Aryan95614/aerograph-asrs huggingface dataset:
Aircraft: SMALL AIRCRAFT; LOW WING; 1 ENG; RETRACTABLE GEAR
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway; Ground Incursion Taxiway

While operating Aircraft X into ZZZ on a program flight using the Company X ABC callsign we landed on Runway XXL and received the normal 'Left at Taxiway 1; cross Runway YR; hold short Runway YL' instructions from Tower after landing around XA:30Z. Upon approaching Runway YR we heard over the radio '[muffled] XXX#CA [callsign] cross-Runway YL on Taxiway 1 and Taxiway 2 to park.' The PIC; who was Pilot Not Flying (PNF); hesitated with a read back because the call sign was slightly muffled due to radio static; but the instructions and cadence made sense that they were for us; since we were the only aircraft on Taxiway 1 in that position to follow the instructions. So he read them back and I the SIC and IP (acting as Pilot Flying doing training in new aircraft) continued to cross YL and continued Taxiway 2 to park.Upon parking and getting out of the aircraft [and] the more I thought about it the more something seemed off. [I found out] Tower did use the wrong callsign; they used the Company Y CA [callsign]; as Company Y CA cross YL and Taxiway 1 to park.'Contributing to this situation was the crew fatigue and us not being 100% on our game. Also; the Controller had a high workload as he appeared to be working both Tower and Ground Control positions.Although the instructions were most likely for us as our callsign was somewhat similar this scenario brought up a lot of other important facts to point out. We as a crew should never assume a runway crossing instruction is for us unless our call sign is 100% specifically used without a question. If we had any doubts about the instruction; we should have stopped and ask for clarification prior to proceeding.As for the Tower Controller; he was working both Ground and Tower; which makes for a high workload; as ZZZ was experiencing a traffic push at that time and he was getting busy. His misspeaking could have caused an incident or incursion. Lucky for us Company Y CA landed 30 minutes prior to this incident taking place. It is possible the Controller had an old strip lying around or just had that specific call sign on his mind. In any case; ATC should consider increasing staffing levels and not having a single Controller work both Tower and Ground positions; except during very low traffic levels. Air traffic loads have increased significantly from the COVID lows experienced several months ago. [Report narrative contained no additional information.] Flight crew reported crossing a runway; taxiing to parking; while not sure if the clearance instructions were for them due to Tower muffling the callsign.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Carrier X is not following SAFO20009 guidance in its operation. Air Carrier X is not providing to its passengers or flight crewmembers procedures on using oxygen masks while wearing required face masks on board aircraft. Alcohol based hand sanitizer is not being provided to flight crewmembers. Lack of facilities on aircraft or near aircraft to wash hands with soap and water. Cabin and flight decks are not being cleaned; disinfected; or sanitized after every flight or between crew changes. Lack of detailed cleaning process for flight crewmembers. Flight decks and cabins are dirty and stained. There is no assurance that you are using a clean; disinfected; and sanitized aircraft or workplace. No social distancing practices are being implemented in workplace. Crewmembers are having to share uncleaned surfaces with numerous coworkers and other company employees.Provide employees with alcohol based hand sanitizer. Provide employees with proper PPE and training for disinfectant product usage and manufacturer's instructions for using product are adhered to IAW with Safety Data Sheets. Create a logbook for each aircraft about its cleaning history with employee names; times; areas that were cleaned; and what products were used. Provide proper cleaning instructions and training. Provide passengers and flight crewmembers guidance on using oxygen masks while wearing face masks. Provide potable water so crewmembers can wash their hands with soap and water. Provide a socially distanced area for crewmembers to use a landline phone and computer to complete preflight briefings; through flight and post-flight paperwork. Air carrier Captain reported that airline is not following the SAFO2009 guidance during the COVID-19 pandemic.
Aircraft: SKYNIGHT 320
Phase of flight: Initial Climb
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

My clearance was via the RUUDY 4 Departure; radar vectors SBJ; thence... I wasn't given an initial heading or altitude; I briefly looked over the SID; but not close enough to realize there was a route with altitudes for the first few fixes. I had assumed; probably out of habit; and was expecting radar vectors to SBJ as soon as I contacted New York Departure. After departing and contacting New York they didn't give me a heading or altitude so I continued on the runway heading of 240; this put me left of the course to WENTZ and TASCA. I believe I also climbed past the SID altitude; I was then cleared to a higher altitude but I had already gone past 2;000 FT which the SID said to cross TASCA at. I think the confusion arose out of the terminology in the clearance; by using the words 'Radar Vectors' I incorrectly thought I didn't need to fly to any fixes in the SID; but would be given a heading to the initial fix of SBJ VOR. A Cessna 320 pilot; cleared to depart TEB via the RUUDY RNAV SID radar vectors to SBJ; instead took off and flew runway heading rather than the SID track and climbed at will.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

While flying the GLASR ONE Arrival into SEA; the LNAV appeared to malfunction and didn't make the turn to 163 degrees at the HETHR intersection. I proceeded to select heading to have the autopilot make the turn. The heading select button was unresponsive. I then disconnected the autopilot and made the turn. While in the turn; Approach asked about our heading. We were on the GLASR ONE arrival into SEA; the LNAV disconnected and did not make the turn south to 163 degrees at HETHR intersection. The Captain was flying pilot used heading bug to make the turn and still no response; he then disconnected the autopilot and hand flew the turn. After the turn the controller asked what heading we were on. I told him 163 degrees. Nothing further was said. B737-800 flight crew reported that their aircraft did not make the turn to 163 degrees at HETHR on the GLASR1 arrival to SEA. Heading select was engaged with no effect then the auto pilot was disengaged and the aircraft turned manually.
Aircraft: C172
Phase of flight: Takeoff / Launch
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Student was performing a soft field takeoff at ZZZ. Upon leaving ground effect to begin the takeoff climb out (approximately 50-100' AGL); the engine became significantly rough; shaking and making a loud banging noise. I determined the aircraft not safe for flight and took over controls; reduced power to idle; informed ZZZ tower of the engine problem; and that I intended to make an immediate landing. I landed the plane on the remaining runway; and applied hard braking; bringing the aircraft to a safe speed prior to the end of the runway. Flight terminated. C172 flight instructor reported an engine malfunction after takeoff; which resulted in an immediate landing on the remaining runway surface.
Aircraft: C172
Phase of flight: Initial Climb
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Airport Operations witnessed this event from the ground. A C172 took off to remain in the right closed traffic pattern from Runway XX. Next to take off was a Mooney M20. As the C172 was partway through their crosswind; the M20 turned a very early right crosswind with the intention to depart to the east. In doing so; the M20 cut inside the pattern. The C172 turned right downwind and was now on a perpendicular collision course with the Mooney. The M20 passed in front of and slightly below the C172.Immediately after this near miss; Tower queried the M20 if they were aware of the local departure procedures. The M20 replied 'not really' - they were a transient aircraft. Tower clarified that the ZZZ departure that they were shooting was to be flown via runway heading until past the diamond-shaped waterway; then turning east. This M20 turned before the waterway; producing a very early crosswind turn.Here's a friendly reminder to GA pilots to familiarize themselves with local approach and departure procedures when flying out of unfamiliar airports. Airport operations personnel reported witnessing a near mid-air collision between two small aircraft when one turned an early crosswind inside an aircraft that was on downwind leg.
Aircraft: CRJ700
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

CRJ-200 was climbing westbound. He was at FL340 when I inquired what his estimated time to reach FL380 would be. He said a little more than 4 minutes. His traffic was a point out from ZID; an A320 at FL370. I issued CRJ-200 a climb to FL380 and monitored his progress. When he was at FL360; I issued a rate of climb of 1;000 FPM. He acknowledged my request. At FL375; CRJ-200 indicates he is not longer able to keep the 1;000 FPM. I acknowledge and ask what can he do on climb and do not get an answer; then I ask again if he is climbing at all; he stated; 'We are getting our speed up;' I then ask him to turn 40 degrees left for traffic and climb to FL380. I then called ZID to inform them what was happening. I had a j-ring on CRJ-200; and before losing separation; I witnessed FL380 in my data block. I then re-cleared the CRJ-200 to HNN and shipped him to ZID. Sequence traffic at altitude and leave CRJ-200 at FL360 and let ZID climb him. I know there was a work group investigating the phraseology linked to timed climbs to make it more useful and understandable for controllers and pilots. Something to the effect of 'climb to reach FL380 in 4 minutes of less' with no time stamp requirement would be nice. ZDC Controller described a loss of separation event listing the current required phraseology related to climb instructions as as contributing to this event and recommending changes to the current procedure.
Aircraft: B757
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

I was the Captain on Flight from to ZZZZ. At approximately XA40 or there about I was informed by my lead flight attendant about a medical situation in the main cabin. At the time of notification we were approximately 60nm South of ZZZ and just 30 minutes from our Coast out fix. The lead flight attendant informed me that the sick passenger was a white female in her late 30's and there was a doctor and a nurse attending to her.We reviewed our options in case we needed to divert. I made contact with Dispatch and Medlink through SAT Com. Dispatch was updated frequently as well as Medlink. My concern for updates grew as we closely approached our coast out fix. Little did I know that the situation had gotten worst; apparently the flight attendants were scrambling to get the medical items requested by the doctor onboard our plane. The AED and Medical kit were released to the doctor with my concurrence. I spoke with the doctor who was treating our passenger and he express his concern to me and the possible diagnosis. The doctor stated that based on his examination the passenger was experiencing diaphoresis; chest pain and shortness of breath. The doctor thought it could be DVT with possible pulmonary embolism or possible infectious pulmonary process. The doctor recommended medical attention for our passenger. At approximately XB00z we were rerouted to ZZZ1. We made an uneventful landing. The passenger was taken off the aircraft by the awaiting paramedics and transported to the local hospital. Do to the nature of the [situation] we were force to make an over weight landing. Both dispatch and maintenance were notified and noted in the aircraft maintenance logbook. At about XA00; we were informed of passenger having chest pains/difficulty breathing/vomiting. At approximately XC00 On board physician stated we needed to get plane on ground ASAP as he suspected heart attract or pulmonary embolism. We diverted to ZZZ. Captain [authorized] to land overweight and have IRO remain in crew rest seat due to high workload and short amount of time until we landed (we were below 10;000 feet when he was done coordinating with dispatch and airport ops and I had the opportunity to ask if IRO should come back up). We wrote up overweight landing and inspection was performed by maintenance in ZZZ. Flight crew diverted while enroute when a passenger was taken seriously ill. They performed an overweight landing and the passenger was deplaned and taken to the hospital.
Aircraft: CRJ200
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

A CRJ-200 aircraft had been released from Heavy maintenance in ZZZ and pushed outside for the pilots pre-flight. One of the seven discrepancies that were written was that the Captain's aileron has clicking during actuation to the left and right at a 3/4 scale deflection. At approximately XA:15 AM local time on January 2012; myself and Contract Repair Station Representative X spoke about the [Maintenance] supplement in the Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) to torque the control column nut. After further discussions with Representative X; and [after] reviewing the RII list; I advised him that this discrepancy was not an RII item and noted so in the logbook. The aircraft was released approximately ninety minutes later and flew until the morning of the fourth day; where maintenance personnel in ZZZ1 reviewed their paperwork after the aircraft departure and found the missed RII. The aircraft was the grounded in ZZZ2 [approximately] two hours. In ZZZ2 an inspection of the control column took place. After re-torquing the Captain's control column nut for an aileron clicking during actuation to the left and right at 3/4 scale deflection; Mechanic determines the item does not require an RII Inspection and the CRJ-200 aircraft is released. Aircraft is grounded several days later for the missed RII Inspection.
Aircraft: SKYLANE 182/RG TURBO SKYLANE/RG
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical

I was taxiing for takeoff at Fallbrook Airpark (L18). At entrance to Runway 18; I saw that the windsock showed light wind from the north. I saw an aircraft in the run-up area of Runway 36. I announced on CTAF that I would back taxi on Runway 18 to intersection of Runway 18 and the taxiway and would then exit the runway. While back taxiing; the aircraft in the run-up area of Runway 36 taxied onto Runway 36 with no radio call. I announced on CTAF again that I was now back taxiing on Runway 18 with no response from the other aircraft. The aircraft on Runway 36 then commenced takeoff with no radio call. I moved to the right as far as possible and stopped at the edge of the runway. The other aircraft rotated and climbed over my aircraft. C182 pilot taxiing south on Runway 18 reports an LSA taking off to the north over the C182 pilot. The C182 pilot had announced his intention to back taxi on Runway 18 to an exit on CTAF; but no response was heard; nor was a takeoff announcement broadcast.
Aircraft: B747
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance

We departed for our flight and was notified several hours later via SAT [phone] that [air carrier] had discovered a mistake in the manner in which it calculated our cargo weight. They discovered that their operator incorrectly measured several pallets resulting in a lower than actual weight. After being notified by our company; it was decided to return to [origin]; our departure airport. We requested and company provided new burns and a much higher zero fuel weight (approximately 45;000 lbs). After reading the 'Overweight Policy' in the QRH; and taking other factors into account; we decided to dump our fuel to 60;000lbs remaining. This would give us a landing weight of 625;000; well below our max landing weight.Landing and taxiing were uneventful.It is very difficult to state what as a crew we would have done differently to prevent this situation. We rely on many different people to do their jobs correctly to ensure we have a safe flight. There is very little we could have done in this situation short of standing next to the scale operator to ensure he/she was preparing weight tags properly. B747-400 First Officer reported they departed with incorrect cargo weight information; resulting in a much heavier gross weight than planned for. They returned to departure airport.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Final Approach
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

SEA was utilizing a south flow configuration even though surface winds were northerly 5-10 kt. We were turned in tight approximately 3-4 miles behind a B757 and instructed to maintain 190 KIAS to the marker for Runway 16R. I told the Controller unable due risk of unstable approach with tailwinds not to mention wake turbulence hazard behind 757. As our final speed in the B737-900 this day would easily be 25 kt more than a B757 there would be a significant chance of a wake turbulence encounter as our spacing tightened up. Approach Control countered with an instruction of 180 KIAS and we elected to continue. We soon encountered several sharp jolts of wake turbulence and my First Officer did a fine job of maneuvering above glide slope to get out of the wake. Our spacing with the B757 was quickly eroding as we were given instructions to contact the Tower. The Tower Controller quickly approved our request to sidestep to Runway 16L and we landed without further incident.The PIC is the final authority as to how the aircraft will be flown. The Approach Controller seemed incredulous that I did not wish to comply with her first request; but the reality of the situation was this was an unworkable plan. We elected to continue this approach with the assumption that we would either get to sidestep to 16L or go around. Lesson learned: be the PIC and speak up when you don't like what is happening. Recommendations: we had 13 kt of tailwind to about 500 feet AGL; why does SEATAC insist on the south flow configuration in these conditions? Also; 3 miles behind a B757; especially with a tailwind is not safe. B737-900 Captain reported encountering wake turbulence on approach to SEA in trail of a B757.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

At FL360; right IRS Fault light illuminated with autopilot disconnected. Speed Trim Failure light also illuminated. First Officer (FO) altitude instruments blank and no FO Flight Display (FD). We ran checklist for IRS Fault and Speed Trim Fail. Unable to restore FO instruments with NAV selected on IRS. ATC was notified of failure along with Dispatch. Flight controls transferred to Captain with good instruments. Checklist completed; IRS switch both on 1. Flight Operations Manual referenced; as autopilot would not engage with either A or B; aircraft not RVSM capable. ATC notified.Vectors and descent provided. Dispatch sends message LNAV/VNAV still operable (via flight director). Captain and FO concur. No instructions on QRH or Dispatch to land at nearest suitable airport so flight continued planned route. CRM and risk management discussed relating to Pilot Monitoring functions for radio; assertive calls for Pilot Flying deviations; and autopilot FD control. Flight continued with Captain manually flying. Arrival; approach and landing were uneventful. Logbook entries made; Maintenance notified via radio. A B737-800 Captain reported the right IRS Fault Light illuminated accompanied by the autopilot disconnect; SPEED TRIM FAIL and blank First Officer Instruments. The flight descended out of RVSM with an unusable autopilot but continued to the filed destination.
Aircraft: B747
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Inside of thirty miles; started configuring aircraft for approach and landing. Selecting 5 deg of flaps with lever; noticed outboard flaps indicator split with one needle stuck at approximately 3 deg and the other needle oscillated back and forth between 3 and 10 degrees before settling at 10 deg. No asymmetric roll was noted at this time. Continued to configure for a flap 30 landing; with the outboard flap indicator stuck in a split condition. Needles were stuck in the 3 and 10 degree position. It was apparent that the outboard flaps had not extended due to the increased nose up pitch during approach. Due to landing with less than flight plan fuel; we elected to add 20 KTS to Vref to ensure controllability and continued approach and landed uneventfully. Left flaps extended after landing for Maintenance to verify flap position. During taxi in; the stuck indicator somehow freed itself; and the outboard flaps extended. Cause: Possible malfunctioning flap indicator. B747-200 Captain reported outboard flaps showed a split and did not fully extend on approach. Possible stuck indicator freed itself on taxi in; allowing flaps to extend.
Aircraft: PA28
Phase of flight: Takeoff / Launch
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I landed for fuel; and as a precautionary measure to inspect the engine due to a solitary sound I heard in flight. While all engine indicators and monitors were in the green; I elected the cautious safe action. I removed the cowling with assistance; and replaced it after my inspection showed no abnormalities. After fueling; I preflighted the plane and proceeded to takeoff. Immediately on rotation; the right side of the cowling dislodged; remaining attached to the fuselage by the aft and left connections. My airspeed and altitude dictated insufficient runway remaining to land. I executed a series of turns to establish an approach to the runway; and executed a landing without difficulty. Determining that the cowling sustained damage in the forms of cracks in the fiberglass where it was displaced; I elected no further flight; hangared the plane and took the cowling for repair. Reflecting on the above events; I realize I missed the right two latches not being engaged in my preflight; causing the event. Contributing factors included distraction from my routine by others wishing to assist me. Future corrections will include completing my preflight in a sterile environment cleared of distractions. The pilot of a Piper PA32 landed for fuel; and as a precaution removed the engine cowling to inspect the engine. Others assisted him in re-installing the cowling; but not having been latched properly; came loose just after takeoff and sustained damage; but did not depart the aircraft. The pilot immediately returned to land; and grounded the aircraft to await the necessary repairs.