Aryan95614/aerograph-asrs huggingface dataset:
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Final Approach
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict; Conflict NMAC

Cleared from ARCHI to PONKE to intercept 28L final approach course. ATC said there was a 737 at 3 o'clock for 28R. Did not see that airplane. ATC said the 737 has us in sight. We continued. I saw the TCAS of the 737 coming towards us; but did not see the airplane visually; I thought from looking at TCAS he was behind our right wing. The TCAS rapidly went from 500 ft difference to 400; 300; 200 we initiated the RA as soon as we heard it. I saw the TCAS as low as a 100 foot differential but did not see the airplane until they were banking away from us and we were on the Go around. First Officer said that he could make out the pilot! Thank you TCAS for getting me out of there before they hit us. [Report narrative contained no additional information.] Air Carrier Crew reported a NMAC on approach to SFO runway 28L with an airliner on visual approach to runway 28R.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

This is a General Safety concern. No faults were committed by myself or the Captain. HOU ATC is constantly running 1 frequency to work Tower and Ground Control. This is causing an unsafe level of radio congestion. We could not get a push call in without blocking other aircraft or being blocked ourselves. Finally; once pushed; we had difficulty obtaining a taxi clearance. We finally were told to taxi and hold short of 13L. As we were holding short; we noted several aircraft attempting to push; taxi to and from runways; and obtain landing clearances. We noticed one corporate aircraft that could not obtain a landing clearance until short final; despite multiple attempts on their part; with no answer from Tower.HOU is a complex airport with multiple crossing runways; multiple taxi routes utilized; while also crossing runways. HOU ATC has been utilizing a single Controller for Ground and Tower Ops for most of the last 12 months; since the start of the slow down in air traffic. While this may have worked in the early days of this pandemic; it has turned into its own form of danger as air traffic has steadily increased; especially with the onset of Spring Break travel.I believe I am not alone in my concern that this could cause a serious incident at HOU; as there is no way a single Controller can safely manage traffic on the ground and in the air. I have been to far less complex; and less busy airports that utilize designated Ground and Tower Controllers. Please see to it; that this is not allowed to continue any longer. It poses a danger to our aircraft and our customers. Air carrier First Officer reported not being able to communicate with ATC due to Controller working Tower and Ground Control combined at HOU airport.
Aircraft: A320
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I observed a mechanic possibly install wrong parts in order to save time on a live flight that maintenance was being performed on. The mechanic was [Mechanic]. The log page is xxxxxxx. After an hour of trying to find the correct fasteners with a team of three mechanics; I find it hard to believe [Mechanic] was able to just bring and install the correct fasteners in a matter of minutes. I suspect [Mechanic] just installed what most likely would fit. Reporter observed a mechanic possibly install incorrect parts on airplane.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Enroute; the First Officer noticed that the flap gauge show a slight split. The left indicator showed up while the right showed not quite up. We talked about how this was strange; but we showed no other indication that the flaps were other that fully retracted. On approach; the First Officer asked for flaps 5. I moved the handle to 5 and the indicator did not move nor was there any transition lights on the overhead panel. We called Approach and asked for a box vector to work through the QRH. I made a PA announcement stating the reason we broke off the approach and then got into the QRH. I called operations on the radio and told them the situation to pass on to Dispatch. ATC asked if we needed anything and we requested the fire trucks to check the brakes after landing. Once we were all setup and down to the Before Landing Checklist I made another PA stating we were set to land but at a higher speed and there was no need to panic. I failed to talk to the Flight Attendants directly to get them in the loop and to hear their concerns. I did not have the Flight Attendants prepare the cabin as I thought this would get passengers more nervous. I should have discussed this with the flight attendant; however; there was plenty of time to do so. I took the controls from the First Officer and did the landing. The fire trucks looked us over and checked the brake temps. During this time we ran the brake cooling [checklist]; which told us not to approach the gate for 30 minutes. Fire Crew measured the temps at 500 on the left; and 570 on the right. They offered to put fans on the brakes and we accepted. We called Dispatch and Maintenance Control and discussed what happened. While going through the brake cooling checklist; we could not find what temperature was safe to proceed to the gate. Since we had the fire crews and fans we figured our time should be reduced; but we could not find what temperature was safe. Maintenance Control came up with a time of one hour before going to the gate which contradicted our [checklist] time. The fire crews continued to give us updates on the temps. Maintenance eventually sent out a mechanic to check the fuse plugs and they confirmed we were good to head to the gate. By this time we had been on the ground for about 55 minutes. We stared the engines back up and proceeded to the gate. Later that evening I did find the max brake temperature for ground turnaround of 425 degrees in the AOM Chapter 3. Once I was there I remember the number; but it would have been nice to have had the number somewhere in the brake cooling procedures as a reminder. B737 Captain reported a trailing edge flap malfunction that resulted in a flaps up landing.
Aircraft: CITATION X (C750)
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

During descent into BOS; numerous delay vectors and speed reductions were assigned by ATC. We were sequenced behind an Airbus with approximately 8 - 10 miles separation during the arrival. While descending through approximately 8;000 FT MSL; autopilot engaged; airspeed below 250 KTS; we experienced wake turbulence presumably from the Airbus ahead of us. We experienced an arrested descent; sudden abrupt roll to the right and left; followed by an increased descent; sudden abrupt roll to the right and left; followed by several abrupt bumps. The entire event was approximately 5 seconds. One passenger reported their neck and back was injured after parking on general aviation ramp. Medical attention was offered but passenger refused the offer. Passengers were not wearing seat belts during this event though the seat belt sign was on prior to the incident. There should be some legal enforcement for a Part 91 flight requiring passenger to comply with signs; and crew member instruction like a Part 135/121 flight operation. As we descended through approximately 8;000 FT; autopilot engaged; our airspeed began to slow below 250 KTS. I began to make an adjustment and we entered an area of turbulence. We experienced an arrested descent; followed by an increased descent and a bank to the right of approximately 15 degrees. This was followed by 3 short 'vertical bumps' and a bank to the left of approximately 10 degrees. The entire encounter lasted between 3 and 5 seconds. The turbulence was never more than what I would characterize as moderate. I think it was probably wake turbulence from the Airbus. CE-750 flight crew reported wake vortex encounter on arrival into BOS in trail of an Airbus. Aircraft rolled in response and one passenger; not wearing a seatbelt; reported back and neck pain.
Aircraft: PA28
Phase of flight: Landing
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

I was working on local control with moderate traffic and a fair amount of frequency congestion. Aircraft Y was number one and cleared to land on a 2 mile final. An aircraft called for departure. I told Aircraft Y 'cancel landing clearance; traffic holding in position' Aircraft Y responded 'you want us to cancel landing clearance' I said affirmative and then immediately told my other aircraft to line up and wait; traffic on two mile final. I then observed Aircraft Y breaking off the final northbound. Aircraft X was in the right traffic pattern approximately midfield downwind with Aircraft Y about a mile ahead of him northbound. Observing the aircraft out the window it appeared that they were separated and diverging. I called the traffic for Aircraft X letting him know traffic was ahead northbound. He said looking and then I have him in sight. I informed the pilot of Aircraft Y that cancel landing clearance does not mean to break off the final; only that we cannot issue a landing clearance with traffic in position and that he should expect his landing clearance on short final. He apologized; and then without instruction or clearance made an immediate southbound turn back into the north downwind coming in close proximity to Aircraft X who said 'that was close'. Aircraft Y was given further instruction and landed without further incident and was given a brasher warning by ground control. He called on the phone and apologized saying he didn't know why he broke off the approach and later turned into the downwind. He stated he could not give us his license number since it is a temporary license he's only had for a week.I have never seen this occur before after cancelling an aircraft's landing clearance. I think it's obvious that pilot inexperience added confusion to a sometimes already confusing procedure using lineup and wait. Perhaps more pilot education as to why a landing clearance must sometimes be withheld or cancelled when using the procedure would be appropriate. An aircraft on final approach was informed its landing clearance was cancelled. The aircraft misunderstood this transmission as to be an instruction to go-around. The aircraft initiated a go-around on their own and entered right downwind for the runway without receiving any instructions to do so from the Controller. There was another aircraft in the pattern on a right downwind. The Controller issued traffic to the aircraft. The aircraft established on the right downwind saw the go-around traffic and stated it was close to them.
Aircraft: JETSTAR 1329 (C140)
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

The Captain leaves flight station to go the lavatory. FO flying. For unknown reason; autopilot disconnects when captain is in the back of the cabin. FO does recover from unusual attitude when he receives airplane attitude nose low and left bank 45 degrees. Captain back to flight station; FO calls Center and advises of situation. Airplane is then hand-flown to resume altitude and route. AP is checked and reengaged and monitored closely until the end of the flight. No other discrepancies or autopilot problem were encountered thereafter. Aircraft lost approximately 3;000 feet in the process. During and prior to the event; the Captain had left the flight deck and FO was flying (monitoring Autopilot coupled flight at FL360) and programming the FMS when the autopilot disconnected and the aircraft rolled off into a diving left banked descend; losing 3;000 feet before the FO could recover. In retrospect; FO should have delayed diverting attention to the FMS until both pilots were at the flight station. A normal recovery from the unusual attitude was made and reported to ATC. Jetstar First Officer experienced an unnoticed autopilot disconnect at FL360 with the Captain in the lavatory. The aircraft is recovered from a 45 degree bank at FL330 and ATC is advised. The autopilot is reengaged and functions normally for the remainder of the flight.
Aircraft: CITATION II S2/BRAVO (C550)
Phase of flight: Initial Climb
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

During our taxi from the south ramp to [Runway] 16R; all checklist items were performed and all indications were normal. The takeoff roll and rotation were all normal. Moments after the gear came up; we lost our right engine indicated by a yaw sensation. With what seemed like 10-15 seconds; we started to get annunciators indicating the loss of the right engine. Soon after completing the emergency checklist procedures; we declared an emergency and requested to continue to our destination where the weather was better. We attempted a restart on the failed engine to no avail.Our landing was uneventful; with the exception of all the emergency vehicles. After shutdown and exiting the airplane; we noticed fuel leaking out of the right engine cowling. The next morning the right lower cowl was removed by Maintenance who found two bolt heads; safety wired together; that had sheared off from the fuel transmitter housing.ATC performed with the highest level of professionalism and were greatly appreciated by this flight crew. A C550 flight crew suffered a right engine failure shortly after takeoff. After securing the engine and declaring an emergency they elected to continue to their destination a short distance away due to better weather and facilities.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Briefed by on duty pilots with following information: XA18Z ADS-B OUT L; XA33Z NAV UNABLE RNP; XA35Z VOR UPDATE ON; XA49Z GPS normal. Event (GPS jamming) began at location N37 58.9 E042 24.3 near OTKEP FL330 (near Turkey/Iraq border). Event ended at 35nm north of SOBIL. Recommend avoiding this airspace. Air carrier Captain reported experiencing GPS signal disruption flying near the Iraq/Turkey border.
Aircraft: CRJ200
Phase of flight: Initial Climb
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

While working Local 3; I instructed Air Carrier X to line up and wait on Runway 27R than issued take-off clearance to an SLAWW RNAV. At the same time; Local 2 issued a take-off clearance to Air Carrier Y off Runway 26L on a heading of 280 degrees both controllers observed the aircraft's close proximity off the departure end; Local 2 issued a heading of 290 to Air Carrier Y at the same time Local 3 issued traffic to Air Carrier X and received a response that the pilot of Air Carrier X had the 26L departure in sight and would maintain visual separation before transferring radio communication. I understand the LOA for noise abatement and its procedures completely; but for all practicable purposes these procedures; in reference to the; so called midnight headings are executed differently by different supervisors according to the traffic volume we have. These procedures have also been changed numerous times over the past months for one reason or another leaving the controllers; that I have spoken with; confused on what heading or action we are taking today. Controllers; as well as; some Management Personnel have made their concerns known that the current procedures do not allow for a heading off the north runway that would make an incident; such as this; most likely never occur. Currently these procedures do not allow for minimum separation of 15 degrees if a situation such as this happens. My recommendations to fix this problem would be that the Supervisor shall state to both controllers that we are now using headings; and no longer using the RNAV; and to coordinate with ATL departure; both controllers putting it on the recorded line that headings are in effect to avoid any confusion. In the event; a Supervisor is not present at the time the Local 2 (North) Local 3 (South) will coordinate via the recorded line before changing to a heading; and also advise ATL departure before implementing this procedure. I also recommend that a heading off the north runway; regardless of noise abatement; should always be at least 15 degrees north of the south runway's magnetic heading of 273 degrees. ATL Controller voiced concern regarding the confusion that exists when transitioning from normal operations to mid shift procedures to accommodate noise concerns; the reporter noted differences between supervisors and lack of clarity during coordination are contributing factors.
Aircraft: DHC8
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

During cruise flight at 16;000 FT; the flight crew noticed the SMOKE Warning flickering. This occurred for about 10 seconds. During this time we initiated the necessary memory action items; declared an emergency with ATC and began the diversion to the nearest suitable airport. We ran the appropriate emergency checklist and were notified by the Flight Attendant that there was no smoke or fire in the cargo compartment. We continued the diversion; contacted operations and landed without incident. The Contract Mechanic who came to inspect the issue said the Number 1 baggage smoke sensor cannon plug had become loose which caused the flickering of the smoke warning. DHC 8-200 Captain experiences a flickering smoke warning at 16;000 FT. The crew elects to divert to the nearest suitable airport after declaring an emergency. During descent the Flight Attendant reports that there is no smoke in the baggage compartment; but the diversion is continued. A loose smoke detector cannon plug is found to be the cause.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Aircraft X was being vectored for the ILS Runway 13R approach at SAT airport. Aircraft X was 10 NW of SAT on a modified downwind given a pilot's discretion to 3;000 feet. At this point I saw a target depart 5C1 airport climbing low-level southbound initially away from Aircraft X. The unknown target aircraft then made a turn to the northeast heading about 050 degrees climbing out of 2;800 feet converging with Aircraft X who was approximately descending out of 4;000 feet heading 260 degrees. As soon as I noticed something had to be done to avoid the conflict someone else called and delayed my transmission. I then based Aircraft X a little early heading 220 to parallel the target to pass off Aircraft X right. Maybe 3 seconds later Aircraft X said he was turning to a 200 heading to further avoid the target so I told him to turn even further left heading 180 to ensure separation. The last control instruction resolved the conflict.This is a systemic problem with aircraft departing 5C1. This airport is located directly on the approach course to SAT to our most used runway. This airport is also on the base turn which makes it even worse. SAT controllers have gone to 5C1 to educate the pilots about climbing off 5C1 into the downwind/base turn without talking to Approach Control but nothing has changed. This situation happens every day. SAT has had countless RA'S (Resolution Alerts) due to this. This airport is often used by gliders that are most of the time not talking to us nor have a working transponder. It's a matter of time before a crash happens.To fix this problem the Class C at SAT needs to extend further out to cover 5C1. SAT TRACON Controller reported an airborne conflict between an IFR and VFR aircraft along with a possible related airspace problem.
Aircraft: CRJ700
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

When setting up for visual backed up by the ILS XX into ZZZ we couldn't get the LOC/GS identified and decided to break off and back up our visual using the RNAV XX. Once set up we came back around and upon crossing ZZZZZ I mistakenly set 2600 ft. instead of the DDA; I didn't realize ZZZZZ was the final approach fix and continued to 'dive and drive' with a 1500fpm descent rate; at 2600 ft. we received a low altitude alert from ATC and realized my mistake and that I was 20 ft. below the required altitude of 2620 ft. at ZZZZZ1. I immediately initiated a go around where we came back in uneventfully. Did not set DDA at FAF and initiated a descent well beyond the proper 700fpm descent rate resulting in getting low. Upon vectors for the ILS we noticed no blue/ghost needles. We selected the nav source to the ILS frequency; still no ghost needles. I recalled the NOTAM for the ILS being out but it was only for XA00-XG00 local. We inquired with approach they said it was working. We elected to be pulled off the approach and set up for the RNAV. When coming in for the RNAV we thought we were brought out much further beyond the FAF. We began to descend with 2600 ft. set the next fix was 2620. We got an altitude alert and elected to go around at 2600 ft. as soon as we knew we were low by 20 ft. We [had] both mistaken the FAF. we realized we were beyond the FAF after the go around. We then came back and did the ILS by turning the course knob and listening to the nav frequency to identify it. Being rushed on a short flight and being rushed to set up for an RNAV during a line check had us misidentify the FAF for the RNAV approach. CRJ-700 flight crew reported a CFTT event when they set up the approach using the wrong Final Approach Fix and descended below a required crossing altitude. ATC alerted the crew who conducted a go around to a landing.