Statement

I am Col. Terry J. Ebbert, USMC (Ret) and I currently serve as the
Director of Homeland Security & Public Safety for the City of New
Orleans. In this position I have the leadership responsibility for the
Police Department, Fire Department, Emergency Medical Service and the
Office of Emergency Management. I have spent my adult life serving the
citizens of our nation and the City of New Orleans. I want to thank you
for the invitation to testify before the Select Bipartisan Committee
investigating the Preparation and Response to Hurricane Katrina.

I also want to give public thanks to General Russell Honore, Vice
Admiral Thad Allen, Admiral Robert Duncan, Captain Tom Atkin, General
William Caldwell and his magnificent warriors from the 82^nd^ Airborne
Division as well as the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) and the
other Federal Law Enforcement officials. The only question they ever
asked was, "What do you need and want?" America is blessed and lucky to
have such leadership and I am privileged to have been given the
opportunity to have walked beside them.

Hurricane Katrina was an unprecedented natural disaster which
overwhelmed operational capabilities, resources and civil infrastructure
at the Local, State and Federal level and decimated homes, businesses,
lives, and the unique lifestyle of Southeast Louisiana. Left behind to
build the foundation for a future New Orleans is a city with no money or
revenue, a crippled criminal justice system, a faulty levee protection
system, lack of housing for fifty percent (50%) of its citizens, and
healthcare system clinging to life. I have lived in the belly of the
beast Katrina for the last three months and have been blessed with the
opportunity to work with many of the finest first responders anywhere in
the world.

Given our location on the gulf coast and being extremely vulnerable to
water threats, New Orleans, and our surrounding partners, has dedicated
great time and effort in planning for Hurricanes. The basis of our
efforts has been to develop effective evacuation plans. This is a
challenge due to the limited time we have after a storm enters the Gulf,
limited highways and a large population with an anti-evacuation
mentality. Driven by model predictions of potential deaths well over
10-12,000, we worked hard with our regional and state partners to
develop a plan and educate our citizens on its execution. We worked to
refine this plan after storms over the last two years. One of the lost
success stories is the evacuation in advance of Katrina. This highly
complex joint plan moved over 1 million people and saved over 10,000
lives. This was a two state, eight parish effort, which included
multiple law enforcement agencies, emergency planning offices, local
media and volunteer organizations. The continued improvement of this
plan is the foundation of future Hurricane planning in New Orleans.

Faced with the knowledge that we would be left with citizens without the
ability to evacuate, we worked to develop a "Refuge of Last Resort" for
both citizens with special needs, citizens without transportation, and
for those who recognized too late the serious nature of the storm. This
phase was designed to begin once Contaflow was discontinued and a dusk
curfew was to be implemented. The plan utilized RTA buses, moving
throughout the city, picking up citizens at preestablished checkpoints
and transporting them to the Superdome. All citizens were thoroughly
searched by National Guard troops upon entering the dome. Security was
provided by both the National Guard and the New Orleans Police
Department. This refuge was not intended to be a shelter, but it was
created to ensure that citizens lived through the storm with basic
necessities provided. As planners we recognized that further evacuation
with federal assets would be required. The planning window for this
relief was response within 48 hours. For all the difficulties, this plan
was a success. Many of the citizens in the dome would have become the
predicted 12,000 deaths.

There are two particular areas that need to be addressed if we are to be
prepared for a disaster, both natural and man made.

Funding Allocation from Department of Homeland Security

The Urban Area Security Initiative, conceived in the aftermath of 9-11,
was enacted as a mechanism to provide Federal funding to specific
metropolitan areas having a disproportionate share of the Nation's
critical infrastructure and, therefore, at greater risk to attack. The
intent of the program was and is to enhance the capacity to prepare for,
respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks employing weapons of mass
destruction.

The four parishes of Orleans, Jefferson, Plaquemines and St. Bernard
have been formed into Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) Region One
for joint planning, training, and exercising of the Department of
Homeland Security defined events. This includes WMD, all acts of
terrorism and natural disasters.

Executing the intent of Congress in the program, the Office of Domestic
Preparedness restricted any use of grant funds for planning, equipping,
training, and exercise to enhancing the preparedness of first responders
operating in a potential WMD environment. Most allowable expenditures
under the UASI program remained closely linked to the WMD threat to the
exclusion of other forms of enhanced readiness. As late as summer 2005,
ODP Training authorities rejected applications for reimbursement that
would have supported a request for funding to pay for Urban Search and
Rescue Water training for our Police, Fire, and Emergency Medical
personnel because the curriculum for the training, though nationally
recognized, did not include a WMD component. A request to purchase a
number of inexpensive, flat-bottomed, aluminum boats to equip our Fire
and Police Departments, with the intent of having them available to
rescue people trapped by flooding, was denied.

The rules on what is permitted and reimbursable are unaltered while the
newly stated focus on an "All Hazards" approach to preparedness remains
illusive. In recognition of the truth that the consequences of any large
scale disaster are remarkably similar. The existing limitations imposed
on the availability of federal preparedness funding should be broadened.

One other area that significantly impacts the ability of any UASI region
to implement its Homeland Security strategy is the cumbersome
bureaucratic layers in the funding approval process. Although the UASI
grant is awarded directly to the selected metropolitan area, 20% of the
funding is dedicated to the state and approval for reimbursement of
expenditures deemed necessary to achieve the objectives rests with the
State Administrative Agent, subject to the concurrence if the ODP
Federal Preparedness Officer who supervises the grant. This ensures that
the decisions will be made by officials far removed from the local
officials required to carry out the millions.

Although The Urban Area Security Initiative program provides a
desperately needed and long overdue source of critical funding whereby
economically challenged metropolitan areas can substantially increase
the level of protection, it is in great need of changes to provide
increased flexibility to the local UASI regions so that they can
properly cope with future natural disaster like Katrina.

Interoperable Communications

The State of Louisiana has for some time recognized the need for
statewide communications interoperability; however, the austere fiscal
environment, the challenges of getting "buy-in" from local governments
and support through the legislative process prevented any real progress
toward interoperability. Regionally, the City of New Orleans and the
parishes of Jefferson, St. Bernard and Plaquemines have undertaken a
project, supported by a Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS)
Grant, to establish communications interoperability within the region;
however, the project was eighteen months from completion when Hurricane
Katrina struck. Pre-Katrina, the New Orleans Maritime Interoperable
Committee (NOMIC), which was an outgrowth from the federally funded PSWN
project, was the primary means to accomplish interoperability. The
project connected seventeen local, state and federal agencies through
ACU 1000 bridging technology. Direct console patches linked the
Jefferson Parish Sheriff's Office and the New Orleans Police Department.
Regionally, the City of New Orleans, Jefferson, St. Bernard and
Plaquemines Parishes were attempting to leverage all available federal
and local funds to eliminate the number of disparate voice radio systems
and upgrade others to improve day to day operability and build
interoperability; however, the funding was not there to support the
requirement.

During Hurricane Katrina, the City of New Orleans lost two primary tower
sites and had to evacuate the police and fire communications centers
because of flooding. Associated with the loss of the communications
centers was the loss of all 911 capabilities and the NOMIC interoperable
bridging capability. Over 2000 police, fire and EMS personnel were
forced to communicate in a single channel mode, between radios,
utilizing three mutual aid frequencies. There was no voice radio contact
with surrounding parishes or state and federal agencies. Lives were put
at risk and it created a direct operational impact on their ability to
maintain control of the rapidly deteriorating situation within the city,
carry out rescue efforts and control the evacuation of those people who
had failed to heed the call for evacuation.

Though we are working diligently to restore voice radio communications,
it has not been fully restored to pre-storm levels. Attempting to move
toward regional and statewide interoperability, the State has installed
700 MHz antennas and repeaters; however, FEMA has denied funding for
subscriber radios, which are needed in order to take advantage of the
state architecture and tower sites. FEMA has provided St. Bernard and
Plaquemines Parishes with 700 MHz subscriber radios, yet they can not
talk to the 800 MHz systems in New Orleans and Jefferson. From an
interoperability perspective, we are worse today than we were before the
storm. The storm has left New Orleans and the parishes of St. Bernard
and Plaquemines without funding. The parishes are unable to meet the
cash match requirements for the COPS Grant and will ask for a waiver to
the requirement but the overall value of the grant will be reduced by
\$1.8 million and this will further impact our ability to establish
interoperability. FEMA funding and the COPS grant provide the only
funding source for restoration of our communications system and for
interoperability at this time. Based on our Regional Plan, we are moving
forward but, from an interoperability perspective, we will be less
prepared for the 2006 hurricane season unless we receive immediate
funding support from outside sources.

Much has been discussed about relief response after the storm. I can
assure you this was a very difficult seven days. I witnessed the best of
human valor and the worst of human nature, but I want to state that I
find no fault with any official, but rather a National Response Plan and
a FEMA organization totally overwhelmed by the magnitude of the
disaster. This storm did not fit into the nice little neat book of
administrative regulations during a huge time sensitive operational
response. I believe we must:

1.  Recognize that an administrative organization (FEMA) built around
    contractors, has no operational capability to control large scale
    emergency response. It needs to concentrate on recovery operations.

2.  Find a way to immediately utilize the only organization with the
    leadership, command and control capability, equipment and training
    to accomplish large scale response---The Department of Defense.

3.  Develop prepackaged capability for communication, food, water, fuel,
    medical and other vital supplies.

4.  Ensure early relief efforts are PUSH rather than PULL.

This is the greatest nation on earth and I know we can do better. I am
dedicated to working together with our state and federal partners to
ensure that we do get better.

It is clear the nation needs to review Katrina planning, response and
recovery at every level to look at our organizations with intent to
increase capability and compatibility. Katrina was an act of nature and
the impact, this time, was the Gulf Coast Region of the United States.
The next act could be a manmade act of terrorism and could happen
anywhere in our country. I believe we have been given a warning
shot---our preparation and integrated responses at every level must
improve.

I can only reflect on Katrina and her destruction. My concern is to the
future and my responsibility to the Mayor and citizens of New Orleans.
We are currently looking down the gun barrel of the 2006 Hurricane
season due to begin 1 June. With another projected "Super Storm" season
ahead we need your support to insure the survival of our great city.
Thank you very much Mr. Chairman and Committee members.