Aryan95614/aerograph-asrs huggingface dataset:
Aircraft: A300
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Cleared to descend via PHLBO3 RNAV Arrival into EWR for an ILS 04L approach. Captain was pilot flying. Used max automation due to poor weather. Autopilot Number 1 was engaged with NAV and Profile selected. We made the SOMTO Intersection crossing restriction at 11;000 FT with no problem. Shortly after SOMTO we still had a tailwind and also encountered an area of heavy rain and moderate turbulence. We were night IMC conditions with engine anti ice on and static electricity on the windshield. Captain disconnected the autopilot and manually began flying the aircraft when he realized the FMS in Profile mode would not make the crossing restriction at DYLIN of 8;000 FT. Had he allowed the autopilot and profile to stay engaged it probably would have crossed DYLIN at least 1;500 FT high. First Officer called ATC and told Controller we were in heavy rain with moderate turbulence and that we crossed DYLIN intersection 500 FT high. No traffic was noted on the TCAS within a 12 mile range; we had no loss of separation; and Controller didn't say anything about it. He gave us a vector to final approach for ILS 04L. Profile mode in the Airbus apparently cannot handle strong tailwinds; updrafts and turbulence. In retrospect; one level less of automation might have helped (using level change with step down altitudes); but the situation we encountered would probably still have required an autopilot disconnect. An A300 First Officer reported crossing DYLAN high on the PHLBO 3 RNAV arrival due to strong tailwinds and turbulence. The Captain was the pilot flying using LNAV and VNAV. The autopilot was disconnected in an attempt to make the restriction.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

We were descending into ZZZ on the ZZZZZ2 Arrival when we were given a vector to the east and held up higher than normal. Upon handoff to the final Controller; we were still at 12;000' and the FMC was telling us that we would be about 1500'-2000' high after I extended the centerline off the FAP. I had briefed the visual Runway XXL backed up by the ILS. However; due to being concerned about how high we were; I didn't go through the FMC to brief those points as well. Unbeknownst to me; my F/O had put in XXR and I did not catch it via a correct briefing. We were given a vector to join the XXL Localizer and I extended the centerline and then selected LNAV to join. My mistake allowed us to go through the XXL Localizer; and we aligned up with XXR. Due to it being dusk and the distance made it slightly difficult to tell; but thankfully the Final Controller saw what was going on and asked us which runway we were setup for. We immediately came back to the left; joined up with Runway XXL and landed without incident.With news of the COVID 19 Pandemic fresh in my head; I can state quite certainly that I let my worry and thoughts of what is happening to Company and the industry creep into my job performance. I let outside threats cloud my performance and I was not focusing on the task at hand as much as I should have been. My briefing was rushed; and because of that and that ATC left us high; I completely missed that the FMC was setup for Runway XXR instead of Runway XXL. In times like this when the stress level is high; we need to hammer home the importance of standardization; and I need to remind myself to slow down and make sure that both my F/O and I are sufficiently briefed and we both have a shared mental model of what we are going to do. After landing both my F/O and I walked back through the event and identified what went wrong; and how we strayed from not properly briefing the approach. As the Captain and Pilot Flying I should have taken the extra minute or two so that every aspect of this simple approach was briefed and talked about. Slightly contributing to this incident is when ATC asked us what runway we were lined up for instead of telling us what he was seeing. When ATC asks a question like this; there is always a 5-10 seconds of hesitation as we are double checking to make sure we have it right. I think ATC telling us what they see instead of asking us might be a quicker way to get the problem resolved. Of course in the end it is my fault that this happened; but I would rather ATC tell than ask. Air Carrier Captain reported lining up for the incorrect runway on a set of parallel runways.
Aircraft: DHC8
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

While enroute; I heard a snap and some caution lights came on. The caution lights were the Number 1 ECU and the Number 1 fuel tank low caution light. I notice the torque on the Number 1 engine had fallen to 3.8 percent. The aircraft did not yaw when this event occurred. We ran the ECU checklist; but there was no improvement. I slowly retarded the Number 1 power lever to confirm that the engine was no longer producing power. It was not so we elected to shut down the Number 1 engine I suspected we had a TQ motor failure. After calling MTC; I found two more circuit breakers popped the Number 1 TQ cond; and the Number 1 auto temp controller.We ran some checklists and talked to the FO to decide what was going on. Once we concluded the Number 1 engine was not producing any power; we shut down that engine. Ran all the checklist. Declared an emergency. Notified company and made announcements to the people. A DHC-8-100 Number 1 ECU and Fuel Tank Low caution lights illuminated along with the torque drop so the engine was shut down; the QRH completed; an emergency declared and the aircraft landed at its destination.
Aircraft: SMALL TRANSPORT
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict

Drone in Vicinity of Airport: We were at 400 feet AGL off of Runway 26 in HVR and began reducing the power for normal climb and began our turn toward the southeast. Upon entering the turn; I spotted what was clearly a personal drone (DJI Phantom) off our left wing at 150 feet away and 50 feet lower than our altitude. I alerted the captain about the drone; he made the same assessment about the drone sighting upon seeing it. We then got on the CTAF to let other potential traffic in the area about the drone approximately 1 mile west of the field. HVR UNICOM asked for more details; we gave them the above statement. Upon reaching a higher altitude; we checked in with Salt Lake Center; asked for VFR flight following and gave them the report of the drone sighting. Pilot reported airborne conflict with a drone approximately 400 feet AGL after takeoff from Havre City-County Airport; Montana.
Aircraft: A319
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

After landing and clearing runway we were instructed by ground to taxi via 'C' to hold short of taxiway 'R' while waiting for the alley around the gate to clear of traffic. Once holding short; with the parking brake set; I proceeded to start the APU. At the same time the Captain instructed me to shutdown engine number 2 when we had the appropriate cool down time (3 minutes). After the appropriate cool down time; I proceeded to shut down what I thought was engine number 2 but was in fact engine number 1. Since the number 2 generator was already OFF the first indication of my error was the loss of power. The APU generator kicked on shortly after. While this was happening the alley near our gate had cleared and ground cleared us to continue to the gate. We advised ground that we were working a problem and that we needed a few minutes. After a quick systems discussion; we both decided that the best course of action was to restart engine number 1 before continuing to the gate to establish a normal configuration for taxi in. We both confirmed that the engine was shut down by verifying the N2 was at zero. The N1 also indicated the amber 'XX' with amber band. I noted the EGT was about 250 and decreasing when I attempted the start. We then received an ECAM because I forgot to configure the APU BLEED appropriately so I shut off the number 1 engine master and turned the APU BLEED ON. I then re-attempted the start. The engine motored longer than usual as expected due to the higher EGT. Just after 1 minute of motoring; ground control advised us of excessive smoke coming out of the number 1 engine. We shutoff the engine master at approximately 1m 19s after initiating the start (start valve opening). At the same time the Captain asked the controller to send out the fire trucks as a precaution; however; there was never an ECAM; or fire warning. Since there was no fire warning we decided to hold off any further checklists until the approaching crash/fire/rescue (CFR) vehicles could give the number 1 engine a visual inspection. CFR still noted smoke but no fire. CFR offered to spray water only into the inlet to see if smoke would dissipate. We both agreed and the Captain instructed CFR to proceed with the water shot. The water did dissipate the smoke. We both decided that shutting down engine 2 and being towed the rest of the way to the gate was the safest course of action at that point. We coordinated with ops and accomplished the tow-in checklist. The tow in was uneventful. Once towed in to the gate we accomplished the parking checklist. [Report narrative contained no additional information.] A319 flight crew reported shutting down the wrong engine on the taxiway. During the attempted engine restart; smoke was reported from the tailpipe.
Aircraft: B757
Phase of flight: Takeoff / Launch
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

We had a deferred APU bleed air and did a air start at the gate then went to spot 3 and did a cross bleed start. We taxied out to Runway 4L and it was my leg as Pilot Flying. ATC was issuing windshear loss of 15 kts. on final for Runway 4R and we planned for a Vr max for takeoff for the windshear. Wind was 330 gusting to 27 kts. We were cleared for takeoff I set 1.1 EPR called for set thrust. Captain set it. Check thrust. Thrust checked we were accelerating. We had not hit 100 kts. when ATC issued the reject. We rejected the takeoff. I called for the flight attendants to remain seated and we taxied off the runway to Taxiway P about 3;000 ft. down the runway. I ran the QRC and pulled the QRH. Another aircraft said they saw smoke coming from our gear so we asked [Crash Fire rescue] to come. Brakes hit 3 on the left side with the white box. We checked on the passengers and flight attendants. I called Maintenance and they said we would have to go to the ballpark for inspection. [Software] chart showed 56 min I rounded up to 100 kts. as I know we were below that. [Crash Fire Rescue] could not inspect our gear because they needed us to shutdown engines which we could not do because of the inoperative APU. We taxied to the [ramp] and Maintenance met us and we wrote up the reject there. We also notified Dispatch and the passengers and flight attendants. The brakes went back to 0 and after shutting down the left engine; Maintenance cleared us. We did a crossbleed at Taxiway Y short of Taxiway U and got a new release with the fuel we had; new to data and departed. Gusty winds on clear day. LLWS (Low Level Wind Shear) advisories in effect in departure ATIS. First Officer's takeoff. Cleared for takeoff and approaching 80 kts.; tower cancelled our takeoff clearance due to aircraft on Runway 4R executing a go-around due to wind shear. We completed the Rejected Takeoff Checklist and were cleared off the runway onto Taxiway P; between the runways; to run checklists and resequence for takeoff. Tower noted seeing smoke around the brake assemblies; so we had [Crash Fire Rescue] inspect the aircraft. Referencing the brake cooling checklist; we needed 56 mins for cooling. Brake temperatures reached 3 for 230.0. Because of limitations due to a deferred APU; we were not able to shut down both engines for complete inspection by [Crash Fire Rescue]. With 40 minutes remaining for cooling; we decided to have Maintenance and [Crash Fire Rescue] check the aircraft. Brake temperatures was 0 by time we reached the [parking spot]. Shutdown 1 engine shutdown for inspection and Maintenance and Crash Fire Rescue saw no damage and cleared us to go. Conferred with [Maintenance] and Dispatch and updated our weights and flight plan. Started 2nd engine; taxied out; and departed off Runway 4L. B757 flight crew reported a rejected takeoff that resulted in hot brakes and a flight delay.
Aircraft: CARAVAN UNDIFFERENTIATED
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

IFR flight plan in IMC at night. Cruising at 11;000 in visible moisture; OAT 0*C. TKS anti ice system on; vents closed; heater on. Noted cooked TKS odor in cockpit immediately after turning on TKS system. Immediate difficulty breathing; tightness in chest; later in flight noted chemical film on lips; bad taste in mouth; throat irritation; and voice became raspy. Symptoms of TKS exposure as noted on TKS 406B MSDS. A C-208 pilot reported suffering symptoms of TKS exposure consistent with those noted on the TKS 406B MSDS (Material Safety Data Sheet).
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

We were descending on the ILS [and] had just entered sterile cockpit and ATC asked if we had the airport in sight. We responded that we did and they cleared us for the visual and gave a speed reduction from 250 kts to 210 kts. I set the speed selector to 210 kts and after the throttles went to idle for the slowdown we received an ENG 2 CONTROL FAULT caution message on the EICAS. My FO grabbed the QRH and I told him that I had the aircraft and the radios and he would run the QRH for the displayed message. We performed QRH which after disconnecting autothrottles asked if the engine was responsive. I advanced the engine 2 thrust lever and there was no response; this was at approximately at 8800 ft. The QRH said that throttle response would be either slow or stabilized in an idle condition. The engine was stabilized at idle and the QRH told us to prepare for a single engine approach and landing. After determining that the throttle was unresponsive we told ATC our problem. We informed the flight attendants of the situation even though we were in sterile because I felt they should be aware of the situation. We did not brief the passengers because of the high workload and felt that it was more important to get the airplane on the ground since we would be landing very shortly. I elected to keep the non-responsive engine running because it was at a stabilized idle thrust condition and there was no indications that I felt warranted a complete shutdown. We configured the aircraft early to ensure a stabilized approach. In the high workload I forgot to arm the approach mode and ended up slightly high on glide slope. I clicked off the autopilot and hand flew the approach to an uneventful landing. We taxied to the gate and deplaned normally without any further incidents. Once everyone was off the plane I called Dispatch to notify them of the event as required per the Flight Operations Manual. While descending through approximately 10;000 MSL after speed reduction to 210 knots; EICAS message 'ENG 2 FADEC CONTROL FAULT' appeared. EMB-175 flight crew reported landing with the #2 engine at idle thrust; with no response to thrust lever input; due to a FADEC fault.
Aircraft: NO AIRCRAFT
Phase of flight: unknown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

The FAA (Federal Aviation Administration) conducted a facility audit. During the audit; they found several consumable products with an expired shelf life in the Fire / Storage in the hangar. The FAA brought these items to the Supervisor's attention at the time and the Supervisor responded properly and removed the items from use. I received a phone call and an email stating that the FAA had decided to issue a SNAAP (Streamed No Action and Administrative Action Program) Letter to me regarding the incident.Monthly audits performed at the base failed to identify or locate the material prior to the expiration. This is not caused by an improper audit; but by the extensiveness of the task and the number of locations requiring the audit. In my opinion; the tasks is too large to be 100 % accurate.Expired shelf life or improperly labeled material was found in the work area.After the FAA brought the items to our attention; Management disposed of the items.[Company] needs to implement a new program dealing with shelf life material. Possibly an electronic program to Label; Monitor; Track; and Control shelf life items; or a 'one Time Use' program so material is not stored for later use and have the possibility of expiring. The current program is too complicated and labor intensive; and a 100% level of accuracy is difficult to achieve. Also; our Company culture needs to change as well so employees stop storing items for later use creating the possibility of the finding. Maintenance Manager reports that audit found expired consumable products in stock at maintenance facility.
Aircraft: M-20 E SUPER 21
Phase of flight: Landing
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft

After departing for home field; the landing gear failed to raise. When within range I called Unicom; advised the attendant of the situation; and asked him to stay on duty to visually verify that my gear was down. When I was adjacent to the terminal; he verified that the gear was in fact down. I had a green gear down light and with visual confirmation I landed the airplane. I felt the wheels on the pavement and immediately the airplane was on its belly. I shut everything down and got out. The airport attendant had closed the runway and met me at the airplane. He called a tow and we got the airplane back on its wheels and towed it to the hangar. It's worth noting that after being serviced [earlier this year]; the gear had failed to raise as I departed for home. I returned to the shop and they worked on the squat switch for several hours before releasing it. I had not had any more issues until this incident. M20E pilot reported that after being unable to raise the landing gear; the gear collapsed on the landing roll.
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 140 ER/LR
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

While serving as First Officer; the following event occurred.After takeoff while performing the After Takeoff Flow Checklist; crew noticed illuminated BAGG EXT button at approximately 4;000 ft. Crew [advised ATC]; and asked to return to ZZZ while also requesting assistance from Crash Fire Rescue. Crew performed the [recommended procedure] in the QRH; returned and landed safely at ZZZ on Runway XXR. Crash Fire Rescue crews inspected the baggage compartment on the taxiway and then escorted the airplane back to the gate for further inspection.There were no live animals onboard and no personnel injury or aircraft damage noted. Unsure of cause of smoke alarm; overweight landing reported to Maintenance with a touchdown descent rate of 250 fpm. ERJ-140 flight crew reported cargo compartment fire warning after takeoff; resulting in a return to land.
Aircraft: SKYLANE 182/RG TURBO SKYLANE/RG
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

I was given a heading for a (diverging) right downwind for [the] visual. I was advised to remain at 7500 feet as the approach controller tried to get me in sequence for a touch and go. I was given directions to a lower aircraft which I understood that I was to follow and then immediately told to climb to 8500 (1500 above pattern) due to converging traffic. In fact this would have put me at the same altitude as the converging traffic; a Cirrus; there was immediate evasive action required by me. I was brought back into the pattern and told to follow Diamond Star; then they said 'that's not going to work because you are overtaking him by 50 knots'; I was on Right base and the other traffic was on final. I had not slowed down because I was being vectored all over.On departure after switching back to tower I was told to maintain an altitude and given a heading which took me into the [a near by] Class D airspace. I continued to fly this heading until the approach controller turned me out of the airspace. I assumed I had been cleared into as I was vectored to the airspace. I don't know what was going on that day but it was pretty scary.I am uncertain if they created a collision hazard by flying me on a heading and making me climb to a converging aircrafts heading or that I truly violated airspace squawking a discreet code and being vectored into [a near by Delta] airspace at 8500. Cessna 182 pilot had to maneuver to avoid oncoming traffic in the airport pattern. While maneuvering he entered another airports class D airspace inadvertently. Once clear of traffic the pilot departed the airspace and landed normally.
Aircraft: SMALL AIRCRAFT; HIGH WING; 1 ENG; FIXED GEAR
Phase of flight: Landing
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Excursion Runway

I was attempting to land at runway 27U turf at X51 when I heard the ramp vehicle come on Unicom asking to cross 27U. I called final for 27U and the airport car stated that it is holding for me. The airport car distracted me so I came in 15kts fast and decided to go around after passing 1/3 of the runway without touching down. As I was turning base to final I was informed of bird activity near the runway distracting me from flying the aircraft. I finally spotted the birds and determined that they were of no conflict with my flight path. On short final I was having difficulty locating the runway environment due to poor airport markings. I was certain I was lined up on the runway right up until I touched down at which point the terrain was much rougher than I recall from my prior landings on the turf runway. Upon turning off of the runway we taxied over to the tie down area where we were informed by the airport manager that we had landed to the side of the grass runway in the grass. I was informed that no touch and goes were permitted along with landing an aircraft over 3600 lbs. The AFD did not indicate that either prohibited. They went on to say that only tail draggers; helicopters and gliders are permitted to land on the grass. GA pilot reported he landed to the side of the grass runway 27U at X51.