Aryan95614/aerograph-asrs huggingface dataset:
Aircraft: B757
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

On route we noticed the left engine oil temperature had risen into the caution range with the corresponding oil quantity indicating zero gallons at which time I started the timer for the 20 minute limitation and called for the appropriate Non-normal checklist. I initiated a phone patch with Commercial Radio to flight operations informing them of our situation and that I was planning to divert to the nearest suitable airport. Having coordinated with Center I was cleared direct to the divert airport and started a descent. During this time the oil temperature had been in the caution range approximately 10 minutes but then reached the maximum temperature so I called for and we performed the Inflight Engine Shutdown checklist of the left engine. I informed Center that I had shutdown an engine and was now declaring an emergency and we started our preparations for a single engine approach which was completed without incident. Report contains no additional information. A B757 engine oil was detected in the Caution Range with no oil quantity remaining so after waiting ten minutes when the oil temperature reached maximum; the QRH completed; the engine was shutdown; an emergency declared and the flight diverted to a nearby airport.
Aircraft: SMALL AIRCRAFT
Phase of flight: Takeoff / Launch
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types

When preparing for takeoff Camarillo Airport controllers expend very precious communications (radio) time (airwave availability) on unnecessary read backs and repeated read backs. This could cause; and has caused; in some instances; missed communications with aircraft that need to contact the control tower facility. This is especially critical when the Class D airspace is crowded with aircraft and aircraft operations. This could lead to confusion in the Class D airspace. I would like to suggest that all communications are kept 'Clear' and 'Terse' due to the crowded conditions at CMA airport. I have gotten complaints from other ATC facility personnel about operations at CMA and unnecessary radio communications. This seems to be a 'local' Camarillo issue and should be resolved with tower personnel immediately. I have personally experienced this issue with CMA ground and tower personnel in the past. I have; on occasion departed the Class D airspace while in the airport traffic pattern; because I have not been able to effectively break into the 'radio chatter' to make a position report. This is a safety issue and should not happen. Especially if a pilot is in the pattern. Pilot reports of excessive chatter on CMA Tower frequencies.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Landed on 12R instructed to cross 12L at F. Ground ATC instructed; taxi Z to the gate. Upon crossing 12L I turned the wrong direction; stopped and had the FO call for new taxi instructions. Told ATC we made a wrong turn. ATC gave new instructions to taxi Z; E; D; Y to the gate. Upon completing the turn on Yankee; Ground gave us a number to call. I complied once at the gate. The Supervisor asked if I saw the NOTAM that taxiway between D and E on Zulu was closed. I said yes; however; was following ground ATC new taxi instructions. Since I received this clearance and there were no markers or lights indicating the taxiway was closed; I assumed it was now open. The ATIS with the NOTAM was 35 minutes old. The Supervisor said; 'Actually it is open for towed aircraft; but we don't like to advertise it.'In any event; if my aircraft did not belong on that 'Closed' taxiway; ATC should have never given me a clearance to taxi on it and there should have been some type of markings/lights indicating it was closed; especially at night.I made a wrong turn off the runway; should have studied the gates and referenced the taxiways. And when ATC's instructions where contrary to ATIS; NOTAM; we should have inquired.In any event; if my aircraft did not belong on that 'Closed' taxiway; ATC should have never given me a clearance to taxi on it and there should have been some type of markings/lights indicating it was closed; especially at night. B737 Captain reported turning on the incorrect taxiway; then ATC issued another clearance which included taxiing on a closed portion of a taxiway.
Aircraft: A319
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

On approach to ZZZ noted a very faint odor from the ventilation; commonly referred to as a 'dirty sock' odor or variation thereof. The odor manifested itself at a late phase of flight near and below 10;000 MSL so little was done to attempt to isolate the cause in-flight. My primary concern at that point was to simply land the aircraft given we were on downwind and the odor was very slight. The FO [First Officer] elected to don his O2 mask while I did not. In my estimation this was a very minimal fume event and in the 20 years I have been flying the A320 series of aircraft as a Captain I have experienced multiple odor/fume events in all phases of flight ranging from barely noteworthy to severe. After landing and during taxi we selected the left pack OFF and the odor dissipated; although I cannot say with certainty that the left pack was the source due to the numerous variables involved. Upon arrival at the gate the #1 FA [Flight Attendant] said that he had noticed the odor but my impression was he was not overly concerned. I do not recall the other FAs expressing concern at the time. I asked two deadheading [airline] pilots if they had perceived the odor and they replied they had not noticed anything out of the ordinary during the flight. The outbound flight crew was awaiting our arrival so I advised them of the faint odor and that in my personal experience I did not feel the event was significant enough to warrant a write-up at that point. I also advised them if they had any concerns operating the return flight to ZZZ1 I would make an immediate entry into the logbook and notify Maintenance Control. Based on the information provided they expressed no concern and advised that if they had any issues with odors/fumes while on APU or engine bleed they would advise MX [Maintenance]; file a fume report and make the necessary logbook entry. At that point we departed the aircraft/airport for the layover hotel. Cause: unknown; but the aircraft was unaffected until the last phase of descent at lower altitudes. Suggestions: fume events seem to have become an industry-wide issue; with claims ranging from headaches to neurological damage; debilitating illness as a result. Sensitivity to these odors/fumes also seems to vary widely between individuals. Unfortunately; it seems any aircraft utilizing traditional bleed air-driven packs are susceptible to odor/fume events; and the causes of odors/fumes are numerous and diverse. Elimination of these events will likely fall to the implementation of new technologies such as those present in the 787 aircraft. None of this is meant to cast aspersion on the effect of odor/fume events and rest assured I have no reservations in documenting noteworthy odor/fume events. However; the perceived severity of these events can be subjective. I reiterate that in my experience this event; while detectable; was transitory and minimal. A319 Captain reported 'very faint dirty socks odor' on descent to landing.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Landing; Taxi
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway

First Officer was flying a very demanding approach due to high crosswinds. After landing; I was taking control of the aircraft to make a high speed turnoff. Tower asked us what gate we were going to; as I was calling for 'flaps up' and slowing the aircraft on the high speed taxiway. At this time; we were issued instructions to turn right on Taxiway A and hold short of Taxiway A5. These instructions from Tower were being issued as we were completing our After Landing Flows. Since we were both busy; while the Tower was issuing these instructions; I was not able to write them down as I normally do. Once I got the aircraft slowed down on Taxiway A; I incorrectly thought I was supposed to HOLD SHORT of Runway 26R at Taxiway A5; when we were supposed to hold short of Taxiway A5 on Taxiway A; as the Tower Controller queried us why were not holding short of Taxiway A5. There was also a lot of activity on the Tower Control radio. B737-800 Non Flying Captain reported a taxiway incursion and referenced the Tower's timing giving the taxi instructions.
Aircraft: A321
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

[I] was Captain on [this] flight; approximately 90 minutes into the flight and level at FL 290 an ECAM warning message was generated. FUEL ACT XFR FAULT. After confirming it was not an immediate action or an ECAM exception and confirming a fault with the transfer of fuel from the additional center tanks I completed the ECAM procedure; which was unsuccessful. As directed by the procedure a descent was made to FL270 and another attempt was made to transfer fuel; with no success. ECAM procedure was then completed and QRH follow Up procedures were applied; which included FUEL ACT UNUSABLE (321) and ECAM supplemental. After calculating usable fuel on board; Dispatch and Maintenance Operation Center (MOC) were contacted. With insufficient fuel on board to continue to the destination; and adhering to the QRH directed maximum flight time of 2.5 hours; MOC requested; if possible; a diversion to [airport ZZZ]. Dispatch was given Fuel On Board (FOB) and usable FOB and concurred with MOC to divert to ZZZ. I requested ZZZ weather; new route; fuel burn and amended release. FAs and Passengers were advised of diversion; given arrival time and FAs were requested to prepare the cabin. Dispatch was advised of landing weight in ZZZ and I accomplished QRH overweight landing procedure; including confirming landing distance required. Flight Manual (FM) 1 was reviewed for diversion/overweight guidance. ATC [was advised] and normal landing was accomplished using longest available runway in ZZZ adhering to overweight landing procedures. Required Aircraft Maintenance Log (AML) entries were made upon gate arrival. Flight continued to [original destination] after 90 minute delay at gate. [Report Narrative Contained No Additional Information.] An A321 ECAM alerted FUEL ACT XFR FAULT; but crew ECAM actions were unable to resolve the fault so with insufficient fuel to reach their filed destination; the flight diverted for maintenance.
Aircraft: SMALL AIRCRAFT; LOW WING; 1 ENG; RETRACTABLE GEAR
Phase of flight: Initial Climb
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC

1. Prior to departure from ZZZ; I requested the ZZZ Ground Controller to set me up with VFR flight following to my destination. They responded by saying that they were unable; but to contact ATC once airborne. 2. I departed ZZZ at XA:25 local time. Tower requested I fly runway heading on departure.3. Around 7;000 feet MSL; the Tower requested I fly west to accommodate incoming traffic. Which I complied with.4. I wasn't completely due west yet; when ZZZ Tower advised that I was clear of their Airspace; to assume my own navigation; and to contact Center for flight following. I tried reaching Center twice without a response. Although Center could hear me; Center would not acknowledge my transmission. The reason I know they could hear me; is because I could hear them.5. All of a sudden I heard ATC request for Aircraft Y to exercise evasive action as they were headed straight for me. I had Aircraft Y on my screen with the help of ADSB; so I deviated south to avoid an incursion. 6. I finally got acknowledgment from ATC about 3 minutes after the event. 7. The Controller provided me with a squawk; then instructed me to write down a phone number. 8. I requested the controllers initials so as to document the parties involved; but he denied my request. 9. ATC then transferred me to another frequency. 10. Reason for possible collision: 1. Ground control at ZZZ unwillingness to set me up with flight following prior to departure. 2. ATC's delay/unwillingness to acknowledge my transmission. 3. Tower at ZZZ erroneous radar vectors that could have put me in a collision course with the oncoming Aircraft Y without ATC's knowledge. 4. Lack of communication between ZZZ Tower and Center. 11. To prevent future possible mid-air collisions; I would advise that Ground/Tower at ZZZ to be willing to set up VFR departing aircraft with flight following prior to departure on their clearance delivery frequency. If ATC is ready for departing traffic; they could advise aircraft before it is too late. Pilot reported attempting to receive flight following from Center; and being involved in a NMAC.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

We anticipated a high load-factor on flight ZZZ-ZZZ1 as our pairing showed about XX bookings; so blocking all six rows may not be possible.We decided that if for no other reason than consistency for all FA crews; we would try to uphold the seating restrictions of 3 rows FWD and AFT. While I may feel fine personally allowing customers to sit in one additional row; and another FA two rows; some FAs may not feel comfortable allowing any leeway unless they had to.We had to redirect many customers back FWD because the Operations Agent refused to make a PA about the restrictions prior to boarding and the customers don't always pay attention to our PAs onboard.There were (understandably) a few frustrated customers; but we tried to explain the reasoning. We feel like there should be a bit more definition. It's very complicated when we don't have assigned seating and people just sit where their boarding pass tells them. If we block 6 rows total; that means we can't have more than X number of passengers on this type of aircraft (leaving an open middle seat between them); and with middle seats filled that brings us to a maximum of X number of passengers while still keeping our 6 rows.Can we possibly get some guidance on how to best handle this? I was trying to be consistent for every other FA's sake; so that customers understand what's expected. While I wouldn't tell a customer this; they have a choice in flying...and their travel should be limited to essential only. Plus; they don't all wear masks etc. Crews do not have a choice; we have to come to work and these restrictions are there to protect us. It puts us in a very uncomfortable position to have to manage our own safety in this way without any support or guidance.Hopefully this doesn't continue for much longer; but at the end of the day either our safety matters; or it doesn't. We can't expect Customers to do what we ourselves aren't even being consistent with and I shouldn't have to feel like the bad guy for protecting not only my own safety; but the safety of my crew.We need clarity. We need access to better signage (buckling seatbelts means nothing). We need OPS to make a PA about this when they announce we aren't doing service. We need to know it's ok to push back if we need to. Some Customers are used to doing as they please and right now there's not as much autonomy in their choices. Flight Attendant reported concerns with COVID-19 guidelines on blocking or not blocking seats and making reference to Flight Attendant/passenger safety.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Legal placard of #1 Generator; APU operation required for back up generator per MEL. APU serviced prior to initial departure per logbook placard and an uneventful first leg was completed. On the next leg; about 45 minutes from destination the APU failed which resulted in a single electrical power source operation. The QRH directs a landing at the nearest suitable airport. I deemed ZZZ the nearest suitable for landing; declared an emergency for priority handling and landed. I commend my First Officer for his outstanding assistance during this event. In the future; I will consider day/night and weather considerations before accepting an aircraft with a deferred generator. There should be weather minima associated with the placarding of a generator to prevent this from occurring again. When dispatched with one generator inoperative the flight crew of a B737-800 was forced to divert to their nearest suitable airport when the APU; required to be operative to provide a secondary electrical power source; failed enroute.
Aircraft: CITATIONJET (C525/C526) - CJ I / II / III / IV
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

[During the flight]; we had a baggage smoke annunciation. We identified the annunciator and canceled the alarm. I called for the checklist and completed it. We [requested ATC assistance] and were cleared direct to the airport. We landed on Runway XX uneventfully. There was no smoke present upon landing and we were escorted to the ramp by fire vehicles. Once on the ramp we deplaned safely while fire crews examined the baggage compartments in both the nose and the tail. No smoke was found. During descent we got a Baggage Smoke annunciator and master warning. Captain called for the QRC which we completed. We [advised ATC] and requested direct to the field. We also requested fire and rescue to meet us. The Captain briefed the passengers. We landed and were met by the fire trucks and crew. We determined there was no smoke or fire and then taxied to the FBO. The fire crew examined both baggage compartments and the cabin using a thermal cameras. No hot spots were detected. Passengers remained calm and thanked us afterward. C525 flight crew reported a baggage compartment smoke warning; resulting in an unscheduled landing.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Landing; Taxi
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

We took off out of ZZZ to ZZZ1 for a night ETOPS flight. Everything was normal. Although the crew was current; all hadn't flown much in the past XX months due to COVID. We briefed this fact and were aware that we would all have to be on our toes due to the fact that our flying skills were rusty.The flight was normal. We operated the flight very close to the flight plan.After a normal approach and smooth landing; we taxied to the gate. After shutting down the engines and performing the Parking Checklist; we were surprised to see an overweight landing message being printed. We had landed approximately 700 pounds overweight.We sent the appropriate overweight landing code and I called local maintenance to report the issue. Air carrier Captain reported an overweight landing at destination airport caused by failure to monitor fuel burn during flight. Captain cited rusty pilot skills caused by COVID inactivity as a contributing factor.
Aircraft: PA28
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was relieving a controller off of Finals and getting ready to brief my trainee on the position she was about to get into. I put my presets up and I notice Aircraft X at 2800 feet inside of the 3000 foot Minimum Vectoring Altitude (MVA) abeam and north of the antennas. I told the trainee to wait a second and asked the relieved controller 'what's he doing again?' The answer was 'direct ELREN because he wanted the visual.' I called the Operations Manager (OM) over and asked had the rules changed for discontinuing vertical separation from an obstruction? He said 'no...I don't think so'. Aircraft X was at 2300 feet past the antennas. I asked if he had the airport in sight. He said yes; I have the airport in sight; however he was looking for runway 4. I cleared him for the Visual Approach runway 4 and switched him to the Tower. I asked my OM who listened to the audio if Aircraft X descended on his own. He was given a descend and maintain by the previous controller.Controllers should know the rules and not be lazy and giving in to what the pilot wants. An aircraft [had] been vectored on left base to Runway 4 for Hobby airport. I descended the aircraft to 2000 feet in a 3000 feet MVA; the aircraft was clear of the obstruction on the north side more than 2 3/4 of a mile but the circle is 3 miles.I just need to bring my MVA maps on next time. I90 Controllers reported that a PA28 aircraft was on a vector below the Minimum vectoring Altitude and less than three miles from the obstruction depicted on the radar display.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

There was forecast to be some turbulence along route. Around XA20 we discussed climbing because we were starting to get moderate chop and light turbulence. The Captain sent the CPDLC (Controller Pilot Data Link Communication) message and requested FL360 due to weather. While waiting for instructions; we noticed an aircraft behind us on TCAS (Traffic Collision Avoidance System) at FL360. I verbalized that the request will get denied due to traffic. At XA23 we got the message that said 'UNABLE REQUESTED ALTITUDE DUE TO TRAFFIC' all in caps like all ATC CPDLC messages. Below that line there was 'Climb and maintain FL350' in all lowercase. We saw the unable and accepted the message. The climb instructions were not observed and we maintained FL340. At XB15 we received a message to confirm altitude; you were cleared to climb and maintain FL350 about an hour ago. The Captain and I then went through all the log and found the missed clearance. We coordinated with ATC and determined we would stay at FL340. The confusion on my part came into effect because we [were] used to seeing instructions from ATC in all caps and the previous message below [was] in lower case. The message that cleared us to climb and maintain FL350 was not in the same format as other messages we received. The UNABLE CLIMB portion in all caps and then the climb and maintain in lower case led me to believe that was the previous message. I went back though all of our ATC messages and they all followed that same format with ATC in bold and our response in lower case. At XA21 we entered an area of moderate turbulence; so we sent a CPDLC (Controller Pilot Data Link Communications) request to climb to FL360 due to weather. At XA23 we received a response in large lettering; 'UNABLE REQUESTED ALTITUDE DUE TO TRAFFIC;' followed by small lettering; 'climb to and maintain FL350.' We missed the clearance to climb to FL350 and maintained FL340. At XB15 we received a CPDLC message asking us to confirm altitude; stating we were cleared to FL350 about an hour ago. At XB16 we responded to inquiry; stating we saw unable FL360; do you want us at FL350 or can we stay at FL340. At XB22 [Center] responded; 'WE DID UNABLE FL360 BUT CLEARED YOU TO FL350 AT THAT TIME. You can stay at FL340.'I believe the difference in the size of the lettering on the XA23 CPDLC message led to the error of missing our clearance to FL350 along with the fact that we had not requested FL350. Nice of [Center] to do; but we missed it. I will not be reading any more CPDLC messages off the First Officer's FMC (Flight Management Computer). From now on I will select ATC on my FMC; review silently and confirm with the First Officer that we've seen the clearance in its entirety. Yes we acknowledge [Center's] XA23 message; but perhaps [Center] could have asked us to confirm altitude sooner? B737 flight crew reported missing clearance from ATC to climb.