Aryan95614/aerograph-asrs huggingface dataset:
Aircraft: BONANZA 36
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I departed that morning after checking weather/TFR's on the internet. I was either direct CHS or TYBEE Intersection on my route. I saw R5311 on the GPS and touched the outline and pressed the info button for R5311. I saw the image (photo taken after ATC notified me on Guard) below and confirmed that I was below the minimum altitude of 12;000 FT. So; instead of deviating right a couple of miles I continued through R5311. About 10 miles south of my exit of R5311 I heard a call on Guard (121.5) of an unknown flyer at my position so I called Fayetteville Approach as I was told. They told me to contact them after landing. They told me about R5311A/B/C and I quickly realized what happened. They also picked me up for flight following. When I landed I contacted Fayetteville Approach and they explained what had happened and I described the above. I was told I might get a call from the R5311 people about the incident. I did get that call and told them the same thing and discussed the issue. I looked at a 'paper' chart (VFR Sectional) and it clearly showed R5311A; R5311B and R5311C. This is unusual for restricted areas (in my experience) but I'm sure not unique. In retrospect I should have noticed the 'C' on the GPS screen and inquired as to where 'A' and 'B' might be but I did not because I had never seen a restricted area like this with three designations for the exact same area. I am an experienced; careful pilot; and yet I was not able to see the difference in the paper charts and GPS charts. I think this deserves some attention and could probably save a life someday. It is not that difficult for the chart makers to denote areas like this such that it is more obvious that there are three different 'criteria' for the R-Area. The paper charts do this very clearly as an example. To me this is a very serious matter and I don't take it lightly. I now know to look closer at what the GPS display is telling me won't make this mistake again; but what about the thousands of other pilots out there that might make the same mistake for the same reason. We really should try to fix this one. A pilot entered R5311C at 6;500 FT below the GTN 750 GPS depicted 12;000 FT floor but that GPS did not depict the lower R5311 A/B areas along with their respective restricted altitudes.
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Phase of flight: Taxi; Climb
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Aircraft X from ZZZ to ZZZ1. I was the FO (First Officer) and the pilot monitoring and the Captain was the Pilot Flying. The time was approximately XA:25-XA:30 at ZZZ when we picked up the ASOS (Automated Surface Observing Systems). At the end of the ASOS there was a message from the Tower from last night stating that the Tower is closed after XQ00 local time and for IFR services to contact ZZZ Center. As we pulled out from the gate I announced on CTAF Frequency our intentions to taxi to Runway XX via Taxiway XX. We got a response from Tower saying the Tower is open and to contact Ground. We contacted Ground and they said to taxi to XX via 1. Once back on with the Tower Controller we asked her when the Tower had opened and she said at XA:00 and we mentioned the ASOS stated that they were closed and she said they had forgotten to flip the switch for the ATIS. The cause was the Tower forgetting to flip the switch to broadcast the ATIS when they opened so the ASOS was still broadcasting and it stated the Tower was closed. The Tower needs to make sure they are broadcasting the ATIS when they open. Aircraft X. ZZZ-ZZZ1. Captain was the PF (Pilot Flying) and the PM (Pilot Monitoring) was FO (First Officer) NAME. After receiving the ASOS at XF:20z (XA:20 local time) the remarks said the Tower closed at XQ:00 local time. With this being said; there was no Tower resume operations time said and the Jeppsen charts has very little information about the closed/open times for Tower operations. All the field conditions report in the release says FAA TOWER OPEN XC00-XL00 HRS. After de-icing we left the gate and contacted CTAF to mention our intentions for taxi and departure approximately XA:55 local time. After we told CTAF we were taxiing to Runway XX. The Tower Controller told us to contact Ground and that the Tower was open. Both myself and the FO did not hear that the Tower resumed operations and quarried the Controllers. We explained that the ASOS was still reporting the Tower was closed at XQ:00 and was under the impression that CTAF was in effect. The Tower apologized and said they opened at XA:00 local time and forgot to flip the switch. We asked if there was any issues and the reply was no. We taxied to the runway with ground and Tower with no issues.Failure of ATC not stating the airport was open for operations and no accurate Tower operations times.Having a form of or having an updated Airport Facilities Directory of all online as well as off line airports we have listed in the ops specs. Flight crew reported an erroneous message over the ASOS stated the tower was closed and that the tower had forgot to switch to ATIS when they opened for the day.
Aircraft: B777
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

As the Galley Flight Attendant; I was in the aft galley with other Main Cabin Flight Attendants setting up for breakfast service when we hit severe turbulence. The plane fell about three times. Both beverage carts fell over as well as inserts; garbage and other galley items. Debris came down on us. We had a full flight with no passenger seats available. There were 6 flight attendants in the galley. We only have 5 available jumpseats in the galley. That meant one flight attendant did not have a seat to go to and thus was thrown around throughout this ordeal. This is totally unacceptable. There should be enough seats in a cabin for all the flight attendants working that cabin or else an available passenger seat for us. I ended up with bruised rib and thigh. We were told by pilots that it was clear air turbulence. Unaware if any passengers ended up declaring any injuries. None did at the time of landing. B777 Flight Attendant reported being injured when the aircraft encountered unexpected turbulence and there were not enough jump seats in the aft galley for Flight Attendants to occupy.
Aircraft: EMBRAER PHENOM 300
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

June 2015. [Aircraft X]; an EMB-505 (Phenom-300) aircraft was due for its 15-day Hydraulic Accumulator Check. Per AOM 5.21; we performed it; twice; and it failed both times. [Check that] the drop rate does not increase to approximately 1;000 psi/sec (above 1;200 psi); but continues decreasing at a rate of approximately 100 psi/sec. We completed AOM 5.21 and noted the accumulator fluid level was overfilled (Yellow range).Company Maintenance Controller was contacted and he coordinated for an Embraer ZZZ Maintenance Technician to proceed to the aircraft. We conducted this third test with the Technician in the left seat. The test failed again. The Embraer maintenance Technician discussed with three other Embraer maintenance technicians and we all agreed to perform the check on another EMB-505; Aircraft Y. The test was completed by Embraer and upon completion it failed and [the accumulator fluid] was overfilled. We completed Company [Logbook] Maintenance form with the discrepancy for Aircraft X.The following day; upon reviewing Aircraft X's company Logbook it was determined that a Technician fraudulently completed the Corrective Action section of the Logbook for the Hydraulic Accumulator Check. We completed the Hydraulic Accumulator Check; per AOM 5.21; and it passed with the accumulator fluid level in the middle of the Green band. Technician's Corrective Action states that they did not drain the fluid level. However; this is blatantly false as I have provided a picture of it overfilled (Yellow) and it was in the middle of the Green band the next day. Not only is this an ethical conundrum; it has serious safety ramifications. As a human; professional pilot and FAA Mechanic with Airframe and Powerplant ratings I am appalled by the actions of Embraer. A Captain challenges the accuracy of a Maintenance Corrective Action sign-off in a logbook after several Hydraulic Accumulator Checks had failed on one of their EMB-505 (Phenom-300) aircraft due to overservicing of the hydraulic accumulator. No reference to hydraulic fluid being drained to correct the discrepancy.
Aircraft: PA28
Phase of flight: Takeoff / Launch
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway

Went to practice a soft field takeoff and when the nose wheel came off the ground I didn't have enough right rudder in and the plane was pulled to the left. The plane went off the runway and down into the grass so I just took it back onto the taxiway and taxied back to the ramp area. I then did a walk around and nothing seemed to be broken on the plane. PA28 student pilot reported a loss of control during takeoff that resulted in a runway excursion.
Aircraft: NO AIRCRAFT
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

In tow with aircraft at Spot XX. Call was made to Ground tower for Super Tug XX; Spot XX for Gate XXa. No response. This was repeated several times; unable to hear response from Ground tower. Turned off all lights (beacons; headlights; cradle lights) and still unable to hear Ground response for instruction. We contacted Super 13 to ask for them to communicate to Tower and to communicate their instruction for tow. Super Tug XA was able to communicate to Ground and relay instructions to us for tow. Radio issues continue to be primary safety concern for those of us on [the aircraft] move team. Several requests have been made to upgrade our system with continued ignored requests. This issue needs to be resolved to give us the proper tools and equipment necessary to do our job safely. We are aware that these issues are ignored in favor of budget concerns; hopefully an accident will not occur before these issues are actually addressed. A ramp employee reports about continuing radio malfunctions in their Super Tugs (STs) that prevent drivers from hearing Ground Control Tower instructions when towing aircraft. Requests to upgrade their communication radios due to safety concerns have been ignored.
Aircraft: CESSNA 140
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

I had departed ZZZ1 VFR en route to ZZZ2. There was a band of clouds on the route and as it was bumpy down low I wanted to climb up above the clouds and take advantage of the smooth air and hopefully a tailwind. I maneuvered a little to maintain VFR while climbing and eventually leveled out at 5;500 ft. MSL. I noted the lack of any distinct horizon to the north and northeast while to the south and southeast there was a horizon. It looked like the air to the north and northeast was trying to decide if it wanted to be a cloud or not. Since I could not determine distance and did not want to run into IMC I turned more eastward. About this time I caught a sudden movement out of the corner of my right eye. I first thought that it was extremely strange for a bird. I quickly turned and saw a skydiver; pilot chute deployed dragging the bag and risers out. I quickly turned my head to the left and noted a white square canopy fully deployed on my left side about 8 o'clock and lower. This scared me and I scanned rapidly for other canopies; not seeing any others. I have a Stratux for ADS-B in and I looked for traffic. I noted a contact about 2;600 ft. below and descending rapidly. I had not noticed him before and I guessed this was likely the jump plane. I had also immediately tuned into the CTAF to listen. I didn't hear any radio traffic. I am a USPA licensed sport parachutist with XXX jumps logged; though I haven't jumped in XX years or so. I fly very often by airports with jump activity and listen in for activity and give them a wide berth so as to avoid any unannounced activity. I have flown by ZZZ quite a few times; in fact I had flown by on the way to ZZZ1 from ZZZ3 earlier. I had listened to the CTAF and there had been no activity in the 15 minutes or so I listened while I passed well to the east and southeast en route to ZZZ1. I wasn't thinking about that on my return trip. I believe I was pre-occupied with evaluating the clouds and clearance when I lost situational awareness and found myself over ZZZ. I'm not so sure that the conditions were good enough for skydiving given I could not see the airport. I continued on to ZZZ2 descending after passing by the band of clouds. My normal flying is all low in my Cessna 140 and I am rarely above 3000 ft. MSL. I am normally quite conscious of my position in relation to the airports I am near. I think it likely the distraction of getting above the clouds; loss of visual ground cues for my position and the unusual visibility contributed to loss of focus on remaining clear of ZZZ. I'm going to have to make a concerted effort to maintain situational awareness at all times. C140 pilot reported an NMAC with a skydiver.
Aircraft: A320
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

On engine start; the #1 ENG began spilling a large amount of fuel. The aircraft spilled approximately 300 gal over a 1 mile stretch of taxiing. On throttle up for T/O (Take-Off); the leak stopped and allowed the flight to continue without interruption. When the crew got on the ground; the PIC (Pilot in Command) called and reported a 2300lb overburn. I looked at the winds aloft and saw a reported 150kt wind at FL340. With a large internal overburn and the winds aloft; and no other info regarding the previous leak; I assessed that the fuel burn; while excessively large; was still within the realm of possibility given the circumstances. I told the crew to monitor their fuel burn for the return leg; as there would be a tail wind to help. When the flight arrived in ZZZ; ARFF (Airport Rescue and Fire Fighting) was waiting for the flight. Crew was instructed to taxi to the end of the RWY and shutdown. When the aircraft eventually made it back to a gate; the [Fire] Chief reported the fuel leak; and sent the PIC the pic; who then forwarded it on to [Maintenance Control]; where I was finally able to see it. At no point was the fact that an aircraft was leaking fuel in such fashion; reported to either Dispatch; or ATC to relay to the crew; even though ZZZ Ops had to have known; as ARFF knew that specific tail would be returning to ZZZ; and the approximate time they would arrive.Ensure all ground personnel know to report to flight crew if a fuel leak is suspected on push back/engine start. If unable to notify crew; or suspected after out of communication with flight crew; relay to OPS if a fuel leak is suspected. Furthermore; ensure Dispatch or [Operations Control] is made aware of the issue in order to establish communication with the Flight Crew to better assess the issue. If unable to contact Dispatch or [Operations Control]; contact Station TWR/Cab to relay message to flight crew about possible fuel leaks. Maintenance Control reported an aircraft experienced a fuel leak causing fuel quantity to drop below flight plan limit.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

While on the departure; we were initially given a 275 heading after departure from Runway 25. Sometime around FL200; we were given direct ZIMMR; on course. I punched ZIMMR into the FMC Page 1 Route page; executed it; and thought I hit LNAV. First Officer was making a PA at the time and I did not verify with him as I usually do. A few minutes later; ATC called and asked us if we were on a different arrival since we were about ten miles north of course. We said we were not and Controller cleared us direct MEEKER and we resumed the arrival. Controller stated that there was no problem and no conflict. [We had a] routine flight after that. I did not verify pressing LNAV because the First Officer was on the radio. I should have done it immediately after he got off the radio. B737-300 Captain attributed a track deviation to his failure to engage LNAV on the FMS after loading a 'direct to' fix.
Aircraft: LIGHT TRANSPORT; LOW WING; 2 TURBOJET ENG
Phase of flight: Initial Approach; Landing
Anomaly: Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Landing Without Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

Cleared by Midland approach for a visual approach to the ODO airport. Controller advised crew that the runway requested there was closed. He advised crew that an additional runway at ODO was closed also. Crew discussed landing at the alternate airport due to the unreported runway closures. Weather was deteriorating when aircraft broke out below the overcast. Rain showers moving through the area at the time obscured visibility to the west of MAF. First Officer reported the airport in sight and was instructed to cancel IFR in air or on the ground. Upon turning on final; crew cancelled the flight plan and a normal landing was accomplished on runway 10 at MAF. Controller acknowledged cancellation; advised crew to squawk 1200. He made no comment concerning our lineup at MAF. Crew realized mistake on landing and immediately advised tower.Crew believes that the deteriorating weather; coupled with nearly identical runway orientation at our alternate; and no controller advisory of the deviation; caused the crew to assume that the only lit runway at MAF was indeed the active runway at ODO. This occurrence could have been avoided by closer monitoring by ATC; or by the crew electing to shoot the instrument approach to the ODO airport in light of the changing weather conditions. [Report narrative contained no additional information.] Corporate jet flight crew reported landing at the wrong airport citing weather and runway lighting as contributing.
Aircraft: A321
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Upon door closure clearance was received for push back. I contacted the push back crew and stated 'ready for push back; brakes released'. When they did not answer; I looked down to make sure I was on interphone. When I looked up; the aircraft was moving backward. The First Officer stated 'They want you to step on the bakes'. The aircraft had rolled back around 20 feet; and I eased on the brakes to stop the aircraft. The ground crew stated that the parking brake on the tug was inoperative; and they had left the tug in gear; so the aircraft parking brake was the only thing holding the aircraft still after they pulled the chocks. They changed to a tug with an operative brake and continued the push back.I thought the ground crew was on interphone; when they were not. I did not wait for a verbal acknowledgment from the ground crew before releasing the parking brake.Do not leave the tug in gear if the park brake on it is broken. A321 Captain reported when he released the brakes ready for push back the aircraft started moving backwards. The Captain reported he stepped on the brakes and was told the tug parking brake was inoperative and they had left the tug in gear.
Aircraft: B747
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

During cruise; we encountered severe turbulence. This resulted in VNAV and LNAV disengaging and the aircraft unable to maintain altitude. After the loss of VNAV; the vertical mode reverted to Vertical Speed and was holding about a 1200 to 1400 foot per minute climb. We got an overspeed warning that lasted about one second while the aircraft was in this climb. The altitude deviation was about 500 to 600 feet off the assigned altitude. The automation was disengaged and we returned to the assigned altitude. ATC queried us about our altitude via CPDLC and we notified them about our turbulence encounter. As we exited the area of turbulence; automation was reengaged successfully. About 45 minutes prior to our turbulence encounter; we received SIGMET CHARLIE 1 for frequent thunderstorms. Most of the area plotted was west of our route; however; we tried to maintain situational awareness with the weather radar. Prior to our encounter; we saw no radar returns; or other visual cues of cells ahead such as lightning. Therefore the encounter came as somewhat of a shock. Upon realizing we were entering turbulence I looked up to engage the continuous ignition. In hindsight; as pilot flying I should have requested the continuous ignition and stayed on the instruments. The level of turbulence made it difficult to even read the instruments. Temporarily looking away only compounded the challenge. Air Carrier pilot reported encountering unexpected severe turbulence which caused an uncontrolled altitude deviation.
Aircraft: C172
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Immediately after entering Class B airspace southbound at 1;500 FT; lost communications. Turned north and exited Class B airspace and squawked VFR. Began a return trip to my destination and while doing so; trouble shot for lost communications. During this time; also lost all electrical - fuel quantity gauges; oil temperature gauge; radios; lights; flaps. [I] circled over my destination at 2;500 FT twice; no light gun from Tower. Continued circle at 2;000 FT; no signals. [I] continued at 1;500 FT; observed no traffic; no signals. After 20 minutes of circling without notice from the Tower; entered right pattern for the runway and performed a no flap landing. Called Tower after landing and was told they did not notice me until short final. A C172 lost all electrical during night flight and after circling the destination airport from 2;500 FT down to 1;500 FT the pilot landed without ATC clearance.
Aircraft: A320
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Our push back crew failed to secure the tow bar to the pushback vehicle; resulting in the aircraft being pushed back without control. I applied brakes gently after recognizing the problem; but the brakes did not respond immediately due to the generator coming on line after engine start. Shortly thereafter; the brakes did respond resulting in an abrupt stop. There were no injuries or damage to airplane. When pushback of the A320 was initiated without the tow bar securely attached to the tug; the aircraft rolled backwards without restraint and had to be braked abruptly to a halt by the flight crew.