**\[DNFSB LETTER HEAD\]**

February 22, 2008

The Honorable J. Clay Sell

Deputy Secretary of Energy

1000 Independence Avenue, SW

Washington, DC 20585- 1000

Dear Mr. Sell:

The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board) recently completed
its review of draft DOE-STD-1189, *Integration of safety into the Design
Process.* This review followed a detailed technical exchange between the
Board's staff and Department of Energy (DOE) personnel tasked with the
standard's development. To a large extent, our respective staffs have
resolved the majority of safety-related concerns. The Board believes
that the draft standard, when properly implemented, will help DOE
effectively design new hazard category 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facilities.
The standard addresses many of the concerns expressed by the Board
during public hearings held to improve the integration of safety early
in the design process for defense nuclear facilities.

The Board points out two remaining issues that require additional
attention from DOE. However, the Board believes that the benefit of
issuing and implementing DOE-STD-1189 expeditiously, outweighs the need
to resolve these issues before the standard's issuance. Any changes to
the standard resulting from the resolution of these issues should be
incorporated in the most efficient manner practicable.

One issue is that the development of DOE-STD-1189 necessitates modifying
other DOE directives to ensure that the system of directives is properly
aligned. For example, Appendix A of DOE-STD-1189 replaces the existing
guidance for determining seismic design criteria and the associated
classification of systems, structures, and components (SSCs) as
safety-class or safety-significant; however there is no provision in
Appendix A to cancel the existing (and at times inconsistent) directives
addressing these topics. The Board believes a concerted effort by DOE is
needed to identify the many directives impacted by DOE-STD-1189 and
revise them in a timely fashion. Otherwise, it is likely that full
implementation of DOE-STD-1189 will be unnecessarily complicated or even
prevented by competing or contradictory directives.

A second issue is that Appendix B, "Chemical Hazard Evaluation," and
Appendix C, "Facility Worker Hazard Evaluation," are advisory, and
individual projects will not be required to implement them. Since these
appendices are used to classify safety-related SSCs, it is unclear to
the Board why these appendices would not be mandatory, particularly
since the approach for protection of the public and collocated and
facility workers is normally based on the severity rather than the type
of hazard, i.e., chemical or radiological. Additionally, the design
criteria derived by applying these appendices do not provide the
requisite system and component reliability, e.g., separation and
redundancy needed for protection of the public. Safety-related systems
must be designed and maintained to higher standards than
non-safety-related systems and these standards must effectively address
the potential of hazards to harm the public, workers, and the
environment. To implement DOE-STD-1189 effectively, DOE should carefully
consider the need to implement Appendices B and C to ensure that the
criteria governing design of safety-related controls are adequate to
protect the public, independent of the hazard type.

Therefore, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. *§* 2286b(d), the Board requests,
within 60 days of receipt of this letter, (1) a report identifying DOE
directives that require revision as a result of DOE-STD-1189 and a
schedule for their revision, and (2) a briefing describing the technical
basis for the safety and design criteria provided in Appendices B and C
of DOE-STD-1189.

Sincerely,

***A. J. Eggenberger***

***Chairman***

c:

Mr. Glenn S. Podonsky

Mr. Mark B. Whitaker, Jr.