Aryan95614/aerograph-asrs huggingface dataset:
Aircraft: MEDIUM LARGE TRANSPORT; LOW WING; 2 TURBOJET ENG
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

While in the descent/arrival phase of flight; we were cleared direct to a fix and to descend and maintain 7000 ft. At this time Center also handed us off to the next Center. In compliance with the clearance; we proceeded direct to the fix and descended to 7000 ft. The hand-off to the next Center was successful and the Captain was able to establish communication. However; as we were approaching the fix; with no further clearance; the Captain attempted to query the new Center 2-3 times for further instructions. With no response; as we passed the fix at 7000 ft.; I initiated a right procedure turn (northwest) and initiated a descent to 2500 ft. As we completed the procedure turn; the Captain was able to re-establish communication. The Center Controller expressed concern about the fact that we had proceeded past the fix and descended below 7000 ft without further clearance. However; he did not ask for follow-up communication via landline. The Center Controller cleared us to continue the RNAV (GPS) approach. We landed without incident and cancelled our flight plan once we were on the ground.Once we determined we were not in contact with Center; we had no way of knowing when or if we would be able to re-establish communication with them and we had a limited amount of fuel left. Additionally; TCAS displayed no other aircraft operating in the area. Based on these circumstances; the Captain and I decided to fly the published RNAV (GPS) approach procedure and proceed to the airport. [Report narrative contained no additional information.] An Air Carrier flight crew lost communication with ATC in the final phase of flight and during approach. Communication was regained prior to landing.
Aircraft: GOLDEN EAGLE 421
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter VFR In IMC

While at the Sector; I was receiving numerous icing reports. Aircraft X departed northbound; requesting 18;000 FT. Eighteen thousand feet was not usable due to low altimeters; so I asked the pilot if he wanted 16;000 FT or 20;000 FT. He chose 16;000 FT. The aircraft turned around in the adjacent airspace due to severe icing and was handed back to me at 13;000 FT; my control. I descended him to 11;300 FT; my lowest MIA; but he could not maintain altitude due to icing. I asked him if he had the terrain in site; and he said no. He was IMC. I informed my supervisor that I had an emergency situation. I kept the pilot updated on the MIA and when he would be able to get lower. At one point he was 1;500 FT below my MIA. I advised him that we have a 2;000 FT buffer in mountainous terrain so he could be as close as 500 FT to an obstacle. I issued a heading for him to fly to get to lower terrain sooner. I then asked my supervisor to pull up a terrain chart so I could estimate his proximity to the closest obstacle. I informed him that he was south of the highest obstacle that we depicted on the chart and kept assigning the lowest altitudes possible. He was able to get his departure airport in sight about six miles out. He chose to do a visual approach. An Enroute Controller reported that an IFR aircraft was below MIA and unable to hold altitude in an emergency situation due to icing.
Aircraft: A300
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

[We had] planned RNAV30 approach into Oakland because notams said long term outage of ILS30. Upon reaching NORCAL approach control; they told us to expect ILS30 which we accepted and began setting up approach in ILS radio head and FMS according to our iPad jepp data. In our printout of FPR and weather/notams was included an ILS30 approach plate dated 26 September. This was not effective for two more days so we both questioned why it was even included in our paper work; and had no indication that it would be a valid approach so we did not reference it. ILS was identified via morse code. Approach controller tried to clear us direct to MYFUT and intercept the localizer. On our approach plates; this point was not present so we queried approach and he gave us vectors at that time to intercept localizer course. At least two other flights questioned this same clearance from the controller. At this point we were too high to commence the approach so we did a go around to re-enter the pattern. We got vectors to final for ILS30 approach and landed. Because of the confusion of the event; several phone calls transpired between my Captain and the duty officer to get a note placed for future crews traveling to Oakland so they wouldn't be involved in a similar confusing situation. Multiple airlines are having this issue even as I type this the next day. Apparently; the communication on this approach change has not made it down to the end user. An A300-600 was cleared for an ILS 30L approach at OAK for which their company provided approach plate was not yet valid and for which their nav data base had no data. Cooperative assistance from ATC ultimately provided the tools to fly the approach.
Aircraft: SMALL TRANSPORT; LOW WING; 2 TURBOPROP ENG
Phase of flight: unknown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

The airport rotating beacon was lighted up but not rotating; there is no NOTAM for the airport to this effect. Approximately five days earlier on a flight to 9V9 [Chamberlain Municipal Airport] the airport beacon was not working at all. I notified ATC Center via comm radio and the Controller explained that their Supervisor would call the airport Manager about issuing a NOTAM. There is still no NOTAM or operational rotating beacon for the field. Pilot reported the airport rotating beacon is out of service at 9V9 airport and there is no NOTAM.
Aircraft: SMALL AIRCRAFT
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was conducting a Part 135 IFR flight check for a PIC (Pilot In command). We flew a hand flown ILS to minimums at FXE and advised the Tower that we wanted to go missed and fly one more ILS Runway 9(coupled this time). This was all done in VMC conditions with VFR traffic advisories from ATC. Our missed approach instructions from the Tower were to 'make a left turn northwest; climb and maintain 2;000 ft'. Shortly after the missed we were handed off to Miami Approach. On check in with Miami; we stated that we were climbing to 2;000 ft. and on a 290 heading which we continued maintaining VFR. The Controller instructed us to 'turn left to a 270 heading'; a few moments later the controller asked us if we were going to 'turn left to 270' the PIC replied ' yes we turned left to a 270; that is what we are doing' The Controller once more asked us if we were 'going to turn left' the PIC asked 'left to what heading; we are flying 270 as instructed' the Controller replied 'I wanted you to make a left 360 to a 270 heading'. The PIC replied 'that wasn't what you gave us but were turning left'. As we started the turn; I saw what was a very close by smaller jet descending to get out of our way. This must have been the traffic in conflict. Being on a 290 heading and the controller stating 'turn left to 270' we both were under the impression that the Controller wanted us to tighten up our downwind for the ILS. After 3 attempts to turn us 360 degrees to the left; the controller never said the words 'make a 360' or 'make a left orbit' or anything that would indicate to us that he wanted us to turn further than 20 degrees to the left. I do not believe that standard phraseology was used by the Approach Controller and this could have avoided a near collision. If I was under the hood taking a flight check; I would have reacted the same way as the PIC taking this flight check as he was doing exactly as the Controller instructed him to do. I'm not sure why; if he didn't see us doing what he thought he was instructing us to do he did not move the other conflicting traffic clear of us? I am a firm believer of standard phraseology use for communication with ATC and this is precisely the reason why. Check Airman reported miscommunication with MIA TRACON issuing clearances as incomplete; unclear; and non standard which resulted in an NMAC.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: No Specific Anomaly Occurred All Types

I was very surprised to find that all three flight attendants (FA) assigned to work the Boeing 737-700 from were conducting their first flight. The three new flight attendants were incredibly personable and did their best to operate the trip as they were trained; but as all of us can attest when we are new to a position; there is a big difference between learning something in training and putting it to practice in the real world. I do not know what the training footprint or scheduling rules are for FAs; but I was incredibly surprised to learn this was even legal. Yes; the FAs are trained for safety events; but would three brand new FAs be able to manage the cabin well? I would greatly appreciate more insight into the FA training footprint; what their level of OE is before being signed off; and would love to see a no all-low-time crew restriction. Even having just one experienced flight attendant; even one with just 100 hours or so; would have been extremely helpful for providing much better service and ensuring the highest level of safety. Additionally; I would suggest that if those procedures are not going to be changed; then at a minimum an all-new-FA crew should be assigned to a longer flight; not one with barely a 1hr flying time. B737 Captain reports that all three flight attendants assigned to work his flight were on their first flight out of training. FAR 121.434 (operating experience; operating cycles; and consolidation of knowledge and skills) only lists a 'consolidation of knowledge and skills' requirement; after completion of initial operating experience; for PIC and SIC; none for Flight Attendants.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Final Approach
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

SFO ATIS reported cig 1800 BKN; Few 1200. Cleared for the ILS 28L; on 10 mile final with bridge and airport in sight. Given the ATC instruction to maintain 220 or better to the 7 mile final; we were at 240. Pairing traffic to 28R visually acquired by both pilots and communicated this to ATC who then told us to maintain visual separation. Both pilots recognized excessive closure rate to E170 and Pilot Flying started to pair airspeed towards 220 by disengaging Autothrottle and using manual thrust (idle). Around this point (@9miles) ATC instructed 'slow to 180 knots to San Mateo Bridge'. Approaching San Mateo Bridge; we entered IMC (BKN layer) with E175 @ 500 above; offset to 28R FAC (Final Approach Course); and slightly in trail. Pilot Monitoring advised ATC that we were IMC and lost sight of pairing traffic. ATC responded with 'maintain visual separation'; to which Pilot Monitoring advised we were unable due to IMC. ATC instructed 'Go Around; maintain RUNWAY HEADING' (emphasis mine). By this point; we were VMC with field in sight again (@1400ft) but E175 was in the layer above. Pilot Flying disengaged autopilot and began a methodical go-around conscientious of the presence of the E175 above and slightly in trail and that winds at altitude were @220/25kts. With this in mind; Pilot Flying instructed a slight offset upwind of RH to Pilot Monitoring to enter into HDG window and @275 was entered with Pilot Flying executing a reduced rate climb back into the IMC. ATC nearly simultaneously instructed a left turn towards a downwind and remainder of FM GA/MAPP was executed. B737 flight crew reported entering IMC conditions and losing visual separation with landing aircraft on parallel runway while on an ILS approach. Go-around and missed approach conducted.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

On approach to 9R in Atlanta we flew through a large roll change due to wake turbulence from an aircraft ahead; aircraft went into Control Wheel Steering and disengaged LNAV mode. Loss of LNAV mode was not noticed until late turn onto 9R Localizer. Deviation corrected by Crew and ATC gave us a new heading to intercept the 9R Localizer. Remainder of the approach and landing was normal. B737-700 First Officer reported a track deviation following a wake turbulence encounter on approach to ATL.
Aircraft: SMALL AIRCRAFT
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types

Please listen to the Phoenix [P50] TRACON sectors during peak periods. The Controller could not work all of the traffic. The COVID-19 cutback by ATC is dangerous during peak use hours. The controllers are magnificent but need help/more controllers. One Controller is working an area twice to 3 times the reasonable area. Please let them get back to work like it was before the COVID slowdown.I have been actively flying for XX+ years. Please don't blow this off. The environment is dangerous. Pilot reported the P50 TRACON controllers appear to be working unreasonably large areas and expressed concern over COVID-19 related cutbacks in ATC staffing.
Aircraft: CRJ900
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

We had flown to MSY from ZZZ earlier and knew of various unstable build ups earlier and had conducted a quick turn back to ZZZ from MSY. As a crew we were cautious and on guard for possible turbulence. The FA's were aware of the possibility of light turbulence and according to previous aircraft and ATC there had been nothing worse than occasional light chop so the seatbelt sign was turned off and there were no returns in the immediate area on the aircraft radar. Approximately 40 NM from LGC VOR we started to get continuous light chop and the seat belt sign was turned on. When we were approximately 25 to 30 NM from LGC to the South we encountered Moderate turbulence and the PF (Captain/Me) guarded the controls and then Severe turbulence was encountered with the Autopilot becoming disengaged and the aircraft banked hard left and started to descend at approximately 700-800 FPM and speed decreased. I applied Climb thrust and was able to regain control of the aircraft smoothly but the turbulence persisted for 45 seconds to 1 minute at Moderate. After aircraft was under control I directed the FO to check on the FA's and Passengers. The report was that things flew around the cabin and I transferred control of the aircraft; made an announcement to the passengers and received more information from the rear FA that she had hit her head and I checked to make sure she didn't need immediate medical attention or anyone else. The aircraft was handling normally and all systems were checked. It was discussed and as a crew to include dispatch we decided to continue to ZZZ with no severe injuries and no indication of aircraft damage.I did not use AIRINC but utilized ACARS. In hindsight I would have utilized AIRINC to ensure Dispatch; Maintenance and the crew were on the same page. I do not believe without being risk adverse that we as a crew could have done anything different or taken a different route. Aircraft encountered moderate and severe turbulence at FL370. Pilot regained control and stabilized aircraft. One injury reported by Flight Attendant.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

During boarding; I noticed a passenger step on to the plane with a mask around his neck. I said hello and he said hello back. When he turned right to head down the aisle; he stopped almost as soon as he stepped on to the carpet. I stepped forward from the galley to see why he had stopped. I saw him turn his head completely to the left so that his face was now facing mine; with approximately 18' between us. He sneezed directly in my face; making no attempt to cover his mouth; pull up his mask or turn towards the row 1 window. I immediately stepped back; grabbed a C-fold and blotted my face. I politely asked him to cover his mouth and/or wear his mask if he needs to sneeze or cough. He said okay and proceeded to a seat. I don't believe his behavior was intentional; but I was still exposed to any germs he has. I was wearing a mask; but no eye glasses or goggles to cover my eyes. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic; this is an even greater safety concern than it normally would have been.Not sure what else could have been done; as passengers should always cover their mouths when they sneeze. Perhaps Operations could add some basic hygiene tips to their boarding announcements; like washing hands; covering their mouths; etc. Flight attendant reported passenger sneezed directly into Flight Attendant's face without attempting to cover the sneeze. Flight Attendant suggested passengers should be given hygiene tips during pre-boarding announcements.
Aircraft: LARGE TRANSPORT; LOW WING; 2 TURBOJET ENG
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Approx 2 hours into our flight (time and position were not noted); we were advised by ATC that an experimental balloon was in free fall near our position. We were also advised that the vehicle was unlit and had no transponder and no way to fix its position. ATC later reported that they had a primary target at our nine thirty position and eight miles and estimated the altitude at 45;000; but could not confirm that it was the plummeting balloon. Although we were looking for any trace of the balloon; we did not see; nor would we likely see it; due to the fact that it was unlit and it was a dark nightWe continued to our destination without further incident.Why the balloon failed is unknown. However; the fact that it did not have emergency lights and emergency transponder (or other way to absolutely fix it's position) when operating above commercial air routes is inexcusable. It would seem a simple thing to have an emergency aneroid switch that would activate when below a certain altitude; say 80;000 ft; thus giving position/altitude data; as well lighting for visual conformation (see and avoid) during hours of darkness. ATC notified an air carrier at FL360 about an experimental balloon in a free fall descent through an estimated FL450; unlit and without a transponder during night conditions.
Aircraft: EMBRAER JET UNDIFFERENTIATED OR OTHER MODEL
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict

After being cleared for the visual approach; ATC called out traffic and advised leveling at 5;000 FT until traffic passed. I was able to make visual contact with the traffic below. The traffic continued to climb. At that time I turned the aircraft to the left to create more space and began to level the aircraft prior to reaching 5;000 FT. At that time I watched the traffic pass below us and started a shallow descent for the airport. We received the traffic alert followed by a RA that lasted approximately 5 seconds. I complied with the RA. I should have been more aggressive with my spacing for the other traffic. After we were cleared for a visual approach to Runway 30L; we were advised that there was traffic that seemed to be climbing toward us. Norcal suggested that we level off at 5;000 FT which we did. The light single engine plane continued to climb toward us. The non-flying pilot climbed slightly to about 5;100 FT and we got a 'Monitor Vertical Speed' followed shortly thereafter by a very brief 'Climb'. A very slight climb was initiated and then we were 'Clear of conflict'. The approach was continued uneventfully to a normal landing.It would be nice if VFR traffic would not be allowed to climb into busy airspace without having to talk to any Approach Control facility. Air Carrier flight crew reports a TCAS RA arriving SJC from the south at 5;000 FT. Climbing slightly and turning to avoid VFR traffic.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

During a restroom break in cruise at FL370; the Captain stepped out of the flight deck and the FA came in. I had my headset on and was communicating with Center about the rides ahead. When I was done with ATC; I moved one of my headset ear cups off of my ear and I said hello to the FA and mentioned to her that we would have turbulence ahead. She said hello and then said 'I see you don't have your mask on; could you please put it on?' Well; I was in a bit of shock by the request as that has yet to be asked of me. I then was queried from ATC about our current ride and answered them and then put my mask on for her comfort.But then I became uncomfortable.I have been in a rapid decompression at altitude before and it all started to come back to me about TUC [The Times of Useful Consciousness] and I became concerned about what would happen if I had that happen again in this situation. The Captain came back though in short order and the FA left but I worry that in my appeal to go along with making her comfortable with putting on my mask I would not have been able to perform my required duties if something bad were to happen.Imagine for a moment being in an aircraft at [fight level] 370; having a rapid decompression and putting your oxygen mask on. At that altitude a person has a TUC of approximately 19 seconds. 19 seconds seems like a long time even with the startle factor of what is happening and trying to figure out why. However; most of us in the aircraft type wear full headsets and I would take my headset off before putting the O2 mask on if a rapid decompression where to happen. 19 seconds of TUC minus the startle factor minus the headset and putting on the O2 mask and time is getting pretty tight not to mention if someone has glasses on. Now throw the surgical mask into the equation and I believe we are now out of time.I wonder how much of this has been explored? Do we indeed have time to take off all of this stuff with a TUC of 18-20 seconds and still live to save the day? It's one thing to have the mask on when the door is open or even below 25;000 feet but I believe we are setting ourselves up if we experience a rapid decompression with our headsets; surgical masks and glasses on.It's also fair to say this became a major distraction as the captain and I were discussing how best to deal with this situation in the future. Not so much as missed radio calls or unsafe handling of the aircraft but just a general distraction weighing on our minds and how this can be handled in the future. Air carrier First Officer reported concerns with having to wear a face mask in the cockpit especially in a rapid decompression situation.