Aryan95614/aerograph-asrs huggingface dataset:
Aircraft: B757
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Pilot inbound write up for Left Engine Hydraulic on and Center Electric 1 Hydraulic lights on overhead panel extinguished in flight. Myself and the Local Technician applied MEL 33-11-01 to both of the above inbound write-ups considering the write-ups for both [were] for the background lighting for both of the switches per the B757 AMM [Aircraft Maintenance Manual] and wiring manual; but the above MEL mentions that in the remarks that the individual switches cannot be MEL'd. It must be noted that this light is controlled by the rheostat after it is pushed in and is only an info light for the crew. The MEL was updated and not given the proper consideration when updated for what is the function of each light. A Maintenance Technician applied a Minimum Equipment List (MEL) reference to the pilot log write-ups for panel lighting but was confused by the restriction against using the MEL reference for individual switch lights.
Aircraft: DHC8
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

I have noticed a significant and consistent increase of frequency interference (loud static) over 123.77 (PDX Tower) that is hard to talk over via the interphone. These events are occurring on final and departure; at various altitudes (including below 1;000 FT AFE) in various tail numbers. While it doesn't seem to affect comm transmissions or reception; it can significantly interfere with crew communication. Duration has lasted approximately 15 seconds or more on some occasions. It seems like interference issues which were encountered some time back; have resurfaced. It doesn't appear to be called out by other traffic or caused by someone's stuck mic. It also could be limited to our type of aircraft since the Q400 radios continue to be sub-par. Q400 Captain experiences frequency interference (loud static) over 123.77 (PDX Tower) that is hard to talk over via the interphone.
Aircraft: NO AIRCRAFT
Phase of flight: unknown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

As I was returning to the control room after my lunch break; I was asked by a Technician about what caused Sector X to power down. He indicated that it might have been caused by the Controller working the sector. The Technician told me that the power button to the VSCS had been turned off and he wasn't sure why the Controller had done it. So I asked the Controller why he turned the power off; and he replied; 'Because I was bored. I thought if I just pushed it once; it would reset and not shut off completely.' The result of his actions caused the sector's frequencies and land lines to be inoperable for 24 minutes while the system had to be reset by the Tech Ops. The Controller did not notify management right away and simply moved to another sector; compromising the safety of the operation. Once the CIC became aware of the situation; he notified the technicians; but did not notify myself or the OM.More training on the equipment to prevent occurrences so controllers have better knowledge of how to operate and handle the VSCS; particularly the consequences of what will happen if they are not handled with care. Front Line Manager reports a Controller while bored turns off the VSCS; causing the frequencies and land lines to be inoperable.
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

During the taxi out the First Officer informed me that the detent on the start/stop knob might not have been functioning 100%. I thought about the night before (as we had brought in the same airplane) and when I shut down the Number 1 engine. The detent was functioning (albeit maybe slightly loose); but it seemed to be functioning correctly and preventing the knob from traveling on its own. I thought this was what the First Officer was alluding to and decided to continue with the taxi out. After thinking about it further enroute and in the interest of safety I decided to inform Dispatch that the start/stop detents might not be functioning 100% and perhaps it would be wise to have them looked at by Maintenance. When we arrived at the gate I confirmed that the detents were in fact not functioning 100% and warranted a write up. It should be noted the situation may have been aggravated further on the ground when I attempted move the selectors to stop without first pulling them up to confirm they were not functioning properly. I believe this made the difference between them being slightly loose; and being inoperative. Although the knobs were functioning correctly at departure; it might have been prudent to try and force them to stop without lifting them before we left to confirm that a little bit of looseness in the travel would not cause a problem. Perhaps put more of an emphasis on safety than on-time performance. A comment from the Mechanic that showed up to our airplane 'THANKS FOR GROUNDING THE AIRPLANE' does not help in the argument of whats more important. EMB170 Captain is informed by the First Officer during taxi out that the detent for the engine start/stop knob may not be functioning correctly. Upon arrival a quick test indicates that the knob should be written up. The Mechanic who shows up chastises the Captain for grounding the aircraft.
Aircraft: A320
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

While climbing out of approximately 20;000 feet we received an ECAM G RSVR low level alert and noticed that the fluid quantity was zero. I transferred control to the First Officer and completed the ECAM actions. After referencing the QRH; there were many items now unavailable for use on landing. Among these were gravity gear extension and no nose steering upon landing. I contacted dispatch and maintenance to let them know our situation; and they advised us that ZZZ and tech ops would be ready for us upon landing. I reiterated to dispatch that we would need a tow in from the runway upon landing and was assured they would be ready. We briefly thought about diverting; but with a full load we were overweight. We elected to continue to ZZZ.We discussed at length on the flight southbound what we needed to do upon arrival. I chose not to inform inflight or the customers of the failure until closer to ZZZ. I called the #1 up to the cockpit about an hour out and explained to her we had a code yellow. I went into detail the nature of the problem and how it might affect our landing. I explained that I didn't think there would be anything abnormal on landing other than the fire trucks and being towed to the gate. Everyone was professional and did their jobs as trained. I made a PA to the customers about 40 minutes out and explained the failure in layman's terms and what they could expect on landing.Out of an abundance of caution with a hydraulic failure; I instructed the First Officer to request priority handling with ZZZ approach. After all pertinent information was exchanged we requested a 20 mile final to be sure we could get all checklist items completed before landing. On downwind we slowed and lowered the gear successfully by the gravity extension. We then configured the aircraft for landing. ATC asked if we were ready for the approach and we flew a 15 mile final to runway 10L. We reiterated to the tower that we would not be able to clear the runway upon landing. We touched down about 1500 feet down the runway and braked to a stop abeam Taxiway XX. I made a quick PA when the aircraft stopped to ask everyone to stay seated. We completed the after landing checklist; started the APU and shut down the engines. The tug then entered the runway; hooked up to us and towed us to Gate XX. The required logbook entries were made and I discussed our failure with CFR and tech ops. Tech ops said there was a major leak on top of engine number one in a hydraulic line. A320 Captain reported diverting after the loss of the green hydraulic system and made a precautionary landing.
Aircraft: A321
Phase of flight: climb
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

We were established in holding pattern over CAPTI Intersection at our assigned altitude of FL240. We received TCAS TA which was followed by TCAS RA from traffic descending. We followed TCAS RA commands and descended to 23;500. We notified Center; and when clear we climbed back to FL240. The traffic was a CRJ. Center cleared them to climb and/or maintain FL260. Possible ATC or pilot error; DFW was not taking any aircraft due to weather over the field. It was a very busy time for ATC and air crews. Many aircraft were holding; and making decisions to divert to alternate airports. We ended up diverting to for fuel. ZFW Center informed us to expect holding 'As Published' at WEIRS Intersection on the CQY7 STAR arrival due to thunderstorms over DFW. We slowed to approximately 200 KIAS. Later ZFW Center instructed us to proceed to WEIRS Intersection. Approaching WEIRS Intersection; ZFW Center then re-cleared us direct CAPTI Intersection and to 'hold as published' at FL240; 10 mile legs; and gave us an EFC. Once confirming the correct holding definition information was set in FMS2 (pilot flying); I began to enter the same in FMS1 with conventional VOR navigation underlying the GPS information. At approximately 3-4 NM from CAPTI Intersection; a red TCAS 'Resolution Advisory' displayed on my MFD screen. The aural TCAS commanded to 'Climb; Climb' and I visually acquired a B737 or A320 at the 10 o'clock position on a converging course. The aircraft appeared to be at the same or slightly lower altitude of FL240. I reacted by pulling the control yoke aft and pushing both thrust levers full forward to the stops. We climbed to FL251 and ZFW Center cleared us to descend to FL220. I informed ZFW Center of the RA and gave control back to my First Officer and turned the autopilot back on. The First Officer never visually acquired the intruder aircraft as he was seated on the opposite side. There was another aircraft holding at CAPTI Intersection at a higher altitude during this event. Several factors coincided to cause this event: Multiple aircraft holding at the same STAR arrival intersection; a last moment ATC clearance to hold at another intersection; an ATC Controller change with several aircraft holding at the same fix which increases the risk.Holding at the WEIRS Intersection would have been less flight crew workload as it was on our original STAR clearance. There was sufficient time to input the holding definition into the FMS navigation units and verify the information by both pilots. In the midst of a chaotic ZFW ATC scene an A321 and an E-135 were both cleared to enter the hold at CAPTI Intersection at FL240. Rapidly sequential TA and RA commands to both aircraft prevented a disastrous culmination. Five reports from pilots and controllers involved provided a close up look at both sides of the events. Excerpts from the final ATC report are must reading to obtain the flavor of the event.
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Phase of flight: Takeoff / Launch
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types

While waiting to take off from Runway 04L in EWR; the Captain and I noticed that we were directly behind a 757. We both talked about having had wake turbulence upsets (from which we'd recovered; but were still unexpected and potentially dangerous) behind 757s in the past after receiving takeoff clearances with minimum separation; and agreed that we would ask for some extra time if ATC tried to have us takeoff too soon after the 757. I started a timer when the 757 started its roll (before lining up on Runway 4L as directed); and sure enough; 56 seconds later; we were cleared for takeoff. We asked for extra time for wake turbulence separation; so Tower cancelled our takeoff clearance. We called back after two minutes after the departure of the 757; and; after an aircraft crossed the runway downfield; Tower then granted our clearance. After takeoff; Tower suggested that we ask for extra time sooner; as he would have to fill out paperwork for the rejected clearance.The major threat is unusual attitudes resulting from being in the wake of a near-heavy aircraft. Because we waited to take off; we did not experience this Unusual Attitude Scenario today. From a safety perspective; I think we made the best choice for the situation. From a procedures perspective; we could have asked Tower for extra spacing when we were first told to line up on the runway; instead of after getting the takeoff clearance. We suspected Tower might clear us more quickly than we'd like; but we did not know for sure; and we didn't know this would cause them any hassle.If wake turbulence separation seems insufficient; in the future; I could ask for extra spacing earlier; before getting the takeoff clearance - while receiving the line up and wait clearance seems ideal. However; based on my prior experience of an upset behind a 757; I think we made the right call; and it might behoove the company or even the FAA to increase spacing minimums between near-heavies and trailing RJs. EMB-145 First Officer reported that requesting additional wait time prior to departure behind a B757 resulted in a canceled takeoff clearance.
Aircraft: PA-44 SEMINOLE/TURBO SEMINOLE
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC

I was on a checkride with Mr. X and had just received my transponder squawk for a practice approach for the ILS 30C into IWA. PHX approach control called out traffic as 11 o'clock and 4 miles; then 11 o'clock and 2 miles. Both times we replied with looking for the traffic. Then we received a call to turn 270; maintain 4000 until established on the ILS. As I turned to the assigned heading; I noticed an aircraft in my left peripheral vision and called the traffic to Mr. X. He saw the traffic; but at that point; there was no action taken as the aircraft passed as close as 100 feet; from left to right and then was out of our view. We called Tower and informed them of the near-miss. PA44 pilot reported a NMAC while on approach to IWA.
Aircraft: CRJ200
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: Deviation - Speed All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Just after rotation; departing behind a DC-9 the aircraft was hit by wake. Moderate aileron forces were needed but the most concerning issue was a momentary stick shaker. The aircraft was and remained on speed V2 plus 15 knots as bugged; 166 knots. The numbers are certain as they were later checked. We were about 400 FT AGL at start of wake turbulence. There was a slight quartering tail wind. The report is mostly to catalog the event to hopefully avoid other wake events. Duration of event was very short.Cause may have been tail wind and separation being close; along with being right in the center of the wake due to being in trail. Better separation obviously helps avoid these problems. The rotation speed and pitch attitude were standard. There was a slight tailwind (340 at 6 knots). The captain; who was flying; added the correct aileron and pitch to hold our altitude and gain airspeed while we climbed out. CRJ-200 flight crew reported encountering wake turbulence in trail of a DC-9 departing ATL that resulted in a momentary stick shaker.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Final Approach
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

We were arriving ZZZ with weather reported at 700 overcast and 4 miles visibility. The ILS was out of service; so we briefed and flew the RNAV Approach. This aircraft has no speed intervention. I was flying the approach with the autopilot connected; Lnav and Vnav active; flaps 5 and controlling speed with the throttles. We configured with gear down; flaps 15; then flaps 25. The autopilot disengaged; and would not reengage; so we requested vectors straight ahead and received clearance to maintain 2000 feet. We completed the missed approach; and received a climb and vectors for another approach. We set up and briefed the RNAV Y for this second attempt; then received vectors for approach. Again while configuring; the autopilot disengaged and we executed a missed approach. The weather was less than 1000/3; so there was no approach we could fly without the autopilot. Due to this and our fuel state I elected to divert to ZZZ1. Being in the high traffic approach environment I made this decision without contacting dispatch. Our dispatcher saw the two missed approaches and acars destination change. He contacted us by acars to let us know he was working with the ZZZ1 station and we let him know a short reason for the divert. We landed with 4200 pounds of fuel and the station did an excellent job with the short notice divert. B737 Captain reported an autopilot failure into IMC airport led to a diversion.
Aircraft: A319
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

At approximately 100 nm NE of ICT we were deviating due to thunderstorms in the area along the same track ATC was using with other traffic. The Captain called the flight attendants and told them to be seated. After a few minutes we started seeing St Elmo's Fire on the forward windscreen. Shortly after that we had a lightning strike or static discharge on the nose of the aircraft. After that the radar stopped working. Cycled the radar on-off but still was inoperative. We notified ATC that we had lost our radar and asked if our current track would keep us clear of any additional weather. ATC advised a 20 degree turn right would keep us clear of weather (wx). A minute later we experienced severe turbulence and our altitude increased approx 600 feet. We immediately turned left and notified ATC of the altitude deviation. Within a minute our conditions improved to light chop. We notified Dispatch of the radar inoperative and lightning strike and routing that would keep us clear of wx. Dispatch indicated it was able to help us with routing that kept us clear of wx. [Report narrative contained no additional information.] An A319 flight crew reported they encountered severe turbulence that resulted in slight flight attendant injuries after the weather radar failed due to a lightning strike.
Aircraft: ANY UNKNOWN OR UNLISTED AIRCRAFT MANUFACTURER
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

With the tropical system bands arriving in all sectors the weather complexity increased dramatically within all sectors of the specialty. Our personnel count was down to only [a few] Certified Professional Controllers (CPC) at the start of the shift for our night count. I overheard one of the supervisors tell the relieving supervisor that we took two sick hits but the weather wasn't going to be a factor because it's going to shut down our airspace. This proved completely false. With our staffing levels low they decided to combine all low sectors into a mid-shift style configuration. Now you're working 4 sectors with 4 different frequencies with 6 different sites to try and manage. At no normal time do we ever combine all the sectors into this configuration unless we are preparing for the mid [shift.] This was my first session to work it today but I watched another previous controller struggle for almost two hours on position in the same manner. At no time could you provide a good safe service to the flying public. It was utter chaos with the supervisor sitting at the desk for [several] hours letting the specialty go down the tubes. Have an engaged supervisor in the area at all times; especially with weather. To provide some relief in surrounding approaches for departures; routing; etc. Just sitting there doing nothing for hours is unacceptable. Utilize Overtime (OT) with a low count is unacceptable in the conditions we were experiencing. Center Controller reported a staffing problem and weather related issues that made the sectors overloaded with traffic.
Aircraft: SMALL AIRCRAFT; HIGH WING; 1 ENG; FIXED GEAR
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

I was providing flight instruction to a student pilot and reviewing the maneuvers for the required Airmen Certification Standards. The flight was conducted in VFR conditions 6 miles east of the Plymouth Airport (KPYM) and 2-4 miles northwest of the Plymouth Nuclear Power plant over Plymouth Bay and Duxbury Bay. We flew from the airport to a practice area over the water between 3;000 and 4;000 ft. The flight began with simulated IFR training and unusual attitudes. Stalls; slow flight; steep turns; emergency descents and turns around a point were maneuvers conducted after the simulated IFR training.Upon completion of the training flight; I was advised by my FBO the FAA; Cape TRACON (K90); wanted to speak with me. I contacted the person via phone and was asked if I had been operating over the power plant. The person stated the facility's primary radar was out of service and Boston TRACON (A90) tracked my aircraft on radar. A90 subsequently contacted K90 in an effort to determine the aircraft's identity. A US Coast Guard aircraft apparently flew near my aircraft and photographed my call sign relaying it to the FAA.The FAA official I spoke with indicated to me that the FAA wanted me to be aware I was operating over a nuclear power plant. I was operating northwest of the power plant over Plymouth Bay and Duxbury Bay. There was no indication that action would be taken by the FAA in the form of a Pilot Deviation.Since instructing at this FBO for the last 9 years in this area; this is the first inquiry made to me regarding flights in that area. Bordering this practice area is V141; 2.5 miles east of the power plant and FREDO; a holding fix; 2 miles south of the power plant. Also; the area lies near the boundary of K90's and A90's airspace and is approximately 10 miles from the Boston Class B airspace.The wording of FDC 3/1655 'SPECIAL NOTICE' states in part;' PILOTS CONDUCTING FLIGHT OPERATIONS ARE ADVISED TO AVOID THE AIRSPACE ABOVE OR IN PROXIMITY TO ALL NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS. PILOTS SHOULD NOT CIRCLE OR LOITER IN THE VICINITY OF SUCH FACILITIES.' 'Proximity and vicinity' are ambiguous at best. In an effort to resolve any misunderstanding of the applicable NOTAM I recommend the FAA clearly review and redefine restrictions near a nuclear power plant. A pro-active stance in defining 'proximity' and 'vicinity' would remove any subjectivity of their definition. However; the simplest solution would be the creation of Prohibited Airspace around all nuclear power plants and publishing them on all navigation charts.It is unclear at the time of this report if the TSA has been notified and if it would be involved in an investigation. GA flight instructor reported that K90 TRACON was concerned about his flight lesson near a nuclear power plant.