Aryan95614/aerograph-asrs huggingface dataset:
Aircraft: LARGE TRANSPORT; LOW WING; 2 TURBOJET ENG
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Security; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Just prior to push another air carrier's pilot came into the cockpit asking for a jumpseat ride. She had a jumpseat authorization form; but it had the wrong name on it. We called Operations and asked about the jumpseater and the wrong name etc.; and were told that it was OK; she was entered in the system; and it will show up on the final weight manifest which it did. Her company ID and pilot credentials were OK. All the cabin seats were full. We were informed later in the flight that the jumpseater should not have been allowed jumpseat access. We took another carrier's pilot jumpseater at gate. She came into cockpit about 3 minutes prior to pushback. We verified her airline ID; her pilot's license and medical certificate. We then noticed her jumpseat form had the wrong name on it. So we called it into operations. They verified they had her correct name in the computer; that she was C.A.S.S. certified and by her showing up on our weight manifest; we had proper documentation and were good to leave. Approximately 1 1/2 hours into flight we received an ACARS message that she should not have been given access to jumpseat. This information is incorrect. We verified everything. The pilot had been cleared by gate agent; by boarding agent; by operations and then we were told she was OK specifically by ZZZ Operations. I believe this is strictly a problem of our carrier's new computer reservation system. The gate agents are having so many problems that we often can't even board our own employees. I want to stress that we verified this pilot extensively and even personally know her from her commuting from ZZZ. A jumpseating air carrier pilot was C.A.S.S. verified; as were the pilot's credentials; but after departure the flight crew was told via ACARS that the jumpseater should not have been given access because her name was not correct on the jumpseat form.
Aircraft: AIRLINER 99
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

With the Weather at 2 SM (Statue Miles) and snowing; as part of my pre-takeoff brief I acknowledged the low visibility and set the ILS Runway XXR frequencies in Nav1 and Nav2. Takeoff roll began and rotation went as normal; around 700 ft. AGL I started to notice a hot smell. Climbing out of about 1500-2000 ft. AGL. It was at this time I stared to see smoke coming out of the fuel gauges; I reacted by turning off the Master Light switch on the overhead panel. And then I ran the checklist for smoke in the cockpit. I [Requested Priority Handling] and requested the ILS Runway XXR which was given to me. I received vectors to the final approach course and came back and landed Runway XXR without any additional incident. Noticed a smell shortly after takeoff; and then saw smoke.Looked to be little water that got behind the fuel gauge. Turning off the electric load to the fuel gauges; and running the checklist.Preventing water from getting in the crew door as much as possible. Pilot flying C-99 Aircraft encountered smoke in the cockpit after takeoff.
Aircraft: AMATEUR/HOME BUILT/EXPERIMENTAL
Phase of flight: Landing
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Some non-pilot friends were flown into a backcountry private airstrip; which we have permission from the owner to use and land. I routinely fly formation in the air and on the water daily. The non-pilot friends wanted to see a simulated water assisted landing; which I have trained for and done many times before. The pre-brief contained the information that all observers were to remain on the field so they were 500 feet from the aircraft at all times as per 91.119. I made sure the river was clear by flying up-river and completed the maneuver without incident. [A few] days later the observers posted a video on [online] which enraged a rafter group on the internet. To be clear; the rafters were not at the site during the maneuver. Due to the radical comments by the rafters I realized they were going to call the FAA and do everything in their power to get me in trouble. I am both extremely proficient with my plane and have a high regard for the rules. I watched the video very closely and noticed that the observers did not stay where I wanted them to stay; and potentially were closer than 500 feet from the aircraft during the touch and go simulated water assist landing. While 91.119 does not come into play in a landing or takeoff I realize this maneuver is not a clear cut takeoff or landing. I only became aware of this after watching the video; during the maneuver neither of us noticed people close to the bank of the river; and if I would have; I would have knocked off the maneuver immediately. My personal corrective action is going to potentially be to not do this type of maneuver for non-pilots; or to stress harder that there are rules for a reason and if I break them I can have action taken against me. [Report narrative contained no additional information.] Two pilots reported they may have inadvertently flown less than 500 feet over a populated area.
Aircraft: A320
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

I noticed a very strong fishy smell when I walked into airplane. I didn't think anything of it because airplanes always seem to have a funky smell; especially near the lavatories. We boarded the airplane. Since I was the C; I was prepping the galley and watching the aft doors because catering came while we were boarding. The B said passengers were commenting on smells; but I couldn't smell anything in the aft galley area. The next thing I know there was an announcement from pilots saying we were deplaning because of the odor. We deplaned; and when I went up front I didn't notice the smell. Only once we were in the jetway for a while and reentered the plane could I smell it again. I don't have a good sense of smell; but again; it smelled like rotten fish. I need to be more in tune with smells and notice these things before boarding. I honestly just thought it was the forward lavatory when I walked into plane. A320 Flight Attendant reported strong fish smell during preflight. Subsequently; Captain ordered passengers to deplane.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Takeoff / Launch
Anomaly: No Specific Anomaly Occurred All Types

URGENT: the Dec 2014 SKBO Special Engine Failure procedure page incorrectly displays the same procedure text for 13 L/R as for 31 L/R in the 'PROCEED TOWARD' box. The graphic map is correct. Air carrier Captain advised the latest revision of the SKBO tailored Special Engine Failure on Takeoff aero chart includes the same textual description for runways 13L&R and 31L&R; although the graphic depictions are different and correct.
Aircraft: AMATEUR/HOME BUILT/EXPERIMENTAL
Phase of flight: Final Approach
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

On a personal pleasure flight; flying low (500-1000 AGL) over extremely remote terrain (well more than 500 ft from an person; vessel; vehicle or structure) and careful not to operate in a careless or reckless manner; I descended low towards an open area; simulating an approach to landing. I misjudged my height and the wind conditions and unintentionally hit the surface. The wheels grabbed and I began to decelerate. In spite of adding power slowly the plane continued to decelerate. Finally in spite of being at full power; the plane continued to decelerate. It was unable to regain flight; so I committed to landing; by now at a very slow speed. The rollout was flat and smooth; but upon hitting a muddy area; the plane nosed over out of control. Damage was limited to the propeller and spinner; which struck the ground; [and] the engine cowling. Other than the plane; no object was damaged. No person was injured. I was able to push the Light-Sport plane to a nearby road where it was towed away.Contributing Factors:Airplane: A Light-Sport plane is more vulnerable to gusts and has less power.Attitude: In retrospect; had I added full power immediately; I may have been able to regain flight. Probably the overconfident macho attitude 'I can handle it' contributed the incident.Conditions: Trees; hills; and the open area probably produced gusts and directional changes in the wind.Different planes: I had just recently flown my Cessna T210 16 hours during the week; and I may have instinctively treated the Light Sport as if I were still in the T210 regarding the slow adding of power so as to not over-boost the turbo.Corrective Actions: Emphasis on transition both from light to heavier aircraft and the reverse from heavier to lighter.Human Performance Considerations:Macho attitudeGreater familiarity and comfort - training the body to respond in another airplane than the one being flown.Fatigue: The non-reportable incident occurred after a long week of travelling. Avid Mk IV pilot reported inadvertently touching down in a muddy area during a simulated landing which resulted in a slow speed nose-over.
Aircraft: DHC8
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

On climbout we were given two left turns and we were now heading towards ALB. Departure then gave us direct to HANAA and a frequency change to BOS Center. The aircraft turned 180 degrees because we had HANNA programmed into the FMS instead of HANAA. When we realized the mistake; BOS Center asked where we were going; we replied that we had put the wrong HANAA in; Center jokingly replied 'go direct ALB; there is only one of those.' We then turned direct to ALB and continued the flight.When verifying the flight plan; be sure to check the total mileage in the FMS; check the spelling letter by letter of each fix. HANAA and HANNA are so similar; we both missed the Data Entry error. No additional information was provided in the secondary narrative. When cleared direct to HANAA waypoint the flight crew of a Dash 8 entered HANNA from their legs page; not realizing it had been misspelled in their filed route. The start of a 180 degree turn alerted them to the error and they were recleared direct to a local VOR.
Aircraft: LARGE TRANSPORT
Phase of flight: Final Approach
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

I was monitoring the North sector and waiting for the training team in North to give a briefing to me and my trainee. At the same time Final was being split off from North and they would be briefed at the same time. The trainer and trainee were obviously very busy and engaged with the traffic complexities while working North and Final combined. This caused an unnecessary situation when Final should have been already opened. The trainee working North cleared [Aircraft X] for an ILS approach to RWY28L (maintain 025 until established) even though a VFR callup was going to cross [Aircraft X`s] path in the next 5 miles at 025. The trainer who was busy watching many other situations in the North sector took over and turned Aircraft X to a 250 heading; cancelling his approach clearance; and tried turning the VFR aircraft; who didn`t respond; but it was not looking good. The two aircraft passed within a mile of each other. There has been a big push at P80 to combine sectors because of staffing; meetings; lack of awareness of traffic; and it is making for an unsafe environment for the flying public. #1 ATM [Air Traffic Manager] is new and on the fast track to bigger things. ATM has spent very little time understanding the TRACON environment and this disconnect roles down hill. The FLM's [Front Line Managers] are frustrated and not staying engaged with the traffic flows. Safety has to be our first priority and I don`t feel it is. FLM's are criticized for calling overtime or keeping sectors opened. It was only by the grace of God and 'the big sky' theory that someone didn't die today. P80 Controller reports of an airborne conflict that was saved by the instructor. The reporter also states that the positions were combined and caused an unnecessary situation when the final position should have been open.
Aircraft: BEECHJET 400
Phase of flight: Takeoff / Launch
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Right engine did not make N1 takeoff power. It needed to make 98.5 but only provided 97.9 and the N1 number started to roll back during takeoff roll. An abort takeoff was executed; all procedures and checklists were followed. ATC was notified and we taxied back to [parking]; Called maintenance and reported issue. A BE-400XP First Officer reported rejecting the takeoff when the right engine failed to produce calculated takeoff thrust.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance

Aircraft X was placed in short term storage on [date]. The step in Job Card XX to disconnect the main batteries was accomplished/stamped off; but not documented in the AML as required. The same day; 2hrs later; Job Card XY was issued to take Aircraft X out of short term storage. The step to reconnect the aircraft batteries was accomplished/stamped off; but once again it wasn't documented in the AML as required. Both groups of technicians failed to show compliance to document in the AML these steps. Paperwork audit found the discrepancy and it has been rectified on AML XX; to show it had been accomplished. A message has also been sent to records to show correct date work was complied with. Miscommunication between technicians assigned both job cards. Technicians need to verify work accomplished on job cards before submitting finalized package. Better communication between technicians assigned to the tasks. Technician reported problems with job cards not being signed off correctly.
Aircraft: FIGHTING FALCON F16
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

A formation flight requested breakup. I issued a beacon code to the second aircraft; issued holding instructions as requested 4000 feet and approved Aircraft X go to initial as requested. I instructed Aircraft X 'when able descend to 2500 feet'. I was informed I had an operational error because I didn't tell Aircraft Y to instruct Aircraft X to descend to 2500 feet when able. FAA 7110.65W paragraph 2-1-13 Note 1 states' Separation responsibility between aircraft within the formation during transition to individual control rests with the pilots concerned until approved separation has been approved.'A memorandum interprets this to mean we can only issue control instructions through the lead aircraft. How can this interpretation be construed from this note? It clearly states that separation responsibility rests with the pilots does it not? To add this extra requirement when it's obviously not the intent of this note is ridiculous. It's apparent that [the memorandum] is intending to complicate and infer a simple interpretation. This facility has had numerous operational errors attributed to this incorrect memorandum. Redact this memorandum and apply this note as it's obviously intended. Military flights know they are responsible for their separation until another form of separation is attained. A TRACON Controller reported providing instructions for a military formation flight break up in accordance with FAA H 7110.65 but did not relay instructions through the flight lead.
Aircraft: BONANZA 35
Phase of flight: Final Approach
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

We departed and climbed to approx. 3000 ft. and orbited the runway for 3-4 patterns at that time we began to climb to 5000 ft.; after several orbits we began a downwind to base turn and I observed the Manifold pressure indicator decreasing. I made an immediate turn to the runway and adjusted the throttle. The manifold pressure gauge did not react to throttle inputs. At that time I setup for best glide and changed from the right fuel tank to the left fuel tank. At some time in the guide it appeared to me that we would be high; so I extended the gear. Prior to the approach end of [the runway] is a set of train tracks and a set telephone wires. As we got closer to the airport I was not sure I was going make the runway. I had a field to my left so I choose to put the aircraft down in the field. I made a turn to align with the borrows in the field and extended flaps. After touchdown the engine was observed to still be running; I again adjusted the throttle with no observed change in engine operation. The cowl panel was removed and the throttle cable linkage was observed to be loose. The linkage was reinstalled and an engine run-up was performed. All parameters appeared to be normal. I performed a test taxi and then parked the aircraft in the corner of the field for Inspection. A Beechcraft M35 pilot lost manifold pressure while descending and turning downwind to base leg. He immediately turned toward the runway while noticing that the manifold pressure gauge did not respond to throttle inputs and landed in a field near the airport. Upon inspection; the throttle cable linkage was observed to be loose.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Final Approach; Initial Approach
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Approach control cleared us direct to WESEN for ILS [Runway] 08 [approach] at SJU. Captain was Pilot Flying; First Officer was Pilot Monitoring. This was the second leg of the night for this three day pairing of a long duty day. Level at 3;000 ft. (pilot selected) then cleared descent to 2;500 ft. (pilot selected) accomplished in vertical speed. Aircraft pilot selected speed was 180 kts. Controller assigned heading 110 to intercept and then cleared us for ILS [Runway] 08 approach. Approach/Land was armed and 'Land Armed' was displayed on PFD. The localizer remained identified and aircraft turned to intercept inbound course. Glide slope was above. Halfway through the intercept; the aircraft made an abrupt pitch-up followed by a thrust increase. This was very unusual as I have never experienced or seen an aircraft climb to capture a glide slope. While this was happening the aircraft exited approach/land mode and reverted to heading mode and solid bow tie altitude (2;500 ft.) All FMAs were 'white'. During the automation the aircraft pitched up and altitude was approximately 3;000 ft. in an attempt to capture the glide slope. The FO made a quick analysis and quick calls to the pilot flying while I was simultaneously disconnecting the autopilot and manually retarding the throttles to correct this anomaly. The aircraft was stabilized and a hand flown ILS was accomplished without autopilot assistance. This aircraft was scheduled for an 'auto land' for currency requirements and subsequently not accomplished. The First Officer monitoring that was accomplished and the verbal inputs from the FO were timely and appropriate; solid CRM. A note in our company aircrew briefing guide notes: Safety Alert Runway 08 Intermittent Glideslope Weak or intermittent glideslope signals have been reported when using ILS Runway 08. Exercise caution and intercept glideslope at the altitude depicted on the approach chart to guard against following a false glide slope signal. If the crew experiences any anomalies while conducting the approach; report the incident to tower and file an event report. Air carrier Captain reported an unreliable glideslope signal at SJU Airport.
Aircraft: SMALL TRANSPORT; LOW WING; 2 TURBOJET ENG
Phase of flight: Final Approach
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

This was my first OJTI session on the arrival sector. The developmental issued Aircraft X a heading toward the final; but did not instruct the aircraft to join (vector angle too large). The aircraft began slowing as Aircraft Y was coming up behind. The developmental recognized the blow through of the final and issued a LA (low altitude) alert and a turn back west. We were focusing on Aircraft X and getting him out of the MVA that we didn't notice right away Aircraft Y overtaking; but still with vertical separation. I eventually had Aircraft Y maintain Visual Separation with Aircraft X; but I don't know exactly at what point that occurred. There were other IFR conflicts that we were focusing on and traffic was getting busier. I failed to listen actively and assumed Aircraft X was going to join the final. I should have stopped Aircraft Y at 4;000; but was too concerned about Aircraft X and the MVA. I realize that in this sector; control from the OJTI must be maintained constantly or things get out of hand quickly - not like other sectors where there's room to correct actions. SCT Controller reported a loss of separation and a MVA violation.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Event / Encounter Object

We landed on 1L in MCI. Weather was 1;000 FT ceiling and one mile with snow. I took aircraft after landing rollout and taxied clear of runway. Ground first gave taxi instructions; 'B; M' to gate and asked about braking conditions on taxiway and runway. We thought runway and taxiways were good. As we approached Taxiway M; Ground said we could use Taxiway M1. I turned onto M1 since it was a shorter distance to our gate and wouldn't require as many sharp turns on the snowy taxiways. The taxiways had some snow on them; but the yellow center lines were visible and the blue taxiway lights were highly visible as it was starting to get dark.While approaching the gate the aircraft pulled [yawed] right four or five feet. We were still on the taxiway and we were trying to figure out what happened and whether we should proceed. We then noticed that the Number 2 engine had shutdown. We notified Ground that we would need a tow and contacted Company Ops. We shut down the other engine and let the passengers know it was going to be a few minutes to get to the gate. After Ops and Company Maintenance arrived; we saw that the right main gear and engine were in a snow drift and arranged for air stairs and busses to take the passengers to the terminal.Airport Ops needs to ensure that the taxiways are better cleared. The snow had been cleared from the centerline of M1 but had been pushed into a three to four foot drift on the taxiway; not off the taxiway. With the light snow covering and the darkening conditions; the snow drift was not visible from the cockpit. While taxiing to the gate on darkening; snow covered and slippery MCI taxiways the flight crew of a B737NG failed to note that plowed snow was built up three or four feet on the taxiway itself. The right main gear and engine impacted the snow drift and they shut down the jet and removed the passengers by bus.