**HIGHEST SCORING RFI RESPONSES**

WITH MAJORITY REVIEWER SCORES OF 4 OR 5

(Note, in some instances the majority gave high marks but there were
still individual low scores)

**CATEGORY RFI RESPONDANT RFI RESPONSE \#**

**Effectiveness Spin-In** Holland and Davis LLC 23433

Holland and Davis LLC 23434

NTTC 23568

Fuentek LLC 23453

RTI International 23489

TechLink 23553

University of Florida 23275

University of Southern California 23324

University of Southern Mississippi 23638

Center for Comm. Of Advanced Tech 23495

Consultant/SSC Tech Consultant 23635 (1 reviewer only)

Virginia Center for Innovative Tech 160

Ohio Aerospace Institute 23595

Enterprise Network Silicon Valley 23540

Space Alliance Tech Outreach Prog. 23597 (1 reviewer only)

Ohio Aerospace Institute 23593

Bay Area Economics 23567

Futuraspace LLC 23586

NASA/JSC 23803

**Effectiveness Spin-Out** Fuentek LLC 23452

Holland and Davis LLC 23433

Holland and Davis LLC 23434

Holland and Davis LLC 23435

NTTC 23568

RTI International 23561

Fuentek LLC 23453

TechLink 23553

University of Florida 23275

Center for Comm. Of Adv. Tech 23495

Consultant/SSC Tech Consultant 23635 (1 reviewer only)

RTI International 23566

Virginia Center for Innovative Tech 160

Ohio Aerospace Institute 23595

Enterprise Network of Silicon Valley 23540

Florida Institute of Technology 23556

Fuentek LLC 23454

Space Alliance Tech Outreach Prog 23597 (1 reviewer only)

U.S. Chamber of Commerce Space Ent. 23487

NASA Langley Research Center 23580

NASA Ames Research Center 23569

Battelle 23563

Futuraspace LLC 23586

Holland and Davis LLC 23436

**CATEGORY RFI RESPONDANT RFI RESPONSE \#**

**Potential Improvements**

**Cost and/or Timeliness** Holland and Davis, LLC 23433

NTTC 23568

RTI International 23561

RTI International 23489

TechLink 23553

University of Florida 23275

Consultant, SSC Tech Consultant 23635 (1 reviewer only)

NASA Langley Research Center 23589

Ohio Aerospace Institute 23595

Enterprise Network of Silicon Valley 23540

Space Alliance Tech Outreach Prog. 23597 (1 reviewer only)

NASA Ames Research Center 23569

Ohio Aerospace Institute 23593

Futuraspace LLC 23586

Manyworlds 23418

NASA/JSC 23803

**Demonstrated Performance** Holland and Davis LLC 23433

Holland and Davis LLC 23434

Holland and Davis LLC 23435

NTTC 23568

RTI International 23489

TechLink 23553

University of Florida 23275

University of Southern Mississippi 23638

Consultant, SSC Tech Consultant 23635 (1 reviewer only)

Fuentek LLC 23451

Virginia Center for Innovative Tech 160

Ohio Aerospace Institute 23595

Enterprise Network of Silicon Valley 23540

Space Alliance Tech Outreach Prog. 23597 (1 reviewer only)

U.S. Chamber of Commerce 23487

NASA Langley Research Center 23580

Ohio Aerospace Institute 23593

**Leveraging of Resources** Fuentek LLC 23452

Holland and Davis LLC 23434

Fuentek LLC 23453

University of Southern Mississippi 23638

Virginia Center for Innovative Tech 160

Ohio Aerospace Institute 23595

Girvan Institute of Technology 23602

Space Alliance Tech Outreach Prog. 23597 (1 reviewer only)

NTTC 23577

Futuraspace LLC 23586

**CATEGORY RFI RESPONDANT RFI RESPONSE \#**

**Ease of Implementation** Holland and Davis LLC 23433

Holland and Davis LLC 23434

Holland and Davis LLC 23435

Holland and Davis LLC 23848

NTTC 23572

RTI International 23489

University of Southern Mississippi 23638

SSC Consultant 23635 (1 reviewer only)

RTI International 23566

Ohio Aerospace Institute 23595

Space Alliance Tech Outreach 23597 (1 reviewer only)

NASA Langley Research Center 23580

**Robustness/Longevity** Holland and Davis LLC 23433

Holland and Davis LLC 23434

Holland and Davis LLC 23435

Holland and Davis LLC 23848

NTTC 23568

RTI International 23561

Delotte Consulting LLP 23559

Fuentek LLC 23453

ManyWorlds 23415

RTI International 23489

TechLink 23553

University of Florida 23275

University of Southern Mississippi 23638

SSC Consultant 23635 (1 reviewer only)

Virginia Center for Innovative Tech 160

Ohio Aerospace Institute 23595

Florida Tech R&D Authority 23522

Enterprise Network Silicon Valley 23540

Florida Institute of Technology 23556

Space Alliance Tech Outreach 23597 (1 reviewer only)

U.S. Chamber of Commerce 23487

NASA Langley Research Center 23580

Bay Area Economics 23567

NTTC 23577

Futron Corp 23295

Futuraspace LLC 23586

**OBSERVATIONS ON RFI RESPONSES**

One question I would like to pose....in terms of strategic planning for
technology transfer out/spin in, will this contractor be seen to focus
on implementation efforts only, or will it be expected to provide
analysis that will play a direct role in strategic development of
technology transfer goals and objectives?

I have highlighted from the RFI's response comments and observations
that I thought would be useful to consider in developing the RFP. Rather
than select a specific RFI response per se, particularly since some
responses were scored high in some categories, low in others, it would
be more useful to identify points made by different respondents that
would lead to a comprehensive, quality RFP. Even the RFI responses
scored low in the overall evaluation matrix have useful comments that
should be taken into consideration in the development of the RFP.

1.  Technology-based network rather than regional tech transfer centers
    may be more adaptive and effective **(Fuentek LLC, RFI response
    #23452)**

    -   Good observation, for two reasons:

        -   With the communication advances, geographic location takes
            on less importance than physical proximity, and NASA field
            centers are also encouraged under "one NASA" to foster links
            to other centers and organizations apart from their
            immediate location.

        -   Given emerging and changing technical direction of the
            agency, it may be more useful to focus on the research and
            technology development rather than aligning the tech
            transfer support role along geographic lines that have no
            direct linkage to technology and research. At the same time,
            great care must be taken to ensure that NASA has a presence
            in all parts of the country to make sure no part of the
            country is under-represented.

2.  Recognition that a stronger Headquarters role is needed, in part due
    to the shift back to HQ of mission directorate leadership **(LaRC
    IPP, RFI response #23583)**

> At the same time, caution must be exercised when one considers the
> comment, and the source:

-   "Contractor support is actually not required and indeed, most
    centers have civil servants available..."

    -   In this instance a NASA center indicates a contractor is not
        needed, which sounds a bit self-serving in favor of government
        civil servants instead of out-sourcing a particular effort. In
        other instances a company indicates what it has to offer rather
        than keying in on what NASA needs.

3.  A cautionary note was raised that the RFI responses might not
    represent the "best approaches" as companies may not want to divulge
    their most innovative ideas, saving them for the RFP itself.
    Therefore, the RFI feedback may be useful in helping to shape the
    RFP, but should not be construed as being all-inclusive and the RFP
    should not be tightly structured around the input received to date
    via the RFI. **(RFI response \# 23488 no name given).**

4.  Some fundamental questions should be generated as part of NASA's
    development of what it needs in a prime contractor **(RFI response
    23430):**

    -   Does the contractor have a national presence with capable
        infrastructure?

    -   Track record of operating a credible tech transfer program?

    -   Industry and university networking already in place?

    -   Sufficient technical background in NASA research and technology
        development?

    -   Contractor's own strategic development plan?

5.  Clarify and communicate the technology transfer out/spin in mission
    statement and its linkage to NASA's exploration objective.
    Development of the mission statement in itself is not sufficient;
    clear communication is also needed. The communication messages need
    to be reinforced to ensure they are not viewed as "transient and
    ignorable". **(Holland and Davis, RFI response #23433)**

6.  Enhance staffing capabilities through rotational assignments from
    other agencies, such as Commerce or USDA, perhaps as part of an
    exchange program with NASA individuals gaining greater exposure to
    other agencies though a cooperative exchange.

> Assess ways of centralizing activities to avoid duplication and
> "customer overlap" where companies or other targets are contacted by
> more than one RTTC, national marketing initiatives are duplicated,
> etc. (I would not go as far as the white paper recommends in removing
> the RTTC role, but agree that there should be analysis to determine
> ways to optimize and maximize efforts, and eliminate redundancy).
> **(Holland and Davis response #23434).**

7.  Strengthen the core processes

    -   Each field center presently has its own set of individualized
        processes for supporting licensing and partnering endeavors.
        Recommendation is to create a core set of processes at the HQ
        level based on best practices identified at the sites. Core
        practices then would be disseminated to the field centers with
        recognition of the need for localized flexibility.

> **(Holland and Davis, RFI response #23435)**

8.  Develop metrics that can be verified, using such indicators as
    "licensing value index" developed for use at JSC which includes
    reimbursable partnerships for licensed NASA technology, commitment
    of resources of the licensee, breadth of likely market impact, etc..
    Whether this approach or others are used, there needs to be a
    consistent set of quantifiable metrics that reflect technology
    transfer spin-out, spin-in achievements and progress against goals
    across the agency. This will also aid in developing summary analyses
    of tech transfer efforts across NASA. **(Holland & Davis, RFI
    response \# 23507)**

9.  Thought should be given to the matrix of duties and positions
    required for an effective technology transfer program, including:

    -   Technical background to interact with technical community

    -   Ability to participate in market analyses for new innovations
        and partnership opportunities

    -   Knowledge of cooperative agreement negotiation and
        implementation

    -   Knowledge of patent and licensing processes

    -   Interpersonal/team skills

> **(Holland and Davis RFI response #23508)**

10. The tech transfer office can take a more proactive role in working
    with licensees to optimize the prospects for a successful license of
    NASA technology, including the offer of technical assistance for a
    specific period of time, perhaps the first few weeks after a license
    is negotiated, to give the licensee useful insight into use of the
    technology. **(Holland and Davis, RFI response #23509)**

11. Proactive use of screening in order to focus on the most promising
    technologies that are not already supported in the marketplace:

    -   **Initial Commercialization Evaluation**, performed immediately
        after a new innovation or partnership opportunity identified, to
        help in screening process.

    -   **Commercialization Strategy Recommendations** analysis
        performed only on those innovations or partnerships that are
        continued beyond the screening process.

    -   **Marketing Strategy and Sales Plan** performed last for the
        most promising and including what is presently in the
        marketplace with alternative solutions.

> Such research is often out-sourced, which makes it important to have
> clear, consistent expectations such as viable/workable technology,
> significant market potential, what is the best way to implement:
> license, partnership arrangement, etc., and what market sectors are
> likely to contain a pool of potential licensees for this technology.
>
> The analysis should contain benefits to NASA including the use of
> under-utilized NASA facilities or staff expertise through partnership
> arrangements. **(Holland and Davis, RFI response \# 23848)**

12. The use of "standard business practices" to foster consistency among
    the NASA field centers and NASA HQ's guidance to the centers, which
    will also aid the external community to better understand NASA's
    direction, policies, etc. **(NTTC RFI response \# 23568)**

13. Marketing analysis is critical to ensure that there is a stated need
    for a new or improved product or service rather than an assumption,
    and that the price for the new or improved product or service is
    within the acceptable range of the target market. **(Polaris Systems
    response to RFI 23506)**

14. NASA HQ management plays a key role in setting the tone and
    visibility of the technology transfer program. If NASA HQ does not
    reinforce the importance of tech transfer, the field centers will
    likewise place the tech transfer function in a minor role, perhaps
    fragmented (with different centers each interpreting the degree of
    importance tech transfer should play and amount of resources
    warranted), and "buried" in a larger functional area where it may be
    substantially overlooked. **(RFI response \# 235651)**

15. Recognizing that it is often impossible to predict breakthroughs
    from a specific license, NASA is encouraged to support a wide degree
    of efforts to "spread the seed" and optimize the prospects for
    research and technology development success. Clearly, this approach
    must be done with resource constraints in mind, and the respondent
    also noted that marginal technologies that are continued over time
    despite evidence of limited benefit should not be continued. This
    RFI response also supported centralizing the process to establish
    clear standards, streamline the process and accelerate the pace of
    licensing, and eliminate duplication. **(RFI response \# 23562)**

16. Alternative approach offered: use technology transfer as a business
    model including determining the size of a given office by the amount
    of revenue generated, relying on field centers to set the target
    revenue threshold. Decisions on patenting, strategic partnering,
    equity investments, etc. are driven by contribution to the revenue
    target. Patent activity is focused on technologies with significant
    return on investment; other technologies are released to the public.
    This approach emphasizes the role of centers given proximity to the
    inventions and research. This approach also suggested administrative
    functions to be housed in the NASA Shared Services Center rather
    than at HQ. **(RFI response #23558, no name given)**

    -   Though I do not agree with all of the comments made in this
        particular response, as the government is not strictly driven by
        a dollar value in its program activity, there were still a
        number of useful observations that bear consideration, such as
        gauging the size of a tech transfer office by the revenues
        generated in its activities, as an incentive. The flip side of
        this is to work with centers that are under-performing to avoid
        a spiral downward, where lackluster performance at a center
        results in budget cuts, which further undermines efforts leading
        to yet more cuts, etc.

17. Good observations made regarding the importance of various factors
    in technology transfer success and what can hinder success:

> **Transfer/Spin-Out Issues:**

-   **Government lab commitment**. Without strong management support,
    the tech transfer function at the lab level is seen as
    insignificant.

-   **Scientist participation**: The lab scientist or engineer may be
    reluctant to part with the technology to an outside entity as
    something that is "not my responsibility", or even a stronger sense
    that the mission is to solve a government problem, not produce or
    sustain a business.

-   **Government bias in selecting or prioritizing tech transfer
    projects**. Use of impartial experts who know the market, have the
    business expertise, can determine product maturity level can give
    important feedback on the value of a given tech transfer effort.

-   **Timeline to identify a company and negotiate an agreement**. The
    process can drag on and become a dis-incentive for the company
    participant.

-   **No follow-through**. Many offices consider their work accomplished
    with the license negotiated and signed, without offering
    follow-through that may add to the likelihood of a tech transfer
    effort becoming a success by products/services actually entering the
    marketplace. In short, the signed license is a tool and a step in
    the process, not the goal in itself.

> **Infusion/Spin-In issues:**

-   Not having clear communication on what government labs need from the
    private sector for successful infusion of research and technology

-   Insufficient awareness on the part of government program managers as
    to what research and technology is out there.

-   Burdensome licensing processes that are a dis-incentive to the
    government users, just as they are for the private sector
    participants.

> Among other things, the respondent underscored the need for early
> determination of which technologies to continue to pursue and which to
> terminate when it becomes clear a market niche will not be found or
> developed.
>
> **(Center for Commercialization of Advanced Technology response to
> RFI, \# 23587)**

18. Respondent recommends "out-sourcing" the tech transfer function
    including marketing analysis, data management, invention assessment,
    joint venture creation, IP assessment and protection, etc.

> This respondent is another example of supporting a centralized role in
> the management of the technology transfer program, to standardize
> policies and programs, achieve economies of scale, improved
> efficiencies, etc.
>
> Admittedly this firm, Deloitte Consulting, seems to be setting the
> stage for their firm to be the "outsource". **(RFI response \#
> 23559).**

19. Clear documentation of NASA's needs and technical capabilities is
    required for effective spin-in (infusion) and spin-out (technology
    transfer). The identification mechanism should be easy to use,
    useful in not being either incomplete on detail or burdensome with
    too much detail, fast/timely, accessible yet protective of security,
    and electronic-based.

> Clear demonstration of support for infusion and tech transfer by HQ
> and center management, and ensuring that tech transfer efforts are a
> recognized part of employee performance, including incentives and
> rewards for tech transfer and tech infusion efforts.
>
> Efforts must be prioritized based on which opportunities offer the
> greatest potential for success. Evaluation must be centralized rather
> than distributed so that cross-center needs can be addressed and to
> ensure a consistent evaluation/prioritization, while recognizing that
> there is no uniform set of high priority needs/technologies from each
> center. Documentation of expected outcome is also needed.
>
> Intellectual property filing/protection is one area that needs to be
> done by civil servants, given potential conflict of interest and
> understandable concerns raised if performed by another contractor.

-   I don't fully agree here. The Research Partnership Centers are not
    "civil servants" but have addressed private sector partner
    intellectual property issues for a number of years. The sensitivity
    of intellectual property does remain a legitimate issue, though.

> An outreach plan should be developed for each spin-in and spin-out
> opportunity and should link to a web portal. Outreach should be
> comprehensive, appropriate, accurate, useful, timely, and consistent
> in the message(s) conveyed.
>
> In negotiating partnerships, NASA will not be a "bulk buyer" the way
> that other government entities, such as DOD, may be. Therefore NASA
> needs to recognize the needs of its intended partner in order to
> ensure there is an incentive for that entity to become a partner with
> NASA.
>
> HQ should develop processing time performance for patent application,
> licenses, and partnership agreements, which gives all parties a
> reasonable understanding of the length of time the process will take,
> at the outset, rather than speculation throughout. That also allows
> the partner and NASA to determine, at the outset, whether the length
> of time needed for the partnership process warrants the intended
> partnership itself.
>
> **(Fuentek response to RFI, \# 23453).**

20. Key challenge of large organizations is not in technology creation,
    but the process of advancing technologies toward commercialization:
    opportunity recognition, identifying a match between a specific need
    and the capabilities of a specific technology.

    a.  Opportunity recognition is an individual creative act but the
        most effective approach is to link the creative act or acts with
        networks linking various perspectives and implementation
        capabilities together.

    b.  Network model is therefore a good tool or Innovative
        Partnerships to use as an organizing principle.

    c.  Recommended paradigm is a system of integrated processes managed
        centrally, but contributed to by many. Includes standardized
        processes and using what has already been learned/knowledge
        re-use, and leveraging of network capabilities. **(ManyWorlds
        response to RFI, \# 23415)**

21. Problem of tech transfer/spin-out partnerships is a lack of
    understanding within NASA of how the private sector works, a lack of
    clarity within NASA about the roles of participants in the spin-out
    process, and a lack of a sense of urgency from NASA to complete
    partnership transactions.

> In tech transfer/spin-out, market understanding must be both ways:
> NASA needs to know what potential users exist *and what they need* for
> the research or technology under development, and external entities
> need to know what research or technologies NASA has to offer;
> otherwise, no transaction will be done.
>
> If the parties are well known to each other such as Boeing and NASA,
> transactions occur easily. The challenge is to reach others not used
> to dealing with NASA. Intermediaries can serve an important bridging
> role.
>
> Time is a crucial commodity to the external community. "The useful
> life of a technology begins to erode as soon as it is announced. Delay
> diminishes value, in some instances, completely." **(NTTC response to
> RFI, \# 23572)**

22. Some good, practical observations regarding NASA technology
    outreach:

    a.  Events frequently involve marginal/dated technologies that may
        not be state of the art

    b.  These technologies showcased frequently show a diverse spectrum
        in an effort to appeal to broad audiences, but in so doing there
        is not a "critical mass" identified within a well-defined
        technology area.

    c.  Most of the dialogue has been one-directional: NASA talking to
        industry despite the fact that much of the technology
        development and innovation is in the private sector. The focus
        should be on emerging technologies rather than only focusing on
        NASA's innovations.

    d.  Rather than a scatter-gun approach across all technologies,
        there needs to be more focused efforts with a smaller range
        where the need is greatest and the outcome is most likely to be
        successful.

> **(RTI International, RFI response \# 23489)**

23. Partnerships are key to successful spin-out/technology transfer, and
    spin-in/technology infusion. Partnerships need to be forged with a
    focus on market drivers rather than geographic boundaries.
    Partnership efforts must be measured against "hard metrics" to
    ensure that there is tangible progress against stated goals. This
    respondent also recommended central management from NASA HQ while
    maintaining close interaction with all of NASA's centers **(TechLink
    response to RFI, \# 23553)**

24. Innovative approaches to contractor support may include a "virtual
    institute" approach that links researchers and technologists from
    various institutions and organizations together via networking.
    Workshops may be developed to foster best practices, tools/methods
    and metrics, innovative approaches, knowledge gained from prior
    experience including organizational dynamics, cultural/social issues
    to address, and communication effectiveness.

> There can be a bridge via this contracted support linking the research
> communities, universities, and NASA to contribute to the agency's
> mission and objectives. This inter-connectivity can also support
> leveraging opportunities to maximize resources as well as building
> program advocacy with the research community.
>
> **(USRA response to RFI, \# 23588)**

25. Four phases of technology development were identified:

    a.  Identify and prioritize NASA's technology requirements

    b.  Pursue the most promising solution for each requirement

    c.  Bring industry into the collaboration at the earliest
        opportunity

    d.  Protect intellectual property rights throughout the process

> Leveraging was highlighted as an important function and a metric
> (though not the only metric) of program success; each project cited
> was focused on a specific NASA requirement. Alternative funding
> sources were aggressively pursued. Success in attracting suitable
> industry partners was linked to a professional technology assessment
> early in the development cycle. **(University of Florida response to
> RFI, #23275).**

26. Recommends seeking input from industry on ways to reduce barriers to
    implementing effective partnerships, through one or two forums a
    year that will foster idea exchange.

> NASA needs to clearly communicate at the outset what the agency brings
> to the table in a partnership, in terms of intellectual property,
> personnel expertise, facility capabilities and (where appropriate)
> funding opportunities. NASA should not engage in discussions that are
> vague and poorly defined even though early stages of discussion are
> likely to require ongoing development.
>
> Thought should be given to periodic cost-share RFPs that require a
> cash match in addition to NASA funding.
>
> *"IPP involvement from the early stages of NASA mission planning is
> important if IPP is to have the best chance of making an impact on
> technology infusion at the Agency.* *A holistic approach is needed, an
> approach that looks at partnership development as a process extending
> from the earliest stages of strategic road-mapping, through
> requirements definition, technology specification, technology
> development or acquisition, infusion and ultimately diffusion into the
> private sector...for commercial use."*
>
> The SBIR/STTR program should be assessed to improve corporate
> performance as many SBIRs do not mature beyond SBIR phase II. IPP can
> also play a substantial role in linking its SBIR projects to those of
> other agencies whose SBIR projects meet critical needs of NASA.
>
> Joint NASA/Federal Lab workshops is encouraged to bring to NASA other
> agency technologies.

Innovative approaches for tech transfer efforts:

-   Match the technology patent process to the value involved.
    Technologies with a limited timeline of benefit (given rapidly
    advancing technology improvement) or having limited licensing
    interest should be simplified with minimal licensing fees and low
    royalty rates identified up front. This would reduce the negotiation
    time and may spur interest in the technology being licensed.

-   Develop an e-mail alert service to NASA Tech Brief subscribers,
    advising the business community of new tech transfer opportunities
    as they become posted on the Tech Briefs website. Interested parties
    would create an interest profile for notification along research and
    technology lines: biomedical, robotics, nanotechnology, etc. The
    e-mail alerts would link to the technology report on the NASA web
    site, fostering a "one NASA" approach. This would be a proactive
    approach to reach the business community.

-   Business assistance support to small firms, improving the likelihood
    of tech transfer success. NASA should not be seen as accountable for
    a company's success, but providing support to small firms who
    qualify may increase the commercial success rate for these
    technologies. Where appropriate this may be reimbursed by the
    company.

> **(RTI/RTTC/NTTC collaborative review of RFI, \# 23324)**

27. Strong support for cost-share arrangements under a dual use program
    approach; projects within this program are selected where the
    government's funding does not exceed 50% of project cost unless a
    project is deemed particularly beneficial to the mission. DOD's Dual
    Use Program was cited as a model for this type of program.

    a.  Funding stability is seen as an important element for this type
        of program's success; a fixed percentage of R&D funding was
        suggested along the lines of the SBIR program. **(University of
        Southern Mississippi response, RFI \# 23638)**

28. Issues in technology transfer:

    a.  Lack of laboratory commitment, low priority given, bias against

    b.  Protective reaction of scientists and engineers reluctant to
        relinquish control

    c.  Insufficient in-house marketing and business expertise

    d.  Insufficient followthrough beyond the technology license stage

    e.  Lengthy negotiation and execution process

    f.  Divergent cultures between the government lab and the company

    g.  Insufficient post-agreement communication between the lab and
        the company

> Issues in technology infusion/spin-in

-   Insufficient definition by NASA of technology needs/requirements

-   Lengthy negotiation and licensing process

-   Lack of support for technology infusion/bias against externally
    developed (vs. in-house) research and technology

> A successful tech transfer and technology infusion program requires
> clear and visible NASA management support at HQ and the field centers.
>
> Tech transfer personnel need the experience/knowledge to evaluate and
> represent candidate technologies.
>
> The CCAT approach was outlined as a good model including
> prioritization of most promising candidate technologies. Proactive
> steps such as business development support, mentoring, and link with
> strategic partners to aid in funding are recommended to focus on the
> "final mile" or which covers the span between product development and
> marketplace introduction.
>
> An effective tech transfer program needs involvement by
> representatives of the stakeholder communities; a selective technology
> process, weeding out the weakest or non-candidates (having no market)
> in the process early on; evaluation by teams of industry,
> technologists, and investors who can determine the most promising
> technologies. *(A caution here in my review of this response. The
> issue of proprietary data and conflict of interest must be carefully
> and fully addressed when a company's research and technology
> development effort is submitted to potential competitors; this could
> be a major issue unless protective steps are taken);* streamlined
> selection and negotiation process; post-agreement support for the
> company including links to sources of venture capital.
>
> Internal programmatic performance metrics

-   Number of proposals received for targeted solicitations

-   Processing time for selection and award of technologies

-   Portfolio mix of technologies awarded

-   Success rate of awarded technologies in their deliverables

-   New partnerships

-   Number of licenses negotiated

-   Income derived from licensing fees

> External performance metrics:

-   Benefits to NASA

-   Benefits to society

-   Economic developments

    -   public and private investments in the technology

    -   Spinoff businesses

    -   Initial public offerings of a new company formation

> **(Response to RFI, \$ 23495, no name given)**

29. Strong linkages and communication between the technology developers
    and technology users, into and out of NASA, is key to effective
    technology program development.

> After license award, few NASA license-type partnerships are carefully
> tracked during innovation beyond royalty payment receipts. Few long
> term innovation outcomes or impact summaries are routinely published.
> **(Response to RFI #23635).**

30. Key principles cited:

    a.  Prioritize to optimize limited resources

        i.  Market factors should be the driver rather than arbitrary
            quotas or responses to "squeaky wheels"

    b.  Centralize to avoid duplication and inefficiencies and support a
        broader approach.

        i.  Recommends spin-in, spin-out technology *decisions* be made
            at the centralized/HQ level, as not all technology
            opportunities necessarily have the same weight: "the top 15
            opportunities from one Center may yield higher benefits than
            the top 5 opportunities from 3 Centers. Because the Agency's
            mission goals are NASA wide and not Field Center specific,
            so too should the Agency's spin-in and spin-out selections
            should be NASA-wide." Centralized functions also support
            consistency and quality control.

            1.  (I don't necessarily agree that it needs to be so heavy
                in one area, namely all decisions are to be made at the
                HQ level, but the observation was a good one and perhaps
                there needs to be some manner that HQ can provide
                insight based on its broader view of the agency's
                technology picture overall. This particular respondent
                did note the distributed role of evaluation that field
                centers can play, with HQ serving in the decision
                capacity).

            2.  

    c.  A centralized responsibility can also be used to support
        outreach, where a consistent message is needed that is not field
        center specific.

    d.  Standardize while still supporting flexibility, in evaluation
        criteria, outreach implementation, "boilerplate" terms and
        conditions in negotiated agreements, etc.

> **(Fuentek LLC response to RFI, #23451)**

31. Tech transfer/spinout: Barriers to successful commercialization of
    research and technology:

    a.  Restrictions on government/NASA practices (Federal Register
        publication requirements, license negotiation and signature
        authority residing in two different organizations, etc.)

    b.  Some areas of research are not inherently as lucrative in
        commercialization

    c.  Low TRL/Technology Readiness Level

    d.  Research driven by NASA mission not market requirements or
        identified industry need

    e.  Technologies infused into NASA programs are rarely licensed due
        to NASA perception that licensing is a barrier to dissemination
        of results.

    f.  Unavailability of researchers or uncooperative researchers

    g.  Inability to acquire an equity position in start-up companies

    h.  Poor selection of licensees

    i.  Crowded "prior art", pre-existing licenses

> Formation of cooperative agreements was one of the broadest,
> cross-technology recommendations by this respondent to address the
> barriers noted above.
>
> Institutions contacted for a survey noted that name recognition rather
> than directed marketing was used for their products. Therefore, "given
> NASA's significant name recognition one might wonder why more licenses
> do not seek us out (e.g. difficulty locating relevant NASA
> technologies, difficulty entering the NASA system, too many
> regulations...) Other information gleaned from the survey was the
> factor of technology commercialization cost, specifically licensing:

-   \$15,000 to \$20,000 per invention filed for patent

    -   Stanford's legal fees were \$5.2 million for 290 patent
        applications (117 patents issued) in 2003

    -   CalTech spent \$4.5 million for 207 patent applications (169
        patents issued)

    -   Cornell spent \$2.9 million for 65 applications (53 patents
        issued)---AUTM 2003 survey

> Technology infusion/spin in:

-   Interpersonal contacts were deemed essential. This included
    matrixing the tech transfer/business specialists out to the research
    organizations, and to use "technology gatekeepers" who can bridge
    the gap between the technology developers and the users as well as
    "technology scanning" to develop an awareness of technology options
    not known to the user organization.

-   Leverage SBIR companies, actively encourage SBIR firms to track NASA
    solicitations as well as other agency announcements.

> **(Langley Research Center response to RFI, \# 23589)**

32. Respondent noted that geographic presence should contribute to NASA
    involvement across the entire country, but should not be the sole
    driver.

    a.  Industry is not uniformly distributed; the network resources
        therefore do not need to be uniformly distributed

    b.  Information access and telecommunication tools have greatly
        diminished the need for geographic proximity

> The needs of the end user should be a prime driver.
>
> "Whatever the organization model, effective performance of the
> envisioned national network role requires individuals who combine
> elements of technical sales, problem solving, and business
> development". **(Response to RFI \# 23566, no name given)**

33. A market-based approach is needed for tech transfer and tech
    infusion

> Another call for NASA to "relax its geographic approach to technology
> transfer in favor of an approach providing centralized, one-stop
> access to information about NASA-developed technologies, and NASA
> technology needs.
>
> Supports a more centralized role at NASA HQ for NASA technology
> development efforts. Strategic direction at HQ, but keep the RTTC
> network approach to support post-agreement spin out and spin in
> processes.
>
> Tech transfer team must have timely and accurate knowledge of NASA
> technology challenges and also closely track market needs that can be
> met by NASA technology.
>
> Acquisition strategy should be performance based contracts using
> incentive fee provisions and other inducements

-   added fees for licensing deals consummated in the case of spin-out,
    and for spin-in, instances of adoption of externally oriented
    technology by NASA),

-   opportunity for an equity participation by a contractor in the
    formation of a new company if such a new company formed as a result
    of a NASA need.

-   opportunity for entrepreneurial support services offered by the
    contractor as a spinoff to that contractor's efforts

> Designated prime contractors should maintain significant reach into
> private, public, and non-profit institutions relevant to NASA.
>
> Applauded NASA's recent initiative to form the Mercury Fund to sponsor
> innovative, multi-use technologies for young, privately held companies
> working in nanotechnology, robotics, intelligent systems and
> high-speed networking and communication sectors.
>
> Suggested use of external experts such as those used by NSF, in SBIR
> selection processes, to ensure that the dual use thrust of the SBIR
> program does not develop so narrow an agency mission focus for the
> SBIR program that the commercial market applicability is lost.
>
> Consider structuring a partnership with a private or non-profit firm
> to attract and provide grant funding for technology development of
> benefit to NASA, such as the role CCAT (Center for Commercialization
> of Advanced Technology) plays for DOD as a neutral broker and funding
> agent for federal technology needs
>
> **(Virginia Center for Innovative Technology response to RFI, #160).**

34. Recommends a "clustering" of resources approach to technology
    development and transfer, in this instance based in the San
    Francisco Bay area linking academia (Stanford, U of CA at Berkeley,
    U of CA at Santa Cruz, etc. ) government institutions (NASA Ames,
    Sandia, National Lab at Livermore, Lawrence Livermore National Lab)
    and industry (IBM, HP, Lockheed-Martin, etc.)

> **(Bay Area Science and Innovative Consortium response to RFI, \#
> 23574)**

35. Recommends exploratory, university-led "seed projects" responsive to
    the technical needs of NASA and industry and partnership development
    linking universities, industry and NASA.

> Guiding principles:

-   Make university research more focused on NASA and industry-driven
    needs

-   Involve NASA and key industry participants in topic identification
    and down-selection process

-   Develop metrics, milestones and deliverables for each project

-   Build new, long-term strategic relationships linking industries,
    universities, and NASA

> **(Ohio Aerospace Institute response to RFI, \# 23595)**

36. Underscored the importance of high-tech, small businesses and
    incubators as catalysts in the fulfillment of NASA research and
    technology development objectives.

> The white paper provided some interesting metrics (albeit dated,
> through 2001) associated with NASA's incubator program, including
> number of jobs created by incubator firms (908), total sales revenue
> generated by incubator firms (\$56.7M), number of companies incubated
> (186), leveraged local/state/private sector funding (\$19.3M), etc.
> The inference is to establish at the outset meaningful metrics as part
> of performance.
>
> "Incubators" could aid NASA in remaining cognizant of emerging
> technology trends (infusion), could serve as marketing agents for
> research and technology emerging from NASA or NASA sponsored labs
> (tech transfer), and could work with the SBIR/STTR program to foster
> maturing business success along the lines of NASA HQ's National
> Alliance for Small Business Opportunity (NASBO) program.
>
> **(Technological Research and Development Authority response to RFI,
> \# 23522)**

37. The role of strong leadership in incubator development is deemed
    crucial to program success. Recommends:

    a.  NASA seek contracting opportunities that enable incubators to
        work for NASA in partnership with one or more companies, and for
        the incubators to gain both revenues and intellectual property
        rights under the Bayh-Dole act

    b.  Encourage incubators take a small amount of equity in companies
        being incubated.

> Stresses the importance of a partnership role between NASA and
> incubator management rather than a strict contractual role hierarchy,
> including open dialogue, understanding each other's interests and
> limitations, defining common objectives. (It would seem that this
> recommendation could apply to other areas apart from NASA incubators).
>
> Stresses the importance of interaction between the entrepreneur in the
> incubator role, and the NASA researchers or engineer.
>
> Three levels of interaction between NASA and the incubator community
> are identified:
>
> Policy and values level, based on fair-use policies, values, broad
> objectives, and applicable laws and regulations need to be identified
> and articulated.

-   Program development level where incubators and NASA organizations
    establish networks through conferences, internships, personnel
    exchanges, joint grant applications, joint technology development,
    or collaboration on training.

-   Data access and online collaboration where information is accessed
    by network participants and online collaboration occurs including
    links to libraries and databases.

> Meaningful metrics must be addressed; the white paper cites the two
> main thrusts as benefit to NASA and benefit to the economy.
>
> **(The Enterprise Network of Silicon Valley, response to RFI #23540)**

38. Recommends the establishment of a loosely-based "customer group"
    with Girvan Institute of Technology as a coordinator; the team would
    consist of:

    a.  IBM, Motorola, Intel, Boeing and StatOil

    b.  USAF represented by aerospace corporations

    c.  DOE represented by the Jefferson Laboratory

    d.  NASA

    e.  CIA and U.S. Army represented by In-Q-Tel and OnPoint

> Admittedly, Girvan's suggestion that they act as coordinator is
> self-serving. This approach is stated here not to reflect for or
> against Girvan as a coordinator, but to highlight the team concept
> itself which would, as noted by Girvan, share technology roadmaps and
> support the coordinator in the search for dual-use technologies
> relevant to the roadmaps. The desired result would be a broadening of
> the technology base and strategic partnership/joint venture
> opportunities for all of the team participants.
>
> **(Girvan Institute of Technology, response to RFI \# 23602)**

39. Suggests benefits of "Virtual Institute" linking universities and
    researchers. Program management insights from this university
    network include:

    a.  Best practices/lessons learned

    b.  Definition of program metrics

    c.  Development of a strategic system approach

    d.  Understanding project/program management efforts most suitable
        for NASA

    e.  Communication improvement

> Describes the Center for Program/Project Management Research (CPMR), a
> new institute sponsored by the NASA Academy of Program and Project
> Leadership (APPL), in 2004.
>
> Recommends the use of an intermediary linking NASA and
> academia/university sectors particularly recommending the use of
> university-NASA linkages and partnerships already in place.
>
> **(USRA response to RFI, \# 23590)**

40. Systems engineering approach to tech transfer with a balanced, life
    cycle approach.

> Notes that teaming arrangements of researchers and engineers from the
> private sector and academia can help to counter the "Valley of Death"
> gap between technology development and product/technology to market.
> This partnering activity can also be a cost effective means of
> bringing to bear resources from diverse research organizations.
>
> Recommends web-based tools for training and information dissemination.
>
> (Much of this white paper centers on local technology innovation and
> entrepreneurship, which may benefit the local area under discussion
> but would not be appropriate for a contract on a national scale. I
> mention this as other white papers have also been locally focused that
> is not appropriate for a national scale.)
>
> **(Space Coast Innovation and Technology Commercialization Partnership
> response to RFI, #23556)**

41. NASA can be a positive factor in regional economic development
    through expertise in problem solving and in the agency's unique
    resources that may also be available for dual use purposes;
    innovations developed by NASA or through NASA sponsorship that have
    commercial application, and in formal partnership development to
    meet agency goals while benefiting life on earth.

> Recommends a proactive effort to link NASA technology transfer efforts
> with other federal as well as state and local economic development
> organizations and with private or public research institutions.
>
> NASA needs to understand needs of intended partners, and they need to
> understand NASA's evolving direction and requirements, for a
> partnership to be effective.
>
> The agreement approval process should be as streamlined as possible,
> using standard language wherever applicable; this helps to foster a
> consistent approach across NASA field centers and HQ.
>
> Active use of conferences and community events to foster technology
> transfer and technology collaboration. This may be a significant
> stimulant to regional businesses that may align with the NASA field
> center in that region.
>
> Recommends regional "cluster analysis" to explore the regionally based
> networks of academia, government and industry that may be optimized
> through informal and formal networks. This analysis will also give
> NASA better insight into a specific region's economic profile, its
> priorities and target markets. This may also aid NASA in locating
> regional resources that would benefit the agency in meeting its
> objectives.
>
> **(Fuentek response to RFI, \# 23454)**

42. Recommends use of linking economic development organizations
    cross-region.

> Identifies the use of an intermediary to aid in identifying a
> "pipeline" of companies able to respond to NASA requirements, and
> conversely to aid businesses in using NASA technology by disseminating
> NASA technology information to potential user firms.
>
> (Another white paper largely devoted to how this organization can
> specifically aid NASA as an economic consultant to small businesses;
> more of a sales pitch than an overview of processes that NASA could
> take to improve tech transfer and tech infusion. This does raise one
> interesting point\-\--the fact that there are already in place though
> NASA sponsorship consortia arrangements that may be expanded on,
> rather than the need to create a wholly new organization or
> consortium.)
>
> **(Space Alliance Technology Outreach Program response to RFI, \#
> 23597)**

43. Notes the cyclical pattern of successful technology transfer
    efforts:

    a.  Partnership formation demonstrates NASA technology is relevant
        to companies.

    b.  Successful partnerships provide a direct link between a NASA
        program, a company's product or service, new job creation, and
        benefits to company customers.

    c.  Success stories produce public support for NASA programs.

    d.  Public support when communicated to Congress helps provide
        support for NASA's budget.

    e.  A healthy budget supports new technology development and the
        cycle is repeated.

> Strongly recommends that NASA actively capture program activities,
> partnership and success stories to quantify NASA's value to the
> nation's economy.
>
> **(Chamber of Commerce response to RFI, #23487)**

44. This White Paper focused on licensing and how NASA could more
    successfully license its technology using Langley Research Center's
    efforts as a model, which resulted in annual royalty income
    exceeding \$1M. Key elements identified for successful licensing;

-   Selection of inventions using analysis to select the most probable
    successes. Suggests focusing on inventions most closely designed for
    original purpose without substantial modification. Close alignment
    between original purpose and potential commercial application also
    strengthens the likelihood the inventors will provide technical
    expertise needed in technology implementation.

-   Licensing policies must be supported and disseminated by management
    to ensure sufficient visibility and support.

-   Close communication between patent and intellectual property
    attorneys, and tech transfer staff, is necessary.

> Based on a survey at Langley ("Home Run" survey to review
> licensing/tech transfer successes), the easiest technologies to
> license were associated with life science or biotechnology. The survey
> indicated that was partly due to the presence of a ready market of
> industry partners in the life science field, i.e. pharmaceutical
> firms, who were used to licensing technology. Research and technology
> development arising from the physical sciences were deemed more
> difficult to license.
>
> NASA should consider using Cooperative Research and Development
> Agreements as these agreements have some provisions NASA's Space Act
> Agreement terms and conditions does not have, and most other federal
> agencies use CRADA's that prospective licensees are most accustomed to
> using.
>
> Outreach is also considered vital to define industry needs, identify
> valuable technology for patent development and marketing, determine a
> technology's economic value, and locate qualified licensees. It is
> recommended the outreach be centralized to avoid redundancies and
> potential competition with one another.
>
> There needs to be interaction with venture capital organizations and
> either establishing or maintaining good ties with these groups.
>
> License evaluation criteria should be standardized and include
> sufficient capitalization, capability, and commitment. The economic
> value of a particular technology should be assessed to support the
> negotiation of reasonable financial terms. Market information helps in
> the assessment. A license application should include a business plan.
>
> Once in place, licensing arrangements should be tracked for progress
> (royalty payments, etc.) If a license is not productive it should be
> reviewed for either remedial action or potential termination to avoid
> having agreements that are not bearing fruit. At the same time,
> patience is required; the Langley survey noted that a successful
> license may take 7-10 years from initial invention to eventual
> commercial applicability and product sales.
>
> **(Langley Research Center response to RFI, \# 23580)**

45. Licensing: Recommendations for licensing:

    a.  Bundle related technologies across Field Centers to present
        packages rather than individual technologies.

    b.  Use of web-based databases for communication to the public,
        standardized and updated.

    c.  Participate in industry and technology conferences and trade
        shows to disseminate NASA technology.

    d.  Leverage ongoing relationships already in place with the private
        sector.

    e.  Timeliness is crucial. Drawbacks to licensing NASA technology
        include lengthy and cumbersome processes, as well as
        inconsistent levels of technical support from NASA.
        Standardizing the process may mitigate the process issues.

    f.  Conduct periodic surveys of NASA licenses to identify "Best
        Practices" and lessons learned.

    g.  Standardize metrics.

> **(Paula Webster response to RFI, \# 23626)**

46. Software Usage:

> This White Paper recommends NASA make use of Open Source software in
> support of technology transfer spin-in, spin-out.
>
> Several NASA centers (Ames, GSFC) have established Open Source
> agreements and releases. The number of downloads and impacts per
> project vary considerably. Some software codes are relevant to a very
> selective niche; other codes are of interest to a much wider audience.
>
> In sum, this White Paper indicates there have already been successful
> NASA Open Source software projects to aid in technology dissemination,
> and that such efforts should be expanded. **(Ames Research Center
> response to RFI, \# 23569)**

47. Successful partnerships require strong advocates on both sides of
    the partnership.

> Given limited resources to commit to partnerships, there needs to be
> an assessment of which NASA requirements will benefit most by spin-in
> efforts. Included in this screening process is:

-   Technical relevance to NASA's mission

-   Identification of a strong advocate within NASA

-   NASA resources available to be leveraged

-   Prospects for continued NASA and partner resources including
    funding.

> For tech transfer spin-out, "triage" is recommended to select those
> technologies most likely to be successfully commercialized.
>
> The timeliness of the process is crucial to attaining and sustaining
> partnerships, to match the timing needs of the commercial partner;
> existing processes are long and complex. This approach includes early
> discussion with NASA General/Patent Counsel to streamline the
> review/approval process at NASA. Specific milestone dates need to be
> laid out for both parties, and met. "Surprise" or additional
> requirements beyond the original negotiated terms need to be
> minimized. A "Blanket Agreement" approach and delegated signature
> authority without further review, for small dollar level funding
> actions, may streamline the process.
>
> A national agent in support of technology transfer efforts helps link
> those potential industry partners that may be technically but not
> geographically aligned with a NASA field center.
>
> Follow-through and publication of positive results is needed, to
> underscore NASA visibility of support for a given collaboration and
> also serves to document success as part of metrics development and
> monitoring.
>
> **(RTTC response to RFI, \# 23563)**

48. This White Paper recognizes the collaboration success of the
    Research Partnership Center (RPC) program as a consortia of
    academia, industry and government and in their long history of
    partnership formation for new or improved product development.

> The White Paper also notes that the RPCs have leveraged in both
> directions...leveraged NASA in-kind support, and leveraged commercial
> support.
>
> RPCs can also bring to bear their own in-house research and technology
> development expertise.
>
> RPCs can address government policy and procedural issues without
> having to bring the industry partner into the complexity of the
> process...in effect, serving as "buffer" for industry partners,
> particularly non-aerospace firms not used to the complexity and
> magnitude of agreement reviews especially involving flight payloads.
>
> Protection of proprietary data is an important inducement for
> commercial partners.
>
> **(No name given, but presumably linked to a specific RPC; response to
> RFI \# 23598)**

49. Emphasizes the importance of centralized coordination of policy,
    strategy, interagency relationship and marketing in support of tech
    transfer infusion and diffusion.

> Recommends closer relationships with industry and other government
> agencies, as well as leveraging of government physical assets.
>
> Should use greater access to intellectual property through contractor
> rights, and cite contractor successes directly linked to NASA projects
> as NASA successes as well.
>
> Raises a concern that the individuals usually involved in tech
> transfer (lawyers, institutional professionals, technologists) are
> reflecting their respective boundaries and do not look at the broader
> picture to creatively generate tech transfer opportunities. Recommends
> the use of marketing and commercialization experts who can link and
> bridge these diverse areas.
>
> Infusion of technology must be globally based rather than limited to
> U.S. only, given the locus of tech development occurring outside the
> U.S. Suggests using a single, global contract with an organization
> that has the capability to act as intermediary, scout and marketing
> agent, motivated by performance-based terms and conditions.
>
> Recommends NASA using its physical assets including physical plant
> assets as a means of closer interaction with industry, to foster and
> accelerate two-way tech transfer.
>
> Suggests an institute approach as the intermediary, who can also draw
> in support from other federal agencies as an impartial, "neutral"
> third party not intricately linked to NASA alone. A prototype could be
> set up at a specific NASA center and if successful, could be expanded
> for development at other NASA centers.
>
> To gain and sustain public support for NASA's efforts, there needs to
> be a robust outreach program to show the public a direct link between
> space endeavors and benefit to life on earth. Sufficient agency
> resources must be dedicated to make this mission of benefits
> demonstration successful.
>
> Post-license followup is important, including technical consultation
> and progress monitoring, to enable the license or technology agreement
> to continue beyond the signing of the licensing agreement itself. To
> aid in the cross-fertilization of technology development,
> consideration should be given to detail assignments to and from
> industry.
>
> Interagency tech transfer collaboration can be an effective tool to
> optimize limited agency resources in technology dissemination, through
> a "multiplier" effect of linking with other federal organizations.
> This can and should extend to state agencies and other research
> organizations, not only other federal agencies.
>
> Metrics must be clearly identified and tracked, be they royalties,
> patents, etc. and the outcome of such activities, not just the
> document (patent, license) itself.
>
> Use the Federal Laboratory Consortium as a marketing tool and a
> pathway for interagency agreements.
>
> Increase school competitions in creative technology development and
> publicize such events sponsored by NASA
>
> Foster web-based tools and provide a centralized, electronic access to
> available technologies through easy, intuitive, user-friendly access
> portals.
>
> Continued formation of industry/government/academia teams to respond
> to spiral development objectives. Engage in venture capital firms.
> Explore links to all of the SBIR emerging firms, not only those
> associated with NASA.
>
> **(Pendulum Management Co., response to RFI, no #, submitted apart
> from RFI call)**

50. White Paper noted the substantial migration of R&D funding as a
    measure of total U.S. R&D investment, from federal laboratories to
    the private sector. The expanding globalization of technology
    transfer was also noted.

> Increasing the technology transfer rate with traditional and
> non-traditional organizations will accelerate critical technology
> development and reduce associated costs.
>
> Tech transfer incentives:

-   Significant demand/perceived value for the technology in development

-   Incentives for NASA and the commercial entity

> The White Paper supports use of networks and
> industry/government/academia alliances/partnerships.
>
> Elements to effective partnership development:

-   Outreach and partnering efforts with non-traditional commercial
    firms through cost sharing where both parties have a vested interest
    in a successful outcome. Co-development of the technology early in
    the development cycle also fosters commitment to use the matured
    technology.

-   Build partnerships early in the technology development process

-   Flexible contracting mechanisms

-   Link venture capital firms where appropriate

-   Inter-government agency partnerships provide a source of innovative
    technology

**(Ohio Aerospace Institute response to RFI, \# 23593)**

51. Stresses the importance of patented technology and technology
    protection as an inducement to industry commitment (and a means of
    protecting NASA intellectual property to be used in partnership
    formation), and in the development of strategic partnerships to
    foster NASA diffusion and infusion. The best partnerships are those
    where

    a.  "both parties bring assets to the table and both parties stand
        to leverage a joint effort into a valued outcome".

> **(Response to RFI, #23565, no name given)**

52. Five factors that are key to either technology development success,
    or failure:

    a.  Corporate vision: goal setting

    b.  Marketing: create demand and sell product

    c.  Manufacturing: produce and deliver

    d.  Quality Systems: produce new product with acceptable performance

    e.  Strategic Teaming: negotiating necessary agreements,
        distribution channels

> **(Polaris Systems Inc. response to RFI, \# 23461)**

53. Suggests the importance of a regional focus to technology spin-out
    and spin-in. Also notes the difference between a linear assumption
    of technology development, and the "chaos" approach of collaboration
    where there are many factors (including the experience base of
    participants) that may alter the technology development path.

> Suggests a "targeted team" approach of NASA and private sector
> contractors within collaborative partnerships helps to provide a focus
> to a wide field of potential collaborative opportunities.
>
> **(Bay Area Economics response to RFI, \# 23567)**

54. Developed a draft "Partnership Proposal Form" that would help
    standardize information associated with NASA partnerships, identify
    timeline of partnership, value to NASA, value to outside entity,
    potential alternative approaches, history of efforts in this area,
    etc.

> **(Holland and Davis response to RFI, \# 23510)**

55. Recommends a centralized database of NASA needs and requirements, in
    order to support the identification of NASA "spin-in" or infusion
    opportunities based on needs. Suggests a single, national level
    center to support "spin-in" or infusion efforts in coordination with
    the NASA centers; this would also provide industry with a
    clearinghouse of information regarding technology migration. This
    "infusion center" would serve as a broker between NASA's needs and
    external entities capable of meeting those needs. This would include
    drafting agreements, with NASA being the final authority and
    signatory on any agreement. Also recommends greater use of
    standardized, "boilerplate" agreements **(NTTC response to RFI, \#
    23577)**

56. Discusses web-based tools to store, retrieve, categorize and provide
    access to information. This white paper also noted the following as
    market leaders in information technology. The white paper notes that
    information management and knowledge management tracks are beginning
    to emerge. Key players in the following areas are:

    a.  **Databases**: IBM, Oracle, Microsoft

    b.  **Data Warehouses**: IBM, Oracle, Teradata

    c.  **Enterprise Disk Storage:** Hewlett-Packard, IBM\< EMC, Dell,
        and NetApp

    d.  **Content Management (Infrastructure):** IBM, Documenturn (EMC),
        OpenText, and FileNet

    e.  **Recovery and Backup Software**: VERITAS

> Main players in overall knowledge management market: Autonomy,
> Captiva, eiStream, EMC/Documentation, Entrieva, Hummingbird, Mobius,
> Plumtree, SAP, Siebel, TheBrain, TIBCO, Vignette, and Verity. More
> specific company breakout information was provided within the white
> paper, by sub-categories of Content Management, Process Management,
> and Communication Management.
>
> **Information Management** (basic data manipulation and reporting):
> Leaders are IBM, Oracle, Microsoft, EMC, FileNet, NetApp,
> Hewlett-Packard, and VERITAS.
>
> **Knowledge Management** (extraction and distribution of data
> throughout organizations by adding structure to less-structured
> content, including external and internal sources of data, and
> incorporating problem-solving experience and expertise in useable,
> accessible data): Leaders are evolving but likely to remain for the
> next five years: eiStream, Entrieva, Hummingbird, Hyperwave, Mobius
> Management Systems, Plumtree, Verity, and Vignette**. (Futron response
> to RFI, \# 23295)**

57. Recommends a web-based architecture to link government agencies,
    academia, non-profit organizations, and industry in technology share
    activities and in NASA's case, to link geographically and
    thematically diverse NASA field centers. NASA HQ is the "hub" of
    this system, providing macro and policy guidance. The NASA field
    centers are linked up to HQ and to each other, having flexibility of
    action within the overall parameters established by NASA HQ. This
    strives to strike a balance between too much oversight by HQ, that
    may result in an over-bureaucratized and rigid organization, and too
    disperse an organization that may have unnecessary redundancies and
    is too diffuse to have consistent levels of performance.

. Recommends building two databases: a NASA "Demand Pool" for
technologies needed by the agency, and a "NASA Supply Pool" of NASA
technologies available for use by others. Both of these databases would
be publicly available to optimize market conditions for linking up the
supplier with the user.

Valuation of technology can be delineated into three categories:
mission-enabling, mission-enhancing, and cost-reduction.

**(Futuraspace LLC response to RFI, \# 23586)**

58. Recommends simplifying and streamlining the NASA tech transfer web
    presence; noted that a large array of NASA and contractor web sites
    currently exist, some which are incomplete and out of date. Suggests
    that one primary web site that is maintained, comprehensive, and
    user-friendly will be an important tool for those seeking insight
    into NASA technologies to license (technology spin-out or tech
    transfer) or those seeking to match their capabilities, resources
    and developed technology to NASA needs (spin-in, infusion). A good
    system allows for outside entities to perform their own analyses
    rather than rely on NASA resources to find the connection.

**(Holland and Davis response to RFI, \# 23436).**

59. On-line innovation network as a "virtual" clustering of capabilities
    and requirements. Enable a NASA-driven evolving network of knowledge
    that is compelling enough to attract and sustain interest. The
    system should be web-based with no client software other than a
    browser required to access the information.

> Integrate with the processes of other institutions and businesses on a
> distributed basis.
>
> Built-in adaptation to user requirements and evolution of network
> content.
>
> Describes the company's software program that can take documents,
> multi-media or software objects and relate objects weighted by the
> degree of the relationship.
>
> The adaptive knowledge network should be:

-   Low cost: minimal programming is needed

-   Flexible: Knowledge network can be segmented and manipulated as
    needed

-   Open: Knowledge network solution complements other application i.e.
    advanced search, collaboration tools, etc.

-   Adaptable: Automatically learns preferences of individuals and
    communities

-   Durable: Adapts to new requirements and auxiliary technologies

-   Extensible: Integrates across organizational boundaries and
    infrastructure

> **(Manyworlds, Inc. response to RFI, \# 23418)**

60. Recommends development of a partnership candidate registry to
    expedite the partnership process that is now deemed to be
    inefficient, too time consuming and lengthy. It may also help
    improve what is now perceived (by this respondent, at least) to be
    an ineffective hit or miss approach to partnership formation.

> Development in and encouragement for the participation in a registry
> is seen as building on outreach activities such as a sponsored event
> or conference that will "still provide value to finding partnerships
> long after the activity is complete"
>
> A registry would have to be monitored and maintained to ensure the
> information is accurate and current, and that the prospective partners
> have the requisite skills and resources to fulfill partnership
> obligations.
>
> A well defined and publicized set of criteria would be needed to
> address reactions by entities that are not included, or who are
> subsequently dropped from, an on-line registry due to their not
> meeting the criteria. This also helps to "vet" the list of
> participants on the registry, adding credibility to the registry.
>
> **(Response to RFI, \# 23803)**

61. Use of a "Technology Innovation Management Systems Needs" approach
    that seeks three objectives:

    a.  **Determination of NASA technology needs** including the
        identification of existing technology, to enable the agency to
        make optimum use of existing resources and not create what
        already exists. This allows the agency to concentrate resources
        where technology development is not taking place and where NASA
        needs such technology development to occur.

    b.  **Technology inventory of new developments/identification of
        NASA-developed technologies.** Documentation of NASA assets.

    c.  **Technology tracking:** intellectual property protection and
        tech transfer application. Also tracks progress against
        anticipated outcomes.

> Recommends a web-based system to optimize access to the widest
> possible communities while ensuring sufficient safeguards are in place
> on sensitive information, be it commercially sensitive or sensitive to
> government programs.
>
> Users should not have to have adaptive software, and any upgrades
> should be accomplished at a centralized source that incorporates the
> upgrade automatically to the benefit of users accessing the system.
>
> **(NetCentrics Corporation response to RFI, \# 23167)**

.

> Summary Prepared by John Emond/IPPO \~2 Feb. 2005