**Global Evolutions**

**And**

**The Role Of Nuclear Weapons:**

**Alternative Futures For The Next Decade**

Daniel J. Whiteneck

The CNA Corporation

May 2004

**The views expressed in this and other papers associated with the NIC
2020 project**

are those of individual participants. They are posted for discussion
purposes

**only and do not represent the views of the US Government.**

**Global Evolutions**

**And**

**The Role Of Nuclear Weapons:**

**Alternative Futures For The Next Decade**

Daniel J. Whiteneck

The CNA Corporation

May 2004

The views printed here are those of the author alone. They do not
represent the position of the Center for Naval Analyses, the United
States Navy, or the Department of Defense.

**The Future Global System**

The global system (political-military, economic, and social) will be
shaped by six major trends that can be identified currently, and which
will continue to evolve over the next decade to frame the choices
states, organizations, and individuals will make. These trends are
independent of the purposes of states, organizations, and individuals.
They are the result of a global system that can be characterized as
increasing in complexity and integration along political, economic, and
social dimensions.

These trends have complementary and contradictory impacts as they evolve
and interact across nations, cultures, and regions of the globe. These
interactions may result in different combinations of the trends to
create three distinct future global security environments. Those
environments are characterized here as Cooperative, Competitive, or
Chaotic. This is not to say that each outcome is equally likely, or that
each outcome is a pure form of one of the three alternatives. For
example, a global system that exhibits greater cooperation among its
leading nations, with declining chances for major global conflicts and
increasing coordination of complex economic and political solutions to
international problems, will probably still have a number of small
regional or civil conflicts and a number of nations in economic
distress. But, these conflicts and the existence of economic and social
distress will not be at a level of intensity that threatens systemic
disruption.

In each of the alternative futures, the role for nuclear weapons in the
arsenals of the United States and its allies will be decidedly
different. A world characterized by increased great power rivalry and
regional competitions for ascendancy will help to shape strategic
nuclear decisions on the size and structure of the nuclear forces that
are very different from the influences of a world dominated by
increasing chaos because of a never-ending war on terrorist
organizations and the persistence of "rogue states" pursuing vigorous
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs.

The objective here is not to suggest a particular policy, but to
illuminate the potential directions of the evolving global system, and
the choices those directions impose on nuclear weapons policy decision
makers in the United States and its allies.

**The Global Trends**

1\. There will be an increasing gap between the globalization of
economic interactions and the localization of political interactions.
Many questions of security and economic organization will be in
supranational regional and international organizations. On the other
hand, populations increasingly demand local autonomy on political
decisions based on cultural preservation, language, ethnicity, history,
education, and governance.

2\. The sovereign power of the nation-state will continue to be eroded
from above by international organizations and from below by individuals,
sub-state regional alliances, and private commercial enterprises.
Nation-states must fulfill expectations placed on them by citizens who
demand accountability in democratic institutions, yet they are
increasingly powerless to counter the life-changing impacts of actors
effectively beyond their control.

3\. The global community of states will be increasingly democratic. The
end of the Cold War gave rise to democratic revolutions (both liberal
and illiberal) in the past decade. 46% (88 out of 191) of the states of
the world are rated as free and 28% (53 out of 191) of the states are
rated as partly free. 24% (50 out of 191) of the states are listed as
not free. This list now includes 39 multiethnic democracies.

4\. The diffusion of technology will continue to increase as the
mobility of capital, information, and people decrease state controls.
Technology (military, business, or entertainment related) will be harder
for states to control in the future. A global education system has
expanded the applications of such technologies to scientists and
policy-makers. Global agreements increase the pressure for states and
the private sector to share technological information and spread its
applications to other states in an effort to solve transnational
problems.

5\. The 'Americanization' of the global culture will continue to create
both positive and negative effects inside and outside of the United
States. American dominance of lifestyle, media, culture, and information
markets is, and will be, a great source of power for the United States
in the world political and economic systems. The United States uses this
'soft power' to seduce societies into the democratic, free-market world
that promises to create the incomes needed to enjoy this lifestyle.
There is a backlash though. This 'Americanization' process carries the
seeds of destruction of traditional cultures and societies, especially
in emerging markets and transitional states where the social fabric is
weak from years of repression and a lack of civil society building or
widespread legitimacy of the institutions.

6\. There will be a single military superpower with dominant forces of
global reach and technological superiority. Such a superpower will be
the indispensable actor and shaper of the global security architecture.
In a world of regional conflicts, the presence or absence of the United
States (and its allies) will be a determining factor in decision about
whether or not to use force and what level of force to use.

**Three Alternative Futures**

The global system that emerges from the interaction of these trends is
likely to take one of three courses. These are not equally likely; in
fact their chances of coming to pass are very different. All three
however, can be reasonably projected as possible outcomes over the next
ten years. Whether or not one of them is to be the future depends on the
choices made by individuals faced with myriad problems presented by the
above trends in their policy incarnations.

**The Cooperative Future**

This future is characterized by the following developments:

1.  The extension and strengthening of the democratic community of
    states.

2.  The continued management of the global economy without major crises
    by the OECD states through legitimized multilateral organizations.

3.  Economic growth at a sustainable level in the first world and the
    integration of key third world markets through economic development.

4.  An absence of major regional conflicts in areas of vital interest to
    major powers.

5.  Conflicts that occur in the third world will be contained and
    localized with minimal impact on regional stability.

6.  Emerging threats to international security (proliferation,
    terrorism, failing states) will be contained through enhanced
    cooperation among major states.

**The Competitive Future**

The competitive future will more than likely have these features:

1.  The existence of strong states who challenge the efforts of the
    United States and its allies to create a system of global governance
    based on liberal principles.

2.  An absence of major theater wars, but there are increased tensions
    and instability from regional arms races and the threat of regional
    wars by aspiring regional hegemons.

3.  Divergent security interests and policies among Western powers,
    leading to\
    renationalization.

4.  Conflicts in the third world that will remain localized and
    contained, but\
    subject to outside influence and machinations by aspiring regional
    powers,\
    allies, and the United States.

5.  Increased economic competition between first world states, while
    conditions in the third world stagnate.

**The Chaotic Future**

A world of increasing chaos would look something like this:

1.  The alliance that won the Cold War breaks down over economic
    competition and divergent security policies.

2.  In this environment, major regional challengers to the interests of
    the United States and other liberal democracies gain power and move
    to change regional security arrangements.

3.  Terrorism continues to plague the United States (occasionally at
    home and frequently abroad on installations and deployed troops) and
    its allies (hitting them at home).

4.  Technology and information diffusion lead to the rapid spread of
    weapons of mass destruction in failing states and terror groups.

5.  Local conflicts in the third world have dramatic spillover effects
    from refugees, diseases, terrorism, and ethnic conflicts.

6.  The global economic system is disrupted by a breakdown of prevailing
    regimes in the financial sector, the trade sector, and the
    development sector.

**The Role of Nuclear Weapons**

In each of the future security environments outlined above, the role of
nuclear weapons and the structure of the US nuclear arsenal would be
markedly different, as would the rationale for US positions on the size
of the nuclear reserve stockpile, the resumption of nuclear testing, and
the public rationales for maintaining nuclear weapons. Working from
least likely to most likely, I will go through these issues for the
competitive, chaotic, and cooperative futures described earlier.

**The competitive future,** with large nations and regional blocs
jockeying for regional power in many global areas would in some ways be
the easiest for the US to adapt to. The US nuclear arsenal might closely
resemble its past and current structures. It would rely on a traditional
triad to ensure survivability of a deterrent force against the robust
nuclear forces of other nations with similar (but probably smaller
forces). The targeting policy of the US forces would be very similar to
the past as it would be able to concentrate on the traditional
counterforce targeting of other nations' military and political assets
developed so extensively during the Cold War. A large reserve stockpile
could be maintained to guard against "breakout" by any one nuclear
power.

These nuclear states might undertake nuclear testing in the future as
they sought to ensure the reliability of new weapons systems as they
built up deterrent forces opposite the US. In that case, the resumption
of testing of by any one of the powers would probably result in the
resumption of testing by other states in an effort to prevent
vulnerability gaps.

The rationale for maintaining a robust nuclear deterrent force along the
classic lines inherited from the Cold War would return to that previous
era. It is possible that nuclear weapons would serve as a cautionary
brake on direct great power confrontations in global and regional
political disputes. The need to maintain balance among great powers and
the use of the weapons as bargaining pieces in any potential arms
negotiations between them could also be cited as reasons for the robust
arsenal. Most importantly, a competitive environment would return
nuclear weapons to a central role for the US and other states as a
measure of great power position.

**If the global system moves toward a more chaotic future**, the US
might choose to make significant changes in all of these areas of
nuclear weapons policy and arsenal structure. Such a future could look
back at the Nuclear Posture Review written by the Bush Administration as
the nascent beginnings of a long-term change in US nuclear forces, their
potential use, and the rationale behind their maintenance and evolution.
The new targets in this future would probably be the WMD-related
facilities and unsophisticated delivery systems of rogue states. The
small (and usually paranoid) leadership groups of those rogue states
might also be directly targeted. In addition to these targets, leaders
of terrorist groups, along with remote or difficult to access terrorist
facilities might be targeted if there were evidence of WMD developments
or other planned mass attacks.

The US nuclear forces required for missions in this environment would
most likely be smaller in number (no need to compete with other large
powers), with more emphasis on strike capabilities by (1) tactical
aircraft delivering highly accurate low-yield weapons (2) naval assets
firing highly accurate low-yield cruise missiles, or (3) single warhead
ICBMs (no need for over flight access or bases). The US might boldly try
to include new warheads and delivery systems such as the RNEP system
under study by the Bush Administration. These developments could lead to
increased demands to resume nuclear testing to assess the new systems
and assure their utility and reliability. The result of that would be
the almost certain resumption of testing by other nuclear powers and the
failure of the CTBT regime.

The rationale for testing and developing this new nuclear weapons
posture would be very clear, but highly contested. It would be dependent
on convincing the public and the international system that rogue states
with small numbers of nuclear weapons or other WMD systems posed a
serious threat to the security and safety of the US and its allies (and
that US and allied intelligence correctly interpreted these rogues as
aggressively using nuclear programs to threaten regional peace and
security). And that those rogue states could be forced to change their
policies or be perpetual deterred by developing a specific threat to the
survival of their regimes and the weapon systems they value.

A central point of domestic and international contention would probably
be that the development of a new US arsenal (even a smaller, more
focused arsenal) would be more "usable" and therefore lower the
threshold for the use of nuclear weapons in a chaotic world of
aggressive rogue states and a continuing global war against terrorism.
The rationale for this arsenal would have to be based on an old argument
against self-deterrence (the political strictures against using large
weapons with high collateral damage), and the argument that when faced
with "usable" and flexible nuclear forces, aggressor states can not be
certain that they will not face catastrophic counterattacks or
escalation in any confrontation.

**Finally, the cooperative evolution of the global system** presents the
greatest dilemma for the maintenance of current nuclear force postures
and the evolution of US and allied nuclear forces in the future as
systems age and new ones are required. In such an environment, how would
the "need" for robust nuclear forces be explained, what would such a
force look like, and what rationale would be offered for targeting
policies or the resumption of testing?

A largely cooperative evolution of the global system would put pressure
on the US to reduce its deployed number of nuclear weapons and the
numbers maintained in reserve (if there are no big threats from other
states and if the number of rogue states is declining and terrorist acts
are local and do not disrupt the global system, then why keep a large
number of weapons?). Similarly, why should the US break the current
regime embodied by a consensus adherence to the CTBT regime by
developing new nuclear systems that require a resumption of testing? The
argument would be that such testing would serve as a declaration of US
exceptionalism and an invitation to other states to resume testing and
development of new systems and risk a new round of proliferation and
raised tensions between regional rivals like India and Pakistan and
China.

What would a US arsenal look like in this increasingly cooperative
world? It would almost certainly be smaller in number. Fewer weapons
would be deployed and they might be on lower levels of alert. A reserve
stockpile would be maintained, but it would likely be a much lower
numbers, as the time needed for any state to reconstitute its forces
through testing and production lengthened and transparency increased
among the major powers. The structure of the arsenal might be very
conservative. It would be dominated by legacy systems and incremental
changes to those systems as designers relied on proven technologies in
the absence of testing.

The focus of US and international efforts would be redoubled on
non-proliferation and counter-proliferation in a few specific cases, and
on the gradual reduction in numbers of weapons among those states
already holding them. The rationale for maintaining the US nuclear
arsenal would be based on maintaining the US position as the world's
strongest superpower. No nation, given the current state of world
politics (or any future cooperative system absent a permanent state of
world peace), would give up its nuclear weapons so long as other states
maintained their arsenals. Nuclear weapons would exist as an "insurance
policy" against the accidental use, the leakage of weapons from
unsecured sites, and the spread of nuclear technology and knowledge (the
genie can not be put back in the bottle). Nuclear weapons become "part
of the background" of US military power (real and reputational) that
under girds a global security regime.

**Conclusion**

Global trends are directing the world toward a more cooperative future.
While this is not a direct, conclusive projection from all of the
trends, it is the most likely path for global politics in the next
decade. The past ten years have indicated that chaotic disruptions to
the world system can be contained by concerted action among the major
powers.

-   Global economic problems have been met with cooperative measures of
    the G-7, the OECD, the IMF, Central Banks, and informal arrangements
    between states. There have been some setbacks in the WTO between the
    US and Europe, and the last round of trade talks in Mexico did not
    produce a breakthrough between the West and the Third World, but
    these are generational projects that must be viewed within the
    larger growth in world trade, the inclusion of most of Asia in the
    system, and the coordination of positions between the US and Europe
    that took place in Mexico.

-   Global security threats from rogue states have decreased, as has
    their number. The rogue states have been reduced to Iran and North
    Korea, with some policymakers stretching the definition to include
    Syria and Cuba.

-   The chief security threat to the U.S. and allies, global terrorism,
    has been hurt by concerted military and police actions from
    Afghanistan to Europe and Southeast Asia. Terrorism, while a more
    diverse threat than the one faced in the Cold War, is far less a
    mortal threat. It is the tool of the weak and it does not pose an
    existential threat to the West. Local conflicts in Europe, Africa,
    and South Asia have been isolated and contained.

-   The UN, NATO, and ad hoc \"alliances of the willing\" have involved
    the United States, its allies, and other regional actors in many
    peacekeeping and nation-building efforts. Preventive deployments of
    peacekeepers have taken place to limit the spread of conflicts to
    neighboring states, and force has been used to enforce some minimal
    international standards against aggression and ethnic oppression.

-   While disagreements over the intervention in Iraq dominated
    relations for a year, the US and Europe have moved forward on many
    other fronts to cooperatively address security issues from NATO to
    Iran to Africa.

The utility of nuclear weapons in a cooperative future lies, not in
their "use", but in their role as insurer. A cooperative future does not
mean the end of conflict, nor does it mean that international tensions
will disappear. In such an environment, nuclear weapons possessed by the
major powers are largely symbolic (signifying status) in relations
between major powers. Whereas, their possession by near-major powers
(India, Pakistan, and Israel) serves as a reminder that these countries
face unique security dilemmas or that they are still at a stage of
nuclear relations passed through by the other nuclear powers during the
Cold War.

A wild card in this future is the proliferation of nuclear weapons to
"rogue states" or terror groups that can never be totally eliminated. To
rogue states, nuclear weapons are believed to be the ultimate tool for
regime survival. Again, nuclear weapons would have utility, but without
much rationale for "use". The maintenance of a small number of weapons
(\<less than 20 say) would be indicative of a belief that major powers
can be deterred from threatening regime survival even if they face a
minimal deterrent force.

Terror groups (especially those with a "suicide bomber" mentality) may
not be easily deterred. Dealing with this threat by denying them access
to both weapons materials and parts or to finished weapons from various
sources, will be a chief concern for the future. Will terror groups have
more than one bomb? Will a single nuclear weapon threat against an
Israeli, American, Japanese or European target be enough to destroy any
of these societies, or the "West" as a whole? The answer to both
questions is likely to be "no".

Fortunately, the cooperative future of great power coordination against
"rogues" and terror groups is already being foreshadowed by the
extension of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the growing membership and
acceptance of the Proliferation Security Initiative, the expansion of
the Cooperative Threat Reduction program from a US-Russia program to one
that includes all members of the G-8, as well as, evolving UN
resolutions and international and national law against nuclear
proliferation. An international consensus is also forming on
strengthening the IAEA for a future where the reprocessing and
production of enriched nuclear materials is under tighter control and
becomes the firebreak for nuclear proliferation. (The trade off would
have to be international guarantees of fuel supplies for civilian
reactors and further reductions in great power arsenals.) There is also
cooperation among the military, police, and intelligence forces of the
major powers on this issue.

By 2020, these developments could form the core of a better
non-proliferation regime and the number of nuclear powers could be at no
more than 10. They could also allow the US and Russia to further reduce
and restructure their arsenals. While new and smaller weapons might
require testing, increased transparency and lower numbers overall might
be a good exchange. While some might see such a compromise as
legitimizing nuclear weapons and increasing their attractiveness and
their chances of "use", there are other conclusions that can be reached.
The caution displayed by the US and Russia after the near-miss of the
Cuban Missile Crisis may be a lesson for India and Pakistan. The arms
control agreements of the 1980s may serve as role models of transparency
for future multilateral efforts in the future. Restructured and reduced
arsenals may make their "use" less likely, but enhance their "utility"
as insurers of a cooperative future.