Aryan95614/aerograph-asrs huggingface dataset:
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was working the arrival sectors; LUCKE; MULRR; BINNS; for Dulles airport. During the afternoon arrival bank; multiple international air carriers were given descents on the HYPER7 and MAPEL2 arrivals. These aircraft were given descend via clearances for their respective runways. For this example; Aircraft X was told to descend via the MAPEL2 arrival for Runway 19C. The aircraft complied with all crossing altitudes and speeds; but once the aircraft reached waypoint COVUR; the aircraft joined the localizer (as they were instructed to do); and then also descended on the glide slope. There is a major safety issue with this! There cannot be any margin for error for this problem to keep occurring. If another aircraft is crossing below Aircraft X at 060; a major collision could occur causing many innocent people their lives. Not only is this a potential issue; but we're not even factoring in wake turbulence. What if another aircraft catches the wake of Aircraft X due to this descent? The issues are clearly present. Fix it! We have; over the last 3 years; designed brand new STARs and approaches into IAD that creates a much safer and efficient environment keeping everyone on course and happy. These designs also allow IAD to begin utilizing TRIPs which is safer and less workload on feeders. We have everything designed and ready to go just awaiting final meeting for implementation process to begin and not sure what the holdup is. TRACON Controller reported aircraft incorrectly starting descent on ILS which creates a conflict and wake turbulence error.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

We were getting ready to depart ZZZ [at] gate X-XX which is at the end of the concourse. Due to a variety of issues; it appeared that we were going to leave late. As usual; the flight was totally full with last minute bags coming down the 'Dumb waiter'. As departure time came I could just see the tug driver hop into the cab. He was very much out of breath huffing and puffing being rushed. His first words were something to the effect please let the brakes go so that we get an out time!!! I've got a Manager in the huff/tug next to me and we got to get an out time NOW. There was no good morning; FOD check complete; bypass pin installed; etc. He kept saying release the brakes a Manager is next to us; he needs the out time otherwise there is going to be a hearing. This man was in a terrible frantic panic because of the Manager in the tug/huff next to him. I said SLOW down; give me; the Captain; the delay; we're going to do this right. Pushing from this gate requires coordination between not only Ramp Control but ZZZ Ground as well. It just happened that the gate next to us (X-XY) was pushing as well. Apparently; both X-XX and X-XY cannot push simultaneously; so we completed our checks; and pushed when safe. Our out time on ACARS by brake release roughly 6 minutes late. The tug driver was VERY VERY concerned because 'there was going to be a hearing for sure now! We left late and the Manager was livid. Another issue brought up by my push tug driver was that the Manager in his huff/tug was very angry because his original tug did NOT have a beacon on it allowing him to go onto ZZZ's inner taxiway; so he had to go and find an amber beacon. After I settled down MY tug driver to worry about the delay; he was perfect in following procedures. It was just the initial part here that he panicked about some hearing that was going to be conducted because of the late departure. During the push back; he mentioned several times how he was dreading the manager; and the hearing that was going to take place. May I say that the ground crews I encounter day after day are ALL VERY PROFESSIONAL. I do NOT understand what this Manager in the huff next to was up to. HE WAS OUT OF LINE. B737 Captain reported that pressure from ramp manager induced pushback operator to take short cuts and violate numerous safety concerns; endangering the safety of the aircraft and passengers.
Aircraft: B777
Phase of flight: Takeoff / Launch
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

On the outbound flight the previous day four EICAS advisory messages and 12 status messages appeared about 3 hours prior to landing (DOOR ENTRY 1L; 1R; 2L; 3L and DOOR ENTRY IND 1L; 1R; 2R; 2L; 3R; 3L and DOOR FLIGHT LOCK 1L; 1R; 2L; 2R; 3L; 3R). Appropriate checklists and maintenance log entries were completed.When we left the hotel for the return flight; we saw that we were assigned the same aircraft and that an earlier flight in the same aircraft had cancelled due to the same door indication problem. I contacted Station Operations and Maintenance while enroute to the airport and was told that the problem had been determined to be a hard fault in one of the component cards of the Proximity Sensor Electronic Unit (PSEU); and that there had been overheating in the same component. A replacement part had been borrowed. When we arrived at the airport; maintenance was still working on the problem. We were informed that maintenance had replaced the entire PSEU; not just the faulty card; and that the system would be fully operational with no status or advisory messages. When we received the Maintenance Release Document (MRD); it was nine pages long; and included a maintenance deferral of two door status messages; DOOR FLIGHT LOCK 3L and DOOR IND 3R.Meanwhile; our preflight preparation was delayed due to difficulty getting data uplinks to the FMC. After more than an hour of troubleshooting with Maintenance; Station Maintenance; Dispatch; and the Duty Manager; we succeeded in restoring the FMC uplinks by arranging for Dispatch to re-release the flight using a different server. We departed the gate 2 hours 10 minutes late. Passengers were on board throughout the delay. I made regular PA announcements.As we taxied out to the runway we observed another B777 abort their takeoff; coincidentally due to an entry door light; as revealed by their communications with Tower.During our takeoff 10 minutes later; we received a DOOR ENTRY 3R EICAS alert caution message at approximately 60 knots and aborted the takeoff. We notified Tower and the passengers.As we exited the runway; Tower instructed us to hold our position before completely clearing the runway. We then received clearance to taxi onto a parallel taxiway and stop. We completed the rejected takeoff checklist; and notified Dispatch and Station Operations. We resumed our taxi back to the gate and entered a maintenance write-up. We waited an additional hour at the gate with passengers on board while maintenance worked on the problem before the flight was cancelled.The cause of the door indication problem was later determined to be chafing on a wire to the proximity sensor at door 3L. B777 Captain reported that during the takeoff roll they had multiple door warning lights. Captain elected to reject the takeoff and return to the gate.
Aircraft: A320
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Aircraft had one MEL 49-10 inoperative APU. Normal operations with assisted ground air start after starting engine #1 while still at gate; configured aircraft for taxi. Turning both packs on and opening the cross bleed; there was a very noticeable smell and odor. It was a dirty; sharp; acrid; smell in the cockpit. I called the First Flight Attendant; she smelled an odor and said the passengers were complaining about the smell too. I switched off the bleeds and packs and called the gate back to the aircraft. We deplaned all the passengers and I entered a discrepancy in the aircraft log for smell and odor filling out the additional maintenance work sheet. While waiting with the crew for operational decisions to be made. The flight attendants all had complained of headaches and dizziness. The First Officer said he had a headache; I had no symptoms. The flight was canceled and my crew all deadheaded to the crew base. The flight attendants went to the company clinic. Pilots were released and went home. The Reporter stated that the crew assembled in the airport lounge but that EMS was not called at that time. The flight attendants did go the Company clinic after the deadhead flight which was about three hours after the actual event. The Reporter did not know the outcome of the flight attendants' clinic visit. He did smell the odor but had no ill effects. The odor was difficult to describe but the term 'dirty socks' would be appropriate. This aircraft had the APU MEL'ed because the same smell was detected by the previous crew resulting in the flight cancellation. An APU malfunction was suspected. The crew of an A320 with the APU MEL'ed started engines at the gate; turned the bleeds and packs ON and immediately the aircraft filled with a dirty; acrid smell which made some crew members ill and caused the flight to be canceled.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Parked; Takeoff / Launch
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

We were called to re-crew a flight that had previously done a gate return that resulted in an aircraft swap for a mechanical issue. The new aircraft had been pre-boarded and power was initiated by a mechanic prior to our arrival. The preflight was normal until we tried to initialize the flight data on the ACARS. The Auto Init prompt continued to appear after several initialization attempts and even after the flight data was ultimately loaded manually. No Takeoff Performance Report was included in the flight paperwork packet even though it was requested and printed 20 minutes prior to departure. We did receive the load close-out but had to enter it manually into the FMC. Takeoff data was requested thru ACARS but we received an error message 'Takeoff Plan Not Found'. We finally had dispatch send us takeoff data which was verified accurate; manually loaded; and briefed per standard operating procedures. We taxied out in moderate rain in a long line for takeoff. After approximately 20 minutes we were cleared for takeoff. The takeoff was ops normal until around 80 knots when we both felt the acceleration to be lower than normal. I rechecked that the N1 was set to the FMC programmed bug; which was indicating 84%. This seemed low to me for the takeoff weight but I did not have access to the printed; dispatch generated; takeoff values previously briefed in order to verify. Also; due to the long takeoff delay I could not remember the briefed N1 value. Lastly; with the standing water on the runway I could justify the slower acceleration rate. As we neared V1 we both agreed that a continued takeoff was safe. The First Officer rotated normally and began the climb out but only at a sustained 1000 feet FPM. At 1000 feet AGL I checked the N1 limit page in the FMC and manually increased the power to climb N1 of approximately 92%. The climb out proceeded normally. There was no further issues for the duration of the flight.I can only speculate what caused this problem. Obviously there was an ACARS data transfer glitch disallowing the request to initiate specific flight data. We found an ACARS message in the cockpit from a previous flight stating 'aircraft XXX is listed out of service contact dispatch before push'. We don't know if this is evidence that the ACARS was having issues prior to our event; however. We received an ACARS message during numerous initialization attempts stating 'Error Message. No Takeoff Plan Found'. We mentioned this message to dispatch with no answer to its meaning. Lastly; the previous flight had a much lighter takeoff weight (approx 100;000 lbs) which required an N1 close to the setting generated on our takeoff. Could the old data somehow populate itself into the FMC? B737-400 Captain detects very sluggish takeoff performance and suspects that the takeoff data they received did not reflect the actual aircraft load.
Aircraft: CITATION EXCEL (C560XL)
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

While acting as Pilot in Command we arrived from ZZZZ for the purpose of clearing customs. After the crew cleared customs and proceeded to have the luggage screened a customs officer informed me that one of the passengers did not have her passport in her possession. The customs officer also informed me that as P.I.C. of the aircraft I am subject to a $5000.00 fine for bringing an undocumented passenger into the country. I did not verify that the passenger had her passport in her possession before departing ZZZZ as she is a company employee who travels with us on a regular basis. In the future I will personally check all passenger passports before departure to comply with U.S. Customs regulations. [Report narrative contained no additional information]. A corporate flight crew arrived back into the United States with a company employee on board. The Customs Officer threatened to fine the Captain because the employee on his aircraft did not have a passport and was undocumented.
Aircraft: CRJ900
Phase of flight: Takeoff / Launch
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL

I received a call from the flight attendants shortly after takeoff. The Flight Attendant said that the cabin overhead liner at the over wing emergency exits had fallen down. It was the overhead liner that had the 'EXIT' sign attached. I transferred the controls and radios over to the First Officer and consulted with the flight attendants on the nature of the problem. The concern was the possible blockage of the emergency exits if an evacuation had to be initiated for whatever reason. However; there was a Company Flight Attendant commuting home sitting in the emergency exit row who offered to assist if necessary. The flight attendants determined that it would be safe to proceed; consultation with the company through ACARS said that there was no need to return to the field. As there seemed no additional risks; I agreed to continue the flight. On landing; it was noticed that the panel was held up by tape; not dissimilar to the type used in the cargo bays and other temporary fixes. A Field Mechanic stated that one of the two securing grommets was too large to hold the securing pin. It was further noticed that there was no write up for the NEF (Non-Essential Equipment Furnishings) deferment. Prior to the flight; a Company Mechanic was working on the cabin lights in that vicinity. I thought it was associated with that maintenance procedure. I did not ask the Mechanic what was done as there was a push to keep the flight on time. The Field Mechanic who inspected the fallen panel stated that it was unlikely to be associated with the cabin lights procedure. He proceeded to NEF the panel.[My suggestion is to] resist the pressure from gate to board early. I personally feel that the 'auto-boarding' procedure from main-line adds unnecessary pressure on the flight crew to get things done in a hurry. Every crew member that I have talked to says that they feel pressured to rush tasks when passengers are waiting at the doorway as preflight procedures are still being completed or when catering is still in the galley stocking as passengers as boarding. Take time to talk to the Mechanic and ask what tasks were actually performed. If I had done this; I would have known if they were the ones who applied the tape and not someone else. Refuse to accept the abnormal as normal. The proliferation of temporary quick-fix tape within the fleet should not be disregarded as just another normal day. Each temporary taping should be examined to see if it complies with company operational procedures. Again; time pressures can muddy the waters some. Captain reported that a ceiling panel came loose during takeoff when the tape securing it failed and it was discovered to be not recorded in the NEF deferral list.
Aircraft: SMALL AIRCRAFT; HIGH WING; 1 ENG; FIXED GEAR
Phase of flight: Takeoff / Launch
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC; Ground Incursion Runway

Incident site is AUN. Two aircraft in pattern making extensive position reports; speaking in a fast clipped manner. Three other aircraft approaching airport making short; to the point initial reports. I am on run up pad for [Runway] 25 monitoring radio report. Hear someone say 'base'. I continue with my pre-takeoff check. Checklist completed; I check for traffic on base and final (base leg is partially obscured by a hill) and runway traffic. None. I broadcast my intentions and taxi from run up pad to limit lines at taxi way/runway junction heading easterly to check for traffic on base or final. None. Pull out onto and line up on runway; check for aircraft; animals etc.; on runway. With a clear runway; I apply power and make a normal takeoff. Two thirds down and about 300 feet above the runway I start a left noise abatement turn and spot a helicopter perpendicular to the runway centerline exiting from the runway to the taxiway.I never saw the helicopter until then! GA pilot reported an NMAC with a helicopter during initial climb from AUN airport. Pilot stated they checked for traffic before departing but did not see the helicopter.
Aircraft: PA-24 COMANCHE
Phase of flight: Final Approach
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

My brother and I had lunch together and I asked him if he wanted to go look at the new wind turbines and the above-flood-stage Lake. He did so we maneuvered in the area of my home base for about 45 minutes and on approach to the airport in the pattern my gear down green light did not come on. I continued in the pattern trying to troubleshoot and get the gear down but did a go around and at the end of the runway on ascent I smelled an electrical burn for a few minutes and then the smell was gone. I moved out away from the airport and maneuvered checking circuit breakers and trying to see in my wing mirror if the gear was down. The best I could tell it was not fully locked in place so I made the decision to fly to a nearby [airport] where they have a tower and emergency equipment. As I neared the airport I contacted Approach and advised them of the emergency situation. As I continued I began to lose electrical to my Garmin 430; # 2 radio; fuel scan; and transponder intermittently. I was able to maintain pretty good communication with ATC and they gave me full cooperation and were very helpful. They directed me to the runway for a tower fly buy. They informed me that my gear was down but not completely. When I got to the end of the runway and started to ascend to pattern altitude; my green gear down light came on. I immediately informed ATC I was coming around to land. On my way around the pattern I changed my mind and on final informed them I was going back to my home airport to land. ATC asked if I was sure and I was. They also informed me that it looked like my gear was fully down. Shortly after departing the area all of my electrical came back and stayed steady. With Flight Following I continued for a safe smooth landing! A PA-24-260 pilot reported his landing gear would not fully extend and an electrical odor developed. After troubleshooting and preparing for a diversionary landing; the gear became safe so he returned to his home airport for a normal landing.
Aircraft: LEARJET 60
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

North of CHS we encountered severe-extreme turbulence at an altitude of FL400. We accumulated rime ice and we had a total altitude loss of 2;500-2;700 feet until we fully recovered the aircraft from the turbulent weather and landed. Crew and passengers were ok and the aircraft went under inspection to make sure everything is ok. LR60 First Officer reports encountering severe turbulence at FL400 which resulted in an altitude loss of over 2;500 FT before control is regained.
Aircraft: LIGHT TRANSPORT; HIGH WING; 2 TURBOPROP ENG
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

We departed ZZZ and climbed to 8;000 feet. Five minutes into cruise flight; we received a LH Engine Fire CASS message. I immediately conducted the red box memory items; shut down and secured the affected left engine. Co-Pilot advised ATC and requested to return back to ZZZ. The aircraft was met by fire and first responders. The passengers were deplaned on the ramp after firefighters confirmed the LH was not on fire. Everyone was deplaned without incident. Light Transport aircraft pilot reported a LH Engine Fire CASS message which resulted in an engine shutdown and a return flight to departure airport.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway

I was providing training on Ground 1 when Aircraft X exited Runway 25R and the trainee instructed them to taxi via C; N; north route. The Aircraft X pilot read back the instruction correctly. A minute later; I heard the OS (Operational Supervisor) advise us that Aircraft X taxied up L and not N which we; the training team; had not noticed. (Background: Taxiway K & L used to be the north route; but those are now a ramp area controlled by the City of LA for pushback from the international terminal. Taxiway N is now the north route.) This situation began to present itself several months ago when the taxiway routes first changed from L & K to N & P. It does not seem to happen as often; but I've now noticed four different scenarios in the last week (two last weekday; and two this same weekday.) It still seems to be a possibly systemic problem. In addition to Aircraft X; while the OS was telling me and the trainee that our 'scan needs to be better' to prevent this situation; Aircraft Y was under tow to Gate X and began to turn on K instead of L. (Per the LOA with the city; all arrivals to the ramp must enter via L & hold short of K1.) I immediately instructed Aircraft Y to stop; called the Ramp Tower to coordinate any potential traffic conflicts; then allowed the Aircraft Y reposition to continue. I'd recommend additional signage; a change to the charts; or added emphasis in the text of the 'north route' that emboldens how N is now the north route; not K or L. Or all of the above. The above recommendations would help alleviate the issue from the IFR/pilot side. Regarding the repositions/tows: the City of LA should disseminate refresher training to every airline that repositions aircraft on the LAX airfield. This training should be mandatory for any reposition operator and clearly explain the new procedures for the ramp. The response from Aircraft Y for why they turned on K instead of L was that they 'temporarily lost communication with their tow driver.' This response is unacceptable. Unless specifically instructed; no revenue flight or reposition is ever to enter the ramp via K. LAX Ground Controller reported issues relating to the changing of a specified taxi route and flight crews not following the new routes.
Aircraft: MD-83
Phase of flight: Other Non-Flight
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

During off-load station personnel notified me that we had Li-metal batteries in the cargo. I had no NOTOC for this flight. MD-83 Captain reported he was not properly notified of a shipment of Li-metal batteries on his flight.