Aryan95614/aerograph-asrs huggingface dataset:
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

During cruise we encountered two to four seconds of wake turbulence/moderate turbulence. Prior to incident; during climb and cruise; conditions there were occasional light chop with ATC (MDW and IND ARTCC) reporting the same ahead of us. During climb; I had authorized F/As (Flight Attendants) to get up to conduct a water service and then clean/secure the cabin for anticipated turbulence projected for the last third of flight. When encountered; I made a PA immediately for the F/As to take their seats. Afterwards we contacted F/As to check on their status. We were informed that the C F/A had fallen to the floor; injuring her back. When queried; she informed me she was in a lot of pain and could not continue her duties. She then told me she was going to apply ice and take ibuprofen for the pain. I discussed with her about contacting Stat-MD and she felt it was not necessary. I discussed with the F/O (First Officer) that we would check on her status in ten minutes and if no improvement; then contacting Stat-MD. When I checked with her after ten minutes; she informed me that the ice and ibuprofen had helped but she still did not feel well enough to continue her duties. I instructed her to stay seated and we would have EMS meet the aircraft. During this process; Dispatch was notified of situation; to contact EMS to meet aircraft; and notify F/A scheduling. Arrival; landing; and taxi to gate were uneventful. Passengers were kept seated while EMS came on board and assisted her off the aircraft. We talked with her in terminal and suggested she go to local hospital to be completely evaluated (EMS did not have facilities to do so). She declined; choosing to go home and be evaluated there. After the initial turbulence encounter; we did not encounter any more moderate turbulence; along with the short duration; leads me to believe what we encountered was due to wake turbulence. During cruise we asked ATC for a ride report. We were told to expect occasional light chop. Shortly thereafter the Captain asked me to relay to the cabin crew that he would like them to do a water only service. A couple minutes later we hit what felt like two distinct wake turbulence bumps followed by a third a couple moments later. I would characterize them as strong light to weak moderate. A few moments later; one of the crew called up to inform us that our C Flight Attendant had injured her back. B737-700 flight crew reported encountering probably wake turbulence in cruise flight at FL260 that resulted in a minor injury to a Flight Attendant.
Aircraft: B777
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Aircraft X was on the arrival and level at 15;000 feet. Aircraft Y was stopped short at 14;000 feet. The Aircraft Y passed 5-6 miles behind Aircraft X and reported severe turbulence; determined to be wake turbulence.[We need] better awareness of wake turbulence. An aircraft reported severe wake turbulence.
Aircraft: SMALL AIRCRAFT; HIGH WING; 1 ENG; FIXED GEAR
Phase of flight: Final Approach
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC

I was performing touch-and-go's during a supervised solo flight. On my final approach (GMU Runway 19); the other aircraft; who was told by ATC to continue flying through the final; took a northbound turn straight in front of me; flying directly towards me. I took evasive maneuvers by dropping down to the right. The other plane; only after being told by ATC that he had cut someone's final off; also took evasive maneuvers and started flying to his right and upwards. Following the evasive maneuver; landing on Runway 19 was uneventful. Student pilot reported a Near Mid Air Collision on final approach with another aircraft that required reporter to take evasive action.
Aircraft: CRJ200
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I failed to control the situation correctly. This is my error only. I should have stopped Aircraft X when I was told that there was a roller possibly missing from the cargo door support on the rail. The door was reinstalled to the rail and allowed to continue. We are not allowed to fly with missing parts. I hesitated at the time but erroneously called this a non event and allowed Aircraft X to continue to ZZZ1 flight. This was my error. We took a call from Company Maintenance stating the cargo door stuck when the ramp. Agents tried to close it. I went to Aircraft X to find the door was off its track on both sides and the aft upper track roller was missing; just the wheel axle was present. I re-seated the door on its track and was able to close and lock the door for flight. I called Maintenance Control and informed [them] of the missing track wheel and if [they] wanted to place it on MEL or clear the item; Maintenance Control informed me that there is no MEL/CDL relief for this specific item and told me to sign the Corrective Action and [complete the appropriate paperwork]; putting the aircraft back into service as serviceable. Aircraft was then released for service and flew from ZZZ to ZZZ1 with 49 souls onboard. Technician reported allowing aircraft to fly with parts missing on cargo door.
Aircraft: B757
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

I had the opportunity to use for the first time the new 75 taxi without final weights procedure and the new Before Takeoff Checklist. This new checklist and procedures are completely unsafe and a step back in time. The taxi checklist was eliminated in order to have the FO more engaged in taxiing in order to reduce runway and taxiway incursions. Now we decided to put all the garbage back into a checklist and have it done right before we takeoff. I watched my very experienced FO flip through multiple pages in the FMC and multiple pieces of paper in order to locate all the information that need to be read on the Before Takeoff Checklist. This took a number of minutes where he was completely out of the loop and of absolute no use to me in the safe taxiing of the aircraft. Basically he was no use to me in taxiing; and I was of no use to him in confirming all the information he was reading. I found myself just saying 'SET' in order for us to get through all the words and numbers that were being thrown at me. I finally stopped on the taxiway in order to make sure the aircraft was safe and configured correctly. Once the checklist was complete; we continued our taxi. I feel that having to stop on a taxiway on a clear VFR day in order to run a checklist is a clear indicator that the procedure and checklist are not practical; have no basis in human factors; and is completely unsafe. This also shows a lack of professionalism on the part of our airline. What if it was night; a congested taxi; unfamiliar airport; new FO; single engine taxi; etc. Basically I would never utilize this procedure. I would push back; set the brake; run the 'After Start Checklist' followed by the 'Before Takeoff Checklist' up to the LINE; before I would call for taxi.I also cannot understand why there was mandatory CBT training for [other aircraft types in our] fleet; but it was optional for the 75?It is clear that this new procedure and checklist change have nothing to do with standardization and safety; but has everything to do with Load Plannings inability to get accurate weights to the aircraft in a timely manner. A B757 Captain questioned his Company's new Before Takeoff Checklist procedure which takes the First Officer's full attention during taxi; leaving the Captain solo while taxiing for takeoff.
Aircraft: NO AIRCRAFT
Phase of flight: unknown
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

It is my responsibility to alert pilots of a growing concern at the F70 (French Valley) uncontrolled airfield. In the past 6 months there have been 8 traffic conflicts (evasive maneuvers taken); 3 Near Mid Air Collisions; and 6 unsafe (not in compliance with FAA rules and regulations) traffic pattern operations. As this airfield continues to grow in popularity and activity there is an increasing desire and need to have this airfield added to the Contract Tower list for controlled airspace. Reporter stated there are multiple traffic conflicts and near mid air collisions reported at F70 uncontrolled airport.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Started descent for the ZZZZ 1 arrival into ZZZ from FL400. At approximately FL330 we received an IAS DISAGREE message. I checked all 3 airspeed indicators and mine matched the standby while the Captain's showed 10 KTS slow. Captain ran the appropriate checklists. Shortly after finishing the checklist we got an ENG master caution. I looked up and saw the Electronic Engine Control (EEC) had both reverted to ALTN. Captain ran the checklist. At approximately FL200 we got the ALT DISAGREE message; again ran the checklist. As we descended the Captain's airspeed indicator got as low as 40 KTS slower than my airspeed indicator and the standby airspeed indicator. We continued to descend via the arrival and shot the visual approach to Runway XXL with no other issues or incidents. B737 First Officer reported an airspeed split and Electronic Engine Controls both switching to alternate while in icing conditions.
Aircraft: A320
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

At cruise over ZZZ; Flight Attendant called to say lights in both aft lavs were flickering; [and] then went out. Emergency Exit light in aft lav was only light on; and too hot to touch. I passed information to Maintenance Controller and he suggested pulling Circuit Breaker (C/B) H7 on Captain's overhead panel that controls the three Emergency lights in three lavatories. I pulled C/B and had Flight Attendant check; hot light went out. All other operations normal; continued to destination. Maintenance Control suspected light batting [insulation]. Reporter stated the aft Flight Attendant called him after she started noticing an odor that smelled like overheated; melting plastic coming from one of the aft lavatory light fixtures on an A320 aircraft. Concerns about potential cabin smoke or fire developing could have been a greater issue if pulling the Circuit Breakers (C/B) for the aft lavatories Emergency Lights had not shut the lights off and stopped the odor. Captain on an A320 aircraft reports the aft Flight Attendant informed him of an odor that smelled like overheated; melting plastic coming from one of the Emergency light fixtures in the aft lavatory.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Enroute [while over the Pacific Ocean] I was notified by ATC and Dispatch of a SIGMET that had a report of Observed Severe Turbulence on our route and altitude. I attempted for one hour to get a new route north of the area or lower altitude below the reported/forecast area of turbulence. Approaching fix GITLE after ATC was only willing to let me offset 50 NM south into the forecast area to get a lower altitude and Dispatch was unable to get ATC to change my route; I [exercised my Captain's authority]. We turned 45 degrees north and offset 15 NM then descended to FL270. Then we returned to our route. FL270 was below the SIGMET area. I prepped the cabin for turbulence while we passed the area just in case. The flight was normal and ATC and Dispatch were advised. B737 Captain reported deviating around an area of reported severe turbulence on a trans-Pacific flight without ATC approval.
Aircraft: LIGHT TRANSPORT; LOW WING; 2 TURBOJET ENG
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict

Working Boeing sector stand-alone due to Flight Check aircraft maneuvering in the airspace. VFR; high volume and complexity. Aircraft X; landing BFI on the localizer for runway 13R at BFI. As I cleared Aircraft X for the visual approach; I called traffic on a VFR tag; Aircraft Y; at 2100 ft heading NE towards the final approach course for 13R. Aircraft X subsequently reported traffic in sight; but still encountered a TCAS-RA with respect to the VFR. The supervisor was immediately made aware of the TCAS-RA and Aircraft X continued on the visual approach without further incident.This is another report of a continued problem within our airspace. The VFR traffic crossed approximately 1 NM NW of ISOGE from the SW to the NE; directly through the final approach course 100 ft below; and then climbing through; our required crossing altitude at ISOGE on the ILS. A review of the FALCON replay indicated that before the VFR and Aircraft Y crossed paths; the separation was .71NM laterally and 600 ft vertically. Fortunately; Aircraft Y only climbed 100 ft in response to the TCAS-RA; because had the aircraft elected to execute a complete go-around it would have been much worse. The Seattle final was busy; there were aircraft on the downwind in the vicinity of Aircraft X; and a Flight Check aircraft doing arcs across the Seattle finals at 1900 ft in the Class Bravo airspace.Something needs to change. The VFR aircraft are transiting a very narrow; busy corridor of airspace and are doing so without any communication with ATC. It is simply unsafe. The VFR aircraft in this area at the very least need to be in communication with ATC so that we can assign; as necessary; altitude restrictions ensuring the safety of all the aircraft involved. The solution(s) are not hard and while they are potentially more restrictive to VFR aircraft the bottom line is that what happens day in and day out in that airspace as it exists and operates now will eventually result in a very bad accident. S46 TRACON Controller reported a VFR aircraft caused an airborne conflict north of the BFI area. This is a recurring issue.
Aircraft: GULFSTREAM IV / G350 / G450
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

As we were climbing through FL350; the cabin altitude started to climb. I put on my oxygen mask; contacted ATC and told them I needed to descend immediately. I was cleared to FL240. As the cabin altitude rapidly climbed through 14;000 FT I initiated an emergency descent; declared an emergency and requested a lower altitude. I was re-cleared to 11;000 FT. As a result of my rapid rate of descent; I descended 300 FT below my assigned altitude as I leveled off but immediately climbed back up to 11;000 where we were given a heading while we assessed the situation. None of the passengers or crew was injured. We cancelled the emergency and continued to our destination at a lower altitude. Closer to our destination we diverted to another airfield for maintenance. In the future I would try to start arresting my descent rate earlier in order not to descend below my assigned altitude. Today I realized the importance of the use of oxygen masks at high altitude and the training that we receive regarding emergency descents. I am very thankful for both. Without oxygen this situation could have ended up much worse. While making an emergency descent due to a loss of pressurization at FL350 the flight crew of a G-IV descended 300 FT below their cleared altitude of 11;000 MSL before recovering.
Aircraft: LIGHT TRANSPORT; LOW WING; 2 TURBOJET ENG
Phase of flight: Final Approach; Landing
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was the radar controller working an average session on sector 16; the Jackson Hole sector. Aircraft X was arriving to JAC; everything was a standard flight. At XX00 I cleared him for an RNAV Z approach for runway 19 into Jackson Hole. At XX+03 I terminated his radar and told him to contact tower at 118.07. He read that back correct. At XX+13 he came onto my frequency and said he just broke out 300 feet from surface and can see the airport. I was surprised to be talking to him; so I asked if that was Aircraft X. He said it was; I again told him to contact tower. I called tower about a minute later to inquire. They said they had never talked to him until he came over at XX+13 basically on the ground. Come to find out there was a snowplow on the runway and Aircraft X apparently came to a stop within 15 feet of the snowplow. I finished the session; and told management what happened. They reviewed the tape; and I did indeed tell him to contact tower on the correct frequency; and the pilot had a correct read back. I don't know what happened; whether the pilot forgot to contact tower; or tower couldn't hear him; who knows. But it could have been bad.Pilot should switch frequencies when told. Tower could advise center when snow plows are out; and maybe be more concerned if they haven't heard from an aircraft they know is landing soon. ZLC Controller reports of switching an aircraft over to Tower; then at 300 feet the aircraft reports to the Center Controller that he just broke out and can see the runway. Pilot did not switch to Tower frequency and landed on a runway with a snowplow on it.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

This event occurred due to the lack of experience and training by station personnel that are contracted out to do our ground operations in ZZZ. If the more experienced mainline ground personnel had been working they would have advised us of the device that was being loaded. In addition; ground personnel disconnected ground power without warning. This has become commonplace now as it seems that unqualified workers are routinely employed on the ramp. It is a safety sensitive position and not a minimum wage job.Today we started passenger boarding with a passenger that required an aisle chair. The Flight Attendant advised us that we would need an aisle chair; ramp; and wheelchair upon arrival. After the completion of loading the agent handed us a Cargo Load Report which included 16 Standard Checked Bags; 1 Heavy Bag; 4 Gate Checked Bags; and 39 lbs of Counter-to-Counter Small Package Shipment. The passenger count consisted of 15 adults; 7 children; and 1 infant. The Zero Fuel Weight was 31;577 lbs and the takeoff weight was calculated at 35;377 lbs with a pitch trim of 8 degrees. The flight was uneventful. After all passengers deplaned at our destination; we were waiting for an extended period of time for the aisle chair to arrive. Since all of the shutdown checklist items had been completed I decided to ground safe the aircraft and go outside to see what the situation was with the aisle chair. At this point I noticed the ground crew unloading a very large; and heavy; mobility aid for the aisle chair passenger. We are supposed to either use the actual weight of this device (if known) or the weight specified by the operations manual when calculating the weight and balance for the flight. Therefore the weight and balance was not properly calculated; but due to the light load and forward loading of the aircraft no limits were exceeded.Ground Support is not a minimum wage job and definitely should not have a high turnover. Experience and competence is very important and let us try to avoid a recurrence of a previous invalid loading implicated disaster. Unfortunately; since then; the airlines (business people...i.e. non-team players) have contracted out more and more ground support operations. An air carrier Captain expressed concern regarding the training and competence of contract ground service personnel.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway

We were taxiing in at PHL on taxiway E. We were told to enter the ramp at E5 we called ramp on 130.575 and asked for clearance in. The controller said to call the other ramp on 129.75 at spot 12. So we taxied to spot 12 and called the ramp. The controller on 129.75 said we were in the wrong spot and that we shouldn't have been in that spot. We were cleared into park and no issues arose from this. No traffic was near us on the ramp and the flight was completed successfully. The Ramp Controller informed us of our mistake and we accepted it. Confusing ATC instructions are what caused me to go to the spot without clearance. The PHL ramp controllers didn't make very clear instructions to us and I am new to PHL so I was unfamiliar. It does not seem like the ramp controllers talk to one another and it seemed like one controller cleared me into another ramp that they did not control. It was very confusing but again no issues arose from this and the flight was completed without any further issues. Air carrier Captain reported receiving conflicting and confusing taxi clearances from Ground Control and Ramp Control after landing at PHL.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

ATC issued reroutes from ZDV to BDL. It was my third straight day on this desk and that reroute had been out for all 3 days. I missed it on (flight#) resulting in a 4.4 arrival fuel. I told the crew once they entered ZMP center to request direct YYB. After Consulting with the Chief Dispatcher and ATC coordinator I advised the crew then to ask DCT NIPPY which ATC granted. Mistakes were made on both ends. The communication with Dispatch and Crew is one of the most important safety features we have. It broke down. Once the Crew asked me for the winds at FAR YQT YYB that was when I noticed I had them filed on the standard route. At that point I got the Chief and atc coordinators involved and asked the crew to request a dct routing to NIPPY resulting in about a 5.2 landing fuel. B737-700 Dispatcher reports not noting a NOTAMed airspace closure and files the standard route. This results in a reroute by ATC and landing with less than planned fuel.