### *James Madison\'s Notes of Debates, Feb. 19^th^, 1787*

In Congress. Feby. 19. 1787(1)

Mr. Pinckney in support of his motion entered on the Journal, for
stopping the enlistment of Troops,(2) argued that we had reason to
suppose the insurrection in Massts., the real, tho\' not ostensible
object of this measure, to be already crushed: that the Requisition of
500,000 dollrs. for supporting the troops had been complied with by one
State only, viz Virginia, and that but in part: that it would be absurd
to proceed in the raising of men who could neither be paid, cloathed nor
fed, and that such a folly was the more to be shunned, as the
consequences could not be foreseen, of embodying and arming men under
circumstances which would be more likely to render them the terror than
the support of Government. We had, he observed, been so lucky in one
instance, meaning the disbanding of the army on the peace, to get rid of
an armed force without satisfying their just claims; but that it would
not be prudent to hazard the repetition of the experiment. Mr. King made
a moving appeal to the feelings of Congs. reminding them that the real
object in voting the troops was, to countenance the exertions of the
Govt. of Masts.; that the silent cooperation of these military
preparations under the orders of Congs. had had a great and double
effect, in animating the Govt. and awing the insurgents; that he hoped
the late success of the former had given a deadly blow to the
disturbances, yet that it would be premature, whilst a doubt could exist
as to the critical fact, to withdraw the co- operating influence of the
federal measures. He particularly and pathetically intreated Congs. to
consider that it was in agitation and probably would be determined by
the Legis. of Massts. not only to bring to due punishment the more
active & leading offenders, but to disarm & disfranchise for a limited
time the great body of them; that for the policy of this measure he
would not undertake to vouch, being sensible that there were great &
illustrious examples agst. it, that His confidence however in the
prudence of that Govt. would not permit him to call their determinations
into question; that what the effect of these rigors might be it was
impossible to foresee. He dwelt much on the sympathy which they probably
would excite in behalf of the stigma\[t\]ized party, scarce a man was
without a father, a brother, a friend in the mass of the people; adding
that as a precaution agst. contingencies, it was the purpose of the
State to raise and station a small military force in the most suspected
districts and that £40,000, to be drawn from their impost on trade had
been appropriated accordingly: that under these circumstance\[s\] a new
crisis more solemn than the late one might be bro\'t on & therefore to
stop the federal enlistments and thereby withdraw the aid which had been
held out, would give the greatest alarm imaginable to the Govt. and its
friends, as it would look like a disapprobation & desertion of them, and
if viewed in that light by the disaffected mightrekindle the
insurrection. He took notice of the possibility to which every State in
the Union was exposed, of being visited with similar calamities\-\--;in
which events they would all be suing for support in the same strain now
used by the delegates from Massts. & that the indulgence now requested
in behalf of that State might be granted without the least inconvenience
to the U.S. as their enlistments without any countermanding orders,
would not go on whilst those of the State were in competition; it being
natural for the men to prefer the latter service in which they would
stay at home & be sure of their pay, to the former, in which they might
with little prospect of it, be sent to the Ohio to fight the Indians. He
concluded with the most earnest entreaties, and the fullest confidence
that Congs. would not at so critical a moment and without any necessity
whatever, agree to the motion; assuring them that in 3 or 4 weeks,
possibly in less time, he might himself be a friend to it and would
promote it.

Mr. P\[inckney\] in reply contended that if the measures pursuing by
Massts. were such as had been stated, he did not think the U.S. bound to
give them countenance. He thought them impolitic and not to be
reconciled with the genius of free Govts. and if fresh commotions should
spring from them, that the State of Massts. alone should be at the
charge, and abide by the consequences of their own misconduct.

Mr. M\[adison\](3) would not examine whether the original views of
Congs. in the enlargemt. of their militar\[y\] force were proper or not,
nor whether it were so \[to\] mask these views with an ostensible
preparation agst. the Indians. He admitted indeed that it appeared
rather difficult to reconcile an interference of Congs. in the internal
controversies of a State with the tenor of the Confederation which does
not authorize it expressly, and leaves to the States all powers not
expressly delegated; or with the principles of Republican Govts which as
they rest on the sense of the majority, necessarily suppose power and
right always to be on the same side. He observed however that in one
point of view(4) military precautions on the part of Congs. might have a
different aspect. Whenever danger was apprehended from any foreign
quarter which of necessity extended itself to the federal concerns,
Congs. were bound to guard agst. it, and altho\' there might be no
particular evidence in this case of such a meditated interference \<\<by
G.B.\>, yet there was sufficient ground for a general suspicion of
readiness in G.B. to take advantage of events in this Country, to
warrant precautions agst. her. But waving the question as to the
original propriety of the measure adopted and attending merely to the
question whether at this moment the measure ought from a change of
circumstances to be rescinded, he was inclined to think it would be more
advisable to suspend than to go instantly into the recision. The
considerations which led to this opinion were

1\. That though it appeared pretty certain that the main body of the
insurgents had been dispersed it was by no means certain that the spirit
of insurrection was subdued. The leaders too of the insurgents had not
been apprehended and parties of them were still inarms in disaffected
places.

2\. that great respect is due on such an occasion to the wishes and
representations of the suffering member of the federal body, both of
which must be judged of by what comes from her representatives on the
floor. These tell us that the measures taken by Congs. have given great
satisfaction & spirits to their Constituents, and have co- operated much
in baffling the views of their internal enemies; that they are pursuing
very critical precautions at this moment for their future safety and
tranqility; and that the construction which will be put on the proposed
Resolution if agreed to by Congs. can not fail to make very unhappy
impressions, and may have very serious consequences. The propriety of
their precautions depends on so many circumstances better known to the
Govt. of Massts. than to Congs. that it would be premature in Congs. to
be governed by a disapprobation.

3\. that every state ought to bear in mind the consequences of popular
commotions if not thoroughly subdued, on the tranquility of the Union, &
the possibility of its being itself the scene of them. Every State ought
therefore to submit with cheerfulness to such indulgences to others, as
itself may in a little time be in need of. He had been a witness of the
temper of his own State (Virginia) on this occasion. It was understood
by the Legislature that the real object of the military preparations on
foot, was the disturbance in Mass\[t\]s. & that very consideration
inspired the ardor which voted towards their quota, a tax on tobacco(5)
which wd. not have been granted for scarce any other purpose whatever,
being a tax operating very partially in the opinion of the people of
that State who cultivate that article: yet this class of the Legislature
were almost unanimous in making the sacrifice, because the fund was
considered as the most certain that could be provided.

4\. that it was probable the enlistments for the reasons given would be
suspended without an order from Congs. in which case, the inconveniency
suggested would be saved to the U.S. and the wishes of Massts. satisfied
at the same time.

5\. that as no bounty was given for the troops, and they could be
dismissed at any time, the objections drawn from the consideration of
expence, could have but little force.

6\. That it was contended only for a continuance of the apparent aid of
Congs. for 3 or 4 weeks, the members from Massts. themselves considering
that as a sufficient time.\
After the rejection of the motion as stated on the journal a dispute
arose whether the vote should be entered among the secret or public
proceedings. Mr. Pinkney insisted that in the latter(6) case, his view
which was to justify himself to his constituents would be frustrated.
Most of those who voted with him were opposed to an immediate
publication. The expedient of a temporary concealment was proposed as
answering all purposes.(7)\
\
MS (DLC: Madison Papers). Madison, Papers (Rutland), 9:276\--;79.\
1 Beginning this day and continuing intermittently through April 26
Madison resumed the daily notes on congressional proceedings that he had
kept from November4, 1782, to June 21, 1783, during his first term as a
Virginia delegate, which were published in v. 19 and 20 of these
Letters. During these ten weeks in 1787 Madison made entries on only
seventeen occasions, some of them quite brief, due to Congress\' failure
to maintain a quorum or to conduct business that Madison regarded as
significant. For a physical description of the notes, see Madison,
Papers (Rutland), 9:275\--;76; and for the editorial policy adopted by
the editors of this project in presenting the texts, see these Letters,
19:341n.1.\
2 See the preceding entry, note 5.\
3 Madison later inserted \"Madison.\"\
4 At this point in the manuscript Madison wrote but crossed out \"the
right of interposition on the part of the U.S. could not be drawn into
doubt,\" completing the sentence as printed.\
5 See Hening, Statutes, 12:288\--;89.\
6 Madison later interlined \"former\" above this word.\
7 For Madison\'s compromise motion to place the vote under a two-month
injunction of secrecy, see JCC, 32:64.\
Immediately following this entry Madison wrote: \"Teusday 20 Feby.
Nothing of consequence done."

**Letters of Delegates to Congress: Volume 24 November 6, 1786-February
29, 1788\
**