**SECURITY**

######## RESPONSIBLE PROGRAM MANAGER

Chief Health, Safety and Security Officer Chief Information Officer

Office of Health, Safety, and Security

###### Associate Administrator for Defense Nuclear Security Director of Security

National Nuclear Security Administration Office of the Under Secretary
of Energy

Director of Security

Office of the Under Secretary for Science

######## DESCRIPTION OF PROBLEM

Unprecedented security challenges have evolved since the events of
September 11, 2001. The need for improved homeland defense, highlighted
by the threats of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, created new
and complex security issues that must be surmounted to ensure the
protection of our critical energy resources and infrastructure. These
have made it necessary for the Department to reassess and strengthen its
security postures.

**PRIOR YEAR ACCOMPLISHMENTS**

In May 2004, the former Secretary of Energy announced a set of sweeping
new initiatives to improve security across the Department's nationwide
network of laboratories and defense facilities, particularly those
housing weapons-grade nuclear material. The Department's continued
completion of these initiatives will ensure the Department has a clear
strategic security plan outlining the Department's future security
course, conducts ongoing threat analyses to establish the framework for
continually improving security protective measures and enhances the
physical security of our facilities. In FY 2006, a number of actions
were taken to improve security across the Department. These actions
focused on implementing the necessary improvements to meet the current
Design Basis Threat (DBT) Policy to include revising vulnerability
assessments (VAs); evaluating, testing and deploying security
technologies; and implementing the elite protective force model. Through
an integrated approach, the Department is working to coordinate site
mission, operations, security technologies and the elite protective
force to provide more robust security protection measures at a lower
overall cost. The Security Technologies Demonstration at the Idaho
National Laboratory in July 2006 included this approach and the results
of this successful demonstration were combined with a review of security
protection measures. This approach was initiated throughout the
Department to build an efficient security program that is also flexible
to meet both today's threat and tomorrow's challenges.

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) continued the
implementation of processes, procedures and technologies to fully
implement the Enhanced DBT. Resource and planning documents were
developed for the Diskless Workstation Conversion Secretarial
initiative. During FY 2006, NNSA also continued work with various
programmatic and administrative elements to meet portions of Homeland
Security Presidential Directive-12 access controls requirements. NNSA
also continued to address specific security operations and personnel
issues identified by the IG and GAO.

The Department has aggressively pursued actions to improve security.
These include: continuing to support the implementation of the DBT
Policy; completion of the DBT Policy-driven upgrades; and continuing to
aggressively pursue actions on the remaining Secretarial Security
Initiatives announced in May 2004.

The aggressive action taken by the field elements has changed the face
of security at Departmental sites. Over the past three years investments
in security upgrades include the following:

-   Implemented a denial protection strategy designed to ensure that
    adversaries are prevented from completing an in-situ improvised
    nuclear device (IND).

-   Provided security police officers (SPO) with armored vehicles and
    heavy caliber weapons that increase their survivability.

-   Provided armor-penetrating ammunition and ballistically protected
    fighting positions that contributes to improving effectiveness.

-   Improved training capabilities by expanding training ranges and
    support facilities; developed additional tactical training courses,
    hired instructors, and commenced implementation of the "Elite
    Forces" model. This initiative will help us transform our protective
    forces into well-trained enhanced tactically oriented forces needed
    to fight in the current environment.

-   Used low-tech, but highly effective measures to upgrade the physical
    security site features. We installed physical barriers around key
    approaches to sites and critical facilities to provide increased
    standoff distances and to delay vehicle and personnel movement. The
    standoff barriers also serve to mitigate the effects of a vehicle
    and personnel movement. The standoff barriers also serve to mitigate
    the effects of a vehicle bomb attack.

-   Employed security technology solutions as force multipliers to
    enhance site defenses, including the critical aspects of detection,
    assessment, delay and response. Deployment of security technologies
    continues through ongoing implementation of Memoranda of Agreements
    (MOA) with several sites including: Nevada, Y-12, INL and ORNL.
    Additionally, we have initiated as a direct result of the recently
    conducted Security Technology Exposition, MOA discussions with the
    Pantex Plant, Hanford, the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL),
    and the Brookhaven National Laboratory.

-   Worked to aggressively reduce the footprint associated with our SNM
    storage processing operations. For example, material was removed
    Category I SNM from Technical Area 18 at LANL, greatly improving the
    effectiveness of the security mission at LANL. We have made great
    strides in reducing the number of SNM target locations at Y-12 and
    the on-going construction of the Highly Enriched Uranium Materials
    Facility (HEUMF) will drive even further target area reductions.
    Additionally, SRS has consolidated materials and remains scheduled
    to complete additional consolidation by the end of CY 2006,
    resulting in a single Category I materials storage location.

VAs form the foundation of site DBT Implementation Plans. Most NNSA
sites and the SRS completed detailed VAs with additional testing and
analysis planned for FY07. ORNL completed a baseline VA for the 2003 DBT
and an "optimization" analysis for the 2005 DBT has been initiated.
RL/Hanford has an approved policy deviation to the 2003 DBT Annex and
the 2005 DBT, based on material consolidation efforts and a qualitative
VA due by December 2006 to identify mitigating measures. HSS continues
to work with the HQ and Field Elements to ensure the VAs are thorough
and adequately address the DBT Policy requirements.

NNSA, Energy and Science facilities were reported to be in compliance
with the 2003 DBT Policy at most Category I SNM sites by the end of
FY06. The two formally approved deviations from the 2003 DBT Policy are
at Y-12 and Hanford.

Y-12 has a Secretarial-level 2-year Waiver from meeting the 2003 DBT. A
new deviation from the 2005 DBT for Y-12 is being considered based upon
\$100 M cost avoidance and risk acceptance until the HEUMF comes on line
in 2011. Hanford's DBT Policy Exception to the 2003 DBT Annex and the
2005 DBT was approved on the basis of relocating the material off-site.

The Pantex Plant, LLNL, SRS and the Office of Security Transportation
plan to be in full compliance with both the 2003 and 2005 DBT. NTS will
be full compliance with the 2005 DBT by the end of 2009. NNSA declared
SNL/NM a "non-enduring" facility with expectations that all material
will be moved off site by 2009. LANL and Y-12 are considering submission
of request for DBT policy deviation reflecting an extension for full
implementation of the 2005 DBT to 2011. INL, dependent upon funding, may
be in compliance with the 2005 DBT by the end of 2008.

Additionally, continued concerns surround the strengthening of human
capital expertise and the use of new technologies. Examples of the
Department's continued successes in FY 2006 include:

-   Continued implementation of recommendations from the Miles Report,
    Independent NNSA Security Review. For example, NNSA continued to
    consolidate security functions and responsibilities under a single
    responsible office, trained personnel and has conducted reviews of
    field security implementation (e.g., validation of implementation of
    the 2003 DBT). Further, with the establishment of the Office of the
    Under Secretary for Science (SC), the transition of security
    interface from the Director of Security for the Office of the Under
    Secretary of Energy (formerly ESE) to a responsible SC security
    point of contact will facilitate better communications with HQ and
    Field elements.

-   In 2004 in response to one of the Secretarial Security Initiatives,
    a working group was formed to examine options for changes needed to
    develop an elite protective force. The existing protective force
    organizational structure was examined; alternative models were
    analyzed; a preferred option for protective force structure was
    selected; and recommendations were made to senior management. In
    January 2005, the former Deputy Secretary directed immediate
    implementation of the recommendations. Implementation of those
    recommendations is ongoing. On March 7, 2006 the Deputy Secretary
    approved Change 1 to DOE Manual (DOE M) 470.4-3, Protective Force,
    to initiate the necessary changes to form the foundation for the
    elite protective force model. Implementation remains in progress.

-   HSS, in partnership with NNSA, INL and ID, conducted a Security
    Technology Exposition at INL July 11-12. Over 125 attendees from
    Departmental HQ and Field Elements, Office of Inspector General and
    National Laboratories; Idaho and Tennessee State Emergency
    Organizations; various DoD branches; the Defense Threat Reduction
    Agency; NRC; DHS and FEA; House and Senate local staff members;
    three Tribal Nations; and private industry observed the activities.
    This Technology Exposition helped to expand the vision of the
    attendees by demonstrating what is achievable upon deployment of
    security technologies. It demonstrated an improved ability to
    mitigate today's threats and deny adversaries the ability to
    accomplish objectives like theft of SNM, sabotage or fatalities.

-   The technologies showed that our fighting forces can effectively
    engage an aggressive assault with a substantially higher likelihood
    of surviving. At INL, Protective Forces enthusiastically embraced
    the technology future that offers training and career enrichment
    associated with the deployment of the new technologies.

-   Because resources are not endless, work continues to ensure
    expenditure of resources are made as efficiently as possible and
    work to minimize the impact on the primary operational mission of
    our facilities. Deployment of technologies will help us achieve this
    goal. While some savings were quantified during this Exposition, a
    more rigorous analysis is currently being conducted (the
    Zero-Baseline Review of Protection measures) and is expected to show
    an even greater cost avoidance potential.

-   Work continues to deploy security technologies that make our
    protection systems so robust that they will tolerate new attack
    methods that become available to an adversary. By doing so, we will
    reduce a site's exposure of periods when vulnerabilities exist until
    a countermeasures is fielded.

The Security Technology Exposition successfully demonstrated that the
deployment of security technologies, complemented with modifications to
protective force tactics, can significantly assist DOE sites to meet the
DBT Policy requirements in a cost effective manner.

+---------------------------+---------+---------+----------+----------+
| PLANNED CRITICAL          | Pre     | Current | Res      | Res      |
| MILESTONES                | viously |         | ponsible | ponsible |
|                           | R       | Com     | Office   |          |
|                           | eported | pletion |          | In       |
|                           | Date    | Date    |          | dividual |
+===========================+=========+=========+==========+==========+
| Implement approved        | 12/05   |         | NNSA     |          |
| recommendations of study  |         |         |          |          |
| groups regarding security |         |         |          |          |
| operations and security   |         |         |          |          |
| personnel.                |         |         |          |          |
+---------------------------+---------+---------+----------+----------+
| Upgrade and improve the   | 9/07    | 9/07    | HSS      | Glenn    |
| Nuclear Materials         |         |         |          | Podonsky |
| Management and Safeguards |         |         |          |          |
| System (NMMSS), the       |         |         |          |          |
| Department's official     |         |         |          |          |
| nuclear material          |         |         |          |          |
| accounting system to      |         |         |          |          |
| result in increased       |         |         |          |          |
| accuracy and reliability  |         |         |          |          |
| of NMMSS data.            |         |         |          |          |
+---------------------------+---------+---------+----------+----------+
| Implement diskless        | 9/05    | 5/07    | NNSA     |          |
| desktop computing.        |         | NNSA    |          |          |
|                           |         |         | US E     |          |
|                           |         | 9/09    |          |          |
|                           |         | Re      | US SC    |          |
|                           |         | mainder |          |          |
|                           |         | of      | CIO      |          |
|                           |         | Dep     |          |          |
|                           |         | artment |          |          |
+---------------------------+---------+---------+----------+----------+
| Conduct Vulnerability     | 09/04   | US E    | App      | Heads of |
| Assessments (VAs) at DOE  |         | TBD     | ropriate | App      |
| site in accordance with   |         |         | DOE      | ropriate |
| the new 2005 DBT Policy.  |         |         | Elements | DOE      |
|                           |         |         |          | Elements |
+---------------------------+---------+---------+----------+----------+
| Conduct VAs at DOE        | 12/05   | Com     | HSS      | Glenn    |
| Headquarters in           |         | pleted: |          | Podonsky |
| accordance with the new   |         |         |          |          |
| 2005 DBT Policy.          |         | GTN VA  |          |          |
|                           |         | a       |          |          |
|                           |         | pproved |          |          |
|                           |         | in      |          |          |
|                           |         | 12/06;  |          |          |
|                           |         | FORS VA |          |          |
|                           |         | a       |          |          |
|                           |         | pproved |          |          |
|                           |         | on      |          |          |
|                           |         | 6/26/07 |          |          |
+---------------------------+---------+---------+----------+----------+
| Implement new (2005) DBT  | 09/06   | 09/08   | NNSA     |          |
| Policy throughout NNSA    |         |         |          |          |
| complex.                  |         |         |          |          |
+---------------------------+---------+---------+----------+----------+
| Implement new (2005) DBT  | 09/06   | 09/08   | US E     |          |
| Policy throughout the     |         |         |          |          |
| Department                |         |         | US SC    |          |
+---------------------------+---------+---------+----------+----------+
| Implement new keyless     | 9/09    | 9/09    | NNSA     |          |
| access control            |         |         |          |          |
| technology.               |         |         |          |          |
+---------------------------+---------+---------+----------+----------+

**PROGRESS STATUS**

Although the Department has made significant progress, improving
security will require continued management attention, especially with
the renewed emphasis placed on this program as a result of the September
11, 2001, terrorists attacks. DOE's response to these threats and an
allocation of adequate resources to these missions will have far
reaching consequences for the Department's budget, programs and
organization. To meet the Department's overarching mission of national
security, we are aggressively addressing the challenges presented by a
need for improved homeland defense and threats posed by terrorists.
Emphasis on full DBT Policy implementation by the end of FY 2008
continues to be a priority by ensuring the implementation plans are
complete and based on thorough analysis. While a significant effort
remains, we are working to transition the appropriate protective force
elements to elite force status and be better prepared to counter the
threat. In addition, although technology development, evaluation and
implementation are a continuous process that will occur as long as we
have protection systems, we are working to integrate appropriate
available technologies into our security posture over the next two years
to meet the DBT Policy requirements.

With the full implementation of the 2003 DBT Policy, there is a level of
confidence of secure operations throughout the complex; however, with
the enhanced DBT Policy (2005), much work remains to achieve the
necessary efficient, effective and enhanced security status. NNSA and
other elements of the Department have formed teams to work with each
site to evaluate current status, develop requirements to achieve full
implementation of DBT Policy requirements, and assist in implementing
the sites' path forward. Within NNSA, security functions are now
captured in the NNSA planning, programming, budgeting and evaluation
processes in order to achieve required funding and to measure progress.
The Offices of Energy and Science continue to work issues related to
planning, programming, budgeting and evaluation process associated with
implementation of the 2005 DBT Policy.

Deployment of security technologies is being accomplished as quickly as
possible to reduce the extreme workload on the contractors' security
force. As the infrastructure, plans and processes are implemented for
achieving the enhanced DBT Policy requirements, emphasis will shift to
training and right-sizing the Federal staff that is charged with the
oversight of security operations.

The net effect of the upgrades and planning vehicles outlined above
reflects the continuance of an enhanced security posture across the
Department's diverse set of facilities. Fundamentally, we continue to
strive for a more secure nation while minimizing the impact that
security has on Departmental programs

Specific security improvements that have been made in FY 2007 include:

-   Completion of the VAs at DOE Headquarters in accordance with the
    2005 DBT. The HSS Office of Headquarters Security Operations
    continuously assesses the threat and protection status at
    headquarters facilities. To meet this objective, the Central Alarm
    Station (CAS) at both the Germantown and Forrestal facilities were
    upgraded. Additionally, the jersey barriers that were used to keep
    vehicles away from the building's support columns were replaced with
    concrete security planters arrayed around the base of the twelve
    roadway columns. This has improved the protection of the facility
    while improving its appearance.

-   Security Technology Deployment: HSS has established agreements with
    several sites to deploy specific technologies in 2007. HSS has
    worked extensively with these sites, various vendors, other
    government agencies, and testing laboratories to select, procure,
    and deploy technologies that represent the best possible investment
    for the Department to protect critical assets and that adhere to
    safety principles.

-   Revised Vulnerability Assessment (VA) Methodology: The results of
    the INL Super Site Assistance Visit conducted in FY 2006, and
    subsequent validation activities and process reviews, led to the
    development of a draft VA methodology that more closely reflects a
    representative risk assessment metric than the current worst-case VA
    methodology.

-   

-   Personnel Security Program Review: This review was conducted to
    examine the Department's personnel security policies and procedures,
    quality assurance and line oversight, training, and organizational
    structure for access authorizations. The Secretary of Energy
    approved the resulting recommendations and actions are ongoing to
    address those recommendations.

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
-   HSS is working to enhance and integrate safety and security training
    throughout the Department by leveraging the resources at the
    National Training Center.

-   

-   

-   

-   

-   

-   

-   

-   

-   

-   

-   Independent Oversight: Continued to conduct a rigorous performance
    based Independent Oversight program that assesses safeguards and
    security; cyber security; emergency management; and environment,
    safety and health programs across the Department.

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
-   Security Policy: HSS began a complete review of security policy to
    include identifying current security requirements (both internal and
    external to the Department), identifying the protection need being
    met by each requirement, and assessing the effectiveness of the
    current requirement in meeting that need. HSS, in coordination with
    the DOE programs and site offices, will create a revised set of
    security policies that increase the utility of the directive.

-   Design Basis Threat (DBT) Annual Review: HSS coordinated and led the
    2006 review of the DBT policy.

-   Force-on-Force Performance Testing: Protocols and Rules of
    Engagement were developed, extensively field tested, and approved.
    At the request of certain field elements, HSS has reviewed
    protection strategies to facilitate the deployment of new security
    technologies; reviewed critical pathways identified by VAs;
    developed adversary scenarios to use for their performance testing
    program; and observed force-on-force performance testing exercises
    to assist the field element enhance their protection strategies.

-   Continued to ensure the protection of classified information through
    classification and declassification training, technical guidance and
    document reviews.

**PROPOSED CLOSURE DATE**

Long-term correction is expected due to the continuing nature of
security threats.