Aryan95614/aerograph-asrs huggingface dataset:
Aircraft: B757
Phase of flight: taxi
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

After taxi out for departure. the right engine generator failed. Followed the checklist; notified Maintenance Control; and Dispatch. Returned to the gate to perform HMG generator test and check oil in the APU so as to defer aircraft with right generator inop. I agreed to accept deferral and fly aircraft to ZZZ with IFR WX thinking if I had to fly a CAT III autoland. I was legal to go. A Mechanic showed up and started to perform the test to verify the HMG was working. He spent over 45 minutes without a checklist to test the HMG. I asked what circuit breaker he pulled and he replied it was the HMG control CB. He said that's the CB he pulls on B767s. Later another Mechanic showed up and questioned why the HMG [Hydraulic Moter Generator] CB was pulled. They left and came back with a copy of the test procedure from their manual. They pulled a different CB and tested the HMG; which passed successfully. Then they asked me to de-power the entire aircraft to reset some relays. We departed 2 hours late. Thirty minutes after departure at FL360 50 nm west of ZZZ1 the APU flamed out. We restarted and it flamed out again. We contacted Dispatch and elected to divert to ZZZ1 since ZZZ was down to 1/4 mile vis; and 200 foot ceiling. Also directed by checklist and dispatch to divert to nearest suitable airport. Notified flight attendants; passengers; etc. Completed all checklist; and diversion guide. Obtained overweight landing data for ZZZ1 from Dispatch. Landed normally and taxied to the gate. Met with three mechanics; and observed them at the APU area. The Mechanic said he found the APU filler cap was not secured; oil was leaking everywhere; and the chip detector was loose. They found the APU to only have two quarts of oil remaining. That is why the APU flamed out. The next day we were to ferry the aircraft with the right gen still deferred using the APU. It took over 2.5 hours to get the aircraft released from Maintenance. There was a conflict between the two maintenance departments. They couldn't agree on how or who should defer it. I got everyone involved trying to get a resolution. I finally went into the Maintenance Office and asked; 'What seems to be the problem?' The same Mechanic we dealt with the day before said there was no problem; and that we had the opportunity to take the aircraft yesterday. Also; there wasn't anything he could do to help us. He denied that the APU cap was off yesterday even though he made the entry in the log book; and showed us that it was indeed off. Maintenance Control finally sent the release and we departed. B757 Captain experiences a generator failure during taxi out and returns to the gate for maintenance. The generator is MEL'd and the flight is dispatched with the APU running and its generator connected to the right bus. Enroute the APU fails and flight diverts to the nearest suitable airport.
Aircraft: SKYLANE 182/RG TURBO SKYLANE/RG
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

I departed RIR to the north beneath the ONT class C airspace. Turning westward; north of ONT at 2000 ft MSL; I failed to note the residences and neighborhoods on the rising terrain in the foothills and may have been less than 1000 ft AGL. In future; I would review flight plan more accurately for pitfalls in what I believe to be familiar airspace. C182 pilot reported possible flight below 1000 ft AGL in residential area of rising terrain north of ONT.
Aircraft: BEECH 1900
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was working the R-Side with 3 sectors combined; one of which was a fixed posting. Frequency congestion caused it to feel busier than it was with different aircraft stepping on each other. The Supervisor decided to split the sector. I gave a BE1900 a pilot's discretion descent from FL220 to 100 from the south landing PGA; which is canned clearance many controllers do. The flight path has the BE1900 flash through another sector and back into our airspace. Recently; the MIA changed from 100 to 106. I'm not sure why this is; but the adjacent MIA in our airspace remained the same; which is below 100. I forgot the MIA raised 600 FT in the airspace and while the sector was being split off; I saw the BE1900 flashing with the terrain. I told the BE1900 to amend altitude and maintain 106. He complied but descended as low as 099 before stopping his decent and climbing back up to 106. I'm not sure why the MIA changed. I was told that it wasn't graphed properly and that to more accurately display the correct MIA they would need to create more MIA's? I remember reading a memo about it but I'm so used to giving that clearance that I forgot the terrain changed in LA's airspace. It would be nice to have more accurate MIA's that reflected the terrain in that area since it has been lowered over the last years I've been working here. Enroute Controller described a below MIA event failing to note a recent change had raised the MIA by 600 FT.
Aircraft: A319
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

On ILS approach to Mexico City we were given headings to fly for a minute; then a turn to intercept the course. We asked for an altitude 3 times before we were given one; the first couple times just getting headings and airspeeds while being vectored on and off the approach. When I selected the altitude for about the third time while the first officer was calling the Tower; I accidentally put in 8000 ft instead of 8800 ft. The FO told me I was 300 ft high. I looked out the window as we were rolling onto the localizer and noticed the PAPI had 4 red lights. Since I was VFR and had the runway in sight; I turned off the autopilot and the autothrottles and stopped the descent and climbed to the proper PAPI glidepath. We got a warning at about the same time as I joined the proper glidepath; and I continued the approach visually to landing. With a good visual on the runway and on the glidepath and stable I determined we were in a safe position to land. We briefed the arrival and approach and reviewed the airport info for Mexico City several times and were well prepared for the arrival and approach. We were configured and at speed and on profile early and all was going well when ATC gave us a heading to fly for a minute then a turn to intercept without an altitude. Since we were being vectored off the course on the chart we asked for an altitude which took several times to get from ATC. If we were left on the arrival and approach as cleared I'm sure it would have gone as planned. The non-standard surprise clearances we received took us out of the green and into the yellow. Since the FO was on the radio rather than calling for the altitude to be set by him I set it myself. I set it wrong and neither of us caught it with all the changes we kept getting at a critical time of flight. Both the FO and I have learned from this event. In the future I will make sure that I get the entire clearance including altitude before turning to a heading while descending on an approach. I also will call for altitudes at critical times and verify them with my FO before communicating with ATC. Aviate; navigate; communicate. A319 Captain reported several ATC clearance changes on approach to MMMX led to descending below the glideslope after incorrectly setting the altitude on the autopilot.
Aircraft: A319
Phase of flight: takeoff
Anomaly: Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

While walking aft to stow my bags I noticed a strong smell of fuel in the forward area of main cabin. It seemed to dissipate by the time I came forward from the aft to report it to A Flight Attendant and boarding was beginning. The other flight attendants said nothing; so I did not mention it myself. After takeoff I went aft to prepare for service and the passenger in 6A was already in the LAV with the seatbelt sign on as she had told the B Flight Attendant she felt like she may vomit. She was in there for quite awhile and had been ill; so we offered her something to drink to help her. She advised she did not feel ill prior to boarding; but had begun to feel symptoms as she sat waiting during boarding and they got worse during takeoff. She denied being a nervous flyer or upset about anything. We monitored her throughout the flight and gave her some cold wet towels with ice. She seemed improved when we arrived to destination. The passenger in XA was also experiencing some sinus irritation only during flight and sneezed repeatedly; so I offered napkins and tissues as the seat belt sign was on. B Flight Attendant was also experiencing some sinus irritation and blowing her nose in aft galley. I told the A who called the Captain and was asked why this was the first he heard about the fumes and said sometimes when they are fueling fumes enter the cabin air supply as a possible explanation. Our FAM says to mention only when they don't seem to dissipate. During final descent passenger in YYE complained of nausea and vomiting after coming out of the LAV. She was also provided with cold wet towels and sip to settle her stomach. I reported additional passenger illness to other crew members. My eyes were red and burning. We reported events to new crew same aircraft prior to next flight as well. I did not see Maintenance during ground time; but had left aircraft to seek fresh air and walk in terminal. Suggestion; proper maintenance; proper assessment; and preventative filtering of cabin air supply and procedural compliance. A319 Flight Attendant reported several passengers and crewmembers felt ill from poor cabin air quality.
Aircraft: A320
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Brief; checklist; start; and all phases leading to the incident were in accordance with SOP and no issues. I was the Pilot Flying. Approach had us at 4;000 FT and on a vector to intercept final for Runway 17R at OKC. We reported the field in sight and were cleared for the approach and to contact Tower. I was completely visual at this point and locked onto the PAPI at what turned out to be Runway 17 at Wiley Post. We were in a gentle descent to 2;800 FT (IAF altitude at OKC 17R) when OKC Tower came on frequency and said it looked like we were lined up on Wiley Post; and to climb to 3;000 FT and gave us an appropriate heading. We complied with the instructions and picked up OKC 17R and landed without incident. There were no TCAS RAs/TAs; the aircraft was always in a stable configuration; and there were no additional instructions from the Tower. Upon reaching 2;800 FT the pilot not flying commented that the ILS DME for Runway 17R still showed 12 NM; but that the runway seemed very close. We then both commented that the ILS glide slope showed low while the VASI showed high.Our company procedure of backing up all approaches with available navaids helped the crew realize something was not right during the approach; but it was the Tower that clarified our visual error. Cleared for a visual approach to OKC; the flight crew of an A320 mistook PWA for OKC and began a descent to land there. Approach Control noted their track and altitude and brought the error to their attention.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Landing; Taxi
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway

While landing on the runway and then taxing; slid onto a runway overrun area. Prior to landing; the Dispatcher planned 'wet good braking action and engine anti-ice on.' METAR information was reporting [icing and 'wet good']. Also; no notable PIREPs reporting less than 'wet good' for braking action. Upon landing; Captain reported normal landing of 'good.' He also reported; receiving instructions from Tower to proceed to the end of the runway bypassing a closer taxiway. Once arriving at the end of the runway; he proceeds to turn onto the taxiway when he reported the aircraft slid uncontrollably forward; leading onto the runway overrun area. A pilot reported the aircraft slid off an icy runway while taxiing after landing.
Aircraft: B757
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

After takeoff; and after selecting VNAV/Climb power; at about 2000 ft. MSL; we experienced loud compressor stalls; with associated significant airframe vibrations; loss of thrust and high EGT on the right engine. Accomplished the Engine Fire/Severe Damage checklist and shut down the engine. [Requested priority handling] with Approach. While accomplishing this checklist; after the autopilot was turned on; we also received a Stab Trim EICAS message and the autopilot disconnected. Also accomplished the Stab Trim checklist. We elected to stay offshore while accomplishing checklists; clear of terrain and populated areas. After completing the checklists; our position was roughly equal distance from ZZZ; ZZZ1 and ZZZ2. After discussion; we selected ZZZ2 as the nearest suitable airport; and diverted there. Uneventful one engine inoperative approach and landing accomplished at ZZZ2. Received following ACARS from crew: ENGINE FAIL. COMP STALL. DIVERT ZZZ2ACARS message: compressor stall divert ZZZ2 B757 flight crew reported compressor stall on departure.
Aircraft: CARAVAN 208B
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Object; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway

On exiting the end of RWY 35L; one third into the turn I experienced a sudden wind change that caused my aircraft to slide sideways. Wind shear along with the water standing on the runway made it difficult to control the aircraft; resulting the propeller to strike 2 lights on the end of the runway 35L. In the future if I find myself in similar situations I will elect to hold and wait a bit longer to let wind shear clear of the airport and if I'm on the ground stop or taxi at a crawling pace. The pilot of a C208 reported loss of control during turnoff of the runway due to standing water and a wind shift.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

After engines were shut down for over ten minutes; we noticed that one engine displayed and fuel flow of zero; while the other engine showed no data whatsoever in those fields. The engines showed different data; not abnormal; just different. We called Maintenance and he performed BITE checks; which showed that one of the engines registered internal faults on our previous flights that day. The aircraft was removed from service to perform Maintenance on the engine start switch. All operations and indications had been normal besides this discrepancy we noticed which prompted the Maintenance call. B737-700 flight crew reported suspect engine indications after engine shutdown post flight.
Aircraft: AMATEUR/HOME BUILT/EXPERIMENTAL
Phase of flight: Landing
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Ground Excursion Runway; Ground Incursion Runway

I was 2nd in sequence in the landing traffic pattern at a non-towered airport. Just prior I had been flying with other aircraft and spoke on the radio several occasions; establishing that my radio was working in both transmit and receive mode. The aircraft in front in the pattern; a Super Cub announced turning from downwind to base for runway 19. I was still 2 miles east of the airport and announced that I would be entering a left downwind for 19 behind traffic; which I announced in sight. The Cub announced turning base to final for 19. I announced entering left downwind for 19. On announcing and turning left base for 19; I saw the Cub was not landing on runway 19; but was offset towards the grass to the east of 19. This is not a published runway; but it has been known that tailwheel aircraft occasionally land on it. The Cub landed in the grass approx. 150 feet laterally away from the edge of the paved runway 19. I announced turning final for 19 and kept my eye on the Cub. The Cub appeared to have stopped in the grass approx. 1/2 the way down the paved runway 19. I made the decision to continue my approach and I announced on short final for 19. I landed just beyond the numbers on 19. During my rollout; the Cub turned towards the paved runway and crossed it at about a 90 degree angle without making any radio announcements or stopping. I applied heavier than normal braking and turned to the right as far as I could on paved runway 19 to keep clearance from the Cub. The Cub passed approx. 100 feet in front of me at the closest point. Once I assured there would be no collision; I announced on the radio something to the effect of 'Cub; there is another airplane on the runway!' I did not hear any response. Upon return to the hangar area; I walked to where the Cub had parked. I asked the pilot if he had seen me prior to crossing the active runway 19. The pilot stated that he had not seen me and apologized if he had caused any problem. I asked the pilot if he was aware from my several radio calls that there was someone landing behind him. The pilot responded that he was aware of an airplane that took off before he landed. I repeated that I was behind him and he appeared to not understand that anyone was landing behind him. I asked him to be sure his radio volume was turned up and that he look both ways prior to entering an active runway. The pilot of a small aircraft landing at a non-towered airport; observed the aircraft ahead land on the grass alongside the runway; then taxi across the runway unannounced. The landing aircraft was forced to take evasive action to avoid a ground collision.
Aircraft: BONANZA 33
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC

Student demonstrating a diversion to CHD airport at 5500 FT. Student was maneuvering for a right base to runway 4R. About 6nm South of CHD at about 2500-3000 FT MSL; during descent I noticed an aircraft appear in my vision from behind my front door post. The aircraft seemed level at about same altitude and around 150-200 FT lateral separation and head on. By the time I could take control to attempt to avoid; the aircraft moved from about my 1:00 to 5:00 position; nearly instantly. I noticed a white piper (warrior) with maroon or orange numbers. It appeared to be a single pilot aboard the other aircraft. After notifying CHD tower of NMAC; I asked if she saw anything on radar. She said that it appears that the aircraft had inoperable transponder. There was no TCAD indication of any kind; as well.Remain vigilant on scanning; even when in contact with ATC. When workload situations are higher; divide attention accordingly. Scan blind spots (door post) more frequently. We were approximatly on radial 223; 12 NM away from IWA VOR. At that moment we were descending between 2500 and 3000 FT MSL into Chandler Airport and already had contact with tower. I was preparing the arrivel into CHD and when I looked outside to the right I saw an airplane closing in on us wich was between 150 and 200 FT away from us. Around the same time I saw the airplane my Checkpilot saw the airplane as well and he wanted to evase but before he could the plane passed by on the distance of 150-200 FT. After this had happend we called the tower to report a near miss. The other airplane didn't had a working transponder since our TCAD didn't detect it and the plane wasn't on the the radar of ATC as well. As the plane passed by we saw the plane was white with what looked like some orange on the tail. My Check pilot believed it was an airplane wich looked like a piper warrior.Don't only rely on your TCAD or traffic suggestions from ATC. always trust your eyes. And ofcourse look more outside of the airplane. BE33 instructor and two students report a NMAC with a small low wing aircraft about 6 NM south of CHD at 2;500 FT. The other aircraft was detected too late to take evasive action and passed within 200 FT. The other aircraft did not have an operating transponder.
Aircraft: LARGE TRANSPORT
Phase of flight: Final Approach
Anomaly: Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

There were no deviations; and no Flight Crew errors. This is being reported solely for safety reason. An industrial strength type BRIGHT PULSE green laser struck my cockpit during descent in to Houston Hobby airport; Runway 4; on Final Approach; during VMC Night flying condition; with no moon sky (pitch black); at about 700 feet MSL. Approximately two sudden intense pulses of green laser temporarily struck both of my eyes; causing a flash blindness for an instant; with an imprint of an afterimage in my right eye (leaving temporary spots). The laser was a distraction and startled both Pilots. The light burst did interfere with my vision; and both Pilots immediately confirmed the experience to be that of a green laser. We both confirmed we were apparently okay to continue the Approach; but immediately the PM radioed the Tower to report being struck by a green laser; and its approximate location to our flight. Shortly after landing; the Tower Controller reported before my flight; they had three reported incidents of laser sightings in the last hour; and that the authorities were trying to locate the person responsible. Once at the gate I sent Dispatch an ACARS report of the incident; then telephoned my Dispatcher to speak to a supervisor; as I was experiencing a burning sensation in my right eye. The supervisor elected to hand me off to the Chief Pilot on Call; who decided on his own; based on my description of the event; the safer course of action was to pull me from further flying; because of an on the job eye injury. There were no deviations; and no Flight Crew errors. If there were three reported laser incidents leading up to the one I experienced; by the same facility then why wasn't there a PIREP report for the reports? Why was it not on the ATIS? Why was it not mentioned by the Controller? Why did my Dispatcher not advise this flight? On approach to HOU at about 700 feet; flight crew was struck by a green laser light flash. They were able to continue the approach and landed.
Aircraft: NO AIRCRAFT
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

The company's new beltloader policy is an injury waiting to happen. The company no longer will allow beltloaders in the pit which in turn is now having the [ramp personnel] grab and pull bags and cargo off the belt. This is going to cause numerous injuries to the shoulders; elbows; back; neck; and knees. This also could cause injuries to the head. This has already happened to an employee; but luckily did not cause serious injury. Also; with the beltloader outside the pit; the emergency-stop button is not accessible to the pit person in case of an emergency. [Ramp personnel] cannot utilize the stop sensors on the belt which was always a safety feature. This new procedure goes against everything [the Safety Course] told the [ramp personnel] not to do. One last thing; the gap between the aircraft and beltloader of roughly 6 inches could cause injury to the [ramp personnel] by falling through this opening. [Report narrative contained no additional information]. Air carrier cargo handler questioned the safety aspects of a new company procedure that requires that the cargo belt-loader not be placed inside the cargo pit.