ELECTION CENTER NATIONAL TASK FORCE

**ON ELECTION REFORM 2004**

# ELECTION ADMINISTRATION COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS

**ON VOTER VERIFIED PAPER AUDIT TRAILS**

The Election Administration Committee will make recommendations on a
number of issues including the logic and accuracy testing of voting
equipment, the procurement of voting equipment, and
early/absentee/satellite voting. The focus of this document though is
the committee's feelings on the issue of voter verified paper audit
trails (VVPAT) on DRE (Direct Recording Electronic) voting equipment.
While a complete report will be included in the final report of the
Election Center National Task Force on Election Reform, the committee
feels it is important to provide information as quickly as possible as
states and federal agencies are discussing this important issue. As we
began discussion on this issue, we recognized that some states have
already made the decision to move to VVPAT. Other states are just
beginning the discussion on this topic and the committee feels it is
important to get this information distributed so state legislatures
could take our recommendations into consideration when discussing this
issue.

The committee was unanimous in stating that all voting systems need the
ability for verification that the voters' ballots are recorded and
tabulated in accordance with the voters' intent. Whether a paper-based
or direct recording electronic voting system, tabulation is conducted
electronically and verifiable, documented audit procedures are necessary
on all voting systems to insure the integrity of ballot tabulation. For
paper- based systems, this audit trail is created by the voter in the
form of the marked ballot. For DRE systems, the voter creates an
electronic ballot record that needs additional mechanisms to provide
verifiability but does not necessarily require a voter verified paper
ballot record.

Election administrators currently rely on a combination of an internal
audit conducted by the DRE, security procedures and testing to insure
the integrity of their voting systems. While these mechanisms have
worked well, we feel that confidence in their reliability would be
enhanced through increased audit capacity by way of an independent,
highly secure, electronic ballot record, not exclusively dependent on
the reliability of or "trust" in one vendor's software. Current DRE
audit trails have been challenged in, at least, two significant ways: 1)
they provide no independent means of verification apart from the
operating software provided by the vendor and 2) insufficient
protections exist against accidental and irretrievable loss of ballot
records.

The Committee makes the following recommendations:

1.  National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) standards are
    needed for a scientifically sound, independently verifiable audit
    trail for DRE systems regardless of whether it involves a
    contemporaneous paper replica or a tamper proof electronic record.
    NIST will bring a great deal of independent credibility to this
    process and standards from this organization will provide the
    election community with the framework necessary for comprehensive
    audit trails on all voting systems. The committee feels strongly
    that these standards should not be a federal mandate but should
    continue to be voluntary standards for states to adopt.

2.  While states may adopt VVPAT, it is the consensus of the committee
    that a paper audit trail is less accessible, more costly, more
    burdensome to the voters, more complex for poll officials and less
    accurate than an electronic audit mechanism. We note that manual
    tabulation of paper ballots may not be an auditable tabulation
    process. There are no standards for judging the accuracy of hand
    counting ballots. Standards developed by NIST can provide future
    means by which independent verification on DREs can take place.

3.  Mandating a paper audit trail would stifle innovation and establish
    a ceiling on the quality of our verification tools. What is needed
    is not a ceiling but a floor and room for emerging technologies.
    Technology is advancing every day and a mandated paper audit trail
    would lock the vendor community in to that technology and slow
    development of new, possibly better, audit technology.

4.  There are potential serious consequences of a VVPAT system. In
    addition to significant cost increases, these include lengthened
    voting times, jammed printers slowing the process and possibly
    exposing voters' votes, and undermining the Help America Vote Act
    (HAVA) mandate for blind/visually impaired voters to vote
    independently. Due to lengthened voting times, more voting devices
    may be needed which will increase even further the need for
    additional money.

5.  Any DRE paper record that is implemented in a state should be
    designated as an audit record to be used for verification that the
    equipment is counting correctly and not be designated as the
    official ballot. The committee has serious concerns that a paper
    trail produced by a DRE can be accurately counted. Envision
    scrolling hundreds of thousands of DRE paper ballots back to an
    exact race then recounting that race. Also, paper ballots produced
    by a DRE may be more difficult to securely store than electronic
    records.

6.  Any VVPAT system that is implemented should require retention of the
    paper ballot at the polling location and must preserve secrecy of
    the ballot. Allowing paper ballot receipts to leave the polling
    location could lead to voter fraud and vote buying.

It is the recommendation of the committee that voter verified paper
audit trails are unnecessary and will create administrative problems
that far outweigh any benefit that they bring. In fact, voters
themselves have shown that they do not feel the need for a VVPAT. In
exit surveys done in the first major election conducted using VVPAT in
the

State of Nevada, only 31% of the voters actually used the paper ballot
to compare all of the races on their ballot. Without such verification,
a VVPAT system cannot provide a scientifically reliable audit of voter
intent.

We note that this document is a work in progress and subject to change.
It will be included in the Election Center National Task Force on
Election Reform final report and is subject to review and approval by
the full task force. That final report of the task force will be
completed in early March.

The members of this committee thank you for taking the time to consider
our thoughts and welcome any questions or comments on our
recommendations. Please do not hesitate to contact Dana Walch at (614)
466-6998 if you have any questions regarding this document.

Members:

Dana Walch, Co-Chair, Director of Legislative Affairs, Ohio Secretary of
State

Beverly Kaufman, Co-Chair, Harris County, Texas, Clerk

Donald Blevins, Fayette County, Kentucky, Clerk

Ron Cheney, Henrico County, Virginia, Electoral Board Chairman

Bill Cowles, Orange County, Florida, Supervisor of Elections

Pam Finlayson, Allen County, Indiana, Director of Elections

George Gilbert, Guilford County, North Carolina, Director of Elections

James Johnson, Shelby County, Tennessee, Elections Administrator

Conny McCormack, Los Angeles County, California,
Registrar-Recorder/County Clerk

Gary Smith, Forsyth County, Georgia, Chairman, Board of Elections

Christopher Thomas, Director of Elections, State of Michigan