Aryan95614/aerograph-asrs huggingface dataset:
Aircraft: CRJ200
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

After checking in with Approach; I heard and read back cleared to descend to 2;000 [feet]. The Pilot Flying also heard 2;000 [feet] and set 2;000 [feet] in the ALT Alerter. Passing through approximately 5;500 feet; ATC said your assigned altitude is 6;000 [feet]. After the Pilot Flying was slow to react; I disengaged the autopilot and leveled the aircraft at 5;000 [feet] and started to climb back to 6;000 [feet]. ATC then assigned 5;000 [feet] and gave us vectors.Both pilots hearing the wrong altitude; or the Controller [made a] mistake of giving the wrong altitude. Passing through approximately 10;000 [feet]; I thought that 2;000 feet sounded a little low for our area. But I dismissed it because I was sure I heard it. Also 2;000 feet is usually the altitude given for the visual approach; so in that sense it sounded normal. At my first second thought; I should have asked the Controller for the altitude again. The Captain [and I] heard an instruction from Approach to descend and maintain 2;000 feet upon checking in ~40 miles north on descent. I believe the Captain read back the 2;000 feet altitude instruction. The Captain and I followed the appropriate callout per the SOP after selecting 2;000 feet in the Alt Preselect. Reaching 5;400 [feet]; the Approach Controller informed us our assigned altitude was 6;000 [feet]; but that his MVA was 5;000 [feet]. He then proceeded to say everything was good and instructed us to fly a heading of 150 and maintain 5;000 [feet]. He then vectored us for a visual approach without further incident. Following the event; the crew reviewed and confirmed we both heard an instructed descent to 2;000 [feet]; which was verified and selected in the Alt Preselect. Next time; question a descent all the way down to 2;000 [feet] when in the mid-teens altitude wise with some terrain east of the airport. CRJ-200 flight crew reported descending below cleared altitude on arrival after apparently misunderstanding the Approach Controller.
Aircraft: HELICOPTER
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

After performing maintenance on a helicopter Air Ambulance; I noticed an outbreak of a skin rash on my arms. Consequently; this was found to be caused by a shop issue. But; I inquired to the flight crew as to what cleaning agents are used to disinfect the interior after a patient transfer flight. The crew member responded by stating; they do not have any supplied cleaning agents and seldom will wipe down the medical interior. If they do; they will use the window cleaner or aircraft exterior cleaning soap.This practice puts the Maintenance personnel at risk for contamination. After researching general guidelines and several state requirements for Air Ambulance Operations; all were strongly in agreement as to post flight decontamination. Not so much from the actual patient; but the medical equipment such as gurneys; bags; attendants' shoes/garments as possible sources for biological contamination. Our Part 135 Manual states it is the medical team's responsibility to decontaminate the aircraft after use; but the team is usually busy with off-loading the patient while the aircraft remains running. The aircraft will depart with no medical interior cleaning performed. Recommendations: the cleaning should be part of the post flight operation and written into the operations specifications as such. A Maintenance employee reported that the company's Air Ambulance Operations staff do not disinfect cabin interiors or medical equipment on their helicopters after each patient transfer; even though the requirement is in their Part 135 Manual. That practice puts Maintenance personnel at risk for contamination while working the aircraft.
Aircraft: BELL HELICOPTER TEXTRON UNDIFFERENTIATED OR OTHER MODEL
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

During a night time IFR flight in VFR conditions autopilot # 1 stopped working; at the destination hospital deferred and MEL'd the autopilot. Aircraft restricted to VFR only. In cruise flight returning with patient I received weather of 1;300 FT on the AWOS at ZZZ1 and clear at ZZZ2. The weather between the two facilities appeared lower. At 700 AGL the flight became inadvertent IMC. I started a climb; declared an emergency with Approach. Approach gave radar vectors to the ILS 12R at ZZZ1. It appeared no other traffic was around at this hour of the morning. I flew the approach comfortably using the autopilot that was now working but MEL'd. Broke out from the approach and flew VFR to the hospital with out incident. I declared an emergency due to the aircraft was restricted to VFR; and inadvertent IMC. Don't fly the aircraft with a MEL'd autopilot. I don't know what I could have done differently with the weather. All indications were 1;300 FT and clear. Forecast was for 1;500 FT broken. I followed company procedures for deteriorating weather. BHT-430 pilot inadvertantly entered IMC on a VFR approach and declared an emergency due to the fact that the helicopter was restricted to VFR flight because of an autopilot malfunction. While on an ILS approach coordinated by ATC; pilot broke out into VMC and landed VFR.
Aircraft: A319
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Approximately two hours after takeoff at FL370 we experienced a HYD G RSVR LO ECAM shortly followed by a FWS SDAC1 FAULT ECAM. Duties were delegated and the ECAM procedures were accomplished in reference to the Flight Manual. Dispatch was contacted via voice patch and Maintenance Control was also notified by Dispatch. A review of the situation was done; including en route and destination weather forecasts. Due to the forecast of thunderstorms and gusty winds at the forecast time of arrival and after; Dispatch informed us that holding times were starting to be issued. The decision to divert was made. The weather and the possibility of windshear and/or a go around and subsequent chance of divert with landing gear extended were driving factors. Dispatch took care of coordinating the equipment (tow in) on the ground and the notification of the station of our inbound status. An emergency was declared in order to facilitate handling and ensure a runway into the gusty wind would be available. The flight attendants were briefed and passengers informed of the situation. Upon arrival; the landing gear was gravity extended successfully; all pertinent checklists accomplished and uneventful landing made. As a note; the hydraulics were in the normal range on preflight. When the landing gear was gravity extended; the Green hydraulic level went to well over-serviced. The mechanics who met the aircraft at the gate also noted the reservoir was over serviced. An A319 had a HYD G RSVR LO ECAM shortly followed by a FWS SDAC1 FAULT ECAM. Forecast weather at the destination led to a divert to a suitable alternate. After landing; the Green system reservoir was found to be over serviced.
Aircraft: CESSNA AIRCRAFT UNDIFFERENTIATED OR OTHER MODEL
Phase of flight: Landing
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Departed VFR flight to JNX [at] 3;500 [feet]. Contacted RDU Approach for flight following to JNX. RDU cleared me to JNX with no reported traffic. Authorized change to local frequency at JNX. Local frequency as published is 122.80. Received weather report via local AWOS. Wind 150 at 3. Selected RWY 21 for landing. Made numerous calls on local frequency advising of intentions. ADSB In indicated no traffic in the area. Was concerned that I did not hear anyone. Double checked frequencies to make sure I was on correct frequency both by checking frequency listed in Garmin 750 frequency listing and on charts books. All listed same frequency. Proceeded with landing sequence. Just before touchdown; I saw Aircraft Y on runway headed toward me; either landing or departing on RWY 3. Pretty sure he was in a takeoff roll; but not sure. We both avoid each other by veering to the right. Both planes were at that point in taxi mode passing about 50 feet apart in opposite directions. Both planes taxi to ramp; and pilots both met to find out what happened. I asked the other pilot if he heard my calls and he said no. He asked what frequency I was on and told him. He reported that frequency had been changed 'a few weeks ago;' he asked if I had listened to weather and I told him yes and he said there was a recording at the end of the report that advise pilots of the change. I went back and listened to the report and in fact it is there at the end. There is; however; about a 2 second gap when the weather report ends and the notice comes on. As normal; I had changed back to my comm radio to continue landing. Wind that day was always favoring RWY 21 for departures and takeoffs and I saw no traffic and Raleigh saw no traffic; but still proceeded with caution.Raleigh did not report any frequency change at my arrival airport and reported no traffic when they released me. Not sure what their process is when these sorts of changes are made. I recognize it is up to me to make sure I have the data. At same time; I used every resource I had on board to confirm frequency. This is not an airport that I visit often.Suggestion to JNX staff or controlling agency that they put the frequency change notice at the beginning of the weather report rather than the end. Things happen so fast; any delay could be missed; which I did in fact miss this. General Aviation pilot reported a near miss with an opposite direction aircraft when attempting to land.
Aircraft: SMALL AIRCRAFT; LOW WING; 2 ENG; RETRACTABLE GEAR
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

On arrival at the airport; our aircraft [was] not in ready position as requested. Were told by line personnel prop planes often moved to make way for jets. Fog not in forecast; delayed VFR departure to make appointment. When conditions became VFR; we thought we could depart VFR and started engines and requested taxi clearance. Ground said airport still IFR. Requested IFR clearance to VFR on top and were advised they were unable to request IFR clearance. Ground said I could call Unicom on 122.95 or 'our company' to request IFR. Shut down engines and called FSS on cell phone from airplane. After going through their automated menu; the Briefer said there was another number to call to file IFR. Called the second number and gave info and were told clearance should be printing out at DWH in a few seconds. Called Ground on portable radio and were told clearance request was not done correctly.Ground then advised airport about to go VFR and asked if we wanted to depart VFR. Started engines and did run-up on ramp. Requested taxi clearance and flight following with Ground and were told to taxi to Runway 17R via Charlie. Requested directions and understood we were to go right past the Falcon parked on the ramp. I do not recall hearing any hold short instructions. Proceeded perhaps 100' past the Falcon and encountered an intersection and noted the sign on the left indicated we were on Charlie. To our right was what appeared to be a closed taxiway with X's. Continued to taxi and turned right on what I thought was Runway 17L being used as a taxiway. After taxiing about 300 feet on what turned out to be Runway 17R; I was called by Ground Control and told to contact the Tower; which I did. I exited the runway at taxiway Alpha and stopped to await further instructions. The Tower told us they were required to submit a possible pilot deviation and that I might receive a call from the FSDO. We were then cleared for takeoff and flew home.I allowed a series of frustrating events to affect my situational awareness. I have determined that when I become aware that events are affecting my judgement or performance; I will exit the airplane and take a break. And I will verify taxi instructions on the airport diagram before moving the airplane. If I am even the least bit uncertain of my clearance; I will call for progressive taxi instructions. I just completed the AOPA Runway Safety course and have changed my preflight routine to consider ground operations to be as important as those in the air. The signage at DWH is inadequate. There should also be mandatory hold short instructions in all taxi clearances for Runway 17R at Charlie. GA pilot reported a runway incursion due to disorientation from confusing signage and markings at DWH.
Aircraft: UAV - UNPILOTED AERIAL VEHICLE
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I began the drone flight to inspect the subject property roof thinking I had the automated FAA authorization to fly in the Class D ZZZ airspace. After realizing that I had not written down the authorization on my work order I immediately discontinued the flight and landed the drone. I then tried to obtain the automated approval through the Airmap application. Per the Airmap application; approvals up to 400 feet could be obtained; however; the application stated that the approval was not available on an automated basis at that time. Flight was discontinued. The max height the drone climbed to was 110 feet without approval for a period less than a couple of minutes. Pilot error was not obtaining approval before flight. The pilot thought the approval was already obtained which was the reason the drone flight was started. Future corrective action is to include the approval verification in the preflight checklist. UAV pilot reported pilot error in not obtaining authorization for the flight.
Aircraft: LEARJET 55
Phase of flight: Initial Climb
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

We were cleared for takeoff on 25R at LAX behind [a B737-800] as soon as he rotated. I knew we would be off before his takeoff point. I did not know he was going to the same fix as us; DOCKR. We were climbing to 3;000 feet to DOCKER; doing 250 knots when we encountered moderate to severe turbulence. We were then trying to turn left to 236 degrees per ORCKA2 Departure. I was trying to maintain control of aircraft; jockeying the throttles forward/back trying not to go over 5;000 feet. I was flying on my instruments when I saw aircraft tail lights out of my left peripheral vision and saw the 737 that took off in front of us about a mile from us. At that moment; the Controller said do you have the aircraft in sight at 11 o'clock and 1 1/2 mile? We replied affirmative. He said maintain visual on that aircraft. We had caught up to him. While maintaining visual with him and thinking about what to do next; the Controller said maintain 250 knots. So I looked back inside and saw that we were in a left bank; because I was flying visual on him out over the ocean (no reference visually). I corrected my heading by turning right 10 degrees when the Controller hurriedly said fly 240 degrees. Then Controller said climb to 12;000 feet.At this point; we were decompressing from the [wake turbulence] and a little distracted by the event. We were in the climb when Controller said 'Left turn 020'. We read back '020.' Controller said 'Left turn.' We said 'Left turn 080.' He did not correct us. Shortly after the Controller said; 'When able; direct KLIPR'. We read back 'When able direct KLIPR.' We were still bothered by what happened; while [programming] direct KLIPR. Before we were able to turn direct KLIPR; the Controller started asking us about what we did coming off the runway and about going to DOCKR and afterwards; what heading we were flying; etc. We were then talking about what happened between each other. We tried to answer him in this conversation understanding that this is being all recorded and inadvertently did not turn to KLIPR. Then he spoke hard to us for not going direct KLIPR and told us we had a possible pilot deviation.We should have not been cleared for takeoff that close to an aircraft slower than us going to the same fix. We did not know we were going to the same fix. Then the Departure Controller allowed us to get too close to that aircraft; we were flying on instruments. The controller started a conversation on the frequency about the event as if it was our fault; and asked us about what we did 2 minutes ago; and we; knowing that it was being recorded; had to discuss it before replying; while we were to be navigating. He distracted us from making that turn and navigating. [Report narrative contained no additional information.] Learjet 55 flight crew reported a track deviation occurred following a wake turbulence encounter in trail of a B737-800 departing LAX.
Aircraft: C172
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

We were conducting a visual inspection of a pipeline Right-of-Way (ROW) from the Class B surface area into [a] Class D environment. After establishing communications with Tower and being cleared on our transition through the airspace; my right-seat observer requested we circle to re-capture data in our computer-based patrol software at the southernmost extent of the Class D. I informed Tower I needed to circle to evaluate a sighting; and this was approved. We made a single circle; captured the data we needed; and continued on our way; roughly due north. As we approached the field (our pipeline route is inside the airport fence for a short distance) Tower advised us to let him know when we were back northbound due to inbound traffic. Realizing that he was not expecting us to be close to the field; I stated we were already northbound; began a climb and asked Tower if we needed to circle. At this time the Controller called helicopter traffic close to us about the same time as our traffic advisory system alerted us to the traffic. As we were already in a climb; we had between 200-300 feet vertical separation and the traffic advised Tower they had us in sight. The Tower advised the helicopter to maintain visual separation. We never got closer than 4-500 feet horizontally before passing the traffic but it was obvious that both I and the Controller had misunderstood each other's intentions and ended up with a traffic conflict. The helicopter pilot was obviously vigilant and had us in sight before we saw him. We continued our patrol without further conflict or incident. Upon reflection; I should have been clear with the Controller and stated that we needed to make a single circle and then would continue our patrol. This would have allowed him to plan for the inbound rotorcraft and avoided the conflict altogether. C172 pilot reported an NMAC with a helicopter during his pipeline patrol.
Aircraft: C172
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Bird / Animal

Approaching ZZZ while en route on a cross country flight; I experienced a near miss with a red and white low wing plane. I was flying at 500 AGL 6 miles south west of the field I decided to climb a bit and turn left to keep some distance between my flight path and the airport area. I lifted the nose and began climbing. After a brief climb (perhaps 100 feet) I saw some birds and leveled off; simultaneously increasing my left turn rate to continue further from the airport area. As I leveled off I saw the other plane for the first time. He was directly in front of and slightly below my flight path. I made an aggressive turn to the right while gaining as much altitude as I could. I'm not sure he ever saw me as his flight path never changed. I confirmed clearance from him and returned to my left turn and continued my flight as planned. I was monitoring CTAF during this whole time; but did not make any radio calls myself. There were no radio calls during this time that I received. My plane is not equipped with ADS-B. I believe we both may have assumed there was no traffic in the area thus neither of us made calls over CTAF. Next time I will either give more room for deviating around an airport or make a radio call with my intended path. I also didn't spend all that much time scanning for traffic below me since I was at 500 AGL myself. Clearly this is a lack of situational awareness on my part and will be a focused point of improvement moving forward. C172 pilot reported a NMAC with traffic while avoiding birds around a non-towered airport.
Aircraft: SKYLANE 182/RG TURBO SKYLANE/RG
Phase of flight: Takeoff / Launch
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

On takeoff Runway XX ZZZ incoming aircraft announced 3 mile final Runway XX; incoming aircraft was spotted and I announced I had the incoming traffic in sight and had time to take off before he arrived. On starting my takeoff roll the incoming plane was closer than I thought and he passed over head turning out to the south and initiated a go around. Pilot reported misjudging the distance of an approaching aircraft and took the runway for takeoff; causing the other aircraft to initiate a go around.