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**THE FINAL REPORT AND FINDINGS OF THE *SAFE SCHOOL INITIATIVE*:
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PREVENTION OF SCHOOL ATTACKS**

#### IN THE UNITED STATES

**[United States Secret Service]{.smallcaps}**

**[and]{.smallcaps}**

**[United States Department of Education]{.smallcaps}**

by

##### **Bryan Vossekuil**

Director

National Violence Prevention and Study Center

**Robert A. Fein, Ph.D.**

Director

National Violence Prevention and Study Center

#### Marisa Reddy, Ph.D.

Chief Research Psychologist and Research Coordinator

National Threat Assessment Center

U.S. Secret Service

#### Randy Borum, Psy.D.

Associate Professor

University of South Florida

#### William Modzeleski

Director

Safe and Drug-Free Schools Program

U.S. Department of Education

**Washington, D.C.**

**May 2002**

Joint message from the Secretary, U.S. Department of Education and the
Director, U.S. Secret Service

Littleton, Colorado; Springfield, Oregon; West Paducah, Kentucky;
Jonesboro, Arkansas. These communities have become familiar to many
Americans as the locations where school shootings have occurred in
recent years. School shootings are a rare, but significant, component of
school violence in America. It is clear that other kinds of problems are
far more common than the targeted attacks that have taken place in
schools across this country. However, each school-based attack has had a
tremendous and lasting effect on the school in which it occurred, the
surrounding community, and the nation as a whole. In the aftermath of
these tragic events, educators, law enforcement officials, mental health
professionals, parents, and others have asked: "Could we have known that
these attacks were being planned?" and, "What can be done to prevent
future attacks from occurring?"

In June 1999, following the attack at Columbine High School, our two
agencies\--the U.S. Secret Service and the U.S. Department of
Education\--launched a collaborative effort to begin to answer these
questions. The result was the *Safe School Initiative*, an extensive
examination of 37 incidents of targeted school shootings and school
attacks that have occurred in the United States beginning with the
earliest identified incident in 1974 through June 2000. The focus of the
*Safe School Initiative* was on examining the thinking, planning, and
other behaviors engaged in by students who carried out school attacks.
Particular attention was given to identifying pre-attack behaviors and
communications that might be detectable\--or "knowable"\--and could help
in preventing some future attacks.

The *Safe School Initiative* was implemented through the Secret
Service's National Threat Assessment Center and the Department of
Education's Safe and Drug-Free Schools Program. The *Initiative* drew
from the Secret Service's experience in studying and preventing
assassination and other types of targeted violence and the Department of
Education's expertise in helping schools facilitate learning through the
creation of safe environments for students, faculty, and staff.

This document, the *Safe School Initiative*'s final report, details how
our two agencies studied school-based attacks and what we found. Some of
the findings may surprise you. It is clear that there is no simple
explanation as to why these attacks have occurred. Nor is there a simple
solution to stop this problem. But the findings of the *Safe School
Initiative* do suggest that some future attacks may be preventable, if
those responsible for safety in schools know what questions to ask, and
where to uncover information that may help with efforts to intervene
before a school attack can occur.

Since it began in June 1999, our partnership has been a tremendous asset
to each of our respective agencies and vital to the success of this
study. It is our hope that the information we present in this final
report is useful to those of you on the front lines of this problem --
the administrators, educators, law enforcement officials, and others
with protective responsibilities in schools -- and to anyone concerned
with children's safety. We encourage all of you in your efforts to keep
our nation's children safe in school and hope this report helps you in
those efforts.

![](media/image2.wmf){width="2.7083333333333335in"
height="1.0972222222222223in"}![](media/image3.wmf){width="2.111111111111111in"
height="1.0555555555555556in"} Brian L. Stafford

Secretary Director

U.S. Department of Education U.S. Secret Service

**ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

The U.S. Secret Service and the U.S. Department of Education are
grateful to many agencies and individuals for their assistance in
planning and carrying out the *Safe School Initiative*. First and
foremost, the authors of this report owe a debt of gratitude to the
representatives of the numerous law enforcement and criminal justice
agencies that permitted Secret Service personnel to review investigative
files on the school attacks in their respective communities; provided
other key information and materials about these attacks; and assisted
and supported Secret Service personnel in seeking permission to
interview 10 attackers. Moreover, the authors are grateful to the U.S.
Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs' National Institute of
Justice for providing critical financial support that helped make the
study possible.

In addition, Secret Service and Department of Education personnel
benefited substantially from the contributions of several law
enforcement, behavioral science and mental health professionals whose
collective experience and expertise helped to inform the development of
the project plan and research design. In alphabetical order, these
individuals are: Gerardo Blue, Frederick Calhoun, Charles Ewing, Michael
Gelles, Dennis McCarthy, Edward Mulvey, William Pollack, Larry Porte,
Pam Robbins, Raymond Smyth, Sara Strizzi and Andrew Vita.

This project would not have been possible without the support and
guidance that the authors received from several key officials and
personnel at the Department of Education and the Secret Service. Absent
the expertise and insights of these individuals, the Secret Service's
experience in researching and preventing targeted violence could not
have been translated into a useful study of targeted school violence. At
the Department of Education, these individuals are: Secretary of
Education Rod Paige, former Secretary of Education Richard Riley and
Connie Deshpande. Secret Service officials who provided guidance and
support for this project are: Director Brian Stafford, Assistant
Director Terry Samway, Deputy Assistant Directors Bob Byers and Tom
Riopelle, Special Agent in Charge George Luczko and Resident Agent in
Charge John Berglund. Special thanks are extended to Social Science
Research Specialist Karissa Kumm who assisted with project data
collection and was instrumental in organizing information from the *Safe
School Initiative* kick-off meeting. Our thanks go also to Dean Terry,
Michael Gelles and Marty Allen for providing extensive assistance with
project data collection.

The authors extend special thanks to Assistant Director Barbara Riggs,
Office of Protective Research, U.S. Secret Service for her support of
the *Safe School Initiative* and the National Threat Assessment Center.

The authors wish to thank Assistant Special Agent in Charge Matt
Doherty, Assistant to the Special Agent in Charge Cindy Rubendall and
Special Agent Ignacio Zamora for giving generously of their time in
reviewing earlier drafts of this document, and former Special Agent
Nancy Fogarty, Social Science Research Specialists Derricka Dean and
Megan Williams and interns Marissa Savastana, Becca Norwick and Colleen
Spokis for their invaluable assistance with data collection, data entry
and project management.

Finally, the Secret Service and the Department of Education gratefully
acknowledge the contributions of Paul Kelly and Gwen Holden of the
Nauset Group, whose insightful observations and comments helped to shape
the *Final Report*. Special thanks go out to Gwen Holden, who edited the
*Final Report*.

> Bryan Vossekuil
>
> Robert Fein
>
> Marisa Reddy
>
> Randy Borum
>
> William Modzeleski
>
> Washington, D.C.
>
> May 2002

CONTENTS

JOINT MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION AND THE
DIRECTOR, U.S. SECRET SERVICE 3

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 5

CONTENTS 7

CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION: THE *SAFE SCHOOL INITIATIVE* 8

The *Safe School Initiative* 8

Defining "Targeted" School Violence 9

The Secret Service Threat Assessment Approach 10

The Prevalence of Violence in American Schools 11

Methodology 13

The Study Population 14

Sources of Information on Incidents of Targeted School Violence 14

Analysis of Responses to the Coded Study Questions 15

Organization of the Final Report 16

Overview of *Safe School Initiative* Findings 17

CHAPTER II: CHARACTERISTICS OF INCIDENTS OF TARGETED SCHOOL VIOLENCE 19

Target and Victim Characteristics 20

CHAPTER III: FINDINGS OF THE *SAFE SCHOOL INITIATIVE* 22

Characterizing the Attacker 22

Conceptualizing the Attack 27

Signaling the Attack 28

Advancing the Attack 30

Resolving the Attack 31

CHAPTER IV: IMPLICATIONS OF *SAFE SCHOOL INITIATIVE* FINDINGS FOR THE
PREVENTION OF TARGETED SCHOOL VIOLENCE 33

> The Implications of Key Study Findings 34

CHAPTER V: CONCLUSION: THREAT ASSESSMENT AS A PROMISING STRATEGY FOR
PREVENTING SCHOOL VIOLENCE 41

Threat Assessment and Targeted School Violence Prevention 41

APPENDIX A: Incidents of Targeted School Violence by State 43

APPENDIX B: Incidents of Targeted School Violence by Year 44

APPENDIX C: Resources 45

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION: THE *SAFE SCHOOL INITIATIVE*

Littleton, Colorado; Springfield, Oregon; West Paducah, Kentucky;
Jonesboro, Arkansas. These communities have become familiar to many
Americans as among the locations of those schools where shootings have
occurred nationwide in recent years. In the aftermath of these tragic
events, educators, law enforcement officials, mental health
professionals and parents have pressed for answers to two central
questions: "Could we have known that these attacks were being planned?"
and, if so, "What could we have done to prevent these attacks from
occurring?"

This publication, *The Final Report and Findings of the Safe School
Initiative: Implications for the Prevention of School Attacks in the
United States*, is a recent product of an ongoing collaboration between
the U. S. Secret Service and the U. S. Department of Education to begin
to answer these questions.[^1] It is the culmination of an extensive
examination of 37 incidents of targeted school violence that occurred in
the United States from December 1974 through May 2000.[^2]

###### The *Safe School Initiative* 

Following the attack at Columbine High School in April 1999, the Secret
Service and the Department of Education initiated, in June 1999, a study
of the thinking, planning and other pre-attack behaviors engaged in by
attackers who carried out school shootings. That study, the *Safe School
Initiative*, was pursued under a partnership between the Secret Service
and the Department of Education, and implemented through the Secret
Service's National Threat Assessment Center and the Department of
Education's Safe and Drug-Free Schools Program. In its execution, the
*Safe School Initiative* drew from the Secret Service's experience in
studying and preventing targeted violence and from the Department of
Education's expertise in helping schools facilitate learning through the
creation of safe environments for students, faculty and staff.

The objective of the *Safe School Initiative* was to attempt to identify
information that could be obtainable, or "knowable," prior to an attack.
That information would then be analyzed and evaluated to produce a
factual, accurate knowledge base on targeted school attacks. This
knowledge could be used to help communities across the country to
formulate policies and strategies aimed at preventing school-based
attacks.

Key features of the *Safe School Initiative* were its focus on
"targeted" school violence and its adaptation of earlier Secret Service
research on assassination for its examination of incidents of
school-based attacks.

######### Defining "Targeted" School Violence

The *Safe School Initiative* examined incidents of "targeted violence"
in school settings--school shootings and other school-based attacks
where the school was deliberately selected as the location for the
attack and was not simply a random site of opportunity. The term
"targeted violence" evolved from the Secret Service's five-year study of
the behavior of individuals who have carried out, or attempted, lethal
attacks on public officials or prominent individuals. That study, the
Secret Service's *Exceptional Case Study Project* (ECSP), was initiated
in 1992 under funding provided by the U. S. Department of Justice,
Office of Justice Programs' National Institute of Justice.

The focus of the ECSP study was an operational analysis of the thinking
and behavior of those who have assassinated, attacked or tried to attack
a national public official or public figure in the United States since
1949. The ECSP defined "targeted violence" as any incident of violence
where a known or knowable attacker selects a particular target prior to
their violent attack.[^3] The purpose of the ECSP was to generate a
better understanding of attacks against public officials that, in turn,
would help Secret Service agents in their investigations of threats
toward the president and others they protect and in the prevention of
harm to these protected officials. [^4]

The ECSP sought to identify what information might be knowable prior to
an attack and to better enable intervention before an attack occurred.
Findings from the ECSP helped to dispel several myths and misconceptions
about assassination.

In addition to the ECSP's particular focus on incidents involving
attacks on public officials and prominent individuals, other types of
violence in which a victim is targeted specifically include
assassinations, stalking, some forms of domestic violence, some types of
workplace violence, and some types of school violence. In the case of
targeted school violence, the target may be a specific individual, such
as a particular classmate or teacher, or a group or category of
individuals, such as "jocks" or "geeks." The target may even be the
school itself.

######### The Secret Service Threat Assessment Approach 

The findings of the ECSP also led to the Secret Service's development of
a more thorough and focused process for conducting threat assessment
investigations. As part of its mission, the Secret Service is
responsible for protecting the president and vice president of the
United States and their families and certain national and international
leaders, all of whom are referred to as "protectees." The Secret Service
provides this protection by means of two distinct yet complementary
strategies: the use of physical measures\--including magnetometers,
armored vehicles, perimeters of armed agents, and canine units\--that
are designed to both deter potential attacks and serve as protective
barriers in the event someone tries to attack; and a second, far less
visible component known as threat assessment.

Threat assessment is a process of identifying, assessing and managing
the threat that certain persons may pose to Secret Service protectees.
The goal of threat assessment is to intervene before an attack can
occur. The threat assessment process involves three principal steps--all
before the person has the opportunity to attack:

-   identifying individuals who have the idea or intent of attacking a
    Secret Service protectee;

-   assessing whether the individual poses a risk to a protectee, after
    gathering sufficient information from multiple sources; and,

-   managing the threat the individual poses, in those cases where the
    individual investigated is determined to pose a threat.

The Secret Service considers threat assessment to be as important to
preventing targeted violence as the physical measures it employs.

In 1998, the Secret Service established the National Threat Assessment
Center, an entity within the Secret Service that is dedicated to
continuing efforts agency-wide to better understand and prevent targeted
violence, and to share this developing knowledge with other
constituencies responsible for public safety and violence prevention.
Adaptation of its threat assessment protocols for use in addressing the
problem of school-based attacks is the most recent of the Secret
Service's initiatives to share this body of knowledge and expertise with
other constituencies engaged in developing strategies to address
targeted violence issues. In the late 1990s, the Secret Service and the
Justice Department's National Institute of Justice joined forces to make
information on the Secret Service's threat assessment protocols
available to a wider law enforcement audience. *Protective Intelligence
& Threat Assessment Investigations: A Guide for State and Local Law
Enforcement Officials*, released in July 1998, offers state and local
police officials insights into the elements of carrying out and
evaluating the findings of threat assessment investigations.[^5]

In addition, since the release of the *Safe School Initiative* *Interim
Report* in October 2000, personnel from the Secret Service and the
Department of Education have given over 100 seminars and briefings on
the study to thousands of educators, law enforcement officials, mental
health professionals and others across the United States. Several
questions and discussion points raised by seminar attendees have been
addressed in this final report.

Finally, the Department of Education and the Secret Service currently
are completing work on a guide to investigating and responding to
threats in schools. The guide is scheduled for publication in 2002. The
guide will include recommendations for investigating and evaluating
threats and other behaviors of concern in school; address considerations
for developing policies and capacity to support threat assessment
efforts in schools; and provide suggestions for approaches schools can
adopt to foster school environments that reduce threats of targeted
violence.

###### The Prevalence of Violence in American Schools

Public policymakers, school administrators, police officials and parents
continue to search for explanations for the targeted violence that
occurred at Columbine High School and other schools across the country,
and seek assurance that similar incidents will not be repeated at
educational institutions in their communities. While the quest for
solutions to the problem of targeted school violence is of critical
importance, reports from the Department of Education, the Justice
Department and other sources indicate that few children are likely to
fall prey to life-threatening violence in school settings.[^6]

To put the problem of targeted school-based attacks in context, from
1993 to 1997 the odds that a child in grades 9-12 would be threatened or
injured with a weapon in school were 7 to 8 percent, or 1 in 13 or 14;
the odds of getting into a physical fight at school were 15 percent, or
1 in 7.[^7] In contrast, the odds that a child would die in school--by
homicide or suicide--are, fortunately, no greater than 1 in 1
million.[^8] In 1998, students in grades 9-12 were the victims of 1.6
million thefts and 1.2 million nonfatal violent crimes, while in this
same period 60 school-associated violent deaths were reported for this
student population.[^9]

The findings of the *Safe School Initiative*'s extensive search for
recorded incidents of targeted school-based attacks underscore the
rarity of lethal attacks in school settings. The Department of Education
reports that nearly 60 million children attend the nation's 119,000+
schools.[^10] The combined efforts of the Secret Service and the
Department of Education identified 37 incidents of targeted school-based
attacks, committed by 41 individuals over a 25-year period.[^11]

Nevertheless, the impact of targeted school-based attacks cannot be
measured in statistics alone. While it is clear that other kinds of
problems in American schools are far more common than the targeted
violence that has taken place in schools in this country, the
high-profile shootings that have occurred in schools over the past
decade have resulted in increased fear among students, parents and
educators. School shootings are a rare, but significant, component of
the problem of school violence. Each school-based attack has had a
tremendous and lasting effect on the school in which it occurred, the
surrounding community and the nation as a whole. In the wake of these
attacks, fear of future targeted school violence has become a driving
force behind the efforts of school officials, law enforcement
professionals and parents to identify steps that can be taken to prevent
incidents of violence in their schools.

###### Methodology

The Secret Service and the Department of Education began work on the
*Safe School Initiative* in June 1999. Research protocols employed in
carrying out and analyzing the findings of this work reflect an
adaptation of the ECSP operational approach to examining targeted
attacks against public officials and prominent individuals. Researchers
used a similar operational focus for the *Safe School Initiative* to
develop information that could be useful to schools in better
understanding and preventing targeted violence in school settings. The
emphasis of the study was on examining the attackers' pre-incident
thinking and behavior, to explore information that could aid in
preventing future attacks.

For the purposes of this study, an incident of targeted school violence
was defined as any incident where (i) a current student or recent former
student attacked someone at his or her school with lethal means (e.g., a
gun or knife); and, (ii) where the student attacker purposefully chose
his or her school as the location of the attack. Consistent with this
definition, incidents where the school was chosen simply as a site of
opportunity, such as incidents that were solely related to gang or drug
trade activity or to a violent interaction between individuals that just
happened to occur at the school, were not included.

Under the study's research strategy, each incident of targeted violence
was assigned to a study review team comprised of criminal investigators
and social science researchers. At least two reviewers were assigned to
each incident.

The Secret Service and the Department of Education made every effort to
ensure that the *Safe School Initiative* would produce information that
would be useful for school administrators, educators, law enforcement
officials and others working with schools. To that end, researchers
consulted regularly with experts in the fields of education, school
violence and juvenile homicide, among others, in the course of
developing the study design and protocols. Feedback from these various
experts was incorporated into the final study design.

######### The Study Population

Researchers from the Secret Service and the Department of Education
initiated their study of targeted school violence with an extensive
search for information that would identify incidents of targeted school
violence that have occurred in the United States. Beginning with June
2000 and working back in time, researchers explored all relevant,
searchable databases maintained in the public domain or available by
subscription, such as public news databases and professional
publications, to identify incidents meeting the definition of the study
population. Researchers also consulted with law enforcement officials
and school violence experts to develop leads on incidents of school
violence that might meet the criteria for inclusion in the study
constituency.

In the end, researchers identified 37 incidents of targeted school
violence involving 41 attackers that occurred in the United States from
1974, the year in which the earliest incident identified took place,
through June 2000, when data collection for the study was
completed.[^12] The school-based attacks included in the *Safe School
Initiative* represent all of the incidents of targeted school violence
meeting the study criteria that Secret Service and Department of
Education researchers were able to identify in that time frame.

######### Sources of Information on Incidents of Targeted School Violence 

Information on each incident of targeted school violence identified by
Secret Service and Department of Education researchers was drawn
principally from primary source materials concerning the incident. These
primary source materials included investigative, school, court, and
mental health records.

In addition, study researchers conducted supplemental interviews with 10
of the perpetrators of incidents of the school-based attacks identified
by the Secret Service and the Department of Education. These interviews
provided researchers with further opportunity to examine the incident
from the point of view of the attacker and to "walk through the process
of the attack" from its conceptualization to its execution. Insights
gleaned from these interviews have been used by the Secret Service
primarily in training venues to illustrate particular aspects of
incidents of targeted school violence.

**Coding of Primary Source Materials.** Each member of the review team
assigned to a particular incident independently answered several hundred
questions about each case, entering his or her answers to the questions
in a codebook. Review team members were instructed to record information
gathered from primary sources as it appeared in those sources, and not
to engage in interpretation of facts presented.

Information gathered and reflected in incident reviewers' responses to
the coded study questions included facts about:

-   the attacker's development of an idea to harm the target, and
    progression from the original idea to the attack;

-   the attacker's selection of the target(s);

-   the attacker's motive(s) for the incident;

-   any communications made by the attacker about his or her ideas and
    intent, including any threats made to the target(s) or about the
    target(s);

-   evidence that the attacker planned the incident;

-   the attacker's mental health and substance abuse history, if any;
    and,

-   the attacker's life circumstances/situation at the time of the
    attack, including relationships with parents and other family
    members; performance in school; and treatment by fellow students.

Information regarding the attacker's demographic characteristics and
personal history, including criminal and school history, also were
coded. When each reviewer had completed his or her response to the
questions, the review team met as a whole to compare responses and
produce a single "reconciled" coding of the incident.

######### Analysis of Responses to the Coded Study Questions

Findings presented in Chapter III of this report reflect researchers'
careful analysis of the coded responses to the extensive questionnaire
employed in recording information gathered on each of the 37
school-based attacks and 41 attackers that were examined in the *Safe
School Initiative*. Researchers were cautious not to overreach in
drawing conclusions from this information.

Primary source materials reviewed for the 37 incidents did not provide
answers in every case to all of the areas of inquiry covered in the
questionnaire. In general, researchers declined to draw a conclusion if
information directly responsive to a particular area of inquiry was
available for fewer than half of the incidents reviewed.

Moreover, even when answers to a particular coded study question were
available for the majority of incidents, these responses collectively
did not suggest in all cases a common or shared characteristic. Here
again, researchers were cautious not to draw a conclusion in a
particular area of inquiry if that conclusion was supported by fewer
than the majority of the responses to the subject question.

However, in some cases, researchers believed that the absence of a
common or shared characteristic or behavior in the coded responses to
inquiries--most notably with respect to the characteristics and
behaviors of the attackers\--was sufficiently compelling to note those
observations as findings as well.

###### Organization of the Final Report

The remainder of this report is organized into four chapters. Chapter
II: "Characteristics of Incidents of Targeted School Violence," presents
basic descriptive information about the attacks examined by the *Safe
School Initiative* study, including incident, target and victim
characteristics. Chapter III: "Findings of the *Safe School
Initiative*," describes the conclusions reached by *Safe School
Initiative* researchers after careful analysis of the facts and other
information collected in the course of the Secret Service's and the
Department of Education's study of targeted school violence.

#### Chapter IV: "Implications of *Safe School Initiative* Findings for the Prevention of Targeted School Violence," will be of particular interest to educators, law enforcement officials and others who are seeking guidance to inform efforts to address the problem of targeted school violence. In this chapter, the authors focus in on 10 key findings of the *Safe School Initiative* that appear to have implications for the development of strategies to prevent targeted school violence. These findings specifically concern what information was known--or knowable--about these incidents prior to the attack, and that, in turn, might be relevant to efforts to prevent future attacks. Discussion of these key findings also includes consideration of how this information might be applicable to investigating threats and other behavior in schools that may raise concerns. 

In the final chapter of this report, Chapter V: "Threat Assessment as a
Promising Strategy for Preventing School Violence," the authors offer
some concluding observations on how threat assessment protocols might be
incorporated into strategies to prevent targeted violence in schools.

###### Overview of *Safe School Initiative* Findings

The findings of the *Safe School Initiative* suggest that there are
productive actions that educators, law enforcement officials and others
can pursue in response to the problem of targeted school violence.
Specifically, *Initiative* findings suggest that these officials may
wish to consider focusing their efforts to formulate strategies for
preventing these attacks in two principal areas:

-   developing the capacity to pick up on and evaluate available or
    knowable information that might indicate that there is a risk of a
    targeted school attack; and,

-   employing the results of these risk evaluations or "threat
    assessments" in developing strategies to prevent potential school
    attacks from occurring.

Support for these suggestions is found in 10 key findings of the *Safe
School Initiative* study. These findings are as follows:

-   Incidents of targeted violence at school *rarely* were sudden,
    impulsive acts.

-   Prior to most incidents, other people knew about the attacker's idea
    and/or plan to attack.

-   Most attackers did not threaten their targets directly prior to
    advancing the attack.

-   There is no accurate or useful "profile" of students who engaged in
    targeted school violence.[^13]

-   Most attackers engaged in some behavior prior to the incident that
    caused others concern or indicated a need for help.

-   Most attackers had difficulty coping with significant losses or
    personal failures. Moreover, many had considered or attempted
    suicide.

-   Many attackers felt bullied, persecuted or injured by others prior
    to the attack.

-   Most attackers had access to and had used weapons prior to the
    attack.

-   In many cases, other students were involved in some capacity.

-   Despite prompt law enforcement responses, most shooting incidents
    were stopped by means other than law enforcement intervention.

CHAPTER II

CHARACTERISTICS OF INCIDENTS OF TARGETED SCHOOL VIOLENCE

The *Safe School Initiative* found that targeted school violence is not
a new or recent phenomenon. The earliest case that researchers were able
to identify occurred in 1974. In that incident, a student brought guns
and homemade bombs to his school; set off the fire alarm; and shot at
emergency and custodial personnel who responded to the alarm.

The *Safe School Initiative* identified 37 incidents involving 41
attackers that met the study definition of targeted school violence and
occurred between 1974 and the end of the 2000 school year.[^14] These
incidents took place in 26 states, with more than one incident occurring
in Arkansas, California, Kentucky, Missouri and Tennessee.[^15]

Analysis of the study findings identified the following characteristics
of incidents of targeted school violence:

-   In almost three-quarters of the incidents, the attacker killed one
    or more students, faculty or others at the school (73 percent,
    n=27[^16]). In the remaining incidents, the attackers used a weapon
    to injure at least one person at school (24 percent, n=9). In one
    incident, a student killed his family and then held his class
    hostage with a weapon.

-   More than one-half of the attacks occurred during the school day (59
    percent, n=22), with fewer occurring before school (22 percent, n=8)
    or after school (16 percent, n=6).

-   Almost all of the attackers were current students at the school
    where they carried out their attacks (95 percent, n=39). Only two
    attackers were former students of the school where they carried out
    their attacks at the time of those attacks (5 percent, n=2).

-   All of the incidents of targeted school violence examined in the
    *Safe School Initiative* were committed by boys or young men (100
    percent, n=41).[^17]

-   In most of the incidents, the attackers carried out the attack alone
    (81 percent, n=30). In four of the incidents, the attacker engaged
    in the attack on his own but had assistance in planning the attack
    (11 percent, n=4). In three incidents, two or more attackers carried
    out the attack together (8 percent, n=3).

-   Most attackers used some type of gun as their primary weapon, with
    over half of the attackers using handguns (61 percent, n=25), and
    nearly half of them using rifles or shotguns (49 percent,
    n=20).[^18] Three-quarters of the attackers used only one weapon (76
    percent, n=31) to harm their victims, although almost half of the
    attackers had more than one weapon with them at time of the attack
    (46 percent, n=19).

###### Target and Victim Characteristics

Perpetrators of incidents of targeted school violence chose a range of
targets for their attacks, including fellow students, faculty and staff,
and the school itself. These incidents were usually planned in advance
and for most part included intent to harm a specific, pre-selected
target, whether or not the attacker's execution of the incident, in
fact, resulted in harm to the target.

Target and victim characteristics identified by the *Safe School
Initiative* were:

-   In over half of the incidents (54 percent, n=22), the attacker had
    selected at least one school administrator, faculty member or staff
    member as a target. Students were chosen as targets in fewer than
    half of the incidents (41 percent, n=15).

-   In nearly half of the incidents, the attackers were known to have
    chosen more than one target prior to their attack (44 percent,
    n=16).

-   Most attackers had a grievance against at least one of their targets
    prior to the attack (73 percent, n=30).[^19]

-   In almost half of the incidents (46 percent, n=17), individuals who
    were targeted prior to the attack also became victims (i.e.,
    individuals actually harmed in the attack). However, other
    individuals at the school, who were not identified as original
    targets of the attack, were injured or killed as well. Among these
    non-targeted individuals, over half were other students (57 percent,
    n=21) and over one-third (39 percent, n=16) were school
    administrators, faculty or staff.

CHAPTER III

FINDINGS OF THE *SAFE SCHOOL INITIATIVE*

The findings of researchers' analysis of the 37 incidents of targeted
school violence that were examined under the *Safe School Initiative*
fall generally into five areas:

-   characterizing the attacker;

-   conceptualizing the attack;

-   signaling the attack;

-   advancing the attack; and,

-   resolving the attack.

The findings in each of these areas are presented and explained below.

###### Characterizing the Attacker

Finding

There is no accurate or useful "profile" of students who engaged in
targeted school

violence.[^20]

*Explanation*

Although all of the attackers in this study were boys, there is no set
of traits that described all--or even most--of the attackers. Instead,
they varied considerably in demographic, background and other
characteristics.

-   The attackers ranged in age from 11 to 21, with most attackers
    between the ages of 13 and 18 at the time of the attack (85 percent,
    n=35).

-   Three-quarters of the attackers were white (76 percent, n=31).
    One-quarter of the attackers came from other racial and ethnic
    backgrounds, including African American (12 percent, n=5), Hispanic
    (5 percent, n=2), Native Alaskan (2 percent, n=1), Native American
    (2 percent, n=1), and Asian (2 percent, n=1).

The attackers came from a variety of family situations, ranging from
intact families with numerous ties to the community, to foster homes
with histories of neglect.

-   Almost two-thirds of the attackers came from two-parent families (63
    percent, n=26), living either with both biological parents (44
    percent, n=18) or with one biological parent and one stepparent (19
    percent, n=8).

-   Some lived with one biological parent (19 percent, n=8) or split
    time between two biological parents (2 percent, n=1).

-   Very few lived with a foster parent or legal guardian (5 percent,
    n=2).

For those incidents for which information on the attackers' school
performance was available, that information indicates that those
attackers differed considerably from one another in their academic
achievement in school, with grades ranging from excellent to failing
(n=34).

-   The attackers in the largest grouping were doing well in school at
    the time of the attack, generally receiving As and Bs in their
    courses (41 percent; n=17); some were even taking Advanced Placement
    courses at the time of the incident or had been on the honor roll
    repeatedly.

-   Fewer of the attackers were receiving Bs and Cs (15 percent, n=6),
    or Cs and Ds (22 percent, n=9).

-   Very few of the attackers were known to be failing in school (5
    percent, n=2).

Attackers also varied in the types of social relationships they had
established, ranging from socially isolated to popular among their
peers.

-   The largest group of attackers for whom this information was
    available appeared to socialize with mainstream students or were
    considered mainstream students themselves (41 percent, n=17).

-   One-quarter of the attackers (27 percent, n=11) socialized with
    fellow students who were disliked by most mainstream students or
    were considered to be part of a "fringe" group.

-   Few attackers had no close friends (12 percent, n=5).

-   One-third of attackers had been characterized by others as "loners,"
    or felt themselves to be loners (34 percent, n=14).

-   However, nearly half of the attackers were involved in some
    organized social activities in or outside of school (44 percent,
    n=18). These activities included sports teams, school clubs,
    extracurricular activities and mainstream religious groups.

Attackers' histories of disciplinary problems at school also varied.
Some attackers had no observed behavioral problems, while others had
multiple behaviors warranting reprimand and/or discipline.

-   Nearly two-thirds of the attackers had never been in trouble or
    rarely were in trouble at school (63 percent, n=26).

-   One-quarter of the attackers had ever been suspended from school (27
    percent, n=11).

-   Only a few attackers had ever been expelled from school (10 percent,
    n=4).

Most attackers showed *no marked change* in academic performance (56
percent, n=23), friendship patterns (73 percent, n=30), interest in
school (59 percent, n=24), or school disciplinary problems (68 percent,
n=28) prior to their attack.

-   A few attackers even showed some *improvements* in academic
    performance (5 percent, n=2) or *declines* in disciplinary problems
    at school (7 percent, n=3) prior to the attack. In one case, the
    dean of students had commended a student a few weeks before he
    attacked his school for improvements in his grades and a decline in
    the number of disciplinary problems involving that student in
    school.

Finding

Many attackers felt bullied, persecuted or injured by others prior to
the attack.

Explanation

Almost three-quarters of the attackers felt persecuted, bullied,
threatened, attacked or injured by others prior to the incident
(71percent, n=29).[^21]

In several cases, individual attackers had experienced bullying and
harassment that was long-standing and severe. In some of these cases the
experience of being bullied seemed to have a significant impact on the
attacker and appeared to have been a factor in his decision to mount an
attack at the school.[^22] In one case, most of the attacker's
schoolmates described the attacker as "the kid everyone teased." In
witness statements from that incident, schoolmates alleged that nearly
every child in the school had at some point thrown the attacker against
a locker, tripped him in the hall, held his head under water in the pool
or thrown things at him. Several schoolmates had noted that the attacker
seemed more annoyed by, and less tolerant of, the teasing than usual in
the days preceding the attack.

###### *Finding*

A history of having been the subject of a mental health evaluation,
diagnosed with a mental disorder, or involved in substance abuse did not
appear to be prevalent among

attackers. However, most attackers showed some history of suicidal
attempts or thoughts, or a history of feeling extreme depression or
desperation.

*Explanation*

-   Only one-third of attackers had ever received a mental health
    evaluation (34 percent, n=14), and fewer than one-fifth had been
    diagnosed with mental health or behavior disorder prior to the
    attack (17 percent, n=7).

-   Although most attackers had not received a formal mental health
    evaluation or diagnosis, most attackers exhibited a history of
    suicide attempts or suicidal thoughts at some point prior to their
    attack (78 percent, n=32). More than half of the attackers had a
    documented history of feeling extremely depressed or desperate (61
    percent, n=25).

-   Approximately one-quarter of the attackers had a known history of
    alcohol or substance abuse (24 percent, n=10).

-   The only information collected that would indicate whether attackers
    had been prescribed psychiatric medications concerned medication
    non-compliance (i.e., failure to take medication as prescribed). Ten
    percent of the attackers (n=4) were known to be non-compliant with
    prescribed psychiatric medications.

###### *Finding*

Over half of the attackers demonstrated some interest in violence,
through movies, video

games, books, and other media (59 percent, n=24). However, there was no
one common type

of interest in violence indicated. Instead, the attackers' interest in
violent themes took

various forms.

*Explanation*

-   Approximately one-quarter of the attackers had exhibited an interest
    in violent movies (27 percent, n=11).

-   Approximately one-quarter of the attackers had exhibited an interest
    in violent books (24 percent, n=10).

-   One-eighth of the attackers exhibited an interest in violent video
    games (12 percent, n=5).

-   The largest group of attackers exhibited an interest in violence in
    their own writings, such as poems, essays or journal entries (37
    percent, n=15).

    *Finding*

    Most attackers had no history of prior violent or criminal behavior.

    *Explanation*

-   Fewer than one-third of the attackers were known to have acted
    violently toward others at some point prior to the incident (31
    percent, n=13).

-   Very few of the attackers were known to have harmed or killed an
    animal at any time prior to the incident (12 percent, n=5).

-   Approximately one-quarter of the attackers had a prior history of
    arrest (27 percent, n=11).

*Finding*

Most attackers were known to have had difficulty coping with significant
losses or personal failures. Moreover, many had considered or attempted
suicide.

Explanation

Most attackers appeared to have difficulty coping with losses, personal
failures or other difficult circumstances. Almost all of the attackers
had experienced or perceived some major loss prior to the attack (98
percent, n=40). These losses included a perceived failure or loss of
status (66 percent, n=27); loss of a loved one or of a significant
relationship, including a romantic relationship (51 percent, n=21); and
a major illness experienced by the attacker or someone significant to
him (15 percent, n=6). In one case, the attacker, who was a former
student at the school where the attack occurred, was laid off from his
job because he did not have a high school diploma. The attacker blamed
the job loss on the teacher who failed him in a senior-year course,
which kept him from graduating. He returned to the school a year after
leaving the school, killed his former teacher and two students, and then
held over 60 students hostage for 10 hours.

For most attackers, their outward behaviors suggested difficulty in
coping with loss (83 percent, n=34). For example, the mother, the
brother and a friend of the attacker who lost his job each had commented
that the attacker became depressed and withdrawn following the lay-off.
The friend also reported that he knew that the attacker blamed his
former teacher for his problems and had begun planning how to retaliate.

###### Conceptualizing the Attack

*Finding*

Incidents of targeted violence at school *rarely* are sudden, impulsive
acts.

*Explanation*

Several findings of the *Safe School Initiative* indicate clearly that
the school-based attacks studied were rarely impulsive. Rather, these
attacks typically were thought out beforehand and involved some degree
of advance planning. In many cases, the attacker's observable behavior
prior to the attack suggested he might be planning or preparing for a
school attack.

In nearly all of the incidents for which information concerning the
attacker's conceptualization of the attack was available, researchers
found that the attacker had developed his *idea to harm* the target(s)
before the attack (95 percent, n=39). The length of time that attackers
held this idea prior to the actual attack varied considerably. Some
attackers conceived of the attack as few as one or two days prior to
advancing that attack; other attackers had held the idea of the attack
for as long as a year prior to carrying it out. For those incidents
where information was available to determine how long the attacker had
an idea to harm the target (n=33), the analysis showed that a little
over half of the attackers developed their idea for the incident at
least a month prior to the attack (51 percent, n=17).

In addition, almost all of the attackers *planned* out the attack in
advance of carrying it out (93 percent; n=38). Moreover, there was
evidence from the attacker's *behavior* prior to the attack that the
attacker had a plan or was preparing to harm the target(s) (93 percent,
n=38). For example, one attacker asked his friends to help him get
ammunition for one of his weapons; sawed off the end of a rifle to make
it easier to conceal beneath his clothes; shopped for a long trench coat
with his mother; and cut the pockets out of the coat so that he could
conceal the weapon within the coat while holding the weapon through one
of the cut-out pockets. That attacker had a well-known fascination with
weapons and had told his friends on several occasions that he thought
about killing certain students at school.

The length of time between the planning and execution of the attacks
also varied considerably for the targeted school violence incidents
studied. Some attackers developed their plans on the day of their attack
or only one or two days prior; others developed their plans between six
and eight months prior to the attack. In cases where there was
information available to establish the date planning began (n=29),
analysis of available information revealed that most of the attackers
developed a plan at least two days prior to the attack (69 percent,
n=21).

Revenge was a motive for more than half of the attackers (61 percent,
n=25). Other motives included trying to solve a problem (34 percent,
n=14); suicide or desperation (27 percent, n=11); and efforts to get
attention or recognition (24 percent, n=10). More than half of the
attackers had *multiple* motives or reasons for their school-based
attacks (54 percent, n=22). In addition, most of the attackers held some
sort of grievance at the time of the attack, either against their
target(s) or against someone else (81 percent, n=33). Many attackers
told other people about these grievances prior to their attacks (66
percent, n=27).[^23]

###### Signaling the Attack

*Finding*

Prior to most incidents, other people knew about the attacker's idea
and/or plan to attack.

Explanation

In most cases, other people knew about the attack before it took place.
In over three-quarters of the incidents, at least one person had
information that the attacker was thinking about or planning the school
attack (81 percent, n=30). In nearly two-thirds of the incidents, *more
than one* person had information about the attack before it occurred (59
percent, n=22). In nearly all of these cases, the person who knew was a
peer--a friend, schoolmate, or sibling (93 percent, n=28/30). Some peers
knew exactly what the attacker planned to do; others knew something
"big" or "bad" was going to happen, and in several cases knew the time
and date it was to occur. An adult had information about the idea or
plan in only two cases.

In one incident, for example, the attacker had planned to shoot students
in the lobby of his school prior to the beginning of the school day. He
told two friends exactly what he had planned and asked three others to
meet him that morning in the mezzanine overlooking the lobby, ostensibly
so that these students would be out of harm's way. On most mornings,
usually only a few students would congregate on the mezzanine before the
school day began. However, by the time the attacker arrived at school on
the morning of the attack, word about what was going to happen had
spread to such an extent that 24 students were on the mezzanine waiting
for the attack to begin. One student who knew the attack was to occur
brought a camera so that he could take pictures of the event.

*Finding*

Most attackers did not threaten their targets directly prior to
advancing the attack.

*Explanation*

The majority of the attackers in the targeted school violence incidents
examined under the *Safe School Initiative* did not threaten their
target(s) directly, i.e., did not tell the target they intended to harm
them, whether in direct, indirect or conditional language prior to the
attack. Only one-sixth of the attackers threatened their target(s)
directly prior to the attack (17 percent, n=7).

*Finding*

Most attackers engaged in some behavior, prior to the incident, that
caused others concern or indicated a need for help.

Explanation

Almost all of the attackers engaged in some behavior prior to the attack
that caused others--school officials, parents, teachers, police, fellow
students--to be concerned (93 percent, n=38). In most of the cases, at
least one *adult* was concerned by the attacker's behavior (88 percent,
n=36). In three-quarters of the cases, at least three people--adults and
other children--were concerned by the attacker's behavior (76 percent,
n=31). In one case, for example, the attacker made comments to at least
24 friends and classmates about his interest in killing others kids,
building bombs or carrying out an attack at the school. A school
counselor was so concerned about this student's behavior that the
counselor asked to contact the attacker's parents. The attacker's
parents also knew of his interest in guns.

The behaviors that led other individuals to be concerned about the
attacker included both behaviors specifically related to the attack,
such as efforts to get a gun, as well as other disturbing behaviors not
related to the subsequent attack. In one case, the student's English
teacher became concerned about several poems and essays that the student
submitted for class assignments because they treated the themes of
homicide and suicide as possible solutions to his feelings of despair.
In another case, the student worried his friends by talking frequently
about plans to put rat poison in the cheese shakers at a popular pizza
establishment. A friend of that student became so concerned that the
student was going to carry out the rat poison plan, that the friend got
out of bed late one night and left his house in search of his mother,
who was not home at the time, to ask her what to do.

###### Advancing the Attack

*Finding*

In many cases, other students were involved in the attack in some
capacity.

*Explanation*

Although most attackers carried out their attacks on their own, many
attackers were influenced or encouraged by others to engage in the
attacks. Nearly half of the attackers were influenced by other
individuals in deciding to mount an attack, dared or encouraged by
others to attack, or both (44 percent; n=18). For example, one
attacker's original idea had been to bring a gun to school and let other
students see him with it. He wanted to look tough so that the students
who had been harassing him would leave him alone. When he shared this
idea with two friends, however, they convinced him that exhibiting the
gun would not be sufficient and that he would have to *shoot at* people
at the school in order to get the other students to leave him alone. It
was after this conversation that this student decided to mount his
school attack.

In other cases, friends assisted the attacker in his efforts to acquire
a weapon or ammunition, discussed tactics for getting a weapon into
school undetected, or helped gather information about the whereabouts of
a target at a particular time during the school day.

*Finding*

> Most attackers had access to and had used weapons prior to the attack.

*Explanation*

Experience using weapons and access to them was common for many
attackers. Nearly two-thirds of the attackers had a known history of
weapons use, including knives, guns and bombs (63 percent, n=26). Over
half of the attackers had some experience specifically with a gun prior
to the incident (59 percent, n=24), while others had experience with
bombs or explosives (15 percent, n=6). However, fewer than half of the
attackers demonstrated any fascination or excessive interest with
weapons (44 percent, n=18), and less than one-third showed a fascination
with explosives (32 percent, n=13) prior to their attacks. Over
two-thirds of the attackers acquired the gun (or guns) used in their
attacks from their own home or that of a relative (68 percent, n=28).

###### Resolving the Attack 

Finding

Despite prompt law enforcement responses, most attacks were stopped by
means other than law enforcement intervention.

*Explanation*

Most school-based attacks were stopped through intervention by school
administrators, educators and students-or by the attacker stopping on
his own. In about one-third of the incidents, the attacker was
apprehended by or surrendered to administrators, faculty, or school
staff (27 percent, n=10) or to students (5 percent, n=2). In just over
one-fifth of the incidents, the attacker stopped on his own or left the
school (22 percent, n=8). In a few incidents, the attacker killed
himself during the course of the incident (13 percent, n=5).

Just over one-quarter of the incidents were stopped through law
enforcement intervention (27 percent, n=10). Law enforcement personnel
discharged weapons in only three of the incidents of targeted school
violence studied (8 percent, n=3).

Close to half of the incidents were known to last 15 minutes or less
from the beginning of the shooting to the time the attacker was
apprehended, surrendered or stopped shooting (47 percent, n=16).[^24]
One-quarter of the incidents were over within five minutes of their
inception (27 percent, n=9). The fact that it was not through law
enforcement intervention that most of the targeted school violence
incidents studied were stopped appears in large part to be a function of
how brief most of these incidents were in duration.

CHAPTER IV

IMPLICATIONS OF *SAFE SCHOOL INITIATIVE* FINDINGS FOR THE PREVENTION OF
TARGETED SCHOOL VIOLENCE

After careful review of the case histories of the 37 incidents of
targeted school violence examined under the *Safe School Initiative*, 10
key findings were identified that highlight information that may have
been known or knowable prior to school-based attacks and that therefore
might inform some type of intervention in or prevention of future
attacks. In this chapter, the authors discuss the implications that
these findings may have for schools and communities in developing
strategies for preventing targeted violence in schools.

###### In focusing in on these findings for their potential relevance to the development of prevention and intervention strategies, the authors acknowledge that these findings may raise other issues for consideration in addressing the problem of targeted school violence beyond those noted here. Moreover, the authors recognize that the conditions, circumstances and facts underlying the findings highlighted here may not manifest themselves in the same way in every school. Schools and communities therefore are in the best position to determine whether and how these findings and the implications suggested may apply to their particular problems and needs.

The 10 key findings that the authors believe may have implications for
the development of strategies to address the problem of targeted school
violence are as follows:

-   Incidents of targeted violence at school *rarely* are sudden,
    impulsive acts.

-   Prior to most incidents, other people knew about the attacker's idea
    and/or plan to attack.

-   Most attackers did not threaten their targets directly prior to
    advancing the attack.

-   There is no accurate or useful profile of students who engaged in
    targeted school violence.

-   Most attackers engaged in some behavior prior to the incident that
    caused others concern or indicated a need for help.

-   Most attackers had difficulty coping with significant losses or
    personal failures. Moreover, many had considered or attempted
    suicide.

-   Many attackers felt bullied, persecuted or injured by others prior
    to the attack.

-   Most attackers had access to and had used weapons prior to the
    attack.

-   In many cases, other students were involved in some capacity.

-   Despite prompt law enforcement responses, most shooting incidents
    were stopped by means other than law enforcement intervention.

###### The Implications of Key Study Findings

Key Finding 1

Incidents of targeted violence at school *rarely* are sudden, impulsive
acts.

*Implications*

Students who engaged in school-based attacks typically did not "just
snap" and then engage in impulsive or random acts of targeted school
violence. Instead, the attacks examined under the *Safe School
Initiative* appeared to be the end result of a comprehensible process of
thinking and behavior: behavior that typically began with an idea,
progressed to the development of a plan, moved on to securing the means
to carry out the plan and culminated in an attack. This is a process
that potentially may be knowable or discernible from the attacker's
behaviors and communications.

To the extent that information about an attacker's intent and planning
is knowable and may be uncovered before an incident, some attacks may be
preventable. However, findings from the *Safe School Initiative* suggest
that the time span between the attacker's decision to mount an attack
and the actual incident may be short. Consequently, when indications
that a student may pose a threat to the school community arise in the
form of revelations about a planned attack, school administrators and
law enforcement officials will need to move quickly to inquire about and
intervene in that plan.[^25]

*Key Finding 2*

Prior to most incidents, other people knew about the attacker's idea
and/or plan to attack. In most cases, those who knew were other
kids--friends, schoolmates, siblings, and others. However, this
information rarely made its way to an adult.

######### Implications

First and foremost, this finding suggests that students can be an
important part of prevention efforts. A friend or schoolmate may be the
first person to hear that a student is thinking about or planning to
harm someone. Nevertheless, for a variety of reasons, those who have
information about a potential incident of targeted school violence may
not alert an adult on their own. Schools can encourage students to
report this information in part by identifying and breaking down
barriers in the school environment that inadvertently may discourage
students from coming forward with this information. Schools also may
benefit from ensuring that they have a fair, thoughtful and effective
system to respond to whatever information students do bring forward. If
students have concerns about how adults will react to information that
they bring forward, they may be even less inclined to volunteer such
information.

In addition, this finding highlights the importance in an inquiry of
attempts to gather all relevant information from anyone who may have
contact with the student. Efforts to gather all potentially relevant
pieces of information, however innocuous they may appear on their own,
from all individuals with whom the student has contact may help to
develop a more comprehensive picture of the student's ideas, activities
and plans. In the end, investigators may find that different people in
the student's life have different pieces of the puzzle.

Key Finding 3

Most attackers did not threaten their targets directly prior to
advancing the attack.

*Implications*

This finding underscores the importance of *not waiting* for a threat
before beginning an inquiry. The *Safe School Initiative* found that
most attackers in fact did not threaten their target directly and some
made no threat at all. Instead, other behaviors and communications that
may prompt concern, such as hearing that a child is talking about
bringing a gun to school, are indicators that the child may pose a
threat and therefore should prompt the initiation of efforts to gather
information.

School administrators should respond to all students who make threats.
The lack of response could be taken by the threatener as permission to
proceed with carrying out the threat. In the end, however, it is
important to distinguish between someone who *makes* a threat--tells
people they intend to harm someone--and someone who *poses* a
threat--engages in behaviors that indicate an intent, planning or
preparation for an attack. Those conducting inquiries should focus
particular attention on any information that indicates that a student
*poses* a threat, regardless of whether the student has told a potential
target he or she intends to do them harm.

*Key Finding 4*

There is no accurate or useful profile of students who engaged in
targeted school violence.

######### Implications

The demographic, personality, school history, and social characteristics
of the attackers varied substantially. Knowing that a particular student
shares characteristics, behaviors, features or traits with prior school
shooters does not help in determining whether that student is thinking
about or planning for a violent act.

The use of profiles in this way likewise is not an effective approach to
identifying students who may pose a risk for targeted school violence at
school or for assessing the risk that a particular student may pose for
a school-based attack, once a particular student has been identified.
Reliance on profiles to predict future school attacks carries two
substantial risks: (1) the great majority of students who fit any given
profile of a "school shooter" will not actually pose a risk of targeted
violence; and, (2) using profiles will fail to identify some students
who in fact pose a risk of violence but share few if any characteristics
with prior attackers.[^26]

Rather than trying to determine the "type" of student who may engage in
targeted school violence, an inquiry should focus instead on a student's
*behaviors and communications* to determine if that student appears to
be planning or preparing for an attack. Rather than asking whether a
particular student "looks like" those who have launched school-based
attacks before, it is more productive to ask whether the student is
engaging in behaviors that suggest preparations for an attack, if so how
fast the student is moving toward attack, and where intervention may be
possible.

*Key Finding 5*

Most attackers engaged in some behavior, prior to the incident, that
caused others concern or indicated a need for help.

######### Implications

Several key findings point to the fact that kids send signals--both
directly and indirectly--to others regarding their problems. The boys
who engaged in the targeted school violence examined by the *Safe School
Initiative* were not "invisible" students. In fact nearly all of these
students engaged in behaviors\--prior to their attacks\--that caused
concern to at least one person, usually an adult, and most concerned at
least three people.

This finding highlights the range of behaviors in a student's life that
may be noticeable and that could prompt some additional probing by a
caring adult. A student's family, teachers, friends and others may have
information regarding aspects of a student's behavior that has raised
concern. As was true in some of the incidents covered in this study,
individuals in contact with the attacker may have observed something of
concern about that student's behavior, but not of sufficient concern for
them to notify anyone in a position to respond.

Educators and other adults can learn how to pick up on these signals and
make appropriate referrals.[^27] By inquiring about any information that
may have prompted some concern, an investigator may be able to develop a
more comprehensive picture of the student's past and current behavior,
and identify any indications that the student is intent on or planning
to attack. However, discretion should be exercised in determining whom
to talk to about the student, so as not to alienate or stigmatize the
student of concern. A significant challenge facing schools is to
determine how best to respond to students who are already known to be in
trouble or needing assistance.

*Key Finding 6*

Most attackers had difficulty coping with significant losses or personal
failures. Many had considered or attempted suicide.

######### Implications

Many students, not just those who engaged in school-based attacks,
experience or perceive major losses in their lives. Most students who
face a significant loss, or who have difficulty coping with such a loss,
are not going to be at risk for a school-based attack. However,
information that indicates a student is facing or having trouble dealing
with a significantly difficult situation may indicate a need to refer
the student to appropriate services and resources.

In cases where there is concern about the possibility that a student may
engage in targeted violence, attention should be given to any indication
that a student is having difficulty coping with major losses or
perceived failures, particularly where these losses or failures appear
to have prompted feelings of desperation and hopelessness. An inquiry
also should anticipate changes in the life of a troubled student, and
consider whether these changes might increase--or decrease--the threat
the student poses.

*Key Finding 7*

Many attackers felt bullied, persecuted, or injured by others prior to
the attack.

######### Implications

Bullying was not a factor in every case, and clearly not every child who
is bullied in school will pose a risk for targeted violence in school.
Nevertheless, in a number of the incidents of targeted school violence
studied, attackers described being bullied in terms that suggested that
these experiences approached torment. These attackers told of behaviors
that, if they occurred in the workplace, likely would meet legal
definitions of harassment and/or assault.

The prevalence of bullying found in this and other recent studies should
strongly support ongoing efforts to reduce bullying in American
schools.[^28] Educators can play an important role in ensuring that
students are not bullied in schools and that schools not only do not
permit bullying but also empower other students to let adults in the
school know if students are being bullied.

*Key Finding 8*

Most attackers had access to and had used weapons prior to the attack.

######### Implications

Access to weapons among some students may be common. However, when the
idea of an attack exists, *any* effort to acquire, prepare or use a
weapon or ammunition may be a significant move in the attacker's
progression from idea to action. Any inquiry should include
investigation of and attention to weapon access and use and
communications about weapons. Attention should also be given to
indications of any efforts by a student to build a bomb or acquire
bomb-making components.

The large proportion of attackers who acquired their guns from home
points to the need for schools and law enforcement officials to
collaborate on policies and procedures for responding when a student is
thought to have a firearm in school. In particular, schools should be
aware of the provisions of the Federal Gun-Free Schools Act, which
requires that all schools expel students who bring a firearm to school
and should report all violations to local law enforcement
officials.[^29]

*Key Finding 9*

In many cases, other students were involved in the attack in some
capacity.

######### Implications

This finding highlights the importance of considering what prompting or
encouragement a student may receive from others in his life that
influences his intent, planning or preparations for a potential attack.
Any investigation of potential targeted school violence should include
attention to the role that a student's friends or peers may be playing
in that student's thinking about and preparations for an attack. It is
possible that feedback from friends or others may help to move a student
from an unformed thought about attacking to developing and advancing a
plan to carry out the attack.

Key Finding 10

Despite prompt law enforcement responses, most attacks were stopped by
means other than law enforcement intervention and most were brief in
duration.

######### Implications

The short duration of most incidents of targeted school violence argues
for the importance of developing preventive measures in addition to any
emergency planning for a school or school district. The preventive
measures should include protocols and procedures for responding to and
managing threats and other behaviors of concern.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION: THREAT ASSESSMENT AS A PROMISING STRATEGY FOR PREVENTING
SCHOOL VIOLENCE

Taken together, the findings from the *Safe School Initiative* suggest
that some future attacks may be preventable. Most incidents of targeted
school violence were thought out and planned in advance. The attackers'
behavior suggested that they were planning or preparing for an attack.
Prior to most incidents, the attackers' peers knew the attack was to
occur. And most attackers were not "invisible," but already were of
concern to people in their lives.

In light of these findings, the use of a threat assessment approach may
be a promising strategy for preventing a school-based attack. Educators,
law enforcement officials and others with public safety responsibilities
may be able to prevent some incidents of targeted school violence if
they know what information to look for and what to do with such
information when it is found. In sum, these officials may benefit from
focusing their efforts on formulating strategies for preventing these
attacks in two principal areas:

-   developing the capacity to pick up on and evaluate available or
    knowable information that might indicate that there is a risk of a
    targeted school attack; and,

-   employing the results of these risk evaluations or "threat
    assessments" in developing strategies to prevent potential school
    attacks from occurring.

###### Threat Assessment and Targeted School Violence Prevention 

Threat assessment, as developed by the Secret Service and applied in the
context of targeted school violence, is a fact-based investigative and
analytical approach that focuses on what a particular student is doing
and saying, and not on whether the student "looks like" those who have
attacked schools in the past. Threat assessment emphasizes the
importance of such behavior and communications for identifying,
evaluating and reducing the risk posed by a student who may be thinking
about or planning for a school-based attack. The Department of Education
and the Secret Service currently are completing work on a publication
that will provide school administrators and law enforcement officials
with guidance on planning and implementing a threat assessment approach
within school settings.[^30]

In relying on a fact-based threat assessment approach, school officials,
law enforcement professionals and others involved in the assessment will
need tools, mechanisms and legal processes that can facilitate their
efforts to gather and analyze information regarding a student's behavior
and communications. For example, school and law enforcement personnel
should be offered training regarding what information to gather, how to
gather and evaluate it, and how they might try to intervene in cases
where the information collected suggests a student may be planning or
preparing for a school-based attack.

Several states have enacted legislation that makes it easier for schools
to share student information with law enforcement agencies and others
who are trying to determine whether a student might be moving toward a
school-based attack.[^31] Localities and states may wish to explore such
options for supporting threat assessment components in schools and
facilitating sharing information across school, law enforcement and
community systems participating in the threat assessment process.

Finally, educators can play a part in prevention by creating an
environment where students feel comfortable telling an adult whenever
they hear about someone who is considering doing harm to another person,
or even whether the person is considering harming themselves. Once such
an environment is created, it will remain important that the adults in
that environment listen to students and handle the information they
receive in a fair and responsible manner.

#### Appendix A

Incidents of Targeted School Violence, by State

+-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
| #### [State]{.smallcaps}          | #### [Town or County]{.smallcaps} |
+-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
| #### Alabama                      | #### Lanett                       |
+-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
| #### Alaska                       | #### Bethel                       |
+-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
| #### Arkansas                     | #### Jonesboro, Stamps            |
+-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
| #### California                   | #### Anaheim, Napa                |
|                                   | , Olivehurst, Palo Alto, Redlands |
+-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
| #### Colorado                     | #### Jefferson County (Littleton) |
+-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
| #### Florida                      | #### Lake Worth                   |
+-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
| #### Idaho                        | #### Notus                        |
+-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
| #### Iowa                         | #### Manchester                   |
+-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
| #### Georgia                      | #### Conyers, Scottsdale          |
+-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
| #### Kansas                       | #### Goddard                      |
+-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
| #### Kentucky                     | #### Grayson, Union, West Paducah |
+-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
| #### Massachusetts                | #### Great Barrington             |
+-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
| #### Mississippi                  | #### Pearl                        |
+-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
| #### Missouri                     | #### DeKalb, Patterson            |
+-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
| #### Montana                      | #### Lewistown                    |
+-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
| #### New Mexico                   | #### Deming                       |
+-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
| #### New York                     | #### Olean                        |
+-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
| #### North Carolina               | #### Greensboro                   |
+-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
| #### Oklahoma                     | #### Fort Gibson                  |
+-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
| #### Oregon                       | #### Springfield                  |
+-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
| #### Pennsylvania                 | #### Edinboro                     |
+-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
| #### South Carolina               | #### Blacksville                  |
+-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
| #### Tennessee                    | #### Fayetteville, Lynville       |
+-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
| #### Texas                        | #### Austin                       |
+-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
| #### Virginia                     | #### Virginia Beach               |
+-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
| #### Washington                   | #### Moses Lake                   |
+-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
| #### Wisconsin                    | #### Wauwatosa                    |
+-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+

#### 

####  

#### Appendix B

Incidents of Targeted School Violence, by Year

+--------------------------+-------------------------------------------+
| #### [Year]{.smallcaps}  | **[Month and Day]{.smallcaps}**           |
+--------------------------+-------------------------------------------+
|                          |                                           |
+--------------------------+-------------------------------------------+
| **1974**                 | December 30                               |
+--------------------------+-------------------------------------------+
| **1978**                 | May 18, October 15                        |
+--------------------------+-------------------------------------------+
|                          |                                           |
+--------------------------+-------------------------------------------+
| **1985**                 | January 21                                |
+--------------------------+-------------------------------------------+
| **1986**                 | December 4                                |
+--------------------------+-------------------------------------------+
| **1987**                 | March 2                                   |
+--------------------------+-------------------------------------------+
| **1988**                 | December 14                               |
+--------------------------+-------------------------------------------+
| **1989**                 | October 5                                 |
+--------------------------+-------------------------------------------+
|                          |                                           |
+--------------------------+-------------------------------------------+
| **1992**                 | May 1, May 14, December 14                |
+--------------------------+-------------------------------------------+
| **1993**                 | January 18, December 1                    |
+--------------------------+-------------------------------------------+
| **1994**                 | May 26, October 12, November 8            |
+--------------------------+-------------------------------------------+
| **1995**                 | January 23, October 12, November 15       |
+--------------------------+-------------------------------------------+
| **1996**                 | February 2, February 8, March 25,         |
|                          | September 25                              |
+--------------------------+-------------------------------------------+
| **1997**                 | February 19, October 1, December 1,       |
|                          | December 15                               |
+--------------------------+-------------------------------------------+
| **1998**                 | March 24, April 24, May 19, May 24        |
+--------------------------+-------------------------------------------+
| **1999**                 | April 16, April 20, May 20, November 19,  |
|                          | December 6                                |
+--------------------------+-------------------------------------------+
|                          |                                           |
+--------------------------+-------------------------------------------+
| **2000**                 | May 26                                    |
+--------------------------+-------------------------------------------+

#### Appendix C

Resources

###### Boys and Violence

Pollack, W. (1998). *Real boys: Rescuing our sons from the myths of
boyhood*. New York: Henry Holt, Inc.

Pollack, W., & Cushman, K. (2001). *Real boys workbook*. New York:
Villard.

Pollack, W., & Shuster, T. (2000). *Real boys' voices*. New York: Random
House.

###### Legal Issues

Medaris, M.L., Campbell, E., & James, B. (1997, June). *Sharing
information: A guide to the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act
and participation in juvenile justice programs*. Washington, DC: U.S.
Department of Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention and U.S. Department of Education, Family Policy Compliance
Office.

Slayton, J. (2000, March). Establishing and maintaining interagency
information sharing. *JAIBG Bulletin*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department
of Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention.

Thomerson, J. (2001, May). *School violence: Sharing student
information*. Denver, Colo.: National Conference of State Legislatures.

###### Related Research

Borum, R. (2000). Assessing violence risk among youth. *Journal of
Clinical Psychology, 56,* 1263-1288.

Dwyer, K., Osher, D., & Wagner, C. (1998). *Early warning, timely
response: A guide to safe schools.* Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of
Education.

Fein, R.A., & Vossekuil, B.V. (1999). Assassination in the United
States: An operational study of recent assassins, attackers, and
near-lethal approachers. *Journal of Forensic Sciences, 44,* 321-333.
Available at http://www.secretservice.gov/ntac.htm

###### Threat Assessment 

Borum, R., Fein, R., Vossekuil, B., & Berglund, J. (1999). Threat
assessment: Defining an approach for evaluating risk of targeted
violence. *Behavioral Sciences & the Law, 17,* 323-337. Available at
http://www.secretservice.gov/ntac.htm

Fein, R.A., & Vossekuil, B. (1998). *Protective intelligence & threat
assessment investigations: A guide for state and local law enforcement
officials* (NIJ/OJP/DOJ Publication No. 170612). Washington, DC: U.S.
Department of Justice. Available at
http://www.secretservice.gov/ntac.htm

Fein, R.A., Vossekuil, B., & Holden, G.A. (1995, September). Threat
assessment: An approach to prevent targeted violence. *National
Institute of Justice: Research in Action,* 1-7. Available at
http://www.secretservice.gov/ntac.htm

Reddy, M., Borum, R., Berglund, J., Vossekuil, B., Fein, R., &
Modzeleski, W. (2001). Evaluating risk for targeted violence in schools:
Comparing risk assessment, threat assessment, and other approaches.
*Psychology in the Schools, 38,* 157-172. Available at
http://www.secretservice.gov/ntac.htm

###### Web Sites

United States Department of Education www.ed.gov

United States Secret Service www.secretservice.gov

#### CONTACT INFORMATION

United States Secret Service United States Department of Education

National Threat Assessment Center Safe and Drug Free Schools Program

950 H Street NW, Suite 9100 400 Maryland Avenue, SW

Washington, DC 20223 Washington, DC 20202-6123

Phone: 202-406-5470 Phone: 202-260-3954

Fax: 202-406-6180 Fax: 202-260-7767

Web site: www.secretservice.gov/ntac Web site:
www.ed.gov/oese/offices/sdfs

# **U.S. Department of Education**

Roderick Paige

## *Secretary*

# **Office of Elementary and Secondary Education**

Susan B. Neuman

## *Assistant Secretary*

# **Safe and Drug-Free Schools Program**

William Modzeleski

## *Director*

# **U.S. Secret Service**

Brian L. Stafford

## *Director*

# **Office of Protective Research**

Barbara S. Riggs

## *Assistant Director*

**National Threat Assessment Center**

George P. Luczko

## *Special Agent in Charge*

May 2002

This report is in the public domain. Authorization to reproduce it in
whole or in part is granted. While permission to reprint this
publication is not necessary, the citation should be: Vossekuil, B.,
Fein, R., Reddy, M., Borum, R., & Modzeleski, W. *Final Report and
Findings of the Safe School Initiative: Implications for the Prevention
of School Attacks in the United States.* U.S. Department of Education,
Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Safe and Drug-Free Schools
Program and U.S. Secret Service, National Threat Assessment Center,
Washington, D.C., 2002.

**To order copies of this report,**

**write to:** ED Pubs, Education Publications Center, U.S. Department of
Education, P.O. Box 1398, Jessup, MD 20794-1398;

or **fax** your request to: (301) 470-1244;

or **email** your request to: <edpubs@inet.ed.gov> or
[ntac@secretservice.gov](mailto:ntac@usss.treas.gov).

or **call** in your request toll-free: 1-877-433-7827 (1-800-4-ED-Pubs).
If 877 service is not yet available in your area, call 1-800-872-5327
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or **order online** at: <http://www.ed.gov/pubs/edpubs.html>.

This report is also available on the Department of Education's Web site
at: [www.ed.gov/offices/OESE/SDFS](http://www.ed.gov/offices/OESE/SDFS)
and the U.S. Secret Service Web site at:
[www.secretservice.gov/ntac.shtml](http://www.secretservice.gov/ntac.shtml).

On request, this publication is available in alternative formats, such
as Braille, large print, audiotape, or computer diskette. For more
information, please contact the Department of Education's Alternate
Format Center (202) 260-9895 or (202) 205-81113.

[^1]: This report is an update and expansion of the earlier *Interim
    Report on the Prevention of Targeted Violence in Schools*, which was
    released in October 2000. This *Final Report* supercedes the
    *Interim Report* and should be used and referenced in place of the
    *Interim Report*.

[^2]: See Section I, "INTRODUCTION: THE *SAFE SCHOOL INITIATIVE*,
    Methodology," for a discussion of the approach used by the Secret
    Service to identify incidents of school-based attacks.

[^3]: Fein, R., Vossekuil, B., & Holden, G. (1995, September). Threat
    assessment: An approach to prevent targeted violence. *National
    Institute of Justice: Research in Action,* 1-7.

[^4]: Fein, R., & Vossekuil, B. (1999). Assassination in the United
    States: An operational study of recent assassins, attackers, and
    near-lethal approachers. *Journal of Forensic Sciences, 44,*
    321-333.

[^5]: Fein, R. & Vossekuil, B. (1998). *Protective Intelligence & Threat
    Assessment Investigations: A Guide for State and Local Law
    Enforcement Officials*. U. S. Department of Justice, Office of
    Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice: Washington, D.C.

[^6]: See, for example, Kaufman, P., et. al.(2000). *Indicators of
    School Crime and Safety, 2000*. U. S. Department of Education (NCES
    2001-017) and U. S. Department of Justice (NCJ-184176): Washington,
    D. C. Online Vers.:
    [\<http://nces.ed.gov/pubsearch/pubinfo.asp?pubid=2001017\>;]{.underline}
    Anderson, M., et. al. (2001). School-associated Violent Deaths in
    the United States, 1994-1999. *Journal of the American Medical
    Association, 286,* 2695-2702; and, National Research Council and
    Institute of Medicine, Committee on Law and Justice and Board on
    Children, Youth, and Families. (2001). *Juvenile Crime, Juvenile
    Justice*. Panel on Juvenile Crime: Prevention, Treatment, and
    Control. McCord, J., et. al. (Eds.). National Academy Press:
    Washington, D.C.

[^7]: Snyder, H.N., & Sickmund, M. (1999). *Juvenile offenders and
    victims: 1999 National Report*. Washington, D.C.: Office of Juvenile
    Justice & Delinquency Prevention, U.S. Department of Justice.
    Available online at
    www.ncjrs.gov/html/ojjdp/nationalreport99/index.html.

[^8]: U.S. Department of Education and U.S. Department of Justice
    (1999). *1999 Annual Report on School Safety*. Washington, D.C.:
    Authors.

[^9]: Ibid.

[^10]: U.S. Department of Education. National Center for Education
    Statistics (2002). *Digest of Education Statistics 2000*; Washington
    D.C.: Authors

[^11]: *Supra* note 2.

[^12]: It is possible that incidents of targeted school violence other
    than those identified by *Safe School Initiative* researchers might
    have occurred prior to the 1974 incident included in the study, or
    between 1974 and the completion of data collection for the study in
    June 2000. For example, incidents that met the study definition, but
    that were not identifiable under the study search strategy, or that
    were not reported as school-based crimes, would have been unlikely
    to come to the attention of Secret Service and Department of
    Education researchers. In addition, incidents of targeted school
    violence that have occurred since June 2000 were outside the scope
    of the study.

[^13]: Here the term "profile" refers to a set of demographic and other
    traits that a set of perpetrators of a crime have in common. Please
    refer to "Characterizing the Attacker" in Chapter III and to
    "Evaluating Risk for Targeted Violence in Schools" in Appendix C for
    further explanation of the term "profile."

[^14]: See Appendix A for a list of the dates of the incidents of
    targeted school violence examined by the *Safe School Initiative*.

[^15]: See Appendix B for a list of the locations of the incidents of
    targeted school violence studied under the *Safe School Initiative*.

[^16]: "N" refers to the number of attackers that corresponds to the
    reported percentage. Unless indicated otherwise, when the finding
    pertains to total attackers all N's are out of a total of 41. When
    the finding pertains to total incidents (i.e., school-based attacks)
    all N's are out of a total of 37 incidents.

[^17]: While all the attackers in this study were boys, it would be
    misleading to read the findings of this study as suggesting that a
    girl could not or would not carry out a school-based attack. For
    example, an incident occurred after the completion of this study in
    which a girl shot her classmate at a parochial school in
    Williamsport, Pa. In addition, a well-publicized school shooting
    that occurred in San Diego, Calif., in 1976 was carried out by a
    woman. The San Diego incident was not included in this study because
    the attacker was not a current or former student of the school where
    she conducted her attack, but, rather, lived across the street from
    the school.

[^18]: These percentages include all weapons used (i.e., discharged) in
    the attack, and therefore total more than 100 percent.

[^19]: For the purposes of this study, "grievance" was defined as "a
    belief that some other person or organization is directly or
    indirectly responsible for injury or harm to self and/or someone
    whom the subject cares about."

[^20]: *Supra* note 13.

[^21]: It is important to note that the way in which information was
    gathered for the *Safe School Initiative* did not permit researchers
    to determine the exact proportion of attackers who had been victims
    of bullying specifically. Moreover, not every attacker in this study
    felt bullied.

[^22]: The *Safe School Initiative*'s approach to gathering information
    concerning incidents of targeted school violence did not permit
    researchers to determine conclusively whether the experience of
    being bullied \--or perceptions that they that had been
    bullied\--[caused]{.underline} the attacker to engage in targeted
    school violence.

[^23]: *Supra* note 19.

[^24]: Information on incident duration was not available for seven of
    the incidents (19 percent).

[^25]: The Department of Education and the Secret Service have prepared
    a companion work to the Final Report, *Threat Assessment in Schools:
    A Guide to Managing Threatening Situations and Creating Safe School
    Climates*. This Guide is scheduled for publication in May 2002. The
    guide will include recommendations for investigating and evaluating
    threats and other behaviors of concern in school; address
    considerations for developing policies and the capacity to support
    threat assessment efforts in schools; and provide suggestions for
    approaches schools can adopt to foster school environments that
    reduce violence.

[^26]: Please refer to Reddy et al. (2001), "Evaluating risk for
    targeted violence in schools: Comparing risk assessment, threat
    assessment, and other approaches," for a full discussion review of
    assessment approaches currently available to schools. The full
    citation for the article is listed in Appendix C of this document.

[^27]: See "Early Warning, Timely Response," listed in Appendix C of
    this report, for more information about how to identify students who
    may need assistance.

[^28]: See, for example, Nansel, T., Overpeck, M., Pilla, R., Ruan, J.,
    Simons-Morton, B., & Scheidt, P. (2001). Bullying behavior among
    U.S. youth. *Journal of the American Medical Association,
    285*[,]{.underline} pp. 2094-2100.

[^29]: Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, as amended by No
    Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Title IV, Part A, Subpart 3, Section
    4141

[^30]: *Supra* note 25.

[^31]: See "Legal Issues" under the Resources section in Appendix C of
    this report for listings of documents that include descriptions of
    state statutes in this area.