Aryan95614/aerograph-asrs huggingface dataset:
Aircraft: SMALL TRANSPORT; LOW WING; 2 TURBOJET ENG
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

We blocked in on the ramp in ZZZ at (time). We shut down according to our AOM procedure. I kept the parking brake set; knowing we were not chocked. After seeing the passenger off and cleaning and postflighting the plane; we still [were] not chocked. I asked the FBO agent if she could get us some chocks since none were available on the new ramp they were using. The sedan that was to drive us to ZZZ1 showed up at the plane. We loaded our bags into the sedan. Still waiting for chocks and not wanting to leave the plane unchocked; I asked the sedan driver if he could drive us to the FBO about 200 yards away so I could get the chocks myself. When we got to the FBO; the FBO agent was leaving the FBO with chocks in hand. I spoke to the crew that was taking our plane to brief them of its status and fuel load. I happened to look out at the plane only to see it slowly rolling across the ramp. Two pilots from [FBO] were attempting to stop it. The sedan driver quickly drove us back to the plane. By this time the chocks were placed on the nose wheel. One of the [FBO] crew members said he had injured his right calf in attempting to physically stop the plane. I contacted the Company and spoke to the [Chief Pilot]. When back on the plane; [name] and I both noticed that the parking brake was still set. While chocked; we started the plane; checked the brakes and taxied to another part of the ramp. I set the parking brake again and brought the left engine up to about 60%. The brakes held. We shut down the plane. By this time the crew from [FBO] had departed the airport in their plane. I briefed the crew who were taking 583 of the situation; and they assumed control of the airplane for their trip to ZZZ2. I understand the ramp we parked on was recently opened but yet there were no chocks immediately available. Chocks should be located anywhere planes are expected to park. Also; would it be possible to have airplanes carrier their own set of chocks for instances like this? Small Transport Jet Captain reported aircraft began to roll from parking position even though parking brake was set. Captain reported FBO had not yet inserted wheel chocks.
Aircraft: CITATION II S2/BRAVO (C550)
Phase of flight: Initial Climb
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was Pilot In Command (PIC) on a CE550 and weather was 2;500 overcast 2 miles with light snow. After about 3 minutes into the flight the left engine oil light illuminated with the oil pressure showing 40 psi. We returned to the airport by being vectored for the ILS; landing uneventfully 8 minutes after the light illuminated. I didn't shut down the engine feeling that it was safer to land with it operating at reduced power. Opening the oil access door; I noticed the loss of oil was from the dipstick not being fully locked in place. I had preflighted the aircraft a few days before the scheduled flight; and recall the oil level in both engines was in the normal range. I can't believe that I would not have secured the dipstick into its proper place. It is so routine. My inactions of not checking the oil dipsticks to make sure they were secure was the reason for this incident.My judgment was further clouded because after new oil was put into the engine I completed the two day trip. I wrongly perceived that having some oil pressure after landing I could still go on the trip. I regret not having a discussion with my supervisor and the other pilot about doing so. While taking full responsibility for my actions; the 'get the job done' attitude may have overshadowed my judgment. If any of us had raised some doubt; I don't believe we would have departed. I have implemented a new procedure that after the oil is checked by one pilot; the other pilot will check to make sure everything is secure. A CE550 Captain reported a low oil pressure indication on the left engine shortly after takeoff and returned to the departure airport. Post flight revealed that the dipstick was not locked in place; causing the oil loss and the reporter was likely the last person to touch it. The oil is then replaced and the flight departs on a two day trip without any additional maintenance.
Aircraft: DHC8
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

An electrical anomaly occurred upon taxi in to the gate. After deplaning the passengers all electrical power was removed from the aircraft. Under direction from maintenance control ground power was introduced to the aircraft to try and diagnose the problem. At that point the 'Check Fire Detect' warning light illuminated with no other indications. I smelled what I believed to be smoke. I exited the aircraft to perform a visual inspection from the exterior and saw smoke pouring from a vent in the tail section of the aircraft. The automatic thermal fire suppression system had not discharged. I got back on the aircraft and ordered the remaining crew members to evacuate. I manually discharged the APU fire bottle and called ground control to send the fire trucks then removed all electrical power from the aircraft again. Some sort of electrical malfunction caused a fire to start in the tail section of the aircraft.All appropriate check lists and immediate action items were performed. Nothing really could have been done to prevent this other than being extremely cautious when diagnosing an electrical problem. In my opinion it would have happened regardless. After landing; started APU taxiing in to the gate. APU starter light did not extinguish. Cycled APU off; then on; but it did not restart. Noticed APU AUX breaker (N8) was popped. GPU voltage was low; so we requested a different one. Began getting erroneous lights; such as 'touched runway' along with others. After hooking up different GPU; the 'check fire detect' light illuminated; but we had no other signals from the control panel. We went outside to check; and saw smoke coming from the APU. The Captain went back onboard; discharged an extinguisher bottle; and advised ATC to roll Crash Fire Rescue to our location. DHC8 flight crew reported attempting to start the APU during taxi in to the gate but the APU starter light did not go out and the APU did not start. A second attempt is also unsuccessful. After deplaning at the gate; smoke was detected coming from the APU compartment; the APU fire handle was pulled and Crash Fire Rescue was called.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Takeoff / Launch
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

All checklists/procedures were properly done prior to takeoff. We then aborted the takeoff due to the Takeoff Warning Horn sounding. Horn did not sound until approximately three to five seconds after takeoff power was set (88.4% N1). The Captain aborted takeoff at approximately 75 KIAS and cleared the runway. We ran the rejected takeoff and Takeoff Configuration Warning Horn Checklists and calculated brake cooling. Horn sounded again when Captain did a throttleburst.We discussed possible problems/solutions. He ran the stab trim forward 'about a dot' and redid the throttleburst with no horn. I mentioned that it was still in the green band on my side before he ran it forward; but apparently 'my side' indicated a higher setting (i.e. 5.2 vs. 4.9). The Captain then notified Dispatch and we told ATC we could take off again after the cooling period. We ensured the aircraft was properly reconfigured for takeoff (i.e. rejected takeoff re-selected) and the Captain made several more throttlebursts. The second takeoff was uneventful. Brake cooling was 16 minutes. A subsequent throttleburst check gave an immediate Takeoff Warning Horn. Flaps were checked at 1; speedbrake handle down detent; and the trim checked in the green at 4.9 units. However; I noticed the First Officer's trim pointer indicated closer to 5.1 units; so I trimmed the First officer's side to 4.9 (Captain's side now 4.8); and moving the thrust lever forward now produced no horn. Had I checked across the center console to view the First Officer's trim pointer I would have set the trim conservatively with the disparate pointer closest to the edge of the green band further towards the center of the green. If the pointers aren't matching; I'd notify Maintenance to recalibrate. A B737-300 rejected their takeoff upon receipt of a takeoff warning horn determined to be the result of the Captain's trim indication being in the green band; but not the First Officer's. By electing the most conservative of the two displays a subsequent takeoff was uneventful.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

On [date] technicians painted Aircraft X right and left elevator top surface with a spray paint gun in an improperly ventilated area. The fumes were very strong and concentrated causing me to experience a headache and throat irritation. Aircraft paints can be cancer causing when inhaled; according to OSHA and the company's respirator training exposure and inhaling some of these toxic fumes may compromise our health. I approached the techs and told them to stop spraying and to open the hangar doors; they informed me that they had been authorized by Management. They also said that they were told to paint it during lunch. Nonetheless; management authorization or painting during lunch; does not reduce exposure to cancer causing fumes; specially in a non ventilated area. I spoke to the supervisor of line 3; and he said they had been authorized to do so by our local 'safety manager'. I then went to the shift manager and he said he would 'look into it'; in the meantime the fumes continued to accumulate in the hangar so that there was a mist in the bay where they were painting and beyond. After about an hour; they stopped spraying and opened the hangar doors. Incidents like this are not isolated. I've brought up to Management the dangers of buffing on fiberglass panels; cutting honeycomb; grinding on aluminum on the open hangar floor. It seems to me that our local Safety Manager does not care to emphasize the importance of following proper safety and health procedures. Air Carrier maintenance technician reported a fume event in an improperly ventilated maintenance hanger during aircraft spray painting. Hanger doors were opened and painting ceased after notifying supervisor.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Enroute at FL400. Received Number 1 Bleed Trip Off light approximately 100 NM west of where we had taking off from. Executed QRH procedures (light did not extinguish with trip reset button). We were now single pack operation. Continued to our filed destination with single pack. Pressurization OK. I was thinking about the single pack status and not feeling too comfortable with the fact I was one malfunction away from a possible emergency descent. Also; there would be some icing conditions possibly encountered enroute and I knew we were to 'avoid' icing conditions in that configuration. After about 10 minutes; I wondered if the Number1 Bleed Air would reset so we pressed the trip reset button. The light extinguished and we were two bleed source operation again and then brought the left pack on line again. Now; we had full capability if encountering icing. After another 10 minutes; the Number1 Bleed tripped off again. This time; QRH was used and we did not attempt any further resets. We arrived at our destination single pack with no icing encountered enroute. When we arrived; I explained to Maintenance what had transpired including the attempt to get the Number 1 bleed back on line. He seemed to appreciate that this was a verified more than one time event; asked I write all that in the logbook; which I did; and the aircraft was taken out of service. I wanted to do the right thing by telling Maintenance all my in-flight steps and; in doing so; realized I might be 'putting myself on report' by doing more than the QRH specifically authorized; hence this ASAP report. The QRH could be better amplified to tell us that we should not attempt a second reset of the system after waiting 10 minutes or so if it doesn't want us to do it. It is just too tempting given the situation we are put in with just single pack; long cruising requirements. I don't feel it is specifically (enough) prohibited; but better refinement could be warranted if in fact we should not be doing any extra resetting attempts. [This Report contains no additional information] A B737-700 Left Bleed tripped at FL400; but did not reset following the QRH. Ten minutes later a successful reset was accomplished but the bleed tripped again; so the flight continued single pack.
Aircraft: LARGE TRANSPORT
Phase of flight: Descent; Initial Approach
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Heavy weather and thunderstorms moving through the bay area. Winds were gusting on the surface and all Bay area airports were using non-standard runways. OAK closed while we were on arrival and aircraft were holding and diverting. The frequency was very congested. We were a couple of miles north of MNTNA intersection descending via the FRLON2 Arrival. A large cell was just past the MNTNA intersection and we asked Approach if we could maintain present heading for one to two miles for weather and then go direct MISSS. That request was approved. We finished the deviation and reported we were turning direct MISSS.The turn toward MISSS ended up being a fairly hard left turn. The Controller at one point asked if we were turning direct MISSS and we answered affirmative. He then said we weren't headed to MISSS and gave us a heading. The navigational display clearly showed we were headed to MISSS. After established on the heading we realized we hadn't been given an altitude after deviating off the arrival. We were at about 6500 feet with 5500 feet set in the altitude window. We asked what altitude we were cleared to and the Controller said 7000 feet. We said 'roger climbing back to 7000 feet;' and he said just maintain 6000 feet. He then gave us a frequency change and added that we were never headed toward MISSS. With all the frequency congestion and the high workload; we just shrugged; acknowledged the frequency and pressed. We never got an altitude clearance when cleared to deviate off the arrival; but we should have thought to ask. [Report narrative contained no additional information.] Air carrier flight crew; while deviating around weather; was questioned by ATC if they were proceeding to the cleared waypoint. The crew was convinced they were but ATC still questioned their track.
Aircraft: ATR 42
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

During climb; had a pitch trim Asymmetry [message]; followed QRH. En-route crew discussed possible issues with control of aircraft with pitch trim being stuck in a nose up trim. [Advised ATC] and landed in ZZZ normal. Notified Maintenance. Possible changes to QRH for Pitch Trim failure should include notes about uncontrollably issues and possible needing to divert to another airport. ATR-42 Captain reported a pitch trim issue during climb was resolved with QRH procedure; but crew was concerned about further controllability issues.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

A 4th gear pin was discovered installed after takeoff in the nose gear. Performed return and landed uneventful. Pin was removed and flight resumed to destination. The aircraft had just returned from several days of maintenance. At some unknown point; someone installed a nose gear pin that had no ribbon or markings. Using standard gear pins with proper markings would have prevented this occurrence. B737 Captain reported takeoff with an unknown nose gear pin resulted in a return to the departure airport.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

We were descending on the ZZZZ 1 arrival into ZZZ. As we were descending the First Officer extended the speed brakes to help us get down. Upon retraction to about 50 percent stowed; the aircraft rolled right about 15 degrees. Then the autopilot rolled wings level. Once the speed brake was stowed to 25 percent it rolled again to the right 15 degrees and then it went wings level again. After the speed brakes were fully stowed; the aircraft rolled left 15 degrees and then back to wings level. After that we knew we had a spoiler problem and we decided we would not use the speed brakes for the remainder of the flight. After referencing the QRH and the manuals; we requested priority handling; we notified the flight attendants and we let the passengers know with a PA. We descended uneventfully with priority handling and landed with vehicles standing by. We taxied to the gate. We debriefed with maintenance and the flight operations. B737 NG Captain reported experiencing several 15 degree rolls to the right due to a possible speedbrake/spoiler malfunction during arrival flight phase. The crew landed uneventfully without the use of speedbrakes.
Aircraft: LIGHT TRANSPORT; LOW WING; 2 TURBOPROP ENG
Phase of flight: Landing
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

While training a third party student I was making radio calls on CTAF at GUC. I had previously verified that the radio I was using (Comm 1) was operative. After several approaches (both to missed and to landings); during which I continued to make calls on CTAF; we ended up head to head on the runway with another airplane. Both aircraft were fully stopped while still a great distance from one another (probably more than 1000 feet). I made another call on CTAF and we taxied back to the FBO to find out what happened.We were informed that no one had heard our calls; so I went back out to the airplane in order to check the radios. I could not discern why Comm 1 was inoperative; so I wrote it up first and then called Maintenance. Maintenance Control asked the usual questions; including checking the volume and making sure the radio was on (both these things I had already checked); and then suggested I check the circuit breaker. The breaker was popped so I reset it as per Maintenance Control's directive and I cleared the write up according to the instruction of the Maintenance person I was talking to.Asking for frequent radio checks from the FBO are the only way I can think of to avoid this happening again. It was very hot (over 100 degrees F) in the cabin; despite having the temp control set to full cold. This might have had something to do with the circuit breaker popping.I am certain that for most of that training flight; we were hearing (and were heard on) CTAF. It was just right at the end when something happened. Instructor pilot; practicing landings with a student and using CTAF procedures; finds himself nose to nose with another aircraft on the takeoff roll. After stopping with room to spare it is discovered that Comm1 had failed due to a tripped circuit breaker.
Aircraft: MD-82
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types

On an unpressurized ferry flight [to] LAX at a cruise altitude of 10;000 feet; got a TA on an aircraft below us 12 o'clock and climbing. At approximately 4 miles ATC gave us a traffic advisory at the same time we got an RA with a CLIMB command. As we were climbing the First Officer spotted the aircraft coming right at us and said 'TURN LEFT.' I rolled into a 35-40 degree turn as the ATC Controller was advising a right turn which we could not comply with at that point. We observed we were climbing with the other aircraft with a constant 100 feet separation. The First Officer still watching the other aircraft said 'DESCEND - DESCEND.' As I was lowering the nose the other aircraft passed behind us at close range. We climbed to approximately 11;300 feet before descending to 10;000 feet and returning on course. It appears we (both aircraft) were nearing the border between two sectors because we were not on the same frequency. Seconds before our Controller had given us a frequency change; then said to stay with him and then gave us the traffic advisory as we were responding to the RA. It is not apparent to me that the other aircraft maneuvered to avoid us or even saw us. The other aircraft was a Cessna Citation. An MD82 Captain on an unpressurized ferry flight encountered an opposite direction Citation and responded to TA and RA warnings as well as directives from the First Officer based on visual contact.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Final Approach
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types

Aircraft X was on ILS approach to Runway 4 at GSP when a VFR aircraft inbound to GMU went across final under Aircraft X. Traffic was called. GMU [Tower] was called. Aircraft X was below the clouds and stated he would execute missed approach if there was a RA. The pilot seemed to stay above glide slope to avoid the RA. Both aircraft eventually got each other in sight and Aircraft X landed.This is a known safety problem. The closest proximity of 2 aircraft in this situation is zero lateral and less than 100 feet vertical if the GSP arrival is on the glideslope and the VFR is in the GMU Delta airspace. However; it should not be taken for granted that aircraft on instrument and visual approaches will be at or above glideslope altitude. Since the VFR is under the GSP arrival; which is usually a jet; there are also wake turbulence issues.The Charlie and Delta airspace design is flawed. The FAA is either unwilling or unable to redesign the airspace to provide for the safety of the flying public.From my experience; the VFR aircraft involved are always inbound to GMU from SC72 (Chandelle). It is probably less than half a dozen aircraft that occasionally do this. When they depart GMU; they are instructed to fly over VPLOW when GSP Runway 4 is in use. If they were instructed to fly over VPLOW when inbound to GMU; the problem would be resolved. GMU Tower can instruct aircraft to remain outside the Delta and instruct aircraft where to enter the Delta; so there is no reason this solution would not work. It could be agreed to; briefed and implemented in 24 hours.This situation develops quickly and there are no guarantees that the controllers will see it before the RA or collision alert. When it is seen; or when the alarms go off; what does FAA management want the controllers to do? Should we be breaking off the approach as a preventive measure? GSP Tower Controller reported an airborne conflict over intersection VPLOW. Controller stated this is an ongoing issue between IFR and VFR aircraft near VPLOW intersection.