Consumer complaint received 2021-08-11
Company: BANK OF AMERICA, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION
State: CA
Product: Money transfer, virtual currency, or money service
Sub-product: Domestic (US) money transfer
Issue: Fraud or scam

Complaint:
On XX/XX/2021, I received a phone call from what I thought was an XXXX customer service representative, informing me that there had been some fraudulent charges on my XXXX account and that I needed to take action on several of my online accounts to ensure my online security. The caller ID on my XXXX  indicated the call as " XXXX '', which initially led me to believe this was actually XXXX, not a scammer. 

The short story is that over the course of about an hour on the phone with this scam operation, I was convinced to transfer {$3300.00} from my Bank of America mobile app to the XXXX scammers via XXXX on XX/XX/2021. Specifically, I transferred {$2400.00} to " XXXX '' via an email given to me on the phone and {$950.00} to " XXXX '' via another email address provided on the phoe. 

While I had doubts about the authenticity of the real identity of the scammer from the initial phone conversation very early in the phone call, this was a sophisticated scam operation that had me fooled until too late. Every time I questioned something and asked to be transferred to supervisor, which took place several times, I kept getting transferred to people with increasingly better scamming skills as I really believed I was talking to actual XXXX employees. Only until I merged a phone call with a real XXXX representative to the scammer did I realize that I was hoodwinked, but this was after I had transferred funds. After the scammers reaching the near credit limit of {$3500.00}, they continued to try to convince me to go to a local BofA branch, which is when I merged the call with an XXXX rep. 

Immediately after transferring my funds, I called up Bank of Americas Fraud Dept to create a claim. My claim number is : XXXX. 

Additional details : - One of the first things the scammer had me do was ask for remote access to my XXXX. I understand now that you are never supposed to grant device access at the request of unknown companies and individuals, but numerous times I have called XXXX, XXXX, and XXXX and given their techs access to my desktop screen to troubleshoot, so that is why I didnt believe this request was out of the ordinary. When I gave remote access, the call was transferred to another person who then had me to my Settings on my XXXX to show payments were transferred in the amount of {$4500.00}, indicating that some scammer had comprised my entire phone and therefore he needed to access my BofA account. I was transferred to another person who claimed to be a liaison between BoFA and XXXX. I was directed to XXXX to transfer funds and was told that these were just tests to make sure my account wasnt compromised and that monies would be transferred back. Although I was dubious, I had never used XXXX before and assumed that this was a variation of my online checking services, where I could put a stop payment if I was unsure of the transaction. I had no idea that XXXX was similar to XXXX or XXXX, where once a payment was authorized, there was no way to stop the transaction from going through.

Company public response: Company has responded to the consumer and the CFPB and chooses not to provide a public response
Company response to consumer: Closed with explanation