Consumer complaint received 2022-12-21
Company: REGIONS FINANCIAL CORPORATION
State: FL
Product: Checking or savings account
Sub-product: Checking account
Issue: Managing an account
Sub-issue: Funds not handled or disbursed as instructed

Complaint:
XX/XX/XXXX From : XXXX XXXX XXXX and XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX. 
XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX FL XXXX XXXX, XXXX XXXX, XXXX Re : $ XXXX Wire Fraud. XX/XX/XXXX My Regions online bank account permissions were changed to allow WIRE TRANSFERs out of my bank account without my permission. Then money was wired of of my bank accounts without my permission. 

Wire Fraud Fraudulent wires originated from a Florida residents, Florida corporations bank accounts, doing business with a Regions Bank ( licensed in Alabama ) at a Florida Branch, Scammers Hackers are Florida Residents with Florida addresses who took the money illegally using XXXX accounts with account holder Florida address on wire instructions. 

What FLORIDA law enforcement agency has jurisdiction over this crime? 

What agency regulates banking in FLORIDA? 

How can somebody just CLICK and send a wire from an account that never been able to send a wire previously? And do so from a ip address that has never been used to access the banks online portal? 





We NEVER gave our account numbers or login information. 

On XXXX  XX/XX/XXXX my wife XXXX XXXX XXXX and I, XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX were defrauded of {$210000.00}. This happened by the FRAUDSTERS wiring money from three business accounts which never had the ability to wire funds without personally appearing at the branch. One account was the security deposit account for our hundreds of rental units the XXXX operate. 

XXXX and XXXX both received phone calls from hackers about XXXX XXXX  for XXXX and XXXX for XXXX. XXXX was traveling in XXXX XXXX XXXX. XXXX got the call while riding a bicycle in XXXX XXXX. 
The hackers had access to our bank account when the phone calls were made to XXXX and XXXX. The caller claimed to be a Regions Bank Fraud Agent. To verify his identity, he was able to tell us our account numbers, FEIN numbers, Balances and recent transactions. The caller claimed suspicious activity on our account in Texas and gave bogus fraud charges happening on our accounts as examples to gain our trust. He texted us a transaction to respond with 1 for YES and 2 for NO if this transaction is fraud. While he was on the phone with us. He then demanded that we escalate the fraud to next tier by typing the case number into our phone. XXXX XXXX realized that this was forwarding her phone and unforwarded he phone after 5 minutes, XXXX spent 15min trying to unforwarded his XXXX XXXX . 

XXXX then called the Regions Bank located at XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX. XXXX FL. XXXX spoke with XXXX XXXX. XXXX logged into XXXX accounts and said he saw no suspicious activity to any accounts. He stated no money had been moved. He suggested to change passwords. 

XXXX then called XXXX XXXX in our office and XXXX gave XXXX her login and password and asked XXXX to CHANGE the PASSWORD because of a suspected hacker. XXXX changed the password XXXX times around XXXX. 

XXXX called XXXX XXXX at the office at XXXX XXXX  after he unforwarded his phone by XXXX. XXXX then rode his bicycle to the XXXX XXXX XXXX arriving around XXXX XXXX  and met XXXX and discussed suspicious calls to XXXX and XXXX. XXXX tried to call Regions Fraud Dept at the toll-free number but cant remember if he got through all the prompts. A call was made to the local Regions branch in XXXX XXXX where employee XXXX XXXX said to get to the XXXX XXXX Regions branch immediately. XXXX and XXXX arrived at XXXX XXXX. Simultaneously XXXX told XXXX to find a Regions Branch and she arrived at the XXXX XXXX Regions branch and spoke to XXXX XXXX. 

XXXX and XXXX were speaking with each other on speaker phone in front of XXXX and XXXX. XXXX and XXXX both changed the Login and Password to XXXX and XXXX online credentials simultaneously from their Regions Computers at their desk between XXXX and XXXX. 

XXXX and XXXX reviewed our accounts and said NO Activity, NO Pending, XXXX even looked for new login credentials, new permissions, new devices and the last time somebody was logged into the account. They both said all safe. 


We both left the branches at XXXX XXXX XXXX. Thinking our accounts were SAFE. We both never even logged in to our Regions accounts with our new credentials. While XXXX was driving home from XXXX XXXX FL to XXXX XXXX, she received the TXT msg from Regions notifying her that money was leaving our bank accounts. This message came at XXXX XXXX. XXXX and XXXX Both called regions toll free as the local branch was closed. XXXX called to inquire HOW the money could be leaving our account and he was told of the WIRE transfer, something that the account never had the ability to do. XXXX and XXXX both requested that the accounts be locked immediately something never offered to us at the local branch. 

At XXXX XX/XX/XXXX XXXX XXXX and XXXX arrived at the Regions Bank to report the FRAUD and figure out what happened. 

Apparently for Regions Business accounts users can login in online and click to enable wire transfers out of the REGIONS BANK with only a TXT or Phone verification ( reason for the XXXX forward of our phones ). This is something never explained to us, as we DID NOT want this service and would have liked for an authorized signor to produce identification at the branch before such change was made to the account. 

So Regions waited 48 hours to get the Regions Wire transaction data that is still missing the TIME of the wire. We still do NOT have the wire TIMES. We feel that is very important. As we think we could have notified the receiving Bank sooner increasing our chances of recovery. 










Regions states that they have no financial responsibility. I feel that they do have financial responsibility for several reasons. 

Our complaint : 1 ) Regions Bank allowed three wires to leave our accounts electronically. This is a service that was NOT available on our accounts. I know because I have called in the past and was told that wires need to be originated at the branch. The hacker used a back door in the regions electronic banking site to gain wire transfer access. This and the regions suspicious activity monitor should have realized 1 ) backdoor wire access from a NEW device, new IP address, login credential changing quickly etc. 
2 ) Both XXXX and XXXX rushed to the local Branches immediately when we realized that we were compromised, but first we reset our passwords ourselves. XXXX went to XXXX XXXX XXXX and had XXXX XXXX of Regions reset the user name and password at XXXX XXXX  from her system computer in the Regions Branch. We were told that there is no activity and our account is safe. XXXX XXXX went to the XXXX XXXX Regions Branch and had XXXX XXXX of Regions reset his user name and password from his Regions bank computer at XXXX XXXX. XXXX and XXXX of Regions looked in all accounts and said NO activity, He was speaking with XXXX on speaker phone. Additionally, he checked logins and said no new devices have logged into these accounts. Then while I was sitting in his office, he saw my phone blowing up with phone and text messages from the hackers and he reassured me that the reason that they are calling is they do NOT have what they need to get into your account. He said when they get in and take your money they will stop calling and texting. At XXXX XXXX the wire went through, after regions representatives changed the user and pw on the regions System. A ) Regions has responsibility because our online accounts were not supposed to be able to wire to outside banks. B ) Regions has responsibility because they had they reset the passwords and user names themselves and allowed a hacker to penetrate their system without any correspondence from the hacker to us. C ) Both Regions representative did NOT notify us that our account WIRE privileges have changed between XXXX and XXXX, and the change was made from a new device logging into the system. We both did NOT leave the branches until XXXX XX/XX/XXXX. D ) Regions notified us of a wire transfer at XXXX when it actually happened XXXX XXXX. their delay caused us to be unable to STOP the wire on the other end and delayed action by 18 hours. 
3 ) It took them 48 hours to produce the wire transfer receipts. Withholding this information delayed in providing law enforcement agencies with the proper information. Yet still almost one week later we still do NOT have the Wire Times, SWIFT codes, recipient bank routing numbers 4 ) When you look at the WIRE transfer receipts you will notice that they do NOT show the time of the wire that is conveniently cutoff. 
5 ) Im sure the Local Regions bank representatives XXXX, XXXX and XXXX have my best interest. However, I feel REGIONS corporate has withheld and is still withholding information. 
Regions Fraud Department XXXX XXXX office XXXX cell says that I will need a Subpoena to get the following information from Regions IP Address used to complete FRAUD Website Address used I would like the time on XX/XX/XXXX that the account permissions were changed to allow wire transfers without physically showing up at local branch to initiate a wire transfer via a regions representative? 

What login was used for this wire permissions account change? Profile Name, UN, PW, and IP address and time. 

The IP Address that initiated this change? 

The time of the Fraudulent Wire transfers? I think that you said XXXX XXXX  XXXX XXXX... XXXX EST. Please confirm. 

What login was used for wire transfers? Profile Name, UN, PW, and IP address I would like a record of all the login credentials changes for XXXX and XXXX accounts on XX/XX/XXXX to XXXX XXXX to include Account user, UN , PW, NEW UN , NEW PW, date, time, Device, device location, IP address. 

XXXXXXXX XXXX PW was changed at approximately XXXX XXXX  on XX/XX/XXXX from XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX on a XXXX  laptop to try and protect the account. 

XXXX at the XXXX XXXX Regions Branch changed the UN and PW to XXXX 's online credentials at approximately XXXX XXXX  XX/XX/XXXX. to protect the account. 

XXXX at the XXXX XXXX Regions Branch changed the UN and PW to XXXX online credentials at approximately XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXXXX/XX/XXXX. 


Note : The address on the XXXX XXXX is a condo that XXXX XXXX owns. XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX FL XXXX. XXXX has never heard of the name XXXX XXXX.

Company public response: Company has responded to the consumer and the CFPB and chooses not to provide a public response
Company response to consumer: Closed with monetary relief