Aryan95614/aerograph-asrs huggingface dataset:
Aircraft: SKYLANE 182/RG TURBO SKYLANE/RG
Phase of flight: Takeoff / Launch
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe

I was going to practice takeoffs and landings at the Buttonwillow Airport (L82). I noticed persons flying radio controlled model aircraft on the mid portion of the runway. This is not an uncommon occurrence and these people are permitted to operate at this airport. On prior occasions; I have had no problem with these people; they clear the runway and usually yield to aircraft; so I decided to continue my approach to the airport. I had previously checked NOTAMs for any activity at the Buttonwillow airport and there were none. I could see them clearing the area and as I approached on final they were just about clear. I was configured for a short field landing and was able to land and stop my aircraft about 500 feet from where they were standing off the runway. I did self announce on the CTAF frequency of 122.9.I made a 180 turn and back taxied to the beginning of Runway 29 which I had just landed on. I saw the people were clear of the runway and initiated a short field takeoff. As I was approaching rotation speed; one of the persons stepped right to the edge of the runway. I thought about aborting the takeoff but reasoned this would be more dangerous than continuing because it would cause me to have to go past the person as I decelerated on the ground. I continued and became airborne prior to reaching the person. I stabilized my climb and turned to the right to create distance from the person and my aircraft. When I passed the person I estimated my altitude to be 100 feet and a horizontal distance of 200 feet from the person. I continued my climb and left the area. I did self announce on CTAF.In reviewing this incident; I have decided not to land at the Buttonwillow Airport; outside of an emergency; if there are model aircraft operating. There are just too many variables that make it unsafe. The pilot of a C-182; after experiencing a close call with radio control modelers sharing--with permission--the use of the runway at L82 airport determined he would go elsewhere in the future for landing practice if the modelers were again present.
Aircraft: C172
Phase of flight: Initial Climb
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

With my student flying we departed Runway XX. After takeoff; Tower advised us of two Light-Moderate rain cells. Not having flown this route before I did not know if they were on our route of flight; but I believed them to be. I stated that we would return to ZZZ1; our original departure point. We were told to fly our current heading; await further clearance; and switched to Departure. With my student flying I researched the likely new route. I looked up to see that we were 90 degrees or so left of our assigned heading. I took controls; righted our course; and continued climbing. We received our new clearance and a vector to intercept VX. At this time we had been in IMC with light turbulence for all of the time I had controls and some of the time prior to my taking them.When given a second vector to intercept VX; and 2;000+ FPM descent. My VSI maxes out at 2;000 fpm and it was pinned to that number. I reduced power to idle only to have my airspeed decrease. I returned to cruise power and slowly re-obtained 80 KIAS. I requested priority handling and requested vectors direct to ZZZ. I could not raise my left wing. I instructed my student to give me airspeed call-outs. While descending I was very aware of the oddity of my VSI and Airspeed disagreement. I believe I was caught in a severe downdraft of a weather cell. At approximately 4;000 feet MSL I started regaining control of my bank and leveled at approximately 3;600 feet on my 090 vector. I had turned two 360's and lost about 3;000 feet of altitude. I was; mostly; between layers of clouds and followed vectors for a visual approach. I landed Runway XX.Human Performance ConsiderationsMy student initially struggled to maintain heading. I believe she was fixated on airspeed.After the spiral dive was initiated I decided to maintain 80-90 KIAS; between Vs1+bank and Va. I based my unusual attitude recovery power setting based on maintaining this airspeed with wings level being my first priority.I decided I was not going to die at that time.The stress of the situation degraded the clarity of my communication with ATC.I was later informed the Controller decided I was no longer in an emergency and told his supervisor I had stated I was no longer in an emergency. I have the audio archive to disprove this.I believe my error in this situation is that I choose to fly a new route with a private pilot/instrument student at night. I do not intend to repeat this error and have adjusted my personal minimums to reflect that. Pilot reported a loss of control and downward spiral in weather conditions until safely recovering the aircraft.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Takeoff / Launch
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

As we took Runway 24L; both pilots commented on the large aircraft and its landing on 24R. We were cleared to takeoff on heading 230. Takeoff procedures were normal through 80 KTS. Approaching coincidental V1 and rotate speeds; both pilots noted the other aircraft did not appear to be holding short of 24R as instructed. It did indeed begin to cross our takeoff runway without slowing. As pilot flying; I rotated normally until the tail was clear of the runway and then aggressively rotated further while adding additional power eliminating the reduced thrust takeoff. The Captain called out; 'Get it up; keep it climbing; and let's get outta here.' It was my opinion that we flew directly over the other aircraft as I could see the tail section of his aircraft while looking down. Tower immediately called for the following aircraft to cancel his takeoff clearance on 24R; issued some instruction to the other aircraft; and eventually sent us to Departure. During takeoff roll; we heard LAX Tower direct the carrier to hold short of 24L but did not hear a response. As I called; 'V1 rotate;' I watched the other aircraft clear Runway 24R onto Taxiway AA at a rate that I felt he was not going to hold short of our runway. I directed the First Officer to increase his rotation rate into an aggressive rate of climb and increase power. I note that the other aircraft had crossed the hold short line and was crossing 24L as we lifted off and climbed aggressively. I then heard LAX Tower cancel the takeoff clearance of the aircraft cleared for takeoff after our clearance. While I could not see the other aircraft from my side of the aircraft; the First Officer did see that we were crossing over him. As a crew our actions were in accordance with procedure to ensure the safety of our aircraft and passengers. ATC may have been over taxed and missed the other carrier's response/non-response to Tower's instructions. The other carrier apparently thought they were cleared to cross 24L. However; they did not clear Runway 24L prior to crossing the hold short line as they most certainly would have seen our takeoff configurations lighting. Increased situational awareness and radio monitoring on the part of this carrier might have prevented the incident. After landing; I am always aware of Tower's instructions and aware of any takeoff clearances on runways that I need to cross. I also clear every runway before I cross it. An aircraft departed LAX Runway 24L and passed directly over another aircraft which; contrary to ATC's instructions; did not hold short after landing on Runway 24R.
Aircraft: CRJ900
Phase of flight: Landing
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

FO was flying a visual approach to runway 26 in ZZZ. Winds were reported at approximately 240/10G21 with low level wind shear reported in the area though nothing recent or specific to our runway. FO was on speed and glideslope with the autopilot on. Autopilot was disconnected at approximately 1000ft. Approach appeared completely normal until about 300-400ft when a short gust of wind caused us to drift slightly right of course. FO began to correct back to centerline. At about 100ft I began to feel the tail of the plane begin to sink indicating the onset of a slight shear. A little increase in thrust or maintaining thrust until a lower altitude would have corrected the situation and was what I was expecting. Instead FO began pulling thrust at 50ft. With the thrust pulled back I tried to pull back on the yoke to break our rate of descent but it was too late. I estimate we hit the runway at approximately 700 ft/min. No secondary indications of aircraft damage were detected either through EICAS messages or gauge readings. Aircraft was taxied to gate and deplaned normally.It is my opinion that we do not spend enough time hand flying our airplanes. We mostly fly RNAV departures which require the autopilot on at 600ft. Even when we are not on an RNAV departure; I've noticed most FO's ask for the autopilot on at 600ft and then don't turn it off until below 1000ft on landing. When not conducting IOE training; I fly almost entirely with reserve FOs. When I suggest they hand fly the plane; on a departure or on a visual approach; you can literally see the uncertainty in their faces. They are clearly uncomfortable at the controls of their own airplane. I believe this uncertainty is even there in some of our new Captains. For Captains upgrading today; I believe many have not been at the controls of their plane for more than 2 minutes per flight. Perhaps it's time to reconsider policy of turning on the autopilot at 600ft on RNAV departures. I'm not aware of any other airline that has this requirement. This would be the first step in getting our pilots to hand fly the plane more. I believe as they get more comfortable at the controls they would be able to pick up on subtle changes in aircraft attitude/airspeed which allow for safer and smoother landings. I was the PF and didn't recognize how fast the aircraft was sinking when I pulled the power to start the flare. It was too late to add power back in and the airplane had a hard landing. It was reported to maintenance by the Captain.Better situational awareness [is needed]. Better depth perception by looking further down the runway than the nose of the aircraft. CRJ-900 flight crew encountered windshear at 50 feet. The First Officer failed to perceive the high descent rate and the aircraft made contact with the runway at 700 FPM. The Captain suggested more hand flying practice.
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

When we got to the airplane in ZZZ there was an MEL in the logbook that Maintenance was working on MEL 33-XX-XX-X due on [Date 1]. The Maintenance Technician signed off the MEL as fixed; and we received an amendment from Dispatch removing the MEL prior to the door closing. In ZZZ1 the release had the MEL back on it. The Captain called Dispatch about it and got transferred to Maintenance. The Maintenance team over the phone said the MEL was never closed out in their system; so according to our logbook and Dispatch we were okay; but on the Maintenance side we had an MEL open. The Captain corrected the logbook in ZZZ1 with Maintenance via phone and added MEL 33-XX-XX-X due [Date 2] into the logbook. The back end maintenance system needs to match the logbooks. Electronic logbooks can mitigate this risk by having multiple parties see the actual aircraft logs versus several phone calls going back and forth. There was a breakdown between Maintenance Control and Dispatch because our Dispatcher saw it as closed out hence he removed it and provided the amendment. Air Carrier First Officer reported a miss connect between Dispatch and maintenance regarding matching the aircraft logbook and electronic logbook differences.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway

The flight was exiting Runway XX Left at Taxiway XX; and had not yet called. I reached out to give them taxi instructions and they asked if the instructions were for them. I assumed I either blocked them or they were transferring frequencies mid sentence; so I reissued the instructions - Taxi via XY to the ramp - as though it was their first call-up. The acknowledged and said they had not received a hand off from the Tower Controller. I told them all was good.A minute or two later; I observed the aircraft turning eastbound on Taxiway XY3 to join Taxiway XZ southbound. I reached out to them by call sign only; and they responded. I followed up with asking them where they were going. The pilot said they were going to the 'north line'; which is on the Ramp Tower apron. I advised them that Taxiway XY4 is the delineation of where the ramp begins and that is where I would have expected them to go to. They apologized and said they were looking for the north line and headed in there. We left it at that.During the slowdown; some crews are probably going to places they either have never been; or have not been to in some time. The only recommendation I can make is to ask; it is not like the frequency congestion would make asking a bad thing. Ground Controller reported an airliner taxied in the wrong direction toward the ramp.
Aircraft: LARGE TRANSPORT; LOW WING; 2 TURBOJET ENG
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Speed All Types; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

[We] encountered severe turbulence and two separate lightning strikes while descending into ZZZ. The event occurred while level at 13;000 FT and 250 KTS approximately 20 NM south of ZZZ VOR. We had deviated several times prior to this for moderate rain showers during the arrival but were back on course at the time of the incident. The seatbelt sign was on and we were in continuous light chop and light rain showers with no reports of anything more than light chop. When we encountered the turbulence we immediately lost 20 KTS of airspeed and violently pitched in all axis. We were tossed about in our seats and we lost approximately 150 FT of altitude as the autopilot kicked off. The First Officer was pilot flying and immediately responded to the situation and recovered the aircraft manually. The initial severe turbulence lasted 10-15 seconds. We again confirmed nothing but green showers on our radar. While reporting severe turbulence to ATC our E Flight Attendant notified us that someone was on the floor apparently injured. At that time we were told it was our A Flight Attendant. We had previously been instructed to hold and as we waited to obtain more information from the cabin; we were struck by lightning twice within about a two minute period. We then received additional information that the injured party was a passenger. Now declaring a medical emergency; the First Officer handled both the flying and radios while I continued to receive updated information about the injured party and notified Operations and Dispatch of the need for paramedics. Within a matter of just minutes; our green radar scope turned to multiple cells of yellow and red; and while being vectored; we once again encountered moderate to severe turbulence approximately abeam ZZZ VOR. I continued to communicate with the cabin while informing Operations and Dispatch of our lightning strikes. The remainder of the approach was normal and ATC did a nice job getting us into ZZZ and to the gate quickly. Medics were there to meet us so the communication chain was nicely done by all. There was a rapid change in weather conditions and no warning of turbulence. An air carrier aircraft approaching ZZZ encountered unannounced severe turbulence and lightning strikes which resulted in a temporary loss of control and injury to a passenger thrown about in the cabin.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Prior to this flight being planned there was an email concerning South America staffing changes. A sector was being closed. With comments that the flight had been moved to a sector monitored by the same desk; and that if the flight was delayed that action needed to be taken. This flight departed early. (Aircraft X is a very early departure; this may have led to the flight being omitted or the flight from the previous day being moved.)As the oncoming dispatcher; I was briefed by the dispatcher sitting at the desk I was assuming and the dispatcher on [a different] desk that was passing [two] sectors to [another] desk. The desk responsibility sheet was on the desk showing [four] sectors assigned to [one] desk. I added the sectors to my desk at sign in. I read my emails early in the shift and noted the comment that the flights had been moved. I noticed on the Aircraft Situation Display that there was a SVR turbulence PIREP over northeast Nicaragua; and noted that the report was made by a [Company] flight. I looked to see who was monitoring the flight and discovered the flight was unmonitored as it was assigned to [the closed] sector. I logged into the flight and saw that the flight had been attempting to report the turbulence and they were concerned there was no response from dispatch.If the flight had not encountered SVR turbulence we would not have known that this flight was not monitored. Aircraft X transited the area and would have been advised of the turbulence had a dispatcher been signed into the sector. The phones were not properly configured with the closure of the desks. Air carrier Dispatcher reported a gap in operational coverage discovered when a flight provided a PIREP for severe turbulence that was not being monitored.
Aircraft: LARGE TRANSPORT; LOW WING; 2 TURBOJET ENG
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types

[We] experienced significant localizer signal deviations on final approach to Runway 16. Subsequent MD-80 aircraft also reported same issue to ATC. [We] reported to ATC via radio and phone call. Uneventful stabilized approach and landing. An Air Carrier crew reported a significant localizer signal deviation on final to RIC Runway 16 which was reported to ATC but did not disrupt their stabilized approach.
Aircraft: ANY UNKNOWN OR UNLISTED AIRCRAFT MANUFACTURER
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

ATC told us to plan for the ILS19 circle to runway24 after the JAIKE3 Arrival to TEB. When we were 8.5 miles from the airport the controller asked if we were able to take a left downwind to runway24 and we complied with the heading instruction for the left downwind to runway24. After a couple seconds controller asked if we would like runway6; and gave us heading 090 to intercept the localizer; at this time we were at 2;000 feet. Since we were so close the controller added: fly direct TORBY and cleared for the visual approach to runway6. We were changing the FMS for the different runway but we were so close to the runway and ATC told us that we were supposed to cross DANDY at 1500 feet but we were cleared to TORBY for the visual and we were at 1800 feet. Everything happen so fast; but ATC changing our approach three times so close to the airport was the reason we did not comply with the altitude restriction. Pilot reported failing to meet altitude restriction altitude after being cleared for a visual approach following two runway assignment changes.
Aircraft: FALCON 20FJF/20C/20D/20E/20F
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Cruising at FL340 on autopilot; suddenly aircraft rolled up to 60 degrees of bank and began a descent in excess of 2;000 FT per minute before we could recover control. Altitude deviated down to FL330 with a subsequent recovery to FL340. [We] immediately advised Center of an autopilot hard over with the altitude deviation. Upon recovery; Center asked if we could maintain RVSM and we responded yes; but after further consideration decided that we should not continue in RVSM and requested a descent out of RVSM airspace. We were cleared to FL280 and continued to our filed destination without further incident. I wrote up the autopilot as INOP; canceled the remainder of the flights; spoke to our Maintenance; and deferred the autopilot to fly manually to home station at FL250; flying off autopilot. I am unaware of any traffic conflict at this time and was not advised by ATC that there had been a traffic conflict. The jet is now in maintenance (troubleshooting the problem). The reporter stated that the aircraft's Mechanic determined the only component in the system which could cause an upset such as this would be the autopilot amplifier. That component was changed; the autopilot run continuously on the ground for a full day with no anomalies and so; deemed airworthy. The reporter has since flown the aircraft numerous flights with no problem.The upset developed very rapidly and resulted in a 4;000 FPM rate of descent. During the recovery G's were pulled; but not what he would consider excessive. A Falcon 20 autopilot amplifier malfunctioned at FL340 which resulted in a rapid roll to 60 degrees; and a 1;000 FT altitude loss. The flight descended out of RVSM airspace for the remainder of the flight.
Aircraft: BE-KA
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict

Collision Alert [CA] alarmed multiple times between Aircraft X and a target indicating beacon code [XXYY]. First alert occurred when Aircraft X was approximately ENM080050 at FL270. Aircraft is ADSB equipped. These alarms appeared to be conflicts between the aircraft's two transponders.These nuisance CAs occur multiple times each day; and have an additive desensitizing effect on controllers and CICs/FLMs (Controller in Charge/Frontline Manager). This leads to a potential reduction in response time to legitimate CAs. I recommend an analysis of our display and data processing systems to determine the cause of these spurious alerts; and applying software patches or equipment upgrades as necessary to resolve them. FAI FLM (Frontline Manager) reported of collision alerts that are caused by the aircrafts ADS-B. FLM states there are multiple nuisance alarms due to aircraft equipped with ADS-B. FLM would like some type of a software upgrade or an equipment upgrade to stop the spurious alerts.