Aryan95614/aerograph-asrs huggingface dataset:
Aircraft: EMBRAER UNDIFFERENTIATED OR OTHER MODEL
Phase of flight: Taxi; Parked
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Event occurred during a quick turn. Due to ATC delays in the Northeast; we were delayed. I'm all for a quick turn and hustle; but after requesting crew meals that weren't boarded and seeing the cabin a disaster with an open wine bottle; trash everywhere; debris/crumbs on seats and carpet and then the concern [of] numerous life vest misplaced; I instructed the gate to stop boarding. The safety vest around a dozen plus were stuffed in a seat back pockets; sidewalls; overheads and everywhere in between. This is a cleaning function. Cleaners might have come but didn't have time to do their job correctly and more than likely were rushed off the airplane to facilitate turn stats for LGA operations. We are having immense issues with a Maintenance Operations Manager in LGA. My issue is the aircraft wasn't airworthy and therefore until corrected I wasn't boarding let alone departing. That's when the mob of suits and radios showed up as if in a show of force. The Maintenance Operations Manager showed up in my flight deck. I didn't know who the hell these people were but I explained my issue. The response; still very crisp and clear and concise was heard by the purser. 'Our concerns as managers is customer reliability not safety.' [This] blew my socks off. Then she heckled me telling 'You know I know your Chief Pilot really well.' The intent of the harassment was clear and continued. 'How long have you been here?' Why does any of this matter? I'm the Captain; fix my issues; and we can board. The culture is certainly changing at [the company]. This event pissed me off so much that it became a further safety issue as it dominated the work environment for the entire flight causing a huge threat. Get these Maintenance Operations Manager out of the cockpit; let the gate agents do their jobs; let the cleaners do their jobs; let the catering do their jobs; [and] let me do my job without interruption. Pilot harassment and pilot pushing will not be tolerated; regardless how long you have been here at [the company]; whether you know my boss or not and regardless of who you are in the company management chain. [The cause of the event is that the] culture of safety [was put] second and operation first. [We had to] get the turn times and on time so the management can get their bonuses meanwhile safety is being compromised. Passenger comfort and product perception is thrown in the garbageAwareness and the FAA to start stepping up and look into LGA and other various issues with management and safety. ERJ Captain reported the aircraft cabin had not been cleaned and Station Management did not agree with the Captain's assessment.
Aircraft: NO AIRCRAFT
Phase of flight: unknown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I came in for duty on my regularly scheduled shift. I called the Supervisor on duty for a position assignment. The Supervisor asked if I had worked the position yet with the radar in the fused mode. I told him that I had not and I was not aware of any changes that might have occurred at that position. He instructed me to grab the read and initial binder; take it with me to the position; and read all of the new changes and separation minima required to work that position while on that position. Apparently; there is a new radar site that allows the facility to have radar coverage in an area we previously did not. In doing so; it changed the way we see the targets and requires us to have different separation minima. The supervisor is notorious for poorly managing a shift rotation and controllers tend to be left on position consistently over two hours. This was the case; again; when I came in for duty. The supervisor was in what appeared to be in a panic-like state; and wanted me on the position so the previous controller did not work too long past two hours. I believe that we consistently work with minimum staffing on [some] nights without overtime being considered. With more people assigned to the shift; the Supervisor on duty will be able to accomplish extra duties like having the controllers read and initial pertinent information. I think an emphasis on communication would greatly enhance this facility. I believe that a new radar site with new separation minima is quite substantial; yet I had no idea this had happened; nor had I known until I signed on and began working this position with the requirement of reading the several page information binder detailing the changes. A TRACON Controller reported not recieving any instructions or briefing about a new radar site and a significant radar software system upgrade including new separation standards prior to its implementation.
Aircraft: SKYLANE 182/RG TURBO SKYLANE/RG
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Flying my 182 from ZZZ to an avionics shop in ZZZ1 to correct autopilot issues. The weather was unsettled - standard late afternoon 'pop up' convection in the greater [city] area. I decided to fly south around the west side of [the city] since the weather looked best in that area. Immediately after departing I received an indication that my panel GPS was not receiving signal. I had reviewed Airport; Obstacle; TFR; and ARTCC NOTAMS but did not see any indication of expected GPS signal loss. Given the recent challenges with my autopilot - I considered that perhaps this was yet another 'issue' with my avionics. Initially - I knew the area well enough to navigate by sight (while heading SW) but I then turned on my Stratus and connected to my iPad that I keep for back up to regain situational awareness of my location. At this point my altitude was level at 3200 ft MSL and I decided to turn south flying under the 4000 foot base of the Bravo airspace. As I continued on the heading I noticed some convection forming and decided to lower my altitude to 3000 ft MSL and fly right around the corner of the Bravo shelf that sits at 3000 MSL. At this point; still about 8-10 miles from ZZZZZ I got another 'lost GPS signal' from my panel and immediately reverted to my Status/iPad combination which appeared to be working. A few minutes later - the panel GPS returned and my iPad 'flashed' and showed me approximate 2-4 miles at the Bravo 3000 ft MSL shelf. I immediately reduced altitude to 2800 ft and continued to fly out from under the shelf to the 4000 ft MSL Bravo shelf and then on to ZZZ2 where I landed. It is unclear if I in fact 'busted' the Bravo or not - it was certainly very close. I'll also mentioned that I left ZZZ2 in a different airplane headed east about 1 hour later and it initially had GPS reception challenges as well - so perhaps something was going on with the GPS network. In reflection - it is clear that I've been very comfortable with technology based navigation - and did not think to use pilotage as a backup for electronic navigation. It is also worth noting that I was flying after a full day of work; still distracted from work issues; and flying in stressful weather conditions as well - and was not as fresh as I should have been for this flight. Cessna 182 pilot reported experiencing intermittent 'lost GPS signal' alerts while attempting to avoid Class B airspace and significant weather.
Aircraft: GULFSTREAM V / G500 / G550
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

Aircraft X en-route to ZZZ from ZZZZ at FL430. The autopilot and auto throttles were engaged. Suddenly and without warning; the right engine began to experience high vibration and excessive EGT simultaneously a red message blinked momentarily on CAS RT fuel pressure low. I looked up to ensure all pumps were on and they were on; I went to reach for the QRH; when the Pilot Flying and I heard multiple loud bangs; the throttles split and the right throttle moved to full forward. Airplane yawed significantly as if an engine had rolled back or failed; in that moment we were not sure and began to assess the situation. As a precaution; I; the Pilot Not-Flying; engaged both air start ignitions. The pilot flying disconnected the auto throttles and retarded the right throttle manually. The red CAS message extinguished.We [advised ATC] and initiated a descent while diverting to ZZZZ1 as a precautionary measure and landed uneventfully.After the aircraft was parked; the pax were briefed and they were happy to be safely on the ground; however; one pax began to experience a panic attack. Paramedics were called and she was examined on board and was found to be in good health. All pax deplaned on their own and went into the FBO to clear Customs. All other pax reported to be doing very well. GIV Captain reported sudden multiple right engine malfunctions including high vibrations; excessive EGT; plus other indications; accompanied with aircraft yaw.
Aircraft: B717 (FORMERLY MD-95)
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Level at FL260. Midway between ZZZ and ZZZ1 we felt a pressure bump and very soon after the CABIN RATE EAD alert illuminated. While I was running that checklist the CABIN ALTITUDE EAD alert illuminated. We donned our oxygen masks; ran the appropriate emergency checklist and performed an emergency descent per the CABIN RATE emergency checklist. We [Requested Priority Handling]; diverted to ZZZ2; and landed without further incident. Maintenance informed that a section of ducting in the tailcone separated. Maintenance also advised that there was a CPC fault detected in the FMS MAINT review. B717 Captain reported a CABIN RATE EAD alert related to duct failure led to a diversion to an alternate airport.
Aircraft: HELICOPTER
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

GPS accuracy issue. I was notified I had appeared in the airspace of STS during IFR/IMC; and was asked to leave which I did promptly. Helicopter pilot reported mistakenly flying into STS Class D airspace due to a GPS accuracy error.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Takeoff / Launch
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

An aircraft was on a three-mile final for our Runway 31C. Aircraft Y was cleared for takeoff on 31C. Immediately after that; while Aircraft Y was barely moving; we where cleared for takeoff with a heading of 010 degrees that we both heard and confirmed with each other. The heading seemed odd at the time; but we where both distracted by checking to see if Aircraft Y was wheels up yet on 31C. He was not by the time we were in position for takeoff and we delayed a few seconds until he lifted off. Once airborne; the First Officer (FO) turned to 010 heading and I contacted Departure. We did hit prior aircraft's wake turbulence that was an additive. When I contacted Departure; the FO stated my comment panel was still on intercoms. Once I changed over; Departure asked what heading we were assigned. I told him 010; which again felt weird. Departure told us to turn to 110 and we complied. We were cleared into position 31C with an aircraft on 2.5 to 3 mile final. Aircraft Y had just taken off; and we were cleared for takeoff with Aircraft Y still on takeoff roll; this surprised us. We were given a heading of 010 as we lined up on runway and exchanged controls. Shortly after starting the turn; we hit wake off of Aircraft Y close ahead of us. It was a flaps 25 takeoff so we were also busy with cleaning the configuration; turning; leveling off and contacting Departure. In the turn we contacted Departure. As we rolled out I realized something was wrong. In my head I heard 010; and 010 was set and confirmed; but mentally I was thinking we were turning to 110 per normal operations. I was surprised when we reached the heading bug so quickly; and knew something was off. Departure gave us the 110 heading and we complied. B737 flight crew reported a track deviation occurred following a misunderstood ATC clearance.
Aircraft: B787
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

We were flight planned for the [arrival into ZZZ.] This was entered and verified in the FMC prior to pushback. We received our PDC (Pre-Departure Clearance) 30 minutes prior to push and it stated 'DIRECT ZZZ' removing the [arrival name.] This took us several minutes to decipher; since the PDC formatting for route changes is so incredibly difficult to read and understand; especially in the cockpit just prior to push with all the typical distractions going on. The filed route should not be included; just the changes. In fact the only thing a PDC with changes to the routing should be the cleared route; nothing else.The CA (Captain) was thankfully suspicious of what was eventually going to happen on departure; so we did not do a route copy after loading the new route; ensuring the [original arrival] was left in the FMC.Takeoff was uneventful and as suspected we were cleared by Departure direct to ZZZZZ to then the [arrival into ZZZ] as originally filed. So the whole event was an exercise in confusing the flight crew. Well it didn't work; since the CA was ready for ATC. Pilots 1; ATC 0.In all seriousness; the formatting of a PDC changing the routing need to be addressed. Ever since the PDC program first started in the 90s (has it been that long?!) PDCs with a changed routing have included the filed route. Why? Once a clearance change has been made the filed routing is just a distracter with no bearing on the flight anymore. I know this has been the subject of numerous reports.Reformat the PDC. B787 First Officer reported that PDC clearances are confusing and should be reformatted.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Takeoff / Launch
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

I was the pilot in command. A high-speed reject was accomplished at or near 110 knots. ATC was notified of the rejected takeoff; aircraft was slowed to a safe speed; and we exited the runway at the first available high-speed exit. All required calls were made and the QRH was referenced. After contacting the flight attendants it was determined that we could move the aircraft. We notified ATC that no assistance would be required and asked to return to the gate. B737 Captain reported a high-speed rejected takeoff.
Aircraft: DHC8
Phase of flight: Initial Climb
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

During the initial climb I noticed the Number 1 engine oil pressure fluctuating lower than normal. By 1;500 FT HAT it became apparent that it was trending below the green arc. All other engine indications were normal. For a bit the oil pressure seemed to settle down in the green arc and we thought it might have been an abnormality with the oil pressure indication. We decided to be on the safe side and return to the field just in case. We advised ATC that we'd like to return; but at this point no emergency existed. ATC turned us to a downwind and we started preparing for landing. We made a quick PA to advice of the precautionary return and also let the flight attendants know. We reviewed the Low Oil Pressure checklist. Just about the point ATC started turning us on base leg for landing the oil pressure started trending down again; this time well below the green arc. We decided to actually run the Low Oil Pressure checklist which leads to feathering the prop. Because the pressure was not below 44 PSI; we did not shut down the engine. Because of the compression of time; we did not run the single engine landing checklist. An uneventful landing was performed and we were able to keep our taxi speed such that I felt fine clearing all runways and taxiing to the gate. A Q400 Captain reported low Number 1 engine oil pressure that led to feathering the prop and returning to departure airport.
Aircraft: SMALL TRANSPORT; LOW WING; 2 TURBOJET ENG
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Upon IFR departure from SJT tried to pickup IFR clearance from both FSS frequency listed and DFW frequency. Unable to get clearance on ground. At this time local Tower and Approach/Departure Control had closed. [I] decided to depart VFR and pick up clearance in the air. It was a clear night with no reported traffic so departed VFR off of Runway 18. Set initial climb alt to 17;500 ft. At about 10 NM noticed alert from iPad that TFR was ahead. Ended up clipping NW corner. As soon as error was noticed immediate corrective action was taken to clear TFR. Time in TFR estimated at less than 20 seconds. Tower/Approach states 'When you're talking with us; you can proceed through the TFR.' We are normally talking to ATC; and routinely fly through the TFR without thinking about it - developed complacency toward the TFR. Tower/Approach control had just closed. Just before Tower closed; we heard an arriving aircraft ask about the TFR; and Tower reported that the area was not in-use and allowed the aircraft to fly through the TFR.Was unable to reach FSS or Center on the ground to open flight plan/talk to ATC. Elected to depart VFR and pick up IFR enroute.Had TFR displayed on moving maps on both iPads. Did not get our attention (factors: complacency mentioned above; fatigue after long flying day; just a ferry home). The TFR should have been displayed graphically on the aircraft's moving map; but the XM weather subscription recently expired. 'TFR' option was selected for display but not receiving XM data.Saw another aircraft in TFR; didn't occur to us it was a military drone until they called on radio. Having never operated there at night; maybe had assumption they wouldn't be flying when Tower closed. Captain of a corporate jet reported a TFR violation occurred in part because their XM subscription had expired.
Aircraft: CRJ700
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Event occurred due to a door seal failing and the pressure inside the cabin putting too much stress on the seal.On the previous flight the flight attendant complained that the main passenger door was louder than usual in flight. After landing I went out to inspect the door and found nothing wrong.After leaving ZZZ we were climbing through about FL190 when an extremely loud noise started. I was loud enough that it was difficult to hear the radios through the headsets. The Flight Attendant immediately called up to the flight deck to tell us that it was the door that was making the noise. We stopped climbing at FL200 and pressurization seemed to be holding. The First Officer and I discussed returning to ZZZ and decided that it would be the best course of action for safety; due to the possibility of loss of pressurization; and passenger comfort; due to the noise.We notified ATC of our intent; followed by Dispatch then the Flight Attendant and passengers. As we descended the noise seemed to decrease; and we were able to hold on the Runway 26 approach course while we burned enough fuel to get below landing weight. Once on the ground we returned to the gate; deplaned and called Maintenance. The mechanic found that the door seal had separated from the door from around halfway down the aircraft front side; around the first step and about a quarter of the way up the back.After replacing the seal and running multiple pressurization tests the seal was continuing to pop out of place.After the loud noise inbound to ZZZ; I could have called Maintenance even though I was unable to determine that anything was wrong. CRJ-700 Captain reported a door seal failure during climb that resulted in excessive noise and loss of pressurization.
Aircraft: LIGHT TRANSPORT
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

While on a shallow VMC descent into the LBE area; Johnstown Approach advised us of King Air traffic at our 1-2 o'clock position. We advised 'traffic in sight' and the Controller responded with 'maintain visual separation.' Continuing our descent; the light twin also advised 'traffic in sight;' and again the Controller responded with 'maintain visual separation on the jet.' While monitoring our TCAS display; I recognized the necessity to increase our rate of descent; but the system still barked an advisory command. It was evident that we were on a converging course; something NOT conveyed to us by the Controller. Accepting the separation command; we essentially exonerated the Controller of all responsibility. It would have been nice to know initially the degree of threat the light twin actually was. In the future I will NOT call traffic in sight descending into this area; relinquishing my protection. I'm surprised the Controller did not advise the degree of threat posed by the twin. Both aircraft were issued 'maintain visual separation' and both aircraft accepted. Never did Johnstown mention that the aircraft would be converging. As we descended; it became apparent that we were converging with the twin. The PF acknowledged this and increased his descent rate. As the courses converged; the twin asked Johnstown if the jet was descending and Johnstown acknowledged that we were descending. At some point; the TCAS sounded and was giving RA instructions. The PF continued his descent knowing that there was no substantial risk of collision and the twin was in visual contact the whole time. A Corporate jet crew and light twin pilot both asked JST Approach about mutual traffic and were told to maintain visual but neither was advised of their converging tracks which resulted in the jet crew taking evasive action.
Aircraft: SR22
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

I took the sector with Aircraft X on route through the airspace at 16;000 feet. Our highest MVA (Minimum Vectoring Altitude) is 16;600 feet. The aircraft continued on route and the next sector gave a control instruction to have the aircraft climb which I issued. I lapsed and didn't think about the MVA at all. The aircraft climbed and was handed off to the next sector. The aircraft was about 10 miles and 1;495 feet away from the highest obstical in the MVA block.I am mostly irritated at myself for both missing the error and not taking action to fix the problem immediately myself. Normally I am hyper aware of MVAs yet this happened. I will be seeing about placing a memory aid on my settings as this is not something we deal with very often. In addition; I will not forget this anytime soon and will not let it happen again. A TRACON Controller reported they forgot to issue a climb clearance to an aircraft and it flew below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude.