# **Chapter 8: Business Crisis and Continuity Management and Planning**

# 

**Chapter Outline**

1.  Introduction of topics and concepts to be discussed in this chapter.

> a\. Introduction
>
> b\. The term Business Crisis and Continuity Management (BCCM)
>
> c\. Moving ahead -- the future of BCCM
>
> d\. A functional framework for BCCM
>
> e\. BCCM definitions
>
> f\. Conclusion
>
> g\. References

2.  Case Studies

> a\. The 2003 Northeast Blackout
>
> b\. The Marriott Corporation Practices Business Continuity Planning
>
> c\. The University of Washington's Experience with the FEMA Disaster
> Resistant Universities Program

3.  Additional Sources of Information

4.  Glossary of Terms

5.  Acronyms

6.  Discussion Questions

> a\. General
>
> a\. The 2003 Northeast Blackout
>
> b\. The Marriott Corporation Practices Business Continuity Planning
>
> c\. The University of Washington's Experience with the FEMA Disaster
> Resistant Universities Program

7\. Suggested Out of Class Exercises

**Introduction**

All organizations from all sectors (public, private and not-for-profit)
face the possibility of disruptive events that have impacts ranging from
mere inconvenience and short-lived disruption of normal operations to
the very destruction of the organization. Organizational functions
supporting business[^1] disruption prevention, preparedness, response
and recovery such as risk management, contingency planning, crisis
management, emergency response, and business resumption and recovery are
thus established and resourced based upon the organization's perception
of its relevant environments and the risks within those environments.

Unlike public sector emergency management, which is a primary function
at all levels of government, Business Crisis and Continuity Management
(the term Business Crisis and Continuity Management \[BCCM\] will be
defined in the next section\] remains largely a supporting project or
program that is discretionary except in highly regulated industries such
as healthcare[^2] and banking[^3] where BCCM related requirements and
standards have been established. The preparations for Y2K and the
impacts of the 9/11 attacks have provided some impedance for the more
widespread recognition and acceptance of BCCM as a strategic function
and have resulted in the development of voluntary BCCM
standards/guidelines across the private sector and not-for-profit
sectors such as National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 1600
*Standard on Disaster/Emergency Management and Business Continuity
Programs*[^4] and the ASIS International *Business Continuity
Guideline*.[^5]

Despite these recent advances in BCCM, resources required to develop an
ongoing and robust program still compete with other organizational
priorities which may result in a less than optimal program with
functional deficiencies, poor integration and dispersed authority and
responsibility. Witness the August 2005 study *Disaster Planning in the
Private Sector: A Look at the State of Business Continuity in the U.S.*
conducted by the International Association of Emergency Managers and
AT&T.[^6] This study found that business continuity planning is not a
high priority at four in ten companies surveyed and that almost one
third of the companies have no business continuity plans. The reasons
for this low priority may extend beyond resource considerations to a
lack of understanding of what actually comprises a comprehensive BCCM
program. A functional framework for BCCM, displaying the component
functions and their relationships to one another is provided in this
chapter and is intended to be simple enough to be understandable at all
levels of the organization, yet complete enough to identify and support
the need for the various functions and their integration. This
functional BCCM framework should be considered in the context of the
case studies presented in this chapter.

**The Term Business Crisis and Continuity Management**

The hybrid term business crisis and continuity has been introduced as a
title for an enterprise wide strategic program and process. It is
necessary to include a brief discussion of the creation and choice of
this term since much of the current literature and business practices
use the individual terms crisis management or business continuity
management separately and often interchangeably while recognizing that
they work together to support overall business enterprise management.
The Business Continuity Institute's *Business Continuity Management:
Good Practices Guidelines* (Smith, 2002) and the Standards Australia
draft *Business Continuity Handbook* (Standards Australia 2003) use the
term Business Continuity Management as a unifying process and the
umbrella under which multiple supporting functions, including crisis
management and business continuity operate and integrate. United States
based organizations such as Disaster Recovery Institute International
(DRII 2004), ASIS International (ASIS 2004), and the Association of
Contingency Planners (ACP 2004) also use the term Business Continuity
Management or Business Continuity Planning as an umbrella with crisis
management as an essential component. Noted experts such as Ian Mitroff
(Mitroff and Pauchant 1992) and Stephen Fink (Fink 1986) use crisis
management as their umbrella term with business continuity as one of
many supporting functions.

Despite the difference in terminology, there is little debate in the
business continuity and crisis management literature that crisis
management, business continuity management, and their supporting
functions need to be thoroughly integrated in support of overall
business enterprise management. *Business Continuity Management: Good
Practices Guidelines* explains the inconsistency in terminology by
stating "Crisis Management and BCM (Business Continuity Management) are
not seen as mutually exclusive albeit that they can of necessity stand
alone based on the type of event. It is fully recognized that they are
two elements in an overall business continuity process and frequently
one is not found without the other." (Smith 2002)

Thus, in an attempt to emphasize the inter relatedness and equal
importance of crisis management and business continuity management,
Business Crisis and Continuity Management has been chosen as the
umbrella term for this proposed research study and is defined as:

> Business Crisis and Continuity Management -- "The business management
> practices that provide the focus and guidance for the decisions and
> actions necessary for a business to prevent, mitigate, prepare for,
> respond to, resume, recover, restore and transition from a disruptive
> (crisis) event in a manner consistent with its strategic objectives."
> (Shaw and Harrald 2004)

**Moving Ahead -- The Future of BCCM**

The reality of business is that increasing and dynamic natural,
technological and human induced threats, business complexity, government
regulation, corporate governance requirements, and media and public
scrutiny demand a comprehensive and integrated approach to BCCM. Classic
natural, technological and human induced events such as Hurricane Andrew
(1992), the Northridge Earthquake (1994), the Exxon Valdez oil spill
(1989), the Bhopal chemical release (1984), the World Trade Center
attack of 1993, and the Tylenol poisoning case (1982) have provided
lessons learned that emphasize each of these factors and the need for
coordination and cooperation within and between organizations, and
between all levels of government, the private and not-for-profit
sectors. The tragic events of September 11^th^, 2001 and the
implications for businesses directly and indirectly impacted by the
physical events further reinforce the need for enterprise wide
recognition and coordination of the multiple functions supporting BCCM.

One of the barriers to more universal acceptance and implementation of
comprehensive BCCM programs that support the strategic goals of
individual businesses and business sectors is a lack of understanding of
the necessary and sufficient components of such a program and their
inter relations within and between organizations. Attempts to define
such a program, as found in most literature prior to the 9/11 attacks,
provide a list of business continuity planning steps/elements such as
those set forth in Geoffrey Wold's Disaster Recovery Journal (DRJ)
article *Disaster Recovery Planning Process*[^7] (Figure 1) or the
Disaster Recovery Institute International (DRII) Professional Practices
for Business Continuity Professionals[^8] (Figure 2).

Figure 1

Business Continuity Planning Steps

1.  Obtain Top Management Commitment

2.  Establish a planning committee

3.  Perform a risk assessment

4.  Establish priorities for processing and operations

5.  Determine Recovery Strategies

6.  Perform Data Collection

7.  Organize and document a written plan

8.  Develop testing criteria and procedures

9.  Test the Plan

10. Approve the plan

Figure 2

Disaster Recovery Institute International Professional Practices for

Business Continuity Professionals

1.  Project Initiation and Management

2.  Risk Evaluation and Control 

3.  Business Impact Analysis 

4.  Developing Business Continuity Management Strategies 

5.  Emergency Response and Operations

6.  Developing and Implementing Business Continuity Plans

7.  Awareness and training Programs

8.  Exercising and Maintaining Business continuity Plans

9.  Crisis communications

10. Coordination with External Agencies 

There is no argument that these are necessary steps/elements, however a
mere listing falls short of emphasizing the inter relationships and
temporal nature of the functions that comprise a comprehensive and
ongoing program and the establishment of widely accepted standards. In
the aftermath of 9/11, there have been several initiatives to define and
communicate such standards.

The National Fire Protection Association Standard, NFPA 1600 *Standard
on Disaster/Emergency Management and Business Continuity Programs*
(2004)[^9] provides a "total program approach for disaster/emergency
management and business continuity programs (NFPA 2004)." Similar to the
DRJ and DRII and steps/elements, NFPA 1600 does not provide a functional
framework for, but lists a set of program elements (Figure 3) that
contain general descriptions and are referenced to the DRII Professional
Practices.

Figure 3

NFPA 1600 2004 Edition Disaster/Emergency Management and Business
Continuity Programs Elements

1.  General

2.  Law and Authorities

3.  Hazard Identification, Risk Assessment and Impact

> Analysis

4.  Hazard Mitigation

5.  Resource Management

6.  Mutual Aid

7.  Planning

8.  Direction, Control and Coordination

9.  Communications and Warning

10. Operations and Procedures

11. Logistics and Facilities

12. Training

13. Exercises, Evaluations, and Corrective Actions

14. Crisis Communication and Public Information

15. Finance and administration

The NFPA 1600 *Standard on Disaster/Emergency Management and Business
Continuity Programs* has been recommended as a national standard by the
9/11 Commission Report [^10]and the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004[^11] and is evolving into the de facto standard
for private sector continuity.

Complementing the NFPA Standard, ASIS International, a preeminent
organization not-for-profit organization dedicated to increasing the
effectiveness and productivity of security professionals published its
'all sector' *Business Continuity Guideline* [^12]document which
provides a generic planning guide applicable to any organization. The
Guideline makes the following statement which places the importance of
the Business Continuity/Continuity of Operations process in the context
of organizational survival and success:

> "Recent world events have challenged us to prepare to manage
> previously unthinkable situations that may threaten the organization's
> future. The new challenge goes beyond the mere emergency response plan
> or disaster management activities that we previously employed.
> Organizations must now engage in a comprehensive process best
> described generically as Business Continuity. ... Today's threats
> require the creation of an on-going, interactive process that serve to
> assure the continuation of an organization's core activities before,
> during, and most importantly, after a major crisis event. Regardless
> of the organization -- for profit, not for profit, faith-based,
> non-governmental---its leadership has a duty to stakeholders to plan
> for its survival (ASIS 2005)."

The ASIS *Business Continuity Guideline* does provide a functional
framework (figure 4) which provides a means of visualizing some BCCM
functions, but falls short of providing a level of detail necessary to
capture and explain the totality of a comprehensive program.

Figure 10

ASIS Business Continuity Framework

![](media/image1.png){width="3.879166666666667in"
height="2.752083333333333in"}

**A Functional Framework for BCCM**

The intent of this chapter is not to be critical of any of the before
mentioned lists of steps/elements and the ASIS framework, but to
recommend areas of improvement. Each of them were the result of a
consensus process representing multiple constituencies and present a
logical and necessary first step in the development of national
standards written at a level of detail that can be used to define and
measure compliance. As presented, they provide relatively broad
descriptions of the program steps/elements with minimal detail and
remain open to very liberal interpretations as to what actually
comprises compliance at the function and program level. A listing of the
program elements is useful, but a graphical presentation of the
elements, their hierarchy and interdependency could assist in the
understanding and marketing of a comprehensive program that truly
integrates the component parts.

The functional framework presented below (Figure 5), which displays the
hierarchy of the functions (from top to bottom) and the temporal nature
of each (from left to right), accompanied by functional area and
function definitions (provided following the functional diagram)
provides such a graphical presentation. This framework reflects the
following research process as documented in the Journal of Homeland
Security and Emergency Management article *The Core Competencies
Required of Executive Level Business Crisis and Continuity Managers*
(2004).[^13]

1.  A literature search of existing frameworks.

2.  Synthesis of existing frameworks into a proposed framework

3.  Expert review -- Fourteen interviews with recognized 'experts' from
    the private, public and education sectors.

4.  Revision of the proposed framework based upon the 'expert's'
    comments

5.  A final 'expert' review -- Six interviews with recognized 'experts'
    from the private, public and education sectors.

# 

# Figure 5

# Business Crisis and Continuity Management Framework

![](media/image2.wmf){width="5.958333333333333in" height="5.75in"}

It must be emphasized that the BCCM framework, as presented, is in no
way intended to prescribe a model organization chart for any business.
It is merely the representation of multiple functions that require
integration and coordination for the sake of program effectiveness and
efficiency. Definitions for each of the functions are provided as a
common point of understanding since there is significant disparity in
the various glossaries of Business Crisis Management and Business
Continuity Management found in sources such as NFPA 1600, The Business
Continuity Institute, Disaster Recovery Institute International, and the
Business Contingency Planning Group.

**Business Crisis and Continuity Management Definitions**

[Enterprise Management]{.underline} -- The systemic understanding and
management of business operations within the context of the
organization's culture, beliefs, mission, objectives, and organizational
structure. - Enterprise wide programs and structures, including Business
Crisis and Continuity Management, should be aligned and integrated with
overall Enterprise Management.

[Crisis Management]{.underline} -- The coordination of efforts to
control a crisis event consistent with strategic goals of an
organization. Although generally associated with response, recovery and
resumption operations during and following a crisis event, crisis
management responsibilities extend to pre-event mitigation, prevention
and preparedness and post event restoration and transition.

[Crisis Communication]{.underline} -- All means of communication, both
internal and external to an organization, designed and delivered to
support the Crisis Management function.

[Knowledge Management]{.underline} -- The acquisition, assurance,
representation, transformation, transfer and utilization of information
supporting Enterprise Management. Environmental Sensing, Signal
Detection and Monitoring and Organizational Learning are functions
emphasized as essential components of the Knowledge Management
functional area.

> [Environmental Sensing, Signal Detection and Monitoring]{.underline}
> -- Continual monitoring of the relevant internal and external
> environment of the business to detect, communicate and initiate
> appropriate actions to prevent, prepare for, respond to, recover,
> resume, restore and transition from a potential or actual crisis
> event.
>
> [Organizational Learning]{.underline} -- Developing a business culture
> and support mechanisms that allow the business and its members to gain
> insight and understanding (learning) from individual and shared
> experience with a willingness and capability to examine and analyze
> both successes and failures for the purpose of organizational
> improvement.

[Risk Management]{.underline} -- The synthesis of the risk assessment,
business area analysis, business impact analysis, risk communication and
risk-based decision making functions to make strategic and tactical
decisions on how business risks will be treated -- whether ignored,
reduced, transferred, or avoided.

> [Risk-Based Decision Making]{.underline} -- Drawing upon the results
> of the risk assessment, business area analysis, and business impact
> analysis, the development of strategic and tactical risk management
> (risk reduction, risk transfer, risk avoidance, and/or risk
> acceptance) goals and objectives and the allocation of resources to
> meet those objectives. Risk-based decision-making is a continual
> process that requires dialogue with stakeholders, monitoring and
> adjustment in light of economic, public relations, political and
> social impacts of the decisions made and implemented. Risk-based
> decision making requires the consideration of the following questions:

1.  Can risk be reduced?

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
1.  What are the interventions (controls) available to reduce risk?

2.  What combination of controls make sense (economic, public relations,
    social and political (adapted from Haimes 1998)

> [Risk Assessment]{.underline} - The identification, analysis, and
> presentation of the potential hazards and vulnerabilities that can
> impact a business and the existing and potential controls that can
> reduce the risk of these hazards. Risk assessment requires
> consideration of the following questions:

1.  What can go wrong (hazards identification)

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
1.  What is the likelihood that it would go wrong?

2.  What are the consequences (adapted from Haimes 1998)?

3.  What controls are currently in place?

> [Business Area Analysis]{.underline} -- The examination and
> understanding of the business functions, sub-functions and processes
> and the interdependencies amongst them. Business area analysis
> requires consideration of the following questions:

1.  What are our business functions?

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
1.  What are our business sub-functions and processes?

2.  Which are critical to the continuity of our business?

> [Business Impact Analysis]{.underline} -- Applying the results of the
> risk assessment to the business area analysis to analyze the potential
> consequences/impacts of identified risks on the business and to
> identify preventive, preparedness, response, recovery, continuity and
> restoration controls to protect the business in the event of business
> disruption. Business impact analysis requires consideration of the
> following questions:

1.  How do potential hazards impact business functions, sub-functions
    and processes?

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
1.  What controls are currently in place?

> [Risk Communication]{.underline} - The exchange of risk related
> information, concerns, perceptions, and preferences within an
> organization and between an organization and its external environment
> that ties together overall enterprise management with the risk
> management function. Risk communication requires consideration of the
> following questions:

1.  To whom do we communicate about risk?

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
1.  What do we communicate about risk?

2.  How do we communicate about risk?

[Planning]{.underline} -- Based upon the results of risk management and
within the overall context of enterprise management, the development of
plans, policies and procedures to address the physical and/or business
consequences of residual risks which are above the level of acceptance
to a business, its assets and its stakeholders. Plans may be stand alone
or consolidated but must be integrated. Some example plans include:

-   Crisis management plan

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
-   Incident management plan

-   Communication plan

-   Business continuity plan

-   Business recovery plan

-   Business restoration and transition plan

[Program Implementation]{.underline} -- The implementation and
management of specific programs such as physical security, cyber
security, environmental health, occupational health and safety, etc.
that support the Business Crisis and Continuity Management (BCCM)
program within the context of Enterprise Management.

[Systems Monitoring]{.underline} -- Measuring and evaluating program
performance in the context of the enterprise as an overall system of
interrelated parts.

[Awareness/Training/Exercising]{.underline} -- A tiered program to
develop and maintain individual, team and organizational awareness and
preparedness, ranging from individual and group familiarization and
skill based training through full organizational exercises.

[Incident Management]{.underline} -- The management of operations,
logistics, planning, finance and administration, safety and information
flow associated with the operational response to the
consequences/impacts (if any) of a crisis event.

[Incident Response]{.underline} -- The tactical reaction to the physical
consequences/impacts (if any) of a crisis event to protect personnel and
property, assess the situation, stabilize the situation and conduct
response operations that support the economic viability of a business.

[Business Continuity]{.underline} -- The business specific plans and
actions that enable an organization to respond to a crisis event in a
manner such that business functions, sub-functions and processes are
recovered and resumed according to a predetermined plan, prioritized by
their criticality to the economic viability of the business. Business
continuity includes the functions of business resumption and business
(disaster) recovery.

> [Business Recovery]{.underline} -- Plans and actions to recover
> essential business systems that support business resumption and
> eventual business restoration and transition. The alternative term of
> "disaster recovery" is often used interchangeably with business
> recovery and carries with it an information technology (IT)
> connotation. For the purpose of this research, business recovery
> applies to all business systems and not just those related to IT.
>
> [Business Resumption]{.underline} - Plans and actions to resume
> (continue) the most time sensitive (critical) business functions,
> sub-functions, processes and procedures essential to the economic
> viability of a business.

[Restoration and Transition]{.underline} - Plans and actions to restore
and transition a business to "new normal" operations following a crisis
event.

**Conclusion**

Business Crisis and Continuity Management, by what ever title it is
assigned (Business Continuity, Crisis Management, Disaster Planning,
etc.), is a strategic program with supporting functions that must be
integrated for the sake of overall efficiency and effectiveness. A
functional framework and function definitions are presented to visualize
the structure and inter dependencies of the components of a
comprehensive BCCM program. The following case studies should be
considered in the context of this framework.

In the case of the 2003 Northeast Blackout, would a BCCM program have
assisted individual businesses and overall industries, prevent, prepare
for, respond to and recover from the highly disruptive event.

The Marriott Corporation is presented as a model for comprehensive
Business Continuity (their title for BCCM). The case study describes the
BCCM functions at Marriott and how they are brought together as a
comprehensive program,

The FEMA Disaster Resistant University program encourages Universities
to apply mitigation measures to prevent and/or decrease the impacts of
disasters. University responsibilities extend to preparedness, response
and recovery which encompass the BCCM functions.

**References**

Association of Contingency Planners -- International. Web Site. Oak
Creek, WI. 2004.
[**http://www.acp-international.com/**](http://www.acp-international.com/).

ASIS Commission on Guidelines. *Business Continuity Guideline: A
Practical Approach for Emergency Preparedness, Crisis Management, and
Disaster Recovery. Guideline.* Alexandria, VA. July 12, 2004.

<http://www.asisonline.org/guidelines/guidelinesbusinesscon.pdf>

Disaster Recovery Institute International. *Introduction and
Professional Practices for Business Continuity Professionals.* DRI
International. Falls Church, VA. 2005.
[http://www.drii.org](http://www.drii.org/).

Disaster Planning in the Private Sector: A Look at the State of Business
Continuity in the U.S*.*2005.
<http://www.att.com/presskit/_business_continuity>.

Federal Emergency Management Agency. *Emergency Management Guide for
Business and Industry*. Federal Emergency Management Agency. Washington,
DC. 1996.

Fink, Steven. *Crisis* [Management: Planning for the
Inevitable.]{.underline} Authors Guild Backprint Edition. 1986, 2002.

Harrald, John R. *A Strategic Framework for Corporate Crisis
Management.* The International Emergency Management Conference 1998
(TIEMS '98) Proceedings. Washington, DC. 1998.

Laye, John. [Avoiding Disaster: How to Keep Your Business Going When
Catastrophe Strikes.]{.underline} John Wiley and Sons, Inc. Hoboken, NJ.
2002.

Mitroff, Ian I., Pauchant, Thierry, C. [Transforming the Crisis-Prone
Organization.]{.underline} Jossey-Bass, Inc. San Francisco, CA. 1992.

Mitroff, Ian. I*.* [Managing Crises Before They Happen: What Every
Executive and Manager Needs to Know About Crisis
Management.]{.underline} Amaco. New York, NY. 2001.

[9/11 Commission Report]{.underline}*.* U. S. Government Printing
Office. Washington, DC. 2004.

NFPA. *NFPA 1600 Standard on Disaster/Emergency Management and Business
Continuity Programs*. 2004 Edition. Quincy, MA. 2004.

Shaw, Gregory. L. and Harrald, John. R. *Required Competencies for
Executive Level Business Crisis and Continuity Managers*. Journal of
Homeland Security and Emergency Management. Jan. 2004.

Smith, David, J. Editor. *Business Continuity Management: Good Practices
Guidelines*. The Business Continuity Institute. London, England. 2002.
[http://www.thebci.org](http://www.thebci.org/) .

Standards of Australia Ltd. *A Handbook on Business Continuity
Management: Preventing Chaos in a Crisis*. Consensus Books. Sydney,
Australia. 2002.

Standards of Australia Ltd. *Draft Business Continuity Handbook.*
Sydney, Australia. 2003.

United States Government. *Intelligence* *Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004*. Section 7305. Private Sector Preparedness.
Washington, DC. 2005.

U. S. Securities and Exchange Commission. Interagency Paper on Sound
Practices to Strengthen the Resilience of the U.S. Financial System
<http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/34-47638.htm>*.*

White House Administrative Office. *National Strategy for the Physical
Protection*

*of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets.* Washington, DC. February
2003*.*

Wold, Goeffrey. Disaster Recovery Planning Process. Disaster Recovery
Journal. 1992. <http://www.drj.com/new2dr/w2_002.htm>

# Case 8.1: The 2003 Northeast Blackout

## Introduction

On August 14, 2003, the largest power blackout in North American history
occurred, affected eight U.S. States and the Province of Ontario. In
less than an hour, approximately 50 million people were left without
electricity. Though much of the power was returned within 29 hours,
outages persisted for up to two weeks in some places.

For many businesses, electricity is a vital resource without which they
would not survive. Many businesses take for granted the fact that
electricity flows into their buildings each day, rarely considering what
they would do should the power disappear. Some businesses, however, have
performed business continuity planning, and have worked through what
they could do to ensure that they are able to remain operational in the
event of a power outage. Such planning, or the lack thereof, determined
who suffered that hot August day in 2003.

This case will examine the effect of the 2003 blackout on small
businesses. It will give a brief background on the causes and the events
surrounding the blackout. An analysis of business performance in the
aftermath of the blackout will be given. Finally, lessons learned will
be provided.

### The Event

August 14 started out like any other day in the North-Central and
Northeast United States, other than that it was slightly warmer than
usual. Then, at about 1:30 in the afternoon, a power generation plant in
Ohio, FirstEnergy Unit 5, shut down due to conditions that were not
necessarily out of the ordinary. However, another plant in the area,
FirstEnergy's Davis-Besse nuclear power plant, had just previously been
shut down for maintenance. The combination of the two outages set into
motion the series of events that led to the great power outage that
followed.

**Power grids** in the United States are tightly interconnected, and
depend upon each other to an extent to both supply and receive generated
power. The primary components of these grids are the generation plants
and transmission lines. The demand load on any power grid must be
matched exactly by the amount of power supplied, and its ability to
transmit that power must not be impeded. Because any great overload of a
power transmission line, or under- or overload of a generator, can cause
costly and difficult-to-repair damage, the power grid is disconnected
whenever a serious imbalance is detected.

Whenever a single generation plant is taken out of the grid, the power
that was being routed through that local grid becomes backed up, and
must be accommodated by the remaining plants and transmission lines that
exist nearby. They do this by increasing or decreasing their own power
output to adjust to the changes in supply and demand. When parts of the
grid are taken off line, the power transmitted through the lines still
connected increases for some time, making the transmission lines heat up
and sag. If they sag far enough such that they make contact with a tree
branches that have not been pruned, they ground out, causing that
section of the grid to automatically trip off. This phenomenon is what
began to occur throughout Ohio after FirstEnergy Unit 5 shut down.

Operators are able to reverse to flow of electricity through the
transmission lines when events like this occur, to reduce the amount of
power flowing through the transmission lines. However, four main systems
of transmission lines were out of service before power was routed out of
the area, including 200 megawatts that was coming in from Michigan. When
this reversal happened, the load on the systems in Michigan increased
significantly, and by 4:06 pm, the direction of the power was reversed
again such that it was flowing back into the already-strained Ohio
lines. More and more lines sagged and tripped off, causing increased
power loads on systems throughout several states, including Tennessee,
Kentucky, Missouri, Michigan and Ontario in Canada.

To avoid damaging their systems, and unaware of the growing problems
throughout the larger system of power grids, many of these individual
plants independently chose to take themselves 'offline'. Within minutes,
several plants were taken offline, and individual grids began reversing
power away from their transmission lines to avoid tripping them off.
However, due to the number of plants that were down, taking the
electricity out of the system become impossible due to the backups that
resulted, and one by one more plants and transmission lines were shut
down in rapidly-increasing succession.

By 4:13 pm, the system completely failed, resulting in shutting down 531
generation plants in the United States and Canada. Fifty million people
were without power, forty million of which were in the United States.
61,800 megawatts of power demand was taken out of the international
system. Figure 8.1.1 displays the area affected by the power outages.

Crews immediately began working on restoring power to customers. Power
was restored by the night of August 14^th^ in New Jersey, parts of
Pennsylvania and Ohio, parts of Long Island, NY, and in eastern
Connecticut. New York City, however, went that entire night without
power (though Kennedy and LaGuardia airports had power by that first
night). It was not until the evening of August 16^th^ that all of New
York City was back online.

## Consequences

#### 

#### Virtually all systems that require the use of electrical power were affected, and many that did not, *but were associated with systems that did* were affected as well. The following section describes a sample of the affected systems, and provides examples of how the systems were affected.

#### 

#### Power Generation

Under normal circumstances, if one or two generation plants is taken
offline, other plants are able to fill in for the lost power or
accommodate the surge that results from the line disruption. However,
with the cascading failures that occurred, almost all of the plants were
shut down entirely, and the nuclear power plants were placed into a
'safe mode' to prevent accidents. Restarting them from this mode is a
slow process. Other fossil fuel plants were able to go back online soon
after the blackout, but were unable to supply all of the necessary power
required. To accommodate these shortfalls, people and businesses were
asked to use only as much power as they absolutely required to avoid
further failures. Though the power companies were the source of this
disaster, it must be noted that these facilities are businesses
themselves, and the losses they incurred are included in the overall
cost of the disaster.

#### []{.mark}

#### Water Supply

Because many of the public water systems run on electric pumps, many
people and businesses lost water pressure. Many businesses depend upon a
constant source of water, without which their production ceases (such as
restaurants, chemical plants, among others). The low pressure and
failing pressure in the water systems resulted in many cases of water
supply contamination as a result of the backwashing that occurred. There
were many instances of sewage systems spilling out raw sewage into
rivers, confounding this problem. In many cities, including Detroit, a
'boil advisory' was issued to prevent outbreaks of waterborne diseases.
Many restaurants in the affected area were ordered closed pending water
decontamination. There were also cases of chemical plants accidentally
releasing chemicals into the water due to problems the power outage
caused to their pumping systems.

#### Transportation

Trains, which run primarily on electricity, were severely impacted by
the outage. All Amtrak lines north of Philadelphia, including all going
in and out of New York City, were out of service during the blackout.
Commuter trains leaving New York City, and the New York City subway
system were out of service as well. Many commuters, including hundreds
of thousands in New York City, were unable to return home, and images of
workers in business suits sleeping in the streets dominated the news.

Although airplanes did not require electricity, the passenger screening
systems were not operational, and therefore flights were cancelled. The
same was true for ticketing issues, which continued even after power had
been restored at many airports.

Gas stations that lost power were unable to provide gasoline, limiting
the amount of transportation in personal vehicles that could be
conducted. Major trucking lines were held up due to the inability to
purchase fuel as well. Traffic in some areas was backed up due to cars
running out of gas on major roadways and highways. Gas station operators
that did have power tended to raise their gas prices significantly to
guard against the possibility that they might not be able to operate
should their tanks not be able to be refilled in a timely manner. Many
of the refineries on the East Coast that produced gasoline for the area
were unable to operate as well, justifying the station operators' fears.

#### Communication

Land-based ('wired') telephone systems were mostly unaffected by the
outage. Their services, however, were severely impeded due to a
dramatically increased call volume. Cellular systems, on the other hand,
were out of service for most of the duration of the blackout. Most radio
stations had backup power and were able to remain online. Though
television media stations were able to remain online, most of their
transmissions were disrupted because the cable companies, upon which
customers relied, were without power, as were the customers' homes,
rendering their televisions useless. Cable internet service was
disconnected during the blackout, but dialup service was unaffected.

#### 

#### Economic Impacts of the 2003 Blackout 

#### 

ICF Consulting estimated that the blackout would cause financial impacts
ranging from \$7 to \$10 billion (basing their figures on estimates of
direct costs per **kilowatt-hour (kWh)** of the power outage (*e.g.,*
losses due to food spoilage, lost production and overtime wages) and
indirect costs due to the secondary effects of the direct costs.) ICF
asserts that these estimates have been corroborated by simulations of
potential outages in California. Anderson Economic Group, however,
estimated that the impact ultimately fell between \$4.5 and \$8.2
billion (with a mid-point of \$6.4 billion.) These figures include \$4.2
billion in lost income to workers and investors, \$15 to \$100 million
in extra costs to government agencies (*e.g.,* due to overtime and
emergency service costs), \$1 to \$2 billion in costs to the affected
utilities, and between \$380 and \$940 million in costs associated with
lost or spoiled commodities. The most frequently cited cost estimate for
the blackout, established by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), is
about \$6 billion. (Electricity Consumers Resource Council, 2004).

One month after the blackout, a survey of affected companies was
conducted by Mirafex Systems, LLC, and the Weatherhead School of
Management. In total, 142 companies were interviewed, across the full
range of locations, sizes, and industries. The purpose of the survey was
to determine the costs incurred by businesses during the blackout
period. The following points detail their findings:

-   Two-thirds of the businesses surveyed (66.2%) lost at least a full
    business day due to the blackout. One-quarter (25%) of the
    businesses surveyed were impacted for two or more business days.

-   Over one-fifth of the businesses surveyed (21.9%) lost more than
    \$50,000 per hour of downtime---meaning at least \$400,000 for an
    8-hour day. One business in ten, lost between \$100,000 - \$500,000
    per hour. And 3.5% of businesses surveyed lost more than \$1 million
    for each hour of downtime.

-   Nearly half of the businesses surveyed (47%) said lost employee
    productivity was the largest contributor to losses suffered due to
    the blackout. Employee productivity is largely impacted by
    availability of information technology resources and workplace
    environmental conditions (e.g. drinking water, sanitary systems,
    **HVAC**, etc.).

-   Production/Manufacturing was the area of business hardest hit
    (31.7%) followed by Sales and Marketing (18.3%) and Information
    Technology (14.8%). Also, Customer Services was identified as being
    impacted (12.7%) by The blackout.

-   Though half say the blackout will have "no impact" on their
    company's plans for the future, nearly 10% say the blackout will
    affect their decision-making with regards to either growth or
    relocation. Nearly 27% say future plans will involve Disaster
    Recovery & Risk Management initiatives.

-   More than a third of the businesses surveyed (34.5%) felt it was
    somewhat or very likely that the region's image would suffer as a
    result of the blackout.

-   More than half the businesses surveyed say the top threat of future
    interruption is either Cyber-Crime (26%) or a Utility Outage (26%),
    outdistancing other concerns more than 2:1. The loss of key staff
    (13.4%) and Regulatory Changes (8.4%) were also identified as key
    areas of concern (Mirafex Systems, LLC, and Weatherhead School of
    Management, 2004).

**Examples of Impacts on Specific Industries (Adapted from ELCON,
2004)**

Businesses of all kinds were affected by the blackout, no matter their
size. Whether a family owned business with one computer or a
multinational company with several plants employing thousands, it seemed
that all suffered some negative consequence. The following list,
compiled by the Electricity Consumers Resource Council, profiles many of
these individual consequences.

**Motor Vehicle & Automotive Parts Industries**

At least 70 auto and parts plants and several offices were shutdown by
the blackout, idling over 100,000 workers. General Motors Corporation
reported that the blackout affected approximately 47,000 employees at 19
manufacturing facilities and three parts warehouses in Michigan, Ohio
and Ontario.

The Ford Motor Company reported that 23 of Ford's 44 plants in North
America were shut down, as were numerous office, engineering and product
development facilities in southeastern Michigan. Other facilities were
affected by disruptions in parts supply lines. At Ford's casting plant
in Brook Park, Ohio, the outage caused molten metal to cool and solidify
inside one of the plant's furnaces. The company reported that a week
would be required to clean and rebuild the furnace.

The North American operating units of DaimlerChrysler AG, lost
production at 14 of its 31 plants. Six of those plants were assembly
plants with paint shops. All the vehicles that were moving through the
paint shop at the time of the outage had to be scrapped. The company
reported that, in total, 10,000 vehicles had to be scrapped.

Three Neff-Perkins Company manufacturing plants, located in Lake,
Geauga, and Ashtabula counties, Ohio, lost production from 4:10 pm on
August 14 until 7:00 am on August 15. The company also shut down certain
presses and air conditioning in the office areas to comply with the
local utility's request to cut back power consumption. Neff-Perkins is a
manufacturer of custom-molded rubber and plastic parts for the
automotive and controls industries.

**Petroleum Refineries**

The blackout affected at least eight oil refineries in the U.S. and
Canada. The loss of production at the damaged refineries threatened a
gasoline shortage in the Detroit Metropolitan Area, creating the
potential for a broader energy emergency. As a result the Governor of
Michigan issued two Declarations of Energy Emergency on August 22 that,
in part, suspended certain air quality regulations that might have
exacerbated a gasoline shortage.

Affected refineries and their production capacities included:

-   Marathon Oil Corporation -- 76,000 barrels per day (bpd) at Detroit,
    Michigan

-   BP PLC -- 160,000 bpd at Toledo, Ohio

-   Sunoco Inc -- 140,000 bpd at Toledo, Ohio. The refinery also
    produces cumene feedstock for the company's phenol plant in
    Frankford, Pennsylvania.

-   Imperial Oil Ltd. -- Two refineries: 119,000 barrels per day at
    Sarnia, Ontario, 118,000 bpd at Nanticoke, Ontario.

-   Petro-Canada -- 90,000 bpd at Oakville, Ontario.

-   Shell Canada Ltd. -- 75,000 bpd refinery at Sarnia, Ontario.

-   Suncor Energy Inc. -- 70,000 bpd at Sarnia, Ontario. The main
    pipeline network for Canadian oil shipments to the U.S. Midwest and
    southern Ontario---operated by Enbridge Inc.---was also crippled by
    the blackout.

Much of the 2 million bpd system, the world's longest for crude oil and
petroleum products shipments, was shut down east of Lake Superior.
Enbridge reported that it was forced to cut volumes moving to its
terminal at Superior, Wisconsin, from Alberta to prevent overfilling
storage tanks.

The blackout was responsible for triggering emergency shutdown
procedures at the Marathon Oil Corporation's Marathon Ashland refinery
about 10 miles south of Detroit. During those procedures, a carbon
monoxide boiler failed to shut down properly, causing a small explosion
and the release of a mixture of hydrocarbons and steam. As a
pre-cautionary measure, police evacuated a one-mile strip around the
183-acre complex and forced hundreds of residents to seek shelter
elsewhere. The Marathon refinery can process 76,000 barrels of crude oil
per day into a variety of petroleum products.

Approximately half the production from the refinery is gasoline designed
to meet the air quality requirements in southeastern Michigan. Full
production was not restored at the refinery until eight days after the
onset of the outage. During that time the company was unable to deliver
to the local market approximately 500,000 barrels of gasoline and other
products.

**Steel Industry**

United States Steel's Great Lakes Works, the company's second largest
plant, resumed production on August 18, four days after the blackout
knocked the plant off line. U.S. Steel is the largest integrated steel
maker in the country. The Great Lakes Works is located in Ecorse and
River Rouge, Michigan.

Rouge Industries Inc. reported that its huge Dearborn, Michigan, plant
was completely shutdown for 24 hours with only limited power for several
days thereafter. The company lost the equivalent of four days' worth of
production.

The International Steel Group Inc. reported that its Cleveland Works was
shut down by the blackout and did not restart steel production until
four days later. When the plant lost power, 1,250 tons of molten iron
had to be dumped into two slag pits along the west bank of the Cuyahoga
River. ISG said that the plant suffered some damage as a result of the
outage.

AK Steel Corporation's Manfield, Ohio, facility lost power at 4:15 pm on
the day of the blackout. The plant's melt shop had six heats of steel in
process, all of which were lost. Also in Manfield, Bunting Bearings
Corporation, a manufacturer of bronze, plastic, powdered metal and
aluminum bearings and solid bars, could not cast for four days.

BCS Cuyahoga LLC reported that its Cleveland plant was shutdown until
August 18. When the power failed, plant personnel had to manually fill
the water-cooling jackets on the reheat furnaces to prevent damage.

An explosion and fire caused significant damage to Republic Engineered
Products' No. 3 Blast Furnace in Lorain, Ohio, as a result of the
blackout. No one was injured due to the explosion. Within 15 to 30
minutes after the outage began, the plant lost the ability to cool the
iron inside the furnace and the molten metal burned through the side of
the structure and started spilling inside the building. Several fires
erupted sending an orange-gray plume of smoke that was visible
throughout the city. Company officials refused to allow firefighters on
the premise, but the company's workers were able to successfully contain
the fires. The company announced that it expected to resume production
at Lorain by the middle of September. Republic is North America's
leading producer of special bar quality (SBQ) steel. On October 6, 2003,
Republic announced that it had been forced to file for protection under
**Chapter 11** of the U.S. Bankruptcy laws. It cited the August 14
explosion and fire at Lorain as a contributing factor.

**Chemical Industry**

Over thirty chemical, petrochemical and oil refining facilities are
located in the "Chemical Valley" area near Sarnia, Ontario. All the
plants suffered some form of outage resulting in the flaring of products
at most of the facilities. Massive clouds of black smoke were visible
throughout the area. Estimates of the cost to producers in the Valley
range from \$10 to \$20 million per hour of outage.

Nova Chemicals Corporation reported that plant outages resulting from
the blackout reduced third-quarter earnings by \$10 million or 12 cents
per share. The power outage hit production at its Corunna, Moore
Township, Sarnia, and Sti. Clair River, Ontario, and Painesville, Ohio,
facilities. Nova stated that it lost a total of 150 million pounds of
ethylene and co-products, polyethylene (PE), styrene and expandable
polystyrene (EPS) production by the time its facilities returned to
normal. The company declared ***force majeure*** on ethylene co-product
deliveries from Corunna. Nova restarted its ethylene plant at Corunna
and its styrene plant at Sarnia, as well as portions of its Moore
Township complex about a week after the outage began.

DuPont reported that all five plants in Ontario were downed by the
blackout. The company produces nylon and nylon intermediates at Kingston
and Maitland, specialty polymers at Sarnia, polyethylene films at
Whitby, and automotive finishes at Ajax. Three DuPont facilities in the
U.S. were also affected by the blackout. DuPont said that sodium and
lithium production at Niagara Falls and operations in Buffalo, NY, where
Corian® solid surfaces and Tedlar® PVF film are manufactured, were shut
down on Thursday, August 14, but were back to full power by Thursday
night. Its automotive finishes facility in Mount Clemens, Michigan,
suffered a complete outage but started to receive power a day later. The
facility at Kingston, Ontario, was down for more than week.

Approximately ten Praxair, Inc**.** air separation plants in
Connecticut, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, Ohio and Pennsylvania, as
well as three in Ontario, Canada, were out of service as a result of the
regional electricity failure at 4:11 p.m. on August 14, 2003. All plants
either returned to service when power was restored or temporarily
remained off-line at the request of the local utility on Friday and
Saturday. Praxair plant operations and logistics responded to the sudden
power outage safely and successfully. The North American Logistics
Center in Tonawanda, NY, took steps to shift product deliveries to
customers in the affected area.

**Other Impacts on Industry and the Commercial and Public Sectors**

Alcan Inc., the world's second largest aluminum producer, reported that
its **cold rolling** plant in Kingston, Ontario, was shutdown by the
blackout.

Revere Copper Products Inc**.**, in Rome, New York, lost copper and
alloy production as a result of the blackout. The plant facilities
include melting, casting, hot rolling, cold rolling extrusion, bar
making and testing equipment. Paper-maker Domtar Inc**.** shutdown its
pulp mill in Espanola, Ontario, and a paper mill in Cornwall, Ontario,
as a result of the blackout. Forestry company Tembec Inc**.** shutdown
sawmills in Timmins,Cochrane, Huntsville and Hearst, Ontario, a pulp
mill in Smooth Rock Falls, Ontario, and a newsprint mill in Kapuskasing.

The National City Corporation reported that across the bank's six-state
franchise, approximately 174 branches were closed due to the power
situation: 30 in Ohio, 134 in Detroit, Michigan and 10 in Pennsylvania.

Kroger Company, the largest U.S. supermarket chain, reported that 60 of
its stores were without power as a result of the August Blackout. Most
of the stores were in Michigan.

The Associated Food Dealers of Michigan estimates that over \$50 million
in perishable foods were lost due to the lack of refrigeration caused by
the blackout.

Local telephone service was also jeopardized by the energy emergency
created by the blackout. SBC, the dominant carrier in Michigan,
requested assistance from Michigan's State Emergency Operations Center
(SEOC) to locate supplemental supplies of petroleum liquids to assure
the continued operation of the local telephone system. This fuel was
needed for both standby generators and company vehicles to allow travel
to remote locations to assure continued operation of telephone
equipment.

Duane Reade Inc**.**, the largest drug store chain in the metropolitan
New York City area, reported that the August 14th Blackout forced the
closure of all of the company's 237 stores. The company estimates that
as a result of the interruption, lost sales totaled approximately \$3.3
million.

Airports were closed in Toronto, Newark, New York, Detroit, Cleveland,
Montreal, Ottawa, Islip, Syracuse, Buffalo, Rochester, Erie, and
Hamilton.

The New York City comptroller's office estimated that losses topped \$1
billion, including \$800 million in gross city product. The figure
includes \$250 million in frozen and perishable food that had to be
dumped. The Restaurant Association calculated that the city's 22,000
restaurants lost between \$75 and \$100 million in wasted food and lost
business. Broadway lost approximately \$1 million because of cancelled
performances. New York City's mayor estimated that the city would pay
almost \$10 million in overtime related to the outage.

#### 

#### Lessons Learned

#### 

Nearly one in five businesses suffer a major disaster every year (Global
Partnership for Preparedness, 2004). No matter where a business is
located, and regardless of how small it's employee base, it can never be
fully removed from the effects of disasters. These "disasters" need not
materialize in the form of a hurricane, flood, or terrorist attack.
Power outages, denial-of-service internet attacks, economic downturns,
robberies and civil unrest can all prove equally or more devastating in
the consequences they produce.

That approximately \$6 billion in losses were incurred during the 2003
blackout indicates that a great number of businesses were not prepared
for a sudden, unexpected loss of electrical power. For some of these
companies, even if their facilities were not directly impacted, it was
the case that their suppliers, their customers, or their transportation
services were impacted, which in turn indirectly caused them to suffer.
In comprehensive continuity planning, all of these 'upstream' and
'downstream' factors are considered.

This event was relatively short lived. Power outages can and have lasted
for much longer than occurred in this event. Following hurricanes,
tornadoes, ice storms, floods, and other disasters where the power
generation and transmission infrastructure is damaged or destroyed, it
can be several days or even weeks before full production capacity is
returned. Businesses must consider how they will continue to operate
under these circumstances before the event occurs, and invest in these
measures as they see appropriate.

In the Mirafex / Weatherhead survey (Mirafex Systems, LLC, and
Weatherhead School of Management, 2004), it was discovered that over
one-third of firms surveyed (34%) had no risk management or disaster
recovery plans in place when the blackout occurred. Another study, by
Info-Tech Research, found that 60 percent of businesses did not have
plans to help IT departments deal with the blackout, even if they did
have business continuity plans. While these figures may seem
unforgivable, they are not necessarily surprising. Business continuity
planning can require both time and money to conduct, which many
companies may be unwilling to commit. Many feel that they do not have
the resources or even the ability to perform business continuity
planning -- others have convinced themselves that it is not necessary.
The survey also found, however, that nearly half (46%) of the businesses
surveyed claimed they would be investing more in risk management,
business continuity and/or disaster recovery in the future. Apparently,
this was a lesson learned through the difficult experience of negative
consequences. Not all businesses should have to suffer before they
commit to planning for emergencies.

It has been predicted that power outages like that which occurred in
2003 could become much more common as infrastructure ages and demand for
electricity increases. The blame for the 2003 outage boils down most
simply to poor tree-trimming by a single component in the greater power
transmission interconnected system. Though Congress has since addressed
the issue of the power system's fragile nature, companies cannot assume
that they need not worry about the issue any longer. The 2003 blackout
should serve as a wake-up call to all businesses that do not currently
have comprehensive business continuity plans.

**References:**

Electricity Consumers Resource Council. 2004. The Economic Impacts of
the August 2003 Blackout. February 9.

Global Partnership for Preparedness. 2004. "What is being done for
businesses: The Facts." GPP Small Business Preparedness Campaign.
<http://www.globalpreparedness.org/>

Government Accountability Office (GAO). 2003. "2003 Blackout Identifies
Crisis and Opportunities for the Electricity Sector. November.
GAO-04-204.

Mirafex Systems, LLC, and Weatherhead School of Management. 2004. An
Analysis of the Consequences of the August 14th 2003 Power Outage and
its Potential Impact on Business Strategy and Local Public Policy.

New York Independent System Operator (NYISO). 2004. "Interim Report on
the August 14, 2003 Blackout." January 8.
<http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/hepg/Papers/NYISO.blackout.report.8.Jan.04.pdf>

Small Business Computing. 2003. "Most Businesses Unprepared for
Blackout." August 22.

**Figure 8.1.1: Area Affected by the 2003 Blackout**

![](media/image3.wmf){width="5.99375in" height="4.273611111111111in"}

Source: GAO, 2003

**Sidebar 8.1.1: Timeline of the Blackout**

-   2 p.m. FirstEnergy\'s Eastlake Unit 5, a 680-megawatt coal
    generation plant in Eastlake, Ohio, trips off. A giant puff of ash
    from the plant rains down on neighbors. On a hot summer afternoon,
    \"that wasn\'t a unique event in and of itself,\" says Ralph
    DiNicola, spokesman for Akron, Ohio-based FirstEnergy. \"We had some
    transmission lines out of service and the Eastlake system tripped
    out of service, but we didn\'t have any outages related to those
    events.\"

-   3:06 p.m. FirstEnergy\'s Chamberlin-Harding power transmission line,
    a 345-kilovolt power line in northeastern Ohio, trips. The company
    hasn\'t reported a cause, but the outage put extra strain on
    FirstEnergy\'s Hanna-Juniper line, the next to go dark.

-   3:32 p.m. Extra power coursing through FirstEnergy\'s Hanna-Juniper
    345-kilovolt line heats the wires, causing them to sag into a tree
    and trip.

-   3:41 p.m. An overload on First Energy\'s Star-South Canton
    345-kilovolt line trips a breaker at the Star switching station,
    where FirstEnergy\'s grid interconnects with a neighboring grid
    owned by the American Electric Power Co. AEP\'s Star station is also
    in northeastern Ohio.

-   3:46 p.m. AEP\'s 345-kilovolt Tidd-Canton Control transmission line
    also trips where it interconnects with FirstEnergy\'s grid, at
    AEP\'s connection station in Canton, Ohio.

-   4:06 p.m. FirstEnergy\'s Sammis-Star 345-kilovolt line, also in
    northeast Ohio, trips, then reconnects.

-   4:08 p.m. Utilities in Canada and the eastern United States see wild
    power swings. \"It was a hopscotch event, not a big cascading domino
    effect,\" says Sean O\'Leary, chief executive of Genscape, a company
    that monitors electric transmissions.

-   4:09 p.m. The already lowered voltage coursing to customers of
    Cleveland Public Power, inside the city of Cleveland, plummets to
    zero. \"It was like taking a light switch and turning it off,\" says
    Jim Majer, commissioner of Cleveland Public Power. \"It was like a
    heart attack. It went straight down from 300 megawatts to zero.\"

-   4:10 p.m. The Campbell No. 3 coal-fired power plant near Grand
    Haven, Mich., trips off.

-   4:10 p.m. A 345-kilovolt line known as Hampton-Thetford, in
    Michigan, trips.

-   4:10 p.m. A 345-kilovolt line known as Oneida-Majestic, also in
    Michigan, trips.

-   4:11 p.m. Orion Avon Lake Unit 9, a coal-fired power plant in Avon
    Lake, Ohio, trips.

-   4:11 p.m. A transmission line running along the Lake Erie shore to
    the Davis-Besse nuclear plant near Toledo, Ohio, trips.

-   4:11 p.m. A transmission line in northwest Ohio connecting Midway,
    Lemoyne and Foster substations trips.

-   4:11 p.m. The Perry Unit 1 nuclear reactor in Perry, Ohio, shuts
    down automatically after losing power.

-   4:11 p.m. The FitzPatrick nuclear reactor in Oswego, N.Y., shuts
    down automatically after losing power.

-   4:12 p.m. The Bruce Nuclear station in Ontario, Canada, shuts down
    automatically after losing power.

-   4:12 p.m. Rochester Gas & Electric\'s Ginna nuclear plant near
    Rochester, N.Y., shuts down automatically after losing power.

-   4:12 p.m. Nine Mile Point nuclear reactor near Oswego, N.Y., shuts
    down automatically after losing power.

-   4:15 p.m. FirstEnergy\'s Sammis-Star 345-kilovolt line, in northeast
    Ohio, trips and reconnects a second time.

-   4:16 p.m. Oyster Creek nuclear plant in Forked River, N.J., shuts
    down automatically because of power fluctuations on the grid.

-   4:17 p.m. The Enrico Fermi Nuclear plant near Detroit shuts down
    automatically after losing power.

-   4:17-4:21 p.m. Numerous power transmission lines in Michigan trip.

-   4:25 p.m. Indian Point nuclear power plants 2 and 3 in Buchanan,
    N.Y., shut down automatically after losing power.

Source: Associated Press, August 17, 2003. Published on CNN, August 17,
2003, <http://edition.cnn.com/2003/US/08/17/blackout.chron.ap/>.

#  Case 8.3: The University of Washington's Experience With the FEMA Disaster Resistant Universities Program

# 

# **Introduction**

During the late 1990's, in partnership with six major universities, FEMA
developed the Disaster Resistant University (DRU) Program. FEMA
officials recognized at that time the major role universities played in
both the structure and stability of the local economy within which they
operated, and postulated that the result of a hazard impact that forced
one of these institutions to close would have a dramatic negative effect
on the surrounding community. Universities are unique organizations that
not only serve their communities and states, but also the Federal
government which has invested significant economic and social capital in
them. Each year, in fact, Federal agencies fund approximately \$15
billion in university research. Much of these research grants and
allocations are multi-year programs, and the value of ongoing research
is understandably even higher (Comerio 2000).

The Disaster Resistant University program was established within the
Pre-disaster Mitigation Grant Program, to be funded by competitive
grants (FEMA, 2003). The DRU Program's primary objective is to encourage
universities to implement mitigation through actions that extend beyond
simple life safety codes and that focus on safeguarding their research
capacity as well as the human capital associated with their academic
environment.

This case study will briefly examine the history of disasters on the
campuses of United States universities, and the impact these disasters
have inflicted. The historical background of the DRU program as it
relates to these disasters will follow. Finally, an examination of the
DRU program and its implementation at the University of Washington will
be provided.

# **Disasters at Universities in the United States**

Disasters have affected a great number of the hundreds of universities
dispersed throughout the United States. In many of these instances,
members of the student body, the faculty, or the staff were injured or
killed. Without exception, however, the disaster events caused some
level of structural damage to these universities and their grounds,
resulting in a tangible negative financial impact to the afflicted
institutions.

In the past decade alone, disasters have caused tens of millions of
dollars of damages at US universities. Examples include, but are not
limited to, earthquake damage at Stanford University and California
State University, Northridge; hurricane damage at the University of
Miami, Tulane University and East Carolina University; a power outage at
Columbia University; flooding damage and business interruption at the
University of North Dakota, Colorado State University, Syracuse
University, and many others. The following five examples, representing
only a small sample of all recognized impacts, are provided to expand
upon these details:

-   The Northridge earthquake, which struck southern California in
    January of 1994, caused significant damage to three universities in
    the Los Angeles area. California State University, Northridge
    suffered the most of the three: nearly all of its buildings were
    damaged and the university was forced to close for one month. It was
    able to resume classes for approximately 30,000 students that were
    enrolled at the time through the use of 450 trailers that served as
    temporary classrooms. Damages to the university were estimated to be
    about \$380 million (FEMA, 2003).

-   Hurricane Andrew passed over the city of Miami in 1992, which is
    home to the University of Miami. The storm resulted in \$17 million
    in damage to the University. As result of these damages, the school
    was forced to close for almost one month because of a lack of both
    water and electricity. The university incurred the cost of
    round-trip transportation for all of its student body in order to
    help them return to their homes during this period. As a result of
    this disaster, the University's insurance premiums increased
    dramatically (FEMA, 2003).

-   On Labor Day in 1998, a severe windstorm occurred in central New
    York State. The storm damaged or destroyed many buildings, trees,
    and utilities on the Syracuse University campus. After the storm had
    passed, the university found itself having to close residence halls.
    Six-hundred students needed to be relocated immediately. The final
    cost to the university for repairs to roofs, windows, and masonry,
    and for the removal of debris, exceeded \$4 million (FEMA, 2003).

-   In July of 1997, a local creek that passed through the Colorado
    State University overflowed. Water poured into both the library and
    the bookstore, damaging hundreds of thousands of books and other
    valuable documents. Most of the campus was closed for one to two
    weeks while clean up was underway. Damages exceeded \$100 million
    (FEMA, 2003).

-   In June of 2001, Tropical Storm Allison inundated the Houston Area
    and its universities and colleges with 10 to 24 inches of rain. The
    University of Texas at Houston Medical School Building had 22 ft. of
    water in it, causing the hospital to close for the first time in its
    history and seriously disrupting its research efforts. Damage to the
    Medical School has been estimated at more than \$205 million.

# **The Economic Impact of Disasters to US Universities**

In addition to being businesses, universities are also genuine
communities, both irrespective and intermixed with the greater civic
communities that surround them. These institutions often employ
thousands and house tens of thousands of people. Like the communities
within which they reside, universities experience the full impact of
disasters; to their members, their infrastructure, and their individual
business processes. The long term impacts and resulting needs, likewise,
are comparable.

In 2000 a study was conducted for the University of Berkeley entitled
*The Economic Benefits of a Disaster Resistant University: Earthquake
Loss Estimation for UC Berkeley.* This study, performed by Mary Comerio
of the Institute of Urban and Regional Development of UC Berkeley,
examined earthquake hazards and the associated economic consequences of
potential losses at the University of California. Comerio estimated that
the cost of replacements and repairs to the facilities of UC Berkeley
that would result from an earthquake could range from \$600 million to
\$2.6 billion (assuming that buildings with 60 percent or more
structural damage would be replaced.) She also found that, in the event
that an earthquake of 7.0 magnitude ("rare") occurred, approximately 40
to 60 percent of all campus space would require more than twenty months
for repairs.

The study further estimated that an earthquake of 7.25 ("very rare")
magnitude or greater could close the campus for up to one year. As an
illustration of the uncertainty involved in such estimations, whose
reality universities must contemplate, the study displayed how building
damage and the time needed for repair varies significantly depending
upon the location of the epicenter, the duration and directivity of the
ground motions, and the availability of money and materials for repair
(Comerio, 2000).

A fact that was not lost on the officials at FEMA who developed the DRU
program was that universities helped to drive the economic engine in the
communities where they resided. The universities helped to provide jobs,
a source of income for residents (through the students' needs and the
local services required by the university itself), and even a certain
level prestige and identity to the community. Comerio's study reinforced
these findings, reporting that a severely damaged UC Berkley would have
a significant impact on the surrounding Berkeley, CA community through a
loss of capital flow (operating expenditures, salaries, and income) from
the University. The study found that a yearlong campus closure would
result in the loss of approximately 8,900 jobs, \$680 million in
personal income, and \$861 million in sales. While these losses would be
offset in the larger economy by the increase in construction jobs
generated, it is important to note that the losses and gains are in very
different sectors of the economy (Comerio, 2000).

In her study, Comerio also addressed the issue of vulnerability. She
found that 50 percent of the research funded projects, as a measure of
dollars funded to the university, were concentrated in just seven
buildings, or 12 percent of campus space. Expanding upon these findings,
the study reported that 75 percent of research funded projects are
located in just 17 buildings -- or one third of campus space. The
seismic ratings of eleven of these buildings are such that they would be
closed for an extensive period following an earthquake of 7.0 magnitude
(Comerio, 2000).

The study also looked at some of the indirect benefits that universities
provide, that were at risk from the impacts of disasters, such as the
long-term contribution that students made to the local economy. Comerio
reported that a significant number of out-of-state students continued to
reside in California after graduation. Each additional out-of-state
graduate that remained in California resulted in almost a million
dollars in increased state output (gross domestic product), and
\$100,000 in state tax revenue, over their lifetime, in present value
terms (Comerio, 2000). It can be assumed that, in the event of a closure
of one year, many of these out-of-state students would seek enrollment
elsewhere.

# **Development of the Disaster Resistant Universities Program**

The Disaster Resistant Universities first grew out of the FEMA
Mitigation Division "Project Impact: Building Disaster Resistant
Communities" initiative. The Project Impact program had begun to show
progress in reducing both the human and economic impacts of disasters
within the communities where it had been adapted. In recognition of the
important role universities played within the communities where they
operated, it was proposed by FEMA Director James Lee Witt that there be
a special program that addressed the unique mitigation and preparedness
needs of university communities.

FEMA leadership began developing the program in late 1998 and early 1999
together with six universities from around the country that showed a
dedication to disaster prevention and preparedness. The UC Berkeley
study, described above in detail, was part of this developmental effort.
The six universities and FEMA leadership met several times during this
developmental period to hash out the details of the program, and to
agree upon a program that was satisfactory in scope and requirement by
all participants.

On October 2^nd^ of 2000, FEMA selected these same six universities to
serve as pilots for a larger future program. The six universities were:

-   Tulane University

-   University of Alaska at Fairbanks

-   University of California at Berkley

-   University of North Carolina at Wilmington

-   University of Miami

-   University of Washington.

Each of these selected universities was awarded a \$100,000 grant from
FEMA, which they were required to match 100%. These universities were
tasked with developing and implementing sustainable, long-term
mitigation projects on their campuses as prescribed by the program's
guidelines (FEMA, 2000)**.**

Building upon their collective efforts, the six universities and FEMA
leadership developed prescriptive publications for use by other
universities interested in performing emergency preparedness and
mitigation on their campuses, including the widely-accepted self-help
guide entitled, \"Building a Disaster-Resistant University.\" This guide
became the prescriptive text for future awardees within the DRU program.

In recognition of the success of the six pilot programs that received
grant funds in 2000, FEMA offered over \$3.4 million in competitive
Pre-Disaster Mitigation (PDM) Disaster Resistant University grants in
fiscal year 2003 (FEMA-PDM, 2003). These DRU funds were competitively
awarded within the bounds of a national priority of ensuring that the
program funds benefited a representative range of universities, based on
hazard type, size, geography, and academic community served, which
included consideration of Historically Black Colleges and Universities
and Tribal Colleges and Universities. In total, 28 universities were
awarded funds in this round. Figure 8.3.1 lists these awards.

# **The University of Washington DRU Program**

FEMA provides Pre-Disaster Mitigation (PDM) funds through its DRU
initiative to assist universities, through State and local governments,
to implement a sustainable pre-disaster natural hazard mitigation
program that seeks to reduce overall risk to facilities, research
assets, students and faculty. The primary objective of the PDM DRU grant
program is to raise risk awareness of the importance of disaster
mitigation and planning by universities and communities, and to reduce
the Nation\'s disaster losses at universities through pre-disaster
mitigation planning. The DRU grant-funded programs are expected to
include the implementation of planned, pre-identified, cost effective
mitigation measures designed to reduce injuries, loss of life, and
damage and destruction of property from all hazards, including damage to
critical facilities, and research operations (FEMA-PDM, 2003). The
implementation of the DRU program at one of the six pilot universities,
University of Washington, will be examined in the analysis of the
Disaster Resistant University program.

The University of Washington is the oldest State institution of higher
education on the West Coast, is the largest university in the Pacific
Northwest, and is consistently ranked as one of the top public
universities in the nation. The University is also very well recognized
for the comprehensive medical services it provides through its teaching
hospital. Its School of Medicine consistently ranks at or near the top
of the nation\'s primary-care medical schools. The University is among
the nation\'s top five institutions in Federal research grants and
contracts awarded to its faculty, which directly contributes to the
educational goals of graduates, professional students, and
undergraduates. In addition, the University serves as a hub for cultural
resources and events, and a recreational center for the community and
region (UW, 2002).

UW is a fully accredited, publicly funded regional institution of higher
education. The University\'s academic program is divided into 18 schools
and colleges that contain 124 academic departments and degree programs.
The University\'s libraries system is one of the largest research
libraries in North America, with collections that exceed 5 million
catalogued volumes, an equal number of microform, and several million in
other formats (UW, 2002**)**. Annual research funding exceeds \$650
million (one-third of the University\'s annual budget), accounts for
more than 5,200 jobs on campus (return on Investment, 2000). Of
significant interest is that there are more than 2,200 laboratories on
the UW campus. They house priceless research and teaching programs that
use biological, chemical, radioactive, and flammable materials; animals;
rare and sensitive specimens and cell lines; and highly specialized
research equipment (UW, 2002).

Through its primary mission of education and research, the UW makes a
substantial economic impact on the State of Washington. The UW employs
almost 23,000 people on its three campuses and has an annual budget of
\$1.9 billion. The funds spent on salaries, equipment, goods, services,
and capital expenditures circulate through the economy, generating even
more economic activity through job creation, and more demand for local
goods and services. This re-circulation of money through the economy,
known as the \"multiplier effect,\" was estimated to be \$5.1 billion in
1999 alone. Furthermore, the presence of the UW is estimated to have
indirectly resulted in the creation of 46,000 jobs in addition to the
23,000 people employed directly by the University. As the UW has become
more integrated into the economy, the total economic impact made by the
university on the local economy has increased from \$3.4 billion in 1995
to \$5.1 billion in 2002 - even as State Investment in the University
has remained under \$400 million per year (UW-Return Investment, 2000).

**Analysis of the UW Disaster Resistant University Program**

The University of Washington followed the DRU guidelines in creating
their Emergency Response Management Plan (ERMP). The DRU Guidelines, as
illustrated in the FEMA Guidebook "Building A Disaster Resistant
University," in turn follow FEMA\'s mitigation planning guidance for
local communities. This follows in line with the recognition of
universities themselves being small or medium-sized communities that are
capable of drawing upon important lessons learned through the efforts of
counties and municipalities (FEMA, 2003).

The four phases of the DRU\'s mitigation process are described as:

> Phase 1- Organize Resources (on and off campus stakeholders)
>
> Phase 2 - Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment
>
> Phase 3 - Developing the Mitigation Plan
>
> Phase 4 - Adoption and Implementation

Each of these phases will be described in brief below, with an
examination of the actions taken by the University of Washington to
fulfill the phase requirements.

**Phase 1**

In Phase 1, \"Organize Resources,\" the university is instructed to take
the initial step of identifying stakeholders from within both the
university and the surrounding community, and to inventory the resources
that are available to the planners. An advisory committee is created out
of these efforts, after all appropriate parties have been identified and
invited to join. FEMA advises that, "Planning organizations exist at
many levels of the university, and it is important to identify all of
the various planning committees that might share an interest or have
jurisdiction in the area of hazard mitigation before the planning
process gets too far." Clearly, only by having a representative from
each of these levels and components can a committee ensure that they
have considered all of the universities needs and vulnerabilities.

The University of Washington created an Emergency Management Planning
committee composed of representatives from both academic and operating
units of the university. They also included members of the community
that had a stake in the planning process, such as emergency management
coordinators and planners. The included officials selected were those
that were able to (and continue to) design and develop the plan, and
then subsequently provide guidance and day-to-day program oversight for
the University\'s emergency and disaster management programs that result
from the process. To ensure that the planning process was thorough,
open, and transparent to the community at large, all meetings were and
continue to be open to any member of the campus community. To see a list
of the committee members, see sidebar 8.3.1.

FEMA stresses that an important objective for the first meeting of the
advisory committee is to develop a mission statement to help committee
members understand what outcomes they will seek to achieve. Doing so,
they claim, will build a common understanding of the mitigation plan\'s
purpose (FEMA, 2003). The University of Washington did just this,
stating that the mission of their Hazard Mitigation Planning process was
to \"Guide the University in protecting its people, its facilities,
environment, equipment and systems by identifying appropriate
initiatives and projects." The statement continued to say that the plan
"will also help the University to prepare business resumption plans in
order to resume normal education and research operations as quickly as
possible following a disaster\" (UW, 2004).

Once the initial inventory of resources has been completed, stakeholders
identified, advisory committee formed, project manager determined, and
timeline established, FEMA recommends moving into Phase-2 of the program
-- Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment.

Phase 2

In Phase-2, \"Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment,\" the
university is instructed to complete a thorough assessment of the
hazards faced by the campus, the associated risks they pose, and the
institution\'s vulnerability to those risks (FEMA, 2003). This section
guides higher education institutions on the methodology of conducting a
hazard identification and \"single-point\" risk assessment that will be
used to identify and prioritize the mitigation actions in the hazard
mitigation plan (FEMA, 2003). Included in this process is the detailing
of hazard profiles that address in specific terms the scope and extent
of damage that a particular hazard event could cause to the university.

By conducting a Hazard Identification and Vulnerability Assessment
(HIVA), UW identified the below hazards that could have a potential
impact on the University\'s Main Seattle Campus (UW, 2002):

Natural Hazards

-   Earthquake

-   Severe Local Storm

-   Snow Storm

-   Fire

Man-made Hazards

-   Civil Disturbance

-   Hazardous Materials Release

-   Terrorism

-   Transportation Accident

-   Urban Fire

In the HIVA, UW assessed terrorism, urban fires and earthquakes as the
most destructive hazards that it faces. They also assessed those hazards
that have a local presence, but from which the campus would experience
have minimal impact potential. This was done in order to minimize the
later mitigation efforts dedicated to them in favor of more likely
hazards. These less-likely hazards include:

-   Avalanches

-   Drought

-   Flood

-   Landslide

-   Tsunami

-   Volcano

Included as Sidebars 8.3.2 are two examples of hazard profiles created
by the university during this process. Also included as Sidebars 8.3.3
and 8.3.4 are the UW Hazards Worksheet and Hazard Impact Matrix
completed by the university for their Disaster Resistant Universities
Project. As part of a detailed hazard analysis, the UW defined each
hazard in order to understand the nature of the hazard, the direct and
indirect effects, and the secondary impacts that maybe created. This
included a historical data to provide documentation of the reality of
the hazards that UW has faced in past and to calibrate planning and
preparedness efforts. The main goal was to assess the vulnerability of
the University\'s people, property, and environment to hazards in order
to their impact, and to develop strategies for mitigation and emergency
preparedness (UW, 2003).

**Phase 3**

After the campus' risks have been identified and vulnerabilities to
these hazards assessed, the university can continue on to Phase 3,
\"Developing the Mitigation Plan.\" This step focuses on the development
of the hazard mitigation plan upon which the committee will base its
future actions for disaster reduction and preparedness.

FEMA stresses that the development of a comprehensive hazard mitigation
plan should draw from, and complement existing plans, to include those
of local and state jurisdictions (the FEMA how-to guide *Developing the
Mitigation Plan* (386-3) provides helpful guidance for state and local
governments on this process and may assist a college or university in
aligning their mitigation plan with those of their surrounding
jurisdictions (FEMA, 2003)). A university\'s mitigation plan should
address all of the hazards that were identified in the HIVA and
prioritize those hazards based on the vulnerability of the institution
to a particular natural and man-made hazards (FEMA, 2003). FEMA advises
that the university's mitigation plan do the following:

-   Establish goals and objectives aimed at reducing or avoiding
    vulnerabilities to the identified hazards

-   Identify actions that will help you accomplish the established goals

-   Set forth strategies that detail how the mitigation actions will be
    implemented and administered

-   Provide continuity to the planning process as it provides a link
    between determining what your community\'s risk are and actually
    implementing mitigation actions

-   Establish a process for regular updates and review of the plan

The hazard mitigation plan documents how a university will reduce its
vulnerability to natural and man-made disasters. The plan details the
purpose of the planning effort, the process that was followed, and the
actions that need to be taken. Once the plan is finalized, the next step
is for it be formally approved and implemented. (FEMA, 2003).

In 2003, the University of Washington developed a Hazard Mitigation Plan
as part of its DRU program. This plan is attached as Sidebar 8.3.5. The
University\'s plan includes hazard mitigation action items that provide
guidance and suggests specific activities that academic and operational
units can undertake to reduce risk and prevent loss from earthquake or
severe storms. Each action item is accompanied by ideas for
implementation, which can be considered by decision-makers as
opportunities arise for funding (FEMA, February 2004). In developing a
University Hazard Mitigation Plan, UW followed the previously discussed
process from FEMA\'s \"Building a Disaster-Resistant University.\" The
Senior Advisory Committee which was facilitated by an Emergency
Management Specialist developed mitigation plan\'s mission, goals and
action items (UW, 2004). The Committee also reviewed all materials
proved by the Hazard Mitigation Plan (HMP) coordinator for additions,
comments and corrections (UW, 2004).

As part of this process the HMP coordinator conducted more than 50
interviews with individuals associated with key academic and
administrative units in order to identify common concerns related to
natural and technical hazards (UW, 2004). Also, in developing the HMP
the coordinator informed and consulted with the University\'s senior
leadership (UW, 2004). As recommended in Phase-1 of the DRU Guide, the
HPM coordinator examined State and Federal guidelines and requirements
for mitigation plans. Consulted with the Washington State Emergency
Management Division, FEMA, the City of Seattle Emergency Management
Office, the King County Office of Emergency Management, the Seattle Fire
Department and the Seattle Police Department (UW, 2004).

With this plan in hand, the University of Washington was armed to submit
an application to FEMA for a Pre Disaster Mitigation (PDM) grant for DRU
funding in the FY2003 round of grants Because of their comprehensive
efforts, the University of Washington was recipient of the largest
amount of funding from the program. The following summary list
highlights the eight priority initiatives proposed by UW in its 2003
Disaster Resistant University PDM Grant application (for which they were
awarded \$500,000):

1.  Development, Implementation, and Evaluation of the UW\'s first major
    Functional Tabletop Exercise since 1998 (\$43,807)

2.  Establishment of a Pilot Campus Emergency Response Team (CERT)
    modeled after FEMA\'s Community Emergency Response Teams (\$51,858)

3.  Development of a model business continuity Planning and Resumption
    Model for critical UW financial, administrative and support
    functions (\$120,395)

4.  Hosting a 2-Day DRU University Workshop and Best Practices Symposium
    (\$23,000)

5.  Co-hosting a campus-wide Student and Staff Emergency Preparedness
    and Personal Safety Fair (\$13,000)

6.  Updating and Improving the University\'s emergency Management
    Website (\$13,000)

7.  Development Emergency Plans for Campus Special-Needs Populations
    (\$18,000)

8.  Seismic Retrofit for the University of Washington Bryant Building
    home t the UW Police 9-1-1 Dispatch Center and Emergency Operations
    Center (\$200,000)

## Phase 4

The final phase in the disaster-resistant university process is the
adoption and implementation of the mitigation plan. Adoption and
implementation go hand in hand. Adoption refers to the formal and
informal acceptance of the plan by appropriate entities, such as a
formal vote or a statement of support or memorandum of understanding.
Implementation refers to putting the plan into action by taking steps to
adopt the mitigation actions described in the plan. At some point in
this process, it is expected that the university will hold a press
conference or other means of announcing their work in progress to the
community (FEMA, 2003).

At UW the Executive Vice President and Provost were given the
responsible for adopting the University\'s HMP because of their
authority to promoting University policy regarding hazards. The
University\'s Office of Emergency Management, with oversight by the
Capital Facilities Committee, is responsible for coordinating the
overall implementation of the mitigation plan and undertaking the formal
review process every six months (UW, 2004). A key objective of the
University\'s implementation strategy is to use existing programs
existing programs to address identified hazard mitigation goals and
objectives (UW, 2004).

### Lessons Learned

The University of Washington Emergency Management Office\'s published
lessons learned from the Disaster Resistant University Pilot Program, in
order for other universities to benefit from the experience of the
genuine leadership role that UW took in the DRU process. These lessons
are listed as:

-   Conduct the HIVA in-house with committed and knowledgeable staff of
    campus activities, operations, and its physical layout.

-   The individual(s) conducting the HIVA should have an established and
    positive relationship with faculty, staff and students as well as
    local emergency response agencies.

-   UW had no formal archives of information related to specific hazard
    events.

-   There is a lack of communication between the academic side of the
    University and the operational side implementing hazard mitigation
    strategies.

-   Facilities information not available on Geographic Information
    Systems (GIS) limited ability to analyze infrastructure.

Having completed its goals for the pilot DRU Program, the University
Washington has established the following objectives for its second round
DRU Program awarded in 2003:

-   Participate in the FY 03 FEMA Disaster Resistant University Program
    to enhance the initial efforts began in 2000-2001.

-   Continue the seismic retrofit for existing buildings and implement a
    campus-wide nonstructural mitigation program aimed at loss reduction
    in laboratories, libraries, classrooms and offices.

-   Assess hazards and vulnerabilities when making space allocation
    decisions for University activities.

-   Construct a Loss Estimation model to assess financial risks
    associated with business interruption.

-   Create a strategic campus plan encompassing academic and facility
    planning, as well as business continuity and resumption planning
    that incorporates the recommendations from HIVA and Emergency
    Response Action Committee (ERAC) reports to improve the quality of
    teaching and research activities.

-   Improve record keeping on the damage, costs and effects of hazard
    events to aid future planning and mitigation efforts.

-   Shift UW maps/records to the similar coordinate system used by the
    city of Seattle in order to manage data and provide the information
    to conduct analysis on Geographic Information Systems.

# **Conclusion**

For any major teaching and research institution where operations are
threatened by natural disasters, hazards mitigation and post-disaster
recovery strategies must be a regular part of the ongoing planning in
every academic department and management unit. In implementing hazard
mitigation and post-disaster recovery strategies the University of
Washington is only one of many universities that has since demonstrated
that the Disaster Resistant University Program is an effective enabler
towards accomplishing these objectives. UC Berkley has initiated both
structural and non-structural mitigation programs to limit the economic
impact of an earthquake, including performing above life-safety criteria
seismic retrofits of identified critical infrastructure for continued
operations after a large earthquake and also a campus-wide
non-structural mitigation program aimed at loss reduction of the
contents in laboratories, libraries, classrooms and offices (Comerio,
2000). At the University of Washington, the DRU program seed money was a
catalyst for many other disaster mitigation and preparedness activities
throughout the campus community (UW, 2004).

As a result of the DRU process, the University of Washington has since
hired a full-time professional Emergency Manager, established an Office
of Emergency Management, and is aggressively pursuing several structural
and non-structural mitigation programs (UW, 2004). This action, in
concert with the creation of the plan described in this case, helps to
ensure that disaster mitigation and planning at the university remain
ongoing and adaptable. As stated by Sandra Lier, the Associate VP for
Business Services of the University of Washington in the introduction to
their Emergency Response Management Plan, "This plan is not the end of
emergency planning; it is just the beginning."

# **References:**

Comerio, Mary C. 2000. "The Economic Benefits of a Disaster Resistant
University: Earthquake Loss Estimation for UC Berkeley." Institute of
Urban & Regional Development. IURD Working Paper Series. Paper
WP-2000-02. <http://repositories.cdlib.org/iurd/wps/WP-2000-02>

Federal Emergency Management Agency. 2000. "UW Pilots Disaster Resistant
University Initiative-FEMA Initiative Helps Universities Limit Disaster
Damage." FEMA Press Release.
<http://www.fema.gov/region/x/2000/r10_82.shtm>

Federal Emergency Management Agency. 2003. Building a Disaster-Resistant
University. FEMA 443. <http://www.fema.gov/pdf/fima/dru_report.pdf>

Federal Emergency Management Agency. 2003. Grant Guidance Pre-Disaster
Resistant University-Disaster Resistant University - Competitive Grants:
CFDA#97.063. <http://www.fema.gov/fima/dru.shtm>

University California, Berkley. 2000. Campus News: *The Economic
Benefits of a Disaster Resistant University: Earthquake Loss Estimation
for UC Berkeley.*
<http://www.berkeley.edu/news/media/releases/2000/05/01_disaster.html>

University of Washington. 2000. Homeland Security: Conducting a
Vulnerability Assessment. Provided by University of Washington\'s Office
of Emergency Management.

University of Washington. 2000. The Return on an Investment in
Education: How the University of Washington Benefits the Region\'s
Economy. <http://www.washington.edu/reports/invest>

University of Washington. 2002. Hazard Identification and Vulnerability
Assessment. Provided by University of Washington\'s Office of Emergency
Management.

University of Washington. 2003. Disaster Resistant University/PDM Grant
Proposal.

Provided by University of Washington\'s Office of Emergency

Management.

University of Washington. 2004. Agency Annex for the 2003 Washington
State Hazard

Mitigation Plan.
<http://www.washington.edu/admin/business/oem/mitigate/hmp.html>

**Figure 8.3.1: List of Universities Funded by the DRU Program in FY
2003**.

  ----------- -------------------------------------- -------------- --------------------
  **State**   **College/University**                 **Activity**   **Federal Share
                                                                    Awarded**

  CA          San Jose State University              Plan           \$ 99,957.00

  CA          University of California-Berkeley      Plan           \$ 67,100.00

  CA          University of Southern California      Plan           \$ 100,000.00

  CO          University of Colorado-Boulder         Plan           \$ 100,000.00

  FL          University of Miami                    Project        \$ 226,500.00

  FL          Florida Agricultural & Mechanical      Plan           \$ 100,000.00
              University (FAMU)                                     

  FL          Florida International University (FIU) Plan           \$ 99,759.00

  GA          University System of Georgia           Plan           \$ 100,000.00

  KY          University of Louisville               Plan           \$ 94,958.00

  LA          Tulane Power Plant                     Project        \$ 18,113.00

  LA          Southern University (LA)               Plan           \$ 100,000.00

  LA          University of New Orleans              Plan           \$ 99,750.00

  MA          Colleges of the Fenway                 Plan           \$ 100,000.00

  MA          Mass. Institute of Tech.               Plan           \$ 99,750.00

  MO          Metropolitan Community College         Plan           \$ 100,000.00

  MS          University of Mississippi              Plan           \$ 75,000.00

  NC          UNC-Wilmington                         Project        \$ 80,000.00

  NC          UNC-Wilmington                         Project        \$ 24,000.00

  NC          UNC-Wilmington                         Project        \$ 57,000.00

  NC          UNC-Wilmington                         Plan           \$ 110,000.00

  ND          North Dakota State University          Plan           \$ 100,000.00

  ND IT       Sitting Bull College                   Plan           \$ 100,000.00

  NV          University of Nevada-Reno              Plan           \$ 50,000.00

  OH          University of Akron                    Plan           \$ 100,000.00

  OK          University of Central Oklahoma         Plan           \$ 75,000.00

  OR          University of Oregon                   Plan           \$ 100,000.00

  SC          Horry-Georgetown Tech                  Plan           \$ 89,002.00

  TN          University of Memphis                  Plan           \$ 100,000.00

  TX          Texas State Technical College          Project        \$ 75,000.00

  TX          Texas University-Medical Center        Plan           \$ 97,500.00

  VA          Radford University                     Plan           \$ 31,500.00

  VA          Virginia State University              Plan           \$ 75,000.00

  VA          Virginia Tech                          Plan           \$ 75,000.00

  WA          University of Washington-Seattle       Project        \$ 200,000.00

  WA          University of Washington-Seattle       Plan           \$ 300,000.00

  **TOTAL**                                          **35**         **\$3,419,889.00**
  ----------- -------------------------------------- -------------- --------------------

Source: FEMA, 2003.

**Sidebar 8.3.1**: **University of Washington's Senior Advisory
Committee for Disaster Resistant University Program**

-   Director of Records Management Services

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
-   Executive Director of Health Sciences Administration

-   Assistant Vice President for Regional Affairs

-   Director of the Institute for Hazard Mitigation Planning & Research

-   Disaster-resistant University Coordinator

-   Director of Student Activities and Union facilities

-   Director of the Student Health Center

-   Director of Purchasing and Stores

-   Representative form the Real Estate Office

-   Associate Vice President for Business Services

-   Associate Vice President for Facilities Services

-   Director of Communications Technologies

-   Director of University computing services

-   Assistant vice Provost for Research

-   Chief of the University Police

-   Associate Director of University Computing Services

-   Director of News and Information

-   Lieutenant from the University Police Department

-   Associate Vice President for Capital Projects

-   Seismology Lab Coordinator in Geophysics

-   Director of Academics Services & Facilities

-   Director of Environmental Health & Safety

-   Representative from University Relations

-   Representative from Faculty Council on University Facilities and
    Services

Representation from the community:

-   Program Manager for King County Emergency Services Public Health

-   Local risk consultant

-   Director of Seattle Emergency Management Section

-   Manager of King County Office of Emergency Management

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
-   Local planning analyst

**Sidebar 8.3.2: UW Emergency Management Planning Committee**

**Sandra Lier**\
*Associate VP for Business Services*

**Charles Chamberlain**\
*UW Libraries*

**Ralph Robinson**\
*UW Police Department*

**Barbara McPhee**\
*Environmental Health and Safety*

**Bob Roseth**\
*News & Information*

**Carol Garing**\
*Publication Services*

**Brad VanPelt**\
*Student Representative*

**Steve Charvat**\
*Emergency Management*

**Scott Mah**\
*C & C / Communications Technology*

**Lincoln Johnson**\
*Office of the VP for Student Affairs*

**Ron Fouty**\
*Capital Projects*

**Tamlyn Thomas**\
*UW Medical Center*

**Chip Lydum**\
*Athletics*

**Stephanie Steppe**\
*Health Sciences*

**Jim Calbreath**\
*Health Sciences*

**Andrew Ward**\
*Computing & Communications*

**Eric Holdeman**\
*King County Emergency Management*

**Duane Mariotti**\
*Harborview Hospital*

**Debra Nelson**\
*Office of the VP for Student Affairs*

**Elenka Jarolemik**\
*Emergency Management*

**Anne Guthrie**\
*Facilities Services*

**Clare Donahue**\
*Computing & Communications*

**Kelly Hudson**\
*UW Bothell*

**Doug Gallucci**\
*Environmental Health & Safety*

**Tom Profit**\
*Computing & Communications*

**Liz Coveney**\
*Human Resource*

**Bob Freitag**\
*CREW*

**Sidebar 8.3.2: Examples of Risk Profiles from the UW HIVA**

**LANDSLIDE**

## Definition

There is tension between stresses pulling down on a slope and the
resistance holding it in place. The slope becomes unstable as the forces
of resistance and stress converge. The change in these forces is due to
dynamic forces. Some develop gradually, such as normal erosion and
weathering. Others occur suddenly, such as earthquakes and torrential
rains that increase water pressure within the slope. Usually, the most
catastrophic landslides occur on slopes that already have a low margin
of safety and are struck by a sudden event. Determining a slope's slide
potential rests on discovering the inherent stability of the slope and
the intensity of forces that attack
it.![](media/image4.png){width="2.895138888888889in"
height="2.8131944444444446in"}

**There are four kinds of slides:**

**Slump** -- the earth moves as a coherent mass;

**Block slide** -- a chunk of rock slips on a layer of loose material
underneath it like wet clay;

**Debris slide** -- loose, dry material falls chaotically;

**Debris or mudflow** -- the slide material is wet and churns as it
moves.

Slumps and block slides are the least dangerous because the material
does not usually move far and does not break apart. Mudflows are the
most dangerous because they move quickly and run out far from the slope
where they are. Sometimes they are even classified as flash floods.

The Seattle HIVA cites one prominent study that argues that landslides
are not well understood nationally as a threat to public safety. It has
been estimated they cause between \$245 million and \$1.5 billion of
damage, kill 25 people annually, and cause numerous transportation
problems (*Seattle HIVA, 1999*). It concludes that they are often
perceived as individual events rather than symptoms of a wider problem.

## History

Landslides are common in Seattle. Some that have occurred near the
University include:

**1941** - Several slides during December around Sand Point

**1965** - SR 520 threatened, one lane closed, Roanoke interchange on
I-5 closed

**1983** - Queen Anne slide closes Aurora for a day. Mud travels as far
as Lake Union

**1997** - Over 100 slides and the accompanying snow caused
approximately \$100 million in damages. Slides occur on most slide prone
slopes throughout the Seattle area in a continuation of the wet winter.

## 

## Vulnerability

Late winter and early spring are the most common times for slides in
Seattle. According to Tubbs (1975), the probability of sliding rises
after a wet, cold winter, especially if a freeze occurs in late winter
and early spring. The ground becomes saturated over the winter, and then
porous following a freeze, so a subsequent rain will penetrate the
surface while the high water table will prevent the ground from
absorbing it. The water increases the stress to the slope by adding
weight and by increasing pore pressure within the soil.

In the past, the greatest vulnerability has been to property rather than
public safety. Most landslides in Seattle start as slumps that develop
slowly, giving people in danger some warning.

Landslides can also disrupt roads and other lifelines, with roads most
frequently affected. The University is vulnerable since several
arterials run along slopes with potential for landslides, including
Montlake Blvd. and the 45^th^ St. viaduct, as well as the Montlake Cut.
Structures that could be affected include Fluke Hall, residence halls,
Nuclear Physics Lab, and Plant Services. According to the Shannon &
Wilson report, intermediate or transitional soils in Zones B, C, and D
may be at moderate hazard of ground instability, such as
earthquake-induced landslides or liquefaction (*Earthquake Microzonation
Study, 1991*).

## Effects

Significant impacts could include the interruption of lifeline services,
such as water, sewer and transportation. Landslides can induce other
disasters, particularly flooding storm drains and lead to releases of
hazardous materials by destroying waste and storage sites.

Any attempt to mitigate the damage must weigh the potential harm against
the costs of prevention; there is a gap in knowledge. Until more
information exists, it will be hard for the University to plan for
mitigation and recovery efforts.

**TERRORISM**

## Definition

Terrorism is the unlawful, premeditated use of violence, or threat of
violence committed by a group of two or more individuals against persons
or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian
population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of a political or
social objective.

Terrorists use threats to create fear among the public, to try to
convince citizens that their government is powerless to prevent these
acts of violence, and to get immediate public recognition for their
causes. Bombing, kidnapping, sabotage, assassination, and extortion,
whether politically or criminally motivated, are included under the
definition of terrorist activity. The types of terrorist organizations
that may be operating in the United States include:

-   Ethnic separatist and émigré groups;

-   Left-wing Radical organizations;

-   Right-wing racist, anti-government groups (i.e., militia groups);

-   Foreign and domestic terrorist organizations; and

-   Issue-oriented groups that use violent forms of protest.

The media play an important role for terrorists and give them a powerful
new voice worldwide. The ability and willingness of television to bring
terrorists' acts of violence into the homes of Americans has greatly
enhanced terrorism as an effective weapon. Terrorism has come to depend
on the mass media to extend their audience from local to global and to
greatly exaggerate the impression of violence and its results
(*Snohomish County HIVA, 2000*).

**Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) --**

-   Weapon or device that is intended, or has the capability, to cause
    death or serious bodily injury to a significant number of people
    through the release, dissemination, or impact of toxic or poisonous
    chemicals or their precursors; a disease organism; or radiation or
    radioactivity.

-   Explosive, incendiary, or poison gas, bomb, grenade, rocket having a
    propellant charge of more than four ounces, or a missile having an
    explosive or incendiary charge of more than one quarter ounce, or
    mine or device similar to the above;

-   Poison gas and weapons involving a diseased organism

-   Weapon that is designed to release radiation or radioactivity at a
    level dangerous to human life.

Until recently, most recent terrorist incidents in the United States
have involved "conventional" threats in the form of plastic explosives,
agricultural chemicals (fertilizer mixed with diesel fuel), and car,
pipe, or letter bombs using materials easily obtainable through open
markets. The increasing accessibility of more exotic agents, such as
biological, chemical, and possibly even nuclear (WMDs) weapons,
heightens the concern about terrorism in the U.S.

## History

-   During the 1960\'s-1970\'s several University buildings were bombed
    by the domestic terrorist groups. The bombings and other related
    anti-Viet Nam activities influenced the development of the Seattle
    Police Bomb Squad.

-   In recent years, some UW researchers have been targeted by animal
    rights extremist groups. Crimes have included threats, vandalism to
    University and private property, and criminal trespass and vandalism
    at researchers' homes. In one incident, just before the 1999 World
    Trade Organization (WTO) meeting, an extremist kicked in the front
    door of a primate researcher's home in Seattle.

-   Other crimes that targeted primate researchers included mail
    (letters) booby trapped with razor blades. The letters also included
    a threatening letter giving the researcher a year to get out of
    their line of research or face retribution.

-   Doctors on the Organ Transplant Committee have been threatened
    because they make life and death decisions on who will and will not
    receive transplants. Other Doctors who perform abortions or work
    with fetal tissue have been victims of harassment, home visits by
    demonstrators, and have had lectures disrupted.

-   The most recent domestic terrorist incident in May, 2001, was the
    arson fire at Merrill Hall, for which the group Earth Liberation
    Front claimed responsibility. It resulted in the total loss of the
    building and significant loss of contents and research materials.
    The current replacement cost of the building is estimated at \$4.5
    million.

## 

## Vulnerability

A basic and fundamental function of the University is to carry out
research in an open and unrestricted manner, with complete freedom to
publish or otherwise disseminate the results of its search for
knowledge. The requirements of secrecy and restrictions on freedom to
publish that are inherent in security classification, or the
restrictions on dissemination that derive from proprietary rights of
privately sponsored research, are in direct opposition to this function
*(UW Handbook, 1995).*

The inherent open environment of an academic research institution makes
the University of Washington vulnerable to terrorist attack. A daytime
population of 60,000 moving freely around the campus makes it difficult
to track activities of individuals who might chose to harm the
University's people, programs, and properties. Large concentrations of
University people (Stadium, Pavilion, lecture halls, etc.) could be at
risk from external as well as internal threats.

-   **Employment**

Pre-employment criminal history checks are only carried out on
individuals as currently required by specific statute for prospective
employees who will be driving commercial vehicles, working with children
or dependent populations, handling cash or drugs, or working for the UW
Medical Center or the UW Police Department (only UWPD applicants are
fingerprinted). This means that individuals who may wish to harm the
University could be provided with access to facilities, vehicles,
laboratories, food supplies, and other potentially vulnerable areas of
the campus.

-   **Research and researchers**

Particularly vulnerable are research projects and researchers on the
campus. Nine of the UW's Schools and Colleges receive more than half of
their total expenditures from external sources such as grants and
contracts. University offices are individually responsible for the
management of their records. The Office of Risk Management recommends
that each department implement adequate security measures to supplement
the insurance, especially for equipment that has a high theft potential.
However, research is not monitored at an institutional level for what is
being done and where, and most offices do not implement specific
security measures to protect research. Security consulting services
offered by UWPD and C&C are underutilized. In addition, researchers may
be vulnerable to personal attack whether at home or office.

-   **Health Sciences**

The Health Sciences complex is of particular concern because of the
large concentration of research dollars and sensitive research located
in the complex. Security measures may need to be upgraded. The complex
has a large transient population ranging from 7,000 to 10,000 people per
day; staff, faculty, and students are not required to wear photo I.D.;
and individuals can enter freely from the UW Medical Center into HSC.
Between midnight and 8:00 a.m., one security guard walks the 22 miles of
corridor (*Stephanie Steppe, Personal Interview, Oct. 2001*).

Animal and genetic engineering research have been threatened or attacked
in the recent past by extremist groups. The UWPD has identified groups
and individuals who pose threats.

A key missing piece is the early identification of potentially sensitive
research projects that may need additional security. While research
projects proposed for outside funding are reviewed for use of animals,
human subjects, biohazards, and other elements, currently there is no
systematic review for special safety or security requirements. In the
light of experience in recent years, this needs to be addressed.
Departments and Schools/Colleges should be reviewing at the local level,
and consulting with UWPD, C&C, Risk Management, etc., as needed.

In the HSC, specific security response plans have been developed for
research projects using animals and fetal tissue. Individual departments
have developed health and safety plans, and building
emergency/evacuation plans are in place. Recent UW Medical Center work
has developed a plan for mass decontamination and quarantine space;
Environmental Health and Safety is inventorying laboratories for
hazardous substances.

-   **Buildings and infrastructure**

As a large complex with 285 buildings on campus, the University faces a
critical issue in locating sensitive research in secure spaces. Other
buildings with specific vulnerabilities are:

-   Fluke and Wilcox Halls contain poisonous gases used for research.
    The gas is stored in exposed containers. Containers are located
    behind locked gates, but they are vulnerable to individuals
    determined to tamper with them.

-   The residence halls on the Northeast campus are located near these
    tanks (large tanks of liquid oxygen) and near the Cyclotron. Several
    residence halls have parking garages located beneath them
    (vulnerable to car bombs).

-   Clark Hall where the ROTC department is located and Gerberding Hall
    were in the past the locations of bombings and violent protests.
    Also adjacent to Gerberding Hall lies the underground Central Plaza
    Garage.

-   Applied Physics Laboratory/Henderson Hall is located at the edge of
    the West Campus near the University Bridge. Currently it conducts
    some classified research funded by the military.

-   Bryant Building, location of EOC and UW Police Department, sits
    exposed on the waterfront and has a number of storage lockers below
    it that are easily accessible.

-   Power Plant and West Receiving Station receive power from Seattle
    City Light. They are located on busy arterial streets with
    additional road access around the area.

-   Utility Tunnels that carry normal and emergency power throughout the
    campus can be accessed through many buildings. Access to the tunnels
    is restricted, and there\'s a special key. Accesses from the West
    Receiving Station and the Power Plant are alarmed. Maintenance staff
    are in the tunnels every day. Hatches out on the campus sometimes
    have been vandalized\--and when discovered by UWPD or maintenance
    personnel are reported and repaired immediately.

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
-   **Campus Health and Safety**

Terrorist incidents elsewhere in the City could have an impact on the
University, especially UWMC. As a tertiary care facility and part of the
regional hospital/healthcare network, the UWMC is prepared for mass
casualties. However, the link to the operation of the University campus
is less clear.

# 

UW EH&S has close ties with the State Department of Health and
participates in special Department of Health task forces, e.g.,
bioterrorism. UW EH&S is involved in efforts to plan the distribution of
medication in case of an emergency and works closely with the Seattle
Fire Department about the buildings and potentially hazardous materials
located on the campus.

Managed by UW EH&S, the Environmental Safety Storage Building (ESSB),
located on the east campus, stores chemicals and other hazardous waste.
ESSB has been specially designed on pylons with built-in locked area,
alarm and sprinkler systems, and a secondary containment area. Any fire
would most likely be contained.

An inventory of chemicals used on camps is maintained by EH&S in an
online database. A similar database for biological agents has not been
developed. A key concern is that assembling and recording this kind of
information may subject it to public records requests and thus increase
the University's vulnerability to harm.

Radioactive materials used for research are tightly controlled and
monitored, and are least likely to cause problems. The Nuclear Reactor
is no longer in operation (radioactive core is gone) although it is
still considered a contaminated site. EH&S is in communication with the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the State Health Department regarding
decommissioning of the site.

Faculty are working with EH&S to track who, what, when, and where select
agents are located, yet it is assumed that the University has a low
number of these select agents located on the campus. A Federal law
requires registration of any select agent obtained and its transfer to
other facilities (*Van Dusen, Personal Interview, Nov. 2001*). Major
surveys of laboratories are done once a year, however the staff
conducting these surveys is small to deal with the 1,000+ laboratories
on campus. Any new laboratory construction undergoes plan review with
Capital Projects Office and EH&S, which also requires certain kinds of
laboratory equipment and facilities to ensure health and safety
protection (*Van Dusen*). Any project involving animals used must go
through the animal care committee and must be reviewed by EH&S before
release. EH&S also reviews the record of the laboratory's performance.

Responsibility for oversight of laboratories rests with their home
colleges and departments. EH&S's role is to provide advice and
assistance, not oversight, and bioagent research is particularly hard to
keep track of. EH&S reviews research projects at the proposal stage, but
there is no direct feedback to EH&S regarding which projects get funded.
Emergency communications network needs to be improved to rapidly
disseminate information on response efforts, including building
evacuations. There is no campus-wide evacuation plan.

-   **Communications**

Communications is the heart in any major organization where intellectual
property, personnel information, medical records, and other information
if not securely protected could be accessed and used for illegal
purposes or to harm the institution. A staff of three people in
Computing and Communications (C&C) are dedicated to dealing with network
security, including working with law enforcement agencies. In addition,
C&C offers consulting services to other departments on campus, and
provides recommendations to strengthen computer security, because it is
seen as essential to have security measures in place, as there are
constant attempts to break into the system even though in most cases
they do not constitute terrorist attack. Yet most departments have not
taken advantage of these services, and usually wait till after an attack
occurs.

Other forms of terrorism can make C& C vulnerable to attack. C&C's
location in part of a building that is not owned by the University
raises concerns about control of security. The building also contains a
four story parking garage with a majority of the spaces utilized by the
public. Although a key card is required to enter most parts of the
building, 500 individuals have these cards. The building is located at a
major intersection, very close to the street, with an alley behind the
building. C& C is reassessing the risks associated with its location and
reviewing building security (*Tom Profit, Personal Interview, October
2001*).

-   **UW Police Department (UWPD)**

UWPD needs updated training and equipment for weapons of mass
destruction and light urban search and rescue. UWPD has staff trained in
Incident Command, first aid, and CPR. They are well trained to work on
large events, demonstrations, and political rallies, however, due to
recent budget cuts, they are short on staff to cover security for
aspects of the campus and need some equipment to handle these large
events. A particular problem associated with vulnerability to attack by
terrorists is that in most cases UWPD is not usually given adequate time
to prepare for Highly Controversial Visitors, which could place the
campus population at risk (*John Schultz, Personal Interview, October
2001*).

## Effects

The disaster potential of terrorism is unknown. There are no areas safe
from terrorist violence. Terrorism is a battle with no quarter, and to
most terrorists, anything and anyone is fair game; nothing is too sacred
to be considered a target (*Snohomish County HIVA, 2000*).

It will be difficult\--perhaps impossible\--to determine the extent of a
terrorist attack. There could be significant numbers of casualties
and/or damage to buildings and infrastructure. Evacuation from an
affected area could be difficult. Local, state, and federal law
enforcement would be heavily involved because of the event's criminal
nature. Clean up could take months. Health and mental health resources
may be strained or overwhelmed. Extensive media coverage, strong public
fear, and international implications and consequences can continue for a
prolonged period.

Other forms of terrorism could have major implications for the
University. Cyber terrorism attack on communications and computer
systems could cause large amounts of intellectual data, personnel
information, and records to be destroyed or used for illegal purposes.

Biological attacks can be far more difficult to respond to than
conventional terrorist attacks. They are covert rather than overt, so it
could take some time to discover that an attack had occurred. For
example, with anthrax, up to 80 percent of people infected by inhaled
spores die within days if untreated (*Weiss, 2001*). By the time
symptoms appear\--fever, rash, and congested lungs---it is usually too
late.

Contagious diseases\--unlike explosions\--keep spreading long after an
initial attack. Smallpox, for example, is a highly contagious disease
(30% mortality; no treatment) and it is easily spread by coughing and
sneezing. The disease was declared eradicated in 1980, but vials of the
virus were saved and the whereabouts of some may be uncertain.
Vaccination no longer occurs, leaving an entire population susceptible
to attack.

In a June 2000 Federal exercise, 24 simulated cases of smallpox were
\"discovered\" in U.S. hospitals as part of an assessment of U.S.
preparedness for bioterrorism. Less than two weeks after those cases
popped up, computer models indicated that\--if the exercise had been
real\--15,000 people would have contracted the disease and 1,000 would
have died. The \"epidemic\" was still raging when the exercise ended.
The computer models predicted that rioting and looting would have broken
out as vaccine supplies ran out (*Weiss, 2001*).

Source: The University of Washington

Sidebar 8.3.3: University of Washington -- DRU HAZARDS WORKSHEET

+------+------+-----+-------+----+------+----------------------------+
| *    | **S  | **  | **    | ** | *    | **Major predicted impacts  |
| *Pri | econ | Fre | Possi | Lo | *Abi | on UW**                    |
| mary | dary | que | ble** | ca | lity |                            |
| Haza | Haza | ncy |       | ti | to   |                            |
| rd** | rd** | of  | *     | on | P    |                            |
|      |      | Ev  | *Effe | ** | redi |                            |
|      |      | ent | cts** |    | ct** |                            |
|      |      | s** |       |    |      |                            |
+======+======+=====+=======+====+======+============================+
| Ea   | \-   | La  | \-    | En | None | 1\. An earthquake from the |
| rthq | Gr   | rge | High  | ti | a    | Seattle Fault is the       |
| uake | ound | ev  | casua | re | vail | worst-case scenario,       |
|      | fail | ent | lties | ca | able | because the epicenter      |
|      | ures | of  |       | mp |      | could be directly under    |
|      |      | 6   | -D    | us |      | the City. The most         |
|      | \-   | .0m | amage |    |      | vulnerable campus areas    |
|      | L    | or  | to    |    |      | are the liquefaction and   |
|      | ands | g   | Struc |    |      | landslide prone areas,     |
|      | lide | rea | tures |    |      | which experience more      |
|      |      | ter | and   |    |      | ground motion and higher   |
|      | \-   | ev  | Non   |    |      | accelerations than other   |
|      | Liqu | ery | struc |    |      | areas.                     |
|      | efac | 20  | tural |    |      |                            |
|      | tion | -30 | compo |    |      | 2\. Of the 50 buildings    |
|      |      | yea | nents |    |      | identified in the 1991     |
|      | \-   | rs. |       |    |      | ERAC Report as having      |
|      | Lat  |     | \-    |    |      | potential damage and loss  |
|      | eral |     | Di    |    |      | of life 35 buildings have  |
|      | s    |     | srupt |    |      | yet to be retrofitted.     |
|      | prea |     | acad  |    |      |                            |
|      | ding |     | emic, |    |      | 3\. Structural (utilities) |
|      |      |     | res   |    |      | -- hard-piped water        |
|      | \-   |     | earch |    |      | distribution system,       |
|      | Diff |     | and   |    |      | especially within          |
|      | eren |     | bus   |    |      | buildings is vulnerable.   |
|      | tial |     | iness |    |      |                            |
|      | se   |     | funct |    |      | 4\. Structural             |
|      | ttle |     | ions, |    |      | (asbestos) - asbestos      |
|      | ment |     |       |    |      | permeates the campus,      |
|      |      |     | \-    |    |      | including the utility      |
|      | \-   |     | In    |    |      | tunnels. Shaking from      |
|      | Tsu  |     | terru |    |      | earthquake can cause       |
|      | nami |     | ption |    |      | widespread contamination.  |
|      |      |     | to    |    |      |                            |
|      | \-   |     | tran  |    |      | 5\. Non-structural         |
|      | Se   |     | sport |    |      | elements, particularly     |
|      | iche |     | ation |    |      | millions of dollars in     |
|      |      |     | and   |    |      | equipment, animals,        |
|      | \-   |     | comm  |    |      | research, etc. are at      |
|      | F    |     | unica |    |      | significant risk.          |
|      | ires |     | tions |    |      |                            |
|      |      |     |       |    |      | 6\. People -- UW faculty,  |
|      | \-   |     |       |    |      | staff, and students are    |
|      | H    |     |       |    |      | largely unprepared.        |
|      | azar |     |       |    |      |                            |
|      | dous |     |       |    |      | 7\. Transportation --      |
|      |      |     |       |    |      | bridges, roads, etc. are   |
|      | mate |     |       |    |      | vulnerable and could       |
|      | rial |     |       |    |      | affect access for UW       |
|      | rele |     |       |    |      | staff, responders and      |
|      | ases |     |       |    |      | emergency services.        |
|      |      |     |       |    |      |                            |
|      | \-   |     |       |    |      | 9\. Fire -- UW has no fire |
|      | Floo |     |       |    |      | fighting capability. If    |
|      | ding |     |       |    |      | widespread area impact     |
|      |      |     |       |    |      | occurs Seattle Fire        |
|      | \-   |     |       |    |      | Department will not be     |
|      | W    |     |       |    |      | able to respond to the     |
|      | ater |     |       |    |      | Seattle Campus.            |
|      | shor |     |       |    |      |                            |
|      | tage |     |       |    |      | 10\. Hazardous Materials   |
|      |      |     |       |    |      | -- potential for toxic     |
|      | \-   |     |       |    |      | spill release with no      |
|      | Diff |     |       |    |      | campus hazmat teams,       |
|      | eren |     |       |    |      | relying on SFD or outside  |
|      | tial |     |       |    |      | clean-up contractor.       |
|      | co   |     |       |    |      |                            |
|      | mpac |     |       |    |      |                            |
|      | tion |     |       |    |      |                            |
|      |      |     |       |    |      |                            |
|      | \-   |     |       |    |      |                            |
|      | St   |     |       |    |      |                            |
|      | ruct |     |       |    |      |                            |
|      | ural |     |       |    |      |                            |
|      | fail |     |       |    |      |                            |
|      | ures |     |       |    |      |                            |
|      | of   |     |       |    |      |                            |
|      | b    |     |       |    |      |                            |
|      | uild |     |       |    |      |                            |
|      | ings |     |       |    |      |                            |
|      |      |     |       |    |      |                            |
|      | \-   |     |       |    |      |                            |
|      | No   |     |       |    |      |                            |
|      | n-st |     |       |    |      |                            |
|      | ruct |     |       |    |      |                            |
|      | ural |     |       |    |      |                            |
|      | fail |     |       |    |      |                            |
|      | ures |     |       |    |      |                            |
|      | of   |     |       |    |      |                            |
|      | buil |     |       |    |      |                            |
|      | ding |     |       |    |      |                            |
|      | co   |     |       |    |      |                            |
|      | mpon |     |       |    |      |                            |
|      | ents |     |       |    |      |                            |
|      |      |     |       |    |      |                            |
|      | \-   |     |       |    |      |                            |
|      | Dam  |     |       |    |      |                            |
|      | aged |     |       |    |      |                            |
|      | L    |     |       |    |      |                            |
|      | ifel |     |       |    |      |                            |
|      | ines |     |       |    |      |                            |
+------+------+-----+-------+----+------+----------------------------+
| Floo | \-   | 1%  | \-    | Ea | Lake | 1\. Flooding outside       |
| ding | Bank | cha | D     | st | Wa   | Seattle may indirectly     |
|      | ero  | nce | amage | &  | shin | affect water quality       |
|      | sion | of  | to    | s  | gton |                            |
|      |      | a   | indiv | ou | and  | 2\. Flooding along         |
|      | \-   | 10  | idual | th | Ship | Thornton Creek north of    |
|      | H    | 0-y | buil  | ca | C    | campus. Has a direct       |
|      | azar | ear | dings | mp | anal | impact on University.      |
|      | dous | fl  |       | us | w    |                            |
|      |      | ood | \-    |    | ater | 3\. Transportation system  |
|      | mate | occ | Di    |    | l    | could be affected          |
|      | rial | urr | srupt |    | evel |                            |
|      | rele | ing | tran  |    | are  |                            |
|      | ases | in  | sport |    | r    |                            |
|      |      | the | ation |    | egul |                            |
|      | \-   | S   |       |    | ated |                            |
|      | W    | eat |       |    | by   |                            |
|      | ater | tle |       |    | the  |                            |
|      | shor | a   |       |    | l    |                            |
|      | tage | rea |       |    | ocks |                            |
|      |      | in  |       |    |      |                            |
|      | \-   | any |       |    |      |                            |
|      | L    | gi  |       |    |      |                            |
|      | ands | ven |       |    |      |                            |
|      | lide | ye  |       |    |      |                            |
|      |      | ar. |       |    |      |                            |
+------+------+-----+-------+----+------+----------------------------+
| L    | \-   | Fr  | \-    | Ea | War  | 1\. Earthquakes and        |
| ands | Floo | equ | D     | st | ning | torrential rains can cause |
| lide | ding | ent | amage | ca | a    | stresses in slope to fail. |
|      |      | o   | to    | mp | vail |                            |
|      | \-   | ccu | indiv | us | able | 2\. Multiple slides        |
|      | H    | rre | idual | in |      | incidents can occur        |
|      | azar | nce | bui   | ar |      | throughout the city,       |
|      | dous | in  | lding | ea |      | indirectly affecting the   |
|      | mate | S   |       | ar |      | University.                |
|      | rial | eat | -     | ou |      |                            |
|      | rele | tle | Disru | nd |      | 3\. Roads are most         |
|      | ases | ar  | ption | F  |      | frequently affected. Major |
|      |      | ea; | of    | lu |      | highways and arterials run |
|      |      | u   | tran  | ke |      | along landslide prone      |
|      |      | sua | sport | H  |      | areas. (e.g., NE 45^th^ St |
|      |      | lly | ation | al |      | viaduct)                   |
|      |      | co  |       | l, |      |                            |
|      |      | inc | \-    | a  |      | 4\. Significant impacts    |
|      |      | ide | Blo   | lo |      | include interruption of    |
|      |      | w   | ckage | ng |      | lifeline services (water,  |
|      |      | ith | of    | Mo |      | sewage, power,             |
|      |      | s   | storm | nt |      | transportation).           |
|      |      | now | d     | la |      |                            |
|      |      | sto | rains | ke |      | 5\. I-5 corridor runs      |
|      |      | rms |       | Bl |      | through large slide areas  |
|      |      |     |       | vd |      | around Beacon Hill         |
|      |      |     |       | a  |      |                            |
|      |      |     |       | nd |      | 6\. Can cause flooding by  |
|      |      |     |       | B  |      | blocking storm drains and  |
|      |      |     |       | ur |      | lead to releases of        |
|      |      |     |       | ke |      | hazardous materials by     |
|      |      |     |       | Gi |      | destroying waste and       |
|      |      |     |       | lm |      | storage sites.             |
|      |      |     |       | an |      |                            |
|      |      |     |       | Tr |      |                            |
|      |      |     |       | ai |      |                            |
|      |      |     |       | l, |      |                            |
|      |      |     |       | 45 |      |                            |
|      |      |     |       | ^t |      |                            |
|      |      |     |       | h^ |      |                            |
|      |      |     |       | V  |      |                            |
|      |      |     |       | ia |      |                            |
|      |      |     |       | du |      |                            |
|      |      |     |       | ct |      |                            |
+------+------+-----+-------+----+------+----------------------------+
| Se   | \-   | L   | \-    | En | Nati | 1\. The seasons with the   |
| vere | L    | ess | Da    | ti | onal | highest probability for a  |
| L    | ight | t   | maged | re | Wea  | tornado seems to be late   |
| ocal | ning | hen | buil  | Ca | ther | spring and late fall.      |
| St   |      | one | dings | mp | Ser  |                            |
| orms | \-   | per | and   | us | vice | 2\. Lightly constructed    |
|      | F    | y   | util  |    | wea  | buildings are most         |
|      | lash | ear | ities |    | ther | vulnerable                 |
|      | floo |     |       |    | war  |                            |
|      | ding |     | \-    |    | ning | 3\. The most likely        |
|      |      |     | Sm    |    | net  | tornado in the Seattle     |
|      | \-   |     | ashed |    | work | Area would have wind       |
|      | St   |     | wi    |    | b    | speeds of 40 to 72 miles   |
|      | rong |     | ndows |    | road | per hour                   |
|      | w    |     |       |    | cast |                            |
|      | inds |     | -Upr  |    | over |                            |
|      |      |     | ooted |    | VHF  |                            |
|      | \-   |     | veget |    | r    |                            |
|      | Hail |     | ation |    | adio |                            |
|      |      |     |       |    | and  |                            |
|      | \-   |     | \-    |    | Inte |                            |
|      | N    |     | In    |    | rnet |                            |
|      | onst |     | terru |    |      |                            |
|      | ruct |     | ption |    | \-   |                            |
|      | ural |     | to    |    | S    |                            |
|      | obj  |     | tran  |    | torm |                            |
|      | ects |     | sport |    | W    |                            |
|      |      |     | ation |    | atch |                            |
|      | \-   |     |       |    | (2   |                            |
|      | Upro |     | \-    |    | 4-36 |                            |
|      | oted |     | Low   |    | h    |                            |
|      | ve   |     | casua |    | ours |                            |
|      | geta |     | lties |    | adv  |                            |
|      | tion |     |       |    | ance |                            |
|      |      |     | \-    |    | not  |                            |
|      | \-   |     | Disru |    | ice) |                            |
|      | Dam  |     | ption |    |      |                            |
|      | aged |     | to    |    | \-   |                            |
|      | l    |     | acad  |    | S    |                            |
|      | ifel |     | emic, |    | torm |                            |
|      | ines |     | res   |    | war  |                            |
|      |      |     | earch |    | ning |                            |
|      |      |     | and   |    | (1   |                            |
|      |      |     | bus   |    | 2-24 |                            |
|      |      |     | iness |    | h    |                            |
|      |      |     | func  |    | ours |                            |
|      |      |     | tions |    | adv  |                            |
|      |      |     |       |    | ance |                            |
|      |      |     |       |    | not  |                            |
|      |      |     |       |    | ice) |                            |
+------+------+-----+-------+----+------+----------------------------+
| Snow | \-   | Sn  | \-    | En | See  | 1\. This hazard most       |
| St   | Fire | owf | D     | ti | Se   | likely to occur more often |
| orms |      | all | amage | re | vere | then the other hazards     |
|      | \-   | of  | to    | ca | S    | identified.                |
|      | Floo | m   | indiv | mp | torm |                            |
|      | ding | ore | idual | us |      | 2\. Heavier the snowfall,  |
|      |      | t   | buil  |    |      | the greater the safety     |
|      | \-   | han | dings |    |      | risks and costs of the     |
|      | L    | 4   |       |    |      | storm                      |
|      | ands | inc | \-    |    |      |                            |
|      | lide | hes | Di    |    |      | 3\. Snow and cold weather  |
|      |      | occ | srupt |    |      | endanger utility lifelines |
|      |      | urr | tran  |    |      | through direct impact and  |
|      |      | ing | sport |    |      | by increasing demand on    |
|      |      | sl  | ation |    |      | some systems, most notably |
|      |      | igh |       |    |      | electrical power.          |
|      |      | tly | -     |    |      |                            |
|      |      | m   | Power |    |      | 4\. Halts ground           |
|      |      | ore | ou    |    |      | transportation in heavy    |
|      |      | t   | tages |    |      | storms.                    |
|      |      | han |       |    |      |                            |
|      |      | 1   |       |    |      | 5\. Snow removal costs.    |
|      |      | per |       |    |      |                            |
|      |      | y   |       |    |      | 6\. Substantial economic   |
|      |      | ear |       |    |      | losses resulting from work |
|      |      |     |       |    |      | stoppages                  |
+------+------+-----+-------+----+------+----------------------------+
| Tsu  | \-   | \-  | D     | Ea | St   | 1\. Seiche could affect    |
| nami | Run  | T   | amage | st | rong | 520 floating bridge and    |
| and  | --   | sun | to    | &  | ch   | the east and south campus  |
| Se   | up   | ami | built | S  | ance | (WAC).                     |
| iche |      | in  | e     | ou | of   |                            |
|      | \-   | L   | nviro | th | o    | 2\. Damage to boats on     |
|      | Slos | ake | nment | ca | ccur | south campus by battering  |
|      | hing | W   |       | mp | ring | them against docks and     |
|      |      | ash | -     | us | be   | moorings, Lake Washington  |
|      | \-   | ing | Disru |    | fore | and Lake Union.            |
|      | La   | ton | ption |    | war  |                            |
|      | ndsl |     | to    |    | ning | 3\. Infrastructure and     |
|      | ides | (Ra | tran  |    | can  | built structures located   |
|      |      | re) | sport |    | be   | near the water could be    |
|      |      |     | ation |    | d    | damaged.                   |
|      |      | \-  |       |    | eliv |                            |
|      |      | S   | \-    |    | ered | 4\. Tsunamis can be        |
|      |      | eic | Pos   |    |      | generated by landslides.   |
|      |      | hes | sible |    |      |                            |
|      |      | t   | casua |    |      |                            |
|      |      | end | lties |    |      |                            |
|      |      | to  |       |    |      |                            |
|      |      | oc  |       |    |      |                            |
|      |      | cur |       |    |      |                            |
|      |      | w   |       |    |      |                            |
|      |      | ith |       |    |      |                            |
|      |      | ea  |       |    |      |                            |
|      |      | rth |       |    |      |                            |
|      |      | qua |       |    |      |                            |
|      |      | kes |       |    |      |                            |
|      |      | or  |       |    |      |                            |
|      |      | w   |       |    |      |                            |
|      |      | ind |       |    |      |                            |
|      |      | sto |       |    |      |                            |
|      |      | rms |       |    |      |                            |
+------+------+-----+-------+----+------+----------------------------+
| Volc | \-   | .01 | \-    | En | S    | 1\. Ashfall causes many    |
| anic | Ash  | % - | D     | ti | ince | indirect effects on health |
| Erup | fall | .   | amage | re | an   | (respiratory troubles),    |
| tion |      | 02% | to    | ca | erup | hazardous driving          |
|      | \-   | per | built | mp | tion | conditions, damage to      |
|      | Ac   | y   | e     | us | is   | mechanical equipment, and  |
|      | idic | ear | nviro |    | usu  | interference with wireless |
|      | rain |     | nment |    | ally | communications             |
|      | fall |     |       |    | prec |                            |
|      |      |     | \-    |    | eded | 2\. Campus safe from       |
|      | \-   |     | Di    |    | by a | mudflows, but could get    |
|      | L    |     | srupt |    | s    | large amounts of ash or    |
|      | ands |     | trans |    | warm | gas depending on how the   |
|      | lide |     | porta |    | of   | wind blows.                |
|      |      |     | tion, |    | s    |                            |
|      | \-   |     | wir   |    | mall | 3\. Seattle's electric     |
|      | Mud  |     | eless |    | eart | generation facilities and  |
|      | flow |     | comm  |    | hqua | water resources in the     |
|      |      |     | unica |    | kes, | Cascades are vulnerable to |
|      | \-   |     | tion, |    | Casc | ashfall and mudflow.       |
|      | Rain |     | and   |    | ades |                            |
|      | /mud |     | power |    | Vol  |                            |
|      |      |     | gener |    | cano |                            |
|      |      |     | ation |    | Obs  |                            |
|      |      |     |       |    | erva |                            |
|      |      |     | \-    |    | tory |                            |
|      |      |     | S     |    | w    |                            |
|      |      |     | trong |    | ould |                            |
|      |      |     | i     |    | be   |                            |
|      |      |     | mpact |    | able |                            |
|      |      |     | on    |    | to   |                            |
|      |      |     | eco   |    | give |                            |
|      |      |     | nomic |    | some |                            |
|      |      |     | act   |    | war  |                            |
|      |      |     | ivity |    | ning |                            |
|      |      |     |       |    | to   |                            |
|      |      |     | \-    |    | ci   |                            |
|      |      |     | Inc   |    | ties |                            |
|      |      |     | rease |    | that |                            |
|      |      |     | in    |    | c    |                            |
|      |      |     | r     |    | ould |                            |
|      |      |     | espir |    | rec  |                            |
|      |      |     | atory |    | eive |                            |
|      |      |     | ali   |    | da   |                            |
|      |      |     | ments |    | mage |                            |
+------+------+-----+-------+----+------+----------------------------+
| W    | \-   | Ev  | S     | En | Sea  | 1\. Shortages can occur    |
| ater | P    | ery | trong | ti | ttle | due to long periods        |
| Sh   | ower | 5-  | eco   | re | dep  | without precipitation, but |
| orta | shor | -10 | nomic | ca | ends | can be caused by over      |
| ges/ | tage | ye  | i     | mp | on   | consumption or structural  |
|      |      | ars | mpact | us | wi   | failures such as pipeline  |
| Dro  | \-   |     |       |    | nter | breaks.                    |
| ught | fire |     |       |    | snow |                            |
|      |      |     |       |    | pack | 2\. Low water supply can   |
|      |      |     |       |    | for  | affect power generation    |
|      |      |     |       |    | its  | for the campus.            |
|      |      |     |       |    | w    |                            |
|      |      |     |       |    | ater | 3\. Unforeseen shortages   |
|      |      |     |       |    | sup  | may force emergency        |
|      |      |     |       |    | ply, | purchases (costly)         |
|      |      |     |       |    | but  |                            |
|      |      |     |       |    | s    | 4\. Drought does not       |
|      |      |     |       |    | till | necessarily cause water    |
|      |      |     |       |    | ca   | shortages but can          |
|      |      |     |       |    | nnot | contribute to one.         |
|      |      |     |       |    | pre  |                            |
|      |      |     |       |    | dict | 5\. Contamination can      |
|      |      |     |       |    | su   | cause system to be shut    |
|      |      |     |       |    | mmer | down.                      |
|      |      |     |       |    | time |                            |
|      |      |     |       |    | dem  | 6\. UW Medical Center and  |
|      |      |     |       |    | and. | Vivariums will be          |
|      |      |     |       |    |      | immediately affected by    |
|      |      |     |       |    |      | water shortage.            |
|      |      |     |       |    |      |                            |
|      |      |     |       |    |      | 7\. Summer droughts impact |
|      |      |     |       |    |      | public safety by drying    |
|      |      |     |       |    |      | vegetation and             |
|      |      |     |       |    |      | contributing the spread of |
|      |      |     |       |    |      | grass and bldg fires       |
|      |      |     |       |    |      |                            |
|      |      |     |       |    |      | 8\. UW is considered a     |
|      |      |     |       |    |      | Large Water User and could |
|      |      |     |       |    |      | be strongly affected,      |
|      |      |     |       |    |      | causing a significant      |
|      |      |     |       |    |      | economic impact.           |
+------+------+-----+-------+----+------+----------------------------+
| Wind | \-   | One | \-    | En | See  | 1\. Universal Bldg Code    |
| st   | P    | big | D     | ti | Se   | maps of the US show that   |
| orms | ower | st  | amage | re | vere | Western Washington can     |
|      | ou   | orm | to    | ca | S    | receive 70 --80 mph winds  |
|      | tage | o   | built | mp | torm | and that the Puget Sound   |
|      |      | nce | e     | us |      | area is a "Special Wind    |
|      | \-   | ev  | nviro |    |      | Region" where the speeds   |
|      | Tree | ery | nment |    |      | can go even higher.        |
|      | fall | 3-4 |       |    |      |                            |
|      |      | ye  | -     |    |      | 2\. Mutual aid may be      |
|      | \-   | ars | Disru |    |      | unavailable since          |
|      | Se   |     | ption |    |      | Northwest windstorms are   |
|      | iche |     | to    |    |      | regional and affect the    |
|      |      |     | tran  |    |      | whole Puget Sound region.  |
|      | \-   |     | sport |    |      |                            |
|      | Fl   |     | ation |    |      | 3\. The 520 floating       |
|      | ying |     |       |    |      | bridge is a special        |
|      | de   |     | \-    |    |      | concern, because it is     |
|      | bris |     | Power |    |      | vulnerable to storm        |
|      |      |     | ou    |    |      | generated waves and is of  |
|      |      |     | tages |    |      | large economic and social  |
|      |      |     |       |    |      | importance.                |
|      |      |     |       |    |      |                            |
|      |      |     |       |    |      | 4\. Windstorms halt normal |
|      |      |     |       |    |      | economic activity and can  |
|      |      |     |       |    |      | cause widespread and       |
|      |      |     |       |    |      | extensive property loss.   |
|      |      |     |       |    |      |                            |
|      |      |     |       |    |      | 5\. Structural damage can  |
|      |      |     |       |    |      | occur at wind speeds as    |
|      |      |     |       |    |      | low as 32 mph and destroy  |
|      |      |     |       |    |      | wood frame structures at   |
|      |      |     |       |    |      | speeds around 100 MPHs.    |
|      |      |     |       |    |      | (Seattle's highest         |
|      |      |     |       |    |      | sustained winds were 85    |
|      |      |     |       |    |      | mph.).                     |
|      |      |     |       |    |      |                            |
|      |      |     |       |    |      | 6\. Power outages are      |
|      |      |     |       |    |      | common during windstorms   |
|      |      |     |       |    |      | and some can last for      |
|      |      |     |       |    |      | days.                      |
+------+------+-----+-------+----+------+----------------------------+
| **   |      |     |       |    |      |                            |
| Huma |      |     |       |    |      |                            |
| n-Ca |      |     |       |    |      |                            |
| used |      |     |       |    |      |                            |
| H    |      |     |       |    |      |                            |
| azar |      |     |       |    |      |                            |
| ds** |      |     |       |    |      |                            |
+------+------+-----+-------+----+------+----------------------------+
| C    | \-   | Mo  | \-    | -S | \-   | 1\. Disturbances often     |
| ivil | F    | der | Per   | ta | Hi   | occur in areas that are    |
| Dis  | ires | ate | sonal | di | ghly | crossroads and natural     |
| turb |      | to  | ass   | um | c    | gathering places - The     |
| ance | \-   | h   | aults |    | ontr | Seattle HIVA identifies    |
|      | Rock | igh |       | \- | over | the University District as |
|      | thro | cha | \-    | R  | sial | an area where a            |
|      | wing | nce | D     | ed | visi | disturbance could occur.   |
|      |      | t   | estru | Sq | tors |                            |
|      | \-   | hat | ction | ua | or   | 2\. Biggest danger to      |
|      | Rio  | a   | of    | re | e    | campus would be many       |
|      | ting | si  | p     |    | vent | roving bands of            |
|      | and  | gni | ublic | Un |      | individuals setting fires  |
|      | loo  | fic | and   | iv | \-   | and damaging property.     |
|      | ting | ant | pr    | er | Anno |                            |
|      |      | act | ivate | si | unce | 3\. Looting is the most    |
|      |      | of  | pro   | ty | ment | common form of property    |
|      |      | ci  | perty | W  | of a | damage                     |
|      |      | vil |       | ay | c    |                            |
|      |      | di  | -Di   |    | ontr | 4\. Rock throwing and      |
|      |      | stu | srupt | \- | over | personal assaults have not |
|      |      | rba | tran  | Ma | sial | been common at the         |
|      |      | nce | sport | gn | deci | University.                |
|      |      | co  | ation | us | sion |                            |
|      |      | uld |       | on |      | 5\. Economic backlash      |
|      |      | oc  | \-    | He | \-   | against the University may |
|      |      | cur | Pote  | al | Game | occur.                     |
|      |      | on  | ntial | th | days |                            |
|      |      | c   | law   | Sc |      |                            |
|      |      | amp | suits | ie |      |                            |
|      |      | us. | ag    | nc |      |                            |
|      |      |     | ainst | es |      |                            |
|      |      |     | the   | Ce |      |                            |
|      |      |     | Unive | nt |      |                            |
|      |      |     | rsity | er |      |                            |
+------+------+-----+-------+----+------+----------------------------+
| H    | \-   | Th  | \-    | \- | An   | 1\. Fixed sites, (i.e.,    |
| azar | Fire | ere | High  | Ma | nual | labs and other research    |
| dous |      | is  | casua | gn | in   | facilities), are the most  |
| M    | \-   | a   | lties | us | spec | common locations for       |
| ater | Tr   | mo  |       | on | tion | accidents, but the         |
| ials | ansp | der | \-    | He | c    | greatest vulnerability is  |
| Inci | orta | ate | D     | al | ondu | to transportation          |
| dent | tion | cha | amage | th | cted | accidents                  |
|      | a    | nce | to    | Sc | by   |                            |
|      | ccid | for | built | ie | E    | 2\. Other disasters (i.e., |
|      | ents | a   | env't | nc | nvir | earthquakes, landslides)   |
|      |      | haz |       | es | onme | could produce hazardous    |
|      | \-   | ard | \-    | C  | ntal | materials incidents.       |
|      | Epid | ous | Disru | en | He   |                            |
|      | emic | mat | ption | te | alth | 3\. Areas up to one half   |
|      | o    | eri | to    | r, | and  | mile downwind from an      |
|      | utbr | als | aca   |    | Sa   | accident site are          |
|      | eaks | in  | demic | \- | fety | considered vulnerable      |
|      | of   | cid | res   | UW |      | according to the US Dept.  |
|      | i    | ent | earch | M  |      | of Transportation, which   |
|      | llne | to  | and   | ed |      | could affect thousands of  |
|      | sses | oc  | bus   | ic |      | people in densely          |
|      |      | cur | iness | al |      | populated areas.           |
|      |      | on  | func  | C  |      |                            |
|      |      | cam | tions | en |      | 4\. Incidents in other     |
|      |      | pus |       | te |      | locations demonstrate that |
|      |      | in  | \-    | r, |      | a single hazardous         |
|      |      | a   | Di    |    |      | materials incident can     |
|      |      | gi  | srupt | \- |      | kill or injure hundreds of |
|      |      | ven | trans | H  |      | people.                    |
|      |      | ye  | porta | en |      |                            |
|      |      | ar. | tion- | de |      | 5\. Most incidents would   |
|      |      |     | mod   | rs |      | be localized emergencies   |
|      |      |     | erate | on |      | without large economic     |
|      |      |     | i     | H  |      | impact on the University   |
|      |      |     | mpact | al |      |                            |
|      |      |     | on    | l, |      |                            |
|      |      |     | eco   |    |      |                            |
|      |      |     | nomic | -  |      |                            |
|      |      |     | act   | EH |      |                            |
|      |      |     | ivity | &S |      |                            |
|      |      |     |       | S  |      |                            |
|      |      |     | \-    | to |      |                            |
|      |      |     | Inc   | ra |      |                            |
|      |      |     | rease | ge |      |                            |
|      |      |     | in    | B  |      |                            |
|      |      |     | r     | ui |      |                            |
|      |      |     | espir | ld |      |                            |
|      |      |     | atory | in |      |                            |
|      |      |     | ali   | g, |      |                            |
|      |      |     | ments |    |      |                            |
|      |      |     | and   | \- |      |                            |
|      |      |     | other | Ba |      |                            |
|      |      |     | h     | gl |      |                            |
|      |      |     | ealth | ey |      |                            |
|      |      |     | pro   | Ha |      |                            |
|      |      |     | blems | ll |      |                            |
|      |      |     |       |    |      |                            |
|      |      |     | \-    |    |      |                            |
|      |      |     | Over  |    |      |                            |
|      |      |     | whelm |    |      |                            |
|      |      |     | local |    |      |                            |
|      |      |     | emer  |    |      |                            |
|      |      |     | gency |    |      |                            |
|      |      |     | perso |    |      |                            |
|      |      |     | nnel, |    |      |                            |
|      |      |     | and   |    |      |                            |
|      |      |     | hosp  |    |      |                            |
|      |      |     | itals |    |      |                            |
+------+------+-----+-------+----+------+----------------------------+
| T    | \-   | Th  | \-    | -  | \-   | 1\. Terrorist use threats  |
| erro | F    | ere | High  | Ma | Hi   | to create fear among the   |
| rism | ires | is  | casua | gn | ghly | public.                    |
|      |      | a   | lties | us | c    |                            |
|      | -    | mo  |       | on | ontr | 2\. Bombing, kidnapping,   |
|      | Epid | der | \-    | He | over | sabotage, assassination    |
|      | emic | ate | D     | al | sial | and extortion are included |
|      | o    | cha | amage | th | v    | in the definition of       |
|      | utbr | nce | to    | Sc | isit | terrorist activity.        |
|      | eaks | for | built | ie | ors, |                            |
|      | of   | a   | e     | nc | rese | 3\. Terrorism has come to  |
|      | i    | ter | nviro | es | arch | depend on the mass media   |
|      | llne | ror | nment | Ce | or   | to extend their audience   |
|      | sses | ist |       | nt | e    | from local to global and   |
|      |      | act | \-    | er | vent | to greatly exaggerate the  |
|      | \-   | oc  | Disru |    |      | impression of violence and |
|      | H    | cur | ption | \- | \-   | its results.               |
|      | azar | on  | to    | H  | Anno |                            |
|      | dous | cam | Aca   | en | unce | 4\. Weapons of Mass        |
|      |      | pus | demic | de | ment | Destruction and increased  |
|      | nate | in  | res   | rs | of a | accessibility of more      |
|      | rial | a   | earch | on | c    | exotic agents, such as     |
|      | rele | gi  | and   | Ha | ontr | biological, chemical and   |
|      | ases | ven | bus   | ll | over | nuclear weapons heightens  |
|      |      | ye  | iness |    | sial | the concern about          |
|      | \-   | ar. | func  | -  | deci | terrorism.                 |
|      | St   |     | tions | Ge | sion |                            |
|      | ruct |     |       | rb |      | 5\. The inherent open      |
|      | ural |     | \-    | er | \-   | environment of an academic |
|      | fail |     | Di    | di | Foot | research institution makes |
|      | ures |     | srupt | ng | ball | the UW vulnerable to       |
|      | of   |     | trans | Ha | Game | terrorist activity.        |
|      | b    |     | porta | ll | Days |                            |
|      | uild |     | tion- |    |      | 6\. Health Sciences        |
|      | ings |     | Mod   | \- |      | complex is of particular   |
|      |      |     | erate | C  |      | concern because of large   |
|      | \-   |     | i     | la |      | concentration of research  |
|      | No   |     | mpact | rk |      | dollars and sensitive      |
|      | n-st |     | on    | H  |      | research located in the    |
|      | ruct |     | eco   | al |      | complex.                   |
|      | ural |     | nomic | l, |      |                            |
|      | fail |     | act   |    |      | 7\. Cyber terrorism attack |
|      | ures |     | ivity | \- |      | on communications and      |
|      | of   |     |       | 45 |      | computer systems could     |
|      | buil |     | \-    | 45 |      | cause large amounts of     |
|      | ding |     | Inc   | bu |      | intellectual data,         |
|      | co   |     | rease | il |      | personnel information, and |
|      | mpon |     | in    | di |      | records to be destroyed or |
|      | ents |     | h     | ng |      | used for illegal purposes. |
|      |      |     | ealth |    |      |                            |
|      | \-   |     | pro   | \- |      | 8\. Contagious             |
|      | Dam  |     | blems | P  |      | diseases\--unlike          |
|      | aged |     |       | ow |      | explosions\--keep          |
|      | l    |     | \-    | er |      | spreading long after an    |
|      | ifel |     | Over  | P  |      | initial attack.            |
|      | ines |     | whelm | la |      |                            |
|      |      |     | local | nt |      | 9\. Fear alone could       |
|      | \-   |     | emer  |    |      | create a mass exodus of    |
|      | Rio  |     | gency |    |      | faculty and students that  |
|      | ting |     | perso |    |      | could affect the financial |
|      | and  |     | nnel, |    |      | future of this             |
|      | loo  |     | hosp  |    |      | institution.               |
|      | ting |     | itals |    |      |                            |
|      |      |     | and   |    |      |                            |
|      |      |     | blood |    |      |                            |
|      |      |     | banks |    |      |                            |
+------+------+-----+-------+----+------+----------------------------+
| Tra  | \-   | Th  | \-    | \- | \-   | 1\. The two major effects  |
| ns-p | H    | ere | Human | Mo | High | of transportation          |
| orta | azar | is  | i     | nt | vo   | accidents are human injury |
| tion | dous | a   | njury | la | lume | and hazardous material     |
|      | mate | h   | and   | ke | tra  | releases.                  |
| Acci | rial | igh | mass  | B  | ffic |                            |
| dent | rel  | cha | casua | lv | t    | 2\. In heavily populated   |
|      | ease | nce | lties | d. | imes | areas like the University  |
|      |      | for |       |    |      | District, there are        |
|      | \-   | a   | \-    | \- | \-   | secondary problems such as |
|      | Fire | tr  | Tr    | P  | Foot | crowd control and slow     |
|      |      | ans | affic | ac | ball | emergency response time    |
|      | \-   | por | jam   | if | Game | due to congestion.         |
|      | C    | tat |       | ic | Days |                            |
|      | ivil | ion | \-    | Av |      | 3\. For three hours, six   |
|      | dis  | ac  | Crowd | e. | \-   | days a year during Husky   |
|      | turb | cid | co    |    | F    | football games the chances |
|      | ance | ent | ntrol | \- | oggy | of a major traffic         |
|      |      | to  | pro   | S  | or   | accident on the University |
|      |      | oc  | blems | te | i    | campus increase.           |
|      |      | cur |       | ve | ncle |                            |
|      |      | on  | \-    | ns | ment | 4\. Bigger the volume on   |
|      |      | cam | Inab  | W  | wea  | SR520 or I-5 the greater   |
|      |      | pus | ility | ay | ther | the impact on the          |
|      |      | or  | of    |    |      | University.                |
|      |      | in  | emer  | \- | \-   |                            |
|      |      | the | gency | NE | High | 5\. Draw bridge failure    |
|      |      | vi  | pers  | 45 | s    | could cause major problems |
|      |      | cin | onnel | ^t | peed | for traffic flow           |
|      |      | ity | to    | h^ | z    | Southbound.                |
|      |      | e   | a     | S  | ones |                            |
|      |      | ach | ccess | t. |      | 6\. 28,000 people out of   |
|      |      | d   | site  |    |      | approximately 60,000 live  |
|      |      | ay. |       | \- |      | within 5 miles of the      |
|      |      |     | \-    | SR |      | campus.                    |
|      |      |     | Over  | 5  |      |                            |
|      |      |     | whelm | 20 |      |                            |
|      |      |     | local |    |      |                            |
|      |      |     | emer  | \- |      |                            |
|      |      |     | gency | I  |      |                            |
|      |      |     | perso | -5 |      |                            |
|      |      |     | nnel, |    |      |                            |
|      |      |     | hosp  | \- |      |                            |
|      |      |     | itals | NE |      |                            |
|      |      |     | and   | 15 |      |                            |
|      |      |     | blood | ^t |      |                            |
|      |      |     | banks | h^ |      |                            |
|      |      |     |       | Av |      |                            |
|      |      |     |       | e. |      |                            |
+------+------+-----+-------+----+------+----------------------------+
| U    | H    | Th  | \-    | \- | \-   | 1\. Fires are caused by    |
| rban | azar | ere | Human | O  | An   | criminal acts, residential |
| Fire | dous | is  | i     | ld | nual | accidents and industrial   |
|      | mate | a   | njury | er | ins  | accidents.                 |
|      | rial | h   | and   | b  | pect |                            |
|      | rel  | igh | mass  | ui | ions | 2\. Large structural fires |
|      | ease | cha | casua | ld | by   | are a substantial risk and |
|      |      | nce | lties | in | E    | are most likely to occur   |
|      | \-   | for |       | gs | H&S, | in older buildings.        |
|      | C    | an  | \-    | w  | Sea  |                            |
|      | onfl | ur  | D     | it | ttle | 3\. Any fire can become    |
|      | agra | ban | amage | ho | Fire | disastrous because any one |
|      | tion | f   | to    | ut | De   | can cause high casualties  |
|      | or   | ire | built | fi | part | and induce secondary       |
|      | Fire | to  | e     | re | ment | impacts such as hazardous  |
|      | s    | oc  | nviro | s  | and  | materials release and      |
|      | torm | cur | nment | up | I    | damaged lifelines          |
|      |      | on  |       | pr | nsur |                            |
|      | \-   | cam | \-    | es | ance | 4\. A large fire could     |
|      | C    | pus | Disru | si | C    | close off a large part of  |
|      | ivil | in  | ption | on | ompa | campus and block major     |
|      | dis  | a   | to    | sy | nies | roadways to facilitate     |
|      | turb | gi  | aca   | st |      | movement of emergency      |
|      | ance | ven | demic | em |      | vehicles.                  |
|      |      | ye  | res   | s, |      |                            |
|      | \-   | ar. | earch |    |      | 5\. The worst case         |
|      | E    |     | and   | Ma |      | scenario would probably be |
|      | xplo |     | bus   | gn |      | connected with an          |
|      | sion |     | iness | us |      | earthquake or riot.        |
|      |      |     | func  | on |      |                            |
|      | \-   |     | tions | He |      |                            |
|      | St   |     |       | al |      |                            |
|      | ruct |     | \-    | th |      |                            |
|      | ural |     | Disru | Sc |      |                            |
|      | fail |     | ption | ie |      |                            |
|      | ures |     | to    | nc |      |                            |
|      | of   |     | tran  | es |      |                            |
|      | b    |     | sport | C  |      |                            |
|      | uild |     | ation | en |      |                            |
|      | ings |     |       | te |      |                            |
|      |      |     | \-    | r, |      |                            |
|      | \-   |     | Crowd |    |      |                            |
|      | No   |     | co    | \- |      |                            |
|      | n-st |     | ntrol | UW |      |                            |
|      | ruct |     | pro   | M  |      |                            |
|      | ural |     | blems | ed |      |                            |
|      | fail |     |       | ic |      |                            |
|      | ures |     | \-    | al |      |                            |
|      | of   |     | Inab  | C  |      |                            |
|      | buil |     | ility | en |      |                            |
|      | ding |     | of    | te |      |                            |
|      | co   |     | emer  | r, |      |                            |
|      | mpon |     | gency |    |      |                            |
|      | ents |     | pers  | \- |      |                            |
|      |      |     | onnel | H  |      |                            |
|      | \-   |     | to    | en |      |                            |
|      | Dam  |     | a     | de |      |                            |
|      | aged |     | ccess | rs |      |                            |
|      | l    |     | site  | on |      |                            |
|      | ifel |     |       | H  |      |                            |
|      | ines |     | \-    | al |      |                            |
|      |      |     | Over  | l, |      |                            |
|      | \-   |     | whelm |    |      |                            |
|      | P    |     | local | -  |      |                            |
|      | ower |     | emer  | EH |      |                            |
|      | ou   |     | gency | &S |      |                            |
|      | tage |     | perso | S  |      |                            |
|      |      |     | nnel, | to |      |                            |
|      |      |     | hosp  | ra |      |                            |
|      |      |     | itals | ge |      |                            |
|      |      |     | and   | B  |      |                            |
|      |      |     | blood | ui |      |                            |
|      |      |     | banks | ld |      |                            |
|      |      |     |       | in |      |                            |
|      |      |     |       | g, |      |                            |
|      |      |     |       |    |      |                            |
|      |      |     |       | \- |      |                            |
|      |      |     |       | Ba |      |                            |
|      |      |     |       | gl |      |                            |
|      |      |     |       | ey |      |                            |
|      |      |     |       | Ha |      |                            |
|      |      |     |       | ll |      |                            |
+------+------+-----+-------+----+------+----------------------------+

Sources: The City of Seattle -- HIVA, USGS, NOAA

University of Washington - Hazard Impact Matrix

<table>
<colgroup>
<col style="width: 14%" />
<col style="width: 7%" />
<col style="width: 9%" />
<col style="width: 9%" />
<col style="width: 10%" />
<col style="width: 11%" />
<col style="width: 9%" />
<col style="width: 8%" />
<col style="width: 9%" />
<col style="width: 9%" />
</colgroup>
<thead>
<tr class="header">
<th><h1 id="expected-hazards">Expected Hazards</h1></th>
<th>UW Campus Area Affected</th>
<th>Casualties</th>
<th><p>Disruption</p>
<p>of Academic Research</p></th>
<th>Utilities</th>
<th>Transportation</th>
<th>Structures</th>
<th>Non structural</th>
<th>Mass Care &amp; Medical Services</th>
<th>Secondary Hazards</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr class="odd">
<td>Civil Disturbance</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<td>Earthquake</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td>Flooding</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<td>Hazardous Materials Incident</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td>Landslide</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<td>Severe Local Storm</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td>Snow Storm</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<td>Terrorism</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td>Transportation Accident</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<td>Tsunami/Seiche</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td>Urban Fire</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<td>Volcanic Eruption</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td>Water Shortage</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<td>Wind Storm</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

HIGH: There is strong potential for a disaster of major proportions
during the next 25 years; or History suggests the occurrence of multiple
disasters of moderate proportions during the next 25 years. The threat
is significant enough to warrant major program effort to prepare for,
respond to, recover from, and mitigate against this hazard. This hazard
should be a major focus of the County\'s emergency management training
and exercise program.

MEDIUM: There is moderate potential for a disaster of less than major
proportions during the next 25 years. The threat is great enough to
warrant modest effort to prepare for, respond to, recover from, and
mitigate against this hazard. This hazard should be included in the
county\'s emergency management training and exercise program.

LOW: There is little potential for a disaster during the next 25 years.
The threat is such as to warrant no special effort to prepare for,
respond to, recover from, or mitigate against this hazard. This hazard
need not be specifically addressed in the county\'s emergency management
training and exercise program except as generally dealt with during
hazard awareness training. *Source: Thurston County Office of Emergency
Management -- HIVA*

Source: The University of Washington

### Sidebar 8.3.5: Excerpts from the UW Annex for the 2003 Washington State Hazard Mitigation Plan

Through the primary missions of education, research and public service,
the University

makes a substantial economic impact on the state of Washington. The
University

employs the full-time equivalent of 23,000 people and has a \$2.2
billion annual budget

(*Fueling Our State's Economic Future, 2002*). The funds spent on
salaries, equipment,

goods, services and capital expenditures circulate through the economy,
generating even

more economic activity through job creation and demand for goods and
services. This recirculation of money through the economy was estimated
to be \$6 billion (*Fueling Our*

*State's Economic Future, 2002*). Furthermore, the presence of the
University is estimated

to have created an additional 56,000 jobs. As the University has become
more integrated

into the economy, the total economic impact that it makes has increased
from \$3.4 billion

1995 to \$4.8 billon today, even as state investment in the University
has remained under

\$414 million per year (*Fueling Our State's Economic Future, 2002*).

With its 643-acre campus located in the city of Seattle, the University
is a powerful

magnet for attracting investment and produces a highly educated
workforce for the Puget

Sound region and the state. A significant natural or human-caused hazard
would affect

the University's people, programs and facilities. Hazards affecting the
Seattle Main

Campus were evaluated in the *2001 University of Washington Hazard
Identification and*

*Vulnerability Assessment* (*UW HIVA*), prepared as part of the
FEMA-funded Disaster

Resistant University (DRU) Project.

Along with terrorism and urban fire, earthquakes are the most
destructive natural hazard

the University faces. Three major earthquakes have affected the
University in the past 52

years (in 1949, 1965 and 2001). New information about the nature and
extent of the

seismic threats in Seattle and the Puget Sound region increases the
urgency for University

planning. The majority of potential damage and causalities would come
from building

damage and the effects of unsecured equipment and other non-structural
elements throughout campus buildings. The secondary hazards of fire and
release of hazardous materials could overwhelm University resources. If
the University prepares for earthquake, the impacts of the other hazards
would be mitigated as well**.**

This report also addresses severe storms, which, based on an historical
record of high frequency, could affect the entire campus. According to
the *UW HIVA,* the following natural hazards have been assessed to have
minimal impact on the University's Seattle Main Campus:

-   **Avalanche:** University of Washington Seattle Main Campus is not
    located in an area for avalanche activity.

-   **Drought:** University of Washington Seattle campus will have
    minimal direct impact from water shortages.

-   **Flood:** University of Washington Seattle campus is not located in
    a NFIP designated flood hazard zone.

-   **Landslide:** University of Washington does not have designated
    landslide areas on the Seattle Main Campus.

-   **Tsunami:** University of Washington Seattle campus is not located
    in a tsunami inundation zone.

-   **Volcano:** University of Washington Seattle campus is not located
    in a volcano hazard zone and will not be impacted directly from a
    lahar.

Future updates to the Agency Annex for the 2003 Washington State Hazard
Mitigation

Plan will evaluate terrorism and urban fire in more detail. Future
updates will also include the vulnerabilities of the UW Tacoma and UW
Bothell campuses as well as University-owned off-campus sites.
Essentially, the University must have an all-hazards

approach to recovering quickly from natural and human-caused events in
order to

preserve the institution and its valuable services.

**University of Washington Hazard Mitigation Planning Mission**

As a condition of receiving federal mitigation financial assistance
after November 1, 2003, states and localities must prepare a plan that
addresses natural hazards following a

FEMA requirement as set forth in Section 322, Mitigation Planning, of
the Robert T.

Stafford Disaster Relief Emergency Assistance Act, enacted by Section
104 of the

Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000.

The Agency Annex for the 2003 Washington State Hazard Mitigation Plan
will guide the

University in protecting its people, its facilities, environment,
equipment and systems by

identifying appropriate initiatives and projects. It will also help the
University to prepare

business resumption plans in order to resume normal education and
research operations

as quickly as possible following a disaster.

**University of Washington Hazard Mitigation Planning Goals**

***Protect Health and Life Safety***

-   Integrate personal and workplace safety considerations into planning
    and design of circulation elements, buildings and open spaces.

-   Implement a non-structural program that assists in reducing injury
    and loss of life by making furnishings, equipment and systems more
    resistant to natural and human-caused hazards.

-   Support the disaster response efforts of Harborview Medical Center
    and the University of Washington Medical Center (UWMC).

-   Improve education and outreach programs to increase campus wide
    public awareness of the risks and responses associated with natural
    and human-caused hazards.

-   Develop the tools, partnership opportunities and funding to assist
    in implementing mitigation activities.

-   Appoint and train appropriate Campus Emergency Response Teams
    (CERTs) to respond to disasters on campus.

***Create Backup Systems for Lifeline Systems***

-   Set priorities to replace, retrofit or relocate aging and vulnerable
    water, sanitary and storm sewers, gas, electrical, communication and
    fire suppression and alarm systems.

-   Maintain security of computing and voice systems and environments.

-   Establish mutual aid agreements with local utility providers, as
    well as with out-of- area campuses and contractors, to quickly
    restore loss of critical infrastructure systems.

***Support the University Mission of Teaching, Research and Public
Service***

-   Ensure the capability of resuming medical care, instruction and
    research activities within a predetermined time after a major
    disaster.

-   Prioritize and quantify restoration of functions in accordance with
    the University's mission.

-   Continue preparedness support systems for faculty and staff.

-   Review and enhance communication strategies for students, parents,
    faculty and staff to follow in an event of an emergency.

-   Work with faculty to integrate disaster-resistance concepts into
    curricula in relevant disciplines at the University.

-   Host public events at the University that emphasize safety and
    disaster preparedness.

***Reduce Known Sources of Risks***

-   Supplement the policy structure and support management processes to
    reduce risk.

-   Incorporate information on risk identification and reduction methods
    and programs currently in place in other University departments such
    as Environmental Health & Safety (EHS), University of Washington
    Police Department (UWPD), Emergency Management and Facilities
    Services into overall hazard mitigation planning.

-   Create a data management (GIS) system for documenting, tracking and
    updating identified risks, hazards and mitigation efforts.

-   Continue structural retrofit programs through restoration of older
    campus facilities to protect lives and reduce damage.

***Create and Develop Business Continuity Initiatives***

-   Develop business continuity plans for critical University business,
    financial and other key operations to resume activity within a
    predetermined time.

-   Enhance procedures and priority rankings necessary to guide
    decisions about resumption of critical activities.

-   Prioritize the restoration of emergency response facilities and
    other critical facilities.

-   Create support systems to re-develop facilities, financial recovery
    and other initiatives.

***Protect and Preserve Facilities and Contents***

-   Preserve and promote the use of the buildings as sites of special
    historical, aesthetic and architectural significance while providing
    for the future and allowing development of architectural
    innovations.

-   Identify unique and valuable contents that include records, research
    data, collections and specimens, and develop a plan for
    preservation.

***Maintain Continuity of Transportation Systems***

-   Maintain the availability of access to and within the campus.

-   Require emergency access to all buildings through existing service
    or vehicular routes.

-   Cooperate with the City of Seattle and adjacent communities to
    improve traffic flow on street networks surrounding and leading to
    the University.

-   Develop a campus evacuation plan including staged departures and
    designated alternate route to ensure a safe and orderly evacuation
    of campus in coordination with the City of Seattle and surrounding
    communities.

***Protect the Environment***

-   Commit to protecting the environment and complying with
    environmental regulations as part of all University-sponsored
    activities, including disaster management and response.

-   Develop contingency plans for emergencies involving identified
    environmental risks.

-   Incorporate Environmental Management Systems (EMS) concepts and
    practices into hazard mitigation planning and program activities.

For security reasons, other sections of the Hazard Mitigation Plan are
not available for public viewing. Please call the UW Office of Emergency
Management at (206) 897-8000 or email at <disaster@u.washington.edu> for
more information.

Source: The University of Washington

**Additional Sources of Information on the 2003 Blackout**

Edison Electric Institute Blackout Investigation Page

<http://www.eei.org/industry_issues/reliability/power_outages/nonav_August_2003_blackout/>

Harvard Kennedy School of Government 2003 Blackout Reference Page

<http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/hepg/Blackout.htm>

North American Electric Reliability Council Blackout Investigation Page

<http://www.nerc.com/~filez/blackout.html>

The Blackout History Project

<http://blackout.gmu.edu/transition.html>

Union of Concerned Scientists "Lessons Learned" from the 2003 Blackout

<http://www.ucsusa.org/clean_energy/renewable_energy/page.cfm?pageID=1248>

**Additional Sources of Information on the Marriott Corporation and
BCP**

ASIS Guidelines -
<http://www.asisonline.org/guidelines/guidelinesbc.pdf>

Disaster Recovery World - <http://www.disasterrecoveryworld.com/>

FEMA Emergency Management Guide for Business and Industry -
<http://www.fema.gov/library/bizindex.shtm>

Marriott WTC Information from Answers.Com

<http://www.answers.com/topic/marriott-world-trade-center>

NFPA 1600 -
<http://www.google.com/url?sa=U&start=1&q=http://www.nfpa.org/PDF/nfpa1600.pdf%3Fsrc%3Dnfpa&e=9888>

Ready.Gov Business Continuity Page -
<http://www.ready.gov/business/index.html>

**Additional Sources of Information on Disaster Resistant Universities**

DRU Grant Announcement -
<http://www.federalgrantswire.com/predisaster_mitigation_disaster_resistant_universities.html>

FEMA Disaster Resistant Universities Page -
<http://www.fema.gov/fima/dru.shtm>

University of Alaska, Fairbanks DRU Program

<http://www.uaf.edu/safety/DRU1.htm>

University of Central Oklahoma DRU Program

<http://nemesis.ucok.edu/ucodru/index.htm>

University of Oregon DRU Program

<http://csc.uoregon.edu/PDR_website/projects/community/DRU/UO-DRU.htm>

University of Washington DRU Program

<http://www.washington.edu/admin/business/oem/dru.html>

**Glossary of Terms:**

Chapter 11 - A reorganization proceeding in which the debtor may
continue in business or in possession of its property as a fiduciary. A
confirmed Chapter 11 plan provides for the manner in which the claims of
creditors will be paid in whole or in part by the debtor.

Cold Rolling - The rolling of metal at a temperature below the softing
point of the metal. This allows work hardening during forming

Force Majeure - French for an act of God; an inevitable, unpredictable
act of nature, not dependent on an act of man. Used in insurance
contracts to refer to acts of nature such as earthquakes or lightning

HVAC - A system that provides heating, ventilation and/or cooling within
or associated with a building

Kilowatt-Hour (kWh) - 1,000 watts for one hour. A measure of electric
power consumption.

Power Grid - A network of electric power lines and associated equipment
used to transmit and distribute electricity over a geographic area.

SARS - a clinical syndrome characterized by fever, lower respiratory
symptoms, and radiographic evidence of pneumonia

Y2K Crisis - Year 2000. The Year 2000 problem was the possibility that
financial institutions\' computer systems would fail on 1 January 2000
and spark a loss of public confidence in individual institutions or at
worst, in the financial system as a whole. In the event, the arrival of
Y2K was virtually incident-free.

**Acronyms:**

BCO -- (Marriott) Business Continuity Office

BCP -- Business Continuity Planning

BPD -- Barrels Per Day

CERT -- Community Emergency Response Team

DHS -- Department of Homeland Security

DOE -- US Department of Energy

DRU -- Disaster Resistant Universities Program

ERAC -- Emergency Response Action Committee (UW)

ERMP -- Emergency Response Management Plan

FBI -- Federal Bureau of Investigation

FEMA -- Federal Emergency Management Agency

GAO -- Government Accountability Office

HIVA -- Hazard Identification and Vulnerability Assessment

HMP -- Hazard Mitigation Program

IAEM -- International Association of Emergency Managers

NEMA -- National Emergency Management Association

NFPA -- National Fire Protection Agency

PDM -- Pre-Disaster Mitigation

SARS -- Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome

SEOC -- Michigan State Emergency Operations Center

UC -- University of California

UW -- University of Washington

Y2K -- Year 2000 Crisis

**Discussion Questions**

**General**

1.  Why should a business consider the risks of suppliers and customers
    when conducting BCCM planning?

2.  Do all businesses need to conduct BCCM planning? Why or why not?

3.  Are there any benefits that a business can enjoy as result of BCCM
    planning outside of times of disaster?

4.  Should the government require BCCM planning for publicly traded
    companies? Why or why not?

5.  What BCCM requirements are placed on private sector businesses by
    the National Response Plan (2004) and the National Incident
    Management System (2004)?

6.  What are the similarities between municipal emergency planning and
    BCCM planning? What are the differences?

7.  Why does a business need to look beyond the data needs of the
    company when conducting BCCM planning?

**2003 Blackout**

1.  Is it surprising that so much money was lost by US businesses during
    the 2003 blackout? Would you have expected that much, more, or less?
    Explain your answer.

2.  Should the utility companies be liable for business losses during
    blackouts? Why or why not?

3.  Is there any difference to companies performing BCCM planning in
    their consideration of blackouts like the one that occurred in 2003
    and losses of power that result from disasters? Explain.

4.  What can companies do to prevent business losses during blackouts?
    Is a comprehensive BCCM program the answer to preventing business
    losses? Provide a theoretical example of a business, their
    electricity dependence, and a solution to a power-loss crisis.

5.  Is it possible to bring the amount of business lost during a
    blackout like the one that occurred in 2003 to zero dollars? Explain
    your answer.

**Disaster Resistant Universities**

1.  How are universities like traditional businesses? How are they
    different? How do these similarities and differences affect Business
    Continuity Planning?

2.  What is the appropriate role for students in the development and
    implementation of Business Continuity Planning and Emergency
    Preparedness and Response at a University?

3.  What lessons and experience can universities borrow from municipal
    emergency management?

4.  Why is it vital to the DRU process that participation is garnered
    from members of the greater community within which the university
    operates?

5.  Should the Federal Government require that this process be conducted
    by all US universities? Why or why not?

6.  If your university were to close, in what ways would the community
    be affected?

**Suggested Out Of Class Exercises**

1.  Learn the basics of business continuity planning. Contact a small
    business in your community and offer to volunteer your time to help
    them prepare a business continuity plan.

2.  Research and critique your Universities' Business Continuity Plan
    and overall emergency response readiness. Is the Business Continuity
    Plan appropriately available and communicated to all stakeholders?

3.  Find out if your university participates in the DRU program. If so,
    discuss with them the planning process, and report your findings to
    the class. If they are not participating, find out what they have
    done to prepare for disasters and report these findings to the class
    instead.

4.  Contact your local emergency management office. Interview the
    emergency manager to find out how local businesses participate in
    the emergency planning process of the community. Report your
    findings to the class.

5.  Visit the website of the Public Entity Risk Institute (PERI --
    [www.riskinstitute.org](http://www.riskinstitute.org/)). Download
    their publications describing BCP for municipal offices. Learn the
    differences and similarities between businesses and public entities.

6.  Download and take the free FEMA Higher Education Project course
    entitled "Business and Industry Crisis Management."
    (<http://www.training.fema.gov/emiweb/edu/busind.asp>)

[^1]: The term business refers to any organization in any sector
    (public, private, or not-for-profit) that provides a product or
    service to its customers.

[^2]: JCHAO Standard EC.4.10 Emergency Management

[^3]:
    #  U. S. Securities and Exchange Commission. Interagency Paper on Sound Practices to Strengthen the Resilience of the U.S. Financial System <http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/34-47638.htm>. Last accessed 08/26/06

[^4]: NFPA 1600 *Standard on Disaster/Emergency Management and Business
    Continuity Programs*.
    [www.nfpa.org/PDF/nfpa1600.pdf?src=nfpa](http://www.nfpa.org/PDF/nfpa1600.pdf?src=nfpa).
    Last accessed 08/26/05

[^5]: ASIS International Web Site. [Business Continuity Guideline: A
    Practical Approach for Emergency Preparedness, Crisis Management,
    and Disaster Recovery (2005)]{.underline},
    <http://www.asisonline.org/guidelines/guidelines.htm>. Last accessed
    August 9, 2005.

[^6]: Disaster Planning in the Private Sector: A Look at the State of
    Business Continuity in the U.S*.*2005.
    <http://www.att.com/presskit/_business_continuity>.

[^7]: Wold, Goeffrey. Disaster Recovery Planning Process. Disaster
    Recovery Journal. 1992. <http://www.drj.com/new2dr/w2_002.htm>.

[^8]: Disaster Recovery Institute International Professional Practices
    for Business Continuity Professionals. 2005.
    [http://www.drii.org](http://www.drii.org/).

[^9]: NFPA 1600 Standard on Disaster/Emergency Management and Business
    Continuity Programs 2004 Edition. Quincy, MA. 2004

[^10]: [9/11 Commission Report]{.underline}*.* U. S. Government Printing
    Office. Washington, DC. 2004.

[^11]: United States Government. *Intelligence* *Reform and Terrorism
    Prevention Act of 2004*. Section 7305. Private Sector Preparedness.
    Washington, DC. 2005.

[^12]: ASIS International Web Site**.** Business Continuity
    Guideline**:** A Practical Approach for Emergency Preparedness,
    Crisis Management, and Disaster Recovery.
    http://www.asisonline.org/guidelines/guidelines.htm

[^13]:
    > Shaw, Gregory. L. and Harrald, John. R. *Required Competencies for
    > Executive Level Business Crisis and Continuity Managers*. Journal
    > of Homeland Security and Emergency Management. Jan. 2004.