Security Council resolution 2310 (2016) [on nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament]
Symbol: S/RES/2310 (2016)
Date: 2016-09-23
Status: adopted
Agenda: S/71 [23] NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION
S/71 [30] NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT
S/ X Maintenance of international peace and security.
Subjects: Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization|Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1968)|Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (1996)|NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION|NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT|DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS|NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS|VERIFICATION
Votes in favour: 14
Votes against: 0
Abstentions: 1
Voting record:
country: ANGOLA
vote: yes
country: CHINA
vote: yes
country: EGYPT
vote: abstention
country: FRANCE
vote: yes
country: JAPAN
vote: yes
country: MALAYSIA
vote: yes
country: NEW ZEALAND
vote: yes
country: RUSSIAN FEDERATION
vote: yes
country: SENEGAL
vote: yes
country: SPAIN
vote: yes
country: UKRAINE
vote: yes
country: UNITED KINGDOM
vote: yes
country: UNITED STATES
vote: yes
country: URUGUAY
vote: yes
country: VENEZUELA (BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC OF)
vote: yes

               United Nations                                                                   S/RES/2310 (2016)
               Security Council                                                 Distr.: General
                                                                                23 September 2016




               Resolution 2310 (2016)
               Adopted by the Security Council at its 7776th meeting, on
               23 September 2016

                    The Security Council,
                     Recalling its resolution 1887 (2009), and reaffirming its firm commitment to
               the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in all its aspects,
                    Reaffirming the Statement of its President adopted at the Council’s meeting at
               the level of Heads of State and Government on 31 January 1992 (S/23500),
               including the need for all Member States to fulfil their obligations in relation to
               arms control and disarmament and to prevent proliferation in all its aspect s of all
               weapons of mass destruction,
                    Underlining that the NPT remains the cornerstone of the nuclear
               non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear
               disarmament and for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy,
                     Reaffirming that proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and their means
               of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security,
                     Recalling that the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (Treaty), adopted
               by the General Assembly by its resolution 50/245 of 10 September 1996, was
               opened for signature on 24 September 1996, and that States Signatories, by their
               resolution on 19 November 1996, including paragraph 7 thereof, established the
               Preparatory Commission (PrepCom) for the Comprehensive Nuclear -Test-Ban
               Treaty Organization,
                    Recognizing that a universal and internationally and effectively verifiable test
               ban treaty that has entered into force is the most effective way to ban nuclear -
               weapon test explosions and any other nuclear explosions, and that an end to all such
               nuclear-weapon test explosions and any other nuclear explosions will constrain the
               development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and end the
               development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons,
                    Recognizing that early entry into force of the Treaty will constitute an effective
               nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation measure that would contribute to the
               achievement of a world without nuclear weapons,
                    Welcoming progress made towards universalization of the Treaty, noting that
               183 States have signed the Treaty and 166 States have deposited their instruments of

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               ratification, and further noting that of the 44 States listed in Annex 2 to the Treaty,
               whose ratification is needed for its entry into force, 41 have signed and 36 hav e
               both signed and ratified the Treaty, including several nuclear weapons States,
                     Welcoming the efforts of Member States of the PrepCom and its Provisional
               Technical Secretariat to build all elements of the Treaty’s verification regime,
               unprecedented in its global reach, recognizing the maturity of and progress achieved
               in the establishment of the International Monitoring System (IMS), as well as the
               satisfactory functioning of the International Data Centre (IDC) that has
               demonstrated its ability to provide independent and reliable means to ensure
               compliance with the Treaty once it enters into force, and emphasizing the continuing
               progress in developing, exercising, and demonstrating the advanced technologies
               and logistical capabilities necessary to execute on-site inspections,
                     Stressing the vital importance and urgency of achieving the early entry into
               force of the Treaty,
                     1.    Urges all States that have either not signed or not ratified the Treaty,
               particularly the eight remaining Annex 2 States, to do so without further delay;
                    2.    Encourages all State Signatories, including Annex 2 States, to promote
               the universality and early entry into force of the Treaty;
                    3.    Recalls the statements by each of the five nuclear-weapon States, noted
               by resolution 984 (1995), in which they give security assurances against the use of
               nuclear weapons to non-nuclear-weapon State Parties to the NPT, and affirms that
               such security assurances strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime;
                     4.    Calls upon all States to refrain from conducting any nuclear-weapon test
               explosion or any other nuclear explosion and to maintain their moratoria in this
               regard, commends those States’ national moratoria, some of which are established
               by national legislation pending entry into force of the Tr eaty, emphasizes that such
               moratoria are an example of responsible international behaviour that contributes to
               international peace and stability and should continue, while stressing that such
               moratoria do not have the same permanent and legally binding eff ect as entry into
               force of the Treaty, and notes the Joint Statement on the Comprehensive Nuclear
               Test-Ban Treaty by China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and
               the United States of America of September 15, 2016, in which those States no ted
               that, inter alia, “a nuclear-weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion
               would defeat the object and purpose of the CTBT ”;
                     5.   Underlines the need to maintain momentum towards completion of all
               elements of the Treaty verification regime, and in this regard, calls upon all States
               to provide the support required to enable the PrepCom to complete all its tasks in
               the most efficient and cost effective way, and encourages all States hosting
               International Monitoring System facilities to transmit data to the IDC on a testing
               and provisional basis, pending entry into force of the Treaty;
                      6.   Welcomes the voluntary information in the national statements in the
               PrepCom by States listed in Annex 1 to the Protocol to the Treaty as responsible for
               one or more facilities of the IMS on the status of completing the construction of
               those facilities as well as regarding the status of transmission of data from their
               facilities to the IDC, encourages States hosting IMS facilities to complete
               construction of the IMS facilities in a timely manner as provided for by the Treaty



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           and text on the establishment of the PrepCom, and invites the Provisional Technical
           Secretariat to provide a report to all State Signatories within 180 days of the
           adoption of this resolution on the status of States Signatories assessed contributions
           to the PrepCom and any additional support provided by State Signatories for the
           completion of the Treaty’s verification regime and for the maintenance and
           operational needs for the IDC and IMS;
                7.    Recognizes that even absent entry into force of the Treaty the monitoring
           and analytical elements of the verification regime, operating on a testing and
           provisional basis, are at the disposal of the international community in conformity
           with the Treaty and under the guidance of the Preparatory Commission, and that
           such elements contribute to regional stability as a significant confidence-building
           measure, and strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime;
                 8.    Affirms that entry into force of the Treaty will contribute to the
           enhancement of international peace and security through its effect ive prevention of
           the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects and through its contribution to
           nuclear disarmament and recognizes that the Provisional Technical Secretariat has
           demonstrated its utility in bringing tangible scientific and civil b enefits to States,
           for example through early tsunami warnings and seismological monitoring, and in
           this regard encourages the PrepCom to consider ways to ensure that these benefits
           can be broadly shared by the international community in conformity with the Treaty,
           through capacity building and the sharing of relevant expertise on the verification
           regime;
                9.    Decides to remain seized of the matter.




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