[BACKGROUND]{.underline}

In FY '03,'04,'05, '06 and '07 the Committee included language to
prevent ATF from disclosing unredacted firearm trace data and multiple
handgun purchase data.

-   Firearms trace data include information such as the agency
    requesting a gun trace, the location from which the gun was
    recovered, and the identity of the dealer and original retail buyer.

-   Multiple handgun sales reports include information such as the
    buyer's name and address, and the makes, models and serial numbers
    of handguns purchased.

[ATF and the Fraternal Order of Police oppose release of these databases
(See Tabs 2 & 3).]{.underline} The databases contain information (such
as names of buyers of traced guns) that could identify officers or
informants, and could jeopardize ongoing investigations.

-   If this information were made public, for example, a suspected gun
    trafficker targeted by an investigation could search the multiple
    sales database for names of "straw purchasers" he had used to buy
    handguns, or search the trace database for traces requested on guns
    he had sold.

> Current New York City Police Commissioner Ray Kelly supported this
> policy in 2002 when he wrote former U.S. Attorney General John
> Ashcroft (See Tab 4) and then in 2003 when he entered into a
> Memorandum of Understanding with the ATF supporting the policy. (See
> Tab 5) After New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg took office,
> Commissioner Kelly's position changed.

-   In affidavits filed in one case on this subject, senior ATF staff
    testified to several such scenarios in which investigations could be
    compromised and the safety of federal agents, local police officers
    and others could be threatened.

> The FOP claims a New York City sting operation by private
> investigators hired by the City jeopardized multiple investigations in
> 2006. (See Tab 3) The U.S. Department of Justice complained to the
> City of New York in a February 2007 letter about the potential for
> their actions to "interrupt or jeopardize ongoing criminal
> investigations." (See Tab 6)

-   Brooklyn Judge Weinstein has claimed that the FY 2004 language
    "could be interpreted to prevent the cooperation of BATF with the
    courts in amassing evidence in a murder prosecution." The FY 2005,
    2006, 2007 language clearly addresses that concern, as well as any
    concern about the effect on civil actions such as license revocation
    proceedings.

-   The 2005 Tiahrt Amendment clarified that the ATF may release
    aggregate statistical data for publication. Unfortunately, that
    provision continues to be misinterpreted and Rep. Tiahrt is working
    on additional clarifying language for the FY 2008 bill. (See Tab 7)

[SUMMARY]{.underline}

-   The FOP and the ATF, as well as individual law enforcement officers,
    have expressed concern that the release of trace data into the
    public impairs their job.

    -   These are the men and women concerned with bringing criminals to
        justice and we should pay heed to their concern -- especially as
        they put their own lives on the line to protect us and our
        families.

-   The Fraternal Order of Police (FOP) states that:

    -   "The FOP has supported this language since the original version
        was first enacted several years ago because of our concern for
        the safety of law enforcement officers and the integrity of law
        enforcement investigations."

    -   "According to media reports last year, law enforcement sources
        cited that as many as 'four cases were compromised, and an
        additional 14 were put at risk' by private investigators
        employed by the city \[NYC\] who acted on the basis of trace
        data."

-   In multiple meetings with Rep. Tiahrt over the years, ATF directors
    have unequivocally expressed their belief that the release of trace
    data for any other reason than a criminal investigation/prosecution
    puts officers' lives on the line. Director Truscott expressed
    concern about the breadth of personal information about officers and
    investigative tools included in trace data reports that would
    threaten the ability of his agency and local law enforcement
    agencies to carry out their duties. He also believed that it would
    expose undercover agents and put them and their families at risk.

-   [The facts are clear here:]{.underline}

    -   [The intention of the so-called Tiahrt Amendment was never to
        prevent the sharing of trace data or other information in a
        criminal investigation or prosecution.]{.underline} In fact,
        over the past couple of years Rep. Tiahrt has tweaked the
        language to ensure that there is no misinterpretation.

-   This year, Rep. Tiahrt has asked Chairman Mollohan for a revision in
    the language to clarify that trace data information is always
    available to law enforcement officials and prosecutors conducting
    bona fide criminal investigations. This revision will ensure that
    the language reflects Congressional intent that such data not be
    prevented due to geographic jurisdiction. (See Tab 7)

-   Rep. Tiahrt has also requested that due to national security
    concerns, nothing in the language shall be construed to prevent the
    sharing or exchange of such information among and between federal
    state, local or foreign law enforcement agencies or federal, state,
    or local prosecutors, or national security, intelligence, or
    counterterrorism officials.