**\[DNFSB LETTERHEAD\]**

January 18, 2007

The Honorable Samuel W. Bodman

Secretary of Energy

1000 Independence Avenue, SW

Washington, DC 20585-1000

Dear Secretary Bodman:

The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board) has long recognized
that significant risk reduction can be achieved by the shipment off-site
of the large inventory of high-activity transuranic waste drums stored
at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). The Board believes it
would be prudent to either expeditiously develop a viable pathway for
shipping these drums off-site or, if an acceptable approach cannot be
implemented in a timely manner, then improvements to the storage area
safety posture should be implemented on an urgent basis.

Several postulated accidents involving these transuranic waste drums
result in very high consequences because of their significant
radioactive material inventory, the proximity of the storage area to the
site boundary and the lack of robust engineered controls to mitigate or
prevent these scenarios. This waste is stored in drums and other
containers within several hundred meters of the site boundary. The
containers are stored above and below ground at Area G in Technical
Area-54. Despite the good intentions to date of the National Nuclear
Security Administration (NNSA) and the Department of Energy\'s Office of
Environmental Management, programs to reduce this waste inventory remain
only partially implemented. For example, in 2002, the Department of
Energy committed to a goal of shipping half the above ground
radioactivity offsite by 2004. That goal has not been met, and the means
to achieve it remain elusive.

Risk reduction at Area G depends largely on shipping this waste off-site
to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in New Mexico. Roughly 50,000
containers are stored at LANL; approximately 20,000 of these are
currently above ground. Of the 20,000 above ground containers, 320 (two
percent by volume) contain about one-third of the above ground
radioactivity. A comparable number of high-activity drums are buried
below ground.

Preparing and shipping these high activity drums to WIPP has been
restrained by limits placed upon the LANL repackaging and shipping
facilities. The high-activity drums exceed the radioactive material
inventory limit of the repackaging facility, while the shipping facility
radioactive material inventory limit is well below the limit for the
shipping package. The limits have been imposed because the facilities'
engineered safety systems cannot be relied upon to prevent or mitigate
certain accident scenarios, such as a full facility fire or a
significant seismic event.

In 2004, NNSA conditionally approved short-term use of a new glovebox in
an existing radiological facility to repackage the high-activity drums
for subsequent shipment to WIPP. However, in 2005, efforts to start up
this operation were discontinued, primarily because of deficiencies in
critical designated engineered safety systems.

In November 2006, the LANL contractor proposed raising the inventory
limits for the current repackaging and shipping facilities for specified
durations to prepare the above ground high-activity drums for shipment
to WIPP. The proposal submitted to NNSA identified additional
administrative controls intended to compensate for the known facility
vulnerabilities. The fundamental premise of the proposed strategy is
that accepting additional risk in these facilities to process a small
number of high-activity drums is warranted in order to achieve timely
risk reduction at Area G. In December 2006, NNSA suspended its review of
the proposal because of deficiencies in the safety basis documentation
for the proposed activities.

The Board is concerned regarding the continuing lack of a viable
disposition pathway for the high-activity transuranic waste drums at
LANL, particularly given the previous failures to resolve this problem.
Given the risks associated with continued above ground storage of these
high-activity drums, the Board believes it would be prudent to either
expeditiously develop a viable pathway for shipping these drums to WIPP
or, if an acceptable approach cannot be identified in a timely manner,
implement additional engineered measures, such as thermal, mechanical,
or confinement barriers, to improve the Area G safety posture on an
urgent basis.

However, the argument to accept additional risk to achieve timely risk
reduction for the above ground drums should not translate unchallenged
to the longer term plan to retrieve and ship below ground waste
containers. While the above ground drums are being re-packaged in the
near term, there is adequate time to develop a more measured strategy
for fully implementing engineered safety controls to fully compensate
for existing facility vulnerabilities when shipping below ground drums
to WIPP.

Therefore, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2286b(d), the Board requests a report
and a briefing within 45 days of receipt of this letter describing (1)
the risks and priority associated with LANL transuranic waste
operations, (2) either a timely pathway for shipping the above ground
high-activity drums to WIPP or urgent actions to improve the current
safety posture at Area G, and (3) a prudent strategy for shipping
additional transuranic waste that will be retrieved from underground
storage in the future.

Sincerely,

***A. J. Eggenberger***

***Chairman***

c: The Honorable Thomas P. D'Agostino

The Honorable James A. Rispoli

Mr. Edwin L. Wilmot

Mr. Mark B. Whitaker, Jr.