Aryan95614/aerograph-asrs huggingface dataset:
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance

We brought Hazmat/Diesel fuel on Aircraft X. The Diesel fuel was failed to be offloaded at HNL and it was continued on to ZZZ on Aircraft X. An Agent in ZZZ realized it was on board in the forward cargo compartment and it was offloaded in ZZZ. B737 Captain reported Hazmat cargo was not offloaded at intermediate destination and erroneously transported to subsequent destination.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation

Hazardous liquid spilled in forward cargo department.Cause: TSA missed bag with hazardous liquid in checked bag contained in laundry detergent containers. B737 First Officer reported hazardous liquid spill in cargo pit from passenger checked bag.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Recently we upgraded all of our B-737s with new Ipad holders for ground and flight operations. Upon first review; the Ipad holder seems to be an improvement on the previous suction cup design. However after having flown multiple segments with the new IPad holder; it is a bit of a safety concern. The holder drops down several inches below the clipboard/window line. The creates an impediment to my ability to move my arm while taxing the aircraft. It has also on several occasions; bumped my elbow and forearm while I am performing crosswind landings.While the holder has some good points; modifications are needed to this holder to ensure in does not impede my ability to taxi the aircraft and perform crosswind landings. A Boeing 737 Captain reported an anomaly with recently installed cockpit holders for the iPad. He stated that the mount tends to drop down which can impede arm movement; especially when taxiing or performing crosswind landings; and needs to be modified.
Aircraft: GULFSTREAM G200 (IAI 1126 GALAXY)
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

We were being radar vectored for a Visual Approach and were told to report 'airport in sight'. Upon obtaining visual contact with the airport; we tried to notify Approach that we had the airport in sight. Due to congested radio traffic we were not able to inform Approach right away. When there was a gap in radio transmissions we immediately informed Approach we had the airport in sight. We were quickly approaching the extended centerline of the runway; and we were at an altitude where we needed to begin our Visual Approach quickly.We reported 'airport in sight' with no response from Approach. We reported 'airport in sight' again and Approach asked for clarification of our call sign. The controller seemed confused as to who we were; and where we were. We responded again with our call sign and stated the airport was in sight. After a short pause; the controller told us to contact the Tower. We asked for clarification about whether we were cleared for a visual approach. I don't think we received a reply. We contacted the Tower; but by this time we had flown through the final approach course and were no longer in a position to land.Tower queried us about our position and status. We told them 'we were told to contact Tower; but were never cleared for a visual approach.' Tower asked for clarification by repeating what we just told them; and we confirmed. Tower then asked did you come to Tower on your own; or were you told to contact Tower. We stated 'we were told to contact Tower; but were not cleared for a visual.' She then gave us vectors to parallel the runway until we were abeam the departure end; then they turned us over to Approach. We were now speaking with a different approach controller than the one who never cleared us for the visual. He vectored us around for another visual approach. We continued the approach and landing without incident.Since we know it was Approach Control's intent to issue a visual approach once the airport was in sight; we could have made the approach without the explicit clearance. We did not feel this would be appropriate; even though it would delay our flight by having to come around for another approach. To our knowledge no one was endangered nor was a traffic conflict created with another aircraft. There was no traffic for the parallel runway. A pilot reported he was on a base leg vector for a visual approach and was issued a frequency change to the Tower without receiving an approach clearance.
Aircraft: LARGE TRANSPORT; LOW WING; 2 TURBOJET ENG
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

On the arrival in MGGT; winds were reported out of the south at 10 kts; so MGGT was landing Runway 20. Referencing WSI (Weather Services International); there were two active areas for volcanic ash; one for Pacaya and one for Agua. Both had plumes and ash clouds from the surface to 14;000 ft; and both were moving west. While selecting what approach we were planning; we looked at the different missed approaches and decided the VOR Z Runway 20 would be best in the event of a missed approach and avoid any ash cloud. The Missed Approach procedure for the VOR Z Runway 20 is AUR; 1 DME past the VOR; a slight left turn via the 169 radial to 17 DME and then hold at 11;000 ft with no special climb rates associated with it. Then our briefing turned to the Engine-Out (EO) Procedure. We immediately noticed the EO procedure splits the gap of the volcanos Pacaya and Agua; and right through the SIGMET area.We thought about what to do in the event of an engine-out missed approach. I decided; in this situation; the EO procedure would not be appropriate due to the active SIGMETs for volcanic ash; and I decided the missed approach for the VOR Z Runway 20 would be more appropriate and safer than the EO as published. We reviewed the terrain that shows on the EO procedure; terrain charts; and considered our landing weight. Landing was normal and no missed approach was accomplished. But planning for worse case revealed challenges to our procedures of following company EO procedures as published.Our training has us brief and setup EO procedures for missed approaches as well as takeoff; and fly them as published in the event of an engine-out event. This particular procedure; on this night; sets a crew up for a terrible scenario of going missed approach or takeoff; losing an engine; and flying directly into a volcanic ash cloud with one engine while these volcanoes are active.My suggestion would be to give the aircrews more options; have the EO procedure ready but review all the missed approaches as published and note whether we can fly them as a published engine-out. In this case; I believe we could have safely executed the missed approach for the VOR Z Runway 20; and possibly an engine-out scenario on initial takeoff; but I just don't have access to the information to confirm this. Blindly following EO procedures when other factors encroach on the procedures could result in a worse outcome. Air carrier Captain reported company policy for single engine missed approach would be through volcanic ash; unless flight crews plan for a different procedure.
Aircraft: CESSNA 150
Phase of flight: Final Approach
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

On short final after a 3.4 hour cross-country flight the engine quit. [ATC was advised] and pilot safely operated an engine failure landing on runway; vacating the runway as well. Engine failure was due to faulty fuel gauge indicating aircraft had adequate fuel present when fuel starvation occurred. C150 pilot reported a loss of engine power on short final due to fuel exhaustion that resulted in a dead-stick landing.
Aircraft: BONANZA 35
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Loss of GPS signal and primary navigation equipment while in flight. Signal was lost twice and service restored within 10 minutes. Longest duration of outage was 5 minutes. Loss of primary GPS navigation was reported to RFD Approach. After discussing this with other local airmen; I believe there may be a source of interference in this area. Another pilot reported loss of GPS while en route at low altitude through this same area. The reporter states that the area in question is mostly farmland with no large structures or other possible sources of interference in the area. The interference detected by another pilot was on a different date but in the same area. BE35 pilot reports a loss of GPS signal at 5;000 FT in the vecinity of RFD. Discussions with other local airmen indicate that there may be a source of interference in this area near SIMMN Intersection.
Aircraft: MD-11
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

The RECAT wake turbulence spacing caused us to encounter the wake turbulence from the previous aircraft. Further Tower was telling every aircraft to use minimum time on the runway because of other aircraft on very close approaches. This is eroding safety both in flight during approach and while decelerating and vacating the runway. Don't space us so close when we have tailwinds on final. The tailwind is holding the vortices of the previous aircraft right on the glide path causing a greater opportunity to cause encounters when aircraft are slow and close to the ground. MD-11 Captain reported that ATC procedures on MEM arrivals are causing avoidable wake vortex encounters.
Aircraft: BE-KA
Phase of flight: Initial Climb
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

We had just received this aircraft the day before and it was 24 years newer than what we had been flying. The chief pilot called and ask if I could fly to an outlying field and pick up a medical team and fly them back to home base. I took my time and ran the complete checklist and departed on the active runway.The aircraft accelerated normally and after I rotated I took my hands off the throttles to raise the landing gear; the left engine lost power. Auto feather was engaged so the aircraft was kept in control and I notified the tower I had an engine failure and continued to climb to a safe altitude. They asked me if I needed priority and said negative and requested for a few minutes to sort the problem out. I started to troubleshoot and found the left power lever was at idle. Advancing the power lever restored normal power and I continued without incident. BE90 First Officer reported a loss of power after takeoff on one engine due to the friction lock not being set for a throttle.
Aircraft: EUROCOPTER AS 350/355/EC130 - ASTAR/TWINSTAR/ECUREUIL
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

During cruise flight port side cabin door window popped out and departed the aircraft. The helicopter just came out of paint and the gasket was installed improperly. Pilot corrective action was to slow to 50-60 KTS and land as soon as possible. No further damage was done to aircraft; people; or property on the ground. An AS350's right cabin door window popped out and departed the aircraft in-flight; following an aircraft painting the window gasket was improperly installed; the pilot landed as soon a safely possible.
Aircraft: MU-2
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was working the Local Control position; we were active Runway 3. I had a BE33 (IFR) on an ILS approach to Runway 26R on a 3 mile final with instructions to circle to land Runway 3. SCT Approach switched a MU2 (IFR) to me 4 east of the airport on an IFR Visual Approach. I advised the MU2 to make right traffic to Runway 3. The MU2 turned to the down wind 2 northeast of the field and reported that he did not have the BE33 in sight. The BE33 was turning a 1 and 1/2 mile final to Runway 3. I gave him the traffic. The MU2 abeam the numbers for Runway 3 again said he did not have the BE33 in sight. The BE33 at that point was abeam him less by than 1 mile opposite direction. There were no altitude restrictions on either aircraft. Chino Tower is a VFR Tower. We are not authorized to provide separation between IFR arrivals; per LOA. These two aircraft were well within standard IFR separation requirements. SCT needs to train its controllers on proper IFR separation requirements and inform them that we are not authorized to provide IFR separations on arrivals. VFR Tower Controller described a potential separation issue when the Approach Controller failed to insure required separation between two IFR arrivals.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Relatively new RNAV Arrivals into OAK resulted in FMC commanded airspeeds exceeding the below Class B 200 knot speed limit requiring Pilot action to prevent exceeding the limit. (Pilot action we accomplished on this and other recent flights into OAK.) Is it possible to adjust the FMC speeds to comply with the Class B airspeed limits at the appropriate point on the arrival? A B737 Captain wonders if it is possible to adjust the FMC speeds to comply with the under Class B airspeed limits at the appropriate point on arrivals that pass beneath the Class B airspace; in this case OAK.
Aircraft: CIRRUS VISION SJ50
Phase of flight: Initial Climb
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Event / Encounter Person / Animal / Bird

At about 900' after takeoff I received a double dong tone and sfd alt miscompare" yellow EICAS message followed by two more different miscompare EICAS messages and repeating dong tones. I was distracted with the tones and 3 scrolling EICAS messages while troubleshooting the EICAS messages. While going to the checklist for the EICAS messages; I went through assigned altitude of 1500' to about 1750'. I had not turned on the autopilot yet because of my reviewing all the EICAS messages. When I caught the altitude deviation I immediately descended to my assigned correct altitude but about 10 seconds later ATC assigned me to climb to 2000'. There were no traffic conflicts. Ended up being mud daubers had built nests in all 4 static ports. The material deposited by the insects was white and did not look abnormal on my preflight. Lesson is to always fly the plane first and to double check all static ports and other openings for bugs." Cirrus Vision SJ50 pilot reported an altitude deviation while troubleshooting multiple EICAS messages.
Aircraft: SMALL TRANSPORT; LOW WING; 2 TURBOPROP ENG
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was conducting OJT on STN/STV; we had just gotten the briefing. There was a small single piston holding south of KIZER at 3;000 FT and the previous controller had climbed a twin turboprop to 3;000 FT and turned on the north downwind for the ILS 9L. This created a conflict between the twin turboprop and single piston; I pointed this out immediately to my trainee. The trainee turned the aircraft but waited to descend. This caused them to come closer than 3 miles. Well I teach my OJT's not climb to 3;000 FT on the downwind if holding at this holding fix. If you get this handed to you it may take precise vectors to avoid the holder and possible traffic on the ILS. You can always have the single piston/holding traffic turn north to the fix early due to traffic. I've been told to give my trainee a long leash but in this case I've learned that leash was to long and I needed to take over. F11 Controller providing OJT described a conflict event when the trainee was late in descending one of the aircraft involved.
Aircraft: SMALL AIRCRAFT; LOW WING; 1 ENG; FIXED GEAR
Phase of flight: Final Approach
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

On final approach to Runway 20 at ICL there are grain bins in the flight path with the red obstacle [light] burned out. I have requested for weeks that it be fixed; but has not as of today. On a night landing training flight; student was making adjustment for a wind change and drifted too close to the bins because he could not see them without the red light. I as the instructor had to take immediate action to avoid collision with them when I noticed that the wind had drifted us too close to them. I will continue to request that the light be fixed and have students fly an above glide slope on Runway 20 in the future. Flight instructor reported the aircraft flew close to an obstacle at night that did not have a red obstacle warning light during approach to ICL airport.
Aircraft: A319
Phase of flight: Landing
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types

While working LC3/4 combined at LC4; I had two CRJ's land Runway XXR and exit at Taxiway XX. An A319 then landed Runway XXR and was rolling out towards the second high speed exit; Taxiway XY. I informed the A319 that company traffic was on short final. I then attempted to stop the second CRJ short of Taxiway DY so that the A319 could exit the runway unimpeded. While talking to the CRJ; I realized that the A319 was not going to be off the runway in time and sent the A320 around. At the time I sent the A320 around; the aircraft was crossing the runway threshold. I then gave the A320 runway heading; a climb to 9 thousand; and handed him off the appropriate departure sector. In the future; I will give priority to the possible go-around situations and initiate the missed approach much sooner (before the landing threshold; when it is obvious that the operation will not work). It is also critical to 'paint a picture for each aircraft involved.' Advising the preceding aircraft to plan the first high speed exit and minimal time on the runway for traffic close in trail; and ensuring that the trail aircraft knows of the distance between the preceding aircraft and any speed overtakes. Two sick leave hits for staffing; leaving only 7 CPCs for the shift. Normal would be 10; and won't approve leave below this. However; in the event of sick leave; OT will not be called and supervisors who are not proficient during normal traffic are forced to work. This was the case here. A Supervisor working due to staffing; no OT was attempted. Due to lack of proficiency; an A320 was sent around very late after crossing landing threshold with another aircraft on the runway. This was during normal arrival rush. If 10 is what we need for staffing; we should be calling fully proficient OT CPC's to replace them; and not try to save the budget by staffing with supervisors who do not work busy traffic. Tower Controller described a very late go-around instruction noting his/her lack of timely instructions.
Aircraft: CRJ900
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

During my preflight on this aircraft I usually check the oven just for checks; and surprisingly I found a blanket inside the oven; door was closed and got the attention of the other FA; and the Captain as well. Which gives me the idea that on the previous flight one of the flight attendants was warming up this blanket to keep themselves nice and warm. I would never expected to find such an item; specially a blanket inside the oven; it is super and extremely dangerous; very irresponsible and an unprofessional act; a serious subject for me to bring it up and to be investigated. I had to fill out this [report] to bring the attention for the safety department of [Company]. When it comes to safety issues and preventing a terrible tragedy to happen in the air; I personally would like to take action and the attention of this serious matter. I can't say exactly which of the flight attendants did this; or whoever did it; but a proper investigation about this incident would lead to whoever may have done this. To make sure that anyone do it again. Air carrier Flight Attendant reported finding a blanket in the oven during preflight.
Aircraft: ANY UNKNOWN OR UNLISTED AIRCRAFT MANUFACTURER
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was working the Local 2 position; which entails working Runway 31L off-loaded departures and CBA (VFR/Helicopter Operation in the B). Local 1 is working Runway 4R/L. Aircraft X appears to be vectoring in for Runway 4L and checks in on my frequency; which is the wrong frequency as he should be with Local 1. I switch him to that frequency. He then appears to be disoriented and is overshooting the finals. He's now in conflict with Aircraft Y; an arrival for Runway 4R. Neither of them appear to be Local 1 or the Approach Controller. I double check on my frequency and they aren't on mine either. They finally come up on Local 1 and the Controller separates them both.I recommend that the Approach Controller ensures that aircraft are either established on course and are no longer a factor with other aircraft before switching frequencies because sometimes they go to the wrong frequencies or lose communication and can become a problem; so much so that it can create an accident. JFK Tower Controller reported an aircraft was using the incorrect frequency during handoff; which resulted in a conflict with another aircraft.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

As I was reviewing the logbook for a B737-800 aircraft; the First Officer returned to the cockpit from his walk around. He mentioned he saw speed tape along the leading edge of the right horizontal stabilizer. I noted that we only had a placard form for the speed tape in the right wheel well [for the] vapor barrier. I began a review of the aircraft damage log history. The first entry was for the damage to the right stabilizer in January 2011. The entry referenced that speed tape was applied to damaged area. No mention of follow-on inspection requirements. I called [our] B737 Technical support. After asking Technical support to pull-up the aircraft damage history items; I asked; if speed tape was applied; should there not be a logbook placard form in the logbook. Technician said he was going to have to enter a discrepancy item. I gave my cell phone over to the ZZZ Mechanic that was now present so he could get the item entered per Technical support. I insisted that since the item was originally addressed on January 2011 without any follow-up inspection; that we should at least re-inspect the condition of the Temporary Repair (TR). This aircraft flew over 16-months without any follow-up inspection to a Temporary Repair using speed tape. The logbook may not have been properly filled out at ZZZ1; where the original damage repair was made. A Captain was informed by his First Officer that he saw speed tape along the leading edge of the right horizontal stabilizer during his walk around. The B737-800 aircraft had flown for 16-months without any follow-up inspection to a Temporary Repair (TR) using speed tape.