**Before the**

**Federal Communications Commission**

**Washington, D.C. 20554**

+----------------------------------+---+------------------------------+
| In the Matter of                 | * |                              |
|                                  | * |                              |
| Motions for Stay of Auction No.  | ) |                              |
| 57 and Requests for Dismissal or | * |                              |
| Disqualification                 | * |                              |
|                                  |   |                              |
|                                  | * |                              |
|                                  | * |                              |
|                                  | ) |                              |
|                                  | * |                              |
|                                  | * |                              |
|                                  |   |                              |
|                                  | * |                              |
|                                  | * |                              |
|                                  | ) |                              |
|                                  | * |                              |
|                                  | * |                              |
|                                  |   |                              |
|                                  | * |                              |
|                                  | * |                              |
|                                  | ) |                              |
|                                  | * |                              |
|                                  | * |                              |
|                                  |   |                              |
|                                  | * |                              |
|                                  | * |                              |
|                                  | ) |                              |
|                                  | * |                              |
|                                  | * |                              |
+----------------------------------+---+------------------------------+

ORDER

**Adopted: September 14, 2004 Released: September 15, 2004**

By the Chief, Auction and Spectrum Access Division, Wireless
Telecommunications Bureau:

1.  We have before us various motions to stay the Commission's auction
    of licenses for Automated Maritime Telecommunications System
    ("AMTS") spectrum (Auction No. 57), and related requests to dismiss
    or disqualify applicants and for other relief. Following the release
    by the Wireless Telecommunications Bureau of a public notice
    announcing procedures and minimum opening bids for Auction No.
    57,[^1] Warren C. Havens, Telesaurus Holdings GB LLC and Telesaurus
    VPC LLC filed a Petition for Partial Reconsideration seeking, among
    other things, the disqualification of Mobex Network LLC ("Mobex")
    from participation in Auction No. 57 and a delay of the announced
    auction schedule.[^2] Shortly before the August 20, 2004 upfront
    payment deadline, Mobex submitted several filings seeking a delay of
    the auction schedule and disqualification of the short-form
    applications filed by Telesaurus and AMTS Consortium, LLC.[^3] In
    these filings, Mobex requests that the Bureau issue a declaratory
    ruling on whether two commonly-controlled entities can participate
    in the same auction.[^4] Mobex asks that the Bureau dismiss the two
    short-form applications that are each controlled by Warren C.
    Havens,[^5] and stay the deadline for submission of upfront payments
    until thirty days after the Bureau resolves the Request for a
    Declaratory Ruling.[^6] Mobex further requests that the Bureau stay
    the start date for bidding in Auction No. 57 until thirty days after
    the Commission has lifted the requested stay of the deadline for
    submission of upfront payments.[^7] For the reasons set forth below,
    we dismiss the Havens filings, deny both of Mobex's motions for
    stays and its motion to dismiss, and confirm that there is no *per
    se* prohibition against participation in a spectrum auction by
    commonly-controlled entities.

**I. BACKGROUND**

2.  On April 4, 2004, the Wireless Telecommunications Bureau ("Bureau")
    released a *Public Notice* announcing the scheduling of Auction No.
    57 and seeking comment on a variety of procedures for Auction No.
    57.[^8] The Bureau issued the *Auction No. 57 Comment Public Notice*
    pursuant to delegated statutory authority.[^9] Consistent with the
    Commission's statutory obligation to ensure that potential bidders
    have adequate time before the auction to familiarize themselves with
    the specific rules and procedures that will govern the auction, on
    May 26, 2004, the Bureau released a public notice announcing the
    procedures and minimum opening bids for Auction No. 57.[^10]

3.  On June 25, 2004, Warren C. Havens, Telesaurus VPC LLC, and
    Telesaurus Holdings GB LLC filed a Petition for Partial
    Reconsideration of the *Auction No. 57 Procedures Public Notice*.
    These entities also submitted a Request for Stay of Auction No. 57
    on July 2, 2004. In these filings, the Petitioners sought to have
    the Bureau bar Mobex from participation in Auction No. 57 and delay
    the auction until such relief was granted.[^11] Mobex filed a
    Limited Opposition to the Petition.[^12]

4.  On August 4, 2004, the Bureau released its *Auction No. 57 Status
    Public Notice* which announced that five short-form (FCC Form 175)
    applications to participate in Auction No. 57 had been
    submitted.[^13] The *Auction No. 57 Status Public Notice* identified
    three applications accepted for filing and two applications that
    were "incomplete."[^14] Among those accepted for filing were
    applications filed by Telesaurus-VPC, LLC ("Telesaurus") and AMTS
    Consortium, LLC ("Consortium"), both of which applicants are
    controlled by Warren C. Havens.[^15] According to the Telesaurus and
    Consortium short-form applications, these entities have different
    ownership structures, although Mr. Havens is a controlling interest
    for each entity.[^16] Mobex was the third application accepted for
    filing. Thomas K. Kurian and Paging Systems, Inc. were provided with
    an opportunity to address deficiencies in their respective
    applications and resubmit them.[^17] After further review, the
    Bureau accepted these resubmitted applications.[^18] Mobex, however,
    did not submit an upfront payment and thus was not qualified to
    participate in Auction No. 57.[^19] One week prior to the upfront
    payment deadline for Auction No. 57, Mobex filed its request to have
    the Commission: (i) stay the start of bidding in Auction No.
    57; (ii) stay the due date for upfront payments; (iii) declare that
    applications submitted by a commonly controlled entity cannot
    participate in a spectrum auction; and (iv) dismiss the applications
    of Warren Havens.[^20]

    II. **DISCUSSION**

## Havens Petition for Reconsideration and Request For Stay

5.  In a filing dated August 28, 2004, following the release of the
    *Auction 57 Status Public Notice*, the Havens-affiliated entities
    withdrew their Petition for Partial Reconsideration and Request for
    Stay.[^21] Having reviewed the facts and circumstances surrounding
    the request to withdraw, we conclude that grant of this request
    would be in the public interest. Accordingly, Mobex's related
    Limited Opposition is dismissed as moot.

## Mobex's Motion to Dismiss and Request for Declaratory Ruling

6.  Mobex's Motions to Stay Auction No. 57 and Stay the Due Date for the
    Upfront Payments rest entirely on its presumption that it will
    prevail on the merits of its Motion to Dismiss and Request for a
    Declaratory Ruling in which it contends that two commonly-controlled
    entities cannot participate as separate bidders in Auction No. 57
    and it Motion to Dismiss both Havens' Applications. Thus, we begin
    by analyzing the merits of Mobex's Request for a Declaratory Ruling
    and Motion to Dismiss.

7.  Mobex claims that it cannot "conceive of any legitimate reason why
    two or more commonly controlled entities would or should be
    permitted to participate in an auction in which both commonly
    controlled entities file to bid on the exact same licenses."[^22]
    Mobex lists what it believes are the reasons why Havens might want
    to participate in Auction No. 57 using two commonly controlled
    applicants.[^23] Mobex claims that permitting two or more commonly
    controlled entities to participate in the same auction would be
    unfair to other bidders.[^24]

8.  After review of the short-form applications, we have found that
    Telesaurus and Consortium's disclosure of their ownership structures
    and joint bidding agreements comply with the requirements for
    short-form applications.[^25] Consistent with the Part 1 disclosure
    requirements,[^26] Consortium and Telesaurus have each disclosed
    that: (i) Havens is the controlling interest for both
    applicants; (ii) Havens manages both applicants; and (iii) there is
    a joint bidding agreement between the two applicants.[^27] Mobex
    does not dispute that both entities have made full disclosure.
    Rather Mobex argues that because both entities are commonly
    controlled, both applications should be dismissed.[^28]

9.  Mobex says that it cannot conceive of any legitimate reason why two
    or more commonly controlled entities would or should be permitted to
    participate in an auction in which both commonly controlled entities
    bid on the exact same licenses. Mobex's inability to understand the
    underlying approach of Telesaurus and Consortium is not relevant to
    our determination. Significantly, Mobex has cited no rule or other
    authority that prohibits common control of two applicants seeking to
    participate in the same auction. Mobex also argues that if Havens
    wanted the licenses that he might win to be held by more than one
    entity, he could use one entity to bid, then make a *pro forma*
    assignment of licenses to be held by another entity.[^29] For their
    part, Telesaurus and Consortium state that the two entities have
    separate business plans and separate funds and accounting which
    allows for different sources of capital.[^30] Telesaurus and
    Consortium also argue that they would need to seek and obtain
    Commission approval before a transfer or assignment could be
    completed.[^31] We note that bidders may have other possible
    legitimate business reasons for proceeding in this fashion. For
    example, such an approach may facilitate implementation of different
    business plans, financing requirements, or marketing needs, avoid
    transactional costs in the secondary market, or meet other business
    needs. Moreover, we note that, although they share the same
    controlling interest, Telesaurus and Consortium have different
    ownership structures.[^32]

10. We disagree with Mobex's contentions that we must forbid
    participation in an auction by two commonly-controlled entities
    because it would be *per se* anti-competitive or would necessarily
    facilitate gaming of the auction process. Mobex contends that
    participation in Auction No. 57 by both Telesaurus and Consortium
    would be anti-competitive because the two entities cannot be
    expected to compete against each other. We note, however, that there
    is no requirement that bidders compete against all other bidders in
    an auction. Mobex also ignores that bidders are expressly permitted
    to have a joint bidding agreements, joint marketing agreements, and
    post auction agreements concerning market structure.[^33]

11. Mobex asserts that Havens may be "badly motivated," and may intend
    for one of the applicants that he controls to be "a throw-away
    entity to be used and discarded when its purpose had been
    achieved."[^34] To support this proposition, Mobex points out that
    Consortium reported having no gross revenue for the past three
    years.[^35] According to Mobex, Havens could intend to use one of
    his two entities, more likely Consortium, to bid up the prices that
    other bidders must pay for licenses which Havens does not actually
    desire to win.[^36] As an alternative, Mobex speculates that
    Consortium could raise bids licenses to excessive levels and then
    simply withdraw or vanish. Mobex fails to provide any factual
    support for these allegations. In our experience, we have found that
    it is not uncommon for applicants to form new entities to
    participate in spectrum auctions. We decline to draw any negative
    inference from that fact alone.

12. We disagree with Mobex's assertion that Mr. Havens would not incur
    any risk if one of the applicants that he controls fails to live up
    to its bid obligations.[^37] Mobex fails to acknowledge that the
    Commission has established safeguards to protect against
    anti-competitive bid withdrawals or defaults. For example, bidders
    that withdraw high bids during an auction are subject to the bid
    withdrawal payments specified in section 1.2104(g) of the
    Commission's rules.[^38] Moreover, in order to deter
    anti-competitive strategic bidding during the Auction No. 57, the
    Bureau has limited the number of rounds in which bidders may place
    withdrawals to two rounds.[^39] Also, any high bidder that defaults
    or is disqualified after the close of the auction (*i.e.*, fails to
    remit the required down payment within the prescribed period of
    time, fails to submit a timely long-form application, fails to make
    full payment, or is otherwise disqualified) will be subject to the
    payments described in section 1.2104(g)(2) of the Commission's
    rules.[^40] Pursuant to section 1.2109(d) of the Commission's rules,
    bidders who are found to have violated anti-trust laws or the
    Commission's rules in connection with their participation in an
    auction may be subject to forfeiture of monies on deposit and may be
    barred from participation in future auctions.[^41]

13. In addition, if a default or disqualification involves gross
    misconduct, misrepresentation, or bad faith by an applicant, the
    Commission may declare the applicant and its principals ineligible
    to bid in future auctions, and may take any other action that it
    deems necessary, including institution of proceedings to revoke any
    existing licenses or construction permits held by the
    applicant.[^42] The upfront payment requirement also protects
    against insincere bidding.[^43] In this case, Consortium and
    Telesaurus have each made substantial upfront payments, which the
    Bureau can use in part to satisfy any payment obligations that may
    be incurred by these bidders in connection with their bidding
    activity.[^44]

14. Finally, we are not persuaded by Mobex's argument that Havens's
    interest in two separate applications provides an informational
    advantage relative to other bidders and may effectively provide
    Havens with twice as many bidding waivers.[^45] Mobex has not
    explained how one applicant could benefit the other with the use of
    bidding waivers. In this regard, we note that each bidder is
    required to meet its own bidding activity requirements without
    regard to the activity levels of any other participants in the
    auction (whether affiliated or not).[^46]

15. Mobex analogizes to a hypothetical situation in which one poker
    player could see, bet, raise, or fold another player's hand.[^47] We
    do not see the parallels between card games and the Commission's
    competitive bidding processes, in which all bidders' actions are
    made public at the end of each bidding round. The competitive
    bidding process is designed to be transparent. Indeed, all
    applicants are required to disclose their ownership structures and
    the existence of any agreements or understandings which relate in
    any way to the licenses being auctioned.[^48] Participation by a
    bidder in the auction reveals useful information to other bidders
    about its demand and valuations for licenses.[^49] Such full
    information promotes an efficient auction process which increases
    the likelihood that the winning bidder will be the party that most
    highly values the license. We also note that the Bureau has reserved
    the right to stop an auction for any reason that affects the fair
    and competitive conduct of competitive bidding.[^50] For these
    reasons, we find no basis to grant Mobex's Motion to Dismiss and
    Request for a Declaratory Ruling.

## Mobex's Requests for Stay 

16. We now turn to the merits of Mobex's Motions to Stay Auction No. 57
    and Motion to Stay Upfront Payment Date. The Motion to Stay Upfront
    Payment Date and Motion to Stay the Auction are grantable if Mobex
    can show that: (i) Mobex is likely to prevail on the merits; (ii)
    Mobex will suffer irreparable harm, absent a stay; (iii) other
    interested parties will not be harmed if the stay is granted;
    and (iv) the public interest would favor a grant of the stay.[^51]
    The Bureau finds that Mobex fails to meet this standard. Mobex has
    not demonstrated that it is likely to prevail on the merits, that it
    will be irreparably harmed, and that other parties will not be
    harmed if the auction is stayed. Moreover, the public interest does
    not favor a stay.

### Likelihood of Success 

17. Mobex has failed in its effort to show that it will likely prevail
    on the merits of its argument that two commonly controlled entities
    cannot participate in the same auction. As discussed above, there is
    no prohibition in the Competitive Bidding Rules that prohibit the
    use of two commonly controlled entities in the same auction.
    Further, the Responders have made full disclosure of the common
    ownership interests, common management, and joint bidding
    arrangement. Moreover, the Responders have identified legitimate
    reasons such as financing, marketing, and development of business
    plans to substantiate why they chose to participate in Auction No.
    57 as commonly controlled entities. For the foregoing reasons, the
    Bureau finds that there is no likelihood that Mobex will prevail on
    the merits of its argument that two commonly controlled entities may
    not participate in the same auction.

### Irreparable Harm

18. Next, we analyze Mobex's claim that it "would be irreparably harmed
    by being put to a choice of either participating in a clearly unfair
    auction or forever foregoing a chance to bid on the offered
    licenses.[^52] An injury qualifies as "irreparable harm" only if it
    is both certain and great, it must be actual and not
    theoretical.[^53] Thus, to demonstrate irreparable harm, Mobex must
    provide "proof indicating that the harm it alleges is certain to
    occur in the near future.[^54] Mobex has supplied no such proof. In
    terms of harm to it, Mobex, as a nonqualified bidder is unable to
    demonstrate any concrete injury to it. Mobex decided not to preserve
    its place in Auction No. 57 by not submitting an upfront payment.
    Any harm that might flow to Mobex as a result of its decision to not
    participate in Auction No. 57 is harm that Mobex brought upon
    itself. To the extent that cash outlays would be required to
    participate in Auction No. 57, such funds would be refunded to Mobex
    is not successful in winning licenses (provided that it has not
    incurred any payment obligations as a result of its participation in
    the auction).[^55] Thus, we find that Mobex has not met the second
    prong of the test to support its requested relief.[^56]

### Harm to Others 

19. Mobex next claims that other parties will not be harmed if the
    Bureau grants its Motion to Stay Auction No. 57 and Motion to Stay
    the Due Date for the Upfront Payment. In support of its position,
    Mobex notes that the decision to auction the AMTS licenses was made
    two years ago and a further delay would not, in Mobex's opinion,
    disadvantage any applicant.[^57] Also, Mobex claims that all
    applicants would be benefited if the Bureau stays the due date for
    the upfront payments while it considers these last minute matters
    because the Commission does not pay interest on upfront
    payments.[^58] We disagree with Mobex' claim of no harm to other
    Applicants. Delay would harm other applicants that have already
    undertaken numerous efforts to prepare for Auction No. 57, including
    the development of business plans, assessment of market conditions,
    and evaluation of the availability of equipment for AMTS spectrum
    and those that have expended resources, including funds, time, and
    efforts in the expectation that upfront payments would be due on
    August 20, 2004 and that an auction would begin on September
    15, 2004. In light of the foregoing, the Bureau believes that it
    would be injurious to those Applicants to stay the start of Auction
    No. 57.

### Public Interest Considerations 

20. Finally, the Bureau must consider whether the public interest
    warrants a stay of the due date for the upfront payment and start of
    Auction No. 57. We believe that the public interest is best served
    by maintaining the current schedule. One of the primary goals of the
    Commission's auction program is to ensure the development and rapid
    deployment of new technologies, products, and services for the
    benefit of the public without delays, and promote the efficient and
    intensive use of the electromagnetic spectrum.[^59] These goals can
    best be met by moving forward with Auction No. 57 licensing process
    and by maintaining the announced auction schedule. Thus, we find
    that the public interest would not be served by the grant of Mobex'
    motions for stays.

# III. conclusion  {#iii.-conclusion .unnumbered}

21. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED pursuant to sections 1, 4(i), 4(j), and
    303(r) of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. §§
    151, 154(i), 154(j), 303(r), 309(j)(3) and the authority delegated
    pursuant to section 0.331 of the Commission\'s rules, as amended, 47
    C.F.R. §§ 0.131(c), 0.331, Petition for Partial Reconsideration
    filed by Warren C. Havens, Telesaurus Holdings GB LLC and Telesaurus
    VPC LLC on June 25, 2004, Request for Stay filed by Warren C.
    Havens, Telesaurus Holdings GB LLC and Telesaurus VPC LLC on July 2,
    2004, and Limited Opposition to Petition for Partial Reconsideration
    of Mobex dated July 8, 2004, ARE DISMISSED.

22. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion to Stay Auction No. 57, Motion
    to Stay Upfront Payment Due Date, Motion to Dismiss, and Request for
    a Declaratory Ruling filed by Mobex Network Services, Inc. ARE
    DENIED.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

Margaret W. Wiener

Chief, Auctions and Spectrum Access Division

Wireless Telecommunications Bureau

[^1]: Automated Maritime Telecommunications System Spectrum Auction
    Scheduled for September 15, 2004, Notice and Filing Requirements,
    Minimum Opening Bids, Upfront Payments, and Other Auction
    Procedures," *Public Notice,* 19 FCC Rcd. 9518 (2004) ("*Auction No.
    57 Procedures Public Notice*")*.*

[^2]: Petition for Partial Reconsideration of Warren C. Havens,
    Telesaurus Holdings GB LLC and Telesaurus VPC LLC filed June 25,
    2004 ("Havens Petition for Reconsideration"); Request for Stay of
    Warren C. Havens, Telesaurus Holdings GB LLC and Telesaurus VPC LLC
    filed July 2, 2004 ("Havens Request for Stay"). These parties
    submitted a request to withdraw these filings on or about August 28,
    2004. *See* Withdrawal of Filings of Warren C. Havens, Telesaurus
    Holdings GB LLC and Telesaurus VPC LLC filed August 28, 2004
    ("Havens Withdrawal").

[^3]: Specifically, Mobex Network Services, LLC (Mobex) has filed: (i)
    Motion for Stay -- Urgent Action Requested, Automated Maritime
    Telecommunications System, Auction #57, dated August 13, 2004
    ("Motion to Stay Auction"); (ii) Request for Declaratory Ruling --
    Urgent Action Requested, Automated Maritime Telecommunications
    System, Auction #57, dated August 13, 2004 ("Request for Declaratory
    Ruling"); (iii) Motion for Stay -- Urgent Action Requested,
    Automated Maritime Telecommunications System, Auction #57, dated
    August 13, 2004 ("Motion to Stay Upfront Payment Date"); and (iv)
    Informal Request for Action -- Urgent Action Requested, Automated
    Maritime Telecommunications System, Auction #57, dated August 13,
    2004 ("Motion to Dismiss").

[^4]: Request for Declaratory Ruling at 1.

[^5]: Motion to Dismiss at 1.

[^6]: Motion to Stay Upfront Payment Date at 1.

[^7]: Motion to Stay Auction at 1. Telesaurus VPC LLC, AMTS Consortium,
    and Warren Havens (the "Responders") have filed pleadings in
    opposition, and Mobex responded. The Responders have filed: (i)
    Opposition to the Mobex § 1.41 Request to Dismiss the Applications
    of Telesaurus VPC LLC and AMTS Consortium LLC to Participate in
    Auction No. 57, dated September 8, 2004 ("Opposition to Motion to
    Dismiss"); (ii) Opposition to Request for Declaratory Ruling, AMTS
    Auction 57, dated September 7, 2004 ("Opposition to Request for
    Declaratory Ruling"); and (iii) Opposition to the Two Motions for
    Stay, AMTS Auction 57, dated September 7, 2004 ("Opposition to
    Motions for Stay"). In response, Mobex filed: (i) Reply to
    Opposition to Request for Declaratory Ruling, Automated Maritime
    Telecommunications System, Auction No. 57, dated September 14, 2004;
    (ii) Reply to Opposition to Motions for Stay, Automated Maritime
    Telecommunications System, dated September 14, 2004; and (iii) Reply
    to Opposition to Informal Request for Action, Automated Maritime
    Telecommunications System, dated September 14, 2004. Although it
    made this filing electronically with the Commission less than one
    day before the start of the bidding in Auction No. 57, Mobex chose
    to serve the other bidders via regular mail. Also, on September 14,
    2004, Paging Systems, Inc. submitted a letter seeking a response to
    the ruling requested by Mobex in its Motion to Dismiss. Letter from
    Audrey P. Rasmussen to Marlene H. Dortch dated September 14, 2004.

[^8]: "Auction of Automated Maritime Telecommunications System Spectrum
    Auction Scheduled for September 15, 2004, Comment Sought on Reserve
    Process or Minimum Opening Bids and Other Auction Procedures,
    *Public Notice*, 19 FCC Rcd 6274 (2004) ("*Auction No. 57 Comment
    Public Notice*"); 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(3)(E)(i).

[^9]: 47 U.S.C. §§ 309(j)(3) and (15); 47 C.F.R. § 0.131(c).

[^10]: 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(3)(E)(i) (as amended by Section 3002(a)(E)(i),
    Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. 105-33, 111 Stat. 251 (1997)
    (establishing obligation of the Commission to "ensure that, in the
    scheduling of any competitive bidding under this subsection, an
    adequate period is allowed before issuance of bidding rules, to
    permit notice and comment on proposed auction procedures"));
    *Auction No. 57 Procedures Public Notice,* 19 FCC Rcd. 9518*.*

[^11]: Havens Petition for Partial Reconsideration; Havens Request for
    Stay.

[^12]: Limited Opposition to Petition for Partial Reconsideration of
    Mobex dated July 8, 2004 ("Limited Opposition").

[^13]: Automated Maritime Telecommunications System Spectrum Auction,
    *Public Notice*, DA 04-2468 (rel. August 4, 2004) ("*Auction No. 57
    Status Public Notice*"). The five applications were received from
    (i) AMTS Consortium, LLC; (ii) Telesaurus-VPC, LLC; (iii) Mobex;
    (iv) Thomas K. Kurian; and (v) Paging Systems, Inc. *See id.*

[^14]: *Id.* Applicants that had incomplete applications were provided
    with an opportunity to address the deficiencies with their
    applications.

[^15]: *Id.*

[^16]: The Responders state that Consortium and Telesaurus are not
    identical because Telesaurus has interest holders other than Havens.
    Further, according to the Responders, Consortium and Telesaurus have
    separate business plans and separate funds and accounting which they
    claim allows for different sources of capital. *See* Opposition to
    Request for Declaratory Ruling at 5, n. 13 and page 9. *Compare* FCC
    Form 175 filed by Telesaurus on July 19, 2004 with FCC Form 175
    filed by Consortium on July 19, 2004. Short-form applications and
    other information concerning Auction No. 57 may be viewed at:
    <http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/57/>.

[^17]: *Auction No. 57 Status Public Notice* at 1-2, Attachment B. *See*
    47 C.F.R. § 1.2105(b)(2).

[^18]: Automated Maritime Telecommunications System Spectrum Auction,
    *Public Notice*, DA 04-2721, (rel. August 27, 2004) ("*Auction No.
    57 Qualified Bidders' Public Notice*") at 1, Attachment A.

[^19]: *Auction No. 57 Qualified Bidders' Public Notice* at Attachment
    C.

[^20]: *See* Motion to Stay Auction; Request for Declaratory Ruling;
    Motion to Stay Upfront Payment Date; Motion to Dismiss.

[^21]: Havens Withdrawal.

[^22]: Request for Declaratory Ruling at 2.

[^23]: *Id.* at 2-3.

[^24]: Request for Declaratory Ruling at 1-2.

[^25]: *See* 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.2105(a)(2)(viii), (ix); *see also* *Auction
    57 Qualified Bidders Public Notice* (accepting Telesaurus and
    Consortium short-form applications).

[^26]: 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.2105 (a)(2)(viii-ix), 1.2105(c)(1).

[^27]: Consortium Form 175, Exhibits A and B (filed July 19, 2004).

[^28]: Motion to Dismiss at 1-3. Mobex does not explain why the
    infirmity it alleges would not be remedied by dismissing the
    application of just one of the two commonly-controlled entities.

[^29]: *Id.* at 2.

[^30]: Opposition to Motion for Declaratory Ruling at 5, 9.

[^31]: *Id.* at 10.

[^32]: *See* note 16, *supra.*

[^33]: 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.2105 (a)(2)(viii-ix), 1.2105(c)(1).

[^34]: Motion to Dismiss at 2.

[^35]: *Id.* at 1.

[^36]: Motion for Declaratory Ruling at 1-2.

[^37]: *See* Motion to Dismiss at 2.

[^38]: 47 C.F.R. § 1.2104(g).

[^39]: *See Auction No. 57 Procedures Public Notice*, 19 FCC Rcd at
    9546-47.

[^40]: 47 C.F.R. § 1.2104(g)(2).

[^41]: 47 C.F.R. § 1.2109(d).

[^42]: 47 C.F.R. § 1.2109(d); *see also AMTS Procedures Public Notice*,
    19 FCC Rcd at 9557.

[^43]: *See* Implementation of Section 309(j) of the Communications Act
    -- Competitive Bidding, PP Docket No. 93-253, *Second Report and
    Order*, 9 FCC Rcd 2348, 2377-81 ¶¶ 169-188 (1994).

[^44]: *See id.*, 9 FCC Rcd at 2379 ¶ 176.

[^45]: *See* Motion for Declaratory Ruling at 3.

[^46]: *See AMTS Procedures Public Notice*, 19 FCC Rcd at 9545-46.

[^47]: Request for Declaratory Ruling at 1-2.

[^48]: *See* 47 C.F.R. §1.2105(a)(2).

[^49]: *See* Banks Broadcasting, Inc., 18 FCC Rcd 10431, 10436 (WTB
    2003).

[^50]: *See AMTS Procedures Public Notice*, 19 FCC Rcd at 9548-49.

[^51]: *Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Commission v. Holiday
    Tours, Inc*., 559 F.2d 841, 843 (D.C. Cir. 1977)

[^52]: Motion to Stay at 1.

[^53]: *Wisconsin Gas Company v. FERC*, 758 F.2d 669, 674 (D.C. 1985).

[^54]: *Id.*

[^55]: *See, e.g.,* 47 C.F.R. § 1.2104(g) (bid withdrawal payments).

[^56]: *Cf.* Motion of Ranger Cellular and Miller Communications, Inc.
    for a Stay of Auction No. 45, 17 FCC Rcd 9320 (WTB 2002).

[^57]: Motion to Stay Auction at 1-2.

[^58]: Motion to Stay Upfront Payment at 1.

[^59]: *See* 47 U.SC. § 309(j)(3)(A)and (D).