Aryan95614/aerograph-asrs huggingface dataset:
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Final Approach
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC

We were cleared LEMIG 1 arrival; after ELKAY fix we were assigned heading 330 as vector to rwy 12R; we were instructed to maintain 6;000 ft; by about 9 miles away from ISAT LOC; ATC told us to descend to 3;000ft; turn right heading approximately direct ALAMO fix (don't remember exact heading) and to look for traffic at 12 o'clock; that [we were] number 1 for approach to 12R; we answered that we were looking for traffic and started turning and descending to 3;000 as instructed. 30 seconds later ATC told us that traffic was now at 2 o'clock; this time we saw it and told ATC. Then we were cleared to visual approach 12R and instructed to maintain visual separation with traffic. And so we did. By then; the traffic ahead was approximately 4 miles from us so FO decided to reduce speed by configuring aircraft for landing; and maintaining present heading a while longer in order to follow traffic with safe separation. I realized that we were now at a good point to turn to final and told FO to start turning right; When we were turning final; intercepting localizer; at about 2;800 ft and 7 miles final a TA advisory was heard; so I started looking for traffic; it appeared in my EHSI a traffic at left but I couldn't get a visual of the aircraft; while this; our aircraft was in a continuous right turn to intercept final and descending to intercept glide path; just about 6 seconds after the first TA; a RA started instructing us to CLIMB and in our EADIs a pitch of almost 20 degrees nose up was required; FO correctly leveled wings; applied pitch up and maximum thrust; the aircraft climbed slowly so we decided to rise the gear and set flaps to 15. After the RA escape maneuver; 'Clear of conflict!' was heard and advised ATC about the situation; then they gave us left vectors to re-intercept final approach. When all was under normal conditions and control; I requested ATC to inform us about the traffic that got in conflict with us; and only told us that was a visual traffic that had us in sight. At the moment of climb I think I saw about 100ft of vertical separation with traffic! So it really was a close call. At no moment during the approach were we informed about this third traffic; if he was supposed to maintain visual separation with us; he clearly didn't do it. ATC had cleared us to a visual approach; so we were responsible [for] altitude and traffic separation with the traffic ahead; but this other small VFR traffic was never in our situational awareness; nor in our EHSI but until very late to avoid. And why was this traffic flying at that altitude at that point of the final approach path of the runway; without any ATC warning to us? B737 Captain reported an NMAC with another aircraft on approach to SAT that was not pointed out by ATC.
Aircraft: B777
Phase of flight: Takeoff / Launch; Taxi
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Taxi instructions were to back taxi XXR; 180 for takeoff. The taxi chart did not appear to have a turnaround at the end. I did a 180 on the runway and took off. I got the RAAS (Runway Awareness and Advisory System) alert for short runway somewhere near 80 knots. It was a Max Power takeoff. The aircraft was accelerating rapidly; I elected to continue and made a normal takeoff. After climb out I had an uncomfortable feeling about the whole chain of events - short runway; 180 on the runway; and the RAAS alert. As a crew we discussed and took a close look at everything. We noticed on the iPad taxi chart selected to moving map; on the widest scale a turnaround area was depicted. This would have solved the issue. Then we noticed the minimum width for the runway 180 is 157.4 feet. [This runway was only] 148 feet. I also came to the conclusion that while making the 180 I used up runway length.Did not recognize the red flags. Short runway with a back taxi 180 for takeoff. A poor taxi chart depicting the turnaround. When the taxi instructions were issued there were clearly two red flags; short runway back taxi and 180 to take off. At this point I should have reviewed the 180 procedure since it is not a normal operation. That would have clued me that the runway was not wide enough and lead to inquire ATC. A Boeing 777-200 Captain reported receiving a RAAS (Runway Awareness and Advisory System) alert for short runway takeoff.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Final Approach
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Landing Without Clearance

While approaching DEN on the KOHOE3 RNAV arrival; the ATIS reported ILS; RNAV or visual approaches in use. We setup and briefed the ILS 35R approach. After checking in with the second Approach Controller; we were issued the RNAV (RNP) RWY 35R. This assignment required a lot more cockpit workload; not to mention; this was the first leg of IOE for my First Officer. After loading the RNAV approach; I brought up the DOGGG waypoint on approach and executed. The legs page and the map magenta line looked correct. After the MSIMS waypoint; the route did not sequence to FRONZ; the aircraft continued downwind. Controller called us off course and issued vectors for visual approach.I really don't know what the setup error was as the magenta line showed radius leg to FRONZ. The DOGGG waypoint may have become the active waypoint and I did not catch it. This is the only reason I can think of. The late assignment to the RNAV approach caused high cockpit workload and I may have missed improper leg page sequencing. ATIS provided three approaches and we selected the one which we thought would most likely to be used. DOGGG waypoint is on the KOHOE3 arrival and the routing on the bottom right of the STAR shows 'then as depicted to BARRK' which is what I believe the jet was trying to do even though on the MAP depiction showed otherwise. DOGGG is also the IF for the RNAV Z 35R. B737NG flight crew reported ATC issued a new clearance when they deviated from the RNAV Z 35R approach to DEN.
Aircraft: SMALL AIRCRAFT; LOW WING; 1 ENG; FIXED GEAR
Phase of flight: Takeoff / Launch
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Preparing to depart from Runway 01; I had checked the AWOS and had reset my local airport UNICOM frequency and had monitored the frequency taxiing to the departure runway. After run-up; I announced my intentions to depart [Runway] 01. At about 400 FT AGL and 3/4 way down the runway; I noted that there was a plane that had begun its takeoff run for Runway 19. I called the aircraft on the advisory frequency with out response and switched to Approach Control. It was at this time that I noticed that the frequency that I had selected was XXX.025 rather than XXX.05. I will NEVER make that mistake again! A pilot taxied and departed Runway 1 using proper CTAF communications procedures but on the incorrect frequency and had a near miss with an aircraft landing on Runway 19.
Aircraft: WIDEBODY; LOW WING; 2 TURBOJET ENG
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

After takeoff we received clearance above the initial altitude of 6000 feet. The Captain was the PNF and was handling ATC transmissions. The Captain understood the altitude clearance to be FL270. I heard the Captain read back the clearance to ATC of FL270 with no correction by ATC. It was the controller's intent to clear the flight to 7000. At 6400 the controller stated that we should level off at 7000 and turn immediately to a heading of 270 degrees. The flying FO leveled the aircraft at 7000 (did not bust the altitude) and turned to a heading of 270 degrees. After the turn was complete the controller asked why the mode control panel altitude was set at FL270. The captain responded that he understood the clearance to be to FL270 and that he had read that back with no correction by the controller. The controller said they would review the tapes. Once again; the aircraft did not climb above the ATC intended altitude of 7000. [Report narrative contained no additional information.] Flight crew on departure read back the incorrect altitude clearance. The incorrect readback was not caught by the Controller.
Aircraft: MEDIUM TRANSPORT; LOW WING; 2 TURBOJET ENG
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

We were on right downwind for RWY22R at 1900 MSL on the first of two almost identical flights. As we approached the base turn; I noted an amber R ALT flag in the PFD and the EICAS indicated a cyan 'FGC - A/T Rad Alt Invalid' CAS message. Our GPS track indicates the event occurred approximately above Laramie & 31st St. None of the three of us knew exactly the corrective action from memory; but it was apparent that the autothrottles were affected by a radar altimeter issue. The tower frequency was busy; working us between numerous arrivals and departures. We were coordinating inside the cockpit since I could not see the airport from my position on the left side of the aircraft. Between the long traffic pattern checklist; increased coordination in the cockpit; lots of radio traffic; configuring the airplane; discussing the implications of the CAS message; and tracking numerous targets outside; we were quite busy so we didn't have the opportunity to compare radar altimeter indications. We had briefed the possibility of radar altitude issues stemming from the rollout of 5G services; and we elected to disconnect the autothrottles and continue the approach to a normal landing.While we were aware of the possibility of radar altimetry issues due to the NOTAM at MDW and all of the industry publications as of late; we didn't really expect to have any issues with our operation. With a combined years of [aircraft type] operation between the three of us; we have found the radar altimeters to be supremely reliable; and none of us had seen that CAS message ever displayed prior to this occurrence. We discussed the 5G NOTAM during our preflight brief; but we had assumed (incorrectly) that it would only affect the listed operations. It was certainly a very unwelcome distraction during an especially high workload critical phase of flight. [Report narrative contained no additional information.] Pilots on a training flight reported a malfunction of the radio altimeters and autothrottles while on approach to MDW. The crew suspected the anomaly was 5G related.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Takeoff / Launch
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Normal preflight start and taxi. No noted issues with the aircraft prior to takeoff. I was accomplishing the takeoff as the F/O. We were cleared for takeoff. Takeoff was normal until after the gear was up and we noticed a steady loud noise. Shortly after; we noticed a Master Caution light. The aircraft was not pressurizing and a Forward Cargo door light was illuminated. The Captain coordinated with Tower to return to the field. I continued to fly the aircraft for the approach and landing. No other issues were noted. B737-300 First Officer experiences a loud steady noise shortly after takeoff and a Master Caution for Forward Cargo Door light and the aircraft will not pressurize.
Aircraft: LARGE TRANSPORT
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Aircraft X was issued taxi clearance to RWY 28R via taxiways K; V; and A. Read back was accurate. While taxiing the aircraft turned on A5 and joined A. V is the next taxiway after A5 if taxiing eastbound for RWY 28R. TWY V is preferred by ATC since A5 leads directly onto RWY 28R and V does not. Also aircraft often exit RWY 28R on A5 (high speed exit) so an aircraft mistakenly using A5 it is at risk of an opposite direction issue with aircraft exiting RWY 28R. This specific mistake has been observed numerous times by many different air carriers. Possible reason for why it happened are confusing signs and markings on the taxiway. Take a look at the taxiway signs and markings to see if they can be improved. Reporter describes confusing taxiway markings that may lead to a runway incursion.
Aircraft: LEARJET 31
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

I was given taxi instruction; which I read back. It included a 'Hold short of Runway XX.' Which I read back. In the middle of shutting things down in the cockpit I missed the hold short line and stopped short of the runway. The aircraft in question was overhead already approximately 300 feet. No excuse; I just got busy and missed a hold short. I have well over 20;000 hours; most if it at night flying freight; which involved many multiple landings during night. This is the first time with such an occurrence; hopefully the last. At no time was the other aircraft in any danger from my inaction/action. LR-31 Captain reported that he taxied past the runway hold short line that resulted in the aircraft on final executing a go-around.
Aircraft: C172
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC

Tracking outbound 055 radial from the ELN VOR; at about 12 NM and at 7500 MSL; my student and I encountered traffic inbound on the same radial; same altitude. My student spotted the other aircraft (Red and White Cessna; possibly a 182 with retractable gear; was able to see the pilots face but unable to get the tail number); banked right and climbed instantly; missing the other aircraft by about 500 ft horizontal and 200 ft vertical. No radio calls from other aircraft on CTAF (123.0). We had made frequent radio calls departing the Ellensburg; WA valley stating we were at 7500 MSL outbound on the 055 radial (Victor 2 Airway) with distance reports along the way. Had my student not done what he had; we would likely have had a midair collision. When the other aircraft was spotted; we were at most a half mile away. No effort to avoid a collision was made by the other aircraft; and was unable to get in touch with them on the Ellensburg CTAF on 123.0. C172 instructor pilot reported a NMAC with another Cessna in the vicinity of ELN VOR.
Aircraft: GULFSTREAM V / G500 / G550
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Noise abatement climb out of SNA. Clearance (CPDLC) FINZZ1 departure MISEN KEPEC arrival to LAS. Climb via SID except maintain 5000 ft. Passing through 4000 ft SoCal issued climb to 8000 ft climb via the SID. I read back the clearance and set the altitude alerter to 8000. I looked down at the SID and saw the crossing restriction at STREL at or below 5000 ft. Called out to PF the STREL restriction as we are passing 6500 ft. PF stated that we were cleared to 8000 ft. SOCAL called with a heading change and frequency change and [asked] were we aware of the 5000 ft crossing restriction. I called back that we believed we were cleared to 8000 ft. Controller then restated the frequency change.I believe that there were two factors that applied here. First; the clearance to climb to 8000 ft before we reached the 5000 ft hold down as we were in a rapid climb for noise abatement. To be clearer; I think the call should have been 'After STREL climb to 8000 ft climb via the SID.' Second the crew should have been more familiar with the 5000 ft crossing restriction and made sure we are climbing in VNAV. Also we should have made sure as a crew what the clearance actually was.Interesting side bar: Today we did the same SID with the same restriction of 5000 ft. SoCal cleared us to 8000 ft at exactly the same spot. I asked the Controller if we were cleared to climb to 8000 ft or were we to climb via the SID. He came back with we were indeed cleared to climb to 8000 ft at this time. Sometimes these RNAV SIDS can be confusing when we are issued exceptions to what we see on the SID we are issued and then then Controller changes things in a high workload environment. Departing SNA on FINZZ1 departure. 5000 ft preselected in altitude window. This is the hold down at STREL. Prior to reaching STREL the Controller advised; cleared to 8000 ft. Climb via SID. The next fix at DOLLF has an 8000 foot restriction. Even by adding the phrase 'climb via the SID' we were both under the impression that the 5000 foot restriction was deleted. The other issue here is the quiet flying sensors all around the airport and everyone believes climbing up and out is preferred. This is a setup that needs serious attention. This was a no harm no foul day; no conflicting traffic. G550 flight crew reported they overshot the 5;000 restriction at STREL departing SNA citing confusion with the 'climb via' clearance.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Passing 4;500 feet I noticed the airspeed at 268 kts and that the speed was not set in managed speed; the flying pilot (Captain) reduced the speed to 250 kts and then set the speed to managed speed. This happened on climbout departing ZZZ on the ZZZZZ SID. The First Officer was the non-flying pilot. Cause: 35 hours in seat and the second flight in two months.Suggestions: Having more time in seat; before having an extended break from flying. Pilot reported exceeding 250 knots below 10;000 feet.
Aircraft: C172
Phase of flight: Initial Climb
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

A C172 was holding short for release. LAX gave the release but there was a jet on final that would have lost separation if and when he went around so I told the Flight Data Controller to let LAX know that I would depart the C172 after that aircraft landed. The Citation landed without any issues and I was briefed that no one had gone missed even though the weather was marginal. I put the C172 in position and told him about the twin Cessna on final that I previously slowed to make the situation work. I departed the C172 and switched him to Departure. The twin Cessna on final started to close the gap and separation was most likely lost when the twin Cessna declared that he was going missed. Their error was a misjudgment on my part. Having not seen the situation in some time and pressed against a release window; I forced the issue. I believe that the approach plate for this airport is a contributing factor to my error and others like it at SMO. It is published as a circling approach but the circle is never allowed. Pilots that are unfamiliar with that fact; tend to not fly the approach to minimums because they assume they can circle. This is the cause of a large number of missed approaches at this airport. SMO Controller described a loss of separation event during marginal weather when spacing judgement was flawed; the reporter noting the published approach chart could be a contributing factor.
Aircraft: B787
Phase of flight: Final Approach
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

We had a spoiler 5 fail. We were informed by Dispatch and [Technical Support Maintenance Control] that we would not be able to retract the flaps after extending them to a landing position; whether in flight or on the ground. We decided; as a crew; to land flaps 20. This was done in case we had to do a go around since we didn't want to be stuck at flaps 25/30 for a go around in case that became necessary. We [Requested Priority Handling] because of the spoiler fail and the resulting non-normal landing configuration (flap 20). Normal approach and landing. Fire/rescue did an inspection after landing. B787 First Officer reported an indication of a #5 spoiler failure which resulted in a partial flap approach and landing.
Aircraft: A319
Phase of flight: Final Approach
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown

The flight was cleared to fly the standard arrival into Mexico City (MMMX) to Runway 5R. The aircraft was flying with the autopilot and autothrottle engaged; fully configured at final approach speed; in LNAV with the ILS approach armed; turning inbound to final on the arrival and on profile. As the localizer and glideslope became active; the autopilot and autothrottle systems attempted to capture the localizer and glideslope. The autopilot went into an aggressive bank in its attempt to capture the localizer and glideslope while the autothrottle lagged in its power application causing the airplane to enter into Alpha Floor. The Captain intervened and disconnected the autopilot and autothrottle systems and exited Alpha Floor while continuing to fly a visual approach manually to an uneventful landing on Runway 5R. A319 Captain reports entering Alpha Floor during localizer capture for Runway 5R at MMMX; with the autopilot initiating an aggressive bank. Both autothrust and autopilot are turned off and the approach is completed manually.
Aircraft: WIDEBODY; LOW WING; 3 TURBOJET ENG
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC

Between HUNDA and LIMMA; we saw a drone go right over us while on ILS final. We told Tower. Landed uneventfully. [I] suggest a drone radar. Captain reported a NMAC with a drone on final to Runway 25L at LAX.