Aryan95614/aerograph-asrs huggingface dataset:
Aircraft: SR22
Phase of flight: Final Approach
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was working Aircraft X from the southwest for an ILS to CRG. I asked NRB RADAR who was working Aircraft Y; to keep the pattern tight so I could follow with my approach to CRG. I asked the pilot to reduce his speed for sequence. Both CRG and NRB airports were VFR with low ceilings. Our Letter of Agreement states that CRG Tower will provide visual separation when the field is VFR; unless the Tower states otherwise. The final to NRB crosses over CRG Tower; and in this case the aircraft was vectored out a little further than I anticipated. I knew it was going [to] get close; but I figured that NRB would point-out the helicopter to CRG Tower; in turn CRG Tower would be talking to Aircraft X on final to Runway 32 to circle to Runway 5. My instinct was to verify with CRG that they could provide visual separation; and the Tower's response was that they were both above the bases of the clouds and they could not see them. I immediately called CRG Tower back and told him to break the aircraft out. I assigned a heading of 210 and 3;000 FT altitude. By the time CRG Tower got the aircraft turned; they seemed to have gotten close. NRB aircraft doing a GCA approach to Runway 5 is a conflict with aircraft doing practically any approach at CRG. The airports are just in close proximity to each other; and it's always a hand-full. Also; be more mindful of the bases in the future; and realize that CRG Tower might not be able to give the visual separation they are required due to weather. JAX TRACON Controller described a loss of separation event when anticipated visual separation could not be provided by CRG Tower.
Aircraft: CRJ200
Phase of flight: Takeoff / Launch
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Following take off from 15; at 400 feet; I called for NAV mode as we were flying the HORTO2 RNAV departure. The First Officer (FO) selected NAV and confirmed 'FMS.' I happened to look down at the CDI and saw the head of the needle pointing toward HORTO which was behind us! My first reaction was we didn't have the proper runway selected. The FO checked the FMS and said it showed 15. The MFD showed the proper ground track. I expected the next fix to be CAPVC. Having briefed this at the gate; I knew a right turn was required at 515 feet; so I started a right turn. Then; the FMS 'caught up' with us. I've never seen this on any FMS before. After returning to DCA; we were able to depart 15 again. The second time; the FMS worked properly.Not sure what the cause was. We did have some ACARS issues enroute which seemed due to the ACARS-FMS keypad interface. I don't know if those are somehow related. Following a runway change to 15 from 19 the FMS either dropped out or was never updated with the departure runway. We already had set the aircraft up and briefed for 19. On the initial climb out the Captain (CA) caught the fact that the Map page was blank. He then verbally remarked that there was no runway entered into the FMS after he tried to call for NAV. I reacted by trying to change the FMS to input the runway back into the box. At the same time a caution appeared for a Right AOA HEAT error. At this point we were still in our initial climb phase. This caused me to get distracted as I had to see what the message was. When I saw it was something we could handle at a later point I refocused on reentering the runway. I entered 15 into the SID; executed; and told the CA we had good NAV. During this the CA had started a turn at 512 feet as depicted on the SID. However; with the delay in reacting to the FMS combined with the caution message we flew beyond the SID turn by at least 2 miles. We competed the turn on NAV/FMS and continued with no other issues on the SID. Failure to check the FMS during the Takeoff Brief for a runway change by myself. Whether the FMS dropped out or the runway was never entered was not known. We only realized it after rotation. CRJ200 flight crew reported departing Runway 15 at DCA on the HORTO2 RNAV with Runway 19 selected in the FMC. The Captain turned late at 515 feet while the First Officer corrected the FMC.
Aircraft: A321
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

On our return flight we were cleared the visual approach about 20 miles south of DEN for Runway 35R. Before being handed over to Tower we were assigned 170 kts until FRONZ and intercepted the LOC and GS well south of FRONZ. South of FRONZ we were given our landing clearance and I had a gradual intercept with the GS. I am not exactly sure what happened in the interim but I remember being just inside FRONZ on the LOC and GS and we got the gear horn in which we immediately lowered the gear; got fully configured; ran the landing checklist and continued to landing. In the moment where we were it just seemed so stable just not fully configured. The Captain said the approach looked fine and we were on speed; fully configured and had the before landing checklist completed so quickly at that moment it seemed like the best decision and we landed safely. I do not feel that I was fatigued but I do remember being pretty tired on our return; we descended on the arrival without incident around some weather and the approach just seemed so uneventful. 20/20 hindsight I thought I remember thinking that the gear horn went off at 1;500 feet but I don't think that was correct and realized that it may not have qualified for the stabilized approach minimums. I feel like in the future having a bit more situational awareness of the Final Approach Fix regardless of our visual status would have helped. Communicating a bit more and using more callouts for both the Non-flying pilot and myself to hear to help with that situational awareness would have helped as well. I normally am pretty good about being in managed speed before the final approach fix as well but today I was not so I will work on making sure that speed is managed to approach speed by that point in the future regardless of ATC requests for us to hustle on our arrival. A321 First Officer reported unstabilized approach into DEN citing fatigue as a factor.
Aircraft: B767
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Per our FOM; I reported a cruise altitude change of 4000 ft greater than flight planned to Dispatch and never received an acknowledgment that it was received at all. We also had the airport change from a South flow to a North flow and we were not notified; which is not mandatory but certainly nice to know. There are specific items listed in the FOM that require notification for change and acknowledgement. This is a constant recurring problem with a lack of support from Dispatch while we are enroute which I feel is not in compliance with the intent of Flag/Domestic Operations. Especially with the fuel loads that are on the aircraft with the Fuel Sense initiative.Lack of compliance with FAR 121 Flag Domestic Operations for 'reliable communications.' I feel our dispatchers handle too many flights at one time and do not have the Flight Planning System or automation to handle the number we require.Better Flight Planning Software to allow point by point updates to our flight plans and more training and compliance from Dispatch as true Dispatchers rather than flight followers. B767-300 Captain reported that due to staffing levels he felt he is not supported by Dispatch services to the extent required by FAR 121.
Aircraft: MUSKETEER 23
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

I was flying (by myself) my Beech Musketeer Super III. The sky was clear; but a tad hazy and somewhat turbulent. After flying for about an hour my radios started to make a cracking sound. At approximately fifteen miles from [my destination]; I keyed for the Tower. At this time there was a crack sound and all electric; radio and GPS went out. I checked all other instruments and only the electric was gone.I circled away from the airport pattern to consider my options; always surveying for traffic. The thought of looking for a non-towered airport close by was hindered by my GPS flashing on and off. I also was aware that the electric may not be my only problem; and I did not want to become a glider for an off field landing if I could prevent it.Having knowledge of the wind direction for the landing pattern; I made a decision to survey the total area several times and go for a short field landing and quick departure from the active runway. I had no way to contact the Tower; but surveyed the area several times before taxiing down the tarmac.At this point I stopped in the tie down area and a young woman in a golf cart came to me with a note to call the Tower; which I did. The repair was to fix two wires that had parted from the alternator during flight. BE23-24 pilot experiences electrical failure and lands at his Tower controlled destination airport without communication.
Aircraft: MEDIUM TRANSPORT; LOW WING; 2 TURBOJET ENG
Phase of flight: Landing
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft

[Flight was] second leg of IOE. I (in left seat on Captain IOE) was flying as Pilot Flying. After departure; EICAS 'HYD QTY R' warning illuminated. Secured right hydraulic system according to QRH. Verbally conferred with Dispatch and Maintenance and continued flight. Received ACARS message that this issue had occurred on this jet 5 times recently; and it was a suspected bad sensor. Normal descent and visual approach to ZZZ ILS XXL. On approach; I called for the QRH Deferred Items Landing Checklist. Pilot Monitoring reestablished right hydraulic system per QRH. Right hydraulic quantity began to decrease from 0.44 to the low 0.30s on landing. Crew noticed acrid smell immediately after the right hydraulic system was pressurized. Smell dissipated after 10-15 seconds. Approach was briefed and flown as Flaps 25; Autobrakes 1; and stable. Flare was initiated at 30 feet and power was reduced to idle; speed within limits. Flare was not aggressive enough leading to firm touchdown and no bounce. Jumpseater noticed the autobrakes kicked off and called out 'No Autobrakes' immediately on touchdown. I was concerned that the R system hydraulic loss contributed to this; and then considered that the right engine reverser might also be inoperative. After spoiler deployment; nose pitched up rapidly to approximately 12 degrees. The Pilot Monitoring (Line Check Airman) and I pushed the nose back down to 10 degrees and then the Line Check Airman discontinued control inputs. I then gently lowered the nose to the runway. Landing roll and taxi-in both normal. On post flight inspection; pilots found hydraulic fluid leaking and puddling under left wing and Tail Scrape Damage Limiter worn down as evidence of tailskid contact and reported it to Maintenance Control and Chief Pilot. [Report narrative contained no additional information]. B757 Captain reported a tailstrike during a firm landing following a Hydraulic System malfunction.
Aircraft: PC-12
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Departed ZZZ on IFR flight to ZZZ1 as first leg of a reposition. Deice systems were inspected on the ground and tested prior to departure with no apparent failures. Boots and prop heat were activated upon entering icing conditions in cruise and both failed within a few minutes. OAT was within boot operation limits. Ran appropriate checklists and were unable to clear the failures. We elected to divert initially selecting ZZZ2. In the descent to ZZZ2 we discovered that our EFBs (electronic flight bags) did not have any approach procedures for the area downloaded. ZZZ2 showed VFR conditions so we attempted a visual approach but were unable to find the airport beacon light. ATC issued delay vectors while we worked on a new plan. It appeared that ice accumulation had stopped and that the layer of rime ice accumulated in cruise had been removed; but the OAT was still below freezing and we were still encountering precipitation and clouds. At this point we [advised ATC] and opted to land at ZZZ3. Upon nearing ZZZ3 It became clear that a visual approach was not going to be possible so we copied the RNAV RWY XX Approach at ZZZ3 from ATC and successfully completed the approach. After shutdown we discovered a layer of clear ice on the wings behind the boots that had not been visible in flight. Deice equipment tested on ground prior to departure with no issue. During cruise; light ice was encountered; and plane was configured appropriately. De-ice boot message appeared; and was troubleshooted; but could not be rectified. Propeller deice failed shortly after; was troubleshooted; and could not be rectified. ATC was notified to coordinate descent out of icing conditions. Conditions persisted in descent; and decision was made to divert as altitude in positive temperatures could not be established. Vectors were given for ZZZ2; but airport lights could not be confirmed as on in marginal conditions. New vectors were given for approach into ZZZ3. Approach assisted in vectors onto course as EFB issue (unable to pull up approach plate) prevented standard ID of approach. Landing was safely achieved and flight was terminated and calls were made to Dispatch; Director of operations; and Maintenance. Crew believed aircraft to be free of ice on approach descent through visual inspection. Upon landing; patches of clear ice were found on the top of each wing behind the boots. Boots were clear of ice on approach and upon landing. Air taxi pilots reported that after entering icing conditions; the boots and propeller heat failed. Pilots diverted and during postflight discovered clear ice on the wings.
Aircraft: B777
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL

Prior to departure no MEL items were listed [as deferred]. We departed on schedule; pushed back; and upon left engine start I noticed an amber ENG BLEED L EICAS message was displayed. I queried the CA (Captain) and FO (First Officer); and the CA responded that the [Maintenance Release] now listed a MEL for a bleed pressure sensor Status Message. I was also busy coordinating with the flight attendants about the short taxi; so my attention was diverted among several issues. I fished out the [Maintenance Release]; read it as best I could in the dim light; and determined that there was a left engine bleed issue relating to a bleed pressure sensor; and that the message could be displayed as part of the MEL. We then departed. In cruise flight; and after I returned from my rest break; I again inquired about the bleed failure; and that there are usually some operational limitations that go along with that. In our case; there were none. I checked the AIR schematics page and saw that; in fact; we had no bleed air from the left engine; and were using the bleed air from the right engine only. I again read the MEL and it sounded like we might have been given the wrong MEL for the issue we were facing; or the issue we were originally MEL'ed for had become a larger issue. With what we were seeing; we should have been given MEL 361 rather than 362. The CA sent a message to [Maintenance Control] who agreed that the issue we had was different than was MEL 362 would have covered. [Maintenance Control] provided a 777 [flight manual] reference to this issue; and ultimately a reset of the bleed switch was performed; which allowed the left engine to again supply bleed air normally. The flight continued and landed at the intended destination without issue. The CA sent in an ELB message regarding the engine bleed. B777 First Officer reported incorrect MEL assigned resulting in abnormal operational pneumatic configuration.
Aircraft: B787
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

There is a common condition on the 787-8 and 787-9 aircraft where Maintenance is finding and documenting heat damage to the engine pylon aft inboard fairings. The finish has been found deteriorated and/or missing from the carbon fiber fairing panel just above the heat shield. The normal interim repair for this condition per the SRM (Structural Repair Manual) 54-51-70-03b- 661a-a is to make a temporary seal on the panel per step 2e (1) with speed tape. The repair has a re-inspect interval of 400 hrs. to check the condition of the speed tape and reapply if necessary. These temporary repairs are not coming close to lasting the 400 hrs. between inspections; which could allow water ingression into the panel and eventual failure of the panel requiring replacement. [Three aircraft] had the speed tape re-applied per the SRM procedure on in ZZZ and when the aircraft returned the tape was missing and had to be re-applied. I believe this repair needs to be re-addressed and the procedure changed to address the exposure to extreme heat and air flow over the damaged area. Also; I believe the inspection interval should be lowered to match the general re-inspection requirement of 100 hours as required for speed tape re-inspection in AFMM 20-11-33. Maintenance Technician reports that interim repair to 787 engine pylon not working.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

Received a runway change from 13L to 13R after taxi out. No hotspots for 13R; but due to construction; taxi out was a threat; so we kept our heads up until established on Taxiway A. After taxiing on Taxiway A; FO went heads down and I started to prepare for the departure plan briefing.I crosschecked my EFB with my taxi track and identified the hold short line as an ILS hold short line due to the position of the line. I went over; stopped; and we briefed the departure plan; did Before Takeoff Checklist; and subsequently looked for the hold short line. We saw one on the right/First Officer side and behind us.There was an aircraft on final during this; but due to the position of the hold short line; there was no conflict and the aircraft landed normally. Tower never said anything either; but we found it worth mentioning.We were both distracted due to yet another checklist to be accomplished. It would also have helped if I knew the runway symbology; difference between a runway hold short line vs ILS hold short line. I do now. While stopping to read the Departure Checklist because of a runway change; we crossed the hold short line for 13R in DAL. Do away with so many checklists. I feel my attention is sometimes diverted with all the briefs and checklists. B737 flight crew reported crossing the hold line for Runway 13R in DAL due to the Captain believing it was an ILS hold line and not the runway hold line.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Utilizing Controller Pilot Data Link Communications (CPDLC) out of LaGuardia; our manual suggests writing the clearance on the flight plan. I mention this to all the First Officers. Many of them do not know this. With CPDLC there's no way to print the clearance. We were cleared to LAGUARDIA FIVE Departure Coney transition. Since we are unable to print I mentioned we should write it on the flight plan; [but] the First Officer did not. We went to the FMC; pulled up the LAGUARDIA FIVE Departure; [but] there were no transitions and no way to select Runway 13. We were both puzzled so I suggested we'll just double check with Tower or they will tell us what to do. Because 30 minutes had elapsed; we did not double check with Tower on the clearance; they just cleared us for takeoff. Once airborne Departure said 'were you given the Coney departure?' I said no. My mistake; they gave us another heading [and] never mentioned anything else. My mistake for being nice; in the future I will demand the First Officers write the clearance on the flight plans. However we are going paperless so where are you going to write these clearances?Because of CPDLC on the 737 and the inability to print the clearance; there's not a directive outlined in our manual directing us what to do. Some First Officers will take a picture on their phone of the clearance page on the CPDLC FMC. I suggest to most of the First Officer's our [manual] requires us to write the clearance on the international flight plan and a domestic flight plan. Many of them doubt me on this; I usually have to pull out the manual and show them.This was my mistake for not catching the Coney on the FMC; and [not] thoroughly reading the departure SID. Even though I asked the First Officer to write the clearance on the flight plan; in the future I will demand the First Officers do this! And failure to follow up with Tower on departure instructions. Part of this is because we don't have said guidance on the new procedure of CPDLC clearances. B737 Captain reported a track deviation occurred when they misinterpreted the Controller Pilot Data link Communications (CPDLC) departure clearance.
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: Deviation - Speed All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Las Vegas Ground assigned us Runway 26R. We were cleared for takeoff; provided we had visual separation with an A321 and we did have visual separation. Our takeoff data called for a Flaps 1 takeoff; which requires a slightly longer takeoff roll. After the takeoff roll on [Runway] 26R; I was hand flying the aircraft during the initial climb. At about 500 ft. AGL; we encountered wake turbulence from the A321. This is what caused the stick shaker to activate. I immediately stated; 'Stall'; and pitched the nose of the aircraft down; announced 'Max Thrust' and applied Max Thrust by pushing the thrust levers past their detents. We regained speed almost immediately but due to the nose down pitch to recover from the stall; we received an EGPWS warning. We received this EGPWS warning as I was pitching back up to continue our climb after the stall recovery. The EGPWS warning did not last more than one auditory message and it was gone. We advised Las Vegas Tower of the situation and were then transferred to Las Vegas Approach; where we continued the remainder of the flight without incident. In the end; we believe we only lost about 100 feet from the stall recovery before continuing our climb on the departure. After looking back; there are two things in my mind that possibly could have helped. One would be to have re-sent for the takeoff data to get a flaps 2 takeoff; which would have allowed us to have a shorter takeoff roll. However; there was no way of knowing we would encounter the wake of another aircraft and had no reason to believe a flaps 1 takeoff would not suffice. The second thing I think that could have helped was to delay our takeoff roll slightly for about 15-30 more seconds to have a bit more separation from the other aircraft. At the end of the day the stall recovery procedure was performed by the standards it is trained and the flight was completed without injury or incident. EMB-175 First Officer reported a wake turbulence encounter climbing out of 500 feet AGL departing LAS in trail of an A321 that resulted in a stick shaker and an uncommanded descent that triggered an EGPWS warning.