Aryan95614/aerograph-asrs huggingface dataset:
Aircraft: LIGHT TRANSPORT; LOW WING; 2 TURBOJET ENG
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

We were on approach to DTS for the GPS 14 approach in light rain. The weather was changing at DTS due to the fact there was a thunderstorm just to the south and west of DTS. We saw VPS and thought it was DTS so we told [the] Controller we had a visual and began to maneuver for landing; we descended to approximately 500 to 600 AGL when we noticed the crossing runway and saw runway numbers of 12 Not 14. So we went around and continued to DTS. We saw DTS when approximately 1 to 2 mile past VPS. I think it would enhance safety to add a note on the planned view GPS 14 to DTS regarding the fact that you cross over VPS and in low Visibility it can be mistaken for DTS due similar runways; i.e. Runway 12 versus Runway 14. [Narrative #2 contains no additional information] An air taxi crew executed a go-around while on final to VPS Runway 12 in light rain with four miles visibility after realizing that they were not on final approach for DTS GPS Runway 14 about six miles beyond VPS.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude

At about seven mile final to Runway 30 in Oakland; we received an 'ADJUST VERTICAL SPEED; ADJUST' RA. The traffic was a VFR traffic that had departed from Hayward Executive. The aircraft was configured for a flaps 40 landing and the 'Before Landing Checklist' was complete. I was the Pilot Flying; autopilot and autothrottles were both disengaged prior to the TA and RA. The traffic was reported to us by OAK Tower. The First Officer and I did not visually acquire the aircraft so FO responded with a 'negative contact'. Upon receiving the 'ADJUST VERTICAL SPEED; ADJUST' I smoothly applied additional thrust and reduced the descent rate of the aircraft in compliance with the displayed RA commands. FO made a radio call to OAK Tower stating that [we were] responding to an RA. Upon receiving the 'CLEAR OF CONFLICT' call from the TCAS; I ensured that I was still comfortable; and stable to continue the approach. We were less than one dot displacement high on the electronic glideslope; and I still had about 300 ft to ensure aircraft stability. The remainder of the approach and landing were uneventful. Tower gave us a phone number to call on the taxi in. Upon engine shutdown and completion of checklist; I called ATC and sent an ACARS message to Dispatch with a brief explanation of the event and informing him that the passengers seemed unaware of the event.We followed our protocol perfectly. The traffic at Hayward needs to be more careful to follow traffic pattern altitudes. [Report narrative contained no additional information.] B737-700 flight crew reported responding to an RA on a visual approach to OAK that appeared to be from a small aircraft in the HWD area.
Aircraft: B747
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Given an assignment with parts ordered and on hold to replace the R48 [Relay]. Deferral was updated with parts needed. It [Relay] looks different than the other three [relays] installed; but match R48. Upon checking the online Illustrated Parts Catalog (IPC) 28-22-51-006a under Item-25 with company Part Numbers (P/N) and Sub-section-25 with Manufacturer's (MFG) Parts Number that do not cross to company Part Numbers; [I] was not aware that replacement relay is a non-stock part. Since Pre and Post-Service Bulletin (S/B) Part Numbers (P/N) are both under the same company Part Number item at the moment; I believed I was installing the correct part. Reporter stated there are four relays; each identified with an 'R' and a two digit number; such as R-46; R47; R48. The relays are located in the 414 Power Panel in the Main Equipment Center (MEC) on B747-400 aircraft. One relay for each Main wing tank boost pump. The deferral involved a right wing Main fuel tank boost pump and the associated R48 Relay. The R48 Relay had been upgraded to a Ground Fault Interrupter (GFI) design as a result of a Service Bulletin (S/B); but was still listed under their company's Parts Numbering System with the same P/N as the older Non-GFI Relay. Reporter stated the Aircraft Wiring Diagram Manual still refers to the upgraded relays as R46; R47; R48; but their Illustrated Parts Catalog (IPC) and IPC item Sub-section did not have a new company P/N to identify the upgraded R48 GFI-type Relays. They were both listed under one Part Number even though the Manufacturer's part numbers were different. His company has since revised their IPC Manual to reflect the Pre and Post Service Bulletin Relays. Inadequate information in the Illustrated Parts Catalog (IPC) led to installing a Pre-Service Bulletin R48 Relay in the 414 Power Panel of a B747-400 aircraft. A Ground Fault Interrupter (GFI) type R48 Relay associated with the right wing Main fuel tank boost pump was required.
Aircraft: B767
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Immediately after takeoff from ZZZ we received this ICAS message 'C HYD PRESS'. Initially we thought that the APU may not have been providing enough air for the ADP to work properly since we were operating with a deferred maintenance item on the right-side bleed system which required the right side to be off. We waited until flaps were retracted to see if message and light would go off. It did not and in addition to the ICAS and ADP Pressure lights we got the System light and both the Left and Right main pump low pressure lights on.We proceeded to execute the QRH procedure and stopped the climb at 15;000 ft. to work the checklist. After completing the checklist; we were faced with operating the aircraft without a center hydraulic system which will call for a flaps 20 landing using the alternate method of extension for the flaps and gear.After receiving weather for ZZZ1; we elected to divert to ZZZ1 because it offered an instrument approach; a longer runway and less mountainous terrain than ZZZ. We were going to land overweight; may need assistance getting off the runway and elected to [request priority handling] and have equipment standing by. B767 Captain reported a hydraulic system failure that resulted in a diversion.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Takeoff / Launch
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

This was the first time either of us would fly the TERPZ4 Departure. We briefed the new TERPZ4 departure. We even emphasized the new waypoint; PIRCH. We were in a -300; so we could not arm LNAV on the ground. We were cleared for takeoff from 15R with the simple phrase 'cleared for takeoff.'At 400 Feet AGL; we continued on runway heading. This was the old TERPZ procedure. At approximately 1;200 Feet AGL; we realized we needed to begin our turn to PIRCH. This turn should have been started at 667 Feet MSL (524 Feet AGL). We engaged LNAV to begin the turn. At this time Tower 'reminded' us to turn to PIRCH. We acknowledged their call and continued our turn to follow the departure. The rest of the flight was uneventful. The new departure procedure is significantly different from the old SID; which was in place for many years. The TERPZ Departure had just changed from 3 to 4. We briefed up the new departure highlighting all the new points and verified them in the FMC. We failed to notice that it was no longer a; 'fly heading 155 and expect vectors.' I saw the 155 heading and the line but didn't pick up on the fact that it was an RNAV track requiring a turn at 667 Feet. As we were passing 1;200 Feet MSL; Tower came up and mentioned that we were turning towards PIRCH (a friendly reminder). We began the turn and the rest of the departure and flight were uneventful.We have been flying runway heading for so long; I just assumed the departure was asking for the same thing. Obviously; read the whole thing in detail; especially after a change. What I'd recommend to fix this has already taken place; and that would be to put a note on the weather release about this change. I suspect a lot of flights did the same thing and when we came back to BWI later in the trip; this note was there. B737 flight crew reports a track deviation flying the new TERPZ4 departure from Runway 15R at BWI. The TERPZ3 had required runway heading after takeoff while the TERPZ4 requires a turn direct PIRCH. ATC issues a reminder.
Aircraft: NO AIRCRAFT
Phase of flight: unknown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types

I was leaving the building and noticed the Castle Sector position was not being manned/worked by anyone. I noted the person shown working the position was in the center of the control room outside of hearing range of the position. No one in the area knew the Controller stepped away; so they weren't even monitoring the position while he was away. I went and called him back to the position and asked why he left; he stated the Supervisor required him to leave position even though he said he indicated he was working. Recommendation; Don't leave a position unattended without someone monitoring the traffic and frequencies; especially during a point in time when there is still traffic in the airspace and surrounding airspace. NCT Controller voiced concern regarding the absence of a Castle Sector Controller present at the position even though one was assigned. The reporter noted positions should never be left unattended.
Aircraft: C172
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Toward the end of my hour and a half flight block at ZZZ; my student and I were transitioning back to ZZZ from a local airport (ZZZ1) where we conducted practice landings and maneuvers in our designated practice area in which we were ramped out by dispatch to. We called 10 NM northwest and told ATC our intentions. They instructed us to report back 4 NM northwest; we complied. Upon reaching approximately 7 NM northwest; after several broken radio calls that my student and I were unable to distinguish; we were instructed to fly NE in order to provide separation for a flight of military T6's that were on a long straight in final.I confirmed that ATC wanted us to fly northeast in order to avoid an aircraft that was on a straight in; they confirmed. Making a judgment call; I decided to instruct my student to fly straight north due to not wanting to cross over; under; or in front of the approaching aircraft that were seemingly on a straight in long final. Being out of the class D airspace; I was free to do as I pleased to ensure safety of flight. We called ATC and informed them we were doing so; unsure of what they wanted us to do; as we saw on our Multi-Function Display (MFD); the indication of an aircraft -2 (200 ft. below) moving toward us at a fast rate. ATC informed us that there was no traffic to the northwest; and that they were on a straight in. To which I responded they are incorrect because I have two military T6's in sight (visual; and on my MFD) and they were passing below us approximately 200 ft. below. We then turned to the left (west trending south/southeast) in order to keep the T'6s in sight and continue in to the airport. Cessna 172 Flight Instructor reported an NMAC event that was caused by an ATC assigned heading. Flight Instructor executed an evasive maneuver to prevent a collision.
Aircraft: B787
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

While descending on the RNAV ARRIVAL within a mile or two of waypoint ZZZZZ the autopilot; for unknown reasons; went into a degraded mode. While in the degraded mode the aircraft continued straight ahead at ZZZZZ not staying on the LNAV course. By the time we recognized the situation and got the autopilot out of the degraded mode the controller informed us we had missed the turn and he gave us a heading. Flight continued normally from there. I was the flying pilot. We were arriving on the RNAV STAR into ZZZ. At the time of the incident we were between the ZZZZZ and ZZZZZ1 waypoints; very close to the ZZZZZ waypoint. ATC instructed us to descend. The autopilot was engaged. I pushed the MCP FLCH button to start the decent. Immediately afterward I expected the aircraft to pull the power back and start a descent via the FLCH mode. Immediately the aircraft showed an 'autopilot mode' caution message on the ECAIS. Both the captain and I then realized that the aircraft was not descending as per the selected mode. We did not get a horn or a red autopilot warning message. Also the PFD showed that the autopilot was still engaged via the A/P FMA but the aircraft was not descending. We weren't sure if the aircraft was connected to the autopilot or not as per the conflicting information the aircraft was indicating. We then noticed that the aircraft airspeed was slowing and wasn't descending. I disconnected the autopilot and pushed the throttles forward to correct the low airspeed and pushed the yoke forward to start the aircraft descent. We also disconnected and reengaged the flight directors. We then noticed that the yellow 'autopilot mode' caution message had disappeared. Since we believed that the problem had been resolved I reengaged the autopilot. At that time the aircraft continued to descend and fly at the correct assigned airspeed. We didn't however notice that LNAV had not reengaged since we had just reengaged the autopilot and believed that all the modes had been reengaged correctly via the autopilot. At this time; only about 10 seconds later; we noticed that the aircraft was not tracking the arrival course correctly and immediately turned to the left towards the FMC arrival course to intercept. About 5 seconds later ATC said 'it appears that you missed your turn'; and the gave us a 090 heading. The captain told ATC that we were having autopilot issues and were already correcting back to the STAR arrival course. We were then given two more heading changes. We followed ATC directions for the remainder of the approach and landing to a safe landing with no further incident. I'm not certain; but I may have accidentally pushed the autopilot disengage bar while I was reaching for the FLCH button to start the descent. B787 flight crew reported an autopilot malfunction that caused a track deviation.
Aircraft: MEDIUM LARGE TRANSPORT
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was working the 'A' Final position with normal traffic and visual approach weather conditions. I am turning my aircraft onto the final at 4000 Ft. MSL in my airspace and the adjacent final controller brings their aircraft through my airspace without a point out or any coordination to let me know they would be in close proximity with my aircraft. I was never informed if visual separation was being applied or even if traffic had been called. I was under the impression by the rule 7110.65 7-4-4 two aircraft intercepting two different final approach courses could not join from the same side without standard separation being applied. The other controller allowed the aircraft to come within about 600 Ft MSL vertically and 2.1 - 2.5 miles laterally. This has been an ongoing issue with this particular controller and it creates an environment of distrust and animosity. If visual separation was applied I should have been informed so I could inform my adjacent aircraft of the situation and everything was in control. I was in my airspace doing the necessary tasks to insure my aircraft were getting onto the final and to the tower at the appropriate time for safe landing. Make sure you let the other person know what you are doing in their airspace prior to doing whatever you want. Retraining or skill enhancement maybe necessary on the final positions to insure appropriate control instructions; airspace procedures; and communication skills are met. Something as simple as saying 'maintain 5000 feet until established' would have prevented the entire issue as this person was turning at our outside the 5000 Ft fix on the ILS for a visual approach anyway. CLT Controller reports of a loss of separation due to another controller turning an aircraft next to the reporter's aircraft with less than 1;000 feet and less than 3 miles.
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Phase of flight: Takeoff / Launch
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Prior to takeoff; everything was normal. Once on the runway and cleared for takeoff; the controls were passed to me; I advanced the thrust levers and said 'set thrust.' Around 60 KTS; the aircraft distinctly jerked to the left; taking a significant amount of right rudder input to try to correct. At this time; my attention was entirely on trying to keep the aircraft on the centerline. At almost the exact same time; we got a triple chime and I saw the Master Warning and Master Caution lights flashing. The Captain took the controls and aborted the takeoff; at which time I was trying to split my attention between the runway (due to a possible steering malfunction) and the EICAS.I saw at least three messages on the EICAS (1 warning and 2 cautions); but I only read the first which was an SPS 2 INOP; and before I could even advise Tower of the abort; they were giving us instructions on where to clear. I responded to Tower; made he required passenger PA; and when I looked back down at the EICAS; all the messages were gone. I never had the chance to read the caution messages; but I assume one was a steer inop. After clearing the runway; we did the required checklists. After discussing the occurrence and with two seemingly unrelated malfunctions; we opted to contact Maintenance and Ops; and then returned to the gate. After arriving at the gate; the Captain spoke with the mechanics while I did the walk around. I didn't see any anomalies. We then walked to the gate next door; boarded the passengers; and departed. I never had a clear idea of exactly what happened; but under the circumstances; I felt the best thing for me to do initially (during the transfer of controls back to the Captain and immediately after) was stay focused outside in case we were having a steering malfunction. For me; the main threat during the abort was trying to figure out how to split my attention between the EICAS and the position of the aircraft on the runway. Knowing exactly what is presented on the EICAS is important; but I felt that since we had a possible steering malfunction; my attention outside while we were above a taxi speed was more important so that I could help monitor the aircraft's position and call out any deviations from the centerline if they occurred again. An EMB-145 EICAS alerted during takeoff as the aircraft jerked left at about 60 KTS; so the Captain rejected and the flight returned to the gate for a replacement aircraft. The First Officer noted EICAS SPS 2; a Master Warning and Caution; but all messages self-cleared.
Aircraft: TRAVELAIR 95
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Upon entering a right turn to return to airport the left engine lost power and shut down. I feathered the engine and proceeded towards [the airport]. Landing was uneventful. No injuries or damage to the aircraft. The reason of the engine failure is probably fuel starvation due to me thinking fuel in the aux tank as part of main tank fuel; total fuel showed 6 gallons (40-45 minutes at cruise power) Had I changed tanks the engine probably would have restarted. I wasn't sure that that was absolutely the problem so I feathered and proceeded to [the airport]. Beech B95 pilot reported a safe landing followed an inflight engine failure related to fuel mismanagement.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Other Load Planning
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance

I received 3 alerts the ramp was attempting to finalize the DSTG with unsecured Hazmat. [I received an error message in the load planning software.]The flight was already off the gate when the ramp lead attempted to finalize I then pulled up the DSTG and witnesses both the second and third attempt at finalization. It was then that the ramp lead noticed the DG was not secured. I called ZZZ operations to request a phone call from the ramp and while on the phone the lead moved the DG from pit 5 to pit 4 which had 40 bags and proceeded to finalize the flight. Around 8 minutes later the lead called and I inquired as to which pit the DG was actually loaded in and I told him I saw it was planned in pit 5 and a witness him try to finalize the flight 2 [times] then saw the DG move to pit 4 after the flight had departed. The lead responded he was told the DG had been loaded into pit 4. After that conversation I told my shift manager and released the final weights. Load Planning personnel reported a communication breakdown between Load Planning and Ramp personnel regarding the Hazmat requirement to secure Hazmat cargo in cargo compartment with cargo pax bags. Flight completed an uneventful flight before error corrected.
Aircraft: B777
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance

I believe there is an error in our Company's ACARS Runway Data message system. The 4 of us have about 18 years experience on the 777 and have never seen T/O (takeoff) NOT POSSIBLE; let alone 10 or more times. We all checked that every single entry was correct with the FM page. We asked Dispatch for help and to get a 777 Flight Duty Manager involved. Dispatch sent nine different RWY DATA messages to us. The first was 38;400 LBS below actual final TOGW. I ACARS'ed back the large discrepancy error. He sent another for TOG of 627.6 and I had to inform him again that our real final weights were 9;300 LBS HIGHER!!!!! Then we got 3 more at 638.4 even though final weights were 636.9. BUT the big problem I told him is we are still getting T/O NOT POSSIBLE on our RWY DATA message and all of us agreed we needed to have ACARS RWY DATA agree with dispatch calculations so could he please find out why ACARS is still showing us for the 10th time T/O NOT POSSIBLE. Several minutes later ACARS RWY DATA finally came up and we were able to takeoff legally but after so many different GW numbers all claiming to be correct it's hard to believe they were but the plane handled normal and fuel burn was right on. IF THIS CARRIER HAS CHANGED SOME COMPUTER SYSTEM RECENTLY IN RELATION TO ACARS OR Dispatch RWY DATA THEN AN AUDIT NEEDS TO BE DONE because that many gross weight changes for no apparent reason is not right. I think I have most of the ACARS and Dispatch messages printed although I could not print our outgoing messages to Dispatch. A B777 received nine T/O NOT POSSIBLE FMC messages because the gross weight takeoff data from Dispatch was incorrect and the Captain questioned whether a Company computer program had been modified.