# Sectoral Perspectives on Corruption

######## November 2002

# Cross-Sector Anlysis of Corruption: Summary Report

Stephen Schwenke

The views and interpretations represented in this paper belong solely to
its author and should not be attributed to USAID or to MSI.

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# Contents

# Introduction 2

**1. Sectoral Characteristics of Corruption 3**

**2. Sectoral Interventions 8**

**3. Sectors and USAID's Anti-Corruption Framework 18**

**4. Gaps in the Sectoral Analysis 20**

**5. Conclusions 23**

**Bibliography 24**

# Introduction

During the last quarter of 2002, Management Systems International
engaged nine specialists in major development sectors to prepare papers
on the impact of corruption and viable remedies to the corruption
problem in their sectors. The sectors included agriculture, education,
energy, environment, health, justice, political parties, the private
sector, and public finance. The authors examined their sector's
vulnerabilities to corruption, special characteristics of corruption in
their sector, illustrative case studies of anti-corruption approaches,
and recommendations on how best to control, prevent, and eradicate the
problem.

The basic premise of this study is the belief that governments, civil
society, the business community and donor organizations can address the
problem of corruption more effectively if initiatives are targeted at
the root causes, vulnerabilities, and opportunities characteristic of
particular development sectors. Corruption manifests itself in different
ways depending on the sectoral context. Similarly, remedies must be
sensitive to the distinctive nature of corruption sector-by-sector. Some
anti-corruption strategies may be universally applicable across sectors,
but each sector also may require customized approaches. If this premise
holds true, it would suggest a new approach to USAID programming in the
anti-corruption field, one that fortuitously draws on the Agency's
sectoral strengths.

The conclusions of this summary paper suggest that while there are many
commonalities across sectors in terms of how corruption is manifested,
points of vulnerability, enabling environments and stakeholders, there
are many differences as well. As a result, while the toolkit of
potential interventions is essentially the same across sectors, it makes
sense to consider tailoring programmatic options to the institutional
and legal context of each sector.

This summary paper provides a synthesis and commentary on the findings
and recommendations of all nine authors. In Part One, the
characteristics of corruption are reviewed from a sectoral perspective
to compare and contrast the findings of individual sectoral analyses.
Part Two provides an integrated compilation of the recommended
anti-corruption remedies, both within and across sectors. Part Three
reflects upon how the sectoral analyses fit within USAID's existing
anti-corruption framework. In Part Four, several gaps in the sector
analyses are discussed. Part Five offers some conclusions.

The sector authors include:

1)  Agriculture \~ Rodney Fink, Ph.D.

2)  Education \~ David Chapman, Ph.D.

3)  Energy \~ Matthias Ruth, Ph.D.

4)  Environment \~ Svetlana Winbourne, Ph.D.

5)  Health Sector \~ Taryn Vian, Ph.D.

6)  Justice Sector \~ Mary Noel Pepys, J.D.

7)  Political Parties \~ Verena Blechinger, Ph.D.

8)  Private Sector \~ Russell Webster

9)  Public Finance \~ Michael Schaeffer.

These sector reports are available from the Office of Democracy and
Governance.

# 1. Sectoral Characteristics of Corruption

## How Corruption is Manifested

The presence and character of public sector corruption varies
significantly from sector to sector. On one hand, much of the corruption
encountered in the developing and transitional world is petty in nature
and scale, and causes little public outcry. In the education, health,
and justice sectors, it is common to find school teachers, health care
providers, and police charging extras for services, seeking small
favors, or using public facilities and materials for their own marginal
personal gain. Such activities are often accepted by the public as a
needed corrective to systems that fail to provide a living wage. The
impact may be less benign, however, as these activities set examples
that make it more difficult to draw clear boundaries between right and
wrong.

In sharp contrast, public sector corruption in other sectors is often
large in scale, hidden from view, and controlled by the few most
powerful. In energy, environment, the private sector, and in some
situations in the justice and political parties sectors, deals are made
that result in enormous distortions to the economy to the benefit of the
few, at the cost of the many. These often are based on major
infrastructure projects seeking special market advantage, or securing
access to powerful positions.

In the middle ground between hidden but large scale corruption and
common but petty corruption, a wide variety of forms of corruption exist
that often start small but grow into enormous drains on the economy. In
the energy sector, massive misuse of meter payment systems resulting in
the dramatic loss of sales from energy production (e.g. in Bangladesh
one half of the electricity supplied by the Power Development Board ends
up as system losses through mismanagement and falsified meter readings)
is echoed in the political party system, as vote buying undermines the
democratic process. All sectors have examples in this middle ground.

The elites pursue their interests in this middle ground of corruption,
where they benefit from advantageous treatment and favored access to
scarce resources. For example in agriculture, only the well connected
are able to offer inducements to government officials to get access to
the best land, to irrigation infrastructure, and to preferential credit
terms. The elites arrange special arrangements to shelter themselves
from taxes, to avoid legal sanctions, and to obtain desirable positions
within government institutions.

Corrupt government officials also find ample opportunities in the middle
ground, where corruption is far from petty but where their
"arrangements" are far less discreet. These officials in all public
sectors use their positions to extract a wide range of payments from the
public, from inducements to grading crop quality at a higher level,
claiming salaries for "ghost teachers," charging business people "fees"
for permits and business licenses, receiving payments to influence the
decisions of judges and magistrates, charging "handling fees" at customs
offices, and a multitude of other examples in all public sector
activities where public officials come into regular and unsupervised
contact with the general public.

Corruption can be manifested in the pervasive evidence of severe waste,
damage or deterioration -- all with no accountable party identified.
Massive environmental pollution and habitat destruction from energy
extraction is all too common, as is the wasteful loss of human potential
and time through the intentional imposition of bureaucratic impediments
and red tape.

Perhaps the greatest manifestation of corruption is underdevelopment
itself, and the inhibition of states to embrace transparency in their
operations -- across all sectors \-- or to decentralize decision-making
to local governments. Economies do not flourish, nor does democracy grow
strong, in situations where corruption is embedded and pervasive, and
where decision-making is controlled tightly at the top and the use of
public resources hidden from public oversight. In such conditions,
government legitimacy remains weak, quality of life erodes, formal
sector employment opportunities decline, and underdevelopment becomes
persistent.

## Corruption Vulnerabilities 

While the terminology may vary, most analyses of corruption draw
attention to the combination of monopoly power, unfettered discretion,
and minimal or no accountability[^1] as the optimal conditions of
vulnerability to corruption. This perspective was common to the
nine-sector analysis too, but other conditions of vulnerability \-- some
sector-specific \-- were also noted.

The role of the state, and specifically the central government, often
was cited as giving rise to conditions of tight control by a
self-interested few, with little or no transparency. For example, in the
agricultural sector in many developing countries, the central government
enjoys a preeminent position of power and decision-making in nearly
every aspect of commercial agriculture throughout the commodities chain,
from actual production to grading, pricing, storage to distribution.

Those in powerful positions within the central government also often
face great incentives to corrupt behavior in the handling of major
public infrastructure projects, where large sums of money become the
subject of non-transparent deal making, vulnerable to arrangements
favoring illicit kickbacks and influence buying. Major infrastructure
projects are common within the energy sector (and, though not a sector
of this analyses, the transportation sector), and significant public
infrastructure investments also occur in the health, education,
agriculture, and private sectors. The public finance sector is
vulnerable in a related manner, in that this sector provides the
institutional mechanisms for monetary transactions associated with
public infrastructure.

A different but related vulnerability occurs when the central government
fails to monitor the integrity of lower, decentralized echelons on
government, or fails to establish transparent linkages between the tiers
of government. While decentralization generally does shorten the
accountability linkages between government and public user, it can also
favor the interests of powerful local elites who find new opportunities
to seek illicit gain through pressuring local government officials with
less fear of powerful central government oversight. Public finance is
vulnerable to distortions in the character of the financial flows
between central and local government, for example.

There are also other similar vulnerabilities. Corruption can easily
flourish when public services cover the majority of the population, such
as in education and health, or where the massive scale of services and
the large number of individual transactions make central government
monitoring ineffectual. Vulnerabilities to corruption arise any time
that multiple sources of government control exist at different levels of
government, disbursing a very large quantity of resources in numerous
small transactions. Political patronage schemes often find inviting
vulnerabilities within these large decentralized systems.

The difficulty of government to monitor the integrity of public
officials also owes much to a low level of public awareness of the
nature and real costs of corruption, and to a high level of tolerance
(or resigned acceptance) of corruption. The environmental sector perhaps
best exemplifies this vulnerability, but the problem of public tolerance
also invites generally low level but embedded corruption within the
health, education, and justice sectors, with political parties, and with
public sector interactions with the private sector. The justice sector
has a distinctive vulnerability, in that it is highly susceptible to
external (and often inappropriate) government pressure from a variety of
powerful sources.

One step removed from direct or official government control, both
political parties and the private sector generally shelter behind few
requirements for public transparency and accountability, making them
particularly vulnerable to corruption. The activities of political
parties are difficult to monitor (unless it is in their interests to
monitor each other), and vulnerabilities occur with biased or
manipulated selection of candidates, buying of votes, political party
fundraising and financing of candidates and issues, political party
manipulation of decisions by elected officials, or party co-optation by
special interests.

## The Enabling Environment for Corruption

Corruption in the public sector finds root and can easily become
embedded in many less developed and transitional countries where
political leaders fail to display concern for the public interest or
fail to set examples of integrity, where social and political
institutions are relatively weak, and where civil servants -- often
underpaid and held in low public esteem -- have self-interested
incentives to engage in corrupt alternatives to formal rules and
procedures. Adherence to the formal rules of society's institutions may
lack motivational weight if those empowered with authority perceive
these rules to be weak, unfair, inappropriate, or punitive, or where the
distinctions between public and private are blurred. This superficiality
of personal investment in such rules is further stretched by a sense of
impunity -- either the lack of meaningful sanctions, or the high
probability of not being punished for engaging in corruption even if
severe sanctions exist. For those who may be unwilling participants on
the receiving end of corrupt transactions, as may be common in the
justice, education, health, public finance (particularly tax and
customs), energy, and environmental sectors, there may be few or no
alternatives to accomplish a necessary task or avoid an unpleasant
consequence but to comply, or it may be perceived as expected or
convenient to do so.

In the justice sector, and to a lesser extent in the environment,
energy, and private sectors, weak judicial and regulatory systems also
make it difficult for injured parties to seek redress in the courts for
contract violations. Complexity of laws, government regulations, and
procedures provide fertile ground for arbitrary discretion by
self-interested officials. Institutional complexity also exacerbates
corruption vulnerabilities, where overlapping or unclear management
responsibilities allow for poor levels of oversight and inadequate
accountability -- a common situation in public finance, education,
health, and public finance sectors.

The lack of political competition, the dominance of monopoly interests,
political parties that are either too strong or too weak, and the
weakness or absence of watchdog institutions also contributes to a
situation prone to the growth of corruption.

In the environment and energy sectors, the problems of poor governance
and diffuse public ownership (i.e. no one "owns" energy, so its misuse
is not well monitored) create conditions favorable to corruption.
Globalization plays an important role in these two sectors, since one of
its goals is to seek the lowest cost for resources without regard to how
or where they are obtained. The character of global capitalism is often
to focus on short term profits over long term sustainability, which also
can lead to corruption influencing decisions that lead to consequences
counter to the public interest.

It is in the interest of many to resist change. Those individuals best
placed to affect the necessary reforms in public policy, public
attitudes, and public behavior, as well as their counterparts in the
private and civil society sectors, are often also the ones who stand to
lose the most from significant curtailment of a corrupt status quo.

## Stakeholders and Actors in Corruption

Corruption takes two. Consumers are often willing to pay bribes for the
sake of "convenience" (avoiding burdensome and lengthy bureaucratic
steps, for instance) -- a willingness that stimulates a supply-side
pressure to perpetuate associated forms of corruption. In some cases,
both parties to the corrupt act appear to gain, at the expense of the
general public (and specifically the poor). In other cases, there is a
vulnerable victim and someone who exploits that victim -- a loser and a
winner. The multiple permutations of corruption reflect the complexity
of human and institutional interactions, making the analysis of distinct
stakeholders and roleplayers a challenging undertaking. In some cases
the stakeholder group may not even yet exist -- for example, in the
environment and energy sectors future generations cannot argue their
claims for the judicious use of non-renewable resources.

Those who have power to exercise and who enjoy minimal accountability --
such as senior public officials, judges, police, political party bosses,
trade union leaders -- are the commonly cited perpetrators of
corruption, preying upon those in need who generally are powerless to
resist such approaches. In some extreme cases of deeply embedded
corruption, entire institutions become the perpetrator -- such as
corrupt central government ministries, or government controlled
marketing boards and parastatal organizations. Private sector actors --
both domestic and international -- can corrupt public officials. For
example, international consumers of natural resources may provide a
strong stimulus to corruption by choosing to accept local corruption as
a cost of doing business.

In every sectoral analysis in this study, the important role of the
public -- and the attitude of the public -- was noted. Corruption
flourishes when the public is poorly informed, apathetic, cynical,
tolerant, or so weak as to be unable to protest. The most vulnerable
individuals in society are the poor, and they often encounter petty
corruption on a daily or regular basis -- for example, poor patients who
must pay fees for "free" government health services. The poor also bear
the heaviest burden from the larger economic and societal impacts of
corruption -- the slowing of development, the dissipation and wastage of
public resources, the erosion of formal sector employment, the decline
in investment, and the loss of government legitimacy through poor
governance.

Several of the authors of the sectoral analyses called attention to two
particular roleplayers in the problem of -- and solutions to --
corruption that are largely overlooked: civil society and the donor
community. Civil society has played a positive role in limiting
corruption by means of its activities in education, oversight, and
facilitating access to public services, yet not all NGOs perform
satisfactorily in this regard. Some NGOs are motivated more "in the
money than in development."

Donors and development assistance organizations have often chosen to
ignore corruption when formulating and implementing their programs and
projects, so that other strategic aims can be focused on. Examples
include members of the donor community who may be aware of corruption in
education systems, for example, but who pursue an agenda that stresses
strategic donor self-interests, ignoring this set of corruption
problems. This form of selective vision warrants re-evaluation, as it
provides a potent example of an intentional and strategic tolerance for
corruption that almost certainly has significant negative impacts in the
longer term.

## Interventions to Prevent and Combat Corruption

Preventing corruption, or curbing corruption when already present, can
be approached from both the general and the particular. Each of the nine
sectors called for interventions that are directly aimed at attacking
the enabling environment for corruption. Chief among these are improving
the example of leadership that models integrity, raising public
awareness of the cost and character of corruption, and seeking an
economic and social solution to underpaid civil servants who
additionally suffer from low public esteem.

Other systemic recommendations include: improved public access to
information on decision-making and resource allocation and public
participation in these processes; a more active, free, and professional
press; strengthening the rule of law; minimizing unsupervised contact
between private individuals (or businesses) and tax or customs
officials, and more aggressive enforcement of laws against corrupt
practices. In education, for example, it is argued that training the
community and enlisting community support in the fight against
corruption offered real prospects for effectiveness, making parents
effective agents of change in their local schools.

Technical approaches also have their place. In the education, energy,
agriculture, and health sectors, and in public finance, it is argued
that the better use of information technology to monitor accounts, and
the use of outside independent auditors to provide oversight of the
conduct of government agencies and institutions would reduce
opportunities for corrupt transactions.

Certain anti-corruption interventions have particular relevance to
specific sectors. In the energy sector, for example, the use of an
autonomous, transparent regulatory body is an effective means to oversee
energy transformation and distribution. Similarly, decentralization and
privatization of some government functions can constrain corruption --
for example, a move towards decentralized, competitive electricity
markets. In the environmental sector, improvements might result from
generating better environmental data and from the regular monitoring
both of environmental resources and environmental quality standards. In
the health sector, downsizing public health care system and/or charging
cost-sharing user fees to achieve better pay and improved status for
health sector workers are possibilities, but such interventions are
often very difficult to implement, and may adversely affect the poorest.
Decentralizing government health care services and privatizing some
services may be more realistic intervention options. In the justice
sector, the analyst argues for increasing autonomy while raising
transparency, and allowing the justice sector to have control over its
own budget and administration. With respect to political parties, they
might be restructured so that internal institutional processes are
transparent and accountable, and that effective campaign finance
legislation be enacted and enforced.

Throughout public service institutions, a strong case is argued for
appointments and promotions to be transparently made on basis of merit,
combined with periodic disclosure of assets by senior public sector
officials.

# 2. Sectoral Interventions 

This cross-sectoral analysis found several common threads among the
author's recommendations for action:

-   There are a wide range of anti-corruption approaches that are common
    across sectors.

-   While many development sectors share basic anti-corruption
    approaches, these remedies need to implemented in a customized way,
    within the particular context of each sector, to be effective.

Many of the authors observe that sector-specific anti-corruption
strategies are of limited efficacy if not carried out in conjunction
with broader, integrated anti-corruption initiatives systemically
applied across many sectors. While fully accepting the need for such a
broad approach, the scope of this current analysis does not lend itself
to the identification of a comprehensive set of integrated, systemic
recommendations; clearly there is a need for further research in this
context. In all cases, it is recommended that a donor should carry out a
diagnostic appraisal of the source and opportunities for corruption, so
that any subsequent interventions will be formulated with reference to a
specific country and sector context.

### Shared Anti-Corruption Remedies

### *Addressing Governing Competence and Capacity*

Lack of competence and capacity including insufficient educated and
skilled staff; understaffing; lack of adequate equipment, research
materials and data; and poor working conditions all combine to create
the enabling environment for corruption. The prevailing conclusion to
date has been that a significant reallocation of public revenues in a
developing country to fund a higher standard of government service is
prohibitively expensive, politically sensitive, and therefore
unrealistic as a policy option. Institutional weakness however surfaces
again and again as a fundamental contributor to embedded corruption and
a resulting low level of legitimacy for the government. Without strong
government legitimacy, all development aspirations are hindered, and the
resources allocated to development assistance are of questionable
efficacy.

The clear conclusion of this summary analysis is that this situation of
pervasive institutional weakness, high incentives for corruption, and
poor levels of government service to the public needs to be confronted.
A strategic assessment of the opportunity costs and actual wastage in
loss of productivity, increasing levels of corruption, declining
economic growth, and misuse of government resources due to an
under-financed civil service are likely to far exceed the actual costs
of providing adequate salaries and working conditions. This should be
established empirically through a comprehensive analysis in a given
country, and -- assuming the results support this expectation -- the
data should be used by appropriately placed stakeholders to advocate for
a dramatic change in policy to improve the performance standards,
integrity, prestige, and benefits for civil service employees.

Dramatic, sweeping changes to civil service institutions may not always
be possible or warranted. In such cases, targeted interventions to
improve selected aspects of government performance and to limit the
spread and damage of corruption may be chosen. These are described
below; it is noteworthy that the more comprehensive restructuring to
achieve a better paid, more professional (and almost certainly smaller)
civil service would incorporate all of these recommendations.

Specific recommendations include:

-   Professionalism should be encouraged and fostered through training
    and continuing education for all public officials who must exercise
    sophisticated skills, discerning judgment, and comprehensive
    subject-matter expertise (e.g. judges).

-   The budget process should be improved so that it is accurate and
    comprehensive, including all revenue and expenditure.

-   Attract and retain competent staff within the public sector by
    improving salaries, working conditions, and prestige.

-   Set standards for competent and professional performance, and
    enforce these standards through formal monitoring, regular personnel
    evaluations (and, in some cases, examinations), through incentives
    for meeting and exceeding standards (rewards, merit-based
    promotions, public honors) and through disincentives for failing to
    meet standards (warnings, sanctions, demotions, dismissals,
    prosecution).

-   Privatize those government functions that demand levels of
    competence that the private sector can more readily generate and
    sustain.

### *Addressing Tolerance of Corruption*

There can be little incentive for government to arrest the spread and
limit the damage of corruption when citizens simply do not care about
this scourge. In many societies, the public assigns a low priority to
preventing and combating corruption. This complacent attitude springs
from a sense that corruption is inevitable and that nothing can be done
to address it. In such societies, the public may consider it a futile
exercise to express outrage when their political (and private and/or
civil society sector) leaders behave unethically and ignore the broader
public interest in favor of narrower group or self-interest. Despite
this apparent complacency, significant majorities in all countries find
corruption to be shameful and undesirable[^2], and this pervasive
dislike speaks of a strong set of moral values that can be the catalyst
for positive change.

Among the most common of all recommendations within the sectoral papers
is that concrete steps should be taken to raise public awareness about
the negative impacts and costs of corruption, to foster the qualities of
integrity in leadership, to give voice to public outrage when the public
interest is forsaken, and to punish those in authority who flout the
laws for their own ends.

Specific recommendations include:

-   Government -- as well as both the private sector and civil society
    -- should take steps to actively encourage, publicize and reward
    integrity in leadership. Changing public attitudes and expectations
    to become less tolerant of corruption and more demanding of a
    corruption-free society depend on the sustained example of integrity
    by senior public sector, private sector, and civil society sector
    leaders.

-   Government, the private sector, and civil society should collaborate
    on the provision of training in ethical discernment and ethics-based
    judgment. While codes of conduct can provide valuable guidance to
    stakeholders in many sectors as to how to recognize, prevent,
    report, and limit the damage caused by corruption, such codes must
    have comprehensive buy-in from those who most stand in need of their
    guidance. Codes of conduct do not directly translate into the
    ability of people to perceive ethical dilemmas and modify behavior
    to become consistently ethical; codes of ethics must be internalized
    and supported through training, deliberative dialogue, and
    enforcement if they are to be effective.

-   Employ "integrity pacts" as appropriate to help governments,
    businesses and civil society to establish mutual contractual
    obligations and rights, among which are mutual agreements to refrain
    from bribery from bidding through to implementation and operation of
    the business or public service.

### *Addressing Independent and Autonomous Bodies*

Government is the exercise of power, and in many successful and mature
democracies it is clear that power must be balanced by consistently and
rigorously enforced checks and controls, so that the public interest may
best be served. In some cases, such as in the appointment of judges,
there should be an institutional solution that optimizes independence
from subjective political influences and encourages objective,
merit-based decision-making.

Specific recommendations include:

-   Establish a suitable legal framework and autonomous and transparent
    regulatory bodies with "teeth" to enforce compliance for those
    sectors where public goods are exploited or distributed (water,
    energy, environment) or where critical democratic activities are
    undertaken (political party operations and elections) -- provided
    that these regulatory bodies do not become yet another fulcrum to
    leverage illegal returns.

-   Depending on the specific country context, the appointment and
    promotion of highly qualified and competent judges and magistrates
    would be strengthened if such appointments and promotions were made
    -- or at least closely monitored -- by an apolitical and independent
    institution.

-   Depending on the specific country context, the justice sector should
    control its own budget and the administration of the courts.

-   The justice sector -- the integrity and competence of which are
    fundamental to the effective and just rule of law -- should not be
    subject to direct control and manipulation by other government
    institutions or officials in certain key aspects (determined with
    specific reference to local context).

-   In most cases, it is advantageous to encourage a system of life term
    appointments for judges, selected from candidates with demonstrated
    competence and integrity. In so doing, judges have improved job
    security and are able to make their judicial decisions without fear
    of loss of their jobs by disgruntled senior government officials.

### *Addressing the Donors' Role*

As the embodied voice of the international community, donors and
international financial institutions bear a special responsibility for
moral leadership by example. Ignoring corruption so as to attend to
other "strategic development objectives" telegraphs a powerful message
that corruption is tolerated. In the past, international development
assistance sent a similar message or complacency about environmental
degradation and gender inequality, but no longer does this apply.
Corruption should be added to the list of situations regarding which the
international community will no longer "look the other way."

Specific recommendations include:

-   Incorporate specific corruption-prevention measures in all
    development interventions.

-   Donors should record and make public the degree to which they are
    aware of corruption existing in recipient countries, and the extent
    to which their bilateral (or multilateral) programs take due
    cognizance of this problem in their design and in the establishment
    of priorities and procedures.

### *Addressing Political and Institutional Reforms*

The practices, procedures, traditions and values that combine to
characterize any given public institution, and the legal context in
which it exists, directly influence the behavior of that institution,
and its vulnerability to corruption. The frequency and manner in which
the officials of that institution interact with the public, the level of
discretion exercised by officials, the degree of oversight and
management throughout all levels of that institution, and the
accountability of individual officials to the public and to the laws of
the land all are significant factors in diagnosing contributory factors
for corrupt behavior. So too are the prestige enjoyed by government
officials within any given society, the value of their remuneration
relative to the attainment of a reasonably secure and comfortable
standard of living, their job security and work environment, and their
institution's commitment to their own professional development
important. Ultimately, the broader professionalism and ethical standards
of the entire institution, and that institution's awareness of and
compliance with the law, together shape that institution's
effectiveness, responsiveness to the ideals of public service, and
integrity.

Specific recommendations include:

-   Limit the authority of monopoly political parties and support --
    through increased civil liberties -- the toleration of opposition
    parties, thereby encouraging a competitive liberal democratic
    regime.

-   Prepare and implement monitoring and evaluation methods to improve
    effectiveness, detect and reduce corruption, and promote
    results-based attribution of cause and effect for various reforms to
    institutions.

-   In situations where political parties are weak, support legislation
    that defines the scope of activities for and authority of political
    parties, allows for transparent public funding of party activities,
    provides reasonable controls and limits for campaign spending, and
    generally fosters a "level playing field" for political competition.

### *Addressing Administrative Streamlining and Eliminating Administrative Barriers* 

Complexity may often be unavoidable as government functions become more
diverse and sophisticated, but in a great many instances the plethora of
bureaucratic procedures is unnecessary and counter-productive to the
objectives of providing public services of a high standard of quality
and efficiency. In many instances, complexity is artificially imposed to
create a demand for corruption, so that corrupt officials can offer
"short-cuts" for a fee.

Specific recommendations include:

-   Simplify and expedite the land registry and title process, and
    remove legal and procedural constraints to private ownership.
    Private ownership and the formalization of private capital drive
    economic growth, and should be a high priority of government.

-   Review all bureaucratic procedures at the interface between public
    and government officials, to evaluate the potential for streamlining
    and to reduce opportunities for illicit short-cuts.

-   Reform tax laws so that private ownership of land and capital is not
    unfairly or inappropriately taxed.

### *Addressing Transparency and Accountability* 

Corruption does not flourish is an environment open to public scrutiny,
and in which the law and administrative procedures clearly define the
obligations of public officials to be accountable for their stewardship
of public resources.

Specific recommendations include:

-   Evaluate and diagnose corruption in appropriate sectors by following
    commodity chains -- starting at the market and working backwards
    towards production (warehousing, transportation, licensing, etc.) to
    identify corrupt links in the chain.

-   Reform systems and institutions that allow for evidence of
    corruption to be easily hidden, for example by requiring periodic
    disclosure of assets by senior government officials (and their
    families).

-   Make appropriate judgments of the courts public.

-   Implement effective and professional accounting and audit practices
    to prevent and constrain corruption.

-   Make public budgets accessible, completely accounted for (no
    off-book accounts), and transparent. Government has an obligation to
    regularly publish accurate, accessible, and complete information on
    the allocation and distribution of public revenue.

-   Provide for independent monitoring of expenditures by political
    parties.

-   Require political parties to formulate and implement transparent
    procedures for candidate selection and nomination.

-   Exploit the ability of privatization to improve accountability. To
    the extent that privatization of government assets and operations
    exposes suppliers and producers to the discipline of the market and
    to market-based incentives, it can serve as a useful counterbalance
    to corruption among company managers, who become directly
    accountable to private owners who have a direct interest in
    protecting and increasing the value of their assets.

-   Institutions should restructure their operations to provide better
    quality and more thorough oversight of staff by management, the
    minimization of private (unsupervised) contact between staff and the
    public, and the periodic rotation of staff so that illicit personal
    arrangements can be constrained.

-   Public funds should be spent only as authorized by law.

### *Addressing Information Technology*

New IT applications offer significant potential to not only make
government function more efficiently and openly, but also to remove many
government operations from inappropriate manipulation by self-interested
officials.

Specific recommendations include:

-   Make appropriate use of IT solutions -- coupled with demonstrated
    high level political support -- to support institutional reform and
    facilitate sustainable corruption prevention (e.g. the World Bank's
    education management information system -- "EMIS" -- successfully
    applied in the Gambia, the use of computerized applications in tax
    and customs administration, and the computerization of court
    records).

### Sector-Specific Anti-Corruption Remedies

To date, the traditional emphasis of USAID and most other donors and aid
organizations has been to concentrate anti-corruption interventions in
such sectors as public administration, public finance, judiciary and
legal reform, political parties, and governance generally. The analyses
of these sectoral papers make a strong argument for broadening the range
of donor interventions so that anti-corruption measures are integral to
interventions in such sectors as agriculture, education, energy,
environment, health, the private sector (including micro-enterprise and
entrepreneurship initiatives) and civil society. The major
recommendations in both the traditional sectors of anti-corruption
intervention, and these less traditional sectors are summarized below.

Most of these remedies are not unique to the sector; they include such
generic anti-corruption approaches as raising public awareness,
increasing government transparency, and improving control mechanisms.
However, these remedies are framed in the sectoral context -- to be
implemented within particular institutions and processes, with
particular stakeholders, and using appropriate legal structures and
standards. A conclusion that can be drawn is that these sector-specific
remedies are best implemented taking into account the sensitivities and
peculiarities of the sector. As indicated earlier, they are considered
to be most effective when initiated as part of an overall
anti-corruption program that includes general, non-sectoral activities
as well.

*Agriculture*

-   Raise public awareness of corruption in agriculture, and educate
    people on their right of access to critical information on how
    decisions are made and financial resources utilized in pursuit of
    the public interest in this sector. Provide more consistent and
    aggressive enforcement of laws against corrupt practices in
    agricultural production, distribution, and marketing.

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-   Design development programs and projects so that beneficiaries are
    able to participate more effectively in targeted
    corruption-prevention decision-making in all aspects of agricultural
    production, marketing, transportation of products, access to
    extension agents, setting of fair prices, and determination of
    product quality (and hence price). Publicize examples of successful
    interventions.

####### Education

-   Ensure that teachers earn a living wage, linked with clearly
    articulated standards of professional performance, so that
    incentives for corrupt activities are dramatically lessened and the
    sense of corruption being "justified" is no longer supportable.

-   Following a broad-based public awareness campaign to bring to public
    attention the high costs and damaging impacts of corruption, and to
    reinforce a sense that corruption can be tackled effectively, enlist
    local community engagement in the fight against corruption. Begin
    with community training, so that parents become effective agents of
    change as demanding and discerning consumers of the public service
    provided by public schools. Teach parents how to assess the
    effectiveness of their local schools, what their legal rights are as
    parents to access information about school expenditures and
    operations, and what sanctions communities can bring to bear on
    under-performing schools.

####### Energy

-   Increase the transparency of energy transactions and budgets, and
    increase the accountability of institutions and decision makers who
    control and regulate energy.

-   In cases that involve international companies, formulate codes of
    conduct, monitor foreign partners and their collaborators, train
    employees and establish organizational structures to monitor and
    enforce these codes of conduct.

-   Establish internal audit departments or other codes of conduct that
    represent corporate values in a consistent manner.

-   Establish a legal framework and an autonomous, transparent
    regulatory body with sufficient authority to oversee energy
    transformation and distribution.

-   Ensure that clear guidelines exist for accounting practices, that
    budgets are transparent and accessible; and that auditing systems
    are developed to ensure that existing guidelines and rules are
    followed.

-   Where appropriate, unbundle power system into separate energy
    transformation, transmission and distribution entities.

-   Establish decentralized, competitive electricity markets and
    decentralize payments between distribution and generation companies.

-   Formulate and apply "integrity pacts" (IPs) to help government,
    businesses and civil society establish mutual contractual rights and
    obligations. Whenever possible, IPs should cover all the activities
    related to the contract from the pre-selection of bidders, the
    bidding and contracting proper, through the implementation, to the
    completion and operation of the business.

####### Environment 

-   Support a public awareness campaign to heighten awareness of
    environmental concerns and to disseminate information about the
    costs to the public (now and in the future) of mismanagement and
    corrupt management of environmental resources.

-   Advocate for greater transparency in decisions on resource use and
    distribution.

-   To better identify corruption in the environmental context, actively
    encourage civil society to adopt a proactive role in monitoring
    development projects and government policies generally, and
    encourage civil society to advocate for stronger political action
    against corruption in environmental management and decision-making.

-   Carry out baseline environmental analyses so that critical data can
    be collected to enable the subsequent creation and implementation of
    effective and well publicized environmental monitoring systems,
    coupled with effective laws, policies, and conventions. Widely
    publicize the findings of periodic monitoring and evaluation of
    environmental impacts.

####### Health 

-   Establish and encourage the use of an essential drug lists (EDL) in
    public hospitals and clinics, to limit choices in procurement to the
    most appropriate drugs relative to the most pressing needs of the
    specific country

-   Encourage and support the formation of multidisciplinary groups
    within public hospitals to make recommendations on policies for the
    selection and use of drugs.

-   Establish and encourage the use of standard treatment guidelines in
    public health care facilities, the use of codes of ethics in drug
    marketing, and the monitoring of purchasing patterns (drugs and
    medical equipment) to detect unusual deviations that might signal
    corruption.

-   Establish and encourage the use of a government-recognized "white
    list" of drug and medical equipment suppliers of proven and
    consistent integrity.

-   Widely disseminate and regularly update a government-approved list
    of drug prices.

-   Decentralize government health services, with some degree of
    privatization of such services, where efficiency and improved
    service can be achieved.

-   Allow for limited use of user fees by patients to improve the levels
    of remuneration by health care providers, provided safeguards are in
    place to prevent discrimination against patients unable to pay user
    fees.

-   Increase and improve access to health insurance, where the capacity
    exists to support a viable health insurance industry.

-   Restructure and rationalize secondary and tertiary levels of health
    care, so that an appropriate level of care is made accessible, and
    reliance on overcrowded, centralized medical facilities is
    discouraged.

####### Justice

-   An essential attribute of successful anti-corruption efforts is an
    objective and independent authority, able to diagnose the character
    and extent of corruption and empowered to act institutionally to
    address it in a systemic and comprehensive manner.

-   Without public-spirited, ethical, and committed leaders who are
    respected for their integrity and competence, their vision and
    leadership skills, reforms cannot happen.

-   Increase the independence of the judicial branch of government,
    including a judicial sector with control over its own budget and
    administration.

-   In nearly all cases, the funding of the judicial sector must be
    increased to allow for effective and efficient administration of
    justice, including increasing salaries and improving working
    conditions.

-   Appointments and promotions must be made on a merit basis and in a
    transparent manner, so that nepotism and political patronage become
    hard to hide.

-   Require key justice sector officials periodically to disclose their
    assets (and assets of family members).

-   Systematically improve the training and professionalism of justice
    sector officials.

-   Institutionalize and stringently enforce codes of ethics.

-   Improve the timely access to information on laws and legal
    precedent.

-   Implement random assignments of cases to judges and magistrates.

-   Encourage the open publication of judicial decisions.

-   Make more extensive use of alternative (but legal) dispute
    resolution techniques.

-   Promote uniformity and transparency in court procedures in the
    processing of cases, so that opportunities for extortion and bribery
    are curtailed.

-   Computerize court operations (e.g. maintenance of court files)
    wherever appropriate.

-   Hold bar associations to a high standard of integrity in exposing
    and preventing corrupt practices.

-   Improve legal education be improved within law schools.

-   Encourage civil society organizations to become active in educating
    the public on their rights and assisting them in accessing legal
    services, and carry out oversight on the performance of the justice
    sector.

-   Improve the quality of media coverage of the judicial system, with
    greater access to those court files and records that ought to be
    publicly accessible.

####### 

####### Political Parties

-   Restructure political parties so that their internal structures are
    governed by transparency and accountability.

-   Foster competitive liberal democratic regimes so active opposition
    parties can contribute to anti-corruption oversight.

-   Expand legislation governing political parties so that party laws
    are not limited to the role of party behavior at elections, but
    extend to embrace parties as central components of good democratic
    governance. This would include limiting the extent to which
    political parties can be in the pocket of special interests,
    possibly through some level of public funding of their activities,
    coupled with appropriate accountability for the use of such funding.
    Campaign finance legislation, if effectively drafted and enforced,
    would also positively influence the behavior of political parties
    across their whole spectrum of activities.

-   Strengthen democratic practices within political parties. Rules and
    procedures affecting membership, election and accountability of
    party leadership, the selection of candidates, transparency of
    operations and finances, and ethical behavior all are needed if
    parties are to model the democratic principles they purport to
    represent.

-   Improve the accountability of political parties. An independent
    anti-corruption watchdog organization (e.g. electoral commissions,
    ethics committees) should be instituted at the same time that
    anti-corruption legislation is improved (or introduced), and this
    watchdog body should be granted both independence and the
    unquestioned power to prosecute corrupt activities and, where
    necessary, to impose sanctions.

-   Realign the incentives and disincentives that influence corruption
    in political party behavior. To be effective in controlling
    corruption, the risk of being punished for corrupt behavior must be
    credible. This punishment may come at the ballot box, but it may
    also take the form of penalties, fines, jail sentences, or loss of a
    seat in parliament.

-   Transform public attitudes and reduce public tolerance regarding
    corruption, and mobilize the necessary political will and integrity
    to affect positive changes in the fight against corruption.

####### 

####### Private Sector 

-   Provide clear standards to differentiate between private and public
    sector activities, obligations, and authorities, so that confusion
    and undesirable overlap can be prevented.

-   The government, in collaboration with organizations that represent
    the interests of the private sector, should establish and/or
    encourage training programs to inculcate the values of ethically
    responsive business practices as a central component of corporate
    governance.

-   The government should establish a scheme to recognize, honor, and
    publicize those private sector suppliers of goods and services of
    proven and consistent integrity.

-   In cases where private sector perpetrators of corruption have been
    successfully prosecuted, establish a "name and shame" set of
    sanctions to disqualify such private sector providers of goods and
    services from contracting with any agency of government for a set
    period of time. Widely publicize this list, with regular updates.

####### Public Finance

-   Minimize unsupervised contact between private individuals (and
    businesses) and tax or customs officials.

-   Institute staff rotations within tax, customs, and other appropriate
    departments, and improve oversight by senior managers.

-   Encourage the progressive computerization of tax and customs
    administrations.

-   Improve public sector accountability through the use of public
    sector audits by independent public sector auditors.

-   Simplify those tax laws that are too complex and too open to various
    interpretations by those holding positions in which they can
    exercise powers of official discretion, often with little or no
    accountability.

-   Ensure that high-incentive arrangements for corruption are avoided,
    e.g. so that the same official is not both tax inspector and tax
    collector.

# 3. Sectors and USAID's Anti-Corruption Framework

USAID's Handbook on Fighting Corruption employs a framework for curbing
corruption that relies on three main initiatives: (1) limiting authority
by reducing the role of government in economic activities; (2) improving
accountability by strengthening transparency, oversight, and sanctions;
and (3) improving incentives by redesigning terms of employment in
public service.[^3] The nine sector studies generally support this
framework. Sectoral remedies to fighting corruption basically apply
these same three approaches.

On the issue of privatization of some of the government's
responsibilities, it was noted that there are many instances in which
there is a strong case to be made for privatizing certain government
functions. Privatization imposes market disciplines, and generates a
body of owners who demand accurate information on the changing value of
their assets. Privatization is not a panacea, however, and expanding the
analysis lens beyond just the public sector demonstrates this. Employees
of private firms can find positions in which to demand bribes or to
exert corrupt influences, particularly when internal financial controls
remain weak. Public officials involved in the privatization process can
also influence this process in their favor, through having a direct or
indirect financial stake in the newly created private venture.

In terms of improving accountability by strengthening transparency,
oversight, and sanctions, the important role of a free press and related
mass media was a common theme to nearly all of the sectoral reviews.
Public awareness of the nature of corruption, public access to
information, and a public acceptance that corruption is a problem that
can be effectively addressed all are essential to transforming existing
social tolerance or apathy into a strong public demand for integrity in
governance.

Accountability and transparency can also be improved through the
application of information technology. The application of computer
technologies to standard operations of government (e.g. taxation and
customs operations, budgeting, court records, drugs procurement) has
been demonstrated to be an effective tool in constraining and preventing
corruption. Arbitrary discretion and lack of transparency are greatly
reduced through the use of such technologies, although this is not a
totally reliable cure -- there are sophisticated methods available by
which to subvert software programs to hide illicit activities.

The periodic use of public sector audits (to establish institutionalized
checks, clear lines of accountability, and improve access to
information) by independent (disinterested) auditors was also noted as
an affective tool in the pursuit of non-corrupt governance.

USAID's third component of its framework -- improving incentives by
redesigning terms of employment in public service -- was almost accepted
as a default position by the authors. There was a sense in many of the
papers, however, that this is the most important yet least probable
strategy to curb public sector corruption. Currently there are very few
effective anticorruption incentives for civil servants who do not earn a
living wage -- an economic situation that is more the rule than the
exception in most developing countries. Until civil servants receive
benefits and security of employment that allows them to achieve and
sustain a reasonable standard of quality of life, and a status that
commands the respect of their peers, they will continue to resort to
corruption in order to meet their urgent needs. Strategies to remedy
this predicament are mired in complexity, since not only must civil
servants earn more, they must also perform more efficiently and
demonstrate a profound change of attitude towards serving the public
good. To some extent, this challenge is captured in the concept of
professionalism, which appeared in many of the papers.

Government institutions in some countries demonstrate a culture of pride
in professionalism, ensuring that their officials adhere to a
consistently high standard of performance and commitment to public
service. The inculcation of a professional ethic rewards competence, and
does not tolerate shoddy performance. In such institutions, however,
there also is considerable social status and economic security attached
to permanent employment with the government, and competitive pressures
to perform well or risk loss of career advancement or even job
termination. There is also a reasonably good package of employment
benefits. Given such an environment of professionalism, and the
articulation and internalization of appropriate ethical standards and
codes of conduct, it becomes very difficult for corruption to become
embedded, and there is a high correlation between public expenditures
and the provision of high quality public goods and services.

In less developed and transitional countries, it is often difficult or
even deemed impossible to make the level of economic investment
necessary to create and sustain such conditions. Further research is
needed to explore the potential returns to an elevated level of
investment in the civil service, particularly if the hidden costs of
inefficiency, poor service to the public (and consequent loss of
productivity by the public), crime, and corruption are factored in to
establishing the cost of current arrangements. It arguably may be worth
the investment in improved benefits and standards even in conditions of
relative scarcity.

#  

# 4. Gaps in the Sectoral Analyses

The nine sector analysis of corruption summarized by this paper presents
a broad, but by no means exhaustive review of the ways in which
corruption affects development. There are gaps in this analysis: key
development sectors are missing from the analysis, private sector
corruption has not been addressed, and there is a need to focus on
development ethics.

First, there are other major public sector analyses that should be
pursued, including a review of the government's role in physical
infrastructure, transportation, communications, tourism, defense, and
social services. The role of local governments in this era of expanding
decentralization warrants close scrutiny, as well, as does the central
government's role in regulating and participating in the financial
sector.

Second, corruption is not limited to the public sector, although
linkages between the public sector and the private and civil society
sectors are often conduits for corrupt activities. Corruption occurs in
all sectors -- public, private, and civil society -- yet most donor
strategies and interventions in the developing world focus on the public
sector. Isolating the public sector in this way can be misleading, since
nearly all persons interact in public and private spheres that often
overlap, and which certainly influence each other. Identifying
corruption as just a public sector problem or giving preponderant weight
to the public sector context can confuse the origins and vectors through
which corruption finds expression.

The focus in this study on just the public sector both simplifies and
complicates the overall conclusions, and renders any conclusions
incomplete.[^4] The relationships between public sector, private sector,
and the civil society sector are intricate and growing in their
interdependence, particularly as the divisions become intentionally
(and, occasionally, unintentionally) blurred among these three sectors
with respect to which sector performs certain public services and
provides certain public goods. As the private sector and NGOs begin to
perform more of what was once always deemed public sector services,
lines of accountability become very tenuous -- an obvious concern when
considering the prevention of corruption. Government cannot selectively
abdicate its governance functions through subcontracting, nor can it
avoid an obligation to ensure that corruption and inefficiency do not
come to characterize any functions and services that have been
subcontracted or otherwise come to be performed by others. This level of
oversight is partially addressed by better and more transparent
procurement by the public sector of goods and services by the private
and civil society sectors, but the analysis needs to go deeper in
considering how the government should best maintain a quality and
integrity assurance role appropriate to its ultimate accountability to
the public.

Third, as Robert Klitgaard says, "Corruption is at its heart an ethical
problem."[^5] Analysis has to go beyond this sectoral approach to get to
the core of the corruption problem and what to do about it. Klitgaard
follows his observation with a quick disclaimer that his purpose is not
to provide a moral analysis of corruption, and that any such analysis
probably would run adrift on the rocks of moral relativism. Other noted
analysts have made passing comments on the ethical dimensions of
corruption; Ackerman speaks of the need for "personal honesty and a
devotion to democratic ideals,[^6]" while Cragg stresses a universalist
argument when he says that "Bribery is *prima facie* unethical virtually
everywhere judged by the standards of prevailing conventional
morality.[^7]"

If one accepts that corruption is fundamentally a problem of ethics, the
lack of emphasis in the literature on the ethical dimension is puzzling.
Problems of moral relativism are hardly insurmountable, as evident in
widely accepted human rights principles. Despite this, there is little
in the literature on corruption to suggest that a moral framework is
appropriate to analysis -- yet this may be due to the nature of ethics
itself. Ethics approaches moral dilemmas from several angles, which
means that there probably never will be a definitive framework for the
moral analysis of corruption. Several leading moral theories (for
example the human rights approach, the capabilities approach[^8], virtue
ethics, various feminist moral theories, social contract theory,
Kantianism, utilitarianism) all separately offer carefully reasoned
contemporary ethical frameworks that would -- were they applied to this
pursuit -- illuminate various ways in which corruption constrains
essential human freedoms, limits human opportunities and choice and
thereby prevents human flourishing, fails to support the universal quest
for "the life lived well," erodes compassion and concern for the plight
of those less fortunate, undercuts justice and equitable treatment for
all persons under the rule of law, ignores or diminishes respect for
fundamental human dignity, and fails to generate maximum pleasure or
utility for the greatest number of people. The application of ethics to
the problems of development generally, and corruption specifically, now
finds expression in the relatively new field of *development ethics*. To
date, however, leading multilateral and bilateral aid institutions such
as the World Bank or USAID seldom frame their discussions on corruption
or development from a development ethics perspective[^9].

The prominent exception to this institutional disregard for development
ethics now may be emerging with the recent emphasis on leadership and
its role in curbing corruption. In a recent study by Daniel Kaufman of
the World Bank, over 80 percent of government officials from 62
countries in the sample identified the need to improve the quality of
leadership as the single most important factor in the fight against
corruption.[^10]

Effective leadership entails more than competence, leadership skills,
and a strong disposition towards developing a leadership role \-- high
moral standards of integrity, honesty, and commitment to the common good
are also needed. It is important to appreciate both the practical and
the ethical qualities of leadership and the public expectations of
adherence to a public trust -- what some call civic virtue. A leader's
effectiveness does depend in large measure on charisma, intellect, and
assertiveness, but moral attributes underpin and influence the leader's
actions within the political process, and are arguably fundamental to
successfully mitigating and preventing corruption -- regardless of
development sector. Corruption appears to flourish and become socially
embedded in an environment devoid of integrity at the highest levels of
leadership. Top leadership exerts a powerful influence on societal
tolerance to and participation in corruption, for good or ill depending
on the moral attributes -- or virtues -- being modeled.

## 5. Conclusion

The analyses undertaken by the nine authors emphasized the importance of
transparency, accountability, access to information, and strong
disincentives for engaging in corrupt behavior. Corruption must be
prevented in a variety of ways, some sequenced, some simultaneous, some
sectorally-based, some regardless of sector. Significant advances can be
made in the fight against public sector corruption provided there is the
requisite political will, competent and well-trained public sector
staff, and effective and civic-minded leadership.

Three additional observations warrant special mention:

-   First, working for the public sector must be made economically
    viable so that talented, competent, and publicly minded individuals
    can be attracted and retained. It is simply not reasonable to expect
    absolute integrity and the provision of efficient, high-quality
    services responsive to the public interest from civil servants who
    typically are underpaid, undervalued, inadequately trained, and --
    not surprisingly -- poorly motivated. The cost implications of such
    an investment appear to be prohibitive, but serious research should
    be undertaken to compare the hidden costs of corrupt public sector
    performance and the many lost opportunities that result from
    embedded corruption with the actual costs and potential returns from
    investing a greater proportion of available resources into the
    public sector, in turn demanding corruption-free standards and
    efficient stewardship of public resources.

-   Second, the role of leadership in modeling and motivating ethical
    and corruption-free behavior is pivotal to any success in curbing
    corruption. Leaders who demonstrate integrity and demand the same
    from others inspire public service, and such leadership deserves
    more direct support and recognition.

-   Finally, the public must demand integrity, effectiveness, and
    responsiveness from the public sector. The public should be made
    aware of the profoundly negative impacts of complacency in the face
    of growing and worsening corruption, and a public dialogue should
    begin on the values and qualities that ought to characterize the
    public sector, and how this can be made to happen. Involving the
    public as full participants in the fight against corruption is the
    most powerful and potentially effective approach available because
    it starts at the place where corruption hurts the most -- by
    respecting the essential dignity and worth of every human being.

# Bibliography

Ackerman, Susan Rose. 1978. *Corruption: A Study in Political Economy*.
New York: Academic Press

Cragg, A.W. 1999. "Bribery, Globalization and the Problem of Dirty
Hands." Paper presented at conference *Corruption: Ethical Challenges to
Globalization*, November 5, 1999, Georgetown University, Washington, DC

Klitgaard, Robert. 1988. *Controlling Corruption*. Berkeley: University
of California Press

Noonan, John T., Jr. 1984. *Bribes: The Intellectual History of a Moral
Idea*. Berkeley: University of California Press

# 

[^1]: Robert Klitgaard, *Controlling Corruption*, (Berkeley: University
    of California Press, 1991), 75

[^2]: John T. Noonan, Jr., Bribes (New York: Macmillan, 1984), 702-3

[^3]: USAID Handbook on Fighting Corruption, Washington: Center for
    Democracy and Governance, February 1999.

[^4]: While there was a "private sector" analysis conducted within this
    study, it focused on public sector corruption related to
    government-business transactions. It did not highlight the problem
    of business-to-business corruption.

[^5]: Robert Klitgaard, *Controlling Corruption*, (Berkeley: University
    of California Press, 1991), 11

[^6]: Susan Rose Ackerman, *Corruption: A Study in Political Economy*,
    (New York: Academic Press, 1978), 95

[^7]: A.W. Cragg, "Bribery, Globalization and the Problem of Dirty
    Hands." Paper presented at Corruption: Ethical Challenges to
    Globalization, November 5, 1999, Georgetown University.

[^8]: An example of a capabilities approach framework for the analysis
    of corruption may be found in "The Moral Critique: Corruption in
    Developing Countries," by Stephen Schwenke, published in the Journal
    of Public and International Affairs, Volume 11, Spring 2000.

[^9]: Interesting exceptions do occur. Both the United Nations
    Development Programme (UNDP) and the British Department for
    International Development (DFID) speak openly and prominently about
    ethical concerns associated with human rights claims and protections
    in the UNDP *Human Development Report 2000: Human Rights and Human
    Development* and the UK Government's 1997 *White Paper on
    International Development* respectively.

[^10]: Daniel Kaufmann, "Corruption: The Facts," *Foreign Policy 107*,
    Summer 1997.