**HAZARDS, DISASTER, AND U.S. EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT**

**AN INTRODUCTION**

**STUDENT READING ASSIGNMENT**

**SESSION 2**

**Excerpt---Doctoral Dissertation**

**An Integrated Approach For Community Hazard, Impact, Risk and
Vulnerability Analysis: HIRV**

**by**

**Dr. Laurence Dominique Renee Pearce**

**The University of British Columbia**

**December 2000**

**(Dr Pearce has graciously consented to this excerpt appearing in the
Intro Student Reader)**

**1.1. Definitions of Disaster**

In defining "disaster," it is useful to consider this term within the
context of four categories: (1) lexicology, (2) origin/cause, (3)
characteristics, and (4) capacity to respond.

**1.1.1. Lexicology**

In many cases, words such as "emergency" and "planning" have been used
interchangeably with words such as "disaster" and "management,"
respectively. According to the *Oxford Canadian Dictionary* (1998) an
"incident" is considered to be a minor situation; an "emergency" a more
serious situation; a "disaster" a yet more serious situation; and a
"catastrophe" the most serious situation of all. However, depending on
one's discipline, terms such as "incident" as opposed to "emergency," or
"emergency" as opposed to "disaster," are less clear. It would be
helpful if disaster management and emergency response agencies could
agree on a common terminology. Still, as long as we have incident
command systems[^1] to deal with large-scale events (such as the
Northridge earthquake) and emergency response teams to deal with two-car
pile-ups, not to mention both Emergency Preparedness Canada (EPC) and,
in the United States, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA),
consensus as to the precise definition of "emergency" as opposed to
"disaster" is unlikely to occur in the near future. Therefore, in order
to obviate the confusion caused by these two terms, one must examine
other factors.

**1.1.2. Origin/Cause**

Foster (1980) maintains that disasters are the consequences of extreme
events. Many disaster planners still think of disasters in terms of
their origin (e.g., natural as opposed to technological), while most
researchers seldom view them as agent-specific (Hewitt 1995). The
exception to this may be with regard to war. Some researchers (Gilbert
1995a) feel very strongly that war should be included in a definition of
disaster. That war and disaster have something in common is clear;
however, depending on one's bias, a war may be perceived either as a
disaster or as the first step away from a previously unbearable way of
life. It is this moral (or immoral) dimension of war that makes it
difficult to include under a definition of disaster, and, following
Drabek (1986) and Auf der Heide (1989), this dissertation does not
include it in its definition.[^2]

Perhaps because of the difficulty of including all of the potential
causes of a disaster within a succinct definition, and because of
multi-hazards (i.e., situations within which one hazard \[e.g., an
earthquake\] causes another \[e.g., a landslide\]), it is extremely
difficult to define disaster in terms of cause. Most pieces of
legislation in Canada (Emergency Program Act \[Bill 38, sec. 1(1): 2\];
Emergency Act \[c. 29, sec. 2(5): 779\]) define a disaster by referring
to its particular characteristics or impact.

**1.1.3. Characteristics**

Many of those who choose not to define a disaster by its origin/cause
define it according to its characteristics. These may include: (1)
length of forewarning, (2) magnitude of impact, (3) scope of impact, and
(4) duration of impact (Kreps 1995, 258). Disaster researchers generally
agree that a disaster affects people (Korver 1985; American Red Cross
1986) and that it is often catalogued in terms of the number of dead and
injured. However, others have expanded the definition to reflect major
losses to both population and physical structures---losses that disrupt
the social structure and essential functioning of a community (Fritz
1961, Dynes 1970; Gilbert 1995a). The problem with focusing on community
disruption as a way of defining disaster is reflected in situations such
as that of Lauda Flight 004, which, carrying 213 passengers, crashed in
a remote jungle site in Thailand in 1991.

Researchers such as Handmer et al. (1991) and Rosenthal et al. (1989)
have pointed out that in the developed world, the impact of disasters is
more readily evident in their psycho-social and politico-economic
impacts than in their mortality rates. But, because the impact of a
disaster can be both unexpected and extremely varied, it is extremely
difficult to include all potential impacts within any single definition.
Similarly, in situations in which no human lives are lost (such as the
1989 *Exxon Valdez* oil spill), definitions based on impact on humans
become less relevant (at least in regard to direct impact).

Others researchers, such as Drabek (1986, 46-47), state that disasters
have six characteristics that differentiate them from emergencies: (1)
degree of uncertainty, (2) urgency, (3) development of an emergency
consensus, (4) expansion of the citizenship role, (5) convergence (i.e.,
the sudden influx of people and material upon a disaster scene), and (6)
de- emphasis of contractual and impersonal relationships.[^3]

Drabek's first characteristic, degree of uncertainty, seems to be a
major preoccupation of a number of researchers, as five of the
contributors (Dombrowsky, Gilbert, Horlick-Jones, Kreps, and Porfiriev
1995a) to an issue of the *International Journal of Mass Emergencies and
Disasters* agreed that a disaster should be defined not in terms of
cause and effect but, rather, in terms of uncertainty. Uncertainty is
seen as a product of the increasing complexity of modern communities,
and a disaster is seen as "the loss of key standpoints in common sense,
and the difficulty of understanding reality through ordinary mental
frameworks" (Gilbert 1995b,\
237-38).

However, I would contend that Kreps (1995) and others who focus on
characteristics when attempting to define disasters fail to take into
account the great differences between these events. As technology has
improved, many disasters that, twenty or even ten years ago, would have
been unexpected events can now be forecast with some accuracy. For
example, Hurricane Andrew was forecast ahead of time and thousands of
people were able to evacuate prior to its arrival. In this case,
uncertainty had little relevance to an event that resulted in few
casualties but billions of dollars worth of damage. Likewise, factors
such as duration bear little relationship to amount of damage. For
example, the Kobe earthquake, whose impact can be measured in seconds,
is the most costly disaster of recent years: over U.S. \$100 billion
(Mileti 1999). In an attempt to overcome the problems posed by defining
disaster in terms of impact, some researchers define it in terms of
capacity to respond.

**1.1.4. Capacity to Respond**

The issue of the local government's capacity to respond is crucial to
many Canadian and American definitions of disaster (Richie 1983; Tierney
1985). Britton (1986) employs three levels of social crisis---(1)
accidents, (2) emergencies, and (3) disasters---each of which is defined
according to who is involved, the degree of their involvement, and the
degree of disruption to the social system, thus combining the capacity
of a community to respond with the actual impact of the event.
Quarantelli (1987) states that, in disasters (unlike in emergencies),
organizations have to: (1) involve the public to a great degree, (2)
lose a certain amount of autonomy, and (3) relate to different agencies
and organizations. Focusing on Quarantelli's last point, Drabek (1986,
xix) differentiates between emergencies and disasters according to the
number of agencies required to adequately respond to the situation:
generally, the greater the number of agencies required, the greater the
disaster. However, I contend that Drabek's model is limited in that it
is urban-based, tailored to first responders, and does not lend itself
to minor incidents---incidents that may require a number of different
players but that may still be negligible in terms of effect (e.g., minor
oil spills). Although the inability of a community to respond to a
situation is certainly a key point, it is not very reliable to define
"disaster" according to the number of agencies required to attend to it.

**1.1.5. A New Definition**

It would appear that any adequate definition of disaster must reflect a
given locality's capacity to respond; the fact that what has occurred is
unusual; and the fact that the impacts of what has occurred are of
social, economic, political, and ecological significance. Having
considered the pros and cons of the various definitions set forth in
this and the preceding section, I offer the following as a comprehensive
working definition of disaster: ***A disaster is a non-routine event
that exceeds the capacity of the affected area to respond to it in such
a way as to save lives; to preserve property; and to maintain the
social, ecological, economic, and political stability of the affected
region.***

This definition of disaster does the following:

\(1\) It eliminates from consideration such routine emergencies as house
or apartment fires, and motor vehicle accidents. Disasters are unusual
events, complex and difficult to respond to, and their impacts may last
for generations. By defining them as non-routine I exclude events that
even though they might involve death and destruction, can be handled by
simple operating procedures.

\(2\) It takes into consideration the capacity of the local area to
respond to an incident. This is important because, in most cases, large
communities, simply because of the number of their available resources,
are more capable of handling very serious situations than are small
communities.

\(3\) It takes into consideration the importance of maintaining the
social, ecological, economic, and political stability of the affected
area. This is important because, clearly, when people are killed and
homes are destroyed, those who survive will suffer long-lasting
emotional and psychological effects. Property damage results in both
direct (e.g., property loss) and indirect (e.g., job loss) economic
consequences. Oil spills and tsunamis can destroy shellfish habitat and
other areas of ecological significance. Incoming personnel from higher
levels of government and national and international agencies may disrupt
local decision-making processes, and terrorist operations may increase
political instability. All of the foregoing may be included under the
potential effects of a disaster, and, as Handmer et al. (1991)
indicates, any definition of disaster must recognize their seriousness.

**1.2. Disaster Management: A Process**

Various terms (e.g., emergency preparedness, disaster planning) have
been used to describe the process of dealing with disasters. In order to
avoid confusing the reader, throughout this dissertation the commonly
recognized expression "disaster management" is used when referring to
the process of attempting to control/manage disasters.

**1.2.1. Definitions of Disaster Management**

"Disaster" has been defined in the previous section. Certo et al. (1983,
9) define management as "the process of reaching organizational goals by
working with and through people and other organizational resources."
However, this definition can be problematic since there are many
organizations involved in dealing with disasters and each may have its
own goals (e.g., firefighters may be focused on putting out a fire,
while others may be concerned about securing property). Drucker's (1974,
17) definition of management is preferable: "\[making\] people capable
of joint performance by giving them common goals, common values, the
right structure, and the ongoing training and development they need in
order to perform and to respond to change." Certainly, disasters involve
change, and responders and the community need assistance in dealing with
it.

Most disaster management, from an operational perspective, has focused
on the development of an emergency plan (Quarantelli 1986; Faupel 1987);
however, according to Aguirre (1994, 2), "despite its obvious relevance
to preparedness activities, planning for disasters has not received a
great deal of research attention in the social sciences." Much of the
research has been devoted to post-disaster sociological or psychological
studies.

Essentially, Quarantelli (1986), Drabek (1986), and Faupel (1987) agree
that the disaster management process is comprised of a series of
activities that precede, carry on during, and follow a disaster. Drabek
(1986) expands the concept of disaster management to conform to the
nomenclature proposed in the 1979 National Governors' Association report
entitled

*Comprehensive Emergency Management: A Governor's Guide.* This concept
includes four phases:

**Table 1: Concept of Disaster Management**

**1. Preparedness 3. Recovery**

Planning Restoration (6 mos. or less)

Warning Reconstruction (6 mos. or more)

**2. Response 4. Mitigation**

Evacuation and Pre-Impact Mobilization Hazard Perceptions

Post-Impact Emergency Actions Adjustments

***Source:* (Drabek 1986)**

This framework suggests a linear approach to disaster management, while
others extol a circular (Quarantelli 1981). Drabek also omits reference
to the development of, training for, and testing of the plan. In keeping
with Quarantelli, I contend that the disaster management process
includes activities in six areas: (1) hazard, risk, and vulnerability
(HRV) analysis; (2) mitigation; (3)

response (including alert and warning, impact, immediate post-impact,
and rescue); (4) recovery and reconstruction; (5) education and
training; and (6) exercising or testing of emergency plans.

HRV analysis is included as one step within a circular disaster
management process wherein, although one activity clearly leads to the
next, the activities in any given step affect those in all steps (see
Figure 2). In other words, Figure 2 shows that (1) the disaster
management process is circular rather than linear; (2) each step in this
process is distinct; and (3) each step affects every other step.

**Figure 1: The Disaster Management Process**

![](media/image1.png){width="5.873611111111111in"
height="3.4270833333333335in"}

**1.2.2. Hazard, Risk, and Vulnerability (HRV) Analysis as Part of
Disaster Management.**

While researchers agree that HRV analysis is an important part of the
disaster management process, they do not agree as to where, in the
overall process, this analysis should be conducted. And they often do
not agree on the particulars. Hoetmer (1991, xxi), for example, states
that the emergency management process requires that the "community
undertake a hazard and risk analysis, assess its current capabilities in
the areas of mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery, and
devise action steps to close the gap between existing and required
levels of capability." How this is to be accomplished is left very
vague. Hays (1991, 8) makes the point that HRV analysis is only the
first step of the disaster management process: an HRV analysis is not an
end in itself; it is the means towards an end (i.e., to mitigate the
risks and consequences of disasters). In other words, Hays believes that
HRV analysis forms the cornerstone of mitigation. However, he and others
(Maskrey 1989; Godschalk 1991; Scanlon 1991) are less clear about the
direct relevance of HRV analysis to mitigation. For example, Godschalk
(1991) gives a number of reasons why the results of HRV analysis are
important for disaster management planning, but they are presented in
theoretical terms rather than in practical examples. For example, he
says that an HRV analysis should 'justify management decisions for
altering program and staffing assignments that may vary from the
previous norm" (145). This leaves the reader uncertain as to the direct
contribution of HRV analysis to the overall disaster management process.

It is important to understand the role of HRV analysis in the
development of mitigative strategies within the disaster management
process. Fischhoff et al. (1978) state that, since hazards are divided
into events and consequences, one has the following options: (1) prevent
the event from occurring; (2) prevent the potential consequences of the
event from occurring; or (3) lessen the harmful consequences of the
event. To this could be added (4) develop strategies to share in risk
reduction measures. It is apparent that, without adequate HRV analyses,
communities may neglect to plan for likely hazards. This is because,
without understanding the extant hazards and vulnerabilities, it would
be impossible for them to adequately follow any of the foregoing
options. Consequently, they would not be able to achieve "sustainable
hazard mitigation" (Mileti 1999, 215).

Drabek (1986, 21) defines mitigation as "purposive acts designed toward
the elimination of, reduction in probability of, or reduction of the
effects of potential disasters." There is, however, a blurring of the
timing of mitigation, as Quarantelli (1986, 4) classifies prevention
activities as those geared to preventing the occurrence of an event,
while he classifies mitigation activities as those geared to lessening
the impacts of an event. As is shown in Figure 2, I choose to define
mitigation as representing those pre-, during, and post-disaster
activities that reduce the risk and consequences of any given disaster.
For example, seismic retrofitting of unreinforced masonry buildings,
raising the level of dykes during a flood, and moving homes out of a
flood plain after a flood are all mitigation activities. Because of its
importance within the context of disaster management, the concept of
mitigation must be explored further.

**1.2.3. Mitigation**

Current research defines the concept of mitigation as central to the
success of disaster management. In the mid-1990s many of the United
States' top hazards experts met and collaborated on the *Reassessment of
Natural Hazards in the United States,* which was completed in 1998
(Mileti 1999). Based on its findings, Mileti concluded that a shift in
the field of disaster management must take place so that it would be
possible to focus on "sustainable hazard mitigation" (2). Mileti argues
that there are six objectives that must simultaneously be reached

in order to mitigate hazards in a sustainable way: (1) maintaining and
enhancing environmental quality (i.e., human activities should not
reduce the carrying capacity of the ecosystem), (2) maintaining and
enhancing people's quality of life, (3) fostering local resiliency and
responsibility, (4) recognizing that vibrant local economies are
essential, (5) ensuring inter- and intra-generational equity (i.e., not
precluding a future generation's opportunity for satisfying lives by
exhausting resources in the present generation), and (6) adopting local
consensus building.

The importance of mitigation is recognized in FEMA' s major initiative,
"Project Impact" (FEMA 2000), which was developed as a partnership
between communities, government, and businesses in order to build
disaster-resistant communities. Sustainable hazard mitigation warrants
an inter-disciplinary approach that encompasses environmental, social,
and economic considerations as well as technical analysis in order to
determine hazards, risks, and vulnerabilities. This being the case, it
is clear that an adequate HRV analysis is critical to the success of
sustainable hazard mitigation.

This concept of mitigation parallels the conclusions of MacCrimmon and
Wehrung (1986, 10) concerning risk: "There are three components of
risk---the magnitude of loss, the chance of loss, and the exposure of
loss. To reduce riskiness, it is necessary to reduce at least one of
these components." Taking into account Mileti's conclusions regarding
mitigation, one could reword MacCrimmon and Wehrung to state that the
components of mitigation strategies are to eliminate or reduce (1) the
consequences of loss, (2) the probability of loss, and (3) the sharing
of loss. In most cases it will be impossible to eliminate the
probability of loss (i.e., the probability of a natural hazardous event
taking place), but it may be possible to do so in the case of
person-induced hazards (e.g., hazardous waste in-situ spills).

In keeping with Mileti's conclusions, any definition of disaster
management must be able to incorporate the concept of mitigation. As
will be seen, mitigation is also central to the definitions of "hazard,"
"risk," "vulnerability," and "risk management."

**1.2.4. A Definition of Disaster Management**

Myers (1997, 1) states that: "Mitigation, preparedness, response and
recovery are not separate endeavors and they should not be pursued by
separate professionals. They are a long-term process and must be
linked." Indeed, this is implicit in my definition of disaster
management: ***Disaster management is the process of forming common
objectives and common values in order to encourage participants to plan
for and deal with potential and actual disasters.***

Quarantelli insists that in order for disaster management to be
successful, attention must be given to process rather than merely to
written plans. The foregoing definition takes this into consideration.
It also assumes that disaster management involves a number of
participants, each one of whom (whether an individual or an agency)
needs to cooperate with the others and to establish common objectives
and values. Since time and resources are not unlimited, some activities
will be given priority over others. The process of disaster management
should help participants to arrive at common objectives; namely, those
itemized by Mileti (1999), which, in turn, should help them to arrive at
suitable priorities (i.e., those that most adequately reflect community
values). Thus the goal of disaster management is to encourage
sustainable hazard mitigation, and all steps in the disaster management
process must support this end.

**1.3. Hazard Identification**

In disaster management, a hazard refers to the potential for a disaster.
I use the definition developed by Harris et al. (1978), who conclude
that hazards "are threats to humans and what they value: life, well
being, material goods, and environment." Harris et al. indicate the need
for judgment when determining whether or not a potential hazard exists.
If, for example, a meteor were to fall on a desolate barren area of
northern Canada (even if it killed no one, destroyed no property, and
left minimal damage to the environment), then it would be considered a
potential hazard. This contradicts Hewitt's (1983) view that "hazard"
refers to the potential for damage to a vulnerable human community.
Following Harris et al., it is not important for a hazardous event
*actually* to take place; it is only important that it is *likely* to
take place.

Beginning in the 1960s, disaster management literature discussed hazards
without considering their origin. This changed in the 1980s, when
hazards began to be described as either natural or technological
(Lindsay 1993). While natural hazards were defined as "Acts of God,"
technological hazards were defined as fitting into four categories:
hazardous materials, hazardous wastes, hazardous substances, and
extremely hazardous substances. As Parker (1992, 237) points out,
however, "the significance of these classifications varies across
countries and even among agencies within the same country."

**1.3.1. Hazard Classifications**

Why is it important to classify hazards? First, scientific disciplines
tend to be insular and to have narrow foci: atmospheric researchers do
not necessarily communicate with hydrologists and other natural
scientists. By failing to classify hazards, research may be duplicated
and gaps may go unnoticed. Second, and perhaps most important, as "the
type of hazard affects the choice of mitigation strategy" (Godschalk
1991, 40), failure to accurately classify types of hazards may lead to
the misapplication of mitigation strategies. For example, if one is
trying to combat an increase in the number of forest fires by installing
additional lightning monitors when, in fact, the fires are being caused
by careless campers, not only will the strategy not work, but it will
also waste resources. Third, failure to correctly classify hazards leads
to failure in other parts of the emergency management process. For
example, in order to receive FEMA funding, communities

must conduct at least three exercises every four years and must include
in them "a natural, a technological and a civil disaster" (Daines 1991,
187). Because of the way in which hazards are defined, communities are
not encouraged to think about, or to consider how they would deal with,
an epidemic.

For these reasons, I propose that hazards be classified. However, a
number of researchers (e.g., Kreps 1991; Quarantelli 1991) have
questioned the need to separate the causes of hazards from one another.
Jovanovic (1988), for example, believes that person-induced and natural
hazards are interrelated because humans can influence natural events and
natural events can change and modify human activities. However, I
maintain that while in many cases there are similarities between the
consequences of, and responses to, both person-induced and natural
disasters, because their causes are different, the mitigation strategies
adopted to reduce them will also be different---thus the importance of
classification.

As can be seen, hazards have been classified in a number of
ways---usually by cause. Fischhoff et al. (1978) recognize that, in
terms of both events and consequences, natural hazards differ from
technological hazards. Similarly, Britton and Oliver (1991)
differentiate between natural and technological hazards. According to
them, natural hazards result from a *lack* of control, whereas
technological hazards result from a *loss* of control. They conclude
that hazards have three origins: (1) natural; (2) failure or misuse of
technological processes; and (3) misapplication of technology, medicine,
or biology. While it is important, in terms of applying mitigation
strategies, to determine the origin of technological hazards, it is
difficult to justify, in the planning stages, the use of Britton and
Oliver's typology. For example, an aircraft can crash as a result of
mechanical failure, metal fatigue, poor maintenance, a bomb explosion,
pilot error, and so on. Defining hazards by origin seems unsatisfactory,
as they have numerous possible origins---only some of which may actually
lead to a disaster. With the current emphasis on carcinogens and other
similar concerns, it is important to distinguish between these hazards
and those leading to major disasters such as earthquakes and explosions.
Therefore, it seems more suitable to classify hazards by general cause
rather than by specific origin. To this end, I propose that hazards be
classified as: (1) natural; (2) diseases, epidemics, and infestations;
and (3) person induced.

White (1979, 15) defines natural hazards as "any extreme events in
natural systems which have the potentiality of causing major
perturbations in social systems." This definition appears to be accepted
within the disaster management community, and it is the one used
throughout this dissertation.

Interestingly, while natural hazards are the focus of much current
research, diseases and epidemics are usually overlooked. Yet the latter
can affect people, plants, or animals. While some diseases, such as the
bubonic plague, have existed for centuries, others, such as acquired
immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS), are quite new. Some diseases are the
result of bacterial or viral infections (e.g., meningitis) that have
natural causes, while some are the result of human manipulations.
Locusts have been swarming in Africa for hundreds of years, but threats
of an Asian gypsy moth infestation in British Columbia have only
occurred in the last few years. Furthermore, genetic researchers are
capable of creating new diseases. Consequently, diseases and epidemics
do not fit nicely into either natural hazards or person-induced hazards.
As well, while controlling other hazards typically means evacuating
people, animals, and property, controlling diseases and epidemics
typically means containing them. For these reasons, diseases and
epidemics should be classified separately from natural hazards and
person-induced hazards.

Drabek (1991, xxi) points out that researchers have traditionally
identified three types of disasters according to type of potential
hazard: (I) natural, (2) technological, and (3) civil. He adds that a
fourth type of disaster---ecological---has now entered the picture.
Ecological disasters are events "that are caused principally by human
beings and that initially affect, in a major way, the earth, its
atmosphere, and its flora and fauna" (xxi). While the need for natural
hazards has already been discussed, the term "person-induced hazards"
includes Drabek's typology of technological, civil, and ecological
hazards as well as what are commonly referred to as "man-made hazards."
I use the term "person-induced hazards" because: (1) it is
gender-neutral and non-sexist; (2) people do not "make" disasters, they
"induce" them---either through acts of commission (e.g., planting a
bomb, crashing a plane, or spilling chemicals) or through acts of
omission (e.g., not building a dam able to withstand seismic conditions,
failing to maintain a proper watch at sea, or using poor construction
techniques); and (3) it addresses the issues presented by Britton and
Oliver (1991).

**1.3.1.1. *Impact of Hazard Identification on Emergency Response Plans
***

There has been considerable academic discussion concerning the need to
develop disaster management emergency plans for specific hazards rather
than for all hazards. Some researchers believe that different types of
disasters warrant different types of plans, while others believe that
the similarities between any two disasters are sufficient to allow for
generic plans. A generic, or all-hazard, plan would be one that could be
used for any hazard, regardless of its cause or effect. For example,
Quarantelli (1991, 98) maintains that "there are more individual and
organizational behavioral similarities than differences for all disaster
occasions." Similarly, Kreps (1991, 38) states that one of the key
requirements for adequate emergency preparedness is a generic rather
than an agent-specific approach to planning.

Both Quarantelli and Kreps believe that for most disaster management
needs, the type of disaster is irrelevant. For example, with regard to
warnings, "regardless of whether the threat is a hurricane, a chemical
spill, a flood, a tidal wave, or a nuclear emergency, what matters is

whether people will understand, believe and respond to warning messages.
There must be an alerting system that works, and warning messages must
be accurate, precise, consistent, and timely" (Kreps 1991, 40). Kreps
goes on to point out that a general preparedness approach to disaster
management is efficient in terms of time, effort, and money and that it
helps to avoid duplication of effort, gaps in responses, and possible
conflicts between divergent approaches. He believes that for these
reasons, moving from a generic all-hazard plan to a hazard-specific
plans would be politically undesirable.

And yet social researchers keep reminding planners that disasters affect
different populations differently. If one assumes that all parts of a
disaster area will be equally affected, no matter

what the hazard, then resources will, in fact, be poorly utilized. For
example, when a tornado approached Edmonton (Edmonton Police Department,
1987), despite an excellent general disaster plan,

-   no public warning system was in place to alert people to the hazard
    and to tell them what actions they should take (as there were no
    specific references to tornadoes);

-   there was no specific plan in place to evacuate the Evergreen Mobile
    Home Park, the source of the majority of deaths (notwithstanding
    widespread knowledge that tornadoes are extremely destructive to
    mobile home parks); and

-   as there was no consideration of the widespread flooding that
    normally follows tornadoes, no alternate routes to the northern part
    of the city had been developed.

Kreps (1991, 40) argues that writing elaborate plans for specific
functions results in too detailed a plan, thus creating a false sense of
security. Some researchers, such as Hoetmer (1991, xxi), believe that
the Integrated Emergency Management System (IEMS) is adequate:
"Operationally \[IEMS\] provides the framework to support the
development of emergency management capabilities based on functions
(warning, shelter, public safety, evacuation, and so forth) that are
required for all hazards." Others, such as Daines (1991, 167), believe
that IEMS (as developed by FEMA) is problematic because of the large
amount of documents it produces. IEMS supports hazard-specific planning
but treats disaster management generically and, as Daines points out,
may not meet community needs (169).

Quarantelli (1991) states that to move from a generic to a
hazard-specific plan is to assume that, with regard to any two
disasters, there are fewer individual and organizational behavioral
similarities between them than there are differences. He disagrees with
this, stating that concepts of disaster have shifted from a physical
focus to a social focus. Following this, a disaster is defined according
to "the characteristics of individuals and groups reacting to a
situation." This notion of disaster focuses on the common properties of
a social event rather than on "the social happening and away from the
physical features of natural and technological agents and their effects"
(98). He then goes on to state that, no matter what is involved, people
must be evacuated according to a common warning system. "What motivates
people to heed warning messages, what kind of warning message is
effective, what limits the acceptance of a warning, and so on, is the
same in all cases" (98).

Even though Showalter and Myers (1992, 10-11) were able to list nineteen
differences between natural and technological disasters and only
fourteen similarities (see Table 2), Quarantelli argues that, although
tactics may differ (e.g., how far to evacuate), strategies do not. He
says that the generic approach to disaster management is difficult to
accept because of its tendency to deal with disasters according to
cause. He states that the generic approach does not deny that there are
important differences between disasters, only that they are not linked
to specific types of hazards.

**Table 2: List of Differences Between Natural and Technological
Disasters**

+-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
| **Natural Disasters**             | **Technological Disasters**       |
+-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
| Are an expected aspect of the     | Are created by human development  |
| physical environment              | and use of hazardous materials    |
|                                   | and are usually                   |
|                                   |                                   |
|                                   | caused by human error             |
+-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
| Are considered uncontrollable     | Are considered controllable       |
+-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
| Issues of control appear to       | Issues of control appear to       |
| produce more psychopathology in   | produce lower psychopathology     |
| affected citizens                 | than natural disasters            |
+-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
| Humans are not held responsible   | Responsibility is perceived as    |
|                                   | lying with a human or group of    |
|                                   | humans who calculate an event's   |
|                                   | predictability                    |
+-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
| Onset often allows                | Characteristically occur rapidly  |
| warning/evacuation                | and without warning               |
+-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
| Reluctance to evacuate until the  | A large portion of the population |
| threat is seen as extreme         | will evacuate without formal      |
|                                   | instructions to do so             |
+-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
| Usually have a clear beginning    | Although the onset may be clear   |
| and end via obvious destruction   | (e.g., warning sirens signaling a |
|                                   | release), its "end" may not       |
+-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
| The event and its effect on       | The event and its effects on      |
| people and the environment are    | people and the environment are    |
| generally visible                 | generally invisible               |
+-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
| Recovery is generally visible     | Recovery is generally invisible   |
| (e.g., removal of debris)         | (i.e., removal of radiation       |
|                                   | cannot be seen)                   |
+-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
| Individuals can personally        | Because the effects are often     |
| observe the effects of a natural  | invisible, individuals are more   |
| disaster                          | dependent on authority figures    |
|                                   | and/or the media for facts        |
+-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
| Private individuals, public       | Corporations and governments      |
| agencies, and corporations become | respond while private citizens    |
| involved in the response          | are relegated to roles as victims |
|                                   | and/or must be separated from the |
|                                   | event's aftermath to ensure their |
|                                   | safety                            |
+-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
| Authority figures are seen as     | Authority figures are seen as     |
| helpful                           | evasive and unresponsive          |
+-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
| Individuals tend to personalize   | Individuals tend to depersonalize |
| event                             | event                             |
+-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
| Mitigation focuses on human       | Mitigation tends to focus on the  |
| adjustment to potential events or | technical process                 |
| to hazardous areas                |                                   |
+-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
| Response/relief efforts more      | Because of perceived control,     |
| common than mitigation because of | mitigation is more common than    |
| perceived lack of control over    | response/relief                   |
| the event                         |                                   |
+-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
| Familiarity develops due to       | Familiarity is lacking due to     |
| experience                        | lack of experience                |
+-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
| Accumulated experience guides     | Few accumulated experiences to    |
| mitigation, management, and       | guide mitigation, management,     |
| preparation decisions             | *or* preparation decisions        |
+-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+

  ----------------------------------- -----------------------------------
  Following an event, community       Following a technological event, a
  solidarity and consensus generally  community may search for a
  emerges                             "culprit," and conflict may emerge

  No documented increases in          A greater potential exists for
  naturally occurring hazardous       hazardous technological events
  events                              because: (1) a greater number of
                                      facilities use hazardous materials;
                                      (2) greater numbers and amounts of
                                      hazardous materials are in the
                                      marketplace; and (3) the
                                      population, along with its spatial
                                      distribution, has increased
  ----------------------------------- -----------------------------------

***Source: Showalter and Myers (1992, 10).***

Quarantel1i (1991, 101) concludes that there are eight dimensions to any
given population's response to a disaster and that these are crucial to
the establishment of a generic plan. These dimensions are: (1) the
relative proportion of the population involved, (2) the social
centrality of the affected population,[^4] (3) the length of time the
affected population is involved, (4) the rapidity with which the
population becomes involved, (5) the predictability of involvement, (6)
the unfamiliarity of the crisis, (7) the depth of the population's
involvement, and (8) the recurrence of involvement. According to
Quarantelli, these dimensions apply almost exclusively (and equally) to
only two of the four stages of the disaster management process: (1)
emergency preparedness and (2) response.

[^1]: An Incident Command System (ICS) is an organizational structure
    used to determine overall command and planning during disaster
    response (Kuban 1996).

[^2]: It is also beyond the scope of this dissertation to include
    "complex emergencies," as defined by the Department of Humanitarian
    Affairs for the United Nations, in its definition of disaster.
    Complex emergencies refer to situations of prolonged civil conflict,
    often compounded by drought, famine, or other hazards and usually
    characterized by hunger and poverty. Recently, responding to complex
    emergencies has consumed much of international humanitarian efforts.

[^3]: Drabeck would define as impersonal the relationship between
    response agencies (such as the police and firefighters) and/or the
    relationship between state agencies and local agencies.

[^4]: That is, whether or not the affected population is central or
    peripheral to the larger social community.