Aryan95614/aerograph-asrs huggingface dataset:
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Flying at FL240 in and out of IMC with Pack 1 MEL'd. We were in the process of getting coffee from the Flight Attendant when the First Officer and I both felt a change in cabin pressure. The First Officer locked the door and we both noted the rapidly climbing cabin (it was in red in a matter of seconds). Neither of us recall the rate at which the cabin was climbing but we both agree it was very; very fast. The Flight Attendant was still on the phone since we had just closed the door and told us the masks had deployed. I told her to use the mask as well as the passengers and to be seated as we are going to descend. The First Officer and I donned our masks; notified ATC of the pressure loss and emergency descent. We squawked 7700 and I initiated the descent almost immediately since the cabin was so high and the pressure was very uncomfortable. I didn't slow to 240 KTS to wait for the gear extension prior to starting down. I just wanted to get the aircraft down since I knew the passengers were without the benefit of 100% oxygen and the cabin was lost. Midway through the descent I noticed the Pack 2 valve closed EICAS message. During the descent I called for the emergency descent QRC. It was then that I had slowed enough to drop the gear and continue the descent. During the descent we encountered ice and got the bleed low temp message since we were at idle. Once leveled off at 10;000 FT and reconfigured; Pack 2 was reset and began pressurizing again. I checked in with the Flight Attendant to make sure everyone was OK. She seemed shaken up but assured me everything was fine. I informed her that we were at 10;000 FT and oxygen was no longer necessary. We told ATC the emergency was over and everything was stable. We squawked our original beacon code. After conferring with Dispatch and Maintenance we decided the fuel load was sufficient to continue to destination at 10;000 FT. I didn't want to climb again even though the pack was working again since the oxygen generators had already been used and I didn't think the passengers wanted to experience that again if it were to happen. I feel that the aircraft cabin climbed much faster than I was ever led to believe it would if I were to loose both packs. I was taught the outflow valve would close and there would be a slow leak giving us time to get down to 10;000 FT. This event seemed more like a rapid decompression rather than a slow loss of pressurization. I would like to see the maintenance data that shows the climb rate of the cabin as well as how high it got. Also; the QRC memory items for emergency descent seem fine on the ground but in practice waiting for the aircraft to slow; drop the gear; and then begin the descent seems like a long time with a very high cabin. EMB145 Captain experiences a rapid decompression at FL240 when the Number 2 pack shuts down after being dispatched with the Number 1 pack inoperative. The descent is initiated without extending the landing gear as required by the QRC. Flight continues to destination at 10;000 FT although the crew is able to reestablish pack operation.
Aircraft: SMALL TRANSPORT; LOW WING; 2 TURBOJET ENG
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

I set up an approach in the recently installed IFMS system. The approach was input for the ILS 20 at CDC using MEGGI as the IAF. For some reason the IFMS system was anticipating a steep turn for the outbound leg of the approach. The Center Controller commented that it was showing south [me] of course; which I acknowledged. He continued to press me on the variance to direct. I acknowledged that I was seeing the same thing and finally just asked him to cancel that approach and take me to MLF (Milford) for the Milford Transition to the ILS. That is when the problems got bad; I could not get the previous inserted approach out of the IFMS system to input a new one. It was not allowing me to remove the old (I am sure it is my lack of experience with the 'button-ology'). The Controller was frustrated as was I; so I finally asked for Vectors to MLF. He continued to tell me how far off course I was; and asking if I was navigating to MLF. I told him I was trying. I continued to ask for vectors and the Controller continued to tell me how far my variance was to the correct course. Our communication was not working well. In the end I arrived at MLF and made the turn back to the 154 to VELDE; again requesting vectors. The Controller continued to give me my variance; but never once (to my memory) gave me a vector to my needed waypoint. I finally arrived at VELDE and began the approach; when the Controller told me to break off the approach and climb to 14;000 FT. I declined. I had used up much of my reserve in the process of finding my way to MLF and back to VELDE. I told him I was low on fuel and was going to make the approach. He then cleared me for the approach and I successfully flew the approach under less than ideal conditions. I experienced ice; turbulence; and 35 KTS gusting winds.My error was not knowing the IFMS system as well as I should have. I did not know how to get rid of the incorrect information on the screen and in the system to re-input the correct information. My only complaint was the Controller's lack of willingness to give vectors as requested. I have only had one other situation when I needed the 'urgent help' of a controller. A Center Controller calmly talked me through a bad case of vertigo. He saved my life. This Controller was less than empathetic or helpful. Pilot of a small jet experienced course deviations on the ILS2 Approach to CDC due to unfamiliarity with a newly installed IFMS system and apparent lack of assistance from ATC.
Aircraft: A319
Phase of flight: Other Rejected Takeoff
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

We were in position on the runway; initially with a Lineup and Wait clearance; when we received takeoff clearance. My Captain was Pilot Flying. As he began to advance the thrust levers for takeoff we received an ECAM Caution message F/CTL ELAC 2 PITCH FAULT (Flight Control Elevator and Aileron Computer). Thrust was still spooling up to 50% on the initial setting and we slowly had begun to roll not quite up to a normal taxi speed. The Captain retarded thrust levers to idle and I notified tower of our problem as well as the need to taxi off the runway. Tower cleared us to taxi off the runway where we stopped; discussed the message; and ran our QRH procedure. My Captain also contacted [Maintenance Control] for concurrence as we conducted the QRH procedure. This directed us to perform a reset of the system. This reset successfully cleared the Fault; the Captain entered an INFO ITEM in the AML (Airplane Maintenance Log) indicating as such at the direction of [Maintenance Control]; and we then continued by performing a successful takeoff with no further issues.The sole issue in this instance is a Flight Control Computer Fault which was successfully cleared via a QRH-directed reset procedure. I believe we handled this properly in accordance with FOM; OM Vol 1; and QRH procedures. The problem was due to a Computer Fault causing us to reject the takeoff. A319 First Officer reported rejected takeoff.
Aircraft: AMATEUR/HOME BUILT/EXPERIMENTAL
Phase of flight: Takeoff / Launch
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Object; Ground Excursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Object

After an aborted takeoff; student incorrectly applied power to aircraft and failed to correct for left turning tendencies allowing aircraft to veer off runway into the grass and knocked over an airport sign and runway light. Student failed and refused to relinquish throttle to me (CFI); my application of brakes and rudder were ineffective in trying to overpower the student's applications. Damage [was] only to skin of leading edge of the starboard wing from impact with the sign. No power plant/prop or landing gear damage. Airport manager has students' aircraft insurance information for claim and repair of sign and light. A CH2T instructor reported a student lost control of the aircraft after an aborted takeoff; refused to relinquish control; had a runway excursion damaging an airport sign and the aircraft wing.
Aircraft: ANY UNKNOWN OR UNLISTED AIRCRAFT MANUFACTURER
Phase of flight: Initial Climb
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict

Departing MUE VFR; we were on the right downwind climbing out. There was a BKN-OVC layer about 1;000 above us; just south of our location. I was about to switch to Approach to open my IFR flight plan; when I received a traffic alert on the TAS. The target was showing 100 FT above me and right on top of my location. I stopped the climb; and maneuvered to the right in an attempt to avoid the traffic. I was surprised to see traffic in this location and questioned whether or not the target was possibly a false echo or even our own ship. I never saw anybody; but a few seconds later a helicopter made a broken radio call that said he was two miles south of the airport; which was also our approximate location. I switched to HCF Approach and began receiving advisories until getting my IFR clearance. The tour helicopters seem to fly pretty close to clouds out here and can be very hard to see. Our company has recently started airline service into this airport and the helicopter pilots are probably not used to much traffic in this area. I will be much more vigilant when departing uncontrolled fields in Hawaii. One lesson here is to remember to keep eyes outside and always be aware of the possibilities of other traffic in the area. A departing fixed-wing pilot encountered an inbound helicopter as he was in the process of picking up his IFR clearance.
Aircraft: CESSNA STATIONAIR/TURBO STATIONAIR 6
Phase of flight: Takeoff / Launch
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Normal checklist run up. Departed and at midfield and approximately 150 feet altitude; experienced a complete loss of power...straight ahead landing not an option due to rugged terrain with trees...180 turn executed with very hard landing and roll out into a fence near the parking area. Prop strike; front wheel separation; cowling damage. I was the only occupant and had no injuries what so ever. JP Instrument [engine monitor] data reveals a drop in fuel flow from 26 GPH to 0 and rpm from 2850 to 0 in approx 12 seconds. Fuel on board was 30.8 gallons...fuel selector valve was on the fullest tank that had approximately 23 gallons. The pilot of a C206 reported a loss of engine power during takeoff. A turn away from terrain was executed and a hard landing was made.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

On departure Master Caution illuminated with associated right IRU 'Fault' and 'Align' light on overhead panel after running proper QRH the decision was made to divert to [a nearby airport]. An overweight landing of +900 to 1000 LBS was accomplished. Required write ups were entered and inspection completed. Flight continued after inspection and IRU replacement. B737 Captain reported diverting to an alternate airport after receiving IRU 'Fault' and 'Align' caution lights in flight.
Aircraft: CESSNA STATIONAIR/TURBO STATIONAIR 6
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

During this event; I was working Sector 68/66 combined. The weather was IFR with reports of light ice in the area. I just accepted four radar handoffs from ICT Approach; 2 HYS arrivals; a GBD arrival and a GCK arrival. 2 aircraft at 060 and 2 at 080. I then accepted a MPR arrival from SEC06 inside of ICT Approach's airspace descending to FL240; which needs to descend to 060 by ICT boundary per LOA. This was a complex scenario because all aircraft requested RADAR vectors for ILS approaches at their destinations and the close proximity of all the aircraft. I was also having to go offline to issue multiple IFR clearances through FSS. The MPR arrival was on a vector for traffic descending to 090 initially then issued a descent to 060; traffic was the GBD arrival that I had on vectors for the ILS RY35. Everything was working fine then I started losing aircraft on RADAR! I inquired to the Supervisor if there was any reported issues with the HTI radar. He then informed me it was [going to be out of service for 8 hours] . This was never briefed to the controllers working or written down on any status information areas in SEC68/66. Why would anyone release a RADAR when it is IFR knowing all arrivals will need instrument approaches! This is not the first time this has happened in the last few months! This is unacceptable! At no time should NAVAIDS or Radar sites be released for maintenance during IFR conditions. All aircraft were RADAR separated until the RADAR went out and then I didn't have any aircraft at the same altitude non-radar procedurally separated. The OM (Operations Manager) and FLM (Front Line Manage)] released the radar knowing the weather conditions and that is unsafe. This was the worst position I've been put in by someone's negligence.In the last few years; we had a lot of new FLM's and OM's with very little experience. Most supervisors are on the computer not engaged on what's going on in the area. I see multiple FLM's on the internet looking at sport scores when they have red sectors. No cell phones in the areas but FLM's on [the web]; no accountability. It was always common practice for Management to ask the opinion of the controllers working the sector when it came to releasing NAVAIDS or RADAR. How about they come up with a checklist when releasing equipment. i.e.; look at the weather forecast; forecasting IFR conditions don't release it. If VFR tentatively release it but coordinate with sector effected. I feel that Management is not held to the same level of responsibility; they released the RADAR putting me in a bad situation and nothing happens. If they are unsure what to do ask the sector for their opinion! Kansas City Center Controller reported that a radar system was released to maintenance during IFR conditions with highly complex traffic.
Aircraft: CESSNA 150
Phase of flight: Landing
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

I flew a Cessna 150 from ZZZ. After doing the pre-flight check; everything appeared to be in working order. I taxied the airplane slowly from FBO1 to FBO2 for fuel. So it maybe took me about 0.3 or 0.4 hour from engine start because I needed to wait for the fuel person. After refilling; I taxied to the run up area with full fuel. My destination airport was ZZZ1. After taking off; the engine [shuddered] suddenly; I checked all the engine gauges but everything was good. Few minutes later; the engine [was] back to normal. It took me about 1.8h to ZZZ1 which was less than what I planned. So I didn't think I needed additional fuel. I made a full stop for the restroom.After a few minutes rest; I took off from ZZZ1. I picked another route. At the start of the flight everything worked; but when I flew above ZZZ2; the engine started [shuddering] again. I tried to find out what the problem weas but everything still looked good. And the engine stopped [shuddering] few minutes later. I checked the fuel gauges and I[recall] that it showed me 1/4 per tank (about 5.6 gallons in total). It was enough for me to fly back to ZZZ.After the radar service [was] terminated by Approach; I got the landing clearance from ZZZ Tower. At the time I was descending to 2000ft; my engine started to lose power with RPM dropping. I noticed the fuel gauges still showed me 1/4 per tank. I tried to restart the engine but I failed. I talked to ZZZ Tower immediately for emergency landing. Fortunately I landed on Taxiway A. I really appreciate ZZZ Tower's help. I didn't know what the problems were. But [when] I turned on the battery again the fuel gauges showed completely different. Left tanks showed the fuel almost empty (maybe 0.5-1 gallon I thought). Right one still showed 1/4 (approximately 2.5 gallons). The total fuel of the flight on my flight plan in day VFR is 22.17 gallons. I made a perfect flight plan; but I didn't realized my flight cannot be [done within] that time. I ignored other factors. Also under the influence of the fuel gauges. I made a bad decision. Even though it was an intense experience; I believe it was a good learning experience in my career to consider other factors during flight. Cessna pilot reported a safe landing on a taxiway after the engine quit because of a low fuel issue.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Today Aircraft X called after push out that fluid was observed dripping out of #1 engine by baggage handlers. I sent two mechanics out to the plane. Supervisor went out on his own. Unbeknownst to me the flight crew ran the engine and the mechanics observed hydraulic fluid dripping out of the drain mast at the rate of 1 drop every 8 seconds. They came in and updated me. I pulled up the drain mast inspection MM 71-XX-XX and gave it to them. A few minutes later [Supervisor] came in and said the plane taxiied out. Since the plane had no entry in the logbook and we weren't sure of the limits I demanded the plane return to the gate. [Supervisor] said if I wanted the plane back I had to call myself. I tried raising the plane on the radio to no avail. I told [Supervisor] I was filing a report for the plane leaving illegally. At first he didn't care but then came running back claiming he called Tech to have the plane return. I advised [Supervisor] that if the plane returned I would delete the report. However; the plane took off. Maintenance Technician reported aircraft departed after fluid was observed dripping from aircraft engine drain mast.
Aircraft: PA28
Phase of flight: Final Approach
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

The temporary loss of control due to spatial disorientation occurred on the ILS approach into my alternate airport on an IFR flight plan from. The loss of control was precipitated by the pilot's inability to disconnect the altitude pre-select and an otherwise non-stable approach.The contributing factors were:1. Low IFR with conditions not improving as forecasted for the time of my arrival.2. Did not adhere to personal limits.3. While current; not proficient for IFR flight in the aircraft with only 56 hours in type.4. Not proficient with auto pilot and avionics in the aircraft.5. Did not have the 'numbers' memorized for the aircraft type to insure a stable approach.Corrective Action:1. Spoke with and discussed incident with Gold Seal Instructor.2. Arranging schedules to do in depth IFR recurrent training in the aircraft with [with a CFI].3. Equipment familiarization with auto-pilot and navigational avionics training.4. Subscribe to and participate in the FAA Wings Program. GA pilot reported getting disoriented during instrument conditions.
Aircraft: BRASILIA EMB-120 ALL SERIES
Phase of flight: Takeoff / Launch
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Tower cleared the B737 ahead of us to cross [Runway] 28L; hold short [Runway] 28R. Then we were given the same clearance. We noted the pair on short final and knowing there was not much holding space we expedited across and stopped pretty close to the B737. We were only able to get half of our plane over the runway hold short line. It looked like slight staggering on arrival so it was possible for the B737 to just take the runway making room for us between arrival of [Runways] 28R and 28L traffic. Tower amended our departure - right turn 060 now a new frequency. Before the arrival of the [Runway] 28R traffic though Tower cleared another airplane to cross [Runway] 28L and hold short [Runway] 28R. They questioned his clearance since this would be three aircraft holding short of [Runway] 28R with not even room for two and traffic closing in. Tower reconfirmed previous instructions. Upon [Runway] 28R landing; Tower cleared the B737 to line up and wait [Runway] 28R. We were so close that their expedited movement really rocked our plane from jet wash. After Tower cleared the B737 for takeoff; were given line up and wait [Runway] 28R; maintain 3;000 on departure; and to move down the runway so he could line up [another aircraft] on the runway behind us. Reaching about the 1;000 FT marker Tower cleared us for takeoff and to turn as soon as able. I was aware we had performance for the pseudo intersection takeoff since we were well before Taxiway E that we had data for. Wake turbulence separation was not as well planned as we hit it upon rotation. The early turn helped avoid it more however it put us rather close to the B737 that departed ahead of us.Cause: Tower playing cowboy trying to get more departures out. [It was] our inability to see the big picture and having to trust Tower's plan and their spacing.Suggestions: Not to accept Tower's clearance even if they say there is room. Not to get rushed by the situation so you can focus on things like wake separation; and inform Tower of your requirement. Find out how much they want us to 'move down' when lining up a second aircraft. Try to accommodate Tower but do not let them fly your plane for you. EMB-120 Captain reported encountering wake turbulence after takeoff from SFO in trail of a B737.
Aircraft: CITATIONJET (C525/C526) - CJ I / II / III / IV
Phase of flight: Takeoff / Launch
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

We were a MEDEVAC flight; carrying an organ onboard for the purpose of transplant. Since it was a busy; uncontrolled field; we opted to depart VFR and pickup our IFR clearance in the air. The winds were favoring Runway XX; and there were several aircraft in the traffic pattern. While waiting for two close-in aircraft to land (one on final; and another on base); there was a radio call from an aircraft that was practicing the wrong-way approach to RWY XY. We made a radio announcement of our intention to depart RWY XX ASAP (when the landing aircraft were clear of the runway or out of the way from touch-and-go). The aircraft on the wrong-way final made statement that they would break the approach off early; giving us the indication they understood there was traffic in the pattern. We seen the landing lights of the wrong-way aircraft on a long final for RWY XY; and kept an eye on him the entire time. Our takeoff was announced on the radio; and as we were approaching V1; it was clear that the wrong-way aircraft was still continuing to descend and remain on the approach course. I felt it would have been unsafe to abort at this time; and took the aircraft into the air. Our closure rate was increasing; and it appeared that the inbound aircraft had no intention of breaking off the approach. Once airborne; evasive maneuvering toward the east was required to avoid what could have potentially been a collision course. Concurrently; the other aircraft began a turn to the west (I would estimate that they were less than a mile from the approach end of RWY XY when they began to turn)On our part; we could have waited on the runway longer to observe what the inbound aircraft was going to do. On the other aircraft's part: If there is a number of aircraft in a traffic pattern at an uncontrolled field taking off and landing in the opposite direction that a practice approach is being conducted; it is prudent to either choose a more-appropriate approach/runway and/or establish more defined communications and intentions with the other affected aircraft. CE525 First Officer reported NMAC with opposite direction landing traffic.