**Commentary on Hodgson's Target Article in JCS.**

Hodgson aims to present a scientifically and philosophically respectable
defense of the claim "that free will exists and is inconsistent with
determinism." His argument depends upon an important claim made and
defended in Hodgson (2002). That claim is that nature has two different
kinds of processes: quantitative processes and qualitative processes.
Quantitative processes are based on *mathematical descriptions*, and can
be general. They can be deterministic and/or random, but can merely
*constrain*: they may leave certain options open. Qualitative processes
occur only under special conditions, and allow agents/subjects to grasp
or feel whole gestalts, and make judgments that are influenced by these
feelings. These judgments can influence *selections* that can choose
between options left open by the quantitative process.

In the target article Hodgson elaborates upon his earlier argument by
stating and defending nine propositions. The linchpin is Proposition 5,
which asserts that "the subject makes an effective non-random selection
between the available alternatives, based on these non-conclusive
reasons, albeit not determined by rules or laws of nature."

Hodgson's arguments supporting Proposition 5 are, as he himself admits,
"difficult." For example, he gives an argument based on evolution to
support his contention that there is in the selection process an element
"that is not accounted for by strict rules of any kind." He says "If
choices were in fact determined by algorithms, such as
evolution-selected computation-like procedures, which *as algorithms*
need no help from conscious judgment, and could indeed be hindered by
conscious interference, there could be no plausible explanation of why
evolution selected in favor of brains that, at considerable expense in
terms of complexity and energy-use, support conscious processes."
However, this argument does not justify, or even support, the conclusion
that the selection processes cannot be "accounted for by strict rules of
any kind." What it is difficult to understand is how such a selection
process could produce pertinent determinate actions or beliefs without
any rules. On the other hand, this argument certainly does buttress the
idea that the selection process needs to give real causal efficacy to
our thoughts, ideas, and feelings *themselves*, in order for these
*qualitative* feature of reality to have a non-redundant functional role
in the unfolding of the world, and hence a reason to exist and to
evolve.

Hodgson's thesis is incompatible with the truth of classical physics, in
which all physical activity is fixed deterministically from initial
conditions. Thus Hodgson appeals to quantum mechanics (QM). However, he
creates unnecessary difficulties by asserting both that that the
selection process is "inconsistent with determinism" and is "nonrandom,"
and that "according to QM, any determinism is mere randomness." This
combination of claims means that he must reject not only classical
physics but QM as well. However, the main problem with the idea of free
will since the time of Isaac Newton has been its incompatibility with
basic physical theory. Proposing a solution that conflicts with basic
physical theory is *not* the scientifically respectable thing to do.
However, there is no need to reject QM. Rather, the principles of QM
provide a solid scientific foundation for the existence of Hodgson's two
processes, provided the condition that the qualitative process not be
governed by rules of any kind is rescinded.

Orthodox QM has *three* processes: the locally deterministic
Schroedinger equation, the random "choice on the part of nature," and
the process called Process **1** by von Neumann. This process **1** is
absolutely essential, and it involves an element of "choice." It
constitutes the major departure of QM from classical mechanics, *because
it brings actions selected and performed by human agents directly into
the fundamental structure of the theory.* The causal roots of these
choices are not specified by the theory. Nor are there any statistical
constraints on these choices. They are, explicitly, "Free Choices," not
in the strong sense that the theory dogmatically asserts that they have
no causal roots at all, but in the weak sense that contemporary orthodox
QM treats them as *free parameters.* This official silence of
contemporary QM on the causal roots of Process **1**, coupled with the
fact that *in practice* the causal roots of each Process **1** selection
involve a conscious decision by a conscious agent, makes the
identification of Hodgson's qualitative process with von Neumann's
Process **1** a plausible possibility.

Orthodox Copenhagen QM is formulated in a realistic and practical way.
It is structured around the activities of human agents, who are
considered able to freely elect to probe a system of interest in any one
of many possible ways. Bohr emphasized the freedom of the experimenters
in passages such as:

\"The freedom of experimentation, presupposed in classical physics, is
of course retained and corresponds to the free choice of experimental
arrangement for which the mathematical structure of the quantum
mechanical formalism offers the appropriate latitude.\" (Bohr, 1958: 73)

The fact that the causal roots of these "free choices" *are not
specified by contemporary QM* stems from the fact that in the original
Copenhagen formulation of quantum theory the human experimenter is
considered to stand outside the system to which the quantum laws are
applied. Those quantum laws are the only precise laws of nature
recognized by that theory. Thus, according to the Copenhagen philosophy,
*there are no presently known laws that govern the choices* made by the
agent about how he or she will act upon the quantum system that he or
she is probing.

The introduction of choices made by participating agents directly into
the basic structure of the theory constitutes a profound change in the
principles of physics. It is greatly celebrated and much discussed, and
is epitomized in Niels Bohr's dictum that " in the great drama of
existence we ourselves are both actors and spectators." (Bohr, 1963: 15
& 1958: 81) The emphasis here is on "actors": in classical physics the
human agents were treated essentially as spectators. But orthodox
Copenhagen QM is formulated only within the context of agents acting on
systems and observing what happens. The choices made by the agents as to
how they will act play an essential role in the extraction from the
theory of predictions pertaining to the outcomes of observations, *and
these "free choices" can strongly influence the course of physical
events in the observed system.*

These "free choices" are normally experienced as being determined by a
thought or idea, such as a desire to test some theory, or to determine
some parameter. There is no rational reason, at this point, and no basis
in contemporary physics, to doubt the very strong intuition that our
thoughts, ideas, and feelings are part of the motive forces behind these
"free choices."

The second part of the tripartite quantum process is "causal." It is
specified by the Schroedinger equation of motion, and is locally and
globally deterministic. Von Neumann calls this causal component Process
**2**.

The third process in contemporary QM is ruled by "chance". Dirac called
this process a "choice on the part of nature." It picks out, in way
governed only by a statistical rule, a definite outcome of the probing
action selected by Process **1.**

In orthodox Copenhagen QM the agent is taken to include not only his own
physical body and stream of conscious experiences, but also his
measuring devices. His actions and resulting observations -- as
represented within his stream of consciousness -- are described in a
language that allows him to communicate to colleagues what he has done
and what he has learned.

The agent acts intentionally upon the system being probed in order to
elicit an experiential feedback that can be recognized. The agent's
choice of action specifies a reduction of the state of the system being
examined into two subsystems, one corresponding to the occurrence of the
recognizable positive feedback, the other corresponding to the
non-occurrence of that response. This theoretical structure allows the
actions and feedbacks, described in terms of experiences residing in the
stream of consciousness of the agent, to become correlated to physically
described properties of the system being examined. That connection is
the basis of science.

This Copenhagen formulation is pragmatically useful. But it is not
suitable for analyzing the connection between the experiences of an
agent and his physical brain. That is because the brain and body of the
agent are, in the Copenhagen scheme, not parts of the physically
described system. However, John von Neumann (1932/1955) formulated QM in
a way that allows (the quantum counterparts of) all of the particles in
the universe to be included in the physically described part of the
theory, with only the streams of consciousness of agents being described
in terms of the way we experience objects, intentions, and feelings.

In this von Neumann form of QM the brain of the agent becomes the system
being examined by the experientially described agent. But the theory is
still pragmatic in the sense that no commitment need be made about the
ontological character of either the physically described system or the
stream of consciousness. The physically described system is treated as
an objectively existing system, even though it effectively represents
knowledge, information, and tendencies for experiential mind-brain
events to occur. Each event in a stream of consciousness is an
experiential event that occurs in conjunction with a physical event in
the brain of the experiencing agent. Whether this puts consciousness
inside the brain of the agent (identity theory) or outside it (duality)
need not be specified: science can proceed without an ontological
commitment on this issue.

The original Copenhagen formulation considered science to be a human
endeavor, and it accorded human beings a special place. Von Neumann's
theory includes the Copenhagen theory within it, in the sense that von
Neumann showed that *in the special cases where the Copenhagen
human-based rules* *apply* the von Neumann formulation gives, for all
practical purposes, the same predictions as the Copenhagen rules.
However, the von Neumann form can, in principle, be applied also to
cases where the agents are non-human. This allows one to begin to
develop a theory of the evolution of consciousness. However, that
entails developing a better understanding than we now possess about the
special conditions under which Process **1** events occur. A first step
in this development is to address these points by elaborating upon von
Neumann's theory already for the case of human observers by breaking the
silence of the theory on the causal roots of the Process **1** free
choices. This can be done by introducing hypotheses, or new postulates,
that equate von Neumann's Process **1** to Hodgson's qualitative
process.

For persons accustomed to thinking of physics, and the laws of nature,
in *classical* terms the idea of introducing fundamental dynamical rules
based on experiential qualities may seem far fetched. If, following
Isaac Newton, one considers the world to be made of "solid, massy, hard,
impenetrable, movable particles" (Newton, 1721) that move in accordance
with immutable deterministic laws that fix the entire course of history
from initial conditions, then the idea that experiential qualities enter
in a non-redundant and non-eliminable way into the flow of physical
events may seem to be irrational wishful thinking. But quantum phenomena
show the concepts of classical physics to be inconsistent with the
observed behavior of the world. Copenhagen QM replaced that classical
materialist conception of the physical world by an essentially
"idea-like" structure. The physical state represented "our knowledge,"
rather than a material structure. Von Neumann's generalization of the
Copenhagen version of QM features a physical world that, although
treated as objectively existing, retains the features that had led Bohr,
Heisenberg, & company to claim that the quantum state represented an
idea-like reality rather that a material one. In view of this un-sought
entry of idea-like qualities into the basic structure of the theory it
is no longer irrational to suppose that idea-like qualities may play an
basic role in the dynamics, particularly in connection with the
essential Process **1** whose causal roots are not specified by the
theory, but which *seems* to be influenced by our thoughts and feelings.

In von Neumann QM the state of the universe specifies propensities
(probabilities) for events to occur. Each such event has a quantitative
and a qualitative side. It is represented by a mind-brain event that, on
the physical side, actualizes, as a unified whole, a spatially extended
complex informational structure instantiated in the brain of the agent,
and, on the experiential side, is a conscious experience that grasps as
a gestalt a characteristic *quality* of that informational structure.
Since these qualitative parts of reality enter into the events that tie
our minds to our brains, it is not unreasonable to suppose that the
qualitative elements enter also into the Process **1** that instigates
these mind-brain events?

Of course, a priori reasonableness is not enough in science: a
scientific theory must deliver some goods. Some consequences in
psychology and neuroscience of pursuing this line are described in Stapp
(2001, 2003), and are, in my judgment, encouraging.

Hodgson's final aim is to provide a scientifically respectable and
rational theory of personal responsibility. It might be argued that
making Process 1 deterministic undermines the concept of personal
responsibility. Indeed, Hodgson's insistence that the qualitative
process be both non-deterministic and non-random was meant to rescue the
concept of personal responsibility from the argument that a person
cannot be held responsible for any action that was already
pre-determined before he or she was born, or was determined by random
choices beyond his or her control. However, personal responsibility is
rooted not in the *ultimate* causes of an agent's actions but in the
*immediate* causes of those actions. It is rooted in the nature of the
agent that selects and performs that action. It stems from the capacity
of the agent to grasp and understand the consequences of its actions,
and from its physical capacity to act in accordance with the freedom
accorded to it by its inner nature, and in particular by the
*qualitative process* that allows its action's to be controlled by
sufficient willful effort (Stapp 2001, 2003). The personal
responsibility of a human being arises from his or her nature as a human
being: as an agent that is able to grasp and be moved by the meaning of
the complex informational structures that have been instantiated in his
or her brain by the sequence of mind-brain events whose mental sides
constitute his or her stream of consciousness. It arises from his or her
character as the thinking, reflecting, selecting and physically
efficacious agent that deep intuition proclaims him or her to be, as
contrasted to the essentially mindless automaton ruled by local
mechanical process that nineteenth century philosophers, and even some
twentieth century philosophers, mistakenly claimed him or her to be.

In view of these considerations I believe that Hodgson's arguments can
be strengthened at a critical point by accepting quantum mechanics
fully, and expanding it, and weakening the unnecessarily strong
condition that the selection process cannot be "accounted for by strict
rules of any kind."

*Acknowledgements.*

This article has benefited from comments on earlier drafts by David
Hodgson, Aaron Sloman, Kathryn Laskey, Stan Klein, and Ken Augustyn.

*References.*

Bohr, N. (1958). *Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge.* New York: Wiley.

Bohr, N. (1963). Essays 1958/1962 on *Atomic Physics and Human
Knowledge.* New York: Wiley.

Newton, I. (1721). *Opticks*. 3^rd^ ed. London: Printed for William and
John Innys. p. 375/6.

Stapp, H (2001). "Quantum theory and the role of mind in nature."

*Found. of Phys*. 11 1465-1499.

Stapp, H. (2003). "Neuroscience, atomic physics, and the human person"
in *Mind, Matter, and Quantum Mechanics*, 2^nd^ Ed. Berlin & New York:
Springer. Ch 12.

Von Neumann, J. (1955/1932). *Mathematical Foundations of Quantum
Mechanics.* Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Translated by Robert
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