**Strategic Reactions to American Preeminence:**

**Great Power Politics in the Age of Unipolarity**

G. John Ikenberry

28 July 2003 

 

**The views expressed in this and other papers associated with the NIC
2020 project**

**are those of individual participants. They are posted for discussion
purposes**

**only and do not represent the views of the US Government.**

**Strategic Reactions to American Preeminence:**

**Great Power Politics in the Age of Unipolarity**

G. John Ikenberry

28 July 2003 

 

***The National Intelligence Council recently engaged a group of leading
international relations theorists in a series of discussions about
"power politics" in the "age of unipolarity." At the end of the
discussions, the group's chair, Professor John Ikenberry of Georgetown
University, drafted a paper on strategic reactions to American
preeminence. The views in this paper are Professor Ikenberry's alone and
do not represent official US Government positions or views.***

 

INTRODUCTION

 

American global power -- military, economic, technological, cultural,
and political -- is one of the great realities of our age. Never before
has one country been so powerful and unrivaled. The United States began
the 1990s as the world's only superpower and its advantages continued to
grow through the decade. After the Cold War, the United States reduced
its military spending at a slower rate than other countries and its
economy grew at a faster pace. The globalization of the world economy
has reinforced American economic and political dominance. No ideological
challengers are in site. More recently, in response to terrorist
attacks, the United States has embarked on a massive military buildup.
In the recent National Security Strategy, the Bush administration has
articulated an ambitious and provocative global military role for the
United States in confronting new-age threats. Overall, American power
advantages are multidimensional, unprecedented, and unlikely to
disappear any time soon.

 

The world has taken notice of these developments. Indeed, the post-Cold
War rise of American power \-- what might be called the rise of American
"unipolarity" \-- has unsettled world politics. Governments everywhere
are worried about the uncertainties and insecurities that appear to flow
from such extreme and unprecedented disparities of power. The shifting
global security environment -- triggered by the terrorist attacks of
September 11^th^ --also has conspired to upset old relationships and
expectations. The American invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq have put
American power on display and raised far-reaching questions about the
use of force, alliances, weapons of mass destruction, sovereignty and
interventionism. [The world is in the midst of a great geopolitical
adjustment process.]{.underline} Governments are trying to figure out
how an American-centered unipolar order will operate. How will the
United States use its power? Will a unipolar world be built around rules
and institutions or the unilateral exercise of American power? This
global worry about how a unipolar world will operate -- in which the
most basic questions about the character of world politics are at stake,
namely, who benefits and who commands -- is the not-so-hidden subtext of
all the recent controversies in America's relations with the rest of the
world.

 

The question posed in this report is: [how are the major countries
around the world responding to American global preeminence]{.underline}?
Overall, strategies and policies are mostly still in flux around the
world. Responses up to now have been mostly ad hoc. Governments are
learning, adapting, negotiating, and reacting -- thus it is not possible
to identify fixed "strategies of response." This report seeks to help us
understand these evolving responses in two ways: first, it will provide
conceptual tools to identify and track strategic responses by major
states to American preeminence, and second, it will offer some
preliminary characterizations of the patterns of response, particularly
by Western Europe, Russia, and China. This report might be seen as a
sort of "field guide" to global reactions rather than a definitive
theoretical and empirical statement on the subject.[^1]^\[1\]^

 

I begin by offering a summary of the findings. After this, I look at the
rise of American unipolar power and the variety of ways that American
power is "experienced" around the world. In the next section, I survey
the deeper sources and multifaceted character of American unipolar
power. Next I explore the limits of the basic strategies of response to
concentrated power -- balancing, bandwagoning and binding. In the next
section, I explore some of the emerging strategies that are appearing
among the major countries. Finally, in the conclusion I return to the
issue of unipolar power and rule-based order.

 

 

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

 

1\. [American unipolar power is unlikely to trigger a full-scale,
traditional balance of power response]{.underline}. The major powers --
Russia, China, Germany, France, Britain and Japan -- will attempt to
resist, work around, and counter American power \-- even as they also
engage and work with American power. But they are not likely to join in
an anti-American countervailing coalition that will break the world up
into hostile, competing camps. The balance of power is the most
time-honored way of thinking about politics among the great
powers.[^2]^\[2\]^ In this classical view, when confronted with a rising
and dominant state, weaker states flock together and build an
alternative power bloc. The circumstances for this type of dramatic,
order-transforming move do not exist \-- and they are not likely to
exist even if American power continues to rise relative to other major
states and even if American policy antagonizes other states in the way
that is has recently over the Iraq war.

 

There are a variety of reasons why this is so. One is simply that a bloc
of major states with sufficient power capabilities to challenge the
United States is not possible to assemble. Another is that American
power itself is not sufficiently threatening to provoke a
counter-balancing response. To be sure, American power -- and the
policies and roles that this power enables -- [does]{.underline} worry
other major states. Responding to it is their major geopolitical
challenge. But counter-balancing responses -- manifest in separate and
competing security alliances and systematic policies of opposition --
are both not feasible and not responsive to the distinctive challenges
posed by unipolarity. What troubles the other major countries about
American power cannot be remedied by the classic geopolitical tool of
the balance of power.

 

2\. Governments are adjusting and learning -- as they are trying to
figure out how to deal with American unipolar power. A world with a
single superpower is new. We do not have a great deal of historical
experience and policy relevant theories that states can use in making
strategic decisions in how to deal with the United States. The big
question that the major states are asking is this: will a unipolar
America abandon its postwar approach to global leadership\-- leadership
that operated through multilateral rules and institutions and close
partnerships? Scholars might pose the question this way: is unipolarity
inconsistent with rule-based international order? Some French and other
European foreign policy officials, for example, believe that the rise of
American unipolarity has triggered a radical break in America's global
leadership approach. The United States will increasingly resist
entanglements in formal rule-based institutions and move instead toward
a freer and more imperial grand strategic orientation. Others -- such as
the Japanese -- think that there is more continuity in the American
global posture. The big question in all the major capitals is: is a
unilateral, neo-imperial turn emerging in American foreign policy, and
if so, is it rooted in deep forces of power or the result of more
circumstantial (and therefore passing) factors? Overall, [the judgments
by foreign officials about how the rise of American unipolarity does or
does not alter America's grand strategic orientation are critical for
how major states around the world think about their strategies of
response.]{.underline}

 

3\. A variety of strategies are emerging. Scholars of international
relations tend to think about two basic strategies that are available to
states as they confront a predominant state: balancing and bandwagoning.
One is the classic strategy of counter-balancing alliance. The other is
the strategy of appeasement and acquiescence. But today, strategies for
coping with a preeminent America tend to fall in between these extremes.
Specifically, there are two basic types of strategies. [One type are
strategies of resistance]{.underline} \-- which entail policies that
seek to loosen ties and undercut or block American power and policy.
[The other type are strategies of engagement]{.underline} -- which
entail building cooperative ties in the hope of gaining opportunities to
influence how American power is exercised. Most of the major states are
pursuing both strategies at the same time. But these states also differ
in their assessment of the relative merits of the strategies.

 

4\. Although the major states are not attempting to directly confront or
balance against American unipolar power, domestic political opinion in
many of the major countries has shifted dramatically against the United
States -- and [this new circumstance of world public opinion is perhaps
the most important unknown dynamic that could quickly and unexpectedly
lead to dramatic shifts in state strategies toward the United
States]{.underline}. Recent public opinion data gathered from dozens of
countries indicates that while many people around the world admire
America -- its ideals and open society -- they have growing misgivings
about its policies and role in the world. Anti-Americanism also has
become part of presidential elections in various parts of the world.
Election victors Schroeder in Germany, Lula in Brazil, and Roh in South
Korea all drew upon themes that involved opposition to the United States
and its policies. Political leaders in key countries increasingly have
opportunities to use opposition to the United States in domestic
politics. How this new situation will spill over into the "high
politics" of America's unipolar order is still unknown.

 

5\. The United States has a great capacity to influence how other states
respond to its unipolar power. In particular, [the more that the United
States signals that it intends to operate through mutually agreed rules
and institutions, the more other countries will choose to engage rather
than resist the United States.]{.underline} The more that the United
States signals that it will disentangle itself from rule-based order and
act unilaterally on a global scale, the more other countries will choose
to resist rather than engage the United States. That is, the United
States has two basic approaches to international order today. One might
be called hegemony with "liberal characteristics." This is international
order built around multilateralism, tight alliance partnership,
strategic restraint, cooperative security, and agreed-upon institutions.
The other might be called hegemony with "imperial characteristics." This
is international order built around unilateralism, coercive domination,
and a reduced commitment to shared commitment to mutually agreeable
rules of the game. How the outside world responds to American power will
depend on which of these two alternatives the United States tends to
emphasize.

 

6\. The emerging politics of unipolarity will entail a [distinctive mix
of power politics and a security community]{.underline}. It seems likely
that the United States will not choose to go very far down a
neo-imperial path -- the costs are too great and it is ultimately not an
unsustainable grand strategic orientation for the United States. It
seems also likely that the basic character of the order that exists
between the democratic great powers -- Western Europe, the United
States, and Japan -- will persist even under conditions of unipolarity.
That is, these countries will continue to inhabit a "security community"
where the disputes between them will ultimately be settled peaceful. In
a security community the resort to violence or war is unthinkable as a
tool of policy between countries within the community. Even the worst
disputes between the United States and, say, France are not ones that
will spiral toward war. At least within the "democratic core" of great
powers, the responses to unipolarity will be consistent with the general
characteristics of a security community. But relations among these
democratic countries are also likely to be more hard-nosed and infused
with power politics. Without the common Cold War threat of the Soviet
Union, disagreements -- and how they are handled -- are likely to be
more intense than in the past. American power does generate or reinforce
differences between the United States and the outside world. So the
"politics of unipolarity" is likely to be a new form of power politics
played out within a foundation of security community. The United States
has a huge opportunity to influence what the rules of the game will be
for this unipolar order.

 

 

THE RISE OF AMERICAN UNIPOLARITY

 

The United States has turned into a unipolar global power without
historical precedent. The 1990s surprised the world. Many observers
expected the end of the Cold War to usher in a multipolar order with
increasingly equal centers of power in Asia, Europe, and America.
Instead the United States began the decade as the world's only
superpower and proceeded to grow more powerful at the expense of the
other major states. Between 1990 and 1998 the United States' GNP grew 27
percent, Europe's 16 percent, and Japan's 7 percent. Today the American
economy is equal to the economies of Japan, United Kingdom, and Germany
combined. The United States military capacity is even more in a league
of its own. It spends as much on defense as the next fourteen countries
combined. It has bases in forty countries. Eighty percent of world
military R&D takes place in the United States.[^3]^\[3\]^ What the 1990s
wrought is a unipolar America that is more powerful than any other great
state in history.[^4]^\[4\]^

Various factors intensify these power disparities. First, the other
great powers have all lost ground in the last decade. Russia collapsed
after the Cold War and now has an economy the size of a medium sized
European country. China is still a developing country with the political
and economic problems that come with modernization. Japan has had a
decade of economic decline. Western Europe has been focused inward on
integration and the resulting political controversies.

 

Second, the loss of the Cold War threat has removed bipolar restraints
on American power. During the Cold War, the United States had to
restrain itself for two reasons. One was that it needed its alliance
partners in the global bipolar struggle, so it had to attend to the
interests and preferences of alliance partners. It was more willing than
it needs to be today to make concessions -- adjust its policies, make
commitments, and listen closely to alliance partners' views -- than it
needs to today where the allies are (arguably) less critical to American
security and the realization of its interests. Second, the Soviet Union
also disciplined the exercise of American power because the risks of war
were so high. The United States needed to worry about Soviet reactions
and acted accordingly. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end
of bipolarity, there is no other great power that threatens the United
States and less need for alliance cooperation. These disciplining
restraints on American power have fallen away.

 

Third, there is no other rival global ideology to the American liberal
vision. Other countries may not like specific features of America's
ideological commitment to democracy, open markets, and the globalization
of the world system, but alternative worldviews are not yet in sight. No
other state offers a vision of world order that would facilitate the
creation of a counter-American global coalition.

 

Fourth, the recent exercise of American military power -- in Afghanistan
and Iraq -- has shown the world how extraordinary and effective that
power is. In effect, the exercise of power has created even more power
-- or at least revealed that power to the world. The United States can
take down entire regimes without sustaining high costs of manpower or
national treasure. The cost of war has gone down, particular in the
areas where war is most likely. This expands the realms in which
American military power can be projected. The inability of other great
powers to do the same further intensifies the power disparities.

 

Finally, although the Cold War is over, the American system of client
states and security ties is still in place across Europe and East Asia.
Many of these security protection agreements grew out of the bipolar
struggle with the Soviet Union, but they were not disassembled with the
collapse of the Soviet Union. This means that there is an entire global
system of formal and informal security ties that continue to make states
dependent on the United States for protection. These states -- who exist
in all regions of the world -- have reasons to remain tied to the United
States. There are no good substitutes for military junior partnership.
Japan is a good example. It may not like to be so tied to the United
States for security protection but it is in a security box. All the
other alternatives are more risky and costly. This legacy of the Cold
War reinforces the structure of hierarchy inherent in a unipolar order.

 

The main conclusion to draw from this discussion is two-fold. First, the
global distribution of power can rightly be described as unipolar. The
disparities of power between the lead state and the secondary powers are
extreme and multifaceted. Second, this is a unique power distribution.
The modern state system -- which dates to 1648 -- has never seen such a
configuration of power.

 

It is not surprising, therefore, that states -- including the United
States \-- are in a process of assessing and adjusting to this new power
reality. It is in this context that we look more closely at the
components of American power and the ways in which this power is
"experienced" around the world.

 

 

CHARACTERISTICS OF AMERICAN POWER

 

At the outset, we can make four general observations about American
unipolar power. These observations help frame the discussion of how
major states around the world are perceiving and responding to American
power.

 

First, the United States is a unique sort of global superpower. That is,
it has a distinctive cluster of capabilities, institutions, attractions,
and impulses. Indeed, American power is manifest in complex and
paradoxical ways. For example, during the 20^th^ century, the United
States was the greatest champion of rule-based order. It pushed onto the
global stage a long list of international institutions and rules -- the
League of Nations, the United Nations, GATT, human rights norms, and so
forth. But the United States also has been unusually ambivalent about
actually operating itself within legal and institutional constraints.
Also, the United States has used military force more than any other
state in the last fifty years (with and without UN or NATO backing). Yet
it also has an anti-imperial political culture and a strong isolationist
tradition. My point here is that it is difficult for other countries to
simply decide that American power is manifest in any one way. American
power is sometimes menacing, but at other times it helps provide global
public goods and at other times it turns inward. [American power is
sufficiently complex and multifaceted that it is difficult for countries
to simply decide to counter or work against US power]{.underline}.
American power is complex and because of this there are reasons for
other states to have complex views of and strategies for dealing with
the United States.

 

Second, countries and peoples "experience" American unipolar power is
different ways. A threat to some is an opportunity to others. This is
true across states -- some states find American power more useful and
easy to accommodate than others. For example, Japan finds America's
security role in East Asia more useful to it than France finds America's
security role in Europe. Likewise, people in particular states see
American power differently. In most states there is a range of views,
and these views can be directed at American policy or more generally at
America as a global power.

 

Third, in this regard, it is useful to distinguish at least three levels
or types of American power that are generating reactions around the
world. At the most basic level, American power is manifest as the
[underwriter of American capitalism and globalization]{.underline}. This
is where America gets implicated in the protests over the WTO and the
IMF. At another level, American power is manifest as the [leader of a
global political and military alliance system]{.underline}. This is
where people in countries such as South Korea or Germany seek to push
the United States out of their country. Some people attack or oppose the
United States because it is the alliance partner that is supported by
their own government. American power is challenged because that power --
in some countries such as Pakistan or Saudi Arabia -- helps perpetuate
unwanted regimes. A final level of [American power is manifest in
specific policies or issues]{.underline}. For example, some people --
such as South Koreans \-- oppose the United States because of specific
Status of Forces agreements in their country that protect American
soldiers from local justice. Others oppose the United States because of
its decisions on the use of force, such as in the recent invasion of
Iraq. Governments and peoples can oppose the United States because of
its new doctrine of preemption.

 

Fourth, the "face" that the United States shows the world matters. I
would argue that there are two general faces that the United States can
show. One is American hegemonic power with "liberal characteristics."
This is America as it promotes order organized around multilateralism,
close alliance partnerships, strategic commitment and restraint, and
extensive jointly agreed upon institutions and rules for managing
relationships. Another face is American hegemonic power with "imperial
characteristics." This is America as it acts unilaterally against the
goals and interests of other states, engages in coercive domination to
get its way, and degrades global rules and institutions. My hypothesis
is that the greater the United States tilts toward liberal hegemony, the
greater the incentives these states will have to engage in cooperative
behavior with the United States. The greater the United States tilts
toward imperial hegemony, the more incentives states will have to resist
or move away from the United States.

 

Finally, most of the great power responses to American unipolarity seem
to be falling between the extremes of balancing and bandwagoning. States
can resist without balancing and they can engage without simply
acquiescing. During the Iraq war, British Prime Minister Tony Blair
pursued a strategy of getting as close as possible to the Bush
administration. The strategy was to be so close and supportive of the
American exercise of power that Britain would ultimately get some say in
how policy unfolds. French President Chirac pursued a different policy
-- attempting to build an opposing political coalition to the Bush
administration's Iraq policy. Both were attempting to deal with a
difficult reality: the United States was powerful enough to go on its
own. [How to get some leverage over American exercise of power is the
challenge]{.underline}. The two leaders chose different strategies. In
the aftermath of the war, the effectiveness of the two strategies are
being debated across Europe. How this debate unfolds will say a lot
about the future resort to the strategies. Again, it is useful to see
the present moment as one where governments are making judgments,
experimenting with strategies, learning lessons, and adapting their
behavior.

 

 

FOUR FACETS OF AMERICAN POWER

 

Four facets of American power reinforce unipolarity and undercut
incentives to resist or balance against the United States. These four
facets of power are: traditional power assets; geography and historical
timing; democracy and institutional restraint; and modernization and
civic identity. Together these multiple dimensions of American power
suggest that unipolarity is likely to persist and that the other major
states are likely to continue to have incentives to engage and work with
the United States \-- even as they devise new strategies to cope with
unipolarity.

 

[Traditional Power Assets]{.underline}

 

The first facet of American power is its traditional power assets --
material capabilities that allow it to pursue its objective and get
other states to go along with it. One aspect of material capabilities is
the sheer size of the American military establishment. As mentioned
earlier, American military expenditures are greater than the next
fourteen countries combined -- and if current trends continue, the
United States military expenditures will be equal to the rest of the
world combined by 2007. The advanced technological character of much of
this military power makes this power disparity even greater.

 

This mass of military power makes it difficult if not impossible for a
group of states to develop capabilities that could balance or counter
the United States. But other considerations further increase the
difficulties of organizing a counter-balancing coalition. First, there
are collective action problems. States might like to see the formation
of a counter-unipolar coalition but they would prefer other states do
the work of organizing it and covering its costs. This is the problem of
"buck passing" -- the collective action problem that makes it less
likely that a coalition will form. There is also the problem of regional
blocking problems. If particular great powers do decide to amass greater
military power to challenge the United States, other major states in
their region are likely to be threatened by this move and challenge it.
For example, if Japan were to undertake military mobilization to counter
the United States, it would find a hostile East Asian neighborhood
awaited it. These considerations make counter-balancing
unlikely.[^5]^\[5\]^

 

Other material power assets also work to America's advantage -- namely,
security protection, markets, and nuclear weapons. Alliance security
protection that the United States has the capacity to extend to states
in all four corners of the world provides a positive incentive to
cooperate with the United States. This incentive is of two sorts. One is
simply that American security protection reduces the resources that
these countries would otherwise need to generate to cover their own
protection. It is a cost-effective way to deal with the elemental
problem of national security. If it means working with the United States
and not offering opposition to it, the forgoing of this option of
opposition is a cost that is more than compensated by the value of the
security protection itself. The second benefit of security protection,
at least for some states, it that it means that these states won't need
to face the regional challenges that might come if they provided for
their own security. Germany and Japan are the best examples of this. By
positioning themselves under the American security umbrella, Germany and
Japan were able to reassure their worried neighbors that they would not
become future security threats to their respective regions. The United
States is able to provide security to so many countries because it has
the economic and military capabilities to do so on a worldwide basis.
Indeed, it might well be that economies of scale exist for a versatile
and high-tech military power such as the United States.

 

Another aspect of American material power is its large domestic market.
Both Europeans and East Asians depend mightily on access to the American
market. Of course, the United States relies heavily on both regions for
its own economic prosperity. But the simple point here is that East Asia
and Western Europe have incentives not to resist American unipolarity in
such a way as to break apart the open markets that cut across the
Pacific and Atlantic.

 

American unipolarity is also sustained by nuclear weapons. Even if the
other major powers wanted to overturn the existing order, the mechanism
of great-power war is no longer available. As Robert Gilpin has noted,
great-power war is precisely the mechanism of change that has been used
throughout history to redraw the international order. Rising states
depose the reigning -- but declining -- state and impose a new
order.[^6]^\[6\]^ But nuclear weapons make this historical dynamic
profoundly problematic. On the one hand, American power is rendered more
tolerable because in the age of nuclear deterrence American military
power cannot now be used for conquest against other great powers.
[Deterrence replaces alliance counterbalancing]{.underline}. On the
other hand, the status quo international order led by the United States
is rendered less easily replaceable. War-driven change is removed as an
historical process, and the United States was lucky enough to be on top
when this happened.

 

[Geography and Historical Setting]{.underline}

 

The geographic setting and historical timing of America's rise in power
also have shaped the way American primacy has been manifest. The United
States is the only great power that is not neighbored by other great
powers. This geographical remoteness made the power ascent of the United
States less threatening to the rest of the world and it reinforced the
disinclination of American leaders to directly dominate or manage great
power relations. In the twentieth century, the United States became the
world's preeminent power but the location and historical entry point of
that power helped shaped how this arrival was greeted.

When the United States was drawn into European power struggles, it did
so primarily as an offshore balancer.[^7]^\[7\]^ This was an echo of
Britain's continental strategy which for several centuries was based on
aloofness for European power struggles, intervening at critical moments
to tip and restore the balance among the other states. This offshore
balancing role was played out by the United States in the two world
wars. America entered each war relatively late and tipped the balance in
favor of the allies. After World War II, the United States emerged as an
equally important presence in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East as an
offshore military force that each region found useful in solving its
local security dilemmas. In Europe, the reintegration of West Germany
into the West was only possible with the American security commitment.
The Franco-German settlement was explicitly and necessarily embedded in
an American-guaranteed Atlantic settlement. In Joseph Joffe's apt
phrase, the United States became "Europe's pacifier."[^8]^\[8\]^ In East
Asia, the American security pact with Japan also solved regional
security dilemmas by creating restraints on the resurgence of Japanese
military power. In the Middle East a similar dynamic drew the United
States into an active role in mediating between Israel and the Arab
states. In each region, American power is seen less as a source of
domination and more as a useful tool.

Because the United States is geographically remote, abandonment rather
than domination has been seen as the greater risk by many states. As a
result, the United States has found itself constantly courted by
governments in Europe, Asia, and elsewhere. When Winston Churchill
advanced ideas about postwar order he was concerned above all in finding
a way to tie the United States to Europe.[^9]^\[9\]^ As Geir Lundestad
has observed, the expanding American political order in the half century
after World War II has been in important respects an "empire by
invitation."[^10]^\[10\]^ The remarkable global reach of American
postwar hegemony has been at least in part driven by the efforts of
European and Asian governments to harness American power, render that
power more predictable, and use it to overcome their own regional
insecurities. The result has been a durable system of America-centered
economic and security partnerships.

 

Finally, the historical timing of America's rise in power also left a
mark. The United States came relatively late to the great power arena,
after the colonial and imperial eras had run their course. This meant
that the pursuit of America's strategic interests was not primarily
based on territorial control but on championing more principled ways of
organizing great power relations. As a late-developing great power the
United States needed openness and access to the regions of the world
rather than recognition of its territorial claims. The American issuance
of its Open Door policy toward China reflected this orientation.
American officials were never fully consistent in wielding such
principled claims about order and they were often a source of conflict
with the other major states. But the overall effect of this alignment of
American geo-strategic interests with enlightened normative principles
of order reinforced the image of the United States as a relatively
non-coercive and non-imperial hegemonic power.

 

 

[Democracy and Institutional Restraints]{.underline}

 

The American unipolar order is also organized around democratic polities
and a complex web of intergovernmental institutions -- and these
features of the American system alter and mute the way in which
hegemonic power is manifest. One version of this argument is the
democratic peace thesis: open democratic polities are less able or
willing to use power in an arbitrary and indiscriminate manner against
other democracies.[^11]^\[11\]^ The calculations of smaller and weaker
states as they confront a democratic hegemon are altered. Fundamentally,
power asymmetries are less threatening or destabilizing when they exist
between democracies. American power is "institutionalized" -- not
entirely, of course -- but more so than in the case of previous
world-dominating states. This institutionalization of hegemonic strategy
serves the interest of the United States by making its power more
legitimate, expansive, and durable. But the price is that some
restraints are indeed placed on the exercise of power.[^12]^\[12\]^

 

In this view, three elements matter most in making American power more
stable, engaged, and restrained. First, America's mature political
institutions organized around the rule of law have made it a relatively
predictable and cooperative hegemon. The pluralistic and regularized way
in which American foreign and security policy is made reduces surprises
and allows other states to build long-term, mutually beneficial
relations. The governmental separation of powers creates a shared
decision-making system that opens up the process and reduces the ability
of any one leader to make abrupt or aggressive moves toward other
states. An active press and competitive party system also provide a
service to outside states by generating information about US policy and
determining the seriousness its seriousness of purpose. The messiness of
democracy can frustrate American diplomats and confuse foreign
observers. But over the long term, democratic institutions produce more
consistent and credible policies than autocratic or authoritarian
states.

 

This open and decentralized political process works in a second way to
reduce foreign worries about American power. It creates what might be
called "voice opportunities" -- it offers opportunities for political
access and, with it, the means for foreign governments and groups to
influence the way Washington's power is exercised. Foreign governments
and corporations may not have elected officials in Washington but they
do have representatives. Looked at from the perspective of the stable
functioning of American's unipolar order, this is one of the most
functional aspects of the United States as a global power. By providing
other states opportunities to play the game in Washington, the United
States draws them into active, ongoing partnerships that serve its
long-term strategic interests.

A final element of the unipolar order that reduces the worry about power
asymmetries is the web of institutions that mark the postwar order.
After World War II, the United States launched history's most ambitious
era of institution building. The UN, IMF, World Bank, NATO, GATT, and
other institutions that emerged provided the most rule-based structure
for political and economic relations in history. The United States was
deeply ambivalent about making permanent security commitments to other
countries or allowing its political and economic policies to be dictated
by intergovernmental bodies. The Soviet threat was critical in
overcoming these doubts. Networks and political relationships were built
that \-- paradoxically \-- both made American power more far-reaching
and durable but also more predictable and malleable.

 

 

 

[Modernization and Civic Nationalism]{.underline}

 

American power has been rendered more acceptable to the rest of the
world because the United States "project" is congruent with the deeper
forces of modernization. The point here is not that the United States
has pushed other states to embrace its goals and purposes but that all
states are operating within a transforming global system -- driven by
modernization, industrialization, and social mobilization. The
synchronicity between the rise of the United States as a liberal global
power and the system-wide imperatives of modernization create a sort of
functional "fit" between the United States and the wider world order. If
the United States were attempting to project state socialist economic
ideas or autocratic political values, its fit with the deep forces of
modernization would be poor. Its purposes would be resisted around the
world and resistance to American power would be triggered. But the deep
congruence between the American model and the functional demands of
modernization both boost the power of the United States and make its
relationship with the rest of the world more harmonious.

 

Industrialization is a constantly evolving process and the social and
political characteristics within countries that it encourages and
rewards \-\-- and that promote or impede industrial advancement \--
change over time as countries move through developmental stages. In this
sense, the fit between a polity and modernization is never absolute or
permanent. Industrialism in advanced societies tends to feature highly
educated workforces, rapid flows of information, and progressively more
specialized and complex systems of social and industrial organization.
These features of industrial society \-- sometimes called
late-industrialism \-- tend to foster a citizenry that is heterogeneous,
well educated, and difficult to coerce.[^13]^\[13\]^ From this
perspective it is possible to see why various state socialist and
authoritarian countries -- including the Soviet Union -- ran into
trouble as the twentieth century proceeded. The old command order
impeded industrial modernization while, at the same time, industrial
modernization undercut the old command order. In contrast, the American
polity has tended to have a relatively good fit with the demands and
opportunities of industrial modernization. European and Asian forms of
capitalist democracy also have exhibited features that seem in various
ways to be quite congruent with the leading edge of advanced industrial
development. The success of the American model is partly due to the fact
that it used its postwar power to build an international order that
worked to the benefit of the American style of industrial capitalism.
But the success of the American model -- and the enhanced global
influence and appeal that the United States has experienced in recent
decades -- is also due to the deep congruence between the logic of
modernization and the American system.

 

The functionality between the United States polity and wider
evolutionary developments in the international system also can be traced
to the American political identity \-- which is rooted in civic
nationalism and multi-culturalism. The basic distinction between civil
and ethnic nationalism is useful in locating this feature. Civic
nationalism is group identity, which is composed of commitments to the
nation's political creed. Race, religion, gender, language, or ethnicity
are not relevant in defining a citizen's rights and inclusion within the
polity. Shared belief in the country's principles and values embedded in
the rule of law is the organizing basis for political order and citizens
are understood to be equal and rights-bearing individuals. Ethnic
nationalism, in contrast, maintains that an individual's rights and
participation within the polity are inherited - based on ethnic or
racial ties.[^14]^\[14\]^

 

Because civic nationalism is shared with other Western states it tends
to be a source of cohesion and cooperation. Throughout the industrial
democratic world, the dominant form of political identity is based on a
set of abstract and juridical rights and responsibilities which coexist
with private ethnic and religious associations. Just as warring states
and nationalism tend to reinforce each other, so too do Western civic
identity and cooperative political relations reinforce each other.
Political order \-- domestic and international \-- is strengthened when
there exists a substantial sense of community and shared identity. It
matters that the leaders of today's advanced industrial states are not
seeking to legitimize their power by making racial or imperialist
appeals. Civic nationalism, rooted in shared commitment to democracy and
the rule of law -- provides a widely embraced identity across most of
the American hegemonic order. At the same time, potentially divisive
identity conflicts -- rooted in antagonistic ethnic or religious or
class divisions -- are dampened by relegating them to secondary status
within civil society.

 

THE LIMITS OF BINDING AND BALANCING

There are two extreme strategies for coping with concentrated power. One
is to balance against it and the other is to bind that power to rules
and institutions. Balancing entails resisting, pulling away, and forming
a counter-concentration of power in cooperation with other weak states.
By pulling away from the dominant state, the weaker states remove
themselves from the direct reach of the powerful state. By forming a
counter-coalition, the dominant state's power is checked by the
aggregation of countervailing power. Binding is the opposite strategy.
The power of the dominant state is made less threatening to weaker
states by embedding that power in rules and institutions that channel
and limit the ways that power is exercised. In most historical times and
places, power binding has not been an option because the conditions of
anarchy make restraints on power non-credible. Some practical restraints
may exist -- custom, domestic politics, geography, etc. -- but they do
not have the geopolitical heft to provide the ultimate protections
against a dominant power. Balance of power is the most enduring
mechanism to restrain power because it is the most reliable; power
checks power.

 

These strategies, of course, are themselves varied and complex. There
are many ways that balancing can be manifest and a rich theoretical and
historical literature reveals these complexities. Alliance-based,
war-time coalitions that seek to stop the territorial aggression of a
dominant state -- such as the one that eventually took shape to confront
Napoleonic France in the early 19^th^ century \-- is one manifestation.
Balancing coalitions that seek to deny geopolitical influence of a
dominant state through resistance and the organizing of counter-spheres
of influence is another manifestation. Binding can also vary. The
dominant state can be bound to weaker states and the
international/regional order in more or less formal ways. German power
is tied to Europe in various layers of formal regional and Atlantic
mechanisms -- including monetary union, the wider EU order, and NATO.
The dominant state can be bound in looser ways. The United States is
party to a growing array of multilateral treaties and
agreements.[^15]^\[15\]^ In the trade area, American economic power is
disciplined by the rules and institutions of the WTO. Binding might also
be manifest in informal, political ways, such as through consultations,
ad hoc bargaining, and the continuous pulling and hauling of inter-state
relations.

 

But there are limits to these ideal-typical strategies. As a rich
literature on balance of power politics shows, balancing is not easy or
automatic -- even in the face of overwhelming and threatening
power.[^16]^\[16\]^ First, it is often costly to mobilize a
counter-coalition, particularly when the threat is not that of immediate
territorial conquest. There is a tendency to engage in
buck-passing.[^17]^\[17\]^ Collective action problems reinforce this
constraint. Second, balancing can be costly by disrupting economic gains
that flow from linkages with the powerful state. Third, it can be
dangerous. If balancing is attempted but fails, a cost comes from
reprisals. Fourth, even if balancing is successful -- and a
counter-coalition is created -- it might not solve the problem. If the
threat is not from the dominant state's hard power but its cultural,
economic, or political influence, military balancing is not necessarily
the appropriate strategy. How do you balance against soft power?
Finally, balancing may actually be impossible. William Wohlforth argues

that American unipolarity is so extreme there is not a realistic
combination of states that could combine to produce a counter-hegemonic
bloc.[^18]^\[18\]^

 

Behind these limits on traditional security balancing are other
considerations. The presence of nuclear weapons and deterrence alter the
logic of balancing among the great powers -- it changes the character of
the threats that are manifest. If territorial conquest is not a serious
security issue among the major states, the most important reason to
balance is taken away. American unipolar power may be threatening to
China, Russia and other states, but this does not include the fear of
invasion or direct imperial domination. In this sense, American power is
less worrisome to the other major states than dominant states in the
past who were less powerful than the United States is today but more
threatening to their neighbors.[^19]^\[19\]^

 

The balancing logic also must confront a second background condition
that is emphasized by realist theories of hegemonic stability. Powerful
states are not just threats but they can also be providers of
international public goods. Robert Gilpin's work reminds us that at
least in the age of liberal hegemonic states, the dominant power tends
to seek mutually beneficial trade and economic relations. It also can
identify its own interests with the provision of stable and open
relations. This logic can even lead the hegemonic state to make security
calculations -- whom to protect in security partnerships -- with an eye
to the trade and economic growth implications of the security order. The
United States may continue to offer security protection to Europe and
East Asian partners if it calculates that the resulting system of
indivisible security ties reinforces open economic relations and
facilitates domestic economic gains.

 

Finally, another background consideration is the wider structure of
convergent and divergent interests. If the threat of territorial
conquest and direct political domination is taken out of the system, the
question is what are the remaining interest-based rivalries. Presumably,
the great powers worry not just about American power but about the
interests that are pursued with that power. On the one hand, it is
possible to argue that the range of divergent interests between the
United States and the other major powers is actually quite narrow by
historical standards. Certainly, this is true between the advanced
democratic countries. On the other hand, the rise of unipolar power
itself has created new, divergent interests. For example, the sheer size
of the American economy -- and a decade of growth unmatched by Europe,
Japan, or the other advanced countries -- means that the United States'
obligations under the Kyoto protocol would be vastly greater than those
of other states. In the security realm, the United States has global
interests and security threats that no other state has. Its troops are
more likely to be dispatched to distant battlefields than those of other
major states -- which means that it would be more exposed to the legal
liabilities of the International Criminal Court (ICC) than others. The
United States must worry about threats to its interests in all parts of
the world. American unipolar power makes it a unique target for
terrorism. It is not surprising that Europeans and Americans make
different

threat assessments about terrorism and rogue states seeking weapons of
mass destruction than American officials do.

 

There are also limits and constraints on the binding strategy. The big
problem, of course, is that the leading state may not agree to bind
itself to rules and institutions. The attraction of this strategy for
weak states is that it allows them to realize all the advantages of
interacting with the dominant state without risking domination or
exploitation. The dominant state operates within a framework of rules
and institutions that limit the ways in which that power can be
exercised. Arbitrary and indiscriminate actions by the powerful state
are reduced. But when the leading state agrees to operate in a
multilateral or rule-based order, it is agreeing to reduce its freedom
of action. But why would it ever do this? The answer is that there must
be something it gets in return. What the other states can offer the lead
state is not always clear, particularly when the binding restraints on
the powerful state relate to the way it pursues core security and
national interests. The United States may be willing to reduce its
policy autonomy is trade and other "low politics" realms through
commitments to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and other multilateral
economic regimes, but it is more reluctant to cede any real autonomy in
the areas of arms control and the use of force. Moreover, weaker states
also have to calculate what they are willing to give up in order to gain
some concessions from the unipolar state. Finally, again, in the
background is the question of whether binding, rule-based institutional
commitments are ultimately credible. If institutional bargains are too
easily violated or overturned, the binding strategy loses its viability.

 

The usefulness of the binding strategy to both strong and weak states
hinges on their assessments of particularly trade-offs. The United
States has to ask: how much entanglement in rules and agreements is it
worth enduring to get other states organized and locked into a
predictable rule-based system? Such an order would be desirable at the
right price. The United States also has an interest in not driving other
states to abandon cooperation with the dominant state and move toward a
strategy of resistance or balancing. If the acceptance of some binding
constraints reduces this possibility, this too is desirable -- again, at
the right price. These are continuous rather than dichotomous variables.
The United States is most likely to agree to be bound to rules and
institutions that create loopholes, veto rights, weighted voting, and
escape clauses. The more it needs cooperative and predictable behavior
from other states, the more it presumably will be willing to tighten up
these opt-out conditions. The WTO is a good example of this. Weaker
states, in turn, need to determine whether loose and conditional binding
by the United States nonetheless provides sufficient reduction in the
threats of arbitrary and indiscriminate actions to make the compromise
of their policy autonomy worthwhile. In the background, these weaker
states also need to ask: is the overall reduction in threats and dangers
from American power dominance sufficient and credible enough to justify
their compliant participation within the order?

 

The limits and constraints on both balancing and binding strategies
suggest that the actual choices and options of the great powers as they
confront American unipolar power will be varied and fall in between
these extremes. States will need to pursue a variety of strategies
depending on the specific situation. They will both resist and engage
the United States.

 

 

STRATEGIES OF RESISTANCE AND ENGAGEMENT

 

Strategies are emerging among the major states to deal with American
unipolar power. In particular, it is possible to identify strategies
that move in two different directions -- either toward [resistance and
the loosening]{.underline} of ties to the unipolar state or toward
[engagement and cooperation]{.underline}. At the extremes are the two
strategies that we have just discussed: balancing and binding. These
strategies are not mutually exclusive -- and indeed it is the mix of
these strategies pursued by the major states that is the hallmark of
today's unipolar order.

 

[Buffering]{.underline}

 

This strategy entails reducing exposure to the lead state through the
development of alternative regional political spheres. The idea is to
loosen and reduce direct interaction with -- and therefore control by --
the lead state. The strategy can be structural: pulling away from and
creating an alternative regional order organized around competing ideas
and agendas. A state or group of states can try to construct an
alternative and separate realm of international order. The strategy can
also be more limited: creating regional infrastructure and independent
capacity that allows the weaker states to strengthen their ability
together to interact with the dominant state.

 

Regarding structural buffering, some scholars have depicted the
post-World War I communist movements in Russia and China as great global
ruptures that were driven by vanguards seeking to remove their societies
from modern Western development. Japan's East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere
was an extreme version of regional order building undertaken to counter
and protect against the encroachment of a dynamic West. These great
historical projects may have been driven in part by calculations by
elites that their countries could not compete with or within the Western
order. There is no evidence today of anything similar to this type of
order-building dynamic.

 

Another version might simply involve the creation of some independent
regional security or political capability. The case being made inside of
Europe for a non-NATO, independent security identity is driven in part
by a desire to loosen dependence on American military
protection.[^20]^\[20\]^ There is no serious proposal on the European
table for a completely separate and equal military force that would
allow Europe to end the NATO pact and act as a free-standing regional
entity. But proponents of a strengthened European defense capability do
seek to gain capacity for independent action and some enhanced ability
to influence American security policy. This is the view of Chris Patten,
the EU commissioner for external relations, who has argued: "We
\[Europeans\] have to, as football coaches say, dig deeper, . . . if
we're going to be a credible ally and an occasional
counterweight."[^21]^\[21\]^

 

Buffering can take the form of strengthening more limited and functional
groupings. The ASEAN plus 3 forum is an example of an effort by East
Asian countries to establish some regional identity and capacity so as
to reduce the economic vulnerabilities that intrude from the wider
global economy. At least some of the inspiration for this nascent
grouping came from the Asian economic crisis of 1997-98 that saw the
United States resist Japanese efforts to establish a so-called Asian
Monetary Fund. The recently released ASEAN plus 3 vision statement
advances a notion of regionalism that is compatible with global economic
and political institutions -- and close American economic and security
ties -- but which provides a greater measure of regional
self-governance.

 

[Baiting]{.underline}

 

Another strategy entails developing counter-regional or functional
groupings that are designed, at least in part, to lure the dominant
state into interaction with -- and ultimately conformity with -- this
regional or functional grouping. The strategy is to develop principles
and institutions that establish international standards or best
practices that over time will become universal in scope. The leading
state may resist the initial establishment of the regional or functional
grouping but over time it will find it increasingly difficult to avoid
or circumvent that alternative cooperative arrangement.

 

The decision by the Europeans to go forward with the ICC is one example.
There are at least some ICC proponents who argue that over time a
successfully functioning ICC will be harder for the United States to
resist. Change in the American position may come from a shift in
administration or from evolving views of the ICC based on experience.
The Europeans and other governments also have moved forward with the
Kyoto protocol on climate change. There may be less anticipation in this
case that the United States will eventually join the agreement but by
moving forward with the implication of the Kyoto agreement proponents of
this approach to global warming seek to keep pressure on the United
States to do something.

 

[Bargaining]{.underline}

 

The most obvious and prevalent strategy for dealing with the untoward
consequences of American unipolarity is simply to bargain with the
United States. The United States is preeminent but it is not omnipotent.
The power disparities are extreme but the other major states do have
assets and some leverage over the United States. This strategy entails
attempting to alter the policies of the dominant state through carrots
and sticks and it can take a variety of forms.

 

One is simply to engage in old-fashioned pulling and hauling.
Governments can play the bargaining game through inter-governmental
channels and working with like-minded domestic groups and politicians in
the dominant state. In most policy areas, the entire weight of American
power is not on the line. The issues and relative bargaining advantages
are more proximate and this means that the outcome will reflect a
variety of inputs -- the cogency of arguments, the quality of the
expertise, the determination of the participants, etc. In effect, this
is great power politics under conditions of "complex interdependence."

 

Second, major states can also play a slightly harder-edged game by
threatening to withhold cooperation. This is the main source of leverage
for weaker countries facing the United States. In various policy areas,
the United States needs the active cooperation of other states to
achieve its goals. In the war on terrorism, the United States needs
other governments for intelligence sharing and law enforcement. One
British member of the House of Lords recently argued that the way to
show the Bush administration that there is a cost of acting unilaterally
is to withhold cooperation on intelligence sharing in the war on
terrorism. "I would switch off U.S.-U.K. intelligence cooperation for
three days to make the point of how important cooperation is," remarked
Lord William Wallace.[^22]^\[22\]^ Withholding cooperation can move from
the symbolic to the more tangible and consequential. Saudi Arabia, for
example, has threatened restrictions on the basing rights of American
forces in military operations aimed at Iraq. Threatening to deny the
United States use of a strategic asset is a way of getting some leverage
into Washington policy making.

 

Third, weaker states can use economic tariffs and embargoes as a tool to
gain some political leverage over American policy. The European response
to the American decision to impose high tariffs on imported steel in the
spring of 2002 involved EU threats of massive retaliation. Moreover, the
proposed counter-tariffs were targeted on American exports from
politically sensitive states. Some observers saw this aggressive
response as a message to the United States not just on steel tariffs and
trade policy but on the Bush administration's more general unilateral
foreign policy.

 

Fourth, bargaining can take the form of old fashioned log rolling. This
variation entails seeking to work with the dominant state to seek
opportunities for joint gain. Weaker states do not resist the politics
of the dominant state but try to adapt them in local circumstances for
local advantage. For example, Russian President Putin offered support
for America's Iraq policy in exchange for American acquiescence in
Russian policies toward its minorities. More generally, governments
around the world have sought to find ways to connect their policy
agendas to America's war on terrorism and thereby gain support from
Washington.

 

Finally, bargaining may also involve an attempt by weaker states to use
a more diffuse source of leverage -- the threat to withhold legitimacy
for an American action. This is most relevant in the area of the
American use of force. The United States is clearly sensitive -- some
officials in the Bush administration more than others -- to the general
acceptability of its use of military force. While insisting that it has
the right to act unilaterally to preemptively attack threats in Iraq and
elsewhere, the administration is also sensitive to the views of other
allied governments and -- at least to some extent \-- foreign public
opinion. American domestic opinion is also sensitive to the legitimacy
of its use of force and domestic support for such actions when they are
seen as generally acceptable by the outside world. In this way, the
"legitimacy pressure" is felt indirectly through domestic politics. This
sensitivity about the legitimacy of American power -- and the use of
force -- is what ultimately led the Bush administration to seek U.N.
Security Council support for its confrontation with Iraq. And it is here
that the views of Russia, China, Britain, and France take on more
importance than would otherwise be the case.

 [Bandwagoning]{.underline}

 

Bandwagoning is a strategy that can encompasses a wide range of state
behavior but it essentially entails policies that support and
accommodate the dominant power.[^23]^\[23\]^ Weaker states seek to work
with rather than resist the dominant state -- and they look for
opportunities to advance their interests without directly challenging
the dominant state. Bandwagoning can take various forms -- ranging from
simple appeasement to more active attempts to work with and manipulate
the policies of the leading state. Today, in one way or another, all the
major states -- including Russia and China -- are pursuing a
bandwagoning strategy toward American unipolar power.

 

In its simplest form, bandwagoning is appeasement. It is a strategy of
non-resistance where weaker states accommodate the dominant state by
seeking to remove sources of conflict in their relations. In classical
European diplomacy, as Gordon Craig and Alexander George note,
appeasement referred to "the reduction of tension between \[two states\]
by the methodical removal of the principal causes of conflict and
disagreement between them."[^24]^\[24\]^ This strategy is particularly
useful to the major states that confront the United States if the
sources of their conflict are primarily secondary and out of area --
such as in the case of American policy toward Iraq. They can soften
their opposition or simply get out of the way without compromising their
core interests. They are also able to make a calculation that in
appeasing the United States they are not encouraging the United States
to expand its unipolar ambitions.[^25]^\[25\]^ This strategy might be
used in several ways. One is to play for time until the power
disparities change -- or until there is a leadership change in
Washington. A more sophisticated strategy might involve using
appeasement in an effort to alter the domestic coalitions in the
dominant state -- and thereby alter the policy position of the state
itself.

 

A more general strategy of bandwagoning entails finding ways to gain
advantages within an international order dominated by the lead state.
This seems to be an attractive option when the lead state is a mature,
status quo power that pursues a restrained and accommodating grand
strategy. Again, these conditions appear to hold today.

 

In the last several years, for example, China has moved from a strategy
of resistance to a strategy of bandwagoning. As one reporter noted
recently, "Exhibiting new self-confidence and unprecedented acceptance
of US power in the world, China has embraced a more moderate, engaged
foreign policy than ever before. . ."[^26]^\[26\]^ Through the 1990s,
China articulated a foreign policy that at least in formal, rhetorical
terms called for resistance to American "hegemonism." Summit meetings
with Russian and other leaders often culminated in public statements of
opposition to a one superpower world. A variety of factors may explain
Chinese movement toward more willing acceptance of American unipolar
power, including the decision by Russian President Putin to seek closer
ties with the West. With Russia in a near-alliance with the United
States, a Chinese policy of resistance was increasingly costly -- and
ultimately not viable. The search for economic growth through expanding
trade and investment with the West was also a lure. The opportunities
presented to Beijing in the wake of September 11 to align itself with
the United States in the war on terrorism and thereby gain great room
for maneuver within its own neighborhood might also be a factor.
Bandwagoning is all the more attractive to Beijing if it calculates that
long-term economic and strategic trends favor China.

 

[Bonding]{.underline}

 

Another version of bandwagoning might be called bonding -- where leaders
of weaker states develop close personal and policy ties with the
American president. The goal is to become so close, so loyal, and so
indispensable that the United States effectively incorporates them into
the inner circle of decision making. British Prime Minister Tony Blair
is the best example of this strategy. The British leader has tied
himself to the American anti-terrorist plan but in doing so he has made
it an Anglo-American-based campaign. By bonding itself to the
superpower, Britain gains a stake in the struggle but also a voice in
the policy.

 

[Promoting Hierarchy, Specialization and Division of Labor]{.underline}

 

Another engagement-oriented strategy of secondary states in a unipolar
order is to seek niche specialties in military and economic realms that
make it harder for the dominant state to ignore or exploit these states.
Even if weaker states cannot alter their overall position within the
international order, they can develop some special capabilities and
assets that the dominant state might find useful and necessary. In
hierarchical orders, after all, there is a division of labor -- the
subordinate actors in such an order have secondary functions but their
functions and specialties are nonetheless indispensable to the operation
of the hierarchical order. The strategy is not to resist subordination
or to seek to match the dominant state's power capabilities, but it is
rather to promote division of labor and the sharing of functions.

 

When the European members of NATO agreed recently to develop a NATO
rapid reaction force that would give the alliance capacities useful to
the war on terrorism, they were attempting to keep themselves relevant
to American security operations and make it more difficult for the
Pentagon to by-pass the alliance. By creating assets that Washington
finds useful, they are creating incentives for the United States to
operate and use force within an alliance-based, multilateral framework
where their voices will be heard. At a more operational

level, British special forces are also said to have capacities that the
United States cannot fully duplicate -- and this gives the British a
role -- and voice -- in some American-led military operations.

 

 

CONCLUSION: RESTRAINTS ON UNIPOLAR POWER

In evaluating the emerging great power reactions to unipolarity, the
first question that must be asked is: what precisely are the threats
that concentrated American power present to the other major states? The
fact that the United States does not seek territorial conquest or direct
domination of the other states -- either because it has no incentives to
do so or because nuclear weapons and other factors make it very costly
or impossible -- sets the parameters for thinking about the reactions to
unipolarity.

As noted at the beginning, it can be argued that the greater the
willingness of the United States to exercise its power through
multilateral, rule-based mechanisms and institutions the less the
likelihood of systematic great power resistance to American unipolar
power. This hypothesis brings us back to the question posed earlier: to
what extent does unipolarity create incentives and pressures for the
United States to reduce its willingness to operate in multilateral,
rule-based ways? Does the distribution of power increasingly "select"
for unilateralism in American foreign policy? Is the United States
doomed to act unilaterally and exercise its power in increasingly
arbitrary and indiscriminate ways or to act in a coercive and imperial
manner? To answer these questions is to determine whether great power
reactions to American unipolarity will move in the direction of
resistance and loosening of ties or in the direction of engagement and
bandwagoning.

There are at least three sources of rule-based, multilateralism in
American foreign policy that serve as counter-pressures to unipolar
unilateralism. One is simply the functional demand of cooperation in the
face of growing economic interdependence. The more economically
interconnected that states become, the more dependent they are for the
realization of their objectives on the actions of other states. "As
interdependence rises," Robert Keohane argues, "the opportunity costs of
not co-coordinating policy increase, compared with the costs of
sacrificing autonomy as a consequence of making binding
agreements."[^27]^\[27\]^ Rising economic interdependence is one of the
hallmarks of the contemporary international system. Over the postwar
era, states have actively and consistently sought to open markets and
reap the economic, social, and technological gains that derive from
integration in the world economy. If this remains true in the years
ahead, it is easy to predict that the demands for multilateral
agreements -- even and perhaps especially by the United States -- will
increase and not decrease.

American support for multilateralism can also stem from a grand
strategic interest in preserving power and creating a stable and
legitimate international order. This logic is particularly evident at
major historical turning points \-- such as 1919, 1945, and after the
Cold War \-- when the United States has faced choices about how to use
power and organize inter-state relations. The support for
multilateralism is a way to signal restraint and commitment to other
states thereby encouraging the acquiescence and cooperation of weaker
states.[^28]^\[28\]^ This has been a strategy that the United States has
pursued to a greater or less degree across the 20^th^ century -- and it
explains the remarkably durable and legitimate character of the existing
international order. From this perspective, multilateralism -- and the
search for rule-based agreements -- should increase rather than decrease
with the rise of American unipolarity. It predicts that the existing
multilateral order -- which itself reflects an older multilateral
bargain between the United States and the outside world should "rein in"
the Bush administration -- and it suggests that the current
administration should respond to general power management incentives and
limit its tilt toward unilateralism.

A final source of American multilateralism emerges from the United
States polity itself. The United States has a distinctive
self-understanding about the nature of its own political order \-- and
this has implications for how it thinks about international political
order. To be sure, there are multiple political traditions in the United
States that reflect divergent and often competing ideas about how the
United States should relate to the rest of the world. These traditions
variously council isolationism and activism, realism and idealism,
aloofness and engagement in the conduct of American foreign affairs. But
behind these political-intellectual traditions are deeper aspects of the
American political identity that inform the way the United States seeks
to build order in the larger global system. The enlightenment origins of
the American founding has given the United States an identity that sees
its principles of politics of universal significance and
scope.[^29]^\[29\]^ The republican democratic tradition that enshrines
the rule of law reflects a deeper American view that polities --
domestic or international -- are best organized around rules and
principles of order. America's tradition of civil nationalism also
reinforces this notion -- that the rule of law is the source of
legitimacy and political inclusion. This tradition biases American
foreign policy toward multilateralism.

These considerations allow us to specify a variety of mechanisms that
reinforce restraint in the exercise of American unipolar power. One
restraint mechanism is simply the bi-product of functional bargaining
with other states. The United States may be preeminent but it is not
omnipotent. It needs other states; thus the United States and the other
major states will seek bargains that allow them to achieve mutual gains.
Another restraint is a bi-product of the sensitivity of the United
States to its international legitimacy. The United States has a great
incentive for other states to willingly accept America's preeminent
position rather than resist it. It is not in America's interest to be
the lead state in a coercive order built around the exercise of naked
power. The decision by the Bush administration to go back to the UN
Security Council to get support for its confrontation with Iraq shows
how even an administration that is skeptical of the UN understands the
benefits that come from the legitimate use of force. A third mechanism
of restraint comes from the inter-government pulling and hauling, which
is facilitated, by democracy and global institutions. Even a unipolar
state is embedded in a larger structure of ongoing political relations
and interactions.

A final mechanism of restraint is the deeper processes of modernization.
States are not simply interacting power packages -- or billiard balls,
to use the term of art \-- they are also societies undergoing long-term
transformations driven by the forces of industrialization and
modernization. In this regard, the functionality between the United
States and the wider evolutionary developments in the international
system will be critical in determining the degree of congruence and
incongruence between it and the other major states. To the extent that
the United States continues to be at the leading edge of modernization,
the other major states will ultimately find reasons to work with and
engage the United States. If the United States falls off the cutting
edge of modernization and becomes a huge backwater that seeks only to
protect its existing gains, great power conflicts will likely re-emerge.
American unipolar power built on a 21^st^ century version of the "iron
and rye" coalition will have a different foreign policy and global
presence than one built on leading edge, internationally oriented
socioeconomic interests and coalitions. The world reacts not just to
American power but also to its purpose and functionality within the
larger system.

[^1]: ^\[1\]^ Scholars and policy analysts are just beginning to explore
    the character and consequences of a unipolar distribution of power.
    See Ethan B. Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno, eds., [Unipolar
    Politics: Realism and State Strategies after the Cold
    War]{.underline} (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999); and G.
    John Ikenberry, ed., [America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance
    of Power]{.underline} (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002).

[^2]: ^\[2\]^ The modern classical statement of this view is Kenneth
    Waltz, [Theory of International Politics]{.underline} (Reading,
    Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979).

[^3]: ^\[3\]^ Economic comparisons calculated from OECD statistics (July
    1999 web edition). GNP measures are figured at 1990 prices and
    exchange rates. In military capacity, see International Institute
    for Strategic Studies, [The Military Balance 1999/2000]{.underline}
    (London: Oxford University+ Press, 1999).

[^4]: ^\[4\]^ The best description of American unipolarity is William
    Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World," [International
    Security]{.underline}, 24, No. 1 (Summer 1999).

[^5]: ^\[5\]^ This is argued in William Wohlforth, "The Stability of a
    Unipolar World," [International Security]{.underline}, 24, No. 1
    (Summer 1999).

[^6]: ^\[6\]^ Robert Gilpin, [War and Change in World
    Politics]{.underline} (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

[^7]: ^\[7\]^ On the notion of offshore balancing, see Christopher
    Layne, "From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing," [International
    Security]{.underline}, Vol. 22, No. 1 (Summer 1997).

[^8]: ^\[8\]^ Joseph Joffe, "America: Europe's Pacifier," [The National
    Interest]{.underline}. See also Robert Art, "Why Western Europe
    Needs the United States and NATO," [Political Science
    Quarterly]{.underline}, Vol. 111 (1996), pp. 1-39.

[^9]: ^\[9\]^ See Ikenberry, [After Victory]{.underline}, Chapter Six.

[^10]: ^\[10\]^ Geir Lundestad, "Empire by Invitation? The United States
    and Western Europe, 1945-1952," [The Journal of Peace
    Research]{.underline}, Vol. 23 (September 1986), pp. 263-77.

[^11]: ^\[11\]^ See Bruce Russett and John Oneal, [Triangulating Peace:
    Democracy, Interdependence, and International
    Organizations]{.underline} (New York: Norton, 2001).

[^12]: ^\[12\]^ This is the argument of G. John Ikenberry, [After
    Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of
    Order after Major War]{.underline} (Princeton: Princeton University
    Press, 2001).

[^13]: ^\[13\]^ See Daniel Dell, [The Coming of Post-Industrial
    Society]{.underline} (New York: Basic Books, 1973).

[^14]: ^\[14\]^ This distinction is made by Anthony D. Smith, [The
    Ethnic Origins of Nations]{.underline} (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986).

[^15]: ^\[15\]^ Roughly 150 multilateral treaties were in force in 1950,
    400 in 1980, and close to 600 in 2000. These agreements deal with
    the full range of human rights protections, international
    organizations, trade and investment, and environmental protection.
    State Department data, reported in Steward Patrick, "Multilateralism
    and its Discontents," in Patrick and Shepard Forman, eds.,
    [Multilateralism and U.S. Foreign Policy: Ambivalent
    Engagement]{.underline} (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2002), pp. 11-12.

[^16]: ^\[16\]^ See Stephen M. Walt, [The Origins of
    Alliances]{.underline} (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987).

[^17]: ^\[17\]^ John Mearsheimer stresses this dynamic in [The Tragedy
    of Great Power Politics]{.underline} (New York: Norton, 2001),
    Chapter Six.

[^18]: ^\[18\]^ See Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World."

[^19]: ^\[19\]^ This focus on the variability of threats is developed in
    Stephen Walt, "Keeping the World 'Off Balance': Self Restraint and
    U.S. Foreign Policy," in Ikenberry, ed., [American
    Unrivaled]{.underline}, Chapter Four.

[^20]: ^\[20\]^ See discussion of motivations behind the unification of
    Europe in Charles Kupchan, [The End of the American Era: U.S.
    Foreign Policy after the Cold War]{.underline} (New York: Knopf,
    2002).

[^21]: ^\[21\]^ Steven Erlanger, "The Need for Cooperation Remains an
    'Old Truth' In a Changed World," [The New York Times]{.underline},
    13 September 2002.

[^22]: ^\[22\]^ Bruce Stokes, "Our Allies' New Slogan: Constrain
    America," [National Journal]{.underline}, 15 June 2002, p. 1803.

[^23]: ^\[23\]^ See Steve Walt, [Theory of Alliances]{.underline}; and
    Randall Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the
    Revisionist State Back In," [International Security]{.underline},
    19, 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 72-107.

[^24]: ^\[24\]^ Gordon Craig and Alexander George, [Force and
    Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time]{.underline}, 3^rd^
    Edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).

[^25]: ^\[25\]^ See discussion in Stephen R. Rock, [Appeasement in
    International Politics]{.underline} (Lexington: University Press of
    Kentucky, 2000).

[^26]: ^\[26\]^ John Pomfret, "China Embraces More Moderate Foreign
    Policy," [The Washington Post]{.underline}, 23 October 2002, p. A23.

[^27]: ^\[27\]^ Robert Keohane, "Multilateralism: An Agenda for
    Research," [International Journal]{.underline} (Autumn 1990), p.
    742.

[^28]: ^\[28\]^ This argument is developed in G. John Ikenberry, [After
    Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of
    Order after Major War]{.underline} (Princeton: Princeton University
    Press, 2001).

[^29]: ^\[29\]^ See Samuel Huntington, [American Politics: The Promise
    of Disharmony]{.underline} (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
    1983).