+-------+-----------------------------------+----+---------------------+
| >     | > 1450, 5130                      | >  | > October 16, 2001  |
|  File |                                   |  D |                     |
| >     |                                   | at |                     |
| Code: |                                   | e: |                     |
+-------+-----------------------------------+----+---------------------+
| >     | > District Ranger, Fire Staff,    |    |                     |
| Route | > Partnership Council, Files      |    |                     |
| > To: |                                   |    |                     |
+-------+-----------------------------------+----+---------------------+
|       |                                   |    |                     |
+-------+-----------------------------------+----+---------------------+
| > Sub | > M.V.R.D. Fire Staff Comments on |    |                     |
| ject: | > the Thirtymile Fire             |    |                     |
|       | > Investigation Report            |    |                     |
+-------+-----------------------------------+----+---------------------+
|       |                                   |    |                     |
+-------+-----------------------------------+----+---------------------+
| > To: | > Okanogan-Wenatchee N.F.         |    |                     |
|       | > Administrative Officer          |    |                     |
+-------+-----------------------------------+----+---------------------+

The purpose of this memo is to provide feedback on the Thirtymile Fire
Investigation Report. The perspectives contained herein are primarily
from Methow Valley Ranger District, Fire Staff who had direct
involvement in actions taken during the first 24 hours. Our intent is to
be objective, and to provide some clarity to the portions of the report
that were ambiguous or inaccurate. The comments range from substantive
and pertinent to key points in the report, to clerical or typographical
in nature. Toward the end of the memo there are observations and
recommendations from the fire group as a whole that are intended to
provide additional insights. The format is by page, reference and
content as contained in the report.

+--------+-------------+----------------------------------------------+
| Page   | Reference   | Content                                      |
+--------+-------------+----------------------------------------------+
| Title  |             | Winthrop, Washington                         |
| Page   |             |                                              |
+--------+-------------+----------------------------------------------+
| Page 3 | 7           | Schmekel arrived, assessed and requested     |
|        |             | additional support including an IC (he is    |
|        |             | ICT5 qualified, and an ICT4(T)), and an      |
|        |             | investigator. He was communicating with the  |
|        |             | District FDO on fire location, behavior, and |
|        |             | potential.                                   |
+--------+-------------+----------------------------------------------+
| Page 3 | 8           | It was Schmekel not Laughman who             |
|        |             | communicated the assessment.                 |
+--------+-------------+----------------------------------------------+
| Page 6 |             | Forest Management Structure.... Table. The   |
|        |             | District FDO was Jack Ellinger.              |
+--------+-------------+----------------------------------------------+
| Page 8 | Table       | To our knowledge there was no assigned IC    |
|        |             | Trainee. It may be that Kampen operated as   |
| Page   | #9          | an IC Trainee in the mind of some, but he    |
| 31     |             | was not assigned as such, nor was he viewed  |
|        | 5^th^       | that way by the receiving unit.              |
| Page   | bullet      |                                              |
| 34     |             | " " "                                        |
|        | #13, 2^nd^  |                                              |
| Page   | bullet      | " " "                                        |
| 36     |             |                                              |
|        | #3, 1^st^   | " " "                                        |
| Page   | bullet      |                                              |
| 81     |             | " " "                                        |
|        | last        |                                              |
| MER-2  | paragraph   |                                              |
+--------+-------------+----------------------------------------------+
|        |             |                                              |
+--------+-------------+----------------------------------------------+
| Page   | 74          | E-701 and E-704 checked in with Daniels (not |
| 13     |             | Kampen) upon arrival at the origin.          |
|        | #25         |                                              |
| Page   |             | " " "                                        |
| 38     |             |                                              |
+--------+-------------+----------------------------------------------+
| Page   | 75          | E-704 held at the origin and E-701 proceeded |
| 13     |             | up the road, turned around near what would   |
|        |             | be the eventual deployment zone, and headed  |
|        |             | back down the road looking for and working   |
|        |             | spots.                                       |
+--------+-------------+----------------------------------------------+
| Pages  | 83          | After foaming the upper spot, E-701 spoke    |
| 14, 15 |             | with Daniels for a few minutes then headed   |
|        |             | back down the road to look for other spots   |
|        |             | while the crew contained the spot at the     |
|        |             | upper spot location. E-701 disconnected a    |
|        |             | length of hose there, with the intent of     |
|        |             | returning and mopping the spot after the     |
|        |             | crew had it lined.                           |
+--------+-------------+----------------------------------------------+
| Page   | 84          | E-704 didn't call for help. They worked      |
| 15     |             | spots south of E-701. E-704 proceeded north  |
|        |             | in response to an E-701 request for a volume |
|        |             | pump. E-704 drove to E-701 location then     |
|        |             | drove back down road to set up the volume    |
|        |             | pump where the river met the road, and just  |
|        |             | below the point the escape route was         |
|        |             | breached.                                    |
+--------+-------------+----------------------------------------------+
| Page   | Paragraph 3 | E-701 also radioed Daniels to evacuate.      |
| 15     |             | Daniels confirmed.                           |
|        | Paragraph 5 |                                              |
| Exec   |             | " " "                                        |
| Su     |             |                                              |
| mmary, |             |                                              |
| ii     |             |                                              |
+--------+-------------+----------------------------------------------+
| Page   | 2^nd^       | While fire behavior was relatively "benign"  |
| 23     | bullet      | as described on page 7, during the           |
|        |             | mid-morning on 7/10/01, fire behavior was    |
|        |             | not consistently underestimated throughout   |
|        |             | the incident. Schmekel's initial size-up     |
|        |             | (pg.3), fire behavior throughout the night   |
|        |             | at Thirtymile (ref. Pg.24, #17),             |
|        |             | observations from the previous day on        |
|        |             | Libby-South, weather indicators, known       |
|        |             | drought factors throughout the season, and   |
|        |             | observed fire behavior beginning in the      |
|        |             | early afternoon all pointed to potential     |
|        |             | extreme fire behavior. What appears to have  |
|        |             | been misread was the ability to continue a   |
|        |             | holding action into a period when torching,  |
|        |             | running, and spotting exceeded the           |
|        |             | capabilities of assigned resources.          |
+--------+-------------+----------------------------------------------+
| Page   | #7          | Is not consistent with statements about      |
| 23     |             | reading the weather on page 54, paragraph 2. |
|        |             | Based on discussions with Okanogan Dispatch, |
|        |             | we believe the reality of that situation was |
|        |             | that Okanogan Dispatch did read the morning  |
|        |             | weather for the entire north end of the      |
|        |             | Forest, but only read the afternoon weather  |
|        |             | for the Okanogan Valley. The reason they did |
|        |             | not transmit the p.m. weather to the Methow  |
|        |             | Valley side was that by that time the fire   |
|        |             | traffic on the radio was continuous. Fire    |
|        |             | traffic always takes precedence. (Also see   |
|        |             | Recommendation #2.)                          |
+--------+-------------+----------------------------------------------+
| Page   | #18         | It was actually late-morning to early        |
| 24     |             | afternoon (ref. ppg.8-10, 52).               |
+--------+-------------+----------------------------------------------+
| Page   | #40         | E-701 crewmember provided 1^st^ Aid          |
| 33     |             | assistance to one of the civilians.          |
+--------+-------------+----------------------------------------------+
| Page   | #5          | The information was passed on to the         |
| 35     |             | District FDO.                                |
+--------+-------------+----------------------------------------------+
| Page   | #7          | States that Forest FMO requested road        |
| 35     |             | closure, while page 7, paragraph 1           |
|        |             | attributed this to District FMO. District    |
|        |             | FMO is correct.                              |
+--------+-------------+----------------------------------------------+
| Page   | #8 & 10     | There was no doubt in any of the             |
| 35     |             | leadership's mind or actions that we were    |
|        |             | still in IA on the morning of 7/10/01. It    |
|        |             | was still the first operational period,      |
|        |             | containment had not been achieved, and the   |
|        |             | fire had not escaped IA strategies and       |
|        |             | tactics at that point. Page 6, last          |
|        |             | paragraph attributes this knowledge to       |
|        |             | Kampen and Daniels. MER-6, Strategy,         |
|        |             | Tactics, and Transition recognizes we were   |
|        |             | still in IA.                                 |
+--------+-------------+----------------------------------------------+
| Page   | #11         | The WFSA was initiated on the evening of     |
| 35     |             | 7/10/01. It was not done on 7/9/01, nor      |
|        |             | during the morning hours of 7/10/01, because |
|        |             | until the afternoon of 7/10/01 the fire had  |
|        |             | not escaped IA, and IA had not been          |
|        |             | unsuccessful to that point (criteria from    |
|        |             | Wildland and Prescribed Fire Management      |
|        |             | Policy, Implementation Procedures Reference  |
|        |             | Guide,8/98). Statements on page 37, numbers  |
|        |             | 19-22 support the premise that IA had not    |
|        |             | been unsuccessful until 7/10/01 in the p.m., |
|        |             | as well as other locations in the report.    |
+--------+-------------+----------------------------------------------+
| Page   | 1^st^       | There is a clear and consistent process, it  |
| 37     | bullet      | just wasn't clearly understood by some key   |
|        |             | people on 7/10/01.                           |
+--------+-------------+----------------------------------------------+
| Page   | #23         | Was the ATGS relaying a request from the IC, |
| 37     |             | or was he actually making the decision and   |
|        |             | placing the order?                           |
+--------+-------------+----------------------------------------------+
| Page   | #1          | The statement under Standard Order #1 may be |
| 40     |             | true for the afternoon operations. It is not |
|        |             | true for the morning operations.             |
+--------+-------------+----------------------------------------------+
| Page   | Watch Out   | The first two statements under Watch Out     |
| 42     | Situations  | Situation #5 may be true for the afternoon   |
|        |             | operations. They are not true for the        |
|        |             | morning operations.                          |
+--------+-------------+----------------------------------------------+
| Page   |             | Shawn Rambo, crew member on E-701 was        |
| 49     |             | interviewed.                                 |
+--------+-------------+----------------------------------------------+
| Page   | Gary Reed   | Gary Reed was not MVRD FDO. Jack Ellinger    |
| 49     |             | was.                                         |
+--------+-------------+----------------------------------------------+
| Page   | Gary Reed   | Gary Reed and Sally Estes (Dispatcher and    |
| 49     | and Sally   | Dispatch Coordinator, resp.) according to    |
|        | Estes       | our understanding were not interviewed. We   |
|        |             | understand that they provided copies of      |
|        |             | dispatch logs, mobilization guides, and      |
|        |             | other documents, but that no one in Okanogan |
|        |             | dispatch was actually interviewed.           |
+--------+-------------+----------------------------------------------+
| Page   | Appendix:   | Event and Response Actions columns:          |
| 52     | Time Line   | typographical errors, 11:00 p.m. should read |
|        |             | a.m.; same comment further down the page     |
|        |             | under Events column for 1:00 a.m. (should be |
|        |             | p.m.).                                       |
+--------+-------------+----------------------------------------------+
| Page   | #1,         | Some knew, this according to comments by     |
| 79     | G           | Furnish at the employee rollout meeting      |
|        | eographical | (Wenatchee, 9/26/01). The fact that it was a |
|        | Dis         | dead end road is why the escape route        |
|        | orientation | identified in the morning was to the road    |
|        |             | and head south.                              |
+--------+-------------+----------------------------------------------+
| Page   | Medical and | DFMO: The notion that he was unaware of      |
| 80     | Ph          | Schmekel's original assessment and size up   |
|        | ysiological | had nothing to do with his lack of sleep. It |
|        | Factors     | had everything to do with it not having been |
|        |             | communicated to him. It's immaterial either  |
|        |             | way because the DFMO was on site, witnessed  |
|        |             | the fire behavior from the night before,     |
|        |             | worked the operational period the day        |
|        |             | before, saw what fire behavior was then and  |
|        |             | expected similar again this day (7/10/01).   |
|        |             | He provided weather information that         |
|        |             | indicated more of the same. Soderquist       |
|        |             | provided this information during his first   |
|        |             | interview with the investigation team,       |
|        |             | however that among other elements of his     |
|        |             | statements are not acknowledged in the       |
|        |             | report. Daniels, Kampen, Brown, Cannon,      |
|        |             | Thomas, and Soderquist all reviewed,         |
|        |             | reconned, debriefed, transitioned on-site    |
|        |             | together that a.m. and agreed we had to get  |
|        |             | water on it quick before containment (also   |
|        |             | acknowledged earlier in the report, see page |
|        |             | 6, bottom paragraph), and mop-up. That is    |
|        |             | probably 100 plus years of fire experience   |
|        |             | with local knowledge, standing together      |
|        |             | agreeing on strategies, tactics, production, |
|        |             | fire weather and behavior. Plans and         |
|        |             | decisions on that morning were not being     |
|        |             | made by a single intoxicated individual on   |
|        |             | their own.                                   |
|        |             |                                              |
|        |             | It must also be recognized that we were in   |
|        |             | the first operational period. While 2:1 work |
|        |             | to rest ratio is what we strive for, the     |
|        |             | Interagency Incident Business Management     |
|        |             | Handbook (Ch. 12.7-1) recognizes that during |
|        |             | the first operational period exceptions may  |
|        |             | need to be made.                             |
|        |             |                                              |
|        |             | The final sentence on the DFMO indicates     |
|        |             | that he was out of the loop for several key  |
|        |             | hours as events unravel because he was       |
|        |             | ordered to get some rest. This statement     |
|        |             | delivers a rather mixed message. Is the      |
|        |             | point that he should have gone home and      |
|        |             | rested after the first 16 duty hours, and    |
|        |             | recommended that all similarly worked        |
|        |             | assigned resources do the same? This would   |
|        |             | have occurred around 0100 hours on 7/10/01,  |
|        |             | and to achieve 2:1 would have put him and    |
|        |             | other key individuals "out of the loop"      |
|        |             | until 0900 on 7/10/01. This is the period    |
|        |             | that the WFSA for Libby-South was being      |
|        |             | prepared as well as numerous other support   |
|        |             | functions for ongoing operations. Maybe it   |
|        |             | is that he should have stayed up, and        |
|        |             | continued to be available to stay in the     |
|        |             | loop? Was he supposed to get some sleep or   |
|        |             | not? The reality of the matter is that when  |
|        |             | he did head home for some rest, it was after |
|        |             | 1500 hours. And when he was awakened to      |
|        |             | return to duty it was sometime after 1700    |
|        |             | hours. He was never really out of contact,   |
|        |             | as he left instructions for him to be called |
|        |             | in the event in a significant change, and    |
|        |             | this is precisely what happened.             |
+--------+-------------+----------------------------------------------+
| Page   | DFMO Sleep  | It's a little tough to reconcile the numbers |
| 83     | Chart       | in the chart with those listed above it.     |
|        |             | They don't agree. But near as one can        |
|        |             | ascertain, the numbers above have Soderquist |
|        |             | waking up at 0400 hours on Sunday, 7/08/01.  |
|        |             | Why would he do that?! It was his day off.   |
|        |             | He also would have gone to bed earlier than  |
|        |             | 2400 hours on Sunday night, recognizing that |
|        |             | the next day was a work day. On Monday,      |
|        |             | 7/09/01, it shows him having slept from      |
|        |             | 0430-0500 hours. That actually occurred on   |
|        |             | 7/10/01.                                     |
|        |             |                                              |
|        |             | These transcriptions are significant,        |
|        |             | because the chart has the DFMO in a          |
|        |             | diminished cognitive state throughout        |
|        |             | Monday, 7/09/10, apparently because of the   |
|        |             | erroneous data used for Sunday. Monday in    |
|        |             | fact, should have the DFMO in as high a      |
|        |             | state of cognitive effectiveness as a person |
|        |             | who has had a full night sleep can be. The   |
|        |             | trend after that should be downward, but     |
|        |             | should be higher than indicated in the       |
|        |             | chart. It appears as though someone set out  |
|        |             | to prove a point.                            |
+--------+-------------+----------------------------------------------+
| Page   | Map 3       | Map numbers don't show all listed numbers.   |
| 94     |             |                                              |
+--------+-------------+----------------------------------------------+
| Page   | NWR #6      | Daniels was assigned as Crew Boss, a         |
| 96     | Qua         | position for which he is well qualified. He  |
|        | lifications | is, in addition, qualified at the Division   |
|        |             | Supervisor and ICT3 levels.                  |
+--------+-------------+----------------------------------------------+
| Page   |             | Methow Valley District Personnel             |
| 97     |             | Qualifications. Schmekel is a qualified ICT5 |
|        |             | and is a trainee ICT4. His job on initial    |
|        |             | dispatch was to respond, size up, assess,    |
|        |             | request appropriate resources, and           |
|        |             | communicate with the District FDO.           |
+--------+-------------+----------------------------------------------+
| MER-2  | 5^th^       | It's a euphemism to write that '...the water |
|        | paragraph   | handling system was ineffective...", the     |
|        |             | plan was sound for the morning hours, and    |
|        |             | the equipment was operational.               |
+--------+-------------+----------------------------------------------+
| MER-3  | 2^nd^       | E-701 & 704 did check in with the IC.        |
|        | paragraph   |                                              |
+--------+-------------+----------------------------------------------+
| MER-6  | Fatigue     | Work to rest cycles were not disregarded. It |
|        |             | is true that 2:1 guidelines were not adhered |
|        | Strategy... | to for everyone, but as stated in previous   |
|        |             | comments, the Thirtymile Incident was in its |
|        |             | first operational period. Standard practices |
|        |             | acknowledge that 2:1 shall be followed       |
|        |             | beyond the first operational period.         |
|        |             |                                              |
|        |             | To clarify, it should be noted that the      |
|        |             | suppression strategy for the a.m. was not    |
|        |             | appropriate for the p.m. The morning         |
|        |             | strategy did consider the noted parameters.  |
|        |             |                                              |
|        |             | The report has a tendency to run the morning |
|        |             | and afternoon operations together when       |
|        |             | talking about LCES, strategies, tactics, and |
|        |             | adherence to the 10 and 18. There should be  |
|        |             | a clear distinction in thinking and writing  |
|        |             | that is separated by the period of           |
|        |             | disengagement from the east side of the      |
|        |             | Chewuch River.                               |
+--------+-------------+----------------------------------------------+
| MER-7  | Failure in  | The report classifies this as still being in |
|        | Road        | Initial Attack. The entrapment of the        |
|        | Closure...  | civilians occurred during the afternoon      |
|        |             | hours, and would more accurately be          |
|        |             | considered as extended attack. It should     |
|        |             | also be noted that while the barricade was   |
|        |             | not in place to block their ingress, or      |
|        |             | alert them to the hazard, the road was run   |
|        |             | to the end, and their presence was not       |
|        |             | determined. They apparently were off road    |
|        |             | and hidden on one of the numerous "rabbit    |
|        |             | trails" that take off the main road to the   |
|        |             | Thirtymile Campground and trail head.        |
+--------+-------------+----------------------------------------------+
| MER-9  | Org         | If leadership on the incident was unclear,   |
|        | anizational | it would be more accurate to portray that    |
|        | Re          | from the perspective of whomever was         |
|        | lationships | unclear. As far as Forest and District       |
|        |             | management were concerned, there was no      |
|        |             | doubt as to who was in charge throughout IA  |
|        |             | and the associated transitions. While it is  |
|        |             | generally recognized that the transition     |
|        |             | period is one in which safety and adherence  |
|        |             | to standards are violated, it appears as     |
|        |             | though the most grave oversights and         |
|        |             | consequences occurred during a period when   |
|        |             | there was no transition in incident          |
|        |             | leadership.                                  |
+--------+-------------+----------------------------------------------+
| MER-13 | Endangered  | What is clear is that we need to communicate |
|        | Species     | the existing relationship between ESA and    |
|        | Act...      | fire suppression as practiced on this unit.  |
+--------+-------------+----------------------------------------------+

Additional comments, questions, and observations:

1\. The format, style, and content of this report is substantially
different from the South Canyon reports. It focuses on a number of
factors that weren't addressed in prior reports. The useage of the terms
management and leadership is variable and promotes ambiguity. It is
often vague as to whether the report is referring to people on site, on
the incident, or back at forest/district headquarters. The style varies
from that of a technical report, to that of a more creative work. Is
that because of different physical, site, human, or political factors?
Various sections being authored by an array of people?

2\. Recommend that dispatch always check with field IC's when weather is
being read to confirm that it's been received. This is done sometimes.

3\. The report acknowledges that the Libby-South Fire was a high
priority, and that it played a major role in allocating resources. It
also needs to be said that the attention between the fires for
resources, support, and the response times by dispatch and district
personnel was affected in all facets of fire management.

4\. In addition to the previous requests for interview transcripts
(Soderquist for the OSHA interview, and Laughman and Schmekel for all
interviews) we would like transcripts for all interviews sent to the
respective interviewees. In other words, each person who was interviewed
should receive a copy of all interviews in which they participated. This
should occur poste haste in view of recent decisions to provide all
interviews to Congress, the families, and the media.

In summary, we feel the report addressed all key features of the
Thirtymile Incident that led to the catastrophic events of July 10,
2001. We also recognize that we must learn from the findings of the
report and management recommendations. Four unique and dearly loved
people who were members of the firefighting community perished in the
performance of duty. Many of us who were involved will eternally replay
the events of the day, the accounts of what happened, and attempt to
find our own answers for the tragedy. No one willingly or knowingly
acted negligently. To think otherwise, would be a mistake. It is
difficult to provide feedback to the report without feeling defensive.
As indicated in the opening remarks, our intent has been and will
continue to be, to remain objective yet sensitive to the perspectives of
others who had direct involvement in the incident. This includes the
investigation team who had the challenge of assembling a report that
considered many, and we're sure varied points of view of the same
events. Our hope is that our comments will facilitate understanding, and
as stated in the Prologue of the report, hope that a tragedy of this
nature never happens again. This has been a sobering experience for all
of us on the Methow. That includes a large network that runs through the
community, our families, and well beyond. None of us will be the same as
before. That's good and not so good. All of us hope our review comments
support the goal of making future actions safer.

Pete Soderquist

District Fire Management Officer

Methow Valley Ranger District