Aryan95614/aerograph-asrs huggingface dataset:
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Initial Climb
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

KOA Tower called me for a release on a B737. I issued a departure clearance of 'Depart heading 350 until joining V11; released your discretion Air Carrier...'. The Air Carrier aircraft was inbound on the ILS17 Approach. The KOA Tower Controller then questioned this clearance by asking if I really wanted to send the departing aircraft at the inbound aircraft. I replied that 'released your discretion' meant that they needed to provide visual separation or the pilots had to provide visual separation between the aircraft or else don't release the departure until the arriving aircraft has landed. The heading of 350 insured IFR separation would be provided after the use of visual separation to protect for the missed approach. The LOA with KOA allows KOA Tower to provide visual separation between referenced aircraft; in this case the B737 and the other Air Carrier. When the B737 checked in on my frequency the aircraft was about six miles south of the airport out of 3;500 FT. When I asked the pilot why he was so far south he replied that the Tower had issued him Runway (17) heading and then; just before being switched; was issued a heading of 350 leaving 3;000 FT to join V11. By this time the aircraft was already past the point where it could join the airway and had now become a factor with another aircraft inbound to KOA from the northwest as well as was crossing over the missed approach fix for the ILS 17 Approach. KOA Tower must be staffed with competent controllers. I would recommend that the FAA take over the Tower and make the airspace surrounding the Tower Class Charlie airspace. This airport handles way too many air carriers and passengers; as well as a mix of military and general aviation aircraft; to remain a Contract VFR Tower HCF Controller expressed concern regarding the competance of the 'Contract ATC Controllers' at KOA Tower; citing a recent example of a clearance issued that was not understood.
Aircraft: BONANZA 33
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC

In descent while returning to land at ZZZ from west of the airport and north of the Denver Class B airspace; I received a TCAS warning very close to our aircraft. I made a rapid and aggressive descending turn away from the threat aircraft in the direction of the Class B airspace (the only way that I could turn). We were near; but below the ceiling of the Class B segment and did not enter it. We never did see the other aircraft. The remainder of approach and landing were normal. GA pilot reported taking evasive action in response to a TCAS warning near DEN Class B airspace.
Aircraft: DUCHESS 76
Phase of flight: landing
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

I was flying with my student in [a] BE-76 for a check ride review flight. We were doing the usual flight training in [the] training area at 6000 feet; and after all maneuvers we started to do single engine operations - Single engine failure in air and restart. But after the single engine failure; when we tried to restart the left engine we were unable to restart the left engine using the appropriate methods - using [both with] accumulator and without accumulator methods as per checklist. So we landed [at a nearby airport]. When we were [on the] ground after [the] safe landing we tried to start the left engine and it started after couple of tries. BE76 Instructor Pilot reported diverting to an alternate airport after the left engine failed to restart following an inflight shut down for training.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Initial Climb; Takeoff / Launch
Anomaly: Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Shortly after takeoff on Runway XXR in ZZZ we (CA/FO/JS) smelled a strong odor; presumably an electrical odor. The FA called the flight deck and told the CA that the smell was in the cabin as well. The CA immediately [contacted ATC] and we were given immediate vectors to return to Runway XYR in ZZZ. As the pilot flying; I was vectored to a right downwind for Runway XYR and we leveled off at 3000 FT. FA's were briefed; a PA was made to the passengers and ATC was notified. The QRH was referenced and were back on the ground within 10 minutes. After landing we taxied off of Runway XYR and came to a stop so fire rescue could examine the aircraft. No discrepancies were noticed by ARF and we proceeded to the gate without further incident. In the high speed portion of the takeoff roll I began to notice a distinct odor unlike any of the typical odors normally encountered. At 500 FT the FO and JS rider also mentioned a strong odor. At about 1000 FT; the FA called the cockpit and informed me that they had a very strong 'electrical' odor throughout the cabin. At that point I [contacted] tower and we received vectors back to ZZZ for a visual approach and landing on Runway XYR. The FO continued to fly the A/C and also handled ATC communications. I communicated with the FA's and made a PA announcement to the passengers informing them of our situation. We conducted the QRH procedure for SMOKE; FIRE; OR FUMES. (We elected to not don the O2 masks but to take them out of the box as the fumes seemed to be manageable in the cockpit and visibility was not impaired.) After landing the CFR conducted a visual inspection of the aircraft; no issues were noted so we taxied to E3. Maintenance requested that we deplane the aircraft so that they could troubleshoot the problem. B737 crew noticed an electrical burning smell immediately after takeoff. Cabin crew also detected the fumes. Crew returned to departure airport.
Aircraft: BONANZA 35
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types

Low IFR conditions in the area with a reported ceiling of 400 FT OVC at IAH and we were running simultaneous operations to Runways 8L and 8R. A BE35 was cleared for an ILS approach to Runway 8L and was talking to the Local North Controller. Traffic Management had coordinated an airport flow change and we were to begin landing to the west (26R/26L.) When the BE35 was very short final and leaving 400 FT the Tower Controller 'swung' the localizer creating for a potentially deadly situation. The Bonanza lost all points of reference for navigation at a very critical phase of flight. The aircraft was IMC at the time and had to abandon the approach. This is like throwing a blindfold on the pilot. The pilot then began to drift right of course in the direction of an air carrier departure off of Runway 9. There were also incredibly strong winds in the area associated with convective activity. Provide re-training. I90 Controller described an unsafe event when; prior to an anticipated runway configuration change; the Tower changed the localizer with an aircraft on the ILS; on short final and in IMC conditions.
Aircraft: MD80
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

On climb out; passing thru 10;000 FT flight attendants informed us that there was smoke in the aft cabin; advised ATC and returned to departure airport. The Captain secured the galley power and was in constant communication with the flight attendants. On down wind he informed me that the flight attendants were reporting that the smoke was dissipating. We set up for an overweight landing; (132;200 LBS). Proceeded uneventfully to the gate and were met by the Medics (asthma patient) and Fire/Rescue. Flight attendant's reported smoke in cabin about 10 minutes into climbout; we chose to get turned back and did so with ATC clearance. Immediately shut off galley power and smoke was reported as clearing and now the new problem was a passenger having an asthma attack and being administered oxygen. Our guess was breathing problems from the smoke/fumes. Got right into the airport First Officer flew a perfect approach to a very smooth landing. Medics; Maintenance; and Fire Team at gate right away; everyone was fine and we got a new plane and headed back out. Overweight landing by about 2;000 LBS but did not choose to loiter with a passenger in need of medical attention. MD80 flight crew is informed of smoke in the aft cabin passing 10;000 FT and requests a return to the departure airport. Galley power is secured and smoke begins dissipating quickly. Crew is able to quickly land and taxi to the gate where paramedics are waiting to aid a passenger in distress.
Aircraft: GULFSTREAM IV / G350 / G450
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

We encountered moderate turbulence and subsequent loss of the flight director; auto-throttles; autopilot; and yaw damp as well as electric trim. Additionally; we lost the use of both display controllers; and the flight guidance panel which prevented us from inputting data in the altitude select window; heading window and the speed window. We were unable to select our assigned heading or altitudes for our PFDs; and we could not input any data to perform an ILS approach. The aircraft was being flown on autopilot at the time of the encounter with the moderate turbulence. By the time we realized we had lost the autopilot and electric trim; we had descended 500 ft. below our assigned altitude. We reverted to manual trim; and returned to our assigned altitude. At the same time this was happening; we alerted ATC to our problem and requested priority assistance since we were unsure of the nature of the failures at that time; and were concerned we could possibly experience a total loss of flight instrumentation. After a few minutes; we were able to get all systems back online and advised ATC we were back to normal flight operations. We completed the flight without further incident.This appeared to be a mechanical failure possibly induced by moderate turbulence. [Report narrative contained no additional information.] Gulfstream 400 flight crew reported the loss and recovery of the autopilot and multiple systems during moderate turbulence.
Aircraft: CRJ900
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

As we were pulling into the gate; the ground crew displayed the stop signal. I was going; honestly; too fast as I was anxious about the flight blocking-in on time and there was about 1 minute until we were going to be late. I was comfortable to at least cross the service road and then stop as our gate area appeared to be clear. There was a catering box truck to our left in the adjacent gate area. Suddenly; a [catering] car came around the front of the truck and was an immediate threat for a collision. I hit the brakes quite hard. I made an erroneous PA announcement to the passengers to please remain seated as the ramp agents weren't ready to accept the aircraft. What I should have said was that a car had pulled out in front of us; and was the reason for the abrupt stop. I was quite bothered by this and when we were marshalled to continue; I pushed the sole running engine's thrust lever up to the stop. First Officer immediately reached over and pulled the thrust lever back toward idle. No injuries or complaints were reported by the flight attendants or the gate agent after all of the passengers had de-planed. I suggest following the marshaller's instructions; limiting taxi speed; and not over-reacting to conflicts. Kudos to the First Officer for helping to keep things in check in a moment of frustration. CRJ-900 Captain reports a near collision with a vehicle while taxiing rapidly to his gate for an on time arrival. Hard braking is required to avoid the vehicle and when cleared to taxi in by the marshall full thrust is used momentarily; but quickly retarded by the First Officer.
Aircraft: LARGE TRANSPORT
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown

We were on downwind at 3000 feet when ATC cleared us for the Visual Approach. We replied ''Aircraft X cleared for the Visual 13L.' ATC then came back and said 'Aircraft X; are you still at 3000 feet'? We said 'No; you cleared us for the visual.' She said 'that was for Aircraft Y'. Well; I heard Aircraft X; my First Officer heard Aircraft X; and Aircraft Y didn't respond when ATC cleared us for the approach! So ATC said 'I'm sorry for the confusion; Aircraft Y is cleared for the visual.' Right after that ATC RECLEARED us for the Visual Approach behind Company aircraft. ATC again apologized and we made an uneventful landing. Air carrier flight crew reported ATC issued a clearance for the Visual Approach but then indicated it was intended for an aircraft with similar callsign.
Aircraft: B757
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

While cruising at FL380; ATC advised us of traffic approaching us at 10 miles; opposite direction; FL370. My First Officer visually verified the traffic; but we did not relay this to ATC. Within 40 seconds from being notified we initially received a (TA) Traffic Advisory then immediately followed by an (RA) Resolution Advisory. My FO (First Officer) immediately disengaged the autopilot and flew the RA commands. As PM (Pilot Monitoring) I backed up my FO due to the high altitude deviation and climb. I immediately then advised ATC of our situation and actions. We initially climbed 700-800 feet before the RA commands stopped. Once stabilized and safe; we descended back to our cruise altitude of FL380. At one point the RA indicated the Learjet was within 200 feet of our aircraft. There was no communication from the [Learjet] or ATC concerning their deviation from assigned altitude.From what we can determine; the Learjet vacated its assigned altitude of [Flight Level] 370 and continued to climb. At no point did we hear any communications from them or ATC speaking to them. They could have been with another controller/Center frequency. Clearly; we were RVSM airspace.[Suggest] the Learjet not vacating its assigned altitude and ATC advising the Lear of [their] deviation would correct this situation. There was no acknowledgment or explanation to us for the deviation or error. In cruise at FL380; ATC advised us of traffic at 1o'clock and 10 miles. I was able to gain sight of the called Learjet shortly. Within 40 seconds we had a Traffic Advisory (TA) followed by a Resolution Advisory (RA). I disengaged the autopilot and flew the RA commands to climb. The Captain as Pilot Monitoring advised ATC we were climbing for an RA. I maintained sight of the traffic and saw him pass just beneath our right wing and during the maneuver as little as 200 feet below us. Once stabilized with the traffic no longer a factor I descended down to our assigned altitude and reengaged the autopilot. At no point did we hear any communication to the Learjet from ATC regarding us as they were supposed to be at FL370.Better communication via ATC needed to both us and the Learjet if they saw any altitude deviations from the Learjet. Did not hear other than the initial traffic call was given and only to us. Air Carrier flight crew reported a NMAC while at cruise altitude.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Other Load Planning
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation

This flight will have to be delayed until they can get 15 bags to secure the HAZMAT. The Ops Manager has requested that maybe we could use ballast to secure. I told them that I prefer bags. There is always a problem with this type of flight situation when there are no bags around to secure HAZMAT. I know we must follow the 15 bags policy; but what happens when the flight has to be there and there are no bags. Do we have a plan for this. I will not take any suggests from the floor (as I am hearing different suggestions on what can be done or to do). However I would like to come up with a solution that will help everyone in this situation and be consistent about it. Load Planner reported compliance inconsistency between company policy and HAZMAT requirements.
Aircraft: CRJ700
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

After takeoff I selected gear up and nothing happened. About 5-10 seconds later we got a GEAR DISAGREE WARNING. The First Officer (pilot flying) called for speed mode; heading mode; autopilot ON. As I was reaching for the QRH the gear safe lights started going berserk: 3 green; 3 yellow; 1 green; 2 yellow; 2 green; 1 yellow; etc. and the nose gear sounded like it cycled up and down 3 or 4 times.With gear lever down indications were three green and the nose gear stopped cycling up and down. Question was; can we really trust the 3 green indicators? We decided to do a flyby and get some outside help. On the first pass we used flaps 20 setting thinking any more would interfere with viewing the gear. As we passed by the EMS leader said it 'did not look like the nose gear was down 90 degrees.' Following a second pass; this time by company personnel; everyone was in agreement that the gear was; in fact; down. We made a wide pattern back around to get ready for landing.Throughout the event; I made numerous communications with Maintenance; the flight attendants; ATC; and PA's to the passengers. We reviewed the QRH for the Gear Disagree Down and Up Procedures and the Landing Gear Up/Unsafe Landing Procedure. The manual extension handle was fully stowed and the gear pins were stowed behind the First Officer's seat. I asked the First Officer if he was comfortable as the flying pilot or if he wanted me to take it. He said he was good and I had no reservations about his piloting skills. Landing was very gentle and we let it roll to a stop on the runway where gear pins were installed and the aircraft was towed to the gate. We landed overweight; touching down at 69;000 LBS. I entered discrepancies in the logbook for the gear disagree and the overweight landing in coordination with Maintenance Control. A CRJ-700 flight crew returned to their departure airport when they received anomalous gear safe indications following takeoff.
Aircraft: A319
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance

We were operating ZZZ-ZZZ1-ZZZ2 as a through flight; utilizing the same aircraft for both flight segments. Inbound to ZZZ1 we had an ECAM (Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitoring): Flight Control - Spoiler Fault. The Flight Control System Display showed both #3 spoilers faulted (amber x's). We accomplished the QRH procedure; determined via visual inspection that the spoilers were retracted and consulted with [dispatcher] and [maintenance]. We continued and conducted a normal approach and landing at ZZZ1.Because this same fault had occurred several days earlier; maintenance elected to defer the affected spoilers by de-activating and locking them down. With the aircraft released by maintenance; we departed for ZZZ2.During the climb out we began to notice a slight airframe vibration. I referenced the Flight Control System Display and saw that the right aileron was deflected down and the left deflected upward. There was also a slightly greater than normal amount of rudder displacement.I switched the autopilot off and attempted to trim out the flight controls; but the airplane remained out of trim. There was a check airman on the flight deck conducting a line check; so the captain sent him to the cabin to do a visual inspection of the spoilers. He confirmed that the #3 spoiler on the right wing was partially extended.We again contacted [the Dispatcher] and [Maintenance] and advised them of the situation. The airplane remained fully controllable; and the effect of the raised spoiler on airspeed and fuel burn was negligible. The descent; approach and landing at ZZZ2 were uneventful. When parked at the gate the right #3 spoiler remained in its partially extended position. A319 First Officer reported experiencing inflight vibration from a partially extended spoiler that was supposed to have been locked down by Maintenance.
Aircraft: M-20 SERIES UNDIFFERENTIATED OR OTHER MODEL
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

I was flying in smooth air uneventful since takeoff from home base. All of a sudden I heard two soft pops and noticed that I was losing power and descending. I immediately switched tanks turned on aux fuel pumps and told Center I was declaring an emergency for loss of power due to engine malfunction or fuel issue. I asked for nearest airport and was told it was approximately 8 miles away. Looking in the area of my GPS I noted there were some low clouds limiting visibility of the ground. I asked about distance to an airport where I was familiar from numerous prior landings. Told that was 20 miles. I was unable to recover power and continued a descent toward the selected airport. ATC was very helpful giving me instructions on where to look as I cross checked with GPS and was able to concentrate on controlling my glide speed and descent. Clouds below began to dissipate and I could see Runway 32 markings ahead of me and below and by then most of the runway. I told ATC I was going to land on 32 and would begin to circle down. They told me to switch to Unicom 122.8. I did this and then noted complete loss of power on downwind. Although high I decided I would not have altitude for another circle on downwind so dirtied up the plane and dropping gear on turn to final I decided I had more than enough speed and altitude so put in full flaps and speedbrakes. I landed smoothly I did not want to brake hard to make the ramp turn so let speed bleed off on runway until full stop. I then got out of plane with my wife and got the tow bar out to move plane off the runway. A local pilot came up to me and said ATC wanted to talk to me to make sure things were fine. I told them that we were alright but had no power. The person I spoke to said he was [the] Supervisor and heard the conversation with the Controller. I said he did a wonderful job and allowed me to concentrate on flying the plane. We then pulled the plane by hand onto the ramp. No mechanic could come until Sunday. The Mechanic called first to say that it was the magnetos that failed but when he pulled them late this evening he said they were fine but whatever controlled the magnetos either a crankshaft lobe or camshaft lobe was broken off and so magnetos were not functioning all pistons and valves appeared to move correctly. Engine is Lycoming 0 time 2 years old with only 200 to 250 hours on it. A M20J engine failed in flight because the magnetos ceased to function after the controlling cam shaft lobe apparently broke.