Aryan95614/aerograph-asrs huggingface dataset:
Aircraft: WIDEBODY; LOW WING; 2 TURBOJET ENG
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Ground Excursion Runway

Aircraft X landed runway 36c with an RVR of 1200. He was instructed to taxi via D; J and S to the ramp. The pilot read back the correct instructions. I then advised him to turn right on N off of S [as] if he was parking on the north ramp. He again read back the instructions correctly. Other aircraft were cleared to land and given instructions. Aircraft X then asked if he was cleared to cross runway 27. I repeated his taxi instructions and then realized he had missed his turn onto taxiway J. I then turned him on runway 27 and gave him instructions to the ramp. I knew vehicles were on the runway 27 doing sweeping. They were using 3 different call signs and I checked with my scratch pad to make sure of the 2 remaining call signs because 1 vehicle had exited. As I was getting ready to advise the vehicles one keyed up and said I had an aircraft on the runway. I advised he was using it to taxi to the ramp. A vehicle said he drove into the grass to clear the runway. Upon further review they stated he was taxiing very fast and estimated about 50mph. I advised the FLM of the situation.My recommendation would be that when multiple vehicles are on a runway give me just one call sign to communicate with. If one leaves and another call sign has to be used so be it. I spent too much time making sure my notes were correct instead of controlling the situation. When snow removal is in progress this is almost exclusively how it is done. CVG Local Controller reports of a pilot missing his turn-out off the runway. Controller instructs pilot to taxi on parallel runway where sweepers were working. Before Controller could advise the vehicles; a Sweeper calls the Tower to alert him of an aircraft on the runway.
Aircraft: SMALL TRANSPORT; LOW WING; 2 TURBOJET ENG
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

While within the class B airspace; 10 miles North of ZZZ; we called the airport 'in sight' and were cleared for a visual approach to ZZZ runway XX. As we began our descent from 4;000 MSL; we noticed a target on TCAS 500 ft below our altitude approaching our path from the East. We stopped our descent while looking for the traffic. Then the [TCAS] commanded a climb as the aircraft neared our location. We began a climb as the aircraft passed below us. When TCAS stated clear of conflict; we continued our approach to ZZZ. I reported our conflict to ZZZ tower; and we were cleared to land on XX. VFR traffic below the Class B airspace combined with our clearance for a visual approach contributed to our conflict within 500 ft vertical. We never saw the other aircraft. [TRACON] was busy; but a warning that the aircraft was below us and converging on our track to the airport could have delayed our descent; and avoided the conflict. Small Transport pilot reported a TCAS warning on initial approach.
Aircraft: B747
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Contract maintenance noted a leaky hydraulic line on the right body gear and were replacing the line when I was conducting my preflight. I asked them about the repair and they said that they were finishing up. They signed the repair off and we pushed taxied and took off without incident until the first officer attempted to raise the landing gear. He could not get the lever past the off position and a 'GEAR TILT' caution message displayed on the EICAS. We informed ZZZ departure that we needed to work a landing gear issue; and requested to level off at 5;000 feet. I believe ZZZ TRACON [advised] an issue on our behalf; since thereafter they referred to us as an emergency aircraft. We completed the QRH for 'GEAR TILT' after advising departure of our issue; then consulted with our dispatcher and maintenance control via satphone; and determined that the best course of action would be to jettison fuel to below max landing weight and return to ZZZ. We calculated our maximum amount of fuel to be on board when landing by subtracting the zero fuel weight from the max landing weight. Since we were so close to the field we elected to jettison down to our max landing weight before returning to the field. We calculated 85.3 tons of fuel to be the maximum amount of fuel we could have on board considering a zero fuel weight of 210.4 tons and a max landing weight of 295.7 tons. We decided to be cautious and jettison down to 83.0 to ensure we were well below max landing weight. We ran the fuel jettison checklist in the QRH; and jettisoned fuel as per procedure. We were receiving radar vectors during this time. After our jettison was complete; we returned to ZZZ and conducted an ILS to Runway XXL landing without further incident. Bill contract maintenance when they make a mistake and cost the company money. B747-400 First Officer reported an EICAS GEAR TILT message on takeoff; resulting in fuel jettison and an air turn back to a precautionary emergency landing.
Aircraft: SA-227 AC METRO III
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

When I entered the approach environment at ZZZ; Approach Control had me increase speed to 210 knots. I was then told to slow to 180 knots or less on the downwind segment. Shortly thereafter; I was given an altitude change (9000 feet to 8000 feet) and a 180 degree heading change. As I inputted all those into the altitude select and OBS; the airplane started the turn and began diving for the ground at a high rate. I disconnected the autopilot and began a recovery but not before I descended to around 7000 feet. During this time; the sink rate and pull up visual and aural warnings were going off.After landing and securing the aircraft; I called my mechanic and explained what happened. He said that when the plane was going 210 knots at that low altitude; the autopilot trimmed the airplane for that speed; which is trimmed pitched down significantly to maintain level attitude. When I slowed the plane to below 180 knots by reducing power and deploying 1/4 flaps; it further pitched the nose forward. So; when I commanded the 180 degree turn and descend; the airplane configuration along with the turbulence in the area at the time probably overloaded the autopilot servos; causing it to be unresponsive.I have never flown the plane at 210 knots in the approach environment in this airplane. I've been advised not to do that again due to the above situation possibly reoccurring. SA-227 pilot reported entering speed changes; altitude descent; and 180 degree heading changes in rapid succession causing aircraft to nose dive and activate aural warnings.
Aircraft: NO AIRCRAFT
Phase of flight: unknown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I had the idea in my head from somewhere in my training about what medicals were due for what type of operation. And if you are not confronted with it you don't really look into it. You feel you know the answer. In the course of running my business I got a database to track currencies; compliance; inspections and flight and engine times. While I was loading the database and setting up alerts and warnings I noticed that I may have; in the past; been flying commercially on a third class for a couple of short periods. I am not sure since I do not have all my old medicals to check. And by the past I am talking about 4 to 5 years ago. Remembering exactly what happened is difficult. Because of this incident I am super vigilant now about medicals; although because of COVID; I had to use an extension on my last medical. My database now warns me when I am getting close to my medical due date. I have gotten the idea out of my head that I can let a second class turn into a third class. Reporter reported possibly flying commercially with a third class physical several years ago.
Aircraft: NO AIRCRAFT
Phase of flight: unknown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

New jumpseat relocation has a negative when it comes to safety and security concerns. Compromising our ability to communicate in an emergency and security situation by being away from the interphone and private conversations that occur on the jumpseat cause issues and does nothing to promote social distancing because we still work together and there is no way to avoid that aspect on the airplane.What's [the] purpose when you have to sit next to people and the whole row is not blocked anyways. It doesn't change anything and I am concerned this is throwing safety out the window. Safety demo and oxygen and life vest should be demonstrated regardless. In addition; we need to address oxygen masks with personal masks on their faces. This needs to be addressed immediately. Flight Attendant reported concerns about safety and security issues relating to new COVID-19 jumpseat arrangements and social distancing guidelines.
Aircraft: BEECH 1900
Phase of flight: Landing
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

The airplane had come out of maintenance and this was its first flight since being released. The mechanics had worked on the pressurization system as part of their scheduled maintenance. During our climb out we noticed that the cabin altitude was indicating below our departure airport elevation with the cabin at max differential. In cruise we observed normal indications. During descent; I set the pressurization correctly to [the airport elevation] and we observed a 1;000 FPM descent all the way during the descent with the cabin remaining at max differential and the cabin altitude went well below zero (approximately 3;000 feet below zero). On final we felt the pressure change and I tried to adjust the rate controller to stop the cabin descent. Since the altitude was way below sea level; I began dumping the cabin (small bursts while on final approach) in an attempt to equalize the pressure for [the airport]. Once we landed the cabin VSI indicated a climb pegged at 6;000 FPM and the pressure equalized. The cabin climbed approximately 9;000 feet in a second which caused extreme discomfort in our ears (we were screaming in agony rolling down the runway). At the gate several passengers complained about the pressurization system as they were deplaning. I instructed the First Officer to go to the new airplane since we were swapping and I contacted Maintenance regarding the pressurization. We had a non-reving pilot riding on board who suggested that we call in sick due to the large change in pressure citing possible issues associated with the decompression (similar to those that a diver might experience) and issues with our ears. When I arrived at the new airplane; I made my suggestion known to the First Officer and called us both in sick as a precaution. The company asked us to go to a doctor who told us not to fly for 24 hours as a precaution. This event concerned me in a few ways. First: the airplane had come out of maintenance that morning with work being done on the pressurization system. It was apparent to us once airborne that the pressurization system was not acting normally. The system did test properly on the ground during our run up checks. Second: there is no checklist guidance for an airplane that is slow to pressurize; or one that remains pressurized while on the descent. The only checklist guidance is for a cabin altitude high and a cabin differential high. In the case of this flight; neither occurred. The closest would have been cabin differential high but we had no annunciators for that and the gauge was showing max differential; not anything higher. When we noticed the cabin remaining at max differential on the descent and the cabin descending below sea level; it would have been nice to reference something telling us how to remedy the situation. Pressurization problems like this are becoming increasingly common on our fleet. B1900 flight crew experienced a loss of the cabin pressurization controller and rapid pressure changes resulting in extreme ear discomfort. Flight crew noted a lack of checklist guidance for the problem they encountered.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Unauthorized Flight Operations (UAS); Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I am a 20+ year CFII who was a passenger on [a] paid commercial flight from ZZZ to ORD. Just before our aircraft transitioned from a heading of approximately 120 heading to 090 just northwest of the KURKK intersection; I happened to be looking outside and saw an object pass by about 200 feet below and 250-300 ft away from our flight. The object was black and had red and green highlights. In the moment; my brain registered this as a drone with typically dim position lights. The encounter was understandably fast given our speed and I know my memory isn't going to provide much detail and may be biased; but we were dangerously close to something. I cannot rule out that it was a balloon; but it would have been the most rectangular balloon I'd ever seen. I also happened to have Foreflight open on my phone at that moment as I like to watch where we are in flight. About 10 seconds after seeing the object; I used Foreflight's option to mark a position and will gladly share screen shots and such if needed.Since my phone was in airplane mode and had a limited view of the GPS constellation; there is likely considerable error in that data. Still; where it shows on the map matches the location I saw out the window as I distinctly remember seeing the Twin Lakes Recreational Area in Palatine; IL. Our aircraft did not seem to make any course changes other than the move to 090. So; I don't know if the crew saw the object. Obviously; we landed without incident. I tried to connect with the crew to share my observation; but they were already out of the aircraft. One thing I noticed in this process... I had no idea how to make a report in the moment. Despite being a commercial CFII and 107 operator; I didn't know where to turn to be helpful. I'm sure there was a better; faster reporting option; but I had forgotten the best route. So; I'll add that to my list of things to review for my flight review next week. I hope this data is helpful in some way. A seated passenger reported observing a UAS while on an air carrier flight on final approach to a Class B airport.
Aircraft: B777
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

While working B777-200 today; I noticed the Captain's seat front rail stops were not correctly positioned; and when I checked the forward limit switch; it was broken off. After noticing the discrepancy; I placarded on MEL 25-1a; the Captain's seat power functions inoperative. As said before; it appears the figures and explanations on seat installation are not clear enough. Evening; ETOPS Pre-Departure Check (PDC). Reporter stated he was working a PDC Check on a B777-200 aircraft. Revisions to the Maintenance Manual Seat Installation Procedures and Figures (Diagrams) will be made soon to clarify the correct installation position of the Front Rail Stop Limit switch. Because the limit switch (micro-switch) on the lower frame of the Captain's seat had been installed upside down; the micro-switch could not ride up on the ramp on the seat rail stop fitting to interrupt electric power to the seat motor. As a result; the limit switch on the seat frame was literally cut in half and allowed the seat motor to continue driving the seat forward to the rail end stops. The limit switch is not a Line Replaceable Unit (LRU); the seat has to be replaced.Reporter stated there are eight different ways to install the stops while the limit switch is only installed on the inboard side of the seat frame facing outboard. The Maintenance Manual is being misinterpreted due to the unclear procedures and drawings Maintenance has to use for the installation. A Line Aircraft Maintenance Technician noticed during a Pre-Departure Check on a B777-200 aircraft; the Captain's seat forward limit switch was broken off. The front rail stops were also not correctly positioned. Unclear procedures and drawings in the Aircraft Maintenance Manual allowed for misinterpretation of installation.
Aircraft: B767
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL

Our aircraft was dispatched with MEL XA-XX-X-X ADP Controller - Auto Function. The MEL operational procedures directed us to turn ADP ON - on ground prior to takeoff; and inflight prior to flap extension. On climb out; through about 10;000 feet we turned the ADP OFF. Later in the climb; (around FL180); we received an EICAS msg C HYD SYS PRESS. We ran the QRH procedure for this message; which directed us to turn the ADP ON; and note whether SYS PRESS was restored or not. The msg remained; so the procedure then directed us to turn this pump off; along with the C1 and C2 electric pumps. This left us with the Center Hydraulic system inoperative; which would require an alternate flaps and gear extension at destination; and flaps 20 landing. We then contacted dispatch and [Maintenance Operations] to discuss our situation and options. The current weather and forecast at our destination was VFR. The extra time enroute would allow for a lower weight landing; using less runway. The runway at our destination was sufficient for our planned landing weight and configuration; so we elected to continue to our destination. Further along in the flight we noticed that the destination weather was reporting a 1;000 feet ceiling. Our dispatcher then issued an [Amended Release] listing the addition of an alternate with recomputed fuel burns and reserves. It later occurred to me that our dispatcher may not be aware that if we were to divert after an unsuccessful approach at destination; that we would have no way of raising our gear; therfore our fuel burn to our alternate would be higher. I then contacted dispatch and advised of this possibility; and was subsequently issued a second ARTR with a revised fuel burn to our alternate with the aircraft in a Gear Down configuration. [Report Narrative Contained No Additional Information]. B767-300 flight crew reported the Dispatcher may have overlooked an important planning factor when they were dispatched with an MEL for C Hyd Sys inoperative.
Aircraft: MEDIUM TRANSPORT
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

D10 called to coordinate Aircraft X direct to GYI airport and I approved it. If they said he would be assigned 030 I missed it. The higher MVA is just across the facility boundary and aircraft had penetrated before I realized he wasn't climbing. I issued a climb immediately and the pilot reported he had ground and airport in sight. ZFW Center Controller reported about an aircraft altitude at transfer that was below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude.
Aircraft: DHC8
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft X was due to leave ZZZ to reposition to storage. Aircraft X had issues so it was decided that Aircraft Y had to be released to take its place. I was tasked to release Aircraft Y to make that happen as soon as possible. I went through all paperwork and verified it was all present as well as complete. After releasing the aircraft; Aircraft Y was forced to abort its takeoff because the pilot was unable to rotate. Later mechanics found that speed tape that was applied to the elevator spring tabs per a storage Workcard X had been removed from the lower surface of the elevator but not the top causing the aborted takeoff. After the aborted takeoff Aircraft Y returned to the ramp area and by this time Aircraft X was fixed and it repositioned as originally planned. For several days there was no word what happened to Aircraft Y. [3 days later] I was again asked to release Aircraft X. That was when I saw the corrective action that stated speed tape had been removed and the removal from storage workcard had been issued.As I audited the paperwork all steps were stamped as completed. Workcard X final step for repetitive storage inspections is to reapply the speed tape to all flight controls. I have been back from workman's comp for a couple weeks and this being the first aircraft I have released from storage I should have read every step of the workcard. Which I did not; I only verified steps were stamped as complete. What this workcard does not ever mention is a follow up Workcard Y which has the steps to remove aircraft from storage. So Workcard X final step has a mechanic cause a discrepancy by applying the tape to flight controls but does not give any guidance to create a discrepancy or issue the removal from storage workcard before flight. Had there been such a step it would ensure the discrepancy caused by adding the speed tape would have been addressed. This gives the impression that work is complete when in reality by completing Workcard X you are making the plane unairworthy. Further; speed tape had been removed from all other flight controls and the bottom side of the elevator. So someone had been instructed to remove all tape applied to the aircraft for storage and for whatever reason did not remove the tape from the upper surface of the spring tabs. I went back to read the work cards in question to try to find out how the tape could have been missed when I had released the aircraft the first time.A step on the repetitive storage inspection Workcard X and the initial storage Workcard Z stating to ensure the removal from storage workcard has been issued to the aircraft would have made it impossible for this situation to occur. Also due to the fact that we rarely have planes in storage making the workcards mandatory would give a further level of protection. DHC-8 Maintenance Technician reported an aircraft aborted takeoff due to lack of elevator control. Speed tape was discovered on the topside of the elevator spring tabs.
Aircraft: AIRBUS INDUSTRIE UNDIFFERENTIATED OR OTHER MODEL
Phase of flight: Final Approach
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Runway XXL had been closed for maintenance. The airport called to tell me that the runway was open and I amended the IDS to reflect the runway open. However; I forgot to change the runway to open on the ASDE-X. An A310 was inside 1 mile final and the ASDE-X alarmed for the closed runway. I quickly fixed the runway status on the ASDE-X to show it open; as it should be. The alert went away and I allowed the aircraft to land. I now know that I was required to send the aircraft around. There are already adequate procedures for updating the runway status. This has made me realize that I should start using the checklist. This would have been a good time to have some leeway with ASDE-X alerts. After re-opening a closed runway; Tower Controller failed to note the runway as open on the ASDE-X programming and allowed an aircraft to land after an alarm was broadcasted. The reporter acknowledged his failure to use the checklist.