Aryan95614/aerograph-asrs huggingface dataset:
Aircraft: CESSNA 180 SKYWAGON
Phase of flight: Landing
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Arriving runway 25 (the active runway); there was a crosswind from approximately 180; that was transitioning at times to a quartering tailwind. Landing started nominally with a 1 point landing on the front left wheel; transitioning to a 2 wheel landing. As the plane slowed; the wind began to push the tail to the right; causing the airplane to swing to the left. Correcting to the right; the plane came too far to the right and ground looped. The left wing touched the runway; as did the left elevator; causing damage to both; as well as the rim of the left wheel. No occupants were injured; and the plane was able to be taxied safely off of the runway. C180 pilot reported losing directional control after landing resulting in a ground loop.
Aircraft: MEDIUM TRANSPORT
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

While in route to Burlington Airport (BUY) descending from 11;000 feet to 4;000 feet and approximately 20 miles to the south of the field on a very clear VFR day; the Co-pilot and I both had the Burlington airport in sight and informed ATC (Greensboro Approach). We were then cleared for the visual approach for BUY and told to contact the advisory frequency 122.97; we then descended to 3;000; we were on an extended downwind for Runway 24 in BUY; I had spotted traffic off my left wing which was indicating 200 feet below our altitude. In an attempt to ensure there would not be a conflict with the traffic; I promptly climbed up to 4;000 momentarily until the conflicting traffic was no longer a factor. At that point descended back down to 3;000 feet and began our final approach into Burlington (BUY). While in route to Burlington Airport (BUY) descending from 11;000 feet to 4;000 feet and approximately 20 miles to the south of the field on a very clear VFR day; the co-pilot and I both had the Burlington airport in sight an informed ATC (Greensboro Approach). We were then cleared for the visual approach for BUY and told to contact the advisory frequency 122.97; we then descended to 3;000; we were on an extended downwind for Runway 24 in BUY; I had spotted traffic off my left wing which was indicating 200 feet below our altitude in an attempt to ensure there would not be a conflict with the traffic; I promptly climbed up to 4;000 momentarily until the conflicting traffic was no longer a factor. At that point descended back down to 3;000 feet and began our final approach into Burlington (BUY). Corporate flight crew reported NMAC on approach to land.
Aircraft: CARAVAN 208B
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical

After I had taxied out of the ramp; I joined the taxi line and contacted Ground Control for taxi instructions. The Controller advised me to standby; so I continued taxiing through the uncontrolled area of the ramp. After I had made a 90 degree left turn; the Ground Controller gave me my taxi instructions. As this was happening; I noticed a tug pulling up to the gate to the right of the taxi centerline. I continued my taxi while I was reading back the instructions from the Controller. While I was doing this; the tug pulled past the security gate; and I noticed the brake lights illuminated by reflection from the luggage cart it was towing. I was moving rather slowly at this point; since most of my forward momentum had been used in the 90 degree turn. Still; I slowed down and rode the brakes until I saw the brake light reflection; and released the brakes. While I was near the end of my readback of taxi instructions; the tug accelerated right in front of me; necessitating my emergency application of the brakes. I interrupted my readback; and attempted to turn my landing lights and strobes on; but was only able to get one landing light on before the tug crossed my path. When the aircraft stopped; the propeller was approximately on the vehicle roadway edge line. When I stopped the aircraft; the tug was approximately 3 feet away from the propeller of the aircraft. The driver looked directly at me/the aircraft and kept traveling from my right to left. I then re-verified my taxi instructions and completed the rest of the flight uneventfully.The uncontrolled area of Baltimore airport is dangerous due to vehicle drivers not yielding to aircraft. This type of incident occurs on a regular basis and apparently with different types of aircraft and different pilots. It is truly unknown to me why someone would intentionally come within a few feet of the propeller of an aircraft just so they do not have to wait two seconds for an aircraft to pass by. A C-208 pilot reported a near collision with a ground vehicle as he was transiting the ramp obtaining a taxi clearance from Ground Control.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: unknown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Our EFB program due to poor implementation; training; and approval process has become a hazard to this operation. The mounting procedure currently being addressed is only one facet of an ill conceived and executed plan. I am an Apple product user for some years and consider my knowledge and experience of the hardware and operating system as above average. My company issued iPad will only charge from a domestic outlet with an Apple brand charger and/or cord or the hyperjuice battery. Not so with any other Apple product I own. My hyperjuice battery charging cord does not work and I use a Toshiba laptop cord to charge it. When I originally called the help desk; I was told my entire cord and hyperjuice would need to be turned into my flight office and wait for a new one or borrow a spare...if there was one available. I asked if I would be legal to fly without one; he asked what my seniority; aircraft; and seat and said as a Relief Pilot I probably would be OK; or something to that effect. Knowing there are limited spares; I opted to charge the hyperjuice with my laptop cord and avoid trying to chase down a spare every time I fly which is normally early turns or late Europe on weekends when the flight office is not manned. There are many issues with these units (iPads and batteries) of which I would estimate 25% of users share faster than normal battery drain and other issues. Today the TCPro App locked up again and after help from the help desk; the unit was reset for a third time and the App was deleted and reloaded. The response was within one hour and he was helpful.Training; training; training....remarkable that the FAA; our pilot union; and our Company signed off on implementation of a mission critical component by flight crew after watching some rather mediocre videos. -Stable platform. Tested prior to distribution. -Stable mount. [This should have been] properly evaluated prior to implementation. I find it hard to believe the manufacturer recommend wiping pliable rubber with an alcohol type solution. -24/7 Help desk....as we fly 24/7?! -Ample spares; back-ups; trained experts at each base. -Bandwidth to perform all necessary operations at any Company base/destination. I do not understand why a union has to negotiate this? An international relief pilot for an air carrier expressed misgivings about the implementation of a tablet type EFB by his airline; citing training; spares; battery issues and lack of 24/7 support.
Aircraft: AMATEUR/HOME BUILT/EXPERIMENTAL
Phase of flight: Takeoff / Launch
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Gear collapsed during takeoff; due to gear lock disengaging while bouncing on the runway. Found out later that retaining spring to keep lock engaged was missing. This spring is not on annual nor on preflight check list. Strongly recommend to add on both list and check function on regular basis. Experimental aircraft pilot reported a gear collapse on takeoff due to a faulty gear lock spring.
Aircraft: MEDIUM LARGE TRANSPORT
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

I was working the handoff position at the sector. There was a lot of weather deviations and route closures. Aircraft X had a flight plan which took them backwards. The pilot did not question the route and I did not catch the fact that the routing took them backwards. Aircraft X was coordinated with the adjacent sector who also did not catch that the routing would take this flight backwards. ATOP probed the flight as if he was going reverse course at a fix. The flight did not reverse course and came together with another flight at 41000 feet.ATOP should have a logic check when a flight reverses course like this. Also the pilot didn't fly flight plan. ZNY Center Controller reported the flight plan processing software did not detect that an aircraft filed a route which reversed course at a fix.
Aircraft: B767
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: No Specific Anomaly Occurred All Types

A portion of our route included VVC UB689 BOG UG447 SPP. This route overflies high terrain with mountain peaks exceeding 13;300 feet. The Planning guide; South America Region section; does not include a Terrain Critical Depressurization Procedure for this route. Approaching VVC; we contacted Dispatch and asked if the procedure may be located in another section of the guide. While waiting on the answer from Dispatch; we considered a course change including a course reversal. Dispatch [could not suggest any specific publications that covered this route.] We proceeded on our dispatched and cleared route with great caution. We discussed contingency plans for possible mechanical failures requiring a descent. No additional information provided. B767 flight crew discovers enroute that there is no pre planned escape route in their manuals for loss of pressurization over high terrain along their route in South America.
Aircraft: GULFSTREAM IV / G350 / G450
Phase of flight: Takeoff / Launch
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

All checks completed all normal. Took off and at approximately 500 FT AGL had the red THRUST REVERSER UNLOCK light come on and the auto checklist came up for the right engine. We declared an emergency followed the checklist and returned to the departure airport with the unlock light still illuminated. We returned without incident and landed as instructed by the checklist. A GIV aircraft's right engine red THRUST REVERSER UNLOCK light illuminated after takeoff; so the auto checklist was completed; an emergency declared and the flight returned to the departure airport.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

[B737-800] was instructed to push to spot X. Prior to that another 737-800 was instructed to push to spot YY which is just in front of spot X on the north side of ZZZ Airport. There was no aircraft coming in which would give a reason to leave spot Z and spot YZ open. The push crew for [the first aircraft] had to stand in the jet blast of [the second flight] as they disconnected the tow bar. Even if there was an operational need this is still not safe. I believe that spots YZ and YY were put there for wide body aircraft and not for Control to use randomly. This is not the first time this has happened. Air carrier ramp employee reported the push back crew for a B737-800 was subjected to jet blast from another B737-800 when the two aircraft were directed to adjacent ramp spots. Reporter suggested Ramp Control should give more consideration to ramp safety when they assign ramp spots for push back and tow bar disconnect operations.
Aircraft: SMALL AIRCRAFT; HIGH WING; 1 ENG; FIXED GEAR
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC

Reporting aircraft was returning to PWK. Traffic at 12 and several miles was seen on the TCAS. We were monitoring PWK Tower at the time of the incident. External lights were on. Right front seat passenger acknowledged traffic; PIC was not able to see it until it was within 5 miles. Conflicting aircraft was against darkening overcast. PIC saw the conflicting and a few seconds later; rear seat passenger said to pull up and turn to the right. Conflicting traffic passed below and to the right of the reporting aircraft. Listening to Chicago TRACON would have been helpful in avoiding the incident. [Report narrative contained no additional information.] GA pilot near PWK performed evasive climb to avoid traffic. Traffic was shown on TCAS display.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Climb; Initial Climb
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Climbing out of ZZZ on the ZZZZZ TWO on our flight plan. After a short delay ATC cleared us direct to the ZZZZZ1 Intersection followed by the ZZZZZ2 and ZZZZZ3 intersections which are on the ZZZZZ2 THREE departure.During the departure briefing both the FO identified our lack of recency experience as a threat. When the clearance was sent to the FMC with the new routing the FO was not aware of the LOAD FMC prompt so the new routing was never loaded. When I reviewed the print out of the PDC clearance I remember being confused by the clearance.I should of voiced my concern to the FO when I did not understand the clearance. Unfortunately; I got distracted and never resolved the discrepancy. There's no substitute for diligence when it comes to the route check. Air carrier Captain reported a track heading deviation. Captain stated when the clearance was sent to the FMC with the new routing the FO was not aware of the LOAD FMC prompt so the new routing was never loaded.
Aircraft: NO AIRCRAFT
Phase of flight: Other Preflight planning
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

PHILADELPHIA NINE departure. PDC states 'Cleared PHL9 departure climb via SID' (no altitude given). Nowhere on the PHL9 10-3 page is there any indication of the altitude limit. To find it one has to go to the 10-3-1 procedure text page. Also; nowhere on the Graphics page does it say to reference Text page for altitude information. This runs contrary to almost every other SID and as such makes it an easy thing to miss or forget.How hard is it to put the 'Maintain ____ or assigned altitude' on the same page as the graphic? If this departure had been assigned at the last minute prior to take-off the required altitude would have been difficult to find as it is on a separate page that has to be called up on an iPad that is slow to render the Jeppesen graphics. I feel this has potential for loss of situational awareness given the right circumstances. Pilot reported the PHL 9 Departure altitude limit was not printed on departure page; requiring bringing up another IPad page to find the altitude. Reporter feels there is potential for loss of situational awareness.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Takeoff / Launch
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance

We planned 26K Bleeds Off Takeoff due to Right Pack Inop and per MEL we applied Engine Bleed Off Takeoff or Landing with the APU Operating procedure. Cleared for takeoff on XXR. At 40% N1 CA TOGA. Both Engines advanced. Engine #2 achieved takeoff thrust of 100.8 N1. Engine #1 stagnated at 85.0 N1. Auto-throttles were on. I pushed on the #1 throttle lever to get a response; but engine stayed stagnated. I was not sure if it was an engine failure or bird strike; so I commanded PF to Reject. We Rejected below 80 knots. Announced Reject with Tower and they directed us to exit first available taxiway. We decided since we were not sure of the nature of the problem; it would be prudent to taxi back to gate and let maintenance troubleshoot the problem.A cascading effect of maintenance issues: During pre-flight the ground crew pulled the external power without our concurrence which caused a power interruption. Had to rebuild/recover several pre-flight items. Five minutes prior to pushback right PACK light illuminated. Could not reset. Maintenance MELed right pack. During pushback/engine start we could not get N2 rotation on #2 engine with Engine Start switch in GND and Start Valve Open light illuminated. Isolation Valve switch was in the Open position. We made several attempts; but each time we moved the Engine Start switch to GND the Isolation Valve would close; and we would lose right duct pressure. We decided to return to the gate via tug and made a logbook write-up. Maintenance fixed the problem and we pushed off the gate for a second time. The low speed reject was the subsequent event.First; more vigilance/coordination from ground crew prior to pulling external power. Second; local ZZZ maintenance mentioned the plane had been sitting idle for more than 60 days. I cannot verify this information. Maybe more Maintenance pre-flight or systems tests if aircraft has been sitting idle for an extended period? Air Carrier Captain reported a rejected takeoff due to mechanical issues with an aircraft that had been sitting for a couple of months.
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Phase of flight: Landing
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

We were landing at ZZZ at XA40 local time after the tower has closed. We requested ILS [Runway] XX and were cleared for the approach from ZZZ Center. Outside the FAF we were switched to advisory freq; the FO made an initial call of an 8 mile final for the runway and adjusted the PCL (Pilot Controlled Lighting). Inside the FAF the FO made another radio call of short final to the runway. We landed normal and about 90 KTS I saw head lights on Taxiway 1 where I planned to exit; so I decided to roll to the next one. When the FO called 60 that['s when] we saw the truck was crossing the hold short line. I immediately applied full brakes and redeployed and used max reverse as we were only within a few hundred feet. The truck stopped on the runway when the driver heard our reversers; they were almost to the centerline when they stopped. We stopped about one and a half runway stripes from the truck which then reversed off the runway and we continued to our gate.Only thing that might better safety is sharing this experience with other crews for landing at untowered fields. Air carrier Captain reported a ground conflict with a vehicle that had crossed the runway hold short lines during their landing roll requiring the Captain to immediately apply full brakes and thrust reversers.
Aircraft: BE-KA
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

The aircraft was planning the RNAV Approach. We had just split the sector and there was confusion as to which frequency the aircraft was on. The aircraft was close to the Initial Approach Fix and asked for lower. We assigned 9;000 feet and turned them 30 degrees right to give an appropriate intercept angle. We left the aircraft on the heading just a minute too long. We climbed the aircraft to 10;000 feet for terrain and turned them back to the fix; but while the aircraft was turning they got into a 10;000 feet terrain box while at 9;500 feet. A low altitude alert was then issued. On the job training was in progress. ZLC ARTCC Controller reported due to a communications error after de-combining sectors an aircraft was left on a heading too long and flew below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

The 737 fleet newsletter has; in the past; advised pilots experiencing an inadvertent flap torque brake activation to execute a go around and run the appropriate QRH procedure (Flaps--Trailing Edge Flap Disagree). The newsletter chided pilots for not automatically making the go around decision. I think this blanket one-size-fits-all guidance needs rethinking for at least three good reasons.First; it is not unusual to be dispatched to an airport wherein the Dispatch remarks require a bleeds off approach; flaps 5 go around. A torque brake lockout with flaps stuck at 5 degrees makes the go around performance questionable. I envision an approach at night in icing conditions into an airport surrounded by high terrain; and the pilot trying to execute a successful go around with flaps stuck around 30 degrees. Throw in an engine failure during this sluggish go around; and the consequences are dire.Second; the normal call outs for a routine go around begin with calling for flaps 15. I can see the flaps being oversped as the pilots muddle through a procedure never practiced; with flaps stuck nearer 25-30.Finally; the flight manual allows a pilot to land flaps 15 without exercising due diligence on stopping capability should an engine fail on final approach. With an engine failure on final; the pilot may continue the approach by increasing thrust; re-bugging to a higher speed; and selecting flaps 15. There is no prohibition against continuing the approach--even to a high altitude airport; a short runway; or a terrain critical airport; or all three combined. For those who would argue landing with a flap disagree due to torque brake lockout represents an unstable approach (not configured as briefed); I submit the engine failure on final scenario trumps that hands down: one must raise flaps; deal with resulting sink rate; achieve a higher target speed (lower the nose more); add full power on the working engine; and counter the asymmetric thrust. Totally unstable.I recommend company revisits the guidance that a go around is appropriate in all circumstances with a flap torque brake lockout. Perhaps the flight manual could advise that a go around for a flap torque brake lockout during a mandated bleeds off; flap 5 go around approach is inadvisable if flaps are stuck much beyond flaps 5. I'm not even sure if a normal approach predicated on a flaps 15 go around is capable of adequate terrain clearance should the go around be executed with flaps much greater than 15 degrees in certain circumstances. At any rate; landing with flaps stuck between 15-30 seems no worse than landing flaps 15 following an engine failure on final approach; particularly when landing performance issues exist. A B737 Captain reported that procedures for flap torque brake activation should be reviewed.