Aryan95614/aerograph-asrs huggingface dataset:
Aircraft: C172
Phase of flight: Takeoff / Launch
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Cleared for takeoff Runway 34 by Tower. As we took the runway we saw a shadow move across us from a Citation that was on short final and was forced to do a go around. The aircraft I was in was approaching ZZZ and upon initial contact with the Tower I was prompted to cancel the IFR flight plan; which I did and was then immediately cleared to land. The Captain then commenced a visual approach to the runway. At approximately 200 FT AGL and about 1 mile or less from the airport; we both noticed a high-wing single engine aircraft taxi onto the runway and we briefed each other on the event; waiting for about 4 or 5 seconds to see if the aircraft was just crossing the runway but then the aircraft lined up on the runway as if getting ready to takeoff. We initiated a go-around. After we set the appropriate flap setting; started to climb and retracted the landing gear we were approximately midfield and I advised the Control Tower that we had gone around; assuming they already were aware of that and that we were just doing the appropriate action to announce that. The Tower's response was; 'Ok; is there a problem?' My response was. 'No; we don't have a problem just the plane that taxied in front of us just before we were about to land.' Their response was; 'Ok; make right traffic and cleared to land.' The Captain called the Tower on the phone after we were at the FBO and the passengers were situated and was told by the Controller that they had cleared the plane to takeoff and they thought that he was gone. I think that if the Tower had watched the other aircraft leave the runway before they focused their attention elsewhere; the incident could not have happened. A Citation First Officer and a C172 Instructor describe an incident resulting in a go around for the Citation when the C172 taxis onto the runway for takeoff. The C172 had been cleared for takeoff; but apparently took some time to do so.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Final Approach
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

The Captain and I made a go around on our second attempt to landing. The first approach was discontinued due to RVR being reported below the minimums for the approach outside the final approach fix. Due to a glideslope anomaly on Runway 23. The glideslope a few hundred feet from reaching minimums made a quick movement towards half scale deflection down. The aircraft was on a constant rate of descent; airspeed and proper configuration; hand flown below 1700 feet per approach plate. At the point that I called runway in sight the Captain and I noticed that the aircraft was not going to touch down in the prescribed TDZ and accomplished the go around procedure. While being vectored for a 3rd attempt at landing; the Captain and I briefed that if the anomaly happened again; we would accomplished another go around. Before the 3rd approach; another flight was able to land on their first attempt. After requesting a PIREP from the crew; they said they were able to see the runway right at minimums. We were able to obtain visual reference with the runway right at minimums and complete a successful landing. In the hotel van with the other crew we asked them if they had issues with the glideslope and mentioned they did. They said it acted very similarly to our situation. It seems that this has been a recurring theme at CRW in the past as well. The cause of the second go-around was due to an inaccurate indication of the glideslope that put the crew in a situation where a landing would have been made outside of the TDZ. I think the FAA needs to take a deeper dive in what is causing glideslope anomalies for the ILS 23 into CRW. Especially coming into the winter months in mountainous areas where weather can deteriorate rapidly. An Air Carrier First Officer reported having to initiate a go around on their second approach attempt due to the glideslope fluctuating. The pilot reports this is a recurring issue on this approach and other crews also reported the glideslope fluctuating.
Aircraft: AMATEUR/HOME BUILT/EXPERIMENTAL
Phase of flight: Landing
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Ground Excursion Runway

After landing the left gear mechanism broke causing the left gear to raise; the hull skidded on the runway; and the aircraft made a left 90 uncontrolled turn exiting the runway to the adjacent grass. Aircraft came to rest upright.There were no injuries; no fire; no fuel leakage and no structural damage done to the aircraft; no airport facilities (lights; markers) were struck nor damaged.First responders contacted maintenance personnel; and thru manual lifting; we lifted the aircraft; supported with wooden blocks; lowered the left gear; and secured in place with wooden blocks. This rendered the aircraft towable. (In fact; the aircraft could have been safely flown under this condition except for activating the electric gear reposition mechanism.)I speculate that the collapse of the gear mechanism was caused by normal 'wear and tear' from typical runway landing loads over the past two years; which lead to an undiscovered bowing of the actuator clevis (U Channel Part) and it's mounting bar which in turn lead to a deformity which prevented the gear; when lowered for runway landing; to be secured in the designed over-center and locked position. I would recommend this mechanism (behind both seats) to be visually inspected at least after every 20 runway (land) landings. The pilot of an experimental amphibian aircraft described the failure of a landing gear mechanism that resulted in a left main landing gear collapse and subsequent runway excursion. He speculated the cause and suggested repetitive inspections of the mechanism.
Aircraft: C172
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC

During a training flight for the purpose of NAVAID training; my post solo private pilot student; myself; a CFI; and a backseat observing Private Pilot License student were east of LMO at 7;100 feet. I had made two position reports on CTAF when the student pilot noticed a Canadian registered Mooney immediately ahead and to our left. I prompted the student to make an easterly descending turn as the plane overflew us by less than one wingspan width; and with our wingtips overlapping at approximately five knots over our airspeed (which is significantly slower than a Mooney's normal cruising speed.) Mid air impact was never imminent; but it was truly a 'near miss.' It was never apparent the [pilot of the] other aircraft saw our C172. The Mooney continued northbound. A C172 with an instructor; student and a back seat student observer aboard suffered an NMAC with a Mooney traveling in the same general direction but closing slightly right to left as it passed over them and continued on its way.
Aircraft: A320
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Working the FLL Final; Aircraft X was at 5;000 feet tracking inbound the ILS for [Runway] 10R. A VFR target was observed coming off of the OPF/HWO area VFR climbing to the northwest; through both FLL finals. Aircraft X was issued the traffic and could not descend on the approach because the VFR was climbing unrestricted and uncontrolled. Aircraft X was then very high and unstable on the approach; creating an unsafe situation.FLL airport is the 19th busiest airport in the USA; and one of the top 3 fastest growing; averaging 8% growth each of the last 5 years. FLL has a basic Class C airspace surrounding it that is beyond out of date and unable to aid in the safety of its aircraft on the finals. Planes inbound to each of their parallel runways are not offered any sort of protection until within 5 miles of the field. [This] allows several dozen VFRs each day to climb; descend; and transition across each final; without ATC advisories creating a very dangerous; unsafe; and hazardous situation in the skies above. The FLL Class C is inadequate; and out of date; and needs a major airspace change around it; whether a bigger Charlie; or a full blown Class B before it's too late. MIA TRACON Controller reported an airborne conflict with an IFR arrival to FLL and a VFR aircraft.
Aircraft: CRJ200
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

On takeoff; the First Officer called for gear up and I selected the gear handle to the up position. 6-10 seconds later; we received a Gear Disagree master warning with the other associated indications. We declared an emergency with Tower and switched over to Departure who gave us a level off altitude of 3;000 when we were already at 3;200 FT. We started to return to 3;000 when he cleared us up to 5;000. At 4;000; Departure told us to maintain 4;000 and the First Officer had to hit the ALT button; but captured the altitude. After running the QRH checklist; we received three green gear down indications and received vectors back towards the airport. I contacted Dispatch via ACARS; talked to the Flight Attendant and made a PA informing the passengers of our return. We made a normal approach and landing back at the airport. The aircraft's landing gear failed to fully retract resulting in the Gear Disagree warning and the resulting need to return to our departure airport. Also; we received several altitude assignments very close to the altitude we were already at.This is the second Gear Disagree failure I have had in less than a week. Both times I was asked by Maintenance if I cycled the gear at all before completing the QRH. I don't know if cycling the gear would have corrected the problem and while there is a step for cycling the gear if the Gear Disagree occurs with the handle in the down position; there is no such step in the QRH procedure for the Gear Disagree with the handle up. If cycling the gear could possibly correct the malfunction; then that step needs to be added to the QRH as our training clearly tells us to follow the QRH and not add our own procedures. The threats experienced this afternoon were the combination of running an emergency procedure while being given instructions from ATC that required immediate action or immediate corrections. A CRJ200's GEAR DISAGREE alerted after takeoff; so the Gear Disagree Checklist was completed; an emergency declared and the flight returned to the departure airport.
Aircraft: MD-88
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

While working with contract maintenance in ZZZ on a MEL deferral of the right engine fuel heat valve. All MEL procedures were complied with except for wiring the position indicator into place to secure the valve. On climb out; crew had high fuel and oil temperature. Crew was unable to control oil temperature and shut the right engine down. Aircraft off landed in ZZZ1. Landing was uneventful. October 2014. I was called by Air Carrier X for contract maintenance on field at ZZZ. Discrepancy was listed as Right-Hand (R/H) fuel heat valve light stays illuminated. I spoke with Air Carrier X Maintenance Control Operations and was instructed to open the front lower cowling. Upon opening I could hear the fuel heat valve motor running continuously. I pulled the breakers for the motor and indicator. The motor stopped running and the indicator light went out. I positioned the valve to the closed position; all under specific instruction by the Maintenance Controller for Air Carrier X. I specifically asked if there were any further 'M' procedures for mel compliance and was told there were not. Apparently both the controller and myself missed the step of safety wiring or manually fixing the valve to the closed position. I closed the cowling; collared the effected Circuit Breakers (C/Bs) and filled out the log book and mel placard; again under direct instruction of Air Carrier X Maintenance Controller. The aircraft was dispatched and developed oil overheat problems as the fuel/oil heat valve vibrated to the open position. The aircraft diverted to ZZZ1 and landed safely. There was no damage to the aircraft or engine. There were no injuries. Two Aircraft Maintenance Technicians (AMTs) were informed that an MD-88 aircraft they had just performed an 'M' procedure for an MEL deferral of the Right Engine Fuel/Oil Heat Valve; had developed uncontrollable high fuel and oil temperatures on climbout; requiring an inflight engine shutdown. Valve had been physically positioned to the 'closed' position; but not safety wired and vibrated to the 'open' position after engine start-up.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

This is in relation to a crew bulletin. During taxi-out I realized both aft galley supplemental O2 drop mask doors were sealed shut with security tape. Having experience with this known safety issue I immediately contacted the Flight Attendant and Captain. We all three agreed I (Flight Attendant C) would simply break the security tape freeing both O2 door compartments so they would deploy if needed. Although I received full permission from the crew; this action is technically a maintenance procedure hence this report. Not having a procedure to verify active O2 compartments are in working order. Because we do not check this during preflight if there is something wrong it is either not discovered or found after we have departed the gate. I suggest we ensure Maintenance is NOT sealing these doors shut. Also; add a visual inspection of active O2 masks compartments to the list of flight attendant preflight checks. This would be a cross-check of Maintenance and would catch the issue before departure. A B737 Flight Attendant discovered an aft galley supplemental oxygen mask panel locked with security tape during taxi and with the Captain's permission cut the tape before takeoff. No preflight procedure in place to check oxygen panel conditions.
Aircraft: MD-83
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

During my preflight I noticed that the longitudinal trim pointer tip was missing. The longitudinal and aileron trim pointer tips on the MD-80 are tritium-gas filled capsules. Tritium is a radioactive gas that emits electrons while it decays. Those electrons then excite the gas-filled capsule so that it glows as a self-powered gas even in the absence of any direct light source. It is designed that way so that the pilots would be able to trim the airplane in the event of a complete power failure in darkness. Well; the longitudinal trim pointer was missing and Maintenance (MX) signed off the logbook saying that according to McDonnell Douglas Service Bulletin DC-9-27-311 the pointer tip was not required anymore. I accepted the airplane; however; having gotten bogus sign-offs before I promised myself to obtain that bulletin and see for myself. I did and unfortunately that service bulletin deals with modifications to the internal jack-screw mechanism there is not one word in the whole bulletin that would give anyone rise to believe that the pointer tips can be missing. I checked the maintenance manual. It actually says that if the pointers are damaged or broken then everybody would have to leave the cockpit as tritium gas is radioactive/toxic and hazmat procedures have to be followed.How do I know that the missing tip is not somewhere lying broken inside the center pedestal? The bulletin gives no relief to fly with missing pointer tips. Why did MX sign off the logbook with a reference that does not address the discrepancy? How are pilots supposed to safeguard against bogus sign-offs if we do not have access to the documentation that is being referenced? The pointer tips are not mentioned in our MEL book? Can I now assume that either they are installed or if missing the airplane is not airworthy? MX needs to be held accountable for their actions. Bogus sign-offs just to get the airplane off the gate is a no-no. I am extremely disappointed that this happened again. MD-83 Captain reported a missing longitudinal trip pointer tip. The trim pointer tips are tritium-gas filled capsules. Reporter stated tritium gas is radioactive/toxic and hazmat procedures have to be followed if they are damaged.
Aircraft: AMATEUR/HOME BUILT/EXPERIMENTAL
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC

On a northerly heading on the east side of a Class D airspace; I called the Tower requesting to transition the Class D airspace; the Tower then informed me of a Cessna 172 that had just departed [the airport] on an IFR flight plan. I was asked; and did; IDENT on 1200. And at that time; I did not have the aircraft in sight. The Tower instructed me to perform a right 360 degree turn to increase separation; which I did. Upon rolling out wings level; I then saw the 172 climbing at my 11:00; heading east; and I informed the Tower of this. To improve our separation; I descended a couple hundred feet and the C172 passed directly over me by; I estimate; 300 FT to 500 FT. At NO time did I feel in danger; because I clearly saw the other aircraft and was easily able to provide VFR separation; but I assume the TRACON facility; controlling the C172's departure; was concerned. I called the Tower and said 'I bet that looks real 'good' on the TRACON's radar screen'; and the Tower operator; with some exasperation; agreed. In hindsight; it would have been better had I been instructed to initially perform an immediate left turn; which would have put me well South of the climbing/departing aircraft. To repeat; I was never concerned about the incident or felt either aircraft was in jeopardy; but in hindsight; I believe an immediate LEFT turn; rather than the right 360; would have been a better solution. The pilot of an experimental aircraft was operating in the vicinity of Class D airspace. When he contacted the Tower Controller to request transition through the airspace; he was advised of an IFR departure from that airport. When he could not acquire the aircraft visually; the Tower suggested a 360 degree turn for separation. When he completed that orbit; he observed the traffic; and descended. He estimated that the aircraft passed over him within 300-500 FT.
Aircraft: CITATION LATITUDE (C680A)
Phase of flight: unknown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance

While outside running the aircraft two APU starter generator wires were found to be disconnected. The wires that were disconnected were taped separately to the two larger terminal wires and labeled. After bringing the aircraft back into the hangar I connected the two disconnected terminal wires as they were labeled and taped and torqued them per the AMM.I found out when I returned to work that evening the wires were marked incorrectly so I had installed them incorrectly. We would normally install the wires how they are marked. As far as I was aware the operations check was written up separately. Technician reported that APU generator wires were mismarked; resulting in incorrect installation.
Aircraft: A319
Phase of flight: Initial Climb
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

I was watching a trainee in Sector X. He was having issues giving a pop up IFR clearance to an aircraft. As he was trying to figure it out I saw Aircraft Y to the south west of the airport at 075 and Aircraft X was headed south bound climbing to 080. I initially thought it would not have been a factor; however; I then heard the trainee give the IFR clearance the wrong altitude and issued a climb into another sectors airspace; IFR. I went and corrected it to avoid a potential airspace violation or worse. As soon as I fixed that situation I saw that Aircraft Y had climbed to 080 and was headed right at Aircraft X. The trainee issued traffic to Aircraft Y and Aircraft Y said he the airbus (Aircraft X) in sight. Aircraft X then said that he was responding to an RA. The trainee then told Aircraft Y to descend for traffic. I keyed up and told Aircraft X to report complete with RA and that the traffic had Aircraft X in sight. Aircraft X said he was going to file a near midair.Aircraft Y should have been capped at a VFR altitude and coordination should have been made to keep Aircraft X climbing. Trainees should be competent at issuing an IFR clearance prior to a control position. TRACON Controller reported an IFR pop up aircraft was given an IFR altitude resulting in an airborne conflict with an IFR departure.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical

We had finished our push off of [the] gate and had been cleared to taxi. As we began our taxi [another aircraft] pushed off [a nearby] gate and overlapped our wing tip clearance requiring us to stop. Had we not stopped the two aircraft would have collided. Contacted [Airport Operations] after departure; advised we had a near miss and requested that they save the ramp video. After [the other aircraft] pushed onto [the] taxiway we proceeded without further incident. B737-800 pilot reported that they had to stop the taxi to avoid a collision with another aircraft being pushed back from an adjacent gate.
Aircraft: C172
Phase of flight: Final Approach; Initial Approach
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter VFR In IMC

I was on a schedule and needed to arrive by a certain time; however the weather was uncooperative. The problem was that I decided to continue VFR flight into LIFR conditions. I had the approach plate ready to go in case if the weather was not MVFR or VFR upon arrival. It was LIFR upon arrival; so I decided to execute the ILS approach procedure for Runway X at ZZZ. The landing was successful. In all honesty; I should not be alive. I am a VFR-only pilot with just 3.4 hours of simulated instrument time. However; I put to use all of my instrument training and flight simulator experience to shoot an ILS approach to minimums. I think it is very important to emphasize to VFR pilots how stupid of a decision it is to continue flight into IMC. Everyone thinks; 'It won't happen to me. I'll never make a decision that imprudent.' No. That is a lie. Everyone will make a mistake. People need to be educated well ahead of time what are the dangers of continued VFR flight into IMC. Additionally; VFR flight training needs to be changed to better suit an emergency in which a VFR pilot might have no choice but to execute an approach and not be afraid to call up ATC and ask for help. A low time; non-instrument rated pilot survives penetration of IFR conditions and the successful execution of an ILS approach to minimums. He admits the error in his judgment and offers advice to the industry.