Aryan95614/aerograph-asrs huggingface dataset:
Aircraft: MEDIUM TRANSPORT
Phase of flight: Takeoff / Launch
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

I was working the Local Control position during a west operation. Traffic was very light with only a few departures for Runway 28 and a couple of arrivals for Runway 33L. Ground Control asked to cross Runway 28 at R1 with Aircraft Y behind my aircraft that was on departure roll. I approved Ground Control's request to cross. After my scan to make sure I had the required spacing for my next departure; I issued Aircraft X a departure clearance off of Runway 28. Right after the Aircraft X flight began takeoff roll; Ground Control alerted me of Aircraft Y flight crossing down the field. I immediately canceled Aircraft X takeoff clearance; and advised the aircraft to stop the roll due to traffic crossing midfield. Aircraft X stopped short of Taxiway Delta on Runway 28. The aircraft was then taxied clear of the runway and into a hold area to reconfigure. I did not use a memory aid for the crossing which would have aided in preventing this incident.My recommendation for myself would be to utilize the memory aids regardless of the traffic complexity. This is not a facility issue. Management recently stressed the importance of memory aids in our local read and initial binder. Baltimore Local Controller reported approving an aircraft to cross a runway after the departing aircraft. Local then cleared an additional aircraft for takeoff before the aircraft had finished crossing downfield.
Aircraft: TECNAM P2012 TRAVELLER
Phase of flight: Takeoff / Launch
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Takeoff was normal until rotation. Rotated at 75 knots; but didn't lift off until 100 knots. Verified flaps were at takeoff. Climb-out was at 100 knots. At around 400 feet AGL; started a turn and was scanning the instruments when the stall warning went off. The airspeed had dropped to 77 knots. almost instantly. I performed a stall recovery and proceeded to climb to 3;000 feet MSL. At cruise; I noticed all 3 airspeed indicators were showing different airspeeds and the altimeters were different as well. The true airspeed and ground speed were displaying higher than indicated. I pulled the ALT static air and pilot airspeed dropped about 15 knots; but I could not tell which reading was correct. I informed ZZZ Departure and returned for a visual landing. I verified my altitude with ATC and the pilot altitude was correct but the PFD2 was showing about 200 feet lower. On approach airspeed was showing 120 - 130 knots; but the pitch attitude was too high and the controls were mushy. Post-flight walkaround found pitot and static openings OK; but the static system drain lock open. P2012 Traveller Captain reported performing an air turnback due to unreliable airspeed and altimeter functions caused by the open static system drain.
Aircraft: SMALL TRANSPORT; LOW WING; 2 RECIP ENG
Phase of flight: taxi
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown

I'm writing to bring attention to fatigue issues with FAR 135 [dispatchers]. I am a Dispatcher. Specifically; since there are no restrictions on the amount of hours a [dispatcher] can work; leadership at my company allows some [Dispatchers] to work extremely abnormal amounts of hours. Specifically; [Dispatchers] are allowed to work a double shift for several consecutive days. 'Double Shifts' are an average of 16 hours long and can go as long as 20; always with no formal breaks. Younger [Dispatchers] are signing up for this many hours for the Overtime Pay. However; this is leading to many mistakes that are relatively minor; for now. Missing radio calls from pilots in the air; not recognizing adverse weather conditions along a flight path until someone alerts the [Dispatchers]. Not recognizing when a pilot is in danger of going over duty and/or flight time limits; etc. Other [Dispatchers] working nearby are assisting in identifying and correcting these mistakes and lack of recognition from fatigued [Dispatchers]; but it is not in the context of a healthy CRM 'checks & balances' relationship nor positive teamwork.Due to staffing shortages; management appears to only be happy that all shifts are covered; and are not concerned about the overall cost and liability to all parties involved; especially our passengers. Certainly training and development can play a role in reducing these common mistakes. One only has to cite any number of fatigue studies done by the FAA to know that fatigue can make any of these small mistakes to become serious mistakes that could have grave consequences. After raising my concerns several times; and not wanting to face potential consequences of using my company's safety reporting system; I feel it prudent to report it here. Fatigue rules exist for Part 121 operations for a reason. Just because Part 135 operations involve fewer passengers; why safety should be allowed to be compromised. Safety systems work best when they are proactive; not when reacting to a worst-case event. I believe safety is being compromised by having zero duty time restrictions for [Dispatchers] at my [company]. Air taxi Dispatcher reported company Part 135 dispatchers are allowed to work very long hours and that fatigue has compromised safety.
Aircraft: NO AIRCRAFT
Phase of flight: Other General Ramp
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

There is a green fuel nuzzle connected to the gas fuel hose at the terminal fuel farm. All of the other gas nuzzle are black. The green ones indicates diesel. There are times when employees do not have their fuel farm key fob with them. They would pull to fuel farm and just ask someone to borrow their key fob or sometimes just tell the person to hand over the nuzzle when they are finish fueling their equipment; the green NON-STANDARD nuzzle can lead to serious equipment damage that can become costly to the company. For instance; let's say there is an employee there at the fuel farm utilizing the non-standard green nuzzle that is attached to the gas pump to refuel a gas powered piece of equipment. An unsuspecting fellow co-worker pulls up just when the person was about to finish gassing up his piece of equipment and to use the same fuel pump with the green nuzzle because he/she thinks it is diesel because that is the type of fuel their piece of equipment requires. This is piece of equipment can be an air start mobile cart or even a pushback tractor and on the equipment the cost can be substantial. Air carrier ramp worker reported the use of a non-standard fueling nozzle could lead to introduction of the incorrect fuel to ground equipment.
Aircraft: MD80
Phase of flight: Final Approach
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

I was the Pilot Monitoring. During this approach in daylight; Pilot Flying disconnected the autopilot and descended at the final approach fix. The aircraft descended below MDA [Minimum Descent Altitude] (400 feet MSL) and Pilot Monitoring informed of the altitude and Pilot Flying adjusted pitch and power to return to MDA. At the same time; we received an aural 'obstacle' and we were in the clear with the airport in sight and executed a normal landing. Instrument cross-check. As the Pilot Monitoring; paying more attention to the descent to MDA as opposed to cross checking the approach chart too much. I was Pilot Flying [a] daylight approach. I disconnected autopilot and manually flew approach. We descended below MDA [Minimum Descent Altitude] 400 feet MSL. Pilot Monitoring called below MDA and I corrected back up toward MDA with aural obstacle warning; and seconds later; we broke out in clear for visual landing. I disconnected autopilot because of aircraft wobble on localizer and should have kept autopilot on. MD-83 flight crew reported descending below the MDA while hand flying an ILS approach to MSY airport.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

During ZZZZZX arrival into ZZZ descended to 12;000 at ZZZZZ. Prematurely started descending to ZZZZZ1 (11;000) before reaching ZZZZZ2. ATC deleted speeds; was a little preoccupied checking speed; making sure I did not have a speed deviation. First flight in almost three months.I need better situational awareness. ZZZZZX Arrival; After we leveled off at 12;000 feet at ZZZZZ; the FO set next altitude of 11;000 feet for ZZZZZ1 with confirmation. Approach Control notified us of a new ATIS. During our level off at 12;000 feet I copied the new ATIS. I looked up at the PFD and noticed we had vacated 12;000 feet prior to ZZZZZ2; and shortly after crossed ZZZZZ2.[Suggest a] digital ATIS. Air carrier flight crew reported not making a crossing restriction during arrival.
Aircraft: EXTRA 200/300 SERIES
Phase of flight: Landing
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft

Suffice it to say that after touching down on a good 3-point landing with full control of the aircraft; on the rollout my left sneaker briefly got stuck on the left rudder pedal and then it started to lose the footing as I did the left-right; left-right continuous tapping that is required to control a tailwheel on the ground. So; with the tapping that is required in a tailwheel; with each tap after getting stuck; the left foot came more and more off the pedal; but I had to keep tapping to control the aircraft. While I slowed the aircraft down a lot; when my foot finally popped off the rudder pedal; the plane did about a ¼ loop to the left and the left landing gear snapped (as it is supposed to do when it receives excess side stress) and the left aileron scraped the runway. There was no real other damage [to the aircraft]; or to the runway; or any other aircraft. There were no injuries at all. As soon as the plane stopped; I turned the master and mags (magnetos) off and rotated the fuel lever into the off position. Tailwheel pilot reported that during landing rollout their shoe became stuck on the rudder pedal and eventually slipped off resulting in a partial group loop.
Aircraft: DHC8
Phase of flight: Takeoff / Launch
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

We taxied into position for takeoff. After advancing the power levers for takeoff the inboard and outboard roll spoiler caution lights illuminated. We advised ATC and taxied off the runway and called Dispatch. DHC100 First Officer reports inboard and outboard roll spoiler caution lights as the power levers are advanced for takeoff. Flight returns to the gate.
Aircraft: B777
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

We arrived on time into ZZZ. While being towed into parking; I felt that we were too close to the fence on my side. (Right). I advised the Captain to stop the pull. He immediately told the ground crew to stop the pull. They advised him that they had a wing walker and we were clear. They continued to pull the aircraft. I felt very sure that this was unsafe and for a second time announced; stop the pull; we are not going to clear the fence. The Captain once again stopped the ground crew immediately. This time a large group of people walked to the right side of the airplane and spent several minutes looking at the clearance. I could see that we had almost hit the fence pole; but until seeing the pics that a ground crew took; I didn't realize that we drove over the pole. Missing it by approximately 12 inches. The wing tip was about 2 feet past the pole.ZZZ was not ready for a 777 to arrive. We were pulled into the wrong spot that was designed for a 767. We found out later that our spot was changed due to a 747 coming at the last minute. The ground crew over rode the Captain's authority and assured us that we were clear.Better training for the ground crew involved. That spot is not suitable for a 777. Although I was very assertive; next time I will refuse to allow the airplane to put in jeopardy with me in the seat. I felt as a crew; we handled the situation well; but I also felt that we were not totally in charge of the push crew. Next time I feel I don't have a safe distance; I will contact the Chief Pilot for further guidance. B777 First Officer reported tow crew pulling aircraft into a gate not approved for B777 aircraft.
Aircraft: BEECH 1900
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Just a little confusion on my part. I was cleared direct to the FAF for the approach. The crossing altitude was high. I was cleared for the approach; being cleared direct to the fix; I was a little confused as to whether I should execute the procedure turn; because of the direction I was coming from. When I went to query the controller to confirm this; he became saturated with radio calls from other aircraft. I began the turn to intercept; got established on the inbound course; began descending to intercept; but was far too high on the glide slope; to safely get stabilized while inside the FAF. The controller gave me the hand off to tower. Knowing I was going to have to execute a steep descent to intercept the glide slope; I made the decision to level off and begin the missed approach. When I contacted tower; I notified them I was going missed; they instructed me to fly the published missed and contact Center. I reestablished contact with center; flew the published missed; and got the plane set-up for my next approach. What I could have done different. Exercised my PIC (Pilot in Command) authority and executed the procedure turn based off the angle I was approaching the final approach course from; and my high crossing altitude and communicate with ATC earlier and more assertively about my concerns. How the system can be improved. Provide clear guidance in the AIM; Instrument Flying Handbook; and Instrument Procedures Hand book; about when to execute a procedure turn when cleared direct a fix. Depending on the angle you are going to intercept the course and where the fix is located on the approach one may or may not necessitate a procedure turn to get established. When cleared to a fix are you technically on a vector because you are going from a point in space direct to a fix? Are you essentially flying a self-assigned heading via GPS to that point? This is a bit of a gray area that could use some clarification. On GPS approaches this is fairly clear; especially on approaches that are constructed within a Terminal Arrival Area (TAA). On GPS approaches without a TAA and non GPS approaches; this can be a little confusing. BE1900 Captain reported being unsure if they should complete a procedure turn for an approach.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Landing
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe

Air Carrier X was [on] landing roll. Thought they were going to make turn off onto Runway 22R. Aircraft never turned off the runway. Was distracted by other aircraft checking in. Thought I had enough space for second arrival. When I looked out window saw second arrival touching down. No alarms for runway occupied were sounded. [Need to] verify aircraft makes turn off on runway. Tower Controller failed to note that a landing aircraft missed the assigned runway turn off; allowing a second aircraft to land without appropriate separation.
Aircraft: BEECHJET 400
Phase of flight: Final Approach
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

I was training a Developmental on arrival radar. Aircraft X inbound to LWV; a satellite airport just outside of our airspace that we sometimes work approaches into. Aircraft was descended to 030 and they requested direct the final approach fix for the RNAV 9 approach to set up for the visual. Developmental first gave the wrong fix to the wrong approach and cleared the aircraft for the RNAV 18. After pilots second request they were given direct the final approach fix. When the aircraft was observed crossing the fix and turning toward the airport the developmental advised them to report the airport in sight; to which they replied they were established on the approach and would call the airport in sight. I questioned the Developmental on the pilot advising they were established on an approach they were not cleared for. Our radar coverage is not good in that area and we lost the track on the aircraft occasionally; but on the next good hit the aircraft was observed at about 020; when the last assigned altitude was 030. I told the Developmental about the altitude discrepancy and at about that time the aircraft reported the airport in sight and cancelled IFR. There was confusion on both sides with the aircraft proceeding to the final approach fix; advising they were established on an approach they were not cleared for; spotty radar coverage and the Developmental not knowing what to do. Also with it being a high performance aircraft all of this happened pretty quickly and before proper instructions could be given the aircraft cancelled IFR and was switched to advisory as they were within 2-3 miles of the airport. Immediately question the pilot when they advised they were established on the approach. HUF controller reported a BE40 was issued the wrong approach; sent to the wrong fixes; and descended below the MVA while providing training.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Inflight Event / Encounter Bird / Animal

We took off out of ZZZ1 and at approximately 4;000 feet and I saw what appeared to be a bird fly past the FO's (First Officer's) windscreen. It was immediately followed by a loud impact noise. The smell of an animal through an engine entered the aircraft. Additionally a change in air noise happened. Almost like a panel was open. A check of the engines indicated that they were both operating normally; and I also checked the pressurization which was also normal. The FO and I quickly agreed that we should level off; which ATC granted. We told them we had hit a bird and would probably be returning to ZZZ1 or maybe ZZZ. At that time the FA (Flight Attendants) called about the smell and that we had hit something on the number two engine. They indicated that there was a hole or dent in the thing that goes around the engine. I asked if everyone was alright and they said 'yes'. I told them I would get back to them with more information. When I returned; the FO indicated that ATC had requested priority handling for us. We then agreed to stay in the area while we got a plan in order. We believed (based on our aircraft being approximately 8000 lbs over max landing weight; and the possibility that there could be some issues with the leading edge devices); we decided ZZZ was where we wanted to go to. I called ZZZ1 Operations and had them have Dispatch call us on frequency. Once on with us; we told him our plan and he agreed and said he would get things coordinated at ZZZ. With the FO flying; I ran the Diversion Checklist; and also got landing information for ZZZ. ATC planned for us to land on Runway XXR. We briefed the approach and talked about it again to make sure we had done everything; and were not missing anything. I also read the overweight landing information from the AOM out loud. When all checklists and notifications were complete (and on the approach) we transferred controls so that I could land the aircraft. After landing; we cleared the runway; shut down the number 2 engine; and had airport rescue inspect the aircraft for any smoke or liquids coming from the aircraft. They said all was normal. We the completed the performance [calculation for] brake cooling and found that no special restrictions were needed and we could cool at the gate. We taxied to the gate and deplaned all the Passengers into the terminal. On climbout after takeoff from Runway XXC at ZZZ1; we had a bird strike the Number 2 engine. Realizing there was aircraft damage; we ran all appropriate checklists; and diverted to ZZZ; due to the extra runway length and our overweight condition. Upon landing at ZZZ we were inspected by the Fire Department and ran brake cooling data. Both were normal. We then taxied to the gate and shut down the aircraft. B737-700 flight crew reported a diversion and landing after a bird strike to the right engine.
Aircraft: LEARJET 60
Phase of flight: Initial Climb
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Shortly after takeoff; while accelerating through approximately 180 KIAS; the primary electrical stabilizer pitch trim failed to respond to pitch down trim commands. This condition applied to commands from both the Captain's and Copilot's primary pitch trim switches. The decision was made to return to ZZZ. Landing and taxi was made without further incident. A Learjet 60 Captain reported the trim stabilizer failed to respond after takeoff resulting in a return to departure airport.
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I had a long; challenging day. One contributing factor was a van departure at XA:10 for a XA:50 check in. Typically; the van would depart at XA:30; but they had us go earlier due to shuttle availability. Additionally; this trip and preceding trips had various irregularities such as schedule changes and lengthy mechanical delays. This particular day was quite challenging. Our day was getting close to max FDP prior to the last leg. During my walk-around prior to the last leg; I observed what appeared to be hydraulic fluid near one of the brake calipers. Maintenance notified. The Maintenance Technician pumped the brakes; cleaned the area; and signed the logbook. I did not feel comfortable with this and spoke with the Duty Officer; Maintenance Technician; and Flight Operations Director. I explained that I experienced an identical problem in the past where the test was conducted (seemingly successfully); but on the next flight; brake fluid sprayed out and the caliper had to be replaced. It took a lot of discussion and explanation before I felt safe accepting the aircraft. By that time; I was fatigued from an intense day. I elected to report fatigued. At XL:48; we were provided rest until XX:15. E175 Captain reported calling in fatigued after a long challenging day involving maintenance delays.