***Port Security:***

***Administration's Layered Defense is Full of Holes***

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**February 23, 2006**

**Representative Bennie G. Thompson**

**Ranking Member**

**Committee on Homeland Security**

**WHY PORT SECURITY MATTERS**

-   **U.S. seaports handle over 95% of our nation's foreign trade worth
    over \$1 trillion a year.**

-   **The 9/11 Commission report concluded that terrorist have the
    "opportunity to do harm as great or greater in maritime and surface
    transportation" than the 9/11 attacks.**

-   **A weapon of mass destruction detonated in a container at a seaport
    could cause tremendous numbers of casualties, and an estimated
    economic loss ranging from \$58 billion to \$1 trillion.**

-   **The U.S. Coast Guard estimates that ports will have to spend \$5.4
    billion over 10 years to maintain a basic level of security.**

-   **The Bush Administration has stated that it has a layered approach
    to port security that begins when a container is stuffed overseas
    until it arrives in the U.S.**

-   **Security experts, the Government Accountability Office, and the
    Department of Homeland Security have reported that each layer of the
    Administration layers have large holes resulting in port
    insecurity.**

> **CLAIMS VERSUS REALITY**

+---------------------------------+------------------------------------+
| **"Layered" Approach**          | **Holes and Gaps Remain**          |
|                                 |                                    |
| **Assertion**                   |                                    |
+---------------------------------+------------------------------------+
| *Customs and Border Protection  | The Department of Homeland         |
| (CBP) uses intelligence and a   | Security Inspector General and the |
| risk-based strategy to screen   | GAO have both reported that the    |
| information on 100 percent of   | screening system relies heavily on |
| the cargo before it is loaded   | manifest data, which according to  |
| onto vessels destined for the   | terrorism experts, industry        |
| United States.*                 | leaders, and CBP inspectors is one |
|                                 | of the least reliable forms of     |
|                                 | information for screening          |
|                                 | purposes. [^1]                     |
+---------------------------------+------------------------------------+
| *24 Hour Rule: Under this       | The Department of Homeland         |
| requirement, manifest           | Security Inspector General and the |
| information must be provided 24 | GAO have both reported that the    |
| hours prior to the sea          | screening system relies heavily on |
| container being loaded on a     | manifest data which according to   |
| vessel.*                        | terrorism experts, industry        |
|                                 | leaders, and CBP inspectors is one |
|                                 | of the least reliable forms of     |
|                                 | information for screening          |
|                                 | purposes. [^2]                     |
+---------------------------------+------------------------------------+
| *Container Security Initiative  | The GAO has stated that staffing   |
| (CSI) enables CBP to examine    | imbalances at foreign seaports has |
| high-risk maritime              | resulted in 35% of high-risk       |
| containerized cargo at foreign  | containers not being inspected     |
| seaports.*                      | overseas. [^3]                     |
+---------------------------------+------------------------------------+

+---------------------------------+------------------------------------+
| *Customs Trade Partnership      | The GAO reported that security     |
| Against Terrorism: CBP created  | checks performed by CBP are not    |
| a public-private partnership    | rigorous enough to achieve the     |
| with over 5,800 businesses to   | program's purpose. In fact less    |
| improve baseline security       | than 13% of the checks have been   |
| practices for supply-chain and  | performed on the 10,000 C-TPAT     |
| security. All C-TPAT businesses | businesses. [^4]                   |
| are checked for compliance with |                                    |
| the programs requirements.*     |                                    |
+---------------------------------+------------------------------------+
| *Use of Cutting-Edge            | According to CBP officials, CBP    |
| Technology: CBP is currently    | have deployed 157 radiation portal |
| utilizing large-scale X-ray and | monitors ate seaports. [^5]        |
| gamma ray machines and          |                                    |
| radiation detection devices to  |                                    |
| screen machines. Presently CBP  |                                    |
| operates 680 radiation portal   |                                    |
| monitors at our nation's        |                                    |
| ports.*                         |                                    |
+---------------------------------+------------------------------------+
| *DHS has approximately \$1.6    | The Administration requested \$150 |
| billion on port security in FY  | million in port security grants in |
| 2005.* [^6]                     | FY2005 which is the only funding   |
|                                 | that went directly to ports for    |
|                                 | security purposes." This amount    |
|                                 | was \$250 SHORT of what ports need |
|                                 | to implement and maintain security |
|                                 | measures.[^7]                      |
|                                 |                                    |
|                                 | Port operators have stated that    |
|                                 | there is a \$1.5 billion gap       |
|                                 | between what is required to        |
|                                 | implement security measures and    |
|                                 | what the Administration has been   |
|                                 | willing to support. [^8]           |
|                                 |                                    |
|                                 | The remaining funds went to Coast  |
|                                 | Guard and Customs, including \$966 |
|                                 | million for the Coast Guard's      |
|                                 | Deepwater program which is         |
|                                 | important but does not directly    |
|                                 | help our ports.                    |
|                                 |                                    |
|                                 | The Administration's FY2007 budget |
|                                 | also eliminates the port security  |
|                                 | grant program in favor of a        |
|                                 | Targeted Infrastructure Protection |
|                                 | Grant which forces ports to        |
|                                 | compete for limited resources with |
|                                 | mass transit, rail, and other      |
|                                 | critical infrastructure sectors.   |
+---------------------------------+------------------------------------+

[^1]: Richard Stanna, Homeland Security: Preliminary Observations on
    Efforts to Target Security Inspections of Cargo Containers. U.S.
    General Accounting Office. Testimony before the Subcommittee on
    Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Energy and Commerce,
    House of Representatives. December 16, 2003, p. 11. Department of
    Homeland Security, Office of the Inspector General, Audit of
    Targeting Oceangoing Cargo Containers, OIG-05-26, July 2005. p.2.

[^2]: Richard Stanna, Homeland Security: Preliminary Observations on
    Efforts to Target Security Inspections of Cargo Containers. U.S.
    General Accounting Office. Testimony before the Subcommittee on
    Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Energy and Commerce,
    House of Representatives. December 16, 2003, p. 11. Department of
    Homeland Security, Office of the Inspector General, Audit of
    Targeting Oceangoing Cargo Containers, OIG-05-26, July 2005. p.2.

[^3]: Government Accountability Office, *Container Security: A Flexible
    Staffing Model and Minimum Equipment Requirements Would Improve
    Overseas Targeting and Inspection Efforts*. GAO-05-557, April 26,
    2005.

[^4]: Government Accountability Office, *Cargo Security: Partnership
    Program Grants Importers Reduced Scrutiny with Limited Assurance of
    Improved Security*. GAO-05-404, March 2005, p.4.

[^5]: Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Customs and Border
    Protection FY 2007 Budget Briefing February 2006.

[^6]: Department of Homeland Security Press Office Fact Sheet "Securing
    U.S. Ports" February 22, 2006.

[^7]: American Association of Port Authorities, Position Paper on Port
    Security.
    http://www.aapa-ports.org/govrelations/aapa_security_position.pdf

[^8]: Joseph Brouchard, Ph.D. *New Strategies to Protect America: Safe
    Ports for a More Secure Economy*, Center American Progress, June 15,
    2005, p.9.