**Draft Defense Program**

**High Level Program Description**

*This report is based on an informal information exchange session
initially held on*

October 17, 1999, continued on October 20, 1999, and drastically revised
on November 8, 1999 (Participants --Defense Programs -- Laboratory
Program Manager: Steve Binkley (DP-10); Collaborative Management
Environment Strategic Information Management (CME SIM) Process
Co-Leader: Kimberly Rasar). The purpose of the information exchange
session was to educate Steve Binkley about the CME and the CME SIM
process and to education Kimberly Rasar about general management
activities within DP related to the processes being evaluated as part of
the CME SIM. The ultimate uses of this document are to: (1) briefly
describe Defense Programs and management processes related to the CME
SIM, (2) validate the information provided by Steve Binkley through
further iteration with him; (3) educate the CME SIM Team, and (4) aid in
the development of structured interviews to capture additional details
and ensure the appropriate information about processes is gathered and
documented as part of the CME SIM.

## General Information

"The mission of Defense Programs is to ensure the safety, reliability,
and performance of nuclear weapons without underground nuclear testing.
We will provide an infrastructure and the intellectual capability to
maintain the nuclear weapons stockpile, including replacing limited life
components and assuring an adequate supply of tritium. We will also
provide the ability to reconstitute underground nuclear testing and
nuclear

weapons production capabilities as required to meet future national
security requirements.[^1]

The Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) was established in response to
the FY 1994 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 103-160), which
called on the Secretary of Energy to "establish a stewardship program to
ensure the preservation of the core intellectual and technical
competencies of the United States in nuclear weapons." In the absence of
nuclear testing the Stockpile Stewardship Program must: 1) support a
focused, multifaceted program to increase the understanding of the
enduring stockpile, 2) predict, detect, and evaluate potential problems
due to the aging of the stockpile, and 3) refurbish and remanufacture
weapons and components, as required. In order to accomplish these tasks,
the SSP is structured to sustain the strong scientific and technical
base needed to ensure the safety, security and reliability of the
stockpile. \[A listing of reviews of the Stockpile Stewardship Program
is given in Appendix A.\]

## Program Organization and Goals

The highest priority of the SSP is to ensure the operational readiness
of the nuclear weapons stockpile. The SSP program is organized into
three focus areas: 1) Directed Stockpile Work (DSW), which is designed
to ensure that stockpiled weapons meet military requirements; 2)
Campaigns, which are designed to provide the capability improvements
needed to meet the future DSW needs of the Nation's nuclear deterrent;
3) Infrastructure (Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities, RTBF)
that is required for stockpile work, and computational and experimental
research activities.

*Directed Stockpile Work*

Directed Stockpile Work (DSW) includes all activities which directly
support the scientific understanding and engineering development
capabilities necessary for the refurbishment and certification of the
nuclear weapons stockpile. The purpose of the DSW Program is to ensure
the reliability, surety, and performance of the nation's nuclear weapons
for both current and future nuclear weapon systems. DSW supports weapons
maintenance, surveillance, assessment and certification for the existing
stockpile, scheduled weapon refurbishments and dismantlements, and R&D
systems studies and technology applications. The DSW Program encompasses
a broad range of activities that directly support the readiness of the
enduring nuclear stockpile. These activities must be able to preserve
the readiness of the deployed stockpile, support the nuclear deterrent
in the future, and dispose of retired weapons and associated components.

The DSW requirements and schedule are derived from the Stockpile Life
Extension Plan (SLEP). The SLEP addresses weapons stockpile concerns by
defining probable future refurbishment requirements for the nuclear
weapons stockpile. The SLEP provides the basis for focusing the DSW
research and development activities and, in consultation with the DoD,
prioritizing those activities.

The SLEP effort begins with the identification of stockpile support
requirements, which are linked the fundamental scientific underpinning
necessary to understand and respond to those requirements, and to the
maintenance of the manufacturing capabilities necessary to execute
changes. The SLEP created a planning process to evaluate the components
of each weapon type of the enduring nuclear weapons stockpile, in order
to determine each component's contribution to the weapon's long-term
reliability, performance, and safety. The SLEP planning places
particular emphasis on components whose degradation might cause a
reduction in weapon performance or safety and provides the planning
factors for evaluating weapon refurbishment actions in light of these
concerns.

The DSW program goals, which are designed to meet the SLEP requirements,
are:

1\. Meet directed schedule requirements (in the field and at DOE
locations)

-   Design and produce high reliability and quality products and
    services for the enduring stockpile

-   Support stockpile evaluation programmatic requirements

-   Support Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan

2\. Confirm the safety, reliability, and performance of fielded weapon
systems

-   Certify the existing stockpile, certify changes to the stockpile,
    and identify technologies needed to support certification

-   Establish and update the baseline physics and engineering
    performance for each enduring stockpile weapon

-   Provide required material science, system/subsystem design,
    engineering, and planning capabilities

3\. Modernize Stockpile Designs

-   Conduct studies and advanced/exploratory development to support
    future refurbishment needs and anticipated future stockpile
    requirements

-   Provide prioritization and guidance for required research and
    development, technology development, and process development efforts

4\. Plan to extend stockpile life

-   Provide effective stockpile support planning and workload analysis

-   Anticipate future stockpile requirements and production needs

5\. Dispose of retired weapons and components

-   Optimize weapon and component dismantlement throughput

-   Maintain the ability to support arms control agreements

-   Provide for materials recovery and recycle

-   Effectively dispose of excess materials

*Campaigns*

Campaigns are technically challenging, multi-year, multi-functional
efforts across the DP laboratories, the production plants, and the
Nevada Test Site (NTS), designed to develop and maintain specific
critical capabilities needed to sustain a viable nuclear deterrent. The
goal of these campaigns is to provide the capability to address current
or future issues by employing the best scientists and engineers and the
most advanced scientific infrastructure. Campaigns have milestones and
specific end-dates, which are designed to focus efforts in science and
computing, applied science and engineering, and production readiness, on
clearly defined deliverables related to the stockpile. Currently, there
are 18 Campaigns. It is anticipated that as these mature and milestones
are achieved, new campaigns will be developed to address problems and
issues in the DSW.

Eight campaigns deal primarily with providing the scientific
understanding required to certify the nuclear weapons stockpile in the
absence of nuclear testing, and to support the stockpile refurbishments
required for weapon life extensions. These are:

*[Primary Certification Campaign]{.underline}* includes experimental
activities which will develop and implement the ability to certify
rebuilt and aged primaries to within a stated yield level without
nuclear testing. Capabilities developed under this Campaign will
directly support DSW, including the B61, W80, and W76 SLEPs and
certification of the newly fabricated W88 warhead pit**.**

[End State]{.underline}: Develop the tools required to certify the
performance and safety of any newly fabricated replacement or aged
primary to a specified yield (Phase I). Focus on hydrodynamics and
generalized materials descriptions.

*[Dynamic Materials Properties Campaign]{.underline}* includes efforts
to develop physics-based, experimentally-validated data and models of
all stockpile materials at a level of accuracy commensurate with the
requirements of Primary and Secondary Certification.

[End State:]{.underline} Provide complete, accurate and
experimentally-validated models which describe the state and evolution
of material properties in imploding primaries with special emphasis on
Pu.

*[Advanced Radiography Campaign]{.underline}* develops technologies for
three dimensional images of imploding surrogate primaries, with
sufficient resolution to resolve uncertainties in primary performance.

[End State:]{.underline} Provide 3D imagery of imploding surrogate
primaries.

*[Secondary Certification and Nuclear-Systems Margins
Campaign]{.underline}* includes experimental and computational
activities which will determine the minimum primary factors necessary to
produce a militarily effective weapon. The activities in this Campaign
will develop a validated predictive computational capability for each
system in the stockpile, determine the primary radiation emission and
energy flow, and determine the performance of nominal, aged, and rebuilt
secondaries.

[End State]{.underline}: Determine the minimum primary factors necessary
to produce a militarily- effective weapon.

*[Inertial Confinement Fusion (ICF) Ignition & High Yield
Campaign]{.underline}* includes those activities needed to support the
start of ignition implosions in FY06 and enhance experimental
capabilities for stewardship. Material conditions that can be reached at
the National Ignition Facility (NIF), together with the diagnostics
available, will also provide enhanced experimental capability for
primary certification and weapons-relevant materials dynamics
measurements.

[End State:]{.underline} Start of ignition implosion in FY06 and the
enhancement of experimental capability for stewardship.

*[Certification in Hostile Environments Campaign]{.underline}* will
develop validated computational tools for certification, reevaluate
nuclear weapon hostile environments, develop radiation-hardened
technologies, and demonstrate certification technologies on the W76 life
extension program.

[End State]{.underline}: Develop certification tools and
microelectronics technologies required to ensure that refurbished
weapons meet Stockpile to Target Sequence (STS) hostile environment
requirements.

*[Defense Applications and Modeling Campaign]{.underline}* uses the
tools of the Accelerated Strategic Computing Initiative (ASCI) to
provide 3-D, high-fidelity, full-system simulation codes required for
engineering, safety, and performance analyses of the stockpile.

[End State:]{.underline} 3D high fidelity physics, full-system
simulation.

*[Weapon System Engineering Certification Campaign]{.underline}*
establishes science-based engineering methods that will increase
confidence in weapons systems through validated simulation models and
high fidelity experimental tests. This Campaign will validate
engineering computational models and develop a suite of tools to enable
for science-based certification of the B61, W80, and W76 required by the
SLEP.

[End State]{.underline}: Establish a predictive capability integrated
with fewer, but smarter experiments to assess weapon performance with
science-based certification.

Three engineering campaigns focus on providing specific tools,
capabilities, and components necessary to support the maintenance and
refurbishment and continued certification of specific weapons systems.
These campaigns support both certification and DSW work. These campaigns
are:

*[Enhanced Surety Campaign]{.underline}* will develop enhanced surety
options, including a new level of use-denial capabilities, which may be
considered for incorporation in scheduled stockpile refurbishments. This
Campaign will develop enhanced surety options for the B61, W80, and W76
weapon systems in time to support refurbishment schedules.

[End State]{.underline}: Meet modern nuclear safety standards and
upgrade use-denial capabilities, in time for weapon refurbishments.

*[Enhanced Surveillance Campaign]{.underline}* develops the tools to
predict or detect the precursors of age-related defects before they
jeopardize warhead safety or reliability. Material, component, system
characterization, and predictive modeling and simulation are central to
this activity. With sufficient lead time, the necessary redesigns,
refurbishments, and recertifications can be made efficiently and cost
effectively within the capabilities and capacity of the rightsized
manufacturing complex. The Enhanced Surveillance Campaign is developing
the technologies and methods, as well as the fundamental understanding
of materials properties and weapons science, to improve detection and
predictive capabilities. These capabilities will be used to develop new
estimates for weapon lifetimes.

[End State]{.underline}: Provide lifetime assessments and the
quantitative decision basis for future life extension programs.

[*Advanced Design and Production Technologies (ADAPT*)
*Campaign*]{.underline} is designed to accelerate and advance the
product realization technologies by developing capabilities to deliver
qualified refurbishment products cheaper, better, and quicker. This
Campaign will develop modeling and simulation tools and information
management technologies to enable full-scale engineering development
with minimal hardware prototyping, and through a totally paperless
processes for monitoring weapon refurbishment activities.

[End State]{.underline}: Provide the capability to deliver qualified
stockpile life extension program refurbishment products upon demand at
one-half cost, one-half time and zero stockpile defects by 2005.

Seven other campaigns are focused on sustaining the manufacturing base
within the nuclear weapons complex. Some manufacturing processes and
capabilities are no longer viable. Without the viability of
manufacturing capability, the nuclear deterrent can not be maintained.
These campaigns are driven by the current work required to maintain the
stockpile in the SLEP and the fact that weapons are expected to remain
reliable for decades beyond the anticipated deployment period
established when the systems were manufactured. These campaigns are:

*[Pit Readiness Campaign]{.underline}* will reconstitute pit
manufacturing within the DOE nuclear weapons production complex
including the reestablishment of the technical capability to manufacture
all war reserve pits for the enduring stockpile at a capacity 20 pits
per year. These pits will be produced at LANL.

[End State:]{.underline} Develop an automated, expandable, robust
manufacturing capability to produce stockpiled and new-design pits,
without underground testing, within 19 months, and with a stockpile life
greater than the weapon system.

*[Secondary Readiness Campaign]{.underline}* will ensure future
manufacturing capabilities (equipment, people, processes) for production
of secondaries. This includes the reestablishment of special
processes/materials, replacement of sunset technologies, development of
technical work force competencies, and the development of component
certification/recertification techniques. This includes the development,
implementation, and maintenance of appropriate capability and capacity
to: accomplish all Directed Stockpile Work and respond to surge
production scenarios to manufacture/remanufacture replacement components
for all weapon systems in the active enduring stockpile. If the need
were defined, the program must be able to produce secondaries for a
single weapon type at a rate of 10% of its START I active stockpile
quantity per year. The first production unit would be delivered in 36
months after the need is defined.

[End State:]{.underline} Develop the capability for secondary readiness
by 2010.

*[High Explosives (HE) /Assembly Readiness Campaign]{.underline}* is
focused on ensuring future manufacturing capabilities for high explosive
fabrication and weapon assembly.

[End State:]{.underline} Develop the capability for HE/assembly
readiness by 2010, by providing the technologies, facilities, and
personnel for high explosives component manufacturing, production
requalification, and weapon assembly/disassembly operations to support
Phase 6.4 cycle time of 19 months.

*[Nonnuclear Readiness Campaign]{.underline}* is focused on ensuring
future manufacturing capabilities for nonnuclear components.

[End State:]{.underline} By FY2006, bring all identified production
vulnerabilities to acceptable level of risk; develop advanced
technologies to yield defect-free products at half the traditional cost
and within 19 months after the need is defined.

*[Tritium Readiness Campaign]{.underline}* will provide a source of
tritium consistent with the Secretarial Record of Decision announced in
December 1998. This designated the Commercial Light Water Reactor option
as the primary technology with the linear accelerator to be developed as
backup technology. New tritium is needed by approximately FY05.

[End State:]{.underline} Complete CLWR in FY2006 with tritium gas being
delivered to SRS Tritium Loading Facility. Develop & demonstrate key
components of linear accelerator and target/blanket technologies;
complete preliminary design of APT Facility.

*[Material Readiness Campaign]{.underline}* will include activities to
support the construction of a new Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) storage
facility. This will result in the consolidation of long-term HEU
material into a state-of-the-art facility. It will also involve planning
activities for new nuclear material storage vaults to provide for
long-term storage of the national plutonium assets.

[End State:]{.underline} Develop a fully integrated material management
system to identify future needs and support those needs either with
stockpiled material or the capability to produce that material.

*[Transportation Readiness Campaign]{.underline}* will provide
sufficient transport capacity to meet the requirements of the Department
of Energy and the Department of Defense for safe and secure
transportation of nuclear weapons, nuclear components, and other cargoes
related to maintenance of the stockpiled weapons. It will field improved
transportation equipment and increase personnel training to counter all
postulated threats for the year 2010. The capacity will be at a level
meeting the standards set for Transportation Safeguards Division (TSD)
transport security. This is a multi-faceted campaign with improvements
in both personnel and equipment.

[End State:]{.underline} Field improved transportation equipment and
increase personnel training to counter all postulated threats for the
year 2010; provide safe and secure transport of nuclear weapons and
components.

*Infrastructure -- Readiness In Technical Base and Facilities*

Infrastructure (Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities (RTBF))
provides the physical infrastructure and readiness activities required
for the scientific, computational, engineering, and manufacturing
activities of the Stockpile Stewardship program at the National
Laboratories, Production Sites, and the Nevada Test Site. Maintaining
the intellectual competencies of personnel in the science, engineering
and manufacturing disciplines relevant to nuclear weapons technology is
imperative to ensure the capability to address unanticipated technical
issues as well as enable efforts in Campaigns and DSW. This program also
encompasses activities needed to ensure that the infrastructure -
utilities, facilities, equipment - are operationally safe, secure and
environmentally compliant within a defined level of readiness. The
primary goal of this program is to ensure that the infrastructure is
available to conduct the scientific, technical, and manufacturing
activities of the Stockpile Stewardship Program.

These activities are directed by DOE Federal personnel at Headquarters,
supported by Operations Offices for contract management, and implemented
by contractor personnel at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory,
Livermore, California; the Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos,
New Mexico; the Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico,
Livermore, California, and Tonopah, Nevada; the Nevada Test Site, Las
Vegas, Nevada; the Pantex Plant, Amarillo, Texas; the Kansas City Plant,
Kansas City, Missouri; the Y-12 Plant, Oak Ridge, Tennessee; and, the
Savannah River Site, Aiken, South Carolina. (See Appendix B for
site-specific descriptions).

In addition to maintaining the programmatic and site infrastructure at
these locations, the SSP is proceeding with a major initiative to
rightsize the manufacturing complex to better match changes in the
workloads and budgets with maintenance of core capabilities and
facilities. This rightsizing is being conducted consistent with the
Stockpile Stewardship and Management Programmatic Environmental Impact
Statement (PEIS), the Record of Decision for which was signed by the
Secretary of Energy on December 19, 1996. The PEIS formally defines the
architecture of the weapons complex for the future. \[See Appendix C for
text of the PEIS\]

The RTBF program elements are linked to key issues associated with the
sequence of events leading to a nuclear explosion, the environments a
nuclear weapon may encounter, and critical technologies associated with
sustaining the nuclear deterrent. All of these issues bear on the
continuing assessment and certification of the safety and reliability of
the nuclear weapons stockpile. Following the legacy of almost 50 years
of nuclear weapons research, design, development, and production, many
Defense Programs facilities are well beyond design life. Maintenance
costs continue to escalate, and more stringent operational requirements
emerging from Environmental, Safety, Health, and Security mandates
result in higher baseline facility costs and less resources available
for program work. The first step in managing this problem is to identify
requirements and costs, and then to consider options and make informed
decisions across all sites. Through better accountability and increased
visibility of emerging infrastructure issues at the facility level, the
RTBF Program is structured to ensure that a defined level of readiness
is sustained at all needed facilities, and that facilities are
operational, safe, secure, and compliant.

## Proposal Submission Process

Each year, an integrated planning process across the entire SSP
(campaigns, DSW, &RTBF) is completed by HQ DP managers and laboratory
representatives. For each campaign, DSW, and RTBF a program plan is
developed. The program plan describes the program in terms of major
technical efforts (MTEs) in a five-year context. At the next level of
detail, implementation plans are developed that describe first and
second order milestones. Milestones are typically defined over a
two-year period (CHECK ON THIS). The program and implementation plans
are developed by the three defense laboratories, the Nevada Test Site,
and HQs. These plans are submitted to DOE HQs in MicroSoft Word format.

**Program Execution**

Each year, based upon Congressional appropriations, the Defense
executive management (e.g., ASDP, DASs) provides guidance to the
laboratories, production plants, and the test site on program execution
priorities. Based on this guidance, the laboratories, production plants,
and test site develop detailed execution plans based upon the
implementation plans and available budget. Authorized Work Statements
(AWSs) are issued to the laboratories, production plants, and the test
site through DOE AL to authorize expenditure of funds. Execution is done
at the Budget and Reporting Code level.

# Tracking Process

Defense Programs has implemented a business process to manage the
overall SSP using a tightly integrated management approach. A system,
called Prima Vera Project Management and Project Controls, is being
installed to track the details of Defense Programs activities including
the baseline and change controls. The point of contact for this system
is Ken Carver. From a Department perspective, Defense Programs plans to
track the first and second order milestones. WILL HAVE TO ASK TERRY
BEARCE ABOUT RECONCILATION BETWEEN ALLOCATION AT THE B&R CODE LEVEL AND
TRACKING AT THE MILESTONE LEVEL. ASK JAMIE HEARD ABOUT THE AWS PROCESS.

**Management Process**

At the Congressional level, the budget is tracked at stat table level.
Another crosscut is maintained in laboratory tables. These tables are
developed by Bonnie Giampietro in DP-40. Within DP-10 and 20
spreadsheets are maintained that track all campaigns, DSW, RTBF by MTEs,
by funding level, by site.

[^1]: http://www.dp.doe.gov/public/default.htm