Aryan95614/aerograph-asrs huggingface dataset:
Aircraft: B757
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Ten minutes after passing TOPPS; flying direct to OYSTR in level flight; FL390; M.80; clear of clouds; encountered wake turbulence. Preceding A330 was 10 miles ahead; slightly left of our track proceeding to STEAM; FL390. Wind was approximately 65 knots; left quartering tailwind. Incurred approximately 2-3 seconds of light turbulence then aircraft started rolling hard left. Just prior to receiving 'BANK ANGLE; BANK ANGLE' alert; disconnected autopilot and manually rolled back wings level. Aircraft bank exceeded 45 degrees but unsure of actual bank angle. (No horizon reference available). No loss of altitude and no damage to aircraft. No injuries to crew or passengers. No further encounters. [Narrative 2 contained no additional information.] B757 flight crew reported wake vortex encounter from a preceding A330 at FL390 that resulted in a 45 degree roll to the left.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Due to partial system wide ACARS failure the ATC Coordinator notified me that my FLL flight was holding south of RSW due to line of thunderstorms between RSW and FLL; the destination of the flight. I sent the flight updated RSW weather. I asked the crew; through an ACARS message of 'any chance of MIA?' RSW reported 1 1/4 VCTS PLUSRA; I asked the crew through an ACARS message to verify fuel on board to possibly change alternate to TPA. I was shortly notified by the captain that he was on the ground in PGD (Punta Gorda; FL). He arrived with 3000 lbs of fuel on board. Flight landed safely. Following the Dispatch Procedure Manual for Off-line Fueling and provided airport plates to crew for PGD. I built a flight release in accordance with FM for Departure from an Alternate Airport and emailed the Flight documents to the FBO handling the flight.All computer programs showed the flight was on the ground in RSW and I called station to verify. The station agent notified me flight was not there. The computers could not recognize PGD and the programs showed the flight in RSW. This led to confusion with in Operations which was rectified shortly after notification. A serious weather event was occurring in south Florida. ATC changed the arrival to FLL 3 times; eventually taking us out over the Bahamas. Numerous airplanes were in the line for both MIA and FLL. We were being vectored number 1 for the approach to FLL when a tornado was reported [in the area of FLL]. Diverted to RSW. Moderate convective activity was also in the RSW area. We were #2 for the approach when the aircraft in front of us executed a go around due to a 20 knot loss on short final due to windshear. ATC advised us that PDG airport was approximately 30 miles north of RSW. The reported wx was approximately 1700 overcast with 7 miles visibility. We diverted with approximately 6400 lbs on the fuel at that time. We were still deviating for convective activity between RSW and PDG. We were vectored for a downwind for Runway 22 and cleared to descend to 1500 ft to enable us to see the runway. We then executed a visual approach and landed with 3200 on fuel. This was a serious wx event in south Florida; resulting in numerous aircraft diverting for fuel issues. Numerous flight cancellations should have occurred to prevent this event. B737 Captain and Dispatcher reported serious weather that resulted in a diversion to an offline airport.
Aircraft: MD-83
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Departing VMC all checks were normal; but climbing through 25;000 feet the pressure flow light illuminated. The Captain stated the cabin was at 8;000 feet and climbing 1;000 FPM and directed me to initiate an emergency descent to 10;000 feet. The Captain declared an emergency with ATC and coordinated a vector to return to the departure airport. The Captain read the QRH procedure and we accomplished the procedure. We were able to prevent the cabin altitude from climbing to 10;000 feet and the oxygen masks did not automatically deploy. The Captain informed the flight attendants what was happening; gave them their TEST briefing; and informed the passengers we were returning. We landed overweight with a normal touchdown. After landing; we coordinated with Airfield Rescue and Fire Fighters; ATC; Operations; and Ramp Tower to return to a Gate. The brake temps remained within normal range. After arrival; we debriefed with Maintenance. The Captain filled out the Maintenance Log for the pressurization problem and overweight landing; and then coordinated with Dispatch and crew tracking. [This report contains no additional information.] At FL250 and climbing; a MD-83 pressure flow light illuminated with the cabin climbing 1;000 FPM at 8;000 feet; so an emergency was declared; a descent started; and the QRH completed followed by an uneventful landing at the departure airport.
Aircraft: PA28
Phase of flight: Final Approach
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC

Near mid-air collision at the approach end ZZZ. It was almost a perfect storm that could have put us in a nearly unavoidable accident had the timing been a few seconds different. I was number one on final (RNAV Approach; VFR conditions; approximately 1/4 mile from threshold; visual landing) ahead of Aircraft Y on a survey mission landing for gas. The other aircraft was a Airtractor crop duster operating from a semi-trailer full of chemicals parked on the ramp. The pilot reported that his radio was marginal; but they had no replacement. His ground crew reported that he was using a hand-held radio. He made no calls before getting to the runway; and may not have even had the radio on until taking the runway. He certainly wasn't listening to it. He says he made a call taking the runway; but the FBO said it was more like a call after he was on the runway and rolling; and I didn't hear it or recognize it as there were also two aircraft operating same runway alignment; same frequency. I believe he took off from the midfield intersection just short of the midpoint of the 6307 ft. runway opposite direction to the one with two aircraft on final who had been making multiple position reports on CTAF. Winds were being called as calm until I was on three-mile final when they went to about 9 kts. crosswind. He obviously didn't visually clear the final approach course as he took the runway because I had all lights on (three strobes and three landing/taxi lights) and would have been quite visible had he looked.He was likely concentrating on centerline (tailwheel aircraft with a crosswind); and I was concentrating on the aim point on short final (end of the runway) so I could turn off at midfield with Aircraft Y behind me. When I was about ¼ mile on final; he came into my field of view just above the pavement less than 1000 ft. from the end of the runway. I went around and broke right; but he didn't deviate before he passed out of my view under my wing as I banked away. We passed abeam one another just south of the approach end of Runway XX. I doubt he saw me before I was wing-up passing him on his left. PA-32 Pilot reported an NMAC on short final with a crop duster departing opposite direction.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

[Don't know] if weather west of ZAU was necessitating odd routes or dispatchers are unfamiliar with optimal routes out of DTW with the DTW Metroplex implementation. Aircraft X departed DTW for ZZZ. The aircraft had filed the RNAV departure procedure that departs into ZID and replaces the departure route over RID (BARRI; BARRT; I looked at the previous route; that's what he had.) Aircraft X then filed over VHP and points west to ZZZ. The LOA between ZAU and ZOB requires DTW departures to be on the SNDRS SID; and that ZOB leave them on the filed route; ZAU has control for turns. ZOB cleared Aircraft X direct VHP; which avoided ZID and brought Aircraft X perilously close to FWA and the arrival stream into DTW (via the HANBL STAR); which is exactly what we're [trying to] avoid by having ZOB leave aircraft on the SID. Also; this aircraft climbed exceptionally poorly. That's another serious of reports. ZOB [should have] left the aircraft on the route; at least into ZID. ZAU has control for turns on SNDRS SID departures; there's no mention of aircraft ZOB shortcuts. ZOB should be discouraged from these reckless shortcuts when they (should) have an idea ZAU has worked to prevent them. Chicago Center Controller reported a route change due to Detroit Metroplex; that had an aircraft's route too close to FWA and the arrival stream into DTW.
Aircraft: MEDIUM TRANSPORT; LOW WING; 2 TURBOJET ENG
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

While working the radar position on Sector 05; we were feeding Miami Approach all of the arrivals through one fix. Every single airport in Miami Approach's airspace was being fed through the FAMIN ATA due to weather. Aircraft X was level at 100 and Approach had the handoff with communication. I had initially vectored Aircraft Y northbound due to the overtake he had on Aircraft X. I waited till we had about 10 miles in between the aircraft and then proceeded to clear Aircraft Y inbound towards CURSO to cross CURSO at 100 and 210 knots. I noticed that Aircraft Y was catching Aircraft X and I tried to stop him at 110 but he had already descended through 110. I verified that he had reduced to 210 knots and proceeded to ship him to Approach. At this time separation was less than 5 miles but approach was already talking to Aircraft X and I am uncertain of what type of rule they were using to separate the two aircraft. My Supervisor told me that Approach might have been using a legal vector in order to maintain their separation standards. Everytime that there is weather over the SSCOT and JINGL arrivals; the procedure is to send all of the arrivals to the FAMIN ATA. All of the aircraft have to cross the same fix at the same altitude and we pretty much have an air show every time trying to sequence 4 arrivals into 1. Most of the time during the summer months; we not only get the arrivals from the north but we also get the arrivals from the east coast and then we have to try and sequence 6 arrivals in through 1 fix. I always hear everybody complaining about this; but nothing has ever been done to remedy this situation. Maybe we can incorporate a different procedure so that one controller doesn't have to be overloaded with this type of workload. There is more than enough space in approach to at least make another ATA for situations like these. As far as the overtake with Aircraft Y and Aircraft X; if I wouldn't had been so busy trying to sequence all the arrivals; I would have shipped Aircraft Y as soon as they took the handoff and their would be no doubt in mind that approach was using some type of divergence rule to separate the aircraft. ZMA Controller reports of traffic being funneled over one fix causing an operational error issue to speed differences.
Aircraft: A319
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Filed on the COMIX 2 STAR and slowed and level at FL220. We received slow to 250 and descend to 15;000 then handed off to next controller. We were slowed and just descending through FL218 and the new controller said climb back to FL230. When questioned he says climb to FL220. We received multiple delay turns and at one point were over 9;000 FT high on the profile for the COMIX; then cleared to LEJEN. We were never cleared to descend via the COMIX 2. Next controller seemed to think we were cleared in some form on the COMIX; but we informed him negative we were not. So we were turned on a high wide downwind and slowed to 210. We get descended to 7000; 6000; and finally 5000 on the downwind and well past the field. We were then turned direct VYDDA and descend to 4000; cleared for the RNAV. We were then re-cleared for the approach but from a 240 heading and 4000. The distance from VYDDA was 5-7 miles still. When descending out of 4500 ft ATC advised us Low Altitude Alert and told us to climb to 5000. As we were climbing through 4800 he re-cleared us for the approach at 4000. We descended to 4000 and continued to VYDDA. We received no warnings from the aircraft of any terrain issues whatsoever. So my First Officer questioned ATC what that was all about. ATC replies that he cleared us for the approach too early. We then got handed off to Tower and continued the approach to landing. [Report narrative contained no additional information] A320 flight crew reported receiving a low altitude alert on arrival into SAN after descending to ATC cleared altitude.
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

I was cleared for a visual approach to Runway 34. At 1;100 FT AGL I received a ground proximity warning indication on the PFD. I immediately leveled off. I realized that the glideslope was not captured and I was still in FPA mode at a 3 degree path down. After I level off I captured the glideslope and landed safely. When I armed the approach I should have verified the FPA I choose would intercept the glideslope. In this case it should have been at a reduced path angle. At a reduced path angle I would have intercepted the glideslope further out and at or above the final approach fix. An ERJ-170 Captain received an EGPWS warning at 1;100 FT AGL on a visual approach because he set the FPA at 3 degrees and did not capture the ILS.
Aircraft: A320
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

RE the BULLZ RNAV STAR into ORD. If an aircraft is cleared to descend via the BULLZ arrival that aircraft will descend and reduce speed at specified points of the arrival. The BULLZ has aircraft cross TEDDY intersection at 11;000 feet at 250 knots.Both aircraft in this report were assigned 300 knots. Both aircraft were cleared direct TEDDY intersection. Both aircraft were issued a descent clearance to 15;000 feet. Both aircraft were then cleared to cross TEDDY at 11;000 feet. Both aircraft reduced speed to 250 knots at TEDDY without clearance to do so.I recommend speed restrictions be removed from the published BULLZ arrival. 70% of the time ORD is on a westerly flow and Approach Control requires the aircraft on the BULLZ arrival to cross TEDDY at 300 knots. This often causes confusion for the pilots and sometimes results in an aircraft not performing as directed or expected. Constantly having to restate or clarify clearances causes an increase in complexity and a decrease in safety and efficiency. An ARTCC Controller expressed consternation at the failures of some flight crews to fail to maintain their assigned airspeed of 300 knots at TEDDY waypoint on the BULLZ RNAV STAR; instead slowing to 250 knots as published on the arrival.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

I was informed by Maintenance that a passenger on the flight; two legs prior; noticed a screw on the wing that wasn't fully secured. The passenger never informed the flight crew. [Report narrative contained no additional information] Passenger on a B737-700 observed a screw on the wing not fully secured. Maintenance addressed the problem.
Aircraft: SR22
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types

I was working East RADAR position/hand off combined and was the only person in the TRACON. Aircraft X was on a track from the southeast to the northwest at 8;000 FT. Aircraft Y was on a southwesterly course; also at 8;000. I became busy; and wasn't able to call for assistance. As a result; of trying to handle everything by myself; I didn't notice that the two aircraft were on converging courses. The Local Controller called down and pointed out to me that the two were at the same altitude. I was able to issue headings to each aircraft in time to avoid a loss of separation; but it would have been extremely close if the other controller hadn't spoken up. This is a situation I've been concerned about for some time. We have become complacent and people don't seem to want to keep the Hand Off position open. There's an overall feeling that it reflects on the RADAR Controller negatively if they have someone working that position. At the very least; an additional person needed to be in the TRACON to help. However; that isn't enough; controllers will often sit back at the supervisor's desk and expect the RADAR Controller to ask for help if he needs it. The newer controllers especially won't ask for help because they feel they need to prove themselves. AVL Controller experienced a near loss of separation event when traffic suddenly increased to a point that he/she could not ask for assistance; the reporter noting a facility attitude with regard to opening the hand off position.
Aircraft: PA-46 MALIBU/MALIBU MIRAGE/MALIBU MATRIX
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

During a flight to maintain currency an upset event occurred. Aircraft X took off from ZZZ on a VFR flight with flight following. After takeoff and communication hand off from ZZZ Tower to Departure; Aircraft X was instructed by ATC to maintain runway heading due to traffic. After watching the traffic pass on the moving map display and no other traffic in the immediate area; asked ATC for permission to proceed on course. ATC apologized for the delay and cleared Aircraft X to proceed on course. Leveling off at 5;500 feet MSL and after visually and electronically checking for traffic; setup for slow flight and approach to stall practice. Retarded throttle; airspeed was already below 165 knots so landing gear was extended; verified all gear was down and locked. Held altitude while speed bleed off; applying flaps incrementally until fully extended. Began stabilized slow flight; adjusting throttle and pitch as necessary to maintain 5;500 feet. Winds at 5;500 MSL were 18 knots and there was some light turbulence. After 1-2 minutes of steady slow flight the airspeed indicator dropped quickly even though there were no rapid throttle or control surface adjustments. The stall horn began sounding continuously and the aircraft experienced very slight buffeting at which point full throttle and downward pitch were applied simultaneously and in the same instant the right wing dropped extremely rapidly as if the aircraft had been commanded into a snap roll. The roll continued even as left aileron and left rudder were applied with no effect and in less than 2 seconds the aircraft was inverted. At this point the nose dropped and the aircraft entered a right-hand spiral dive. The throttle was immediately retarded and standard recovery efforts begun. Attempts to level the wings were complicated by the g-forces as the pilot struggle to remain upright. At least 5-7 right hand turns occurred in spite of left aileron input. At approximately 500-700 feet AGL; control was reestablished and the aircraft returned to zero roll. A climb was initiated and as the airspeed dropped the pilot remembered the aircraft was still in full landing configuration with the throttle at idle. Power was added; flaps retracted one notch and the landing gear was retracted. Continued retracting flaps one notch at a time as speed and altitude increased.After returning to a safer altitude; all aircraft controls were checked and seemed to be normal with no apparent explanation for the un-commanded roll. Only after landing and examining the aircraft was the extreme damage noted. Apparently during the spiral dive; the aircraft exceeded speed and g-force limitations even though the pilot does not recall an overspeed warning. PA46 pilot reported loss of aircraft control and aircraft damage.
Aircraft: B757
Phase of flight: Takeoff / Launch
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Pushed back onto ramp. Planned to depart runway XY with an RNAV departure as cleared. Expecting long taxi from ramp to [RWY] XY; but when we called for taxi; ATC issued departure/runway change to runway XX. As Captain; I was still in the long taxi mindset; so we started the (now very short) taxi to runway XX as the first officer worked on the runway and departure change. We arrived quickly at the hold short and simply forgot to configure. We went 'below the line' on taking the runway; thinking that the first part of the takeoff checklist was complete. On takeoff roll; as throttles were advanced; we received a takeoff configuration warning and immediately discontinued the takeoff. We communicated the situation with tower as we exited the runway. We then taxied back to the hold short; completed the required checklists; and completed an uneventful takeoff.Trying to do too much in too little time. When dealing with multiple changes; such as runway/SID changes; the urge to try and fit it all in the original timeline in the pilot's mind is very strong. Inevitably; this is when something slips through the cracks; in this case; an entire checklist. When something new or different occurs; that's the time to consciously slow down and double check everything. I learned a valuable lesson and am thankful for the protections afforded by the takeoff configuration warning system; although they are only a last line of defense. The first line is always the crew. When in doubt; slow down! If we had stopped the taxi still on the ramp and done the runway change there; things would have flowed much more normally through the 'cleared to configure' call. We would have given ourselves time instead of trying to do more with less time. B757 Captain reports being issued a runway and SID change when calling for taxi. This results in the aircraft not being configured and the first part of the Before Takeoff Checklist not being accomplished. A takeoff warning sounds and the takeoff is rejected.
Aircraft: EMB-505 / PHENOM 300
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Received an ECS (Environmental Control System) 1 Fail message in flight. After running the QRH we then conferred with Maintenance and the [Chief Pilot]; we made the decision to divert to ZZZ; in the interest of safety. We landed uneventfully at ZZZ. [Narrative contained no additional information]. EMB-505 flight crew reported executing an uneventful precautionary diversion due to failure of secondary ECS system.
Aircraft: CRJ200
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

While in Cruise; my windscreen started to arc and flash. A traveling crack had developed on the outer screen. My First Officer and I recognized the issue and began planning for the window to break. After a minute or so; the screen shattered. The break was on the outermost layer. We determined it to be prudent to descend slowly and reduce airspeed. We didn't want to create any more pressures on the compromised glass. Also; we didn't want to turn a relatively benign situation into a hurried and unsafe situation. Along our travel; we picked out good landing spots in the direction of our destination in case the situation worsened. ATC was alerted to our situation and priority routing was given. We landed the plane at our original destination. It proved to be the quickest in terms of time with our descent restrictions. Also; it had the best emergency services and clearest runways and lowest winds of the choices along the way. A CRJ-200 Captain reported a cockpit window shattered during flight. After descending and reducing airspeed; a successful landing was accomplished at the destination airport.