Aryan95614/aerograph-asrs huggingface dataset:
Aircraft: FALCON 2000
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

During post engine start checks both pilots and flight attendant saw an orange glow up in glare shield vent emitting heavy black smoke with particulate matter. The aircraft was immediately evacuated; engines were shut down; and all generators and batteries turned off.After evacuation ships main batteries in forward service compartment were disconnected. Fire department was notified and responded. They inspected the aircraft and found no further evidence of an active fire. The Reporter stated that the windshield heat contactor over heated and as it melted the smoke entered the cockpit through the vent directly below the window. A DA 2000 First Officer reported that after engine start the glare shield vent emitted an orange glow and black particulate smoke as a windshield contactor failed. The aircraft was shutdown and evacuated.
Aircraft: CRJ200
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was the FO on flight to ZZZ. Prior to departure the Captain and I noticed a CAS Miscomp status message. Maintenance was called and we performed an FIM reset to clear the message. In the process we detected a second status message for INBD GND SPLR FAULT. Maintenance had us perform a second FIM reset. During the climb out in IMC; the Captain's airspeed indicator malfunctioned. We received STALL FAIL; STAB TRIM and MACH TRIM caution messages. My PFD displayed an amber boxed IAS message. The Captain disengaged the autopilot and transferred the controls to me. My airspeed and the standby airspeed indicator seemed to be functioning properly. We ran the Unreliable Airspeed IAC and QRH. During this process ATC quarried our position and we determined that the FMS was not functioning properly. The Captain [advised ATC] and we asked for radar vectors and to stop the climb at FL300. Because the aircraft was dispatched with an MELed ACARS we had to utilize ARINC to contact Company Dispatch and Maintenance. Contrary to the QRH which states; 'land at the nearest suitable airport;' Company advised that we could continue to ZZZ because we had two remaining airspeed indicators. All information on both MFD's was inaccurate and unusable; flying at high altitude with no stall protection. ATC offered any and all assistance available. ATC vectored us to the final approach course and we flew the ILS and landed without incident. Following the safety briefing with Operations Control we were informed that we would ferry the aircraft for Maintenance. We were not questioned if we were fit-for-flight. Following this emergency; we were not. Captain called fatigued.Following this incident; I have become very concerned about the safety of operations here at our company. It is my impression that the company is more concerned with performance numbers; and cost savings. I believe the primary cause of this incident is directly related to Maintenance and Dispatch procedure. My understanding is that an FIM reset is allowed once before Maintenance needs to inspect. A CAS miscomp is a serious issue. I don't believe dispatching an aircraft without a functioning ACARS is smart or safe but it happens all the time. The ACARS is our primary means of communication with company. We as a pilot group are noticing an increase in MEL's on the aging fleet. Automatically expecting the flight crew who safely managed multiple system failures in a serious emergency to ferry the aircraft for Maintenance is not smart or safe. Please take these concerns seriously. CRJ-200 First Officer reported receiving multiple EICAS messages while in cruise.
Aircraft: RV-6
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC

While flying [a charity flight] I heard on the radio; 'Wow! That's a nice RV'. I suspected that I was close to another aircraft for that transmission to occur; however I could not locate one. After looking all around; I noticed the Taylorcraft also providing rides about a mile in trail of me and at the same altitude.I was surprised that it was at the same altitude because I was briefed that low-wing aircraft were to fly at 2000 feet and high-wing would fly at 2500 feet. When I got on the ground and after the Taylorcraft landed; I introduced myself to the pilot of the Taylorcraft and inquired about how close we were. The pilot said that I flew over the top of him. I was shocked because I expected that he was near 2500 feet. I told him that I was briefed that low-wings were to be at 2000 feet and high-wings were at 2500 feet. He replied; 'Yeah; but I can't get to 2500 in this'. I never saw the Taylorcraft and informed the pilot that I never saw him. He said 'That's scary!' I agreed.I was fairly upset with myself for not seeing the other aircraft and reflected on what could have distracted me. At the time I was pointing out to the [passenger] the instrument panel; specifically the altimeter and airspeed. However; I was still doing my traffic scan. I believe that this should be a learning event and I intend to brief this at our next [organization] meeting. RV-6 pilot reported a near mid-air collision with another aircraft while on a charity flight.
Aircraft: B757
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was sent to a hearing for the events stemming in June 2012. On that day; I observed moisture ingress on the R-3 (Right) cockpit window while checking a Logbook. I was charged with violating company rules. The charges were eventually dropped. Now I'm again being brought in for another investigation (which is the application of discipline) for the moisture ingress I documented [also] in June 2012 on the L-3 (Left) cockpit window on another B757-200 aircraft. On this occasion I was sent to the aircraft to unlock the cockpit door for a Rockwell Collins Contractor and noticed the moisture ingress when I stepped into the cockpit. Management has nothing but contempt for the FARs and a safe airline operation. They expect me to ignore obvious defects to avoid a delay. My Air Carrier is aware it has a major problem with moisture ingress in the B757 [cockpit] side windows; which are not permitted because it may lead to [electrical] arcing. Yet; the company has not issued an Engineering Order (E/O) to inspect their B757 fleet or sought any other remedy. Instead; I get harassed when I discover moisture ingress during the course of the day. This is now my 2nd report on the subject and Management still continues to harass me for the discovery of obvious defects. At this point; I believe we need new management leadership. A Line Mechanic reports he continues to be harassed by Maintenance Management for discovery of obvious defects and moisture ingress at the L-3 (Left) and R-3 (Right) cockpit side windows on their B757-200 aircraft.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict

During our arrival Center asked us to descend and maintain 33000 feet. We complied and during our descent we received a frequency change to the next Center. We checked in with our current altitude which was 35000 feet and advised of our crossing instructions. Once we reached 34000 feet we received 'Traffic Traffic' on our TCAS. The pilot flying switched to VS mode and shallowed the descent. We then received a Resolution Advisory (RA). We advised Center but he said there was no traffic in our area. We advised him of the RA and that we had visual on the traffic below us; which was an airliner. He again said that the only traffic near us was 40 miles ahead of us. We said nothing else and continued the arrival. A Pilot reported they recieved an RA for traffic and sighted the traffic but ATC stated they showed no traffic in that position on their radar.
Aircraft: CRJ700
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

A CRJ7 departed Runway 1R on the SFO8 SID. When the aircraft began their right turn to the SID heading; I shipped them to NorCal. When I went to clear the next arrival to land; I noticed the CRJ7 almost due eastbound about 2 miles north of final climbing out of 3;000 FT. This was not an issue for my arrivals. My Local Assist and I briefly discussed what could have taken place. Maybe NorCal turned them early was our thought. About three hours later; a Supervisor asked me if I remember anything unusual about this flight. I said they appeared to have eastbound outside of my airspace for some reason. The Supervisor then explained that NorCal had the pilot call; and found out they were flying the wrong SID. This is where it gets bizarre: The aircraft was filed; KSFO.DUMB6.LIN... The aircraft was cleared; KSFO.SFO8.SFO.LIN... I am curious how the pilot(s) got the plane to depart on a SID that does not connect with the runway used? The DUMB6 is only used for Runways 10 and 19. The SFO 8 SID is only used for Runways 1/28. Determine what anomaly took place to allow this to occur. SFO Controller described a confusing turn initiated by a SFO8 departure; later discovering the aircraft in question was flying the DUMB6 SID contrary to the clearance issued.
Aircraft: LEARJET 60
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

We were IMC on initial descent in the high 20s or low 30s; between ZZZ and ZZZ1; going through some rain/ice and light; borderline moderate turbulence. The Master Caution flashed so I checked the annunciator panel and saw that both generator lights were on. I called my First Officer's attention to it and told him it looks like we have a dual generator failure and called for the generator fail checklist. I also called Center and [advised them] and requested assistance with weather as we focused on the aircraft. We completed the checklist; which included reducing the electrical load. I only had cabin fans and lights to turn off. With the icing conditions I did not want to risk turning off any anti-ice. The checklist had us press the generator reset buttons; and when we did; both generators came back on line. I confirmed with seeing 28 VDC on the EIS. Shortly after; we got an amber Stab Heat annunciator; showing there was a disagreement and may not be working. We did the Stab Heat light checklist. At some point around then; I don't remember exact timing; we got a white L ENG COMPUTER light and an aural alarm of some sort. We did not know what the alarm was and could not find a way to mute it. We completed the checklist for the engine computer light.In the meantime we were descended further by ATC and ended up in the clear with layers above and below. I turned off the anti-ice after a couple of minutes and addressed my passengers. We still could not determine what the alarm was. Prior to entering the layers below us; I turned the anti-ice back on; and the Stab Heat light did not come on; indicating it was working. With all systems appearing to be working as they should be; I advised ATC that I was expecting a normal landing and [advising them] was more precautionary at this point. We landed without incident and the alarm finally stopped when I turned off the main batteries after engine shutdown. We have since determined the alarm was the SelCal going off; however; I don't know what set it off. Learjet 60 Captain reported dual generator failure; left engine computer master caution; and intermittent stab heat fail in descent through clouds and icing.
Aircraft: MEDIUM LARGE TRANSPORT
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types

We departed 16L and tower was fairly busy. However; we had to ask for a frequency change since it was not given at about the normal time on the LEETZ departure. This is not inherently a big deal. We continued on the departure and were given a; 'delete the speed' clearance. Shortly after; another clearance; climb and maintain FL230 came as well. At about ZEETA intersection; we were given the clearance 'cleared direct UPJAR' intersection. We agreed that this would be in conflict with our drift down since we were only about 6000 feet above the terrain and we would have to take responsibility for terrain clearance. So; we requested to stay on route since that is the safest and most conservative. We were approved to stay on course. We were then handed over to another controller. This controller; the second departure controller on the LEETZ departure issued the clearance 'Direct EKR (MEEKR).' There was an exchange back and forth between us and the controller in which we attempted to communicate we wanted to stay on the route for drift down alternate planning. We were not far from the original course. But; the end result of the conversation was what seemed to be a very strong-willed controller not taking into consideration what we were trying to convey in our radio communications. This being that our route is most conservatively flown in this aircraft using the drift down procedures dispatched with us. The controllers should be educated on exactly why drift down is important to our operations. Also; this communication should include the importance of not clearing us to fixes directly; taking us off our route. It is equally important for controllers to listen to the pilots and planes they are monitoring. Our reasoning may be in conflict with their need to expedite traffic out of their sectors; but safety is always in mind. Air carrier Captain reported being given direct routings in mountainous terrain and repeatedly having to explain to ATC controllers that he wanted to remain on his filed route due to drift down considerations.
Aircraft: B757
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

At cruise RT SYS QTY EICAS. Ran checklist which called to turn OFF electric and engine pumps. Contacted Dispatch and Maintenance. Continued to our filed destination which shutdown for weather and diverted to an enroute airport. Turned on both pumps before landing. Rest of flight uneventful. A B757 EICAS alerted RT SYS QTY so the QRH was completed and the flight continued with both RT system pumps OFF. After the destination airport close; the flight diverted and turned the pumps on prior to landing.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

On approach to OAK; we asked for the RNAV Z 29. ATC said they would check on the request. They told us then to descend on the PXN 3 Arrival. They then asked if we were doing the BUSHY transition. BUSHY is on the PXN 3 Arrival prior to SUNOL so we said yes (no mention of any clearance on the RNAV Z 29). We then switched controllers and they again asked us if we were on the BUSHY transition. We said yes. They cleared us for the visual and we responded; 'Are we cleared for the visual RNAV Z 29?' and then they said 'Cleared RNAV Z 29.' At this point; we were past BUSHY and almost to SUNOL and they said; 'Oh; I thought you were on the BUSHY transition' and we said; 'We were never really cleared the RNAV Z.' They said 'no problem' and they gave us a short vector for traffic and cleared us for the visual. ATC needed to clarify the Approach instead of assuming. And; we needed to also clarify and ask when there are misunderstandings. BUSHY is not a transition and should never have been referred to as such. It is an initial approach fix. The term transition refers to a point on a STAR from which an approach can start and it is published on the STAR. All LAX STARs and approaches are a good points of reference. When clearing an aircraft for an approach say; 'Proceed direct BUSHY. At BUSHY cleared the RNAV Z 29.' Revise the PANOCHE Three Arrival to indicate BUSHY as a transition point! Never issue partial or vague clearances. Never ask an aircraft to fly a transition that is not published on the STAR! Instead; say 'Proceed direct BUSHY. At BUSHY cleared the RNAV Z 29.' A B737 crew on the OAK PNX 3 Arrival was cleared via the RNAV Z 29 but did not begin the approach at BUSHY because they did not believe that the BUSHY IAF should be termed a transition from the arrival.
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

At FL330; we felt and heard an audible thump. We were at cruise power and no change had been made to the thrust setting. Immediately following the thump; the ITT on the Number 1 Engine momentarily spiked. Neither of us noticed the actual temperature value; but it was a red indication over the max line. I slowly began pulling the thrust lever back that is when the engine vibration indicator went full scale high. About the same time we noticed an acrid smell; albeit not overwhelming. We then accomplished the memory items for severe engine damage to secure the engine. The First Officer then continued the QRH. We quickly decided on ZZZ for our diversion airport for its proximity; visible weather; and operations available. This was not on our release; so after we notified ATC of our intensions; we then ACARSed Dispatch of our situation. Although I cannot recall the exact sequence of events; we:-Spoke with the Flight Attendant almost immediately following the thump; verifying with her there was no smoke or damage inside the cabin. She also noticed the acrid smell. Which did dissipate quickly after the engine was secured and bleed and pack were deselected.-Notified the passengers of the failed engine and explained that we would be diverting to ZZZ. The Flight Attendant told us that they responded well to the PA.-Spoke with our Flight Attendant multiple times during our descent to update her on our progress/time; and verify the condition of the cabin and passengers.-To the best of my recollection and understanding; the necessary QRH items were completed prior to approach and landing.-Two separate logbook entries were made one for the engine issue; and one for the overweight landing. We landed on the longest runway. We were somewhere around 1;000 LBS overweight on the landing. I deployed engine reverser number 2; but did not use reverse thrust (spool the engine). The touchdown was smooth; with minimal descent rate (as noted in the logbook for the overweight landing). After turning off the runway; the emergency response team inspected the aircraft and verified that nothing was on fire. 'No excessive heat' was the report to the Tower from them. We then continued to taxi to the gate. Notes:-No fire indication was received at any time.-Oil quantity remained at 8 quarts for Engine 1.-Difficult to recall; but I believe N2 continued to spin at a low value. I cannot recall N1 at all. EMB-145 Captain experiences a sudden engine failure at FL330. The engine is shut down and the flight diverts to a suitable airport.
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

While receiving vectors to land; ATC alerted us of a severe storm cell in our path. Our radar was not adequately depicting any weather in front of us. As such; we asked ATC to provide an initial heading to keep us away from the worst of the weather. As we were starting the initial turn; we were struck by lightning; causing the number one engine to go out. Due to the circumstances of the failure and seeing a high ITT (Interstage Turbine Temperature) spike during the failure; we elected not to restart the engine since we were unsure of the state of the engine if we tried to restart it. We were quickly brought in to land single engine. Fire trucks verified there was no visible damage to the engine; and we proceeded to the gate. Identification: EICAS master caution for engine one out. Cause: inadequate time to react to severe weather in the vicinity before the lightning strike occurred. Response: we ran the appropriate QRH checklist for an engine out; and decided not to attempt an engine restart given the nature of the failure and the proximity to the airport. Suggestions: rely less on ATC when there is a time critical decision to make concerning weather. While snap decisions should not be made; sometimes a definitive decision is still needed. EMB-145 Captain reported a safe landing followed the loss of #1 engine due to a lightning strike.
Aircraft: A319
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Upon arriving at the gate in ZZZZ; the APU was started; bleed on with packs operating. The flight crew conducted a walkaround. As we climbed up the jet bridge; we were greeted by the flight attendants and the Station Manager advising us that the aircraft had a terrible odor; similar to smelly socks; burning crayons; and musty. A logbook writeup was made and the local maintenance started working on the writeup. After several hours they came up with the source being the number 1 air conditioning pack. The next day we departed with Pack 1 on MEL. Sometimes you come across an aircraft that exhibits the distinct low odor of being 'old'. We must determine if this odor is embedded in the interior? Or is it slowly seeping through the vent system? I am aware our airline is at the forefront of addressing these odor issues and I understand they are in the preliminary stage of replacing the APU on the A320 fleet. [Captain recommends Company] should consider a safety campaign educating fight crews on the cause and types of odor events associated with air conditioning packs and APU. I know several publications have addressed this issue in the past; but it keeps happening. A319 Captain reported a fume event during pre-flight resulting in flight cancellation for maintenance action.
Aircraft: B747
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

New SOP in effect requires right downwind traffic to San Francisco be vectored between two points depicted on video map only a few miles wide. This requirement never existed before. Vector off arrival route to remain between these points must be timed very precise and can be affected by wind; aircraft performance; workload etc; etc. I was sequence delay vectoring aircraft to SFO; picking up VFR aircraft; issuing approach clearances and coordinating a HAF GPS approach. My vector to the right downwind left the aircraft slightly south of the southern point now required in the SOP. Delete this unrealistic requirement in the SOP. There are too many variable factors and too busy a sector to keep aircraft between these points all the time. Concentrating on this vector to comply with the SOP will deter from other more important sector duties. NCT Controller voiced concern regarding newly established vectoring points on the downwind to SFO; claiming the precise vectoring required is unrealistic given other position responsibilities.