**CHAPTER 4**

**RISK PERCEPTION AND COMMUNICATION**

This chapter explains how people perceive the risks of environmental
hazards and the actions they can take to protect themselves from those
hazards. Addressing such perceptions is the most common way for
emergency managers to change the behavior of those at risk from
long-term threats or imminent impacts of disasters. This chapter
describes the *Protective Action Decision Model*, which summarizes
findings from studies of household response to disasters, and concludes
with recommendations for risk communication during the continuing hazard
phase, escalating crises, and emergency response.

**Introduction**

Risk can be defined broadly as a condition in which there is a
*possibility* that persons or property could experience adverse
consequences. Some people, by virtue of their access to data or their
specialized expertise in interpreting those data, have more information
than others about the risk of a particular hazard and about ways in
which that risk can be managed. These risk analysts have a
responsibility to convey their assessments to decisionmakers who must
determine what action to take in response to the risk that the analyst
has characterized. These assessments typically define *risk* in terms of
the *likelihood that an event of a given magnitude will occur at a given
location within a given time period* and describe the *expected
consequences that the event will inflict on persons, property, and
social functioning*. The decisionmakers to whom the analysts communicate
this information can be either the population at risk or emergency
managers who are responsible for protecting the population at risk. In
either case, the principal reason for risk communication is to initiate
and direct protective action.

Risk communication has become a common concept in recent
decades---appearing in many contexts (infectious diseases, food
additives, natural hazards, routine effluents, and technological
accidents) and referring to many target groups (employees, households,
minority groups, and legislators, to name only a few). The principal
concern of this chapter will be events that, because of their rapid
onset and the large amounts of energy or materials released, have the
potential to cause significant numbers of casualties and substantial
amounts of property damage unless timely and effective action is taken.

Some of these extreme events *originate* in the natural environment and,
thus, are known as natural hazards. Events involving the release of
substantial amounts of energy (e.g., earthquakes) can cause immediate
destruction of buildings and infrastructure, inflicting many casualties
(deaths, injuries, and illnesses) and much disruption to social,
economic, and political activities. In some cases, these effects are
immediate, whereas in other cases they might take years to manifest
themselves.

In addition to hazards originating in the natural environment, there are
also hazards that are *transmitted through* the natural environment.
These include some, but not all, of what are commonly referred to as
technological hazards. Some technological hazards can have a very rapid
onset and have the potential for killing many people very quickly unless
there is a prompt and effective emergency response. Others involve the
cumulative effect of routine air- or water-borne releases from
technological facilities or contamination of food and drugs. Many
exposures to these hazards unfold over an extended period of time and
the adverse health effects even more delayed---frequently producing low
incidence rates of disease in the affected population. Regardless of the
speed of onset or the persistence of the hazard, the same principles of
risk communication are likely to apply.

There is, however, a temporal distinction that is central to the
organization of this chapter---the amount of time between the detection
of the hazard and the onset of exposure. A risk communication effort
addressing the imminent threat of an extreme event is referred to as a
*warning*; it is intended to produce an appropriate *emergency
response*. By contrast, a risk communication program addressing the
long-term potential for such events to occur is often known as a *hazard
awareness program*; such efforts are intended to produce *long-term
hazard adjustments*. There are quite distinct research literatures on
natural and technological hazards that have produced similar conclusions
about warnings but have encountered an important difference in the case
of hazard awareness programs. Natural hazards seem to arouse
substantially less concern than technological hazards, so risk
communication programs about the long-term threat of natural hazards
generally have sought to *increase* public concern. By contrast, risk
communication programs about the long-term threat of technological
hazards have more frequently sought to *decrease* public concern.
Research on technological risk perception has sought to explain why some
hazards elicit more concern than others, and it appears the difference
is due, at least in part, to such hazard characteristics as the
voluntariness and controllability of hazard exposure and the degree of
dread about its consequences (Slovic, 1987).

Risk communication attempts to promote appropriate protective behavior
by those to whom the information is directed; such *hazard adjustments*
to long-term threats include modifying the hazard, modifying the
hazard's impact by preventing specific effects, moving to another
location, changing the land use to reduce hazard vulnerability, sharing
the loss, or bearing the loss (Burton, et al., 1993). Alternatively, one
can think of such behavior changes as *disaster responses* to an
imminent threat by such actions as evacuating, sheltering in-place,
expedient respiratory protection, or food interdiction (Drabek, 1986;
Mileti, Drabek & Haas, 1975).

In general, this chapter will emphasize the communication of information
to those who are actually at risk of exposure to a hazard, but also will
recognize the need for communicating to those who *think* they are at
risk of exposure to the hazard even if authorities do not share this
belief. In the latter case, messages are sometimes needed to convince
people they do not need to take protective actions because they will not
be exposed to the hazard or because the actions being taken by
authorities will be sufficient to protect them. Alternatively, such
messages might be designed to convince people that hazard managers do
not need to implement protective actions because the costs of responding
outweigh the risk. Moreover, authorities are occasionally knowledgeable
enough about citizens' concerns that a one-way communication flow from
them to citizens will produce results that are satisfactory to all
concerned. In practice, however, authorities frequently need feedback
from citizens and should expect such feedback whether or not they
believe it is needed. For most environmental hazards, the risk
communication process should be based upon a hazard analysis that
identifies *risk areas*---the geographical locations in which the
environmental extremes are expected to occur---and the mechanisms by
which exposure can occur. The risk communication process also should be
guided by a vulnerability analysis identifying the populations and
property located in those risk areas. These analyses provide the basic
data upon which messages can be formulated that describe the
vulnerability of different population segments and the protective
responses that are appropriate to reduce these risks.

It is important to recognize that one cannot focus exclusively on a risk
analyst's definition of the situation to generate risk messages.
Unfortunately, many well-intended attempts at risk communication are
based on the assumption that risk area populations fail to implement
analysts' protective action recommendations because they are unaware of
or misperceive the risk. Thus, analysts assume that disseminating
scientific information about the hazard agent will motivate people to
adopt their protective action recommendations. This assumption is
correct in some cases, but it substantially oversimplifies the risk
communication process because it ignores the roles of the information
source, the channel by which the information is transmitted, and the
individual differences among message receivers. In addition, this naive
approach to risk communication also ignores the effects of impediments
to information processing such as competing demands for attention, the
use of cognitive heuristics (simplified rules of thumb for processing
complex information), and conflicts of the new information with people's
existing beliefs (Yates, 1990). Finally, such an approach neglects the
social structural (community) and cultural environments in which
communication processes are immersed (Gudykunst, 1998).

Instead, risk communication should be a process in which stakeholders
share information about hazards affecting a community. The use of the
term *sharing* is important because risk analysts and emergency managers
must understand how different segments of the population at risk think
about a hazard if they are to be effective in communicating with their
audience. These population segments include businesses and households
that are vulnerable to a specific hazard, as well as community and
industry personnel who are responsible for managing a hazard in ways
that reduce the risk to a level that is acceptable to the community.

People's attentiveness to risk communication varies across the four
emergency management functions---hazard mitigation, emergency
preparedness, emergency response, and disaster recovery. Decades ago,
Fritz (1968) observed most of the money and resources for emergency
management are expended in connection with response and recovery
activities. This is consistent with the cycle, noted in previous
chapters, of significant citizen and government interest in disasters
only during imminent threats and in the immediate aftermath of
disasters. However, public attention declines significantly as time
passes. Because considerable time is required to translate public
concern into government budget allocations and coherent programs, many
mitigation and preparedness programs have simply failed to be
implemented (Birkland, 1997; Prater & Lindell, 2000).

The important differences between imminent threat associated with
response and recovery and the long-term threat associated with
mitigation and preparedness---especially the significant differences in
the behavior risk communicators should expect from those at
risk---suggests there should be corresponding differences in the risk
communication processes associated with these two different types of
situations. This dichotomy between imminent and long-term threats does
not imply that two completely different theories are needed to guide
risk communication. In fact, most of the same theoretical principles are
relevant to both situations, so a single theoretical model can account
for short-term warning response and long-term hazard adjustment.
Nonetheless, each of these situations requires specific modifications of
the overall model.

**The Classical Persuasion Model**

According to Lasswell (1948), all communication should be analyzed in
terms of who (Source) says what (Message), via what medium (Channel), to
whom (Receiver), and directed at what kind of change (Effect). This
*classical persuasion model*, which is depicted in Figure 4-1, was
further articulated by Hovland, Janis and Kelley (1953) and has remained
the predominant conceptual approach in the field of communication, and
especially research on persuasive communication (McGuire, 1969, 1985;
O'Keefe, 1990).

Research guided by this model has found sources are perceived primarily
in terms of expertise and trustworthiness, but also by other
characteristics such as status, likeability, and attractiveness. Similar
to French and Raven's (1959; Raven, 1964) definitions of expert and
information power, a source's expertise is defined by its information
about a situation and knowledge about cause-and-effect relationships in
the environment. By contrast, trustworthiness refers to a source's
willingness and ability to provide accurate information and take actions
that protect the receiver without seeking hidden advantage for him- or
herself.

[**Figure 4-1.** The Classical Persuasion Model.]{.underline}

Source: Lindell & Perry (2004).

Messages vary in their content---especially their information about a
hazard, its impact characteristics (e.g., magnitude, location, and time
of impact), potential personal consequences (e.g., likelihood of
casualties, property damage, and social disruption), alternative
protective actions (e.g., evacuation, sheltering in-place), and the
attributes of those protective actions (e.g., efficacy; safety; cost;
and requirements for time and effort, knowledge and skill, tools and
equipment, and cooperation from others). In addition, messages also vary
in terms of their style (clarity, forcefulness, and speed of delivery,
use of figurative or humorous language), inclusions and omissions
(whether or not to include one's own weak arguments, address opponents'
arguments, or to rely on implicit or explicit conclusions), ordering of
message content, and amount of message material (McGuire, 1985).

The information channels available for use by emergency managers include
print media such as newspapers, magazines, and brochures; electronic
media such as television, radio, telephone, and the Internet; and
face-to-face interaction through personal conversations and public
meetings. The distinctions among these information channels are
important because they differ in the ways they accommodate the
information processing activities of receivers. For example, orally
presented information is ephemeral and will be lost unless otherwise
recorded, whereas written information inherently provides a record that
can be examined at a later time. Moreover, many types of risk
information can be presented in either verbal (words), numeric
(numbers), or graphic (pictures) format. Sometimes one mode of
presentation is more effective for a particular type of information; for
example, charts generally are more effective than tables of numbers in
conveying trends. However, there are individual differences among
receivers, so some presentation modes are more effective for some people
but not others. For example, some people can understand verbal
descriptions much more readily than graphs of data, whereas the reverse
is true for others.

Receivers differ in many respects, but the most important of these are
psychological characteristics that have direct effects on the
communication process. For example, receivers differ in their
perceptions of source credibility, access to communication channels,
prior beliefs about hazards and protective actions, ability to
understand and remember message content, and access to resources needed
to implement protective action (Lindell & Perry, 2004). The effects of a
message on a receiver include attention, comprehension, acceptance,
retention, and behavioral change. Indeed, researchers agree message
effects should be characterized in terms of multiple stages, but the
boundaries among these stages are not well defined, so differences exist
among various researchers in their typologies (see McGuire, 1985 vs.
Mileti & Peek, 2001) and some theorists have varied in their definitions
of these stages over time (McGuire, 1969, 1985).

Finally, feedback is an important component of the communication model
because some attempts are unidirectional, whereas others are
interactive. Unidirectional communications are appealing to many risk
communicators because they appear to be less time consuming and
sometimes this actually is the case. Frequently, however, interactive
communication is needed for receivers to indicate they have not
comprehended the message that was sent or to explain that the message
sent by the source did not satisfy their information needs.

The classical persuasion model makes it clear that risk communication is
an activity with relatively clearly defined parameters regarding source,
message, channel, and intended effect. In most cases, the source is an
authority, the message describes an environmental hazard, and the
intended effect is a change in receivers' behavior. However, receiver
characteristics have very important influences on each of the stages in
the communication process. For example, the effect of a given
information source is determined by receivers' perceptions of that
source and the effect of a given message is determined by receivers'
willingness to attend to and ability to comprehend and retain the
information. Moreover the effect of a given channel is determined by
receivers' access to and preference for that channel and the amount of
feedback depends upon receivers' willingness and ability to provide it.
Unfortunately, authorities often fail to recognize the importance of
these factors and sometimes fail to design risk communication programs
in accordance with the principles of effective communication even when
these issues are recognized (Perry & Lindell, 1991).

Some scholars have criticized the classical persuasion model as
providing an incomplete representation of the risk communication process
(Kasperson & Stallen, 1990). They contend the feedback loop in the model
implies a dyadic relationship that is limited to contact with the
original information source. However, extensive research shows people
engage in information seeking activities that are directed to other
sources as well. More generally, risk communication should be
represented by a network in which multiple sources are linked to
intermediate sources who receive information and relay it to the
ultimate receivers (Figure 4-2). The original sources could be linked to
few or many intermediates or could even be linked directly with some of
the ultimate receivers. Similarly, the intermediates could be linked to
few or many of the ultimate receivers and the ultimate receivers could
be linked to each other.

Another apparent limitation of the classical persuasion model is that
receiver characteristics have pervasive effects on the other components
of the model. For example, receivers' demographic characteristics are
correlated with access to sources and channels, as well as with message
comprehension. Thus, receiver characteristics are of critical importance
in determining the success of risk communication programs, but many of
them are psychological in nature and, thus, not readily observed.
Nonetheless, receivers' demographic characteristics---such as sex, age,
education, income, race, and ethnicity---are readily identifiable.
Because some of these demographic characteristics are related to
relevant psychological characteristics, they can provide some indication
as to how receivers will respond.

**The Protective Action Decision Model**

A review of theories on social influence, persuasion, behavioral
decisionmaking, attitude-behavior relationships, protective action, and
innovation processes reveals a wide variety of perspectives providing
useful accounts of the ways in which risk communication can influence
disaster response and hazard adjustment (Lindell & Perry, 2004).
Although these theories overlap to some extent with the findings of
research on hazards and disasters, all of them provide valuable insights
that can extend our understanding of ways in which people respond to the
threat of environmental hazards. The relevant elements of these
complementary approaches have been integrated with the findings of
disaster research to produce a model of the factors that influence
individual's adoption of protective actions against natural and
technological hazards and disasters. This integrated model is the
Protective Action Decision Model (PADM).

[**Figure 4-2.** Communication Network Model.]{.underline}

Source: Lindell & Perry (2004).

According to Lindell and Perry (2004), the PADM is most directly based
upon a long history of research on disasters that has been summarized by
many authors (Barton, 1969; Drabek, 1986; Fritz 1961; Janis & Mann,
1977; Lindell & Perry, 1992; Mileti, et al., 1975; Mileti & Peek, 2001;
Mileti & Sorensen, 1987; Perry,et al., 1981; Tierney, et al., 2001).
This research has found sensory cues from the physical environment
(especially sights and sounds, see Gruntfest, Downing & White, 1978) or
socially transmitted information (e.g., disaster warnings) can each
elicit a perception of threat that diverts the recipient's attention
from normal activities. Depending upon the perceived characteristics of
the threat, those at risk will either resume normal activities, seek
additional information, pursue problem focused actions to protect
persons and property, or engage in emotion focused actions to reduce
their immediate psychological distress. Which way an individual chooses
to respond to the threat depends upon evaluations of both the threat and
the available protective actions.

The findings of previous disaster research can be combined with
propositions drawn from the theories listed earlier in this chapter to
express the PADM in terms of a flow chart that provides a graphic
representation of the model (see Figure 4-3). The process of
decisionmaking begins with environmental cues or risk communication
messages that initiate a series of predecisional processes. In turn,
these predecisional processes stimulate either a protective action
decisionmaking process or an information seeking process. To proceed
through the successive stages of either process, the individual must
arrive at an affirmative answer to the questions posed. The dominant
tendency is for environmental cues and risk communication messages to
prompt protective action decisionmaking, but information seeking occurs
when there is uncertainty about the answer to the critical question at a
given stage in the protective action decisionmaking process. Once the
question is resolved, processing proceeds to the next stage in the
protective action decisionmaking process.

[**Figure 4-3.** Information Flow in the PADM.]{.underline}

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Source: Lindell & Perry (2004).

The model attempts to characterize the way people "typically" make
decisions about adopting actions to protect against environmental
hazards. The stages within the protective action decisionmaking process
are sequential, as are those within the information seeking process.
However, few people follow every step in the model in the exact sequence
listed in Figure 4-3. For example, an extremely credible (or powerful)
source might obtain immediate and unquestioning compliance with a
directive to evacuate an area at risk---even if there were no
explanation why evacuation was necessary or what alternative protective
actions were feasible (Gladwin, Gladwin & Peacock, 2002). Such an order
would, of course, be quite improbable in contemporary American society,
but compliance with such an order would bypass all of the intermediate
stages in the PADM. Other situations can be imagined in which some, but
not all, decision stages would be bypassed. The important lesson is
that---unless risk communicators have an extreme amount of credibility
or power to compel compliance---the more stages in the PADM they
neglect, the more ambiguity there is likely to be for message
recipients. In turn, greater ambiguity is likely to lower compliance and
cause warning recipients to spend more time in seeking and processing
information rather than preparing for and implementing protective
action. Indeed, ambiguity can initiate a repetitive cycle of decision
processing and information seeking that postpones the initiation of
protective action until it is too late to be completed before hazard
onset.

## *Predecisional Processes*

Both environmental cues and risk communication from other persons prompt
three predecisional processes that are needed to bring information to
conscious awareness. These are exposure to, attention to, and
interpretation of environmental cues or---alternatively---reception of,
attention to, and comprehension of socially transmitted information
(Fiske & Taylor, 1991). Environmental cues and risk communications are
somewhat independent of each other, so one household might only observe
environmental cues, whereas another might receive only warnings. Still
other households might have access to both environmental cues and
warnings. Regardless of whether information comes from environmental
cues or social warnings, all three pre-decisional processes are
necessary. That is, information from the physical environment will not
lead to the initiation of appropriate protective actions unless people
are exposed to, heed, and accurately interpret the environmental cues.
Similarly, information from the social environment will not lead to the
initiation of appropriate protective actions unless people receive,
heed, and comprehend the socially transmitted information.

These predecisional processes are critical because some of those at risk
who are exposed to environmental cues will heed this information, but
others will not. Whether or not people heed the available information is
determined by their expectations, competing attention demands, and the
intrusiveness of the information. Specifically, expectations of threat
are established when people have advance information that leads them to
believe the potential exists for a significant environmental impact. For
example, many people in tornado-prone areas know the months of the year
in which there is a peak level of activity. Consequently, they check
weather forecasts frequently and attend to environmental cues such as
cloud formations. Competing demands are important because attention is
limited, so absorption in one task will tend to prevent the processing
of information associated with other tasks. Continuing with the example
of tornadoes, people who are engaged in tasks that require intense
concentration are less likely to notice gathering storm clouds and might
not notice a warning even if they have a radio turned on. Of course, the
perceptual intrusiveness of hazard information affects attention because
it disrupts cognitive processing of the primary task at hand. Those who
did not notice the gathering storm clouds, or even an approaching funnel
cloud, are certain to notice the roar of the wind or will notice a
warning if it is preceded by a loud signal from a radio or a nearby
siren. Finally, interpretation of environmental cues is critical because
this requires an understanding of the hazard. For example, some coastal
residents have lost their lives because they did not understand that a
sudden recession of water is the trough phase of a tsunami. The naïve
reaction to receding water has frequently been to confuse it with a
sudden low tide and to take advantage of an unexpected opportunity to
collect stranded fish. Of course, those who have been properly trained
recognize this as a sign of danger and immediately evacuate to high
ground.

The predecisional processes for warnings are similar to those of
environmental cues. First, people must receive information from another
person through a warning channel and attend to this information.
Accordingly, the characteristics of the warning channel itself can have
a significant impact on people's reception and attention to warning
message content. Once a warning has been received and heeded, some
people will comprehend the available information, whereas others will
not (what Turner, Nigg & Heller-Paz, 1986, call "hearing and
understanding"). The comprehension of warning messages will depend upon
whether the message is conveyed in words they understand. Quite
obviously, warnings disseminated in English are unlikely to be
understood by those who understand only Spanish. In addition, however,
comprehension also affected by more subtle factors. A warning source
cannot achieve comprehension of a warning message if it uses technical
terms that have no meaning for those at risk. For example, phrases such
as "hypocenter", "Saffir-Simpson Category", "oxidizer", and "millirem"
are specialized terms that will not be understood by all who hear them.
Specialized terms cause confusion and distract people from processing
the information in the rest of the message. If such terms must be used
in warning messages, they should be explained---ideally before any
emergencies arise.

## *Decision Stages*

Once the three predecisional processes have been successfully completed,
cognitive processing turns to the decision stages in the core of the
model presented in Figure 4-3---risk identification, risk assessment,
protective action search, protective action assessment, and protective
action implementation. In addition, information seeking activities
include information needs assessment, communication action assessment,
and communication action implementation. Each of the decision stages in
the PADM is discussed in detail below.

*Risk identification*. According to the PADM, people's decisions about
how to respond to a hazard or disaster begin with risk identification,
which can be interpreted as the initial step in what Lazarus and Folkman
(1984) call *primary appraisal*. As noted earlier, this process can be
initiated by the detection of environmental cues, but the most important
sources of risk identification usually are warning messages from
authorities, the news media, and peers such as friends, relatives,
neighbors, and coworkers. Conversely, the first step emergency managers
must take when promoting the adoption of hazard adjustments is to
disseminate their message widely to attract the attention of those at
risk and inform them of the potential for environmental extremes that
could threaten their health, safety, and property.

In both disaster response and hazard adjustment, those at risk must
answer the basic question of risk identification, "Is there a real
threat that I need to pay attention to?" (Anderson, 1969a; Janis & Mann,
1977; Mileti, 1975; Perry, 1979a). The importance of the resulting
*threat belief* is supported by research showing individuals routinely
try to maintain their definition of the environment as "normal" in the
face of evidence that it is not (Drabek, 1986). Researchers have found a
positive relationship between level of threat belief and disaster
response across a wide range of disaster agents, including floods
(Mileti, 1975; Perry, Lindell & Greene, 1981), volcanic eruptions (Perry
& Greene, 1982; Perry & Hirose, 1991), hazardous materials emergencies
(Lindell & Perry, 1992), hurricanes (Baker, 1991), earthquakes
(Blanchard-Boehm, 1998), and nuclear power plant emergencies (Houts,
Cleary & Hu, 1988; Perry, 1985).

*Risk assessment.* The next step, *risk assessment,* refers to the
process of determining the likely personal consequences that the
disaster or hazard could cause (Otway, 1973; Perry, 1979a). Decades of
research have shown the perception of personal risk---the individual's
expectation of personal exposure to death, injury, illness, or property
damage---is a critical variable in explaining disaster response (Mileti
& Sorensen, 1987). This process of assessing personal relevance, which
Mileti and Sorensen (1987) refer to as the "personalization of risk",
has been recognized as an important factor by persuasion theorists as
well as disaster researchers (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). In the risk
assessment stage, a positive response to the question, "Do I need to
take protective action?" elicits *protection motivation* whether the
risk involves a disaster response or long-term hazard adjustment (Fritz
& Marks, 1954; Perry, 1983). Some of the factors associated with
people's personalization of risk include "the probability of the
impending event occurring \[and\] the severity, to the individual, of
such a development" (Withey, 1962, p. 104; see also Neuwirth, Dunwoody &
Griffin, 2000 and Lindell & Perry, 2000 for reviews of relevant
research).

The immediacy of a threat is also important because warning recipients
must understand that the message describes a threat whose likely
consequences will occur in the very near future. Thus, immediacy is
related to forewarning, which is the amount of time between the arrival
of the warning (or personal detection of environmental cues) and
disaster onset. For emergency managers, the amount of forewarning
received from hazard detection agencies such as the National Weather
Service and US Geological Survey affects their choice of message
content, the channels feasible for delivery, and the number of times the
warning can be repeated. For those at risk, the amount of forewarning
received from emergency managers affects their sense of urgency to act.
Other factors being equal, the likelihood of immediate disaster response
increases as the amount of time until impact decreases. However, people
tend to devote this additional time to other activities such as
information seeking and expedient property protection when they believe
there is more time before impact than the minimum necessary to implement
protective action. Information seeking can ultimately increase
compliance with recommended protective actions but does, inherently,
delay it. Similarly, the amount of time risk area residents devote to
expedient property protection also delays their initiation of personal
protective action. In both cases, the delay in protective action might
be dangerous because the time of disaster impact cannot be predicted
with perfect accuracy. For many of the events studied by disaster
researchers, warnings were issued when impact was imminent, thereby
reducing the extent of these other activities. Ultimately, increasing
the amount of forewarning changes the risk communication from a disaster
warning to a hazard awareness message (Perry, et al., 1981; Nelson &
Perry, 1991).

Previous research has addressed people's beliefs about other temporal
dimensions of hazard impact, as well. The duration of impact, which
refers to the length of time hazard impacts will persist, has been
addressed principally in connection with studies of technological risk
perception (Slovic, Fischoff & Lichtenstein, 1980; Lindell & Earle,
1983; Lindell & Barnes, 1986). For radiological and toxic chemical
hazards, it appears many people are concerned that long-term
contamination could prevent them from returning to their homes for a
long period of time after a disaster (Lindell, 1994c).

In general, research has shown simple measures of risk perception are
positively correlated with disaster response (Drabek, 1999), but it also
is important to qualify this finding with one further consideration.
Specifically, the hazards most frequently studied by disaster
researchers are ones whose principal physical impacts are property
damage and traumatic injuries. In such cases, the exposure paths from
the hazard agent through the environment to those at risk are relatively
simple and well understood by the general public. Physical proximity to
the hazard increases risk, so safety increases with distance from the
point of impact. Indeed, Kunreuther, et al. (1978) reported proximity,
along with certainty and severity, was an important threat
characteristic influencing the purchase of hazard insurance. The
correlations between risk perception and behavioral responses to that
object might not be so high in cases where the exposure paths are more
complex than those involved in simple proximity. For example, food
contamination and infectious diseases both involve complex exposure
paths that might be difficult for most people to understand. For
example, some have found it difficult to understand why AIDS can be
transmitted by infected needles but not by mosquito bites because the
two types of exposure seem to be similar (both involve injection through
the skin surface).

Similar issues must be considered in examining hazards that have
different types of impacts. For example, Perry and Montiel (1997)
reported the magnitude of perceived risk was higher for threats
affecting life safety and property than for those affecting property
alone. Another issue concerns the definition and measurement of
perceived risk. Some studies have used very global measures of risk,
whereas others have used more specific measures. Early studies of
evacuation compliance that defined risk in terms of three
components---certainty, severity, and immediacy---of the threat have
reported high positive correlations between risk perception and disaster
response (Perry, et al., 1981). However, some researchers have applied
these characteristics to the occurrence of a disaster, whereas others
have applied them to personal hazard exposure, and still others have
applied them to the consequences of that exposure. In some cases, there
are essentially no differences among disaster impact, personal hazard
exposure, and personal consequences. For example, people living close to
a volcano might think the occurrence of a major eruption is highly
likely to occur within the next year, their chance of severe exposure is
high because they live so close to the volcano, and their chance of
experiencing severe adverse health consequences within that time
interval is high because the effects of blast and ash will be felt
immediately. In other cases, the differences among disaster impact,
personal hazard exposure, and personal consequences could be profound.
For example, people living in the vicinity of a toxic chemical facility
might think the occurrence of a major release to ground water is highly
likely to occur within the next year, but also believe their chance of
severe exposure within that time interval is low because they live
*upstream* from the release point. Even if they thought the chances of
personal exposure were high, they might believe their chance of
experiencing severe adverse health consequences within that time
interval is low because it would take many years to develop cancerous
tumors.

The differences among disaster impact, personal exposure, and personal
consequences are important because a number of investigators have found
many people have an unrealistic sense of optimism about their ability to
avoid danger---in extreme cases, this results in a sense of total
invulnerability. For example, data from Lindell and Prater (2000)
indicate people's perceptions that there is a significant probability of
an earthquake in their community do not necessarily imply that they
believe there is a high probability of being personally affected by that
earthquake. Moreover, some studies have indicated perceptions of
severity also can be quite complex. Research on earthquake hazard has
revealed perceptions of severity to be multidimensional because people
are concerned about death, injury, property damage, and disruption to
work and daily activities (see Lindell & Perry, 2000, for a review).
Other research on risk perceptions regarding radiological and toxic
chemical hazards indicates people are also concerned about delayed
health effects such as cancers and genetic effects (Lindell, 1994;
Lindell & Barnes, 1986; Perry & Montiel, 1997).

*Protective action search*. If a threat is judged to be real and some
unacceptable level of personal risk exists, people turn to *protective
action search*---which involves retrieving one or more feasible
protective actions from memory or obtaining information about them from
others. The relevant question in protective action search is "What can
be done to achieve protection?" and its outcome is a *decision set* that
identifies possible protective actions. The results of some studies
(e.g., Jackson, 1977) suggest risk area residents' first attempt to
answer this question often involves a search for what can be done *by*
*someone else* to protect them against the hazard. When there is
insufficient time to find someone else to provide protection---as is
usually the case during disasters---or when such a search is
unsuccessful, households must rely on their own resources to achieve
protection. In many instances, an individual's own knowledge of the
hazard will suggest what type of protection to seek (e.g., sheltering in
the basement following a tornado warning). People are especially likely
to recall actions they have taken on previous occasions if they have had
personal experience with that hazard. Alternatively, they might consider
actions they have taken in the course of their experience with similar
hazards---recognizing, for example, the impact of a volcanic mudflow is
similar to that of a flood and, thus, protective responses to flood are
likely to be effective for a mudflow as well.

Information about protective actions also can be received from a variety
of external sources. Specifically, those in the risk area are likely to
become aware of alternative protective actions by observing the behavior
of others. This occurs, for example, when neighbors are seen packing
cars in preparation for hurricane evacuation or employing contractors to
reinforce their homes against earthquake shaking. People also are likely
to consider actions with which they have had vicarious experience by
reading or hearing about others' actions in response to a hazard. Such
vicarious experience is frequently transmitted by the news media and
relayed by peers---friends, relatives, neighbors, and coworkers.
Finally, people also are made aware of appropriate protective actions by
means of disaster warnings and hazard awareness programs that carry
protective action recommendations from authorities. Specifically, a well
designed warning message will assist recipients in constructing a
decision set by providing *guidance* in the form of one or more
protective action recommendations (Mileti & Sorensen, 1988).
Nonetheless, authorities should not assume warning recipients will
implement the official protective action recommendation even if only one
protective action is mentioned in the warning message. People will
always be aware that continuing normal activities is an option and they
might think of other alternatives by recalling such actions from memory
or observing the actions of others.

*Protective action assessment*. After people have established that at
least one protective action is available, they pass from the protective
action search stage to protective action assessment. This involves
examining alternative actions, evaluating them in comparison to the
consequences of continuing normal activities, and determining which of
them is the most suitable response to the situation. At this point, the
primary question is "What is the best method of protection?" and its
outcome is an *adaptive plan*.

As noted earlier, choice is an inherent aspect of emergencies because
those at risk generally have at least two options---taking protective
action or continuing normal activities. Comparing alternatives with
respect to their attributes leads, in turn, to a balancing or trade-off
of these attributes with respect to their relative importance to the
decision maker. Under some conditions, those at risk can only take one
action and, therefore, must make a choice among the alternatives.
Evacuation maximizes the protection of personal safety, but abandons
property to the action of the hazard agent or, as some evacuees have
erroneously feared, to looters (Perry, et al., 1981; Lindell & Perry,
1990). On the other hand, emergency measures to protect property (e.g.,
sandbagging during floods) require the property owner to remain in a
hazardous location. This problem also exists in the context of long-term
hazard adjustment but is significantly reduced because households have
time before disaster onset to carefully consider trade-offs among
alternative protective actions and to implement multiple actions. Even
when there is only a moderate amount of forewarning, households might be
able to engage in a combination of actions. For example, if a flood has
been forecast to arrive within a few hours, people could perform
emergency floodproofing and elevate contents to higher floors to provide
as much property protection as possible, yet evacuate family members
before the floodwater reaches a dangerous level.

When households assess the salient characteristics of alternative
protective actions, they are likely to consider a set of characteristics
that have been identified by previous research on disaster response and
hazard adjustment. In reviews of disaster studies conducted since the
1940s, Fritz (1961), Sorensen and White (1980), Sims and Bauman, (1983),
Drabek (1986), and Tierney, et al. (2001) have noted that a protective
action is unlikely to be considered unless it is considered to be
effective in reducing the negative consequences associated with disaster
impact. Thus, *efficacy,* which is measured by the degree of reduction
in vulnerability to the hazard, refers to success in protecting both
persons and property (Cross, 1980; Kunreuther, et al., 1978). In some
cases, such as sandbagging during floods, property protection is the
specific objective of the protective action. In other cases, however,
people consider the implications for property protection of actions
whose principal goal is to protect persons. For example, many
researchers have found that those who fail to comply with an evacuation
recommendation do so because of concerns about protecting their property
from looting.

Research also suggests people evaluate protective actions in terms of
their *safety*---that is, the risks that might be created by taking that
protective action. For example, some research has reported that those
who have not complied with recommendations to evacuate did so because
they were concerned about the traffic accident risks involved. As a
general rule, the traffic accident risks of evacuation appear to be no
greater than those of normal driving (Lindell & Perry, 1992). However,
it is important to recognize warning recipients' behavior is determined
by their *beliefs* about safety, not the historical evidence about
safety. Thus, it is important for local authorities who want to increase
compliance with evacuation recommendations to ensure people are aware
that evacuation accident rates are low.

Alternative protective actions also can be assessed in terms of their
perceived *time requirements* for implementation, which are a function
of the number and duration of the steps required to complete a given
action. Evacuation is typically time consuming, requiring unification of
the family, preparation for departure, selection of a safe destination
and route of travel, and transit out of the risk area (Lindell & Perry,
1987; Lindell, Prater, Perry & Wu, 2002). By contrast, time requirements
for in-place protection are small---requiring only that occupants shut
off sources of outside air, such as doors, windows, chimney dampers, and
forced air circulation systems for heating and cooling (Lindell & Perry,
1992). A major problem in large scale evacuations such as those for
hurricanes is people's underestimation of the amount of time needed to
reach their destinations. Kang, Lindell and Prater (in press) found
coastal residents have reasonably accurate expectations about the time
requirements of familiar tasks under their control (e.g., packing bags
and shuttering windows), but they substantially underestimate the amount
of travel time needed to clear the risk area. The problem seems to be
that they plan to take familiar routes to familiar destinations and
assume it will take the usual amount of time to get there.
Unfortunately, they fail to account for the fact that an evacuation
might have ten times as much traffic on that route as they normally
encounter, thus turning a two hour trip into a 20 hour trip.

The *perceived* *implementation barriers* affecting protective action
decisions arise from resource constraints precluding the selection of a
preferred protective action, as well as obstacles that are expected to
arise between the decision to take a protective action and the
achievement of protection. In the former category, resource constraints
include a lack of knowledge and skill, tools and equipment, or social
cooperation required to achieve protection (Lindell & Prater, 2002). In
the case of evacuation, this may include a lack of knowledge of a safe
place to go and a safe route to travel. Related barriers include the
lack of access to a personal vehicle (e.g., those who are routinely
transit dependent or families in which one spouse has the only car
during the workday) or lack of personal mobility due to physical
handicaps. These were clearly factors affecting the alarming death toll
in Hurricane Katrina. In some instances, the separation of family
members will be considered to be an evacuation barrier. Until family
members have been reunited or separated family members can establish
communication contact and agree upon a place to meet, evacuation is
unlikely to occur (Killian, 1952; Drabek & Boggs, 1968; Haas, Cochrane &
Eddy, 1977). Of course, separation of family members is unlikely to be a
significant problem during incidents, such as hurricanes, that have
ample forewarning.

Finally, a variety of researchers (Cross, 1980; Fritz, 1961; Kunreuther,
et al., 1978; Sorensen & White, 1980) have reported the *perceived*
*cost* of actions to protect personal safety is a consideration in
protective actions decisions. Such costs include out-of-pocket expenses
(gasoline, food, and lodging), opportunity costs (e.g., lost pay from
workdays missed during evacuation), effort, personal sacrifice, and
aesthetic cost (e.g., the unattractive appearance of houses that are
elevated out of the flood plain). The high cost of protective action can
lead people to delay its implementation until they are certain it is
necessary. For example, many households delay hurricane evacuation
because they want to avoid incurring evacuation expenses if possible.
These averaged \$262 per household during the Hurricane Lili evacuation
(Lindell, Prater, Lu, Arlikatti, Zhang & Kang, 2004).

A significant impediment to the assessment of protective actions arises
when none of the available alternatives dominates the others (i.e., is
superior to the others on all of the evaluation attributes). For
example, Lindell and Perry (1992) reported evacuation was rated higher
than sheltering in-place and expedient respiratory protection in
efficacy for protecting persons (a positive consequence). However,
evacuation also was judged to be higher in its resource requirements for
time, effort, skill, cost, and barriers to implementation (all negative
consequences). This suggests people must sometimes make a difficult
choice between the higher effectiveness of evacuation and its higher
resource demands against the lower effectiveness of the alternative
protective actions (sheltering in-place and expedient respiratory
protection) and their lower resource demands.

The importance of *perceived* attributes in the protective action
assessment stage should alert risk communicators to the potential for
differences between the judgments of experts and the public, especially
in connection with protective actions that are not well known to those
at risk. Sheltering in-place can substantially reduce toxic gas exposure
to safe levels (Wilson, 1987, 1989), but its effectiveness does not seem
to be recognized outside a relatively narrow circle of experts.
Moreover, attempts to evacuate immediately prior to tornado impact,
which are contrary to scientific recommendations (Glass, et al., 1980),
are probably due to the recognition that sheltering in-place during the
tornado does not guarantee survival. This observation also holds true
for many victims of fires in high-rise buildings who have attempted
unsuccessfully to evacuate when sheltering in their rooms would likely
have saved their lives.

The end result of protective action assessment is an adaptive plan, but
people's adaptive plans vary widely in their specificity, with some
being only vague goals (e.g., "We'll stay with my sister's family") and
others begin extremely detailed. At minimum, a specific evacuation plan
includes a destination, a route of travel, and a means of
transportation. More detailed plans include a procedure for reuniting
families if members are separated, advance contact to confirm the
destination is available, consideration of alternative routes if the
primary route is unsafe or too crowded, and alternative methods of
transportation is the primary one is not available.

Research has documented a tendency for those who lack a ready adaptive
plan to experience more negative disaster outcomes (Quarantelli, 1960;
Perry, 1979b; Drabek, 1986). A classic example in the literature on
floods lies in the Hamilton, Taylor, and Rice (1955, p. 120) interview
with the recipient of an evacuation warning that contained no
information on safe evacuation routes or safe destinations: "We
couldn\'t decide where to go\... So we grabbed our children and were
just starting to move outside\...if it had just been ourselves, we might
have taken out. But we didn\'t want to risk it with the children."

*Protective action implementation*. The fifth step, *protective action
implementation*, occurs when all the previous questions about risk
reduction have been answered satisfactorily. Specifically, those at risk
have determined action should be taken, at least one available option is
likely to be effective in achieving protection, and that option is
logistically feasible. In general, the implementation of protective
actions consumes resources people would prefer to allocate to other
activities, so those at risk frequently delay implementation until they
have determined that the immediacy of the threat justifies the
disruption of normal activities. Thus, people often ask the question,
"Does protective action need to be taken now?" The answer to this
question, whose outcome is the *threat response*, is crucial because
people sometimes postpone the implementation of protective action even
when there is imminent danger. As noted earlier, recipients of hurricane
warnings have often been found to endanger their safety because too many
of them wait until the last minute to begin their evacuations.
Unfortunately, they fail to recognize that adverse weather conditions
and a high volume of traffic can significantly reduce the average speed
of evacuating vehicles, thus running the risk that their evacuation will
not be completed before the arrival of storm conditions (Baker, 1979,
1990, 1993; Dow & Cutter, 1998, 2002; Prater, Wenger & Grady, 2000). The
problem of procrastination is even more severe in connection with
long-term hazard adjustment than it is in disasters with ample
forewarning because hazard awareness programs cannot specify even an
approximate deadline by which action must be taken. For example, an
earthquake prediction might indicate a 75% chance of a damaging
earthquake within the next 20 years.

*Information needs assessment*. At all stages of the protective action
decision process, people who are responding to the threat of disaster
must act on the basis the available information, even if it is
insufficient for a confident appraisal of the threat or the available
protective actions. However, when people think time is available, they
cope with the lack of information by implementing three additional
stages involving information search. The process of information search
begins with an *information needs assessment* arising from an
individual's judgment that the available information is insufficient to
justify proceeding further in the protective action decision process.
The research literature indicates ambiguity at any point in the
protective action decision process will tend to initiate information
seeking, especially when the probability of disaster impact reaches a
critical threshold. Thus, if any of the questions cannot be answered
with an unequivocal yes or no, people will ask "What information do I
need to answer my question?" so they can generate an *identified
information need*. As is the case with a lack of information about a
threat, information seeking can also resolve a lack of information about
appropriate protective actions. In particular, additional information
about alternative protective actions could make it clearer which action
would be most appropriate for that situation. Such information seeking
is frequently needed because, as noted earlier, those at risk are rarely
aware of all of the alternatives available to them.

*Communication action assessment.* Identification of a need for
information does not necessarily suggest where the needed information
can be obtained. Thus, the next question in the information seeking
process is "Where and how can I obtain this information?" Addressing
this question leads to information source selection and information
channel selection, which constitute an *information search plan*. The
sources from which information is sought are likely to differ depending
upon stage of the protective action decision process that has generated
the need for information. For example, uncertainty about risk
identification and risk assessment can stimulate questions directed to
officials and, more likely, the news media (see Lindell & Perry, 1992).
The high level of reliance on the news media appears to be due to
people's desire to confirm the information they initially received in a
warning message from one source by contacting a different source
(Drabek, 1969). By contrast, uncertainties about protective action
search, protective action assessment, and---especially---about
protective action implementation are likely to prompt questions directed
to peers.

The sources sought are likely to be affected by the available channels,
which in many disasters precludes the use of the telephone because
circuits are so overloaded that it is impossible to obtain a dial tone
for hours or even days. Further, attempts to reach authorities sometimes
prove futile because emergency response agencies are busy handling other
calls. Thus, people are often forced to rely on the mass media and peers
even when they would prefer to contact authorities. This distinction
between risk area residents' *preferred* channels of information receipt
and their *actual* channels of information receipt also can be seen in
connection with long-term hazard adjustment. For example, Lindell and
Perry (1992) reported residents of communities downstream from the Mt.
St. Helens volcano revealed some significant disparities between their
preferred and actual channels of information receipt in the years after
the 1980 eruptions. However, there also were significant differences
between the two communities of Toutle and Lexington in both their
preferred and actual channels of information receipt. Unfortunately, the
available research does not reveal any general principles of source and
channel preference that can be assumed to apply across a broad range of
communities.

*Communication action implementation.* The final step in the information
search process is communication action implementation, which provides
*decision information* by answering the question, "Do I need the
information now?" If the answer to this question is positive, that is,
they are threatened by an imminent disaster, people will actively seek
the needed information from the most appropriate source through the most
appropriate channel. Drabek's (1969; Drabek & Stephenson, 1971) research
indicates people will go to great lengths, contacting many people over a
period of minutes to hours, if the prospect of an imminent disaster
needs to be confirmed. However, information seeking will be less
frequent and less active if the location is specific but the time of
impact is ambiguous. Perry, Lindell, and Greene (1982) reported many
residents of the area around Mt. St. Helens monitored the radio four or
more times a day after the initial ash and steam eruptions led
authorities to believe increased activity might indicate an increased
probability of a larger eruption. By contrast, the absence of locational
specificity and time pressure inherent in a hazard awareness program
provides little need for those at risk to obtain immediate answers, so
they are likely to forego active information seeking in favor of passive
monitoring of the situation. Unfortunately, the absence of a deadline
for action means this passive monitoring is likely to continue until an
imminent threat arises (as in the case of hurricanes and floods) or
until a disaster strikes (as in the case of earthquakes).

Communication action implementation can have one of three outcomes. If
the query elicits a message that meets the information needs that
initiated the search, then information seeking has been successful and
the decision maker can return to the point in the protective action
decision process that generated the information search. However, if the
source is unavailable, the query produces no additional information, or
the query produces no useful information at all, then information
seeking is unsuccessful. The response to this situation is likely to
depend upon an individual's expectations for success in obtaining the
desired information from another source or through another channel.
Optimism regarding either of these is likely to motivate further
information seeking. Pessimism regarding the success of obtaining the
needed information is likely to force the decision maker to attempt a
protective action decision on the basis of the information available.

In summary, The PADM provides a framework that identifies the critical
stages of information processing relevant to household adoption of
protective actions and---for each stage---the activities performed, the
typical question asked, and the outcome (see Table 4-1). If an
individual cannot determine a satisfactory answer to the question posed
at one of the decision stages, then progress toward implementation of a
protective action is likely to be delayed and possibly even terminated.
If the process terminates due to a negative answer about risk
identification, then the decision maker is likely to return to normal
activities. If the process terminates due to a negative answer about
risk assessment, then the decision maker is likely to monitor the
situation. If the process terminates due to a negative answer about the
availability or acceptability of protective actions, then the decision
maker is likely to enter a state of either denial or panic (Janis &
Mann, 1977). Which of these emotion-focused coping strategies is used
depends upon a person's susceptibility to distraction, with the most
distractible being inclined to denial and the least distractible being
inclined to intense fear. Nonetheless, extensive research reveals a very
low incidence of panic in disaster (Drabek, 1986).

**Table 4-1.** Warning Stages and Actions.

  --------- ------------------- ---------------------------- -----------------
  *Stage*   *Activity*          *Question*                   *Outcome*

  1         Risk identification Is there a real threat that  Threat belief
                                I need to pay attention to?  

  2         Risk assessment     Do I need to take protective Protection
                                action?                      motivation

  3         Protective action   What can be done to achieve  Decision set
            search              protection?                  (alternative
                                                             actions)

  4         Protective action   What is the best method of   Adaptive plan
            assessment and      protection?                  
            selection                                        

  5         Protective action   Does protective action need  Threat response
            implementation      to be taken now?             

  6         Information needs   What information do I need   Identified
            assessment          to answer my question?       information need

  7         Communication       Where and how can I obtain   Information
            action assessment   this information?            search plan
            and selection                                    

  8         Communication       Do I need the information    Decision
            action              now?                         information
            implementation                                   
  --------- ------------------- ---------------------------- -----------------

Source: Lindell & Perry (2004).

**Risk Communication During the Continuing Hazard Phase**

As noted at the beginning of this chapter, there are theoretical and
practical reasons for distinguishing between risk communication
activities undertaken during the continuing hazard phase (which are
directed toward long-term hazard adjustment) and those taken during an
escalating crisis or emergency response (which are directed toward
disaster response to avoid personal exposure or minimize personal
consequences). The continuing hazard phase involves a stable probability
(usually low) that a catastrophic incident will threaten public safety,
property, and the environment. This phase is characterized principally
by hazard mitigation and emergency preparedness activities, although
preparedness for disaster recovery also should be undertaken at this
time (Schwab, et al., 1997; Wu & Lindell, 2004).

There are five basic functions that should be addressed in the
continuing hazard phase. Table 4-2 identifies these as strategic
analysis, operational analysis, resource mobilization, program
development, and program implementation. These five functions and the
tasks associated with them are listed in the table as if they form a
simple linear sequence but, in fact, some tasks will be performed
concurrently. In addition, the process will frequently be iterative. For
example, some resource mobilization tasks might take place concurrently
with the operational analysis, or tasks conducted during the operational
analysis phase might be suspended temporarily in order to return to the
strategic analysis and refine it.

# Strategic Analysis 

*Task 1: Conduct a community hazard/vulnerability analysis.* As will be
discussed in Chapter 6, emergency managers need to understand the
hazards to which their communities are exposed and the geographic areas
at risk. Knowing the characteristics of the most significant hazards
makes it possible to identify the most appropriate hazard adjustments.
Identifying the geographic areas at greatest risk makes it possible to
identify the most vulnerable population segments and types of
businesses. In turn, this knowledge about vulnerable population segments
and types of businesses provides information about how to target the
risk communication program and also suggests which incentives and
sanctions might be best suited to increasing hazard adjustment adoption
(see Lindell & Perry, 2004, for a further discussion of the roles of
risk communication, incentives, and sanctions).

> **Table 4-2.** Tasks for the Continuing Hazard Phase.

# Strategic analysis 

Conduct a community hazard/vulnerability analysis

Analyze the community context

Identify the community's prevailing perceptions of the hazards and
hazard adjustments

Set appropriate goals for the risk communication program

# Operational analysis 

Identify and assess feasible hazard adjustments for the community and
its households/businesses

Identify ways to provide incentives, sanctions, and technological
innovations

Identify the available risk communication sources in the community

Identify the available risk communication channels in the community

Identify specific audience segments

# Resource mobilization 

Obtain the support of senior appointed and elected officials

Enlist the participation of other government agencies

Enlist the participation of nongovernmental (nonprofit) and private
sector organizations

Work with the mass media

Work with neighborhood associations and service organizations

# Program development for all phases

Staff, train, and exercise a crisis communications team

Establish procedures for maintaining an effective communication flow in
an escalating crisis and in emergency response

Develop a comprehensive risk communication program

Plan to make use of informal communication networks

Establish procedures for obtaining feedback from the news media and the
public

# Program implementation for the continuing hazard phase

Build source credibility by increasing perceptions of expertise and
trustworthiness

Use a variety of channels to disseminate hazard information

Describe community or facility hazard adjustments being planned or
implemented

Describe feasible household hazard adjustments

Evaluate program effectiveness

Source: Lindell & Perry (2004).

*Task 2: Analyze the community context.* As noted in Chapter 3, the most
comprehensive research on the practice of local environmental hazard
management is that undertaken by Drabek (1987, 1990), whose careful
analysis of the problem has identified many effective managerial
strategies. In particular, he has emphasized the need for emergency
managers to continually study their communities' ethnic composition,
communication channels, perceptions of authorities, levels of education,
and income distribution.

If environmental hazards are not high on the community's priorities, as
usually is the case (Rossi, Wright, Webber-Burdin, Peitras & Diggins,
1982), emergency managers need to begin with small programs, demonstrate
their effectiveness, and build constituencies for environmental hazard
management (Lindell, 1994b). In developing a risk communication program,
emergency managers need to realistically assess the resources the
community can afford to allocate to this activity, but should not limit
their assessment to the resources of a single agency. Instead, they
should explore the ways in which a variety of different organizations
(e.g., LEMA, police department, fire department, watershed management
authority, and public health department) might collaborate in developing
a comprehensive program. As noted in Chapter 3, the LEMC provides an
excellent framework within which to achieve this collaboration.

*Task 3: Identify the community's prevailing perceptions of hazards and
hazard adjustments.* Of the many hazards that are prevalent in modern
society, the ones that seem to produce the greatest conflict are those
having a potential for inflicting significant harm on bystanders such as
the residents of areas near technological facilities. The general public
perceives the risks of nuclear power plants and chemical facilities as
being greater than those of other technologies and natural hazards
(Lindell & Earle, 1983; Slovic, 1987). In addition, they differ from
technologists by considering what Hance, Chess, and Sandman (1988) call
"outrage" dimensions, including a risk's (un)naturalness,
(un)familiarity, (lack of) understanding by science, (lack of)
detectability, (un)trustworthiness of information sources, (lack of)
controllability by those exposed, (lack of) voluntariness in exposure,
(un)fairness in the distribution of risks and benefits, and dread. Thus,
this line of research suggests residents of most communities are likely
to consider the risks of technological facilities to be greater than
those of natural hazards, even if the annual fatality rate is the same
for the two types of hazards (Slovic, 1987).

As noted earlier, technological hazards generate a level of risk
perception exceeding what experts consider to be warranted, whereas
natural hazards seem to elicit the opposite pattern. Emergency managers
can begin to address this problem by explaining the community
hazard/vulnerability analysis and their resulting assessments of risk
area residents' personal likelihood and consequences of disaster impact.
A major impediment to effective risk communication is the difficulty in
explaining small probabilities of occurrence and small numbers of
expected casualties per year. This has led some experts to propose risk
comparisons that list the annual death rate (Morrall, 1986), loss of
life expectancy (Cohen & Lee, 1979), and the time to increase risk by
one chance in a million (Crouch & Wilson, 1982). Unfortunately, these
solutions seem to produce more problems than they solve (Covello, 1991).
Specifically, such risk comparisons typically ignore the uncertainties
in the estimates (which could differ significantly from one hazard to
another). Moreover, by comparing hazards only in terms of casualties,
these risk comparisons equate hazards having what many people consider
to be very different types of consequences. The problem is compounded
when the experts presume that if people "have voluntarily accepted"
risks having higher fatality rates (often these are a lifestyle risks
such as automobile driving), they also "should accept" another risk
having a lower fatality rate (often this is the risk of a technological
facility that someone is proposing to build and operate). Of course,
this argument ignores the fact that the facility risk will be added to
the lifestyle risk, not substituted for it, and that the facility risk
often is estimated from analytical models whereas the lifestyle risk is
computed actuarially from a very large database. Even local residents
who cannot articulate these distinctions explicitly often seem to be
aware of them implicitly and, thus, reject these arguments.

*Task 4: Set appropriate goals for the risk communication program.* As
indicated earlier, hazard awareness is an important first step in the
process of hazard adjustment, so people need to be informed about the
hazards to which their community is exposed. This could include
information about physical science, engineering, public health, social
science, and planning perspectives on environmental hazards. In
addition, people need to be informed about the likelihood that events of
different magnitudes will occur at their locations. In the case of
hurricanes, emergency managers should ensure residents of coastal
communities understand the basic atmospheric processes that cause
hurricanes, the long-term probabilities of their community being struck
by hurricanes in Saffir-Simpson Categories 1-5 over the next ten years,
and the different types of threats caused by hurricanes (wind,
tornadoes, storm surge, and inland flooding). However, it also is
necessary to ensure local residents personalize the risk of casualties
to themselves and their families, damage to their property, and
disruption to daily activities such as work, school, and shopping. To
help people personalize the risk, local emergency managers should
provide detailed maps showing areas at risk from wind, storm surge, and
inland flooding, as well as the vulnerability of different types of
structures in the community to these threats. For example, hurricane
vulnerability can be assessed by defining the areas that would be
affected by hurricanes in Saffir-Simpson Categories 1-5 and displaying
these risk areas on large-scale maps. Such maps should indicate streets,
rivers, political boundaries, and other local landmarks that will help
people to identify the risk areas in which their homes and workplaces
are located. These maps could be supplemented by drawings of different
types of structures (e.g., mobile homes, typical single family
residences, and typical multifamily structures) showing the level of
damage expected for each hurricane category. Such information needs to
be developed and pretested thoroughly because recent studies have shown
only one- to two-thirds of coastal residents can accurately identify
their hurricane risk areas, even when shown a risk area map (Arlikatti,
et al., in press; Zhang, Prater & Lindell, 2004).

In addition, emergency managers must foster people's sense of personal
responsibility for self-protection to achieve high levels of household
hazard adjustment adoption. Thus, it is important to remind local
residents of the limits to what local government and industry can do in
mitigating environmental hazards. Moreover, as the PADM indicates, risk
communication programs should ensure people are aware of the available
hazard adjustments and have accurate beliefs about the efficacy and
resource requirements of these hazard adjustments. Indeed, there is
theoretical and empirical support for the proposition that the
probability of hazard adjustment adoption is higher if messages address
attitudes toward the hazard adjustments themselves as well as addressing
the hazard (Lindell & Whitney, 2000). That is, emergency managers should
provide information about the personal consequences of hazard impact to
arouse protection motivation but also identify feasible protective
actions, describe the effectiveness of those actions, and help people to
meet the resource requirements needed for implementation.

Finally, the risk communication program should be structured as a
progressive, long-term process but emergency managers should recognize
that even the most scientifically sound and effectively implemented risk
communication programs will not produce very high levels of household
adoptions of hazard adjustments. A long-term perspective will not
demonstrate immediate results, but it can put environmental hazards on
the political agenda, which can reinforce the results achieved at the
household level (Birkland, 1997; Prater & Lindell, 2000).

# Operational Analysis

*Task 1: Identify and assess feasible hazard adjustments for the
community and its households/businesses.* The purpose of this task is to
address the problem that many people who know about their exposure to
environmental hazards often don't know what to do to reduce their
vulnerability (Lindell & Perry, 2000). To identify feasible hazard
adjustments, local emergency managers could access resources such as the
American Red Cross web site at
www.redcross.org/services/disaster/beprepared, where they can find
information about recommended household adjustments for a wide range of
hazards. These can be evaluated in terms of resource requirements such
as financial cost, time and effort, knowledge and skill, tools and
equipment, and required cooperation with others.

*Task 2: Identify ways to provide incentives, sanctions, and
technological innovations.* Some hazard adjustments require a
significant amount of household resources for implementation, so the
level of adoption could be increased by supplementing risk communication
with sanctions, incentives, or technological innovations. As noted in
Chapter 1, sanctions are appealing because they avoid the obvious costs
associated with incentives and have been shown to be effective in
situations such as the use of seat belts in automobiles (Escobedo,
Chorba & Remmington, 1992). However, sanctions are less useful than they
might seem because they require constant monitoring for enforcement,
even in the workplace (Lindell, 1994a). By contrast, the financial cost
of a hazard adjustment can be reduced by providing incentives such as
grants, loans at subsidized interest rates, or tax credits. An
alternative incentive is for emergency managers to reduce resource
requirements such as knowledge and skill by providing specific plans or
checklists for hazard adjustment implementation. For example, providing
plans for homeowners to bolt their houses to their foundations makes
this hazard adjustment feasible for do-it-yourselfers with only a modest
level of construction experience, but adding a community tool bank also
makes this hazard adjustment feasible for those who lack the tools and
equipment that are needed.

*Task 3: Identify the available risk communication sources in the
community.* As noted earlier, sources can be categorized as authorities
(local, state, and federal government agencies, facility operators, and
scientists), news media, (especially newspapers, television, and radio)
and peers (friends, relatives, neighbors, and coworkers). These sources
are judged in terms of their credibility, which primarily comprises
perceived expertise and trustworthiness, but these credibility
perceptions are likely to vary depending upon whether a source is
speaking about hazards or hazard adjustments. Within the latter
category, sources are likely to be differentiated with respect to their
credibility regarding disaster responses and long-term hazard
adjustments and, within each of these categories, with respect to hazard
adjustment efficacy and hazard adjustment resource requirements
(Lindell, 1994c).

The best risk information sources will be credible because of their
expertise regarding multiple hazards and their trustworthiness to
multiple community groups. Previous hazard research has documented that
official sources are generally the most credible, and message recipients
infer credibility from the source\'s credentials (e.g., job title and
educational degrees), acceptance by other sources of known credibility,
or previous history of job performance (Perry & Lindell, 1990b). Lindell
and Perry (1992) found the degree of expertise attributed to different
sources varies from one hazard to another and there is evidence that
perceptions of source characteristics vary by gender, ethnicity, and
other demographic characteristics (Nigg, 1982; Perry, 1987; Perry &
Nelson, 1991).

Source credibility has special implications among ethnic minorities, but
most research on ethnicity has focused on Mexican Americans, African
Americans, and Whites. The results of these studies indicate authorities
(particularly firefighters and police) tend to be regarded as credible
by the majority of all three ethnic groups, except under special
circumstances (Lindell & Perry, 1992). African Americans and Whites
tended to be more skeptical of the mass media than Mexican Americans. In
general, Mexican Americans are more likely than African Americans or
Whites to consider peers (friends, relatives, neighbors, or coworkers)
to be the most credible sources. There is evidence, however, that the
results vary by community, which appears to reflect historical
differences in relationships between ethnic groups and authorities in
these specific communities.

The practical implication of these differences in source credibility is
that each emergency manager must identify the patterns of credibility
attribution in his or her own community. There is no substitute for
knowing which minority groups live and work in the community, if they
are geographically concentrated (and where), and how they view
alternative sources of information about environmental hazards and
hazard adjustments. Such information can be gained from census data,
informants, and personal observation. Census data can be used to
identify those census tracts having a greater than average percentage of
ethnic minorities. These data can be supplemented by informants, who can
describe the nature of credibility attributions among the ethnic groups
located in those areas. It is particularly important to identify
*opinion leaders*, who are individuals that are recognized as especially
credible by particular ethnic groups, that might be recruited to
participate as additional sources of risk information. In this regard,
they play the role of social influentials, as was discussed in Chapter
2, and intermediate information sources, as represented in Figure 4-2.
Finally, the best information comes from emergency managers' active
outreach programs employed over a long period of time---for example,
speaking at meetings of neighborhood associations and civic
organizations, and involving a diverse group of citizens in advisory
committees. Not only does such community involvement provide emergency
managers with information about citizens' credibility attributions, but
it also enhances authorities' visibility, fosters dialogue, and
facilitates citizens' access to accurate risk information.

*Task 4: Identify the available risk communication channels in the
community.* The primary risk communication channels available in most
communities are electronic media such as radio and television (and,
increasingly, Web sites) and print media such as local newspapers and
magazines. Other print media that have been used in hazard awareness
programs include brochures, posters, newsletters, telephone book
inserts, comic/coloring books, reports and scientific journal articles.
Additional communication channels include informal face-to-face
conversations (drop-in hours at local libraries and information booths
at local events and shopping malls) and formal meetings with or without
audiovisual presentations such as computer simulations, slide shows and
films (Hance, et al., 1988; Mileti, Fitzpatrick & Farhar, 1990). Even
though emergency managers have access to all of these channels in
principle, access to some of them is limited in practice because their
costs exceed agency budgets. To gain access to low-cost opportunities
for publicity, emergency managers must establish contacts with local
media personnel. In addition, collaboration with private sector
organizations can sometimes yield financial contributions that can be
used to pay for low cost items such as brochures and posters.

*Task 5: Identify specific audience segments.* Emergency managers face a
significant dilemma when designing their hazard awareness programs. On
the one hand, most risk communication programs have assumed a very
homogeneous "public" and have done little to tailor information
materials to different groups. One obvious reason for this strategy is
that it is easier and cheaper to provide a generic program; another
reason is that existing research can barely provide a basis for what to
say to the "typical" person, let alone guidance on how to tailor
messages to specific demographic groups. On the other hand, individuals
with different demographic characteristics are likely to have different
interests and concerns, distinct motives for undertaking hazard
adjustments, and varying media preferences, so different approaches must
be used.

A variety of sources have emphasized the importance of tailoring
information to the characteristics of each audience segment (Expert
Review Committee, 1987; Hance, et al., 1988; Nelson & Perry, 1991;
Olson, Lagono & Scott, 1990). Accordingly, the design of these *audience
segmentation* strategies should be based upon local assessments of
receiver characteristics, which we have defined broadly in terms of
geographic (e.g., recency and frequency of hazard experience, and
proximity to the impact area) and demographic (e.g., age, sex,
education, income, and ethnicity) attributes. Emergency managers should
assess each audience segment's channel access and channel preference to
identify the types of media (e.g., radio) and, more specifically, the
channels used (e.g., specific radio stations). Next, emergency managers
need to ensure recipients heed and comprehend the messages, which can be
facilitated by determining each population segment's and business
sector's perceptions of different information sources to assess their
credibility.

Message comprehension can be improved if emergency managers determine
whether there are any audience segments for whom there are language
barriers. These are less likely to arise among more acculturated ethnic
groups (except perhaps among Native Americans) or among ethnic groups
whose socioeconomic status is similar to that of the majority
population. However, language tends to be a very important issue for
recent immigrants and for minority groups who either have resisted
acculturation (which is most likely when there is a high level of ethnic
identity) or who have experienced sufficient prejudice and
discrimination to preclude acculturation. Thus, information about
environmental hazards and hazard adjustments often needs to be presented
in multilingual format, preferably across multiple channels. In
jurisdictions with small minority populations, the number of channels
will be quite limited---perhaps not including mass media at all---but
the emergency managers who know their communities should be able to
identify some (even informal) mechanisms of native language
communication.

Moreover, emergency managers should assess the information needs of each
population segment to determine what message content should be
transmitted to them. Specific questions include whether local residents
have adequate information about the hazards to which they are
vulnerable, appropriate hazard adjustments, and the efficacy and
resource requirements of those hazard adjustments. Finally, emergency
managers need to identify any audience segments that lack a sense of
personal responsibility or self-efficacy for adopting hazard
adjustments. Any groups that are low on these characteristics should be
targeted for special attention during the implementation of the risk
communication program.

# Resource Mobilization

*Task 1: Obtain the support of senior appointed and elected officials.*
The research literature from a wide range of settings indicates
successful implementation of a new program in any type of organization
needs the support of higher level management (Lindell, 1994b). In the
public sector, obtaining the support of senior appointed and elected
officials is an important step toward obtaining the participation of
other government agencies, as well. Organizational support can be
increased when middle managers recognize they must effectively "sell"
the issues that they believe should have a high priority. This means
emergency managers must successfully identify community hazard
vulnerability as an important issue and propose hazard mitigation,
emergency preparedness, and recovery preparedness as effective
solutions.

*Task 2: Enlist the participation of other government agencies*. No
matter how supportive senior appointed and elected officials would like
to be, they are almost certain to have few additional resources to
allocate to environmental hazard management, let alone to environmental
risk communication. Consequently, emergency managers should adopt an
interorganizational approach, the first stage of which is to be certain
each agency is aware of the risk communication programs being planned
and implemented by other governmental (city, county, state and federal)
agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and hazardous technological
facilities. The second stage of this interorganizational approach is to
develop a coalition that pools the resources of multiple agencies within
local government (Drabek, 1990; Gillespie, et al., 1993; Lindell, et
al., 1996a). To elicit the active support of other government agencies,
emergency managers should identify ways in which collaboration can
achieve the goals of both organizations. For example, emergency managers
could work with the police to ensure that Block Watch (also known as
Neighborhood Watch) groups are provided with information about
environmental hazards.

*Task 3: Enlist the participation of nongovernmental and private sector
organizations.* Nongovernmental organizations such as the American Red
Cross and religious organizations such as the Salvation Army are active
in household emergency preparedness and, especially, disaster recovery.
Some of these organizations routinely work with needy families and can
identify the geographic areas in which there is a high concentration of
population segments that are most likely to be vulnerable to disaster
impact. These organizations can also help to identify methods of
assisting households to prepare for emergencies, reduce the
vulnerability of the structures in which they live, or to find safer
places to which they can move.

In addition, there are many disaster-relevant infrastructure
organizations such as water, wastewater, fuel, and electric power
utilities that can play a significant role in promoting the adoption of
hazard adjustments. Most of these respond to more routine emergencies
such as severe thunderstorms and winter storms, so they are aware of the
demands that disasters can place on a community. In addition, these
organizations routinely send bills to all of the residents of their
service areas, a situation which provides emergency managers with an
opportunity to disseminate notices about sources and channels for
obtaining further information about hazards and hazard adjustments.

*Task 4. Work with the mass media.* Collectively, the mass media
comprise a variety of channels that routinely reach a large number of
community residents. Consequently, a knowledge of media goals and
operations, as well as familiarity with specific news media personnel,
can set the stage for relationships in which information about
environmental hazards adjustment can be disseminated. At the same time,
the visibility and credibility of local environmental hazard management
agencies can be enhanced. In particular, contact with reporters and
editors can allow emergency managers access to channels with which
citizens are familiar and routinely use for information. Cultivation of
a cooperative relationship with the mass media through these mechanisms
serves to diversify channels for the dissemination of risk information,
as well as to increase the visibility of the environmental hazard
management function in the community. Finally, reporters are often aware
of their specialized audiences and tend to target them directly. This
aspect of media coverage creates opportunities for emergency managers to
target messages to specific audience segments defined by gender, age,
ethnicity (and language groups), and socioeconomic status.

It is important for emergency managers to recognize that, even though
they consider environmental hazards to be a topic of vital concern for
the community, reporters and editors will not automatically consider
this information to be "newsworthy" during the continuing hazard phase.
In order to increase the priority of this topic for the news media, many
federal agencies such as the National Weather Service urge government
officials to "declare" weeks for hazards such as tornadoes and
hurricanes. Local emergency managers can take advantage of the publicity
generated by these agencies to contact their local media. In addition,
emergency managers can collaborate with the news media by working with
them to develop the background materials reporters will need in an
escalating crisis, emergency response, or disaster recovery. Thus,
emergency managers need to anticipate what types of information
reporters are likely to seek during these events and to prepare fact
sheets and other "boilerplate" that can be used no matter what specific
conditions occur during an emergency.

*Task 5: Work with neighborhood associations and civic organizations.*
Most communities have many neighborhood associations and civic
organizations whose members participate when they perceive social and
environmental problems in their community that they expect the
organization to be successful in mitigating (Chavis & Wandersman, 1990;
Florin & Wandersman, 1984). Such studies have found group members' sense
of individual and collective self-efficacy is enhanced when these
organizations are empowered by successfully influencing actions taken by
the community (Prestby, et al., 1990). As noted in Chapter 3, emergency
managers can help the leaders of these groups to increase members'
organizational commitment by increasing leader initiating structure
(explaining what tasks to perform and how to perform them), leader
consideration (recognizing the needs and limitations of each person),
and perceived reward opportunities, and by reducing role conflict
(differing expectations regarding members' duties). In addition,
emergency managers can work with these organizations by providing them
with opportunities to learn about environmental hazards and feasible
adjustments to those hazards. Time is frequently available for this
purpose during organizational meetings because most of these
organizations meet regularly, but are not always able to fill their
meeting agendas.

# Program Development

*Task 1. Staff and train a crisis communication team.* One important
principle of risk communication is to establish a crisis communication
team as part of a broader emergency preparedness program (Churchill,
1997; Fink, 1986). The crisis communication team forms a critical link
between technical experts and the population at risk, so it must be able
to communicate effectively with both groups. In addition, the crisis
communication team should be represented by a spokesperson who is
technically competent to explain the situation clearly. As noted
earlier, spokespersons will be perceived as credible if they have
relevant credentials (e.g., job title and educational degrees), are
accepted by other sources of known credibility, or have a demonstrated
history of job performance that has enhanced their credibility (Lindell
& Perry, 1992; Perry & Lindell, 1990). It also will be helpful if they
receive training from public relations experts (Hance, et al., 1988).

As is the case with any other emergency response organization, the
crisis communication team should have written operating procedures to
guide its activation and initial contacts with the news media. The
crisis communication team's procedures should include documentation of
all emergency response related activities, especially an event log
recording the information that was available and the criteria that were
used to guide critical decisions such as those involving protective
actions for the public. The crisis communication team should also
prepare to monitor information being disseminated by the news media and
should designate a rumor control center that will be staffed by
operators who are frequently updated on the status of the incident and
the response to it.

The crisis communication team should recognize that reporters are taught
to describe events in terms of stories that are framed by five
questions---who, what, when, where, and why (Churchill, 1997).
Specifically, they will want to know what happened and what were the
specific causes of the event. Other questions include who was (or will
be) affected---including casualties, property damage, and economic
disruption---and what authorities have done (and will do) to respond to
the situation. It frequently is difficult to answer one or more of these
questions because information is lacking. In such cases, it is important
for the spokesperson to avoid speculation (and especially premature
blame), but rather to admit he or she does not know the answer and will
find out as soon as possible. This should not be interpreted as a
license to plead ignorance even when you are reasonably confident about
your assessment of the situation. It is important to strike a balance
between avoiding speculation and withholding information.

When providing information to the news media, it is important to
remember few reporters have scientific backgrounds, so technical details
might not only be unnecessary but potentially confusing and thus
counterproductive. To distinguish material that is informative from that
which is useless or confusing requires advance preparation---especially
advance contact with local reporters. This will not solve all problems;
major crises such as the 911 terrorist attacks and Hurricane Katrina
draw reporters from around the country and even around the world.
Reporters from national or international newspapers and television
networks will not cover stories in exactly the same way as local
reporters, but most of the important information needs will be common to
all categories of reporters.

Despite their limited knowledge about scientific and technological
processes, reporters should be treated with respect because they have a
difficult job to do. Specifically, they must translate complex
scientific concepts in terms that can be understood by any reasonably
intelligent and literate citizen. Thus, emergency managers who prepare
briefing materials that facilitate this process will have a far better
chance of getting their message to the public than those who continue to
speak in technical jargon (McCallum & Anderson, 1991). Just as officials
should translate warnings from English to minority languages in order to
ensure the warning messages are transmitted correctly, agency officials
also should translate their assessment of a situation from technical
jargon to ordinary English to ensure this message is also transmitted
correctly. It is important to provide reporters with the best available
information when they face a deadline, even if that information is less
reliable or current than one might prefer.

Finally, the crisis communication plan and procedures should be
evaluated using drills that test the crisis communication team alone and
also by means of full scale exercises that test the integration of the
crisis communication function into the overall emergency response
organization. Each drill or exercise should be followed by a critique
that evaluates the adequacy of the crisis communication plan and
procedures, as well as the staffing, training, and materials used.

*Task 2: Establish procedures for maintaining an effective communication
flow during an escalating crisis or emergency response.* All
organizations participating in the risk communication program should
establish procedures for coordinating the information they disseminate
during crises and emergencies. It is especially important to routinize
the flow of information among these organizations to ensure each
organization receives all the information it needs as promptly as
possible. The types of information needed in an escalating crisis will
depend upon the circumstances, but recommendations regarding the content
of incident notifications can be found in guidance for chemical
(National Response Team, 1987) and nuclear (US Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, 1980) facilities, and are summarized in Table 4-3. It is
*advisable* that this table be adopted as a template because it is based
upon long experience with escalating crises and disaster responses. It
is *essential* that facility operators and local emergency managers
discuss their information capabilities and needs and agree in advance
what information will be exchanged when the need arises.

*Task 3: Develop a comprehensive risk communication program.* As noted
earlier, McGuire's (1985) system for analyzing message content can be
defined in terms of the amount of material, speed of presentation,
number of arguments, repetition, style, clarity, ordering, forcefulness,
and extremity of the position advocated. Some of these characteristics
can be measured objectively; for example, the amount of material can be
measured in terms of the number of words, the speed of presentation can
be measured in words per minute, and the number of arguments can be
counted. Other characteristics are more ambiguous---repetition can be
measured either in terms of the number of verbatim duplications of the
message or the number of times an idea or argument is presented.
Finally, characteristics such as the clarity and extremity of the
arguments must be measured subjectively. As one might expect, there
often are significant individual differences in receivers' perceptions
of the subjective message characteristics as well as in their reactions
to all of these message characteristics.

**[Table 4-3.]{.underline}** Essential incident data.

+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
| Date and time of report                                               |
|                                                                       |
| Name, affiliation, and telephone number of information source         |
|                                                                       |
| Location, type and current status of the incident                     |
|                                                                       |
| -   Derailment, containment failure, fire, explosion, liquid spill,   |
|     gaseous release                                                   |
|                                                                       |
| -   Hazardous material name, physical properties (gas, liquid,        |
|     solid), environmental cues (sights, sounds, smells), and          |
|     potential health effects                                          |
|                                                                       |
| -   Hazardous material release duration and quantity released         |
|                                                                       |
| -   Casualties and damage already incurred                            |
|                                                                       |
| Incident prognosis                                                    |
|                                                                       |
| -   Potential for fire or explosion at site                           |
|                                                                       |
| -   Potential for fire or explosion affecting residential,            |
|     commercial, or industrial areas                                   |
|                                                                       |
| -   Hazardous material quantity available for release and expected    |
|     release duration                                                  |
|                                                                       |
| -   Locations and populations requiring protective action             |
|                                                                       |
| -   Types of protective actions recommended: evacuation, sheltering   |
|     in-place, expedient respiratory protection, interdiction of       |
|     food/water                                                        |
|                                                                       |
| Weather conditions (current and forecast wind speed and direction)    |
|                                                                       |
| Chronology of important events in the development of the incident     |
|                                                                       |
| Current status of response                                            |
|                                                                       |
| -   Facility/shipper/carrier actions: assessment, preventive,         |
|     corrective, population protective actions                         |
|                                                                       |
| -   Local/state/federal agency actions: assessment, preventive,       |
|     corrective, population protective actions                         |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+

Source: Lindell & Perry (2004).

At a somewhat broader level, Mileti and his colleagues (Mileti, et al.,
1992; Mileti & Peek, 2000; Mileti & Sorensen, 1987) have defined warning
message content in terms of information about the information source,
the nature of the hazard, the impact location and time, guidance about
recommended protective action, and frequency of repetition. Messages can
be further characterized in terms of stylistic characteristics, which
include message specificity (the level of information detail),
consistency (compatibility of information within and between messages),
and certainty (the stated or implied probability of an event's
occurrence, as well as sources' apparent confidence in what they are
saying). The stylistic characteristics also include clarity (simplicity
of the words used in the message), accuracy (the degree to which a
source's statements are proven to be correct over time), sufficiency
(adequacy of the amount of information provided---neither too much nor
too little), and channel (electronic, print, face-to-face).

In evaluating the suitability of message content, the primary concern is
that it should take into account the protective action decision process
that determines the adoption of household hazard adjustments. Although
adjustment adoption intentions and actual adoption depend upon many
additional variables, the four key message content factors are *personal
risk*, *personal responsibility for action* (when this is necessary
during the continuing hazard phase), *guidance for protective action*
(including information about an action's efficacy and resource
requirements), and *sources of further information*. These factors
should become important themes during risk communication and should be
addressed in designing messages that are most likely to have an impact.

There are several implications of the PADM for the construction of risk
communication messages. First, information about hazards and hazard
adjustments should be presented in a form that attracts attention and is
easily understood and retained but, even then, it will require periodic
repetition over time.

Second, risk communication programs should address risk perception but
should not over-emphasize it. Risk perception should be addressed
because probabilities are difficult for most people to understand. In
particular, the statement that "there is a 1% probability of a damaging
earthquake within the next year" might have little impact on people's
behavior, but cumulating probabilities over time by making the
mathematically equivalent statement that there is a 20% chance of an
earthquake in the next twenty years does seem to make more of a
difference in risk perception (Kunreuther, 2001). However, even
communication programs that succeed in increasing the accuracy of
people's risk perceptions are of no consequence if risk area residents
fail to act on these risk perceptions by adopting effective hazard
adjustments. In the case of warnings, it is especially important to
describe what the risk is, where it is going to happen, when it is going
to happen, and what the effects will be (Mileti, 1993). Beyond this,
however, detailed explanations of risk assessment processes and hazard
agent dynamics might be unnecessary or even counterproductive if such
information displaces a discussion of the other three issues---personal
responsibility for action, guidance for protective action (including
information about a hazard adjustment's efficacy and resource
requirements), and sources of further information (Mileti, 1993).

Explicitly addressing personal responsibility for action is important
because research suggests repeated officials statements regarding the
need for households struck by earthquakes to be self sufficient for 72
hours have increased citizens' sense of personal responsibility for self
protection (Lindell & Perry, 2004). Thus, a frank acknowledgement of the
limits to governmental assistance might be useful in other contexts as
well. Moreover, self sufficiency is likely to increase when emergency
managers describe the ways in which households can protect themselves,
together with specific descriptions of the resource requirements to
implement these hazard adjustments. In addition, emergency managers
should work with NGOs in their communities to ensure households with low
incomes and other disadvantages are able, as well as willing, to take
personal responsibility for self protection.

As noted earlier in this chapter, guidance for protective action during
an emergency response often requires nothing more than stating what is
the recommended protective action and when to implement it (e.g.,
evacuate now). In other cases, such as the continuing hazard phase,
guidance would include information about a hazard adjustment's efficacy
and resource requirements (e.g., bolting water heaters to the
foundation).

Finally, sources for further information should be addressed because
message recipients vary in so many ways that they might need
individualized information. This might include information about their
personal risk (for those who are on the edge of the risk area),
alternative protective actions (e.g., sheltering in-place rather than
evacuation for those whose health status is too fragile to be moved
safely), or sources of assistance (e.g., for those who have no personal
vehicle and have not been able to leave with friends, relatives,
neighbors, or coworkers).

In addressing the four critical risk communication issues, emergency
managers should pay attention to message style factors such as achieving
clarity by choosing simple, nontechnical language. The essential
information is simple and can be communicated quickly by the broadcast
media or in a small space by the print media. For additional detail or
elaboration, people can be referred to another specific channel or
source. Messages should be short enough to avoid losing receivers'
attention because of seemingly irrelevant details that induce boredom.
Conversely, long messages presenting many details have the potential for
overloading receivers with so much information they are unable to
determine what is centrally important and what is peripheral. That is,
the provision of too much information is probably as dysfunctional as
the provision of insufficient information. Nonetheless, emergency
managers should recognize what is "too long" will vary from one
community to another and even from one situation to another. In regard
to the latter, people's attention spans for emergency management
information will be relatively short during the continuing hazard phase,
but can be expected to increase significantly during an emerging crisis
or emergency response. In the latter case, lengthy messages should be
repeated frequently to ensure that people can obtain the information
they need if they fail to attend to it or comprehend it the first time
they receive it.

In all multiethnic communities, the production of brochures or other
official written information should be multilingual. It is important to
note, as Lindell and Perry (1992) indicate, that translations should be
professionally executed to avoid complications arising from dialect
variations within the same language group. Furthermore, when providing
hazard information to non-English outlets, it is appropriate to provide
it in both English and the target language to minimize information
distortion that might be introduced if employees of a radio or
television station, newspaper, or magazine provide a "freelance"
translation of the English version.

*Task 4: Plan to make effective use of informal communication networks.*
It is important for emergency managers to recognize peer communication
takes place during all phases---the continuing hazard phase, the
escalating crisis phase, and the emergency response phase. They should
plan to use these informal networks to increase the level of hazard
adjustment adoption in their communities and to alert peers to dangerous
situations. However, even the best intended friends, relatives,
neighbors and coworkers might misunderstand a message in the first place
or inadvertently distort it through selective recall. One strategy for
reducing distortion is to disseminate information through a range of
official sources and channels, creating what Mileti (1993, p. 148) calls
a "supplemental barrage of information". The idea is to provide many
opportunities for citizens to hear official messages via several
channels in the expectation that people will retain the common elements
of these messages.

*Task 5: Establish procedures for obtaining feedback from the news media
and the public.* As Figure 4-1 indicates, feedback is a critical part of
any communication process because it provides receivers with an
opportunity to confirm they have comprehended the message, to reconcile
inconsistencies within or between messages, or to obtain information
that is not available in the messages they have received. Feedback is an
inherent part of some communication channels such as informal
face-to-face discussions. It is somewhat more limited in public hearings
where public comment might be limited to a few minutes at the end of a
meeting (indeed, avoiding feedback is often a major objective of such
"hearings") and, in any event, individual speakers are typically limited
to 3-5 minutes apiece. This need for feedback is precisely the reason
why many scholars recommend informal channels of communication (e.g.,
Committee on Risk Perception and Communication, 1989; Covello, 1987;
Hance, et al, 1988). Thus, if community or agency procedures require
public hearings, these should be supplemented by less formal procedures
such as advisory panels and meetings with neighborhood associations and
civic organizations.

During emerging crises, there often is pressure to disseminate
information more rapidly via electronic and print media, so
opportunities for monitoring the degree of message distortion are
somewhat limited. One effective strategy for performing this function is
to monitor the news media by obtaining copies of local newspapers,
listening to radio, and viewing television broadcasts. In addition,
emergency managers can obtain feedback from citizens via rumor control
centers with a telephone number or a Web site that has been publicized
in advance.

# Program Implementation During the Continuing Hazard Phase

*Task 1: Build source credibility by increasing perceptions of expertise
and trustworthiness.* As noted previously, disaster researchers have
found those who think they are at risk from environmental hazards seek
information from the news media (print and broadcast) and peers
(friends, relatives, neighbors, and coworkers), as well as from
authorities (federal, state and local government). In order to ensure
local authorities are considered to be the *most* credible source, they
must take steps during the continuing hazard phase to enhance
perceptions of their expertise and trustworthiness. Accordingly, the
members of the crisis communication team should ensure its procedures
are coordinated with all relevant agencies' emergency operations plans.
This coordination can be verified by using joint training, drills, and
full-scale exercises to produce joint messages, messages that reference
each other or, at least, messages that are consistent with each other.

It also is important for personnel from each agency to develop a
demonstrated history of effective job performance that enhances their
credibility. In part, this experience can be gained during minor
incidents such as severe storms and minor floods that cause localized
damage and disruption of normal activities. However, credibility can
also be enhanced by effective performance in public hearings or in
meetings with advisory committees, neighborhood associations, and civic
organizations. Of course, expertise is only one component of
credibility; trustworthiness is also essential. According to Renn and
Levine (1991), trust develops when messages are perceived to be
accurate, objective, and complete. This can be expected when a source is
fair, unbiased, complete, and accurate (Meyer, 1988; Trumbo & McComas,
2003). Similarly, Maeda and Miyahara (2003) contend that a trustworthy
source is competent, open and honest, caring and concerned, and
sympathetic. Accordingly, emergency managers are advised to earn a
community's trust by being competent, caring, honorable, and considering
outrage factors when working with the public (Covello, McCallum &
Pavlova, 1988; Hance, et al., 1988). It also is important to promote
meaningful public involvement by involving the community in the
continuing hazard phase (or early in the decision process of a new
facility), avoiding secret meetings, and explaining the agency's
procedures (especially what constraints on public participation are
imposed by law and agency policy). Emergency managers also should
provide accurate information that is responsive to people's requests. In
this regard, it is important to recognize the difference between the
information people think they need and the information experts think is
needed. Emergency managers must learn to respond to both sets of
information needs.

*Task 2: Use a variety of channels to disseminate hazard information.*
Information channels differ significantly with respect to the types of
information most suited to them, so messages tend to be "channel-bound".
Radio, face-to-face conversations, and oral presentations are limited to
verbal information, whereas television, print media, computer
simulations, slide shows, and films can convey numeric and graphic
information as well as verbal information. The fact that messages
disseminated through different media inherently have different
characteristics implies different channels could be selected to
contribute to different stages of information processing. For example,
radio or television "spots" might have their greatest impact in
establishing initial hazard awareness (i.e., attracting attention to the
problem) and maintaining its intrusiveness by means of frequent thought
and discussion. By contrast, printed materials are most effective in
providing the detailed information needed to establish a perception of
threat and identifying suitable hazard adjustments. This function
follows from their ability to be retained and re-read to enhance
comprehension and memory for important information such as definitions
and checklists.

Still other channels include public meetings and interactive (listener
or viewer call-in) broadcast programs, which provide opportunities for
two-way communication that are effective for answering unresolved
questions but have the disadvantage that communication is oral and thus
less readily retained. The advantage of such interactive channels is
that their use is likely to enhance the receiver\'s personalization of
the message, but large public meetings are especially likely to elicit
theatrical demonstrations of outrage rather than sincere questions.
Thus, when agency policies or particular circumstances require large
public meetings, Hance, et al. (1988) advocate considering the use of
neutral moderators such as the League of Women Voters, structuring
agendas so that public comment can be made before the end of the meeting
(by which time most people have left), and breaking the meeting up into
smaller working groups with specific topics to address.

In addition to the channel boundedness of certain types of information
(verbal, numeric, and graphic), environmental hazard mangers should
recognize channel access is unevenly distributed in communities and can
be compounded by variations in ethnicity and income. Typically,
variation in resources and personal skills do not eliminate channel
access altogether, but instead concentrate it on a narrower range of
channels. Moreover, individual preferences also restrict the access each
channel provides to different community groups, so cross-channel
linkages might be required. If enough channels are used, emergency
managers are likely to reach all members of a community that has even
the most varied pattern of channel preferences.

*Task 3: Describe community or facility hazard adjustments being planned
or implemented.* In many communities, there are emergency management
actions being planned or implemented by local government agencies or, in
the case of some technological hazards, by hazardous facility operators.
Local residents should be informed of any hazard mitigation actions
being taken to reduce the probability of an incident so they will
understand that their risk is being reduced. Of course, it is unlikely
all of them will believe these measures will be wholly effective in
protecting them and, indeed, emergency managers should acknowledge there
is no mitigation action that can guarantee complete safety. That is,
land use and building construction practices can reduce, but not
eliminate, the threat of natural hazards. The same can be said about the
use of land use practices and engineered safety features in connection
with technological hazards. In addition, emergency managers should
describe any emergency preparedness actions being taken to facilitate an
active response to an incident and any recovery preparedness actions to
support a rapid restoration of the community to normal patterns of
social and economic functioning after an incident occurs.

*Task 4: Describe feasible household hazard adjustments.* Even when
hazard mitigation actions have been implemented to reduce the likelihood
of incidents ranging from floods to accidental chemical releases, some
local residents will not be satisfied that these actions will provide an
adequate level of safety. In such cases, emergency managers should
inform risk area residents of hazard adjustments they could take to
protect themselves. For example, households can mitigate flood risk by
adopting a variety of floodproofing measures (Federal Emergency
Management Agency, 1986), prepare for airborne releases of toxic
chemicals by reducing air infiltration in their homes (Lindell & Perry,
1992), or drink bottled or boiled water in the event of groundwater
contamination of local wells.

In some cases, the most cost-effective (and, sometimes, the only
available) hazard adjustments are those taken by households. For
example, earthquakes cannot be prevented (as engineered safety features
can prevent chemical releases) or controlled (as levees can control
floods). Consequently, the most effective methods for reducing
earthquake casualties and damage is by household hazard adjustments,
such as bolting heavy items with a high center of gravity (e.g.,
refrigerators, water heaters) to the walls. In such cases, emergency
managers should promote the adoption of the most feasible hazard
adjustments by beginning with the ones that are most effective, most
generally useful, and lowest in resource requirements.

*Task 5: Evaluate program effectiveness.* It is important to evaluate
the effectiveness of any risk communication program by measuring the
degree to which it has achieved its objectives (Stallen, 1991). An
evaluation of program effectiveness is the logical complement to the
goal setting activity undertaken in the strategic analysis. Thus,
emergency managers should determine how to measure the goals that they
have set, how to collect the data needed, and how to decide if the data
indicate the goals have been achieved. This comparison process can then
serve as the basis for determining whether changes need to be made in
the risk communication program.

As this chapter has indicated many times, a primary goal of
environmental risk communication should be to promote household adoption
of hazard adjustments. Thus, the first step in the program evaluation
will usually be to identify the hazard adjustments whose adoption the
program is seeking to increase. The remaining steps will depend upon the
resources available.

#### Risk Communication During an Escalating Crisis or Emergency Response

There is an important difference between a state of chronic hazard and
an escalating crisis, but the time at which the transition takes place
is rarely well defined. It helps to consider the definition of an
escalating crisis---a situation in which there is a significantly
increased probability of an incident occurring that will threaten the
public's health, safety, or property. Unfortunately, the problem is that
the probability of occurrence is at least partially subjective. Thus,
the determination of whether a crisis exists will also be subjective. As
a practical matter, a crisis exists if authorities (including
technological facility operators), *or* the news media, *or* a
significant proportion of those in the community believe that there is
an increased risk. Asserting that a crisis exists if any of these groups
defines the situation as such follows from the basic principle that
"perception is reality". If the news media or local residents believe
there is a crisis, then there is a crisis unless authorities can
convince them otherwise. This might make it seem as if any abnormal
situation will inevitably become an escalating crisis, but such is not
necessarily the case. The crucial point is that authorities must be
prepared to explain specifically why a situation is or is not a crisis.

*Classify the Situation*

Authorities can exert some control over other people's definition of a
situation by establishing specific criteria in advance of an incident
that systematically define elevated conditions of threat. For example,
the National Weather Service has established an emergency classification
system that consists of watches and warnings, whereas the US Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (1980) classifies an incident as an Unusual Event,
an Alert, a Site Area Emergency, or a General Emergency. The number of
categories in the emergency classification system should correspond to
meaningful differences in the levels of response by local authorities
(and facility personnel, in the case of technological facilities), but
the number of categories is less important than that the fact that the
emergency classification system has been established in advance, is
defined as objectively as possible, and is agreed to by all responding
organizations (Lindell & Perry, 1992). By establishing a set of
objective indicators of environmental or plant conditions that are
linked to specific response actions, authorities commit themselves in
advance to take those actions under those conditions---a situation
indicating decisions are being made on the basis of rational scientific
considerations rather than the exigencies of the moment.

*Program Implementation During an Escalating Crisis or Emergency
Response*

Once authorities have determined that environmental conditions have
exceeded the criteria listed in the emergency classification system,
they need to implement the predetermined response actions. Many of these
actions will include further emergency assessment, property protection,
population protection, and incident management. One of the most
important incident management actions is risk communication, and this
will consist of six tasks:

-   Activate the crisis communication team promptly,

-   Determine the appropriate time to release sensitive information ,

-   Select the communication channels appropriate to the situation,

-   Maintain source credibility with the news media and the public,

-   Provide timely and accurate information to the news media and the
    public, and

-   Evaluate performance through post-incident critiques.

*Task 1: Activate the crisis communication team promptly.* When the
criteria in the emergency classification system have been exceeded, the
crisis communication team should activate promptly and prepare to
disseminate information even if it does not need to release that
information immediately. Members of the team should contact all
appropriate authorities and open all necessary communication links to
ensure all sources of information and expertise are brought to bear on
the situation. It is essential that all organizations be aware of the
information being disseminated by other organizations so they can
identify any disagreement and prepare appropriate explanations before
they are contacted by the news media to explain the discrepancies.

Emergency managers should review the information in press kits and any
background materials they have prepared for briefing the news media in
press conferences or community groups in public hearings. They should
also contact personnel in their agencies who are peripherally related to
the crisis (e.g., plant workers and clerical support staff) to brief
them about the situation. Such personnel might otherwise have only
incomplete or outdated information to provide about the situation if
they are queried by the news media and peers.

During the initial stages of an escalating crisis or emergency response,
emergency managers should take care to review their communication
objectives (Churchill, 1997). These objectives should become the
criteria according to which all later press releases, press conferences,
and public meetings are evaluated. In most environmental emergencies,
the principal objectives will be to promote appropriate protective
action by those whom the authorities believe to be in the most immediate
danger and also to promote active monitoring of the situation by those
who might later be determined to be at risk. The objectives should not
be to prevent panic, which disaster researchers have found to be
extremely rare (Drabek, 1986; Lindell & Perry, 1992). Nor should
authorities ridicule what they consider to be unnecessary protective
action by those who *think* they are at risk, as long as such actions do
not impede the protection of those whom the authorities believe *are* at
risk. It is especially important for authorities to avoid attempting to
promote one protective action by criticizing another. For example, some
misguided attempts have been made to promote sheltering in-place by
asserting that people are exposing themselves to major traffic accident
risks if they evacuate. Not only is this incorrect (the accident risks
in evacuation appear to be no greater than those of normal driving;
Lindell & Perry, 1992), but it is likely to lead those at risk to
believe that there is nothing they can do to protect themselves.

*Task 2: Determine the appropriate time to release sensitive
information.* When emergency managers, but not others, can detect the
subtle environmental cues that indicate the onset of an emergency, they
must determine when to alert others of the danger. Thus, the crisis
communication team needs to be guided by procedures that define when
information is to be released, but there are no universal rules for
determining when to release information because even experts disagree
(Kasperson, 1987). On the one hand, early releases of information often
are characterized by a significant degree of uncertainty, so there is a
possibility that crisis conditions might never materialize or will be
less severe than initially expected. Consequently, authorities
frequently withhold information in order to avoid unnecessary
disruption. The disadvantage of delaying the release of information is
that this can be misinterpreted as a cover-up if the data are leaked
(Hance, et al., 1988) and there are many ways in which such leaks can
occur. It also is important to respond appropriately to reporters'
questions when they become aware that something important is happening.
Statements of "no comment" are almost certain to be interpreted as
meaning that authorities have important information that is being
withheld.

By contrast, early release of information tends to enhance the
credibility of the information source and to increase a source's control
over the agenda. In particular, being the first to break bad news
provides an opportunity to put the information into an appropriate
context. In addition, controlling the timing of a press release can have
a significant impact on the amount of attention it receives. A press
release distributed on a slow news day might receive substantially more
coverage in the news media than the same information released on a busy
day or late on a Friday afternoon preceding a three day weekend.

*Task 3: Select the communication channels that are appropriate to the
situation.* One of the most significant differences between a continuing
hazard and an escalating crisis is that the latter is "newsworthy", so
emergency managers will generally have little difficulty in obtaining
the news media coverage they sought, usually unsuccessfully, during the
continuing hazard phase. As always, news media coverage needs to be
monitored to ensure reporters are accurately disseminating the
information released by emergency managers, yet this procedure alone
cannot ensure those at risk are receiving, heeding, and comprehending
the information they need. Thus, emergency managers need to promote
dialogue through two-way communication, preferably in small groups
rather than massive public hearings. This will help them to understand
public risk perceptions and explain risks more effectively (Hance, et
al., 1988).

Even though an escalating crisis or an emergency response will prompt
the news media to seek information, emergency managers should not rely
only on reporters' requests for interviews to determine when and what
information to disseminate. Instead, they should initiate communication
with reporters through press releases and press conferences. Typically,
press releases afford the most control over the agenda, whereas
interviews provide the least control.

*Task 4: Maintain source credibility with the news media and the
public.* During an escalating crisis or emergency response, emergency
managers should obtain timely and accurate data from within their own
and other agencies and make their recommended actions consistent with
the analyses. If the available data are incomplete, they should be
honest about what is and is not known. A candid confession of ignorance
might be uncomfortable at the time, but it is less dangerous to one's
credibility than making up an answer that is later found out to be
incorrect.

A related principle is that emergency managers should recognize the news
media have many sources of information in addition to authorities.
Consequently, it is important to respond to reporters when they need
information for an imminent deadline because they will obtain the best
information they can from whatever sources are available at the time
that they need to file their stories (Churchill, 1997). Accordingly, it
is often better to explain that data have been or are being collected,
describe how they are being or will be analyzed, and indicate the date
on which the results of the analyses will be released. Hance, et al.
(1988) note that agencies should present some management options when
the data reveal environmental problems, but practitioners differ in
their beliefs about the balance between analyzing these options
thoroughly and presenting tentative options that provide a starting
point for input from the community.

Trust is a major issue because there tends to be so little of it to
begin with and what there is can be lost so easily. As Kasperson (1987)
noted, trust in institutions has been decreasing for some time and
television anchors tend to be among the few people other than
independent scientists that are generally trusted. Television anchors
are trusted because they are familiar, authoritative, and have developed
a track record of accuracy over time. Frequently, those who must
communicate information about environmental risks are stereotyped as
representatives of their organizations and, unless the stereotype is
positive at the outset, it can be difficult to build trust during a
crisis. This is the reason why it is so important for emergency managers
to forestall public stereotypes about their agencies, and thus
themselves, by working with community groups on multiple environmental
issues before crises arise and publicizing the accomplishments of their
agencies in handling these problems.

*Task 4: Provide timely and accurate information about the hazard to the
news media and the public.* News releases should be no longer than two
pages with simple short sentences in plain English (Churchill, 1997).
They should contain a dateline (date and location of release), the
organizational source (including point of contact) for the information,
a summary lead that provides a one sentence abstract of the press
release, the text of the press release, and a brief description of any
attachments. These should be supplemented by fact sheets that contain
basic background information appropriate to any incident. There should
be attachments including information such as a biographical summary
about the spokesperson and other pertinent details about the hazard and
official responses.

In deciding how to present risk information, it is important to assess
the audience's level of technical sophistication so the presentation can
avoid being too technical for people to understand, yet not so
simplistic the audience is insulted. In general, it is important to
presume the average member of the audience is intelligent but uninformed
about environmental risks. Thus, emergency managers should avoid
acronyms and use ordinary English words rather than technical jargon to
explain basic concepts. They also should anticipate the possibility of
confrontational tactics by the news media or some members of the public.
If confronted with differing interpretations from other experts,
emergency managers should be prepared to calmly reiterate their own
scientific qualifications, repeat the rationale for their own position
on the dispute, and explain what they believe are the weaknesses in
alternative positions.

Emergency managers should be prepared to describe the process by which
risks were assessed (including ways in which cautious estimates were
used in different steps of the analysis), and what the risks are (in
terms of quantities released, ambient concentrations, individual
exposures via different pathways, probabilities of adverse effects, and
expected levels of impact over different time periods). They also should
be prepared to acknowledge uncertainties in hazard data and even be
ready to acknowledge they don't know the answer to a question when this
is the case. However, they also should be prepared to state what will be
done to obtain an answer to the question and when the answer will be
forthcoming.

*Task 5: Evaluate performance through post-incident critiques.* To
improve their performance, organizations must learn from their
experience. Thus, each incident in which emergency managers must
disseminate risk information to the news media or the public should be
followed by a thorough critique of performance (Lindell & Perry, 1992;
National Response Team, 1987). All members of the crisis communication
team should review the goals of the risk communication program, the
event logs kept during the incident, and other available documentation
to identify deficiencies in organizational performance. Experience in
drills, exercises, and incidents has demonstrated the importance of
focusing on the performance of the organization rather than the
performance of individuals because this enhances a spirit of
cooperation. Thus, each participant should be encouraged to follow up on
any deficiencies by identifying the ways in which these can be corrected
by improvements in plans, procedures, training, facilities, equipment,
or materials and supplies.

**Case Study: Risk Perception and Warning of the Mt. St. Helens
Eruption**

In late March, 1980, Mt. St. Helens began a series of ash and steam
eruptions that culminated six weeks later in a blast that ejected one
cubic mile of material from the top of the mountain. Prior to the March
eruptions, most residents of nearby communities were aware that Mt. St.
Helens was a volcano and could name a specific threat that could affect
their safety (Perry & Greene, 1983). The majority of those within about
20 miles of the volcano expressed concern about ashfall, whereas most of
those in communities 30-40 miles away were concerned about mudflows and
floods. The severity and immediacy of the volcano threat led people to
search for information frequently---most of them sought information four
times a day or more. The unfamiliarity of the threat led them to rely on
the news media more than peers. Reliance on authorities was very high in
communities closest to the volcano, but very low farther away.
Similarly, residents of areas closest to the volcano thought they were
more likely to evacuate and had made more preparations to evacuate.

On the day of the May 18 eruption, most of those living close to the
volcano (Toutle/Silverlake) were warned by authorities (48%) but almost
as many were warned by peers (41%) and few were warned by the news media
(11%). By contrast, most of those living farther away the volcano
(Woodland) were warned by peers (59%) and equal proportions of the
remainder were warned by authorities (21%) and the news media (20%). The
initial response also differed by community. Toutle/Silverlake residents
were most likely to prepare to evacuate (40%), but many took family
oriented action (18%), sought to confirm the warning (19%), or continued
normal routines (18%). Woodland residents were most likely to take
family oriented action (41%), while others sought to confirm the warning
(21%) or continued normal routines (29%) rather than prepare to evacuate
(7%). Most residents of both communities sought warning confirmation,
but those in Toutle/Silverlake were less likely to use the mass media
(33% vs. 59% in Woodland) and more likely to contact peers and local
authorities.