Aryan95614/aerograph-asrs huggingface dataset:
Aircraft: A319
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Approach cleared us for the visual approach to Runway XXL. The clearance was; 'Proceed direct [Final Approach Fix]'; cleared for the visual Runway XXL.' We inserted 'Direct [FAF]' into the box and verified NAV. Autopilot-1 and 'APPR' modes were selected to intercept the LOC and GS at [FAF]. We were at 7;000 FT; the GS intercept altitude for [FAF]. We were approximately 3-4 miles outside of [FAF] and east of centerline for XXL. As we proceeded; still in NAV mode; the airplane remained slightly left (east) of an actual direct path to [FAF]. Both pilots were watching outside the aircraft. We were still tracking towards XXL; but unknowingly not tracking to [FAF] anymore. Tower asked us to verify we were landing XXL. We acknowledged that we were. It was at this point we saw we were going to intercept the XXL centerline inside of [FAF] and not at [FAF]. We saw that the aircraft was still in NAV mode; yet the aircraft was clearly about a mile or so east of the course that would've taken us to [FAF]. The autopilot was disengaged and we landed with no incident on XXL. The only abnormality to this was that the aircraft wasn't doing what the box was saying it was doing. And we intercepted the LOC inside of [FAF] instead of at [FAF] as we were told to do by ATC.Suggest better monitoring of the automation. We as a crew assumed the automation was doing what it was suppose to be doing. We looked as if we were tracking to the airport; not fully aware we were tracking inside [the FAF]; not to [the FAF]. Being that we were cleared direct [FAF] 15 miles away and the aircraft was confirmed to do this; we did not think the track was drifting off course. I have never seen this happen; but I will be more aware even in visual conditions. A319 flight crew; cleared to proceed direct to the Final Approach Fix for a visual approach; entered the fix into the FMS; but failed to notice that the aircraft was tracking left of course until advised by the Local Controller.
Aircraft: CRJ900
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC

About 15 - 20 miles out from EVV we called the airport insight. Approach said they would clear us in about 10 miles. When we got closer and it looked as though we were approaching an aircraft that just took off from EVV. About the same time the First Officer was going to ask for a lateral deviation we received a TA then immediately RA went off monitor VS and then Desend. Additionally ATC announced the traffic at the same time we were responding to the Desend RA and that there was traffic 12'oclock and 2000 ft. We were at 2500 ft. and the aircraft was at our altitude. We responded to the RA and acknowledged the traffic and informed ATC we had a RA. It appeared we were within 300 ft of the helicopter when it passed off our left wing.We should have asked for a deviation when the helicopter turned towards us. I initially made the assumption the aircraft was climbing out and would be on top of us by the time it passed. And not that it was going to be a helicopter at our altitude. ATC should have announced the traffic when they didn't clear us for the approach. I don't know whether the helicopter was at fault or ATC; but this was way too close for my comfort. CRJ-900 Captain reported an NMAC event while under control of Approach Control during approach with a departing helicopter.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Final Approach
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Aircraft X was flying an RNAV approach. There was weather and lightning in the southeast. I received a call from ZZZ Tower saying that they have lost power and were on backups. The lighting did not work at the airport and they were using other phones to talk to airplanes and the reception for those phones only worked about 5 miles out from the field. I was on the line with ZZZ Tower getting information and creating a plan for other planes going into ZZZ. They needed us to call all inbounds since they weren't receiving any information with the Tower's power shut down. A couple minutes after getting off the phone with ZZZ; Aircraft X calls up and says he had a lightning strike and was going to hold over a fix on the published approach or something along those lines; which is an IF (Intermediate Fix) for the approach.He said he wanted to head back up to ZZZ. I told him that ZZZ just called me and said their power went out. At the time; I did not have the approach pulled up and didn't exactly know where the fix was and didn't recall there being a holding pattern there but when he mentioned it was on the approach I wanted to double check. At the time; I told him there was high terrain to the east of him and that he climb to 12000 feet; with no delay through 9000 feet. He was at 5000 feet which was below the MIA (Minimum IFR Altitude) for that area. After pulling up the approach; there was no holding pattern at that fix so I told him to fly the published missed approach except maintain 12000 feet. After a few minutes go by; he told me he was over the fix and was doing the missed approach; so he never did do any holding over that fix and was flying the approach path. Once he was reaching 12000 feet; he said he wanted to divert now for his company's request. I gave him instructions to proceed to [diversion airport]. After the thought; I do not believe I ever radar identified him. He was ADS-B so I was looking at him. I do believe I did get an altitude out of him before I proceeded him to ZZZ1. Center Controller reported a B737 encountered a lightning strike and executed a missed approach which placed them below the Minimum IFR Altitude.
Aircraft: J3 CUB
Phase of flight: Landing
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Object; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Incursion Runway

Aircraft was caught by a wind gust on landing rollout. The aircraft departed the runway and struck a runway distance remaining sign with the left wing. The pilot of a J3 Cub lost control when the aircraft was buffeted by a wind gust on the landing roll. The aircraft exited the runway and the left wing struck a runway marking sign.
Aircraft: CRJ900
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Two helicopters at least one was a Law Enforcement Department were in a pattern for RW XX at ZZZ. We were cleared for the ILS XY and were on final below 1;000 feet AGL (?). We got an RA with a climb warning from one of the helos that was climbing into us. I disconnected the auto pilot and started a climb. The VSI showed a climb requirement of over 4000 FPM. Somehow the helicopter avoided us and by the time I stopped the climb we were no longer in a stabilized approach. We elected to go around. After we went white needles/Nav mode I noticed that we were not turning for the published missed approach. I disconnected the A/P and started the turn. At the same time ATC told us to turn to heading 210. Afterwards we realized that because I did not hit the TOGA button the A/P did not capture the missed approach. I think we missed the helicopter by less than 300 feet. the second approach was without issues. CRJ-900 Captain reported a NMAC with a helicopter during approach and while flying the missed approach a track deviation occurred.
Aircraft: A320
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict

During our initial approach to SAT; descending via the LEMIG 1 arrival; ATC issued us an amendment to our altitude to be maintained (first we were assigned 10;000 FT then 11;000); that was due to traffic (small aircraft). When we leveled off at 11;000 FT first we had a TA; followed by a RA to level off. We executed the procedure as prescribed; it just took a couple of seconds. We didn't notify ATC of the conflict because we were out of it (the RA commanded us to level off; the traffic seemed not to be able to keep the altitude very well; it was like 400 FT below us). As additional information the autopilot was engaged. The rest of the flight continued without any further incident. One of the contributing factors I think was that ATC was a little bit busy managing other traffic; also the lack of precision from the small aircraft pilot to maintain the altitude as assigned. A320 First Officer describes a TCAS RA descending into SAT at 11;000 FT. Leveling off was the required action to avoid a VFR small aircraft.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance

Shift manager advised us; in the ETOPS office; today that Management could no longer stamp the 'Accomplishment reporting' of the last page of the ETOPS check. This is due to most members of Management not being fleet ETOPS qualified. Since manning the ETOPS office for 7 months; it's been customary that Management stamps the box in question and accomplish the associated transaction on [maintenance computer system]. Now I'm discovering Management was not qualified to stamp the box. Technician reported that company policy had allowed ETOPS Pre Departure Checks to be signed off by non-ETOPS qualified personnel.
Aircraft: PA28
Phase of flight: Final Approach
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

While on final approach to L19 Runway 30; a crop duster was seen landing on Runway 12. The duster was not using the radio; a landing light; or the normal runway in use. We saw each other about the same time and he made a right turn immediately after becoming airborne following the abort of his landing and I aborted my landing and made a climbing right turn. This is a county owned general use airport; not a private duster strip. If they want to land on 12 and take off on 30 to save time they need to at least use a radio. PA28 pilot reported an airborne conflict on final at L19 with a crop duster aircraft that was on the opposite runway approach without announcing intentions.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Ground Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Taxing out to Runway 18 from ramp. Normal taxi route of H; Runway 32; B; M; M1 unavailable due to snow removal at Runway 32. Decided to taxi H; M; M1 because it was the next shortest route and the only restriction was the wingspan on east ramp of 150 feet. Our aircraft has a wingspan of 147 feet. When we turned onto M we were finally able to see that the taxiways did not have enough space to get thru due to aircraft parked in the triangle concrete area south of M and west of E. There were also a few fuel trucks that seemed to be within 20 feet of the Taxiway M center line just off of the FBO and it did not meet the clearance for our aircraft to get thru. No one was working at the FBO so nothing could get moved out of our way and we could not turn around. We had to have our maintenance cross runway 32 and push us back onto the ramp to taxi out to Runway 18 via a different route. Nothing else significant happened.The confusion of how the airport diagram depicts the east ramp on the taxi diagram. It shows that we should have been able to get through the taxi ways and not interfere with the east ramp. That was not the case.A more clear picture that the taxiway lines are apart of east ramp. Also if it has a wingspan restriction; not reducing that ability without a NOTAM. Pushed from ramp to taxi to Runway 18 for departure. Tower closed; non-tower ops in effect with snow removal in progress. Usual taxi route under these circumstances is H - Runway 32 to B - M - M1. Runway 14/32 was not accessible as it wasn't plowed. So H - M - M1 seemed reasonable. Jepp 10-9 page shows E Ramp accessible to aircraft with a wingspan of 150 ft or less (ours is 147' 1'). After we made the left turn onto M from H; we saw private jets parked in the triangle concrete area south of M and west of E. They weren't really visible until turning onto M as it was night and they were sort of behind a snow bank. There were also a number of fuel trucks by FBO where E and M meet. The trucks seemed to be in the taxiway somewhat. The combination of the jets and trucks made the gap between them unsafe to try and navigate. Contacted an airfield ops vehicle via CTAF and they tried to find someone at the FBO to move the trucks; but were unsuccessful. Contacted the ramp and they sent out the tug and pushed us back to the south ramp where we taxied out a different route.Cause - Nighttime; non-tower ops; snow on the airfield; previously unused and unfamiliar taxi route; FBO possibly parking things in the taxi lane (no idea what their restrictions / requirements are).Suggestions - It seems that the whole east ramp area; even though it's open to our type aircraft; should probably be restricted from use by our company aircraft...doesn't seem like a good idea generally speaking taxiing over there. Put a note on the taxi chart and Company page to avoid the east ramp area. Air carrier flight crew reported ramp congestion and charting issues at MSN airport.
Aircraft: B777
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

ZZZZ; weather via ATIS was VFR. RWY XXL closed for maintenance/construction. Glideslope fluctuations occurring RWY XXR. Crew discussed the cautions of flying into ZZZZ. Terrain; Approach speeds; missed approach procedures for single and two engine and variable wind due to terrain. All crew members had been to ZZZZ many times before. Cleared for ILS XXR starting at 2000 feet 2 miles from FAF. Aircraft was configured gear down; flaps 25; speed 160 knots and autopilot on. I noted an amber AUTOPILOT on EICAS to FO (First Officer) who was flying the approach. When I looked at the Primary Flight Display; the green GS on FMA had an amber bar drawn across it. Flight Director had turned amber with full down deflection on it. I instructed the FO to maintain altitude. The [Relief Pilot] confirmed and repeated it to FO. Autopilot was disconnected. FO asked for FD (Flight Director) to be turned off. Flaps 30 selected. Approach continued with visual using VASI bars. Before Landing Checklist completed. Aircraft was in normal landing profile at 500 feet. Landed in the TDZE (touchdown zone). The First Officers; (all former Captains) and I with 100 plus years experience had not seen this event before. This might be a good training scenario. B777 Captain reported a glideslope warning on final approach and continued using the VASI.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

On Date I was working a transit check on Aircraft X. I was doing the inspection of the cargo compartment and found that all the tape was missing from the joint between the sidewall panel and the ceiling panels. Both the forward and aft cargo compartments were missing the tape. The AMM (Aircraft Maintenance Manual) specifies that the joints require sealing tape for fire suppression. This has been an issue lately I have been finding. I found this on Aircraft Y on Date1 and Aircraft Z on Date2. There was another aircraft or two but I can not recall the nose numbers. I at first thought this was a one off situation but it appears to be more widespread of an issue. Some have just the ceiling joint but others have been missing sidewall seam tape also. This makes the aircraft not in compliance with the manual and a possible fire suppression issue as the compartment is not sealed.Possibly coming out of heavier checks incomplete as many of the compartments appear to have been redone in new tape and new panels. Much of the compartment is done and repaired but the ceiling seam is consistently missing. Aircraft Mechanic reported upon inspection; a widespread problem of AMM non-compliance to tape joints for fire suppression on several aircraft cargo compartments.
Aircraft: B777
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Around 1.5 hours into flight from ZZZ to ZZZZ at a cruise FL of 380 the Captain and I noticed an auto populated amber cabin pressure altitude of around 8;400 feet with a steady climb. We looked through our manuals to try to find a solution to get the pressure under control. We asked for a lower altitude to see if that would fix the problem but the cabin continued to climb. After manually trying to close the outflow valves which already indicated full closed; the pressure altitude exceeded 10;000 feet. We performed the emergency procedure for cabin altitude annunciation and ran the QRH which we had already reviewed. We communicated the issue with ZZZ Center and told them we would need to descend to the lowest altitude possible with a return to ZZZ. We sent an ACARS message to Operations and discussed the issue with them over Satcom after. Around 17;000 feet is when the cabin altitude started to stabilize around 10;400 cabin altitude so a further descent was still required to be off oxygen. We descended to the MSA of 9;000 feet in the area and landed safely in ZZZ advising the Tower we would not need further assistance. Around 1.5 hours into flight from ZZZ to ZZZZ at cruise FL 380 observed amber cabin pressure altitude of around 8400 feet with a steady climb of +100 ft/min. FO and I looked through our manuals to try to find a solution to get the pressure under control. I asked for a lower altitude to see if that would fix the problem but the cabin continued to climb. After manually trying to close the outflow valves which already indicated full closed; the pressure altitude exceeded 10;000 feet. We performed the emergency procedure for cabin altitude annunciation and ran the QRH which we had already reviewed. We communicated the issue with ZZZ Center and told them we would need to descend to the minimum safe altitude to return to ZZZ. Sent an ACARS message to Dispatcher and discussed the issue with them and Maintenance Control. Around 17;000 feet MSL is when the cabin altitude started to stabilize around 10;400 cabin altitude so a further descent was still required to be off oxygen. We descended to the MSA of 9;000 feet in the area. As cabin altitude stabilized we climbed up to 14000 ft for the return to ZZZ. Normal approach and landing advising the tower we would not need further assistance. B777 flight crew reported loss of cabin pressure control and elected to make an air turn back and precautionary landing.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

The season for lightning is not [for a few months from now.] Customer service representatives are asked to operate jet bridge to aircraft during severe lightning. The aircraft is parked by a truck. The aircraft has NOT been chocked. The ramp is closed; no ramp personnel outside.Three agents were injured; when a jet bridge was struck by lightning [years ago]. It is unsafe to operate a jet bridge during severe lightning; for the agents; and the customers. The rational is that the jet bridge is grounded. I do not believe that is true; since three agents were hurt during a lightning strike years ago. With the severe lightning and wind; and the aircraft not chocked; the aircraft could move and damage both the jet bridge and the aircraft. It is much safer for the aircraft to be completely parked; chocked and the weather no longer a threat; before opening the door to the passengers. This would protect the customer and the agent operating the jet bridge during severe threat of lightning. A Gate Agent reported being asked to operate the jet bridge to the aircraft during severe lightning.
Aircraft: B767
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

About 10 mins after leveling off at our final cruise altitude of FL360; we received a CAB ALT alert and warning. After donning our oxygen masks and accomplishing the appropriate QRH procedure; we determined that our altitude was uncontrollable and requested descent to 10;000 feet. After conferring with Dispatch; we [returned] to our origin airport. Cruising at FL360; the CAB ALT light and master warning light and horn went off. I had turned the right pack off out of 4;000 feet MSL; so I immediately turned the right pack to AUTO as I simultaneously donned my oxygen mask and established crew communication. We accomplished the CABIN ALTITUDE or Rapid Depressurization checklist. The cabin altitude remained uncontrollable; so we descended to 10;000 feet. The company advised us to return to [departure airport]; which we did without further incident. B767-300 flight crew reported returning to departure airport after experiencing loss of cabin pressure.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Landing
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

During landing roll we felt some bangs and shuddering coming from the right side of the aircraft. I initially thought we had blown a tire on the right side and upon slowing the aircraft and exiting on [the] taxiway we noticed Engine Fail annunciations for the right (number 2) engine. We stopped the aircraft; analyzed what we had and decided to shut down the engine. We ran the Engine Fail Checklist in the QRH and without any other abnormal indications we decided to taxi towards the gate.Enroute to the gate; we asked Tower if they noticed anything abnormal in the number 2 engine area and they said they noticed a very small trace of smoke. At that point; in an abundance of caution; we stopped the aircraft and asked for assistance from the Fire Department. I notified the Flight Attendants and passengers of our situation so they would not be alarmed to see fire trucks around the aircraft. The Fire Department checked out the engine and right side of the aircraft and said they noticed no fire; leaking fluids or any indications of damage. We decided taxiing to the gate with the Fire Department following us in would be the best and safest way to deplane our passengers. We shut down and deplaned passengers in an expeditious manner while Maintenance and the Fire Department stood by. [Report narrative contained no additional information.] B737 flight crew reported the Number 2 engine failed at 90 knots during landing roll.