**NNSA International Program Description Package**

**Expectation:**

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Office of Defense
Nuclear Nonproliferation mission is to: \"Detect, prevent, and reverse
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, worldwide.\"
Preventing weapons of mass destruction from falling into the hands of
terrorists is the top national security priority of the current
Presidential administration and is expected to remain so throughout the
life of the contract. NNSA accomplishes this mission by providing both
policy and technical leadership to limit or prevent the spread of
materials, technology, and expertise relating to weapons of mass
destruction; advancing the technologies to detect the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction worldwide; and eliminating or securing
inventories of surplus materials and infrastructure usable for nuclear
weapons.

The Savannah River Site (SRS) provides support for this mission across a
broad spectrum of programs. Areas of SRS support for international
nonproliferation missions are discussed in this package. Programs
supporting the disposition of US surplus fissile materials are addressed
elsewhere.

The SRS contractor will be expected to provide technical expertise,
programmatic expertise, and/or facilities and equipment to support the
following international nonproliferation missions and emergent threats
that may occur during the life of the contract:

-   **Global Threat Reduction**

> This program works to identify, secure, remove and/or facilitate the
> disposition of high‑risk, vulnerable nuclear and radiological
> materials and equipment around the world that pose a potential threat
> to the U.S. and international community.

-   **Nonproliferation and Verification Research and Development**

> This program works to develop new technologies to improve capabilities
> to detect and monitor nuclear weapons production, proliferation and
> verification worldwide.

-   **Nuclear Risk Reduction**

> This program currently supports international emergency management
> activities, as well as two specific programs in Russia: The
> Elimination of Weapons Grade Plutonium Production program works to
> shut down Russia's last remaining weapons‑grade plutonium producing
> reactors by constructing or refurbishing fossil fuel power plants. The
> Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Transparency Program develops and
> implements measures to increase confidence that low enriched uranium
> (LEU) purchased under the 1993 U.S./Russian HEU Purchase Agreement is
> derived from HEU extracted from dismantled Russian nuclear weapons.

-   **Nonproliferation and International Security**

> This program works to counter proliferation and strengthen the
> nonproliferation regime by: promoting weapons of mass destruction
> (WMD) dismantlement, transparency, and effective verification through
> the development of technical applications and methods for verifying
> international agreements and declarations; denying terrorist
> acquisition of WMD and countering illicit technology trade by
> strengthening treaties and other proliferation barriers, including
> international institutions, such as the NPT, Additional Protocol,
> IAEA, and NSG; and engaging with international partners to strengthen
> their export control and safeguards systems.

-   **Global Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention**

> This program works to prevent the adverse migration of WMD expertise
> to terrorists and countries of proliferation concern by redirecting
> scientists, engineers, and technicians to peaceful work.

-   **International Nuclear Materials Protection and Cooperation**

> This program works in Russia and other areas of concern to secure and
> eliminate vulnerable nuclear weapons and weapons‑usable material, and
> to install detection equipment at border crossings and mega-ports
> around the world to prevent and detect the illicit transfer of nuclear
> material.

The contractor may also be expected to support national security
emergent needs identified by NNSA Headquarters not specifically
identified in the contract scope of work.

**Background/Lifecycle Discussion:**

NNSA defense nuclear nonproliferation programs use and leverage SRS
capabilities, mainly the expertise of technical personnel and specific
facilities, in support of international nonproliferation and national
security goals. SRS provides personnel, facilities, and/or equipment to
directly support missions of the Office of Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation organizations as requested.

The success and progress on international nonproliferation missions is
greatly impacted by external factors. The pace and nature of treaties
and agreements, poor economic conditions in many host countries,
political and economic uncertainties, and the challenge of negotiating
with certain countries or regimes have significant impacts on program
performance. NNSA also coordinates many activities with other entities
including the National Security Council; Departments of State, Commerce
and Defense; and various non‑governmental organizations. Additionally,
it is impossible to fully account for the nature and timing of emergent
threats. These factors can result in significant challenges in planning
and implementing work at the field level.

Some nonproliferation programs are full‑time, ongoing activities (such
as the Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel Acceptance Program
and the Nuclear Cities Initiative Program), while others require
maintaining a capability to be called upon when the need and opportunity
arise as a result of emergent threats, progress in international
negotiations, or as a result of other factors. To the extent possible,
ongoing and potential tasks are described in this package. Some program
work is sensitive and details cannot be provided.

**Contract Period Objectives 12/1/06 -- 9/30/11**

Contract period objectives are to support achievement of NNSA Defense
Nuclear Nonproliferation objectives, to the maximum extent possible, as
described in the Core and Optimized Work sections below. Key NNSA
Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation objectives during the contract period
include:

-   By 2010, secure 799 high‑priority sites with vulnerable radiological
    material, worldwide.

-   By 2011, train 13,000 international and domestic experts (including
    International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors, export control
    officers, and Department of Homeland Security personnel) in nuclear
    nonproliferation including weapons of mass destruction and commodity
    identification training.

-   By 2008, secure 100 percent of 600 metric tons (MT) of
    weapons-usable nuclear material in Russia. By 2008, reduce the
    cumulative cost of rapid upgrades per metric ton of Russian material
    stored to \$3.5M/MT.

-   By 2010, convert over 15MT of Russian HEU to LEU.

-   By 2010, engage 8,200 former Soviet weapons scientists, engineers
    and technicians in nonmilitary activities annually and commercialize
    technologies or create/expand businesses in Russian closed cities to
    a cumulative total of 52.

-   By 2011, redirect 100% of targeted former Libyan WMD scientists and
    engineers, and complete 14 technical exchanges to help Libya meet
    nonproliferation obligations.

-   By 2010, repatriate 1,370 kilograms of Russian‑origin HEU. By 2009,
    repatriate or validate acceptable disposition of 9,396 U.S.‑origin
    fuel assemblies from foreign research reactors.

-   Annually complete 100 percent of agreed upon Special Monitoring
    visits to four Russian HEU-to-LEU processing facilities and ensure
    that the onsite Transparency Monitoring Office at the Russian Ural
    Electrochemical Integrated Plant is staffed.

By 2008, complete refurbishment of the fossil plant in Seversk, Russia.
By 2011, complete construction of the fossil plant at Zheleznogorsk,
Russia.

**Core Work Scope 12/1/06 -- 09/30/11**

**Global Threat Reduction Initiative (NA-21)**

> The contractor WILL provide technical expertise, facilities, and
> equipment to

-   support work with Russia to prioritize risks, accelerate and
    complete the repatriation of Russian-origin spent nuclear fuel;

-   work with teams in Russia and newly independent states to support
    safe and secure repatriation of spent nuclear fuel;

-   support research, development and testing of equipment to facilitate
    treatment of spent nuclear fuel around the world;

-   support the accelerated repatriation of U.S.‑origin research reactor
    spent fuel from locations around the world;

-   work with governments around the world to identify and remove or
    secure radiological sources and other materials that could be used
    in weapons;

-   support international radiological threat reduction worldwide; and

-   support emerging threats and national security needs around the
    world.

**Nonproliferation Research & Engineering**

> The contractor WILL perform research and development for
> nonproliferation and homeland security, with specific emphasis within
> the areas of radiochemistry and radiation sensors, as directed by
> NNSA, and perform critical research and development work. Some of this
> work is classified and cannot be discussed in this document.

**Nuclear Risk Reduction**

> The contractor WILL provide technical expertise to

-   support critical programs in areas including nuclear technology
    development and emergency preparedness;

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-   represent the United States on the Euro Ensemble project and
    associated activities involving the development, testing, and
    validation of computer models that can used to predict or retrace
    atmospheric radioactive releases;

-   work in Russia in support of the HEU Transparency Implementation
    Program;

-   support the Elimination of Weapons Grade Plutonium Production
    Program; and

-   support international emergency management programs worldwide in
    dispersion, modeling, exercise evaluation and hosting foreign
    officials, as requested by NNSA Headquarters.

**Nonproliferation & International Security (NA-24)**

> The contractor WILL provide technical expertise, facilities and/or
> equipment in critical program areas to:

-   strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation regime, control nuclear
    exports, and international nuclear safeguards;

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-   provide reactor and plutonium storage monitors for the verification
    of compliance of Russian plutonium production reactors in accordance
    with the US-Russian Plutonium Production Reactor Agreement;

-   support hosting of Russian monitors during their shutdown plutonium
    production reactor verification trips to SRS;

-   supports implementation of International Atomic Energy (IAEA)
    safeguards over U.S. material stored at SRS;

-   supports strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation regimes and
    international nuclear safeguards involving support to the IAEA,
    including support for Additional Protocol activities and developing
    safeguards to detect undeclared proliferation activities;

-   evaluate the use of environment monitoring techniques in the
    detection of undeclared nuclear activities, providing technical
    assistance and material support in the design, planning, and
    implementation of environmental sampling and inspections at select
    nuclear facilities in cooperation with IAEA and member states;

-   review export control licenses for proliferation concerns and
    provides technical assistance in regulating U.S. nuclear technology
    transfers under the Atomic Energy Act and to develop and implement
    International Nuclear Export Control Program training activities
    around the world;

-   develop and implement domestic weapons of mass destruction training
    for U.S. national security purposes; and

-   provide technical and business management expertise for the
    implementation of Global Initiatives for Proliferation
    Prevention/Nuclear Cities Initiative Programs in the Russian closed
    city of Sarov, in other Russian closed cities, and in other
    countries as directed.

**International Material Protection & Cooperation (NA-25)**

The contractor will provide technical expertise in critical program
areas to

-   support development and implementation of programs supporting
    nuclear materials protection, control, and accounting (including
    material accountability, physical protection, protective force, and
    second line of defense) in Russia and with other international
    partners and organizations;

-   host U.S.‑foreign national project teams at SRS in support of
    international nonproliferation missions;

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-   support U.S. teams providing Material Protection, Control and
    Accountability and security upgrades at Russian facilities and
    facilities at other locations as appropriate;

-   support to Second Line of Defense programs and initiatives,
    including the Megaport project, at locations around the world.

-   provide coulometry and mass spectrometry technical support, as
    requested;

-   provide monitoring support personnel to validate blend‑down of
    civilian highly enriched uranium material at facilities in Russia;
    and

-   provide personnel with plutonium processing and handling expertise
    to support civilian material disposition programs in Russia and
    other locations around the world.

**Optimized Work Scope**

Provide increasingly significant technical expertise, programmatic
expertise, project leadership, and business management expertise and
support to NSNA Headquarters to accelerate and support achievement of
international nonproliferation missions.

**Appendix A**

**System State at Contract Start 12-01-06:**

-   Programs are active.

**Appendix B Assumptions**

-   Technical expertise maintained and enhanced

-   Facilities/equipment maintained/available to meet known and emergent
    needs

-   Congress continues to support nonproliferation objectives and
    programs

**Appendix C Risks**

-   Technical expertise not maintained

-   Facilities/equipment not maintained or available to meet emergent
    needs

**Appendix D International Programs Relevant International Program
Documents**

**[Orders/SRIDs]{.underline}**

**[SRIPS/Manuals]{.underline}**

**[Regulatory Documents]{.underline}**

Atomic Energy Act

Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty

U.S. --Russian Plutonium Production Reactor Agreement

**[Authorization Basis (e.g. SAR/SER)]{.underline}**

**[Program Plans]{.underline}**

The National Nuclear Security Administration Strategic Plan,
DOE/NA-0010, November 2004

President's Fiscal Year 2006 Budget Request