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**MEDIA SECURITY AND RELIABILITY COUNCIL**

**Adopted Best Practices Recommendations**

**[Communications Infrastructure Security,]{.underline}**

**[Access & Restoration Working Group]{.underline}**

*[Prevention Task Force]{.underline}*

[National Recommendations]{.underline}

1.  All media companies should reassess their vulnerabilities
    considering the possibility of deliberate attacks in addition to
    natural disasters and equipment failures and take appropriate
    measures to prevent loss of service and to expedite rapid recovery.

    1.  In contemplating the possibility of deliberate attacks,
        vulnerability assessments should consider system redundancies
        and their geographic distribution.

> 1.2 Because commercial communications satellites are the predominant
> means of national signal distribution for mass media, the
> vulnerability of the satellite infrastructure, especially TT&C, should
> continue to be examined and reinforced.
>
> 1.2.1 Each major source of news should consider alternatives to
> commercial communication satellites (*e.g.*, DBS satellites, Internet,
> etc.) as a last-resort backup means of signal distribution, even if
> technical signal quality is substantially degraded under such
> conditions.

2.  Under government declared emergency conditions, news media should
    consider agreements that allow unconventional flexibility in local
    use and retransmission of the content to serve the public interest.

    1.  In order to cost-effectively gain additional geographic
        diversity, news networks should consider the possibility of a
        backup carriage plan with other non-news networks that can be
        exercised under government declared emergency conditions.

[Local Recommendations]{.underline}

3.  Each local media facility (television stations, radio stations and
    cable headends) should have a vulnerability assessment and disaster
    recovery plan that is periodically reviewed, updated and practiced.

4.  Local media (television stations, radio stations and cable
    operators) in each market should cooperate to assess their
    collective vulnerability and to develop reciprocal agreements and a
    cooperative emergency response plan to ensure that some media will
    remain in service even under extreme circumstances.

    1.  Vulnerability assessments should consider the location and
        geographic distribution of key facilities in the market, such as
        news studios, ENG receive sites, towers and cable headends.

    2.  Vulnerability assessments and cooperative emergency response
        plans should consider the scenario of widespread power outage
        and the resulting importance of radio to reach battery powered
        and automotive receivers.

## Radio Best Practices

# *Physical security*

5\. Radio broadcasters should have appropriate physical security,
augmented by security personnel and/or video surveillance at their key
facilities, including studios/newsrooms, satellite transmit and receive
sites and antenna/transmitter sites.

*Backup Power*

6\. Radio Broadcasters should employ diverse power grid sources wherever
feasible.

7\. Radio broadcasters should take appropriate measures to provide
backup power capabilities for their key facilities, including
studios/newsrooms, satellite communications and transmitters.

8\. Radio broadcasters with local news origination should ensure that
they have robust and redundant ways to communicate with external news
services and remote news teams, such as the use of mobile radio and
Internet to augment cell phones.

9\. Radio broadcasters should have backup signal feeds to their primary
satellite transmit and receive sites.

10\. Radio broadcasters should have redundant signal paths to their
primary and backup transmission facilities.

*Redundant Facilities*

11\. Radio broadcasters with local news origination should plan to have
emergency origination capability at a separate location from their
primary studio (e.g., backup studio, transmitter site, remote van,
another station, etc).

> 11.1 Radio broadcasters with local news origination should have a
> remote vehicle, or some means of delivering live news and information
> from a remote site.
>
> 11.2 Radio broadcasters should have the capability of receiving a
> remote feed at an additional site from their primary studio (e.g.,
> directly at their tower site, at a backup studio, etc).

12\. Radio broadcasters should have a backup satellite transmitter and
receiver, or an alternate means (e.g., a Satellite Radio receiver, a
dedicated phone line or a streaming audio Internet connection) to send
and receive signals from and to national news services in emergency
situations.

13\. Radio broadcasters should have a backup transmitter, and should
attempt to make practical arrangements for geographic diversity where
possible (e.g., provisions for emergency use of other backup
transmitter/antenna facilities in the community or other means).

14\. With the cooperation of federal and local policy makers, all radio
broadcasters in a market should collaborate to increase their collective
site diversity and redundancy, including their collective news studios,
operations, satellite transmit and receive facilities and transmitter
and antenna sites.

[Local Television Best Practices]{.underline}

*Physical Security*

15\. Television broadcasters should have appropriate physical security,
augmented by security personnel and/or video surveillance at their key
facilities, including studios/newsrooms, satellite communications
facilities and antenna/transmitter sites.

*Backup Power*

16\. Television broadcasters should employ diverse power grid sources
wherever feasible.

17\. Television broadcasters should take appropriate measures to provide
backup power capabilities for their key facilities, including
studios/newsrooms, satellite communications and transmitters.

*Redundant Communications*

18\. Television broadcasters with local news origination should ensure
that they have robust and redundant ways to communicate with external
news services and remote news teams, such as the use of mobile radio and
Internet to augment cell phones as well as some means of receiving
remote feeds (e.g., directly at tower site or at a cable headend) and
delivering live news and information from a remote site (e.g., ENG/SNG
truck).

19\. Television broadcasters should have backup signal feeds to their
primary and backup satellite transmit and receive sites.

20\. Television broadcasters should have redundant signal paths to their
primary and backup transmission facilities.

*Redundant Facilities*

21\. Television broadcasters with local news origination should plan to
have emergency origination capability at a separate location from their
primary studio (e.g., backup studio, transmitter site, ENG remote,
another station, cable headend, etc).

> 21.1 Television broadcasters with local news origination should have
> an ENG or SNG truck, or some means of delivering live news and
> information from a remote site.
>
> 21.2 Television broadcasters should have the capability of receiving a
> remote feed at an additional site from their primary studio (e.g.,
> directly at their tower site, at a backup studio, etc).

22\. Television broadcasters should have a backup satellite transmitter
and receiver, or an alternate means (e.g., a DBS receiver, or a
streaming video over a broadband Internet connection) to send and
receive signals from and to national news services in emergency
situations. (We recognize that there may be copyright issues involved
but recommend that operators negotiate a reasonable solution).

23\. Television broadcasters should have a backup satellite transmitter
and receiver, or an alternate means (e.g., a Satellite Radio receiver, a
dedicated phone line or a streaming audio Internet connection) to send
and receive signals from and to national news services in emergency
situations.

> 23.1 Television broadcasters should examine the possibility of their
> DTV facilities providing emergency backup capabilities to their analog
> facilities.

24\. Television broadcasters should provide the same prevention
approaches to their DTV facilities, to the extent economically feasible.

25\. With the cooperation of federal and local policy makers, all
television broadcasters in a market should collaborate to increase their
collective site diversity and redundancy, including their collective
news studios, operations, satellite transmit and receive facilities and
transmitter and antenna sites.

[Cable Television Best Practices]{.underline}

*Physical Security*

26\. Cable Operators should have appropriate physical security,
augmented by security personnel and/or video surveillance at their key
facilities, including their headend, hub, plant and customer service
facilities.

*Backup Power*

27\. Cable Operators should employ diverse power grid sources wherever
feasible.

28\. Cable Operators should take appropriate measures to provide backup
power capabilities for their key facilities, including their headend,
hub, plant and customer service facilities.

*Redundant Communications*

29\. Cable systems should have backup satellite receivers for their
major news and information channels. In cases where a backup satellite
receiver is unaffordable or impractical, cable operators should consider
the use of DBS receivers at headend and/or hub facilities for use in
emergency situations.

30\. Cable systems should have redundant signal routes as far out in
their network as economically practical.

*Redundant Facilities*

31\. Cable Operators should take appropriate measures to provide
redundant and geographically diverse equipment for their headend, hub
and plant facilities, appropriate to the system's operations and
facilities.

31.1 Cable systems should have capability in an emergency situation to
provide some news or information from a location other than their
primary headend, where economically practical.

32\. Cable systems should have some capability to obtain news and
information in an emergency situation, such as their own studio or an
arrangement to receive signals from local television broadcasters or
cable program providers (e.g., ENG/SNG trucks or satellite links).

33\. All Cable Operators in a market should collaborate, where possible,
to increase their collective site and equipment diversity, redundancy
and interconnections.

34\. All Local Media (e.g., Television Broadcasters, Cable Operators and
Radio Broadcasters) in a market should collaborate to increase their
collective geographic diversity and to establish redundant
interconnections capable of supporting emergency operations.

34.1 Cable systems and local broadcasters in a market should work
jointly to develop prevention plans and to improve the redundancies in
their interconnections.

34.2 Radio broadcasters should work with television broadcasters and
cable operators to establish diverse primary and backup signal feeds
from local television broadcasters and cable systems for use in
emergency situations.

*[Restoration Task Force:]{.underline}*

1\. Radio and television broadcasters, cable companies, direct broadcast
satellite (DBS) and digital satellite radio providers, and other
delivery media should develop and implement written disaster recovery
plans, geared not only to short-term disruption but to the possibility
that primary transmission and studio facilities may suffer catastrophic
failure.

2\. Television and radio stations and other media organizations should
update their disaster recovery plans as events warrant, and regularly
conduct emergency drills at least once a year.

3\. FCC licensees, MSOs, and other electronic media organizations
(including television, radio, cable, DBS, digital satellite radio, and
telecommunications) should establish market-by-market restoration
committees.

4\. Radio and television stations and cable systems should implement
studio and transmitter reciprocity arrangements to ensure signal
availability in all markets.

5\. Television stations should develop plans for utilization of ENG
trucks as emergency alternate studios, with microwave links at
transmitter sites for both analog and digital service.

6\. Television stations should create plans for alternate paths to cable
headends. Alternate emergency distribution paths could include: DTV
transmitter to cable headend, downconverted to NTSC; SNG to DBS to cable
headend and DBS to homes; cross-connecting cable systems; opening
local-to-local DBS service to all subscribers on an emergency basis; low
data rate Internet links; and portable microwave links.

7\. Radio and television stations should develop recovery timelines in
situations where backup facilities exist. Stations with backup
facilities should be prepared to provide service within 15 minutes of
loss of primary facility.

8\. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), or another
appropriate federal entity, should acquire and administer emergency
response broadcast equipment packages. These containerized recovery
systems would be stored in regional depots for use in emergency
situations and would include self-contained VHF, UHF, AM and FM
transmission units and mobile generators, along with sections for
500-foot and 100-foot towers. The federal government should also have
the authority to designate emergency channels for television and radio
where needed.

9\. Federal preemption authority should be established during declared
emergencies for replacement towers and other essential broadcast and
delivery media needs.

10\. Radio and television stations should have the ability to access
alternate telecommunications capabilities. These may include: satellite
phones, amateur radio facilities in studios, and alternate 450 MHz
communication repeater sites with portable handheld units.

*[Future Technologies/Digital Solutions Task Force]{.underline}*

1.  Government should coordinate development of a Media Common Alert
    Protocol (MCAP). This protocol should be designed to deliver
    emergency messages via digital networks. It should flow over all
    methods of digital transport and be received by all digital
    receivers. This protocol should be optimized for
    point-to-multi-point networks and devices only.

    1.  Key attributes of the MCAP should be addressability,
        scaleability, interoperability and prioritizing.

    2.  Industry organizations and companies should develop standards
        and specifications for carriage of MCAP on various media.

2\. The existing tool set of digital television, comprised of standards
for over-the-air, cable and satellite, should be leveraged in the
development of new emergency notification standards and practices. Many
of the existing capabilities are readily applicable, including but not
limited to multiple video and audio channels, uniform channel
designation, closed captioning and the ACAP middleware standard.

**[Public Communications and Safety Working Group]{.underline}**

1.  A single federal entity should be responsible for assuring:

-   Public communications capabilities and procedures exist, are
    effective, and are deployed for distribution of risk communication
    and warnings to the public by appropriate federal, state and local
    government personnel, agencies and authorities.

-   Lead responsibilities and actions under various circumstances are
    established at federal, state and local levels within the overall
    discipline of emergency management.

-   A national, uniform, all-hazard risk communication warning process
    is implemented from a public and private consensus on what best
    meets the needs of the public, including people of diverse language
    and/or with disabilities, including sensory disabilities.

2.  Effective delivery of emergency information to the public should be
    achieved through a public/private partnership that makes coordinated
    use of mass media and other dissemination systems to quickly reach
    large numbers and diverse groups of the public at risk to deliver
    emergency information to the public.

3.  Consistent with best practices in emergency management and business
    continuity planning, local and state governments and the media
    should cooperate to create, review and update emergency
    communications procedures, such as EAS, Amber plans and their
    components, to quickly disseminate critical information to the
    largest possible audience.

    1.  Effective use should be made of current, emerging, and legacy
        systems, including television, radio and weather radio that
        includes EAS.

    2.  Local media must be included in the creation of the
        communications and warning plan and understand their key role in
        its successful implementation.

    3.  The skill set of both federal and local agency participants
        should include training and process knowledge of how to work
        with and the benefits of utilizing the media to inform the
        public in a timely fashion during emergencies. Emergency
        managers should have a working knowledge of how to access EAS
        and other public warning systems.

    4.  Local media should assist government to create and deliver more
        effective public education about emergencies and preparedness.

    5.  Local media should agree to develop consistent presentation
        guidelines to ensure that all emergency delivery systems work
        well together to accurately deliver emergency information to the
        entire community.

    6.  Government and local media should conduct regular testing and
        rehearsals of emergency communications plans.

4.  All local media should form emergency jurisdiction/market
    cooperatives to assure delivery of local government emergency
    messages in a coordinated way to all constituencies in the
    community.

    1.  Local media in each market should be encouraged to create media
        pools for risk communication and warning; in markets where pools
        exist, a working committee should take the pool to the higher
        level of security, isolating it from the traditional news
        coverage pool concerns.

        1.  Local media should consider the creation of an Emergency
            Communications Coordinator position to serve as single media
            point of contact for government and develop a cooperative
            relationship with the local government lead agency.

    2.  Media and government jurisdictions should agree to take
        pre-planned actions upon authenticated notice from authorized
        government agencies, and incorporate these pre-planned actions
        in overall emergency management training exercises.

        1.  Local media and appropriate public safety and other
            government agencies should establish local and state
            emergency communication committees to plan well coordinated
            community responses for disasters.

        2.  Local media should engage in coordinated activities to
            assure the flow of emergency information using multiple
            languages and means to make this information available to
            persons with disabilities in their communities.

    3.  Pre-planned coordinated activities/roles appropriate to local
        conditions for each media under various scenarios (e.g., the
        type and number of delivery systems continuing to function)
        should be created, developed, rehearsed and tested.

        1.  In particular, emergency communications plans must take into
            account the probability of widespread power outages when AM
            and FM radio is the only way to communicate to battery
            powered receivers in the community.

5.  As the nation's current means to issue timely warnings through mass
    media, the Emergency Alert System should be periodically tested,
    upgraded as necessary, implemented and maintained at the local,
    state, and national levels.

    1.  EAS equipment should be uniformly implemented to make use of the
        latest EAS codes approved by the FCC.

    2.  Written state and local EAS plans should be brought up to date
        with close participation by broadcasters and cable operators.

    3.  Wired and wireless paths to EAS entry points from warning
        sources designated in state and local EAS plans should be in
        good working order.

    4.  The Primary Entry Point system that gives the President the
        ability to address the nation through EAS should be in good
        working order and be regularly reviewed and improved if
        necessary in terms of reliability, reach and robustness.

6.  Research into development of alternative, redundant and/or
    supplemental means of communicating emergency information to the
    public should be accelerated.

    1.  An expanded government partnership with the media, consumer
        electronics and computer industries should harness free market
        innovation, foster competition, and enhance interoperability to
        meet changing national warning needs.

        1.  The partnership should explore the use of emerging new
            technologies to improve and/or complement existing
            infrastructures and to leverage emerging new
            infrastructures.

7.  Local jurisdiction/market cooperatives should be encouraged to share
    their locally developed best practices for coordinating their
    efforts, delivering risk communications and warnings to their
    diverse public constituencies, and joint continuity planning to
    maintain communications under crisis conditions.