Session No. 8

Course Title: Theory, Principles and Fundamentals of Hazards, Disasters,
and U.S.

Emergency Management

Session Title: Disaster As A Growth Business

Time: 3 Hours

**Objectives:**

1.  To provide an awareness of the increasing risk and vulnerability of
    the U.S. population to hazards as well as some of the more important
    factors bearing on this increase.

2.  To describe some of the actions that could be taken to reduce
    vulnerability and loss.

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**Scope:**

To introduce this session, the professor describes disaster as a growth
business from the international and U.S. perspectives. Next, the
students explore the factors that contribute to the growing risk of
disasters and attempt to discern between superficial reasons and root
causes. Finally, the class examines potential actions that could lessen
vulnerability and losses in the United States.
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**Suggested Student Homework Reading Assignment:**

Need to determine specifics.

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**Additional Sources to Check:**

American Meteorological Society. 2000. *Policy Issues In Hurricane
Preparedness and Response -- Report of The Weather Channel Forum*.
Washington, DC: AMS Atmospheric Policy Program, September.

Association of State Floodplain Managers. 2000. *National Flood Programs
in Review, 2000*. Madison, WI: ASFPM. Available online at URL:
[www.floods.org](http://www.floods.org/).

Changnon, Stanley A. and David Changnon. "Record High Losses for Weather
Disasters in the United States During the 1990s: How Excessive and Why?"
*Natural Hazards*, Vol. 18, pp. 287-300.

Claussen, Eileen and Lisa McNeilly. 1998. *Equity & Global Climate
Change: The Complex Elements of Global Fairness*. Arlington, VA: Pew
Center on Global Climate Change, October 29.

Contingency Planning & Management. "East Coast Collisions: The 1999
Atlantic Hurricane Season." Vol. 5, No. 1, January/February, pp. 24-28.

Davies, Kert. 2000. *Heat Waves and Hot Nights* (A Report by Ozone
Action and Physicians for Social Responsibility). Ozone Action and
Physicians for Social Responsibility, July 26. Online document at URL:
<http://www.ozone.org/heatstress>.

Easterling, David R., et al. 2000. *Climate Extremes: Observations,
Modeling and Impacts.* Science's Compass. 22 September 2000. Vol. 289.
[www.sciencemag.org](http://www.sciencemag.org/).

Field, C.B. et al. 1999. *Confronting Climate Change in California:
Ecological Impacts on the Golden State*. Union of Concerned Scientists,
Cambridge, MA and The Ecological Society of America, Washington, DC.

Flavin, Christopher. 1994. "Storm Warnings: Climate Change Hits The
Insurance Industry." *World Watch*, Vol. 7, No. 6, November-December,
pp. 10-20.

Foster, John. 2000. "Global Warming & Risk Management." *Public Risk*,
Vol. 14, No. 5, May-June, pp. 22-23.

Gornitz, Vivien. 2000. Climate Change and a Global City: An Assessment
Of The Metropolitan East Coast (MEC) Region. Coastal Zone Sector Report:
Sea Level Rise And Coastal Hazards.
[www.nefsma.org](http://www.nefsma.org/).

Heinz Center (The H. John Heinz III Center for Science, Economics and
the Environment). 2000. Evaluation of Erosion Hazards. Washington, DC:
Heinz Center. Available online at URL:
[http://www.heinzcenter.org](http://www.heinzcenter.org/).

Hooke, William H. 2000. "U.S. Participation In International Decade For
Natural Disaster Reduction." *Natural Hazards Review*, Vol. 1, No. 1,
February, pp. 2-9.

Insurance Services Office, Inc. 1999. *Financing Catastrophe Risk:
Capital Market Solutions (Executive Summary)*.
<http://www.iso.com/docs/stud013.htm>.

Lichterman, Joshua D. 1999. "Disasters to Come." *Futures*, 31, pp.
593-607.

Newman, James E., Gary Yohe, Robert Nicholls, and Michelle Manion. 2000.
*Sea-Level Rise & Global Climate Change: A Review of Impacts to U.S.
Coasts*. Arlington, VA: Pew Center on Global Climate Change. Also online
at URL: [http://www.pewclimate.org](http://www.pewclimate.org/).

NOAA. 1998 (online). *State of the Coast Report*. Silver Spring, MD:
NOAA. URL:
<http://state-of-coast.noaa.gov/bulletins/heml/pop_01/pop.html>.

Panel on Reconciling Temperature Observations. 2000. *Reconciling
Observations Of Global Temperature Change.*

Peilke, Roger A., Jr., 2000. "Policy History of the US Global Change
Research Program: Part I. Administrative Development." *Global
Environmental Change*, Vol. 10, pp. 9-25.

Quarantelli, E.L. 1999. "Implications for Programmes and Policies From
Future Disaster Trends." *Risk Management: An International Journal,*
Vol. 1, pp. 9-19.

Robinson, Andrew. 1993. "Global Climatic Change." Chapter 9 (pp.
259-295) in *Earth Shock -- Hurricanes, Volcanoes, Earthquakes,
Tornadoes and Other Forces of Nature.* NY, NY: Thames and Hudson, Inc.

[Schlmadinger]{.mark}, Bernhard and Gregg Marland. 2000. *Land Use &
Global Climate Change -- Forests, Land Management, and the Kyoto
Protocol.* Arlington, VA: Pew Center on Global Climate Change, June.

Subcommittee on Global Change Research. 2000. *Climate Change Impacts on
the United States: the Potential Consequences of Climate Variability and
Change (Review Draft).* Committee on Environment and Natural Resources
of the National Science and Technology Council, National Science
Foundation.

Vellinga, P. and W. J. van Verseveld. 2000. *Climate Change and Extreme
Weather Events*. Amsterdam: Institute for Environmental Studies,
World-Wide Fund for Nature.

Western Governors Association. 1999. *Flood Plain Management and Dam
Operations: An*

*Issue Paper for the Western Governors Association.*

Wigley, Tom, M.L. 1999. *The Science of Climate Change: Global and U.S.
Perspectives.* Arlington, VA: Pew Center on Global Climate Change, June
29. Also available online at URL:
<http://www.pewclimate.org/projects/env_science.html>.

Dynes, Russell R. 1997. *The Lisbon Earthquake in 1755: Contested
Meanings In The First Modern Disaster.* Disaster Research Center,
University of Delaware.

#### General Requirements:

PowerPoint slides have been prepared to support this session. The
session is not dependent upon the utilization of these visual aids. They
are provided as a tool that the professor is free to use as PowerPoints
or overhead transparencies.

**Objective 8.1 To provide an awareness of the increasing risk and
vulnerability of the U.S. population to hazards as well as some of the
more important factors bearing on this increase.**

You may wish to introduce this session by reminding the students of the
range and state of U.S. hazards that they explored in the last session.
Encourage the students to recall how losses from all types of disasters
are increasing and how projections point to worsening losses in the
future. Explain that to begin this session, the students will examine
how disaster seems to be a growth business, both globally and in the
United States.

**Disaster Risk From An International Perspective**

-   In the previous session we learned that disaster seems to be a
    growth business, both globally and in the United States. Addressing
    himself to the global situation, Chris Tucker has written in the
    Emergency Preparedness Digest that:

    **"...we are seeing world-wide, rapidly escalating human and
    economic losses** from weather-related disasters."[^1]

-   This trend of increasing and costlier catastrophes poses serious
    implications for the role of emergency preparedness.

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-   In 1996, floods, windstorms, earthquakes, and volcanic eruptions
    around the world claimed 12,000 lives[^2] and caused economic losses
    exceeding US\$60 billion. (Of this, US\$9 billion were insured
    losses.)

-   **In comparison with the 1960s, five times as many natural
    catastrophes are now occurring**, costing the world's economies
    (taking inflation into account) eight times as much, and the
    insurance industry fifteen times as much. (Tucker, Etkin, Henault
    1998, 14.)

    **"The explosive combination of human-driven climate change and
    rapidly changing socioeconomic conditions will set off chain
    reactions of devastation leading to "super disasters" in the years
    to come."**[^3]

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-   Another composite measure of disaster impact is the **number of
    people adversely affected.**

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-   Using Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED)
    data, the **total number of people** in this category **has grown
    from less than 50 million per year in the late 1960s to a
    present-day \[1993\] average of around 250 million each year.**"[^4]

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-   According to the *Natural Hazards Observer* (Sept. 1999, p. 14), a
    report issued by the International Federation of Red Cross and Red
    Crescent Societies (IFRC) states that:

    **"In 1998, natural disasters created more refugees than wars and
    conflict;** the report indicates that **declining soil fertility,
    drought, flooding, and deforestation drove 25 million 'environmental
    refugees' from their land and into the already vulnerable squatter
    communities of fast-growing cities.** They represented **58% of the
    total refugee population worldwide."**[^5]

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-   The cost of global disasters in just the last couple of years has
    been enormous:

    **"Man-made and natural disasters killed 17,000 people and caused
    \$38 billion in losses in 2000**, the Swiss Reinsurance Co. (Zurich)
    reported. **This compares to 105,000 fatalities and \$100 billion in
    losses in 1999."**[^6]

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-   Janet Abramovitz, in Unnatural Disasters, sees irony in the fact
    that, while the United Nations had designated the 1990s as the
    International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction (IDNDR),

    "Instead, the 1990s may go down in history as the **International
    Decade of Disasters,** as the world experienced the **most costly
    spate of floods, storms, earthquakes, and fires ever.**

    "Around the world, **a growing share of the** devastation triggered
    by 'natural' disasters **stems from ecologically destructive
    practices and from putting ourselves in harm's way**. Many
    ecosystems have been frayed to the point where they are no longer
    resilient and able to withstand natural disturbances, setting the
    stage for **'unnatural disasters'---those made more frequent or more
    severe due to human actions. By degrading forests, engineering
    rivers, filling in wetlands, and destabilizing the climate, we are
    unraveling the strands of a complex ecological safety net."**[^7]

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-   Abramovitz elaborates on "unnatural disasters," citing the
    **"enormous expansion of the human population and our built
    environment. . . the migration of people to cities and coasts"** in
    the developing world---putting "untold numbers of people at
    risk"[^8]

**Disaster Risk From a U.S. Perspective**

-   From a U.S. perspective, it is uncontestable that **disaster costs
    are going up**.

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-   **Within the 20-year period, 1965 and 1985 there were about 500
    Federally-declared disasters in the U.S**.[^9]

-   **Between 1989 and 1995** the U.S. experienced a sizable increase in
    the number and expense of its natural disasters, with **roughly
    300** disasters large enough to warrant a Presidential Disaster
    Declaration.

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-   Jerry T. Mitchell and Deborah S.K. Thomas describe the trends in
    hazard events, losses, and casualties as "escalator-like," with
    major contributors to the totals being exceptional disasters such as
    Hurricanes Hugo, Andrew, and Iniki; the Northridge and Loma Prieta
    earthquakes; and the Midwest floods.[^10]

    Mitchell and Thomas provide this estimate of losses:

    "**Natural hazards conservatively cost this nation \$12.5 billion
    annually during the past 24 years**. Damages from natural hazards
    are highly variable from year to year and from decade to decade.
    However, **steady increases in losses were found during the 1990s,
    the most disastrous decade ever.** Fatalities remained relatively
    steady during the past 24 years." (Cutter, 112)

    "A burgeoning population and a desire to congregate in attractive,
    yet hazard-prone areas may alter these trends in the future,
    especially if we base our projections on the decade of the 1990s.
    For example, **the population of all coastal counties has outpaced
    the total U.S. population growth by 15 percent in the past two
    decades.**" (Ullmann, 2000)

-   According to FEMA, **75 percent of housing stock in the United
    States is susceptible** to natural hazards. For example, in 2000,
    there were:

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-   10 million homes at risk from flooding.

-   25 million homes at risk from wind hazards.

-   2 million homes at risk from coastal storm surges.

-   50 million homes in counties with significant earthquake risk.[^11]

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-   In 1998, **90% of the country's population** lived in seismically
    active areas,[^12] and in 1990, **more than 50 percent** of all
    Americans **lived in coastal regions**.

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-   In **Florida** alone, **over 80 percent** of the State's population
    lived **within 10 miles of the coast** in 2000.[^13]

". . . the state of Florida represents more than **\$900 billion at
risk**."[^14]

**Note:** Explain to the students that the growing population in coastal
areas is but one factor that contributes to disaster as a growth
business. But growth itself is not necessarily a root cause of the
problem. At this point, you may wish to elicit student suggestions of
additional factors and note them on chart paper for reference during the
following discussion.

**Factors Contributing to the Growing Risk of Disasters**

-   There are a number of factors that contribute to the increase and
    severity of disasters in the U.S. Many explanations that might be
    put forth as reasons, however, are superficial in that they do not
    address the root causes. Here, we will discuss first the most common
    examples of these types of explanations, and then also some of the
    underlying factors---the root causes---that contribute to disaster
    as a growth business.

**Superficial Explanations**

(1) **Population Growth and Population Density or "Urbanization"**

-   **The population of the U.S., like that of the entire world,
    increases every day.** It has been estimated that the rate of global
    population growth runs at 1.6 percent annually, adding nearly 100
    million people per year, primarily in developing countries.[^15]

-   More people live in major metropolitan areas and are thus more
    vulnerable to disaster events. For example, **in 1990, more people
    lived in Dade and Broward counties in South Florida than lived in
    all 109 counties from Texas through Virginia along the Gulf and
    Atlantic coasts in 1930**.[^16]

-   The United Nations newsletter, Stop Disasters, points out that this
    is one of the primary reasons why, worldwide, **the number of people
    affected by disasters has been growing by 6% per year** and has been
    doing so since the early 1960s.[^17]

-   It has been estimated that "**by the year 2000, half the world's
    population will live in urban areas,** crowded into 3% of the
    earth's land area," and that **at least 80% of the population growth
    through the 1990s will be in larger towns and cities**.[^18]

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-   It can also be assumed that **earthquakes, hurricanes, and many
    other hazards are much more of a threat in areas of population
    concentration.**

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-   And, as Mitchell has written in his 1993 book, Prediction and
    Perception of Natural Hazards:

    **"Urbanization is one of the most important factors propelling
    worldwide growth in natural disaster potential**. People and
    material investments are pouring into cities that are already
    exposed to significant physical risks, are **expanding into areas at
    risk** or are pushing against the limits of biophysical systems and
    socio-technical systems."[^19]

    According to Dr. Rutherford H. Pratt of the University of
    Massachusetts:

    **"Between 1950 and 2000, metropolitan population of the United
    States nearly tripled from 84 million** (55% of U.S. total) **to 226
    million** (80% of U.S. total). **At the same time, the land area
    within designated 'metropolitan statistical areas' more than
    doubled** from about 9% to about 19% of the coterminous U.S. land
    area. **The expansion of metropolitan areas in size and number**
    (from 169 in 1950 to 347 in 2000) **has been accompanied by the
    degradation of local watersheds, streams, wetlands, groundwater
    aquifers, and coastal waters. Aquatic resources** in the path of
    urbanization **have been widely polluted, littered, dredged, filled,
    paved over, channelized, walled, and otherwise abused in the
    process. 'Nature's services'---including flood mitigation, water
    quality filtering, biotic habitat, nutrient uptake, soil formation,
    scenic amenity---have been impaired or obliterated.** This has
    **compelled cities, regions, states, and the federal government to
    substitute costly technology for those services, as with structural
    flood protection and water treatment plants."**[^20]

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-   Burton, Kates, and White write in their book, The Environment as
    Hazard:

    "by extending its presence in more places and in larger numbers than
    before, the human race exposes itself and its artifacts more widely
    to risk from natural events....with accumulation of material wealth
    mounting in most countries, there is simply more property to be
    damaged" [^21]

(2) **Increased Development and Property Values**

-   A factor to consider when trying to understand why the costs of
    disasters have gone up and continue to do so is that development
    continues, in some places unabated, and this results in greater
    exposure. Inflation and demand translate into an increase in
    **property values --** again, greater exposure.

    "Along with the growing complexity and cost of the physical plant
    responsible for the world's industrial output, **capital development
    has ensured that each hazard will encounter an increasing amount of
    property....**"[^22]

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-   Consider the increased need for supportive infrastructure required
    for such development. Ever-expanding sewer systems raise the
    probability that sewage plants will be inundated by flood water and
    that systems will back up, thus flooding basements and low-lying
    areas. **Nine sewage and water treatment plants were overrun by
    Hurricane Floyd.**

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-   Nonetheless, the value of **insured residential coastal property in
    Florida increased 135 % between the years 1980 and 1993**---from
    approximately \$178 billion to \$418 billion.

-   During the same time**, insured commercial property increased from
    approximately \$155 billion in 1980 to \$453 billion in 1993**---a
    192 percent increase.

    "...in addition to an increase in the number of natural disasters,
    the dramatic rise in disaster losses has been caused primarily by a
    large increase in the population of hazard-prone areas, as well as
    **a rise in the costs of construction.**"[^23]

    "...from **1970 to 1990 we developed as much land in Maine as had
    been developed over the entire previous history of the state**,
    consuming land four times faster than population growth. If we
    continue with that same pattern, land use consumption will double
    again by 2010."[^24]

    "While population growth in Kansas City increased by less than 30%
    between 1960 and 1990, **land devoted to housing and development
    rose by 110%; since 1970**, every two years the location of the
    highest-valued homes has moved two miles farther away from
    downtown"[^25] (Beatley and Manning, 1997.)

(3) **Changes in the Climate**

-   Within the scientific community there is a debate underway
    concerning the frequency of natural disaster events.

-   Some argue that **"the world will most likely experience a changing
    climate in the near future, with more frequent extreme events of
    some weather hazards..."**

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-   For example,

    "Early in 2001, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
    published its third assessment report. This revealed that the
    **speed and** **impact** of anthropogenic climate change **is likely
    to be substantially greater than previously thought, with
    temperatures forecast to rise by up to 8 degrees Celsius by the end
    of the century."**[^26]

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-   The authors of Natural Hazards and Environmental Change (2002) argue
    the case as follows:

    "It is almost certainly no coincidence that **modern human society
    has developed against a background of generally equable climate and
    geological calm**. . . For the past two millennia. . . the Earth's
    environment has been characterized by **a general level of climactic
    and geological stability sufficient to ensure the growth of a
    technology-based global society**.[^27]

    "Notwithstanding contemporary planetary warming---whether
    anthropogenetically attributable or not---**the current period of
    relative environmental stability cannot be expected to last.**[^28]

    "\[E\]vidence from the quaternary (the past 1.6 million years; Adams
    et al., 1000) reveals that **large-scale global and regional
    climactic change over the last two and a half million years occurred
    rapidly rather than incrementally.** Over the past 150,000 years in
    particular (Taylor et al., 1993), **most significant climactic
    variations**---involving regional changes in mean annual temperature
    of several degrees Celsius---**appear to have occurred over periods
    ranging from centuries to as little as a few years.**[^29]

    **"A picture of a benign planet characterized by an unchanging or
    slowly changing environment has always, therefore, been a wildly
    inaccurate one. . . Environmental change is the norm rather than the
    exception**.[^30]

    **"Of most concern is the impact of rapidly rising concentrations of
    carbon dioxide and other 'greenhouse gases' in the atmosphere on
    surface temperatures and sea levels, and in turn on the frequency
    and severity of accompanying hazardous geophysical phenomena**
    (e.g., Downing et al., 1999a; Saunders, 1999). To some extent the
    implications for natural hazards of the current period of
    environmental change can be forecast. **Clearly, for example, if sea
    levels are elevated, then the impacts of storm surges and tsunami
    are liable to be correspondingly more severe."**[^31]

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-   The impact of this assessment seems uncertain:

    "**It is difficult to imagine certain elements of the international
    community** **taking the threat** of contemporary environmental
    change **seriously, without being shocked into action by events** of
    a dramatic and unambiguous nature. Perhaps natural hazards will have
    a pivotal role to play here, and **unless and until a hurricane
    obliterates Miami or wildfires rage through downtown Sydney, the
    dramatic consequences of our impact on the global environment will
    continue to be played down or disregarded."**[^32]

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-   **Others argue against this position** and posit that any postulated
    increase in disaster events in the recent past can be attributed to
    a cyclic nature of disaster occurrences as well as increased
    vulnerability.

> If a tornado touches down where there are no people or structures it
> isn't a disaster, whereas if it hits a town killing people and
> damaging property, it is---and people and structures are occupying
> more spaces.[^33]

-   Some argue that **the debate is over**:

> The trend of increasing and costlier catastrophes continues....**A
> scientific**
>
> **consensus has arisen that the world will most likely experience a
> changing climate in the near future**, with more frequent extreme
> events of some weather hazards....Evidence on how storminess will
> change in a warmer climate is conflicting, and conclusions, especially
> severe storms, must be viewed as uncertain. Nevertheless, it is
> generally agreed that:

-   The number of connective events will increase in a warmer climate,
    due to the thermodynamic changes.

-   Warmer climates may cause higher extreme storm frequencies.

-   There will be much more frequent heat waves as a result of climate
    warming; similarly, cold waves would become more rare.

-   A warming of even a couple of degrees Celsius can have a major
    impact on heat waves.

-   There will be an increase in flooding events, as a result of a trend
    towards more...precipitation and greater atmospheric absolute
    humidity.

-   The frequency of meteorological droughts will increase in the
    future. (Tucker, Etkin, and Henault 1998, 14 and 15)

    "Though the precise timing of climate change and its geographical
    effects are not fully known, there is strong logic to the argument
    that **we should stop acting in the business-as-usual manner that
    may have caused the problem in the first place."**[^34]

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-   Dennis Mileti (1999, 42) writes that after many years of
    disagreement and uncertainty...

    "The highly respected **Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change**
    came to an **unambiguous conclusion in 1995. Global warming**, it
    said, **was occurring and continued emissions of greenhouse gases**,
    through a direct chain of events, **would cause a rise in sea level
    and increasingly malevolent weather extremes, such as flooding."**

***Note:** Explain that sea-level rise will be considered specifically
next in this session.*

-   If the global climate does warm, some **medical scientists have
    expressed concerns** about the **extension of vector-born diseases**
    such as malaria and yellow fever in that warmer climates create
    favorable conditions for the hosts over a wider area.[^35]

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-   While the subject of **global warming is controversial**, it should
    be clear to anyone who studies the history of the planet that the
    **climate not only does change but is always changing.**

-   According to the Insurance Institute for Property Loss Reduction,
    **climate change today is affecting the natural barriers to storm
    surges along the east coast, storm severity is increasing, and storm
    tracks may shift northward with more storms making landfall along
    the U.S. east coast.**[^36]

***Note:** Explain that coastal erosion will be considered specifically
next in this session.*

-   Perhaps bearing on this question, the **National Research Council**
    notes that:

    **"El Niño** events have become stronger and more frequent since
    1980, certainly one reason for the increased losses from
    weather-related natural disasters over the past 15 years...."[^37]

    "The term El Niño ('the child' or 'the Christ child') refers to a
    warming of surface waters in the eastern tropical Pacific Ocean.
    Through history, this pool of warm surface water periodically
    appeared off coastal Ecuador, Peru, and Chile near Christmas. The
    tremendous amount of energy contained within this water has the
    ability to disrupt atmospheric patters throughout the region and
    across the planet. The El Niño which developed in the eastern
    tropical Pacific during the summer of 1997, and lasted through much
    of 1998, was exceptionally warm and ultimately 'blamed' for several
    weather-related disasters in the United States during that
    period."[^38]

(4) **Coastal Erosion and Sea Level Rise**

-   A study issued in June 2000 by the Center for Climate Systems
    Research at Columbia University (with input from the Goddard
    Institute for Space Studies and the New York District of the U.S.
    Army Corps of Engineers, states that, "anticipated climate changes
    will greatly increase risks to coastal populations in the near
    future."[^39]

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-   It is inescapable that U.S. coastlines are receding. Further, **even
    small rises in sea level "result in significant coastal land
    loss."**[^40]

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-   Researchers have determined that "**nearly 90% of eastern beaches
    are eroding, and the average beach has lost two to three feet per
    year** during the past century."[^41]

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-   In October, 2001, experts at a forum on Sea Level Rise and Coastal
    Disasters held by the National Disasters Roundtable of the National
    Academies of Science in Washington, DC, stated that:

    "\[B\]each erosion is a national problem---80 to 90 percent of the
    nation's sandy beaches are eroding. **Global warming and accelerated
    sea-level rise have the potential to increase erosion rates two to
    four times during the next century."**[^42]

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-   New Orleans, Louisiana, has been found to be particularly vulnerable
    to the rising sea level. As stated in the *National Hazards
    Observer* (March 2002), had the levees and dikes of New Orleans
    broken during Hurricane Andrew in August 1991, as many as **100,000
    people could have drowned**. About one-third of Louisiana's barrier
    islands have disappeared since 1880, and coastal wetlands erode at
    the rate of several acres per hour. "Relative sea-level rise" (land
    subsidence combined with the worldwide rise in sea level) is judged
    to be the primary cause.

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-   In New Jersey and New York, remediation of beach erosion has become
    a costly business:

    "Almost **\$1.08 billion in adjusted dollars** has been spent for
    **New Jersey beach erosion projects** over the decades, more than
    any other state.. . . It had the costliest beaches in the country at
    **more than \$8.7 million spent per mile** of shorelines for
    replenishment projects. Neighboring **New York has the second most
    expensive beaches at \$6.6 million a mile**, testifying to the power
    of Northeast states in Congress."[^43]

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-   "In 2001, Congress approved a record \$135 million for 75 shoreline
    rebuilding projects and studies in 21 states. **In the past 79
    years, beach replenishment along the Atlantic and** **Gulf coasts
    has cost the federal treasury an estimated \$3.6 billion in 2002
    dollars**. That's about **\$1 million a mile** of open coast along
    the Atlantic and gulf, according to records from Duke University's
    Program for the Study of Developed Shorelines. . . . Once the
    federal government agrees to protect a beach, the **U.S. Army Corps
    of Engineers is obligated to replenish the sand for the next 50
    years**."[^44]

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-   The practice of beach replenishment **remains controversial**, with
    opponents calling it a subsidy for the rich and some proponents in
    tourist-dependent coastal communities defending it, citing it as
    necessary to their economies.

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-   Finally, a report compiled by the Heinz Center for the Federal
    Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) estimates that "**over the next
    60 years, 25% of the houses within 500 feet of the shore would fall
    into the water** without mitigating action. (See the *National
    Hazards Observer,* Vol. XXV, No. 1, p. 10).

(5) **Increased Incidence of Events**

-   Data compiled by the **Center for Research on the Epidemiology of
    Disasters** (CRED), at the University of Louvain, Belgium, for the
    years 1963-1992 looking at worldwide disasters reveal:

    **...a consistent upward trend over a 30-year period**. While the
    number of **disasters claiming at least 100 deaths has more than
    doubled**, disasters creating economic damage equivalent to 1 per
    cent or more of GNP \[Gross National Product\] have risen well over
    **four-fold**. This evidence for rapidly rising economic losses can
    be supported by **insurance data, which tend to reflect conditions
    in** the MDCs \[more developed countries\]. Berz (1990)[^45] showed
    that major **natural disasters increased** approximately **five-fold
    from the 1960s to the 1980s**. (Smith 1996, 38)

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-   In the United States, **according to the General Accounting
    Office:**

    **"The growth in disaster assistance costs in the 1990s has been
    attributed to a number of factors, including: a sequence of
    unusually large and costly disasters ..."**[^46]

> This is an **area of controversy**. There does indeed seem to be an
> increased frequency in hazardous events, but this could be due to
> improvements in reporting systems and to the spread of populations
> into hazardous areas as Burton, Kates, and White note (1993, 25).
>
> Nonetheless, these authors believe that **"further increase in the
> incidence of disaster is the probable 'wave' of the next decade."**
> (1993, 238)

-   Causes are being sought as to the increase of certain events:

    "Despite warnings of crackling dry conditions, bans on campfires and
    canceled fireworks shows, **most of the major wildfires in the West
    this year have been man- or woman-made."**

    **"In Arizona alone, 1,198 out of a total of 1,317 fires were
    manmade,** according to the Southwest Coordination Center in
    Albuquerque, which tracks fires in Arizona and New Mexico."

    "In **New Mexico, 718 out of 998 fires this year have been started
    by people**. **Nine of Colorado's last 15** major fires were
    **manmade."**

    "Over the Memorial Day weekend, **rangers in Arizona wrote more than
    140 tickets to people for violating the no-burning rules**. One
    camper actually **used a paper sign reading "No fires" to start his
    barbecue**."[^47]

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-   Government fire-suppression policies are under scrutiny:

    "The wild lands in the West are filled with dense, dangerous
    underbrush that helps blazes burn hotter and faster, and that brush
    is the consequence of a **long-standing federal policy to suppress
    all fires as soon as they start."**

    "And as **residents keep moving to the forests' edge**, it gets more
    complex and expensive by the year."

    "**Conservation groups** that support forest thinning---and most
    do---are **clashing with western politicians on another important
    issue: where the clearing should occur**. Environmentalists say
    thinning should take place first near **vulnerable communities**. .
    .

    "But to clear underbrush near new housing developments could mean
    **imposing rules on homeowners**, which westerners have
    traditionally resisted. It certainly means changing the aesthetic of
    the forest and producing smoke from a procedure called a
    **prescribed burn**. And for many residents and tourism officials,
    that is too much to bear---especially after the tactic went awry two
    years ago in a forest near Los Alamos, NM, and **ignited a wildfire
    that destroyed 220 homes**."[^48]

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-   Some believe that even carefully planned prescribed burns are
    unsafe. And the preventive practice would be extremely expensive.
    Thomas M. Bonnicksen, a member of the Advisory Board of the National
    Center for Public Policy Research and Professor of Forest Science at
    Texas A&M University critiques prescribed burning and suggests an
    alternative:

    **"**Each 20,000 acres of 'prescribed burn' is likely to produce one
    escaped fire. That means there could be as many as **243 escaped
    fires in a year**.

    "In addition, most forests require **thinning before prescribed
    burning**, and **73 million acres need such treatment**.

    "**The initial treatment would cost about \$60 billion during the
    first 15 years**. And **maintenance costs of about \$31 billion for
    subsequent 15-year periods** would continue ad infinitum. That
    figure does **not include** the vast amounts of money spent to
    **fight escaped fires, rebuild destroyed homes, control erosion and
    plant trees to replace burned forests.**

    "**Restoration provides the best hope for returning health to our
    forests** because it uses forest history as a model for management.
    . . It would take little public funding since restored forests would
    come close to supporting themselves from the sale of carefully
    harvested wood products."[^49]

(6) **Lowered Eligibility Requirements for Federal Disaster Aid**

-   The U.S. General Accounting Office in its 1998 report, cited
    earlier, stated:

    "The growth in disaster assistance costs in the 1990s has been
    attributed to a number of factors, including...a general increase
    per year in the number of presidential disaster declarations; and
    **a gradual expansion of eligibility for assistance, through
    legislation and administrative decisions"** (GAO 1998, 1).

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-   The same report continues:

    "For fiscal years **1984 through 1988**, the average number of such
    declarations was **26 per year**, whereas, for the periods from
    fiscal years **1989 through 1993** and from fiscal years **1994
    through 1997**, the average number was **42 and 49 per year**,
    respectively" (GAO 1998, 5).

    "...**more facilities have become eligible for disaster
    assistance**. Over the years, the Congress has generally increased
    eligibility through legislation that expanded the categories of
    assistance and/or specified persons or organizations eligible to
    receive assistance. **For example, 1988 legislation expanded the
    categories of private nonprofit organizations that are eligible for
    FEMA's public assistance program.**

    **FEMA's Inspector General reported in 1995**[^50] that the agency's
    **administrative decisions on eligibility** for disaster
    assistance---such as the threshold for determining whether to repair
    or replace a damaged public facility---**may have expanded federal
    disaster assistance costs**" (GAO 1998, 5).

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-   Patterns of repeat claims have been discovered. For example, St.
    Charles County, MO, had more repetitive losses than any other river
    community in the United States. In his chapter, "Uncle
    Sam---Floodplain Recidivist," Steinberg states that, "In all, **899
    structures had filed two or more claims** under the National Flood
    Insurance Program since 1978. **'There are people in St. Charles
    County who collect insurance every time two guys upstream spill
    their beers in the river,'** said Ron McCabe of FEMA."[^51]

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-   Steinberg goes on to say that the county's building commissioner at
    the time of the 1993 flood stated, in regard to FEMA policy,
    **"Taxpayers have bought some of these people refrigerators and
    chain saws 10 times over. . . FEMA's idea of relief. . . was to
    stand on the back of a pickup truck and throw away sacks of \$100
    dollar bills"** (2000, p. 108).

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-   A similar view:

    **"There's the one group who. . . the women and children go to
    church and pray that the rain stops and the men go out and start
    sandbagging. And then there's the other group, who the women and
    children go to church and pray that the rain doesn't stop and the
    men go to the bar and have a few drinks and talk about how they're
    going to spend their flood money."** (Steinberg 2000, p. 109)

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-   Also:

    "Until recently, one heard stories about the **'neighborhood washing
    machine.'** In theory, **people would move a beat-up old washer from
    house to house** in advance of the adjuster**, collecting insurance
    money repeatedly.** Eventually **FEMA started taking down serial
    numbers to** stave off any further fraud. **It would be a mistake,
    however, to see these worst-case scenarios as the norm**. Most of
    those with federal flood insurance were not trying to rip off the
    system. In fact, if anything, the system was more likely ripping off
    the people. Recall that the **entire rationale for the federal flood
    insurance program centered on the offer of subsidized insurance in
    return for more stringent land-use regulation at the state and local
    levels**. But instead of holding communities to the bargain, **the
    federal government has. . . simply weakened the standard to the
    point that by 1994 the Clinton administration simply required that
    'positive attitudes' with respect to floodplain management be
    'encouraged.'** Paying for a few extra washers is one thing, but
    what the federal government has perpetuated on the American people
    here is **the equivalent of passing out the keys to the treasury."**
    (Steinberg 2000, p. 111)

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-   Finally, there is the question of FEMA flood maps that are outdated,
    or improperly drawn. For example, a \$2.3 million lawsuit was
    settled in favor of homeowners in a new subdivision (shown outside
    the floodplain) that was flooded during routine spring floods in
    1996 and 1997.

    '"In many places, **FEMA's floodplain boundaries were traced on a
    topographic map by someone who has never visited the river basin in
    question**,' said Fred Metzler, a specialist with FEMA's National
    Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) in Denver."[^52]

    '"**We've always taken what they've given us, which is the engineer
    taking the FEMA maps and transposing them onto a subdivision map**,
    said Lanette Windemaker, county planner and interim floodplain
    manager."[^53]

    **(7) Federal Budgetary Procedures**

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-   The GAO report also cites Federal budgetary procedures as a factor
    that may influence disaster assistance costs:

    "According to the Senate Task Force report**, federal budgeting
    procedures for disaster assistance may have influenced amounts
    appropriated for disaster assistance.** This is because **disaster
    relief appropriations have often been designated as 'emergency'
    spending.** If the Congress and the President agree to designate
    appropriations as emergencies, **the appropriations are excluded
    from the strict budget disciplines** that apply to other
    spending---specifically, the discretionary spending limits under the
    Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, as
    amended by the Budget Enforcement Act of 1999...

    ...one criticism of the procedures for emergency spending is that
    **the assistance provided is more 'generous' than would be the case
    if it had to compete with other spending priorities."** (GAO 1998,
    6)

    **(8) Increased Technological Risks**

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-   Large-scale use of hazardous chemicals in production processes and
    aircraft that carry larger numbers of passengers are but two of
    dozens of high risk technologies that did not exist in prior
    centuries. Add to this a growing concern "that bio-technology will
    bring us a major disaster sooner or later." (Quarantelli 1996, 230)

    **(9) Increased Dependence on Technology**

-   A society becomes vulnerable to catastrophe when it becomes
    dependent upon complex energy and capital-intensive 'high'
    technologies that radically extend control over nature, but
    simultaneously increase the potential for catastrophic side effects
    and social breakdown. (Orr 1979, 43)

-   A **major new threat** that is developing is associated with the
    disastrous consequences that will come from the **computer
    revolution** that human society is presently undergoing. It is
    making life easier for most of us, in many ways. Yet our
    **increasing dependence on computer technology will magnify future
    disasters and turn some minor emergencies into major crises**. This
    is particularly true because many sectors of government and business
    are increasingly computer-based for the data and information they
    need to function, sometimes literally from minute to minute.
    (Quarantelli 1996, 229)

    **"...the more a society becomes dependent on advanced technology,
    the greater is the potential for disaster if technology fails.**"
    (Smith 1996, 45)

    **(10) Better Data Collection, Reporting, and Media Attention**

# 

-   Tobin and Montz speculate that one of the lesser reasons that
    contributes to the trend of higher disaster costs is that with
    higher awareness and interest in hazards and disasters, along with
    better communications and better data collection techniques, more
    disaster loss information is collected and enters into the public
    discourse.

**Root Causes of Disaster as a Growth Business**

***Note:** At this point, you may wish to seek student suggestions as to
the underlying causes in the incidence and cost of disasters. Record the
students' suggestions and encourage the class to compare them to the
superficial explanations.*

**(1) Increased Settlement in High-Risk Areas**

-   In answer to the question "**Why are losses from natural disaster in
    the United States increasing?**" one disaster researcher has
    written:

    "Because **Americans like to build on beaches, in floodplains, atop
    earthquake faults, and in the middle of forested areas.**" (Dane,
    see also Kunreuther 1998, 2)

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-   More people reside in coastal areas, which are hurricane prone and
    in earthquake prone areas, because of **favorable climates** and the
    **availability of work**.

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-   It has been estimated that **Florida's population alone has
    increased more than 500% since 1950.** (Knap 1998)[^54]

    "Moreover, **80 percent of Florida's population lives within 10
    miles of the coast."** (Schwab, et al. 1998, 12)

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-   **Improvements in building, planning, and hazard-reduction programs
    are largely offset** each year by the **increasing number of people
    and value of property in high-risk areas**.[^55] [^56] [^57]

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-   Indeed, within the U.S. it has been estimated that:

    **". . . by the year 2000, 75 per cent of the U.S. population will
    live within 10 miles of either coast**, subject to hurricanes in the
    East and Gulf Coast and earthquakes in the West." (Quarantelli 1996,
    233)

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-   And, if sea levels rise, as is predicted by some "Greenhouse Effect"
    models, then coastal hazard risks will also rise. (White and Etkin
    1997, 156)

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-   Yet another projection is that **by the year 2010**, more than **73
    million Americans** will live in **hurricane-prone counties**
    (**double the 1995 population** of 36 million). (GAO 1998, 5)

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-   It is also anticipated that **between now and 2010 the population
    density in the hurricane-prone southeast will increase 23%.**

> Moreover:

**The dollar value of residential and commercial structures in the first
tier of coastal counties along the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts, a band of
real estate approximately fifty miles wide, as of 1993, was \$3.15
trillion. That represents an increase of 69% over 1988**.[^58]

**"More recent demographic trends,** significantly increasing the
populations of States like **Utah and North Carolina,** continue to move
people into other vulnerable areas of the country, **the former facing
seismic hazards and the latter famous for coastal hazards,**
particularly on its barrier islands." (Schwab et al. 1998, 12)

-   A closer look at the development patterns along the **Pacific
    Coast** makes obvious that demographic trends have been **moving
    people closer to serious hazards.**

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-   **Four of the largest and fastest-growing metropolitan areas** in
    those five coastal states---**Los Angeles, the Bay Area, Seattle,
    and Anchorage**---are **directly affected by underlying active fault
    zones**, and all have a history of recent seismic disturbances.

-   Each of these areas has a **large inventory of existing hazard-prone
    buildings already in place**, a problem that Los Angeles has
    recognized for nearly two decades with an ordinance aimed at
    seismically retrofitting older structures.

-   Moreover, local topography in both Southern California and the Bay
    Area add **serious wildfire hazards** to the mix, again with a
    history of costly recent disasters." (Schwab et al. 1998, 12)

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-   We've examined increases in population and development as a cause
    for an increase in loss. It is suggested that where and how the
    increases occur is the more causal issue:

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-   Frequently, the **demand for more land** to accommodate urban spread
    translates into the **use of marginal land more prone to such
    threats as floods and landslides**.

-   Some **3.5-5.5 million acres** of this have been urbanized, with
    **over 6,000 communities (each with populations of 2,500 or more)
    exposed to flood hazard.**

-   The **rate of urban growth on floodplains** (1.5 to 2.5% annually)
    has **been twice that of the rest of the country** (Federal
    Interagency Floodplain Management Task Force, 1992)." (Cited in
    Tobin and Montz, 1997, 28.)

-   Increasing populations also means that **more land is devoted to
    population support.**

-   That leads, for example, to **deforestation**---more people living
    in forested areas, resulting in more forest fires and more forests
    destroyed for land-use development.

-   More people means **more dams and levees** (many of which are now
    unsafe).

-   It means more **wetlands are filled in**; and it means that **more
    land is paved** over---all of which leads to a **higher risk of
    flooding**.

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-   As the National Research Council writes:

    "Various forms of economic development have also driven up the costs
    of natural disasters. For example, the **destruction of wetlands,
    the clearing of forests for a range of human activities, and the
    paving of roads and parking lots all have increased the peaks of
    runoff from heavy rainfall."** (NRC 1999, 8)

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-   In addition, **heavy engineering of flood control works** sometimes
    lulls communities into a **false sense of security** and encourages
    inappropriate risk-taking---this is sometimes called the **Levee
    Effect**.

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-   Finally, **tourism increases the hazard**. This situation is made
    more complicated by the fact that **many high risk areas,
    particularly along the coasts, are also** **tourist attractions**
    and thus experience **surges in holiday, weekend, and seasonal
    population increase.**

***Inequalities as a Factor***

-   Vulnerability is increasing for persons with disabilities:

    "The time is long overdue for disaster researchers and disaster
    management policy analysts to start systematically singling out the
    effects of disasters upon particular groups of people. . . **Persons
    with disabilities make up one of the groups that exists in every
    population** that warrants consideration in disaster mitigation
    policy formulation.[^59]

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-   It is believed that vulnerability is increasing in this group
    because the **percentage of this population is increasing as people
    live longer lives**:

    "Due to improved nutrition, more effective public health measures,
    and new medical treatments, **life expectancies in the U.S. and
    other Western industrial societies have increased. At the same time,
    chronic health problems and their attendant physical disabilities
    have become increasingly widespread** (Berkowitz, Johnson, and
    Murphy, 1976; Fingerhut, Wilson, and Feldman, 1980)."[^60]

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-   Vulnerability does not extend solely to the aged, however.

    "Disability is also common at the opposite end of the life cycle.
    **Infant mortality has declined, and the health care system now
    intervenes in seriously disabling physical conditions, such as
    severe birth defects, that in the past would have been fatal.** As a
    result, severely impaired younger members of the population survive,
    but may require high levels of physical support."[^61]

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-   **Disability should not preclude equality of safety during
    disasters:**

    "Increased vulnerability should not mean that persons with
    disabilities should inevitably experience a higher casualty rate in
    disasters**. They have the right to expect an equivalent level of
    safety protection in disasters to that experienced by people in
    general."**[^62]

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-   Disaster **vulnerability is also closely associated with the
    economic gap between rich and poor, which is growing in many
    areas.** (Smith 1996, 43)

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-   Compounding this problem is the fact that quite often it is the
    poor, those least able to shoulder the financial burdens of
    disaster, who use marginal land. For example, "In the
    U.S....**approximately 7% of the country can be defined as
    floodplain (94 million acres), which puts 9.6 million households and
    \$390 billion worth of property at risk."**

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-   Finally, as indisputable as the increase in populations is as a
    factor leading to increased disaster costs and risk, this factor
    alone cannot explain the increase in vulnerability and disaster
    losses. As Bolin and Stanford point out,

    **"Certainly there are four billion more people now variously
    exposed to environmental hazards than there were in 1900**. But **if
    all four billion were securely housed in well-planned communities,
    appropriately educated, and had access to adequate diets, health
    care, and well-compensated livelihoods, their vulnerability to
    calamities might be minimized. "**[^63](1998, 2)

    **(2) The Bottom Line Is [Not Building Smart]{.underline}**

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-   If all new construction were built in a way congruent with local
    risks and hazards, then disaster losses would go down.

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-   The American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) and The Institute for
    Business & Home Safety (IBHS) point out:

    "The startling fact is **that in spite of increased knowledge,
    better building regulations, land-use ordinances, and improved
    construction practices, many new buildings still have the same kinds
    of vulnerabilities** as do those in the existing inventory."[^64]

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-   The vulnerabilities in residential and commercial buildings are
    similar:

    "Experience has shown that the insured **losses in residential and
    commercial** buildings will occur primarily as a consequence of
    **vulnerabilities in the roof, building envelope, structural, and
    foundation systems**, and the disaster agents of the specific peril
    or natural hazard. (ASCE and IBHS, 2001, 6)

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-   It's not that there have not been "lessons learned."

    ". . . we conclude that, in the United States and other developed
    countries a **lack of knowledge is not a major contributory factor**
    to the growth of disaster losses."[^65]

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-   White, et al. suggest that **"There is perhaps more reason to
    attribute rising losses on the failure to act.**" (2001, p. 89)

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-   Some find specific reasons why we have failed to act on the lessons
    learned:

    **"Corruption and vested interests in and around government** play a
    large role in many of the long-term precursors to disaster."[^66]

    "Others point to **failures in the political system**."[^67]

**Objective 8.2 To describe some of the actions that could be taken to
reduce vulnerability and loss.**

**What To Do**

-   David Weir, in his comparison of the failure of the British R101
    airship in 1930 and the 1986 Challenger explosion suggests that **".
    . . we may have to recommend to the authorities that they should
    change the way we do things."**[^68]

    "...the part that state and federal governments need to understand,
    is that **government is influencing how development happens by their
    investments.** If you build a road, they will come. If you develop a
    job center, people will go to it. If you build a school, houses will
    develop around it" (Valle 2001, 4).

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-   Cristoplos, et al., write that:

    "A number of long-standing challenges remain: most of all, the
    complexities of **maintaining the political will that is needed to
    ensure that risk management becomes more than a passing fad.**"
    (2001, p. 186)

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-   Susan Cutter believes that, "First and foremost, **a shift in public
    policy is required.**" (2002, 158)

    Her recommendations include:

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-   **Move away from a disaster assistance mindset** (rewarding
    individuals and communities for building and living in hazard-prone
    areas) to one that fosters long-term thinking about mitigation, loss
    reduction, and personal responsibility for actions.

-   **Work toward sustainable and disaster-resistant communities**.

-   **Defederalize the costs of disasters and limit federal subsidies on
    risk**. We need **to make sure that individuals and communities**
    who choose to build in known hazardous environments **take
    responsibility for the risk they assume.**

-   **Improve hazards mitigation** and **reduce our vulnerability
    through wise land-use decisions** and **ensure that land-use
    policies** are integrated so as to **preclude development and
    redevelopment of hazardous environments**." (2002, p. 158)

***Note:** At this point, you may wish to solicit student suggestions of
additional steps that could be taken to reduce vulnerability and losses
from disasters in the United States. Relate the discussion to the
upcoming session, "What is Emergency Management?"*

**REFERENCES**

Abramovitz, Janet. October 2001. *Unnatural Disasters* (Worldwatch Paper
158). Washington, DC: Worldwatch Institute.

American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) and The Institute for
Business & Home Safety (IBHS). *The Most Wanted: A Search for Solutions
to Reduce Recurring Losses from Natural hazards*. Fall, 2001.

Beatley, Timothy and Kristy Manning. 1997. *The Ecology of Place*.
Washington, DC: Island Press.

Berz, G. 1990. "Natural Disasters and Insurance/Reinsurance." *UNDRO
News* (Jan./Feb.) pp. 18-19.

Birkland, Thomas A. 1997. *After Disaster: Agenda Setting, Public
Policy, and Focusing Events*. Washington DC: Georgetown University
Press.

Bolin, Robert, with Lois Stanford. 1998. *The Northridge Earthquake:
Vulnerability and Disaster*. London and New York: Routledge.

Burby, Raymond J. and Linda C. Dalton. 1993. State Planning Mandates and
Coastal Management. In *Coastal Zone'93*, edited by W.S.W. Orivlle, T.
Magoon, Hugh Converse and L. Thomas Tobin. New York: American Society of
Civil Engineers.

Burton, Ian, Robert Kates, and Gilbert White. *The Environment as
Hazard.* 2^nd^ ed. New York: Guilford Press, 1993.

Christoplos, Ian, Anna Liljelund and John Mitchell. "Re-framing Risk:
The Changing Context of Disaster Mitigation and Preparedness."
*Disasters, 2001*. Oxford UK and Malden, MA. Blackwell Publishers. p.
187.

*Emergency Preparedness News.* Business Publishers, Inc. Silver Spring,
MD.

FEMA. 2000b (Sep.). Planning for a Sustainable Future (FEMA 364).
Washington, DC. FEMA.

Friedman, Pamela. "Rethinking Climate Risks." *Risk Management*. April
2002.

General Accounting Office. 1998. *Disaster Assistance: Information on
Federal Costs and Approaches for Reducing Them* (GAO/T-RCED-98-139).
Washington, DC: GAO.

Haines, A. et al. 1993. Global Health Watch: Monitoring Impacts of
Environmental Change. *Lancet* 342: 1454-1469. Cited by Rodney White and
David Etkin in Climate Change, Extreme Events and the Canadian Insurance
Industry, *Natural Hazards* (16, no. 2-3, November 1997): 175.

Insurance Institute for Property Loss Reduction. 1995. *Coastal Exposure
and Community Protection: Hurricane Andrew's Legacy*. Boston, MA: IIPLR
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[^1]: Chris Tucker, David Etkin, and Jacques Henault. 1998. Climate
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[^2]: A very small percentage of worldwide disaster-related deaths take
    place in the U.S., however. While economic damage runs very high,
    deaths generally do not. It has been estimated that "\[in\] the USA
    a mere 0.01 per cent of the population has died from severe natural
    disasters" (Smith 1996, 7; citing A.F. Fritzche).

[^3]: *Natural Hazards Observer*, September 1999. p. 14.

[^4]: Keith Smith. *Environmental Hazards: Assessing Risk and Reducing
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[^5]: *World Disasters Report 1999*. (For details on the report, see the
    IFRC website: http://www.ifrc.org.)

[^6]: *Emergency Preparedness News*. January 16, 2001. "Cost of Global
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[^7]: Janet Abramovitz. October 2001. *Unnatural Disasters* (Worldwatch
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[^8]: Ibid.

[^9]: Claire B. Rubin, Anthony M. Yezer, Qaizar Hussain, and Anne Webb.
    1986. *Summary of Major Natural Disaster Incidents in the U.S.,
    1965-1985*. Special Publication #17. Boulder, CO. Natural Hazards
    Research and Applications Information Center. Quoted in Roenigk
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[^10]: Jerry T. Mitchell and Deborah S.K. Thomas. "Trends in Disaster
    Losses," Chapter 5 in *American Hazardscapes: The Regionalization of
    Hazards and Disasters*." Susan L. Cutter, Ed. 2002, Washington, DC:
    Joseph Henry Press. p. 112.

[^11]: William D. Wagoner. 2000 Hazard Mitigation/Comprehensive Plan
    Interface---Integration of Emergency Management Into the
    Comprehensive Planning Process (FEMA IMI Student Manual G626).
    Emmitsburg MD: FEMA, Emergency Management Institute, p. SMI-10;
    citing FEMA.

[^12]: ISO (Insurance Services Office, Inc.). 1998. *Evaluating Building
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[^13]: FEMA. 2000b (Sep.). Planning for a Sustainable Future (FEMA 364).
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[^14]: Ryland. 1999. 260, citing the Insurance Information Institute.
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[^15]: Rodney White and David Etkin. 1977. Climate Change, Extreme
    Events and the Canadian Insurance Industry. *Natural Hazards* 16,
    No. 2-3 (November). p. 155.

[^16]: R.A. Pielke, Jr., and C.W. Landsea. 1998. Normalized Hurricane
    Damages in the United States: 1925-1995. *Weather and Forecasting*
    13. pp. 621-631. Website:
    http://www.dir.ucar.edu/esig/HP_roger/hurr-norm.html.

[^17]: United Nations. 1997. *Stop Disasters*. No. 28. p. 4.

[^18]: Ibid.

[^19]: J.K. Mitchell. 1993. Natural Hazard Predictions and Responses in
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    Hazards*. Proceedings Symposium, 22-26 October 1990, Perugia, Italy.
    Edited by Jaromir Nemed, J.M. Nigg, and F. Soccardi. Dordrecht, the
    Netherlands. Kluwer Academic Publishers. p. 29.

[^20]: Dr. Rutherford H. Platt, Project Director. (Department of
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[^21]: Ian Burton, Robert Kates, and Gilbert White. 1993. *The
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[^22]: Smith, 1996, p. 45.

[^23]: Howard Kunreuther. 1998. "Introduction." Chapter One (pp. 1-15)
    in *Paying the Price: The Status and Role of Insurance Against
    Natural Disasters in the United States*. Howard Kunreuther and
    Richard J. Roth, Sr., (eds). Washington, DC, Joseph Henry Press. p.
    2.

[^24]: Beth Della Valle (Coordinator of Maine State Planning Office's
    Land Use Team). 2001. "Are We Paving Over Paradise? Maine's Efforts
    at Directing Development." *Coastal Services* (NOAA), Vol. 4, Issue
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[^25]: Timothy Beatley and Kristy Manning. 1997. *The Ecology of Place*.
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[^26]: Bill McGuire, Ian Mason, and Christopher Kilburn. 2002. *Natural
    Hazards and Environmental Change*. New York: Oxford University
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[^27]: McGuire, Mason, Kilburn. 2002. p. 2.

[^28]: McGuire, Mason, Kilburn. 2001.p. 3.

[^29]: Ibid.

[^30]: Ibid.

[^31]: McGuire, Mason, Kilburn. 2002. p. 4.

[^32]: McGuire, Mason, Kilburn. Preface.

[^33]: For a brief discussion of this dialog, see White and Etkin 1997.

[^34]: Pamela Friedman. "Rethinking Climate Risks." *Risk Management*.
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[^35]: A. Haines, et al. 1993. Global Health Watch: Monitoring Impacts
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    November 1997). p. 175.

[^36]: Insurance Institute for Property Loss Reduction. 1995. *Coastal
    Exposure and Community Protection: Hurricane Andrew's Legacy*.
    Boston, MA. IIPLR and Wheaton, IL. Insurance Research Council,
    April. p. 13.

[^37]: National Research Council, Commission on Geosciences, Environment
    and Resources, Board on Natural Disasters, Committee on Assessing
    the Costs of Natural Disasters. 1999. *The Impacts of Natural
    Disasters: A Framework for Loss Estimation*. Washington, DC.
    National Academy Press. p. 4.

[^38]: Ibid.

[^39]: *NEFSMA News*, Vol. VIII, Issue 3. "Impacts of Future Sea Level
    Rise on Coastal Flooding." New England Floodplain and Stormwater
    Managers Association, Inc. December, 2000. p. 1. (For the full
    report, see NEFSMA's website:
    [www.nefsma.org](http://www.nefsma.org/). See *Flood Happens!)*

[^40]: *Natural Hazards Observer*. Vol. XXVI, No. 4. "Sea Level Rise and
    Coastal Disasters: Lessons from the East Coast and New Orleans."
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[^41]: Ibid.

[^42]: *National Hazards Observer*. March, 2002. p. 11.

[^43]: Frank Kummer. *Courier Post*. "NJ Rakes In Lion's Share Of Beach
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[^44]: Paige St. John and Larry Wheeler, Gannett News Service. "Erosion
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[^45]: G. Berz. 1990. "Natural Disasters and Insurance/Reinsurance."
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[^46]: General Accounting Office. 1998. *Disaster Assistance:
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[^47]: Associated Press. "People Largely To Blame For Wildfires."
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[^48]: Rene Sanchez and William Booth. *The Washington Post*. June 27,
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[^49]: Spokesman Review.com (Knight-Ridder). "Forests need Return To
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[^50]: *Options for Reducing Public Assistance Program Costs*
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[^51]: Ted Steinberg. 2000. *Acts of God: The Unnatural History of
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[^52]: Nick Gevlock. *Bozeman Daily Chronicle*. "NFIP: Federal Maps
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[^53]: Ibid.

[^54]: See also Burton, Kates, and White. 1993. p. 25.

[^55]: Raymond J. Burby and Linda C. Dalton. 1993. State Planning
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[^56]: National Research Council, Commission on Geosciences, Environment
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    Disaster Reduction. 1991*. A Safer Future: Reducing the Impacts of
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[^57]: Thomas A. Birkland. 1997. *After Disaster: Agenda Setting, Public
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[^58]: Eugene Lecomte, President Emeritus, Insurance Institute for
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    the National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster, March 19,
    1997, Washington, DC: Statistics from IIPLC report *Coastal Exposure
    and Community Protection*, 1995.

[^59]: Arnold R. Parr. "Disasters and human rights of persons with
    disabilities: a case for an ethical disaster mitigation policy. *The
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    1997-98, p. 2.

[^60]: Kathleen J. Tierney, William J. Petak, Harlan Hahn, University of
    Southern California. 1988. *Disabled Persons and Earthquake
    Hazards*. Institute of Behavioral Science, University of Colorado.
    Program on Environment and Behavior, Monograph #46. pp. 2-3.

[^61]: Ibid.

[^62]: Parr, p. 2.

[^63]: Robert Bolin with Lois Stanford. 1998. *The Northridge
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[^64]: American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) and The Institute for
    Business & Home Safety (IBHS). *The Most Wanted: A Search for
    Solutions to Reduce Recurring Losses from Natural hazards*. Fall,
    2001. p. 5.

[^65]: G.F. White, R.W. Kates and I. Burton. "Knowing better and losing
    even more: The use of knowledge in hazards management."
    *Environmental Hazards*. Vol. 3, Nos. 3-4. September/December 2001.
    p. 89.

[^66]: Abramovitz. 2001, p. 36.

[^67]: Ian Christoplos, Anna Liljelund and John Mitchell. "Re-framing
    Risk: The Changing Context of Disaster Mitigation and Preparedness."
    *Disasters, 2001*. Oxford UK and Malden, MA. Blackwell Publishers.
    p. 187.

[^68]: David Weir. "When will they ever learn? The conditions for
    failure in publicly funded high technology projects: the R101 and
    Challenger disasters compared." *Disaster Prevention and
    Management*. Volume 11, No. 4. 2002. pp. 299-307. For full text, see
    [http://www](http://www/).emeraldinsight.com/0965-3562.htm.