<table>
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<col style="width: 5%" />
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<thead>
<tr class="header">
<th colspan="8"><h1 id="payload-flight-hazard-report">PAYLOAD FLIGHT
HAZARD REPORT</h1></th>
<th>a. NO:</th>
<th colspan="3">AMS-02-F11</th>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<th colspan="2">b. PAYLOAD</th>
<th colspan="6">Alpha Magnetic Spectrometer-02 (AMS-02)</th>
<th>c. PHASE:</th>
<th colspan="3">II</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr class="odd">
<td colspan="2">d. SUBSYSTEM:</td>
<td colspan="3">Structural, Mechanical</td>
<td>e. HAZARD GROUP:</td>
<td colspan="2">Impact, Collision</td>
<td>f. DATE:</td>
<td colspan="3">May 25, 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<td colspan="2" rowspan="2">g. HAZARD TITLE:</td>
<td colspan="6" rowspan="2">Mechanism Failure</td>
<td>i. HAZARD</td>
<td colspan="2">CATASTROPHIC</td>
<td><strong>X</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td>CATEGORY:</td>
<td colspan="2">CRITICAL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<td colspan="4">h. APPLICABLE SAFETY REQUIREMENTS:</td>
<td colspan="8">NSTS 1700.7B and ISS Addendum, 200.1b, 200.2, 200.3</td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td colspan="4">j. DESCRIPTION OF HAZARD:</td>
<td colspan="8"><p>AMS-02 relies on a number of mechanisms to
successfully complete the planned mission profile. Failure of these
mechanisms could limit the AMS-02’s ability to complete its mission.
Additionally failure of these mechanisms could place the AMS-02 in
conditions that pose a risk of inadequate structural load conditions or
damage to vehicle systems.</p>
<p>The AMS-02 is complying with ICD requirements for Shuttle and ISS
interfaces and is subject to integrated hazard analyses performed by the
applicable Programs.</p></td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<td>k. CAUSES</td>
<td colspan="11" rowspan="2"><blockquote>
<p>1. Inability to Open/Close Orbiter Payload Retention Latch Assembly
(PRLA)/ Keel Latch.</p>
<p>2. Inability to Operate the ROEU.</p>
<p>3. Improper Installation of Grapple Fixtures.</p>
<p>4. Inability to fully capture/release the Payload Attach System,
including the UMA.</p>
<p>5. Inadvertent release of Payload Attach System EVA Release
Mechanism.</p>
<p>6. Inability to Secure ROEU Support Structure.</p>
</blockquote></td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td><em>(list)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<td colspan="12"></td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td colspan="3">o. APPROVAL</td>
<td colspan="4">PAYLOAD ORGANIZATION</td>
<td colspan="5">SSP/ISS</td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<td colspan="3">PHASE I</td>
<td colspan="4"></td>
<td colspan="5"></td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td colspan="3">PHASE II</td>
<td colspan="4"></td>
<td colspan="5"></td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<td colspan="3">PHASE III</td>
<td colspan="4"></td>
<td colspan="5"></td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td colspan="12"></td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<td colspan="10">l. HAZARD CONTROL (CONTROL), m. SAFETY VERIFICATION
METHODS (SVM), n. STATUS OF VERIFICATIONS (STATUS)</td>
<td colspan="2">OPS CONTROL</td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td colspan="10">1. CAUSE: Inability to Open/Close Orbiter Payload
Retention Latch Assembly (PRLA).</td>
<td colspan="2"></td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<td colspan="10"><p>1.1 CONTROL: The AMS-02 interface to the PRLAs, the
Trunnions, Scuff Plates and keel pin are constructed and installed in
accordance with NSTS 21000-IDD-ISS. Trunnions and keel pin are
constructed of custom 455 stainless steel and the scuff plates are
constructed of aluminum 7050. Integrated hazard analysis to be performed
by Shuttle Program to establish fault tolerance of integrated cargo to
establish secured PRLA conditions for a contingency return or assure
that a complete release of the AMS-02.</p>
<p>1.1.1 SVM: Review of design</p>
<p>1.1.2 SVM: Inspection of as built hardware</p>
<p>1.1.3 SVM: AMS-02 Installation into Orbiter</p>
<p>1.1.4 SVM: Closure when accepted by cargo integration organization
for integrated hazard analysis.</p>
<p>1.1.1 STATUS: Open</p>
<p>1.1.2 STATUS: Open</p>
<p>1.1.3 STATUS: Open</p>
<p>1.1.4 STATUS: Open</p></td>
<td colspan="2"></td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td colspan="10"><p>1.2 CONTROL: In the event that one or more Orbiter
PRLA is unable to open during the AMS-02 deploy sequence, the AMS-02 is
designed to be compatible with an unscheduled EVA to open/close the
PRLAs. AMS-02 hazard report AMS-02-F14 indicates the constraints to EVA
activities; none of these no touch/keep out zones will impact the
ability of the crew to access the PRLAs for EVA operations. The
unscheduled EVA to open/close PRLA is a standardized EVA operation for
the Shuttle, no unique operations are required for the AMS-02.</p>
<p>1.2.1 SVM: Review of design.</p>
<p>1.2.2 SVM: Inspection of as built hardware.</p>
<p>1.2.1 STATUS: Open</p>
<p>1.2.2 STATUS: Open</p></td>
<td colspan="2"></td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<td colspan="10"><p>1.3 CONTROL: The AMS-02 is safe to return only with
all PRLAs and the Active Keel (latch) Assembly closed. A restriction
rule (by OCAD) will be in place that the AMS-02 can only return with
this safe configuration. In the event that any latches cannot be closed
either electrically or by EVA, the AMS-02 will have to be returned to be
berthed upon the ISS until an Orbiter with working latches is available
to return the AMS-02.</p>
<p>1.3.1 SVM: SVM: Structural Analysis to confirm safe return
configuration of PRLA and KEEL latches.</p>
<p>1.3.2 SVM: Formal acceptance of safety criteria for safety return
configuration by MOD by way of OCAD acceptance.</p>
<p>1.3.1 STATUS: Open</p>
<p>1.3.2 STATUS: Open</p></td>
<td colspan="2">S</td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td colspan="10">NOTE: Nominal generic flight rules for PRLA/AKA
operations (A10-281) are all applicable for the AMS-02.</td>
<td colspan="2"></td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<td colspan="10">2. CAUSE: Inability to Operate the ROEU.</td>
<td colspan="2"></td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td colspan="10"><p>2.1 CONTROL: In the event that the ROEU fails to
separate, the AMS-02 can provide access and all required EVA interfaces
to support an unscheduled EVA to access the ROEU EVA interfaces to
either disengage or reengage the ROEU.</p>
<p>2.1.1 SVM: Review of Design.</p>
<p>2.1.2 SVM: Inspection of as built hardware.</p>
<p>2.1.1 STATUS: Open</p>
<p>2.1.2 STATUS: Open</p></td>
<td colspan="2"></td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<td colspan="10"><p>2.2 CONTROL: The inability to reattach the ROEU will
not create a scenario where a hazardous condition will exist for the
AMS-02 or the Orbiter, however there is a damage potential for AMS-02
scientific hardware that will preclude its reuse (Mission Success Only).
If possible the use of an unscheduled EVA to reattach the ROEU is
encouraged, but not required.</p>
<p>2.2.1 SVM: Review of design to confirm no safety impact to loss of
power and communication for return configuration.</p>
<p>2.2.1 STATUS: Open</p></td>
<td colspan="2"></td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td colspan="10"><p>2.3 CONTROL: The installation of the AMS-02 passive
half of the ROEU is designed to be compatible with the requirements of
NSTS 21000-IDD-ISS for alignment, strength and deflection.</p>
<p>2.3.1 SVM: Review of design.</p>
<p>2.3.2 SVM: Inspection of as built hardware.</p>
<p>2.3.3 SVM: Structural Analysis.</p>
<p>2.3.1 STATUS: Open</p>
<p>2.3.2 STATUS: Open</p>
<p>2.3.3 STATUS: Open</p></td>
<td colspan="2"></td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<td colspan="10">3. CAUSE: Improper Installation of Grapple
Fixtures.</td>
<td colspan="2"></td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td colspan="10"><p>3.1 CONTROL: Grapple fixtures are located and
mounted in accordance with NSTS 21000-IDD-ISS for clearances, mass, CG
offset and visibility. Grapple fixture locations have been selected to
facilitate the exchange of the AMS-02 between SRMS and SSRMS and SSRMS
berthing activities.</p>
<p>3.1.1 SVM: Review of design.</p>
<p>3.1.2 SVM: Inspection of as-built hardware.</p>
<p>3.1.1 STATUS: Open</p>
<p>3.1.2 STATUS: Open</p></td>
<td colspan="2"></td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<td colspan="10">4. CAUSE: Inability to fully capture/release the
Payload Attach System, including the UMA.</td>
<td colspan="2"></td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td colspan="10"><p>4.1 CONTROL: The AMS-02 passive half of the Payload
Attach System (PAS), including the UMA interface has been built to
comply with the requirement of SSP57213 (AMS-02 to ISS ICD) and through
the ICD, SSP 57003 and SSP 57004.</p>
<p>4.1.1 SVM: Review of design.</p>
<p>4.1.2 SVM: Inspection of as-built hardware.</p>
<p>4.1.3 SVM: AMS-02 PAS interface testing between flight Passive
(AMS-02) and flight Active (ISS) components.</p>
<p>4.1.4 SVM: UMA electrical Connectors verified to be mechanically and
electrically compatible across the UMA interface.</p>
<p>4.1.5 SVM: AMS-02 will be tested prior to installation into the
Orbiter on the Active Common Attach System Simulator (ACASS) to confirm
proper mating and interface.</p>
<p>4.1.1 STATUS: Closed. Memo ESCG-4390-06-SP-MEMO-0001, “Mechanical
Design of the Payload Attach System (PAS)”, Dated 8 January, 2006 from
AMS-02 Chief Engineer.</p>
<p>4.1.2 STATUS: Closed. Memo ESCG-4390-06-SP-MEMO-0003, “Quality
Inspection of the Payload Attach System” dated 03 March 2006, from
AMS-02 Chief Engineer Chris Tutt.</p>
<p>4.1.3 STATUS: Closed. On March 10-11, 2003, PAS was placed in
position on S3 truss (flight) and capture claw was fully closed and
reopened three times. All mechanical interfaces operated successfully.
Closure Reference Memorandum ESCG-4390-05-SP-MEMO-0012, “Functional
Testing of the Payload Attach System (PAS)”, dated 28 December 2005 from
AMS-02 Chief Engineer Chris Tutt.</p>
<p>4.1.4 STATUS: Open</p>
<p>4.1.5 STATUS: Open</p></td>
<td colspan="2"></td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<td colspan="10"><p>4.2 CONTROL: The AMS-02 passive interface to the
Payload Attach System includes an EVA release mechanism capable of
releasing the stored energy of the maximum preload of 6430 lbs and
removing the capture bar to release the AMS-02 from the ISS. EVA
operated, screw driven ramps release the preload created by the capture
of the Passive PAS capture bar. Once the loads are released, an EVA
release bar allows for the extraction of the capture bar from the Active
PAS.</p>
<p>4.2.1 SVM: Review of Design.</p>
<p>4.2.2 SVM: Inspection of as-built hardware.</p>
<p>4.2.3 SVM: Functional testing of the EVA Release mechanism.</p>
<p>4.2.1 STATUS: Closed. Memo ESCG-4390-06-SP-MEMO-0001, “Mechanical
Design of the Payload Attach System (PAS)”, Dated 8 January, 2006 from
AMS-02 Chief Engineer.</p>
<p>4.2.2 STATUS: Closed. Memo ESCG-4390-06-SP-MEMO-0003, “Quality
Inspection of the Payload Attach System” dated 03 March 2006, from
AMS-02 Chief Engineer Chris Tutt.</p>
<p>4.2.3 STATUS: Closed. On February 12-14, 2003, the PAS capture bar
release mechanism was successfully used to release the loaded PAS as
part of the general PAS qualification testing. On March 10-11, 2003, the
PAS was placed in position on S3 truss (flight) with the capture claw
fully closed and the capture bar mechanism was also successfully used to
release the loaded PAS. Closure Reference Memorandum
ESCG-4390-05-SP-MEMO-0012, “Functional Testing of the Payload Attach
System (PAS)”, dated 28 December 2005 from AMS-02 Chief Engineer Chris
Tutt.</p></td>
<td colspan="2"></td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td colspan="10"><p>4.3 CONTROL: To assure that the appropriate preload
is present when the AMS-02 is interfaced with the active PAS, a travel
limiting screw is adjusted prior to flight to provide the appropriate
placement of the capture bar, utilizing the 10° ramp to raise and lower
the capture bar. When positioned correctly the capture position of the
latch and the required displacement of the bar generated the preload.
This travel limiter (with two forms of backout prevention (locking nut
and locking insert with preload torque) allows for the EVA crew to
readily replace the capture bar once it is removed and make the passive
PAS of the AMS-02 capable of being installed in a functioning active
PAS.</p>
<p>4.3.1 SVM: Review of Design</p>
<p>4.3.2 SVM: Inspection of as built hardware. (MIP)</p>
<p>4.3.3 SVM: Functional testing of preload set travel limiter.</p>
<p>4.3.4 SVM: Final setting/check of preload position of latching
bar.</p>
<p>4.3.1 STATUS: Closed. Memo ESCG-4390-06-SP-MEMO-0001, “Mechanical
Design of the Payload Attach System (PAS)”, Dated 8 January, 2006 from
AMS-02 Chief Engineer.</p>
<p>4.3.2 STATUS: Closed. Memo ESCG-4390-06-SP-MEMO-0003, “Quality
Inspection of the Payload Attach System” dated 03 March 2006, from
AMS-02 Chief Engineer Chris Tutt.</p>
<p>4.3.3 STATUS: Closed. During integration testing with S3 Truss
February 12-14, 2003 and March 10-11, 2003 travel limiters were
confirmed. Closure Reference Memorandum ESCG-4390-05-SP-MEMO-0012,
“Functional Testing of the Payload Attach System (PAS)”, dated 28
December</p>
<p>4.3.4 STATUS: Open</p></td>
<td colspan="2"></td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<td colspan="10">5. CAUSE: Inadvertent release of Payload Attach System
EVA Release Mechanism.</td>
<td colspan="2"></td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td colspan="10"><p>5.1 CONTROL: To release the AMS-02 from the ISS PAS
the EVA Releasable Capture Bar must be withdrawn from the latched PAS
mechanism. Once latched, the preload generated by the capture event and
the design of the AMS-02 is 5650 lbs nominal/6430 lbs maximum to prevent
gapping of the AMS-02. To relieve this load, two independent load relief
devices must be operated to drive apart two wedges. The sliding of these
wedges apart releases the energy of the interface and lowers the guides
through which the capture bar runs. The capture bar cannot be extracted
due to interference with the alignment brackets that lock the capture
bar in place until the bar is lowered by each of the load relief
devices. Each EVA Load Release Screws have a separate spring operated
lock to preclude the 7/16<sup>th</sup> inch EVA bolt head from turning
until depressed by the EVA tool.</p>
<p>Thus to release the AMS-02 from the PAS by fault, the following must
occur:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Failure of first EVA Load Release Screw locking
mechanism</p></li>
<li><p>Fault operation of first EVA Load Release Screw and wedges to
release the 5650 lb (nominal) preload and lower the guides</p></li>
<li><p>Failure of second EVA Load Release Screw locking
mechanism</p></li>
<li><p>Fault operation of second EVA Load Release Screw and wedges to
release the 5650 lb (nominal) preload and lower the guides</p></li>
<li><p>Fault extraction of the EVA Releasable Capture Bar from PAS
latch.</p></li>
</ul>
<p>5.1.1 SVM: Review of Design.</p>
<p>5.1.2 SVM: Inspection of as built hardware.</p>
<p>5.1.3 SVM: Functional testing of EVA Release Mechanism,</p>
<p>5.1.4 SVM: Final setting/check of travel limiter for release
position.</p>
<p>5.1.1 STATUS: Closed. Memo ESCG-4390-06-SP-MEMO-0001, “Mechanical
Design of the Payload Attach System (PAS)”, Dated 8 January, 2006 from
AMS-02 Chief Engineer.</p>
<p>5.1.2 STATUS: Closed. Memo ESCG-4390-06-SP-MEMO-0003, “Quality
Inspection of the Payload Attach System” dated 03 March 2006, from
AMS-02 Chief Engineer Chris Tutt.</p>
<p>5.1.3 STATUS: Closed. On February 12-14, 2003, the PAS capture bar
release mechanism was successfully used to release the loaded PAS as
part of the general PAS qualification testing. On March 10-11, 2003, the
PAS was placed in position on S3 truss (flight) with the capture claw
fully closed and the capture bar mechanism was also successfully used to
release the loaded PAS. Closure Reference Memorandum
ESCG-4390-05-SP-MEMO-0012, “Functional Testing of the Payload Attach
System (PAS)”, dated 28 December 2005 from AMS-02 Chief Engineer Chris
Tutt.</p>
<p>5.1.4 STATUS: Open. Initial testing of travel limit positions
occurred during PAS integration testing with S3 Truss.</p></td>
<td colspan="2"></td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<td colspan="10"><p>5.2 CONTROL: The AMS-02 will be restrained by the
SSRMS prior to any EVA operations to release the PAS interface to
preclude being a released, uncontrolled mass.</p>
<p>5.2.1 SVM: Acceptance of AMS-02 restrained by SSRMS requirement by
MOD through an OCAD.</p>
<p>5.2.1 STATUS: Open</p></td>
<td colspan="2">I</td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td colspan="10"><p>5.3 CONTROL: The Capture Bar is design to preclude a
complete release of the bar by a physical interference to complete
extraction from the support structure. If not reinstalled and put to
“preload” position, the capture bar design is such to allow for safe
return without release.</p>
<p>5.3.1 SVM: Review of design.</p>
<p>5.3.2 SVM: Inspection of as built hardware.</p>
<p>5.3.3 SVM: Structural analysis of “released” position of capture bar
without return to “preload” position.</p>
<p>5.3.1 STATUS: Closed. Memo ESCG-4390-06-SP-MEMO-0001, “Mechanical
Design of the Payload Attach System (PAS)”, Dated 8 January, 2006 from
AMS-02 Chief Engineer.</p>
<p>5.3.2 STATUS: Closed. Memo ESCG-4390-06-SP-MEMO-0003, “Quality
Inspection of the Payload Attach System” dated 03 March 2006, from
AMS-02 Chief Engineer Chris Tutt.</p>
<p>5.3.3 STATUS: Open</p></td>
<td colspan="2"></td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<td colspan="10"><p>5.4 CONTROL: The AMS-02 will maintain the SSP 57003
required stiffness of the AMS-02 to ISS interface by accurately
positioning the AMS-02 PAS Capture Bar during ground processing prior to
flight. Preflight testing has established the proper spring constant
required to exceed the required stiffness and the AMS-02 PAS is
configured specifically to provide this stiffness capability. When the
capture bar is lowered, this stiffness is reduced. The AMS-02 is
equipped with anti-rotation devices to preclude the wedge drive screws
from backing out. Although structurally isolated from significant
vibrational and acoustic loading, the design of the anti-rotation device
was analyzed to establish its sensitivity to directly applied random
vibrational loads. The natural frequency of the anti-rotation device,
based on the spring constant of the design, is 36.6 Hz. The design of
the anti-rotation device requires a compressive force of 4.88 lbs. A
maximum acceleration of the induced random vibrations at 36.6 Hz
generates a acceleration of 4.79g, resulting in an applied force of 0.63
lbs to the anti-rotation device. Using the maximum Power Spectral
Density level anywhere (well outside what is possible for this
equipment), the maximum applied force of 1.58 lb is calculated (again
assuming direct application of the loads). This is a factor of three
less than that required to depress the anti-rotation device even if the
structure of the AMS-02 did not attenuate the transmission of these
random loads to the mechanisms. A broken spring analysis has shown that
the spring (with coil lost) is capable of providing sufficient force to
retain the anti-rotation function making it equivalent of single fault
tolerant)</p>
<p>NOTE: Given that the design of the anti-rotation device did not
preclude the rotation, the drive screws have a measured minimum running
torque of 3 in-lbs that would resist rotation and a minimum “break”
torque of 5 in-lbs. Assuming that the anti-rotation devices can be
overcome or experience failure, and the rotation of the drive shafts
were to occur, to lose the preload of the AMS-02 passive PAS to the ISS
active PAS, the shafts driving the wedges that support the capture bar
must rotate through a minimum of 12.7 rotations. Given that the exposure
to a vibration load (again ignoring the attenuation of the AMS-02
structure that essentially makes the forces at the anti-rotation
mechanism insignificant) lasts for approximately 20 seconds, the
statistical probability to rotate the shafts sufficiently during launch
to reposition the capture bar to reduce the stiffness/preload to below
the SSP 57003 allowable is 10<sup>38</sup> to 1 against or 5.877 x
10<sup>-39</sup> chance.</p>
<p>No mechanism for removal of the preload has been identified as
credible for any other mission phase.</p>
<p>5.4.1 SVM: Preflight Inspection for proper configuration of preload
mechanism.</p>
<p>5.4.2 SVM: Analysis of anti-rotation devices on EVA Release Mechanism
of AMS-02 PAS.</p>
<p>5.4.3 SVM: Testing of EVA Release Mechanism for Breaking Torque and
Running Torque.</p>
<p>5.4.4 SVM: Analysis of AMS-02 Preload to rotation of EVA Release
Mechanism drives.</p>
<p>5.4.5 SVM: Approval of ISS Mechanism Working Group/Mechanical Systems
Working Group.</p>
<p>5.4.6 SVM: Preflight Inspection of Anti-Rotation Devices to assure
Anti-Rotation Device is properly engaged for launch.</p>
<p>5.4.7 SVM: Post testing inspection to assure anti-rotation device has
not worn during any testing/operational uses.</p>
<p>5.4.8 SVM: Broken Spring Analysis</p>
<p>5.4.1 STATUS: Open</p>
<p>5.4.2 STATUS: Closed. Memo ESCG-4390-06-SP-MEMO-0017</p>
<p>5.4.3 STATUS: Open. Activity Complete, awaiting documentation</p>
<p>5.4.4 STATUS: Open. Activity Complete, awaiting documentation</p>
<p>5.4.5 STATUS: Open</p>
<p>5.4.6 STATUS: Open</p>
<p>5.4.7 STATUS: Open</p></td>
<td colspan="2"></td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td colspan="10">Note: ISS requirements imposed on the AMS-02 and other
external payloads to attach to the PAS only require that a means of EVA
release from the PAS be provided, not that the release be multiply fault
tolerant. The AMS-02 PAS EVA Release mechanism is designed to be
zero-fault tolerant in its operation and not represent a multiple fault
tolerant approach through out design for minimum risk.</td>
<td colspan="2"></td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<td colspan="10">6. CAUSE: Inability to Secure ROEU Support
Structure.</td>
<td colspan="2"><mark></mark></td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td colspan="10">Note: The AMS-02 EVA operation to rotate the ROEU
Support Structure to maximize the distance between the AMS-02 and the
adjacent PAS payload envelope is a contingency operation that will only
be performed if required by the specific installation of an adjacent
payload or ISS External Logistics Carrier (ELC). With the redesigned ELC
information, the ROEU on the AMS-02 is no longer a driving factor for
clearances.</td>
<td colspan="2"><mark></mark></td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<td colspan="10"><p>6.1 CONTROL: The AMS-02 ROEU Support Structure has
been designed to reduce the protrusion of the ROEU from the SSP 57003,
3.1.3.1.1.1 defined payload envelope. MAGIK Analysis of the extended
(worst case protrusion) of the ROEU from the AMS-02 indicates that there
is no longer an identified contact issue from the ROEU and the worst
case displaced (translation and rotation) SSRMS installation of a full
size payload next to the AMS-02. The ROEU Support Structure folding
mechanism has been design to increase the current margin. As a margin
exists to contact/collision without the folding mechanism being
operated, it has been considered NON-SAFETY CRITICAL for operation.</p>
<p>6.1.1 SVM: Review of Design</p>
<p>6.1.2 SVM: Installation testing of AMS-02 PAS interface on flight
hardware confirming AMS-02 berthing accuracy and by extension,
positional accuracy of the ROEU.</p>
<p>6.1.3.SVM: Geometric Analysis of Installation Process (MAGIK)</p>
<p>6.1.4 SVM: Inspection of as built hardware for AMS-02 Geometry
compliance</p>
<p>6.1.1 STATUS: Open</p>
<p>6.1.2 STATUS: Closed. Tests conducted February 12-14, 2003 and March
10-11, 2003. Test results are discussed in detail in ATA Reports 53013
and 53013A respectively.</p>
<p>6.1.3 STATUS: Closed. Published MAGIK Analysis Action Item #1705
Report dated May 12, 2003</p>
<p>6.1.4 STATUS: Open</p></td>
<td colspan="2"><mark></mark></td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td colspan="10"><p>6.2 CONTROL: Once operated, the AMS-02 ROEU Support
Structure Folding Mechanism is capable of surviving all loads with only
a single fastener (MSWG Approved Dual Action Pip Pins) of two being
installed. The Pip Pins used are Avibank Spec 56789 Double Acting
Ball-Lok (Space) Pin. These EVA compatible pins are design for minimum
risk per MA2-00-057 and are single fault tolerant to inadvertent
operation. Pip pins are secured with tethers to preclude release from
structure. Note: Hard stops exist at each alignment location for the pip
pins to ease installation and not over extend its rotation. The hard
stop is designed to handle all expected nominal and contingency loading
(addressed as part of the structural margins).</p>
<p>6.2.1 SVM: Review of Design</p>
<p>6.2.2 SVM: Structural Analysis of Single Pin Configuration for
subsequent loads.</p>
<p>6.2.3 SVM: Approval of DFMR criteria compliance by JSC/MSWG</p>
<p>6.2.4 SVM: EVA Worksite Analysis for mechanical systems
operability.</p>
<p>6.2.1 STATUS: Open</p>
<p>6.2.2 STATUS: Open</p>
<p>6.2.3 STATUS: Open</p>
<p>6.2.4 STATUS: Open</p></td>
<td colspan="2"></td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<td colspan="10">Notes:</td>
<td colspan="2"></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

  -----------------------------------------------------------------------
  ACRONYMS                           
  ---------------------------------- ------------------------------------
  ACASS -- Active Common Attach Site PAS -- Payload Attach System,
  Simulator                          Payload Attach Site

  AKA -- Active Keel Assembly        PRLA -- Payload Retention Latch
                                     Assembly

  AMS-02 -- Alpha Magnetic           ROEU -- Remotely Operated Electrical
  Spectrometer - 02                  Umbilical

  BCS -- Berthing Camera System      SRMS -- Shuttle Remote Manipulator
                                     System

  DFMR -- Design for Minimum Risk    SSRMS -- Space Station Remote
                                     Manipulator System

  ELC -- External Logistics Carrier  SVM -- Safety Verification Method

  EVA -- Extravehicular Activity     UMA -- Umbilical Mating Assembly

  MSWG -- Mechanical Systems Working 
  Group                              
  -----------------------------------------------------------------------

Mechanisms Associated With the AMS-02

  ------------------------ ------------ ----------------------------------
  **Mechanisms**           **Type**     **Operated by**

  Orbiter PRLA             GFE          Electrical/EVA

  Orbiter Keel Latch       GFE          Electrical

  Orbiter ROEU             GFE          Electrical/EVA

  SRMS Grapple Fixture     GFE          Physical Interface to SRMS, EVA
  (FRGF)                                Release Capable

  SSRMS Grapple Fixture    GFE          Physical Interface to SSRMS, EVA
  (PVGF)                                Release Capable

  Active Payload Attach    ISS          Electrical
  System                   System/GFE   

  EVA Releasable Passive   Payload      Passive interface to ISS. EVA
  Payload Attach System    Hardware     interfaces (two preload relief
                                        interfaces and Capture Bar
                                        retraction)

  UMA Interface            GFE          Electrical, EVA

  AMS-02 ROEU Support      Payload      EVA Crew.
  Structure Folding        Hardware     
  Mechanism                             
  ------------------------ ------------ ----------------------------------

  --------------------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------------------
  ![](media/image1.png){width="4.670138888888889in"   ![](media/image2.png){width="4.436111111111111in"
  height="5.272916666666666in"}                       height="3.2090277777777776in"}

  **ISS Payload Attach Site**                         **ISS Payload Attach Site**
  --------------------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------------------

  --------------------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------------------
  ![](media/image3.png){width="4.591666666666667in"   ![](media/image4.png){width="4.364583333333333in"
  height="4.017361111111111in"}                       height="3.3541666666666665in"}

  **AMS-02 Interface to ISS Payload Attach Site**     **AMS-02 Passive PAS Assembly with EVA Release
                                                      Mechanism**
  --------------------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------------------

  ---------------------------------------------------- -----------------------------------------------------
  ![](media/image5.png){width="7.333333333333333in"    
  height="4.09375in"}                                  

  **AMS-02 Passive Attach System with EVA Release      
  Mechanism**                                          

  ![](media/image6.png){width="8.3875in"               
  height="5.1125in"}                                   

  **AMS-02 Passive Attach Mechanism with EVA Release   
  Mechanism (View from ISS PAS)**                      

  ![](media/image7.png){width="8.599305555555556in"    
  height="3.1972222222222224in"}                       

  **AMS-02 PAS Preload Release Mechanism with EVA      
  Release Screw**                                      

  ![](media/image8.png){width="6.426388888888889in"    
  height="5.978472222222222in"}                        

  **AMS-02 PAS Load Relief Wedge Operation**           

  ![](media/image9.png){width="4.013194444444444in"    
  height="2.5166666666666666in"}                       

  **AMS-02 PAS EVA Release Screw Locking Mechanism**   

  ![](media/image10.png){width="4.509027777777778in"   ![](media/image11.png){width="3.5743055555555556in"
  height="2.8652777777777776in"}                       height="2.548611111111111in"}

  **AMS-02 PAS EVA Screw Interface Design**            **Capture Bar Capture Feature**
  ---------------------------------------------------- -----------------------------------------------------

+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
| ![](media/image12.png){width="6.266666666666667in"                    |
| height="5.334027777777778in"}                                         |
|                                                                       |
| **AMS-02 ROEU Folding Bracket**                                       |
|                                                                       |
| **(Electrical Panel in Old position above the ROEU Bracket, following |
| pictures reflect updated position of electrical panel.)**             |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+

  -----------------------------------------------------------------------
  ![](media/image13.png){width="7.209722222222222in" height="5.7375in"}

  ROEU Folding Bracket with Panel

  ![](media/image14.png){width="7.092361111111111in" height="6.00625in"}

  Alternate View of Extended ROEU Folding Bracket

  ![](media/image15.png){width="7.416666666666667in"
  height="5.795138888888889in"}

  ROEU Folding Bracket in Folded Position

  ![](media/image16.png){width="5.276388888888889in"
  height="5.333333333333333in"}

  Alternate View of Folded ROEU Bracket
  -----------------------------------------------------------------------

+-----------------------------------+---------+------------------------+
|                                   |         |                        |
+-----------------------------------+---------+------------------------+
| **ROEU FOLDING BRACKET -- LAUNCH  |         |                        |
| AND FOLDED POSITION -- EVA        |         |                        |
| COMPATIBLE PIP PINS**             |         |                        |
+-----------------------------------+---------+------------------------+
| ![](media/image17                 | !       |                        |
| .png){width="4.444444444444445in" | [](medi |                        |
| height="3.6798611111111112in"}    | a/image |                        |
|                                   | 18.png) |                        |
|                                   | {width= |                        |
|                                   | "4.4493 |                        |
|                                   | 0555555 |                        |
|                                   | 5555in" |                        |
|                                   | h       |                        |
|                                   | eight=" |                        |
|                                   | 4.43819 |                        |
|                                   | 4444444 |                        |
|                                   | 444in"} |                        |
+-----------------------------------+---------+------------------------+
| **ROEU Folding Bracket Hardstop** |         |                        |
|                                   |         |                        |
| **Old Electrical Panel shown, no  |         |                        |
| tethers shown on Avibank Pip      |         |                        |
| Pins.**                           |         |                        |
+-----------------------------------+---------+------------------------+

  ---------------------------------------------------- ----------------------------------------------------
  ![](media/image19.png){width="5.020138888888889in"   ![](media/image20.png){width="5.020138888888889in"
  height="6.496527777777778in"}                        height="6.496527777777778in"}

  ![](media/image21.png){width="4.541666666666667in"   ![](media/image22.png){width="4.6125in"
  height="5.877777777777778in"}                        height="5.958333333333333in"}

  ![](media/image23.png){width="4.541666666666667in"   ![](media/image24.png){width="4.665972222222222in"
  height="5.877777777777778in"}                        height="6.027083333333334in"}

  ![](media/image25.png){width="4.604166666666667in"   ![](media/image26.png){width="4.6125in"
  height="5.958333333333333in"}                        height="5.958333333333333in"}

  ![](media/image27.png){width="4.418055555555555in"   ![](media/image28.png){width="4.524305555555555in"
  height="5.70625in"}                                  height="5.831944444444445in"}
  ---------------------------------------------------- ----------------------------------------------------