Aryan95614/aerograph-asrs huggingface dataset:
Aircraft: C172
Phase of flight: Takeoff / Launch
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway

I was on my first solo cross-country after receiving my endorsement from my CFI. The actual cross-country went very well and I made it safely from my home airport to ZZZ. I made a successful landing are receiving clearance from Tower and once on the ground I was instructed to back taxi on runway XX to depart again and do one lap in the traffic pattern before I headed back to my home airport to finish my solo cross-country. I was lined up and received clearance to depart runway XX; the ATIS if I remember correctly was winds from 130 at 5 kts so little to none crosswind component on this takeoff. I was performing a normal takeoff and I noticed my aircraft had trouble staying on the centerline; wanting to veer left; up to the point where I was using full right rudder. I got up to about 20 kts groundspeed before the aircraft took a fairly sharp turn to the left and was on course to go off the runway into the grass. I immediately pulled throttle idle and tried to stop but I knew I wasn't going to stop on time and I didn't want to make a sharp hard right turn with my brakes because of the risk of flipping the aircraft so I opted to just let it ride out in the grass right off the runway XX. I immediately notified Tower and told them 'I went off the runway into the grass. I think I have a flat tire;' and he responded to stay put; shut down the aircraft and he'll send some of the FBO guys to come out and help me and I complied. There was no damage to me or the aircraft during this time. I then called my CFI and told him exactly what happened and told me to stay put and have maintenance check it out and that I did the right thing for owning up to what happened. The aircraft was then inspected and nothing was visibly wrong with it and so my CFI picked me up that day and then the A&P's from my flight school came and picked it up the next day. For precautionary measures; the flight school had me do a training flight with my CFI of just takeoffs and landings and that went satisfactorily and I'm being double-checked by a check instructor at my flight school to ensure I'm a safe pilot. Student pilot reported a runway excursion.
Aircraft: PA28
Phase of flight: Initial Climb
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I made a radio announcement that I was departing the airport heading north. Another aircraft flew in front and slightly above me during my initial climb; causing a near-miss in the traffic pattern. This aircraft made several other landings without using a radio and was not entering the traffic pattern mid-field as expected. The pilot of a Piper Dakota reported that another pilot caused a near mid-air collision condition in the traffic pattern by failure to utilize his radio and the use of non-standard traffic pattern entry.
Aircraft: WIDEBODY TRANSPORT
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Inverted the parking spot coordinates in the initial position to initialize the IRUs. The sign at gates XX and XY have the wrong coordinates. Signs read N122.4 E1040.04. The correct coordinates are N 1 22.4 E 104 00.4. This needs to be fixed. The Jeppesen 10-9C1 pages that list parking spot coordinates is correct; the sign at the gate is wrong. The decimal place on the longitude is in the wrong place. Our aircraft had been towed to the gate. When I initialized the FMS; the numbers were off so I used the coordinates off the gate sign to initialize. That position put the IRUs on the west coast of Africa. The GNS (Global Navigation System) RNP (Required Navigational Performance) began to climb after alignment and after some time; we received an unable RNP alert. Maintenance deferred the GNS and we proceeded without GNS and ADS-B.I realized what had happened on pushback from the gate and informed maintenance of the discrepancy in the gate sign. Wrong coordinates on the gate sign for gate XX and XY at WSSS. Fix the sign and always take the coordinates off the flight plan for FMS initial coordinates. Air carrier First Officer reports entering IRU coordinates from the gate sign at WSSS which has a decimal point error. The east coordinate is entered as a 10.4 instead of 104 causing GPS error messages and a call for maintenance. The GPS is deferred and the actual cause of the anomaly is discovered during push back and corrected.
Aircraft: A300
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

IMC arrival. After several vectors for spacing; and speed changes; we were given a heading of 320 degrees to join the LOC; maintain 3;000 ft. and cleared the ILS. Sometimes; an Airbus Flight Director does not like large turns to join a LOC; this was one of those cases. Our aircraft indicated 'LOC STAR' meaning it was joining the LOC; yet the aircraft continued a right turn through the LOC course and a further 20 deg right. I immediately noticed the deviation; and directed the First Officer to disconnect the autopilot and turn left back on course. Our CDI indicated a max deviation of 1.5 dots right of course. When; while hand flying; we were centered on the LOC once again; we re-automated the aircraft. Remainder of the ILS was normal. Later that same night; I got a phone call from the [Chief Pilot] stating that TRACON wanted to speak with me; saying we had left an ILS and returned without clearance. I called TRACON and explained the situation above. Once I told him that our max deviation was 1.5 dots (meaning we were on the LOC at all times while correcting back to centerline) he was relieved and stated 'ok that's all I need to know.'I have experienced this problem with Airbus Flight Directors before and written them up; and the clearing action is always 'cannot duplicate the error'. Even the [Chief Pilot] said he has experienced this same problem. While being vectored for an approach; a speed of 190 kts. and a heading of 310 degrees was given approximately 20 miles away from the runway. Subsequently; a clearance was given to intercept the localizer. Shortly after; A clearance was given to 'maintain 170 kts.; 3;000 ft. until established; cleared for the ILS.' The crew noticed the aircraft make excessive roll inputs while it was intercepting the localizer (LOC star). As the pilot flying; I placed my hands on the control wheel as it was now oscillating back and forth in a rolling fashion. A decision was made to disengage the autopilot and suppress the rolling tendencies. I quickly took control and noticed that the localizer deviation indexer was 1 1/2 dot off the localizer. This was corrected immediately and once corrected; I asked that the Captain re-automate the FCP. Once the runway was in sight (about 800 ft. AGL) the autopilot was disengaged and the remainder of the approach was hand flown; without incident.The parameters built into the A300 Honeywell suite are at times; overly sensitive. This creates over correcting/over controlling of the auto flight system. Generally; when this minor malfunction is written up; it results in a 'cannot duplicate' resolution or sign off.Flight crews are always ready to intervene and remove the automation on the Airbus. A300 flight crew reported that an autopilot malfunction resulted in a course deviation.
Aircraft: PA28
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown

I was doing a night VFR cross country to PBI with a part-141 student... My student used SUA as a checkpoint. Upon arriving over SUA; the airport was dark with no runway lights on. I used the pilot controlled lighting frequency and activated the runway lights to high intensity to show my student where SUA was as he could not find it... PBI approach then asked me if I was the one who turned on the runway lighting (SUA was asking PBI approach)... I was un-aware that SUA increased their operational hours to [later in the evening]. I admitted that it was me. I was then told my PBI tower that I was given a possible pilot deviation for said action of turning on the runway lights @ SUA. I then called SUA and proceeded to talk with them. We had a discussion and was told that no action would be taken and that they would appreciate if it was not done again. I can understand the possible consequences that could result of turning on the runway lights at both a controlled/uncontrolled airport at night without listening in on the frequency first to determine traffic status... I should also consult the AFD before turning on the runway lights at a controlled airport to verify operational time. A flight instructor reported comments by ATC after he had activated the airport lighting while flying overhead as this could impact other traffic.
Aircraft: LIGHT TRANSPORT; LOW WING; 2 TURBOJET ENG
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was training a CPC/IT on Local Control; and he had Aircraft Y depart 17L; and then slotted Aircraft X into departure position; with the Aircraft Z on about a 3 mile close in visual approach. Aircraft Z checked in at about 2.5 mile final (due to a missed frequency change; I was told later) and I know he was caught off guard by the arrival; thinking that it was still on the downwind versus being on a really close in base leg; but instead of fixing the arrival; which I was anticipating; he told the arrival to continue; and then launched Aircraft X; with Aircraft Y just off of the departure end. We turned Aircraft Y to a diverging heading with plenty of time to spare; but that did not help us with the wake turbulence separation requirements. We ended up with 2.5 miles of lateral separation on the two departures. I believe this was caused by a reflex on the trainee's part that he was in the heat of the moment and knew he had enough separation with his departures. As a CPC from another facility; he is used to using the standard separation standards between these types of aircraft; and he reverted to that mindset when he realized he was in a tight spot. At SDF however; we have Wake Turbulence Recategorization Separation Standards; which allow us to run large and heavy aircraft closer together; but we have to have more separation with the small aircraft and anything else. This; along with the very quick nature of the event; and slower reaction time on my part; were all contributing factors to this event. After the operation; I and my trainee discussed all of the options we should have employed to prevent this situation; such as not slotting the second departure; or using visual separation; coordinating for another runway for the arrival to land; etc.I would love to see the Wake Recat standards allow for the benefit of the closer heavy separation requirements; along with keeping the same standards for smalls as we used to have; that would be a benefit to all facilities; nationwide; not just facilities that have a majority of heavy aircraft. SDF Local Control Instructor reports of incident where he let the Developmental depart an aircraft too close to a previous departure because of aircraft on short final.
Aircraft: LARGE TRANSPORT
Phase of flight: Final Approach
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Cleared to 'descend via RIIVR Arrival; cleared ILS 25L approach.' Weather: Cloud top deck at 3700 FT MSL and ceiling 1600 FT MSL. Passing 4300 FT MSL on ILS glidepath/course and 240 knots; SoCal Approach pointed out another carrier on right base to 24L. We were asked if we had it in sight. We said yes; but would lose them when both aircraft entered the cloud deck. Told to respond when we lose sight in clouds. We respond that we were losing sight of the other aircraft as they were entering clouds. We were told to maintain 4000 FT MSL. We were not told to cancel approach clearance. Then we were told to maintain 3800 FT MSL. We had to climb from 3700 FT MSL back up to 3800 FT MSL. We queried the Controller about our approach clearance. He said to maintain localizer course. We were now well above glidepath. Then; we were told 'cleared ILS approach.' We were high. Then; we were told to slow further because of overtake of the aircraft in front of us. We were high at the FAF and fast trying to configure and get down. Broke out just inside FAF with runway in sight. High on glidepath; greater than 1000 FT Vertical Velocity Indicator descent; and fast. We were stabilized inside the slot and elected to land as the approach criteria were coming together.Factors attributed to this incident included poor ATC controlling and verbiage. Question: With field under IMC conditions and both aircraft under IMC approach criteria; why were we told to maintain visual after being given instrument approach clearance? And; then didn't have approach clearance cancelled after given altitude clearance while on ILS approach? Pilot reports of marginal weather inbound to LAX and being asked if they could maintain visual with another aircraft. Pilot responded that they could; but would lose the aircraft when it went into the cloud deck. Controller told them to maintain an altitude; then cleared them for the ILS. Pilot wondered why controller would issue the visual when they were aware of the clouds and why did the Controller not issue a clearance cancellation.
Aircraft: A320
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

CA (Captain) on Aircraft X; ZZZ-ZZZ1 called and asked about NOTOC (Notice to Crew). He noticed that on walk around in ZZZ1 that human organs and dry ice was loaded on to the aircraft. ACARS was inoperative via MEL; but nowhere on the Load Closeout [documents] were restricted articles listed. I conference called the CA with CLP (Load Planning) and the CLP Supervisor said that there is nothing on their side they can do if the Crew Chief does not advise them. Also; usually a MEDEVAC notice from ATC would give us both a heads up about dry ice but they [did] not advise Dispatch. [Incomplete flight closeout documents issued due to] Missed SOP by Crew Chief. [Reporter recommends] not allow a flight closeout to be sent when a restricted item is loaded until CA acknowledges. Air Carrier Dispatch reported a communications breakdown between Dispatch and Ramp Crew Chief regarding SOP to issue required Hazmat documents.
Aircraft: CRJ200
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

METROPLEX Subject Matter Expert submitting report on behalf of a D21 [controller] working East Departure. This was his first session working 1E since the DTW/CLE Metroplex implementation. While observing the operation as a floor-walker; I overheard him; utilize the legit 7110.65 phraseology to 'climb via except maintain 17;000' upon initial radar identification off of DTW. I warned the controller to be vigilant about watching the corner where the RNAV SID procedure turns from the southeast to the southwest and are procedurally separated from RNAV STARs so long as the departure complies with an at/below 7;000-ft crossing restricting at LAZYI that coincides with the STAR traffic descending via to a bottom altitude of 8;000-ft on the downwind. Many pilots who are initially assigned a top altitude of 7;000-ft by DTW clearance delivery and subsequently instructed to 'climb via except maintain 17;000' by the Radar Controller seem to disregard and not comply with the at/below restriction at LAZYI. This particular pilot read back the revised climb via clearance and was subsequently observed climbing above 9;000-ft as they crossed LAZYI. Air carrier flight crews do not seem to understand how to comply with a 'Climb Via' clearance. It appears they read it back correctly but treat it as an arbitrary 'Climb and maintain' clearance; disregarding all subsequent altitude restrictions on the RNAV SID. As much as we want the pilot community to learn how to comply with the phraseology correctly; in the interim; we are advising radar controllers to avoid utilizing the 'climb via except maintain' phraseology and instead utilize standard 'climb and maintain' phraseology once clear of traffic conflicts. This option is safer but if we universally decide to avoid using the 'climb via' phraseology; the flight crews will never learn either. An education piece needs to be forced out to the airline pilot workforce at large. D21 Subject Matter Expert training ATC personnel in the facility reported pilots often miss altitude restrictions when issued 'climb via' clearances.
Aircraft: EMBRAER UNDIFFERENTIATED OR OTHER MODEL
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Upon landing in ZZZ1 an unsecured catering cart from the aft galley rolled down the center aisle of the aircraft and struck the back of seat 2C. This was a ferry flight being operated from ZZZ with no flight attendants on board. After taking over the aircraft in ZZZ both the First Officer and I performed a preflight check of the main cabin as per Standard Operation Procedure. We checked the cabin safety equipment and made sure the catering carts were present and secure. I then went to the cockpit to prepare for departure. During this time catering arrived and performed a full service of the aircraft. I was checking on a paperwork issue with Dispatch and Maintenance Control and I did not pay much attention to the caterers onboard. They performed their service and then left. Once we were ready to depart; I went to the back of the aircraft and armed the cabin doors for departure. I neglected to re-check the catering carts because I had already completed that task once and it did not occur to me to recheck them with the caterers having been onboard. I armed the front cabin doors and we departed the gate. The flight to ZZZ1 was normal and uneventful. Upon landing in ZZZ1; I did hear a noise that sounded like a collision but over the thrust reverse noise it didn't seem very loud. I assumed it was the maintenance log; which I had placed on the cockpit floor; hitting the back of the main pedestal. Once we parked the aircraft; I headed to the rear of the aircraft to disarm the cabin doors. On the way; I discovered a catering cart resting on the back of the aft first class seat; 2C. It had come loose during braking on the runway and collided with the back of the seat; bending the seat and the door of the catering cart. It also broke a piece of trim off another seat on the way down the aisle. This whole incident could easily have been prevented by a double check of SOP before departure instead of just using it to perform the preflight inspection. This is a good example of how tasks that aren't performed regularly can cause threats to safe operation. Thankfully no one was injured in this incident. Air carrier Captain reported failing to secure galley carts on takeoff for a ferry flight.
Aircraft: LARGE TRANSPORT
Phase of flight: Initial Climb
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I had taken a handoff from Wooly Sector with VFR Aircraft Y when he was 9-10 miles to the NW of BWI. When he checked in I told him to proceed direct to [our hospital] and that there were going to be departures off of runway 28. I had quite a few departures that were lined up at the end of the runway. I had departed a few B737 and they had been climbing well and over where Aircraft Y would be crossing the extended center line of runway 28. After clearing Aircraft X for takeoff I called traffic to Aircraft Y when Aircraft X was rolling midfield to be safe. Aircraft Y said that they were looking for the traffic. I saw that Aircraft X was not climbing like the previous departures. After Aircraft X was airborne I then told him the traffic and he also said that he was looking. I saw the traffic outside and saw that they were getting closer and they both did not have [each other] in sight. I continued to call the traffic to both aircraft giving them updates on their current location. After doing another traffic call Aircraft Y said that they had seem them. At that point Aircraft Y was still at 2500-2600 feet and Aircraft X was around 2100. I observed Aircraft X turning north to advert away from the traffic. Aircraft X then said that they were turning back on course and that they had a Resolution Advisory (RA); and he was still climbing. At that point they were past each other and were no longer a factor. I told Aircraft X to contact Potomac. Aircraft Y continued south bound towards his destination and was handed off back to PCT.Be more aware of aircraft performance. We were cleared the TERPZ4 departure climb via SID to 4;000 off of RWY 28. Shortly after takeoff ATC made a very timely and accurate traffic call of a helicopter at our 1 [o'clock]; 2500 feet; heading south. We acquired the helicopter on TCAS and shortly after visually. We were on a collision course with zero LOS (Loss of Separation) and climbing into the helicopter. Recognizing it would be difficult to level below or out climb; I turned right/north to pass behind the helicopter. After the maneuver was in progress we received an RA after we had generated lateral clearance. Estimate we passed behind the helicopter between 500 and 1000 feet. BWI Controller and airline pilot report of a NMAC. Controller thought climb rate would be better for the air carrier based on previous departures. Once the pilot acquired the aircraft visually; a turned was made to avoid it.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Equipment Issue

On pushback; the tow bar shear pin failed. Given the angle the tug was to the airplane it wasn't a surprise and no damage was suspected or reported. I recalled that we could do an information only write up in the logbook if no damage was suspected. Since this was the 737 MAX; I called maintenance control through dispatch to make sure we could still do that. Maintenance control said yes; we could do an information only write up. The fleet Captain contacted [me] today to let me know we can't do this on the MAX yet and that an inspection was required per our manual. I was used to the guidance for the NG and missed the note for the MAX requiring an inspection for shear pin failure. Since it was the MAX; I did take the extra step to obtain guidance from maintenance control but unfortunately that didn't trap this error. Perhaps a quick note or bulletin highlighting this change to the pilot group would help. B737 MAX 9 Captain reported the shear pin broke during pushback and they failed to have maintenance inspect the aircraft as required.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

Alerted to passenger with continuous cough throughout flight. Passenger in [seat] X3 had spent the last year in [foreign country] and reported that she had the cough for a week and had been taking medicine for 2 days. Flight Attendant witnessed her taking cough medicine during flight. No other COVID symptoms reported. Dispatch and Medlink consulted. Passenger was relocated to aft of aircraft to isolate; per recommendation of Medlink doctor. She was also given an N95 mask. Paramedics met aircraft. Passenger's temperature was taken by EMS and was normal. She refused to answer any further questions and treatment. All 3 flight attendants [were] exposed to this passenger. Air carrier Captain reported having a passenger who was coughing throughout the flight.