Aryan95614/aerograph-asrs huggingface dataset:
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Initial Climb
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

To start out; ATC stated that no violations had occurred; only that this occurrence has occurred many times in the past. Therefore; I am filing this report. I personally contacted Tower and Center to speak to them about this issue; as Center told me on climbout that this was occurring frequently. Our flight plan is always filed as ALPIN2 KICKNE DCT SWEAT; but the clearance we received from Tower is ALPINE2 and either DIRECT SWEAT or the SWEAT TRANSITION.Now since all clearances are verbal; the confusion could arise if it is not clearly understood by the crew as to whether you are cleared DIRECT SWEAT or SWEAT TRANSITION. Yesterday we thought we were cleared ALPIN 2 then SWEAT; so on the taxi out we contacted Ground for clarification as to AFTER KICKNE DIRECT SWEAT? Ground stated 'I never stated KICKNE; I stated SWEAT.' So we flew the ALPIN 2 DIRECT SWEAT as our flight plan exactly stated but by doing this we bypassed BPI fix. B737 NG Captain reported recurring confusion over how a SID clearance was issued; resulting in deviation from the expected course.
Aircraft: A320
Phase of flight: Takeoff / Launch
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Captain set thrust levers to TOGA (Takeoff Go Around) for takeoff. At approximately 70 knots we received an Engine 1 compressor vane warning on the ECAM. Captain called My Aircraft and rejected the takeoff. I; Pilot Monitoring; called out 2 in reverse. Captain stopped on the runway. I notified ATC we rejected the takeoff. We shut the engine down and returned to the gate. Reject was initiated due to the ECAM Warning. Followed training and rejected the aircraft safely. On takeoff roll with TOGA (Takeoff Go-Around Power) power set; we received an engine 1 compressor vane fault at approximately 70 kts. I verbalized 'reject; my aircraft' and stopped the aircraft on the runway. I told the passengers to remain seated. ATC was informed. We taxied back to the gate. I made 2 AML (Aircraft Maintenance Log) entries: one was for the underlying ECAM and the other was to record the speed at the time of the reject. Maintenance was called. We switched airplanes and went to [Destination]. Cause due to Compressor Vane fault. A320 flight crew reported a rejected take-off due to engine compressor vane fault message.
Aircraft: PC-12
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict

There was a refueling track active blocking FL200B220 at the time. A PC12 was handed off at FL220 and I requested control to descend them. They were from the north moving south landing. When they checked on I descended them to 150 for the refueling track and start a slow descent for destination. I then received a call from approach NON-Radar sector requesting an altitude for a LJ60 off of ZZZ1 to ZZZ2. I approved 140 for the LJ60. When the LJ60 checked on freq I called them radar; and then stopped the PC12 at 170 so I could keep the LJ60 climbing to 160. I had put a circle on the PC12 and was waiting for them and the LJ60 to separate at which time the refueling aircraft would be opposite direction of the LJ60 and I would be able to climb the LJ60 to my top alt of 230. While waiting I received a call from requesting the LJ60 to be at 140 for traffic he had. I told him I would and immediately descended the LJ60 to 140 seeing the traffic. At that time I had in my mind that everyone was separated so no conflictions. I then had a thought of an issue at home and wrote myself a note about it; stuck it in my pocket and started my scan. Seeing what I had done I turned the PC12 to the west just as he was going though 161 and then in the hope that the LJ60 would see the PC12 called traffic trying to get visual and then climb the LJ60. The LJ60 did have the PC12 in sight and asked if he should climb or descend. I climbed him to FL190 under the refueling track. I was so surprised that I had trouble getting the heading out for the PC12 and stammering on frequency. I'm sure that was what leads the LJ60 to ask the question that he did.It was my distracting thought that took my attention away. We only occasionally have refreshers about these types of things; it is normally about things in the area; which has always been a problem. ARTCC Controller has a plan to separate aircraft; becomes distracted thinking about a personal situation; and loses separation between two aircraft.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

Parents stated their X year old child will not wear [a] mask when we were just about to take off. I was doing final walk through when I discovered [this]. Due to the timing I decided to not enforce mask policy. I stated to parents they may not be able to fly again if their child does not comply with policy. I asked customer service to meet plane to explain policy for their next flight. Please remove mask policy for children under 5 at minimum. Flight Attendant reported allowing a child to fly without wearing a face mask. The child had refused to wear it.
Aircraft: MEDIUM LARGE TRANSPORT; LOW WING; 2 TURBOJET ENG
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Wake turbulence-induced upset recovery at 6000 feet MSL which resulted in no damage or injuries. Upon executing the upset recovery procedure I asked ATC for a level off and inquired what was in front of us; to which I was told a CRJ 200; and a heavy B747 which was about 10 miles ahead and descending into ATL as well. TCAS and visual confirmation of this traffic was achieved. Given the traffic was ten miles away from us; nearly double the minimum safe distance; I am not sure that this could have been anticipated by any party involved. Air carrier First Officer reported a wake turbulence encounter on arrival into ATL 10 miles in trail of a B747 resulted in an upset.
Aircraft: CITATIONJET (C525/C526) - CJ I / II / III / IV
Phase of flight: Final Approach
Anomaly: Ground Excursion Taxiway

We were cleared for the ILS Runway 05 at CYYZ. We broke out just inside the outer marker and had the approach lights and runway in sight. There was rain over the north half of Runway 05 extending to the west. As we got over the approach lights and I began to reduce power to slow and begin the transition; we hit heavy rain and our forward visibility was greatly reduced. We were able to land but the rain intensified to where we could not see out the forward windows. We struggled to find the runway exit (H3) and were able to exit; but then continued slightly right onto an access road. We soon realized our mistake; notified ATC and were cleared for a 180 degree turn and hold short of Runway 05. Just as I was turning back onto the taxiway; I noticed what appeared to be a light that had the glass top knocked off. I was not sure if this was done by us or not; but we mentioned this to Toronto ATC and they sent a CFR truck out to check. We never heard of the findings of their investigation whether it was us or not. We thought it was possibly done by us as we had our flaps in the 'ground' position as we taxied off. We checked out our aircraft thoroughly once we cleared customs. I gave my name and phone number to CFR and secured the a/c for the evening. The next morning we inspected the aircraft again more thoroughly and again found no evidence of any impact with a light. CE525 Captain reports landing in a rain storm reducing forward visibility to near zero. Once off the runway on the desired taxiway an inadvertent turn onto a service road is made; requiring 180 turn back to the taxiway. No damage to the aircraft is reported.
Aircraft: A320
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

At the Captain's request I initiated a three way phone patch with Maintenance Control. My initial radio contact with the flight was very weak but readable so I completed the patch with Maintenance. After Maintenance Control came on line; however; the whole patch failed. I contacted the flight again with the same very weak but readable radio contact; brought Maintenance Control on the line but then couldn't re-raise the flight. The Captain then contacted me via our commercial radio link system and that connection was loud and clear. I requested that they make the patch to Maintenance Control as my phone system appeared not to be working well. They completed the initial patch successfully. However; when Engine Maintenance Control said the flight needed more input from Airframe Maintenance Control and tried to transfer the patch; there was a long silence. I finally asked the Captain if he was still there and he was. However Maintenance Control appeared to have dropped off the patch.At this point the Captain decided he would continue to destination and the patch was terminated. Airframe Maintenance Control then advised he could hear me and the flight on the line but could not join in. While this was all going on I had to ask two other Dispatchers to assist me with my workload. The airport weather forecast had changed to require an alternate so that flights en route had to be advised and I had to add an alternate to flights not yet departed. Although the reporter provided no more 'incident specific' information she did expand on the generic problems associated with their new communications system; advising that similar breakdowns in 'conference' calling are regular occurrences and that pilot's frequently lose patience with the system and elect to 'go it alone' rather than face the continued distractions and interruptions that fail to resolve themselves. Dispatchers find themselves frequently having to multi-task and cover for one another in terms of completing 'routine' tasks while one or another is involved trying to communicate with a flight in need of assistance. An air carrier Dispatcher was unable to establish a flight crew/Dispatch/Maintenance Control communication link request from a domestic flight. Ultimately; the Captain gave up the attempt due to the distraction being more of a problem than was the reason for which the patch was requested.
Aircraft: C172
Phase of flight: Landing
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

My student and I were conducting a Part 91 instrument training flight under visual flight rules in the vicinity of the Auburn University Regional Airport (AUO) in Auburn; Alabama. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed during the flight and we were making normal position reports on the airport's CTAF. We were conducting a practice ILS runway 36 approach as our last approach during the flight; followed by a full stop landing. While we were on a three mile final; a Pilatus PC-12 made a left downwind radio call for runway 36 and I told the pilot I had him in sight. I do not recall the exact words he replied with; but he said something similar to 'Are y'all still on final? We can't extend much for you'. We commented that we were on a three mile final. When we reached a two mile final; I noticed the Pilatus already on a short left base directly abeam us. We continued the approach; and he called his turn to final when we were on approximately a one mile final. As we landed and continued on the runway without delay to A2 taxiway to exit the runway; I looked over my shoulder and noticed the Pilatus was past the threshold and touching down on the runway. We quickly turned left on A2 taxiway while he was quickly overtaking us at a high speed on the runway. The Pilatus quickly rolled past us as we cleared the runway; only missing us by approximately ten feet. I asked his for his tail number and he responded by saying 'Get over it'. He did not make another radio call while at Auburn to avoid identifying himself. Approximately ten minutes later; he took off runway 36 and made a low gear-up pass down the runway; making a very early turn out and departed Auburn. C172 flight instructor reported a near collision as he cleared the runway at AUO just as a PC-12 passed through the intersection on his landing roll.
Aircraft: NO AIRCRAFT
Phase of flight: unknown
Anomaly: No Specific Anomaly Occurred All Types

After watching a video of a 'hover board' catching fire; I have become extremely concerned that our Company policy regarding carrying such devices in the cabin will lead to a disastrous event! I am told that our current Company policy is to consider them like cell phones. However; an electric wheel chair has the battery disconnected and put in our cargo bays. Over the last month; I have seen several of these 'hover boards' onboard. They are generally stored in the overhead compartments. My suggestion is that our Company change its policy so that these devices may only be carried in the cabin if the battery is disconnected. The rationale is simple. A reason for the fires is the motor overheats and catches fire. Once on fire; the batteries catch on fire and thermal discharge creating an extremely hot and out of control fire; one that I question could be extinguished before it would cause serious damage to the aircraft; and cause serious injury to passengers. Being stored in the overhead; near critical equipment (oxygen); gives me great concern after seeing videos of what happens to these devices. They are not like cell phones. Cell phones do not have motors that could get turned on or activated causing an overheat situation. These devices are no different than carrying powered chairs or wheel chairs. Here is a possible scenario. Passengers store 'hover boards' in overhead. Either due to the arranging or re-arranging of luggage and such in the overhead; the 'hover board' gets turned on; or perhaps the owner fails to turn it off. While in the overhead; one of the drive motors becomes engaged or activated. Whether because the motor remains on and engaged in a confined; unventilated space for an extended period of time; or because it is trying to turn jammed wheels; an overheat situation is likely. If that overheat leads to a fire; the fire could be fed by surrounding combustibles. If the fire gets to the batteries; a thermal runaway and intense fire occurs; lighting the entire overhead on fire. The intense heat could reach our oxygen system and results in an uncontrollable cabin fire. A complete aircraft loss and loss of life is highly possible! Currently; Pilots and Flight Attendants are virtually unaware and unprepared for such an event. My concern is that our current policy is not consistent with our high safety standard and concern. I propose; as a minimum; 'hover boards' not be allowed on the aircraft unless the battery is disconnected prior to boarding. Air carrier Flight Attendant expressed concern that current procedures related to hover boards may not be sufficient to prevent a serious in-flight fire.
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance

While at the gate before boarding passengers; I attempted to open the Captain Cockpit Window. The windows seemed initially stuck in the locked position; but eventually opened. When I later went to close the window; the window would not secure shut as indicated by the red indicator pin. The [Aircraft Manual] states 'A pin protrudes near the opening handle when the window is not properly locked in the closed position.' I called maintenance about the problem and they sent out a maintenance tech. He arrived and I described the problem. He opened and closed the window numerous times and declared that the window was securely shut. The red indicator pin was still protruding and showing red. I told him that the window was not fixed. He left mad and said in the hearing of my crew that 'if the plane was safe flying in; it is safe to fly out.' After 30 minutes in the maintenance vehicle; he returned to the aircraft with a can of oil. He sprayed generous amounts of oil into the red indicator pin assembly; and some in the window tracks. He examined the best he could to ensure there were no obstructions that was blocking the closure and securing of the window. He again open and closed the window numerous times and declared that the cockpit window was secured shut; with the red indicator pin not flush; and indicating red. He told me that the window was fixed. Again; I pointed out that the window was not fixed. I showed him that when you depress the front securing latches; the pin remains up; indicating that the securing latches possibly have not cleared the aircraft window frame lock wedge assembly. He left and another maintenance tech came and looked at the window. The aircraft was placed out of service and we deplaned the passengers. Upon taking the window apart; it was discovered that a pin in the window had loosened enough to cause the window not to securely lock.What concerns me is that the first maintenance tech was so willingly to declare a maintenance issue fixed when it clearly wasn't. I am concerned that newer Captains may have been willing to take his word and fly the aircraft with the cockpit window unsecured. An unsecured cockpit window that comes open during the takeoff run and subsequent flight presents a danger to the crew and passengers. EMB-175 Captain reported Maintenance Technician argued that a cockpit window latch was safe; when the indicator showed unsafe.
Aircraft: CITATIONJET (C525/C526) - CJ I / II / III / IV
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

I was the On-the-Job Training Instructor (OJTI) during this session. A C206 was southwest of ZZZ operating VFR at 8;500 and outside of the ORD Class B airspace. They wanted to descend because they were fighting nearly 90 knots (reported winds 298 at 89 at 6;000) of headwind. They were advised that they were outside Class B and could descend and navigate at their discretion.A C525 was a ZZZ IFR departure. I mentioned to the 1S Controller that the C206 was descending and to watch out. The C525 was handed off to us climbing to 6;000 as coordinated. My trainee continued the climb to 10;000 and issued traffic with the C206. There was no reply on the traffic call; and then my trainee issued a left turn to 180 to go behind the C206.The C206 descended far faster than either of us had anticipated with very little forward movement; approximately 40 knots ground speed. By the time the C525 replied; the pilot stated 'That was way too close for comfort;' and the C206 even keyed up and agreed. I asked both pilots; but neither said they got a TCAS RA.I had prompted my trainee to allow the C206 to navigate at their discretion since they were well outside of the Class B airspace. However; we didn't issue any control instructions to avoid this situation. I don't believe any legal separation was lost; but I feel it was poor performance on my own part. While returning from a day VMC flight; PIC experienced a near miss situation with a jet. PIC was in contact with Chicago TRACON throughout all phases of flight. PIC was initially at 8;500 and experiencing 90 knot headwinds. PIC requested a descent to a lower altitude to avoid excessive headwinds. ATC instructed PIC to remain clear of the O'Hare Class B and to descend. Passing through approximately 7;000 feet; PIC caught a glimpse of movement at the 3 o'clock position. At this time PIC made a comment to the passenger that an aircraft off the right side was coming in quickly. The PIC increased the rate of descent from approximately 800 feet per minute to approximately 1;600 feet per minute. The PIC observed the other aircraft take evasive action by turning hard left and climbing. The other aircraft stated to the controller that it was a close call. PIC confirmed this by also telling the controller it was close. The controller immediately took responsibility and stated he would file his own report. PIC was clear of the Class B at the time of the incident and was previously given clearance to descend. PIC believes the extreme windy conditions were the cause of this incident. The controller acknowledged this by not anticipating the rate of descent of the PIC's aircraft. A C90 Controller and one of the two pilots involved reported an airborne conflict in C90 airspace.
Aircraft: CITATION EXCEL (C560XL)
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

While on the RNAV GPS Z 22L approach into Midway; after breaking out of the overcast; and with the runway in sight; was given a low altitude alert by ATC; checked altitude and saw we were at the MDA; continued and landed safely. CE-560XLS FO reported receiving a low altitude alert from ATC on approach to MDW.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

We were descending on the arrival into ZZZ. We were descending at a high speed programmed into the FMC. I have over 10;000 hours flying the Next Gens and am comfortable with that descent profile. This was my first MAX flight. Somewhere in the descent the FMA changed without warning to MCP SPD (Mode Control Panel Speed). It went unnoticed. I have witnessed many Next Gens revert to VNV SPD (Vnav Speed); but never MCP SPD. There is a significant difference; in that MCP SPD gives no altitude protection. I have never seen anything like this. Somewhere around ZZZZZ/11000; we received a radio call and became distracted as the aircraft descended through 11000. I did not catch the deviation until 10;000 and momentum and recovery took us to about 9;500 feet. I disconnect all automation and hand flew the recovery as I tried to figure out what had just happened. We reported the deviation to ATC and continued to ZZZ without incident.I do not know why this happened. I can only guess that somehow LVL CHG (Level Change) was inadvertently selected. Another theory is that VNV could not keep up and reverted to MCP SPD. This happens sometimes in the Next Gens; but it always reverts to VNV SPD; which is much safer. On arrival to ZZZ in VFR conditions. Arrival information was checked by both pilots for altitude and speed restrictions prior to descent. Aircraft was cleared by approach to descend via the arrival with a bottom altitude of 8;000 feet. The crossing restriction at ZZZZZ is 11;000 feet. Prior to reaching ZZZZZ the crew saw the aircraft was in Lvl Chg (Level Change) mode instead of VNAV and was descending through 10;000 feet. The Captain (Pilot Flying) took the controls; disconnected the autopilot and returned to altitude. The FO (Pilot Monitoring) notified ATC of the deviation but no conflicts existed and was handed to the next controller. Upon checking the FMS the First Officer determined the altitude restriction was still active at ZZZZZ for 11;000 feet. The crew briefly discussed the incident and possible errors but did not determine how or when the autopilot entered Lvl Chg mode during the descent. B737 MAX flight crew reported an altitude deviation caused by the aircraft reverting to MCP SPD that has no altitude protection.