Aryan95614/aerograph-asrs huggingface dataset:
Aircraft: TRAVELAIR 95
Phase of flight: Landing
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Gear Up Landing; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft

On the afternoon of Date; I was on a routine training flight with one student training for their multi-engine add on.The entire flight was without any abnormalities; on our final approach all the normal pre-landing checks were made; gear was put down and I could feel the landing gear go down; I saw the green indicator light; and saw the red flag for the nose gear in the down position.A normal and smooth touchdown was made by the student; both mains touched down and he held the nose wheel off nicely. When the airspeed had decayed and the nose was let down it proceeded to fall all the way to the asphalt. I felt and heard the props striking the asphalt and pulled full elevator to take as much weight off the nose as I could. We pulled the mixtures on both engines.I knew there was nothing else to do but hold on and maintain centerline of the runway using rudder inputs.We came to a complete stop on the centerline of Runway XX and shut off both mags for each engine; shut off masters and generators; and made sure the mixtures were completely closed.We then exited the aircraft without any injuries.After further examination part number 002-820017-1 had [broken] causing the push/pull rod for the nose gear to not lock the nose gear into place.What I had learned from this was a more in depth inspection of the landing gear on preflight to potentially avoid this from happening again. Flight Instructor on training flight in a BE-95 aircraft reported the Nose Landing Gear collapsed on landing.
Aircraft: MD80
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Climbing out on the departure; we had the Tail Comp High Temp light come on. The QRH memory items were done and an emergency was declared with Departure Control. I requested to level at 18;000 FT and return to the departure station. Departure Control cleared us to turn to an arrival fix; descend to 12;000 FT and cleared ILS DME. The landing was normal at 134;400 LBS. Airfield Rescue and fire fighters inspected the aircraft and followed us to the hard stand. During climb out an MD-80's TAIL COMP HIGH TEMP light alerted so the QRH was completed; an emergency declared; and the flight returned to the departure airport.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

This narrative highlights two incorrect published crossing altitudes on two different arrivals that can lead to altitude deviations and aircraft overspeeds. The first is the PASLY 4 (10-2C) arrival to BNA at GROAT intersection. The crossing is depicted to cross GROAT at or below FL 230. It is always 1000 out of 1000 times given to cross GROAT at FL 220 usually by Memphis Center and has been for at least five years. Sometimes this occurs very late. This can lead to a situation where the aircraft was on the path; is now high; and the aircraft then pitches down at the last minute to meet the unpublished altitude of 22;000 ft. This pitchdown can lead to an overspeed and a situation that still does not meet the crossing. The second instance is on the ENDEE 6 Arrival into MDW (10-2). The fix in particular is KAMBL and the published crossing is between FL 270-FL 240. The unpublished crossing that is given; very late; is to cross KAMBL at 24;000 ft. Now the aircraft is in the same situation as the PASLY 4 Arrival; only you may have a 100 plus kt. tailwind to deal with as well. Both these situations persist but are preventable by simply changing the published altitude. Finally; there are several Pilots who are rusty from not flying; due to low utilization; whose situational awareness and lack of currency make this situation even more grave. Please fix these easy to remedy issues and trap the known errors. Thank you. We did not have a deviation. I am only reporting to highlight these issues. Air Carrier pilot reported ATC consistently issues a crossing restriction at a specific fix different than what is published and programmed causing difficulty complying with the clearance.
Aircraft: CRJ200
Phase of flight: Takeoff / Launch
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC

The first instance I was made aware of our close proximity to the ERJ-145 was an utterly unintelligible and faint radio call from the 18C Tower Controller. What I remember hearing was; 'Air Carrier flight number; there is conflicting traffic on the go around for Runway 23'. It was later learned that the ERJ aircraft was executing a balked landing on Runway 23. This departure path placed the ERJ aircraft on a converging course with our aircraft. At the time we were made aware of the ERJ in question; we were beyond V1 and were beginning to rotate the aircraft. I caught a glimpse of the ERJ-145 as the nose was smoothly pitched up into the takeoff command bars. As a rough approximation; there was about 200 - 400 FT separation from our aircraft and the ERJ and our paths nearly converged exactly at the same point. We queried the Controller as to whether it was SOP to have simultaneous operations on 23 and 18C to which the reply was something to the effect of; 'we do this all the time'. What makes this event particularly troubling is that; had we not been at an approximate TOW of 51;300 LBS; the upshot of this event could have included loss to life and property. It is of the opinion of both my Captain and me that there was only one action that; within the limitations of the ATC system in CLT; could have prevented our egregiously close encounter; monitoring the ATC Tower frequency for Runway 23. The risk factors were: 1) Simultaneous departures on 18C and arrivals on 23; 2) Differing Tower frequencies for Runway 23 and 18C; 3) An unstabilized approach performed by 'Air Carrier'; which resulted in a balked landing. Change: 1) Not allowing simultaneous departures on 18C and arrivals on 23; 2) Have the same Tower frequencies for Runway 23 and 18C or find an alternate means to keep pilots in the communications loop. Air Carrier departure from Runway 18C at CLT described a conflict with traffic executing a go around on Runway 23; the reporter suggesting these simultaneous operations be terminated.
Aircraft: MEDIUM TRANSPORT; LOW WING; 2 TURBOJET ENG
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types

While on the CEDAR CREEK STAR; ATC assigned a speed of 300 KTS for traffic with a clearance to cross 'HOWDY' at 11;000 and 250 KTS. At approximately FL180 ATC vectored us off the arrival and; approximately 90 seconds later; cleared us back direct HOWDY. I instructed the First Officer to ask if ATC still wanted 300 KTS. ATC then said 'no comply with the speed restrictions on the arrival.' Approximately 10 seconds later the Controller asked if we were going to be able to make the restriction [at HOWDY]. Initially we responded yes; and then in the interest of passenger comfort and safety said no. The Controller then gave us a 40 degree vector off course and upon roll out re-cleared us back to HOWDY; descend and maintain 12;000 FT and to contact Approach. No altitudes or speed restrictions were violated; however this narrative is an example of what seems to be becoming commonplace on arrival. ATC is using speed and vectoring to obtain optimum spacing; once their spacing is optimized; the aircrew is then expected to make speed and altitude restrictions. While on the vector the aircrew has no idea how long the vector will be or if the duration of assigned airspeed. Trying to plan a reasonable and comfortable descent becomes almost impossible. This example is one of at least two on this pairing and two on my last four day trip. It appears to me that ATC is assigning high speeds and then relying on the crew to remind them that there is a speed restriction over the fix. Please advise DFW ATC that if they assign a speed and a vector they are responsible for insuring that THEY specify that the restrictions over a fix will still be expected. It's becoming common once a speed is assigned that the aircrew has to ask if the fix crossing restrictions are still in place....and then as an after thought 'yes comply with the speed and altitude restrictions' This phenomenon seems unique to DFW. An air carrier Captain took exception to DFW TRACON's habit of assigning speeds for spacing and/or vectors off of STARs and failing to specify their expectation with respect to subsequent published airspeed/altitude constraints on the arrival when they are re-cleared to intercept and descend via the arrival.
Aircraft: A330
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

At 4;000 FT MSL [we] encountered wake turbulence from a 747 five miles ahead on final approach Runway 25L EDDF. Climbed to 4;400 FT MSL and stayed above glideslope for a normal landing. Five miles is not enough space for 747. A330 First Officer reported encountering wake turbulence in trail of a B747 on final to EDDF; stating that in his opinion five miles is not enough separation.
Aircraft: CESSNA 402/402C/B379 BUSINESSLINER/UTILINER
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

During climb out at 1000 ft. AGL the left auxiliary fuel pump was selected to the off position. This resulted in an immediate loss of power in the left engine. The auxiliary pump was then selected back to the low position and the engine did not return to a normal power output. Engine failure after takeoff flow was performed and [Advised ATC]. ZZZ Tower cleared aircraft to land on Runway XX. After landing and during the roll out; the left engine stopped running. The aircraft taxied to the ramp under the power of the right engine. A Cessna 402 Captain reported a loss of engine power when reconfiguring the fuel boost pumps; necessitating an immediate return to the departure airport.
Aircraft: NO AIRCRAFT
Phase of flight: unknown
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

A ramper nearly had his foot severed off when his foot came in contact with a bag tug while backing up a belt loader. The steel from the boot was completely torn out of the boot. A Ramp Operations worker backing a belt loader up nearly had his foot severed when it came in contact with a bag tug.
Aircraft: MD-83
Phase of flight: Landing
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Enroute flight was uneventful. Upon handoff to MSP Approach we were given vectors to an ILS [Runway] 12L approach as they were in the process of closing [Runway] 12R for snow removal. Weather was 03014G20KT 3/4SM -SN 006OVC. Approach was briefed and MED Auto-Brake selected. Landing weight was 129;500 and airspeed bug for 40 Flap landing with additive was 138. 3 previous flights landing reported braking action FAIR. Landing was on speed in the touchdown zone. Spoilers deployed; auto braking commenced and reverse thrust was initiated. Aircraft started drifting as we slowed and I came out of reverse to regain directional control. This was at midfield and the aircraft stopped decelerating. I started maximum manual braking but the runway was covered in more snow than what was noted in the first half of the runway and braking was ineffective. I then went to max reverse in an attempt to stop the aircraft. As we were headed for the end of the runway and a steep drop off to a highway below; I continued with reverse thrust and maximum manual braking. Several compressor stalls were noted and the aircraft stopped with literally only feet to spare. We cleared the runway and taxied to the gate with both engines running. We reported that braking action was POOR and the airport was subsequently closed for snow removal. The compressor stalls were written up and Maintenance was informed. Total Flight time for the day 8:50; duty time was 12:10. Get accurate braking action reports from previous aircraft and have airport be more aggressive with snow removal and runway condition reporting. MD83 Captain reports poor braking action during landing roll out after being told to expect fair. Braking and reverse thrust are reduced during landing roll due to directional control issues. Maximum reverse thrust is applied and several compressor stalls are heard before stopping just feet from the end of the runway.
Aircraft: B747
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I received an e-mail stating; 'During a recent internal audit; the Company discovered that a crew scheduling rule in the system which impacts three FAA regulations was inadvertently turned off. As a result; you may have exceeded the following crew scheduling regulation(s): 14 CFR 121.471(a) on [date]'.[Recommend] corrective action was taken by the company. B747 First Officer reported that Company email informed him that the Company schedule tracking software was turned off causing possible violations of FAR 121.
Aircraft: SMALL AIRCRAFT; LOW WING; 1 ENG; FIXED GEAR
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flying in level cruise flight at 7000 feet; on a heading of 060; at 155 Kts IAS; 10 miles NE of JFK; we spot a small white object ahead; slightly below; and to the right of our plane. We are closing fast yet clearly saw that it was a drone/white quadcopter with a white light. When we passed the drone (approximately 5-10 seconds later); it was 100 feet horizontally from our right wing and 50 feet below us. We were unable to tell the direction it was flying. It was clearly a close call. We notified JFK Approach; he warned other aircraft in the area; and gave us a number to call upon landing. A small aircraft pilot in cruise at 7;000 ft 10 miles northeast of JFK reported a near miss with a UAV.
Aircraft: FALCON 2000
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Assigned [an aircraft] for a ferry then passenger leg. Weather at both destinations was marginal with snow and 1 mile visibility being forecast at our final stop. Spoke to 2 (TWO) other crews who both refused this tail due to the MELs listed. One of the crews was the crew that brought the plane in the night before and was assigned it this morning (who subsequently refused). The plane in question had the autopilot; yaw damper; right side flight director; mach trim and several other MELs listed. After speaking to both crews and to each other about this situation; both the PIC and I decided it was unsafe to fly this plane with a majority of the automation missing. The PIC contacted the [Chief Pilot] and informed him of our decision and concerns. We were then given another tail to sit standby on. The fact that the company tried to get 3 crews to fly a plane that was quite unsafe is astonishing. Every recurrent we talk about altitude and navigation deviations being the big 2 issues we have; and yet the company tried to push THREE crews to fly a plane several legs a day for numerous days with the autopilot deferred AND no flight director on the right side with no yaw damper or mach trim. This increases the workload on the crew exponentially and unnecessarily. More so; the plane was at a maintenance base at the maintenance facility! This event never should have happened and further events can be avoided by standing by [our company's] SMS level 4 safety status and fixing a plane that has this many MELs that compromise safety. Sadly had we or another crew taken this plane and had a nav/alt deviation I'm sure the company would have said the plane should have been refused by the crews?!?! Fractional First Officer (FO) reported he and his Captain; as well as two other flight crews; refused to fly an aircraft into a marginal weather situation with several autoflight systems inoperative and deferred. Reporter stated he was concerned with his employer's attitude and pressure.
Aircraft: B777
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Shortly after takeoff PACK R EICAS message appeared on upper screen. Pack R procedure accomplished with no reinstatement of right pack. review of Air synoptic page showed right engine bleed valve; pack valve; and right isolation valve all closed. ENG BLD LOSS R EICAS message also noted at this time. Established communication with Dispatch and Maintenance. Because of loss of wing anit-ice as a result of the above proceedure the decision to return was concurred with by all parties. Emeregency was declared with ATC on hand off. Coordinated with ATC for fuel jettison. 43;000 lbs of fuel was jettisoned at FL300; for approximately 14 mins. Recovered with uneventful landing below max landing weight. B777 Captain reports loss of the right pack shortly after takeoff. Pack reinstatement is attempted before noting that the right engine bleed valve and right isolation valve are also closed. Fuel is dumped and the flight returns to the departure airport.
Aircraft: PA28
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

I was on a training flight with a student. We had been flying for around 45 minutes. The student was under the hood. Minutes after reaching 3500 MSL approximately 2800 AGL our engine cut off (complete loss of power). I took the controls from the student and asked him to do the restart procedures while I found a place to land. I attempted to restart; but it did not. I found a runway and began to glide there. We made it to the Runway safely with a soft landing. Nobody was hurt and the airplane was in great [albeit dead engine] condition. We were happy to have made it to the Runway. The mechanic from my school confirmed that it was not our fault and we couldn't have prevented the engine failure. While conducting flight training in a Piper Cherokee PA28 this reporter experienced a complete engine failure and successfully landed power-off at a nearby airport.
Aircraft: SKYLANE 182/RG TURBO SKYLANE/RG
Phase of flight: Final Approach
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

While conducting a power-off 180 precision landing on Runway XX; an aircraft that had initially indicated they were entering the pattern for the opposite Runway XY crossed in front of my aircraft as I was beginning my base to final turn. I did not hear this aircraft specify they were on final straight-in; nor see them as I was clearing final prior to my turn. My co-pilot also did not hear or see them.This aircraft had earlier stated they were going to enter on the downwind left traffic for Runway XY; the opposite direction of Runway XX; which was in use by myself and two other aircraft. Estimated distance is easily at or less than 500 ft. horizontal separation when they crossed in-front. I aborted the maneuver and elected to remain in slow flight configuration to gain separation. The aircraft landed 2/3 down Runway XX and took back off again; departing to the south of the field. C182 pilot reported a near midair collision as another aircraft was landing on the opposite runway and took evasive action to avoid a collision.
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

[This is] the same aircraft we took in to ZZZ and landed with MAIN PITCH TRIM INOP. Upon landing; the FO thought he smelled an odor. During taxi; we both started to smell a roasting burning smell. We turned off pack 1 and it dissipated. When we arrived at the ramp; I smelled another burning smell. We turned off pack 2 and it went away again. After troubleshooting with maintenance; we could not get it to reproduce. Captain recommended replacement all packs and ductwork or investigate more into why a burning smell is such a common issue. EMB-145 LR flight crew reported a burning smell event upon landing and taxi-in; which dissipated when the Pack 1 was turned off. Maintenance action was assigned.
Aircraft: M-20 J (201) / ALLEGRO
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

I was on an IFR flight plan to Caldwell; NJ (CDW). The airport was in sight and I had received clearance for the visual approach to Runway 4. I was handed off to Caldwell Tower and was instructed to fly straight in to Runway 4 and report 4 mile final. I was descending to pattern altitude at a relatively slow rate of descent (around 300 FPM) and inside 10 miles from the field. Pattern altitude is 1;200 FT MSL. At around 2;000 FT MSL I received a low altitude alert from the Tower Controller. I was constantly in visual contact with the terrain which did not appear to be unsafe. I am aware that the terrain southwest of the field is somewhat higher than field elevation but I was in visual contact with the approach end of the runway and with the ground below me. I then arrested my descent and continued my approach. Distracted by the Tower's communication and by my wife asking what that was all about; I remained high and then had to make a greater than average final descent to land. The Mooney is somewhat hard to slow down especially in a descent so I try to get to pattern altitude by 3 to 4 miles from the field. In the future I will probably load the GPS approach so as to get safe glide slope information even on a visual approach. A Mooney M20J pilot reported getting a low altitude alert from the CDW Tower on visual approach to Runway 4.
Aircraft: BOEING COMPANY UNDIFFERENTIATED OR OTHER MODEL
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Each aircraft has a flight kit for the Captain and one for the First Officer containing our company manuals; Aircraft manuals and Charts. As per our procedure part of our preflight is to check the revision card in each flight kit against those printed on our release to verify each kit is current. This was accomplished and both kits were up to date. For departure I took out my departure airport charts as well as all appropriate en-route charts. Two hours into the flight the Captain asked what charts I had for Alaska. I did not have our destination airport and neither did he. After combing through all charts to see if Anchorage was misplaced we then realized we did not have a single plate for our destination airport even though our other Alaskan charts had been updated just as recently as August 13. I went into the FMC and retrieved all the information available for the three ILS's as well as VOR information and runway length. I also used my Alaska/Canada high chart as well as my Alaska Low chart for all communication information. The Captain used the SAT phone to call the company and verify that our destination current and forecast weather was to remain VFR. He also had the Dispatcher read all pertinent information for each ILS; confirming frequencies; inbound course; missed approach procedure; MSA's etc. As the weather at our destination was VFR and forecast to stay so we decided to continue. The flight was completed without incident. A flight crew discovered enroute that all ZAN approach and airport charts were removed from their respective flight kits even though preflight checks indicated both kits onboard were current.