Consumer complaint received 2022-07-26
Company: BANK OF AMERICA, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION
State: NJ
Product: Money transfer, virtual currency, or money service
Sub-product: Mobile or digital wallet
Issue: Fraud or scam

Complaint:
To whom it may concern : I am writing to share my story of a XXXX fraud scam. I have been a Bank of America client for 20 years, and have come to trust the bank 's marketing of consumer fraud protection. I was told by my bank that XXXX was a safe tool for money transfers. I was scammed by a fraudster who took advantage of this trust, and who knew that both Bank of America and XXXX ( a product of XXXX XXXX XXXX  ) would have opportunities to prevent or reverse the scam but would repeatedly fail to do so. Specifically : 1. Bank of America as a whole bank brand advertises fraud protection constantly. As a customer, my expectation has been repeatedly set that Bank of America products come with fraud protection, and yet they have built a service ( XXXX ) into their online banking and mobile banking apps that comes with XXXX protection for consumers. 
2. Bank of America and XXXX XXXX XXXX make insufficient effort to warn account holders of this lack of protection. It wasn't clear to me until I was scammed that I would have absolutely no recourse, yet Bank of America customer service all but laughed in my face when I asked if they could help recover my funds. 
3. Bank of America and XXXX XXXX XXXX apparently make no use of their data to detect what should have been clearly fraudulent activity on my account : First, multiple declined transfer requests should have prompted an account lockdown. Second, a third-party link should not have the ability to directly confirm a transfer. Third, it should have been obvious from my account history and/or from the activity of the fraudster 's account that this was a suspicious transfer, yet no special authorization was required to drain my account of nearly its entire balance. 

My expectation as a customer of the bank is that I will be protected from fraudulent activity. The bank advertises and promotes fraud protection constantly, but now that I have been a victim of fraud, consumer protections are nowhere to be found from either Bank of America or XXXX XXXX XXXX. This deception and failure of responsibility from my bank feels in many ways like an even worse violation than the scam itself. 

On Monday evening XX/XX/XXXX I received a call which showed as " BOA '' on my caller ID. I then received a text and then another phone call from the same party. Believing I was being contacted by my bank, I answered the call. The caller addressed himself as " XXXX XXXX, ID number XXXX. '' He informed me that someone had made a fraudulent {$3500.00} XXXX transfer from my Bank of America personal checking account. He kept saying he was checking a few things out because there was a high volume of fraudulent attempts - I was seeing these transfer requests and declining them on my end, which corroborated his story. He then said, " let 's try one more thing, '' texted me a link, and instructed me on the phone call to click the link to complete a " test '' on my account. I clicked the link, which was in fact a link to confirm the transfer request. This was the first violation, where Bank of America and XXXX XXXX XXXX inexplicably have allowed a link sent by a third party to point customers to confirm a transfer request. It seems obvious to me that I should have to go directly to my online banking account or app to do something like this. 

I received a text message saying thank you for your confirmation on this transfer. I immediately panicked ; the fraudster on the other end of the phone actually giggled. He told me that because it was after bank hours I would have to wait until morning for the " test '' to be reversed. When I awoke, I called Bank of America directly and told a customer service agent what had happened. I was clearly in a state of panic but the agent lacked any empathy, saying only that I had been scammed and that I need to make a claim with the fraud department. The fraud department was so busy that they had to call me back - and when they did, I was already at a local Bank of America branch seeking any assistance they might be able to provide. All Bank of America 's representatives could tell me is that they would " not likely '' be able to protect me or reclaim my lost funds. 

Having been abandoned by Bank of America, and knowing the fraudulent transfer was completed via XXXX, I decided to contact XXXX directly. Of course Bank of America and the XXXX user interface intentionally obfuscate the fact that XXXX is run by a company called " XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, '' something I would not learn until much later. All I could do to find XXXX contact information was to search XXXX. I called the phone number that I found, and I was pleased to reach a live person, who identified himself as " XXXX. '' I explained the situation and he told me not to worry - he had the power to help, and that there would be a few steps to begin the process. First, he had me install XXXX ( a screen sharing app ) so that he could record our interaction for his management to review. With my screen being shared to XXXX, he had me sign into my checking account and go to XXXX to do a test transfer for {$220.00}. At this point I have already exceeded my max in XXXX transfers from the prior scam. Seeing this, XXXX sent me a text and said he will be in touch once he is able to review my case with his superiors. He collected my email address, had me log out of Bank of America and all social media accounts while he watched my screen, and told me that my device had been hacked and that I was being monitored from multiple locations before we ended the call. 

Feeling suspicious and beginning to sense that something was wrong, I used a family member 's phone to try contacting XXXX again - this time, finding a different phone number, I reached an automated system. It became apparent that this was the actual contact for the XXXX operators, and that the human I had reached earlier was in fact another fraudster. I was sick to my stomach, realizing that Bank of America had yet again failed to give me the information I needed to know who operates XXXX or how to get in contact with them. When I learned about XXXX XXXX XXXX I was even more disappointed- why was I able to reach a FRAUDULENT customer service agent so easily, yet calling the real XXXX provider only got me to a brick wall of an automated system? 

I have closed my accounts, changed all of my passwords, enrolled in personal credit monitoring services at my own expense, and updated billing information at all the places I had my Bank of America card on file. The process has only begun for me to earn back the money I've lost. What may take even longer is the process for me to heal the psychological wound that this has left behind. I hope that this letter helps to inform other consumers, the regulatory authorities, banks offering XXXX to their customers, and XXXX XXXX XXXX of the very real fraud risk being willfully left open right now. I only feel fortunate that I am young enough to recover financially ; I can't imagine how this wide-open fraud opportunity is impacting the elderly and other vulnerable individuals who have been deceived into trusting their bank. 

Best, XXXX XXXX

Company public response: Company has responded to the consumer and the CFPB and chooses not to provide a public response
Company response to consumer: Closed with monetary relief