Aryan95614/aerograph-asrs huggingface dataset:
Aircraft: LEARJET 60
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

We were on arrival into ZZZ and on vectors with Approach Control. Prior to switching over to Approach Control ATC advised us that we could expect moderate turbulence; I believe from 9;000 to 12;000 feet; on descent. We were higher up on our descent when they notified us that we could expect the moderate turbulence in the lower altitude structure. We were switched over to approach control. I remarked to approach that we were picking up moderate turbulence; again I believe we were at or above 6;000 feet to give them a heads up. We were given a left northerly turn to 010 degrees and a descent to 5;000 feet. The Autopilot was engaged. It was very turbulent. We received an Alts Cap which is a normal indication on the FMA (Flight Mode Annunciator) that the autopilot is now armed to capture the selected altitude. We were getting bumped around pretty good by now; full continuous moderate turbulence. It was at that moment when the autopilot was capturing the altitude that the upset occurred. The aircraft was rocked to a 45 to 50 degree left bank and a sinking drop occurred similar to what you would receive in an airliner if you ever have hit an air pocket. This exceeded the limits of the autopilot and it kicked off. I took over manually to right the airplane and that is when we received what I would call a severe bump which led to the second upset that did the same thing; left bank to 45 to 50 degrees and a pitch downward. I was already in the process of advancing power from the first upset but this time I went to full thrust; TOGA power if you will; to initiate the unusual attitude recovery. I was aggressive in the recovery; put some G on the aircraft; airspeed bled down from 250 to about 180 or 190 at that moment which is still a safe flying airspeed in our type aircraft; well above stall. I traded airspeed for altitude to expedite the recovery. We recovered to altitude shortly after.This all happened so quickly. Severe turbulence upset coupled with automation exceedance were contributing factors. Lessons learned are significant. Turbulence is always a threat.Constance vigilance is always required. Secondly we stress at our company to never fully rely on automation and that it will not always work in all situations. We also stress that situations can happen to anyone regardless of experience. An Incident/Hazard Report has been filled out as part of our Safety Management System (SMS) program and submitted to the Director of Safety at our company. We train for upset situations every X months as part of our X month continuation qualification and training. I've flown many types of aircraft as well as fighter type aircraft and have never experienced a situation such as the one described above. Lear 60 pilot reported that the aircraft encountered moderate to severe turbulence; resulting in two upsets and subsequent recovery.
Aircraft: BEECHJET 400
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

The FBO personnel informed the crew that there was frost on the wings after fueling; and that they had deicing equipment available. The Captain declined to receive deicing and stated that the frost was very light and that 'the jet will fly just fine'. I felt uncertain about this and while standing next to him in front of the left wing; I ran my finger over the frost and told him I thought we should deice. He again rejected this and told me to 'sit my butt down in my seat; cause we are leaving'. I felt intimidated by him (due to previous issues) and did as he told me to. The Captain closed the door behind me and got ready to start the engines. Before engine start; I expressed my concerns again and received a snappy response. 'What do you know?! You barely have any time in this jet! I have thousands of hours! She will fly just FINE!'The Captain then started the engines and started taxiing in a rush without completing the required checklists; or acknowledging my concerns. During taxi; I expressed my concerns and received another snappy response. In the months prior; I had tried to convey to him my safety-related concerns and often feeling uncomfortable when flying with this particular Captain. I was scared to conduct the flight with frost on the wings; but it seemed that the Captain just wanted to get home (as soon as possible). He wouldn't listen to me; and he conducted the takeoff for our flight. I felt horrible; scared; unsafe; belittled; and powerless. Nothing I said to him in a professional manner got through to him. I felt hijacked and taken along for a ride I did not want to be on. I felt intimidated by the Captain. Corporate First Officer reported the Captain ignored several procedures including refusing to deice the aircraft when frost was identified on the wings prior to engine start.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

The Lead Flight Attendant had apparently talked to the Captain or First Officer about masks. They said something to me about it after my break along the lines that she was upset and combative. I was surprised; as I wore my mask (a KN95 on the ground and a solid multi-layer cloth one in the air) all times outside of the flight deck and in the flight deck if a Flight Attendant was present. Additionally; the other First Officer did as well. The Captain wears glasses that fog easily with a mask on. He wore a mask on the ground; he did not airborne because it would greatly interfere with his duties both because he wouldn't be able to see and could not communicate. This was our 4th leg together and we had no issues with masks among ourselves or other flight attendants. Additionally; both the Captain and other First Officer already had COVID which they had gotten from people they knew at home; not in the workplace. Before our next rest room break I got out a new unused N95 mask for the Flight Attendant that would be in the flight deck while I was in the bathroom. When I called back and ask for the break she ordered me that the pilot remaining in the flight deck should wear the crew oxygen mask. I said that was not something that we did anymore-the practice stopped months ago because of COVID. I offered her the N95 for extra protection because the Captain can't wear a mask and do his job. She refused it. Instead continuing to wear what appeared to be a single layer stretchy black cloth mask. Additionally the flight attendant blocking the cart was wearing a KN95 but the Lead FA did not send her into the flight deck. I found the flight attendant to not be willing to exercise self-help and any wearing of an N95 and apparent multiple complaints to be a distraction from my flight duties. This was not good for crew CRM. While the single pilot on the flight deck; I was distracted from monitoring the airplane by her distress and complaints. Air Carrier First Officer reported poor CRM with the Lead FA regarding the company face mask policy on the Flight Deck.
Aircraft: SMALL AIRCRAFT; LOW WING; 1 ENG; FIXED GEAR
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

I was merely the TMC (Traffic Management Coordinator) in the room when the event occurred. Aircraft X was inbound and lost his auto pilot. It appeared that the pilot was a little too panicked to fly the airplane on an instrument approach and was struggling to hold a heading and an altitude. A Controller was working the emergency at the time and by the Controller in Charge's (CIC) account; was doing a good job. The OM (Operations Manager) decided to send a Supervisor to take over the position; even though the Supervisor isn't certified at all on satellite sector. The CIC said that this caused a little chaos initially; but then it settled down. All of us in the room were scratching our heads as to why you'd pull a full time controller off the position to plug in a supervisor that controls 8 hours a month and isn't certified on the position and no; he isn't pilot either. Maybe this is a new FAA policy? If so; not a good one. As a part time controller myself; I would never want to take a position from a Controller on a position that I don't work and work an emergency. Staffing was not an issue and I can't fathom why the OM would put the supervisor in that position and why the pilot didn't get the more experienced person available. My recommendation would be to let the controller do their job. Traffic Management Coordinator reported an Operations Manager assign a non certified Supervisor to work a sector during an aircraft emergency event.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: approach
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

I observed the use of a [galley service] truck during a ground stop due to lightning; park an aircraft. This method of operation I feel is unsafe since an aircraft is being parked without the use of chocks; hooked up to push tractor and the loading bridge is able to approach the aircraft. We had an incident two days prior where during a ground stop due to lightning the catering truck parked an Airbus and about 8 minutes after arrival the pilot released the brakes and the aircraft rolled back about 5 feet while passengers were exiting the aircraft. The only thing stopping the aircraft was the fact that the 1L door was pinned up against the loading bridge. Somebody could have been seriously hurt walking off the plane by getting pinned or falling to the the ground at ramp level. The company is putting passengers and crew in danger of allowing this operation to continue since there is always the possibility of the brakes being released while an aircraft is not chocked or connected to a push tractor. A ramp person reports that his company's practice of marshalling aircraft from a catering truck during a lightning storm is unsafe since chocks are not installed and the aircraft may roll if the Captain releases the parking brake.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Takeoff / Launch
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

We were cleared to depart on the ATUMA3B. The chart depicts climbing on the CAT 092/15.0 and above 8;000 ft. then turning to a 315 heading. This is also what is depicted when selecting the departure in the FMC. However; the narrative below says to fly out the CAT 092 until 8000 and then turning to a 315 heading. It does not say to fly to the fix depicted on the chart only to turn once passing 8;000 ft. Air carrier Captain reported that the MSLP ATUMA3B SID depiction differs from the narrative.
Aircraft: FALCON 2000
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

While descending via the CHINS4 arrival into BFI (Seattle/King County Boeing Field); on the segment between 'HUMPP' and 'AUBRN'; passing approximately 14;500 ft. MSL at 250 kts. IAS; I encountered wake turbulence. Temporary loss of control was experienced as the aircraft rolled right; back left; and strongly back right again - with the final bank angle in the roll estimated to be beyond 30 but not more than 50 degrees wing down to the right before I could fully react. During the course of the roll and recovery; automation (including autopilot and auto throttle) was disengaged; and at no time did the EGPWS 'BANK ANGLE' warning sound. I stopped the roll and regained controlled flight with full and smooth application of left aileron; while adding power and climbing out of the perceived vortex. Once clear; automation was restored; the event briefed amongst the crew; and I instructed the PNF (Pilot not Flying) to radio Seattle Approach indicating we had 'encountered wake turbulence' and that 'we were attempting to re-establish on the arrival'. The Approach Controller acknowledged the transmission and advised we were following a Boeing 737-900 series sequenced for SEA (Seattle). From there; a normal descent and approach was conducted to the destination airport. No aircraft faults/failures/malfunctions/warnings; nor exceedances were experienced at any time before; during; or after the event. I was aware of the altitude and spacing regarding the traffic ahead on the arrival; with use of TCAS indications and relative altitude; as well situational awareness provided by our aircraft's INAV display. Spacing and distance appeared more than adequate considering the flight conditions; as the preceding aircraft was consistently indicating around 2;500 ft. below our level and well ahead on the arrival. At no time were we given advisories from ATC in regards to traffic ahead; nor caution on wake turbulence.This event was truly unexpected; however; I must credit flight training providers with modeling extremely accurate wake turbulence simulation scenarios that helped me to quickly identify; and recover properly from this real life upset. Experiencing this is a reminder that wake turbulence can be encountered during a descent profile - especially on an RNAV arrival with 'at-or-above/below' vertical crossing restrictions that could result in brief level offs at slower airspeeds which could lead to preceding aircraft generating stronger than expected vortices. Falcon 2000 Captain reported momentary loss of control after encountering wake turbulence on approach to BFI airport.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Taxied out on Taxiway A from the terminal to Runway 11. I was temporarily confused because there is a well-marked Taxiway H near the departure end of Runway 11 that does not appear on my PWM Jepps 11-1. After confirming with the other pilot that we were indeed correct by staying on A; all the way to the end and that H did not appear on our Jepps chart; we took off safely using the full length (from Taxiway A entrance) of Runway 11; as we had been cleared to do. Air Carrier pilot reported at PWM there is a taxiway that is not indicated on their Jeppesen Chart. The taxiway is also not on the FAA Chart Airport diagram.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Landing
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Go-around due to aircraft ahead on the runway. It didn't clear due to slippery runway conditions. ZZZ indicated we'd be the last to land on [Runway] XXR and then it would close for snow removal. The aircraft which landed ahead of us couldn't make the turn off and stopped. Tower instructed us to go around. We set up and landed on [Runway] XY. 737-900 Captain reported receiving a missed approach instruction from the Tower Controller. The preceding aircraft was unable to exit the runway in a timely manner due to snow and slippery conditions.
Aircraft: CRJ200
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Our ATC clearance given to us by TRI Ground was: As filed; [maintain] 3;000 FT; [expect] 13;000 FT in ten minutes; a departure frequency and a squawk. Holding short of Runway 23; our takeoff clearance by TRI Tower was: Fly runway heading; cleared for takeoff Runway 23. I read back the clearance as stated. After initial climb and level off at 3;000 FT MSL (1;500 FT AGL) Departure gave us a vector; a left turn. According to EGPWS the turn put the aircraft on a course for terrain depicted red. I asked the Captain if he would like me to request higher. ATC then advised our initial departure clearance was to 10;000 FT initially and to expect 13;000 FT in 10 minutes. We informed ATC that his clearance was not what we received; copied; and read back. We were then cleared to climb and maintain 10;000 FT; which we did. No EGPWS cautions or warnings were ever triggered and no other disruptions to flight occurred.The departure procedure for TRI airport on all runways is to fly runway heading to 3;000 FT and no turns below 3;700 FT. Even though we were in positive radar contact we should have not accepted a vector until we complied with the ODP. Confusion reigned on departure when the CRJ-200 flight crew and Ground Control failed to agree as to their cleared altitude after takeoff from TRI.
Aircraft: SMALL AIRCRAFT; LOW WING; 2 ENG; RETRACTABLE GEAR
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

I was flying long cross country to Chino via Ontario and Ramona and with touch and go landings at Ontario and Ramona. As soon as we cleared the mountains; we started our descent from 11500 feet. SoCal Approach (app) asked us what altitude we were going to descend down to. We said 4000. As Ontario Airport appeared from behind the clouds and was getting close; we started to descend to below 4000.Approach told us to fly heading 090; which we thought was going to put us to a right downwind entry for 26R. A few seconds later; app told us to fly heading 130. A few seconds later; we realized that 130 heading would take us across the departure corridor of Ontario runway 26 and we saw a jet just taking off. As soon as we saw the airplane; for safety reasons; we requested resume own navigation to avoid the traffic and we told Approach we have the airport insight. Upon approval; we turned back north away from the departure corridor to the northeast to avoid the departing traffic. That's the moment when we realized that Approach didn't know we were going to land at Ontario and that's the moment when Approach realized we were going to land at Ontario. Approach asked us what altitude we were going to descend down to. We said pattern altitude at 2000. He told us we should have informed him before descending through 4000. He told us to contact tower. We were on the right downwind at 2000. We got a possible pilot deviation warning from Ontario Tower and SOCAL Approach. We called SOCAL quality control when we landed at Ramona. SOCAL told me that we showed on the jet's TCAS. It's a case of lost separation. SOCAL was going to listen to the tape and investigate. After I got back from the flight; I talked to our chief instructor. We should have been more careful when in the unfamiliar LA area and notified the ATC for altitude changes. I should have clarified more when there's a suspected confusion. I briefed my student and we talked about the incident. We learned from the case that we need to more cautious and listen more carefully and notify ATC of the altitude change. I also talked with other instructors so we could help prevent similar situations in the future. Instructor pilot reported a loss of separation due to confusion on where they wanted to land. Their aircraft came close to aircraft departing ONT. Pilot did not advise ATC prior to descending that they wanted to land at ONT.
Aircraft: SMALL AIRCRAFT; LOW WING; 1 ENG; RETRACTABLE GEAR
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Aircraft leveled off at 3600 and then told me he was continuing his descent. I believe I misheard him and thought he said he was continuing inbound. The 3600 MVA [Minimum Vectoring Altitude] was busted and I had him climb back to 3600. Listen actively. Controller reported not listening correctly to a read back which had the pilot descend below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude.
Aircraft: PA28
Phase of flight: Landing
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

My flight began at ZZZ1 with the intent to fly direct to ZZZ for touch and goes and return to ZZZ1. I have flown this particular airplane multiple times with no issues. The start; taxi; and run-up were normal and no different than any other time; except that the strobe lights were blinking slower than usual but working as expected.The airplane was flown earlier; and no issues were reported; hence there was no reason to suspect a problem. I did two take-offs and landings before departing to ZZZ; I had no issues. During a normal approach to landing at ZZZ; all-electric equipment failed at an altitude of 300 feet from touching down on Runway XX. I was forced to immediately clear the runway and exit onto the first taxiway I saw; Taxiway XX; I had a disabled radio; transponder; and ADS-B.Although clear from the tower for a touch and go; I could not continue the flight safely with disabled equipment; therefore a go-around was not an option. Luckily; I have a handheld radio and was able to contact the control tower to explain what happened; and request directions to the parking area. I had to deviate from the touch and go clearance since I dint know what else was wrong with the airplane and continuing the flight would have been unwise.After arriving at the parking area; I talked to the mechanic who was only available by phone and asked me to go through my checklist again to troubleshoot the issue. I made multiple attempts to restart the airplane; loud cabin speaker noises could be heard as the power switch was turned on as if there was a short circuit in the system; but all fuses were okay and there was no power to start the engine. The mechanic determined that I had a dead battery and it could only mean that the airplane suffered an alternator failure on landing; grounding the airplane immediately.The flight club from which I rented the airplane has multiple airplanes of the same make and model and provided me with one so I could fly back to ZZZ1. The return flight was uneventful. PA28 pilot reported that on final approach all electrical equipment failed. After a successful landing; it was determined that the battery was dead.