Aryan95614/aerograph-asrs huggingface dataset:
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Shortly after reaching cruise the # 1 engine hydraulic pump low pressure light illuminated; QRH (Quick Reference Guide) directs to turn off pump. It was a previous write up and pump was replaced a few days ago. A short time later the #1 engine Oil filter bypass light illuminated. After looking at QRH I decided to make the FO (First Officer) the flying pilot and take control of checklist which leads to an engine shutdown. We [requested priority handling] and descended to 260 in a drift down. ZZZZ looked to be the closest suitable airport and messaged dispatch with our condition and intentions and they agreed. Set course for ZZZZ and briefed the FA (Flight Attendant) with [acronym]. Discussed situation with passengers and then continued with preparing for arrival. I.E. Nonnormal landing config; one engine inop approach and landing; briefed the approach and discussed the threats. FO did a great job and parked at a hard stand. Very impressive how the Dispatch runs this place. B737 Captain reported engine hydraulic and oil warning lights resulted in engine shutdown. Prior to this flight; maintenance had signed off repair of this previous write up.
Aircraft: CRJ200
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Excursion Taxiway

It was a normal flight with delays and thunderstorms going into DTW. During descent; vectors onto final we received an intermittent caution of Integrated Drive Generator (IDG) 1. I started the APU in anticipation of single generator operations and checked the status of the generator via the electrical page and the overhead panel. The left IDG on the electrical page would flash yellow and green with a caution associated. We decided it would be best to resolve the issue on the ground. During the approach and landing the IDG 1 caution message continued to go off. On rollout we taxied the aircraft towards the first available high speed exit A4 which was NOTAMed closed at the time of arrival. ATC told us after we were heading towards A4 to turn off on A5. I said 'We are turning off A4.' ATC replied 'Do you see the barricades?' I replied 'Yes sir; we do. We can turn around and taxi to A5.' Tower at this time called the proceeding traffic to go around. ATC then said 'Aircraft X; re-enter RWY 4L and taxi via A5 Alpha; and await further instructions.' We taxied on the runway and off A5 and on Alpha. Tower then transferred us to ground and we continued our taxi to the gate with IDG 1 caution still periodically chiming. We shut down engine 1 and proceeded to gate with no further issues. There was no contact with any barriers nor was there any damage of any sort to the aircraft or airport property. The cause of the event was inadequate briefing on current NOTAMs to highlight runway taxiway closures. This was due to delays and thunderstorm avoidance which diverted attention from a more complete brief. During final descent we had an IDG 1 caution chime and we decided to resolve the issue after we had landed. During approach and landing the chime did cause a distraction. This distraction diverted our attention and caused us not to notice that A4 was barricaded closed during a high-speed exit. Pilot's complacency and inattention to detail caused the main issue which was missing the A4 closure via NOTAMs. When giving and receiving briefings; make sure to verify all available NOTAMs. We were both familiar with DTW layout and operations however both pilots had not been to DTW in some time. CRJ-200 pilot reported an inadequate briefing resulted in a taxiway excursion.
Aircraft: A321
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

I was the D FA (Flight Attendant) working and this was my first time working on a retrofit A321. I have noticed that a difference with the retrofit is that XA and XF seats sit so far back they partially block the L2 and R2 emergency door. When I went to arm and disarm the doors I had to reach over the passenger's heads and shoulders to put the safety pin in the pouch because they were blocking the pouch. The emergency handle on the wall for is blocked by the passenger row and the EVAC/RESET buttons are blocked by [the] passenger's head in XF.The seats are also allowed to recline and they even further block the exit door which is a huge safety hazard. How is it that on the 737 the row before an exit window the seats cannot recline but on the A321 they can? I am curious how both the Company and the FAA thought that safety wise this was ok to do when retrofitting the aircraft? This is a HUGE SAFETY issue if there was an emergency and should be looked at to be fixed. My recommendation is to move row X a few inches closer so that it isn't blocking the L2/R2 emergency exit doors. A321 Flight Attendant reported that specific seats recline and block the emergency exits at L2 and R2.
Aircraft: B757
Phase of flight: Initial Climb
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Aircraft dispatched with deferred LEFT ENGINE PRIMARY CONTROL status message displayed. Takeoff roll [was] normal. At approximately 600 AGL the left engine experienced a compressor stall and slight surging; followed by idle power setting as indicated on the left EPR and N1 indicators. Tower initiated hand-off to Departure. I declared an emergency with an engine failure and decided to return to the departure airport. As I began to discuss the engine failure procedure with the Captain; the left engine was beginning to develop thrust and EPR/N1 was increasing. Engine was idle power for approximately 10 seconds. Reported to Departure that engine was once again operating; and reaffirmed our emergency status and return to land. I took control as pilot flying while Captain did pilot not flying duties and executed the compressor stall/surge checklist and communicated with company.ATC provided priority and vectors for an ILS. We coordinated with [airport] operations on VHF for a return and had them notify Maintenance and Dispatch of our situation. Approach and landing were normal. Emergency trucks were standing by on arrival. During climb from [the airport] leaving approximately 800 FT AGL we experience a compressor stall and subsequent loss of thrust on the left engine. After getting the aircraft stabilized I gave the aircraft to the copilot while I ran the engine surge/stall checklist. Although we had both engine primary and secondary control EICAS status messages the engine continued to run within parameters and was controllable. We therefore elected to leave it running for an overweight landing back into [the airport]. During initial climb; the B757's left engine lost power; an emergency was declared and flight returned to the airport.
Aircraft: A321
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

Sat on taxiway with no movement. [9 minutes after doors closed] fumes entered Aft Galley where myself (#6) and #2 were seated. Passengers in last row commented on fumes. Flight Attendant #1 made public address 'fumes are due to engine restart and will dissipate once we're moving.'Fortunately; I carry a mask for these occasions; however; #2 did not have a mask and was suffering. And even though I do have a mask; I was still exposed as this mask doesn't necessarily filter jet engine exhaust; nor does it cover the eyes. #6 left jump seat because he could no longer bear the fumes. Meanwhile; #1 called me to ask if I wanted to return to gate. Yes; I wanted to; however; I wanted it to be a joint decision with the #6 but he was standing in the aisle. I yelled for him to return to Galley. He indicated he didn't want to return to gate. In my opinion; he was toughing it out and didn't want to appear weak; etc. He later admitted this was the incorrect decision. I had no time to talk sense into him because at that point takeoff was imminent. He required oxygen in flight.Knowing that this is a known potential issue on Airbus; pilots should have informed us of the situation so we would have had time to protect ourselves; or some other action should have been taken by pilots to protect us. Instead; we sat with the fumes for 30 minutes. Pilots never said a word to us or asked how we were. This is an extremely serious issue with potential long-term health impact and was preventable; in my opinion. A321 Flight Attendant reported after engine start; fumes entered the cabin aft galley area.
Aircraft: C172
Phase of flight: Landing
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway

I was landing at TTN. I had a nice smooth touchdown on Runway 24. On the ground roll when I was trying to exit the runway; a sudden gust of wind hit me. I lost control for a second and went off the side of the runway and into the grass. I was able to get off the grass and back onto the runway and taxi back to the ramp as directed by ATC. C172 pilot reported a loss of control on landing that resulted in a runway excursion.
Aircraft: CESSNA 402/402C/B379 BUSINESSLINER/UTILINER
Phase of flight: Landing
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Landed without a locked nose gear. Heading into ZZZ; I did the before landing flow and put the gear handle down. The gear lights only indicated 2 green mains and the red unlocked light with no nose gear indication. Seconds after the lights illuminated for both the Left and Right Hydraulic Flow. I informed Tower I needed to break off my approach for a gear indication issue and troubleshoot. They gave me a heading and altitude then sent me to approach. Approach gave me vectors while I troubleshot. I performed the landing gear will not extend hydraulically checklist. Part of the checklist is to pull the emergency gear extension handle; I did so briskly and without twisting the handle. The indications did not change and I did not hear or feel a thump. I then pulled even harder on the emergency gear handle and braced myself by putting my feet on the floor then tried again and still no response. I finished the checklist then read through the next checklist to land with defective gear. I called approach and said my checklist was unsuccessful. I asked to return to ZZZ and told them there was no indication for the nose gear; and [advised ATC]. They brought me around for [Runway] XX; I ran through the checklist multiple times to ensure I had the procedure down; then left the book open. I landed softly and held the nose off for as long as possible. Performed the ground evacuation checklist then shut everything off and got out. Pilot reported landing with the nose landing gear not locked and hydraulic flow indicators illuminated.
Aircraft: LARGE TRANSPORT; LOW WING; 2 TURBOJET ENG
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

The Wooly sector of the Chesapeake (CHP) area of PCT handed off a number of TERPZ departures to the Fluky sector. Aircraft X was leading/ahead of Aircraft Y on the TERPZ departure. Initial separation when Fluky accepted the hand off was about 8 miles with Aircraft Y about 10 kts faster. When Aircraft Y got to 170 MSL; still in WOOLY's airspace; the overtake of Aircraft Y on Aircraft X was around 80 kts with minimal separation longitudinally. I instructed my trainee to turn Aircraft X westbound and increase to maximum forward speed and to then turn Aircraft Y southbound on a 210 heading. I'm not sure if separation was lost. I am sure after confronting the WOOLY controller in the breakroom about the overtake situation; he said he was not at fault; that the aircraft were 'separated when I shipped them' and that he no longer had any responsibility for the above mentioned aircraft. He was adamant that he did nothing wrong; and was rather smug in response to my questioning his action or inaction.I'm close to retiring and I'll admit it's been a while since I've sat down and read the .65; but I'm pretty sure a transferring controller is required to resolve all and any conflicts before an aircraft leaves his or her airspace. If this requirement has changed and no longer in effect please disregard this report. However; in my opinion; this action by the controller borders on negligence. My recommendation is that the controller and others like him; understand that all conflicts between aircraft need to be resolved before they leave your sector. Coordinate; amend an altitude; give a speed or a vector; anything to make sure we have separation. To smugly say you did your job and that you; in effect; are not concerned about a potential conflict; is not the FAA I grew up in. He might as well told me to 'go eat s#@%; it's your problem'. That's pretty much what I deciphered from his comment. PCT Controller reported of a loss of separation resulting from a speed overtake. Controller was also training at the time and attempted to have the Developmental fix the situation. Reporter then confronted the transferring Controller who said it was not his fault and that the aircraft were separated when he shipped them.
Aircraft: B777
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

I was Flight Attendant (FA) #11 in the business class cabin picking up the meal trays and preparing for the dessert service. There was sudden onset of feeling lightheaded; dizzy; disoriented and a headache. FA #7 and #4 asked if I was feeling the same sensations as [they were] in the business class galley. I responded yes. At that time the Purser came back and said she and the first class galley were also feeling the same way. The Purser called the Captain to report what was going on. The #6 business class FA was also feeling ill. I managed to complete the dessert service having great difficulty due to my disorientation and being lightheaded. The Purser came back to start the 1st round of crew breaks. The Captain was still working on the issue. I went on first break feeling worse; but thinking if I could just lay down I would be okay. Right after I went into the bunk area FA #6 passed out. A doctor was paged and responded. The Captain decided that we were turning around back to [departure airport]. He told the purser to get all of the FA's out of the bunks onto the main deck to be checked out by the Doctor.I could barely walk at this point and the Doctor put me on oxygen and I laid down in an empty row.We landed back at [our departure] 2 hours later. The Captain had diversion locations picked out along the way if things got worse. There were 4 passengers who were also feeling ill. The Doctor who had assisted during the flight was feeling ill. The flight was met by a bio-hazard team and all passengers and crew were kept on the aircraft. After completing their inspection the paramedics came on to access the passengers and crew that were feeling ill. There were 8 flight attendants out of 13 feeling ill. We were released to go to the layover hotel; but told by the paramedics if we started to feel worse to go to the hospital. My observation was this: How quickly I went from feeling fine to ill. There was a definitive difference and it was quick. There were no fumes nor odor. The Captain took the aircraft up the next day with company mechanics to check the aircraft. Everything checked out fine. My feeling is it is impossible to replicate the exact event because of cargo; cruise altitude; cabin crew being active; catering on board; etc. B777 Flight Attendant reported the aircraft turned back to departure airport after several flight attendants and passengers experienced symptoms consistent with air contamination. No odor or fumes were noticed; and no cause found.
Aircraft: LEARJET 60
Phase of flight: Initial Climb
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Shortly after departing ZZZ the right engine shut down. We [requested priority handling] and were given radar vectors. We complied with appropriate factory checklists and restarted the engine. We requested a precautionary landing at ZZZ1 after burning off excess fuel. Lear 60 Captain reported an engine failure shortly after takeoff that resulted in a diversion.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Speed All Types

On ZPLYN RNAV STAR cleared direct to QUAIL and already in the descent to cross QUAIL at ZPLYN altitudes (FL220-FL200). We were then cleared the BOSSS arrival and to descend via the BOSSS (QUAIL between FL190-17000). The FMC will not change the old altitudes to the new BOSSS altitudes while proceeding direct to QUAIL. We spent too much time heads down trying to get the new ones into the box. It will not happen! The only way to get the new altitudes in is to go into heading select mode; go direct to a waypoint behind you and activate it; then move QUAIL back to the active waypoint and activate it; then back into LNAV. HUGE THREAT! Since we were [now] higher than we needed to be ATC also wanted us to slow down. WE CANNOT SLOW DOWN AND STILL DESCEND; ATC NEEDS TO KNOW THIS. We did not violate any crossing restrictions but were too high and fast to fit in so we were vectored for a downwind leg and resequenced into the approach flow. All could have been avoided if there were no conflicting altitudes on the arrival procedures; if the FMC would program itself correctly; if ATC would give a more [reasonable] clearance change; if all of the [new] DEN arrivals and transitions were thrown out and the old were used again; if ATC would just let you fly the entire procedure without vectors off course. Another HUGE threat is having higher altitudes on the transitions than those on the STAR! Who came up with that one? With higher altitudes on the transition than the STAR the FMC will not let you go into an active mode. HUGE THREAT and too much time spent heads down reprogramming. A B737 captain expressed general umbrage toward the recently initiated 'OPD' RNAV STARs to DEN. In the specific incident referenced they had been cleared direct to cross QUAIL as charted (Between FL220 and FL200) on the ZPLYN RNAV STAR; thence to descend via the STAR. Subsequently they were recleared via the BOSSS RNAV STAR via direct to QUAIL and to cross as charted; between FL190 & 17;000; but were unable.
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Phase of flight: Landing
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I took a call from Aircraft X telling me that 'No.1 TR failed to open on landing '; which I had the Captain document in the log book. I then called ZZZ MX to alert them of this issue along with the fact that the No. TR was MEL'd and RIC was the ZZZ1 base it was at prior to this first flight of the day and to make certain the MEL deactivation was correctly performed. A call came in from ZZZ informing me that the wrong ICU was inhibited. They remedied the issue and the aircraft was returned to service. This was also an issue one day before; I was not working then; and the same discovery was made and remedied. I am guessing the closeness of the ICU 1 and ICU 2 is confusing to some. Follow Manual procedures and take close look at work after doing it while comparing it to manual pics. Maintenance Technician found incorrect maintenance accomplished on aircraft thrust reverser.
Aircraft: A319
Phase of flight: Final Approach
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown

Cleared for a visual approach to Runway 1R in LAS. We installed the RNAV (GPS) RWY 1R approach into the FMGC as a backup. Weather was clear and visibility unlimited in day VMC conditions. While on a right base approximately .5 miles east of the FAF; GALNE; descending through approximately 4;100 feet at a rate of descent of about 800-1000 fpm; we received a GPWS 'Terrain; Terrain; Pull Up; Pull Up' warning. Although in day visual conditions with obstacles clearly in sight; I increased thrust and transitioned to a shallow climb. The GPWS warning immediately ceased. I was still in a position to make a stabilized approach so I returned to the profile and completed the approach without further incident. A319 First Officer experiences a GPWS terrain warning during a day visual approach to Runway 1R at LAS. Although the aircraft appears to be clear of terrain; power is added and the warning immediately stops. A normal landing ensues.
Aircraft: B777
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Number 1 Flight Attendant called and stated that there were smoke and fumes in the mid to forward cabin. She stated that the fumes smelled like burning plastic and the fumes/smoke were increasing. She turned off the Power Ports and IFE switches. We declared an emergency with Center and started a level left turn toward ZZZ. We accomplished the Smoke; Fumes; Fire Checklist. The fumes and smoke immediately dissipated with the accomplishment of this checklist. Reconfirmed with a Flight Attendant Instructor and two pilots aboard via intercom that the problem was solved. Per the checklist and having stopped the source of fumes and smoke; we cancelled the Emergency and continued to destination. After reading the maintenance follow-up; it appears to have been the Upper Recirc fan. B777 Captain is informed of smoke and fumes in the cabin by the Lead Flight Attendant and declares an emergency with ATC. The Smoke and Fumes Checklist is accomplished eliminating the problem and the flight continues to destination. The upper recirculation fan is thought to have been the source of the smoke.
Aircraft: C172
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

During a training flight with a student we experienced an electrical failure/fault with our ammeter indicating a discharge. My student and I flew to another airport 50 NM away from our home airport for a night flight to satisfy PPL (Private Pilot) training requirements. We preflighted the aircraft and all systems were operational. Our runup was uneventful with normal indications and the ammeter showed an appropriate charge indication. We completed two full stop taxi-back landings at the other airport and departed back towards our home airport. About 25 minutes from our destination we heard an odd feedback in the headset and noticed the ammeter was ticking and indicating a discharge. We attempted to cycle the master switch/alternator switch but that did not remedy the situation. We heard the radio start to sound garbled as well. I elected to discontinue the training flight and head back to our home airport where the airplane could be serviced. However; due to the discharging battery; I turned off all electrical equipment in the aircraft including navigation lights and ADS-B out to conserve power so that we could put the landing light and navigation lights on during our approach and landing. This resulted in us not having ADS-B out or navigation lights on in airspace in which they are normally required. I felt it necessary to deviate from the regulations in order to safely get the aircraft back into our home airport where repairs could be made. I also avoided known busy airspace so as to deconflict from any other traffic in the area. We landed uneventfully and the plane was squawked so that it can be inspected. Flight Instructor reported returning to home airport with NAV lights and ADS-B off after an alternator failure.