Shrimp or Barracuda?

Contemplating a Unified and Nuclear Capable Korea

***Susan F. Bryant***

***Russell D. Howard***

The sudden and surprising summit between the leaders of North and South
Korea has left Korea-watchers in a quandary. Some discount the meeting
as largely a ploy by South Korean president Kim Dae Jung and North
Korean leader Kim Jong Il to bolster their political power. Others are
encouraged by the level of reconciliation achieved at the summit but
doubt the possibility of early unification. In fact, most observers
believe that unification is years if not decades away and will be
achieved only gradually.[^1] Still, few experts anticipated the quick
collapse of East Germany or the speed with which German reunification
took place. It is therefore important to look now at what a reunified
Korea might mean, especially from a security perspective. Whenever it
occurs, reunification of the Korean peninsula is certain to change the
Northeast Asia security landscape and the rationale for a U.S. military
presence there.[^2]

Analysts interested in Korea offer three possible scenarios for Korean
reunification: soft landing, hard landing, and war. This study forecasts
an accelerated soft landing that leads to unification between 2015 and
2020. However, Korean unification will be more difficult and expensive
than the German experience for a variety of economic, demographic, and
security reasons. Indeed, this paper argues that reunification will be
so costly, and conventional forms of security so expensive, that Korea
may well decide it has no alternative to retaining a nuclear capability
in order to ensure the new state\'s security.

Clearly, a nuclear-capable Korea (NCK) would present new security
challenges. It would affect the regional balance of power, perhaps
leading other states, especially Japan, to consider the nuclear option.
It would limit the rationale for a robust U.S. military presence on the
peninsula. It would run counter to longstanding US policy, which has
encouraged disarmament and discouraged non-nuclear states from going
nuclear. It would complicate the national missile defense (NMD) and
theater nuclear defense (TMD) issues. And it might encourage states
outside the region to choose the nuclear option, upsetting
non-proliferation regimes that have developed over the last several
decades.

Assuming that a unified Korea is a nuclear power, how will it behave in
the international community? Will a unified NCK cooperate with other
nuclear powers, sign the nuclear test ban treaty and join other
non-proliferation regimes, allow inspections, and promote other
transparencies and confidence-building measures? Or will it develop and
maintain its nuclear program covertly, much as Israel has for thirty
years? How will the United States, China, and Japan react to a Korea
that has nuclear weapons? How will the security relationship change
among the Northeast Asian states?

"Shrimp or Barracuda---Contemplating a Unified and Nuclear Capable
Korea\" examines these and other important questions. The chapter first
compares German unification to possible Korean scenarios, including
union, federation, and confederation. It then discusses three nuclear
options for Korea: renunciation of nuclear weapons (the German model),
open nuclearization (joining the nuclear club), or covert nuclearization
(the Israeli model). Next, it examines the likely effects of a
nuclear-capable Korea on the security policies of China, Japan, and
Russia. Finally, the chapter examines U.S. foreign policy options if a
unified Korea goes nuclear.

**Reunification Scenarios**

Much previous discussion of Korean reunification has centered on the
question of "landings." A "hard landing" would be reunification of the
peninsula as the result of a second Korean War. A "soft landing" would
be reunification resulting from the collapse of North Korea and its
absorption by the South. Or there may be no landing: the status quo
might continue indefinitely.

Although these scenarios provide a framework for discussion, they also
oversimplify. First, they rest on the unlikely premise that the North
Korean government will collapse, either as a result either of war or of
economic strain. But despite years of famine and economic strangulation,
the North Korean regime does not appear to be on the brink of collapse.
At any rate, it has shown that it can teeter on the brink indefinitely.
The above scenarios also assume that if reunification does occur, it
will be without the input or consent of the North Korean government. But
this is not a foregone conclusion. For these reasons, this paper\'s
discussion of reunification will not be confined to the "landing"
scenarios but will also consider other ways in which the peninsula could
be reunified.[^3]

**Reunification Through Violence**

This is the scenario most familiar to the American public. It assumes
that as a result of desperation or miscalculation, the North Korean
government will attempt to reunify the peninsula by force. The
plausibility of this scenario rests on several basic facts. First,
although North Korean rhetoric has softened over the years, Pyongyang
has never formally renounced its intention to reunify the peninsula
under communism. According to a Defense Department White Paper:

Despite the ROK government's consistent engagement policy toward the
North, North Korea, based on its "One Chosun" logic, continues to refuse
inter-Korean peaceful, coexistence and pursues the strategy of
communizing the South. After forming a united front against the South
and stepping up war preparations at home, the North seeks to communize
the peninsula by means of a "violent revolution," or "war by using
force" when the crucial moment comes. A crucial moment is when a
politically and militarily favorable atmosphere is created by social
disorder in South Korea, the withdrawal of USFK, etc.[^4]

Although such threats may seem like nothing more than empty posturing,
when coupled with the military capabilities of the DPRK they do give
prudent observers pause. North Korea boasts the world's fifth-largest
army, maintains a constant war footing along the demilitarized zone, and
has been responsible for numerous attempts at aggression and
infiltration since the armistice was signed.

Nevertheless, despite the power and past aggressive behavior of the
North Korean armed forces, it is doubtful that the regime in Pyongyang
will attempt to reunify the peninsula by force. The North Korean
military is technologically inferior to both the South Korean and US
forces. Although the North's military outnumbers the South's, analysts
have concluded, "the DPRK army does not have the sustained fighting
power simply because of the shortage of its oil supply."[^5] The
consensus among experts is that North Korea is incapable of reunifying
the peninsula by force, and it seems doubtful that they will try.

**Reunification Through Collapse of the North**

The reunification of the peninsula through the collapse and absorption
of North Korea is more likely. In this case, North Korea would simply
cease to exist as a state, to be subsumed by South Korea. This scenario
corresponds most closely to the reunification of East and West Germany.
As part of his "Sunshine Policy," South Korean President Kim Ad Jung has
stated that, primarily for economic reasons, South Korea will not seek
reunification through the absorption of the DPRK. However, the
possibility cannot be dismissed. North Korea's economy has worsened
considerably since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Except for 1999,
the country has experienced negative economic growth every year since
the fall of the USSR.[^6] It has also experienced recurring famine. It
is estimated that more than one million North Koreans have starved to
death in the last five years.[^7] The DPRK runs an annual structural
food deficit of two million tons.[^8] Given the North's economic woes
and its extreme reluctance to reform, it is impossible to overlook the
potential of reunification through collapse and absorption.

However, there are key differences between Germany and Korea. South
Korea does not have West Germany's economic strength. The ratio of East
Germans to West Germans was one to three, while the ratio of North
Koreans to South Koreans is one to two. The per capita income ratio
between East German and West Germany at reunification was one to four;
the ratio between North Korea and South Korea is now one to seven[^9]
and was expected to reach one to twelve by the end of 2000.[^10]
Finally, South Korea is just emerging from a severe economic crisis,
which highlighted substantial and persistent structural weaknesses in
its economy. Despite the present recovery, some observers predict that
South Korea is headed for a new crisis worse than that of 1997.[^11]
Given all this, if Korea does reunify through collapse and absorption,
the new state will need substantial foreign aid and investment in order
to survive.

**Reunification through Peaceful Negotiation**

The third and most plausible scenario for reunification is peaceful
negotiation. Before the recent summit, circumstances leading to a
negotiated settlement were hard to imagine. The two states have a
history that includes a fratricidal war as well as extreme ideological,
political, and economic differences. In order for the two Koreas to
agree to a negotiated settlement, one of the two would almost certainly
have to undergo a fundamental transformation. This seems unlikely in the
near term: the North Korean regime has shown no interest in political
reform, and the Republic of Korea is certainly not going to agree to be
communized.

Nonetheless, it is conceivable that a negotiated reunification will
occur in the near term without the fundamental transformation of either
state. A possible resolution to the dilemma could be a loosely federated
but unified Korea that resembles the Chinese "One State, Two Systems"
model currently in effect for Hong Kong and China. This would allow both
governments to maintain their respective systems while still being
recognized internationally as a single state.

During the summit meeting of June 15, 2000, leaders of both North and
South Korea agreed that they needed to reach an independent resolution
on reunification. In the view of some Korea-watchers, there has been a
distinct "Koreanization" of the issue,[^12] i.e., the two governments
are increasingly interested in achieving reunification without the
interference of foreign powers. This Koreanization may facilitate the
formation of a loose federation.[^13]

Federation is not a revolutionary idea. Both North and South Korea have
proposed it as an interim step to reunification. The DPRK has promoted
this idea in the form of the Democratic Confederative Republic of Korea.
Under this plan, both Koreas maintain their respective governments while
creating a unified national government.

> As it is known, the DPRK has advanced the idea of the creation of the
> North-South Confederation in the form of the Democratic Confederative
> Republic Korea. The idea allows preservation of the two existing
> social political systems. At the same time a unified national
> government will be formed with equal participation of the DPRK and ROK
> representatives. Under the leadership of the unified national
> government the North and South will practice self-government. [^14]

South Korea has also proposed confederation. In 1989, the ROK proposed
the "Korean Commonwealth" which would operate through a common Council
of Ministers from the two Koreas. The goal of this confederation was to
work out the issues of divided families and to draft a constitution for
a reunified Korean state.[^15] Although these two proposals differ in
their intent and scope, there may be room to compromise on a
confederation agreeable to both sides.

**Federation---An Interim Solution**

Several circumstances could lead both governments to look favorably on
federation. The North Korean economy is non-functional.[^16] The South
Korean government shrinks from reunification in the near term because of
the expense of rebuilding the North after reunification. \"Opinion polls
in recent years have suggested that while South Koreans think
unification is important, they are not prepared to pay very much for
it.\"[^17] Unfortunately, the cost of reunification increases the longer
it is delayed. In 1990 the estimated cost of reunification was \$319
billion. By 1995 the figure had risen to \$754 billion and is currently
estimated at more than \$1.7 trillion.[^18]

It is not just the cost of unification that worries South Koreans. They
are also concerned about the possible massive human exodus from the
impoverished North if border restrictions are lifted. With the bright
lights of Seoul, \"glowing like a beacon\" just sixty kilometers south
of the Demilitarized Zone, some analysts believe 1.4 to 4 million North
Koreans could head south if the border were opened.[^19]

Given North Korea's desperate economic situation and South Korea's
reluctance to take on overwhelming debt, a loose federation that
provides potential economic benefits for the two governments without
bankrupting the South may offer a satisfactory compromise.

In several instances the South has already succeeded in helping the
North expand its economy. During the 1990s South Korea's trade with the
North doubled to more than \$330 million. This has already had a
positive impact on the North Korean economy. According to recent
reports, the North's economy actually grew by 6% last year, its first
growth in more than a decade.[^20] The Mount Kumgang Tourism Project,
undertaken with Hyundai, guarantees North Korea \$150 million annually
in revenue, and other South Korean corporations are watching this
project with cautious optimism, ready to enter North Korea if the
circumstances remain favorable.[^21] The South Korean government has
pledged to help the DPRK rebuild its now-defunct infrastructure.[^22]
Although these projects do not indicate a desire for wholesale economic
reform on the part of the North Korean government, they could provide
revenue in amounts that would encourage the DPRK to seek other
opportunities.

Despite this positive news, North Korea remains dependent upon foreign
assistance. By entering a federation, it could increase the amount of
aid received from South Korea and continue slowly to expand its economy.
Some form of federation might also reduce North Korea's current
reputation as a pariah in the international community, making the DPRK
eligible for a variety of international economic packages, including war
reparations from Japan. When South Korea normalized relations with Japan
in 1965, it received an immediate reparations and assistance package of
\$800 million.[^23] If a federated Korea and Japan were to normalize
relations, it could mean a windfall of several billion dollars for the
North. In short, North Korea has substantial incentives to engage Japan
and the rest of the international community, and it will be easier to do
so, while maintaining internal political control, if it is federated
with the South.

Another incentive is reducing the cost of maintaining a constant war
footing. The North Korean government spends between 25% and 33% of its
GNP on defense.[^24] This translates into five to seven billion dollars
each year, while "for two billion dollars annually, one could
sufficiently fix the North Korean economy so that it would generate
rising living standards and reduce discontent."[^25]

The South would also benefit. Although South Korea's military spending
is a much smaller percentage of GNP (around 5%), it still approaches ten
billion dollars annually and accounts for nearly 30% of the government's
annual budget.[^26] The ROK has undeniably made progress since the
financial crisis of 1997, achieving a growth rate of more than 10% in
1999. But signs of economic weakness remain.[^27] The major Korean
conglomerates (*chaebols*) still carry excessive debt, which could
precipitate another economic downturn.[^28] Redirecting funding from
defense spending to economic restructuring could benefit South Korea
substantially. A recent economic study concluded a reduction in defense
spending would boost South Korean exports, as well as spur investment
thus strengthening the ROK economy. In other words, South Korea could
experience a "Peace Dividend."[^29] Federation would increase South
Korea's security by ending the state of war that has persisted on the
peninsula for the past fifty years, while forestalling the economic
disaster that would almost certainly accompany reunification through
North Korea's collapse and absorption.

This, then, is the logic of a negotiated settlement resulting in a loose
federation. South Korea could provide enough aid to prevent North
Korea's collapse and enhance the latter's image in the international
community. Federation could also reduce the costs of security for both
sides, enabling the North to concentrate on basic development and the
South to reclaim its economic prowess.

Given the current desire of all involved to postpone formal
reunification indefinitely, the status quo could continue for several
more decades. Yet discussions of Korean reunification invariably center
on when and how, never on if. Since both North and South Korea agree
that the country must ultimately reunify, this paper will also adopt
that framework. The remainder of the paper addresses the possibility
that a reunified Korea will decide to become a nuclear power. It will be
useful to begin by describing the previous attempts of both North and
South Korea to acquire nuclear weapons.

**Rationale for a Nuclear-Capable, Unified Korea**

Much has been written about North Korea's efforts to acquire nuclear
weapons, though it remains uncertain whether or not the North has
actually succeeded. Despite this uncertainty, most observers believe
that the North does possess nuclear weapons, even though it has been a
signatory of the NPT since 1985.[^30] In 1994 the United States and
South Korea became aware that the North Korean government was removing
spent fuel rods from its nuclear reactor in Yongbyon. This caused
significantly heightened tension, which some have said brought the
peninsula to the brink of war. The standoff ended in October 1994, when
North Korea signed the Agreed Framework and pledged to give up its quest
for nuclear weaponry in exchange for fuel oil, the replacement of its
nuclear reactors, and the gradual normalization of diplomatic relations
with the United States.[^31] However, its actions have continued to
arouse suspicion.

North Korea's nuclear aspirations again became front-page news in August
1998, when it launched a Taepodong missile across the main island of
Japan. Although dismissed by the North Korean government as an attempt
to launch a satellite for propaganda purposes, this action demonstrated
that the North was fast developing inter-continental ballistic missile
technology. The latest National Intelligence Estimate concludes that the
DPRK could develop a missile capable of reaching the US mainland by the
year 2005.[^32] North Korea's continued development of its missile
technology, along with some questionable activities observed by
satellite, leave its neighbors, as well as the United States, uncertain
about its intentions.

Though the DPRK's attempts to become a nuclear power are better known,
the South Korean government has made its own bid to acquire nuclear
weapons. During the 1960s South Korea decided to develop its own nuclear
deterrent because of eroding confidence in US security guarantees. The
ROK watched the United States' failures in Vietnam with concern. Its
anxiety was also fed by the American decision to withdraw the Seventh
Infantry Division in 1970.[^33] For several years South Korean efforts
at nuclearization went unnoticed by the US. In 1974, however, the United
States did notice, and responded swiftly and sharply, threatening
suspension of all economic, trade, and financial assistance, as well as
total American military withdrawal from South Korea, unless the ROK
immediately abandoned its nuclear program.[^34] These threats
effectively ended South Korea's quest for an independent nuclear
deterrent.

Although the United States continues to provide a nuclear security
guarantee for South Korea, it removed all nuclear weapons from the
country in 1991. On December 31, 1991, the two Koreas signed a pledge to
ensure a nuclear-free peninsula.[^35] Despite this pledge, both sides
have since continued research in this area. Recently the South Korean
government has sought to extend the range of its missiles from 300km to
500km. In a 1972 agreement, South Korea agreed to cap its missile firing
range in exchange for US missile technology. Last year US satellites
detected evidence that South Korea was engaged in a covert program of
ballistic missile research and development.[^36] This discovery led to
friction between the two countries. Although they have held several
high-level meetings on this issue, the transparency of South Korea's
ballistic missile research and development program remains a sticking
point in US/ROK diplomatic relations.

Both North and South Korea have a proven history of attempts at nuclear
proliferation. The peninsula also has much unfortunate experience of
Japanese and Chinese imperialist expansion. In the words of one South
Korean general, Korea has always been a "shrimp among whales."[^37] This
unlucky geography and the memory of Japanese occupation could spur a
reunited Korea to pursue an independent nuclear deterrent as a guarantee
against becoming an invasion route again.

**Applying the German Model: Rejecting Nuclear Weapons**

Arguing that a reunified Korea will maintain a nuclear capability goes
against mainstream opinion, and there is not enough historical evidence
to settle the question. Reunified Germany did not consider a nuclear
option, but just as economic comparisons between Germany and Korea may
be misleading, so may security comparisons. Germany had participated in
collective defense and collective security regimes for several decades,
while the Koreas have no such tradition. Although many policymakers are
calling for more robust security cooperation in Northeast Asia, there is
currently no shared vision of a future regional security structure:[^38]

> There is no consensus about the desirable regional security structure
> end state, nor any commonly shared view of the conditions for peace
> and stability in Northeast Asia. Uncertainty, flexibility, and
> fluidity will dominate the strategic reality of Northeast Asia for the
> time being.[^39]

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), of which
Germany is a member, provides an institutional framework for discussion
of several forms of confidence-building measures. There is no similar
organization in Northeast Asia. Instead, interaction between the states
in the region is most always bilateral. While the potential usefulness
of bilateral security arrangements in Northeast Asia should not be
underestimated, such arrangements may breed suspicion and
misunderstanding in other states.[^40] Finally, while Korea is a
\"shrimp among whales,\" Germany is a whale among whales---in fact, the
biggest whale. A reunified Korea will not have the collective defense
and security guarantees that protect Germany, nor will it be able to
shape the security environment through dialogue, as Germany does in the
CSCE.

There are several reasons why a reunified Korea, even in a federated
form, may want to retain the North\'s missile and nuclear program (see
Chart 1 below). Koreans may argue that, as the smallest country in the
region, they will need to be equipped with a strong deterrent
capability, which it would be too costly for conventional forces to
provide. Indeed, in order to develop the North, finance the South\'s
full economic recovery, and build mutual confidence, both Koreas will
have to downsize their conventional forces and reduce the percentage of
GDP spent on defense. National pride may play a role, with some Koreans
viewing nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles as a symbol of Korean
strength.[^41] Finally, mindful of the Monju fast breeder reactor that
the Japanese have put into operation, Koreans are concerned about
Japan\'s nuclear potential.[^42] With the technology and nuclear
industry needed to build nuclear weapons and the rocket technology
necessary to build ballistic missiles,[^43] Japan is a \"quasi-nuclear
power\" and a potential threat in the eyes of many Koreans.

**Joining the Nuclear Club**

If a federated Korea does retain the North\'s nuclear arsenal, the best
scenario would be for it to join the nuclear club. Doing so might anger
the United States, other nuclear states, and regional actors, especially
Japan. But Korea could increase its nuclear transparency and build
confidence by adhering to all the protocols and treaties observed by the
other nuclear states and by allowing scheduled and non-scheduled
inspections.

Both North and South Korea are signatories of the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty. If a reunified Korea openly declared itself a
nuclear power, it would experience tremendous international pressure to
abandon the nuclear path. If it resisted this pressure, it should at
least be required to comply with all current international inspection
regimes, including challenge inspections from the International Atomic
Energy Agency.[^44] It could also increase transparency by providing
unrestricted access to Defense Threat Reduction Agency onsite inspection
teams and by adhering to the same inspection requirements as Russia and
the United States.

  -------------- ---------- ------------ ------------- ------------ ----------- ----------- ------------ -----------
                 **United   **Russia**   **Britain**   **France**   **China**   **India**   **Israel**   **Korea**
                 States**                                                                                

  World Power    Yes        Yes          Originally    Originally   Future plan Possibly    \-           Unlikely
  Status                                                                                                 

  National       Yes        Yes          Yes           Yes          Yes         Yes         Yes          Yes
  Security                                                                                               

  Ideological    Yes        Yes          \-            \-           Yes         \-          \-           
  leadership                                                                                             

  Regional Power \-         Yes          \-            \-           Yes         Yes         \-           Possibly

  Alliance       Yes        Yes          Yes           Originally   \-          \-          \-           Unlikely
  obligations                                                                                            

  Second         \-         \-           Yes           Yes          \-          \-          \-           
  decision                                                                                               
  center                                                                                                 

  To offset      Yes        Yes          Yes           Yes          \-          \-          Yes          Yes
  conventional                                                                                           
  weaknesses                                                                                             

  Internal       \-         \-           Possibly      Yes          \-          Yes         \-           Yes
  prestige                                                                                               

  Insurance      \-         \-           Yes           Yes          \-          Possibly    Possibly     Possibly
  against future                                                                                         
  changes in                                                                                             
  alliances                                                                                              

  Scientific or  Yes        Yes          Yes           Yes          \-          Yes         Possibly     Yes
  military                                                                                               
  pressures                                                                                              

  Reaction to    Yes        Yes          Yes           Yes          Yes -       Yes -       \-           Yes
  possible                                                                                               
  nuclear threat                                                                                         

                                                                                                         
  -------------- ---------- ------------ ------------- ------------ ----------- ----------- ------------ -----------

**Chart 1**

Currently the United States and Russia ensure that their nuclear
arsenals remain transparent to one another. Both states are parties to
the 1992 Treaty on Open Skies, allowing reciprocal unarmed aerial
observation flights. In 1991 both countries agreed to a moratorium on
underground testing that remains in effect pending the ratification of
the CTBT.[^45] If a nuclear-capable Korea wished to join the nuclear
club as a member in good standing, it would have to guarantee the
transparency of its nuclear program to all anxious observers.

**The Israeli Model: *Ein brera---*No Alternative**

Israel developed nuclear weapons because of concerns about the
steadfastness of the U.S. commitment to Israeli security. President
Eisenhower would not agree to a security agreement with Israel and
maintained an embargo on arms sales to the Jewish state throughout his
administration. Without the protection of the US nuclear umbrella,
Israel embarked on an independent course called *Ein brera*, which means
"no alternative." *Ein brera* was a phrase used by many Holocaust
survivors to signify their belief that a nuclear arsenal was essential
to Israel's survival. *Ein brera* emphasized self-defense and
self-reliance and evolved in secret.\"[^46]

"No alternative" refers to a scenario in which Israeli conventional
forces are defeated by Arab coalition forces and the existence of Israel
is threatened. The Israelis formulated a two-pronged doctrine,
incorporating the use of nuclear weapons as a last resort and as a
deterrent. As a deterrent, nuclear weapons could either prevent war or,
if war occurred, could bring about a quick termination by means of a
threat to attack the Arab states. Rather than a first-strike capability,
Israel\'s objective would be self-defense.[^47]

Even though Israel has had a nuclear program since 1966, it was not
acknowledged until 1996, by then-Prime Minister Shimon Peres.[^48] In
February 2000 Israel\'s nuclear program was debated in the Knesset for
the first time, after an Arab member called on the government to
disclose the number of Israeli nuclear warheads and dismantle them.[^49]
Minister of Jerusalem Affairs Haim Ramon replied, on behalf of the
government, that he could not respond in detail because \"to do so would
aid the enemy.\"[^50] He reiterated the Israeli government\'s policy on
nuclear arms:

(1) Israel would not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the
    Middle East. (2) Israel supports nuclear nonproliferation, but at
    the same time, the nuclear proliferation treaty in its present form
    is not an appropriate solution for the Middle East as proven in the
    case of Iran and Iraq. (3) Israel supports a Middle East free of
    nuclear and ballistic weapons in the long term, but only if there is
    no threat of warfare and a longstanding peace between the countries
    in the area.[^51]

Despite international pressure to sign nuclear proliferation treaties,
Israel is still very guarded about its nuclear program. Recently Prime
Minister Ehud Barak refused to permit international inspectors access to
Israel\'s nuclear facility in Dimona and reaffirmed Israel\'s need for a
nuclear capability as long as hostile neighbors continue to pose a
threat.[^52]

It is generally believed that Israel possesses between one hundred and
two hundred nuclear weapons and has the means to deliver them within the
Middle East.[^53] Its technical capabilities and intentions remain
ambiguous, for several reasons. First, according to the 1976 Symington
Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1967, all military aid would
be cut off if Israel participated in a nuclear weapons program.[^54]
Second, acknowledging a nuclear weapons program would embarrass the US,
which has officially accepted Israeli denials for decades. Third, an
arms race might result if Arab states felt compelled to respond to an
Israeli announcement. Finally, by not declaring its nuclear weapons
program, Israel has been able to avoid domestic debate.[^55]

This nuclear version of \"don\'t ask, don\'t tell\" seemed the logical
solution when Israel felt compelled to develop weapons to defend against
its neighbors at the same time the US was pushing for global
nonproliferation.[^56] The same logic may apply to a reunified Korea.
Like Israel, Korea is surrounded by potentially hostile states and is
not part of a collective security or defense organization. Both South
Korea and North Korea have, like Israel, occasionally doubted the
steadfastness of their security guarantors. South Korea was quite
nervous when in 1976 President Carter advocated a pullout of all U.S.
forces over a five-year period.[^57] On the other side, it is generally
assumed that the breakup of the Soviet Union robbed North Korea of one
of its staunchest allies, but a split actually occurred during the
Gorbachev era, when Soviet policy began to place less emphasis on
ideological and military ties with Pyongyang and more emphasis on
economic and political ties with the South.[^58]

Indeed, many analysts see North Korea\'s apparent efforts to accelerate
its nuclear program as a response to changes in relations with the
Soviet Union and China, changes, which also had serious repercussions
for the North Korean economy. The collapse of the USSR cut off Pyongyang
from its major source of modern military hardware. The demise of the
Soviet bloc eliminated sixty percent of North Korea\'s two-way trade,
which made it difficult for the North to support its large
military.[^59] Another blow was Beijing\'s 1993 decision to establish
diplomatic relations with Seoul and to increase trade and investment
ties between China and South Korea.[^60]

Israel\'s self-reliance policy, *Ein brera*, is not dissimilar to the
North Korean *chuche* ideology. Essentially, *chuche* means
self-reliance but, depending on the context, may also mean national
identity, national pride, or national assertiveness. Introduced in
December 1955, *chuche* has been used to justify major initiatives,
including eliminating factional enemies, widening diplomatic activities,
neutralizing attempts by China or Russia to exert influence over Korea,
questioning the legitimacy of the South Korean government, and
relentlessly attacking US imperialism.[^61]

While the South Korean government has no such doctrine, it has chafed
under US restrictions limiting South Korea\'s production of advanced
missile systems. At present Seoul is limited to producing missiles with
a range of 110 miles. The South Koreans want to alter the agreement to
permit development of space-launcher capabilities, which involve
technologies and systems identical to those used in long-range,
warhead-tipped missiles.

> South Korean officials have said they will seek missile technology
> from Russia or other missile-producing nations if the United States
> does not supply it. \"We should try to maintain a minimum level of
> self-defense capabilities without depending on the United States
> forever,\" a South Korean Foreign Ministry official told Yonhap, the
> official South Korean news agency, on Friday. "It\'s about national
> pride."[^62]

Like Israel, a nuclear-capable, unified Korea could adopt a two-pronged
doctrine, defining nuclear weapons as a deterrent and a weapon of last
resort. As a deterrent, nuclear weapons would prevent nuclear attack by
other regional nuclear powers, such as China and Russia, or by potential
nuclear powers like Japan. As a weapon of last resort, they would be
used if Korea\'s conventional forces were near defeat and the existence
of the state were threatened. Korean capabilities would be too small to
allow a first strike, so self-defense would be the only rationale for
maintaining nuclear weapons.

Even though North Korea has had a nuclear program for more than a
decade, it is not clear how many weapons, if any, they have produced.
Considering the amount of plutonium that it has been able to accumulate
by reprocessing unsafeguarded spent uranium, there is a good chance that
Pyongyang has already secretly developed one or more nuclear
devices.[^63] Obviously a unified Korea, determined to build a nuclear
arsenal, could readily increase the number of its weapons and delivery
systems, though the leadership may want to keep the program secret for
many of the same reasons that the Israelis did.

For example, Korea would not want to run the risk of violating the 1976
Symington Act.[^64] Presumably, it would very much want to remain
eligible for military assistance from the United States, since the cost
of rebuilding the North would cut into the percentage of GDP available
for military needs. Acknowledging a nuclear weapons program would
exacerbate the arms race that already exists in the region and might
well lead the Japanese to consider the nuclear option. \"A nuclear Korea
is one of the few scenarios that might cure Japan of its \'nuclear
allergy\' and induce it to establish its own nuclear strike
force.\"[^65] The U.S. might be willing to accept an opaque and
ambiguous nuclear program but not an open one, at least in the near
term. And by officially declaring a nuclear weapons program, Korea would
precipitate public debate in the South and possibly throughout the
country. Korean politics are traditionally quite volatile, and it is
unclear how citizens of the newly unified state would react.

A unified Korea could justify a "don't ask, don't tell" policy with some
of the same arguments that Israel uses. It could pledge not be the first
to use nuclear weapons. It could declare adherence to the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty, as the North does today. And it could promise
support for a region free of nuclear and ballistic weapons in the long
term, once there is no threat of warfare and the major regional powers
have given up their historical proclivity for using the peninsula as a
favorite invasion route.

**Evolving Regional Security**

In theory, an easing of Cold War tensions on the Korean should benefit
all. In practice, however, many analysts contend that the positive
atmospherics of the June 2000 inter-Korean summit presage a substantive
change in the security situation, with wide-ranging and perhaps not
wholly comforting implications for the region.[^66]

> A reconciliation that led eventually to reunification between the
> Koreas would be welcome. It would also be hugely unsettling, obliging
> America to review its region-stabilizing troop commitments in South
> Korea and Japan, and rekindling old rivalries among China, Japan, and
> Russia for influence in Korea[^67]

Animosities in East Asia, unlike those in Western Europe, did not wither
away during the Cold War. When the former Soviet Union was the enemy,
most East Asian states, eventually including China, clustered around
America for protection. \"East Asia\'s two natural rivals, China and
Japan, managed to curb their hostility, but never resolved it.\"[^68]
The new potential for a reunified Korea has rekindled concerns about
historical animosities in the region. Shortly after the Korean summit,
South Korea\'s military proposed a new strategy called \"an
omni-directional defense posture,\" looking beyond North Korea and
focusing on the waters and airspace around South Korea.[^69] The new
strategy has several objectives. First, it deflects North Korean
criticism of South Korea\'s military by focusing the latter's military
power on other areas. Second, it signals a desire to end South Korea\'s
longstanding security dependence on the United States.[^70] Third, it
expresses Seoul\'s concern about the expanding security spheres of Japan
and China, which overlap South Korea\'s and therefore increase the
chances of confrontation.[^71]

> In expanding its areas of concern, South Korea is joining Japan and
> China in redefining security interests and operational strategies in
> post-Cold War Northeast Asia. Already some of their operations overlap
> and will increasingly do so. Beyond the Sea of Japan and the Yellow
> Sea, however, the three nations have competing, strategic and economic
> interests in developing and maintaining security in the shipping lanes
> through the South China Sea to the Indian Ocean.[^72]

Eventually, Japan, China, Russia, and a unified Korea will seek to exert
control over various parts of the same large area: from the Kamchatka
Peninsula to Japan to Singapore to India and the Middle East.

**Japan**

Currently, the Japanese navy projects the most power in the region.
Japanese military policy is restricted by the nation\'s
American-dictated Constitution. Under Article Nine of that Constitution,
the Japanese people forever renounce war or the threat of force.[^73]
But Japan\'s constitutional restraint is fading as the U.S. encourages
Japan to take on more of the security burden in the region. Potential
new conflicts with China, North Korea, and others have led many Japanese
to call for a reinterpretation of the Constitution or an amendment to
give Japan\'s armed forces greater freedom.[^74]

> For all the constitutional restrictions and historical sentiments,
> Japan has built its self-defense forces into one of the most powerful
> armies in Asia. Its annual military budget of \$45 billion is the
> second largest in the world after that of the United States. The size
> of its forces and the sophistication of its weaponry are roughly
> equivalent to those of Britain, which has an annual defense budget of
> about \$33 billion. Japan has about 236,000 military personnel,
> compared to Britain\'s 220,000.[^75]

# Relations With Korea

Improved political and military relations between Japan and South
Korea---now arguably the best they have been since normalization of
relations in 1965---have mostly been based on the continued viability
and hostility of the North Korean regime. Absent a hostile North Korea,
the question arises: \"Will inter-Korean détente necessarily mean a rise
in anti-Japanese sentiment potentially destructive to the painstaking
efforts to put these colonial ghosts to bed?\"[^76]

Memories are long in both North and South Korea. Japanese troops
occupied South Korea from 1910 to 1945, setting up a brutal occupation
government that forced all Koreans to take Japanese names. The Korean
flag was banned, and schoolchildren were taught exclusively in Japanese.
It is common today for Koreans in their sixties and seventies to know
Japanese but refuse to speak it, out of distaste for their former
colonial rulers.[^77] South of Seoul is a museum dedicated to
memorializing the hardships of Japanese rule. In the port city of
Chinhae, South Korean naval cadets study in the shadow of a museum
devoted to the Korean Admiral Yi, who in the late 1500s fought off
repeated invasion attempts by the Japanese warlord Hideyoshi
Toyotomi.[^78][^79]

A reunified Korea could have serious financial implications for Japan.
The resolution of North Korea\'s post-colonial claims against Japan
could be the single biggest source of funding to rebuild the North\'s
economy.[^80] Japan paid South Korea \$800 million in compensation for
colonial and wartime activities upon normalization of diplomatic
relations in 1965.[^81] North Koreans will expect similar compensation.
Adjusting the South Korean payment for differences in population,
accrued interest, inflation and appreciation of the yen since 1965 gives
a figure of \$20 billion. The claims of \"comfort women\" who were
pressed into sexual slavery during World War II may add another \$5-8
billion.[^82]

Japan\'s relations with China will also be affected by reunification. An
antagonistic North Korea has enabled Japan to justify a number of
security initiatives, such as enhanced military relations with the
United States and the exploratory development of a missile-defense
system.[^83] Even absent a hostile North Korea, Japan will wish to
continue these security initiatives, which will then be seen as what
they really are: means to protect Japan from China\'s military
modernization program.[^84]

**Japan and a Unified, Nuclear-Capable Korea**

A nuclear-capable, unified Korea would be disconcerting to the Japanese.
A nuclear Korea bound together by anti-Japanese nationalism would be
seen as potentially threatening to Japanese national security. And the
nuclearization of the Korean peninsula, leaving Japan the non-nuclear
odd man out in the region, would arouse nationalist forces, occasioning
political and social turmoil and putting pressure on the Japanese
government to further rearm. Japan would very likely respond in its
usual fashion, with its checkbook, withholding much-needed cash and
credit from the struggling new Korean State or handsomely rewarding the
denuclearization of the peninsula.[^85]

**China**

China is modernizing its military by acquiring new weapons systems,
restructuring forces, and improving training. Much of China\'s new
military equipment has been purchased from Russia at bargain prices
because of Russia\'s lack of hard currency. China\'s modernization is
driven by several factors, including lessons learned from the Gulf war,
the need to protect its vital economic interests and territory, the need
to maintain internal stability, and a desire to be the leading power in
Asia.[^86]

Regionally, China has territorial disputes with many countries. \"The
most prominent examples are China\'s claim to the South China Sea and
its resolve to use force if Taiwan declares independence from the
mainland.\"[^87] Several US and Asian policymakers and scholars believe
that as China\'s military capability increases, so does regional anxiety
about its intentions. At present, many Asians believe that China\'s
threat is limited, but they are concerned that China will eventually
have the military capability to challenge them in contested areas.[^88]
\"Tempering the potential for aggression is China\'s economic
development, which relies heavily on foreign investment and
trade.\"[^89] Furthermore, many of China\'s neighbors, like South Korea
and Japan, are also modernizing their militaries, and at a faster pace
than China.

China is a nuclear power. Its nuclear force is small, relatively
primitive, and vulnerable---far smaller than those of the US or Russia
and much less sophisticated.[^90] But China is expanding and modernizing
its nuclear arsenal, possibly with Russian assistance, and it is not
constrained in its nuclear modernization efforts by any arms control
agreements such as those (SALT, START, etc.) governing Russia and the
United States.[^91] Beijing\'s assessment of its nuclear force
requirements may be driven by such factors as the India-Pakistan
dispute, problems with Taiwan, or stability on the Korean
peninsula.[^92] Of course, China\'s modernization efforts may well
stimulate a nuclear modernization race among neighboring countries,
including Russia, India, Japan, and a unified Korea.

**China and Korean Unification**

Most American policymakers believe that the Korean reunification process
will be lengthy and gradual and that reunification on Seoul\'s terms is
the desirable final objective. Beijing's objectives are slightly
different. Publicly, it welcomes reunification, provided that the
resulting Korean state is not anti-Chinese. But Beijing does not want
Pyongyang to undergo a full-scale conversion to capitalism and it may
not be happy to see the peninsula reunified under Seoul\'s leadership,
especially if US forces would thereby have access to China\'s southern
border.[^93] China accepts a US-South Korea alliance in a divided Korea,
but a unified Korea with a continued Korean-American military alliance
would be undesirable.[^94]

**China and Unified, Nuclear-Capable Korea**

The China-Korea relationship will certainly be strained if a unified
Korea retains a nuclear capability. The Chinese believe that a new
nuclear neighbor will probably induce Japan to go nuclear and will
stimulate interest in ballistic missile defense in Japan and other Asian
States. Beijing is no less hypocritical than the other established
nuclear powers: now that it has nukes, it doesn't want any new members
in the club. Besides, a nuclear Korea might feel less need to cultivate
an ally for its security, depriving China of any hope of being Korea\'s
strategic partner in Northeast Asia.

While China would not welcome another nuclear-capable neighbor, it
probably would not see an independent nuclear Korea as a direct threat.
Its probable reaction would be to go along passively with international
pressure on Korea to disarm, although more active coordination with the
US and the United Nations Security Council is not out of the question.
More troublesome to China would be Japan's going nuclear or a nuclear
Korea in the US camp. Either a US-Korea nuclear alliance or a nuclear
Japan would prompt China to reexamine its own nuclear strategy and
levels and types of armament.[^95]

**Russia**

\"Russia\'s basic policy toward Northeast Asia is to create an
environment in which it can exercise its influence over the
region.\"[^96] This means helping establish lasting peace and stability
on the peninsula and supporting direct talks between the two Koreas.
\"In line with such policies, Russia supports the peaceful co-existence
of the two Koreas, exchanges and cooperation between the two, and
denuclearization and arms reduction throughout the entire
peninsula."[^97]

Although Russia would like to be a player in Northeast Asia, the Putin
regime has little to offer. Russia\'s economy is in trouble and its
military power is in decline. Russia inherited 60 percent of the Soviet
Union\'s GDP, which has since declined by more than 40 percent.[^98]
\"In the wake of the 1998 financial crisis, predictions of slight
economic growth in 1999 have given way to forecasts of further
contraction, perhaps negative 2 to 4 percent."[^99] Inadequate economic
infrastructure, declining production, and crime are among the most
troubling problems.[^100] The downturn in the Russian economy during the
1990s struck the Russian Far East particularly hard. Output in this
region was lower than for the country as a whole[^101]: its share of the
country's economic output fell from 5 percent in 1991 to 3.8 percent in
1995.[^102]

Russia\'s military is also in trouble. The recent *Kursk* submarine
tragedy, followed by Russia\'s inability to launch a rescue mission at
sea, is but one example of a defense establishment in steep decline.
Ground and air units lack regular training, basic maintenance, housing,
and social support for their personnel.[^103]

> Now it is obvious that this is not the case. Russia\'s military
> technical abilities have become increasingly outdated, and are
> repaired only in a most provisional way. Whole swathes of equipment,
> which exist on paper, have already been either shut down for a long
> time or sold off by corrupt officers for their personal enrichment.
> Thus it proved impossible to find divers in the entire Russian fleet,
> or the whole country, who could have dived down to the Kursk. When the
> army leadership steals and is corrupt, the majority of ordinary
> soldiers and sailors see no sense in their service and are completely
> demoralized.[^104]

Military problems are even more severe in the Russian Far East. Just
weeks after a major military exercise in the European Theater, Russian
nuclear forces in the east had their power supply terminated because
they had not paid their utility bill.[^105] The military-industrial
complex in the region is also in serious trouble. \"The end of the
Soviet Union meant a decline in military orders of between 20 and 60
percent, depending on the enterprise. This strongly affected both the
military production enterprises, and the cities in Siberia and the Far
East that relied upon them."[^106]

Moscow understands that the Russian Far East will be economically weak
and militarily deficient for some time and worries that this
resource-rich region could come under the sway of an increasingly
powerful China.[^107] \"The issue is often discussed in purely
demographic terms, with a declining population of seven million Russians
in the area contrasted with one hundred million or more Chinese just
across the border.\"[^108] Moscow recognizes that Russia\'s economic and
military weaknesses limit its opportunity to influence decisions in
Northeast Asia. Thus Russia faces the long-term challenge of managing
relations with China, Japan, and the two Koreas from a position of
relative isolation.

**Russia and Korean Unification**

Russia publicly supports Korean unification, though not without some
private concerns. Compared with China, however, which many Russians
believe to be desirous of keeping Korea divided because a unified Korea
might lead to a stronger American presence in the region, or with Japan,
which is concerned about traditional anti-Japanese sentiment among
Koreans, Moscow does not have much to lose. Russia sees the following
positive aspects of Korean unification:

> 1\) The disappearance of a potential threat near the Russian border;
> 2) a reduction in the size of the two large Korean armies and
> withdrawal of American troops from a strategically important Far
> Eastern region; 3) the end of Moscow\'s diplomatic maneuvering between
> Pyongyang and Seoul, which has not brought many benefits to Russia; 4)
> the creation of more opportunities to solve regional security problems
> in cooperation with a unified Korea, including nuclear security,
> ecological security, terrorism, and illegal migration; and 5) the
> opportunity to develop economic cooperation with a large Korean
> economy.[^109]

According to a senior Russian Korea expert, \"Russia can accept any
scenarios and formulas for Korean unification, provided they rule out
foreign intervention and any forms of violence or the use of force,
satisfy the people of the North and the South, and are based on a
democratic, evolutionary, negotiating process that is respectful of
national and universal human values.\"[^110] Although Moscow agrees that
the truce agreement signed in 1953 after the Korean War has become
obsolete, it insists that efforts to replace it with another treaty
should not be rushed. At present, according to Russian analysts, the
1953 agreement is the only internationally recognized document that
insures peace on the Korean peninsula. Russia prefers South Korea\'s
approach, whereby a Korean peace treaty would be based on a bilateral
agreement between the South and the North, to North Korea\'s suggestion
that it be signed by North Korea and the US. Moscow wants to prevent any
growth of US influence on the peninsula.[^111]

**Russia and a Unified, Nuclear Capable Korea**

Moscow\'s position regarding nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula has
been clear for decades. Russian leaders and their Soviet predecessors
have consistently called for the peninsula to be a nuclear-free zone and
have sought guarantees from other nuclear powers to this end.[^112]
Russia will be sorting out its own problems while Korean unification is
underway, but it will doubtless subscribe to international pressure on
Korea to give up nuclear arms. A nuclear arms race among the states of
Northeast Asia would not be in Russia\'s interest, and anything that
causes the Chinese to go beyond a strategy of minimal deterrence would
be particularly worrisome.[^113]

**United States**

The US military presence in Northeast Asia has long made important
practical and symbolic contributions to regional security. US forces
stationed in Japan and Korea, as well as those rotated throughout the
region, promote security and stability, deter conflict, give substance
to American security commitments, and ensure the continued access of
other US forces to the region.[^114] According to Defense Secretary
William Cohen:

> Our military presence in Asia serves as an important deterrent to
> aggression, often lessening the need for a more substantial and costly
> U.S. response later. Today deterrent capability remains critical in
> areas such as the Korean Peninsula. A visible U.S. force presence in
> Asia demonstrates firm determination to defend U.S., allied and
> friendly interests in this critical region.[^115]

The United States maintains approximately 100,000 military personnel in
the Asia-Pacific region, most of them in South Korea (37,000) and Japan
(47,000).[^116] This regional force level is based on an analysis of the
strategic environment now and in the future and of the military
capabilities needed to achieve US foreign and security policy goals.
These forces include the US Eighth Army and Seventh Air Force in Korea,
the III Marine Expeditionary Force and Fifth Air Force in Japan, and the
US Seventh Fleet. All are focused and ready.[^117]

**The United States and Korean Unification: Questioning the Rationale
for American Forces on the Peninsula**

The success of the recent summit has led many to question current US
force levels and security policy in Northeast Asia. In fact, there is a
growing sense among defense experts and security analysts that enormous
changes may be in the offing.[^118] "The prospect of peace on the Korean
Peninsula challenges the keystone assumption of recent US military
planning: the idea that the US military must be ready to fight
simultaneously in Korea and in the Persian Gulf against Iraq or
Iran.\"[^119] The US military has used this scenario, known as the \"two
major regional contingency" (2MRC) scenario, to justify its size,
structure, and doctrine since the end of the Cold War.[^120] If tensions
subside, as they appear to be doing, what analyst Doug Paal calls a "fig
leaf---the easy reference to the danger of North Korea as a solution to
any budget or policy problem threatening the military status quo---would
disappear.\"[^121]

Some US politicians are already talking about reconsidering America\'s
troop commitments to South Korea. Senator Jesse Helms says he is
\"heartened\" by summit developments and believes it is time for the US
to consider removing troops from South Korea.[^122] Former US Assistant
Defense Secretary Richard Armitage, an adviser to Republican
presidential candidate George W. Bush and possible senior official in
the Bush administration, agrees but thinks even greater cuts might be
warranted. Armitage believes that the current policy of keeping 100,000
American troops in Asia---down from 135,000 in 1990---needs to be
reviewed and that troop cuts in Korea and throughout the region should
not be ruled out.[^123]

Reconciliation on the Korean peninsula may also undercut America's
rationale for investing in national missile defense. North Korea\'s
development of long-range and potentially nuclear-capable missiles has
been the Clinton administration\'s principal rationale for building a
missile interceptor system.[^124] It has been convenient for the
President and many Republicans to hang the \"rogue state\" label on
North Korea in order to justify an expensive (\$60 billion) and unproven
nuclear missile defense (NMD) program. If things continue to go well
between the two Koreas, it will be much more difficult to sell
NMD.[^125]

Other Northeast Asia states have mixed opinions about American troops
remaining in the region. South Korea is sending ambiguous signals in the
aftermath of the summit. President Kim Dae Jung has repeatedly said that
US forces should stay. On the 50th anniversary of the North Korea
invasion of South Korea, he offered his strongest affirmation of the
need for US troops. \"U.S. armed forces will stay until a complete
system is put in place on the Korean peninsula,\"[^126] he said; and
\"U.S troops will still be needed after reunification in order to
maintain the balance of power in Northeast Asia.\"[^127] But many of
President Kim\'s countrymen do not agree. Days after the summit there
were protests throughout South Korea calling for the removal of US
forces.[^128] The protests have continued, sometimes with crowds
numbering in the thousands.[^129]

North Korea has regularly railed at the presence of US troops, calling
them an \"occupation army\" and sometimes demanding their removal as a
prerequisite for improved relations with Seoul and Washington.[^130]
Privately, however, it has hinted at more flexibility.[^131] Recent
statements attributed to Kim Jong Il appear to turn the North's
long-proclaimed strategic equation on its head. Evidently Kim Jong Il
agrees with his South Korean counterpart: a USwithdrawal would create a
huge vacuum that might draw the other regional powers into a fight for
hegemony. \"We are surrounded by big powers---Russia, China and
Japan---and therefore it is desirable that the American troops continue
to stay.\"[^132]

China has also called publicly for a pullout of American forces.
\"Further détente on the Korean peninsula will gradually weaken the
basis for the U.S. military presence in South Korea,\" said a recent
*China Daily* editorial.[^133] A leading Beijing expert on North Korean
affairs told the *China Daily News* that China might accept unification,
with North Korea absorbed by the South, but only if the 37,000 U.S.
troops are withdrawn.[^134] \"Obviously a continued presence of US
forces in Korea after unification would potentially limit Chinese
influence on the peninsula. Those forces would also be useful to the US
in any effort to contain China.\"[^135] Privately, however, many Chinese
academics and policymakers say they are not worried about a continued US
presence, because it might serve to block Japanese strategic designs on
a unified Korea.[^136]

For several reasons, Japan would want US forces to remain in a unified
Korea and are counting on continued promises by the United States that a
regional force of 100,000 will be sustained.[^137] First, Japan
recognizes the fundamental and continuing contribution of its alliance
with the US to the defense of Japan and to regional peace and stability.
Second, without American forces in a unified Korea, Japan would have to
expand its security establishment, fearing the possibility of a hostile
unified Korea and of a Chinese-Russian alliance.[^138] Third, the recall
of US forces from Korea would increase popular pressure in Japan for US
forces to leave. Buffeted by protests in South Korea and Japan and the
diplomatic thaw on the Korean peninsula, the \"forward deployment\" of
American forces in Northeast Asia is under the most intense scrutiny in
decades.[^139] Residents of Okinawa, where US bases cover 19 percent of
the main island, are the most outspoken. Many Okinawans are irritated by
the heavy concentration of forces there after fifty years, and protests
are common.[^140]

Russia has traditionally been a major power in Asia, and both the former
Soviet Union and its present-day successor have consistently called for
US military personnel to leave the Korean peninsula. But Russia has
lately been marginalized in Northeast Asian security issues, and its
opinions are increasingly falling on deaf ears.[^141] In the future,
Russia\'s ability to influence events on the peninsula will depend more
on its own political and economic evolution than on Korean developments.
In the long run, if Russia reestablishes its credibility as a major
power, political, economic, and security opportunities could well arise.
But for the present, its prospects are severely constrained.[^142]

Senior American officials say that missions in Korea and Northeast Asia
are far from over and that calls for the removal of US forces are
premature.[^143] Indeed, Washington and Seoul have moved quickly to
dampen speculation that rapprochement on the peninsula will mean fewer
US troops stationed in South Korea anytime soon.[^144] "Talk of cutting
military strength is inappropriate,\" said Madeleine Albright recently.
According to senior US military officials, \"U.S. forces are a
stabilizing force underpinning economic development and political calm,
keeping the sea lanes open, deterring military adventurism and acting as
an \'honest broker\' among rival powers.\"[^145] "Even if you had a
reconciliation and eventually reunification," commented General Henry
Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "there still is the
issue of America\'s forward presence and the peace and stability we
bring to the region.\"[^146] \"When you are 10,000 miles closer to where
the problem is, you are there much sooner, \" said another military
official. \"As soon as you turn around and draw yourself back to the
continental United States---or even to the middle of the Pacific---you
find yourself seven to ten days away from the problem.\"[^147]

Nevertheless, future military leaders may face that contingency, and
there are indications that planning for an eventual withdrawal has
already begun.[^148] In fact, military officials say they are reviewing
strategy to determine whether US ground forces could be reduced or
removed from South Korea and Japan without a loss of military power in
the region.[^149] Speaking anonymously, one official said that a review
was being conducted in case the next president wants to reconsider US
military commitments overseas.[^150]

The United States has its own strategic interests, of course, but its
foreign-based troops are guests, not agents of imperial or colonial
hegemony, a point that was reaffirmed by President Clinton during his
speech to US troops in Okinawa recently.[^151]

> The ultimate decision about whether U.S. forces remain in a reunified
> Korea depends on the perceptions of Koreans and their government(s)
> regarding how best to address Korea\'s own security needs. The
> security relationship itself will remain viable only to the extent
> that both Americans and reunified Koreans perceive joint coordination
> in pursuit of the common interests of both nations as valuable.[^152]

**The United States and a Unified, Nuclear-Capable Korea**

If a unified Korea chose the nuclear option, the United States-Republic
of Korea security alliance would be in jeopardy and the US would demand
that Korea divest itself of such weapons.[^153] The US would not wish to
see a nuclear arms race between China and Japan triggered by Korea\'s
action, which would also be inconsistent with the US commitment to
non-proliferation. The US would probably withdraw from the alliance, or
what was left of it, and would also withdraw political support for the
unified state. Like Japan, the US would probably use economic leverage
to persuade the Koreans to give up their nuclear weapons, either by
offering incentives or by withholding much-needed direct US aid, as well
as multilateral aid if possible.

**Contemplating a Unified Korea as a Nuclear Power**

**Convincing a Unified Korea Not to Go Nuclear**

Some theorists, like Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer, believe that a
nuclear-capable Korea makes sense. Waltz believes that \"more may be
better.\"[^154] \"Nuclear weapons reduced the chances of war between the
United States and the Soviet Union and China and between China and the
Soviet Union. Nuclear weapons make wars hard to start for small as well
as for big nuclear powers".[^155] Mearsheimer argues that stability
would be the result of well-managed proliferation and that the current
nuclear powers could help manage proliferation better by providing
technical assistance to new nuclear powers.[^156] \"And they can help to
socialize nascent nuclear societies to understand the lethal character
of the forces they are acquiring. This kind of well-managed
proliferation could help bolster peace.\"[^157]

In practice, however, it is hard to envision any enthusiasm among the
Northeast Asian powers for a unified and nuclear-capable Korea. It is
still more difficult to imagine that China, Russia, or the United States
would assist Korea in its quest for nuclear weapons. And it is
inconceivable that Japan would acquiesce calmly in a nuclear-capable
Korea. As we have previously observed, if a unified Korea retains a
nuclear capability, Japan would probably become a nuclear power too.

Yet a unified Korea will have genuine security concerns, and its
historical experience may induce it to the take the nuclear option
unless other security guarantees convince Koreans otherwise. China and
Russia once exercised dominant influence on the Korean peninsula. Japan
colonized Korea for thirty-five years in this century. The U.S. has
exercised a benign hegemony over the Korean peninsula for the past
half-century. Without a strong U.S. presence and continued willingness
to underwrite a unified Korea\'s security, there is a definite
possibility---or so many Koreans believe---that China, Russia, and Japan
would again become assertive on the peninsula.[^158] To protect itself,
a unified Korea might well combine the nuclear and missile assets and
the conventional forces of North and South, thereafter gradually seeking
force reductions while providing for military personnel stability and
force-structure efficiencies.[^159]

To forestall such action, the United States has two options. It can use
its influence to \"leverage\" a unified Korea away from the nuclear
option and toward a multilateral security arrangement. This option
assumes the continuation of the present United States-Republic of Korea
security arrangement with a unified Korea, which would entail continued
stationing of some American forces on the peninsula. The U.S. would also
need to encourage a unified Korea to sign bilateral security agreements
with the other regional powers.[^160] Our second option would be to add
to such bilateral arrangements a regional collective security regime
that could provide a security guarantee similar to that which a
reunified Germany enjoys in NATO. Of course, a Northeast Asian
equivalent of NATO does not exist and could not be created overnight.
However, "there already exist several forums for multilateral
cooperation, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the Northeast Asia
Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD), and the Council for Security Cooperation
in Asia Pacific (CSCAP).\"[^161] These organizations arrive at
non-binding consensus about matters of common interests and objectives
like cooperative security. Unfortunately, consensus building does not
always result in institution building.[^162] It will take a greater
commitment on the part of all Northeast Asian states, the United States,
and Canada to develop a multilateral mechanism that goes beyond
discussion and non-binding consensus to the more difficult areas of
collective security and dispute settlement.[^163] A combination of
bilateral commitments with other regional actors, a multilateral
confidence-building forum for security matters, and continued US
interest could alleviate the concerns that might otherwise push a
unified Korea to consider the nuclear option.

**If a Unified Korea Does Go Nuclear**

If North and South Korea combine their nuclear, missile, and
conventional forces, contrary to the wishes of the US and other powers,
consideration should nevertheless be given to allowing a unified Korea,
even in a federated form, to join the nuclear club. An openly nuclear
Korea would have to adhere to all nuclear protocols and treaties, like
all other openly nuclear states. Unrestricted access to Defense Threat
Reduction Agency onsite inspection teams would have to be a
non-negotiable part of any agreement allowing Korea to remain nuclear.

US insistence on applying the Glenn and Symington Amendments could be
counterproductive. Punitive sanctions against Korea at a time when it
needs massive development capital and foreign-trade earnings might
convince the unifying state to forgo the nuclear option. But it could
also drive Korea\'s nuclear program underground, like Israel's, which
would be in no one's interest. A secret program could not be
\"managed,\" would force Japan to go nuclear based on perceptions
instead of facts, and would force Korea to lie to the United States, the
most important partner in Korea\'s quest for unification and worldwide
acceptance.

**Concluding Remarks**

The strategic implications of Korea's geography are inescapable. The
Korean shrimp has been devoured before and will do whatever is necessary
to ensure that it does not get eaten again. Failure to acknowledge these
basic facts defies both history and common sense. Although all regional
actors acknowledge the coming of unification, not even the two Koreas
are looking to hasten its arrival. Nevertheless, real progress towards
normalization of relations and eventual reunification has been made and
will most likely continue. It is time for the United States to begin
shaping a strategy for dealing with a reunified Korea, particularly a
potentially nuclear one.

If a reunified Korea decides to pursue its nuclear option, it could
either join the nuclear club or follow Israel\'s path. The costs of
reunification will likely be astronomical, and Korea will need
considerable foreign aid in order to accomplish the task. The United
States' policy regarding nuclear proliferation under any circumstances
is unambiguous. Under the Symington, Pressler, and Glenn Amendments,
severe economic penalties will be levied against any state that defies
the NPT. It is doubtful that a reunified Korea would risk badly needed
foreign assistance by proliferating openly. But if it does, the U.S. and
other regional powers should consider allowing it the option of joining
the nuclear club.

Given that a nuclear-capable Korea is not in the United States'
interests, what can we do to prevent it? Reunification of the peninsula
will require the United States and Korea to renegotiate all treaty
obligations, including security guarantees. During this process, the US
must ensure that the new Korean state remains under the US nuclear
umbrella and that American security commitments to Korea are strong and
unambiguous. Korea's decision whether or not to pursue an independent
deterrent will be based primarily upon how secure it perceives itself to
be. If Korea trusts American security guarantees, it will be much less
likely to pursue a nuclear deterrent of its own. The United States must
work to ensure that trust.

Presently, bi-lateral security arrangements characterize the Northeast
Asian security landscape. The future of American military in Korea is
uncertain. Absent a robust US military presence in Korea and strong US
security guarantees, a multilateral approach to security is required.
Multilateralism and open communication on security issues may keep Korea
(and Japan) from exercising their nuclear option. Although this
represents a new approach to security issues in the region,
multilateralism is not completely unprecedented. Organizations such as
ASEAN and the Asian Regional Forum, which just admitted North Korean
into its ranks, illustrate some potential for cooperative problem
solving in Northeast Asia.

The reunification of Korea will usher in a new order in the region,
which will have not only military but also far-reaching political and
economic implications. All the regional players will be affected. A
best-case scenario would envision greater trade, economic integration,
and open and stable diplomatic relations. This can only occur if China,
Japan, and Korea avoid renewed military competition, including a nuclear
arms race. For the past fifty years, the United States has been the
guarantor of stability for the peninsula and for the region. Korean
reunification necessitates that the US reaffirm rather than abandon this
role.

A final observation: the collapse of the Soviet Union and the ensuing
German reunification took the world by surprise. In the Korean case,
there is time to consider the implications of reunification and plan for
its arrival. But such study and planning must begin now.

[^1]: Calvin Sims, \"Despite Speedy Accord, Long Road Ahead to Korean
    Unification,\" *New York Times,* July 2, 2000, 1.

[^2]: ^?^ Thomas E. Ricks and Steven Mufson, \"Korea Summit May Portend
    Changes for U.S. Military,\" *Washington Post,* June 21, 2000, 7.

[^3]: ^?^ The framework for these cases was taken from the Arroyo Center
    Study *Preparing for Korean Reunification Scenarios and
    Implications* by Jonathan Pollack and Chung Min Lee, The Arroyo
    Center of the Rand Corporation, 1999.

[^4]: ^?^ The Ministry of Defense, The Republic of Korea, *Defense White
    Paper 1999,* 46.

[^5]: ^?^ Fei Ling Wang. "Joining the Major Powers for the Status Quo:
    China's Views and Policy on Korean Reunification," *Pacific Affairs*
    (Summer, 1999).

[^6]: ^?^ The 1999 CIA *World Factbook*
    (<http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/kn.html#Econ>)
    places the 1999 real growth rate in North Korea at 1%. However, many
    sources refuse to list GDP figures for North Korea due to the
    difficulty of obtaining accurate and usable data.

[^7]: ^?^ CIA *World Factbook* 1999.
    http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/html.

[^8]: ^?^ Marcus Noland. "The Summit and the Economic Future of the
    Korean Peninsula," The Institute for International Economics, May
    1999.

[^9]: ^?^ Ming Liu. "An Obsessed Task: Prospects, Models, and the Impact
    of Korean Reunification." *East Asia: An International Quarterly*
    (Winter 1999).

[^10]: ^?^ Marcus Noland. "Some Unpleasant Arithmetic Concerning
    Unification"

[^11]: ^?^ Gifford Combs. "The Role of International Finance in Korean
    Economic Reconstruction and Reunification." The National Bureau of
    Asian Research, NBR Analysis, Vol. 10, No. 5.

[^12]: ^?^ Interview with Dr. Sung Han Kim, 19 July 2000. Seoul, Korea.

[^13]: ^?^ When speaking of a federation, the two Korea's would reunify
    under one flag, but still maintain their respective separate
    economic and political systems.

[^14]: ^?^ Evengeni Bajanov "A Russian Perspective on Korean Peace and
    Security." *The Nautilus Institute*. Accessed on line at
    [www.nautilus.org](http://www.nautilus.org/).

[^15]: ^?^ Ibid

[^16]: Ming Liu. "An Obsessed Task: Prospects, Models, and the Impact of
    Korean Reunification." *East Asia: An International Quarterly*
    (Winter 1999).

[^17]: ^?^ Reginald Dale, \"The Daunting Task of Uniting Korea,\"
    *Hearald Tribune,* June 27, 2000, downloaded from the World Wide
    Web: http.//www.iht.com/1HT/RD/00rd062700.htm.

[^18]: ^?^ Marcus Noland, Sherman Robinson, and Li Gang Liu. "The
    Economics of Korean Reunification." The Institute for International
    Economics Working Paper 97-5.

[^19]: ^?^ Dale, \"The Daunting Task of Uniting Korea.\"

[^20]: ^?^ Doug Struck "North Korean Growth Reported." *The Washington
    Post.* September 5, 2000.

[^21]: ^?^ Marcus Noland, "The Summit and the Economic Future of the
    Korean Peninsula" Testimony downloaded from the World Wide Web:
    http:207.238.152.36/TESTIMONY/kosummit.htm.

[^22]: Struck. "North Korean Growth Reported."

[^23]: ^?^ Don Oberdorfer. *The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History.*
    (Basic Books Publications, 1997), 34.

[^24]: ^?^ CIA *World Factbook*. Accessed via the Internet 4 Aug 2000.
    http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/kn.html#mil.

[^25]: ^?^ Noland, "The Summit and the Economic Future of the Korean
    Peninsula."

[^26]: ^?^ According the CIA *World Factbook*, South Korea's military
    spending is estimated to comprise only 3.2% of its GNP. This source
    was accessed 3 August 2000, via the Internet.
    http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/ks.html#mil.

[^27]: ^?^ C.B. Lee. "Korean Performance Picks Up in 1999," *Pulp and
    Paper International,* (July 2000). Accessed on Line 20 September
    2000.

[^28]: ^?^ Samuel Len. "South Korean Figures Show Conglomerates Still
    Deep in Debt," *The New York Times,* Aug 2, 2000.

[^29]: ^?^ Uk Heo, Kwang H. Ro, and Chung Minh Hyun. "Redirecting South
    Korean Security Policy," *Pacific Focus, Inha Journal of
    International Studies;* Vol. XV, No. 1 (Spring 2000): 67.

[^30]: ^?^ Leon V. Sigal. *Disarming Strangers; Nuclear Diplomacy with
    North Korea,* (Princeton University Press, 1998), 9. The agreed
    framework was designed as an interim agreement rather than a binding
    negotiation. In *Disarming Strangers,* Leon Sigal estimates the
    total cost of fulfilling this agreement at around five billion
    dollars. Of this, the US share is only thirty million a year, which
    the US congress has consistently resisted funding.

[^31]: ^?^ Ibid.

[^32]: ^?^ Jane Perlez. "North Korea's Missile Pledge Paves the Way for
    New Talks," *The New York Times,* June 22, 2000.

[^33]: ^?^ Michael J. Siler. "US Nuclear Non-proliferation policy in the
    Northeast Asian region during the Cold War: The South Korean Case."
    *East Asia: An International Quarterly* (Autumn 1998). Accessed on
    Line.

[^34]: ^?^ Ibid.

[^35]: ^?^ Leon V. Sigal. *Disarming Strangers; Nuclear Diplomacy with
    North Korea,* (Princeton University Press, 1998), 5.

[^36]: ^?^ James Risen. "Pentagon Fears Korea Arms Race/ South allegedly
    tries to boost missile range." *Houston Chronicle;* November 14,
    1999, 31.

[^37]: ^?^ Interview with General Kim, Jae Chang, 19 July 2000. Seoul,
    South Korea.

[^38]: ^?^ Kang Choi, \"Enhancing Peace and Security Through Engagement:
    A South Korean View,\" in *Arms Control in the Asia-Pacific Region,*
    ed. Jeffrey A. Larsen and Thomas D. Miller, (Colorado Springs: U.S.
    Air Force Institute for National Security Studies, 1999), 116.

[^39]: ^?^ Ibid.

[^40]: ^?^ Ibid, 120.

[^41]: ^?^ Robert Dujarric, \"Korea After Unification: An Opportunity to
    Strengthen the Korean-American Partnership,\" *The Korean Journal of
    Defense Analysis,* vol. XII, no. 1 (Summer 2000): 56.

[^42]: ^?^ Kim Tae-u, \"ROK Has No Alternative But To Regain Its
    Sovereignty in Nuclear Policy,\" *Seoul SINDONG-A,* July, 1994,
    164-175

[^43]: ^?^ Ibid, 54.

[^44]: ^?^ The IAEA Board of Governors has affirmed the agency's right
    to conduct inspections at ALL suspected undeclared nuclear
    facilities. Victor Zaborsky: What to control and How to Control:
    Nonproliferation Dilemmas;" *World Affairs* (Fall 1998). Accessed on
    line.

[^45]: ^?^ Defense Threat Reduction Agency On Site Inspection Page.
    Accessed on line at
    <http://www.dtra.mil/inspection/ops/mainpg/nuclear.html>.

[^46]: Elizabeth Stevens, \"Israel\'s Nuclear Weapons-A Case Study, \"
    1.

[^47]: ^?^ Ibid, 3.

[^48]: ^?^\_\_\_\_\_, \"Government Decides No Changes Planned in Nuclear
    Program,\" *Israel Wire*, September, 15, 1999, p. 1. Found online at
    www.israelwire.com/New /990915/99091523.html.

[^49]: ^?^ \_\_\_\_\_, \"Nuclear Debate Leads to Shouting Match in the
    Knesset,\" *Israel Wire*, February 3, 2000, found online
    http://www.israelwire.com/New/000203/0002034.html, 1.

[^50]: ^?^ Ibid, 1

[^51]: ^?^ Ibid, 2

[^52]: ^?^ Ibid.

[^53]: ^?^ See *World Current Nuclear Arsenals,* Center for Defense
    Information, July 24, 2000, found at
    http://www.cdi.org/issues/nukef&f/database/nukestab.html.

[^54]: ^?^ Stevens, 4.

[^55]: ^?^ Ibid, 5.

[^56]: ^?^ Cameron W. Barr, \"Israel\'s Worst-Kept Secret, on Web,\"
    *Christian Science Monitor,* August 24, 2000, 1.

[^57]: ^?^ Doug Bandow, \"Korea, the Case for Disengagement,\" *Policy
    Analysis,* no. 96, December 8, 1987, 7.

[^58]: ^?^ Seung-Ho Joo, \"Soviet Relations with the Two Koreas,
    1988-1990,\" *Pacific Focus,* vol. 15, no. 1 (Spring 2000): 129.

[^59]: ^?^ According to unclassified CIA data, North Korea\'s two-way
    trade dropped from \$5.5 billion in 1988 to \$3.2 billion in 1992.
    US Central Intelligence Agency, *The World Factbook*, 1990 and 1993.

[^60]: ^?^ Richard Cronin, \"North Korea\'s Nuclear Weapons Program:
    U.S. Policy Options,\" *Congressional Research Report for
    Congress-CRs494-470F,* June 1, 1994.

[^61]: ^?^See Defense Intelligence Study, \"North Korea: The Foundations
    of National Defense---1995 Update." Online
    http://www.fas.org/irp/dia/product/knfms95/1510-101_tinta.html.

[^62]: ^?^ Bill Gertz, \"South Korea Counters North\'s Missiles,\"
    *Washington Times,* December 2, 1996, 1.

[^63]: ^?^ Rex R. Kiziah, \"US-Led Cooperative Theater Missile Defense
    in Northeast Asia---Challenges and Issues,\" *The Maxwell Papers,*
    no. 21, July 2000, 6. See also, Stephen A. Cambone. \"The United
    States and Theater Missile Defense in Northeast Asia,\" *Survival
    39,* no. 3 (Autumn 1997): 66-84. John Burton, \"U.S. Fingers Crossed
    Over North Korea,\" *Financial Times,* January 21, 1994, 5.

[^64]: ^?^ See Symington Act at
    http://www.clw.org/pub/clw/coalition/sancsymi.htm.

[^65]: ^?^ Dujarric, \"Korea After Unification: An Opportunity to
    Strengthen the Korean-American Partnership,\" 56.

[^66]: ^?^ Victor Cha, \"The Roller Coaster of Expectations,\" *Pacific
    Forum CSIS-Comparative Connections-An E-Journal on East Asian
    Relations,* Internet www.csis.org/pacfor/cc/002Qjapan_skorea.html.
    August 23, 2000, 4.

[^67]: \_\_\_\_\_, \"Asia\'s Shifting Balance,\" *Economist,* September
    2, 2000.

[^68]: ^?^ Ibid.

[^69]: ^?^ \_\_\_\_\_, \"The Other Threats to South Korea,\" *Global
    Beat,* Online. http://www.nyu.edu/globalbeat/ asia/GIU100500.htm

[^70]: ^?^ Ibid.

[^71]: ^?^ Ibid.

[^72]: ^?^ Ibid.

[^73]: ^?^ Calvin Sims, \"A Virtual Battlefield Helps Keep Japan
    Alert,\" *New York Times,* October 1, 2000, 1.

[^74]: ^?^ Ibid.

[^75]: ^?^ Ibid.

[^76]: ^?^ Ibid, 5.

[^77]: ^?^ \_\_\_\_\_, \"Japanese Military Unwelcome in South Korea,\"
    *Pacific Stars and Stripes,* October 14, 1999, 7.

[^78]: ^?^ Ibid.

[^79]:

[^80]: Marcus Noland, \"Economic Alternatives for Unification,\" Paper
    prepared for the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, Spring
    2000, 13.

[^81]: ^?^ Ibid.

[^82]: ^?^ Ibid.

[^83]: ^?^ \"Japan and China Eye Each Other Warily\--as Usual,\"
    *Economist*, September 2, 2000.

[^84]: ^?^ Ibid.

[^85]: ^?^ Mike Finnegan. Interview October 15, 2000.

[^86]: ^?^\"National Security: Impact of China\'s Military Modernization
    in the Pacific Region,\" United States General Accounting Office.
    (Chapter Report, 06/06/95, GAO/NSIAD-95-84). Online
    [http://www.fas.org](http://www.fas.org/)/

    irp/gao/nsi95084.htm, 4.

[^87]: ^?^ Ibid. 5.

[^88]: ^?^ Ibid.

[^89]: ^?^ Ibid.

[^90]: ^?^ Russell D. Howard, \"The Chinese Liberation Army: Short Arms
    and Slow Legs,\" *INSS Occasional Paper* 28*,* September 1999, 27.

[^91]: ^?^ Kathryn L. Gauthier, \"China as Peer Competitor?\" *Air War
    College Maxwell Paper,* no. 18, July, 1999, 10.

[^92]: ^?^ Ibid. See also, John Caldwell and Alexander T. Lennon,
    \"China\'s Nuclear Modernization Program, *Strategic Review* 28, no.
    4 (Fall 1995): 28.

[^93]: ^?^ \"Sino-American Cooperation on the Korean Peninsula:
    Prospects and Obstacles,\" 5.

[^94]: ^?^ Fei-Ling Wang, \"Tacit Acceptance and Watchful Eyes:
    Beijing\'s Views about the U.S. ROK Alliance,\" *Strategic Studies
    Institute Monograph,* January 24, 1997, 18.

[^95]: ^?^ Mike Finnegan. Interview, October 15, 2000.

[^96]: ^?^ \_\_\_\_\_, \"Military Situation in Northeast Asia,\"
    *Republic of Korea Ministry of Defense White Paper-1999,* found
    online at http://www.mnd.go.kr/mnden/emainindex.html.

[^97]: ^?^ Ibid.

[^98]: ^?^ Sherman W. Garnett, \"A Nation in Search of Its Place,\"
    *Current History,* vol. 98, no. 630, October 1999, 328.

[^99]: ^?^ Ibid.

[^100]: ^?^ Richard Wade, \"The Russian Far East\--Ten Years Since the
    Vladivostok Speech,\" found online at
    <http://www.cerc.unimelb.edu.au/bulletin/bulsep.htr>, September
    1999, 2.

[^101]: ^?^ Ibid.

[^102]: ^?^ Ibid.

[^103]: ^?^ Garnett, \"A Nation in Search of Its Place,\" 328.

[^104]: ^?^ Vladimir Volkov and Julia Dänenberg, \"Putin\'s
    \'Chernobyl\': The tragedy of the Russian submarine disaster in the
    Barents Sea,\" *World Socialist Website* found online
    <http://www.wsws.org/articles/2000/aug2000/sub-a23.shtml>, August
    23, 2000, 1.

[^105]: ^?^ Garnett, \"A Nation in Search of Its Place,\" 328.

[^106]: ^?^ Volkov and Dänenberg, \"Putin\'s \'Chernobyl\': The tragedy
    of the Russian submarine disaster in the Barents Sea,\" 3.

[^107]: ^?^ Garnett, \"A Nation in Search of Its Place,\" 332.

[^108]: ^?^ Ibid.

[^109]: ^?^ Vasily Mikheev, \"Russian Policy Towards Korean Peninsula
    after Yeltsin\'s Reelection as President,\" *The Journal of East
    Asian Affairs,* vol. 11, no. 2 (Summer/Fall, 1997): 362-363.

[^110]: ^?^ Valentin Moiseyev, \"Russia and Korea\", *International
    Affairs*, Moscow, Vol. 42, No 1, 42.

[^111]: ^?^ Kan Vong Seek, \"Russia\'s Role in Korean Unification\", in
    Russian, *Problems of the Far East*, No.1, 1999, 43

[^112]: ^?^ Evgueni Bajanov, \"A Russian Perspective on Korean Peace and
    Security,\" *Nautilus Institute Policy Forum Online,* no. 8, July
    30, 1997, 10. Found online at http://www.nautilus.org/for
    a/security/8a_Bajanov.htm.

[^113]: ^?^ Mike Finnegan. Interview, October 15, 2000.

[^114]: ^?^ William Cohen, \"The United States Security Strategy for the
    East Asia-Pacific Region---1998,\" Speech at the Commonwealth Club,
    Los Angeles California, July 21, 1997.

[^115]: ^?^ Ibid.

[^116]: ^?^ Barry Wain, \"U.S. Forces Still have a Role in South
    Korea,\" *Asian Wall Street Journal,* July 21, 2000, l.

[^117]: ^?^ William Cohen. \"The United States Security Strategy for the
    East Asia-Pacific Region---1998.\"

[^118]: ^?^ Thomas E. Ricks and Steven Mufson, "Korea Summit May Portend
    Changes for U.S. Military," *Washington Post,* June 21, 2000, 7.

[^119]: ^?^ Ibid.

[^120]: ^?^ Ibid.

[^121]: ^?^ Barry Wain, \"U.S. Forces Still Have a Role in South
    Korea,\" *Asian Wall Street Journal,* July 21, 2000, 1.

[^122]: ^?^ Joyce Howard Price, \"Helms Broaches Return of Troops,\"
    *Washington Times,* June 18, 2000, C1.

[^123]: ^?^ Chester Dawson, \"Yankee Go Home?\" *Far Eastern Economic
    Review,* August 10., 2000, 1.

[^124]: ^?^ Ricks and Mufson, "Korea Summit May Portend Changes for U.S.
    Military," 7.

[^125]: ^?^ Holger Jensen, \"Breakthrough Unlikely in North Korea
    Missile Program,\" *Denver Rocky Mountain News,* July 20, 2000, 1.

[^126]: ^?^ Don Kirk, \"Tough Stand in Seoul: U.S. Troops Must Stay,\"
    *International Herald Tribune,* June 26, 2000, 1.

[^127]: ^?^ Ibid.

[^128]: ^?^ \_\_\_\_\_, \"Demonstrators Battle Police at U.S. Base Near
    Seoul,\" *New York Times,* June 18, 2000, 1.

[^129]: ^?^ \_\_\_\_\_, \"Protesters Demand End to U.S. Presence,\" *Los
    Angeles Times,* October 8, 2000, 1.

[^130]: ^?^ Doug Struck, \"South Korean Says North Wants Troops to
    Stay,\" *Washington Post,* August 30, 2000, A01.

[^131]: ^?^ Ibid.

[^132]: ^?^ Nayan Chanda, \"G.I. Joe, Meet Kim Jong Il,\" *Far Eastern
    Economic Review,* October 5, 2000.

[^133]: ^?^ Ibid.

[^134]: ^?^ Ibid.

[^135]: ^?^ Robert Pfaltzgraph, ed., \"China and the Northeast Asian
    Powers,\" in *Exploring U.S. Missile Defense Requirements in 2010:
    What Are the Policy and Technology Challenges,* (Cambridge:
    Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1997), 11. Found online at
    http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/advocate/ifpa/index.html.

[^136]: ^?^ Ibid.

[^137]: ^?^ Robert Scales and Larry M. Wortzel, \"The Future U.S.
    Military Presence in Asia,\" *Strategic Studies Institute Occasional
    Paper,* April 6, 1999, 17.

[^138]: ^?^ \_\_\_\_\_, \"Japan and China Eye Each Other Warily---As
    Usual,\" *Economist*, September 2, 2000, 35.

[^139]: ^?^ Dawson, \"Yankee Go Home?\"

[^140]: ^?^ Ibid.

[^141]: ^?^ Stephen J. Blank, \"Why Russian Policy is Failing in Asia,\"
    *Strategic Studies Institute Occasional Paper,* April 2, 1997, v.

[^142]: ^?^ \_\_\_\_\_, *Preparing for Korean Unification: Scenarios and
    Implications*, (Santa Monica: Rand, 1999), 86.

[^143]: ^?^ Dawson, \"Yankee Go Home?\"

[^144]: ^?^ Wain, \"U.S. Forces Still Have a Role in South Korea.\"

[^145]: ^?^ Dawson, \"Yankee Go Home?\"

[^146]: ^?^ Ibid.

[^147]: ^?^ Ibid.

[^148]: ^?^ Ibid.

[^149]: ^?^ Richard Halloran, \"Ground Forces in Japan, South Korea,
    Under Review,\" *Washington Times*, September 29, 2000, 1.

[^150]: ^?^ Ibid.

[^151]: ^?^ Doug Struck, \"South Korean Says North Wants U.S. Troops to
    Stay,\" Washington Post, August 30, 2000, AO1.

[^152]: ^?^ Ibid.

[^153]: ^?^ Post Unification Dynamics and Their Regional Implications,
    87.

[^154]: ^?^ Kenneth N. Waltz, \"More may be Better, *The Spread of
    Nuclear Weapons,* 44. Also, conversation with Kenneth Waltz on
    November 5, 1999, West Point, New York.

[^155]: ^?^ Ibid.

[^156]: ^?^ John Mearsheimer, \"Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War,\"
    *The Atlantic,* vol. 266, no. 2, 35.

[^157]: ^?^ Ibid.

[^158]: ^?^ Hwal-Woong Lee, \"A Regional Approach to Korean Security,\"
    *Nautilus Policy Forum Online,* no. 1, January 3, 2000, 8. Found
    online at <http://www.nyu.edu/globalbeat/asia/napsnet010300.htm>.

[^159]: ^?^ Garrit Gong, \"What if Korea Unifies,\" *Worldlink*, July 3,
    2000, 4. Found online at
    http://www.worldlink.co.uk/stories/storyReader\$291.

[^160]: ^?^ Richard L. Bogusky, \"The Impact of Korean Unification on
    Northeast Asia: American Security Challenges and Opportunities,\"
    *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis,* vol. X, no. 1, (Summer,
    1998): 57-58.

[^161]: ^?^ Ibid, 64.

[^162]: ^?^ Ibid, 65. See also, Douglas T. Stuart, \"Preparing for
    Multipolarity in the Asia-Pacific: Recommendations for American
    Defense Planners,\" *Journal of East Asia Affairs,* vol. XI, no. 1
    (Winter/Spring, 1997): 115.

[^163]: ^?^ Ibid, 65.