Consumer complaint received 2024-01-06
Company: WELLS FARGO & COMPANY
State: CA
Product: Money transfer, virtual currency, or money service
Sub-product: Domestic (US) money transfer
Issue: Fraud or scam

Complaint:
On the XXXX and XXXX of XX/XX/2023, Wells Fargo enabled an unidentified third party to perform two money transfers out of my checking account for a total of {$50000.00}. Both wire transfers came out of my checking account but the fraudsters had access to all of my banking accounts and transferred {$20000.00} from my savings account into my checking account to take the maximum daily amount ( {$25000.00} per day ). 
The transfers themselves ( maximum daily amount transferred to newly added recipients ), the online activity leading up to the transfers ( enrolling a new online wire transfer program, adding new recipients and starting transferring money right away ) and the online context ( new device connecting from a new IP address, location undisclosed by Wells Fargo, simultaneously as to regular connection from myself ( usual activity, usual device, usual IP ) had all the trappings of fraudulent transactions. 
Yet, Wells Fargo failed to apply even the most basic scrutiny because the fraudsters provided codes that had been texted to me. I was tricked into providing these codes to fraudsters pretending to be Wells Fargos fraud department. The fraudsters spoofed Wells Fargos fraud department phone number and did not trigger any warning from XXXX  Scam ID that was enabled on my mobile phone. It should be noted that Wells Fargos fraud department calling customers is the standard way for them to communicate and that they indeed routinely ask customers to read out loud texted security codes over the phone to identify the customer. Furthermore, the fraudster could credibly impersonate a Wells Fargo employee by displaying knowledge ( SSN, account numbers, ) that should have only been available to a Wells Fargo employee and performing actions only a Wells Fargo Employee should be able to perform : simultaneous access to the account and the ability to freeze and unfreeze (! ) the online access. 
Furthermore, when I alerted Wells Fargo right after the second unauthorized money transfer when it was still pending, Wells Fargo waited for four hours before contacting the receiving bank. Wells Fargo was unable or unwilling to explain such a delay. While reporting the unauthorized transaction on the morning of XX/XX/XXXX, the banker repeatedly told me that this happened every week and that there was no point in filing a police report or doing anything ( I should just wait for Wells Fargo Claim Department to call me after their " investigation '' ). 
Also, when it became apparent to Wells Fargo that I had not been the person making and authorizing the money transfers using a new device at a new location, Wells Fargo did not disclose this to me and instead kept saying and implying otherwise. To add insult to injury, Wells Fargo used that fact to refuse to disclose to me information essential for law enforcement to investigate the case ( IP address, recipient 's bank account numbers and XXXX codes ) on privacy grounds. I filed an FBI IC3 complaint and the FBI agent contacted me for this information and was shocked that Wells Fargo had not given me all information about the recipient accounts when I reported the fraud on XX/XX/XXXX. 
To this day, Wells Fargo still pretends that I authorized the money transfers to the fraudsters recipients ' accounts ( and thus denies indemnification ) while simultaneously acknowledging that Wells Fargo never informed me of the recipients accounts details ( and refusing to provide them now ). 

While the breadth of incompetence displayed by Wells Fargo is staggering, incompetence can only explain so much and it is still unclear if the fraudsters had inside help at Wells Fargo to : - gather personal and banking information about me and my ex-husband ( he has not been known to be the victim of any documented data breach/leak and yet the fraudster had his SSN ) - unfreeze the online access to my accounts a few minutes after getting Wells Fargo to freeze it.

- delay Wells Fargos actions for 4 hours with regards to canceling the second unauthorized money transfer or alert the receiving bank to freeze the recipient account. 

Wells Fargo has been unwilling or unable to offer any alternative explanation.

Company public response: Company has responded to the consumer and the CFPB and chooses not to provide a public response
Company response to consumer: Closed with monetary relief