Aryan95614/aerograph-asrs huggingface dataset:
Aircraft: LARGE TRANSPORT
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Aircraft X departed ANC on the SID climbing to 4;000 ft. I vectored Aircraft X to the north and climbed him to 7;000 ft. below another IFR aircraft that was eastbound above. I became busy with other aircraft requesting special VFR clearances. When my scan brought me back to Aircraft X; I saw he was at an altitude that I could turn him on course into higher MVAs and thought I climbed him to 20;000 ft.As my scan approached him again; he was climbing well through 6;500 ft. in a 2;000 ft. MVA area. I asked him for a PIREP and was writing that down on the PIREP form. I turned around to give the PIREP form to the CIC and as I was sitting down; Aircraft X requested higher. I saw that Aircraft X was still at 7;000 ft. in an 8;000 ft. MVA by a few miles and climbed him to 20;000 ft. I realized the climb was not going to be well enough to clear the 10;000 ft. MVA so I expedited his climb through 10;000 ft. When I realized that wasn't going to work and he was out of 8;000 ft.; I turned him left to avoid the higher MVAs. He was clear of the 10;000 ft. MVA box but had already missed the 8;000 ft. MVA.My recommendation is when we are inundated with IFRs off of our satellites and primary airport and our satellites start going below basic VFR; we should have a low radar staffed so that they can deal with all the special VFR requests rather than leaving the North Radar Controller to do it all. TRACON Controller reported being overwhelmed by distractions from satellite airport operations and forgetting to climb an air carrier departure; resulting in the aircraft flying below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude.
Aircraft: B757
Phase of flight: Final Approach
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Established on LOC 27 between VYDDA and OKAIN. LOC Capture and VNAV Path were established. Speed 170 Kts as assigned by ATC. Flaps 20 Gear Up. Descending to out of 3800 MSL and we received a GPWS warning 'Terrain Terrain - Pull Up Pull Up Pull Up' warning. Initiated Terrain Escape maneuver and as soon as we climbed 200 feet the warning ceased. We continued to climb to 4000 feet and advised ATC. After initiating Terrain Escape maneuver; we were unable to re-establish VNAV Path and executed a Go-Around and diverted. After executing a missed approach due to low visibility on our first try into SAN we were vectored north of the airport and cleared for the LOC 27 again. We were established in LOC and VNAV Path modes; at approximately 3;800 ft; approaching OKAIN; at 170 KIAS; flaps 20; gear up and speed brake armed. We received a 'TERRAIN; TERRAIN; PULL UP; PULL UP' GPWS Alert. The PF (Pilot Flying) (Captain) executed the GPWS escape maneuver and the alert did not reoccur. I alerted ATC of the GPWS alert and our maneuver. We were subsequently re-cleared the approach but were unable to re-establish VNAV Path in time; executed a missed approach and diverted. B757 flight crew reported executing a go-around and diverting to an alternate after receiving a GPWS terrain alert on approach to SAN.
Aircraft: WIDEBODY TRANSPORT
Phase of flight: Takeoff / Launch
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

Approaching number 1 for the runway; we had watched 4-5 departing and arriving aircraft. Spacing between arrivals and departure was large; maybe 2-3 miles. Number one and holding short of the runway; just as landing traffic passed by; I heard the controller say what sounded like 'can you accept immediate?' Clearing left (final) and confirming with Captain; I responded to the affirmative. There was no reply. I was watching the landing traffic roll out and clear when I heard the controller repeat the request; and I again responded affirmatively. At this point the Captain was saying I wasn't transmitting. I looked at my communication panel and realized we had begun moving into position as the Captain responded to Tower we were lining up to hold for immediate takeoff. I selected my mic button as the Tower ask if we were lining up on the runway. 'I responded affirmative' and Tower then cleared us for takeoff. On departure; we were asked to contact the Tower. I remained on departure frequency while the Captain talked to Tower. They said we had taxied into position without clearance and to be more careful. It all had happened quickly and with some language barrier combined with the communication mishap; the Captain's reply to Tower led me to believe he had heard a different clearance than me; but by then we had been cleared for Takeoff. I did not hear anything from the First Officer B or First Officer C during all this; but I may have missed something listening to the Captain speaking as well as the Tower transmissions. To the best of my knowledge; no other aircraft/traffic was affected. First Officer reported taxiing into position on runway without clearance. The flight was subsequently cleared for takeoff.
Aircraft: CRJ900
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Repositioning flight about 29 minutes from landing; we got the announcement to prepare cabin. Secured galley and came back into cabin at row 1 hit turbulence so took seat in 1C. After sitting we had at least one really hard jolt and then I heard the other Flight Attendant call my name then turned to see if she was ok. Still could not get up at that point. When we arrived at the ramp area to deplane the boarding door would not open after trying 2 times the Captain then tried with no success. Also First Officer tried. Severe turbulence was cause. A CRJ-900 on a repositioning flight with only flight and cabin crews aboard encountered severe turbulence during the descent. Upon landing they were unable to open the main cabin boarding door.
Aircraft: ANY UNKNOWN OR UNLISTED AIRCRAFT MANUFACTURER
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Frequently at RSW METAR/SPECI and weather reported on the ATIS is inaccurate. This leads to poor decision making and flight planning mistakes by pilots; dispatchers and meteorologists who rely on the weather observations to be accurate and representative.[One day] a thunderstorm was reported in the METAR for several hours after it ended. A few days earlier a FC (funnel cloud) was reported in METAR by accident when none occurred.The ATC at RSW should either learn how to augment the ASOS properly or leave it in AUTO mode. Currently; the ATC augmentation of the ASOS at RSW leads to a poor and inaccurate product which has the potential to be dangerous. A pilot reported that RSW METAR at times was inaccurate with outdated conditions or conditions which have not occurred.
Aircraft: PA-34-220T TURBO SENECA III
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

We were doing practice approaches in VFR. We were on our way to RMG to shoot the GPS approach to RW1. I was under the hood; the safety pilot saw a parachutist we immediately deviated. We were listening to 4A4 CTAF; but did not hear info about parachute jump. In my briefing; I did not see a NOTAM about parachute jumpers in my route. While there was plenty of space to maneuver it was a concern as we did not know if there were other parachutists in the area. In retrospect I should have asked for flight following. In the future I intend to do all practice approaches under an IFR flight plan in constant communication with ATC. PA34 pilot reported coming upon parachute jumpers necessitating evasive action in the vicinity of 4A4 Airport.
Aircraft: CITATION X (C750)
Phase of flight: Final Approach
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Working Boeing satellite sector; light traffic; marginal VFR conditions. Aircraft X on a vector to the ILS rwy 13R approach at 2200 feet. As I turned Aircraft X to a base leg heading of 040 I scanned and saw VFR traffic NE of the localizer moving westbound at 2000 feet and the target appeared to be climbing. Anticipating that this traffic would become a factor for Aircraft X I continued their turn to a 090 heading and called the traffic. Aircraft X did not have the traffic in sight; so I also advised them of the field for the visual approach. Aircraft X reported the field in sight; so I instructed them to continue the right turn towards the field and cleared them for the visual approach. By this time; the VFR target's Mode-C indicated the same altitude as Aircraft X. After Aircraft X cleared the traffic the pilot advised me that they had responded to a TCAS-RA reference the VFR traffic I had issued as they were in the turn on the visual approach. I informed the supervisor on duty and after determining that no more information was required for the daily log I transferred communication with Aircraft X to BFI ATCT and the aircraft landed without further incident.The FALCON replay demonstrated the targets were .89 NM apart at the same altitude and closest laterally at .71 NM by which point Aircraft X had descended 200 feet below the VFR. While I believe both of those measurements occurred after I had taken positive control action to separate Aircraft X from the VFR target; had I been busier or not caught the VFR target in my scan it could have been much worse. FALCON also illustrates that the VFR target crossed the BFI runway 13R localizer less than 2NM North of ISOGE at 2100 feet climbing; which is exactly where an IFR aircraft would be positioned; both vertically and laterally; to execute the ILS approach to BFI.This is another report of a continued problem within our airspace. Something needs to change. The VFR aircraft are transiting a very narrow; busy corridor of airspace and are doing so without any communication with ATC. It is simply unsafe. The VFR aircraft in this area at the very least need to be in communication with ATC so that we can assign; as necessary; altitude restrictions ensuring the safety of all the aircraft involved. The solution(s) are not hard and while they are potentially more restrictive to VFR aircraft the bottom line is that what happens day in and day out in that airspace as it exists and operates now will eventually result in a very bad accident. S46 TRACON Controller reported of a conflict between and IFR arrival and a VFR aircraft. Controller reported this is an ongoing problem with VFR aircraft using a corridor that conflicts with IFR aircraft arrivals at the same altitudes.
Aircraft: SR22
Phase of flight: Landing
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Excursion Runway

I was descending to land. At 12 miles out I switched from flight following to monitoring Unicom. Unicom announced 'Rwy 28 active; left hand pattern'. I then responded with my position and intentions to stay north of I-10; cross midfield for a left downwind. I again reported midfield; downwind and turning base. Just as I was finishing my turn to final at about 800 ft AGL; a Falcon announced a 5 mile final. I called him saying I was 2 mile final. Then again announced 1 mile final. After touchdown and rollout; I saw lights approaching to land from the opposite direction (Rwy 10) at about 700 feet. I called: 'jet on final; I am on the runway'. As he continued his approach; I was looking for a turnoff. Getting close to the turnoff; I again screamed at the jet that I was on the runway. As he was about 1000 ft on my nose; about 20 ft above touchdown height; I decided to leave the runway for the sand/grass. As I cleared the runway; the jet performed an abrupt go-around.As the sand was soft; I required a tow back onto the asphalt. No damage was caused.After I tied down I examined my radios and found that I was monitoring Unicom; but transmitting on my last flight following frequency. SR22 pilot reported taxiing off the runway after landing in UDD when he noticed a small jet about to land on the opposite runway. Reporter stated he noticed later he was transmitting on the wrong frequency.
Aircraft: REGIONAL JET CL65; UNDIFFERENTIATED OR OTHER MODEL
Phase of flight: Initial Climb
Anomaly: Deviation - Speed All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Flight departed Runway 26L from ATL behind an Airbus A321. Airbus had just rotated when we were cleared for takeoff. On rotation just as Captain called for gear up aircraft encountered wake turbulence causing stick shaker to activate. Captain slightly lowered nose and shaker immediately went away. Regained airspeed and continued departure with no further incidents. Reporter suggested increased separation from A321 type aircraft. CRJ Captain reported encountering wake turbulence departing ATL in trail of an A321 that resulted in a stick shaker.
Aircraft: NO AIRCRAFT
Phase of flight: unknown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Whomever decided to split up desks gave me 11 additional aircraft's to dispatch and flight follow until the X shift comes in at XF:00 hours am.Since I start at XA:00am it means I had 19 aircraft on my desk as usual with an additional 11 aircraft on top of that. Half of my shift I was dealing with 30 aircraft and it wasn't an issue until XE:00 am when we started to get reroutes based on the weather.My Coordinator tried to find a solution but we were so close to XF:00am; it was better to keep them until the relief takes them. Another problem is how the phones are set. It appears that I have a higher priority so I get almost all the calls to whatever code share I work.We have to make sure the desks are spread evenly including the desks for dispatchers who come in later. Phones need to be set so inbound calls are split evenly. We also need more people early in the morning. The X shift helps the night shift but puts more load on the morning shift who actually dispatches twice as much aircraft than the night shift. We could use some dispatchers back in the morning.It would also help everyone in Dispatch if we could simply get pilots to use the extensions to call Dispatchers. Dispatcher reported working an overloaded desk and overall staffing issues.
Aircraft: CESSNA CITATION SOVEREIGN (C680)
Phase of flight: Initial Climb
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Approaching rotation speed on takeoff the Pilot Flying said it felt like the rudder pedals locked up in neutral. He rotated the aircraft and we became airborne. Shortly afterward he tried pushing alternately on the left and right rudder pedals and they were indeed immovable. And I found the same thing on my side. I announced that to the Pilot Flying (PF) and we continued a normal climbout and cockpit flow to reach a safe altitude where we could evaluate our status. I engaged the yaw damper; which engaged normally; and then the autopilot and we continued our climbout. The 680 climbs quickly; so we were climbing in the teens as the I pulled out our QRH checklist for Jammed Rudder. We had just flown into ZZZ on a short flight from ZZZ1 at 10;000 ft.; so we knew that cold soak was not a factor. We had not set the flight control gust lock because the winds were calm and we were doing a quick turn. When we started engines; we did a 'full throw' flight control check (including the rudder); per our checklist; so we knew the flight controls were free before taxi. Anyway; as the Jammed Rudder checklist was run with no relief; we [requested priority handling] and diverted into ZZZ2 and used the longest runway; XXL. On about a 3 mile final; the rudder became free; and a normal landing and rollout ensued. Maintenance drove over from our home airport (ZZZ1). Unfortunately the problem could not be duplicated. The aircraft flight control gust lock system was thoroughly inspected and it was determined that it was operating normally and could not have caused the jammed rudder. Maintenance examined the rudder control cables from the rudder pedals to the rudder and found no problems in the flight control system. In short they were unable to definitively identify what caused our jammed rudder condition. Since then the aircraft has flown 4 legs with no further problem. Citation 680 Captain reported diverting after the rudder system jammed. A precautionary landing was made and the rudder worked normally during landing.
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Phase of flight: Other All Phases
Anomaly: No Specific Anomaly Occurred Unwanted Situation

After 4 days of giving new hire FO IOE I was exhausted. We finished up our four-day trip just about 2.5 hours late due to maintenance issues and an understaffed airline. The four-day finished at XA30pm. I then had to take the employee shuttle from the terminal which took time. I finally drove home to my place and made it to sleep around XDam [two and half hours later]. I did my best to sleep and I was unable to get adequate rest for the 5 legs I was supposed to fly on my 5th straight day of duty. The sign in was supposed to be 12 hours on the dot almost from when I finished my 4-day trip.Cause - Understaffed airline forcing us to do the last turn of the four day. The last turn resulted in maintenance issues and required a plane swap. Due to this flight; we were 2.5 hours late and I was super tired from doing 2 straight weeks of IOE. EMB-145 Captain reported going to work while extremely fatigued and attributed the challenging schedules to staffing issues at their company.
Aircraft: EMBRAER PHENOM 100
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

The EAGUL5 arrival can be misleading for aircrew and could result in an unsafe position. If an aircrew were to pass HOMRR just below 16;000 FT; in accordance with the arrival procedure; and then be required to be between 11;000 and 10;000 FT within four miles; an unsafe descent rate could ensue (1;500 FT/NM or > 6;000 FT/min). Avionics systems read 'HOMRR at or below 16;000 FT' to be '16;000;' and when calculating ability to be between 11;000 and 10;000 FT in four miles; determines that it cannot be done and thus reads unable. Please consider altering the STAR to allow a more gradual descent. Phenom 100 Captain reports that his FMC incorrectly reads the HOMRR crossing restriction on the EAGUL5 RNAV to PHX as a hard altitude instead of 'at or below' as depicted. This makes the VNNOM crossing restriction impossible to achieve.
Aircraft: CRJ200
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC

We were being vectored for a visual 22L into JFK. Just after crossing the shore of Long Island at 4000 ft heading 040; speed 250 KIAS about 2-4 miles southwest of FRG airport; [the First Officer] and I were both heads up because of all the VFR traffic surrounding the airport. It was a beautiful day. That's when something caught my eye passing off the left side of the aircraft. It was only visible for about 3 seconds before it passed about 100-200 ft below us; but it was quite clearly a drone. It was white and shaped like a box. Looked like one of those phantom quadcopters or larger. The First Officer did not see it. I reported it to the Approach Controller and then called to give a more detailed report after we parked at the gate. CRJ-200 Captain reported a NMAC with a UAV on a visual approach to JFK Runway 22L.
Aircraft: B777
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Following the Crew Chief's instruction; I went to the aircraft. I was informed by a cabin crew member that the cabin interphones were not operating correctly. I called the office to request technical assistance. A Technician arrived to assist me approximately 5 minutes later. After discussing the issue with the Captain; it was determined that the fault was with the chime at L1 Door. As a result the Customer Service Manager falsely accused me of making the aircraft late on purpose. This is a troubling trend the Managers have recently adapted towards aircraft departures.This has an unsettling after effect whether intended or unintended by management to lower actual write ups in the logbook to thus lower maintenance delays subsequently impeding with the safety of the travelling public whom have put their safety and the safety of their loved ones in our hands. Furthermore; through intimidation; as well as impediment with legal and compliant documentation required for aircraft departure; myself as well as every mechanic here at this airline's number one responsibility is to the safety of all onboard. The unsettling truth for Maintenance at Company is non-maintenance management attempting to dictate how maintenance is performed. Allow us to have the time to properly maintain aircraft. B777 Maintenance Technician reported that while attempting to repair a cabin interphone problem; a Customer Service Manager accused him of intentionally delaying the flight.
Aircraft: B777
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Upon opening P-110 Power Panel to install new wiring; found six relay bases installed incorrectly. Because of improper installation of the bases; four of the installed relays were contacting panel structure or the adjacent relay. Relay bases affected: DK23022; DK23025; DK23040; DK23041; DK23042 and DK23043. Reporter stated he has 15 years experience; much of the time in avionics doing special wiring modifications on various aircraft for an air carrier. He was installing new wiring for Wi-Fi and passenger seatback touch screens on some of their B777 aircraft when he saw the improper relay installations in the Left P-110 Power Management Panel in the lower Main Equipment Center (MEC). Reporter stated all the relays have a common base; are installed with three screws and involve the In-flight Entertainment System (IFEs). When properly installed; there is approximately 1/4' of an inch clearance between the relays. But since the bases of the six relays were torqued at an angle and installed on the opposite side of their mounting flange; the tops of the relays were contacting the adjacent relays and chafing against the inside of the P-110 Power Panel. He suspects the six relays have been flying around in that condition for three years; possibly since the last Service Bulletin (SB) modifications involving the Cabin IFE System that brought some of their B777 up to a base standard to allow future expansion of cabin IFE equipment. The six relays were replaced and installed correctly. An Aircraft Avionics Technician reports finding six relay bases installed incorrectly; contacting structure and adjacent relays inside the Left P-110 Power Panel located in the lower Main Equipment Center (MEC) on a B777-200 aircraft.