Aryan95614/aerograph-asrs huggingface dataset:
Aircraft: A320
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

At FL350; auto flight on; we had an ECAM Yellow Hyd Low Level. We established PF/PM (Pilot Flying/ Pilot Monitoring) roles and completed the ECAM. Notified Dispatch via ACARS. Reviewed the QRH notes; and briefed the landing. We asked Dispatch to confirm our decision to land at [scheduled destination]; but never got a response. Possible ACARS lost message and we didn't have enough time to follow up. Sent a message to [Operations Control] that we had a Yellow Hyd failure. The ECAM had us shut off the Yellow Hyd System; and turn it back on on final. We evaluated our landing distance based upon the Yellow system not recovering; and verified we had a very safe margin with only one reverser and two spoilers per wing inop. I performed a brief with the flight attendants and advised them there was no reason to prepare for an evacuation. We turned the Yellow Engine pump back on when we dropped the gear. We had Approach Control give us an extended final to ensure our flaps would still deploy when operating at half rate. The Yellow Hyd system recovered with normal pressure and very low volume. We made an uneventful landing and exited the runway. Clearing the runway we stopped to allow for the [ramp] crew to complete a walk around safety check. When complete; we taxied to gate and waited until the ground crew verified the chocks were set before securing the number 1 engine; per the QRH notes. The Yellow Hyd pressure remained normal until shutdown; although the volume dropped to zero. On the post flight walk around we found the entire aircraft belly wet with dripping hydraulic fluid.Post flight I debriefed the event with my FO (First Officer) [and ground personnel]; all of whom responded perfectly. [Report narrative contained no additional information.] A320 flight crew reported receiving an ECAM for low fluid level in the Yellow hydraulic system.
Aircraft: SMALL AIRCRAFT; LOW WING; 1 ENG; RETRACTABLE GEAR
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

On a southbound departure from ZZZ I requested clearance from ZZZ2 Tower to transition west through the ZZZ2 Class D airspace. The controller approved my request with a midfield crossover restriction. She called [small jet] traffic 2 miles south of ZZZ3 at 3;000 feet. During her call she responded with an incorrect call sign. Subsequent to my initial response I visually acquired the [small jet]. By this point I had initiated a west bound turn and climb to higher altitude for my transition as I believed I was well within the ZZZ2 Class D and below the 3;000 foot floor of the Class B.The controller became excited and issued instructions to stop climb to 'XYY' and subsequent transmissions to 'YY'. This caused extreme confusion to me as to whom her instructions were directed. The airspace in the location near my westbound turn is complicated as there is overlapping design with different control and altitude jurisdictions. I use aircraft GPS navigation and EFB data for a visual presentation of airspace. While it is possible I penetrated Class B airspace it was purely unintentional. At one point the Tower controller stated 'you almost hit a [small jet']. I had visual contact with the small jet who was going to pass well behind my flight path. The complicated nature of the airspace design combined with the controller's tone and delivery of incorrect call sign contributed to an extremely confusing experience. Single Engine Pilot reported a possible airspace violation and NMAC . The pilot cited the complicated airspace at this location and confusion with ATC instructions as contributing to the event.
Aircraft: C172
Phase of flight: Landing
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway

While flaring on final a slight wind shift occurred during the flare for landing causing the longitudinal axis of the aircraft to move to the left of the ground track and insufficient right rudder application to correct the change was applied. Side load was placed on the main gear and directional control was temporarily lost as nose wheel touched down. I took control of the aircraft as soon as I observed the loss of directional control from the pilot. The aircraft veered momentarily off the runway into the grass to the left of the runway and back onto the paved runway exit. No damage occurred to the aircraft; airport installations and no physical injuries occurred to the pilot or myself (instructor.) C172 CFI reported taking control of the aircraft on following his student's loss of directional control after touchdown.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Approximately five minutes before this incident the Captain called the flight attendants and told them to clean up early; grab a seat and call when seated because we would be getting some moderate turbulence on the descent fairly soon. I; the First Officer; had the passengers be seated and mentioned about the turbulence we would soon encounter. Approximately four minutes later with about one minute prior to entering the clouds (since we had not received confirmation from the flight attendants that they were indeed seated) the Captain directed them twice to take their seats on the PA. On descent; passing FL290; we entered the clouds and encountered moderate turbulence.The Captain called to check on them and the passengers and they told him that two flight attendants were seated in the aft galley; but the third flight attendant was standing in the aft galley and rode out the turbulence standing up. The ride was still bumpy and the Captain told him that we should encounter a few minutes of relatively smooth air so he could travel up the aisle to his seat. He did make it up to the front and belted in for the remaining of the flight. During the flight the Captain asked the flight attendants three times how they were; and if there were any injuries and they said one of the flight attendants had jammed a finger while in the galley. When he asked specifically about the male flight attendant who was not in a seat; he stated several times that he was fine.After the flight he said that his groin was now hurting and was going to call scheduling. There were two tray tables that needed to be repaired by Maintenance and several vomit areas that needed to be cleaned before departing again. We tried to get assistance from Operations about cleaning; but he told us it was the crew's responsibility to clean the aircraft and no assistance was going to be provided. The Captain promptly called the Chief Pilot on call and within five minutes we had the assistance we needed to clean the soiled areas and continue to move the mission. [Report narrative contained no additional information.] B737 flight crew reported a moderate turbulence encounter while on descent that injured a flight attendant and caused some passengers to get sick.
Aircraft: PA-23-250 AZTEC
Phase of flight: Final Approach
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Upon my arrival into ZZZ; I attempted to lower my landing gear and noticed my front nose wheel did not extend fully in the mirror and I was not getting an indication light. I was on final and waited until a minute to see if it would eventually lock in place. I advised ZZZ tower that I needed to conduct a right 360 after they already issued me a clearance to land and informed them that I was having a gear issue. While conducting a 360 steep turn; I was able to get the front nose wheel to lock and a green indication light came on. After returning to final and tower issuing me another clearance to land; I reduced my throttles and set them for landing but noticed my RPM gauges were stuck and I was unable to see what my power settings were. I reduced my throttles to idle as I was approximately 300 yards away from Runway XX at which time my right engine failed. I was able to get the aircraft safely into ground effect and taxied to the local FBO. I am not sure what caused the engine failure; after talking with a mechanic he believes it is a fuel/mixture ratio; however; I do believe the gear issue is most likely low hydraulic pressure which needs to be addressed. PA-23 Pilot reported landing gear extension issue and engine failure on short final.
Aircraft: A320
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Arrived at aircraft to be greeted by a pungent odor and Flight Attendants advising me of a deferred row of seats due to a vomit event that had occurred on a prior flight (unknown how many legs flown in present condition). As the FAs had already made inquiries as to additional cleaning of the soiled area it was related/determined that the particular event had taken place in excess of 24 hours prior and the entire row was merely deferred without any apparent or indicated cleaning as a corrective action. The prior resolution was to apparently pick up the 'chunks'; covering the affected area with coffee grounds to mask the odor and then defer the entire row. As the spill was indicated to be vomit and/or containing other bodily fluid; myself and other crew members agreed that the situation was bio-hazard/hazmat in its present condition. Cleaning staff that was present at the time had additionally stated that they would not address; were unable and could not/would not provide any further resolution to the soiled area. 'No supplies or time' was the response I received.I would not/will not expose my crew; my passengers or myself to the continuation of this condition/potential hazard. I subsequently contacted operations and requested further cleaning and Maintenance to review the situation and was met with significant opposition to any resolution. 'Can we board?' was entirely unacceptable to the entire crew with respect to the odor and additionally the visual aspect (especially being that it was row 2). Finally a Maintenance Supervisor arrived to assist in the situation; whereby it was finally agreed on that this was a valid concern. I also then made a logbook entry in an effort document/require corrective action. Additionally I must also mention that the aircraft apparently had flown multiple legs in this condition. Finally further cleaning was accomplished and the corrective action was agreed upon to be satisfactory with the row remaining deferred. Upon further review/scrutiny of the incident it has now become apparent that the original deferral used (a previous crew/crews) was also wrong since this row does not contain inflatable seat belts. There are 2 specific/different MEL deferral procedures relating to the seat belts. Although the deferral used is/would be more restrictive and minor in difference it is nonetheless wrong. It is also troubling that this was overlooked in haste to keep this airplane 'on-time/schedule' under the oversight of myself and however many supervisors were present/became involved. A320 Captain reported refusing to accept an aircraft until an insufficiently cleaned area of vomit in the cabin had been addressed.
Aircraft: MEDIUM LARGE TRANSPORT
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight was allowed to enter a tornado watch area without dispatcher notifying in a timely manner. It wasn't until almost through the area when I realized they hadn't been notified of hazardous weather. This flight and 16 other flights were passed to me as part of the normal pass down. After the pass down I had turned my attention to completing the 6 or 8 releases still pending. I now had over 20 flight airborne throughout the entire U.S.; Canada and Mexico; weather was marginal throughout the Mississippi/Ohio valleys with convective tornado activity throughout. I had 14 pending departures during this time as well. Several flight had landed without me being able to see and analyze them as required in flight following responsibilities. 40 minutes after being handed this pass down I needed to begin the pass down process myself only this time I had to pass it to a dispatcher with less than 2 months experience who was still under training supervision. I feel that the 20 flights if not for the trainer would have been too overwhelming for a new employee. It was during this pass down of my flights that I realized I had lost situational awareness of several alternates due to weather developing faster than anticipated. The passdown dispatcher excepted this and I assume made the appropriate changes. This scenario plays out almost daily in dispatch and is in no way acceptable to me; I will be trying much harder at the end of my shift to improve; however this will never be enough to handle this total task saturation in the last hour of a difficult shift.Management's total lack of understanding of task saturation and organizational ability to develop a plan to alleviate this scenario. This was a policy change a few months ago to fix a problem; unfortunately it created more than it fixed.I will do the best I can to reorganize my priorities at the end of my shift and deal with this saturation. Air carrier Dispatcher reported his workload was so high he allowed a flight under his supervision to enter a tornado watch area without notification.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Arrival flight came in with pit 3 soaked with water. Class 9 [Hazmat] marked package base was also wet. After offload; lead ramp service employee notified immediate supervisor of the issue and potential Hazardous Materials spill. Scheduled local departure time of XA:10 was pushed back to XA:40. After updated departure time the crew was asked to speak with immediate Supervisor to determine condition of Hazmat package. Area Manager arrived and stated it was just water and gave a direct order for us to clean it up. Another ramp service employee voiced his concern in which Area Manager stated 'Are you refusing to do your job' in an aggressive manner. At that point; I contacted a lead from another gate who reiterated the fact that we cannot clean the pit of an aircraft if there is a potential Dangerous Goods spill and suggested that I get a Shop Steward. After following that direction and getting a Shop Steward; he informed the supervisors that were still on the gate that we cannot clean that aircraft and that a team of trained employees with proper PPE have to do the task. We were only given paper towels and Clorox wipes; nor are we trained to handle that task. The direct order issued by Area Manager is in direct violation of Safety Policies. Class 9 Hazmat spill all over bags in forward pit 3.I call for Supervisor and then the Supervisor called for Assistant Manger on duty. Assistant Manager aggressively and menacingly demand I clean up spill. I choose to not clean up the spill due to no PPE and lessons stating that I should not be doing this. He then threaten my job if I did not clean up the spill. directive is against company safety policy's and procedures. Air Carrier ramp personnel reported refusing supervisor's order to clean up liquid on Class 9 Hazmat package. Ramp agent's refusal was based on company Hazmat cleanup policy which requires specific training to do so.
Aircraft: CHAMPION CITABRIA 7ECA
Phase of flight: Landing
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Event / Encounter Object

While doing stop and goes; directional control was lost and aircraft impacted a runway electrical hold short sign with the left tire; wheel and strut and ended up facing approximately 230 degrees. No injuries to student or instructor.Post examination revealed the tail wheel had about 5 inch of side to side sloppy travel while the rudder was held stationary. A tighter tail wheel connection may have provided better overall directional control. Tailwheel flight instructor reported that the student lost control during landing that resulted in contact with a runway sign.
Aircraft: MEDIUM TRANSPORT; LOW WING; 2 TURBOJET ENG
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

ZTL had Aircraft X high and fast on the RNAV arrival trying to 'blow by' another aircraft; this caused Aircraft X to be high and fast over the arrival fixes as he tried to fight the plane down. ZTL put the plane in an unsafe situation and didn't coordinate any of it. They only called for a handoff 4000 ft above my airspace.Work issues out before the airspace boundary and read the letter of agreement. CLT TRACON Controller reported that an inbound aircraft handed off from ZTL Center was too high and too fast to comply with crossing restrictions.
Aircraft: ANY UNKNOWN OR UNLISTED AIRCRAFT MANUFACTURER
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Experienced significant interference on CTAF 122.800 from what is believed to be a local radio station to the point of distraction. The interference forces the need to turn down the radio monitoring 122.800 to enable pilot and crew to monitor and communicate on other radios required for operations. Additional aircraft operating in said area encountered a similar event. A cursory check of aircraft systems and radio were performed in an attempt to troubleshoot the issue. No aircraft or radio discrepancies were detected. Pilot reported radio interference on PGV CTAF 122.8. Pilot reported a local radio station as the possible source.
Aircraft: LARGE TRANSPORT; LOW WING; 2 TURBOJET ENG
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

We were cleared by Albuquerque center to descend via the EAGUL6 with an east landing. We selected 7;000 in the altitude and soon began the descent. All crossing restrictions and speeds had been verified by both pilots. However; soon afterward there were multiple interruptions to the arrival by Albuquerque center taking us repeatedly off the profile. They included giving hard altitudes to stop at; speed changes differing from the arrival and even a heading off of the arrival and eventually cleared to return to the eagul6 arrival and then handed off to Phoenix approach. With this much confusion I looked at the FMC to confirm that we were going to cross our next point (GENO) as prescribed on the eagul6. It showed we would indeed cross it at 11;000 (is prescribed for crossing between 11;000-12;000). However we were once again given a speed deviation by Phoenix approach but comply with altitude restrictions. The next things happened almost simultaneously: we received a TCAS TA; saw the traffic; Approach asked us our altitude; we responded. We said climbing back to 10;000 (which was where we were supposed to cross the next point; QUENY. The First Officer (FO) (flying pilot) immediately disconnected the autopilot and we were back at 10;000 within seconds. No TCAS RA was issued.I cannot say for certain; only guess; as to why the aircraft did not respect the altitude restrictions. The MULTIPLE speed; course; and altitude changes on an already difficult arrival certainly was a contributing factor. I can also say that although we had obviously been pushed into the 'red' that 'automation' (TCAS); 'external resources' (ATC); 'knowledge; skill and aircraft handling' -as described in the model of the threat and error management - brought us back out of the 'red'One of the purposes of the RNAV arrival is that once cleared on it everyone should be doing the same speeds; altitudes; etc so there is little need for ATC intervention. I do understand some adjustments may need to be made. The event we were taken through was beyond the ordinary and pushed the airplane and the crew to the edge. This should not happen on an RNAV approach. Once ATC decides the need to start manipulating an aircraft to this degree they should take over full responsibility for issuing speeds and altitudes for the remainder of the flight. Of course the other option is for the crew to refuse to return to following the RNAV arrival and request hard altitudes and speeds be issued by ATC. An air carrier on the PHX EAGUL6 RNAV was vectored off the arrival and given altitude changes so that when cleared back onto the track; the aircraft failed to capture a 10;000 foot altitude constraint. Similar malfunctions occur at other airports where ATC makes extensive RNAV changes causing the FMS to not respect crossing altitudes.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

I was PF on this leg; first flight in 40 days. During approach prep for LGA ILS 4; review of briefing strip indicated 'Autopilot Coupled approach not authorized.' Review of other available approaches with similar 3.1 degree glideslopes and initial approach fixes have no restrictions. Since weather was rain with low ceilings; the ILS was the approach with the best capability. Trying to hand-fly an ILS in bad weather didn't seem to be a viable option or the safest; and ceilings were low enough to require an ILS approach. I shot the approach with both APs engaged; monitored flight path compliance; and was able to take over visually around 400 feet AGL; landing in the first 1;200 feet of runway. This breakout point is similar to the DH for the RNAV GPS to Runway 4; which is allowed to be coupled. After returning home I inquired about why this restriction was listed; and what we are expected to do when bad weather requires approach to LGA Runway 4. New to aircraft; had not flown in 40 days. Had not been in situation where a published ILS approach could not be used with an autopilot. 1. Provide a precision approach into LGA Runway 4 suitable for low ceiling/bad weather.2. Provide some insight into why the coupled ILS is not as safe as a hand-flown ILS along the exact same flight path. 3. Provide some insight into why the RNAV GPS 4 can be coupled and flies the same flight path. (If the coupled ILS can only go down to 400-500 AGL; that seems like a more correct limitation than to completely limit AP use for an entire approach.)4. Make this a review item in the company pages and provide some guidance on how best to handle this.5. ATIS should not advertise ILS 4 as the active approach in bad weather when the approach is not authorized to be coupled. Should advertise 'ILS and RNAV Runway 4.' Air carrier First Officer reported concerns with the LGA ILS 4 approach identified as 'Autopilot Coupled approach not authorized.'