**Before the**

Federal Communications Commission

Washington, D.C. 20554

+----------------------------------+---+------------------------------+
| In the Matter of                 | ) | WT Docket No. 06-150         |
|                                  |   |                              |
| Service Rules for the 698-746,   | ) | PS Docket No. 06-229         |
| 747-762                          |   |                              |
|                                  | ) |                              |
| and 777-792 MHz Bands            |   |                              |
|                                  | ) |                              |
| Implementing a Nationwide,       |   |                              |
| Broadband, Interoperable Public  | ) |                              |
| Safety Network in the 700 MHz    |   |                              |
| Band                             | ) |                              |
|                                  |   |                              |
|                                  | ) |                              |
|                                  |   |                              |
|                                  | ) |                              |
+----------------------------------+---+------------------------------+

Second Further NOtice Of Proposed Rulemaking

**Adopted: May 14, 2008 Released: May 14, 2008**

By the Commission: Chairman Martin and Commissioners Copps, Adelstein,
Tate, and McDowell issuing separate statements.

**Comment Date:** \[**30 days after publication in the Federal
Register**\]

**Reply Comment Date:** \[**45 days after publication in the Federal
Register**\]

Table of Contents

Heading Paragraph \#

I. introduction 1

II\. Background 8

III\. Discussion 20

A. The Public Safety Broadband License 24

1\. Eligible Users of the Public Safety Spectrum in the Shared Network
24

2\. Provisions Regarding the Public Safety Broadband Licensee 39

a\. Non-Profit Status 39

b\. Other Essential Components 46

B. Possible Revisions/Clarifications Relating to the 700 MHz
Public/Private Partnership 54

1\. The 700 MHz Public/Private Partnership 58

a\. Network/System Requirements 58

\(i\) Technical Requirements for the Shared Wireless Broadband Network
59

\(ii\) Priority Public Safety Access to Commercial Spectrum During
Emergencies 84

\(iii\) Performance Requirements Relating to Construction of the Network
88

b\. Respective Roles and Responsibilities of the D Block Licensee and
Public Safety Broadband Licensee with regard to Construction,
Management, Operations, and Use of the Network 106

\(i\) Role and Responsibilities of the D Block Licensee 112

\(ii\) Role and Responsibilities of the Public Safety Broadband Licensee
117

\(iii\) Fees 127

2\. Negotiation of the Network Sharing Agreement 135

3\. Auction-Related Issues 155

a\. Eligibility to Participate in the D Block Auction 155

b\. Reserve Price 162

c\. Designated Entity Eligibility for the D Block Licensee 165

d\. Default Payment 168

4\. Narrowband Relocation 176

5\. Size of Geographic Areas and Other Rules and Conditions 183

C. Other Options for the D Block License and the Public Safety Broadband
License 192

1\. D Block License Service Rules without the 700 MHz Public/Private
Partnership 193

a\. Size of the Geographic Areas 194

b\. Performance Requirements 196

c\. License Block Size and Term 198

d\. Power Limits and Out-of-Band Emission Limits 200

e\. License Partitioning, Disaggregation, Assignment, and Transfer 203

f\. Other Service and Auction Rules and Conditions 205

2\. Alternate Public Safety Broadband Opportunities 207

IV\. procedural matters 214

A. Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis 214

B. Initial Paperwork Reduction Act Analysis of 1995 Analysis 215

C. Other Procedural Matters 216

1\. Ex Parte Presentations 216

2\. Comment Filing Procedures 217

3\. Accessible Formats 220

V. ORDERING CLAUSES 221

APPENDIX - Possible Technical Framework for a 700 MHz Public/Private
Partnership Shared Wireless Broadband Network

# introduction

1.  In the *Second Report and Order*, we adopted rules for the
    establishment of a mandatory public/private partnership ("the 700
    MHz Public/Private Partnership") in the upper portions of the
    698-806 MHz band ("700 MHz Band") as the means for promoting the
    rapid construction and deployment of a nationwide, interoperable
    broadband public safety network that would serve public safety and
    homeland security needs.[^1] Specifically, we required that the
    winning bidder of the commercial license in the Upper 700 MHz D
    Block (758-763/788-793 MHz) ("D Block") enter into the 700 MHz
    Public/Private Partnership with the nationwide licensee of the
    public safety broadband spectrum (763-768/793-798 MHz) ("Public
    Safety Broadband Licensee") to enable construction of this
    interoperable broadband network, which would span both the
    commercial D Block and public safety spectrum. As essential
    components of this partnership, the D Block licensee would be
    chiefly responsible for the construction and operation of a
    state-of-the-art shared wireless broadband network that would be
    used by public safety users as well as commercial users. In exchange
    for taking on these responsibilities, the D Block licensee would
    gain access to the public safety broadband spectrum for use by its
    commercial customers on a secondary preemptible basis. In turn,
    public safety users, through the Public Safety Broadband Licensee,
    would benefit from obtaining access to a state-of-the-art broadband
    network on their 700 MHz spectrum that would incorporate their
    unique requirements, which would not otherwise be possible given the
    limited availability of public funding.[^2] In Auction 73, the
    recently concluded auction of commercial 700 MHz licenses, bidding
    for the D Block license did not meet the applicable reserve price of
    \$1.33 billion and, pursuant to the Commission's rules, there was no
    winning bid for that license.[^3] In the *D Block Post-Auction
    Order* released shortly after the close of Auction 73, we determined
    not to re-offer the D Block license immediately in order to "provide
    additional time to consider options with respect to the D Block
    spectrum."[^4] Accordingly, in this Second Further Notice of
    Proposed Rulemaking ("Second Further Notice"), we revisit our
    decisions concerning the 700 MHz Public/Private Partnership --
    considering revisions to this partnership as well as alternative
    rules we should adopt in the event the D Block licensee is no longer
    required to enter into a mandatory public/private partnership.

2.  First, we consider clarifications and revisions to the public safety
    component of the 700 MHz Public/Private Partnership that would
    better promote our public interest goals.[^5] More specifically, we
    seek comment on whether, under Section 337 of the Communications Act
    of 1934, as amended ("Act"),[^6] and Section 90.523 of the
    Commission's rules,[^7] only entities that are providing public
    safety services, as defined in the Act, are eligible to use the
    public safety spectrum portion of the shared network established
    under the 700 MHz Public/Private Partnership, and whether such
    entities should be required to subscribe to the network. We also
    seek comment on whether to clarify the requirement that the Public
    Safety Broadband Licensee be a non-profit organization and specify
    that entities associated with the public safety component of the 700
    MHz Public/Private Partnership, apart from outside advisors or
    counsel with no debt or equity relationship to the Public Safety
    Broadband Licensee, may not be for-profit entities. We seek comment
    on these and other clarifications or changes to the structure of the
    Public Safety Broadband Licensee and the criteria adopted in the
    *Second Report and Order*.

3.  In addition, we seek comment on possible modifications to the
    various rules governing the D Block licensee and the Public Safety
    Broadband Licensee within the framework of the 700 MHz
    Public/Private Partnership (as revised or clarified). First, we seek
    comment on whether it remains in the public interest to require a
    public/private partnership between the nationwide D Block licensee
    and the Public Safety Broadband Licensee for the purpose of creating
    a nationwide, interoperable broadband network for both commercial
    and public safety network services. Next, to ensure a thorough
    consideration of the Commission's options in the event that we do
    continue to require a public/private partnership between these
    licensees, we seek comment on a broad set of possible revisions to
    the 700 MHz Public/Private Partnership, including revisions
    regarding the respective obligations of the D Block licensee and the
    Public Safety Broadband Licensee. In particular, we seek comment on
    the following issues: (1) the technical requirements of the shared
    wireless broadband network to be constructed by the D Block
    licensee, (2) the rules governing public safety priority access to
    the D Block spectrum during emergencies; (3) the D Block performance
    requirements and license term; (4) the respective roles and
    responsibilities of the D Block licensee and Public Safety Broadband
    Licensee in connection with the 700 MHz Public/Private Partnership
    and the shared wireless broadband network, including whether the
    Public Safety Broadband Licensee may assume responsibilities akin to
    a "mobile virtual network operator"[^8]; (5) the various fees
    associated with the shared network; (6) the process for negotiating
    and establishing the Network Sharing Agreement, including the
    consequences of a failure to reach agreement; (7) certain
    auction-related issues, including whether to restrict who may
    participate in the new auction of the D Block license, how to
    determine any reserve price for such an auction, whether to adopt an
    exception to the impermissible material relationship rule for the
    determination of designated entity eligibility with respect to
    arrangements for the lease or resale (including wholesale) of the
    spectrum capacity of the D Block license, and whether we should
    modify the auction default payment rules with respect to the D Block
    winning bidder; and (8) relocation of the public safety narrowband
    operations. Finally, we seek comment on other revisions or
    clarifications that may be appropriate with regard to the 700 MHz
    Public/Private Partnership, including whether to license the D Block
    and public safety broadband spectrum on a nationwide or adopt a
    regional geographic service area basis such as Regional Economic
    Area Grouping (REAG).[^9]

4.  In addition to considering possible revisions to the 700 MHz
    Public/Private Partnership, we consider our options if the D Block
    is licensed without this 700 MHz Public/Private Partnership
    condition. We note that there are several circumstances where such
    options might be relevant. First, we might determine that we should
    not re-auction the D Block with the 700 MHz Public/Private
    Partnership condition, and instead immediately conduct an auction to
    license the D Block without such a condition. In addition, we might
    conclude that, even if we should retain the 700 MHz Public/Private
    Partnership condition in the next D Block auction, the condition
    should be removed if the next D Block auction fails to produce a
    winning bidder, or the winning bidder defaults or fails to negotiate
    a successful Network Sharing Agreement with the Public Safety
    Broadband Licensee. Therefore, for any circumstances where we
    determine that the 700 MHz Public/Private Partnership condition on
    the D Block should not be retained, we seek comment on revisions to
    the rules that would be appropriate with respect to the D Block
    license as well as revisions with regard to the Public Safety
    Broadband License that would ensure the development and deployment
    of a nationwide interoperable broadband network for public safety
    users.

5.  Finally, we note that, in adopting the *Second Report and Order*, we
    took an innovative approach to addressing a vitally important
    problem: promoting interoperability, on a nationwide basis, for
    public safety communications. We intended that the mandatory
    public/private partnership model between two nationwide licensees --
    the commercial D Block licensee and the non-profit Public Safety
    Broadband Licensee -- would facilitate access for public safety to a
    robust, advanced communications infrastructure and produce economies
    of scale inherent in a nationwide footprint. Importantly, we also
    found that this approach was the best means available to address the
    issue of funding for construction of a public safety communications
    infrastructure, which has proven a significant impediment to date.
    At the same time, however, we anticipated that the partnership would
    involve a balance between the commercial partner's obligation to
    construct a shared network infrastructure and the commercial
    partner's secondary access to the 700 MHz public safety broadband
    spectrum. By partnering these two spectrum assets, we intended to
    promote spectrum efficiency and innovation. Thus, we aimed to have
    the 700 MHz Public/Private Partnership between the D Block licensee
    and the Public Safety Broadband Licensee be complementary, and we
    designed this framework to strike the appropriate balance such that
    the maximum benefits accrued to both parties.

6.  Although the initial sale of the D Block license did not result in a
    winning bidder, these goals remain. In reexamining our approach to
    the D Block following Auction 73, we continue to proceed with these
    objectives in mind. Accordingly, we initiate this Second Further
    Notice with the following principles and goals:

-   To identify concerns in the existing structure of the 700 MHz
    Public/Private Partnership to inform our decision making going
    forward;

-   To promote wireless innovation and broadband network penetration
    while meeting the communications needs of the first responder
    community in a commercially viable manner;

-   To facilitate public safety access to a nationwide, interoperable
    broadband network in a timely manner;

-   To identify funding opportunities for the public safety community to
    realize the promise of a broadband communications infrastructure
    with a nationwide level of interoperability; and

-   To maximize the commercial and public safety benefits of this unique
    piece of 700 MHz spectrum.

7.  We invite comment broadly on these principles and goals, as well as
    the specific subjects discussed herein. While today's item raises a
    number of specific questions, it should not be seen as providing any
    limitation on the public safety issues that we seek comment upon. 
    We are interested in any and all perspectives from interested
    parties on how the Commission can develop rules and procedures that
    will achieve the multiple goals enumerated above. Finally, before
    ultimately adopting final rules in response to this Second Further
    Notice, we plan to present for public comment, in a subsequent
    Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, a detailed proposal regarding
    the specific proposed rules.[^10]

# Background

8.  In the *Second Report and Order*, released August 10, 2007, we
    adopted a band plan and service rules affecting the upper portions
    of the 700 MHz Band in order to promote the creation of a
    nationwide, interoperable broadband public safety network through
    the establishment of the 700 MHz Public/Private Partnership.
    Specifically, with regard to the public safety spectrum in the 700
    MHz Band, we designated the lower half of this spectrum (the 763-768
    MHz and 793-798 MHz bands) for public safety broadband
    communications, and we consolidated existing narrowband allocations
    to the upper half of the spectrum (the 769-775 MHz and 799-805 MHz
    bands).[^11] We also created a single nationwide license for the
    public safety broadband spectrum, and we specified the criteria,
    selection process, and responsibilities of the licensee assigned
    this spectrum, the Public Safety Broadband Licensee.[^12] We
    required, for example, that no commercial interest may be held in
    the Public Safety Broadband Licensee, that no commercial interest
    may participate in the management of the licensee, and that the
    licensee must be a non-profit organization.[^13] With regard to the
    commercial spectrum in the 700 MHz Band, we designated one block --
    the D Block (the 758-763 MHz and 788-793 MHz bands) located adjacent
    to the public safety broadband spectrum block -- for use as part of
    the 700 MHz Public/Private Partnership. As set forth in the *Second
    Report and Order*, we required the D Block licensee, working with
    the Public Safety Broadband Licensee in a public/private
    partnership, to construct and operate a nationwide network shared by
    both commercial and public safety users.[^14]

9.  *The 700 MHz Public/Private Partnership.* In the *Second Report and
    Order*, we determined that promoting commercial investment in the
    build-out of a shared network infrastructure for both commercial and
    public safety users through the 700 MHz Public/Private Partnership
    would address "the most significant obstacle to constructing a
    public safety network -- the limited availability of public
    funding."[^15] We concluded that providing for a shared
    infrastructure using the D Block and the public safety broadband
    spectrum would help achieve significant cost efficiencies. We noted
    that this would allow public safety agencies "to take advantage of
    commercial, off-the-shelf technology and otherwise benefit from
    commercial carriers' investments in research and development of
    advanced wireless technologies."[^16] We also stated that this
    approach could benefit the public safety community by providing it
    with access to an additional 10 megahertz of broadband spectrum
    during emergencies, when it is needed most. Most importantly, it was
    our view that this particular public/private partnership approach
    would provide all of these benefits on a nationwide basis and thus
    provide the most practical means of speeding deployment of a
    nationwide, interoperable, broadband network for public safety
    service that is designed to meet their needs in times of crisis. At
    the same time, we pointed out that the 700 MHz Public/Private
    Partnership would provide the D Block licensee with rights to
    operate commercial services in the 10 megahertz of public safety
    broadband spectrum on a secondary, preemptible basis, which would
    both help to defray the costs of build-out and ensure that the
    spectrum is used efficiently.[^17]

10. We established various features of the 700 MHz Public/Private
    Partnership. First, we set forth the essential components of this
    partnership.[^18] In particular, we specified certain parameters for
    the shared wireless broadband network, including features relating
    to the technology platform, signal coverage, robustness and
    reliability, capacity, security, operational capabilities and
    control, and certain equipment specifications.[^19] With regard to
    the spectrum shared by the common network, we required that the
    Public Safety Broadband Licensee lease the public safety broadband
    spectrum for commercial use by the D Block licensee on a secondary,
    preemptible basis and provided that the public safety entities would
    have priority access to the D Block spectrum during
    emergencies.[^20] We also established certain minimal performance
    requirements relating to construction and build-out of the shared
    700 MHz Public/Private Partnership network.[^21]

11. Next, we established that the terms of the 700 MHz Public/Private
    Partnership would be governed both by Commission rules and by a
    Network Sharing Agreement ("NSA") to be negotiated by the winning
    bidder for the D Block license and the Public Safety Broadband
    Licensee.[^22] Throughout the *Second Report and Order* we
    identified certain elements that the parties were required to
    address in the NSA. These included, for instance, the details of
    certain mandatory network specifications established in the order
    and a detailed build-out schedule as jointly agreed upon by the
    Public Safety Broadband Licensee and the D Block licensee.[^23] We
    also determined that the NSA should include, among other things,
    specification of all service fees that public safety entities would
    pay with respect to access and use of the shared network, both in
    terms of fees applicable for normal network service and fees for
    priority access to the D Block spectrum in an emergency.[^24]

12. We established rules governing the establishment of the NSA to
    ensure timely completion of the negotiations and to resolve any
    disputes that may arise.[^25] Among other rules, we required the
    winning bidder of the D Block license and the Public Safety
    Broadband Licensee to negotiate in good faith, and we provided that
    the D Block license application would not be granted until the
    parties obtained Commission approval of the agreement, executed, and
    then filed the NSA with the Commission.[^26] We also required the
    negotiations to begin by a date certain and conclude within six
    months. Further, we specified rules to govern in the event of a
    negotiation dispute. Specifically, we provided that if, at the end
    of the six month negotiation period, or on their own motion at any
    time, the Chiefs of the Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau
    ("PSHSB") and the Wireless Telecommunications Bureau ("WTB") found
    that negotiations had reached an impasse, they could take a variety
    of actions to resolve any disputes, including but not limited to
    issuing a decision on the disputed issues and requiring the
    submission of a draft agreement consistent with their decision.[^27]

13. *Narrowband Relocation.* In the *Second Report and Order*, we found
    that, in order to maximize the benefits of the 700 MHz
    Public/Private Partnership to deploy a nationwide, interoperable
    broadband communications network, the current 700 MHz narrowband
    public safety operations must be consolidated and cleared no later
    than the DTV transition date.[^28] To effectuate the consolidation
    of the narrowband channels, we required the D Block licensee to pay
    the costs of relocating narrowband radios to the newly consolidated
    portion of the band and capped the disbursement amount for such
    relocation costs at \$10 million.[^29] We also cautioned that any
    narrowband equipment deployed in the 764-770 MHz and 794-800 MHz
    bands (channels 63 and 68), or in the 775-776 MHz and 805-806 MHz
    bands (the upper one megahertz of channels 64 and 69), more than 30
    days following the adoption date of the *Second Report and Order*
    would be ineligible for relocation funding.[^30] In addition, we
    prohibited authorization of any new narrowband operations in that
    spectrum, as of 30 days following the adoption date of the *Second
    Report and Order*.[^31]

14. *Rules for an Auction to License the D Block.* In addition to
    adopting service rules for the 700 MHz commercial spectrum,
    including the D Block, we also made several determinations regarding
    the auction of the 700 MHz commercial licenses. In particular, we
    concluded that block-specific aggregate reserve prices should be
    established for each commercial license block -- the A, B, C, D, and
    E Blocks -- to be auctioned in Auction 73, and directed WTB to adopt
    and publicly disclose those reserve prices prior to the auction,
    pursuant to its existing delegated authority and consistent with our
    directions.[^32] For the D Block, we concluded that WTB should
    consider certain factors in setting the D Block reserve price,
    including the 700 MHz Public/Private Partnership conditions, which
    might suggest a reserve price of \$1.33 billion. We provided that,
    in the event that bids for the D Block license did not meet the
    reserve price, we would leave open the possibility of offering the
    license on the same terms or re-evaluating the D Block license
    conditions.[^33]

15. In an effort to encourage the widest range of potentially qualified
    applicants to participate in bidding for the D Block license, in the
    *Second Report and Order*, we enabled eligible applicants for this
    license to seek designated entity bidding credits for small
    businesses as a means to create incentives for investors to provide
    innovative small businesses with the capital necessary to compete
    for the D Block license at auction.[^34] We subsequently decided to
    waive, on our own motion, the application of our "impermissible
    material relationship" rule[^35] for purposes of determining an
    applicant's or licensee's designated entity eligibility solely with
    respect to arrangements for lease or resale (including wholesale) of
    the spectrum capacity of the D Block license.[^36] Given the unique
    characteristics of the regulations governing the D Block license, we
    concluded that a waiver of the impermissible material relationship
    rule served the public interest.[^37]

16. *Petitions for Reconsideration.* Ten parties filed petitions for
    reconsideration seeking review of various aspects of the *Second
    Report and Order*.[^38] Three of the petitions sought
    reconsideration of the rules governing the 700 MHz Public/Private
    Partnership specifically,[^39] and two petitioners sought
    reconsideration of the aggregate reserve prices set for the
    commercial license blocks, including the D Block.[^40] These
    petitioners presented related arguments in the pre-auction
    process.[^41] After considering the arguments, WTB established
    reserve prices consistent with the direction of the *Second Report
    and Order.*[^42] Two other parties filed petitions seeking
    reconsideration of some or all of the requirements regarding public
    safety narrowband relocation, and also filed requests for waiver of
    some of these requirements.[^43] All of the petitions remain
    pending.

17. *Auction 73.* The auction of 700 MHz Band licenses, designated
    Auction 73, commenced on January 24, 2008, and closed on March 18,
    2008.[^44] While the bids for licenses associated with the other 700
    MHz Band blocks (the A, B, C, and E Blocks) exceeded the applicable
    reserve prices, bids for the D Block license did not meet the
    reserve price and there was no winning bid for that license.[^45]

18. *D Block Post-Auction Order*. On March 20, 2008, we determined that
    we would not proceed immediately to re-auction the D Block
    license.[^46] We made this decision in order to provide additional
    time to consider our various options with respect to the D Block
    spectrum.[^47]

19. *Inspector General's Report*. On April 25, 2008, the Office of
    Inspector General (OIG) issued a report on its investigation
    relating to allegations relating to whether certain statements made
    by an advisor to the Public Safety Broadband Licensee to potential
    bidders for the D Block license in Auction 73, particularly those
    regarding the spectrum lease payments that the Public Safety
    Broadband Licensee would request from the D Block licensee for use
    of public safety spectrum, had the effect of deterring various
    companies from bidding on the D Block.[^48] The OIG determined that
    the statements in question were "not the only factor in the
    companies' decision not to bid on the D Block." Rather, it concluded
    that "the uncertainties and risks associated with the D Block,
    including, but not limited to, the negotiation framework with \[the
    Public Safety Broadband Licensee\], the potential for default
    payment if negotiations failed, and the costs of the build-out and
    the operations of the network, taken together, deterred each of the
    companies from bidding on the D Block."[^49]

# Discussion

20. In this Second Further Notice, we revisit our decisions concerning
    the public safety broadband spectrum, the 700 MHz Public/Private
    Partnership, and the shared wireless broadband network it is
    intended to create, as we move toward a new auction to license the D
    Block spectrum in the near future.[^50]

21. First, in reevaluating the 700 MHz Public/Private Partnership in
    light of the results of Auction 73, we find it appropriate to
    consider clarifications and revisions to the public safety component
    of the partnership that would better promote our public interest
    goals. More specifically, in section A, we seek comment on our
    proposed clarifications regarding the entities that are eligible to
    use the public safety spectrum in the shared wireless broadband
    network as public safety users rather than as commercial users. We
    also seek comment on possible clarifications of or changes to the
    rules governing the structure and criteria of the Public Safety
    Broadband Licensee,[^51] including whether to clarify further the
    requirement that the Public Safety Broadband Licensee must be a
    non-profit organization.

22. In section B, we seek comment on possible changes to the rules
    requiring and governing the 700 MHz Public/Private Partnership. As
    noted above, we seek comment on whether the 700 MHz Public/Private
    Partnership between the D Block licensee and the Public Safety
    Broadband Licensee, with appropriate revisions and clarifications,
    would best serve the public interest in ensuring the development of
    a nationwide, interoperable broadband network for public safety
    users. We therefore explore a variety of possible revisions to the
    700 MHz Public/Private Partnership to provide greater assurance to
    potential bidders for the D Block license that the shared wireless
    broadband network will be commercially viable and to help ensure
    that this partnership will be successful in making a nationwide,
    interoperable, broadband network available to public safety users.
    We also seek comment on issues related to the negotiation of the
    Network Sharing Agreement. In addition, we request comment on select
    issues relating to auctioning the D Block license, including
    eligibility to participate in the auction, a reserve price, and
    potential default payments. Finally, we seek comment on issues
    relating to narrowband relocation and on whether to continue to
    license the D Block on a nationwide basis or adopt a regional
    geographic service area basis such as REAGs.

23. Finally, in section C, we examine our options in the event we decide
    not to condition the D Block on the establishment of the 700 MHz
    Public/Private Partnership with the Public Safety Broadband
    Licensee, either immediately in the next auction or if the next
    auction fails to produce a winning bidder. First, we seek comment on
    various revisions that might be appropriate with respect to the D
    Block spectrum. Then we invite comment on what additional revisions
    might be appropriate with regard to the Public Safety Broadband
    License in order to ensure the development and deployment of a
    nationwide interoperable broadband network for public safety users.

## The Public Safety Broadband License 

### Eligible Users of the Public Safety Spectrum in the Shared Network 

24. [Background]{.underline}. To meet anticipated public safety and
    homeland security needs, we proposed a comprehensive plan in the
    *Second Report and Order* to promote the rapid deployment of a
    nationwide, interoperable, broadband public safety network. This
    plan was based on taking "a centralized and national approach to
    maximize public safety access to interoperable, broadband spectrum
    in the 700 MHz Band."[^52] In particular, we required that a single,
    nationwide public safety broadband license be assigned to the Public
    Safety Broadband Licensee. That licensee would be responsible for
    negotiating a Network Sharing Agreement with the winning bidder of
    the D Block licensee, pursuant to which the D Block licensee would
    construct and operate a shared, nationwide 700 MHz interoperable
    broadband network that serves the public safety entities seeking
    access to the network, and the D Block licensee would, in turn, gain
    access to the 700 MHz public safety broadband spectrum for use by
    its commercial users on a secondary preemptible basis.[^53]

25. The eligibility rules for the 700 MHz public safety band, including
    both the narrowband and broadband segments, are contained in Section
    90.523 of our rules.[^54] By linking eligibility to the provision of
    statutorily-defined "public safety services," Section 90.523
    attempts to ensure compliance with the statutory mandate of Section
    337(a)(1) of the Communications Act, which requires the Commission
    to allocate 24 megahertz of spectrum between 746 MHz and 806 MHz for
    "public safety services."[^55] The statutory definition of "public
    safety services," which is set forth in Section 337(f) of the Act,
    provides as follows:

    \(f\) Definitions

    For purposes of this section:

    \(1\) Public safety services

    The term "public safety services" means services -

    \(A\) the sole or principal purpose of which is to protect the
    safety of life, health, or property;

    \(B\) that are provided -

    \(i\) by State or local government entities; or

    \(ii\) by nongovernmental organizations that are authorized by a
    governmental entity whose primary mission is the provision of such
    services; and

    \(C\) that are not made commercially available to the public by the
    provider.[^56]

26. The eligibility rules of Section 90.523 that apply to the narrowband
    licensees of the 700 MHz public safety band limit operations to the
    provision of public safety services, as defined in Section
    337(f)(1). Thus, all such licensees are either state or local
    governmental entities[^57] or authorized non-governmental
    organizations (NGOs),[^58] which provide services that are not made
    commercially available to the public and are for the sole or
    principal purpose of protecting the safety of life, health, or
    property.[^59]

27. With respect to the broadband licensee -- *i.e.*, the Public Safety
    Broadband Licensee -- the Commission crafted eligibility
    requirements that were also intended to limit operations to the
    statutorily-defined public safety services in order to ensure that
    the band remained allocated to such services, as required by Section
    337(a)(1), and to focus the Public Safety Broadband Licensee
    exclusively upon the needs of public safety entities that stand to
    benefit from the interoperable broadband network.[^60] Specifically,
    we required that the Public Safety Broadband Licensee satisfy the
    following eligibility criteria: (1) no commercial interest may be
    held in this licensee, and no commercial interest may participate in
    the management of the licensee, (2) the licensee must be a
    non-profit organization, (3) the licensee must be as broadly
    representative of the public safety radio user community as
    possible, including the various levels (*e.g.*, state, local,
    county) and types (*e.g.*, police, fire, rescue) of public safety
    entities, and (4) to ensure that the Public Safety Broadband
    Licensee is qualified to provide public safety services, an
    organization applying for the Public Safety Broadband License was
    required to submit written certifications from a total of at least
    ten geographically diverse state and local governmental entities,
    with at least one certification from a state government entity and
    one from a local government entity.[^61] The written certifications
    from these state and local governmental entities were required to
    verify that: (1) they have authorized the applicant to use spectrum
    at 763-768 MHz and 793-798 MHz to provide the authorizing entity
    with public safety services; and (2) the authorizing entities'
    primary mission is the provision of public safety services.[^62]

28. [Discussion]{.underline}. As a preliminary matter, our review of the
    eligibility provisions that apply to the narrowband licensees and
    those that apply to the Public Safety Broadband Licensee have led us
    to identify two elements of the statutory definition of "public
    safety services" that the rules do not appear to apply explicitly
    enough to the Public Safety Broadband Licensee: (a) the Section
    337(f)(1)(A) element that requires the "sole or principal purpose
    \[of the services to be for the\] protect\[ion of\] the safety of
    life, health, or property," and (2) the Section 337(f)(1)C) element
    that bars such services from being "made commercially available to
    the public by the provider."[^63] In addition, there is some degree
    of ambiguity as to the applicability of the narrowband eligibility
    provisions in Sections 90.953(a)-(d) to the Public Safety Broadband
    Licensee. Accordingly, we seek comment on whether to make minor
    amendments to Section 90.523 to (a) clarify that the services
    provided by the Public Safety Broadband Licensee must conform to all
    the elements of the Section 337(f)(1) definition of "public safety
    services," and (b) clearly delineate the differences and overlap in
    the respective eligibility requirements of the narrowband licensees
    and the Public Safety Broadband Licensee.

29. As discussed in more detail below, it would appear that, under
    Section 337 of the Act and in furtherance of the policies that have
    led to the creation of the Public Safety Broadband Licensee, the
    eligible users of the public safety broadband network that are
    represented by the Public Safety Broadband Licensee should be
    restricted to entities that would be eligible to hold licenses under
    Section 90.523. Thus, only entities providing public safety
    services, as defined in the Act, would be eligible to use the public
    safety spectrum of the shared network of the 700 MHz Public/Private
    Partnership on a priority basis, pursuant to the representation of
    the Public Safety Broadband Licensee. Accordingly, we also seek
    comment on whether all other users of the shared network, including
    critical infrastructure users, should consequently be treated as
    commercial users who would obtain access to spectrum only through
    commercial services provided solely by the D Block licensee.

30. *Eligible Users of the Public Safety Broadband Network.* As the
    licensee of the broadband portion of spectrum within the 700 MHz
    public safety band, the Public Safety Broadband Licensee occupies a
    somewhat unique position insofar as it will not use its licensed
    spectrum to serve its own communications needs. Rather, the Public
    Safety Broadband Licensee will ensure the provision of public safety
    service by providing spectrum access to others via the nationwide
    shared public/private network.[^64] Thus, the question of whether
    the Public Safety Broadband Licensee's service qualifies as a
    "public safety service" under Section 337(f)(1) will turn (in part)
    on the nature of the spectrum use by the entities that it permits to
    gain access to the network. To the extent that these entities are
    public safety entities that use this access to provide themselves
    with communications services in furtherance of their mission to
    protect the safety of life, health or property, the Public Safety
    Broadband Licensee's services related to the public safety broadband
    spectrum would fall well within the Section 337(f)(1) definition of
    "public safety services" and would comport with the Commission's
    obligation under Section 337(a)(1) to allocate a certain amount of
    spectrum to such services.

31. We note that, pursuant to the statutory definition, a service can
    still be considered a "public safety service" even if its purpose is
    not solely for protecting the safety of life, health or property, so
    long as this remains its "principal" purpose.[^65] Accordingly, the
    service provided by the Public Safety Broadband Licensee --providing
    public safety entities access to the spectrum for
    safety-of-life/health/property communications operations -- could
    conceivably include the provision of spectrum access to public
    safety entities for uses that do not principally involve the
    protection of life, health or property, so long as it can be said
    that the principal purpose of the Public Safety Broadband Licensee's
    services is to protect the safety of life, health or property.

32. Taken to an extreme, this reasoning could even permit the Public
    Safety Broadband Licensee to provide spectrum access to small
    numbers of entities with no connection to public safety under the
    rationale that the bulk of the Public Safety Broadband Licensee's
    services would remain that of providing the public safety entities
    access to spectrum for use in safeguarding life, health or property.
    Moreover, the Public Safety Broadband Licensee could arguably leave
    entire pockets within its nationwide service area served only by
    such non-public safety entities, based on this same rationale that
    the small amount of non-public safety use -- relative to the nature
    of the overall use across the country -- does not alter the fact
    that the principal purpose of the service remains public safety.
    Such a result appears patently inconsistent with the spirit of
    Section 337(f)(1)(A), and we seek comment on whether, or to what
    degree, the Public Safety Broadband Licensee would be statutorily
    precluded by that subsection from representing and allowing any
    entity to use the network for services that are not principally for
    public safety purposes. We also seek comment on whether there are
    other grounds -- specifically, the authorization requirement of
    Section 337(f)(1)(B)(ii) and policy reasons -- for prohibiting the
    Public Safety Broadband Licensee from providing network access to
    non-public safety entities or from permitting public safety entities
    that it represents to use the network for services that do not have
    as their principal purpose the protection of the safety of life,
    heath or property. With respect to Section 337(f)(1)(B)(ii), we
    observe that, in order for the Public Safety Broadband Licensee's
    services to meet the public safety services definition, the Public
    Safety Broadband Licensee, as a nongovernmental organization, must
    receive authorization from "a governmental entity whose primary
    mission is the provision of \[public safety\] services." We believe
    it unlikely that the intended scope of the authorization from such
    governmental entity or entities would include providing spectrum
    access, even on an occasional or limited basis, to entities that
    provide no public safety services.[^66] On the policy front, the
    finite amount of spectrum available to the public safety community
    -- particularly for interoperability purposes -- strongly argues
    against any provision of spectrum access by the Public Safety
    Broadband Licensee to entities the sole or principal purpose of
    which is not the protection of the safety of life, health, or
    property. For these reasons, we seek comment on whether the public
    interest would be served by prohibiting the Public Safety Broadband
    Licensee from providing an entity with access to the network if that
    entity fails to meet the eligibility requirements of Section 90.523
    of our rules.

33. We seek comment on which types of public safety users can be
    expected to use the national public safety broadband network (rather
    than legacy or new local networks) and on what timeframes.  Which
    public safety communication functions (e.g., voice, remote data
    access, video upload, video download, photo download) are likely to
    migrate to the new broadband network (in the short- and or
    long-term) and which will remain on existing networks? What factors
    will local jurisdictions weigh when making such decisions?

34. We seek comment on the extent to which the public safety broadband
    network will or should be interoperable with existing voice and data
    networks. How can the Commission encourage interoperability with
    legacy public safety systems and should interoperability with
    existing voice and data networks be a mandatory feature of the new
    broadband network? Can the use of multi-mode handsets (that support
    legacy networks and the new public safety broadband network) enhance
    interoperability? How can the Commission encourage or mandate the
    development and use of such handsets? How would any proposed
    policies in this regard affect the cost of handsets and network
    construction/operation? How does the use of 10 or 20 megahertz of
    shared spectrum affect the throughput of the broadband network and
    the functions it can support? What throughput can reasonably be
    expected on a network with this amount of spectrum? What
    functionalities can only be supported on a network with additional
    spectrum?

35. We also seek comment on issues arising from the possibility that in
    some areas a local jurisdiction may not elect to make use of the
    public safety broadband network. How extensive are such areas likely
    to be in the short- and long-term? Should the D Block licensee be
    permitted to use the entire 20 megahertz of shared spectrum for
    commercial service in such areas? Should the local jurisdiction
    receive compensation in these instances? Could such compensation
    discourage local jurisdictions to ever make use of the public safety
    broadband network? Would restriction of such compensation to use in
    purchasing public safety equipment such as radios for the public
    safety broadband network be an appropriate policy? What incentives
    can the Commission give the D Block licensee to encourage and
    facilitate use of the broadband network by local jurisdictions?

36. *Potential Pool of Users of the Public Safety Broadband Network.* We
    seek comment on the number of public safety providers in the country
    that have no interoperable broadband network. What is the size of
    the potential pool of public safety providers that may work with the
    Public Safety Broadband Licensee? We also seek comment on the extent
    to which some public safety providers already have established
    interoperable broadband networks. We especially encourage comment
    from parties that may have an inventory or database that collects
    this information. Where have such networks been established, and
    under what types of arrangements? To what extent are current
    interoperable public safety systems able to obtain lower prices
    and/or superior quality for commercially available, off-the-shelf
    technologies? Have public safety and commercial operations been
    developed on shared/parallel systems, and if so, how have they
    addressed network security issues? We further seek comment on how
    previously developed systems have addressed issues such as network
    reliability, including hardening of the network, provisions for back
    up power, etc. How do such developed networks envision connecting to
    an interoperable, nationwide network? Finally, to the extent some
    public safety providers already have established interoperable
    broadband networks, might these providers have less incentive to
    participate with the Public Safety Broadband Licensee? If this is
    the case, how might the rules established in this proceeding help
    provide a nationwide, interoperable network?

37. *Mandatory Usage of the Public Safety Broadband Network*. While we
    seek comment above regarding what users of the network are eligible
    to receive service from the public safety spectrum, we also seek
    comment on whether such eligible public safety users should be
    required to subscribe to the network for service, at reasonable
    rates or be subject to some alternative obligation or condition
    promoting public safety network usage in order to provide greater
    certainty to the D Block licensee. For example, should we require
    the purchase of a minimum number of minutes and, if so, on whom and
    in what way would this obligation be imposed? We seek comment on
    whether any such obligation should be conditioned on the
    availability of government funding for access, for example, through
    interoperability grant money from the United States Department of
    Homeland Security, and whether we should require public safety users
    to pay for access with such money. We ask further questions below
    regarding whether and how we should regulate the fees charged to
    public safety users for network access. Would it be possible to
    ensure that small public safety providers pay a "Most Favored
    Nation" rate for broadband services, or for equipment? How should
    the Commission ensure that smaller public safety entities can
    participate in the network?

38. We note that the State of Arizona used a grant from the Department
    of Homeland Security ("DHS") to build a broadband network for both
    public safety and commercial purposes using WiFi technology.[^67]
    This network serves a portion of the I-19 corridor running north of
    the Mexican border, a sparsely populated area that previously had
    little or no coverage for commercial or public safety
    communications.[^68] We seek comment on this and similar programs,
    especially those instituted by State agencies, and by both large and
    small municipalities. What specifications (*e.g.*, reliability of
    service, network hardening, etc.) have been required for this and
    similar projects to promote broadband communications for public
    safety providers? [^69] What lessons have been learned from these
    projects, and how might these lessons be applied to a variety of
    public safety providers, including those in very rural areas and
    those in urban areas? For example, do network congestion issues make
    sharing between commercial and public safety users more of a
    challenge in urban areas, and are such concerns lessened in rural
    areas?

### Provisions Regarding the Public Safety Broadband Licensee

#### Non-Profit Status 

39. [Background]{.underline}. Among other criteria for eligibility to
    hold the Public Safety Broadband License that we established in the
    *Second Report and Order*, we provided that no commercial interest
    may be held in the Public Safety Broadband Licensee, that no
    commercial interest may participate in the management of the
    licensee, and that the licensee must be a non-profit
    organization.[^70] We indicated, however, that, as part of its
    administration of public safety access to the shared wireless
    broadband network, the Public Safety Broadband Licensee might assess
    "usage fees to recoup its expenses and related frequency
    coordination duties."[^71]

40. [Discussion]{.underline}*.* With respect to the requirements that
    the Public Safety Broadband Licensee must be a non-profit
    organization, we seek comment on whether to clarify this non-profit
    requirement by specifying that the Public Safety Broadband Licensee
    and all of its members (in whatever form they may hold their legal
    or beneficial interests in the Public Safety Broadband Licensee)
    must be non-profit entities. We further seek comment on whether to
    clarify that the Public Safety Broadband Licensee may not obtain
    debt or equity financing from any source, whether debt or equity,
    unless such source is also a non-profit entity. We also seek comment
    more generally on whether the Commission should restrict the Public
    Safety Broadband Licensee's business relationships pre- and
    post-auction with commercial entities, and if so, what relationships
    should and should not be permitted.

41. We do anticipate that the Public Safety Broadband Licensee may
    contract with attorneys, engineers, accountants, and other similar
    advisors or service providers to fulfill its responsibilities to
    represent the interests of the public safety community, as required
    by the Commission. Under the approach on which we seek comment
    above, capital or operational funding mechanisms for the Public
    Safety Broadband Licensee involving private equity firms or other
    commercial or financial entities would not be permitted, unless they
    are non-profit entities and are controlled, if at all, by non-profit
    entities, in order to ensure that the financial considerations of
    the Public Safety Broadband Licensee remain aligned with serving the
    public safety community, and that no "for-profit" incentives
    inadvertently influence the Public Safety Broadband Licensee's
    priorities. We seek comment on these restrictions. In particular,
    are the restrictions on financing warranted to ensure that the
    Public Safety Broadband Licensee is not unduly influenced by
    for-profit motives or outside commercial influences in carrying out
    its official functions within the 700 MHz Public/Private
    Partnership? If so, in what ways might we allow necessary financing
    while still ensuring the independence of the Public Safety Broadband
    Licensee? Specifically, should we allow working capital financing
    from commercial banks and, if so, should we restrict the assets of
    the Public Safety Broadband Licensee that can be pledged as security
    for such a loan? Are there other types of loans or alternative
    funding sources that we should allow the Public Safety Broadband
    Licensee to employ? How can the Commission establish
    incentive-compatible rules for the Public Safety Broadband Licensee
    and parties with which it may have a relationship, such as advisors,
    contractors, and investors?

42. More generally, we seek comment on the best way to fund Public
    Safety Broadband Licensee operations. For example, should the D
    Block licensee or license winner be required to pay the Public
    Safety Broadband Licensee's administrative costs? If so, should we
    limit the D Block licensee's maximum obligations in this regard, and
    what would be a reasonable cap or limitation on expenses? Assuming
    government-allocated funding were available, would this be the best
    solution for funding the Public Safety Broadband Licensee? In
    addition, we seek comment on the extent to which we can adopt
    incentive-compatible rules for the Public Safety Broadband Licensee
    and the public safety providers it represents. What set of rules
    would encourage most or all public safety providers to collaborate
    with the Public Safety Broadband Licensee to establish a nationwide,
    interoperable broadband network? Under what circumstances might some
    public safety providers choose not to participate in a relationship
    with the Public Safety Broadband Licensee?[^72]

43. We seek comment on whether the Commission has legal authority to use
    the Universal Service Fund to support the Public Safety Broadband
    Licensee's operational expenses.[^73] If the Commission has legal
    authority to do so, should it exercise this authority? What degree
    of support would be appropriate? Similarly, can the Commission
    facilitate funding of the Public Safety Broadband Licensee's
    operational expenses through entities such as the Telecommunications
    Development Fund?[^74]

44. We also seek comment on how any excess revenue generated by the fees
    or other sources of financing obtained by the Public Safety
    Broadband Licensee from non-profit entities should be used. First,
    we seek comment on whether any excess revenues should be permitted
    at all. If we do allow any excess revenue generation, should we
    limit this amount? How should we determine what that amount should
    be? Should we allow the Public Safety Broadband Licensee to hold a
    certain amount of excess income as a reserve against possible future
    budget shortfalls or should we require that excess income be used
    for the direct benefit of the public safety users of the network,
    such as for the purchase of handheld devices? Should we further
    specify what would be a "direct benefit" or permissible use of such
    funds? In this regard, we note that the quarterly financial
    accounting we required in the *Second Report and Order* will enable
    the Commission to continually monitor the finances of the Public
    Safety Broadband Licensee.[^75]

45. Finally, we seek comment on whether the Public Safety Broadband
    Licensee may legitimately incur certain reasonable and customary
    expenses incurred by a business, consistent with the constitution of
    the Public Safety Broadband Licensee and the nature of its
    obligations as established by the Commission.

#### Other Essential Components 

46. [Background]{.underline}. In the *Second Report and Order*, we
    instituted certain minimum criteria that the Public Safety Broadband
    Licensee must meet in order to ensure that it "focuses exclusively
    on the needs of public safety entities that stand to benefit from
    the interoperable broadband network."[^76] To that end, we
    established certain criteria for the Public Safety Broadband
    Licensee eligibility, including a requirement that the Public Safety
    Broadband Licensee must be broadly representative of the public
    safety community.[^77] Further, we required that the Public Safety
    Broadband Licensee be governed by a voting board consisting of
    eleven members, one each from the nine organizations representative
    of public safety, and two at-large members selected by the Public
    Safety and Homeland Security Bureau and the Wireless
    Telecommunications Bureau, jointly on delegated authority.[^78] On
    reconsideration, we revised and expanded the voting board, and
    increased the at-large membership to four.[^79]

47. In the *Second Report and Order*, we further required that certain
    procedural safeguards be incorporated into the articles of
    incorporation and bylaws of the Public Safety Broadband
    Licensee.[^80] For example, in the *Second Report and Order* we
    specified that the term of the Public Safety Broadband Licensee
    officers would be two years, and that election would be by a
    two-thirds majority vote. A two-thirds majority was also required
    for certain other Public Safety Broadband Licensee decisions,
    including amending the articles of incorporation or bylaws. In
    addition, we recognized that Commission oversight in the affairs of
    the Public Safety Broadband Licensee would be necessary and
    appropriate in light of the nature of the public safety broadband
    spectrum licensed to the Public Safety Broadband Licensee as a
    national asset, and in furtherance of the Commission's role in
    ensuring the protection and efficient use of such asset for the
    benefit of the safety of the public.[^81] Meaningful oversight in
    this respect requires a level of transparency, and to that end we
    required the Public Safety Broadband Licensee to submit certain
    reports to the Commission, including quarterly financial
    disclosures.[^82]

48. [Discussion]{.underline}. In light of the scope of the subjects
    discussed elsewhere herein addressing a number of aspects of the 700
    MHz Public/Private Partnership between the D Block licensee and the
    Public Safety Broadband Licensee, we believe it appropriate to
    reexamine the structure of the Public Safety Broadband Licensee and
    the criteria adopted in the *Second Report and Order* to ensure they
    are most optimal for establishing and sustaining a partnership with
    a commercial entity, as well as efficiently and equitably conducting
    the business of the Public Safety Broadband Licensee. We seek
    comment on whether we should reevaluate any of these criteria,
    whether we should clarify or increase the Commission's oversight of
    the Public Safety Broadband Licensee, and, aside from retaining its
    nationwide scope, whether we should make other changes to the
    license or license eligibility criteria. We further seek comment on
    how the Commission can ensure an oversight role for Congress, both
    in the operations of the Public Safety Broadband Licensee and the
    700 MHz Public/Private Partnership. Should Congress designate some
    of the Public Safety Broadband Licensee's board members?

49. *Articles of Incorporation and By-laws.* Specifically, with respect
    to the articles of incorporation and bylaws, we seek comment on the
    adequacy of the provisions specified. Should we require additional
    provisions, and if so, what should they be? Should we amend or
    eliminate any of the current requirements? Should we require a
    unanimous vote in certain instances? For example, should a unanimous
    vote be required for a major undertaking of the Public Safety
    Broadband Licensee? What would such an undertaking include? In the
    alternative, should we require a supermajority vote in such
    instances instead of a unanimous vote? In addition, should we
    provide for Commission review of decisions requiring a unanimous or
    supermajority vote, or should the Commission make certain decisions
    for the Public Safety Broadband Licensee if unanimity or
    supermajority is not achieved?

50. With respect to the voting board, we seek comment on the composition
    of the board, and its size. Should we include additional or fewer
    entities? If so, what qualifications should we require of such
    entities? We also seek comment on whether we should eliminate
    altogether the requirement of inclusion of specific voting board
    members. If we eliminate this requirement, how should we ensure that
    broad representation of the public safety community is adequately
    addressed? With respect to the leadership of the board, should we
    revise the terms of the officers? Should we require a unanimous vote
    for appointment of officers? Should we require a rotating
    chairmanship among the voting board members? Should the Commission
    appoint a chairperson if unanimous consent cannot be attained?

51. *Commission oversight.* We also seek comment on how the Commission
    can better exercise oversight over the activities of the Public
    Safety Broadband Licensee and the commercial partner. Is quarterly
    financial reporting adequate, or are additional disclosures by the
    Public Safety Broadband Licensee or commercial partner necessary?
    What additional measures, if any, should the Commission take to
    ensure the appropriate level of oversight. For example, should
    Commission approval of certain activities be required before the
    Public Safety Broadband Licensee may undertake them? For example,
    should Commission approval be required before the Public Safety
    Broadband Licensee enters into contracts of a particular duration or
    cumulative dollar amount? Should we require or reserve the right to
    have Commission staff attend meetings of the voting board?

52. *Role of State Governments.* We seek comment on whether providing a
    nationwide, interoperable broadband network might be more
    effectively and efficiently accomplished by allowing State
    governments (or other entities that have or plan interoperable
    networks for the benefit of public safety) to assume responsibility
    for coordinating the participation of the public safety providers in
    their jurisdictions. To the extent commenters believe the State
    governments should assume such a role, we seek comment on the proper
    relationship between the State governments and the Public Safety
    Broadband Licensee and on our authority to establish such a role for
    State governments. Should the Public Safety Broadband Licensee be
    authorized to choose a minimum standard for any public safety
    broadband operation, with the State governments given the
    responsibility to work with public safety providers to implement
    operations in their jurisdictions? Would such an approach allow
    State governments wanting higher-grade networks to implement
    separately these more-advanced systems, while those wanting networks
    at the minimum standard avoid what they may consider unnecessary
    expenses? Are State governments better situated to address
    implementation challenges that cross public safety jurisdictions
    (*e.g*., coordinating use by sheriffs departments in neighboring
    counties) as well as intra-jurisdictional challenges (*e.g*.,
    coordinating use by the police versus fire departments)? On the
    other hand, if different jurisdictions chose different grades of
    networks, would there be a lack of economies of scale and thus
    higher equipment costs for all public safety users?

53. *Reissuance of the Public Safety Broadband License and selection
    process.* In light of the changes contemplated above and the
    corresponding changes contemplated with respect to the D Block, we
    seek comment on whether we should rescind the current 700 MHz Public
    Safety Broadband License and seek new applicants. If so, should we
    use the same procedures as before, *i.e.,* delegating authority to
    the Chief, Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau to solicit
    applications, specifying any changed criteria that may be adopted
    following this Second Further Notice, and having the Commission
    select the licensee? Are there considerations other than those above
    or previously considered that should be taken into account in
    selecting the licensee? Recognizing the need to identify the
    licensee quickly to enable the effective development of the 700 MHz
    Public/Private Partnership, what mechanism should the Commission use
    to assign the license if there is more than one qualified applicant?

## Possible Revisions/Clarifications Relating to the 700 MHz Public/Private Partnership

54. As a preliminary matter, we seek comment on whether the public
    interest would best be served by the development of a nationwide,
    interoperable wireless broadband network for both commercial and
    public safety services through the 700 MHz Public/Private
    Partnership between the D Block licensee and the Public Safety
    Broadband Licensee, and whether we should therefore continue to
    require that the D Block licensee and Public Safety Broadband
    Licensee enter into the 700 MHz Public/Private Partnership. Below,
    we consider in detail the Commission's options in the event that we
    continue this requirement. We seek comment on a broad set of
    possible revisions to the 700 MHz Public/Private Partnership,
    including revisions and/or clarifications with regard to the
    respective obligations of the D Block licensee and the Public Safety
    Broadband Licensee.

55. First, we address the terms of the 700 MHz Public/Private
    Partnership, including (1) what the D Block licensee is required to
    construct; and (2) the operational roles of the D Block licensee and
    Public Safety Broadband Licensee once the network is constructed.
    With regard to network construction requirements, we seek comment
    on (1) the technical specifications of the network; (2) whether to
    provide public safety users with access to D Block spectrum during
    emergencies and, if so, under what terms; and (3) the build-out
    obligations of the D Block licensee, and whether such obligations
    should be revised in conjunction with a modification to the D Block
    license term. Regarding operational roles, we seek comment on the
    respective roles and responsibilities of the D Block licensee and
    Public Safety Broadband Licensee with regard to the operation of the
    network, including the management of users on the network, and we
    seek comment regarding service or spectrum usage fees.

56. Next, we address the procedures by which the winning bidder of the D
    Block license will enter into a Network Sharing Agreement (NSA) with
    the Public Safety Broadband Licensee that will further define and
    govern the 700 MHz Public/Private Partnership. Specifically, we seek
    comment on possible revisions to the rules relating to both the
    negotiation of the NSA and the dispute resolution procedures
    applicable in the event the parties are unable to reach agreement on
    NSA terms. In particular, we seek comment on whether, following a
    default due to the failure of a winning bidder for the D Block
    license to execute an NSA with the Public Safety Broadband Licensee,
    we either should offer the license to the party with the next
    highest bid, in descending order, or promptly auction alternative
    license(s) for the D Block spectrum without the 700 MHz
    Public/Private Partnership conditions and subject to alternative
    service rules.

57. We then seek comment on a number of issues related to the auction of
    the D Block license, including (1) whether to restrict who may
    participate in the new auction of the D Block license; (2) how to
    determine any reserve price for such an auction; (3) whether to
    adopt an exception to the impermissible material relationship rule
    for the determination of designated entity eligibility with respect
    to arrangements for the lease or resale (including wholesale) of the
    spectrum capacity of the D Block license; and (4) whether we should
    modify the auction default payment rules with respect to the D Block
    winning bidder. We also seek comment on the rules governing the
    relocation of public safety narrowband operations and the D Block
    license winner's obligations to fund that relocation, and on any
    other revisions that may be appropriate with regard to the 700 MHz
    Public/Private Partnership. Finally, we seek comment on other
    revisions or clarifications that may be appropriate with regard to
    the 700 MHz Public/Private Partnership, including whether to license
    the D Block and public safety broadband spectrum on a nationwide or
    REAG basis.

### The 700 MHz Public/Private Partnership

#### Network/System Requirements

58. Assuming that we determinate that we should continue to require the
    700 MHz Public/Private Partnership, in this section, we seek comment
    on whether to adopt changes to the requirements of the network that
    the D Block licensee is required to construct, and whether to modify
    the required schedule for that construction.[^83] We seek comment on
    what changes will best serve the Commission's goal of making a
    broadband, interoperable network available on a nationwide basis to
    public safety entities, which requires providing sufficient
    assurances to bidders for the D Block license that the required
    shared network will be commercially viable. We also are seeking
    comment below on the costs to build and operate such a broadband,
    interoperable network, including the specific costs necessary to
    meet public safety needs and the additional costs of covering remote
    areas.

##### Technical Requirements for the Shared Wireless Broadband Network

59. [Background]{.underline}. In the *Second Report and Order*, we found
    that in order to ensure a successful public/private partnership
    between the D Block licensee and the Public Safety Broadband
    Licensee, with a shared nationwide interoperable broadband network
    infrastructure that meets the needs of public safety, we must adopt
    certain technical network requirements.[^84] Accordingly, among
    other requirements, we mandated that the network incorporate the
    following technical specifications:

-   Specifications for a broadband technology platform that provides
    mobile voice, video, and data capability that is seamlessly
    interoperable across agencies, jurisdictions, and geographic areas.
    The platform should also include current and evolving
    state-of-the-art technologies reasonably made available in the
    commercial marketplace with features beneficial to the public safety
    community (*e.g.*, increased bandwidth).

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-   Sufficient signal coverage to ensure reliable operation throughout
    the service area consistent with typical public safety
    communications systems (*i.e.*, 99.7 percent or better reliability).

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-   Sufficient robustness to meet the reliability and performance
    requirements of public safety. To meet this standard, network
    specifications must include features such as hardening of
    transmission facilities and antenna towers to withstand harsh
    weather and disaster conditions, and backup power sufficient to
    maintain operations for an extended period of time.

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-   Sufficient capacity to meet the needs of public safety, particularly
    during emergency and disaster situations, so that public safety
    applications are not degraded (*i.e.*, increased blockage rates
    and/or transmission times or reduced data speeds) during periods of
    heavy usage. In considering this requirement, we expect the network
    to employ spectrum efficient techniques, such as frequency reuse and
    sectorized or adaptive antennas.

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-   Security and encryption consistent with state-of-the-art
    technologies.[^85]

60. We required that the parties determine more specifically what these
    technical specifications would be and implement them through the
    NSA. In addition, we required that the parties determine and
    implement other detailed specifications of the network that the D
    Block licensee would construct.[^86] We determined that allowing the
    parties to determine specific details, including the technologies
    that would be used, subject to approval by the Commission, would
    provide the parties with flexibility to evaluate the cost and
    performance of all available solutions while ensuring that the
    shared wireless broadband network has all the capabilities and
    attributes needed for a public safety broadband network.[^87]

61. [Discussion]{.underline}. We seek comment on whether we should
    clarify or modify any aspect of the technical network requirements
    adopted in the *Second Report and Order* or otherwise establish with
    more detail the technical requirements of the network. To guide the
    discussion that follows, and to enable more focused comment that
    better assists the Commission as we address these technical
    requirements, we attach as an appendix a possible technical
    framework ("Technical Appendix") that identifies in greater detail
    potential technical parameters for the shared wireless broadband
    network. We thus seek detailed comment on this Technical Appendix,
    as well as on the following discussion points.

62. Would clarifications in this regard provide appropriate additional
    certainty, prior to re-auction, regarding the obligations of the D
    Block licensee and the costs of the network that this licensee would
    be expected to construct? Would such specification enhance the
    abilities of the winning bidder of the D Block license and the
    Public Safety Broadband Licensee to negotiate the NSA? Would
    modifications provide greater assurance that the required network
    would be economically viable? Conversely, would greater specificity
    hinder the NSA negotiations or otherwise inadvertently impact the
    success of the 700 MHz Public/Private Partnership?

63. We seek comment on whether, as a general matter, maintaining
    parties' flexibility to negotiate most details of the network
    specifications would best serve the public interest goals of the
    partnership. We seek comment on what technical requirements should
    be specified in advance, rather than being left to be negotiated
    after the auction, and whether there are any critical aspects of the
    network, either in the existing requirements or beyond those already
    addressed, that it would be beneficial to specify or clarify in the
    rules in order to increase bidder certainty regarding the cost of
    the D Block obligations. In addition, are there network
    specifications that would be particularly difficult to negotiate in
    the absence of further clarification by the Commission?

64. Are any changes to requirements needed to reflect the practical
    differences between the architecture of traditional local wireless
    public safety systems and the architecture of nationwide commercial
    broadband network systems? If so, we seek comment on what
    requirements, modifications, or clarifications we should adopt.
    Conversely, we seek comment on whether to require national
    standardization in the implementation of these network requirements,
    and the extent to which national standardization will help the
    network to achieve efficiency and economies of scale and scope.

65. We also welcome comments on other specifications we required of the
    network. These included:

-   A mechanism to automatically prioritize public safety communications
    over commercial uses on a real-time basis and to assign the highest
    priority to communications involving safety of life and property and
    homeland security consistent with the requirements adopted in the
    *Second Report and Order*;

-   Operational capabilities consistent with features and requirements
    specified by the Public Safety Broadband Licensee that are typical
    of current and evolving state-of-the-art public safety systems (such
    as connection to the PSTN, push-to-talk, one-to-one and one-to-many
    communications, etc.);

-   Operational control of the network by the Public Safety Broadband
    Licensee to the extent necessary to ensure public safety
    requirements are met; and

-   A requirement to make available at least one handset that would be
    suitable for public safety use and include an integrated satellite
    solution, rendering the handset capable of operating both on the 700
    MHz public safety spectrum and on satellite frequencies.[^88]

66. Commenters with proposals should provide detailed information
    regarding their proposed technical network specifications, and the
    extent to which such proposals are typical of current wireless
    public safety or commercial systems. For example, with regard to any
    particular network requirement, are there any established public
    safety standards in the broadband context? To what extent have these
    standards been implemented in commercial networks? Commenters should
    also discuss how such proposals will ensure that the goals of the
    700 MHz Public/Private Partnership are met, in particular by
    enabling the creation of a viable commercial network that addresses
    the unique needs of the public safety community.

67. We seek comment on how the technical specifications of existing or
    anticipated future public safety networks differ from existing or
    anticipated commercial networks. Commenters are encouraged to be as
    specific as possible in answering these questions, providing
    detailed technical data where possible.  How different are the
    technical specifications of existing or anticipated public safety
    networks from other public safety networks?  How do the technical
    requirements of different public safety networks differ based upon
    factors such as intended user base and local morphology (e.g., urban
    vs. rural environments; fire, police, emergency medical service and
    other first responders; in-building vs. outdoor usage; high-speed
    vehicular vs. pedestrian public safety users, etc.)?  How do these
    technical requirements differ based upon factors such as type of use
    (mission-critical voice and data versus non-mission-critical
    communications)?  What purposes, if any, do public safety users make
    of commercial wireless networks today for mission-critical and/or
    non-mission-critical communications?  How distinct in practice is
    the line between mission-critical and non-mission-critical
    communications?  How do network construction and operation costs
    vary among different types of public safety networks and between
    public safety and commercial networks?  To what extent can a
    commercial provider make use of publicly-owned or leased property,
    and how could use of such facilities affect the cost of constructing
    and operating a public safety broadband network? 

68. We seek comment on the payment and funding models employed by public
    safety users when building and operating dedicated public safety
    networks (e.g., construction and operation by municipal employees,
    construction and operation by private subcontractors). Similarly, we
    seek comment on the payment and funding models employed by public
    safety users when they rely upon commercial wireless services.  Are
    fees assessed based on usage, number of users, or other factors?
    What provisions are typically made for unanticipated demand for
    services and how are these reconciled with fixed budgets? Again,
    commenters are encouraged to be as specific as possible in answering
    these questions, providing specific cost data or concrete numerical
    estimates where possible.

69. We note that the Public Safety Spectrum Trust ("PSST"), after it was
    designated Public Safety Broadband Licensee by the Commission,
    released what it referred to as a Bidders Information Document
    ("BID"), which, it stated, was offered to provide "high-level
    information regarding the PSST's expectations of the D Block partner
    in building and operating the shared Public/Private network" and "to
    define and detail certain expectations that the PSST has for this
    partnership."[^89] We emphasize that the BID has no formal legal
    role in the development of the nationwide, broadband public safety
    network under the existing rules and we express no view on the
    positions taken by the PSST as reflected in the BID. We take this
    opportunity, however, to seek comment on the impact of the BID on
    the previous auction, whether any particular aspects of the PSST's
    "expectations" were of particular concern to potential bidders or of
    particular importance to public safety entities, whether the release
    of the BID was helpful in clarifying costs, what role the BID played
    in pre-auction discussions and what formal role, if any, that a
    document similar to the BID such as a statement of requirements
    should play in establishing or clarifying the technical requirements
    of the nationwide, broadband public safety network under revised
    rules. We note, for example, that one commercial entity has
    suggested that the Public Safety Broadband Licensee should be
    required to release a statement of requirements before auction, and
    that the statement of requirements should constrain the elements
    that the Public Safety Broadband Licensee can require in the shared
    network.[^90] We seek comment on this suggestion.

70. With these questions and issues in mind, we seek comment on whether
    the Commission should itself establish in a detailed and
    comprehensive fashion the technical obligations of the D Block
    licensee with regard to the network, and if so, what specifications
    it should adopt. For example, we seek comment on whether the
    attached Technical Framework could, following comment on its
    specific components, provide for establishing an appropriate set of
    requirements for the shared wireless broadband network. We also seek
    comment on a number of particular technical issues, as set forth
    below.

71. *Specification for broadband technology platform.* We seek comment
    on whether we should modify or further clarify any aspect of the
    broadband technology platform specifications provided in the *Second
    Report and Order*. Would clarifying that the D Block winning bidder
    has the right to make the final technical determinations with regard
    to the network platform serve the public interest? Should the
    Commission specify the precise public safety services and
    applications that must be carried or that need not be carried,
    beyond typical broadband applications (*e.g.*, Internet access,
    video, multimedia), such as cellular telephony, dispatch voice
    service, push-to-talk, etc., and if so, what should they be? Should
    we establish limits on the obligation to accommodate applications
    similar to those established in the C Block? For example, should we
    provide that there is no obligation to carry customized applications
    where accommodating such applications would require modifying
    network infrastructure or back-office systems?[^91] What impact
    might any of these determinations have on the utility of the network
    for public safety purposes?

72. We ask commenters to provide detailed information regarding any
    proposed broadband platform solution. How can we establish a set of
    requirements that will meet public safety's needs while providing
    prospective bidders with sufficient certainty that it will be
    possible to construct a system that is economically viable? How can
    we best meet this objective without impeding flexibility regarding
    network design or inadvertently deterring potential bidders from
    participating in the auction?

73. *Reliability*. We seek comment on whether we should modify any
    aspect of the reliability standard established in the *Second Report
    and Order*. Should we eliminate the specific requirement of 99.7
    percent network reliability and impose only the general requirement
    of "reliable operation throughout the service area consistent with
    typical public safety communications," leaving the specific level of
    reliability to negotiations? Should we specify a different level of
    reliability, such as 95 percent reliability over 95 percent of a
    defined area?[^92] Does the latter standard better reflect a typical
    level of reliability in public safety communications systems?
    Further, is the typical level of reliability in public safety
    systems a relevant factor for cellularized broadband systems? Are
    there any real-world examples of reliability based on cellularized
    broadband systems used by public safety?

74. We also seek comment on whether, in the event we continue to require
    a specific level of reliability, we should nevertheless expressly
    provide that the parties have flexibility to mutually agree to a
    different level in particular geographic areas. Are there specific
    provisions related to reliability that would create unreasonable
    challenges in establishing the network? If so, what limitations
    should we establish? Finally, we seek comment on how the reliability
    standard impacts the performance requirement, *e.g.*, might it
    effectively transform the population-based performance requirements
    into geographic benchmarks?

75. *Robustness and hardening.* We seek comment on whether to further
    specify or modify the requirements of the network regarding
    robustness and hardening. For example, should we further specify the
    particular environmental conditions (temperature range, wind,
    vibration, etc.) that the installations must be designed to
    withstand? Should we specify the minimal number of hours that base
    stations and network equipment must be capable of operating in the
    event of a power outage? Should we require an onsite power generator
    and a specific supply of fuel for each base station? Should we
    simply provide that the network must meet the same requirements
    regarding backup power applicable to commercial mobile radio service
    providers, given that these requirements were themselves established
    to meet homeland security and public safety goals?[^93] Should we
    address whether and to what extent redundant infrastructure must be
    provided, such as provisions for overlapping cell sites that could
    provide backup coverage in an emergency, and if so, how would such
    provisions impact the viability of the system and its cost? Should
    we establish minimum obligations to have access to backup equipment
    and systems, such as cellular systems on wheels, or minimum
    timeframes for system restoration? Alternatively or additionally,
    should we establish ceilings on the extent of robustness and
    hardening that may be required of the D Block licensee?

76. We also seek comment on whether these requirements should be subject
    to variation. Should we specify circumstances in which the
    robustness and hardening obligations may vary, such as to account
    for local zoning restrictions, geography, or patterns of weather?
    Should we alternatively specify that the extent and circumstances of
    variation will be left to the parties to negotiate? Commenters
    advocating particular requirements relative to robustness and
    hardening should also explain how their proposals compare to the
    standards for current public safety wireless systems.

77. *Capacity, throughput, and quality of service.* As stated in the
    *Second Report and Order*, NPSTC contended that capacity is a key
    consideration, arguing that "the Commission should require a
    detailed capacity plan as one of the central elements in the
    negotiated agreement . . . ."[^94] Should we further specify the
    minimum levels of capacity or throughput (*i.e.* data transmission
    rates), or ceilings on such levels, that the network must provide?
    If so, how should such levels be defined? Should they vary by
    geographic location, or other conditions? Should we establish other
    quality of service parameters, such as resource reservation and
    session control mechanisms? What means should be made available by
    the D Block licensee to enable public safety to monitor the quality
    of service in an unobtrusive way and without the addition of
    significant cost to the network? Should the means be nationally
    standardized and/or be limited to those provided by the D Block
    licensee? Is there a need for a formal process to address future
    increases in demand?

78. As we have emphasized throughout this Second Further Notice, one of
    the key elements of the 700 MHz Public/Private Partnership is the D
    Block licensee's access to the public safety broadband spectrum on a
    secondary basis to defray the cost of building a nationwide network
    serving both commercial and public safety users. We thus invite
    comment as to whether there are any particular services or
    applications that might be too inefficient or far removed from
    typical public safety communications needs, or that may overburden
    or otherwise not be viable for a broadband network, such that they
    may frustrate this key element by excessively limiting or precluding
    the secondary access to this spectrum contemplated in the *Second
    Report and Order*. For example, would it be appropriate to prohibit
    or restrict use of the network for continuous or routine video
    surveillance from fixed locations as being an inefficient or
    inappropriate use of the capacity of the shared wireless broadband
    network?[^95] Would such use create undue uncertainty concerning
    network availability for either the D Block licensee or for public
    safety users? If there are such concerns, how else should they be
    addressed? Are other frequencies available to public safety users
    more appropriate for fixed video applications? Could such networks
    be made interoperable with the public safety broadband network using
    700 MHz spectrum? What are the relative costs of using alternative
    frequencies?  What cost savings, if any, would there be to
    incorporating video into the 700 MHz network as compared to allowing
    individual jurisdictions to develop their own fixed video wireless
    networks? Should we set certain parameters to determine or predict
    capacity needs of public safety users? We could, for example, base
    the capacity needs on the levels of authority within the public
    safety community, the existence or absence of an "emergency"
    (further discussed below), or type, time, or location of
    communication. Are there any technical, operational, or cost-based
    means to monitor or regulate capacity needs of certain public safety
    entities? Should we require the Public Safety Broadband Licensee to
    forecast public safety use on a regular basis (monthly, quarterly),
    or otherwise provide the assistance needed for the D Block licensee
    to make such predictions? Commenters proposing any limits to address
    such capacity concerns should provide detailed information on how
    such limitations could be implemented without compromising public
    safety. Would payment obligations of public safety users for network
    use be sufficient incentive for users to voluntarily limit use?
    Would a rate-of-return or cost-plus pricing mechanism provide the
    appropriate incentives? Alternatively, should we vary the
    obligations of the D Block licensee, its right to recover costs from
    public safety, or other terms of the NSA, based on the extent to
    which the public safety broadband spectrum is available for
    commercial operations? Or is it sufficient to clarify that the
    parties may negotiate such variations?

79. *Security and encryption.* Should we provide greater specificity
    regarding what the D Block licensee must provide with regard to
    security and encryption, or establish an alternate requirement?
    Should we identify further what constitutes "state-of-the-art"
    security and encryption technology? Should we limit the requirement
    to technical network solutions or standards for security and
    encryption implemented on a nationwide basis? We seek comment on the
    costs and practical challenges of implementing such measures in the
    public/private network to be constructed by the D Block licensee,
    particularly in the event that we permit local variation in the
    security solutions and standards.

80. *Combined use of spectrum*. We seek comment on whether, in order to
    provide the D Block licensee with appropriate flexibility to achieve
    an efficient and effective implementation of the 700 MHz
    Public/Private Partnership obligations, we should amend our rules to
    clarify that the D Block licensee may construct and operate the
    shared wireless broadband network using the entire 20 megahertz of D
    Block spectrum and public safety broadband spectrum as a combined,
    blended resource. In particular, we seek comment on whether, in
    designing and operating the shared network, the 10 megahertz of D
    Block spectrum and the 10 megahertz of public safety broadband
    spectrum may be combined, in effect, into a single and integrated 20
    megahertz pool of fungible spectrum that may be assigned to users
    without regard to whether a public safety user is being assigned
    frequencies in the D Block or a commercial user is being assigned
    frequencies in the public safety broadband spectrum, so long as the
    network provides commercial and public safety users with service
    that is consistent with the respective capacity and priority rights
    of the D Block license and Public Safety Broadband License and with
    our rules. For example, such a network would have to guarantee that
    public safety users have priority access to at least 10 megahertz of
    spectrum capacity consistent with the 10 megahertz associated with
    the Public Safety Broadband License, but, at any particular time,
    the network might be using frequencies associated with either the D
    Block license or the Public Safety Broadband License to provide that
    capacity.[^96]

81. We seek comment on whether permitting the combined use of spectrum
    in this fashion would provide for a more efficient and effective use
    of spectrum, whether it provides further flexibility to evaluate and
    use all available wireless broadband technologies to build and
    operate the network and thus promote our ultimate goal of making
    available a nationwide interoperable broadband network for public
    safety users. We also seek comment on whether such combined use
    would be consistent with the different rights and obligations
    associated with the D Block license and the Public Safety Broadband
    License, respectively, and whether, in light of these and other
    considerations, it would be in the public interest to allow such
    use. Commenters should also discuss whether permitting such combined
    use of the spectrum associated with these two licenses would be
    consistent with the requirements of Sections 337(a) and (f) and the
    Commission rules allotting specific frequencies for use by the
    Public Safety Broadband Licensee and the D Block licensee.

82. *Power flux density, and related notification, and coordination
    requirements*. In the text of the *Second Report and Order*, we
    indicated that we would not adopt any power flux density (PFD) limit
    requirement in the public safety broadband segment, based on the
    limited record received on this issue.[^97] We also noted that,
    should additional facts be presented, we might revisit this
    issue.[^98] The applicable rules adopted by the *Second Report and
    Order,* however, require the Public Safety Broadband Licensee to
    meet a PFD limit when operating base stations at power levels above
    1 kW ERP.[^99] In light of this discrepancy between the text of the
    order and the rules, we seek comment on whether we should retain
    this PFD requirement for the public safety broadband spectrum.[^100]
    Further, we note that Verizon Wireless ("Verizon") filed a petition
    for reconsideration of the *First Report and Order*[^101] with
    regard to certain of the notification and coordination obligations
    placed on commercial 700 MHz licensees.[^102] First, Verizon
    requests that we eliminate the PFD/notification requirement for
    Upper 700 MHz C and D Block licensees when operating base stations
    at power levels above 1 kW ERP in non-rural areas. And second, with
    respect to Upper 700 MHz C and D Block licensees operating in rural
    areas, Verizon requests that such licensees: (1) should only have to
    coordinate with adjacent block licensees (*i.e.*, not all other 700
    MHz licensees) when seeking to operate at power levels greater than
    1 kW ERP; (2) should be permitted to use a power level of "1 kW ERP
    and 1 kW/MHz ERP" as the trigger for coordination instead of 1 kW
    ERP; [^103] and finally, (3) should be subject to a
    PFD**/**notification requirement, rather than a coordination
    requirement, when operating base stations at power levels greater
    than 1 kW ERP and 1 kW/MHz ERP.[^104] In light of this petition, we
    seek comment on whether to apply any or all of Verizon's proposed
    rule changes to the public safety broadband spectrum.

83. *Other technical requirements.* As noted above, we also seek comment
    on whether to establish, modify, or clarify the requirements with
    regard to any other critical aspect of the network that may
    significantly affect its commercial viability or its ability to meet
    the needs of public safety. For example, should we further specify
    the technical requirements and standards with regard to
    interoperability or network availability?

##### Priority Public Safety Access to Commercial Spectrum During Emergencies

84. [Background]{.underline}. In addition to requiring that the network
    meet certain technical specifications, we also required that the D
    Block licensee provide the Public Safety Broadband Licensee with
    priority access, during emergencies, to the spectrum associated with
    the D Block license (in addition to the 700 MHz public safety
    broadband spectrum). At the same time, we noted that the potential
    disruption of commercial service in the D Block, while appropriate
    in an emergency situation, must be limited to the most serious
    occasions in order to avoid jeopardizing the commercial viability of
    the 700 MHz Public/Private Partnership. To balance these competing
    concerns, we thus required the parties to define "emergency" for
    purposes of priority access to D Block license spectrum as part of
    the NSA. [^105] We also provided that in the event that the parties
    are unable to agree that an emergency situation requires priority
    access to the D Block license spectrum, especially in circumstances
    that do not clearly fall within the definition of "emergency"
    negotiated by the parties in the NSA, the Public Safety Broadband
    Licensee may request that the Commission declare, on an expedited
    basis, that particular circumstances warrant emergency priority
    access.[^106]

85. [Discussion]{.underline}. We seek comment on whether we should
    continue to require that the D Block licensee provide the Public
    Safety Broadband Licensee with priority access, during emergencies,
    to the spectrum associated with the D Block license. We seek comment
    on whether this obligation is essential to ensure that the network
    capacity will meet public safety wireless broadband needs, or
    whether removing the obligation could significantly improve the
    chances that this proceeding will succeed in achieving our goal of
    making available to public safety users a nationwide, interoperable,
    broadband network that incorporates the greater levels of
    reliability, robustness, security, and other features required for
    public safety services.

86. If we continue to require that the D Block licensee provide the
    Public Safety Broadband Licensee with priority access, during
    emergencies, to the spectrum associated with the D Block license, we
    seek comment on whether we should provide more clarity on the
    circumstances that would constitute an "emergency" for this purpose.
    If so, we ask whether any or all of the following events should
    define an "emergency:"

-   The declaration of a state of emergency by the President or a state
    governor.

-   The issuance of an evacuation order by the President or a state
    governor impacting areas of significant scope.

-   The issuance by the National Weather Service of a hurricane or flood
    warning likely to impact a significant area.

-   The occurrence of other major natural disasters, such as tornado
    strikes, tsunamis, earthquakes, or pandemics.

-   The occurrence of manmade disasters or acts of terrorism of a
    substantial nature.

-   The occurrence of power outages of significant duration and scope.

-   The elevation of the national threat level, as determined by the
    Department of Homeland Security, to either orange or red for any
    portion of the United States, or the elevation of the threat level
    in the airline sector or any portion thereof, as determined by the
    Department of Homeland Security, to red.

87. Are there any other events, or modifications to the above, that
    would assist in removing uncertainty in reaching a definition of
    "emergency?" Would this proposed definition of "emergency" be too
    burdensome on the D Block licensee? If we adopted some or all of the
    above event-defining emergencies, should we permit the parties to
    the NSA to propose different or additional scenarios that should be
    considered emergencies? Further, should we make explicit that
    priority access in emergency situations be limited to the geographic
    and/or jurisdictional area directly affected by the emergency?
    Should we establish time limits on the duration of priority access?
    If so, how should such time limits be based? Alternatively, should
    we establish limits on the priority access given to the D Block
    spectrum capacity, for example by limiting public safety's priority
    access to D Block spectrum capacity in emergencies to 50 percent?

##### Performance Requirements Relating to Construction of the Network

88. [Background]{.underline}. In the *Second Report and Order*, we
    decided that the D Block license would be issued for a period of 10
    years and imposed unique performance requirements for the D Block
    license in connection with the construction of the shared wireless
    broadband network. Specifically, we required the D Block licensee to
    provide signal coverage and offer service to at least 75 percent of
    the population of the nationwide D Block license area by the end of
    the fourth year, 95 percent by the end of the seventh year, and 99.3
    percent by the end of the tenth year.[^107] We further specified
    that "the network and signal levels employed to meet these
    benchmarks be adequate for public safety use . . . and that the
    services made available be appropriate for public safety entities in
    those areas."[^108]

89. Certain other requirements were imposed to further ensure coverage
    of highways and certain other areas such as incorporated communities
    with a population in excess of 3000.[^109] We concluded that these
    build-out requirements "will ensure that public safety needs are
    met."[^110] We also required, however, that, "to the extent that the
    D Block licensee chooses to provide commercial services to
    population levels in excess of the relevant benchmarks, the D Block
    licensee will be required to make the same level of service
    available to public safety entities."[^111]

90. [Discussion]{.underline}. We seek comment on whether we should
    revise the performance requirements that we imposed on the D Block
    licensee with regard to building out the nationwide, interoperable
    broadband network and, if so, how those requirements should be
    revised. We also invite comment on whether to extend the license
    term for that license, and possibly the Public Safety Broadband
    License, if we determine to provide for construction benchmarks that
    extend past the initial license term that we established for the D
    Block license.

91. We seek comment on whether we should retain the existing end-of-term
    population benchmark of 99.3 percent or whether instead we should
    adopt a lower population benchmark that is equal to or more
    aggressive than the 75 percent benchmark that is applicable to the C
    Block. We note that each of the top four nationwide carriers is
    currently providing coverage to approximately 90 percent or more of
    the U.S. population.[^112] Given that existing commercial wireless
    infrastructure already covers approximately 90 percent of the
    population, we seek comment on whether it is reasonable to expect
    that the D Block licensee would be able to meet at least a 90
    percent of the population coverage requirement or more, or whether
    some other coverage requirement is appropriate.

92. Based on extrapolations from one estimate in the record, it appears
    that reducing the population coverage level from 99.3 to 98 percent
    would result in a potential cost savings for the D Block licensee of
    approximately \$3.1 billion in capital expenditures and reducing the
    coverage level to 95 percent would result in a potential cost
    savings of approximately \$6.1 billion in capital
    expenditures.[^113] Even assuming that a more reasonable estimate of
    potential cost savings may amount to around half these figures,
    reducing the coverage level to 98 percent would result in a
    potential cost savings of approximately \$1.6 billion and reducing
    the coverage level to 95 percent would result in a potential cost
    savings of around \$3.1 billion.[^114] We seek comment on these
    specific estimates, as well as any other estimates that commenters
    can provide relating to the incremental additional costs associated
    with covering each percentage (in whole or part) of the population
    above 95 percent. We also note that reducing the population coverage
    level for the end-of-term benchmark from 99.3 percent to 98 percent
    or 95 percent would also reduce the geographic area covered by the
    network. We estimate, for example, that under the current 99.3
    percent end of term build-out benchmark, approximately 61 percent of
    the geographic area of the country would be covered by the network.
    By contrast, with a 95 percent end-of-term build-out benchmark, we
    estimate that approximately 40 percent of the geographic area of the
    country would be covered.[^115] We seek comment on these estimates,
    or on any related estimates.

93. More generally, we seek comment on how much a dedicated, nationwide,
    interoperable broadband network for public safety, built to the
    requirements outlined in the *Second Report and Order*, costs to
    build and operate. We seek as much detail on these costs as
    commenters can provide. How should the Commission balance the
    potential savings associated with adopting less stringent
    performance requirements with our goal of establishing a nationwide
    interoperable public safety network?

94. As we consider appropriate construction benchmarks for the D Block
    license, we note that for the 22 megahertz C Block we required
    licensees to provide signal coverage and offer service to at least
    40 percent of the population in each EA of the license area within
    four years and to at least 75 percent of the population in each EA
    of the license area by the end of the ten-year license term.[^116]
    Given that the licenses in the C Block were successfully auctioned
    in Auction 73, and that at least one bidder has put together a
    nearly nationwide geographic footprint with these licenses, we
    assume that the D Block licensee should, at the very minimum, be
    able to meet these benchmarks with respect to its nationwide
    license. We seek comment on this assumption.

95. Depending on which performance benchmarks we may ultimately adopt,
    should we include benchmarks that extend beyond the end of the
    initial 10 year license term? If so, should we also extend the term
    of the D Block license accordingly? Would doing so make it easier
    for the D Block licensee to meet the performance requirements the
    Commission adopted? If, for example, we were to adopt a 15 year
    license term, would such a modification increase the commercial
    viability of the required network while still meeting public safety
    needs? If we were to adopt a 15 year license term, how should the
    interim build-out benchmarks be modified? We could, for example,
    require the D Block licensee to provide signal coverage and offer
    service to at least 50 percent of the population of the nationwide
    license area by the end of the fifth year, 80 percent of the
    population of the nationwide license area by the end of the tenth
    year, and 95 percent of the population of the nationwide license
    area by the end of the fifteenth year. Would modifying the license
    term and performance requirements in this way, or similar way, serve
    the public interest? Alternatively, if we extend the overall license
    term, should we add additional interim benchmarks to reflect the
    longer deployment period? What potential impact would these revised
    terms and benchmarks have on the near-term and long-term needs of
    public safety? Would roaming be a possible solution to increased
    coverage needs?

96. We also seek comment on how making changes to the license term and
    performance requirements as described above would affect other
    aspects of the rules that we adopted, such as the requirement that
    the D Block licensee and Public Safety Broadband Licensee negotiate
    inclusion into the build-out schedule coverage of major highways and
    interstates, as well as incorporated communities with a population
    in excess of 3,000 people?[^117] In addition, we seek comment on
    whether any aspect of the renewal requirements for the D Block
    licensee should be revised. In the *Second Report and Order*, we
    determined that, at the end of the 10 year license term, the D Block
    licensee will be allowed to apply for license renewal that will be
    subject to its success in meeting the material requirements set
    forth in the NSA as well as all other license conditions, including
    meeting the performance benchmark requirements.[^118] Because the
    initial NSA term will expire at the same time, we also required the
    D Block licensee to file a renewed or modified NSA for Commission
    approval at the time of its license renewal application.[^119]
    Should we make any changes to these requirements?

97. How will the possibility of NSA re-negotiation at some point in the
    future affect the incentives of public safety users to develop
    reliance on the public safety broadband network?  What steps could
    provide public safety users with confidence that using the broadband
    network will remain attractive after potential changes to the NSA at
    renewal time?[^120]  What are the downsides to such an approach?

98. As discussed above, we are seeking comment on whether the license
    term of the D Block should be revised. In adopting the ten-year
    license term for the Public Safety Broadband Licensee, we sought to
    harmonize the license terms to facilitate the contemplated leasing
    arrangement and build out requirements. Accordingly, should we
    determine to extend the term of the D Block license, we seek comment
    on whether we also should extend the Public Safety Broadband
    Licensee term in a corresponding manner. Further, we determined in
    the *Second Report and Order* that the NSA was to have a term not to
    exceed 10 years from February 17, 2009, to coincide with the term of
    the D Block license. Thus, we also ask whether we should extend the
    term of the NSA to be co-extensive with any extended term we may
    adopt for the D Block.

99. We also seek comment on whether we should revise our rules to permit
    the D Block licensee to use Mobile Satellite Service to help it meet
    its build-out benchmarks. In the *Second Report and Order*, we found
    that satellite services can enable public safety users to
    communicate in rural and remote areas that terrestrial services do
    not reach. We also stated that satellite technology can provide the
    only means of communicating where terrestrial communications
    networks have been damaged or destroyed by wide-scale natural or
    man-made disasters.[^121] As a result, we required that the D Block
    licensee make available to public safety users at least one handset
    that includes a seamlessly integrated satellite solution.[^122] In
    addition, we strongly encouraged the D Block licensee and the Public
    Safety Broadband Licensee to negotiate large-scale satellite service
    agreements that could be used to either expand or expedite build-out
    in rural areas and to replace terrestrial services where terrestrial
    facilities are damaged or destroyed.[^123]

100. In light of the potential for Mobile Satellite Services to
     supplement the D Block licensee's coverage, we seek comment in this
     Second Further Notice on whether it would serve the public interest
     to permit the D Block licensee to utilize Mobile Satellite Service
     as a way to meet, in part, its build-out requirements. We seek
     comment on whether this proposal could better enable the D Block
     licensee to meet its performance requirements by providing the
     licensee with additional means for ensuring that broadband public
     safety services are available in remote and rural areas. If the D
     Block licensee is able to make use of Mobile Satellite Service
     coverage, we seek comment on whether satellite coverage would make
     it easier to cover gaps in rural areas in the terrestrial 700 MHz
     public safety network. We seek comment on whether this additional
     flexibility in infrastructure deployment would serve to bolster the
     availability, robustness, and survivability of the public safety
     communications network. If we permit the D Block licensee to use
     Mobile Satellite Services to help it meet the build-out benchmarks,
     we seek comment on whether we should limit the extent to which it
     can rely upon such services and, if so, how its reliance on Mobile
     Satellite Services should be limited.

101. We also seek comment on whether the D Block licensee's obligation
     to meet its build-out requirements should be delayed or relaxed if
     the licensee ensures that handsets with terrestrial and mobile
     satellite components are available in areas that have not been
     built out with a terrestrial network, but are covered by a Mobile
     Satellite Service footprint. Alternatively, we seek comment on
     whether we should retain the terrestrial build-out requirement, but
     provide the D Block licensee with more flexibility if it makes
     terrestrial/mobile satellite handsets available for public safety
     use. We seek comment, for example, on whether the D Block licensee
     should be provided scaled flexibility based on the substitutability
     of the satellite offering for terrestrial services to be used by
     public safety users. Factors that we could consider in assessing
     such an offering might include: (1) the capabilities of the
     satellite component (*e.g*., voice, data, video, interoperability,
     priority/preemption); (2) the availability of terrestrial/mobile
     satellite data devices, in addition to handheld voice devices;
     and (3) geographic coverage. To the extent we determine to lower
     the population coverage level for the end-of-term benchmark from
     99.3 percent to 98 percent or 95 percent, is there some other way
     than Mobile Satellite Service to provide service to 99.3 percent of
     the population?

102. What would be the marginal cost to public safety entities of using
     Mobile Satellite Service-based communications services?   To what
     extent would these marginal costs be comparable to the marginal
     cost of using the terrestrial component of the public safety
     broadband network?  Is it reasonable to require the D Block
     licensee to ensure some degree of comparability of costs for public
     safety end users if the D Block licensee relies upon Mobile
     Satellite Service to fulfill a network buildout requirement?  How
     could such comparability be defined and enforced?

103. We also seek comment on whether there are other terrestrial or
     non-terrestrial technologies or services that the D Block licensee
     may utilize to satisfy its performance requirements.[^124] We
     reiterate the questions asked of Mobile Satellite Services above
     with regard to other such non-terrestrial technologies, and we seek
     comment on the costs and benefits of such technologies,
     particularly in comparison to Mobile Satellite Service, and whether
     permitting the use of such technologies to satisfy in part the D
     Block licensee's performance requirements would raise any other
     issues that should be addressed by the Commission.

104. We further seek comment on whether, to reduce the cost of meeting
     our build-out requirements, we should adopt rules to promote or
     facilitate access by the D Block licensee to public safety towers
     and/or rights of way, and if so, what measures would be
     appropriate? We might, for example, obligate the licensees in the
     700 MHz Public/Private Partnership to make "reasonable, good-faith
     efforts to obtain access" to both public safety towers and public
     safety rights of way, as earlier proposed by one party in this
     proceeding.[^125] We seek comment on this option, and on whether
     measures should be adopted to provide public safety entities with
     some degree of obligation or incentive to provide such access.
     Commenters proposing such a measure should also discuss the
     Commission's authority to adopt it. Alternatively, should we
     clarify that the D Block licensee has flexibility to provide this
     type of incentive, such as by agreeing to reduced rates for
     services to public safety entities that provide access to their
     towers, and otherwise leave the issue to be negotiated between the
     two licensees and the relevant public safety entities? Are there
     impediments that might limit the ability of public safety entities
     to enter into such arrangements? If so, what steps can the
     Commission take to address such impediments that are within its
     authority and consistent with the public interest?

105. Finally, as an alternative approach for establishing construction
     requirements, we seek comment on whether we should employ a "two
     tiered" build out obligation, such that the D Block licensee would
     be allowed to incrementally enhance its network. Under this
     approach, the D Block licensee could satisfy its "first tier" build
     out requirement by meeting a subset, or some lower-cost aspects, of
     the technical requirements we adopt for the public-private
     partnership, and later enhance the network to meet public safety
     needs. The D Block licensee would then be required to satisfy a
     "second tier" requirement and fully upgrade portions of the network
     to meet all technical requirements adopted for the shared wireless
     broadband network based on certain temporal and/or public safety
     take-rate-based triggering mechanisms. Would adopting this two
     tiered performance requirement serve our goals to ensure a
     commercially viable opportunity for the D Block licensee to
     construct a shared wireless broadband network suitable for public
     safety use? If so, what "first tier" requirements or capabilities
     should the D Block be required to meet? When should the D Block
     licensee be required to fully upgrade to the entire set of
     technical requirements? Should we specify a certain amount of time
     following each construction benchmark, or after a certain take-rate
     is achieved by public safety entities?

#### Respective Roles and Responsibilities of the D Block Licensee and Public Safety Broadband Licensee with regard to Construction, Management, Operations, and Use of the Network 

106. In adopting the 700 MHz Public/Private Partnership in the *Second
     Report and Order*, we sought to delineate the respective roles and
     responsibilities of the D Block licensee and the Public Safety
     Broadband Licensee in a manner that would ensure that the
     construction and operation of a shared, interoperable broadband
     network infrastructure that operated on the 20 megahertz of
     spectrum associated with the D Block license and the Public Safety
     Broadband License and that served both the needs of commercial and
     public safety users.[^126] Under this plan, the D Block licensee
     and its related entities would finance, construct, and operate the
     shared network,[^127] while the Public Safety Broadband Licensee
     would represent the interests of public safety community and ensure
     that the shared network meets their needs.[^128]

107. In establishing the 700 MHz Public/Private Partnership, we
     determined that promoting commercial investment in the build-out of
     a shared network addressed the most significant obstacle to
     constructing a public safety network -- the limited availability of
     public funding.[^129] We concluded that providing for a shared
     infrastructure would help achieve significant cost efficiencies,
     provide the public safety community with priority access to
     commercial spectrum during emergencies, and speed deployment of a
     nationwide interoperable broadband network for public safety. At
     the same time, by providing the D Block licensee with rights to
     operate commercial services in the 10 megahertz of public safety
     broadband spectrum on a secondary, preemptible basis, this
     partnership would help defray the costs of build-out and ensure
     that the spectrum is used efficiently.[^130]

108. We stated that the D Block licensee would have the "exclusive right
     and obligation to build out the shared network," using both the
     spectrum associated with the D Block license as well as the public
     safety broadband spectrum leased from the Public Safety Broadband
     Licensee.[^131] We determined that providing for "commercial
     operations" on the public safety broadband spectrum, on a secondary
     and preemptible basis, was "an integral part of a viable framework
     for enabling the 700 MHz Public/Private Partnership to finance
     construction of a nationwide, interoperable public safety broadband
     network."[^132] We also afforded the D Block licensee "operational
     flexibility" in using the leased spectrum to provide "an
     appropriate balance between the commercial and public safety
     operations in the public safety broadband spectrum."[^133] We
     stated that the spectrum leasing component of the partnership
     "permits the D Block licensee to construct a network to serve its
     business needs, yet preserves the network infrastructure required
     for primary public safety use in the Public Safety Broadband
     Licensee's band."[^134] We considered the D Block licensee's
     commercial operations throughout the 20 megahertz band of spectrum,
     including operations on a secondary basis with regard to public
     safety spectrum, as a necessary condition in order to "harness
     private sector resources to facilitate construction of a nationwide
     interoperable public safety broadband network."[^135]

109. Meanwhile, in the *Second Report and Order* we provided that the
     Public Safety Broadband Licensee's responsibilities would center
     around directly representing the public safety interests with
     respect to the 700 MHz Public/Private Partnership, negotiating on
     their behalf with the winning bidder of D Block license and
     ensuring that their interests are met in the NSA.[^136] Among other
     things, as discussed above, we provided that no commercial interest
     may be held in the Public Safety Broadband Licensee, that no
     commercial interest may participate in the management of the
     licensee, and that the licensee must be a non-profit
     organization.[^137] We assigned various general responsibilities
     that we considered in keeping with the Public Safety Broadband
     Licensee's responsibilities, as discussed more fully below. We
     afforded the Public Safety Broadband Licensee "significant
     flexibility and control in connection with the construction and use
     of the nationwide broadband public safety network," while at the
     same time we sought "to balance that discretion with the concurrent
     and separate responsibilities" of the D Block licensee.[^138]

110. Finally, we provided some guidance on the service fees that the D
     Block licensee could charge public safety users for their access to
     the shared network, both for "normal network service" using the
     public safety broadband spectrum and for priority access to the D
     Block spectrum.[^139] We required that these fees, to be negotiated
     by the winning bidder of the D Block license and the Public Safety
     Broadband Licensee, be specified in the Network Sharing
     Agreement.[^140] In addition, we indicated that the Public Safety
     Broadband Licensee, as part of its administration of public safety
     access to the shared wireless broadband network, might assess
     "usage fees to recoup its expenses and related frequency
     coordination duties."[^141]

111. Below, we seek comment on whether we should clarify or revise the
     roles and responsibilities relating to the D Block licensee and the
     Public Safety Broadband Licensee. We also seek comment on whether
     we should clarify or revise the guidance or requirements relating
     to fees, including both service fees and spectrum usage fees.
     Finally, we seek comment generally on whether additional revisions
     or clarifications regarding the construction, operation,
     management, or use of the shared network would help ensure that the
     goals of the 700 MHz Public/Private Partnership are achieved.

##### Role and Responsibilities of the D Block Licensee

112. [Background]{.underline}. As discussed above, the D Block licensee
     is generally responsible for financing, construction, and operation
     of the shared network, which will serve both commercial users and
     public safety users. Also as noted above, we considered the D Block
     licensee's "commercial operations" throughout the 20 megahertz band
     of spectrum as a necessary condition in order to "harness private
     sector resources to facilitate construction" of the network.[^142]

113. [Discussion]{.underline}. We invite comment on whether additional
     clarity with regard to the role and responsibilities of the D Block
     licensee would be helpful to ensure that the 700 MHz Public/Private
     Partnership achieves its goal in creating a shared, interoperable
     broadband network. We further seek comment on the appropriate
     extent of the relationship between the D Block licensee and
     individual public safety entities with regard to either the
     establishment of service with those entities or ongoing customer
     care and billing, bearing in mind the role and responsibilities of
     the Public Safety Broadband Licensee, which we discuss below.

114. As we have indicated, the ability of the D Block licensee to
     finance construction of the shared network is critical. Have we
     established sufficient and appropriate incentives in the 700 MHz
     Public/Private Partnership that ultimately will enable the D Block
     licensee to finance and construct the shared network as
     contemplated? Are there additional steps we can take, or further
     clarifications, that would improve the likelihood of the success
     for this partnership?

115. With respect to management and operations of the network, we expect
     that the D Block licensee will establish a network operations
     system to support the network infrastructure that it deploys and
     uses to serve its commercial customers. Such network operations
     functions typically include a network operations/monitoring center,
     billing functions, customer care, and similar functions. Should
     these network operations functions be viewed, much like the
     build-out of a common network infrastructure, as responsibilities
     to be assumed solely by the D Block licensee for the benefit of
     both its commercial customers and the public safety users
     represented by the Public Safety Broadband Licensee? If the D Block
     licensee were to assume all traditional network service provider
     operations, would this better enable the Public Safety Broadband
     Licensee to administer access to the national public safety
     broadband network by individual public safety entities, coordinate
     frequency usage, assess usage fees, and exercise its sole authority
     to approve equipment and applications for use by public safety
     entities?

116. We also seek comment on the factors that will affect and determine
     the D Block licensee's commercial operations and anticipated
     profitability. Commenters are encouraged to be as specific as
     possible and to provide detailed projections and figures where
     possible.  What types of commercial customers can the licensee be
     expected to serve (e.g., critical infrastructure industries,
     commercial wireless carriers seeking additional spectrum or roaming
     capacity, commercial wireless customers, automotive companies and
     service providers, large enterprise customers)?  How might current
     trends and recent developments in the commercial wireless market
     and the general financial markets affect the D Block licensee's
     financial model?

##### Role and Responsibilities of the Public Safety Broadband Licensee 

117. [Background]{.underline}. As discussed above, the Public Safety
     Broadband Licensee generally is charged with representing the
     interests of the public safety community to ensure that the shared
     interoperable broadband network meets their needs. In the *Second
     Report and Order*, we assigned the following responsibilities to
     the Public Safety Broadband Licensee concerning its partnership
     with the D Block licensee:

-   General administration of access to the national public safety
    broadband network by individual public safety entities, including
    assessment of usage fees to recoup its expenses and related
    frequency coordination duties.

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-   Regular interaction with and promotion of the needs of the public
    safety entities that would utilize the national public safety
    broadband network, within the technical and operational confines of
    the NSA.

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-   Use of its national level of representation of the public safety
    community to interface with equipment vendors on its own or in
    partnership with the D Block licensee, as appropriate, to achieve
    and pass on the benefits of economies of scale concerning network
    and subscriber equipment and applications.

-   Sole authority, which cannot be waived in the NSA, to approve, in
    consultation with the D Block licensee, equipment and applications
    for use by public safety entities on the public safety broadband
    network.

-   Responsibility to facilitate negotiations between the winning bidder
    of the D Block license and local and state entities to build out
    local and state-owned lands.[^143]

118. We also identified several other of the Public Safety Broadband
     Licensee's responsibilities, which included:

-   Coordination of stations operating on public safety broadband
    spectrum with public safety narrowband stations, including
    management of the internal public safety guard band.

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-   Oversight and implementation of the relocation of narrowband public
    safety operations in channels 63 and 68, and the upper 1 megahertz
    of channels 64 and 69.

-   Exercise of sole discretion, pursuant to Section 2.103 of the
    Commission's rules, whether to permit Federal public safety agency
    use of the public safety broadband spectrum, with any such use
    subject to the terms and conditions of the NSA.

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-   Responsibility for reviewing requests for wideband waivers and
    including necessary conditions or limitations consistent with the
    deployment and construction of the national public safety broadband
    network.[^144]

119. As noted above, we also provided that no commercial interest may be
     held in the Public Safety Broadband Licensee, that no commercial
     interest may participate in the management of the licensee, and
     that the licensee must be a non-profit organization.[^145] We
     indicated, however, that, as part of its administration of public
     safety access to the shared wireless broadband network, the Public
     Safety Broadband Licensee might assess usage fees to recoup its
     expenses and related frequency coordination duties.[^146]

120. We afforded the Public Safety Broadband Licensee flexibility in
     overseeing the construction and use of the nationwide broadband
     public safety network, while seeking "to balance that discretion
     with the concurrent and separate responsibilities" of the D Block
     licensee.[^147] In order to fulfill these obligations, we indicated
     that the Public Safety Broadband Licensee should have "operational
     control of the network to the extent necessary to ensure public
     safety requirements are met."[^148]

121. [Discussion]{.underline}. As an initial matter, we seek comment on
     whether we should clarify that the Public Safety Broadband Licensee
     may not assume any additional responsibilities other than those
     specified by the Commission in this proceeding. We also seek
     comment generally on whether we should clarify, revise, or
     eliminate any of the specific responsibilities listed above that
     the Public Safety Broadband Licensee must assume. We seek comment
     in particular on whether to clarify or revise the division of
     responsibility between the Public Safety Broadband Licensee and the
     D Block licensee regarding direct interaction with individual
     public safety entities in the establishment of service to such
     entities, the provision of service, customer care, service billing,
     or other matters. What division will best serve the interests of
     public safety and the goals of this proceeding?

122. In addressing these questions, we ask commenters to consider the
     unique role served by the Public Safety Broadband Licensee by
     virtue of holding the single nationwide public safety license,
     while not being an actual user of the network. As evidenced by many
     of the responsibilities given to the Public Safety Broadband
     Licensee, at a fundamental level, the Public Safety Broadband
     Licensee would in many respects function much like the way regional
     planning committees presently do in the 700 MHz and 800 MHz bands,
     yet with a nationwide scope. For example, like regional planning
     committees, the Public Safety Broadband Licensee would administer
     access to the spectrum, coordinate spectrum use, interact with and
     promote the needs of individual public safety agencies, and ensure
     conformance with applicable technical and operational rules. One
     important difference, however, is that unlike regional planning
     committees, the Public Safety Broadband Licensee is the licensee of
     the spectrum that it administers. Further, the Public Safety
     Broadband Licensee has distinct abilities, in that it may assess
     usage fees to recoup its costs, can use its national level of
     representation to pass on the benefits of economies of scale for
     subscriber equipment and applications, and holds sole authority to
     approve, in consultation with the D Block licensee, equipment and
     applications for public safety users, and to permit Federal public
     safety agency use.

123. In light of these similarities and differences, we ask whether it
     would add clarity to the Public Safety Broadband Licensee's role to
     specify how it is to carry out these responsibilities. For example,
     are there certain elements of the existing regional planning
     committee functions that we should adopt for the Public Safety
     Broadband Licensee? For those functions distinct from regional
     planning committees, should we adopt specific rules to govern how
     the Public Safety Broadband Licensee is to carry out such
     functions? Other responsibilities listed above are more specific to
     the Public Safety Broadband Licensee's status as a partner with the
     D Block licensee. These include its role to facilitate negotiations
     between the D Block licensee and state and local agencies for local
     build-outs, oversight and implementation of narrowband relocation,
     and review of wideband waiver requests. Thus, while a number of the
     Public Safety Broadband Licensee responsibilities are in a
     frequency planning and coordination role, the Public Safety
     Broadband Licensee is at the same time an equal partner with the D
     Block licensee with respect to the overall partnership we envision.
     Accordingly, we seek comment on how the Public Safety Broadband
     Licensee's role as one half of the 700 MHz Public/Private
     Partnership should impact how we modify or clarify the respective
     responsibilities of the D Block licensee and the Public Safety
     Broadband Licensee.

124. While the Public Safety Broadband Licensee may need some discretion
     to carry out its partner-related responsibilities, there may need
     to be more specific limits on the nature of this role. For example,
     related to the Public Safety Broadband Licensee responsibilities
     discussed herein, we previously noted that among the shared
     wireless broadband network requirements we adopted in the *Second
     Report and Order* was that the network infrastructure incorporate
     operational control of the network by the Public Safety Broadband
     Licensee "to the extent necessary" to ensure public safety
     requirements are met.[^149] As we have reiterated throughout this
     item, the underlying premise of the 700 MHz Public/Private
     Partnership is the responsibility of the D Block licensee for
     construction of a broadband network for shared commercial and
     public safety use. Thus, primary operational control of the network
     is inherently the responsibility of the D Block licensee (and its
     related entities), which would in turn generally provide the
     operations and services that enable the Public Safety Broadband
     Licensee to ensure public safety requirements are met. Conversely,
     allowing duplication of some or all of these operational functions
     may result in a structure more akin to a reseller of services,
     which could inject an inappropriate "business" or "profit" motive
     into the Public Safety Broadband Licensee structure, detracting
     from the intended primary focus of the Public Safety Broadband
     Licensee. Accordingly, we seek comment on whether to clarify that
     none of the responsibilities and obligations of the Public Safety
     Broadband Licensee, either as previously adopted or as possibly
     revised pursuant to this Second Further Notice, would permit the
     Public Safety Broadband Licensee to assume or duplicate any of the
     network monitoring, operations, customer care, or related functions
     that are inherent in the D Block licensee's responsibilities to
     construct and operate the shared network infrastructure.

125. We further seek comment on whether to expressly provide that
     neither the Public Safety Broadband Licensee nor any of its
     advisors, agents, or service providers may assume responsibilities
     akin to a "mobile virtual network operator,"[^150] because such a
     role would be contrary to the respective roles and responsibilities
     of the D Block licensee and Public Safety Broadband Licensee
     regarding construction, management, operations, and use of the
     shared wireless broadband network, may unnecessarily add to the
     costs of the 700 MHz Public/Private Partnership, and may otherwise
     permit "for profit" incentives to influence the operations of the
     Public Safety Broadband Licensee.

126. In addition, we seek comment on whether we should modify Section
     2.103 of the Commission's rules to limit Federal public safety
     agency use of the public safety broadband spectrum to situations
     where such use is necessary for coordination of Federal and
     non-Federal activities. If so, should Commission approval be
     required? That would ensure that Federal public safety agencies
     will be able to interoperate with state and local public agencies
     in the use of 700 MHz public safety broadband services during
     incidents of mutual interest. In other situations, Federal public
     safety agencies would, of course, be able to purchase 700 MHz
     wireless broadband services from commercial service providers using
     the D Block, just as they purchase satellite service from
     commercial service providers. How does the proposed public safety
     broadband network for state and local users compare (on a technical
     level or in terms of functionality) with the planned Integrated
     Wireless Network ("IWN") for Federal users?[^151]  What lessons can
     the Commission learn from the IWN program?  To what extent should
     development of the public safety broadband network be coordinated
     with the agencies responsible for construction and planning of the
     IWN program? 

##### Fees 

127. [Background]{.underline}. In the *Second Report and Order*, we
     provided guidance concerning the service fees that the D Block
     licensee could charge public safety users for their access to and
     use of the public safety broadband network and, in times of
     emergency, to the D Block spectrum.[^152] We also discussed the
     importance of the D Block licensee's ability to offer commercial
     services using the public safety broadband spectrum leased from the
     Public Safety Broadband Licensee.[^153]

128. We required that all service fees -- including service fees that
     the D Block licensee would charge public safety users for normal
     network service using the public safety broadband spectrum and for
     their priority access to the D Block spectrum -- be specified in
     the Network Sharing Agreement.[^154] We stated our expectation,
     however, that the winning bidder of the D Block license and the
     Public Safety Broadband Licensee will negotiate a fee structure for
     priority access to the D Block in an emergency that will protect
     public safety users from incurring unforeseen (and unbudgeted)
     payment obligations in the event that a serious emergency
     necessitates preemption for a sustained period.[^155] We also
     encouraged the parties to negotiate a fee agreement that
     incorporates financial incentives for the D Block licensee based on
     the number of public safety entities and localities that subscribe
     to the service.[^156] We noted that, for the negotiation of
     reasonable rates, typical commercial rates for analogous services
     may be useful as a guide, but that the negotiated rates may in fact
     be lower than typical commercial rates for analogous
     services.[^157]

129. In addition, we considered the D Block licensee's opportunity to
     provide commercial services using the public safety broadband
     spectrum (on a secondary, preemptible basis) to be "an integral
     part of a viable framework for enabling the 700 MHz Public/Private
     Partnership to finance construction of a nationwide, interoperable
     public safety broadband network."[^158] We also noted that
     permitting such access to this spectrum "will harness private
     sector resources to facilitate the construction" of the
     network.[^159]

130. We did not discuss the commercial fees that the D Block licensee
     might charge subscribers to the commercial services that it offers
     using the shared network. We left that to the marketplace. As
     discussed above, however, we seek comment in this Second Further
     Notice on whether all non-public safety users of the shared
     spectrum -- including critical infrastructure users -- should be
     treated as commercial users that gain access to the shared network
     through the commercial services provided by the D Block
     licensee.[^160]

131. [Discussion]{.underline}. We seek comment on whether we should
     further clarify, revise, or specify the service fees that the D
     Block licensee may charge public safety users for access to the
     shared network. We also seek comment on whether we should provide
     any guidance on whether the Public Safety Broadband Licensee may
     assess spectrum usage fees for the leasing of the public safety
     broadband spectrum to the D Block licensee or the amount of any fee
     permitted. Is there any additional guidance that we could provide
     with regard to fees that the D Block licensee or Public Safety
     Broadband Licensee might assess that would be helpful in ensuring
     that the goals of the 700 MHz Public/Private Partnership are
     achieved?

132. *Network service fees*. We invite comment on whether we should
     reconsider any aspect of the rules regarding service fees to be
     paid by public safety users, including any applicable fees for
     normal network service and fees for priority access to the D Block
     in an emergency. Specifically, we seek comment on whether we should
     clarify any aspect of these service fees that was left to
     negotiations. Did we provide adequate guidance in the *Second
     Report and Order* to enable the parties to negotiate reasonable
     rates for all fees? Or should the Commission adopt a more detailed
     fee structure or formula to facilitate negotiations on this
     issue?[^161] For example, should we specify that the D Block
     licensee is entitled to charge rate-of-return or cost-plus rates,
     taking the incremental costs of public safety network
     specifications and other costs attributable uniquely to public
     safety users into account? Alternatively, would requiring public
     safety users to pay the same rates as commercial users be
     sufficient? Should we mandate that public safety users be entitled
     to receive the lowest rate that the D Block licensee offers to its
     commercial users for analogous service? Commenters suggesting that
     the Commission adopt a detailed fee structure should provide
     detailed information on their proposals and discuss how adopting
     such proposals would result in just and reasonable rates and strike
     the best balance among competing interests in determining fees.
     Would more clearly defining the circumstances that would constitute
     an "emergency," as addressed elsewhere, impact how fees should be
     structured for priority access?

133. We also seek comment on whether particular uses of the public
     safety broadband network by public safety users should be free and
     others fee-based.  On what bases can this distinction be made?  Is
     it practical to use service- and context-based distinctions such as
     between voice and advanced data services, mission-critical and
     non-mission-critical communications, emergency and non-emergency
     events, priority and non-priority access, or similar metrics? 
     Would it instead be preferable to rely on technical distinctions,
     such as a specified number of minutes or bits, a percentage of
     network capacity, or similar metrics?  Would either approach give
     sufficient certainty to public safety users and/or the commercial D
     Block licensee? 

134. *Spectrum leasing fees associated with the public safety broadband
     spectrum leasing arrangement.* In the *Second Report and Order*, we
     did not specifically address whether the Public Safety Broadband
     Licensee, when leasing access to the public safety broadband
     spectrum to the D Block licensee, may impose any spectrum usage
     fees for use of this spectrum. We seek comment on whether any
     aspect of the spectrum leasing arrangement should be clarified by
     the Commission, or whether spectrum usage fees might be considered
     reasonable or unreasonable given the role of the spectrum leasing
     arrangement in the 700 MHz Public/Private Partnership. When we
     provided guidance in the *Second Report and Order* on determining
     reasonable network service fees, we assumed that the network
     service and priority access fees may in fact be lower than typical
     commercial rates in part to reflect the value of the D Block
     licensee's access to the public safety spectrum through leasing. We
     seek comment on whether and how any spectrum usage fees might
     affect the reasonableness of service and emergency access fees
     discussed above? Should we prohibit any spectrum usage fees
     associated with the spectrum leasing arrangement? Is the D Block's
     responsibility for building the public safety broadband network
     sufficient in-kind contribution for use of the public safety
     spectrum? If we allow spectrum usage fees, should we require public
     safety users to pay commercial rates for their access to the shared
     network?

### Negotiation of the Network Sharing Agreement

135. [Background]{.underline}. To ensure the timely establishment and
     execution of an NSA that adequately safeguards the public interest,
     we provided rules to govern the process by which the winning bidder
     of the D Block license and the Public Safety Broadband Licensee
     would negotiate and establish the agreement.[^162] Under these
     rules, the parties were required to begin negotiations on the date
     that the D Block winning bidder filed its long form application and
     to conclude negotiations within six months.[^163] Both the D Block
     winning bidder and the Public Safety Broadband Licensee were
     required to negotiate in good faith, and were obligated to submit
     status reports during the negotiations period.[^164] To ensure that
     the D Block winning bidder would not stall negotiations to avoid
     its obligations to public safety, we provided that the D Block
     license would not be issued until the parties filed an NSA that had
     been approved by the Commission and was subsequently executed by
     the parties.[^165]

136. If the parties successfully negotiated an agreement on all terms
     within the six month period, they were required to submit the NSA
     to the Commission for review and approval. In the event the parties
     did not reach agreement on all terms at the end of the six month
     negotiation period, or if they were found to have reached an
     impasse at any time, we delegated authority jointly to the Chiefs
     of PSHSB and WTB (the Bureaus) to take a variety of actions to
     resolve the disputes, including but not limited to: (1) granting
     additional time for negotiation; (2) issuing a decision on the
     disputed issues and requiring the submission of a draft agreement
     consistent with their decision; (3) directing the parties to
     further brief the remaining issues in full for immediate Commission
     decision; and/or (4) immediate denial of the long-form application
     filed by the winning bidder for the D Block license, to be followed
     by either re-auction of the license or some other means of
     re-assignment.[^166]

137. After the release of the *Second Report and Order*, the Chiefs of
     PSHSB and WTB issued a Public Notice that, among other things,
     clarified how the Bureaus would exercise their authority to resolve
     disputes that arise in the NSA negotiations.[^167] They stated: "we
     will not exercise our authority for immediate denial of the
     long-form application filed by the winning bidder for the D Block
     license, as a result of any dispute over the negotiation of the
     terms of the NSA, until we take one of two steps: (1) issuing a
     decision on the disputed issues and requiring the submission of a
     draft agreement consistent with our decision; or (2) referring the
     issues to the Commission for an immediate decision and the
     Commission issues such a decision."[^168] The Bureaus also noted
     that "failure to comply with a decision by the Commission or the
     Bureaus on the disputed issues . . . will be deemed a
     default."[^169]

138. [Discussion]{.underline}. We seek comment on whether and how to
     modify the rules governing the negotiation of the NSA, including
     dispute resolution, to provide bidders with greater certainty
     regarding their obligations while still protecting the interests
     and needs of public safety, and to ensure that both the D Block
     license winner and the Public Safety Broadband Licensee have
     incentives to engage in good faith negotiation and to reach terms
     that will reasonably protect the interests of both sides. In
     particular, we seek to provide a process that will give bidders
     confidence that the network the D Block licensee will be required
     to construct will be commercially viable, and provide assurance to
     state and local public safety entities that the resulting network
     will meet their needs for broadband wireless service.

139. To achieve these goals, we seek a process that provides incentives
     to both sides to make a maximum good faith effort to reach an
     agreement consistent with the important commercial and public
     safety interests at stake. As discussed elsewhere in this Second
     Further Notice, one way for the Commission to provide greater
     certainty regarding the terms of the NSA would be to further
     specify the requirements of the 700 MHz Public/Private Partnership
     in our rules. In this section, we seek comment on whether we should
     modify the NSA negotiation process itself.

140. Any party's incentives to make a maximum good faith effort in any
     negotiation process are framed by the consequences of failing to
     reach agreement. Below, we seek comment on whether we should
     maximize the incentives for a bidder winning the D Block license to
     reach agreement on an NSA with the Public Safety Broadband Licensee
     by providing that, if the parties do not reach agreement, we
     promptly will offer the license to the next highest bidder, in
     descending order. Alternatively, we seek comment on whether we
     should maximize the incentives for both parties to reach agreement
     on an NSA by providing that, if the parties do not reach agreement,
     we promptly will offer in a subsequent auction the license(s) for
     the D Block spectrum without the 700 MHz Public/Private Partnership
     conditions and subject to service rules more typical of commercial
     wireless services licenses. Would either of these alternatives
     offer an appropriate balance of incentives for the negotiating
     parties to reach an agreement?

141. We also seek comment in this section on other related issues.
     First, we seek comment on whether, if the NSA process fails to
     produce an agreement between the parties, there are any
     circumstances in which we should relieve a defaulting D Block
     license winning bidder of its obligation to make default payments.
     We discuss later the distinct question of what amounts a defaulting
     D Block license winning bidder should be required to pay, if any,
     under these or other circumstances. Second, in the following
     subsections, we seek further comment on whether to modify the
     mechanisms for resolving any disputes that may arise during the
     negotiations or otherwise modify the negotiation process.

142. *Action subsequent to failure to negotiate an NSA*. Pursuant to the
     Commission's competitive bidding rules, in the event of a default
     by a winning bidder, the Commission, at its discretion, may either
     offer the licenses to the next highest bidders (in descending
     order) at their final bids or auction new licenses for the
     spectrum.[^170] If the winning bidder does not execute an NSA with
     the Public Safety Broadband Licensee, that winning bidder will be
     in default and its license application will be dismissed. We seek
     comment on whether, following such a default, we should offer the
     license to the party with the next highest bid, in descending
     order. The next highest bidder would then have the option of paying
     the amount of its final bid, filing a long-form application, and
     entering into a negotiation process with the Public Safety
     Broadband Licensee. If that next highest bidder declined to
     exercise that option, the Commission could offer the license to the
     party with the next highest bid, in descending order, and so on.
     Under such circumstances, should the Commission provide for a
     shorter time period for a second attempt to negotiate an NSA, in
     light of the first effort? Or should each D Block bidder be
     entitled to the same amount of time to attempt to negotiate the
     terms of the NSA?

143. In the event of a failure to negotiate the NSA, we also seek
     comment on whether, in lieu of offering the license to the next
     highest bidder, we promptly should auction alternative license(s)
     for the D Block spectrum without the 700 MHz Public/Private
     Partnership conditions and subject to different service rules. This
     option limits not only the winning bidder for the D Block license
     to one opportunity to negotiate an NSA but also limits the Public
     Safety Broadband Licensee to one opportunity. Does this limit
     create a better or worse set of incentives for the negotiators,
     given the public interest in producing a broadband network to serve
     the public safety users?

144. Under each of the foregoing alternatives, how should the Commission
     define a "failure" of the negotiation process? For instance, should
     we require adjudication of any dispute before deeming the
     negotiations a failure and the D Block winning bidder in default?
     Should such adjudication be binding? Or should we deem the
     negotiations a failure and the D Block winning bidder in default
     simply if negotiations are at an impasse after six months, or even
     sooner if the parties certify that an impasse exists? If the
     consequence of a failure of negotiations is the auction of the
     alternative D Block license(s), should we make additional
     provisions for resolving any impasse between the parties?

145. We further seek comment on whether there are any circumstances in
     connection with the failure to negotiate an NSA under which a
     winning bidder for the D Block license should be relieved from
     making default payments based on its winning bid. Commenters also
     should address the possibility that relieving the winning bidder
     from default obligations while offering the D Block license to the
     next highest bidder might create an incentive for the winning
     bidder to bargain with the next highest bidder and offer to
     default. Generally, if we do not adjudicate any impasse that arises
     in negotiation, should we automatically subject the D Block winning
     bidder to default payments when its license application is
     dismissed? Or should some finding of fault on the part of the
     winning bidder be a prerequisite of imposing a default payment? If
     so, how should such fault be determined? Should any other
     consequences, separate and apart from a default payment, be imposed
     on the defaulting D Block winning bidder under any of these
     circumstances?

146. Alternatively, if we provide for binding adjudication with respect
     to any negotiation impasse, should we subject the D Block license
     winning bidder to default payments if either party rejects the
     binding decision or only if it the D Block license winning bidder
     fails to comply? Should any other consequences, separate and apart
     from a default payment, be imposed on the defaulting D Block
     winning bidder under any of these circumstances?

147. Elsewhere in this Second Further Notice, we seek comment on the
     rules we should adopt for the D Block, as well as the Public Safety
     Broadband License, if we offer the license(s) for the D Block
     without the 700 MHz Public/Private Partnership conditions. If we
     decide that such licenses should be offered after a failure to
     negotiate an NSA, should that affect the rules we otherwise might
     adopt for such license(s)? We likewise seek comment on whether any
     of our Part 1 competitive bidding rules or other auction procedures
     would be inappropriate or should be modified for an auction of D
     Block license(s) without the 700 MHz Public/Private Partnership
     conditions that is held subsequent to negotiations between a
     winning bidder and the Public Safety Broadband Licensee that do not
     produce an NSA.

148. If we provide that a failure of negotiations to produce an NSA will
     result in a subsequent auction of D Block license(s) without the
     700 MHz Public/Private Partnership conditions, a winning bidder
     might have an incentive for those negotiations to fail so that it
     can bid on license(s) without the 700 MHz Public/Private
     Partnership conditions in the subsequent auction. We seek comment
     on whether this theoretical incentive is a practical concern and,
     if so, whether we should adopt either of two potential auction
     eligibility rules to mitigate any such concern.

149. First, we could prohibit a D Block license winning bidder and
     related parties from participating in any subsequent auction in
     which any licenses for the D Block are offered without the 700 MHz
     Public/Private Partnership conditions. We seek comment on this
     alternative, and on whether any such eligibility restriction should
     depend on whether the D Block license winning bidder is at fault
     for the failure of the 700 MHz Public/Private Partnership, *e.g.*,
     if the D Block license winning bidder refused to comply with a
     Commission adjudication of a negotiation dispute. Further, should
     any such eligibility restriction extend to the winning bidder's
     controlling interests or other related parties? If so, how should
     such parties be defined?

150. Alternatively, we might lift any auction eligibility restrictions
     that made other parties ineligible for the prior auction of the D
     Block license with the 700 MHz Public/Private Partnership
     conditions. We seek comment in a later section of this Second
     Further Notice regarding whether to restrict parties already
     possessing significant access to 700 MHz spectrum from
     participating in auctions of license(s) for the D Block. If such a
     restriction applied to an auction of the D Block license with the
     700 MHz Public/Private Partnership conditions, we could lift the
     restriction in a subsequent auction of licenses without those
     conditions. Would doing so significantly alter the likelihood that
     the winning bidder in an initial auction could win the license
     again, and would this offset any potential incentive such a winning
     bidder might have for NSA negotiations to fail following the first
     auction?

151. *Potential modifications to dispute resolution mechanisms*. We also
     seek comment on whether we should eliminate the option of binding
     adjudication of disputed issues and provide that, in the event of
     an intractable dispute, so long as a D Block bidder has negotiated
     in good faith, the Commission will relieve the D Block winning
     bidder of its financial obligations in connection with the license.
     Although this option has been advanced by parties on
     reconsideration,[^171] we are concerned that it would be difficult
     for the Commission to determine when a disagreement was the product
     of "bad faith" negotiations and that this option may not provide
     sufficient incentive to the D Block winning bidder to meet the
     needs of public safety. We therefore invite commenters that
     advocate this option to discuss these concerns and how they might
     be addressed. For example, should we establish a specific standard
     for what will constitute an act of bad faith, similar to the
     standard incorporated at Section 76.65(b) of our rules?[^172]

152. We further seek comment on whether, instead of eliminating binding
     adjudication, we should modify its application or scope. For
     example, should we limit the issues of adjudication to the
     requirements specified in our rules? If so, what rules should apply
     to disputes regarding other terms? Alternatively, should we adopt a
     specific measure, such as a presumption that a D Block bidder
     proposal that otherwise satisfies the Commission's stated
     requirements should be upheld in adjudication? If so, what
     demonstration should we require of the Public Safety Broadband
     Licensee to rebut the presumption? Should we provide that we will
     require the parties to the adjudication to each submit their best
     offer and that we will then choose one submission or the other?
     Would this encourage the parties to make proposals that address
     each other's needs?

153. *Other modifications to the process for establishing the NSA*. We
     also seek comment on whether to adopt other measures relating to
     the process for establishing the NSA. We seek comment on whether
     there are any concerns inherent in the adjudication of NSA disputes
     by the Commission. If so, we seek comment on how such concerns
     could be addressed, and whether there are alternatives to
     Commission adjudication that will still achieve a final agreement
     in the event of a dispute.

154. This Second Further Notice generally seeks comment on whether we
     should further clarify or revise requirements relating to the
     network as well as the D Block licensee's and Public Safety
     Broadband Licensee's respective responsibilities with regard to the
     700 MHz Public/Private Partnership. One likely effect of such
     additional clarity would be to reduce the scope of and uncertainty
     relating to issues that need to be negotiated between the parties
     to the NSA. Accordingly, we seek comment on whether, if we adopt
     such clarifications, it would be appropriate to also reduce the
     length of the NSA negotiation process, and if so, what length would
     be reasonable. We also invite commenters to suggest other measures
     that we might adopt that would help to give potential bidders
     additional certainty regarding the outcome of the process, or
     otherwise reduce the risks of the process for the D Block winning
     bidder, or that would otherwise improve the process. In considering
     this issue, commenters should take into account the availability of
     the spectrum as of the DTV transition date, and the needs of both
     parties to access and utilize this spectrum in a timely manner.

### Auction-Related Issues

#### Eligibility to Participate in the D Block Auction

155. [Background]{.underline}. In the *Second Report and Order,* after
     considering whether open eligibility would pose a significant
     likelihood of substantial competitive harm in a specific market, we
     declined to restrict eligibility for 700 MHz Band licenses.[^173]
     We determined that the appropriate market to assess when
     considering restrictions on eligibility to hold 700 MHz licenses is
     the broadband services market.[^174] Recognizing the numerous
     actual and potential broadband service providers that exist, we
     concluded that the record did not demonstrate that open eligibility
     to hold 700 MHz band licenses was likely to result in substantial
     competitive harm in the provision of broadband services.[^175]
     Since our prior determination, Auction 73 has only increased the
     number of potential providers of broadband service.

156. [Discussion]{.underline}. Although there is no significant
     likelihood of substantial competitive harm in the broadband
     services market that we need to address by restricting otherwise
     eligible parties from holding the D Block license, the D Block is
     intended for uses that extend beyond commercial broadband services.
     Indeed, the requirements of the D Block create a unique opportunity
     for a new type of nationwide network. Such an opportunity is
     unlikely to present itself again in the foreseeable future. It
     therefore may serve the public interest to limit eligibility for
     participation in the D Block auction in order to maximize the
     possibility that a party otherwise without significant access to
     spectrum potentially suitable for the provision of mobile wireless
     broadband services will have an opportunity to create a nationwide
     700 MHz network using the D Block. [^176]

157. The Commission has adopted auction eligibility restrictions in
     other circumstances, where limited opportunities in existing or
     emerging services presented potential competitive concerns but did
     not warrant restricting license ownership or spectrum access beyond
     the initial auction of the license.[^177] Accordingly, we now seek
     comment on whether the public interest would be served by adopting
     an auction eligibility restriction with respect to the license(s)
     made available for the D Block.[^178] More specifically, now that
     various parties have already obtained spectrum access as a result
     of Auction 73, we seek comment on whether the public interest would
     be served by limiting eligibility to bid on the license(s) for the
     D Block to parties that do not already have significant access to
     700 MHz Band spectrum or other spectrum potentially suitable for
     the provision of mobile wireless broadband services. A restriction
     limited to eligibility to bid on the license(s) in a Commission
     auction would not restrict any parties' ability to acquire the
     license(s) or to access D Block spectrum in the secondary market -
     through leasing or wholesaling arrangements, which are otherwise
     permissible within our rules.[^179] We also seek comment on whether
     any restriction that limits the ability of otherwise qualified
     parties to bid on the license(s) for D Block spectrum should apply
     only to the next auction of any license(s) for D Block spectrum, or
     to all future auctions of such license(s). Should whether the
     restriction applies depend in whole or in part on whether the
     license(s) are subject to the 700 MHz Public/Private Partnership
     conditions?

158. Generally, restrictions on the ability of parties to bid for new
     licenses based on their existing access to spectrum may favor new
     entrants. Should the auction rules favor new entrants? If so, how?
     We seek comment on how to structure an auction eligibility
     restriction to assure that a party not already able to offer
     nationwide or near-nationwide service using 700 MHz Band spectrum
     or other spectrum potentially suitable for the provision of mobile
     wireless broadband services will have the opportunity to win a D
     Block license. Should we preclude from applying for D Block
     license(s) parties in which any party holding a present or future
     interest already has sufficient spectrum access, however that
     access is defined? Should we preclude from applying for D Block
     license(s) any party with an agreement to provide future access to
     D Block spectrum, *e.g.*, a spectrum lease agreement, to any party
     that already has sufficient spectrum access, however that access is
     defined? Given that the restriction is intended solely to apply to
     auction eligibility, and not subsequent eligibility to hold the
     license, parties already having sufficient spectrum access might
     obtain an interest in winning bidders or access to their spectrum,
     but only after licensing.

159. With respect to the spectrum access parties already have, should
     the potential restriction be concerned with only particular
     spectrum blocks or bands, or should we consider any spectrum
     potentially suitable for the provision of mobile wireless broadband
     services? One party previously proposed a restriction that would
     have precluded the same party from winning in initial Commission
     auctions both licenses in the C Block and the D Block
     license.[^180] Should we be concerned only with parties' access to
     the adjacent C Block or to all 700 MHz spectrum, including spectrum
     held in the C and D Blocks of the Lower 700 MHz Band? What extent
     of spectrum access should trigger any restriction? Should we
     restrict the auction eligibility only of those parties that have
     nationwide or near-nationwide 700 MHz spectrum access or include
     parties that have nationwide or near-nationwide access in other
     bands? Should the extent of access be measured by geographic or
     population coverage, or some combination of the two? Should
     bandwidth be a factor? What is the appropriate threshold at which
     to apply the restriction?

160. We also seek comment on the appropriate method of measuring a
     party's spectrum access for this purpose. Should it be measured
     solely by the party's control of current 700 MHz license holders
     and winning bidders? Or by the party's equity interest in current
     700 MHz Band license holders and winning bidders? By existing
     leased access to 700 MHz Band spectrum capacity, i.e., leases with
     respect to already granted licenses? By existing leased rights to
     700 MHz Band spectrum capacity, i.e., leases with parties that are
     winning bidders but not yet licensees? Should we include other
     bands potentially suitable to the provision of mobile wireless
     broadband services? If so, what method should we use to measure a
     party's access to such bands?

161. While we seek comment on the appropriate scope of an auction
     eligibility restriction, at the same time, we recognize that
     restricting eligibility may adversely impact the ability of public
     safety to gain access to an advanced broadband network as quickly
     as possible. In this respect, it may be desirable to have the
     broadest pool of bidders possible in order to maximize the
     likelihood of a successful partnership that will benefit both
     public safety and consumers. We seek comment on how this
     consideration should impact our decision on auction eligibility
     rules. We also seek comment on whether the Commission should apply
     its spectrum aggregation screen used for wireless transactions to
     the D Block.

#### Reserve Price

162. [Background]{.underline}. In the *Second Report and Order,* we
     directed WTB to adopt and publicly disclose block-specific
     aggregate reserve prices, pursuant to its delegated authority and
     its regular pre-auction process, consistent with our conclusions in
     the *Second Report and Order*.[^181] Those conclusions in part
     directed WTB to establish the particular amounts of the
     block-specific aggregate reserves by taking into account a
     conservative estimate of market value based on auction results for
     AWS-1 spectrum licenses.[^182] With respect to the specific
     circumstances of the D Block, we directed WTB to give substantial
     weight to the detailed rules regarding the D Block license, the D
     Block licensee's required construction of a network to be shared by
     public safety service users, and the resulting limitations on the
     flexibility of the D Block licensee, which together, we noted,
     might make it appropriate to expect a D Block licensee to pay only
     75 to 80 percent of an amount based on AWS-1 auction results, or
     roughly \$1.33 billion.[^183] Pursuant to our direction, WTB issued
     the *700 MHz Auction Comment Public Notice*, in which, among other
     things, WTB proposed and sought comment on reserve prices for all
     blocks of 700 MHz licenses offered in Auction 73, including a
     \$1.33 billion reserve price for the D Block.[^184] After reviewing
     the record of comments submitted in response, WTB issued the *700
     MHz Auction Procedures Public Notice*, which adopted and set forth
     procedures for Auction 73, including a \$1.33 billion D Block
     reserve price.[^185] In Auction 73 bidding, applicants placed bids
     for licenses in the A, B, C, and E Blocks that met, and in some
     cases significantly exceeded, the applicable reserve price adopted
     pursuant to the Commission's direction.[^186] The single bid for
     the D Block did not meet its reserve price.[^187]

163. [Discussion]{.underline}. We now seek comment on whether we should
     direct WTB to adopt a different approach to establishing a reserve
     price in a new auction for the D Block license, pursuant to its
     delegated authority and its regular pre-auction process. This
     Second Further Notice generally considers revisions to the rules
     governing the D Block license in order to further the public
     interest by facilitating the creation of an interoperable broadband
     network that can meet public safety needs. In light of that public
     interest, as well as Auction 73's success in raising the revenue
     anticipated by Congress, we now seek comment on an appropriate
     reserve price, or whether we need a reserve price, other than a
     minimum opening bid, at all, for a new auction for the D Block
     license. We seek comment on the purpose that a reserve price should
     serve in the current context, and what level of reserve price would
     best serve that purpose. We seek comment later in this Second
     Further Notice regarding whether to offer regional licenses for the
     D Block in place of a single nationwide license. In an auction
     offering multiple licenses, the Commission could set either
     aggregate reserve price(s), as it did for licenses in the A, B, C,
     and E Blocks in the 700 MHz auction, or a license-specific reserve
     price. Commenters should address whether aggregate or
     license-specific reserve prices would best serve the purpose of any
     proposed reserve price. In the event that there is some uncertainty
     regarding the relative value of multiple licenses, an aggregate
     reserve price applicable to a set of licenses may allow some
     flexibility in relative license prices. With respect to aggregate
     reserve prices, commenters should address whether all the licenses
     offered should be subject to a single aggregate reserve price or
     whether subsets of the licenses offered should be subject to
     various aggregate reserve prices. We ask that commenters provide
     detailed support for any suggested reserve prices provided.
     Furthermore, would any of the rule revisions presently contemplated
     be likely to increase or decrease the appropriate reserve price?

164. In addition, we seek comment on whether we should direct WTB to set
     minimum opening bid(s) at the amount of any separate license
     specific reserve price(s), whether for a single nationwide license
     or for regional licenses. For Auction 73, WTB established a minimum
     opening bid for the D Block license below the D Block license
     reserve price to facilitate substitution among licenses in
     different blocks. If we conduct an auction with multiple licenses
     and aggregate reserve price(s), should we set the minimum opening
     bids of individual licenses such that the aggregate total of the
     minimum opening bids is less than the aggregate reserve price, to
     reduce the risk that a mistaken minimum opening bid will keep
     bidders from bidding on a particular license? However, in the event
     we set license-specific reserve prices, whether for a single
     nationwide license or regional licenses, there would be no apparent
     benefit from accepting bids below the license-specific
     reserve[^188] For the next auction of license(s) for the D Block
     spectrum, WTB will establish the minimum opening bid and any
     reserve price for the D Block pursuant to its delegated authority
     and its regular pre-auction process. We ask commenters addressing
     the reserve price issues raised herein to address whether there is
     any reason to permit bids below any reserve price and, if so, the
     extent to which their comments on reserve price issues presume a
     particular relationship between a minimum opening bid and any
     reserve price.

#### Designated Entity Eligibility for the D Block Licensee

165. [Background]{.underline}. Under our designated entity eligibility
     rules, as modified in 2006 in the *Designated Entity Second Report
     and Order*, a business model that involves a designated entity
     licensee entering into arrangements with other entities for the
     lease or resale (including wholesaling arrangements) that involve
     more than 50 percent of the spectrum capacity of a license
     constitutes an impermissible material relationship and renders the
     licensee ineligible for otherwise available size-based bidding
     credits.[^189] On November 15, 2007, however, we waived, on our own
     motion, the application of our impermissible material relationship
     rule[^190] for purposes of determining an applicant's or licensee's
     designated entity eligibility solely with respect to arrangements
     for lease or resale (including wholesale) of the spectrum capacity
     of the D Block license.[^191] In so doing, we determined that the
     unique regulations then governing the D Block license, which
     required the establishment of the 700 MHz Band Public/Private
     Partnership subject to a Commission-approved Network Sharing
     Agreement[^192] -- together with the application of the
     Commission's other designated entity eligibility requirements[^193]
     -- eliminated for the D Block license the risks that led the
     Commission to adopt the impermissible material relationship rule.
     We found that the D Block rules subjected the licensee to
     significant obligations and substantial Commission oversight, which
     when combined with the continued application of other designated
     entity rules led us to conclude that waiver of the impermissible
     material relationship rule served the public interest.

166. [Discussion]{.underline}. Now that we are revisiting the service
     and auction rules for the D Block license, we seek comment
     regarding whether we should adopt a service specific exception to
     our impermissible material relationship rule for purposes of
     determining designated entity eligibility solely with respect to
     arrangements for lease or resale (including wholesale) of the
     spectrum capacity of the D Block license. Could revised service and
     auction rules that we might adopt for the D Block license continue
     to present unique circumstances and regulatory obligations that
     warrant an exception to our impermissible material relationship
     rule?

167. If we establish such a service specific exception to our general
     designated entity impermissible material relationship rule, will
     our other designated entity rules sufficiently ensure that only
     bona fide small businesses, exercising control over the D Block
     license in accordance with our rules, will benefit from bidding
     credits applicable to that license?[^194] For instance, consistent
     with the scope of the *D Block Waiver Order*, will the continued
     application of the controlling interest rule, attributable material
     relationship rule, and the unjust enrichment rule, as well as all
     other designated entity eligibility rules together with the unique
     requirements that will apply to the D Block license prevent the
     abuses the impermissible material relationship rule was designed to
     address? Do the terms and conditions pertaining to the D Block
     license, both previously set forth and as discussed in this Second
     Further Notice, provide sufficient assurance that the D Block
     commercial licensee's provision of service for the benefit of the
     public will not be significantly influenced by any party leasing
     (or accessing through wholesale arrangements) fifty percent or more
     of the spectrum capacity of the D Block license? Does the unique
     relationship between the D Block licensee and the Public Safety
     Broadband Licensee, and their regulatory obligations to ensure the
     ongoing integrity and consistency of service to the public safety
     users of the network, mitigate any potential for such influence?
     If, however, the Commission chooses to license the D Block without
     the 700 MHz Public/Private Partnership, are there any circumstances
     in which we should consider an exception to the impermissible
     material relationship rule?

#### Default Payment

168. [Background]{.underline}. The Commission's competitive bidding
     rules provide that if a winning bidder defaults for any reason, the
     bidder is liable for a default payment.[^195] In the *Second Report
     and Order*, the Commission provided that the D Block winning bidder
     would be deemed to have defaulted under Section 1.2109(c) of the
     Commission's rules and would be liable for the default payments set
     forth in Section 1.2104(g) if it failed to comply with the
     procedures established for negotiation or dispute resolution in the
     NSA, including a failure to comply with a Commission or Bureau
     decision in binding adjudication, as well as under other
     circumstances, *e.g.*, if it failed to pay its winning bid.[^196]
     Pursuant to Section 1.2104(g) of those rules, a default payment is
     comprised of (1) a "deficiency payment," based on the amount, if
     any, by which a subsequent winning bid is lower than the defaulted
     bid; and (2) an "additional payment," based on a percentage of the
     lesser of the defaulted bid or the subsequent winning bid.[^197]

169. The Commission's implementation of its competitive bidding
     authority enables the assignment of licenses to parties that value
     them more highly than others and are more likely to put the
     licenses to efficient and effective use. The failure to pay a
     winning bid undermines this entire process. At a minimum, defaults
     delay the assignment of licenses and the deployment of service. In
     addition, a default may impair the ability of the auction process
     to assign licenses to those parties best able to serve the public.
     Accordingly, the Commission requires defaulting bidders (or
     withdrawing bidders, in auctions in which withdrawals are
     permitted) to pay the deficiency portion of the default payment so
     that bidders are more likely to submit bids accurately reflecting
     their ability to pay, enhancing the efficiency of the competitive
     bidding process in assigning licenses.[^198]

170. The Commission further requires an additional payment when a
     winning bidder defaults to both discourage unsupportable bidding
     and provide an incentive to bidders wishing to withdraw previously
     placed bids to do so prior to the close of an auction (when
     permitted), because, among other things, a default or
     disqualification after an auction prevents other bidders from
     winning the license in the initial auction, thereby delaying the
     use of the spectrum to provide service to the public.[^199]
     Originally, the additional default payment was set at three
     percent.[^200] In 2006, we concluded that having the discretion to
     set the additional payment percentage between three and 20 percent
     would help the Commission "persuade bidders to be more realistic in
     their advance assessment of how much they can afford to pay for
     licenses."[^201] For Auction 73, the additional default payment
     percentage for any default on a bid for the D Block license was set
     at ten percent. In auctions where the Commission accepts single
     bids on combinations, or packages, of licenses, the Commission has
     fixed the additional default payment percentage at twenty-five
     percent.[^202] The Commission adopted the higher additional default
     percentage in response to the greater potential significance of
     such a default. In auctions with combinatorial bidding, a bidder's
     winning bid may affect not only the licenses subject to that
     winning bid, but the set of bids that wins other licenses as well.

171. Over the history of the Commission's 69 auctions before Auction 73,
     the net winning bids placed by bidders totaled nearly \$59 billion,
     yet the Commission's collection of those bids has totaled far less.
     The shortfall in the applicants' promised payments has stemmed, in
     large part, from bidders' failure to bid consistently with a
     careful and realistic assessment of their ability to pay. This
     failure has been evidenced by bidders subsequently filing for
     bankruptcy or seeking debt compromise in lieu of fulfilling their
     auction obligations. Historically, the Commission has found that a
     bidder's inability to render full and timely payment for its
     winning bid impairs the Commission's assignment of licenses by
     competitive bidding by impeding the deployment of service to the
     public and interfering with the efficiency of the assignment. To
     counter the negative effect of bidders' failure to honor their
     payment obligations, such as in the case of a post-auction default,
     we have sought to assure that the additional payment portion of the
     default payment calculation is sufficient to discourage defaults
     resulting from insincere bidding and to help ensure that licenses
     are assigned to financially and otherwise qualified parties that
     are able to use them effectively and efficiently to provide
     service.[^203]

172. [Discussion]{.underline}. In the present context, the need to deter
     default is substantially increased. The Commission seeks to license
     the D Block spectrum to promote the creation of a ubiquitous
     nationwide wireless network providing interoperable broadband
     service to the nation's public safety service providers. Delay in
     assignment of the license could result in substantial harm to the
     public. Much of this Second Further Notice seeks to reduce the risk
     of default, and consequent delay, by seeking comment on where
     greater specificity in the requirements of the 700 MHz
     Public/Private Partnership might increase the likelihood of success
     in creating the hoped-for public safety network. At the same time,
     we seek comment on whether we should modify the default payment
     rules with respect to a D Block winning bidder. We recognize that a
     D Block winning bidder faces risks of default that are different in
     nature, and potentially greater, than those facing the typical
     winning bidder in a Commission auction. We seek comment on whether
     a D Block winning bidder's consequent exposure to a potential
     default payment is excessive and, if so, on ways to reduce it to an
     acceptable level by modifying either the rules regarding the
     imposition of a default payment or the default payment amount. In
     particular, we seek comment regarding the obligation of a D Block
     winning bidder to make default payments in the event that the
     Bureaus or the Commission adjudicate a dispute with respect to the
     NSA and a D Block winning bidder will not comply with the decision
     on the disputed issues. In this context, the default payments
     provide a strong inducement to a D Block winning bidder to accept
     the adjudicated terms. It is possible, however, that public safety
     representatives aware of a D Block winning bidder's incentives may
     have greater incentives to make additional demands in
     pre-adjudication negotiations than if the D Block winning bidder
     were not facing the threat of default payments.

173. More specifically, we seek comment on whether we should modify the
     applicable default payment based on the particular circumstances
     that lead to the default, such as after negotiations fail to
     produce an NSA. Under such circumstances, should we cap the
     deficiency portion of the default payment, or direct WTB to apply a
     different percentage when calculating the additional payment
     portion of the default payment then it would after a winning bidder
     defaults on a post-auction payment, or eliminate one of these
     components of the default payment, while retaining the other? We
     note that in the event that we conduct a subsequent auction after
     negotiations fail to produce an NSA and offer license(s) for the D
     Block that are not subject to any 700 MHz Public/Private
     Partnership conditions, the deficiency portion of any default
     payment may well be zero, given that, if all other factors are
     equal, the winning bid(s) in such a subsequent auction should be
     higher. How should we take this possibility into account?

174. We seek comment on what specific amount or percentage limits, if
     any, would provide the best balance between maintaining the
     incentives for a D Block winning bidder to commit to its bid amount
     and the required negotiating process while limiting the risk that
     it may face a choice between default and accepting NSA terms that
     jeopardize the success of its business plan. Commenters should
     consider the possibility that the Commission might offer multiple
     regional D Block licenses subject to combinatorial bidding. Under
     such circumstances, should the Commission continue to retain the
     higher additional default payment percentage for combinatorial
     auctions, given the potentially greater effects of a default by one
     of multiple winners? We note generally with respect to the
     percentage for the additional payment portion of the default
     payment, applying the ten percent additional payment previously
     adopted to a bid equal to the previous \$1.33 billion reserve price
     would have resulted in additional payment portion of the default
     payment of \$133 million. The Commission has assessed a total
     default payment pursuant to Section 1.2109 that exceeded \$200
     million on one prior occasion. The license in that case was for
     Basic Trading Area 347, covering Phoenix, Arizona and approximately
     one-one hundredth the population covered by the D Block nationwide
     license. However, the largest additional payment previously
     assessed as part of a default payment was less than \$6 million.

175. We also seek comment on whether, in the event that the Public
     Safety Broadband Licensee is required to negotiate multiple times
     after separate auctions of the D Block license, to require a
     defaulting D Block winning bidder, either as a substitute for or in
     conjunction with any default payments, to pay the Public Safety
     Broadband Licensee's negotiation costs for unsuccessful
     negotiations. If we establish such an obligation, how should we
     define the covered negotiation costs? Such a payment might provide
     some additional incentive to reach successful negotiations, and
     would also ensure that, in the event the parties did not reach an
     agreement, the Public Safety Broadband Licensee would not be left
     financially unable to proceed with alternatives or to negotiate
     with a future licensee.

### Narrowband Relocation 

176. [Background]{.underline}. Among other things, in designating the
     lower half of the 700 MHz Public Safety Band (763-768/793-798 MHz)
     for broadband communications, the *Second* *Report and Order*
     consolidated existing narrowband allocations to the upper half of
     the 700 MHz Public Safety block (769-775/799-805 MHz).[^204] To
     effectuate the consolidation of the narrowband channels, we
     required the D Block licensee to pay the costs of relocating
     narrowband radios from channels 63 and 68, and the upper one
     megahertz of channels 64 and 69, and capped the disbursement amount
     for relocation costs at \$10 million.[^205] We also cautioned that
     any narrowband equipment deployed in channels 63 and 68, or in the
     upper one megahertz of channels 64 and 69, more than 30 days
     following the adoption date of the *Second Report and Order* would
     be ineligible for relocation funding.[^206] In addition, we
     prohibited authorization of any new narrowband operations in that
     spectrum, as of 30 days following the adoption date of the *Second
     Report and Order*.[^207]

177. We found that, in order to maximize the benefits of the 700 MHz
     Public/Private Partnership to deploy a nationwide, interoperable
     broadband communications network, the current 700 MHz narrowband
     public safety operations must be consolidated and cleared no later
     than the DTV transition date.[^208] We required every public safety
     licensee impacted by the consolidation to file a certification with
     the Commission no later than 30 days from the effective date of the
     *Second Report and Order*, including certain information to account
     for "pre-programmed narrowband radios that public safety agencies
     may have already taken delivery as of the adoption date of \[the
     *Second Report and Order*\] and intend to immediately place into
     operation."[^209] We emphasized that such information was "integral
     to the success of the relocation process," and cautioned public
     safety entities that failing to file this information in a timely
     manner would result in forfeiture of reimbursement.[^210] As "an
     additional measure to define and contain the costs that would be
     entitled to reimbursement," we prohibited any new authorizations
     outside of the consolidated narrowband segment, stating that such a
     prohibition would "ensure that the relocation proceeds in an
     orderly manner and without complications stemming from additional
     operations being deployed in spectrum being reallocated."[^211]
     Moreover, as "an additional means to ensure the integrity of the
     relocation process," we imposed a \$10 million cap based on the
     best evidence available in the record at the time of the *Second
     Report and Order*.[^212]

178. Two parties filed petitions seeking reconsideration of some or all
     of the foregoing requirements in the *Second Report and
     Order*.[^213] Among other things, these parties challenged the
     adequacy of the \$10 million cap on relocation expenses.[^214] A
     number of other parties also supported revising or eliminating the
     relocation cap.[^215]

179. One petitioner also asked that the Commission make clear that
     parties who purchased and began to deploy systems before the August
     30 cut-off date can continue to deploy those systems after August
     30, and allow full reimbursement for the relocation of all such
     systems.[^216] Another party asks the Commission to modify the
     *Second Report and Order* to permit continued authorization and
     deployment of statewide radio public safety systems in Channels 63
     and 68 and the upper one megahertz of Channels 64 and 69 through
     January 31, 2009, allow the owner of a statewide radio public
     safety system to obtain reimbursement for all its costs incurred in
     the installation of such a system which was in the process of
     construction and implementation as of the date of the *Second
     Report and Order*, and reconsider the \$10 million cap on rebanding
     costs.[^217]

180. [Discussion]{.underline}. Being mindful of the desire to provide
     certainty to potential bidders as to the relocation obligation that
     would attach to the winner of this spectrum, we seek comment on
     whether we should revise or eliminate the \$10 million cap on
     relocation expenses. In commenting, we ask parties to provide
     specific data and cost estimates regarding relocation expenses,
     particularly taking into account the certifications filed in the
     docket pursuant to the *Second Report and Order.*

181. Given the proposed re-auction of the D Block and associated timing,
     we also seek comment on the date by which such relocation must be
     completed. Should we continue to require relocation be completed by
     the DTV transition date? If not, should we set an alternative date,
     and if so, what would that date be? Should we allow relocation to
     occur on a rolling basis, such that the D Block licensee would be
     required to relocate narrowband operations only as the broadband
     network is built out in a particular market? If so, how much notice
     should the D Block licensee be required to give to a narrowband
     licensee in advance of relocation? We also seek comment on any
     other viable mechanism for facilitating relocation, and the
     appropriate timing of such an approach. Should we retain the
     requirement that capped costs be deposited in a trust account to be
     administered by the Public Safety Broadband Licensee? If we
     eliminate the cap, how would the trust mechanism function? Should
     we continue to require that the Public Safety Broadband Licensee
     manage the reimbursement process for these licensees? If so, should
     we require that public safety entities seeking reimbursement
     provide detailed cost information to the Public Safety Broadband
     Licensee? What should such cost information entail? Should the
     Public Safety Broadband Licensee be afforded discretion in
     assessing the soundness of the cost estimates? Can the Public
     Safety Broadband Licensee leverage its status as the nationwide
     public safety broadband license holder to negotiate terms with
     equipment and technology vendors to relocate multiple narrowband
     operations, and thus achieve economies of scale? Should the Public
     Safety Broadband Licensee have recourse to the Commission if it is
     determines that cost estimates provided by individual public safety
     entities, including those passed through by technology or equipment
     vendors, to be unreasonable?

182. With respect to the August 30, 2007, cut off date for narrowband
     deployments outside of the consolidated narrowband spectrum, we
     sought to balance the needs of individual public safety entities
     with the necessity of carrying out a swift and thorough narrowband
     relocation process in order to quickly and efficiently establish
     the nationwide, interoperable public safety broadband network.
     While we understand the concerns expressed by certain parties, we
     continue to believe that the cut off date was appropriate and
     struck the right balance. Rather, addressing each such situation on
     a case-by-case basis through the waiver process is a more
     appropriate mechanism. Accordingly, we seek comment on whether
     extension of the August 30, 2007, deadline established in the
     *Second Report and Order* would be inappropriate, and any other
     issue related to the reconsideration petitions filed by Virginia
     and Pierce Transit.

### Size of Geographic Areas and Other Rules and Conditions 

183. *Size of geographic areas*. In the *700 MHz Second Report and
     Order*, the Commission determined that the D Block license would be
     auctioned as a single, nationwide license to provide for commercial
     service in the D Block to build and operate a joint broadband
     public safety and commercial network for public safety use.[^218]
     We seek comment on the appropriate geographic service area for the
     D Block. Our goal has been to make a nationwide, interoperable
     broadband network available to state and local public safety users.
     We found that creating a partnership between a single, national
     public safety entity and a single D Block licensee with a
     nationwide license was the most practical means of speeding
     deployment of the shared network. We seek comments about whether
     there is any reason to change the approach taken in the *Second
     Report and Order*. Would it best serve the public interest to
     continue to license the D Block on a nationwide basis, or should we
     choose regional geographic service areas such as REAGs?

184. If the D Block were split into regional licenses, to what extent,
     if any, should we modify any of the policies or rules previously
     adopted or proposed herein with respect to a D Block 700 MHz
     Public/Private Partnership? How would the Commission ensure that
     the primary goal of a national, interoperable, communications
     network for public safety agencies is not jeopardized? In
     particular, how would we ensure interoperability of communications
     between public safety users of different regional networks? How
     would we ensure that interoperable communications capabilities are
     extended to first responders in every region in an equitable
     fashion? What obligations should we adopt to facilitate
     coordination between D Block licensees or to otherwise promote the
     ability of the regional networks to function as a seamless,
     nationwide network for public safety users? For example, should we
     mandate that each D Block licensee provide roaming to the public
     safety users of all other D Block regional networks? What rules
     should apply in the event that some regional licenses are
     successfully auctioned while other regional licenses are not
     successfully auctioned?

185. We also seek comment on whether the D Block should be split into
     one license (or several licenses) covering high-population density
     areas and a second license (or set of licenses) covering
     low-population density areas. Would such an arrangement allow a
     commercial licensee that specializes in rural coverage (or has some
     comparative economic advantage in covering such areas) to better
     serve public safety users in rural areas? Do public safety users in
     rural areas have different or unique technical requirements as
     compared to public safety users in more densely-populated areas? If
     so, to what extent are commercial entities that specialize in rural
     coverage suited to serving public safety users in such areas?[^219]

186. We also seek comment on whether any of our other standard rules,
     such as our Part 1 competitive bidding rules, should be modified to
     take into account the possibility of offering multiple licenses to
     use D Block spectrum subject to the 700 MHz Public/Private
     Partnership conditions. What rules should we adopt regarding the
     establishment of an NSA? Are the needs of public safety served if
     the Public Safety Broadband Licensee must negotiate separate NSAs
     with several commercial entities, rather than a single, nationwide
     commercial partner? Under a regional approach, how would we ensure
     that interoperable communications capabilities are extended to
     first responders in every region in an equitable fashion? Should we
     mandate a "master" NSA that would include minimum network
     specifications, which could then be modified on a regional basis
     with more detailed schedules? If we were to adopt regional license
     areas for the D Block, should we also adopt corresponding regional
     public safety broadband licenses for the public safety broadband
     spectrum to facilitate the establishment of regional 700 MHz
     Public/Private Partnerships?

187. *Other rules and conditions.* Lastly, we seek comment on whether
     there are any other aspects of the rules or conditions for the 700
     MHz Public/Private Partnership that we should modify. For example,
     should we require the D Block licensee to operate on an exclusively
     wholesale and/or open access basis?[^220] Would it serve the goals
     of this partnership to impose such requirements? Or, would
     maintaining a more flexible approach improve the viability of the
     700 MHz Public/Private Partnership? How would an open access
     environment affect public safety? If we adopt a wholesale only
     approach, do we need to revise or clarify any aspect of the
     operational responsibilities of the D Block and the Public Safety
     Broadband Licensee? Should we permit the D Block licensee in
     certain circumstances to obtain access to public safety narrowband
     spectrum on a secondary, non-interference basis? If so, under what
     circumstances should this be permitted, and what safeguards should
     be adopted? Are there any other changes that the Commission should
     consider making to the rules or conditions for the 700 MHz
     Public/Private Partnership to ensure its success?

188. We seek comment on other means by which the Commission could
     effectively match the needs of public safety users with the
     capabilities of potential service providers while still meeting our
     obligation under the Act to assign the D Block by competitive
     bidding.[^221] In particular, we observe that Federal, State and
     local government agencies regularly use requests for proposals
     ("RFPs") to contract for services provided by private parties. Such
     RFPs can be weighted to reflect the priorities and needs of the
     contracting governments. We seek comment on the feasibility of such
     an approach in this instance.

189. We note that RFPs could be combined with an auction in at least two
     ways. Under one approach, the Commission or Public Safety Broadband
     Licensee could request proposals from potential providers of the
     broadband network for public safety, then select its preferred
     specification from the proposals offered, making these
     specifications part of the rules for the D Block license to be
     auctioned. Under another approach, the Commission or Public Safety
     Broadband Licensee could auction the D Block with a minimum set of
     requirements, then allow the three or four highest bidders to
     submit proposals that meet or exceed the minimum requirements, with
     the Commission ultimately selecting the winning bidder. We seek
     comment on these approaches. In particular, regarding the first
     approach, we ask commenters to address how we can incorporate the
     generally applicable information that RFP responses would provide
     while avoiding adopting entity-specific requirements that would
     limit the flexibility of other entities to meet our outcome
     objectives in a way that is best suited to their particular
     business plans, technologies, and resources. With respect to the
     second idea, we ask what specific criteria the Commission should
     use in selecting among proposals.

190. Similarly, we seek comment on whether the Commission could
     approximate the benefits of an RFP through a more expeditious
     process. In particular, as noted above, the Commission seeks
     comment in this Second Further Notice on the possibility of
     establishing a public/private partnership and, if such a
     partnership is established, what requirements should apply. As
     discussed in the Technical Appendix, these requirements would
     include specifications for the system architecture, reliability,
     and capacity. In requesting comment on these issues, we especially
     seek input from both the public safety users of such a network and
     the potential providers of such a service, including existing
     wireless service providers and/or potential new entrants that may
     be interested in participating in a public/private partnership.
     Following the issues raised in the Technical Appendix, what
     specifications are needed by public safety users? What
     specifications are economically feasible for potential providers,
     and at what cost?

## Other Options for the D Block License and the Public Safety Broadband License

191. In this section, we consider the Commission's options in the event
     that we determine not to proceed with the 700 MHz Public/Private
     Partnership approach requiring a mandatory partnership between the
     D Block licensee and the Public Safety Broadband Licensee with
     regard to a shared network using both the D Block and public safety
     broadband spectrum. For example, as discussed previously, we might
     decide that we should not retain the 700 MHz Public/Private
     Partnership obligations if, in the next auction of the D Block
     license, we offer the D Block license with the 700 MHz
     Public/Private Partnership obligations and the license again fails
     to attract a winning bidder, or the winning bidder defaults or
     fails to negotiate a successful NSA with the Public Safety
     Broadband Licensee. Alternatively, we may decide not to retain the
     700 MHz Public/Private Partnership condition, and instead
     immediately conduct an auction to license the D Block without a 700
     MHz Public/Private Partnership obligation. There may also be other
     circumstances whereby the 700 MHz Public/Private Partnership
     obligation on the D Block would not serve its purpose and our
     objective to facilitate the creation of a nationwide,
     interoperable, broadband network for public safety users. We
     therefore seek comment generally on rules the Commission should
     adopt, both for the D Block licensee and the Public Safety
     Broadband Licensee, in those circumstances where the D Block
     license would be auctioned without a 700 MHz Public/Private
     Partnership condition. If the D Block were auctioned for
     unrestricted commercial services, how much money would the auction
     raise? Assuming that the auction would yield less than the cost of
     building a dedicated, nationwide, interoperable broadband network
     for public safety, how should the shortfall be addressed? If
     estimated network construction costs exceed the estimated receipts
     from the auction of license(s) for the D Block with no commercial
     service restrictions, to what extent might this shortfall be
     addressed from the auction receipts of spectrum bands that will be,
     or might be, auctioned in the near future?[^222] For example, what
     are reasonable estimates of the value of the AWS-3 spectrum with no
     commercial service restrictions? Similarly, what are reasonable
     estimates of the value of the "white spaces" spectrum (for unused
     portions of television channels 2-51) licensed with no commercial
     restrictions?" In addition, if the D Block were auctioned for
     unrestricted commercial services, to what extent would the
     remaining spectrum available to public safety providers be
     insufficient to meet their communications needs, including the need
     for an interoperable broadband network?[^223]

### D Block License Service Rules without the 700 MHz Public/Private Partnership

192. We seek comment below on the particular service rules that we
     should adopt for the D Block in the event that we determine that
     the D Block should be licensed without any 700 MHz Public/Private
     Partnership obligation.

#### Size of the Geographic Areas 

193. [Background]{.underline}. In the *First Report and Order*, the
     Commission determined that a balanced mix of geographic service
     area licenses -- CMAs, EAs, and REAGs -- would be appropriate for
     the commercial 700 MHz Band licenses.[^224] In the *Second Report
     and Order*, we reaffirmed the determination to use CMAs, EAs, and
     REAGs for all of the 700 MHz commercial spectrum blocks except for
     the D Block. We concluded that the D Block should be licensed on a
     nationwide basis for use as part of the 700 MHz Public/Private
     Partnership with the Public Safety Broadband Licensee.[^225] We
     adopted CMA, EA, and REAG areas for the other commercial licenses
     "to promote dissemination of licenses among a wide variety of
     applications, accommodate the competing need for both large and
     small licensing areas, \[and\] meet the needs expressed by
     potential entrants seeking access to spectrum and incumbents
     seeking additional spectrum."[^226]

194. [Discussion]{.underline}. We now seek comment on the appropriate
     geographic service area for the D Block in the event that the D
     Block license is re-auctioned without a 700 MHz Public/Private
     Partnership obligation. Would it best serve the public interest to
     continue to license the D Block on a nationwide basis, or should we
     choose a smaller geographic service area, such as the CMA, EA, and
     REAG sizes used to license the other 700 MHz blocks? We note that,
     in evaluating the appropriate balance of license areas, we will
     continue to consider the 700 MHz Band as a whole, including the
     commercial spectrum that has been previously auctioned. As we
     stated in the *Second Report and Order*, recent statutory and
     regulatory changes have served to harmonize this spectrum band and
     warrant our consideration of the 700 MHz Band spectrum as a
     whole.[^227] We request that commenters provide information that
     would corroborate the benefits of their proposed geographic area
     and the costs and benefits of adopting an alternative license area.
     Commenters should also discuss how a particular license area for
     the D Block would best serve the public interest, considering the
     commercial 700 MHz Band spectrum as a whole. Finally, commenters
     should address whether the availability of package bidding, which
     may mitigate the exposure risk for bidders seeking certain
     aggregations of licenses, should influence our choice of geographic
     license service area for the D Block.

#### Performance Requirements 

195. [Background]{.underline}. In the *Second Report and Order*, we
     adopted different performance requirements for the commercial 700
     MHz Band licenses depending on the geographic size of their license
     areas. CMA and EA licensees in the 700 MHz Band are required to
     provide service sufficient to cover 35 percent of the geographic
     area of their licenses within four years, and 70 percent of this
     area within ten years (the license term), and REAG licensees must
     provide service sufficient to cover 40 percent of the population of
     their license areas within four years and 75 percent of the
     population within ten years.[^228] Licensees with CMA, EA, or REAG
     areas that fail to meet the applicable interim benchmark, the
     license term is reduced by two years, and the end-of-term benchmark
     must be met within eight years.[^229] At the end of the license
     term, licensees with CMA, EA, or REAG areas that fail to meet the
     end-of-term benchmark will be subject to a "keep what you use"
     rule, which will make unused spectrum available to other potential
     users.[^230] We adopted these stringent performance requirements to
     "better promote access to spectrum and the provision of service,
     especially in rural areas."[^231]

196. [Discussion]{.underline}. We seek comment on the appropriate
     performance requirements for the D Block license or licenses if the
     D Block license is re-auctioned without a 700 MHz Public/Private
     Partnership obligation. We further seek comment on whether, if we
     decide to license the D Block on a CMA, EA, or REAG basis, we
     should impose the same performance requirements applicable to other
     700 MHz commercial licenses with the same geographic service area.
     We seek comment on whether these performance requirements are
     appropriate for the D Block. In the event that we continue to
     license the D Block on a nationwide basis, we seek comment on
     whether performance benchmarks similar to those required of REAG
     licensees would be appropriate.[^232] To the extent commenters
     believe the performance benchmarks should be higher or lower than
     the proposals above, we request that they provide information that
     would corroborate the benefits of their proposed benchmarks and the
     costs and benefits of alternative approaches. Comments should
     address whether these specific geographic benchmarks would promote
     access to spectrum and the provision of service.

#### License Block Size and Term

197. [Background]{.underline}. In the *Second Report and Order*, we
     determined that the D Block should be auctioned as a 10-megahertz
     spectrum block made up of paired 5-megahertz blocks.[^233] We also
     determined that it be given an initial license term of 10 years,
     consistent with the term given to other commercial licensees.[^234]
     We found that a 10-year term would "provide regulatory parity by
     establishing the same license term for \[\] all 700 MHz
     licensees."[^235]

198. [Discussion]{.underline}. We intend not to revisit these
     determinations if the D Block license is re-auctioned without a 700
     MHz Public/Private Partnership obligation. Indeed, in the *Second
     Report and Order,* we determined the band plan for all commercial
     bands as a whole.[^236] Any changes to the block sizes that would
     affect other bands would not serve the public interest given the
     fact that the adjacent commercial spectrum licenses have already
     been auctioned. Dividing the current D Block into smaller block
     sizes may also not be in the public interest considering that a
     10-megahertz spectrum block made up of paired 5-megahertz blocks
     can facilitate more innovative and efficient broadband deployment
     than any smaller block sizes in this band. With regard to the
     license term, we note that all other commercial licenses in the
     band have a 10-year term similar to the D Block license, and we see
     no reason to treat the D Block differently if it does not include
     the 700 MHz Public/Private Partnership. We seek comment on our
     intention not to revisit these determinations.

#### Power Limits and Out-of-Band Emission Limits

199. [Background]{.underline}. In the *Second Report and Order*, we
     adopted rules to protect 700 MHz Band commercial and public safety
     licensees from interference from the out-of-band emissions
     (OOBE).[^237] In accordance with those rules, the D Block licensee
     was required to satisfy an OOBE limit of 43 + 10log P dB in
     protecting commercial 700 MHz Band licensees[^238] and 76/65 +
     10log P dB OOBE limits in protecting the 700 MHz public safety
     narrowband channels.[^239]

200. [Discussion]{.underline}. Because of the anticipated relationship
     between the D Block licensee and the Public Safety Broadband
     Licensee, it was not necessary to impose any OOBE limits on the D
     Block licensee in order to protect the Public Safety Broadband
     Licensee. However, if that relationship is no longer in effect, we
     seek comment on what measures we should adopt to adequately protect
     public safety broadband communications from interference from D
     Block operations, and whether measures to protect against such
     interference reduce the amount of usable, broadband spectrum
     available to the Public Safety Broadband Licensee and the D Block
     licensee. We would propose to require that D Block licensees
     provide appropriate OOBE protection to the public safety broadband
     spectrum. As to the appropriate level of protection, we see no
     reason to protect the public safety broadband block to any lesser
     degree than we currently protect the public safety narrowband
     channels. We therefore propose that D Block licensees be required
     to protect the public safety broadband block by satisfying the same
     76/65 + 10log P dB OOBE limits currently applicable to the D Block
     licensee in protecting the public safety narrowband channels. We
     seek comment on this proposal.

201. In the *Second Report and Order*, we did not adopt any changes to
     the then-existing power limits for base, fixed, mobile, and
     portable D Block stations,[^240] nor did we modify the notification
     and coordination requirements we had imposed on D Block licensees
     choosing to operate base stations at high power levels.[^241] The
     change in the anticipated relationship between the D Block and the
     public safety broadband block should not necessitate any
     modifications to these requirements, and we therefore seek comment
     on whether the power, notification, and coordination requirements
     currently applicable to D Block licensees should remain
     unchanged.[^242]

#### License Partitioning, Disaggregation, Assignment, and Transfer 

202. [Background]{.underline}. In the *Second Report and Order*, the
     Commission prohibited geographic partitioning and spectrum
     disaggregation for the D Block licensee. The Commission found that
     adopting such a restriction would serve the public interest by
     assuring a reliable partnership between the D Block licensee and
     Public Safety Broadband Licensee.[^243]

203. [Discussion]{.underline}. If we auction the D Block without the 700
     MHz Public/Private Partnership, we seek comment on whether we
     should allow geographic partitioning and spectrum disaggregation
     similar to other 700 MHz commercial bands.

#### Other Service and Auction Rules and Conditions 

204. [Background]{.underline}. Aside from the subjects addressed above,
     the *Second Report and Order* addressed a number of other service
     and auction related issues regarding the commercial use of the D
     Block and the rules regarding other 700 MHz band commercial
     licenses, such as open platform, wholesale, license eligibility,
     and small business bidding credits.[^244]

205. [Discussion]{.underline}. We seek comment on whether we should
     revisit and adopt any other rules or conditions for the D Block in
     the event that we auction it without a mandatory public/private
     partnership condition. For example, would it serve the public
     interest to impose any eligibility restrictions, or open platform
     conditions similar to those imposed on the adjacent C Block? Should
     the Commission consider imposing a mandatory wholesale obligation?
     We also seek comment on whether the Commission should apply its
     spectrum aggregation screen used for wireless transactions to the D
     Block. We also seek comment on whether any of our Part 1
     competitive bidding, designated entity eligibility, and/or other
     auction rules or procedures would be inappropriate or should be
     modified for licensing the D Block without the 700 MHz
     Public/Private Partnership.

### Alternate Public Safety Broadband Opportunities 

206. In the event that that we determine not to proceed with the 700 MHz
     Public/Private Partnership approach requiring a partnership between
     the D Block licensee and the Public Safety Broadband Licensee, we
     seek comment broadly on how we may still achieve the public
     interest goal of ensuring a nationwide, interoperable broadband
     network is available for the use of public safety, and whether
     there are further revisions or obligations we should impose on the
     Public Safety Broadband License to achieve these goals.

207. [Background]{.underline}. In the *700 MHz Public Safety* *Ninth
     NPRM*,[^245] we previously considered one option in the absence of
     a public/private partnership with the D Block auction winner, that
     would permit the nationwide Public Safety Broadband Licensee to
     provide unconditionally preemptible access to the public safety
     broadband spectrum to commercial service providers, on a secondary
     basis, through spectrum leases or in the form of public/private
     partnerships established by contract with the Public Safety
     Broadband Licensee. In this respect, the Public Safety Broadband
     Licensee would enter into arrangements with one or more commercial
     service providers for accessing or sharing their communications
     systems infrastructure in order to create the nationwide,
     interoperable, broadband public safety communications network. This
     could be accomplished, for example, through the use of a request
     for proposal (RFP) process by which commercial partners would be
     solicited to provide access to their network infrastructure. The
     Public Safety Broadband Licensee would then select one or more
     entities to provide access to or build out all or a portion of the
     network, and/or provide certain services to the public safety
     community on the public safety broadband spectrum, in exchange for
     secondary, preemptible access to the Public Safety Broadband
     Licensee spectrum.

208. [Discussion]{.underline}. We seek comment on this option as an
     alternative to the particular public/private partnership model that
     we earlier endorsed as our preferred approach in the *Second Report
     and Order*. This option would preserve the concepts of a unified
     broadband standard and nationwide level of interoperability, as
     managed by the Public Safety Broadband Licensee on behalf of the
     public safety community. We recognize, however, that such a
     proposal might not be ideal given that there would be no guarantee
     of securing a commercial partner(s) that could provide the network
     infrastructure, including features beneficial to the public safety
     community. Further, the Public Safety Broadband Licensee may be
     limited in the service providers with which it could partner in
     order to ensure deployment of a unified broadband technology with a
     nationwide level of interoperability, and take advantage of
     economies of scale in terms of handsets and network equipment.
     Accordingly, we seek comment on whether we should adopt this
     approach should the D Block fail to attract a successful bidder.
     What alternatives or variations on this approach may be more
     appropriate? Are there other sources or mechanisms of funding that
     could be used to build out or support a nationwide, interoperable
     broadband network for public safety? Will the 10 megahertz of
     public safety spectrum allocated for broadband be sufficient to
     support a nationwide, interoperable broadband network for public
     safety?

209. If we do adopt an approach whereby the Public Safety Broadband
     Licensee could enter into multiple contracts with commercial
     providers, would it be necessary for the Commission to establish
     certain baseline performance requirements, including those for
     broadband system architecture, interoperability, build-out of
     national coverage, unconditional preemption of commercial use, and
     disaster restoration capability? If the Commission establishes such
     requirements, what should they be? Alternatively, should we require
     or allow any or all of these issues to be addressed by the Public
     Safety Broadband Licensee rather than the Commission? What limits,
     if any, should be placed on the Public Safety Broadband Licensee's
     ability to enter into leasing arrangements with commercial
     entities? What Commission oversight should be retained with respect
     to the Public Safety Broadband Licensee's activities under these
     circumstances? Is there additional review that the Commission
     should undertake with respect to approval of the leasing
     arrangements, or other reporting with respect to the Public Safety
     Broadband Licensee's activities that should be required?

210. We note that many of these considerations were initially raised in
     the *700 MHz Public Safety Ninth NPRM*, and we thus incorporate by
     reference the questions posed in that document, and seek further
     comment here in light of the revisions to the 700 MHz band and the
     possible additional changes contemplated in this Second Further
     Notice. Are there other issues raised by the *700 MHz Public Safety
     Ninth NPRM* or associated comments that we should consider here?

211. Another alternative may be to permit build out on a regional,
     state, or local basis of the broadband spectrum. This could be done
     either through a spectrum lease with the nationwide Public Safety
     Broadband Licensee, or by rescinding the nationwide license and
     allowing regional, state, or local licensing of this spectrum. We
     seek comment on both approaches. In either instance, we continue to
     believe parameters must still be established that would ensure that
     systems operating on this spectrum would be interoperable with one
     another on a nationwide basis. Accordingly, we seek comment on the
     role of the Public Safety Broadband Licensee in establishing such
     standards, and if we adopt a local licensing scheme, whether we
     should retain a national body such as the Public Safety Broadband
     Licensee to manage the use of this spectrum by establishing
     baseline performance requirements, determining a common broadband
     standard, and/or serving in a frequency coordinator or planning
     role.

212. Finally, we seek comment on whether, in the absence of a
     public/private partnership, we should continue to obligate the D
     Block auction winner to fund the relocation of those public safety
     narrowband systems operating in the lower portion of the public
     safety spectrum. As noted in the Second Report and Order, it would
     be to the benefit of the D Block auction winner to ensure that
     narrowband operations adjacent to the D Block under the former band
     plan be relocated to the upper portion of the public safety 700 MHz
     band and thus minimize interference concerns. As another option,
     should we grandfather existing operations until such time as
     relocation funding is secure, and require the Public Safety
     Broadband Licensee to include relocation funding in its RFP
     process? What alternative sources of funding may be available to
     facilitate this transition?

# procedural matters

## Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis

213. Section 213 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act 2000 provides
     that the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA), 5 U.S.C. § 603, shall
     not apply to the rules and competitive bidding procedures for
     frequencies in the 746-806 MHz Band,[^246] which includes the
     frequencies of both the D Block license and the 700 MHz public
     safety broadband and narrowband spectrum. Accordingly, we have not
     prepared an Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis in connection
     with the Second Further Notice.

## Initial Paperwork Reduction Act Analysis of 1995 Analysis

214. This document contains proposed new or modified information
     collection requirements. We note, however, that Section 213 of the
     Consolidated Appropriations Act 2000 provides that rules governing
     frequencies in the 746-806 MHz Band, which encompass the spectrum
     associated with both the D Block license and the 700 MHz public
     safety broadband and narrowband spectrum, become effective
     immediately upon publication in the Federal Register without regard
     to certain sections of the Paperwork Reduction Act.[^247] We are
     therefore not inviting comment pursuant to the Paperwork Reduction
     Act on any information collections proposed in this document.

## Other Procedural Matters

### Ex Parte Presentations

215. The rulemaking shall be treated as a "permit-but-disclose"
     proceeding in accordance with the Commission's *ex parte*
     rules.[^248] Persons making oral *ex parte* presentations are
     reminded that memoranda summarizing the presentations must contain
     summaries of the substance of the presentations and not merely a
     listing of the subjects discussed. More than a one or two sentence
     description of the views and arguments presented generally is
     required.[^249] Other requirements pertaining to oral and written
     presentations are set forth in Section 1.1206(b) of the
     Commission's rules.[^250]

### Comment Filing Procedures

216. Pursuant to Sections 1.415 and 1.419 of the Commission's
     rules,[^251] interested parties may file comments on or before the
     dates indicated on the first page of this document. All filings
     related to this Second Further Notice should refer to WT Docket No.
     06-150, PS Docket No. 06-229, and WT Docket No. 96-86. Comments may
     be filed using: (1) the Commission's Electronic Comment Filing
     System (ECFS), (2) the Federal Government's eRulemaking Portal,
     or (3) by filing paper copies.[^252]

-   Electronic Filers: Comments may be filed electronically using the
    Internet by accessing the ECFS: <http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/ecfs/> or
    the Federal eRulemaking Portal:
    [http://www.regulations.gov](http://www.regulations.gov/). Filers
    should follow the instructions provided on the website for
    submitting comments.

    -   ECFS filers must transmit one electronic copy of the comments
        for WT Docket No. 06-150, PS Docket No. 06-229, and WT Docket
        No. 96-86. In completing the transmittal screen, filers should
        include their full name, U.S. Postal Service mailing address,
        and WT Docket No. 06-150, WT Docket No. 06-169, and WT Docket
        No. 96-86. Parties may also submit an electronic comment by
        Internet e-mail. To get filing instructions, filers should send
        an e-mail to <ecfs@fcc.gov> and include the following words in
        the body of the message, "get form." A sample form and
        directions will be sent in response.

-   Paper Filers: Parties who choose to file by paper must file an
    original and four copies of each filing. Filings can be sent by hand
    or messenger delivery, by commercial overnight courier, or by
    first-class or overnight U.S. Postal Service mail (although we
    continue to experience delays in receiving U.S. Postal Service
    mail). All filings must be addressed to the Commission's Secretary,
    Marlene H. Dortch, Office of the Secretary, Federal Communications
    Commission, 445 12^th^ Street, S.W., Washington, DC, 20554.

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
-   The Commission's contractor will receive hand-delivered or
    messenger-delivered paper filings for the Commission's Secretary at
    236 Massachusetts Avenue, N.E., Suite 110, Washington, DC 20002. The
    filing hours at this location are 8:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. All hand
    deliveries must be held together with rubber bands or fasteners. Any
    envelopes must be disposed of [before]{.underline} entering the
    building.

-   Commercial overnight mail (other than U.S. Postal Service Express
    Mail and Priority Mail) must be sent to 9300 East Hampton Drive,
    Capitol Heights, MD 20743.

-   U.S. Postal Service first-class, Express, and Priority mail should
    be addressed to 445 12^th^ Street, S.W., Washington DC 20554.

217. Parties should send a copy of their filings to: Neşe
     Guendelsberger, Wireless Telecommunications Bureau, 445 12^th^
     Street, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20554, or by e-mail to
     <nese.guendelsberger@fcc.gov>; and Jeff Cohen, Public Safety and
     Homeland Security Bureau, 445 12^th^ Street, S.W., Washington, D.C.
     20554, or by e-mail to <jeff.cohen@fcc.gov>. Parties shall also
     serve one copy with the Commission's copy contractor, Best Copy and
     Printing, Inc. (BCPI), Portals II, Room CY-B402, 445 12^th^ Street,
     S.W., Washington, D.C. 20554, (202) 488-5300, or via e-mail to
     <fcc@bcpiweb.com>.

218. Documents in WT Docket No. 06-150, PS Docket No. 06-229, and WT
     Docket No. 96-86 will be available for public inspection and
     copying during business hours at the FCC Reference Information
     Center, Portals II, Room CY-A257, 445 12^th^ Street, S.W.,
     Washington, D.C. 20554. The documents may also be purchased from
     BCPI, telephone (202) 488-5300, facsimile (202) 488-5563, TTY (202)
     488-5562, e-mail <fcc@bcpiweb.com>.

### Accessible Formats

219. To request materials in accessible formats for people with
     disabilities (Braille, large print, electronic files, audio
     format), send an e-mail to <FCC504@fcc.gov> or call the Consumer &
     Governmental Affairs Bureau at 202-418-0530 (voice), 202-418-0432
     (TTY). Contact the FCC to request reasonable accommodations for
     filing comments (accessible format documents, sign language
     interpreters, CARTS, *etc*.) by e-mail: <FCC504@fcc.gov>; phone:
     202-418-0530 (voice), 202-418-0432 (TTY).

# ORDERING CLAUSES

220. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED pursuant to sections 1, 2, 4(i), 5(c),
     7, 10, 201, 202, 208, 214, 301, 302, 303, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311,
     314, 316, 319, 324, 332, 333, 336, 337, 614, 615, and 710 of the
     Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151, 152,
     154(i), 155(c), 157, 160, 201, 202, 208, 214, 301, 302, 303, 307,
     308, 309, 310, 311, 314, 316, 319, 324, 332, 333, 336, and 337,
     that this SECOND FURTHER NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING in WT Docket
     No. 06-150, WT Docket No. 96-86 and PS Docket No. 06-229 IS
     ADOPTED. The SECOND FURTHER NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING shall
     become effective upon publication in the Federal Register.

221. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that pursuant to applicable procedures set
     forth in Sections 1.415 and 1.419 of the Commission's Rules, 47
     C.F.R. §§ 1.415, 1.419, interested parties may file comments on the
     SECOND FURTHER NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING on or before 30 days
     after publication in the Federal Register and reply comments on or
     before 45 days after publication in the Federal Register.

222. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Commission SHALL SEND a copy of this
     SECOND FURTHER NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING in a report to be sent
     to Congress and the General Accounting Office pursuant to the
     Congressional Review Act, 5 U.S.C. § 801(a)(1)(A).

> FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
>
> Marlene H. Dortch
>
> Secretary

**APPENDIX\
**

**Possible Technical Framework for a 700 MHz**

**Public/Private Partnership Shared Wireless Broadband Network**

**I. Overview**

This appendix serves as a possible framework for establishing the
technical requirements for the 700 MHz public/private partnership shared
wireless broadband network (SWBN). It is intended to solicit detailed
comment and result in a final set of technical requirements that will
provide greater certainty for bidders for the D Block license while
ensuring that the network meets public safety's needs. This appendix is
not intended to prejudge any of the issues identified for comment in the
accompanying Second Further Notice. Further, we recognize that certain
aspects of the public/private partnership, if adopted, may be impacted
by determinations made through the questions posed in the Second Further
Notice, and that to some extent the technical considerations here are
dependent on one another.

Each of the technical requirements discussed in the Second Further
Notice is covered below. In many cases we have included more specific
technical specifications or obligations in order to solicit more
meaningful comment. We ask commenters to recommend any specifications
they believe should be modified, deleted, added or retained. The final
requirements will take into account the comments filed in response to
the Second Further Notice, as well as this appendix.

**II. Specifications for Public/Private System Architecture**

Sections 27.1305(a) and 90.1405(a) state that the network must be
"\[designed\] for operation over a broadband technology platform that
provides mobile voice, video, and data capability that is seamlessly
interoperable across public safety local and state agencies,
jurisdictions, and geographic areas, and which includes current and
evolving state-of-the-art technologies reasonably made available in the
commercial marketplace with features beneficial to the public safety
community."

The architecture of the SWBN likely would consist of two general
elements: (a) a Radio Access Network (RAN) and (b) a Core Broadband
Network (CBN). Both the RAN and CBN would be expected to be packet
switched networks using Internet Protocol (IP).

An overall view of a generic functional architecture for the SWBN is
shown in Figure 1. The SWBN depicted has the following characteristics:

1.  The broadband IP network would be based on advanced next generation
    mobile network standards and commercial technologies, with
    performance characteristics supporting voice, data, and multimedia
    applications.[^253]

2.  The SWBN would support end to end multiple quality of service
    classes associated with public safety.

3.  During normal operating conditions, the RAN would support assured
    access for public safety users over commercial users to a limit of
    50% of engineered capacity.[^254]

4.  The RAN would support emergency priority access for public safety
    users over commercial users.

5.  Commercial service capabilities deployed by the D Block licensee
    (*e.g*. voice calling, Internet access, etc.) would be available to
    public safety users at a quality of service (QoS) level as
    identified by the Public Safety Broadband Licensee ("PSBL") as part
    of its responsibilities to administer access to the SWBN and
    interact with individual public safety entities.

6.  The CBN would support interconnection with public safety regional
    and local networks. This interconnection would facilitate
    interoperability with existing public safety networks operating in
    other frequency bands. It can be accomplished through a standard or
    proprietary interface at an appropriate point or points in an
    existing public safety communications system. Consideration should
    be given to implement this interconnection in a way that will not
    have a detrimental impact on the wireless broadband network. It is
    noted that IP broadband networks are already being used in some
    areas to facilitate such interoperability.

7.  The D Block licensee would provide the PSBL with sufficient
    real-time information and network transparency to:

    a.  Ensure that the service obligations of the D Block licensee to
        the PSBL are fully met.

    b.  Provide reports on public safety network usage, user patterns,
        etc.

    c.  Forecast future service needs.

    d.  Administer access by end users.

    e.  Assemble data for assessing usage fees.

    f.  Activate a service alert declaring an emergency condition exists
        for purposes of enabling priority access in excess of the 10
        megahertz of public safety broadband spectrum.

Figure 1: Generic functional architecture for the Shared Wireless
Broadband Network (SWBN)

**III. Reliability, Robustness and Hardening**

Sections 27.1305(c) and 90.1405(c) require that the network must
incorporate "\[s\]ufficient robustness to meet the reliability and
performance expectations of public safety."

This requirement could be met in two ways. First, the Commission could
develop reasonable technical specifications based on comments received
in this proceeding and incorporate these specifications into the service
rules for the D Block. One advantage of this approach would be to
provide certainty to public safety users as well as commercial bidders
in advance of an auction. Second, the D Block licensee could prepare a
draft network reliability plan and submit it to the PSBL. The PSBL would
then provide comments to the D Block licensee on the plan within 30 days
of receipt. The D Block licensee would incorporate any reasonable
requests or suggestions.

In developing the network reliability plan, the D Block licensee may
employ a variety of techniques to ensure that service is maintained and
that service is promptly restored in the event of an outage. These
techniques may include the pre-deployment of backup equipment and
systems, provisions for rapid deployment of systems such as cells on
wheels, flexible system design that provides for rapid reallocation of
resources such as boosting power at certain cell sites, etc.

Public safety users would remain responsible for the reliability of the
equipment that they purchase and use with the network, such as mobile
and hand-held radios, video surveillance systems, broadband access
devices, etc. Further, such equipment should meet the same standards as
those specified by the D Block licensee for commercial equipment that
may be connected to the broadband network.

The network reliability plan also should include the following features
and capabilities:

1.  The network should be designed based on industry best practices,
    specifically, the recommendations of the Network Reliability and
    Interoperability Council.[^255]

2.  Network outages must be reported to the FCC, consistent with the
    requirements for commercial wireless systems.[^256] Plans should be
    put in place and implemented to resolve any pattern of repeated
    outages.

3.  Critical network elements,[^257] such as CBN facilities, base
    stations and antenna towers, should be built to withstand harsh
    weather and natural disasters that are reasonably foreseeable in any
    geographic area, such as hurricanes, floods, earthquakes, etc. Where
    appropriate, local building codes may be used as a guide, with an
    additional margin, as appropriate to ensure a reliable public safety
    system, taking into account cost and other factors. Switches,
    gateways, routers, radio and backhaul systems are typically
    self-redundant.[^258]

4.  Critical sites should have generators available with fuel supplies
    sufficient to operate for as many as 5 to 7 days. By "critical
    sites," we mean those sites that are necessary for maintaining basic
    system availability and access to the core network.

5.  Backup power should be available at least at critical sites
    sufficient to last as many as 8 hours.

6.  Back-haul diversity should be provided at critical sites.

7.  Public safety users are encouraged to obtain any additional backup
    equipment they may need for their own use, such as a reserve supply
    of mobile units and chargers for use in emergencies.

**IV. Capacity, Throughput and Quality of Service**

*Capacity*

Sections 27.1305(d) and 90.1405(d) require that the SWBN incorporate
"\[s\]ufficient capacity to meet the needs of public safety." One method
for complying with these rules is for the D Block licensee to anticipate
public safety user needs during emergency and disaster situations, so
that public safety applications are not degraded (*i.e*., increase in
blocked calls and/or transmission times or reduced data speeds) during
periods of heavy usage.

The network capacity, in terms of the amount of traffic that can be
carried throughout the system generally, or for each user at any given
location, is determined by many variables, including the characteristics
of the radio transmission technology, number of cell sites, spectrum
reuse, use of efficient technologies such as smart antennas, various
factors affecting propagation, core network resources, backhaul
availability, etc. Similarly, the users' traffic demand that determines
the capacity requirements depends on a great many variables, such as the
number of users, the applications that will run on the network and the
resources they consume, peak usage times, acceptable blocking rates,
etc. In the case of a SWBN, the network capacity available for public
safety users will also be affected by the priority that is given to
public safety communications and the ease and degree to which public
safety users can access the commercial spectrum. We recognize that
capacity requirements are not static and we expect them to continue to
grow for both commercial and public safety applications.

This requirement could be met in two ways. First, the Commission could
develop reasonable technical specifications based on comments received
in this proceeding and incorporate these specifications into the service
rules for the D Block. One advantage of this approach would be to
provide certainty to public safety users as well as commercial bidders
in advance of an auction. Second, the D Block licensee could prepare a
draft plan to meet the capacity requirements of public safety users,
based on consultation with the PSBL and based on their experience with
commercial broadband network performance. The plan should take into
account both national and local public safety requirements. The PSBL
would then provide comments to the D Block licensee on the plan within
30 days of receipt. The D-Block licensee would incorporate any
reasonable requests or suggestions.

The D Block licensee should consult on an ongoing basis with the PSBL to
address any shortcomings related to network capacity and to plan
continued evolution of the network to meet growing needs. To assist with
this endeavor, the PSBL should provide a rolling 12-month usage forecast
on a quarterly basis. The network should incorporate a mechanism for
adequate resource management so as to allow for continued improvements
over time and best mitigate any detrimental impact on public safety
operations.

*Throughput*

With regard to throughput, the SWBN should meet the following minimal
specifications:

1.  Data rates should be consistent with state-of-the-art commercial
    wireless systems, such as WiMAX Mobile, LTE, or other equivalent or
    advanced technologies.

2.  Public safety applications should be provided sufficient resources
    to perform at least as well as similar applications on the
    commercial network (*i.e*., voice, video, Internet access).

3.  Blocking rates should be no greater than 2 % or other mutually
    agreeable criteria.[^259]

*Quality of Service*

With regard to quality of service, Sections 27.1305(f) and 90.1405(f)
require the SWBN to incorporate a "mechanism to automatically prioritize
public safety communications over commercial uses on a real-time basis
consistent with the requirements of \[Sections 27.1307 and
90.1407(c)\]." There are certain priorities at the air interface that
relate to the ability of a user to access and connect to the network.
Such priority, "access priority," is to be distinguished from traffic
priority that arises after the connection admission. The notion of QoS
is applied after the connection is established.

Concerning access priority, public safety users will have priority
access to the 10 megahertz of public safety broadband spectrum (or, put
another way, as discussed above, half of the engineered capacity of the
total spectrum (2x10 MHz)) at all the times, and to a portion of the
engineered capacity on the D Block in the event of emergency priority
access. An example of such a scheme is the current Wireless Priority
Service (WPS).[^260]

As it relates to traffic priority and QoS, the following can be
considered as specific requirements of the SWBN:

1.  The networks should provide sufficient capacity, and augment
    capacity as needed, in order to meet the QoS requirements for public
    safety applications.

2.  The SWBN is anticipated to provide a number of QoS classes and
    performance objectives such as those defined in ITU-T Y.1541 or
    those defined in the advanced next generation technology standards
    (*e.g*., LTE and WiMAX Mobile). The network should support QoS
    classes for real time applications as well as low delay data
    transfer applications for public safety users, comparable to those
    in ITU-Y.1541.

3.  Using QoS mechanisms as defined by the relevant standards (i.e.
    linked to the selected technology), public safety traffic should
    have higher priority of transmission and delivery over the
    commercial traffic consistent with the access priority circumstances
    discussed above. While the QoS classes and performance objectives
    are standard, the implementation of the priority schemes in
    achieving the QoS classes is vendor-specific. We anticipate
    different methods of traffic management by vendors (such as
    connection admission control, queuing management, congestion
    control, etc.) to achieve the desired QoS and priority requirements
    for public safety usage. It is possible that at times of network
    congestion, commercial traffic will be denied access to network
    resources, or be dropped in favor of public safety traffic, again
    consistent with the access priority circumstances discussed above.

4.  Using QoS mechanisms as defined by standards, various public safety
    applications should have different levels of QoS, depending on the
    type of application. For instance, command-level applications may
    require QoS settings with relatively higher priority.

**V. Security and Encryption**

Sections 27.1305(e) and 90.1405(e) require the SWBN to incorporate
"\[s\]ecurity and encryption consistent with state-of-the-art
technologies."

Accordingly, the system should include the following capabilities:

1.  The SWBN should implement controls to ensure that public safety
    priority and secure network access is limited to authorized public
    safety users and devices, using an open standard protocol for
    authentication.

2.  The SWBN should allow for public safety network authentication,
    authorization, automatic logoff, transmission secrecy and integrity,
    and audit control capabilities as well as other unique attributes
    that may be mutually agreeable.

3.  The SWBN technical and operational parameters should accommodate
    public safety administrative safeguards and controls for security
    management, oversight, incident management, and privacy that may be
    defined in the final negotiations.

**\
VI. Coverage**

Sections 27.1305(b) and 90.1405(b) require the SWBN to incorporate
"\[s\]ufficient signal coverage to ensure reliable operation throughout
the service area consistent with typical public safety communications
systems."

The Second Further Notice invites comment on the coverage requirements
for the SWBN. Coverage may be defined in terms of the signal levels that
will be available at all locations based on accepted predictive methods
(*i.e*., 90% availability, 90% of the time) and taking into account
appropriate factors to meet in-building coverage needs.

**VII. Operational Capabilities -- Network Services and Applications**

Sections 27.1305(g) and 90.1405(g) require the SWBN to incorporate
"\[o\]perational capabilities consistent with features and requirements
that are typical of current and evolving state-of-the-art public safety
systems." At a minimum, these capabilities should include seamless
interoperability for fixed as well as mobile voice, video, and data
communications on the SWBN across local, state, tribal, and Federal
public safety users. To be more specific, the SWBN should support the
reliable exchange of text, voice, secure voice, data, video,
photographs, and detailed graphical information such as maps, drawings,
engineering plans, fingerprints, graphical files, etc.

The SWBN should support and be compatible with standards used by public
safety. For example, these may include the standards and practices
established by the National Information Exchange Model (NIEM). NIEM is a
partnership of the U.S. Department of Justice and the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS). Its purpose is to develop, disseminate and
support enterprise-wide information exchange standards and processes
that enable jurisdictions to effectively share critical information in
emergency situations, as well as support the day-to-day operations of
agencies throughout the nation.[^261]

In addition, DHS created the National Incident Management System (NIMS)
to establish a framework for organizations to work together to prepare
for, protect against, respond to, and recover from the entire spectrum
of all-hazard events.[^262] Other standards organizations that are
important in the development of the transmission and information
exchange standards that the network may employ include the Organization
for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards (OASIS)[^263]
EDXL standards, and the Global Justice XML (GJXML) data model.[^264]

Users of the network should have access to the full range and suites of
evolving commercial voice, data, and video services and applications as
well. The Table below from the Public Safety Spectrum Trust Bidder
Information Document (BID) Version 2.0 reflects example applications and
services that may be supported. Actual data rates should exceed the
minimum for acceptable quality of service measures and key performance
indicators shown but also should be consistent with the performance
indicators listed separately in this document. However, it may not be
necessary to specify data rates or performance criteria for each
individual application.

![](media/image1.wmf){width="6.885416666666667in"
height="6.166666666666667in"}**VIII. Operational Control and Use of the
Network**

Sections 27.1305(h) and 90.1405(h) require the SWBH to incorporate
"\[o\]perational control of the network by the \[PSBL\] to the extent
necessary to ensure that public safety requirements are met."

The D -Block licensee should provide control capabilities or a level of
network transparency sufficient to permit the PSBL to exercise its role
in general administration of access to the SWBN by individual public
safety entities. These functions should include:

1.  Real time or near real time messages detailing material violations
    of the technical requirements contained in the Commission's rules or
    the NSA, including the scale and scope of the violation. The
    timeframes, format and the scenarios in which this information is
    required should be addressed in the NSA. The PBSL should be notified
    immediately of any situations that impede vital public safety
    communications, with details to be made available as soon as
    practicable.

2.  The ability of the PSBL to host services subject to negotiation
    requiring elements of IP multimedia subsystem (IMS) or Service
    Architecture Evolution.

3.  Capabilities permitting the PSBL and/or authorized public safety
    entities the ability to set up and manage user/user
    group/application profiles, authenticate users and devices and
    provision services.

4.  Over the air framework to allow the management of end user devices,
    either singly or in groups, permitting such functions as over the
    air programming of devices and the clearing of data and disabling of
    devices.

5.  Notification to the PSBL of system downtime (or any work that may
    affect service or system performance over any given geographic area)
    due to planned maintenance, configuration changes, or upgrades. The
    PSBL should provide the D Block licensee with advance notice to
    address planned public safety events.

**STATEMENT OF**

**CHAIRMAN KEVIN J. MARTIN**

Re: *Service Rules for the 698-746, 747-762 and 777-792 MHz Bands, WT
Docket No. 06-150; Implementing a Nationwide, Broadband, Interoperable
Public Safety Network in the 700 MHz Band, PS Docket No. 06-229.*

The recent auction of the 700 MHz band commercial spectrum was a
success. Auction 73 achieved a number of significant milestones,
including: being the largest auction in FCC history, raising a record
\$19.6 billion in bids; advancing new open platform policies; affirming
aggressive build-out obligations; creating what will be a new wireless
broadband provider to compete with the incumbent telephone and cable
companies in nearly every home in the U.S.; and providing small
businesses, new entrants, rural providers and existing nationwide
wireless providers with access to additional spectrum needed to deploy
the next generation of wireless networks. In one area, however, we still
have work to do.

In July 2007, this Commission, both Republicans and Democrats alike,
made a unanimous commitment to fulfilling the needs of the public safety
community for a nationwide, interoperable public safety broadband
network. The Public/Private

Partnership was designed to address this crucial issue, as the only tool
reasonably available to the Commission. Auction 73, however, did not
yield a successful bidder for the "D Block" of commercial spectrum,
which would have fulfilled the commercial role in this partnership.
While the results of the last auction will help inform our decision with
respect to the D Block going forward, our decision must also be informed
by the continuing need for a truly nationwide interoperable broadband
network for public safety agencies to use during times of emergency. In
the absence of the financial resources for public safety to build out
their own network, however, I believe we should continue to try to
explore ways in which we can help facilitate a tool to achieve a
nationwide interoperable public safety network.

Today's *Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking* is the first step
in a renewed effort to provide our Nation's first responders with the
broadband network they need and deserve. And while I continue to support
the concept of a Public Safety/Private Partnership as a viable tool to
achieve this goal, I am pleased that this *Further Notice* turns a
critical eye on the specific parameters of the partnership, and ways to
ensure the commercial viability of this endeavor by providing greater
certainty to all parties involved. In this respect, the *Further Notice*
appropriately looks at both sides of the ledger. For example, it
examines ways to more clearly define the role of the Public Safety
Broadband Licensee, asking questions about the scope of who would
constitute a public safety user, the appropriate role of advisors, and
whether increased oversight is necessary. With respect to the commercial
side, it seeks input on how to clearly define expectations regarding
build out, default penalties, and network parameters that will allow
potential bidders to construct a positive business case for undertaking
this unique opportunity.

Finally, while not required, we will seek additional comment through a
Third Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, and I have also agreed to
hold an en banc hearing on these issues. I also continue to recognize
the need to make this spectrum available in the marketplace in a timely
fashion, and to provide the public safety community with a clear path
forward to achieving a nationwide interoperable broadband network. In
this respect, I am committed to moving with deliberate speed to address
these issues both thoughtfully and quickly.

I thank my colleagues for their cooperation and commitment to these
issues, and look forward to working with them in the coming months.

**STATEMENT OF**

**COMMISSIONER MICHAEL J. COPPS**

 

Re: *Service Rules for the 698-746, 747-762 and 777-792 MHz Bands, WT
Docket No. 06-150; Implementing a Nationwide, Broadband, Interoperable
Public Safety Network in the 700 MHz Band, PS Docket No. 06-229.*

 

            In the seven years since 9/11, three years since Hurricane
Katrina, and one year since we began the most recent auction of the 700
MHz spectrum band, we have learned two hard and disappointing lessons. 
First, that America desperately needs to improve the communications
tools available to its heroic first responders.  And, second, that
achieving this task is not going to be easy.

 

            As I have stated before, I believe the nation's most prudent
response in the terrifying days following 9/11 would have been to build
a dedicated, federally-funded, interoperable national broadband network
for first responders.  However, as I explained last month in testimony
before the Telecommunications and Internet Subcommittee of the House
Energy and Commerce Committee, that option is no longer on the table. 
So I believe the FCC is left with the sobering conclusion that a
public-private shared model represents the last, best chance we have at
using the 700 MHz spectrum band to improve communications for state and
local public safety users.  I still believe that today.

 

            Nevertheless, I think we need to begin the process of trying
to create such a network with a healthy dose of realism.  Even if we
roll up our sleeves and dedicate ourselves this summer to coming up with
realistic network specifications, the truth is that we still are not
assured of coming up with a workable solution.  What we are trying to do
here is conduct the most difficult FCC auction ever in an
extraordinarily difficult economic environment.  At the same time, I
***do*** know with 100% certainty that if we give any less than the full
measure of our efforts, the result will assuredly be that the needs of
public safety will continue to go unmet.  I, for one, am eager to begin
this challenge---and will give the process nothing less than my best.

 

            I approve today's item---kicking off the process of
considering a new public-private sharing model---with great hope that we
can improve public safety in the way that I believe all my colleagues
seek.  I hope that public safety will devote its best engineers and
wisest minds to the task.  We need the best thinking and the best
experts they are capable of providing to this process.  I hope that the
wireless industry---which has profited handsomely from use of the public
airwaves---will participate in this process with the full measure of its
talent, ingenuity, and public spiritedness.  And---most of all---I hope
that the Commission will probe far and wide for the finest and most
visionary engineers, technologists, economists, and financial experts to
inform our decision-making.  It is going to take all that---and then
some---to get this done.

 

            I understand that we need to move as quickly as possible
here, because the need for improved communications grows more pressing
with each day.  I am not afraid to push hard, work long hours on this
process and make difficult decisions.  But at the same time, the
ultimate acid test here has to be whether we are developing a set of
rules that will create a network that meets public safety's broadband
and interoperability needs.  To me, this means that the time for
deferring uncertainty to a post-auction negotiation process is over. 
Now that we are not facing a hard-and-fast auction deadline, the right
course is to work out the difficult questions in advance---thus
providing much needed certainty and predictability to public safety,
potential bidders, their investors, the public, the FCC and Congress. 
And make no mistake about it, if I do not think that we have developed
workable and specific network specifications before a future auction, I
will not hesitate to say that we need to go back to the drawing board
and get it right before proceeding any further.

 

            Judged against this set of aspirations, today's item has
encouraging aspects as well as some causes for concern.  On the happy
side of the ledger, we have given interested parties 30 days for
comments and 15 days for reply comments on this Second Notice---more
than was initially contemplated when this item was circulated.  We have
also committed in today's item to an additional further notice of
proposed rulemaking that will tee up very specific, proposed rules for
the public-private sharing concept, which will allow the parties to aim
at a specific proposal and help us assess whether it will actually
produce the outcome we need.  Given the uncertainties of the financial
markets today, it is certainly essential that we take every precaution
to make sure that there are no unnecessary specifications in our rules
that would discourage investment. 

 

            My concern stems from the fact that our plans to bring the
best engineering and economics talent to the Commission to aid it in its
deliberations are still far from finalized, long after Congress in its
oversight capacity and many leading experts have warned us that
technical and financial sophistication is essential to making this
process work.  I am disappointed that we cannot make use of the
Commission's Technical Advisory Council---a body of distinguished
engineers that is supposed to provide the Commission with unbiased,
expert technical guidance, but which, over a year and half after having
its charter renewed, still has no members and no Chair.  I also wish
that the Commission had already finalized consulting or other
arrangements for leading engineers to provide us with their best
thoughts and guidance, but I am encouraged by the Chairman's willingness
to bring this to a speedy resolution.  I also appreciate that the
Chairman and my colleagues have shown willingness to hold one en banc
hearing this summer to inform the process---though I would have
preferred more such hearings wherein the experts could come before us
and put their thoughts to the test of expert public discussion.  I also
think it is good news that we are establishing a working group here at
the FCC that will put our best experts on public safety directly on the
task at hand.

 

            I want to thank the Wireless and Public Safety and Homeland
Security Bureaus for their hard work in drafting this lengthy item on a
very tight timeframe, and our Office of Engineering and Technology for
their work in developing a short technical appendix to today's item.  I
hope the item we release today will jumpstart a detailed and substantive
discussion of the issues before us.  I believe the item tees up the
important questions, and I appreciate the willingness of my colleagues
to allow certain additions from my office as well as to offer their
own.  I also urge interested parties to raise any important issues that
they feel the item does not expressly address.  We have written the item
broadly, to solicit ***any*** useful comment---and I hope that the
responses we receive will be thoughtful, detailed and cover the
waterfront of issues.  

 

            In particular, I hope that parties will be extremely
specific in discussing what functions they believe this public safety
network needs to fulfill and what network specifications are necessary
to meet these needs.  After all, the network that a highway patrol
officer needs when cruising along at 100 mph with a high-gain antenna on
the roof is quite different than the network required by a firefighter
about to plunge into a 40-story glass and steel building.  Similarly, a
network that is used for everyday voice communications is quite
different from one suitable for mission-critical functions, and
different still than one which sends still pictures and even streaming
video.  Which of these different needs are we attempting to meet?  We
also need to understand how the network we build will be interoperable
with existing public safety networks.  A network that does not solve the
broader problem of inter-agency and inter-service interoperability
would, by any measure, be a tragic opportunity missed. 

 

            Even beyond the daunting technical issues, we also need to
resolve difficult problems of governance and economic incentives.  For
example, how can we ensure that the public safety broadband licensee has
adequate funding to engage in planning and support its ongoing
operations?  Is USF funding a possible answer?  Or the
Telecommunications Development Fund?  And we need to look at how to
ensure that public safety entities can actually afford to use this
system.  What pricing plans are consistent with the needs of local
jurisdictions to meet fixed budgets?  What rules for use of the network
by public safety, either for free or at a discounted rate, will the
economics of this arrangement permit?  After all, the elephant in the
room is that we need to make sure that our rules allow the commercial
partner a reasonable opportunity to turn a profit in the long-term, or
else we will never find a bidder and the network will go unbuilt.  We
also need to understand if innovative technologies---like multi-mode
satellite handsets, or dividing the commercial block into two or more
blocks with varying degrees of population density---can improve the
ability of commercial licensees to serve their public safety partners. 

 

            These governance and economic questions go way beyond
discrete issues like reserve price and default penalty (which are
important in their own right).  What the Commission needs to do is
examine the full package of incentives we create, taken as a whole. 
Unless we are capable of this broad-ranging and complex inquiry, we
simply cannot be assured of a better result than the last time around. 
This simply underscores to me the importance of issuing proposed rules
and allowing for comment before issuing final rules.  So I am pleased
that we now have a commitment to proceed with a Third Notice which will
be altogether specific in laying out what the proposed rules are.  I
would have liked more time for comment on those, but this is the best
that could be achieved.

 

            I also have to register some discomfort over the portions of
the item that solicit comment on the possibility of stating, up-front,
that if this auction does not yield a bidder it will be re-auctioned for
commercial purposes.  This proceeding is about establishing a viable
public-private partnership to enhance public safety.  It would be
unfortunate if anyone was able to conclude that by simply torpedoing the
partnership concept, they can move quickly to a purely commercial
auction.  This item could inadvertently send the message that a
commercial outcome is the likely outcome of this process. The commercial
scenario raises other and important questions for another day---one that
hopefully doesn't ensue.  While I accept that we need to consider
different perspectives on this issue, I also believe that, speaking
practically, our public safety mission is best served if commenters in
this process and bidders in the auction are focused with laser-like
precision on trying to make the public-private model work.  As I stated
earlier, it's going to take 100 percent focus and dedication to get this
right.  Any provisions that encourage gaming of the system or distract
from this key objective are highly counterproductive in my view.  I also
think we will need to look long and hard at some point in the process
about how much time potential bidders need to develop business plans for
this unique public-private proposition---as I've mentioned before,
investors assure me that the financial markets are as bad as they have
been in a long time right now, that their recovery is not imminent, and
we certainly should not add to these problems by holding an auction too
quickly.

 

            Again, I thank everyone who helped develop today's item and
who is willing to dedicate the next few months to contributing to the
pressing and unbelievably important task we find before us.  We're going
to need all the help we can get.

**STATEMENT OF**

**COMMISSIONER JONATHAN S. ADELSTEIN**

Re: *Service Rules for the 698-746, 747-762 and 777-792 MHz Bands, WT
Docket No. 06-150; Implementing a Nationwide, Broadband, Interoperable
Public Safety Network in the 700 MHz Band, PS Docket No. 06-229.*

We need only tune in to any news channel, particularly in recent months,
to find constant reminders of the important role communications plays
during emergencies. Despite these alarm bells, we are still without a
network that allows our first responders to communicate with each other
across agencies and beyond state borders quickly and easily. The ability
to respond to an emergency event directly correlates to the ability of a
first responder to save a life, protect people from harm or mitigate
property damage. Quite simply, the longer we delay the implementation of
an interoperable broadband network for public safety, the more lives we
put at risk.

One of the Commission's core directives under the Act is to promote the
safety of life and property through communications. We can and we must
play a key role in improving our nation's disaster preparedness, network
reliability, and communications among first responders. Were we working
on a blank canvas, I would have preferred direct federal funding for
building a national public safety broadband network. Nevertheless, I am
aware that the public-private partnership framework itself presents the
only option available to us. Members of Congress on a bipartisan basis
have endorsed such an approach.

I do believe that the public/private partnership framework can be a
successful model for bringing about this desperately needed network, but
only if appropriate checks and balances are in place. A true
public-private partnership must meet the needs of both partners. If
public safety's needs are not met, the basic objective is not met. If a
private partner's need for a return on capital and regulatory certainty
are not met, then that partner will not be in a position to attract the
capital necessary to meet public safety's objectives. A partnership is
just that, and both sides must win to make it work.

With these concerns in mind, I extend my support for this Second Further
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking because it represents our collective
efforts to remedy the interoperability problem that has long plagued our
nation's public safety community. The open-ended nature of this inquiry
reflects a good-faith effort to start from scratch after a disappointing
failure. I certainly hope we will make every attempt to find a solution
that works for public safety, and not simply throw up our hands in
frustration and go the commercial auction route.

True interoperability has been an elusive goal for the public safety
community. Despite our best efforts, the Commission's policies to date
have not provided the results we had hoped. And while there have been
some gains towards interoperability with the creation of certain
state-wide and metropolitan area networks, most public safety
communications systems remain localized, and interoperability between
local, state, and federal agencies continues to be limited. This is
unacceptable. As we become a country increasingly immersed in the
digital broadband world, it is critical that our first responders have
access to the same first-rate communications systems that many consumers
already have.

Our proposal today lays out a myriad of complex and critical elements
that must be closely evaluated in order to address the end goal of
bringing our public safety community an interoperable network that keeps
pace with our digital advancements. I am pleased that we have put forth
for comment a broad set of possible revisions to the public/private
partnership structure as well as a framework for technical requirements.
While we have carefully attempted to include as comprehensive a set of
proposals and options as possible, we look to commenters to address many
important details and specifics and to elucidate any stones we have left
unturned.

One of our greatest failings last time was that the expectations were
not made clear upfront as to how the network would look and what would
be asked of a private sector partner. We have since learned that
potential private partners did not have the certainty they needed to
raise or commit capital to the project. Our hope this time, in the end,
is to generate a set of rules that provide a real incentive for building
the most advanced and interoperable nationwide network possible through
a careful balance of flexibility and conditions that are laid out
clearly and explicitly upfront.

Finally, while I wholeheartedly support the launch of this proceeding
today, I do want to counsel for taking a cautious and deliberate
approach to an ultimate resolution. I am pleased that my colleagues have
agreed to put forth a Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that details
a more specific and complete proposal. This allows commenters to "kick
the tires" on any proposed rules, and I thank Commissioner Copps for his
wise insistence on this approach. It is important that we get the
specifics nailed down as clearly as possible this time around, since it
may be our last shot. I look forward to a full and detailed record on
these issues, and commend the Bureau staff and my colleagues for working
diligently to draft a comprehensive and detailed proposal.

**STATEMENT OF**

**COMMISSIONER DEBORAH TAYLOR TATE**

Re: *Service Rules for the 698-746, 747-762 and 777-792 MHz Bands, WT
Docket No. 06-150; Implementing a Nationwide, Broadband, Interoperable
Public Safety Network in the 700 MHz Band, PS Docket No. 06-229.*

The Commission\'s July 31, 2007 Report and Order on the 700 MHz band was
clear in its intent - to make available spectrum for new commercial uses
and for the benefit of public safety, to include a nationwide,
interoperable, broadband public safety communications capability. The
recently completed 700 MHz auction was a grand success with regard to
this first goal. It made available 52 megahertz of highly valued
spectrum for new commercial uses, including advanced services such as
broadband. So highly valued is this spectrum that this historic auction
set the record for most receipts for any U.S. spectrum auction -- \$19
billion. Moreover, the auction was conducted flawlessly, despite
including more than 1,000 licenses and incorporating anonymous bidding
in addition to allowances for combinatorial bidding on certain licenses.
We too often gloss over "good news" when something runs flawlessly, so I
especially want to thank the many FCC staff who spent months in
preparation and execution of this auction, and congratulate them on
being part of history.

Nonetheless, as we all know, there was one very disappointing outcome of
this auction. Congressman Pickering may have most eloquently described
the situation as "a blessing in disguise." No party offered a bid
sufficient to meet the reserve price for the D Block, which was
designated for a public/private partnership that would establish an
interoperable broadband network for the benefit of public safety users.
Today, we have an opportunity to learn from our mistakes and set the
course for a path forward. To that end, in this Second Further Notice,
we seek comment on the policy that will best advance this goal.

From Silicon Valley to MIT to the Oak Ridge National Laboratory in my
home state of Tennessee, to other centers of excellence across this
country, I am firmly convinced that we have the intellect, ingenuity and
collaborative skills to solve the problem of interoperability once and
for all in this country. Some areas of the nation already are
interoperable; others are well on their way. Some have initiatives that
have been years in the planning and many have already expended State,
local and private resources. We should not disrupt those who have begun
and in some cases already created their own public/private partnerships,
and we should keep in mind that the D Block will not even be available
until some period after the DTV transition. As a former State official,
I have worked hard to ensure that the Commission\'s rules work with, not
against, the best efforts of State and local governments. I hope that
the rules that we will adopt for this spectrum will be consistent with
that goal.

For this reason, we should encourage States and localities to continue
to make interoperability a top priority and a reality; not wait on the
Federal government to go through another auction process. Those systems
must assuredly be integrated into a national network, but I continue to
hear that this is feasible given the intelligence of today's devices and
architectures. At the same time, we should encourage them to share their
successes and challenges as we attempt, again, to provide the only
solution that we, the FCC, have at our fingertips -- that is, spectrum
-- so that our public safety entities can truly be part of a nationwide
interoperable communications network.

With regard to the choices before us, in this item we seek comment on
whether the Commission should auction the ten megahertz of spectrum
comprising the D Block with a modified version of the public/private
partnership that was previously adopted, or auction this spectrum with
no such requirement. The choice between these two options is one of the
key decisions we will make in this preceding.

It is important to clearly understand the strengths and weaknesses of
both approaches. For example, auctioning the D Block with no
public/private partnership and minimal service rules might maximize the
funds raised at auction, funds that then would be available for Congress
-- if it so chooses -- to appropriate for public safety communications.
On the other hand, requiring the D Block winner to participate in a
public/private partnership would ensure a dedicated provider that then
may be well-positioned to coordinate interoperable services and take
advantage of economies of scale. There are other potential costs and
benefits that should be addressed. For this reason, I strongly encourage
comments in this regard from the public safety community, from potential
service providers, and from other experts and interested parties. I
especially encourage the comments of parties that already have developed
interoperable broadband communications capabilities for public safety
operations, including State agencies, large and small municipal
agencies, as well as the commercial entities that service those
initiatives. We need and value your input.

Also, to the extent the Commission adopts a public/private partnership,
we must be clear about the capabilities our public safety providers will
need, and exactly what will be required of their commercial partner(s)
in terms of coverage, reliability, functionality, network hardening,
quality of service, and more. Establishing those specifications is a
complicated process, one that frequently is handled elsewhere in
government -- by Federal agencies such as the Department of Defense and
Department of Homeland Security, by State agencies, and by
municipalities -- often through the use of RFPs (requests for proposal).
While the Commission does not have experience conducting RFPs, it could,
through an additional round of comments or other process, seek input
from the public safety community so as to ascertain their needs, as well
as input from potential providers so as to ascertain what specifications
can be provided, and at what cost.

Today, I call on this nation's best and brightest -- engineers, members
of the public safety community who are already engaged in establishing
these networks, other federal agencies with similar needs, commercial
enterprise, network operators, providers, new entrants and yes, even
successful investors and entrepreneurs -- to respond to this call from
your country. I ask you to give of your brainpower, your time, your
efforts and your money to ensure that every emergency situation --
whether a natural disaster or a terrorist attack -- will receive the
immediate response it deserves from public safety providers with fully
equipped, truly interoperable communications capabilities. All of
America will truly be safer and more secure because of your efforts.

I thank the dedicated staff of the Public Safety and Homeland Security
Bureau, the Wireless Telecommunications Bureau, the Office of
Engineering and Technology, and the Office of Strategic Plans and Policy
for their long hours and valuable contributions to an extremely complex,
yet extremely important, public policy item.

**STATEMENT OF**

**COMMISSIONER ROBERT M. McDOWELL**

RE: *Service Rules for the 698-746, 747-762 and 777-792 MHz Bands, WT
Docket No. 06-150; Implementing a Nationwide, Broadband, Interoperable
Public Safety Network in the 700 MHz Band, PS Docket No. 06-229.*

President Franklin D. Roosevelt once said, "It is common sense to take a
method and try it. If it fails, admit it frankly and try another. But
above all, try something." Today, all five of us are admitting that we
tried something and failed at it. Now we're back to the drawing board
and calling upon the public and interested parties for guidance on how
to move forward and successfully auction the D Block.

To put today's *FNPRM* in context, let's review some recent history.
Last summer's 700 MHz Order included a plan to spark the construction of
a state-of-the-art, nationwide, interoperable network for America's
public safety users through a public/private partnership. We allocated
10 megahertz of spectrum for public safety use, known as the "D Block,"
on top of the 24 megahertz Congress allocated to public safety in 1997.
The Commission created this framework after working closely with the
public safety community, and I supported it. Hopes were high that this
additional spectrum would provide an incentive for a private entity to
construct the nationwide, interoperable, broadband network all of us
have been discussing since the attacks of 9-11.

Even though public safety already has at its disposal 97 megahertz of
spectrum in total to serve America's approximately two million public
safety users, roughly half of that spectrum lies fallow due to a lack of
funds and coordination. The Commission allocated an additional 10
megahertz, above and beyond what Congress gave, to try to create an
incentive for the private side of the public/private partnership to
invest risk capital to build a nationwide public safety network suitable
for 21st century challenges. In the absence of
congressionally-appropriated funding for this network, the Commission
concluded that this type of public/private partnership was the best way
to jump-start funding and construction.

In the wake of the D Block's failure, I have met with a number of
parties to analyze what went wrong. Apparently potential bidders were
deterred by onerous build-out and service requirements that required the
eventual licensee to incur massive costs in an atmosphere of extreme
uncertainty regarding how many, if any, public safety entities might
actually sign up as paying customers. Today's further notice offers an
open-ended opportunity for all interested parties to tell us what we did
wrong, what our new goals should be, and how we can accomplish those
goals.

Even though the D Block auction was unsuccessful, I am fully committed
to examining all options that may lead to the construction, and
continued operations, of this vision. Yes, the comment periods we adopt
today are fairly tight; however, it is important that we continue to
move forward and increase our momentum. We are well-positioned to build
upon our already robust record. I am confident that we can and will
proceed in a thorough and thoughtful manner.

What we don't want is the type of situation Samuel Beckett was referring
to when he wrote, "Go on failing. Go on. Only next time, try to fail
better." In contrast, Thomas Edison once said about failure, "I am not
discouraged because every wrong attempt discarded is another step
forward." Today we are taking that next step forward. Accordingly, I
support this further notice.

[^1]: *See* Service Rules for the 698-746, 747-762 and 777-792 MHz
    Bands, WT Docket No. 06-150, Revision of the Commission's Rules to
    Ensure Compatibility with Enhanced 911 Emergency Calling Systems, CC
    Docket No. 94-102, Section 68.4(a) of the Commission's Rules
    Governing Hearing Aid-Compatible Telephones, WT Docket No. 01-309,
    Biennial Regulatory Review -- Amendment of Parts 1, 22, 24, 27, and
    90 to Streamline and Harmonize Various Rules Affecting Wireless
    Radio Services, WT Docket 03-264, Former Nextel Communications, Inc.
    Upper 700 MHz Guard Band Licenses and Revisions to Part 27 of the
    Commission's Rules, WT Docket No. 06-169, Implementing a Nationwide,
    Broadband, Interoperable Public Safety Network in the 700 MHz Band,
    PS Docket No. 06-229, Development of Operational, Technical and
    Spectrum Requirements for Meeting Federal, State and Local Public
    Safety Communications Requirements Through the Year 2010, WT Docket
    No. 96-86, Declaratory Ruling on Reporting Requirement under
    Commission's Part 1 Anti-Collusion Rule, WT Docket No. 07-166,
    *Second Report and Order*, 22 FCC Rcd 15289 (2007) (*Second Report
    and Order*) *recon. pending*.

[^2]: *Id,* at 15295 ¶ 13, 15431 ¶ 396.

[^3]: The auction of these 700 MHz licenses, designated Auction 73,
    began on January 24, 2008, and concluded March 18, 2008. *See*
    http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/default.htm?job=auction_summary&id=73.

[^4]: Auction of the D Block License in the 758-763 and 788-793 MHz
    Bands, AU Docket No. 07-157, *Order*, FCC 08-91, ¶ 3 (rel. Mar. 20,
    2008) (*D Block Post-Auction Order*). In the *Second Report and
    Order*, the Commission decided that, if the reserve price for the D
    Block was not satisfied in the initial auction results, the
    Commission might either re-offer the license on the same terms in an
    immediate second auction, or re-evaluate the license conditions.
    *See Second Report and Order*, 22 FCC Rcd at 15404 ¶ 314.

[^5]: We use the term "700 MHz Public/Private Partnership" to refer
    specifically to a mandatory public/private partnership between the D
    Block licensee and the Public Safety Broadband Licensee, along the
    general lines initially set forth in the *Second Report and Order*.

[^6]: 47 U.S.C. § 337.

[^7]: 47 C.F.R. § 90.523.

[^8]: A mobile virtual network operator is a non-facility-based mobile
    service provider that resells service to the public for profit.
    *See* Implementation of Section 6002(B) of the Omnibus Budget
    Reconciliation Act of 1993, WT Docket No. 05-71, *Tenth Report*, 20
    FCC Rcd 15908, 15920 ¶ 27 (2005).

[^9]: As licensing the D Block on a REAG basis would result in issuing
    multiple D Block licenses, references herein to "the" D Block
    license and licensee should be understood to incorporate reference
    to any of multiple D Block licenses or licensees and vice versa, as
    appropriate.

[^10]: In this subsequent Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, we plan
    to seek comment on an expedited basis, with comments due fourteen
    days after publication in the Federal Register, and reply comments
    due twenty-one days after such publication.

[^11]: *See Second Report and Order,* 22 FCC Rcd at 15406 ¶ 322. We also
    created an internal guard band in the 768-769 MHz and 798-799 MHz
    bands located between the broadband and narrowband allocations.
    *Id*.

[^12]: *See id*.

[^13]: *See id.* at 15421 ¶ 373.

[^14]: *Id*. at 15428 ¶ 386.

[^15]: *Id.* at 15431¶ 396.

[^16]: *Id*. (citing Sprint Nextel *700 MHz Further Notice* Comments at
    7-8).

[^17]: *Id*.

[^18]: *Id*. at 15432 ¶ 399.

[^19]: *Id*. at 15432 ¶ 399, 15433-44 ¶¶ 403-06.

[^20]: *Id*. at 15432 ¶ 399, 15434-43 ¶¶ 407-31.

[^21]: *Id*. at 15432 ¶ 399, 15443-46 ¶¶ 432-43.

[^22]: *Id*. at 15432 ¶¶ 399-400, 15447-49 ¶¶ 444-54.

[^23]: *Id.* at 15448-49 ¶¶ 448-53.

[^24]: *Id*. at 15448-49 ¶¶ 450-52.

[^25]: *Id.* at 15448 ¶ 447*.*

[^26]: *Id*. at 15448 ¶ 447.

[^27]: *Id*. at 15465 ¶ 508.

[^28]: *Id.* at 15410 ¶ 332.

[^29]: *Id.* at 15412 ¶ 341.

[^30]: *Id.* at 15412 ¶ 339.

[^31]: *Id.*

[^32]: *See id.* at 15400 ¶ 301.

[^33]: *See id.* at 15404 ¶ 314.

[^34]: 47 C.F.R. § 27.502.

[^35]: 47 C.F.R. § 1.2110(b)(3)(iv)(A).

[^36]: *See* *generally* Waiver of Section 1.2110(b)(3)(iv)(A) of the
    Commission's Rules For the Upper 700 MHz Band D Block License,
    *Order*, 22 FCC Rcd 20354 (2007) (*D Block Waiver Order*) *recon.
    pending.*

[^37]: *Id.* at 20354 ¶ 1.

[^38]: AT&T Inc. Petition for Reconsideration and Clarification, WT
    Docket No. 06-150; PS Docket No. 06-229 (filed Sept. 24, 2007);
    Blooston Rural Carriers Petition for Partial Reconsideration and/or
    Clarification (filed Sept. 24, 2007); Petition for Reconsideration
    of the Ad Hoc Public Interest Spectrum Coalition (filed Sept. 24,
    2007); Cyren Call Communications Corporation Petition for
    Reconsideration and for Clarification (filed Sept. 24, 2007);
    Frontline Wireless, LLC Petition for Reconsideration (filed Sept.
    24, 2007); Pierce Transit Petition for Reconsideration (filed Sept.
    24, 2007); Rural Telecommunications Group, Inc. Petition for
    Reconsideration (filed Sept. 24, 2007); Commonwealth of Virginia
    Petition for Reconsideration (filed Sept. 24, 2007); NTCH, Inc.
    Petition for Partial Reconsideration (filed Sept. 21, 2007);
    MetroPCS Communications, Inc. Petition for Clarification and
    Reconsideration (filed Sept. 20, 2007).

[^39]: *See* AT&T Petition for Reconsideration; Cyren Call Petition for
    Reconsideration; Frontline Petition for Reconsideration. The
    Frontline September 20, 2007 Request also seeks changes to the rules
    governing the 700 MHz Public/Private Partnership. *See* Request to
    Further Safeguard Public Safety Service by Frontline Wireless, WT
    Docket No. 06-150 (filed Sept. 20, 2007) (Frontline September 20,
    2007 Request).

[^40]: *See* Frontline Petition for Reconsideration; MetroPCS Petition
    for Reconsideration.

[^41]: *See* Auction of 700 MHz Band Licenses Scheduled for January 24,
    2008; Notice and Filing Requirements, Minimum Opening Bids, and
    other Procedures for Auctions 73 and 76, *Public Notice,* 22 FCC Rcd
    18141, 18194-95 ¶¶ 197-90 (2007) (*Auction 73/76 Procedures Public
    Notice*).

[^42]: *See id.* at 18193-96 ¶¶ 194-200.

[^43]: *See* Commonwealth of Virginia Petitions for Reconsideration;
    Pierce Transit Petition for Reconsideration. Pierce Transit and
    Virginia have been granted limited waiver relief. *See*
    Implementation of a Nationwide, Broadband, Interoperable Public
    Safety Network in the 700 MHz Band; Development of Operational,
    Technical and Spectrum Requirements for Meeting Federal, State and
    Local Public Safety Communications Requirements Through the Year
    2010, PS Docket No. 06-229, WT Docket No. 96-86, *Order*, 22 FCC Rcd
    20290 (2007); Implementing a Nationwide, Broadband, Interoperable
    Public Safety Network in the 700 MHz Band; Development of
    Operational, Technical and Spectrum Requirements for Meeting
    Federal, State and Local Public Safety Communications Requirements
    Through the Year 2010; Request for Waiver of Pierce Transit, PS
    Docket No. 06-229, WT Docket No. 96-86, *Order*, 23 FCC Rcd 433
    (PSHSB 2008).

[^44]: *See*
    <http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/default.htm?job=auction_summary&id=73>.

[^45]: *See* *id.*; *see also* "Auction of 700 MHz Band Licenses
    Closes," *Public Notice*, DA 08-595 (rel. Mar. 20, 2008) (*700 MHz
    Auction Closing Public Notice.*

[^46]: *See* *D Block Post-Auction Order* at ¶ 5.

[^47]: *See id.* at ¶ 5.

[^48]: *See Office of Inspector General Report*, from Kent R. Nilsson,
    Inspector General, to Chairman Kevin J. Martin (OIG rel. Apr. 25,
    2008) (*OIG Report*).

[^49]: *OIG Report* at 2.

[^50]: As noted above, before ultimately adopting final rules in
    response to this Second Further Notice, we plan to present for
    public comment, in a subsequent Further Notice of Proposed
    Rulemaking, a detailed proposal regarding the specific proposed
    rules.

[^51]: *See* 47 U.S.C. § 316 (permitting the Commission to modify any
    license if, in the judgment of the Commission, such action will
    promote the public interest, convenience, or necessity).

[^52]: *See Second Report and Order*, 22 FCC Rcd at 15419 ¶ 365.

[^53]: *See id.* at 15419 ¶ 366.

[^54]: 47 C.F.R. § 90.523.

[^55]: 47 U.S.C. § 337(a)(1).

[^56]: 47 U.S.C. § 337(f).

[^57]: *See* 47 C.F.R. § 90.523(a).

[^58]: *See* 47 C.F.R. § 90.523(b).

[^59]: *See* 47 C.F.R. § 90.523(a) -- (d).

[^60]: *Second Report and Order*, 22 FCC Rcd at 15421 ¶ 373.

[^61]: *See* 47 C.F.R. § 90.523(e).

[^62]: *See* 47 C.F.R. § 90.523(e)(i), (ii).

[^63]: 47 U.S.C. § 337(f)(1)(A), (C).

[^64]: *See Second Report and Order*, 22 FCC Rcd at 15426 ¶ 383.

[^65]: *See* 47 U.S.C. § 337(f)(1)(A).

[^66]: 47 U.S.C. § 337(f)(1)(B)(ii).

[^67]: *See* <http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/press_release_0515.shtm>
    (last visited May 12, 2008).

[^68]: *See* <http://gita.state.az.us/tech_news/2006/7_19_06.htm> (last
    visited May 12, 2008).

[^69]: We note, however, that use of Part 15 devices may not be
    appropriate for mission-critical public safety communications, in
    light of the requirement for Part 15 devices to accept interference
    from other Part 15 devices and from licensed operations. *See,
    e.g.*, Continental Airlines Petition for Declaratory Ruling
    Regarding the Over-the-Air Reception Devices (OTARD) Rules, ET
    Docket No. 05-247, *Memorandum Opinion and Order*, 21 FCC Rcd 13201,
    13214 (2006).

[^70]: *See Second Report and Order*, 22 FCC Rcd at 15421 ¶ 421.

[^71]: *Id.* at 15426 ¶ 383.

[^72]: *See* *Second Report and Order*, 22 FCC Rcd at 15454 ¶ 470.

[^73]: *See, e.g.,* 47 U.S.C. § 254(c)(1), (h).

[^74]: *See, e.g.,* 47 U.S.C § 614.

[^75]: *Second Report and Order*, 22 FCC Rcd at 15425 ¶ 377.

[^76]: *Id.* at 15421-22 ¶ 373.

[^77]: *Id.* at 15421-25 ¶¶ 373-375.

[^78]: The nine organizations included: the Association of Public Safety
    Communications Officials (APCO); the National Emergency Number
    Association (NENA); the International Association of Chiefs of
    Police (IACP); the International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC);
    the National Sheriffs' Association; the International City/County
    Management Association (ICMA); the National Governor's Association
    (NGA); the National Public Safety Telecommunications Council
    (NPSTC); and the National Association of State Emergency Medical
    Services Officials (NASEMSO). *Second Report and Order*, 22 FCC Rcd
    at 15422-23 ¶ 374.

[^79]: On reconsideration, we removed NPSTC and included the Forestry
    Conservation Communications Association (FCCA), the American
    Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO),
    and the International Municipal Signal Association (IMSA), and added
    two additional at-large positions. Service Rules for the 698-746,
    747-762 and 777-792 MHz Bands, WT Docket No. 96-86, *Order on
    Reconsideration*, 22 FCC Rcd 19935 (2007). The Chiefs of the Public
    Safety and Homeland Security Bureau and Wireless Telecommunications
    Bureau jointly appointed to the voting board the American Hospital
    Association (AHA), the National Fraternal Order of Police (NFOP),
    the National Association of State 9-1-1 Administrators (NASNA), and
    the National Emergency Management Association (NEMA). *See* "Public
    Safety and Homeland Security Bureau and Wireless Telecommunications
    Bureau Announce the Four At-Large Members of the Public Safety
    Broadband Licensee's Board of Directors," *Public Notice*, 22 FCC
    Rcd 19475 (2007).

[^80]: *Second Report and Order*, 22 FCC Rcd at 15423-26 ¶ 375.

[^81]: *Id.* at 15426 ¶ 376.

[^82]: *Id.* at 15426 ¶ 377.

[^83]: 47 C.F.R. §§ 27.1305, 27.14(m).

[^84]: *Second Report and Order*, 22 FCC Rcd at 15433 ¶ 405.

[^85]: *Id.*

[^86]: *Id.* at 15434 ¶ 406.

[^87]: *Id.* at 15426 ¶ 383.

[^88]: *Id.* at 15433-34 ¶ 405. We seek comment on the responsibilities
    of the D Block licensee with regard to the operation of the shared
    network elsewhere herein.

[^89]: *See* Letter from Harlin R. McEwen, Chairman, Public Safety
    Spectrum Trust to Prospective D Block Bidders (Nov. 30, 2007)
    (*available at* <http://www.psst.org/documents/BID2_0.pdf>) at 3.
    The PSST released an initial version of this document on November
    15, 2007, and released version 2.0, the final version, on November
    30, 2007. *See* <http://www.psst.org/bidsummary.jsp>.

[^90]: *See* AT&T Petition for Reconsideration at 4-5.

[^91]: *See Second Report and Order*, 22 FCC Rcd at 15371 n.502.

[^92]: *See* Cyren Call Petition for Reconsideration at 8; Frontline
    Petition for Reconsideration at 23.

[^93]: *See*, *e.g.*, Recommendations of the Independent Panel Reviewing
    the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks, EB
    Docket No. 06-119, WC Docket No. 06-63, *Order on Reconsideration*,
    22 FCC Rcd 18013 (2007).

[^94]: *Second Report and Order*, 22 FCC Rcd at 15433 ¶ 404 (quoting
    NPSTC *700 MHz Further Notice* Comments at 13).

[^95]: *See*, *e.g.*, "DC OCTO Wireless Broadband Network Wins Police
    Chiefs' Technology Award,"
    <http://newsroom.dc.gov/show.aspx/agency/octo/section/2/release/6342>
    (stating that the DC wireless broadband network is designed to
    provide, among other applications, "remote video surveillance");
    *see also*
    <http://govtsecurity.com/state_local_security/close_watch/>
    (stating, with regard to Baltimore, Maryland video surveillance
    system, that "\[m\]any of the city\'s surveillance cameras and all
    of its housing cameras are wireless" and that "\[w\]ireless camera
    signals from groups of cameras are brought back to a fiber node . .
    . .").

[^96]: We note that, under current rules for the 700 MHz Public/Private
    Partnership, public safety users would be entitled in emergencies to
    the full combined 20 megahertz of capacity on a priority basis.
    Elsewhere in this Second Further Notice, we seek comment on whether
    to eliminate or clarify this requirement.

[^97]: *See id*., 22 FCC Rcd at 15417 ¶ 358.

[^98]: *Id*.

[^99]: *See* 47 C.F.R. § 90.542(a)(5), (b).

[^100]: This requirement had initially been imposed on Upper 700 MHz C
    and D Block licensees to protect public safety narrowband licensees
    from interference.

[^101]: *See* Service Rules for the 698-746, 747-762 and 777-792 MHz
    Bands, WT Docket No. 06-150, Revision of the Commission's Rules to
    Ensure Compatibility with Enhanced 911 Emergency Calling Systems, CC
    Docket No. 94-102, Section 68.4(a) of the Commission's Rules
    Governing Hearing Aid-Compatible Telephones, WT Docket No. 01-309,
    Biennial Regulatory Review -- Amendment of Parts 1, 22, 24, 27, and
    90 to Streamline and Harmonize Various Rules Affecting Wireless
    Radio Services, WT Docket 03-264, Former Nextel Communications, Inc.
    Upper 700 MHz Guard Band Licenses and Revisions to Part 27 of the
    Commission's Rules, WT Docket No. 06-169, Implementing a Nationwide,
    Broadband, Interoperable Public Safety Network in the 700 MHz Band,
    PS Docket No. 06-229, Development of Operational, Technical and
    Spectrum Requirements for Meeting Federal, State and Local Public
    Safety Communications Requirements Through the Year 2010, WT Docket
    No. 96-86, *Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed
    Rulemaking*, 22 FCC Rcd 8064 (2007) (*First Report and Order*).

[^102]: Petition for Reconsideration of Verizon Wireless, WT Docket No.
    06-150 (filed June 14, 2007) (Verizon Petition).

[^103]: Upper 700 MHz C and D Block licensees may operate base stations
    at power levels up to 2 kW/MHz ERP in rural areas.

[^104]: Verizon Petition at 8-12.

[^105]: *Second Report and Order*, 22 FCC Rcd at 15441-42 ¶ 426.

[^106]: *Id.* at 15442 ¶ 427. We delegated authority to the Defense
    Commissioner to decide these requests. See 47 C.F.R. § 0.181.

[^107]: *Second Report and Order*, 22 FCC Rcd at 15445 ¶ 437.

[^108]: *Id.* at 15446 ¶ 440.

[^109]: *See id.* at 15445 ¶ 438 -- 15446 ¶ 440.

[^110]: *Id.* at 15445 ¶ 437.

[^111]: *Id.* at 15446 ¶ 440.

[^112]: UBS Warburg Investment Research, U.S. Wireless 411, at 17 (Mar.
    18, 2008).

[^113]: *See* Frontline Petition for Reconsideration at 22 (stating that
    increasing the 10-year coverage requirement from 99 percent of the
    population to 99.3 percent added \$1 billion in costs to the
    network). Commission staff extrapolated from Frontline's analysis to
    estimate potential cost savings associated with various coverage
    levels. First, Commission staff estimated Frontline's implied
    network cost per square mile by taking the difference in square
    miles between CONUS population coverage at 99.3 percent and 99
    percent (149,048 square miles), and then dividing Frontline's \$1
    billion cost savings by this difference in square miles. Using this
    methodology, Commission staff estimated Frontline's implied network
    cost per square mile to be approximately \$6,700. In estimating the
    difference in square miles between population coverage at 99 percent
    and 99.3, Commission staff used U.S. Census-based population data by
    county, starting with the county that has the highest population
    density, and working down in counties to arrive at 99 and 99.3
    percent of the U.S. population. Using the implied network cost per
    square mile derived from the Frontline data, Commission staff
    estimated that reducing the CONUS population coverage level from
    99.3 to 98 percent would result in a reduction of 913,612 square
    miles covered by the network. This reduction in square miles is
    multiplied by the implied cost of \$6,700 to arrive at potential
    network cost savings for the D Block licensee of approximately \$3.1
    billion. Similarly, Commission staff estimated that reducing the
    CONUS population coverage level from 99.3 to 95 percent would result
    in a reduction of 462,591 square miles covered by the network. This
    reduction in square miles is multiplied by the implied cost of
    \$6,700 to arrive at potential network cost savings for the D Block
    licensee of approximately \$6.1 billion.

[^114]: By reducing this estimated implied network cost per square mile
    by 50 percent (from \$6,700 to \$3,355), Commission staff estimated
    a potential cost savings of approximately \$1.6 billion if the
    coverage level were reduced to 98 percent, and a potential cost
    savings of \$3.1 billion if the coverage level were reduced to 95
    percent.

[^115]: See Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget
    Reconciliation Act of 1993; Annual Report and Analysis of
    Competitive Market Conditions with Respect to Commercial Mobile
    Services, *Twelfth Report*, 23 FCC Rcd 2241, at 5 (2008) (Twelfth
    CMRS Competition Report).

[^116]: *Second Report and Order*, 22 FCC Rcd at 15351 ¶¶ 162-63.

[^117]: We do not revisit our decision to prohibit geographic
    partitioning and spectrum disaggregation for the D Block licensee in
    the context of the 700 MHz Public Private Partnership. We continue
    to find that such restriction is necessary to ensure the integrity
    of the public/private partnership and nationwide broadband network.

[^118]: *Second Report and Order*, 22 FCC Rcd at 15450 ¶ 458.

[^119]: *Id*.

[^120]: *See* A New Proposal for a Commercially-Run Nationwide Broadband
    System Serving Public Safety by Jon M. Peha, Associate Director,
    Center for Wireless and Broadband Networking, Professor of
    Electrical Engineering and Public, PS Docket No. 06-229, WT Docket
    No. 96-86 (filed Feb. 27, 2007), at 9.

[^121]: *Second Report and Order* at 15452 ¶ 463.

[^122]: *Id.* at 15452 ¶ 464.

[^123]: *Id.* at 15453 ¶ 467.

[^124]: *See*, *e.g.*, Letter from Gerald Knoblach, CEO, Space Data
    Corporation, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, AU Docket No.
    07-157, ET Docket No. 04-186, *Ex Parte* (filed April 29, 2008)
    (arguing that wide area technologies such as Space Data's SkySite
    Platforms, which "create a wireless network consisting of
    transceivers on weather balloons that operate in near space from
    60,000 to 100,000 feet," can "address issues associated with
    build-out and landmass coverage for the 700 MHz D Block . . . .");
    Interoperable Communications: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on
    Telecommunications and the Internet, 110th Congress (2008)
    (statement of Robert F. Duncan, Rear Admiral, United States Coast
    Guard (ret.), Senior Vice President, Rivada Networks). *See also*
    Letter from Cheryl A. Tritt, Counsel to Space Data Corp., to Marlene
    H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, WT Docket Nos. 96-86, 05-211, and 06-150,
    PS Docket No. 06-229, AU Docket No. 07-157, *Ex Parte Notice* (filed
    Oct. 24, 2007).

[^125]: *See* Notice by Frontline Wireless, LLC, WT Docket No. 06-150
    and 06-169, PS Docket No. 06-229 (filed Mar. 27, 2007), Draft Rules
    at 5.

[^126]: *See, e.g.,* 22 FCC Rcd at 15426 ¶ 383 , 15431 ¶ 396.

[^127]: *See, e.g., id.* at 15428 ¶ 386, 15431 ¶ 395-96, 15432 ¶ 399,
    15437 ¶ 415, 15441 ¶ 425, 15445-46 ¶¶ 437-43, 15450 ¶ 457, 15449 ¶
    452, 15467 ¶ 517.

[^128]: *See, e.g., id.* at 15421-25 ¶¶ 373-75, 15426-27 ¶ 383, 15433-34
    ¶ 405, 15437-38 ¶ 416.

[^129]: *Id.* at 15431 ¶ 396.

[^130]: *Id*.

[^131]: *Id*. at 15432 ¶ 399. *See also, e.g.*, *id*. at 15450 ¶ 457; 47
    C.F.R**.** § 27.1303.

[^132]: *Id*. at 15437 ¶ 416.

[^133]: *Id*. at 15438 ¶ 417.

[^134]: *Id*.

[^135]: *Id*. at 15438 ¶ 419.

[^136]: *Id*. at 15437 ¶ 416 (role of the Public Safety Broadband
    Licensee "in ensuring that the public/private network established
    pursuant to the 700 MHz Public/Private Partnership serves the
    interests of public safety"), 15438 ¶ 417 (Public Safety Broadband
    Licensee, through its spectrum leasing arrangement with the D Block
    licensee, "has the regulatory means (and obligation) to preserve the
    fundamental public safety function of the band").

[^137]: *Id*. at 15421-22 ¶¶ 373-374.

[^138]: *Id*. at 15426 ¶ 383.

[^139]: *Id*. at 15448-49 ¶¶ 450-52.

[^140]: *Id*. at 15448 ¶ 450.

[^141]: Id. at 15426 ¶ 383.

[^142]: *Id*. at 15439 ¶ 419.

[^143]: *Id*. at 15427 ¶ 383.

[^144]: *Id*.

[^145]: *Id*. at 15421-22 ¶¶ 373-374.

[^146]: *Id.* at 15426 ¶ 383.

[^147]: *Id*. at 15426 ¶ 383.

[^148]: *Id.* at 15434 ¶ 405.

[^149]: *Id*.

[^150]: A mobile virtual network operator is a non-facility-based mobile
    service provider that resells service to the public for profit.
    *See* Implementation of Section 6002(B) of the Omnibus Budget
    Reconciliation Act of 1993, WT Docket No. 05-71, *Tenth Report*, 20
    FCC Rcd 15908, 15920 ¶ 27 (2005).

[^151]: The IWN is a collaborative effort by the U.S. Departments of
    Justice, Homeland Security, and the Treasury to provide a
    consolidated nationwide Federal wireless communications service that
    replaces stovepipe stand-alone component systems, and supports law
    enforcement, first responder, and homeland security requirements
    with integrated communications services (voice, data, and
    multimedia) in a wireless environment. The IWN will implement
    solutions to provide Federal agency interoperability with
    appropriate links to state, local, and tribal public safety, and
    homeland security entities. *See* <http://www.usdoj.gov/jmd/iwn>. On
    April 17, 2007, the Department of Justice announced that it has
    selected General Dynamics C4 Systems to implement wireless
    communications services to department field agents as part of the
    IWN program. *See*
    <http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2007/April/07_jmd_256.html>.

[^152]: *Second Report and Order*, 22 FCC Rcd at 15448-49 ¶¶ 450-52.

[^153]: *Id*. at 15437-39 ¶¶ 414-19, 15441 ¶ 425.

[^154]: *Id*. at 15448 ¶ 450.

[^155]: *Id.* Elsewhere, we stated that this "\[p\]riority service,
    although provided to public safety, will still be commercial, and
    will not appreciably impair the D Block licensee's ability to
    provide commercial services to other parties." *Id*. at 15437 ¶ 413.

[^156]: *Id.* at 15448 ¶ 450.

[^157]: *Id.* at 15449 ¶ 451.

[^158]: *Id.* at 15437 ¶ 416.

[^159]: *Id.* at 15439 ¶ 419. *See also id.* at 15438 ¶ 417 (stating
    that the requirement that the Public Safety Broadband Licensee lease
    the public safety broadband spectrum to the D Block licensee
    spectrum "permits the D Block licensee to construct a network to
    serve its business needs . . . .").

[^160]: *See supra* discussion in section III.A.1.

[^161]: *See*, *e.g.*, Frontline September 20, 2007 Request at 3
    (proposing a formula that would limit the amount public safety users
    could be charged to that necessary to recover (1) the amortized,
    incremental fixed costs of building the network to public safety
    standards, plus (2) ongoing operating expenses for maintaining the
    network to public safety standards, minus (3) the amortized value of
    secondary use of the Public Safety Broadband Licensee spectrum by
    commercial customers).

[^162]: *See* *Second Report and Order,* 22 FCC Rcd at 15463 ¶ 501,
    15466 ¶ 512.

[^163]: *See id.* at 15464 ¶ 504.

[^164]: *See id.* at 15464-65 ¶¶ 505-506.

[^165]: *See id.* at 15463 ¶ 502.

[^166]: *See id.* at 15465 ¶ 508.

[^167]: *See* "Revised Procedure for Auctions 73 and 76: Additional
    Default Payment for D Block Set at Ten Percent of Winning Bid
    Amount; Disputed Issues in the Negotiation of Network Sharing
    Agreement," *Public Notice*, 22 FCC Rcd 19320 (2007) (*D Block
    Default Payments PN*).

[^168]: *Id.* at 19322 ¶ 7.

[^169]: *See id.* at 19322 n.11.

[^170]: *See* 47 C.F.R. § 1.2109(b), (c); *see* *Second Report and
    Order*, 22 FCC Rcd at 15465 ¶ 508 (noting that, after failure of the
    parties to negotiate an NSA, the Commission may reassign the license
    to the next highest bidder, citing 47 C.F.R. § 1.2109).

[^171]: *See, e.g.*, AT&T Petition for Reconsideration at 8; Cyren Call
    Petition for Reconsideration at 6, 7; Frontline Petition for
    Reconsideration at 23.

[^172]: *See* 47 C.F.R. § 76.65(b). Implementing the requirements of 47
    U.S.C. § 325(b)(3)(C), this section provides that television
    broadcast stations and multi-channel video programming distributors
    must negotiate the terms and conditions of retransmission consent
    agreements in good faith. It establishes the following standard for
    determining whether a party has violated its duty to negotiate in
    good faith:

    > \(1\) Standards. The following actions or practices violate a
    > broadcast television station\'s or multichannel video programming
    > distributor\'s (the "Negotiating Entity") duty to negotiate
    > retransmission consent agreements in good faith:
    >
    > \(i\) Refusal by a Negotiating Entity to negotiate retransmission
    > consent;
    >
    > \(ii\) Refusal by a Negotiating Entity to designate a
    > representative with authority to make binding representations on
    > retransmission consent;
    >
    > \(iii\) Refusal by a Negotiating Entity to meet and negotiate
    > retransmission consent at reasonable times and locations, or
    > acting in a manner that unreasonably delays retransmission consent
    > negotiations;
    >
    > \(iv\) Refusal by a Negotiating Entity to put forth more than a
    > single, unilateral proposal;
    >
    > \(v\) Failure of a Negotiating Entity to respond to a
    > retransmission consent proposal of the other party, including the
    > reasons for the rejection of any such proposal;
    >
    > \(vi\) Execution by a Negotiating Entity of an agreement with any
    > party, a term or condition of which, requires that such
    > Negotiating Entity not enter into a retransmission consent
    > agreement with any other television broadcast station or
    > multichannel video programming distributor; and
    >
    > \(vii\) Refusal by a Negotiating Entity to execute a written
    > retransmission consent agreement that sets forth the full
    > understanding of the television broadcast station and the
    > multichannel video programming distributor.
    >
    > \(2\) Totality of the circumstances. In addition to the standards
    > set forth in § 76.65(b)(1), a Negotiating Entity may demonstrate,
    > based on the totality of the circumstances of a particular
    > retransmission consent negotiation, that a television broadcast
    > station or multichannel video programming distributor breached its
    > duty to negotiate in good faith as set forth in § 76.65(a).

[^173]: *Second Report and Order*, 22 FCC Rcd at 15383-84 ¶ 256.

[^174]: *Id.*

[^175]: *Id.*

[^176]: As we determined in the *Second Report and Order*, we are not
    proposing to change our decision to prohibit geographic partitioning
    and spectrum disaggregation for the D Block licensee. The D Block
    licensee would continue to be permitted to assign or transfer its
    license subject to Commission review and prior approval. *See*
    *Second Report and Order*, 22 FCC Rcd at 15475 ¶ 542.

[^177]: *See* Service Rules for the 746-764 and 776-794 MHz Bands and
    Revisions to Part 27 of the Commission's Rules, WT Docket No.
    99-168, *Second Report and Order*, 15 FCC Rcd 5299, 5326 ¶ 62 (2000)
    (*700 MHz Guard Bands Second Report and Order*) (adopting auction
    eligibility restriction in new service by precluding one party from
    winning both licenses in a given area); Revision of Rules and
    Policies for the Direct Broadcast Satellite Service, IB Docket No.
    95-168, *Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd 9712, 9736-37, ¶¶ 61-66
    (1995) (imposing an auction eligibility restriction in Direct
    Broadcast Satellite ("DBS") service by prohibiting any party with an
    attributable interest in DBS channels at a full-CONUS orbital
    location from acquiring at auction an attributable interest in the
    full-CONUS channels offered at the 110° orbital location without
    divesting its prior interest in full-CONUS channels).

[^178]: As discussed elsewhere, we seek comment on whether the D Block
    should be comprised of regional licenses instead of one nationwide
    license.

[^179]: We would not, however, propose that such access would be
    permitted through partitioning or disaggregation of the D Block
    spectrum in light of the unique relationship contemplated and the D
    Block licensee's responsibilities under the 700 MHz Public/Private
    Partnership.

[^180]: *See* PISC Petition for Reconsideration at 3.

[^181]: *Second Report and Order*, 22 FCC Rcd at 15400-01 ¶ 304.

[^182]: *Id.*

[^183]: *Id.* at 15401 ¶ 305.

[^184]: *Auction 73/76 Procedures Public Notice*, 22 FCC Rcd at 18195 ¶
    199.

[^185]: *Id.*

[^186]: *See* "Auction of 700 MHz Band Licenses Closes," *Public
    Notice*, DA 08-595 (rel. Mar. 20, 2008) (*700 MHz Auction Closing
    Public Notice*).

[^187]: *Id.*

[^188]: *Auction 73/76 Procedures Public Notice*, 22 FCC Rcd at
    18199-200 ¶ 212.

[^189]: *See* *generally* Implementation of the Commercial Spectrum
    Enhancement Act and Modernization of the Commission's Competitive
    Bidding Rules and Procedures, WT Docket No. 05-211, *Second Report
    and Order and Second Further Notice of Proposed Rule Making*, 21 FCC
    Rcd 4753 (2006) (*Designated Entity Second Report and Order*)
    *recon. pending*; Implementation of the Commercial Spectrum
    Enhancement Act and Modernization of the Commission's Competitive
    Bidding Rules and Procedures, WT Docket No. 05-211, *Order on
    Reconsideration of the Second Report and Order*, 21 FCC Rcd 6703
    (2006) (*Order on Reconsideration of Designated Entity Second Report
    and Order*); 47 C.F.R. § 1.2110(b)(3)(iv)(A).

[^190]: 47 C.F.R. § 1.2110(b)(3)(iv)(A).

[^191]: *See* *generally D Block Waiver Order.*

[^192]: *See Second Report and Order*, 22 FCC Rcd at 15428-79 ¶¶
    386-553.

[^193]: *See* *Designated Entity Second Report and Order*; *Order on
    Reconsideration of the Designated Entity Second Report and Order*;
    47 C.F.R. §§ 1.2110, 1.2111, 1.2112, 1.2114.

[^194]: This attribution requirement based on D Block arrangements will
    affect the designated entity's ongoing eligibility for designated
    entity benefits. *See*, *e.g*., *Designated Entity Second Report and
    Order*, 21 FCC Rcd at 4759-60 ¶ 15, 4763-65 ¶¶ 25-30, 4765-68 ¶¶
    31-41; *Order on Reconsideration of Designated Entity Second Report
    and Order*, 21 FCC Rcd at 6712-13 ¶¶ 24-26; 47 C.F.R. §§
    1.2110(b)(3)(iv)(B), 1.2111(d). *See also* 47 C.F.R. §
    1.2110(b)(1)(i), (m), (n).

[^195]: 47 C.F.R. § 1.2109(b), (c).

[^196]: *See Second Report and Order*, 22 FCC Rcd at 15466 ¶ 511.

[^197]: *See* 47 C.F.R. § 1.2104(g)(2).

[^198]: *See* Implementation of Section 309(J) of the Communications
    Act-Competitive Bidding, *Second Report and Order*, 9 FCC Rcd 2348,
    2373 ¶ 147 (1994) (*Competitive Bidding Second Report and Order*).

[^199]: *Id.* at 2374 ¶ 154, 2382-83 ¶ 197.

[^200]: *Id.* at 2374 ¶ 154, 2382-83 ¶ 197.

[^201]: Implementation of the Commercial Spectrum Enhancement Act and
    Modernization of the Commission's Competitive Bidding Rules and
    Procedures, WT Docket No. 05-211, *Report and Order,* 21 FCC Rcd
    891, 903-04 ¶ 31 (2006) (*CSEA/Part 1 Report and Order*).

[^202]: 47 C.F.R. § 1.2104(g)(2)(ii).

[^203]: *See* BDPCS, Inc., *Memorandum Opinion and Order*, 15 FCC Rcd
    17590, 17598-99 ¶ 15 (2000) (citing *Second Report and Order*, 9 FCC
    Rcd at 2381 ¶ 190); *see also* *Competitive Bidding Second Report
    and Order*, 9 FCC Rcd 2348.

[^204]: *Second Report and Order*, 22 FCC Rcd at 15406 ¶ 322.

[^205]: *Id.* at 15412 ¶ 341.

[^206]: *Id.* at 15412 ¶ 339.

[^207]: *Id.*

[^208]: *Id.* at 15406 ¶ 322.

[^209]: *Id.* at 15411 ¶ 336.

[^210]: *Id.* at 15411 ¶ 337.

[^211]: *Id.* at 15412 ¶ 339.

[^212]: *Id.* at 15412 ¶ 341.

[^213]: *See* Virginia Petition for Reconsideration; Pierce Transit
    Petition for Reconsideration.

[^214]: *See* Virginia Petition for Reconsideration; Pierce Transit
    Petition for Reconsideration.

[^215]: *See* National Association of Telecommunications Officers and
    Advisors (NATOA) Comments at 9-11; State of Nebraska (Nebraska)
    Opposition at 2; Motorola Comments at 1-7.

[^216]: *See generally* Pierce Transit Petition for Reconsideration.

[^217]: *See generally* Virginia Petition for Reconsideration.

[^218]: *700 MHz Second Report and Order*, 22 FCC Rcd at 15315-16 ¶ 62.

[^219]: *See* Letter from Andrew D. Beard, counsel for Vanu, Inc., to
    Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, WT Docket Nos. 06-150; 06-169,
    96-86; PS Docket No. 06-229; AU Docket No. 07-157, filed May 8,
    2008.

[^220]: In the *Second Report and Order*, the Commission declined to
    impose wholesale or open access obligations on the D Block licensee.
    *Second Report and Order*, 22 FCC Rcd at 15476-77 ¶ 545.

[^221]: *See* 47 U.S.C. § 337(a)(2) (Commission must assign 36 megahertz
    of 700 MHz spectrum for commercial use "by competitive bidding
    pursuant to section 309(j).").

[^222]: We note that using auction revenues for such construction would
    require additional Congressional action.

[^223]: The Commission has allocated more than 97 MHz of spectrum for
    use in support of public safety services, including approximately
    13.7 MHz in frequencies below 470 MHz, varying amounts in the
    470-512 MHz band, 24 MHz in the 700 MHz band, an average of 4.5 MHz
    in the 800 MHz band, and 50 MHz in the 4.9 GHz band.

[^224]: *See* Service Rules for the 698-746, 747-762 and 777-792 MHz
    Bands, WT Docket No. 06-150, Revision of the Commission's Rules to
    Ensure Compatibility with Enhanced 911 Emergency Calling Systems, CC
    Docket No. 94-102, Section 68.4(a) of the Commission's Rules
    Governing Hearing Aid-Compatible Telephones, WT Docket No. 01-309,
    Biennial Regulatory Review -- Amendment of Parts 1, 22, 24, 27, and
    90 to Streamline and Harmonize Various Rules Affecting Wireless
    Radio Services, WT Docket 03-264, Former Nextel Communications, Inc.
    Upper 700 MHz Guard Band Licenses and Revisions to Part 27 of the
    Commission's Rules, WT Docket No. 06-169, Implementing a Nationwide,
    Broadband, Interoperable Public Safety Network in the 700 MHz Band,
    PS Docket No. 06-229, Development of Operational, Technical and
    Spectrum Requirements for Meeting Federal, State and Local Public
    Safety Communications Requirements Through the Year 2010, WT Docket
    No. 96-86, *Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed
    Rulemaking*, 22 FCC Rcd 8064, 8082-86 ¶¶ 42-45 (2007) (*First Report
    and Order*).

[^225]: *See Second Report and Order*, 22 FCC Rcd at 15431 ¶ 395.

[^226]: *Id*. at 15316 ¶ 64.

[^227]: *Id*. at 15316 ¶ 63.

[^228]: *See id*. at 15439 ¶ 157, 15351 ¶162.

[^229]: *Id.* at 15439 ¶ 157, 15351 ¶ 163.

[^230]: *Id.* at 15349 ¶ 157, 15351 ¶ 163.

[^231]: *Id.* at 15348 ¶¶ 153, 154.

[^232]: We note that only the C Block, located adjacent to the D Block,
    is licensed on a REAG basis. *Id.* at 15293 ¶ 4.

[^233]: *See id.* at 15315-16 ¶ 62.

[^234]: *See id.* at 15450 ¶ 457.

[^235]: *Id.*

[^236]: *See id*. at 15316 ¶ 63.

[^237]: *See* 47 C.F.R. § 27.53(d).

[^238]: *See* 47 C.F.R. § 27.53(d)(3), (5).

[^239]: D Block base stations must meet a 76 + 10log P dB limit in a
    6.25 kHz band segment and D Block mobile and portable stations must
    meet a 65 + 10log P dB limit in a 6.25 kHz band segment. *See* 47
    C.F.R. § 27.53(d)(1), (2), (4).

[^240]: *See* 47 C.F.R. § 27.50(b)(2), (3), (4), (5), (9), (10).

[^241]: *See* 47 C.F.R. § 27.50(b)(7), (8), which impose coordination
    and notification requirements on D Block licensees operating base
    stations at power levels greater than 1000 watts ERP.

[^242]: We note, however, that Verizon has sought reconsideration of
    certain rules adopted in the *First Report and Order* regarding
    power limits for the 700 MHz Band commercial licensees and related
    notification and coordination obligations, and this petition remains
    pending. *See* Petition for Reconsideration of Verizon Wireless, WT
    Docket No. 06-150 (filed June 14, 2007).

[^243]: *Second Report and Order*, 22 FCC Rcd at 15475 ¶542.

[^244]: *See id*. at 15289.

[^245]: *See* Implementing a Nationwide, Broadband, Interoperable Public
    Safety Network in the 700 MHz Band, Development of Operational,
    Technical and Spectrum Requirements for Meeting Federal, State and
    Local Public Safety Communications Requirements Through the Year
    2010, PS Docket No. 06-229, WT Docket No. 96-86, *Ninth Notice of
    Proposed Rulemaking*, 21 FCC Rcd 14837 (2006) (*700 MHz Public
    Safety Ninth NPRM*).

[^246]: In particular, this exemption extends to the requirements
    imposed by Chapter 6 of Title 5, United States Code, Section 3 of
    the Small Business Act (15 U.S.C. 632) and Sections 3507 and 3512 of
    Title 44, United States Code. Consolidated Appropriations Act 2000,
    Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 2502, Appendix E, Sec.
    213(a)(4)(A)-(B); *see* 145 Cong. Rec. H12493-94 (Nov. 17, 1999); 47
    U.S.C.A. 337 note at Sec. 213(a)(4)(A)-(B).

[^247]: *Id*.

[^248]: 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.200 *et. seq.*

[^249]: *See* 47 C.F.R. § 1.1206(b)(2).

[^250]: 47 C.F.R. § 1.1206(b).

[^251]: 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.415, 1.419.

[^252]: *See* Electronic Filing of Documents in Rulemaking Proceedings,
    63 Fed. Reg. 24121 (1998).

[^253]: Examples of such standards and technologies are the 802.16e IEEE
    standard, coupled with the WiMAX Mobile profile developed by the
    WiMAX Forum, and the Long Term Evolution (LTE) proposal advanced by
    the 3GPP.

[^254]: In other words, public safety would be ensured to have primary
    access to the 10 megahertz allocated for public safety broadband
    operations. Further, commenters should consider the potential that
    advanced next generation technology may be employed to combine the
    public safety broadband spectrum with the D Block spectrum and then
    randomly allocate the spectrum to users in incremental amounts.
    Accordingly, with such technology this requirement could be
    characterized as ensuring that public safety has assured access to
    50 percent of the engineered RAN capacity.

[^255]: *See* Network Reliability and Interoperability Council Wireless
    Network Reliability Final Report, September 2005 at
    http://www.nric.org/meetings/docs/meeting_20051019/NRICVII_FG3A_FinalReport_September_2005.pdf.

[^256]: *See* 47 C.F.R. §§ 4.1-4.2, 4.3(f), 4.5, 4.7, 4.9(e), 4.11,
    4.13. *See also* New Part 4 of the Commission's Rules Concerning
    Disruptions to Communications, *Report and Order and Further Notice
    of Proposed Rulemaking*, ET Docket No. 04-35, 19 FCC Rcd 16830,
    16882-16890 ¶¶ 97-114 (2004).

[^257]: By "critical network elements," we mean to refer to those
    network elements that would require geographic redundancy and mesh
    connectivity in case of catastrophic events impacting large or
    heavily populated areas.

[^258]: Self-redundancy implies having a duplicate active element that
    will take over the function of the main element in case of the
    latter's malfunction or failure.

[^259]: The term blocking is meant to include instances in which a
    public safety user's request for service cannot be fulfilled with
    the defined QoS associated with that specific service.

[^260]: *See* http://www.fcc.gov/pshs/emergency/wps.html.

[^261]: *See* <http://www.niem.gov/>. "NIEM enables information sharing,
    focusing on information exchanged among organizations as part of
    their current or intended business practices. The NIEM exchange
    development methodology results in a common semantic understanding
    among participating organizations and data formatted in a
    semantically consistent manner. NIEM will standardize content
    (actual data exchange standards), provide tools, and managed
    processes."

[^262]: *See* <http://www.fema.gov/emergency/nims/standards.shtm>. DHS
    created the National Incident Management System as required under
    Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-5. NIMS is a
    framework that provides guidelines and principles to first
    responders in an effort to achieve a single nationwide system for
    managing incidents.

[^263]: *See* <http://www.oasis-open.org/who/>.

[^264]: *See*
    <http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/CourTopics/ResourceGuide.asp?topic=GJXDM>.