**This version includes the errata of 30May02-e**

**UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS**

No. 00-2083

[Roger D. Pentecost, Appellant,]{.smallcaps}

[v.]{.smallcaps}

[Anthony J. Principi,]{.smallcaps}

[Secretary of Veterans Affairs, Appellee.]{.smallcaps}

On Appeal from the Board of Veterans\' Appeals

(Decided May 24, 2002 )

*James W. Stewart* (non-attorney practitioner)*,* and *Barton F.
Stichman*, both of Washington, D.C., were on the pleadings for the
appellant.

*John H. Thompson*, Acting General Counsel; *Ron Garvin*, Assistant
General Counsel; *Darryl A. Joe*, Acting Deputy Assistant General
Counsel; and *Erica M. Dornburg*, all of Washington, D.C., were on the
pleadings for the appellee.

Before FARLEY, IVERS, and STEINBERG, *Judges*.

IVERS, *Judge*: The veteran, Roger D. Pentecost, appeals from a July 26,
2000, Board of Veterans\' Appeals (BVA or Board) decision that
determined that post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) was not incurred
in, aggravated by, or otherwise the result of active-duty service.
Record (R.) at 3. The veteran has submitted a motion for reversal, and
the Secretary has submitted a motion for remand pursuant to the
**Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (**VCAA)**, Pub. L. No.
106-475, 114 Stat. 2096 (Nov. 9, 2000)**. The Court notes that the
veteran has not presented any arguments before this Court regarding the
following three alleged in-service stressors, which the Board considered
in its decision: The veteran (1) read in *Stars and Stripes* that his
\"buddy,\" Robert Rusher, was killed in action in January 1968; (2)
observed the body of an unidentified Marine mutilated by a mine or other
explosive at a Da Nang hospital; and (3) observed an infant from a
nearby village whose head had been chewed on by a rat. The Court deems
any argument pertaining to those three stressors abandoned and will not
address them further. *See Bucklinger v. Brown*, 5 Vet.App. 435, 436
(1993). The veteran requests that the Court reverse the Board decision
and order the Secretary to award service connection for PTSD. Motion
(Mot.) at 10. The Secretary requests that the case be remanded for
reajudication in light of the enactment of the VCAA and pursuant to
*Holliday v. Principi*, 14 Vet.App. 280 (2001), and does not address the
veteran\'s arguments on the merits. The Court will deny the Secretary\'s
motion and address the veteran\'s request for reversal, a remedy greater
than that proposed by the Secretary. *Cf. Mahl v. Principi*, 15 Vet.App.
37 (2001); *Best v. Principi*, 15 Vet.App. 18 (2001). This appeal is
timely, and the Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 38 U.S.C. §§ 7252(a)
and 7266(a). For the reasons discussed below, the Court will reverse the
July 26, 2000, Board decision and remand the matter for the Board to
award service connection.

**I. FACTS**

The veteran served in the U.S. Marine Corps from June 15, 1966 to June
4, 1968. R. at 45. He was stationed in Vietnam and served as a
warehouseman and messman at the U.S. air base at Da Nang from February
4, 1967 to May 21, 1968. R. at 369. While stationed at Da Nang, the
veteran\'s unit experienced enemy rocket attacks. R. at 454-55.

On March 3, 1993, the veteran filed a claim for service connection for,
inter alia, PTSD. R. at 47. In April 1993, after a VA examination, the
veteran was diagnosed with dysthymia, anxiety disorder, and somatization
disorder. R. at 175. In an October 10, 1993, decision, a VA regional
office (RO) denied, inter alia, service connection for PTSD. R. at
190-91. The RO found, \"Service connection is denied for \[PTSD\],
because a chronic nervous condition is not shown in service, and
\[PTSD\] was not diagnosed on last examination.\" R. at 191. In May
1994, the veteran appealed the RO denial of service connection for PTSD
to the Board. R. at 206-10. The veteran had a hearing before the Board
in August 1996. R. at 212-57. In March 1997, the Board remanded his
claim for PTSD to the RO for the RO to obtain medical records of the
April 1993 PTSD evaluation with directions for the RO to readjudicate
the PTSD claim. R. at 288. In January 1998, the RO declined to reopen
the veteran\'s claim because new and material evidence had not been
submitted. R. at 293. On several subsequent occasions the RO declined to
reopen his PTSD claim also on the basis that no new and material
evidence had been submitted. R. at 292, 315, 326.

In January 1999, the Board remanded the veteran\'s claim for service
connection for PTSD to the RO for further development. R. at 353. In
April 1999, the veteran completed a PTSD screening questionnaire. R. at
404-07. In July 1999, the RO sent a letter to the Commandant of the
Marine Corps requesting information to confirm the veteran\'s alleged
stressors. R. at 401. The Commandant\'s office informed VA that the
information the veteran provided was \"insufficient for the purpose of
conducting any meaningful research on the veteran\'s behalf.\" R. at
420. The veteran submitted to the RO various medical records dated
between March and August 1999. R. at 410-18, 424-30. According to an
August 1999 VA compensation and pension examination report by a VA
physician, the veteran was diagnosed with chronic PTSD. R. at 434. In
January 2000, the RO denied the veteran\'s claim for PTSD because the
evidence reviewed did \"not establish that a stressful experience
occurred.\" R. at 469. On July 26, 2000, the Board denied service
connection for PTSD. R. at 10. The Board found that the stressors that
the veteran claimed to have been exposed to in Vietnam had not been
verified. *Id.*

**II. ANALYSIS**

Service connection for PTSD requires the presence of three elements: (1)
A current diagnosis of PTSD; (2) credible supporting evidence that the
claimed in‑service stressor actually occurred; and (3) medical evidence
of a causal nexus between the current symptomatology and the claimed
in‑service stressor. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f) (2001); *see Cohen v. Brown*,
10 Vet.App. 128, 138 (1997). Where a current diagnosis of PTSD exists,
the sufficiency of the claimed in‑service stressor is presumed. *Id*. at
144. Nevertheless, credible evidence that the claimed in‑service
stressor actually occurred is also required. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f).

The Board found that \"VA examination reports and clinical treatment
records contain current diagnoses of PTSD.\" R. at 3. It further noted:

\[T\]he medical evidence in the claims folder contains several
references to stressors to which the veteran has claimed he was exposed
during his service in Southeast Asia during the Vietnam Era. Such
evidence, at least by implication, suggests a nexus between the
veteran\'s current disability from PTSD and the claimed in-service
stressors.

R. at 3-4. The Board opined that \"\[t\]he veteran\'s essential problem
is that he lacks a verifiable stressor.\" R. at 5. Indeed, in its
January 7, 2000, Statement of the Case, the RO seems to have limited its
inquiry to the stressor element. R. at 468-69. The Board further
explained:

As indicated previously, the veteran\'s difficulty in satisfying the
requirements for service connection for PTSD arises not with regard to
medical evidence of a clear, current diagnosis of PTSD, nor with regard
to medical evidence of a link between his current symptomatology and his
claimed in-service stressors--the first and third elements required
under 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f), respectively. His difficulty arises with
regard to the second element, verification of the alleged stressors in
Vietnam to which he attributes his current PTSD symptomatology.

R. at 6. As noted above, the Da Nang rocket attacks are the only
in-service stressors alleged by the veteran and considered by the Board
below that the Court will review, because the veteran has abandoned the
other alleged stressor arguments asserted before the Board. For a
stressor to be sufficient for PTSD, the stressor must meet two
requirements:

\(1\) A person must have been \"exposed to a traumatic event\" in which
\"the person experienced, witnessed, or was confronted with an event or
events that involved actual or a threatened death or serious injury, or
a threat to the physical integrity of self or others\" and (2) \"the
person\'s response \[must have\] involved intense fear, helplessness, or
horror.\"

*Cohen*, 10 Vet.App. at 141 (quoting [Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
of Mental Disorders]{.smallcaps} 32 (4th ed. 1994)).

The veteran does not assert that his exposure to rocket attacks is
combat related. If the claimed stressor for PTSD is not combat related,
its occurrence must be corroborated by credible supporting evidence.
*Id.* at 142. This Court has held that \"\'\[t\]here is nothing in the
statute or the regulations which provides that corroboration must, and
can only, be found in the service records.\'\" *Dizoglio v. Brown*, 9
Vet.App. 163, 166 (1996) (quoting *Doran v. Brown*, 6 Vet.App. 283, 289
(1994)). However, when a claim for PTSD is based on a noncombat
stressor, \"the noncombat veteran\'s testimony alone is insufficient
proof of a stressor.\" *Moreau v. Brown*, 9 Vet.App. 389, 396 (1996).
\"\[C\]redible supporting evidence of the actual occurrence of an
in‑service stressor cannot consist solely of after‑the‑fact medical
nexus evidence.\" *Id*.

The veteran argues that the Board decision should be reversed because
the Board\'s factual determination that the independent evidence of
record does not corroborate the veteran\'s alleged stressor is clearly
erroneous. Mot. at 1. The veteran described the occurrence of Da Nang
rocket attacks as follows:

> In February 1967, the first 144mm rockets were fired at Da Nang
> Airbase. Other attacks occurred in \[1967 and 1968\]. Incoming rounds
> would whistle then stop and you knew they were coming down but not
> where they would hit. This is traumatic in itself. A\[n\] F-4 Phantom
> coming in to land would back off their engines which for a time
> sounded like incoming rounds to me. I awoke many times in total fear,
> sat up and waited for the explosions. These events so traumatized me
> that I have taken medications for insomnia and emotional/mental
> problems for 32 years.

R. at 366. Records for the veteran\'s unit contain the following
descriptions of rocket attacks that occurred while the veteran was
stationed at Da Nang:

> [3 Jan 1968.]{.underline} At approximately 0400 hours the Da Nang Air
> Base came under attack from NVA Forces. Three (3) 530B Fire Trucks and
> one (1) 5500 gallon Water Tanker was dispatched to VMF-122 Squadron to
> fight fire in a Hangar which was hit by an enemy Rocket.
>
> [30 Jan 1968,]{.underline} At approximately 0325 hours, the Da Nang
> Air Base came under attack from NVA Forces. Enemy rockets hit POL dump
> and started a large JP-4 fuel blaze, Rockets also hit VMA-AW-242 and
> VMF-122 flight line starting numerous fires also hit was the Air Force
> Flare dump.

R. at 454-55. The unit records corroborate the veteran\'s assertion that
enemy rocket attacks occurred during the time period he was stationed at
Da Nang.

The Board determined:

> It is entirely possible that the veteran was, in fact, exposed to the
> stressors he has alleged. Nonetheless, the law and regulations require
> independent verification of the claimed stressors. The veteran\'s
> alleged stressors have not been corroborated by independent evidence,
> nor has he provided specific, detailed information regarding these
> events that could permit corroboration of the incidents to which he
> attributes his PTSD symptomatology. . . . As for the rocket attacks,
> there is no way, based on the information provided by the veteran, to
> corroborate that he was anywhere near the targets of such attacks, or
> was otherwise threatened thereby.

R. at 9-10.

The Board decision neglected to cite *Suozzi v. Brown*, 10 Vet.App. 307
(1997), as controlling precedent. Based on *Suozzi*, we conclude that
the Board erroneously insisted that there be corroboration of the
veteran\'s personal participation. In *Suozzi*, the Court rejected such
a narrow definition for corroboration and instructed that \"\[t\]he
Secretary, in insisting that there be corroboration of every detail
including the appellant\'s personal participation . . . , defines
\'corroboration\' far too narrowly. The veteran has offered new and
independent evidence of stressful events and that evidence implies his
personal exposure.\" *Id.* at 311.

The facts in this case are similar to those in *Suozzi.* The veteran in
this instance has offered independent evidence of the occurrence of a
stressful event, and the evidence implies his personal exposure. In
*Suozzi*, the veteran submitted radio logs of transcripts describing the
events his company endured, which were independent descriptions of some
of the stressors he described. He also submitted a copy of the morning
report, referenced in his statement, that tended to substantiate his
account of events. *Id.* at 310. Similarly, the veteran in this case
submitted his unit log and unit records, (R. at 369, 454-55),
independent descriptions of rocket attacks his unit experienced when he
was stationed at Da Nang, which would, when viewed in the light most
favorable to the veteran, objectively corroborate his claim of having
experienced rocket attacks*.* R. at 369, 454-55. Although the unit
records do not specifically state that the veteran was present during
the rocket attacks, the fact that he was stationed with a unit that was
present while such attacks occurred would strongly suggest that he was,
in fact, exposed to the attacks. *Suozzi* makes clear that corroboration
of every detail is not required. The Board\'s finding that \"\[a\]s for
the rocket attacks, there is no way\[,\] based on the information
provided by the veteran, to corroborate that he was anywhere near the
targets of such attacks, or was otherwise threatened thereby\", (R. at
10), appears to suggest that the veteran should have proven his physical
proximity to, or firsthand experience with, the attacks. His presence
with his unit at the time such attacks occurred corroborates his
statement that he experienced such attacks personally. The Court notes
that 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f) only requires, as to stressor corroboration,
\"credible supporting evidence\" that the claimed in-service stressor
occurred. The veteran\'s unit records are clearly credible evidence that
the rocket attacks that the veteran alleges, did in fact, occur.

Factual findings by the Board will not be overturned by this Court
unless they are \"clearly erroneous.\" 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a)(4); *see
Gilbert v. Derwinski*, 1 Vet.App. 49, 53 (1990). Under the \"clearly
erroneous" standard, \"if there is a \'plausible\' basis in the record
for the factual determinations of the BVA, even if this Court might not
have reached the same factual determinations, \[the Court\] cannot
overturn them.\" *Gilbert,* 1 Vet.App. at 53. \"Reversal is the
appropriate remedy when \'\[t\]here is absolutely no plausible basis\'
for the BVA\'s decision and where that decision \'is clearly erroneous
in light of the *uncontroverted* evidence in appellant\'s favor.\'\"
*Hicks v. Brown*, 8 Vet.App. 417, 422 (1995) (*citing Hersey v.
Derwinski*, 2 Vet.App. 91, 95 (1992)) (emphasis in original). The Court
will reverse the Board\'s decision because the Board erred in
interpreting the corroboration requirement too narrowly in violation of
*Suozzi* by requiring the veteran to corroborate his actual proximity to
and participation in the rocket attacks on Da Nang. Because the Board
neglected to follow *Suozzi*, there is no plausible basis, in light of
the uncontroverted evidence of the veteran\'s exposure to rocket attacks
that is contained in his unit records, for the Board\'s factual
determination that the veteran did not corroborate his alleged
in-service stressor with independent evidence.

As noted above, the Board has conceded that the veteran has a current
diagnosis of PTSD, which establishes the first element for the award of
service connection for PTSD, and that, if the veteran\'s stressors were
verified, they would provide the necessary nexus between the current
diagnosis of PTSD in 1999 and the veteran\'s alleged stressor, which
would establish the third element for service connection. R. at 4.
Because the Board erred in finding that the veteran did not corroborate
his in-service stressor, the second element for service connection is
now established, and therefore all three elements necessary for the
award of service connection for PTSD have been established. On remand
the Board is instructed to grant the veteran\'s claim for service
connection for PTSD and to assign the appropriate rating and effective
date.

**III. CONCLUSION**

After consideration of the veteran\'s motion, the Secretary\'s motion,
and the record on appeal, the Court holds that the Board committed error
warranting reversal when it determined that the veteran did not
corroborate his exposure to rocket attacks while stationed at Da Nang.
Accordingly, the Court will grant the veteran\'s motion and the July 26,
2000, Board decision is REVERSED and the matter is REMANDED for
proceedings consistent with this opinion.