Aryan95614/aerograph-asrs huggingface dataset:
Aircraft: A319
Phase of flight: landing
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Enroute to DEN we attempted several times to contact Dispatcher to inquire about the conditions at DEN; and the respective arrival gates going into DEN; with impending thunderstorms impacting all the above. We were unable to get any answers; or establish any communication with this dispatcher; which created an unsafe situation for us. Had we been able to get some timely weather information; we could have immediatly altered our course to be at the only arrival gate that was accepting arrivals into DEN. As a result; we were sent there by DEN ATC late; which created an unnessessary delay in holding; and a subsequent divert to COS; when we could have been landing at DEN. The divert to COS put us in another situation on the ground at COS. We got into the 'Passenger Bill of Rights' issue while on the ground in COS due to the an inabity to refuel (stationary storm that didn't move; and had lightning within 7 miles). Upon finally getting refueled; we flew up to DEN in weather that was precarious at best; and landed at DEN with a thunderstorm lurking off the South end of runway 8. Not a safe situation! This whole episode could have been prevented if we had been able to communicated with our dispatchers in a timely manner....which is A FEDERAL LAW! These lapses in communication with our dispatchers is a recurring theme as of late; and is flat out UNSAFE! A319 Captain reported he was unable to contact Dispatch to discuss options and planning; which in his opinion created an unsafe situation.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

When stepping onto aircraft almost immediately my eyes and throat began to burn. I would also feel headaches. When talking to other crewmembers and pilots many of us expressed similar symptoms. I am concerned what is being used to clean the aircraft based on the reactions my body is having. Flight Attendant reported experiencing burning eyes and throat as well as headaches upon boarding aircraft. Flight Attendant referenced the sanitizing agent used to clean the aircraft as a possible cause.
Aircraft: A300
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

During preflight I noted that the green system hydraulics were very low; almost into the yellow or amber band. I let Maintenance know we needed to be serviced. He stated the level had been good when Maintenance had last checked it at the termination of the previous flight. I asked when they were servicing the green system if they found any leaked hydraulic fluid; and Maintenance replied in the negative. This seemed a little odd; and indicated either a possible gauge problem or a hidden leak. During descent we received an ECAM warning for low green hydraulic system fluid quantity. The overhead quantity gauge pointer was at the 'red dot.' Per the ECAM we turned off the green hydraulic pumps. Due to the fact we would need some extra time on final approach to manually extend the landing gear; plus the requirement to stop on the runway and be towed in from there; we declared an emergency with ATC. After completing all related ECAM and QRH procedures; we landed uneventfully. After extending the gear; the green hydraulic quantity recovered to about the 12 o'clock position on the quantity gauge. By the time we arrived in the gate after tow-in; the quantity had dropped almost to the yellow band again. On post flight Maintenance stated they found a leak in the Number 1 Engine pylon. Perhaps more in-depth troubleshooting during the preflight would have revealed the hydraulic leak there. A300 Captain reports loss of Green Hydraulic System fluid during descent for landing. The fluid level had indicated low prior to departure and was serviced. An emergency is declared and a normal landing ensues after gravity gear extension.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

During inspection of main deck cargo I noticed a box on a pallet stack with arrows pointing down instead of up. Upon closer inspection the box was labeled 'flammable liquid' and 'Cargo aircraft only'. I brought it to the attention of the PIC. We then notified the Load Master. He removed the net and restacked the box with the correct orientation. We noted no leakage or deformation of the box.The Hazmat we carry needs to be packed correctly. This is not a small issue or isolated. Train the people loading our airplanes how to do their job. First Officer reported discovering a box with arrows pointing down when they should have been up. The box was labeled 'FLAMMABLE LIQUID' and 'CARGO AIRCRAFT ONLY.'
Aircraft: SINGLE ENGINE TURBOPROP UNDIFFERENTIATED
Phase of flight: Final Approach
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

On the arrivals I was flying very high indicated airspeed. Approach controller asked IAS and then assigned 180 IAS. Shortly he said I was still catching up to plane ahead on approach and assigned 150 kts to ZZZZZ. I was aware of 2 planes ahead of me on the ILS and closely monitored my IAS to not overtake. Switched to Tower and heard 2 line up and wait clearances (one after another) with note of my position on final. I put landing flaps (122 max IAS) down at ZZZZZ (GS intercept). Tower asked [company] jet behind me (first time I realized he was there) to slow to min forward sped. Company jet said they were there and asked for S turns. S turns were approved and Tower noted another plane in trail. I was told to expect minimum time on runway. I complied a normal landing and Tower requested I make XX high-speed turn off. My attempt to increase breaking lead to a brief skid and I said unable. Tower sent Company jet around.Had Tower or Approach asked me to keep my speed up on final I certainly could have but my mindset was to not catch up to planes ahead of me. I was also focused on the line up and wait planes which also encouraged me to fly a normal approach profile. The parallel runway is also closed which increased congestion on XXR. A single engine turboprop pilot reported braking to attempt to turn off the runway at a high speed turn off caused the aircraft to briefly skid and miss the turn at the assigned taxiway. The pilot also failed to maintain the ATC assigned airspeed on final which caused the succeeding arrival to go-around.
Aircraft: AMATEUR/HOME BUILT/EXPERIMENTAL
Phase of flight: Landing
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

I was landing my Bower's Fly Baby. The winds were about 5 Knots out of the Northeast. As I crossed the approach end of runway 11; I reduced power to idle and began to flare for landing. The aircraft touched down normally (with a slight bounce) and then settled down on to the runway. I rolled out approximately 75 feet and began to decelerate. As the aircraft slowed; it began a slight track to the left of the centerline. I attempted to correct this by inputting right rudder and tapped the right brake. It was at this point that the tail swung around to the left causing the right wing to tip up and left wing to lower. As a result of this; the left wing tip briefly scraped the runway surface and the engine stalled. The tower called to ask if I was OK and to see if I needed assistance. I reported that I was fine but would need some assistance to restart my engine (since it is not equipped with a starter or electrical system).The Airport Authority assisted by escorting me as I pushed my aircraft off of the runway and into the parking ramp. I surveyed the aircraft for damage and noticed only a minor scrape on the lower aft surface of the left wing tip bow. Bowers Fly Baby pilot reported losing directional control on landing roll; resulting in a ground loop and a scraped wingtip.
Aircraft: B777
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Received our DCL [Datalinked Clearance] which directed the VIBOS8Y departure but I misread it and saw the VIBOS9Y departure. This was what I expected to see based on my preflight study which indicated that the 9Y was the more direct routing to point VIBOS and the other departures were 'by ATC'. I had preloaded this in the FMS and let my FO know it was there along with my reasons for choosing it. I read the DCL from a printed copy and I believe my expectation bias captured the FO as well. We then briefed and flew the VIBOS9Y. A query by the controller on departure as to what SID we were flying caused us to review the DCL (printed copy) again and we discovered our error. Of course; there were interruptions to our flow by ground personnel but no more than normal. I allowed my attention to detail to falter.Captain failed to ensure clearance was correctly loaded in the FMS.I will return to my normal habit pattern of double checking the DCL clearance with the FMS programming pages after all briefings are completed. A B777 flight crew departing ZGGG programmed an incorrect SID into the FMS and were advised by Departure Control when they diverged from their clearance.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Takeoff / Launch
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Inbound write up 'Eng N1 vib 7.7 on T/O climbout varied between 4.0 and 7.7. At cruise varies 1.4 to 3.0 Maintenance accomplished Task 77-32-00-810-807-A; No damage found; everything secure.' During takeoff prior to 80 KTS call my First Officer called out N1 indication of 8.7 (we discussed during our briefing if above normal Flight Operations Manual (FOM) range of up to N1 of 5.0 we would abort); rejected takeoff engaged and we notified Tower of our abort. Wheel brakes did not exceed 420; so we elected to taxi to the gate. Air carrier Captain reported rejecting takeoff when N1 vibration exceeded normal limits.
Aircraft: B757
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

On takeoff roll around 100 KTS; received a caution Left High stage bleed; we did not abort; continued with the takeoff. Around 10;000 FT took out the QRH; went to the procedure; which asked us to close the left bleed valve; thereby single pack operation. Informed Dispatch and Maintenance. Confirmed no limitations on single pack. Two minutes later got Red Warning and Aural light for Cabin Altitude. Apparently this single pack was unable to maintain cabin altitude. We contacted Center and started an initial descent to 30;000 FT; 19;000 FT; 14;000 FT; 12;000 FT; [and] 13;000 FT. We told flight attendants that we will be landing at a divert airport in 35-40 minutes. Dispatch 'call me' did not function. Sent a Dispatch Message. After a little while got a hold of them on commercial radio and a phone patch with Maintenance was established. Best course of action was to divert. We declared an emergency; had jumpseater come to cockpit; kept passengers informed. Uneventful. First Officer made the landing. The deadheading crew member help regulate the pressurization by using the manual control. A B757 EICAS alerted L HI STAGE BLEED during takeoff so the QRH was completed and the crew continued to FL370 single pack where the aural and light CABIN ALT WARNING alerted. An emergency was declared and the flight descended to a divert airport.
Aircraft: BARON 58/58TC
Phase of flight: Landing
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Normal landing configuration; winds were a factor in that they were gusty up to 20 kts with perhaps a 20 [degree] crosswind component. I carried 10 knots over normal Vref and used approach flaps until 500 feet then selected full flaps and confirmed three green indication on my landing gear indicator. Crosswind controls were input and landing was otherwise normal with initial contact on the mains and I held the nose off to reduce flying airspeed; throttles were selected to idle just before touchdown.As the nose gear was lowered to the runway it collapsed and both props ground to a stop. I immediately closed both fuel levers and selected mags to off position. No fire ensued. I reported the event immediately to FSS so as to close the runway and get a NOTAM out. Beech 58 pilot reported the nose gear collapsed upon landing. The aircraft was secured and evacuated.
Aircraft: CRJ200
Phase of flight: Takeoff / Launch
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

While taxiing for runway; two status messages were posted. Ground (GRD) spoiler fault; Flight spoiler fault. A Master Caution was also posted as GRD spoiler. Maintenance was notified and crew was advised to return to gate. Upon return to gate; maintenance personnel replaced the faulty electrical systems and aircraft was returned to service. Aircraft taxied back to runway. All pre-takeoff checks were normal. On the takeoff roll after 80 KTS and before V1 approx. 120 KTS a master caution was posted with a takeoff configuration and ground spoilers. The Captain called for an abort and assumed control of aircraft. The aircraft was brought to a stop on the runway; and exited under control to a taxiway. ATC was notified and a call to the flight attendant placed to make sure that all was ok in the cabin. The aircraft was taxied back to a gate. The right brakes were smoking and the Brake temperature Monitoring System (BTMS) readings were 8. Maintenance was notified. A walk around was completed along with all appropriate checklists. The only abnormal aspect was the smoking brakes; that subsided with time. A master caution for a Takeoff configuration at 120 kts with possible ground spoiler deployment. The Captain did a great job in bringing aircraft to a safe stop. I believe that when we have flight control faults the aircraft should undergo deeper checks prior to being released for service. Also during training we should include a high speed abort in simulator training for this exact problem that we experienced. A CRJ-200 First Officer reported the Captain decided on a high speed rejected takeoff when they received master caution warnings of 'Takeoff Config' and 'Ground Spoilers.' The reporter stated these items were the subject of maintenance attention prior to takeoff.
Aircraft: J3 CUB
Phase of flight: Landing
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

I was on a normal crosswind approach to landing in a landing configuration. After my main gear touched; a gust of wind picked up my left wing and as a result collapsed my right main gear. As a result the aircraft suffered damage. No injuries were involved. Piper Cub pilot reported a gust of wind during landing caused his landing gear to collapse.
Aircraft: J3 CUB
Phase of flight: Final Approach
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC

Right hand pattern for 28R MYF; a Cessna had just turned final. I was on downwind about to turn base at pattern altitude; and a Cirrus was #3 for touch and go. All of us had clearances. I told the Tower to assure the Cessna that they were in sight.Cessna was on about a mile and a half final; and I turned above and to the north of that aircraft to establish spacing at the runway. The Cessna pilot asked if I saw her; and the Tower answered in the affirmative. Altitude separation estimated at 300 FT and lateral distance approximately the same. That is roughly 420 FT slant-range separation.Tower changed me to the left runway; because the Cirrus was closing from behind. The Cirrus touched down before I did; and the Cessna was west of the field turning downwind as I touched down. This interesting scenario is due to disparate approach speeds: I estimate the 172 at about 65 KTS; the Cirrus at perhaps 75; and my approach was 35.As the Cessna was turning right base on the next circuit; she started an extended transmission criticizing my flying. It seemed to go on forever; but was probably less than a half minute nonstop. My answer - on the Tower frequency - was 'come see me at my hangar.' The answer: 'I don't have time.'So I landed and dropped by as the pilot was debriefing her student. I introduced myself and she again said 'I do not have time to talk to you.'Putting aside whether paralleling an aircraft on final is some kind of violation or bad judgment - my impression is that it just makes sense for a slow aircraft to try to optimize separation on the runway - the point of this report is that criticizing another pilot on an ATC frequency is bad policy; even if a student is not involved. But adding a student to the mix; and then teaching that such a transmission is good practice is not good instructing. The student has learned that resolving problems should be restricted to ATC frequencies; and that ground and/or telephone discussions are not appropriate.An appropriate response is to call the Tower on the telephone; get the N-number of the pilot you wish to discuss something with; and then either do it on the phone; or in person; or simply call the FSDO. In an unsolicited attempt to provide spacing at the threshold of the runway the pilot of Piper J3 elected to turn final close to and slightly above and behind the C-172 he was to follow. When the Instructor pilot of the Cessna took exception to the J3's unagreed to propinquity a verbal exchange resulted.
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

During pushback off of [gate] in ZZZ; the I noticed white smoke and a burning odor. The smoked seemed to be coming out from under the First Officer avionics panels. We stopped the pushback and shut off the engine we had just started. Initially; based on the rapid rate at which smoke was filling the cockpit; I decided to make an announcement to evacuate using the main boarding door without stairs. There were only 14 passengers on board and we had several ground crew outside to help with deplaning without steps. However; the smoke seemed to subside rather quickly when we opened the cockpit windows so; as a crew; we decided that we now had time to have the tow pull us back into the jet bridge to make a safer; more normal deplaning situation. I made another announcement explaining the situation and for each pax to take the nearest seat. We then pulled back into the jet bridge and deplaned. We then shut down the aircraft completely. We returned the personal belonging to the passengers and eventually swapped to a spare aircraft and continued to ZZZ1.We handled the situation in the cockpit by shutting down the engine; opening windows and running the QRH procedures. The procedures are obviously made for inflight; but it had us turn off recirc and gasper fans. We then shut off all inessential electronics and avionics once we talked to everyone we needed to. Since the smoke subsided; we felt like we had time to pull up to the jet bridge and deplane rather than risking a evacuation without stairs. I had called Dispatch right after we deplaned. I was bombarded with many people such as gate managers; ramp managers; [Crash Fire Rescue]; etc. as I was on the phone. Next time I'll wait to call Dispatch and Maintenance until all the information is relayed to the different people on the ground. EMB-145LR Captain reported smoke in the cockpit during pushback that resulted in a return to the gate.
Aircraft: CITATION EXCEL (C560XL)
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

We were on the RNAV XX Approach. We were reporting position on. Calls were made 8.5 miles out; 4 miles out; and there on frequent calls were made to report our position and intentions. Winds were 140@6 knots. Our intention was a full stop landing on Runway XX. At around 200 feet we suddenly saw a red single engine Aircraft Y take off from the opposite end (runway 32) without making any radio calls and turned away from us (to our left). We landed on runway XX and the incident was terminated. There was no traffic alert on TCAS and we didn't see the airplane takeoff till he was airborne. The pilot monitoring was thorough with all radio calls to report intentions and position. The Aircraft Y didn't make any further calls and departed the pattern. Flight Crew landing CE-560XLS had Near Miss with small single engine aircraft taking off.
Aircraft: PA28
Phase of flight: Final Approach
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

We were changing Runway XXR to XXL. We were given turn base on our discretion and cleared to land Runway XXL on downwind and there were aircraft on downwind XXL. I thought they were following us; but according to ATC we were supposed to follow that traffic. PA-28 flight instructor reported an airborne conflict in the traffic pattern due to confusion with ATC communication.
Aircraft: MD-83
Phase of flight: unknown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

We departed with an inoperative observer seat O2 mask. I do not think I briefed Flight Attendant at the gate on this item. (was not sure we would even need a lav break on this fairly short leg). However; during the flight; the First Officer needed to very briefly use the lav. I remember briefing the Flight Attendant at the time of transition about using the First Officer's mask if necessary; due to MEL item. In hindsight; it would have been better to have accomplished this briefing before we departed. The MEL does not provide any guidance on inop observers O2 and lav breaks. I suppose using a portable O2 unit would have been possible; but this seemed like it would compromise the desired 3 second cockpit to cabin transition. O2 was always readily available to the Flight Attendant from the First Officer's mask; which was positioned only a few inches from where the observers mask was located. Was told a flight attendent was not comfortable with it being inop on bathroom breaks. The flight crew of a MD-83 reported a flight attendant had stressed concerns about an MEL'd Observer O2 mask required for their use when; per security requirements; they occupy that seat while a flight crewmember is absent from the cockpit.
Aircraft: ANY UNKNOWN OR UNLISTED AIRCRAFT MANUFACTURER
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Parachute operation being conducted to the east of the airport close enough to be a factor for east downwind traffic. I was informed the aircraft would be held outside the airspace until jumpers were on the ground. The supervisor informed me aircraft will be held out until he gave the ok. The TRACON called me and said Aircraft X reported the jumpers on the ground and the arrivals were now inbound. I informed the supervisor who appeared to be on the line with the TRACON at the time. Another controller informed me it didn't look like the last jumper was all the way on the ground yet. I then moved the traffic as far west as I could to avoid any possible conflict.There was some type of miscommunication between the supervisors in the TRACON and tower; and the TRACON controller as to when to allow aircraft back into the airspace. Additionally Aircraft X reported the jumpers were on the ground when that may not have been the case. It seems to avoid any confusion the tower supervisor should make this call. SLC Tower Controller reports of parachuting exercise going on in close proximity to the airport.