Aryan95614/aerograph-asrs huggingface dataset:
Aircraft: CRJ900
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Climbing out we were advised of light occasional moderate between FL250 and FL310 with good rides above FL310. We were advised as such just after climbing through 10;000 ft. FO (First Officer) then called cabin crew to sit down with seat belts fastened until advised further. The encounter started out as light. Around FL260 the conditions became more constant and moderate. Around this time pitch mode; continuous ignition and turbulence mode were selected. Climbing through FL270 the autopilot seemed out of sync with the needed corrections and airspeed deviations were becoming greater. Autopilot control inputs were becoming significant with yaw deviations such that the brick was almost completely out to the side. Around this time shaking became enough that it was becoming hard to read the displays. When conditions worsened I disconnected the autopilot (FL280) as the airspeed deviation was increasing to an unacceptable degree with general autopilot over actions. The autopilot was acting as if it was out of phase with the needed inputs. Climbing through FL310 conditions improved and the autopilot was re-engaged with turbulence mode on. We verified with the cabin crew that they and the PAX were ok. We also told them to remain seated until we gave them the all clear. During the encounter we told ATC that the conditions were more than moderate. I hesitated to call it severe until after the encounter and discussed the events with the FO. Once the severe determination was made ATC was notified; Dispatch notified; and the condition of the cabin verified to be ok. At no point was the aircraft ever out of control and the predominant conditions were moderate with some instances that may be called severe. Cabin was in good spirits upon deplaning the aircraft. CRJ-900 Captain reported encountering severe clear air turbulence; and taking manual when the autopilot seemed unable to maintain control.
Aircraft: BONANZA 36
Phase of flight: Final Approach
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types

A Bonanza 36 was holding at the EMI VORTAC waiting for another aircraft executing the ILS23 approach at FDK to cancel IFR. After the first aircraft cancelled IFR; he recommended that due to the ceiling and visibility that the BE36 consider trying the GPS to Runway 05 instead. The BE36 concurred and was vectored for the GPS05. FDK Tower opened at 0700L advertising Runway 23 as the active runway. FDK Tower was advised that the BE36 was already being vectored for the GPS05; the Tower responded they were unable because the airport was below weather minimums for the GPS05. The BE36 called FDK in sight and cancelled IFR and proceeded VFR to the field. FDK was reporting IFR conditions at the field and told the BE36 that they were unable to allow him to land at the field VFR. The BE36 picked up another IFR clearance and requested the GPS05 at FDK; as he could see the airport from the air and was unable to see the field from the other direction. Again; FDK denied MULRR sector authorization to conduct the approach. After nearly an hour; the BE36 had to divert from FDK and went VFR into KDMW. There is no reason that the active runway at FDK could not be changed from Runway 23 to Runway 05 as the wind was calm and there were no other operations being conducted at the airport. FDK simply would not authorize the GPS05 approach because the airport was below weather minimums for the approach. However; controllers are not allowed to deny a pilot an approach request. As Pilot in Command; the pilot of the aircraft has all pertinent weather and approach information and ultimately the call to shoot a particular approach rests with the pilot. If he wants the approach; it is the controller(s) responsibility to let the pilot conduct the approach; that is why missed approach instructions exist and are published. Not to mention the fact that the pilot of the BE36 could see the field while on the final approach course for the GPS05 approach into FDK. It was the Tower Controller's unwillingness (and lack of understanding of rules regarding approaches) that directly led to the BE36 being delayed over an hour before finally having to divert to an alternate airport. PCT Controller described an unsafe condition when FDK Tower denied a pilot requested GPS05 approach due to weather minimums; the pilot cancelling IFR after observing the airport.
Aircraft: SMALL AIRCRAFT; LOW WING; 1 ENG; RETRACTABLE GEAR
Phase of flight: Initial Climb
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

After departing ZZZ for ZZZ1 on an IFR flight plan; at about 500 feet AGL and 2 miles from the airport I switched frequency from ZZZ Tower to ZZZ2 Center before being asked to switch frequency by the tower. I have not flown IFR for more than one year due to COVID. I recently completed a Flight Review and Instrument Proficiency Check; but this was only the second IFR cross-country flight since then (the first was from ZZZ1 to ZZZ a few days earlier); and the first departing from a towered field. This led to my improper ATC communication procedure. Single Private Pilot reported; after a year away from flying due to COVID-19; not following proper IFR communication procedures after departure.
Aircraft: A321
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical

After landing on 27L; taxiing in eastbound on B approaching A6; an RJ on J almost hit us as it approached A6 from our 5 o'clock position. It didn't even slow as we converged. I could not see it from that direction and was unaware of its proximity until the F/O said 'Stop! This guy is close!'. It passed by about 10 feet by our starboard bow. Queried Ground Control and was told the RJ was supposed to follow us. A321 Captain reports a near collision with a Regional Jet at the A6 and J Taxiway intersection. Last second detection by the A321 First Officer may have prevented a collision. Ground Control had instructed the Regional Jet to follow the A321.
Aircraft: BONANZA 33
Phase of flight: Landing
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Coming in on the last landing of the night after doing pattern work; we were working on power off 180 and short field techniques; after about 6 patterns we decided to make the last one a full stop and practice our crosswind technique. In the pattern I briefed [the student] that I would take controls when we were close to the runway environment to show her a float using ground effect if she needed to use it in an event of a power off landing. We were on final and crossed the runway threshold when I took over controls we were approximately 50-75 feet when we crossed the numbers; I then started to correct for the crosswind adding right rudder and left aileron as I got closer to the ground. I started pitching up in the flare to demonstrate a controlled stall over the runway using ground effect to my advantage; suddenly I found myself in a higher than normal pitch attitude which cause me to stall slightly higher than anticipated; this caused my right wing to fall suddenly and this is what made it make contact with the runway. It was a hard landing but I thought I had landed on the mains; it wasn't until we came to a complete stop on taxiway alpha that I saw the right rear wing tip had been bent up slightly. We were then told to taxi back to the ramp by tower; I was checking controls and they seemed operational. I did a closer inspection of the tip and found contact marks on outer mid tip as well as the rear tip. I believed I misjudged the actual height above the runway which caused me to stall and let the wing drop. A flight instructor reported that while working on power off 180 and short field techniques in a Beechcraft BE-33; the pilot found himself in a higher than normal pitch attitude which caused the plane to stall; resulting in the wingtip contacting the runway.
Aircraft: MD-11
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

During initial climb above 5;000 feet. MSL and 250 KIAS experienced Number 1 Engine Fire Light and associated warning tones. Reduced Throttle 1 to idle and light went out. We completed Engine Fire Severe/Severe Damage checklist and [advised ATC] and returned to [departure airport] landing XXR. [Report narrative contained no additional information.] MD11 flight crew reported that during climb a Level 3 ENG1 FIRE alert sounded along with aural warnings causing them to return to their departure airport.
Aircraft: ANY UNKNOWN OR UNLISTED AIRCRAFT MANUFACTURER
Phase of flight: Initial Climb
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

VFR departure out of SDL. Positive control by PHX ATC departure. Controller asked what altitude was requested. Responded 15;500. Controller responded back. I heard climb to 15;500. I readback cleared 15;500. Controller later said the clearance was to 5;500. Very similar numbers may have caused error. A corporate First Officer had an altitude deviation during departure from PHX airport.
Aircraft: A321
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Flying the HLYWD1 arrival into LAX; LA Center cleared us to descend via. The First Officer; pilot flying set 12;000 in the altitude window and managed the descent. The aircraft started down at 1;000 FPM. At the top of the hour I; the pilot monitoring; went off to get the new ATIS and load new info into the performance page. ATC called us and told us to climb and maintain FL240 till BRUEN. I looked up and we were at 23;300 about 15 miles short of BRUEN. We had checked all the crossing restrictions; they were all correct. The aircraft was descending in managed mode. I don't know why it descended below 240. I copied a phone number and called LA Center at the gate. He advised me that there was no loss of separation.Pilot flying and pilot monitoring did not do a good enough job monitoring the aircraft's descent.Do not rely on the aircraft to always make crossing restrictions. Both pilots have to monitor all the time. Yet another Airbus busting its altitude restriction on the profile descent (descend via). This is a known issue with Airbus aircraft deleting the upcoming altitude constraint when the aircraft is in level flight already at the bottom of the upcoming altitude window on the arrival.The pilots were issued the 'Descend Via' and descended early; missing the 240B300 altitude window.Do not allow Airbus aircraft to fly in the National Airspace System (NAS) until they fix this ridiculous issue with their FMS. The system is setting its pilots up for failure; and this is becoming a daily occurrence. It is an ongoing major safety issue. So far we have gotten lucky and there have been no other aircraft involved; but sooner or later; we will not be so lucky. It is ridiculous that the Airbus engineers cannot get this straight. A321 Captain and Los Angeles Center Controller reported that the Airbus did not comply with a crossing restriction.
Aircraft: CRJ200
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

First Officer was flying and was issued a crossing restriction. Immediately after pulling the thrust levers back to initiate the descent the First Officer saw that the Right Engine was unresponsive to thrust lever inputs. First Officer called for the QRH and the Captain ran the Jammed Thrust Lever QRH procedure. The Captain and the First Officer agreed to keep the Engine running until 10;000 feet and closer to ZZZ. The First Officer deployed Flight Spoilers to continue the descent because the Right Engine N1 was at 98 percent. The Captain kept the passengers and Flight Attendant informed of everything. Once level at 12;000 feet and complying with the crossing restriction the Captain completed the thrust reverser jammed QRH procedure and used the fire push switch to shut down the Right Engine. An emergency was declared and the ILS was requested to maximize the runway length. First Officer kept the PF role and landed the airplane safely. The Captain took controls and taxied to the gate. Passengers were deplaned without compromising safety. The flight crew attempted to swap the bleeds to the APU above 15;000 feet but the other crew member quickly noticed and prevented it. The flight crew with no guidance from the checklist attempted to 'test' the Thrust Lever by moving it forward increasing the N1 to 98 percent where it stayed. Captain was the PNF and the First Officer was the PF. As the descent was initiated; it was discovered that the Right Thrust Lever was unresponsive to any commands; with the N1 displaying 97.5 percent. The thrust lever was moved forward and aft to verify unresponsiveness and the N1 increased to 98.3 percent to which the decision was made to not move the thrust lever any further without QRH compliance. The QRH was consulted; and since the engine was still producing power at a continuous level; the decision was made to not secure the engine until speed control would become an issue (i.e.; prior to 10;000 feet to comply with the 250 knot requirement). An emergency was declared with Approach; and the Right Engine was secured in compliance with the QRH procedure for 'Thrust Lever Jammed' at approximately 14;000 feet. A single engine landing was accomplished with emergency equipment standing by. The landing was uneventful; and the aircraft was taxied to Gate with no further assistance. All passengers deplaned normally with no major concerns noted by the Flight Attendant. CRJ200 flight crew discovers that the right engine is unresponsive to thrust lever movement when attempting to retard thrust for descent. An emergency is declared; the engine is shut down; and a single engine landing ensues.
Aircraft: EUROCOPTER AS 350/355/EC130 - ASTAR/TWINSTAR/ECUREUIL
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Batt V 23.2 prior to start; initiated start and Batt V dropped to 13.4V but recovered quickly through 14V. Continued scan of VEMD; T4 rising normally; oil pressure check; and when scanning back to Batt V; noticed T4 needle moving quickly. Moved start selector to OFF and immediately noted OVERLIMIT DETECTED on upper VEMD. Accessed Maintenance pages and noted T4 of 871'C.Batteries that are cycled through show good voltage on preflight / before start checks; but how they will respond to a starter load is an unknown. Future first flight of day starts during cold weather / cold aircraft will be Start Pak assisted. Eurocopter AS 350 pilot reported low battery voltage caused an engine over temperature on start. The engine start was discontinued and maintenance was notified.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Takeoff / Launch
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway; Ground Incursion Taxiway

At the gate we received a message that we needed to push early; or on time; due to ZZZ Center closure for COVID cleaning. We pushed back and taxied west route to Runway XL. Halfway down the taxi; by [Taxiway] 1F on [Taxiway] 1; we received a takeoff clearance for [Runway] XL. As I pulled out onto the runway; the FO advised me I entered the runway at [Taxiway] 1D and not [Taxiway] 1C full length. I started a back-taxi for full length and we received a clearance from Tower at [Taxiway] 1D for cleared for takeoff; and we had traffic on four-mile final. When we took off we were between [Taxiway] 1C and behind [Taxiway] 1D. Additive conditions were being off for three weeks. Takeoff at night on unfamiliar runway direction usually is [Runway] XXR. Getting takeoff clearance almost one minute prior to takeoff during taxi. ATC zero hour for destination COVID cleaning was a distraction trying to get off in time before ATC closure. While taxiing to [Runway] XL for a nighttime departure; we were cleared by the Tower to line up and wait well ahead of the runway end; roughly [Taxiway] 1F. As we had just completed the Before Takeoff Checklist after a single engine taxi and engine start; I was a bit behind in setting the Departure frequency. I went into the EFB to find the frequency; and when I looked up I realized we were turning onto the runway at [Taxiway] 1D. I alerted the Captain that we weren't at the end. At the same time; Tower advised us we were at [Taxiway] 1D; but cleared us for takeoff with traffic on four-mile final.The Captain had already started a bit of a back-taxi; and upon hearing the traffic report we discontinued the back-taxi; lined up and departed. We were not at the very end; rather somewhere between [Taxiway] 1C and [Taxiway] 1D; but behind [Taxiway] 1D. Upon reflection; we decided that our takeoff data may not have been valid since we were not sure of our start point. Additive conditions were an ATC zero hour at destination and the Captain admits his three weeks off prior to our day put him a little behind. I also didn't advise that my head would be down while taxiing out.Better verification of runway departure point and better awareness of taxi diagram. Air Carrier flight crew reported a taxiway/runway incursion and cited being rushed to beat an ATC Zero time contributed to the event.
Aircraft: CRJ700
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

During approach to Runway 9R at PHL; Crew was assigned 4000 ft. altitude and vectors to intercept localizer to Runway 9R. After descending and establishing at 4000 ft. and the assigned vector; ATC instructed us to descend [to] 3000 heading 120 to intercept the localizer. As we descended from 4000 to 3000 around 3200; a GPWS alert of 'TERRAIN' came on. Pilot Flying disconnect AP (Autopilot); seconds after that another GPWS alert 'PULL UP' was received; PF (Pilot Flying) initiated escape maneuver and initiated climbed. Pilot Non-Flying contacted ATC and advised we had a GPWS alert and we were climbing. ATC asked want altitude do we want to level off; PF said 4000 and ATC assigned us 4000. ATC asked if we can continue the approach from that altitude to which PF indicated that yes we can intercept the LOC and GS. PF continued the approach hand flown to intercept the ILS and landed uneventfully. Vectors ILS 9R; NIGHT/IMC; outside ASOCI on heading 120 approximately 3200 ft. MSL we got a terrain caution message; almost immediately followed by a terrain warning with 'pull up' command. The Captain turned off the autopilot and immediately began a full power climb. At this time we were getting ATC instructions for the approach; which I then was able to tell ATC we were climbing due to terrain warning. At 4000 ft. the warning had gone away; ATC asked if we could accept 4000 ft. Once established at 4000 ft. ATC asked if we were good to shoot the approach. We were given vectors and intercepted the localizer; then the GS at 4000 ft. and had an otherwise uneventful ILS approach and landing.We are unsure why we would have gotten the terrain caution or warning. We were on vectors and well above the obstacles in the area with a normal descent rate. CRJ-700 Flight Crew reported receiving a Ground Proximity warning on approach to PHL.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Landing
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

For landing I sat in XR jumpseat instead of XR foward facing jumpseat. The passengers in the second to the last row were coughing and sneezing and I was concerned for my health and safety. I felt that I needed to social distance. I was unaware that moving to the XR jumpseat for health reasons violated an FAR.In circumstances such [as] this; we should have provisions in place to protect not only ourselves; but our loved ones at home. Flight Attendant reported moving to an unassigned jumpseat for social distancing purposes. The move conflicted with FAR regulations.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Descending into ZZZ; the Controller was very difficult to understand. It sounded like he was wearing a mask while attempting to communicate. Every instruction we were given I had to verify. Some instructions were more or less difficult to decipher than others. Due to the divisiveness associated with the mask issue; I chose not to remark on the radio about not being able to clearly understand all of the instructions. I simply verified each instruction while clearly annunciating.Inability to understand ATC instructions appears to be a Safety threat. I have no way of knowing if the Controller was wearing a mask or not; but all other transmissions from other aircraft and other Controllers were clear. I have heard that controllers may begin to wear them; but that is unverified. In the event that this is the case it presented a clear barrier to communication; which seems to pose a significant Safety threat. Air carrier Captain reported difficulty understanding ATC instructions possibly due to the Controller wearing a face mask.
Aircraft: CRJ900
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Enroute we received a Left Bleed Leak warning. After 30 seconds; the warning persisted and the AC automatically closed both bleeds and began to depressurize. I was surprised how fast it depressurized. We followed the POM emergency procedures and began an expedited descent to 10;000 feet. The cabin altitude did not exceed 10;000 feet; but close enough to receive a Cabin ALT Warning. Cabin temperature began to rise and it was very uncomfortable.I transferred controls to the First Officer; so I could brief the flight attendants. I asked them to prepare for landing and give ice water to the passengers if needed as safety permits. I briefed the passengers. We requested priority handling to descend and requested the VOR 13. We called ahead to Operations and Dispatch to have them ensure our gate was ready and the ally would be clear. We landed taxied off the runway directly into the gate and had the door open with minimal delay. A CRJ-900 depressurized automatically when; first the left bleed closed with the LEFT BLEED LEAK warning; then 30 seconds later; the right bleed automatically closed. The crew descended from 17;000 feet to 10;000 feet and continued to the filed destination.