Aryan95614/aerograph-asrs huggingface dataset:
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Aircraft X checked on descending to 6300 feet. I turned the aircraft heading 280 and descended them to 5200 feet. They violated the 6300 foot Minimum Vectoring Altitude (MVA) by 100 feet; and the 5800 foot MVA by 200 feet. My instruction to descend the aircraft to 5200 feet was too soon and resulted in a loss.We previously had a 'step down procedure' for aircraft landing from the east. This allowed us to descend into the MVA between heading 220 clockwise to 320. The first step was 5000 feet; then 4000 feet; then 3000 feet. This was a great tool that allowed us to easily descend aircraft from the east. In the area that I violated by 100 and 200 feet; we were previously authorized to descend to 5000 feet. This tool was taken away from us and it is my recommendation that we bring it back. Bring back the step down procedure for arrivals into from the east. ATC TRACON Controller reported using a procedure no longer authorized which resulted in vectoring an arriving aircraft below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude.
Aircraft: PREMIER 1
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Aircraft X was given a descent to the Minimum Vectoring Altitude of 9;000 feet which he read back correctly. I observed him starting the descent and responded to another aircraft checking onto the frequency. The other aircraft failed check on properly so I had to query the check on information; issue a heading and an altitude to descend to. The other aircraft did not read back altitude or give a complete read back so I was in the process of getting him squared away. I then noticed Aircraft X was exiting the edge of the 9;000 foot Minimum Vectoring Altitude and descending through 8-something. He had obviously descended through the assigned altitude. He was already in the 7;000 foot (next) Minimum Vectoring Altitude so I issued a new altitude to maintain of 7;000 feet which he read back and complied with. [I recommend] proper staffing levels; [and a] standalone Supervisor in the TRACON. Had there been another set of eyes scanning as well this may have been avoided. TRACON Controller reported they did not notice an aircraft descending below its assigned altitude and below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude.
Aircraft: A300
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Taxiway; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

ZZZ weather was reported light snow. Runway XX was in use due to winds. On approach; I requested updated braking action reports and Tower reported fair with taxiways reported as slippery by aircraft that landed in front of us.We selected MED Autobrakes and the aircraft slowed with no problems. We were not able to make [our target] taxiway and continued to taxi to the end of the runway for turnoff. Tower cleared us to turn left on [a taxiway]; left on [another] and to contact Ground and advise when clear.Upon turning onto [the taxiway] the aircraft started to skid to the right. The Captain was able to steer the aircraft back toward centerline but then the aircraft started to skid to the left. The Captain did everything to try and regain control; but was unable. We both tried braking with no response. The aircraft came to a stop on the left side of the taxiway. It appeared we may have been over the taxi lights although we could not confirm that due to the snow cover.We made no attempts to move the aircraft at this point. I reported our position and intentions to the Tower and then contacted Company Maintenance for a tow. Maintenance and the ZZZ airport authority worked to tow us to the ramp. They determined we were still on the taxiway and had not hit any taxi lights. One taxiway light was removed by the airport authority during the tow process.No aircraft damage was suspected or found that I am aware of. The CVR circuit breaker was pulled per Maintenance Control. We remained with the aircraft until it was towed to the gate and we were released. The airport was reporting runway braking action but it would have helped to have taxiway reports that used a recognized scale of braking action. ATIS winds were 330 at 18 KTS with gusts to 22 KTS with 1 1/4 mile visibility in light snow and mist. As I approached the taxiway; I slowed the aircraft to 8 KTS. Upon entering the turn; the aircraft started a skid to the right. I used full tiller and differential braking to get the aircraft tracking towards centerline. As the aircraft approached centerline; I put in right tiller. At this time the aircraft started skidding left. I applied more right tiller; differential braking; and differential thrust to get the aircraft to correct back towards centerline. The First Officer advised the Tower that we had come to a stop off the surface and to notify aircraft landing behind us. During the straightening process; it took a load of sand and two tugs to move the aircraft. While attempting to turn off the end of the slippery runway in a strong crosswind the flight crew of an A300 was unable to stop the aircraft nose from sliding to the left. The crew believed they had left the hard surface and called for a tow.
Aircraft: C172
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

On a planned IFR training flight during my preflight I noticed a crack including 2 ribs near the trim tab; causing it to move around I would expect it to cause flutter; possibly losing the horizontal. So I reported it to the flight school owner. His response was 'I know it's been like that' then told us we needed to jump start the aircraft. At this point we called the flight and he preceded to argue about the aircraft being airworthy ended up doing the training flight in another aircraft. I am concerned about the lack of safety culture teaching primary students it's okay to fly a broken airplane. That type of mentality I feel will cause serious problems in the future. Pilot reported being pressured by a flight school owner to fly an unairworthy aircraft.
Aircraft: GULFSTREAM IV / G350 / G450
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

The aircraft was slowing from 250 kts. to 220 kts. approaching the ZZZZZ fix (Initial Approach Fix) for the RNAV XX approach. As the Flying Pilot; I asked the FO (First Officer) for Flaps 10 at which point he moved the flap handle from zero to ten and advised me the flaps were not moving. I asked him to bring the flap handle back to zero and try again. The FO attempted the second attempt but the flaps did not move. I advised the FO to let ATC know that we would need to break off the approach due to a flight control problem. We were given headings and I took over the radios and flew while the FO ran the Partial flaps/Jammed flaps checklist. I advised ATC that I needed the longest runway available at ZZZ1 and needed some headings and or an orbit to delay the approach until we ran the checklists and loaded the approach into the FMS and set up our navigation system. The Controller was very helpful and provided excellent air traffic control services while we accomplished the things we needed to do to set up and brief the no flap approach into Runway XYR using the ILS. The approach and landing went without incident and the aircraft was safely landed and taxied off the runway. After landing checklists were accomplished and the aircraft was taxied to FBO where we parked and deplaned our one passenger. Aircraft was shut down and the flaps were written up and Maintenance and Company were advised. Gulfstream IV Captain reported trailing edge flaps failed to extend for landing and elected to divert. Aircraft landed safely.
Aircraft: MEDIUM LARGE TRANSPORT; LOW WING; 2 TURBOJET ENG
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway

I was working Coordinator Cab East. I was monitoring the arrivals and departures and coordinating for the Local Control East controller. I noticed aircraft had been taxied out to the Runway 31R from the terminal. The weather was hard IFR and we were protecting for the ILS Critical Areas. Earlier; with no one on final; the Ground Controller taxied an airplane out and did not issue instructions to hold short of the ILS Critical Area. I made a comment to the Ground Controller that they were lucky no one was on final. Several more aircraft were taxied out; and the hold short for the critical are was not given; though no one was on final. Then there was an aircraft on final; and I had not been actively listening to Ground Controller (within 6 feet of my position); when the local controller and I both noticed at the same time Aircraft X had crossed the ILS Hold Line. He issued the instruction to hold his position. I estimate the entire aircraft had crossed the hold line. At the time of the hold instruction; I looked up to see Aircraft Y's lights on short final (about 1/2NM); and then looked again at Aircraft X to verify that he stopped. I had the approach plate book in my hand and threw it down loudly to make a point to the ground controller.After that; the Ground Controller still did not issue hold short of the ILS Critical Area instructions to every aircraft that taxied out; but only to those when they saw an aircraft on final. I believe this is a poor work ethic; called 'Shooting for the minimums and still failing.' The Ground Controller did the minimum amount of work; and then failed to do the job correctly when absolutely required. It also does not represent the professionalism the FAA and NATCA are trying to instill on our younger controllers. Weather lines: KDAL XX 07007KT 2 1/2SM BR OVC004 09/08 A3042 RMK AO2 SLP300 T00890078KDAL XX 06006KT 2 1/2SM BR OVC004 09/08 A3041 RMK AO2 SLP295 T00890078 I would recommend an SOP change to state that the Local Controller owns the taxiways and pavement in the ILS Critical Areas when they are in effect. This would insure that all aircraft are required to be told to hold short and any aircraft or vehicle needing to be in the critical area would be coordinated with local control regardless of any aircraft on final. This would tighten the standards in the 7110.65V that only requires the area to be protected when an aircraft is inside the final approach fix; and the local SOP that states to protect the areas when required. This would give the judgment and control of the protected areas back to Local Control; and not someone else who is not working airborne traffic. DAL Cab Coordinator describes a situation where the Ground Controller does not issue correct clearances to taxiing aircraft to protect the ILS Critical area.
Aircraft: NO AIRCRAFT
Phase of flight: Other Training
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Flight Attendants in the Recurrent Training program for 2015 are conducting an aircraft validation drill using sandblasted safety/sunglasses. This is supposed to represent a smoke filled environment; however the condition is so dark flight attendants can barely see based on the aircraft mock-up lighting. When the flight attendant goes to assess conditions they can't accurately figure out which condition is posted outside their door (flight attendants think the poster is a nighttime condition when they assess); however they open the door anyway. This training is concerning as they are not responding to opening the scenario by seeing a daytime photograph of a clear unobstructed path. They are responding based on watching a video; and not to how they were trained to evacuate an airplane. They are not responding based on seeing an unobstructed path to evacuate or none of the other aircraft exits are usable. During annual recurrent training; a smoke filled cabin environment is simulated by flight attendants wearing sandblasted glasses which causes incorrect assessments of outside evacuation conditions.
Aircraft: HELICOPTER
Phase of flight: Final Approach
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Tonight a helicopter went over the top of one of my hangars at roughly 20 feet above the roof. I consider this very unsafe especially when there is room in all directions to enter and exit the airport safely without endangering hangars or people. This happens frequently and the pilots do not seem to care. I am worried that one of these helicopter is going to drop through my roof; destroying airplanes and possibly killing people in the hangar. I think most of the problems with helicopters at this airport could be eliminated if they had a set pattern to enter and exit the airport. A ground observer reported that helicopters frequently fly very close to the hangars and may be a hazard to persons on the ground.
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 135 ER/LR
Phase of flight: Takeoff / Launch
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

I was the First Officer and Pilot Flying on Aircraft X from ZZZ-ZZZ1. The aircraft was leaving a maintenance facility and heading back to resume normal line flying. After both the Captain and I conducted thorough preflight; we started the jet and began to taxi to Runway XX. The taxi was uneventful. The takeoff roll began at approximately XA:15 pm and yielded nothing out of the ordinary till a few knots below V1. Approaching V1 I began to smell a very pungent order and shortly after began to see a haze like smoke forming in the cockpit. I called 'reject; reject; reject' to which the Captain and I performed the Rejected Takeoff procedure. We taxied off the runway and had airport operations follow us back to the maintenance facility. The taxi back to the maintenance facility yielded no additional smoke or fumes. EMB-135LR First Officer reported pungent odor and haze occurred during takeoff roll. Crew executed a rejected takeoff and return to maintenance.
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Phase of flight: Takeoff / Launch
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Upon takeoff flight crew noticed heavy burning rubber odor present in flight deck. Not being able to rule out the possibility of an onboard fire; I elected to abort the takeoff. The takeoff was aborted at 95 knots. We stopped on the runway; assessed the condition of the aircraft and elected to return to the gate to have maintenance come. EMB145 Captain reported aborting takeoff due to burning odor in the cockpit.
Aircraft: SMALL TRANSPORT; LOW WING; 2 TURBOJET ENG
Phase of flight: Final Approach
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Aircraft X had been cleared for the VOR B into PSP. When the aircraft was short final the PSP tower called and told the approach controller that Aircraft X was going to execute a 360 on final. The controller working position was very confused about what the aircraft was going to do. She had an aircraft on final behind Aircraft X that she had to maneuver to maintain spacing. I think there is a big misconception on what exactly an aircraft is allowed to do when cleared for the VOR B approach. The tower was not clear about what the aircraft was doing. The tower tried to argue with the TRACON controller over the landline. We need to develop training for the controllers who work PSP tower and approach so that they are aware what an aircraft can do on a VOR B approach so that we can provide positive separation. SCT TRACON Controller reported of confusion when PSP Tower advised SCT that the aircraft on final was going to do a 360. SCT had traffic following the initial aircraft and wanted the rules clarified on what the Tower and Approach can do.
Aircraft: MEDIUM LARGE TRANSPORT
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Blocked out on time. The ATIS temp was M12; with no visible moisture expected on climb. I failed to include the anticipated use of anti-ice for contaminants in my briefing. Following the #1 engine start; we were cleared for taxi. I had instructed the FO (First Officer) to start the #2 engine during the initial taxi movement. While making a sharp 180 degree turn from the gate; I noticed the ramp outside of the gate area was contaminated; and selected the anti-ice selector to ON. After the #2 engine was started; we had an ENG REF A-I DISAGREE; with ENG TDS (Temperature Detection System) REF A-I ENG EICAS messages. I had suspected it was due to the A-I mode selector being turned ON and no anti-ice selection in the TDS.When we got to an area of the taxiway without contaminants; the mode selector was moved back to AUTO; but the fault did not clear. We ran the QRH; resending and resetting the takeoff data with ENG anti-ice selected; this time; with no help. Maintenance Control was contacted; and we shut down the engines. The messages cleared during shutdown; but returned when the engines were re-started and configured the same way. Discussed situation with on-duty CP (Chief Pilot) and coordinated with Maintenance Control to return to gate for a power reset. While waiting for Maintenance; [I] researched the AOM to find the ENG REF A-I DISAG message will be present when the REF A/I is set to ENG in the TDS and the OAT is below 5 degrees Celsius. At this point; it was evident why the messages were there; as the OAT was -12; and the A-I TDS should have been set to ALL. Maintenance came out to the aircraft; ran the FIM (Fault Isolation Manual Procedure); and cleared the log page item.Anytime contaminants are reported/suspected; this should be briefed; and the appropriate anti-ice settings should be confirmed in the TRS. Before leaving the gate; I should have recognized the TDS anti-ice needed to be selected to ALL; for the corresponding OAT and conditions. Captain reported EICAS anti-ice malfunction message annunciation during taxi for takeoff.
Aircraft: DHC8
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft had a maintenance open write up for the main cabin air stair door and maintenance was just completing their work. Also; at the same time; the weather at the destination was below dispatch minimums and the dispatcher did not publish the release until it improved. I noticed a stream of passengers walking out to our aircraft unsupervised. I walked out to direct them back into the terminal and noticed the gate agent to stop boarding. Never was our crew asked whether we were ready to board; nor was there a flight release up; and maintenance was in progress. The propeller was not tied and the sure step wasn't in place either. The passengers were in disarray on the busy ramp.The gate agent began an auto-board without checking with the crew; even though there was active maintenance and the dispatcher even put a delay on the flight due to weather. I walked with the passengers back to the terminal and then notified the gate agent.These types of scenarios occur frequently ever since auto-boarding was instituted. There must be some type of exchange between the crew and gate agents before boarding; on every flight. Frequently we are surprised by passengers boarding and this puts undue pressure on the crew to rush through tasks; sometimes before we can even verify whether an aircraft is airworthy and ready for passengers. DHC 8-300 flight crew reported witnessing unsupervised passengers walking out to the aircraft for boarding. The agent had not alerted the crew of the boarding process.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

During the exterior walk around; the exterior door handle for door 1R was not in the proper closed position. After the walk around; I asked the flight attendants if they were catered in ZZZ; and they replied that they were not. I told them that the exterior door handle was not in the closed position. They replied that they did hear an unusual noise coming from door 1R shortly after the sterile cockpit chime sounded during climbout. I asked if there was any loud squeal or an air rushing noise coming from the door during the flight from ZZZ1 to ZZZ. They said they did not hear either. I had the ramp crew re-secure the door latch in the proper position. At no point while at the gate did the FWD SERVICE door light illuminate while the door was closed. During the initial climb out from ZZZ; the pressurization was normal and no door lights were illuminated. Upon arriving at ZZZ1; I had the ramp personnel check the door handle on door 1R and it was still in the proper closed position. B737 Captain reported an exterior door handle was not properly secured during pre-flight checks.
Aircraft: CRJ200
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

In cruise flight at FL350 we lost fuel quantity indications on the left; center; and total fuel quantities. We also received an AUTO XFLOWINHIBIT message. The fuel synoptic page also indicated an AUTO XFLOW INHIBIT message and showed amber dashed lines for the left; center; and total quantities and approximately 1;700 LBS of fuel in the right wing tank. We tried to get Maintenance Control through the company frequency and could not. We [contacted] Dispatch [via] ACARS that we were going to divert and stated the fuel conditions along with out estimate of FOB. We received an ACARS from the Dispatch saying to continue to [destination] and call when we got there.We referenced the QRH and there is no procedure for no quantity (amber dashed lines) indication. We decided that not knowing the true fuel quantity and the possibility that we were creating a fuel imbalance that could exceed the 800 LBS limitation; and that the current indicated fuel onboard was within 200 LBS of our reserve fuel that the best idea was to divert to [a nearby airport]. We then declared an emergency with ATC and were vectored to the ILS; accomplishing a normal approach and landing below maximum landing weight. After arrival Maintenance Control MEL'd the quantity indicators; refueled the aircraft per the MEL and we continued to [original destination]. I feel we handled this situation well as a crew to best serve the needs of safety; our passengers; and the company. CRJ-200 First Officer reported loss of all fuel quantity indicators. They elected to divert to a nearby airport even as Dispatch recommended continuing to destination.
Aircraft: J3 CUB
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Event / Encounter Object; Ground Excursion Runway

I was landing a Piper Cub J3 the aircraft had touched down and was transitioning to the three point attitude when it started to yaw to the right. Due to a fluctuating winds that had produced a quartering tail wind; the aircraft yawed to the right. I [applied] full Left rudder and Left brake with little or no effect. I then rolled the aircraft to the left the aircraft then started to correct when the right wing tip impacted a building causing the aircraft to turn into the building. Then the spinner impacted the building stopping all residual motion at this point the aircraft came to rest in front of the building. Piper Cub pilot reports loosing control during landing resulting a runway excursion and impact with a building.