Aryan95614/aerograph-asrs huggingface dataset:
Aircraft: A300
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Arriving on the RNAV Star; we were cleared direct [fix] to cross at 8000 feet. Prior to [fix] we were given descend to 6000 feet then later 3000 feet. We were instructed to join the localizer. At that point I selected heading mode and V/L on the MCP. Our heading was direct to a fix which is an extension of the Runway 35L localizer with no significant wind that would affect our course. At some point the controller; apparently in training; said: turn left to 020 to join the localizer do you have the runway in sight? The pilot monitoring repeated the heading and declared the runway in sight. The controller said: cleared for the visual. In the turn the localizer came alive and we joined and I selected LAND on the MCP. Immediately a voice came on and asked us why we departed from the arrival. The pilot monitoring said: we were cleared to join the localizer. The pilot monitoring asked: If you have a minute can you explain the problem. The same male voice in a very condescending manner repeated his previous statement insinuating that we had done something wrong. We continued the approach to land. After shut down the First officer and I discussed the event and were still puzzled. We did not over shoot the localizer or deviate from course. We decided the best thing to do would be to call the controller by phone which we did. The controller's supervisor said that they had discussed the event already. He said that our heading would take us toward the traffic for the parallel runway and that was the reason for the last minute heading change. Well of course it does; that's what happens when you come from the West. We both agreed that the instructions given to us on the approach should have been more precise. The trainee should have said: continue on the arrival to join; or present heading to join the localizer; which is what we did. Either way there should have been very little difference. The supervisor also said that there was no incident because of that issue. [Report narrative contained no additional information.] An aircraft on an RNAV arrival with a transition to the ILS approach was vectored off the arrival to join the localizer then cleared for a visual approach. There was confusion between the pilots and ATC if the crew was navigating in accordance with their clearance.
Aircraft: SMALL AIRCRAFT; LOW WING; 1 ENG; RETRACTABLE GEAR
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Departed Isla Grande airport (TJIG) VFR approved for the (VFR) Tango Transition by TJIG Tower to TIST (St. Thomas). Was cleared for takeoff by TJIG Tower climb to 1;500 FT and fly the Tango Transition. I departed on 095 heading and waited for as always for Tower to transfer me to San Juan Tower; but they never did. I called San Juan Tower and checked in on the Tango Transition proceeding as approved to the Tower. I was informed by the Controller that I had entered Class C airspace without authorization. I apologized and stated that I was not handed over to Tower as usual. The Controller stated that I should have circumvented Class C airspace. I have always understood that once I was cleared for the Tango Transition and given a discreet transponder code that my authorization was already granted. I still believe that is the case; nonetheless I will in the future assure myself that I call San Juan Tower before proceeding. There were no conflicts with other aircraft; I was switched to San Juan Departure and continued my VFR flight. I will be more vigilant in the future. SMA pilot assumed he had Class C clearance; Controller advised pilot that they had violated the airspace.
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Speed All Types

We were on the HAARP3 arrival into LGA when we were given a descent and holding instructions. ATC advised that they were turning LGA around; and that we were to descend and maintain 11000 ft; cleared direct VALRE and hold as published with 10 NM legs. The First Officer (FO) was the flying pilot and entered 11000 and started a descent using PATH. He also entered the hold into the FMS and we both verified the course. When we entered the hold (which was essentially a direct entry) we were level and 11;000 ft with 11;000 ft set in the altitude preselect. The FO also had the speed set in manual at 210 kts. Upon entering the hold I made the ATC report. Just after the AP started its turn (as it should have); the auto-throttles advanced to full thrust and the AC started an aggressive climb leaving the 11000 ALT and disregarding the 210 kts speed. Again; 11;000 was set in the ALT and 210 kts in manual speeds. Because the AC was departing from its programmed values; I used TCS to take control and returned the AC to 11;000 and 210 kts. (I believe I was able to keep it from exceeding 11;200 ft.) I then gave the controls back to the FO and told him to fly it manually while I changed the Vertical mode to green ALT. The FO got us established in the hold and we were able to return to AP for the remainder of the hold. After reviewing what happened the FO said he selected one of the 3 holds in the Database for VALRE. The one he had selected showed the hold BELOW FL180. His reasoning was that since we were level at 11;000 that would be appropriate. (I would have to agree.) Regardless of the hold selected from the database the AC should never have departed from the 11;000 ft selected. I believe there is a programming error with the current software load that would allow the AC to depart from an altitude without having a different altitude selected. At no time were we prompted to enter a new altitude (which the automation will usually prompt you to do if you've asked it to make a crossing without entering the new ALT in the preselect). Bottom line the AC should never decide on its own to start a climb without us authorizing it. If I had not overridden the AP as quickly as I did we could have easily climbed into other traffic in the same holding pattern (there was none there at the time but there was a few min later). EMB-175 flight crew reports being issued a holding clearance at VALRE at 11;000 FT. A database hold that matches the clearance is selected in the FMC. As the aircraft crosses the holding fix at 11;000 FT and starts to turn; autothrust advances to climb power and the nose pitches up. The Captain quickly takes control and returns the aircraft to the proper altitude and flight path. Autothrust is normal for the remainder of the flight.
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Notified ATC and diversion due to burning smell inside flight deck. Passing through FL310 Captain asked First Officer (FO) if he smelled anything out of the ordinary. FO stated he smelled something like burning toast. Captain rang flight attendant and asked the same to which she stated burnt toast as well. Captain notified ATC and we diverted to ZZZ. During descent smell went away but reoccurred intermittently. Performed overweight landing smoothly and stopped on runway. Confirmed smell was gone with flight attendant and taxied to gate while fire rescue followed. Passengers deplaned. Maintenance met us at gate and we were able to duplicate smell when packs were turned on using APU. First Officer flew aircraft while Captain performed checklist. We landed without further incident. Captain and FO spoke and initially felt okay to continue on [from] ZZZ. However as time passed and adrenaline wore off fatigue set in. We spoke again and both determined that we could not safely operate the flight [from] ZZZ. When climbing through 31;000 feet; both the FO and I noticed a distinct odor that smelled like burning toast. We immediately asked the FA if she smelled it as well and she did. I then [requested priority handling] with ATC and the FO initiated a descent as we diverted to ZZZ1. Once we descended through 31;000 feet; the smell dissipated. Throughout the flight; we smelled the burning order intermittently for short durations of only a few seconds. Once we landed; we came to a stop on the runway and assessed the situation. The odor was gone so we taxied back to our gate under our own power with fire trucks in tow. When at the gate with the door open and APU bleed and packs on; the odor came back and intensified. Maintenance was able to reproduce this on the ground. EMB-145 flight crew reported a fume event that resulted in a diversion. After landing when the APU bleed and packs were on; the odor returned.
Aircraft: ANY UNKNOWN OR UNLISTED AIRCRAFT MANUFACTURER
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

GPS provided faulty direction to an entered waypoint which I did not immediately recognize. While manipulating the controls of the unit to attempt to get the appropriate result to the desired waypoint I continued to travel on an inappropriate course for my destination. When I switched back to the map page I was very close to the Class D airspace of CHD and IWA and may have breached the border of the D airspace(s) while I was reversing course. It could have been eliminated if I had reversed course immediately when I became aware of the problem with the GPS and returned to my departure airport and attempted to solve the problem on the ground. General aviation pilot reports problems with his GPS which is not immediately recognized; resulting in possible Class D airspace entry without a clearance.
Aircraft: MD-11
Phase of flight: Takeoff / Launch
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

While taxiing out we turned onto the taxiway and heard a pop; stopped; [and] checked for any indication of something abnormal. Nothing noted. Continued taxiing and took off with no indication of anything wrong. Tower called at 140 kts. on the takeoff roll. Called again passing 700 ft. after gear was retracted to inform us of a nose tire left on the taxiway. [We] made the decision to bring the jet to [destination]. Landed on [Runway XX] after advising ATC. Flaps 50 Power on flare. No damage noted; towed back to parking. Air Carrier Captain reported hearing multiple loud pops on takeoff and was informed that a nose wheel assembly was left on the runway.
Aircraft: CESSNA 404 TITAN
Phase of flight: Landing
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was cleared to land Runway 15; while 8 miles from the airport. My company traffic was preceding me to the airport. Prior to company traffic landing; the Tower had an F-16 which was in the traffic pattern; execute a go-around. As I neared the airport; the Tower advised me of the F-16 in the traffic pattern. I noticed the F-16 on a downwind for Runway 21. As I neared approximately a mile final for Runway 15; I noticed the F-16 on an approximate 1 mile final for Runway 21. At this time I questioned the Controller if I was cleared to land Runway 15. The Controller said yes; that I was number 2. At this point I decided to initiate a left 360; to re-enter final for Runway 15 and land. As I initiated my turn; I advised the Controller that I was making a left 360. The Controller said nothing. As I was about 180 degrees into my turn; I verified with the Controller that I was cleared to land on Runway 15. The Controller confirmed that I was cleared to land [Runway] 15. Upon discussing this with my Director of Operations and Director of Safety; it was mentioned that I should have initiated a go-around straight ahead; as that airspace 'should' be cleared ahead of me. It was also made mention that if traffic had been behind me; it could have created a conflict. With the situational awareness I had; I knew there was no conflicting traffic behind me; and with the F-16's go-around before the preceding company traffic; I could not guarantee that the airspace was cleared ahead of me. Also; my turn to the left put me closer to the traffic; rather than away from it; so a right turn may have been a better option. I choose the left; since I was single pilot and my view is best in a left turn. Corrective action; speak up sooner if something doesn't seem right!!! IFR Twin inbound to FSD elected to execute a 360 degree turn on final without ATC approval because of military traffic operating on an intersecting runway.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

We were being vectored to final for Runway 29. I was the PF [Pilot Flying]. We had been assigned 180 knots by the Approach Controller; I was maintaining that. There was an aircraft about 5 miles ahead as we were on base to final. While intercepting the localizer; the Captain instructed me to slow to 160 knots; as the aircraft was now 4 miles in front of us. I hesitated as we had been assigned a speed; but then followed the Captain's instructions. He told ATC 'we are slowing to 160 knots for separation with the aircraft in front of us.' ATC immediately told us not to slow without permission; then said to maintain 160 knots to 6 DME. He then told us he can go to 2.5 miles separation. We encountered some light wake turbulence and after landing saw that the preceding aircraft was a 787. ATC in Vienna is always challenging to deal with at best. As PF; I was put in the position where I had to choose whether to follow an ATC clearance; or the Captain's instructions. ATC in Vienna is not the best. Approach Controllers will assign speeds on final that are immediately contradicted by the Tower Controller after switching over; for example; 'maintain 180 knots to 6 miles' then after switching to Tower; 'slow to minimum approach speed; aircraft departing ahead.' The Captain made orders to me contradicting an ATC clearance; that didn't make sense at the time; so I just had to randomly follow his instructions. After landing and thinking about it for a while; he explained his reasoning; which then made some sense. Better communication during the event would have helped us be on the same page during it; which I always think is a better way to do things. The Captain made the right call in my opinion; we would have probably encountered more wake turbulence with the 787 as our separation decreased. Tower also departed an aircraft ahead of us on 29; and had we not slowed; it more than likely would have resulted in a go around for us. Air carrier F/O reported slowing below ATC assigned speed when directed to do so by the Captain; who saw a potential conflict occurring with the aircraft preceding them.
Aircraft: SMALL AIRCRAFT
Phase of flight: Other Go Around
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

During a go-around the aircraft was on the upwind at 800 feet MSL when the engine lost all power and the engine began wind milling. The instructor performed the engine failure in flight checklist with no restart. The instructor made a radio call to tower 'Tower; Aircraft X [has an] emergency engine failure' the engine restarted 'we have it back I want the first available runway.' Tower responded 'Cleared to land.' The instructor executed a normal landing and turned right on taxiway. Tower wanted to know if any further assistance was needed. The instructor responded 'Negative.' and taxied back to the ramp under aircraft's own power. GA pilot reported the engine quit in the pattern. Engine was restarted successfully and a normal landing ensued.
Aircraft: WIDEBODY TRANSPORT
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

[We were] required to wear C02 monitor due to dry ice waiver. During de-icing operations with packs off; the monitor alarm began to chirp. I donned the O2 mask and noticed the level on the monitor as 0.5 and climbing to 0.7. Both the Captain and I stayed on O2 for approximately 20 minutes during the duration of de-icing. After confirmation from ground support that the deicing procedure was complete; I turned the packs on per the QRH and the CO2 alarm subsided approximately 1 minute later. The Captain called the Duty Officer for protocol guidance regarding the event and we were advised that we were 'probably OK' to continue. We resumed the flight. Unfortunately; we have no idea to determine the levels of CO2 in the cockpit and our exposure levels. We followed the published bulletin relating to the CO2. Better guidance and knowledge from flight safety regarding our susceptibility of the types of exposure risks pertaining to hazardous materials. The First Officer of a cargo flight noticed his carbon monoxide monitor alerting at a 0.5 to 0.7 level during de-ice operations with the Packs OFF and dry ice onboard. The crew used oxygen for about 20 minutes until the Packs were ON again.
Aircraft: CHALLENGER 300
Phase of flight: Initial Climb
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

During our climb out from Runway 30; we received vectors 20 degrees left from our initial heading of 301 degrees due to another aircraft not answering radio transmissions. Just prior to the new vector; we had also been cleared to an altitude higher than the departure procedure's initial 3;000 FT. During this climb and the vectors; we entered intermittent IMC conditions. This report is due to the fact that as the flying pilot; I allowed the aircraft to reach a speed of 270-280 KTS below 10;000 for approximately 1 minute. I realized this through a visual scan of my instruments; it was not brought to my attention otherwise. Although I am not attempting to excuse my lack of full situational awareness for this; I will explain what I believe were contributing factors: The CL300 does not have autothrottles. I have not flown an aircraft without auto throttles for 15+ years. The aircraft also has issues with the FLCH mode 'porpoising' the aircraft; so our company has its pilots take off in FLCH; but prefers us to switch to VS mode as soon as practical. With the newness to the aircraft; and my past experiences of taking off with autothrottles in either FLCH and/or VNAV modes; I did not appreciate that my V-bars had a significant lag when switching from FLCH pitch mode to my newly set 3;000 FPM VS setting. By following the V-bars and paying more attention to my new heading and looking out for the other aircraft while in an out of IMC conditions; I did not anticipate how much I needed to pull back the throttles in order to not surpass my required 250 KT speed below 10;000 FT.This made a significant impact on me; as I always aspire to be a safe; fully aware pilot at all times! As for myself; this is being corrected by continuing to gain more flight time in the CL300 and studying the manuals; paying particular attention to what I can expect to see on the Primary Flight Display in various flight modes as well as gain knowledge as to the various power settings the throttles require in a variety of operational situations. As for other pilots to learn from my mistake: the FAA should continue to stress that pilots still need to hand fly their aircraft when it is operationally feasible and not get too reliant on technology. A CL300 reached about 275 KTS during a level off at about 5;000 FT on a SID; the pilot was new to this aircraft and the transition from FLCH to VS caused lag in the Flight Director command bars.
Aircraft: NO AIRCRAFT
Phase of flight: landing
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance

This is an official report of [company] Airline's shortcuts in maintenance and processes. During the month of November 2018; there have been 22 SDRs (Service Difficulty Reports) that have not been reported; for events like shattered windows in-flight; engine shutdowns in-flight; landing gears malfunctioning; etc. When I informed these to my supervisors; they swept it under the rug; and my boss literally said; 'That is not my problem...let it go!!' And he is the Quality Assurance Director. These guys should not work in aviation because all the safety issues are most of the time ignored; or neglected. Reporter explained that discrepancies in reporting process related to Service Difficulty Reports (SDR) were found during audits but were not corrected. Critical items such as in-flight engine shutdowns and landing gear malfunctions were not reported to the FAA. Fuel tank mechanics were not properly trained to comply with SFR88 requirements. Maintenance Auditor reported critical airplane component failures are not being reported as required by the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR)'s.