Aryan95614/aerograph-asrs huggingface dataset:
Aircraft: A319
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

We were filed via the SWANN3 departure; DQO transition. As is commonly the case; BWI was departing on Runway 28. I selected Runway 28 and the SWANN3 departure; DQO transition in the MCDU but noticed that it was entered into the MCDU flight plan as merely Runway 28; a discontinuity; and then DQO and the rest of our filed route. However; the SWANN3 departure for JETS requires a left turn to a heading of 150 degrees at the BAL 3 DME. The A319 is generally considered to be a turbojet; so that is how the departure should be coded in the navigation database. Instead; the departure is coded for the PROPS departure; which is just to fly runway heading. We worked around it by entering the BAL/285/3 fix as the first fix after the runway; and then flew the departure in HDG mode; using the PDB01 place/bearing/distance pseudo-waypoint as a marker to remind us to make the turn. We also entered BAL as in the RAD NAV page; and monitored the DME on the ND to identify exactly when to turn. The reason I'm making this report is because if a pilot trusts the navigation database to be correctly coded (as it usually is) and fails to review the paper or EFB version of the departure; he or she will be unaware of the incorrect coding; and is likely to continue straight ahead past the three DME point; potentially infringing on the restricted airspace off the departure end of the runway (as often happens to those flying the TERPZ departure; HAFNR transition; who fail to select the transition correctly). This is 'a violation waiting to happen'. I presume an error was made in the coding of the navigation database; where the engineer doing the coding incorrectly entered the PROP departure instructions rather than the JET instructions. An A319 First Officer discovered that the SWANN3 departure from Runway 28 at BWI does not include the turn to 150 degrees at three DME when inserted into the MCDU.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

At the gate we set the wrong altitude for our departure clearance. It should have been 5;000. 4;000 was set for our initial altitude and neither myself or the First Officer caught the error. No excuse. We simply made a mistake. After takeoff the First Officer checked in with Departure and told him we were climbing to 4;000. The Departure Controller read back our clearance to 4;000. When we leveled off at 4;000; the Controller asked who gave us that clearance and we replied it was entered in error. He cleared us to climb to 5;000. Our time at 4;000 was minimal (less than 30 seconds). A B737 departed on the ORD8 and leveled at 4;000 FT instead of 5;000 FT because the neither pilot realized 4;000 FT was set as the initial level off altitude when it really was a crossing restriction.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

After a divert from Beijing then an alternate closing; we proceeded to the next suitable airport. Initially we were assigned to Runway 15 and after Tower offered Runway 33; we switched to the VOR Runway 33 approach. Fully configured at the FAF; the aircraft pitched over seemingly more than normal; but due to fatigue I did not notice the VSI. I was however; monitoring the altitude. I was not aware of the descent rate or that the aircraft had descended below MDA. We had sighted the runway off to our right and a turn was made to intercept final aways out. We had briefed a PAPI and saw we were below a normal glide path and I diverted my attention to monitoring altitude to make sure at that point no further descent was allowed. I assumed that the MDA was still set in the window and another cockpit crew member said the MDA of 650 was still in the window upon landing. On arriving to a foreign airport we found the airport weather was good but the arrival corridor had heavy showers and it appeared to have thunderstorms along the way. Our alternate weather was good and we flew over it on our only attempt to see if we could go around the weather. From this flyover; we could see that the heavy weather was well northwest of the alternate. Prior to starting the arrival; we chose to set a BINGO 2K [divert fuel] higher than our R plus A [reserve plus alternate]. We ended up choosing to divert prior to reaching this fuel amount. We said we wished to divert to our alternate and every time we were told we could NOT go there and for us to state intentions. After many attempts; we chose ZZZZ which had good weather. ZZZZ was landing south; but from our arrival direction; landing north was closer. Prior to arriving at ZZZZ we declared an emergency. I was preparing for the ILS landing south when the Controller offered the VOR landing north. Since this was closer; I accepted. We set the VOR in the FMC; checked the iPad and confirmed an altitude of 600 plus 50 for MDA 650 RNAV approach. The aircraft was quickly configured; LNAV; VNAV; MDA (DA); and airspeed were all set. The PFD confirmed LNAV and VNAV PATH were engaged. We NEVER saw the DIAMOND on the Nav Display but the autopilot was engaged and at the FAF the aircraft pitched over but at a higher rate than I expected. Weather was good enough to make easy ground contact visually and we were still above the adjusted MDA. When I saw the approach lights and PAPI; I had to make an adjustment for runway alignment and leveled off as I saw that I was low. After a brief altitude adjustment; I saw RED over WHITE and continued to a landing. We landed and taxied off the runway. Air Carrier flight crew reports diverting to a second alternate after their filed alternate and original destination are denied by ATC due to weather. During the non-precision approach the aircraft descends below MDA prior to arriving at the normal glide path. An emergency is declared during the diversion due to fuel and the aircraft lands with seven thousand pounds.
Aircraft: WIDEBODY; LOW WING; 3 TURBOJET ENG
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Descending on the BLUZZ1 RNAV arrival approx 10MN West of AXXEL encountered Wake Turbulence (Wing Tip) off a Widebody Transport ahead of us on the arrival. Aircraft rolled 20 deg right then 40 degs left; autopilot disconnected itself. Manually lowered nose recovered wings level and expedited descent to exit vorticies. Winds were 260/50 at altitude pretty much on the nose. Our Aircraft weighed approx 305K. Visually appeared other Aircraft was 10-15 miles ahead on the approach. Appeared to be a one-off incident. [In many] years of flying arrivals [I] have never seen a wake turbulence incident of this magnitude; all factors and rules seemed to have been complied with but still experienced vorticies and Aircraft upset. [Suggest] Greater spacing. [Report narrative contained no additional information]. Widebody transport flight crew reported the aircraft rolled up to 40 degrees after encountering wake turbulence on arrival to MEM in trail of another wide body aircraft.
Aircraft: A320
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

After takeoff; and just north of the ORL VOR; we were given a turn to 270 degrees and a climb to and maintain 8000 feet. We leveled off at 8000 feet and stayed there for a minute or so. We had to wait until we were clear of [another] aircraft to climb higher.After we were clear; we were given a clearance to climb to 16000 feet. After passing 10000 feet; I performed my flow. I monitored to FMA; and saw that the climb speed increased from 250 knots to something around 290 knots. As we were accelerating; we hit a patch of rough air. I elected to select 250 knots for a temporary climb speed to climb a little quicker into smoother air.Just as I pulled the speed selector to command the flight guidance to maintain 250 knots; something caught my eye. Orlando approach requested we switch to Jacksonville Center frequency at the same time. As the First Officer began to read back the instructions; the same thing caught his eye; also. He stopped mid sentence.What we saw was a small remote controlled red aircraft with white and blue markings. I was fortunate to have pulled for open climb at 250 knots; because if I had let the aircraft accelerate; we may have been on an intersecting flight path. As it was; we only had 2-3 seconds to respond; but did not have to respond aggressively. We passed above the remote aircraft by 100-200 feet.All of this happened 17-18 northwest of MCO at approximately 10;200-10;500 feet MSL.We immediately informed Orlando Departure Control of what happened. He took the report; and then re instructed us to contact Jacksonville Center. We did; and the rest of the flight was uneventful.[I believe] all remote control aircraft owners need to register their aircraft so that a regulation book can be given to the owner of the craft.The remote controlled vehicle should be subject to the same rules as any other aircraft. If it flies into a B; C; or above 10000 feet in E airspace; it must have a transponder. There should also be a maximum distance and altitude a remote controlled vehicle can fly from its operator. Two miles high is too far for an operator to safely maneuver his craft safely.And finally; a written exam should be given to any operator of a class of remote controlled aircraft that can fly high enough; or fast enough to come into conflict with a traditional aircraft. If the test is not taken; or if it failed; the operator should be prohibited from flying his craft until the test is taken and passed. An A320 flight crew had a close encounter with a UAV they identified as a red; white and blue model aircraft operating above 10;000 FT; within the confines of and at or above the MCO Class B.
Aircraft: A319
Phase of flight: Takeoff / Launch
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Engine Fail/RTO (Rejected Takeoff) I was PF (Pilot Flying) holding short. After receiving a TO (takeoff) clearance from Tower; I taxied onto and began aligning with centerline. I advanced thrust levers to 1.05 EPR and slightly more before advancing TLs (throttle levers) to FLEX TO setting. As both engines spooled up and simultaneously the aircraft lurched hard to the left of the centerline; I noted an ECAS message accompanied with a ding. In Box 1 of EWD I saw ENG 1 Overspeed and immediately after I noted ENG 1 Fail. I rejected the TO and called 'My aircraft' bringing the aircraft to a stop on the runway. I immediately made a PA to remain seated; while assessing what condition the engine was in. My FO (First Officer) immediately made a call to ATC and had already retrieved the QRC. Together while determining what condition the engine was in; the FADEC started to attempt a relight and I decided to command my FO to select off on the Engine 1 master switch. Afterwards we completed the ECAM. With the engine shutdown and no indication of fire or severe damage I cleared the runway. After clearing the runway and brake set my FO reported the engine failure to the Tower Controller and I briefed the FAs (Flight Attendants). With the engine secure; no fire or severe damage; and a low speed RTO in my judgement I did not request ARF (Airport Rescue and Fire Fighting). After notifying the company and getting a gate we interrupted the flight and returned. At gate arrival my FO contacted Maintenance and I made a logbook entry. I would like to recognize FO for his proficiency and calm reaction to the event. Also my FAs remained calm and professional which I believe reassured our customers that their pilots had an unusual event fully under control. We made an aircraft swap and continued the flight [losing] not one passenger. Mechanical failure. [Report narrative contained no additional information.] A319 flight crew experience an engine failure at beginning of takeoff roll; resulted in a low speed rejected takeoff.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Landing
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway

While on IOE (Initial Operating Experience); first landing attempt with Company; the First Officer made a normal and successful IFR ILS Approach and landing. The RCC (Runway Condition Code) received was 6-DRY GOOD; and weather reported winds 040/9; Vis 1 NM -FZDZSN BR; 600 overcast; temp -5/-7 and landing XXR/L. During the approach; Tower directed the flight to depart at the end of the runway. Discussion included the type of approach and confirming the RCC for the runway via ACARS. After landing; handoff of the aircraft was completed and while taxiing less than 20 knots (est.) and approaching the departure end of Runway XXR; brakes were applied with no effect including control input using the tiller. Prior to pavement departure; the nose wheel was centered and the aircraft came to rest right of the overrun in the grass. Notifying Ground Control of the situation; coordination proceeded for rescue though both the Tower and Company Ops. The FAs (Flight Attendants) and [all] Passengers were notified of the situation; remaining in their seats until further information was available. Dispatch and Chief Pilot were contacted. Engines were shut down following APU start; and with Maintenance concurrence; the CVR (Cockpit Voice Recorder) circuit breakers were pulled and documented in the logbook.With outstanding support from Rescue; deplaning began using the Captain side rear entrance after deicing a path; [in groups of passengers] at a time due to shuttle size. Five shuttles were eventually used for the transportation making round trip runs. The aircraft shutdown checklist was accomplished and the Crew left last; after inspecting the aircraft for remaining passenger items. No injuries reported during the event. One oversight was not completing the logbook oil and fuel entry prior to leaving the aircraft. [We] flew to ZZZ and was on time. After landing (executed by the First Officer); the aircraft slowed as expected with normal speedbrake extension and thrust reverser deployment. At approximately 60 knots; transfer of control was performed from the FO (First Officer) to the Captain. Just prior to an expected turn off at either Runway XY or Taxiway X; instructions from Tower were received to 'taxi to the end'. By that point; aircraft had slowed and had to complete a long taxi to the end of the runway. Approaching the end of the runway; the Captain began the turn to Taxiway Y; but the aircraft did not respond to brake or tiller inputs and slid into the grass at the intersection of Runway XXR and Taxiway Y. Of note is the fact that braking action at the airport had been reported by ATIS as 6. The runway appeared to have good braking until the very end.The only thing that could have prevented this was for airfield management to report possible icing conditions on other parts of the airfield. B737 flight crew reported a runway excursion while exiting the runway in poor weather with runway condition erroneously reported to them as 6-dry.
Aircraft: COMMANDER 114/A/B/TC
Phase of flight: Takeoff / Launch
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

[I] had a landing gear extension problem. No green or in transit light. Asked ATC to see if gear was down and they advised low pass and I complied. ATC said they could not see gear down. I departed the pattern to work on the issue. Despite efforts to lower gear no green lights or in transit light would come on. [I] used my emergency landing gear checklist and gear extended per the checklist. Heard the gear thumps and had 2 green for the mains. [I] slowed the airplane per checklist and around 85 KTS felt and heard nose gear drop. Had 3 green. On final called ATC and asked for visual on the gear. Was advised all three were down. Landed as slow as possible and it was a normal landing.After discussing the problem with maintenance personnel and knowing the gear issue was isolated by the circuit breaker I placarded the gear lever and the circuit breaker in case I got distracted during takeoff or landing and flew the airplane with the wheels down direct to my airport and landed normally. When the normal landing gear extension system failed the pilot of a Commander 114 utilized the emergency extension procedure; was rewarded with three green lights; and landed safely.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

I removed my mask/facial covering upon boarding an empty aircraft and stowed my personal belongings in the cockpit. The B Flight Attendant asked why I wasn't wearing a mask in the cabin. (Again; the aircraft was empty; except for the six-person crew.) I stated it was not required when not in view of customers. She said it was. I checked my manual updates and sure enough she was correct. I notified the Flight Attendant that I had seen the [update]. Flight departed on time and landed safely in ZZZ. Air carrier Captain self reported not following the latest update regarding face mask policy.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

After pushback we had completed the after start checklist; I had just turned on the taxi light; along with the runway turnoff lights and called for 'Flaps 25'. As I was pushing the throttles up to move the jet for taxi and the jet was just starting to move; I noticed the tug that was used for pushback approaching the jet a high rate of speed. My first officer also noticed and I stopped the jet. Apparently the pushback crew was concerned that they had left the access panel open and they were coming back to verify that it was closed. Unfortunately we were in the process of taxiing for takeoff and were not expecting them to approach the jet while we were moving. This could have resulted in a serious accident had we both not been as vigilant as we were. We learned that operations had been trying to contact us so that the ramp crew could come out and verify that the access panel was closed; but due to non-tower operations we had one radio selected to ZZZ and the other radio selected to CTAF so we weren't monitoring company frequency as we normally would. In my opinion this event was caused solely by the ramp crew rushing to push us back so that they could go home. I've recently observed a pattern of unsafe activity by ramp personnel at this station. Last week we were approximately 40 minutes late pushing due to a late inbound airplane. During pushback the ramp crew was absolutely reckless in their pushback and they pushed us back at a very high rate of speed. I asked them to slow down but they continued a fast push and I was afraid they were going to jackknife the pushback tug at the end of they push they turned the jet so quickly with the tug just prior to the termination of the push back. This pattern of behavior is going to result in a serious; if not fatal accident if something is not done to slow these guys down and emphasize safe push backs. This issue was immediately brought to the attention of [station] operations right after it took place and I also notified my supervisor of the unsafe operation as well. A B737 Captain reported improper and unsafe ground handling by ramp personnel.
Aircraft: C172
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

A friend and I were flying from [departure airport] to [destination] for a bite to eat and then returning to [departure airport]. We are both very familiar with the Denver area and have done all of our training in the Denver area. Enroute to [destination] we noticed the magnetic compass had become frozen and was no longer moving freely. [Disregarding] its effects on the flight; we proceeded on course. We arrived at [destination] in the dark and had no problems finding the airport. We became rushed to get back to [departure airport] as it was late; 2200 local. When departing from [destination] towards Las Vegas we thought we found and intercepted Interstate I25 and turned to what we thought to be North. We decided that using I25 all the way to the Denver area would be easier for navigation.We tracked I25 and passed what we thought was Raton; Trinidad; and Pueblo; but when we got to Colorado Springs the shape and route of the highway did not seem familiar. The local airport seemed unfamiliar and this is when I decided we were lost. I plugged in VORs and tried to reach Denver Center and COS Approach; none of which responded. We were now three hours into the flight and running low on fuel (aircraft only had 4 hours of fuel); so I decided to squawk 7600 and land at the unfamiliar airport. Tower gave us a green light. After landing we learned we were...in Texas; and that we may have passed through other airports' airspace unknowingly. The causes to the loss of situational awareness are: using only roads for navigation (not backing up with Navaids); lack of flight planning; flight into mountainous and unfamiliar areas at night; the loss of the magnetic compass and not fixing the magnetic compass. To prevent or correct this situation we should not have conducted the flight without more planning; should have utilized ATC when the compass failed; should have fixed the compass; should have been more vigilante when using roads as navigation (make sure its the right road using NAVAIDS or clear land features). The main cause of this incident is the pilots' laziness to perform safe operations combined with the failure and lack of equipment in the aircraft (which the pilot should have prepared for and taken into consideration.) Two C172 pilots attempted to return to their departure airport in the Denver area at night with an inoperative magnetic compass. Following a highway which they thought was headed north; they land in Texas with low fuel.
Aircraft: MU-2B 60 MARQUISE
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Transponder went off line after entering the IFR flight/system. Lost transponder 100% and was told to descend to 8;000 FT for a 'Tower to Tower' clearance. Clearance for us was FL220 and I queried why we could not go on at altitude. Harrisburg Controller said New York Center would not accept and required us thereafter to descend to 8;000 FT (from 9;000 FT) for remainder of the trip. I felt this would impede the trip and cancelled IFR at that point. Transponder remained intermittent for the remainder of the flight. We preceded VFR; with intermittent transponder on 1200 for remainder of trip. We remained clear of Airspace B; C; and D (including overflight); as well as special use airspace for remainder of trip with our intermittent transponder. Note that we have it now at an avionics shop for repair. I feel that; with an intermittent transponder and our being available as a primary target on an IFR flight plan; we should have been allowed to proceed on our IFR flight at altitude; with reporting of altitudes and distances as required by ATC for the route. Requiring turbine flights to go low because ATC does not want the extra workload could be a possible safety concern with fuel; speed of aircraft in low airspace; etc. IFR MU2 with failed transponder was refused ATC service by ZNY at FL220; the pilot questioning ATC services.