Aryan95614/aerograph-asrs huggingface dataset:
Aircraft: B777
Phase of flight: unknown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

In a recent AOM revision the requirement to check the pilots' oxygen mask oxygen flow and mask microphone was removed from our normal operating procedures. I feel so strongly that a check of this critical piece of safe equipment is essential prior to every flight. Numerous fellow crew members and I have continued to do the check even though it's no longer SOP. On a recent international flight I discovered that my oxygen mask microphone was inoperative. I have no idea how many flights this aircraft had flown with this item being inoperative but it likely was many. Had an event occurred that required the oxygen masks to be donned the Captain would have had no way to establish crew communications; nor could he communicate with ATC as is required in several of our Emergency checklists. This would make a potentially difficult situation much more difficult and challenging; if not outright unsafe. A B-777 Captain addressed his disagreement with his airline's decision to no longer require flight crews to test the functionality of the crew oxygen mask flow and microphone. In support of his concern he detailed his discovery of an inoperative Oxygen mask microphone prior to an international flight.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

A flight was taxiing by on the taxiway. [It] had an audible fire warning and flames coming out of the number 1 engine. We called our Tower via radio and via phone to our Company Airlines Tower and told them the aircraft had a back fire or engine fire and to have it come back to the gate. Our request was ignored and the aircraft continued taxi to the runway for take off. We called our Tower again and were ignored again. The aircraft took off before anyone took our concern seriously. A Ramp Dispatcher reported they reported fire coming out of an aircraft's engine to their ramp controller who did not take action to notify the flight in a timely manner.
Aircraft: CRJ700
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Once the aircraft was parked; nose-gear secured with chocks and arrival hand signal given; ground power was connected and enabled. For almost 3 minutes; the flight crew left the #2 (right) engine running; even though customers were deplaning. The ramp crew was kept away from the aircraft; per SOP. The flight crew did not shut down this running engine until given the 'cut engine'; hand signal by me; the ramp supervisor. When given this hand signal; it took only about 15 seconds to cut the engine. Only then; did normal ramp servicing commence after the aircraft was safe to approach.Events like this are the norm; rather than the exception for CRJ-700 crews. Some engines are left running for 5+ minutes.Prolonging the engine shut-down time impacts both employee safety and operational performance. The long shutdown time and the time constraint of short ground times; leads to unsafe employee behavior of approaching the aircraft with a running engine; if not managed properly by the employees. The most effective risk control is to eliminate one or more threats. Following ramp SOP eliminates one threat; and changing shut-down procedures eliminates the other threat. Ramp Supervisor reported that their air carrier's CRJ-700 crews' seem to leave their right engine running long after ground power has been plugged in; jeopardizing ground safety.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

Passenger in [seat] X1 refused to wear a mask. Dispatch was notified. [Requested] aircraft [be met] upon arrival. Landed without further incident. I initially told Dispatch it was not a security threat level 1. I was in a busy part of the flight and did not have time to look it up. After landing; I reviewed the flight manual and realized it was a security threat level 1. Either way; all security threat level one procedures were followed. Air carrier Captain reported a passenger refused to comply with face mask policy.
Aircraft: C172
Phase of flight: Final Approach
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC

Instructor pilot was demonstrating a soft-field landing to the student (me). We were cleared for touch and goes on the right runway and we were on a right downwind. After turning right base the Instructor announced that he saw traffic for the left runway (the Cherokee; however we did not know aircraft type). After completing roll out onto final; Instructor and student noticed the traffic for the left was rapidly drifting toward us. Instructor turned right and descended rapidly. When I looked back at the other aircraft it was where we would have been if the Instructor had not taken evasive action. Aircraft Y started a gradual climbing left turn. Instructor then called Tower and asked; 'Were we supposed to follow another aircraft or were we cleared for touch and goes?' Tower replied; 'You are number one and cleared for touch and goes.' Instructor stated; 'Another aircraft just flew past us and we almost had a mid air.' Tower replied; 'Was the aircraft a low wing?' Instructor replied; 'Yes.' Tower responded; 'The aircraft was a Piper Cherokee and he was on the ILS for the left runway; he just reported going missed.' C172 student with instructor was turning final for the right runway and experiences a NMAC with a PA28 on the ILS for the left runway. The instructor takes evasive action and the PA28 goes around.
Aircraft: MEDIUM TRANSPORT; LOW WING; 2 TURBOPROP ENG
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft X after landing on Runway 22L in LFT; we were given taxi instructions by the Tower Controller to take J; then B; cross 11; hold short of 22R. We crossed 11; and then held short of 22R as instructed. We sat there for a short time waiting for a crossing clearance; but the Tower didn't say anything. There were no aircraft on final for either 22R or 4L; and there were literally no other aircraft on any taxiways; so the Captain prompted the Controller and asked if we could cross 22R. The Controller immediately said; 'Cross 22R/4L;' but he left off a call sign. So I asked if that transmission was for Aircraft X. He immediately responded by saying; 'Affirmative; cross 22R/4L [Company Name] (then some other call sign that wasn't ours).' As soon as we had heard 'affirmative' and 'cross 22R/4L' we had slowly started to roll across the hold lines; but we stopped as soon as the wrong call sign was said (our nose was across the hold lines at this point). I queried the Controller and asked him to confirm that the crossing clearance was indeed for Aircraft X; and he said that it was. So we continued to cross and proceeded to the ramp with no further issues. The Controller had nothing further to say. We wanted to file the ASAP because of the fact that we had crossed the hold line prior to hearing our actual call sign (even though it was clearly intended for us; and I think the Controller just got our numbers mixed up with the flight that was still parked at one of the jetways). As I mentioned; there were literally no other aircraft on any of the taxiways.Threats: Controller not using the call sign to begin the radio transmission; instead; putting it at the end. Error: We started to roll as soon as we heard; 'Affirmative; cross 22R/4L.' Undesired state: Being across the hold line until we got the call sign issue worked out. I'm always quite cautious about making sure the correct callsign is used and all instructions are correct over the radio. That being said; as soon as the Controller responded to our direct question with the; 'Affirmative; cleared to cross 22R/4L' part; I knew he was talking to us. Still we must always make sure to hear the correct callsign before following Controller instructions. In this case; the Controller was indeed talking to us and made a mistake using the wrong call sign; but I realize that in some instances; that may not be the case. So we must always pay attention to the call sign. Pilot at LFT airport reports of bad communication procedures at the airport that they thought almost caused them to be part of a runway incursion.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Upon arriving for my 3rd bank trip of the morning to find no equipment prepared; I proactively began gate set up and prep work for a trip with a large outbound total. During the trip; at departure time; we received about 10 more last minute bags. I instructed my wing walkers to do a walk around while I scanned and closed out the trip. As the walk around was finishing; I got in the tug to push and try to ensure an on time departure. With my walk around complete; maintenance standing there and a supervisor present; I did not touch check my tow bar connections as is my routine pushback procedure. (I had connected it improperly). Upon pushback; the aircraft broke away from the push tug and travelled about 5-10 feet disconnected. I immediately contacted the pilot and instructed him to apply the brakes on the aircraft. We set the brakes; re-connected the towbar; continued the push. During the following push back; while straightening the aircraft; the shear pin snapped and I once again immediately halted the push. I contacted maintenance; to ensure no aircraft damage (the aircraft checked out as ok and departed). I then immediately reported the incident to my supervisor. Pushback tug operator reported several problems during pushback procedure that resulted from deviation from ramp safety SOP.
Aircraft: SMALL TRANSPORT
Phase of flight: Landing
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Equipment Issue

Approached Runway 28 into GMU and had the Pilot Monitoring turn the pilot controlled lighting up to max (7 clicks). The runway lights for Runway 28 did not appear to turn on. The approach was continued to 500 feet at which point a go around was executed. We joined the traffic pattern and landed on Runway 1. A third check of the NOTAMs showed that there were no NOTAMs identifying the runway as closed or showing the runway lights as out of service. After landing; we learned that several aviation [websites] such as airnav.com and skyvector.com contain this remark: ATC-CTL. WHEN ATCT CLSD ACTVT MALSF RWY 01; REIL RWY 19; HIRL RWY 01/19; PERIMETER LGTS H1; H2 - CTAF. However; the FAA Chart Supplement contains this remark: ACTIVATE perimeter lights H1 and H2--CTAF. Of note; this is listed only as a Heliport Remark; not in the general remarks for the airport. Thus; it appears that the Runway 28 lights cannot be controlled using Pilot Controlled Lighting procedures on the CTAF frequency; however; there is incomplete information is the FAA Chart Supplement. We recommend that the FAA Chart Supplement be updated with the correct information. Also; consider adding the pilot controlled lighting limitations information to the Airfield Sketch and on the Runway 28 Approach Plate; as these products are much more likely to be referenced by a flight crew while in flight. A pilot landing at GMU airport after the Tower closed reported the Runway 28 lights cannot be activated from the aircraft. This information is not published on the FAA approach charts or airfield diagram.
Aircraft: BONANZA 36
Phase of flight: Landing
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

I was flying VFR with flight following to TMB at 2;000 feet. I asked approach for an RNAV 9R approach and received a clearance for that approach. I was on an assigned heading of 180 and was approaching the extended center line of the runway and waiting for the approach controller to give me a turn inbound; but felt he had forgotten about me and so I asked for a turn inbound. Approach gave me the inbound turn and instructed me to contact TMB tower; which I immediately did. The local controller at TMB told me I should have contacted him before entering the TMB Class D airspace. Assuming (without knowing) I entered TMB's Class D airspace before contacting the local controller; it seems to me the approach controller should have coordinated with TMB local controller. I was communicating with the appropriate ATC controller if I entered Class D airspace before contacting TMB tower. I so advised the local controller. Pilot reported being chastised by tower for entering Class Delta. Pilot was under flight following from Approach Control and told to contact Tower.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Final Approach; Initial Approach
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Shortly after being given a vector to intercept the localizer inbound on the ILS 26L into Ontario; CA my First Officer advised me that he saw a drone pass under our right wing. I never saw the drone; but immediately after being notified from the First Officer I reported the sighting to ATC (Approach Control). No evasive maneuvers were needed; nor any deviations from ATC instruction were needed. Drone came within 10-20 ft. from striking aircraft. Airline Captain reported NMAC with a UAV during the turn to final approach.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

We were taxiing to Runway 8 via Q to hold short of Q2. We were then instructed to taxi to Runway 8 and hold short on the right side of the pad. We initially stopped short of the proper hold line; but then saw the other hold short line closer to Runway 8. I started to taxi towards the next hold short line so I could be in the right side of the holding pad. A better instruction would have been to turn right and hold short of Runway 8 on P. At the time I felt I was still on the taxiway and needed to proceed into the pad area. Air Carrier Captain reports a runway incursion due to confusion over which hold line is the proper line to hold short of.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Object

On taxiout of the gate I made a left turn onto Charlie eastbound when two containers were blown off a truck by a B767 that was parking at the adjacent concourse. One struck the side of our aircraft. We shut down the engines and were towed back to the gate. There were no injuries. As they departed the gate the flight crew of a B737 noted that two containers blown off a truck by an aircraft parking across the alley from them bounced toward them and at least one struck their aircraft. They returned to the gate for inspection.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

After our initial descent out of cruise and before the outer marker; it became busy but manageable. We were doing well. Situational awareness; comm cadence; alertness; all quality high end work being done. Being sequenced behind two heavy B777's; so LA center and SoCal App were focused on us. From top of descent it started. 6 speed changes; one runway change; 3 descend via clearances after being vectored off the HLYWD 1 STAR; multiple altitude and heading changes; all programmed into the FMC for the 'highest mode of autopilot automation' that training taught us.However; one got away from us and we didn't catch it until ATC told us to level off at FL230. As the FMC was being updated with a new set of clearance instructions; the jet began a 1000 fpm rate of descent. I looked up and both of us verified the AVATR crossing between FL190-FL240. The problem was that we were 3 NM from BRUEN at FL240; when the jet started down. That crossing is FL240-FL300. Neither of us caught it and neither of us thought the jet was doing something we didn't want it to do. We are still not sure why this descent started nor did we investigate. I focused completely on the STAR crossing restrictions and QUIT with 'highest mode of operation' while on an RNAV STAR. I was vectored off the arrival and given several descents putting us below VNAV path. We were given direct a point on the arrival and a descend via instruction at FL240. The point after the point I was cleared direct to contained an at or above FL240. When we dialed down the altitude to the lowest altitude of the arrival VNAV was not in path and began a cruise descent going below FL240. We were then told to maintain FL230 till past that point and then cleared for the approach. B737 flight crew reported an arrival to LAX requiring multiple arrival changes; resulting in one crossing restriction that was missed.
Aircraft: SAIL PLANE
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I and the pilot of the second glider briefed our cross country flight with the understanding that we would maintain 100 meter separation with each other ideally off to one side to double our chances of finding optimal thermals. I received the communication 'I am following you' as we began our northeast leg at about 13;500 MSL. Reliable communication between gliders was apparent on glider air-to-air frequency during this leg of about 80 KM. After I announced 'now we are heading west' after our turn point from the 050 heading; I heard no further communication from the other glider; nor acknowledgement of my broadcast. About seven minutes later; I scanned to my right; commenced a thermalling turn to the right and found myself in hazardous proximity to the second glider. I immediately flew back to our departure airport; concerned that my fellow glider pilot had a physical or aircraft problem that precluded his answering my several subsequent radio calls. Soon after the hazardous proximity event; I noted his aircraft straight and level; but then lost visual contact with his glider for the remainder of my flight. As he did not respond to my calls; and I had no further visual contact with that aircraft; I broadcast on 121.5 a mayday concerning the lost or somehow disable aircraft. I received no response on 121.5. I landed routinely 20 minutes later; and the other glider only a minute later. After examining my glider on the ground; it was learned that the speaker connection had failed sometime before the northwest turn point; so I could hear no transmissions. I was unaware that the other glider had broadcasted that it was flying at various times at my 3:00; 6:00; and 9:00 positions to accomplish photos of my glider. His broadcasts; I later learned on the ground; had requested that I maintain straight and level flight while he flew nearby; but these broadcasts were neither heard nor acknowledged. For me the lessons have been:1. any transmission not acknowledged has not been heard.2. team flying should be conducted as per ground briefing agreements which should include contingency plans for lost radio communication.3. formation flying of any type should never be undertaken without reliable communication between aircraft. 4. see and avoid remains paramount in VMC flight; and team flying or contest flying gliders should be equipped with a rear view mirror within the canopy to allow sighting of aircraft directly behind and overhead.5. any aerial photography should not be done by pilot flying.6. equipment such as radios or speakers or microphone may fail in-flight despite proper operation before launch and during a portion of the flight. Glider pilot reports lost communication with his wingman during a cross country formation flight. Unable to communicate or see his wingman; a turn is initiated resulting in a NMAC.
Aircraft: B777
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Aircraft X was given the restriction 'Cross RODYY at and maintain flight level 280' and he read back what from my understanding was 'Cross RODYY at and maintain flight level 280.' However because of his thick accent I was unable to hear that he actually said LOLLY which is a fix further down the line on the arrival he was flying. This happens all the time because there are so many foreign pilots that fly this arrival. Their read back sounds correct to us but because of their accent we are not hearing them correctly. RODYY and LOLLY sound alike in an Asian accent.I would recommend to change the name of the fix RODYY to something that is very different from any other fix on the IGN arrival and make sure it sounds different with foreign accents. ZBW Controller reported of a problem with similar sounding fixes. Pilot with a foreign accent read back a fix further down than what the Controller stated. Controller stated this is a problem that happens all the time.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

We had been cruising at FL370 for almost an hour. We were with Jacksonville Center on frequency 135.62. At about 86 NM south of CAMJO - proceeding direct; we received a TCAS traffic advisory. While decreasing the range scale on the Navigation Display and trying to acquire the traffic; the advisory transitioned to a TCAS Climb RA. At the same time; Jacksonville Center told 'Aircraft Y [we were Aircraft X] to turn 50 degrees right. We were already performing the TCAS RA maneuver as this call came in. Clear of conflict came about 37;700 and we smoothly transitioned back to FL370. Jacksonville pointed out additional traffic above us to our left as we transitioned back to our assigned altitude and cleared us back to direct CAMJO. Jacksonville was told on the radio of us responding to a TCAS RA. Dispatch was contacted by ACARS to report the event. ATC doing more with less during the pandemic.Controllers should only work a single frequency. We had been cruising at FL370 for almost an hour. We were with Jacksonville Center on frequency 135.62. About 86 NM south of CAMJO - proceeding direct; we received a TCAS traffic advisory. While decreasing the range scale on the ND and trying to acquire the traffic; the advisory transitioned to a TCAS Climb RA. At the same time; Jacksonville Center told Aircraft Y to turn 50 degrees right. We were already performing the TCAS RA maneuver as this call came in. Clear of conflict came about 37;700 and we smoothly transitioned back to FL370.Jacksonville pointed out additional traffic above us to our left as we transitioned back to our assigned altitude and cleared us back to direct CAMJO. Jacksonville was told on the radio of us responding to a TCAS RA. Dispatch was contacted by ACARS to report the event. A report was filed. Air carrier flight crew reported an airborne conflict resulting in a TCAS RA.