**\[DNFSB LETTERHEAD\]**

July 12, 2006

The Honorable Samuel W. Bodman

Secretary of Energy

U.S. Department of Energy

1000 Independence Ave., SW, Room 7A-257

Washington, DC 20585-1000

Dear Secretary Bodman:

The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board) is pleased to
enclose a copy of our Third Annual Report to Congress on Plutonium
Storage at the Department of Energy's Savannah River Site. Congress
mandated the Board to write this report in Section 3183 of the Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Public Law 107-314.

The annual report addresses actions taken by the Secretary of Energy in
response to the proposals included in the Board's initial report to
Congress on this topic, issued December 1, 2003. The initial report
dealt with the adequacy of the K-Area Materials Storage (KAMS) facility
and related support facilities such as Building 235-F at the Savannah
River Site, Aiken, South Carolina, for the storage of defense plutonium
materials.

Sincerely,

***A. J. Eggenberger***

***Chairman***

[Enclosure](../fb06l12b.pdf)

**PLUTONIUM STORAGE**

**AT THE**

**DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY'S**

**SAVANNAH RIVER SITE**

**THIRD ANNUAL REPORT**

**TO CONGRESS**

**DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES**

**SAFETY BOARD**

![](media/image1.png){width="1.96875in" height="1.6458333333333333in"}

**JUNE 2006**

**PREFACE**

**DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2003**

**PUBLIC LAW 107-314**

**SEC. 3183. STUDY OF FACILITIES FOR STORAGE OF PLUTONIUM AND PLUTONIUM
MATERIALS AT SAVANNAH RIVER SITE.**

\(a\) STUDY.―The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board shall conduct a
study of the adequacy of the K-Area Materials Storage facility (KAMS),
and related support facilities such as Building 235-F, at the Savannah
River Site, Aiken, South Carolina, for the storage of defense plutonium
and defense plutonium materials in connection with the disposition
program provided in section 3182 and in connection with the amended
Record of Decision of the Department of Energy for fissile materials
disposition.

\(b\) REPORT.―Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board shall submit to
Congress and the Secretary of Energy a report on the study conducted
under subsection (a).

\(c\) REPORT ELEMENTS.―The report under subsection (b) shall―

\(1\) address―

> \(A\) the suitability of KAMS and related support facilities for
> monitoring and observing any defense plutonium or defense plutonium
> materials stored in KAMS;
>
> \(B\) the adequacy of the provisions made by the Department for remote
> monitoring of such defense plutonium and defense plutonium materials
> by way of sensors and for handling of retrieval of such defense
> plutonium and defense plutonium materials; and
>
> \(C\) the adequacy of KAMS should such defense plutonium and defense
> plutonium materials continue to be stored at KAMS after 2019; and
>
> \(2\) include such proposals as the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety
> Board considers appropriate to enhance the safety, reliability, and
> functionality of KAMS.

\(d\) REPORTS ON ACTIONS ON PROPOSALS.―Not later than 6 months after the
date on which the report under subsection (b) is submitted to Congress,
and every year thereafter, the Secretary and the Board shall each submit
to Congress a report on the actions taken by the Secretary in response
to the proposals, if any, included in the report.

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

In its study *Plutonium Storage at the Department of Energy\'s Savannah
River Site*, dated December 1, 2003, the Defense Nuclear Facilities
Safety Board (Board) made proposals concerning the Department of
Energy\'s (DOE) plutonium disposition program, the suitability of
facilities planned for plutonium storage at the Savannah River Site
(SRS), and the remote monitoring and retrieval of plutonium.

**PROPOSALS CONCERNING THE PLUTONIUM DISPOSITION PROGRAM**

The Board proposed that DOE expedite the development of a complete,
well-considered plan for the final disposition of all excess plutonium
to preclude unnecessary extended storage of plutonium at SRS. Even with
a sound disposition plan, excess plutonium is expected to be stored for
several decades at SRS; therefore, the Board proposed that DOE conduct a
new study of available options for the storage of plutonium at that
site.

***Status of DOE Actions***. DOE has to date been unsuccessful in
consolidating excess plutonium at SRS. DOE has yet to establish a
consistent, well-considered plan for storage and disposition of excess
plutonium as envisioned by the Board. Rather, DOE\'s storage plans
continue to change. The Hanford Site initially started its planning
process for construction of a new facility for storage of its excess
plutonium, but recently ceased this effort because of the expectation
that its plutonium will be moved to a consolidation site in the near
future. DOE\'s laboratories must also continue to store excess
plutonium.

The Board believes that DOE should aggressively pursue consolidation of
its excess plutonium. DOE has reconfigured the K-Area Materials Storage
(KAMS) facility such that SRS could now consolidate all of DOE\'s excess
plutonium into this facility. DOE currently does not have the capability
at SRS to perform all of the surveillance, stabilization, and packaging
required by the long-term plutonium storage standard, but is in the
initial planning process for adding this capability to the K-Reactor
facility.

If unable to consolidate plutonium at SRS, DOE should consider other
locations that might serve the purpose. Options include consolidation in
a new facility specifically designed for such storage, or consolidation
in an existing facility that has been determined suitable for extended
storage.

Last year, DOE established a broadly chartered group―the Nuclear
Materials Disposition and Consolidation Coordination
Committee―comprising senior DOE management personnel, intended to
provide strategic planning for storage and disposition of excess
plutonium and other nuclear materials. To date, the Board has not seen
any real progress from this group toward establishing a firm strategic
plan that could be implemented across the DOE complex to consolidate,
store, and disposition excess plutonium.

**PROPOSALS CONCERNING THE SUITABILITY OF FACILITIES**

DOE originally planned for extended storage of plutonium at SRS in two
facilities-the KAMS facility and Building 235-F (235-F). Both are
50-year-old facilities that currently do not meet modem safety
standards. The Board proposed safety upgrades to ensure the safety,
reliability, and functionality of these facilities for plutonium
storage.

***Status of DOE Actions*.** As noted in the Board\'s last annual
report, DOE decided to consolidate the excess plutonium currently at SRS
into the KAMS facility and not to utilize 235-F for extended storage.
The Board agreed with this decision, which obviates the need for safety
upgrades to 235-F related to extended storage. The Board\'s proposals to
enhance the safety and reliability of 235-F for extended storage are no
longer applicable.

The Board considers the KAMS facility to be a robust structure that can
be made suitable for extended storage if an appropriate fire protection
system is established and unnecessary combustibles are eliminated. DOE
is now working toward upgrading the facility\'s fire protection system
and removing unnecessary combustibles.

Sampling of the combustible materials has revealed that they are not
contaminated with radionuclides, asbestos, or polychlorinated biphenyls,
which simplifies their removal. Removal of the materials is expected
this fiscal year. DOE is designing a fire detection system for the
storage areas and a limited fire suppression system in a small
analytical area of KAMS, but needs to provide funding for implementation
of these systems.

**PROPOSAL CONCERNING REMOTE MONITORING AND RETRIEVAL**

As stated in the Board\'s first annual report on this subject, DOE has
completed all necessary actions concerning this proposal.

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

  ------------------------------------ ----------------------------------
  Section                              Page

  ------------------------------------ ----------------------------------

**1 INTRODUCTION** 1-1

1.1 Congressional Mandate to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board
1-1

1.2 Background 1-1

1.3 The Board\'s Proposals 1-2

**2** **DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY\'S ACTIONS ON THE BOARD\'S PROPOSALS** 2-1

2.1 Plutonium Disposition Program 2-1

2.2 Suitability of Facilities 2-3

2.3 Remote Monitoring and Retrieval of Material 2-4

**APPENDIX** **PUBLIC LAW 107-314, SUBTITLE E―DISPOSITION OF**

**WEAPONS-USABLE PLUTONIUM AT SAVANNAH RIVER,**

**SOUTH CAROLINA, SECTIONS 3181, 3182, AND 3183** A-1

**GLOSSARY** GL-1

**REFERENCES** R-1

**1. INTRODUCTION**

**1.1 CONGRESSIONAL MANDATE TO THE DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY
BOARD**

In Section 3183 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2003 (Public Law 107-314),[^1] Congress directed the Defense
Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board) to conduct a study of the
adequacy of the K-Area Materials Storage (KAMS) facility and related
support facilities at the Savannah River Site (SRS) in South Carolina,
in which the Department of Energy (DOE) proposes to store defense
plutonium and defense plutonium materials. The Board was also required
to address the suitability of KAMS and related support facilities for
monitoring and observing plutonium materials stored in KAMS, the
adequacy of provisions for remote monitoring and for retrieval of
material, and the adequacy of KAMS for plutonium storage beyond 2019.
Congress required that the Board include in its report proposals the
Board considered appropriate to enhance the safety, reliability, and
functionality of KAMS.

**1.2 BACKGROUND**

A lack of consistent planning has forced managers at SRS to focus on
what can be done with existing facilities, foreclosing consideration of
other options that might have been more cost-effective and
safety-conscious. DOE\'s past decisions concerning plutonium storage at
SRS were based on a study (Sena, 2000) that is no longer consistent with
present circumstances. DOE\'s storage plans were based on the assumption
that planned immobilization and mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication
facilities would provide a near-term disposition path for all excess
plutonium metal and oxide. In 2001, primarily as a result of short-range
budget constraints, site plans changed from having one new,
state-of-the-art facility for stabilization, packaging, and storage of
materials to using multiple 50-year-old facilities (KAMS facility and
Building 235-F). Subsequently, DOE decided to not utilize 235-F and
modified the KAMS facility such that it can accept all current excess
plutonium.

DOE\'s current plutonium disposition plan relies on successful
licensing, construction, and operation of the MOX fuel fabrication
facility for disposal of the bulk of excess plutonium. However, the
planned immobilization facility has been canceled. Therefore, DOE needs
to establish disposition plans for up to 13 metric tons of excess
plutonium that would have been processed in that facility. DOE is
currently working to establish a disposition path.

Although KAMS is a 50-year-old facility, the Board considers it to be a
robust structure that can be made suitable for extended storage of
plutonium. Fires are the most significant accidents of concern in the
facility, yet it lacks fire protection systems.

**1.3 THE BOARD\'S PROPOSALS**

The Board\'s report on its study of plutonium storage at SRS was
provided to Congress and to the Secretary of Energy on December 1, 2003
(Conway, 2003).[^2] In that report, the Board concluded that plutonium
can be stored safely in the KAMS facility for a limited period of time
(4-5 years). For storage beyond this time, the Board made proposals to
enhance the safety, reliability, and functionality of the plutonium
storage facilities at SRS. The Board further concluded that DOE should
expedite decisions on disposal of excess plutonium and reevaluate its
plutonium storage plan to determine whether there are better options for
extended storage of plutonium at SRS. The Board\'s study included the
following proposals.

**Plutonium Disposition Program**

Expedite the development of a complete, well-considered plan for the
disposition of all excess plutonium to preclude unnecessary extended
storage at SRS.

Conduct a new study of available options for the storage of plutonium at
SRS.

**Suitability of Facilities**

***K-Area Materials Storage Facility***

Install fire protection systems and eliminate unnecessary combustibles
in KAMS.

***Building 235-F***

Establish an acceptable safety basis for stabilization and packaging of
plutonium, and for extended storage of plutonium in the facility.

Conduct a systematic evaluation of the facility\'s safety systems to
determine needed upgrades.

Perform a structural analysis assessing the seismic adequacy as measured
by current acceptance criteria.

Decontaminate unused process cells.

**Remote Monitoring and Retrieval of Material**

Develop and implement validated procedures for the handling and
intrasite shipment of plutonium containers, including damaged
containers.

**2. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY\'S ACTIONS ON THE BOARD\'S PROPOSALS**

This section presents the status of and the Board\'s observations on
actions being taken by DOE to address the Board\'s proposals for
enhancing the safety, reliability, and functionality of plutonium
storage facilities at SRS. Information on the status of DOE\'s actions
is based on discussions between the Board\'s staff and representatives
of DOE-Headquarters and DOE\'s Savannah River Operations Office (DOE-SR)
and the site contractor.

1.  **PLUTONIUM DISPOSITION PROGRAM**

> **Proposal 1. Expedite the development of a complete, well-considered
> plan for the disposition of all excess plutonium to preclude
> unnecessary extended storage at SRS.**

It is important for DOE to establish a consistent, technically feasible
disposition path for excess plutonium not planned for use in MOX fuel.
Without a clearly defined disposition path, plutonium storage at SRS
could be unnecessarily prolonged and located in facilities not
specifically designed for such storage.

**Status.** DOE\'s tentative plan has been to consolidate its
complex-wide excess plutonium at SRS. Doing so requires that DOE develop
a disposition plan for this excess plutonium. DOE\'s preliminary
disposition plan entailed vitrifying plutonium in lanthanide
borosilicate glass. As previously envisioned, DOE would locate this
vitrification activity in the K-Reactor facility at SRS and operate it
for about 7 years. The vitrified plutonium canisters would subsequently
be encased in high-level waste containers in the Defense Waste
Processing Facility and stored on site for eventual shipment to Yucca
Mountain. DOE-SR (Allison, 2005a) requested DOE approval of a mission
need (Critical Decision-0) for this vitrification activity.

In response to the request for approval, DOE (Sell, 2005) approved a
mission need for a plutonium disposition project. This approval required
development of an alternatives analysis for a plutonium disposition
project that considered other ongoing or planned plutonium processing
activities prior to Critical Decision-l. Submittal of the Critical
Decision-1 package is planned for the end of 2006.

Last year, DOE (Hayward, 2005) established a new group―the Nuclear
Materials Disposition and Consolidation Coordination
Committee-comprising senior DOE management personnel. This group is to
provide a forum for performing cross-cutting planning for DOE\'s nuclear
material disposition and consolidation activities.

**Board\'s Observations.** DOE has yet to establish a consistent,
well-considered plan for storage and disposition of its excess plutonium
as envisioned by the Board. Rather, DOE\'s storage plans continue to
change. DOE has to date been unsuccessful in consolidating excess
plutonium

material at SRS. In February 2005, DOE (Golan, 2005) directed the
Hanford Site to assume for planning purposes that some of its plutonium
would remain on site through 2035. Hanford thus initiated planning for
construction of a new facility for storage of its excess plutonium, but
this effort recently ceased because of the site\'s expectation that its
plutonium will be moved to a consolidation site in the near future. The
contractor has been instructed to plan for the shipment of plutonium to
a consolidation site starting in 2007 as part its baseline plan. DOE\'s
laboratories must also continue to store excess plutonium.

As previously stated, the Board believes DOE should consider broader
alternatives for safe and secure storage of its excess plutonium. If the
material cannot be consolidated at SRS, DOE should consider other
locations that could be used for this purpose. Consolidation of excess
plutonium into a single, robust facility suitable for extended
retrievable storage is logical from safety, security, and economic
perspectives.

DOE\'s long-term plutonium storage standard\'[^3] requires that storage
sites perform periodic surveillance of containers to help ensure that
unexpected conditions do not develop. DOE currently lacks the capability
at SRS to perform all of the surveillance, stabilization, and packaging
required by this standard, but is in the initial planning process for
adding this capability to the K-Reactor facility. The Board intends to
follow this effort as part of its normal oversight of activities at the
site.

During the past year, DOE-SR has been considering various options for
the disposition of excess plutonium. At this time, DOE-SR still appears
to prefer the vitrification option. The vitrification process appears to
be a technically acceptable alternative, but the concept is preliminary,
is still years away from being realized, and is expected to require
significant new funding for SRS.

> **Proposal 2. Conduct a new study of available options for the storage
> of plutonium at SRS.**

DOE\'s plans for storage of plutonium currently at SRS are based on
assumptions that are no longer consistent with the current situation. In
the Board\'s view, DOE would benefit from conducting an integrated study
of options for storage of plutonium at SRS.

**Status.** To better meet security requirements, DOE has decided to
consolidate the plutonium already at SRS into the KAMS facility and will
not utilize 235-F. In its last annual report, the Board suggested DOE
should consider whether a new facility would be economically viable. No
formal consideration of this suggestion has been performed, but
informally site personnel have indicated they do not believe a new
facility would be cost-effective given the expected duration of storage
following construction of a new facility.

**Board\'s Observations.** The Board agrees that if current plans for
storage and potential disposition are met, a new facility will likely
not be warranted, especially considering the current funding shortages
facing DOE. Accordingly, the Board considers this proposal closed.

**2.2 SUITABILITY OF FACILITIES**

**K-Area Materials Storage Facility**

**Proposal 1. Install fire protection systems.**

Accident scenarios involving fires are of great concern in KAMS, yet the
facility does not have a fire protection system. The Board believes DOE
should establish an appropriate fire protection system-a fire alarm and
suppression or, alternatively, fire detection and alarm system with an
enhanced firefighting capability.

**Status.** DOE has now agreed to provide a fire protection system for
the KAMS facility.

DOE-SR (Allison, 2005c) directed the contractor to submit a baseline
change proposal to perform this work by September 30, 2006. DOE is
currently designing a fire detection system for the storage areas and a
limited fire suppression system in a small analytical area of KAMS.

**Board\'s Observations.** The Board has not reviewed the design of the
proposed fire protection system modifications due to its current
incomplete status. However, the modifications are straightforward and
should not be difficult to design and install. Funding for completion of
the modifications still needs to be provided.

**Proposal 2. Eliminate unnecessary combustibles in KAMS.**

Abandoned cables in the actuator tower present a large combustible load
and pose a risk of fire. The Board believes it would be better to remove
the abandoned cables, rather than accommodate this fire as approved by
DOE for the short-term storage mission.

**Status.** DOE-SR (Allison, 2005c) directed the contractor to submit a
baseline change proposal for removal of the abandoned cables by
September 30, 2006. Sampling of the combustible materials has revealed
that they are not contaminated with radionuclides, asbestos, or
polychlorinated biphenyls, which simplifies their removal.

**Board\'s Observations.** The combustible cables are expected to be
removed this fiscal year.

The Board has been told informally that the salvage value of the cables
partially offsets the cost of removal.

**Building 235-F**

As stated in the Board\'s last annual report (Conway, 2005),[^4] DOE-SR
(Allison, 2005b) directed that its site contractor proceed with planning
that effectively required 235-F not to be used for extended storage. The
Board agreed with that direction. The Board\'s proposals for enhancing
the safety and reliability of this facility are no longer applicable to
the extended storage mission.

3.  **REMOTE MONITORING AND RETRIEVAL OF MATERIAL**

As stated in the Board\'s first annual report (Conway, 2004) on this
subject, DOE has

completed all necessary actions concerning this proposal.

**APPENDIX**

**PUBLIC LAW 107-314, SUBTITLE E―DISPOSITION OF WEAPONS-USABLE**

**PLUTONIUM AT SAVANNAH RIVER, SOUTH CAROLINA,**

**SECTIONS 3181, 3182, AND 3183**

**SEC. 3181. FINDINGS.**

Congress makes the following findings:

\(1\) In September 2000, the United States and the Russian Federation
signed a Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement by which each
agreed to dispose of 34 metric tons of weapons-grade plutonium.

\(2\) The agreement with Russia is a significant step toward
safeguarding nuclear materials and preventing their diversion to rogue
states and terrorists.

\(3\) The Department of Energy plans to dispose of 34 metric tons of
weapons-grade plutonium in the United States before the end of 2019 by
converting the plutonium to a mixed-oxide fuel to be used in commercial
nuclear power reactors.

\(4\) The Department has formulated a plan for implementing the
agreement with Russia through construction of a mixed-oxide fuel
fabrication facility, the so-called MOX facility, and a pit disassembly
and conversion facility at the Savannah River Site, Aiken, South
Carolina.

\(5\) The United States and the State of South Carolina have a
compelling interest in the safe, proper, and efficient operation of the
plutonium disposition facilities at the Savannah River Site. The MOX
facility will also be economically beneficial to the State of South
Carolina, and that economic benefit will not be fully realized unless
the MOX facility is built.

\(6\) The State of South Carolina desires to ensure that all plutonium
transferred to the State of South Carolina is stored safely; that the
full benefits of the MOX facility are realized as soon as possible; and,
specifically, that all defense plutonium or defense plutonium materials
transferred to the Savannah River Site either be processed or be removed
expeditiously.

**SEC. 3182. DISPOSITION OF WEAPONS-USABLE PLUTONIUM AT SAVANNAH**

**RIVER SITE.**

\(a\) PLAN FOR CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION OF MOX FACILITY.―(1) Not later
than February 1, 2003, the Secretary of Energy shall submit to Congress
a plan for the construction and operation of the MOX facility at the
Savannah River Site, Aiken, South Carolina.

\(2\) The plan under paragraph (1) shall include―

\(A\) a schedule for construction and operations so as to achieve, as of
January 1, 2009, and thereafter, the MOX production objective, and to
produce I metric ton of mixed-oxide fuel by December 31, 2009 ; and

\(B\) a schedule of operations of the MOX facility designed so that 34
metric tons of defense plutonium and defense plutonium materials at the
Savannah River Site will be processed into mixed-oxide fuel by January
1, 2019.

\(3\) (A) Not later than February 15 each year, beginning in 2004 and
continuing for as long as the MOX facility is in use, the Secretary
shall submit to Congress a report on the implementation of the plan
required by paragraph (1).

\(B\) Each report under subparagraph (A) for years before 2010 shall
include―

> \(i\) an assessment of compliance with the schedules included with the
> plan under paragraph (2); and
>
> \(ii\) a certification by the Secretary whether or not the MOX
> production objective can be met by January 2009.

\(C\) Each report under subparagraph (A) for years after 2009 shall―

\(i\) address whether the MOX production objective has been met ; and

> \(ii\) assess progress toward meeting the obligations of the United
> States under the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement.

\(D\) Each report under subparagraph (A) for years after 2017 shall also
include an assessment of compliance with the MOX production objective
and, if not in compliance, the plan of the Secretary for achieving one
of the following:

> \(i\) Compliance with such objective.
>
> \(ii\) Removal of all remaining defense plutonium and defense
> plutonium materials from the State of South Carolina.

\(b\) CORRECTIVE ACTIONS.―(1) If a report under subsection (a)(3)
indicates that construction or operation of the MOX facility is behind
the applicable schedule under subsection (a)(2) by 12 months or more,
the Secretary shall submit to Congress, not later than August 15 of the
year in which such report is submitted, a plan for corrective actions to
be implemented by the Secretary to ensure that the MOX facility project
is capable of meeting the MOX production objective by January 1, 2009.

> \(2\) If a plan is submitted under paragraph (1) in any year after
> 2008, the plan shall include corrective actions to be implemented by
> the Secretary to ensure that the MOX production objective is met.
>
> \(3\) Any plan for corrective actions under paragraph (1) or (2) shall
> include established milestones under such plan for achieving
> compliance with the MOX production objective.
>
> \(4\) If, before January 1, 2009, the Secretary determines that there
> is a substantial and material risk that the MOX production objective
> will not be achieved by 2009 because of a failure to achieve
> milestones set forth in the most recent corrective action plan under
> this subsection, the Secretary shall suspend further transfers of
> defense plutonium and defense plutonium materials to be processed by
> the MOX facility until such risk is addressed and the Secretary
> certifies that the MOX production objective can be met by 2009.
>
> \(5\) If, after January 1, 2009, the Secretary determines that the MOX
> production objective has not been achieved because of a failure to
> achieve milestones set forth in the most recent corrective action plan
> under this subsection, the Secretary shall suspend further transfers
> of defense plutonium and defense plutonium materials to be processed
> by the MOX facility until the Secretary certifies that the MOX
> production objective can be met.
>
> (6)(A) Upon making a determination under paragraph (4) or (5), the
> Secretary shall submit to Congress a report on the options for
> removing from the State of South Carolina an amount of defense
> plutonium or defense plutonium materials equal to the amount of
> defense plutonium or defense plutonium materials transferred to the
> State of South Carolina after April 15, 2002.
>
> \(B\) Each report under subparagraph (A) shall include an analysis of
> each option set forth in the report, including the cost and schedule
> for implementation of such option, and any requirements under the
> National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.)
> relating to consideration or selection of such option.
>
> \(C\) Upon submittal of a report under paragraph (A), the Secretary
> shall commence any analysis that may be required under the National
> Environmental Policy Act of 1969 in order to select among the options
> set forth in the report.

\(c\) CONTINGENT REQUIREMENT FOR REMOVAL OF PLUTONIUM AND MATERIALS FROM
SAVANNAH RIVER SITE.―If the MOX production objective is not achieved as
of January 1, 2009, the Secretary shall, consistent with the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 and other applicable laws, remove from
the State of South Carolina, for storage or disposal elsewhere―

\(1\) not later than January 1, 2011, not less than 1 metric ton of
defense plutonium or defense plutonium materials ; and

\(2\) not later than January 1, 2017, an amount of defense plutonium or
defense plutonium materials equal to the amount of defense plutonium or
defense plutonium materials transferred to the Savannah River Site
between April 15, 2002 and January 1, 2017, but not processed by the MOX
facility.

\(d\) ECONOMIC AND IMPACT ASSISTANCE.―(1) If the MOX production
objective is not achieved as of January 1, 2011, the Secretary shall,
from funds available to the Secretary, pay to the State of South
Carolina each year beginning on or after that date through 2016 for
economic and impact assistance an amount equal to \$1,000,000 per day,
not to exceed \$100,000,000 per year, until the later of―

> \(A\) the date on which the MOX production objective is achieved in
> such year ; or
>
> \(B\) the date on which the Secretary has removed from the State of
> South Carolina in such year at least 1 metric ton of defense plutonium
> or defense plutonium materials.

(2)(A) If, as of January 1, 2017, the MOX facility has not processed
mixed-oxide fuel from defense plutonium and defense plutonium materials
in the amount of not less than―

> \(i\) one metric ton, in each of any two consecutive calendar years;
> and
>
> \(ii\) three metric tons total, the Secretary shall, from funds
> available to the Secretary, pay to the State of South Carolina for
> economic and impact assistance an amount equal to \$1,000,000 per day,
> not to exceed \$100,000,000 per year, until the removal by the
> Secretary from the State of South Carolina of an amount of defense
> plutonium or defense plutonium materials equal to the amount of
> defense plutonium or defense plutonium materials transferred to the
> Savannah River Site between April 15, 2002, and January 1, 2017, but
> not processed by the MOX facility.

\(B\) Nothing in this paragraph may be construed to terminate,
supersede, or otherwise affect any other requirements of this section.

\(3\) If the State of South Carolina obtains an injunction that
prohibits the Department from taking any action necessary for the
Department to meet any deadline specified by this subsection, that
deadline shall be extended for a period of time equal to the period of
time during which the injunction is in effect.

\(e\) FAILURE TO COMPLETE PLANNED DISPOSITION PROGRAM.―If on July 1 each
year beginning in 2020 and continuing for as long as the MOX facility is
in use, less than 34 metric tons of defense plutonium or defense
plutonium materials have been processed by the MOX facility, the
Secretary shall submit to Congress a plan for―

\(1\) completing the processing of 34 metric tons of defense plutonium
and defense plutonium material by the MOX facility; or

\(2\) removing from the State of South Carolina an amount of defense
plutonium or defense plutonium materials equal to the amount of defense
plutonium or defense plutonium materials transferred to the Savannah
River Site after April 15, 2002, but not processed by the MOX facility.

\(f\) REMOVAL OF MIXED-OXIDE FUEL UPON COMPLETION OF OPERATIONS OF

MOX FACILITY.―If, one year after the date on which operation of the MOX
facility permanently ceases, any mixed-oxide fuel remains at the
Savannah River Site, the Secretary shall submit to Congress―

> \(1\) a report on when such fuel will be transferred for use in
> commercial nuclear reactors; or
>
> \(2\) a plan for removing such fuel from the State of South Carolina.

\(g\) DEFINITIONS.―In this section:

\(1\) MOX PRODUCTION OBJECTIVE.―The term \"MOX production objective\"
means production at the MOX facility of mixed-oxide fuel from defense
plutonium and defense plutonium materials at an average rate equivalent
to not less than one metric ton of mixed-oxide fuel per year. The
average rate shall be determined by measuring production at the MOX
facility from the date the facility is declared operational to the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission through the date of assessment.

\(2\) MOX FACILITY.―The term \"MOX facility\" means the mixed-oxide fuel
fabrication facility at the Savannah River Site, Aiken, South Carolina.

\(3\) DEFENSE PLUTONIUM; DEFENSE PLUTONIUM MATERIALS.―The terms
\"defense plutonium\" and \"defense plutonium materials\" mean
weapons-usable plutonium.

**SEC. 3183. STUDY OF FACILITIES FOR STORAGE OF PLUTONIUM AND PLUTONIUM
MATERIALS AT SAVANNAH RIVER SITE.**

\(a\) STUDY.―The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board shall conduct a
study of the adequacy of the K-Area Materials Storage facility (KAMS),
and related support facilities such as Building 235-F, at the Savannah
River Site, Aiken, South Carolina, for the storage of defense plutonium
and defense plutonium materials in connection with the disposition
program provided in section 3182 and in connection with the amended
Record of Decision of the Department of Energy for fissile materials
disposition.

\(b\) REPORT.―Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board shall submit to
Congress and the Secretary of Energy a report on the study conducted
under subsection (a).

\(c\) REPORT ELEMENTS.―The report under subsection (b) shall―

\(1\) address―

> \(A\) the suitability of KAMS and related support facilities for
> monitoring and observing any defense plutonium or defense plutonium
> materials stored in KAMS;
>
> \(B\) the adequacy of the provisions made by the Department for remote
> monitoring of such defense plutonium and defense plutonium materials
> by way of sensors and for handling of retrieval of such defense
> plutonium and defense plutonium materials; and
>
> \(C\) the adequacy of KAMS should such defense plutonium and defense
> plutonium materials continue to be stored at KAMS after 2019; and
>
> \(2\) include such proposals as the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety
> Board considers appropriate to enhance the safety, reliability, and
> functionality of KAMS.

\(d\) REPORTS ON ACTIONS ON PROPOSALS.―Not later than 6 months after the
date on which the report under subsection (b) is submitted to Congress,
and every year thereafter, the Secretary and the Board shall each submit
to Congress a report on the actions taken by the Secretary in response
to the proposals, if any, included in the report.

**GLOSSARY**

  --------------------- -------------------------------------------------
  Board                 Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

  DOE                   Department of Energy

  DOE-SR                Department of Energy Savannah River Operations
                        Office

  KAMS                  K-Area Materials Storage

  MOX                   Mixed-oxide

  SRS                   Savannah River Site

  235-F                 Building 235-F
  --------------------- -------------------------------------------------

**REFERENCES**

Allison, J. M., Manager, Savannah River Operations Office, U.S.
Department of Energy. 2005a.

Letter, Request for Critical Decision Zero (CD-0) Approval of Mission
Need for the Plutonium Vitrification Project. February 9.

Allison, J. M., Manager, Savannah River Operations Office, U.S.
Department of Energy. 2005b.

Letter, *Letter of Direction to Implement an Accelerated Shutdown of
Building 235-F*. April 22.

Allison, J. M., Manager, Savannah River Operations Office, U.S.
Department of Energy. 2005c.

Letter, *K-Area Fire Protection* (Letter, Pedde to Allison, *\"WSRC
Standards/Requirements Identification Document (SRID) compliance
Approval,\"* 7/13/05). September 29.

Conway, J. T., Chairman, Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board. 2003.
Report to Congress, *Plutonium Storage at the Department of Energy\'s
Savannah River Site*. Washington, D. C. December.

Conway, J. T., Chairman, Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board. 2004.
First Annual Report to Congress, *Plutonium Storage at the Department of
Energy\'s Savannah River Site*. Washington,

D.C. June.

Conway, J. T., Chairman, Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board. 2005.
Second Annual Report to Congress, *Plutonium Storage at the Department
of Energy\'s Savannah River Site*. Washington, D.C. June.

Golan, P. M., Acting Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management,
U.S. Department of Energy. 2005. \"Memorandum, *Implementation Guidance
for DOE Order 470.3 Design Basis Threat Policy*. February 15.

Hayward, M. A., Senior Policy Advisor National Security Matters, U. S.
Department of Energy.

2005\. Memorandum, *Nuclear Materials Disposition and Consolidation
Coordination Committee*. February 17.

Sena, R. F., Director, Nuclear Materials Stewardship Project Office, U.
S. Department of Energy.

2000\. Memorandum, *Savannah River Plutonium Storage Study Final
Report*. November 30.

Sell, C., Deputy Secretary, U. S. Department of Energy. 2005.
Memorandum, *Approval of Mission Need (CD-0) for a Plutonium Disposition
Project*. September 6.

[^1]: See the appendix for the statutory text of Sections 3181, 3182,
    and 3183.

[^2]: The Board's study is available on the Board's website at:
    www.dnfsb.gov/pub_docs/dnfsb/rc_20031201.pdf.

[^3]: DOE-STD-3013, Stabilization, Packaging, and Storage of
    Plutonium-Bearing Materials.

[^4]: The Board's annual reports are available on the Board's website
    at: http://www.dnfsb.gov/pub_doc/dnfsb/rc/html