**\[DNFSB LETTERHEAD\]**

November 28, 2005

The Honorable Linton Brooks

Administrator

National Nuclear Security Administration

U.S. Department of Energy

1000 Independence Avenue, SW

Washington, DC 20585-0701

Dear Ambassador Brooks:

The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board) was briefed on
October 5, 2005, in response to a reporting requirement contained in the
Board's letter of April 20, 2005, regarding structural deficiencies in
the 9212 complex at the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12), and the
need to eliminate the backlog of nuclear materials placed at risk by
these deficiencies. The Board notes that the 9212 complex is more than
50 years old and is continuing to deteriorate. The 9212 complex is
constructed of metal frame and hollow clay tile walls. This facility
does not meet safety requirements for Hazard Category 2 nuclear
facilities, and the current path forward does not identify upgrades
needed for the facility to meet these requirements.

In summary, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
presented to the Board a plan for a phased approach to repair
maintenance-related deficiencies, followed by an evaluation of the
facility to identify potential modifications to improve its resistance
to earthquakes or other natural phenomena hazards. These improvements
would then be prioritized using a risk-based methodology. NNSA proposed
that an annual review be conducted to determine which modifications will
be implemented. In parallel, an effort to eliminate the backlog of
nuclear materials stored in the 9212 complex is being undertaken to
reduce the material-at-risk. The annual decision on implementing the
additional structural improvements would depend on the operations
planned for the 9212 complex, progress toward the goal of completing
construction of the planned replacement facility, the Uranium Processing
Facility (UPF), by 2013, and progress in reducing the backlog of nuclear
materials.

The Board agrees that reduction of material-at-risk and
maintenance-related repairs should be pursued immediately and
aggressively as planned. However, the Board does not agree with the plan
to assess the need for further structural improvements annually unless
decisions on upgrades are directly linked to the achievement of specific
milestones on a specified schedule in the UPF project. Otherwise, the
annual assessments could result in a continuing series of short-term
decisions to accept deficiencies in the 9212 complex. Absent a direct
link to progress on UPF, it is not clear what would cause a string of
such incremental decisions to come to an end, or what would drive the
difficult decision to invest heavily in the 9212 complex or shut down
its operations should UPF not be developed as planned.

Although appropriate to support near-term operations, incremental
improvements to the 9212 complex structure will not be sufficient to
allow long-term operations given the continuing structural and process
equipment deterioration. Construction of UPF or a major systemic upgrade
of 9212 to meet Hazard Category 2 safety requirements (if such upgrades
are even practical) is necessary to support long-term performance of the
national security mission at Y-12. Any decision to upgrade 9212 for
long-term operation would require a timely and thorough condition
assessment of the 9212 complex. Absent that, consideration should be
given to closing the facility at a point where the health and safety of
the workers can no longer be objectively assured.

Therefore, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2286b(d), the Board requests that a
report be submitted within 60 days of completion of the risk
prioritization activity (scheduled for April 2006), clearly setting
forth the facility modifications that would be implemented should each
Critical Decision milestone for the UPF project be delayed.

Sincerely,

***A. J. Eggenberger***

***Chairman***

c: Mr. William J. Brumley

Mr. Thomas P. D'Agostino

Mr. Mark B. Whitaker, Jr.