Aryan95614/aerograph-asrs huggingface dataset:
Aircraft: SMALL AIRCRAFT; LOW WING; 1 ENG; RETRACTABLE GEAR
Phase of flight: Landing
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC

I was returning to my home airport and was aware of a couple of light aircraft in the traffic pattern. As I approached on a 45 to Runway 30 one of the aircraft had made a touch and go and had turned to crosswind. Both of us were making proper position reports. From his radio calls I felt I would be ahead of him but stayed outside a normal traffic pattern to ensure good separation. I was at about 1100 feet when I spotted the other aircraft in front of me at about 1130 position and slightly above me. At the same time I received a warning from my TCAD. I maneuvered lower and to the right of the other aircraft to ensure separation; since my speed was greater than his. I passed about 100 feet below and 300 feet to the right of him and landed without incident or other conversation with the pilot; other than normal position reports.I was surprised that he was that wide on downwind and was actually in front of me. In retrospect I should have been even further away from the airport on downwind and at a higher altitude to avoid any possible conflict. Pilot reported a NMAC while entering the traffic pattern at a non-towered airport. Pilot maneuvered past the aircraft and landed.
Aircraft: CRJ200
Phase of flight: Final Approach
Anomaly: Deviation - Speed All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

On the Captain's leg we received a stick shaker on very short final due to a C-130 that executed a practice go-around. The Captain landed uneventfully. The threat was the C-130's wake. I believe the Captain decided to land due to the aircraft close proximity to the ground and the lengthy runway. At that exact moment I felt like my attention on the aircraft remaining in a state where it was able to make a safe landing was a correct one. I feel that second guessing the Captain's decision to land or taking the controls would have been more dangerous due to our proximity to the ground. CRJ-200 First Officer reported receiving a stick shaker on very short final from a preceding C130 wake vortex. Captain continued the approach to a normal landing.
Aircraft: MEDIUM TRANSPORT; LOW WING; 2 TURBOJET ENG
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

On arrival to APA. Moderate turbulence over the Front Range north of Denver. ATC vectored us east of downtown enroute to APA. Declared airport insight and cleared for visual approach. Had the RNAV GPS RWY 17L set in FMS for awareness and set 6800 ft in altitude alerter for mandatory altitude at LOWRE intersection. Position about 8 miles NW of APA. TCAS indicated two contacts; one along the extended centerline to 17L that appeared to be traveling north and another west of the airport in a right downwind for 17L. ATC recommended we turn to right base; which was outside LOWRE for aircraft to our east; traveling north; but we opted to continue on our angled course to join between LOWRE and CENTN (FAF) because the left turn to right base would have created conflict with that aircraft. The two other aircraft indicated +/- 100-200 feet vertically around our position. As we continued the aircraft to the east appeared to turn towards us while the one in the right downwind continued northbound; both closing our position. I turned off autopilot; turned southbound; and immediately descended below both aircraft about 200 feet as the SIC recommended we descend. TCAS gave us a TA but no RA. With both aircraft insight we then made the left turn to right base and conducted a stable approach visually to 17L.ATC and crew were aware of all aircraft and the situational picture but not the intentions of the other two aircraft other than they were in the pattern for 17L at KAPA. Thinking about and discussing our options afterward; we talked of how we could have just requested the actual IFR approach or having seen the aircraft on TCAS; asked tower if we could turn southbound to turn back for a 45 degree entry into the right downwind. Fractional Captain reported evading two aircraft while on approach to APA.
Aircraft: A320
Phase of flight: Final Approach
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Prior to FIL; we were told to fly heading 100; which was different than we expected for the Four Stacks Visual App 15 BUR. The 100 heading split Oat Mountain and San Gabriel Mountain; keeping our altitude higher than the recommended alt on approach (5000 feet abeam Oat). We were told to maintain 6000 feet until clear of traffic. We reported traffic in site and when clear we began a slow descent. However; as we descended we got a TCAS 'adjust descent;' call which we immediately complied with and slienced the warning. We did not expect our distance and rate to be a factor from the traffic in question. We had that aircraft in sight and continued our scan for other traffic as well as focus on the airport and ground track. While balancing the later two factors above; the TCAS alerted up to our proximity to the first aircraft; which while we adjusted our descent; that aircraft began a hard right turn. I can't be sure if that aircraft had adjusted his path into ours after we began our descent but if they had; that could have been the factor that triggered the TCAS to provide us with the RA which prevented an encroachment into an unsafe zone. After getting 'clear of conflict;' we continued scanning for other traffic as well as attempting to descend into BUR 15. Due to that first aircraft and another one descending into Whiteman airport; we were unable to descend and stabilize for the approach into 15. Prior to 1000 feet AGL; we went around and continued for vectors for Visual 8. Weather at time was VFR and we had the Four Stacks and airport in site 15-20 miles from the field as well as Whiteman. Winds at BUR were varying 130-180 at 8-10 knots which is why we chose RWY 15.Finally; our vectors for the approach were a combination of vectors for RNAV15 and Visual. The 100 heading was more in line with the RNAV15 approach which we had line selected and used to back up our SA. An A320 First Officer reported that multiple traffic targets in the vicinity of Whiteman (WHP) caused TCAS alerts and necessitated maneuvering that prevented the A320 from achieving a stabilized approach by 1;000 feet AGL on the Visual Approach to Runway 15 at BUR. A go-around was performed and the aircraft subsequently landed uneventfully at BUR on runway 08.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Takeoff / Launch
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

On the first takeoff attempt when we were cleared onto the runway; the Captain's PFD & ND failed along Yaw Damper; Pressurization panel; and L IRS. We told Tower we needed to clear the runway; called Dispatch; and returned to gate. Maintenance replaced L IRS however there were still issues. The Yaw Damper would not engage and the left stall warning would not test. The items were deferred and we attempt to complete the flight.On the second takeoff; airspeeds matched at 80 kts but soon after takeoff; Captain's airspeed indicator malfunctioned along with the Captain's altimeter. First Officer's and standby instruments agree and Captain's airspeed was indicating greater than 350 kts in the climb which also caused the overspeed warning to activate. We called company on Arinc because the ACARS had also failed and planned for an air return. We were also getting multiple other false warnings such as; but not limited to the PSEU; which is supposed to be inhibited in flight. Also received several false stall warnings. During our first approach attempt we received a wind shear report so we discontinued the approach; on the second attempt we landed without further incident.Aircraft X had a history of avionics problems. Captain's airspeed indications had been written up by a previous crew also. The cause of the problems wasn't identified before our flight and actually got worse.When an aircraft has multiple similar issues; ground it until the problems are positively identified and corrected; even if it takes days before it's released for flight. B737-800 flight crew reported multiple system malfunctions; resulting in a return to the departure airport.
Aircraft: MEDIUM LARGE TRANSPORT; LOW WING; 2 TURBOJET ENG
Phase of flight: Final Approach
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Aircraft X was cleared for an ILS approach via the SABAT transition. The transition altitude all the way to the localizer is 11;500 feet. The pilot descended to 9;500 feet. I checked the approach plate to see if there was a descending altitude on the transition that I missed; but I couldn't see one; so I queried the pilot about the procedure. He said I was correct; that the transition altitude remained at 11;500 feet. I gave the pilot a low altitude alert; then climbed him to the MIA [Minimum IFR Altitude] of 10;000 [feet] and vectored the aircraft onto the localizer. Salt Lake ARTCC Controller reported an aircraft descending below a transition altitude by 2;000 feet.
Aircraft: A319
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Upon arrival to gate at PBI. The Number 1 engine was running while we waited for the ground power to be connected. We got an ECAM that the forward cargo door was opened and then shortly after the rear cargo door was opened with a second ECAM. I feel this is a serious safety concern because there are personnel approaching the aircraft with an operating engine. The danger is both in front of the engine; i.e. the fan; and the rear of the engine with the exhaust. I believe that all personnel should remain clear of the aircraft until the engines are secured. Instruct all station personnel that they are not to approach the aircraft while an engine is running due to the danger both in front and back of the engine. Make this a company wide standard/policy. That they are not to go past the nose wheel aft while the engines are running. An A319 Captain reported he was concerned when ramp personnel began working around the aircraft after taxi in while an engine was still running.
Aircraft: AMATEUR/HOME BUILT/EXPERIMENTAL
Phase of flight: Landing
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Left main landing gear failed to extend due to obstruction between the tire and the wheel well. Back up system of manual pump down failed to extend gear and overcome obstruction. Experimental aircraft pilot reports failure of the left main landing gear to extend due to interference between the tire and the wheel well. The manual pump is unable to overcome the interference.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Object

A B737-800 aircraft was just lowered from jacks after all three landing gears were replaced. Mr. Y and I were assigned to service all three landing gear struts. All gears had a nitrogen pre-charge that had to be removed prior to service with fluid and a final nitrogen charge. I cleared the aircraft of obstacles and connected tooling to deflate the left Main Landing Gear (MLG). I told Mr. Y and other technicians that the aircraft would be lowered. An Inspector was on a ladder in the left main landing gear wheel well when I was connecting the tooling; but was not there when I started bleeding the left main landing gear. The Shift Manager walked up and started talking to us at this time. A crack was heard and we saw the ladder the Inspector left in the wheel well under the keel beam area. We raised the left main landing gear to remove the ladder and saw that a panel and an intercostal had been damaged.Increase communication with everyone working around the aircraft. Pay more attention to clearing aircraft for Operational (Ops) Checks; etc.; and [do] not be distracted by others. [I] will not assume everyone will remove ladders etc. from around aircraft. Asked Supervisor and Lead Technicians to hand out all work cards and documents related to job assigned at start of shift. Not all related work cards were given to us at beginning of the job assigned.Tools (ladder) were incorrectly used; not moved away from aircraft after completing a task. All applicable work documents were not handed out at the beginning of job assigned. Talking with Shift Manager while job was in progress [was a distraction.] Complacency. Workplace distractions; interruptions. Physical health. High noise levels. An Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) reports about damage to the keel beam area of a company B737-800 aircraft when a left Main Landing Gear (MLG) was deflated. Contributing factors were heat; noise; lack of communications; distraction when Shift Manager started talking with the crew and maintenance work being accomplished during the MLG deflation.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Final Approach; Landing
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Get vectors in terminal area for [SFO] ILS 28L; told we are following B747. Captain said to stay a dot high on glideslope (GS) to avoid wake. I; pilot flying; agreed. As we started intermediate descent from about 6;000 FT to 5;000 FT we encountered moderate turbulence with rolling tendencies. Without hesitation I disengaged autopilot (AP); as I correctly interpreted encountering the 747's wake. Told the Captain (pilot not flying) that I was going to hand fly. He said no problem. A final vector/heading we were told to intercept localizer for Runway 28L. I engaged the VOR/LOC to arm and capture localizer. After getting LOC CAP displayed on FMA and following FD commands we were then told cleared for ILS Approach. I then armed APCH to capture GS. Captain said; 'GS alive' followed by GS CAP. I followed FD commands with AP off; continuing to configure with gear and flaps; fully configured in the slot by 1;500 FT AFL. AT approximately 700 FT AFL on GS Captain said LOCS not armed and that I was in HDG SEL with a 3/4 - full scale deflection to the right; meaning I was left of course. I began to maneuver the aircraft back to the right to get back on the LOC immediately and at almost the same time we broke out of the clouds and I maneuvered the aircraft back onto the LOC for a safe and smooth landing. We do not know why the aircraft fell out of LOC CAP mode and defaulted to HDG SEL. We never lost GS CAP mode. I was fully configured and on speed with no excessive maneuvering. We talked about possible go around but broke out of the clouds almost immediately when all this took place. While a go around may have been the better option; I felt due to rising terrain to the left and right of the aircraft may have put us in an unsafe situation since we were off the LOC and we did break out by 500 FT AFL. We advised ATC after landing they said no one reported problems with localizer. We took same aircraft [out] and had no similar problems. B737-800 First Officer reported losing LOC capture on approach to SFO for unknown reasons.
Aircraft: A300
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL

Aircraft had MEL 36-11-03 HP Bleed Air Valves (#1) inop. During taxi out for takeoff; we got a single chime and the left ECAM displayed:AIR BLEED 1 HP VALVE STUCK OPEN (Amber)-AIR X FEED....................MAN-AIR X FEED....................IN LINE-BLEED VALVE 1.............OFFrThe Right ECAM displayed Bleed picture with the line from High Pressure (HP) to Intermediate Pressure (IP) from # 1 Engine Amber but inline; even though the HP switch was Off. The MEL calls for the HP bleed valve to be secured CLOSED. There is verbiage in the MEL that the associated PACK Valve may fault due to insufficient flow. We did not get a PACK fault at any time during this event. The MEL does not indicate that you may get an HP Bleed stuck open after being secured closed. I stopped the taxi in order to confer with maintenance about whether this was a normal indication. The Maintenance Center rep indicated that it could be normal so we concluded the call at which point I called the ZZZ Ramp and talked to Maintenance. The ZZZ station is the place the work took place so I spoke with the mechanic to make sure the HP valve was secured closed per the MEL. Maintenance stated that it was secured Closed so we then continued taxi and departed.Airbus Systems Manual 21-4-0-2 Item #8 indicates that a manually closed valve should be Amber cross-line on ECAM; not Amber in-line. Was the valve manually secured open instead of closed?[Recommendations]Would be helpful if the MEL had more amplifying remarks about ECAMS and other indications that may occur. It isn't clear that an ECAM stating that the HP valve is stuck open after being deferred closed is a possible indication you may get. Reporter stated with the High Stage valve for the #1 engine manually closed that the ECAM should show Cross-lines across the Flow lines indicating it was closed. It did not; the ECAM indicated the valve was open. Reporter stated the valve was verified manually closed and MEL was ambiguous as to what the ECAM indication should be.The Reporter felt that the MEL needs to be more precise as to what the indications should be in the cockpit when a high stage valve is manually closed. An A300 #1 Engine High Stage valve was manually closed Per the MEL but the indication on the ECAM showed the valve open which created confusion for the flight crew. The MEL was ambiguous as to what the flight deck indications should be.
Aircraft: A300
Phase of flight: Takeoff / Launch
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Performed RTO (rejected takeoff) in low speed regime; less than 20kt GS on Runway X due to aircraft controllability issues because of runway conditions. During deice ops I asked the Tower about the condition of the runway and when it was plowed last. ATC responded with a poor braking action report and plowed an hour and a half ago. I requested that the runway be plowed again prior to us taking off as it had been snowing continuously for hours. They agreed and we saw 3 plows start at the Runway X threshold and proceed down the runway. After deice ops we proceeded for departure on Runway X. Double checked APS (aircraft performance) and FOM prior to takeoff. Lined up with RWY X centerline; released brakes and gently advanced power towards 60%. Around 40 to 50% power the aircraft began to slide to the left. Immediately performed RTO procedure. Braking at this point was NIL. Reported RTO to ATC; exited runway and performed necessary checklists. The plows had done a very poor job of plowing the runway leaving portions of it unplowed. Notified ATC of the runway condition and braking action. Requested that the runway be replowed thoroughly before we would attempt a second takeoff. Due to the time involved with this and a couple of other departures ahead of us I elected to deice/anti-ice a second time due to possible holdover time issues. Runway replowed thoroughly and second takeoff uneventful. Cause: Weather conditions and less than adequate plowing of the runway. Suggestions: More diligent work performance of the plowing crew during deteriorating weather conditions. Pilots should not have to ask ATC for the runway to be plowed. A300 Captain reported executing an RTO after the aircraft began to slide sideways. Captain informed ATC the runway needed re-plowing.
Aircraft: MD-88
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

During climbout passing 15;000 FT MSL; the left engine stalled and was subsequently shutdown in accordance with our procedures. We returned to the departure airport for an uneventful landing. An emergency was declared due to single-engine operations. MD80 Captain experiences a compressor stall on the left engine during climb. The engine is shutdown and the flight returns to the departure airport.
Aircraft: CRJ700
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

We were cleared to intercept the localizer for 8R. The first officer said he was going to go to heading mode and then switch over to green needles for the intercept (but we were still many miles out) I stayed in white needles and intended on going green as soon as we were inbound as we were 20 mi out for the localizer intercept. When the first officer began to intercept; the autopilot took an excessively sharp turn; I realized something was not right. I had the first officer go back into heading mode; as I tried to figure out the sharp turn that the autopilot took. As I was trying to figure out why the autopilot was acting abnormal; the FO mentioned that maybe his inbound course was not correct. I quickly realized what the problem was (he must have flipped to green needles outside of the 30 mi 'blue needle' point) at that point; I helped him with the heading; and set his inbound course for him to get us back on course. As I was trying to help him with this; we ended up slightly off course from the localizer; ATC questioned us as I was trying my best to correct it. We said correcting for the localizer. I asked ATC if we caused a problem; and the response was; no you're fine. The first officer must have selected green needles prior to the '30 mi' or blue needle point. As a result; his inbound course was not correct; and when trying to intercept the localizer this caused the autopilot to take a sharp turn. Make a quick look at first officer's screen before intercepting the localizer. If something like this were to happen again; it will be my first instinct to look at the first officer's screen and double check our screens are in agreement. Also; probably should have just taken the controls at that point and got the first officer lined up and given the controls back. This would have avoided us being off course. CRJ-700 Captain reported a track deviation on approach when the flying pilot First Officer selected green needles too soon.