Executive Summary

######## Hazmat Safety & Security

######## Field Operational Test

**[Task 1:]{.smallcaps}**

**[Risk/Threat Assessment]{.smallcaps}**

To

######### Federal Motor Carrier Safety 

######### Administration

######### U.S. Department of Transportation

######### Washington, DC 20590

**In association with Total Security Services**

**International, Inc.**

![](media/image1.png)December 4, 2002

# Executive Summary

*Introduction*

Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the U.S., the
Department of Transportation was asked to identify areas within the
transportation system that were vulnerable to terrorist attack. One
major area of concern identified was the transportation of hazardous
materials (hazmat). The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration is
conducting a field operational test (FOT) to quantify the security costs
and benefits of an operational concept that applies technology and
improved enforcement procedures to hazmat transportation. The FOT will
demonstrate an approach that enhances the safety and security of hazmat
shipments from origin to destination.

As part of the Hazmat FOT, a risk/threat assessment (Task 1) was
conducted to organize the safety and security risks and threats in the
highway transportation of hazardous materials. This report documents
that assessment. It frames the safety and security risks being addressed
by the FOT and is the basis for developing the Concept of Operations
(Task 2). This assessment categorizes the threats and leads to the
prioritization of potential countermeasures.

*Assessment Process*

*Figure 1* illustrates the assessment process developed to conduct this
task. The assessment begins with a look at the broad universe of hazmat
transportation. This universe is extremely varied, encompassing a
diverse set of factors that need to be considered in conducting a
risk/threat assessment, including:

-   Type and characteristics of commodity;

-   Quantity of hazmat in individual shipments;

-   Frequency of hazmat shipments;

-   Type of operation (e.g., bulk and non-bulk, private and for-hire);

-   Routing and length of haul; and

-   Commodity loading and transfer points.

These factors are then considered from two very different perspectives:
intentional vs. unintentional releases. Because the scope of work for
the Hazmat FOT includes consideration of both security [and
safety]{.underline}, both intentional (i.e., terrorist threat) and
unintentional (i.e., accidents and incidents) releases are addressed. As
shown in Figure 1, a greater portion of this effort was focused on
terrorist-based intentional releases, but safety-related unintentional
releases were considered as well.

Figure 1 - Assessment Process Flow

To address intentional releases, general categorizations (called
*reference components*) for shippers, carriers, consignees, and en route
conditions were defined. The definitions for specific reference
components included typical operations and characteristics. Carrier and
en route conditions were grouped together. The reference components used
are:

Shipper: warehouse/reseller, hazmat manufacturer, academic/research
facility, and hazmat waste generator

Consignee: residential consumer, warehouse/reseller, industrial
consumer, construction or mining consumer, academic/research facility,
and waste disposal facility

En Route: rural Interstate, urban Interstate, rural arterial or two-lane
highway, urban arterial, truck stop, rest stop or parking area, weigh
station and border crossing, carrier terminal, and transfer terminal

The primary purpose for defining reference components was to organize,
identify, and represent typical vulnerabilities. Each reference
component was defined not to represent industry best practices related
to security but to reflect the combination of vulnerabilities that can
be readily found throughout industry. A reference component cannot be
deemed typical in aggregate, but individual characteristics are taken
from typical cases. The reference components were developed from
industry knowledge and were confirmed and augmented by visiting
facilities and/or conducting interviews with persons responsible for the
transportation of hazmat.

As Figure 1 shows, the next step in the assessment process was to
identify vulnerabilities for each reference component. The
vulnerabilities were then categorized according to physical security,
information integrity, operations, or environment.

Completing the development process for addressing intentional releases
is the definition of terrorist tactics that would be effective against
hazmat transportation. These tactics are also called attack profiles
(see left side of the flowchart in Figure 1). In this study, a
comprehensive database of threats developed by a member of the Battelle
team, Total Security Services International, Inc. (TSSI), was examined
for those threats relevant to the transportation of hazmat and
specifically to the vulnerabilities identified for the reference
components. Three key threats were identified: theft, interception
(including diversion), and legal exploitation. For simplicity, diversion
is considered a special case of interception and these two are combined
and treated as a single threat. A simple definition of these threats
follows.

*Theft* -- to take control by stealth, deception, or force;

*Interception* -- to release, detonate, or ignite while at or near a
target; and

*Legal exploitation* -- to exploit the system in a "legal" way so as not
to arouse suspicion, for example, to acquire hazmat by commercial
transaction or diversion using "insiders."

In addition, the two major types of transportation operations,
bulk/truckload and less-than-truckload (LTL) shipments, are considered
in developing attack profiles. The three threat types are then applied
against each of the two operational types to develop six different
attack profiles that address the intentional use of hazmat as a weapon.

Safety concerns are also addressed at this stage by consideration of
unintentional releases from accidents or incidents (see the right side
of the flowchart in Figure 1). Considerable prior work has addressed
this issue from a purely risk perspective and the results from the most
recent study for the FMCSA were included.

The attack profiles are then considered for different types of hazardous
materials. The DOT hazard classifications were reviewed from a
"weapons-based" perspective and new threat-based material categories
were developed (see middle of Figure 1). When considering the use of
hazmat as a weapon, additional distinctions are made between materials
in the same USDOT hazard class. For example, gases with a
toxic-by-inhalation (TIH) hazard are all in a single USDOT hazard class.
These TIH materials include those that are heavier than air (HTA) and
those that are lighter than air (LTA). To a terrorist, these materials
are distinctly different in their weapons potential and in how they
would be used against a target (i.e., the tactics that would be used).
An HTA TIH gas might be directed into an enclosed underground area such
as a subway station; whereas, an LTA TIH gas might best be released over
a larger, heavily populated area or into a building's air intake. From
these considerations, a slightly revised categorization of hazmat was
developed that considered weapons-based distinctions.

*Consequence Analysis*

A typical security-based vulnerability analysis involves development of
exposure values based on specific weapons and tactics. This study
assumes worst-case outcomes for materials, defines reference components
with specific vulnerabilities that can be exploited, and constructs
attack profiles that can be used as the basis for defining test
scenarios.

Further adaptation was necessary to address targets, which are
ordinarily the focus of the analysis (such as critical facilities,
sporting events, or monuments). To address the general use of hazmat as
a weapon, it was necessary to conceptualize an ideal target for each
material for each defined attack profile, much as a terrorist would.
These idealized targets are not described in this report, as the
information would provide a detailed blueprint for target
identification, evaluation, and exploitation.

For the intentional release-based attack profiles, two sets of
worst-case, material-specific consequence estimates were developed, one
for bulk/truckload and one for LTL, primarily based on the different
material quantities associated with each of these two operational types.
It is assumed that the release of the material being transported will
result in worst-case consequences, which are not dependent on which
specific tactic is used. The only exception to this is for interception,
in which the terrorist cannot precisely place the hazmat prior to
release, detonation, or ignition; therefore, consequences for these
attacks would typically be lower than for theft or legal exploitation.
Consequences estimates include deaths, injuries, and property damage and
were developed from accident scenarios and expert judgment. They are
designed to be order-of-magnitude estimates and to be relative rather
than absolute.

For the unintentional releases, the results of the FMCSA study[^1] were
applied to an abbreviated list of the threat-based material
classifications to allow comparisons. These consequences were expressed
on an expected annual basis rather than on a single-incident, worst-case
basis to reflect the nature of the risk assessment used to determine
them. The consequences for unintentional releases also include other
costs such as delay and evacuation costs.

The consequence values for both intentional and unintentional releases
include a cost-equivalent for fatalities and injuries of \$3,000,000 and
\$215,000, respectively. These values were selected based on previous
USDOT hazmat impact studies. Rankings are sensitive to the total
economic impact value of which these are a component in the
calculations. These costs represent those that are recognized by the
USDOT for the purpose of analytical studies such as this one. A series
of tables are presented with estimated consequences resulting from each
combination of attack profiles (e.g., theft involving bulk/truckload
operations) and each of the 18 threat-based material categories.

*Result of Risk/Threat Assessment Task: Threat and Material Rankings*

The final step in the assessment process is to use the consequence
estimates to develop a ranking of threat and material categories. In
order to rank the various threat-based attack profiles against each
other, two different sets of weights are applied to the consequence
estimates. These weights are designed to reflect the attractiveness to a
terrorist of (a) a specific attack profile relative to others and (b) a
specific material for a specific attack profile. These weights take into
account two sets of criteria: (1) the FBI criteria, which are focused on
the attractiveness of a target and include the potential for mass
casualties, significant economic damage, extensive psychological trauma,
and high symbolic value; and (2) TSSI-developed criteria, which are
focused on the attractiveness of the set of operations that a terrorist
would need to employ to mount a successfully attack. The ranking
provides an understanding of how the different attack profiles relate to
each other and make it possible to prioritize efforts to address the
specific vulnerabilities that would allow terrorists to effectively
carry them out.

In addition to ranking the attack profiles themselves, it is possible to
rank the threat-based material categories across all attack profiles
based on their estimated consequences and weightings. The material
category ranking could be used to apply specific countermeasures to the
top-ranked categories.

It is these rankings (and the specific vulnerabilities that were
identified for each reference component) that are provided as input to
Task 2, the Concept of Operations. This will become an important
consideration in defining operational scenarios and associated
countermeasures that will be selected for testing during the field
operational test. This development of test scenarios will be done during
Task 2.

Without a sufficiently large historical record of terrorist events
exploiting hazmat, it is impossible to predict the likelihood of any
specific type of incident. It is instructive, however, to compare the
expected annual consequences of unintentional releases to the relatively
large theoretical consequences of just one terrorist incident.

The overall FOT, and the companion cost-benefit analysis, will address
security, safety, and efficiency within the same context. It is likely
that some protective measures applied to security vulnerabilities will
provide benefits in safety and efficiency and these additional benefits
will facilitate the adoption of these protective measures by industry.

[^1]: *Comparative Risks of Hazardous Materials and Non-hazardous
    Materials Truck Shipment Accidents/Incidents: Final Report*, March
    2001, prepared for FMCSA by Battelle