Aryan95614/aerograph-asrs huggingface dataset:
Aircraft: WIDEBODY; LOW WING; 3 TURBOJET ENG
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

While at cruise altitude; cockpit began filling with smoke. Smoke appeared to come from the ventilation system. Smoke density increased to a point where cockpit visibility was difficult. Both crewmembers immediately donned oxygen masks. Center was contacted and a divert was initiated. Prior to the event; the cockpit temp had been recently adjusted to a warmer setting. When the smoke was noticed; the rheostats were returned to the full cold setting the smoke stopped after 3-5 minutes.The divert; approach; and landing were uneventful. ARFF met the aircraft upon landing. ARFF escorted both flight crew members to the hospital for evaluation. Both crew members were released with no injuries and no signs of smoke inhalation. During enroute cruise the cockpit filled with smoke from the ventilation duct inside the cockpit. The cockpit filled with smoke requiring the crew to execute the Phase I Oxygen Mask On. Smoke was billowing so much so that it became difficult to see the flight instruments. A temperature adjustment was made prior to the first sign of smoke. The pilot monitoring adjusted the rheostats back to full cold. After approximately 3-5 minutes the smoke dissipated and the visibility increased enough to see the instruments. The landing was uneventful. [Fire rescue] shuttled the crew to a local hospital for observation for potential carbon monoxide poisoning. The crew was released several hours later after tests came back negative. Flight crew experiences a cockpit full of smoke shortly after the temperature controls have been adjusted to a warmer temperature. Oxygen masks are donned and temperature selected to full cold. As a descent is initiated the smoke begins to dissipate and the crew continues the descent and diverts to a suitable airport.
Aircraft: A320
Phase of flight: Initial Climb
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Captain flying. After an extended taxi; with a pass through the deicing pad; no ice detected; continued towards runway. Approximately 10 minutes before TO started engine 2. After engine 2 start and at power change over received a FLCT SPLR FAULT. Following non normal methodology decided to contact dispatched and advised. Connected with maintenance and a reset of SEC 3 was suggested and instructed by maintenance. This cleared the fault and all flight controls and spoiler movement was checked. After takeoff; FLCT SPLR FAULT returned. No high roll rate experienced or autopilot disconnect with fault. Through 10;000 ft followed non normal methodology; and ECAM exception procedures. First officer is now flying pilot. After discussion with dispatch; selected a diversion airport. Enroute [we advised ATC] and managed fuel to an acceptable landing weight. Uneventful landing and taxied to gate. [Report narrative contained no additional information.] A320 flight crew reported a FLCT SPLR FAULT after takeoff. Crew followed recommended procedures. After discussion with Dispatch; the crew diverted for an uneventful landing.
Aircraft: B767
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

We landed; the seatbelt sign was [turned off]; and the Inflight Service Manager (ISM) made the announcement; 'Flight attendants; please prepare your doors for arrival; crosscheck; standby for all call'. The three of us at door two (2) released our seatbelts and got up. I then proceeded to stop; drop; review; I proceeded to touch the disarming lever; but instead accidentally hardly lifted the door handle; causing the pneumatic assist to kick in; therefore fully opening the 2R door and causing the slide to fully deploy. As soon as the pneumatic assist took over I took a step back. Once the slide was fully deployed; [another] flight attendant placed the barrier strap across the door; while I blocked passengers away from the door. During the all-call; the ISM [was] informed of the mishap. B767-300 Flight Attendant reported accidentally deploying a slide at destination gate following an international flight.
Aircraft: GLOBAL EXPRESS (BD700)
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

I would like to elaborate on a loss of separation event that occurred. The events below are to the best of my recollection at this time. I was the Pilot in Command of a Global Express aircraft on an IFR flight plan. In the remarks section of the flight plan was 'training flight; HMU check.' The aircraft had just been returned to service after maintenance and the event occurred off an airway in VMC conditions at FL450. Late morning; the crew was flying at FL430. The crew decided to climb to a higher altitude and referred to approved performance data (FMS and cruise charts.) After establishing that the aircraft performance was within the acceptable range for FL450 we requested a climb. The Controller cleared us to FL450 and we commenced a slow climb. After leveling off; the aircraft would not accelerate to cruise speed. After approximately four minutes our first request to ATC was for a lower altitude. We stated 'We would like a lower altitude if possible.' The Controller said 'We have your request; expect lower in nine minutes' After approximately four minutes our second request was for a lower altitude with a turn if necessary. The Controller responded 'Turn left 15 degrees-lower in three minutes. The crew set maximum continuous thrust to maintain airspeed and altitude; but the aircraft performance continued to degrade. After two minutes the aircraft safety parameters were in jeopardy and the crew took evasive action and informed ATC 'We need an immediate descent!!' ATC cleared us to FL400 with a turn to 180 degrees. We observed an aircraft visually and on our TCAS. After passing FL430 we were re-assigned maintain FL430 if able. We told ATC we were unable and continued to FL400 and received a request to contact ATC Sector Supervisor via telephone upon landing. I believe some contributing factors associated with this occurrence were: The possibility of a temperature inversion or unusual warmer than expected air at FL450. Turbulence associated with the assigned altitude and the lack of phraseology to convey immediacy of situation to ATC. [This was] an aircraft returning to service after a heavy inspection. A BD-700 climbed to FL450 on a test flight but aircraft performance deteriorated to an unsafe level. After several requests; FL400 was approved but traffic separation was lost.
Aircraft: CRJ900
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

We were on a visual approach into New Orleans Rwy 2 backed up by ILS Rwy 2. On downwind; Tower gave a left turn to heading 110 and cleared for visual to follow aircraft on final. The clearance heading was well inside the final approach fix with a 90 degrees intercept to final approach. I needed to start the descent down because we were high to begin with. Tower gave low altitude alert and we made the correction with power adjustment. I believe we were at 1;100 FT between FAF POVVI and YERUB. I made correction and we were below GS while correcting and at one point with one white and three red on the PAPI. On short final 3/4 mile we were back on GS.Next time advise ATC for vectors outside FAF and do not accept 90 intercept and try to get a vector to FAF with 30 degrees intercept. [Report narrative contained no additional information.] CRJ-900 flight crew reported receiving a low altitude alert from ATC on a visual approach to MSY.
Aircraft: SMALL AIRCRAFT; HIGH WING; 1 ENG; FIXED GEAR
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC

The Heli Pilot was not talking on the radio; but had it on. I found out later in the day he was unsure where he was. He heard my radio calls but didn't know how to process them. Didn't understand N1ame & Name 2 Beach or where they were. I have T-CAS & ADS-B that are working perfectly; he didn't have transponder turned on & I'm not sure if he had ADS-B. My system would have warned me he was there. I was descending through 500 feet on base-leg 1/2 mile off shore to land on the Name 1 Beach to pick up clients. I checked the 3 planes on the Name 2 beach to my left to make sure they were not departing; then focused on my landing paying close attention to the two Bears sleeping on the beach and folks taking pictures; maneuvering around and beyond them. Then suddenly there was a Heli at my altitude 100 feet off my right wing. At the end of the day I have discussed this with Company that own the Heli & the Pilot. I believe it to be resolved. Pilot reported a NMAC with a helicopter.
Aircraft: B777
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation

During preflight; the crew noticed the Hazmat paperwork showed 15300 pounds of Lithium in position 15L. This Lithium was in an AAD can. This can only weighted 2800 pounds. As the Captain; I asked for the Dangerous Goods [DG] specialist to explain what we were seeing. I asked the ramp agent what the weight of the can was and that is when I found out it was around 2800 pound. Clearly there was a problem. First problem is that the two systems do not talk and crosscheck the weights. Secondly; the DG system does not know the max weight of a can and therefore can't check to see that the maximum can weight is not violated. Third; did I have a CG issue? Fourth; how does the system generate paperwork that has such gross errors?I believe the cause is the systems for DG and W&B do not talk and the DG system Allows Lithium to be declared way above the maximum AAD can weight. Also; the W&B system does not catch such gross errors.My suggestion is to ensure the DG paperwork system and Weight and Balance system learn how to crosstalk. There should be no way for the system to produce paperwork that has gross errors. The DG paperwork system must know and be able to verify the max can weight is not violated. Further; the actual can weight must be known by the DG paperwork system as another crosscheck. It should never be able to have more Lithium declared in the can than the can weights. B777-200 Captain reported Hazmat documents contained Hazmat cargo weight errors caused by Weight & Balance software/automation issues.
Aircraft: SMALL AIRCRAFT
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

Aircraft X was cleared to land on Runway 23. Aircraft Y was holding short of Runway 23 at Taxiway E; and Aircraft Z was continuing inbound for Runway 23; having been advised that traffic would be holding in position. Once Aircraft X had passed Taxiway E; Aircraft Y was instructed to line up and wait was as issued traffic for Aircraft Z inbound. Aircraft X was rolling out on Runway 23; and as instructed to turn left onto Taxiway K; Cross Runway 19 on K and contact Ground Control. Aircraft X slowed to taxi speed and was informed no delay off the runway; traffic holding in position; which the pilot acknowledged. Once I visually assured that the tail for the Aircraft X was clear of the runway; I issued a takeoff clearance to Aircraft Y; with a wind check and an instruction to turn left to heading 190. I observed Aircraft Y beginning a departure roll; and then issued a landing clearance to Aircraft Z. The Ground Controller/ICT then informed me that Aircraft X had not completed crossing Runway 19. Aircraft X was informed to continue to pull forward as he was still in the runway environment. The pilot of Aircraft X then asked if he was cleared to cross Runway 23. Then; I informed the pilot to cross Runway 19 straight ahead and then contact Ground Control. The Ground Controller then taxied the aircraft to parking. [My recommendations are to] improve the airport markings at the Taxiway K; Runway 23 and Runway 19 intersection to make it more clear to pilots which runway they are currently on; or change Taxiway K to parallel Runway 19 south of Runway 23 to join Taxiway F. CAK Tower Controller reported a runway incursion of a pilot that hadn't fully cleared the runway.
Aircraft: SMALL TRANSPORT; LOW WING; 2 TURBOPROP ENG
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was working combined Radar Approach Control from the east side R3 position. Aircraft X was descending west to east on an IFR flight plan to UES. I received Aircraft X from ZAU descending to 110 and continued his decent to 050 to comply with MKE LOA. I received Aircraft Y from MKE Approach Ripon sector north east of UNU airport level at 060 enroute to SUS. Somewhere between UNU and RYV I inadvertently terminated control on Aircraft Y resulting in a dropped data block. The target still showed a splat with altitude. As I was scanning Aircraft X's descent to see if he was going to make his descent per our LOA to 050 before entering MKE airspace. I saw the 060 altitude splat over RYV without a data tag and assumed it was a VFR aircraft. I issued traffic to Aircraft X told him to stop descent. Aircraft X leveled at 063. I then realized that this was not a VFR aircraft but Aircraft Y enroute to SUS. Before I issued traffic to Aircraft Y he reported aircraft in sight as the CA alert chimed. Aircraft Y passed behind Aircraft X at an estimated 2 miles and 300 feet vertical. The event happened due to my inadvertent dropping of the IFR tag enroute to SUS; and failing to realize that the tag was an aircraft I had on frequency and was IFR. My scan missed the dropped data block.To prevent this from happening I need to pay particular attention to tags I drop. I also need to slow my scan to ensure I am aware of all targets on my scope. MSN Controller drops IFR tag not realizing it and later has conflict with other IFR aircraft causing a loss of separation.
Aircraft: C172
Phase of flight: Landing
Anomaly: Ground Excursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

During a 10 knot direct cross wind landing; immediately after the all three wheels were down; the plane veered sharply to the left. I was unable to correct the left turn with right rudder and right brake and the plane exited the runway onto the grass field between the runway and Juliet Taxiway. The plane crossed the grass and came to a rest adjacent to Juliet with the engine still running and no structural damage. I was able to apply power and get the plane onto the taxiway and taxi back to the East Ramp without assistance. Upon touchdown in a moderate left crosswind the pilot of a C-172 lost control of the aircraft which exited the runway onto a grassy area and came to a stop close to a crossing taxiway. No damage or injuries were reported and the undamaged aircraft was taxied back onto the hard surface and to parking.
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Taxiing to runway was uneventful as was the takeoff.As we were climbing through about 28;000 feet approximately 20 minutes into the flight; I noticed on the EICAS display that the Engine 2 Oil Pressure PSI indication was amber and dropping. I had my FO (First Officer) bring up the Status page on his MFD at which time we noticed the oil quantity was dropping at a constant rate. We briefly discussed this situation and determined that at any moment we were going to get a low oil pressure message. We determined [departure airport] would be the better option for the safety of the flight.I instructed my FO to tell ATC we needed to return. I also had him look up engine 2 low oil pressure in the QRH as we anticipated this indication. Within a minute after telling ATC we needed to return; we did get the Engine 2 low oil pressure indication. I was flying the airplane and I had my FO run the QRH which required the engine to be shut down. The engine was shut down approximately within 5 minutes after we noticed the low pressure indication on the EICAS at an altitude of approximately FL300.We verified that Dispatch had been notified [and] we informed the flight attendants of the situation. They were told we were returning to [departure airport]. We also informed the passengers that we were returning for precautionary reasons as a result of abnormal engine indications and at no time were the passengers informed that the number 2 engine had been shut down. We continued to make sure that all QRH procedure had been completed and that all checklists were done as we were descending. I had my FO ask for straight out missed approach if we needed to go around. ATC provided a discrete frequency; I had my FO advise we would be stopping on the runway to have the emergency vehicles inspect the number 2 engine before we proceed to the gate. We did not send for number via ACARS; instead we used the check list numbers together with QRH procedures and inputted them manually. The rest of the approach and landing was uneventful. The FO did an outstanding job with the QRH and ATC communications.When the aircraft came to a complete stop; vehicles inspected the number 2 engine and did not notice any abnormalities and indicated it would be OK to taxi to the gate however they would follow us to the gate as a precaution. When we arrived at the gate we proceeded to shut down the aircraft at which time the passengers deplaned. EMB-175 Captain reported returning to departure airport after shutting down Number 2 engine because of low oil quantity and pressure.
Aircraft: DHC8
Phase of flight: Takeoff / Launch
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

First Officer was the flying pilot. After rotation First Officer felt the elevator was heavy and oversensitive. After we cleaned up the aircraft and ran the checklist I confirmed that there was a 5 second delay between elevator command and elevator reaction. [I was] asked to return to the airport and notified flight attendant; Operations; and passengers that we were returning to land. I did not declare an emergency; approach was normal until flare; then the pitch became over sensitive; notified Dispatch and Maintenance. During before takeoff controls check the elevator felt heavy; but with a tail wind on the parallel taxiway; this was normal. The take-off run was normal until Vr; the elevator was slow to respond and over sensitive. The aircraft over pitched to 12-15 degrees and I relaxed the back pressure to 8 degrees and the aircraft nose lowered to about 4 degrees. The aircraft oscillated a few more times until it stabilized into a normal climb attitude. After aircraft clean up and running appropriate checklists; the Captain confirmed that the controls were slow to react; 3-5 seconds between input command and elevator reaction. We discussed if we should continue or not. The Captain and I agreed to return to the field. I flew a wide downwind leg to give the Captain time to call the Flight Attendant; Operations and make a PA to the passengers that we were returning. The Captain did not declare an Emergency because we had control of the aircraft. We configured the aircraft early with gear down; flaps 15 degrees and 1200 RPM. The approach was normal until the flare; and then the elevator was overly pitch sensitive again and oscillated between too high and low for normal landing attitude. The aircraft bounced once and landed firm. We cleared the runway and taxied to the gate. The Captain called Dispatch and talked to Maintenance. The aircraft was taken to the Hangar and the flight was canceled. We found out later; that the elevator servo for the auto-pilot was partially jammed. The servo was removed and replaced. DHC100 flight crew detects strange elevator response during takeoff and initial climb. The crew elects to return to the departure airport where maintenance discovers the autopilot elevator servo is partially jammed. Tail winds during the elevator check prior to takeoff apparently masked the condition.
Aircraft: C172
Phase of flight: Final Approach
Anomaly: No Specific Anomaly Occurred All Types

Two developments have happened recently in the vicinity of RHV that have dramatically decreased safety at night.The first is that the street east of the runways (Capitol Expressway) has had new street lights installed. From the air these street lights look EXTREMELY similar to runway lights. The street lights exist only in the vicinity of and approximately parallel to the runways.The second of the two events is that the actual runway lighting has been converted to Pilot Controlled Lighting (PCL). However since the conversion was done many pilots have complained that the PCL control circuitry does not recognize their inputs to the system and that they have been unable to turn on the runway lights.Now that the street lights are on permanently and the runway lights are difficult to turn on the opportunity exists for pilots at night to think that they have turned on the runway lights (when in fact the runway lights have not turned on) and mistake the street lights on Capitol Expressway for the runway.I have already heard reports of pilots mistaking the street lights for runway lights even when the runway lights are turned on. If the runway lights are turned off the temptation to assume the street lights are the runway lights will be VERY strong.There needs to be something done to prevent this potential disaster. At a minimum there needs to be an entry in the Airport and Facilities Directory that alerts pilots to the possible error. Fixing the PCL so that it is easier to turn on will also help. An experienced area Flight Instructor advised that the new street lights installed to the east of and parallel to the runways at RHV are easily mistaken for runway lights. Difficulties associated with activating the newly installed pilot controlled runway lighting exacerbates the likelihood of misidentifying the highway as the runway.
Aircraft: LARGE TRANSPORT; LOW WING; 2 TURBOJET ENG
Phase of flight: Final Approach
Anomaly: Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

While flying the ILS 22L into EWR we heard an aircraft in front of us report that 'They may have just flown past a drone'. The tower then asked us to be sure we heard the report. I was the Pilot monitoring so was looking intently for the drone. At about 420 MSL the drone came into sight above and to the right of our flight path. The FO also had it in sight and no deviations were needed. It all happened very fast and the object was quite a blur. It appeared to be brown or grey in color and the outline of circular rotor blades visible. Size; speed and direction of travel impossible to tell. It appeared stationary from my perspective but may be because of the large speed differential. We landed completely normally other than spotting the drone. We verbally reported to the tower and also were met by police who wanted a description as well. The aicraft was stable and the drone was not in our immediate Flight Path as it was to the right and above us. The CA filed a report to capture the details for the company. An air carrier crew was notified by EWR Tower about an earlier UAS sighting. They also detected the UAS at about 420 feet; but the craft's details were difficult to determine.