Discussion on Ground Stop Procedures

I took an action item at the last CDM meeting to summarize, from an
airline perspective, some thoughts on the disruptive nature of Ground
Stop (GS) initiatives. This is that summary.

We recognize the need for ATCSCC to rapidly execute control over demand
for an airport (or airspace) that has had its capacity suddenly and
drastically reduced. Historically, when speed of response is of the
essence, ATCSCC will implement a GS for traffic from selected ARTCCs.
While there are many valid reasons for this type of initiative it can be
extremely disruptive to an airline schedule and make it impossible to
deliver a reliable product to the traveling public.

As events at DFW on April 26th and May 17th demonstrated, it is
impossible to operate a Hub and Spoke airline through 3 to 5 hours of
various GS initiatives. It is the total lack of control over the order
of arrivals that creates this disruption. As an example:

AAL -1445 departed BOS for DFW at 0957EDT and diverted over DFW to AUS.
This flight was refueled and ready to return by 1315CDT. However, since
this flight was diverted into an ARTCC that was in G/S it was not able
to return to DFW until 2040CDT, making the journey almost 12hours long.
By comparison AAL-299 departed BOS at 1141EDT and arrived DFW at
1514CDT. This meant the passengers on AAL -1445 took 3 times longer to
complete the same journey than those on AAL-229. In some ways the
passengers on AAL-1445 were lucky in that they at least had same day
service. Many flights that diverted to into Ground Stopped airports were
delayed so long that the crew exceeded their allowable duty day and the
flight had to remain overnight at the diversion airport, making some
passengers almost 24 hours late.

Surely we can find a more equitable and orderly way to distribute
reduced capacity during these constrained conditions. I realize that we
need to achieve multiple goals in re-thinking the GS initiative, and the
solution may not be what we first expect. What follows is a brief
comparison between the nature of Miles In Trail (MIT), Ground Stop (GS)
and Ground Delay Program (GDP) initiatives. This discussion is meant
only to point out the salient features of these programs to the airline
user and to promote discussion on how we might enhance procedures during
GS-like operations.

Weather induced ATC initiatives can produce large delays. The
ATC-Traffic Flow Management initiatives that produce these delays are:

1\. Ground Delay Programs (GDP)

2\. Ground Stops (GS)

3\. Expanded Miles In Trail (MIT)

These large delays are especially disruptive to complex airline
schedules.

First let's discuss the Ground Delay Programs (GDP).

Some airlines prefer this method of Traffic Flow Management initiative
to the other two programs. The reasons for this are that the amount of
delay for each flight is known because the Air Traffic Control System
Command Center (ATCSCC) issues an Expected Departure Clearance Time
(EDCT) and a Controlled Time of Arrival (CTA). Also, the GDP
procedurally allows the airline to manage its CTAs in the airline\'s
best interests. This is done by allowing the Airline Operations Control
Center (AOC) to reassign flights to CTAs and utilize the arrival slots
of delayed or cancelled flights. It is just this ability for the airline
manage its slots that encourages airlines to cancel and combine flights
and thus reduce demand in an orderly fashion.

Ground Stops (GS)

Ground Stops are normally issued for arrival airports when there has
been a sudden and unexpected drop in arrival capacity. Their purpose
(like the GDP) is to keep aircraft on the ground in an attempt to bring
demand and capacity into line. Unlike the GDP there is no EDCT or CTA.
Flights in the GS are determined by what Air Route Traffic Control
Center (ARTCC) they are departing from. The duration of the GS is
contained in a teletype message sent by ATCSCC. There is no way for the
airline to interact with ATCSCC or manage its flights during a GS. In
fact it is cumbersome to even figure out which flights are affected.

The duration of a GS is normally short (less that 1 hour). However, they
are often extended and sometimes may last a total of 3 or 4 hours.
Because some flights from unaffected ARTCCs may leave on time while
others are 3 or 4 hours late this is completely disruptive to the
airline\'s complex schedule.

Expanded Miles In Trail (MIT)

Expanded Miles In Trail is normally implemented because of convective
activity within an ARTCC area. Most MIT restrictions are in the 30-50
mile range but under rare cases can be as great as 120 miles. If the MIT
is short and the demand is low these resrictions can be almost
transparent to the airline. However if the MIT is large and the demand
is high this type of initiative can create large and unknowable delays.
Because of these restrictions aircraft can wait on the ground for
extended periods of time. Additionally, when airborne, flights may be
held in adjacent ARTCCs awaiting the required spacing.

MIT restrictions cannot be converted to expected departure or arrival
times and so are most perplexing to airline operational control. There
is no way to plan a rational reduction in schedule or reschedule
aircraft and crews. The airline managers can only react to actual
departure events and even then expected arrival times can be inaccurate
since planned enroute times are no longer valid.

To characterize the airlines\' perception of each of these TFM
initiatives:

1\) The GDP under CDM procedures.

a\) Highly predictive with flight specific EDCTs and CTAs.

b\) Airline control of flight to slot assignment.

c\) Airline ability to use slots of delayed and cancelled flights, thus
providing airline incentive for voluntary reductions in schedule.

d\) Highly interactive involvement of ATCSCC and AOCs.

2\) Ground Stops

a\) Limited flight specific predictability by back calculating from the
ARTCCs involved and GS duration.

b\) No airline control to prioritize flights.

c\) No airline incentive to reduce demand.

d\) Little ATCSCC and AOC interactivity.

3\) Expanded Miles-In-Trail

a\) No flight specific predictability.

b\) No airline control to prioritize flights.

c\) No airline incentive to reduce demand.

d\) No ATCSCC and AOC interactivity.