# Lessons Learned -- Electronic Screening

This chapter contains "lessons learned" in the area of electronic
screening. Specifically, the states were asked to respond to the
following questions:

-   What you did right that you'd recommend to other states.

-   What you didn't do that you wish you had.

-   What issues you wish you could have settled earlier.

-   What requirements turned out to be key drivers for design.

-   What design choices you considered and rejected/chose and why, etc.

## Lessons Learned -- California

-   What you did right that you\'d recommend some other state repeat?

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-   Agreed to the concept that CVISN required a multi-agency and
    industry effort.

-   Approved over 100 carriers who volunteered to participate in this
    demonstration project either directly, through agents, or through
    leasing companies.

-   Established an industry advisory council early in the project.

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-   What you didn\'t do that you wish you had?

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-   Seek federal funding through earmarks for funds committed.

-   State teams attending the workshops should demand significant break
    out sessions for open state interaction.

-   Be proactive in discussing multi-state development contracts to
    minimize cost.

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-   What issues you wish you could have settled earlier?

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-   Finalize and encumber all federal funds early in the project, rather
    than on a year-by-year basis.

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-   What requirements turned out to be the key drivers for design?

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-   Development of the interfaces to all legacy systems in their native
    mode rather than EDI.

-   Combining the CI/CVIEW functionality into a single computer
    platform.

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-   What design choices you considered and rejected/chose and why, etc.?

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-   Choosing to produce final documents versus temporary documents as
    requested by the industry.

## Lessons Learned -- Colorado

-   Colorado was using transponders and clearing vehicles at mainline
    speed before it became a popular option. The lesson there is that it
    can be done internally with state resources, if a state desires to
    do it this way.

-   The increasing commercial vehicle traffic is making it necessary to
    either clear a vehicle at mainline speeds or to begin doing a random
    sampling of this population. It will become physically impossible to
    stop and clear each vehicle in the very near future.

-   Cooperation between the vendors in transponder interoperability is
    slow at best. Something must be done on a national level to insure
    that any vehicle, using any transponder issued by the competing
    vendors, can clear your site without an undue burden on the state or
    the carrier.

-   Minimum bypass criteria needs to be standardized among the states in
    order to ensure that each any transpondered vehicle will have met
    the requirements of each state they wish to travel in. No sense
    getting into the vendor brouhaha (above) unless the states can agree
    to this.

## Lessons Learned -- Connecticut

No information was available from Connecticut at the time of publication
of this document.

## Lessons Learned -- Kentucky

-   What you did right:

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-   Transponder distribution needs dedicated marketing group and/or
    personnel to market overall program.

-   The technology works.

-   In order for public agencies to benefit from electronic screening,
    high participation levels are required. Thus marketing and outreach
    must be emphasized.

-   States must deal with the "chicken and egg" syndrome. Truckers are
    waiting for expanded deployment. States are waiting on increased
    trucker participation. States wishing to lead must demonstrate a
    high level of commitment by deploying first and allowing the trucker
    participation to grow in response.

-   Electronic screening is truly just a mainline sorting function. It
    should not be made more complex than necessary.

-   After initial skepticism, support by enforcement personnel is very
    high.

-   Truckers who use the system are very pleased with it.

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-   Issues and considerations include:

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-   Costs tend to increase dramatically.

-   Interoperability is needed across jurisdictional and functional
    lines.

-   The lack of multiple vendors for the technology is a concern.

-   States need availability of a turnkey system (ideally, from more
    than one vendor) that is non-proprietary and integrated with CVISN.
    While Kentucky is developing such a system, it is not yet available
    as a turnkey product.

## Lessons Learned -- Maryland

## Lessons Learned -- Michigan

In summary, Michigan has found that proper staffing and a strong
commitment at the very beginning can avoid many pitfalls and lead to a
much smoother project.

## Lessons Learned -- Minnesota

No information was available from Minnesota at the time of publication
of this document.

## Lessons Learned -- Oregon

No information was available from Oregon at the time of publication of
this document.

## Lessons Learned -- Virginia

-   What went right:

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-   Developed a collaborative roadside screening algorithm representing
    industry, operations, and technical interests in advance of
    development.

-   Employed enforcement personnel with computer knowledge to test
    equipment prior to deployment.

-   Trained enforcement personnel with knowledgeable peers using a
    tiered approach.

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-   What issues should have been settled earlier:

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-   Adopt DSRC standards for transponder interoperability.

## Lessons Learned -- Washington

-   What we did right:

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-   All partners (Enforcement Officers, Trucking Association members,
    and state agencies) were involved at the start.

> *Example: Early in the project we partnered with the Washington
> Trucking Associations without any clue as to the importance of that
> decision. Our intent was noble, in that we thought we wanted them on
> board so they could "see what we were going to do for (to) them"! In
> actuality, they become our biggest asset in terms of "insider
> information" (finding out what really will and will not work) and
> lobbying for funding. They were the folks that eventually sold CVISN
> to our state legislators.*

-   Established weekly meetings for information exchange and open
    agenda.

> *Example: We conducted team meetings once a week (every Thursday
> morning) that lasted from 1 -- 3 hours long. Rule number one...an open
> agenda with everybody speaking their minds. These meetings proved to
> be most productive in terms of good communications, sharing ideas and
> workloads, and sharing lessons learned. Management representatives
> from various state agencies dropped into these meetings to find out
> what was going on. They quite often raved about the process and
> results. We would also conference the vendors/consultants into these
> meetings.*

-   Upgraded Port of Entry and scalehouse equipment

> 18.3" flat screen monitor
>
> 400mhz Pentiums
>
> Upgraded permit computers
>
> Provided LAN at the scale house
>
> *Example: We bought the best equipment possible for use by the scale
> house enforcement officers. Not only did it look good to the public,
> but also it instilled a since of pride in the officers, who became our
> ambassadors of good will. Also, by buying the state of art, our agency
> IS folks were "thrilled" to work with the installation of new toys and
> creating the LAN/WAN.*

-   Chose an experienced vendor

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-   Wish list:

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-   Provide plenty of time (more than you'll ever think you'll need!).

> *Example: We opted for an aggressive schedule, knowing that up front
> we couldn't pull it off unless we got lucky. We set an aggressive
> schedule because we wanted to showcase the CVISN concept during
> legislative session. We made our deadline, but will have to come back
> and do a lot of polishing. In retrospect, I am glad we pushed because
> I think we would have taken the easy way out on some issues...like
> waiting for some other states to develop some components. In this
> manner we develop a product that the legislature could see, touch and
> feel. As a result, they funded us for another two years!*

-   Investigate options such as Thin Client

-   Subcontracting creates communication/schedule/specification
    problems.

> *Example: The more subs involved, the harder it was to control the
> deliverables/time frames. It was frustrating to have one vendor hold
> up the others. This is a real life hurdle!*

-   SAFER inspection data is not current enough for effective screening.

> *Example: We found that the JHU/APL model (which had us going to
> MCMIS) for SAFER/safety information isn't current enough for
> enforcement use. The officers want to be able to see information from
> their own, and adjoining states, SAFTEYNET database. They also want to
> be able to directly input out of service data and corrections to out
> of service data for use by the officers at the next (upstream) scale
> house.*

-   Key drivers for design:

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-   Internal support and expertise and infrastructure

-   Agency standards dictate use of Microsoft NT Server; Windows Based
    Applications in VB6 and C++6 and MS SQL Database

-   Existing WIM computer

> *Example: We already had a WIM installed without an AVI. After
> installing AVI, we had to interface with the WIM computer, and will
> eventually do away the WIM server. It just slows the process down.*

-   Design choices considered/rejected:

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-   Agency standards did not allow for the use of JHU/APL ROC and CVIEW.
    Developed own and modeled our ROC and CVIEW after JHU/APL's.

> *Example: We want to make use of the Internet and realize that JHU
> does not mention that in their architecture. We think increasing use
> of the Internet will enhance CVISN and interoperability. When JHU
> reviews our system, we will discuss this notion in more detail.*

-   Another concern is that the early CVISN model did not take into
    account that some one had to issue transponders to the trucking
    community. This has taken on an entirely new avenue that bears
    plenty of discussion with new CVISN states. We contracted with a
    vendor to market and sell transponders, which has been a good thing,
    but it would have been terrible if there were no experienced vendors
    available.

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