Aryan95614/aerograph-asrs huggingface dataset:
Aircraft: CESSNA SINGLE PISTON UNDIFFERENTIATED OR OTHER MODEL
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

With two students on board flying a cross country flight the following events occurred. While climbing though 2;000 feet on a 050 assigned heading with Departure we encountered a repeated momentary loss in power. The engine would stumble and run rough then surge back to full power. The first two times the power loss was momentary; not more than one second. The following 3 or 4 occurred with less time between the power loss events and lasted for a second or two and getting longer for each occurrence. All the engine instrumentation was in the green; the mixture was full in; fuel cutoff full in; fuel valve on both and mags on both. I took the flight controls and tried to radio departure to request a return to the field. After the second request was unanswered I turned to a 180 heading and reduced the power to maintain altitude. I was unable to get my request to the controller due to frequency congestion after four attempts. At this point I went back to the tower frequency without departure's approval. I requested an immediate return to the field on runway XX; I was northeast of the field at this point at 2100 feet within gliding distance. The tower instructed me to continue 180 heading and maintain altitude. I maintained separation from the traffic I saw in the pattern below us. As we passed abeam mid field we heard the go-around calls for both a [twin-engine GA aircraft] landing on XX and a business jet landing XY (intersecting runways). The two planes approached midfield at about the same time and same altitude. We witnessed the business jet make a significant turn to the right and immediate climb as they approached the intersection of the runways to avoid the [GA plane]. We continued south and tower called out regional jet traffic ahead and about 1000 feet below. We were instructed to follow the regional jet traffic cleared to land XY. The approach to the runway was uneventful. We were very high but with full flaps and a full forward slip through the descent I was able to land. Member of management asked if I would take the plane around the pattern to further troubleshoot the issue; I declined and requested to have the engine looked at before further flight.The repeated power loss caused the heading deviation in order to return to the field. The frequency change to tower without departure's approval was due to frequency congestion and being unable to reach the controller when needed. I chose a heading and altitude that would keep our flight within gliding distance and not conflict with traffic in the pattern. The conflicting aircraft over the field more than 1500 feet below our flight was due to poor sequencing and spacing by the controllers.Issue turned out to be a fouled plug. Lesson learned to lean the mixture even during climb if engine power issue occurs. Cessna pilot reported rough-running engine after takeoff due to fouled spark plug.
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 190/195 ER/LR
Phase of flight: Final Approach
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Aircraft had MEL requiring an autoland [function check]. We set up and attempted to perform the autoland [function check]. Weather was VMC; we informed tower that we would be conducting an autoland and he said; 'okay'. When we were about to flare; the controller (or more likely the ground controller) taxied an aircraft through the critical area on taxiway Yankee. This caused the localizer to become erratic and we had to disconnect the autopilot before it put us in the dirt. I called tower on the phone to advise them of their mistake; I am not sure action will be taken on their end.This situation was caused by ATC error. ATC should have advised us that they were 'unable to protect the ILS critical area.' We should not have to do [function checks] exactly because of these types of situations. Controllers are not familiar with our procedures and because of [a new pilot training] program; we have significantly increased the amount of [function checks] required in VMC conditions. I suggest trying to get rid of this [function check] requirement for the airline. An EMB-190 Captain reported requesting an autoland from the Tower in VMC in order to return the system to service after maintenance. The response is OK. During the flare; Ground Control taxis an aircraft through the localizer requiring the Captain to take over manually.
Aircraft: B777
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation

ZZZZ hub failed to notify us (Dispatch ZZZ) of Dry Ice being loaded in aft belly of aircraft. Required fuel over burn not included on release as a result.Failure of the ZZZZ hub to notify Dispatch ZZZ of Dry Ice being carried in forward or aft belly of a 777. Air Carrier Dispatcher [at main base] reported Hub Dispatch neglected to provide Dry Ice cargo information to main Dispatch resulting in no 'over burn fuel' on Flight Release..
Aircraft: B777
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

After we received taxi Inst from ZZZZ ground to taxi X to Y to XXL hold point we proceeded as instructed. We stopped at the intersection of X and Y because a Aircraft Y was holding on Y. I stopped shorter than I normally do because I didn't want to be sitting in his Number 1 engine wake while sitting still. We had brakes parked. My First Officer looked to his right and commented that an aircraft was approaching from the right on Taxiway Y. After a few seconds he said he's coming fairly fast and it didn't look as if he was slowing. We both realized at the same time he was going to continue and not stop. I flashed my R turnoff lights then my taxi lights to alert him of our close relationship. He never slowed. My First Officer made two 'aircraft stop' transmissions with no reaction. Looking at his wingtip approaching our cockpit I made the comment 'hang on guys' and his wingtip passed within 10 feet. of our windscreen. We told ATC of what happened. She came back and said; 'sorry for [the] inconvenience.' I have never been so mad and scared in my over 30 years here at [Company]. There are no holding lines or holding instructions given to us. We were cleared to the runway. Either Ground Control or Aircraft Y made a horrible mistake; potentially ending our lives by driving their wingtip through our cockpit.I think either ATC gave two clearances to both of us Aircraft X and Aircraft Y; or Aircraft Y had an ATC taxi violation. Regardless Aircraft Y either ignored our lights flashing and radio calls or was not looking outside past the center line of the taxiway. I have no clue to his thought process.If a Tower Frequency change was given to Aircraft Y prior to our intersection; that policy MUST stop. If he could have heard us tell him to stop it would have prevented a possible collision. If he heard us and ignored us; God help us all. B777 flight crew reported ATC instructions caused a critical ground conflict with another aircraft.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

While in cruise at FL360 the Cabin Altitude Warning horn sounded as cabin altitude climbed through 10;000 feet. We accomplished the applicable checklists but were unable to control the cabin pressure. We initiated an emergency descent and told the flight attendants to sit down and expect the oxygen masks to deploy; which they did automatically at approximately 15;000 feet cabin altitude. We declared an emergency and descended to 10;000 feet. We then considered diverting to MSY; which was 120 NM behind us but the reported weather was +TSRA; so we decided to continue to our planned destination. We had plenty of fuel for the lower altitude. We landed at our original destination and were met by EMTs at the gate. [Narrative #2 contained no additional information] A B737-500 flight crew suffered a pressurization failure; initiated an emergency descent and; when level at 10;000 feet with adequate fuel reserves; elected to continue to their destination rather than divert.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Takeoff / Launch
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance

We have planned for a 27K MAX BUMP bleeds off take-off on Runway 28. My copilot and I have done this several times in the last 30 days while not together but both very experienced with the procedures and the airport. We followed the procedures to the letter and fully briefed the take-off. After being cleared for take-off and lining up with the runway I advanced the throttles to 40%. After they were established at 40%; I hit TOGA. Just as the aircraft started rolling it suddenly surged to the right and at the same time the co-pilot called out the #2 engine not accelerating. By then the #1 was at full 27K 103.1 N1. I was able to retard both engines and was able to keep the aircraft on the runway. We taxied back to the gate and called for Maintenance to come out and inspect the tires and write up the #2 engine slow to accelerate after 40% power setting. The inspection showed no damage or wear on the tires and no faults on EEC or any other systems.We talked with TECH in ZZZ and they said that this has occurred several times on the 737 and was usually the cause of having one engine that is new and the other engine having a lot of time on it. The older engine is 'looser' and may not accelerate like a new engine but when 2 older engines are matched up they accelerate at the same rate so you don't notice the acceleration rate. He said that was the case with our aircraft. Our #1 engine was just installed 2 months ago. Our #2 engine was the original engine installed NEW recently. The #1 engine has 253 cycles; the #2 engine has 12;588 cycles and is 10 years old compared to a brand new aircraft. I was told by the Technician that they just watched a video on this subject and in the video it recommends after the power is set to 40% to leave it there for 20 seconds prior to hitting TOGA. I told him that is not something we were told about or trained to do.I believe that as our aircraft are getting older and engines are getting changed with high cycles; we should be tracking this combination and have a procedure in effect such as the 20 seconds at 40% N1 prior to TOGA especially when high N1 is required such as 27K BUMP; to avoid what could have been a more serious outcome had this crew not acted so quickly and communicated so quickly regarding the #2 engine not accelerating after TOGA. B737 Captain reported a rejected takeoff after #2 engine would not accelerate to match #1 engine.
Aircraft: DHC8
Phase of flight: Initial Climb
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Shortly after takeoff (approximately 1800 feet AGL; 2400 MSL; 145 KIAS) the aircraft's #1 engine malfunctioned resulting in zero torque. The crew declared an emergency; secured the engine per the QRH and returned. After landing; the crew turned off the runway and shut down on taxiway W-5. Airfield emergency crews responded and secured the aircraft for shutdown. Afterwards; ground crew towed the aircraft to the ramp. The torque motor in the #1 Engine Hydro Mechanical Unit (HMU) malfunctioned as diagnosed through high power ground engine runs. This failure was not realized by the crew inflight due to the nominal operation of the engine with Engine Control Unit (ECU) selector in TOP (Takeoff Power). Once the ECU selector was switched from TOP to NORM (as per the QRH (pilot checklist) during after takeoff checks); the Enrichment Solenoid was de energized resulting in low fuel flow to the #1 engine. The low fuel flow caused a power reduction and a command to reduce torque to maintain 900 RPM. The torque was reduced to zero resulting in the crew executing the Engine Failure QRH procedures. Replacing the #1 HMU remedied the problem. This condition is serious and affects operators using this combination of PW120/121 / HMU's everywhere. There were no indications of impending failure prior to moving the ECU selector from TOP to NORM. This situation is dangerous because you have to create the dangerous situation before you know anything is wrong. A safety message should go to all affected operators immediately. Possible workarounds (not verified). If upon selecting ECU selector-NORM; if a loss of power is detected; go back to ECU-TOP and land as soon as possible. Also disabling the affected ECU by selecting ECU-Manual may reestablish sufficient fuel flow through mechanical linkages. The reporter states that the power loss occurred five to ten seconds after the ECU was switched from TOP to NORM and it was not obvious that the switch had caused the power loss. He believes that placing the switch back to TOP would have restored normal engine power and allowed a two engine landing. He flies multiple aircraft types for a maintenance facility and is not as familiar with the DHC8 as an airline crew would be and believes that the QRH and the flight training company should provide some guidance on this subject. DHC8-100 Captain experiences a power loss after takeoff shortly after the ECU is switched from TOP to NORM. The engine is shut down in accordance with QRH procedures and the flight returns to the departure airport.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe

We were taxiing out for takeoff on Taxiway Alpha for Runway XX. It was early morning and still dark. ATC cleared us for takeoff just prior to the Alpha southwest holding pad. When I turned on all exterior lights for takeoff; I noticed Aircraft X in the holding pad ahead of us. The First Officer didn't notice the aircraft until I told him. Aircraft X was parked parallel to Taxiway Alpha. I don't think Aircraft X had on it's beacon. I immediately stopped the aircraft due to the proximity of aircraft. Had I continued to taxi I could not insure our wingtip would clear Aircraft X's wingtip. Had Aircraft X parked perpendicular to Alpha; proximity clearance probably would not have been an issue. I told ATC I couldn't insure proximity clearance with Aircraft X if I continued to taxi. ATC then cancelled our takeoff clearance and then cleared Aircraft X for takeoff which kept us properly separated. This is a possible ground collision threat. I never saw Aircraft X until I turned on all my exterior lights; even though I was taxiing slow and had on my taxi light. Fortunately I received my takeoff clearance prior to the Alpha holding pad and turned on my exterior lights earlier than normal. Threats include no lighting on the holding pad. There is also a road and intersection beyond the holding pad with a lot of red; green and white lights which makes exterior aircraft lighting less noticeable. We were also finishing our Before Takeoff Checklist which keeps our attention inside the flight deck. Flight Crew reported that as they taxied up to the holding pad in nighttime conditions; they did not see another parked aircraft with no exterior lights until in close proximity; and had to immediately stop taxiing.
Aircraft: MEDIUM TRANSPORT; LOW WING; 2 TURBOJET ENG
Phase of flight: Landing
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

We were doing a late night flight to Evansville on the visual approach for Runway 22 and the FO (First Officer) (Pilot Flying) drifted below the glide slope as he went to full visual not cross referencing a glide slope. I told him he was sinking below it and about that time we received the glide slope warning as he was correcting. Pilot Monitoring stated the Pilot Flying was too low and below the glide slope while shortly after the glide slope GPWS went off.I believe the cause of this was improper scan of the Pilot Flying while transitioning to the visual part of the approach and also it being late at night and being tired on the last leg of the day.The Pilot Flying climbed the airplane back on to glide slope and proceeded with the visual approach and a good landing.Keep a continuous scan in and out of the cockpit while on a visual approach; especially when there are no PAPIs. While hand flying the approach around 500 ft. to Runway 22 in Evansville; I allowed the aircraft to drift below glide slope. The Captain; who was PM (Pilot Monitoring) noticed and informed me I was getting low. I also received a 'glide slope' aural warning. I quickly corrected pitch and power to get back on glide slope and landed without any further issues. The Captain informed me I was getting low; and the 'glide slope' GPWS aural alert. I believe the cause was my insufficient scan of the flight instruments; as well as transitioning from the glide slope to scan the runway environment. Since it was nighttime; and since Runway 22 in Evansville has no VASI or PAPI; I believe my sight picture was incorrect; and I judged the aircraft to be higher than it was. I corrected pitch and power and returned to the glide slope for a normal landing. I believe I can do a better job of scanning the flight and navigation instruments while on approach; especially to an airport with no VASI or PAPI. Air carrier flight crew reported the pilot flying drifted below the glideslope on visual approach resulting in a GPWS alert and evasive action.
Aircraft: GLOBAL 5000 (BOMBARDIER)
Phase of flight: Final Approach
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

The crew and the aircraft were repositioning after a [trans-Pacific overnight] flight. On arrival the crew was informed they were required to position the aircraft to [another airport]. The weather at [destination] was VMC with no ceiling and excellent visibility with little or no wind. We were given and accepted a visual. Approaching from the northwest we positioned for a left base and configured appropriately; rolling out on final at approximately 1500 ft fully configured with speed reducing as per a normal approach on the visual glide path (one red; one white). Once established on final the crew were distracted by a Cessna given clearance for departure. It was after this that the crew were alerted to an amber windshear annunciation on the primary flight display. As the PIC and the [flying] pilot I elected to continue the visual approach instead of executing an immediate go-around for the windshear. The windshear lasted 15 seconds approximately with minimal airspeed deviation of +/-5 kts.In effort to regain the visual glide path from above after the event a single audible 'sink rate' from the terrain warning system was heard. The aircraft regained the visual glide path at 500 ft and a normal on speed landing ensued. Given the fact the crew had left [departure airport the previous day] and crossed multiple time zones in two days; quality of judgement had been seriously impaired. In hindsight the crew should have stayed in [original destination] and repositioned the aircraft [later]. This would have ensured the crew were well rested and improved judgement and decision making. Global 5000 Captain reported continuing an approach after receiving a windshear alert. Fatigue following a long duty day of international operations affected his judgment.
Aircraft: B717 (FORMERLY MD-95)
Phase of flight: Landing
Anomaly: No Specific Anomaly Occurred All Types

Even though the trip pairing should have allowed for more than enough rest; I wasn't able the get more than 7 hours total of restless sleep in those two nights. I found myself making mistakes that I never made before on that last leg; such as looking right at the pack switches and turning them off instead of the hydraulic switches. Scheduling sent an ACARS enroute to call after we landed and I sent one back calling in fatigued. Restless sleep on my part; not sure why. B717 First Officer reports informing crew scheduling that he is too fatigued to take another flight at the end of his scheduled trip pairing.
Aircraft: MD-88
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types

During cruise flight the Captain's Primary Flight Display (PFD) and attitude indicator tumbled. The autopilot and autothrottles disconnected. The Navigation Display (ND) indicated a map fail message. The heading on the RMI changed approximately 90 degrees in wings level flight. All navigational instruments were lost. The First Officers PFD attitude was still correct; therefore controls were handed over to myself; the First Officer. The Captain began running through the QRH procedures. The QRH directed us to attitude and heading fail; which we accomplished. However; this did not result in restoring a heading. We were navigating by the whiskey compass. We then proceeded to another QRH section IRS fault. This allowed us to input our compass heading. Afterward; the autopilot was useful for holding basic level flight. At this time; our only navigation information was VOR directions from the RMI. We called maintenance; our discussion with them was fruitless. Therefore; we coordinated a diversion with dispatch. [Requested priority handling] with ATC. [Coordinated] with the flight attendants; notified the passengers; and completed appropriate checklists for the diversion. We landed safely.In this case; it appears there was a mechanical discrepancy. Such failures happen from time to time and are not completely preventable. [Report narrative contained no additional information.] MD-88 Captain's primary flight display/attitude indicator; navigation display & RMI failed in cruise flight. Controls passed to First Officer. Crew complied with Quick Reference Handbook procedures followed by a safe landing at a diversion airport.