Aryan95614/aerograph-asrs huggingface dataset:
Aircraft: CITATION V/ULTRA/ENCORE (C560)
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Myself and Technician Y were working on a Cessna CE560E aircraft inspection. We performed the task which checks the Emergency Braking System. One of the final steps is to disconnect the [Emergency Brake] line and blow it out with alcohol to make sure that if there's any fluid (Skydrol); that it's cleaned out. When removing the Right-Hand (R/H) side; the 'B' nut was partially seized and the line broke while being removed. I capped the line on the aircraft side and took the broken line and placed it on the table by my Lead Mechanic. I told him that the line broke and that it needed [to be] written-up and a new line ordered. It has been three weeks since all of this happened; so I don't know what his exact reaction was as far as a thumbs ups; an O.K.; or even just a nod; but I do know that I was under the impression that he heard me and understood. I then turned around and went back to cleaning up after the [Inspection] Checks we had accomplished. Apparently the Lead Mechanic didn't hear me; or misunderstood because the line was not ordered and was not written up and from my understanding it was found on the Post Maintenance Checklist this past weekend. The broken line was the one that connects directly to the Brake Assembly and going from their Removal and Replacement here is the Part Number (P/N) 6527365-16 and it's found in the Cessna CE-560 Illustrated Parts Catalog (IPC) 32-41-00; Figure 04a; Item # 2. Not sure what could be done differently other than double checking all of the write-ups and parts when your Lead finishes for the day...but not sure that's 100 % possible. This is the first time I have had to fill out one of these reports. An Aircraft Maintenance Technician was informed that a broken Emergency Brake System line he had removed and capped off was not replaced on their Cessna CE-560E aircraft. The brake line was discovered missing during a Post Maintenance Check.
Aircraft: B787
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Equipment Issue; Ground Event / Encounter Vehicle; Ground Incursion Ramp

A [ramp employee] driving a cargo loader cut in front of a 787 marshaling in at gate XX at XA20 on Date; the right wing walker did have his stop signal but the aircraft could not stopped. The [ramp employee] barely made it to the right side of aircraft with out any incidents. Ramp Agent reported observing a cargo loader cut in front of a taxiing Dreamliner as it was being marshalled into the gate. The Observer further stated that it was impossible to stop the Dreamliner and the cargo loader was able to get out of the way.
Aircraft: MD-82
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

We had descended from FL320 to FL280 due to turbulence. Upon reaching FL280 an acrid odor briefly presented in cockpit. Shortly thereafter the flight attendants reported an odor in the cabin and advised the passengers were very concerned. We turned off galley power and recirc fans and increased cabin altitude to dissipate the odor; which seemed to help temporarily as the attendants reported that they were not sure if the odor was gone or not. We then decided to divert to a nearby airport and so advised ATC and company operations. While proceeding direct to the airport in the descent the cabin reported the odor was recurring. Maintained as high airspeed as possible consistent with ride conditions to reduce enroute time and deviated from SOP to get the jet on the ground in minimum time. Landed overweight but softly in the touchdown zone. An MD-82 flight crew declared an emergency diverted to a nearby airport and landed overweight but uneventfully when acrid odors permeated the cockpit and passenger cabin.
Aircraft: FIGHTER
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

My Supervisor who was working as arrival data and had the shift took a call from the tower controller. The tower controller informed him that an inbound flight of military aircraft needed to do a hung ordinance procedure due to a practice bomb possibly stuck on the plane. The supervisor then informed me that the Aircraft wanted to do a 'practice hung ordinance procedure.' It turns out that the supervisor misinterprited what the tower controller was saying and gave me incorrect information. I was treating it as a practice procedure and was going to work it into the rest of my pattern traffic based on what the supervisor told me. Soon after I started the flight split up and vectors to accommodate the aircrafts request I was told by the flight lead that they [had a situation] due to the hung ordinance. I asked to confirm that this was an exercise and that they wanted to do a practice procedure. At that time I was told that the hung ordinance was a practice bomb not that they wanted a practice procedure. I had to scramble to turn aircraft out of the way to accommodate the priority and to turn Aircraft X away form populated areas. This would not have been needed had I been given the correct information from the supervisor. The supervisors lack of knowledge and inattention to detail contributed to making the situation much harder and unsafe than it needed to be. I am unsure how to rectify this. TOL TRACON Controller reports of being told about a practice hung ordinance requested procedure. Controller later finds out it was not a practice; but the aircraft had actual hung ordinance and had possibly flown over populated areas.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

ZZZ cargo entered 2 items containing flammable liquids onto the DG Load Control Plan form. Item X indicated a net weight of 25lbs with a remark line 33lbs flammable liquid. The load planner questioned the accuracy of the 2 items and held the items off when it became clear that ZZZ cargo was not sure of the weights of both the container and the flammable liquid. A Load Planner stopped two dangerous goods items containing flammable liquid from being loaded onto an aircraft because of inaccurate weights of the containers and liquids.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL

Pilot write up of missing 2nd fire extinguisher not installed to aircraft first class bin for having the new interior mod. Contacted Maintenance Control Technician had given me an eco number of [X] for new mod should got a separate engineering authorization for extinguisher only. One fire extinguisher was missing in the forward over head bin this was to be installed IAW a mod to the aircraft but was never installed see mic # [X] Unknown if the ECO (Engineering Change Order) was completed and how long the fire extinguisher was missing.I think the ECO for the plane was not completed. Mechanics reported missing portable fire extinguisher after aircraft had undergone an interior modification; requiring an Engineering Authorization to account for the missing required safety equipment.
Aircraft: MD-83
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

I was working the R14/R88 position when I accepted two RADAR hand offs from Approach; the MD83 departing to the northwest and the B737; approximately 10 miles in trail; departing to the northeast. The MD83 declared an emergency requesting to turn back to the airport. I cleared the MD83 to amend climb to 100 and cleared direct to the airport. I also asked nature of emergency and if they would need assistance. The MD83 explained that there was an electric odor in the cockpit and no assistance needed. I then called Approach on the land line and asked to have them stop the B737 at 090 and explained the emergency. They had already shipped the aircraft and gave me control. The B737 was actually checking in on the loud speaker as I was talking to Approach. I hung up on Approach and gave the B737 an 'immediate clearance to climb to 160 and turn to a 090 degree heading for emergency traffic. Both aircraft at this time were maybe 3-4 miles apart and reacting to TCAS Alerts. The MD83 to climb and the B737 to descend; after the TCAS alert the B737 began its climb and back on course and the MD83 I gave further instruction from Approach to return to the field; where the MD83 landed without incident. This was a mistake on my part. I gave the MD83 the clearance back to Approach without positive separation with the B737; believing I could coordinate with Approach to stop the B737 before separation would be lost. I was wrong. I would recommend that I not make a hasty reaction to an emergency aircraft before a complete scan of traffic. Enroute Controller described a TCAS RA event involving two Air Carrier departures; the first declaring an emergency and requesting an immediate return to the departure airport; separation was not insured with the following aircraft.
Aircraft: MEDIUM TRANSPORT; LOW WING; 2 TURBOJET ENG
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict

Climbing out of SEA; we were issued a clearance to 6000 feet. When I checked in with Seattle Departure; the controller advised us of traffic (A Cessna) at 6500 at our 12 o'clock and a few miles (I can't remember the exact number) and I responded that I was looking for traffic. Around that time we were climbing through 3000 feet at around 4000 FPM. A few moments later we got a TA and I noticed that the altitude was already capturing so I reached over and pulled the thrust levers back to arrest the rate of climb. The First Officer (FO); who was the pilot flying; was prepared to execute an RA and had his hands on the yoke. At around 5500 feet we got an RA and the FO used the TCAS button to fly the aircraft into the green box; I turned on all the lights; and then advised ATC that we had an RA and were leveling momentarily at 5800. The RA cleared and we continued and leveled at 6000. The FO and I talked about the event pretty extensively in a constructive manner. We were very light and climbing faster than 'normal.' The FO was new; and commented that he'd never had an RA outside of the sim. When ATC made the traffic call; I immediately recognized the possibility of a traffic conflict; but I did not take control of the aircraft (just the thrust levers) until I realized that the FO wasn't going to do so. In talking with the FO; it was clear that he was very much primed to REACT to an RA; but not so much prepared to PREVENT an RA. I believe this is a symptom of the way we train TCAS maneuvers in the simulator. Throughout the event; positive control was maintained at all times and the aircraft was never in danger. The FO did a marvelous job responding after the RA was issued. In the end; it was a very good learning experience. Climbing out of SEA; the crew responded to a TA that became an RA by reducing their rate of climb.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Takeoff / Launch
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

TPA winds were approximately 300/17G30. Departing Runway 1R; just prior to VR; we experienced a strong gusting left crosswind. At VR I rotated; but the aircraft climb was sluggish with the gusty winds; so I increased the pitch to establish a positive rate of climb. The rest of the takeoff was turbulent; but uneventful. Upon arriving at [destination]; I checked the Aircraft Condition Monitoring System (ACMS) pitch limit indicator and it was 14; so I conducted an external inspection of the tail skid and discovered there had been contact. The crushable cartridge was still showing green and the skid plate dimples were visible. Dispatch and Maintenance were notified.With the gusty crosswind conditions a max performance takeoff might have helped. If I was using the Head-up Guidance System (HGS); I might have been advised of the tailstrike from the tailstrike indicator. Takeoff was in very gusty winds that I think had picked up after we left the gate; Captain was fighting pretty good to maintain centerline; rotation rate appeared normal; I think a large gust just lifted him off and increased his Angle of Attack (AOA) as he was leaving the runway. No in-cockpit notification of a tailstrike was received; the flight was normal. B737-800 flight crew reported experiencing a tail strike on takeoff in gusty winds at TPA.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight planning for flight airport ZZZ-ZZZ1 on the company Pilot Mobile App on my Company iPad. I signed in to Pilot Mobile; selected flight XX; and signed off as Fit For Duty. I was selecting flight plan; and noticed that a flight plan was already displayed without me having to go to the flight plan manager. When I scrolled through to look at the flight plan; I noticed that the flight was signed off with my name and ZZZ1. I had not logged into the system to even look at the flight plan let alone accept the release. My First Officer said he hadn't gone in to the system yet; and I called dispatch and they said they hadn't signed it off either. In fact; they hadn't generated a flight plan yet. So I looked again and noticed that the flight was from ZZZ-ZZZ1 but it was for August X... today is August X+2. I had noticed yesterday that one of my flights was signed off without me looking at it yet; but I thought the dispatcher had done it because I had trouble logging in; and had called to talk to them. It appears that somehow Pilot Mobile and/or Sabre is automatically signing my release for me. And I have no idea why the flight plan for a flight 2 days from now automatically propagated to my Pilot Mobile App. I finally was able to get the correct flight plan and signed it off in Sabre and we departed without incident. But good thing I noticed.... A Captain discovered during preflight that his company issued iPad's Pilot Mobile APP had signed his flight's release before he had examined the flight plan. Upon further examination; the flight plan and release for his flight that day was for that flight two days prior with his information.
Aircraft: LEARJET 60
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict

I was working final sector. I had a LJ60 arrival from the west coming to SAT; I descended the LJ60 to 4;000 feet. When the LJ60 was about 20 miles from SAT I noticed a primary target pop up with no altitude about 5 miles apart. I clicked on the target and noticed it was squawking 1202; which for us is an indicator that it is a glider. I issued traffic and turned the LJ60 to a 090 heading to avoid the maneuvering glider at 5C1. As fate may have it; the primary tracked directly in to and merged with my LJ60 on final. I was basically praying to the gods that this glider was not at 4;000 feet as I frantically issued traffic. Fortunately the LJ60 never saw the glider and landed safely. On a different date I was watching the Final Controller on APW [Approach West] work around multiple aircraft coming in and out of 5C1 squawking VFR flying through air carrier arrivals into SAT. There was also a glider there maneuvering again with an intermittent transponder. They were flying up to 5500 feet and below; our arrivals are 6;000 feet and below. The Final Controller was issuing traffic and playing guessing games as to what these VFR aircraft; gliders; 15 miles from SAT runway final; were going to do. Extend the Class C all around 5C1 or create Class B to protect SAT finals. 5C1 has been an issue for a long time; enough is enough. A SAT TRACON Controller reported two instances of jet aircraft on final approach to SAT conflicting with gliders maneuvering into and out of a non-towered airport (5C1) located underneath the final approach course.
Aircraft: MEDIUM LARGE TRANSPORT; LOW WING; 2 TURBOJET ENG
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

After departing Key West and some multiple vectors we were told to turn 'Direct CARNU and Contact Miami center'After turning direct to CARNU my First Officer could see that it was taking us directly towards the Weather Balloon/Restricted Airspace; my view was temporarily blocked due to the window spar. After rolling out I could see it as well and concurred. We had the visual and were above the Balloon. I immediately tried to contact Miami Center but the controller was very busy; at about the exact time my FO initiated a turn to the right; we also got the EGPWS warning 'Obstacle; Obstacle; Pull UP.' We followed the EGPWS and initiated a turn. Right after imitating the climbing/turn I was able to contact Miami Center and told them what was going on. They turned us 20 degrees right; followed by an additional 10 degrees right. We immediately complied and returned to assigned altitude. We were assigned 9;000 FT and climbed to 9;500 FT to comply with the EGPWS warning. Key West departure should not turn us directly toward a restricted airspace. Before he could communicate with center; I received an Obstacle Obstacle Pull Up Warning; in which I pushed the TCS button and climbed and initiated a turn to avoid the balloon; after the conflict was avoided I returned to previous assigned altitude. When the captain was able to communicate with center he advised them of are deviation. EYW Departure turned an aircraft toward R-2916 at 9;000 FT so the crew took evasive action as the EGPWS alerted Obstacle; Obstacle; Pull UP.
Aircraft: A321
Phase of flight: Parked; Taxi
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

We arrived at Gate slightly early. Initially; nobody at gate to marshal us in. Arrived at gate and shutdown. No agent to operate the jet bridge. Three calls by radio and one cell phone call to ops to get an agent down to the jet bridge. The first officer then noticed that the fueler was hooked up to the aircraft and fueling; while the aircraft entry doors were closed and the jet bridge still away from the aircraft. Attempted to call ops once again to tell them to stop fueling but there was an inbound medical emergency on the radio and we did not want to block their transmissions. An agent finally arrived fifteen minutes after we set the brake and we deplaned normally.Have fueler make sure the door is open before he/she starts fueling. [Report narrative contained no additional information.] Flight crew reported taxiing their A321 into the gate with no Marshal or Agent to operate the jet bridge. Ground personnel began fueling the aircraft while the doors were still closed.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Upon landing Runway 31 in LGA; during the landing rollout; the Local Controller (LGA Tower) instructed us to clear the runway at Taxiway S. We were too fast on our landing roll to make the turn so the Controller then changed the instruction to 'Clear at R; left on Taxiway P and contact ground.' I was the Captain on the flight and did as I was instructed. We cleared at R; made an immediate left onto Taxiway P and I stopped the aircraft as not to cross Taxiway B or T on Taxiway P since I did not have a further taxi clearance. About 5-10 seconds; I contacted LGA Ground Control and was scolded for stopping on Taxiway P. LGA Ground informed me I cannot stop there because it is a 'Runway hotspot' for exiting aircraft landing on Runway 31. I informed the Controller I had not received any taxi instructions to move beyond the point where we were stopped. His reply to me was 'Then next time you need to ask the Local Controller (aka Tower) for taxi instructions before switching to Ground.' This is not compliant with AIM 4-3-20 which states the pilot must hold unless further instructions have been issued by ATC and also says immediately change to Ground Control frequency when advised by the Tower and obtain a taxi clearance. We complied with all of this and nowhere does it state we need to ask Tower for further taxi instructions beyond what were issued. The Controller 7110.65 states 'An aircraft is expected to taxi clear of the runway unless otherwise directed by ATC. This does not authorize the aircraft to cross a subsequent taxiway or ramp after clearing the runway.' Hence; the reason we turned on P and stopped as not to cross any other taxiways. This occurred because the LGA ATC controllers routinely expect aircraft to assume their expectation without proper clearances. The controllers at this airport routinely fail to issue instructions to taxi beyond a point of clearing the runway; yet the expect aircraft to keep moving. Compounding the problem at LGA is the lack of coordination between the Local Controller and the Ground Controller; as well as a lack of standard phraseology at LGA. If the controllers at LGA expect aircraft to keep moving when they clear the runway; the Local Controller needs to issue very clear instructions to turn on whatever taxiway and keep moving until told to stop. They cannot expect pilots to disregard AIM procedures and taxi the aircraft without a taxi clearance. Pilot reported that sometimes at LGA other pilots taxi without instruction towards the gate area anticipating a call from Ground Control. Air carrier Captain reported concerns with LGA ATC phraseology and expectations; which were apparently non-compliant with AIM procedures.