Session No. 11

Course Title: Theory, Principles and Fundamentals of Hazards, Disasters,
and U.S.

Emergency Management

Session Title: Models of Emergency Management

Time: 1 Hour

**Objective:**

11.1 To define several models of emergency management and explore their
evolution and implications.

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**Scope:**

To begin this session, the professor introduces two significantly
different philosophical models of emergency management today---the
Emergency Services model and the Public Administration model. The
students explore the evolution and current implementation of both models
and discover how an emergency manager can determine which model is used
in his or her community. Next, the professor introduces a third model,
the Civil Defense model, and describes how one city, in particular, saw
the evolution of its emergency management from that model toward the
Public Administration model. The inclusion of terrorism to the concept
of "all hazards" is discussed, along with the potential for the pendulum
to swing backward in the direction of the Cold War era Civil Defense
model. Then, the class briefly explores the strengths and weaknesses of
what one scholar terms the "dominate model," and how some emergency
managers have perceived the Incident Command System (ICS) as a model,
rather than as a bureaucratic and tactical tool. The use of ICS,
including its strengths and weaknesses, is mentioned briefly as it---or
variations of it---may be used as a tool within any model of emergency
management. The upsurgence of the terrorism threat, inciting the
perceived need for "more authoritarian" means of emergency management is
presented, along with one scholar's assessment and caution for
practitioners in the face of the current situation. Next, the professor
presents a perceived trend toward the "swallowing up" of emergency
management by homeland security, as practitioners seek to implement a
response to current realities. Finally, the professor transitions to the
next unit, which will explore various approaches to emergency
management.

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**Suggested Student Homework Reading Assignment:**

Alexander, David. 2002. From civil defence to civil protection\--and
back again. Disaster Prevention and Management 11(3)

Selves, Michael D. CEM, CPM. *Local Emergency Management: A Tale of Two
Models.*
[http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/edu/localEM1.html](http://training.fema.gove/EMIWeb/edu/localEM1.html)

Winslow, Frances, Ph.D., CEM*. Changing the Emergency Management
Paradigm: A Case Study of San Jose, California*. Available at FEMA's
Higher Education Project "Practitioner's Corner" website:
<http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/edu/practitioner.asp>.

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**Additional Sources to Check:**

Alexander, David. "Do *you* want to be commanded and controlled?
Reflections on modern emergency management." Cranfield Disaster
Management Centre, Cranfield University, UK.

Drabek. Thomas E. 2003. *Strategies for Coordinating Disaster
Responses*. Program on Environment and Behavior Monograph No. 61.
Institute of Behavioral Science, University of Colorado

R. T. Sylves and W.L. Waugh, Jr. (eds.). *Disaster Management in the
U.S. and Canada*. Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas, 1996.

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#### General Requirements:

PowerPoint slides have been prepared to support this session. The
session is not dependent upon the utilization of these visual aids. They
are provided as a tool that the professor is free to use as PowerPoints
or overhead transparencies.

Objective 11.1 To define several models of emergency management and
explore their evolution and implications.

*You may wish to introduce this session by reminding the class about the
way emergency management is seen to have evolved, reiterating briefly
from the history session. Explain that in the course of the evolution,
several methods, or models, of thinking about and establishing ways to
manage emergencies have developed. You might pose the question: Where,
in the hierarchy of local government does the responsibility for
emergency management lie? In short, in what agency does the function
reside? Who serves as emergency manager; who are his or her peer
colleagues; who sets the standards; and who is the boss? And, in many
cases, what does the emergency manager do when he or she is not managing
emergencies?*

-   Michael Selves, a Certified Emergency Manager with long-term
    experience in local government, posits that there are two
    significantly different philosophical models evident within the
    profession today:

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-   Emergency Services (E-S)

-   Public Administration (P-A)[^1]

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-   Selves believes that a local emergency manager is able to
    distinguish between these two models---and, more importantly,
    ascertain which model the local program follows---based on:

> ". . . the **organization and culture** of a local E.M. program, the
> **nature of the interactions with other agencies**, and the **general
> assumptions and perceptions which persons, both within and outside the
> program, have regarding the role of E.M.** within the local
> community."[^2]

**The Emergency Services Model**

-   According to Selves, this model focuses on the role of emergency
    management in coordinating the response of emergency services
    (police, fire, EMS) to emergencies and disasters. Thus, the
    **response functions are the primary responsibilities**, with issues
    such as mitigation, public awareness, continuation of government,
    and other "non-emergency" issues addressed as secondary.

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-   During the period when **Civil Defense** was a primary model, much
    of the responsibility for emergency management focused on **law
    enforcement** agencies.

-   Then, partly because of the effects of Title III of the Superfund
    Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA), which dealt with
    **hazardous substances** in the local community---and what Selves
    sees as the obsolescence of the Civil Defense model---the numbers of
    emergency managers affiliated with the **fire service** has
    increased.

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-   A candid caution from an emergency management professional,
    however---one size does not fit all:

> "We have found that most fire and law agencies do not understand the
> meaning of emergency management or what it is supposed to do. . .
> **Where I live the Fire Chief also serves as the EM Director and
> believe me he doesn't have a clue or begin to understand or know the
> difference. He is fire first and what's left may be EM Director if he
> has time**. We had a full time professional EM Director \[and because
> of illness\] the Fire Chief was appointed to take his place and now
> there is no resemblance of what was an extremely good, respected,
> proven all hazard agency coordinated program. \[Another city\] **now
> has a full time Director, retired from \[that city's\] police, but he
> wants to do nothing but WMD---where is the all hazard program?** He
> doesn't understand the meaning of all hazards to even explain it to
> his supervisors or have any idea where to begin to put a program in
> place if he wanted to. **This is my major concern that they think
> their backgrounds make them an automatic Emergency Manager. I'm really
> not trying to disrespect their position or profession but they really
> don't understand."** (Hill 2000)

-   Some of the indicators that a community's emergency management
    functions follow an Emergency Services model are:

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-   **An emphasis on people, equipment and procedures as they are used
    in emergency response**---"drills," for example, that move people
    and equipment but neglect executive decision-making and
    interdepartmental coordination.

-   **Interactions that take place primarily among emergency services
    agencies**---linked with an effort to keep away the "politicians,"
    who are regarded more as a nuisance than as key players.

-   **Turf concerns**---amid uniformed responders with the "red lights
    and sirens" trappings, some emergency managers present their role as
    mere resource support, thereby reinforcing the perception of some
    policymakers that their role is redundant and unnecessary.

-   **Emergency management as an additional duty** within an emergency
    services department, more often than not, the fire department. Here,
    the role loses its independence, runs the risk of turf
    complications, lacks coordination ability and/or authority, and
    suffers possible misunderstanding by both elected and appointed
    policymakers.

    **What Is the Distinction?**

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-   Selves writes:

> "Certainly the first line of response capability is emergency services
> and a primary objective of emergency management must be the support
> for and integration of that capability into an overall jurisdictional
> plan for emergencies/disasters. **In truth emergency management and
> the various emergency services are separate but equally different and
> important functions within an integrated emergency management system.
> The important distinction in this regard is between being closely
> involved with and a strong supporter of emergency services rather than
> being a part of the local emergency service function."**[^3]

**Who Sets the Standards?**

-   **The National Fire Protection Association(NFPA)** created a set of
    national standards---NFPA 1600---for managing disasters. Embedded in
    the notion of standards set by NFPA is the implication that
    emergency management is a discipline within a fire service. Selves
    points out that:

> "Emergency managers operating under the P-A model would argue that if
> any entity outside the emergency management community should establish
> such standards, it would be the **National Academy of Public
> Administration (NAPA)** which has done extensive research and studies
> of the emergency management field."[^4]

-   Selves poses, and answers, these questions:

> "Who at the local level would be most interested in **a NFPA
> standard---the Fire Chief**. Who at the local level would be most
> interested in **a NAPA standard---the City/County Administrator**. The
> implications should be obvious."[^5]

**The Public Administration Model**

-   To clarify the implications, Selves provides a broad objective for a
    local emergency management program that operates under the P-A
    model:

> **"The function of emergency management is to provide a proactive
> framework and pre-planned mechanisms which allow government to operate
> in an effective and integrated manner during a crisis."**[^6]

-   Quoting Sylves and Waugh, Selves lists the myths that these authors
    attempted to refute:

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-   Emergency management is all training and no education.

-   The field of emergency management has few occupants willing to
    promote knowledge creation and professionalism.

-   Studies of disaster are only uni-disciplinary and anecdotal.

-   Emergency management is peripheral, narrowly occupational, episodic
    work.[^7]

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-   The P-A model, then, reflects emergency management not as a function
    of, or subordinate to, an emergency services agency, but **as a
    separate element of the overall administration of
    government**---"that aspect of public administration which deals
    with the operation of government during crisis."

-   Indicators of a P-A model, according to Selves, include the practice
    of:

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-   Viewing emergency management as a **discipline**, with the attendant
    professional focus on research and debate.

-   Recognizing the roles of **politicians and the media**, and
    investigating how the roles can be fulfilled.

-   Coordinating and integrating **all governmental and private efforts
    within a single framework**.

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-   Selves urges self-examination to determine which philosophy best
    describes the way the emergency management role is carried out, and
    notes that the size and culture of jurisdictions may have a
    significant effect on how the role is carried out. If, indeed, the
    need for change is indicated, he suggests several initial steps:

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-   Create job-defining documents---a mission statement and goals and
    objectives.

-   Gradually eliminate practices that tend to send the wrong signals,
    such as unnecessary presence at the scene of an emergency incident.

-   Emphasize elements beyond the emergency services
    aspects---mitigation, public awareness, continuity of government.

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-   Selves acknowledges that the emphasis on continuity of government
    may be perceived as a continuance of the "obsolete" Civil Defense
    model. Such emphasis, he contends, however, does not cast the P-A
    model in the same mold.

> "The P-A model, to some degree, may reflect the need to continue the
> Civil Defense emphasis on the preservation of viable government and
> community functions regardless of the crisis situation. Indeed, P-A
> model emergency managers would give significantly more attention to
> Continuity of Government issues than their E-S model counterparts.
> **To say that the P-A model is simply a 'remnant' of the national,
> Civil Defense, perspective, would be seriously misleading,
> however."**[^8]

**Another Model: Civil Defense---One City's Experience**

-   One examination of the Civil Defense model perceives Selves' caution
    as more of a characterization. Dr. Frances Edwards-Winslow writes:

> **"While Selves characterizes one view of the public administration
> model as 'simply a "remnant" of the national Civil Defense
> perspective,' it may instead be viewed as the evolutionary development
> from the older, military oriented model."**[^9]

-   Dr. Winslow traces briefly the history of the Civil Defense model as
    it evolved in the City of San Jose, including the construction of a
    bunker-style Emergency Operations Center (EOC) and weather station.
    She relates the emergence from Cold War preparedness:

> "As the threat of war subsided and the likelihood of natural disaster
> was recognized, **federal and state Civil Defense programs evolved to
> the "all hazards" approach to emergency management**. Recognizing that
> floods and earthquakes were far more likely than Soviet invasion of
> San Jose, **the work of the Civil Defense Office shifted to community
> preparedness education. During this time the name was changed to
> Emergency Services, and the civilian staff became part of the San Jose
> Fire Department.** The emergency services staff began to be drawn from
> civilian analysts, who worked in various departments over a career.
>
> "The **emergency management function appears to have been compatible
> with the work of the Fire Department in the beginning**. **Fire
> fighters** traditionally delivered public education on fire
> prevention, evacuation drills, and personal fire safety. The
> **emergency management staff** delivered information on developing a
> personal preparedness capability for 72 hours of self-sufficiency.
> **They worked with city departments** to develop standard operating
> procedures for departmental roles in the EOC**. Together with the City
> attorney they crafted an emergency management ordinanc**e that
> detailed the special powers of the City Manager during a declared
> local emergency."[^10]

-   The 1978 passage of Proposition 13, however, limited the growth of
    taxable real estate values, drastically diminishing a needed revenue
    source over time.

-   Then, the State of California developed the Governor's Office of
    Emergency Services in the 1980s. With a renewed emphasis on natural
    hazards preparedness, this office mandated that staff members across
    the state (whose salaries were supported by a Federal Emergency
    Management Assistance 1/3 salary match) undertake a specific series
    of annual related public events. Coupled with the tax restrictions
    of Proposition 13, the mandated events caused a drain on finances of
    the original civil defense programs, which were required to support
    the additional events.

> "Local governments adopted a variety of strategies to deal with the
> problem. **Many communities chose to drop out of the EMA program after
> determining that it was costing them more than they were able to
> recoup** from the federal EMA program. **Other cities transferred the
> emergency management function to a sworn police or fire staff member
> as a collateral duty.**
>
> **"Some cities remained in the EMA program, but the host departments
> found the financial support of the annual campaigns and exercises
> difficult**. As local revenue growth dwindled, and community demands
> for primary public safety services increased, **the value of dedicated
> emergency** **management was questioned. . . emergency management
> became a costly stepchild."**[^11]

-   After the 1984 Morgan Hill Earthquake, a committee of department
    heads reported on several inadequacies of the city's emergency
    management. Examples cited in their 1988 report were the old
    bunker-style EOC, an outdated emergency plan, and lack of community
    outreach. So, in response, the committee created plans detailing
    tasks required to improve preparedness.

-   Then, the Loma Prieta Earthquake occurred in 1989---still, some of
    the deficiencies that had been noted in 1988 persisted. A 1990
    follow-up report was developed on events and issues related to the
    earthquake.

> "In the final 'General Emergency Management Issues' section it noted
> that **one source of these problems was the placement of the emergency
> management function within the Fire Department**, a department with
> other competing core services. **Access to the city manager and
> governing body was exclusively through the fire chief**, a department
> **head who was fighting for budget for apparatus, personal protective
> equipment and fire prevention needs**. **Emergency management was not
> viewed as a core service of the department and needed funding was not
> provided as a priority."**[^12]

-   Other issues included:

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-   The perception of staff members who rotated through emergency
    services that the tenure there was not career-enhancing.

-   Staff members had little advance training and little opportunity to
    obtain on-the-job training.

-   The 1950s bunker facility, with its outdated equipment, was
    insufficient and served to isolate employees from the rest of the
    city's staff.

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-   Then, starting on July 1, 1990, San Jose's Office of Emergency
    Services began to assume an executive function, moving as an
    independent agency to a new facility with the placement of a full
    time professional Director of Emergency Preparedness under the City
    Manager's office. Thus, its evolution from the Civil Defense model
    to the Public Administration model, with all professional staff
    members certified for their jobs. Examples of such credentialing and
    active efforts toward professionalism include:

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-   The Director, with a graduate degree in public administration, is a
    Certified Emergency Manager (CEM) and has completed FEMA's
    Professional Development Series (PDS).

-   The Emergency Services Coordinator, also with a graduate degree in
    public administration, has completed the PDS.

-   All instructors in the *Prepared!* program have completed FEMA's
    Community Emergency Response Team (CERT) training.

-   The Office of Emergency Services is a member of the Collaborative
    for Disaster Mitigation at San Jose State University, and has
    actively pressed for the University's Master of Public
    Administration Program to include emergency management courses.

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-   Dr. Winslow's conclusion on the evolution of the military model:

> **"The military heritage of emergency management lives on through the
> Standardized Emergency Management System (SEMS) in California**
> Emergency Operations Centers. Based on the Incident Command System
> (ICS) used at the field level by the fire service nationally, and by
> law enforcement in many western states, SEMS is a flexible
> hierarchical structure for managing an emergency or disaster."[^13]

-   Dr. Thomas Drabek cites Dynes (1994) on the strengths and weaknesses
    of the "dominate model," the "most widely used approach to community
    disaster planning."[^14]

> "This 'dominate' model, as Dynes called it, has its **roots in
> military planning and bureaucratic organizational theories that have
> been successful in many businesses, e.g., fast food chains. A
> standardized product is the desired output and standardized procedures
> are used to create it.** High levels of certainty and stability allow
> for the rapid training of personnel who are taught highly specific
> tasks so they will fit into a specified division of labor. As in the
> military, there are commanders who issue orders. **With tight control
> processes in operation, human-machine behavior sequences can be
> organized into highly efficient units.** When applied to the
> turbulence of disaster response with the massive participation of the
> many agencies that arrive to assist, **the command and control model
> fails local emergency managers who try to use it."** (Dynes and
> Drabek, 1994, p. 13; Drabek, 1997a, pp. 289-290; Dynes and
> Quarantelli, 1997)
>
> "This model does have limited applicability at the **tactical level**
> of managing community disaster responses, *but local emergency
> managers must approach their task strategically."* (Senior Executive
> Policy Center, 1984).

-   Drabek quotes Dynes (1994, p. 147) on specific weaknesses of the
    command and control approach, such as excess time spent creating
    planning documents that specify authority relationships, and:

> ". . . a host of negative consequences that resulted when community
> leaders tried to implement it (e.g., it **places responsibility in a
> top down authority structure** to make the 'right decisions.')"[^15]

-   Drabek (with Kreps, 1996) proposes that:

> ". . . disasters are nonroutine social problems. As such,
> **bureaucratic theory and efforts to implement it become part of the
> problem of managing disasters, not a solution**. It is as if one were
> planning a trip within the state of Colorado using a road map from
> Alaska. While a helpful tool farther north, the map is the wrong model
> for Colorado. So too are theories of bureaucracy when it comes to
> disaster management."[^16]

-   Drabek on the incident command system (ICS) that evolved from the
    fire services community:

> **"ICS is now advocated by some as "the model" for local emergency
> managers**. . . \[o\]thers, I assumed might see this managerial model
> as but one of many tools.
>
> **"ICS has taken on the aura of religious dogma for many** (for a
> historical account and advocacy, see Yates, 1999). When Wenger,
> Quarantelli, and Dynes (1990) questioned the efficacy of ICS, they
> encountered sharp criticism. . . . While I found numerous emergency
> managers who claimed that their county or city program used ICS,
> others described different models. Some used variants of the Federal
> Response Plan developed by FEMA . . **The point is that some
> organizational model is needed, but not all will follow the language
> of the ICS despite the push by some for national
> standardization.**[^17]

-   ICS is a **tactical and bureaucratic management approach**. Drabek
    (2003, pp. 17-18) cites Osborne and Plastrik (1998) on the
    recognition of the limitations of bureaucratic management applied to
    the uncertainty and turbulence of disasters:

> **"The resulting bureaucracies have been described as systems designed
> by a genius to be run by idiots**. That may be a little harsh, but it
> contains a kernel of truth. In the soul of the bureaucratic machine
> there lurks a control freak. **Employees are cogs in a highly
> regulated machine. Their work is broken down into different functions
> and described in great detail.** Managers do the thinking; workers do
> the tasks they are assigned. Detailed rules and procedures specify
> behaviors. Inspectors check for compliance.
>
> **"This model served us well in its day. As long as the tasks were
> relatively simple and straightforward and the environment stable, it
> worked. But for the last 20 years it has been coming apart."**
> (Osborne and Plastrik, 1998, p. 17)

-   Terrorism, however, may have the effect of swinging the pendulum
    from the P-A model backward toward the E-S model:

> **"Now that "all hazards" has come to include terrorism, emergency
> management may be working on the edge of the Selves 'emergency
> services' model.** OES can actually make an important contribution to
> community emergency response capability **by acting as a neutral
> ground for police, fire and emergency medical services (EMS)
> representatives to meet."**[^18]

-   On ICS as it relates to the Emergency Services model (Drabek 2003,
    pp. 193-194):

> **"Some emergency managers have successfully implemented the ICS model
> into their EOC, although others use a variation**, both in
> nomenclature and philosophy. **Unity of command**, however, is the
> desired outcome."

-   Note the variation of opinion between two emergency managers whom
    Drabek interviewed for his work, *Strategies for Coordinating
    Disaster Responses*:

> "There are three important items that I would emphasize. First is the
> importance of pre-existing relationships. The way you work day
> day-to-day will reflect your disaster response. Second, joint training
> and cross-agency training. For example, our police and fire
> departments trained together in our community. Third, the **incident
> command system as being a tactical management tool. We use the
> functional areas instead of the language of the incident command
> system. Our emergency operations center works at a higher and more
> strategic and abstract level than I feel is possible through the
> incident command system."**
>
> *As contrasted to:*
>
> "What I would stress to a new emergency manager is that **the quality
> of our response. . . was very much related to our utilization of the
> incident command system as a management system. There are a lot of
> egos out there and sometimes you simply have to intercede.** **We
> found that the use** **of this management tool allowed us to integrate
> new agencies, including federal and state resources, into our overall
> response structure very quickly and without very many problems."**

-   Dr. David Alexander asserts terrorism's effect on the swinging
    pendulum:

> **"September 11, 2001. . . has galvanised emergency preparedness** in
> the rich countries: the scenarios are changing**; the equipment
> requests now include antidotes for anthrax, bomb detection devices,
> protective suits capable of resisting Sarin gas attacks, and other
> expensive hardware; the objectives and methods of medical and
> logistical training are under review;** evacuation is topical once
> again; tall buildings have ceased to appear as safe, **benign
> environments and command structures are changing to reflect the need
> to manage huge numbers of people."** (Alexander 2002, Rubin and
> Renda-Tanali, 2002)[^19]

-   And he suggests the need for wariness in our choices:

> **"The terrorism threat is drastic enough to require more
> authoritarian methods of management than do most civil emergencies**.
> It also involves different levels and criteria of predictability than
> most other non-military hazards. But need it require the suspension of
> participatory emergency management? **Has anyone asked the general
> public whether it wishes to be commanded and controlled, and if so to
> what extent?** Is authoritarianism really the way to manage great
> crises? Are there alternative and less dictatorial ways of ensuring
> compliance with public safety requirements? These questions remain
> largely unanswered."[^20]

**On Emergency Management and Homeland Security**

-   On November 19 and 20, 2003, with funding support from the National
    Science Foundation, the George Washington University presented a
    Workshop on Emergency Management in the Homeland Security
    Environment. The point of the workshop was to convene:

> "\...researchers, practitioners, and educators\...\[to\] discuss some
> of the many pressing issues regarding emergency management as it is
> evolving currently in the national environment dominated with concerns
> about homeland security. The focus\...\[was\] on documenting research
> and policy needs in the field of emergency management in the homeland
> security environment."

-   The much-voiced point of view/concern was **how emergency management
    has been or is being "swallowed up" by homeland security**. Workshop
    participants also presented some questions about what homeland
    security actually is.

-   Interestingly, no one from the Department of Homeland Security
    Headquarters Office or any Directorate other than the Emergency
    Preparedness and Response Directorate was in attendance to address
    these concerns.

-   Notes from the workshop include this statement from Dr. Joseph
    Barbera, Co-Director of the Institute of Crisis, Disaster and Risk
    Management at GWU:

> **"We have now lumped the security 'I\'m not going to tell you
> anything' mentality into the homeland security arena which has
> swallowed emergency management, and some find this a matter of
> concern."**

-   Kevin Shanley, Senior Policy Analyst, National Emergency Management
    Association (NEMA) Homeland Security & Technology Division \[which
    used to be named the Emergency Management Division\], noted his
    observation that one of the recent trends he has observed in the
    "swallowing up" of emergency management is that:

> **\[A\] number of local and State emergency management organizations
> have changed their names to "Emergency Management and Homeland
> Security," or "Homeland Security and Emergency Management," or just
> "Homeland Security."**

-   Dr. Jack Harrold, the other Co-Director of the Institute of Crisis,
    Disaster and Risk Management at GWU, included a slide during his
    presentation quoting Don Kettl (24 March 2003) to the effect that:

> **"At the core of the problem of homeland security is some**
>
> **disagreement about what homeland security is, who ought to be in
> charge of it, and how it ought to work."**

*You may wish to elaborate on this emerging trend, based on how and
whether it continues to unfold. If time permits, you might elicit
student opinion on the models presented in this session and how some
practitioners perceive a growing encroachment of homeland security on
the emergency management profession. You may transition to the next
session by pointing out that it will explore various approaches to
emergency management.*

**References**

Alexander, David. 2002. From civil defence to civil protection\--and
back again. Disaster Prevention and Management 11(3)

Alexander, David. "Do *you* want to be commanded and controlled?
Reflections on modern emergency management." Cranfield Disaster
Management Centre, Cranfield University, UK.

Blanchard, B. Wayne. November 17-21, 2003, FEMA Emergency Management
Higher Education Project Activity Report. November 24, 2003.

Drabek. Thomas E. 2003. *Strategies for Coordinating Disaster
Responses*. Program on Environment and Behavior Monograph No. 61.
Institute of Behavioral Science, University of Colorado

Hill, Ron (Deputy Director, State of Oklahoma Office of Emergency
Management). E-mail communication to B. Wayne Blanchard. August 3, 2000.

Selves, Michael D. CEM, CPM. *Local Emergency Management: A Tale of Two
Models.* http://training.fema.gove/EMIWeb/edu/localEM1.html.

Sylves, R.T. and W.L. Waugh, Jr. (eds.). *Disaster Management in the
U.S. and Canada*. Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas, 1996.

Winslow, Frances, Ph.D., CEM*. Changing the Emergency Management
Paradigm: A Case Study of San Jose, California*. Available at FEMA's
Higher Education Project "Practitioner's Corner" website:
http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/edu/practitioner.asp**.**

[^1]: Michael D. Selves, CEM, CPM. *Local Emergency Management: A Tale
    of Two Models.* http://training.fema.gove/EMIWeb/edu/localEM1.html.

[^2]: *Ibid.*

[^3]: *Ibid.*

[^4]: *Ibid.*

[^5]: *Ibid.*

[^6]: *Ibid.*

[^7]: R. T. Sylves and W.L. Waugh, Jr. (eds.). *Disaster Management in
    the U.S. and Canada*. Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas, 1996.

[^8]: Selves, 2003.

[^9]: Frances Edwards-Winslow, Ph.D., CEM*. Changing the Emergency
    Management Paradigm: A Case Study of San Jose, California*.
    Available at FEMA's Higher Education Project "Practitioner's Corner"
    website: http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/edu/practitioner.asp**.**

[^10]: *Ibid.*

[^11]: *Ibid.*

[^12]: *Ibid.*

[^13]: *Ibid*.

[^14]: Thomas E. Drabek. 2003. *Strategies for Coordinating Disaster
    Responses*. Program on Environment and Behavior Monograph No. 61.
    Institute of Behavioral Science, University of Colorado. p. 15

[^15]: Drabek. 2003, p. 16.

[^16]: *Ibid*.

[^17]: Drabek. 2003, p. 100

[^18]: Winslow. 2003, p. 10

[^19]: David Alexander, 2002. From civil defence to civil
    protection\--and back again. Disaster Prevention and Management
    11(3): 209-213.

[^20]: David Alexander. "Do *you* want to be commanded and controlled?
    Reflections on modern emergency management." Cranfield Disaster
    Management Centre, Cranfield University, UK. p. 4