Aryan95614/aerograph-asrs huggingface dataset:
Aircraft: LIGHT TRANSPORT; LOW WING; 2 TURBOPROP ENG
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

I had been working Arrival E and Arrival W combined during the beginning of an arrival rush. Aircraft were beginning to step on each other over 2 frequencies as the workload increased. Multiple aircraft also started to report icing in the weather which added to the frequency congestion. Another controller finally came back to split the Arrival West frequency. As that briefing was happening; I accepted a handoff from the P sector of Aircraft X. The controller verbally coordinated to me that the aircraft was direct the SEA065050 fix climbing to 3;000 feet. This is an abnormal route for our airspace which requires coordination with departure a; as well as sector 31. I was stepping Aircraft X up underneath arrivals on the GLASR arrival as soon as I could. At some point; I became preoccupied with the multiple Seattle arrivals and when I looked to climb Aircraft X further; he was already about to enter the 7;000 foot MVA area only climbing out of 6;200. I asked if he could maintain his own terrain/obstruction clearance through 8;000 and he replied negative. I gave him an immediate right turn to a 180 heading to get him out of the area and issued a climb to 15;000. Aircraft X was in the 7;000 MVA for a couple miles. Once above the MVA; I turned him back on course and gave the frequency change to sector 31.First and foremost; traffic management came over to me and said they tried to get me help to split the sector but that there wasn't the staffing. So I continued to work both sectors until relief was brought back in. Just because the board doesn't look like the volume of traffic is too difficult for one controller to work both sectors combined; doesn't mean the complexity of our airspace won't warrant the sector to be split.Stepping up aircraft from Paine field underneath arrivals on the GLASR arrival to SeaTac is cumbersome and takes attention away from other things that need to be done. This will be amplified once commercial service begins flying daily flights out of that airport. There are no procedures in place to handle the influx of this traffic and there will be more events like the one that just happened. S46 TRACON Controller reported working a combined position; having to climb an aircraft underneath other aircraft and it entered a higher MVA.
Aircraft: BRASILIA EMB-120 ALL SERIES
Phase of flight: taxi
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

This was an incident where we lost several panels during flight. We had no indication of when the panels came off. The aircraft had gone through maintenance the day before due to the aircraft not producing heat to the passengers or pilots. The following day the aircraft was working good and putting out heat; making the flights that day tolerable. My first officer made the preflight for the day but saw nothing unusual in the walk around. We were originally scheduled to fly one more leg but due to the time and the condition of the airport; both runway and ramp had areas of ice; making taxiing and possible takeoff unsafe. I informed my Company that we needed to end the trip there and go to the hotel. The next day when we reported to the airport is when we discovered that the aircraft was missing the panels. EMB-120 Captain reported discovering that their aircraft had lost several exterior panels in flight.
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Phase of flight: Initial Climb
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Assigned to operate [a] ferry flight from ZZZ to PHL. The aircraft being ferried [requested priority handling with ATC] the day prior and returned to ZZZ after takeoff. After takeoff; a smell of an electrical burn and LAV SMOKE master warning [was] encountered. Returned to ZZZ.After takeoff; around 200 feet; both the Captain and I noticed the smell of an electrical burn. Passing through 400 feet the aircraft produced a LAV SMOKE master warning. No other warnings; cautions; or advisories were present. Cause unknown. MEL was signed off from the day prior by Maintenance in the logbook.Once the aircraft was cleaned up; we ran the LAV SMOKE QRH procedure. Once that was complete I ran normal checklist; sent an ACARS message; and set up for the approach while the Captain flew the aircraft and handled ATC. We wanted an immediate return to ZZZ and vectors to final for the LDA Runway XX.No suggestions at this time. Since the Captain was flying it was easy for him to take control of the radios while I ran the checklists. It is my belief that in any emergency situation; no matter who is the Pilot Flying; the cockpit should be divided such that the Captain is the one communicating with ATC throughout most of the emergency. That way the Captain doesn't have to listen to an ATC request; make an informed decision; tell his First Officer what to say; and then [pass it] off to ATC or the Flight Attendant. I am reviewing our publications currently to see if this is SOP. EMB-145 First Officer reported smelling an electrical burn and receiving a LAV SMOKE master warning after takeoff.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance

I was pilot monitoring in cruise flight at FL 350 headed when the Captain pointed out that my R1 windshield was arcing. He instructed me to don my mask and get the checklist out. I was in the process of opening the Window Damage Checklist when I heard a loud bang and my windshield shattered/cracked in at least five places with numerous fingers from each. The Captain ordered me to declare an emergency and started slowing the airplane for a descent. I declared the emergency and told the Controller I needed a clearance to the nearest suitable airfield and an immediate descent. He cleared us direct to ZZZ and FL 290. We monitored the pressurization and had normal readings. We initiated the descent and as I was getting into the checklist; I loaded FMS landing data; and the Captain flew in that direction. I turned the seatbelt sign back on. The pilot flying communicated with the flight attendants and flew the airplane as I [restarted] the Window Damage Checklist. In the descent; I evaluated the window as possible outer pane cracks only. The Captain thought they were too severe to tell; but due to the severity of them and the fact he saw them arcing; we proceeded with our plan to divert. We lowered the landing gear and left the speedbrakes out to burn fuel for landing. I lowered my seat and put on sunglasses to help avoid debris in case the rest of the window gave way.We ran the QRH Checklist; the Descent Checklist; the Divert Checklist; loaded the box; ran the landing numbers; and flew to an overweight landing on Runway XXR and taxied to a gate. Touchdown fuel was 11.5; ZFW was 104943 giving us an overweight landing at 116.4 thousand pounds; performed with Captain's emergency authority Directed the First Officer to don O2 mask and goggles as did I. A B737 flight crew opted to descend and divert to a nearby airport when the First Officer's windshield first arced and then shattered. They were unable to determine with certainty whether the shattering was limited to the outer pane; a situation that would not have required such immediate action.
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

On the right downwind for Runway 23 we were given a descent down to 2;600 from 5;000 FT. During the descent the Captain asked for flaps 9 degrees. When I selected the flap position the Caution light and ding went off signaling on the EICAS that we had 'FLAP FAIL.' I checked the backup RMU page for the aircraft systems and saw the flaps were still in the 0 position. We cycled the flaps back to 0 and back to 9 then back to 0 to no avail. Approach gave us a vector to base. We then began the Flap Fail QRH. At this point we were given a vector to join final and contact Tower. Once with Tower we advised Tower that we were experiencing a problem and needed delay vectors to finish the QRH. Tower advised us to maintain 2;600 FT and circle as necessary to handle the situation. We then completely ran the Flap Fail QRH. We determined that per the QRH; we had enough runway available to safely completely a flap 0 landing on Runway 23 and that a diversion was unnecessary. After completing the in range portion of the QRH; the Captain instructed me to declare an emergency with the Tower so that emergency personnel would be standing by the runway as a precaution. The Captain then informed the Flight Attendant of the situation and then made a PA to the passengers informing them of the situation and to not worry. Once on final we finished the QRH once the gear came down. We landed safely with no abnormal occurrence other than landing with the flaps 0. We departed with around 300 LBS over release fuel but discovered the problem on downwind with about 2;300 LBS. This made options such as diverting to an airport with longer runways such as IAD more difficult. We had a flap low speed MEL for the aircraft (27-53-00-02). On approach we selected flaps 9 and the EICAS flap fail message appeared. The weather was good with no alternate. Fuel planned on arrival for release was about 2;400 LBS. The fact we had only about 1 hours worth of fuel was a threat. It took away time and options that might had been available had we had more fuel. Without the extra time; and the fact we were on the approach; the process moved along pretty quick. We were trying to make sure all necessary checklists and communications were accomplished before the approach was continued. Try to take your time as much as you can. Given that not much time/options are available; prioritize what is important. An EMB-145 EICAS alerted FLAP FAIL as flaps 9 were selected for landing so the crew completed the QRH; declared an emergency; and landed without incident.
Aircraft: A320
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

We were cleared to leave the ramp and taxi to the runway. We were told our sequence was to follow the MD88 ahead and monitor the tower which we did. Approaching the taxiway the MD88 started taxiing to cross the left runway which was being used as a taxiway as there was a tug pulling an aircraft stopped on the runway. So as previously cleared we continued to follow the aircraft ahead.Approaching the runway Tower called our flight number so I stopped with nose slightly on the runway. My co-pilot then told Tower our clearance was to follow the MD88 and monitor the tower which we were doing. The controller then said he has a phone number to call for possible runway violation. We continued on with no further incident. There was no threat to safety in anyway. The clearance to sequence and follow the MD88 superseded the one given to us on the ramp. We were never told to hold short of a taxiway or the left runway with the second clearance. There was a definite communication failure on both parties; ATC and us. With the tug and aircraft stopped on the left runway the runway was obviously not active. In the future with this type of communication I will clarify the intent. A320 Captain reported being issued taxi instructions to follow another aircraft and following the aircraft onto a runway to cross; but that was not ATC's intention.
Aircraft: LIGHT TRANSPORT; HIGH WING; 2 TURBOPROP ENG
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Taxiway

I was PIC (Pilot in Command) and Pilot Flying. We were cleared to land and to expect to exit at Taxiway XX; approach and landing were normal; as I was approaching the high speed left turn onto Taxiway XX; the wind; which was out of the south and gusty; caused the aircraft to veer left; I attempted to correct with full right rudder and right brake; which was ineffective. I realized we were committed to going through the lights; went through/around them; then just as quickly back thru them onto XX taxiway. We taxied to the ramp and parked.While not minimizing my full responsibility for this event; I believe it's important to consider how this happened in order to mitigate any future occurrence. Contributing factors: 1. The gusty crosswind2. My inexperience with Aircraft X3. Excessive speed for the conditionsMitigation Strategies:1. Slow down; get to taxi speed more quickly.2. Understand the only connection to the nose wheel is the tiller and to guard/utilize it appropriately. Captain reported loss of control while exiting runway at the high speed turnoff.
Aircraft: C172
Phase of flight: Final Approach
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC

My student and I were practicing the Localizer DME RWY XX Approach into ZZZ. I had made 3 position reports on the CTAF frequency notifying airport traffic of our position on the approach; and what our intentions were. The winds were favoring Runway XY and that's what runway was in use at the time. I had planned to do a low approach over the top at circling approach minimum which [was] 1260 ft; and then enter the downwind for Runway XY; and I made that clear over the CTAF. The goal was to practice circling to land off an approach with my instrument student. A Piper Seminole had just departed the runway and I had that traffic in sight; and I was aware there was another aircraft that was behind the Seminole on final. Believing I had enough time; I had my student take off the hood; at which point the aircraft was under my control. As we passed over the top of the field in preparation to circle; I realized that there was only about 400 feet between me and the other aircraft which had been behind the Seminole (as noted via the Traffic information Service and visual observation). Rather than continue; my student and I departed the pattern and re-entered on the 45 for Runway XY without incident. ZZZ is among the top 4 busiest airports within the state; but is un-towered. The field is currently attempting to fund a control tower; which many people believe is much needed and critical to maintaining the safety at the airport. However; in order to prevent future occurrences; and until a tower is implemented; breaking off approaches and re-entering on the 45 when there are multiple aircraft in the pattern is probably safest. Instructor pilot decided to break off approach due to close proximity of traffic at a non-towered airport airport.
Aircraft: MD80
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

We were climbing enroute. We were given FL280 as an altitude to climb to. Autopilot was on. ATC called traffic about 10 o'clock above us at FL290. As the aircraft climbed through about 27;700 the TCAS gave us an RA to adjust vertical climb. The FO took off the auto-pilot; not unusual when receiving an RA. I scanned the outside for the traffic and saw them; alerting the FO I had the traffic in sight. I glanced down and saw we were at 28;150 feet and climbing. I told him to 'Stop the Climb!' We leveled at 28;200 and reversed down to 28;000 feet. Then the FO told me for an unknown reason he got the meaning of the red and green arcs confused and was thinking he needed to keep the VSI needle in the Red arc. When I told him to stop the climb he said he immediately realized what he was doing wrong.Perhaps if the FO would have left the autopilot on the capture of 28;000 would have been better; however I see that the autopilot routinely will capture and climb 100 feet high; then come back down to the correct altitude. The RA came on before he took off the autopilot; so the RA was not a result of our altitude getting to 28;200. We were in cruise at FL290. We saw traffic on the TCAS; no advisory from ATC was ever received; and watched it climb through FL280 (1;000 below us) and approach our flight path. The TCAS RA activated and stated Climb; Climb. We immediately climbed & turned away from the offender aircraft. During our climb the FO stated; 'He's coming right at us.' During our climb the aircraft remained 800 feet below us. We climbed to FL300 and advised ATC at once. When the offender aircraft had passed below us we asked ATC to advise what altitude they wanted us to maintain. They responded FL290 so we descended to FL290. An air carrier First Officer climbing to FL280 with FL290 traffic ahead; misinterpreted his TCAS RA red/green visual cues and continued climbing with the VSI needle in the red band. The FL290 aircraft crew took evasive action to the climbing traffic RA.
Aircraft: DA40 DIAMOND STAR
Phase of flight: Takeoff / Launch
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

During takeoff roll; the rear hatch of the aircraft opened and blew off the aircraft. I heard a loud noise at that time; but was unaware as to the source of the noise. I immediately aborted takeoff; and notified the Tower of my intentions. I then noticed the rear hatch was no longer on the plane; and notified the Tower that there was FOD on the runway. I exited the active Runway (18L) at first chance and taxied back to the ramp. The plane was put in the hangar along with the hatch that was retrieved. The aircraft never left the ground. A pilot (me) and one passenger were on board. No one was injured; and there was no apparent structural damage to the aircraft. A DA40's rear hatch opened and blew off on to the runway during the takeoff roll. The takeoff was rejected and aircraft returned to the FBO for maintenance.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was placing my luggage in the overhead bin; turned around and saw passengers boarding the aircraft. I was not notified boarding had begun; nor had ops checked to make sure we were ready. Ops should always check with the crew to ensure they are ready before boarding. B737 Flight Attendant reports passengers boarding before she was ready and without any communication from the gate agent or operations.
Aircraft: SMALL TRANSPORT; LOW WING; 2 TURBOPROP ENG
Phase of flight: Final Approach
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

During this situation; the Biltmore Sector at P50 did not initiate the flash to hand an aircraft off until the aircraft on the edge of SDL Tower Class D airspace. While this was happening; I had Aircraft Y on final and Aircraft Z turning approximately a 3 mile base turn for a touch and go. I did not observe the inbound Aircraft X on the STARS display because the alfa numerics were not visible; and I did not observe the 'B' tag; which is designated to the Biltmore Sector; until the controller at P50 called to initiate a manual handoff. At the time he called he apologized for the late flash; I said I could not take that because of pattern traffic; and gave my operating initials and came off the line. A few seconds later Aircraft X came over to my frequency stating he was cleared for the visual approach. I gave the aircraft the sequence to follow Aircraft Z on final. Subsequently Aircraft X closure rate on the Aircraft Z resulted in me having to send Aircraft X around. I called back to the P50 controller and asked if he had just switched the aircraft and he said he did against my decision stating that I could not accept the aircraft. This is becoming a recurrent problem facing SDL Tower and puts us in a severely disabling position while dealing with our heightened seasonal traffic that is taking place now. A new Letter of Agreement was just put into effect. This LOA mandates that SDL tower must accept the data transfer for an IFR inbound aircraft regardless of current traffic volume whether it be IFR/VFR. This is not feasible with the traffic volume we can have during the winter months. If we do not accept the data transfer as management requires; P50 will make a quick shout over the shout line and switch the aircraft. At SDL we are a training facility and have numerous 'green' controllers who are susceptible to adverse situations by this mandate. It must be retracted. Additionally it is very misunderstood at SDL how this is only called a data transfer and not a handoff; and how another facility can get away with one aircraft entering another controllers airspace if they do not accept the handoff. SDL Local Controller reports of a attempted handoff late from P50. SDL Controller advises he's unable handoff due to other traffic. Minutes later the aircraft is on his frequency cleared for a visual approach. SDL Controller had to send an aircraft around due to the overtake from the un-handed off aircraft. A new LOA went into place 3 days prior.
Aircraft: B757
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

On descent; we received a L hydraulic system pressure message The First Officer continued to fly and i worked through the QRH. After running the QRH we decided to [advise] with ZZZ Approach. We also had a jumpseater in the back who had just transitioned from the B757 to the [aircraft] so I asked if he would join us in the cockpit as an extra set of eyes. At this time the left hydraulic fluid was so low that alternate means had to be used to extend LE and TE flaps and the landing gear. After an extended down wind to configure we advised the Tower that we would need [to be] towed off of the runway and would be making a full stop on Runway XXL. Captain's landing was smooth and light braking was used and the airplane was brought to a stop at [taxiway] 1X and shut down. After arriving at the gate; the First Officer; jumpseater and I went inside to go over it as I was curious to see what things i could have done better. I had full intention of immediately calling the [Chief Pilot] right after this; but in the mix; I forgot and didn't speak to him for almost an hour and a half. I also did not put that [we advised ATC] in the write up. Being my first [priority event] with the maintenance software I selected the '[advised ATC]' switch to yes and made the wrong assumption that this would suffice. Lesson learned. On descent into ZZZ; a Left Hydraulic System Pressure malfunction illuminated. I was Flying Pilot and continued to fly while the Captain commenced QRH procedures for the associated malfunction. Once the QRH procedures were completed; we [advised] ZZZ Approach. We elected to get our one jumpseater who is typed in the B757 and [aircraft] to assist as needed in the cockpit. With loss of left hydraulic fluid; we needed to lower flaps/slats and landing gear via alternate means. Both procedures were properly completed as per the QRH. We notified ATC that we would need assistance upon landing and that we would be a full stop on the runway. Landing was uneventful and shutdown was per QRH and normal procedures while on Runway XXL. Normal communications were established with ZZZ rescue. Company maintenance personnel arrived to the aircraft and towed the jet to Gate XX without incident. Fire/Rescue escorted jet to gate; no services required. Suspected hydraulic system pressure/fluid loss on left hydraulic system. B757 flight crew reported loss of a hydraulic system resulted in a precautionary landing and a tow off the runway to the gate.