Aryan95614/aerograph-asrs huggingface dataset:
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

On taxi out; ENG 1 overheat light illuminated. Consulted the QRH (shut off engine and discharged fire bottle) and returned to gate. For safety declared emergency and equipment followed. Cockpit indications [were] all normal except ENG 1 overheat light. Outside reported engine normal as we taxied to gate. B737-700 Captain reported that engine #1 overheat light illuminated on taxi out. Engine was shut down; fire bottle discharged; and flight returned to gate.
Aircraft: B777
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Aircraft

I had taxied the aircraft to a hold short position on Z1 for RWY36L and parked the brakes. While waiting for our clearance from tower to takeoff our aircraft was struck on the right stabilizer and then right wingtip by an A330 that taxied behind us. Our aircraft was not moving as we had the brakes set.We [notified] tower and requested assistance. I made several PA's to the cabin crew and passengers to stay seated and keep calm. Ramp personnel and a fire truck observed the damage and no spillage of fluids. We left the aircraft configured as it was and coordinated a return to a gate. There were no injuries to crew or passengers.After arrival at the gate station personnel rerouted the passengers and crew. I informed dispatch and the Chief pilot on duty; as well as Union representatives. After ensuring the aircraft and passengers were secure I left with the crew to the hotel. Captain taxied out to Runway 36L on Z1 for takeoff. Holding short with brakes parked. Aircraft was struck from behind on right stab and right wingtip. By an A330. [Notified ATC]. Fire trucks called; escorted back to gate. Aircraft left configured for inspection. A B777 flight crew reports being struck on the right horizontal stabilizer and the right wingtip by a passing A330; while holding short of the runway for takeoff. The flight returns to the ramp for maintenance.
Aircraft: A300
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

During our enroute climb we received an Avionics Smoke Warning accompanied by the smell of fumes. We declared an emergency and got vectors to return to our departure airport. After landing we stopped on the runway for CFR to inspect for hot spots. When they found none we cleared runway and taxied to ramp parking where CFR inspected inside the aircraft for overheating avionics and/or lithium batteries in a shipping container. Preceding this event we had a deferral of the Field Limit Computer System 2 and the MEL did not direct us to pull the circuit breakers; thus power was applied to [the system which] caused overheating and fumes of the system 2 computer. I recommend that pulling circuit breakers should be written into the MEL. An A300 flight crew declared an emergency and returned to their departure airport after receipt of an Avionics Smoke warning accompanied by the smell of electrical fumes. A circuit breaker involved with an associated system had not been pulled when deferred prior to departure.
Aircraft: GULFSTREAM IV / G350 / G450
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Enroute to PHL at 45;000 feet we encountered a 5 minute period of heavy moderate turbulence. There was a north south line of thunderstorms stretching 800 miles centered over Nebraska along our route. We transited the area along the same route that ATC had sent all previous airline traffic. Passengers and Flight Attendant were briefed and cabin was secure. We encountered speed variations between .83 and .74 and altitude variations between 44;700 and 45;300 feet. We advised ATC of the turbulence and there was no traffic near our altitude. In retrospect the situation would have been much safer if our situational awareness could have been expanded by looking at the real time weather radar picture available thru using the onboard wireless to access internet live radar shot. Our current company policy forbids the crew members from accessing the WiFi signal during flight. The aircraft radar only gave us a sliver of the big weather picture and it is possible that with more information a smoother route could have been selected. G IV Captain experiences moderate turbulence at FL450 on a transcontinental flight due to a long line of thunderstorms perpendicular to his route. He believes he may have been able to choose a better route had he been able to view a Nexrad radar image via on board WiFi which is prohibited by his company.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical

Landed at SNA Runway 19R. Exited Taxiway E. Just prior to turning on to Taxiway A noticed helicopter approaching on Taxiway A flying southbound; opposite taxi flow; at a high rate of speed. Locked brakes and stopped short of Taxiway A to avoid a collision. Ground Control was busy with radio communications. The helicopter took no evasive action and passed 30 feet off our nose 10-15 feet above the taxiway. After the helicopter passed us; Ground Control told us to stop short of Taxiway A. Had we not stopped; the helicopter would have collided with our aircraft. After talking to the Tower Supervisor; my understanding is that Ground Control; with Tower concurrence; can clear helicopters to takeoff from Taxiway A opposite the taxi flow of jets exiting Runway 19R. I think this is an extremely dangerous practice and collision potential is high. Runway 19L was available to the helicopter for back taxi and takeoff but was not used. B737 Captain exiting Runway 19R on Echo reports a near collision with a helicopter air taxiing southbound on Alpha at SNA.
Aircraft: SMALL AIRCRAFT
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

I was on an IFR flight plan to SPG. During the descent into the airport in the IMC condition; ATC clears me to fly direct to IAF (Initial Approach Fix) JRGAL. I was not sure if the approach that I load in the GPS was correct; so I looked over to verify. When I looked back at the instrument; since it was a descent turn; I got disoriented. It took me two to three seconds to recover; however; I ended up heading 90 degrees to the right of my course and around 300 feet lower. I then informed ATC and continue to destination without other problems. Pilot reported disorientation on a descending turn in IMC led to deviating from approach course.
Aircraft: LARGE TRANSPORT; LOW WING; 2 TURBOJET ENG
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Unauthorized Flight Operations (UAS)

On PHLBO 3 arrival to EWR; approximately 5 to 10 miles south of PHLBO; level at 6;000 feet; 250 KIAS. Saw a bright yellow drone off the left side of the aircraft; maybe 200 feet below our altitude and 100 feet lateral. Reported the drone sighting to ATC; New York Approach Control on 120.15. Air carrier flight crew was descending into a Class B airport on a STAR. At approximately 6;000 feet they had a near miss with a UAS and advised ATC.
Aircraft: A321
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

We were delayed leaving so we were in the very early morning hours when this happened. As we neared White Sands; NM our Dispatch advised us that the military was conducting GPS jamming exercises; so we were anticipating losing our GPS signals for a short time period. We got a warning on our FMGC that GPS signals were being lost. We were able to see on our FMGC that the signals had degraded. As we neared an intersection the aircraft began to bank the wrong direction in a 30 degree bank. I had to select heading to force the aircraft back on course. ATC then called and said we were 5 degrees off on heading to the next intersection. Once I had the aircraft back on course I found that we had lost both GPS signals completely. Apparently the FMGC weighs the GPS signal very highly and losing it from a very good to lost signal caused the aircraft to shift the perceived location enough to cause a 30 degree bank and ATC to see the error. Eventually we recovered GPS number 2 but GPS number 1 never came back online. After the signal was lost and things 'settled down' it seemed that the system was able to restore an accurate position. We confirmed position with basic VOR tuning and flying over the VOR. Military was conducting GPS jamming in area. Dispatch was aware that this was happening but ATC was not. We had a momentary loss of nav position as the FMGC had to adjust to the loss of its' best and most accurate signal. This adjustment meant we had a slight nav error. Please have ATC advised when GPS jamming will occur in their ATC zones. Please give pilots a method to disable GPS when jamming will occur to avoid the nav errors when the FMGC has to adjust to losing the GPS signal. Please give pilots a method for recovering a GPS signal when the receiver won't recover on its' own. Perhaps pilots will have to be advised to use heading when going into a GPS jamming area. ATC may need to increase separation if GPS jamming will occur as they are used to our aircraft having a very high level of nav accuracy. A321 Captain describes the effects of military GPS jamming on his aircraft over White Sands late one night.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance

Three mechanics assigned to accomplish an irregular refuel process on Aircraft X. After I reviewed MEL AMM we started the refuel process. One mechanic in the flight deck to monitor the fuel load; and in direct radio contact with a mechanic at the fuel panel. The refuel process started and stopped several times as the fuel load was balanced. There was some miscommunication causing a few gallons of fuel to spill on the ramp. A fuel spill kit was brought in to contain and clean up fuel. There was no power at the fueling panel. Fueling procedure per MEL [and] AMM were followed. I was in the flight deck to read fuel quantity while fuel was added to aircraft. We were near the total fuel needed but had too much fuel in the right tank. I said to stop fueling on the radio and said I was coming down [to] review the fuel numbers. We were discussing the numbers when we saw fuel coming out of the wing. We immediately contained the fuel spill. Maintenance personnel reported a communications breakdown during irregular refueling procedure resulting in fuel spill of a B737.
Aircraft: SMALL AIRCRAFT; HIGH WING; 1 ENG; FIXED GEAR
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Object

I exited Runway 20 at Alpha after landing and taxied to apron. Turned right next to grass and taxied parallel to Runway 20 to a marked taxiway leading toward Taxiway Charlie. I have followed this routing many times in the past after progressive taxi instructions were given to me many years ago. While in slow taxi; I heard a bang while following the marked taxiway in the open apron area. I could not see anything that could have been hit so I continued taxi to shutdown. I inspected the propeller and saw a scuff mark on the forward side of one blade's tip. Looked back into the incident area and didn't see any obstructions. Several days later I thought to return and investigate further. Walking the area I found a row of plastic taxi lights across the marked taxiway I followed with markings and evidence one light was glued to the pavement on the taxiway line. At this point; there is a slight dip in the pavement from the direction I approached; apparently obscuring the taxiway lights as I approached. I thought I was following an authorized taxiway because the yellow line was clearly visible.On further investigation; I learned that the area is now marked closed on the airport diagram. The diagram was not consulted before the incident because of familiarity with the airport; clear VMC conditions prevailing in daylight hours; in reliance upon the taxiway markings on paved open apron area; and the absence of clearly painted warnings on the pavement that the area was closed despite the clearly marked taxiway. If the taxi light had been placed a few feet to either side of the marked taxi line; a propeller strike would not have occurred.It would be helpful if the marked taxi lines in this area were moved off the existing taxi lines; the taxi lines obliterated; and painted signage on the pavement be installed stating 'Closed Area' at intervals around the closed part of the apron or the entire area painted green or red to better alert of the area's closure to aircraft operations. The reporter stated that he had not looked at the airport diagram but had read the NOTAMs. Since he did not see any reference to a closed apron area he assumed no restrictions exited. He felt deceived by Taxiway H centerline markings continuing into the closed area and suggests the line be obliterated. Because of the prop strike an engine tear down was required. He also remembers short duration drop in RPM from around 900 to 500 at the time of the event but did not connect the event with an encounter. After landing at SAC; a pilot taxied to parking on Taxiway H without referencing an airport diagram and taxied into the closed apron area where his propeller struck a taxi light. The taxiway centerline was clearly visible deceiving the pilot into believing the area was open.
Aircraft: CRJ900
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

We experienced a DC EMER BUS caution message. We ran the QRH. The first line in the QRH for this event was 'land at nearest suitable airport.' We (the FO and myself) discussed the situation and made a plan. We [advised ATC] diverted to [a nearby airport]. This gave us enough time to prepare the plane for landing. We asked ATC to roll the fire trucks as we no longer had any system fire protection and lost our DC Emergency Bus (electrical). I [briefed] the flight attendants. I made an announcement to the passengers that we were diverting due to mechanical issues. I ACARS texted Dispatch to let them know our plan. We landed and taxied to the gate without further incident. We deplaned the passengers and shutdown the aircraft. I have a concern in this event. The Tower Controller cleared an aircraft to takeoff in front of me when we were at 500 ft. The aircraft was slow to depart. I queried the Tower Controller again if we had been cleared to land. Had that aircraft had any difficulties on the runway; we would have had to go around. No aircraft in an emergency that needs to 'land at nearest suitable airport' would like to accomplish a go around; for any reason. I understand the ATC description of the 'Safe; efficient flow of traffic.' Unfortunately in this event I believe 'efficient' took precedence over 'safe.' During normal traffic flow it would have been good work; but not during an emergency. CRJ-900 Captain reported diverting to a nearby alternate after experiencing a DC EMER BUS caution message.
Aircraft: WIDEBODY; LOW WING; 2 TURBOJET ENG
Phase of flight: Initial Climb; Takeoff / Launch
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC

On takeoff from EWR Runway (RWY) 04L at approximately 100 feet AGL noted traffic executing go-around/missed approach from RWY 04R. Weather at time was OVC 003; 2SM RA. Traffic was at our 2 O'clock position when first noticed and slightly above our altitude. We ultimately were at same altitude and separated by approximately 500-1000 feet laterally before losing sight of traffic as we climbed into clouds at 300 AGL. ATC issued traffic an immediate right turn to HDG 080 and to climb to 3;000 and then issued our aircraft clearance to fly RWY HDG and climb to 2;000. After takeoff from EWR 4L on the NEWARK FOUR Departure we spotted close proximity traffic to our right as we were climbing through approximately 200 feet. My best guess is the traffic was about 100 feet above our altitude and 1000 feet laterally. I found out later the traffic was on a go-around from 4R. I do not remember hearing any traffic declaring they were going around. Tower immediately instructed us to maintain runway heading and an altitude of 2000 feet and instructed the traffic to turn right to a heading of 080. We did not receive a TCAS TA or RA which are inhibited on takeoff below 600 feet and 1100 feet respectively. Flight crew reported sighting close proximity traffic immediately after takeoff from runway 4L at Newark.
Aircraft: SR22
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC

While in cruise to ZZZ; ZZZ Approach issues traffic advisory of a glider at 5;000 [feet]; 1 o'clock. Negative contact. 3 minutes later; glider appears on collision course but at around 9;200 [feet]. I query ATC [if] they have that contact and reported evasive action. ATC advises they only had the glider at 5k with transponder not other targets. The near miss glider at 9;200 [feet] did not have a transponder and was not showing up at a primary target. SR22 pilot reported NMAC with non-transponder equipped glider.
Aircraft: CRJ200
Phase of flight: Takeoff / Launch
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

A CRJ-200 aircraft in ZZZ displayed an 'IDG 2' Caution message as the flight crew advanced power for takeoff. The crew aborted their takeoff at 50-60 KTS; and then returned to the gate. I asked the Captain if the IDG had been disconnected; to which he replied that it 'had not' been disconnected. I contacted Contract Maintenance in ZZZ to comply with the Maintenance Action and defer the Number 2 Generator. The Contract Mechanic complied with the Maintenance Action for the deferral for the Number 2 Generator and it was deferred per MEL 24-11-1b. The aircraft then departed ZZZ enroute to ZZZ1.Some time after the CRJ-200 had departed ZZZ; I was reviewing work that I had performed in the earlier hours of my shift on various aircraft. As I read through the deferral for the IDG on the CRJ-200; I came to the conclusion that the EICAS Caution message 'IDG 2' is caused by a low oil pressure or high oil temperature condition; and should be manually disconnected and deferred per MEL 24-11-1a; regardless of whether or not the IDG had been disconnected by the [flight] crew. After getting a brief description of the discrepancy with the Captain; I asked him if the IDG had been disconnected; to which he replied that it had not been disconnected. I then reviewed the deferrals for the IDG Constant Speed Drive (CSD) (24-11-1a); and for the IDG Generator (24-11-1b). The remarks section of MEL 24-11-1a deferral states that 'the respective IDG is disconnected;' whereas MEL 24-11-1b states that the 'respective Gen 1/2 switch is selected to the 'Off' position' (and is not disconnected). Because the IDG had not been previously disconnected; I decided to use MEL (24-11-1b). I had the Contract Mechanic check oil level in the opposite IDG and APU and comply with the Maintenance Action for that deferral. Upon realizing that the incorrect MEL may have been applied to the aircraft; I contacted ZZZ1 Line Maintenance to have them defer the Number 2 IDG Constant Speed Drive per MEL 24-11-1a and physically disconnect the IDG.This event has been a reminder for me personally to be sure I review the messages displayed on EICAS and verify that the correct MEL is used as a Corrective Action. Perhaps a memo to all maintenance controllers specifically about this deferral would be helpful. High workload. Flight delay. Dayshift. A Maintenance Controller explains why he revised a previous MEL deferral he had applied to a CRJ-200 aircraft that had aborted takeoff due to an EICAS 'IDG 2' Caution message. After later reviewing probable causes for the EICAS message; he decided MEL 24-11-1A was more appropriate; but required a physical disconnection of the IDG Constant Speed Drive (CSD).
Aircraft: CARAVAN 208B
Phase of flight: Takeoff / Launch
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Aircraft X departed ZZZ with its planned destination of ZZZ1. The aircraft taxied for runway XXR and departed on an IFR clearance. By all indications the takeoff was normal and nothing unusual occurred. At approximately 200 feet the Garmin autopilot Self - Engaged and put the airplane into a steep descent. I immediately pushed the Auto-Pilot (AP) disconnect switch; which (briefly) disconnected the AP before it re-engaged. This occurred two or three times consecutively as I tried to troubleshoot the issue. I then pushed and held the AP disconnect switch for 5-6 seconds with no success. (All the while the airplane continued to make attempts at descents.) Additionally; I tried the CWS (Control Wheel Steering) button to attempt to regain control over the autopilot. The current weather in ZZZ was IMC; with ceilings of 600 feet and 6 miles visibility with mist. I was on an IFR flight plan; and made the decision to request priority handling with ZZZ tower. I remained below the weather to return to the field and land runway XXR. To regain control over the autopilot; I turned off the avionics; and landed without incident. The cause of the event is unknown at this time while maintenance is troubleshooting the issue. At this time it is unknown (from a pilot's perspective) as to what could have prevented the malfunction of the autopilot; and cause it to self-engage. C208 pilot reported autopilot malfunctions in IMC conditions and elected to perform an air turn back and a precautionary landing.
Aircraft: CRJ900
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

During cruise flight at our planned cruising altitude of FL370; we encountered mountain wave and up/downdrafts. During the hour or so in cruise at FL370 leading up to the event; we were constantly changing the power; attempting to maintain our filed cruise speed of M.77. At one point; the airspeed started to drop towards M.74. I selected the climb detent. Instead of increasing; the airspeed started decreasing. At about M.72 I selected MAX POWER (APR thrust). I told my First Officer (FO) to ask ATC for a lower altitude. ATC said it would be 3 minutes before they could grant a descent clearance. The airspeed continued to decrease; even though we were still set at APR thrust. Once the speed decreased to approximately M.705 and showed a negative trend vector; I started approximately 1;000FPM descent and instructed my FO to inform [Center] that we were in a descent. Within about 600 feet descent; we were able to regain our normal airspeed and returned to a normal flight profile at FL350 with an amended ATC clearance. Flying at a lower altitude than our planned cruising altitude during times of strong jetstream winds and mountain wave would give us a greater margin to recover airspeed lost due to a downdraft. [Report narrative contained no additional information.] CRJ-900 flight crew reported descended from assigned altitude of FL370 when they were unable to maintain speed because of downdrafts.