Aryan95614/aerograph-asrs huggingface dataset:
Aircraft: CRJ700
Phase of flight: Final Approach
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

While on final approach to Runway XXL approximately at 700 feet; the First Officer disconnected the autopilot to perform the landing. I heard the autopilot disconnect sound follow by a strong noise. The First Officer told me that the control column got 'stuck' momentarily and he pushed it forward and it got free (I was looking outside when it happened). We looked into the problem [and] everything was working normal. No CAS (Crew Alert System) indications; hydraulics were looking good and flight control page was good. The flight controls were moving correct and free. We continued with the landing. I was PF (Pilot Flying) on the ILS XXL into ZZZ. At about 600 feet AGL I pressed the AP (Autopilot) disconnect and the AP disconnect warning sound came on as it always does for about 1-2 seconds. I had full roll control; however; I needed to force the control column forward to get pitch control. The control column was somewhat stuck in position. It made a light snapping noise that was loud enough to also grab the Captain's attention. I had full control after it and landed the plane safely. Neither I nor the Captain have experienced a similar issue before. On the ground we performed another flight control check before shutting down the engines and the EICAS (Engine Indicating and Crew Alerting System) Flight Control Page showed no malfunction. We called MX (Maintenance) and Dispatch to take care of the issue. Flight crew reported the First Officer's control column stuck after auto pilot disconnect during landing. It became free after 1 to 2 seconds of force applied and the landing was continued.
Aircraft: LARGE TRANSPORT; LOW WING; 2 TURBOJET ENG
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Object

During an ongoing snow event; airport operations failed to maintain and or assess and properly NOTAM apron conditions. A Part 121 air carrier taxied onto the apron and skidded approximately 20 ft past its intended stopping point striking a GPU damaging the cowl and ingesting a chock that was sitting on top of the GPU. Pilot in command issued a PIREP of NIL braking on the apron to JAC ATCT. Airport authority immediately upgraded braking condition to POOR. Airport authority has no functioning certified friction measuring equipment to ascertain braking action on any surfaces. Airport authority reported contaminates as 1 inch dry snow over packed snow. Conditions were more than 1 inch dry snow over ice. JAC Ramp Agent reported aircraft damage due to contact with a GPU during gate arrival when the flight crew could not stop due to snow and ice on the ramp. Conditions on the ramp were not NOTAM'ed.
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

We got to do a ferry flight. After stowing our bags; the FO did a walk around; we both did a check of the interior to ensure the carts/lavs were secure; did our preflight flows; ensured our ferry permit was correct; then we thought we were ready to go. I walked into the jetway and told the gate agent and supervisor we were ready to close and have the jetway pulled. The agent and supervisor were the only 2 people the FO or I had seen in the jetway or on the plane. I closed and armed the main cabin door. I then went back into the cockpit to get ready to fly. After about a minute we heard a strange sound coming from the main cabin door and went back to take a look. A ramper; which I had not seen before; had attempted to open the 1L door. The ramper; agent; and supervisor were all standing in the jetway. The door was approximately 1/4-1/3 open with the slide beginning to deploy; but not yet inflated. We told them to stand back because there was a chance of the slide deploying into the jetway. We notified ops and called dispatch and maintenance control.Just before leaving a manager came to tell us the rampers side of the story. According to him; the ramper had come on the plane and was still on the plane when we closed the main cabin door. He then realized the plane was being closed up and needed to get off; so he walked from wherever he had been hiding and opened the 1L door which I had armed. According to the manager; this long time employee has a history of some non-compliant behavior and seems to be where he has no business being; on a regular basis.Shortly after the door was opened; the first time I saw the ramper; was in the jetway messing with the door and had no reason to expect that he was ever on the airplane at any time. If he was; the cockpit door was open the entire time; and he never stopped to talk to us; or question if it was safe to open the door. Regardless of if he opened the door from the inside or outside; he had no authority to do so.On a ferry flight; the rampers should have no authority to be anywhere other than the front galley in direct communication with the pilots.On a ferry flight; doing one final check to ensure the pilots are indeed the only ones on the airplane prior to closing the main cabin door. [Report narrative contained no additional information.] An ERJ-175 crew preparing to ferry an aircraft described their confusing interaction with the ground crew while preparing for departure. When finally ready; the main cabin door was closed and the slide armed. Unfortunately; an agent had remained in aircraft and activated the slide while attempting to sneak out.
Aircraft: C172
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical

My student and I were initiating a training flight. We had just completed our takeoff checklist; and pulled up to the hold short lines on Alpha for Runway XXL. We made the radio call to Tower that we were holding short and ready for takeoff. We received the clearance '(Our call sign); cleared for takeoff runway XXL; on course.' I took the readback for the student. We cleared visually base and final legs for the approach side of Runway XXL; and proceeded into position on the runway. Just short of the runway pavement; my student puts the brakes on hard and brings the plane to a full stop. A Piper Warrior was on approximately a 1/8 mi final at approximately 50 ft in altitude. The plane on final had been obscured by our wing and we did not see it. We did not have the time or the space to maneuver back behind the hold short line before the Piper Warrior landed. C172 flight instructor reported stopping just past the hold short lines when an aircraft was observed on short final.
Aircraft: WIDEBODY TRANSPORT
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft Y requested to transition SFO Bravo airspace from the north to south at 3;500 feet which would involve crossing the runway departure corridor. The pilot stated it looked like a departure was on takeoff roll and questioned whether or not it was a problem for them. I then noticed the radar target off the departure end and informed the pilot that the departure would be restricted to 3;000 feet. Aircraft X checked in and I believe he said he was climbing to 3;000 feet. I issued traffic to Aircraft X; but don't recall if he said he had it in sight. For informational purpose I told the pilot of Aircraft Y that it is standard procedure that runway departures are restricted to 3;000 feet as a safety measure for transitioning aircraft. The pilot of Aircraft X overheard the conversation and said he was not issued a 3;000 feet restriction. Although I'm not sure; he may have said he stopped at 3;000 feet because of the traffic I issued. There was no TCAS event nor did the conflict alert sound.With the mix of departure procedures and the new airspace procedures in use it is possible the tower did not issue the 3;000 feet restriction via PDC. The new airspace procedures have the restriction built-in. I would recommend; if possible; the 3;000 foot restriction is added to the departures when sent via PDC. New departure procedures at SFO have a 3;000 foot published restriction for departures. Previous departure procedures are still issued to some aircraft due to aircraft capabilities. The previous departure procedures do not have the 3;000 foot restriction. The Controller had 3;500 foot Class B airspace crossing traffic. The Controller thought departing jet traffic was restricted to 3;000 feet; but it was not because it was still flying the old departure procedure.
Aircraft: MEDIUM TRANSPORT; LOW WING; 2 TURBOJET ENG
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

I was riding jumpseat out of BNA. We had switched to ZME and were climbing out assigned FL230. We switched frequencies and I'm somewhat uncertain what altitude we were assigned but I believe I recall FL340. I do recall the two pilots via the intercom/headsets reading back FL340 and putting it in the FMS.I believe we switched frequencies again and checked on with the next sector. The controller told us to expect higher soon. The pilots were puzzled and got into their flight plan paperwork and saw that the company had requested 260 as a final.Shortly thereafter the TCAS turned yellow and another aircraft went by opposite direction around 3 miles lateral and 600 vertical. Center urgently asked say altitude assigned; First Officer (FO) read back FL340. They asked who assigned it and FO said the previous controller. I confirmed with the crew my recollection of the events and it matched up.I'm unsure if the FO checked on with the next sector and said what altitude they were climbing to. If he didn't it should be required. I may have missed some of this because I could hear the pilots much louder on the intercom/headset than I could hear the frequencies. Also there were a lot of aircraft blocking each other and the center out on this trip. A BNA Controller; while riding jumpseat hears and confirms with pilots an altitude assignment. Minutes later an aircraft passes with less than standard separation. A working Controller asks the pilot to say altitude and pilot reports altitude. The Controller asks who gave you that altitude and pilot reports that the last Controller did. The flight plan of aircraft was only up to FL260.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC

Captain flying. Normal flight. During descent; we were held at 4000 ft until turning a dogleg to final for Runway 35C. We had ILS frequency dialed in; and were on localizer when we were cleared to slow from 220 to 170; and cleared the approach. I immediately disconnected the autopilot; lowered the nose and continued configuring (we were at flaps 1 or 5). When we left 4000 ft; we were slightly above glideslope (about 1 dot) and centered on the localizer. At or near JOBBS; the final approach fix; with the aircraft configured with gear down and flaps 15 and the aircraft on both glideslope and localizer; we had a TA. I was busy flying the aircraft; but peaked at the TCAS and noticed an aircraft near our aircraft. It quickly became a RA and I was given the command 'Descend; descend' with the accompanying symbology. I was approximately 1500-1800 feet at the time and immediately pushed the nose over and looked at the TCAS. I saw the other aircraft exactly above our aircraft and only 300 feet separation. I descended to approximately 1200 feet AGL; as the symbology was moving up. Also; at the time of my level off; the non-flying pilot said he visually acquired the other aircraft and stated that we were clear. I then called for final flaps (flaps 25; flaps 30) as we approached the glideslope from below. I re-intercepted the glideslope and continued down. The landing was uneventful. On rollout; the Tower controller stated that he did not have a TA or RA; but that he had 'logged the event' or some wording similar to that.I am unsure of the cause of this event. It seems to me that Tower was not paying enough attention to traffic separation. I find it very hard to believe that ATC did not have a TA or RA. We had 300 feet separation. I also speculate that tower cleared the regional jet (RJ) for a visual approach even though the RJ was west of our localizer and cleared to land on 35R (to the east of our localizer); creating a situation in which the RJ either had to extend their downwind leg past our flight path; or cutting across our flight path. The FO told me that the RJ was in a steep descent and landed ahead of us on 35R. I cannot verify this as I didn't see the aircraft. Another question is what was the reaction in the other aircraft? If they received a RA; which they should have; why didn't they begin an immediate climb? If they did initiate a climb; how were they able to continue to land on 36R?Clearing an aircraft for a visual approach removes separation responsibilities from ATC; but clearing the aircraft for visual approaches when they were located as stated above is very poor judgement. [Report narrative contained no additional information.] B737 flight crew reported receiving an RA on approach to DFW from another aircraft that was going over the top of them for a parallel runway.
Aircraft: MEDIUM LARGE TRANSPORT; LOW WING; 2 TURBOJET ENG
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

We pushed back and taxied out normally to the runway. When we were about five minutes from departure we started the #1 engine. It started normally. As we took the runway to line up and wait; an aircraft behind us reported over the radio that there were flames coming out of the left engine. About 15 seconds later they said it was getting worse and the tower could now see it so we shut down the left engine and cleared the runway. Preliminary reports were that the fire went out when engine was shut down. The tower controller took it upon himself to roll the trucks before I could even think about...which is a good thing. We ran our checklists and briefed the cabin crew and passengers. The CFR personnel showed up to do a visual inspection. They did a visual inspection on foot and reported absolutely no fire. So we finished up checklists and briefing passengers and crew and returned to the gate. CFR followed us to gate as a safety precaution. Anomaly was written up and we went to the hotel.Never during this event did the engine indications show anything other than completely normal stable operation. While awaiting takeoff clearance the flight crew was advised that flames appeared to be coming from one of the aircraft's engines. As the flight crew accomplished the appropriate emergency checklists; the Tower initiated an emergency vehicle response. After the fire was confirmed to be extinguished the aircraft returned to the gate.
Aircraft: LIGHT TRANSPORT; LOW WING; 2 TURBOJET ENG
Phase of flight: Final Approach
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

We have an MVA defined northeast of the field (026 feet) for a group of antennas. Aircraft X was just approaching the depicted antennas at 3000 and was given an approach clearance to maintain 3000 until established. I observed Aircraft X pass the antenna below the MVA at 2400; but past the obstruction. The surrounding MVA being 018; I repeated the clearance. Ref: 7110.65 5-5-9. The skill level of pilots in the ATC system is drastically declining. I have saves every week. Examiners need to stop handing out certificates like bubble gum in a pack of baseball cards. TLH TRACON Controller reported an aircraft descending below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude (MVA).
Aircraft: WIDEBODY; LOW WING; 2 TURBOJET ENG
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

This was a near identical problem as my previous dozen or so reports. The flight progress strip was flat in a radar bay with zero indication that it would enter the sector non radar. A strip scan caught the mistake and I made needed corrections. There were multiple aircraft on the airway that is 50 miles north and parallel to the Center boundaries. Luckily (again) there was inadvertent separation standards (vertical and longitudinal). Nothing positive. When ATOP's (Advance Technology and Oceanic Procedures) receives a flight plan entering Anchorage Center; Oakland Center ATOP could be programed to immediately send a message to Anchorage Center of a revised altitude at the aircraft's current altitude; creating an update in FDP (Flight Data Processing) that Oakland Center revised the altitude. Use this or any of the other suggestions I or anyone else has made to improve the safety of this operation. The round of crew briefings Anchorage Center leadership decided might mitigate this situation has not from my observations been effective as evidence from conversations I have had with other operational personnel. Oceanic Center Controller reported they did not receive updates for a flight entering their airspace non-radar.
Aircraft: SR20
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC; Inflight Event / Encounter VFR In IMC

We were conducting a dual training flight in a Cirrus SR-20 aircraft; and with ceilings overcast at 3;000 feet. We filed an IFR flight plan and requested a block altitude with Approach so that the student could experience actual IMC. Approach granted us a block from 4 to 6 thousand feet. We were performing basic instrument flying maneuvers within this block at 5000 feet and were in IMC when we received a traffic alert (same altitude; less than a mile). The Cirrus is equipped with the L3 Skywatch Traffic Advisory System; which means that the other aircraft had to have been equipped with at least a Mode C transponder in order for the system to detect it. The student had been flying but I took controls and banked to the right while we were still in the cloud. As we exited the other side of the cloud we could clearly see a high wing aircraft exactly where Skywatch had indicated. We queried ATC; and the controllers response was that 'someone was probably VFR and had decided to get a little too close to you'; and that he was not talking to anyone in that area at the time. We notified ATC of the flight conditions and had no other conflict. During the incident the other aircraft also properly banked right to avoid us.I have no doubt that had we not banked right inside the cloud the outcome could have been much different. We were operating on an IFR flight plan and well within the limits of our block altitude that had been granted by approach; which means that the other aircraft was also inside our block. I would also like to stress that the other aircraft had to have been equipped with at least a Mode C transponder in order for Skywatch to report it as a target and display its altitude relative to us. Flight conditions were mixed inside the block but I do not think it would have been possible to have been operating within the legal VFR weather minimums. A Flight Instructor conducting training in IMC reported a near miss with an aircraft not identified or in contact with ATC.
Aircraft: GULFSTREAM JET UNDIFFERENTIATED OR OTHER MODEL
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types

Between the AEX VOR and JERNY intersection on the SKNRD4 arrival into IAH; we were given a 'Descend Via' clearance from our cruise altitude of FL430. After we had initiated the descent; we were assigned a heading of 180 for spacing. We inquired as to what our new altitude clearance was; but were again told to 'descend via' the arrival. The controller was saturated; so we did not press the issue that a descend via clearance was invalid now that we were not on the lateral track of the STAR. We opted to reset the altitude preselector to FL240 so as to not go below the crossing restriction over the BEATL intersection (between FL240 and FL280). We were subsequently recleared direct to DOOBI and continued with the descend via clearance.This is another case of controller's not correctly utilizing 'climb via' and 'descend via' clearances. G280 Captain is cleared to descend via the SKNRD4 to IAH. Once the descent is initiated; ATC issues a heading for spacing. When the crew asks for a new altitude assignment; they are told to descend via the arrival although they are no longer on the arrival.
Aircraft: MEDIUM TRANSPORT; HIGH WING; 2 TURBOPROP ENG
Phase of flight: Initial Climb
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was flying as the first officer of Aircraft X being used on contract by the US Military to conduct parachute operations inside of Restricted airspace. We had 14 military free fall jumpers on board and were taking off from a 3;000 feet unimproved landing strip. We had full inboard fuel tanks. Upon rotation; we experienced a power-plant failure of the left engine at approximately 200 feet. We performed emergency action procedures for a power-plant failure after V1 and attempted to climb to a safe altitude to release jumpers. The aircraft would not climb above 1;000 feet AGL so we diverted to the closest airstrip; ZZZ; which has a 3;200 feet paved runway and was three miles away. Upon landing; braking action was extremely poor and it was extremely difficult to maintain directional control. On taxi back; we experienced a right brake fire that was most likely caused by a leaking hydraulic line dripping fluid onto hot brakes. Passengers were evacuated on the ramp and fire was extinguished with on site fire fighting equipment by myself and the captain. The most likely cause of the engine failure was a Flight Control Unit (FCU) failure and the brake fire because of heavy braking with poorly maintained brakes and a shorter than desired runway available. In a post event debrief; the captain and I reworked the numbers on our useful load for conditions and determined that we had not added enough safety factor into our runway analysis. If we had properly accounted for density altitudes and current conditions; the aircraft would have had better single engine performance and we could have diverted to a longer and more appropriate runway for the situation. There were no injuries to any personnel. We did not declare an emergency during the event because of the the speed at which events happened and the attention needed to safely fly the airplane to landing. Twin engine; high wing turboprop First Officer reported losing an engine shortly after takeoff. Flight diverted to a nearby airfield where a safe landing was made.