Aryan95614/aerograph-asrs huggingface dataset:
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

On a visual approach to Runway 16L to the RNO airport we received a EGPWS Pull Up Warning. The warning came as I was telling the First Officer who was the Pilot Flying that he looked low. The First Officer disengaged the autopilot and began an aggressive climb. We rejoined the glidepath and landed. I believe I had expectation bias that he would recognize that we were getting low. The truth is we were momentarily in the red and thanks to the aircraft warning we made a recovery. During descent into RNO landing [Runway] 16L on downwind; the Controller cleared us for the visual to after another aircraft that was on final. Slightly past abeam that aircraft and at 9;000 ft. MSL; I squared the turn to base and began a descent and then angled the turn to final and select LNAV. We intercepted final and as we rolled out still descending and I noticed; as did the PM; that we were low. As I was arresting the descent and rolling out; an EGPWS took place. We initiated an escape maneuver with an aggressive climb and corrected and climbed up onto the approach path. Air carrier flight crew reported receiving an EGPWS terrain warning on a visual approach to RNO.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Cleveland Center asked if we wanted a fix further down our route. We requested BERYS or RUBYY. Cleveland Center cleared us to BERYS or what we believed was BERYS. We changed frequencies and checked on with Toronto Center. Toronto confirmed we were direct BERYS. Several minutes later he confirmed again direct BERYS and spelled if phonetically this time. He spelled BEERI. We advised we were cleared to what we believed was BERYS. The Controller told us to proceed direct BEERI. We thought we were cleared direct to BERYS intersection. That's what we read back. Toronto later asked us if we were going direct BERRI. Apparently; that's where we were originally cleared. These two intersections are very close together and it's very hard over a VHF radio to distinguish one from another. B767 flight crew reported a track heading deviation due to similar sounding fix names BEERI and BERYS.
Aircraft: B727-200
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

On initial climb-out passing approximately 6;000 MSL; oil quantity on Number 1 Engine was decreasing through 2.0 gallons. QRH procedures were followed and an air turn-back ensued. Oil quantity continued to zero gallons; and engine was wind-milled until approximately 6 mile final when oil pressure went below parameters and QRH directed an engine shutdown. Declared emergency and landed uneventfully with one engine out. B727-200 First Officer stated the aircraft lost oil quantity on number one engine during initial climb and turned back to departure airport. Crew declared an emergency; shut down affected engine and landed uneventfully.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft taxied into gate (Marshalled by Employee XX) and Employee XX gave stop signal. Captain stopped aircraft. Employee XY approached nose landing gear to chock. Placed rear tire chock and Captain powered up engine uncommanded. Aircraft moved forward 2-3 feet. Employee XX jumped back from MLG (Main Landing Gear) chocking to avoid injury. Employee XY rolled away from aircraft to avoid injury. Employee XX still held same stop command.Once aircraft stopped for second time; Employee XX and Employee XY approached aircraft to chock after additional all clear given by Employee XX. Employee XY and Employee XX (separately) spoke to flight crew and questioned why move aircraft [the] 2nd time. Captain explained he's been doing this for 26 years and knows what to do. Again I asked why moved when given stop signal.He stated 'I thought he needed me to come forward because he was only holding the x or really v with one hand. It looked like a v to me instead of an x.'I asked him specifically if he was even remotely unclear about the command being given; why presume and just move the aircraft? He said he knew what the command was... He said 'I thought' multiple times. He said he thought that we wanted him to move forward. We don't do 'I thought'. If unclear; do not move the aircraft and wait for a clear concise command. He would neither agree nor disagree. We both maintained respectfulness throughout; but it was obvious to me he felt no fault or misjudgment. Flight crew ignored ground personnel commands to stop aircraft.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

After landing taxi in to gate noticed oil pressure gauge right engine read 40 PSI and decreasing; status message; 'engine oil pressure' generator for right engine then shed; 'engine generator' EICAS appeared; 'right engine shutdown' EICAS appeared. With engine fuel control switch was in the run position; positive fuel flow to the engine; approximately 4;000 LBS of fuel in the right main tank. Right engine EGT started to rise from approximately 450C; to 507C and rising when I commanded the fuel control switch right engine to stop. Parked the aircraft; did shutdown checklist; called Maintenance; made appropriate write up. [I] stayed to debrief Maintenance on my observations and actions. On leaving the aircraft I went down to see the right engine and noticed an 8-10 [inch] diameter puddle of fluid on the ramp and what appeared to be oil dripping from the cowling. Upon taxing into gate after landing; right engine oil pressure and right engine bleed off light came on EICAS. Oil pressure continued to drop but engine did have N1; EGT; N2 and FF positive indications. This continued for about 30 seconds and we shutdown the right engine fuel control switch. Upon taxi into the gate Air Carrier flight crew note EICAS indications that the right engine is shutting down although the fuel control switch is still on with fuel flow indicated with EGT rising and N2 decreasing. The engine is secured with the fuel control switch and Maintenance is informed.
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

As we sat with the parking brake set awaiting our gate; the lower windshield metal heat strip on the Captain's side had a bright spark that sent flames throughout the inside of the laminated glass in the windshield; instantly sending spider cracks throughout the entire windshield. The flames lasted around 1 to 2 seconds before extinguishing on their own. We immediately deselected windshield heat; and I asked our jumpseater to obtain the fire extinguisher and hold it ready. We ultimately agreed that CFR assistance was not necessary; but we placed appropriate frequencies in standby in case we needed to call for immediate assistance. After a brief discussion with Maintenance we agreed the problem was contained and since I was able to see out the windshield to we taxied to the gate without further event. As they awaited their gate after arrival the flight crew of an ERJ-170 experienced a shorted windshield heat event that blazed momentarily and spider webbed the Captain's windshield.
Aircraft: C172
Phase of flight: Landing
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

While approaching DAL; I was asked by regional approach which runway I wanted to land on. I requested 13R then believe I corrected and asked for 13L because it was near the FBO. I was told to contact tower and continue my own navigation toward the runway. I contacted tower and was cleared to land even though I was still a little way out. I believe I read back the clearance as 13L. There was one departing aircraft in front of me; but no other aircraft on final. I crossed the final approach path of 13R and turned final onto 13L. At that point the controller realized I was on 13L; gave me a clearance on 13L; which I thought I already had; and I proceeded to land on 13L. After exiting the runway the controller informed me that it didn't create a problem this time because there wasn't traffic; but I had landed on the wrong runway. I apologized; stated I thought I had requested and been cleared for 13L; but volunteered that it must have been my mistake. He was very courteous and I tried to be the same. I certainly didn't want to complicate his job in any way! Because the active runway at my departing airport was runway 35; I anticipated the winds would be similar and I would land on 31R at DAL. That was the approach I visualized; so when I was vectored in for landing on the opposite runway; I think I may have been somewhat disoriented. This may have been a contributing factor in my initial request of 13R; then change to 13L and the ensuing miscommunication between the tower controller and myself. It appeared aircraft were also being vectored in to runway 31. An Airline jet had crossed right in front of me west to east; and then turned for an approach to 31; and I could see it for most of my approach. Regional approach was vectoring me on an easterly heading when I was already east of the airport. These factors contributed to my anticipation of being vectored in for 31R. It wasn't until I was close to the airport that I was told to turn left on a heading that brought me basically on a right downwind to 13R. Had I been vectored West of the airport; I think it would have realized which approach I was being set up on and been less confused by the runway reversal. Not that the approach control did anything wrong; it was just slightly confusing. A C172 pilot was confused approaching DAL when the landing direction was not as expected. Runway 13R was requested and clearance granted when the pilot actually intended and lined up for 13L. Tower revised clearance to land on Runway 13L on short final.
Aircraft: B767
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Deviation - Speed All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Aircraft EECs and Autothrottles were inoperative and deferred.During arrival into the CVG area on the SARGO3 arrival; we were given holding instructions at the JKUKA intersection due to thunderstorms in the vicinity of the airport. We were in the hold at 14;000 FT and clean maneuvering speed in the clean configuration. The autopilot was engaged in LNAV and ALT HOLD and I was maintaining the speed manually. At a point during an inbound leg; ATC told us that CVG was accepting arrivals on the CEGRM3 arrival and asked us if we'd like to proceed via TTH-CEGRM and then the CEGRM arrival; or whether we'd like to continue holding; hoping that the SARGO arrival would open up. We briefly discussed the options while looking into the location of TTH and the CEGRM arrival in relation to the thunderstorms and our current position. We decided to accept the suggested clearance about the time the aircraft began its right turn for the outbound leg of the holding pattern. ATC then cleared us to deviate as necessary and then cleared direct TTH. We entered direct TTH into the FMC but did not activate it immediately. It was located at about our 5 o'clock position; so I decided to continue the right turn past the outbound holding pattern leg using heading select until I had a better idea of where the thunderstorms were in relation to our newly selected course. It was during this turn that the stick shaker activated for 2 or 3 seconds. I saw an airspeed of approximately 165 KIAS and immediately advanced the throttles to initiate the recovery. The engines were already spooled up and responded immediately and the airspeed increased rapidly.The engine power had been stabilized to hold clean maneuvering speed while in the hold; but in hindsight; I realized that by continuing the right turn using heading select; the bank had steepened some and thereby caused the airspeed to decay. We had become distracted by all that was going on and didn't notice the airspeed decreasing. I should have left the autopilot on LNAV; since the power was already stabilized to hold the speed at the shallower bank commanded by LNAV; and adjusted my course as necessary once I was able to see the radar display after the turn was completed. I also should not have allowed myself to become so distracted that the airspeed dropped out of my scan.The remainder of the flight was normal without further incident. [Report narrative contained no additional information.] B767-200 flight crew reported the autothrottles were deferred INOP and that they got a stall warning in a turn when the speed dropped.
Aircraft: B777
Phase of flight: Initial Climb
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

On departure and climb out passing through 14000 ft.; crew observed a constantly high engine oil temperature indication; followed by an ECL (Electronic Checklist) annunciated procedure. We followed the ECL procedures and [requested priority handling] back to ZZZ. After communicating with Dispatch of our intentions; requesting overweight landing performance and manually reviewing aircraft landing performance; we communicated with our FAs (Flight Attendant) and passengers of our intentions. We performed on overweight landing on Runway XXL at ZZZ and taxied to the gate without further incidents. On climb out around 15;000 feet we received an EICAS alert for 'left engine high oil temperature.' We noted the oil temperature was boxed and it was high. We ran the checklist which led us to reducing the thrust on the left engine to idle. It remained there for the duration of the flight. While the Captain flew; I took care of checklists; radios; automation; FMC tasks; ACARS tasks; ATC; and performance data in FM; as well as requesting from Dispatch. The Captain did brief FAs (Flight Attendants) and make a PA.We discussed landing overweight as I noted we would be about 32;000 lbs. over. We felt that given our performance data; and weather; not dumping fuel would be okay in this case. We [requested priority handling] and headed back towards ZZZ. With the engine at idle; the oil temperature was no longer boxed amber. The Captain did a tremendous job handling and prioritizing tasks while flying. At no time did I feel overloaded as we worked systematically through the issue as best we could. We had an otherwise normal landing; the brakes did not get above '2.5 - 3' and we taxied to the gate where we were met by [Company] and Maintenance for support.As an aside; I self-assessed and while I felt comfortable to do another 'normal flight' I was unsure of how I would I feel about doing another flight that may have another irregular issue to handle. I communicated this to [Company]; and was removed off the flight to deadhead to my next destination. I struggled making this choice initially; but reflecting back; it was the right move for me. Also; when talking to ATC it was a little difficult to communicate our 'state.' I wanted to let them know we were essentially on one engine; but the other engine wasn't in a fuel cut off state. So I did the best I could to communicate that while keeping it simple and clear. After we got to the gate; I mistakenly sent [the] electronic logbook entry as 'high engine oil pressure' by accident. It should have stated 'high engine oil temperature.' I sent another logbook entry in to correct this mistake. The Captain informed me he had only been on the airplane for about 5 months; and it was our first leg together. He did a great job managing the situation very calmly and in a very organized fashion. B777 flight crew reported 'High Oil Temperature No. 1' EICAS annunciation during initial climb.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

We were cleared for the BARDI 1C Arrival to LEMD. We followed the charted altitude assignments; but continued on the lateral path of the arrival past BUREX Intersection. Unlike other arrivals--such as at EGLL--the clearance limit is clearly printed on the chart. We did not catch the fine print by the intersection indicating it was the clearance limit. We were given vectors back around to eventually fly the 33L approach. On arrival to LEMD via the BARDI 1C STAR; an air carrier flight crew failed to comply with the 'Clearance Limit' notation at BUREX and its associated warning advising flights to '...not leave the clearance limit without ATC clearance.' The reporter cited the 'fine print' utilized to advise of the limit as a contributing factor.
Aircraft: AEROBATIC
Phase of flight: Landing
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

I was ferrying an MXS for repairs. I had made two fuel stops and was on my final leg cruising at 8;500 FT MSL when the engine failed catastrophically. I had enough altitude to glide over [a suitable airport]. I was busy shutting the engine down and turning off switches when I entered an overhead pattern and began spiraling down. I did not have time to look up a frequency and I had shut off the avionics at that point anyway. So I visually cleared the area as best I could. Saw no conflicts and selected a runway into the wind. I landed on a runway which had barriers on the surface. I dodged those and rolled to a stop just past the intersection of the primary runway. I did not contact Tower due to my emergency status. I did not land on the primary runway as I was guessing that any jet traffic would prefer that one. I contacted the Tower via telephone and they did not request any other information. MXS pilot experiences a catastrophic engine failure at 8;500 FT and is able to glide to a suitable airport and land on a closed runway. There was insufficient time to contact the Tower via radio prior to landing.
Aircraft: LIGHT TRANSPORT; LOW WING; 2 TURBOJET ENG
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Aircraft X was level at 12000 feet direct TOXEE waypoint. An unknown aircraft less than 6 miles in front of and slower than Aircraft X was also direct TOXEE issued a descent to 13000 feet. I observed unknown aircraft descend below 13000 feet and alerted the Radar Controller. Conflict alert went off and the Radar Controller attempted to expedite the unknown aircraft to 11000 feet. I observed a closest proximity of 4.9 miles. Very complex traffic with bad weather. Due to heavy traffic volume and bad weather the traffic began to overwhelm the Radar Controller's and my ability to give control instructions due to frequency congestion both air to air and air to ground.This happens every year. KSUN is a popular destination. The airport and airspace is dangerous during these times. It is a matter of time; not chance; that aircraft collide with either terrain or each other. KSUN should set a maximum operations a day and hour limitation. During times where approaches are conducted arrivals should be spaced a minimum of 10 minutes apart or in VMC 5 minutes. To prevent collision of opposite direction aircraft; arrivals should only be allowed during the first half of the hour; departures the second half. This may seem like overkill but this is not a suggestion it is a must. Lives are at risk and it is not taken seriously by anyone other than the controllers. A Center Controller reported an unknown aircraft descended into the sector with less than the required 5 miles lateral separation.
Aircraft: SMALL AIRCRAFT
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Unauthorized Flight Operations (UAS)

Aircraft and Drone in-flight near miss. Drone appeared off my left wing moving behind aircraft heading south east Drone heading north west Pilot reported a near miss with a UAS.
Phase of flight: unknown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation

Found large puddles of Glycol with runoff on [two] gates. Estimated 20+ on ground for each gate. This; in addition to the environmental hazard; creates slippery conditions on the gate for ground crews. If the frost was heavy enough to require this amount of fluid to remove; it should have been done at the De-ice Pads. If this was a training issue; then it should be followed up on. Ground Agent reported large amounts of Glycol [Hazmat class 6 Toxic liquid] in gate/ramp area.
Aircraft: B777
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

During the normal flight control check procedures after engine start for an MRO (Maintenance Repair Overhaul) FCF (Functional Check Flight) refly; the rudder pedals did not move and were locked in the neutral position. The First Officer also attempted to cycle the rudder pedals with the same locked in neutral results. We contacted the ground crew via radio to ensure the nose gear steering bypass pin was removed and steering bypass lever in normal steering position. The ground crew confirmed the nose gear steering bypass pin was removed and lever in the normal steering position. We performed an after landing checklist; performed shutdown and shutdown checklist. A maintenance representative opened the forward E&E door to inspect the flight control assembly area under the flight deck and found a rudder lockout/rig pin still installed then subsequently removed. I elected to have the aircraft towed back to the hangar to address how the rudder pedal rig pin was not removed after maintenance repair and needed confidence prior to future ops.Established maintenance procedures were not followed. [Suggest] ZZZ MRO Rig Pin Kit to better inventory parts. B777 Captain reported rudder pedals were locked in position and would not move. Captain requested Maintenance inspect rudder pedal linkage and a rig pin was discovered still installed in the forward electronics and equipment bay.
Aircraft: CARDINAL 177/177RG
Phase of flight: Landing
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Requested landing runway with least crosswind angle. During landing; just after touchdown; encountered 70 degree crosswind gust. Aircraft yawed to left; I applied strong nose down pitch and maintained full right rudder. Aircraft tail and left wing lifted; left main wheel lifted off runway; nose wheel fairing scraped for approximately 50 feet on runway surface. After a few seconds; regained directional control and aircraft settled flat on runway. Inspected aircraft. No damage other than scrape on nose fairing. Attempted to obtain ATIS runway report before departing; but could not find phone number. Runway condition seemed less than reported 3 condition. I should have been more mentally prepared to handle cross wind gust; including immediate go around decision. C177 pilot reported a loss of control during landing after encountering a significant crosswind.