Aryan95614/aerograph-asrs huggingface dataset:
Aircraft: CHEETAH; TIGER; TRAVELER AA5 SERIES
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Aircraft X was instructed to taxi via D taxiway to Rwy 9L. He took a parallel taxiway C instead. Aircraft Y had been instructed to taxi via G;C; and H to the ramp. When Aircraft Y got to C taxiway he informed he was holding short C. I looked up and saw Aircraft X on taxiway C near G. By that time it was too late to say anything and he sidestepped to D and continued his taxi. I was so busy writing up strips on other aircraft; following our new procedures; that I was not able to turn around and see the conflict. This is a problem having Ground Control combined up with FD/CD with our new procedures. It doesn't work well. Too much time is spent writing and looking down instead of looking up and watching for aircraft turning on the wrong taxiways or doing other unsafe procedures. We either need to change the procedures in order to accommodate the times we combine up FD/CD with Ground Control or have more controllers working the shifts so that we have adequate coverage to safely work the traffic and use the new procedures that were put in place. I think these new procedures are unsafe when we work the positions combined. I saw another controller later today having trouble working the positions combined. TMB Ground Controller reports of issuing taxi instructions to two aircraft and then having them at the same intersection because one went the wrong way. Controller was working Flight Data/Clearance at the same time and doing those functions.
Aircraft: B767
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Upon pushback and start-up in ZZZ the Wingwalker and Marshal gave the all clear salute. Problem was; the headset was still connected to the Ground Agent and he was still below. The Captain relayed the danger in what happened; but I'm not sure the guy understood what he was saying since it varied from the script of the typical push back. Had the Captain not been paying attention the incident could have ended tragically. 767 First Officer reported that the Ground Marshal gave all clear signal with Ground Agent and headset still attached to aircraft.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Had Aircraft X assigned to me and Mechanic on my shift DATE third shift. Aircraft X had an inbound write up for potable water system inop. The t/s was started on first shift DATE and continued thru second shift. Parts was changed and panels remove but when I got aircraft assigned to me and my work partner there was no work turnover in the log book or no form 10194. My work partner and I was expected to continue work on the issue with on clear understanding with what work was actually done. The event occurred because of improper turnover.Document work that is done. I was assigned Aircraft X with NAME1. I was informed by my lead that there was an inbound discrepancy which was worked by 1st and 2nd shift and that parts were changed. I asked where are turnover was at; which is supposed to be documented on a company form; I was informed there was none and that he was given a verbal turnover only. I immediately informed my supervisor. We then went out to aircraft to perform RON service check and found multiple cargo panels removed which just confirms maintenance was being worked and not documented. The event occurred due to maintenance being done accomplished on Aircraft X with none of it documented. This happened across 2 shifts.Supervision and Leads/Crew Chiefs need to make sure all turnover is documented per company policy. Technicians reported an aircraft in work did not have required documents and logbook entries for a pass down task completed.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Takeoff / Launch
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Returned to [the departure airport] after N1 abnormal indications on departure. After maintenance ran a check it was determined that a T12 malfunction was the cause of the abnormal indications. An overweight landing was logged at 129;000 LBS and a VSI sink of 50 FPM. After a B737-700 returned to land because of an abnormal N1 indication on takeoff; maintenance found a T12 inlet temperature probe fault.
Aircraft: CRJ700
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Security

I was PIC for the aircraft's first flight of the day. I was handed a security sweep form signed by ground personnel stating that the exterior compartments had been inspected by station personnel per the recent crew memo. The First Officer completed his preflight per the memo. After we arrived [at our destination] ramp personnel informed me that there was 'at least' 600 LBS of ballast in the forward cargo compartment. We had no knowledge of this prior to departure and did not put the required ballast weight on the weight and balance form. The flight had been completed with no significant issues.This should not have happened. Ground personnel are required to search the forward cargo compartment and then declare that the aircraft has been searched and sign the security sweep form. It is obvious that no one looked into the forward cargo compartment at all or they would have seen the ballast. Perhaps even more troubling; this aircraft flew a revenue flight the night prior and I doubt the ballast was noted on THEIR weight and balance form. Prior to that flight the aircraft was repositioned from a hub where; presumably; the ballast was loaded. The same First Officer flew the first two flights and should have known the ballast was on board (there was a Captain swap for the second leg). This First Officer should have notified the new Captain that they had loaded ballast for the reposition flight. Despite having received a signed security form advising the exterior compartments had been inspected as required prior to departure; the Captain of a CRJ-700 was advised after landing that the forward cargo compartment contained 'at least 600 LBS' of ballast weight; weight the reporter believes was added on a repositioning flight. The aircraft had flown at least three legs since that flight without notification to the crews that the ballast was aboard.
Aircraft: M-20 SERIES UNDIFFERENTIATED OR OTHER MODEL
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Although I marked 'Unsafe Situation' I do not think that there was any unsafe situation. This is a failure to follow procedure that has a limited; if any; impact on safety. The Controller at Local Control 1 issued LUAW to a Mooney after preceding departure. At the time; there were no other aircraft on frequency or inbound to the airport sequenced to the runway. At that time; an experimental called inbound from north; prior to [that] adequate runway spacing was attained to allow for take off clearance to be issued to the Mooney. Rather than wait the few seconds for runway spacing to be attained and the Mooney could be cleared for takeoff; the Controller elected to answer the inbound experimental and issued pattern entry instructions. The Controller failed to issue traffic to the LUAW aircraft and the inbound aircraft involved; thereby resulting in non-compliance with a national procedure (traffic was not issued to both the LUAW aircraft and the aircraft inbound to the runway where another aircraft was in position). On previous occasions when I have been in the CIC position I have noted the need to follow the new LUAW procedures. I suggest that the agency either get rid of LUAW altogether or give us a waiver so we do not need to issue the traffic to both the LUAW aircraft and the aircraft inbound to the runway where another aircraft was in position as required in the order. As it is; the procedure leads to misapplication and delays for traffic when controllers attempt to use it correctly. To me; a controller who has used TIPH for decades before it was denuded into the useless air traffic tool it is; the rule has an analogy in the world of tools. By revising the previous TIPH rules to the existing LUAW rules; it is like taking a perfectly good Phillips screwdriver and grinding down the end to a perfect cylinder. Tower Controller described a non-compliance event involving the LUAW procedures noting the new requirements are less than efficient and changes should be considered.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Some time after [push back]; Flight Attendant #2 and I detected strong smell of aircraft fumes in the aft galley area. The smell was strong where we both were bothered physically by the smell. For instance; a strong burning sensation in my nostrils and throat. We both covered our nose and mouth; but of course had to remove our hand from either place in order to breath. The burning sensation where I've indicated continued for a while. Unfortunately; on the very next flight we were exposed once again to strong smell of aircraft fumes in the aft galley and cabin area. I'm sure making the exposure and symptoms worst.I have worked [many] years as a Flight Attendant. More often now we're being exposed to aircraft fumes in the cabin that my union is collecting data as too many Flight Attendants are being exposed to aircraft fumes repeatedly; and Flight Attendants are reporting in record number. [Report narrative contains no additional information.] Two Flight Attendants reported strong fume odors in the aft galley.
Aircraft: BEECHCRAFT SINGLE PISTON UNDIFFERENTIATED OR OTHER MODEL
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict

I fly with an iPad running ForeFlight and using an external AHARS/ADSB-In receiver (Sentry). My aircraft is not equipped with ADSB In/Out. While in cruise flight at 4;600 ft MSL on a heading of 180 degrees; my iPad suddenly showed a target less than a mile ahead of me and 500 ft below me. Sometimes a very close target that shows up is a 'ghost' target of my own aircraft which is what I suspected this target was initially. I was looking for traffic out of the windows; and I wanted to turn to avoid the traffic but the target was right on top of my own aircraft on the screen yet below me. I did not know which way to turn so I maintained course until I was able to finally make visual contact with the other aircraft; which was climbing from below and through my altitude at my 2 o'clock position and about 1;000 ft away. Upon visual contact I began an immediate left turn and a few moments later the pilot of the other aircraft saw me and began a right turn and the conflict was resolved. This was the classic high wing aircraft climbing up into a low wing aircraft so both pilots' views were restricted. I think the other aircraft was a parachute jump plane because it appeared their back door was removed. VFR flight following would have helped me in this case by providing traffic advisories and I will be more diligent about using ATC services even when flying VFR. Beechcraft Bonanza pilot reported observing a traffic conflict on ForeFlight. When visual contact was made the pilot reported taking evasive action.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types

Chicago Approach was very; very busy our entire time on frequency. Runway 13C Ops likely made this more challenging. Some aircraft were given to expect the RNP Y; while some were being vectored to ILS final. We were set up for the ILS as expected but also reviewed the RNP. Approach Control suddenly assigned us direct TINLY to fly the full RNP procedure. I refused as we were only a mile or so away and not prepared (I wonder if that was even legal under their rules?). I could see the First officer (F/O) instantly go heads down and start the FMC re-programming. I have been in this situation too many times before when we try so hard to comply that we rush beyond our capabilities and likely make critical mistakes. Ironically I was showing the F/O earlier how to not succumb to the double discontinuity trap with changing approaches so close in. ATC was a bit miffed and that was disappointing to see as there was no way we could have pulled this off. We then were given vectors to final and landed uneventfully all the while staying in the Green. Chicago Approach has some of the most talented Controllers; but they were trying too hard this day with too much traffic. They were in the Red whether they realized it or not. Air carrier Captain reported refusing a last-minute clearance change to the RNP approach at MDW; citing workload and the high possibility of programming errors.
Aircraft: CESSNA 340/340A
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical

I observed the aircraft taxiing on Runway 28R. After a quick verification from Ground Control that he was not supposed to be there; Ground Control instructed the aircraft to turn off the runway at Foxtrot and join Taxiway Alpha. Local Control canceled the take off clearance of an aircraft at the approach end of 28R who was just turning onto the runway. The location and height of the Tower does not enable the Controllers to positively identify where an aircraft is taxiing at the far northwest corner of the airport. This is an ongoing issue that has been affecting FCM for many years. A new Tower is currently being sited. This could be a lengthy process. The geometry of Taxiway Alpha in relation to the ramp that the aircraft started out on causes some pilots to misjudge where Taxiway Alpha actually is. In reality; Alpha and the ramp are just one big paved area and Runway 28R is the next piece of pavement; which may look like a taxiway for Runway 28L. Pilot education always helps. FBO's have hot spot cards available. A new tower that is taller and in a different location would a least give us a fighting chance to positively locate and track these aircraft on the ground by being able to differentiate between what is ramp; taxiway and runway. This was only 20 - 30 seconds from becoming something much bigger. An FCM Controller described a runway incursion event claiming the lack of tower visibility contributed to the incident.
Aircraft: CITATION V/ULTRA/ENCORE (C560)
Phase of flight: Landing
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I operate PIC on a C560 under an FAA single pilot exemption. Training occurred [last year]; and I was signed off and given the schools FAA Exemption letter. Unbeknown to me; the Exemption letter under which I operate; had been changed by the FAA; and sent to my training provider; not to me. My training provider failed to notify me of this change and as a result of this lack of awareness; I inadvertently operated single pilot into a foreign country. The foreign country authority advised me of the transgression; but said they would not register a complaint. As soon as I became aware of this; I did not operate single pilot outside the United States; as stated in the new FAA exemption letter.In my view; there was nothing unsafe which occurred; and I was simply operating as previous; however; the process by which this occurred; left me holding the bag. In my view there should have been a chain of people notified of this change; not just the training provider. This could have been a serious issue had an accident or incident occurred. Cessna V pilot reported that he flew as a single pilot into a foreign country where his exemption letter was not valid.
Aircraft: B767
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Immediately after takeoff above 400 feet AGL; the First Officer's Flight Director bars disappeared. Turned off then on; but no bars still. Started the right turn on the departure and cleaned up the aircraft normally. Captain (pilot monitoring) suggested to engage the AP. Did; and the FD bars re-appeared; corrected back to course and continued the departure. Was left of the magenta line to the first point on the departure; but it calls for a right turn direct about 520 feet AGL; which was complied with. NORCAL handed us to Oakland ARTCC and the flight continued. Right FD operated normally for the rest of the flight; however; made a Maintenance logbook entry as it did momentarily fail.Strangely after 15 years of instruction to remove automation if need be; this time; by adding automation; the system corrected itself. B767-300 First Officer reported losing the Flight Director command bars shortly after takeoff; but regaining them when the autopilot was turned on.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

We arrived in poor weather. It was the brand new FO's leg. We planned landing on Runway XX via RNAV Approach. We were cleared for approach. The FMC/CDU locked up heading to the IAF. By the time I realized this; I evaluated the approach was not salvageable; and we went around. Since the FO was new; the weather was bad; and we seemed to have a malfunction of some sort; I took the aircraft. (CDU was frozen and would not respond to any input attempts).We informed ATC of our situation and requested vectors for an ILS to Runway XX. We received vectors to intercept the Localizer; but were unable. The Localizer would capture; but then swing full scale deflection both left and right. Unable to lock onto the Localizer; and unable to descend; we informed ATC of our need for an additional go-around. ATC gave us a small descent to de-conflict with traffic; and then gave us another G/A vector/altitude. The aircraft behind us reported the same problems. NOTE: On downwind; our CDU began responding to input attempts again. We requested and received clearance for another try at an LNAV Approach monitored by Approach Control; with altitude monitoring; to marginal VMC below the bases; for a visual final approach to Runway XX. Around five miles out the Localizer and glideslope became stable; and was our backup to the HGS assisted visual approach. This attempt was successful and uneventful. We informed Maintenance of the issues we had faced with the aircraft; and they troubleshot the instrument/navigational panels; eventually replacing the MCP panel. We had no further problems with the aircraft after that. [Report narrative contained no additional information.] B737 flight crew reported the Mode Control Panel (MCP) malfunctioned after they were cleared for an RNAV approach so a go-around was executed in poor weather. On vectors for downwind; the MCP returned to normal and a successful ILS approach was subsequently flown.
Aircraft: LARGE TRANSPORT; LOW WING; 2 TURBOJET ENG
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance

1 piece of mail was scanned and loaded into cart for Aircraft X; ZZZ. This piece was held off plane side due to having 'Cargo Aircraft only' and UN3481 [Lithium Batteries] labeling on the exterior of the piece. Air Carrier Ramp Personnel reported the removal of Hazmat parcel from cargo due to Hazmat label 'Cargo aircraft only'.
Aircraft: LARGE TRANSPORT; LOW WING; 2 TURBOJET ENG
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

On arrival into IND we were cleared for the approach. As PM I read back 'turn right 200 degrees maintain 2000 till established cleared the ILS 23 left approach.' Just outside RACYR; ATC informed us of a low altitude alert and were told to climb back up to 3000 feet. Once there we were re-cleared for the ILS 23 left approach. No further incidents. I would say that fatigue was the primary culprit. When we read back the clearance it should have seemed an unusual alt to intercept at; as the minimum alt at RACYR is 2600 ft. Also when I received the clearance there was chatter on guard 121.5 which could have interfered with hearing our clearance correctly. Better rest; clarification of the clearance and acknowledgement by ATC of the read back. We must have misheard and read back an incorrect altitude during an approach clearance. Air carrier crew on vectors for the IND Runway 23L ILS descended to 2;000 feet; but climb back to 3;000 feet after ATC issued a low altitude alert. Fatigue and a misunderstood descent clearance were factors.
Aircraft: MEDIUM LARGE TRANSPORT; LOW WING; 2 TURBOJET ENG
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

We were descending into DTW on the VCTRZ1 RNAV arrival. After passing the fix SEEGR; DTW approach queried our airspeed. I was still indicating 250 kts. DTW asked if we were assigned that speed. I told him we were not. He assigned a new speed and told us were expected to be at 210kts at SEEGR. I slowed to the assigned airspeed. The flight continued normally.DTW approach started assigning us altitudes below the published altitudes on the VCTRZ1 RNAV arrival. I think we given the clearance to descend to 8000; before we had passed HYZMN. I slowed to 250kts before descending below 10;000. We were cleared to 6000 before SEEGR. I assumed we would be receiving vectors for a short approach. I was expediting down to the assigned altitude in anticipation of a turn to a base leg for a visual approach. I neglected to slow to 210 kts at SEEGR. This is a new arrival at DTW. This was the first time I had flown this arrival. I should have recognized those threats. I should have paid more attention to the arrival instead of anticipating the next clearance from DTW. Air carrier Captain reported exceeding a speed clearance on an unfamiliar STAR into DTW.