**Who's in Charge Here?**

**Some Observations on the Relationship**

**Between Disasters and the American Criminal Justice System**

**Robert J. Louden, Ph.D.**

**Professor and Program Director, Criminal Justice**

**Department of Sociology, Anthropology and Criminal Justice**

**Georgian Court University**

**900 Lakewood Avenue, Lakewood, New Jersey 08701**

**(732) 987-2711 <loudenr@georgian.edu>
[www.georgian.edu](http://www.georgian.edu/)**

**Abstract:** Since the beginning of time the world has experienced a
wide range of disasters. Responsibility for organizing and directing
responses to disasters has varied over time and from place to place. The
core functions of the American criminal justice system were established
between 1776 and the adoption of the US Constitution, particularly the
Bill of Rights in 1789. However, it was not until 1967 that our federal
government produced a schematic that graphically presented both the
process and the major decision points of the criminal justice system.
Although disaster related activity has been present and accepted as a
central function of many criminal justice agencies, it did not appear in
this significant document. A brief overview of the American criminal
justice system is offered. The aftermath of the terrorist attacks of
09/11/01 and the hurricanes of 2005 have illuminated many problems and
concerns confronting the criminal justice system as a major component of
government response to disasters. Practical experiences in NYC and New
Orleans are highlighted. Broad based recommendations for research are
suggested.

**INTRODUCTION**

As with any discussion involving links between disasters and a given
discipline, the relationship between this subject and the criminal
justice system are extensive and complex. In our society criminal
justice is perhaps the ultimate multi-disciplinary discipline. At a
minimum, aspects of the law, political science, public health, public
management, psychology, and sociology influence the practical, tactical
and legal activities of criminal justice system agencies on a daily
basis. All of these sometimes complementary and sometimes contradictory
interactions converge in disaster planning and response. Disaster in
this paper is regarded to be a nonspecific event and includes natural
and man-made incidents.

There are numerous overlapping practical associations that one must be
concerned with when considering this topic. One set of issues is
relevant to the mandate of an individual criminal justice organization;
a second is the interconnected bureaucratic concerns of police, the
courts and corrections. Another is the involvement of the machinery of
criminal justice with the broader community that it is part of. Within
this context one must also remember that given the nature of
governmental and political sub-divisions in the US: federal, state,
county, and local, linkages are far-reaching and potentially confusing
if not conflicting. The concerns of issues related to 'states-rights'
and 'home-rule' have influenced the development of criminal justice
agencies, and their organizational mandates, throughout the country.
Although our federal government does not directly control most of the
criminal justice agencies in the US, there are several ways in which
local policy and practice may be influenced by Washington through
various court decisions, rule settings, investigative bodies, oversight
mechanisms and funding. All of this has had an impact upon the role of
law enforcement in emergency management in the United States.

This paper reflects on the topic of disaster and the discipline of
criminal justice from a number of perspectives: inter and intra
operations of criminal justice agencies, and the collaboration or lack
there of, between criminal justice agencies and other aspects of
governance. Portions of this paper are anecdotal in nature, based on the
author's participant-observer status during an active twenty-one year
career in policing and a subsequent eighteen year career in higher
education, primarily involving criminal justice and protection
management programs.

The three components of the criminal justice system - police, courts,
and corrections -- have their own responsibilities and concerns when
faced with a disaster. This paper presents many issues from a police
perspective since they are generally considered the gate-keepers for the
rest of the system and they are also the boots-on-the-ground among the
first responders to disasters which usually impact on the operations of
the courts and correctional institutions. Occasionally conflict will
arise between law enforcement agencies and others responsible for
disaster related response activities. In other cases, there will be
lawlessness in disasters. Both situations present a challenge to be
overcome by future emergency managers.

**THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM**

First, let's consider an abbreviated and selective criminal justice
history. It was not until The President's Commission on Law Enforcement
and Administration of Justice published their *The Challenge Of Crime In
A Free Society* in 1967 that we could view "...in simplified form the
process of criminal administration and the many decision points along
its course" (pp. 7-9). Obviously, our nation had components of a
criminal justice system in place since the founding of the Republic, but
President Johnson indicated in forming his Commission in 1965 that there
was a "depth of ignorance about \[criminal justice\];" the country
needed a comprehensive examination of crime and justice to identify
where we were and the direction that we should be headed in. The 340
page document "embodies all the major findings we have drawn from our
examination of every facet of crime and law enforcement in America"
(forward). It does not include discussions of disasters, with the
exception of a brief consideration of some social, economic and criminal
aspects of riots (pp. 37-38). Riots, not unlike other disasters, are
mostly spontaneous outbursts, precipitated by a spark-event and every
bit as complicated as the social problems and conditions present in a
community.

The President's Commission presented some 200 Recommendations (pp.
292-301), but none of them dealt with disasters. The Commission also
issued nine task force reports. The one most appropriate to a
consideration of disasters is *Task Force Report: The Police* (1967). In
that 239 page document, the treatment of disaster is limited to issues
related to "Handling Crowds, Demonstrations, and Riots." The topics were
mostly concerned with police-community relationships and Constitutional
questions (pp. 192-193). Police and subsequently court and correction
agency reaction to looting and violence are the focus of the very brief
discussion. Riots and related activities are thus distinctive types of
disaster requiring both specific and generalized responses. Twenty-first
century police agencies, as they have been for more than 150 years, are
often the first responders to a variety of actual and potential disaster
scenarios. However, the *Task Force Report* admonition that "the police
have little control over the social, economic, or other factors which
create riots" (p.193) could well have been written in 2006 in a
discussion about the response of the criminal justice system to
disasters.

In *Disasters and Democracy* (1999), Rutherford Platt cited a 1987
California Court of Appeals case, *First English Lutheran Evangelical
Church v. County of Los Angeles* (p. 143): "If there is a hierarchy of
interest the police power serves -- and both logic and prior cases
suggest there is -- then the preservation of life must rank near the
top" (originally reported as 258 Cal. Rptr. at 904). Although this is
obviously a reference to the overall police power of our government in a
Constitutional context, the concept could be interpreted as applicable
to certain roles of government in dealing with disasters, often
operationalized by criminal justice agencies.

**Cops**

Sir Robert Peel, the British Home Secretary in the early nineteenth
century wanted a particular attention to order in society and was
instrumental in forming the first professional police force in 1829. His
police force was organized according to nine principles which
demonstrated a commitment to the public. It is generally accepted that
his organization for the London police, originally tested in Ireland,
became the model for the first police agencies formed in the
northeastern United States. The British police role became ours
(Pfiffner, 1967). Disaster related activity was a common police function
from the earliest days in the UK and in the US. Commentary on
characteristics of present day policing would not be meaningful without
reflecting on the formation of organized policing in the US.

For instance, Lee (1901) noted that the police are the only members of
the public who are paid to give full-time attention to duties which are
incumbent on every citizen in the interest of community welfare.
Although this is obviously an out-dated characterization, such police
duties often involved response to disasters.

The fire service of course has a longer history of response activity,
but then as now the majority of fire-fighters are volunteers who are not
always as readily available as full-time paid police officers.
Interestingly, Boston hired the first paid fire captain in the country
(IMCA, 1979) almost one hundred years before the first police forces in
the US were formally organized in Boston and New York.

This nation\'s police departments are therefore charged by law,
administrative code and ready availability with providing certain
services to the population of a given political or geographical
division. Depending on geographic location, correctional institutions
and courts are located within a given law enforcement agency's area of
responsibility. According to federal government statistics there are
more than 17,000 local and state police departments in the country; more
than fifty federal agencies have law enforcement authority. Even though
the NYPD employs almost 40,000 sworn officers, the next largest city has
only about one-third that complement of officers. Not even 100 local
agencies have at least one thousand officers and less than 1000
departments employ a minimum of 100 officers (BJS, 2003). We are largely
a nation of small town, not national policing. In contrast, most
democratic nations have one, or at most a few, principal law enforcement
organizations which have nationwide jurisdiction.

A forty-year old publication of the University of Connecticut noted that
\"police duties and responsibilities are predicated upon the customs,
traditions, and demands of the community served.\" This has resulted in
a \"wide diversity of tasks\" (Goldstein, 1966, p. 1). Among those tasks
are various response protocols to disasters. As the 1967 *Task Force
Report: the Police* noted "The police are the part of the criminal
justice system that is in direct daily contact...with the public. The
entire system -- courts and corrections as well as the police -- is
charged with enforcing the law and maintaining order" (p. 1). The
American Bar Association (ABA, 1974) reported that included among the
"Major current responsibilities of police" were (excluding four items):

1.  to aid individuals who are in danger of physical harm;

2.  to facilitate the movement of people and vehicles;

3.  to assist those who cannot care for themselves;

4.  to identify problems that are potentially serious governmental
    problems;

5.  to create and maintain a feeling of security in the community;

6.  to promote and preserve civil order; and

7.  to provide other services on an emergency basis" (pp. 3-4).

Each of these responsibilities may be considered as applicable to the
role of law enforcement in preparing for and responding to disasters.

Egon Bittner (1975) discussed two inter-related aspects of policing that
could also be equated to their role in dealing with disasters: "...the
police are nothing else than a mechanism for the distribution of
situationally justified force in society." And "The American city
dwellers repertoire of methods for handling problems includes one known
as 'calling the cops'" (p. 39). Bittner advances the concept that police
are called upon to respond to a situation and do something about which
something must be done. It has been stated many times in the literature
of policing that they are viewed as an immediately available resource in
times of emergency and crisis.

Post 9-11 law enforcement activities in America span a range from the
traditional, often characterized as community policing programs, to
enhanced intelligence gathering and analysis to military-style tactical
units to search, rescue and recovery. Obviously, not all US police
agencies perform all of these functions and the capacity of a local law
enforcement agency to do more without commensurate increases in
resources is problematic. One law enforcement concern is that
intelligence collection or investigative follow-up may be compromised if
a criminal justice agency is not 'lead-agency' in disasters resulting
from criminal or terrorist actions (see Louden, 2005).

This practical and potentially problematic concern has framed part of
the discussion of the role of criminal justice in disaster response at
least since the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, and continued
with the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, the explosion of TWA 800 and
certainly 9/11/01. The final chapter of *The 9/11 Commission Report*,
"How to Do It? A Different Way of Organizing the Government" (pp.
399-428) may serve as a good starting point to explore not only
intelligence and defense issues but also the broader question of 'Who is
in charge here?"(See also Police Executive Research Forum, October 2,
2001.)

**Corrections**

Correctional institutions present special problems and concerns when
exposed to disasters. A disaster may endanger the lives and well being
of inmates and staff, yet under most circumstances the inmates must
continue to be controlled. Faced with the high number of individuals
incarcerated in jails and prisons throughout the country, the potential
for disasters impacting on the correctional population is highly
probable. Protection of life is a standard of care imposed on all
agencies charged with the custody of others. In addition to protecting
inmates, government officials must keep in mind that a perception that
prisoners may not be under proper control could generate fear in the
surrounding community. Persistent attention to issues of operational
security and rumor control are crucial to a competent response to
correction related disaster. A potential positive consequence of a
disaster in or near a correctional institution is that non-violent
inmates may be available to assist in rescue, recovery and rebuilding
efforts.

There is a lack of published research dealing exclusively with
corrections and disasters situations. For example, see The New York
State Special Commission on Attica (1972); Useem and Kimball (1989);
Wills-Raftery (1994); Useem, et al (1995); and (Flin and Arbuthnot,
2002). Additionally, the special population nature of inmates found in
disaster related literature is appropriate to assess in the context of
the criminal justice system.

Prisoners are sentenced to jails or prisons as the result of a judicial
process. Much of what subsequently happens to prisoners in the US is
determined or at least reviewed by a court. This role is only one part
of the potential effects of disasters on our judicial branch of
government; local, state or federal.

**Courts**

As with correction related disasters, there had not been a great deal of
material published on the relationship of disasters and the courts prior
to the bombing in Oklahoma City in 1995. The federal General Services
Administration, the landlord for the federal judiciary, became more
actively involved in prevention, mitigation and response activities for
court buildings as a result of the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah
federal building. However, in 1998 the American Bar Association devoted
an entire issue of the *Judges' Journal* (Vol. 37, No. 4) to disaster
related court experiences and concerns. This forty page special volume
is a mix of articles and case studies, mostly natural disaster related.
It deals with local, state and federal jurisdictions and includes the
impact of disasters on the mechanics and logistics of trial calendars,
'time-sensitive-progression' aspects of case flow; processing of new
arrests and other criminal and civil actions; managing the jury process,
production of transcripts and other case files; and the potential
distress of court personnel.

**AN EXAMPLE FROM NYC**

NYC experiences suggest a range of problem areas that deserve
consideration and resolution. Less than one year after 9/11/01, the *NY
Daily News* quoted NYC Police Commissioner Ray Kelly as saying that
between \$500 and \$700 million was needed for training, resources and
equipment to fight terrorism. He further noted that "There was \$3.5
billion languishing in Congress, and we are not going to get anything
before the coming \[2002\] 9/11." Likewise, *Newsday* attributed similar
sentiments to the director of the NYS Police Chief's Association, who
indicated, "Not one additional resource has been provided even though
all first-response comes locally." Both of these views were against the
backdrop of comments by President Bush, as reported in *The New York
Times*, "...he would not spend \$5.1 billion approved by Congress last
month for domestic security..." (see Louden, 2002).

Cordes (1971) noted that when rules and procedures are being devised it
becomes necessary to clear up obvious misconceptions, re-examine
relationships, and review the responsibility of each toward the other.
This process should foster a redefinition of the collective obligation
to approach and in some cases attack society\'s problems. This caution
was especially cogent in 2005 New York City - the battle of the badges.
This is a perennial problem: Which agency, fire or police or emergency
management, should perform a particular task, and/or be in charge of
what?

Prior to the first administration of Mayor Rudolph Giuliani in 1994, the
city-wide function generally referred to as emergency management was
actually an organizational entity within the headquarters of the New
York Police Department (NYPD). It had been that way for many years,
including twenty-five years ago when the NYPD Office of Civil
Preparedness was designated as the Director of the NYC Mayor's Emergency
Control Board (Urban Academy, 1979). The Office of Civil Preparedness
was a pre-cursor of city-wide emergency management. The NYPD coordinated
activities of all city agencies, including FDNY, utilities and
supplementary services during a declared emergency.

Giuliani created a separate and distinct Office of Emergency Management
(OEM), in part to settle problems and disputes between NYPD and FDNY. He
believed that "the city had to reorganize its response to emergencies"
(Giuliani, p. 315). A decade later the separate OEM still exists, but
serves more as a research, resource and facilitating entity than the
"overarching organizational structure that was equipped to coordinate
many different departments" that the Mayor had envisioned (p. 315).

The NYPD also maintained a highly specialized tactical element, the
Emergency Service Unit (ESU). Originally formed in 1930 as the
'riot-squad', ESU evolved into a diverse group of EMT certified police
officers which also involved Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) and a
variety of rescue and recovery related activities; building collapse,
subway derailment, hazmat. A commonly heard expression among NYPD
personnel is 'when the public needs help they call the police; when the
cops need help they call ESU.' Companion elements within the NYPD
Special Operations Division (SOD) were Aviation, Harbor, and Scuba. The
rescue and recovery functions of ESU and several of the other SOD tasks
are often assigned to Fire and Rescue Units in many jurisdictions across
the country; not generally a police function. The New York Fire
Department (FDNY) also fielded rescue and recovery units, marine and
scuba personnel. One argument as to why the NYPD was so heavily involved
in such specialized non-enforcement duties, besides long-standing
traditions, was the relationship between the police SOD and the
pre-Giuliani police-based city-wide emergency management apparatus.

Historically both agencies responded to the same emergency situations.
Sometimes the agencies worked the problem together and other times they
worked in competition with each other. In extreme cases, fists flew and
arrests were occasionally a result! Periodically politicians or the
press, often prompted by one side or the other, call for a modification
in arrangements; substantive change seldom occurred.[^1]

The attacks of 09/11/01, predictably, brought OEM, FDNY and NYPD, among
others, to the horrific scene; we all know the toll in death and
destruction. Although often working side-by-side, some aspects of the
smoldering rivalry continued and intensified over the following four
years. As Clyde Haberman (2005) noted in the *New York Times*,

> Take the Fire and Police Departments. Having both suffered terribly,
> they seemed headed after Sept.11 for a new era of comity. Their
> ancient antagonisms? The occasional testosterone-fueled fistfights at
> disaster scenes? The failed communication that may have contributed to
> the 9/11 death toll? They belonged to the unlamented past, or so some
> thought (April 26, 2005, p. B1).

Haberman's column was one of many reactions to a change in "...one part
of a (sic) emergency response plan known formally as the Citywide
Incident Management System." (Confessore, 2005).

In testimony before the NYC Council, Glenn P. Corbett, an engineer,
volunteer firefighter and professor of fire science at John Jay College
of Criminal Justice in NYC noted that, \"Instead of taking a giant leap
forward through correcting longstanding major flaws in New York City\'s
emergency response protocols, the plan \"takes several steps backward.\"
(Corbett, 2005). Corbett has stated that absent exigent circumstances, a
police agency should not be in-command of most disaster scenes. He also
indicated that he does not believe that there is another jurisdiction in
the country that is organized like NYC for response to disasters.

Regardless of the genesis of rivalry between FDNY and NYPD, Mayor
Bloomberg has spoken. OEM still exists as a separate governmental entity
but does not have a lead-agency role in responding to disasters. The new
Citywide Incident Management System (CIMS) delineates primacy to one
agency or another depending on events and expertise. (See
[www.NYC.gov](http://www.NYC.gov/)). The NYC plan is designed to meet
the mandate of the NIMS. A major point of demarcation is the nature of
the disaster. Terrorism automatically begets law enforcement command and
control while natural and non-terror man-made disaster adheres to the
mayor's newest plan. Neither NYPD nor FDNY are totally pleased with the
new system, but both agencies have pledged to support the mayor and
adhere to the guidelines. In fact, there have been, and continue to be,
numerous examples of cooperation and coordination among and between the
agencies. For example, a task force of FDNY and NYPD personnel,
coordinated by NYC OEM, recently participated in WMD exercise at the
Center for National Response in Standard, W.Va. (McGeehan, 2005).
Likewise, two helicopter crashes during 2005 in the East River in NYC
resulted in a well coordinated multi-agency response.

**COMPATABILITY AND CONTROVERSY**

A different, longer standing, example of positive police and fire agency
collaboration may be found in the Report of the Joint Fire/Police Task
Force on Civil Unrest (FEMA, 1994). At the time it was noted that "...
for the first time in recent memory, police and fire executives were
able to sit and work together, to voice their concerns and wishes, and
to come to a basic agreement on how personnel can best cooperate in the
filed." (P. iii). It was also noted in their report that: "A successful
collaboration among agencies will depend on:

1\. Compatibility of the agencies

2\. Adaptation of a common technical terminology

3\. A strong joint command structure

4\. Regularly scheduled joint training exercises

5\. Effective mutual aid agreements." (p. 4).

When considering the appropriateness of these five points one may
consider whether there is an ideal organizational structure for disaster
response, or might dynamic leadership be more fundamental? And, under
what circumstances should criminal justice personnel be in-charge at the
scene of a disaster?

In these times of increased threat and response, natural and man-made,
some factors about preparing for potential role change become apparent.
This nation has a variety of government, volunteer and private sector
mechanisms that respond to disaster. Some are the result of legal
mandate, others are the result of long-time practical experiences and
some will continue to be ad hoc. Accordingly, the most important issue
to be considered in any response is 'Who is in charge?' In order to be
able to properly address that simple-sounding question a number of items
must be considered. First, there is a need to specify the new reality
and determine what is to be done about it. Next, a review of legal and
administrative directives is appropriate. These two items should
identify 1) the nature of the problem(s), 2) the legislated parties
responsible for response; 3) the actual parties involved in attempts at
resolution, and 4) suggested changes in mandate or practice which would
provide an improved conclusion. Another basic factor for any role change
is to specify appropriate organizational change, if any, and delineate
the nature of resources needed and of training required. Adequate and
appropriate funding is a must.

Some jurisdictions rely on an operational version of OEM, incorporating
Incident Command principals. Others have adopted a Public Safety model
(Nickerson, 2005). Whatever the configuration, the controversy will
continue.

**NEW ORLEANS AND THE FUTURE**

There has not been sufficient time since hurricanes Katrina and Rita to
assess the long-term implications of the relationship of disaster and
criminal justice response. However, preliminary comments can be made.

The police department and its personnel were heroic and selfless in many
ways, but also experienced serious bouts of disorder in many forms
including desertion, pilfering and brutality. Communications systems
failed dismally forcing 120 - 911 operators to evacuate, resulting in
thousands of emergency calls to go unanswered (Connolly, 2005). Evidence
stored at police headquarters, including DNA in rape kits and bags of
cocaine was destroyed by flood water, severely limiting the chance of
proceeding with trials for hundreds of defendants; innocent and guilty
alike.(Peristein, 2006). Additionally, emergency plans were not up to
the task, and many routine duties have not been resumed some six months
later.

Many court operations have been impacted by the distress of the police
department and further negatively influenced by damage to physical
structures, computer systems and lack of personnel. In October 2005, the
Orleans Parish District Attorney reported that he was close to shutting
down operations, impacting on 3000 criminal cases, due to a lack of
resources caused by the hurricane. (Randolph, 2005)

Corrections, like the police and the courts, can boast of many positive
contributions to the people of New Orleans. They too have many problems.
Standards of care were not always adequate, prisoners absconded, and
facilities are in need of major rebuilding. There were reports of inmate
dying due to flood water in confined spaces (see Asbury Park Press,
2005); and, escaped and prematurely released inmates were transported to
other jurisdictions at government expense (see Tucker, 2005). Some
inmates were evacuated and released early while other were detained
beyond their sentence due to the destruction of records and lack of
personnel. (Millhollon, 2005).

The entire criminal justice system appears to be in dire need of a major
influx of personnel, equipment and other resources and plans and
training that may simultaneously provide for a return to some normalcy
and prepare for the next worse case scenario.

We can state, based on media accounts and government hearings, that:
organized policing was not prepared for the vastness of the tasks; the
court systems are in a state of turmoil with long term implications for
the delivery of justice, for defendants and victims alike; correctional
inmates were in many cases positive contributors to response strategies
and in other instances the cause of additional concern as special
populations in need of special care and consideration. Criminal,
organizational and procedural investigations and reviews are in
progress. The findings of these deliberative bodies will make meaningful
contributions to the questions of compatibility and controversy that are
present in the criminal justice disaster response discussion.

**CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

This paper provides a selective overview of the discipline and practice
of criminal justice in America. It also notes that there is a direct
relationship between criminal justice and disaster response. Sometimes
there are well ordered and complementary, and at other times rife with
confusion and conflict.

This document was framed, in part, by considering a series of questions:
What recommendations does criminal justice have for the study of
disasters? What recommendations does criminal justice have for emergency
management; what are the gaps in knowledge? Hopefully answers to those
questions are contained in the preceding material. Working backwards
through the questions, the gaps are still vast, but the right questions
are beginning to be asked, prompted in large part by the NYC experience
with 9/11 and the New Orleans experience with Katrina.

Criminal justice, as a discipline and as a system, has had a great deal
of experience with formulating and implementing emergency management
plans. It is my opinion that an on-going impediment to smoother future
operations is territoriality and turf issues, at all levels of
government coupled with sometimes conflicting mandates concerning the
primacy of response, rescue, recovery in the context of intelligence and
investigative evidence gathering and collection. Criminal justice as an
academic discipline must also assume an active leadership role in
collaboratively conducting empirically sound research projects, across
scholarly disciplines and across geographic, political and bureaucratic
boundaries; the problems are not going away

NYC, of course, is unique in many ways; no other jurisdiction has
comparable resource availability or parallel life and death experiences.
New Orleans, on the other hand, is still reeling from the aftermath of
*Katrina*. Many of the on-going problems in both cities are criminal
justice related. The New York City example, historically and especially
post-9/11 should be viewed as a living laboratory which affords
bureaucrats and researchers an opportunity to review and challenge both
traditional and unique organizational arrangements and resource
allocation for disaster response. Likewise, New Orleans should be
subjected to examination, criminal, civil and academic to contribute
answers to the question: What went wrong?

Disaster research must focus on the practical, tactical and legal
aspects of the appropriate role of criminal justice. Among other facets,
the research agenda, privately and publicly funded, must reflect on
organizational configurations, human factors, technological
applications, governmental relationships.

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[^1]: An advisory comment! This author worked very closely with ESU
    personnel over a span of many years, particularly in their tactical,
    SWAT, role during hostage, barricade and siege type situations. In
    my view, their training and actual deployment to non-enforcement
    rescue and recovery related activities helps to prepare them to be
    more competent tactical officers. They gain practical experiences,
    improved patience and a greater reverence for life