Aryan95614/aerograph-asrs huggingface dataset:
Aircraft: LARGE TRANSPORT; LOW WING; 2 TURBOJET ENG
Phase of flight: Parked; Climb
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Ops Alert for MROC Departures 'RW7 Departure at SJO [MROC]'; exceedance of Terrain Threat bulletin; combined with 10-7 pages that differ; and the assignment of the COCOS 5 RNAV departure caused significant confusion. The bulletin says for RW7 departures you have to depart RNAV/VNAV off; turn at 4 DME and maintain V2+20. The diagram shows exceedance of the R113 radial on many RW7 departures and no other types of departures leaving MROC. The 10-7 page says the same thing if you are flying the POAS4 departure. (The bulletin says RW7 departures period). The flight plan had us filed direct RADON; with no SID assigned. ATC assigned us the COCOS5 RNAV; which is a straight out departure; over lower terrain; with an engine failure procedure to turn back to TIO between the first two waypoints. The COCOS5 requires a significant climb gradient; with a note specifically stating you must make the climb gradient. We estimated we could make the climb gradient based on distance and alt; required climb gradient table to at least above the MSA for the area. The departure has restrictions based on arrival traffic that go up to over FL230. We flew the departure and at about 15;000 feet were cleared to climb unrestricted. Although we had zero deviations from out clearance; I don't think we could have cleared the climb restrictions. We crossed the FL200 restriction at 19.3; and the FL230 restriction at about FL200; 270 KTS. Confusion results for the bulletin implying that the only way to leave MROC on RW7 is to follow the bulletin guidance (Do we have to tell ATC we cannot accept anything but the POAS4 departure?) How do we know we can meet climb gradient requirements for the COCOS[5]? Dispatch didn't assign it. There is no note on the 10-7 pages saying the POAS4 is the only acceptable departure. If we fly the COCOS[5] off runway 7; can we use LNAV/VNAV? Bulletin only addresses RW7 departures. Requires LNAV/VNAV off. On a minor note; the COCOS 5 requires a NADP1 departure according to the Takeoff Data Message. It's not in the 10-7 page. B737 First Officer reported confusing and conflicting guidance for departures from MROC.
Aircraft: PIPER AIRCRAFT CORP UNDIFFERENTIATED OR OTHER MODEL
Phase of flight: Landing
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Landed in a crosswind which normal flight control inputs did not prevent a exit from the runway and a wingtip touch on the ground. Received a ferry permit and airplane given to A&P to inspect a correct any issues. PA-14 Single Pilot reported loss of directional control during cross wind landing resulting in a runway excursion and wingtip ground strike.
Aircraft: A320
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Over the last week; we are noticing ramp moving aircraft on the hangar ramp without wing walkers; [the company] has procedures in place; as a result of aircraft damages in the past for the same operation. Now we have two groups working in the same area using two different manuals; contradicting processes. As soon as this operation started we informed the management personnel of the differences. 10 days into it; no changes have been made.Also Airport ops docs and the FAA /ATC document governing the movement of aircraft on taxiways and runways are being totally violated. The aircraft are being towed around without the required Anti-collision not turned on. Missing brake rider in the cockpit; not using aircraft radio for communication with ATC.The ops docs governing this; specifically calls out for Licensed Aircraft Mechanic to be the only person allowed outside of the Pilots; to accomplish this function (moving aircraft on taxiways and runways). These two groups are randomly drug tested.Normally the rules governing implementation of new procedures; requires a Safety Risk Assessment involving front line employees who were directly affected by the change.Once an airplane is released into service at the hangar; this group that moves an airplane are allowed to operate controls; switches; pressurize; etc. where is the chain of command. Undocumented work/operation is being performed. Will the mechanic be held responsible because of his 'release'; two FAA licensed group were in control of the aircraft throughout in the past; while the pilot and the mechanic remain part of the aircraft record; what FAA controlled document covers this other work group. A Maintenance Technician reported that ramp personnel are moving aircraft with unauthorized personnel and not following procedures.
Aircraft: CITATION X (C750)
Phase of flight: Final Approach
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC

A C750 was on a visual approach to Runway 23 about 8 miles north of MMU airport and was descending thru 1;700 FT to turn about a 7 mile final. The Local Controller called VFR traffic to the C750 at its 10 o'clock and 2 miles climbing slowly northbound out of 1;300 FT. The VFR traffic was a departure off of CDW airport. MMU was advertising the ILS Approach but the C750 was scratch padded as a visual; per the old LOA with N90 and CDW and MMU Towers. The pilot said they did not see the traffic and then came right back and said he was responding to an RA and climbed to 2;200 FT to avoid the VFR traffic that MMU Tower was not talking to. All of this occurred on a 7 mile final to Runway 23; well inside CDW's airspace. The C750 was then able to continue the approach and land on [Runway] 23 without further incident. I was observing in the Tower as I had just been relieved. This is an on-going safety issue. One filed report noted this very issue of N90 not coordinating with CDW for a visual approach thru their airspace when MMU is on the ILS Approach. In my opinion; nothing is going to be done about this until there is an actual mid-air or accident caused by an aircraft avoiding a mid-air and losing control and crashing. N90 seems to be of the opinion that when the ILS approach is in use at MMU; the approach course is protected and VFR aircraft cannot fly thru it. However; the problem occurs when N90 gives an arrival a visual approach and assumes the airspace is still protected and therefore does not need to be coordinated with CDW before flying the arrival thru CDW's airspace and switching the arrival to MMU Tower. Numerous reports have been filed and whatever changes were made (having MMU advertise the ILS all the times Runway 23 is the active) does not solve the problem because it almost always occurs when the arrival is on a visual approach instead of the ILS. It is not the responsibility of the controllers at MMU Tower to make sure the arrivals have been coordinated with CDW Tower but every time I have checked; CDW Tower was not coordinated with by N90. I can only assume the controllers at N90 don't know or don't think they have to coordinate a visual approach thru CDW's airspace since MMU is on the ILS Runway 23 approach. They are dead wrong and one of these days a pilot is going to pay for N90's continued resistance to following the 7110.65 in this situation. As far as a solution; coordinating any approach; other than an ILS approach is mandatory before N90 can switch the arrival to MMU Tower. N90 simply has to abide by the 7110.65; no new rule is required. Just make sure all of the controllers at N90 in the EWR sector know this is not optional but mandatory! MMU Controller described a reported NMAC when traffic on a visual approach to Runway 23 to MMU encountered VFR departure traffic from CDW; the reporter claiming N90 controllers consistently fail to coordinate as required.
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Phase of flight: Takeoff / Launch
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

After being cleared for takeoff; Pilot flying added takeoff thrust. Pilot monitoring set thrust. At approximately 20 knots engine takeoff message occurred. Rejected takeoff was accomplished. ATC was immediately notified and request was made to exit runway with no assistance needed. After exiting runway; request was made to troubleshoot issue. ATC cleared aircraft to park on taxiway in order to confirm all takeoff numbers were correct. Flight Attendants and passengers were notified of the issue and told to remain seated with their seatbelts fastened. Maintenance was contacted. Maintenance provided that all parameters appeared normal and that auto throttles did not arm properly. Maintenance cleared pilots to attempt another takeoff as no other issues or incorrect parameters were noted. Maintenance found no reason to have aircraft return to gate for inspection.Upon receiving clearance from ATC to taxi to runway; clearance for takeoff was once again received from ATC. No further issues occurred on takeoff. Auto throttles did not arm or were inadvertently deselected prior to adding takeoff thrust. After selecting A/T Verify TO is armed on PFD before adding thrust. After thrust is added; upon checking thrust; visually verify TO has armed properly. ERJ-175 First Officer reported a rejected takeoff due to an engine takeoff message due to the failure of the auto throttles to arm.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Initial Climb
Anomaly: Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

After departing [Runway] XXR from ZZZ [airport] on the ZZZZZX SID; began to accelerate through 9;000 feet MSL using speed mode. This caused the aircraft to level off around 9;300 feet MSL as it was speeding up from 250 KIAS. Captain was talking with ATC regarding our climb clearance when the acceleration began. ATC did not acknowledge the increased speed. After finishing the clearance readback the Captain noticed the increasing speed and changed to vertical speed mode to reduce airspeed. As pilot flying I reduced the thrust as well. Upon reaching 10;000 MSL we resumed normal profile climb.Limited experience taking off with wing and cowl anti-ice on. Normally upon reaching ZZZZZ1 intersection we have reached 10;000 MSL and can begin to accelerate. Because of the reduction in climb performance using the anti-ice system we were 1;000 feet lower than normal. The use of cowl and wing and anti-ice also caused the aircraft to use a lower angle of attack to reach entered airspeed resulting in a reduced climb performance. Because of reduced loads from COVID-19 we have normally not encountered a problem reaching 10;000 MSL before the west bound turn resulting in a habit of increasing speed at ZZZZZ1 or west/east bound turn. Air carrier First Officer reported exceeding 250 knots below 10;000 feet due to a reduced passenger load on climbout.
Aircraft: A320
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Due to winds in ZZZ we were instructed to hold and the Expect Further Clearance time was a guess from the controller. We did not have enough fuel to do even one turn in the hold so we diverted.Our aircraft had only 1 QRH in it. My iPad battery deprecated to about 17% by the time we arrived in ZZZ after the diversion. I had it plugged into the Tablet Interface Module (TIM); but with the diversion I did not notice that it was not really being charged. The battery symbol showed being charged but it was not. My concern is the removal of the 2nd QRH. I think this is a glaring safety issue.Relying on the iPad for safety critical information is unsafe. The iPad is a great tool; but as is the case with any computer equipment; it can lock up or lose power at the wrong time. I think it is imperative to have 2 QRHs in the cockpit at all times. A320 First Officer reported his iPad didn't charge when plugged in on the ground. This resulted in a flight being conducted with only 1 operational iPad.
Aircraft: LARGE TRANSPORT
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

While on the Arrival to SJC; we briefed a RNAV Z Runway 12L; visual conditions prevailed. When we checked in with Approach we were given clearance to do the approach. I was in VNAV and dialed the FAP in the altitude window. While approaching HITIR waypoint; Approach warned us that an Aircraft Y will be sequenced behind us and to let us know if and when we get the aircraft in sight. The Pilot Monitoring saw the Aircraft Y and told Approach that we indeed had it in sight. This was the first threat; as we were on VNAV path for the approach I noticed that the Aircraft Y had absolute no relative motion with us; at this point ATC gave us instruction to maintain visual separation. As we continued the approach I told the Pilot Monitoring that the aircraft was getting too close for comfort; the Pilot Monitoring then said 'well let's take appropriate action.'It was at that time; I clicked off the autopilot and decided that it was better to start an abrupt descent and get out of his altitude and start a turn to the east to get behind him and out of his altitude. A TA was then given; but no RA. I descended to 3000 feet. The Pilot Monitoring told Approach that the approach was not going to work and then ATC told us to 'be cleared now to 2000 feet and cleared for the Visual Approach.' At that point I was in no doubt in the yellow trying to hand fly the aircraft while keeping the Aircraft Y that was now above us and to the right. After stabilizing the aircraft I tried to engage the autopilot again; but had no luck due to the MCP panel not being set for engagement. I then just flew the aircraft by hand and conducted a Visual Approach and landed without further incident in front of the Aircraft Y.ATC should have never given us an approach clearance while knowing that we were converging with the heavy. Telling Approach that we had the Aircraft Y in sight; put the liability on us to keep separation. It added to the already heavy task loading during the approach phase. While descending to get out of the converging path I exceeded the 250 knots under 10;000. I believe that this was the best course of action to eliminate the threat that was coming. I may have made sure that the thrust levers were at idle. [Report narrative contained no additional information.] Air carrier flight crew reported exceeding 250 knots in order to remain separated from an aircraft conducting an approach to a parallel runway.
Aircraft: NO AIRCRAFT
Phase of flight: unknown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

I was designated guideman for positioning a truck for refueling prior to parking the vehicle for the night. The vehicle has a tank on both sides of the vehicle. Due to clearance issues with an aircraft dispatching from a gate; I guided my driver to back the vehicle to the non-gate side of the island; to fill the driver's side fuel tank. After fueling; we waited for the aircraft to turn out of the gate so we could pull away from the island and back the vehicle into the gate side of the island and fill the passenger side fuel tank. I crossed the island to position as guide for the reverse direction while my driver pulled forward from the island to get the vehicle into position. My driver began a left turn to line up; but started the turn too soon. The vehicle impacted the concrete bollard around the fuel island; causing damage to the Type I and Type IV fill lines. The lines ruptured; draining the full tank onto the ground. [Report narrative contained no additional information.] Deicing truck driver ran into the concrete bollard around the fuel island while repositioning the truck. Deicing lines ruptured and drained the tank.
Aircraft: WIDEBODY; LOW WING; 3 TURBOJET ENG
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Our aircraft had just made the turn passing 58N020W towards 59N030W. The FMS had cycled through these points correctly. I elected to enter a SLOP of 1 nm right; by using the normal procedure of a lateral offset off lL; and inputting a 1 mile right offset into the offset prompt. I then selected the prompt to input the offset. The FMS flight plan then changed with a T-P as the from point (instead of 58N020W) and showed 59N040W as next (instead of 59N030W). We immediately noticed this discrepancy. We called up the secondary flight plan; confirmed the correct waypoint sequence; and activated the secondary flight plan; and the aircraft remained on track to 59N030W. We received an automated ADS shortly thereafter stating 'ADS position reporting indicates that you are deviating from cleared route / indications are that you are routing direct to your 40W coordinate / please check and confirm your next waypoint'. We immediately resent the position report showing the correct waypoint sequence. At no time was the aircraft off course. I do not have an explanation for why the FMS behaved as it did. Vigilent adherence to waypoint passage procedures; kept this event from becoming a gross nav error. I was in the crew rest module asleep when this event occurred. At the end of my rest period the Capt described to me what happened. After passing 58N020W the Capt attempted to put in a 1 mile right SLOP in the FMS. When he activated the SLOP the FMS dropped the 58N020W as the from point and just made the from point a T-P. The FMS also cycled to 59N040W when it should have been tracking to 59N030W. The Captain and First Officer (FO) immediately recognized the problem and activated the secondary flight plan which corrected the problem. The aircraft was never off course due to the rapid reaction of the Captain and; but we did get a message from ATC via ADS that there was a problem with our flight plan. We did not try to put in an offset for the rest of the flight and the rest of the mission was normal. The cleared FMS flight plan routing was checked and correct so I am not sure what caused the FMS to drop the from point and skip the 59N030W point. I use the lateral offset function on all crossings; but I have never seen this happen. An aircraft flight crew attempted to enter a 1R in between fixes on a North Atlantic Track. The FMS dropped the proper 'from' waypoint and also dropped the proper 'to' waypoint. They activated the secondary flight plan and remained on course.
Aircraft: LIGHT SPORT AIRCRAFT
Phase of flight: Landing
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Ground Excursion Runway

On landing had a big bounce; [aircraft] has tundra tires; ran off runway; left wing contact ground and ground looped. [I plan to] change tires and get more landing instruction from instructor. No personal injuries. Light sport pilot reported striking a wing tip when the aircraft ground looped on landing.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

I proceeded to the gate to get an early start on my preflight. Although there was no snow or precipitation; it was colder out than I'd experienced previously so before I walked around I walked straight back and looked out the windows at the wings. It was still fairly dark but I thought I could see the wings well enough with my flashlight to see any ice and I didn't note any. I did my initial preflight and then proceeded to do my walk-around. I'm a new First Officer; have been on the line for 3 months; and during the walk-around I was specifically looking for ice. I was surprised not to see any on the walk-around and remembered thinking it must be due to the dry air. I finished my walk-around and continued my duties in the cockpit. The Captain specifically asked when we taxied if we needed deicing and I told him no. I was completely surprised to hear we had a call indicating we had taken off with icing. Looking back now; I know the best course of action would have been to check the wings when the sun was completely up and after my walk-around and initial preflight. I think I was reluctant to re-check the top surface of the wing as I wanted to look before the aircraft was filled with passengers. Subsequently; the walk-around with zero indications of any ice led me to mistakenly believe my initial look at the top of the wings provided an accurate assessment. I was incorrect and learned a valuable lesson. I will always look in full daylight or with adequate lighting. On the ground; my First Officer and I got to the aircraft. He walked back to the overwing exits and inspected the wings for frost/ice and then proceeded to do his walk-around. I asked him if there was any frost/ice and he said 'No frost or ice; we have a clean aircraft.' B737-800 flight crew reported inadvertently departing with ice on the wings because the new First Officer missed it on the walk-around.
Aircraft: LIGHT TRANSPORT; LOW WING; 2 TURBOPROP ENG
Phase of flight: Final Approach
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

An unreported; unlit crane approximately 600-700 FT AGL existed at 3.2 DME on the final approach course to the VOR Y Runway 06 at MYGF. The MYGF NOTAMs for MYGF did not contain temporary obstructions nor did they include amendments to the VOR Y Runway 06 IAP. On initial contact with MYGF Approach; the Approach Controller did not alert our crew of the temporary obstruction. Prior to the VALRY FAF; the Approach Controller cleared our crew for the VOR Y Runway 06 approach. MVFR conditions prevailed with cloud bases reported at 2;800 FT. After passing VALRY; the pilot flying initiated a descent to 700 FT MSL while established inbound on the 069 final approach course. At approximately 3.7 DME; the pilot not flying alerted the pilot flying of a crane existing on the final approach course to Runway 06. The pilot flying stopped the aircraft's descent and maneuvered right of the final approach course in order to avoid the unreported crane. Given that MVFR conditions prevailed; the crew proceeded to execute a visual approach to Runway 06 and landed without further incident. The crane was resting on-top of a ship that was docked at the harbor southwest of the airfield on the final approach to Runway 06. If IMC conditions prevailed; the unreported crane would have posed a serious threat to the safety of our flight given that it existed exactly at the 3.2 DME/ 620 FT step down fix. A NOTAM should be issued for this obstruction and its location should be passed along to aircrews conducting approaches to Runway 06. In addition; the VOR Y Runway 06 approach should not be utilized during this crane's presence. We were not cleared for the visual or told of the hazard on our approach path. The pilot flying was watching instruments. If the flight was in IMC conditions I believe fatalities would have resulted from impact with the shipyard crane. The reporter stated that the NOTAM referencing the three cranes; with Crane 8 disabled boom up; is not the same crane that the crew avoided. The crane in place that day restricts approaches to VMC only; visual approaches. Also TRACON controllers are required to notify the crew about its presence. Neither of those conditions were met. The Tower Controller informed them of the restrictive conditions after landing. A flight crew on the MYGF VOR Y 06 approach took evasive action from a crane extended to around 600 FT; 3.2 miles from the approach end and were told after landing that the TRACON Controller should have notified them and further that only visual approaches were conducted during the crane's presence.