Aryan95614/aerograph-asrs huggingface dataset:
Aircraft: LARGE TRANSPORT
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

Flight Attendant reported female passenger was being rude to her and asked me to remove passenger from aircraft. I responded that being rude wasn't sufficient reason to remove passenger and she should have another flight attendant deal with the passenger and just avoid any issues with that passenger. She came back to cockpit a couple of minutes later and said the lady in question was getting really nasty and she wanted to remove her again. I then called for the gate agent; who knew before I told him which passenger we were having a problem with because she had gotten really upset at the gate when they asked her to check her bags and apparently was rude there also. I asked him to just calm her down; and told him if she could be polite and quiet; she could stay on the aircraft and we could leave.About 3 minutes later the flight attendant came forward and claimed the lady assaulted her by intentionally 'kneeing' her when she passed her in the aisle and trying to hurt her. I realized this had escalated to a threat level 2; and went back to the agent who was getting an earful from the passenger and instructed him to remove the passenger from the aircraft. The passenger heard me tell him to remove her and got very upset.I went back and stood at the door to the cockpit. The passenger was getting louder with each step forward; and one of the other flight attendants had told me that in first class an off duty Sheriff had offered to intervene if necessary. As the passenger came forward in the aisle yelling at me personally about being a racist pilot for removing her; I pointed at the exit door and said politely that she needed to leave before we called the police. She yelled that all of the flight crew were racists and she was going to sue us all; but would not exit the aircraft as she stood in the door and prevented us from closing it to depart the gate. I suggested the gate agents call the police at that point.I then asked the Sherriff if he would intervene and make sure she didn't assault anyone else as she was very agitated and getting physically close to the gate agents and one of the flight attendants. He showed her his credentials as she moved out onto the jetway where she continued to berate the gate agents. The Sheriff got back on board and we closed the door.Before push back; I turned from my cockpit window and observed the passenger still in the jet way berating everyone; and yelling at me. She then flipped me off as we pushed back; which was so unexpected; it caused me to chuckle slightly. She promptly pulled up a cell phone and recorded me chuckling. The flipping off was witnessed by my lead flight attendant and the gate agent. An air carrier Captain reported removing a passenger for misconduct before departure.
Aircraft: A300
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

While [working] on the right wing anti ice valve; the large man lift was positioned between the right main gear and the right engine exhaust nozzle. After raising the lift to access one of the cannon plugs; we needed to raise the lift higher to access the second plug. While raising the lift and watching clearance between the lift and engine the light bracket on the left rear corner of the lift contacted the right wing inboard fixed flap fairing causing a 1'x1' puncture hole. Puncture hole was within SRM (Structural Repair Manual) limits and placed on deferral. [Report narrative contained no additional information.] Maintenance personnel reported that while working on an A300 they were using a man-lift under the wing and punctured a flap fairing.
Aircraft: B757
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

After level off the First Officer's R1 windshield began arcing. We complied with the QRH and; soon after; the window shattered on outside. We landed at the nearest suitable airport. A B757-200 flight crew diverted to the nearest suitable airport when the First Officer's windshield arced and subsequently suffered a shattered outer panel.
Aircraft: MD-82
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

I was the First Officer and this was my first trip after Initial Operating Experience (IOE). I was pilot flying. The Captain got out of his seat at one point but didn't tell me what he was doing. Later he told me his seat would not latch into position and slid freely forward and backward. He stated that he would be making the landing. He called to the cabin but I could not hear what he was saying. A short while later one of the flight attendants came to the cockpit and the Captain began discussing the need for her to sit on the jump seat and keep his seat from sliding fore and aft. I heard her mention that there was another Flight Attendant covering duties at an exit. They practiced having the Flight Attendant hold his seat steady. The Captain took control of the aircraft before we began configuring for landing. The landing was very smooth and without any problem whatsoever. I was a regional airline Captain for [several] years and would have allowed the First Officer to make the landing. But this was my first trip after IOE so I was not going to argue against the Captain's decision. The Captain made his decision without asking for my thoughts or ideas. At top of descent I moved my seat forward to lock it in landing position. My seat would not lock in any position despite many attempts to do so. The seat was just sliding on the track due to newtons law 1st and 3rd laws. The aircraft was uncontrollable completely from the captains seat. In the right seat was a new hire co-pilot on his very first trip; on the two landings he had attempted to make; I had to intervene for safe landings to occur. I asked the #1 F/A for a knife to wedge into the seat track; that didn't work. I then asked the #! F/A to come up to the cockpit for landing to hold my seat in position while she sat in the jump seat. I then moved the #4 F/A to the #1s position and asked a non-reving AA F/A in uniform to cover the #4s position. The #1 was able to hold my seat in position without sliding to much for a safe landing and taxi in. I felt it was better to remain in positive control of the aircraft; rather than having to save it if the FO was allowed to land. I did have it at the ready however for the possible GA; in case things did not go as planned.This seat had a history according to the mechanics had had to be replaced. You could put 2 to 4 lock pins in each aircraft similar to the ones you put in weight lifting machines you could manually insert into the seat track on each end. When an MD82 Captain's seat failed to latch into position; a Flight Attendant was called to the cockpit to hold the seat in position while the Captain landed the aircraft. Uneventful landing.
Aircraft: A319
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

First of all; I want to note that the First Officer and I later commented that the cadence of guide man gave us the impression that he was experienced and professional when we were approaching the gate. As I lined up on lead in line; right engine was secured; and all equipment and jet bridge were behind red lines. Approaching normal stop point; jet bridge still in peripheral view of my left eye; I noticed bridge moving back quickly. At the same time the momentum of aircraft slowed and I stopped the aircraft as the guide man started pointing in different directions. At that point I decided to set brakes and secure left engine. I immediately left cockpit to find the agent. It was at that time that I realized that the Agent was screaming at the guide man to stop as she was quickly repositioning the bridge. After going to the ramp I then saw that I was marshaled way past the A319 stop bar. The Agent's awareness and actions in all likelihood saved the aircraft from impacting the jet bridge the left nacelle and impacting the GPU on the right nacelle. I certainly hope that here decisive actions will be recognized. I suggest more emphasis on stop bar training for A319! I do not know at this time if the Marshaller mis-ID'd the aircraft as a B737 or an A321; or some other factor caused the confusion. However; there have several incidents now of A319's being marshaled to the wrong stop point. We need to ensure training includes methods to properly identify the correct aircraft type. This will likely become more important as we combine fleets to include a variety of A319/320/321 aircraft. According to the gate agent; they are trained not to move the jet bridge when the aircraft is moving. However; they are part of 'the team.' They need to be ready to get the Marshaller's attention and move the jet bridge immediately; if necessary; to avoid a conflict. The Gate agent did exactly the right thing and likely prevented a serious ground collision. An A319 was marshaled into a gate but not stopped at the correct line; so as the engine nacelle approached the jetway; an Agent moved it back and avoided a collision. This aircraft model is new to the company.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

After clearing runway in GRR we were instructed to turn right into Delta and hold short of Echo. The taxiway was extremely snow covered. We were then instructed to give way to a CRJ. Upon approaching E the aircraft slid when full brakes were applied. We came to a stop pretty close to taxiway. I wasn't sure if the CRJ would be able to pass us. ATC must have seen this and the CRJ wasn't close to the intersection yet; as they instructed the CRJ to give way to us and gave us clearance to the ramp. I told ATC about how we slid when attempting to stop short of E. Snow covered taxiway that was slick and not being familiar with where Echo is. Air carrier First Officer reported aircraft sliding on an ice and snow covered taxiway.
Aircraft: SMALL AIRCRAFT; LOW WING; 1 ENG; RETRACTABLE GEAR
Phase of flight: Landing
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was on the Final approach course cleared to land when the tower allowed a helicopter; that I was unaware of; to cross in front of me close to my altitude between me and the end of the runway. I contacted the tower by Land Line after landing and expressed my outrage. I could not understand why they would have allowed this helicopter to traverse across the final approach course. The tower operator I spoke with told me that the Helicopter had me in site and could maintain safe distance. The helicopter may have seen me but I was not told of the helicopter and he did NOT maintain safe distance. It was a near miss in my mind. I continued to challenge the tower operator and again asked why the helicopter was allowed to cross the final approach course instead of being made to cross at the numbers or mid field. That would seem to me to be the safe crossing point not directly in front of me when I'm on short final. I was unaware until I talked to the tower that they did not have radar and that would probably have helped greatly to ensure that the helicopter either passed behind me or over midfield. However; the fact that the tower does not have radar should inspire an abundances of caution from tower [personnel] in what permissions they hand out. The helicopter should have been instructed to pass behind me; over the numbers at a specified altitude or midfield. Additionally the tower at the least should have required both aircraft to have visual of each other at this point of flight. Had I seen the helicopter prior to him passing directly in front of me I would have abandon the landing and performed a go around. I continue to be mystified as to why the tower felt it was ok to traverse a helicopter across the final approach course of an inbound; cleared to land; flight. All my attention at this point is focused on landing not watching for competing traffic. A general aviation pilot reported being upset that the Tower Controller allowed an unannounced helicopter to fly directly in front of his aircraft while on short final; at 800 feet and cleared to land.
Aircraft: CHALLENGER 300
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

We had previously planned and briefed a visual approach to runway 20R at SNA. The ILS was set for a backup to the visual approach. We visually identified the airport; reported that to Socal approach and were cleared for a visual approach to runway 20R. On final approach; the Runway Awareness Advisory System (RAAS) announced 'Approaching runway 19R'. We confirmed that we were properly established for the correct airport/runway and continued to a normal landing.Apparently the runways were renumbered sometime during the second half of 2014. Either the RAAS database is not up to date or the latest database is not installed in the aircraft.The announcement of the incorrect runway presented a distraction during a critical phase of flight in busy airspace.1) Add an ops note for RAAS equipped aircraft that the database may not be correct for runway 20L/R at SNA.2) Find out if the RAAS database has the correct runway numbering for SNA.3) See of the airplane has the correct RAAS database in it. On short final for Runway 20R at SNA the flight crew of a Challenger was surprised by a RAAS announcement of 'approaching 19R.' The runway number had been altered and; apparently; the RAAS database had not yet been updated.
Aircraft: M-20 B/C RANGER
Phase of flight: Landing
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was approaching [the airport] from the northeast at 2;300 FT. I made a radio call 7 miles out stating my intention to enter the left downwind on a 45 degree angle for Runway XX. I made additional calls at downwind; base and final. At about 200 FT above ground level and 1;500 FT from the runway I noticed a crop duster flying very low across my flight path from west to east. The crop duster flew underneath me eastbound and then turned right to line up with the taxiway. The aircraft then landed on the grass east of the runway and ahead of me. I was watching the crop duster the whole time and was ready to execute a go-around. I did not see any danger at the time so I completed my landing but did a touch and go. For additional safety I should have done a go-around and not completed the landing. I just thought it was safer to get on the ground as I did. An M20 pilot was on short final after announcing his position at several points; and observed a crop duster cross underneath him and land in the grass alongside of the runway in use.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Ready for push back; and while obtaining clearance from Clearance Delivery; they verified we had the clearance and then said something to the effect 'monitor Ground Control;' which was confusing as our documents led us to believe the push clearance would be given by Clearance. As I switched to Ground Control frequency; the aircraft started moving backwards as the Ground Crew started to push us to the start pad. I then checked in with Ground who stated we needed to ask them prior to push for clearance; and I stated; 'sorry we had a communication problem.' [We] pushed and rest of flight uneventful. The FAA needs to move to standardize every airfield ground push back procedures and not let local airfields run amok in their specially designed local procedures; which are confusing to aircrews and depart from industry standards. This needs to be easy and standard for aircrews; not Ground Control. BOS specifically needs to state emphatically on Clearance frequency that the aircrew contact Ground prior to push for clearance to push. This is the only location I know of that have you contact clearance as a normal course of duties. Well; why have PDC? We understand Ramp Control; fine; but this procedure is faulty and needs to change to help the pilots; not the controllers. Air carrier pushing from the gate in BOS alleged the procedure for push backs involving ATC and Ramp Control are confusing and should be standardized in the NAS to avoid unneeded confusion.
Aircraft: CRJ200
Phase of flight: Takeoff / Launch
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL

Soon after the positive rate call; (L) Reverser Unlocked Amber msg displayed. After leveling off at 10;000ft ran the QRH. Notified ATC/FA/Pax of our situation and turned back to [departure airport]. The second part of this report discusses the MEL for the Thrust Reverser System. I noticed after the second departure that MEL Maintenance section number 4 was not accomplished. Specifically referring to open CB B7 on CB panel-4 and collar it. Followed the QRH. Follow through with everything. CRJ-200 Captain reported returning to departure airport after receiving a (L) Reverser Unlock amber message. Reporter noted that Maintenance may not have fully complied with the MEL.
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

As pilot flying; we were vectored to intercept the ILS. While trying to run an approach checklist; the Captain (pilot not flying) informed me that he was unable to get any ID at all on the LOC frequency. The HSI showed a red X on both sides. We double checked our frequencies and they were correct. We informed ATC that we were not picking up the LOC and ATC replied that no one else had reported any problems. We were given a left turn back onto the downwind and were told they would vector us around again while we worked on the problem. We checked the parallel runway LOC; but didn't receive it either. I told the Captain to check a nearby VOR; and did not receive it on either side as well. The weather was BKN-OVC 010 to 020 in all of the area airport. Fuel On Board (FOB) was approximately 3;000 LBS. The Captain said we would just go into destination on an RNAV approach. I told the Captain I was not RNAV certified. After discussing the fuel; weather situation; and our lack of ability to shoot and ILS/LOC/VOR approach; we realized that we did not have much of a chance to make it anywhere within range on a visual approach. Utilizing Captain's authority; the Captain; a Check Airman and Flight Instructor; made the decision to land on an RNAV approach. An emergency was not declared with ATC. The previous leg and on approach both NAV radios functioned properly. The IMC conditions that prevailed at the time and the simultaneous failure of both NAV radios were the primary threats. No lateral or vertical deviations occurred. Both of an EMB145's VOR's failed prior to an ILS approach and so using the Captain's emergency authority the Captain flew a GPS approach with a non qualified First Officer after considering the weather and fuel remaining.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

ZZZ Line Maintenance mechanics were assigned Aircraft X. Flight XXXX was delayed. Lead [Mechanic] provided us the information of work. We were to accomplish #1 engine fuel filter replacement. [Lead Mechanic] provided us the engine fuel filter. We never realized that we incorrectly replaced the wrong filter. We removed and replaced the #1 engine fuel filter instead of the APU filter terminating monitor 29-XX-X-XXXX log required.Trusting our Lead; whom supplied us the #1 ENG filter we never checked or identified the correct job assignment that was required to clear the monitor. APU filter was never changed by [either mechanics]. We completed and signed off #1 ENG fuel filter R/R (Remove and Replace) instead.By not following paperwork assignment of replacing APU filter; we mistakenly followed Lead's assignment to change #1 ENG filter. Aircraft Maintenance Technician reported replacing incorrect aircraft component during maintenance visit.
Aircraft: CHAMPION CITABRIA 7ECA
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

I was enroute to 40I at 3;000 feet. My route; as drawn on the chart; showed me going through a small corner of R3403B. Upon reaching a point just south of OVO I called Indianapolis Center (the controlling agency) to determine if 3403B was in use. Center was very busy and misinterpreted my request to be about a closer area; R3401. (Note that my Champ has an electrical system; radio and transponder.) When Indy Center responded with the incorrect information I immediately corrected them and asked for information about 3403. They were very busy and did not respond. I then switched to Cincinnati Approach and asked them if R3403B was in use. They responded right away and told me that 3403 was indeed 'hot'. I thanked them and immediately turned north to avoid going into the restricted area. After going north several NM and believing I was clear of the restricted area I resumed my on-course heading of about 70 degrees and proceeded to 40I (Red Stewart Field).Upon landing at 40I the person behind the counter told me I needed to call Columbus (Ohio) Approach Control. I did so right away and learned from a Mr. X that his facility had received a hand-off 'tag' from Cincinnati Approach; and he was requested by Cincinnati to get my name; address & phone number; which I provided. He told me it was in reference to a possible restricted area violation; but had no other information.On this particular flight I was using the situation of a route of flight going through a restricted area to refresh my airplane partner's memory (he was in the back seat of the plane) about the proper way to deal with restricted areas. I believe that I did everything right. I knew the restricted area was there; that my straight-line course would take me into it; and that I had to either go around or determine that it was not in use; in which case I could fly through it. I made the full effort; calling two ATC facilities; and then turned away from the area after learning that it was hot.So what went wrong? I was several NM north of the railroad that runs through 3403B when I resumed my on-course heading of 070. I believed I was clear of the restricted area on the north side. I suppose it's possible that I turned back on course a little too soon and just barely touched 3403B on the way by. I certainly didn't think so when I was flying it. In the future I will give restricted areas a much wider berth. In fact; on the way back home later in the day (after my conversation with Columbus Approach) my partner; who was flying the return leg; stayed about 5 NM to the north. I complimented him on his good judgment and told him I would be teaching that to my students in the future. Citabria pilot reports inadvertently entering R3403B while making his best attempt to avoid the northwest corner.