Aryan95614/aerograph-asrs huggingface dataset:
Aircraft: JET/LONG RANGER/206
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

The airport was consistently reporting a marginal VFR ceiling of OVC010. A B206; a helicopter called about 25 miles west of the airport; inbound with the ATIS. I vectored him a little bit for sequence and issued traffic at 2;000 that he was going to follow in to the airport. He replied that he was looking for the traffic. Once the preceding traffic was no longer a factor; a jet; I told him to resume his own navigation to the airport. Then I called him three times; giving him the location of the airport. He did not answer until the third call and he said that he couldn't see the airport because there were some clouds between him and the airport. I told him to maintain VFR and contact the Tower. A couple of minutes later; the Tower called me and advised that the aircraft was an emergency with low fuel and unable to get down. I checked with three other aircraft in my airspace looking for a hole in the clouds; none were found. The crash crew responded and other traffic was broken off of the approach behind him as he maneuvered down through the clouds. I worked the helicopter for about 25 miles. He said that he had the ATIS with the reported overcast layer. He accepted traffic calls and said he was looking for traffic. At no point did he indicate any fuel criticality nor did he mention that he might have any issue descending. Only once did he mention clouds between him and the airport. I assumed this was a small scud deck that he expected not to be an issue. The pilot should have mentioned his concern with the weather much earlier. It goes without saying that the pilot should have checked the weather before getting airborne and had sufficient fuel. TRACON Controller described an emergency event when an inbound helicopter encountered weather and fuel issues but failed to provide ATC with critical information regarding same.
Aircraft: CESSNA 152
Phase of flight: Initial Climb
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

We took off Runway XX to practice some night takeoffs and landings. Upon the second takeoff somewhere around 600-700 ft the rpm dropped drastically then the engine power dropped and we could not climb. Almost simultaneously I took control from my student because I could hear stall warning and the airplane was getting uncontrollable [quickly] so I pitched down [advised ATC] and landed on Runway YY (opposite direction of the runway we took off from) with a tailwind. Just about 15 ft I could hear the engine rev up again. C-152 instructor pilot reported power loss during initial climb that resulted in a return to the departure airport.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Initial Climb
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

After takeoff; the #1 [Flight Attendant] and I started smelling something foul. The # 2 [Flight Attendant] called the #1 [Flight Attendant] to see if all crew was smelling the same thing and the cockpit pitched in saying they were smelling something pungent as well. At first; the pilots wanted to continue on but when the smell kept coming back; they decided to head back to ZZZ. The #4 [Flight Attendant] felt nauseous and threw up; the #1 [Flight Attendant] had a headache; [and] the flight crew had a headache along with itchy and dry eyes. I felt nauseous and had a severe headache with heat flashes. As a team; we decided to go to the ER to check ourselves out. B737-800 Flight Attendant reported persistent foul fumes during climb causing health issues. Flight crew executed a return to departure airport.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

This trip started with an ANF for ZZZ to ZZZ1. The flight was delayed due to late inbound aircraft by approximately 1+ hours. An 11 hour day layover was reduced to XA:06. The hotel cleaning crew was talking loudly outside my door; off and on; until approximately noon. A late afternoon departure to ZZZ2 was delayed 3 hours due to weather. The next segment was scheduled ZZZ2 ZZZ3; approximately 4 hour flight. After the ANF; poor rest; scheduled short day layover; scheduled late night 2 leg flying the next night and adverse weather due to thunderstorms; I was fatigued. Upon arrival at the gate; my fatigue was verified by my failure to shut down the engine once the parking brake was set and APU established on the airplane. My overall parking flow was missed as I realized; during the parking checklist; I had missed other switches (IRS to off; for example). Running the checklist corrected my errors. Captain reported omitting or deviating from several post flight SOP procedures due to feeling fatigued.
Aircraft: SKYLANE 182/RG TURBO SKYLANE/RG
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Returning at 3;500 cruise altitude heading direct to CCR (Concord; CA) between 120 and 130 knots. Using Flight Following with Oakland Center (Freq 127.8). Executive type; twin engine jet was approaching head on at same flight level. Its landing gear was retracted. Oakland Center warned of traffic at 12 o'clock. Approaching jet was on radar; but not identified. Jet did not change course or attitude. Given closing speeds and the fact the jet remained wings level; I determined safest course of evasive action was to force my plane into a steep dive to avoid head on collision. Estimate jet passed directly overhead at approximately 300 feet. C182 pilot reported an NMAC with a small jet in Oakland Center Class E airspace.
Aircraft: FIGHTER
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I took over the sector from a radar controller who was trying to figure out if Aircraft Y could be cleared for approach into KALS. He had a flight plan on Aircraft X and Aircraft Z from ZAB but no datablock. The problem with the RNAV Runway 20 Approach is that the missed approach is not separated from the route that Aircraft X (IR137) and Aircraft Z (IR109) were on. I took over after the radar controller told the first arrival; Aircraft Y; that they were cleared for the RNAV RWY 20 but they couldn't do the missed approach. I read in the flight plan that Aircraft X was entering at IR137 at XA:20z and exiting at XA:35z. I called ZAB Sector 16 to confirm the information and the controller told me he just sat down and had no idea. He would call me back. He didn't call me back. I called him at approximately XA:50z when I saw the Aircraft X in my airspace at 14;000 feet about 15-20 miles north of the boundary with ZAB Sector 16. I called and the controller told me then that the previous controller transposed XA:35z and meant to type XA:53z. I didn't get a datablock on this aircraft either. A similar scenario happened in the last month where the coordination was inaccurate and no datablock was given. It is really hard to separate for aircraft in a non-radar environment when there is no coordination through the flight plan or a datablock. Aircraft Z had a remark that said in IR109 from XA:20z-XB:50z. That is a long time to separate for this aircraft especially when the info in EDST times out and there is nothing in our computer showing them in the space. Aircraft A asked to also do the RNAV Runway 2 because it was IFR conditions but the missed approach is not separated from IR109. Aircraft A said they could fly the approach; get low enough to cancel and heard all the communications with Aircraft Y that were discussed earlier so they didn't have to fly the missed approach. I told them I couldn't authorize them to fly the missed approach with Aircraft Z in the route. ZAB continues to not coordinate aircraft in the IR routes accurately. I cannot count the times they fail to put an accurate time in the remark section of the flight plan; they fail to hand off or display the data block. They call after we stop separating for the aircraft and then they appear in our airspace. They don't build a delay in the flight plan so it won't time out of the computer. These routes begin in their airspace and the aircraft flies through ours without ZDV speaking to them. There are lots of ways they can communicate that they have cleared an aircraft into IR 109/137/308 and let us know because most of the route is non-radar in our airspace. It is unsafe and luckily we haven't had any incidents but it's just a matter of time. Denver Center Controller reported delaying two aircrafts' approach clearances due to incomplete coordination of military training routes.
Aircraft: CESSNA CITATION SOVEREIGN (C680)
Phase of flight: Other Non-Flight
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Picked up [the aircraft]. Had a few write-ups for Maintenance including oxygen level low. I wrote it up and it was serviced to the max level. Then 2 days later (they were working other maintenance issues) we went to go fly it and the oxygen was low again. Wrote it up again. The mechanic discovered 7 of the 10 passenger masks were not attached properly.Reporting this event in the hopes that this type of discovery won't happen again. This could have had a very bad outcome. CE-680 Captain reported maintenance found 7 of 10 passenger oxygen masks were not attached properly; causing a loss of oxygen pressure.
Aircraft: A320
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Had another fumes event. 3rd one in 2 months. The plane had a history of fumes events. Was last written up on Date1 or Date2. It would be nice if the FAA; Airbus; and our company got together and figured a way to reduce these. A320 pilot reported multiple fumes events on assigned aircraft. Reporter suggested there needs to be collaboration between the FAA; aircraft manufacturer; and air carrier to remedy frequent fume events.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

With about 4 hours to go before landing; I had just emerged from the crew rest bunk when Lead Flight Attendant asked me if I could have the flight deck crew wear a face mask when a Flight Attendant was in the cockpit in flight. I told her no for the safety of flight reasons. I did not add anything further.I personally was not going to wear a face mask in the cockpit since I would be in the cockpit for the rest of the flight. I am required by the FAA on my medical 'Must wear corrective lenses; possess glasses for near/intermediate vision.' Since my glasses fog up every time I wear any type of face mask I know that wearing a mask at my flight deck seat is a safety of flight issue. About two hours later when the Lead came to in to give us a restroom break we; First Officer and I; offered her an N95 mask to wear for her safety and set it on the pedestal for her. She did not put it on and chose to wear what appeared to be a non-N95 certified black cloth mask. Air Carrier Captain reported telling the Lead Flight Attendant that he would not be wearing a face mask in the flight deck due to safety of flight reason as his glasses fog up when wearing a face mask.
Aircraft: MD-11
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

15 Minutes into cruise; received a HYD (Hydraulic) 1 OFF alert. Referenced QRH and reviewed HYD 1 FAIL and HYD 1&3 FAIL as contingency. ACARS OPSCTL (Ops Control) message to [dispatch and maintenance control]. Alerted them to limited NWS (Nose Wheel Steering) and possibility of no brakes; worst case. Dispatch coordinated with ATC and ATC [gave us priority assistance]. Received additional and expected QTY LO (Quantity Low) alerts during configuration. Landed uneventfully. CFR (Crash Fire Rescue) followed us to gate XXX. Debriefed CFR. AML entry included '[Priority Assistance Requested]'System malfunction. Hydraulic Leak. MD-11 flight crew reported hydraulic system failure inflight.
Aircraft: B777
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Sector 81 called to coordinate Aircraft X with myself at sector 89. Coordination was probed and accepted without conflict for Aircraft X at FL360. [Five minutes later] a red conflict began flashing between Aircraft Y at 36;000 feet northbound on the airway and Aircraft X. I called sector 81 to re-coordinate Aircraft X at a different altitude. When I initially probed the aircraft at 36;000 feet; the probe in the coordination window for Aircraft X still showed no conflicts despite the data blocks flashing red conflict and a conflict window. Despite the coordination window showing no conflict; I re-coordinated Aircraft X at 37;000 feet.Sector 81 called with an altitude revision for Aircraft X. The aircraft was requesting 38;000 feet so I opened the coordination window; probed the aircraft at 38;000 feet which probed with no conflict so the aircraft was accepted at 38;000 feet. Sector 81 called for Aircraft X requesting direct to either GRATX or LFANO due to weather. Because the aircraft was approaching the boundary; I assumed the aircraft to probe the change in profiled route. Upon assuming the aircraft; a conflict appeared between Aircraft X and Aircraft Z. Aircraft Z was flying northbound on the airway at 38;000 feet.The conflict window showed 9 minutes and 23 seconds on the cross with 15 minutes needed for required minimum separation. At that point; I told sector 81 the aircraft needs to descend or climb 1;000 feet. Sector 81 immediately descended the aircraft to 37;000 feet and I advised them that direct to LFANO was approved. I completed updating the aircraft's profile and completed tasks and took a break. At some point before my break; I measured the two aircraft using the tool in Advanced Technologies and Oceanic Procedures (ATOP) and it showed 35 miles; however they were separated by 1;000 feet at that point and I don't know the closest point in mileage the aircraft got. A [report] is also being filed and the supervisor was notified.It appears as though there is an issue with ATOP in recognizing conflicts. This is a serious issue that needs to be remedied immediately. If this isn't a system issue and ATOP is working as designed; a briefing for all controllers needs to occur to explain what happened and how to avoid this. ZNY Center Oceanic Controller reported they had less than required separation between two aircraft on crossing courses even though the ATOP tool did not identify a separation problem.
Aircraft: C172
Phase of flight: Initial Climb
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

On departure; the initial climb was pretty smooth; but winds were from the southwest with gusts to 20 knots. I started my turn to the north at about 400 feet AGL; and about then was hit with a burst of turbulence that really rocked the plane. The TAWS unit called out 'Obstacle'; then 'Sink Rate; Pull Up'. While recovering from this and re-establishing the climb; I continued my turn through the assigned 350 degree heading to about 60 degrees; toward the incoming aircraft on approach.During the turbulence; I had tried to flip-flop the radio from tower to departure; but the bumpy ride made me brush my finger against the wrong part of the GTN 650 touch screen; leaving the COM radio on the wrong frequency. While turning; I was re-tuning the radio; and when I got it to the correct frequency I immediately heard the departure controller instructing me to turn back to the 350 degree heading. I turned and climbed and followed the rest of the departure instructions correctly. I was instructed to call ATC on landing; since there was a possible loss of separation.Partly due to the turbulence and recovery; and partly due to confusion; once I had continued the turn to far toward the east; I misinterpreted the CDI guidance and would have continued the turn. I had turned the ZZZ VOR into the NAV2 radio; which meant that the needle was 'reverse sensing'. Following the needle at this point was leading me the wrong direction.I could have avoided some of the confusion if I had programmed the GTN 650 better. I had set it into OBS mode with the 286 radial off of ZZZ VOR; so that it was showing the same guidance as the NAV2 radio. If I had entered it as ZZZ VOR to ZZZZZ Intersection; then the map representation would have been more helpful.Before takeoff; I had briefed the departure; but had not actually pulled up the enroute chart and drawn in the route; which I would have normally done if it were IMC. I had a casual attitude about the departure procedure; thinking of it as an obstacle departure procedure that wasn't that important since it was VMC. In reality; it's more like a SID; to keep aircraft away from the approach path; but without the graphical representation. When I spoke with the departure controller; he said that they had a lot of problems with pilots not following the Departure Procedure. Perhaps this would be improved if it were published as a SID. A C172 pilot reported becoming confused and disoriented after takeoff; due to a sudden and unexpected turbulence encounter. The resulting heading and altitude deviation generated both an obstacle and sink rate warning.
Aircraft: CRJ200
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

We were at 27;000 ft in cruise when the right engine oil pressure began to fluctuate. As we began to watch it the pressure started to slowly go down. The FO (First Officer) was flying and flew the aircraft the entire time to landing. I ran the QRH for engine oil fluctuations then descend to 21;000 ft and then 17;000 ft the pressure continued to go down which lead me to the shutdown the engine because the pressure now was below 25 psi as I followed the QRH. [We advised ATC] and we proceeded to ZZZ into an uneventful single engine landing. CRJ200 Captain reported a loss of engine oil pressure at cruise altitude; an inflight shutdown; and successful diversion.
Aircraft: AMATEUR/HOME BUILT/EXPERIMENTAL
Phase of flight: Final Approach
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Landing Without Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flying the Fisk approach into the Kosh airshow. Established at 85-90 Kias and 1800 msl; a PA-28 passed me closely to my right; overtaking me and cutting in front of me. In the confusion that ensued in avoiding collision; I overflew the fisk controllers and my passenger said he believed the 'wing rock' was for us. I was already too far from fisk for them to see my wing rock. I proceeded to runway 36L and upon reaching short final and commitment to land I did not get a clearance specifically for a dot. Going around was deemed far more dangerous than just landing and vacating the runway due to the incredible traffic density and my good traffic separation at the time. The discipline by pilots during the arrival was poor at best. GA pilot distracted by near mid air collision; landed without clearance.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

During pushback a Flight Attendant called and informed me that a passenger was refusing to wear their face mask. I asked if she wished to have the passenger removed for non-compliance to which she responded in the affirmative. I had the push crew pull us backed to the gate and requested a Supervisor from operations. Arriving at the gate; the Flight Attendant informed me that she made four attempts to have the customer replace his mask over his nose to which he refused or was otherwise non-compliant. The Gate Agent boarded the plane and was unable to get the customer to wear the mask appropriately so he was removed. Air Carrier Captain reported a passenger would not comply with face mask policy and was removed from the flight.
Aircraft: SMALL TRANSPORT; LOW WING; 2 TURBOJET ENG
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft X is departing Santa Monica on the preferential route for San Jose (SJC). The pilot filed FL280 and I gave unrestricted climb to FL280 when he checked in to my sector. The preferential for SJC aircraft is RZS (San Marcus) ROBIE3 arrival to SJC. 99% of aircraft filed this route of the Los Angeles basin departure area are suppressed for auto Hand Off to the next sector unless someone at the sector manually routes the flight plan RZS direct ROBIE and the ROBIE3; or direct ROBIE; ROBIE3 Arrival. I enter a hand off with a keyboard entry on every aircraft I transfer to the next sector; but I have auto hand off set up as a backup. During the session as the Radar Controller at Sector 25; Sector 28 was combined with Sector 25 and a substantial portion of the W airspace was hot: W289S all altitudes; W292W all altitudes and W537 all altitudes. Having this airspace active with oceanic departures; arrivals and overflights significantly raises the complexity of the sector and requires attention to a large amount of airspace on two radar scopes. When aircraft are not auto-hand off inhibited and have been processed with the work around RZS direct ROBIE; or direct ROBIE; the auto-hand off occurs at CEANO intersection; approximately 15 miles from the Sector 25 and the OAKLAND Sector 14 boundary. At CEANO Aircraft X crossed CEANO without a hand off to Oakland 14. At this time I had another aircraft on a vector around restricted airspace; pointed out descending to miss another climbing aircraft and another 10-12 aircraft on frequency. I scanned Aircraft X as it crossed the Oakland 14 boundary without a hand off and I typed the keyboard entry to hand off the data tag to Oakland 14. I called them on the land line to coordinate a hand off but said disregard when I recognized that they had taken radar of the data tag for Aircraft X. I switched communications to Oakland Sector 14 and went on with scanning and watching the remaining aircraft in my sectors.In this situation; traffic volume was just beginning to increase and a D-Side could have been used for about 15-20 minutes to decrease the workload. Sector 28 requires a high volume of manual information transfer on the land line for all of the oceanic traffic inbound and outbound. When traffic is complex with large parts of the oceanic airspace active with Military Operations and unavailable for use; it is better to have either a D-Side at the sector or to open Sector 28 as a de-combined sector. ERAM processing on flight plans needs to be fixed so auto hand off is available on all aircraft without a work-a-round. Reporter states auto hand off is not allowed for a specific function and that he must make a automated had off or manual hand off. Reporter violates another sectors airspace because he did not hand off aircraft.