**\[DNFSB LETTERHEAD\]**

September 25, 2008

To the Congress of the United States:

On September 29, 2006, House Conference Report 109-702 on the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (H .R. 5122) was released
and approved by both houses of Congress. The Conference Report, Section
3201, directed the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board) to
provide quarterly reports on the status of significant unresolved
technical differences between the Board and the Department of Energy
(DOE) on issues concerning the design and construction of DOE\'s defense
nuclear facilities.

This is the sixth such quarterly report, reflecting the status of issues
through the end of June 2008. It builds on earlier reports to summarize
the status of issues previously raised and identifies any new issues
associated with the relevant projects. The status of many issues has not
changed significantly during the reporting period; however, the fact
that an issue has not been resolved does not necessarily imply a lack of
progress.

For each relevant facility, the following information is provided in the
Board\'s first quarterly report: (1) a short description of the facility
project, (2) the status of the facility, and (3) the status of
significant issues identified by the Board. As used here, the term
\"unresolved issues\" does not necessarily imply that the Board has a
disagreement with DOE or believes DOE\'s path forward is inappropriate.
Some of the issues noted in these quarterly reports simply await final
resolution through further development of the facility design. All of
the significant unresolved issues discussed here have been communicated
to DOE. Minor issues that the Board believes can be resolved easily and
for which an agreed-upon path forward exists are not included; the Board
will follow such issues as part of its normal design review process. It
is important to note that the Board may identify additional issues in
the course of its continuing design reviews. New issues identified since
the previous quarterly reports are noted below, as well as those issues
the Board believes have been resolved. For this reporting period, three
new issues were identified, and four issues were resolved. Prior to the
discussion of these issues, the status of DOE Standard 1189
(DOE-STD-1189), *Integration of Safety into the Design Process*, is
provided.

**DEVELOPMENT OF DOE STANDARD 1189**

On March 31, 2008, DOE issued DOE-STD- 1189, *Integration of Safety into
the Design Process*. DOE is now in the initial stages of its
implementation. DOE Order 413 .3A, *Program and Project Management for
the Acquisition of Capital Assets,* currently requires implementation of
the standard within 6 months of its issuance. DOE is revising DOE Order
413 .3A to make changes necessary to facilitate the standard\'s
implementation. These changes include a requirement that the standard be
implemented for all Hazard Category 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facilities. The
Board views this as a positive step. However, DOE\'s efforts to
incorporate requirements from the standard into ongoing projects,
particularly those that are still early in their design phase, do not
appear to be aggressively aimed at achieving full compliance before
September 30, 2008. The Board is continuing to track the standard\'s
implementation and will better understand what DOE has accomplished in
this regard at the end of the 6-month implementation period.

The Board supported the timely issuance followed by rapid implementation
of DOE-STD-1189, but in a letter dated February 22, 2008, raised two
issues. First, the Board believed that DOE needed to make a concerted
effort to identify directives impacted by the new standard and to revise
such directives in a timely fashion. Otherwise, implementation of
DOE-STD- 1189 could be unnecessarily complicated or even prevented by
the existence of competing or contradictory directives. DOE responded to
this issue on May 8, 2008, providing a schedule for the revision of
directives impacted by DOE-STD-1189, and established interim guidance
addressing its integration with other DOE directives related to safety
and design for natural phenomena hazards. The schedule for revising the
related directives lacks the urgency desired by the Board, but the
interim guidance should, if implemented properly, satisfy the majority
of the Board\'s concerns with regard to the standard\'s implementation.

The second issue noted in the Board\'s February 2008 letter was that
Appendix B, *\"Chemical Hazard Evaluation,\"* and Appendix C,
*\"Facility Worker Hazard Evaluation,\"* are advisory as opposed to
mandatory; thus, individual projects are not required to implement them.
These appendices are used to classify safety related controls, so it was
not clear to the Board why they would not be mandatory, particularly
since the approach used for protection of the public and collocated and
facility workers is normally based on the severity rather than the type
of hazard (i.e., chemical or radiological). Additionally, the Board
questioned why the safety design criteria derived by applying the
evaluation guidelines in these appendices did not provide the requisite
system and component reliability (e.g., separation and redundancy) for
safety controls needed for protection of the public. To ensure that the
criteria governing the design of safety related controls are adequate to
protect the public, independent of hazard type, the Board believes DOE
should consider carefully the need to implement Appendices B and C. In
further discussions with the Board, DOE acknowledged the need to
reconsider full implementation of these appendices.

DOE is currently developing a mechanism to ensure that the requisite
system and component reliability is included in the design of
safety-related systems that help protect the public.

**PROJECTS WITH THE MOST SIGNIFICANT UNRESOLVED ISSUES**

The Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Project at Los Alamos
National Laboratory (LANL), highlighted in the last quarterly report,
remains of concern to the Board. As noted below, the project is
addressing unresolved safety issues. DOE and the Board have reached
general agreement on the specific safety strategies for the issues of
concern. The Board believes that satisfactory implementation of the
specific safety strategies needs to be confirmed during its review of
the preliminary design and Preliminary Documented Safety Analysis. This
review should occur in the first quarter of next year.

***Los Alamos National Laboratory, Chemistry and Metallurgy Research
Replacement Project.*** In its first quarterly report, the Board noted
its concern regarding the project\'s overall approach for selecting
safety-related systems and the establishment of conservative design
criteria for those systems. In the last quarterly report, the Board
noted that the specified safety strategy, which relied on passive
confinement for some accidents to protect the public, was of particular
concern. Since that time, progress has been made toward addressing this
issue, and the Board believes that the safety strategy for the Chemistry
and Metallurgy Research Replacement facility is now robust.

On May 30, 2008, the Board transmitted a letter to the National Nuclear
Security Administration (NNSA) addressing its ongoing review of project
design documentation and several specific design issues that require
increased attention. The Board supports NNSA\'s plans to complete a
Technical Independent Project Review before proceeding to the final
design stage. This review should provide additional confidence in the
nuclear safety strategy employed and the design adequacy of
safety-related systems. The current schedule calls for publication of a
revised Preliminary Documented Safety Analysis in October 2008. The
Board notes that ongoing reviews of the draft Preliminary Documented
Safety Analysis by the Los Alamos Site Office have identified numerous
issues that need to be addressed before proceeding to the final design.
As reported in the last quarterly report, the Board will undertake its
own detailed independent review of the design of safety-related systems
and will, once it is completed, evaluate the adequacy of NNSA\'s
Technical Independent Project Review.

**NEW ISSUES IDENTIFIED DURING THE PERIOD**

**1.** **Project: Hanford Site, Waste Treatment and Immobilization
Plant**

***New Issue-Fire Safety Design for Ventilation Systems.*** In January
2008, the contractor (Bechtel National Incorporated) submitted a request
to modify fire safety design requirements for the Waste Treatment and
Immobilization Plant (WTP) for protection of confinement ventilation
systems from the effects of a fire. The intent of the request was to
obtain approval for an alternative means of protecting the final exhaust
high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters of the confinement
ventilation systems in a manner equivalent to that of the features
prescribed in DOE Standard 1066, *Fire Protection Design Criteria.* In a
letter to DOE dated June 24, 2008, the Board noted that this standard
permits the use of equivalent (or superior) methods of fire protection
for nuclear final filter plenums. However, the Board identified
significant issues pertaining to the proposed tailoring of the standard,
adherence to higher-tier policies, and the underlying technical
justification for the request. The DOE-Office of River Protection noted
similar issues and subsequently rejected the contractor\'s request. DOE
and the contractor are now working to resolve outstanding technical
issues and prepare a revised proposal that addresses the issues
identified by DOE and the Board. While these issues apply to all WTP
facilities, they are associated primarily with the High Level Waste and
Pretreatment facilities. Technical resolution for these issues is
scheduled to be completed in March 2009, and will include supporting
calculations and a revised proposal by the contractor.

**2. Project: Savannah River Site, Waste Solidification Building**

The Waste Solidification Building (WSB) being constructed at the
Savannah River Site will treat aqueous waste streams from the
Mixed-Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility and the Pit Disassembly and
Conversion Facility. In WSB, the aqueous waste will be concentrated,
neutralized, and solidified in 55-gallon drums. These drums will be
either buried on site as low-level waste, or shipped to the Waste
Isolation Pilot Plant in Carlsbad, New Mexico.

***New Issue-, Structural Design.*** In a letter dated June 25, 2008,
the Board raised several issues concerning the structural design of WSB.
The main issues were related to inconsistency between the roof design
and the design analysis, and to the design for potential settlement due
to the unique soil conditions at the Savannah River Site. The Board\'s
staff and project personnel have reached agreement on a path forward for
resolving these issues. The roof design has been changed to be
consistent with the design analysis. The Board expects to validate the
proposed design revisions in the near future.

> ***New Issue-Preliminary Documented Safety Analysis Deficiencies.***
> In a letter dated July 15, 2008, the Board raised several issues
> regarding the Preliminary Documented Safety Analysis for WSB. NNSA has
> already begun to address some of these issues through revisions to the
> safety analysis. However, several significant concerns are still being
> evaluated: (1) the criterion used to analyze hydrogen explosion
> scenarios in unvented pipes and vessels does not preserve the
> confinement integrity of the primary boundary, and (2) it is not yet
> clear what impact the application of DOE-STD-1189 may have on the
> identification and classification of safety-related controls,
> particularly for chemical hazards. NNSA and the Board\'s staff are
> discussing these concerns and expect to reach an agreement on their
> resolution in the near future.

**ISSUES RESOLVED DURING THE PERIOD**

**1. Project: Los Alamos National Laboratory, Technical Area 55 (TA-55)
Reinvestment Project**

***Issue***-The Board believed that the scope and timing of the TA-55
Reinvestment Project warranted reconsideration to ensure that the
project would address deficiencies of safety systems identified during
upgrades to the safety basis and other reviews conducted within the last
few years. In addition, the baseline assumptions regarding the
programmatic mission for TA-55 have changed substantially, reinforcing
the need to realign the scope and timing of subprojects with safety
upgrades.

***Resolution***-NNSA has elected to resolve issues regarding the
adequacy of safety systems through the development and execution of an
Integrated Priority List for safety system upgrades at TA-55. While this
list includes several subprojects under the TA-55 Reinvestment Project,
it also includes a significant number of TA-55 safety systems upgrades
that are funded and managed through other means. Given that NNSA has
chosen to manage the upgrades to the safety systems in this fashion, the
Board has decided to oversee the upgrades to safety systems through the
Integrated Priority List effort as a whole and therefore will remove
this item as an issue associated specifically with the TA-55
Reinvestment Project. The Board remains concerned about the adequacy of
safety systems at TA-55 and will conduct a detailed review of the
Integrated Priority List effort prior to the next quarterly report.
Specific issues (if any) associated with the adequacy of safety systems
that are identified during this review will be reported in the next
quarterly report.

**2. Project: Los Alamos National Laboratory, Upgrades to Pit
Manufacturing Capability at TA-55**

***Issue***-The Board was originally concerned that NNSA had failed to
demonstrate formal mechanisms for ensuring that design requirements and
interfaces would be appropriately managed and controlled across the
suite of projects contributing to the future plutonium processing
infrastructure at Los Alamos National Laboratory. The Board believed
that adherence to DOE Order 413 .3A could alleviate this concern.

***Resolution***-The Board reviewed the upgrades to the pit
manufacturing capability at TA-55 and evaluated whether the lack of
adherence to DOE Order 413.3A was adversely impacting the integration of
safety into the design of the upgrades. NNSA has stated that the
upgrades will be managed using a tailored approach to the Order;
however, the upgrades are currently on hold pending policy and funding
decisions. Further, NNSA has taken steps to develop an Integrated
Nuclear Planning process to improve coordination among its projects as
national security mission requirements are refined. While the Integrated
Nuclear Planning process is immature and not yet adequate, it is
intended to help resolve the Board\'s concern. This issue will therefore
be decoupled from the pit manufacturing capability program and
considered within the Board\'s ongoing oversight of operations and the
Integrated Nuclear Planning process at Los Alamos National Laboratory.
The Board will conduct a more detailed review in the near future during
which specific technical safety issues associated with pit manufacturing
will be identified. These issues will be discussed in the next quarterly
report, as appropriate.

3\. **Project: Y-12 National Security Complex, Highly Enriched Uranium
Material Facility**

> ***Issue***-The Board had noted that the water supply for the
> safety-significant fire suppression system in the Highly Enriched
> Uranium Materials Facility was not classified as safety-significant
> consistent with design basis requirements. This safety classification
> would help ensure the reliability of the water supply system through
> more rigorous design, construction, maintenance, and configuration
> control.

***Resolution***-NNSA briefed the Board on May 15, 2008, on actions
being taken and planned to increase the reliability of the fire
protection water supply system for the Highly Enriched Uranium Materials
Facility. These actions include a commitment to connect to
safety-significant water supply tanks planned for the Uranium Processing
Facility when completed, to provide a safety-significant water supply
pressure monitor, and to incorporate safety-related configuration
controls to ensure the availability of a single dedicated flow path in
the current supply system. The Board believes these actions address the
Board\'s concern regarding the water supply system and considers this
item closed.

4\. **Project: Y-12 National Security Complex, Uranium Processing
Facility**

***Issue***-In developing the preliminary hazards analysis for the
Uranium Processing Facility, the project used an airborne release
fraction and respirable fraction for bulk uranium metal that were
inconsistent with the values in DOE Handbook 3010-94 (DOE-HDBK-3010-94),
*Airborne Release Fractions/Rates and Respirable Fractions for
Nonreactor Nuclear Facilities.* Use of the values in DOE-HDBK-3010-94
could require additional safety controls not reflected in the safety
basis.

***Resolution***-In a letter dated May 15, 2008, NNSA informed the Board
that it has agreed to use the bounding values for the airborne release
fraction and respirable fraction from DOE-HDBK-3010-94 for the Uranium
Processing Facility and other facilities at Y-12. The Board considers
this issue closed.

**NEWLY LISTED PROJECT**

1\. **Project: Hanford, Interim Pretreatment System**

**Description:** The Interim Pretreatment System will pretreat waste
from tanks at the Hanford Tank Farms that have liquid waste with lower
concentrations of cesium and strontium. The system will remove
sufficient solids and radioactivity to allow immobilization of the waste
through early operation of WTP\'s Low Activity Waste Facility and/or the
operation of supplemental low activity waste immobilization facilities.

> **Status of Facility:** The project received CD-0 approval on December
> 21, 2007. The project is currently developing technology alternatives
> and the safety design strategy. Although CD-0 has been approved, DOE
> has informed the Board that no firm decision to proceed with interim
> pretreatment has been made.

**Status of Significant Issues:** The Board has initiated its review of
this project and has identified no outstanding issues at this time.

**CHANGE IN PROJECT STATUS**

On June 27, 2008, the Under Secretary of Energy approved a revised
preferred alternative for the Plutonium Preparation Project at the
Savannah River Site. This revised alternative will provide equipment and
upgrades to the K-Area complex that will allow excess plutonium
materials to be dispositioned in part through the Mixed-Oxide Fuel
Fabrication Facility and in part through the existing H-Canyon facility.
This action subsumes the Container Surveillance and Storage Capability
Project and revises the scope of the Plutonium Disposition Project.
Accordingly, the Container Surveillance and Storage Capability Project
will be deleted from the Board\'s quarterly report. The title of the
revised alternative is the Plutonium Preparation Project .

As directed by Congress, the Board will continue to exercise its
existing statutory authority.

Respectfully submitted,

***A.J. Eggenberger***

***Chairman***

***John E. Mansfield***

***Vice Chairman***

***Joseph F. Bader***

***Member***

***Larry W. Brown***

***Member***

***Peter S. Winokur***

***Member***

[Enclosure](../AttachedFile/fb08S25A_att.pdf)