Aryan95614/aerograph-asrs huggingface dataset:
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Cleared for the visual approach to 9R at PHL airport. The weather was night VMC with unrestricted visibility and light winds. I was the Flying Pilot with the autopilot engaged. We were at 2;000 ft. AGL approaching the 9R LOC and GS; I selected approach mode; called for the gear down and flaps to 15. The Captain (Pilot Monitoring) verified the speed (below 200) and selected the flaps to 15. The airplane turned to final; captured the LOC and GS. The airplane started a descent on G/S. Without warning the GS indication deflected instantly to full down. With the autopilot engaged; the airplane abruptly pitched nose down as it attempted to track the errant GS indication. I quickly disconnected the autopilot and arrested the sink rate; leveling at 1;100 ft. AGL. The aural warning of 'sink rate' activated. Once leveled at 1;100 ft. with the autopilot disconnected; the Before Landing Checklist was completed. I flew manually level to intercept the glide path to a landing (followed the VASI). Meanwhile the Approach Controller told us he had received a low altitude alert and instructed us to contact the Tower. Once the Captain contacted the Tower; we were cleared to land on Runway 9R. At 1;000 ft. AGL the airplane was fully configured; on speed and before landing checklist completed. I continued the visual approach to a normal landing. Both the Captain and I could not figure out why this event occurred. What makes the glide slope to all of the sudden dive to the bottom of the display?? Either there was a system malfunction; or a truck or airplane drove or taxied across the ILS critical area. (Our assumption). B-737 First Officer reported experiencing glide-slope signal errors resulting in a low altitude alert.
Aircraft: A330
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Initiating cruise climb from FL360 to FL380 engine number one had two compressor stalls. Initial action was to initiate track departure with a turn to the right. Initiated ECAM actions and brought engine to idle. Engine then appeared to operate normally so thrust was restored. Consulted [Operations] and Maintenance on the SAT phone and their advice was to continue as long as the engine operated normally. N3 vibration exceeded the advisory level so thrust on the number one engine was reduced to keep vibration within limits. Flight continued normally. Crew [advised] Approach on initial contact. On an approximately 8 mile base the number one engine failed. Crew ran the ECAM and continued the visual approach to a normal landing. Taxied to gate with no further assistance required.CauseNumber one engine stall; vibration and subsequent failure. I was at my rest station half asleep when I heard a loud thud followed about 15 seconds later by another. I could then hear through the bunk wall ECAM signals etc. A flight attendant started banging on the bunk room door. I quickly got ready and reentered the cockpit. The crew told me they had received an altitude change clearance from FL360 to FL380 and as soon as they selected climb mode that's when the left (#1) engine suffered the stalls. We contacted Dispatch and Maintenance via SATCOM and decided that by manually modulating the engine; we could keep the vibrations (which had been up as high as 7.0) down to 3.9. We continued to ZZZ. Upon contact with approach we [advised them of the situation]; mainly as a precaution. We were placed on a 6 mile left base to Runway XXL. As the FO (doing a magnificent job) brought the power above idle; the left engine failed. We did a quick QRH procedure; went in; and landed uneventfully. A330 flight crew reported engine stall during cruise climb that resulted in an engine failure during initial approach.
Aircraft: PA28
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

We transitioned back to our home airport via a transition through Class C. A couple minutes after; [Tower] transitioned us to Approach for flight following we switched our fuel tanks. We followed procedures and switched tanks by turning on the fuel pump; checking fuel pressure; switching the fuel selector; checking pressure; then turning the pump off.A few seconds after the pump was switched off we had an immediate loss of power. Tried to remedy by reversing the process; pump on; switch tanks while pitching for best glide. No restart and engine continued to lose all power. Tried a flow and checked anything that may lead to a fuel starvation issue. In the pitch black I found a well lighted area that was relatively free of ground traffic. It was a warehouse trucking lot. Was able to maneuver the aircraft between stacked shipping containers as to not hit them. Cleared the wing by 5-10 ft. and performed a normal landing. Came to a stop and contacted Approach to let them know I was safe. No damage to the aircraft; no souls were harmed. [Notified ATC of the problem] roughly 1;000 ft. AGL. Cause is yet to be found; but I suspect something in the fuel line or contaminants in the fuel that reached the carburetor. PA-28 Instructor Pilot reported safely landing in a parking lot following engine failure related to a fuel issue.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Takeoff / Launch
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

On many of my training and line flights; probably more than 50%; I observe pilots delaying takeoff rotation for more than 3 seconds after Pilot Monitoring (PM) calls for rotation. This late rotation leads to the aircraft departing the runway significantly farther down the runway than planned; and at times this leads to less than optimal crossing height at the departure end of the runway. During debriefing I hear the following: 'we were scared to death in training about tail strikes; the simulator doesn't really approximate what the airplane really does; I'm using a constant back pressure on the yoke; so it should work; right?; I was told never takeoff with more than about 5.5 degrees pitch on a 900ER'; etc. A review of the [Manual] confirms that there is minimal practical guidance on the details of a proper takeoff rotation; including specific guidance on 900ER versus 800 or 700; or F1 on hot day with high assumed temp/low takeoff power (below climb thrust setting) for example. I believe this lack of proper standardized training from training and standards departments including lack of agreed upon written material on this important maneuver is resulting in our crews making it to the line with an incomplete level of competence on the proper takeoff on the 737NG. When I have brought up the issue of deep reduced takeoffs; I've been told by standards that we do this in order to extend engine life. When I suggest that a climb thrust power takeoff is still a reduced thrust takeoff; I'm met with blank stares. I have also been surprised by the lack of crosstalk among LCAs during standards meetings on having an open; collegial discussion on how best to train this maneuver. Again; I attribute this to certain personalities within management that are not entirely open to open dialog or questioning of the status quo. I believe the above problems are compromising our safety margins during the takeoff phase of flight. If this is not corrected it is only a matter of time before we will have an airplane fail to reach minimum takeoff height at the end of the runway; leading to an accident with potentially catastrophic consequences. B737NG Check Airman reported observing a high rate of delayed rotation during takeoff; which he feels is due to inadequate training.
Aircraft: CHALLENGER 350
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

We were assigned to a new aircraft that had just completed maintenance for an inoperative push to talk switch on the right side yoke. Prior to arriving at the airport we received a release from maintenance notification from the company. We immediately reviewed the maintenance electronic logbook to verify that it was indeed closed and that no other open write ups existed. Upon arrival at the aircraft we reviewed the paper logbook. The first page was the PTT (Push-to-Talk) write up that contained the proper corrective action and sign offs. I went to the left seat and did the preflight and flight planning while [my FO (First Officer)] cleaned and organized the cabin. All communications were done from the left during this period. When preparing to taxi; [my FO] tried 3 times to reach ground using the right PTT and could not reach them. We were behind several large buildings and hangers and just assumed it was blocking communications. I chose to do the comms from the left until take off. After takeoff we realized that the right PTT was still inoperative. When we reached cruise we located [the correct MEL] that would apply to the condition of the inoperative PTT switch and agreed to continue and write it up at the next stop. Soon after we received a message to divert without a reason. I executed the divert while [my FO] called the company for an explanation. We were told that we were flying an AOG aircraft. After landing we called the company again and were told that the technician that worked on the plane called the company after we took off and told them that he may have installed the PTT switch upside down. I went to the cockpit and tried the PTT in the opposite direction and it did transmit properly. We wrote up the plane again for the PTT switch being installed backwards.In the past we used the #2; or bottom radio for communications. Often in ZZZ we would have to switch to the #1; or top radio in order to establish communications in that area of the ramp. The action switched the comms from the right to the left radio. That past action affected my judgment when I chose to use the left PTT to communicate; thinking I was fixing the problem that I had dealt with before. There was no way for us to know what was going on behind the scenes as we prepared to take off. All the documents and notifications we received confirmed to us that the plane was airworthy. [Report narrative contained no additional information.] CL-350 flight crew reported a malfunctioning push to talk switch after maintenance had released it as repaired.
Aircraft: B767
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Aircraft X arrived with an ELB (Electronic Logbook) report regarding the left engine hydraulic pressure. The corrective action required engine operation to test the hydraulic pump. After setting up the cockpit in accordance with the maintenance manual and receiving clearance from the techs on the ground I was in the process of motoring the left engine when someone barged into the flight deck from behind me; reached over my head; operated some switches on the overhead panel; exited the plane and drove away from the aircraft. After he left I realized he had turned off the main battery causing the APU to shut down aborting the engine motor procedure. I realized the person who interfered was an [outside] vendor and summoned him back to the aircraft. When he returned he told me that he turned the battery off because he was told to 'return the cockpit to the way he found it'. He did not follow any checklist and had no idea what happens when the battery is turned off and seemed to be unfamiliar with the cockpit. He was oblivious to the severity of what he had done and seemed to be unaware of his surroundings regarding the maintenance operation being performed. It was obvious that he should have recognized the maintenance operation being performed at the time of his interference.It would be disturbing to me to find that the company allows inexperienced; untrained and unqualified vendors to operate systems in the flight deck on [company] aircraft. Besides the obvious safety concerns this also may be a security threat. Air carrier maintenance technician reported an outside vendor entered the flight deck and reconfigured the aircraft systems without communicating to maintenance; causing the maintenance procedure to be aborted.
Aircraft: A321
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Speed All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Just south of ALS. In cruise at FL350; .78 Mach; we encountered mild mountain wave and requested a lower altitude. Cleared to FL290; we began the descent; but had descended only about 200 ft. when the aircraft started climbing rapidly. VVI reached 1;600 fpm up. Mach went from .78 to .815; airspeed went into the red by 5 kts.; over speed warning actuated. Max altitude was about FL355. Then it turned around; and resumed the descent to FL290. We notified Denver Center about the mountain wave and the altitude deviation. Notified Dispatch about the strong mountain wave. Notified Maintenance about the over speed. Interestingly; the entire event was in smooth air. Flight Attendants and passengers never knew anything had happened. No rough ride; just a very smooth roller coaster. My first clue was the VVI going from down to up. My comment; 'Why are we climbing?' A321 Captain reported a mountain wave encounter that caused an altitude deviation and an overspeed condition.
Aircraft: B777
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

While in level; smooth; night cruising flight; felt something similar to crossing a wake vortice but we were not near any other traffic. Observed right engine EPR and N1 were lower than left engines indications. Engine was under self-recovery when we observed engine thrust loss/reduction. While discussing the occurrence we received 3 or 4 calls from the cabin report observation of bright flash of light and flames from right engine. Completed engine thrust loss and engine failure checklists. Called dispatch on SATCOM. Conferred with Dispatch and Maintenance Control; reviewed options. Reviewed data from Boeing's computer and maintenance screens per advice of Maintenance Control Engine Controller and Engine Engineer; aircraft and all systems normal; continued to destination. Briefed relief crew prior to entering break period. Reviewed options. Remainder of flight uneventful. In cruise flight crew noticed power loss on right engine and completed the appropriate checklist. All aircraft systems were operating normally. After conferring with Dispatch and Maintenance Control; crew continued to destination.
Aircraft: B757
Phase of flight: Final Approach
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was providing training on an uninvolved position at the time of the incident. I witnessed Arrival Sector X turn a B767 from downwind to base about 10 miles too early and made no attempt to fix the situation he created. He was worried about getting too close to [Runway] 9R arrivals that were descending from above but didn't think about staying away from the low side Arrival Sector Y Controller's airplane (a B757). We were just briefed regarding the ability to use lower altitudes with coordination with other positions. I heard Arrival Sector Y say to him something to the effect of 'what are you doing; I've got an airplane there'. The Arrival Sector X Controller just sat there and watched it all happen. I asked the Arrival Sector Y Controller if he asked to use 4;000 FT on his side; He replied 'no; he couldn't have cared less that he had a deal with my airplane'. My estimate between the B767 and B757 was 500 vertical; 2.25 laterally with no divergence. The Arrival Sector X Controller is one of the weaker controllers here; and even though I work with him less than 5 hours a month; it seems I always see things like this go unchecked; violating the SOP; common sense; and most of all SAFETY. I don't know why he does these things. I would suggest skill enhancement training for the Arrival Sector X Controller throughout the operation. I am concerned when he is here. TRACON Controller voiced concern regarding the actions of a fellow Controller that resulted in a loss of separation event.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown

We felt a buffet and found airspeed well into the barber pole. First Officer flying; I retarded the thrust levers to reduce speed. Our initial evaluation was we'd entered a mountain wave (165 KTS of wind at altitude); but the indicated speeds didn't make any sense. We started checking for other causes; pitot heat; etc. and found the flaps selected and indicating one (speed approximately 270 KIAS and at FL320). I retracted the flaps at approximately 235 KIAS; hand flew the airplane to check for roll or vibration and found all indications normal. We continued to our destination and landed without further event. We also limited descent speed as a precaution. What I believe happened: I was beginning to type a wind report to Dispatch when the autopilot trimmed the airplane. The trim wheel bumped my arm and I must have made contact with the flap handle enough to knock it out of the detent (reaching around the thrust levers and flaps to reach the keyboard). Approximately two or three minutes later the event occurred. If I bumped the flaps it was the result of being bumped by the trim wheel; and I had no idea anything had transpired. Just plain stupid bad luck; but it seems to me something that could be repeated and everyone should be aware of the possibility. Sure didn't know I touched the flap handle and they didn't come out immediately. I would go so far as to say that I have seen every Captain I have flown with use this or similar move to send ACARS messages in the 400. It should be noted that newer airplanes do not have this potential problem because there is a menu button on both sides. As a B737 Captain was entering ACARS data at FL320 he inadvertently moved the flap handle which caused airframe vibrations and a flap overspeed. When they recognized the error power was reduced and the flaps raised.
Aircraft: C172
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

A Cessna 172 checked on to my frequency and I gave him the altimeter as usual. No issues noted. About 5-10 miles later I hear a call. The Cessna 172 [advised he was diverting]. He said he was going to Searchlight Airport. I gave him the airport location; etc. At this sector; we have two different radio sites so at that low altitude we have to switch between radio sites. It was VERY difficult to deliver information to the aircraft; or other aircraft because someone else would cut me off; or vice-versa from the other radio site. I repeatedly made blanket statements of 'all aircraft stand-by' to try to deliver information or get information from the aircraft in distress but was unsuccessful to aircraft on the opposite side of my airspace because of the poor radio coverage. Although we have coped with this for a while; it's during emergencies that it becomes evident that we need good reliable radios with adequate coverage. I recommend we have better radio coverage so that all aircraft can hear each other regardless of position. A Center Controller reported they had difficulty communicating with an aircraft that lost an engine and was diverting due to poor radio coverage at low altitudes in their sector.
Aircraft: WIDEBODY TRANSPORT
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

We were given holding instructions to hold NW on the 320 radial of the BWG VOR. Setup and the initial turn was with the inbound course set to 320 (holding SE of the BWG VOR). When we realized that our clearance was to hold on the other side of BWG; we told ATC we needed to turn back to BWG and re-enter holding.We were pretty busy at this time because [of] a system malfunction. Entering a random holding pattern (and not the published database hold) is an infrequent event in our daily operations. We were also probably pretty tired at this point. We probably could have taken the time to discuss the hold among all three crew members to make sure we all agreed on the holding pattern. We may have also asked ATC for clarification if there was any confusion about the clearance. [Report narrative contained no additional information.] Air carrier flight crew reported entering a holding pattern on the unprotected side of the hold clearance.
Aircraft: CHALLENGER 300
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude

New York Approach Control cleared us to turn to the initial approach fix for the VOR Runway 24 approach in TEB as well as a descent to 4;000 FT. The crew started the left turn and descent towards the fix; mid way through the turn the Controller advised the crew of 'unverified VFR' traffic at twelve to one o'clock. Within a few seconds of the ATC warning; the aircraft TCAS sounded the initial traffic advisory. The crew began leveling the aircraft's descent however the VFR target keep climbing and turning towards us. Seconds after the initial advisory the TCAS sounded a RA climb command. The crew applied max thrust and began a RA climb to 5;400 FT. During this time the crew informed ATC of the RA and associated climb. The Controller then issued a descent clearance to 3;000 FT. The crew again informed ATC of the RA climb and then complied with the ATC clearance to 3;000 FT. A visual approach was completed to Runway 24 in TEB without further incident. It is the opinion of the crew that the problem was caused by the VFR flight climbing into busy airspace used by countless aircraft in the New York area without first making contact with ATC. The problem was further compounded by the controller on duty issuing a late traffic advisory. It is clear that the Controller had lost his situational awareness. This resulted in two aircraft on the same frequency responding to RA's in separate events within a few seconds of each other. CL30 Captain experiences a TCAS RA while being vectored for a visual approach at TEB. ATC had reported the traffic just prior to the TA. An evasive climb is initiated until clear of conflict. A separate TCAS event was heard on the same frequency prior to switching; indicating to the reporter that the Controller was not paying attention.