**JOINT STATEMENT OF**

**COMMISSIONER MICHAEL J. COPPS AND\
COMMISSIONER JONATHAN S. ADELSTEIN,**

**CONCURRING IN PART, DISSENTING IN PART**

Re: *Petition of ACS of Anchorage, Inc. Pursuant to Section 10 of the
Communications Act of 1934, as Amended, for Forbearance from Certain
Dominant Carrier Regulation of Its Interstate Access Services, and for
Forbearance from Title II Regulation of Its Broadband Services, in the
Anchorage, Alaska, Incumbent Local Exchange Carrier Study Area, WC
Docket No. 06-109*.

In today's decision, the Commission addresses a wide-ranging forbearance
petition concerning the appropriate regulation of the incumbent local
exchange carrier in the unique circumstances of Anchorage, Alaska.
Anchorage is a relatively small market, geographically removed from the
lower 48 states. Moreover, a competitive facilities-based carrier has
extensively built out its network and has taken significant market share
for certain services from the incumbent provider. Because we find that
this Order is inconsistent in its consideration of these factors, we
concur in part and dissent in part.

We support this Order's decision to grant conditional relief in
Anchorage for certain services where there is clear evidence of a
vigorous rivalry between the incumbent cable and wireline provider;
where there are few, if any, other competitors seeking to enter the
market; and where the principal competitors previously reached a
long-term commercial agreement that may in fact foster competition in
the mass market. However, we continue to have concerns with a general
approach that suggests that consumers should be satisfied with only two
providers. The goal of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 is to
establish a competitive and de-regulatory telecommunications
environment. While today's order reduces regulation by eliminating some
incumbent obligations and demonstrates that the Commission can respond
to a dynamic marketplace, the Commission relies on the intermodal
efforts of a single alternative provider to conclude that sufficient
competition exists. While we concur in the forbearance of certain
regulations based on the aforementioned factors that affect the unique
Anchorage market, we believe the statute contemplates more than just
competition between a wireline and cable provider.

Moreover, the Commission is forced to craft a novel litany of conditions
in order to grant forbearance in this case. While we appreciate the
efforts of the parties and the Bureau to limit potential adverse effects
of this decision on universal service, access charges, consumer prices,
and for cost allocation purposes, here we create an almost entirely new
regulatory structure out of whole cloth. It will be important for the
Commission to monitor the effects of these safeguards, and we encourage
the Commission to diligently verify whether its predictions about their
sufficiency are accurate.

For business customers, this Order is a particularly mixed bag. We
support the decision to deny relief from the Commission's existing
pricing rules for "traditional TDM-based" special access services, for
which relief the Order finds a lack of evidence about market shares and
the development of competitive forces. Yet, in an inexplicable turn, the
Commission forbears from the pricing rules for other special access
services, referred to in this Order as enterprise broadband services.
While we appreciate the Commission's effort not to rely explicitly on
generalized marketplace conditions for these services or to characterize
explicitly the marketplace as nationwide, in doing so it is left with an
Order that it is devoid of virtually any analysis. The Order readily
admits "that the record in this proceeding does not include detailed
market information for particular enterprise broadband services in the
Anchorage MSA." Much of the data pointed to for support is in fact for
services offered by providers everywhere but Anchorage. In addition, the
Commission finds that "potential" competition is sufficient to forbear
from regulation. In places where substantial competition does not
demonstrably exist, it seems that forbearance actually can make the
problem worse as "potential" competitors will have even less ability to
successfully compete. These kinds of decisions are too important to be
made without the in-depth market analysis that might support them.
Recent Congressional hearings have demonstrated to us a growing
impatience with policymaking via analysis-poor forbearance decisions.
The Commission needs to mend its ways.

While we certainly appreciate the Order's decision to retain key
interconnection, universal service, privacy, disabilities access, and
other Congressionally-mandated provisions \-- forbearance from which
would have been devastating for consumers and competition \-- we cannot
support this Order's decision to forbear from rules that provide
critical pricing protection. We hope that the grant of forbearance here,
without analysis of specific market forces and conditions, is not an
ominous sign for customers in other regions of the country, many who
have fewer options than those available in Anchorage.