Aryan95614/aerograph-asrs huggingface dataset:
Aircraft: BEECHJET 400
Phase of flight: Initial Climb
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

I was relieving the Developmental and Instructor on DAG. During the briefing; a BE400 reports on frequency; the Developmental advises the pilot to contact Departure on 133.95 which is the correct and published departure control frequency. I took the sector; signed-on; and started to adjust my RADAR scope when the BE400 asks for the departure frequency again. I displayed the aircraft because it wasn't on my tag and had only a limited data block; told the MEAD Controller that I still had him on frequency and requested control. I then climbed the BE400 to 19;000 FT and turned him to heading 100 away from NATCF's [Nellis] airspace. I then noticed how low he was and advised the pilot to climb immediately for terrain. I then RADAR identified him; turned him back on course; and advised him to contact ZLA. The pilot did not appear to comply with the published HOOVR3 minimum obstacle climb rate of 328 FT per NM to 5;000 FT. I recommend the Departure frequencies be highlighted and clarified on all Las Vegas DP's; because this wrong frequency issue happens frequently even with U.S. registered aircraft; yet alone foreign ones. L30 Departure Controller reports noticing a departing BE400 well below the required altitude for terrain separation and the HOOVR3 SID restrictions. The foreign pilot had trouble switching to the correct departure control frequency.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

On approach to OAK Runway 11; [we] planned visual approach due to ATIS of 2;600 FT ceiling and 10 miles [visibility]. I briefed the ILS course; frequency; and touchdown zone elevation. I somehow failed to set the correct ILS frequency on my side First Officer had the correct frequency on his side. Weather was worse than planned. We were being vectored for the ILS to Runway 11. Somewhere near ALCAT we were cleared for the approach. The aircraft flew past the LOC course due to the frequency error. We were vectored back toward the course but again failed to intercept. ATC canceled our approach clearance and gave us a heading toward the field with a climb to 3;000 FT. Approaching 2;500 FT they called traffic out above us and gave us urgent instruction to descend to 1;800 FT. We complied and saw the traffic on TCAS (no RA occurred). After we crossed the field at 1;800 FT; we were given a climb and RADAR vectors to an uneventful ILS to Runway 11. OAK Air Carrier arrival for Runway 11 selected an incorrect localizer frequency resulting in a failed intercept requiring additional ATC vectors and an eventual go around event.
Aircraft: A320
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

While being vector to final and at 1;500 feet the F4 (Flight Attendant 4) called the cockpit. The First Officer was pilot flying so I answered the call. The F4 informed me that they were experiencing a fumes event and that the F3 had passed out while exiting the lavatory. (The First Officer and myself were not experiencing any smells or odors). I informed the F4 that we were only about 7 miles from the airport and that we would be on the ground in less than five minutes. I asked the F4 if we needed medical personnel to meet us he said not at that time and that the F3 was conscious. We were next to land I did not declare an emergency and we did not contact med link. After landing and taxing clear of the runway and after completing the after landing checklist I asked the First Officer to call the back and get an update on the F3 and see if we need medical personnel to meet us. The First Officer called back to the inflight and spoke with the F4 who was standing next to the F3 and we both could hear the F3 saying she didn't require or want any medical assistance on arrival. Upon gate arrival we deplaned the 40 customers and no one mentioned smelling anything. After all the customers were off the plane I took the Cabin Odor Report Form to the cabin and discussed the event with the inflight crew. They informed me at that time that they started smelling something shortly after we were descending below 10;000ft. The smell was most noticeable from the emergency exits aft. The F3 had been in the aft lavatory and upon exiting she said she took three deep breaths and then the other flight attendants say she passed out; however the F3 said she only felt light headed but never passed out. During this discussion I was informed that the inflight crew had asked a Deadheading flight attendant to occupy the F3's jumpseat position during landing. After completing the Cabin Odor form I contacted our Dispatcher and Maintenance Control and the duty Chief Pilot. The flight attendants contacted Med Aire and Med Aire advised 3 of the 4 flight attendants to go to the emergency room to get checked out before they would release them to fly again. Air Carrier Captain reported during final descent being notified by F/A 4 that F/A 3 had lost consciousness temporarily due to fumes in the aft cabin. Upon gate arrival Captain submitted a fume report to Maintenance and Flight Attendant crew received Medical evaluation.
Aircraft: MD-82
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict

A MD82 was heading westbound; a C510 was heading northbound. The C510 needed a descent due to his arrival airport. I descended him and realized that I had crossing traffic. I immediately turned the MD82 30 degrees right and turned the C510 right to a 070 heading. Then I told the C510 no delay in his descent and to report leaving FL330 for traffic. I called the traffic to him. ZDC has just gone through a complete area change. I am in a new area with 8 new sectors that I have never been certified on before. I believe that because of the limited time and knowledge on the sector my traffic scan is not as good as it usually is. I moved from an area where we had very little crossing traffic. We should have never moved out of the original configuration. In my current area I see no benefit to these changes. The change has only complicated the combining of sectors and is requiring more personnel to work the area. They told us we were moving to 6 areas due to staffing and if this is true we are requiring more in this new configuration. Plus we put the flying public safety at risk by now having the majority of our personnel with limited knowledge on the sectors. At times you might be the only one in the area able to work a particular sector and if you have any questions there is no one around who can assist. ZDC Controller reported an loss of separation; citing sector reconfiguration as contributory.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: Deviation - Speed All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Upon arrival on the SID; weather around the airport began to rapidly deteriorate. Thunderstorms quickly developed in all quadrants during final phase of the arrival. Multiple deviations and vectoring from Approach eventually put us on a direct course just outside the FAF for The RNAV/GPS Runway XX. The LNAV transition was a 90 degree intercept to the final approach course. Aircraft was in IMC; moderate rain and light to moderate turbulence; level at 2;000 feet AGL and fully configured with flaps 30 degrees.During our flight to the fix we watched a storm develop over the field and start to rapidly intensify. Just prior to our turn to final we noticed via TCAS that the preceding aircraft started a go-around. We queried Approach about the preceding aircraft and were told he went around. At that point we advised Center that we were unable to turn onto approach assuming some kind of wind shear encounter by the preceding aircraft. As the intensity of the effects of the storm intensified I elected to go-around; straight ahead. I directed flaps 15; gear up; and then pushed TOGA (Takeoff Go-Around). As the power came up; [the] aircraft started to accelerate and we encountered a flaps 15 over speed by 5 to 10 kts. FO (First Officer) immediately continued flap retraction to 5 degrees and I started a climb to slow the acceleration as the flaps continued up. As we climbed through 2;300 feet; Approach directed us to descend back to 2;000 feet and turn immediately to the southeast away from the weather and the airport. After aircraft was cleaned up and level at 2;000 feet; we advised Approach we were going to divert due to weather and the ability to have Maintenance inspect the flaps.Experience has shown me that the most awkward and difficult go-arounds are from level flight when not on any published missed approach procedure. The feeling of the need to press the TOGA switches is a hard habit to break especially in the midst of other distractions such as extreme weather and thunderstorms in close proximity to the ground. If I had merely called for flaps 15 gear up and then used the MCP (Mode Control Panel) to slowly increase the airspeed and clean the aircraft up; the altitude deviation and flap over speed could have both been avoided. Consider adding some training on this type of go around to get some muscle memory on this type of procedure. We always train missed approaches while descending on the final approach course at minimums and following the published procedure. B737-800 pilot flying reported over speeding during go-around due to weather.
Aircraft: HELICOPTER
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance

A 300 hour maintenance inspection was completed on Company aircraft. During the preflight; a cotter pin was discovered to be missing from the right side pitch control linkage. I flew the aircraft during the time between the inspection and discovery and could possibly have flown it with the cotter pin missing. Helicopter pilot reported cotter pin was found missing during pre-flight after 300 hour maintenance inspection was completed.
Aircraft: SMALL AIRCRAFT
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Event / Encounter Object; Ground Excursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Object

Local Control landed Aircraft X on Runway 34 with a long landing and instructed him to cross Runway 7/25 to Taxiway Alpha. I was working Ground Control and observed the aircraft taxiing through the grass north of Runway 7 between Taxiways B [and] C. I notified the CIC who said 'no you didn't.' The aircraft then stopped on Taxiway A and notified the Local Controller that they 'may have hit a taxiway light.' Using binoculars I observed a light that had been hit and notified the CIC. As the aircraft was close to reaching their parking area I asked the CIC if they wanted me to issue a brasher warning and they said 'no; that's FSDO's job.'Local Control did not issue clear instructions on which taxiway to exit to on the north side which may have caused pilot confusion (there is no taxiway straight north of Runway 34; a slight left turn must be made to Taxiway B; or a slight right to Taxiway C). The CIC also did not recognize this as a deviation/reportable event given multiple opportunities. MRI Ground Control observes after landing an aircraft taxiing on the grass between the landing runway and another he was told to cross. The pilot reported they hit something while taxiing; which was a taxiway light. Aircraft continued to parking.
Aircraft: SMALL TRANSPORT
Phase of flight: Final Approach
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft X requested to go direct to the final approach fix for the RNAV Runway 21 at MSN. I cleared the aircraft to maintain at or above the MVA until crossing the FAF and they were cleared for the approach. The Local Controller said the aircraft is not allowed to be cleared to the FAF and broke off the approach before the aircraft was established on anything and before it went below the MVA. The data person and I were questioning whether this was ok from the start but could not find a clear answer in the 7110.65 on whether this can be done if the pilot requests it. It may be in there; but is not in an easily accessible area.Briefing that was received at least a year ago on changes to GPS approach procedures do not seem to be in the current 7110.65. If it is; it is not in an obvious area; like a section called 'GPS Approach Clearances.' Controller is advised by local control that a procedure is not authorized and local breaks off aircraft from the approach.
Aircraft: MD-82
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

I was [advised by management] to give my account of a recent flight and approach into MEX. We started a little over two hours late due to a battery charger problem maintenance delay. I was flying with [a first officer] who had not been to MEX airport in a long time. She said she watched the [special airports] video and reviewed the NOTAMS so she was aware of the FMS dead reckoning problem and that SMO VOR was out. I told her that I had been in there several times lately and once en route we talked about the arrival into there and she asked great questions. I told her how they have a tendency to keep you high on descent and that it's important to be at 160 kts inside SMO and that we would need a vector to intercept 5R LOC since the FMS goes to dead reckoning inside SMO. Since we were so late; 5R was closed and we were given the VOR/DME 5L approach. We were asked by approach if we could do the approach on our own and we told them we would need a vector to intercept. On intercept heading the FMS went to dead reckoning followed shortly by a NAV fail warning. We continued and intercepted the MEX VOR 053 course inbound in raw data. Shortly after starting down from PLAZA FAF we picked up the runway and landed. If I could give any advice to crews flying into MEX; especially someone who has not been there before or not in a long time [it would be] to talk about the arrival en route and be prepared for almost anything. Visibility on even good days is usually marginal and language can be an issue. Whenever possible it would be good to have FMS planes that don't have the dead reckoning problem. Hope this was of some help. On final about 400-500' [AGL] we got the LOUD 'pull up terrain' warnings. The runway had been in sight for some time. We continued VFR to land 5R for a normal landing. The #1 flight attendant said she heard the warnings as did some or the forward first class pax. An MD-82 flight crew operating into MEX received DR (Dead Reckoning) and NAV fail warnings while on a visual approach. Because they had briefed the possibility of these issues they were on raw data VOR navigation. The First Officer advised that inappropriate EGPWS warnings generated due to the loss of positional information were heard by the passengers and a flight attendant.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

The delays and confusion between pilots and mechanics is quite honestly; very unsafe. Recent email guidance dictates for 737 pilots to not accept any aircraft for flight with a hyd indication over 100%. In the AMM (Aircraft Maintenance Manual); there is a warning that says if hyd systems are overserviced that hyd fluid will enter the pneumatic ducts and enter the cabin causing injury. Here is the discrepancy between pilot email guidance and [the maintenance task]; hydraulic reservoir servicing has the above mentioned WARNING about overfilling the reservoirs and also directs to fill the hyd reservoirs by the reservoir gauge; from between the ref mark and full; which is approx. 92%; to insure reservoirs are not over filled. [It further states] that 'if you must lower the hydraulic fluid level because it is too high (more than 100%); do these steps'; as in remove fluid; as per the email guidance I might add. This is very clear; directive and definitive as; I say again; per the APA guidance.Now for MX argument; which I disagree with; but I believe IS open for interpretation.MX on this [particular aircraft]; and the attending mechanic; would not sign off the aircraft per the above task for obvious reasons. His guidance from his managers; was to use the following task; which includes the above servicing task; thereby creating the following discrepancy:MX signed off the aircraft; incorrectly; in my honest opinion with the following task.Task Hydraulic fluid quantity transmitter/indicator inspection; which allows a reading of 100 (+/-9%).In my opinion; this is a roundabout way to allow an overservice situation that in my opinion has no bearing on servicing the hyd systems on an operational basis. Boeing 737 Captain reported that the aircraft hydraulic system has been routinely overserviced.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

We were approximately 5 miles east of DBL at 14;000 when approach control assigned us a heading and cleared us for the visual approach to RWY 15. The Captain asked me to sequence the FMS to the 9.9 nm runway extension as he began descending to 12;300 ft to intercept the final approach course. As we passed north of DBL; we received a terrain caution at approximately 13;800 ft. The Captain disconnected the autopilot; leveled momentarily; and we resumed the approach. The caution cleared immediately after the descent rate was reduced. We both had the terrain in sight and maintained visual separation before and during the event.The cause of the event was a misjudgment of our proximity to DBL. We both felt we were north and well above any hazardous terrain. Contributing factors were a hurried approach environment complicated by the need to configure; descend; and manage the FMS in a short time period. Another factor was an abnormally short vector that placed us further south than usual. In the future; I will be cognizant of a vector that places us in close proximity to DBL and suggest that we do not descend below 14;000 ft until passing its general vicinity. Air carrier First Officer reported receiving a GPWS terrain warning on a visual approach to ASE airport.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Landing
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

On landing; I was the A Flight Attendant. I landed in the X jump seat as opposed to the Y jump seat. (This is the correct jumpseat position pre-COVID). This is a new procedure due to COVID because of social distancing. The C Flight Attendant sits in the X row and I land in the X jump seat. Flight Attendant reported sitting in the incorrect jump seat.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

We were at cruise [and] ZZZ Center told us to descend via ZZZZZ landing north. We read it back and continued. After the ZZZZZ1 turn they asked if we were on the ZZZZZ1 or ZZZZZ2 [transition]. We said the ZZZZZ1 [transition] and the Controller said it looked [like] we were cleared the ZZZZZ2 transition. Controller said no problem and we continued to descend via while reviewing the fixes again and discussing how it could have happened. After a few minutes there was a different Controller on the frequency and we could hear him talking to other aircraft. So we queried him a few times to no avail. I then input the approach frequency from the IAP and contacted them there since we had not heard a hand off. They said they were trying us on guard for the last few minutes. Since we were still at 9;000 instead of diving and spoilers etc.; we elected a box vector for the descent. The flight continued with no further incident. [Cause was] improper FMS entry. Still not sure when it changed as we briefed it properly; but we were given the ZZZZZ4 by ZZZ Tower. After push and an FMS change was made at which point the ZZZZZ1 transition could have been selected instead of ZZZZZ2. First trip back after more than 2 months off and forgot to input guard into the standby like I do every other flight. One of the small but beneficial habits that begin to fade without repetition and use. Air carrier Captain reported flying the wrong transition on a STAR due to a possible FMS entry error.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: No Specific Anomaly Occurred All Types

Terrain Clearance Arrival into SAN was night VFR. Approach procedure had changed several times. We had been filed for Shamu 1; were cleared the Bayvu 3 for a 27 localizer. We re-requested the Shamu 1 with an ILS to 9 approach. ILS to 9 was denied due to construction on the taxiway. We were then given vectors to a 27 LOC. We were on a right downwind to 27 and given a vector that would intercept the localizer just outside of the IAF (REEBO) on a diagonal intercept course. As we were passing abeam the runway; ATC inquired if we had the runway insight. We did and they cleared us for a visual approach. We were about 4000 feet (estimate) and descending. The REEBO intercept alt is 2000 feet and my plan was to square the base turn to arrive at REEBO wings level inbound at 2000 feet. In order to do this I had to turn left slightly in order to have enough separation to turn back into REEBO and be wings level for the crossing and descent. I started my descent to 2000 feet. There was terrain to the left of us; which we both saw and talked about. We passed the highest terrain to the right and turned base leg at 2000 feet. There was never a GPWS terrain warning in the cockpit; ATC never issued a terrain warning; nor was there ever a 1000 foot or 500 foot radar altimeter indication. At some point in the approach we did get the 2500 foot altitude radar call out. We had all terrain in sight; talked about it; did not feel uncomfortable and did not receive any cockpit or ATC warnings. This NASA report is timely. If I were to fly this flight again (night VFR); knowing what I do now; I would stay on the published arrival; with ATC control; until established on an approach segment. B737 Captain describes a night visual approach to SAN arriving from the north and believes that only a full instrument approach with ATC control should be flown to this runway at night due to terrain considerations.