Aryan95614/aerograph-asrs huggingface dataset:
Aircraft: WIDEBODY; LOW WING; 2 TURBOJET ENG
Phase of flight: Landing; Taxi
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown

Landing Rollout at ZGSZ Runway 16 almost turned off at NOTAMed closed Taxiway E6. Closed Taxiway E6 was identified and briefed however during landing rollout I started to turn off on E6 but was warned by ATC at about same time that we discovered error. Aircraft never entered closed taxiway as we corrected and exited Runway 16 via E7. What led to confusion: 1. High work load post landing (First Officer was flying) 2. Commercial Chart EFB moving map display selected but aircraft position indication not present. 3. Poor taxiway signage; turnoff sign for E7 (next taxiway) is located very close to Taxiway E6. 4. No barriers or other indicators at closed taxiway. 5. Light weight landing with subsequent short rollout. EFB moving map correctly indicated E6 closed but aircraft position was not present. Question: is the aircraft Present Position (PP) indication designed to appear at a certain ground speed? Had the position indicator been present; I would have instantly noted current position and not have been confused by E7 sign. In the future I will not clear runway until EFB moving map PP indication is available to confirm my actual position. I will also attempt to pick a reference point to indicate desired runway exit route other than rely on signage. Especially in China. An Air Carrier pilot noted that his EFB moving map own ship symbol was not visible after landing and so he nearly exited ZGSZ Runway 15 at Taxiway E6 which was closed. Poor E6 signage location also caused confusion because the sign is near Taxiway E7.
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

While cruising at 31;000 FT the autopilot started oscillating above and below the altitude by a couple hundred feet. Then the autopilot failed. The Captain took control and flew the airplane and noticed that the elevator was not very effective. We descended out of RVSM airspace to comply with the regulations. We decided that it was a jammed elevator and did the memory item and QRH procedures for the event. Upon pulling the elevator disconnect we found that the Captain's side was still jammed but the First Officer side was free. We were at this point descending; so we determined it would be best to declare an emergency with Approach Control and land as scheduled. EMB-145LR flight crew reported a jammed elevator in cruise flight at FL310. They declared an emergency and per the procedure pulled the elevator disconnect and freed the First Officer's elevator; allowing them to continue to a normal landing.
Aircraft: B777
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

During taxi out on ramp we attempted to follow ground controls instructions. However the taxiways have recently been renamed. Additionally the Jepp 10-9 has the old info and 10-9B has the new taxiway info. Ground control appeared to be working off old taxiway info. Assigned us L1 exit. Captain stopped aircraft to verify exit and ground sent follow me [vehicle] out to assist turn back to new L2 (old L1).Issue Pilot alert message warning of Jepp chart needs to be updated. Contact Jepp to alert them of need for update. Taxi out from Apron 3 Rio de Janeiro (SBGL). Taxi instructions were Y2-L1-N-Q (confirmed twice). ATIS stated Apron 1 taxi limited to CAT C aircraft with wingspan less than 33 meters. From Apron 3 we taxied via Y (no other taxi line). From Apron 2 we taxied via Y (Y2 did not allow wingtip clearance). We stopped short of Apron 1 since the Y taxi line disappeared; leaving only Y1/Y2 (which did not allow adequate wingtip clearance). A red line island in between Y1 and Y2 is where the old Y taxiway used to be. We stopped and asked ground for instructions. We were told to 'continue straight ahead' then later told to 'stop; and hold position'. A Follow-Me truck was assigned to lead us out of the Apron area. We executed a 180 degree turn (impossible if we had been a [larger aircraft]) and were led out via an unmarked taxiway that is either L-1 (Jepps 10-9) or L-2 (Jepps 10-9B) to taxiway K; where the rest of the taxi was uneventful. Jepps 10-9; 10-9B; and taxiway markings all conflict. The Ground ATC gave instructions inconsistent with ATIS; Jepps charts; and taxiway markings. The old L1 taxiway marker is blacked out--the taxiways are effectively UNMARKED for entry into the Apron areas. Jepps Taxi chart 10-9B is effective 26 MAY 16. L-1 is the old EE at the north end of Apron 1. Jepps Airport chart 10-9 is effective 24 OCT 14 and EE; L-1; L-2; and L-3 all are different than the current 10-9B. Taxiway markings do not match either chart; and are completely blacked out in some places; leaving the field effectively unmarked. B777 flight crew reported being unable to comply with taxi instructions at Rio De Janeiro Airport (SBGL) because the airport taxiway depiction; provided on the current Jeppesen charts; did not agree with the actual signage on the field. A 'follow me' vehicle was required to assist the crew with the taxi clearance.
Aircraft: LEARJET 35
Phase of flight: Initial Climb
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

[We were] departing VNY on the NUAL8 departure. The SID states to cross 2.2 DME south of the VNY VOR at or below 1;700 MSL. The departure description states NOT to join the radial to the southeast off of FIM VOR unless advised by ATC. We departed Runway 16L at VNY with a clearance to climb to 4;000. We assumed that would be AFTER passing the 2.2 DME fix. While level at 1;700; we became alarmed at the rising terrain south of our position; but I watched as the DME slowly clicked off to 2.2. It just didn't 'look right'. We were finally handed off to SoCal who immediately had us climb to 6;000 MSL and asked if we were assigned runway heading by VNY Tower. We replied yes although we were not actually given those words; nor were we told to join the radial off of FIM. SoCal also gave us an altitude alert and terrain advisory. The First Officer and I continued our climb and were vectored on course. We knew again that something just didn't 'look right'. It was at that time I noticed the knob on the lower left corner of the Captain's HSI with a display in the upper left corner of the HSI. It is a 3 position knob labeled distance; TTG (time to go); and speed. It was in the TTG position. What I had been looking at was time from VNY VOR not the DME! The First Officer had flown the Part 91 leg into VNY from the left seat (company procedure) and prefers to keep this knob in the TTG position for descent planning. I failed to notice/move the knob back to the DME position when I resumed the left seat. I also should have cross checked the DME display in front of the First Officer position on this jet during climbout.This is the second time I have missed a fix/turn/altitude on a SID because of the knob position. I have only myself to blame. I must be more disciplined in my preflight setup of the cockpit. However; I feel the SID we were flying also has some inherent dangers. If departing into low IFR conditions; it would be possible to fly into terrain while adhering to the mandatory at or below 1;700 MSL restriction while waiting for the display to read 2.2 with the knob in the TTG position; especially if there was a slow handoff between VNY Tower and SoCal. If you are not supposed to turn southeast until ATC advises and you are to cross at or below 1;700 MSL; it is just a setup for disaster! Luckily we had good VFR conditions and a clear view of the terrain. LR35 Captain is confused by the NUAL8 departure from Runway 16R at VNY and an HSI that is not set to show DME. The aircraft is maintained on runway heading at 1;700 FT well past the 2.2 DME; alarming himself and the Controller involved.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Descent; Initial Approach
Anomaly: Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Day 1; leg 1 of a 4 day trip from ZZZ to ZZZ1. I was the pilot monitoring on this leg. Had not flown much in the last few weeks. Captain was PF. We flew to ZZZ1 at a pretty low altitude; I believe it was 14;000 feet cruise altitude. After starting the descent; we did not realize we had passed 10;000 feet so quickly; and noticed our speed was beyond 250 knots. The Captain immediately slowed the descent rate and airspeed; in order to return to 250 knots.We were distracted. We were on the first leg of the trip; had woken up pretty early; and the fact that we cruised at such a low altitude were possibly all factors. We did not pay enough attention in the descent.I should have kept better monitoring skills during the descent and avoided distractions. Air Carrier First Officer reported a speed deviation below 10;000 feet during descent.
Aircraft: FIGHTING FALCON F16
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Shortly after receiving the Controller in Charge (CIC) position I noticed conflict alert activating at a Sector. I used the 'See All' scope to observe the sector. I noticed Aircraft X in conflict with an arrival that was descending. The controller at the sector had put a heading in the data block; so I thought he was taking care of the situation adequately. However; the aircraft did appear to get less than 6 miles away from each other. I immediately paged the two people who were on break the longest; and called the watch desk to inform them of the possible loss of separation. Three main factors contributed to this situation. Increased complexity and volume at the sector due to Optimization of Airspace and Procedures (OAPM). Although some of the routes help procedurally separate traffic; the new sectors have halved the previous sector's area; while increasing the vertical boundaries; effectively making the airspace 4 times more complex. I suggest an immediate reversion to the previous sector designs to prevent this from happening again. The new routes will still work in the old sectors.Staffing has been critically low for a long time. Lack of funds for overtime; management's unwillingness to negotiate a fatigue mitigating schedule; and training without the bodies needed are all contributing sub-factors. We need to hire more people; pay the extra money to train them; and create schedules that employees like; to reduce leave usage. If there had been a Radar Assist available; this situation probably would not have happened.The previous CIC had not properly staffed the area for the level of traffic we were experiencing. Although most controllers are willing to work through a busy push by themselves; this was a perfect example of why they shouldn't have to. The previous CIC is recently signed off as a CIC; but management has not provided the proper list of CIC seniority since he was certified. Rather than comply with Article 18; Section 8 g. of the CBA; management put this employee at the top of the CIC list. This means he has been CIC almost every time he is in the area. Although he my be a competent CIC; this has unfairly taken away the opportunity for others to be CIC. I believe it has also encouraged complacency; which I believe was a factor in this situation. Management should be adhering to the CBA. ZLA ARTCC Controller reported a loss of separation between a flight of military aircraft and an arriving descending air carrier aircraft.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Final Approach
Anomaly: Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

On approach to Runway XXL; the airport was experiencing high and gusty winds; last called 220/22G33; we configured at the final approach fix at setting flaps 30 with accompanying green light at approximately 1;200 feet AGL. Autothrottles and autopilot were engaged. Passing through 1;000 feet; we got a good gust wind/airspeed increase to approximately 178-180 KIAS. This must have activated the flap blowback feature and it pushed the flaps back to approximately 26 degrees. At that point; I took the aircraft and disconnected the autopilot and autothrottles. I did not notice the flaps had been pushed back and continued to fly the approach. Passing through 200 feet we received the too low terrain warning. I verbally confirmed visual with the First Officer and continued the approach. Upon receiving the aural warning a third time at approximately 50 feet; First Officer noted the abnormal flap setting. The airplane was easily controllable and I had already started to flare; so I landed with 26 degrees final flap setting and taxied uneventfully from the landing runway to the gate. During taxi; we reset the flaps to 25 and then 30 degrees and the flaps worked normally; without issue. Airspeed correction due to steady state headwind plus gust was 19 KTS. Approach target speed approximately 164 KIAS (flap 30 approach/flap 30 speed 175 placard). Airspeed on approach was observed during FO crosscheck consistently above target but within stable criteria. At approximately 100-200 feet AGL GPWS 'too low' warning sounded. FO crosscheck analysis picked up flap setting at 30 degrees/25 degrees on indicator. Aircraft was approaching threshold stable on normal glide path. FO incorrectly verbalized 'flaps asymmetry' as the words 'trailing edge flap disagree' did not come to my mouth at the time. Captain elected to continue to land as we were now initiating flare.Following landing crew discussed potential that as airspeed was near flap placard limit it was possible that a gust resulted in activation of flap load limiter following full extension on approach resulting in flap blowback to 25 degrees. Clearing runway Captain had FO set flaps up one notch back to 30 which alleviated condition in accordance with trailing edge flap disagree checklist. A B737 encountered 19 knot gusts on short final which caused a flap blow up from 30 to 25. The EGPWS TOO LOW alert sounded but the First Officer thought flap asymmetry. After landing the flaps were cycled with normal results.
Aircraft: HELICOPTER
Phase of flight: unknown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance

In the course of creating comparative weight and balance spreadsheets to determine the effect of the SX-5 on center of gravity (CG); I noticed that the CG of the aircraft moved aft when the SX-5 nightsun was deducted. This was obviously erroneous so I examined the weight and balance certifications and noticed that the arm was incorrectly entered as 19 instead of 190; leading to an incorrect moment. This resulted in our base flying an aircraft with incorrect W&B calculations since it has arrived. This error was undetectable in the normal course of pilot or lead pilot duties. This was a failure of Quality Assurance (QA) to execute their job properly. Helicopter pilot reports discovering that the weight and balance charts for his company helicopter; are using an incorrect moment arm for the search light mounted on tail of the helicopter.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Left with planned arrival of 5.7 and no alternate listed or additional fuel added. Forecast was no lower than six SM for time of arrival. First Officer received oral ATIS for arrival calling 1/2 mile in fog (no digital ATIS). Sent ACARS message to Dispatch for amended Release and alternate airport. First Officer was doing work for weather; checks; and performance; formulated own plan for ZZZ1 as alternate and checked ZZZ2 as well. Through 18;000 FT got message from Dispatch; 'If you want to change to ZZZ1; it is 2000-pound burn and ZZZ1 weather.' Sent ACARS to Dispatch; 'change from what?' Descent for CAT III approach RVR 700 to 1400. Formulated a plan for one approach and if missed; direct ZZZ1; which was VFR and we could see it 40 miles away. Landed RVR about 1200. On rollout; received chime and additional information message from Dispatch. 5.4 at the gate in XXX. Upon phone calls to Dispatch was told he had sent an amendment for ZZZ2 as alternate with burn and initials to us 50 miles west of ZZZ3. I said we didn't get it. He said he had sent it and had documentation to that effect. Also that not getting an ACARS MSG happens all the time to everyone. Dispatcher also said he was willing to 'take the hit on this one.' Have positive TWO-WAY communication. Maybe response required for Release change similar to diversion plan. Or; since this thing happens all the time to everyone; if no response send message until you get one. After updating destination weather which unexpectedly decreased to CAT III; the B737-800 crew requested an alternate but the ACARS with the release was not received until after landing at the filed destination.
Aircraft: SMALL AIRCRAFT; LOW WING; 1 ENG; FIXED GEAR
Phase of flight: Landing
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

My student and I were doing pattern work in an Alarus. We had done 8 touch-and-go's without incident. On the 9th; which was to be a full stop; we touched down mains first; the nose wheel came down; struck the runway and the nose gear fork broke off the strut. The landing wasn't soft; but it wasn't really hard either. We rolled a little ways down the runway and then the nose came down on the strut post; which supported the airplane; but the clearance remaining allowed the prop to strike the surface. I believe the problem arose from metal fatigue between the nose gear strut and the fork. There have been similar reports that I've seen of this event occurring. An Alarus instructor experiences a nose gear fork failure during landing. The fork with its wheel departed the aircraft allowing the the propeller to contact the ground.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

I was deadheading today ZZZ-ZZZ1 and was waiting to board with other deadheaders. The Captain joined us wearing this unorthodox face covering. It's a sheer veil that does not appear to conform with any of the most basic requirements for a face covering: it's open at the bottom and is sheer enough to see through (so small particles from breathing can escape) and does not offer any protections for those around the individual. It does not appear to do anything to arrest the spread of COVID-19. I didn't feel comfortable speaking with the Captain about the mask in the boarding area; since I don't know the individual personally.We all need to be on the same page in order to assure the traveling public that it's safe to fly with us. Flight Attendant reported the Captain's face mask probably did not conform to policy and in the FA's opinion did little to prevent the spread of COVID-19.
Aircraft: A320
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe

Aircraft X was holding on Taxiway 1 for an outbound Airbus in taxi lane XX. Aircraft X taxied to his gate without waiting for the outbound aircraft as instructed. I made numerous attempts to get Aircraft X to stop; but he had left the frequency to talk with the Company Ramp Tower. I could have had aircraft pushing off gates YY or ZZ. I could have had any number of aircraft taxiing on Taxiway 2. Though this did not happen; it does not diminish the potential for an accident in the future if these types of actions occur again. After the Tower spoke with the Company Ramp they said they did not tell Aircraft X to taxi; but they did answer affirmative when the pilot of Aircraft X asked if the Airbus in XX was waiting for them. Recommendation; these scenarios play out almost daily at LAX. The ramp towers at LAX lost their usefulness after 9/11. Soon LAX will be burdened with another position; Ground Control 3; at our critically; short-staffed facility. To provide a modicum of work for this new position; all LAX ramp towers need to close and service must be returned to the tower before someone gets hurt. LAX Controller voiced concern regarding a ground conflict resulting from the handling provided by 'Ramp Control;' The reporter suggested Ramp Controller operations be terminated for safety concerns.
Aircraft: HELICOPTER
Phase of flight: Final Approach
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

On an instruction flight in a helicopter; my student was on the controls on final approach at 300 feet AGL to Taxiway B parallel Runway 35; a fixed wing aircraft executed a practice power-off 180 to Runway 35 (Taxiway B is to the west of Runway 35; the aircraft would be crossing our flight path to make it to Runway 35). Upon hearing his radio call; the other aircraft was at my 10 o'clock and descending into my flight path. I then took controls from my student; descended to 100 feet AGL while making a left turn to the west to avoid the path of the aircraft. I made a radio call to the other aircraft; 'I guess I'll get out of your way; helicopter Y is short final Bravo parallel 35.' I told the pilot of the other aircraft over the radio; 'You need to listen for us; I made a base and final radio call.' He replied; 'I'm sorry; I thought you were further on the approach.' While a midair was avoided in a controlled manner; it could have be a potential accident had I not taken evasive action to descend below the other aircraft's flight path as he was turning a tight base to final.To avoid these situations:Closer attention to position of traffic in the pattern; specifically helicopters on final as they land on Taxiway B parallel Runway 35 to avoid the flow of fixed wing traffic.Visual contact of the helicopter traffic should be made or radio contact with the helicopter to confirm the position of helicopter traffic prior to executing practice power-off 180 landings to Runway 35. Flying in the right pattern for Runway 35 while helicopters are in the pattern will greatly reduce the potential of overflight/mid-air collision. A helicopter instructor took control of the aircraft to take evasive action during a near miss with a fixed wing aircraft whose pilot was performing an emergency return training maneuver.