Aryan95614/aerograph-asrs huggingface dataset:
Aircraft: C172
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

I took off with full fuel; 36 gallons; that I verified on the ground. I used [a] website to plan the flight. At 110 knots TAS [my route] was planned to take 3:45. Using the performance charts I estimated 2.9 gallons to climb to an altitude of 8;500 feet and then a fuel burn of 8 gallons per hour in cruise.Approximately 15 NM from my destination the engine began to sputter and power was reduced. I had begun a descent at the request of Approach from 8;500 feet to 4;500 feet. When I recognized the fuel starvation I informed ATC and requested vectors to the best landing area as well as information on the local terrain. There was also a 172 in the area that gave local information. I spotted a nice field with little obstruction and chose to land at that spot. I was able to make the approach to landing without further incident.After landing; with the assistance of the landowner; I purchased 10 gallons of auto fuel at a local gas station and poured 5 gallons in each wing tank. In the process spilling around .5 gallons from each tank.After being released by the local authorities and the FAA I started the aircraft; performed a run-up and attempted to take off. During the roll; at 40 KIAS I hit a small bump that made the aircraft become airborne with the stall warning horn. I rejected the takeoff and came to a stop at the end of the runway.I taxied the aircraft for a longer takeoff roll and attempted to depart again. I was able to depart the field and land at my destination without further incident. C172 pilot reported making an off airport landing because of fuel starvation.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

During our approach briefing; First Officer pointed out that there was an antennae approximately nine miles to the southwest of AVL that is 5;049 feet tall and that Approach Control would leave us high until we were clear of that. While approaching the airport; we were given a descent from 6;000 feet to 5;100 feet. It was during this descent that we received our 'Terrain' GPWS caution alert. We were on vectors at this time due to the First Officer requesting vectors for our RNAV 35 approach. This was done because Center had left us at a high altitude until about 15 miles from AVL and we needed time to descend. Our position at the time of the GPWS caution was approximately 2.5 miles to the southwest of the fix ZICZU. Immediately upon receiving the caution; we notified Approach Control; and added that we were now climbing to 6;000 feet. I then reminded the First Officer that there was a note on our Jeppesen REF plates that says that high rates of descent could result in GPWS alerts (our descent rate was approximately 1;500 FPM). The cautions did not stop until we were at 6;000. Approach Control replied that the Minimum Safe Altitude in that region was 5;100 feet and that we were fine. Upon reaching 6;000; we informed Approach Control that we had AVL in sight. We were cleared for the visual and turned towards the final approach course. Once we were established; we descended down to 4;200 feet for the fix ZICZU and continued the approach. We received no further GPWS alerts.We complied with the GPWS caution directive to 'Pull Up' that we received during our climb to 6;000 feet. Perhaps the northwesterly winds had blown us close enough to the fix AVEBE which is about 13 miles to the southwest of AVL that the terrain database triggered the GPWS alerts. The Minimum Safe Altitude in this region is 6;200 feet. In the future; I could not descend as fast as 1;500 FPM and can be more proactive at requesting a lower altitude from Center well before entering the terminal area. Air carrier Captain reported a GPWS event during approach to AVL airport requiring a pull up maneuver.
Aircraft: DHC8
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Reaching top of climb; we got a master warning FUSELAGE DOOR and; upon consulting the doors page on the MFD; the galley service door showed open. There was a pressure 'bump' when the warning occurred but within 15 seconds the pressurization system returned to normal. Per the checklist we consulted with the aft Flight Attendant and she visually confirmed that the galley service door handle was no longer locked. We advised her that; per the checklist; she should not touch the door and could reposition herself to a passenger seat if she felt that was a safer option. She chose to move to row 18. The checklist advised to LAND IMMEDIATELY AT THE NEAREST SUITABLE AIRPORT. We consulted with Dispatch and decided to divert to ZZZ; which was our closest airport in terms of time. Advised ATC; FA and passengers and continued to a normal landing. The passengers were bused to their destination and we went to the hotel for a much needed rest. A Q-400 flight crew diverted to the nearest suitable airport when the aft galley door came unlocked during flight.
Aircraft: LIGHT TRANSPORT
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

I was taxiing for takeoff at MTJ. As we approached Runway 13/31 I advised my First Officer (FO) that we were about to cross a runway. I looked left and called clear left. He looked right and said clear right. I asked him to announce our crossing. He did so. After crossing 13/31 on our way to 17/35 I noticed that the frequency was awfully quiet. I looked down at the FMS and saw that my FO had inadvertently put in 122.28 instead of 122.8 for the UNICOM frequency. After he corrected the frequency we heard the conversation of a small low wing airplane that had apparently aborted his takeoff on Runway 31 because we had crossed it. He sounded upset and said that we had made no calls and crossed his runway. Realized only after we heard the conversation on the proper Unicom frequency. My FO inputting the wrong frequency for Unicom into the FMS. Also; my FO failing to see the departing traffic when he cleared right. The only reaction after the fact was to acknowledge that my FO had failed to see the departing traffic on Runway 31. To be more vigilant when inputting frequencies into the FMS and making sure the runway is in fact clear before crossing the runway. [Report narrative contained no additional information.] Business jet flight crew reported crossing a runway while transmitting on the incorrect CTAF frequency which caused another aircraft to abort their takeoff.
Aircraft: C172
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Instructor and passenger were traveling northeast from ZZZ on a training flight; approximately 20 miles north-east of ZZZ; a large amount of smoke was encountered in the cockpit. Instructor immediately closed cabin heat vent; and secured all non essential electronics and opened the windows and cabin vents; executed a 180 degree turn; flew back towards ZZZ and [advised ATC]. Upon completion of the initial actions; smoke in the cockpit was vacuumed out of the cabin and whatever component that was causing it seemed to have been secured; as the smoke stopped. No further issues nor injuries occurred. Upon landing; the plane was taxied back to [FBO] where it was secured and evacuated until cleared by the local fire chief. Upon the chief clearing the aircraft; it was tied down; chocked; and is awaiting further action by [FBO] personnel. C-172 Flight Instructor reported encountering smoke in the cockpit and returning to departure airport.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

During cruise the Standby Power Off light illuminated. The QRH directed us to place the Standby Power switch in the BAT position; which we did. The First Officer then noticed that the C5 Bat Bus Sect 2 circuit breaker was popped on the P-6-5 Standby Power Control Unit and that the illumination of the Standby Power light may have been coincident with his retrieving his personal bag from the area in front of the P-6- 5 panel and possibly inadvertently pulling it out. We contacted Dispatch and advised Maintenance of the situation but they did not want us to reset the circuit breaker and directed us to divert for repairs. We advised ATC that we were diverting and declaring a precautionary emergency since we did not know if the breaker had popped on its own and the Battery Bus appeared to be unpowered although there was no drain on the ships batteries. Maintenance replaced the Standby Power system and we continued the flight without incident. It would be helpful if Maintenance Control had the ability to communicate to the flight crew the various systems that would be affected when a particular circuit breaker is open. B737-700 Captain reports the Standby Power Off light illuminated in cruise. QRH procedures are complied with and it is discovered that a circuit breaker is tripped on the P-6-5 Standby Power Control panel. The First Officer may have inadvertently tripped it retrieving his bag from the area but Maintenance directs a diversion for repairs.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

I went to check the cabin temperature for the flight. When I arrived at the gate I noticed pc unit was switched off; and mechanic was walking down the jet bridge. I asked him if [he] switched it off. He said it was cold on board so he switched it off and will call back if it needs to be [turned] back on. While I was inside aircraft checking aircraft cabin temps mechanic told me he smells fuel; I came down the jet bridge and I noticed wet around the pc air unit. So I checked if it's a fuel spill. Fuel was still dripping out of the unit nonstop; fuel was spilled from the Jet bridge where pc unit was staged to all the way down to taxi lane. I notified my supervisor; he respond quickly and showed up to the gate; he asked me to bring fuel spill cart and we start cleaning the fuel and secured the spilled area. Ground personnel reported a fuel leak/spill from pc unit on jet bridge.
Aircraft: CRJ900
Phase of flight: Landing
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

We were flying a Visual Approach. It was nighttime and VMC. At some point below 100 feet in the flare Tower cleared the aircraft on the intersecting runway for takeoff. As our aircraft touched down I visually saw the other aircraft ahead and to the right of us. This means we had not cleared the intersecting runway. To my knowledge they had not started the takeoff roll yet; but they were cleared to takeoff of the intersecting runway before we even rolled through the runways intersection. As we cleared the runway at the taxiway; I queried the Tower and he said that we were through the runway intersection when he issued the takeoff clearance for the other aircraft. This is not true and could have resulted in aircraft damage or injury to those onboard. The Tower Controller had not verified our location before clearing the other aircraft on the intersecting runway for takeoff. CRJ-900 Captain reported that; while landing; he heard ATC clear an aircraft for takeoff from an intersecting runway before he had rolled through the intersection.
Aircraft: NO AIRCRAFT
Phase of flight: unknown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

A controller came in to work. He called medical to see if he could take some medicine. They no longer have a doctor on call 24/7. It is now [three hours later] and we still do not have a returned call from medical about whether or not the controller can work. Our job requires us to be able to work or know if we are able to work 24/7 so we need to be able to get an answer about medications 24/7. I don't know when this started but it has been this way for at least 6 months. From what I have been told the doctor will not accept calls from 10pm till 8am. I don't know if this is Western; Mountain; Central; or Eastern Time zone. This is unacceptable. We need to be able to get an answer about medication immediately.Have someone available 24/7 to answer questions about medications or stop the airplanes from 10pm to 8am. ZOB Controller reports of a Controller coming to work and attempting to find out from medical if they can take some medicine and work. Time passes and there is no answer from medical. Controller complains about not being able to find out if a Controller can work while taking a specific type of medicine.
Aircraft: EC135
Phase of flight: Takeoff / Launch
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

On departure the Number 1 ENG FAIL light illuminated on the CAD and VEMD with no supporting indications of an engine failure. This was a repeat of symptoms that I experienced in this airframe two days ago. I was enroute to home base; severe thunderstorms were expected in the vicinity and there was no means of getting the aircraft under cover at [destination] so I elected to continue. On approach to the hospital the lights extinguished. Aircraft secured; fault written up in logbook and Maintenance alerted. [We] provided Maintenance with observations from this event that differed from my previous event to assist with troubleshooting. Eurocopter pilot reported Number 1 ENG FAIL light illuminated with no corroborating indications; so he continued to destination. Reporter stated he had seen this same false indication on this aircraft previously.
Aircraft: M-20 F EXECUTIVE 21
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Approximately 1 hour 40 minutes into flight; during cruise; there was an over voltage indication. While trouble shooting the issue; there was a pop noise and a puff of smoke from the right side under the glare shield. The smoke did not continue on after the initial pop. [Advised ATC]; shed all non essential electric load; pulled the alternator CB; received vectors toward closest airfield and landed safely. Landing gear; flaps; and boost pump all worked normal with battery power. M20 pilot reported diverting due to an alternator failure.
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

We were descending along the ZEEKK arrival into IAH. Crossing SOFFT we were cleared the ILS Runway 27. When we loaded the approach we choose SILLS as the IAF. We missed there was and inset on the approach plate which included another IAF CLSIK and the intermediate fix GRUNG. The depiction on the chart is not intuitive and easy to miss. Having been cleared the approach; we flew direct to SILLS. The approach advised we had skipped CLSIK and GRUNG; ATC did not raise a fuss and we landed without further incident. Sounded like we were not the first to miss this.Error in understanding between ATC and the flight crew. Also the Jeppesen plate is not intuitive; lists multiple IAF's for the same approach. I think the approach transitions should be included to the east of the approach and not as an inset. The line indicating other fixes to the east is obscured by writing on the chart.Needless to say this error will result in being more vigilant in the future when transitioning from the arrival to the approach as well as all other phases of flight. An E170 First Officer reported that there was an inset on the approach plate which included another IAF (initial approach fix) that was missed.
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Prior to crossing ZZZZZ while in icing conditions [we] received WG A/ICE FAIL message and then ICE COND - A/I INOP message on EICAS. After complying with AOM1 checklist reset approach speed for Vref 45+30 KIAS and insured calculated landing distance exceeded available landing distance. Upon landing used max reverse. Emergency not declared due to lack of time prior to touching down. EMB-145LR Captain approaching final approach fix reported receiving EICAS messages WG A/ICE FAIL message and then ICE COND - A/I INOP. The appropriate adjustment to V speeds was made and aircraft landed safely.
Aircraft: A320
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict

I was working an increasingly busier session on RADAR at the Sector 68. The E170 was northwest and level at FL340; requesting FL320 for moderate chop. I descended the E170; switched communications to Sector 67; and lost the Data Block for an A320 in a mess of Data Blocks; who was eastbound level at FL330. When I realized separation was going to be lost; I attempted to turn the A320 away from the E170; but the instructions were not received until the third transmission; for some apparent reason. As the A320 was making the turn I instructed; Sector 67 was turning the E170 away from the A320 at the same time; and separation was regained; but the A320 responded to a RA which instructed them to climb; and separation was lost on the next RADAR hit. Work on my scan; but why would TCAS climb an aircraft into one at a higher altitude? ZOB Controller described a loss of separation event when failing to note conflicting traffic prior to issuing a descent. The reporter stated the TCAS RA resolution provided compounded the conflict.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

I was the X FA and I disarmed my door; but forgot at first to move my door flag to the disarmed position; I gave the Gate agent a thumbs up; and when she didn't move; I realized my mistake; moved the flag to the correct position; gave a thumbs up and then we opened the L1 door. Triple check myself before giving a thumbs up! I was concerned about getting my face mask on for door opening and deplaning and I allowed this to interfere with my usual focus. In the future I will put this on after the door is opened since I can't wear the mask and use the intercom to call to the back. Flight Attendant reported initially forgetting to move the door flag to the disarmed position due distraction from putting a mask on to avoid COVID-19 exposure.
Aircraft: CESSNA SINGLE PISTON UNDIFFERENTIATED OR OTHER MODEL
Phase of flight: Landing
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft

I arrived at the flight training [facility] for first three hours of ground school and then planned out a solo cross country with me planning to do three touch and go's and then return to [the departure airport]. After lunch; my instructor and I did the preflight and found the airplane to be fine. The weather was clear; but the wind was gusty and the flight was turbulent. During my flight I was flying at 2;500 FT and in contact with ATC Approach the entire time. Approximately 10 miles out; I called and requested three touch and go's and was cleared to start a left downwind. While on the downwind I was cleared to land. My approach was normal; my speed and altitude were both normal. At the last minute when I was flaring just a few feet off the ground; there seemed to be a gust of wind that caused the plane to float; as the plane settled back to the ground; the landing was bumpy; and I felt as if the plane hit hard on the nose and thought the propeller had struck the ground; so I elected to kill the power and not try to go-around. The plane then bounced several times and I tried to stay on the rudders and keep the plane straight on the runway. At one point; the front nose wheel came off the aircraft and I continued to remain calm and keep the plane as straight as I could with the rudder. The plane finally came to a stop on the runway. I immediately called the Tower and told them that I had crashed; but did not get a response after about thirty seconds. I shut off the lights; but left the avionics Master switch on; just in case I needed to try to contact Tower again. I then got out of the plane and tried to call 911 on my cell phone; as I had been on the ground for some time and the Tower had not responded or sent anyone to assist me. After dialing 911 I let the line ring several times; but received no response. I then reached into the plane to put my headset on and call Tower again; and this time received a response. I was told to shut off all electrical equipment and get out of the plane and walk thirty feet away. I did as I was told and shortly after that people started arriving on the scene. I then called my instructor and informed her of the incident. I was not injured in any way; so required no medical care. I stayed [with the aircraft] until airport personnel took me to the FBO. My instructor then flew [over] by herself to pick me up; and she and I both met with the FAA. My instructor and I then flew back to [the departure airport]. The student pilot on a solo cross country flight experienced gusty winds during landing resulting in damage to the nose landing gear of the Cessna 162.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

The Captain and I discussed not doing a Visual Approach. Passing through about 9;000 feet; we were going direct to the FAF; conditions where ceiling and visibility unlimited. Approach cleared us for a Visual Approach. We accepted and started descending to 7;000 feet; the altitude for FAF. At about 7;300 or 7;200 feet ATC advised us the Minimum Vectoring Altitude was 7;500 feet. The Captain immediately stopped descending and went to 7;500 feet until just outside the FAF. We made a normal stable approach.We didn't want to do a Visual Approach when we briefed it. We were lured in by the visual conditions and the fact that that everything was stable and non rushed. It was late. Lesson is; do not do night visuals at airports that you are not to familiar with; try to do what you brief especially around terrain. I did get distracted when I lost my flight deck WiFi when I was trying to pull up a new ATIS on iPad. Don't do visual approaches at night; especially near terrain. Fly what you brief. While descending on the arrival and approximately 10 miles south of ZZZ; ATC asked us to report the field in sight. It was clear and unlimited visibility. So we called it. When cleared visual [Runway] XXL; I began a descent out of 9;000 feet. I felt that we were within the airspace; but when descending to the FAF altitude of 7;000 feet and at approximately 7;200 feet; we got a call from ATC saying altitude alert. Climb to 7;500 [feet] min vectoring altitude. We immediately climbed to 7;500 [feet] and continued approach. ATC handed us to Tower and nothing else said.During cruise; my First Officer and myself went through all company pages and arrival and approach plates. We discussed terrain and even said that we shouldn't accept a visual approach since it was night time. However; we got direct to FAF and not a usual vector outside the FAF. ATC asked us to report the field. We both evaluated that we were comfortable accepting the visual. We should have stayed with the plan because after being cleared approach; we descended below the ATC min vectoring altitude. Bottom line; be conservative and when flying approaches at night; I will no longer accept a visual approach. B737-800 Flight Crew reported they descended below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude while conducting a night time Visual Approach.