HQ 967284

May 10, 2005

CLA-2-RR:CR:GC 967284 IOR

CATEGORY: Classification

Tariff No.: 8507.20.80; 9903.08.14

Port Director

Customs and Border Protection

111 West Huron St.

Rm. 603

Buffalo, NY 14202

# Attn: Sharon M. Swiatek, SIS

Re: Protest AFR No. 0901-04-100195; classification of lead-acid storage
batteries; extension of liquidation

Dear Port Director:

This is our decision on the application for further review (AFR) of
protest no. 0901-04-100195, filed against your classification of
lead-acid storage batteries, under the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the
United States (HTSUS). The subject two entries were liquidated on March
26, 2004 and this protest and AFR was timely filed on June 3, 2004. Our
decision follows a teleconference held on March 9, 2005, between counsel
for the protestant and members of the staff of the Office of Regulations
and Rulings, General Classification Branch.

**FACTS:**

Two entries of batteries were made on January 22, 2001. The entry
summaries identified the merchandise as "lead-acid stor batteries,
other", imported from Canada, and the entered classification was
subheading 8507.10.0090, HTSUSA. The commercial invoices identified the
merchandise as "UN2794, Group III, Class 8 Batteries" made in Germany.

According to the Customs and Border Protection ("CBP") Automated
Commercial System ("ACS"), the liquidation of the entries was extended
three times. Specifically, according to ACS, the liquidation of the
entries was extended on January 5, 2002, November 23, 2002, and November
15, 2003. For each extension, ACS records indicate that a notice of
extension was sent to the importer and the importer's surety. ACS
reflects separate addresses for the importer and the surety. Two Notice
of Action forms, CF 29, both dated October 8, 2003, were issued with
respect to the two entries. Both informed the protestant that the
entered batteries would be rate advanced to reflect the proper
classification of the batteries under subheadings 8507.20.8090, HTSUS,
and 9903.08.14, HTSUS, to reflect the 100% duties applicable to
merchandise from the European Union ("EU"). The notices stated that
"these batteries are used as reserve power supply in telecommunications
equipment and industrial plant and also in safety power supply
equipment." The notices referenced and had attached HQ 963685, dated
December 12, 2000.

The protestant, the importer, has provided documentation received
through a Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") request pertaining to an
enforcement issue with regard to the batteries. The unredacted versions
of these documents have been provided to this office by the port.
Specifically, an Enforcement Evaluation Referral Form, dated August 14,
2001, indicates that in August, 2000, CBP was evaluating whether
importations of batteries such as the subject batteries were an evasion
of the 100% duties applicable to merchandise from the EU. The document
states that with respect to another entry or entries, a classification
decision was made, and "this" entry was liquidated and the duty bill was
paid without protest. The document refers to HQ 963685, *supra*, which
pertains to the classification of lead acid storage batteries, and the
100% EU duties. In a second document consisting of the Enforcement
Evaluation Team's ("EET") "notes to file," the last note was made on
November 21, 2001, and questions the availability of additional
information pertaining to the merchandise and the appropriateness of the
100% duty, as well as raises the possibility of unsetting the entries
and issuing a proposed rate advance.

Prior to the subject entries of batteries, other entries of similar
batteries had been rate advanced and liquidated as classified under
subheading 8507.20.80, HTSUS, and therefore subheading 9903.08.14,
HTSUS, with the 100% duties, without any protests being filed. According
to the CBP officials at the port, subsequent to the protestant's
entries, an entry of batteries similar to those entered by the
protestant was made on March 8, 2001, under subheading 8507.10.00,
HTSUS. That importer provided information to CBP pertaining to the
batteries, asserting that they had qualities suitable for starting
piston engines, and therefore were not subject to 100% duties.
Liquidation of the subject entries was delayed pending receipt of
supporting information regarding the March 8, 2001 entry of similar
batteries, in the belief that supporting evidence of assertions would be
provided. The information was expected to be potentially applicable to
the subject entries as well. Verification of the assertions by means of
a section 1592 investigation was considered. In addition, the subject
entries pertained to batteries received by the importer from the same
shipper as the other earlier entries for which the 100% duties had been
assessed and not protested, giving rise to the enforcement evaluation
request, dated August 14, 2001, pertaining to the shipper.

Subsequent to the events of September 11, 2001, the entries were
returned by the EET to the port for handling. At the port, due to
staffing changes the classification issue was not resolved without
delay. Prior to September 11, 2001, the two Industry Group V teams, 157
and 158, in the Port of Buffalo each had one Field National Import
Specialist (FNIS) team leader, and shared three Associate Import
Specialists (AIS). Team 158 was assigned the subject entries. Following
September 11, 2001, the AIS's were assigned on a rotational basis to
other duties at the release sites within the port. This assignment
continued until January, 2003, and during this period, at any given
time, two of the three AIS's assigned to teams 157 and 158 may have been
working at the release sites. In addition, from April, 2002 until June,
2003, the FNIS team leader of team 158 was responsible for both teams
157 and 158, due to the departure from CBP of the FNIS team leader of
team 157. The team leader position for team 157 was not filled until
June, 2003. In addition, the staffing of the Commercial Violations Team
at the port was cut in half for the period from September 11, 2001 to
January, 2003. The Enforcement Examination continued to be in effect
until the issue was closed by the Enforcement Examination Team on August
18, 2004, based on the conclusion that the case lacked merit under
section 1592. It was stated by the port that the extensions were
reasonable in light of uncertainty in pursuing enforced compliance given
the shifting priorities of CBP in the post 9/11 environment.

The subject entries were liquidated on March 26, 2004. We note that the
appraised value of the merchandise remained as entered. The entries of
similar batteries made on March 8, 2001, were not liquidated until
February, 2005.

The protestant takes the position that more than one year passed after
entry without the issuance of any valid extensions or suspensions, and
therefore the entries were deemed liquidated. In the protest submission,
it is asserted that neither the importer nor its surety received any
notice of extension until the importer received on November 20, 2003,
notices of extension dated November 15, 2003. Further the protestant
asserts that as of August 14, 2001, CBP had all the information
necessary to classify the entered merchandise and issue a rate advance.
The protestant asserts the documentation submitted establishes that CBP
did not need any additional information to appraise and classify the
entered merchandise and therefore had no legitimate statutory basis to
delay the liquidations for the length of time between entry and
liquidation, and that the extensions were therefore unlawful.

With respect to the classification of the entered merchandise, the
protestant takes the position that subheading 8507.10.0090, HTSUSA, does
not mandate that the principal use must be for starting piston engines,
in order for lead acid storage batteries to be classified therein, when
the only alternative is a basket provision. The protestant also takes
the position that a battery capable of being used for starting piston
engines qualifies to be classified in subheading 8507.10.0090, HTSUSA.
The protestant acknowledges that the batteries in question have multiple
uses, including starting piston engines, telecommunications, emergency
lighting, microwave radio systems, power generation plants, and photo
voltaics. The protestant does not assert that any one of the foregoing
uses predominates over the others.

Finally, the protestant claims that the changes in classification and
value are unenforceable by reason of the equitable doctrine of laches,
and that the protestant was severely prejudiced by the unreasonable
delay of the government in liquidating the entries.

**ISSUES:**

1.  Whether the entries liquidated by operation of law.

2.  Whether the protestant is entitled to equitable relief.

3.  Whether the lead-acid storage batteries are classifiable as electric
    storage batteries under subheading 8507.10.0090, HTSUS, as lead-acid
    storage batteries, of a kind used for starting piston engines, or
    subheading 8507.20.8090, HTSUS, as other lead-acid storage
    batteries.

**LAW AND ANALYSIS:**

Initially we note that the matters protested are protestable under 19
U.S.C. §1514(a)(2) and (5), as decisions on classification, and the
liquidation of an entry.

Under 19 U.S.C. §1504, an entry of merchandise not liquidated within one
year from the date of entry of such merchandise shall be deemed
liquidated at the rate of duty, value, quantity, and amount of duties
asserted at the time of entry by the importer of record, unless the
one‑year period for liquidation is extended. The statute authorizes
reasons for which liquidation may be extended, including that
information needed for the proper appraisement or classification of the
merchandise, or for insuring compliance with applicable law, is not
available. Authority is provided for regulations prescribing the
procedures for such extensions of liquidation.

The CBP regulations issued under this statute are found in 19 CFR
§159.12. Under §159.12(a)(1)(i), the port director may extend the one
year statutory period for liquidation for an additional period not to
exceed one year if information needed by CBP for the proper appraisement
or classification of the merchandise is not available. Under §159.12(b),
if the port director extends the time for liquidation as provided above,
he is required to promptly notify the importer or the consignee and his
agent and surety that the time has been extended and the reasons for
doing so. Under §159.12(d), if the port director extends the time for
liquidation under 159.12(a)(1)(i), the period of time may be extended
for an additional year, if the port director determines that more time
is needed. Section 159.12(e) provides that the total time for which
extensions may be granted by the port director, may not exceed three
years.

According to ACS, notices of extension to the importer and surety were
processed on January 5, 2002, November 23, 2002 and November 15, 2003,
for both entries. In C.S.D. 83-20, the third holding stated "\[w\]here
Customs computer indicated a notice of extension has been sent to the
surety, Customs routine office practice of mailing such notices of
extension within a week after such notices are generated is sufficient
evidence of mailing the notice, even though a surety claims it did not
receive such notice." (C.S.D. 83-20 originally contained three holdings;
however, the first two holdings were reversed by a Headquarters Ruling
Letter dated March 24, 1983, leaving only the remaining third holding
valid. *See* 17 Cust. Bull. No. 19 at 8 (May 11, 1983)).

In this case, the ACS records of the processing of the notices of
extensions are sufficient evidence to create the presumption that proper
notice of extension was given (*see e.g*., [International Cargo & Surety
Insurance Co. (Data Memory Corp.) v. United States]{.underline}, 15 CIT
541, 779 F.Supp. 174 (1991)). A presumption of regularity attaches to
the acts of government officials. *See, e.g*., [International Cargo &
Surety Ins. Co., v. United States]{.underline}, *supra*. In addition,
proof of mailing raises a presumption of delivery. *See*, [Intra-Mar
Shipping Corp. v. United States]{.underline}, C.D. 4160, 66 Cust Ct. 3,5
(1971). The presumption of delivery is rebuttable by proof of
nonreceipt. *Id*. *See* [Hanover Insurance Co. v. United
States]{.underline}, (23 Int\'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1495 (Ct. Intl. Trade
2001)), in which affidavits from the importer's employees and the broker
responsible for handling suspension notices from CBP, asserting no
recollection of receiving or reviewing such notices, were required to
rebut the presumption that notice was not given.

The issue of \"nonreceipt\" of notice was addressed in [A.N. Deringer v.
United States]{.underline}, 20 C.I.T. 978 (1996). In
[Deringer]{.underline}, the broker acting as the importer of record,
challenged CBP's decision denying the plaintiff\'s protest against CBP's
liquidation of the subject merchandise. The plaintiff alleged that it
did not receive any notices of extension or suspension of liquidation
from CBP after the date of entry. The court found that CBP introduced
sufficient evidence to invoke the presumption of regularity that
attaches to acts of government officials. Secondly, proof of mailing
gave rise to the presumption of delivery, which the plaintiff failed to
rebut by proof of nonreceipt. *Id*. at 72. Accordingly, the court found
that CBP was presumed to have generated and mailed the notices that were
at issue. Therefore, the burden to prove non-receipt of the notice is
then on the protestant. In the instant protest, the protestant provides
no evidence that neither it not its surety received the notice. Mere
assertions made by counsel are not evidence. *See* [Bar Bea Truck
Leasing Co., Inc. V. United States]{.underline}, 5 CIT 124, 126 (1983).

In such a case, when the protestant fails to rebut that presumption that
proper notice of extension was given, \"the only issue to be decided is
whether the extension was permissible under the statute,\"
([International Cargo & Surety Insurance Co.]{.underline}, 15 CIT at
545). The issue of the permissibility of extension of liquidation was
addressed by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in [St. Paul
Fire & Marine Ins. Co. \[Carreon\] v. United States]{.underline}, 6 F.3d
763 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (reversing the CIT decision (16 CIT 663, 779
F.Supp. 120 (1992)), wherein the court concluded:

> \...Customs may, for statutory purposes and with the requisite notice,
> employ up to four years to effect liquidation so long as the
> extensions it grants are not abusive of its discretionary authority.
> Such an abuse of discretionary authority may arise only when an
> extension is granted even following elimination of all possible
> grounds for such an extension. There is, in sum, a narrow limitation
> on Customs discretion to extend the period of liquidation.

(6 F.3d at 768). The court went on to state that \"Customs decisions to
extend are entitled to a presumption of legality unless \[the
plaintiff\] can prove that these decisions were unreasonable.\" (6 F.3d
at 768).

> In [Ford Motor Co. v. United States]{.underline}, 286 F.3d 1335 (Fed.
> Cir. 2002), the Court found a 30 month period of almost no substantive
> work during a 44 month investigation including two periods of
> inactivity totalling 22 months was unreasonable as a manner of
> conducting an investigation, and the length of time was unreasonable.
> In [Ford]{.underline}, it was alleged that CBP had abused its
> discretion in extending the liquidation of entries three times. In
> that case the entries were also the subject of an investigation.
> Customs took the position that it extended the entries while waiting
> for further information to ensure the correct classification and
> appraisement of the imported merchandise, and that it extended the
> liquidations because it was the policy to extend liquidation pending a
> section 1592 investigation, and it was reasonably expected that the
> investigation could produce information affecting the classification
> or appraisement of the merchandise.

While the court in [Ford]{.underline} affirmed its decision in [St. Paul
Fire & Marine Ins. Co.]{.underline}, where it acknowledged that CBP
"possesses broad discretion concerning whether a liquidation extension
is warranted," the court did not find the reasons given for the delays
in Ford to be reasonable excuses. 286 F.3d at 1340. However, the court
did consider the setting in which the delays occurred, as follows:

> We do not hold that, in times of natural or national calamity,
> repeated extensions of liquidation and periods of inactivity could not
> withstand judicial scrutiny for reasonableness. Customs' delay in this
> case did not occur in such a setting, however. Rather, Customs sought
> to explain its delay in conducting the fraud investigation by pointing
> to typical day-to-day workplace exigencies, such as competing
> responsibilities, an agent taking sick leave, and the various tasks
> associated with starting a new office. Acceptance of these exigencies
> as excuses for Customs' lengthy delay in this case would leave the
> statutory objective of prompt liquidation, and this court's
> requirement that any liquidation delays be reasonable, largely
> meaningless.

[Id]{.underline}., at 1343.

In [Stemcor USA, Inc. v. United States]{.underline}, Slip op. 2002-149,
24 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 2259 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2002), the importer
claimed CBP had acted unreasonably in issuing a notice of extension,
just before the one year anniversary of the entry, claiming that CBP's
continuing need for information was due to CBP's laxity. The court held
that showing laxity is not sufficient, but it must be established that
the laxity was unreasonably so. The court considered evidence that CBP
was actively considering the matter at issue, and concluded that lack of
evidence of "any other conversations or ongoing discussions does not
prove that \[CBP\] was not considering the matter...." The court held
that the importer had failed to eliminate all possible grounds for CBP's
extension of the liquidation period, and thus failed to overcome the
presumption of correctness afforded to CBP's decisions.

As the protestant asserts that the extension of the liquidation of the
entries was an abuse of discretion, we will consider whether it appears
that between January 22, 2001 and March 26, 2004 Customs took an
unreasonable amount of time in which to liquidate the entries. In the
instant case, the evidence shows that the extensions of January 5, 2002
and November 23, 2002 occurred during the period between September 11,
2003 and January, 2003, when the staff of the Industry Group responsible
for the subject entries, and the staff of the Commercial Violations Team
was significantly reduced. The extension of November 23, 2002 occurred
when even the duties of the team leader of team 158 were increased to
include those of team 157. The third extension of November 15, 2003,
occurred only five months after the team leader of team 158, was
relieved of the additional responsibility for team 157.

In this case, the total time between entry and liquidation was 38
months. Unlike in [Ford]{.underline}, there is no evidence of periods of
total inactivity. Further, a significant portion of the 38 months was
impacted by the events of September 11, 2001, which could be considered
a national calamity. The total period of time during which CBP had to
work on the subject entries, and which was not impacted by the staffing
changes after September 11, or the increased responsibilities of the
responsible team leader, until the third extension, was from January 22,
2001 to September 11, 2001, a period of almost nine months, and from
June, 2003 to November 2003, a period of five months, for a total of
fourteen months. During those fourteen months, the issue had been
referred to the EET for consideration, for a period of just over three
months. Had the fourteen months occurred consecutively, it would be
arguable even then that one year after liquidation it was reasonable to
seek an extension to resolve the issue of the classification of the
batteries.

There is evidence that the battery issue was being actively considered
from the time of entry to November 21, 2001, and no evidence that CBP
was not actively considering the matter during the period after November
21, 2001. The protestant takes the position that the entries could have
been liquidated as of November 21, 2001, however, the documentation does
not support that. The EET's note of November 21, 2001 indicates that as
of that date, the classification issue had not been resolved because
there was still a question whether other information was available to
finally resolve the classification issue. The March 8, 2001 entry of
batteries had raised issues not present at the time of the liquidation
of the batteries entered prior to the subject batteries and referred to
in the enforcement evaluation request of August 14, 2001. Even assuming
complete inactivity on the subject entries during the period of November
22, 2001 to January, 2003, a period of almost 14 months, during the
staffing shortages due to September 11, delays under these
circumstances, are more likely to withstand judicial scrutiny for
reasonableness under the decision in [Ford]{.underline}, *supra*, than
the delays in [Ford]{.underline}, given the enormity of the impact of
the events of September 11 in general and upon CBP in particular. In
this case, according to the port, the issue of the batteries was under
active consideration, and was not resolved until the entries were
liquidated. Under [Stemcor USA]{.underline}, the protestant must
establish that not only was CBP lax in its consideration of the entries,
but was unreasonably so.

Therefore, we conclude that the delay in liquidating the entries was not
so unreasonable as to constitute an abuse of discretion and thereby
invalidate the extensions of the subject entries, and that the
protestant has not eliminated all possible grounds for CBP's extension
of the liquidation period.

Protestant contends that relief should be granted on the basis of
laches. The legal doctrine of laches precludes enforcement of a legal
right or claim if a long delay in asserting the right or claim has
prejudiced the adverse party. We note that laches is an equitable
doctrine (*see, e.g*., [A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Const.
Co.]{.underline}, 960 F. 2d 1020, 1030-1031 (Fed. Cir. 1992); [Robins
Island Preservation Fund v. Southold Dev.]{.underline}, 959 F. 2d 409,
423-424 (2nd Cir. 1992)). Equitable principles do not operate against
the Government in cases involving the collection or refund of duties on
imports ([Air-Sea Brokers, Inc. v. United States]{.underline}, 66 CCPA
64, 67-68, C.A.D. 1222, 596 F. 2d 1008, 1011 (1979); *see also*
[Mitsubishi Electronics America, Inc. v. United States]{.underline}, 18
CIT 929, 932 (1994). Since this is a case involving the collection or
refund of duties on imports, the doctrine of laches is not available in
this case. *See e.g.* HQ 224650, dated November 25, 1994; HQ 229330,
dated March 12, 2002.

With respect to the classification of the batteries, classification
under the HTSUS is made in accordance with the General Rules of
Interpretation (GRIs). GRI 1 provides that the classification of goods
shall be determined according to the terms of the headings of the tariff
schedule and any relative Section or Chapter Notes. In the event that
the goods cannot be classified solely on the basis of GRI 1, and if the
headings and legal notes do not otherwise require, the remaining GRIs
may then be applied. When the issue is based on competing subheadings,
for purposes of determining the subheading, GRI 6 is applied. GRI 6
provides that \"for legal purposes, the classification of goods in the
subheadings of a heading shall be determined according to the terms of
those subheadings and any related subheading notes and *mutatis
mutandis*, to \[rules 1 through 5\], on the understanding that only
subheadings at the same level are comparable.\"

The HTSUS subheadings under consideration are as follows:

8507. Electric storage batteries, including separators therefor, whether
      or not rectangular (including square); parts thereof:

      0.  Lead-acid storage batteries, of a kind used for starting
          piston
          engines......................................................................

      ```{=html}
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      ```
      20. Other lead-acid storage batteries:

          80. Other.................................................................

Articles the product of Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, the Federal
Republic of Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden, or the United Kingdom:

14. Lead-acid storage batteries, other than of a kind used for starting
    piston engines or as the primary source of electrical power for
    electrically powered vehicles of subheading 8703.90 (provided for in
    subheading
    8507.20.80)..................................................

In order for subheading 8507.10.00, HTSUS, to be applicable, the
batteries must be of a kind used for starting piston engines. In [Primal
Lite Inc. v. United States]{.underline}, 182 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1999),
*aff'g* 15 F.Supp. 2d 915 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1998), the court construed
the "of a kind used" language in a different subheading of the HTSUS,
and stated that Additional U.S. Rule of Interpretation 1 of the HTSUS
dictates how tariff classifications should be construed when the
classification decision is controlled by use. The court further stated
that as a principal use provision, the "of a kind used" provision at
issue is governed by Additional U.S. Rule of Interpretation 1(a), which
provides:

> In the absence of special language or context which otherwise requires
> --

(a) a tariff classification controlled by use (other than actual use) is
    to be determined in accordance with the use in the United States at,
    or immediately prior to, the date of importation, of goods of that
    class or kind to which the imported goods belong, and the
    controlling use is the principal use.

In accordance with the [Primal Lite]{.underline} decision, we construe
subheading 8507.10.00, HTSUS, as a principal use provision. *See also*
HQ 963685, dated December 12, 2000, in which the [Primal
Lite]{.underline} decision was applied to another subheading with the
language "of a kind used."

We find that the protestant has not provided any evidence that the
subject batteries are principally used for starting piston engines, that
is, that in accordance with Additional U.S. Rule of Interpretation 1(a),
the largest use in the United States at the time of importation of
articles of the same class or kind as the imported article, is for
starting piston engines. The protestant acknowledges that the subject
batteries have multiple uses, and does not take the position that any
one use of the batteries predominates over the others.

The protestant further takes the position that it is not mandated that
the principal use of the batteries must be for starting piston engines
when the only alternative is a basket provision. The word "other"
generally indicates a basket provision. *See* [The Item Company v.
United States]{.underline}, 98 F.3d 1294, 1296 (Fed. Cir. 1996). The
protestant's argument is without merit. In the [Primal Lite]{.underline}
case, when the merchandise at issue did not meet the requirements of the
principal use provision, the merchandise was held to be classified in a
basket provision. That was also the result in HQ 963685, *supra*.

The imported batteries are classified in subheading 8507.20.80, HTSUS,
which provides for: "\[e\]lectric storage batteries, including
separators therefore, whether or not rectangular (including square);
parts thereof: Other lead-acid storage batteries: Other," which are
subject to the 100% duty rate under subheading 9903.08.14, HTSUS, which
provides for: "\[a\]rticles the product of... Germany...: Lead-acid
storage batteries, other than of a kind used for starting piston engines
or as the primary source of electrical power for electrically powered
vehicles of subheading 8703.90 (provided for in subheading 8507.20.80)."

**HOLDING:**

By application of GRIs 1 and 6, imported batteries are classified in
subheading 8507.20.80, HTSUS, which provides for: "\[e\]lectric storage
batteries, including separators therefore, whether or not rectangular
(including square); parts thereof: Other lead-acid storage batteries:
Other," which are subject to the 100% duty rate under subheading
9903.08.14, HTSUS, which provides for: "\[a\]rticles the product of...
Germany...: Lead-acid storage batteries, other than of a kind used for
starting piston engines or as the primary source of electrical power for
electrically powered vehicles of subheading 8703.90 (provided for in
subheading 8507.20.80)," with a column one, general duty rate of 100% ad
valorem. Duty rates are provided for your convenience and are subject to
change. The text of the most recent HTSUS and the accompanying duty
rates are provided on the internet at
[www.usitc.gov/tata/hts/](http://www.usitc.gov/tata/hts/).

The protest should be DENIED. In accordance with the Protest/Petition
Processing Handbook (CIS HB, June 2002, pp. 18 and 21), you are to mail
this decision, together with the Customs Form 19, to the protestant no
later than 60 days from the date of this letter. Any reliquidation of
the entry in accordance with the decision must be accomplished prior to
mailing of the decision. Sixty days from the date of the decision the
Office of Regulations and Rulings will make the decision available to
CBP personnel, and to the public on the CBP Home Page on the World Wide
Web at www.cbp.gov, by means of the Freedom of Information Act, and
other methods of public distribution.

> Sincerely,

Myles B. Harmon, Director

Commercial Rulings Division