**The Role of the Russian Constitutional Court in Protecting the Rights
of Active Duty and Retired Servicemen**

[Bakhtiyar]{.smallcaps} R. T[uzmukhamedov]{.smallcaps}[^1]

**I. INTRODUCTION**

Some time ago this author was approached by a fellow lawyer from the
United States who boasted a long and distinguished legal career in
academia, government and private practice. My friend was asking on
behalf of creators of the CBS "JAG" television show whether a US
military lawyer could represent a Russian serviceman in a Russian
military court. The hypothetical case was about an officer disobeying a
superior's unlawful orders on the battlefield.[^2] Judging from the
results of brief research, completed with the assistance of civilian
experts in criminal law and procedure, as well as with military
colleagues from the Legal Service of the Armed Forces, that would be a
very distant possibility at best. The then current Code of Criminal
Procedure of 1960,[^3] which through a patchwork of amendments, retained
little semblance to the original text by the turn of the Millenium,[^4]
would not allow a lawyer, other than a properly certified member of an
accredited collegium of advocates, to be by the side of his or her
client and gain access to all the evidence at the pre-trial phase.[^5]
The court may admit a person chosen by a defendant to represent him or
her, but only when the case reaches the courtroom.[^6] A presiding judge
at the military court may well find a few good reasons to bar an
outsider, let alone a foreign military lawyer, from the case.[^7]

However, it is not totally impossible to envision a situation where a
foreign lawyer could represent a party in the Constitutional Court of
the Russian Federation. There is no explicit prohibition in the law, and
the Court does not often hear cases which involve sensitive information
that judges or parties would be reluctant to share with a foreigner.
Current judges, and there are nineteen on the bench, would likely not
mind a lawyer speaking with an accent or communicating through an
interpreter.

This brief article will first introduce a foreign reader to the Russian
Constitutional Court and its powers. Next, it will discuss the
categories of cases the Court may decide. It will then discuss several
Constitutional Court decisions of relevance to the military.

**II. JURISDICTION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT**

The Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation was first established
in 1991 in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union (USSR). The
sources of its authority were the Constitution of the Russian Federation
of 1978, with major amendments introduced immediately prior to and in
the aftermath of the break-up of the USSR,[^8] and the Law "On the
Constitutional Court of the Russian Soviet Socialist Federal Republic"
of 1991,[^9] as amended. The Court decided its first case in February
1992.[^10] It failed to stay clear of the power struggle between the
President and the Parliament that reached its violent climax in the fall
of 1993, and it was suspended until March 1995.[^11]

Currently the Constitutional Court derives its powers from the
Constitution of 1993[^12] and the Law "On the Constitutional Court of
the Russian Federation" of 1994, as amended.[^13] It is part of the
three-tiered judicial system,[^14] but unlike the Supreme Court and the
Higher Court of Arbitration that sit at the apex of their pyramids of
general jurisdiction and of arbitration, the Constitutional Court does
not have such a foundation.

Article 125 of the Constitution and Article 3 of the Law "On the
Constitutional Court" describe categories of cases that may be decided
by the Court. The three categories are (1) cases involving legislative
acts petitioned by public authority, (2) cases involving jurisdictional
disputes between authorities, and (3) cases involving review of a law
applied in a particular case---petitioned by either private parties or
the courts.

### **A. Legislative Acts Petitioned by Public Authority**

The first category of cases the Court may hear involve legislative acts
passed by public authorities, whether federal or regional. In these
cases, only public authorities may petition the Court. Additionally,
these cases need not arise from any on-going dispute---any party with
due authority may request an abstract review of a statute. When
confronted with such petitions, the Court rules on the constitutionality
of federal laws and normative acts issued by the President or by either
chamber of the Federal Assembly, that is, Parliament, or by the
Government.

Among possible cases are laws or decrees that regulate military service,
defense or other national security matters. In 1995 the Court heard a
notable case regarding the constitutionality of the President's decision
to use military force to quell insurgency in the Chechen Republic. The
Court was petitioned by deputies of both chambers of the Federal
Assembly. In deciding that case, the Court did not specifically discuss
the rights of servicemen.[^15] However, it is worth noting that in its
decision the Court invoked Protocol II Additional to Geneva Conventions
regarding the application of international humanitarian law. The Court
directed the legislators to take the Protocol into account while
modifying laws regulating the use of armed forces. The Ministry of
Defense implemented that decision by directing that legal training in
International Humanitarian Law be an integral part of combat
training.[^16]

The Constitutional Court may also rule on the constitutionality of
constitutions, charters and laws of the component entities of the
Russian Federation, as well as on treaties concluded by those entities
with the Federal authorities and between those entities. One possible
scenario for court review would be when a law passed by a constituent
entity interferes with matters that, under the Constitution, fall under
exclusive Federal jurisdiction. One such provision would be Article
71(*l*)of the Constitution which refers to such matters as "defense and
security." For example, a case falling under this rubric could
potentially arise out of a Declaration of the State Council of Tatarstan
that was adopted ten days after the upper chamber of the Federal
Assembly authorized the deployment of a Russian unit as part of Kosovo
Forces. In that Declaration the legislative body of an influential
constituent entity of the Russian Federation stated that it would be
"inadmissible for Tatarstanians to be part of the military units of the
Armed Forces of the Russian Federation that are being deployed in
Kosovo".[^17] However, the emerging conflict had been resolved through
the political process before the issue came before the Court.

Finally, the Court may decide whether international treaties that have
not yet come into force conform with the Constitution. Of relevance to
this discussion could be possible cases about the constitutionality of
international treaties on collective defense, on deployment of forces
abroad, and on their status. The closest the Constitutional Court has
ever come to deciding such cases was when it ruled that a petition
contesting the constitutionality of the Treaty on Friendship,
Cooperation and Partnership between Russia and Ukraine of 1997 was
inadmissible. The Treaty contains general commitments in the field of
cooperation on defense and security matters.[^18] Several legislators
filed a petition with the Constitutional Court requesting that the Court
consider the issue. However, the ratification process moved so fast that
it left no time for the Court to even look into the merits of the
petition. Once the Treaty was ratified and instruments of ratification
exchanged, thus making it effective, the Court no longer had
jurisdiction.[^19]

#### **B. Jurisdictional Disputes Between Authorities**

The second category comprises cases about jurisdictional disputes
between federal authorities, or between federal and regional
authorities, or between regional authorities. The aforementioned Decree
of the State Council of Tatarstan would likely result in a case falling
under this category.

#### **C. Review of Laws Applied in a Particular Case**

The third category consists of cases where the Constitutional Court is
petitioned by private persons or by courts requesting a constitutional
review of a law that has been applied or ought to be applied in a
particular case. Those will be discussed at greater length later in this
article.

It is only natural to expect the supreme judicial body of constitutional
review to interpret the Constitution. However, unlike the US Supreme
Court, the Russian Constitutional Court may also deal with it as an
abstract question. In 1995 the upper chamber of the Federal Assembly
requested an interpretation of an article of the Constitution which
empowered that chamber to decide on the possibility of foreign
deployments of the Russian Armed Forces.[^20] The Court chose not to
consider the petition on its merits. It argued, somewhat arbitrarily,
that the issue had already been resolved by subsequent legislation.[^21]
It should also be mentioned that the Constitutional Court may be
requested to deliver an advisory opinion on the observance of a
prescribed procedure of impeachment of the President.

##### III. TYPES OF DECISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

At this point a brief note on types of decisions that are passed by the
Court would be worthwhile. The Court, when deciding a case on its
merits, will issue a "judgement" (*postanovleniye*). When it rules that
a petition is inadmissible it will issue a "ruling" (*opredeleniye*).
Some of the latter may be rather brief and merely state, for example,
that a petitioner does not have standing. Others may carry more
substance and express an argumentative position of the Constitutional
Court on a matter of law. In the Court's own unofficial parlance those
are called "rulings with positive content."

The Law on the Constitutional Court explicitly requires it to officially
publish its judgements and advisory opinions, but does not require it to
publish rulings.[^22] Therefore, it is up to the Court itself to decide
whether to publish a particular ruling. That leaves a considerable
number of rulings unpublished. While most unpublished rulings are of
importance only to the parties that are directly involved in the matter,
there are quite a few others that may be of interest to a more general
audience, but of which the general audience remains largely unaware due
to a lack of publishing.

The Constitutional Court addresses issues vital to the military mostly
in decisions that develop from this third category---those involving
private disputes and arising from private or court petitions to review a
law. Some may be construed as favoring individuals, others as being
beneficial to the Ministry of Defense.

## IV. SELECTED CASES WITH MILITARY APPLICATION

## 

## A. Conscientious Objectors

The current Russian Constitution, unlike its predecessors, recognizes
conscientious objectors to service in the armed forces. Article 59(3)
states that a person is entitled to alternative civilian service if, by
reason of his convictions or religious beliefs, he is opposed to
military service, which is compulsory in Russia. The Constitution allows
other grounds for such substitution, but those grounds need to be
specified in a federal law in order to be effective. In the absence of
such law, local draft boards restrictively interpret that provision of
the Constitution. They insist that until the law is enacted a
conscientious objector can not claim his right to an alternative
service.

The Constitutional Court has received several petitions regarding the
exercise of the right to alternative civilian service. Those petitions
were filed both by draftees and by courts of general jurisdiction that
heard cases that were brought both by and against objectors.

In one such instance, a court of general jurisdiction in Kemerovo
District in the East of Russia heard a case of a young man who had been
charged with draft evasion. The defendant was a member of the Jehovah's
Witnesses, a religious organization. Although he refused to don the
uniform, he expressed his willingness to perform alternative civilian
service. The court questioned the constitutionality of a provision of
the then effective Criminal Code of 1960[^23] that, in the opinion of
the presiding judge, violated the right of a citizen to such alternate
service. In a situation when a court has doubts about the
constitutionality of an applicable law, it is entitled to suspend
proceedings and request the Constitutional Court to review that law.

The Constitutional Court deferred the consideration of the petition on
its merits. However, in what became a "ruling with positive
content,"[^24] it argued that the disputed provision of the Criminal
Code applied to draft evaders rather than to conscientious objectors.
Thus the article of the Code that made draft evasion a criminal offense
did meet the test of constitutionality. Having said that, the
Constitutional Court stated that the absence of a law regulating
alternative civilian service could not preclude the exercise of a right
by a person who was able to prove that he indeed had convictions or
religious beliefs that made military service unacceptable. The grounds
for the exercise of that right are prescribed by the Constitution and do
not require any implementing law.

Without interfering with the legislative powers of the Federal Assembly,
the Constitutional Court used the technique that may be described as a
"legislative hint". With its own law-making initiative being limited to
matters that explicitly fall within its jurisdiction, the Court
highlighted a lacuna that it believed ought to be closed by the
appropriate branch of power. At the same time it instructed other
departments of the Government as to how to apply the provision of the
Constitution that prescribed the right to alternative civilian service.

However, in that decision, as well as in another decision adopted later
that same year[^25] the Constitutional Court stated that the fact that a
draftee had convictions or religious beliefs needed to be proven in a
court of general jurisdiction, while other grounds would need to be
specified by law. As of the time of this writing, that law had not yet
been adopted.

## B. Drafting Students

The last decade of the 20^th^ Century was a time of expansion of the
private sector in the Russian system of education that had for many
years been run by the state. A student at a state institution of higher
learning would normally get a guaranteed draft deferral for the duration
of studies. For some, such deferral made universities a refuge from the
draft. The new private institutions were required to go through the
process of state accreditation. If they were accredited their students
would be also be granted a draft deferral.

A court in Omsk, a major city in Southern Siberia, asked the
Constitutional Court to review a provision of the Federal Law "On the
Military Duty and the Military Service." The provision granted draft
deferral to students at state, municipal, and private accredited
institutions, but did not grant such deferrals to students in private
non-accredited institutions. The petitioner argued that the provision
violated the right to education, the principal of equality of rights and
freedoms and went beyond reasonable restrictions on the exercise of
rights and freedoms.

The Constitutional Court passed a Judgement[^26] in which it pointed out
that a person contemplating studies at an institution of higher learning
had a choice of applying to state-owned or private colleges and
universities. The reader should be aware that admittance requirements at
state institutions could be more stringent than in private institutions.
However, the majority of students at the former do not pay any tuition
fee. Besides, degrees conferred by traditional, that is, state
institutions, often command more respect.

Having not found any violation of the right to education, the
Constitutional Court considered the constitutional duty to defend the
Motherland by performing the military service. It argued that students
at state or private non-accredited institutions alike are under
obligation to perform that duty. The difference is that some get
deferral while others do not. Those who do not may resume studies upon
completion of their military service. On those grounds the
Constitutional Court upheld the disputed provision of the Law.

## C. Uniformed Parents

A decision of the Constitutional Court resulting from a private dispute
is sometimes likely to become a class action that will affect a group of
people with some common characteristics, even though that group may be
rather small. There are not as many servicewomen in the Russian Armed
Forces as in the United States, although their numbers have certainly
grown in recent years. There are few mothers in uniform, although the
decision that will be discussed below affected both mothers and fathers
serving in the military.

Ms. Leukhina had signed a contract with the Ministry of Defense and was
serving as an NCO in a unit deployed in Azerbaijan, a former Soviet
republic, now an independent state. She was the mother of two young
children who lived with her. The officer commanding her unit refused to
pay her monthly compensations to support minor dependents. He argued
that since the unit was deployed to the territory of a state with which
Russia did not have an agreement on mutual support of dependents, she
was not entitled to compensations provided for by a respective Russian
law.

The reader should be aware that, following the break-up of the USSR in
December 1991, Russia adopted into its jurisdiction quite a few units of
the former Soviet Armed Forces that were deployed in what became
territories of new independent states. Legally, that required a
tremendous amount of treaty-making work---both on bi-lateral and
multi-lateral levels. A treaty that could have been applicable law under
the circumstances in which Ms. Leukhina found herself was the Agreement
on the Guarantees to Citizens with Regard to Payment of Social Benefits,
Compensations to Families with Children, and Alimony, that became
effective on 12 April 1995.[^27] Both Russia and Azerbaijan signed the
Agreement. However, the latter, unlike the former, had never ratified
it, thus making it ineffective in relations between the two countries.

The military court that heard the servicewoman's case asked the
Constitutional Court to review the Federal Law "On Government
Compensations to Citizens with Children". The presiding judge argued
that the Law, by making the compensation conditional on an international
agreement, discriminated against military members serving abroad.

The Constitutional Court stated that it was not the Law, but rather the
application of it that had been defective. The obligation of the State
to support parents was unconditional. The burden of that support could
be shared with another state-party to an international agreement, but in
the absence of such an agreement, it was the duty of the Russian
Government to pay compensations in full. The Court further stated that
"the special legal status of the military stems from the need to perform
the duty and the obligation of the citizen of the Russian Federation to
defend the Motherland. Hence the military, the location of their duty
station notwithstanding, shall be considered residing in the Russian
Federation".[^28]

## V. IMPLICIT LAWMAKING

When asked to scrutinize a law, the Constitutional Court is guided by a
presumption of its constitutionality. However, at the end of the day the
disputed provision may be struck off the books. This may be described as
a negative result. A possible scenario when the attitude becomes
positive is when the Constitutional Court identifies a lacuna in the
legislation and gently suggests that lawmakers might wish to fill that
void. That implicit lawmaking goes somewhat further than what has
already been referred to in this article as a "legislative hint." An
example of such a "legislative hint" that had concerned the military
follows.

Two military courts requested the Constitutional Court to review the Law
"On the Military Duty and the Military Service". They had been hearing
cases in which two plaintiffs, both former servicemen, disputed the
refusal of their commanders to cite the failure of the Ministry of
Defense to fulfill terms and conditions of their contracts as grounds
for termination of the contracts. The commanders argued that the Law did
not provide for such grounds. The military courts reasoned that the Law
they were to apply violated several constitutional rights and freedoms
of plaintiffs.

The Constitutional Court did not find any flaws in the existing text of
the Law. It gave its own interpretation of the petitions as implying a
lack of an applicable norm rather than unconstitutionality of an
existing provision. As noted elsewhere in this article, the
Constitutional Court is entitled to legislative initiative, but that
power is restricted to the sphere of the Court's jurisdiction.
Obviously, the detailed regulation of military service contracts does
not come near that area. For that reason the Constitutional Court did
not consider the petitions on their merits, but expressed an opinion
that the petitioners, in fact, pointed out a lacuna in the Law "On the
Military Duty and the Military Service."[^29]

The legislature reacted quite promptly to the decision. The new version
of the Law under the same title that was adopted on 28 March 1998
included a provision that entitled a serviceperson to initiate an
abrogation of contract in case of a "substantial and (or) systematic
breaches of terms of contract" by the other party.[^30]

Sometimes the Constitutional Court may be less unobtrusive in
identifying both deficiencies of existing laws and defective practice of
their application. Captain 1^st^ Rank Alexander Nikitin, a retired naval
officer, signed a contract with the Norwegian environmental group
"Bellona" to perform a study of nuclear safety issues in the Russian
Northern Fleet. The Federal Security Service (counterintelligence)
charged him with high treason, alleging that Mr. Nikitin illegally
acquired and disclosed secret information in his analysis. The lawyer he
had chosen was barred from the case on grounds that he did not have a
security clearance. The Federal Security Service maintained that the
then effective Federal Law "On State Secrets" of 1993 required clearance
for a lawyer in a case which involved information classified as
secret.[^31]

The Constitutional Court found that this interpretation of the Law
violated the right to legal assistance that was guaranteed by the
Constitution.[^32] Further, the Court stated that the role of a lawyer
as a party in judicial proceedings as well as the nature of the services
he provided to his client were sufficient grounds for a waiver of the
regular procedures of authorization of access to secret information.
Ironically, under the contested Law that authorization was performed by
the Federal Security Service itself. That same agency enjoys almost
exclusive investigatory powers in criminal cases involving state
secrets. A lawyer whose client is charged with high treason would likely
be rather ill at ease if he were obliged to request a security clearance
from the same Federal Security Service that initially brought charges
against his client.

The Constitutional Court ruled[^33] that the disputed provision of the
Law "On State Secrets," in its literal meaning, met the test of
constitutionality, while the meaning attributed to it by the Federal
Security Service did not. To avoid any further misinterpretation of that
provision, the Court explicitly directed the lawmakers to introduce a
clarifying amendment to the Law.

Eighteen months later the Law was amended to include a provision that
waived the authorization procedure with respect to lawyers whose clients
stand criminal charges involving state secrets, as well as to deputies
of both chambers of the Federal Assembly and to judges.[^34] Of course
that would not relieve them of responsibility for disclosure of state
secrets.

## VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS

I conclude this article with a frivolous theory that, nonetheless, quite
a few of my colleagues consider deserving of merit.

Russian society has had a long history of lack of confidence and trust
in the judiciary. This distrust goes back well before the 1917 October
Revolution which brought the Communist Party to power. A common
perception was that courts sentenced rather than administered justice.
Under the Soviet system a person would try to uphold a right in a
regional Communist Party committee rather than in a court of law.

When that system collapsed it left a gap that, in the public perception,
has been partially filled by the Constitutional Court. Some would
probably rather not notice a short noun "Court" hidden behind the long
adjective "Constitutional". Because of this misperception, the new
institution began to receive thousands of petitions on issues that
should have been addressed to other courts or even could have been
resolved outside the judiciary.

The Constitutional Court, for its own part, often seems to be inclined
to take an attitude of protecting the right of the individual, rather
than upholding public interests. Even now, in the second decade of its
existence, the Court has yet to find a way of consistently maintaining
the balance between the two principles.

However, it is in decisions involving the military, both as individuals
and as an organization, that the Court seems to be developing a more
balanced model. It weighs the rights and freedoms of a uniformed citizen
against the duties of a soldier. It puts on one side of the scale the
prerogatives of the military as but one of departments of the
Government, and on the other side of the scale their special
responsibilities as the armed defender of the nation. Several examples
from the practice of the Constitutional Court that were cited earlier in
this article may serve as evidence to prove that theory.

[^1]: ^\*^ *International Law Counselor of the Constitutional Court of
    the Russian Federation and Associate Professor of International Law
    of the Diplomatic Academy, Moscow. This article is based on a
    lecture delivered by the author at the 14^th^ Annual U.S. Pacific
    Command International Military Operations and Law Conference, March
    2001, Honolulu, Hawaii. Views expressed herein should not be
    construed as reflecting the official position of the Constitutional
    Court of the Russian Federation.*

[^2]: The episode called "Legacy" was first aired in October 2000. I do
    not know if my advice was taken.

[^3]: Original version published in: Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR
    (The Bulletin of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Soviet Federated
    Socialist Republic), 1960, No. 40, Art. 592 \[hereinafter Vedomosti
    Verkh Soveta RSFSR\].

[^4]: The number and frequency of amendments made it impossible to
    publish an official up-dated Code. A consolidated text may be found
    in KonsultantPlus© an electronic commercial data-base.

[^5]: Art. 47, fourth paragraph, as amended by Federal Law No. 73-FZ,
    June 15, 1996. Sobraniye Zakonodatel'stva Rossiyskoy Federatsii
    (Collection of Laws of the Russian Federation), June 17, 1996, No.
    25, Art. 2964 \[hereinafter Sobr. Zakonod. RF\].

[^6]: Art. 47, fifth paragraph.

[^7]: The most likely scenario would be if a case involved any
    classified information. Under Art. 21, second paragraph, of the
    Federal Law "On State Secrets" of 1993, as amended (originally
    published in Rossiyskaya Gazeta \[The Russian Gazette\] No. 182,
    September 21, 1993) \[hereinafter On State Secrets\], access of
    foreign citizens to state secrets shall be governed by the
    Government of the Russian Federation. In 1998 the Government issued
    a respective Order (Order No. 1003, August 22, 1998, Sobr. Zakonod.
    RF, *supra* note 4, August 31, 1998, No. 35, Art. 4407). Those
    regulations are quite restrictive with regard to permitting
    legitimate access of foreigners to Russian state secrets. Of course,
    this author is not qualified to discuss the authority under which a
    US serviceman, that is, a JAG officer, could represent a foreign
    national in a court of a foreign jurisdiction.

[^8]: Konstitutsiya (Osnovnoy Zakon) Rossiyskoy Federatsii-Rossii \[The
    Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Russian Federation, Russia\].
    Moscow, 1993, 127.

[^9]: Vedomosti S'yezda Narodnykh Deputatov i Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR
    \[The Bulletin of the Congress of People's Deputies and of the
    Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR\], July 25, 1991, No. 30, Art. 1017
    \[hereinafter Congress of People's Deputies\].

[^10]: The case was quite noteworthy. The Constitutional Court ruled
    that the Presidential Decree on the merger of the Ministry of
    Internal Affairs of the USSR, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of
    Russia, the Inter-Republican Security Service and the Russian
    Federal Security Agency into the Ministry of Security and Internal
    Affairs violated the principle of separation of powers and of the
    delineation of competence between supreme bodies of government. On
    those grounds the Court found the Decree unconstitutional (*see*:
    Congress of People's Deputies, *id*., February 6, 1992, No. 6, Art.
    247.

[^11]: Decree No. 1400 that President Boris Yetsin promulgated on
    September 21, 1993 merely suggested that "the Constitutional Court
    of the Russian Federation does not hold sessions until the
    convocation of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation".
    *See* Sobraniye Aktov Prezidenta i Pravitelstva Rossiyskoy
    Federatsii (Collection of Acts of the President and the Government
    of the Russian Federation), September 27, 1993, No. 39, Art. 3597.
    However, under the circumstances that prevailed in Moscow those days
    the Decree could not have been read other than an unequivocal order.

[^12]: For the text of the Constitution an English-speaking reader may
    be referred to the web-site of the Russian Embassy in Washington,
    D.C., *available at* http://www.russianembassy.org (last visited May
    8, 2002).

[^13]: Sobr. Zakonod. RF, *supra* note 4, July 25, 1994, No. 13, Art.
    1447. A consolidated text may be found in KonsultantPlus© an
    electronic commercial data-base.

[^14]: The powers and jurisdiction of courts are set forth in Chapter 7
    "The Judiciary" of the Constitution and the Federal Constitutional
    Law "On the Judicial System of the Russian Federation" of 1996, as
    amended. *See* id., January 6, 1997, No. 1, Art. 1.

[^15]: Vestnik Konstitutsionnogo Suda Rossiyskoy Federatsii \[The
    Bulletin of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation\],
    1995, No. 5.

[^16]: Directive No. 333, May 29, 1999, of the Minister of Defense of
    the Russian Federation "On the Legal Training in the Armed Forces of
    the Russian Federation" (copy on file with author).

[^17]: Respublika Tatarstan \[Republic of Tatarstan\], No. 125, July 6,
    1999.

[^18]: Sobr. Zakonod. RF, *supra* note 4, May 17, 1999, No. 20, Art.
    2413.

[^19]: Ruling No. 62-O, April 23, 1999 (copy on file with author).

[^20]: Constitution of the Russian Federation, Art. 102.1(*d*).

[^21]: Ruling No. 115-O, December 4, 1995 (copy on file with author).

[^22]: The Federal Constitutional Law "On the Constitutional Court of
    the Russian Federation", Art. 78.

[^23]: Vedomosti Verkh Soveta RSFSR , *supra* note 2, Art. 591. The
    consolidated text may be found in KonsultantPlus© an electronic
    commercial data-base. The contested provision was Art. 80 "Evasion
    from Regular Draft to Active Military Service" that criminalized
    draft evasion with possible sentences of one to five years in
    prison.

[^24]: Ruling No. 63-O, May 22, 1996. Unofficial publication in:
    Konstitutsioniy Sud Rossiyskoy Federatsii: Postanovleniya.
    Opredeleniya (Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation:
    Judgements. Rulings) 1992-1996. Moscow, 1997, 501-503.

[^25]: Ruling No. 93-O, September 26, 1996 (copy on file with author).

[^26]: Judgement No. 13-P, October 21, 1999. Sobr. Zakonod. RF, *supra*
    note 4, November 1, 1999, No. 44, Art. 5383.

[^27]: Sodruzhestvo \[Commonwealth\]. The official Bulletin of the
    Council of the Heads of State and of the Council of the Heads of
    Government of the Commonwealth of Independent States, 1994, No. 2
    (21), p. 89-93.

[^28]: Sobr. Zakonod. RF, *supra* note 4, August 14, 2000, No. 33, Art.
    3430. Incidentally, this was not a judgement, but rather a "ruling
    with positive content" that was delivered on June 8, 2000.

[^29]: Ruling No. 94-O, July 11, 1996 (copy on file with author).

[^30]: Art.51.3(a). Sobr. Zakonod. RF, *supra* note 4, March 30, 1998,
    No. 13, Art. 1475.

[^31]: On State Secret, *supra* note 6.

[^32]: Constitution of the Russian Federation, Art. 48.

[^33]: Judgement No. 8-P, March 27, 1996. Sobr. Zakonod. RF, *supra*
    note 4, April 8, 1996, No. 15, Art. 1768.

[^34]: That amendment was introduce by Federal Law No. 131-FZ, October
    6, 1997. Sobr. Zakonod. RF, *supra* note 4, October 13, 1997, No.
    41, Art. 4673.