CHAPTER 13

INTERNATIONAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

Students of emergency management are exposed to a great deal of
information on what is being done in the United States and, to a lesser
degree, the English speaking world. However, they are often unaware of
the different approaches to emergency management used in other regions.
This chapter identifies some of the ways in which countries differ
systematically in their hazard vulnerability, economic resources,
government organization, quality of the built environment, civil
society, role of the military, and role of international organizations.
The chapter then turns to six case studies of emergency management
capabilities in East Asia, South Asia, South America, Oceania, and
Europe.

## Introduction

Research on emergency management suffers from the same problems as much
social science research; most of it has been done in the English
speaking countries and much of the remaining work has been done in
former colonies of these nations (Heady, 1996). Students of emergency
management are thus exposed to a great deal of information on what is
being done in the English speaking world, yet are often unaware of the
different approaches to emergency management used in other regions. A
few scholars have examined the applicability of emergency management
principles developed in rich countries to other areas. They have
concluded that the principles of an all hazards, integrated, and
comprehensive approach covering all phases of emergency management and
integrating relevant agencies, together with a focus on building
community resilience at the local level, are viable and useful in a wide
variety of settings (Martin, et al., 2001). However, resources, both
human and technical, are frequently lacking for the development of
adequate programs (Vatsa & Joseph, 2003).

One reason to study policies and programs used in other countries is
that, increasingly, countries are learning and borrowing policies from
each other (Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000). Globalization has had two important
effects. First, it has exposed all countries to an increasingly
competitive economic system. Second, advances in the technology of
communications have made it possible for policymakers to communicate
quickly and easily. Because of these changes, policymakers increasingly
look beyond their national borders for ideas on how to address problems
at home.

Governments are not the only institutions looking for ideas abroad. NGOs
of all sorts are also engaged in learning from a wide range of
institutions outside of their host countries' borders (Stone, 2000).
Indeed, many NGOs such as Greenpeace are multinational organizations,
that routinely engage in cross-national policy transfer. Corporations,
independent policy institutes, and less well organized transnational
social movements can also engage in cross-national policy transfer.

The transfer of policy across national borders is complicated by the
presence of "national policy styles" (Howlett, 1991). These policy
styles are based on the different characteristics of the governments
involved, as well as the ways in which the governments relate to civil
society. As a result, policy transfers are not always successful.
Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) identified three ways in which policy
transfers can fail.

-   *Uninformed* transfers fail because the borrowing country does not
    understand the policy it is adopting;

-   *Incomplete* transfers fail because the borrowing country does not
    transfer the necessary elements of the policy; and

-   *Inappropriate* transfers fail because there are too many
    differences between the social, political and economic contexts of
    the two countries.

**Factors That Cause Variation in Policy Choices**

Countries can be compared on the basis of many characteristics including
regime type (roughly on a continuum from totalitarian to democratic),
political culture (traditionalistic, moralistic, and individualistic),
orientation toward modernity (Inglehart, 1997; Barber, 1997), and level
of economic development (Gross Domestic Product per capita[^1], Human
Development Index[^2], or Gini coefficient[^3]) Yet, administrative
structures are relatively similar across a broad range of countries
because the function of an administrative structure has an effect on the
shape it takes (Peters, 1995). In addition, organizational models are
frequently shared among groups of countries. For example, former
colonies frequently have administrative structures that closely resemble
those of their former colonial masters. Countries that share membership
in a multinational organization such as the European Union (EU)
frequently come to share forms of administrative organization in order
to simplify crossnational cooperation. In disaster management, the
influence of the UN through programs such as the International Decade
for Natural Disaster Reduction (IDNDR) and its successor program, the
International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR) has contributed to
the diffusion of common models, while encouraging countries to adapt
these models to their own realities. Regional emergency management
organizations such as the Organization of American States (OAS), the Pan
American Health Organization (PAHO), the Centro de Coordenación para la
Reducción de los Desastres Naturales en América Central (CEPREDENAC),
and the Asian Disaster Preparedness Center (ADPC) have also influenced
the evolution of emergency management across a wide variety of nation
states.

When comparing emergency management policies, the most relevant
dimensions of comparison must include the "propensity for disaster,
local and regional economic resources, organization of government, and
availability of technological, academic, and human resources, ... level
of local responder training, resilience of infrastructure, public
opinion of the government's ability to manage the crisis, and the
availability of specialized assets" (Haddow & Bullock, 2003, pp.
165-166). In other words, the most relevant dimensions of comparison
arise from what emergency managers know as *hazard vulnerability*
(recall Chapter 6) and local *capability* (recall Chapter 3). The rest
of this chapter will consider the dimensions listed above, but will also
examine the role of the military in society, the development of civil
society, and other factors affecting the various programs throughout
this chapter. These factors are linked in complex ways to produce a
unique profile of hazard vulnerability and emergency management in each
country.

# *Hazard Vulnerability*

As Chapter 6 indicated, hazard vulnerability varies according to hazard
type and level of exposure. Frequently, a country's types and levels of
hazard exposure influence its organizational structure and the quality
of its emergency management organizations. Countries with high levels of
hazard exposure have often been found to have "disaster cultures"
enabling them to adapt and respond to recurrent events. Their emergency
management organizations can also show a high level of adaptation to
particular hazards. For example, countries facing frequent typhoons have
developed more sophisticated programs and policies than those that do
not. Bangladesh has developed a system of evacuation platforms because
of the very flat terrain, and Taiwan has put a great deal of money into
typhoon warning research.

An example of the way in which hazard exposure and experience can shape
national emergency management programs occurred in Central America after
Hurricane Mitch in 1998. Prior to the arrival of this devastating
hurricane, most countries of the region had devoted little attention to
emergency management. They had established basic "civil defense"
programs, usually associated with the military and concentrating on
disaster response. However, there was little or no attention paid to the
connections between economic development programs and the production of
hazard vulnerability. After the hurricane, the governments of the
affected countries began to change their national development programs
to a sustainable development paradigm. These emphasized the linkages
between social factors, environmental degradation, and hazard
vulnerability (Lavell, 2002).

# *Economic Resources*

Emergency management is low on the priority list in poorer countries, as
indeed it is elsewhere. Whole societies live on the brink of economic
collapse, so other problems such as the provision of basic education and
public health services seem to be of more immediate concern. Thus,
emergency management is often an afterthought that rises on the public
agenda only after a disaster occurs. In the meantime, poverty and
uncontrolled rapid urbanization generate large concentrations of
vulnerable populations in high risk urban areas. Moreover, the lack of
attention to the links between environment and human settlements has
delayed the development of a better understanding of sustainable
development and increased the incidence of disasters in rich and poor
countries.

The quality of emergency management in a country is related to the
amount of resources available nationally for emergency management and to
the amount of resources available from outside a country. Many poor
countries struggle with high levels of foreign debt, often incurred by
undemocratic regimes. To compound the problem, some of these countries
devoted much of their national budget to the military. This left little
money for improving the country's human capital through education and
health care. Emergency management was left far down the list of
discretionary spending programs. Sometimes this situation has been
exacerbated by structural adjustment programs imposed by multinational
lending agencies such as the World Bank and the International Monetary
Fund. Nonetheless, some countries have been able to use funds from donor
nations and international lending agencies to improve their emergency
management capabilities.

Hazard insurance availability varies from one country to the next. Few
countries have systems with market penetration as widespread as the
National Flood Insurance Program of the US In part, this is because
participation in the NFIP is a condition for getting a mortgage. Many
foreign countries lack disaster insurance programs or, if they do have
one, premiums are too high for the majority of the population to afford
them. In these countries, businesses might have disaster insurance, but
few homeowners do. National governments might want to require homeowners
to purchase hazard insurance but cannot do this by requiring hazard
insurance as a condition of mortgage approval, as in the US. The reason
this option is unavailable is that many fewer people in these countries
borrow money to buy a house. In many cases, people first buy the land
and then build each room of the house as they save enough money to
purchase the construction materials. As a result, these governments lack
the mechanism the US government uses to intervene in the housing market.

Haddow and Bullock (2003) mention the availability of "specialized
assets" as a factor affecting emergency management. These specialized
assets may include items needed during response operations such as heavy
equipment, trained Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) teams, hazmat
capabilities, technical expertise such as GIS, and training facilities.
Such resources are not available universally, but often are shared
regionally through organizations such as the Caribbean Community's
Caribbean Disaster Emergency Response Agency (United Nations
International Strategy for Disaster Reduction, 2002). USAR teams, in
particular, are eager to participate in emergency response efforts no
matter where they occur. They can provide valuable assistance, on the
job training, and assistance with the psychologically difficult task of
body retrieval---although it is rare that they are able to arrive
quickly enough to accomplish rescues during the critical first hours.
This is due to the logistics of moving large numbers of people and their
equipment, as well as to legal and political problems with such
movements. In some cases, flyover rights have been denied to USAR teams,
and the entry of search dogs without the normal quarantine or veterinary
procedures frequently causes problems. Thus, there is increasing
interest in local development of hazmat and USAR capabilities, using
foreign teachers if necessary, or sending a first generation of
practitioners to study abroad and bring back the needed knowledge for a
train-the-trainers approach.

# *Organization of Government*

One of the most important issues affecting emergency management is the
degree of political centralization in a particular country. The control
of policies, programs, and resources by the highest (national) level
limits the ability of local governments to mount a rapid emergency
response or to develop appropriate hazard mitigation programs. Emergency
management is a service, like police and fire protection, that is
delivered over a dispersed area. Consequently, it benefits from a
significant degree of decentralization, allowing local governments to
manage the service delivery (Peters, 1995, p. 161)

An excessive emphasis on major disasters tends to lead to
overcentralization because it is assumed there will be a need for
governmental coordination over the very large areas affected.
Unfortunately, this also requires communication of information through
multiple layers of government---which delays response and recovery
operations. In reality, small frequent events cause more deaths and
economic losses than larger ones. When small events occur, local
governments can respond with more agility and effectiveness if they do
not need to await instructions and resources from the central
government. Thus, empowering local governments and their populations to
deal with local events is very effective, but is frequently resisted by
the national governmental authority because it reduces central control.
Frequent small events also point to the connections between patterns of
development and hazard vulnerability, which can increase calls for more
public participation in national goal setting. This also threatens a
status quo that benefits entrenched elite groups.

The location of emergency management agencies in all levels of
government is related to these agencies' effectiveness and also to the
emphasis given to different aspects of hazard vulnerability. An agency
that is charged with responding to disasters, but has a low status in
government, will have difficulty in finding and delivering the needed
resources in a timely manner. Emergency managers benefit when they
receive input from scientific agencies, such as those who map the
national territory or deliver weather forecasts, but they are often
isolated from such valuable input by their location in government.

The level of professionalization within the emergency management agency
varies a great deal across countries. When an agency has a high
political profile and adequate resources, it is more able to attract and
keep well qualified and dedicated personnel. Few countries have an
adequate supply of well trained emergency management professionals,
however. This situation is of great concern, and a number of countries
are addressing the lack of personnel by beginning training programs at
the university and postgraduate level. Istanbul Technical University in
Turkey and the Autonomous University of Nicaragua have recently
developed multidisciplinary programs in emergency management that
include both physical and social science components, and there are other
examples worldwide.

# *Quality of the Built Environment*

The quality of a country's infrastructure, housing, and business and
industrial installations affects the level of its disaster exposure and
the type of emergency management program required to meet its needs. For
example, the better the quality of the construction, the less need there
is for urban search and rescue techniques after earthquakes. Similarly,
good roads make it easier to evacuate large numbers of people from flood
and hurricane zones. However, it does not necessarily follow that
countries with higher quality infrastructure have uniformly lower hazard
vulnerability. Countries with large numbers of high rise office and
apartment buildings have an increased need for highly developed
firefighting capabilities, as do those with large chemical manufacturing
installations.

# *Civil Society*

Civil society is the aggregate of organizations that are independent of
the government. It includes religious groups, civic clubs such as the
Rotary International, political parties, and other groups organized
around specific interests. The opinion that mass publics have of their
government's abilities in general can affect the degree of trust they
will place in government agencies' pronouncements about its emergency
management efforts. When publics are well informed and have strong
beliefs in their rights as citizens, they are likely to demand more
competence from government emergency responders and other emergency
management agencies. NGOs and CBOs are ways in which civil society seeks
to change governmental priorities or supplement weak governmental powers
with its own capabilities. True civil society groups are not organized
by government agencies, as is the case with the local neighborhood fire
brigades in Taiwan, but are grass roots organizations that emerge
independently of government to meet specific needs such as flood
mitigation in a local watershed. They can exert substantial influence
and can even contribute to processes of regime change, as the
Communidades Eclesiais de Base (CEBs) in Latin America did. For this and
other reasons, governments might be wary of strengthening civil society.

Civil society is often strengthened during disaster response and
recovery operations, especially when government agencies prove
inadequate to the task and emergent organizations arise to take on
seemingly intractable problems. Such organizations were created in
Mexico City after the 1985 earthquake (Velázquez, 1986) and in Kobe,
Japan after the Great Hanshin earthquake of 1995 (Shaw & Goda, 2004). In
addition, existing organizations are strengthened as they extend their
missions to take on new disaster related tasks (Dynes, Quarantelli &
Wenger, 1990).

# *The Role of the Military in Society and Emergency Management*

The armed forces are involved in emergency management to some degree
almost everywhere. The military has a high degree of organization, and
in some countries that is enough to differentiate it from other
governmental agencies and NGOs. In addition, the armed forces usually
have more resources of the type needed for disaster response. These
resources include communications (radios), transportation (airplanes and
trucks), fuel (gasoline trucks), power (electric generators), water
(water trucks), shelter (tents), health care (mobile hospitals), and
food. Equally important is the organization into groups of large numbers
of strong young men who are accustomed to taking orders.

There is another reason for the strong influence of the military in
emergency management, however. This has to do with the nearly universal
roots of emergency management in civil defense---that is, the
organization, training, and equipping of nonmilitary personnel to repel
invaders. In many countries, the military retains a strong influence on
emergency management organizations. This usually leads to a strong
emphasis on disaster response using command and control models. The
problem is not that there are clear lines of authority. Rather, it is
that little or no opportunity exists for civilian input and little
attention is given to other emergency management needs such as disaster
recovery and hazard mitigation. In other countries, the military is part
of the emergency management system but is under civilian control. In
such cases, it cannot respond unless its presence has been requested.
The option is preferred, if only to avoid overdependence on the military
and risking a slide into an authoritarian government during a period of
national weakness. The term "civil defense" is frequently used for
emergency management agencies, but this does not always imply a historic
link to the national armed forces (Nikoluk, 2000).

### The Role of International Organizations

Countries vary widely in their approaches to foreign aid, including
policies on when and how to send help to disaster areas or become
involved in mitigation projects. Some countries have adopted a reactive
approach and confine themselves to offering assistance with search and
rescue or postdisaster clean up. By contrast, others have adopted a more
developmentalist perspective and assist in the formation of
intergovernmental institutions and programs. Major goals from this
perspective are to reduce the incidence of disasters and to increase the
capacity of poor countries in responding to emergencies.

Many regional and international institutions are devoted to promoting
improved emergency management practices. Noteworthy among them are the
United Nations and its International Strategy for Disaster Reduction
(UNISDR), the organization formed to carry on the goals of the U.N.
International Decade for Disaster Reduction. The UNISDR, together with
the Government of Japan, the World Meteorological Association, and the
Asian Disaster Reduction Center, published *Living with Risk: A Global
Review of Disaster Reduction Initiatives* online in 2002. This resource,
(www.unisdr.org/eng/about_isdr/bd-lwr-2004-eng.htm) is a valuable
compendium of information on emergency management worldwide.

In addition to the UN with its global range, there are regional
organizations supporting emergency management programs. The Organization
of American States has supported the development of disaster resistant
schools, hospitals, and road networks through its *Natural Hazards
Project*, a division of the Unit for Sustainable Development and
Environment. The Centro de Coordenación para la Prevención de Desastres
Naturales en América Central (*CEPREDENAC*) is an intergovernmental
organization dedicated to the development of emergency management in
Central America and the Dominican Republic. *La Red* is a network of
Latin American social scientists that publishes scholarly work on
disasters in the region, highlighting the issues of social vulnerability
and sustainable development. The *Pan American Health Organization*, the
regional office of the World Health Organization, has emphasized
retrofitting hospitals and strengthening public health programs to
improve emergency management practices throughout the region. It also
publishes an influential newsletter, *Disasters: Preparedness and
Mitigation in the Americas*, which can be found at the web site,
(www.paho.org/english/dd/ped/newsletter.htm). Other regions around the
world have similar organizations, such as the Asian Disaster
Preparedness Center based in Bangkok, Thailand, that provide mutual aid,
regional discussions of watershed management, and technology transfer.

The following sections of this chapter offer illustrative examples of
emergency management programs and practices in a selection of countries.
These examples are offered in order to show the wide variety of problems
and solutions facing the varied populations of the globe as they
confront hazardous environments.

# **Examples of Emergency Management Programs**

# *Preparedness: Landslide Evacuation in São Paulo, Brazil*

Brazil is a federal republic with strong states and wide regional
variation in topography, soils, vegetation, and climate. Historically,
the population centers have been in the mountainous coastal region. The
interior plains states experienced increasing development only after
construction of a new capital city, Brasília, in the 1960s. Brazil is
fortunate in its lack of exposure to major earthquakes or hurricanes,
two of the most catastrophic natural disasters in South America.
However, it does experience frequent natural disasters from floods,
droughts, landslides, and wildfires. There are also significant
technological hazards, due to the high degree of industrialization in
central and southern regions. Brazil has a significant nuclear industry
as well.

Emergency management in Brazil has developed to reflect the structure of
the government and the types of hazards to which it is exposed. At the
federal level, the 1988 Constitution mandated the "planning and
promotion of defense against public calamities, especially drought and
floods" (Ministério da Integração Nacional, 1999). Following several
major disasters, including floods, landslides, and fires in high rise
buildings, the state of São Paulo created its State Coordinator of Civil
Defense and established a framework of regional and municipal emergency
management offices (Marcondes, 2003). These offices vary in quality and
some municipalities have yet to establish their civil defense
committees.

The Plano de Prevenção da Defesa Civil (Civil Defense Preparedness Plan,
CDPP) was developed by the São Paulo State Coordinator of Civil Defense
Office as part of its effort to meet the goal of natural disaster
reduction during the IDNDR (UN Resolution 44/236). Landslides are the
most common cause of deaths from natural disasters in Brazil. Several
factors contribute to this situation, including environmental factors
such as the varied topography, high levels of rainfall, and soil types
that are prone to slipping. Social factors, which are even more
important, include high poverty levels, rapid urbanization, lack of
adequate housing in safe areas, and lack of education about the causes
of natural disasters (Macedo, Ogura & Santoro, 2002).

The CDPP was developed as a cooperative effort among technical agencies,
state and local governments, and local emergency management
professionals. It is based on the monitoring of watersheds for rainfall
levels, soil saturation, and weather forecasts. The first step in
implementing this plan was risk analysis and mapping of the state,
undertaken by the Geological Institute of the State of São Paulo and the
Institute for Technological Research at the University of São Paulo.
They determined that the Serra do Mar, a mountain range that follows the
coastline and is undergoing rapid urbanization, was the most vulnerable
region of the state. Consequently, landslide risk areas in the Serra
were mapped and local governments were involved in the risk analysis to
collect data on landfills and dumps, cuts, surface drainage patterns,
landslide scars, and the number and location of houses (Scachetti, no
date).

During the Southern Hemisphere's summer rainy season, roughly from
December through March, emergency managers in the Serra do Mar activate
the system and enter the *Observation* stage. During this stage of
operations, rainfall is closely monitored. These data are collected at
computerized collection stations scattered throughout the region and
transmitted by satellite to the state Coordinator's Office. When
rainfall reaches a critical level, defined by the Critical Precipitation
Coefficient (CPC, hourly rainfall intensity divided by antecedent
accumulated rainfall for the past 84 hours and multiplied by a
coefficient for the local area), the *Attention* stage is activated.
During this stage, field observers trained by local or state emergency
managers search the area for ground instability features. These include
cracks at the upper part of slopes, bulges at the bottom of slopes,
color and quantity changes of springs, falling of small stones, small
ground failures, and cracks in the walls of houses. When these signs are
present, the *Critical* stage is entered. During this stage, inhabitants
of the houses at immediate risk are evacuated. If conditions persist or
deteriorate, an *Emergency* is declared, and all inhabitants of the risk
area are evacuated. The plan includes a significant public education
component, with the State Coordinator of Civil Defense Office and
municipal governments producing a wide variety of print and video
materials. These include graphic and verbal descriptions of ground
instability features, as well as lists of what to do and whom to call in
case features indicating a dangerous situation are noted. Figure 13-1
shows a sample of the public education materials developed by CEDEC.

The CDPP, which was instituted in 1988, has been highly successful in
reducing the number of deaths due to landslides in the Serra do Mar.
There were 48 deaths in two cities alone (Cubatão and Ubatuba) in 1986
and 39 in Cubatão and Santos during 1987. During the first year of the
systems' operation, 17 people died, and during the years from 1989 to
1999, most years saw 0-3 deaths, with two years having 7 and 9 deaths
(1995 and 1996, respectively). The system has been so successful that it
is being implemented in another landslide prone region of the state, the
Serra da Mantiqueira in the Paraíba Valley (Ridente, et al., 2002).

**Figure 13-1.** Public Education Material.

![](media/image1.jpeg){width="6.486805555555556in"
height="4.200694444444444in"}

Source: Governo do Estado de São Paulo, 2000.

# *Location of Emergency Management: Restructuring in New Zealand*

New Zealand has significant exposure to floods, earthquakes, tsunamis,
and cyclones. Contrary to the popular image of New Zealanders as sheep
farmers, the population is 85% urban. Consistent with a worldwide wave
of decentralization efforts, New Zealand has made significant changes in
its legal framework for city governance since the middle of the 20^th^
Century. Beginning in the 1970s, the national government undertook many
reform efforts, several of which affected emergency management. These
reforms have followed a general government restructuring aimed at
localizing and privatizing government functions where possible, and
increasing governmental transparency and accountability overall.

The *Local Government Act* of 1974 and its 1996 amendment have increased
the responsibilities of local governments and authorized them to produce
and implement plans. Of particular interest are financial and
environmental management plans that enable local governments to better
control the quality of life in their communities. Sustainability
concerns drove the *Resource Management Act* of 1991, which promoted
performance based environmental management by local authorities. The act
specifically refers to natural hazards and hazardous substances, thus
integrating emergency management into land use planning and development.
Acts specifically aimed at emergency management include the *Hazardous
Substances and New Organisms Act* of 1996, the *Building Act* of 1991,
and the *Biosecurity Act* of 1993, among others. Figure 13-2 shows the
relationships between factors driving changes in emergency management
and the agencies, methods, and goals of change.

Figure 13-2. Emergency Management Drivers.

Source: Britton (2001)

The last major disaster in New Zealand was the Napier earthquake of
1931. As is common in all countries, the long time that had elapsed
since the previous major event had allowed a certain level of
complacency to arise (Britton, 2001). The Loma Prieta and Northridge
earthquakes were instrumental in shaking this complacency, and the
government undertook a thorough review of emergency management
legislation and agencies in the mid 1990s. One of the main reasons for
the review was the belief that emergency management in New Zealand must
shift away from a deterministic and reactionary orientation toward the
use of hazard assessment and risk identification to promote the
incorporation of hazard reduction and emergency management directly into
land use management and urban development. This effort included reports
(the Law Commission Report, 1991), conferences in Wellington during May
and November, 1994, and workshops (involving 26 emergency relevant
organizations in 1994) that together produced some fundamental changes
in emergency management policies and practices.

The review process identified several problems with the country's
emergency management system. These included the unrealistically high
public expectations of aid following disasters, coupled with reduced
central and local government capacity following the public sector
reforms of the 1990s. To address these problems, New Zealand's emergency
management sector needed to improve its ability to adapt to change,
learn from other countries' experiences, and better coordinate
administrative resources. In addition, the review process culminated in
the recommendation of a comprehensive outlook, incorporating all phases
of emergency management and all hazards, that should replace the
existing response focused approach.

As a result of the review process, a new Ministry of Emergency
Management (MEM) was created in 1999 with three operational units. The
first of these, the Sector Development and Education Unit, was given
responsibility for conceptual development and the translation of these
concepts into working models and practices. It also is responsible for
evaluating emergency management effectiveness. The second, the Policy
Unit, is responsible for framing strategic emergency management policies
and integrating the MEM with the work of other governmental agencies.
This unit took the lead responsibility in developing a new bill giving a
more adequate legislative foundation to national emergency management.
The third unit, Sector Support, works with local governments and
emergency services that are the point of service delivery to ensure its
effectiveness.

Legislation developed by their MEM was introduced into Parliament during
November, 2000, to reconfigure New Zealand's emergency management
practices, processes, and structures. The integration of emergency
management with other community goals such as growth, development and
sustainability is a major principle of the new legislative framework.
The goal is to "improve and promote community resilience and continuity
through comprehensive, integrated, and risk based emergency management"
(Britton & Clarke, 2000, p. 147).

Emergency management was declared a "core function" of central and local
governments in 1997. Consistent with the principle that emergencies are
best dealt with at the local level as much as possible, the new
legislation established a system of Emergency Management Groups (EMGs)
throughout the country. These groups are composed of several existing
local authorities with emergency management responsibilities, resulting
in fewer than 20 EMGs incorporating 86 local and regional authorities
(Britton & Clark, 2000). The designers believe that effectiveness will
be increased by grouping local authorities because there will be more
resources available. Moreover, the regional coverage of the groups will
allow for regional approaches to mitigation, preparedness, and response.

Through its reform process, New Zealand has sought a balance between
centralization and localization of emergency management. Policy,
strategic, and support functions remain at the national level while
local and regional authorities are given wide latitude for risk
assessment, mitigation, preparedness, and response functions. The
current statutes emphasize sustainable management of the physical and
social environment. They also use performance standards to avoid,
mitigate, and remedy adverse effects of social and economic activities.

### Reconstruction and Recovery: India

India is a large country with a population that is highly vulnerable to
disaster impacts caused by poverty and crowded, substandard living
conditions. The country suffers from frequent droughts and floods in
addition to earthquakes, tropical cyclones and, recently, tsunami. In
spite of the pervasiveness of the drought problem, famine has not been
as serious a problem as in some other countries. This appears to be due,
in part, to the famine relief systems begun under British colonial rule,
the existence of a free press that can publicize government failures,
and a transportation system that allows for rapid large migrations (Sen,
1981). The political system is federal, and primary responsibility for
disaster relief and reconstruction is delegated to state governments.
The national government supports their efforts with financial and
logistical support and also arranges for assistance from outside
agencies such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank.

As in many poor countries (and not so poor ones as well), emergency
management has been primarily reactive, concentrating on the relief of
high levels of distress after major disasters. There are few slack
resources available for planning, preparedness, and mitigation efforts,
so it is doubly important to include emergency management planning as an
integral part of reconstruction programs (Vatsa & Joseph, 2003).
External agencies are in a position to achieve this objective by
requiring disaster preparedness and hazard mitigation to be built into
any reconstruction efforts they fund, although they do not always
exercise this influence.

In September 1993 a M6.4 earthquake struck the southeastern part of
Maharashtra state. The epicenter was near Killari, a village about 500
km east of Mumbai, the state capital. The earthquake caused about 8000
deaths and 16,000 injuries, inflicted extensive damage to 1500 villages,
and completely destroyed 70 more. Although the state of Maharashtra is
the financial center of India and has a progressive, decentralized, and
competent government, outside resources were needed to help deal with
the disaster's effects. The outcome was a \$358 million reconstruction
project funded primarily by the World Bank in conjunction with the
Government of Maharashtra, the United Nations Development Program, and
others.

The Maharashtra Emergency Earthquake Reconstruction Program (MEERP) was
initially focused on reconstruction and rehabilitation, so it did not
include the development of a disaster management plan. One component of
the program, the *Technical Assistance, Training and Equipment*
component, was given the task of supporting disaster management.
However, no specific goals or timetables were set. The first step
towards developing a disaster management plan was a workshop held in May
1995, almost a year after the MEERP began. It was recommended that the
government of Maharashtra prepare disaster management plans for the
state and four districts, to be used as demonstration projects. In
addition, the state was advised to establish 15 functional committees to
develop the program. For various reasons, no immediate steps were taken.
When activity began in January 1996, the Disaster Management Council was
created and given the responsibility for plan development. The number of
districts involved was increased to six, and the number of committees
was reduced to five, organized along hazard lines. No committee was
created to deal with droughts, because it was felt that the state
already had adequate drought management plans.

The five hazard committees were useful in establishing a broad framework
for hazard assessment and response, but the state government developed
the actual plan in consultation with national and international
consultants who provided the needed substantive and political expertise.
In the end, the newly created Center for Disaster Management in the
state training institute developed plans for all 31 of the state's
districts rather than just the original six because UNDP contributed
additional funding. In addition, the Center developed a separate plan
for the city of Mumbai, because of this city's size and administrative
complexity.

The external funding and support facilitated the rapid development of
technical and administrative institutions for hazard management. It also
raised the prestige of those involved in developing disaster management
plans. However, the state government must maintain its support for this
nascent policy expertise and its associated programs in order to make
sure the effort has a long term payoff. In the short term, disaster
management planning gave the state of Maharashtra a level of expertise
that other Indian states used in later disasters. Moreover, the
Maharashtra project increased awareness at the national level of the
need for disaster management and planning throughout the country.
However, it was a top down, institutionally driven effort, which raises
questions about the long term commitment of local governments to plan
implementation.

The Maharashtra disaster management planning project contrasts with
another effort, the Patanka New Life Project, funded by a consortium of
government agencies and NGOs from India, Nepal, and Japan after the
Gujarat earthquake in 2001. This project was designed as a model for
community rehabilitation, with a strong focus on teaching new skills
that could mitigate the effects of future events. The project was
designed with input at each stage from the community selected, Patanka
Village in the Patan district of Gujarat state. Its main goals were to
rehabilitate lives of residents by providing safer houses, better
infrastructure, and "greater livelihood security". It also used a shake
table demonstration to build local capacity for earthquake safe
construction (Shaw, Gupta & Sharma, 2003).

The project involved a three stage process that was developed and
implemented over a two year period. The process began with a workshop in
March 2001 and continued beyond the end of 2002 with the creation of a
new mason's guild. Stage One established the principles for the project,
with a project team (representatives of NGOs, the state emergency
management agency, local engineers and masons) taking the lead
responsibility for this activity (see Table 13-1).

Stage Two implemented the Community Action and Implementation plans
developed during the consultations in Stage One. There were three steps:
needs assessment, capacity building, and implementation. The project
team worked closely with local leaders to win community trust and
develop strong local leadership to promote sustainable development
activities that would continue after the project itself ended. In order
to build local hazard mitigation capacity, local masons were trained in
building techniques that would allow them to continue using traditional,
affordable materials while building more earthquake resistant homes.
This allowed them to continue their traditional livelihoods,
contributing to the Stage Three goals of ensuring the sustainability of
the social systems established during the project. It also enabled the
community to take care of its own development needs and create a
resilient community.

The success of this type of intervention depends on close communication
and cooperation at every stage between the project team and the
community. The community must "own" the project in order for it to
succeed in achieving its goals. Although foreign donors provided
financial, technical, and logistic support, the project was developed
with a view to local needs and perceptions from the beginning. This
ensured its thorough integration with the community.

# *Mitigation: Land Use Planning in Colombia*

Colombia is a unitary republic with 32 political subdivisions called
departments. It has a high degree of vulnerability to several hazards,
including volcanoes, earthquakes, floods, and landslides. Figure 13-3
shows earthquake damage that occurred in 1999. Under its centralized
form of government, Colombia's national government wields many powers
that are delegated to the states in the US In the late 1980s, Colombia
began a major restructuring of its emergency management systems. In
1988, Law Nº 46 required the "efficient and opportune" management of
human, technical, administrative, and economic resources necessary to
provide for disaster prevention and response. Decree Law Nº 919 of 1989
organized the National System of Disaster Prevention and Response and
established the national level structures needed to implement the law.
In 1997 a Decree Law (Nº 93) set forth a National Plan addressing the
prevention, response, reconstruction, and "development" phases of
emergency management. It also addressed economic and legal issues,
education, and community participation, the integration of information
technology and communication systems across national, regional, and
local levels, inter-sectoral and inter-institutional coordination, and
scientific research, as well as program evaluation and fiscal control.
The National Plan was finally approved by the National Committee in 1997
(Martínez, et al., 1997).

**Table 13-1.** Checklist for Sustainable Community Recovery.

  ---------------- ------------------ ------------------ -----------------
  Stage I          Stage II                              Stage III

  Establish        Needs Assessment   Capacity Building  Local
  Principles                                             Institutional
                                                         Strengthening

  Rehabilitation   Dialogue           Training of        Integration with
  linked to                           masons, labor      government
  development                                            development
                                                         schemes

  Rehabilitation   Training and       Building community Creating assets
  to be            demonstration      confidence in      for security
  participatory                       disaster resistant 
                                      practices          

  To follow        Community feedback Strengthening      Ensuring means
  minimum                             institutional      for continuous
  established                         structures at      capacity building
  standards                           community level    process

  Rehabilitation   Damage assessments Social             Providing new
  aimed at                            mobilization       opportunities for
  reducing                                               growth
  vulnerability                                          

  Promote          Identifying        Social calendar    
  empowerment      suitable options                      

  To be flexible   Preparation of     Joint action       
                   local plans                           

  Cooperation      Community          Prepare sector     
  among            preferences        specific action    
  stakeholders                        plans              

  Improve quality  Mechanism for      One-on-one         
  of life          joint action with  dialogue           
                   the community                         

  Strategic        Identifying areas  Flexible approach  
  planning         of capacity                           
                   building                              

  Mission          Meeting with       Guidance and       
                   community,         supervision of     
                   involving          ongoing            
                   government         construction       

  Aims and         Adapting           Role clarification 
  objectives       government         and transparency   
                   guidelines                            

  Establish team   Identifying        Establishing       
                   confidence         infrastructure for 
                   building measures  local storage of   
                                      raw materials      

                   Making the first   Establishing       
                   move to forge      systems for        
                   trust with the     monitoring and     
                   community          evaluation of      
                                      construction work  
  ---------------- ------------------ ------------------ -----------------

Source: Shaw, Gupta & Sharma, 2003

The National Plan has three goals: disaster reduction/prevention,
effective disaster response, and rapid recuperation of affected areas.
The first of these goals specifically includes development planning at
the sectoral and regional level, as well as land use planning at the
municipal level. The law recommends a number of programs, including
integrated environmental policy and disaster prevention. Information on
threats, risks, and vulnerabilities should be incorporated into
national, regional, and local environmental profiles. Moreover,
environmental management plans and local urban development must
incorporate this information. Basic sanitation infrastructure and other
preventive measures for biological and industrial hazards should be
established, along with watershed management and wildfire reduction
plans.

In pursuit of these objectives, the Territorial Development Law (Nº 388
of 1997) includes a number of provisions related to natural hazard risk
assessment, land use planning, and urban development. The legislation
provides detailed directions on the elements to be included in land use
plans. First, urban planning actions are defined to include the
identification and placement of infrastructure that provides for the
treatment of hazardous waste, identification of areas unsuitable for
human occupation due to its exposure to natural hazards or other
unhealthy conditions, and the identification of areas in need of
recuperation and management in order to prevent disasters (Article 8).

**Figure 13-3.** Earthquake damage, Armenia Colombia, 1999

![](media/image2.jpeg){width="6.5in" height="4.876388888888889in"}

Source: World Vision International.

In addition, municipalities and districts are to consider measures
related to the conservation and protection of the environment such as
mapping zones subject to risk of natural hazards and developing
management strategies for such areas (Article 10). Both urban and rural
land use plans are to include identification of risk areas (Articles 13
and 14) and their designation as protected areas not subject to
development. Expropriation is to be allowed for the purposes of
resettlement of populations living in risk areas (Article 58) and fines
are set for the illegal occupation of risk areas (Article 104).
Responsibility for keeping risk areas free of settlements is given to
the chief executives of municipalities and districts (Article 121).

Under the provisions of the Territorial Planning Law, local governments
are to develop, implement, and enforce their own plans, but the plans
must contain all the required elements and follow the guidance of the
national government's law. It is remarkable that the requirements of
this law are more stringent than those that many states in the US place
on their local governments. Colombia's Territorial Planning Law is
particularly interesting in the way it incorporates hazard mitigation
directly into the fabric of local land use planning.

# *Addressing Hazmat through Land Use Planning: Europe's Seveso Directives*

Management of chemical hazards in the US has been based on the principle
of the community's Right to Know as outlined in SARA Title III. The
constriction of free access to critical information about chemical
hazards after the 9/11 terrorist attacks has exposed the fragility of
this right and the weakness of a policy relying on knowledgeable
citizens to manage chemical hazards in their communities. The European
Union has taken a slightly different approach, as outlined in its Seveso
Directives. While incorporating many of the community Right to Know
provisions in SARA Title III, the Seveso Directives go further in
requiring the active dissemination of information to the public and the
use of land use planning to manage chemical hazards (Eijndhoven, et al.,
1994; Parker, 1999).

The Seveso accident, after which the directives are named, occurred in
Seveso, Italy, in 1976. At that time, a chemical plant manufacturing
pesticides and herbicides released a cloud containing
tetrachlorodibenzoparadioxin (TCDD, or dioxin) into the surrounding
environment. There were no immediate fatalities, but kilograms of this
extremely hazardous substance were deposited over about ten square miles
of land and vegetation, resulting in the evacuation of 600 families and
the treatment of some 2000 people for dioxin poisoning. This incident
resulted in the adoption of the first Seveso Directive by the European
Council in 1982. Seveso I was amended in response to the Bhopal, India
accident in 1984 and the Sandoz warehouse accident in Basel, Switzerland
in 1986. Finally, a review of the directive in 1993 resulted in an
expanded Seveso Directive called Seveso II being adopted in December
1996 and becoming effective in February 1999.

The goal of Seveso II is to prevent hazardous materials accidents and,
if they do occur, to limit their health, safety, and environmental
consequences through restrictions on the storage and processing of
hazardous materials. Establishments that hold small quantities of these
substances are controlled by other legislation relating to health,
safety and the environment. "Lower tier" establishments with more than
the minimum quantities and "upper tier" establishments that hold larger
quantities of hazardous materials are covered by requirements
appropriate to the quantities involved. Seveso II does not cover nuclear
safety issues, the transport of hazardous materials, temporary storage
areas, or pipeline transport (European Commission, 2003) although the
implementation of Seveso II guidance on land use planning "might start a
process among the planning authorities which in the long term could
generally result in taking into account transportation risk in an
appropriate manner" (Christou, Amendola & Smeder, 1999). The chemical
industry has already adopted voluntary programs for the prevention of
chemical transport accidents and for cooperating with local authorities
on emergency preparedness and response.

Seveso II requires the operators of each establishment to develop
internal emergency plans and supply them to local authorities who use
them to develop external emergency plans. Internal plans must be
developed in consultation with plant personnel and external plans must
be developed in consultation with the public. Information is to be
shared with the public, not just passively by making it available upon
request, but by actively distributing literature about actions to be
taken in case of an accident. Accidents must be reported to the
Community Documentation Center on Industrial Risks at the Major Accident
Hazards Bureau of the European Union. (mahbsrv.jrc.it/). This Web site
has guidance documents for safety management systems, safety reports,
inspections, public information, and land use planning. Although these
documents do not constitute legal requirements, they do represent the
views of all the E.U. member states.

By requiring the integration of major accident hazards into the land use
planning process, Seveso II establishes a legal framework in member
states for maintaining appropriate distances of establishments that use
hazardous materials from residential, public use, or environmentally
important areas. Member states are to place controls on the siting of
new establishments, modifications to existing establishments, and new
developments (including roads) in the vicinity of existing
establishments that might lead to an increased risk of hazard exposures.

Member states have exhibited varying degrees of progress in their
implementation of the Seveso II Directive. Many northern European
countries have already developed land use planning procedures for
hazardous facilities, but southern European countries have lagged
behind. There are three basic approaches that have been adopted: tables
of "appropriate distances" based on experience with hazardous materials
and land use compatibility, a "consequence based" approach that uses
assessments of the possible consequences of accidents, and a "risk
based" approach that integrates the probability of an accident's
occurrence with the consideration of possible consequences in
calculating vulnerable zones. In addition, some countries are still
developing their hazardous materials management systems. These
approaches are not mutually exclusive and could be applied to various
categories of establishments. The use of the different approaches to
calculate the necessary zones might or might not lead to very different
results, depending on the inclusion of other considerations such as cost
effectiveness in the analysis (Christou, et al., 1999).

The first approach is used in Germany and Sweden. In Germany, the
limited zones require no risk to humans or the environment from
hazardous facilities. The "consequence based" approach is used in France
and the French speaking area of Belgium and uses the same basis for
calculating vulnerable zones as in US emergency planning. The risk based
approach is used in the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the Flemish
speaking region of Belgium, as well as in such non-EU countries as
Australia and Switzerland. Table 13-2 shows the zoning scheme developed
by the Health and Safety Executive of the United Kingdom in fulfillment
of its obligations under the Seveso II Directive.

*Civil Society: The Chi Chi earthquake in Taiwan*

Taiwan's democracy developed from the ground up, beginning in the 1980s
with the legalization of opposition political parties and continuing
through the election of the first opposition president in the 2000
elections (Rigger, 1999). In late summer of the year before these
historic elections, a strong earthquake hit the north central part of
the island. The M7.6 earthquake caused over 2,400 deaths and more than
11,000 injuries requiring medical attention. It also destroyed or
damaged many thousands of buildings and caused economic losses estimated
at \$14 billion (US), or 3.3% of GDP.

Taiwan had developed a sophisticated seismic network that provided
information on the location, magnitude and shaking intensities of the
earthquake to central government officials within two minutes of the
earthquake's impact at 1:47 a.m. on September 21, 1999. This activated
the national emergency management system, so representatives of
essential agencies assembled in Taipei to constitute the Central
Disaster EOC. Unfortunately, this group was hampered by a lack of
detailed information from the impact area. Although the central
government immediately knew the earthquake's magnitude and epicenter,
damage to roads and communications links caused major delays in the
transmission of information about actual effects and local needs to the
central government. Because Taiwan's government is highly centralized,
the lack of resources and experience at the local government level acted
together with the central government's lack of information about local
needs to hamper the response and recovery effort.

**[Table 13-2.]{.underline}** U.K. Health and Safety Executive Siting
Policy within Consultation Zones.

  ----------------- ------------------ ------------------ -----------------
  Category of       Inner Zone         Middle Zone        Outer Zone
  Development       Individual Risk    Individual Risk    Individual Risk
                    Exceeds 10^-5^     Exceeds 10^-6^     Exceeds
                                                          0.3x10^-6^

  Highly vulnerable Advice against     Specific           Specific
  or very large     development        assessment         assessment
  public facilities                    necessary (advice  necessary
  (schools,                            against if \>25    
  hospitals, old                       people)            
  persons'                                                
  accommodation,                                          
  sports stadium)                                         

  Residential       Advice against     Specific           Allow development
  (housing, hotel,  development (\>25  assessment         
  holiday           people)            necessary (advice  
  accommodation)                       against if \>75    
                                       people)            

  Public            Specific           Specific           Allow development
  attractions       assessment         assessment         
  (substantial      necessary (advice  necessary (advice  
  retail, community against if \>100   against if \>300   
  and leisure       people)            people)            
  facitilies)                                             

  Low density       Allow development  Allow development  Allow development
  (small factories,                                       
  open playing                                            
  fields)                                                 
  ----------------- ------------------ ------------------ -----------------

Source: Christou, et al. (1999).

Nonetheless, the response at the disaster site was massive and,
eventually, effective. There were many totally and partially collapsed
buildings, leading to a tremendous need for urban search and rescue
(USAR). Fortunately, there are many volunteer mountaineering groups
specializing in wilderness rescue located in the areas that were hit
hardest by the earthquake. These groups, such as the International
Association of Search and Rescue of the Republic of China (IASAR/ROC),
activated their members immediately and worked together with local
firefighters and an influx of foreign search and rescue teams that
followed. Most of the more than 5000 live rescues were performed by
local volunteers and firefighters before the foreign teams could even
arrive. As often happens after disasters, logistical, geopolitical, and
bureaucratic problems delayed the outsiders' arrival. This reinforces
the importance of local response capabilities and the need for local and
national governments to plan for the integration of local volunteers in
the crucial first hours after a major disaster.

The IASAR/ROC was founded in 1981 and now has about 10,000 members
organized into local teams of 50-90 people. The paid staff is small,
about eight people at the central office in Taoyuan and one each in the
division offices around the island. Members pay annual dues of about
\$60 (US) and receive subsidies from local businesses and religious
groups to buy equipment and pay for training. They had experience with
mountain rescues and also had participated in rescue efforts alongside a
team from the US the year before the earthquake, when a high rise in
Taipei collapsed. This effort had given them exposure to the USAR
techniques that were needed to respond to the 9/21 earthquake (Prater &
Wu, 2002).

The educational infrastructure of the affected area was severely
damaged, and government resources were insufficient to repair the nearly
800 primary and secondary schools that were damaged and destroyed. In
Nantou County, where the epicenter was located, 75% of the schools had
to close. Here, as in other disasters, NGOs stepped in to fill the gaps.
The Taiwan branch of the International Red Cross committed funds to
rebuild 14 primary and middle schools at a cost of \$15 million (US).

Local governments, churches, and other organizations rebuilt some
schools, but many were rebuilt by the Buddhist Compassion Relief Tz' Chi
Foundation. This group, founded by a Taiwanese Buddhist nun, has a long
history of responding to disasters worldwide and was in the process of
assisting in the relief and reconstruction effort after Turkey's Kocaeli
earthquake when its own country was hit. Members of the organization
immediately set up vegetarian soup kitchens to supplement the
nonvegetarian meals served by other volunteer groups. Tz' Chi members
also began collecting equipment, clothes and money for the victims. The
organization provided tents and more substantial temporary housing, but
their most extensive recovery effort was the reconstruction of 53
schools. Their effort was unique because it featured one-of-a-kind,
locally appropriate and environmentally sensitive architectural designs
for each school, instead of using a single design for all schools.
Architects met with the community members and studied the school sites
to develop designs that incorporated local cultural motifs and
environmental features, as well as meeting the communities' educational
needs. The designs were required to be earthquake resistant and
incorporate natural ventilation and lighting to keep students
comfortable while using a minimum amount of energy. Figure 13-4 shows
the reinforcement being installed before pouring concrete for one of the
new schools.

The government's social services were also stretched to the limit and
beyond after the Chi Chi earthquake. The Presbyterian Church in Taiwan
developed a program to supplement Nantou County's six professional
social workers (for a population of 544,762) by helping minority
communities with their unique recovery needs (Prater & Wu, 2002). There
are few minorities in Taiwan, but there are several thousand members of
aboriginal tribes. These live in isolated villages in the mountainous
areas of central Taiwan that were heavily damaged by the earthquake.
Community Recuperation Centers were created to provide these communities
with counseling, day care for children and seniors, help with navigating
the bureaucracy to acquire recovery assistance, and economic development
projects. In many cases, local workers were hired and given the
necessary training to staff the centers. The response and recovery
efforts of these volunteers, both individuals and groups, provided
significant assistance in promoting the full recovery of households in
earthquake impact zone.

# **Web sites**

-   European Union (EU): europa.eu.int

-   International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction
    (IDNDR)/International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR):
    www.unisdr.org

-   Organization of American States (OAS): www.oas.org

-   Pan American Health Organization (PAHO): www.paho.org

-   Centro de Coordenación para la Reducción de los Desastres Naturales
    en América Central (CEPREDENAC): www.cepredenac.org

-   Asian Disaster Preparedness Center (ADPC): www.adpc.net

-   La Red: www.desenredando.org.

**Figure 13-4.** Rebuilding Begins in Taiwan

> ![](media/image3.jpeg){width="4.166666666666667in"
> height="6.709722222222222in"}

Source: Buddhist Compassion Relief Tz' Chi Foundation

[^1]: ^1^ GDP/capita: Gross Domestic Product is a measure of the total
    value of goods and services produced within a territory. For
    purposes of comparison, it is usually expressed in per capita terms,
    to adjust for different numbers of people living within the
    territories in question.

[^2]: ^2^ HDI: The Human Development Index is a combination of life
    expectancy at birth, literacy and school enrollment rates, and
    GDP/capita. Detailed information on how to calculate HDI values is
    available at hdr.undp.org/.

[^3]: ^3^ Gini Index: Measures inequality over the entire distribution
    of income or consumption, with 0 representing a perfectly equal
    distribution and 100 representing perfect inequality. In other
    words, in a country with a Gini index of 0 everyone would have the
    same amount of income or consume the same amount of goods. Details
    on the Gini index can be found at hdr.undp.org.