**YEMEN**

Yemen, with a population of more than 21 million, is a republic whose
law provides that the president be elected by popular vote from among at
least two candidates endorsed by parliament. In 2006 citizens re-elected
President Ali Abdullah Saleh to another seven-year term in a generally
open and competitive election, characterized by multiple problems with
the voting process and the use of state resources on behalf of the
ruling party. Saleh has led the country since 1978. The president
appoints the prime minister, who is the head of government. The prime
minister, in consultation with the president, selects the Council of
Ministers. Although there is a multiparty system, President Saleh\'s
General People\'s Congress Party (GPC) dominates the government.
Although civilian authorities generally maintained effective control of
the security forces, there were a few instances in which elements of the
security forces acted independently of government authority.

During an ongoing internal conflict that began in 2004, the government
used heavy force in an attempt to suppress the al-Houthi rebels in Saada
governorate. In May the conflict spread for the first time beyond Saada
to Bani Hushaish, a village on the outskirts of the capital. Both sides
agreed to a fragile ceasefire in July. Although total deaths resulting
from the conflict during the year are unknown, an estimated 1,000
government troops were killed and 3,000 wounded in the month of May
alone. No reliable estimates for the number of rebel or civilian deaths
were available.

Significant human rights problems persisted. There were limitations on
citizens\' ability to change their government due to corruption,
fraudulent voter registration, and administrative weakness. There were
reports of arbitrary and unlawful killings by government forces,
politically motivated disappearances, and torture in many prisons.
Prolonged pretrial detention, judicial weakness and fiat, serious
corruption, and poor prison conditions were also problems. During the
year excessive government force was reportedly used against participants
in public demonstrations. Arbitrary arrest and detention and other
abuses increased, particularly of individuals with suspected links to
the Zaydi Shia al-Houthi movement in and around the northern governorate
of Saada and to the series of political demonstrations in Lahj
governorate in the southern part of the coutnry. International
humanitarian groups estimated that in the summer there were as many as
75,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) as a result of the Saada
conflict. By the end of the year, about 6,000 persons were living in
refugee camps in Saada. Academic freedom was restricted. Restrictions on
freedom of speech, the press, and peaceful assembly increased, and
harassment and intimidation of journalists and oppositionists continued.
Pervasive and significant discrimination against women continued to
occur, as did child labor and child trafficking. The right of workers to
associate was also restricted.

**RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS**

Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:

a\. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life

There were reports that the government committed arbitrary or unlawful
killings during the year. Unlike in the previous year, politically
motivated killings by the government or its agents occurred during the
year. Security forces reportedly killed or injured suspects during
apprehensions and public demonstrations in actions that appear to have
been politically motivated.

During protests in the southern governorates that took place throughout
the year, security forces killed at least four persons and arrested and
injured hundreds.

On January 13, security forces reportedly fired bullets and tear gas at
demonstrators in the southern city of Aden, killing Saleh Abubakr
al-Sayed, Mohamed Ali Mohamed, and Saleh Talib Saeed. No investigation
into their death had been conducted at year\'s end.

On April 2, security forces in the city of al-Habileen in Lahj
governorate reportedly arbitrarily fired upon and killed Abdelfatah Saif
Abdullah while he was trying to enter the city. No investigation into
his death had been conducted at year\'s end.

On November 15, police shot and killed 16-year-old Hisham Ahmed Muhsen
during clashes between police and protesters demonstrating at a voter
registration center in Lahj governorate. The police declined to comment
and said they opened fire in self-defense. No investigation had been
conducted at year\'s end**.**

No investigation had been conducted at year\'s end into the 2007 deaths
of Muhammad Muhammad Ahmad al-Qadi, Muhammad al-Shoaibi, or Hashem
Abdullah Yahya Hajar.

There were no new developments in the following unlawful death cases
from 2006: Abed al-Osaily, a journalist from the newspaper *Al-Nahar*;
killings in al-Jawf, Lahj, and Dhamar provinces during the time of the
presidential and local council elections; and police officer Muhammad
Said Abdu while he was in custody.

Tribal violence resulted in a number of killings and other abuses, and
the government\'s ability to control tribal elements remained limited.
In several cases long-standing tribal disputes were resolved through
government‑supported mediation by nongovernmental actors.

Other incidents of fatal shootings and violence continued throughout the
year. In most cases, it was impossible to determine the perpetrator or
motive, and there were rarely claims of responsibility. Some may have
had criminal, religious, or political motives, and others appeared to
involve land disputes or cases of tribal revenge.

Terrorist activity increased sharply during the year. Numerous attacks
against government, foreign, and oil interests occurred, causing
injuries and deaths.

On January 18, two Belgian tourists and a Yemeni driver were killed in
Hadhramout governorate when four gunmen ambushed their four-car convoy.
The Yemen Soldiers Brigade (YSB), an al-Qa\'ida in Yemen (AQY)
affiliated group, later claimed responsibility for the attack in
addition to the July 2007 attack on a convoy of Spanish tourists in
Ma\'rib.

On March 18, mortars fired at a foreign embassy in Sanaa hit a
neighboring girls\' school. One embassy military guard and several
schoolgirls were injured. In a March 21 statement, the YSB claimed
responsibility for the attack.

On April 6, three mortars hit residential complex housing Western
workers in Sanaa.

On April 30, two mortars hit the Customs Administration parking lot,
causing a large explosion adjacent to a foreign embassy, which many
believed to have been the intended target.

In May an AQY affiliated group claimed it mortared the presidential
palace in Sanaa, but no official statement was released acknowledging
the incident.

In July AQY claimed responsibility for a suicide car bomb attack on a
central security forces compound in Hadhramout governorate that killed
eight persons.

On September 17, a suicide attack on an embassy in Sanaa killed 18
persons, including seven attackers. Islamic Jihad in Yemen, reportedly a
second AQY affiliated group, claimed responsibility for the attack.

The country was contaminated with mines and unexploded ordnance as a
result of several conflicts, including the 1962-70 war in the north
between republicans and royalists, the 1963-67 war of independence in
the south, the 1970-83 war against left-wing guerrillas, and the 1994
separatist war. The majority of mines were laid in border areas between
the former North Yemen and South Yemen and in the southern governorates.
Mines in the southern governorates were unmapped and strewn along beach
areas and valleys that lead to the southern coast.

Beginning in April, there were several reports of the use of
antipersonnel mines, including antitank and improvised mines, during the
conflict in the northern Saada province between government troops and
rebel forces led by Abdul-Malik al-Houthi. At least 60 people, including
military personnel, were reportedly admitted to hospitals with injuries
resulting from mine explosions in Saada. The media also reported at
least four deaths from mine explosions in the region during the year.

According to the Yemen Executive Mine Action Center (YEMAC), eight
people died from antipersonnel mines during the year. YEMAC tallied at
least 18 mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) casualties in 2007,
including 12 killed and six injured. In 2006 there were at least 19 mine
and ERW casualties, including seven killed and 12 injured, according to
YEMAC.

At year\'s end YEMAC reported that approximately 215 square kilometers
of land remained to be demined.

b\. Disappearance

During the year there were reports of politically motivated
disappearances of individuals associated with southern protests and the
conflict in Saada. These disappearances were generally characterized by
short-term arrests and releases. Civil society groups accused the
government of using sporadic disappearances to intimidate the populace.
There were also some reports of tribal kidnappings, traditionally
carried out to attract government attention to specific grievances.

On March 31 the Political Security Organization (PSO), a security
apparatus reporting to the president, raided the homes of and arrested
three leaders of the southern political protests: Hassan Ahmed Baom, Ali
Mounasser, and Yahya Ghalib Shuaibi. No information was provided as to
their whereabouts until April 4, when a leading human rights
organization gained access to them. The PSO released all three men in
mid-September.

In March and April the PSO arrested approximately 35 other individuals
related to the southern movement, including lawyers and journalists.
They were reportedly held in isolation and some were moved from one
prison to another to create confusion as to their whereabouts. In
September President Saleh pardoned all of the detainees during Ramadan,
a tradition in the country, and all were released from prison.

On April 7, security forces took Nahr Abdullah Abdulmalik and other
persons from a hotel in Aden allegedly because of their participation in
political demonstrations and sit-ins in the south. No information was
provided as to their whereabouts until April 22, when a leading human
rights organization gained access to them. Abdulmalik and the others
were released on May 26.

On May 21, cleric and chairman of the dissolved al-Haq party\'s Shura
Council Mohamed Miftah was kidnapped and detained in a PSO prison
because of his alleged affiliation with the Saada conflict. The PSO
denied holding him during his disappearance. He was released on
September 12 by a pardon from President Saleh.

On June 30, human rights activist Luay al-Muayed was arrested,
reportedly in connection with the Saada conflict. No information was
provided as to his whereabouts until his September 12 release.

On July 7, Ali Yahya al-Imad was arrested, allegedly in connection with
the Saada conflict. There was no information regarding his whereabouts
at year\'s end.

A leading human rights organization recorded a total of 56 forcible
disappearances during the year in connection with the fighting in Saada.
Other human rights groups believe the number to be much higher.

c\. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment

The law prohibits such practices; however, according to human rights
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and former detainees, authorities
tortured and abused persons in detention. The PSO stated in the previous
year that torture does not occur at its facilities and noted that new
PSO officers must sign a document certifying that they recognize torture
is illegal according to the laws and constitution of the country and
that those who torture prisoners will be punished according to the law.
The 2008 Amnesty International (AI) report alleged that many detainees
were tortured in PSO custody. Reported torture tactics included beatings
with fists, sticks ,and rifle butts; scalding with hot water;
excessively tight handcuffs; prolonged blindfolding; denial of water and
access to toilets; and death threats. Sleep deprivation and solitary
confinement were other forms of abuse reported in PSO prisons.

Ministry of Interior (MOI) officers reportedly used force during
interrogations, especially against those arrested for violent crimes.
Penal law, based on the government\'s interpretation of Shari\'a
(Islamic law), permits amputations and physical punishment such as
flogging for some crimes. AI reported that floggings occurred during the
year in cases related to alcohol consumption and sexual offenses.

Government sources acknowledged that torture occurred; however, they
claimed that torture was not official policy.

The domestic NGO National Organization for Defending Rights and Freedoms
(HOOD) alleged that Adel al-Azani died on May 18 as a result of torture
in a Criminal Investigation Department (CID) prison. Security elements
reported that al-Azani\'s cause of death was suicide. His family,
however, affirmed that al-Azani died of torture, reporting that wounds
were still visible on his body when they retrieved him from the prison.

During the year, the Ministry of Human Rights (MOHR) reported it
received 16 complaints concerning the alleged torture of individuals at
the hands of the National Security Bureau (NSB) and the Criminal
Investigative Department (CID). Throughout the year the MOHR followed up
on cases of torture that were either reported in the press or were
forwarded to the ministry from NGOs.

No investigation had been conducted at year\'s end in the 2007 torture
case of Shaif al-Haimi. In January 2007 National Security Bureau (NSB)
officers allegedly broke into al-Haimi\'s house and arrested him on
charges of theft and disguising himself as an NSB officer. Al-Haimi
alleged that authorities tortured him during his one-month prison
detention, paralyzing his right hand. Human rights groups accused the
authorities of fabricating the charge of impersonating an NSB officer as
a pretext to involve the NSB. The NSB said al-Haimi injured himself
after a partner in crime confessed to their guilt. Al-Haimi was
re-arrested and then released for health reasons in October 2007. At
year\'s end he was still awaiting trial in a Ministry of Justice (MOJ)
specialized criminal court.

There were reports that the MOI\'s CID routinely used torture to obtain
confessions. Defense attorneys and some NGOs claimed that most
confessions introduced as evidence against defendants in criminal courts
were obtained through torture. The MOI denied that torture was part of
its policy. Local NGOs asserted that in several instances in which
prison abuse cases were referred to the Attorney General\'s office for
prosecution, the complainants withdrew their cases after being
threatened. Government sources denied this allegation.

The MOHR was unable to provide any updated information on the torture
case of Muhammad Saleh al-Amari, which it first reported to the cabinet
in June 2007. Al-Amari was detained by the security department for seven
months at the Radaa Central Prison in al-Bayda governorate for allegedly
refusing to disclose information on a murder case. He said he was
tortured during his detention.

Security forces reportedly beat detainees and prisoners during the year.

The 2007 case of Azim Hasan Abdullah al-Wosabi was ongoing at year\'s
end. According to a leading local NGO, al-Wosabi was beaten when he was
arrested for stealing in May 2007. He was transferred to a
rehabilitation center the day after his arrest with wounds still visible
from the beating. Al-Wosabi was released from the rehabilitation center
in December 2007. The officer accused of beating al-Wosabi, Jamal Abdul
Naser al-Maghreb, was ordered to court during the year. His case was
still with the courts at year\'s end.

During the year, 21 CID detainees who were arrested and held without
trial or charges against them in 2006 were released and referred to the
public funds prosecution. The detainees, who held a one-week hunger
strike in May 2007, said they would sue the CID for material losses and
psychological complications resulting from alleged mistreatment in
prison, according to the Web site NewsYemen.

On December 14, three foreigners were kidnapped by tribal members in the
Bait Bous area of Sanaa. The captives were released unharmed on December
19 after the government reportedly paid the tribe\'s requested ransom.

Prison and Detention Center Conditions

Local and international observers reported that prison conditions
remained poor and did not meet internationally recognized standards. The
MOHR and a number of NGOs were granted limited access to MOI prisons.
The government severely limited access to PSO prisons by independent
human rights observers, a claim the PSO denied in 2007.

Many prisons, particularly in rural areas, were overcrowded, with poor
sanitary conditions and inadequate food and medical care. In some cases,
prison authorities extracted bribes from prisoners to obtain privileges
or refused to release prisoners who had completed their sentences until
the prisoners\' family members paid the authorities.

Women were held separately from men under equally poor conditions.
However, men\'s and women\'s prisons differed in important respects. By
custom, young children and babies born in prison were likely to remain
in custody with their mothers. Local tradition requires male relatives
of female prisoners to arrange for their release. Female prisoners
regularly were held in jail after the end of their sentences when male
relatives refused to authorize their release because of the shame
associated with the arrest of a female family member.

In some rural and women\'s prisons, children were held with adults, and
pretrial detainees were held with convicted criminals. Security and
political detainees generally were held in separate facilities operated
by the PSO.

Unauthorized \"private\" prisons in rural areas, often controlled by
tribes, continued to operate. Tribal leaders misused the prison system
by placing \"problem\" tribesmen in private jails, either to punish them
for noncriminal actions or to protect them from retaliation. At times
such prisons were simply rooms in a tribal sheikh\'s house. Persons were
often detained in such prisons for strictly personal or tribal reasons
without trial or judicial sentencing. Although senior government
officials did not officially sanction these prisons, there were credible
reports of the existence of other private prisons located within
government installations.

Persons with mental illness who had committed crimes were imprisoned
without adequate medical care. The MOI denied this charge and asserted
that nurses and doctors watched over mentally ill detainees. In some
instances, authorities detained without charge persons with mental
illness and placed them in prisons with criminals. The MOI reported that
at times, family members brought mentally ill relatives to MOI-run
prisons, asking officers to imprison the individuals. At year\'s end,
MOI-run prisons in Sanaa, Aden, and Taiz operated in conjunction with
the Red Crescent semi-autonomous units for prisoners with mental
illnesses; conditions in these units were reportedly deficient. In 2005
the MOI requested from the cabinet that the Ministry of Health (MOH)
establish centers for mentally ill detainees. At year\'s end, neither
the cabinet nor the MOH had acted on this request.

Limited access was granted to family members of PSO-held detainees, but
requests for access by parliamentarians and NGOs to investigate human
rights violation claims were routinely denied. PSO argued, however, that
visitors failed to comply with proper notification procedures,
necessitating refusal of access.

Individuals working for NGOs were allowed to meet with MOI prisoners as
private visitors. Representatives of the MOHR met with domestic NGO
monitors and responded to inquiries, particularly in matters relating to
prisoners. NGOs had no access to CID prisons.

The MOHR stated that it visited nine prisons in nine governorates and
four detention centers in Sanaa during the year and in March recommended
improvements for prison and detention facility conditions to the
cabinet. The MOHR reports that most of its recommendations from the July
2007 report on prisons were implemented, such as the separation of
incarcerated adults and minors and providing educational instruction to
prisoners.

Since 2004 the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has
suspended visits to PSO prisons, citing a lack of PSO agreement to
ICRC\'s universally applied procedures, which include regular access to
and private interviews with all detainees to assess the conditions of
detention and treatment. In response to the conflict in Saada during the
year, the ICRC sought to visit detainees according to its standard
procedures. By year\'s end no visits had been made and ICRC dialogue
with the authorities to obtain access to all PSO places of detention was
ongoing.

d\. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention

The law prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention; however, the
government generally did not observe these prohibitions. Enforcement of
the law was irregular and in some cases, particularly those involving
suspected security offenses, was nonexistent.

Role of the Police and Security Apparatus

The primary state security and intelligence-gathering apparatuses, the
PSO and the NSB, report directly to the president. Many of the NSB\'s
duties are not clearly defined and appear to overlap with those of the
PSO. The police CID reports to the MOI and conducts most criminal
investigations and arrests. The Central Security Organization (CSO),
also a part of the MOI, maintains a paramilitary force.

Corruption was a serious problem throughout these security and
intelligence organizations. There were no public governmental
investigations of police corruption during the year. Some police
stations reportedly maintained an \"internal affairs\" section to
investigate security force abuses, and citizens had the right to file
complaints with the prosecutor\'s office. However, enforcement of this
right was irregular and there were no effective investigations reported.
MOI also had a fax line for citizens to file claims of abuse for
investigation. It was unknown at year\'s end how many fax complaints MOI
received and how many it investigated.

Arrest and Detention

The law provides that an individual cannot be arrested unless
apprehended in a criminal act or served with a summons. A detainee must
be arraigned within 24 hours of arrest or be released. The judge or
prosecuting attorney must inform the accused of the basis for the arrest
and decide whether detention is required. The law stipulates that a
detainee may not be held longer than seven days without a court order.
Despite the law, arbitrary arrest and prolonged detention without charge
or, if charged, without a public preliminary judicial hearing within a
reasonable time were common practices. For example, numerous southern
demonstration leaders and persons with alleged associations to the
al-Houthi movement were arbitrarily arrested throughout the year and
detained for prolonged periods of time. A leading human rights
organization asserted that there were more than 200 of these cases
during the year.

The law prohibits incommunicado detention and provides detainees with
the right to inform their families of their arrests and to decline to
answer questions without an attorney present; however, these rights were
not always respected. The law states that the government must provide
attorneys for indigent detainees, but in practice it often did not do
so. Almost all rural cases were reportedly settled out of court with
tribal mediators. There are legal provisions for bail; however, some
authorities abided by these provisions only if bribed.

Citizens regularly claimed that security officials did not observe due
process when arresting and detaining suspects and demonstrators. Members
of the security forces continued to arrest or simply detain persons for
varying periods of time without charge, family notification, or
hearings. Detainees were often unclear as to the investigating agency,
and the agencies frequently complicated the situation by unofficially
transferring custodial authority of individuals among agencies. Security
forces routinely detained relatives of fugitives as hostages until the
suspect was located. Authorities stated that they detained relatives
only when the relatives obstructed justice. Human rights organizations
rejected this claim.

The government failed to ensure that detainees and prisoners were
incarcerated only in authorized detention facilities. The MOI and the
PSO operated extrajudicial detention facilities; both MOI and PSO denied
this claim. Unauthorized private prisons also existed. During the year,
Yasser Abdullah al-Idrisi, the last of the 2007 Yemen Economic
Corporation (YECO) prisoners, was released and referred to the public
funds prosecution. In November 2007 a leading local NGO visited an
unauthorized private prison within YECO, formally under the Ministry of
Defense (MOD), and confirmed that five persons were being detained in a
small room adjacent to the main building. The four other detainees were
released shortly after the visit.

Other unauthorized private prisons reportedly existed at the National
Drug Company, the Yemen Television Corporation, the MOI, and the
Ministry of Religious Guidance. Local NGOs considered these prisons
unconstitutional and called for their abolition. The MOI claimed it did
not operate unauthorized private prisons.

There were numerous reports that security forces arrested hundreds of
individuals in relation to the Saada conflict and the southern political
demonstrations and detained them without charge.

Members of the security forces continued to detain journalists for
publishing articles the government deemed controversial.

During the year, the government also continued to detain suspects
accused of links to terrorism, at times without due process. At year\'s
end it was unknown how many persons the government held on suspicion of
terrorist affiliations or activities. A large percentage of the total
prison population consisted of pretrial detainees, some of whom had been
imprisoned for years without charge. In 2007, a leading human rights NGO
estimated the number to be between 50 and 100 persons, attributing the
significant decrease to amnesties and prison escapes. In February 2006
the MOI reported that 172 individuals were being held for suspected
terrorism links.

Amnesty

Prisoners related to the Saada conflict were arrested, released, and
rearrested in what local human rights NGOs referred to as a \"revolving
door\" policy. This practice made it difficult to enumerate how many
prisoners were released during the year. According to September 2007
press reports, President Saleh ordered the release of 67 prisoners
detained on charges of suspected links with the al-Houthi movement. In
October 2007, Saleh granted a general amnesty and released approximately
300 prisoners on the occasion of Eid al-Fitr.

e\. Denial of Fair Public Trial

The constitution provides for an autonomous judiciary and independent
judges; however, a weak judiciary was severely hampered by corruption
and executive branch interference.

Many litigants maintained, and the government acknowledged, that a
judge\'s social ties and occasional bribery influenced verdicts. Many
judges were poorly trained, and some were closely associated with the
ruling party. The judiciary was further hampered by the government\'s
frequent reluctance to enforce judgments. Tribal members at times
threatened and harassed members of the judiciary.

The judicial system is organized in a three‑tier court structure. Courts
of first instance are broadly empowered to hear all civil, criminal,
commercial, and family matters. A single judge may hear a case in these
courts. Decisions taken in the courts of first instance may be appealed
to the Courts of Appeal, of which there is one in each province and one
in the capital. Each Court of Appeal includes separate divisions for
criminal, military, civil, and family issues. Each division is composed
of three judges.

Above the Courts of Appeal is the Supreme Court, which is empowered to
settle jurisdictional disputes between different courts, hear cases
brought against high government officials, and serve as the final court
of appeal for all lower court decisions. The Supreme Court has eight
separate divisions: constitutional (composed of seven judges including
the chief justice), appeals scrutiny, criminal, military, civil, family,
commercial, and administrative. The Supreme Court has special panels
empowered to determine the constitutionality of laws and regulations.

In addition to the regular hierarchy of courts, there are courts for
military, juvenile, tax, customs, and labor matters whose decisions may
be appealed to the Courts of Appeal.

A specialized criminal court, not a military tribunal, was first
established in 1999 under the MOJ to try persons charged with
kidnapping, carjacking, attacking oil pipelines, and other acts
considered to be a \"public danger,\" such as banditry and sabotage.
However, cases that were not security-related were referred to this
court during the year. According to a leading local NGO, this court does
not provide defendants with the same rights provided in the regular
courts. AI and local NGOs reported specialized criminal courts to be
unconstitutional. Defense lawyers reportedly did not have full access to
their clients\' charges or relevant government-held evidence and court
files.

> Trial Procedures

Laws are based on a mixture of Egyptian laws, Napoleonic tradition, and
Shari\'a. The law, social custom, and Shari\'a, as interpreted in the
country, discriminated against women, particularly in domestic matters.
There are no jury trials. Judges, who play an active role in questioning
witnesses and the accused, adjudicate criminal cases. By law, the
government must provide attorneys for indigent defendants in serious
criminal (felony) cases; however, in practice, provision of legal
counsel did not always occur. By law, prosecutors are a part of the
judiciary and independent of the government; however, prosecutors also
investigate criminal cases. The police were generally weak and played a
limited role in developing cases.

The security services continued to arrest, charge, and submit cases to
the prosecutor\'s office to try persons alleged to be linked to
shootings, explosions, and other acts of violence. Citizens and human
rights groups alleged that the security forces and the judiciary did not
normally observe due process.

The accused are considered innocent until proven guilty. Defense
attorneys are allowed to counsel their clients, address the court, and
examine witnesses and any relevant evidence. All defendants, including
women and minorities, have the right to appeal their sentences. Trials
were generally public, but all courts may conduct closed sessions \"for
reasons of public security or morals.\" Foreign litigants in commercial
disputes complained of biased rulings.

In addition to regular courts, there is a system of tribal adjudication
for noncriminal issues; in practice, tribal judges often adjudicated
criminal cases. The results carried the same if not greater weight than
court judgments. Persons jailed under the tribal system usually were not
charged formally with a crime, but were publicly accused of their
transgression.

Parliament has exclusive jurisdiction over executive branch officials
and their representatives for crimes including bribery, interference,
and embezzlement. No government official was investigated or tried under
this law during the year.

Political Prisoners and Detainees

The number of political prisoners or detainees and conditions in which
they were held was unclear. PSO reported in 2007 that no political
prisoners were detained in PSO prisons. Human rights activists were able
to provide limited data on any such persons, and access to such
detainees by local or international humanitarian organizations was
severely restricted or not permitted. During the year, there was a
significant increase in the number of political prisoners and detainees
related to the southern protest movement (see section 1.g.).

Civil Judicial Procedures and Remedies

The law provides for an independent and impartial judiciary in civil
matters; however, there were limitations in practice. In 2006 local NGO
HOOD filed the first-ever civil suit against the president, on behalf of
Ahmad Ali bin Maeili. Maeili claimed the PSO detained him without charge
for six years. After the court rejected the case, HOOD appealed to the
Supreme Court. Maeili\'s case remained with the court of appeals at
year\'s end.

f\. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family Home or Correspondence

The law prohibits such action; however, police forces from the PSO and
MOI routinely searched homes and private offices, monitored telephone
calls, read personal mail and e-mail, and otherwise intruded into
personal matters for alleged security reasons. Activities were conducted
without legally issued warrants or judicial supervision. PSO and MOI
rejected these claims. According to the PSO, the attorney general must
personally authorize monitoring of telephone calls and reading of
personal mail and e-mail. The PSO reported that to do a house search, it
first obtains a warrant and a signed certification by the head of the
neighborhood, and officers are accompanied on the search by two
neighbors who serve as witnesses.

Local NGOs and journalists reported an increase in interference due to
the Saada conflict and southern political discontent. For example,
journalist Abdelkarim al-Khaiwani was re-arrested and in June was
sentenced to six years in jail for alleged connections with terrorism
and the war in Saada. He was released in September. Another journalist
who covered both topics, Mohamed al-Maqaleh, was arrested on April 22,
allegedly on charges of humiliating the judge in al-Khaiwani\'s trial.
Al-Maqaleh was released on August 29**.**

Throughout the year various human rights activists and journalists
reported receiving repeated threatening phone calls throughout the day
and into the night. Activists and journalists charged this is a form of
intimidation by authorities attempting to quiet the opposition, most
specifically in regard to the Saada conflict and southern political
discontent.

The law prohibits arrests or the serving of a subpoena between sundown
and dawn; however, there were reports that persons suspected of crimes
were taken from their homes without warrants in the middle of the night.

No citizen may marry a foreigner without permission from the MOI, but
this regulation does not carry the force of law and appeared to be
enforced irregularly.

In other cases, detention of family members continued while the
concerned families negotiated compensation for the alleged wrongdoing.
Arbitration and mediation by families, tribesmen, and other
nongovernmental interlocutors were commonly used to settle such cases.

g\. Use of Excessive Force and Other Abuses in Internal Conflicts

During the year, fighting continued between the government and the
al-Houthi rebels of Saada in the conflict that initially began in 2004.
The conflict spread in May to Bani Hushaish, a village on the outskirts
of the capital. The government repeatedly used heavy force in an attempt
to suppress the rebels\' uprising, which was suspended with a fragile
ceasefire in July. The government also reportedly used excessive force
to suppress southern demonstrations during the year. A leading human
rights organization claimed there were more than 200 cases of arbitrary
arrests of individuals linked to these internal issues during the year.

According to an October Human Rights Watch (HRW) report, since 2007, the
extent of arbitrary arrests and \"disappearances,\" mainly in the
context of the Houthi rebellion but also relating to the government\'s
domestic counterterrorism efforts and its crackdown on social unrest in
the southern part of the country, expanded. Estimates of the numbers of
persons disappeared or detained vary -- local NGOs have documented
dozens of disappeared persons, and hundreds arbitrarily arrested since
2004. In August, according to HRW, officials spoke of approximately
1,200 political prisoners still detained, some 130 of whom were
gradually being released. On August 31, President Saleh ordered the
release of 131 detainees arrested in the context of the Saada conflict.
On September 24, a credible NGO reported that at least 63 persons
remained arbitrarily detained as a result of the Saada conflict.

According to HRW, among those released in August are former mediation
committee member Shaikh Salih al-Wajman, who had been jailed at the MOI
for two years, and Shaikh Naji Bukhtan and dozens of other detained
Houthi loyalists.

During the year HRW investigated 62 cases of disappearance and arbitrary
arrest linked to the Houthi rebellion. In nearly all of the cases,
arresting officials did not identify themselves or inform the detainee
or his family why he was being arrested and where he was being taken.
The families of persons forcibly disappeared did not know for weeks or
months after their arrest whether their loved ones were alive, who their
captors were, or where their relatives were being held.

Despite the July pause in hostilities, security forces continued to
arbitrarily arrest persons from the conflict areas. Since 2004, an
estimated 130,000 persons have been displaced from their homes in the
northern governorates, although some may have returned since July.
Displaced persons in the capital remained extremely fearful of arrest.
Earlier in the year the government arrested persons who had attempted to
visit recent conflict areas to assess damage to their property or to
bring trapped relatives to safety.

In 2007 approximately 100 individuals from Saada were reportedly
arbitrarily arrested and detained for suspected links with the al-Houthi
movement. Authorities forcibly removed approximately 45 individuals,
including some minors, from Saada and imprisoned them in the neighboring
governorate of Hajja. There were reportedly 50 Saada detainees in Sanaa
and 22 in Dhamar at the end of 2007. During the year, many of these were
released, but others were arrested. Human rights organizations referred
to the Saada arrests as a \"revolving door\" policy. Local NGOs accused
the government of illegal and inhumane treatment of these detainees.

No investigation had been conducted at year\'s end into the Badr Center
intimidation case. In October 2007 the *Yemen Times* reported that 14
military vehicles loaded with security personnel attacked the Badr
Center for Islamic Studies in Sanaa after the head of the center, Dr.
Al-Murtadha al-Mohatwari, demanded the releases of Saada detainees.
Security authorities reportedly destroyed the main gate of the center.

There were no reliable estimates of numbers of rebels and civilians
killed at year\'s end. An estimated 1,000 government troops were killed
and 3,000 wounded in May. International NGOs providing humanitarian
assistance in Saada estimated there were approximately 70,000 internally
displaced persons (IDPs) from the Saada conflict.

In the wake of the Saada conflict, fighting broke out in November
between the al-Osaimat tribe and al-Houthi-aligned Harf Sufian tribe in
Amran governorate and continued through December. According to
unsubstantiated local reports, half or more of the fighters were
children ranging from 12 to 15 years of age.

Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

a\. Freedom of Speech and Press

The constitution provides for freedom of speech and of the press
\"within the limits of the law;\" however, the government did not
respect these rights in practice. The 1990 Press and Publication Law
criminalizes \"the criticism of the person of the head of
state\...\[that\] does not necessarily apply to constructive
criticism,\" the publication of \"false information\" that may spread
\"chaos and confusion in the country,\" and \"false stories intended to
damage Arab and friendly countries or their relations\" with the
country. The country\'s security apparatus, including the NSB and
elements of the military, threatened and harassed journalists to
influence press coverage. Self-censorship was practiced during the year.

The Ministry of Information influenced the media through control of
printing presses, subsidies to newspapers, and ownership of the
country\'s sole television and radio outlets. Three independent
newspapers and no opposition newspapers owned their own presses.
According to the Yemeni Journalist Syndicate (YJS), there were
approximately nine government‑controlled, 50 independent, and 30
party-affiliated newspapers in the country. There were approximately 91
magazines, including 46 private, 27 government-controlled, and 18
party-affiliated magazines. The government selected the items to be
covered in news broadcasts and rarely permitted broadcasts critical of
the government. The government televised parliamentary debates and
occasionally permitted broadcasts of aggressive criticism of ministries.

Press law specifies that newspapers and magazines must apply annually to
the government for licensing renewal and that they must show continuing
evidence of 700,000 riyals (approximately \$4,375) in operating capital.
There were reports that authorities made the registration process
bureaucratically impossible for opposition figures or organizations,
while pro-government or tribal newspapers were said to have received
licenses immediately. Although exact numbers were unavailable during the
year, sources indicated that very few licenses were granted and others
were denied outright.

On March 4, according to a leading human rights organization, the
Ministry of Information instructed printing houses not to print
*Al-Sabah* weekly newspaper in retaliation for its coverage of protests
in the south and for \"criticizing the president.\"

On April 5, Minister of Information Hassan al-Lawzi issued a decree
cancelling the license of *Al-Wasat* newspaper due to its publication of
\"materials prohibited by the law and against the national unity.\"

On April 22, Mohamed al-Maqaleh, editor-in-chief of Ishtiraki.net, was
arrested on charges of humiliating the judge after laughing in court
during the trial of journalist Abdelkrim al-Khaiwani. Al-Maqaleh was
released on August 29.

During the year the Ministry of Information also refused to grant
journalist Fikri Qasim a license to publish the newspaper *Hadith
al-Medina* (Talk of the Town).

In June 2007 the government suspended the text message news service
sponsored by Women Journalists Without Chains (WJWC). The head of WJWC,
Tawwakul Karman, unsuccessfully appealed the decision. The government
instead suspended all text message news services, eventually restoring
all except those of WJWC and the Islah-affiliated Nass Mobile Service.
Karman staged sit-ins throughout the summer of 2007 in an attempt to
overturn the ruling. At year\'s end WJWC\'s news text message service
remained suspended, despite a parliamentary order allowing it to be
reestablished, according to WJWC.

In August 2007 a group of journalists and human rights activists
released a list of individuals and groups responsible for violating
press freedom since 2005. Violations included banning the issuance of
papers, preventing journalists from practicing their duties, shutting
down newspapers, beatings, harassment, and detention. Names of ministers
and heads of government offices were included on the list. In November
2007 during a regional civil society conference in Sanaa where the list
was displayed on a banner, a member of the PSO confiscated the banner
and held it for the remainder of the conference. According to the PSO,
the officer involved did not act on official orders and was reprimanded
for confiscating the banner.

Physical attacks against journalists continued during the year, along
with government harassment, including threats against journalists and
their families, brief imprisonment, and personal surveillance.

Harassment of journalists who reported on the Saada conflict continued
during the year. According to an October HRW report, the government
attempted to prevent news about the details of the Saada conflict from
becoming public by preventing journalists and humanitarian workers from
going to the conflict zone, by disconnecting all but a select number of
mobile telephone numbers in the governorate, by threatening journalists
not to report on the conflict, and by arresting persons who transmitted
information about the impact of the fighting or who could have such
information because they had recently left the area.

On June 30, according to HRW, security forces arrested Lu\'ai
al-Mu\'ayyad, editor of the Web site yemenhurr.net (Free Yemen), where
he published critical reports on the Saada conflict. He was released by
the end of the year.

On July 20, freelance Dutch journalist and videographer Willem Marx,
along with his guide and interpreter, Ali al-Bukhaiti and Muhammad
al-Bukhaiti, was stopped at a checkpoint half an hour outside Sanaa on
their way to Ma\'rib to report on the Saada conflict. They were escorted
back to Sanaa by an intelligence officer and a soldier. Ali and Muhammad
al-Bukhaiti were detained at National Security offices on the outskirts
of Sanaa and Marx was escorted to the airport and summarily deported the
same day. Authorities released Muhammad al-Bukhaiti the week of
September 13, but Ali al-Bukhaiti remained detained at an unknown
location at year\'s end.

On September 24, President Saleh ordered the release from prison of
journalist Abdelkarim al-Khaiwani after he was sentenced to six years in
jail on June 9 on charges of conspiring to overthrow the government and
belonging to an armed group, the \"Sanaa terrorist cell.\" In August
2007 a group of men, reportedly government officials, forcibly removed
al-Khaiwani from the street and put him into a car, where he was beaten.
Al-Khaiwani had been released on bail in July 2007 after authorities
arbitrarily arrested and detained him. Al-Khaiwani was taken to a remote
location in Khawlan district, approximately 9 miles from Sanaa. His
captors allegedly tortured him and threatened that if he continued to
write against his \"masters,\" he and his wife and three children would
be killed. His kidnappers stole his mobile phone and money and left him
in Khawlan, after which he went to the hospital.

The July 2007 case of *Al Shari\'e* newspaper was ongoing at year\'s
end. In July 2007, 10 armed men in two military vehicles broke into the
office of the newly established *Al Shari\'e* newspaper, reportedly
searching for its owners and editors, Nayef Hassan and Nabil Subaie, who
were not there at the time. The intruders allegedly confiscated
electronics. In July 2007 the defense ministry filed a complaint against
*Al Shari\'e* for publishing military secrets in reference to the Saada
investigation. According to the law, cases related to the media are
arbitrated by the Press and Publication Prosecution Office; however,
Subaie and Hassan\'s cases will be tried by the specialized courts for
terrorist-related activity. *Al Shari\'e* is reported to be the first
newspaper to be tried in a specialized criminal court.

No investigation had been conducted at year\'s end into the October 2007
attack on journalist Sadam al-Ashmori, who was attacked by more than 10
men during his coverage of demonstrations at Freedom Square in Sanaa.
Al-Ashmori, who works as a freelance reporter for *The Yemen Times*,
suspected that the attackers were plainclothes security officials.
Police and other security officials who were present claimed they did
not witness the incident.

There were no developments in the following cases: the November 2006
attack and brief detention of al-Jazeera correspondent Ahmad al-Shalafi
and his cameraman, Ali al-Baidhani; the March 2006 abduction and assault
of Qaed al-Tairi, journalist for the Socialist Party weekly *Al-Thawri*;
the April 2006 attack on journalist Abdulfatah al-Hakimi; and the April
2006 reported death threats against Abed al-Mahthari, editor-in-chief of
the independent weekly *Al-Deyar*.

There were no new government cloned newspapers during the year. In a
2005 attempt to counter dissent, elements close to the government or
security apparatus cloned two newspapers, *Al-Shura* and *Al-Thawri*.
The government published newspapers with similar names, fonts, and
colors, but carried more pro-government editorials and stories. The
*Al-Thawri* clone ceased publication in 2005 after several weeks, but
the *Al-Shura* clone continued publishing at year\'s end.

At times, customs officials confiscated foreign publications regarded as
pornographic or objectionable due to religious or political content.
During the year there were some reports that authorities monitored
foreign publications and banned those deemed harmful to national
interests.

Book authors were required to obtain certification from the Ministry of
Culture (MOC) for publication and to submit copies to the ministry.
Publishers sometimes refused to deal with an author who had not yet
obtained certification. Most books were approved, but the process was
time-consuming. There were reports that both the MOC and the PSO
monitored and sometimes removed books from store shelves after
publication. A 2005 ban continued on publishers distributing books that
espoused Zaydi-Shiite Islamic doctrine or were deemed pornographic. The
government denied that the media were subject to censorship by any
security apparatus.

Internet Freedom

The government restricted Internet use by intermittently blocking access
to some political and religious Web sites and to sites deemed immoral.
During the year the government reportedly blocked a number of
independent and opposition news Web sites, such as al-Shura.net and
Ishtiraki.net, and the Web site for the independent weekly *Al-Ayyam*
newspaper. Adenpress.com, a Web site that covered the southern
demonstrations, was intermittently blocked during the year.
Yemenhurra.net, a Web site that covered the Saada conflict, was blocked
at times, and on at least one occasion the content was allegedly changed
by government officials.

The International Telecommunication Union estimated in 2007 that 156,000
of the country\'s population subscribed to the Internet, with 320,000
total users. Many could not afford the Internet, or were unfamiliar with
the equipment and services needed to access it. The government limited
the Internet content its citizens could access, using commercially
available filtering technology and by controlling its two Internet
service providers, TeleYemen (operators of the service YNET) and
YemenNet, through the Ministry of Telecommunications and Information
Technology. Human rights and other NGOs complained that the government
restricted what journalists could write and how citizens used the
Internet through a variety of intimidation tactics. Limited Internet
access was available from homes or Internet cafes in major urban areas.

Academic Freedom and Cultural Events

The government restricted academic freedom, claiming it was necessary
due to the politicization of university campuses. Political parties
frequently attempted to influence academic appointments, as well as
university faculty and student elections. During the year security
officials were present on university campuses and at intellectual fora.
PSO representatives had permanent offices on the campuses. Government
informers monitored the activities of professors and students,
especially those who were alleged affiliates of opposition parties.
Authorities reviewed prospective university professors and
administrators for political acceptability before hiring them, and
favoritism was commonly shown toward affiliates or supporters of the
ruling General People\'s Congress (GPC) party.

A 2005 ban was intermittently enforced on new student associations at
Sanaa University. Opposition sources contended that this regulation was
not enforced against GPC-affiliated organizations.

b\. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association

Freedom of Assembly

The law provides for freedom of assembly; however, the government
limited this right in practice. The government required a permit for
demonstrations, which it issued routinely. Government informers
monitored many meetings and assemblies.

The government banned and disrupted some demonstrations, allegedly to
prevent them from degenerating into riots and violence.

On January 13, security authorities violently broke up a demonstration
in Aden by southern military retirees, unemployed youth and opposition
figures. According to a leading local human rights NGO, the government
reacted with tear gas and live bullets, leading to three deaths, 10
injured, and 27 detained.

On March 30, a sit-in in Dhale\' of more than 200 young men protesting
the lack of acceptance of southerners into military service was broken
up by security authorities with live bullets and tear gas. No deaths or
injuries were reported.

On April 6, the opposition coalition Joint Meeting Parties organized a
sit-in in Taiz in solidarity with arrested artist Fahd al-Qarni and with
those detained in previous demonstrations. This led to the arrest of 10
protestors, who were released the same day.

On April 8, civil society organizations attempted a sit-in in Sanaa to
demand the right of freedom of assembly and in solidarity with those
detained in relation to the southern movement and the Saada conflict.
Security apparatuses, however, blocked access to Freedom Square, the
location of the sit-in, and prevented the sit-in from taking place.

On July 7, massive rallies organized by southern activists took place in
Aden and Dhale\' in which protesters demanded, according to a human
rights NGO, \"the lifting of the northern military campaign from the
southern governorates.\" Security authorities dispersed the crowds with
tear gas and live bullets, and increased the presence of security in
southern governorates, including additional roadblocks and checkpoints
in Aden. According to a leading human rights NGO, a wide arrest campaign
followed in which 306 protesters were detained in Aden, 18 protesters
were detained in Dhale\', and numerous others were wounded. The same NGO
reported that all detainees were released from confinement in September
and October.

In August 2007 clashes occurred between security forces and students
enrolling at Sanaa University, with one student reported injured and
taken to the hospital after a security official beat him on the head
with the back of his pistol. Reportedly the incident coincided with
student protests against the admissions committee at the Faculty of
Trading and Commerce, accusing the faculty of distorting the admissions
process.

After the 1994 civil war, the northern government forced thousands of
southern military and civilian officials to retire. These individuals
have continued to demand reintegration compensation and other redress
and were especially active in 2007. Their movement expanded throughout
the year with significant southern political support.

Freedom of Association

The law provides for freedom of association, and the government
nominally respected this right in practice; however, the ruling party
retained control of professional associations by influencing internal
elections and subsidies. According to local observers, there were
approximately 20 legally recognized NGOs independent of the ruling party
operating in the country.

All associations, including NGOs, are required to register annually with
one of four ministries: Social Affairs and Labor (MSAL), Culture,
Education, or Vocational Training and Technical Education. The
government cooperated to varying degrees depending on the issues with
legally recognized NGOs, which by law were provided with an annual
stipend. Some ministries reportedly harassed NGOs critical of the
government by denying their annual registration and subsidy. For
example, the Yemeni Journalist Syndicate (YSJ) reported it had not been
issued its stipend for the year. The MSAL also refused to register Women
Journalists Without Chains (WJWC) or HOOD, both NGOS that were often
critical of the government.

All political parties must be registered in accordance with the
Political Parties Law, which stipulates that each party must have at
least 75 founders, verified in a court of law, and 2,500 members. In
March 2007 the opposition al-Haq Party was dissolved for reportedly
violating the Political Parties Law. However, civil society observers
claim the party was abolished due to its affiliation with the al-Houthi
rebels and for its Zaydi appeal. There were no political parties
dissolved during the year.

c\. Freedom of Religion

Neither the constitution nor other laws protect or inhibit freedom of
religion. The government generally respected religious freedom in
practice; however, there were numerous violations and restrictions. The
constitution declares that Islam is the state religion and that Shari\'a
is the source of all legislation.

Government actions to counter the increase in political violence
restricted some religious practice. The government took actions to
counter the increase in political violence as a result of the uprisings
by the al-Houthi rebels in the northern Saada governorate. Unlike the
four previous years, the government allowed the people of Saada to
celebrate Ghadeer Day, a holiday celebrated by some Shia. However, media
outlets reported that government officials used the occasion to arrest
individuals allegedly associated with the Houthis. According to an
October HRW report, the government cracked down on Hashemite preachers
and scholars in Zaidi religious institutions and mosques, apparently
conflating the religious motivations that gave rise to the original
Believing Youth movement with armed rebellion. HRW in October documented
14 cases of arrests where Hashemite identity or one\'s profession as a
Hashemite scholar or preacher appeared to be the paramount reason for
the arrest.

The government also reportedly limited the hours that mosques were
permitted to be open to the public and reassigned some imams who were
thought to espouse Shia ideology or Zaydi doctrine, replacing them with
Shafi\'i or Salafi preachers.

Non-Muslims were free to worship according to their beliefs and to wear
religiously distinctive ornaments or dress; however, Shari\'a, as
interpreted by the government, forbids conversion from Islam and
prohibits non‑Muslims from proselytizing. The government enforced this
prohibition. The government required permission for the construction of
all places of worship and the constitution prohibited non‑Muslims from
being elected to the presidency or parliament. Non-Muslim citizens may
vote but may not hold elected office.

Under the government\'s interpretation of Islam, the conversion of a
Muslim to another religion is considered apostasy, which the government
considers a crime punishable by death. There were reports of arrests in
cases related to proselytizing or apostasy during the year.

In June a convert to Christianity and two of his associates were
reportedly arrested in Hodeida for \"promoting Christianity and
distributing the Bible.\" They were allegedly transferred by the
authorities to a jail in Sanaa. Four other associates who evaded capture
were also sought by the authorities. No further information was
available at year\'s end.

On June 20, seven Baha\'is (two Yemenis, four Iranians, and one Iraqi)
were arrested in their homes during raids by police. The two Yemenis
were subsequently released. The government released the four foreign
detainees in October and gave them two months to leave the country or
face deportation. The Baha\'is remained in the country at year\'s end.

Official policy does not prohibit or prescribe punishment for the
possession of non‑Islamic religious literature; however, in previous
years there were reports of persons being harassed and temporarily
detained for possession of religious materials with the intent to
proselytize.

Catholic, Protestant, Ethiopian Orthodox Christian, Jewish, and Baha\'i
services were held without government interference.

Public schools provided instruction in Islam, but not in other
religions; however, most non‑Muslims were foreigners who attended
private schools. Jewish citizens also had private schools where Hebrew
and Judaism were taught.

In 2007 the government shuttered 1,500 schools, bringing to 4,500 the
total number of schools closed because they were deemed to have deviated
from educational requirements or promoted militant ideology. At the same
time, the Ministry of Endowments and Religious Guidance reportedly
opened government-approved schools in the areas where schools had been
closed. Private and national schools were prohibited from teaching
courses outside the officially approved curriculum. The Ministry of
Endowments and Religious Guidance indicated that an unknown number of
school closures continued throughout the year.

The government also deported foreign students found studying in
unlicensed religious schools. There were credible reports that
authorities banned publishing of some materials that promoted
Zaydi-Shiite Islam.

The Ministry of Endowments and Religious Guidance reported that it
conducted several training sessions and workshops targeted at imams and
other religious clerics with the goal of promoting moderation and
tolerance.

Societal Abuses and Discrimination

There were isolated incidents of anti-Semitism. In January 2007 the
historic Saada community of 45 Jews was relocated to Sanaa after being
threatened by a follower of the al-Houthis. Since fleeing their homes,
the community has been under government protection in Sanaa. In April a
large group of men entered, ransacked, and destroyed two homes in Saada
governorate belonging to a member of the Jewish community now living in
Sanaa. The attack was believed to have been the work of al-Houthi
rebels.

Jewish residents of Rayda and Bait Harrash in Amran governorate
experienced increased acts of violence, threats, and harassment by their
Muslim neighbors. In one case, a bullet was fired into a water tank on
the roof of one of the community\'s homes while a member of the family
was on the roof. Government authorities investigated the case and
arrested the perpetrator, who remained incarcerated at year\'s end.

On December 11, Moshe Yaish Nahari, a prominent community member and
teacher in Reyda, was murdered, allegedly by a religious extremist. The
man accused of the murder was immediately arrested and his trial was
ongoing at year\'s end.

In the weeks following the murder, the Reyda Jews reportedly could not
leave their homes and Jewish children stopped going to school for fear
of further violence. On December 14, an explosive device was thrown at a
Jewish home.

Jewish citizens, who number fewer than 500 in the country, are excluded
from certain occupations by social pressures and are not eligible to
serve in the military or federal government. A General Election
Committee policy bars all non‑Muslims from running for parliament.

Following the January commencement of the third phase of fighting
between the al-Houthi rebels and the government, some Zaydis reported
harassment and discrimination by the government. Authorities reportedly
targeted and harassed Sayyid Zaydi families, who are believed to be
descendants of the Prophet Muhammad.

In Dhamar, celebrations of al-Ghadeer, a Shia holiday, in late December
resulted in violent clashes that left four killed and six injured.

For a more detailed discussion, see the *2008 International Religious
Freedom Report* at www.state.gov/g/drl/irf/rpt.

d\. Freedom of Movement, Internally Displaced Persons, Protection of
Refugees, and Stateless Persons

The law provides for these rights, and the government respected them
with some restrictions. The government limited the movement of women,
foreigners, and tourists. The two latter groups were required to obtain
government permission before leaving the country. In practice the
government did not obstruct domestic travel; however, the army and
security forces maintained checkpoints on major roads. Internally
displaced persons were a problem.

In certain areas armed tribesmen occasionally manned their own
checkpoints or operated alongside military or security officials and
subjected travelers to physical harassment, extortion, or theft.

Although not required by law, government officials customarily asked
women if they had permission from a male relative before applying for a
passport or leaving the country. One women\'s rights NGO asserted that a
husband or male relative could bar a woman from leaving the country, and
that this requirement was strictly enforced when women traveled with
children. During the year there were several reports of women who were
turned away at the airport because they did not have the permission of
or were not accompanied by a male relative.

Immigrants and refugees traveling within the country often were required
by security officials at government checkpoints to show that they
possessed resident status or refugee identification cards.

The law prohibits forced exile, and there were no reports of forced
exile during the year.

During the year the government continued to deport an unknown number of
foreigners who were studying at Muslim religious schools and believed to
be in the country illegally. The government claimed these persons were
suspected of inciting violence or engaging in criminal acts by promoting
religious extremism. The government used existing laws to require
foreigners to register with police or immigration authorities within one
month of arrival.

Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)

The fifth round of fighting in the four-year conflict in Saada between
the government and the group of rebels led by Abdul-Malik al-Houthi
broke out in May. Fighting continued until the government declared a
ceasefire in July. At the height of the fighting, HRW estimated there
were as many as 70,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Saada
governorate. Most IDPs lived in camps or with family in Saada City, the
regional capital. The government and the al-Houthi rebels, who still
controlled territory in Saada, limited access to the region, preventing
food and medical supplies from reaching many IDPs. After the end of
fighting in July, some IDPs were able to return to their homes, but
thousands remained in camps for fear of retaliation from the al-Houthi
rebels, according to the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR). The UNHCR also said IDP children showed signs of chronic
malnourishment and did not attend school.

Protection of Refugees

The government does not have a national law addressing the granting of
refugee status or asylum in accordance with the UN 1951 Convention
relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 protocol, and the
government has not established a system for providing protection to
refugees. In practice, the government sometimes provided protection
against refoulement, the return of persons to a country where there is
reason to believe they feared persecution. The government continued to
grant prima facie refugee status to Somalis who arrived in the country
after 1991. Non-Somali asylum-seekers must go through an individualized
refugee status determination conducted by the UNHCR, as the government
has no ability to conduct refugee status determinations on its own.
Since 2007 the government has challenged the ability of the UNHCR to
perform refugee status determinations for non-Somalis. Immigration
authorities have deported some non-Somalis without giving UNHCR access
to conduct screenings.

The government continued to provide temporary protection for thousands
of individuals from Iraq and the Darfur region of Sudan who may not
qualify as refugees under the 1951 Convention and its 1967 protocol,
although there were some reports of deportations. There were continued
reports that some Iraqis were blocked from reuniting with their families
because they had been denied readmission into the country.

Generally, refugees were allowed to work and travel freely within the
country, although they faced some difficulties. There were reports of
refugees refused employment or passage at checkpoints because they
lacked legal documentation. Refugee children attended local schools,
although facilities were limited and could not meet the demand in full.

In 2005 the government and UNHCR signed a memorandum of understanding to
establish six registration centers to register and provide greater legal
protection to refugees. Currently, only one of these centers, located in
Sanaa, has been established. The center has yet to open, awaiting
approval from the government. UNHCR operates three reception centers in
the south of the country, the newest of which opened in March. The
harassment and abuse by security forces at a Somali refugee camp in 2006
has been improved by the replacement of the head of the security force.
Some potential asylum-seekers have been imprisoned while their status
determinations were pending with UNHCR. UNHCR had uneven access to these
refugees, but refugees were generally released from prison upon the
completion of UNHCR processing.

Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to Change
Their Government

The law provides citizens with the right to change their government
peacefully through periodic elections based on universal suffrage;
however, there were limitations in practice. Decision-making and
effective powers were held by the president, who has been in office
since 1978. The president appoints the prime minister, who presides over
a 35-member cabinet chosen by the president. The latest cabinet
reshuffle occurred on May 19. In practice the president, in association
with the ruling GPC party dominated the government. The parliament, in
which three parties were represented, was not an effective counterweight
to the executive branch and can be dissolved by the president.

Elections and Political Parties

After several months of negotiations between the ruling GPC party and
the opposition Joint Meeting Parties (JMP), the Supreme Commission for
Elections and Referendum (SCER)\--the body charged with conducting the
April 2009 parliamentary elections\--was announced in a controversial
parliamentary session on August 25. The three JMP members of the SCER, a
nine-member body, refused their appointments. In August the SCER began
preparing for the April 2009 elections without the participation of the
JMP, who at year\'s end continued to assert the illegality of the SCER
and its actions. Nationwide voter registration took place in November
with a boycott by supporters of the JMP. Violent protests occurred in
some southern governorates.

On May 17, governors of the 21 jurisdictions were elected by a vote of
each jurisdiction\'s local council. The election of governors, who
previously were appointed by the president, was an important step toward
the decentralization of power. The dominance of the ruling party in the
majority of the local councils, however, meant that these elections did
not appreciably reduce ruling party influence. This situation was
exacerbated by an opposition boycott.

According to a report by an international NGO, the September 2007
by-elections in Aden and Ibb were conducted in a generally peaceful and
orderly manner with only a few violations. The voting and counting were
generally considered to have been fair and efficient; however, there
were some delays in opening and closing female sub-committees within
voting centers. There were also numerous instances of confusion
regarding the voting procedures, especially among illiterate and elderly
voters. The report stated that some candidates wrongly used public
resources to fund their campaigns, and campaigning continued on election
day and in some cases within the polling stations. Military personnel
were also employed as members of the field commissions.

According to local and international observers, the September 2006
presidential and local council elections were considered open and
competitive and a marked improvement over previous elections. For the
first time opposition candidates contested the presidential elections
and had equal coverage on government-owned broadcast and print media.
There were problems, however, with voter registration, redistricting,
ballot counting, isolated incidents of election-related violence, and
use of state resources on behalf of the ruling party.

Ali Abdullah Saleh was elected to a seven‑year term in this election,
the country\'s second nationwide direct presidential race, securing 77
percent of the votes. Faisal bin Shamlan, candidate of the opposition
coalition JMP, gained 22 percent. The remaining three opposition and
independent candidates had less than one percent each. According to the
SCER, approximately 65 percent of eligible voters participated in the
elections. Approximately 42 percent of the voters were women. The
constitution provides that the president is elected by popular vote from
among at least two candidates endorsed by parliament.

International NGOs and the European Union Observer Mission characterized
polling as an important and unprecedented step in the country\'s
democratic development. In its final post-election report, the EU noted
that the GPC had an unfair electoral advantage because significant state
resources were put at the disposal of GPC candidates for use during
their campaigns. Opposition parties, while regretting irregularities,
also hailed the elections as the first genuinely competitive contest in
the country\'s history. Unlike in previous years, international and
local observers did not report significant difficulties in accessing
voting centers or filing their reports.

An international NGO reported that the voter registration process
conducted in April 2006 was marred by poorly trained administrative
staff, registration of a large number of underage voters, and
interference by security officials. Local NGOs also alleged that
deceased citizens were registered as voters. The international NGO
reported that the opposition coalition JMP refused to participate in the
voter registration process due to allegations of bias on the part of the
SCER, which conducted voter registration. The SCER therefore recruited
staff members on short notice and was not able to provide them with
meaningful training before voter registration began.

In 2006 the JMP and the GPC agreed on several items of contention,
including the formation of a joint committee to review voter lists with
the SCER and decide which names needed to be removed due to technical
errors. Although the SCER requested that the courts expunge more than
200,000 names identified as underage or duplicate voters, a searchable
electronic copy of the registration list was never provided to
opposition parties or local constituencies so they could verify voter
lists before the election. There were reports that the SCER mistakenly
removed eligible voters from lists in several constituencies.

In addition, many constituencies were redistricted a month before the
election in a manner that was not transparent to the public,
international observers, or opposition parties. Independent and
opposition observers noted that redistricting resulted in the allocation
of more local council representatives for constituencies that were
viewed as progovernment.

Whereas ballot counting for the presidential election was reported to be
generally fair and accurate, there were numerous reports that ballots
for the local council elections went uncounted in some constituencies or
were not secured after the count, rendering a recount or inspection of
the ballots impossible.

Election-related violence during the 30-day campaign period and on
election day was markedly lower than in previous elections. The SCER
reported that seven people were killed in election-related violence.
There were no reports that government security agents killed anyone in
election-related incidents.

The law mandates that political parties be viable national organizations
that cannot restrict their membership to a particular region. The
constitution prohibits the establishment of parties that are contrary to
Islam, \"oppose the goals of the country\'s revolution,\" or violate the
country\'s international commitments.

The law stipulates that each party have at least 75 founders and 2,500
members. Parties based on regional, tribal, sectarian, class,
professional, gender, or racial identities are not permitted. Candidates
from any party may declare their candidacy for elections. The government
provided financial support to most of the 23 political parties,
including a small stipend to publish party newspapers.

The ruling GPC has been the dominant party since unification of the
country and controls 238 of the 301 seats in parliament (elected in
2003). Islah is the largest opposition party, and it controls 46 seats.
At times tribalism distorted political participation and influenced the
central government\'s composition. Observers noted that persons were
often selected to run for office or given jobs in particular ministries
based on their tribal affiliations. Because tribal areas were still run
by patriarchal systems, some tribal leaders reportedly influenced tribal
members to vote for certain candidates.

Although there were no formal restrictions limiting opposition
participation, the government made it difficult for some parties to
organize. At year\'s end the government continued to hold substantial
assets of the opposition Yemeni Socialist Party, including land and
buildings, which were seized after the 1994 civil war. In 2005 the
president publicly accused two minor parties of attempting to overthrow
the government by fomenting the al-Houthi uprising. The headquarters of
the Union for Popular Forces was seized by armed men and the party was
forcibly recreated under dubious circumstances.

In 2007 the government dissolved the al-Haq Party for reportedly
violating the Political Parties Law. However, civil society observers
claim the party was abolished due to its affiliation with the al-Houthi
rebels and for its Zaydi appeal.

Women voted and held office; however, increasingly conservative cultural
norms rooted in tribal traditions and patriarchal religious
interpretation often limited their exercise of these rights. There was
one woman in the 301-seat parliament. There were three women in the
cabinet, including the minister of human rights, the minister of social
affairs and labor, and a Supreme Court justice. In 2005 the SCER
established a Women\'s Department responsible for addressing gender
equality in the electoral process. The department conducted
informational campaigns on the importance and mechanism of voting prior
to the 2006 elections. In the elections, 164 women ran for and 38 won
seats on local and provincial councils. Women\'s rights activists and
female parliamentary candidates accused the ruling party and the
authorities of rigging the elections against women.

Many members of the Akhdam community, a small ethnic minority descended
from east Africans, did not participate in the political process due to
socioeconomic factors and discrimination. There were no members of
minority groups in parliament or the cabinet. There were no reports that
persons with disabilities were prohibited from participating in the
political process.

Government Corruption and Transparency

The law provides criminal penalties for official corruption; however,
the government did not implement the law effectively, and officials
frequently engaged in corrupt practices with impunity. The World Bank\'s
Worldwide Governance Indicators reflected that there is a serious
corruption problem, and a perception of corruption in every branch and
level of government was widespread. Government officials and
parliamentarians were presumed to benefit from insider arrangements and
embezzlement. Procurement was a regular source of corruption in the
executive branch.

In 2006 the Central Organization for Control and Audit (COCA), the
country\'s investigative body for corruption, reported that between its
creation in 1999 and 2005, COCA had investigated 518 official cases of
corruption, of which 361 were filed with COCA in 2005. The cases
represented a loss to the treasury of 4.8 billion riyals (approximately
\$24.7 million). At year\'s end, of the 518 cases, 490 had been sent to
the judiciary for action, and the remaining 28 cases were still under
consideration. COCA\'s reports were rendered to the parliament but were
not accessible to the general public. Only low-ranking officials have
been prosecuted for corruption since COCA\'s inception. The actual
number of corruption cases was generally considered to be significantly
higher than what was reported by COCA.

Petty corruption was widely reported in nearly every government office.
Job candidates were often expected to purchase their positions. Tax
inspectors were reported to undervalue their assessments and pocket the
difference. Many government officials received salaries for jobs they
did not perform or multiple salaries for the same job.

In 2006 the president ratified an anticorruption law, creating the first
Supreme National Authority for Combating Corruption (SNACC), a new
independent authority to investigate cases of official corruption. The
authority includes a council of government, civil society, and private
sector representatives.

In June 2007 parliament elected 11 members to the SNACC, whose chair and
deputy chair will serve a two-and-a-half-year term and can serve another
two-and-a-half-year term, subject to SNACC consent, whereas regular
SNACC members can serve only one five-year term. In July 2007 President
Saleh signed a decree officially establishing SNACC and chaired SNACC\'s
first meeting. SNACC elected former Minister of Telecommunications Ahmed
al-Anesi as chair and Sanaa University associate professor of political
science Bilquis al-Osbo\'a as deputy chair.

In early June 2007 the local authority fired Director General of Taxes
Hussein Ali al-Ameer, Director General of Public Health and Population
Fadhl Muhammad al-Akwa\'a, and Director General of Electricity Ahmad
Sailan on charges of corruption in the Dhammar province.

The law requires a degree of transparency and public access to
information, and the Press and Publications Law provides for journalists
to have some access to government reports and information; in practice
the government offered few procedures to ensure transparency. In 2006
parliament passed a law requiring public disclosure of government
officials\' assets, and the SNACC worked to implement this during the
year. The government provided limited information on Internet sites;
however, few citizens had access to the Internet.

Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights

Domestic and international human rights groups operated with varying
degrees of government restriction, generally investigating and
publishing their findings on human rights cases with little constraint.
NGOs reported that government officials were not always cooperative and
responsive to their views. The Law for Associations and Foundations
regulates the formation and activities of NGOs. This law exempts NGOs
from taxes and tariffs and requires the government to provide a reason
for denying an NGO registration. However, it also requires that any
organization have at least 41 members in order to continue operations
and forbids them from involvement in political activities.

The law permits some foreign funding of NGOs and requires government
observation of NGO internal elections. During the year the MOHR
sponsored several initiatives to advance cooperation with local NGOs
such as the Yemeni Women\'s Union (YWU) and the Violence Against Women
network.

Domestic human rights NGOs operated throughout the year. Although
progovernment NGOs were supported by the government or ruling party,
others were clearly supported by opposition parties or were fully
independent. Some of the most active included the Human Rights
Information and Training Center, HOOD, the Yemen Observatory for Human
Rights, the Democracy School, Media Women Forum, and the Arab Sisters
Forum for Human Rights.

Some NGOs practiced self‑censorship. Some ministries reportedly harassed
NGOs critical of the government by delaying the procedures required for
annual registration and licensing and through bureaucratic funding
criteria. In 2007 the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor (MSAL)
refused to reissue the license for the Arab Sisters Forum for Human
Rights due to its criticism of the government for limiting press
freedom. The group received a temporary two-year license from the
government during the year. The government requires NGOs to register
annually or be declared illegal. However, NGOs that were not granted
licenses continued to operate during the year. WJWC did not receive a
license during the year. In some instances the government reportedly
registered a progovernment clone version of an NGO, recognizing the
clone as the legitimate NGO, thereby preventing the original NGO from
renewing its registration under its original name. In such cases
registration applications must be refiled under a new name. The
government reportedly did not process some registration applications and
placed unofficial freezes on new licenses ahead of the September 2007
by-elections.

The government monitored NGO finances. The government reportedly used
financial reviews as a pretext to harass or close NGOs, and some NGOs
allegedly kept less than transparent records.

The government provided Amnesty International (AI), HRW, the Parliament
of the EU, and The Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) limited access
to records, detention centers, and prisons. The ICRC maintained a
resident office to inspect prisons during the year, although access to
PSO prisons was suspended. ICRC also carried out humanitarian missions
in Saada to support displaced populations during the war. Both ICRC and
the Islamic Relief and the UN World Food Program continued to provide
humanitarian assistance to Saada\'s displaced population. ICRC did not
face governmental restrictions in providing humanitarian assistance;
however, because of the dangerous security situation in Saada, it was
unable to respond to emergencies in an adequate manner.

The MOHR attempted to raise awareness of human rights via public
information campaigns, training of civil society organizations in how to
prepare reports, and participation in numerous conferences in
cooperation with NGOs. The MOHR also donated computers to orphanages and
juvenile centers during the year. The MOHR also succeeded in having the
country ratify the Arab Charter on Human Rights and presented several
regular reports regarding its international commitments, such as a
report on economic, social and cultural rights, and an antiviolence
report.

During the year the parliament\'s committee on human rights was largely
inactive, as was the consultative council\'s committee on human rights.

Section 5 Discrimination, Societal Abuses, and Trafficking in Persons

The law provides for equal rights and equal opportunity for all
citizens; however, the government did not effectively enforce the law.
Discrimination based on race, gender, and disability remained a serious
problem. Entrenched patriarchal cultural attitudes limited women\'s
ability to access equal rights.

Women

The law criminalizes rape, but the government did not effectively
enforce the law. The punishment for rape is imprisonment for up to 15
years; however, by year\'s end, this had not been imposed in any rape
case. The rape victim was often prosecuted on charges of fornication
after the perpetrator was set free. According to the law, the accused
must confess or the defense needs to provide four female or two male
witnesses to the crime. The government has yet to introduce DNA
technology to criminal rape cases, and without witnesses cases were
difficult to prosecute. Rape cases were also often hindered by excessive
corruption. A leading local women\'s rights organization asserted that
the judicial system fails to bring justice to victims of rape.

According to the law, a woman may not refuse sexual relations with her
husband; accordingly, spousal rape is not criminalized. There are no
reliable statistics on the number of rapes. Most women do not come
forward, often remaining silent in fear of shaming the family and
incurring violent retaliation.

The 2003 rape case of Anisa al-Shuaibi was ongoing at year\'s end.
During the year al-Shuaibi claimed she was attacked by unidentified
assailants who threw stones at her. She was also offered a bribe to drop
her case. Al-Shuaibi continued to receive threats on her life and those
of her children at year\'s end. In April a judge convicted one of her
three assailants, whose prison sentence was postponed. Al-Shuaibi was
also awarded one million riyals (approximately \$4,994) as compensation.
At year\'s end an appeals process was ongoing. The CID detained
Al-Shuaibi in 2003 with her two children and charged her with the
kidnapping and murder of her husband, who was later found alive.
According to her lawyers, al-Shuaibi was detained illegally for 38 days
in a CID jail, where she was raped and tortured by two high-level CID
officers.

The law provides women with protection against violence; however, the
law was rarely enforced. Although spousal abuse occurred, it generally
was undocumented. Violence against women and children was considered a
family affair and usually went unreported to the police. Due to social
norms and customs, an abused woman was expected to take her complaint to
a male relative (rather than to the authorities) to intercede on her
behalf or provide her sanctuary, to avoid making the abuse public and
shaming the family.

A small shelter for battered women in Aden assisted victims, and
telephone hotlines operated with moderate success in Aden and Sanaa. The
MOHR announced in April 2007 it was launching a nationwide hotline to
receive complaints on abuses of human rights; it was unclear how many
domestic violence cases the MOHR hotline received. Hotline service was
interrupted due to technical difficulties, but the MOHR reported work
was under way to reactivate it as of the end of year.

The press, women\'s rights activists, and the MOHR continued to
investigate and report on violations of women\'s rights. During the year
NGOs sponsored several women\'s rights conferences dealing with issues
such as violence against women, increasing the political representation
of women, and economic empowerment.

The penal code allows leniency for persons guilty of committing a
\"crime against honor,\" a violent assault or killing committed against
females for perceived immodest or defiant behavior. However, the law
does not address other types of honor crimes, including beatings, forced
isolation, imprisonment, forced early marriage, and deprivation of
education. Legal provisions regarding violence against women state that
a convicted man should be put to death for killing a woman. However, a
husband who kills his wife and her lover may be fined or imprisoned for
one year or less. In June a government report disclosed 2,964 cases in
2007 of violence against women. Of those cases, 130 resulted in death,
and 970 in injuries.

Prostitution is illegal; however, it was a problem, particularly in Aden
and Sanaa. The punishment for prostitution is imprisonment for up to
three years or a fine. The MOI and PSO tolerated and unofficially
facilitated prostitution and sex tourism through corruption for
financial and operational gain. Although no laws addressed sex tourism,
it was a problem, particularly in Aden and Sanaa.

There are no laws prohibiting sexual harassment, which occurred both in
the workplace and in the streets.

Social custom and local interpretation of Shari\'a discriminated against
women. Men were permitted to take as many as four wives. There was no
minimum age of marriage, and some girls married as young as age eight.

A husband may divorce a wife without justifying the action in court. A
woman has the legal right to divorce; however, she must provide a
justification, and there are a number of negative practical, social, and
financial considerations that impede women from obtaining a divorce.

Women who seek to travel abroad must customarily obtain permission from
their husbands or fathers to receive a passport and to travel. Male
relatives were expected to accompany women when traveling
internationally; however, enforcement of this requirement was not
consistent. Some women reported they traveled freely without male
escorts.

Some interpretations of Shari\'a prohibit a Muslim woman from marrying a
non‑Muslim man; however, a Muslim man is allowed to marry a non‑Muslim
woman. Women do not have the right to confer citizenship on their
foreign‑born spouses, but they may confer citizenship on children born
of a foreign-born father if the father dies or abandons the child. The
foreign wife of a male citizen must remain in the country for two years
to obtain a residence permit.

According to a MOI regulation, any citizen who wishes to marry a
foreigner must obtain the permission of the ministry. A woman wishing to
marry a foreigner must present to the MOI proof of her parents\'
approval. A foreign woman who wishes to marry a male citizen must prove
to the ministry that she is \"of good conduct and behavior\" and \"is
free from contagious disease.\"

According to a 2006 Ministry of Public Health and Population survey,
approximately 65 percent of ever-married women were illiterate. A 2004
Central Statistics Organization census estimated male illiteracy at 27
percent. The high illiteracy rate had a significant effect on women\'s
participation in the 2006 elections, limiting access to information on
campaigns and political rights. Election observers also noted that
illiteracy helped to perpetuate the belief that women were incapable of
holding public office. The fertility rate was 6.41 children per woman.
Most women had little access to basic health care.

In general women in the south, particularly in Aden, were better
educated and had somewhat greater employment opportunities than their
northern counterparts. However, since the 1994 war of secession, the
number of women in government in the south has declined, due to
conservative cultural pressure from the north and stagnation of the
economy. According to the UN Development Program, female workers
accounted for 29.7 percent of the paid labor force in 2005.

The law stipulates that women are equal to men in employment rights;
however, female activists and NGOs reported that discrimination was a
common practice in the public and private sectors. Mechanisms to enforce
equal protection were weak or nonexistent.

According to the MSAL there were more than 170 NGOs working for women\'s
advancement. The Arab Sisters Forum for Human Rights worked with other
NGOs, the government, and donor countries to strengthen women\'s
political participation. The Yemeni Women\'s Union and Women\'s National
Committee (WNC) conducted workshops on women\'s rights. The Arab Sisters
Forum, with funding from the Netherlands, set up a four-year project
aimed at providing protection against violence for women and children.
This project plans to include lawyers who will handle cases of violence,
a hotline to report sexual harassment against women and children, and a
shelter to provide assistance to victims.

Children

The government lacked the political will and necessary resources to
ensure adequate education, health care, and welfare services for
children. The law provides for universal, compulsory, and free education
from age six to 15 years; however, compulsory attendance was not
enforced and books and school uniforms raised the cost of attendance to
about 2,000 riyals (approximately \$10) per student per year, which some
parents could not afford. Public schooling was available to children
through the secondary school level. Attendance was mandatory through the
ninth grade; however, many children, especially girls, did not attend
primary school. According to 2006 government statistics, average student
attendance in primary schools was 81.6 percent for boys and 61.7 percent
for girls. The 2007 Community, Habitat and Finance (CHF) ACCESS-MENA
report stated that 55 percent of children between the ages of six and 15
did not attend school.

The law provides for free medical care for children who hold
citizenship; however, this was not always enforced. Malnutrition was
common. According to 2008 UN Children\'s Fund (UNICEF) statistics, the
infant mortality rate was 75 deaths per 1,000 births. Male children
received preferential treatment and had better health and survival
rates.

In 2007 hundreds of children reportedly marched in front of government
buildings in Sanaa demanding more financial aid to solve their health,
education, nutrition, child labor, and trafficking problems. The
participants of the march, which was organized by local NGO Democracy
School and was attended by children\'s rights activists, submitted a
letter to the prime minister requesting that the government fulfill its
promises of offering free education and health services to children.

The law prohibits female genital mutilation (FGM); however, it was a
pervasive practice in the coastal areas on infants before they reach 40
days of age. Although government health workers and officials
discouraged the practice, women\'s groups reported FGM rates as high as
90 percent in some coastal areas, such as Mahara and Hodeida. The WNC
and the Ministry of Endowments and Religious Guidance provided a manual
for religious leaders on women\'s health issues, including the negative
health consequences of FGM.

Child marriage was a significant problem in the country. There was no
minimum age of marriage and many girls were married as young as age
eight. A law setting the minimum age for marriage as 15 years was
revoked in 1998, and multiple attempts to reinstate the law have failed
in parliament. The law does have a provision that forbids sex with
underage brides until they are \"suitable for sexual intercourse,\" an
age that is undefined. An OXFAM study calculated that among 1,495
couples, 52.1 percent of women and 6.7 percent of men were married at an
early age. The report also highlighted that 15 to 16 years is generally
considered the appropriate age of marriage for girls. This varied,
however, depending on region and socioeconomic status. According to the
MSAL, the government did not promote public awareness campaigns on the
negative effects of child marriage due to the cultural sensitivity of
the issue.

Stories that broke in the media during the year highlighted the problem
of child marriage in the country. Nujoud and Arwa, nine and eight years
old respectively, were forced to marry men in their 30s and subsequently
obtained divorces after months of severe sexual and physical abuse.
Reem, a 12-year-old girl who was forced into marriage by her father, was
still attempting to obtain a divorce at year\'s end.

Married boys, ages 12 to 15 years, were reportedly involved in armed
conflict beginning in November in Amran governorate between the Harf
Sufian and al-Osaimat tribes. Local customs in tribal areas reportedly
dictated that when a boy is married he is an adult and owes allegiance
to his tribe.

The law does not define nor prohibit child abuse, and there was no
reliable data on the extent of child abuse.

Trafficking in Persons

The law does not explicitly address or prohibit trafficking in persons,
but other sections of the country\'s criminal code can be applied to
prosecute trafficking offenses. The country is a point of origin for
children, mostly boys, who are trafficked for forced begging, unskilled
labor, and street vending.

There were no reports of underage internal sex trafficking during the
year. However, according to a local human rights NGO, an unknown number
of women, including those under the age of legal consent, were
trafficked from their homes to other regions within the country for the
purposes of prostitution. For example, there were reports that two
underage girls, one in 2005 and one in 2006, were trafficked into
prostitution in Aden after fleeing abusive homes or forced marriages in
the northern governorates.

There were no official statistics available on the number of children
trafficked out of the country. Press and NGO reports claimed children
mostly from northern governorates were trafficked out of the country to
Saudi Arabia at a rate of approximately 200 children per week. The
MSAL\'s Child Labor Unit (CLU) acknowledged that high rates of children
were trafficked into Saudi Arabia for work. The CLU estimated that at
least 10 children per day were trafficked into Saudi Arabia. MSAL had no
reports during the year indicating that children were trafficked into
Saudi Arabia for commercial sex work. However, experts at international
and intergovernmental organizations reported evidence in the three
governorates of Mahweet, Aden, and Taiz indicating that girls younger
than 15 were trafficked into the commercial sex trade in those areas.

Children were trafficked by adults, older children, and loosely
organized syndicates who helped them cross the border by donkey,
automobile, or foot. They worked predominantly in hotels, casinos, and
nightclubs.

Government investigations revealed that extreme poverty was the primary
motivation behind child trafficking, and the victims\' families were
almost always complicit. The traffickers were often well known by, if
not related to, the family; parents were either paid or promised money
in exchange for allowing their children to be trafficked. Many cases
were also later discovered to be instances of illegal immigration.

The law, which does not differentiate between children and adult
victims, allows for a prison sentence of up to 10 years for anyone
convicted of crimes constituting trafficking in persons. Other laws
forbid and punish kidnapping and sexual assault. The Child Rights Law
mandates the protection of children from economic and sexual
exploitation. The country reported 14 arrests and six convictions for
child labor trafficking, but the government did not provide information
regarding the sentences**.** Notably, the government reportedly detained
and prosecuted victims of trafficking under anti-prostitution laws.

The government continued discussions with Saudi Arabian officials to
combat child trafficking. The MOHR ran a hotline for persons to report
child trafficking.

In an attempt to prevent child trafficking, the MSAL conducted a
campaign in regions known as points of origin of trafficked children.
The MSAL warned potential victims\' parents against the dangers of
allowing their children to work in Saudi Arabia.

The State Department\'s annual *Trafficking in Persons Report* can be
found at www.state.gov/g/tip.

Persons with Disabilities

Several laws mandate the rights and care of persons with disabilities;
however, there was discrimination against such persons. By law, 5
percent of government jobs should be reserved for persons with
disabilities, and a law mandates the acceptance of persons with
disabilities in universities, exempts them from paying tuition, and
requires that schools be made more accessible to persons with
disabilities. It was unclear to what extent these laws have been
implemented. No national law mandates accessibility of buildings for
persons with disabilities.

During the year the parliament ratified the Convention on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities, which specifically mandates that the
government take the necessary legislative actions to make its provisions
effective. Among these provisions is the right to participate in
political and public life.

The government\'s Social Fund for Development and the Fund for the Care
and Rehabilitation of the Disabled, administered by the MSAL, provided
limited basic services and funded more than 60 NGOs to assist persons
with disabilities.

> National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities

The Akhdam (an estimated 2 to 5 percent of the population) were
considered the lowest social class. They lived in poverty and endured
persistent social discrimination. The government\'s Social Fund for
Development provided basic services to assist the group. During the year
human rights groups reported that some immigrants of African origin had
difficulty in securing MOI permission to marry citizens.

During the year tribal violence continued to be a problem in Sanaa and
throughout the country, and the government\'s ability to control tribal
elements responsible for acts of violence remained limited. Tensions
over land or sovereignty in particular regions continued between the
government and a few tribes, periodically escalating into violent
confrontations.

There were no public reports of discrimination based on sexual
orientation or HIV/AIDS; however, these topics are socially sensitive
and not discussed publicly.

Incitement to Acts of Discrimination

Two inflammatory government newspapers, *Al Dostor* and *Akhbar Al
Youm,* continuously published propaganda for the purpose of slander and
incitement to discrimination or violence. In 2007 *Al Dostor* published
an article with the names of the country\'s top 40 female activists,
branding them as apostates. The newspaper also printed photos of four of
the activists.

Section 6 Worker Rights

a\. The Right of Association

The law provides that citizens have the right to form and join unions;
however, this right was restricted in practice.

Although not required by law, all current unions are federated within
the General Federation of Trade Unions of Yemen (GFTUY), a national
umbrella organization. The GFTUY claimed approximately 42,000 members in
21 unions during its June 2007 elections. The GFTUY denied any
association with the government; however, it worked closely with the
government to resolve labor disputes through negotiation.

The politicization of unions and professional associations continued to
hamper the right of association. In some instances the GPC ruling party
attempted to control professional associations by influencing internal
elections or placing its own personnel, usually tied to the government,
in positions of influence in unions and professional associations.

The law dictates that a labor union can be dissolved only by court order
or its own members; however, the government did not respect this right
in practice. For example, in September 2007 the MSAL threatened to
dissolve the Yemen Teachers Union, Technical Education Syndicate, and
the Physicians and Pharmacists Syndicate, claiming they had not obtained
a MSAL-issued license and thus were operating illegally. This
announcement from MSAL came after months of sit-ins and demonstrations
staged around the country by the Teachers Union to demand a pay
increase.

The labor law provides unions the right to strike only if prior attempts
at negotiation and arbitration fail, and workers exercised this right by
conducting legal strikes. The proposal to strike must be submitted to at
least 60 percent of all concerned workers, of whom 25 percent must vote
in favor. Strikes for explicit \"political purposes\" were prohibited.

b\. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively

The labor law provides workers, except public servants, foreign workers,
day laborers, and domestic servants the right to organize and bargain
collectively without government interference. The government permitted
these activities; however, at times it sought to influence them by
placing its own personnel inside groups and organizations. Unions may
negotiate wage settlements for their members, and may resort to strikes
or other actions to achieve their demands. Public sector employees must
take their grievances to court. The MSAL has veto power over collective
bargaining agreements. Several such agreements existed. Agreements may
be invalidated if they are \"likely to cause a breach of security or to
damage the economic interests of the country.\"

The law generally protects employees from anti-union discrimination. An
employer does not have the right to dismiss an employee for union
activities; however, there were reports that private sector employers
discriminated against union members through transfers, demotions, and
dismissals.

Employees may appeal any dispute, including cases of anti-union
discrimination, to the MSAL. Employees also may take a case to the Labor
Arbitration Committee, which is chaired by the MSAL; it is composed of
an employer representative and a GFTUY representative. Such cases often
were disposed favorably toward workers, especially if the employer was a
foreign company. Neither GFTUY nor the MSAL was able to provide
statistics on how many unionized employees used this system during the
year.

There are no export processing zones.

c\. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor

The law prohibits forced or compulsory labor, including by children;
however, there were reports of such practices during the year. Yemeni
girls were trafficked within the country for commercial sexual
exploitation in hotels, casinos, and bars. A local NGO reported that
more than 30,000 children worked on the streets of Sana\'a alone.
Children were also reportedly trafficked from the country to work as
child laborers in other countries, especially from the governorates of
Hajja, Hudeidah, and Saada. The NGO blog *Human Trafficking Project*
reported in April that 3,000 Bangladeshis were trafficked to work in
Yemen in conditions close to indentured servitude.

d\. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment

The Child Rights Law prohibits child labor; however, it has not been
effectively implemented.

The established minimum age for employment was 15 years in the private
sector and 18 years in the public sector. By special permit, children
between the ages of 12 and 15 years could work. The government rarely
enforced these provisions, especially in rural and remote areas. The
government also did not enforce laws requiring nine years of compulsory
education for children.

Child labor was common, especially in rural areas. The 2007 CHF
ACCESS-MENA report states that children in the country were
predominantly employed in agriculture and fishing. Many children were
required to work in subsistence farming due to family poverty. Even in
urban areas, children worked in stores and workshops, sold goods, and
begged on the streets. Many children of school age worked instead of
attending school, particularly in areas where schools were not easily
accessible. Local observers reported that half or more of the fighters
involved in armed conflict between the al-Osaimat and Harf Sufian tribes
in Amran governorate, which broke out in November, were boys ranging
from 12 to 15 years of age.

The Child Labor Unit at the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor was
responsible for implementing and enforcing child labor laws and
regulations; however, the unit\'s lack of resources hampered
enforcement.

In 2006 the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor estimated that there
were more than 500,000 working children, ages six to 14 years, and that
working children equaled 10 to 15 percent of the total work force. CHF
2007 estimated that approximately 52 percent of male children between
the ages of 10 and 14 were in the workforce, compared to 48 percent of
female children in the same age group. CHF estimated that 83 percent of
working children worked for their families (including street beggars)
and 17 percent worked outside the family. According to the MSAL,
children working outside the family are employed in small factories and
shops. The government was an active partner with the International Labor
Organization\'s International Program to Eliminate Child Labor. During
the year the program offered remedial education, vocational training,
counseling, and reintegration of child laborers into schools.

e\. Acceptable Conditions of Work

There was no established minimum wage. The labor law provides equal
wages for public workers and civil servants. Private sector workers,
especially skilled technicians, earned a far higher wage. The average
daily wage did not provide a decent standard of living for a worker and
family. During the year the minimum civil service wage did not meet the
country\'s poverty level.

The law specifies a maximum 48‑hour workweek with a maximum eight-hour
workday; however, many workshops and stores operated 10‑ to 12‑hour
shifts without penalty. The 35‑hour workweek for government employees
was seven hours per day from Saturday through Wednesday.

MSAL is responsible for regulating workplace health and safety
conditions. The requisite legislation for regulating occupational health
is contained in the labor law. However, enforcement was weak to
nonexistent due to lack of MSAL capacity. MSAL has a Vocational Safety
Department that relies on committees to conduct primary and periodic
investigations of safety and health conditions in workplaces. Many
workers were regularly exposed to toxic industrial products and
developed respiratory illnesses. Some foreign owned companies and major
manufacturers implemented higher health, safety, and environmental
standards than the government required. Workers have the right to remove
themselves from dangerous work situations and may challenge dismissals
in court.