**Commentary on Hodgson's Target Article in JCS.**

*Introduction.*

Hodgson aims to present a scientifically and philosophically respectable
defense of the claim "that free will exists and is inconsistent with
determinism." That thesis is incompatible with the truth of classical
physics. Classical mechanics is deterministic. Hence if it were true
then nothing inconsistent with determinism could exist, contrary to the
claims about free will. Thus Hodgson appeals to quantum mechanics (QM),
which, by virtue of its indeterministic features, provides a
scientifically respectable way around this first difficulty.

Hodgson rejects also the idea that free will is *random*. But he then
creates a very serious -- and altogether unnecessary -- new difficulty
by grossly mis-characterizing quantum mechanics. He says that "according
to QM, any indeterminism is mere randomness." If that were true, and if
QM were true, then free will could not exist and be, as required, both
indeterministic and non-random. Thus he is forced to abandon not only
classical mechanics but also QM. However, the main problem with the idea
of free will since the time of Isaac Newton has been its incompatibility
with basic physical theory. Proposing a solution that conflicts with
basic physical theory is precisely what is *not* scientifically
respectable.

This second problem is specious. It arises from an incorrect claim about
the nature of quantum theory, namely that every quantum mechanical
process is either causal (deterministic) or chance (random). Actually,
orthodox quantum theory involves, not just *two* process but *three*:
causation, chance, *and choice*.

Orthodox quantum dynamics is a tripartite process. The process called
Process **1** by von Neumann is absolutely essential, and it involves an
element of "choice." It constitutes the major departure of QM from
classical mechanics, *because it brings actions selected and performed
by human agents directly into the fundamental structure of the theory.*
The causal roots of these choices are not specified by the theory. Nor
are there any statistical constraints on these choices. They are,
explicitly, "Free Choices," not in the strong sense that the theory
dogmatically asserts that they have no causal roots at all, but in the
weak sense that contemporary orthodox QM treats them as free parameters.

Orthodox Copenhagen QM is formulated in a realistic and practical way.
It is structured around the activities of human agents, who are
considered able to freely elect to probe a system of interest in any one
of many possible ways. Bohr emphasized the freedom of the experimenters
in passages such as:

\"The freedom of experimentation, presupposed in classical physics, is
of course retained and corresponds to the free choice of experimental
arrangement for which the mathematical structure of the quantum
mechanical formalism offers the appropriate latitude.\" (Bohr, 1958: 73}

The fact that the causal roots of these "free choices" *are not
specified by contemporary QM* stems from the fact that in the original
Copenhagen formulation of quantum theory the human experimenter is
considered to stand outside the system to which the quantum laws are
applied. Those quantum laws are the only precise laws of nature
recognized by that theory. Thus, according to the Copenhagen philosophy,
*there are no presently known laws that govern the choices* made by the
agent about how he or she will act upon the quantum system that he or
she is probing.

The introduction of choices made by participating agents directly into
the basic structure of the theory constitutes a profound change in the
principles of physics. It is greatly celebrated and much discussed, and
is epitomized in Niels Bohr's dictum that " in the great drama of
existence we ourselves are both actors and spectators." (Bohr, 1963: 15
& 1958: 81) The emphasis here is on "actors": in classical physics the
human agents were treated essentially as spectators. But orthodox QM is
formulated only within the context of agents acting on systems and
observing what happens. The choices made by the agents as to how they
will act play an essential role in the extraction from the theory of
predictions pertaining to the outcomes of observations, *and these
"free" choices can also strongly influence the course of physical events
in the observed system.*

The second part of the tripartite quantum process is "causal." It is
specified by the Schroedinger equation of motion, and is locally and
globally deterministic. Von Neumann calls this causal component Process
**2**.

The third process in contemporary QM is ruled by "chance". Dirac called
this process a "choice on the part of nature." It picks out, in way
governed only by a statistical rule, a definite outcome of the probing
action selected by Process **1.**

In orthodox Copenhagen QM the agent is taken to include not only his own
physical body and stream of conscious experiences, but also his
measuring devices. His actions and resulting observations -- as
represented within his stream of consciousness -- are described in a
language that allows him to communicate to colleagues what he has done
and what he has learned.

The agent acts intentionally upon the system being probed in order to
elicit an experiential feedback that can be recognized. Then the
occurrence of that recognizable response indicates that the examined
system has a corresponding property. The agent's choice of action
specifies a separation of the state of the system being examined into
two subsystems, one corresponding to the occurrence of the recognizable
positive feedback, the other corresponding to the non-occurrence of that
response. This theoretical structure allows the actions and feedbacks,
described in terms of experiences residing in the stream of
consciousness of the agent, to become correlated to physically described
properties of the system being examined.

This Copenhagen formulation is pragmatically useful. But it is not
suitable for analyzing the connection between the experiences of an
agent and his physical brain. That is because the brain and body of the
agent are, in the Copenhagen scheme, not parts of the physically
described system. However, John von Neumann (1932/1955) expressed QM in
a form that allows (the quantum counterparts of) all of the particles in
the universe to be included in the physically described part of the
theory, with only the streams of consciousness of agents being described
in terms of the way we experience objects, intentions, and feelings.

In this form of QM the brain of the agent becomes the system being
examined by that experientially described agent. But the theory is still
pragmatic in the sense that no commitment need be made about the
ontological character of either the physically described system or the
stream of consciousness. The physically described system is treated as
an objectively existing system, even though it effectively represents
knowledge, information, and tendencies for experiential mind-brain
events to occur. The events in each stream of consciousness are
experiential events that coincide with -- and structurally correspond to
-- physical events in the brain of the agent. Whether this puts
consciousness inside the brain of the agent (identity theory) or outside
it (duality) need not be specified. Science proceeds without making an
ontological commitment on this issue.

These matters are described in more detail in Stapp (2003). I have
briefly summarized here only what is needed to make intelligible the
following comments on Hodgson's target article**.**

*The impact of QM on Hodgson's thesis and arguments.*

Hodgson's first three propositions and the arguments supporting them,
are largely in line with QM, at least to the extent that the "laws of
nature" that he cites are restricted to the laws recognized by
contemporary physical theory. However, in the argument supporting
Proposition 4 it is claimed that "It is plain that such feelings and
other reasons are of diverse kinds, generally not measurable and
generally incommeasurable." An apparently contrary possibility is that
the role of conscious feelings is precisely to provide the basis for
*assigning comparative values* to highly diverse possible actions, such
as keeping a promise or helping a friend in need. My own experience is
that I "feel" the comparative value of the competing *physically
incommensurate* possibilities, in the process of deciding between
physically diverse possible courses of action. So it is not plainly
evident to me that that all of consciousness is not just an elaboration
and development of "feelings," whose function from the evolutionary
outset has been to provide comparative evaluations of *diverse*
*physically incommensurable* possible actions.

In QM the Process **3 "**choice on the part of nature" is governed by a
statistical rule fixed purely by physical conditions. That means the
choice between the physically opposed options is treated as having no
causal roots in the past: the choice simply pops out, but in accordance
with a "propensity" rule defined exclusively by the *physical*
characteristics of the various options. These choices might actually
have causal roots, but the theory does not acknowledge them.

Process **1** could, similarly, be ruled by tendencies or propensities
controlled, however, not by physical characteristics, but by the
experiential "feels," of the diverse options. The point here is that the
Process **1** choices must, according to orthodox QM, *somehow get
made*, but the existing theory provides no rules for *how* these choices
get made. Additional hypotheses are needed to complete the theory, and
the hypothesis that Process I is governed by propensities based on
"feels" is a viable candidate. A stronger hypothesis would be that the
Process **1** choices are completely *fixed and determined* by a process
based on comparisons of "feels."

These possibilities *for* *extending rather than contradicting* QM have
an impact upon Proposition 5, which asserts that "the subject makes an
effective non-random selection between the available alternatives, based
on these non-conclusive reasons, albeit not determined by rules or laws
of nature. This is a vital proposition, one that is necessary to
overcome the alleged dichotomy of determinism and randomness."

Proposition 5 is the linchpin of Hodgson's position. But if one accepts
orthodox QM then there is no "dichotomy of determinism and randomness."
Orthodox QM provides a third option, "Choice." Hence the validity of QM
need not be denied, and scientific respectability can be retained.

However, Hodgson's Proposition 5 places strong conditions upon this
*selection* process, namely that the selection process be both
non-random, and not determined by rules or laws of nature.

Now the QM Process **1** selection is not controlled by *the randomness
of Process **3***, which is the randomness associated with nature's
choice of an *outcome* of the probing action specified by Process **1**.
Nor is this Process **1** selection controlled by *the rule or law of
nature, specified by the Schoedinger equation.* But the Process **1**
might be, as suggested above, governed by *a different element of
randomness,* say one associated with propensities governed by "feel"
rather than by geometric form, or by a rule or law of *human* (or agent)
nature based, for example, on "feels." There is no compelling need to go
to the extreme of denying *all randomness and all rules*. That option
leads to a degree of incomprehensibility that would make rational
modeling difficult if not impossible. There is no rational need to go
that far.

Hodgson's arguments supporting Propostion 5 are, as Hodgson himself
admits, difficult. But accepting the existence of the QM mandated
selection Process **1** is easy: it is demanded by orthodox contemporary
physical theory. And allowing this Process **1** choice to be governed
by *feel-based rules* is what Hodgson's arguments actually support.

For example, Hodgson gives, in support of proposition 5, an argument
based on evolution. He says "If choices were in fact determined by
algorithms, such as evolution-selected computation-like procedures,
which *as algorithms* need no help from conscious judgement, and could
indeed be hindered by conscious interference, there could be no
plausible explanation of why evolution selected in favor of brains that,
at considerable expense in terms of complexity and energy-use, support
conscious processes." But this argument is not a general argument for
the idea that the needed selection processes can "not \[be\] accounted
for by strict rules of any kind." Quite the opposite! It is an argument
*in favor* of the idea that the selection process is governed by rules
that create physically efficacious judgments based on experienced
feelings. Indeed, all of Hodgson's arguments tend to support, and
certainly not to deny, the existence of rules that create a feel-based
causally efficacious selection process. This dovetails with the fact
that there is both room, and a need, for the incorporation of some such
rules into orthodox QM.

The *outcome* of an agent's intentional action is implemented, in von
Neumann QM, by a mind-brain event that, at the physical level,
actualizes, as a unified whole, a spatially extended complex
informational structure instantiated in the brain of the agent. At the
experiential level this event is an experience that grasps the form of
that informational structure.

This capacity of a quantum agent to "know as a whole" the content of a
spatially extended informational structure renders a conscious quantum
agent fundamentally different from a mechanical automata that is
adequately describable in terms of the principles of classical
mechanics, and hence lacks Process **1** choices. The behavior of the
robot is controlled exclusively by the local mechanical interactions of
microscopic elements with neighboring microscopic elements, and these
simple micro-elements can "know" or "feel" nothing beyond their
immediate microscopic neighborhood.

But the behavior of a quantum agent can be influenced, and in principle
controlled, by the complex spatially extended informational structures
that he can grasp and know as wholes. For Process **1** is intrinsically
non-local: it identifies and actualizes *as a unit* a change in a
spatially extended portion of the brain of the agent.

Hodgson's final aim is to provide a scientifically respectable theory of
personal responsibility, and his endeavor to make the selection process
depend on neither rules nor chance is intended to blunt the argument
that each of a person's acts is a consequence of ultimate causes beyond
his control, or pure chance, and hence that he cannot be held
responsible for it. Quantum theory gives a reply to that claim. Personal
responsibility arises not from ultimate causes but from immediate
causes, and specifically from an agent's capacity to adequately grasp
the consequences of its possible actions, and to control its actions on
the basis of judgments about those consequences. Classical mechanics
provides no way to scientifically understand how a human agent,
consisting basically of collections of "solid, massy, hard,
impenetrable, movable particles" (Newton: Optics, 3^rd^ ed, p,375/6) can
have the feelings by which we evaluate the integral content of complex
physical structures that extend over extended portions of the brain, and
how those feelings can produce felt judgments that can have physical
consequences that go beyond the mindless effects of local mechanical
motions. But quantum mechanics converts the starkly material character
of the classical state of the brain into the qualities of knowledge,
information, and probability that are closer in character to experience,
and it features a mathematical opening that allows experiences *per se*
to enter into brain dynamics in a way that permits non-localized
evaluative feelings to influence what the brain does. These features of
the quantum brain make it far better suited to account for the adequate
grasping and control needed to bear responsibility than the motions of
miniature billiard balls.

*References.*

Bohr, N. (1958). *Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge.* New York: Wiley.

Bohr, N. (1963). Essays 1958/1962 on *Atomic Physics and Human
Knowledge.* New York: Wiley.

Stapp, H. (2003). Mind, Matter, and Quantum Mechanics, 2^nd^ Ed. Berlin
& New York: Springer.

Von Neumann, J. (1955/1932). *Mathematical Foundations of Quantum
Mechanics.* Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Translated by Robert
T. Beyer from the 1932 German original, Mathematiche Grundlagen der
Quantummechanik. Berlin: J. Springer)