**Chapter 4: Response**

**Chapter Outline**

1.  Introduction of topics and concepts to be discussed in this chapter.

    a.  Local Response

    b.  State Response

    c.  Volunteer Group Response

    d.  Federal Response

    e.  Incident Command System

2.  Case Studies

    a.  2003 California Wildfire Response

    b.  Space Shuttle Columbia Disaster

    c.  Pentagon Attack on September 11, 2001

3.  Additional Sources of Information

4.  Glossary of Terms

5.  Acronyms

6.  Discussion Questions

    a.  General

    b.  Firestorm 2003

    c.  Columbia Space Shuttle Disaster

    d.  September 11, 2001 Attack at the Pentagon

7\. Suggested Out of Class Exercises

**Introduction**

When a disaster event such as a flood, earthquake, hurricane or
terrorist attack occurs, the first responders to this event are always
local police, fire and emergency medical personnel. Their job is to
rescue and attend to those injured, suppress fires, secure and police
the disaster area and to begin the process of restoring order. They are
supported in this effort by local emergency management personnel and
community government officials.

If the size of the disaster event is so large that the capabilities of
local responders are overwhelmed and the costs of the damage inflicted
exceeds the capacity of the local government, the Mayor or County
Executive will turn to the Governor and State Government for assistance
in responding to the event and in helping the community to recover. The
Governor will turn to the State's emergency management agency and
possibly the State National Guard and other State resources to provide
this assistance to the stricken community.

Should the Governor decide, based on information generated by community
and State officials, that the size of the disaster event exceeds the
State's capacity to respond, the Governor will make a formal request to
the President for a Presidential major disaster declaration. This
request is prepared by State officials in cooperation with regional
staff from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). The
Governor's request is analyzed first by the FEMA Regional Office and
then forwarded to FEMA headquarters in Washington, DC. FEMA headquarters
staff review and evaluate the Governor's request and forward their
analysis and recommendation to the President. The President considers
FEMA's recommendation and then makes a decision to grant the declaration
or to turn it down.

If the President grants a major disaster declaration, FEMA activates the
National Response Plan (FRP) and proceeds to direct 28 Federal
Departments and Agencies including the American Red Cross in support of
State and local efforts to respond to and recover from the disaster
event. The Presidential declaration also unleashes several disaster
assistance programs in FEMA and other Federal agencies designed to
assist individuals and communities to begin the process of rebuilding
their homes, their community infrastructure and their lives.

This system is built on coordination and cooperation among a significant
number of Federal, State and local government agencies, volunteer
organizations and, more recently, the business community.

In the 1990's the emergency management system in the United States was
tested repeatedly by major disaster events such as the 1993 Midwest
floods, the 1994 Northridge earthquake and a series of devastating
hurricanes and tornadoes. In each instance, the system worked to bring
the full resources of the Federal, State and local governments to
produce the most comprehensive and effective response possible. The
system also leveraged the capabilities and resources of our nation's
cadre of volunteer organizations to provide immediate food and shelter.
In recent years, government officials and agencies at all levels have
begun to reach out to the business community to both leverage their
response capabilities and to work closer with them in the recovery
effort.

# ***Local Response***

Minor disasters occur daily in communities around the United States.
Local fire, police and emergency medical personnel respond to these
events usually in a systematic and well-planned course of action.
Firefighters, police officers and emergency medical technicians respond
to the scene. Their job is to secure the scene and maintain order,
rescue and treat those injured, contain and suppress fire or hazardous
conditions and retrieve the dead.

The types of minor disasters responded to at the community level include
hazardous materials transportation and storage incidents, fires and
localized flooding. Local officials are also the first responders to
major disaster events such as large floods, hurricanes and major
earthquakes but in these instances their efforts are supported, upon
request by community leaders, by State government and, by request of the
Governor and approval of the President, by the Federal government.

The actions of local first responders are driven by procedures and
protocols developed by the responding agency (i.e. fire, police and
emergency medical). Most communities in the United States have developed
community-wide emergency plans that incorporate these procedures and
protocols. These community emergency plans also identify roles and
responsibilities for all responding agencies and personnel for a wide
range of disaster scenarios. The plans also include copies of the
statutory authorities that provide the legal backing for emergency
operations in the community.

In the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist events, many communities
are reviewing and reworking their community emergency plans to include
procedures and protocols for responding to all forms of terrorist
attacks including bio-terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.

***State Response***

Each of the 50 states and 6 territories that comprise the United States
maintain a State government office of emergency management. Funding for
state emergency management offices comes principally from FEMA and state
budgets. For years, FEMA has provided up to \$175 million annually to
States to fund State and local government emergency management
activities. This money is used by state emergency management agencies to
hire staff, conduct training and exercises and for purchasing equipment.
A segment of this funding is targeted for local emergency management
operations as designated by the State. State budgets also provide
funding for emergency management operations but this funding
historically has been inconsistent especially in those states with
minimal annual disaster activity.

The principal resource available to Governors in responding to a
disaster event in their state is the National Guard. The resources of
the National Guard that can be used in disaster response include
personnel, communications systems and equipment, air and road transport,
heavy construction and earth moving equipment, mass care and feeding
equipment and emergency supplies such as beds, blankets and medical
supplies.

***Volunteer Group Response***

Volunteer groups are on the front line of any disaster response.
National groups such as the American Red Cross and the Salvation Army
roster and maintain local chapters of volunteers who are trained in
emergency response. These organizations work with local, State and
Federal authorities to address the immediate needs of disaster victims.
These organizations provide shelter, food and clothing to disaster
victims who have lost their homes to disasters large and small.

In addition to the Red Cross and the Salvation Army, there are numerous
volunteer groups across the country that provide aid and comfort to
disaster victims. The National Volunteer Organizations Against Disasters
(NVOAD) is comprised of 34 national member organizations, 52 State and
territorial VOADs and a growing number of local VOADs involved in
disaster response and recovery operations around the country and abroad.
Formed in 1970, NVOAD helps member groups at a disaster location to
coordinate and communicate in order to provide the most efficient and
effective response.

***Federal Response***

In 1992 the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) developed the
Federal Response Plan (FRP). FEMA defined the FRP as, a "Signed
agreement among 27 Federal departments and agencies, including the
American Red Cross, that: Provides the mechanism for coordinating
delivery of Federal assistance and resources to augment efforts of State
and local governments overwhelmed by a major disaster or emergency,
Supports implementation of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and
Emergency Assistance Act, as amended (42 U.S.C. 5121, et seq.), as well
as individual agency statutory authorities and Supplements other Federal
emergency operations plans developed to address specific hazards." The
fundamental goal of the FRP was to maximize available Federal resources
in support of response and recovery actions taken by State and local
emergency officials.

> Following the absorption of FEMA into the Department of Homeland
> Security, on February 18^th^, 2003, President Bush signed Presidential
> Directive 5 (HSPD-5) "to enhance the ability of the United States to
> manage domestic incidents by establishing a single, comprehensive
> national incident management system." This action authorized the
> design and development of a National Response Plan (NRP) to "align
> Federal coordination structures, capabilities, and resources into a
> unified, all-discipline, and all-hazards approach to domestic incident
> management."

The NRP was designed according to the template of the National Incident
Management System (NIMS -- released March 1, 2004), so as to ensure that
a consistent doctrinal framework exists for the management of incidents
at all jurisdictional levels, regardless of the incident cause, size, or
complexity. NIMS was created to integrate effective practices in
emergency preparedness and response into a comprehensive national
framework for incident management. NIMS enables responders at all levels
to work together more effectively and efficiently to manage domestic
incidents no matter what the cause, size or complexity, including
catastrophic acts of terrorism and disasters.

DHS lists the benefits of the NIMS system to be:

-   Standardized organizational structures, processes and procedures;

-   Standards for planning, training and exercising, and personnel
    qualification standards;

-   Equipment acquisition and certification standards;

-   Interoperable communications processes, procedures and systems;

-   Information management systems; and

-   Supporting technologies -- voice and data communications systems,
    information systems, data display systems and specialized
    technologies

Consistent with the model provided in the NIMS, the NRP can be partially
or fully implemented in the context of a threat, anticipation of a
significant event, or the response to a significant event. Selective
implementation through the activation of one or more of the system's
components allows for flexibility in meeting the unique operational and
information-sharing requirements of the situation at hand and enabling
effective interaction between various Federal and non-Federal entities.

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The NRP provides the framework for Federal interaction with State,
local, and tribal governments; the private sector; and NGOs in the
context of domestic incident prevention, preparedness, response, and
recovery activities. It describes capabilities and resources and
establishes responsibilities, operational processes, and protocols to
help protect the Nation from terrorist attacks and other natural and
manmade hazards; save lives; protect public health, safety, property,
and the environment; and reduce adverse psychological consequences and
disruptions. Finally, the NRP serves as the foundation for the
development of detailed supplemental plans and procedures to effectively
and efficiently implement Federal incident management activities and
assistance in the context of specific types of incidents.

The NRP establishes mechanisms to:

-   Maximize the integration of incident-related prevention,
    preparedness, response, and recovery activities;

-   Improve coordination and integration of Federal, State, local,
    tribal, regional, private-sector, and nongovernmental organization
    partners;

-   Maximize efficient utilization of resources needed for effective
    incident management and Critical Infrastructure/Key Resources
    (CI/KR) protection and restoration;

-   Improve incident management communications and increase situational
    awareness across jurisdictions and between the public and private
    sectors;

-   Facilitate emergency mutual aid and Federal emergency support to
    State, local, and tribal governments;

-   Facilitate Federal-to-Federal interaction and emergency support;

-   Provide a proactive and integrated Federal response to catastrophic
    events; and

-   Address linkages to other Federal incident management and emergency
    response plans developed for specific types of incidents or hazards.

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The NRP covers the full range of complex and constantly changing
requirements in anticipation of or in response to threats or acts of
terrorism, major disasters, and other emergencies. The NRP also provides
the basis to initiate long-term community recovery and mitigation
activities. The NRP establishes interagency and multi-jurisdictional
mechanisms for Federal Government involvement in, and DHS coordination
of, domestic incident management operations.

***Incident Command System***

A difficult issue in any response operation is determining who is in
charge of the overall response effort. The Incident Command System (ICS)
was developed after the 1970 fires in southern California. Duplication
of efforts, lack of coordination and communication hindered all agencies
responding to the expanding fires. The main function of ICS is to
establish a set of planning and management systems that would help the
agencies responding to a disaster to work together in a coordinated and
systematic approach. The step-by-step process enables the numerous
responding agencies to effectively use resources and personnel to
respond to those in need.

There are multiple functions in the ICS system. They include common use
of terminology, integrated communications, a unified command structure,
resource management and action planning. There is a planned set of
directives that include assigning one coordinator to manage the
infrastructure of the response. Assigning personnel, deploying
equipment, obtaining resources and working with the numerous agencies
that respond to the disaster scene. In most instances it is the local
fire chief or fire commissioner who is the Incident Commander.

For the ICS to be effective, it must provide for effective operations at
three levels of incident character: 1) single jurisdiction and/or single
agency; 2) single jurisdiction with multiple agency support; and 3)
multi-jurisdictional and/or multi-agency support. The organizational
structure must be adaptable to a wide variety of emergencies (i.e.,
fire, flood, earthquake, and rescue). The ICS includes agency autonomy,
management by objectives, unity integrity, functional clarity, and
effective span of control. The logistics, coordination and ability of
the multiple agencies to work together must adhere to the ICS so that
efficient leadership is maintained during the disaster.

There are five major management systems within the ICS. They include
Command, Operations, Planning, Logistics, and Finance.

-   The Command Section includes developing, directing and maintaining
    communication and collaboration with the multiple agencies on site.
    Working with the local officials, the public and the media to
    provide up-to-date information regarding the disaster.

-   The Operations Section handles the tactical operations, coordinates
    the command objectives, develops tactical operations, organizes and
    directs all resources to the disaster site.

-   The Planning Section provides the necessary information to the
    command center to develop the action plan to accomplish the
    objectives. This section also collects and evaluates information as
    it is made available.

-   The Logistics Section provides personnel, equipment and support for
    the Command Center. They handle the coordination of all services
    that are involved in the response from locating rescue equipment to
    coordinating the response for volunteer organizations such as the
    Salvation Army and the Red Cross.

-   The Finance Section is responsible for the accounting for funds used
    during the response and recovery aspect of the disaster. The finance
    section monitors costs related to incident and provides accounting
    procurement time recording cost analyses.

The following three case studies provide a clear illustration of the
complexity of effectively responding to a large disaster event. State
and local response roles and responsibilities are detailed. The role of
the Federal response and how the National Response Plan is implemented
and the full resources of the Federal government are brought to bear on
a disaster event are clearly illustrated in the case studies. The role
of volunteer organizations are described. How the Incident Command
System functions is profiled in all three case studies.

**Case Study 4.1: 2003 California Wildfire Response**

**Background**

"Firestorm 2003," as described by the news media, was a wildfire
disaster event never before seen in terms of the combined scope and
impact of its many fires. In total, five Southern California counties
--- Los Angeles, San Bernardino, San Diego, Ventura, and Riverside ---
suffered the consequences of severe wildland fires that were devastating
in both their speed and the breadth of their advance, during a harrowing
two-week period that began in late October of 2003. Ultimately, this
multi-fire event required the emergency services of a staggering 15,000
firefighters, who battled the flames in an area of just under
three-quarters of a million acres (749,401 acres -- an area roughly the
size of Rhode Island). In total, 22 human and countless animal lives
were lost, billions of dollars in damage was sustained, including the
destruction of over 4,800 homes, and approximately \$120 million was
spent in suppression. (Garvey, 28 Dec 03)

California experiences frequent wildfires, although it is very rare that
they strike with the force and magnitude seen during "Firestorm 2003."
Mitigation tactics had been employed prior to 2003 for the purpose of
avoiding extreme wildfire events, but these measures proved inadequate
in the face of the conditions that existed in late 2003. Of the \$53
million spent on fire reduction in the state of California, the four
southern forests involved in this event had received only \$4 million -
less than ten percent of the funds. These forests contain 17% of the
state's National Forest land, and they exist in close proximity to some
of the country's most populated urban areas. Of the approximately
750,000 acres burned, 68% was private, non-federal land, with the
average distance between any of the wilderness areas and a community
only 5.6 miles. (Mission-Centered Solutions)

**Factors Affecting Wildfires in Southern California**

California fires are influenced by several factors, including:

-   The Wildland/Urban Interface

-   Fuel Type and Levels

-   Topography

-   Climate

**Wildland / Urban Interface**

This is the area where the human (built) environment meets the natural
environment. In Southern California, where property value is at a
premium, development has pushed farther and farther into the hills that
were once devoid of structure fire risk. This expansion into the hills
and forests has resulted in great increases in the wildland fire hazard
risk for both structures and lives, most significantly because of the
increased demand the distances and number of structures at risk have
placed upon existing firefighting systems. According to the California
Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (CDF), more than 7.2 million
California homes are categorized in the three highest fire risk levels ―
more than 6 million of which are located in urban areas. Los Angeles
County has more than 734,000 homes at risk (22.5 percent of all the
homes in the county), while San Diego County has more than 619,000, or
59.5 percent. In all, the estimated 585,000 homes categorized in the
highest risk level statewide pose a potential financial loss of at least
\$106 billion, according to CDF projections.

**Fuel Type and Levels**

As in all wildfires, the type and amount of fuel present will be a
primary determinant factor in wildfire risk. In Southern California,
where climatological conditions dry out vegetation quickly and on an
annual basis, fuel levels are almost always at critical levels. The type
of vegetation in Southern California, chaparral, is highly susceptible
to fire and serves to increase overall risk factors. Some of the
vegetation in the area exhibit characteristics that exacerbate fire
conditions, such as producing leaves covered with flammable resins, that
emit volatile gases when burned, or that are purposely high in flammable
materials for the purpose of releasing seeds when burned.

**Topography**

The shape of the land affects wildfire behavior in many ways.
Additionally, it affects wildfires both indirectly and directly.
Directly it serves to influence wind and fire behavior. The hilliness of
Southern California, which is dominated by valleys and canyons, causes
the wind speeds to increase, which in turn acts to both fuel and move
fires quickly. Land with steep slopes also supports fire movement and
burning much better than flat land. A fire will quickly move up a slope
with or without the help of wind, while on a flat field it will move
much more slowly unless strong winds are present to push it along.
Indirectly, the land increases the risk by making it more difficult for
firefighting officials to reach and attack the fires. Unfortunately,
these same hills are sought after by developers because of the views
they provide homeowners.

**Climate**

Southern California is hot and very dry. Low precipitation adds to the
drying effect of the vegetation. Additionally, the Santa Ana winds,
which originate in Utah and are also hot and dry, exacerbate this risk
each fall when fire risk is already at its highest. Drought, the
climatological condition where rainfall is at dangerously low levels,
contributes to fire risk both by increasing fuel levels and by
decreasing water resources available for firefighting. Further
complicating the problem are the bark beetles, which are more deadly to
trees during times of drought.

**Fire protection in California**

In California, the Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (CDF)
works in cooperation with the Governor's Office of Emergency Services
(OES), as well as neighboring State governments through a network of
mutual aid agreements to fight wildland fires. CDF is also a dedicated
firefighting partner to the Federal government, with experience
contributing to firefighting efforts on the 45 million acres of Federal
lands in the State.

CDF is the largest multipurpose fire protection agency in the United
States, responsible for wildland fire protection of over 31 million
acres of California's privately owned watershed lands, as well as 11
million acres under agreements with local governments. CDF responds to
over 7,000 wildland vegetation fires on State responsibility areas each
year. Approximately 95 percent of these fires are contained in less than
10 acres. CDF commands a force of approximately 3,800 full-time fire
professionals, 1,400 seasonal personnel, and approximately 7,800
volunteers. In addition to its 1,027 fire engines, CDF maintains a
significant fleet of aircraft that includes seventeen 800-gallon air
tankers, one 3,000-gallon and two 2,000-gallon contract air tankers, 13
air attack planes, and 10 helicopters. (Department of Homeland Security)

**Detailed Description of the "Firestorm"**

From 1998 to 2003, the weather was atypically dry in Southern
California. In the 10 months leading up to the fires, the region
received only half its average rainfall. Without the occurrence of even
one summer season storm, which typically soak the area's dry land, 2003
ranked in the bottom 5^th^ percentile for rainfall over the preceding
108-year period. Concurrently, wildfire fuel was accumulating and, as
such, exacerbating the disaster risk substantially. By the end of
September, Southern California had burned only 22% of their 10-year
average acres. Additionally, insect infestations had resulted in high
tree mortality rates, and human development had pushed the limits of the
wildlife urban interface. These combined conditions ultimately resulted
in the issuance of a Red Flag Warning for extreme southwestern
California, which was placed on October 25^th^, 2003 by the National
Weather Service (NWS). (NICC)

During the months of July and August of 2003, the Southern California
Area experienced moderate to heavy initial attack activity and steady
large fire occurrence. Aggressive initial attack actions limited large
fire occurrence on both state and federal lands to mostly short duration
incidents. Numerous fires on federal lands were placed in Wildfire use
status in August, including those National Park lands as well as the
Sequoia, Inyo and Stanislaus National Forests. (NICC)

[]{.mark}

The multiple wildfires that started in October and eventually raged out
of control have been traced to several sources, all arson based. The
initial fire event that triggered the rolling progression was started as
a signal fire set by a lost hunter in the mountains east of Ramona to
communicate his position. Referred to as the Cedar Fire, the blaze was
first reported as a small outbreak before 5:37 p.m. on October 25.
Officials investigating the California wildfires have also deemed at
least two other major fires --- the Grand Prix and the Old Fires --- on
arson, though these appeared to have been set entirely for destructive
purposed. (Marquez) The remaining fires are considered offshoots of
these human-initiated fires.

[]{.mark}

Eventually, the fires crossed into urbanized areas. Burning embers,
emitted by the wildfires and carried by the winds generated by the
intense heat, ignited numerous spot fires in developed neighborhoods.
Ornamental vegetation, which was already dry due to the ongoing drought,
quickly caught fire and created ember showers that "carried into attic
vents and under roof eaves, burning most homes from the inside out."
(Mission-Centered Solutions) The structure fires, burning out of
control, quickly moved through entire neighborhoods.

The Southern California fires were maintained and fueled by several
factors, leading to rates of spreading rarely experienced before. The
Santa Ana winds, which are very hot and dry, helped to both continue to
dry out vegetation and to fan the wildfire flames already burning. These
winds blew at speeds of up to 40 mph during the period when the fires
were being fought, lending to extremely unpredictable fire behavior and
erratic changes in fire direction. Sudden wind shifts and huge fire
whirls threw embers and flaming debris far ahead of the main fire. The
fires spread along paths defined by high fuel loads in both forests and
rangelands, going over and around barrier after barrier. The initial
attack of these fires, as result, was both more difficult and more
dangerous than what many of the firefighters had previously encountered.
One fire, for instance, grew from 500 to 31,000 acres in only four
hours. (Mission-Centered Solutions)

In total, 12 major fires burned in the event referred to as 'Firestorm
2003'. These fires resulted in a combined 749,401 acres of land burned.
Property damage amounted to 4,812 homes destroyed, and an additional 185
homes damaged. In three of the fires, the Cedar, Old, and Paradise,
lives were lost -- a total of 24. Over 200 people were injured, and over
3000 families were left homeless. By the end of the month of October,
the fire losses sustained was 215% *greater* than the 10-year average
acres burned for the region.

**The specific fires:**

**The Padua Fire -** This fire was an outgrowth of the Grand Prix Fire,
which began on October 21, 2003, in San Bernardino County. It destroyed
59 homes and burned 10,466 acres before being contained on November 5,
2003.

**The Verdale Fire -** The Verdale Fire started on October 24, 2003, in
Los Angeles, threatening over 350 residences and 40 businesses in the
towns of Val Verde and Piru, as well as major electrical transmission
lines and an oil field in its path. It is suspected that arson started
this fire, which burned approximately 8,680 acres before being contained
on October 29, 2003.

**The Mountain Fire -** The Mountain fire started around October 26,
2003. The fire burned approximately 10,446 acres, destroying nearly 60
structures. Approximately 350 firefighters managed to contain the fire
on October 30, 2003, at an estimated cost of \$1.2 million.

**The Pass Fire -** The Pass Fire started on October 21, 2003, in the
Reche Canyon area in Riverside County. Within hours, the swift-moving
flames threatened nearly a hundred homes, prompting many residents to
evacuate the area. State and local fire investigators suspect arson as
the cause. Two hundred and fifty CDF and county firefighters deployed to
the scene to battle the blaze, assisted by some area residents
determined to save their homes. By the time the Pass Fire was contained
on November 3, 2003, it burned over 2,387 acres, destroyed five homes
and damaged three others. Total firefighting expenses for the Pass Fire
are estimated at approximately \$1.7 million, which saved as much as
\$30 million in property.

**The Grand Prix Fire -** On October 21, 2003, this fire began in Coyote
Canyon, near a construction site. The fire consumed 2,500 acres in its
first day. As the fire snaked into the San Bernardino National Forest, a
USFS Incident Management Team took over command of firefighting
operations, joining CDF and local firefighting personnel, hundreds of
engines and aircraft, and four "hot-shot" crews from Oregon, Nevada,
Virginia and the Navajo Nation. The Grand Prix Fire met the Old Fire to
the East, and the Padua Fire to the West by October 26, 2003, covering
over 52,000 acres, destroying 60 homes, and prompting 5,000 residents to
evacuate the area as the fire marched through Rancho Cucamonga, Upland,
Claremont and La Verne. The Grand Prix Fire was fully contained on
November 8, 2003, after burning approximately 60,000 acres, causing one
death and 35 injuries, and destroying 135 homes.

**The Old Fire --** This fire started on October 25, 2003, in San
Bernardino. Fire investigators suspect arson as the cause. Within a day,
the Old Fire met the Grand Prix Fire, creating a blackened, 60,000-acre
band from Claremont to Running Springs. The fire threatened the
communities of Crestline, Lake Arrowhead, and Big Bear, as fire crews,
joined by military personnel, dropped load after load of water from
helicopters and converted military cargo planes and conducted back
burning operations to eliminate fuels in the fire's path. Over 1,600
displaced residents were relocated to unused airport hangers at San
Bernardino International Airport where the American Red Cross (ARC)
operated a shelter. The Old Fire was contained on November 6, 2003,
after burning 91,281 acres, destroying 993 homes and 10 businesses, and
was responsible for six deaths and 12 injuries.

**The Cedar Fire -** The Cedar Fire, the largest and most destructive of
the California wildfires, started on October 25, 2003, in San Diego
County, reportedly by a lost hunter. In the early hours of October 26,
2003, the Cedar fire swept along the Wildcat Canyon area of San Diego
County, disrupting electricity and killing 11 people, several in their
vehicles as they attempted to evacuate the area. Within two days, the
Cedar Fire grew to 115,000 acres, burning rapidly through the Cleveland
National Forest, as well as 25,000 acres within San Diego City limits,
destroying 150 homes. By the time it was contained on November 5, 2003,
the Cedar Fire proved the costliest in terms of lives and property,
burning 273,246 acres. The fire caused 14 deaths and 113 injuries. It
took a total of 1,478 personnel from USFS, CDF, and local fire
departments to contain the fire, at an estimated cost of \$27 million.
The Cedar Fire was the costliest in terms of residential property
damages, destroying over 2,200 residences and 22 businesses.

**The Paradise Fire -** The Paradise fire started around October 26,
2003 on the Rincon Indian Reservation. The cause of the fire is under
investigation, but is suspected to have been the result of either a
campfire or arson. Thousands of residents were evacuated, while 788
personnel from USFS, CDF, the California Department of Fish and Game,
and local fire districts battled the blaze. The Paradise Fire quickly
swept the southern perimeter of the Cleveland National Forest, from
Valley Central to Escondido, only a few miles north of the Cedar Fire.
By the time it was fully contained it caused two deaths and 24 injuries.

**The Otay Fire -** Also known as the Mine Fire, the Otay Fire started
on October 26, 2003, in San Diego County. The fire burned approximately
46,291 acres, briefly skirting the border into Tijuana, Mexico. It was
contained by October 28, 2003, by CDF and local fire crews after
destroying one home and causing one injury. The fire's cause remains
under investigation.

**The Roblar 2 Fire -** The Roblar 2 Fire started at the Camp Pendleton
Marine Corps Base, south of the Cleveland National Forest, on October
21, 2003. The Fire was contained by October 29, 2003, after burning
nearly 7,000 acres.

**The Piru Fire -** The Piru Fire started on October 23, 2003, and
burned in and around the Los Padres National Forest. Approximately 1,400
firefighting personnel managed to contain the 63,991-acre fire in rough
and inaccessible terrain between Lake Piru and northwest Fillmore, but
not before it destroyed three homes and injured 20 people. The cause of
the fire is still under investigation, but arson is suspected.

**The Simi Fire -** The Simi Fire started around October 25, 2003, in
the area of Simi Valley. Pushed by Santa Ana Winds, the Simi Fire
initially advanced at a rate of 20 miles per day as CDF and county fire
crews labored to block its path. The Simi Fire was contained on November
1, 2003, after burning 108,204 acres, destroying 37 homes and causing 21
injuries. Its cause is under investigation.

**Participants and Their Actions**

The sheer complexity of combating multiple, high-hazard fires over
thousands of acres within a focused, highly populated urban geographic
area tested local, state, and federal fire and emergency response
resources. Most impressively, the Southern California fires showcased
the skill, desire, initiative and unwavering firefighting and emergency
operations, leaving many "best practices" for all those involved with
the emergency management of high-risk incidents. (USDA Forest Service)

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The daunting task of coordinating 15,000 firefighters and thousands of
law enforcement personnel could only be effectively achieved through a
structured architecture of resource management and communication.
Resource mobilization to southern California in support of the fire
included six Type I Incident Management Teams, one National Area Command
Team, some 800 overhead resources, 200 engines, 60 aircraft and 40
crews. (Annual Fire Summary) The first responders command structure is
shown in the organizational chart below, with a brief description of
each functional area.

**Figure 4.1.1: First Responder Command Structure**

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A multi-agency coordination (MAC) group was established under the
Incident Command System (ICS) as a unified command for elected
officials, agency administrators and senior department chiefs. It served
as the governing body overseeing the efforts. MAC was responsible for
state and federal scale coordination, resource requests, and, most
importantly, centralized command and control.

The Joint Information Center (JIC) was centrally located within the MAC
group. It was responsible for information management, media control and
ensuring that a proactive, unified message was communicated to the
public. It is important to note that with the JIC in place, the
potentially confusing distinctions between agencies eventually
disappeared in the public's mind.

Type I and II Incident Management Teams (IMTs) were assigned the
operational and functional roles of attacking the fire. Type I IMTs
manage large wildland fires with over 600 people assigned and address
the most complex logistical, fiscal, planning, operational and safety
issues. During the fires, the Type I responsibilities were to create
fuel breaks, coordinate pre-fire preparation, and work with
infrastructure and utilities support crews to coordinate evacuation
routes to ensure ingress and egress, and service restoration. Type II
IMTs, which generally manage less complex wildland fires and typically
have fewer than 500 people, were tasked with community protection for
areas far ahead of the fire. Each of the Type I and II IMTs, staffed
with a minimum number of actual firefighting resources, utilized local
fire departments in the planning process because of their extensive
knowledge of the areas.

Firefighting Safety Officers were assigned to several IMTs. Their main
responsibility was to critically analyze each of the firefighters'
cognitive abilities and their ability to maintain situational awareness.
By concentrating on the well being of the firefighters themselves, they
were able to ensure that the individuals were staying focused on the
task at hand while concurrently staying aware of their own safety.

The San Bernardino and San Diego County Mountain Area Safety Taskforces
(MASTs), established in December 2002, participated in the fighting of
these fires and were credited with saving numerous lives, thousands of
homes and thousands of acres of land. The MASTs were originally created
to "assure public safety through the development of evacuation plans,
hazard tree and fuel removal, and planning and public information."
Comprised of local, state, and federal agencies, as well as private
companies and volunteer organizations, the MASTs had conducted tabletop
exercises and prepared training videos for law enforcement officers and
agency leaders in basic fire behavior and the implementation of the
Incident Command System (ICS). These activities and others were credited
with creating the working relationships that were key to controlling the
fires as quickly as possible. (Mission-Centered Solutions)

As with most wildfires, aircraft proved essential in containing the
blazes and in providing situational awareness to the ground forces where
visibility was obscured. Dispatchers, air attack teams, helicopters and
air tankers worked as a collective team and on a common frequency
throughout the event, and, once command and control was established,
with the ICPs. Initially, airspace coordination was very difficult and
complicated during the time when external resources were reporting in to
assist. However, airspace coordination greatly improved with dedicated
air space coordinators and FAA representatives on scene. The city and
regional airports, including Camp Pendleton and Naval Air Station
Lemoore, continued normal flying hours and were used as bases of
operation. (USDA Forest Service)

The National Interagency Fire Center (NIFC - see Sidebar 4.1.1) provided
\$7.5 million in supplies and critical support to firefighting forces on
the ground, including 245 Engines and 6 Type 1 Incident Management
Teams. NIFC member agencies made substantial contributions to State and
local firefighting response operations, including:

-   Six Federally sponsored National Interagency Incident Management
    Teams were mobilized to coordinate firefighting efforts.

-   Federal wildland fire agencies provided 77 Fire Crews, 19 Air
    Tankers (16 of which were mobilized through reactivation of
    contracts which had ended for the season.), and 36 helicopters
    provided by DOI through NIFC, as reported by the Office of Wildland
    Fires Coordination.

-   NIFC also provided support staff, such as 1,051 Overhead personnel,
    12 Caterers, and 22 Shower Units, as well as communications gear,
    including 1,661 handheld radios and 30 repeaters/links contributed
    through DOI.

-   BLM responded with all available resource ordered for the
    suppression effort and supplied BLM Liaisons to all fires that had
    an impact on BLM administered lands. BLM's Emergency Operations
    Expenditures are estimated at \$2,349,787.

-   FWS conducted Wildland-Urban Interface (WUI) fuels reduction work
    before the fires in San Diego that protected homes and assisted in
    containment of the Otay Fire. Anticipating the potential impact of
    the Santa Ana winds, FWS pre-positioned its engines, crews and fire
    overhead from southern Oregon and northern California Refuges to its
    southern California Refuges. These fire resources were instrumental
    in protecting both wildlife refuges and private properties. FWS
    estimates its emergency operations expenses at \$264,888.

-   While none of the large fires directly affected National Park
    Service (NPS) areas in California, they contributed a significant
    percentage of our available firefighting resources towards
    containment efforts.

By October 25, 2003, FEMA issued eight Fire Management Assistance Grant
Program (FMAGP -- See Sidebar 4.1.2) declarations to support joint
Federal, State, and local firefighting efforts. Meanwhile, Governor
Davis declared a State of Emergency for San Bernardino and Ventura
Counties, followed by San Diego and Los Angeles Counties the following
day. CDF deployed 209 engines, 173 crews and close to 3,000 personnel
assigned to fight the wildfires, while the Office of Emergency Services
(OES) committed 545 local government engines and 101 OES engines, 2
water tenders, and one support unit to these fires.

The American Red Cross (ARC), as a lead agency in the Federal Response
Plan, opened 24 evacuation centers in cooperation with local officials,
assisting thousands who evacuated the burn areas. The Southern
California Voluntary Organizations Active in Disasters (VOAD), an
umbrella group comprised of leading national and local nonprofit and
faith-based organizations including ARC, the Salvation Army, and others
also assisted State and local governments in providing food, shelter,
and other essential services to fire victims in Los Angeles, Riverside,
San Bernardino, San Diego, and Ventura Counties.

By October 26, 2003, 11 lives were lost, 500 homes destroyed and 30,000
others were threatened. Thousands were ordered to evacuate as
firefighters battled the wildfires that had consumed more than 200,000
acres. DHS-FEMA's Region IX office in Oakland, California, activated its
Regional Operations Center (ROC) at Level III to work in close
coordination with the California OES Fire and Rescue Branch to monitor
fire activity and start planning response and recovery efforts.

On October 27, 2003, President Bush declared a major disaster for the
State of California, designating Los Angeles, San Bernardino, San Diego,
and Ventura Counties, with the subsequent addition of Riverside County
for Federal disaster assistance. FEMA placed the National Emergency
Response Team (ERT-N) White on alert, and field staff pre-positioned
resources that would be needed for recovery operations. With the
President's major disaster declaration, the Federal Response Plan (FRP)
was fully activated.

With the activation of the FRP, the National Emergency Operations Center
was augmented with additional Information and Planning personnel
beginning October 29, 2003, to support field operations, with
representatives from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) Emergency
Support Center (ESF #3---Public Works and Engineering), USFS (ESF
#4---Firefighting), ARC (ESF #6---Mass Care), as well as an Operations
Chief and a Mission Assignment Coordinator. All ESFs, except USDA's mass
feeding component (ESF #11) and Urban Search and Rescue (ESF #9) were
deployed to FEMA's joint Disaster Field Office (DFO), which was
established in Pasadena, with satellite operating facilities in San
Bernardino and San Diego, as well as a resources staging area at nearby
March Air Force Base.

By November 15, 2003, all fires were contained by the Federal, State,
and local crews. In all, over 15,000 firefighters and 17,000 fire trucks
had been mobilized by intergovernmental and interagency efforts. While
many fire units were demobilized as fire activity began to dissipate,
several continued to identify and extinguish "hot spots" in remote and
sparsely populated areas into early December.

The fires left over 350,000 cubic yards of debris and ash, costing
millions to remove. Experts provisionally estimated insured losses
between \$1.7-\$3.5 billion, placing them among the costliest fires in
American history. As response operations began to wind down, Federal and
state agencies, local and tribal authorities, and the dedicated
volunteers of national and local voluntary and faith-based organizations
began to assess damages, coordinate joint recovery operations, and
expedite the delivery of aid to devastated communities.

**Lessons Learned / Best Practices**

**Interagency Cooperation**

The key to Southern California's interagency cooperation was the
pre-existing Incident Command System (ICS). The ICS established common
precepts wherein diverse groups could establish an effective,
centralized command and control with which to function effectively. The
cooperative training done in an ICS format proved invaluable. The most
effective firefighters were the groups that incorporated ICS training
down to the tactical level and also conducted joint training with
ancillary groups, such as the Red Cross. (Mission-Centered Solutions)
ICS scenario training had exposed responders to the planning and
operational considerations of outside teams, and conversely gave the
outside teams insight into the dynamics of wildland fires.

Despite training and pre-planning facilitated by the county MAST
organization, confusion predominated the onset of the fires. Interagency
relationships as the coordinated response was beginning to take place
were described as 'cordial' but lacking any real coordination -- as
such, information and intelligence failed to flow effectively.
Additionally, planning and logistics were in disarray for the first few
operational periods, due in part to administrative difficulties with
resource acquisition systems, and completing regional demands for fire
suppression and support resources. The Incident Command System, however,
was effectively implemented in the response to the fires. (San Diego
News Service)

**Command & Control**

Command and Control, the backbone of any successful large-scale
operation, was performed effectively during the Southern California
fires despite several difficulties and a slow start in underestimating
the impending disaster. Initial and extended attack operations of the
fires, evacuation, suppression and aviation operations were conducted
within a command system that had been refined from previous fire lessons
learned, but the command system was primarily hampered due to
difficulties with radio communications, the fast spread of fire through
different jurisdictions, and rapidly changing operations and priorities.
(USDA Forest Service)

**Communication Systems**

Radio interoperability problems were cited as the largest problem
encountered during the wildland fires, causing coordination difficulties
between cooperating agencies, command and tactical units, air and ground
units, and even between engines on the same strike team. During recent
years, municipal and county fire departments in California converted to
an 800MHz-radio system that was not compatible with the standard VHF
system used by state and federal agencies. Communication problems
prevented effective situational awareness flow from resources back to
unified commanders. This eventually led to the resources losing local
knowledge of neighborhoods, streets, planned actions and completed
tasks. The result was the doubling of efforts to evacuate and clear
neighborhoods. Fortunately, group leaders recognized the disconnect and
took the initiative to find each other, meet face-to-face, and resolve
the situation.

Cell phones were used heavily to overcome communications problems,
however weakness in this strategy erupted as cell towers were lost,
power outages occurred, and cell systems became overloaded. (Garvey)

**Communications/Citizen Notification**

In communicating evacuation needs to the public, difficulties in
enforcing and coordinating personnel evacuation in fire zones were among
the most frustrating challenges during the duration of the fires.
Officials responsible for notifying residents -- the respective county
sheriff offices -- opted against the use of the Emergency Broadcast
System (EBS), as it was considered too limited in effect because of the
late hours needed to make decisions/ notifications. Although it would
have limited impact, its use is essentially cost-free and not
time-consuming, so that even if it only reached one resident, it would
have been worth the small effort. One option being discussed in the
aftermath of the events is the use of a computer-based telephone
notification system that would perform autonomously when initiated.

**Media Relations**

The effective use of the media was a force multiplier. Unified
interagency coordination with local media outlets assisted in the
efficient and accurate flow of information to the public. The media,
when utilized to the fullest, communicated critical fire activity to
shape public actions, evacuate residents, and relay critical messages.
The assignment of an Information Officer, located in the JIC, as a
single point of contact with the media was tremendously important in
getting critical information to and from the fire sites. Additionally,
the JIC informed the public and highlighted volunteer efforts or
activities that would assist in combating the blazes.

**Training & Education**

Pre-planning for wildfires in known high-risk fire corridors was
essential for effective firefighting. Expending cognitive energy before
a fire event was key to testing operations and tactics, identifying and
mitigating risk areas, planning resource allocation and evacuations,
calculating resource needs, and predicting fire behavior. To assist in
training and scenarios, and as a result of the Southern California
fires, a relational database is being developed by the Wildland Fire
Lessons Learned Center. The Wildland Fire Knowledge Management
Information System (WFKMIS) will be a virtual tool for lessons learned,
best practices, tactics, and useful technologies for every level of
firefighter.

**Mitigation**

One of the greatest success stories to emerge during the wildland fires
was of the communities that had worked consistently to reduce community
fuels and create/enhance defensible spaces around property. For this
reason, mitigation, most notably in the critical Wildland-Urban
Interface (WUI) area, should be made a priority action to improve
responders' chances of extinguishing fires that do occur.
Recommendations include better management of brush and other fuels in
open spaces, comprehensive, consistent planning, building and zoning
codes to mitigate hazards, and unified coordination with the local press
for more efficient and accurate information to the public. Specifically,
communities should target fuel reduction in Community Protection Zones
and along evacuation routes and communication sites, as well as build
fire-wise homes, made of fire-resistant materials and landscaping that
ensures proper clearance. (San Diego News Service)

**[References]{.underline}**

Department of Homeland Security (DHS). 2004. The California Fires
Coordination Group: A Report to the Department of Homeland Security. The
Federal Emergency Management Agency. February 13.

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). 2003. Designated Counties
for California Wildfires. FEMA Disaster Summary. October 27.
[www.fema.gov/news/eventcounties.fema/](http://www.fema.gov/news/eventcounties.fema/)

Garvey, Megan., & Leonard, Jack., & Hanley, Christine., & Pfeifer,
Stuart. 2003. Night of Fire. December 28. Los Angeles Times.
[www.latimes.com/news/local/](http://www.latimes.com/news/local/)

International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC). 2003. Bush Signs
Healthy Forests Act. December 4. IAFC Press Release. Fire Chief
Magazine.
[www.firechief.com/microsites/newsarticle.asp](http://www.firechief.com/microsites/newsarticle.asp)

Marquez, Miguel, & Flock, Jeff. 2003. Southern California Declared a
Disaster Area. October 27. CNN.
[www.cnn.usnews.com](http://www.cnn.usnews.com/)

Mission-Centered Solutions. 2004. Southern California Firestorm 2003.
February 10. Wildfire Lessons Learned Center.
[www.wildfirelessons.net](http://www.wildfirelessons.net/)

National Interagency Coordination Center (NISC). 2004. Annual Fire
Summary 2003. March 8. <http://www.nifc.gov/news/nicc.html>

National Park Service. 2004. Developing Opportunities: Incident
Management Teams. Fire Management Program Center. March 22.
[www.nps.gov/fire/developmental.html](http://www.nps.gov/fire/developmental.html)

Paik, Terry, D.V.M. 2003. AVMA Situation Report---Southern California
Wildfires. November 16. American Veterinary Medicine Association.
[www.avma.org](http://www.avma.org/)

Prasse, Lisa, Aileen Flores, and Gretchen Fagg. 2004. Wildfire Hazards
in Claremont California.

San Diego News Service. 2004. Fire Study says Region was Unprepared for
Catastrophe. March 3. San Diego Union-Tribune.
<http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/fires/>

United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). 2004. The 2003 San Diego
County Fire Siege Safety Review. March 3. USDA Forest Service.
[www.fs.fed.us/r5/cleveland](http://www.fs.fed.us/r5/cleveland)

West, Pat. 2004. Lessons Learned from the Southern California's
Firestorms Released. January. Wildfire Magazine.
[www.wildfiremag.com/microsites/newsarticle/](http://www.wildfiremag.com/microsites/newsarticle/)

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**Image 4.1.1: Fire Perimeter Overview, November 4, 2003**

![](media/image1.jpeg){width="4.5in" height="5.0in"}

Source: California Mountain Area Safety Taskforce -
<http://jicfire.calmast.org/maps/>

**Image 4.1.2: FEMA Disaster Declarations in Firestorm 2003**

![](media/image2.jpeg){width="5.511111111111111in"
height="7.132638888888889in"}

Source:
<http://www.gismaps.fema.gov/2003graphics/dr1498/dec_1498_1112.jpg>

**Figure 4.1.2: Firestorm 2003 Fire Statistics**

  ------------ ---------- ---------- ------------- ---------- ----------- ---------
  **County**   **Fire     **Date     **Acres       **Homes    **Homes     **Lives
               Name**     Began**    Burned**      Lost**     Damaged**   Lost**

  Riverside    Pass       10/21/03   2,387         5          3           0

  Los Angeles  Padua      10/21/03   10,446        59         0           0

  San          Grand Prix 10/21/03   69,894        136        71          1
  Bernadino                                                               

  San Diego    Roblar 2   10/21/03   8,592         0          0           0

  San Diego    Otay       10/21/03   46,291        1          0           0

  Ventura      Piru       10/23/03   63,991        8          0           0

  Los Angeles  Verdale    10/24/03   8,680         1          0           0

  Ventura      Simi       10/25/03   108,204       300        11          0

  San Diego    Cedar      10/25/03   273,246       2,820      63          14

  San          Old        10/25/03   91,281        1,003      7           6
  Bernardino                                                              

  Riverside    Mountain   10/26/03   10,446        61         0           0

  San Diego    Paradise   10/26/03   56,700        415        15          2

  **Total                            **750,158**   **4809**   **170**     **23**
  Losses**                                                                
  ------------ ---------- ---------- ------------- ---------- ----------- ---------

**Source:** Prasse, 2004 and DHS, 2004

**Sidebar 4.1.1: NIFC**

Because wildland fires do not observe jurisdictional boundaries,
firefighting, training, research, and outreach are coordinated among a
wide variety of Federal, State, tribal, local, and other stakeholders.
The National Interagency Fire Center (NIFC), headquartered in Boise,
Idaho, is the nation's management and logistical support center to meet
the challenge of wildland fires. NIFC is comprised of representatives
from USFS, the Department of Commerce's (DOC) National Weather Service
(NWS), DHS-FEMA's U.S. Fire Administration (USFA), the Department of the
Interior's (DOI) Bureau of Land Management (BLM), Bureau of Indian
Affairs (BIA), Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), National Park Service
(NPS), Office of Aircraft Services (OAS), and the National Association
of State Foresters (NASF), and supports joint operations for managing
wildland fire throughout the United States. In addition to responding to
wildfires, NIFC can provide firefighting and other assistance to
DHS-FEMA through the Federal Response Plan's (FRP) Emergency Support
Function (ESF) #4 ― Firefighting.2 NIFC also maintains mutual aid
agreements with Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Mexico through the
U.S. State Department.

Source: The Department of Homeland Security

**Sidebar 4.1.2: FMAGP**

FMAGP provides financial assistance in the form of grants to State and
local governments to help manage and control fires on public or private
forest or grasslands that threaten to cause extensive losses to lives
and property. Under an approved FMAGP declaration, DHS-FEMA may cover 75
percent of eligible State and local firefighting costs, such as expenses
for field camps, equipment use, repair and replacement, tools,
materials, and supplies. In addition, States may be reimbursed for
eligible mobilization and demobilization activities, as well as limited
emergency work as authorized under Section 403 of the Stafford Act,
Essential Assistance.

Source: The Department of Homeland Security

## Case Study 4.2: The Space Shuttle Columbia Disaster

# **The Event**

On Feb. 1, 2003, the Space Shuttle *Columbia,* flying mission STS-107,
reentered earth's atmosphere following its 28^th^ successful space
flight that began on January 16^th^ of that year. It was carrying seven
astronauts, including Commander Rick D. Husband, Pilot William C.
McCool, Payload Commander Michael P. Anderson, Mission Specialists David
M. Brown, Kalpana Chawla, and Laurel Blair Salton Clark, and Payload
Specialist Ilan Ramon. The flight had been delayed a total of 13 times
since its originally scheduled lift-off date of January 11, 2001.

On January 16, 2003, when the shuttle finally lifted off, a piece of
insulation on one of the shuttle's fuel tanks broke off about 82 seconds
into the flight. The event was considered inconsequential by mission
specialists. However, because of the speed the shuttle was traveling at
the time (1,650 mph), and the delicate nature of the shuttle's
protective thermal skin, the insulation caused a small breach that did
not pose any problems until the 'burn' period experienced upon re-entry.

During the re-entry burn period (which began at 8:44am), several stages
of shuttle positioning and speed, according to normal procedural
systems, caused the shuttle to slow down considerably from its 17,500
mph speed. The friction caused by the shuttle entering the earth's
atmosphere at over 20 times the speed of sound, which results in an
incredible release of energy, caused the leading edge of the wings to
rise to as much as 3,000 degrees Fahrenheit.

Ground control crews began to notice failures in many of the instruments
in the left wing. Progressively, more problems arose, but the control
teams were having trouble with determining the root of the problems and
with communicating with the crew to gain more insight into what may have
been happening. The last transmission from the crew came at 8:59am,
which was cut off after just one word. At 9:05, a loud explosion was
heard over Texas, and evidence that the shuttle had begun to
disintegrate were clear to the naked eye.

The destruction of the shuttle showered debris across an area of
hundreds of square miles in East Texas and Western Louisiana (a very
small amount of material was also found in Arkansas). In total, over
two-thousand individual debris fields were noted by recovery crews. As
had been true with the Space Shuttle Challenger, the event was witnessed
by the entire nation via breaking news reports. NASA immediately issued
a warning to the public that all debris should be considered hazardous
material, with the potential to cause injuries or death, and that any
information on the location of debris should be immediately reported to
local authorities. (Wikipedia.Com)

# **The Response**

The response to the shuttle disaster has been called the largest
deployment of civilian government agencies in history.

Due to the large area within which the debris was falling, scores of
police and fire departments were immediately called to action by reports
from citizens. As true first responders, these officials began, albeit
without any real organization, in collecting and documenting the shuttle
debris. Although it was almost guaranteed that, beyond the initial seven
astronauts and the Space Shuttle, there would be no additional
fatalities, injuries, or destruction caused by the disaster. However,
the work hours and resources required for such a large operation were
assuredly going to be excessive -- and likewise a strain on the State
and Local agencies involved.

President Bush immediately assessed the situation with FEMA and DHS
officials, and issued emergency declarations for the states of Texas and
Louisiana. It is important to note that these declarations were made in
the absence of any formal request for assistance from the governors of
either of those states. It was later declared by the administration that
this action was considered appropriate because the Space Shuttle
Columbia itself was considered federal property, and therefore the
authority to make such declarations existed.

The disaster declaration, as per the Stafford Act, authorized the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) under Emergency Support
Function (ESF) #5 to coordinate federal aid and the management of
resources used by all responders in the response and recovery to the
disaster. FEMA announced that Michael Brown, FEMA Deputy Director and
Acting Undersecretary of the newly-created Department of Homeland
Security, would lead FEMA's efforts in what was considered a 'search,
find, and secure' operation.

From the onset, the agencies' priorities were three-fold: ensure public
safety, retrieve evidence-pieces of the shuttle that could ultimately
determine the cause of the tragedy, and reimburse expenses of state and
local governments and private citizens who may have sustained property
damage as a result of the accident and search. NASA quickly identified
potential hazardous materials, such as tanks containing toxic substances
or unexploded pyrotechnic devices, and once found, the EPA secured the
material. The EPA also worked with state and local authorities to clear
school campuses and public access areas, and tested air and water
samples taken along the flight path for shuttle contaminates. Using the
resources of the Emergency Response and Removal Service (ERRS)
contractors and the U. S. Coast Guard (USCG), Gulf Strike Team, EPA
found no evidence of hazardous material in the atmosphere or drinking
water supplies. Early in the recovery effort, teams from NASA, the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), National Guard, Urban Search and
Rescue (US&R) organizations, the Department of Public Safety and others,
conducted a successful search in East Texas to recover and bring home
the bodies of Columbia\'s crew.

On February 2^nd^, FEMA announced that its principal mission was to
assist the State and Local response agencies in mapping the debris
fields and collecting any debris reported or found. The agency reported
that they had coordinated the following activities:

-   Established an Interagency Initial Operating Facility (IOF) at
    Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana. Representatives from NASA,
    FEMA, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Environmental
    Protection Agency (EPA) and the Department of Defense were to be
    assembled there to coordinate response activities.

-   Assigned liaisons from FBI, EPA, the Department of Transportation,
    the General Services Administration and the Department of Defense to
    FEMA\'s Regional Operations Center in Denton, TX. FEMA assigned
    state liaisons to the Texas State Emergency Operations Center and
    the State Command Post in Lufkin, TX.

-   Began the process of establishing two Disaster Field Offices (DFOs)
    in Lufkin, Texas, and at the Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana.
    The Lufkin DFO would serve as the primary operational DFO for all
    operations, including staging assets and deploying field teams for
    search, find and secure operations. Barksdale Air Force Base in
    Louisiana would serve as the investigative center and storage
    location. A third (satellite) DFO was set up the next day at the
    Fort Worth Naval Air Station.

-   Deployed special Mobile Emergency Response Systems (MERS)
    communications equipment to Lufkin, Texas.

-   Announced that EPA had deployed HAZMAT teams to collect debris,
    mobilized Airborne Spectral Photo-Imaging of Environmental
    Contaminants Technology (ASPECT) aircraft to help locate debris
    using infrared sensors to detect hazardous chemicals and deployed
    the Trace Atmospheric Gas Analyzer Unit to provide mobile analytical
    support.

-   Announced that the U.S. Coast Guard (now part of DHS) had deployed
    members of its Gulf Strike Team, based in Mobile, Alabama, to Lufkin
    to assist with debris recovery operations there. One of three
    located throughout the country, Gulf Strike Team personnel are
    specially trained and equipped to respond to incidents involving oil
    or hazardous chemical spills. (FEMA 3)

These teams mentioned above had been deployed within hours to the
disaster area to assist local fire, law enforcement and emergency
management authorities already onsite. More than 60 agencies, including
public and private groups, responded with personnel, supplies and
equipment. The Lufkin DFO was the regional center of all search-related
operations. This was the first major response performed by the
newly-created Department of Homeland Security.

By the next day, February third, FEMA had established a Joint
Information Center (JIC) at the Lufkin Civic Center in Lifkin, TX, to
serve as the distribution point for information disseminated to the
public, and to which the public could go to retrieve information. The
JIC was comprised of representatives from FEMA, the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), NASA, The American Red Cross (ARC), the U.S.
Forest Service, The U.S. Coast Guard, the Department of Health and Human
Services (DHHS), and several other agencies involved in the response at
the Federal and State levels. FEMA also announced that additional U.S.
Coast Guard strike teams and the Texas and Louisiana National Guard were
participating in the search, that water quality was being tested in both
states, and that hazardous spills were being addressed.

On February 5^th^, four days after the shuttle disaster, FEMA released a
fact sheet describing the procedures by which materials were to be
collected by State and local response agencies. The following are the
guidelines from that fact sheet:

"The following guidelines are designed to assist public service
personnel to determine when and how to collect and document space
shuttle material. If the material is less than 18 inches in length and
does not appear to be hazardous, then it may be collected under the
following guidelines:

"PRIVATE CITIZENS ARE NOT AUTHORIZED TO COLLECT MATERIAL

"The following trained personnel are authorized to collect non-hazardous
materials:

-   Local, State or Federal Law Enforcement Personnel

-   Fire, Medical, or Emergency Services Personnel

-   U.S. Forest Service or Texas Forest Service

-   Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)

-   Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)

-   National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)

"Only non-hazardous material may be collected under these guidelines. If
the material includes any of the following, officials should contact
**936-699-1032** or **936-699-1034** to report what they have found so
that specially trained personnel can be deployed:

-   **Stored Energy:** High Pressure Tanks and Cylinders. Landing gear
    and tires.

-   **Monomethyl Hydrazine:** Clear liquid stored in tanks, strong fishy
    odor.

-   **Nitrogen Tetroxide:** Greenish liquid or brownish vapor, stored in
    tanks, bleach-like odor.

-   **Ammonia:** Clear liquid, stored in tanks, very strong ammonia
    smell.

-   **Pyrotechnic Devices:** Landing gear, window frames, crew seats,
    hatches and antennae.

-   **Biological Material:** Any biological material, including human or
    animal remains.

"The following procedure should be followed by authorized, trained
personnel if the identified material is non-hazardous:

-   Photograph items before they are moved.

-   Carefully document the location of the items (to include GPS data if
    available).

-   Attach a tag to the item with the location the item was found and
    the name and phone number of the individual collecting the item.
    Include any information you think may be relevant to the
    investigation. Documentation for large items may be recorded with
    permanent marker directly on the hardware.

-   Wear gloves (preferably not cloth) when handling items and do not
    open, adjust or move any switches, components or boxes.

-   If possible, seal the item in a plastic bag.

-   Transport the item to your local command post.

"If an item is marked SECRET, CONFIDENTIAL, or SSOR do not leave this
item unattended before handover to NASA personnel. With any questions or
for more information, please contact DPS at the Lufkin Emergency
Operation Center, **936-699-1077**." (FEMA 5)

On February 6^th^, the President amended the original disaster
declaration to include any state within which shuttle debris was found.
Additionally, the declaration was amended such that FEMA was authorized
to reimburse a full 100 percent of the costs incurred by local and State
agencies in their efforts to retrieve shuttle materials. (FEMA 6) By
this point there have been 115 pieces of shuttle material found by 174
officials searching in Louisiana, Texas was using 800 National Guard
troops, 353 Department of Public Safety personnel, and 140 Forest
Service employees in the search. Additionally, the EPA had collected
over 1,100 bags of hazardous materials through the efforts of 370
employees working in 60 teams. (FEMA 7)

March 1^st^ marked one month of operations in the response and recovery
of the shuttle disaster. By this point there were over 5,200 Federal and
State officials working on the response, and four collection centers had
been established to accept the debris that had been located. (FEMA 8) On
March 27^th^, a Bell 407 helicopter, involved in the search for shuttle
debris, crashed in poor weather. Two members of the crew, Texas Forest
Service employee Charles Krenek and Pilot Jules F. Mier, Jr. died, and
three other crew members were injured. This event brought the death toll
of the disaster to nine. Air operations in the search were suspended
until April 10^th^, until it was determined that flights could resume
under the safest possible conditions. (FEMA 10)

On April 17^th^, FEMA announced that it would be handing over
operational control of the recovery mission to NASA on April 30, nearly
three months following the disaster. Also announced were the following
updates on the progress of the search:

-   Ground crews have searched over 83% of the 704,000 assigned acres.

-   Air operations have searched 577 (92%) of the 629 grids (2 by 2
    mile) assigned areas.

-   Water operations have concluded.

-   More than 79,900 pounds of shuttle material has been shipped to
    Kennedy Space Center in Florida. That represents approximately 37%
    of the weight of the craft.

-   All reported debris in Louisiana has been picked up.

-   Under the FEMA Public Assistance Program, Texas has been obligated
    \$2.6 million and Louisiana has been obligated \$395,000 for
    approved county/parish shuttle debris recovery related activities.
    (FEMA 9)

FEMA turned over control of the recovery operation to NASA on April
30^th^. The same day, NASA opened the Columbia Recovery Operation (CRO)
office at the Johnson Space Center in Houston. FEMA closed the Disaster
Field Office in Lufkin, TX on May 10. On May 5^th^, FEMA released a
recap of the search for the Space Shuttle Columbia debris material. This
announcement included the following final statistics about the disaster
recovery:

-   After three months, search personnel recovered more than 82,500
    pieces of shuttle debris equaling a total weight of 84,800 pounds,
    or almost 40 percent of the total dry weight of the shuttle.

-   Ground, water and air searches combined covered more than 2.28
    million acres.

-   Water operations successfully identified more than 3,100 targets and
    covered 23 square miles.

-   More than 16,500 ground search personnel and their support personnel
    searched an unprecedented 680,748 acres.

-   Total man-hours utilized in the recovery effort amounted to
    approximately 1.5 million.

-   Under the FEMA Public Assistance program, \$10 million is the amount
    projected for Texas to reimburse eligible costs associated with the
    recovery effort. As of May 1, \$3.98 million has been obligated. For
    Louisiana, projected reimbursable payments are \$500,000 while
    \$396,000 has been obligated.

-   Outside Texas and Louisiana, searches have been concluded in New
    Mexico and California. Searches continue in Nevada and Utah.

-   No debris has been found west of Littlefield, Texas or east of Fort
    Polk, Louisiana.

-   More than 130 federal, state and local agencies have participated in
    the recovery effort.

-   Approximately 25,000 personnel took part in the recovery operation.

-   The operation was supported by more than 270 organizations including
    businesses and volunteer groups.

**The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Involvement**

FEMA tasked the Environmental Protection Agency with the management of
all hazardous materials found in the search area. This disaster marked
new territory for many of the agencies involved, including EPA and NASA
which had never before worked together on a project. Additionally, as
NASA had warned repetitively that all shuttle debris should be
considered hazardous, this was to be one of EPA's greatest operational
challenges to date. Over 1,900 employees from the agency deployed.

EPA's response was based out of Region 6, headquartered in Dallas, TX.
EPA's primary mission in the response effort was to protect public
health and the environment, and their first task was to remove shuttle
material from school property -- a task they completed by February
4^th^, only 3 days following the disaster. The search teams were set up
so that an EPA team accompanied each 20-person search crew in order to
handle any debris found within the search grids. In addition, EPA
personnel responded to any other reports of potential debris sites that
were called in to FEMA DFOs. Finally, EPA was charged with staffing the
four local debris collection centers that were established to process
the tens of thousands of pieces of shuttle material that were collected
over the course of the recovery operation.

To handle such a large operation, EPA had national teams suspend regular
operations and deploy to Region 6, where the disaster had occurred, to
help staff the 24-hour per day demands of the shuttle response. On the
day of the disaster, EPA initiated flights of their Airborne
Spectral-Imagery of Environmental Contaminants Technology (ASPECT)
Aircraft, which was able to locate shuttle parts containing potentially
hazardous materials. Based upon these flights they were able to
determine that there were no major concentrations of hazardous materials
present in the debris fields that could pose a major health hazard to
the human populations in the surrounding areas. EPA also mobilized their
Trace Atmospheric Gas Analyzer vehicle, which has the ability to collect
real-time outdoor air quality samples while in motion.

On average, each EPA team processed between 10 and 15 sites per day,
with the goal of processing a county every 3 to 5 days (per team). EPA
dive teams conducted searches of small ponds and lakes, while side-scan
sonar was utilized in larger bodies of water to locate debris.

Finally, EPA was tasked with the Data Management of collected shuttle
debris. The location, description, and other information about each
piece was collected in the field in handheld computers, and uploaded
each night onto a central computer database, in order to assist NASA in
determining the cause of the crash and other investigative goals. (EPA
2003)

# **All Agency Involvement**

-   Participating Federal Agencies:

    -   Defense Coordinating Element

    -   Defense Criminal Investigation Service

    -   Department of Defense

    -   Department of Health and Human Services

    -   Department of the Interior

    -   Department of Transportation

    -   Environmental Protection Agency

    -   Federal Bureau of Investigation

    -   Federal Emergency Management Agency

    -   General Services Administration

    -   National Aeronautics and Space Administration

    -   National Imagery and Mapping Agency

    -   National Transportation Safety Board

    -   National Weather Service

    -   Naval Research Laboratory

    -   Office of Personnel Management

    -   U.S. Air Force

    -   U.S. Army

    -   U.S. Army Corp of Engineers

    -   U.S. Attorney\'s Office

    -   U.S. Coast Guard

    -   U.S. Fire Service

    -   U.S. Fish and Wildlife

    -   U.S. Forest Service

    -   U.S. Marshal Service

    -   National Park Service

    -   U.S. Navy

    -   Urban Search and Rescue,

    -   and others.

-   Participating State Agencies and other Entities

    -   Arkansas National Guard

    -   Colorado Forest Service

    -   Florida Division of Forestry

    -   Louisiana Dept of Wildlife and Fisheries

    -   Louisiana National Guard

    -   Louisiana Office of Emergency Preparedness

    -   Louisiana State Police

    -   Maryland Task Force 1

    -   New Mexico National Guard

    -   North Carolina Forest Service

    -   Oklahoma National Guard

    -   Stephen F. Austin University

    -   Texas Department of Mental Health Mental Retardation

    -   Texas Army National Guard

    -   Texas Commission on Environmental Quality

    -   Texas Division of Emergency Management

    -   Texas Department of Public Safety

    -   Texas Department of Criminal Justice

    -   Texas Department of Transportation

    -   Texas Engineering Extension Service

    -   Texas Fish & Wildlife Department

    -   Texas Forest Service

    -   Texas National Resources Information System Service

    -   Texas Task Force 1

    -   Texas Water Development Board

    -   University of Texas Center for Space Research

    -   Virginia Department of Forestry,

    -   and others.

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-   Participating Local Agencies and other Entities

    -   Angelina County Economic Development Partnership

    -   Angelina County Sheriff\'s Office

    -   Arlington Police Department

    -   Broward County Sheriff

    -   City of Lufkin

    -   City of San Diego Fire Department

    -   City of Dallas Fire Department

    -   City of Ft. Worth Fire Department

    -   Ft. Worth Independent School District

    -   Galveston County Sheriff

    -   Houston Police Department

    -   Jasper County Sheriff

    -   Kern County Fire Department

    -   San Augustine County Sheriff,

    -   and others.

-   Participating Volunteer Agencies

    -   Alpine Rescue Team

    -   American Red Cross

    -   Civil Air Patrol

    -   The Salvation Army

    -   The Texas Baptist Men

    -   and others.

In support of EPA, the U.S. Navy was assigned to coordinate water search
operations. An operations base was set up at Toledo Bend Reservoir.
There were eight dive teams working the reservoir: three U.S. Navy, two
EPA, one each from the City of Galveston, City of Houston and the Texas
Department of Public Safety. In addition, six boats equipped with side
and multi-beam scanning sonar are looking for dive targets, four on the
reservoir and two on Lake Nacogdoches. The Navy also deployed various
handheld sonar units and an autonomous unit that were programmed to
search underwater areas independently. About 130 personnel worked the
water search operation.

Following a tremendous initial search effort by local governments and
volunteers, four base camps were established to house interagency crews
at the request of the Texas Forest Service. These crews relieved the
search burden on state and local resources by bringing in firefighting
crews from other parts of the nation. Crews from 39 states joined the
effort. In total, about 4,500 personnel arrived and about 155 crews of
20 people each daily combed through NASA assigned search areas in a
corridor 240 by 10 miles wide from Ellis County in the west to Toledo
Bend Reservoir in the east. Four crew base camps were set up:
Nacogdoches (1,100 personnel), Palestine (about 1,000), Hemphill (about
1,000) and Corsicana (about 1,350). A mobilization unit was established
at Longview Airport to assist crew arrival, travel to and from base
camps and departure. Since February 14, these out-of-state crews have
expended nearly 132,000 man-hours on the search.

Extensive air searches were used in the search. Operating out of two
facilities, one in the Lufkin area and one in the Palestine area, 33
helicopters and nine fixed wing aircraft flew search grids over the 240
by 10 mile corridor seeking possible debris sites. Possible sites were
relayed to ground crews for inspection.

The State of Texas rushed to assist local communities in the initial
search, and continued to support the federal agencies responding to the
event. The Texas Department of Public Safety's Division of Emergency
Management coordinated the state response. Among state agency personnel
committed were: 353 state troopers, about 800 National Guard, four
aircraft, 17 helicopters, 140 Texas Forest Service personnel, 35
horse-mounted search teams, 20 Texas Department of Transportation
personnel, 27 Texas Commission of Environmental Quality personnel and
various other units such as dogs and handlers, mapping support and game
wardens. Most have now returned to their regular assignments.

### Conclusion

As a test of the response capabilities, many have argued that the
Department of Homeland Security was given an easy assignment -- there
were only 7 initial fatalities, no injuries, and very little
destruction. However, from a coordination standpoint, the event was
colossal. As previously mentioned, it was the single greatest
mobilization of civil service employees in the history of the nation,
and with very few exceptions, the operation was carried off without a
hitch. All local and State costs were reimbursed by the Federal
Government, and many working relationships were created in the response
and recovery phases when counterparts were able to work face to face in
a relatively low-stress environment. The event proved that FEMA had
retained its agency status within DHS, and was able to continue
functioning as it had before the Homeland Security Act was signed just 4
months earlier.

**[References:]{.underline}**

EPA. 2003. Response to the Columbia Space Shuttle Incident. EPA Website.
<http://www.epa.gov/columbia/>

FEMA. 2003. President Declares Emergency in Texas and Louisiana in
Response to Space Shuttle Tragedy. February 1. FEMA Press Release.
<http://www.fema.gov/news/newsrelease.fema?id=2406>

FEMA 2. 2003. FEMA to Lead Search, Find, and Secure Mission Following
Space Shuttle Tragedy. February 1. FEMA Press Release.
<http://www.fema.gov/news/newsrelease.fema?id=2405>

FEMA 3. 2003. FEMA Puts Federal Resources Into Action To Assist State
And Local Authorities In Search, Find And Secure Mission For Columbia
Debris. February 2. FEMA Press Release.
<http://www.fema.gov/news/newsrelease.fema?id=2407>

FEMA 4. 2003. FEMA Establishes Joint Information Center for Columbia
Debris Search, Find, and Secure Mission at Lifkin Civic Center. February
3. FEMA Press Release.
<http://www.fema.gov/news/newsrelease.fema?id=2409>

FEMA 5. 2003. Columbia Material Collection Guidelines: Fact Sheet.
February 5. FEMA Press Release.
<http://www.fema.gov/news/newsrelease.fema?id=2414>

FEMA 6. 2003. President Amends Columbia Emergency Declaration to Include
All States. February 6. FEMA Press Release.
<http://www.fema.gov/news/newsrelease.fema?id=2416>

FEMA 7. 2003. FEMA Updates Search, Find And Secure Activities For
*Columbia* Emergency. February 6. FEMA Press Release.
<http://www.fema.gov/news/newsrelease.fema?id=2415>

FEMA 8. 2003. Good Progress Made In One Month Of Shuttle Recovery.
March 1. FEMA Press Release.
<http://www.fema.gov/news/newsrelease.fema?id=2458>

FEMA 9. 2003. FEMA Will Hand On-Going Recovery Operations To NASA April
30. April 17. FEMA Press Release.
<http://www.fema.gov/news/newsrelease.fema?id=2534>

FEMA 10. 2003. Recap Of The Search For Columbia Shuttle Material. May 5.
FEMA Press Release. <http://www.fema.gov/news/newsrelease.fema?id=2808>

Wikipedia, 2005, Space Shuttle Columbia Disaster.
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Space_Shuttle_Columbia_disaster>

**Image 4.2.1: FEMA Emergency Declaration Counties in Texas**

![](media/image3.jpeg){width="7.991666666666666in"
height="6.175694444444445in"}

**Image 4.2.2: FEMA Emergency Declaration Counties in Louisiana**

![](media/image4.jpeg){width="8.026388888888889in"
height="6.202083333333333in"}

**Image 4.2.3: NOAA Radar Image of the Debris Field**

![](media/image5.jpeg){width="6.467361111111111in" height="5.46875in"}

Source: <http://www.crh.noaa.gov/ncrfc/News/news-index.html>

# **Case Study 4.3: The September 11, 2001 Attack at the Pentagon**

##### **Background**

On Tuesday September 11, the United States experienced the worst
terrorist attacks in its history, resulting in the loss of life of
almost 3,000 primary victims and responders and thousands of injuries.
The nature and complexity of the events called for the very rapid
deployment and large-scale integration of many emergency management,
emergency medical, law enforcement, and military resources as prescribed
by the Terrorism Annex to the Federal Response Plan (FRP). The attacks
also resulted in the first time activation of the National Disaster
Medical System (NDMS) for a terrorist attack. The size, complexity, and
speed required of the response to the September 11 devastation was
unprecedented in the emergency management history of the United States.

The events of September 11^th^ began with the hijacking of four
passenger airlines, two of which crashed into the World Trade Center
Twin Towers, one of which crashed into the Pentagon, and a fourth that
crashed into a field in Pennsylvania - presumably before reaching its
intended target in the Washington, DC area. While this case study
focuses upon the events at the Pentagon, it is impossible to describe
any one of these events without providing information on all the events
involved, as the response was conducted within the greater overall
context of threat experienced that day. Additionally, due to the
importance of the events in shaping current and future legislation and
other changes that have and will occur in both society and government,
an incredibly rich documentation of the events has been achieved,
allowing for much more detailed case analysis than is possible with most
other events.

## The Event

Although the events of September 11^th^ were set in motion years
earlier, when the terrorists involved began planning their attack on
America's financial and military centers, the disaster did not truly
become apparent until early that morning. The first sign of the
impending danger came at 8:19am when a flight attendant on American
Airlines flight 11 reported by cell phone to the American Airlines
reservation center that her plane had been hijacked.

However, because no clear system existed at that time to initiate
preparedness and pre-response actions to a terrorist event, as now is
beginning to emerge through the actions of the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS), the true notification of the initiation of the day's
events came at 8:46am when American Airlines flight 11 was flown by its
hijackers into the North Tower of the World Trade Center, crashing with
great spectacle through floors 93 through 99.

Immediate news reports of the event flashed around the world in just
minutes due to the high profile nature of the twin towers. However,
conflicting information existing at the time about both the nature of
the incident and the type of plane involved masked the attack's true
nature. Most people, including the first responders in New York City as
well as the Federal agency officials who would respond to terrorism,
believed that what had just happened was likely just an accident.

The responding agencies in New York City, including the New York Fire
Department, the New York Police Department, the New York Port Authority,
and the New York City Office of Emergency Management, fully responded to
the incident with a complement of several hundred officials. The event
was deemed 'five alarm' by the department Chief, dictating the
involvement of approximately 235 firefighters, including 21 engine
companies, nine ladder companies, four elite rescue teams, a hazmat
team, among others. The police chief deemed the event to be 'level 4',
which initiated the mobilization of 22 lieutenants, 100 sergeants, and
800 police officers.

At 9:03am, the scenario as recognized by those involved changed
completely, from one of a technological (transportation) disaster to
that of an obvious terrorist attack. United Airlines flight 175, also
under the control of a group of hijackers, was flown through the 77^th^
through 85^th^ floors of the South Tower of the World Trade Center. The
report of the 911 Commission, established to investigate the events and
their aftermath, aptly describes the second incident in stating that,
"What had been the largest and most complicated rescue operation in city
history instantly doubled in magnitude."

At 9:59am, the South Tower completely collapsed in a thundering roar and
a cloud of debris. All responders and other building occupants were
instantly killed. At 10:28, the North Tower followed, collapsing in the
same manner, and leaving behind a toxic cloud of dust and debris that
covered a great area on the southern tip of Manhattan.

## The Pentagon

The attack at the Pentagon began sometime between 8:51 and 8:54am, when
a group of five terrorists began taking over control of American
Airlines flight 77. The findings of the 911 Commission's report detail
the final moments of that flight:

> "At 9:34\[am\], Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport advised the
> Secret Service of an unknown aircraft heading in the direction of the
> White House \[the terrorists had disabled the plane's transponder\].
> American 77 was then 5 miles west-southwest of the Pentagon and began
> a 330-degree turn. At the end of the turn, it was descending through
> 2,200 feet, pointed toward the Pentagon and downtown Washington. The
> hijacker pilot then advanced the throttles to maximum power and dove
> toward the Pentagon. At 9:37:46, American Airlines Flight 77 crashed
> into the Pentagon, traveling at approximately 530 miles per hour. All
> on board, as well as many civilian and military personnel in the
> building, were killed."

The airplane, which had been carrying over 10,000 gallons of jet fuel,
weighed almost 270,000 pounds. The force of the impact and the energy of
both the motion and the burning fuel were far too much for the
reinforced walls of the Pentagon, despite that the section had recently
been retrofitted with even more resistant design to protect against
attack. The plane penetrated three of the building's five concentric
rings, eventually resting against the fourth ring, causing considerable
burning within the section and the eventual collapse of the first ring
around the impact site. The number of lives lost, including the 64 on
the plane and 125 in the building, was 189 (counting the 5 terrorists.)
Had the section not recently been under renovation and therefore not
filled to capacity, the resulting toll would surely have been much
worse.

#### The Response

When the American Airlines flight 77 flew into the Pentagon, it nearly
missed a fire crew that had been stationed onsite, 'Foam 161' of the
Fort Myer Fire Department. The truck was so close to the point of impact
that it caught fire and suffered a flat tire from flying debris. Captain
Dennis Gilroy and firefighters Mark Skipper and Alan Wallace (both of
which were injured by the plane's impact) were the true 'first
responders' to the incident, commencing operations within a few seconds
of the crash. Captain Gilroy was able to immediately call in the actual
location of the incident to his department.

The Pentagon is located in Arlington County, VA, and as such the
Arlington County response agencies (Arlington County Fire Department
(ACFD), Arlington County Police Department (ACPD)) hold jurisdiction in
the fire district where the Pentagon is located. The Arlington County
After Action report describes the first moments when the attack
occurred:

> "At 9:37 a.m., in Arlington County, Captain Steve McCoy and the crew
> of ACFD Engine 101 were en route to a training session in Crystal
> City, traveling north on Interstate 395. Their conversation about the
> World Trade Center attack earlier that morning was interrupted by the
> sight and sound of a commercial airliner in steep descent, banking
> sharply to its right before disappearing beyond the horizon. At the
> same time, ACPD Corporal Barry Foust and Officer Richard Cox, on
> patrol in south Arlington County, saw a large American Airlines
> aircraft in a steep dive and on a collision course with the Pentagon."
> (Arlington County)

Within minutes of the crash on Pentagon, at 9:43 AM, Battalion Chief
Robert Cornwall of the Arlington County Fire Department (ACFD) diverted
from a call to a fire in nearby Roslyn, VA, and rushed to the scene.
Upon arrival, he assumed command of the Pentagon crash site. At the same
time, the Arlington County Emergency Communications Center contacted the
fire departments of Fairfax County, Alexandria, and the District of
Columbia to request **mutual aid**. Assistant ACFD Chief James Schwartz
arrived 5 to 10 minutes after the crash. Chief Schwartz assumed
**Incident Command (IC)** from Chief Cornwall and assigned him to
operational supervision of rescue and evacuation. Approximately 5
minutes after Chief Schwartz assumed IC, Chris Combs of the FBI Joint
Terrorism Task Force arrived on scene and reported to Chief Schwartz (in
accordance with the Federal Response Plan). Chief Schwartz and Agent
Combs had an established professional relationship from prior exercises
and operations and quickly established a close working relationship in
the Pentagon response.

The Incident Command System was vital in the response to this event
because of its complicated nature. Because the event was a plane crash,
fire, and partial building collapse, the Arlington County Fire
Department assumed command as authorized. This initial ICS structure was
converted at 6pm that first evening to a **Unified Command (UC)**
structure, with Chief Schwartz acting as 'first among equals,'
maintaining final authority in almost any operational decision that
would have to be made over the course of the response. Many different
State, Federal, and local agencies were on hand, playing many different
roles. The incident required a major rescue, fire, and medical response
from Arlington County. But, the incident had occurred at the U.S.
military's headquarters, a facility under the control of the secretary
of defense, further complicating the issue. Furthermore, because this
was a terrorist attack, the Department of Justice was the lead federal
agency in charge (with authority delegated to the FBI for operational
response) according to the Federal Response Plan Terrorism Annex. The
full gamut of mutual aid (local) partners, State agencies, and Federal
FRP Lead and Support agencies joined the mix by day's end. The UC
structure, as defined and limited by Chief Schwartz, included Arlington
County Fire, Arlington County Police, FBI, DoD, and FEMA **US&R Incident
Support Team (IST)**.

In addition to county fire, police, and sheriff's departments, the
response was assisted by the Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority,
Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport Fire Department, Fort Myer
Fire Department, the Virginia State Police, the Virginia Department of
Emergency Management, the FBI, FEMA, a National Medical Response Team
(NMRT), the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF), and numerous
military personnel within the Military District of Washington.

At 9:55, the incident commander (Chief Jim Schwartz) ordered an
evacuation of the Pentagon impact area because a partial collapse (which
occurred two minutes later) was, in his opinion, imminent. As a result
of these actions, no first responders were injured. At 10:15, the
incident commander ordered the first of three full evacuations of the
command post and all responders, under a nearby highway overpass, that
were the result of warnings of approaching hijacked aircraft by the FBI.
Commanders had knowledge about the missing airliner (which ultimately
crashed in Pennsylvania), and they were also cognizant of the fact that
*two* planes had struck the same site in New York City -- making such a
scenario at the Pentagon realistic. Fortunately, the FBI officials were
very efficient in relaying information when threats had passed, so
response activities were halted only as long as needed. The Incident
Command Post, however, remained stationed under the highway pass for the
rest of the day to minimize disruption.

The initial fire suppression and search and rescue operations were
conducted by the ACFD, the Pentagon Crash Rescue personnel (from their
heliport), Defense Protective Service personnel, and uninjured
bystanders (primarily military personnel). They received rapid support
from surrounding jurisdictions through mutual aid. By early afternoon on
September 11th, the ACFD was supported by the nearby US&R Task Forces
(VA-TF1 and MD TF-1, plus the Military District of Washington (MDW)
search & rescue team). Special operations teams from ACFD and Alexandria
FD also participated.

A roof fire persisted through the day and the night of September 11^th^,
despite ACFD efforts, but it was extinguished on September 12^th^. The
crash impact, the collapse, the fire and smoke, compromised support
pillars throughout the affected area, a **cantilevered** area in the
front of the structure near the collapse, and tilt of collapse slabs
towards the face of the structure where rescue operations were based,
created a very challenging and complicated US&R operation. Initial
assessment of structural stability and a plan of attack were difficult
to establish due to smoke and darkness of the building's interior.
Complex operations involving structural engineers, hazmat specialists,
search teams, shoring and stabilizing teams, medical oversight, debris
removal, and body and evidence recovery teams ensued. All interior
pillars in the affected area had to be **shored** with **cribbing**, and
the very large amount of debris had to be carefully removed.

## Law Enforcement Involvement

At approximately 9:37am, Arlington County Police Department (ACPD)
Corporal Barry Foust and Officer Richard Cox, on patrol, saw a large
aircraft heading towards the Pentagon. They immediately contacted the
Arlington County Emergency Communications Center (ECC). ACPD
Headquarters issued a simultaneous page to all members of the ACPD with
instructions to report for duty. Media reports of the attack alerted
those who did not receive the pager message. The law enforcement
response to the incident was immediate, with the on-duty shift engaged
in minutes and most ACPD officers arriving on the scene within the first
3 hours.

Lieutenant Robert Medarios was the first ACPD command-level official to
arrive on the scene; he assumed command of the ACPD response. Lieutenant
Medarios quickly reached an agreement with a Defense Protective Service
(DPS) official that the ACPD would assume responsibility for the outer
perimeter - an important decision because the DPS exercises exclusive
Federal legislative jurisdiction at the Pentagon and its surrounding
grounds. Lieutenant Medarios, Lieutenant Brian Berke, and Sergeant Jim
Daly quickly assessed the road network conditions and identified 27
intersections that required immediate police posting. Sergeant Daly
began organizing the staging area at Fire Station 5 and the adjacent
park. The parking lot and adjacent field were cordoned off and guards
posted around the perimeter. By 11:00 a.m., more than 100 law
enforcement personnel had reported to the staging area representing the
ACPD, ACSO, Fairfax County Police Department, Alexandria Police
Department, Arlington County Park Rangers, and the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS).

Many ACPD officers attempting to reach the Pentagon became fully engaged
in rerouting traffic and clearing a path for fire, rescue, and medical
units. Although they had difficulty reaching their intended destination,
these officers knew precisely what needed to be done and acted on their
own initiative, radioing to ACPD Headquarters their respective locations
and activities. Detectives from the ACPD Vice Control Section assumed
general patrol of the county away from the incident site to augment
remaining officers in the event of a major criminal incident. At ACPD
Headquarters, Captain Rich Alt, Captain Mary Gavin, Lieutenant Karen
Hechenroder and Administrative Assistant Barbara Scott began organizing
the department-wide response. The roll call room, a natural meeting
place in the police department, became the home of the ACPD ICS staffing
command for the duration of operations. Officers were being deployed
throughout the county and information had to be gathered regarding their
locations and times of arrival so replacements could be scheduled and
relief coordinated.

The Arlington County Sheriffs' Office (ACSO) also immediately responded
to the attack. Sheriff Beth Arthur and Chief Deputy Sheriff Mike Raffo
were watching the World Trade Center attacks on television when they
were notified that an airliner crashed into the Pentagon. They
immediately headed to the Arlington County Emergency Operations Center
(EOC). ACSO recall procedures were implemented and an Incident Command
Post (ICP) was set up on the first floor of the courthouse building. The
ICP was subsequently relocated to a large conference room in the
Arlington County Detention Facility. Some deputies not already on
assignment rushed to the Pentagon, arriving in time to help rescue a few
of the victims. Other deputies began directing traffic, as roadways
became jammed. One of the first actions taken by the ACSO was closing
the courts and evacuating the judges and staff. This decision freed up
approximately 20 deputies who were then able to assist with the response
to the attack on the Pentagon.

Fairfax motorcycle officers also reported, unrequested, outside
Arlington police headquarters shortly after the attack, offering their
help.

Security was an immediate and critical component to this response, due
to the nature of the disaster (a terrorist attack), the location of the
attack (the nation's military headquarters), and the sheer size of the
response (i.e., a very large number of responding officials and other
non-official responders present). Security for the ICP was maintained
using Arlington County SWAT team members. Other officers from the
Arlington County Police Force played a supportive role, in conjunction
with Virginia State Police, by assuming charge of traffic around the
Pentagon, ordering the closure of roads surrounding it, helping evacuate
the Pentagon and helping the FBI and the other law enforcement agencies
collect evidence and search for bodies.

## State Involvement

Within 50 minutes of the attack, the Regional Coordinator (Region III)
of the Virginia Department of Emergency Management was at the Arlington
Emergency Operations Center (EOC) to assume her role as the state/local
liaison person. The State Emergency Management Organization, represented
at the Pentagon and FBI Joint Operations Center, liaised with the
Federal agencies. The Regional Coordinator acted as an emergency
management consultant to the Arlington Emergency Operations Center (EOC)
and facilitated the State's provision of resources to the local
emergency management operation. By mid-afternoon of 11 September, the
State of Virginia deployed a recovery team of support and administrative
personnel to the EOC in order to aid the local response efforts.

## Federal Involvement

 

FEMA activated all of its 10 regional operations centers on September
11^th^. Virginia requested US&R teams from the Federal government very
early in the incident. FEMA initially deployed four 62-member task
forces, each composed of a search team, a rescue team, a medical team,
and a technical/logistical support team. Based upon proximity,
Virginia-1, Virginia-2, Maryland-1 and Tennessee-1 Task Forces were
dispatched to the Pentagon site to assist and work closely with the
state and county in rescuing and recovering the victims. The Virginia
and Maryland teams were on scene on September 11. The Tennessee team
arrived on September 12. During the first 24 hours, their major priority
was to support search and rescue operations.

FEMA was also responsible for providing financial assistance and
reimbursement to the county and state. On September 13, FEMA assigned a
**Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO)** and established a Virginia
**Disaster Field Office (DFO)** in Clarendon, VA to serve as an
administrative office for Federal and State response and recovery
efforts in Arlington. The FEMA **Emergency Support Team (EST)** in
Washington continued to handle many of the contracting functions
typically conducted by a DFO.

The **National Disaster Medical Service (NDMS)** was activated within 10
minutes of the attacks. Medications from the **National Pharmaceutical
Stockpile (NPS)** were transported and staged at Andrews Air Force Base,
in anticipation of a state request for this assistance. The Office of
Emergency Preparedness (OEP), a division of the Department of Health and
Human Services (DHHS), deployed a total of 382 medical personnel from
disaster response teams to assist physicians and other health providers
at both the Pentagon and NYC. FEMA approved the activation of three
**Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (DMATs)** and three **Disaster
Mortuary Teams (DMORTs)** for the Pentagon site (in addition to four of
each to New York City), including 35 medical personnel from
Winston-Salem, 36 from Atlanta, Georgia, and 46 from Rockville,
Maryland. These units were staged at Anacostia Naval Air Station in
Washington, but were never deployed to the Pentagon since the military
and the State of Virginia indicated that they did not need medical or
mortuary assistance. The Arlington County Based **National Medical
Response Team (NMRT)** was the only NDMS medical resource actually
deployed at the Pentagon.

Other federal medical resources, including the medical teams from the
US&R Task Forces, and military medical personnel supporting military
rescuers, operated at the site until search and rescue activities ceased
on September 21. The US&R **Incident Support Team (IST)** and Task
Forces contain medical personnel that provide preventive medicine and
medical/mental health care for US&R personnel, and the U.S. military
maintained a similar presence for DoD personnel.

 

 The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) deployed US&R teams to work
closely with the FEMA IST to provide technical assistance for body
recovery and structural assessments. USACE executed these actions
through its Prime Power Assessment Teams, Structural Safety Engineers,
and Debris Planning and Response Teams.

EPA Headquarters began 24-hour operations immediately after the attacks
and through its Region 3, deployed four **On-Scene Coordinators (OSC)**
and two air inspectors to the Pentagon and the surrounding Arlington/DC
area. Their primary mission was environmental monitoring by collecting
air, water, and debris samples at and around Pentagon crash site to
assist with the safety of response personnel, Pentagon employees and
nearby residents. There were no major pollutants detected at the crash
site; air-monitoring near the Pentagon revealed no impact from fire, and
air quality monitoring for volatile organic carbons, particulates and
asbestos continued through 29 September.

The Presidential Emergency Declaration for Arlington County was signed
on September 13^th^, 2 days after Virginia's request. On September 21,
President Bush declared the Pentagon and the surrounding region a
disaster area making funding available for those affected by the
attacks, including the Arlington County government. This assistance
included funds for funeral arrangements, crisis counseling,
small-business loans, and additional aid for the county. The search,
rescue and recovery operations lasted for 10 days at the Pentagon crash
site. The FBI officially assumed responsibility for the entire site on
21 September to continue the lengthy criminal investigation. County
rescue workers, and health workers completed their work and departed the
site the same day, however, the fire fighters remained at the scene
because of concerns of possible flare-ups.

## Other Agencies Involved

Captain Michael Defina of the T Metropolitan Washington Airports
Authority (MWAA) Fire Department at Ronald Reagan Washington National
Airport, was investigating an incident at an airport terminal when he
heard the impact and saw the smoke rising in the distance. He called
Fire Communications and was advised of a report of a Boeing 757 crash
off the end of Runway 1-19. That was quickly amended, identifying the
Pentagon as the crash site. The MWAA contacted the Arlington ECC and was
directed to respond to the Pentagon. They did so with substantial
resources: a rescue engine, two foam units, two mass casualty units, a
mini-pumper, and a command vehicle. Because MWAA has authority to
respond automatically to an airplane crash within 5 miles of the
airport, two heavy rescue units had already self-dispatched to the
Pentagon. (Arlington After Action) Their quick actions and numerous
resources contributed greatly to the initial fire suppression and search
and rescue efforts.

The Arlington County Employee Assistance Program (EAP) group -- a
resource that became vital to the overall response effort - was on the
scene in just three hours. They did immediate counseling and later
brought in masseuses for the first responders. Their efforts were key to
ensuring the greatest abilities of the responders were maintained, and
that the responders themselves were kept as safe and healthy as
possible.

The military and the American Red Cross each provided mental health
services to responders and victims. A risk manager was deployed by
Arlington County, and a doctor from Arlington County Fire was assigned
to examine ACFD workers and staff. The mental health professionals
provided a total of 6,356 crisis-counseling sessions to victims,
families and disaster workers during the first month of the Pentagon
response and recovery operation. (NSF Report)

Many other agencies, including several nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs), provided supplementary support, such as the Salvation Army's
food preparation services.

## Analysis

The response to the Pentagon attack on September 11^th^ is a case study
in coordination and interpersonal relationships. The command structure,
established and built upon by the activation of the Incident Command
System, ensured a smooth control of a response that otherwise would have
surely been chaotic at best. This event pushed the limits of
jurisdictional complexity, but almost all major problems were quickly
ironed out. The responding agencies, at all levels, Federal, State, and
local, had a distinct advantage in this case because they had been
working together, meeting face to face monthly, since the Washington
Metropolitan Council of Governments (WMCOG) was formed in response to
miscommunication in the aftermath of an Air Florida plane that crashed
into the Potomac river very close to the Pentagon in 1982. By the time
September 11^th^ came around, these responders at all levels not only
knew about each other, but they had developed personal working
relationships.

The fact that Arlington County assumed command was immediately assertive
and exhibited professional competence was critical to the effective
management of the response. The UC and resulting on-scene organization
and inter-organizational cooperation allowed Chief Schwartz to focus on
strategic considerations. The Unified Command recognized that it was
responding to a unique and complex event. The competence of the
responders that made up the on-scene organization allowed Chief Schwartz
to stand above the tactical situation and allow professional responders
to use their best judgment. Additionally, meetings held every four
hours, conducted by the IC/UC, established trust, effectively shared
information, and accommodated the dispersion of key leaders to their
command areas where appropriate, rather than having to rely on constant
co-location.

Additionally, the Federal Response Plan was vital in guiding the actions
of the numerous Federal agencies that were mobilized to respond to this
event. The addition of the Terrorism Annex to the Federal Response Plan,
which occurred in 1997, allowed for the coordination of responding
agencies and those investigating the crime-scene aspect, without
conflict. The purpose of the FRP is to provide a mechanism for the
mobilization and coordination of federal resources to assist states in
response to Presidentially declared disasters. See Figure 4.3.1 for a
visual representation of how the Federal Response Plan functions in
response to disasters such at the attack on the Pentagon.

However, as would be expected in any event of this magnitude, there were
problems, and likewise, lessons to be learned. Communications, as has
been documented extensively in regards to the events in New York City,
was a leading deficiency for responding agencies. This extends from the
initial notification of responders to the communication between
responders and the command post. Interagency communication -- between
two separate fire or other departments - is the most problematic, and is
often completely impossible due to incompatible systems.

For instance, due to the increasing number of responders at the
incident, numbering into the thousands, the Incident Commander decided
to tighten site access. A new badging system was devised, based upon
lists made and maintained by each organization's leader, identifying
only those responders who were considered vital to the operation.
Additionally, a second (inner) perimeter needed to be established in
order to restrict access to the building work area itself, with special
badges required for entry. It was quickly noted, however, that perimeter
control is not only a security, but also a health and safety issue, due
to the intense desire of rescuers to remain on scene. For instance,
firefighters would end a 12-hour shift and be bused back to the station,
only to get in their cars and drive back to the scene to work another 12
hours without resting. Rest/sleep for the responders became a major
concern of the IC during this time period -- and a color-coded badge
system was devised to ensure only rested responders were participating.
It was recommended in the immediate follow-up to the response that a
comprehensive badging system must be pre-established so that it can be
utilized immediately in the event of another major incident.

##### **Conclusion**

It is arguable that no response agency could have been prepared for the
events that unfolded on the morning of September 11^th^ in New York City
and in Arlington, VA. However, as this case study shows, despite these
incredible circumstances the responding agencies in Arlington responded
in a highly effective manner, thereby preventing further destruction of
the Pentagon building and assisting the injured. These attacks have
become a watershed event for all emergency management activities, and
the lessons learned have shaped disaster management as it exists today
and continues to change.

**[References]{.underline}**

Arlington County, VA. 2002. After Action Report on the Response to the
September 11 Terrorist Attack on the Pentagon. Titan Systems
Corporation.

Harrald, John R., Barbera, J., Renda-Tanali, I.R., Coppola, D, and Shaw,
G.L. 2002. Observing and Documenting the Interorganizational Response to
the September 11 attack on the Pentagon. *Proceedings, 9th Annual
Conference of TIEMS.* Waterloo, Canada. Pp. 32-4.
<http://www.seas.gwu.edu/~icdm/nsf_9_11.htm>.

National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. 2004.
9/11 Commission Report. W.W. Norton and Company.

Wikipedia. N/d. Casualties of the September 11, 2001 Attacks.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/September_11,\_2001_Terrorist_Attack/Casualties

**Sidebar 4.3.1: Recommendations and Lessons Learned from the Arlington
County After Action: Initial Response**

The ECC must provide immediate and complete deployment information to
emergency response units. Every firefighter and EMS responder should
have a pager to receive dispatch notices both on and off shift.

During potential mass casualty events, all involved dispatch centers
must make a concerted effort to provide consistent and accurate
direction to emergency responders.

Deploying units must strictly adhere to instructions from the ECC until
arriving at the incident scene and receiving direction from the Incident
Commander.

All building entrances and exits at the incident scene must be secured
and entry tightly controlled so personnel accountability is not
compromised.

Fire and rescue organizations need interoperable radios with effective
channel management and communications discipline. They must also plan on
expedient alternative means of communications, including, but not
limited to, foot messengers.

The ACFD should review fire apparatus staffing levels to ensure the
speed of early search and rescue operations and provide for the safety
of the crew.

Fire departments must be equipped for sustained operations. Firefighters
should not have to rely solely on breathing apparatus or other items
taken from colleagues they replace. Additionally, reserve apparatus
should have a full complement of equipment stored and secured so they
can be quickly placed into service.

In large incidents, the staging area should be located a moderate
distance from the scene to establish and maintain a system of
accountability. Suitable staging areas should be identified around the
county in advance and clearly identified for incoming emergency services
units in plans and by the instructions of dispatchers. Entrance from
adjoining streets and highways must be tightly controlled by law
enforcement personnel who have received specific guidance from the
Incident Commander to direct incoming units.

Those engaged in fire suppression and rescue operations in buildings
with a potential for collapse need detailed site plans and drawings as
well as access to knowledgeable structural engineers. This information
must be accessible to those engaged at the point of attack.

Fire and medical responders should receive a detailed orientation on
each critical and unique facility in the jurisdiction and have available
site drawings and other graphic aids.

EMS must establish treatment and transport control for the entire
perimeter to attain control and accountability in mass casualty events.

When responding to an incident as large as that at the Pentagon, EMS
personnel must conduct a thorough scene sizeup. All medical treatment
facilities, regardless of the provider, must be integrated into a single
EMS structure.

The provisions of the existing emergency medical support agreement
between the Pentagon and Arlington County should be reviewed by both
parties and validated or modified. Other government sites in Arlington
County should be surveyed to determine which ones have medical
facilities and the extent of their treatment capabilities.

In any casualty situation, triage tags must be used to provide a record
documenting medical treatment, narcotics administered, and patient
disposition. Triage tags should be used routinely in EMS medical
treatment to reinforce their value.

Communications and coordination specified in plans and support
agreements between EMS Control and on-scene medical resources of a
critical facility (the DTHC in this instance) need to be followed.

Public safety organizations need to prepare for, and practice in
advance, fire and rescue operations for critical or unique facilities
within assigned jurisdictions:

-   Requirements for site information, specially trained personnel,
    special equipment, and supplies need to be identified in advance and
    secured for that site.

-   Templates for documenting and controlling information need to be
    prepared, personnel must be trained, and special equipment purchased
    if necessary.

-   Fire suppression plans must include specific procedures for dealing
    with potential difficulties arising from the structure itself---such
    as the visibility problems related to the size and shape of the
    Pentagon.

Information about additional threats to first responders must be
disseminated rapidly and decisions regarding site evacuation made
without hesitation. In an incident that is clearly the work of
terrorists, every attempt must be made to validate the accuracy of
threat reports to avoid unnecessary interruptions to fire suppression
and rescue operations and their debilitating physical and mental
effects.

Other jurisdictions should emulate the ACFD and integrate significant
lessons learned during incident response operations into established
fire and rescue plans, training exercises, and mutual-aid agreements.

**Sidebar 4.3.1: Recommendations and Lessons Learned from the Arlington
County After Action: Command, Coordination, and ICS**

Deploying units must strictly adhere to instructions from the ECC until
arriving at the incident site and being placed under control of the
Incident Commander or Staging Officer. In responding to a catastrophic
incident, it is especially important that units deploying from outside
the immediate area contact the host jurisdiction dispatch center for
information and instructions.

All deployed units, whether or not they have adopted the ICS, must
accept the command primacy of the responsible jurisdiction. Units that
choose to operate outside a unified structure should be replaced.

To every extent possible, the command structure at the incident site
should be preplanned and agreed upon by area responders and public
safety organizations. All agencies should adhere to a single command
system. The NIIMS ICS was recently adopted by the Washington
Metropolitan Area Council of Governments and is a widely accepted model.

In a large-scale incident, it is difficult to distinguish between
command echelons; therefore, a new, more precise, identification system
should be conceived and adopted by all fire and rescue organizations. If
the system described in the Greater Metropolitan Washington Area
Operation Plan is deemed adequate, it should be put into regular
practice. Location flags should be flown routinely for three-alarm
emergencies, possibly augmented by lights of similar color for night

operations.

Similarly, there must be only one person with the title of Incident
Commander and only one ICP. The ACFD should take the initiative to
clarify terminology within the ICS so the Incident Commander is clearly
distinguishable from the leaders of supporting organizations.

Standardized NIIMS ICS forms should be available and used for all
long-term incidents.

The Incident Commander must be physically present at a location in
proximity to the incident and at an ICP that can accommodate the ICS
staff functions.

In a terrorist-generated event, a senior FBI presence at the ICP, as a
member of the Unified Command team, is essential at all times.

During the response to a terrorist attack, the Incident Commander must
have timely access to reliable threat information. It is vital that
valid information be made available to avoid the toll of unnecessary
evacuations. Providing valid tactical threat information is the
responsibility of the FBI and the ACPD.

If a JOC is activated, a JIC should also be activated. Coordinating the
flow of information goes hand-in-hand with coordinating operations.

The ACFD needs access to a fully functional state-of-the-art mobile
command and communications capability. It should be expandable with
compatible tentage, panels, and transportable equipment so it is
adaptable to circumstances of different size and duration.

Shift changes and dismissal instructions should be described in the
department's standard operating procedures (SOPs) to which changes can
be made to accommodate the circumstances of a particular event.

The Arlington County EOC should be exercised periodically with the ICS
to improve coordination, communications, and interaction.

Personal and professional relationships that cross organizational and
jurisdictional boundaries are important and should be established,
reinforced, and nurtured throughout the response community. However,
they are not a substitute for good planning.

**Figure 4.3.1: Organizational Evolution Stipulated by the FRP**

![](media/image6.png){width="4.122916666666667in"
height="4.095833333333333in"}

**Additional Sources of Information on Firestorm 2003**

California Wildfire Information - <http://jicfire.calmast.org/fireinfo/>

California Wildfire Mapping Tools -
<http://wildfire.cr.usgs.gov/fireplanning/>

FEMA Information on the Wildfires -
<http://www.fema.gov/news/event.fema?id=2543>

Glossary of Wildfire Fire Fighting Terms -
<http://c21.maxwell.af.mil/documents/glossary_of_firefighting_terms.htm>

Maps of the California Fires -
[www.esri.com/news/pressroom/firemaps.html](http://www.esri.com/news/pressroom/firemaps.html)

National Forest Service Fire News -
<http://www.nifc.gov/fireinfo/nfn.html>

National Interagency Fire Center - <http://www.nifc.gov/>

Southern California Wildfire Hazard Center -
[www.icess.ucsb.edu/resac/resac.html](http://www.icess.ucsb.edu/resac/resac.html)

**Additional Sources of Information on the Space Shuttle Columbia
Disaster**

CBS News on the Columbia Disaster -
<http://www.cbsnews.com/sections/columbia/main500258.shtml>

NASA Columbia Page -
[www.nasa.gov/**columbia**/home/](http://www.nasa.gov/columbia/home/)

Space.Com Columbia Page -
[www.space.com/**columbia**tragedy](http://www.space.com/columbiatragedy)

**Additional Sources of Information on the Pentagon Attack of September
11, 2001**

Arlington VA Fire Department -
[www.co.arlington.va.us/fire/](http://www.co.arlington.va.us/fire/)

Arlington VA Police Department -
www.co.arlington.va.us/Departments/Police/PoliceMain.aspx

Google Directory of the September 11^th^ Attacks -
<http://directory.google.com/Top/Society/Issues/Terrorism/Incidents/September_11,_2001/>

National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States -
[www.9-11commission.gov/](http://www.9-11commission.gov/)

**Glossary of Terms**

Cantilevered - A projecting structure, such as a beam, that is supported
at one end and carries a load at the other end or along its length

Cribbing - A framework to support or strengthen an unstable structure --
commonly used in mine shafts

Disaster Field Office (DFO) - The office established in or near the
designated area to support Federal and State response and recovery
operations. The Disaster Field Office houses the Federal Coordinating
Officer (FCO), the Emergency Response Team, and, where possible, the
State Coordinating Officer and support Staff.

Disaster Medical Assistance Team (DMATs) - DMAT is (usually) a regional
group of volunteer medical professionals and support personnel with the
ability to quickly move into a disaster area and provide medical care.
Under the control of the U.S. Public Health Service, DMAT\'s can rapidly
deploy for any type of disaster that requires an immediate medial
response.

Disaster Mortuary Teams (DMORTs) - Under Emergency Support Function #8
(ESF #8) of the National Response Plan, these teams provide victim
identification and mortuary services. These responsibilities include:

-   temporary morgue facilities

-   victim identification using latent fingerprint, forensic dental,
    pathology, and forensic anthropology methods

-   processing

-   preparation, and

-   disposition of remains

Emergency Support Team (EST) - An interagency group operating from the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) headquarters. The EST
oversees the national-level response effort and coordinates activities
with the ESF primary and support agencies in supporting federal response
requirements in the field.

Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) -- Official named by the FEMA
director to direct federal response and recovery activities following a
Presidential disaster declaration

Incident Command System (ICS) - ICS is the model tool for command,
control, and coordination of a response and provides a means to
coordinate the efforts of individual agencies as they work toward the
common goal of stabilizing the incident and protecting life, property,
and the environment.

Incident Support Team (IST) - An overhead team used to conduct needs
assessments, provide technical advice and assistance to State and local
government emergency managers, coordinate the activities of multiple
US&R task forces in the field, and provide logistical support for US&R
task forces beyond their initial 72-hour period of self-sufficiency. 

Initial Attack - The actions taken by the first resources to arrive at a
wildfire to protect lives and property, and prevent further extension of
the fire.

Joint Operations Center (JOC) - Established by the LFA under the
operational control of the Federal OSC, as the focal point for
management and direction of onsite activities,
coordination/establishment of State requirements/priorities, and
coordination of the overall Federal response.

Mutual Aid -- An agreement between neighboring or closely-positioned
municipalities to share resources in the event of an emergency or
disaster within any of the municipalities included within the agreement.

National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) - The National Disaster Medical
System (NDMS) is a section within the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Response Division,
Operations Branch, and has the responsibility for managing and
coordinating the Federal medical response to major emergencies and
Federally declared disasters.

National Pharmaceutical Stockpile (NPS) - The NPS is a national
repository of antibiotics, chemical antidotes, antitoxins, life-support
medications, IV administration and airway maintenance supplies, and
medical/surgical items. The NPS Program is designed to supplement and
re-supply state and local public health agencies in the event of a
biological or chemical terrorism incident anywhere, at anytime within
the U.S. or its territories

On-Scene Coordinators (OSC) - The FBI official designated upon JOC
activation to ensure appropriate coordination of the overall U.S.
government response with Federal, State and local authorities.

Shoring - placing of props or braces, called shores, against or beneath
a structure for support. Shoring is often used to stabilize a building
when it is to undergo structural modification or repair. Commonly made
of timbers measuring 12 in. (30.5 cm) by 12 in., shores are placed in an
inclined position, bearing against the external walls of the building.
The upper ends, which are sometimes capped with steel, fit into niches
cut in brickwork, and the lower ends rest on bases or platforms,
frequently of steel plate. The application of wedges or steel jacks
between the lower ends of the shores and the platforms shifts part of
the weight of a building from its foundation to the shoring. Shores are
frequently used as supplemental support for buildings damaged by fire or
by underpinning failure.

Unified Command (UC) - The UC is a structure that brings together the
\"Incident Commanders\" of all major organizations involved in the
incident in order to coordinate an effective response while at the same
time carrying out their own jurisdictional responsibilities. The UC
links the organizations responding to the incident and provides a forum
for these entities to make consensus decisions. Under the UC, the
various jurisdictions and/or agencies and non-government responders may
blend together throughout the operation to develop common strategy
without relinquishing any agency\'s authority. The UC is responsible for
overall management of the incident. The UC directs incident activities,
including development and implementation of overall objectives and
strategies, and approves ordering and releasing of resources. Members of
the UC work together to develop a common set of incident objectives and
strategies, share information, maximize the use of available resources,
and enhance the efficiency of the individual response organizations.

US&R Incident Support Team (IST) - the interdisciplinary support group
trained, supported, and mobilized by FEMA to support its urban search
and rescue (US&R) teams

Wildland Urban Interface - The line, area or zone where structures and
other human development meet or intermingle with undeveloped wildland or
vegetative fuels

**Acronyms**

ACFD -- Arlington County Fire Department

ACPD -- Arlington County Police Department

ACSO -- Arlington County Sheriff's Office

ARC -- American Red Cross

ASPECT -- Airborne Spectral Photo-Imaging of Environmental Contaminants
Technology

ATF -- Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms

BLM -- Bureau of Land Management

CDF -- California Department of Forestry

CRO -- Columbia Recovery Operation

DFO -- Disaster Field Office

DHHS -- Department of Health and Human Services

DHS -- Department of Homeland Security

DMAT -- Disaster Medical Assistance Team

DMORT -- Disaster Mortuary Team

DoD -- Department of Defense

DOI -- Department of the Interior

DPS -- Defense Protective Service

EAP -- Employee Assistance Program

EBS -- Emergency Broadcast System

ECC -- Emergency Communications Center

EOC -- Emergency Command Post

EPA -- Environmental Protection Agency

ERRS -- Emergency Response and Removal Service

ERT-N -- National Emergency Response Team

FAA -- Federal Aviation Administration

FCO -- Federal Coordinating Officer

FBI -- Federal Bureau of Investigation

FEMA -- Federal Emergency Management Agency

FMAGP -- Federal Management Assistance Grant Program

FRP -- Federal Response Plan

GPS -- Global Positioning System

IC -- Incident Command

ICP -- Incident Command Post

ICS -- Incident Command System

IMT -- Incident Management Team

INS -- Immigration and Naturalization Service

IOF -- Initial Operating Facility

IST -- Incident Support Team

JIC -- Joint Information Center

MAC -- Multiagency Coordination Group

MAST -- Mountain Area Safety Taskforce

MDW -- Military District of Washington

MERS -- Mobile Emergency Response System

MWAA -- Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority

NASA -- National Aeronautical and Space Administration

NDMS -- National Disaster Medical System

NIFC -- National Interagency Fire Center

NMRT -- National Medical Response Team

NPS -- National Park Service

NPS -- National Pharmaceutical Stockpile

NWS -- National Weather Service

OEP -- Office of Emergency Preparedness

OES -- Office of Emergency Services

OSC -- On Scene Coordinator

ROC -- Regional Operations Center

SWAT -- Special Weapons and Tactics

TF -- Task Force

UC -- Unified Command

US&R -- Urban Search and Rescue

USACE -- U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

USCG -- United States Coast Guard

USDA -- United States Department of Agriculture

USFS -- United States Fire Service

VOAD -- Volunteer Agencies Active in Disasters

WFKMIS -- Wildland Fire Knowledge Management Information System

WMCOG -- Washington Metropolitan Council of Governments

WUI -- Wildland / Urban Interface

**Discussion Questions**

**General**

1\. Why are problems with communications so commonplace in the
management of large-scale disasters? What can be done to limit these
problems in the future?

2\. Is the National Response Plan a better response coordination
instrument than the Federal Response Plan was? Support your answer with
examples.

3\. How important is cross-departmental training? Explain your answer.

4\. Should the United States Government spend more money on response
capabilities or preparedness and mitigation? Why?

5\. How important is the State in the response phase to emergency and
disaster management?

**Firestorm 2003**

1\. If the costs associated with responding to wildfire events continues
to rise, who should ultimately be responsible for paying for these costs
-- the Federal, State, or local governments, or the private citizens at
risk from the fires? Explain your answer.

2\. Is the incident command system the best way to manage the attack on
severe wildfires that struck Southern California in 2003? Why or why
not?

3\. How effective do you feel public education is as a prevention method
against wildfires. Can the public be trained to respond to these kinds
of disasters as well? Why or why not?

4\. Should there be legislation to limit the construction of houses at
the Wildland Urban Interface? How could limitations like this be
implemented?

5\. When are the media an effective partner in response? Was this the
case with Firestorm 2003?

####### Columbia Space Shuttle Disaster

1\. Should the Columbia disaster have been a Presidentially declared
disaster? Why or why not?

2\. Do you feel that the Department of Homeland Security acted
efficiently in responding to its first major disaster? Why or why not?

3\. How did the response to the Shuttle disaster differ from most other
disasters? What similarities existed?

4\. Was it a wise decision for the President to declare a disaster in
any state where debris had fallen? Why or why not?

5\. Do you feel that FEMA's decision to release a fact sheet for the
public detailing the methods by which they should approach and report
shuttle debris was a wise one? Why or why not?

**September 11, 2001 Attack at the Pentagon**

####### 

####### 1. In what ways was the response to the Pentagon disaster different from the response to the events in New York City? In what ways were the response efforts similar?

####### 

####### 2. Did Chief Schwartz make a good decision when he transferred the Incident Command over to a Unified Command? Why or why not?

####### 

####### 3. How did the personal relationships that had been established between the responding agencies help in the response to the attack at the Pentagon?

####### 

####### 4. Why should the Fire Department have been in charge in this event rather than the Police Department?

####### 

####### 5. Why is it important to have scene security in disasters? Why did they have two (inner and outer) security perimeters at the Pentagon disaster response? 

####### Suggested Out Of Class Exercises

1\. Research what is being done on the national level to alleviate the
problems with disaster communications. Find out if anything is being
done in your municipality to address these issues. Present your findings
to the class.

2\. Contact your local office of emergency management and ask to see the
community's Emergency Response Plan. Try to determine if the plan would
accommodate a major disaster on the scale of the three listed in this
chapter.

3\. Find out if your community has mutual aid agreements with any of the
surrounding communities. Ask your local emergency manager how often the
mutual aid agreements are called upon, and for what types of events.

4\. Find out if your community regularly holds response exercises.
Contact your local emergency manager and find out if volunteers are used
in the exercise. If so, try to participate in one of these exercises.

5\. Research the availability of CERT (Community Emergency Response
Team) training in your community. Take the 20-25 hour class, and
participate in volunteer disaster response.