Aryan95614/aerograph-asrs huggingface dataset:
Aircraft: B767
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

I was flying the IRO position. I was on my crew rest break when I was called back to the cockpit and advised that we had an EICAS message - RT OIL FILTER. We were over the Atlantic Ocean at FL310. We ran the appropriate checklists which led to an engine shutdown. We declared an emergency with Control and diverted. We landed overweight. The passengers and crew deplaned normally. The Captain did a great job running the cockpit and flying the aircraft. Level FL310 on the oceanic portion of our flight; we got an EICAS message 'RT OIL FILTER.' We ran the checklist; which led to an eventual engine shutdown. We requested and received a clearance from Control to divert the nearest suitable and listed enroute alternate airport. We declared a MAYDAY; announced our situation on GUARD frequency and informed Dispatch on SATCOM. We flew the clearance to an uneventful overweight landing. Prior to leaving the runway we had the fire/rescue personnel inspect the brakes and landing gear; and were told we were safe to continue taxi to parking. After the aircraft was safely parked at an off gate location; fuse plugs melted in two tires on the right main gear. Fire personnel again inspected the aircraft and determined it [was] safe. Passengers and crew deplaned normally. My crew provided outstanding guidance and support; the flight attendants were excellent. I know of no deviations or discrepancies with procedures or regulations. At the time of the engine shutdown; we had approximately 14;000 LBS of fuel in the center tank; which we had the option to dump. Based on the fuel dump and overweight landing section in the Emergency chapter of our Flight Manual Part I; and recent discussions on the subject in recurrent training; I as Captain decided not to dump. The relatively small amount of fuel available for dump would not allow us to get below max landing weight (we landed at about 360;000 LBS); I was quite satisfied with the single engine performance of the aircraft; we were going to an 11;000 FT runway while the charts called for less than 5;000 FT; and it was a coastal; sea level runway on flat terrain giving us no climb limited landing weight issues. Dump was not required; in fact some 767 aircraft do not even have the dump system installed. I did not feel I was compromising safety in any way. I landed on speed; on target and rolled to the end of the 11;000 FT runway. I do not know how I could have been any [easier] on the brakes. I was actually somewhat surprised that the fuse plugs melted after landing. I wonder if dumping the 14;000 LBS would have been just enough to make the difference to save the tires. I feel there needs to be more information including the brake energy discussion in the fuel dump vs. heavy weight landing section of our manuals and in training. Our only brake energy guidance is for an aborted takeoff. A B767-300 EICAS alerted RT OIL FILTER while on the Oceanic portion of the flight; so an emergency was declared and flight returned to the nearest suitable airport for an uneventful landing except two wheel fuse plugs melted.
Aircraft: SMALL AIRCRAFT
Phase of flight: Landing
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

There are a series of poorly lit; (some unlit) windmills directly to the east of the private airstrip 15MO. They are currently not marked on VFR sectionals. This creates a potential conflict to aircraft descending into the traffic pattern from the east. This is a much frequented private airfield; and I believe the lack of lighting on these towers could create a fatal accident; especially at night. Series of poorly lit and/or unlit towers directly to the east of 15MO (a private airfield) that could create a conflict to any aircraft descending into the airfield traffic pattern from the east. Pilots reported a series of poorly lighted and unlighted windmills nearby 15MO; a private airfield; that are not marked on VFR sectional chart. Pilots believe the lack of lighting causes a hazard to arriving traffic; especially at night.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

We were at 14;000 MSL on a vector to rejoin our routing. We were being held down for traffic. When that traffic passed overhead we were cleared to climb to FL190 and switched to Washington Center. The Captain dialed in what I thought was 190 on the MCP and then dialed in the frequency on the radio because his hand was closest. I do not remember repeating '190' when he removed his hand from the MCP; but it is a procedure and habit I do regularly.There was a lot of chatter on the frequency so I waited to check in on the frequency until it quieted down. I leaned forward to check the out and off times from the FMC. At that time; we were approaching FL180; so we set 29.92 in the altimeters. I wrote down the times. Then; Center called us to see if we were on frequency yet. I responded that we were 'passing 190 for 290' as I looked at the altitude window on the MCP. Center responded that we were only cleared to 190; but it was 'no big deal' because there were no other aircraft above us. Then; he cleared us to climb to FL260. When Center called us; we were passing 19.2. When finally given a climb and normal speed; I thought the Controller said FL290 versus FL190. It seemed odd to get that much climb from Washington Center all at once; but my pilot not flying seemed to accept it...Although not a particularly difficult day; I think both the First Officer and I let down our guard at the same time. He missed my mistake and I did not pursue verification on a clearance that seemed a little out of place.If something does not seem right--even by a little bit--pursue verification from the other crew member and then ATC. An old lesson relearned. A B737-700 flight crew failed to follow SOP to verify confirmation of a clearance to a higher altitude. As they passed through FL190 for 290 ATC advised they had only been cleared to 190. They were then cleared to climb to FL270.
Aircraft: AMATEUR/HOME BUILT/EXPERIMENTAL
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC

I was flying at approximately 5;500 feet at about 80 knots airspeed. I was using VFR Flight Following; was in contact with Akron-Canton (CAK) approach control on 125.50 MHz; and was squawking an assigned transponder code.I passed an object that appeared to be an Unmanned Aircraft Vehicle (UAV). The UAV was generally spherical in shape and about six to twelve inches in diameter. The UAV also appeared to have protrusions or extensions; that could have been rotors and rotor mounts. The UAV was generally black; with other color(s). The UAV passed less than two hundred feet to my right; and less than fifty feet below. It passed generally parallel to my track of flight. The UAV may have been traveling in the same or opposite direction as my track of flight; or it may have been nearly stationary. I did not perceive any relative lateral motion. The total time of observation was less than two seconds.Within ten seconds I keyed my microphone; and said 'Akron Approach; light experimental [tail number];' or nearly identical words to the same effect. There was some delay in establishing communication with the controller who initially repeated my assigned transponder code. I advised the Controller that I was already using VFR flight following. When the Controller asked the purpose of my transmission; I stated I wished to report being nearly struck by a drone. Subsequently; a Controller asked that I telephone [number removed]. I agreed and the rest of the flight proceeded without further incident. After parking the aircraft; I made a few notes; called the number; and made an (audio recorded) report with CAK Approach Control. Experimental aircraft pilot reported an NMAC with a UAV.
Aircraft: NO AIRCRAFT
Phase of flight: taxi
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types

The Voice Switching System (RDVS) at DFW failed. The first indications were the failure of DR1; MN and FE frequencies. Controllers stopped departures at both DFW Towers. Many frequencies continued to operate normally for a few minutes. All of the RDVS equipment frequencies and land lines ultimately failed and controllers moved to the emergency jacks. The TMU stopped all arrivals into and out of the DFW terminal airspace. All controllers plugged into emergency jacks and with no land line capability; one arrival from each corner post and one departure from each Tower were allowed into the airspace. A TMC was assigned the responsibility to run between positions with any coordination necessary and was to coordinate necessary information with adjacent facilities via the commercial telephone. Tech Ops advised that they could reset the RDVS but it would take 20 minutes. The decision was made to go to ATC Zero until the reset occurred. It appeared the reset was working and TMU took us out of ATC Zero and returned us to an ATC Alert status. DFW departures were resumed with 15 miles in trail while controllers communicated from the emergency jacks. The system appeared to have reset and arrivals were resumed 20 miles in trail. Arrivals and departures were resumed with normal spacing. DFW Tower reported 76 departure delays. DAL reported 8 departure delays. There were an unknown number of arrival delays. Some satellite airports held aircraft on the ramp and didn't even taxi them out. The D10/DFW Tower RDVS system needs to be replaced. The talk among the technicians was that 'cards' were replaced a few days before and if they are not done with a certain time frame in between; then the system goes into failure. This is evidently a glitch or an old problem that they have been 'worked around' for years. The problem with controllers switching to the emergency radios is two fold: 1. most positions are worked with at least one other position combined to it and aircraft are on multiple frequencies. Each position on has two emergency radios for the primary frequency; a Red Jack and an Orange Jack. The logistics of having to unplug and run down to another position to transmit into that emergency radio to switch aircraft to the other frequency is dangerous and unacceptable. 2. The lighting in the TRACON is very spotty with a few bright lights in places surrounded by extreme dark in others. The lighting is so poor near the RADAR scopes that is takes extremely good eyesight to determine if you are plugging into a Red Emergency Jack which has very limited transmission distance; verses an Orange Emergency Jack which has better transmission distance. In either case using the emergency jacks allows the controller no access to land line or interphone communication. [Narrative #2 contained no additional information.] D10 Controller described a complete RDVS failure that eliminated all inter/intra-landline connectivity and required the use of emergency equipment. The reporter noted that the RDVS equipment needs to be replaced ASAP.
Aircraft: ANY UNKNOWN OR UNLISTED AIRCRAFT MANUFACTURER
Phase of flight: Landing
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Upon arrival at Ft. Bliss Biggs Army Airfield; Runway 21 was NOTAMed for men and equipment on the runway and a displaced threshold which closes the first 4;000 FT or so of Runway 21. We were cleared to fly the VOR 21 approach to Runway 21 without any mention from Approach Control or Tower of men and equipment on the runway and any mention of the displaced threshold. I believe there is a requirement that Tower should mention these hazards to arriving aircraft. After talking to Tower via the land line they implied that this is not a requirement. The approaches to the runway bring you to the normal touchdown point which is dangerous not only to the men working; but a part of the runway has been excavated around the normal touchdown zone; so if an aircraft mistakenly landed there it would destroy the airplane. Please pass along to all crews. Normally this NOTAM would also be available through ATIS; but BIF uses El Paso regional airport ATIS for arriving traffic which makes no mention of BIF airfield NOTAMs. Approach Control should not have cleared us for an Instrument approach if a runway has a displaced threshold. Tower should mention to every landing aircraft that men and equipment are on the runway and that there is a displaced threshold. Add BIF NOTAMs to El Paso airport ATIS. Flight crew landed on BIF Runway 21 and unexpectedly discovered men and equipment near the displaced threshold. The BIF NOTAMs are published through the normal FAA channel; but apparently this crew did not get them.
Aircraft: SKYLANE 182/RG TURBO SKYLANE/RG
Phase of flight: Landing
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC

I was on extended downwind; right traffic for Runway XX; approximately 3.5 miles south of the runway. Controller had told me he would call my base. It was a busy pattern. I heard him clear another aircraft further south of my position for landing XX; traffic ahead was a Cessna on 3 and a half mile final. The other aircraft said they had no traffic in sight. Controller asked me if I was on final. I responded; 'Negative; you didn't call my base.' Controller responded: 'Cessna 182 turn left to north heading; fly to the highway; then re-enter right pattern at midfield.' I confirmed the instruction; then turned left to a north heading and started flying to the highway. Within 10-30 seconds; I saw oncoming traffic; another Cessna flying directly toward me at what seemed to be a very similar altitude. I veered to the right; but noticed oncoming traffic did not veer right. I immediately called: 'Tower; Cessna 182 almost collided with another aircraft.' I don't recall my exact words; I was very flustered at the time. When my radio transmission ended; I heard the other aircraft calling Tower asking if they had mistakenly flown their course too wide. It appeared my transmission had been 'stepped on.' Controller asked my position. He then gave me the same instruction as before; to fly to [the highway]; then re-enter the right downwind at midfield. I did that; and this time was able to land with no issue. This is a great airspace to fly in. The controllers are always courteous; and even forgiving. This is the first time I have been in a situation as PIC that made me feel uncomfortable flying in their airspace. I didn't recognize the Controller's voice. I don't want to cause trouble for anyone; just want to make sure this kind of thing can be prevented in the future. VFR pattern traffic instructed to re-enter the downwind experienced a NMAC with other traffic entering the pattern.
Aircraft: A319
Phase of flight: Landing
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

'GLIDE SLOPE' Annunciation at 500 ft. on approach below cloud deck. Deviation was due to a gust or possible wake turbulence. Aircraft was approximately one dot low on GS (glide slope); and we got the aural warning. By the time we would have executed a go-around; aircraft was back on glide slope and all other parameters. We continued the approach; as a go-around would have complicated the situation; as the deviation had already resolved. A319 First Officer reported a momentary excursion below the glide slope on approach; due to possible wind gust or wake encounter.
Aircraft: WIDEBODY; LOW WING; 2 TURBOJET ENG
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown

Aircraft X called my frequency descending on the OLAAA ONE arrival. I had no data block and no information on that aircraft. When I clicked on several limited data blocks around and in my airspace I realized that Aircraft X was an aircraft I was supposed to be talking to over OCN VOR. The aircraft was landing LAX. I then called ZLA thinking that they had made a simple mistake and switched him and forgot to initiate a handoff to me. When I looked at the data block it was on an 'E' tag and it had a 'C' in the hand off space of the data tag. As if the 'E' sector was handing off the aircraft to the center. ZLA controller said that he shows that I took the hand off and was attempting to handoff the aircraft off back to ZLA. I asked the controller to try and take the hand off and reflash it back to me. He informed me that he was able to take the handoff but unable to initiate a hand off to my sector. I then did a multi-function on the tag and was able to get control of the data tag to initiate a hand off to the next sector downy. The entire time in my sky it was on a 'C' tag and once the next controller took radar on the aircraft it reverted back to a 'C' tag as if the next sector did not take the handoff. This was a very serious automation issue. It could have created a very bad situation. The data block was limited and I did not see the airplane until it checked on my frequency and I started investigating. We usually have several aircraft over OCN VOR at the same altitude as the LAX arrivals are descending to on the OLAAA arrival. What if the center had forgotten to switch the aircraft? What if the aircraft went nordo. What if I was busy and missed the limited data block in my scan. We also have SAN arrivals that are at 13000 ft that can pass very close to OCN VOR creating a built in conflict with the OLAAA arrivals. If I had a SAN arrival that was north of their usual flight path it would have conflicted with Aircraft X heavy and could have been a potential NMAC; collision or at the very least a loss of standard separation. This was no one's fault. It was an automation issue. And if all the holes in the Swiss cheese had lined up things could have been much worse. SCT TRACON Controller reported an aircraft checked in on the frequency that had not been handed off by Center due to computer issues.
Aircraft: C172
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft taxiing eastbound to Runway 28 sometimes get issued taxi instructions as simply 'taxi via Echo' instead of the full and seemingly proper 'via Echo; Hotel'; which is the complete taxi route. Failure to miss the turn at Hotel will immediately result in an aircraft entering Runway 33.Because of this potential; I think the Air Traffic Control Tower (ATCT) should issue such taxi instructions as 'Via Echo; Hotel'. It would be a very easy mistake for a solo student or non-local pilot to make. Additionally; the area in the vicinity of Runways 33; 28; and Taxiway Echo should be a hot spot because of the possibility of a runway incursion. The reporter indicated that a clearance to cross or hold short of Runway 20R on Echo is being provided; and is not the area of potential confusion. A local pilot is concerned that ATC instructions that are incomplete or unclear may lead to a less experienced or unfamiliar pilot into a runway incursion.
Aircraft: A300
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

During cruise flight; we had several electrical malfunctions. Some we could correct and some we couldn't. Lost #1 Approach Path; #1 Flight Director; #1 pressure regulator; #1 pitch trim; landing gear system 1; First Officer (FO) alpha probe heat. We complied with ECAM's and QRH. Stabilized the situation and continued on to destination. Number 1 AP came back so I took the aircraft back. In the pattern; we got an ECAM #2 FO pitot heat fault. Complied with ECAM and turned off. When we extended the gear; the FO noticed that we had no antiskid release bars. Cycled brake antiskid switch with no help. No QRH help for this. Elected to land with antiskid off and manual brakes. Runway length was not an issue and was dry. After touchdown; I went into full reverse thrust until 80 knots without any problems. When I transferred to the tiller for steering; it was jammed. I had to use differential braking to keep aircraft on the runway. I had no way to steer off the runway. Came to a stop and advised the tower and had safety equipment called out. Did not declare an emergency. Crash crew evaluated the aircraft and said they saw no hydraulic leaks or broken parts around nose wheel. Maintenance towed us off the runway to our gate. While enroute aircraft encountered spurious failure of the #1 Flight Director;#1 Autopilot; #1 Pitch Damper; FO's pitot heat; #1 Cabin Pressure controller; ECAM directed selection of #2 Landing Gear indicating system. Crew followed ECAM and QRH procedures recovering lost systems or selecting secondary systems except FO's Pitot Heat and #1 Pitch Damper. After recovery of #1 Autopilot Captain resumed role of pilot flying. As a precaution crew decided to descend from FL350 to FL310 and slow to Mach .77 allowing a larger flight envelope margin in the event of a secondary failure of the Pitch system. Upon reaching the terminal area during approach check the ECAM directed the FO pitot heat be placed in the off position and crew complied. After gear was selected down to land ECAM had no Brake Release indicators on the display. Switch position was verified; crew opted to land with the Brake/Anti-Skid switch in the ALT/OFF position. Touchdown and roll out were normal until approx 50 kts when the pilot flying announced; 'No nose wheel steering.' He brought the aircraft to a stop while pilot monitoring informed the tower of the inability to clear the runway. As a precaution crew had the fire department look over the aircraft and follow us to our ramp while maintenance towed the aircraft to the gate. No emergency was declared. Maintenance found a failed Proximity Box and detector; replaced the component; ran checks and returned the aircraft to service. Components fail. A300 flight crew reported multiple electrical failures in cruise. Crew followed QRH procedures recovering lost systems and upon landing; it was discovered that nose wheel steering was inoperative.
Aircraft: LARGE TRANSPORT
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

I just learned that there was an issue; that some people were injured. Aircraft X was handed-off to ZTL (T08) and switched to their frequency without any reported issue.Several minutes later; T08 called back to relay that Aircraft X had reported severe turbulence on their frequency at the ZME/ZTL boundary (near JANES intersection); with no other information; no injuries reported. (Of course; injuries are not required to make the report serious; any severe turbulence report is dangerous). For the next hour I relayed the PIREP to pilot's heading anywhere near the area regardless of altitude. During the same time frame; I received severe turbulence reports (if I remember the specifics correctly) [near] BHM at FL370 [also at the ZME/ZTL boundary] and over MON at FL340. Aircraft eastbound and westbound near these areas received the PIREPs but reported no ill effects.ZTL did a great job; calling me to ensure I received the PIREP. We all forward PIREPs to our local Center Weather Service Unit (CWSU) for facility dissemination but that does not ensure the information gets passed to adjacent facilities. Controllers should verbally coordinate PIREPs occurring near their facility boundary. I've found this more commonly occurs near Approach Controls; but the need is the same for adjacent ARTCCs. Turbulence is especially difficult because it can develop and then dissipate so quickly; with preceding and following aircraft not finding it. ZME Controller reported of an aircraft that encountered severe turbulence on its route. Controller then took steps to advise others of the turbulence.