Aryan95614/aerograph-asrs huggingface dataset:
Aircraft: LARGE TRANSPORT; LOW WING; 2 TURBOJET ENG
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Taxi out from DEN ramp; instructed behind traffic taxi SA; A; A hold point. The Company ramp procedures were briefed to include the requirement to hold at the A hold point and contact Ground. We taxied as instructed but missed the hold point for A. Apparently it is very close the SA and was missed coming out of the turn from SA onto A. We contacted Ground without issue and continued with a normal flight. Having briefed the procedure we were looking for the hold point to be further up A. We were following traffic that did not stop at the hold point and were looking for the hold point to be further up A. The Ramp Pages do a good job of describing the procedure but do not show a very good depiction of its actual location. The Reporter stated that the crew briefed the HOLD POSITION from a Company airport chart and were anticipating its location immediately upon entering Taxiway A. It was not there and the hold position was not obvious to them at any time. Another point of distraction was the four smaller aircraft taxiing ahead of them did not stop at any point leading them to believe they were not required to even though documentation said otherwise.A good friend of his was going to DEN the next day so the Reporter asked him to locate the HOLD POSITION line. He did not see it either. A Captain briefed the taxi procedure from the DEN Freight Ramp to the runways including the A hold point; but did not see the hold point on the taxiway and suggested a better chart depiction.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

[I] departed as pilot flying. At 10;000 FT as I started to accelerate to climb speed; I noticed the aircraft was not trimming in the nose down direction and wanted to pitch up. I told the Captain I thought we might have a trim problem; and passed control of the aircraft to him to try. He found the same results; returned control of the aircraft to me; and got out the QRH. I took ATC on the radio; while the Captain ran the QRH checklist and contacted Maintenance Control. In the course of evaluating the malfunction with maintenance; and after discussing the Circuit Breaker reset policy; we elected that as a flight control system malfunction; it was within the Captain's authority and would be prudent to attempt one reset of a popped Circuit Breaker. The popped Circuit Breaker was reset and immediately popped again when nose down trim was selected. At this point; we completed the QRH; and began a diversion. An uneventful; heavyweight; flaps 15 (per QRH) landing was accomplished. Stabilizer Trim system failed sometime after the trim was set for takeoff. (Note: aircraft was trimmed nose down to set takeoff trim during normal checklist operations and functioned correctly at that time). [Narrative #2 contained no additional information] A B737-800 Stabilizer Trim failed after takeoff without a failure annunciation when the circuit break popped; was reset and popped again; so the flight diverted to a nearby airport.
Aircraft: A320
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Avionics smoke ECAM Came on as we climbed toward FL250. We handled the ECAM and determined that there were no other indications of smoke; fire or instrument degradation. ECAM directed LAND ASAP. We declared an emergency with Center and requested a return to our departure airport (approximately 30 miles away). We notified company Dispatch through ACARS and then landed safely. We were inspected by CFR who determined that there were no other indications of fire or smoke. They then escorted us to the gate. No additional information was provided in the secondary narrative. Following receipt of an Avionics smoke ECAM warning an A320 flight crew performed the associated checklist procedures; declared an emergency and returned to their departure airport.
Aircraft: CESSNA 402/402C/B379 BUSINESSLINER/UTILINER
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Cruise flight 70 NM from [destination]; a passenger alerted us that he saw smoke coming from the left circuit breaker panel. I looked down and confirmed that there was in fact smoke coming from the panel. Performed memory items and referenced QRH. [Advised] ATC. The isolation of the electrical systems stopped the smoke. We diverted to ZZZ (~40 NM) as it was closer than [destination] and would have emergency response crew. Landed at ZZZ and performed emergency ground evacuation per the QRH. Fire crews inspected the plane and were not able to find source of smoke but did detect a strong smell of a previous electrical fire. I suspect the source of the smoke was from the heater and or heater fan which was turned on 15 minutes prior; or it was possible it was the lightning strike detector. No circuit breakers or switch breakers were tripped. Aircraft was fresh out of phase; perhaps Functional Check Flights after phase could prevent this experience for passengers. These passengers were on the previous flight which had an air return for a rough running engine. Cessna 402 Captain reported that a passenger noticed smoke coming from a circuit breaker panel. After confirming that an electrical problem did exist; the Captain elected to divert a suitable nearby airport.
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

While on a visual approach into UNV Runway 24; we received a EGWPS warning instructing the flight crew to take evasive action. The EGWPS warning sounded and instructed us to 'pull up'. The conditions were VFR and we had clear visual contact with the terrain. I started a stabilized descent after I passed the last ridge line to join the final approach course. We appeared to be past the ridge and had over 1;000 ft clearance with the terrain. I immediately performed the EGWPS escape maneuver and the aural alert ceased. We proceeded with the visual approach and landed with no issue. I have flown into UNV numerous times in the [other similarly sized aircraft] and have never had this issue. ATC vectored us in a little tighter than normal and I guess the ridge is a little higher in that vicinity which triggered the alert. In the future I will request a wider vector and delay my descent from the MVA until the aircraft is completely clear of the ridge and established on the final approach course. I also should've been monitoring the 'Terrain' page on my MFD. I typically do this; but realized I wasn't; after the fact; during this event. EMB-145 First Officer reported taking evasive action in response to an EGPWS terrain warning on a visual approach into UNV airport.
Aircraft: A319
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

While at FL320 in completely smooth air we encountered a jolt of moderate turbulence lasting approximately 2 seconds. This was followed by another jolt of turbulence lasting 2-3 seconds that was moderate to more than moderate; but not fitting of the definition of severe in intensity (FOM); and about 3-5 seconds after the first encounter. In our vicinity an airplane had just passed in front and above us and was abeam our aircraft when the turbulence was encountered. I immediately suspected a wake encounter. This occurred about 100 miles south-southeast of BIL. We asked ATC what kind of aircraft it was and he said his designation was a Heavy Airbus A300. A flight attendant in the rear of the aircraft reported bumping her head. No other injuries to passengers and crew. At FL320; prior to top of descent; we flew underneath a heavy Airbus 300; with no warning from ATC and the airplane dropped and rolled aggressively. We immediately put the fasten seatbelt sign on and checked in with the flight attendants. One flight attendant said she hit her head on the bathroom door. A319 flight crew reported an 'aggressive' roll resulted after encountering wake turbulence at FL320 from a crossing A300. A Flight Attendant hit her head during the encounter.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Ramp Lead did not properly identify item 14 as dangerous goods; instead he loaded the item in pit 2 which didn't have the required 15 bags. He called after pushing the aircraft to advise he could not final; at which point I advised him item 14 which was XXXXXX. Biologicals was dangerous goods and the flight would need to gate return. The flight returned and the Ramp Lead then held off item 14. He called to advise that cargo did not properly identify the item as dangerous goods on the [load plan] which I then advised him was not correct and cargo did in fact staged it correctly and used the appropriate code. The Ramp Lead then stated he had never seen dangerous goods stage this way and why is there no pilot paperwork to which I responded this is the normal correct way to stage biologicals and that there are dangerous goods that are exempt from pilot paperwork. His response was he has never heard of dangerous goods being exempt again I informed him all of this information is in the Dangerous Goods recurrent training modules but he claims for the ramp they are there to which I informed him he was wrong. Airline ramp personnel reported communication breakdown between ramp personnel and Ramp Lead regarding incorrectly loading and misidentifying Dangerous Goods in cargo pits.
Aircraft: BEECH 1900
Phase of flight: Final Approach
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

A Cessna 172 and another 172 were in the traffic pattern. [An airliner] was inbound from the West for a visual approach showing 290 KTS of ground speed. MD was working Local 1 and instructed [the airliner] to make a straight in for Runway XXL and report an 8 mile final. The first 172 was on a 5 mile final for Runway XXL when the second 172 was downwind passing the numbers of Runway XXL. Instead of turning the second 172 into the 5 mile hole; the Controller extended his downwind. I thought the intent was to have the second 172 follow the airliner since he was turning base leg 8 NM North of the airport;. Instead the Controller turned the second 172 to follow the first 172. I told the Controller that wouldn't work since the airliner was still going well over 200 knots. I told the Controller to change the second 172 to Runway XXR and the Controller ended up having to send the first 172 around to have enough room to let the airliner land. The Controller didn't want me to get him/her out because it was too busy; honestly it was self-inflicted volume and complexity. I ended up opening Local 2 and getting Local 1 relieved as he/she was clearly in over his/her head. I don't agree with a check ride for certification consisting of being able to work one session of moderate traffic without an 'A1.' This breeds controllers that can squeak by under idea conditions but can't handle the traffic if any little thing doesn't go their way. Not understanding sequencing; speed control; traffic flow; etc and counting on doing everything rote and having it work out makes for some scary situations and very poor customer service. I asked him/her later what went wrong and she said that the airliner turned a 6 mile final instead of an 8 mile final. I explained that when the trailing aircraft is going nearly 5 miles per minute and the leading aircraft is going less than 2 miles per minute; 2 miles doesn't make any difference at all. I suggested that if traffic existed to take the airliner over the top of the airport and enter them on the downwind in addition to moving pattern traffic to the other runway. Tower CIC described a go-around event when the Local Controller failed to noted the overtake speed of a much faster aircraft resulting in a go around clearance even after recommendations were provided by the reporter.
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Phase of flight: Climb; Initial Climb
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

We were initially cleared for take off by Tower Control to depart Runway 23 from CLT and fly the JACAL 6 RNAV departure procedure. Shortly after checking in with Departure Control the Controller gave us a 300 heading direct and cleared us direct to a fix. The Captain and I were confused by the pronunciation of the fix; we thought to be VLADY. I asked the Controller to clarify and confirm direct to VLADY; which she did. Shortly there after the Controller stated that we were showing north of the fix and cleared us direct to JACAL. Upon further investigation we determined the Controller wanted us direct to GLADI a fix on the departure procedure and not VLADY a fix a little further down on our flight plan. Short cuts are great; but flying RNAV SID's as depicted allow pilots to fly what they brief. The Controller was working another frequency at the time and was issuing an IFR clearance to an aircraft. The division of attention my have lead to the Controller not fully hear my verbalization of VLADY. Also having two fixes close to each other with similar names can lead to confusion and is not a good idea. This was a simple case of misinterpreted instructions with two points that sounded very much alike; and which were both on our route of flight. The First Officer and I both thought we were getting an early morning shortcut and the Controller noticed our deviation quickly and issued an updated clearance. Repeat points by spelling them out phonetically whenever in doubt. An ERJ170 on the CLT JACAL 6 RNAV departure was cleared to GLADI intersection but misunderstood and proceeded to VLADI intersection which was a more distant point on their flight plan. This was a similar sounding fix confusion.
Aircraft: EMBRAER LEGACY 450/500
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

During our departure brief we discussed at length the 2 NOTAMs at HXD that would prevent us from landing at night on RWY 3 (favored runway by the current wind). We ran an iPreflight book to determine effect of landing with a tailwind and the possible consequences if it should be raining at arrival time adding the 15% LPA. As a crew we agreed it to be safe to depart and to land with the tailwind on RWY 21. At around 75 miles the Pilot Monitoring (PM) obtained the ASOS for HXD; GPS RWY 3 was in use. I asked the PM to call HXD tower to see if they were indeed landing on RWY 3 since it was after sunset and those approaches were NOTAM'd NA. When queried; HXD tower said 'oh yeah; I'll switch that around by the time you get here'. In planning our approach we decided on the GPS 21 vs. LOC DME 21 as it was a simpler approach with our equipment not requiring a stepdown fix and the GPS would count down the distance to the runway for our Visual Descent Point calculations. Boufort approach asked us what type approach we would like; we asked for the GPS 21; we were then cleared direct to DORVE and cleared for the GPS 21. Upon switching to tower OVER the FAF; tower asked us 'can you shoot the GPS 21 at night?' We looked at each other; agreed that the NOTAMS we reviewed were for RWY 3 and said 'Yes' to the tower who then cleared us to land. I asked the PM if he was comfortable continuing the approach with a question like that from tower and he said yes so we continued the approach and landing without event.Upon landing we continued to discuss the events and how they unfolded and reviewed the NOTAMs yet again; this time we realized we overlooked the NOTAM for GPS 21 'PROCEDURE NA AT NIGHT'. In looking back we did everything right. We reviewed the NOTAMs; discussed the impact of a night landing with a tailwind; discussed wet runways; calculated performance using iPreflight; thoroughly briefed the approach and questioned ATC why they were flying approaches to the wrong runway 3 at night. So where did it go wrong? The error started when we BOTH overlooked the NOTAM for GPS 21 which was in a different format than the other 2 NOTAMs; the second link was losing faith in HXD tower who said 'oh yeah; I'll switch that around by the time you get here' making it seem that he was even unaware of the night NOTAM restrictions to RWY 3; the 3rd link was Boufort APPROACH clearing us for the GPS 21; the 4th link (and the critical one that should have broken the chain) was HXD tower asking us if we can shoot the GPS 21 at night. I think we would have given his question a little more credit if he wasn't surprised when we asked him why they were shooting approaches to RWY 3. We both felt confident in our pre-departure planning so we did not stop to investigate his query to us. In looking back we really should have stopped the approach and re-evaluated the situation prior to continuing. EMB505 Captain reported a night landing at HXD using the GPS 21 approach that was not authorized for night use.
Aircraft: LIGHT TRANSPORT; LOW WING; 2 TURBOJET ENG
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Conducting approach to Runway 4R. Directed to maintain 2;500 feet and intercept the final approach course. Also; told to maintain 200 KIAS until FAF (DOOIN @ 1;700 feet). We were never cleared for the approach or cleared for the visual. I configured the aircraft with gear down; flaps-1 and speed brakes extended and autopilot off in anticipation of having to 'dive'. The First Officer; pilot monitoring; tried several times to call Approach but was blocked at each attempt. Just outside of FAF; contact was finally made with Approach who told us to contact Tower and indicated that we had been cleared for the approach when we were directed to intercept final. They did not!!! (There was [another airline] jumpseater who witnessed the approach and subsequent missed who can verify what occurred). We contacted Tower who immediately asked if we could get down. We responded no and [we] initiated a go-around at about 1;500 feet AGL. This started the next issue. I leveled the aircraft at 1;000 feet; called for gear up; and asked for 170 KIAS. At the same time Tower told us to go to Departure and gave us a frequency switch; which was incorrect. At that point the First Officer and Jumpseater (who was very helpful as he was EWR based and immediately recognized that the frequency was incorrect) were engaged in sorting out the correct frequency. After some confusion; and a call on Guard; we sorted things out and returned for a landing. This approach episode and subsequent missed approach issue were caused entirely by ATC. The Approach Controller 'thought' he cleared us for the approach and then we were prevented from clarifying the situation because of a congested frequency. The Tower giving us the wrong frequency for the go-around basically put us in a lost comm situation in the middle of a congested flight corridor. While on approach to EWR; the TRACON failed to clear an air carrier for a Runway 4 approach. When EWR Tower was called late; the flight was too high for a stabilized approach and so executed a go-around.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Landing
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Approach was stable and uneventful through below 500 ft AGL. At that point; I let the aircraft dip below glideslope to capture three red PAPI. As the aircraft passed through 100 feet AGL; I noticed four red PAPI and began to adjust pitch and power. As the threshold neared; the aircraft began to be affected by the previous arrival's wake; and required control inputs as aircraft crossed the threshold to maintain path and centerline. These inputs were more significant than any inputs on the approach and began rather suddenly.My last look as we crossed the threshold had airspeed on target. I began to increase the back pressure for the flare; but the aircraft did not respond as I expected; never arrested descent; and contacted the runway before planned; resulting in a hard bounce.With the power still up; the resulting bounce was high; and I immediately called for a go around. Go around was accomplished and subsequent landing was uneventful. Thankfully; we later heard from Maintenance the aircraft inspection showed all ok. [Report narrative contained no additional information.] B737NG flight crew reported a hard landing and subsequent go-around occurred following a wake turbulence encounter just before touchdown.
Aircraft: LIGHT TRANSPORT; LOW WING; 2 TURBOJET ENG
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

ZNY-34 flashed me a data block on Aircraft X that showed no aircraft type; or any flight plan information; just a target descending to FL250. I was busy with multiple sectors; and numerous aircraft. I did not have a D-side to handle any coordination for me. I assumed ZNY had an UTM [Unsuccessful Transmission Message] on this aircraft; as it is uncommon to have an aircraft flash without flight plan information; without any UTM; etc. I called the Controller at ZNY-34 and advised I had no flight plan information on the data block Aircraft X; and asked if he had a UTM or any fails. He said no. I questioned this; as I was surprised and he said; 'No; so do you want to write it?' I said standby; as the aircraft was still several minutes from my sector. I went back to a few other aircraft; then I got back on the line with ZNY-34 and said; 'Go ahead; I'll write it;' and he said; 'You know what; I don't like your attitude I'm gonna spin him.' At this point the ZNY Controller entered my airspace with Aircraft X without coordination; turned him around in a 360 turn; then entered my airspace again after descending the aircraft to FL200; violating my airspace a second time. He refused to answer any landlines; and my Supervisor tried calling his area several times and their Supervisor would not answer the phone. The Controller at ZNY-34's unwillingness to communicate; and provide manual coordination led to the aircraft getting delayed; and him violating my airspace twice.I recommend ZNY controllers be responsible for ensuring flight plan information passes to ZBW in a timely manner. ZBW controller describes scenario where he doesn't have complete track data or a flight plan on an aircraft. He requests information from the Controller working the aircraft who refuses to pass the information to him and violates the airspace twice with the aircraft.