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> **APHIS Analysis of the Status of High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza
> H5N1 (HPAI H5N1) Virus in France**

**Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service**

**Veterinary Services**

**December 2007**

**Abbreviations**

ADNS Animal Disease Notification System

AFSSA Agence Francaise de Securite Sanitaire des Aliments

AI avian influenza

APHIS Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

AU Administrative Units

CFR Code of Federal Regulations

CRL Community Reference Laboratory

CSF Classical Swine Fever

DGAL Direction Generale de L\'Alimentation

EC European Commission

END Exotic Newcastle Disease

ESZ Enlarged Surveillance Zone

EU European Union

FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

H5N1 hemagluttin 5 neuraminidase 1

HPAI high pathogenicity avian influenza

LPAI low pathogenicity avian influenza

MAP Ministere de L'Agriculture et de La Peche

MS Member State (European Union)

OIE World Organization for Animal Health

PCR polymerase chain reaction

TRACES Trade Control and Expert System

SCFCAH Standing Committee on the Food Chain and Animal Health

USDA United States Department of Agriculture

[**Executive Summary**]{.smallcaps}

On February 25, 2006, the Ministry of Agriculture, Food, Fisheries and
Rural Affairs (MAP) General Directorate for Food (DGAL) reported to the
World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) a suspected outbreak of
highly pathogenic avian influenza virus subtype H5 in a flock of
breeding turkeys in the Department of Ain, France. The outbreak was
located within the 3-km-radius protection zone established on February
18, 2006, following the detection of highly pathogenic avian influenza
subtype H5N1 (HPAI H5N1) in a wild duck \[1\]. Since the June 22, 2006,
final report to OIE, France has not reported any additional incidences
of HPAI H5N1 in domestic poultry.

In this document, APHIS presents the results of its evaluation of the
Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza subtype H5N1 (HPAI H5N1) status of
France based on the evaluation of documentation submitted by the
Ministere de L'Agriculture et de La Peche (MAP), Direction Generale de
L\'Alimentation (DGAL), European Commission (EC) legislation, and
reports to OIE. APHIS has maintained contact with French veterinary
authorities who kept APHIS advised of animal disease conditions in their
country and concludes that a document review is sufficient to meet the
needs of this evaluation. In addition, because of the long history of
trade between the United States and France, APHIS did not require a site
visit to complete this evaluation.

The documentation reviewed was consistent with the OIE Terrestrial
Animal Health Code recommendation for reinstatement of trade with a
region that has experienced an HPAI H5N1 outbreak \[2\]. In brief, APHIS
based its evaluation on the following critical factors: France has been
free of HPAI H5N1 in their domestic poultry for at least 3 months as the
result of effective control measures undertaken by a competent
veterinary infrastructure; that HPAI H5N1 was a notifiable disease in
France; an ongoing awareness disease program was in place; all notified
or suspect occurrences were investigated; an effective surveillance
program for HPAI H5N1 existed that supported the detection and
investigation of outbreaks; diagnostic and laboratory capabilities were
adequate and effective; eradication and control measures and movement
restrictions were appropriate to prevent further spread of disease; and
procedures used for repopulation of affected premises included
monitoring to demonstrate that HPAI H5N1 had been eradicated.

AHPIS considers that the presence of HPAI H5N1in wild birds presents the
highest risk for the reintroduction of HPAI H5N1 into France.
Eradication of disease should mitigate the immediate risk from the
outbreak that occurred but the reintroduction of disease into domestic
poultry remains a concern whenever HPAI H5N1 is present in wild or
migratory bird populations. Ongoing surveillance programs for wild birds
and domestic poultry in France and the surrounding regions have
indicated that although HPAI H5N1 has been found in wild bird
populations in France and surrounding regions, it has not reoccurred in
the domestic poultry of France since the time of the outbreak on the
turkey farm in Ain. France recognized wild birds as the major pathway of
introduction of HPAI H5N1 and had in place an adequate and appropriate
surveillance system for HPAI H5N1 in wild birds. Extensive surveillance
in wild birds and domestic poultry for HPAI H5N1 in France has been done
since eradication of the outbreak and continues. Surveillance has found
no additional identifications of HPAI H5N1 in domestic poultry and
indicates that it has not been reintroduced to domestic poultry from
infected wild birds. APHIS considers that if there is a reintroduction
of HPAI H5N1 into France it would be rapidly detected and appropriate
control and eradication measures would be applied.

As a result of this evaluation, APHIS concludes that France was able to
effectively control and eradicate HPAI H5N1 in its domestic poultry
population and that the French authorities have adequate control
measures in place to rapidly identify, control and eradicate the disease
should it be reintroduced into France in either wild birds or domestic
poultry. The effectiveness of the eradication program was attributed to
prompt actions taken by MAP with cooperation from backyard and
commercial flock owners. Based on the results of the assessment, APHIS
could identify no additional risk factors that would indicate that
domestic poultry in France continue to be affected with HPAI H5N1.

APHIS concludes that the likelihood of introducing HPAI H5N1 into the
United States through the import of live birds, poultry carcasses, parts
or products of poultry carcasses, and eggs (other than hatching eggs) of
poultry, game birds or other birds from France to be low.

**[Introduction]{.smallcaps}**

On February 25, 2006, the General Directorate for Food (DGAL) of the
Ministry of Agriculture, Food, Fisheries and Rural Affairs (MAP),
reported to the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) a suspected
outbreak of highly pathogenic avian influenza virus subtype H5 in
domestic poultry. The outbreak was on a turkey farm located in the
district of Versailleux in the department of Ain. The location of the
outbreak was within in the Dombes region, a wetland area that hosts
large numbers of wild and migratory birds. The affected farm was within
the 3-km-radius protection zone set up around the municipality of
Joyeux, in the department of Ain, after the discovery on February 18,
2006, of the first case of highly pathogenic avian influenza virus
subtype H5N1 (HPAI H5N1) identified in France in a wild duck. On
February 23, 2006, an outbreak of HPAI H5N1 was identified on a turkey
farm in Versailleux, department of Ain, located within the surveillance
zone and within 1 km of the site of first HPAI H5N1 infected wild
bird.\[1\]

France, in conjunction with the European Commission (EC), endorsed
defining protection, surveillance and buffer zones consistent with
Commission Decisions 2006/135/EC and 2006/115EC in the Dombes.
Commission Decision 2006/115/EC put in place the Enlarged Surveillance
Zone (ESZ) based on geographical, administrative and epidemiological
factors that encompassed the entire wetlands area of the Dombes. The
restricted communes are listed in Commission Decision 2006/175/EC. The
Dombes region was considered to represent an area of increased risk for
the spread of HPAI H5N1 from wild birds to domestic poultry because of
the presence much surface water in the form of marshes and ponds that
support large numbers of migratory wild birds. In 2006, the Dombes
region is where 61 of the 62 identifications of HPAI in wild birds were
detected**.**

In response to the presence of HPAI H5N1in domestic poultry in France
and in an effort to help prevent the introduction of HPAI H5N1 into the
United States, APHIS added the affected region to the list of regions
APHIS considers affected with HPAI H5N1 and banning trade in French
birds, poultry, and poultry products from this region \[Appendix II\].
In this document, APHIS presents the results of its re-evaluation of the
HPAI H5N1 status of France. APHIS is basing this review on the
evaluation of documentation submitted by the *Ministere de L'Agriculture
et de La Peche* (MAP), *Direction Generale de L\'Alimentation*
(Directorate-General for Food, DGAL), EC legislation, and reports to OIE
\[3\].

Previously APHIS has conducted several reviews of the animal health
control system of France and has concluded that the EU and France have
in place an effective system to identify, control and eradicate animal
disease and that these control measures could be effectively be applied
at the sub-national level \[4, 5, 6, 7, 8\]. Important animal health
requirements include compulsory notification of specific animal diseases
to both the EC and OIE. HPAI H5N1 is a notifiable disease in the EU.

The 2003 APHIS risk assessment evaluated France's Classical Swine Fever
(CSF) status and identified the smallest administrative unit in France
to be the commune \[4\]. In the September 2004 CSF risk assessment,
APHIS evaluated the veterinary infrastructure of 15 Member States (MS)
of the European Union (EU), including France, with regard to the ability
to apply the harmonized and binding animal health regulations imposed by
the EC on all the Member States \[7\]. In 2005, APHIS identified and
presented for public comment what it considered to be the smallest
sub-national jurisdictions or Administrative Units (AUs) for 15 EU-MS
that could be demonstrated to have "effective oversight of normal animal
movements into, out of, and within that jurisdiction, and that, in
association with national authorities, if necessary, has effective
control over animal movements and animal diseases locally" \[8\].

As a result of these evaluations, APHIS has recognized that local
authorities in these Member States have effective oversight and control
of animal diseases locally within their respective AUs and in the event
of future animal disease outbreaks in the EU, APHIS would regionalize
Member States to the level of one or more of the identified AUs.
Although the document specifically addressed CSF, the concept of
regionalization to the AU level was considered to be more broadly
applicable and not be disease-specific.

These evaluations of the infrastructure, ability to implement
appropriate control measures, laboratory capabilities, movement
controls, and emergency measures apply equally to HPAI H5N1. The
information provided by France regarding HPAI H5N1, in addition to the
information from previous evaluations of poultry, swine, and ruminant
diseases provide a background that is consistent with the 11 factor
approach in 9 CFR 92.2. APHIS has maintained contact with French
veterinary authorities who kept APHIS advised of animal disease
conditions in their country and concludes that a document review is
sufficient to meet the needs of this risk analysis. In addition, because
of the long history of trade between the United States and France, APHIS
did not require a site visit to complete this evaluation.

France provided information to support their request for being removed
from the APHIS list of H5N1 affected countries \[3\]. The documentation
provided was consistent with that outlined in Article 2.7.12.2 of the
World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) Terrestrial Animal Health
Code (2007); information recommended for reinstatement of trade HPAI
H5N1 free status from a region that has experienced an HPAI H5N1
outbreak \[7\]. APHIS conducted a risk analysis that is consistent with
these recommendations, specifically:

-   France has been HPAI H5N1 free for 3 months because of control
    measures undertaken by an effective veterinary infrastructure**.**

-   HPAI (as defined in 9 CFR) was a notifiable disease in France. An
    ongoing awareness program was in place for veterinary officials and
    the public, and all notified or suspect occurrences of HPAI H5N1
    were subjected to field and laboratory investigations.

-   A surveillance program for HPAI H5N1 already existed that addressed
    France's needs. This program supported the detection and
    investigation of outbreaks, including clinical inspection, active
    and passive surveillance (both serological and agent detection), and
    serological and virological testing in high-risk areas and of
    high-risk flocks. These actions were sufficient to detect disease
    effectively and quickly, even in the absence of clinical signs.

-   Under the surveillance program, all notified and/or suspected avian
    influenza cases were investigated, and officials took appropriate
    actions including collecting samples, transporting these samples in
    a manner that ensured their integrity for testing purposes, and
    documenting subsequent laboratory results.

-   The system for recording, managing, and analyzing diagnostic and
    surveillance data was sufficient to demonstrate the effectiveness of
    France's disease control measures.

-   Laboratory confirmation capabilities were effective, and testing
    procedures were documented and standardized.

-   The eradication program included the definition of appropriate
    quarantine and surveillance zones, monitoring of those zones, and
    implementation of movement restrictions. Measures taken by officials
    were able to contain and control the spread of disease from these
    zones due to effective program measures. Procedures for lifting
    quarantines were followed and were sufficient to prevent further
    spread of disease.

-   Documented standard operating procedures described procedures for
    depopulation, cleaning, disinfecting, and other applicable measures,
    such as carcass disposal. All relevant personnel were familiar with
    these standard procedures and followed them during the outbreak.
    These measures were effective in controlling the disease.

-   Premises repopulation, if applicable, was carried out according to
    documented procedures, including evidence that the disease did not
    recur and monitoring after repopulation to demonstrate that the
    disease was eradicated.

As a result of this evaluation, APHIS concludes that France was able to
effectively control and to eradicate HPAI H5N1in its domestic poultry
population. The effectiveness of the eradication program was attributed
to prompt actions taken by MAP and the cooperation of backyard and
commercial flock owners. Since the 2006 outbreak, France has conducted
extensive surveillance for HPAI H5N1 and has not identified any new HPAI
H5N1 outbreaks in domestic poultry.

**[Objective]{.smallcaps}**

The objective of this review is to evaluate the Highly Pathogenic Avian
Influenza subtype H5N1 status of France following the outbreak in
domestic poultry in 2006 to serve as the basis to characterize the risk
associated with the import of live birds, poultry carcasses, parts or
products of poultry carcasses, and eggs (other than hatching eggs) of
poultry, game birds, or other birds from France.

**[Background]{.smallcaps}**

France, as a Member State (MS) of the European Union (EU), is obligated
to comply with the provisions of Council Directive 2005/94/EC which
describes the measures for the control of avian influenza and Commission
Decision 2004/402/EC requiring all EU-MS have AI contingency plans to
ensure that the most appropriate measures are immediately implemented.
These measures are harmonized and binding throughout the EU serving as
an important means to prevent the spread of HPAI H5N1 within the EU as
well as to prevent the spread of HAPI H5N1 to other countries through
its export market. The Commission has the authority to conduct periodic
evaluations to verify Member State compliance.

Prior to the HPAI H5N1outbreak United States had a long history of trade
of poultry and poultry products with France. France has previously been
evaluated for CSF and other animal diseases as a country and as an
EU-MS. The EU system for animal disease control for classical swine
fever has been extensively evaluated by APHIS and provides a basis for
understanding the EU system for control of HPAI \[4, 5, 6, 7, 8\]. APHIS
has maintained contact with French veterinary authorities who kept APHIS
advised of animal disease conditions in their country. Therefore, APHIS
concludes that a document review is sufficient to meet the needs of this
risk analysis.

APHIS has concluded that MAP was able to effectively control and to
eradicate disease in its domestic poultry population and that the EU
system for animal disease control provides a basis for understanding the
EU system for control of HPAI H5N1. Based on the results of the
assessment, APHIS could identify no additional risk factors currently
applicable to France that would indicate that France is currently
affected by HPAI H5N1.

**[History of HPAI H5N1 in France and the EU]{.smallcaps}**

After the recognition of the spread of HPAI H5N1 from Asia into Western
Europe, the EU enhanced surveillance was conducted to monitor for the
presence of HPAI H5N1 in both wild birds and domestic poultry. The first
EU country to report HPAI H5N1 to the OIE was Romania where HPAI H5N1
was reported in both wild birds and domestic poultry in October 2005. In
February 2006, initial reports of HPAI H5N1 in wild birds were made in
Austria, Bulgaria, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Hungary, Slovakia,
Slovenia, and Switzerland.

In February 2006, France reported the presence of HPAI H5N1 in domestic
poultry in a single turkey flock. In March 2006, initial reports of HPAI
H5N1 were made for domestic poultry in Sweden and wild birds in Poland,
Denmark, Sweden and the Czech Republic. In April 2006, the first report
of HPAI H5N1 in domestic poultry was made in Germany and for wild birds
in the United Kingdom. Outbreaks in domestic poultry were first reported
in Denmark in May and Hungary in June 2006. In 2007, outbreaks of HPAI
H5N1 in domestic poultry were reported in the Czech Republic, Hungary,
Germany and the United Kingdom and in wild birds in Germany and France.

On February 13, 2006, based on positive laboratory findings (PCR) the
presence of HPAI H5N1 was identified in 3 dead pochard ducks (*Aythya
ferina*), in the department of Ain near Joyeux. In accordance with
Commissions Decision 2006/115/EC (Appendix II), protection and
surveillance zones were around the area were established on February 17.
Increased surveillance of wild birds throughout France was undertaken,
with special emphasis on marshy regions with migratory waterfowl
populations.

On February 23, 2006, an outbreak of HPAI H5N1 was identified on a
turkey farm in the department of Ain near Versailleux. The farm was
located within the surveillance zone within 1 km of the site where the
first HPAI H5N1 infected wild bird was identified. The farmer reported
to the veterinary authorities the sudden appearance of clinical signs
and abnormally high mortality among his flock of over 11,000 turkeys.
The National Reference Laboratory in Ploufragan reported that RT-PCR was
positive for H5. On February 25 the presence of H5N1 was confirmed by
RNA sequencing of tracheal swab samples.

In 2006, surveillance throughout France found the presence of HPAI H5N1
infected birds mainly in the Dombes region of marshy wetlands which
includes the department of Ain. In the department of Ain, 61 of the 62
HPAI H5N1 infected wild birds were found in the municipalities of Bourg
en Bresse, Birieux, Chanoz-Chatenay, Joyeux, Lapeyrouse, Marlieux,
Monthieux, Saint Marcel, Sandras, Versailleux, Villars-les-Dombes,
Divonne les Bains and Prevessin-Moëns, although one was found in Bouches
du Rhône department, municipality of Saint Mitre les Remparts. (see
Figure 1)

Figure 1. Map of the department of Ain, showing the location of HPAI
H5N1 positive wild bird samples in red, protection zones in pink and
surveillance zones in yellow. Also
![](media/image2.png){width="7.375196850393701in"
height="4.947244094488189in"}note the location of Versailleux, site of
the outbreak in domestic poultry

**[Hazard Identification]{.smallcaps}**

APHIS has identified several animal diseases listed by OIE that pose
primary hazards associated with initiating trade in animals and animal
products from foreign regions. The listed foreign animal diseases of
primary concern are addressed specifically in APHIS regulations. One of
these diseases, High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza is recognized by
APHIS as a hazard of primary concern. In this regard, before resuming
trade in poultry and poultry products with a region or country
considered by APHIS to have been affected with HPAI H5N1, APHIS is
obligated to conduct an import risk analysis to support this action.

Avian influenza (AI) is caused by an orthomyxovirus virus that infects
wild birds (such as ducks, gulls, and shorebirds) and domestic poultry
(such as chickens, turkeys, ducks, and geese). AI viruses are classified
by a combination of two groups of proteins: the hemagglutinin or H
proteins, of which there are 16 (H1-H16), and neuraminidase or N
proteins, of which there are 9 (N1-N9). AI strains also are divided into
two groups based upon the ability of the virus to produce disease
(pathogenicity): low pathogenic (LP) and highly pathogenic (HP).

HPAI H5N1, often referred to as the \"Asian\" H5N1, is the type causing
worldwide concern. \"Asian\" HPAI H5N1 spreads rapidly and is often
fatal to chickens and turkeys. Millions of birds have died in countries
where the \"Asian\" strain of HPAI H5N1 has been detected. This virus
has also infected people, most of whom have had direct contact with
infected birds. "Asian" HPAI H5N1 has not been detected in the United
States.

Low pathogenicity (LPAI) H5N1, often referred to as the \"North
American\" H5N1, is of less concern. LPAI H5N1 has been detected in wild
birds in the US as recently as 2007. Other strains of HPAI, specifically
H5N2, have been detected and eradicated three times in the United
States: in 1924, 1983 and 2004. In 2004 the H5N2 isolate was limited to
a single flock and was rapidly eradicated. The 2004 H5N2 isolate did not
result in clinical disease and inoculation studies showed it to be a low
pathogenic strain; however, genetic sequencing was consistent with one
of the OIE definitions for HPAI. No significant human illness resulted
from any of the North American outbreaks.

**[Analysis of the Status of HPAI H5N1 in France]{.smallcaps}**

APHIS conducted this evaluation based on the information outlined in the
OIE Terrestrial Code Article 2.7.12, specifying the information
recommended for reinstatement of trade HPAI free status from a region
that has experienced an HPAI outbreak \[9\]. For the purpose of this
report, risk refers to the likelihood that HPAI H5N1 exists in France
and, if so, how likely it would be for the disease to be introduced into
the United States through imports of live birds, poultry carcasses,
parts or products of poultry carcasses, and eggs (other than hatching
eggs) of poultry, game birds, or other birds from France. The likelihood
will depend on the effectiveness of the eradication and control measures
undertaken by France in response to the 2006 outbreaks of HPAI H5N1 and
the ability to identify the presence of HPAI H5N1 if it were to be
re-introduced.

***Evidence that France has been HPAI-free for 3 months* *because of
control measures undertaken by an effective veterinary
infrastructure.***

France has the legal authority to respond to HPAI through a
comprehensive set of regulations, directives and decisions that are
harmonized and regularly updated for all EU-MS
\[[**Appendix**](#_Hlk183324669) II\]. In addition to the fixed body of
legislation laid down for avian influenza, the EC has adopted additional
or emergency measures under the AI Directive, with other pieces of
primary animal health legislation as their legal basis. The Commission,
with backing of the Member States, puts forward legislative measures
through the Standing Committee on the Food Chain and Animal Health
(SCFCAH). Measures implemented include import bans, prevention and
control measures, domestic and wild bird surveillance programs and
defining risk areas around protection and surveillance zones. APHIS also
found the contingency plans, as required by EC regulations, adequately
provided emergency funds, laboratory staff, equipment and infrastructure
for animal disease outbreak control and eradication.

Comprehensive avian influenza specific measures are provided in Council
Directive 2005/94/EC, which replaced Council Directive 92/40/EEC, and
are frequently updated by Commission Decisions
\[[**Appendix**](#_Hlk183324669) II\]. Council Directive 2005/94/EC
includes comprehensive provisions for the early detection of infection
in poultry to ensure rapid response and adoption of appropriate and
proportionate control and eradication measures. This includes a system
of active surveillance to be carried out by EU-MSs, control measures to
be applied in the event of an outbreak of avian influenza in poultry or
other captive birds. Compulsory notification of suspected cases of HPAI,
depopulation of poultry on holdings where HPAI is confirmed, cleaning
and disinfection of affected premises, repopulation, establishment of
protection (3 kilometer radius) and surveillance (10 kilometer radius)
zones around affected holdings to enforce movement controls,
epidemiological investigations. The presence of a national laboratory in
each Member State and a Community reference laboratory for HPAI
diagnosis is also detailed in the Directive.

Immediate notification of the competent authority has been compulsory
since enactment of Council Directive 82/894/EEC for suspected or
confirmed cases of avian influenza. Notification of outbreaks of animal
diseases to the EC is required by Council Directive 92/40/EC. Commission
Decision 2004/402/EC requires that all EU-MS have approved AI
contingency plans. Commission Decision 2006/563/EC requires that each
EU-MS establish the legal powers necessary for the implementation of the
contingency plans. Commissions Decision 2004/450/EC establishes standard
requirements for Community financing for programs for the eradication,
monitoring and control of animal disease.

In 2005, following the recognition of risks associated with the presence
of HPAI H5N1 in wild birds, a number of specific measures related to
surveillance and control measures were updated by the EC to help prevent
virus introduction into commercial and non-commercial poultry flocks
from infected wild birds. A wild bird surveillance program was
established that requires the notification and epidemiological
investigation of all confirmed HPAI H5N1 identifications in wild birds
with the establishment of protection, surveillance and restriction
zones.

Commission Decision 2005/734/EC establishes biosecurity measures for
HPAI H5N1 to reduce the risk of transmission from birds living in the
wild to poultry and other captive birds and provides an early detection
system in areas determined to be at particular risk. This Decision has
been amended with additional risk mitigating measures by Commission
Decisions 2005/745/EC; 2005/855/EC; 2006/405/EC and 2006/574/EC, among
others (see Appendix II). Commission Decision 2005/745/EC immediately
prohibited keeping of poultry in the open air, but allowed the competent
authority to authorize the keeping of poultry in the open air if food
and water were provided indoors. Commission Decision 2005/745/EC also
required preventing access of poultry to surface water reservoirs
accessible by wild birds and prohibited gatherings of birds at markets,
shows and exhibitions.

EC Council Directives and Commission Decisions are incorporated into the
French Rural Code, Article L.223-3 \[[**Appendix**](#_Hlk183324669)
II\]. The Rural Code requires establishing emergency plans for listed
animal diseases, which include Newcastle disease and avian influenza.
The Rural Code includes the organization of an alert network at the
national and departmental level including animal breeders and owners,
health veterinarians; departmental directors of veterinary services and
approved laboratories. The emergency plans are prepared in consultation
at the national level and at departmental level. The alert network also
provided awareness campaigns for the general public to encourage the
reporting of dead wild birds for submission for diagnostic examination.
The Rural Code also supports the measures taken at the local level in
the case of suspicion and confirmation of the presence of the disease.

APHIS has previously evaluated the French veterinary infrastructure and
found DGAL and MAP to be effective and able to implement adequate and
timely animal disease control and eradication measures. APHIS published
a CSF assessment in 2003 based on observations made during a site visit
to France in February 2003 and concluded that the successful restocking
of the affected premises occurred with no further outbreaks was the
result of effective measures of the veterinary authorities \[4\].

***Conclusion***: France has not reported the identification of HPAI
H5N1 in domestic poultry since it made its final report to OIE on March
26, 2006. APHIS concludes France has an effective veterinary
infrastructure that was able to carry out the appropriate control
measures to keep France free of HPAI H5N1 in domestic poultry.

***Documentation that HPAI (as defined in 9 CFR) was a notifiable
disease in France and an ongoing awareness program was in place for
veterinary officials and the public, and all notified or suspect
occurrences of HPAI were subjected to field and laboratory
investigations*.**

HPAI H5N1 is a notifiable disease in France. Council Directive
2005/94/EC requires that all EU-MS notify the EC within 24 hours of the
confirmation of any primary outbreak or detection of AI of all suspected
or confirmed incidents. All forms of AI confirmed by the competent
authority in slaughterhouses, means of transport, border inspection
posts and other places at Community borders and quarantine facilities or
centers operating in accordance with Community legislation on imports of
poultry or other captive birds are considered to be notifiable under
Council Directive 92/40/EC. Commission Decision 2004/402/EC requires
that all EU-MS have AI contingency plans, approved by the EC, in place
to ensure that the most appropriate measures are immediately
implemented.

***Conclusion:*** In France HPAI H5N1 was and continues to be a
notifiable disease and all notified or suspect occurrences of HPAI H5N1
are subject to immediate field and laboratory investigation. Awareness
and educational outreach programs were in place and efforts were
increased following the identification of the presence of HPAI H5N1 in
wild birds.

***A surveillance program for HPAI already existed that addressed
France's needs. This program supported the detection and investigation
of outbreaks, including clinical inspection, active and passive
surveillance (both serological and agent detection), and serological and
virological testing in high-risk areas and of high-risk flocks. These
actions were sufficient to detect disease effectively and quickly, even
in the absence of clinical signs.***

Since 2002, all EU-MS have implemented mandatory surveys for avian
influenza in domestic poultry and wild birds by submitting yearly
surveillance programs to the Commission. These programs were established
under Commission Decisions 2002/649/EC, 2004/111/EC, 2005/464/EC and
2006/101/EC.\[10\]

Commission Decision 2002/673/EC provides for the EC to provide financial
contribution to cover 50% of the costs of the testing. These programs
continue to be supported by Community funding and are updated annually.
EC guidelines for sampling were provided to the MS for poultry, turkey,
duck and goose holdings as well as guidance for wild bird sampling. Wild
bird sampling plans were to include different species of free living
birds with a primary emphasis on waterfowl and shorebirds and sampling
of wild birds trapped, hunted and found freshly dead. Testing of samples
was carried out at or under the control of the MS's national reference
laboratory. Test antigens were supplied by the Community Reference
Laboratory (CRL) to ensure uniformity of testing and all results were
reported to the CRL for collation.

In the face of the recognized risk of the introduction of HPAI H5N1 from
wild birds, Commission Decision 2005/734/EC requires MS to heighten
surveillance and identify poultry holdings located in areas where the
risk for disease introduction from wild birds to poultry is considered
to be higher. Specific risk factors for virus introduction into poultry
were identified including: location of the holding along migratory
flight paths of birds from areas where HPAI had been identified;
proximity to wet areas, ponds, swamps, lakes or rivers where migratory
water fowl may gather; location of the poultry holdings in areas with a
high density of migratory birds, particularly waterfowl; open air
holdings of poultry or other captive birds or in any other premises in
which contact between wild birds and poultry or other captive birds
cannot be sufficiently prevented.

By the middle of January 2006, HPAI H5N1 infected wild birds had moved
from Asia into the European continent. The potential spread of the
epidemic into France was foreseen due to prior findings in neighboring
regions. In February 2006 HPAI H5N1 was detected in wild birds in
Austria, Bulgaria, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Hungary, Slovakia,
Slovenia, and Switzerland.

In 2005, active HPAI H5N1 surveillance in wild birds was concentrated in
the marshy areas based on the migratory patterns of wild birds. Samples
were taken in the regions of Camargue (costal southern France) and the
Loire Atlantique (northern France). Between August 29, 2005 and January
31, 2006 a total of 1004 wild birds were sampled. In 2006, between
February 1, 2006 and March 23, 2006, an additional 149 wild bird
surveillance samples were taken in an expanded area which included the
regions of Morbihan and Rhine. All samples in the active surveillance
programs for 2005 and 2006 were negative for HPAI H5N1.

Passive surveillance of wild birds was done throughout most of the
country in 2005 (see figure 1). Between October and December 2005, 78
birds were sampled and all samples were negative for HPAI. From January
1 to April 12, 2006, 2549 wild birds were sampled through out France
(see Figure 2). A total of 62 were positive for H5N, 61 in the
department of Ain, and 1 in the department of Bouches-du-Rhône.

Active HPAI surveillance in domestic poultry was done by the
departmental veterinary services and organized by DGAL in a system
scientifically supported and designed by *Agence Francaise de Securite
Sanitaire des Aliments* (AFFSA). In 2005, the active surveillance
program was based on serology and targeted flocks at highest risk such
as outdoor broiler, poultry for low capacity slaughterhouses, outdoor
turkeys, quails, ducks for meat production. In 2006, the active
surveillance program was expanded to include sero-sureillance of outdoor
laying hens, partidges, game ducks (*Anas platyrhynchos*) and guinea
fowl \[3\].

Figure 1. Location of passive surveillance samples for 2005 (October to
December)

Figure 2. Location of passive surveillance samples for 2006 (January to
April 12, 2006)

***Conclusion:*** APHIS concludes that the existing surveillance program
for HPAI H5N1 was appropriate for the detection the presence of HPAI
effectively and quickly in wild birds and domestic poultry, even in the
absence of clinical signs. The surveillance was adequate to indicate
that no additional outbreaks of HPAI H5N1 had occurred in domestic
poultry.

***Under the surveillance program, all notified and/or suspected avian
influenza cases were investigated, and officials took appropriate
actions including collecting samples, transporting these samples in a
manner that ensured their integrity for testing purposes, and
documenting subsequent laboratory results.***

Council Directive 2005/94/EC requires that, following the establishment
of a protection zone around the identification of HPAI subtypes H5 or H7
in domestic poultry, a census of all the holdings in zone made as soon
as possible. Visits by the official veterinarian to all commercial
holdings are to occur as soon as possible for a clinical examination of
the poultry and other captive birds with collection of samples for
laboratory tests as indicated. Non-commercial holdings in the protection
zone are also visited by an official veterinarian before the lifting of
the protection zone. Additional surveillance is immediately implemented
to identify any further spread of avian influenza in the holdings
located in the protection zone.

Commission Decisions 2006/115/EC and 2006/135/EC established EC level
measures to implement following the finding of HPAI H5NI in wild birds.
This replaced the interim protection measures applied after HPAI H5NI
first entered the EU. The application of appropriate protection measures
based on the epidemiological situation, to prevent that disease from
spreading from wild birds into commercial and noncommercial poultry
flocks, including protection (3 km) and surveillance zones (10 km) are
established around the place where the disease was detected in wild
birds. These zones are based on geographical, administrative, ecological
and epidemiological factors and may include the territory of other
Member States.

Immediately following the outbreak on the turkey farm in Versalilleux
restriction areas were set up; a 3 km protection zone (referred to as
"zone A") and a 10 km surveillance zone ("zone B"). Within the zones all
veterinarians, farmers and municipal mayors were informed of the
restrictions. Measures applied to all poultry holding in both the
protection (zone A) and surveillance (zone B) zones included movement
restrictions, census of all poultry holdings, compulsory confinement of
all poultry including backyard flocks to prevent direct contact with
wild birds, use of sanitizing footbaths at the entry of all livestock
buildings, application of heightened biosecurity measures, prohibition
of all gathering of birds (fairs, shows etc.) and the prohibition of
transport and spreading of raw manure. In zones A and B hunting was
prohibited and restrictions were placed on human activity, such as
recreational walking and fishing. Surveillance sampling for HPAI H5NI in
wild birds was increased in both zones A and B. Additional measures were
applied to the protection zone (zone A) including veterinary visits to
all poultry holdings to clinically examine the birds for signs of
disease and to inform the owners of the clinical signs and risk factors
for introduction of the disease as well as implementing appropriate
biosecurity measures.

In addition to the 3 and 10 km zones required by Commission Decision
2006/115/EC, France put in place an Enlarged Surveillance Zone (ESZ)
based on geographical, administrative and epidemiological factors. The
ESZ encompassed the entire wetlands area of the Dombes and included
communes in 4 departments (see Appendix I).

From the time of the outbreak in February until to June 18, 2006, when
France declared itself HPAI free to OIE, more than 300 veterinary visits
were conducted for all poultry farms located in the protection zone
around the outbreak on the turkey farm with no evidence of HPAI
infection on any premises. In June 2006, 20 flocks in the zone were
retested with negative results, including 3 flocks of laying hens, 14
flocks of broilers, and 3 flocks of guinea fowl. Testing included both
serology (10 birds per flock by AGID) and virology (15 birds per flocks
by rRT-PCR)\[2\]. No additional HPAI H5NI infected domestic poultry have
been identified and the zones surrounding this outbreak were lifted in
June 2006. Continued surveillance through 2007 has found no reoccurrence
of the disease in domestic poultry in France.

***Conclusion:*** APHIS concludes that the surveillance program was
comprehensive enough to detect the presence of HPAI in domestic poultry.
The system in place requires that all notified and/or suspected avian
influenza cases be investigated with the necessary resources and
diagnostic support to verify the eradication of HPAI H5NI in domestic
poultry in France. The effectiveness of the eradication program was
mainly due to the prompt actions taken by DGAL and of commercial flock
owners.

***The system for recording, managing, and analyzing diagnostic and
surveillance data was sufficient to demonstrate the effectiveness of
France's disease control measures.***

France and the EU have several mechanisms to record and manage
surveillance data, including Animal Disease Notification System (ADNS)
and Trade Control and Expert System (TRACES). ADNS was established by
Council Directive 82/894/EC and updated by Commission Decision
2005/176/EC. ADNS records and reports outbreaks of notifiable animal
diseases in the EU Member States and other participating countries
including Turkey, Iceland, the Faroe Islands, Andorra, and Switzerland.
ADNS provides a reporting system for documenting individual outbreaks of
notifiable animal diseases which automatically forwards information on
primary outbreaks to the EC within 24 hours of identification and on a
weekly basis for secondary outbreaks. The information is posted on the
internet with maps updated weekly showing the location of the outbreaks
and summary data.

In 2006, a total of 3,787 notifications were made in 2006, 1005 in 2005
and 1850 notifications made in 2004 covering all reportable animal
diseases. In 2006, ADNS reported a total of 481 outbreaks of HPAI H5NI
in wild birds in participating countries. The first case was reported on
February 6, 2006, and the last on May 21, 2006. ADNS reported a total of
219 outbreaks of HPAI H5NI in wild birds in February, 133 in March, 117
in April, 17 in May and only 2 for the rest of 2006. Of the 219
reporting's in wild birds, 21 reports (62 individual positive birds)
were in France. For domestic poultry, ADNS had 407 reports of HPAI H5NI
in 2006 birds in participating countries with one in France. The vast
majority of reports of HPAI H5NI in domestic poultry were in Turkey
(202), Romania (172) and Hungary (29).

TRACES is a centralized database for the control and traceability of
animals and animal products moving within the EU-MS. The system provides
electronic certification, data retrieval and central statistical
information for imports of animals and animal products and allows for
the issuance of central risk assessments and warnings. TRACES provides a
platform for updated information on disease alerts to be instantly
available.

Council Directive 2005/94/EC requires maintaining records of all visits
by the official veterinarians in protection zones. Official veterinary
visits were done to all the poultry farms located in the protection
zones set up around the Versailleux outbreak, with clinical examination
of the animals. No clinical indication of HPAI H5N1 was found on any of
the 304 visits were done.

***Conclusion:*** APHIS concludes that the system in place in both
France and the EU for recording, managing, and analyzing diagnostic and
surveillance data was sufficient to demonstrate the effectiveness of
France's HPAI H5NI disease control measures.

***Laboratory confirmation capabilities were effective, and testing
procedures were documented and standardized.***

Council Directive 92/40/EEC put in place comprehensive requirements in
the EU-MS for the laboratory confirmation procedures for HPAI H5NI and
updated in Council Directive 2005/94/EC. AFSSA serves as the national
reference laboratory for all serologic and virologic diagnostic
techniques for HPAI H5NI. ASFFA also coordinates the diagnostic activity
of 12 local veterinary laboratories including oversight of analysis
standardization and methods verification, quality assurance checks and
confirmation tests and training of laboratory personnel. The majority of
the local laboratories are equipped to perform rRT-PCR and the local
veterinary laboratory in Ain has the capability to perform both
serologic and virologic tests for HPAI.

The initial finding of HPAI H5NI in wild birds was done by the
departmental laboratory in Ain using RT-PCR and confirmed by RNA
sequencing on a pooled tracheal swab by AFSSA. The isolate was then sent
to the OIE and European Union Reference Laboratory in Weybridge, United
Kingdom, for laboratory confirmation.

***Conclusion:*** APHIS concludes that France has the laboratory
capabilities to diagnose avian influenza as part of an effective
national laboratory system with appropriately standardized testing and
documentation procedure.

***Emergency control, biosecurity procedures and eradication program:
The eradication program included the definition of appropriate
quarantine and surveillance zones, monitoring of those zones, and
implementation of movement restrictions. Measures taken by officials
were able to contain and control the spread of disease from these zones
due to effective program measures. Procedures for lifting quarantines
were followed and were sufficient to prevent further spread of
disease.***

Commission Decision 2004/402/EC requires all EU-MS to maintain an
approved contingency plan for the control of avian influenza and
Newcastle disease. Under Council Directive 2005/94/EC each Member State
is required to develop and maintain a Contingency Plan which is
periodically reviewed and updated at least every five years. The
Contingency Plan must specify the national measures to be implemented in
the event of an outbreak, including the establishment of a crisis centre
at the national level to coordinate all control measures in the Member
State.

Additional components of the Contingency Plan include: establishment of
local disease control centers with adequate staff, facilities and
resource to coordinate local disease control measures; availability of
resources, equipment and materials to effectively carry out the disease
control measures; training programs for field and administrative
personnel; and adequate diagnostic laboratory testing capacity and
sample handling to ensure rapid diagnosis; maintenance of registration
of commercial poultry holdings with identification of areas with a high
density of poultry. The Contingency Plan must also provide for
diagnostic laboratory support and cooperation with the OIE and Food and
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) reference
laboratories for avian influenza. The Commission reviews and approves
all Contingency Plans to determine that they are adequate and has the
authority to suggest any necessary amendments required to ensure that
they are compatible with those of the other EU-MS.

The Contingency Plan includes the establishment of a national crisis
center to coordinate all control measures in all of France and lists
local disease control centers to facilitate coordination of disease
control measures on the local level. Detailed information is provided to
all staff involved in control measures. Training programs are
established to develop and maintain necessary skills for both field and
administrative personnel. Each local disease control center establishes
a network of personnel and organizations that will be directly or
indirectly involved in outbreak controls. Diagnostic laboratory capacity
must be assured as well as facilities for post-mortem examination.

French authorities have regularly performed simulation exercises to test
the contingency plans. In 2006, 50 such exercises dedicated to HPAI were
done and the same numbers were scheduled for 2007. The French Rural Code
provides the authority for emergency measures to be undertaken when HPAI
is suspected and confirmed and extends the application of these measures
to holdings with epidemiologic links to the infected flock.

Commission Decisions 2006/148/EC and 2006/438/EC introduced the option
for preventive vaccination in France against HPAI H5N1 in ducks and
geese as a pilot project. The area of possible vaccine use was limited
to the departments of Landes, Loire-Atlantique and Vendeé. No
vaccination was used in control of the Vellieux outbreak.

Following the initial detection of HPAI H5N1 in a wild duck on February
17, 2006, a 10-km radius surveillance zone was established and increased
surveillance of poultry and wild birds was put in place along with
strengthened on-farm biosecurity measures on all farms in the zone.
However, no additional HPAI H5N1 was detected. As an additional
precautionary measure, France stated in the initial report to OIE that
these measures would be maintained for a minimum period of 30 days,
instead of the 21 days required after the completion of preliminary
cleaning and disinfection of the infected flock under Council Directive
2005/94/EC. All poultry flocks within the zone including back-yard
flocks must be visited before lifting protection zone restrictions. In
this outbreak on the turkey farm, all poultry flocks within the
protection zone were visited.

***Conclusion***: APHIS concludes that the emergency controls,
biosecurity and eradication procedures were adequate to contain and
control the spread of disease. France put in place appropriate
quarantine and surveillance zones with monitoring adequate to detect the
presence of HPAI if it were present. Based on the geologic terrain with
much surface water supporting a large population of wild birds an
expanded surveillance area was created with additional HPAI surveillance
in wild birds. The measures taken by French officials before lifting
quarantines were sufficient to prevent further spread of disease.

***Documented standard operating procedures described procedures for
depopulation, cleaning, disinfecting, and other applicable measures,
such as carcass disposal. All relevant personnel were familiar with
these standard procedures and followed them during the outbreak. These
measures were effective in controlling the disease. Premises
repopulation, if applicable, was carried out according to documented
procedures, including evidence that the disease did not recur and
monitoring after repopulation to demonstrate that the disease was
eradicated.***

Measures for depopulation, cleaning and disinfection, and repopulation
of the HPAI H5N1 infected holdings is carried out under official
supervision in compliance with Council Directives 92/40/EC and
2006/563/EC. The veterinary authorities approve the preliminary and
final cleaning and disinfection of the affected premises. Repopulation
can not take place for a period of at least 21 days following the date
of completion of the final cleansing and disinfection. Poultry on the
repopulated premises undergo at least one clinical examination by an
official veterinarian with routine laboratory testing and mandatory
testing of all poultry that die during the repopulation phase. The owner
is required to keep a record of production data, including morbidity and
mortality data, and to immediately report any significant change or
abnormalities to the competent authority. The newly repopulated facility
is monitored for compliance with appropriate biosecurity measures and no
commercial poultry can leave the holding without the authorization of
the competent authority.

After the affected turkey flock culling of all the remaining poultry in
the affected farm was carried out on the afternoon of February 23, 2006,
and final cleaning and disinfection operations of the establishment were
completed on March 18, 2006. In this incident, the owner decided not to
continue in poultry production and has not repopulated his premises.
However, extensive monitoring of nearby flocks found no evidence of
infection including the June 2006 monitoring of 20 local flocks for
serologic and virologic evidence of infection and none was found.

***Conclusion:*** Standard operating procedures for depopulation,
cleaning, disinfecting, carcass disposal and repopulation were in place
and would have been conducted under official supervision during the
outbreak. APHIS concludes that these measures were effective in
controlling the disease.

[**Risk factors applicable to France, Occurrence of
Outbreaks**]{.smallcaps}

The occurrence of the HPAI outbreak in the restricted zone in France
posed a risk to the United States from export of live birds, poultry,
parts or products of poultry carcasses, and eggs (other than hatching
eggs) of poultry, game birds or other birds exported to the United
States. While eradication of disease should mitigate immediate risk from
the outbreaks that occurred, reintroduction of disease into domestic
poultry remains a concern when HPAI H5N1 is present in wild or migratory
bird populations. However, the response to the 2006 HPAI H5N1 outbreaks
demonstrates that French authorities have adequate control measures in
place to rapidly identify, control and eradicate the disease should it
be reintroduced into France in either wild birds or domestic poultry.

APHIS cites the following factors as relevant to the situation in
France:

-   The presence of HPAI H5N1 in wild birds represents a high risk for
    the reoccurrence of the disease in domestic poultry. MAP recognized
    wild birds as the major pathway of introduction of HPAI and had in
    place an adequate and appropriate surveillance system for the
    detection of the presence of HPAI in wild birds should it reoccur.

-   MAP was able to effectively control and eradicate the single HPAI
    H5N1outbreak in domestic poultry as a result of an effective
    eradication program and prompt actions taken by DGAL with the
    cooperation of backyard and commercial flock owners.

-   From the time the presence of HPAI H5N1 was first confirmed in wild
    birds in February 2006, France has conducted an extensive
    surveillance program in wild birds and domestic poultry. However, no
    other flocks of poultry were found to be infected with HPAI H5N1 and
    no restriction zones have been put in place for the presence of HPAI
    H5N1 since the last zone was lifted June 2006.

With the successful eradication of HPAI H5N1 following the 2006 HPAI
outbreak in France and the subsequent measures implemented in response
to those outbreaks, APHIS could identify no additional risk factors
currently applicable to France that would indicate that domestic poultry
in France remain affected with Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza subtype
H5N1.

**[Risk Estimation and Conclusion]{.smallcaps}**

APHIS could identify no additional risk factors currently applicable to
France that would justify continuing to consider France to be affected
with Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza subtype H5N1. France was able to
rapidly identify, control and successfully eradicate HPAI H5N1 following
the 2006 outbreak on a single turkey farm in the department of Ain.
France has in place adequate surveillance measures to indicate that the
disease has not reoccurred in their domestic bird population. In
addition, APHIS considers that if there is a reintroduction, France
would be able to rapidly identify, control and eradicate the disease.

APHIS concludes that there exists a risk of reintroduction of HPAI H5N1
into France's poultry population when HPAI H5N1 is present in the wild
or migratory bird populations. However, in consideration of the quick
and decisive action undertaken by French authorities following the
identification of HPAI H5N1 in France and its neighboring countries, the
measures implemented in France, and the high level of awareness and
cooperation of French poultry keepers, APHIS concludes that, if
reintroduced, spread of HPAI H5N1 in France would be limited.

APHIS considers the risk of introducing HPAI H5N1 into the United States
resulting from the import of live birds, poultry carcasses, parts or
products of poultry carcasses, and eggs (other than hatching eggs) of
poultry, game birds or other birds from France to be low. The response
to the 2006 HPAI H5N1 outbreaks demonstrates that French authorities
have adequate control measures in place to rapidly identify, control and
eradicate the disease should it be reintroduced into France in either
wild birds or domestic poultry.

> **[References]{.smallcaps}**

1.  OIE weekly disease information update archive; available at:
    http://www.oie.int/eng/info/hebdo/a_csum.htm

2.  OIE (2006). Risk Analysis. *In* Terrestrial Animal Health Code,
    14^th^ edition. Paris, World Organization for Animal Health: Section
    1.3.

3.  Ministere de l\'Agriculture, de l\'Alimentation, de la Peche et des
    Affaires Rurales (2007). Questionnaire on avian influenza in the
    Dombes region.

4.  APHIS (2003). Risk Analysis for Importation of the Classical Swine
    Fever Virus in Swine and Swine Products from France and Spain,
    November, 2003. United States Department of Agriculture, Animal and
    Plant Health Inspection Service, Veterinary Services.

5.  APHIS (2000). Risk Analysis for Importation of Classical Swine Fever
    Virus in Swine and Swine Products from the European Union -
    December 2000. United States Department of Agriculture, Animal and
    Plant Health Inspection Service, Veterinary Services.

6.  APHIS (1999). Biological Risk Analysis: Risk assessment and
    management options for imports of swine and swine products from the
    European Union - June 2, 1999. United States Department of
    Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, Veterinary
    Services, Policy and Program Development.

7.  APHIS (2004). APHIS Risk Considerations on Importation of Classical
    Swine Fever (CSF) Virus in Breeding Swine, Swine Semen, and Fresh
    Pork from a European Union Region of Fifteen Member States.
    Available at: http://www.aphis.usda.gov/vs/ncie/regrequest.html

8.  APHIS (2005). Considerations on the Identification of Administrative
    Units for (AU) Certain Member States of the European Union.

9.  OIE (2006), Avian Influenza. *In* Terrestrial Animal Health Code,
    14^th^ edition. Paris, World Organization for Animal Health: Section
    2.7.12.

10. SANCO (2006). SANCO/10268/2006, European Commission Guidelines for
    the Implementation of Survey Programs for Avian Influenza in Poultry
    and Wild Birds to be Carried out in the Member States in 2007.

**[Appendix]{.smallcaps} I**

List of French Communes listed in Commission Decision 2006/175/EC

**Department of Ain :**

L\'abergement-Clemenciat

L\'abergement-De-Varey

Amberieu-En-Bugey

Amberieux-En-Dombes

Ambronay

Ambutrix

Ars-Sur-Formans

Attignat

Bage-La-Ville

Bage-Le-Chatel

Balan

Baneins

Beauregard

Beligneux

Beny

Bereziat

Bettant

Bey

Beynost

Birieux

Biziat

Blyes

La Boisse

Boissey

Bolozon

Bouligneux

Bourg-En-Bresse

Bourg-Saint-Christophe

Boyeux-Saint-Jerome

Bressolles

Buellas

Cerdon

Certines

Ceyzeriat

Chalamont

Chaleins

Challes

Chaneins

Chanoz-Chatenay

La Chapelle-Du-Chatelard

Charnoz-Sur-Ain

Chateau-Gaillard

Chatenay

Chatillon-La-Palud

Chatillon-Sur-Chalaronne

Chavannes-Sur-Suran

Chaveyriat

Chazey-Sur-Ain

Chevroux

Civrieux

Cize

Cleyzieu

Condeissiat

Confrancon

Cormoranche-Sur-Saone

Corveissiat

Courmangoux

Crans

Cras-Sur-Reyssouze

Crottet

Cruzilles-Les-Mepillat

Curtafond

Dagneux

Dommartin

Dompierre-Sur-Veyle

Dompierre-Sur-Chalaronne

Douvres

Drom

Druillat

Etrez

Faramans

Fareins

Feillens

Francheleins

Frans

Garnerans

Genouilleux

Germagnat

Grand-Corent

Grieges

Guereins

Hautecourt-Romaneche

Illiat

Jassans-Riottier

Jasseron

Jayat

Journans

Joyeux

Jujurieux

Lagnieu

Laiz

Lapeyrouse

Lent

Leyment

Leyssard

Loyettes

Lurcy

Malafretaz

Manziat

Marboz

Marlieux

Marsonnas

Massieux

Meillonnas

Merignat

Messimy-Sur-Saone

Meximieux

Bohas-Meyriat-Rignat

Mezeriat

Mionnay

Miribel

Miserieux

Mogneneins

Montagnat

Montceaux

Montcet

Le Montellier

Monthieux

Montluel

Montmerle-Sur-Saone

Montracol

Montrevel-En-Bresse

Neuville-Les-Dames

Neuville-Sur-Ain

Neyron

Nievroz

Nivollet-Montgriffon

Ozan

Parcieux

Peronnas

Perouges

Perrex

Peyzieux-Sur-Saone

Pizay

Le Plantay

Polliat

Poncin

Pont-D\'ain

Pont-De-Veyle

Pouillat

Pressiat

Priay

Ramasse

Rance

Relevant

Replonges

Revonnas

Reyrieux

Rignieux-Le-Franc

Romans

Saint-Alban

Saint-Andre-De-Bage

Saint-Andre-De-Corcy

Saint-Andre-D\'huiriat

Saint-Andre-Le-Bouchoux

Saint-Andre-Sur-Vieux-Jonc

Saint-Bernard

Sainte-Croix

Saint-Cyr-Sur-Menthon

Saint-Denis-Les-Bourg

Saint-Denis-En-Bugey

Saint-Didier-D\'aussiat

Saint-Didier-De-Formans

Saint-Didier-Sur-Chalaronne

Saint-Eloi

Saint-Etienne-Du-Bois

Saint-Etienne-Sur-Chalaronne

Sainte-Euphemie

Saint-Genis-Sur-Menthon

Saint-Georges-Sur-Renon

Saint-Germain-Sur-Renon

Saint-Jean-De-Niost

Saint-Jean-De-Thurigneux

Saint-Jean-Le-Vieux

Saint-Jean-Sur-Veyle

Sainte-Julie

Saint-Julien-Sur-Veyle

Saint-Just

Saint-Marcel

Saint-Martin-Du-Mont

Saint-Martin-Le-Chatel

Saint-Maurice-De-Beynost

Saint-Maurice-De-Gourdans

Saint-Maurice-De-Remens

Saint-Nizier-Le-Desert

Sainte-Olive

Saint-Paul-De-Varax

Saint-Rambert-En-Bugey

Saint-Remy

Saint-Sorlin-En-Bugey

Saint-Sulpice

Saint-Trivier-Sur-Moignans

Saint-Vulbas

Sandrans

Savigneux

Serrieres-Sur-Ain

Servas

Simandre-Sur-Suran

Souclin

Sulignat

Thil

Thoissey

Torcieu

Tossiat

Toussieux

Tramoyes

La Trancliere

Treffort-Cuisiat

Trevoux

Valeins

Vandeins

Varambon

Vaux-En-Bugey

Versailleux

Villars-Les-Dombes

Villemotier

Villeneuve

Villereversure

Villette-Sur-Ain

Villieu-Loyes-Mollon

Viriat

Vonnas

**\
Department of Isere**

Anthon

La Balme-Les-Grottes

Charvieu-Chavagneux

Chavanoz

Hieres-Sur-Amby

Janneyrias

Vernas

Vertrieu

Villette-D\'anthon

**Department of Rhone**

Albigny-Sur-Saone

Alix

Amberieux

Anse

Arnas

Belleville

Belmont-D\'azergues

Blace

Bron

Cailloux-Sur-Fontaines

Caluire-Et-Cuire

Cercie

Champagne-Au-Mont-D\'or

Charentay

Charnay

Chasselay

Chazay-D\'azergues

Les Cheres

Civrieux-D\'azergues

Collonges-Au-Mont-D\'or

Corcelles-En-Beaujolais

Couzon-Au-Mont-D\'or

Curis-Au-Mont-D\'or

Dardilly

Denice

Dommartin

Drace

Fleurieu-Sur-Saone

Fontaines-Saint-Martin

Fontaines-Sur-Saone

Gleize

Lachassagne

Lancie

Liergues

Limas

Limonest

Lissieu

Lozanne

Lucenay

Marcilly-D\'azergues

Marcy

Morance

Neuville-Sur-Saone

Poleymieux-Au-Mont-D\'or

Pommiers

Pouilly-Le-Monial

Quincieux

Rochetaillee-Sur-Saone

Saint-Cyr-Au-Mont-D\'or

Saint-Didier-Au-Mont-D\'or

Saint-Etienne-Des-Oullieres

Saint-Georges-De-Reneins

Saint-Germain-Au-Mont-D\'or

Saint-Jean-D\'ardieres

Saint-Jean-Des-Vignes

Saint-Julien

Saint-Lager

Saint-Romain-Au-Mont-D\'or

Taponas

Theize

Vaulx-En-Velin

Villefranche-Sur-Saone

Villeurbanne

Villie-Morgon

Chassieu

Decines-Charpieu

Genas

Genay

Jonage

Jons

Meyzieu

Montanay

Pusignan

Rillieux-La-Pape

Saint-Bonnet-De-Mure

Saint-Priest

Sathonay-Camp

Sathonay-Village

Colombier-Saugnieu

Lyon 1er Arrondissement

Lyon 3e Arrondissement

Lyon 4e Arrondissement

Lyon 6e Arrondissement

Lyon 9e Arrondissement

**Department of Saone Et Loire**

La Chapelle-De-Guinchay

Creches-Sur-Saone

Romaneche-Thorins

Saint-Symphorien-D\'ancelles

[]{#_Hlk183324669 .anchor}**[Appendix]{.smallcaps} II**

Summary of selected EU Council Directives, Council Decisions and French
Rule Code for avian influenza control.

+-------------------+--------------------------------------------------+
| **Council         | **Full Title**                                   |
| Directive**       |                                                  |
+-------------------+--------------------------------------------------+
| Council Directive | Council Directive 2005/94/EC of 20 December 2005 |
| 2005/94/EC        | on Community measures for the control of avian   |
|                   | influenza and repealing Directive 92/40/EEC      |
+-------------------+--------------------------------------------------+
| Council Directive | Council Directive 92/40/EEC of 19 May 1992       |
| 92/40/EEC         | introducing Community measures for the control   |
|                   | of avian influenza, as amended for the accession |
|                   | of Norway, Austria, Finland and Sweden, Czech    |
|                   | Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania,    |
|                   | Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia    |
+-------------------+--------------------------------------------------+
| Council Directive | Council Directive of 21 December 1982 on the     |
| 82/894/EEC        | notification of animal diseases within the       |
|                   | Community.                                       |
+-------------------+--------------------------------------------------+
| **Commission      | **Full Title**                                   |
| Decision**        |                                                  |
+-------------------+--------------------------------------------------+
| Commission        | Commission Decision of 13 April 2007 on the      |
| Decision          | implementation of surveillance programs for      |
| 2007/268/EC       | avian influenza in poultry and wild birds to be  |
|                   | carried out in the Member States and amending    |
|                   | Decision 2004/450/EC                             |
+-------------------+--------------------------------------------------+
| Commission        | Commission Decision of 18 August 2006 amending   |
| Decision          | Decision 2005/734/EC as regards certain          |
| 2006/574/EC       | additional risk mitigating measures against the  |
|                   | spread of avian influenza                        |
+-------------------+--------------------------------------------------+
| Commission        | Commission Decision of 19 July 2006 amending     |
| Decision of 19    | Decision 2006/415/EC concerning certain          |
| July 2006         | protection measures in relation to highly        |
| 2006/506/EC       | pathogenic avian influenza of the subtype H5N1   |
|                   | in poultry in the Community                      |
+-------------------+--------------------------------------------------+
| Commission        | Commission Decision of 11 August 2006 concerning |
| Decision          | certain protection measures in relation to       |
| 2006/563/EC       | highly pathogenic avian influenza of subtype     |
|                   | H5N1 in wild birds in the Community and          |
|                   | repealing Decision 2006/115/EC                   |
+-------------------+--------------------------------------------------+
| Commission        | Commission Decision 2006/438/EC of 27 June 2006  |
| Decision          | amending Decision 2006/148/EC on introducing     |
| 2006/438/EC       | preventive vaccination against highly pathogenic |
|                   | avian influenza H5N1 and related provisions for  |
|                   | movements in France. (Official Journal of the    |
|                   | European Union, No. L 174, 28 June 2006, pp.     |
|                   | 7-8)                                             |
|                   |                                                  |
|                   | EC.06.137                                        |
|                   |                                                  |
|                   | This amendment of the Decision of 24 February    |
|                   | 2006 (see IDHL, 2006, 57, EC 06.072) provides    |
|                   | for the prolongation of preventive vaccination   |
|                   | to 30 June 2006.                                 |
+-------------------+--------------------------------------------------+
| Commission        | Commission Decision of 7 June 2006 amending      |
| Decision          | Decisions 2005/710/EC, 2005/734/EC, 2005/758/EC, |
| 2006/405/EC       | 2005/759/EC, 2005/760/EC, 2006/247/EC and        |
|                   | 2006/265/EC as regards certain protection        |
|                   | measures in relation to highly pathogenic avian  |
|                   | influenza                                        |
+-------------------+--------------------------------------------------+
| Commission        | Commission Decision 2006/314/EC of 16 March 2006 |
| Decision          | approving the Member States\' survey programs    |
| 2006/314/EC       | for avian influenza in poultry and wild birds    |
|                   | during 2006.                                     |
+-------------------+--------------------------------------------------+
| Commission        | Commission Decision 2006/175/EC of 2 March 2006  |
| Decision          | amending Decision 2006/135/EC as regards the     |
| 2006/175/EC       | establishment of areas A and B in France due to  |
|                   | an outbreak of highly pathogenic avian influenza |
|                   | in that Member State. (see Appendix I)           |
+-------------------+--------------------------------------------------+
| Commission        | Commission Decision 2006/148/EC of 24 February   |
| Decision          | 2006                                             |
| 2006/148/EC       |                                                  |
|                   | on introducing preventive vaccination against    |
|                   | highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 and       |
|                   | related                                          |
|                   |                                                  |
|                   | provisions for movements in France               |
+-------------------+--------------------------------------------------+
| Commission        | Commission Decision of 22 February 2006          |
| Decision          | concerning certain protection measures in        |
| 2006/135/EC       | relation to highly pathogenic avian influenza in |
|                   | poultry in the Community                         |
+-------------------+--------------------------------------------------+
| Commission        | Commission Decision of 17 February 2006          |
| Decision          | concerning certain protection measures in        |
| 2006/115/EC       | relation to highly pathogenic avian influenza in |
|                   | wild birds in the Community and repealing        |
|                   | Decisions 2006/86/EC, 2006/90/EC, 2006/91/EC,    |
|                   | 2006/94/EC, 2006/104/EC and 2006/105/EC          |
+-------------------+--------------------------------------------------+
| Commission        | Commission Decision of 6 February 2006 on the    |
| Decision          | implementation of survey programs for avian      |
| 2006/101/EC       | influenza in poultry and wild birds to be        |
|                   | carried out in the Member States in 2006.        |
+-------------------+--------------------------------------------------+
| Commission        | Commission Decision of 30 November 2005 amending |
| Decision          | Decision 2005/734/EC laying down biosecurity     |
| 2005/855/EC;      | measures to reduce the risk of transmission of   |
|                   | highly pathogenic avian influenza caused by      |
|                   | Influenza virus A subtype H5N1 from birds living |
|                   | in the wild to poultry and other captive birds   |
|                   | and providing for an early detection system in   |
|                   | areas at particular risk.                        |
+-------------------+--------------------------------------------------+
| Commission        | Commission Decision of 21 October 2005 amending  |
| Decision          | Decision 2005/734/EC laying down biosecurity     |
| 2005/745/EC       | measures to reduce the risk of transmission of   |
|                   | highly pathogenic avian influenza caused by      |
|                   | influenza A virus of subtype H5N1 from birds     |
|                   | living in the wild to poultry and other captive  |
|                   | birds and providing for an early detection       |
|                   | system in areas at particular risk               |
+-------------------+--------------------------------------------------+
| Commission        | Commission Decision 2005/732/EC of 17 October    |
| Decision          | 2005 approving the programs for the              |
| 2005/732/EC       | implementation of Member States\' surveys for    |
|                   | avian influenza in poultry and wild birds during |
|                   | 2005 and laying down reporting and eligibility   |
|                   | rules for the Community financial contribution   |
|                   | to the implementation costs of those programs.   |
+-------------------+--------------------------------------------------+
| Commission        | Commission Decision 2005/731/EC of 17 October    |
| Decision          | 2005 laying down additional requirements for the |
| 2005/731/EC       | surveillance of avian influenza in wild birds    |
+-------------------+--------------------------------------------------+
| Commission        | Commission Decision 2005/464/EC of 21 June 2005  |
| Decision          | on the implementation of survey programs for     |
| 2005/464/EC       | avian influenza in poultry and wild birds to be  |
|                   | carried out in the Member States                 |
+-------------------+--------------------------------------------------+
| Commission        | Commission Decision of 2004/630/EC of 27 July    |
| Decision of       | 2004 approving the programs for the              |
| 2004/630/EC       | implementation of Member States\' surveys for    |
|                   | avian influenza in poultry and wild birds during |
|                   | 2004 and laying down reporting and eligibility   |
|                   | rules for the financial contribution from the    |
|                   | Community to the implementation costs of those   |
|                   | programs. \[amended by 2004/679/EC on 5 October  |
|                   | 2004\]                                           |
+-------------------+--------------------------------------------------+
| Commissions       | Commissions Decision of 29 April 2004 laying     |
| Decision          | down standard requirements for the content of    |
| 2004/450/EC       | applications for Community financing for         |
|                   | programs for the eradication, monitoring and     |
|                   | control of animal disease                        |
+-------------------+--------------------------------------------------+
| Commission        | Commission Decision of 26 April 2004 approving   |
| Decision          | contingency plans for the control of avian       |
| 2004/402/EC       | influenza and Newcastle disease.                 |
+-------------------+--------------------------------------------------+
| Commission        | Commission Decision 2004/111/EC of 29 January    |
| Decision          | 2004 on the implementation of surveys for avian  |
| 2004/111/EC       | influenza in poultry and wild birds in Member    |
|                   | States, to be carried out during 2004.           |
+-------------------+--------------------------------------------------+
| Commission        | Decision 2002/673/EC of 22 August 2002 approving |
| Decision          | the programs for the implementation of Member    |
| 2002/673/EC       | States\' surveys for avian influenza in poultry  |
|                   | and wild birds.                                  |
+-------------------+--------------------------------------------------+
| Commission        | Commission Decision 2002/649/EC of 5 August 2002 |
| Decision          | on the implementation of surveys for avian       |
| 2002/649/EC       | influenza in poultry and wild birds in the       |
|                   | Member States.                                   |
+-------------------+--------------------------------------------------+
| **French Rural    | **Brief Description**                            |
| Code\*\***        |                                                  |
+-------------------+--------------------------------------------------+
| Article D223-1    | Requires an emergency plans for listed           |
|                   | contagious diseases including Newcastle disease  |
|                   | and avian influenza.                             |
+-------------------+--------------------------------------------------+
| Article D223-22-2 | Requires establishing an alert network organized |
|                   | at the national and departmental levels. Network |
|                   | to include: breeders and owners, health          |
|                   | veterinarians; departmental directors of         |
|                   | veterinary services and approved laboratories.   |
+-------------------+--------------------------------------------------+
| Article D223-22-3 | Requires emergency plans to be prepared after    |
|                   | consulting the committees responsible for animal |
|                   | health at the national level and at departmental |
|                   | level.                                           |
+-------------------+--------------------------------------------------+
| Article D223-22-4 | Following confirmation of a contagious disease   |
|                   | outbreak the emergency plan is immediately       |
|                   | implemented and is organized at the national     |
|                   | level. The Ministry of Agriculture is            |
|                   | responsible for organization and instruction for |
|                   | the departmental and national crisis management. |
+-------------------+--------------------------------------------------+
| Article D223-22-5 | Defines general measures for prevention and      |
|                   | control of diseases, including defining cleaning |
|                   | and disinfection procedures to be used by the    |
|                   | Minister for Agriculture.                        |
+-------------------+--------------------------------------------------+
| Article D223-22-6 | Requires that animals are slaughtered for health |
|                   | reasons outside a slaughterhouse, all            |
|                   | appropriate steps shall be taken to minimize     |
|                   | their suffering and the risk of spread of the    |
|                   | pathogen under the guidance of the Ministry of   |
|                   | Agriculture.                                     |
+-------------------+--------------------------------------------------+
| **Rural code      |                                                  |
| measures in case  |                                                  |
| of suspicion of a |                                                  |
| listed animal     |                                                  |
| disease**         |                                                  |
+-------------------+--------------------------------------------------+
| Article D223-22-7 | Requires establishing an alert network organized |
|                   | at the national and departmental levels. Network |
|                   | to include: breeders and owners, health          |
|                   | veterinarians; departmental directors of         |
|                   | veterinary services and approved laboratories.   |
+-------------------+--------------------------------------------------+
| Article D223-22-8 | Requires emergency plans to be prepared after    |
|                   | consulting the committees responsible for animal |
|                   | health at the national level and at departmental |
|                   | level.                                           |
+-------------------+--------------------------------------------------+
| Article D223-22-9 | Following confirmation of a contagious disease   |
|                   | outbreak the emergency plan is immediately       |
|                   | implemented and is organized at the national     |
|                   | level. The Ministry of Agriculture is            |
|                   | responsible for organization and instruction for |
|                   | the departmental and national crisis management. |
+-------------------+--------------------------------------------------+
| **Rural code      |                                                  |
| measures in the   |                                                  |
| event of          |                                                  |
| confirmation of   |                                                  |
| the presence of a |                                                  |
| listed disease.** |                                                  |
+-------------------+--------------------------------------------------+
| Article           | A decree statement of infection is made          |
| D223-22-11        | following the confirmation of the presence of a  |
|                   | listed disease by the approved diagnostic        |
|                   | laboratory; the prefect applies the emergency    |
|                   | control measures to fight the disease under the  |
|                   | authority of the departmental director of        |
|                   | Veterinary Services. This decree may outline     |
|                   | measures for the indicated farm and establish an |
|                   | area subject to restrictive measures around the  |
|                   | farm.                                            |
+-------------------+--------------------------------------------------+
| #### A            | Following confirmation of the presence of the    |
| rticle D223-22-12 | listed disease, all or part of the measures      |
|                   | provided for articles L.223-3 and L.223-8 of the |
| ####              | Rural Code may be applied. Trace back and        |
|                   | destruction of all animals and animal products   |
|                   | that left the farm before the onset of symptoms, |
|                   | during the time period when they were likely to  |
|                   | be exposed/contaminated are traced and           |
|                   | slaughtered. Repopulation of the farm can only   |
|                   | be done after the completion of the disinfection |
|                   | operation and under conditions established by    |
|                   | decree of the Minister for Agriculture.          |
+-------------------+--------------------------------------------------+
| Article           | Allow application of all or part of the measures |
| D223-22-13        | established in Articles L.223-3 and L.223-8 to   |
|                   | restriction zones.                               |
+-------------------+--------------------------------------------------+
| Article           | #### Establishes the authority of the            |
| D223-22-14        |  Minister for Agriculture to develop the technic |
|                   | al details of implementing the measures provided |
|                   |  for in Articles D.223-22-11 to D.223 -22-13 and |
|                   |  determine the duration of their implementation. |
+-------------------+--------------------------------------------------+
| Article           | Establishes the authority to implement or        |
| D223-22-15        | maintain of the measures mentioned in articles   |
|                   | D.223-22-7 and D.223-22-9 on surrounding farms   |
|                   | or farms with an epidemiological connection with |
|                   | the infected holding.                            |
+-------------------+--------------------------------------------------+
| Article           | Establishes the authority to place a farm under  |
| D223-22-16        | surveillance because of an epidemiological link  |
|                   | to the affected farm and apply restricts based   |
|                   | on the presence of an animal showing clinical    |
|                   | signs or necropsy indicated the presence of the  |
|                   | disease, without waiting for the establishment   |
|                   | of laboratory diagnosis.                         |
+-------------------+--------------------------------------------------+
| Article           | Emergency vaccination may be permitted if the    |
| D223-22-17        | Minister for Agriculture appeals to the European |
|                   | Commission.                                      |
+-------------------+--------------------------------------------------+