Aryan95614/aerograph-asrs huggingface dataset:
Aircraft: SR22
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

I departed ZZZ; climbed normally; received vector for a right turn to a heading of 290 and a climb to 10;000. I complied with all of the uneventfully. West of the airport was cell of precipitation that I couldn't see through. It was depicted as yellow on my weather display. The precipitation was west of the airport and oriented along the axis of about 290 to 300 west of ZZZ.I was doing the ZZZ4 departure. The tower controller advised in the initial climb that in substance that I'd be boxed around on vectors for the climb before being going to the route.A previous departed reported the ceiling at about 6;500 which was basically true. I changed frequency to ZZZ TRACON and got a heading of 290. When I entered the IMC the rain was very intense and it was turbulent. I noticed changes on the vertical speed indicator up and then later down. The temperature was near freezing; but I did not see any actual ice. While climbing in IMC; the radio frequency began to screech such that I couldn't hear anything. That ultimately occurred on both radios and both frequencies. The marker beacon lights were flashing. I received a traffic alert for traffic on my left. It was very turbulent; but I stayed at 10;000 feet as assigned. With no communications (coms); I squawked 7600.I decided to turn 90 degrees right still in IMC because that resolved the traffic; would get me out of the precipitation; was a heading basically on course; was consistent with the expectations from the departure briefing and ZZZ4; and would restore coms. The precipitation was aligned with the vector so remaining on that heading was not viable. There was traffic there. I didn't change altitude (I was at 10;000 ft. the whole time).After the right turn; I exited the side of the precipitation; I was able to hear ground responding to one of my calls (on COM2 on the bottom antenna); so I went back to the departure frequency on COM1 (on the top); re-established communications and departed.The ATC TRACON controller was upset seemed to think that I was in VMC and just turned randomly or something. I've flown through 'yellow' precipitation many times uneventfully. The lost coms procedure when you're on a vector is to either stay on the vector or turn on course. I turned on course because it solved all of the problems; but seemed to surprise ATC. I think that the confusing thing for ATC was that it was fine weather straight over the airport; which is probably what he has on his computer. But west of the airport was unexpectedly intense rain.I'm not sure that this incident could have been avoided given what everyone knew at the time; although once I squawked 7600; the turn on course shouldn't have been a surprise. SR22 pilot reported a loss of communication due to moderate weather during departure.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

While taxiing at FLL; there is a construction fence on the east side of the ramp. Along this fence there are many vehicles; bag carts; and other equipment parked. There are no lines to indicate that we have wing clearance from these items. There was also an aircraft parked at [our intended gate]. I stopped the aircraft and called Ops to tell Ramp we needed Wing Walkers. They told us the Safety Zone was clear.I called Ops again to explain we needed Wing Walkers. Then one of the guys got out of the truck and stood as a Wing Walker for my left side and a Ramp Agent came out to the right wing. We then proceeded to taxi into the gate. Another Pilot heard us talking about this and said they came in last night and agreed with our assessment of the situation. We did not have an incident; but I'm afraid that someone might not be as persistent as me and taxi into this gate without Wing Walkers. There should not be any equipment parked along the fence in this area or lines need to be painted to indicate wing clearance! Captain of B737 reported the lack of visual cues needed to safely park the aircraft in the presence of close proximity ground equipment and material.
Aircraft: BARON 58/58TC
Phase of flight: Initial Climb
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

VFR departure normal. Right turn at shoreline. I departed with flight following but was informed ATC would be too busy along my route and was told to squawk VFR. Limited to the Class Bravo shelf; I set my altitude select to 4500 ft. and engaged the autopilot in the climb. Monitoring the climb; I saw the plane continue the climb past 4500 ft. and where I expected it to settle back to 4500 ft.; instead go through 4600 ft. upon which I disengaged the auto pilot and pushed on the yoke. However; the trim up elevator wouldn't relax; I couldn't turn the trim wheel and all I could do was push hard against the yoke as I busted Bravo and the plane climbed at least another 400 ft. with the trim stuck. I pulled the circuit breaker but it still wouldn't release and I manually pushed the yoke hard to get the plane below the bravo. I cycled the breaker and the switch and finally got the trim under control. I hand flew at 4500 ft. until passing the shelf and continued on my flight climbing to 8500 ft. with no difficulties. Later; I determined that I have a faulty autopilot altitude switch. Getting it fixed tomorrow. In retrospect; I feel I handled the problem calmly but expeditiously. BE58 pilot reported overshooting altitude during climb due to autopilot runaway.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

While flying at cruise altitude at night; the Pilots noticed that the standby attitude gyro was showing 15 degrees left wing down; while the two primary attitude displays were showing 'wings level.' As the flight proceeded; the standby attitude gyro precession in pitch (20 degrees nose up and down) and precession in roll (15 degrees left and right). From the first time the Pilots noticed the standby attitude gyro behaving abnormally until we arrived at the gate (approximately 45 minutes); the 'orange Gyro Failure flag' never appeared to warn the Pilots of the failure. The Captain/Maintenance made appropriate logbook entries. Maintenance removed and replaced the standby attitude gyro; and the next flight was conducted without any problems with the standby attitude gyro. Tonight we were able to reference the two primary attitude displays and outside ground cues in order to maintain the proper aircraft attitude with ease. However; in the unlikely event the two primary attitude references failed; AND the standby attitude gyro failed without the proper 'orange Gyro Failure flag(s);' the Pilots would not know for certain which attitude references were providing valid information and which ones were not providing valid information. Is the B-737-700 standby attitude gyro designed to display an 'orange Gyro Failure flag' when gyro fails? If not; it would certainly be of great assistance during night; IMC flight with multiple attitude display failures. B737-700 Captain experiences a standby attitude indicator failure in cruise without displaying any failure flags.
Aircraft: MEDIUM LARGE TRANSPORT; LOW WING; 2 TURBOJET ENG
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Captain programmed FMS for SYR. Alternate was ROC with weather building in the area. After BEEPS the Captain put ROC airport instead of SYR. Neither Captain nor the First Officer noted the error. ATC cleared flight to 15;000 FT and plane turned to ROC. ATC asked if we were turning to SYR. The First Officer was the flying pilot stopped the descent and the turn until the Captain reprogrammed the FMS and turned to SYR. The Controller never gave any change of instructions.No TCAS alert. Error was due to the plane arriving late about 50 minutes to gate due to Maintenance. Captain was concerned with weather at the alternate ROC and put that into the flight plan. During the flight we were watching the weather and did not notice anything wrong until the Controller asked if we were turning toward SYR. Be more vigilant while programming the FMS and flying. Not being so concerned about the time off the gate. Rushing did not help. An aircraft was late arriving at the gate; so the Captain hurriedly entered the FMS data with an incorrect destination; ROC instead of SYR. Enroute watching weather; the crew missed the error until ATC queried about the destination.
Aircraft: NO AIRCRAFT
Phase of flight: unknown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

I was settled into my hotel; having just diverted to ZZZ due to smoke and convective activity. I received the two emails I enclosed with this report. They tersely reported 'Southern California ACA' (Airspace Coordination Area) and 'Northern California ACA' and gave a range of altitudes. I had never heard of an ACA; so I used Google to find the FAA acronym list. There was no mention of an ACA. The email also mentioned 'Notice Number: NOTCXXXX' so I searched this as well. I found a reference to ZZZ1. That notice expired December; 2008. My cellphone was having trouble making phone calls; so I didn't call [company] until the following day. At that point; I was informed that nobody (including the FSS briefers) previously knew what an ACA was. The briefer pointed me to an FDC NOTAM that gave further information. There was no reference to the FDC NOTAM in the emails I received. I would not have been able to find the FDC NOTAM myself until the FSS briefer pointed me toward it. I would have hoped that the FAA had learned its lesson after declaring ATC Zero events earlier this year and failing to inform pilots what this meant. If the FAA is going to use terms and acronyms; these need to be defined in advance; and educational materials need to be disseminated to pilots and FSS briefers. Also; if FAASafety.gov is going to send emails to pilots; these emails should have useful information. Pilot reported diverting due to weather; then received email notifications from FAA that were confusing.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

On climb out; the First Officer (who was flying) said the yoke roll feel was unusual in bank (roll) of over 10 degrees. He gave me the aircraft and I concurred. The control force was more than usual and so we contacted Dispatch who patched us through to [Maintenance]. Phone problems delayed a resolution. We were flying over an area that had gusty crosswinds due to the remnants of hurricane Patricia so we decided the best course of action was to return to EWR in case something else went wrong and we would have to drop into one of these airports underneath us. The QRH did not have a checklist for this but we checked. We also referenced the FOM for the divert. The aircraft also had two deferrals due to speed brakes and we did not know if this was contributing to this or not. [Maintenance] did not think so. Once the flaps extended for landing; the problem went away. It also did not duplicate on the ground for a flight control check. It only happened in flight with the flaps up. We also did not feel [an emergency was warranted] since the flight controls were working; but just felt different. Everything was uneventful once the flaps were extended for landing. We then changed planes and continued to [our destination]. B737 Captain reported they returned to departure airport because of 'unusual' control feel in roll.
Aircraft: EC135
Phase of flight: Takeoff / Launch
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

HSI precessed 101 degrees in 34 minutes while static on roof top helipad. Unable to manually slew HSI; manual compass heading card slew panel NOT INSTALLED. Night flight conditions; [I was] unable to conduct IFR flight; IMC procedures or accept another flight request due to precession of HSI. [I was] unable to navigate with HSI. Dead reckon navigated from hospital to base. HSI began to correct 5 minutes into the return leg to base at a rate of 4 degrees per minute. I would like to point out that while the problem at this specific Medical Center is significant; it merely is the environmental precondition to a forthcoming unsafe act. This Medical Center is one of at least eight hospitals with known magnetic anomaly interference in our area of responsibility. This has historically never been a significant safety factor because the legacy Bell 222B/U model aircraft were all equipped with a slewable HSI. The introduction of new aircraft has created a supervisory precondition for unsafe acts by not properly equipping the aircraft with this function. The aircraft are a newer variant of the EC 135P2+; the advanced avionics and in particular the AHRS are of a different generation than those installed in the older aircraft. I have seen the HSI take as long as 20-25 minutes to fully recover. Pilots have had to reposition to another nearby landing site to wait out the correction to the HSI; before being able to return to their base in IFR conditions. By conducting a risk/benefit analysis; one could clearly see that the risk is the aircraft and the insufficient capability to correct induced anomalies. Inadequate supervision has failed to correct a known problem that has created a precondition for unsafe acts. In order to mitigate the risk; an aircraft modification should be performed to install the necessary HSI control panel. The expense is irrelevant when compared to the cost of preventing a mishap. While it is true that magnetic interference at some landing sites do create an environmental hazard to the aircraft navigation equipment; the latent factors are insignificant when compared to the known active equipment precondition. It would be unreasonable to think that the environmental impact created by at least eight hospitals in the area could be reduced or mitigated to no longer being a risk. It is reasonable to mitigate the risk and control the aircraft anomalies through an improvement to the IFR aircraft. An EC-135 helicopter pilot reported an HSI precess while parked on a hospital's rooftop helipad which he was unable to correct because the aircraft lacked a compass slew function.
Aircraft: A321
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance

On rollout deployed reversers. Noticed left pull and used heavier braking on RH side. Aircraft tracked fine down centerline. Captain advised one reverser inop. Walk-around prior to flight revealed no indication that No. 2 reverser had been inadvertently locked out. On ground post-flight walk-around verified that reverser lockout pins on No. 2 engine were NOT extended showing red. Mechanic found hydraulics lockout in place after opening cowling. This would not be visible during an external walk-around inspection. This is a procedural issue. During maintenance there is probably a checklist for this and it was simply overlooked; perhaps due to fatigue. A321 First Officer reported that right engine reverser failed to deploy. Post-flight inspection revealed that the reverser was locked out in a manner that was not visible during preflight.
Aircraft: LARGE TRANSPORT; LOW WING; 2 TURBOJET ENG
Phase of flight: Final Approach
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC; Inflight Event / Encounter Object

As First Officer was hand flying and intercepting the final approach course; he alerted me to something he thought was a drone. I was trying to identify something slightly right of the nose and he drew my attention back to the left as two quad copter drones passed right to left off the nose and passed the left wingtip. The drones had a white base/bottom with a dark/black rotor area. We estimate the distance from us was between 200-300 feet. I immediately notified tower and he alerted the aircraft behind us to the threat. After discussing the event on the ground; we realized that the object on the right was also likely a third drone. I notified ground control that we believed there were likely three drones and he stated the aircraft following us had also seen the drones. Reporter stated they were on approach to RSW when two drones passed from right to left at about 200-300 feet and other drone was off to the right. Their aircraft had just intercepted the glide slope when they saw the drones. They were curious what the drones were doing there. Air carrier crew on approach to RSW had several drones pass within 200-300 feet.
Aircraft: LIGHT TRANSPORT; LOW WING; 2 TURBOJET ENG
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

We taxied out from the FBO to Runway 13. As we approached the area on the parallel taxiway near the end of the runway; we checked in 'ready'. The Local Controller replied to 'hold short of the runway; landing traffic' It was a hazy summer day and on first look down the final approach we could not see the landing Cessna. While looking for the aircraft I failed to see the unusually placed hold short line and inadvertently crossed it. When I realized this; I called the Tower to tell them that I had crossed. The landing aircraft was already on the ground and clearing. He said 'no problem' and cleared us for takeoff. There was no conflict at any time. In the future I will be more diligent in my review of the airport diagram and pay particular attention to the location of 'hold short' lines; looking for unusual placement. An aircraft crossed the MFE Runway 13 hold short line because it was located so far from the runway.
Aircraft: A320
Phase of flight: Climb; Landing; Descent
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Climbing out at around 20;000 ft we experienced a thump like we hit something. I thought it was on my side of the aircraft and the Captain thought it was on his side of the aircraft. We discussed what it might be; too high for a bird strike; maybe a panel came off; slight roll back on one of the engines; etc. We checked all systems throughout the flight and every system was normal. We sent Maintenance a message to inspect the aircraft when we arrived in ZZZ. For the next 2 or so hours all indications remained normal. Smooth flight; good weather; nice east flight. We then began our descent into ZZZ; power on slow descents; idle descents; everything remained normal. I was flying the aircraft and the Captain was the PM (Pilot Monitoring). CA (Captain) continued to check the systems throughout the descent. On downwind; we were given a clearance to descend to 4000 feet. I used open descent which is an idle descent because I thought it might be a short final approach. When the # 2 engine came to idle; the vibration started and from that time it stayed at idle. We saw a N1 vibration on the lower ECAM at one time of 9.9. CA immediately called and [advised ATC] and asked for priority. We were landing on XXL and the tower offered XXC so we took [it]. We proceeded on downwind and turned on an 8 to 10 mile final. Tower got us on the ground quick. CA asked if I was comfortable landing the aircraft and I replied yes and continued. We landed the aircraft and rolled to a stop close to where the fire trucks were. During the rollout; we got an ECAM message that the engine failed and tower called and said we had fire coming out the tail pipe. At the end of the roll out CA took the aircraft came to a stop and set the parking brake. He then called for the evacuation checklist so we would be ready because by that time we were already talking to Fire Rescue who had pulled up several trucks and were hosing down the right engine. We never got any kind of fire indication on the FLT deck. They told us not to evacuate. We stayed on the runway for about an hour while Fire Rescue and maintenance made the decision on what to do with the aircraft and passengers. They brought out a super tug and towed us to a gate. This is about the best I can do to describe what happened. During the evacuation checklist; CA did blow the fire bottle on the #2 engine as Fire Rescue was approaching but he elected not to blow a bottle on the #1 engine which was fine by me since nothing was wrong with it; Fire Rescue was approaching; and he had not given the evacuation command. A320 First Officer reported problems with the #2 engine; including significant vibration indication; engine failure ECAM and visible flames from the tailpipe during landing roll.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict

I was working and sector above me asked me to key their frequency because they believed that they lost frequency. I couldn't change their frequency. The CIC then asked if I had my frequency. I had tried to ship an aircraft prior but then tried another and no response. [Operations Manager] then came down the aisle and said switch to VTABS [Voice Switching and Control System Training and Backup Switch]. I proceeded to plug into D-side position PRE-jack. My frequency still wasn't working. I called ZME Calico sector to try they to give my Aircraft X. No luck reaching Aircraft X. I then plugged into D-side headset jack and broadcast for Aircraft X. I had never gotten a response but Aircraft X started descending at 3 mins till loss of separation and 4 mins till impact. We were CPDLC testing at the time of the event. I needed a D-side but was unable to get help because I needed to communicate with aircraft and there was no position available to help me. Kansas City Controller reported radio problems in the area and then a loss of separation due to the radio failure.
Aircraft: MEDIUM TRANSPORT; LOW WING; 2 TURBOJET ENG
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Aircraft X checked on frequency expecting an ILS for RY36 as advertised on the ATIS. Due to weather observed on final to RY36 I offered the ILS RY13 as an alternative. The pilot said sounds like a good idea and that he was getting set up for RY13 instead. I then descended him to what I thought was 3000 (the MVA) as I have done for years in that area. The Low Altitude alert went off somewhere around 2600-2500 MSL. I advised the pilot of his altitude and he said I told him to descend to 2000. At this point he was entering a lower MVA area of 2100. I told him to just maintain 2000 and he simultaneously reported the airport was in sight anyway. I asked if he would like a visual approach clearance instead. He did; and I cleared him for the visual approach for RY13. He landed without incident.Aircraft X had his company Aircraft Y about 5 miles in trail inbound also. I advised the aircraft of similar sounding call signs. I don't know if it was the [number]'s in the call signs that were on my mind or not; but after I listened to the tape; I indeed did say to descend to 2000; not 3000 as I thought I had. I've descended aircraft in this area probably a couple thousand times in my career and this is the first time 2000 ever came out. I didn't catch the read back of 2000 either. I was expecting 3000. Recommend closer attention to read back and not what I expect to hear. Approach Controller reported issuing an altitude below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude; triggering a Low Altitude Alert.