Aryan95614/aerograph-asrs huggingface dataset:
Aircraft: MD-11
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

In cruise flight at FL340 northbound direct to NINVA (FIR boundary Turkey). We received ATC transponder 1 & 2 alerts/ADS B out fault; along with GNS sensor fail messages. We expected these to be associated with GPS jamming and complied QRH procedures. During the evaluation of these malfunctions and unannounced to us; the aircraft reverted into speed; heading and altitude hold (white annunciations). During this time the aircraft reached NINVA and did not turn towards SRT as it was not in NAV mode. We noticed the error and were also queried by ATC. Less than five miles off course; we corrected and were given direct SRT. Flight continued to destination without further incident. GPS jamming caused PROF/NAV issues. Better monitoring and awareness during GPS jamming and transponder issues. [Report narrative contained no additional information.] MD-11 pilot crew reported possible GPS jamming.
Aircraft: B757
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

During decent in ZZZ; [we] received [a] lightning strike. Approximately 5 minutes later; [we] lost [the] Captain's air data and airspeed was INOP. [We] received many related and unrelated EICAS messages to air data failure [and] also received many other EICAS messages; such as EEC for both engines; ground proximity; rudder ratio; etc. [There were] so many messages I lost track. We ran QRH procedures for unreliable airspeed [and requested priority handling] with ATC. Captain landed safely. [We] notified [the Dispatcher]; Duty Officer; and Maintenance. [The] event [was] documented in [the] aircraft maintenance logbook. I do not know for sure but suspect a lightning strike [was the cause]. B757 First Officer reported a lightning strike had rendered numerous systems inoperative during descent to destination airport.
Aircraft: B787
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Remote Power Distribution Unit (RPDU) (1 of 17) lead to multiple system failures. After lengthy discussion with Dispatch; Maintenance Control and the duty manager; we determined to continue the flight to our destination due to system redundancies. One of the failures was an APU fuel valve failure which lead to the APU not being able to be used if necessary. Multiple status messages were displayed and discussed with Maintenance to include going into the maintenance pages to ensure operational systems for later use in the flight. Upon landing and parking at the gate; the flying pilot (First officer) attempted to shut down the left engine while keeping the right engine running while ground power was connected. The engine did not shut down with the fuel cut off switch (initially) and we got an EICAS message to run the ENGINE FUEL VALVE FAILURE Checklist. The checklist directed us to wait 20 seconds - we did and then the engine shut itself down. At no point after the RPDU electrical failure did we expect it would lead to an engine fuel valve failure. The rest of the parking and termination checklist was normal. B787 First Officer reported miscommunication when an RPDC failed and impacted systems unexpectedly.
Aircraft: SMALL AIRCRAFT; LOW WING; 1 ENG; RETRACTABLE GEAR
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Aircraft was on autopilot; set on cruise power at approximately 230 knots when what appeared to be birds or balloons appeared. Attempted a small course correction but the autopilot was too much to overcome and then realized it was skydivers. Reached to disengage; but by that time I was already beneath them and one was very close maybe 200 feet. Passed by with nothing happening; but possible irritated skydivers. The problem resulted from not knowing the autopilot system well and traveling at high speed in a known parachuting location. The reaction time after understanding what you are seeing at high speeds is very short. Never in 20 years of flying have I seen free falling parachutes. I did not recognize what it was until too close. My future action to avoid a situation like this is talk to Flight Following when transitioning jump zones as jumpers are hard to spot. GA pilot reported an NMAC with parachutists in a known jump zone near MZJ.
Aircraft: PC-12
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict

We took off from ZZZ. We made a right turn to 250 heading; then were cleared to climb to 5;000 ft.; and then turn to 190 heading. While cruising at 5;000 ft.; we had just crossed the northern surface-12;500 ft Bravo line of ZZZ1 when we approached what looked like an aircraft about 500 ft. higher heading directly toward us. As we got closer the object looked more stationary and appeared to be a drone. We let ATC know it was a possible drone and answered a few questions from them and continued on our way. The remainder of the flight was uneventful.Always maintain a good visual lookout; even in Class B airspace. PC-12 Captain reported an airborne conflict event during cruise with a Drone; no significant conflict. Reported event to ATC.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Close to departure time; I was removing the chocks from the working side of the aircraft following SOP that all equipment was removed from the aircraft and ensured that there was a person on the pushback tractor. As I removed one of the chocks the aircraft rolled at me. I put the chock back in and went to the person on the pushback and communicated my concern for my safety while under the aircraft. I asked him if he has communication with the flight deck yet and did he give authorization to release brakes. He said no and that he had no communication yet with the flight deck. I looked at the nose gear and the green light was on meaning the brakes have been released. I looked up to the number 2 side and he opened the window. I asked why would he have released the brakes with no communication with us? How do they know what' going on? Are we hooked up? Are we still servicing the water; which we were; as they asked operations for water after the bridge was pulled. They have no idea what we have going on downstairs if they have no communication; and they risk my safety and others on the ground as well as the uncontrolled safety of the aircraft. This was a close call to my leg and foot was almost caught under the tire!I have to tell you that this is not the first time that this type of action has happened. We don't operate like this on mainline. They don't do anything until communication has happened and things are verified by using SOP. I would like you to do what you can to introduce this to whomever needs this info to stop this unsafe action as soon as possible. Ramp worker reported that the flight crew failed to set the brakes properly which caused the aircraft to roll forward unexpectedly.
Aircraft: LIGHT TRANSPORT; LOW WING; 2 TURBOJET ENG
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway

At CLE; we were given taxi instructions from the FBO to Runway 24R for departure via L2; L; K; J1; J; S. There were numerous taxiway closures due to construction. This also included Runway 24L/6R. After we turned left from Taxiway K onto J1; I observed a taxiway sign that indicated Taxiway J was off to the left at a 45 [degree] angle. I turned left according to the sign; but was then advised by ATC that I was in fact heading towards J2 which did not connect with J due to a barricade. I performed a 180 [degree] turn and continued farther down J1 where I eventually found Taxiway J and continued the taxi to Runway 24R. I think the sign I saw while on J1 indicating Taxiway J was to the left is misleading as J1 continues for some distance before it intersects with Taxiway J. A request by me for clarification or a progressive taxi could have avoided the occurrence or better signage to properly indicate how to get to Taxiway J...straight and then left. Light Transport Captain reported making a wrong turn during taxi at CLE airport; citing poor signage as contributing.
Aircraft: CESSNA 400
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

I filed for 13;000 MSL and ATC wanted a climb to 15;000 for mountain clearance. (13;000 was VMC and 15;000 was IMC) At 15;000 I began picking up some rime ice (temp was -4C) so engaged my TKS system and pitot heat. TKS took a few minutes to work and since airspeed decreased 10 knots and more; I tried to contact ATC to request lower. Since I could not contact ATC; another pilot radioed my request to descend to 13;000 and ATC did not want to allow. I said I had on-board terrain information and would be responsible for terrain clearance. I then told him I was descending to 13;000 to get out of clouds and he said I could have a VFR on top clearance which I accepted and came down to 13;000. I was now out of clouds and TKS was removing ice; so after I was past the clouds I requested a climb back to 15;000 and rest of flight had no problems. I was given a number to call after landing which I called to explain situation and he did a good job of explaining why the MVA was 15;000 where I was flying.This problem was caused by ATC requiring me to climb to 15;000 and I now understand why. I'm thankful my plane has a TKS system which helped remove the ice and prevent additional build-up. In the future I will avoid flying in clouds at -4C by requesting a deviation to clear clouds horizontally or by requesting vectors to remain at a VMC altitude authorized by ATC. Columbia 400 pilot reported he was picking up ice and unable to maintain altitude. Pilot descended below MVA to get clear of clouds.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Takeoff / Launch
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

All checklists were completed and all systems showed normal. We were cleared for takeoff prior to reaching the runway hold short line. The Before Takeoff checklist was completed and the takeoff was initiated without stopping on the runway. After the '80 Knots' call out; the master warning illuminated. First Officer alerted then of a ELEC1 HYD OVRHT annunciator illuminated on the forward overhead panel. I proceeded to abort the takeoff using the new procedure except no thrust reverse was activated due to the length of the runway and the extremely effective and immediate response of the RTO braking system. The rejected takeoff was initiated at approximately 95 knots and a TOW of approximately 143;000 lbs. We requested to be directed to a holding place on the airport; for brake cooling and time to troubleshoot the problem. After QRH was accomplished and brake cooling chart was verified; we requested a gate/ramp spot to allow for Maintenance to reach the aircraft as well as to establish communication with Maintenance Control via cellphone. The issue was MEL'd by me with Maintenance Control via cellphone and the aircraft inspection completed by a local Maintenance representative. B737-700 Captain reports rejecting a takeoff at 95 knots after a master warning illuminated indicating a ELEC1 HYD OVRHT annunciator illuminated.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

We received the following clearance on the ground from Dover Clearance Delivery: Flight XXX is cleared via runway heading then vectors to BAL MORTI LITME HIRCK SCRAM WALCE LYH then as filed; on departure climb to 3000 expect FL360 10 minutes after. Departure frequency 132.42; squawk ABCD. After we entered the route of flight on FMC; we noticed the point MORTI will take us 50 miles north of our route. Captain told me we will query departure control after airborne. During climb out we were cleared direct BAL. The captain asked Potomac Departure on 2 different frequencies while we were heading towards BAL; if they want us to go to that point MORTI that would take us 50 miles north of our path; and specifically told them that it seemed very unusual. The first controller told us he would try to take us over the outbound traffic. Then the second controller said that we needed to go to MORTI after BAL. After we reached BAL we started a turn toward MORTI. The controller asked us where we were going. We said MORTI and spelled out MORTI. The controller told us the correct spelling was MORTY. Captain corrected the point on the FMC and we corrected our course. The controller apologized for the confusion and the flight continued uneventfully. ATC controllers saw us going in the wrong direction. The event occurred because there are 2 points with similar names near each other and when we received the clearance the controller did not spell out the point. We suspected something was not right; we should have resolved it on the ground. When there is any question with the clearance; clarify with the clearance delivery on the ground. B737 First Officer reported receiving a clearance on the ground via MORTI which caused a jog in the route of flight. The confusion was not corrected until the turn toward the fix attracted ATC's attention. The proper spelling for the fix was MORTY.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

A Cessna taxied out and entered the run-up area at the western end prior to departure. ATC (Ground) advised the pilot to call when ready to exit the pad. We began our taxi from the gate area and were taxiing on A towards runway. Ground Control instructed us to taxi 'up to and hold short' of the runway. As we approached the run-up area; the Cessna moved to the eastern corner of the run-up pad appearing as if he were trying to go ahead of our aircraft. Tower gave us a takeoff clearance and we rounded the corner onto the runway. The Captain used normal taxi thrust throughout the entire turn and we taxied into position on the runway. Entering the runway; we heard the Tower ask the Cessna if he needed any assistance. The Cessna owner said he wasn't sure but then stated that his prop had struck the ground and sustained damage due to the jet blast from our aircraft. He was asking for pilot names and owner information for insurance purposes. By moving to the east end of the pad and close up to Taxiway A; the Cessna had put himself directly behind our aircraft and apparently in our thrust line. No excessive thrust was used; just normal taxi thrust; but due to the proximity of the Cessna it was apparently enough to upset his aircraft. [Report narrative contains no additional information.] B737 flight crew reported a Cessna in the run up area was exposed to jet blast that caused damage to the aircraft.
Aircraft: A319
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Off-airway vector for approach to runway 12R in SJC. NORCAL cleared us to descend to 5600 feet. (MVA and MSA alt 5600 feet). In IMC; both of us noted the terrain in area. [We] got [a] 2500 feet call out as expected as we crossed over ridge line. Shortly after; as [we were] descending through 5800 feet; [we got a] GPWS terrain warning. We immediately performed escape maneuver with Takeoff Go Around thrust. ATC was notified of our climb. We leveled off at 6600 feet. Once clear of the terrain; and with clearance from ATC; [we] descended back down to 5600 feet. We [were] on the RAZZR4 Arrival into SJC. NORCAL took us off the arrival and cleared us direct ARTAQ on the ILS12R. We were Night IMC in the weather. We were cleared down to 5600 feet. We discussed the terrain ahead and kept a shallow descent [so as] not to trigger the GPWS. We got the 2500 foot call followed by the RA bouncing around. The lowest I noted was 1800 feet RA. The GPWS triggered TERRAIN TERRAIN followed by PULL UP. Performed the GPWS Escape Maneuver. Climbed to 6600 feet. The Captain notified ATC of the climb. ATC said 5600 feet is a safe vectoring altitude. After clearing the terrain we continued our descent and approach into SJC. A319 flight crew reported receiving a GPWS terrain warning on a night IMC approach into SJC when they were vectored off the arrival. ATC reportedly assured the flight they were at a safe vectoring altitude.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

We were cleared for the YWT4 [WATERLOO FOUR] RNAV STAR; descend to 11;000 MSL. The FMC was programmed and on VNAV PATH. When it became clear we would not make the intermediate crossing restrictions we contacted ATC. When a B737-800 flight crew became aware they would be unable to comply with a crossing restriction on the YWT RNAV STAR to CYYZ they advised ATC.
Aircraft: CITATION LATITUDE (C680A)
Phase of flight: Takeoff / Launch
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Shortly after takeoff before 1000 agl; I noticed a very odd odor coming into the cabin. It took me approximately 20 seconds to recognize that it was possible smoke entering the cabin. We were cleared to 5000 feet initially and while checking in with departure we were cleared to 15000. As we turned to our assigned heading and continued to climb; I was still unsure if it was actually smoke that was causing the odor or possibly something else. When I took my sunglasses off; I could see a faint haze in the cabin. I immediately put on my o2 mask and told the SIC; a new hire FO (First Officer) with the company; that I had the airplane and to put his mask on. During the process; I informed departure we had smoke and fumes in the cabin and I was returning to land immediately.As a side note; we found that with both o2 masks selected to mask mic; there is a real problem communicating as the overhead speaker that was previously off; now is on and cannot be turned off. This causes severe feedback anytime you attempt to transmit. I was forced to turn my mic off on the mask and put my headset boom mic inside the lip of the o2 mask to communicate with ATC.Another point of note was ATC inquired if we would extend to an 8 mile final to accommodate an aircraft that was on final doing practice approaches. I respectfully declined that option and advised that I was landing now; I was immediately cleared for a visual to XXR. Which was good; because I had already started a turn that way.On short final I notified tower we would be evacuating the aircraft as soon as we landed. We landed and immediately exited the runway; came to a stop on the perpendicular taxi way; I instructed the FO to go ahead and get out as I finished shutting down the aircraft. We proceeded to the Hospital and were checked out as a precaution. Nothing was noted or expected to cause any further adverse health issues. Overall; I felt we handled the situation well. There was a breakdown in communication due to the overhead speakers causing feedback. Although ATC did a fairly decent job clearing everyone out; I don't believe asking an emergency aircraft to extend his downwind to accommodate an aircraft doing practice approaches was appropriate. After the Valujet crash in the Everglades and Swiss Air off Nova Scotia; I feel smoke and fumes is an immediate threat and should be handled as expeditiously as possible.I elected to evacuate on the taxiway simply to get out of the cabin environment as soon as possible. CE-680 Captain reported smoke/fumes in flight deck on climbout and returned to departure airport.
Aircraft: SMALL AIRCRAFT; HIGH WING; 1 ENG; FIXED GEAR
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC

During an aerial survey mission; another aircraft flying near our same altitude came within 100-200 feet of our aircraft; while traveling the opposite direction. No notification was given to either aircraft by ATC and this incident almost resulted in a Midair Collision. Evasive action was taken on our part once the aircraft was spotted; however by then the aircraft was too close for evasive action to be effective and the aircraft passed below our aircraft. Earlier during this flight we had coordinated with Ft. Wayne Indiana's airport approach controller to receive air traffic advisories while we operated near their airspace. We were then handed over to Indianapolis approach control in order to continue the traffic advisories as we grew closer to their airspace. We were acknowledged by Indianapolis Approach on Frequency 120.650 with our full tail number and asked to report any altitude changes; to maintain our own navigation and we maintained the squawk code. Approximately 45 to 60 minutes after being handed over to Indianapolis approach; while continuing our aerial survey flight at a constant altitude of 4700 MSL; is when the other aircraft involved passed dangerously close to our aircraft; headed southwesterly; while we maintained a north heading. The other aircraft never made any indication as to the proximity they had just flown to us; either by evasive action or by notification to ATC about the incident. We were unable to see the aircraft heading in our direction due to a small window of time during survey collection where we need to be inside the aircraft; operating our survey equipment and ensuring everything is working properly so that we may complete our mission. By the time we were able to continue scanning our outside surroundings; the other aircraft was under ours.I have since talked with Indianapolis TRACON and we have determined that due to a fault of their controller system; sometime after our aircraft was recognized by the assigned approach controller; their system accidentally dropped our beacon code and they were no longer being notified as to our location. This accompanied by a lack of situational awareness by the controller personnel; led to our two aircraft being allowed to continue on a course that nearly resulted in a near midair collision. The non-flying pilot reported a near-miss while receiving traffic advisories from IND Approach.
Aircraft: GULFSTREAM V / G500 / G550
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude

Being vectored for approach to ILS 19 at TEB IMC at 3;000 FT MSL; 190 KTS; received a TA followed immediately by an RA descend command and within one second RA reversed to a climb; then an increase climb command. Topped out at 3;800 FT MSL. RA was displaying -500 then -100 and the RA commenced. The issue was the initial descend command with the target below us. It didn't make sense; but followed the commands and they reversed themselves to a climb shortly after the descent. No visual on the conflicting traffic. Approach was moderately busy and did not provide a traffic advisory. Training is to always follow the TCAS commands and we did. This G550 is equipped with Certification F [CPDLC Software] and submitting this to crosscheck if other like equipped G550s have had similar reversal RAs. G550 Captain experiences a TCAS RA at 3;000 FT while being vectored for the ILS at TEB. The initial RA is to descend and is then reversed to a climb; then an increase climb. The reporter was in IMC and did not see the intruder and ATC did not provide a traffic advisory.