Aryan95614/aerograph-asrs huggingface dataset:
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Phase of flight: Takeoff / Launch
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

The taxi was short and slow as we had a wheels up time about 10 minutes away. We did notice a clicking or very slight knocking at our feet when the aircraft was in motion. We discussed it and then dismissed it. We ruled out the tiller as it wasn't being used. I also noticed no pulling of the steering. Upon takeoff clearance; the steering immediately pulled to the right. I corrected back to the center line. At this point it felt like a strong crosswind with no correction. Wind was calm. After correcting; it pulled again hard to the right and I aborted the takeoff. I'd estimate the speed at around 40 kts. This was not a sudden jerk; but something that became more pronounced with speed. We exited the runway; then taxied to the de-ice pad to troubleshoot and call Maintenance control. At this point the pulling to the right was much more pronounced; even at low speeds. Also; the steering was disengaging on taxi. The passengers were notified and everyone remained comfortable. There were no complaints. Water service was performed by the FAs while in the de-ice pad. After communication with Maintenance Control; we taxied back to gate to await maintenance to arrive. Again; the threat was the steering issue and we contained it the best we could. EMB-145 Captain reported rejecting the takeoff and returning to the gate for maintenance after experiencing nose wheel steering issues.
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Phase of flight: Initial Climb
Anomaly: Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

After V1 the First Officer and I noticed an odor that smelled wet; damp; musky; wet sock type of smell. This odor did not clear and remained strong throughout the duration of the flight. When we reached a safe altitude on departure; I contacted the Flight Attendant and asked if she smelled any odor or fumes. She replied positively. The FO and I requested priority handling and landed back in ZZZ. After landing; we taxied back to the gate. Speaking with the FA more after the emergency; she told us that there had been an odor during taxi and takeoff; with it increasing strongly on takeoff. The FA thought it was just her that smelled it and did not say anything; but confirmed she smelled the same odor mostly in the front to row 2A [I initially noticed] smell of fumes in cockpit and cabin. Requested priority handling; donned O2 mask; and landed in ZZZ. [My] suggestion is to emphasize in training to flight attendants if anything is out of the ordinary or unknown fumes are present to speak up and not be afraid to contact the flight deck in sterile if it may be a safety of flight issue. EMB-145 Captain reported a strong 'wet sock' type smell during takeoff resulting in a return to the departure airport.
Aircraft: MD-11
Phase of flight: Landing
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

During final segment of the landing flare; the enhanced callout system called for a Go-Around. We performed a go-around and returned to a second uneventful landing.Cause: System appears to have called for a go-around during a stable approach to landing.Suggestions: We need training on this system before we fly with it. I have little confidence this enhancement will not cause numerous and dangerous startle events near the ground for the aircrews. MD-11 First Officer reported executing a go-around in response to an apparently erroneous warning from the callout system.
Aircraft: CESSNA 150
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

During the enroute portion of the flight to ZZZ; I experienced a loss of power and engine out situation that required a forced landing. The Cessna 150 aircraft had performed as expected for the entirety of the flight leading up to this event. ZZZ was the point of intended landing for a fuel stop. Preflight planning calculations indicated that the flight would require approximately 18 gallons of fuel. With 22.5 gallons of usable fuel on board; the night VFR reserve fuel requirements were met. On initial approach to the airport the engine begin running rough and losing power. Several adjustments were made to remedy the situation; including several restart attempts. Ultimately these efforts proved unsuccessful and the engine lost all power. Given the current winds aloft; distance from the field; and gliding characteristic; it quickly became apparent that landing at the airport would not be a possible option. Upon descending towards an open field; a nearby road appeared as the best viable option to land the aircraft. After touchdown the aircraft rolled to a stop on the side of the county road. There was no injury or damage to any persons or property. Local authorities assisted with securing the aircraft for the night in a nearby opening. The following morning a mechanic inspected the aircraft for possible defects and it was determined that the aircraft was exhausted of fuel. Upon replenishing the fuel tanks with gas; several engine test runs were conducted. The mechanic concluded that there was an issue with the fuel and/or carburetor system and the engine controls were providing an inherently rich fuel mixture. This defect created an excess fuel burn that was undetectable upon preflight inspection. The excess fuel burn rate had caused the engine to deplete the extra fuel throughout the flight and starve the engine of gas causing the engine out situation. The fuel level gauges were also discovered to be displaying inaccurate information. It was noted that the engine tachometer could also possibly be off by 100 rpm. These undetectable circumstances lead to misleading information about the engine performance and fuel status. In the end it was a successful emergency landing with absolutely no damage or injury whatsoever. The aircraft will be scheduled for maintenance; further inspection; and repair in order to remedy all discrepancies and return to service. C-150 Pilot experienced in flight engine failure.
Aircraft: A319
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types

Normal taxi out and takeoff. The First Officer was the flying pilot. Captain checked in with Departure and read back a turn to heading 230. Dialed 230 into the MCP heading window. Heard the First Officer over radio chatter call to take priority. Did so and locked out side stick on the First Officers side. Landed safely over weight. Emergency declared to get the longest runway. I was flying. On climbout; I engaged AP1 and maintained runway heading. Soon after; we received a vector to heading 230. The heading knob was unresponsive; so I disconnedted the AP and used the stick to turn. The airplane did not turn. I called 'take priority' and the Captain did so; locking me out. We returned for a landing; which was uneventful. A319 Flight Crew experiences autopilot and side stick controller anomalies during climb out. The autopilot is unresponsive to MCP heading inputs nor does the First Officer's side stick controller have any effect after the autopilot is disconnected. Control is passed to the Captain and flight returns to departure airport for an uneventful over weight landing.
Aircraft: B777
Phase of flight: Taxi; Takeoff / Launch
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight planned for max weight takeoff of 545;000#. We were delayed departing due to baggage loading. During taxi final ZFW of 396;965# given. With that ZFW weight at takeoff was 544;900# (within limits). After takeoff we were advised of an error in ZFW. New ZFW 399;532#. We were subsequently advised again of another new final ZFW of 399;532#. Based on those ZFWs we had taxied and taken off over our max allowable structural weight. We updated the ZFW in the FMC in flight. Maintenance inspection was to be accomplished after landing. As an added note to all of this; our new performance takeoff data using SCAP data unbalances the field and reduces required takeoff thrust to a minimum. What; if any; 'pad' this offers is unknown to the crews. The actual runway or performance limits (and available 'pads') are unknown to the crews. Crews were previously more involved; and able to make 'judgment' decisions on flap / runway / takeoff power setting decisions. Crews are now more out of the loop than ever. On this day we were legal for an intersection takeoff and reduced thrust takeoff using full length at the lowest flap setting. Due to winter weather conditions we elected to takeoff full length; max thrust; flaps 15. What kind of runway limit 'pad' did that give us? Don't know under the new process other than it had to be better. How did that affect our performance limit? Don't know under the new process other than it had to be less than flaps 5. With current combination of temperature; airport; and runway we knew performance limit wouldn't be an issue (from experience). All we knew for certain from the supplied runway data was that MTOG (Maximum takeoff weight) remained at 545;000# (structural limit). The PIC is the one on site to make judgment calls. The new procedures do not give the PIC the resources or information to fully use this judgment. This can lead to perhaps less than optimum decisions. The further we take the PIC out of the process and not supply sufficient information; or resources; the worse the situation will become over time and another critical safety component (the PIC) is increasingly removed from the process. A B777 was notified after takeoff that its taxi weight was over its maximum zero fuel weight (MZFW). The new Company performance data calculations leave the flight crew out of the loop about takeoff runway selection; power settings and other information.
Aircraft: MEDIUM LARGE TRANSPORT
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway

When approaching spot 25 (old North line) the north ramp told us to request Mike Charlie as his area was busy. The First Officer thought he was contacting ground to get the clearance (in hindsight; I think he had re-contacted inbound ramp). The wording that was used lead both of us to believe we were cleared Mike Charlie. It sounded like a clearance versus instructions to contact ground. I didn't look down at the frequency but thought that we were cleared Mike Charlie to the North ramp. So I proceeded Mike Charlie.The tower had me call on the phone and informed me.I didn't check the frequency; I just listened to the words and wording of the directions.I talked it over with the First Officer (FO) and he believes he did contact ground for the Mike Charlie clearance.Always check the frequency being talked on before following the directions given. Upon landing on 36L took taxi way N and held short of 36C. Switched to 126.4 to monitor for clearance to cross and acknowledged clearance to cross with call sign. Apparently it was for another aircraft with similar call sign but ATC also cleared us as well before we passed the hold short line. Acknowledged again for second time we were cleared to cross. On taxi in at spot 25N we were holding in sequence to go to our gate when aircraft in front of us got clearance to proceed down taxi way M then C. We asked if we could follow the traffic (on 121.9) and understood that we could. Then proceeded down MC to enter at C-10. Upon proceeding to gate we were asked to contact tower by phone. He stated that we did not receive clearance to proceed down taxiway MC. We stated we thought we did otherwise we would not have proceeded. On taxi in approaching we were told to contact the tower by phone.I believe with the large volume of traffic on the ground it becomes easy to misidentify a call sign especially when they are similar. The radio frequency is more than crowded during push times. Limit the number of departures and arrivals in CLT. Pilots report of landing at CLT and then having confusion about a similar call sign. An aircraft with a similar call sign is given a clearance and then their aircraft is given clearance. The pilots thought they had clearance to use taxiway MC but ATC said they did not.
Aircraft: B767
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

I was the pilot monitoring on a Pegasus 767-300 on departure; when five thousand feet from level off we lost VNAV. We detected the FMC had dropped the cruise altitude somehow; so we're entered cruise altitude of FL320. As we leveled off; we had been cleared to MEAGAN intersection on the departure; but the magenta line was gone from the PFD. Looking at the FMC; we saw that now the route was gone. I selected the departure again; but when I tried to execute it; it gave me a scratch pad message 'stand by one'. As I tried to execute the route the FMC locked up and failed to work. We notified ATC who gave us a heading as we worked on the problem. We ran the QRH procedure and slowly gained some use of the FMC in a limited state. We were finally able to load a route using LAT/LON and execute it. This was done using route two; route one was non-functional at this time. As we loaded more points; ATC gave us a heading for REMIS and we put it in the FMC and it allowed us to execute and NAV. As we continued; more of the functions began to return on both FMC's. We were finally able to load the entire route and successfully navigate to destination without further complications. Dispatch; the company and ATC were advised during the event. No deviations occurred that we are aware of. B767 pilot describes a strange Pegasus FMC failure that the crew is eventually able to overcome; after much effort; and continue to destination.
Aircraft: FIGHTING FALCON F16
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Through the weekend the Military was working in W174. This was apparently a mission with a name and frequencies and a controlling agency but we had no information on it; and neither did the Military Operations Specialist (MOS). The problem arose the first time we worked it; when we had no idea that it had a controlling agency. We cleared aircraft into W174 and capped them at FL280 for traffic; but the aircraft went to the controlling agency frequency when they entered the airspace; and they didn't know they were capped and thought they owned to FL350. Thankfully; we discovered the situation and acted to correct it before a problem arose. Later that evening the controlling agency ceased operations without informing us; and the aircraft came out to operate in the airspace with us (Miami ARTCC) acting as the controlling agency. I did not personally observe; but heard that at another time during the shift an aircraft was cleared into airspace that already had a fighter operating in it. The next day we were informed by the MOS that the airspace would be active. The controllers were informed; and showed the airspace hot. Three fighters came off looking to enter W174. We called the controlling agency but they were not controlling the airspace. The controllers at the sector asked who was controlling the airspace; and I called the MOS for clarification. We ended up clearing the aircraft in and acting as the controlling agency; but the situation was confused and caused disruption to the sector and even the area's operations. Missions operating in Miami ARTCC airspace should be pre-coordinated with the facility and the area affected. Paperwork should exist which spells out when the operation is expected to take place and who the controlling agency is. Flexibility is possible within defined parameters; but no activity should be allowed to take place without a clear procedure. ZMA Controller described a very confused operational event involving military airspace including the coordination with the controlling agency; noting the lack of coordination within the facility referencing these types of operations.
Aircraft: C172
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Enroute ZZZ1 to ZZZ approximately 1.5 hours into flight in MVFR I began to get wildly oscillating readings from the voltage regulator ranging from 16.1v tp battery discharge (~12.4v). Resetting the alternator had no effect and voltage oscillations continued. I shut down all avionics except the transponder to conserve the battery and landed uneventfully at ZZZ. An A&P was located who inspected the electrical wiring (nothing adverse found); tested the alternator (tested OK); and cleaned the contacts at the voltage regulator. A test flight was made without incident. The following day I left ZZZ for ZZZ2 in MVFR (wildfire smoke) and at the 1.5 hour mark the voltage readings began the same wild oscillation as the day before. I shut down all avionics except the transponder and landed without incident at ZZZ3 where the voltage regulator contacts were again cleaned. A 3/4 power run up showed proper voltage (14.2v) and no oscillation. I continued the flight to ZZZ2 and after about 45 minutes the voltage oscillation returned. All avionics were shut down except the transponder. I fell back on the gyroscopic instruments; compass; and the IPad with Foreflight to safely navigate. Radios were turned back on for ZZZ2 and the flight completed. During the last 20 minutes of the flight with the avionics all back on there was no voltage oscillation. Inspection of the regulator (Zeftronics R15VOO Rev A) after shutdown shows no obvious defects but the regulator is obviously failing and a replacement regulator has been ordered.Lessons learned:-IFR partial panel skills should be kept current; even for VFR/MVFR flights.-MVFR/IFR flights should always have an independent navigation backup such as a Garmin or Foreflight/Stratus that can provide reliable navigation and weather information should the aircraft electrical system fail. This is particularly critical over mountainous terrain where landing options are more limited. -Just because an A&P says something is fixed; don't bet the farm on it. I altered the route to ensure that I was never more than 30 minutes (I estimated I had this much time partial panel with a discharging battery) from an airfield.-always know exactly how much draw every item in your panel has and what your total battery capacity is. Pilot reported that the voltage regulator continued to show large oscillations mid-flight despite multiple efforts to isolate and solve the problem.
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

The FA (Flight Attendant) -B - called me to report his suspicion about the behavior of [the] passenger occupying seat 16D. According to FA-B; the passenger had entered the aft lavatory carrying a jacket with him. The passenger had been in the lavatory for more than 10 minutes and flushed the toilet over 10 times. I contacted the CA (Captain) and informed him of the incident and the suspicion that the passenger was vaping in the lavatory. The CA informed me and [FA-B] that he was contacting the ground crew in ZZZ to report the incident.I made two announcements: one stating that the seat belt sign was on and any passenger away from his/her seat should return to their seats immediately and fasten their seat belts; the second announcement reminding passengers that smoking and using e-cigarettes and vaping is not allowed in the cabin and lavatories per federal laws. [The passenger] returned to his seat within two minutes. The CA made an announcement prior to landing requesting all passengers to remain seated until a GA (Gate Agent) boarded the aircraft to resolve a minor issue. I followed with an announcement stating that exceptionally on that flight; the fact that I would get up to open the door was not a signal that passengers could get up and that they should wait until the GA came aboard and after he/she left.While the GA dealt with the passenger in the cabin; the law enforcement officials asked me if the fire alarm went off and I responded that the fire alarm did not go off. They asked me if either FA actually saw the passenger vaping; I responded that we did not see the passenger vaping; informed that the lavatory had an odor familiar with vaping products. They also asked me if we had a witness; and I responded that we did not have a witness. They informed me that they could not do anything without any of the answers being positive. They advised that the GA could speak and warn the passenger; but law enforcement could not approach the passenger without solid evidence. The GA later reported that [the passenger] said that the reason he was in the lavatory for an extended period of time and flushed the toilet multiple times was due to the fact that he is Muslim and he was doing an act of purification. EMB-175 Flight Attendant reported a passenger suspected of vaping in the lavatory.
Aircraft: CESSNA 150
Phase of flight: unknown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I had a near miss with another plane flying approximately 100 ft. above me. I was working with my radio at the time. I'm a high wing so I didn't see the other plane; but I had wondered why another ADS-B (Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast) equipped plane hadn't seen me. When I got back I requested the ADS-B report for my plane and it's not turning up with anything; meaning my ADS-B isn't working and my ADS-B in was probably showing me my plane on radar only. I'll be bringing my plane to an avionics shop to have it checked out. Private pilot flying C-150 aircraft reported NMAC with another aircraft.
Aircraft: FALCON 2000
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

While climbing through FL280 the Fire Baggage Compartment light illuminated with the corresponding horn. Following the Emergency Checklist the First Officer went to the baggage compartment to check for fire. He noted a faint smell of smoke and a higher than normal temperature. He returned to the cockpit where we all agreed as a crew to land as soon as possible but in a safe controlled manner not as an emergency aircraft with the detection system not disarmed as per the checklist. We requested a diversion to ZZZ which was 10 km away and then began a non-emergency descent. When the power levers were pulled to idle and descending through 12000 MSL the fire light extinguished and remained off throughout the remainder of the flight and ground operations. After landing I stopped the aircraft after exiting the runway and personally went back to determine if we could taxi or needed to evacuate the aircraft due to fire or smoke. I found a faint white (haze) smoke hovering near the detector through the baggage light but no other signs of fire or colored smoke. We taxied to the FBO and the passengers deplaned. The Emergency Checklist leads a person to believe that with no fire the problem is with the detector. However; the detector is not heat based but a smoke based detection system. To disable the system by pulling the circuit breaker and continuing the flight is a possible major error when you have a bleed leak entering the pressurization system or fire /smoke in the forward service compartment. This compartment is where all of the bleeds enter the ACM and are plumbed into the cabin and baggage compartment ducting. F2TH Captain experiences a baggage compartment fire warning climbing through FL280. The First Officer is sent back to investigate and can find no fire but there is some faint smoke and temperatures seem to be elevated. The Baggage Fire Checklist directs the crew to disable the baggage fire warning if there is no actual fire present and continue. The crew elects not to do this and diverts in a non emergency fashion.