CHAPTER 3

BUILDING AN EFFECTIVE

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION

This chapter describes the activities needed to build effective
emergency management organizations, beginning with the fundamentals of
running a local emergency management agency. The most important concept
in this chapter is the development of a local emergency management
committee (LEMC) that establishes horizontal linkages among a local
jurisdiction's government agencies, NGOs, and private sector
organizations relevant to emergency management. In addition, an LEMC can
provide vertical linkages downward to households and businesses and
upward to state and federal agencies.

**Introduction**

To build an effective emergency management organization, it is necessary
to understand the relationships among some of the stakeholders that are
involved. As noted in Figure 2-1, local government has downward vertical
linkages with households and businesses, upward vertical linkages with
state and federal agencies, and horizontal linkages with social and
economic influentials and hazards practitioners. However, it also is
important to understand the horizontal and vertical linkages *within*
local government. Specifically, local emergency management agencies
(LEMAs) typically have horizontal linkages with personnel in police,
fire, emergency medical services, public works, and emergency
management/homeland security departments. At the municipal level, all of
these departments report to (i.e., have a vertical linkage with) their
jurisdiction's chief administrative officer (CAO), such as a mayor or
city manager, who has direct supervisory authority over them. The CAO is
responsible for ensuring these departments perform their assigned duties
within the requirements of the law and accomplish these functions within
the time and funds allocated to them. Accordingly, the CAO has the
authority to hire, fire, allocate funds, and evaluate performance---a
relationship represented in Figure 3-1 as a solid line. However, the CAO
typically is not an expert in public safety, emergency medicine, or
emergency management and, therefore, cannot provide these departments
with guidance on how to perform their missions most effectively. Thus,
city and county agencies frequently have vertical linkages with
corresponding agencies at the state (and sometimes federal) level that
provide technical, and sometimes financial, assistance. Because agencies
at higher (state and federal) levels of government lack the legal
authority to compel performance by the corresponding agencies at lower
(county and city) levels, their relationship is sometimes represented as
a "dotted line" relationship in organizational charts (see Figure 3-1).
In turn, the agencies at the state level report to the governor in a
line relationship just as the agencies at the local level report to
their jurisdictions' CAOs.

The relationships among agencies at the county level are somewhat more
complex for jurisdictions in which agency heads are directly elected by
the voters rather than appointed by the local CAO. County sheriffs, in
particular, can be quite protective of their autonomy, so they can be
characterized as having just as much of a "dotted line" relationship
with the Chair of the County Board of Supervisors as with the state
police.

Although it is not shown in Figure 3-1, the hierarchical relationship
between the local and state levels also extends to the federal level,
with the corresponding agencies represented at each level. In addition,
however, emergency management organizations have two other "dotted line"
relationships that should be noted. First, local emergency managers
often establish memoranda of agreement (MOA) with peer agencies in
neighboring jurisdictions to provide personnel and material support
during emergencies. Second, emergency management agencies have close
relationships with Local Emergency Management Committees (LEMCs), which
is a generic term for formalized disaster planning networks that are
used to increase coordination among emergency-relevant agencies within a
given community.

[**Figure 3-1.** Relationships Among Local and State
Agencies.]{.underline}

Some of these LEMCs are established by legal mandate, as is the case for
those required by the Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act
(also known as the Title III of the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act of 1986---SARA Title III) to inform and prepare
their communities for accidental releases of toxic chemicals. However,
some emergency managers have established similar organizations without a
specific legal mandate---calling them disaster preparedness committees,
disaster planning committees, emergency management advisory committees,
or some other similar name (Daines, 1991; Drabek, 1987, 1990). Some of
these LEMCs have assumed responsibility for disaster recovery and hazard
mitigation as well as preparedness and response, and some address all
hazards to which their community is exposed, not just accidental
releases of toxic chemicals. Although LEPCs established under SARA Title
III are probably the most common of these emergency planning
organizations and LEPCs have been the subject of more research than any
other type of formalized planning network, the lessons learned from
studies of LEPCs are likely to apply to all such organizations.
Consequently, we will use the more generally applicable acronym LEMC
throughout the remainder of this book.

**The Local Emergency Management Agency**

Similarly, the generic term we will use in this book to refer to the
community agency that is responsible for emergency management is the
Local Emergency Management Agency (LEMA). In practice, the LEMA might be
known as the Office of Civil Defense, Emergency Management, Emergency
Services, Homeland Security, some combination of these names, or yet
some other name. Moreover, the LEMA might be a separate department, a
section of another department, or an individual attached to the chief
administrative officer's office. In many cities and counties, especially
those with small populations or limited hazard vulnerability, the LEMA
is staffed by a single individual, whose title, like the name of the
LEMA, varies. Consequently, we will refer to this individual as the
local emergency manager. In larger jurisdictions---especially those that
are exposed to major hazards---the local emergency manager is likely to
have multiperson staff. The emergency manager almost always reports
directly to the jurisdiction's CAO during emergencies, but frequently
reports to the head of a major agency such as police or fire during
normal operations. Local emergency managers vary in their employment
status---full-time paid, part-time paid, or volunteer---again depending
upon jurisdiction size (and, thus, its financial resources) and hazard
vulnerability. In the past, local emergency managers have varied
significantly in their training and experience, which frequently is
associated with their jurisdictions' resources and vulnerability; those
jurisdictions that can afford to pay more tend to attract personnel with
greater qualifications. Of course, this is not an invariant rule; there
are many well-qualified and dedicated personnel in smaller
jurisdictions.

## The Job Description

A local emergency manager's first task should be to understand the
duties of his or her own position as defined by a job description
(Federal Emergency Management Agency, 1983). To whom does the incumbent
(the person who serves as the local emergency manager) report, who
reports to the incumbent, what is the specific function of the position,
what duties for the position are specifically listed in the job
description, and what are the specific qualifications (education,
training, and experience) that are listed in the job description? If
there currently is no job description or the one that exists is
outdated, the emergency manager should draft a new job description and
discuss it with her or his superior.

## LEMA Staffing

Many LEMAs have administrative (clerk, secretary, or administrative
assistant) or professional (emergency management analyst) staff that are
paid part- or full-time. Such personnel need to have job descriptions
specifying their titles, reporting lines, functions, duties, and
qualifications. These personnel support the LEMA by receiving and
tracking correspondence, drafting plans and procedures, maintaining
databases, scheduling meetings, maintaining meeting minutes, and the
like. In many cases, a LEMA's budget is too small to support enough paid
staff to perform all of these activities. Consequently, volunteers are
enlisted by contacting community service organizations, clubs, Boy and
Girl Scout troops, and others. These volunteers can be a valuable source
of assistance in achieving the LEMA's goals by performing tasks that are
delegated by the local emergency manager. Indeed, some volunteers have
valuable skills (e.g., computing, radio communications) the emergency
manager lacks.

Each of the LEMA staff members should be given a clear description of
his or her duties. In addition, most jurisdictions require paid staff to
be provided with periodic (at least annual) performance appraisals.
These appraisals allow employees to assess their performance over the
previous year and to set training and performance objectives for the
year to come. Although rarely mandatory, regularly scheduled performance
reviews for volunteers are valuable in guiding their development and
enhancing their performance effectiveness. A jurisdiction's human
resources department can provide valuable guidance on its personnel
policies.

## LEMA Program Plan

Emergency managers need to develop program plans that systematically
direct their efforts over the course of the year. FEMA (1983, 1993) has
advised emergency managers to set annual goals in each of the major
programmatic areas for which they are responsible---such as hazard and
vulnerability analysis, hazard mitigation, emergency preparedness,
recovery preparedness, and community hazard education. Once these goals
have been set, the local emergency manager should assess the LEMA's
ability to achieve these goals. This *capability assessment* is likely
to identify satisfactory levels of capability in some areas but not in
others. The emergency manager should document the *capability shortfall*
and devise a *multiyear development plan* to reduce that shortfall. The
limited funds available for emergency management make it a certainty
that the shortfall cannot be eliminated within a single year, so this is
the reason why a multiyear (typically five year) development plan is
needed. Despite its long planning horizon, the multiyear development
plan should identify specific annual milestones (measurable objective
indicators) to determine if progress is being made at a satisfactory
rate.

## LEMA Budget Preparation

An organization's budget lists the categories of anticipated
expenditures and the amount that has been allocated to each category.
The budget usually covers the jurisdiction's *fiscal year*, which is a
12 month period that might or might not be the same as the *calendar
year* (from January 1 to December 31). The budget is a financial plan
that identifies the amount of money that has been allocated to each of
its budget categories. Typical budget categories include routine
continuing items such as staff salaries, office space, office equipment
(e.g., copiers, computers, fax machines), telephone (local and
long-distance), travel, and materials and supplies (e.g., paper, toner).
The budget should anticipate the need to replace worn out or obsolete
equipment or to purchase new equipment that will increase the LEMA's
capabilities. The budget also should contain a *contingency fund* that
addresses the costs of resources that will be expended in a foreseeable
emergency.

The challenge for the emergency manager is to ensure the expenses do not
exceed the budgeted amount. This is not difficult to do for the routine
continuing items because, for example, staff salaries, office space, and
local telephone service are fixed and materials and supplies are quite
predictable from month to month. Repairs to office equipment can be
unpredictable, but this can be managed by signing a service contract
that establishes a fixed fee for routine preventive and corrective
maintenance. Long-distance telephone and travel for training are
somewhat less predictable but are discretionary, so these activities can
be reduced if the expenses for other categories prove to be greater than
expected.

The amount to set aside in the contingency fund for emergency response
is more difficult to estimate because the scope of an emergency (or even
whether one occurs) is unpredictable. Nonetheless, past agency records
or discussions with emergency managers in neighboring jurisdictions can
provide some insight into the appropriate amount to request. When
preparing a budget, it is essential to justify each of the budget items.
Once again, records of previous years' expenses are useful guides, but
it is important to make adjustments for inflation (consult the
jurisdiction's budget office for guidance on the amount they allow) as
well as making adjustments for changes in the program plan. Has a new
chemical facility been opened? Are there new subdivisions that have been
built in flood prone areas? As new needs arise that cannot be addressed
with the resources provided by previous budgets, the emergency manager
needs to request funding increases that will meet the new program
requirements. The nature of these needs is typically documented in a
*budget narrative* that accompanies the budget request. The budget and
the accompanying narrative are submitted in written form and, in many
cases, are presented orally as well. In the latter case, the use of
presentation graphics can be a valuable method of explaining how each of
the budget items contributes to the achievement of the program plan.

Whatever the amounts turn out to be for the budget categories, it is
essential that the emergency manager submit the new year's budget in the
format that is being used by his or her jurisdiction. The local budget
office will provide assistance in this area.

## LEMA Funding Sources

The local emergency manager's most obvious source of funding is the head
of the department in which the LEMA is administratively located or, if
the LEMA is an independent agency, the jurisdiction's CAO. It is
important to recognize that other funding sources can provide valuable
supplements as well. The federal government has a range of programs that
provide financial assistance to local government. For example, Emergency
Management Performance Grants require LEMAs to submit a statement of
work and budget that makes the local jurisdiction eligible for matching
funds (i.e., a 50/50 cost sharing). This program is administered through
each state's emergency management agency, which might impose its own
requirements for funding. For example, Texas requires a LEMA to have an
emergency management plan that meets a specified standard of quality and
provides competitive awards based upon the quality of recent planning,
training, and exercising activities. Continued financial support is
contingent upon meeting performance and financial reporting
requirements, as well as achieving the annual objectives specified in
the initial proposal.

Another example is the Hazardous Materials Assistance Program, which
provides technical and financial assistance through the states to
support oil and hazardous materials emergency planning and exercising.
Applications are required to list the program objective, describe the
means by which the objective will be achieved (including a list of
specific activities and their duration) and the expected achievements of
the project. LEMAs submit applications through their state emergency
management agencies for review by the corresponding FEMA regional
offices.

There are also local sources that can be contacted for financial and
in-kind assistance. Local industrial facilities such as nuclear power
plants and chemical facilities might be contacted for financial
contributions to defray the costs of emergency preparedness for their
facilities. Truck and rail carriers might be contacted for training
assistance. Commercial businesses such as large retail outlets might be
able to provide in-kind contributions or make small financial
contributions for community hazard awareness programs.

## LEMA Budget Management

As the fiscal year progresses, expenses are automatically incurred for
some items such as salaries, space, and local telephone use. Other
expenses might require the emergency manager's authorization (and
possibly countersignature by a higher authority). These include purchase
orders for equipment and supplies or travel vouchers for attendance at
training courses or professional conferences. These records are
forwarded to the jurisdiction's accounting office where they are entered
and charged against the appropriate accounts.

In many jurisdictions, local emergency managers receive monthly program
accounting, which refers to the recording of actual expenses and a
comparison of these expenses to the corresponding budget amounts. A
budget statement lists budget categories in rows and indicates, in one
column, how much money was allocated to each category and, in another
column, how much money has been spent to date in that category. If the
budget was based upon accurate projections, monthly variances
(deviations of actual expenditures from anticipated expenditures) will
be small. If the monthly variances are large, corrective action will
need to be taken. Unforeseen expenditures attributable to a major
emergency often are the basis for a supplemental request to the LEMA's
parent department or directly to the CAO, but foreseeable items such as
replacement of broken equipment are likely to receive an unfavorable
review. Consequently, emergency managers must make mid-year adjustments
in other categories. Unfortunately, training and travel are the
categories that are commonly cut in such situations---which can produce
a chronic training shortfall if budgeting problems are recurrent.

Senior elected and appointed officials typically require periodic (e.g.,
monthly or quarterly) reports of progress on the program plan and
budget. As is the case with the presentation of each year's budget,
presentation graphics can be a valuable method of explaining which
milestones in the program plan have been achieved and how this compares
to the level of progress expected to date. In addition, the emergency
manager should explain what percentage of each budget line has been
expended to date in comparison to the percentage of the year that has
elapsed. For example, the emergency manager should find it easy to
explain why 0% of the budget for computer replacement has been expended
in the first three months (25%) of the year. However, it probably would
be more difficult to say why 40% of the budget for salaries had been
expended in that same period. In either case, the source of the
variances and the anticipated method of adjustment must be explained.

**Determinants of Emergency Management Effectiveness**

There has been a significant amount of research conducted over the past
30 years that identifies many conditions influencing the effectiveness
of LEMAs. This research will be described in greater detail in the
following pages, but it can be summarized by the model depicted in
Figure 3-2. This figure indicates that LEMA effectiveness---measured by
such organizational outcomes as the quality, timeliness, and cost of
hazard adjustments adopted and implemented by the community---is the
most direct result of individual outcomes and the planning process.
Outcomes for the individual members of the LEMA and LEMC include job
satisfaction, organizational commitment, individual effort and
attendance, and organizational citizenship behaviors. The planning
process includes staffing/equipping, organizational structuring, team
climate development, situational analysis, and strategic choice.

In turn, the planning process is determined by the level of community
support from officials, news media, and the public. The planning process
is also affected by hazard experience, as measured by direct experience
with disasters and by vicarious experiences that reveal potential impact
of future disasters. Hazard experience also appears to have an indirect
effect on the planning process via its effects on community support. It
is important to recognize that even though the model as depicted in
Figure 3-2 is static---that is, the arrows begin on the left and end on
the right hand side of the figure---the actual process is dynamic
because success tends to be a self-amplifying process in which high
levels of individual and organizational outcomes produce increased
levels of *vicarious* experience with disaster demands (through
emergency training, drills, and exercises), community support, better
staffing and organization, and more emergency planning resources.

*Hazard Exposure/Community Vulnerability*

Many studies have found the level of community hazard adjustment is
increased by experiencing disaster impact---especially catastrophic
impacts. Frequent, recent, and severe impacts make the community's
vulnerability to hazards easier to remember and more likely to stimulate
action. In some cases, this leads to the development of a *disaster
subculture* in which community residents adopt routinized patterns of
disaster behavior (Wenger, 1978). When disasters are infrequent,
long-removed in time, or have had minimally disruptive impacts, hazard
vulnerability is likely to elicit little attention from households,
organizations, or the community as a whole. However, the community's
exposure to environmental hazards can be made salient by vicarious
experience that is gained by reading or hearing about other communities'
experiences with disasters. These can be gained through newspaper
articles or television accounts or, most powerfully, through
first-person accounts---especially if they come from peers (Lindell,
1994a). For example, a local fire chief is most likely to be influenced
by other fire chiefs' accounts of their experiences, a city manager is
most likely to be influenced by another city manager, and so on.

[**Figure 3-2.** A Model of Local Emergency Management
Effectiveness.]{.underline}

Hazard exposure can also be affected by salient cues such as the daily
sight of the cooling towers of a nuclear power plant, the intricate maze
of piping at a petrochemical plant, or the placards on railcars and
trucks passing through town. Information from hazard and vulnerability
analyses can also have an effect on the community, but this pallid
statistical information is likely to have less of an effect than the
vivid first-person accounts described above (Nisbett & Ross, 1980). As
will be discussed in the next chapter, *Risk Perception and
Communication*, the psychological impact of hazard/vulnerability
analyses can be increased by linking data on hazard exposure to likely
personal consequences.

The importance of hazard exposure and vulnerability for emergency
management is well supported by research. For example, Caplow, Bahr, and
Chadwick (1984) found emergency management network effectiveness to be
greater in communities with recent disaster experience or, for those
without recent experience, if there was consensus about the most salient
hazard. Moreover, Adams, Burns, and Handwerk (1994) found that one-third
of inactive LEMCs in a nationwide survey blamed lack of hazard
vulnerability for their lack of progress. This accusation is likely to
have some validity because Kartez and Lindell (1990) found that a
greater degree of experience with disaster demands such as issuing
evacuation orders, searching for mutual aid resources and responding to
mass casualties is associated with organizational outcomes such as an
increase in the number of good emergency preparedness practices (e.g.,
establishing citizen emergency information hotlines, establishing
equipment rate and use agreements with contractors). Specifically, they
found cities that were high in experience adopted 1.5 more preparedness
practices than those that were low in experience. Similarly, Lindell and
Meier (1994) and Lindell and Whitney (1995) found a previous history of
evacuations was positively related to emergency planning effectiveness.
Moreover, Lindell, et al. (1996) also found that a recent history of
emergencies---as well as the number of hazardous facilities---both had
modest but statistically significant positive correlations with LEMC
effectiveness.

*Community Support*

Community support from senior elected and appointed officials, the news
media, and the public is important because it affects the resources that
are allocated to the LEMA and the LEMC. As noted earlier, many
researchers have systematically documented what numerous emergency
managers have personally experienced---emergency management is a low
priority for the local elected and appointed officials who control
budgets and staffing allocations (Labadie, 1984; Sutphen & Bott, 1990).
As Kartez and Lindell (1990, p.13) quoted one police chief,

> My number one priority is getting the uniforms out in response to
> calls. The public judges me on that performance, not whether I'm
> planning for an earthquake that may never happen. If left alone,
> disaster planning would get even less attention from my office. It
> requires that the executive clearly make this a priority.

The importance of community support for emergency management is
supported by research. Adams and his colleagues (1994) found that
two-thirds of the inactive LEMCs blamed community indifference and more
than one-third blamed lack of funding for their lack of achievement.
Other studies found community support (official resolutions, media
coverage, and community group actions) was positively related to
emergency planning effectiveness (Lindell & Meier, 1994; Lindell &
Whitney, 1995; Lindell, et al, 1996). For example, community information
requests, media coverage, local support, and the backing of local
officials all were strongly and significantly correlated with LEMC
effectiveness.

*Community Resources*

Differences among jurisdictions in the effectiveness of their LEMAs and
LEMCs can be attributed partially to variation in their communities'
resources. Kartez (1992) found inconsistent evidence for effects of
jurisdictional size, wealth, growth rate, employment, minority
concentration, and industry concentration on compliance with SARA Title
III mandates. However, Adams, et al. (1994) reported compliance was
significantly correlated with jurisdiction size, median household
income, and percent of urban population, The conflict between these two
studies probably is attributable to the fact that Adams found the
strongest effects in the smallest, poorest, and most rural
jurisdictions, which were underrepresented in one of Kartez's (1992)
samples, and altogether absent from his other sample. Nonetheless, the
community support variables had stronger correlations with LEMC
effectiveness than did any of the community resources variables.
Lindell, et al. (1996) reported that jurisdictions' populations,
budgets, police staffing, and fire staffing have statistically
significant, but small, influences on LEMC effectiveness

*Extra-community Resources*

Lindell and Meier (1994) found that emergency planning resources
obtained from outside the community (guidance manuals, training courses,
and computer resources) were positively related to emergency planning
effectiveness. Lindell and Whitney's (1995) study replicated many of
these findings, but also found that emergency planning effectiveness was
correlated most highly with membership in a statewide LEPC Association,
and with state emergency planning resources. Later, Lindell, et al.
(1996) reported access to such emergency planning materials as computer
software, federal agency technical reports, state emergency planning
agency technical support, and Chemical Manufacturers Association
materials had a statistically significant and moderately large
correlation with LEMC effectiveness. Also, frequency of external contact
with federal regional offices, state agencies, and other LEMCs was
strongly related to success. Technical materials provided through
*vertical diffusion* by federal agencies (DOT, EPA, and FEMA) also have
a positive impact on LEMC effectiveness, as does *horizontal diffusion*
of emergency preparedness practices and resources obtained from private
industry and neighboring jurisdictions. These resources can provide
vicarious experience with disaster demands and demonstrate the
effectiveness of specific innovations including plans, procedures and
equipment (Kartez & Lindell, 1987).

*Staffing and Organization*

A number of studies have substantiated the impact of an LEMC's staffing
and organization on its effectiveness. For example, the International
City Management Association (1981) identified a number of
characteristics of effective emergency management organizations. These
included defined roles for elected officials, a clear internal
hierarchy, good interpersonal relationships, commitment to planning as a
continuing activity, member and citizen motivation for involvement,
coordination among participating agencies, and public/private
cooperation.

Caplow, et al. (1984) found emergency management network effectiveness
was greater in communities with recent disaster experience or, for those
without recent experience, if there was consensus about the most salient
hazard. The more effective networks had members with more experience and
a wider range of local contacts, had written plans and were familiar
with them, had personal experience in managing routine natural hazards
such as floods, and were more familiar with the policies and procedures
of emergency-relevant state and federal agencies.

Similarly, Lindell and Meier (1994) found the number of members, number
of hours worked by paid staff, number of agencies represented on the
LEMC, and organization into subcommittees were all positively related to
emergency planning effectiveness. Lindell and Whitney (1995) found LEMC
staffing and structure lacked a significant correlation with LEMC
effectiveness, but was correlated with organizational climate, which did
have a very strong impact on LEMC effectiveness. Lindell, et al. (1996)
also found the total number of members and---more importantly---the
average number of members attending meetings were significant. There
also was a significant correlation between effectiveness and the number
of agencies and organizations represented on the LEMC. Representation by
elected officials and by citizens' groups was the most important,
whereas having representatives from the news media was least important
for overall emergency planning effectiveness. Establishment of an
organizational structure through subcommittees was significant, probably
because this allows members to focus on specific tasks and thus avoid
feeling overwhelmed by all the work that needs to be done.

*Planning Process*

The emergency planning process consists of five principal functions:
planning activities, team climate development, situational analysis,
resource acquisition, and strategic choice.

*Planning activities.* Kartez and Lindell (1990) found superior planning
practices involving key personnel from diverse departments in a
participative and consensus-oriented process of horizontal
integration---exemplified by such activities as interdepartmental task
forces, interdepartmental training, and after-action critiques---had an
even greater effect on the adoption of good emergency preparedness
practices than did disaster experience. Specifically, cities that had a
better planning process adopted 2.5 more preparedness practices than
those that had a poorer planning process. Interestingly, as Table 3-1
indicates, planning activities such as interdepartmental training,
reviews with senior officials, and establishment of interdepartmental
task forces had especially strong effects on the adoption of good
emergency preparedness practices. By contrast, more routine activities
such as procedure updates, plan updates, and reviews of mutual aid
agreements had small effects.

**Table 3-1.** Effects of Planning Activities on Good Emergency
Preparedness Practices.

+---------------------------------+------------------------------------+
| Largest difference              | Smallest difference                |
+---------------------------------+------------------------------------+
| Interdepartmental training      | Procedure updates                  |
|                                 |                                    |
| Reviews with senior officials   | Plan updates                       |
|                                 |                                    |
| Interdepartmental task force    | Review mutual aid agreements with  |
|                                 | neighboring cities                 |
| Community disaster assistance   |                                    |
| council                         |                                    |
|                                 |                                    |
| After action critiques          |                                    |
|                                 |                                    |
| Exercises                       |                                    |
|                                 |                                    |
| Vulnerability analyses          |                                    |
|                                 |                                    |
| Meetings with TV/radio managers |                                    |
+---------------------------------+------------------------------------+

Source: Adapted from Kartez and Lindell (1990)

Characteristics of meetings are important influences on organizational
effectiveness. These include meeting frequency, formalizing member
orientation, formalizing meetings through regular scheduling, advance
circulation of written agendas, keeping written minutes, and formalizing
overall activities by setting and monitoring progress toward annual
goals(Lindell & Meier, 1994; Lindell, et al., 1996). These results
indicate the effectiveness of an LEMC and its subcommittees can be
increased if they conduct frequent meetings that help them to maintain
steady progress and this will work if these meetings are regularly
scheduled far enough in advance for members to avoid conflicts with
their own calendars. If possible, LEMC meetings should be scheduled
monthly on the same day of the week and time of day. The agenda for each
meeting should be distributed in advance and written minutes should be
kept of each meeting.

These findings are consistent with more recent research, which shows
effectiveness in disaster response is significantly determined by
agencies breadth of prior coordination and the depth (both frequency and
intensity) of prior contact (Drabek, 2003). In addition, these findings
are consistent with research conducted by Gillespie and his colleagues
(Gillespie & Colignon, 1993; Gillespie, Colignon, Banerjee, Murty, &
Rogge, 1993; Gillespie & Streeter, 1987). Specifically, these
researchers documented a need to facilitate effective relations between
organizations with full-time staff members and organizations with
part-time staff and volunteers by scheduling meetings at times
convenient for all staff (full-time, part-time, and voluntary). Such
meetings should concentrate on common interests and be guided by
agendas. Failure to meet these suggestions usually results in
termination by neglect, not by direct confrontation over disparate
values.

######## *Organizational climate development.* Lindell and Whitney (1995) found emergency planning effectiveness was greatest in LEMCs that had positive *organizational climates*, which can be defined as "distinctive patterns of collective beliefs that are communicated to new group members through the socialization process and are further developed through members' interaction with their physical and social environments" (Lindell & Brandt, 2000, p. 331). Organizational climate presumably affects LEMC effectiveness because it influences the degree to which members' motivation is aroused, maintained, and directed toward group goals (Lindell & Whitney, 1995). 

Lindell and Brandt (2000) found that three dimensions of leadership
climate (leader initiating structure, leader consideration, and leader
communication), four dimensions of team climate (team coordination, team
cohesion, team task orientation, and team pride), and one dimension of
role climate (role clarity, but not role conflict or role overload) were
strongly related to each other and can be defined as *climate quality*.
Organizational climate is important because it is positively related to
important individual outcomes such as job satisfaction, organizational
commitment, attendance, effort, turnover intentions, and organizational
citizenship behaviors (performance beyond minimal requirements), as well
as organizational outcomes such as product quality, timeliness, and
cost. These latter variables were measured in the research studies by
LEMC chair ratings and State Emergency Response Commission staff ratings
of the organization's performance.

Climate quality is consistently related to support from elected
officials---especially external guidance and recognition. Climate
quality is also positively related to the organization of LEMCs into
subcommittees, meeting formalization, and meeting frequency. However,
climate quality is unrelated to LEMC size, which suggests that
increasing the number of members can increase the range of knowledge and
skills on the LEMC without impairing group performance.

The research findings indicate that LEMC leaders can establish a
positive *leadership climate* within the organization by being clear
about what tasks are to be performed, as well as recognizing individual
members' strengths and weaknesses and being supportive of their needs.
These two aspects of leader behavior, which are known as leader
initiating structure and leader consideration, respectively, have long
been recognized by organizational researchers (Stogdill, 1963). The
importance of these dimensions in facilitating organizational
effectiveness has been recently confirmed in LEMCs (Lindell & Brandt,
2000; Lindell & Whitney, 1995; Whitney & Lindell, 2000).

In addition to a positive leadership climate, it also is important to
foster a positive *team climate*. Specifically, team members must focus
on the tasks to be performed rather than spending all of their time
socializing (team task orientation). In addition, they must share
information and coordinate individual efforts (team coordination). When
these occur, members tend to trust each other and feel that they are
included in all activities (cohesion), as well as believe their LEMC is
one of the best (team pride).

Moreover, LEMC leaders need to promote a positive *role climate* within
the organization. Team members must understand what tasks are to be
performed and how to perform them, which avoids the stress caused by
role ambiguity. Leaders and members must agree on what tasks are to be
performed, which avoids the stress caused by role conflict. Finally,
members must have enough time to perform the tasks for which they are
responsible, which avoids the stress caused by role overload (James &
Sells, 1981; Jones & James, 1979).

LEMC effectiveness is also enhanced when there is a positive *job
climate*, which arises when members have enough independence to do their
work however they choose as long as they deliver a quality product on
time and within the resources available (personal autonomy). They also
should be allowed to perform a "whole" piece of work that provides a
meaningful contribution to the group product (task identity). Finally,
members should be allowed to perform tasks that exercise a variety of
significant skills (skill variety).

The LEMC will function more effectively when it has a positive *reward
climate*, which is characterized by members having opportunities to
perform new and challenging tasks (member challenge), opportunities to
work with other people (social contacts), and are told that other people
appreciate their work (social recognition). When the leadership, team,
role, job, and reward components of organizational climate are positive,
there are positive outcomes at the individual and organizational levels.
Specifically, there is higher member job satisfaction, attendance,
effort, and citizenship behavior (working beyond minimum standards) and
lower turnover intentions and actual turnover. These positive outcomes
at the individual level also produce positive consequences at the
organizational level in terms of greater organizational stability (due
to decreased turnover) and greater productivity (due to greater effort).

*Situational analysis.* Although this is recognized as an important
issue in the strategic management of organizations (Thompson &
Strickland, 1996), there appears to have been little or no research on
the degree to which situational analysis contributes to the
effectiveness of LEMAs and LEMCs. Important components of situational
analysis include hazard exposure analysis, physical vulnerability
analysis, social vulnerability analysis, evaluation of hazard
adjustments, and capability analysis. As Chapter 5 will describe more
fully, *hazard exposure analysis* identifies the natural and
technological hazards to which the community is exposed and assesses the
specific locations that would be affected by different intensities of
impact (e.g., 50- and 100-year flood plains, areas prone to liquefaction
from earthquakes); such analyses are frequently documented by maps of
geographical risk areas. *Physical vulnerability analysis* assesses the
community's structures (residential, commercial, and industrial
buildings) and infrastructure (fuel, electric power, water, sewer,
telecommunications, and transportation) in terms of their ability to
withstand the environmental forces predicted by the hazard exposure
analyses. By contrast, *social vulnerability analysis* assesses the
community's demographic segments and economic sectors to identify
differences in hazard exposure, occupancy of physically vulnerable
structures, utilization of physically vulnerable infrastructure, and
limited resources (psychological, social, economic, and political) for
recovering from disaster impact.

The systematic evaluation of hazard adjustments examines alternative
hazard adjustments (hazard mitigation, disaster preparedness, emergency
response, and disaster recovery) to assess their ability to avoid hazard
impacts such as casualties and damage, to limit these impacts when
disaster strikes, and to recovery rapidly after disaster. The evaluation
of hazard adjustments also examines their resource requirements in terms
of the time, effort, money, and organizational cooperation needed to
adopt and implement them. The final component of situational analysis,
capability assessment, determines whether households, businesses,
government agencies, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have the
capacity (i.e., resources) and commitment (i.e., motivation) needed to
adopt the available hazard adjustments.

*Resource acquisition.* Resource acquisition refers to obtaining
emergency planning staff, equipment, and information of many different
types from a variety of sources. The principal source of emergency
planning staff is the LEMA but, as will be discussed below, there are
other local government agencies, private sector organizations, and NGOs
that can be drawn upon to staff the LEMC. Similarly, the major type of
emergency planning equipment---the microcomputer---is usually available
at the LEMA but the types of high speed/high storage capacity computers
needed for conducting hazard and vulnerability analyses are more
frequently located and used in the Land Use Planning Department where
Geographical Information Systems (GISs) are routinely used (Lindell,
Sanderson & Hwang, 2002). The types of information include data about
hazards and population segments at risk, as well as procedures for
hazard/vulnerability analysis. Communities can obtain hazard data by
accessing Web sites maintained by federal agencies such as the FEMA,
USGS, and National Weather Service, as well as state hazard analysis web
sites (Hwang, Sanderson & Lindell, 2002) or, for technological hazards,
local industry (for fixed-site hazards) and rail or truck carriers (for
transportation hazards). In addition, these organizations provide
computer software, planning guidance manuals, and training courses that
explain how to assess community vulnerability (e.g., FEMA's HAZUS).

######## *Strategic choice.* Organizational scientists generally agree there is no single best way to organize and this proposition has been supported by Drabek's (1987, 1990) findings of significant variation in the strategies and structures utilized by individual emergency managers. Some successful emergency managers enthusiastically endorse strategies that are explicitly rejected by other equally successful managers. Further support for the contingency principle of organization is provided by Mulford, Klonglan, and Kopachevsky's (1973) finding that strategy adoption was dependent upon contextual conditions in the community. Nonetheless, the available research indicates there are some structures and strategies that are likely to significantly improve the success of all LEMCs regardless of context---and especially without significant expense. Although this might seem surprising, it is consistent with previous studies showing that external constraints can be circumvented to some extent by a superior planning process that enhances horizontal linkages among agencies within a jurisdiction and with adjacent jurisdictions, downward vertical linkages to households and businesses, and upward vertical linkages to state and federal agencies (Kartez & Lindell, 1987, 1990). Indeed, it is precisely the purpose of an LEMC to establish this planning process.

As Drabek (1987, 1990, 2003) has observed, disaster researchers have
long been interested in the intergovernmental structures and
interpersonal strategies adopted by emergency managers. For example, a
multiyear research project conducted at Iowa State University found that
communities in which local Civil Defense Directors had developed
systemic linkages among local groups tended to be the most effective in
achieving community preparedness (Klonglan, Beal, Bohlen, & Schafer,
1967). These findings were elaborated by Mulford, Klonglan, and Tweed
(1973), who noted the importance of local emergency managers' horizontal
linkages with their colleagues in similar organizations throughout their
states, and also their vertical linkages with local elected officials.

Mulford, et al. (1973) identified six strategies used by effective
emergency managers. These include a *resource building strategy*, which
emphasizes the acquisition of human, technical, and capital resources
needed for effective agency performance, and an *emergency resource
strategy*, defined by securing the participation of emergency-relevant
organizations in emergency planning and response. The *elite
representation strategy* involves the placement of members of the focal
organization (in this case, the LEMA) in positions or situations where
it is possible to interact with influential members of other
emergency-relevant organizations, and the *constituency strategy*
consists of the establishment of a symbiotic relationship between two
organizations whereby both benefit from cooperation. The *cooptation
strategy* consists of absorbing key personnel, especially those from
other organizations, into the focal organization's formal structure as
directors or advisors, while the *audience strategy* focuses upon
educating community organizations and the public at large about the
importance of community emergency preparedness. Mulford, Klonglan, and
Kopachevsky (1973) noted strategy adoption was contingent upon
environmental (jurisdictional size), organizational (funding level) and
personal (Civil Defense Director training) characteristics. Some
particularly important areas on which interorganizational coordination
has focused include increased involvement of private organizations,
local public services, elected officials and community leaders, and
greater efforts to acquire external funding. (Klonglan, Mulford & Hay,
1973).

Research conducted at the Disaster Research Center during the same time
period found disaster planning requires emergency response organizations
to recognize the ways in which community-wide disasters differ from
routine emergencies that can be handled by a single agency (Dynes,
Quarantelli, & Kreps, 1972). In addition, they encouraged local disaster
planners to foster significant predisaster relationships among
organizations that must respond to a disaster (Anderson, 1969b). Dynes
and Quarantelli (1975) described differences in interorganizational
orientation in terms of nine models including the *maintenance*
(acquiring and maintaining human, material, and financial resources),
*disaster expert* (developing knowledge and skill about hazard agents
such as hurricanes and hazardous materials), and *abstract planner*
(construction of contingency plans derived from generic planning
principles) models. Other models include the *military* (developing a
well-defined hierarchical organization), *administrative staff*
(developing managerial knowledge and skill), and *disaster simulation*
(focusing on the rehearsal of disaster plans through drills and
exercises) models. Finally, there are the *derived political power*
(acting as the representative of the jurisdiction's CAO), *interpersonal
broker* (establishing contacts among emergency-relevant organizations),
and *community educator* (overcoming community indifference through
hazard awareness programs) models.

Table 3-2 summarizes the research on emergency managers' strategies in
the following way. The first category of strategies is defined by LEMA
organizational development, which involves the military and
administrative staff models to address the development of clear roles
and lines of authority, while the abstract planner model emphasizes the
development of coordinated emergency response plans, and the disaster
simulation model supports the importance of emergency exercises to test
the organizational forms that have been developed. Another strategy
involves the resource building strategy and the maintenance model to
ensure the acquisition of resources---such as personnel, facilities
(e.g., normal office space and emergency response facilities such as
EOCs), equipment, materials and supplies, and especially money from
local government funding--- that will positively affect LEMA
effectiveness. Moreover, analysis of the physical environment
encompasses the disaster expert model, according to which success will
be influenced by interagency coordination in the assessment hazard
vulnerability and community resources. Finally, Table 3-2 makes it clear
that most of the strategies emphasize management of the social
environment. According to the researchers at Iowa State University and
the Disaster Research Center, development of an LEMC is facilitated by
securing the legitimacy from the CAO (derived political power model),
establishing the collaboration among emergency-relevant organizations
(emergency resource strategy and interpersonal broker model), and
placing LEMA staff in positions to influence important others (the
constituency, elite representation, and cooptation strategies). Finally,
influence is magnified by engaging in outreach to community groups and
news media (the audience strategy and community educator model).

####### **Table 3-2.** Emergency Management Development Strategies. 

+-----------------------+-----------------------+-----------------------+
| Strategy Type         | Iowa State University | Disaster Research     |
|                       |                       | Center                |
+-----------------------+-----------------------+-----------------------+
| Organizational        |                       | Administrative staff  |
| development           |                       |                       |
|                       |                       | Military              |
|                       |                       |                       |
|                       |                       | Abstract planner      |
|                       |                       |                       |
|                       |                       | Disaster simulation   |
+-----------------------+-----------------------+-----------------------+
| Resource acquisition  | Resource building     | Maintenance           |
+-----------------------+-----------------------+-----------------------+
| Physical environment  |                       | Disaster expert       |
| analysis and          |                       |                       |
| management            |                       |                       |
+-----------------------+-----------------------+-----------------------+
| Social environment    | Emergency resource    | Derived political     |
| analysis and          |                       | power                 |
| management            | Elite representation  |                       |
|                       |                       | Interpersonal broker  |
|                       | Constituency          |                       |
|                       |                       | Community educator    |
|                       | Cooptation            |                       |
|                       |                       |                       |
|                       | Audience              |                       |
+-----------------------+-----------------------+-----------------------+

More recent studies have examined these ideas in further detail by
studying the ways in which local emergency managers implement these
strategies. Drabek (1987, 1990) integrated the findings of previous
disaster researchers with theoretical principles derived from the
broader organizational literature (e.g., Pennings, 1981; Osborne &
Plastrik, 1998) to identify strategies and structures used by successful
managers. Similarly, Gillespie and his colleagues (Gillespie & Colignon,
1993; Gillespie, et al., 1993; Gillespie & Streeter, 1987) conducted an
intensive study of a single disaster preparedness network that had not
coalesced into a formally designated LEMC. In addition, Lindell and his
colleagues (Lindell, 1994b; Lindell & Brandt, 2000; Lindell & Meier,
1994; Lindell & Whitney, 1995; Lindell, et al., 1996a, 1996b; Whitney &
Lindell, 2000) reported a series of studies conducted on nearly 300
LEMCs in three Midwestern states.

Drabek (1987, 1990) found the most effective of the local emergency
managers he interviewed emphasized the development of constituency
support by actively trying to increase the resource base of all local
agencies---not just their own. To do this, they relied on committees and
joint ventures to involve other community organizations. Consistent with
the organizational development strategy, some of them attempted to
manage conflict over controversial issues before they got out of
control. In particular, they achieved more consensus with other
community agencies on the mission of the LEMA. In a variation on the
disaster expert strategy, some of them brought in outside experts.

Drabek found that local emergency managers' reliance on these strategies
varied with community size. Successful directors in small communities
used them less frequently than successful directors in large communities
but more frequently than unsuccessful directors in either small or large
communities. Successful directors had more frequent contacts and more
formalized interagency agreements such as MOAs. Although all successful
emergency managers gave considerable emphasis to coordination with other
emergency-relevant agencies, they tended to give less emphasis to local
businesses and (except in the smallest communities) to elected
officials.

In the studies conducted by Gillespie and his colleagues (Gillespie &
Colignon, 1993; Gillespie, et al., 1993; Gillespie & Streeter, 1987),
the researchers found a large proportion of the organizations relevant
to disaster response were not linked to the preparedness network---which
indicates some deficiencies in the local emergency managers' strategies
for social environment analysis and management. Gillespie and his
colleagues expanded the utility of the research on social management
strategies by noting interorganizational linkages consist of informal
contacts, verbal agreements, and written agreements. In addition, they
emphasized that the existence (or even the frequency) of
interorganizational contacts does not measure the importance of the
relationship (i.e., that needed information, services, or resources have
been established or transferred). This argument points to a logical
connection between social environment analysis/management and resource
acquisition. That is, the low priority given to local emergency
management often makes it impossible for LEMAs to purchase needed
resources outright. Consequently, local emergency managers must build
capacity by collaborating with other organizations that do have those
resources or that have the influence to obtain the funding that will
allow them to make those purchases.

Of course, organizations are more likely to collaborate with the LEMA if
there are compelling reasons for them to do so. Consistent with this
notion, Gillespie and his colleagues found interorganizational linkages
were initiated by awareness of potential disaster demands and by
recognized needs for avoiding gaps in services or duplication of effort.
Other reasons for collaboration included ensuring timely access to
information, services, or resources; development of internal
organizational response capability; and development of political
influence to enhance organizational autonomy, security, and prestige.

Gillespie and his colleagues also found interorganizational linkages are
developed through active and personable individuals, but pre-existing
personal and professional contacts are important, as well as routine
interagency and interjurisdictional meetings, drills, and exercises.
However, these linkages are impeded by geographical distance, lack of
funds, lack of staff, incompatible professional perspectives and
terminology, lack of trust in an organization or its representative,
overconfidence in one's own capability, and unequal rewards and costs of
participation for those in different organizations.

## Individual Outcomes

As noted earlier, individual outcomes include job satisfaction,
organizational commitment, attachment behaviors (effort, attendance, and
continued membership), and organizational citizenship behaviors. Some of
these variables were studied by Whitney and Lindell (2000), who noted
that research on motivational factors involved in staffing voluntary
community organizations suggests people participate in these
organizations when they perceive social and environmental problems
within a community to which they are attached and find organizations
they expect to be successful in mitigating these problems (Chavis &
Wandersman, 1990; Florin & Wandersman, 1984). Such studies have found
that participation in community groups is significantly related to three
types of benefits (personal, social, and purposive) and their
corresponding costs (Prestby, et al., 1990). Moreover, members' sense of
individual and collective self-efficacy, and thus their motivation to
participate, is enhanced when these organizations are empowered by
successfully influencing actions taken by the community.

Other research has found that people often join and remain in a
voluntary organization because they are attracted to its activities, and
that volunteers are more likely than paid workers to have high intrinsic
satisfaction (Pearce, 1983). These findings indicate volunteers'
experiences may differ from those of their compensated counterparts and
suggests it is important to examine members' *organizational
commitment*. Porter, Steers, Mowday, and Boulian defined this construct
as "the strength of an individual's identification with and involvement
in a particular organization" (1974, p. 604) and characterized it as
including: a) strong belief in, and acceptance of, the organization's
goals and values, b) willingness to exert considerable effort on behalf
of the organization, and c) strong desire to maintain organizational
membership. Meyer and Allen (1984) noted research on organizational
commitment has examined two different types of commitment: affective and
continuance. Affective commitment, which is seen in terms of an
emotional orientation to the organization, is likely to be expressed in
high levels of employee performance (Meyer, et al., 1989). By contrast,
continuance commitment is conceptualized as an accumulation of "side
bets", which are anything of value individuals have invested in an
organization that would be lost if they were to leave. Continuance
commitment motivates employees to remain in the job but fails to elicit
performance beyond minimum requirements. Organizational commitment is
important in understanding LEMC effectiveness because it has been found
to predict a variety of participation behaviors. In an analysis of over
200 articles pertaining to organizational commitment, Mathieu and Zajac
(1990) concluded that organizational commitment has a weak but positive
correlation with attendance, but it has very strong negative
correlations with two turnover-related intentions: to search for job
alternatives and to leave one's job.

Whitney and Lindell (2000) discovered LEMC members' attachment behaviors
(attendance, effort, and continued membership in the organization) were
positively related to their affective commitment but not their
continuance commitment. In turn, affective commitment was significantly
influenced by effective LEMC leadership (the ability to structure team
tasks, communicate clearly, and show consideration for team members) and
the LEMC members' job related self-efficacy (perceptions of their own
competence) and role clarity (clear sense of direction in which to
allocate one's efforts). Other factors affecting commitment included
members' identification with an LEMC's goals (perceived hazard
vulnerability and perceived effectiveness of emergency planning) and
perceived opportunity for reward (public recognition and personal skill
development). The negative findings regarding continuance commitment do
not mean that this variable is altogether irrelevant because the study
assessed members' commitment to the LEMC (which lacks the tangible
rewards used to secure compliance commitment), not to their normal jobs
(which can provide such rewards). Based on the research reviewed by
Mathieu and Zajac (1990), one should expect compliance commitment to
significantly predict performance on these other jobs.

*Organizational Outcomes*

Organizational outcomes such as the quality, timeliness, and cost of
plans and procedures are the most direct results of individual outcomes
and the planning process but there also are intermediate results that
are indicative of organizational effectiveness. These include the
production of hazard and vulnerability analyses, public information
briefings, brochures, and Web sites.

Lindell and Whitney (1995) and Lindell and Meier (1994) examined
different indexes of LEMC effectiveness---chair judgments of
effectiveness on six planning activities and submission of completed
plans to the State Emergency Response Commission---and found these were
significantly correlated, but nonetheless distinct. Later, Lindell, et
al. (1996) examined LEMC effectiveness in terms of four criteria:
chairs' judgments of their LEMC's quality of performance on 13 emergency
planning activities, the percentage of vulnerable zones computed, the
number of talks given by the LEMC to community groups, and whether the
LEMC had conducted an emergency exercise. This study also found the
level of LEMC performance varied significantly from one activity to
another. Specifically, LEMCs were generally effective in collecting and
filing hazard data, inventorying local emergency response resources,
acquiring emergency communications equipment, and developing training
for local emergency responders. By contrast, LEMCs were relatively
ineffective in developing protective action guides, analyzing air
infiltration rates for local structures, analyzing evacuation times for
vulnerable areas, and promoting community toxic chemical hazard
awareness.

There are significant correlations between organizational and individual
outcomes (Lindell & Brandt, 2000). This suggests increasing members' job
satisfaction, effort, attendance, and citizenship behaviors and reducing
their turnover intentions will improve the organization's performance.
In addition, organizational outcomes had significant correlations with
external contextual variables (such as community resources, emergency
experience, and elected official support) and internal structural
variables (such as LEMC size, subcommittee structure, meeting
formalization, meeting frequency, role formalization, and computer
technology). Finally, the organizational outcomes had significant
correlations with organizational climate variables (such as leader,
team, role, job, and reward characteristics). All of these correlations
identify ways in which emergency managers can work with LEMC members to
improve organizational performance. In particular, emergency managers'
knowledge of these relationships can serve as a basis for expert power
in persuading other LEMC members to change the conditions within the
organization.

**LEMC Activities**

The previous section has described the factors that influence emergency
planning effectiveness and later chapters will provide recommendations
for the *content* of Emergency Operations Plans, Recovery Operations
Plans, and Hazard Mitigation Plans as described by sources such as the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (1996b), Foster (1980), Daines
(1991), Lindell and Perry (1992), and Schwab, et al. (1998). However,
there is an important intermediate step that needs to be addresses---the
*process* of plan development as it has been recommended by Daines
(1991), Federal Emergency Management Agency (1996b), and Schwab, et al.
(1998).

The development of an emergency plan is a multistage process that
encompasses nine steps. First, the local emergency manager establishes a
preliminary planning schedule. Second, the CAO publishes a planning
directive. Third, the local emergency manager facilitates the
organization of the LEMC. Fourth, the local emergency manager works with
LEMC members to assess disaster demands and capabilities. This leads to
a designation of the organizations responsible for each component of the
Emergency Operations Plan, Recovery Operations Plan, and Hazard
Mitigation Plan and finalization of the schedule for plan completion.
Fifth, LEMC members write the components of these plans. Sixth, LEMC
members evaluate and revise the draft plans. Seventh, the local
emergency manager distributes the draft plans to collaborating
organizations and other jurisdictions for community review. Last, after
the collaborating organizations and other jurisdictions have commented
on the draft plans, the LEMC revises them and publishes them in final
form. Each of these steps is addressed in more detail below.

## Establish a Preliminary Planning Schedule

Table 3-3 shows an example of how the emergency manager should identify
the principal tasks to be performed and the expected amount of time
required to perform them. An experienced emergency manager will be able
to generate accurate time estimates, but the LEMC members will need to
review and approve them at a later date to confirm that the deadline for
publication of the final plans is feasible.

**Table 3-3.** Sample Preliminary Planning Schedule

### Time (months) 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 

Organize the LEMC \[\--\]

Assign responsibility for plan components \[\-\-\-\--\]

Assess response requirements and capabilities \[\-\-\-\--\]

Finalize planning schedule \[\--\]

Write plan components \[\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\--\]

Evaluate/revise the draft plan \[\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\--\]

Obtain community review \[\-\-\-\-\-\-\--\]

Revise/publish the final plan \[\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\--\]

######## *Disseminate a Planning Directive*

Local emergency managers coordinate rather than direct the efforts of
other agencies, so they need some power base other than rewards and
punishments to elicit cooperation. As noted in Chapter 2, French and
Raven (1958; Raven, 1965) contend there are four bases of power in
addition to reward and coercive power that can be used in organizations.
These other bases of power are information, expert, referent, and
legitimate power. Quite obviously, reward and coercive power refer to
the ability to provide incentives for compliance and punishments for
lack of compliance. Information power refers to specialized knowledge of
the state of the social or physical environment, whereas expert power
refers to specialized knowledge about the dynamics of the social or
physical environment (and, thus an ability to predict---and perhaps
control---elements of those environments). Referent power refers to
influence that is determined by another's liking or admiration for an
individual and legitimate power is conferred when people believe that an
individual has the right to expect compliance with his or her requests.

Publication of a planning directive signed by the CAO confers legitimate
power upon a local emergency manager by indicating that specific areas
of authority have been delegated. This planning directive should be a
written document that formalizes the CAO's specific expectations about
the emergency planning process. Thus, the planning directive should
contain three sections, the first of which should state the purpose of
the planning process, the legal authority under which it is being
conducted, and the specific objectives that the planning process is
expected to achieve. Second, the planning directive should describe the
concept of the planning process, including a general description of the
LEMC organization, the organizations that are expected to participate in
plan development, and the local emergency manager's authority as the
CAO's representative in this area. Last, the planning directive should
address the procedure for plan approval and the anticipated deadline for
publication of the final plan. Even though the planning directive is
signed by the CAO, it is often drafted by the emergency manager.

######## *Organize the LEMC*

The emergency manager should request a representative from each of the
governmental agencies, NGOs, and private sector organizations that have
been designated in the planning directive as having significant
emergency response capabilities or hazard vulnerabilities. The
enumeration of all relevant organizations in the planning directive is
especially important because public safety agencies such as police and
fire are likely to participate in any event, but other local
organizations are likely to participate only if directed by the CAO
(Kartez & Lindell, 1990). A typical list of such organizations can be
found in Table 3-4.

####### **Table 3-4.** Organizations Typically Participating in LEMCs. 

Fire Local utilities (gas, electric power, telephone)

Police Red Cross

Emergency medical services Hospitals

Public works Nursing homes

Land use planning Schools

Building construction News media

Chief Administrative Officer's office Environmental groups

Public health Local industry

[Local elected officials Labor unions]{.underline}

Members of these organizations should work part-time (a few hours a
month) for the LEMC while continuing their jobs in their normal
organizations. Once the LEMC has been established, the emergency manager
should work with the members to select officers such as a Chair,
Vice-Chair, Information Coordinator, and subcommittee chairs. As with
other organizations, the Chair presides over meetings and represents the
organization to senior elected and appointed government officials, the
heads of private sector organizations within the jurisdiction, the news
media, and the public. In addition, the LEMC Chair represents the LEMC
to other jurisdictions and to state and federal agencies. The Vice-Chair
performs these duties when the Chair is absent, but the Vice-Chair's
primary role is to take a more active role in the management of the
internal affairs of the LEMC. The Secretary serves in a role that is not
a clerical position but is instead responsible for ensuring meetings are
scheduled and written minutes of the meeting are recorded. In addition,
the Secretary is the principal point of contact for information about
hazards and vulnerability, the planning process, and planning products.
The Information Coordinator might even be the person who is responsible
for monitoring the LEMC's budget.

LEMCs tend to be more effective when members are assigned to specific
activities rather than having everyone contribute to all tasks. Thus all
LEMCs should have subcommittees, but each one should determine for
itself what is the most appropriate division of labor for its own
situation. Most communities are likely to find it useful to have a
Hazard/Vulnerability Analysis committee; a Planning, Training, and
Exercising committee; a Recovery and Mitigation committee; a Public
Education and Outreach committee; and an Executive committee.

The Hazard/Vulnerability Analysis committee is responsible for
identifying the hazards to which the community is exposed and the
vulnerability of residential, commercial, and industrial structures and
infrastructure (fuel, electric power, water, sewer, telecommunications,
and transportation) to these hazards. In addition, the
Hazard/Vulnerability Analysis committee should also identify any
secondary hazards that could be caused by a primary disaster impact.
These secondary hazards would include, for example, earthquake-initiated
hazardous materials releases from chemical facilities and
earthquake-initiated dam failures that cause flooding in low-lying
areas. The Hazard/Vulnerability Analysis committee also should identify
the locations of facilities such as schools, hospitals, nursing homes,
and jails whose populations are vulnerable because of the limited
mobility of their resident populations, as well as the locations of
other facilities with vulnerable non-resident populations. A sample of
such facilities is listed in Table 6-1.

The initial task of the Planning, Training, and Exercising committee is
to write the Emergency Operations Plan (EOP). This committee should also
coordinate the identification of facilities and equipment that are
needed for disaster response. A major focus here will be on a
jurisdictional emergency operations center (EOC). In addition, the
Planning, Training, and Exercising committee should develop a training
program to enhance emergency responders' capabilities. The Planning,
Training, and Exercising committee only needs to develop training
materials for disaster-related tasks that are not performed during
normal operations or routine emergencies (both of which are addressed in
departmental training). That is, they must develop training that
provides an overview of disaster response and also enhances skills
required for tasks that are infrequently performed, difficult, and
critical to the success of the emergency response organization. They can
either develop the necessary training materials for themselves or obtain
them from other sources. Finally, the Planning, Training, and Exercising
committee must test the implementability of the plan through drills and
exercises. To accomplish these tasks, the Planning, Training, and
Exercising committee should recruit representatives from the primary
emergency response and public health agencies.

The Recovery and Mitigation committee has the responsibility for
developing a preimpact recovery plan that will facilitate a rapid
restoration of the community to normal functioning after disaster.
Recovery planning is often erroneously thought of as an activity that
can be postponed until after a disaster strikes, but practitioners have
argued that there are many recovery tasks that can (and *should*) be
addressed during preimpact planning (Schwab, et al., 1998) and this
contention has been supported by recent research (Wu & Lindell, 2004).
In addition, the Recovery and Mitigation committee is responsible for
identifying mitigation projects that will reduce the community's
vulnerability to environmental hazards. Some mitigation projects can
probably be implemented before a disaster occurs, but others will need
to be planned for implementation in conjunction with disaster recovery.
To accomplish these functions, the Recovery and Mitigation committee
should have representatives from public works, community development,
land use planning, and building construction agencies.

The Public Education and Outreach committee is responsible for risk
communication with the news media and the public. Thus, its members
should summarize the findings of the Hazard/Vulnerability Analysis
committee that identify the community's principal hazards and its most
vulnerable locations and demographic groups. The Public Education and
Outreach committee should also develop a description of the activities
of the Planning, Training and Exercising committee and an explanation of
how these will provide a capability for prompt and effective emergency
response to the community's hazards. Finally, the Public Education and
Outreach committee should describe the activities of the Recovery and
Mitigation Committee and an explanation of how these will provide a
capability for prompt and effective emergency recovery from a disaster.
Public Education and Outreach committee members should use this
information about the community's hazards and the hazard adjustments
(preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation) that will protect the
community to construct nontechnical summaries that can be understood by
households and businesses throughout the community. The Public Education
and Outreach committee should develop slides or other graphic
presentations to support talks to community groups, as well as brochures
to be distributed to households and businesses.

The Executive committee is responsible for ensuring the LEMC sets
specific, achievable objectives each year and accomplishes those
objectives through an efficient expenditure of resources. Accordingly,
the Executive committee will consist of the LEMC's principal
officers---Chair, Vice-Chair, Secretary, and subcommittee chairs. In
addition to planning, organizing, directing, and monitoring the internal
activities of the LEMC, the Executive committee needs to obtain the
resources---especially the funds---to support the LEMC's activities.
Although most of the work of the LEMC is performed by personnel who are
already being paid through their primary work organizations, there often
are additional expenses for acquiring computer hardware and software,
training materials, and travel for outside training. In addition, there
are likely to be expenses for producing and printing public education
brochures and other such materials. Sometimes government agencies or
private organizations participating in the LEMC are willing to pay for
some of these expenses from their budgets, but many times other sources
of revenue such as filing fees from hazardous materials facilities are
needed.

A critical step in the process of organizing the LEMC is to conduct a
planning orientation so the members of the LEMC will develop a common
understanding of the process. In preparation for the planning
orientation, local emergency managers should anticipate two very
important obstacles to emergency planning (Daines, 1991). First, they
should recognize that planning agencies lack emergency response
experience. Second, they should be aware that emergency response
agencies often lack disaster planning experience because they tend to
rely on standard operating procedures and improvisation for minor
emergencies. In addition, few---if any---LEMC members are likely to be
aware of the planning resources available from state and federal
agencies, as well as from other sources. Thus, the local emergency
manager should introduce LEMC members to the basic tenets of the state's
Emergency Operations Plan, Disaster Recovery Plan, and Hazard Mitigation
Plan, as well as provide copies of the state's planning guidance in each
of these areas. Similarly, the emergency manager should introduce LEMC
members to the basic tenets of the National Response Plan, as well FEMA
response, recovery, and mitigation programs and planning guidance.

######## *Assess Response Requirements and Capabilities*

Before beginning to write the EOP, Recovery Operations Plan, or Hazard
Mitigation Plan, LEMC members need to identify the functions that need
to be performed in a community-wide emergency. Information about the
likely impact locations as well as the impact scope (area affected) and
intensity will be produced by the hazard/vulnerability analyses. These
analyses will also identify the residential, commercial, and industrial
activities in the exposed locations, as well as locations that could
produce secondary hazards (e.g., dam failures or chemical releases) or
that have especially vulnerable populations (e.g., schools, hospital,
nursing homes, jails).

In addition, this assessment of response requirements needs to address
the likely responses of households and businesses in disaster. As will
be discussed in Chapter 8, there are widespread
misconceptions---frequently labeled *disaster myths*---about the ways in
which people respond to disasters. Though there is some small kernel of
truth in these beliefs, the incidence of individually and socially
maladaptive behavior is substantially exaggerated. According to Dynes
(1972), households and businesses are the foundation of community
emergency response and these organizations respond

-   In their normal forms to perform their normal tasks (existing
    organizations),

-   In their normal forms to perform new tasks (extending
    organizations),

-   In new forms to perform their normal tasks (expanding
    organizations), or

-   In new forms to perform new tasks (emerging organizations).

In addition, community organizations link to form emergent
multiorganizational networks (EMONs, Drabek, et al., 1981). Thus, the
mission of the LEMC can be conceived as one of developing a planned
multiorganizational network that can be adapted as needed to the demands
of each incident involving emergency response and disaster recovery.

In addition, representatives of the different agencies may have
misconceptions about the capabilities of other agencies within their
jurisdiction or of agencies at other levels (e.g., state and federal) of
government. Consequently, the emergency manager needs to assist the LEMC
in addressing these issues systematically so plans will be based upon
realistic assumptions about what needs to be done and who will be able
to do it (Dynes, et al., 1972).

######## *Write Plan Components*

As the previous discussion indicates, there will be three plans, the
EOP, the Recovery Operations Plan, and the Hazard Mitigation Plan The
emergency manager should work with the cognizant committees (especially
the Planning, Training, and Exercising Committee and the Recovery and
Mitigation Committee) to ensure they have the appropriate persons to
draft the components (basic plan, annexes, and appendixes) of each plan.
In addition, the emergency manager should provide guidance regarding the
structure and content of the plans, as well as resources that committee
members can use as they write the plan components. The Federal Emergency
Management Agency's (1996b) *Guide for All-Hazard Emergency Operations
Planning* is a useful source for the EOP (see also National Response
Team, 1987, for hazardous materials planning and US Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, 1980, for nuclear emergency planning) and Schwab, et al.
(1998) provide guidance for the development of the Recovery Operations
Plan, especially the integration of hazard mitigation into disaster
recovery.

In most cases, the emergency manager will draft the basic plan and the
representatives of each organization will draft the annexes that pertain
to their agencies. For example, the police will draft the EOP annex on
law enforcement, whereas the land use planning department should write
the Recovery Operations Plan annex on temporary housing. Each of the
relevant committees---especially the Planning, Training and Exercising
Committee and the Recovery and Mitigation Committee, and the LEMC as a
whole---should set performance goals collaboratively to ensure that all
members are committed to them. These goals should be challenging enough
to motivate high levels of performance and should be specific enough
that people can determine whether they are making progress in achieving
the goals. Goal achievement should be formally evaluated regularly to
determine if the planning schedule is being met and achievements should
be discussed annually with the jurisdiction's CAO.

*Evaluate/Revise the Draft Plans*

The emergency manager should ensure that all draft plans---the EOP, the
Recovery Operations Plan, the Hazard Mitigation Plan, and relevant
sections of the community's comprehensive plan that contain sections
affecting hazard mitigation---are reviewed by other committees within
the LEMC to identify potential conflicts between agency task allocations
and their resource capabilities, or conflicts between the provisions of
one plan and another.

######## *Obtain Community Review*

Once the draft plans have been reviewed within the LEMC, the local
emergency manager should release them for wider review throughout the
community. Working in coordination with the Public Education and
Outreach committee, the emergency manager should make copies available
at libraries and other public facilities throughout the community so
households and businesses can examine them in detail. Of course, it is
essential that people be notified that the draft plans are available for
review and comment. Thus, the Public Education and Outreach committee
should make a major effort to meet with neighborhood groups (e.g.,
community councils, Parent-Teacher Associations) and service
organizations (e.g., Rotary, Kiwanis, Chamber of Commerce) to summarize
the hazard/vulnerability analysis process and its results, as well as
the planning process and the general provisions of the draft plans for
preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation. People should be given
an adequate amount of time to review the plans and provide comments. In
addition, the emergency manager should ensure that at least one public
meeting is held at which individuals and organizations from throughout
the community can provide oral comments concerning the draft plans. Such
comments should be transcribed and retained in the LEMC's archives.

######## *Revise/Publish the Final Plans*

The local emergency manager should ensure that all input from the
community review is forwarded to the appropriate committees so they can
address any identified problems in the final versions of the EOP, the
Recovery Operations Plan, and the Hazard Mitigation Plan. Wherever
possible, it is useful to provide a document to accompany each final
plan that categorizes the comments received and explains how they were
incorporated into the plan or, if that is not possible, explains why
specific comments could not be addressed. Once all changes have been
made in the plan, it should be submitted to the CAO or local governing
body for their approval. At this point, final approval is usually
indicated by a page containing the signatures of the jurisdiction's
senior authorities. Copies of the final plans and accompanying documents
should be forwarded to all government agencies and other participating
organizations (e.g., American Red Cross) having designated roles in the
plans. Additional copies of the final plans and accompanying documents
should be deposited in the same locations as the draft plans so these
documents will accessible to households and businesses throughout the
jurisdiction.

**Case Study: Emergency Management in Smith Hill**

Gillespie, et al. (1993) examined the emergency preparedness in Smith
Hill (a pseudonym), a St. Louis suburb with a population less than
10,000. The city had a very small tax base and, thus, a very small
budget. Elected officials gave low priority to emergency management, so
the city did not allocate enough funding to emergency management to
qualify for state matching funds. Moreover, the city did not attend the
meetings of other interorganizational networks such as the Municipal
League, the Disaster Resource Council, and the Regional Emergency
Planning Council. When the researchers contacted the city to obtain
information about its emergency management program, they were initially
directed to the city building commissioner. After arriving for an
interview with him, they were redirected to the chief of police and
ultimately interviewed a group of six municipal officials---all of whom
were assigned emergency management responsibilities as collateral
duties. The city had an EOP developed from FEMA guidance, but the
organization chart was hand drawn and had not been updated for years.
Questioning by the researchers revealed the chart bore no resemblance to
the roles the interviewees expected to perform in a disaster. Indeed,
the person responsible for city streets was expected to fill most of the
positions in the emergency response organization, the police chief was
expected to fill two more positions, and the rest were not assigned to
any specific individuals. The Smith Hill emergency management
organization, such as it was, had direct links only to a fire protection
district, its municipal police department, the county medical examiner,
and a nearby regional hospital (whose name was identified only after an
extended discussion among the interviewees). The Smith Hill emergency
management organization had only two structurally unique organizations
to connect it (indirectly) to the regional emergency management network
and only after extensive probing of the interviewees were they able to
name any other organizations that should be added to their contact list.
The Smith Hill EOP contained no formal mutual aid agreements, even
though the interviewees expected to be able to borrow equipment from
neighboring jurisdictions in a disaster.