**6. The Jibu-Yasue Approach.**

The preceding sections are both very conservative and very general. They
are very conservative because: (1), they adhere to the underlying
philosophical idea of orthodox quantum theory, which is that science,
like every human endeavor, is built on the fact thathuman beings make
choices about how they will act, and then experience responses to their
actions; and (2), they exploit those equations of quantum theory that
*inject* *the effects of this interaction with* *human agents* into the
mathematical structure. The effect of the choice is represented by von
Neumann's Process **1**, and the effect of the feedback is represented
by Process **3**.

The *generality* of the earlier sections stems from the fact nothing has
been said about the nature of the brain states specified by the P(e).
These operators define the neural correlates of conscious experiences.
But it has not been specified whether these operators P(e) act on the
variables that describe the possible motions of particles in the brain,
or, alternatively, on the electromagnetic fields in the brain. Do the
P(e) act in the coordinate domain or the frequency domain, or in some
other domain? These question are not answered by von Neumann's general
framework: they constitute key problems for future work. On the other
hand, the general theory does provide a methodological handle on these
questions by allowing the physical consequences of a choice about how to
act to be separated, theoretically, from the issue of what causes the
choice to be what it is.

There is a related question of how memories are stored. Karl Pribram has
suggested (Pribram 1966, 1991) that consciousness operates on principles
similar to that of a hologram, in which tiny variations of a myriad of
physical variables, dispersed over a large region, combine to modulate a
carrier wave. These physical variables might be the strengths of the
synaptic junctions. Pribram identifies the dendritic network (a dense
set of neural fibers) as the likely substrate of such a brain process.

This holographic model would seem to be implementable within quantum
electrodynamics, which is the naturally appropriate physical theory for
brain dynamics. However, Umezawa and co-workers (Riccardi, 1967: Stuart
1978, 1979) suggested that perhaps an exotic physical process is
involved, namely one similar to the one that appears in the theory of
superconductively. That theory is characterized by the existence of a
continuum of states of the same (lowest) energy, and Umezawa suggested
that long-term memory is connected to breaking the symmetry of these
ground (hence stable) states instead of, for example, enduring changes
in the physical structures of nerve cells.

Jibu and Yasue (Jibu 1995) have attempted to weave these ideas of
Pribram and Umezawa into a unified quantum theory of brain dynamics
(QBD). Their theory takes the substrate associated with Umezawa's ideas
to be the water that pervades the brain. Excitations of certain states
of the water system are called corticons, and they interact with photons
in the electromagnetic fields of, for example, the dendritic network.
They say:

*"With the help of quantum field theory, we have found that the creation
and annihilation dynamics of corticons and photons in the QBD system in
the sub-microscopic world of the brain to be the entity we call
consciousness or mind."*

It is not clear why "the creation and annihilation dynamics of corticon
and photons" should enjoy or entail the defining characteristic of
conscious process, namely a way that it "feels," nor what feature of
this physically described process *can actually be* a conscious feeling,
nor how *particular* *definite thoughts* emerge from this essentially
quantum process, with its rampant inherent quantum uncertainties. The
structure described by QBD must apparently be placed within the general
von Neumann framework in order to be adequately tied to human
experience. Whether we actually need the immense theoretical richness of
QBD, as contrasted to normal QED (quantum electrodynamics), in order to
accommodate the empirical data of psychology and neuroscience, remains
to be seen. The projection operators P(e) can introduce the pertinent
nonlocal structure. Surplus degrees of freedom will bring ambiguities
into the structure. Hence the more restrictive QED -- which is both well
defined and massively validated -- would appear to be the most promising
initial candidate.

Pribram, K. H. (1966). Some dimensions of remembering: Steps towards a
neurophysiological theory of memory. In J. Gaito (Ed.), *Macromolecules
and behavior*, (pp. 165-187) New York, NY: Academic Press.

Pribram, K. H. (1991). *Brain* *and Perception*. New Jersey: Lawrence
Erlbaum.

Riccardi, L.M. & Umezawa, H. (1967). Brain and physics of many-body
problems. *Kybernetik* 4, 44-48.

Stuart, C.I.J.M,, Takahashi, Y., & Umezawa, H. (1978). On the stability
and nonlocal properties of memory. *Journal of theoretical biology*, 71,
605-618.

Stuart, C.I.J.M,, Takahashi, Y., & Umezawa, H. (1979). Mixed-system
brain dynamics: neural memory as a macroscopic ordered state.
*Foundations of Physics* 9, 301-327.

Jibu, M. & Yasue, K. (1995). Quantum brain dynamics and consciousness.
Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins.