Naval Operations

in an Ice-free Arctic

Symposium

**17-18 April 2001**

**[Final Report]{.underline}**

**OFFICE OF NAVAL RESEARCH,**

**NAVAL ICE CENTER,**

**OCEANOGRAPHER OF THE NAVY,**

![](media/image3.png) **AND THE ARCTIC RESEARCH COMMISSION**

[TABLE OF CONTENTS]{.underline}

Executive
Summary..................................................................................3

Background............................................................................................7

Purpose.................................................................................................7

Objectives.............................................................................................8

Process.............................................................................................\.....8

Phase I-
Introduction................................................................................10

Phase II -- Naval
Operations.......................................................................12

> Aviation
> Group........................\.............................................\..........12
>
> Surface
> Group............................................................................\...19
>
> Subsurface
> Group..........................................................................26

Phase III -- Naval Warfare
Integration.........................................................\...30

> Integrated Operations
> Group..............................................................30
>
> Strategy and Policy
> Group................................................................33
>
> Acquisition, Science & Technology
> Group..........................................\...37

The Road
Ahead....................................................................................43

Recommendations...................................................................................45

Appendix A: Arctic Ocean Climate Change
Paper...........................................A-1

Appendix B: Operational
Vignettes.............................................................B-1

Appendix C: Attendee
Roster....................................................................C-1

Appendix D:
Acronyms........................................................................\...D-1

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

On 17 and 18 April 2001 the Oceanographer of the Navy, the Office of
Naval Research, the Arctic Research Commission, and the Naval Ice Center
co-sponsored a symposium on Naval Operations in an ice-free Arctic. The
purpose of the symposium was to evaluate potential U.S. naval
operations, provide initial guidance in determining potential naval
missions, and identify future naval requirements for operations in an
ice-diminished Arctic.

There were fifty military and civilian participants representing the
Navy staff, the fleet, program managers, U.S. Coast Guard operators,
Arctic subject matter experts, Canadian military and civilian experts
and officers from the Royal Navy. Their diligent efforts and willingness
to share their insights concerning proposed naval operations in a
challenging environment will be invaluable to the development of new
concepts, strategies, policies, and programs.

Throughout the symposium, participants were required to assess potential
needs against operationally driven requirements, identifying and
documenting shortfalls and limitations and their impacts on operating in
an ice-free Arctic (summer). Facilitator led discussions assisted in
clarifying and refining identified strategies, operational impacts and
required capabilities. While the conference focused on an ice-free
Arctic, it should be noted that a more correct term is a navigable
Arctic with ice infested waters. A summary of the salient points
discussed during the symposium are addressed below:

**Observed and Forecasted Arctic Change**

-   Submarine data reveal a 40% decrease in arctic sea ice volume.
    Satellite passive microwave data since the 1970s demonstrate a
    decrease in sea ice extent of 3% per decade. Model data suggest that
    a sea ice thickness decrease of 30% and an ice volume decrease
    between 15% and 40% by 2050.

-   These trends translate into a possibility that the US Navy will be
    required to operate in the Arctic. The ice infested waters will
    restrict maneuverability and limit sensor and weapon employment.
    Harsh arctic conditions will cause super structure icing and limit
    personnel exposure times.

**Overarching Issues**

-   The operational implications of an ice-free Arctic are neither well
    known nor well appreciated outside the oceanography community.
    Significant research and a subsequent education/awareness plan is
    required to inform all stakeholders including requirements officers,
    acquisition executives, and operators. This is essential to produce
    the level of naval service interest required to make informed
    decisions about future extended operations in the polar seas.

-   No new naval missions are expected, but an increased scope of naval
    operations is likely in an ice-free Arctic. Ensuring access and
    stabilizing the global commons are the most overriding reasons for
    increased operations in the Arctic.

-   New capabilities will be required in many aspects of air, space,
    surface and subsurface operations and support.

**Operations**

-   The projected Ice-free Arctic environment will have a significant
    effect on the safety and effectiveness of naval operations. These
    effects will be most telling on fleet capability to conduct
    operations for extended periods of time. Although the current range
    of missions will likely apply, future systems must accommodate a
    significant modification to Required Operational Capabilities (ROC)
    and Projected Operational Environment (POE) for the conduct of
    extended polar operations. Modeling and prediction of the
    environment together with platform design modifications for the
    operating conditions will be important.

-   Polar C4ISR infrastructure appears to be a limiting factor. A
    dedicated polar space support concept of operations is required to
    provide network centric warfare capability for polar operations. Ice
    reconnaissance should be a key component.

-   Logistics support for extended operations appears to be a limiting
    factor. Both organic carrier on board delivery/vertical on board
    delivery (COD/VOD) capability and shore infrastructure must be
    enhanced to preserve current levels of underway replenishment
    (UNREP) capability and desired combat optempo.

-   New sensor and weapon performance capability will be required to
    support both undersea warfare and strike warfare. New sensor
    capability will also be required to support levels of intelligence,
    surveillance and reconnaissance that leverage other warfare areas.

-   Current environmental measurement and prediction, including Arctic
    weather and ice prediction, shallow water acoustic performance
    prediction, and dynamic ocean environmental changes is inadequate to
    support larger naval operations in the Arctic. A new focus on short
    range forecast accuracy for both weather and ice conditions is
    required. Reliance on Synthetic Aperature Radar (SAR) will increase
    and must be budgeted for purchase (OM&N).

-   The Navy currently does not perform weapons testing and evaluation
    in the Arctic environment for either legacy or developing weapons
    systems.

-   Current levels of cold weather/polar operations training are
    insufficient for the conduct of extended combat operations.

-   Current charts and GPS support plans will not support extended polar
    operations. Both safe navigation and precision weapons delivery
    capability may be significantly constrained unless these shortfalls
    are addressed.

-   Current icebreaker capability will not support extended polar
    operations by battlegroup sized forces. The US Navy has no ice
    breaking capability, and the US Coast Guard only has three polar
    icebreakers. Icebreakers should be considered an essential part of
    extended polar operations infrastructure.

-   Constrained maneuvering room and rapidly changing weather conditions
    will require new tactics, techniques, and procedures that must be
    addressed in tailored polar training evaluations. Automated
    navigation systems certified for extreme weather and low visibility
    will be required.

-   The expanded use of autonomous and automated vehicles will be
    required to provide real-time environmental data as well as other
    mission critical information. UAVs, USVs, and UsuVs, will play a
    critical role in accomplishing tasks that the environment prevents
    conventional manned platforms from completing.

-   Aircraft maintenance will be a significant limiting factor to
    optempo unless the expected polar operating environment is included
    in design specifications for new systems, and unless enhanced
    diagnostics tools are available for enabling Smart Maintenance
    procedures. In particular, future low observable (LO) platforms
    could be significantly less effective unless cold weather procedures
    are adopted.

**Strategy and Policy**

-   The most significant change envisioned is that forces will need to
    form into task groups (or forces) where the "task" defines the
    composition of the group. These tailored force packages would likely
    not look like the traditional carrier battlegroup. Additionally,
    traditional assets will likely be used in some non-traditional ways.

-   Interoperability between allied, joint, and coalition forces must be
    improved in order to operate effectively in the region.

-   Bilateral and multinational alliances will be essential to define
    all international boundaries (Economic Exclusion Zones and
    continental shelves) within the Arctic, resolve bilateral issues
    related to the United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
    implementation in the Arctic, and provide forward basing
    capabilities and shorten logistic space and time lines.

-   Potential threats that will emerge from greater access to the region
    must be better defined, both by country (or group such as a
    terrorist organization) and type.

-   A concept of operations for maritime forces in the Arctic will be
    required, including the types of platforms and weapons systems
    needed for Arctic operations.

-   Currently there is no single unified CINC with operational
    responsibility for the Arctic region. An Arctic area of national
    defense/naval requirements should be defined and assigned to a
    single CINC.

**Programmatics**

-   Resources vs. Commitments -- There may be other, more pressing
    challenges and commitments that will stretch forces and budgets and
    potentially preclude integrated operations in the Arctic.

-   The Navy needs a uniformed advocate for RDT&E and S&T Arctic issues.

-   The current S&T investment plan should be reviewed to ensure Future
    Naval Capabilities (FNCs) include technologies relevant to the
    ice-free Arctic.

-   Arctic specific requirements should be incorporated into the formal
    requirements documentation system (CRDs, ORDs).

-   A scrub of current Navy programs should be conducted to evaluate
    their relevance to future operations in an altered Arctic
    environment.

**Conclusion**

The timeline for a significantly navigable Arctic may extend decades
into the future. However, the group noted that U.S. Naval operational
missions in the Arctic, and related requirements, must be identified in
the nearer term to ensure that the necessary operational capabilities
exist when future Arctic missions do present themselves. Recognition and
acknowledgement by DON/DOD of new threats presented by changes in the
Arctic seascape is required to generate the necessary momentum to
sustain an active interest in developing a strategic plan that includes
prudent resourcing in future POM cycles to acquire the unique
capabilities required to operate in the hostile environment of the
Arctic.

The symposium's assessment should be considered as a preliminary
evaluation of Ice-free Arctic operations. Constraints of scope, time and
manpower limited this effort to a preliminary exploration. A detailed
capabilities assessment is required to refine and expand on this initial
work. For further information contact the Naval Ice Center. CDR Zdenka
Willis, Commanding Officer or LCDR Doug Lamb, Science and Applied
Technology Officer.

**BACKGROUND**

The Arctic ice cap is decreasing in thickness and area of coverage, a
phenomena highlighted in recent news articles and a fact confirmed by an
increasing body of data gathered by the National Ice Center (NIC)/Naval
Ice Center (NAVICE) in Suitland, Maryland. Vessels and aircraft
operating in the Arctic have reported diminished summer ice coverage and
scientific models consistently suggest that seasonal sea lanes through
the formerly ice-locked Arctic may appear as soon as 2015. It is
postulated that summertime disappearance of the ice cap could be
possible by 2050 if this trend continues. The implications for national
security and by extension, the impact on naval operations, are
significant.

An initial meeting was held at the NIC on 7 July 2000 with
representatives from the NIC/NAVICE, the Oceanographer of the Navy
(N096), Office of Naval Research (ONR), MEDEA, the Arctic Research
Commission, and U.S. Coast Guard in which some of these national and
strategic issues surrounding operations in an ice-free or ice-diminished
Arctic was framed. Weapons system design and acquisition takes many
years and the development of sound tactics, doctrine and policy take
nearly as long to codify for those new systems. Because of the predicted
changes to the Arctic environment in the near future, it was deemed
prudent to take the first step in evaluating likely naval operations in
that altered environment so that appropriate measures can be taken now
to ensure that systems, operational concerns and policy concerns are
addressed. From this initial meeting a recommendation to establish a
forum to evaluate the naval implications of operating in an ice-free
Arctic was made. The NAVICE was given the task of orchestrating such an
event, and the firm of Whitney, Bradley and Brown, Inc. of Vienna,
Virginia (WBB) was contracted to provide the design and facilitation.
The result was the Naval Operations in an Ice-free Arctic Symposium,
which was held at the Admiral Gooding Center at the Washington Navy Yard
on April 17, and 18, 2001.

## PURPOSE

Sponsored by the Oceanographer of the Navy, the Office of Naval
Research, and the Arctic Research Commission, and hosted by the Naval
Ice Center, the symposium was a first-ever attempt to bring together a
diverse collection of operational representatives from the U.S. Navy and
Coast Guard, as well as various members of the scientific community and
Arctic subject matter experts. Canadian armed forces and research
representatives, and officers from the Royal Navy also contributed their
observations and ideas and added to the richness of the dialogue. The
explicit purpose of the symposium as expressed by the Honorable George
Newton, Chairman of the Arctic Research Commission, was to evaluate
potential naval operations, provide initial guidance in determining
potential naval missions, and identify future naval requirements for
operations in an ice-diminished Arctic.

**OBJECTIVES**

Objectives of the symposium, which were used to design the event, select
guest-speaker topics, tailor formal presentations and, and provide a
benchmark for symposium success, are listed below:

1.  Identify potential requirements for future naval operations for an
    assumed projected retreat of the Arctic ice cover.

2.  Examine potential impacts/effects on such operations and identify
    baseline capabilities for operating in this altered Arctic
    environment.

3.  Explore the strategic and policy issues that could elicit a
    strategic (military) response due to the Arctic being ice-free
    during a portion of the year.

4.  Establish the criteria and key elements for a continuum of
    heightened awareness and participation in examining operations in
    this altered Arctic environment.

### PROCESS

The symposium involved fifty 0-5/0-6 level military and civilian
participants representing the Navy staff, the Fleet, program managers,
U.S. Coast Guard operators, Arctic subject matter experts, Canadian
military and civilian experts and officers from the Royal Navy.
Discussions were conducted at up to the SECRET releasable Canada/U.K.
classification level.

Throughout the symposium, participants were required to assess their
needs against operationally driven requirements, and identify and
document shortfalls and limitations and their impact on operating in an
ice-free Arctic. Facilitator led discussion sessions, and decision
support software were used to assist in discussing, clarifying, and
refining identified strategies, operational impacts and required
capabilities.

The sequence of events for the symposium was as follows:

![](media/image4.wmf){width="5.141666666666667in"
height="2.8555555555555556in"}

**Phase I**

Phase I was conducted in plenary session that began with welcoming and
introductory briefings. RADM Dan Bowler, the Director of Warfare
Integration and Assessment (N70) gave the keynote address. Dr. Gary
Brass from the Arctic Research Commission presented a briefing that
outlined the predictions for the Arctic environment in the 2015
timeframe. CAPT Jeffrey Garrett, CO of the USCGC Healy provided an
operational perspective of current surface operations in the Arctic.
LCDR Doug Lamb from NAVICE provided the participants with seven
operational mission vignettes meant to stimulate discussion and provide
a backdrop for consideration of issues in the breakout sessions that
followed. These presentations established the context and framework for
the remainder of the symposium.

## Phase II

![](media/image5.wmf)Participants were apportioned into one of three
Interest Track Focus Groups, which were organized to ensure a blend of
warfighter competencies and technical knowledge within each group
appropriate to the warfare area being examined. Group A, the Aviation
Group, addressed the implications of an Ice-free Arctic for selected air
warfare, space and aviation support tasks, to include fixed wing, rotary
wing and Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAVs). Group B, the Surface Group,
emphasized issues concerning the operation of naval surface vessels in
the altered Arctic environment. Group C, the Subsurface Group, focused
on issues concerning the operation of submarines and undersea warfare in
the altered Arctic environment. Using the information presented in Phase
I, facilitators and pre-designated team leaders directed the groups
through three sessions. These sessions included an examination of the
operational roles and future missions likely to be undertaken in the
Arctic; an identification and discussion of the unique operational
challenges and threats presented in accomplishing those missions, and
finally a determination of the capabilities needed to meet those
challenges and current shortfalls. This phase concluded with a plenary
session on the morning of day 2 in which each group briefed out their
individual findings.

## Phase III

Participants were re-formed into four new Interest Track Focus Groups.
Group A, the Integrated Operations Group, was challenged with
considering the operational implications and capabilities of operating
in this new Arctic environment from a Battle Group/Fleet presence
perspective vice the platform specific viewpoint of Phase II. Group B,
the Strategy and Policy Group addressed the naval strategy and policy to
achieve operational presence and success in the Arctic. Group C, the
Acquisition / Science & Technology Group, discussed appropriate methods
for inserting some of the capabilities discussed in Phase II into the
formal requirements and acquisition process. They also reviewed ideas
for the integration of new technologies. Group D, the Campaign Plan
Group, began to build the "Road Ahead" plan for continuing the dialogue
of the symposium. This phase concluded with a plenary session in the
afternoon of day 2 in which each group briefed out their individual
findings.

![](media/image6.wmf){width="2.3854166666666665in"
height="1.7944444444444445in"}

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## Phase IV

The symposium concluded with a final plenary session that summarized the
key initial symposium findings and reviewed options for furthering the
discussion in the future.

A Control Group, consisting of NAVICE, ONR, Oceanographer of the Navy,
Arctic Research Commission and WBB personnel, was responsible for the
execution of the entire symposium.

**PHASE I: INTRODUCTION**

The keynote address, delivered by RADM Bowler, provided a perspective on
the new OPNAV alignment and requirements process and highlighted the
reasoning for the mission of the symposium. Furthermore, it challenged
the participants to make their efforts count. The following synthesizes
the keynote briefing:

-   ![](media/image7.wmf)N7 will identify and champion the warfighting
    and training requirements necessary for the Navy to achieve its core
    competencies and meet naval and joint operational commitments.

-   N70 will coordinate relevant analysis within and among the
    supporting warfare commands to ensure research and studies dollars
    are best contributing to a common capabilities-based effort. The
    objective is to prevent a disconnection between what the Fleet
    really needs and what OPNAV actually provides.

-   This new process will eliminate the past process of providing a
    resource driven capability and replace it with one that is
    requirements driven. While the warfare sponsors must remain aware of
    resource limitations as they promote their programs, they must now
    plan to resource to the 100 percent validated requirement, and
    provide an assessment of risk should they be unable to do that.

-   The work of this symposium is a part of this new process and will be
    on the leading edge of what N7 is trying to accomplish. The
    participants were challenged to identify and analyze as many of the
    issues associated with operating in the Arctic region as they could.
    This will contribute to identifying the "ground-truth" requirements
    for operating in the Arctic, from the tactical implications of how
    to operate in that harsh environment, to the kinds of ships,
    aircraft, submarines and other equipment to bring to the arena.

-   The potential implications of an ice-diminished Arctic to the
    commercial shipping industry, as well as the operational
    implications for the military, are enormous.

-   The symposium work will potentially lead to the development of the
    requirements for future programs that allow our forces to operate
    effectively in a new arena. Identifying these fundamental
    warfighting requirements is consistent with Chief of Naval
    Operations (CNO) directives. If the U.S. is to be effective in the
    Arctic from the start, we must begin now to identify the how, where,
    what, and why of Arctic and cold weather operations.

Dr. Gary Brass delivered a brief on the projected altered Arctic
environment in the future. The major discussion items of this brief are
contained in Appendix A. A summary of the salient points and predictions
follows:

-   Over the next 20 years, the volume of Arctic sea ice will further
    decrease approximately 40%, and the lateral extent of sea ice will
    be sharply reduced (at least 20%) in summer.

-   Polar low-pressure systems will become more common and boundary
    layer forced convection will increase mixed (ice-water)
    precipitation. Cloudiness will increase, extending the summer cloudy
    regime through earlier onset and later decline. The likelihood of
    freezing mist and drizzle will increase, along with increased vessel
    and aircraft icing.

-   Sonar operations in the Arctic will experience increased ambient
    noise levels and the surface duct will be diminished or lost. Ice
    keels will be shallower and less abundant and the area in which they
    can be expected to occur will be reduced. Active sonar detection of
    submarines will become more feasible.

-   Within five years, the Northern Sea Route (NSR, a.k.a. the Northeast
    Passage) will be open to non-ice-strengthened vessels for at least
    two months each summer.

-   Within 5-10 years, the Northwest Passage will be open to
    non-ice-strengthened vessels for at least one month each summer.

-   Both Russia and Canada assert policies holding navigable straits in
    the NSR and Northwest Passage under their exclusive control. The
    United States differs in its interpretation of the status of these
    straits, with a potential for conflict.

-   Within 5-10 years, the Sea of Okhotsk and the Sea of Japan could
    potentially remain ice-free throughout the year.

Seven operational mission vignettes were briefed to provide the stimulus
for discussion and provide a backdrop for consideration of issues in the
breakout sessions that followed. These vignettes, standard for all of
the focus groups, spanned a large portion of today's naval roles and
missions, including Freedom of Navigation (FONOPS), Carrier Battle Group
(CVBG) Transit of the Northwest Passage as an opposed deployment option
for Pacific conflict, disputed Economic Enforcement Zone operations
(EEZ), Maritime Interception Operations (MIO), Control of Drug
Trafficking, Coordinated Undersea Warfare Operations (USW), and
Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO). These are provided in
Appendix B.

PHASE II: NAVAL OPERATIONS

AVIATION GROUP FINDINGS

[General]{.underline}

Group membership is indicated at Appendix C. Specific group expertise
included the following:

-   Air wing operations (two former air wing commanders)

-   Fleet operations (former fleet N3)

-   Carrier operations (former CV executive officer)

-   Other air capable ship operations (Canadian cutter commanding
    officer)

-   Maritime patrol operations (VP pilot and TACCO)

-   Maritime command and control (former TACAMO squadron commander)

-   Helicopter operations (LAMPS pilot, HS pilot, helicopter logistics
    (HC) squadron commander)

-   Aircraft test and evaluation (NATC helicopter test pilot)

-   Oceanography (two staff oceanographers)

-   Ice forecasting (Chief of Forecasting, Canadian Ice Service)

-   Naval Intelligence (former NavEur N2)

-   Space reconnaissance (one space agency representative)

-   Several of the members were current aviation requirement officers
    from OPNAV (N7), providing the necessary current aviation program
    context for capabilities discussions (former N780D, current N780E
    and other aviation platform requirement officers).

Using the Phase I briefings as context, the group conducted three
interactive evaluations. Space support factors were considered integral
to each evaluation, but limitations in representation by Navy space
warfare officers typically resulted in discussions and analysis
dominated by an aviation focus.

[Identifying Future Missions for Naval Aviation]{.underline}

The first evaluation was to identify the roles and missions likely for
naval forces operating in the Ice-free Arctic in the 2015-2020 period.
The group focused on factors unique to the projected Arctic environment,
assuming that current projections for force structure, science and
technology development and command and control initiatives currently
included in the Navy program continue to fruition.

[Basic Mission Areas]{.underline}: A full range of likely naval mission
area activity was evident from the information briefings and operational
vignettes with naval aviation playing key roles in the execution or
support of each. Given the meteorological and operational assumptions
provided, the tempo of future Arctic naval operations is expected to be
significantly higher than what it is now. This finding has far reaching
implications for force logistics supportability, which is projected to
be air-intensive. Operations in the presence of significant ice and
under the ice are indicated. Additionally, because operations may be
both relatively large scale and conducted in extreme high latitudes,
command and control requirements may significantly exceed those required
for the present level of mostly submerged naval operations. The capacity
of current space platforms to support the requisite level of command and
control (C^2^) activity is an important question that requires detailed
examination.

[The Future Threat]{.underline}: The assumed high level of economic and
other transnational activity in the Ice-free Arctic implies increased
opportunity for tension between the states contiguous to the region.
These countries include Canada, Norway, Sweden, Russia, China and the
United States. Potential adversarial activity was identified only for
Russia, China and international criminal or terrorist elements.

[Projected Mission Tasking]{.underline}: Based on the suppositions
relating to required naval activity and potential adversary activities,
a full range of aviation and space missions was indicated, including the
following:

-   ![](media/image10.png){width="2.19375in"
    height="1.4479166666666667in"}Mine warfare

-   Anti-air warfare

-   Anti-surface warfare

-   Amphibious operations

-   Anti-submarine warfare

-   Special warfare operations

-   Strategic communications support

-   Air and cruise missile strike operations

-   Underway replenishment, including carrier on-board delivery (COD )
    and vertical on-board delivery (VOD) operations

-   Airborne command and control, including intelligence, surveillance,
    reconnaissance and targeting

-   In-flight refueling operations

-   Support for fisheries protection and control

-   Support for scientific and environmental exploration

-   Search and rescue, and combat search and rescue

[Key factors for mission execution]{.underline}: From this list, the
group examined common mission elements likely to be affected by the
projected environment. This inquiry included launch and recovery
operations from aircraft carriers and other ships, Arctic air
navigation, weapons systems employment, personnel performance,
sustainment factors and command and control considerations. The group
identified the following key mission elements and the challenges
expected for each:

> *Launch and recovery:*

-   Effect of limited ship maneuverability during conditions of rapidly
    changing ice and weather conditions, given current restricted cross
    wind operating envelopes for both fixed wing and helicopters

-   Limitations on safe aircraft handling during potentially extreme
    deck movement and icy deck surfaces

-   Effect on shipboard recovery during rapidly changing poor visibility
    conditions

-   Divert field availability in the expected operating areas

-   Pre-launch de-icing requirements

-   Optempo limitations due to current restrictive flight envelopes

-   Low visibility effects on in-flight refueling ability and
    requirement

> *Navigation:*

-   Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) availability at high latitudes

-   Visual and radar navigation effects from changing ice patterns and
    apparent changes in the ice encrusted beach line

-   Availability and accuracy of land area charts for mission planning

-   Effect of polar magnetic variation on backup navigation options
    (INS) for GPS-denied operations

-   Suitability of present space based systems to provide accurate ice
    position updates to existing charts

> *Weapons systems employment:*

-   Availability and fidelity of sensor prediction models for the polar
    environment

-   Ability to deploy sensors and weapons "through the ice"

-   Air launched torpedo performance under the ice

-   Tactical Land Attack Missile (TLAM) performance given potential GPS
    limitations and effects of predominant fog and snow conditions

-   Other GPS-guided munitions accuracy given potential GPS limitations

-   Effects of low visibility conditions on current EO/IR (electro
    optical / infra-red) terminal weapons guidance sensors

-   Effect of sustained icing environment on performance of fixed wing,
    helo and Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAV) platforms

-   Effect of sustained icing environment on performance of terminal
    weapons guidance apertures

-   Performance of planned aircraft EO/IR sensors in low visibility and
    fog

-   Suitability of current tactics and self-protection countermeasures
    during periods of extended daylight operations

-   Suitability of current precision strike targeting systems during
    periods of extended surface obscuration

-   Potential reduced aircraft survivability due to potentially lower
    durability of planned low observable (LO) treatments in sustained
    icing conditions

> *Personnel performance:*

-   Safety implications of operations during extended periods of extreme
    wind chill, darkness, low visibility, ship movement and ice covered
    decks

-   ![](media/image11.wmf){width="2.4791666666666665in"
    height="1.8541666666666667in"}Potential for increased manning to
    accommodate limited duration topside maintenance and handling
    operations during extended cold weather operations

-   Adequacy of current topside work clothing for full range of nuclear,
    biological, chemical (NBC) protection and cold weather operations

-   Adequacy of current personnel locator system to support rescue
    during periods of slick deck, reduced visibility and cold water
    operations

> *Sustainment:*

-   Suitability of current "Just in Time Delivery" concept for aircraft
    parts in area of poor flying weather and primitive regional support
    infrastructure

-   Compatibility of current carrier (CV) deck multiples with limited
    elevator movement availability during prevailing heavy weather
    operations

-   Effect on current reduced radar signature structures during extended
    operations in icing conditions

-   Suitability of current reduced radar signature maintenance
    procedures during extended low temperature conditions

-   Effect of extended low temperature conditions on key maintenance
    functions, e.g. flight control rigging embarked and ashore, aircraft
    recovery operations ashore and on the ice, and aircraft and support
    equipment battery performance

-   Effect of restricted replenishment at sea, COD and VOD operations on
    projected desired optempo (fuel and weapons) and current AVCAL plans
    (parts)

-   Effect on aircraft availability and sortie rates given anticipated
    decreased Mean Time Between Failure and increased Time to Repair for
    hydraulic systems affected by poor cold weather performance

-   Suitability of current intake screens for engine maintenance during
    extreme icing conditions

> *Command and Control:*

-   Suitability of current C4ISR support when manned aircraft operations
    are restricted for extended periods by weather (could also apply to
    UAV)

-   Suitability of present satellite reconnaissance and targeting
    sensors in periods of extended surface obscuration

-   Suitability of present satellite constellation to support projected
    Network Centric Warfare (NCW) connectivity requirements

-   Availability of spaced based imagery in extreme high latitudes

-   Availability of present regional land-based weather stations to
    support short term forecasting during extended operations in
    conditions of rapidly changing flying weather

-   Effects of Electro magnetic interference on line of sight and beyond
    line of sight communications system

[Identifying Required Operational Capabilities for Naval
Aviation]{.underline}

The next challenge for the group was to identify the operational
challenges and geo-political threats the projected operating environment
would pose to aviation and space operations. Both meteorological and
polar latitude effects were considered. Full political and military
cooperation between Canada and the United States was assumed.

After decomposing mission areas into specific missions and mission
elements, the group used a facilitated groupware process to list
required capabilities for naval aviation and space operations in the
future Ice-free Arctic. The stimulus for this effort was a short
question bank:

-   *What are the capabilities needed to meet the challenges addressed
    in the earlier session?*

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-   *What changes in aviation and space platforms would these operations
    require?*

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-   *What changes in platform-specific tactics, operating procedures and
    support would be required?*

Although mindful of the specific nomenclature and format required by
OPNAV in the requirements development process, the group was not
constrained to make their input compatible with what will be required by
future requirements officers who seek to adapt the symposium report to
Planning, Programming, Budgeting System (PPBS) standards.

The following provides a summary of the projected aviation specific
operational capabilities by mission element that will be required in the
future to operate in the Arctic:

> [Launch and recovery]{.underline}:

-   Automatic landing system capable of zero ceiling/zero visibility
    recovery for all aircraft (fixed wing, helo, UAV, UCAV) and all
    air-capable platforms

-   Expanded cross-wind launch and recovery wind envelopes

-   Special cold weather/icy surface, pitching deck aircraft handling
    systems

-   Built in de-icing capability for flight decks and other critical
    path aircraft handling surfaces

-   ![](media/image12.wmf){width="2.1666666666666665in"
    height="1.6354166666666667in"}Capability for launch and recovery on
    the ice

> [Navigation]{.underline}:

-   Navy high altitude synthetic aperture radar (SAR) capability for
    near real-time ice mapping

-   Increased availability of polar land mass charts suitable for
    precision navigation and targeting support

> [Weapons systems and sensor employment]{.underline}:

-   Additional in-flight de-icing capability for all aircraft platforms
    and sensors

-   Ice penetration capability for acoustic sensors and USW weapons

-   Enhanced target discrimination for under the ice weapons

-   Increased options for active acoustic undersea sensors

-   Low visibility sensors for helicopters

-   Arctic capability for UAV and UCAV

-   Validated polar RF and EO propagation models

-   Terminal guidance for air launched weapons that is less dependent on
    EO/IR condition.

> [Personnel performance]{.underline}:

-   Cold weather protective clothing for flight deck and air crew that
    is compatible with NBC Measures of Protection (MOP)

-   Additional warming spaces to support weather deck/flight deck crew
    rotation

-   Enhanced polar operating experience through more frequent and
    tailored polar training

-   Enhanced adverse weather personnel location systems for search and
    rescue / combat search and rescue (SAR/CSAR)

-   Enhanced remote maintenance troubleshooting support to permit
    smaller numbers of maintenance man-hours and reduce the required
    exposure of diagnostic and repair technician to adverse weather

> [Sustainment]{.underline}:

-   Increased ice breaker support

-   Increased cold-weather kit support in aviation ship AVCAL

-   Improved capability for cold weather repair of LO materials

-   Procedures/protective measures for reduced susceptibility to
    in-flight icing damage to LO materials and sensor apertures

-   Expanded land based polar logistics infrastructure

-   Health monitoring and failure prediction tools for Smart Maintenance
    of all aircraft types

-   Increased fuel, weapons, parts and general stores capacity to offset
    likely restrictions to present UNREP capability

-   Increased availability of long range, land-based tanker support

-   Aircraft recovery equipment and concept of operations for emergency
    diverts onto the ice

> [Command and control]{.underline}:

-   Long duration organic and non-organic sensors to support the battle
    group when flight operations are restricted

-   Wideband 2-way communications systems capable of 24/7 polar
    operations for both C4I and tactical communications

-   Organic modeling access for weather effects on space systems support

-   Increased land site infrastructure to support near-term weather
    forecasting

-   Improved ice prediction models

-   C2 systems hardening for solar/auroral electromagnetic effects

-   Assessment of threat systems performance in polar operating
    environment

-   Enhanced EO/IR aircraft countermeasures systems for self-defense in
    extended daylight operations

-   All weather sensor support for precision targeting

-   Space-based synthetic aperture radar (or equivalent) for ice
    reconnaissance

-   Assessment of national systems support availability during extended
    polar operations

-   GPS adaptations for specifics of high latitude operations

-   Validated geo-spatial models to support TLAM and other GPS guided
    munitions (GGMs)

-   Offboard support concept of operations for low-visibility EMCON
    operations

[Projecting Capability Shortfalls for Naval Aviation]{.underline}

Finally, after identifying the general operational capabilities required
for accomplishing the specified missions in the projected environment,
the group evaluation highlighted capabilities not supported by the
current Navy program.

Aviation requirements officers provided feedback on the degree to which
the current Navy program objective memorandum (POM 02/PR 03) includes
the projected capabilities identified in the group's second examination.
Key shortfalls include:

-   Flight deck surfaces and aircraft handling equipment will not
    support desired polar aviation optempo

-   Personnel protective clothing is not compatible with other combat
    MOP

-   Present maintenance diagnostic and predictive tools lack the
    flexibility to offer the level of Smart Maintenance required for
    extended polar operations

-   Present LO structures and maintenance procedures may not be
    compatible with extended combat demands in the polar environment

-   Present squadron and aviation ship manpower may not be optimal for
    extended polar operations

-   Forward logistics infrastructure is inadequate for support of
    extended polar operations

-   Present organic logistics aircraft will have limited utility for
    UNREP if de-icing and anti-icing capabilities are not enhanced

-   Aviation contribution to conducting Undersea Warfare will be
    constrained unless sensor and weapon delivery capability includes
    provisions for "through the ice" employment

-   There is no provision for the U.S. controlled, wide-scan synthetic
    aperture radar capability necessary for ice reconnaissance

-   Navy lacks the operational meteorological prediction capability
    necessary for safe naval aviation operations in the rapidly changing
    polar environment

-   Plans for tasking, processing, exploitation and dissemination of
    national sensor data do not include the additional demands that
    would be placed on these assets in a navigable Arctic

-   AVCAL requirements for polar operations must be evaluated in light
    of expected degradations to systems reliability

-   Space based infrastructure to support Network Centric Warfare will
    be insufficient to support battle group operations

-   Present amount of cold weather/polar operations training will be
    insufficient for the conduct of extended combat operations

-   Polar operations will affect the current sanctuary emphasis for
    naval aviation employment, making aviation platforms increasingly
    vulnerable to hostile systems in extended daylight operations unless
    enhanced self-protection capability is provided

-   U.S.--Canadian interoperability requires higher priority for
    combined force polar operations

SURFACE GROUP FINDINGS

[General]{.underline}

Group membership is indicated at Appendix C. Specific group expertise
included the following:

-   Maritime Operations Planner from the Canadian Chief of Maritime
    Staff

-   U.S. Navy OPNAV Requirements Officer

-   Two current post-XO tour Surface warfare Officers

-   Post-Command Surface Warfare Officer

-   Head of Icebreaking Program, Canadian Coast Guard

-   Chief of USCG Ice Operations Division

-   Office of Naval Intelligence Analyst

-   CINCPACFLT Senior Analyst

-   Senior Scientists from the National Ice Center and Naval Atlantic
    METOC Center

-   Naval Surface Warfare Center Senior Analyst

The group was tasked with providing a preliminary capability analysis
for future surface operations in northern seas under significantly
different meteorological conditions than those prevailing today. Based
upon this analysis, future operational requirements recommendations were
solicited from the group.

Using the Phase I briefings as context, the group conducted three
interactive evaluations using decision support software. The objective
of the first evaluation was to identify the roles and missions likely
for naval forces operating in the Ice-free Arctic in the 2015-2020
period. The group focused on factors unique to the projected Arctic
environment, assuming that projections for force structure, science and
technology development and command and control initiatives currently
included in the Navy program continue to fruition.

Next, the group identified the operational challenges and geo-political
threats the projected operating environment would pose to surface
operations. Both meteorological and polar latitude effects were
considered. Full political and military cooperation between Canada and
the United States was assumed.

Finally, the group identified the general operational capabilities
required for accomplishing the specified missions in the projected
environment. This evaluation included highlighting capabilities not
supported by the current Navy program.

[Identifying Surface Warfare Missions in an Ice-free Arctic]{.underline}

[Basic Mission Areas]{.underline}: Based on the information briefings
and operational vignettes, all current Naval missions have Arctic
applications, in particular, ensuring access and "stabilizing the global
commons." Surface operations will play a key role in the execution or
support of each. Given the meteorological and operational assumptions
provided, the tempo of future Arctic naval operations is expected to be
significantly higher than presently. This has far reaching implications
for force logistics supportability. Operations both in the presence of
significant ice and under the ice are certain. Because operations may be
both relatively large scale and conducted in extreme high latitudes,
command and control requirements will likely exceed those necessary for
the present level of mostly undersea operations. The capacity of current
space platforms to support the requisite level of C^2^ activity is an
important question that requires detailed examination.

[The Future Threat]{.underline}: The assumptions made relating to a high
level of economic and other transnational activity in the Ice-free
Arctic highlight areas of contention for the states contiguous to the
region. Given the environmental constraints, major threats to surface
forces will likely be from the air or undersea, with mines a particular
concern.

[Projected Mission Tasking]{.underline}: Based on the assessment of
likely Arctic surface warfare missions and potential adversary
operations, the following tasks were seen as the most likely to require
surface support:

-   Transit Escort

-   Illegal Migrant Interdiction

-   ![](media/image13.png){width="2.4868055555555557in"
    height="1.7833333333333334in"}Ice Tracking

-   Anti-Surface Warfare

-   Mine Warfare

-   Ballistic Missile Defense

-   Air Defense

-   Amphibious Operations

-   Undersea Warfare

-   Special Warfare Operations

-   Land Attack

-   Maritime Interdiction Operations

-   SAR

-   Fisheries Patrol

-   Support for Scientific and Environmental Exploration

[Key factors for mission execution]{.underline}: From this list, the
group examined common mission elements likely to be affected by the
projected environment. This inquiry included navigation, sensor
employment, weapons employment, seakeeping, personnel factors,
communications, underway replenishment, ship structural and engineering
considerations, command and control, and tactics, techniques and
procedures. The key challenges expected for each are indicated below.

> *Navigation:*

-   Lack of robust environmental prediction system for
    ice/ocean/atmosphere

-   Inadequate charts (including bottom contour) and soundings

-   Positional accuracy (differential between GPS and charted positions)

-   Absence of navigation aids

-   Refractive conditions

-   Conversion of charts to WGS 84

-   National Technical Means (NTM) satellite sensor design (Arctic use)

-   Host country requirements for pilot/ice pilot/vessel escort

-   Absence of celestial navigation back-up during summer months

-   Ability of navigation system antennae to survive environment

*Sensors:*

-   System survivability in environment (lubricants, etc.)

-   Visibility (optical, laser, infra-red)

-   Atmospheric ducting, acoustic ducting, ice noise

-   Development and use of automated vehicles above and below the
    surface

-   Phased array vs. rotating radar survivability

-   Performance of USW (undersea warfare) sensors

-   Availability of national space sensors in the Arctic regions

-   Need for networked multi-regime sensors

![](media/image14.png){width="2.6354166666666665in"
height="1.7604166666666667in"}*Weapons:*

-   Warhead/seeker performance in harsh environment

-   Cold weather tolerance (high moisture and icing conditions)

-   GPS and topographical considerations for cruise missile employment

-   Acoustic variability, including reverberation, spreading,
    topographic noise stripping, and ducting

*Personnel:*

-   Safety implications of operations during extended periods of extreme
    wind chill, darkness, low visibility, small boat operations, ship
    movement and ice covered decks

-   Isolation in a desolate environment (TV-DTS/Sailor phone and e-mail
    connectivity)

-   Specialized cold weather training

-   Instrument qualified ship navigation

-   Medical requirements on smaller ships

-   Rest and Relaxation (R&R) considerations

-   Cognitive challenges associated with effects of prolonged darkness
    and cold

*Seakeeping:*

-   Reserve buoyancy related to icing

-   Risks associated with rapidly changing environmental conditions and
    shallow water (high seas/winds, icing)

-   Small boat operations

*Command and Control/Tactics, Techniques, Procedures:*

-   Suitability of current C4ISR support when manned aircraft operations
    are restricted for extended periods by weather (could also apply to
    UAVs)

-   Suitability of present satellite reconnaissance and targeting
    sensors in periods of extended surface obscuration

-   Availability of high-bit transmission satellites

-   Suitability of present satellite constellation to support projected
    Network Centric Warfare connectivity requirements

-   Availability of spaced based imagery in extreme high latitudes

-   Applicability of littoral tactics in the Arctic region

-   Joint operations considerations, including OPCON issues

*Underway Replenishment and Logistics:*

-   Sea-state and exposure concerns

-   Oiler availability

-   Pollution regulations

-   Visibility and sea-room

-   Absence of shore-based infrastructure

> *Ship Structural and Engineering Considerations:*

-   Hull plate thickness, stringer separation, propeller construction,
    sea bay construction, and steering gear protection

-   Double hull requirements

-   Cold temperature effects on steel

-   Rime ice build-up on topside surfaces

-   Hull design considerations (ice-breaking vs. warship configuration)

-   Hydraulic system temperature vulnerability

-   Damage control system operability

-   System shock resistance

-   Cracking and loss of protective coatings and insulators

[Identifying Required Surface Operations Capabilities]{.underline}

After identifying the mission elements and the key challenges associated
with them, the group used a similar groupware process to list required
capabilities for surface operations in the future Ice-free Arctic. The
resultant capability requirements were developed in response to the
following queries:

-   *What are the capabilities needed to meet the challenges identified
    earlier?*

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-   *What changes in surface platforms would these operations require?*

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-   *What changes in platform-specific tactics, operating procedures and
    support would be required?*

Although mindful of the specific nomenclature and format required by
OPNAV in the requirements development process, the group was not
constrained to make their input compatible with what will be required by
future requirements officers who seek to adapt the symposium report to
PPBS standards.

The following provides a summary of the projected surface specific
operational capabilities by mission element that will be required in the
future to operate in the Arctic:

[Navigation]{.underline}:

-   Full GPS coverage including Arctic differential GPS

-   More complete bathymetry

-   Current and correct digital nautical charts and consistent datum

-   Automatic Radar Plotting Aid (ARPA) plus radar

-   NAVAID coverage (including hydrographic platforms capable of working
    in the Arctic environment)

[Sensors]{.underline}:

-   Increased use of automated sensors

-   Radomes designed for extreme weather conditions

-   Autonomous or unattended sensors for continuous data collection
    (e.g. through-ice acoustic buoys)

-   Expanded use of networked sensors -- Cooperative Engagement
    Capability (CEC)

-   Integration of multi-spectral and multi-medium sensors for
    navigation

-   All-weather, space-based radars (e.g. Canada RADARSAT 2 & Europe's
    ENVISAT)

[Weapons]{.underline}:

-   Accurate topographical maps for cruise missile targeting and
    navigation

-   Improved environmental prediction models

-   Seeker/guidance improvements for Arctic operations

-   Reload capability

-   Development of microwave weapons (less susceptible to environmental
    conditions)

[Seakeeping]{.underline}:

-   Advanced ship-control systems

-   Active stability control systems

[Personnel]{.underline}:

-   Cold weather protective clothing that is compatible with NBC
    Measures of Protection (MOP)

-   Enhanced polar operating experience through more frequent and
    tailored polar training

-   Cold weather damage control training

-   Progressive watchstanding practices (e.g. Integrated Bridge System
    (IBS), Automatic Radar Plotting Aid (ARPA), etc.)

[Command and Control/Tactics, Techniques, Procedures]{.underline}:

-   Robust satellite communications system

-   INMARSAT above 80 degrees north

-   E-mail connectivity

-   Large satellite bandwidth to handle increased automated data
    requirements associated with Network Centric Warfare

-   Battle group integration of ice-breaker operations

-   Revisions to tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) related to
    Arctic warfare operations (including mine warfare, amphibious
    operations)

-   Constrained waterway tactical doctrine

-   PACFLT/LANTFLT Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) standardization

-   Identification of Arctic peculiar intelligence needs

![](media/image15.png){width="2.7083333333333335in"
height="1.7916666666666667in"}[Underway Replenishment and
Logistics]{.underline}:

-   Ability to conduct stationary refueling

-   Arctic-capable bulk fuel systems

-   Internal UNREP capability (minimize exposure)

> [Ship Structural and Engineering Considerations]{.underline}:

-   New Arctic ship design vs. modifications to existing platforms

-   Increased JP-5 storage

-   Arctic capable paints, insulators, and lubricants

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-   Small boat design

-   Organic aviation capable of operating in that environment

-   Re-engineering of cooling/feed systems (ice guards on seabays)

[Projecting Capability Shortfalls for Naval Surface Forces]{.underline}

Surface requirements officers and subject matter experts provided
feedback on the degree to which the current Navy program (POM 02/PR 03)
includes the projected capabilities identified previously. Key
shortfalls include:

-   Inadequate charts of the Arctic region

-   Navigation training

-   Electronic navigation systems

-   Sensor/Weapon/Communications performance testing

-   Environmental monitoring and modeling (e.g. real time system
    performance prediction)

-   Extreme cold weather design/modifications to existing and planned
    sensor and weapon systems

-   Hull design and performance/stability monitoring systems

-   Arctic capable damage control systems

-   Ice-clearing systems for phased array radars

-   Ice-breakers

-   Wargaming in an Arctic scenario

# **SUBSURFACE GROUP FINDINGS**

[General]{.underline}

The fifteen members of the Subsurface Group represented various
operational commands of the U.S. Submarine Force and scientific research
laboratories, and included representatives of the Canadian Defense
Forces and the Royal Navy. Many of the group had conducted under-ice or
other Arctic-related operations. Group membership is indicated at
Appendix C. Specific group expertise included the following:

-   Director, Arctic Submarine Laboratory

-   Chairman, Arctic Research Commission

-   Head of Operations, Arctic Submarine Laboratory (ice pilot/Arctic
    expert)

-   7 former submarine commanding officers

-   Canadian Department of National Defence Scientist

-   Office of Naval Intelligence -- SWORD

-   HF sonar specialist

-   Deputy Director, NAVOCEANO

-   Manager Charting & Oceanography, CNO N23

-   Unmanned underwater vehicles (UUV) requirements and programs officer

-   ASN (I&E)

-   Science Advisor to CNO N70

The Subsurface Group charter was to discuss the implications for
submarine operations in an ice-free Arctic in the 2015-2020 timeframe
and to identify any shortfalls in current submarine capabilities to
conduct those operations.

[Identifying Subsurface Warfare Missions in an Ice-free
Arctic]{.underline}

After a brief introduction by each of the participants, the group first
considered why U.S. submarines might be conducting operations in an
ice-free Arctic region in the 2015-2020 timeframe. Using electronic
brainstorming, a list of potential missions was generated and duplicate
items were consolidated. These missions tended to stress the typical
"war-fighting missions" that submarines have traditionally engaged in.

###### Projected Mission Tasking: Based on the above discussion, the group revisited their list of potential missions and expanded it to a total of twenty-three missions. The list was clarified and then prioritized based on a mission's likelihood of being conducted. The prioritization was conducted by allowing each group member to prioritize the list independently and then using computer groupware to integrate results into a total group priority listing. Again, the group's prioritization tended to stress more traditional submarine missions as indicated in the top five of the following missions: 

-   ISR

-   Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW)

-   Interdiction/Protection of Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs)

-   Maintaining Arctic Expertise

-   ![](media/image16.png){width="1.96875in" height="2.625in"}Forward
    Presence

# Anti-Surface Warfare (ASUW)

-   Power Projection

-   Testing New Hulls, Sensors & Other Systems

-   Environmental Data Collection

-   Strike Warfare

-   Missile Defense

-   Area Denial

-   Special Warfare Operations

-   Freedom of Navigation Operations

-   Mine Warfare (includes Mining & Mine Counter Measures (MCM))

-   Transfer of Forces

-   UUV/UAV Operations

-   Trade Sanction Enforcement

-   Search & Rescue (SAR)

-   Escort Duty

-   Assist Civilian Law Enforcement Authorities

-   Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO)

-   Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO)

[Projecting Capabilities and Shortfalls for Naval Subsurface
Forces]{.underline}

The group next identified and discussed the operational challenges for
submarines to conduct the above missions in the Arctic in 2015-2020. The
challenges were clarified and sorted into six categories: navigation,
sensor employment, weapons employment, communications, submarine
operability, and tactics.

The group's intended process was to discuss the capabilities needed to
meet these challenges and then identify the shortfalls in existing
and/or planned submarine capabilities. But because the submarine force
has routinely conducted operations in the Arctic for decades, the group
recognized that their *challenges*, in the majority of cases, directly
equated to *submarine capability shortfalls* needed to conduct
operations in the Arctic in 2015-2020. Accordingly, the group
prioritized the shortfalls in each of the six categories based on
importance to Arctic operations in the 2015-2020 timeframe. As a final
step, the group prioritized the six shortfall categories as indicated
below.

Challenges that affected submarine operations in most or all of the
following categories, but those that the group did not translate to a
specific capability shortfall included greater shipping densities,
greater abundance of marine life (e.g., whales), currents due to
freshwater runoff, low temperatures, and effects of weather (fog, waves,
storm surges).

Although mindful of the specific nomenclature and format required by
OPNAV in the requirements development process, the group was not
constrained to make their input compatible with what will be required by
future requirements officers who seek to adapt the symposium report to
Program Planning and Budgeting System (PPBS) standards.

## [Submarine Operability Shortfalls]{.underline}: The group identified nineteen challenges to submarine operability, which encompassed the large area of submarine "seakeeping" and "housekeeping" issues. The list of challenges was easily translated to thirteen capability shortfalls that were then prioritized. The top five operability shortfalls are:

-   Surfacing capability, including hardening, ballasting, & controlled
    deballasting

-   Arctic ice pilot experience

-   Ahead-looking sensors for ice keel and iceberg avoidance

-   Environment measurement and prediction, including Arctic weather and
    ice prediction, shallow water acoustic performance prediction, and
    dynamic ocean environmental changes

-   Maneuverability, including ice avoidance and quiet operations

The technique used to prioritize the shortfall areas showed no
discernable difference in priority for other identified operability
shortfalls including the following:

-   Shallow water operations (especially in ice-covered areas)

-   Lack of search and rescue (SAR) facilities

-   Suitability of submarines and weapons for extended cold weather
    deployments

-   Lack of operational documentation for the Arctic (e.g., Submarine
    Technical Oceanographic Reference Manual (STORMs))

-   Submarine rescue in Arctic environment using external means and
    emergency escape capabilities

-   Logistics in an austere and remote region

[Submarine Weapons Employment Shortfalls]{.underline}: The group
identified fifteen challenges to submarine weapons employment in the
Arctic. These challenges easily translated to thirteen capability
shortfalls that were then prioritized. The top five weapons shortfalls
are:

-   Lack of weapons testing and evaluations in the Arctic environment

-   Surface launch capability of submarine launched missiles

-   Ability to shoot missiles when ice is present overhead

-   Shallow water effectiveness of torpedoes

-   Environment measurement and prediction

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-   Sound velocity profile (SVP)

-   Shallow water acoustic performance prediction

-   Acoustic noise prediction

-   Environmental database deficiencies

-   Dynamic ocean environment changes will require continual updating of
    models & predictions

The technique used to prioritize the shortfall areas showed no
discernable difference in priority for other identified shortfalls
including the following:

-   ![](media/image17.wmf){width="2.1875in"
    height="1.6930555555555555in"}Weapon countermeasures

-   Missile hatch ice clearance system

-   Weapons accuracy at high latitudes

-   Knowledge of ice coverage

-   National sensor limitations

-   Allied interoperability issues

-   Weapon systems designed to operate in an icing environment

[Submarine Sensor Employment Shortfalls]{.underline}: The group
identified fifteen challenges to submarine sensor employment in the
Arctic. These challenges translated to eight capability shortfalls that
were then prioritized as follows:

-   Ahead-looking ice-avoidance sensors for highly variable acoustic
    conditions

-   Acoustic & environmental measurement & prediction, including both
    vertical and horizontal Sound Velocity Profiles (SVP), environmental
    databases, ambient noise measurement, and acoustic modeling

-   Improved high latitude remote sensing capability (polar orbits that
    can see through clouds)

-   More trained sensor operators for the Arctic acoustic environment

-   Secure ice sonar to pick out ice keel, iceberg, bottom obstacle

-   Ice-hardened sensors

-   Variable depth towed array

-   Ice-penetrating ESM/COMMS/NAV buoy

[Submarine Navigation Shortfalls]{.underline}: The group discussed
eleven challenges to submarine navigation in the Arctic. Nearly all of
the challenges focused on the submarine's ability to obtain a fix while
operating submerged in the Arctic. As a result, these challenges
translated to only two capability shortfalls that were then prioritized.
The two navigation shortfalls are:

-   High latitude navigation system accuracy without external input

-   Obtaining navigation fixes while submerged

-   This encompassed a number of challenges, including access to GPS,
    chart accuracy, ice-penetrating NAV buoy, Ring Laser Gyro Navigator
    (RLGN) versus Electro-Static Gyro Navigator (ESGN), and magnetic and
    gravitational anomalies

[Submarine Communications Shortfalls]{.underline}: The group discussed
nine challenges to submarine communications in the Arctic. The
challenges translated to six capability shortfalls that were then
prioritized as follows.

-   High latitude, high speed communications

-   Two-way communications from under ice

-   Limited satellite communications

-   Improved acoustic communications

-   Improved allied interoperability

-   Environment measurement and prediction and environmental database
    deficiencies

[Submarine Tactics Shortfalls]{.underline}: The last category the group
discussed had to do with the challenges to submarine tactics in the
Arctic. Most of the challenges discussed mirrored those identified
earlier for the other five categories. In fact, there was only one new
challenge in this category and the group felt that it was a significant
shortfall in submarine capability to perform Arctic missions in
2015-2020. That shortfall is the lack of tactical development for
routine submarine operations in the Arctic.

######## PHASE III: NAVAL WARFARE INTEGRATION

INTEGRATED OPERATIONS GROUP FINDINGS

Introduction

The Integrated Operations group met to discuss issues related to
integrated naval operations in the context of an Ice-free Arctic.
Participating in the deliberations were warfighting representatives from
the United States Navy, Royal Canadian Navy, Royal Navy, United States
Coast Guard, and Canadian Coast Guard. Additionally, Arctic experts from
the Naval Ice Center, Naval Warfare Development Command (NWDC), and the
Arctic Submarine Laboratory provided valuable subject matter,
environmental, and scientific expertise to the discussions.

Originally, the group was asked to consider several questions regarding
the details of integrated operations. These included:

-   Are there any additional missions or integrated naval operations
    that would be required in the Arctic in the 2015-2020 timeframe?

-   What changes are required in CVBG, ARG, SAG tactics, techniques, and
    procedures associated with integrated operations in an Ice-free
    Arctic environment?

-   What are the implications on OPTEMPO, logistic support, basing, etc?

-   Are there any additional considerations that must be considered when
    planning for integrated naval operations in the Arctic environment?

Although each of the above questions were eventually addressed, the
group found it more useful to approach integrated operations from the
standpoint of missions, required changes to current operating
procedures, and implications for current fleet operations.

# **[Definition]{.underline}**

The first issue encountered by the group was finding an acceptable
definition for integrated operations. Traditionally (i.e. warm-water
open-ocean operations), "integrated operations" comprise all of the
functions of an aircraft carrier battlegroup and its support ships. Less
frequently, integrated operations included the Amphibious Readiness
Group and/or joint force elements.

Given the harsh environment in the Arctic region and the demands placed
on units operating there, the group concluded that the traditional
definition of integrated operations was inadequate. Due to the unique
operating situation, integrated operations would need to include assets
from every available resource capable of working in the Arctic. These
would include military (including allied/coalition), Coast Guard,
scientific, and commercial. The following agreed-upon definition
encompasses the larger scope of integrated operations in an Ice-free
Arctic:

> "Integrated Operations is two or more elements from a mixture of
> possibly Combined and/or Joint forces (including other national and
> civil elements) working towards a common objective."
>
> ![](media/image18.wmf){width="2.8645833333333335in"
> height="1.91875in"}

**[Missions]{.underline}**

Next, the group examined what, if any, new missions would require
integrated operations in the region. By leveraging the assessment
accomplished by the warfare specific working groups (surface,
sub-surface, and aviation) the group concluded that there are no [unique
new]{.underline} missions. [How]{.underline} those existing missions are
executed however, would likely change dramatically, to include an
increased emphasis on less traditional tasks. The more traditional
warfare areas of air defense, undersea warfare, and strike warfare
(among others) will remain important. However, missions such as Military
Assistance to Civilian Communities (MACC), law enforcement, humanitarian
aid, search and rescue, commercial convoy escort, scientific exploration
and research, and environmental protection will gain added importance.
These requirements will necessitate changes in how forces operate in an
integrated fashion. The next section discusses those required changes.

**[Changes Required]{.underline}**

The most significant change envisioned is that forces will necessarily
form into task groups (or forces) where the "task" defines the
composition of the group. These tailored force packages would likely not
look like the traditional carrier battlegroup. The incorporation of both
U.S. and allied icebreakers, mine counter measures vessels, and
operating in the restricted waters in and around the ice will
significantly alter the tactics, techniques, and procedures used by
groups of ships, submarines, and aircraft. Additionally, traditional
assets will likely be used in some non-traditional ways. Submarines and
aircraft will provide perhaps the best "environmental intelligence" of
ice and weather conditions along the group's intended track. For Surface
Action Groups operating without an aircraft carrier or large deck
amphibious ship, it will be imperative to have an organic helicopter
capability to perform the same function. Ice reporting will be a new
mission for helicopters and one that will be critical to the success of
any group operating in the region.

Another very important change will be the expanded use of UAVs, USVs,
and UUVs in the Arctic. These unmanned, relatively inexpensive vehicles
can be used for a variety of missions when manned platforms would be
grounded or forced to operate on the edge of the safety envelope. In
addition to their usual reconnaissance role, unmanned vehicles could be
used for weapons delivery platforms and as "pathfinders" to scout ice
conditions.

The composition of carrier airwings will change to reflect the increased
importance of rotary lift in the harsh Arctic environment. Unpredictable
sea states may preclude routine alongside replenishments and force more
vertical resupply. This may also be true in the case of amphibious
operations where sea state may prevent landing craft operations.
Airborne lift (either helicopter or tilt-rotor) will take on much of the
load of transporting marines from ship to ice or shore.

Logistics and resupply will be accomplished differently than now. Longer
range planning for refueling and replenishment will be required.
Distances between ports with refueling capability, coupled with the
unpredictability of weather that may preclude regular underway
refueling, may force the fleet to develop a stationary refueling
capability. Additionally, shore-based aircraft capable of resupply and
able to operate in the Arctic environment will be needed to fly supplies
into remote regions in the vicinity of transiting battlegroups where
vertical lift can then transport the supplies to the ships. Improvement
of logistical support facilities in friendly areas (e.g. Alaska, Canada,
Greenland) will be important to sustained operations in the region.

Although the group tried to limit their discussions to issues at the
macro level, there were some micro level details worth noting. In
particular, command and control and communications considerations came
to the forefront. The group consensus was that communications procedures
would need to be modified for working with allied, scientific community,
and commercial assets. Additionally, communications satellite coverage
in the Arctic will require improvement to reduce an integrated group's
dependence on less reliable methods. Deck cycle times for aircraft
undoubtedly will be affected by the severe environmental conditions.
Increased reliance on instrument navigation systems like IBS and ARPA
will necessitate more comprehensive training and proficiency in
conducting navigation and piloting by instrument. These are just a few
of the details that will need to be addressed in order to operate
efficiently and safely in the Arctic. All of these considerations may
cause important changes to the ROC/POE (Required Operational Capability
/ Projected Operational Environment) for some task force platforms.

**[Additional Considerations]{.underline}**

Other issues not directly related to integrated operations will,
nonetheless, have an important effect on a battlgroup's ability to
conduct its mission. Devoting training time and exercises to the Arctic
environment will be required to ensure that any forces participating in
Arctic operations are prepared for the unique conditions encountered
there. This training requirement has a testing component as well. The
Navy will need to test ship and aircraft systems for their ability to
operate in the Arctic setting. Increased presence in the Arctic due to
the shrinking of the icecaps will strain already stretched naval
resources even further. How these additional requirements are filled
will effect the Navy's ability to conduct integrated operations in the
region. Currently, there is no CINC with OPCON over the region.
Furthermore, NATO has a standing regional planning group but no command
structure in place. As operations in the area increase, the question of
"who is CINCARCTIC?" will eventually become important.

**[Implications]{.underline}**

After reviewing the various issues discussed above, the group concluded
its work by outlining the five major implications that integrated
operations in the Arctic region will have in the future.

-   Resources vs. Commitments -- There may be other more pressing
    challenges and commitments that will stretch forces and budgets and
    potentially preclude integrated operations in the Arctic

-   Interoperability - Integrated interoperability between allied,
    joint, and coalition forces as well as scientific and commercial
    entities must be improved in order to operate effectively in the
    region

-   Training, Exercises, and R&D -- There must be increased emphasis on
    exercises, training, and R&D in the Arctic or, at least, sub-Arctic
    environment to ensure the efficacy of our forces operating there

-   UUVs/UAVs/USVs -- The increased use of unmanned vehicles for a
    variety of missions will increase the effectiveness of battlegroups
    while mitigating some of the risks to personnel

-   Command Structure -- The assignment of the Arctic to a CINC or the
    creation of a CINCARCTIC command organization will become
    increasingly important as operations in the area increase.
    Additionally, the inclusion of the Arctic in a detailed combined or
    national defense plan will also be required

# **STRATEGY & POLICY GROUP FINDINGS** 

This group consisted of twelve people, including representatives of the
U.S. scientific community, U.S. Navy, U.S. Coast Guard, and Canadian
Defense Forces, which met on the second morning of the symposium. The
Strategy & Policy Group's charter was to (1) discuss the implications
for maritime strategy and naval operational policy of an ice-free Arctic
in the 2015-2020 timeframe and (2) identify potential changes that might
be required in current strategy and policy.

There were several factors that made this a particularly qualified group
to discuss strategy and policy issues. The group leader is a faculty
member of the U.S. Naval War College Strategy & Policy Group. The senior
Canadian officer on the group works for the Canadian Navy Directorate of
Maritime Strategy. The group also had senior officers representing the
U.S. Navy JAG and the Canada Defense JAG. Coast Guard representation
included the Chief, Ice Operations Division, USCG Headquarters. Finally,
the group also had appropriate representation from the naval warfare
surface, subsurface, and air communities. Appendix C provides a detailed
list of the Strategy & Policy Group participants.

### 

### [Why Operate In the Arctic in 2015-2020?]{.underline}

The Strategy & Policy Group's process to achieve its charter used the
Air, Surface, and Subsurface Group outputs on platform missions,
challenges, capabilities, and shortfalls as a starting point for further
discussion. The group had some concerns that these "platform-focused"
groups had not ventured far enough "out of the box" in their
consideration of potential missions in the Arctic, specifically in their
prioritization of those missions. The group spent a considerable amount
of time discussing "traditional" warfare areas versus more
non-traditional areas of naval operations that they expected to occur in
the Arctic. To better focus their discussion, they decided to identify
their own reasons for why U.S. forces might operate in an ice-free
Arctic and to use that information to develop their own list of
prioritized potential naval missions for the Arctic in 2015-2020.

The group ultimately determined that there was [only one overriding
reason for increased operations in the Arctic in 2015-2020: increased
access]{.underline}. Today, most of the Arctic is inaccessible for all
or most of the year because of the ice coverage. As the icecap recedes
and more of the Arctic becomes ice-free for a longer period each year,
more and more vessels (and aircraft) from many nations will operate in
the region. This increased accessibility to a variety of vessels will in
turn require increased naval operations in the region for one of three
purposes:

-   [Increased Economic Activity]{.underline} with increased associated
    environmental protection activities. This includes both [access
    to]{.underline} the region to exploit the natural resources
    available and [access through]{.underline} the region to save
    transit time.

-   [Increased Need for Law Enforcement]{.underline} of both domestic
    laws and international treaty obligations (e.g., United Nations
    Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), counter-drug operations, and
    migrant smuggling). Military forces will have unique capabilities,
    at least in the short term, to support civilian law enforcement
    authorities.

-   [Increased Security Needs]{.underline} resulting from the
    opportunities of potential adversaries to exploit the waters of the
    Arctic in ways that are counter to our national security.

### [National and Maritime Strategy Implications]{.underline}

###  

Having identified why naval forces would operate in the Arctic in
2015-2020, the group next discussed what the implications of those
operations were for U.S. national strategy. The group discussed the
three goals of the ***National Security Strategy for a Global Age***
signed by the President in December 2000 and determined that these goals
would not likely change as a result of changes in the Arctic region. The
three goals are: (1) Enhance security with effective diplomacy and
military forces ready to fight and win; (2) Bolster economic prosperity;
and (3) Promote democracy abroad. The Canadian representatives from the
group indicated that from their perspective, the Arctic would be an area
in which economic development would be "uniquely" regulated because of
its fragile environment.

The group next explored the implications of naval operations in the
Arctic for the three elements of national strategy presented in the
President's ***National Security Strategy for a Global Age*** and
specifically the implications for maritime strategy. The group listed
strategy changes they felt would be required for each element.

[Shaping the Environment]{.underline}: The group felt very strongly that
bilateral and multinational alliances would be a primary concern in
shaping the environment. These alliances will be needed to define all
international boundaries (Economic Exclusion Zones and continental
shelves) within the Arctic, resolve bilateral issues related to United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) implementation in the
Arctic, and to provide forward basing capabilities and shorten logistic
space and time lines. Issues involving commercial and military
overflight of Arctic waters must also be addressed. From a military
perspective, the group discussed the need to ensure interoperability
with allies in the Arctic environment and the implications of greater
access on implementation of our strategic deterrence policy.

Canada, in particular, has strong feelings about access to areas it
considers its territorial waters and also has concerns for protecting
the Arctic waters. In accordance with the provisions of UNLCOS, Canada
has claimed sovereignty and jurisdiction over the Arctic Archipelago by
drawing straight baselines around the outer edges of the archipelago.
Under UNCLOS, all waters inward of the baseline are considered by Canada
to be \"internal waters\". This has the practical effect of not
permitting \"transit passage\" or \"innocent passage\" and requiring all
vessels, aircraft and persons to comply with Canadian domestic law. The
U.S. disputes this claim, particularly in regards to the status of the
Northwest Passage. The U.S. claims the Northwest Passage is an
\"international strait\" as defined under UNCLOS. This means \"transit
passage\" is permitted and vessels, aircraft and persons do not
necessarily have to comply with Canadian domestic law. [The differences
between Canada and the U.S. on these issues are significant and have a
direct impact on the development of national and maritime strategies for
naval operations in an ice-free Arctic.]{.underline} These differences
must be resolved, probably through bilateral agreement(s).

Similarly, Russian maritime claims on the Northern Sea Route, if
unresolved, could hamper operations - especially transit of forces. The
group discussed the need to begin soon to work on developing and
strengthening alliances for the region.

![](media/image19.wmf){width="2.5625in" height="1.7395833333333333in"}

[Responding to Threats and Crisis]{.underline}: Discussions of this
element of the strategy determined there was a need to better define the
potential threats that will ensue from greater access to the region in
2015-2020, both by country (or group, such as a terrorist organization)
and type of threat. Additionally, a concept of operations for maritime
forces in the Arctic will be required that includes the types of
platforms and weapons systems needed for Arctic operations. The group
also felt that the issue of commercial and military overflight needed to
be addressed.

[Preparing for an Uncertain Future]{.underline}: Discussions related to
potential changes to this element of the strategy, as with "responding
to threats and crisis," emphasized the need to conduct greater analysis
to identify and understand the military threats to operations in Arctic
waters. Additionally, the group felt strong emphasis should be placed on
relevant training and exercises for maritime forces to prepare them for
operations in an Arctic climate anticipated to be continually changing.
Other potential strategy changes discussed included the need to prepare
for asymmetric threats, consider the impact of the "Revolution in
Military Affairs (RMA)" and support greater Arctic research and
development.

### [Naval Missions in the Arctic In 2015-2020]{.underline}

Using their discussion of changes to national and maritime strategy as a
backdrop, the group next revisited the missions that each of the
platform groups had briefed earlier that morning. The group brainstormed
some additional missions and then prioritized their own list of
twenty-four "most likely" naval missions. Their results were somewhat
different than those briefed earlier by the Air, Surface and Subsurface
Groups, and reflected the group's strategic, rather than platform focus
on potential naval missions in the Arctic. Their top five missions were:

-   Law enforcement operations

-   Ensure freedom of navigation

-   Protection of natural resources

-   Transit of forces

-   Homeland defense

Rounding out the top ten missions were forward presence, intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), scientific exploration,
maintain/improve capability to operate in the Arctic, and uphold allied
commitments. Initially, strategic deterrence had been ranked as one of
the top ten missions, but after further discussion the group concluded
that there was no value added to operating U.S. SSBNs in the Arctic
given the current capabilities of the Trident missile system.

### [Naval Policy Implications]{.underline}

Finally, policy changes that would be required to better support Arctic
operations in 2015-2020 were considered. The group identified three
broad areas of potential policy change:

-   Increase the emphasis on Arctic issues in our bilateral and
    multilateral engagement with Arctic nations. This area was a logical
    extension of the group's earlier discussion of the strategic need to
    focus heavily on bilateral and multinational alliances in the
    Arctic.

-   Review the Unified Command Plan (UCP). Currently there is no single
    unified CINC with responsibility for the Arctic. An Arctic area of
    national defense/naval requirements should be defined and given to a
    single CINC.

-   U.S. military and political strategy has to engage the American
    public to support a military presence in such an environmentally
    sensitive area as the Arctic. This engagement strategy should also
    include the native peoples of the Arctic area since changes in both
    the natural and political environments of the Arctic will affect
    their lives the most.

### [Critical Issues]{.underline}

The session concluded with a brief discussion of "critical issues" that
the group identified as it explored potential implications of an
ice-free Arctic for U.S. maritime strategy and policy. The group agreed
that the only critical issue was that the U.S. Navy cannot "go it
alone." The need for bilateral and multinational alliances for the
Arctic region will be extremely important, especially with Canada and
Russia.

# **ACQUISITION / SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY (S&T) GROUP FINDINGS**

On day two of the symposium a panel was formed to discuss the
implications of the symposium findings to the Acquisition and S&T
processes. Twelve symposium participants, with varied military and
civilian expertise examined implications of military capability
assessments in the Navy program of record. It should be noted there were
relatively few participants with a practical background in actual
Acquisition or S&T programming.

## [Methodology]{.underline}

The group planned to consider the following broad categories under the
Acquisition and S&T heading:

-   Implications for New Acquisition Programs

-   RDT&E (Research, Development, Testing and Evaluation)

-   S&T Plan Implications

-   Effects on Program Schedules

-   Requirements Process Implications

-   Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Implications

Due to time limitations, only the first three were considered in any
depth.

## [Implications for new acquisition programs]{.underline}

The group considered the following question:

*"Based on the outputs of Phases II (capabilities evaluation), what are
the implications for new programs and modifications to existing programs
to support the projected naval operations in the Arctic in the 2015-2020
period?"*

The following sub-topics were addressed to better characterize the
issues for the Acquisition and S&T processes.

-   Measurement and Modeling Predictions

-   ![](media/image20.wmf){width="2.8125in"
    height="1.8958333333333333in"}Requirements Documentation

-   Weapons

-   Communications

-   Navigation

-   Sensors

-   Manpower

-   Platform Design

-   Space

-   Air

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-   Surface

-   Subsurface

#### Measurement and Modeling Predictions: Data collection in all forms was a topic of great interest. It was generally agreed that we must understand the environment and have the tools to predict environmental conditions in the air, on the surface and under the sea to operate in an ice-free Arctic. It was acknowledged that an "ice-free Arctic" should not be construed as a benign operating environment. As noted in day one briefings, an ice-free Arctic would give our forces greater latitude to operate, but at the same time present unique environmental challenges such as free floating ice, ice fog/mist and cold temperatures. These will remain as significant drivers when conducting operations.

Items that were of significant interest included:

-   Data collection with a requirement for a tool for determining ocean
    temperature structure

-   Development of ice/weather prediction models within a small scale
    area

-   Acquiring an ACOUS (Arctic Climate Observations using Underwater
    Sound) capability for the Arctic

-   Incorporating Arctic sensors into GCCS-M to ensure networking of
    vital information

-   The need for a U.S. based Synthetic Aperature Radar (SAR)

[Requirements Documentation]{.underline}: Discussion was wide ranging on
this subject. The overriding consensus was that all future Operational
Requirements Documents (ORDs) and Mission Needs Statements (MNSs) must
have a section that addresses those systems that will be required to
operate in the ice-free Arctic. Specifics included:

-   Add Arctic operations to the DD-21 and LPD-17 MNS

-   Review all planned NIMA and NSA tasking, process, exploitation and
    dissemination architectures

-   Consider MNSs for two additional USCG icebreakers (this could be
    considered a requirement vice a need for a MNS)

-   Ensure ORD for wide bandwidth communications includes anticipated
    requirement for continuous connectivity within the ice-free Arctic
    region

#### Weapons: An ice-free Arctic will offer new opportunities for science, commercial shipping and development\--particularly oil and gas exploitation. The probability of a military presence and potential for hostile actions logically follows. This would include potential belligerents comprised of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), terrorists and environmental activists. Weapons and weapon systems must function as designed in an ice-free Arctic environment. Highlights of the comments were:

-   Need for the Mk-46 shallow water, under ice, torpedo that would be
    air and surface launched

-   An Arctic Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) capability

-   An Arctic Submarine Launched Cruise Missile (SLCM) capability

-   Potential for Arctic capable mines

-   Cold weather testing for all legacy and future weapons systems to
    include sea based missile systems

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-   Evaluation of terminal guidance sensor performance in icing
    intensive flight environments and in expected low visibility
    conditions

[Communications]{.underline}: The subject of communications created some
of the liveliest discussions of the day. It was widely recognized by all
participants, both scientists and operators alike, that the Arctic will
pose unique and daunting challenges to establishing and maintaining
continuous and effective communications. High latitude operations are
known for their challenges to maintaining communications on all of the
frequency bands the military might use. As the military moves with
increasing vigor towards a Network Centric Warfare architecture that
inherently requires enormous amounts of bandwidth, and weapon systems
that are linked forward and rearward to shooters, sensors, controllers
and commanders, the need to consider and enable a robust Arctic
communication capability is readily evident. Additionally, while the
military will be a primary user of the communications environment,
commercial uses will also balloon as the Arctic opens up. Items that
were of prime importance to the group included:

-   Establishment of a dedicated high latitude satellite communication
    capability

-   Research to determine the unique requirements for communications in
    the northern region

-   The need for a secure acoustic communications system between
    submarines and surface vessels

-   Expanded use of unmanned platforms to relay communications data

-   Requirement for an ice penetrating communications buoy

#### Navigation: Challenges to navigation are similarly significant and often times unique to the Arctic region. As the Arctic becomes more ice-free, significant changes in known landmarks will take place. The group felt that there would be challenges in the ability to navigate using the current standard -- GPS. Among those items that were discussed and considered crucial:

-   Improved, high resolution charting of the Arctic, with sufficient
    detail to enable passive navigation

-   Improving GPS coverage in the high latitudes

-   Improving non-GPS navigation methods at high latitudes

-   Development of ice penetrating buoys not only for communications but
    also for navigational applications

#### Sensors: General discussion was focused on the anticipated requirement to be more able to reach out and "touch" the Arctic environment through either improved legacy sensor systems or the creation of new systems. A particularly important capability will be to know the weather, anticipate climatic changes, track ice flows, and track shipping in this "new" ocean. A major concern was the ability to navigate on the surface in free-floating ice and to be able to withstand potential minor scrapes with floating ice. Items of note included:

-   High latitude SAR satellites

-   Improved weather station monitoring

-   Improved submarine-mounted environmental sensors

-   Acquire and backfit, as required, forward looking/side scan
    fathometer

-   Investigate sonar dome technology that would be able to withstand
    free floating ice encounters

#### Manpower: Recognizing the stressing environment that continuous operations within an ice-free Arctic will place on personnel, the group focused on two areas considered worthy of further development:

-   Protective clothing, including both flight and deck hand exposure
    suits

-   Personnel locator systems for rapid and precise location of
    personnel in the water

#### 

[Platform Design]{.underline}: Development of systems that will
effectively work within the ice-free Arctic will be crucial to our
ability to operate. The extended operating time frames which are likely
to be encountered will drive the design changes. These include:

-   Structure and substructure capabilities to withstand ice
    accumulation

-   Changes to ship habitability systems to accommodate cold
    temperatures

-   Placement of warming stations for deck hands

-   Force structure for an ice-free Arctic appears to be an additional
    design issue. Platform adaptations appropriate for polar operations
    will likely impose more significant cost and performance penalties
    than would be expected for operations in more benign environments. A
    specially configured "Arctic Squadron" (ships and aircraft) approach
    should be evaluated as a candidate baseline acquisition strategy.

#### 

#### Air: Air vehicles may require changes to operate effectively in an ice-free Arctic. Items that should be considered include:

-   Developing an ice accretion model that will help predict
    probabilities of ice accumulation on deck and in the air

-   Development of a reliable Automatic Landing System for all air
    vehicles on all decks. The ability of the Arctic to fall to zero
    visibility is well documented and is expected to worsen in a
    developing ice-free Arctic

-   Improved in-flight deicing for air vehicles

-   Ensuring all UAV/UCAV vehicles are built with operations in an
    ice-free Arctic in mind

#### Surface: As with the air model, stresses will be placed on surface vessels when operating in an ice-free Arctic. Items that should be considered include:

-   Developing an ice accretion model that will help predict
    probabilities of ice accumulation on deck and superstructure
    surfaces

# Ice clearing capability for the AEGIS system

-   Hull strengthening and screw protection in future design and all
    retrofit

-   Development of a bow mounted sonar system not as susceptible to
    damage as the current "glass dome" design

-   Development of deck non-skid material compatible with Arctic
    operations

-   Ensure icing stability consideration is taken into account for DD21
    class ships

-   Procurement of a limited number of icebreaking DDG's for single ship
    operation in the Arctic

#### Subsurface: While submarines have operated under the Arctic ice cap for years, the advent of an ice-free Arctic will dramatically change the roles and operations of submarines. It can be envisioned that types and classes of submarines that have not operated in the Arctic will begin to do so. Items for consideration include:

-   Hull strengthening and screw protection in ship design and retrofit

-   Develop a Virginia Class submarine Arctic capability

-   Develop a SSBN under ice capability

-   Arctic Blow System installation on current 688I and future Virginia
    Class submarines

### [Implications for S&T]{.underline}

The discussion of RDT&E and S&T became rather homogeneous due to the
limited time remaining. Considering the need for an energized RDT&E
program in order to operate in an ice-free Arctic, the group
acknowledged that the 2015 timeframe is just around the corner in terms
of development and fielding of new systems. Research is the highest
importance since so little is still known about long-term climatic
change in the Arctic. Of particular concern was the lack of predictive
models that will be vital when operating in an ice-free Arctic. In
general these models do not exist, nor is there sufficient data with
which to construct such models. Items of immediate concern include:

-   Development and funding of Arctic research in order to create
    accurate predictive models

-   High latitude GPS satellite system

-   High latitude SAR system

-   Open ocean ARGOS (Advanced Research and Global Observation
    Satellite) oceanographic floats are planned in the next few years.
    There are none planned for the Arctic and it would seem advisable to
    develop this program now for an ice-free Arctic.

Finally, the discussion focused on who should be the advocate for RDT&E
and S&T. This is not just a military issue. An ice-free Arctic will
encourage commerce and development and thus bring the civilian populace
in greater concentration than ever before. The technologies that the
military will require will probably have concurrent applications in the
civilian world. National joint advocacy for Arctic issues will be a must
to bring together diverse commercial, DoD, economic competitiveness and
environmental protection interests. The Arctic Research Commission would
most likely serve as an initial representative in any advocacy
consideration. Across the military, major claimants should begin on a
DoD scale. This will ensure a Joint representation of the issues. Within
the Navy there needs to be a uniformed advocate for Arctic issues.
Participants recommended that key stakeholders such as the CINCs, CNO,
and N7 be briefed and consulted. There was general consensus on the need
to incorporate Arctic requirements into the formal requirements
documentation system (CRDs, ORDs). Additionally, a review of the current
S&T investment plan to ensure Future Naval Capabilities (FNCs) include
technologies relevant to the ice-free Arctic should be undertaken.

![](media/image21.wmf){width="3.3854166666666665in"
height="2.2104166666666667in"}

# **THE ROAD AHEAD**

The timeline for a significantly navigable Arctic may extend decades
into the future. However, the Road Ahead discussion group noted that
U.S. Naval operational missions in the Arctic, and related requirements,
must be identified in the nearer term to ensure that the necessary
operational capabilities are resident when future Arctic missions do
present themselves. Recognition and acknowledgement by DON/DOD of new
threats presented by changes in the Arctic seascape are required to
generate the necessary momentum to sustain an active interest in
developing a strategic plan that includes prudent resourcing in future
POM cycles to acquire the unique capabilities required to operate in the
hostile environment of the Arctic. The Road Ahead group recommends a
focus on short-term actions that will help build a momentum case inside
of DON and DOD for preparing for eventual Arctic operations. The
discussion group identified five major elements of an acquisition
pathway that will lead to an Arctic-capable Navy:

-   Climate Change Validation -- Validate the eventuality of a future
    navigable Arctic and continue to update the climatological forecast
    as new information becomes available.

-   Threat Assessment -- Identify plausible future missions that would
    invite or require the Navy to operate in a navigable Arctic.

-   National Maritime/Military Strategy -- Incorporate Arctic Naval
    missions and operations into the development of National
    Maritime/Military Strategy.

-   Requirements Assessment -- Continue the early stage process of
    identifying the unique requirements that must be satisfied to
    successfully meet the operational challenges of Arctic operations.

-   Acquire Capabilities -- Acquire the assets required to operate in
    the Arctic.

Immediate actions can be undertaken to address task elements 1-3 above.
Formal requirements assessment and acquisition planning are future
activities contingent on further refinement of the environmental
forecasts and the development of consequent Arctic centered operational
missions. Additionally, the discussion group advised the development of
a formal, directed communications plan intended to raise awareness of
the evolving Arctic seascape and potential Naval related operational
implications. The group also generated a set of more specific
recommendations for immediate action:

# **[Climate Change Validation]{.underline}**

The Road Ahead group recognized that energizing DON interest in
resourcing for operations related to future Arctic operations requires
validation and ongoing refinement of the existing climatological
forecasts. A significant body of literature already exists that outlines
the positive probability of a navigable Arctic. The group suggests that
climatological and environmental forecasts of Arctic change generated by
the entire range of agencies and organizations (both U.S. and
international) be compiled to establish independent scientific
verification of the phenomenon. A composite set of reinforcing
scientific conclusions will help validate the Arctic warming phenomenon
in an unbiased fashion. The parallel forecasts made by various
scientific and governmental organizations should be distilled into a
technically accessible message that effectively describes the
eventuality of a navigable Arctic. Updated research data should continue
to be compiled by DON so that the evolving climatological profile of the
Arctic can be routinely included in status briefs and reports presented
to senior leadership. Current forecasts predict the window of
significant navigable opportunities in the Arctic will open between the
years 2020 and 2050. A more precise forecast that shifts the time window
of probable occurrence to the left would present a more compelling
argument to DOD/DON leadership for enhanced interest and subsequent
planning activities related to the associated contingencies.

# **[Threat Assessment and National Military Strategy]{.underline}**

As the Arctic climate forecasts continue to mature, a parallel effort
must but made to develop realistic threat and/or opportunity assessments
that describe why and how the U.S. Navy would be called upon to operate
in the Arctic. Naval Arctic missions could result as responses to
national security challenges from hostile agents or from opportunities
to exploit operational efficiencies offered by Arctic transit during
peace-time. These missions and opportunities must be clearly and
credibly identified. The Road Ahead discussion group recommends that the
operational vignettes that provided the backdrop for discussion at the
symposium be examined as a candidate set of potential Arctic missions.
Selected vignettes could be augmented and refined so that they may be
formally validated as feasible missions requiring U.S. Naval operations
in a navigable Arctic.

Accepted missions could be then incorporated into the development of
future National Maritime/Military Strategy. The Road Ahead discussion
group suggests that N81 be encouraged to include validated Arctic
operational scenarios in the IWARS process. Scenario wargames should
also be conducted with the most plausible Arctic missions used as the
situational overlay in game design. These Arctic centered wargames would
reinforce mission plausibility, more fully define the operational
requirements that extend beyond current capabilities, and also build
awareness about a navigable Arctic inside of the operational community.

# **[Raising Awareness]{.underline}**

As the climatological forecasts of the Arctic are updated and made more
accurate, a mechanism must be put into place to communicate the status
of Arctic navigation to DON/DOD leadership and important stakeholders
including other government agencies, Congress, allies, international
agencies and commercial interests. Decision makers in the planning chain
must be made aware of the significant probability the Arctic will become
navigable within the strategic planning horizon. Additionally, the
validated Arctic related threat assessments that result from
climatological change must be broadly communicated to the U.S. national
security apparatus.

The Road Ahead discussion group identified some key communications
mechanisms and stakeholders to assist in advancing the concept of Naval
operations in a future navigable Arctic. Arctic-unique requirements
should be considered in the preparation of Integrated Priority List
(IPL) and Component Commander Issue Papers (CCIP) published by the
Unified and Component Commanders. It also suggests the development of a
Navigable Arctic briefing package. The package should include visual
representations that illustrate the observed changes in the Arctic
seascape documented by remote sensors over the past two decades.
Targeted stakeholder groups for this information package should include:

-   Deputy Assistant Secretaries of the Navy (e.g., Undersea Warfare
    Steering Group)

-   Operational Analysis Groups (OAG's) that span multiple mission areas

-   Presentation at the plenary session of the Anti-Submarine Warfare
    Improvement Program (ASWIP)

-   The Surface Warfare Development Group (SWDG)

-   Navy Strategic Studies Group (NAVSSG )

-   Presentation at the National Defense Industrial Association (NDIA)
    spring/fall symposia

The Road Ahead group also recommends the establishment of a knowledge
management web based portal to share collective knowledge on relevant
issues related to a changing Arctic (science, emerging threats,
commerce, etc.)

Finally, the group also noted that the NAVICE office would eventually
hand off oversight of the Arctic operations challenge. It recommends
identifying one or more DON or Joint offices/organizations with adequate
resources to take on the responsibility of managing the navigable Arctic
initiative.

# 

# **RECOMMENDATIONS**

The efforts described above in the "Road Ahead" provide the rudiments of
a campaign plan for addressing the many points raised during the
symposium. Many other recommendations are found throughout this report
within the individual group findings. While the conference focused on an
ice-free Arctic, it should be noted that a more correct term is a
navigable Artic. Further these recommendations can be applied even with
the current Arctic environment.

-   Realize that this symposium was a limited, initial attempt to
    address operational capabilities required for naval forces in the
    Arctic. While the results and output indicate that there are
    significant issues for the U.S. Navy, they are largely unfiltered. A
    formal methodology for addressing and evaluating these results, to
    include a detailed capabilities assessment, is required to refine
    this preliminary effort.

-   OP 096 should increase both research and analysis of changing polar
    environmental conditions, and increase efforts to educate the
    warfighter on their implications. Consider polar operations as the
    focus in future Global War Games.

-   Incorporate Arctic aspects into planned war games, Fleet Battle
    Experiment (FBE) or other exercises.

-   N7 should incorporate Ice-free Arctic implications into a future
    polar mission capabilities assessment, with results incorporated
    into design specifications for forces expected to serve in the
    projected environment.

-   N8 should incorporate Ice-free Arctic implications into future
    Integrated Warfare Architecture (IWAR) assessments and consider
    means for incorporating Arctic operations requirements into CRDs and
    ORDs.

-   OPNAV should increase interaction between USN and Arctic littoral
    navies to leverage their Arctic operational experience.

    **APPENDIX A**

    **THE ARCTIC OCEAN AND**

    **CLIMATE CHANGE:**

    **A SCENARIO FOR THE US NAVY**

# ***Preface***

The United States Arctic Research Commission has asked a panel of
experts to contribute their informed views of the changes to be expected
in the Arctic Ocean in the mid to late Twenty First Century. The
following is an edited compilation of these views produced to assist the
Navy in considering the effects of climate change on their operations in
and around the Arctic Ocean. Predictions are among the most hazardous
activities scientists can undertake. Neither the individual contributors
to this paper nor the Arctic Research Commission are prepared to assert
that the scenarios discussed here are in any way guaranteed. On the
other hand, they represent the honest expectations of the expert
scientific community.

# ***Summary***

-   The climate of the Arctic responds to short term variations on a
    roughly decadal scale known as the Arctic Oscillation (AO) and the
    North Atlantic Oscillation (NAO) which are closely coupled and may
    be features of the same phenomena observed in different regions.
    These decade long oscillations will continue to add variability to
    Arctic climate.

-   Model studies indicate that temperatures in the Arctic region will
    increase by mid-century with summer temperature (Jun-Aug) increasing
    by 1-2 deg. C, autumn (Sep-Nov) by 7-8 deg. C, winter (Dec-Feb) by
    8-9 deg. C and spring (Mar-May) by about 5 deg. C. Variations
    between model predictions are of the order of 1-2 deg. C in summer
    and 5-6 deg. C in winter.

-   In the winter the entire Arctic Basin will be ice covered. Model
    studies suggest that summer ice extent will decrease by roughly 30%
    and ice volume by roughly 40%. A conservative consideration of model
    results suggests summer ice extent will decrease by only 15% and
    that ice volume will decrease by 40% leading to an increase in the
    relative abundance of thin, first-year ice.

-   The Sea of Okhotsk and the Sea of Japan will remain ice-free
    throughout the year. The Russian coast and the Canadian Archipelago
    will be ice-free and open to navigation by non-ice-strengthened
    ships in summer.

-   In the atmosphere, the Arctic boundary layer will be warmer and
    wetter. Cloudiness will increase, extending the summer cloudy regime
    into earlier onset and later decline. The likelihood of freezing
    mist and drizzle will increase as a result.

-   Polar low-pressure systems will become more common and boundary
    layer forced convection will increase mixed phase (ice water)
    precipitation. Vessel and aircraft icing will be more common.

-   Arctic warming will affect permafrost. The active (seasonally
    melted) layer will thicken and permafrost extent in the
    discontinuous permafrost region (along the borders of permafrost
    stability) will decrease. The inner and outer boundaries of the
    discontinuous zone will move to the North.

-   Changes in timing and composition of river runoff will affect
    surface seawater. Increased sediment loads in spring runoff will
    spread out at sea affecting optical transparency.

-   Soils will be drier and more susceptible to tundra fires. Local
    optical properties may change affecting energy balances and local
    weather.

-   Declines in traffic on the Northern Sea Route (NSR) may continue in
    concert with Russian economic difficulties. But climate induced
    increases in trafficability in the NSR may cause increased use for
    Atlantic-Pacific transportation.

-   Both Russia and Canada assert policies holding navigable straits in
    the NSR and the Northwest Passage under their exclusive control. The
    US differs in their interpretation of the status of these straits.
    As these routes become more available for international traffic,
    conflicts are likely to arise.

-   Ships which can expect contact with even minor abundance of sea ice
    require increases in stiffeners and plate thickness in the affected
    region. Underwater installations including propellers, rudders, fin
    stabilizers, sea chests and especially thin skinned sonar
    installations must be redesigned for Arctic operations.

-   Icing of ships and aircraft will require accommodation in
    ship/aircraft design and operation. Weapons systems will also be
    affected by icing conditions.

-   Sonar operations in the Arctic will experience increased ambient
    noise levels and the surface duct will be diminished or lost. Ice
    keels will be shallower and less abundant and the area in which they
    can be expected to occur will be reduced. Active sonar detection of
    submarines will become more feasible.

-   Russian economic levels have resulted in the reduction of the
    Russian Arctic's European population. Operation of the expensive and
    difficult logistics pipeline to Arctic communities may be further
    reduced leading to a return to subsistence living by native
    populations.

-   The Russian Arctic is a storehouse of natural resources. Changing
    climate may spur an increase in exploitation of energy, mineral and
    forest resources, especially by or for the benefit of resource poor
    Asian nations.

-   The response of marine resources to changing climate is very
    difficult to predict but northward migrations are likely. In
    particular, northward movement of Bering Sea species into the
    Beaufort/Chukchi Sea region north of Bering Strait is likely.
    Climate warming is likely to bring extensive fishing activity to the
    Arctic, particularly in the Barents Sea and Beaufort/Chukchi region
    where commercial operations have been minimal in the past. In
    addition, Bering Sea fishing opportunities will increase as sea ice
    cover begins later and ends sooner in the year.

-   Ecological disruption due to climate induced separation of essential
    habitats can be expected with particular effects on marine mammal
    populations.

-   The exploration, development, production and transportation of
    petroleum in the Arctic will expand with or without climate change
    as prices continue to rise due to the decreasing rate of discovery
    of reserves elsewhere. Climate warming and reduction in ice cover
    will facilitate and perhaps accelerate the process.

    **I. *Modeling recent and future changes in the Arctic Ocean
    environment***

Understanding of global and regional components of the earth's physical
environment and its short-to-long term variability is one of the main
requirements for realistic forecasts of weather and climate. Both global
climate models and recent observations suggest that the Arctic Ocean is
the region where an amplified response to global climate change might be
taking place. In addition, changes in the Arctic Ocean and sea ice
circulation are important to dispersion of nuclear contamination,
biological productivity, and navigational forecasts.

Some models predict that the Arctic ice will significantly reduce in
area and volume or possibly disappear during summer months as a result
of increased greenhouse gases. The sea-ice albedo feedback is used to
explain such a scenario. It implies that at warmer temperatures there
will be less sea ice in the Arctic, which will allow an increased
absorption of solar radiation due to decreased albedo, which will result
in even warmer temperatures, and so on. The only immediate stabilizing
effect (or negative feedback) comes from more rapid radiative cooling of
the sea ice surface at warmer temperatures. On the other hand, other
stabilizing effects are possible over longer times. For example, warmer
air temperatures may lead to enhanced hydrological cycle and greater
moisture convergence into the Arctic Ocean providing increased
stratification in the upper ocean. Melting of large amounts of sea ice
must also lead to dramatic increases in the fresh water flux out from
the Arctic Ocean. The Great Salinity Anomaly of the late 1960s and 1970s
is a good example of such an extreme event. An excess of fresh water
exported from the Arctic into the Nordic and Labrador seas can alter or
stop convection there, thus strongly affecting the formation of North
Atlantic Deep Water and the global thermohaline circulation. A favorable
scenario of Arctic climate change is one with a shorter-term (years to
decades) natural variability superimposed on the long term warming trend
due to greenhouse gas and other human-related emissions. Such a scenario
is at least partly in agreement with time series of the Arctic
Oscillation (AO) and the North Atlantic Oscillation (NAO), which are
often used as indices of Arctic climate variability.

Over the last few decades, general circulation models (GCMs) have made
significant advancements in representation of physical processes
determining oceanic regimes and their variability and in use of modern
high performance computers to solve complex oceanographic problems.
Regional models of the Arctic Ocean have increased their spatial
resolution by an order of magnitude, from the order of 100 km to 10 km,
during the last decade. As a result, many important (and commonly
neglected) small-scale bathymetric and geographic features have been
included in such models. This allows more realistic representation of
circulation and water mass and properties exchanges within the Arctic
Ocean and its interactions with the global ocean. High model resolution
also allows to better address new tactical requirements of operational
ice prediction models, such as ice edge position, lead orientation, and
sea ice thickness and concentration.

Improved regional models can successfully simulate recent regime shift
in the sea ice and ocean circulation between the 1970s / 1980s and the
early 1990s. Model results are in qualitative agreement with
hydrographic measurements (suggesting recent changes) from the SCICEX
submarine cruises and from icebreaker expeditions in the early 1990s.
One of the conclusions from those models is that changes in the sea ice
and ocean circulation and properties are at least partly in response to
larger scale variability in the Northern Hemisphere weather patterns,
such as AO or NAO. The shelf circulation and shelf-basin communication
changes significantly between different regimes. The large scale drift
of sea ice and its properties as well as the fresh water export from the
Russian shelves and the Atlantic Water circulation within the Eurasian
and Canadian Basins change in the early 1990s. Largest changes
associated with this shift take place in the Eurasian and Makarov
basins, over the Chukchi/Beaufort shelves and slopes and in the Canadian
Archipelago. Information about spatial distribution of recent changes is
crucial as it provides guidance for future field campaigns and potential
future tactical operations, not available otherwise. Results from both
observations and models indicate that a continuation of large scale
measurements including repeated basin-wide hydrographic transects and
focused process studies in the above mentioned regions should be of
highest priority. This would allow evaluation of what may be an inherent
cyclicity in Arctic climate and understanding and possibly more reliable
predictions of future climate change in the Arctic Ocean.

**II. *Climate Model Projections for the Mid-21st-Century Arctic***

The global climate models used by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) project a stronger warming over the Arctic Ocean than over
any other area of the Northern Hemisphere. However, the Arctic warming
is highly seasonal, and it varies widely among the nine models used by
the IPCC. Relative to the 1961-1990 baseline climatology, the central
Arctic Ocean is projected to be warmer in the 2030-2060 period by 1-2
deg. C in summer (Jun-Aug), by 7-8 deg. C in autumn (Sep-Nov), by 8-9
deg. C in winter, and by approximately 5 deg. C in spring (Mar-May). The
across-model standard deviation of the projected warming is nearly as
large as the warming itself, ranging from 1-2 deg. C in the summer
months to 5-6 deg. C in the winter months. The spatial pattern of
warming over the subpolar seas and the Arctic Ocean is closely tied to
the retreat of sea ice. Adjacent land areas are projected to warm more
than the ocean areas in summer, but less than the ocean areas in winter.

Projected annual mean precipitation rates for 2030-2060 are generally
higher than at present by about 1 cm per month, although the changes
tend to be smaller in summer and larger in autumn. While there is a
tendency for the largest precipitation changes to occur over the
subArctic (50 deg.-70 deg. N), the spatial pattern of the projected
change in precipitation is noisier than the pattern of temperature
changes. The model-to-model scatter of precipitation change is even
greater than the scatter of the temperature changes. Changes in
evapotranspiration have yet to be evaluated.

Sea level pressure is projected to decrease by 1-2 mb over much of the
Arctic. The largest projected decreases of pressure are in autumn and
winter, and on the Eurasian side of the Arctic Ocean. While lower mean
pressures may imply more cyclone activity, there has not yet been a
systematic evaluation of daily model output to determine whether
synoptic (i.e., storm) activity shows a significant increase in the
climate scenarios. To our knowledge, there have been no evaluations of
changes in cloudiness and radiative fluxes over the Arctic in the
climate projections of global models.

**Observed Climate Change in the Arctic:** Records for 1961-1990 over
the central Arctic Ocean, collected as part of the Russian \"North
Pole\" drifting station program, show statistically-significant
increases in temperature of 0.89 deg. C and 0.43 deg. C per decade for
May and June, respectively. Temperature increases during this period are
also significant for summer as a whole. A different analysis for the
period 1979-1997, based on a combination of temperature data from the
North Pole program, drifting buoys and land stations, reveals
statistically significant trends over most of the Arctic Ocean in
spring, locally exceeding 2.5 deg. C per decade. This is consistent with
indications based on satellite passive microwave records of an earlier
onset of spring melt over the sea ice cover and is likely also related
to reductions in sea ice extent of about 3% per decade since 1979 as
assessed from satellite records.

Temperature trends over the Arctic Ocean are broadly consistent those
over land. Land records show pronounced warming from about 1970 onwards
(mostly in winter and spring), over Siberia and Northwestern North
America. The general pattern of warming is partly compensated by cooling
trends over eastern Canada and the northern North Atlantic. It is
important to note that in terms of 55-85 deg. N zonal averages,
temperatures around 1970 were below average. Hence, what we\'ve really
seen is (in part) a recovery from anomalously cold conditions. It also
appears that from 1920-1940, Arctic temperatures rose even more sharply
than in the past several decades. On the other hand, the paleo-climate
records suggests that today\'s Arctic temperatures are the highest of at
least the past 400 years, possibly longer.

Since 1900, there has been a general increase in precipitation for the
55-85 deg. N latitude band, largest during autumn and winter. There have
been pronounced recent increases in the past 40 years over northern
Canada. Changes over the Arctic Ocean are unknown due to the paucity of
data.

The general pattern of recent Arctic temperature change and (at least to
some extent) changes in precipitation appear to be related to shifts in
the large-scale atmospheric circulation, reflected in generally positive
modes of the Arctic Oscillation (AO) and North Atlantic Oscillation
(NAO). Changes in the AO and NAO are also reflected in observed
decreases on sea level pressure over the central Arctic, as well as a
tendency for more frequent high-latitude cyclone activity. Recent
modeling experiments indicate that anthropogenic forcing may modulate
the intensity and frequency of modes of variability such as the AO and
NAO.

In summary, observed changes in temperature, precipitation and
atmospheric circulation are broadly in accord with climate model
projections. However, attribution of change is complicated by the wide
scatter between projections from different models.

**III. *A Scenario for Arctic Ocean Sea Ice in the Year 2050***

Predicting the future climate is risky. Climate is known to be variable
on \"all time scales.\" Trends that appear for, say, a decade may or may
not persist into the next decade. Climate models make predictions based
on an insufficient representation of important physics and chemistry.
With this disclaimer, we construct a scenario for Arctic Ocean ice
conditions in the year 2050. Our approach is this. We examined the
changes predicted by four reputable global climate models. We compare
these with extrapolated trends that have been observed over the last
several decades. We then suggest a conservative interpretation of both
types of evidence for what to expect by 2050. For both models and
observations, we deal with end-of-summer minimal extent, volume and
thickness which have decreased more than winter maximums.

**Model evidence:** Four global climate models predict reductions in ice
extent and thickness in the Arctic. The models all show a continually
decreasing ice cover. A middle-of-the-road estimate from models is that
by 2050, ice extent will be down about 30% (to 3.5 million sq. km).

Models also predict a declining ice volume. A moderate model estimate is
that by 2050, ice volume will decrease some 40% to 5400 cubic km. Models
are not fully credible. When run to \"predict\" past observations,
different models show different biases, so their projections into the
future are of uncertain validity. But they all predict a diminishing ice
cover.

The 4-model average decrease by 2050 is 30% in summer minimum ice extent
and 40% in summer minimum ice volume.

**Observational evidence:** The 100-year historical record from ships
and settlements going back to 1900 shows a decline in ice extent
starting about 1950 and falling below pre-1950 minima after about 1975.
This decline is better documented by satellites during the last 20
years. The rate of decline is about 3% per decade.

The record of submarine ice draft data shows that the ice draft at the
end of summer has declined by about 40% over a time interval of about
thirty-five years, or about 11% per decade. There are few data from the
intervening years, so it is difficult to assess \"normal\" climatic
variability, even over the 35 years of submarine data, much less over a
longer period.

**Future scenario:** A conservative scenario is that by 2050 the
observed trend will reduce summer minimum ice extent by 15%; this is an
extrapolation of the satellite observations which are quite reliable and
are not contradicted by climate model forecasts. For volume and
thickness, a conservative estimate is obtained by extrapolating model
forecasts that are not contradicted by sparse observations. By 2050, the
end-of-summer volume can be expected to be down by about 40%, of which
about 15% would be due to decreased extent and the remaining 25% would
be seen in an end-of-summer thickness reduced by 25% to about 1.5 m.

What does this mean in terms of various regions of the Arctic? During
winter, the central Arctic and all peripheral seas including the
Greenland Sea, Bering Sea, and Gulf of St. Lawrence will continue to
have significant ice cover. Extent and, in most areas, ice thickness
will be reduced. The Sea of Okhotsk and Sea of Japan will be ice-free
for the entire year. In late summer, the entire Russian coast will be
ice-free, allowing navigation through the Barents, Kara, Laptev and East
Siberian Seas along the entire Northern Sea Route. The Northwest Passage
through the Canadian Archipelago and along the coast of Alaska will be
ice-free and navigable every summer by non-icebreaking ships. Ice will
be present all year along the eastern and northern coasts of Greenland.
Ice will also remain throughout the summer within and adjacent to the
northern Canadian Archipelago. Significant ice will remain in the
central Arctic Ocean, though the mean thickness will be about 1.5 m, and
it will be less compact.

**IV. *Changes in Weather Patterns in the Arctic under Assumed Global
Warming***

Recent scenarios of climate change in the Arctic produced by
state-of-the-art global climate mod­els (GCMs) suggest that the
Arctic/sub-Arctic will see substantial warming over the current state.
The cold season in particular in many models sees a 6-8 deg. C warming
over the ocean, with a less dramatic change in terrestrial regions.
Associated with many of these is the prediction of an ice-free or nearly
ice-free ocean state, at least seasonally if not throughout the entire
year. It is certainly plausible that the marginal ice zone will migrate
considerably poleward throughout the year in a warmer climate.

A discussion of how weather (vs. the cumulative effects of weather we
call climate) is difficult to predict based on a broadly defined
seasonal mean state. That being the case, it *is* possible to spec­ulate
on how weather as currently understood might be impacted by changes in a
background "mean" state. Given the nature of Naval operations, this
discussion will focus on marine weather.

A more ice-free ocean and/or longer ice-free season would clearly lead
to much greater latent and sensible surface heat fluxes into the Arctic
boundary layer (BL). A warmer and moister BL would most likely produce
greater BL cloudiness, perhaps extending the current observed summer
cloud fractional coverage maximum on both ends of the warm season. This
would result in poorer sur­face visibility for a greater portion of the
year, and in the winter could also increase the likelihood of freezing
mist and drizzle

Since the temperature of the continental Arctic away from the coastal
regions will continue to be modulated largely by radiative energy loss
(assuming that seasonal snow cover still pertains), the temperature
differences between land and ocean will likely be more pronounced,
creating more localized baroclinicity to the coastal regions in the cold
season. Given the ingredients of greater baroclinicity, a BL environment
with significantly enriched latent energy, and the strong planetary
vorticity implicit in the high latitude setting, it seems reasonable for
Arctic cyclogenesis of so-called polar lows to be more common than
currently observed during much of the year.

BL-forced convection would be more likely with these systems, much of it
being from mixed-phase clouds, particularly in the warm sector with
higher precipitation rates and more localized precipitation. Vessel
icing could be a prime concern, especially in the vicinity of cold
Arctic conti­nental air masses where over-running is likely to occur.
With the likelihood of more mixed-phase precipitation through a much
greater portion of the year, the threat of aircraft icing would also be
greatly enhanced.

Under the ice-free ocean scenario, the equator-to-pole temperature
gradient will be diminished over current values perhaps weakening the
magnitude of the polar jet. However, as stated above, the increased
heterogeneity of surface heating in the lower troposphere may act as
more of an "anchor" to the long wave pattern producing preferred regions
of cyclonic storm activity and cyclogenesis.

Finally, the current tendency of poleward-propagating extratropical
cyclones to decay in cooler subArctic waters (for example as currently
happens in the Aleutians/Bering Sea and the "coffin corner" of the Gulf
of Alaska near Yakutat) might be diminished, causing stronger and more
fre­quent activity in the subArctic coastal margins.

**V. *The Response of Arctic Hydrological Processes to a Changing
Climate***

The effects of a warming climate on the terrestrial regions of the
Arctic are already apparent; some subsequent impacts to the hydrologic
system are also evident. It is expected that the effects and
consequences of a warming climate will become even more pronounced
within the next 10 to 50 years, at first primarily through atmospheric
and near-surface processes and later through geomorphological evolution
and hydrological responses to permafrost degradation. These changes will
affect the Naval Mission in the Arctic Basin through impacts on regional
weather, oceanic circulation patterns, salinity and temperature
gradients, sea ice formation, and water properties. It is difficult to
quantify the long-term effects of a changing climate, but it is possible
to envision many of the changes that we should expect.

The broadest impacts to the terrestrial Arctic regions will result
through consequent effects of changing permafrost structure and extent.
As the climate differentially warms in summer and winter, the permafrost
will become warmer, and the active layer (the layer of soil above the
permafrost that annually experiences freeze and thaw) will become
thicker. These simple structural changes will affect every aspect of the
surface water and energy balances. As the active layer thickens, there
is greater storage capacity for soil moisture, and greater lags and
decays are introduced into the hydrologic response times to summer
precipitation events. When the frozen ground is very close to the
surface, the stream and river discharge peaks are higher and the
baseflow (low discharge rates that occur in rivers between storms or in
winter) is lower. As the active layer thickens and the moisture storage
capacity increases, the lag time of runoff also increases. This has
significant impacts on large and small scales. The timing of stream
runoff will change, reducing the percentage of continental runoff
released during the summer and increasing the proportion of winter
runoff. This is already becoming evident in Siberian Rivers. As
permafrost becomes thinner and is reduced in spatial extent, the
proportions of groundwater in stream runoff will increase as the
proportion of surface runoff decreases increasing river alkalinity and
electrical conductivity. This could impact mixing of fresh and saline
waters, formation of the halocline, and seawater chemistry.

Other important impacts will occur due to changing basin geomorphology.
Currently the drainage networks in Arctic watersheds are quite immature
as compared to the more well-developed stream networks of temperate
regions. These stream channels are essentially frozen in place because
the major flood events (predominantly snowmelt) occur when the soils and
streambeds are frozen solid. As the active layer becomes thicker, there
will be significantly increased sediment loads delivered to the ocean.
Presently, the winter ice cover on the smaller rivers and streams
(\<\~10,000 km^2^) are completely frozen from the bed to the surface
when spring melt is initiated. However, in lower sections of the rivers
there are places where the channel is deep enough to prevent complete
winter freezing. Break-up of the rivers differs dramatically in these
places where the ice is not frozen fast to the bottom. Huge ice chunks
are lifted by the flowing water, chewing up channels bottoms and sides
and introducing massive sediments to the spring runoff. Such increased
sediment loads may affect coastal water properties with consequent
impacts on sound transmission, estuary productivity, contaminant
transport, and a host of other marine processes.

As the air temperatures become higher, the active layer becomes thicker.
Even if precipitation increases, we have reason to believe the surface
soils will become drier. The Arctic is described in many basic geography
textbooks as a desert due to the low precipitation rates; however, it is
a desert that frequently looks like a bog as the ice-rich permafrost
near the surface prevents infiltration of surface soil moisture to
deeper groundwater. If the active layer thickens to the point where a
talik (an unfrozen layer above the permafrost, but below the seasonally
frozen soil) forms, then soils may drain internally throughout the
winter leaving the surface significantly drier. As the surface soils
dry, the feedbacks to local and regional climate will change
dramatically, with particular emphasis upon sensible and latent heat
flux. Drier soils will also influence the rate and intensity of tundra
fires, providing more positive feedback mechanisms by creating darker
surfaces that absorb more solar radiation and through releasing large
quantities of carbon from peat soils. This may impact recycling of
precipitation, military capabilities to predict weather and may indeed
increase variability of many processes and variables, including
convective storms.

These changes in the hydrological regime should improve productivity of
terrestrial aquatic and marine ecosystems. Increases in winter baseflow
will markedly improve winter habitat in streams and rivers for
freshwater and anadromous fishes. There is a possibility that these
rivers could eventually support commercial fishing industries. There are
numerous economic and natural barriers constraining potential marine
industrial development, however if the sea ice degradation does allow
civilian vessels to work in the Arctic Ocean during at least the summer
months, then we should expect a fishing industry will develop. As
pressure on fishing resources continues to intensify throughout the
North Pacific and North Atlantic, the fishing industry may indeed "push
these limits" and attempt to establish market influence sooner than
natural conditions permit. Consequently, Naval and Coast Guard rescues
of vessels trapped in sea ice may become routine long before sea ice
degradation allows extensive civil transport of the Arctic Ocean.

**VI.** ***Arctic Environmental Change and the Northern Sea Route***

Recent Arctic environmental changes, in particular changes in the area
and thickness of sea ice, can fundamentally impact Arctic marine
transportation. Longer melt seasons, thinning ice covers, and reductions
in multiyear ice have key operational implications (for example, greater
access and longer navigation seasons) for shipping around the Arctic
basin. Notably the Northeast Passage, or the Northern Sea Route (NSR)
from a more formal Russian perspective, across the north of Eurasia has
experienced reductions in the sea ice cover. In addition, the
administration, regulation and overall operation of Russia's NSR have
undergone considerable changes during the past decade following the end
of the Soviet Union. The combination of regional environmental change
and new management of the NSR and Russia's Arctic fleet pose potential
implications for the United States and naval operations.

The end of the USSR has brought great change to all aspects of the NSR.
Total cargo tonnage along the NSR has been reduced to less than 2.0
million tons, less than a third of what it reached during the heyday of
the Soviet Union. This reduction in cargo and ship traffic is primarily
a consequence of changes in the industrial complex at Noril'sk. However,
year-round marine operations across the Kara Sea to Dudinka (port city
for Noril'sk) were maintained throughout the 1990\'s. This was
accomplished using the capable, but aging icebreaker fleet (nuclear and
non-nuclear) of Murmansk Shipping Company (MSC). In November 1998
controlling interest in MSC was acquired by the Russian oil company,
Lukoil; fresh capital from Lukoil has allowed the recent buildup of a
domestic Arctic tanker fleet. Comprehensive and official regulations for
navigation along the NSR remain in effect; navigation control, mandatory
pilotage, mandatory icebreaker escort (in Vilkitskiy, Dmitry Laptev,
Sannikov and Shokalskiy straits) and rules for escort represent a
considerable effort to control domestic and foreign shipping along the
NSR. Recent papers have highlighted the continued differences between
the US and Russia concerning the NSR. The US continues to assert that
the ice-covered straits of the NSR are international and subject to the
right of transit passage; Russia continues to claim the straits as
internal waters. This is likely to remain a contentious political issue
between the US and Russia despite future access to the Russian Arctic
under more favorable climatic conditions.

A comprehensive study of the NSR - the International Northern Sea Route
Programme (INSROP) - was conducted during 1993-99 and funded primarily
by Norwegian and Japanese interests. Three principal partners were
involved: the Ship & Ocean Foundation (Tokyo), the Central Marine and
Design Institute (St. Petersburg), and the Fridtijof Nansen Institute
(Oslo), the key coordinator. The project produced 167 peer-reviewed
working/technical papers (involving 318 researchers at 50 institutions
in 10 countries; a handful of US researchers participated) and a
comprehensive reference volume. Significant Russian information on the
NSR environment, Arctic ship technology, legal positions, commercial
shipping, navigation regulations, and regional (Russian Arctic)
economies is now available outside Russia within the INSROP reports. The
proceedings of an INSROP summary conference held in Oslo 18-20 November
1999 (The Northern Sea Route User Conference) have now been published.
Included are several conclusions drawn from the conference and overall
INSROP effort: the NSR's technological and environmental challenges are
no longer absolute obstacles to commercial shipping; the EU and oil/gas
interests are conducting pilot studies for Arctic marine routes between
the Kara Sea and Europe; Russia needs to better accommodate the concerns
and requirements of international shipping (NSR tariffs require
considerable adjustment); and, the NSR's physical and operational
infrastructure must be further developed to attract increased commercial
use. Discussed during the workshop were the impacts of future reductions
of sea ice along the NSR on extending the navigation seasons and future
requirements for icebreaker support. One significant question remains
unresolved: will future Arctic commercial ships navigate along the NSR
independently (without icebreaker support) if ice conditions continue to
improve?

Recent evidence from satellite observations confirms that the areal
extent of Arctic sea ice has decreased approximately 3% per decade. The
largest decrease derived from historical records has been recorded for
summer since 1950, a key observation for seasonal shipping along the NSR
and other Arctic marginal seas. The Siberian Arctic has experienced sea
ice reductions during the last decades of the twentieth century.
Parkinson has shown regional sea ice reductions in the NSR area for
1978-1996: a 17.6 % decrease per decade in summer for the Barents and
Kara seas, and a 3.7% decrease per decade for a large Arctic Ocean area
including the Chukchi, East Siberian and Laptev seas. Record summer sea
ice reductions in the Russian Arctic for 1990, 1993 and 1995 have also
been identified; a record sea ice retreat was observed in 1998 for the
Beaufort and Chukchi seas. The area of winter fast ice in the Russian
Arctic (Kara Gate to Long Strait) decreased by 11.3% for 1975-93 and
there have been reductions in total and old ice areas in the East
Siberian Sea during 1972-94. Johannessen has observed a 14% decrease in
winter multiyear ice in the central Arctic Ocean for 1978-98 and
Rothrock has calculated ice thickness reductions (40%) from submarine
data across the Arctic Ocean. These significant transformations and the
regional trends noted for the Siberian Arctic, if continued, portend
improved conditions for Arctic navigation along the NSR.

Several implications for the US/USN are apparent with regard to the
changing nature of Russia's Northern Sea Route:

-   Potential greater marine access along the Russian Arctic coast for
    domestic and international commercial shipping;

-   Continued US and Russian differences in the application of the LOS
    to the Arctic and NSR;

-   Closer collaboration between the EU and Russia in development of
    Western Siberia by oil/gas interests and use of the NSR as a
    regional marine route (between the Kara Sea and Europe);

-   Potential use of the NSR for through transit (Atlantic to Pacific
    and return) of hazardous wastes and other sensitive cargoes;

-   Lukoil's dominant position as owner of both icebreakers and Arctic
    tankers, and the exclusion of other domestic & foreign competitors
    (for example Finnish tankers);

-   The continued exclusion of US research ships from operating in the
    Russian Arctic for collaborative science.

    **VII. *Surface Ship Design Requirements for Arctic Operations***

Background: The U. S. Navy has not recently designed surface ships,
other than ice breakers, to operate in the Arctic. The problems of ice
damage and topside icing when surface ships were operated in high
latitudes were handled on an [ad]{.underline} [hoc]{.underline} basis.
From time to time during the design of a new class of surface ships, the
issue of ice hardening has arisen. One example was during the design of
the [Perry]{.underline} (DDG-7) class guided missile frigates. While
high latitude operations were envisioned, these ships were heavily cost
constrained and the ice hardening characteristic was dropped from
consideration during cost tradeoffs.

The Navy and Coast Guard, however, have designed icebreakers, as have
commercial interests. Other commercial ships have been designed for ice
hardening. Most major classification societies who govern the details of
commercial ship hull design have established rules for the design of
ship hulls for operations in ice. The American Bureau of Shipping (ABS)
would be the relevant classification society for U. S. ship design.

The ABS rules for design and construction of ships for "navigation in
ice" have evolved over a period of many years and are part of a
multi-volume set entitled [Rules for Building and Classing Steel
Vessels]{.underline}. This document could provide the basis for design
of a warship that was to "navigate in ice".

There is provision to tailor the hardening of the design to operate in
"multi-year" or "first year" ice, in company with an ice breaker or
independently, in what thickness of ice, and in the area of ice cover it
might be expected to encounter.

**Assumptions:** The likely operation of surface warships in the Arctic
considering the effects of climate change could be in an area of "first
year" open ice, less than one meter thick, covering no more than 60% of
the total area of operations.

**Discussion:** With the above assumptions, ABS Rules require
strengthening of the bow and stern areas. Since current surface ships
have not considered strengthening for ice operations, Future designers
must carefully analyze the ABS Rules in selecting plating and stiffener
configuration in the bow and stern areas. Of course, independent finite
element analysis, taking into account the dynamic and static loads
caused by encountering the ice, can also provide the designer with the
structural design configuration.

Bow mounted sonar domes and arrays in particular would require careful
attention. Propellers, rudders, fin stabilizers, and sea chests are also
affected by ice operation. The effect of topside icing and a provision
to de-ice must also be considered. While straightforward in a new
design, modifications of existing ships could be a costly process

**VIII. *CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE ARCTIC: Effects on Sonar Performance***

Background: Recent reports indicate a dramatic decrease, over the past
several years, in sea ice thickness and extent in the Arctic. If this
trend continues, significant areas of the Arctic Ocean may become
permanently ice-free in the future. The entire area may become
seasonally ice-free. The presence of sea ice has great impact on Naval
operations. In particular, it affects the performance of sonars, and it
makes the region a parochial submarine operating area.

**Discussion -** The present situation: Near-surface sound propagation
paths in the central Arctic are typically upward refracted, due to a
positive sound velocity gradient; such upward refraction traps acoustic
energy near the surface, and results in abnormally low long-range
propagation losses at low frequencies (below 50 Hz.) The presence of ice
cover causes the sound propagation to be dispersive; higher frequencies
suffer greater losses due to multiple reflections off the rough under
side of the ice.

-   Ambient noise in the Arctic can be extremely low (lower than sea
    state zero) in the central Arctic under solid ice cover; or
    extremely high in marginal ice zones, where the noise of collisions
    from moving ice can exceed that of wave noise in the open sea.

-   Ice keels, created as sea ice is compacted by wind and currents,
    present large acoustic reflectors to active sonars; they can easily
    equal or exceed the acoustic target strength of a large submarine.

-   The geographic proximity of the Arctic Ocean to North America,
    Europe, and Asia makes it a particularly attractive area for the
    stationing of strategic (ballistic missile) submarines. Transiting
    submarines may be detected at long range by surveillance sensors,
    but the ice canopy makes deployment of surveillance systems costly
    and difficult. Stationary submarines can take refuge near the ice,
    where they are virtually undetectable and invulnerable to attack; or
    in the marginal ice zones, where environmental noise masks their
    presence.

-   Operation of submarines in shallow ice-covered seas is especially
    difficult and hazardous due to the need for the submarine to operate
    close to the ice where ice keels present collision hazards. Active
    sonar must be used continuously in such environments (contrary to
    the instincts of submariners) in order to assess ice hazards ahead
    of the ship. ASW operations, concurrent to a shallow under-ice
    transit, are impossible as the ship is fully engaged in navigating
    the ice hazards.

**Probable changes due to climate change:** Melting of Arctic sea ice
will expose the sea surface to winds, which will significantly change
both ambient noise and acoustic propagation. Wind-generated waves will
make ambient noise in the central Arctic more typical of temperate
oceans (i.e., increase). Wind-generated mixing of near surface water,
combined with warmer air temperatures, will diminish or eliminate the
surface duct, increasing low frequency propagation loss.

Disappearance of the ice canopy will also eliminate the haven now
provided to stationary submarines by ice keels. Active sonar detection
of submarines, both by ASW sonars and by acoustic torpedoes, will become
feasible.

In summary, melting of sea ice in the Arctic will turn it into a
conventional open-ocean ASW environment, with none of the advantages it
now affords to an adversary strategic submarine.

In spite of the increased vulnerability to a strategic submarine
positioned in the Arctic, because of its geographic location it will
still be a prime location for stationing such forces. And, perhaps
significantly, absence of sea ice will render the ocean both accessible
to and a viable operating area for any submarine force B ice
strengthened or not; nuclear or conventional.

**IX. *Socio-economic Change in the Arctic ***

As climate changes in the Arctic, socio-economic conditions will change
as well. Additional changes are also imposed by factors external to
climate change. The diminution of summer ice cover will permit a more
active use of the Northern Sea Route (see above). On the other hand,
recent population trends in the Russian Arctic indicate that a rapid
decline in the population of European Russians is underway now and that
the demand for the logistics pipeline provided to communities in the
Russian Arctic by the NSR may decline. On the other hand, the Russian
Arctic is a resource rich region and continued and expanding
exploitation of energy, mineral and forest resources may be expected. In
particular the interests of China and Japan in the abundant resources of
the Russian Far East appear to be kindling renewed interest in the
region in these countries. Russia has recently commenced the
construction of a fleet of eleven ice capable tankers for oil transport
in the Arctic.

A further consequence of changes in summer ice extent as well as changes
in the oceanography of the region will be changes in fisheries. Already,
commercial species are recording sightings well north of their usual
ranges. Salmon have been seen in rivers near Barrow, AK, well north of
their normal range. Marine mammals will respond to these changes as
well. Walrus require the opportunity to haul out on ice floes near their
feeding grounds. As the ice edge retreats walrus populations will be
required to adapt new strategies for calving and feeding.

Among indigenous people in Alaska approximately 50% of the calories
consumed come from "country" foods. The seal, walrus, whale and fish
components of the subsistence harvest will change as the climate changes
(as will the terrestrial component of wildfowl, caribou and moose).
These changes may be accompanied by the growth of commercial harvesting
in the region by fishing vessels from farther south. In the Russian
Arctic, subsistence hunting and fishing at sea may well expand due to
the retreat of the European population and the consequent reduction in
the supply both of food staples and of the cash economy necessary for
the purchase of imported food.

In addition to changes at sea, climate change will affect marine
infrastructure in the coastal zone. Permafrost degradation, increases in
sea level (due to thermal expansion as deep water warms and to the
melting of Arctic and Antarctic glaciers) changes in river flood
patterns and timing can be expected to have negative effects on port
structures such as docks, bulkheads, cargo handling facilities, airports
and roads in the Arctic. If resource exploitation in the Russian Arctic
increases, greater demands for sea lift may occur as new and replacement
facilities are required for resource acquisition, processing and
transportation.

In addition to these potential changes, the search for and development
of offshore petroleum resources is bound to come to the Arctic. Climate
warming can only accelerate the process. The petroleum industry is
already moving into deeper water in other regions. A decrease in the
problems associated with drilling and producing oil offshore as sea ice
extent and thickness diminishes will expand exploration and production
opportunities in the Arctic. Plans are already being made for offshore
drilling for oil in the US Arctic. The Russian and Canadian sectors are
also strong potential sites for offshore development. These developments
will bring seismic exploration ships, mobile drilling platforms of
various types and offshore supply vessels into the region with the
concomitant development of shore-based facilities.

**X. *Acknowledgements***

The following experts contributed their time and effort to the
production of this review: Mr. Robert Anderson, University of Hawaii;
Dr. Garrett Brass, USARC; Dr. Lawson Brigham, USCG, Ret.; Dr. Larry
Hinzman, University of Alaska; RAdm Malcolm MacKinnon, USN Ret.; Dr
Wieslaw Maslowski, Naval Post Graduate School; Dr. Peter Olsson,
University of Alaska; Dr. Drew Rothrock, APL, University of Washington;
Dr. Mark Serreze, University of Colorado; Mr. Walter Tucker, U.S. Army
Cold Regions Research and Engineering Laboratory; Dr. John Walsh,
University of Illinois

####### APPENDIX B

## OPERATIONAL PERSPECTIVE -- VIGNETTES

# Freedom of Navigation (Right of Transit Passage): Northern Sea Route dispute between Russia and the U.S escalates. The legal status of the NSR has long been one of the most contentious political issues in US--Soviet/Russian Arctic relations. The USA claims the ice-covered straits of the route to be *international* and subject to the right of *transit passage*, while Russia claims them as *internal waters* under several lines of argument, including historic waters, closed by straight baselines. Russia asserts policies holding navigable straits in the NSR under their exclusive control. Although icebreaker escorts are no longer required, Russia charges a tariff for passage. European shipping companies lobby the EU to adopt a policy that accepts the tariffs, which are competitive with the Suez and Panama Canals for Pacific/Atlantic transit. The U.S. does not want the EU to set a precedent. The USN decides to conduct a FONOP (Freedom of Navigation Operation) through the NSR and sends a SAG consisting of one DDG, one DD, and one FFG to enter the NSR from the west. An LA Class SSN is also assigned to rendezvous with the SAG northeast of Iceland and conducts a submerged NSR transit in support of the SAG.

# Battle Group Transit of Northwest Passage: Chinese sovereignty claims in the China Sea and repeated military exercises in the area lead to a confrontation with Taiwan and China. By the 2020 timeframe, China SSNs have the communications and navigation capabilities for blue water deployments. Naval forces normally forward deployed to Westpac have been sent to Persian Gulf due to a crisis there. The USS Stennis is deployed from San Diego, but Commander Seventh Fleet wants a Second CVBG at his disposal. The USS George Washington is preparing for a Med deployment to relieve the USS Truman in August. The decision is made to deploy the GW battle group to Westpac and extend the USS Truman or gap the Mediterranean Sea. The NW passage is ice-free in the summer and commercial shipping routinely transits. The NW passage offers the shortest route and reduces the transit from 17500 nm around Cape Horn and 11600 nm through the Panama Canal to 8700 nm. Russian SSN crosses Arctic to intercept and monitor CVBG transit. With U.S. forces tied down in Persian Gulf, China seizes the opportunity position forces on disputed islands in China Sea. Hostilities escalate. China believes that it can prevail in an engagement with the JCS BG, and positions both SSs and an SSN in the Strait of Malacca to cut off reinforcement from the west. China perceives the U.S. threat to be the GW BG and deploys an SSN to oppose the transit through Bering Strait. The USWC requires the Bering Strait to be sanitized prior to transit.

1.  Protection of Shipping: Fishing becomes big industry in the Beaufort
    and Chukchi Seas, and tensions rise between Russian, Japanese and
    U.S. fishing fleets. Russia asserts a claim on the continental shelf
    in the Chukchi Sea including the Chukchi Cap as a historic sea and
    territorial waters. The U.S. and Japan dispute Russian claims and
    continue to operate fishing fleets in the vicinity of Chukchi Cap.
    USCG aerial patrols obtain evidence of Russian vessels conducting
    illegal fishing inside U.S. EEZ and seize the responsible vessels.
    Hostile fishing activities including, cutting each nets, vessel
    ramming, etc. occur weekly. The single USCG Hamilton class cutter
    that operates north of the Bering Strait is unable to control the
    situation. Alaskan Senators and Representatives are demanding action
    from the Departments of Defense, State and Commerce. Russian Naval
    forces supported by air forces have moved in to protect their
    interests and are bullying U.S. fishing fleet, including incursions
    into U.S. EEZ. The USN sends two frigates and a destroyer to counter
    the Russian presence. A SSN is deployed for ISR and P-3s and Global
    Hawk UAVs from Adak, AK assist with surveillance.

2.  Maritime Interdiction Operation: All source intelligence indicates
    that merchant shipping will be used to transport chemical warfare
    agents via the North West Passage on a route from China with a
    destination on the U.S. East Coast. US and Canadian establish MPA
    detachments in Adak, AK, Inuvik NW Territories and Thule, Greenland
    to track the vessel, but weather precludes continuous surveillance.
    HUMINT sources substantiate concerns that cargo may be transferred
    to a smaller vessel (i.e. a f/v or speedboat) in the Bering Sea or
    Hudson Bay as a point of entry into North America. Satellite passes
    are too infrequent to determine if cargo is possibly unloaded. USN
    coordinates with USCG and CCG to monitor possible ports. A SSN
    operating in the Norweigan Sea conducts an Arctic crossing to
    covertly intercept and track the suspect merchant vessel through the
    Canadian Archipelago and report on its activities.

3.  Drug trafficking: Former Soviet military transports are used by
    organized crime activities to smuggle heroin via air routes out of
    Russia, across the Arctic, and into North America. JIATF North is
    established to maintain naval detection and monitoring assets and
    coast guard law enforcement assets in the Arctic. Relocatable over
    the horizon radar (ROTHR) sites located in Alaska and Canadian
    Archipelago are used in conjunction with NORAD to maintain
    surveillance. At least one Aegis platform is assigned continuous
    picket duty. USN P-3s flying out of Barrow, AK and CP-140s flying
    out of Inuvik, NW Territories are used for aerial intercept and
    tracking. A SSN conducts an ISR mission offshore of departure
    airfields.

4.  USW Coordinated Operation: In 2030, the U.S. has an operational
    Ballistic Missile Defense shield over parts of Asia. A rogue nation
    with chemical/biological capabilities deploys a SSBN into the Arctic
    to close the distance to the U.S. and take advantage of hiding in
    the marginal ice zone. A JTAA is established in the Chukchi and
    Beaufort Seas. A SAG with T-AGOS support and MPA working in the JTAA
    provide localization assets with a subsequent handoff to a USN SSN
    for tracking. A DDG capable of theater ballistic missile defense
    (LINEBACKER) assumes picket duty in the area in the event of a
    successful ballistic missile launch.

5.  Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation: Environmental terrorists seize a
    research station in the Svalbard Archipelago being used by a U.S.
    based multi-national corporation for mineral and oil exploration in
    the Arctic. The terrorists have been using explosives to destroy
    equipment at the station, and are threatening personnel if the
    corporation does not cease all activities in the Arctic Ocean.
    Although Svalbard is under Norwegian sovereignty, a U.S. signed
    international treaty prohibits military activities in the
    archipelago. The breakdown of hostage negotiations is followed by
    the execution of some of the U.S. citizens. The USS Saipan ARG and
    26th MEU, which is Special Operations Capable, are conducting an
    exercise off Scotland. The Saipan transits to Svalbard and plans a
    rescue using helo inserted special forces. EO capable P-3s flying
    out of Tromso, Norway conduct surveillance. U.S. military actions
    incite protest from the Russians.

######### APPENDIX C

+-----------+-----+---------------+--------------------+----+---------+
| **Name**  | **  | **O           | #                  | *  | **Day   |
|           | Ran | rganization** | ####### Background | *D | 2**     |
|           | k** |               |                    | ay |         |
|           |     |               |                    | 1  |         |
|           |     |               |                    | ** |         |
+-----------+-----+---------------+--------------------+----+---------+
| Addison,  | CDR | Canadian Navy | Canadian Navy      | Su | IO      |
| Tim       |     |               | Current Ops        | rf |         |
+-----------+-----+---------------+--------------------+----+---------+
| Aldinger, | C   | SUBPAC        | METOC              | Su | RA      |
| TY        | apt |               |                    | rf |         |
+-----------+-----+---------------+--------------------+----+---------+
| Arias,    | Mr. | NSWC Dahlgren | Amphibious Ship    | Su | Acq     |
| Jim       |     | Division      | Project Engineer   | rf |         |
+-----------+-----+---------------+--------------------+----+---------+
| Baker,    | CDR | NLMOC COMP    | METOC              | A  | IO      |
| Frank     |     | NWDC          |                    | ir |         |
+-----------+-----+---------------+--------------------+----+---------+
| Barker,   | CDR | Naval War     | METOC              | A  | S&P     |
| Jeffrey   |     | College       |                    | ir |         |
+-----------+-----+---------------+--------------------+----+---------+
| Barns,    | C   | OPNAV N780E   | Helo Pilot         | A  | IO      |
| Thomas    | apt |               |                    | ir |         |
+-----------+-----+---------------+--------------------+----+---------+
| Bienhoff, | CDR | JHU APL       | Sub Co / Arctic    | S  | Acq     |
| Paul      | (r  |               | Research           | ub |         |
|           | et) |               |                    |    |         |
+-----------+-----+---------------+--------------------+----+---------+
| Bo        | CDR | USCG HQ       | Propective Chief,  | Su | S&P     |
| denstedt, |     |               | Ice Operations     | rf |         |
| Joseph W. |     |               | Division @ USCG    |    |         |
|           |     |               | Headquarters       |    |         |
+-----------+-----+---------------+--------------------+----+---------+
| Boulden,  | CDR | ONI-SWORD     | Sub CO             | S  | S&P     |
| John      |     |               |                    | ub |         |
+-----------+-----+---------------+--------------------+----+---------+
| Brass,    | Dr. | US Arctic     | Arctic research    | Su | Acq     |
| Garrett   |     | Research      |                    | rf |         |
| W.        |     | Commission    |                    |    |         |
+-----------+-----+---------------+--------------------+----+---------+
| Cathcart, | LT  | Canadian      | JAG Officer        | S  | S&P     |
| Blaise    | COL | Forces        |                    | ub |         |
+-----------+-----+---------------+--------------------+----+---------+
| Da        | C   | British       | Sub CO             | S  | IO      |
| vis-Marks | DR, | Embassy       |                    | ub |         |
| Michael   | RN  |               |                    |    |         |
+-----------+-----+---------------+--------------------+----+---------+
| Dorman,   | Ca  | EG&G          | Ret Sub CO, HF     | S  | Acq     |
| Merrill   | pt. | Technical     | sonar              | ub |         |
| H.        | (r  | Services Inc  |                    |    |         |
|           | et) |               |                    |    |         |
+-----------+-----+---------------+--------------------+----+---------+
| Fa        | Mr. | Canadian Ice  | Chief of Ice       | A  | RA      |
| lkingham, |     | Service       | Forecast           | ir |         |
| John      |     |               | Operations         |    |         |
+-----------+-----+---------------+--------------------+----+---------+
| F         | C   | Arctic        | Director, Arctic   | S  | Acq     |
| ischbeck, | apt | Submarine     | Submarine          | ub |         |
| Jeffrey   |     | Laboratory    | Laboratory         |    |         |
| A.        |     |               |                    |    |         |
|           |     |               | Sub CO             |    |         |
+-----------+-----+---------------+--------------------+----+---------+
| Furze,    | CDR | NAVOCEANO     | METOC              | S  | S&P     |
| Peter     |     |               |                    | ub |         |
+-----------+-----+---------------+--------------------+----+---------+
| G         | CDR | CNO N78       | Aviator            | A  | S&P     |
| allamore, |     |               |                    | ir |         |
| Jay       |     |               |                    |    |         |
+-----------+-----+---------------+--------------------+----+---------+
| Garrett,  | C   | Co USCG Healy | Polar Ice          | Su | IO      |
| Jeffrey   | apt |               | Operations         | rf |         |
| M.        | U   |               |                    |    |         |
|           | SCG |               |                    |    |         |
+-----------+-----+---------------+--------------------+----+---------+
| Garry,    | L   | OPNAV N763T   | SWO                | Su | Acq     |
| Joe       | CDR |               |                    | rf |         |
+-----------+-----+---------------+--------------------+----+---------+
| Gillard,  | C   | OPNAV N70     | METOC              | Su | RA      |
| David     | apt |               |                    | rf |         |
+-----------+-----+---------------+--------------------+----+---------+
| Gossett,  | Mr. | Arctic        | Head of Operations | S  | IO      |
| Jeffrey   |     | Submarine     | at Arctic          | ub |         |
|           |     | Laboratory N3 | Submarine          |    |         |
|           |     |               | Laboratory         |    |         |
+-----------+-----+---------------+--------------------+----+---------+
| Hayes,    | Mr. | CNO N960B     | Dep. Dir.,         | A  | RA      |
| Richard   |     |               | Programming &      | ir |         |
|           |     |               | Assessment Div     |    |         |
+-----------+-----+---------------+--------------------+----+---------+
| Jackson,  | Mr. | Icebreaking   | Manages CCG        | Su | IO      |
| David     |     | Division,     | icebreaking        | rf |         |
|           |     | Canadian      | program            |    |         |
|           |     | Coast Guard   |                    |    |         |
+-----------+-----+---------------+--------------------+----+---------+
| King,     | L   | NRL Det       | METOC/sub exp      | A  | Acq     |
| Charles   | CDR | Stennis       |                    | ir |         |
+-----------+-----+---------------+--------------------+----+---------+
| L         | C   | Chief, Office | Surface, CO Ice    | Su | S&P     |
| ancaster, | apt | of Aids to    | breaker            | rf |         |
| Chuck     | U   | Navigation    |                    |    |         |
|           | SCG | USCG          |                    |    |         |
+-----------+-----+---------------+--------------------+----+---------+
| L         | Mr. | National      |                    | S  | Acq     |
| edbetter, |     | Science       |                    | ub |         |
| Mike      |     | Foundation    |                    |    |         |
+-----------+-----+---------------+--------------------+----+---------+
| Marsh, W  | R   | OPNAV N75     | Amphibs - mines    |    |         |
| Clyde     | ADM |               |                    |    |         |
+-----------+-----+---------------+--------------------+----+---------+
| Matt,     | Mr. | OPNAV (N23)   | Manager Charting & | S  | RA      |
| Joseph    |     |               | Oceanography       | ub |         |
+-----------+-----+---------------+--------------------+----+---------+
| McFadden, | Ca  | Canadian Navy | Directorate of     | A  | S&P     |
| P. Dean   | pt. |               | Maritime Strategy  | ir |         |
+-----------+-----+---------------+--------------------+----+---------+
| McKeown,  | Dr. | NLMOC         | METOC scientist    | Su | Acq     |
| Raymond   |     |               |                    | rf |         |
+-----------+-----+---------------+--------------------+----+---------+
| Medley,   | CDR | OPNAV N773B   | Sub Co / Arctic,   | S  | RA      |
| Richard   |     |               | UUVs               | ub |         |
+-----------+-----+---------------+--------------------+----+---------+
| Mineart,  | CDR | NRO           | METOC, Space       | A  | Acq     |
| Gary      |     | (AS&T/TDG)    | Systems, Ops       | ir |         |
+-----------+-----+---------------+--------------------+----+---------+
| Morrisey, | Mr. | Canadian      | Defense scientist  | S  | S&P     |
| Charles   |     | Department of |                    | ub |         |
|           |     | National      |                    |    |         |
|           |     | Defence       |                    |    |         |
+-----------+-----+---------------+--------------------+----+---------+
| Newt      | H   | Chair,        | Retired CAPT, USN; | S  | RA      |
| on,George | on. | U.S.Arctic    | Sub CO             | ub |         |
| B.        |     | Research      |                    |    |         |
|           |     | Commission    |                    |    |         |
+-----------+-----+---------------+--------------------+----+---------+
| Noble,    | C   | SECNAV OPA    | SWO                | Su | IO      |
| Chris     | apt |               |                    | rf |         |
|           | (s  |               |                    |    |         |
|           | el) |               |                    |    |         |
+-----------+-----+---------------+--------------------+----+---------+
| O         | CDR | Navy Jag,     | JAG Officer        | A  | S&P     |
| strander, |     | Code 10       |                    | ir |         |
| Frank     |     |               |                    |    |         |
+-----------+-----+---------------+--------------------+----+---------+
| Riedener, | Mr. | ONI-21        | Intel              | Su | S&P     |
| Laurens   |     |               |                    | rf |         |
+-----------+-----+---------------+--------------------+----+---------+
| Ryan,     | CDR | CNO N78       | Aviator            | A  | S&P     |
| Kenneth   |     |               |                    | ir |         |
+-----------+-----+---------------+--------------------+----+---------+
| Stewart,  | CDR | ASN (I&E)     | METOC (SWO         | A  | Acq     |
| Paul      |     |               | background)        | ir |         |
+-----------+-----+---------------+--------------------+----+---------+
| Van       | Dr. | National Ice  | National Ice       | Su | IO      |
| Woert,    |     | Center        | Center Chief       | rf |         |
| Michael   |     |               | Scientist          |    |         |
+-----------+-----+---------------+--------------------+----+---------+
| Widmeyer, | Dr. | OPNAV N70     | Science Advisor to | S  | S&P     |
| Ray       |     |               | N70                | ub |         |
+-----------+-----+---------------+--------------------+----+---------+
| Wilson,   | C   | OPNAV 00K     | N2                 | A  | S&P     |
| Walter    | APT |               |                    | ir |         |
+-----------+-----+---------------+--------------------+----+---------+
| Winter,   | L   | OPNAV (N76)   | SWO - USW rqmnts   | Su | RA      |
| Peter     | CDR |               |                    | rf |         |
+-----------+-----+---------------+--------------------+----+---------+
|           |     |               |                    |    |         |
+-----------+-----+---------------+--------------------+----+---------+
| **Fac     |     |               |                    |    |         |
| ilitation |     |               |                    |    |         |
| Team:**   |     |               |                    |    |         |
+-----------+-----+---------------+--------------------+----+---------+
| Connell,  | C   | WBB           | CAG / F-18         | A  | S&T     |
| Doug      | apt |               |                    | ir |         |
|           | (r  |               |                    |    |         |
|           | et) |               |                    |    |         |
+-----------+-----+---------------+--------------------+----+---------+
| Mack,     | Mr. | WBB           | Facilitator        |    | Road    |
| Steve     |     |               |                    |    | Ahead   |
+-----------+-----+---------------+--------------------+----+---------+
| Nevitt,   | Cdr | WBB           | Facilitator / NFO  | Le | Lead    |
| Pat       | (r  |               |                    | ad |         |
|           | et) |               |                    |    |         |
+-----------+-----+---------------+--------------------+----+---------+
| Roberts,  | C   | WBB           | Sub CO             | S  | S       |
| Dana      | apt |               |                    | ub | trategy |
|           | (r  |               |                    |    | &       |
|           | et) |               |                    |    | Policy  |
+-----------+-----+---------------+--------------------+----+---------+
| Seglem,   | C   | WBB           | Surface            | Su | Int     |
| Mark      | apt |               |                    | rf | egrated |
|           | (r  |               |                    |    | Ops     |
|           | et) |               |                    |    |         |
+-----------+-----+---------------+--------------------+----+---------+
| Taylor,   | C   | WBB           | CAG / A-6          | A  | Acq     |
| Robert    | apt |               |                    | ir |         |
|           | (r  |               |                    |    |         |
|           | et) |               |                    |    |         |
+-----------+-----+---------------+--------------------+----+---------+
| **Control |     |               |                    |    |         |
| Group**   |     |               |                    |    |         |
+-----------+-----+---------------+--------------------+----+---------+
| Willis,   | CDR | NAVICE        | METOC              |    | RA      |
| Zdenka    |     |               |                    |    |         |
+-----------+-----+---------------+--------------------+----+---------+
| Lamb,     | L   | NAVICE        | METOC              |    |         |
| Doug      | CDR |               |                    |    |         |
+-----------+-----+---------------+--------------------+----+---------+
| Conlon,   | Dr. | ONR Code      | Sponsor            |    |         |
| Dennis    |     | 322HL         |                    |    |         |
+-----------+-----+---------------+--------------------+----+---------+
| Spinrad,  | Dr. | N096          | Sponsor            |    |         |
| Rick      |     |               |                    |    |         |
+-----------+-----+---------------+--------------------+----+---------+

> **APPENDIX D**
>
> **ACRONMYS**
>
> ACOUS Arctic Climate Observations using Underwater Sound
>
> ARG Amphibious Readiness Group
>
> ARGOS Advanced Research and Global Observation Satellite
>
> ARPA Automatic Radar Plotting Aid
>
> ASN Assistant Secretary of the Navy
>
> ASUW Anti Surface Warfare
>
> ASW Anti Submarine Warfare
>
> ASWIP Antisubmarine Warfare Improvement Program
>
> AVCAL Aviation Calibration
>
> C2 Command and Control
>
> C4ISR Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence,
> Surveillance and Reconnaissance
>
> CCIP Component Commander Issue Papers
>
> CEC Cooperative Engagement Capability
>
> CINC Commander in Chief
>
> CNO Chief of Naval Operations
>
> CRD Capstone Requirements Document
>
> COD Carrier Onboard Development
>
> CV Carrier
>
> CVBG Carrier Battlegroup
>
> DTS Digital Telephone System
>
> EEZ Economic Enforcement Zone
>
> EMCON Emergency Communications Conditions
>
> ENVISAT European Environmental Satellite
>
> EO/IR Electro Optical / Infra-Red
>
> ESGN Electro-Static Gyro Navigator
>
> ESM Electronic Signal Monitoring
>
> FNC Future Naval Capabilities
>
> FONOPS Freedom of Navigation Operations
>
> GGMs GPS Guided Munitions
>
> GPS Global Positioning System
>
> IBS Integrated Bridge System
>
> ISR Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance
>
> IPL Integrated Priority List
>
> IWARS Integrated Warfare Architecture Assessment
>
> LO Low Observable
>
> MACC Military Assistance to Civilian Communities
>
> METOC Meteorological and Oceanographic
>
> MCM Mine Counter Measures
>
> MIO Maritime Interception Operations
>
> MNS Mission Need Statement
>
> MOP Measure of Performance
>
> NATC Naval Air Test Center
>
> NAVAID Navigational Aid
>
> NAVICE Naval Ice Center
>
> NAVOCEANO Naval Oceanographic Office
>
> NAVSSG Navy Strategic Studies Group
>
> NBC Nuclear, Biological, Chemical
>
> NCW Network Centric Warfare
>
> NDIA National Defense Industrial Organization
>
> NEO Non-combatant Evacuation Operations
>
> NIC National Ice Center
>
> NIMA National Imagery and Mapping Agency
>
> NGO Non-Governmental Organization
>
> NSA National Security Agency
>
> NSR Northern Sea Route
>
> NTM National Technical Means
>
> NWDC Naval Warfare Development Command
>
> OAG Operational Advisory Group
>
> ONR Office of Naval Research
>
> OPNAV Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
>
> OPTEMPO Operational Tempo
>
> ORD Operational Requirements Document
>
> POE Projected Operational Environment
>
> POM Program Objective Memorandum
>
> PPBS Program Planning and Budgeting System
>
> QDR Quadrennial Defense Review
>
> RADARSAT Radar Satellite system
>
> RDT&E Research, Development, Testing & Evaluation
>
> ROC Required Operational Capabilities
>
> RF Radio Frequency
>
> RLGN Ring Laser Gyro Navigator
>
> RMA Revolution in Military Affairs
>
> SAG Surface Action Group
>
> SAR Synthetic Aperture Radar
>
> SAR/CSAR Search and Rescue / Combat Search and Rescue
>
> S&T Science and Technology
>
> SLBM Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile
>
> SLCM Submarine Launched Cruise Missile
>
> SLOC Sea Lines of Communication
>
> SOP Standard Operating Procedures
>
> STORM Submarine Technical Oceanographic Reference Manual
>
> SVP Sound Velocity Profile
>
> SWDG Surface Warfare Development Group
>
> TACCO Tactical Coordinator
>
> TACAMO Take Charge and Move Out
>
> TLAM Tactical Land Attack Missile
>
> TTP Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
>
> UAV Unmanned Air Vehicle
>
> UCAV Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle
>
> UCP Unified Command Plan
>
> UNCLOS United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea
>
> UNREP Underway Replenishment
>
> UsuV Unmanned Underwater Vehicle
>
> USV Unmanned Surface Vehicle
>
> USW Undersea Warfare Operations
>
> UUV Unmanned Underwater Vehicle
>
> VOD Vertical Onboard Delivery
>
> VP Patrol plane