Aryan95614/aerograph-asrs huggingface dataset:
Aircraft: CRJ700
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

After a delay of almost 3 hours due to the issues with the navigation satellites applicable to the CRJ; we departed for ZZZ. On climbout; ATC cleared us direct ZZZ VOR. We turned toward what we thought was ZZZ VOR; but discovered we were getting a big discrepancy in the readings between our moving map on the MFD and the VOR signal. We were flying in green needles. As we were figuring this out ATC alerted us that our heading was incorrect for ZZZ VOR and assigned us a heading. Requested vectors for the remainder of the flight. Issues with the navigation satellites applicable to the CRJ. Training in how to use Auto Tune during GPS inop operations. CRJ-700 Captain reported navigational problems related to the FMS and GPS issues.
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 135 ER/LR
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

The first strange thing the aircraft did was on departure at ZZZ; at 10;000 ft.; the GWPS system advised ' terrain pull up'. There was no terrain at that altitude or on our path. We were descending on the ZZZZZ arrival into ZZZ1; prior to reaching ZZZZZ1 intersection the aircraft Autopilot disconnected with a warning autopilot fail EICAS message. I hand flew the aircraft and had the PM (Pilot Monitoring) run the QRH. I continued on to the airport hand flying. Once we touched down the aircraft EICAS started to display many messages; Autopilot elevator mistrim; auto trim fail; autopilot aileron mistrim; and the pitch trim was moving full down on its own. Also there were some erroneous roll trim indications.Cause was total trim fail.Proper full inspection of aircraft in regards to these failures; we were very lucky these failures did not occur inflight so low to the ground during approach and landing phase. Captain reported autopilot failed and disconnected on approach with false EGPWS warning. After landing; Captain reported multiple EICAS messages indicating a total trim failure.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

During the process of doing the OJT portion of my Tail stand Training; I was asked to remove the Tail Stand from the Aircraft. As I removed it I observed the white Teflon tip came off and was affixed to the aircraft. At this point I became very concern especially since I'm a member of the Safety Team. I began to have an in-depth conversation with the trainers and I was made to understand that this is becoming more common. I was told in such situations aircraft maintenance is to be notified and they will remove it. That's fine! However what if the individual that removes it does not realize that the Teflon tip remains in the aircraft. If this aircraft is to take off with this Tip in and falls off later while in flight; can this become a FAA violation? It can also add FOD to runways; creating a serious hazard! Now on the other end what if an employee fails to do a user check prior to installing a Tail Stand without the Teflon tip? How much damage can occur to an aircraft fuselage without the Teflon tip? I guess it can be substantial. A maintenance technician reported that after removing the tail stand it was observed the Teflon tip remained attached to the aircraft.
Aircraft: BELL HELICOPTER 407
Phase of flight: Initial Climb
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I departed from an airport which lies in a cutout from the adjacent airport Class C airspace. My desired on-course heading was 021. I knew that the adjacent airport Tower handled the nearby airspace; and I was comfortable contacting them and requesting clearance through Class C toward my destination.Immediately after lifting I established contact with Tower. Tower responded; and I requested clearance through Class C climbing to 3;500 feet. The Tower controller responded with the phraseology 'Cleared to operate in Class Charlie;' approved my course heading and told me that he only controlled to 2;500 feet. I took that as an altitude limitation; and continued north north eastward. About the time I was getting ready to level off at 2;500 feet; the Tower Controller cleared me to 3;500 feet; and handed me off to Approach.Upon establishing contact with Approach; that controller asked me if I was familiar with Class Charlie airspace and scolded me; telling me words to the effect of 'You can't just fly around here not talking to anyone.' I informed her that I had been in contact with Tower and he had handed me off to her however; I sensed that explanation didn't satisfy her. She then gave me a phone number that I could call later if I needed to talk with someone about it.At my next fuel stop; I contacted TRACON at the phone number that was given to me; and I was told that I had violated Class Charlie airspace. I explained to the gentleman on the phone that Tower had cleared me using the proper phraseology; 'Cleared to operate in Class Charlie.' The gentleman from TRACON went on to say that the Tower Controller shouldn't have done that. At this point; I didn't know what to do; and I certainly couldn't undo what I had done; so I thanked him for his time and told him I'd be filing a Report when I reached my destination.This airspace is remarkably busy with training aircraft. That is why I contacted Tower immediately with my request. If the Tower Controller didn't have the authority to grant me clearance then it's my opinion that he should have told me to remain clear of Class Charlie airspace; but he didn't do that. Instead; he specifically used the clearance phraseology that is taught in flight school and my company's recurrent training. Given those circumstances I proceeded in good faith with the clearance given to me by the tower controller. I believe that air traffic controller communications are recorded and stored. If so; I believe someone with the proper authority can verify this narrative and correct whatever caused this potentially dangerous situation. A Helicopter pilot reported they received clearance into Class C airspace from the Tower Controller and after handoff to TRACON the TRACON Controller accused them of entering the Class C airspace without authorization.
Aircraft: A321
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

The first officer and I was doing the head bobbing the last hour to hour and half flying the two leg all-nighter into ZZZ. I barely remember the flight as I was so tired. Please see all three fatigue reports on this same sequence of two leg all-nighters. One leg all-nighters are hard enough on your body to safely fly but two leg all nighters are absolutely unsafe and we should never be scheduled to fly them.Our company should never schedule two leg all-night trips; especially with two man cockpits. it is an accident waiting to happen. Please address this now! An A321 Captain addressed his concerns about the fatigue induced by multiple leg all night flights.
Aircraft: C172
Phase of flight: Final Approach
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC

My student and I were doing pattern work at ZZZ and there was Aircraft Y waiting to take off who was also staying in the pattern. We did a touch n go and Aircraft Y took off almost right away after we took off. We flew a left hand pattern and Aircraft Y was right behind us. We did another touch n go and Aircraft Y had to go around because he did not give us proper spacing for him to land behind us. He did not announce that he was going around until we were already on the upwind. At about 500 ft. AGL as we got ready to turn left cross wind; I saw Aircraft Y within 500 ft. of us horizontally. I took the controls from my student and started a left turn away from him and got us on the downwind. We were going to do one more landing then depart. As we got abeam the numbers; and started our descent; about to turn base I hear Aircraft Y call out that he was turning left base and I saw him cut us off. I decided to climb out and depart the airport after he did that. I think that the contributing factors were Aircraft Y not having situational awareness of what was going on around him even though we were making all the appropriate radio calls. Instructing Pilot reported a NMAC with another small aircraft during traffic pattern work with student.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

While taxiing out for takeoff; aircraft behind us reported to ZZZ ground control that our right engine was on fire. ZZZ ground control informed us; rolled ZZZ Aircraft Rescue Firefighting (ARFF); and had us turn east onto taxiway 1 and park. All engine indications were normal throughout the event. We turned off of '1' taxiway onto '2' taxiway; set the brake; requested assistance; and secured the right engine. ZZZ ARFF looked over the aircraft and reported that everything looked normal. We taxied to gate XX with ARFF escort.Maintenance informed us that there was an oil seal issue with the right engine. The fire occurred when the oil that was pooling in the tailpipe ignited. They said it was called 'candle wicking' and it was a term referenced in their manuals. While taxiing for takeoff; Captain reported that another aircraft crew observed an engine fire on their aircraft. The crew of the taxiing aircraft shut down the engine; and after inspection; taxied back to the gate.
Aircraft: B767
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Upon postflight; it was noticed that there was a large amount of oil from the left nacelle. The mechanics in ZZZ discovered that the service caps for the left IDG were left off allowing oil to escape for the duration of our ETOPS flight. B767 Captain reported IDG service caps were not installed prior to ETOPS flight; allowing oil to leak out.
Aircraft: C172
Phase of flight: Landing
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway

I attempted to complete my first solo flight in a Cessna 172. In preparation; my instructor and I; completed four takeoffs and landings with no issues. Once this was complete; I dropped him off at [FBO] and continued on to complete the solo flight. I completed all checklists and ensured everything was correct. Everything appeared to be perfect after takeoff to turning final.After touching down on the runway; I noticed the plane started to veer off to the left. I attempted to correct for this by adding right rudder and left aileron to combat the turning. After this failed; I was already in the grass. I tried to tap the brakes but once I did I was already in the ditch and everything came flying forward. After that; I remember being a little disoriented and coming to my senses and got out of the aircraft and started walking towards the runway. I was met by airport EMS and was transported to the hospital to be checked out. I sustained only minor facial and hand abrasions with some small swelling in the lips. I was released from the hospital. Student pilot reported a runway excursion.
Aircraft: A320
Phase of flight: Final Approach
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

On approach; but prior to landing; the FO requested gear down and flaps full. I selected the requested configuration requests and the aircraft began to shake. I recycled the brakes and brought the flaps back to position 3. I stowed and rearmed the speed brakes prior to selecting gear down and flaps full. Again the aircraft began to shake pretty violently. A firm but safe landing was accomplished. We taxied to the gate and I contacted maintenance and advised them of what just occurred. I also briefed the receiving crew. Upon investigation by local maintenance; it was discovered that we landed with speed brakes 1 and 3 deployed. They were supposed to be locked down prior to leaving the hangar in Denver (they were deferred). I spoke to [maintenance] after learning what happened and was told that the mechanic left the spoilers in Maintenance mode. They were not set for flight. As such; they deployed when they were supposed to be locked down. A320 Captain reported noticing vibration in flight when flaps were extended that was found to be speed brake panels deployed in flight because they were not locked down in accordance with the MEL.
Aircraft: C172
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

On V460 about 15 miles from JLI VOR; ATC cleared us from KARRO to ESCON at 10;000 feet. As we proceeded along the route; I noticed our airspeed start to drop. Simultaneously; my student raised the nose to maintain altitude. He increased power to full. After about 10 seconds; we had lost 200 feet. I told Socal approach that we were encountering some downdrafts and were unable to maintain altitude at the moment. After another 10 seconds we were descending through 9;500 feet with the VSI reading approximately 1;800 fpm down. Approach asked if we had made it out of the downdraft; I told him that it appeared to be a mountain wave; and that we were in an extremely strong downdraft and we were unable to maintain our altitude. He told us to turn right heading 060 in an effort to get us out of the wave; but it only made matters worse. Seconds after we made the turn we were passing through 8;000 feet. Approach advised us of the terrain nearby; and that we were well below the MEA. We asked for a right turn to approximately 100; which he approved. As I had hoped; we were able to get into the rising air from the mountain wave; and were able to climb back up to altitude. Almost. We got into another downdraft shortly thereafter. My student and I worked with approach to get clear of the turbulence and downdrafts. We were able to proceed without further incident. We went from 10;000 feet to just over 7;000 feet in about 2 minutes. Once in the sinking air; it was incredibly smooth. The winds were forecast to be out of the northeast at 30 knots; and there was no report of any windshear or downdrafts. The VFR sectional points out that severe turbulence and up/downdrafts can be encountered when high wind speeds are prevalent; but it's not mentioned on the IFR Low Enroute chart. Had that note been on the IFR chart; my student and I would've picked a different route. Also contributing was the fact that we both got online weather briefings. It would've been smarter to talk to a local weather briefer who could inform us of the possibility of the downdrafts along that route with the strong winds aloft. I have since begun more extensively reviewing VFR charts prior to flying IFR. C172 instructor pilot reported extreme downdrafts in the vicinity of JLI VOR.
Aircraft: AMATEUR/HOME BUILT/EXPERIMENTAL
Phase of flight: Takeoff / Launch
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown

Another light plane took off ahead of me on runway 17R. I was holding short of the runway. The tower controller then asked me what direction I wished to depart. I answered that I wanted to depart to the west. The controller then told me; 'cleared for takeoff; right turn approved.' I repeated his instruction verbatim. I entered the runway and took off. After I gained 400 feet of altitude; I made a right turn to the west. Several seconds later; the controller said 'traffic on downwind.' At that time I saw another aircraft to my left; about one-eighth of a mile away; about 50 feet above me; and on a collision course with me. The other pilot had already begun to take evasive action; so I did not need to take evasive action. The controller became irate at me and said that I should have known that the other aircraft was on right closed traffic and that I should have known to avoid him. I responded calmly that I thought the controller had given me a right turnout.The aircraft with which I had the near miss was the aircraft that took off just before I did. The controller did not inform me that this aircraft was on right closed traffic until after the near miss had occurred.I believe that the controller should have told me to extend my upwind leg and not to turn to the west until I received further instruction or had the other aircraft in sight; or he could have simply said 'Cleared for takeoff; I'll call your turn.' Experimental aircraft pilot reported being cleared for takeoff and right turn approved behind another departing aircraft. A right turn is initiated at 400 feet AGL and resulted in a conflict with the previous departure which had remained in the pattern.
Aircraft: ECLIPSE 500
Phase of flight: Initial Climb
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Was given the Sacat 1 Departure off of FFZ using runway 22L; approximately 1000 ft AGL got several CAS warnings; uncommanded trim; landing gear aural warning; and air data computer fail; the programmed route and navigation was unreliable also. I did not want to inadvertently fly into Sky Harbor's approach paths and airspace and was assessing the situation for a possible return to the airport of departure. I made a left turn back towards the airport of departure and advised the controller that I was having some issues and requested a heading. The controller gave me direct to Mrbil and to climb to 5000 ft which I was able to program into the FMS and I was also able to resolve the uncommanded trim problem. I was in VFR conditions at the time of the deviation and was aware of the terrain and other traffic. EA50 pilot reported deviating from his cleared track departing FFZ when he experienced FMS issues.
Aircraft: LARGE TRANSPORT; LOW WING; 2 TURBOJET ENG
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

We were cleared to 'climb via the SID' on the UDGUV1A departure but were unable to find an altitude listed on the SID. We questioned clearance about this and were told to climb via the SID. Later; we questioned Tower and were told climb via the SID. We again questioned Departure what altitude we were supposed to be climbing to and were told to climb via the SID. There is no altitude given on the SID. Captain reported receiving instructions from ATC to climb via a SID while on the UDGUV1A departure from MMUN; for which the chart did not have published altitudes.
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

EICAS message HYDR1 LO QTY popped up. Viewed hydraulics page to monitor fluid quantity and; after consulting QRH; continued toward [destination]. Quantity seemed to be slowly depleting. Hard to tell because the amber portion of the tape is quite small. Took a picture of it to compare. Read and discussed HYDR SYS 1 FAILURE procedure from QRH with First Officer. Sent ACARS messages to Maintenance and Dispatch. Dispatch suggested [an alternate airport] as a diversion airport if needed. After a few minutes [we were] able to positively identify a drop in hydraulic quantity. [We decided to divert to the alternate]. Prepared to land normally but also briefed what we would do if hydraulic system 1 failed. Briefed FA on situation; again; planned a normal landing but prepared to do more. Normal landing. Explained to passengers what we were doing and deplaned. Got some maintenance. Apparently a 'b nut' had come unsecured and backed off; resulting in fluid leakage. Several threats on this one. Bad weather. Last leg. Lots of squinting at a small gauge wondering if I was crazy or if the indicator was in fact slowly moving to the left. Think it went pretty well. Good support from Dispatch; ATC and Ops. EMB-145XR Captain reported diverting to an alternate airport after experiencing fluid loss in the #1 hydraulic system.
Aircraft: MD-82
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

While climbing through 9;000 for 10;000 MSL on our cleared SID we experienced 'Intermittent AC Power Interruptions'. The autopilot tripped off; we had numerous flashing cockpit annunciators; and the AC busses were cycling on and off. It took a few moments to sort out what was happening and to make sure we leveled at 10;000. As I was preparing to advise ATC 'unable RNAV' the controller cleared us 'direct to a fix on the SID'. He then asked us why we had swung wide on our turn. We explained what we were dealing with. This all happened in a very compact time period. The appropriate QRH procedure was complied with. The company should possibly consider hot weather implications for aging Generator Control and Protection Units. Temperature at takeoff was 40 C. Had to level off at 10;000 due to an inbound traffic conflict. ...did not notice the flight director [had gone] to heading hold which was approximately what the SID course was. ATC told us to fly direct to [a fix on the SID] and asked why we were 3 miles south of course. An MD-82 flight crew; distracted by malfunctioning AC power; failed to note the Flight Director had defaulted to heading hold resulting in a deviation from their SID track.