September 6, 2005

The Honorable Tom Davis

Chairman

Committee on Government Reform

U.S. House of Representatives

Washington, DC 20515

The Honorable Don Young

Chairman

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

Acting Chairman

Committee on Homeland Security

U.S. House of Representatives

Washington, DC 20515

Dear Chairman Davis and Chairman Young:

The federal response to Hurricane Katrina has been woefully inadequate.
Hurricane Katrina was an unstoppable force of nature. But it is plain
that the federal government could have done more, sooner, to respond to
the immediate survival needs of the residents of Louisiana and
Mississippi. In fact, different choices for funding and planning to
protect New Orleans may even have mitigated the flooding of the city.

We believe Congress has a responsibility to understand what went wrong
and why. Unless our Committees conduct thorough oversight to examine the
preparation for and response to Hurricane Katrina, few lessons will be
learned and the nation will remain vulnerable to future natural
disasters.

Over the next weeks and months, Congress and the public will learn much
about the federal response. Already, however, at least ten key questions
have emerged:

**1. Has FEMA been undermined and underfunded?** The Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) has the lead responsibility for federal
emergency response. Five years ago, FEMA had a reputation as one of the
best-performing agencies in government. Since the transfer of FEMA into
the Department of Homeland Security, inexperienced political leadership,
bureaucratic bungling and funding cuts appear to have severely eroded
FEMA's capacity to respond.

**2. Was the planning for a hurricane in New Orleans adequate?**
Multiple studies have identified a hurricane striking New Orleans as one
of the most dangerous natural disaster threats facing the nation.
Despite this, there were no federal plans for evacuating residents
without access to vehicles, sheltering displaced residents, or coping
with a flooded city.

**3. Could the New Orleans levee system have held?** The budget of the
Corps of Engineers for construction projects in New Orleans district was
cut by over 40% between 2001 and 2005, apparently to free up funds for
the war in Iraq and homeland security projects. In 2004, for the first
time in 37 years, the Corps halted all work on the New Orleans levee
system.

**4. Did failures to protect the environment contribute to the impact of
Katrina?** According to experts, the disappearance of wetlands along the
Gulf Coast removed an important buffer that could have dampened the
impact of the hurricane.

**5. Why was the federal government so slow to establish command and
control?** According to FEMA, the foundation of disaster relief is to
establish clear leadership, known as "command and control." But days
passed after the hurricane hit without effective crisis management at
the federal level.

**6. Why were federal relief supplies so late to arrive?** FEMA director
Michael Brown testified before Congress in 2003 that FEMA was taking
steps to ensure that disaster teams could respond within 12 hours and
that disaster relief supplies could be delivered anywhere in the country
in 24 hours. Yet stranded residents in New Orleans went four days
without deliveries of food or water.

**7. Why did the Department of Homeland Security fail to ensure basic
communications capacity?** When the disaster struck the Gulf Coast,
there was no emergency communications system available to police and
emergency personnel. Satellite phones can function even in the absence
of a local telecommunications network, yet this technology was not
utilized.

**8. Why was the federal medical response so slow?** The Department of
Homeland Security runs the National Disaster Medical System, which is
supposed to provide around-the-clock emergency medical response and
deliver essential drugs and supplies to any state in the United States
within 12 hours. Medical supplies did not begin arriving in New Orleans
until three days after the hurricane.

**9. Why was the National Guard and military response so slow?** The
stateside mission of the Army National Guard is to "\[m\]aintain
properly trained and equipped units available for prompt mobilization
for war, national emergency, or as otherwise needed." Yet there was no
prompt mobilization of the National Guard in response to Hurricane
Katrina.

**10. Is the Department of Homeland Security adequately helping state
and local officials prepare to respond to natural disasters?** Many
local first responders have been unhappy with the federal emphasis on
terrorism and the neglect of other types of emergencies, including
natural disasters.

Our Committees should schedule hearings to begin to examine to these
issues, as well as the host of questions that will surely arise about
the ongoing federal response and how to help the displaced residents of
New Orleans and the Gulf region restore their lives. We would like to
work with you in planning for these hearings and coordinating across the
Committees.

The rest of this letter provides more information about these crucial
oversight issues and the questions that Congress needs to address.

**[Has FEMA Been Undermined and Underfunded?]{.underline}**

In 2001, the Federal Emergency Management Agency was an independent,
Cabinet-level agency highly regarded for its work in responding to both
natural disasters and incidents of terrorism. Four years later, FEMA is
a component of the sprawling Department of Homeland Security, which has
devoted the vast majority of its resources to preparing for terrorism.
Following this reorganization, FEMA's disaster preparedness programs
have been cut, talented employees have left the agency, and FEMA's
relationships with state and local emergency responders have suffered.

In 2002, as the President proposed the establishment of the Department
of Homeland Security, experts warned that folding FEMA into a homeland
or national security agency would seriously compromise the nation's
previously effective response to natural hazards. Ranking Members Waxman
and Obey wrote the White House in July 2002 that moving FEMA into the
Department of Homeland Security "creates the risk that \[its\]
responsibilities will be neglected and poorly performed."[^1] Amendments
were offered in the Government Reform Committee and on the House floor
to retain FEMA as an independent agency, but these were defeated, even
though the Transportation Committee had voted to keep FEMA separate.[^2]

The Government Accountability Office said that the merger of FEMA was a
"high-risk" endeavor.[^3] Programs that were likely to receive short
shrift in a homeland security department included insurance and
mitigation services, programs to assist states in preparing for
hurricanes, and providing temporary housing and food for homeless
people.[^4] Another study warned that "while a merged FEMA might become
highly adept at preparing for and responding to terrorism, it would
likely become less effective in performing its current mission in case
of natural disasters as time, effort, and attention are inevitably
diverted to other tasks within the larger organization."[^5]

Regrettably, the concerns about the negative effects of including FEMA
within the Department of Homeland Security appear to have been realized.
The vast bulk of the Department's funding has been directed toward
counterterrorism, at the expense of disaster preparedness.[^6] Nearly
three-quarters of funds spent by DHS to train first responders go to
counterterrorism, rather than disaster response.[^7] Funding for
functions previously performed by FEMA has been cut every year since
2002.[^8] 500 jobs have been cut from FEMA, and as a result the number
of emergency management teams, responsible for overseeing disaster
relief, has been cut from three to two.[^9]

FEMA's preparedness functions have been particularly hard hit. These
functions were merged with the Office of Domestic Preparedness, a former
component of the Justice Department that focused on terrorist attacks
using weapons of mass destruction.[^10] As a result, control of \$800
million in emergency preparedness grants have been transferred since
2003 from FEMA to the Office of Domestic Preparedness, where they are
designated for use in counterterrorism.[^11] In the recent
reorganization proposed by Secretary Chertoff, FEMA was to be restored
as an agency within the Department, but stripped of its preparedness
functions.[^12] FEMA would thus be limited to disaster response and
recovery operations.[^13] According to emergency management experts, the
separation of preparedness from disaster response functions makes little
sense.[^14]

Disaster mitigation programs, which invest in protection for areas
vulnerable to flooding and other natural disasters, have been cut in
recent years.[^15] In 2003, the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program was cut
in half.[^16] Another program, the Pre-Disaster Mitigation Program,
awarded grants in 31 states in 2003 --- but remarkably, all grant
applications from Louisiana were denied.[^17]

Due to the frequent reorganizations and de-emphasis on disaster
preparedness programs, former government officials say that the federal
government is less prepared for a major disaster today than on September
11, 2001.[^18] In March, former FEMA Director James Lee Witt testified
before Congress:

> I am extremely concerned that the ability of our nation to prepare for
> and respond to disasters has been sharply eroded. I hear from
> emergency managers, local and state leaders, and first responders
> nearly every day that the FEMA they knew and worked well with has now
> disappeared. In fact one state emergency manager told me, 'It is like
> a stake has been driven into the heart of emergency management."[^19]

The effect of FEMA's reorganization on its employees has been dramatic.
Beginning in 2001, FEMA began to outsource government jobs to
contractors.[^20] By 2004, one FEMA veteran said, "Our professional
staff are being systematically replaced by politically connected novices
and contractors."[^21] According to an investigative report in the *Wall
Street Journal* in August 2004:

> FEMA\'s 1,700 staffers make up barely 1% of the Homeland Security
> Department's 180,000 employees. Long-serving FEMA employees, unhappy
> with the loss of independence and in some cases with new policies,
> have been leaving FEMA in droves --- taking their years of experience
> with them. Once the highest-ranked government office for worker
> satisfaction, FEMA is now dead last, according to surveys conducted by
> labor unions and the federal government\'s Office of Personnel
> Management. In the most recent union survey, 60% of FEMA staffers said
> they would take a job elsewhere if one were offered, and 80% of
> respondents said they thought FEMA has become a poorer agency since
> joining Homeland Security."[^22]

**[Was the Planning for a Hurricane in New Orleans
Adequate?]{.underline}**

President Bush has said, "I don't think anybody anticipated the breach
of the levees."[^23] But just the opposite is true. Multiple reports
have predicted that a large hurricane could overflow the levees and
cause massive damage in New Orleans.[^24] Both the American Red Cross
and FEMA ranked a hurricane in New Orleans as the nation's most
dangerous natural disaster threat.[^25]

In fact, FEMA itself funded training exercises last year to simulate the
effects of a hurricane in New Orleans. In this five-day exercise, called
"Hurricane Pam," emergency officials from 50 parish, state, federal, and
volunteer organizations simulated the response to a storm with sustained
winds of 120 mph, up to 20 inches of rain in parts of southeast
Louisiana, and a storm surge that topped levees in the New Orleans
area.[^26] The exercise anticipated evacuation of more than one million
residents and destruction of more than half a million buildings.[^27]

Despite these warnings, it now appears that critical elements of
planning were either glossed over or never completed. Follow-up
activities, such as planning for how to shelter thousands of people
displaced by flooding, were not funded.[^28] One expert who participated
in the exercise says that "little attention was paid to the evacuation
of New Orleans' 'low mobility' population --- the elderly, infirm and
poor without cars or other means of fleeing the city, who totaled about
100,000."[^29] According to this expert, when question were raised as to
how to evacuate this population, "the answer was often silence."[^30]

Under the Clinton Administration, FEMA developed a plan to "pre-deploy
nearby ships with pumps to remove water from the below-sea-level city
and have hospital ships nearby."[^31] But this plan appears to have been
abandoned by the Bush Administration. Rather than being pre-deployed for
Katrina, ships were not dispatched from their home ports until days
after the disaster began to unfold.[^32]

**[Could the New Orleans Levee System Have Held?]{.underline}**

The Army Corps of Engineers has approximately 35,000 engineers and
scientists, mostly civilians, who serve both the Army and the public.
One of its primary missions is "\[p\]lanning, designing, building, and
operating water resources and other civil works projects."[^33] One
element of that mission, set out in the 1936 Flood Control Act, is "to
provide flood protection to the entire country."[^34]

In recent years, the Corps' budget for such projects has been repeatedly
slashed. On September 1, Lieutenant General Carl Strock, Commander of
the US Army Corps of Engineers, stated, "I don't see lack of funding as
a contributing factor in this case."[^35] However, it seems plausible
that recent sharp decreases in relevant funding streams influenced the
state of the levee system surrounding New Orleans.

The levee system in New Orleans was designed and built in the 1960s. In
the ensuing decades, the system has required large amounts of
maintenance and repair to continue to protect the city from the waters
that surround it on three sides. In the last few years, funding for this
work has dropped by over 40%. According to one recent analysis:

> \[T\]he Corps' construction budget for the district has gone from
> \$147 million in fiscal 2001 to \$82 million in fiscal 2005. Scores of
> projects, from efforts to build levees, canals and pumping stations to
> bridge improvements --- all of which deal with flood mitigation ---
> are incomplete. (The administration's fiscal 2006 budget proposal cut
> construction funding for the district even further, to \$56 million.)
>
> The Southeast Louisiana Flood Control Project has felt the pinch
> particularly hard. After receiving \$36.5 million for fiscal 2005, the
> project was cut to \$10.4 million in the fiscal 2006 White House
> budget. The House has endorsed that funding level, while the Senate
> voted to boost funding to \$37 million.[^36]

In 2004, for the first time in 37 years, the Corps nearly halted all
work on New Orleans levee system.[^37] Jefferson Parish Emergency
Management Chief Walter Maestri told the *New Orleans Times-Picayune*:
"It appears that the money has been moved in the president's budget to
handle homeland security and the war in Iraq, and I suppose that's the
price we pay .... Nobody locally is happy that the levees can't be
finished, and we are doing everything we can to make the case that this
is a security issue for us."[^38]

In addition, it was reported in June 2005 that the Corps cancelled a
study on how to protect New Orleans from a level 5 hurricane.[^39]

**[Did Failures to Protect the Environment Contribute to the Impact of
Katrina?]{.underline}**

According to Center for the Study of Public Health Impacts of Hurricanes
at Louisiana State University, the disappearance of wetlands along the
state's coast put New Orleans and other coastal cities at higher risk of
severe damage from a storm:

> One of the contributing factors to New Orleans heightened hurricane
> risk is continual land loss and the degradation of wetlands along
> Louisiana's coast. These features --- wetlands and barrier islands ---
> have, in the past, served as significant hurricane protection for
> Louisiana\'s coastal cities. Various research has shown that each mile
> of wetland and barrier island that stands between a hurricane and
> inland Louisiana before landfall causes proportional dampening of both
> wind speed (storm intensity) and storm surge.[^40]

The degradation of the coastal wetlands was due in part to Army Corps
projects intended to divert the flow of the Mississippi River. By
changing the flow of the river, levees blocked the flow of silt which
otherwise would have restored wetlands areas that are constantly eroded
by water and wind.[^41] The Louisiana delegation has sought \$14 billion
for a massive project to restore the coastal wetlands, but Congress has
only appropriated \$540 million.[^42]

In addition, various forms of development have diminished the wetlands.
Among these were support systems for offshore oil operations. The oil
industry cut through wetland areas to connect to their offshore sites,
and there does not appear to have been adequate federal consideration of
the implications of these steps or regulation to limit the harm
caused.[^43]

**[Why Was the Federal Government So Slow to Establish Command and
Control?]{.underline}**

According to FEMA, the foundation of disaster relief is to establish
clear leadership, known as "command and control," over a rescue effort.
Effective command and control permits the integration of diverse teams,
a clear chain of command, and an efficient and swift response. A FEMA
lesson for trainees explains that without command and control, problems
are "far more likely to result from inadequate management than for any
other single reason."[^44] In December 2004, the Administration released
a National Response Plan that promised the "alignment of federal
coordination structures, capabilities, and resources into a unified,
all-discipline, and all-hazards approach to domestic incident
management" that would result in "vastly improved coordination among
Federal, State, local and tribal organizations to help save lives and
protect America's communities by increasing the speed, effectiveness,
and efficiency of incident management."[^45]

Yet FEMA failed to ensure adequate leadership in New Orleans. On
Thursday, September 1, more than three days after Hurricane Katrina
struck New Orleans, federal support still had not arrived and the city's
mayor issued a "desperate SOS" for assistance.[^46] The head of the
Office of Emergency Preparedness in New Orleans publicly begged for
"additional troops, food, water."[^47] Local, state, and federal
lawmakers universally condemned the slow response of the Administration,
and President Bush called it "unacceptable."[^48]

Rescue operations were few and sporadic, and groups and organizations
that offered to help were left waiting for instructions. For example,
FEMA was unable to take advantage of an offer of assistance made Monday
by 500 airboaters from Florida. The head of the Florida Airboat
Association stated, "We cannot get deployed to save our lives ...
\[and\] are physically sick, watching the New Orleans coverage and
knowing that the resources to help these poor people is sitting right in
our driveways."[^49]

Other reports indicate that FEMA blocked the Coast Guard from providing
1,000 gallons of diesel fuel,[^50] turned away three trailer trucks sent
by Wal-Mart filled with water,[^51] refused an offer from the American
Ambulance Association to provide 300 emergency vehicles,[^52] and
rejected major assistance from the city of Chicago.[^53] FEMA apparently
cut the emergency communications line to Jefferson Parish. When the
sheriff fixed it, he assigned armed guards to protect it from FEMA.[^54]

Nor was there a coordinated effort to establish security. While the
National Guard and military took days to arrive, New Orleans police were
left without instructions, food, water, or supplies.[^55] The force was
unable to protect residents from roving gangs, lawlessness, and
violence.

Many of those fortunate enough to have been lifted from flooded homes
were later abandoned without basic necessities or security. Former FEMA
Director Joseph Allbaugh stated that "\[a\] lot of decisions are being
made that aren't being coordinated very well."[^56]

Days passed without effective crisis management. Republican Congressman
Charles W. Boustany, Jr. spent 48 hours trying to compel the Bush
Administration to take charge.[^57] On September 1, the New Orleans
Director of Homeland Security stated, "FEMA has been here three days,
yet there is no command and control."[^58] Citing this statement,
Republican Senator Chuck Hagel called the failure of leadership
"astounding."[^59] He added, "There must be some accountability in this
process after the crisis is addressed."[^60]

**[Why Were Federal Relief Supplies So Late to Arrive?]{.underline}**

Timeliness is critical to disaster response. Food, water, and medical
supplies are immediate needs for the survivors, particularly children,
the elderly, and people with medical problems. In addition, living
conditions in temporary shelters can deteriorate rapidly after a
disaster, increasing both stress and the risk of infectious disease. On
September 23, 2003, FEMA Director Michael Brown testified before
Congress that the agency was "taking steps to reduce disaster response
times so that eventually disaster teams will be able to respond anywhere
in the country [within 12 hours]{.underline} and disaster logistics
packages, commodities, and equipment can be delivered anywhere in the
country [within 24 hours]{.underline} of a disaster declaration."[^61]

Yet relief supplies came painfully slowly to New Orleans. At least four
days without food or clean water took a rapidly mounting toll on
people's health and created an increasing sense of desperation.
Thousands of people trapped in the New Orleans Convention Center lacked
basic necessities.[^62]

Despite an array of promises, little was delivered quickly. John
Copenhaver, a former southeastern regional director of FEMA, stated on
Wednesday, "I would have difficulty explaining why there has not been a
visible presence of ice, water, tarps --- the kind of stuff that
typically get delivered to hurricane areas."[^63] When told that FEMA
had blamed road conditions for delays, Joe Myers, former emergency
management chief of Florida, responded, "I would think that yesterday
they could have flown that in ... Everyone was flying in .... Put it
this way, FOX and CNN are there. If they can get there ...."[^64]

Promises from the Administration vastly outpaced the actual provision of
supplies. "I keep hearing that this is coming, that is coming. And my
answer to that today is ... where is the beef?" said New Orleans Mayor
Nagin in a Thursday evening interview that ended with him and the
interviewer in tears.[^65]

According to news reports, mismanagement appears to have hindered a
rapidly coordinated response. A FEMA manager reported that teams were
being forced to wait for direction from Washington before reaching
people in need.[^66]

FEMA officials also appear to have been out of touch with what was
actually happening. Local and state officials knew that thousands of
people were at the Convention Center without food, water, or medicine.
Yet FEMA director Michael Brown told Paula Zahn of CNN on Thursday ---
three days after the hurricane hit --- that "the federal government did
not even know about the convention center people until today."[^67]

**[Why Did the Department of Homeland Security Fail to
Ensure]{.underline}**

**[Basic Communications Capacity?]{.underline}**

According to the *National Strategy for Homeland Security*, an essential
part of disaster management is to "enable seamless communication among
all responders." According to the *National Strategy*, "It is crucial
for response personnel to have and use equipment, systems, and
procedures that allow them to communicate with one another." The
Administration pledged three years ago that "the Department of Homeland
Security will work with state and local governments to achieve this
goal."[^68]

Yet when disaster struck the Gulf Coast, there was no emergency
communications system. According to Louisiana Governor Katherine Blanco,
"Part of the big problem is the communications network is down. We could
not get cell phone access, we could not get BlackBerry access, much less
a land line. The communications network is completely gone."[^69]

Communication failures seriously compromise rescue and security
missions. New Orleans police took turns using a single radio channel
with walkie-talkies.[^70] In Mississippi, the National Guard resorted to
pen and paper. Major General Harold Cross stated, "We've got runners
running from commander to commander .... In other words, we're going to
the sound of gunfire, as we used to say during the Revolutionary
War."[^71]

These costly breakdowns in communication appear unnecessary. Satellite
telephones can function even in the absence of a local
telecommunications network, but this technology was not utilized.

**[Why Was the Federal Medical Response So Slow?]{.underline}**

The Department of Homeland Security runs the National Disaster Medical
System to provide around-the-clock emergency "medical response to a
disaster area in the form of teams, supplies, and equipment" and assist
"patient movement from a disaster site to unaffected areas of the
nation."[^72] When needed, this system is supposed to be able to
mobilize the Strategic National Stockpile of essential drugs and
supplies. According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
the stockpile can be "delivered to any state in the U.S. within 12
hours."[^73]

Yet the medical response to Hurricane Katrina was severely lacking.
Thousands of people in the Superdome and Convention Center languished
without basic medical care. In New Orleans hospitals, staff struggled to
care for hundreds of patients for days without adequate electricity,
light, food, or sanitation.[^74] Area nursing homes issued desperate
cries for help, including one banner stating: "HELP. THIS IS A
HEALTH-CARE FACILITY. NEED MEDICINE. NO FOOD."[^75] Front-line doctors
complained that the Department of Homeland Security sent disaster
medical assistance teams to Baton Rouge, not New Orleans.[^76] Supplies
from the Strategic National Stockpile did not begin arriving in
Louisiana and Mississippi until three days after the hurricane
struck.[^77]

**[Why Was the National Guard and Military Response So
Slow?]{.underline}**

The stateside mission of the Army National Guard is to "\[m\]aintain
properly trained and equipped units available for prompt mobilization
for war, national emergency, or as otherwise needed."[^78]

Yet National Guard troops were not promptly mobilized in New Orleans. It
was at least four days before National Guard troops reached the
Superdome with basic food, water, and medical supplies. As of Friday
morning, only 12,000 members of the National Guard were on duty in
hurricane-stricken areas. This is less than half of the 30,000 available
in Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida,[^79] and about a
quarter of the 40,000 troops requested by Louisiana Governor Katherine
Blanco.[^80]

On Friday, New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin expressed frustration with the
military response. He told CNN: "I don't want to see anybody do anymore
god damn press conferences. Don't do another press conference until the
resources are in this city. And then come down to this city and stand
with us when there are military trucks and troops that we can't even
count. Don't tell me 40,000 people are coming here. They're not
here."[^81]

Part of the blame for the slow deployment may lie with Administration
emergency managers, who must request assistance from the military. One
officer stated, "There is a tremendous amount of frustration here, that
we have assets stacked up ready to go and we don\'t have the requests
for them .... All we can do is nudge the folks at FEMA and say, 'How
about if we do this or that?'"[^82]

Another contributing factor may be the war in Iraq. Over 3,000 members
of the Lousiana National Guard are in Baghdad. Though the Louisiana
National Guard members in Iraq will return home next week as part of
regularly scheduled troop rotations, there will be no mass Guard
movement back to the United States. "Everyone we have here, and every
piece of equipment we have here, is needed here," said Major General
Rick Lynch, senior spokesman for U.S. forces in Iraq, on Thursday.[^83]

Similar patterns exist in neighboring states. The Mississippi National
Guard has more than 4,000 troops in central Iraq. All of Alabama's
National Guard units have already served in Iraq, and due to retention
and recruitment problems, Alabama's Army National Guard has only 78% of
its authorized number of troops.[^84]

**[Is the Department of Homeland Security Adequately Helping State and
Local Officials Prepare to Respond to Natural Disasters?]{.underline}**

Local first responders have been unhappy with Department of Homeland
Security's emphasis on terrorism at the expense of preparation for
natural disasters, and they have asked for more flexibility to use grant
funds to prepare for "events that were more likely to occur in their
jurisdictions."[^85] As the *Wall Street Journal* reported over a year
ago:

> According to \[FEMA Director Michael\] Brown and other insiders, a
> quiet battle is under way within the Homeland Security Department. On
> one side are former law-enforcement officials, advocating secrecy,
> tight security and intelligence as the key to minimizing the trauma of
> any terrorist attack. On the other are firefighters and emergency
> managers who emphasize collaboration, information sharing, public
> awareness and mitigation efforts to reduce the impact of disasters.
> "It's a competing balance inside the department," Mr. Brown says. "The
> department has two missions. One is to prevent terrorism. The other is
> to prepare the country for all hazards. My job is to convince and show
> and lead by example that the all-hazard approach fits into their
> terrorism prevention."[^86]

**[Conclusion]{.underline}**

The nation has been horrified not only by the destruction caused by
Hurricane Katrina, but also by the government's failure to come to the
aid of our most vulnerable citizens in their greatest hour of need.
While there will be much debate about appropriate legislative responses,
one of the most important functions our Committees can perform is to
provide thorough and independent oversight. Examining the questions
raised in this letter --- and the effectiveness of the on-going federal
response --- is essential to provide accountability and a roadmap to
reform. Whether a disaster is natural or man-made, the federal
government must be prepared to respond with leadership and resources.

We urge you to schedule a series of oversight hearings without further
delay, and we offer our services in planning the hearings and
coordinating across the Committees.

Sincerely,

Henry A. Waxman James L. Oberstar Bennie G. Thompson

Ranking Minority Member Ranking Minority Member Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Committee on Committee on

Government Reform Transportation and Infrastructure Homeland Security

[^1]: Letter from Rep. Henry A. Waxman and Rep. David R. Obey to Tom
    Ridge, Director, White House Office of Homeland Security (July 9,
    2002).

[^2]: ^?^ U.S. House of Representatives, Roll Call Vote on H. Amdt. 574
    to H.R. 5005 (July 25, 2002) (165 ayes, 261 nos) (Oberstar
    Amendment); House Committee on Government Reform, Vote on Mink
    Amendment to H.R. 5005 (July 12, 2002) (failed by voice vote); House
    Committee on Transportation, Vote on Manager\'s Amendment to H.R.
    5005 (July 11, 2002) (passed by voice vote).

[^3]: U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Homeland Security:
    Critical Design and Implementation Issues* (July 2002)
    (GAO-02-957T).

[^4]: Letter from Rep. Henry A. Waxman and Rep. David R. Obey to Tom
    Ridge, Director, White House Office of Homeland Security (July 9,
    2002).

[^5]: Brookings Institution, *Assessing the Department of Homeland
    Security* (July 2002).

[^6]: U.S. Government Accountability Office, *DHS' Efforts to Enhance
    First Responders' All-Hazards Capabilities Continue to Evolve* (July
    2005) (GAO-05-652).

[^7]: *Id.*

[^8]: *Storm Exposed Disarray at the Top*, Washington Post (Sept. 4,
    2005).

[^9]: *Why FEMA Was Missing In Action*, Los Angeles Times (Sept. 6,
    2005).

[^10]: *Hurricane Tests Emergency Agency at Time of Ferment*, Wall
    Street Journal (Aug. 16, 2004).

[^11]: *Disaster Relief Efforts Put FEMA in Spotlight*, Wall Street
    Journal (Aug. 31, 2005).

[^12]: Press Release, Department of Homeland Security, *Homeland
    Security Secretary Michael Chertoff Announces Six-Point Agenda for
    Department of Homeland Security* (July 16, 2005).

[^13]: Press Release, Department of Homeland Security, *Homeland
    Security Secretary Michael Chertoff Announces Six-Point Agenda for
    Department of Homeland Security* (July 16, 2005).

[^14]: *DHS Reorganization Will Split FEMA in Two*, United Press
    International (July 12, 2005).

[^15]: *Destroying FEMA*, Washington Post (Aug. 30, 2005).

[^16]: *Disaster in the Making*, Independent Weekly (Sept. 22, 2004).

[^17]: *Homeland Insecurity*, Gambit Weekly (Sept. 28, 2004).

[^18]: *Storm Exposed Disarray at the Top*, Washington Post (Sept. 4,
    2005).

[^19]: House Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on Energy
    Policy, Natural Resources and Regulatory Affairs and Subcommittee on
    National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations,
    Testimony of James Lee Witt, *The Homeland Security Department's
    Plan to Consolidate and Co-locate Regional and Field Offices:
    Improving Communication and Coordination*, 108^th^ Cong. (Mar. 24,
    2004).

[^20]: *Disaster in the Making*, Independent Weekly (Sept. 22, 2004).

[^21]: *Disaster in the Making*, Independent Weekly (Sept. 22, 2004).

[^22]: *Hurricane Tests Emergency Agency at Time of Ferment*, Wall
    Street Journal (Aug. 16, 2004).

[^23]: *Good Morning America*, ABC (Sept. 1, 2005).

[^24]: *See, e.g., Washing Away*, New Orleans Times-Picayune (June
    23-27, 2002).

[^25]: *Big Blow in the Big Easy*, U.S. News and World Report (July 18,
    2005).

[^26]: Press Release, Federal Emergency Management Agency, *Hurricane
    Pam Exercise Concludes* (July 23, 2004) (online at
    http://www.fema.gov/news/newsrelease.fema?id=13051)

[^27]: *Id.*

[^28]: *Government Saw Flood Risk But Not Levee Failure*, New York Times
    (Sept. 2, 2005); *Federal Government Wasn't Ready for Katrina,
    Disaster Experts Say*, Knight-Ridder (Aug. 31, 2005) (online at
    http://www.realcities.com/mld/krwashington/12528233.htm).

[^29]: *Government Saw Flood Risk But Not Levee Failure*, New York Times
    (Sept. 2, 2005).

[^30]: *Id.*

[^31]: *Federal Government Wasn't Ready for Katrina, Disaster Experts
    Say*, Knight-Ridder (Aug. 31, 2005) (online at
    http://www.realcities.com/mld/krwashington/12528233.htm).

[^32]: *Id.*

[^33]: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, *Who We Are* (online at
    http://www.usace.army.mil/who/).

[^34]: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, *Flood Damage Reduction* (online at
    www.usace.army.mil/public.html#Flood).

[^35]: *Critics Assail Response to Crisis: Federal Reaction Called a
    Disgrace*, Kansas City Star (Sept. 2, 2005).

[^36]: *Ex-Army Corps Officials Say Budget Cuts Imperiled Flood
    Mitigation Efforts*, GovExec (Sept. 1, 2005) (online at
    http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0905/090105jv1.htm).

[^37]: *Federal Government Wasn\'t Ready for Katrina, Disaster Experts
    Say*, Knight-Ridder (Aug. 31, 2005) (online at
    http://www.realcities.com/mld/krwashington/12528233.htm).

[^38]: *Id.*

[^39]: *Id.*

[^40]: Louisiana State University\'s Center for the Study of Public
    Health Impacts of Hurricanes, *Louisiana Coastal Issues: Increased
    Hurricane Impact Due to Wetlands Loss* (online at
    http://www.publichealth.hurricane.lsu.edu/convert%20to%20tables/Louisiana%20Coastal%20Issuestf.htm)

[^41]: *New Orleans in Chaos: Disaster Proves Warnings True*, The
    Atlanta Journal-Constitution (Sept. 2, 2005).

[^42]: *Id.*

[^43]: *U.S. Government Ignored Advice After Flood of '93*, St. Louis
    Post-Dispatch (Sept. 3, 2005) (online at
    http://www.stltoday.com/stltoday/news/stories.nsf/nation/story/A393EE46492AB85E8625707100235276?OpenDocument).

[^44]: Federal Emergency Management Agency, *Incident Command System
    (ICS) 100 Training: Lesson 1: Welcome/ICS Overview* (online at
    http://www.training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/IS/IS100CM/ICS0101summary.htm).

[^45]: Department of Homeland Security, *National Response Plan* (Dec.
    2004).

[^46]: *Planning, Response are Faulted*, Washington Post (Sept. 2,
    2005).

[^47]: *Despair and Lawlessness Grip New Orleans as Thousands Remain
    Stranded in Squalor*, New York Times (Sept. 2, 2005).

[^48]: *An Embattled Bush Says 'Results Are Not Acceptable,'* Washington
    Post (Sept. 3, 2005).

[^49]: *Airboaters Stalled by FEMA*, Orlando Sun-Sentinel (Sept. 2,
    2005).

[^50]: *After Failures, Government Officials Play Blame Game*, New York
    Times (Sept. 5, 2005).

[^51]: *Id.*

[^52]: *Storm Exposed Disarray at the Top*, Washington Post (Sept. 4,
    2005).

[^53]: *Id.*

[^54]: *After Failures, Government Officials Play Blame Game*, New York
    Times (Sept. 5, 2005).

[^55]: *Waiting for Help, Officers Keep a Lonely Vigil*, Boston Globe
    (Sept. 3, 2005).

[^56]: *Federal Aid Efforts Criticized Sharply*, Washington Times (Sept.
    2, 2005).

[^57]: *Planning, Response are Faulted*, Washington Post (Sept. 2,
    2005).

[^58]: *Democrats and Others Criticize White House\'s Response to
    Disaster*, New York Times (Sept. 2, 2005).

[^59]: *Nelson and Hagel Troubled by Government Response to Katrina*,
    Associated Press (Sept. 2, 2005).

[^60]: *Id.*

[^61]: Under Secretary of Emergency Preparedness and Response
    Directorate Michael Brown, Statement before the Senate Committee on
    Environment and Public Works (Sept. 24, 2003) (online at
    http://epw.senate.gov/hearing_statements.cfm?id=212194) (emphasis
    added).

[^62]: *New Orleans in the Throes of Katrina, and Apocalypse*, USA Today
    (Sept. 2, 2005).

[^63]: *Federal Government Wasn't Ready for Katrina, Disaster Experts
    Say*, Knight-Ridder (Sept. 1, 2005).

[^64]: *Id.*

[^65]: *New Orleans Mayor, in Tears, Blasts Washington's Response*,
    Washington Post (Sept. 2, 2005).

[^66]: *Coast Under Water, FEMA Under Fire; Head of Federal Agency
    Defends Disaster Response*, Baltimore Sun (Sept. 2, 2005).

[^67]: Paula Zahn Now, CNN (Sept. 1, 2005).

[^68]: Department of Homeland Security, *The National Strategy for
    Homeland Security: Emergency Preparedness and Response* (2002)
    (Online at http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/book/sect3-5.pdf).

[^69]: National Public Radio, Morning Edition (Sept. 2, 2005).

[^70]: *Katrina Rescuers Improvise Communications*, Associated Press
    (Sept. 1, 2005).

[^71]: *Id.*

[^72]: Department of Homeland Security, *National Disaster Medical
    System* (2005) (online at http://www.oep-ndms.dhhs.gov/index.html)

[^73]: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, *Strategic National
    Stockpile* (Apr. 14, 2005) (online at
    http://www.bt.cdc.gov/stockpile/).

[^74]: *10,000* *Patients and Staff Members Await Evacuation from Barely
    Functional Hospitals*, New York Times (Sept. 1, 2005).

[^75]: *Along Esplanade, Pleas for Help*, New Orleans Times-Picayune
    (Aug. 31, 2005).

[^76]: Dr. Richard Bradley, *A Local Doctor's View from the Front Lines
    in New Orleans* (Sept. 2, 2005) (online at
    http://blogs.chron.com/sciguy/archives/2005/09/one_local_docto.html).

[^77]: *HHS Ships Medical Supplies, Opens 'Medical Shelters' at
    Military* *Bases*, Associated Press (Sept. 1, 2005).

[^78]: Army National Guard, *State Mission* (online at
    http://www.arng.army.mil/).

[^79]: *Red Tape Ties Up Military*, Saint Paul Pioneer Press (Sept. 3,
    2005).

[^80]: *The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer*, PBS (Sept. 1, 2005).

[^81]: *Newsnight with Aaron Brown*, CNN (Sept. 2, 2005).

[^82]: *Red Tape Ties Up Military*, Saint Paul Pioneer Press (Sept. 3,
    2005).

[^83]: *Troops Head Home to Another Crisis*, Washington Post (Sept. 2,
    2005).

[^84]: *Strain of Iraq War Means the Relief Burden Will Have to Be
    Shared*, Washington Post (Aug. 31, 2005).

[^85]: U.S. Government Accountability Office, *DHS' Efforts to Enhance
    First Responders' All-Hazards Capabilities Continue to Evolve* (July
    2005) (GAO-05-652).

[^86]: *Hurricane Tests Emergency Agency at Time of Ferment*, Wall
    Street Journal (Aug. 16, 2004).