Aryan95614/aerograph-asrs huggingface dataset:
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance

As I started my preflight duties in the cockpit; I noticed the 'A' hydraulic system quantity indicating 106%. A logbook entry was made and Maintenance notified. After Maintenance arrived at the jet; one of the Maintenance Technicians apologized that the previous Maintenance crew had not noticed the over-serviced hydraulic system and that they had not corrected the issue. He went on to explain that the over-serviced hydraulics should have been corrected prior to the Pre-Departure Checks being signed-off. After this comment was made; my First Officer began having second thoughts about an observation he made on the #1 engine and asked me if I would mind inspecting the #1 engine with him. After going outside and looking at the #1 engine; I noticed what appeared to be a nick and some white-gray streaking on the front of and behind the # 10 fan blade on engine # 1. Also; there was a white 'nick' on the #1 engine spinner dome so I instructed my First Officer to enter this information in the maintenance log and we called Maintenance back to the jet to address this issue. Maintenance came out and ultimately determined there was a piece of paper that had lodged in the #1 engine. The paper was removed; the fan blade cleaned; along with the engine spinner dome; and the maintenance log was signed-off. After observing both of these incidents on the same scheduled ETOPS flight; both of us began to have reservations as to whether our mechanics in this airport are doing the job that our Air Carrier pays them to do and properly inspecting our jets prior to ETOPS departures. This event was caused by Maintenance's failure to correct the above mentioned mechanical discrepancies prior to signing-off the ETOPS Pre-Departure Checks. A B737-800 Captain describes his reservations as to whether company mechanics at one of their island airports are properly inspecting their aircraft prior to ETOPS departures. An overserviced 'A' system hydraulic reservoir quantity and 'nicks' on #1 engine fan blade and spinner dome had not been corrected or addressed.
Aircraft: A319
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

On gradual descent; a very strong 'smelly sock' odor occurred. The worst one in my 30 years. On arrival at the gate; I asked the FO (First Officer) about the odor and if they smelled it. He said yes and it was because the APU was turned on during descent. We were then to go on to do a turn. All 3 FA's (Flight Attendants) said they felt odd. I said I could not pinpoint it but my head and body felt off. Half a headache and trouble speaking. I told the next flight deck about the situation. We took off and after about 15 minutes the Captain called me and asked if we still smelled the odor. I said yes. A moment later he made a PA saying we were returning to due to [a mechanical problem] and possible oil leak. We landed and were met by supervisors asking how we felt and if we're going to continue to go on to do the turn. The Captain said he did not feel safe going back on the plane. He had a headache and felt bad. He went to the chief pilot and then was going to the clinic. All 3 FA's felt dizzy; half a headache; and just felt off. Supervisor told me my bottom lip was quivering when I was trying to speak. All 3 FA's declined to work the turn and all went to the clinic. After the clinic; I stopped at ER to tell them what happened. They had me call poison control. It took a full 2 days for me to return to somewhat normal. A319 Flight Attendant reported a strong smelly sock odor followed by a headache and difficulty speaking.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Last leg of a 3-day pairing. FO [First Officer] was flying pilot. We were assigned RWY 27L ILS in visual conditions. FO flew on speed and touched down more than 1;000 feet down the runway but well within the touchdown zone. Though MED brakes were selected along with maximum reverse thrust; we were unable to make Taxiway A-1. As control was transferred to me during the rollout; I eased off the brakes a bit; intending to exit left at RWY 4L; which is closed but able to be used for turnoff from RWY 27L. As I began looking for the left turnoff beyond Taxiway A-1; I realized that RWY 4L no longer has any illuminated markings. I recently upgraded to the left seat from the right seat of [another aircraft type] and had not made a night landing on RWY 27L in several years; not since the runway was closed and all illuminated markings were removed. There are no lead-off lines; no taxiway centerline lights; and no taxiway edge lights. At night; RWY 4L left exit from RWY 27L is a dark spot between normally spaced RWY edge lighting. This being the case; I realized that I knew generally where the turn off was; but not exactly. My FO did not immediately realize my confusion until I was carrying excessive speed approaching the turn off. As I began to leave the centerline to make the turn off; I braked firmly and steadily; slowing to an almost stop at the right edge of the RWY 4L 'taxiway' location. Our nose was just short of the taxiway edge markings and I could see the edge lights in front of me. Since ATC had vectored our trailing aircraft so closely to us; I opted to do a slow speed; sharp left turn (similar to lining up on the runway for takeoff) in order to regain the taxiway centerline and exit the active runway. Though this entire evolution took very little time; the poor markings and momentary loss of orientation on my part made me extremely uncomfortable. Air carrier Captain reported poor runway turnoff markings at ORD airport contributed to a momentary loss of orientation.
Aircraft: B747
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

About an hour from ZSPD the relief crew asked for expected arrival procedure in to ZSPD. The relief crew asked two different controllers. Both controllers told them to ask the next controller. About 50 min from ZSPD Capt. and First Officer (FO) resumed operation of the aircraft. We also inquired about approach in use and were passed on to the next controller. At this point the controller cleared us direct to the second fix on the arrival and handed us over to a new controller. We inquired what to expect after (second Fix) and were give the following clearance - Cleared for the SAS12i arrival. This starts at SASAN. The SAS12i was entered in to the FMC; It appeared normal on the legs page and the ND and was executed. LNAV was engaged. About 30 sec later I said why is the Aircraft turning. The Aircraft had turned 30 degrees to the left of desired heading. My immediate action was to select 'Heading Select' and turn the aircraft about 60 degrees in the opposite direction in order to get back on Course. It came to our realization the IAF SASAN never cycled thereby creating a classic problem of having the active waypoint behind us. The clearance to fly the approach was given either right before the IAF SASAN or on top of it. The IAF SASAN was literally at the back of the Aircraft Diamond on the Navigation Display. I estimate the error to be less than one mile left off course given the speed of about Kias 280. ATC asked why we were turning and we tried to convey this to ATC; I am however pretty sure the information was not understood. Contributing factors: 1. Chinese ATC not giving an approach clearance in a timely manner when requested.2. Operating crew did not catch that the aircraft was close enough that it might not Cycle properly; as there is a small delay in the FMC. 3. The FMC contains 19 pages of arrivals in to ZSPD each has several variations and multiple transitions. It is time consuming to figure out exactly which one is the correct approach. Even when selecting the Runway in use in this case RWY 16 there is still 7 FMC pages with variations and transitions. These are not readily identifiable when compared to Jeppesen approach plates. Several must be entered in to the FMC in order to be compared to a Jeppesen plate for verification. 4. Fatigue: This was at the end of an 18 hour duty day with a rolling 2 hour delay. [Report narrative contained no additional information.] B747-400 flight crew reports being cleared direct to the second fix on an SAS 12I arrival to ZSPD before being cleared for the arrival. When the arrival clearance is issued the crew does not clean up the legs page in the FMC to reflect direct to the second waypoint and a minor track deviation occurs.
Aircraft: C172
Phase of flight: Final Approach
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict

I am an instrument student currently flying a rental C-172P (17 hours) while my C-182P (110 hours) is waiting for completion of an engine overhaul. I currently have 45 hours of simulated instrument flying. I was flying a training instrument approach ILS 25 in VMC under the hood with lfight instructor serving as safety pilot. We had been cleared for instrument approach without separation services by Approach. We had contacted Tower and reported at the outer marker. The approach was proceeding well and we were on the localizer and on the glideslope. Another aircraft had just departed a nearby Class D heading to our airport for touch and goes. The aircraft turned toward our flight path and Tower advised the other aircraft that they were flying into the path of an aircraft on approach and to 'turn North immediately'. The other aircraft turned further toward intercept with our flight path. My flight instructor took the controls for evasive maneuvers rolling to the right and climbing to avoid a mid-air collision with the other aircraft. A C172 hooded student instrument pilot reported his instructor took evasive action from an aircraft inbound to the same runway after the other pilot failed to turn away as directed by the Tower.
Aircraft: EMBRAER UNDIFFERENTIATED OR OTHER MODEL
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

During climb while in icing conditions; the following messages posted: ICE COND - A/ICE INOP (Warning); WG A/ICE FAIL (Caution); STAB A/ICE FAIL (Caution). The QRH directed the crew to exit and avoid icing conditions. The crew determined that an immediate return to ZZZ was the safest course of action. We [advised ATC] and returned to ZZZ. Discrepancy was entered into the AML.Unknown what caused the A/ICE FAIL.There isn't much training in the sim surrounding non-engine related emergencies. I would suggest that more time in the simulator; or more scenarios with situations like this are added to the training curriculum. Shortly after takeoff; we received an EICAS advisory message of icing conditions. We were in the presence of visible moisture and the temperature was conducive to such conditions. As we continue our climb through 1;500 ft and were instructed to contact ZZZ Departure; we received WING and STAB anti-ice fail caution EICAS messages; a few seconds later we received the anti-ice fail warning message. As the Pilot Monitoring; I referred to the QRH Checklist; while asking ATC information about the cloud tops - in an effort to exit and avoid icing conditions as instructed by the QRH. At that time; we determined to return back to the airport. The captain asked me to [advise ATC]. After landing safely; the Captain entered the discrepancy in the [logbook]. EMB-140 flight crew reported an A/ICE FAIL condition after departure led to a return to the departure airport.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Other Push-back
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation

During preflight; the crew had received the planned dangerous goods message. The First Officer and I had discussed the fact that we needed our Final Dangerous Goods message before pushback in our preflight briefing. We had completed our preflight briefing 20 minutes prior to schedule pushback; and in our haste to get the flight out on time; we started the push and had not received our Final Dangerous Goods message. Part way through the pushback; I recognized that error and decided to finish the push and then contact operations about no Final Dangerous Goods message. Shortly after setting the parking brake; we received our Final Dangerous Goods message. Since I made the mistake of pushing without that message I had decided not to taxi until we received it and fortunately we received it shortly after commencing the push. The rest of the flight was completed normally. Captain reported push back from departure gate without required Final Dangerous Goods document.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Other Holding Pattern
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Aircraft X departed and told the tower they had some sort of engine malfunction. They handed him to me after the pilot requested to level off at 2;000 ft. and go somewhere to hold while the crew evaluated their options. After speaking to the pilot I took action to vector him around in our airspace until they had a decision to continue or return. I asked if he wanted to stay at 2;000 ft. and he answered in the affirmative. While box vectoring the aircraft it may have entered a small 2;500 ft. MVA (Minimum Vectoring Altitude) in the southeast portion of the airspace before before completing an assigned turn to a heading of 360 away from the 2;500 ft. MVA. TRACON Controller vectoring an aircraft in a box pattern pattern vectored the aircraft below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Landing
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Jet Blast; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown; No Specific Anomaly Occurred Unwanted Situation

ATC advised we would be following a heavy aircraft on approach into ORD. While on short final; I observed the aircraft we were following on Taxiway P; headed eastbound. We continued on the approach and did not experience any effects of wake turbulence. I heard ATC instruct the aircraft to turn left onto Taxiway EE and taxi onto Runway 28R; which requires a turn of more than 90 degrees to complete. As the heavy aircraft negotiated the turn; I was just beginning to flare for the landing. I suddenly experienced what seemed to be a heavy crosswind from the right (much heavier that what was being reported); associated with a higher than normal pitch attitude to arrest the descent rate just before touchdown. Approximately 1-2 seconds before touchdown; the stick-shaker activated until the main landing gear made contact with the runway. A normal touchdown and roll-out was performed and we taxied to the gate without incident. The First Officer and I both agreed during the debrief that the approach and landing was stable and on proper speed throughout.I believe the cause of this event was a result of ATC giving the instruction to the heavy aircraft to make the left turn; causing its jet blast to cross directly over the approach end of Runway 28C. It appeared to create a crosswind/tailwind from the 5 o'clock position of our aircraft. I believe this is what contributed to the higher than expected crosswind from the right and the stick-shaker to activate just before touchdown. If ATC would have had the heavy aircraft hold short until the turn could be made in between arrivals; I believe this situation could have been avoided. Air Carrier Captain reported encountering jet blast while landing as a result of ATC clearance to heavy aircraft while in close proximity to active runway.
Aircraft: LARGE TRANSPORT
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Climbing out of DEN on the SPAZZ Departure off Runway 17R; climb via except maintain 10;000 ft. Hand flying. Approaching 10;000 ft; Controller gave us direct SPAZZ. Turned the aircraft and then Controller called traffic one o'clock; ten miles; I thought I heard him say 'out of 11'. I thought it odd that he'd turn us towards a descending aircraft and proceeded to slow the climb. As we looked for traffic I made a remark to the FO that I 'didn't like this'. As we were looking for traffic I may have climbed slightly above 10;000 ft. Controller then said '(call sign) verify you're climbing to 11;000 ft.' Thinking I'd screwed up; I immediately raised the nose and started the aircraft towards 11 when the Controller corrected himself and said '10;000 ft'. At that time we were about 10;350 ft. FO and I looked at each other and there was an immediate discussion about what we were cleared to since the next waypoint we would've had was RAYDR; which is at or below 10;000 ft but once turned off the SID that shouldn't have applied. The aircraft was headed back down to 10;000 ft when we acquired and called the traffic. Controller then gave us a turn to 120 degrees. Started the turn and Controller then gave the 'possible pilot deviation call this number'. When we got to [our destination] we called. ATC said the Controller's instruction was 'direct SPAZZ; maintain 10;000 ft.' Neither of us recalled hearing the 'maintain 10;000 ft' and PM responded with 'direct SPAZZ' with no altitude mentioned. They also claimed we'd not leveled off at 10;000 ft and got as high as 10;500 ft; and that we were at 10;300 ft when the Controller queried us. They did acknowledge that the Controller did say 11;000 ft at first and then corrected himself. They said that since we had the aircraft in sight; there wasn't a conflict but they would have to pass it up for review and would get back with us. I believe this was more of a Controller error because when he asked us to verify we were climbing to 11;000 ft set the stage for the confusion that followed. Pilot reports of a confusing transmission and instruction to climb to a different altitude then assigned and then descend back to the previously assigned altitude.
Aircraft: MEDIUM LARGE TRANSPORT
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

After pushback during the after takeoff flow and checklist the Captain questioned the flap setting I had selected. We reviewed the takeoff and landing report and determined that; due to in flight icing conditions below acceleration height we needed to use icing performance data. The performance data we had in our Thrust Lever Resolver (TLR) did not provide a configuration that allowed takeoff at our weight. The Captain called Dispatch and the Dispatcher confirmed that the maximum takeoff weight for current conditions was well below our current takeoff weight. We notified the station that we needed to return to the gate. The station called back and said '[load planning] says you're not overweight and you need to call them right away.' We continued into the gate. Five passengers volunteered to take a later flight and the flight was re-released and operated uneventfully.The reason the airplane was pushed back and started without the correct performance numbers is because it was the first time I have encountered the situation of having icing conditions prior to acceleration height. If I had remembered this I would have told the Captain we needed new numbers and we would have caught the problem sooner.The real problem was the fact that it had been low ceilings; precipitation and cold temperatures in Reno and no one saw these conditions and the problem it was going to cause at our planned takeoff weight.The most serious issue was the attempt from [load planning] to override the Captain and Dispatcher's decision to return to the gate by telling the station to tell us that we weren't in fact overweight. We weren't over our structural max weight; but we were limited by climb performance in the current conditions. This is an operational control issue. [Load planning] as far as I know are not licensed Dispatchers or Airline Transport Pilots and should not be interfering with pilot or dispatcher decisions. Q400 FO reported departing the gate overweight for the weather conditions. Flight returned to gate to offload some passengers.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Upon pushing back we started both engines and prepared to taxi. I cleared the left side and saw a passenger transport bus far out in the distance and looked like they had stopped to yield to us as we had our taxi light on in anticipation of taxiing. I asked the First Officer (FO) to clear the right side and he gave me the all clear as I verified it as well looking out the right side. I began moving forward to get some momentum to make the sharp left turn to taxi. As the aircraft moved forward and left I turned and saw that the passenger transport bus was starting to move slowly as well; yet far enough that he would yield to us. As we were moving further forward and now left with the tiller I was sure the driver saw our taxi light shining at them and would yield to us. It soon became apparent that the bus was not going to stop as it continued past us at a high rate of speed. My only course of action was to come to an abrupt stop. We may have been going 2-3 knots ground speed at that time. I reported the incident to ramp control informing them of the bus that had just crossed our path without yielding. The flight attendants at the time were doing the live demo in the aisle due to the MEL'd entertainment system. I called back to ask if everyone was ok and initially one of the Flight Attendants (FA) said they were ok but then paused and asked me to hold on as there might have been an injury to one of the flight attendants in the back. I was then informed that [another] FA had incurred an injury on her knee; could not continue and would need a wheelchair to get off. We called ramp and ops to pull back into [the gate] and the FA was removed from flight with a wheelchair. Replacement FA was called out and we went on our way. B737 Captain reported coming to an abrupt stop when a passenger bus did not yield; which caused injury to a flight attendant.