**Special Forces and the Future of Warfare:\
Will SOF Predominate in 2020?**

**Stephen Biddle**[^1]

Strategic Studies Institute

U.S. Army War College

24 May 2004

**The views expressed in this and other papers associated with the NIC
2020 project**

**are those of individual participants. They are posted for discussion
purposes**

**only and do not represent the views of the Army, the Army War College,
the Department of Defense or the US Government.**

**Special Forces and the Future of Warfare:\
Will SOF Predominate in 2020?**

**Stephen Biddle**[^2]

Strategic Studies Institute

U.S. Army War College

24 May 2004

American Special Operations Forces (SOF) have scored some extraordinary
achievements in recent warfare. In Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) they
were assigned primary responsibility for a vast stretch of Iraq's
western desert, where they denied the Iraqis launch areas for missiles,
led the search for Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and became
the supported, rather than the supporting, command in joint action with
conventional ground forces. In operations along the Green Line in
northern Iraq they were again the lead American element, working with
Kurdish pesh merga militia to tie down Iraqi conventional divisions in a
critical economy of force action, eventually marching into the cities of
Kirkuk and Mosul and securing Iraq's northern oil fields. On Iraq's
decisive southern front they worked closely with conventional forces,
providing important targeting and intelligence for air strikes and
ground maneuver. In Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan, a
handful of commandos transformed a six-year stalemate into a rapid
victory by America's Afghan allies over the Taliban regime. In both Iraq
and Afghanistan -- and elsewhere in the world -- SOF are even now
playing a critical role in combating insurgents and hunting down
terrorists.

SOF have thus become an increasingly central element of American
military power. Their growing utility is in turn attracting an increase
in the personnel and resources devoted to special operations.

But how far should this trend be taken, and how prominent should SOF's
role become? Are there natural limits on the roles and missions suitable
for special operations, and if so, what are they? Is a modest expansion
of special operations at the margins of an essentially conventional
military the best approach? Or should the conventional military
eventually be transformed around SOF -- should special operations come
to provide the predominant ground element in a radically restructured
American military?

This paper approaches these questions by stipulating that some near term
expansion is warranted, and asking instead, what are the limits in how
far this can be taken in the longer term? In principle, this question
could be approached from the supply side, by considering our ability to
produce a greatly expanded SOF without diluting its quality: can
sufficient numbers of qualified individuals be found, and if so, can the
nation afford the time and training expenditures needed to prepare them
properly? Alternatively, one could consider the demand side: how much of
the nation's military needs can be met with special operations, assuming
for the moment that we can supply the forces if we otherwise wanted
them? The ultimate limiter here is SOF's ability to take over missions
now primarily assigned to conventional forces -- and especially, its
ability to shoulder the mission that now drives much of the conventional
ground forces' structure: major combat operations (MCO). SOF's role
could certainly expand within the framework of traditionally
SOF-specific missions such as unconventional warfare or
counter-terrorist direct action, but such tasks are unlikely to become
the central drivers of American force structure any time soon; expansion
within the framework of such missions is thus likely to be incremental
rather than radical. The limiting constraint on SOF's predominance in
the American military is its ability to supplant conventional forces in
one or more of their traditional roles.[^3]

Below I take the demand-side approach, and focus on the potential for
long-term realignment of missions from conventional ground forces toward
SOF. In particular, I consider one of the most widely discussed of these
possibilities: the argument that a "New Model" or "Afghan Model" of war
based on the combination of SOF and standoff precision will enable
America to wage major combat operations without mass conventional ground
forces of our own. If so, this would imply a dramatic shift in the
relative importance of SOF and the conventional military in American
force structure, and would certainly constitute revolutionary, rather
than merely evolutionary, change.

I argue, however, that such a realignment would be ill-advised. Although
such proposals have been regularly advanced (and especially so in the
months following the Taliban's fall), evidence from Afghanistan and Iraq
suggests important limitations to the Afghan Model that would make it
risky to redesign the military around its requirements. While it can
sometimes be highly effective, its preconditions cannot always be met,
and thus a more balanced military will remain advisable for the
foreseeable future.[^4] None of this is to suggest that a moderate
near-term expansion in SOF capability is unjustified; a detailed
cost-benefit analysis of such incremental programmatics is beyond my
scope here. But the scale of advisable change is probably limited to
evolutionary expansion -- certainly the case for the radical option
considered below is too weak to be sustained.

I present this argument in four steps. First I describe the Afghan Model
and its implications for American force structure in somewhat greater
detail. I then assess its performance in Afghanistan and the
implications of this for restructuring. Next I turn to Iraq, and
evaluate evidence from OIF for the prospective performance of an Afghan
Model elsewhere. I then address the prospects for future technological
change in light of this combat experience. I conclude with some summary
observations and implications for long term defense planning.

#### The Afghan Model 

Perhaps the most-discussed concept for a SOF-predominant military turns
on what some have called the "New Model" or "Afghan Model" of major
combat operations. In this Afghan Model, small teams of elite commandos
on the ground provide the targeting information needed for precision
weapons to reach dispersed, concealed opponents. This SOF-directed
standoff precision is so lethal, it is argued, that hostile militaries
can be defeated without mass conventional land forces of our own. In
this view, SOF is thus the catalyst that enables standoff precision
strike to realize its full potential and substitute for large-scale
close combat on the ground. Until the commandos arrived in Afghanistan,
for example, high-altitude bombing could do little against a country
with few large, fixed targets, this school argues. But once Coalition
bombing was guided by friendly eyes on the ground, they claim, it became
possible for airpower to annihilate the Taliban infantry and armor that
had stymied the Northern Alliance for the preceding six years of civil
warfare, enabling even an unsophisticated, outnumbered ally to liberate
the entire country in a matter of weeks.[^5] On the Green Line in Iraq
in 2003, it is argued, SOF similarly enabled Kurdish militia previously
cowed by the Republican Guard to turn the tables on Saddam's forces and
conquer major cities and key economic assets by advancing in the wake of
SOF-directed precision bombing. Elsewhere in Iraq, it is argued, SOF's
ability to target precision strikes contributed greatly to enabling a
Coalition ground force thought undersized by many to triumph
nonetheless.[^6] More broadly, some Afghan Model advocates see
SOF-enabled precision strike as a substitute for large-scale
conventional ground combat.[^7]

If so, this might enable a radical restructuring of the U.S. military.
If SOF-directed precision fires can provide the bulk of the real combat
power needed to prevail in major combat, then much of the heavy
conventional ground forces now held for this purpose could be eliminated
or converted to other purposes. This would produce a possibly smaller,
considerably lighter conventional Army and Marine Corps, combined with
expanded precision strike air and missile assets and a significant
increase in the SOF strength needed for their direction.[^8] The result
would be a very different U.S. military: lighter, faster, more
strategically mobile, less reliant on theater logistical infrastructure
and secure ports, with an even greater ability to project firepower over
greater distances than today's -- but also a military much more reliant
than today's on standoff precision for effectiveness.

#### The Afghan Model in OEF 

SOF-directed precision strike was indeed extremely valuable in both OIF
and OEF. But do these cases suggest that we can safely *rely* on
standoff precision in the way a SOF-predominant Afghan Model
restructuring would require? The answer is no. In neither case does the
evidence suggest that SOF-directed precision was sufficient for success.
In OEF, at least, it was *necessary* -- but it was not in itself
sufficient. And for an Afghan Model based restructuring to make sense,
something very close to sufficiency is required.

In Afghanistan, for example, the war entailed extensive close combat
between two sizeable -- Afghan -- land armies. In fact, the war as a
whole was much more orthodox, and much less revolutionary, than many now
believe. OEF was not waged exclusively at long standoff, and success in
the campaign's close combat actions proved crucial to its outcome. The
results of this close combat rested in turn on friendly land forces'
ability to integrate ground maneuver with the effects of precision
fires. Where those ground forces enjoyed sufficient skills to exploit
the effects of American firepower (or where their opponents were
sufficiently inept, or both), that firepower proved decisive. But where
unskilled allies were forced to confront enemies with the skills to
reduce their exposure to standoff fires, the results were much less
successful. And this in turn means that for the Afghan Model to work
requires an important precondition: the ground forces involved, whether
ours or someone else's, need a combination of skills and motivation that
is at least in the ballpark of the army they are fighting against. If
this precondition is met, SOF-directed precision could indeed provide
OEF-like results in other places and times. But if the precondition is
not met, the OEF experience suggests that SOF-directed precision alone
may not be sufficient for success.

In OEF, the war initially involved a very poorly skilled opponent, and
the early fighting went mostly the way Afghan Model proponents assume.
The new Model apparently took the Taliban by surprise, and their initial
dispositions were poorly chosen for this kind of warfare.[^9] They
typically deployed on exposed ridgelines with little effort at
camouflage or concealment. Entrenchments were haphazard, lacking
overhead cover for infantry positions or proper emplacements for combat
vehicles. As a result, their positions could be identified from often
extraordinary distances. And once located, their poor entrenchment and
exposed movement made them easy prey for precision weapons.

The result was slaughter. At Bishqab on October 21, 2001, for example,
U.S. SOF pinpointed Taliban targets at ranges of over eight
kilometers.[^10] Skeptical Northern Alliance commanders peered through
their binoculars at Taliban positions that had stymied them for years
and were astounded to see the defenses suddenly vaporized by direct hits
from 2,000 pound bombs. At Cobaki on October 22, Taliban observation
posts were easily spotted at 1500-2000 meters and annihilated by
precision bombing.[^11] At Zard Kammar on October 28, Taliban defenses
were wiped out from a mile away.[^12] At Ac'capruk on November 4,
exposed Taliban combat vehicles and crew-served weapons on hillsides
west of the Balkh river were spotted from SOF observation posts on the
Koh-i-Almortak ridge line some 4-5 kilometers distant and obliterated by
American air strikes.[^13] At Polanyi Canyon near Bamiyan on November 7,
Taliban positions were plainly visible from more than four kilometers
away.[^14] Taliban counterattacks, as at Tarin Kowt on November 18, were
conducted in the open with no evident attempt at concealment, dispersal,
or covering fire to keep US or allied observers' heads down or to
complicate target acquisition.[^15]

Within days of the first SOF-directed air strikes, however, American
commandos were already reporting that Taliban vehicles in their sectors
had been smeared with mud to camouflage them.[^16] By November 5, the
Taliban were already making aggressive use of overhead cover and
concealment.[^17] In the fighting north of Kandahar and along Highway 4
in December, al Qaeda defenses were well-camouflaged, dispersed, and
making use of natural terrain for expedient cover.[^18] This pattern
continued through Operation [Anaconda]{.smallcaps} in March, by which
time al Qaeda forces were practicing systematic communications security,
dispersal, camouflage discipline, use of cover and concealment, and
exploitation of dummy fighting positions to draw fire and attention from
their real dispositions.[^19] The Taliban did not just passively suffer
under American attack -- they adapted their methods to try to reduce
their vulnerability. And as they did, the war changed character.

Among the more important changes was increasing difficulty in finding
targets for precision attack. At Bai Beche on November 2-5, for example,
a mostly-al Qaeda defensive force occupied an old, formerly-Soviet
system of deliberate entrenchments. With proper cover and concealment,
the defenders were able to prevent American commandos from locating the
entirety of their individual fighting positions, many of which could not
be singled out for precision attack. American SOF thus called for area
bombing across the entirety of the position. After more than two days of
heavy bombing, enough surviving, actively resisting al Qaeda defenders
remained in the position to drive back the initial attempt by
American-allied Northern Alliance cavalry to take the position. The
attached American SOF observed this reverse and began calling renewed
airstrikes in anticipation of a second assault. In the process, however,
a SOF warning order to the cavalry to prepare for another push was
mistaken by the cavalry as a command to launch the assault, with the
result that the cavalry began its attack much sooner than intended. The
surprised Americans watched the Afghan cavalry break cover and begin
their advance just as a series of laser-guided bombs had been released
from American aircraft in response to the SOF calls for air support. The
SOF commander reported that he was convinced they had just caused a
friendly fire incident: the bomb release and the cavalry advance were
way too close together for official doctrinal limits, and the air strike
would never have been ordered if the SOF had known that the cavalry was
then jumping off for the second assault. As it happened, the bombs
landed just seconds before the cavalry arrived. In fact, the cavalry
galloped through the enormous cloud of smoke and dust that was still
hanging in the air after the explosions, emerging behind the enemy
defenses before their garrison knew what was happening. The defenders,
seeing Northern Alliance cavalry to their rear, abandoned their
positions in an attempt to avoid encirclement.[^20]

The result was an important victory --- in fact, the victory that turned
the tide in the north and led directly to the fall of Mazar-e-Sharif on
November 10. But the battle involved serious close combat (cavalry
overrunning prepared, actively resisting defenses), and the outcome was
a very close call. The assault profited from an extremely tight
integration of movement with suppressive fire --- far tighter, in fact,
than either the cavalry or their supporting SOF would ever have dared
arrange deliberately. Luck thus played an important role in the outcome.
The Northern Alliance might well have carried the position eventually
even without the good fortune of an extraordinary integration of fire
and movement; this was clearly a crucial battle, and they would
presumably have redoubled their efforts if the second attempt had
failed. But as fought, the outcome involved an important element of
serendipity.

Nor was Bai Beche unique in demanding hard fighting at close quarters.
In the December fighting along Highway 4 south of Kandahar, concealed al
Qaeda defenses among a series of culverts and in burned-out vehicle
hulks along the roadside remained wholly undetected until their fire
drove back an allied advance at point blank range.[^21] An al Qaeda
counterattack in the same sector using a system of wadis for cover
approached undetected to within 100-200 meters of allied and American
SOF positions along the highway before opening fire on friendly
forces.[^22] At the village of Sayed Slim Kalay north of Kandahar
between December 2-4, concealed al Qaeda defenders likewise remained
undetected until they fired upon unsuspecting U.S. and allied attackers.
An al Qaeda counterattack using local terrain for cover maneuvered into
small arms range of friendly defenders before being driven back.[^23] At
Konduz in late November, al Qaeda counterattackers penetrated allied
positions deeply enough to compel supporting American SOF teams to
withdraw at least three times to avoid being overrun.[^24] At Tora Bora,
massive American bombing proved insufficient to compensate for allied
Afghan unwillingness to close with dug-in al Qaeda defenders in the cave
complexes of the White Mountains; this ground force hesitancy probably
allowed Osama bin Laden and his lieutenants to escape into neighboring
Pakistan.[^25]

At Operation [Anaconda]{.smallcaps} in March 2002, an intensive
pre-battle reconnaissance effort focused every available surveillance
and target acquisition system on a tiny, ten-by-ten kilometer
battlefield. Yet fewer than 50 percent of all the al Qaeda positions
ultimately identified on this battlefield were discovered prior to
ground contact. The result was extensive close combat. In the opening
action of the battle, for example, American-allied Afghans under General
Mohammed Zia and supported by American SOF were assigned to drive al
Qaeda defenders from the "Tri-cities" area (the villages of Shirkankeyl,
Babakuhl and Marzak); they were instead pinned down under hostile fire
from prepared defenses in the surrounding mountainsides that had
survived preliminary air strikes. Zia's troops eventually withdrew after
they proved unable to advance. Only after the al Qaeda defenders pulled
back under joint, multinational attack by allied airpower, western
infantry, and multinational SOF, were Zia's troops able to enter the
Tri-cities and adjoining ridgelines. In fact, most of Operation
[Anaconda]{.smallcaps} took the form of a series of close assaults to
destroy surviving, actively resisting defenses whose locations were
mostly unknown prior to their firing upon friendly forces, often at very
close quarters.[^26]

Among these examples, the fighting along Highway 4 in December is
particularly instructive. The American-allied Afghans here were divided
among two factions. The first, commanded by Haji Gul Alai, were very
capable troops by Afghan standards. They used terrain for cover and
concealment, maintained good intervals between elements in the advance,
moved by alternate bounds, exploited suppressive fire to cover moving
elements' exposure, and were able to exploit the effects of American air
strikes by coordinating their movement with the bombing (which many
Afghan factions could not). The second faction, by contrast, was much
less skilled: the attached SOF commander characterized them as "an armed
mob --- just villagers given weapons." Their tactics consisted of
exposed, bunched-up movement in the open, with no attempt to use terrain
to reduce their exposure, and little ability to employ supporting or
suppressive fires. At the Arghestan Bridge on December 5, this second
faction launched an assault on a dug-in al Qaeda position south of the
Kandahar airport. Driven back repeatedly, they proved unable to take the
position, in spite of U. S. air support. Only after these troops were
withdrawn and Haji Gul Alai's forces took over the assault the following
day could the al Qaeda positions be taken.[^27]

Of course, the alliance ultimately prevailed.[^28] And SOF-directed
precision airpower was a necessary precondition for this -- it was what
turned a stalemated civil war into a dramatic battlefield victory for
America and its allies. But while precision bombing was *necessary*, it
was not *sufficient*. It could annihilate poorly prepared fighting
positions, and it could inflict heavy losses on even well-disposed
defenses. But it could not destroy the entirety of properly prepared
positions by itself. And unless such positions are all but annihilated,
even a handful of surviving, actively-resisting defenders with modern
automatic weapons can make great slaughter of unsophisticated indigenous
allies whose idea of tactics is to walk forward bunched up in the open.
To overcome skilled, resolute defenders who have adopted the standard
countermeasures to high-firepower airstrikes still requires close combat
by friendly ground forces whose own skills are sufficient to enable them
to use local cover and their own suppressive fire to advance against
hostile survivors with modern weapons.

By and large, America's main Afghan allies in this war either enjoyed
such fundamental skills or profited from accidentally tight coordination
of their movement and American fires (as at Bai Beche) or both. The
Northern, and later the Southern, Alliances were not uniformly the
motley assortment of militiamen they are sometimes said to have been.
Enough of them were capable of modern military tactics to allow them to
exploit the tremendous potential that precision air power can bring to
armies capable of integrating their movement with its firepower.

But not all of America's allies in this war were up to this job. Though
the typical combat units on each side were about equally matched (as the
stalled pre-intervention battle lines imply), both sides in Afghanistan
were actually diverse mixtures of better- and worse-trained, more- and
less-motivated troops --- and this diversity offers a couple of valuable
opportunities to observe instances of unequally-skilled forces in
combat. In such unequal fights as the first day at Arghestan Bridge and
the assault on the Tri-cities in [Anaconda]{.smallcaps}, the results
suggest that where the indigenous allies are overmatched tactically,
American air power and SOF support alone may not be enough to turn the
tide. In Afghanistan, the Northern and Southern Alliances, eventually
combined with the American and Canadian infantry that fought at
[Anaconda]{.smallcaps}, together provided significant ground forces that
ultimately shouldered an essential load of old-fashioned close combat
against surviving, actively resisting opponents. Even with 21^st^
century firepower, without this essential close combat capability the
outcome in Afghanistan could easily have been very different.

#### The Afghan Model in OIF 

What about Iraq? Did SOF-directed precision strike enable an out-matched
or unskilled Kurdish ally to defeat greatly superior Iraqi forces on the
Green Line in 2003? Kurdish skills, though mixed, were certainly no
match for the Republican Guard on their own. A decade of actual combat
experience gives ample evidence of this: the Guard repeatedly crushed
pesh merga resistance whenever Kurdish uprisings without American
military protection gave Saddam cause and opportunity.[^29] If SOF
support had enabled the pesh merga to turn the tables on the Guard in
2003, this would therefore be evidence of precision strike prevailing
without support from capable conventional ground forces, and would thus
strengthen the case for an Afghan Model restructuring of the American
military.

Yet this is not what actually happened on the Green Line. In fact there
was no contact between Kurdish militia and the Republican Guard in OIF.
The Iraqi defenses on the Green Line were disposed with regular
conscript infantry in the forward positions opposite the Kurds. A
handful of Republican Guard divisions were withheld in reserve behind
these forward defenses, with the dual mission of encouraging the
regulars in front of them to fight, and of constituting a mobile
reaction force for response to local breakthroughs or for repositioning
elsewhere in the theater as information developed on the location of the
American main effort. At least one of these reserve Guard divisions was
in fact sent south to Baghdad after the war began, but none of them was
committed to combat on the northern front, and there is no evidence of
any fighting between any Guard elements and either Kurdish militia or
their attached American SOF in OIF.[^30]

There *was* significant combat against Iraqi conscript infantry in the
north. These Iraqi conscripts, however, were poorly motivated and very
poorly skilled. The results bore a strong resemblance to the early
stages of the Afghan campaign, in which inept indigenous Taliban
defenders were swept away by SOF-directed precision air power alone. The
Iraqi 8^th^ Infantry Division's positions before Kirkuk, for example,
consisted of an interconnected system of 20-foot high dirt bunkers that
were plainly visible to the naked eye from any direction, and easily
detected by observers with binoculars at distances of as much as 15
kilometers away. The Iraqis made no apparent attempt at concealment or
camouflage, made no attempt to use natural cover to thwart target
acquisition, frequently silhouetted bunkers on the geographic crests of
ridge lines, and provided no overhead protection for open slit trenches
between bunkers.[^31] American SOF had little difficulty targeting such
positions, which offered little meaningful protection against precision
air strikes. The garrisons of these positions, moreover, rarely
attempted to hold their ground under attack. Though few deserted
outright (Ba'athist paramilitaries and Republican Guards to their rear
saw to that),[^32] many remained in position only until engaged by
Coalition air power, at which point they would withdraw without risking
close combat. Friendly forces thus adopted a pattern of advancing into
visual range of Iraqi defenses, targeting them for precision air
strikes, then walking forward to occupy the abandoned positions after
the Iraqi conscript garrison fell back. Iraqi casualties were
consequently light, but Coalition casualties were all but nonexistent
and Iraqi territory could be taken at will as long as the advance was
pushed no faster than the rate at which air power was available to
destroy static, easily detected Iraqi defenses.[^33]

#### The Future 

Taken together, Afghanistan and Iraq thus suggest that a SOF-predominant
Afghan Model *can* sometimes substitute for large-scale U.S. ground
forces -- but only if an important precondition is met. If indigenous
allies are capable of providing troops whose skills and motivation are
somewhere in the ballpark of their opponents', then SOF-directed
precision firepower can be decisive, turning stalemates or looming
defeats into one-sided battlefield victories for America and its allies.
If the enemy is unskilled or ill-motivated, then even unskilled or
ill-motivated allies will be sufficient -- as both the early stages of
the Afghan campaign and the fighting on the Green Line in OIF show. But
if the enemy is better trained or more willing to stand and fight, then
inept or uncommitted allies may not be able to take advantage of the
tremendous potential that SOF-directed standoff precision brings to the
battlefield -- as we have seen at Tora Bora, Arghestan Bridge, and the
Tri-cities in [Anaconda]{.smallcaps}.

![](media/image1.png){width="5.0in" height="4.242361111111111in"}

Figure 1: Al Qaeda Fighting Position Sanger, Objective Ginger,
Shah-I-kot Valley Afghanistan

But what about the longer term future? Will this finding change with
newer technology by 2020? Probably not. The cover and concealment that
enabled al Qaeda defenders to thwart SOF target acquisition and
precision engagement in 2001-2 were provided by features of the earth's
physical and human geography that are likely to remain problematic for
even 2020's sensors and weapons. Figure 1 provides a concrete
illustration of this problem in the form of a photograph of an al Qaeda
fighting position from Takhur Ghar mountain near Objective Ginger on the
[Anaconda]{.smallcaps} battlefield.[^34] The arrow indicates the al
Qaeda defenders' location; without the arrow, there would be no visible
sign of a combat position even from the nearly point blank range at
which this photograph was taken. Overhanging rock in turn provides cover
and concealment from overhead surveillance systems. In principle one
might hope to observe resupply movement or al Qaeda patrols into or out
of such positions, or to overhear radio communications from its
occupants. Al Qaeda soldiers wearing the flowing robes of local herdsmen
and traveling in small parties among the mountains, however, are nearly
impossible to distinguish at a distance from the noncombatants who tend
goats or travel through such areas as a matter of routine.[^35] And
defenders able to operate under radio listening silence while
communicating using runners, landlines or other non-broadcast means can
reduce signals intercepts to a level that makes identification of
specific fighting positions very problematic. Against such targets, it
is far from clear that any surveillance technology coming any time soon
will ensure reliable target acquisition from standoff distances.

Nor are positions such as this one rare anomalies or atypical of Afghan
terrain more generally. Figures 2 and 3 show broader samples of the
Shah-i-kot battlefield on which Anaconda was fought, including the
features known as "The Whale" (after a similar rock formation at the US
National Training Center at Ft. Irwin California) and Objective Ginger,
respectively.[^36] Almost any of the dozens of shadows, crevices, or
folds in the earth scattered across these landscapes could house
positions like the one shown in Figure 1. And this is just a tiny subset
of even the Anaconda battlefield, which is itself a tiny subset of
Afghanistan as a whole. The natural complexity of such surfaces offers
any adaptive opponent with the necessary training and skills a multitude
of opportunities to thwart even developmental remote surveillance
systems. Against such opponents, remote surveillance will still detect
some targets, and remote sensors remain crucial assets, but the only
sure means of target acquisition is direct ground contact: a ground
force whose advance threatens objectives that the enemy cannot sacrifice
and thus must defend compels them to give away their locations by firing
on their attackers. Skilled attackers can eventually locate any
defensive position by observing the source of the fire directed at them
-- and this, in fact, is how the majority of the al Qaeda positions at
[Anaconda]{.smallcaps} were found.

![](media/image2.jpeg){width="5.625in" height="3.689583333333333in"}

Figure 2: The Whale, Shah-i-kot Valley, Afghanistan

Nor is this problem unique to Afghanistan or its mountainous terrain.
Militarily exploitable cover is commonplace in almost all likely future
theaters of war. For targets who observe radio listening silence, as al
Qaeda now does, foliage, for example, degrades all current remote sensor
technologies; urban areas provide overhead cover, create background
clutter, and pose difficult problems of distinguishing military targets
from innocent civilians.[^37] Each is widely available. More than 26
percent of Somalia's land area is wooded or urban, as is more than 20
percent of the Sudan's, 34 percent of Georgia's, or 46 percent of the
Philippines'.[^38] This cover, moreover, is often distributed in small,
widespread patches. On the [Goodwood]{.smallcaps} battlefield of 1944 in
Normandy, for example, over 80 percent of all one-kilometer grid squares
now contain at least some forest or urban cover (though only 26 percent
of the total land area is covered).[^39] In most countries, the central
geostrategic objectives are urban areas; even where the bulk of the
national land area is open desert (as in Iraq), the cities are both the
key terrain and an ample source of cover from overhead sensors (Baghdad
alone covers more than 300 square kilometers).[^40] Among the most
important themes in the history of modern tactics is the growth of
methods for exploiting such cover to reduce vulnerability to modern
firepower -- the "empty battlefield" that has characterized the modern
era is a product of skilled armies' ability to find cover sufficient to
thwart standoff target acquisition and to exploit this cover to perform
meaningful military missions without excessive exposure.[^41]

And this in turn suggests that the preconditions for Afghan Model
success observed in 2001-3 are likely to remain binding for the
foreseeable future: against an opponent skilled and determined enough to
exploit the complexity of the earth's surface for cover and concealment,
some ground force capable of taking advantage of such cover itself will
remain necessary for standoff precision to be decisive. Fire *and*
maneuver remain essential against skilled, resolute enemies; a model
built on fire alone -- even very precise fires -- will thus remain a
risky proposition for a long time to come.[^42]

![](media/image3.jpeg){width="4.875in" height="3.96875in"}

Figure 3: Takhur Ghar Mountain and Objective Ginger, Shah-i-kot Valley,
Afghanistan

###### Conclusions and Implications 

The primary implication of this analysis is that the Afghan Model has
important limitations as a template around which to restructure the
American military. Sometimes a SOF-centered Afghan Model military would
in fact be the ideal force: where America enjoys either an inept
opponent or the right allies, a restructured force could well be
superior to today's -- with both extreme lethality and increased
agility. But if our enemies' skills are closer to al Qaeda's than to
Iraqi conscripts', then the Afghan Model cannot succeed without allies
on the ground with at least broadly comparable skills and motivation.
And in a world where we cannot know just where, with whom, or against
whom we may be fighting in 2020, to assume we will always enjoy such
allies could be a dangerous gamble. If, instead, we retain a balanced
military in which America is itself capable of fielding a conventional
ground force with the skills and motivation needed to close with the
enemy and exploit properly the potential of standoff fires, we thus
reduce uncertainty and gain important leverage.

Of course, this analysis is limited to the major combat operations
around which the Afghan Model turns. Major combat is not the only
mission required of future forces, and will probably not be the most
often used. Many now see stealthy action against terrorists hiding in
the shadows, for example, as the future of warfare, and argue that such
wars call for a greatly enhanced role for SOF. If the key targets for
the future are small groups of furtive individuals deep in the interior
of potentially hostile countries, then SOF's combination of strategic
reach, independent direct-action capability, human intelligence
collection, and small footprint are ideally suited, whereas heavy
conventional capability is often inappropriate. And if so, some argue,
then in a future of counter-terrorist warfare, special operations should
become the main effort in U.S. military action, with greatly expanded
size and resources, and with much of the remaining military tasked to
support their efforts. Many in this school thus believe the Special
Operations Command (SOCOM) should be transformed from a force provider
into a combatant command with a major operational role -- some say the
lead role -- in prosecuting the Global War on Terror.[^43]

A proper analysis of SOCOM's role in the War on Terror is beyond the
scope of this paper. But it is important to note that even if one posits
a much larger role for SOF in future counter-terror warfare, this is
still a long way from a sound case for a SOF-predominant military in
2020. However important direct action against terrorists may become, it
will remain one among several important missions -- and several of these
will continue to require large conventional ground forces for their
accomplishment. One of these missions -- major combat -- is addressed in
detail above, and will surely remain an important element of U.S.
strategy for the foreseeable future. In fact, the Bush Doctrine for
waging the War on Terror rests heavily on major combat capability as a
means of holding states accountable for the actions of terrorists within
their borders and denying terrorists possible state havens for their
activities. But major combat is hardly the only such mission. A major
element of current U.S. strategy is the political reconstruction of
Iraq, a long-term mission with heavy demands for conventional ground
forces in a stabilization and support operations (SASO) role. More
broadly, SASO capabilities have been in heavy demand ever since the Cold
War ended, and will surely continue to be required, whether in Iraq or
elsewhere, for the foreseeable future. If major combat could be reliably
waged with a military consisting chiefly of SOF and standoff precision
weapons, then one might reasonably prescribe a radically transformed
military in which today's heavy forces were restructured to provide the
needed SASO capability at lower cost and greater effectiveness. But the
analysis above suggests that an Afghan Model restructuring may be
ill-advised for major combat. And either way, an emphasis on
counter-terror war per se would not free America from the need to retain
large-scale conventional ground forces of some sort -- whatever the best
organizational framework for commanding them in the Global War on
Terror.

Though it may well make sense to expand incrementally the role and size
of special operations forces, it thus does not appear that the Afghan
Model, at least, offers a viable opportunity for radical restructuring
by 2020. Change is surely needed, but so is continuity. And the actual
experience of Afghanistan and Iraq suggests that the need for continuity
may be greater than some now expect, the scale of the changes needed may
be more evolutionary, and the prospects for revolutionary change may be
more limited.

[^1]: ^\*^

[^2]: ^\*^

[^3]: Of course, MCO is not the only mission of conventional ground
    forces, and it may no longer be the most demanding on conventional
    force structure: stability and support operations (SASO) have
    emerged as a central driver of force adequacy in the aftermath of
    Saddam's ouster in Iraq. Most proposals for realigning major
    missions of the conventional military to SOF, however, have focused
    on MCO, and it is far from clear that SOF could ever field enough
    troops to shoulder the demands of SASO in a theater the size of Iraq
    while performing their other necessary duties elsewhere. It is also
    theoretically possible that SOF could become predominant via a
    radical diminishing of MCO or SASO's importance relative to such
    traditionally SOF-centered missions as unconventional warfare or
    counter-terrorist direct action. This seems unlikely by 2020,
    however: as long as there are either rogue states or potential great
    power challengers, MCO seems unlikely to recede completely; and as
    long as there are failed states that could potentially require
    large-scale American intervention, SASO seems unlikely to disappear
    as a mission with a significant claim on conventional force
    structure. By contrast, a realignment of the MCO mission to SOF
    could produce a significant change in the size of conventional heavy
    ground forces in the U.S. military, and potentially a major change
    in the nature (if not the size) of conventional U.S. ground forces
    overall. Either would constitute a radical change in the structure
    of the American military. I thus focus below on MCO, though this is
    certainly not the only conventional mission in which SOF's future
    role could increase to some degree.

[^4]: These findings are based on an analysis of data collected through
    a combination of interviews with 222 American, British, and Iraqi
    participants in the two conflicts; direct, physical inspection of
    the ground at key battlefields in Iraq and Afghanistan; and review
    of primary source written documentation from both campaigns. These
    interviews are documented in a series of audiotapes deposited in the
    U.S. Army Military History Institute's archive at Carlisle Barracks,
    Pennsylvania, together with other primary source documentation
    obtained for this project. Collectively, they comprise,
    respectively, the Operation Enduring Freedom Strategic Studies
    Institute Research Collection, U.S. Army Military History Institute,
    cited hereafter as MHI/OEF, and the Operation Iraqi Freedom
    Strategic Studies Institute Research Collection, U.S. Army Military
    History Institute, cited hereafter as MHI/OIF. For reasons of
    security, SOF personnel are identified below by rank and first
    initial only. Full identification of interviewees is available in
    the cited archival material at appropriate levels of classification.

[^5]: See, e.g., Michael Gordon, "'New' U.S. War: Commandos, Airstrikes
    and Allies on the Ground," *New York Times*, December 29, 2001, p.
    1; Paul Watson and Richard Cooper, "Blended Tactics Paved Way for
    Sudden Collapse," *Los Angeles Times*, November 15, 2001; Thom
    Shanker, "Conduct of War is Redefined by Success of Special Forces,"
    *New York Times*, January 21, 2002, p. 1; Vernon Loeb, "An Unlikely
    Super-Warrior Emerges in Afghan War," *Washington Post*, May 19,
    2002, p. 16; John Hendren, "Afghanistan Yields Lessons for
    Pentagon's Next Targets," *Los Angeles Times*, January 21, 2002, p.
    1; Rajiv Chandrasekaran and John Pomfret, "Aided by U.S., Pashtun
    Militias Move Closer to Kandahar," *Washington Post*, November 27,
    2001, p. 6; Ann Scott Tyson, "U.S. is Prevailing With Its Most
    Finely Tuned War," *Christian Science Monitor*, November 21, 2001,
    p. 1; Joseph Fitchett, "Swift Success for High-Tech Arms,"
    *International Herald Tribune*, December 7, 2001, p. 1;
    "Afghanistan: First Lessons," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, December 19,
    2001.

[^6]: See, e.g., Thom Shanker, "After the War: Elite Fighters; Chief
    Details Huge Scope of Special Operations," *New York Times*, July
    28, 2003, p. A10; James Dao, "Aftereffects: Special Operations
    Forces; War Plan Drew U.S. Commandos From Shadows," *New York
    Times*, April 28, 2003, p. A1; Thomas Ricks, "Rumsfeld Stands Tall
    after Iraq Victory," *Washington Post*, April 20,2003, p. A1; Jack
    Kelley, "Covert Troops Fight Shadow War Off Camera," *USA Today*,
    April 7, 2003, p. A2.

[^7]: Rowan Scarborough, "Decisive Force Now Measured by Speed,"
    *Washington Times*, May 7, 2003; Usha Lee McFarling, "The Eyes and
    Ears of War," *Los Angeles Times*, 24 April 2003; Terry McCarthy,
    "What ever Happened to the Republican Guard?" *Time*, 12 May 2003;
    also Max Boot, "The New American Way of War," *Foreign Affairs*,
    Vol. 82, No. 4 (July/August 2003), pp. 41-58; Andrew Krepinevich,
    *Operation Iraqi Freedom: A First-Blush Assessment* (Washington,
    D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2003), pp.
    13-24, 28, 30-31.

[^8]: See, e.g., Krepinevich, *Operation Iraqi Freedom,* pp. 13-24, 28,
    30-31; Hunter Keeter, "Anti-Terror Campaign Could Speed Military
    Transformation," *Defense Daily*, November 21, 2001, p. 4; Michael
    Vickers, *The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, the FY 2003 Defense
    Budget Request and the Way Ahead for Transformation: Meeting the
    \"Rumsfeld Test\"* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and
    Budgetary Analysis, 19 June 2002); Moniz, "Afghanistan's Lessons
    Shaping New Military;" Scarborough, "Army Officials Fear More Cuts;"
    "Misdirected Defense Dollars," *New York Times*, January 16, 2002;
    Joseph Fitchett, "Campaign Proves the Length of U.S. Military Arm,"
    *International Herald Tribune*, November 19, 2001, p. 1.

[^9]: America's opponents in this campaign were not a unitary or
    monolithic military. Their three main components -- the indigenous
    Afghan Taliban, foreign allies who fought for the Taliban regime,
    and the subset of these trained in al Qaeda's infamous camps -- had
    very different military properties and combat performance. Below,
    "Taliban" refers collectively to any hostile forces in Afghanistan.
    "Afghan Taliban" refers to the indigenous Afghan component. "Foreign
    Taliban" refers to all non-Afghan components, both al Qaeda and
    non-al Qaeda. "Al Qaeda" refers exclusively to the forces trained in
    bin Laden's camps and associated with his organization. Of these, al
    Qaeda were the most capable; the Afghan Taliban the least. For a
    more detailed discussion, see Stephen Biddle, *Afghanistan and the
    Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy*
    (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute,
    2002), pp. 13-21.

[^10]: MHI/OEF: Tape 032602p, CPT M. int.

[^11]: MHI/OEF: Tape 032602p, CPT M. int.

[^12]: Kirk Spitzer, "Green Berets Outfought, Outthought the Taliban,"
    *USA Today*, January 7, 2002, pp. 1ff.

[^13]: MHI/OEF: Tape 032802p, CPT D. int.

[^14]: MHI/OEF: Tape 032702a, CPT T. et al. int. Some targets in this
    region were visible at ranges of up to 10 kilometers: ibid.

[^15]: MHI/OEF: Tape 032802a, MAJ D. int.; Tape 041902p, COL Clarke
    int.; see also Karl Vick, "In a Desert Outpost, Afghan War Was Won,"
    *Washington Post*, December 31, 2001, pp. 1ff.; Peter Finn, "Wounded
    Army Captain Details Teamwork Against Taliban," *Washington Post*,
    December 11, 2001, pp. 1ff; Jonathan Weisman, "A Soldier's Story:
    U.S. Backbone Wins Battle," *USA Today*, December 26, 2001, p. 5.
    Note that the Taliban military's compartmentation and poor
    communications meant that learning often proceeded at different
    rates in different parts of the front. In the north, for example,
    Taliban defenders who had seen the effects of Allied bombing at
    Bishqab, Cobaki, and Oimetan had already begun to adopt careful
    camouflage and overhead cover by November 5 at Bai Beche, whereas
    Taliban defenders around Ac'capruk, which had not been extensively
    bombed before November 4, did not (MHI/OEF: Tape 032602p, CPT M.
    int.; Tape 032802p, CPT D. int.). Similarly, the Taliban experience
    in the north filtered down to units in the south more slowly than it
    did among units within the northern fighting -- hence the early
    southern counterattack at Tarin Kowt was massed and exposed in the
    open, rather than covered and concealed as were their later efforts
    at Sayed Slim Kalay or along Highway 4. In each case, however, the
    affected units learned quickly from their own experience, and
    adaptation followed rapidly after the initial air strikes.

[^16]: MHI/OEF: Tape 032602p, CPT M. int. This became widespread
    throughout the theater: see, e.g., Tape 032802a, MAJ D. int.; Tape
    032602a, CPT H. et al. int.; Tape 032602p, MAJ M., MAJ K.

[^17]: MHI/OEF: Tape 032602p, CPT M. int. On al Qaeda's use of cover and
    concealment in southern Afghanistan, see Tape 032602a, CPT H. et al.
    int.; Tape 032802a, MAJ D. int.

[^18]: MHI/OEF: Tape 032602a, CPT H. et al. int.; Tape 032802a, MAJ D.
    int.

[^19]: See, e.g., MHI/OEF: AFZS-LF-B, Memo, FOB 3/3 SSE Support
    Intelligence Summary, 25-29 March 2002; Tape 041902p, LTC Briley
    int.; Tape 041902p, COL Clarke int.; Tape 041802a, COL Smith int.;
    Tape 100702p, LTC Townsend int.

[^20]: MHI/OEF: Tape 032602p, CPT M. int.; Tape 032602p, MAJ M., MAJ K.
    int.

[^21]: MHI/OEF: Tape 032602a, CPT H. et al. int.

[^22]: Ibid.

[^23]: MHI/OEF: Tape 032802a, MAJ D. int.

[^24]: MHI/OEF: Memorandum for the Record, COL J. int., 2 July 2002.

[^25]: See, e.g., Barton Gellman and Thomas Ricks, "U.S. Concludes Bin
    Laden Escaped at Tora Bora Fight; Failure to Send Troops in Pursuit
    Termed Major Error," *Washington Post*, April 17, 2002, p. 1;
    William Arkin, "Dropping 15,000 Pounds of Frustration," *Los Angeles
    Times*, December 15, 2001.

[^26]: MHI/OEF: Tape 042002p, LTC Gray int.; Memorandum for the Record,
    COL J. int., 2 July 2002; Tape 041902p, LTC Briley int.; Tape
    041802p, LTC Lundy int.; Tape 041802a, COL Smith int.; Tape 041802p,
    LTC Preysler int.; Tape 041902a, MAJ Busko int.; Tape 041902a, CPT
    Murphy int.; Tape 041902a, CPT Lecklenburg int.; Tape 100702p, LTC
    Townsend int.

[^27]: MHI/OEF: Tape 032602a, CPT H. et al. int.; Memorandum for the
    Record, CPT H. int., 2 July 2002.

[^28]: At least in the sense of driving the Taliban from power. Whether
    larger American war aims have been secured in Afghanistan is still
    to be determined.

[^29]: On Kurdish skills and tactics in 2003, see, e.g., MHI/OIF Tape
    062503p1sb MAJ P int. Note that this is not to suggest that even the
    Iraqi Republican Guard was especially skilled in military
    fundamentals: on their manifest limitations, see Stephen Biddle,
    "Victory Misunderstood: What the Gulf War Tells Us About the Future
    of Conflict," *International Security*, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Fall 1996),
    pp. 139-179 at 158-61; idem., "Iraq and the Future of Warfare,"
    Testimony Before the House Armed Services Committee in *Operation
    Iraqi Freedom: An Outside Perspective,* *Hearings Before the
    Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives, One
    Hundred Eighth Congress, First Session*, 21 October, 2003, pp. 4-7.
    But limited though the Guard's skills were, they were nevertheless
    manifestly superior to the pesh merga's. If SOF-directed precision
    strike were sufficient to drive the Guard from the field in support
    of a pesh merga advance, this would thus provide at least some
    significant support to a claim that Afghan Model capabilities can
    overturn otherwise very unfavorable local military balances without
    significant U.S. ground strength.

[^30]: MHI/OIF: Tape 062503a1sb LTC B int (J2, CJSOTF-N)

[^31]: MHI/OIF: Tape 062503p1sb MAJ P int.; Tape 062503a1sb LTC B int.
    Iraqi defenses at Mosul were similar: Tape 062403p1sb LTC K int.

[^32]: Some SOF observers report hearing regular Iraqi-on-Iraqi gunfire
    issuing from behind the Iraqi front, which they attribute to
    enforcement action by paramilitaries and Republican Guards assigned
    to prevent conscripts from deserting: see, e.g., MHI/OIF Tape
    062503p1sb MAJ P int.

[^33]: MHI/OIF: Tape 062503p1sb MAJ P int.; Tape 062503a1sb LTC B int.;
    Tape 062403p1sb LTC K int.

[^34]: Photo taken from MHI/OEF: AFZS-LF-B, Memo, FOB 3/3 SSE Support
    Intelligence Summary, 25-29 March 2002.

[^35]: The author observed many such individuals and small parties among
    the high ridge lines and mountain valleys of Paktia Province during
    helicopter travel between Bagram AFB and the Shah-i-kot valley in
    April 2002.

[^36]: Photographs taken by the author, April 20, 2002.

[^37]: See, e.g., Alan Vick, et al., *Enhancing Air Power's Contribution
    Against Light Infantry Targets* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1996), pp.
    13-30; Peter Brooks and Edward Smith, "Evaluation of Airborne
    Surveillance Systems," *IDA Research Summaries*, Vol. 3, No. 1,
    (Winter/Spring 1996), pp. 4-5; Dominick Giglio, "Overview of
    Foliage/Ground Penetration and Interferometric SAR Experiments,"
    *SPIE Proceedings*, Vol. 2230, 1994, pp. 209-17; Tony Capaccio, "An
    Army Bosnia Review Rates JSTARS a 'White Elephant,'" *Defense Week*,
    November 25, 1996, pp.1ff; idem, "NATO Strikes Must Pierce the Fog
    of War," *Defense Week*, Vol. 15, No. 7 (Feb. 14, 1994), pp.1ff;
    Captain Kristin M. Baker, untitled, *Military Intelligence*,
    October-December 1996, pp. 27-29; Lt. Col. Collin A. Agee, untitled,
    *Military Intelligence*, October-December 1996, pp. 6-12. For a more
    detailed discussion, see Stephen Biddle, "The Past as Prologue:
    Assessing Theories of Future Warfare," *Security Studies* Vol. 8,
    No. 1 (Autumn 1998), pp. 1-74 at 24-6.

[^38]: Central Intelligence Agency, *The World Factbook, 2001*,
    available at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/

[^39]: *Institut Geographique National Carte Serie M761, Feuilles XVI-12
    (Caen)* and *XVI-13 (Mezidon)*.

[^40]: http://media.maps.com/magellan/Images/BAGHDA-W1.gif

[^41]: Modern fire-and-movement, combined arms tactics turn on
    exploitation of natural cover: Stephen Biddle, *Military Power:
    Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle* (Princeton:
    Princeton University Press, 2004); also Shelford Bidwell and
    Dominick Graham, *Firepower: British Army Weapons and Theories of
    War, 1904-1945* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1985); Jonathan House,
    *Combined Arms Warfare in the Twentieth Century* (Lawrence:
    University Press of Kansas, 2001); John English, *On Infantry* (New
    York: Praeger, 1984); Stephen Biddle, "Land Warfare: Theory and
    Practice," in John Baylis, James Wirtz, Eliot Cohen and Colin Gray,
    eds., *Strategy in the Contemporary World* (New York: Oxford
    University Press, 2002), pp. 91-112.

[^42]: This is not to suggest that current or developmental sensors are
    useless or that anyone anywhere can fight effectively from cover
    opaque to standoff observation. To find and exploit cover while
    taking or holding ground requires a very demanding set of tactical
    skills. Historically, armies have varied widely in their ability to
    do this, and in fact the Afghan campaign itself displays substantial
    variation in the Taliban's ability to do so: the Afghan Taliban
    early in the fighting were systematically unable to do so; only the
    foreign Taliban and al Qaeda encountered later in the campaign
    proved able to contest territory from covered, concealed positions.
    The less skilled the opponent, the more exposed they will be to
    remote target acquisition. And no army can disappear utterly:
    diligent reconnaissance will always uncover part of an enemy's
    dispositions; the better the sensors, the more they will find, and
    today's sensors can find enough to be a crucial contributor to
    success in theaters like Afghanistan. But this is not to say that
    they can find enough -- on their own -- to break a skilled, resolute
    opponent by standoff fires alone. Even today's best sensors are
    still far from an ability to acquire most or all of a hostile force
    that has learned to exploit the natural complexity of the earth's
    surface for cover and concealment -- as our experience against al
    Qaeda in 2001-2 demonstrates.

[^43]: See, e.g., Susan Schmidt and Thomas Ricks, "Pentagon Plans Shift
    in War on Terror; Special Operations Command's Role to Grow with
    Covert Approach," *Washington Post*, September 18, 2002, p. A1;
    Ricks, "Rumsfeld Stands Tall After Iraq Victory;" Gregory Vistica,
    "Military Split on How to Use Special Forces in Terror War,"
    *Washington Post*, January 5, 2004, p. A1.