**REPORT OF THE EXPERTS TEAM**

**VISIT TO UKRAINE**

October 13-20, 2002

This report was produced jointly under the aegis of the Government of
the United

States of America and Her Britannic Majesty\'s Government

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.  Executive Summary

II. Purpose and Mandate of the Experts Team

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
III. Transparency and Cooperation

IV. Potential Transfers of the Kolchuga System to Iraq, Directly or Via
    Third Parties

V.  The Current Status of Ukraine\'s Export Control Process

VI. Conclusions and Next Steps

> ANNEX A. The Kolchuga System
>
> ANNEX B.

**I. [Executive Summary]{.underline}**

A joint U.S.-UK experts team visited Ukraine October 13-20, 2002 at the
invitation of the Ukrainian government. This fact-finding mission was
prompted by the recent authentication by the U.S. Federal Bureau of
Investigation of a recording of a conversation on July 10, 2000,
involving Ukrainian President Kuchma. In the\' conversation, President
Kuchma approved the proposal of Valeriy Malev, the General Director of
the Ukrspetsexport state arms sales firm, to covertly transfer a
Kolchuga passive detection system to Iraq via a third party (a Jordanian
middleman).

The team\'s main goals were to:

-   determine whether a Kolchuga passive detection system was
    transferred to Iraq either directly or through a third party;

-   determine the technical capabilities of Kolchuga and the level of
    threat it could pose to U.S. and UK forces;

-   inquire about the chain of events leading up to and following a
    conversation on July 10, 2000, between President Kuchma and Malev;
    and,

-   assess the Ukrainian arms export control system.

**Level of Cooperation and Transparency**

The extent of Ukrainian cooperation and transparency was mixed. The
Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Foreign Affairs were very helpful to
the team of experts.

The team was allowed to meet with many, but not all of the individuals
requested. The Ukrainian side told the team that Leonid Derkach, former
head of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), and Yuri Orshanskyy,
former Honorary Consul to Iraq were unavailable because they were
traveling abroad during the time of the team\'s visit.

Frequently Ukrainian officials refused point blank to answer specific
questions central to the team\'s work, especially when questions touched
on the role of senior Ukrainian figures. The team also encountered
evasive responses by Ukrainian government officials to straightforward
questions on the possible transfer of Kolchuga to or through third
parties.

Many documents requested were made available to the inspection team,
though with varying degrees of reluctance. Following specific requests
from the team leader, the Presidential Administration approved access to
additional documents, but some of the most crucial documents were still
withheld. For example, Ukrainian officials were unwilling to provide
requested documentation on the sale of four Kolchuga stations to the
People\'s Republic of China (PRC).

On October 19, the team was told that pending documents would be
declassified and provided in the coming days. The team is still awaiting
those documents.

**Findings**

The main finding of this fact-finding mission is that the Government of
Ukraine (GOU) failed to provide the team with satisfactory evidence that
the transfer of a Kolchuga to Iraq could not or did not take place. As a
result, the issue of the transfer must remain open.

The GOU provided information that confirmed that the meeting between
President Kuchma and Valeriy Malev occurred. The avenues of
investigation were limited relating to the chain of events leading up to
and following President Kuchma\'s July 10, 2000, approval of the sale
and transfer of the Kolchuga system to Iraq.

Given the team\'s necessary reliance on production figures provided by
Ukraine and the lack of full cooperation and transparency overall,
particularly on third party transfer issues, the question of whether
Ukraine transferred or is transferring Kolchugas to Iraq through a third
country must remain open.

It is assessed that Kolchuga has not been directly transferred to Iraq
under openly declared contracts. However, covert or illegal arms
transfers, particularly with the complicity of third parties, remain a
credible possibility. Despite Ukrainian transparency on declared
production, many unanswered questions and contradictions remain.

The GOU provided documentation that purported to show that 72 of the 76
Kolchugas that GOU admits to producing have been accounted for. GOU
asserts that 4 Kolchuga are in PRC, but the team was not given access to
documents to confirm this. Ukrainian interlocutors stated that the
End-User Clause had been modified at the PRC\'s request.

The team found a production discrepancy in 1993. Kolchuga are normally
produced and deployed three stations at a time, but in 1993 GOU reported
four were produced - not six. The team also found it unusual that no
Kolchugas were produced in 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, or 2001 as GOU
claims.

If Iraq acquired a Kolchuga system, it would increase the threat to
Allied aircrews operating in the northern and southern no-fly-zones as
well as to ground and maritime forces operating in the region. The main
threat comes when Kolchuga stations are operated in combination which
would, potentially, allow Iraq to passively track allied aircraft or
geolocate ground and naval radar forces and provide enhanced early
warning of allied operations in general. However, both Kolchuga and
Kolchuga-M would enhance Iraq\'s strategic intelligence gathering
capability.

There has been no satisfactory in-depth investigation carried out by the
Ukrainians. The Prosecutor General, the SBU and the National Security
and Defense Council (NSDC) each asserted to the team that they carried
out investigations and produced reports, but the team was allowed to see
only edited and reduced versions of selected reports. Explanation of the
degree to which information sources were checked or verified was lacking
in the materials provided to the team. As a result, there remain serious
concerns about the credibility and completeness of these GOU
investigations.

Ukraine\'s export control process does not have sufficient safeguards
against senior officials or entities misusing state organs or bypassing
the system. The SBU and Ukrspetsexport have conflicts of interests
within the export control system. When directly questioned about the
late Malev\'s contact(s) with Jordanian middlemen to sell the Kolchuga
to Iraq, the SBU -- the only entity apparently aware of the Jordanian
connection---reluctantly disclosed that it had been aware of the
proposed deal and claimed it advised Malev of the \"inadvisability\" of
carrying it out. But no evidence was forthcoming of whether and how the
process was stopped and who exactly was involved.

**Next steps**

In order for the U.S. and UK to determine whether a Kolchuga passive
detection system was transferred to Iraq either directly or through a
third party, the GOU will need to:

-   make available missing documentation for Kolchuga sales to foreign
    countries, especially regarding the sale of four Kolchuga stations
    to the PRC.

-   provide information on the location of the Kolchuga stations and
    Ukrainian technicians in the PRC.

-   allow U.S. and UK experts to interview individuals that were not
    available during the visit to Ukraine, especially Leonid Derkach,
    former head of the SBU, and Yuri Orshanskyy, former Honorary Consul
    to Iraq.

-   resolve remaining production questions.

**II. [Purpose and Mandate of the Experts Team]{.underline}**

The U.S.-UK Experts Team was formed following separate meetings with
President Kuchma by UK Secretary of State for Defense Geoff Hoon and a
U.S. delegation led by Assistant Secretary of State for Europe and
Eurasia Elizabeth Jones. These visits were prompted by the release of a
recording authenticated by the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation of
President Kuchma authorizing the sale of the Kolchuga passive detection
system to Iraq in July 2000. During the meetings with Minister Hoon and
Ambassador Jones, President Kuchma invited the team to carry out a
review on the basis of full openness and transparency.

The team\'s main goals were to:

-   determine whether the Kolchuga system was transferred to Iraq either
    directly or through a third party;

-   determine the technical capabilities of Kolchuga and the level of
    threat it could pose to US and UK forces;

-   obtain information on the chain of events and leadership decisions
    leading up to and following President Kuchma\'s approval of the
    Kolchuga transfer in July 2000; and,

-   assess the Ukrainian arms export control system.

The Experts Team arrived in Ukraine on October 13 and departed on
October 20. The team was subdivided into three sub-teams. Sub-team 1
studied the historical record of the Kolchuga issue, export policy and
state controls. Sub-team 2 examined arms sales, manufacturing,
contracting, marketing and sales. Sub-team 3 investigated Kolchuga
system technical parameters, its range of application and inventory
issues.

During the course of its work, sub-team 1 met with a number of senior
GOU officials and parliamentarians, including head of the Presidential
Administration Viktor Medvedchuk, National Security and Defense Council
(NSDC) Secretary Yevhen Marchuk, Security Service of Ukraine (SBU)
Chairman Volodymyr Radchenko, Rada Chairman Lytvyn, Chairman of the
State Commission on the Military-Industrial Sector Horbulin, as well as
with the Chairmen of the State Service for Export Control, State
Committee on the Protection of Borders, and the State Customs Service.

Sub-team 2 visited the various Ukrainian state entities engaged in arms
sales, including the umbrella organization Ukrspetsexport and its
subsidiaries, and the Topaz plant in Donetsk, as well as the Montelekt
firm in Kharkiv.

Sub-team 3 also visited the Topaz plant in Donetsk, as well as all
Kolchuga sites declared by the GOU.

**III. [Transparency and Cooperation]{.underline}**

The GOU\'s cooperation and transparency was mixed. The Ministry of
Defense and Ministry of Foreign Affairs were very helpful to the team of
experts.

The extent to which the sub-teams were able to fulfill their mission was
affected by the extent of cooperation and transparency afforded by the
GOU. The sub-team engaged in technical aspects and verification of the
Kolchuga capability and their locations in Ukraine, enjoyed the greatest
degree of cooperation and transparency. This sub-team received full
support from their Ukrainian escorts and all of the sub-team\'s
requirements and requests for information were fulfilled.

The sub-team that investigated the inner workings of the Ukrainian arms
manufacture and marketing system, particularly in the area of
contractual obligations by the end-user, did not receive full
cooperation. Not all documentation for Kolchuga sales to foreign
countries was made available.

The sub-team that examined historical records and export policy directly
related to the Kolchugas encountered the most problems. Access to the
people and documents requested were problematic. After requests directly
to the Presidential Administration some but not all of these problems
were addressed.

The GOU provided requested documentation covering the sale of Kolchugas
to Ethiopia. However, Ukrainian officials were unwilling to provide
requested documentation on the sale of four Kolchuga stations to the
PRC. Ukrainian interlocutors cited classification requirements and
confidentiality restrictions in the PRC contract.

The team was allowed to meet with many, but not all of the individuals
requested. The Ukrainian side told the team that Leonid Derkach, former
head of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), and Yuri Orshanskyy,
former Honorary Consul to Iraq were unavailable because they were
traveling abroad during the time of the team\'s visit.

The team also encountered difficulty in resolving contradictions. For
example, Ukrspetsexport refused to acknowledge Iraq\'s interest through
a Jordanian intermediary, in the Kolchuga system, though the point was
acknowledged publicly and in writing by the SBU. Often answers to the
questions posed, particularly those that touched on the role of senior
Ukrainian leadership figures, were evasive. In addition, key reports of
the various Ukrainian investigations should have been made available to
the team on day one. They were not.

On October 19, the team was told that pending documents would be
declassified and provided in the coming days. The team is still awaiting
those documents.

**IV. [The Potential Transfer of Kolchugas to Iraq, Directly or Via
Third Parties]{.underline}**

Based on records provided by Ukraine, the team prepared a chart showing
the recipients of Kolchuga systems produced at the Topaz plant from 1987
to 1991 and later production from 1992, including those sold to Russia
and other countries (Annex B). The team was not in a position to account
for the possible later transfer of the oldest Kolchuga equipment,
although no evidence was found of any Ukrainian complicity in upgrades
or illegal transfers of upgraded older stock. However, this may be of
lesser concern because of the lower capabilities of early models.

Despite Ukrainian transparency on declared production, many unanswered
questions and contradictions remain. It is assessed that Kolchuga has
not been directly transferred to Iraq under openly declared contracts.
However, illegal arms transfers, particularly with the complicity of
third parties, remain a credible possibility. The team encountered
evasive responses by Ukrainian government officials to straightforward
questions on the possible transfer of Kolchuga to or through third
parties.

The GOU provided documentation which purported to show that 72 of the 76
Kolchugas that Ukraine admits to producing have been accounted for. GOU
asserts that 4 Kolchuga stations are in China, but the team was not
given access to documents to confirm no third party transfer.

The team found a production discrepancy in 1993. Kolchugas are generally
produced and normally deployed three stations at a time, but in 1993 GOU
reported four were produced - not six. The team also found it unusual
that no Kolchugas were produced in 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, or 2001 as
GOU claims.

[Contract issues]{.underline}

The sub-team that investigated the arms sales and contracting issues
sought to examine Kolchuga sales to Ethiopia and the PRC. At
Ukrspetsexport the team met managers of its subsidiary companies and
also interviewed a representative from LR Avionics (based in Tel Aviv),
the company that brokered the Ethiopian contract for Kolchuga. The
Ukrainian side was led by Valeriy Shmarov, General Director of
Ukrspetsexport.

The team questioned Shmarov on the Ethiopian and Chinese transactions,
placing emphasis on the contract clauses limiting transfer of Kolchuga
to third parties. While the team did not seek to compromise Ukraine\'s
legitimate dealings with foreign countries, a satisfactory level of
transparency was requested in key areas of concern.

In response to a U.S. \'\'Non-Paper\" that had been previously presented
to the Government of Ukraine, the Government of Ukraine responded:

\"In drawing up the contracts, Ukraine obliges other countries not to
transfer stations and their components to third countries.\"

The team interpreted this statement as meaning that in the template for
Ukrspetsexport contracts a standard clause would in all cases be
inserted that governed third party transfers. A copy of this template
was requested and provided by Ukrspetsexport.

A copy of the standard clause in the Ethiopian contract was provided on
request. A similar request for copy of the clause governing third party
transfers in the Chinese contract was requested but this was refused.
Ukrainian interlocutors stated that this clause had been modified at the
PRC\'s request.

After the team\'s departure, the GOU provided a copy of a clause
precluding re- transfer without approval, which the GOU said was from
the PRC contract. However, this clause was on an otherwise blank page,
and its authenticity was impossible to judge without access to the full
contract. The GOU did not explain the discrepancy between the written
clause and the interview with Ukrainian experts who explicitly told the
team that the clause had been modified.

[Maintenance and spare parts]{.underline}

When asked whether Ukraine had received any maintenance or spares
inquiries from countries of the former Soviet Union, Ryabkin of the
Topaz plant stated that since 1992 not a single Kolchuga station
supplied had come back to the plant for maintenance or upgrade. He
agreed that in the normal course of events requests for after sales
support would be anticipated. His hypothesis was that the reason for\"
this lay in the lack of finance in those countries with older Kolchuga
stations.

The Experts Team found no documentary evidence or audit trail at any
location visited that would contradict Ryabkin\'s statement. The only
known upgrade to older equipment, that was exported, were the Kolchuga
stations supplied to Ethiopia in 2000 from previous production (1991). A
full and comprehensive audit trail for the sale of three Kolchugas in
2000 was identified for the Ethiopian- transaction and no anomalies were
noted.

Given the team\'s necessary reliance on production figures provided by
Ukraine and the lack of full cooperation and transparency overall,
particularly on third party transfer issues, the question of whether
Ukraine transferred or is transferring Kolchugas to Iraq must remain
open.

[Iraqi visit to Donetsk]{.underline}

Open reporting states that a delegation of Iraqis visited Ukraine on
17-21 June 2002, under the aegis of a Joint Ukrainian-Iraqi commission
for trade, scientific and technology cooperation. The two sides also
held meetings at Donetsk during this period, where Kolchuga is
manufactured, supposedly to discuss the outlook for cooperation in the
oil and gas industry. Various GOU officials denied that there was any
Iraqi military presence in Ukraine on 17-21 June 2002. This information
was contradicted by the team\'s documentary evidence. Ukrainian denials
raised concerns with the fact-finding team about the true nature of the
Iraqi visit to Ukraine.

**V. [The Current Status of Ukraine\'s Export Control
Process]{.underline}**

Since independence Ukraine has been developing an export control system
for military goods. It has followed international advice in setting up
its system. Under current legislation, companies involved in arms
export, whether state or privately owned, are obligated to notify and
receive a permit to undertake negotiations for sale and export of arms.
The permit to export is granted via the State Export Control Service
(SECS) which checks to ensure the customer is not subject to
international sanctions or other bilateral agreements that would
prohibit the sale.

If these checks indicate a need for further review, the request is
forwarded to either an interagency committee or an internal committee
depending on the issue in question. If further problems are identified
then the Committee of Military-Technical Cooperation and Export Control
Policy (headed by recently appointed Ihor Smeshko) reviews the request
and forwards it to State Export Control Committee (SECC). The team was
told that all applications for military export are referred to the SECC
for final decision. All arms firms interviewed during the team\'s visit
were aware of the arms export control process.

The team sought insights into how Ukraine\'s formal export control
process prevents or monitors illegal arms sales to countries such as
Iraq. Questioning focused on how the export control system could be
thwarted or circumvented by individuals or entities that wield
considerable influence in the informal decision-making process:

-   The SECS has no investigative powers and relies heavily on the SBU.
    If there is anything that raises suspicion, such as false End-User
    Certificates, the SECS refers it to the SBU or in the case of clear
    criminal responsibility, to the Procurator General, for further
    action. The team also heard about SBU powers to by-pass other
    agencies such as customs and border guards. The SBU also sits on the
    NSDC and SECS and is first in line for any investigations into
    questionable negotiations/sales/exports of military equipment.

-   In the interviews it was stated that Malev, the former head of
    Ukrspetsexport, did not approach the SECS at any point on a sale of
    Kolchugas to Jordan or Iraq. However, the team was told that Malev
    approached SECS members outside of the official committee meetings
    in order to persuade them to allow controversial deals to go
    through. The current SBU Chief stated that the SBU had rejected Mr.
    Malev\'s proposal, after determining that the Jordanian was a front
    for Iraq. However, there is no record of these conversations or
    investigations in the formal export control system or even in the
    SBU, making it impossible to determine what actually took place.

There are several other areas of concern in the export control process.

-   Contracts can be adapted too freely, with insufficient assurance
    against third party transfers. Ukraine verifies
    End-User-Certificates (EUC) by asking the recipient country\'s
    embassy in Kiev, but audit trail circumvention though false EUCs and
    other means remain as possible avenues to circumvent export
    controls.

-   Violations of the process are not openly reported to independent
    parties. The NSDC, Prosecutor General and the SBU conducted
    investigations into the sale of Kolchugas to Iraq, but all of these
    bodies are subordinate to the president. The scope of investigation
    was not set by a truly independent body. Sections of reports the
    team was allowed to see focused too narrowly on the question of
    whether there was a direct transfer of Kolchugas to Iraq and there
    was insufficient investigation into indirect and third party
    transactions.

-   The reports were not automatically made available to the Ukrainian
    Parliament\'s (Rada) standing committee for investigation into arms
    sale violations. Parliamentarians interviewed by the team expressed
    frustration at the lack of legislative oversight and inability to
    carry out independent investigations. Parliament created special
    investigative commissions that also covered the Kolchuga issue. In
    practice, these commissions lack power because legislation passed
    giving Rada investigative commissions subpoena and other powers
    necessary to carry out their work has not been enacted absent
    President Kuchma\'s signature.

The July 2000 recording concerns a deal involving transfer of the
Kolchuga system to Iraq via a third party (a Jordanian middleman). In
the conversation, General Director of the Ukrspetsexport state arms
sales firm, Valeriy Malev, proposes to President Kuchma a plan for the
covert transfer of the Kolchuga system. President Kuchma approves
Malev\'s proposal. During its investigation the team saw the
presidential appointment book kept by the presidential bodyguard, which
showed that President Kuchma and Malev did in fact meet on July 10,
2000, in the president\'s office.

Officials informed the team that they had discussions with Malev and
claimed they had to tell him that they could not support his informal
proposals. It was suggested by some of the officials interviewed that
Malev then sought President Kuchma\'s approval to pre-empt any decision
against the deal in the formal export control process. However, other
officials interviewed by the team dismissed this possibility.

In the Kolchuga case, it appears, on balance of evidence available to
the team, that Malev avoided the formal export control process and
directly approached President Kuchma and the SBU (then headed by Leonid
Derkach). This could explain the lack of a formal paper trail in the
custody of the various export control bodies.

The Kolchuga controversy highlights serious deficiencies in Ukraine\'s
export control system.

**VI. [Conclusions and Next Steps]{.underline}**

[Conclusions]{.underline}

The main finding of this fact-finding mission is that the Government of
Ukraine (GOU) failed to provide the team with satisfactory evidence that
the transfer of a Kolchuga to Iraq could not or did not take place. As a
result, the issue of the transfer must remain open.

The GOU only provided information that the meeting between President
Kuchma and Valeriy Malev occurred. No information was provided related
to the authorization of the transfer.

Given the team\'s necessary reliance on production figures provided by
Ukraine and the lack of full cooperation and transparency overall,
particularly on third party transfer issues, the question of whether
Ukraine transferred or is transferring Kolchugas to Iraq through a third
country must remain open.

It is assessed that Kolchuga has not been directly transferred to Iraq
under openly declared contracts. However, covert or illegal arms
transfers, particularly with the complicity of third parties, remain a
credible possibility. The team encountered evasive responses by
Ukrainian government officials to straightforward questions on the
possible transfer of Kolchuga to or through third parties

If Iraq acquired a Kolchuga system, it would increase the threat to
Allied aircrews operating in the northern and southern no-fly-zones as
well as to ground and maritime forces operating in the region. The main
threat comes when Kolchuga stations are operated in combination which
would, potentially, allow Iraq to passively track allied aircraft or
geolocate ground and naval radar forces and provide enhanced early
warning of allied operations in general. However, both Kolchuga and
Kolchuga-M would enhance Iraq\'s strategic intelligence gathering
capability.

There has been no satisfactory in-depth investigation carried out by the
Ukrainians. The Prosecutor General, the SBU and the National Security
and Defense Council (NSDC) each asserted to the team that they carried
out investigations and produced reports, but the team was allowed to see
only edited and reduced versions of selected reports. Explanation of the
degree to which information sources were checked or verified was lacking
in the materials provided to the team. As a result, there remain serious
concerns about the credibility and completeness of these GOU
investigations.

Ukraine\'s export control process does not have sufficient safeguards
against senior officials or entities misusing state organs or bypassing
the system. The SBU and Ukrspetsexport have conflicts of interests
within the export control system.

When directly questioned about the late Malev\'s contact(s) with
Jordanian middlemen to sell the Kolchuga to Iraq, the SBU---the only
entity apparently aware of the Jordanian connection---reluctantly
disclosed that they had been aware of the proposed deal and claimed it
advised Malev of the \"inadvisability\" of carrying it out. But no
evidence was forthcoming of whether and how the process was stopped and
who exactly was involved.

[Next Steps]{.underline}

In order for the U.S. and UK to determine whether a Kolchuga passive
detection system was transferred to Iraq either directly or through a
third party, the GOU will need to:

-   make available missing documentation for Kolchuga sales to foreign
    countries, especially regarding the sale of four Kolchuga stations
    to the PRC.

-   provide information on the location of the Kolchuga stations and
    Ukrainian technicians in the PRC.

-   allow U.S. or UK experts interview individuals that were not
    available during the visit to Ukraine, especially Leonid Derkach,
    head of the Security Service of Ukraine at the time of the taped
    President Kuchma/Malev conversation, and Yuri Orshanskyy, former
    Honorary Consul to Iraq.

-   resolve remaining production issues.

ANNEX A

THE KOLCHUGA SYSTEM

The following assessment is based on Kolchuga stations seen by sub-team
3. These units comprised 11 stations produced before 1992 and 8 stations
produced between 1992 and 1995. One prototype station built in 2000 was
also seen. Sub-team 3 saw some stations upgraded to the Kolchuga-M
standard, but it did not see any of the Kolchuga-E systems (the export
version of the Kolchuga-M) supplied to China. The capabilities of the
Chinese Kolchuga system were not revealed to the team except in general
terms. The threat this particular system could pose cannot, therefore,
be assessed with certainty.

**Purpose:** The Kolchuga system provides identification, early warning
and location of radio frequency emissions from land, sea, or air
platforms. Kolchuga can detect communications and navigation emissions,
but is designed to detect radar emitters. Kolchuga can assist in the
production of the Electronic Order of Battle, as well as providing early
warning, target classification and limited tracking.

**Function:** Both variants of Kolchuga search for electronic emissions.
Bearing information is provided for all emissions, but pulsed emissions
are analyzed further to allow determination of emitter type and
function. Multiple Kolchuga stations can coordinate to allow
triangulation of emitters. Kolchuga-M has an improved capability to do
this by using computer-to-computer data communications.

**Composition and variants:** There are 2 design types of Kolchuga, the
basic Kolchuga and the Kolchuga-M. All variants comprise an operations
vehicle (Ml), a support vehicle (M2) and an electrical generator set.
The Kolchuga started production at the Topaz production facility during
1987 and the basic design was modified to produce the Kolchuga-M variant
in 1999. Kolchuga-M offers the following improvements over the original
system: increased frequency coverage, better man-machine interface, the
addition of modem connectivity between stations and an improved data
processing capability. A third version, Kolchuga-E, is the export
version of the Kolchuga-M, which has documentation and labeling in
English. Differences between these two version do exist; it may be that
the main changes are in technology and not capability. However, small
improvements could arise, for example, through software changes but no
step change in capability.

**Capabilities:** The Kolchuga system can detect emitters in the
frequency range 1-11 GHz and 15-18 GHz. Kolchuga-M/E has extended
frequency coverage of 0.1-18 GHz. An individual receiver station can
provide a line-of-bearing to the emitter together with pulse parameters
that can be used to classify the emitter. Multiple Kolchuga stations can
operate as a complex to locate an emitter through triangulation. The
Kolchuga-M has a data-link capability between stations that enables it
to operate as a complex. A complex can track at least a single target,
but the extent of its multi-tracking capabilities requires further
analysis.

**Upgrades:** Kolchuga systems can be modified to Kolchuga-M capability.
This is a considerable modification, which is likely to require access
to specialized test equipment and other facilities available at the
factory and it is therefore considered unlikely that this upgrade could
be performed without factory support.

**Threat:** If Iraq acquired a Kolchuga system, it would increase the
threat to Allied aircrews operating in the northern and southern
nо-fly-zones as well as to ground and maritime forces operating in the
region. The main threat comes when Kolchuga stations are operated in
combination which would, potentially, allow Iraq to passively track
allied aircraft or geolocate ground and naval radar forces and provide
enhanced early warning of allied operations in general. However, both
Kolchuga and Kolchuga-M would enhance Iraq\'s strategic intelligence
gathering capability.

**Verification of Ukrainian MOD Kolchuga Systems:** Sub-team 3 and a
Ukrainian escort group visited each location, declared by the GOU, where
the Ukrainian MOD operates/stores Kolchuga systems. The systems were
verified against an inventory of Kolchuga systems provided by the GOU.
For each system the variant and serial number were checked against the
inventory. There were no discrepancies. A press report stated that
Kolchuga systems from Belarus were moved to the vicinity of Lyubichi,
where the team visited military unit A3330. The team went to the site
and inspected all garages and buildings capable of holding a Kolchuga
system. No evidence of any Kolchuga systems was found at this site.

ANNEX B

Annex B is a list of each of the 76 Kolchuga stations reported by the
Ukrainian side as having been produced by the Topaz facility between
1988 and 2002. We are withholding Annex B because it contains
proprietary information.