Aryan95614/aerograph-asrs huggingface dataset:
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Upon boarding aircraft; crew was overcome by strong smell of vomit in cabin. Cleaners were cleaning aircraft- once they got to back galley; they indicated a passenger on the inbound flight had vomited on the carpeting between the two aft lavs; on the walls and into the aft galley.Cleaners tried in vain to clean the aircraft; altogether taking over 2 hours (and delaying the aircraft) to get the carpet cleaned and the smell reduced. Cleaners DID NOT use proper safety tools to clean the biohazard; no gloves for most of the employees; (some did have gloves on) and even used a regular vacuum to vacuum up the absorbent material.End result; the aft carpets had to be steam cleaned which in the end reduced the smell of vomit; but greatly increased the smell of chemicals in the aft cabin.Onboard Supervisor was on hand; as well as the Chief Pilot on duty and the Ops Manager. Everyone worked hard to find a solution but in the end we were given the impression from management that if we did not take the plane and deal with the chemical odor we would be given a direct order to do so.While I understand the operational needs of the company; the impact of having to breath a unknown cleaning chemicals as well as having to breath the odor of human vomit for the duration of a 3 hour flight out and then another 3 hour flight to return is unhealthy and presents a safety concern for our passengers and crew. The floor was steam cleaned yet the smell was still strong while standing in the aft galley. FAs were informed that even though the smell remainded there was no other action to be taken and the aircraft must be taken by the scheduled FAs. Passenger vomit removal from the previous flight was completed but the offensive odor remained after extensive cleaning. Management strongly suggested the crew complete the scheduled round trip or be ordered to do so with the aircraft in the current condition.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Normal; landing with nice touchdown and no side loads. Departed the runway at the high speed at approximately 40-45 kts. Let the aircraft slow on its own while going up the hill toward XX. Made the turn onto XX at approximately 10 kts; then held short [taxiway] for another aircraft. Made the left onto [taxiway] and continued the taxi holding short of [taxiway] for another aircraft. Taxied approximately another 20 ft. when we felt the right side suddenly drop slightly then a very rough ride then stopped immediately suspecting a flat tire (felt like hitting a large pot hole followed by a blow out in a car). Told Ground Control that we suspected a flat tire and asked if they could see anything. They said they could not. The FO (First Officer) opened his window and looked back confirming a flat. Ground Control called emergency vehicles and we set up maintenance and operations services to offload passengers and get the aircraft fixed. The landing and taxi evolution were absolutely uneventful until the second tire went flat. The landing was great; side-loads were not excessive; taxi speed was well within limits; and there was nothing to indicate a problem. Looking at the pictures that we took; I suspect some kind of internal damage from a manufacturers defect of one of the tires that finally gave way either on landing or taxi (possibly rounding a turn); which lead to the second tire taking the entire load of the truck and the brakes on that side leading to excessive heat and fuse plugs melting. The tire appears to have failed in the direction of internal tire plys. Just a guess; but I'm no tire engineer. B737 Captain reported two tires failed during taxi.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

On descent we were speaking to TRACON. We were on vectors for the visual for 26R. TRACON called out traffic for 26L; another carrier's heavy; we advised in sight and would maintain visual. TRACON then stated; 'Roger; follow the other carrier...he's for the left; you are cleared the visual 26R'. As we proceeded inbound; at about the time we pulled abeam the other carrier; ATC blasted us and said; 'Company; what are you doing? I told you to follow the other carrier!' The Captain responded with; 'We understood he was for the left; we are for the right...how do we 'follow' to separate runways'' TRACON did not like our query...we were never told that the other carrier 'should not be passed; etc.' At that time; we received a Climb RA. We responded to RA for a short climb; followed by an uneventful landing on 26R. The other carrier also received an RA and chose to go-around. 'Company is cleared the visual 26R; the other carrier is for the left do not pass or overtake.' This is a phrase we have all heard; and complied with. The Controller upon initial check-in was clearly agitated with all four aircraft he was handling. He was very 'testy' in ALL his transmissions. [Narrative #2 contained no additional information.] Air Carrier was instructed to 'follow' traffic that was landing on a parallel runway confusing the flight crew; the reporter noting the clearance was unclear and a 'do not pass' instructions should have been issued if required by ATC.
Aircraft: ANY UNKNOWN OR UNLISTED AIRCRAFT MANUFACTURER
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Our taxi instructions from BKL Ground Control were to taxi via Golf; Alpha; cross 6R and hold short of 6L. When planning my route using the Jeppesen taxi diagram; I saw that Golf went all the way to the end of 6R; at which there was a slight dogleg across the runway to get to Alpha. On our taxi; reaching the end of Golf; we were informed that Alpha was slightly behind us; but that we could taxi onto 6R and across to Alpha. After completing the flight; I compared an older taxi chart with my newly updated chart; and there is a discrepancy. The older chart does in fact have the Alpha taxiway crossing 6R; but the newly updated chart does not depict it at all. The current NACO chart also agrees with the most current Jeppesen diagram. The airport was not busy and there were no further issues. A First Officer reported a taxiway incursion at BKL airport. Reporter stated Taxiway A is not properly charted in the current NACO and Jeppessen diagrams.
Aircraft: A319
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

On vectors north of airport to join ZZZZZ arrival at ZZZZZ intersection; due to weather. During descent out of approx. 20;000 ft.; ECAM F/CTRL ELAC 1 fault appeared. I remained flying pilot; First Officer ran ECAM per SOP; and [our] follow up. ELAC 1 would not reset; and the resulting loss was also one of two available servo jacks in each aileron. After discussion with First Officer regarding the resultant flight control malfunction; we decided to [request priority handling] as it was the conservative thing to do. ZZZ was the closest airport so continued there. First Officer notified ATC and company of malfunction; and I briefed the flight attendants of the situation and to treat as precautionary landing. Briefed the passengers of the situation and assured them that all systems were operating normally. Also told them there would be safety vehicles near the aircraft after landing and nothing to be alarmed about. After vectoring around the weather in the area; we accepted visual approach to Runway XX. Landed without incident and taxied to gate.Weather was about the only factor having any effect on the whole situation. Was handled calmly and per SOP. There was a previous write up in logbook for same ECAM. At 20;000 ft. descending on the ZZZZZ into ZZZ we had an ELAC1 fault. The Captain was flying. I ran the ECAM per SOP; and did the follow up. The system did not come back on line. We thought because it is a flight control malfunction that we [request priority handling] and proceed to land at the destination airport at ZZZ. I notified ATC; and company while the Captain handled the FA; and customers. We were vectored around weather and proceeded to fly the visual to Runway XX. Once on the ground we proceeded to the gate and the Captain made an AML entry. Flight crew reported an ELAC 1 fault on arrival resulting in a precautionary landing.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL

Dispatched with a placard; MEL XXXX; for the lower Multi Function Display Unit inoperative. Placard was authorized on the previous day. Checked and complied with the MEL before departure. Specifically; we verified that the engine indications could be manually selected to either the Captains or FOs inboard display unit and that all other display units were operative. Even though we complied with the MEL before departure; during cruise the FO and I had further discussion about the MEL verbiage and the indications that we were able to see. Specifically; we were able to see all engine indications compacted on the upper MFD but were not able to view hydraulic quantity and pressure. Earlier; we initially dismissed not seeing this as a condition of the MEL placard but we increasingly thought that this didn't make sense. Decided to send a message for Maintenance to meet the aircraft upon arrival and followed up with a radio request to Maintenance to discuss the MEL placard. Made the following Aircraft Maintenance Log entry: With current placard for lower display unit inoperative unable to view hydraulic quantity and pressure. Discussed entry with Maintenance and briefed oncoming crew.Possibly an additional unaddressed system display indication failure. If this is true; it would have been better if it was caught sooner by the Flight Crew or maintenance. MEL addresses being able to see engine indications but doesn't address system indications. During the flight we noticed that the hydraulic information (pressures and quantities) was missing and could not be pulled up by pushing the SYS switch which is normally the case. That information was missing and could not be found during or after flight. Possible software issue that does not allow for hydraulic information to be displayed. B737 flight crew reported that with the Lower Multi-Function Display Unit deferred; all engine instruments were displayed except for hydraulic quantity and pressure on the Upper Display Unit.
Aircraft: NO AIRCRAFT
Phase of flight: unknown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Working to close; we are given 2 antiseptic wipes for equipment; no wipes for work areas; ready rooms. In product sort instead of spreading people out; they are putting everybody together in a section. If anyone contracts virus it's very possible to spread. Ramp agent reported working too close to others and not having sufficient antiseptic wipes.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: unknown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

This report is to provide information into the ongoing workload issues we are seeing. I was working day shift Desk XX this day and the amount of flights on this desk if they were not following each other AND I did not have good support around me would of been un-manageable. I am on the workload committee I/WE followed all procedures but this day the Duty Officer and Chief did not want to move any flights off my desk. Thank goodness for my fellow dispatchers they convinced the Duty Officer to move the ZZZ to ZZZ1 flight from this desk there would of been no way I could of released it at sometime around XA:30 LCL time. The flights worksheets were not balanced on MIDs for the dayshift so that is why we requested the ZZZ to ZZZ1 flight be moved right away at XB:10. I just looked at my worksheet and knew I would have issues with that flight given the fact I had 4 other long hauls to release; one of them being the ZZZ2-ZZZ3 flight and due to the amount of flights I had airborne all shift.Please see the attached screen shot from DV (Dispatch View). I am also attaching the afternoon's worksheet. My fellow co-workers and myself requested to have a couple flights moved from afternoon worksheet with no luck. I have no idea what happened after I left. If you look at Desk XY that day you will notice the workload very different. They had some flight yes; but I knew if anything happened I had backup. There was lots of turbulence all the way across the North-Pacific this morning. One of my ETOPS ALT was marginal; ZZZ4; with I was updating my flights about. One thing that was good and I want to point out is that ZZZ5-ZZZ6 flight were all following each other. That provided help and was the only way this desk could be manageable. We recommend that on the committee. Same city pairs on a desks. What would of helped if the ZZZ7-ZZZ6 flight was released on another desk and or the ZZZ3-ZZZ8 flight also moved. That would of made this desk way more manageable Dispatcher reported frustration at the workload on various Desks during normal shift.
Aircraft: ANY UNKNOWN OR UNLISTED AIRCRAFT MANUFACTURER
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types

Severe weather (thunderstorms) over Key West caused numerous aircraft many miles of deviations for weather. W174C was active so all aircraft were deviating north of CANOA and MAXIM. The Supervisor advised us that all of W174 was going to be active surface to FL500. I advised the Supervisor that all my traffic was deviating north and would be in the Warning Area W174B and E. He advised he did not have a choice. The B646 corridor was blocked by severe weather tops to FL420 and all the traffic was deviating into W174B and E. I advised the Supervisor that there was a 'CAR' that required TMU to have Telcons and reroute traffic away from the weather and Active Warning Areas. I suggested to the Supervisor that traffic could be rerouted thru ZHU airspace over MINOW and be clear of weather and away from the Warning Areas. The Supervisor advised me he would tell TMU. Later I still had not been advised of any action by the Supervisor or TMU. At that time; I called Havana Center and advised them that due to weather deviations and upcoming Active Warning Areas I could no longer accept traffic over MAXIM/CANOA and the B646 corridor. I then asked Havana Center to reroute all traffic over TADPO and the G448 corridor with east deviations since W465A and B were cold. This worked for about 20 minutes until W465 also went Active. Numerous arrivals and departures were deviating for weather and spilling into the Active Warning Areas. The Supervisor then left and assigned the Area to a CIC. This operation upset many people and was unsafe. The TMU should have been proactive and reroute inbound traffic over ZHU via MINOW and away from the weather and Active Warning Areas. The TMU should have ground stopped all departures filed over TADPO; MAXIM; CANOA until the weather moved out or the Warning Areas went cold. ZMA Controller described possible airspace incursions due to weather deviations and the Supervisor/TMU failures to coordinate and provide re-routes prior to the incidents.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation

During climb-out; received a message from Dispatch saying; '[Origin airport station] advised Dispatch at that a passenger had in their checked luggage a small lithium battery for a scooter. We have consulted with cargo load [planner] and [Customer Service Manager] and are in agreement it is OK to continue to [the destination].' FO and I discussed it and agreed to go on to [the destination]. No problems with the flight. B737-800 Captain reported Dispatch ACARS notification regarding Lithium Ion battery in a passenger checked bag.
Aircraft: A300
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

On approach; flaps system 1 and 2 faulted; causing flaps stuck at less than 15 degrees. Captain was pilot flying. First Officer recycled slats/flap handle to 15/0; then back to 15/15; flaps still stuck. leveled at 3;000 MSL and got delay vectors. Declared emergency completed QRH procedure and made uneventful landing. Safety was enhanced by extra fuel added by Captain to original flap panel/right fuel. On approach flaps stuck less than 15 degrees with system 1 and 2 flap fault lights illuminated. Cycled slat/flap handle per phase one. Flaps remained stuck less than 15 degrees. Accomplished QRH procedure for flaps stuck less than 20 degrees at or below maximum landing weight. [We] declared emergency [with an] uneventful landing. A300 flight crew experiences stuck flaps during approach at less than 15 degrees with system 1 and 2 flap fault lights illuminated. An emergency is declared; QRH procedures complied with; and an uneventful landing ensues.
Aircraft: SR20
Phase of flight: Final Approach
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict

An SR22 was inbound from the south on a modified right base entry; requesting pattern work. Aircraft was at 1;500 FT; was given the instruction to descend to pattern altitude at pilot's discretion; and to enter the right base to Runway 09R. Additional traffic was to this aircraft's left; making a base entry to Runway 09C for a full stop. Additional traffic was already established in the right traffic pattern of Runway 09R. I misjudged the timing of the inbound the SR22 with the other aircraft in the pattern. My plan was to have the SR22 be first to the runway; and the established aircraft follow the SR22. It ended up being a tie; and I tried to correct the situation by having the SR22 fly eastbound (opposite direction of the other aircraft) with the attempts of having the SR22 now follow the other aircraft. I issued traffic to the SR22 after I told him to make the eastbound turn. The pilot did so; and came close to the other aircraft. There are many things: keep the inbound aircraft at 1;500 FT altitude; could have had existing aircraft make a left 360 in the downwind to create more spacing; could have extended the existing aircraft's upwind; could have turned the SR22 westbound; could have had more urgency with the pilot to have him execute his eastbound turn immediately and give a traffic alert to advise him of the reason for the immediate turn. SFB Controller described a pattern conflict resulting from ATC spacing misjudgments.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway

I went off of comm one briefly to call ramp. We were approaching taxiway 1 for the ramp and parking. I got cleared in from ramp. I turned my head up and left and saw Aircraft Y that seemed to fill the entire windshield. The Captain was already starting to brake and I added additional braking from my side because he was so close. I told ground we almost hit Aircraft Y. Ground said sorry. Aircraft Y said ground told him we would give way. I never heard that clearance or acknowledged it. Aircraft Y was taxiing fast down taxiway 1. Was not stopping for anything obviously. Landed at ZZZ; taxi instructions taxiway 3; 2; 1 to enter ramp for gate.Making the left turn from 2 onto 1; had to slam on the breaks to avoid a collision with Aircraft Y traveling at a high rate of speed southbound on taxiway 1. Asked ground what happened and they said 'sorry' while Aircraft Y stated that we were supposed to give way to them.We did not hear or acknowledge any such instructions. Continued the taxi to gate. Air Carrier Pilots reported a critical ground conflict during taxi to their ramp/gate. The pilots were forced to initiate an abrupt stop just prior to entering a taxiway. Another aircraft; was proceeding down the taxiway and was not going to yield. The pilots reported they did not hear any instructions or acknowledge to yield for the other aircraft.
Aircraft: PA28
Phase of flight: Landing
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

I landed and had a flat right main tire. I was unable to exit the runway. It took approximately 1 hour to clear the runway. The issue is that when speaking to the FAA inspector he asked for my registration. I explained that I have been waiting for the FAA to send it; but they are backed up. It has been a very frustrating experience. The pink form 8050-1 states; 'Pending receipt of the Certificate of Aircraft Registration; the aircraft may be operated for a period not in excess of 90 days; during which time the PINK copy of this application must be carried in the aircraft.' Upon advice of the inspector; I called FAA and they explained that I should not have been operating the aircraft. That section does not apply. I have not gotten an explanation why if the form says I can operate then why can I not? This is very confusing and it is exacerbated by the difficult process of getting my registration. If I operated the aircraft when I shouldn't have then the PINK form needs to be changed. I don't think there is any interpretation other than the one that the form states very clearly. I truly believed that I was operating legally. My mechanic is changing the tire tomorrow and he might have an explanation for the blown tube. I don't know if I ran over anything on takeoff or on the landing. After landing with a flat tire; a PA-32 pilot is informed that his temporary registration may not be valid although the 8051-1 clearly states that the aircraft may be operated up to 90 days with the pink copy.
Aircraft: CRJ700
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft X was climbing to his requested altitude. Aircraft Y was underneath and in front of Aircraft X. Due to westbound traffic; and not wanting to delay Aircraft Y at FL270 for 60 miles; I decided to stop the climb of Aircraft X at FL270; and climb Aircraft Y through Aircraft X. Aircraft Y was out climbing Aircraft X 4:1 at one point. There was a 60-ish knot overtake the entire time; with Aircraft X behind Aircraft Y; however it was a controlled and calculated overtake and climb. I calculated the closure rate; the climb rate of Aircraft Y; put a 'J-Ring' on Aircraft Y; and decided there was no risk involved with this maneuver. Apparently; my calculation was 8 seconds off. The loss of separation occurred. This is the first operational error of my career. There was no traffic complexity or volume in the sector. I had nothing to watch except this situation; and that's what I was watching. Not once did I observe the target of Aircraft X go inside of the 'J-Ring' on Aircraft Y. Had I thought my calculations were incorrect and this was going to be a loss of separation; it was incredibly easy to fix; using turns; stopping an aircraft's climb; etc. It was well calculated and was not going to be an issue. The fact that I was apparently 8 seconds off (2/3 of a single RADAR sweep) in my calculation could be attributed to any number of factors; including a late report by the pilot; right down to the acceptable margin of error for the RADAR mosaic resolution; especially considering multiple RADAR Sort Boxes were in play. The lateral separation was reported to me as 4.96 NM...or less than 50 feet horizontally. If someone can actually prove to me that the aircraft were 49 feet off of those 5 miles; I'll eat my shoe. Like I said; I monitored the entire situation almost exclusively and not once did I observe the target inside the 'bubble'. A move to ADS-B/NEXGEN RADAR so we can actually get accurate position resolution. Enroute Controller experienced a loss of separation detected by automation; the reported estimating the separation loss at less than fifty feet.