Aryan95614/aerograph-asrs huggingface dataset:
Aircraft: LEARJET 45
Phase of flight: Initial Climb
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

During the initial climb of our departure; it was apparent that the towering cumulonimbus was going to be a factor for the SID that was issued. We asked for; and received a heading. We wanted a climb to attempt to avoid the clouds due to the expected turbulence. During the turn and initial level off; we entered into a cumulonimbus type cloud with moderate turbulence and updrafts. During this time; we couldn't level off at our assigned altitude and reached a max of 10500 ft. We immediately lowered the nose and descended back to our assigned altitude. We received NO TCAS TAs or RAs. No further issues were experienced. Captain reported updrafts in weather resulted in overshooting altitude.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I filed a report recently about this very same situation. The hangar is ignoring the pitot tube cover policy on aircraft that are on the ground for more than 48 hours. Today; aircraft came to the line for trip X. Aircraft had been here since [date]. My Supervisor called the hangar at approximately XA:00 to inform the hangar that the pitot inspection was required since they failed to follow procedures. The aircraft was released for service anyway and sent to the line with a violation they were made aware of.This keeps happening because the hangar managers keep failing to follow procedures.Have the hangar managers and supervisors ensure the pitot cover policy is being complied with. Maintenance Technician reported problems with other technicians not following the correct company policy for aircraft checks.
Aircraft: DHC8
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Aircraft X responded to a TCAS RA that he thought was erroneous and returned to airport on a visual approach. There was no traffic observed on the radar [at] the time of the event; nor was there any observed traffic within 10 minutes before and after the event. Aircraft X did refer to himself as [an incorrect flight number] a few times while communicating. It took me a minute to realize it was him calling; because I initially thought Aircraft X was trying to pick up IFR. I did verify that the aircraft was VMC with terrain and the airport in sight before issuing the visual approach because he had descended below the [minimum IFR altitude]. I also informed him the minimum IFR altitude was 5000 feet. ATC Center Controller reported an aircraft descended below the Minimum IFR Altitude and reported a TCAS/RA while there appeared to be no traffic in the area.
Aircraft: ANY UNKNOWN OR UNLISTED AIRCRAFT MANUFACTURER
Phase of flight: Initial Climb
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

At night; following refueling; aircraft was being repositioned to hospital base. Pilot smelled an odor of fuel and elected to return to the airport. Following landing; pilot discovered fuel cap was not adequately secured. Additional attention following refueling to ensure cap is not only in place but completely secured. Pilot of unknown type aircraft smelled fuel after takeoff; returned to airport and found fuel cap not properly secured.
Aircraft: B757
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

A full IRS alignment was completed on the ground prior to flight. There were no position inaccuracies seen on the ground with relation to the runway alignment for takeoff. While climbing through 11;000 ft; we encountered a map shift. LNAV/VNAV were engaged with the center autopilot also on. Aircraft turned about 30 degrees right from previous course to intercept magenta line. Progress page 2 indicated 0.5 NM left of course. Aircraft intercepted course and proceeded on course for remainder of flight with 0 deviation indicated or observed. Later on the arrival and approaching the ZZZZZ intersection; ATC assigned a heading and asked us to verify that we were on the Arrival. We answered in the affirmative and observed 0 deviation from course on Progress page 2 with LNAV engaged; reporting that we showed directly over the ZZZZZ intersection. ATC reported showing us 1 NM west. Both VOR mode selectors were confirmed in the AUTO mode. Approaching ZZZZZ intersection at 4;000 feet on the Arrival; Approach asked us if we were still on the arrival; to which the captain as PM responded yes. The approach controller responded that he was showing us 1 mile west of course. The captain stated that we were showing on course; and by that point he indicated we were showing directly over ZZZZZ intersection as cleared. The controller thereafter gave us vectors to align with the procedure ground track; however our indications on both sides of the cockpit with zero crosstrack error; as loaded from the database; thereafter showed us offset from our map indications. As a matter of reference; earlier in the arrival the captain and I both noticed what appeared to be a rapid and transient map shift with a cross-track error approximately .5 miles left of course. It was momentary; and the FMC almost immediately began a correction back to the STAR course line and soon thereafter to zero cross-track error. The subsequent comment from the Controller indicated we were essentially paralleling the course line; and affirmed the likelihood that we had an FMS cockpit indication anomaly. Upon landing and block-in; the captain and I briefed the mechanic on what occurred; and made the appropriate entry in the aircraft logbook. B757 flight crew reported experiencing a map shift of about a half mile during arrival. Later during arrival; ATC informed the crew they were slightly off course and issued vectors.
Aircraft: SR22
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

I was flying an IFR flight. About 10 miles west of [destination] at 3000 feet; I noticed a steady decline in the oil pressure. I thought it might be a sensor at first; but the gauge was steadily declining vs. jumping around; so I thought there was a potentially serious problem with the plane. At the time; ATC was vectoring me for a visual approach. I knew that I was likely to be brought down towards beach before being turned inland for the final approach. I requested being granted priority handling and they told me to descend to 1600 feet. After a few seconds; I decided that it would be best to get the plane on the ground vs. continuing south and risk an engine loss over a heavily populated area so I [advised ATC]. I was asked [which runway I wanted]. I took a runway straight in from my position. When I landed; tower informed me that there was a trail of black smoke behind me. I took off with 7 quarts of oil and when I landed I had just over 1; so an engine out scenario was in fact imminent. SR22 pilot reported a loss of oil pressure while on approach.
Aircraft: SA-227 AC METRO III
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

I was giving Initial Operating Experience to a pilot who was about to upgrade to Captain in the SA227 Metroliner. We had just finished dropping off our cargo and were enroute on our return leg. This leg I was having the trainee conduct the flight as a 'single pilot leg' while I monitored his progress.We soon leveled off at 10;000 MSL in VFR conditions when I felt the aircraft yaw to the right. I looked up at the annunciator panel and found the right 'Oil Pressure'; 'Right Generator'; and 'R SRL' annunciators illuminated and the right engine's torque between 40-50% and dropping when it should have been closer to 60%. As I monitored the engine's declining torque I informed my trainee that we were now acting in a two crew [member] environment. I took an extra 30-40 seconds to try and unsuccessfully to diagnose the engine's loss of power. We then ran the 'Engine Failure in Flight' Checklist; thus securing and feathering the right engine. We then ran the 'Failed Engine Clean-Up' and 'Operating Engine Considerations' checklists. We advised Approach Control that we were declaring an emergency that our right engine had failed; that we planned to continue to our destination and requested ARFF for our arrival. We had decided to continue to our destination because of the availability of longer runways and better ARFF support than at nearer airports. When all of this was done I assumed pilot flying duties and transferred pilot not flying duties to the less experienced trainee. It was hazy as the sun was starting to set on the horizon so instead of a visual approach we elected to do the ILS to Runway 26L to get better established on the final approach. We had approximately ten miles visibility with winds 220 degrees at approximately 15-20 KTS on landing. We landed without incident and taxied the aircraft; under its own power; off the runway and taxi way and into the FBO parking where we were met by ARFF. Exiting the aircraft I found that the right engine contained all its oil and hydraulic fluid and there was no visible external damage. When their right engine lost power and illuminated multiple system anomaly annunciations the flight crew of an SA227 shut the engine down per checklists; declared and emergency and proceded to their destination due to superior runways and CFR facilities.
Aircraft: PA28
Phase of flight: Takeoff / Launch
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

I had just landed (Piper Archer) at ZZZ runway XX and had taxied back for departure to return to (home airport). I announced on the CTAF that I was departing runway XX; and as I was taxing into position for takeoff; a Glasair on short final came into view and announced that he was going around. He executed the go-around about 150 feet above the runway while I was taking position for takeoff. His evasive action avoided a collision.I had not heard the Glasair position announcements in the pattern; if any. I also did not see the Glasair on final as I was taking into position for takeoff. I should have been more diligent in scanning the pattern area; and especially the final approach course; before taxing onto the runway. The volume control on my headset was set lower than usual; and in retrospect; if I had set the volume higher; if the Glasair had made position announcements; I would have been more likely to hear his reports. PA28 pilot reported taking the runway at non-towered airport and seeing a non-communicating Glasair go-around above him.
Aircraft: MD80
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

After pushback and engine start; upon turning air conditioning packs on; acrid smoke began coming out of vents. Shut off packs and recirculating fan while simultaneously returning to gate. Once the packs were turned off the smoke stopped increasing. Deplaned normally without incident. Smoke appears to have come from a loss of the left hydraulic system. MD-80 Captain reported smoke in the aircraft when packs were turned on after pushback. Flight returned to the gate.
Aircraft: B777
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown; Ground Incursion Taxiway

We taxied out on a clearance to use Charlie and Alpha to 17L. As we approached the Charlie to Alpha Y we saw a sign near where the H is on the chart to the left of the Y. It said to go the left to join Alpha to 17L. As I stated to the Ground controller told us to turn right and continue on Charlie to the right and then join Alpha. I immediately complied and we stayed on the hard surface.My FO and I agreed that we had both been snowed by the sign which had indicated to turn left towards Kilo instead of continuing on Charlie to Alpha. Bad signage was at the heart of the problem. Afterwards we taxied uneventfully to 17L.I hope that other unsuspecting pilots that have been caught in the same trap will cause SCEL ground ops to replace the signs leading to Alpha and Kilo. Review of the signage used by SCEL Ground Ops with a clearer depiction of taxiway A's origin northbound. B777 Captain reported they had difficulty with taxiway signage at SCEL airport.
Aircraft: A320
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown

FILED ROUTE****KIAH LOA8 FUZ J58... CLIMB VIA SID CTC RAMP CONTROL WHEN READY TO PUSH. We were given the clearance; 'On departure turn right to 340; cleared for takeoff Runway 09.' The initial climb altitude was 4;000 feet. First Officer made the takeoff normally and after gear retraction initiated the turn to the right. I delayed pulling the heading knob until passing through 180 because it would have commanded a left turn (the shorter direction to 340). We noticed an amber traffic advisory about 45 off to the right and in front of us; and monitored it. Approximately 1;500 feet the TCAS changed to Resolution advisory (RA) with the command REDUCE CLIMB. I said; 'You need to descend;' and First Officer reduced the climb to 0 VSI as per the RA indication on the VSI. About that time the Tower Controller told us to roll out. I replied; 'We are responding to an RA; rolling out on 210.' The traffic passed nearly over us perhaps within 500 feet; I'm not sure. We were told to continue the turn to 350; and then told to stop the turn at 270. Then we were told to continue the turn to 360 and climb to 16;000 feet. [Report narrative contained no additional information] A320 flight crew departing Runway 9 at IAH with instructions to turn right to heading 340 after takeoff which results in a TCAS RA and a NMAC with an aircraft turning left off one of the south runways.
Aircraft: B717 (FORMERLY MD-95)
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Climbing through 12;000 FT both AC tie bus relays tripped open causing numerous level 1 alerts and continuous stick shaker activation. This activated the emergency power - powering only the AC ground service bus off the ships batteries. I notified ATC and requested to stop the climb so we could analyze and treat the emergency. We performed the checklist for AC GS BUS OFF. This calls for a landing at the nearest suitable airport. Aircraft weight was 114;000 LBS - I requested to return to our departure airport and a short hold to reduce the landing weight below 110;000 LBS. The air return; landing; and gate return were uneventful. Maintenance met us at the gate. I made the appropriate log entries - aircraft weight at landing was approximately 108;000 LBS. A B717 returned to their departure airport when both bus tie relays opened during their climb.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

While level at 6000' on the arrival; we received a new frequency on 121.5 and a simultaneous jolt of wake turbulence. It wasn't clear to me which radio the call came from or even if it was for us. The other Pilot (Pilot Flying) asked for a repeat on 121.5 and we eventually called Approach on the new frequency. In the meantime; we were trying to locate the source of the wake encounter. Eventually; we reviewed our COMM panels and found the hundredths digit had been inadvertently moved on our previous frequency. B737-700 Captain reported losing contact with ATC when they incorrectly entered a new frequency. Situation was complicated by a wake turbulence encounter.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

After pushing off gate and starting 1 engine; we received an Elevator Servo Fault ECAM message. We went through all QRH procedures to resolve the problem to no avail. After calling ZZZ Operations to coordinate a return to the gate; we were informed that we were not allowed to return to the gate for a maintenance problem without Maintenance Control authorization. This seems to be in conflict with 14 CFR 121.533; 14 CFR 121.535 regarding Captain's Pilot in Command authority; as well as the MEL preamble which states that Maintenance Control's role is that of technical consultation (Not Command and Control). In any event; we eventually reached Maintenance Control via personal cellphone; and; eventually; Maintenance Control concurred that we should return to the gate. We returned to the gate; maintenance personnel troubleshot the problem to no avail; and the aircraft was taken out of service. My concern is that; in this scenario; the flight crew was forced to go through a Maintenance Control process that has 3 possible outcomes. First; Maintenance Control directs some off book procedure over the phone that 'fixes' the problem. Second; Maintenance Control directs us to flight crew placard the malfunction (which is not allowed by the MEL in any event). Neither one of those outcomes are acceptable with a primary flight control malfunction. The last possible outcome; and the only realistic outcome; is to return the aircraft to the gate; which we were frustrated from doing by this Maintenance Control permission regimen. I am concerned we are being pushed into possibly unsafe operation as our judgment is automatically questioned by a corporate policy that directly conflicts with Federal law.[Reporter stated the need for a revision of] company policy regarding maintenance troubleshooting.We [flight crews] need clearer understanding of the roles and responsibilities of Maintenance Control versus the PIC. Air carrier Captain reported ground gate return policy violates FARs in regards to Captain's Pilot in Command authority.
Aircraft: SMALL AIRCRAFT; HIGH WING; 1 ENG; FIXED GEAR
Phase of flight: Final Approach
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC

Flying Aircraft X which is not equipped with either an electrical system nor radio; I conducted a run-up and 360-degree turn in the hammerhead of Runway 24 at Cable Airport. I did not observe any traffic in the pattern and elected to take off. I did not observe any traffic entering the pattern via the standard crosswind or midfield local entry procedures. Upon reaching the downwind abeam point; I scanned final and did not observe any traffic and began my base turn. After rolling out on final; I ended up wingtip to wingtip within a 1/2-mile of Aircraft Y. I must not have been able to see the aircraft due to ground clutter. Aircraft Y initiated a go-around and I continued to lend to prevent further conflict. GA pilot reported an NMAC event on the final approach to CCB non-towered airport.
Aircraft: MEDIUM TRANSPORT; LOW WING; 2 TURBOJET ENG
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

We were cleared for taxi to Runway 1. We exited the ramp at Taxiway D and proceeded southbound on Taxiway A. In order to maximize available runway; we followed the second (southernmost) curved taxiway center line onto Taxiway A1; toward the active runway. We observed the enhanced taxiway center line markings; however as the Taxiway A transitioned to Taxiway A1 the hold-short line was completely obscured by packed snow.We stopped the aircraft approximately 60 feet past what we estimate to be the location of the hold-short line and immediately notified the Tower of our error. We were instructed to perform a 180 back to Taxiway A. The incursion did not present any immediate conflict to other aircraft. Another aircraft was simultaneously taxiing on the active runway for the north de-icing pad. The nearest arriving aircraft was greater than 10 miles away and had not yet been cleared to land.Upon further analysis of the error; we (the crew) determined that the short taxi certainly contributed to the confusion. The Holding Position sign for RWY 1-19 is situated on the northern edge of Taxiway A1 and angled to the northeast; in a manner that makes it very easy to miss when entering Taxiway A from Taxiway D. By the time the aircraft is established on Taxiway A; that sign is already abeam the aircraft. From the perspective of the pilot flying from the left seat; that sign is not visible in this situation. But the most significant factor in our misstep today was the nearly complete obscuration of the hold short line at the intersection of taxiways A and A1. Pilot reported a runway incursion at JAC airport and cited snow obscuring the hold short line and the position of the Holding Position sign contributed to the event.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical

Tower did not alert pilot that a 787 was on taxiway prior to giving pushback the 'clear to push' command. Near ground miss with a plane on the taxiway going at least 30mph. Ground Crew reported a near strike with a B787 during pushback due to a communication breakdown with ATC.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Final Approach
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

During FMS Visual to Runway XXR and after I disconnected the autopilot; I noticed that I was low on the approach but before I corrected; ATC issued us a low altitude alert. I corrected and maintained a stable approach to the landing. An Air Carrier pilot reported descending below the glideslope on short final and received a Low Altitude Alert from the Tower.