Aryan95614/aerograph-asrs huggingface dataset:
Aircraft: UAV - UNPILOTED AERIAL VEHICLE
Phase of flight: Takeoff / Launch
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Toy/Consumer Unmanned Aircraft System - Parrot S.A. Rolling Spider Mini Drone. We were flying it outside using an iPhone 6 Plus; via Bluetooth 4.0; and the Parrot S.A. FreeFlight 3.0 iOS application. The application has an altitude limitation option which was on by default to (according to my best recollection) on or about 9 meters (I can't access the option to verify the value without the UAS; but it was active). The aircraft was outside and went into an uncontrolled straight vertical climb. The Bluetooth 4.0 range is about 20 meters; which it rapidly exceeded and lost connectivity with the controller. The UAS; being so small (approximately 5 inches in length; 5 inches in width; and 2 inches height) continued to climb until we lost visual contact. The device had approximately 80% battery life remaining; and can fly up to 5-10 minutes at full charge. I do not know how high the UAS climbed out of control before it began a descent. The UAS has not been found. There were no other aircraft in the immediate vicinity. A brief search on[line] indicates other users having similar problems with these Toy/Consumer UAS devices. Small drone operator reports losing control of a mini drone which disappears out of sight vertically and is not recovered. The drone had a pre programmed altitude limit of nine meters and was being controlled by an iPhone with a free flight application via bluetooth.
Aircraft: B767
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Flight was dispatched to ZZZ with NOTAMs for ZZZ showing that no legal runway was open for the time of our arrival. Which caused us to divert to a nearby airport. It goes without saying I as the Captain told sole responsible for dispatching this flight under the supplemental air carrier certificate. That being said we as crew members must have some faith in the system. We have to ask why an airport that was NOTAM to be unusable a good [number of] hours before departure time was even allowed to be flight planed. I received my copy of the plan before departing the hotel. This is the problem we live with today; the crews are expected to go through all the paperwork and find all mistakes in a very short period of time. In this every increasing complex environment we operate in where it is not uncommon to receive up to 50 pages of information to be deciphered in a short period of time. The current operation is setting us up for failure. My only solution to this is to institute a dispatch system. The dual responsibility will go a long way making sure that more than one person is looking at all the information. B767 Captain reported they diverted because the filed destination airport had been NOTAMed closed during the scheduled arrival period; but neither the Captain nor Dispatch caught the closure notice.
Aircraft: PA28
Phase of flight: Final Approach
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC

While in the traffic pattern at Chandler Municipal Airport; under the direction of Chandler Tower; I was accomplishing touch and go landings. Several landings were made on runway 22L with left traffic being used and at least one on runway 22R with right traffic being used. On one of the touch and goes while on the upwind leg after takeoff; I had noticed that the tower frequency had been switched to ground control. On this specific aircraft there is a switch on the yoke that transfers the active and standby frequency. My guess is that when reading the landing clearance back to tower; the frequency switch button was depressed instead of the push to talk button also located on the yoke. Climbing through approximately 500 feet AGL; I noticed the frequency was not correct and immediately checked in with Chandler Tower. At that time I was not aware of any traffic conflict nor was advised of any traffic conflict. A full stop was requested and the traffic pattern was flown. On final approach; a landing clearance had not yet been given by tower so a go around was initiated. Another traffic pattern was flown and a full stop landing was made. The taxi in and shutdown was uneventful. I did not know of any traffic conflict until [later] when I was informed of a FAA Near Mid Air Collision System report being filed. This is the only anomaly that occurred during the flight and is why I am assuming this is when the near miss event occurred. PA-28 pilot reported he was advised after the fact that he was involved in an NMAC in the pattern at CHD airport.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Flight Control B Low Pressure Light illuminated in cruise. Followed QRH procedure and placed Flight Control B Switch to STBY RUD. B system quantity and pressure were normal. While autopilot A was engaged at the time; there were no apparent flight control issues; although there was increased oscillation in yaw. The procedure offers no additional steps or information. When we placed the switch in STBY RUD; the Feel Diff Press; Stby Rud On and Yaw Damp lights illuminated; which seemed appropriate for the procedure but were not mentioned in the QRH. I consulted Dispatch and Maintenance Control. Maintenance Control advised that flight control operation would be normal; however we would not have use of 2 flight spoilers. This is not mentioned in the QRH. Based upon this information and the increased yaw oscillation; we declared an emergency and diverted. With the anticipation of possible extra braking being needed; we requested ARFF meet the aircraft. Landed without incident. When ARFF advised that the brakes appeared normal; we terminated the emergency and taxied to the gate without further incident. AT cruise (FL 310) B system flight control low pressure light came on. Completed flight control low pressure light checklist and diverted to ZZZ1 (Destination was ZZZ).Checklist provided no guidance regarding degradation of systems. Maintenance Control informed Captain that we would loose 'some of our spoilers.' Captain elected to use a longer runway based upon this input. Recommend specifying in the checklist that a normal landing is indicated in this situation if that is the intent. B737-800 crew reports a Flight Control B Low Pressure Light illuminated in cruise and QRH procedure required placing Flight Control B Switch to STBY RUD. After consulting with Maintenance Control crew elects to divert to an airport with a longer runway.
Aircraft: NO AIRCRAFT
Phase of flight: unknown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types

An equipment incident occurred as I was working Precision Monitor V (PV). I first started noticing that the keystrokes that we use to set up our distance measuring magenta line were acting erratic. We use the keystroke; 'enter' on the lead aircraft; slew to the trailing aircraft and 'enter' again. After I tried to slew and enter the lead aircraft; the cursor reset to the home position. I did not have very many lines up; so I did not meet the capacity of the system; which is six lines. I called the Supervisor to have a look. He in turn called an AF Technician over. The Technician had indicated that the scope had similar issues the day before and they may need to swap out the scope. Later all the Data Blocks on the scope stopped moving. It took me about three seconds to realize that the tracks had indeed frozen in place. I immediately shifted to my left and started sharing the PO position. There was an override wind on the finals; so compression was a large complexity issue. The Controller working PO and I had to judiciously choose which aircraft we put distance measuring lines on since two finals were sharing 6 total lines. No separation was lost. Equipment failures on the Precision Monitor scopes are becoming more common. When this equipment fails; controllers are left scrambling to different positions; sharing resources that are meant for one controller. At the most critical times (low ceilings; low visibility; wind override conditions); controllers are focusing on moving and communicating with FLMs/AF technicians; instead of having total focus on keeping aircraft separated. We need a solution to this problem. Apparently nothing is being done at the local level more than patching the problem. We need new; more reliable equipment in this building. Three failures in a week at the world's busiest airport is unacceptable. A80 Controller described a PRM equipment failure noting failures of this equipment is becoming more common place and needs attention.
Aircraft: BONANZA 35
Phase of flight: Landing
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

This was the second touch and go of the session. I turned final and was cleared for the option with gear and flaps down at 90 KTS; over the boundary fence at 85 KTS; touched down on the numbers. The nose gear collapsed as I reached to retract the flaps at the start of the go process. I do not remember the seconds of the actual collapse. The gear lever was down when the aircraft came to a halt; but some damage to the main gear doors may suggest that I wrongly started to move the gear lever instead of the flaps. With 251 hours in make and model; and the cluster of levers I needed to adjust; flaps; trim; throttle; all in a group at the left of the console; what would make me mistakenly reach right on my second touch and go of the day; if that is what happened? Fundamentals of instructing; addresses primacy; and I have 1;700 hours in Cessna 152 and C172 aircraft as student and instructor. That is my first introduction to flap levers and my most dominant one. It is possible that some early brain path took over as my eyes were outside looking to maintain runway alignment. Since the majority of pilots probably started out in Cessnas; regulators should consider prohibiting touch and goes in retracts; or insurance companies should say they will not cover them. A second issue is that as soon as the lock on the nose gear is broken; rapid collapse is inevitable. Not only the weight of the aircraft; but the forward motion conspired to force the wheel into the well. A forward folding design would still fail; but forcing the wheel forward against the motion would extend the time for deceleration and possibly allow time to shut off the fuel supply. This would minimize forces at the propeller strike and reduce damage. Following a nose gear collapse; the pilot of a Beechcraft V35 suspects that he may have reached for the landing gear handle instead of the flap handle during a touch and go.
Aircraft: A319
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

While taxiing noted strong musty oil like odor. Notified A Flight Attendant and inquired about odor being present in cabin. She indicated a similar odor in aircraft. Immediately told her a return to gate was in progress. ATC notified and a 180 turn was safely completed on taxiway. Coordination between Ground; Ramp and Company was accomplished a new gate and taxi instructions were given. Accomplished QRC Quick Action Items; smoke/avionics smoke/fumes. Passengers notified of returning to gate. Taxied into gate. After arrival at gate Maintenance Control met us at gate and a fumes report was completed. First Officer complained of headache and throat soreness. 'A' Flight Attendant complained of dizziness; headache and breathing problems. As Captain; I experienced a headache. Possible oil and or chemicals (deicing fluid) being ingested into APU inlet and throughout air conditioning ducts. Deadheading flight crew asked to speak to Captain during boarding. He alerted Captain to a smell of wet; dirty socks. Flight attendants took several walks through [cabin] to see what they thought. The odor was faint at the time and very centralized; almost like a coke exploded in a seat pocket and was starting to produce mold. FA2 did not smell anything in aft. As an entire crew we decided we would push back and be vigilant of any changes. During the safety demo we noticed the odor had gotten stronger. During compliance check the odor was so strong it started to cause my eyes to burn/water. By the time I was in the aft galley; Captain called to say it was so strong that we would return to gate. When I got to the front galley I had developed more serious symptoms; such as burning sensation in my throat and lungs as well as labored breathing. No passengers complained of symptoms during deplaning. Two deadheading pilots did. Maintenance informed us that this specific aircraft has had previous fume events; one of which was in October. Captain and Flight Attendant of A319 reported strong odor and fumes when departing the gate. The odor became progressively worse during taxi so crew opted to return to gate and call to Maintenance.
Aircraft: A320
Phase of flight: Initial Climb
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

After takeoff received ECAM message Auto Brake Fault Brakes Released. Phone patch to Dispatch; conferred with Maintenance; declared emergency; burned off fuel to landing weight [and then] landed. An A320 ECAM alerted AUTO BRAKE FAULT BRAKES RELEASE so an emergency was declared and the flight returned to the departure airport.
Aircraft: B777
Phase of flight: Final Approach
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was an International Relief Officer (IRO) on the flight sitting behind the First Officer (FO). When we transitioned from the STAR to the arrival and cleared for the approach Localizer Directional Aid (LDA) Rwy 30; 4;500 ft was displayed and I assume that the Pilot Flying (PF) must have pushed the ALT button; since the aircraft started to go down to that altitude. The problem was that it was about 2 miles prior to LIMKO (IAF). I stated that we needed to be at 5;000 Ft. until we passed that point; but it was too late since the aircraft was already at 4;500 Ft. The ATC stated that we should have been at 5;000 Ft; but said that we could remain at 4;500 Ft. Since; the visibility is limited from that jumpseat; I did not see how we came to be at 4;500 Ft.; but I went off the voice call outs and thus made the remark that we needed to be at 5;000 Ft; but it was too late. On the LIMKO1 STAR to LDA 30 TLV; assigned 5;000 Ft. MSL and 210 kts at LIMKO; leveled off at 5;000 MSL prior to LIMKO. ATC cleared us for the LDA 30 approach; I as Pilot Not Flying (PNF); set 4;500 MSL in ALT window (the next lower altitude prior to the approach); VNAV ALT displayed on FMA. Captain as First Officer pressed altitude selector; and we did not monitor the altitude restriction deleted on the FMC from ALT selector button push; subsequently; the aircraft descended to 4;500 MSL prior to LIMKO altitude restriction of 5;000 MSL. ATC noted the deviation from STAR; we acknowledged are current altitude of 4;500 MSL. ATC cleared us to next fix on approach at 4;500 MSL. No further incident noted. B777 flight crew reports descending below charted altitude on the LIMKO1 arrival to LLBG which is detected by one of the IRO's and ATC but too late to prevent the deviation.
Aircraft: A320
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC

On climb out of Denver (Captain was PM; FO was PF); we were initially given a clearance to FL230. A minute or so later ATC reissued our clearance to maintain 16;000. We complied and the aircraft leveled at 16;000. ATC said something to the effect of once you are clear of traffic; we will climb you. We were trying to acquire the aircraft (which was said to be a glider); visually; but could not see it. I immediately looked at the TCAS and it displayed no targets. I changed mode from above to all; and it still showed no targets. ATC then said 'traffic no factor climb and maintain FL230'. As soon as she began to talk we got an RA immediately (the traffic was now showing on the navigation display) saying 'Descend; Descend; Descend'. The first officer immediately performed the memory items; disconnected the AP and began a descent. I responded to ATC by saying something like 'Unable; descending responding to an RA'. We descended about 300-400 feet and then we were clear on conflict. The glider flew about 400 feet on top of us slightly to our left; I am unsure of the lateral separation. After we ran the QRH and continued our climb to FL230; I checked with the flight attendants to make sure everything was ok in the cabin; everyone (including FAs) had still been seated in their jump seats with seatbelt fastened during the event. I began looking in the handbook for any further info. I found that this was indeed a NTSB reportable event and that an incident report was required. I followed the guidance and sent an ACARS to dispatch notifying them of the situation and providing the details outlined.As sent to dispatch:Prior to COORZ intersectionResponded to an RA while level at 16;000 ft descended about 300 feet; no dangerous articles onboard.I believe ATC should have vectored us off of course to avoid getting anywhere near the glider. As with gliders; they can rapidly change altitude and headings. While ATC did initially change our clearance from 23;000 to 16;000; perhaps a turn would have avoided this entire situation. I also think that because of rapidly changing altitudes abilities of a glider; that's why we were unable to initially acquire the target on TCAS. A320 Captain reported a NMAC with a glider west of DEN at 16;000 feet.
Aircraft: AIRBUS INDUSTRIE UNDIFFERENTIATED OR OTHER MODEL
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude

We were descending to 6;000 feet on a vector of 170 about 30 miles north of MSY. Passing 10;000 feet at 1;000 fpm we got an RA for traffic 900 feet below us. I immediately followed the commands of the RA which called for a climb; passing about 10200 feet; we received a clear of conflict call out. We informed ATC of the RA and that we were climbing. ATC acknowledged and said we were cleared to continue our descent. We continued to MSY for an uneventful landing.Failure of ATC to call out traffic and giving us a clearance through an altitude which was occupied by another aircraft. Also failure of the TCAS to give a traffic call out for which we may have been able to level off and prevent the RA. As a footnote if you reference a report I submitted [about a year ago] the EXACT scenario happened. I mean EXACT. That is too much of a coincidence. There is something systemic. Airbus widebody flight crew reported receiving an RA during descent into MSY; noting that ATC failed to advise them of traffic.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Aircraft X was transferred to the JOT/83 sector at FL320 tracking along J89.Approximately; 10-12 miles south of the RAN/JOT boundary I noticed Aircraft X executing a left turn. I immediately called the JOT/83 sector to inquire and noticed the flight plan route had been changed to direct ROBBY. I asked if the aircraft had just been turned and the JOT/83 replied in the affirmative and asked if I wanted the aircraft turned back.No transfer of control and aircraft was turned head-on into the Chicago Metro Southbound Departure corridor.What led to the event - In my opinion either an oversight or the culture of 'It's late [day] night' - procedures don't apply.Unless SOP's and other orders are considered optional; request control when issuing control instructions to aircraft not in one's area of jurisdiction.Carry out some performance management. ZAU Center Controller reported that an aircraft was turned in his airspace without prior coordination.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Security; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Captain came out for lav break. I went in to the cockpit. First Officer said he was going to do the same but there was a delay in him coming out. Once he came out; not sure how door got closed but it did. Immediately Captain called and said she was reopening the door so I could come in. A Boeing 737 Flight Attendant reported the cockpit door closed before she could get in to relieve the First Officer for a lav break.
Aircraft: AMATEUR/HOME BUILT/EXPERIMENTAL
Phase of flight: Landing
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Ground Excursion Runway

Attempting to land at [a private airport] with 3500 [feet of] runway was unsuccessful resulting in running off the north end of runway by approximately twenty feet landing in a water pond completely submerging the airplane in water. Evasive action was near impossible as there were no less than three other aircraft flying overhead on a fly-by no more than 50 feet above me. Attempting to power had resulted in a midairup to go around would collision due to the close proximity of the overhead aircraft. No air traffic control was provided for approach; landing; takeoff and fly-by of aircraft. It is a see and be seen approaches; departures and fly-bys. There were no injuries sustained and damage was confined to aircraft; to include aircraft completely submerged in water; right center section of wing bent by coming into contact with small 2 [inch] - 3 [inch] diameter tree at edge of water; left and right wing tips; left and right wheel pants and both cowling cheeks upon coming into contact with water. I had no physical impairments or illnesses prior to; during flight and subsequent landing. Not on any medication affecting performance or judgment. My decision to go into the water resulted in damage to my aircraft to avoid injuries to bystanders and aircraft flying overhead. While attempting to land at a private airport; the pilot of an experimental aircraft was unable to stop on the usable runway. Fearing a conflict with overhead aircraft if a go-around was attempted; the pilot ran off the end of the runway and into a pond.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

[At] cruise; smelled like wire burning; put masks on; then visible smoke [was] coming from pedestal. Flew barber pole until approximately 15 km; landed; shut down airplane no more visible smoke; but still bad smell in airplane. Kept masks on [and] opened windows. Opened door; smell dissipated; deplaned. Mechanic found fire/overheat system circuit breaker popped wires were burnt. He told me Maintenance Control advised him this [has happened to several] airplanes. They believe alcohol from wipes is shorting out wires. Air carrier Captain reported smelling a burning smell during cruise. Post-flight Maintenance briefing advised the pilots alcohol from wipes may be shorting out wires.
Aircraft: SMALL AIRCRAFT
Phase of flight: Final Approach
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC

While landing Runway 17 at Chetek Municipal Southworth Airport (Y23) at dusk; an unlighted powered parachute; with no lights made a radical and unpredicted turn into the final segment of Runway 17. Evasive action was taken to avoid colliding with the powered parachute; a hard left bank and climb was initiated to avoid the unlighted powered parachute at dusk. Powered parachutes tend to fly out of Y23 in the evening time but are always lighted and typically communicate over the multicom. Pilot reported a NMAC with a powered parachute while on final approach to Y23.