Aryan95614/aerograph-asrs huggingface dataset:
Aircraft: A319
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

There was a strong carbon monoxide smell in the cabin about thirty minutes into the flight. The flight attendants and flight deck detected it. I; Flight Attendant 2; began to feel like I was getting a headache and I tasted a metallic taste in my mouth. The flight crew called back and asked if we smelled anything because they were experiencing the same symptoms. The Captain then made the decision to turn around and go back to ZZZ. The entire crew was taken to hospital for testing. The #2; #4 flight attendants and the First Officer were released 3 hours later; but the Captain and #1 Flight Attendant remained. A319 Flight Attendant reported a strong odor during flight resulting in health issues for flight attendants and flight crew.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Initial Climb
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Departing SEA; we were flight planned the Mountain 6 SID. PDC had a 'Revised Segment' (-SEA J70 MLP KU15M). We mistook that for a change to the SEATL4 SID. We intercepted the 161 degree radial; and missed the turn to 070 degree. SEA Departure Control then cleared us direct to NORMY. [Narrative #2 had no additional information.] A B737 crew misread a 'Revised Segment' departing SEA and had a track deviation when they started flying the SEATL4 which was not on the PDC.
Aircraft: DHC8
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

During pushback; I noticed the wing walker sprinting back towards the aircraft with his wands set in an 'X' orientation indicating that we should stop. I looked back at the tug driver and tried communicating but noticed something wasn't right. The aircraft was still moving backwards; but the tug had stopped. I realized that the tow bar had become disconnected and began to make efforts to stop the airplane gently. I tried slowly applying the toe brakes and parking brake together. Thankfully the pushback was occurring towards an upslope so the plane quickly slowed on its own and we avoided having it tilt back on the tail or damaging the nose. With the aircraft stopped; the ground crew checked the nose gear and determined nothing was damaged so we continued with the flight. The ground crew noticed first; then I saw the tug slowly separating from the airplane.The ground crew admitted to not installing a safety pin on the tow bar; therefore allowing the plane to come unattached. [Suggest] Better training for ground crew on installing the tow bar. Dash 8 Captain reported his aircraft lost contact with the tow bar during push back when the ground crew failed to use the safety pin.
Aircraft: CESSNA 402/402C/B379 BUSINESSLINER/UTILINER
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

While I was cruising about 60 Miles off ZZZ and 120 Miles to ZZZ1; I saw the Door Warning light just came on; I knew it was from the crew hatch so I tried to re-lock it tight but the crew hatch just came off and opened but still attached with the aircraft. So; I called [Operations Control] and returned to ZZZ. I safely landed back to ZZZ on Runway XXR. Nobody got hurt or injury and everyone seem pretty good.Knowing crew hatch was not fully locked and trying to relock. While I try to tighten the Open and Lock red switch and the D ring the crew hatch was opened in Cruise. I noticed that the D ring is kind of loose and easy to unlock on Aircraft X. Better judgment and decision of fix the problem later fly the airplane as always. Knowing what it is will making you wanna fix the problem. Also having hard day of flying long flight back to back will make your decision poor and not thinking a lot. C-402 Captain reported the crew emergency escape hatch opened in flight resulting in an Air Turn Back..
Aircraft: CESSNA 152
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

I was performing a maintenance test flight in an aircraft that had had a rough running engine the prior day. The previous day's event occurred in cruise about 10 minutes after departure when the engine started fluctuating back and forth about 250 RPM at about 4 second intervals. I landed at the nearest suitable airport.Maintenance replaced all 4 of the lower plugs stating that they were so bad when pulled out of the cylinder head the carbon/lead build up could be heard hitting the lower cowling. Maintenance returned it to flight pending a test flight which I did today. I did a runup with no issues and after departure stayed in the pattern and climbed to 6;000 MSL prior to turning for the aircraft's home airport and advised Approach I would be descending East of the airport. I was handed off to Tower about 6 miles out. Prior to this I had noted slight RPM fluctuations as in the day prior; but this time only about 50 RPM. After flying over midfield; however; the fluctuations had grown to 250 RPM drops. I advised Tower of the issue and that I needed to spiral over the left downwind leg for Runway 25 but they asked for me to spiral to the South. They asked if I was going to declare an emergency. I did so; they cleared me to land and I made a descent with power and carb heat on as the fluctuations were less at higher settings; I made an uneventful landing and was able to taxi in under my own power. A C152 on a maintenance test flight suffered fluctuating RPMs; declared an emergency and landed safely.
Aircraft: MEDIUM LARGE TRANSPORT
Phase of flight: Landing
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft X was landing Rwy XX and an Aircraft Y was landing Rwy YR. We had LAHSO winds for XX but not for YR. Even with early speed adjustments; these two aircraft were tied to the airport; so I planned to send the Aircraft X around. One of the supervisors asked why I wasn't issuing a LAHSO clearance to Aircraft X; and I said I couldn't because Aircraft Y was a foreign carrier that did not participate in LAHSO. She said that only meant that the Aircraft Y couldn't hold short; but I told her that I was taught that foreign carriers could not be involved in any operation in which LAHSO was being conducted. She then went to my FLM to get his opinion and he concurred with the other supervisor (but I think there was some differences of opinion by other controllers in the Tower as to how this rule is interpreted); so I begrudgingly issued the LAHSO clearance to Aircraft X against my better judgment. When I got home; I checked my SOP; and under LAHSO; Section 1-5-2; procedure 'n'; it states; 'Foreign air carriers (Part 129) cannot participate in LAHSO until approved by the FAA as listed in Appendix P. Note: 'Participate' means that an aircraft cannot be issued a LAHSO instruction nor have another aircraft conducting LAHSO on the intersecting runway.' The misdirection from the supervisor conflicted with EWR's facility directives (regarding LAHSO); which ultimately resulted in an illegal operation (loss of runway separation).Supervisors and all tower team members must be familiar with facility directives; especially with regard to ATC separation requirements. EWR Local Controller reports of two aircraft that are tied for the airport. He decides to send one around and the FLM questions; why he isn't using a LAHSO. Controller states it is illegal because one is a foreign carrier. FLM advises it isn't true. Controller then has aircraft land; and later finds out that it was an illegal operation.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: unknown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Pilots [are] not wearing masks when flight attendants are in the flight deck. Captain leaves [the] flight deck without mask on. Flight Attendant reported that when flight attendants are in the flight deck; pilots do not wear face masks.
Aircraft: MEDIUM TRANSPORT
Phase of flight: Final Approach
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Encountered wake turbulence on final to ILS 16R 1nm prior to FINKA. Ceilings 2500 broken. Broke out of clouds on ILS glidepath and encountered wake turbulence from preceding 737. Wings rolled 15 degrees to left and right and required additional power to maintain airspeed. Flew above glideslope and no further encounter happened. No wake turbulence advisory from ATC. Numerous traffic shown in front of us on MFD for both 16L and 16R.ATC should adhere to wake turbulence separation into Seattle despite high demand times for safety. If ceilings are low; advise aircraft in IMC they are following aircraft ahead so pilots can take corrective action for wake avoidance. Air carrier First Officer reported encountering wake turbulence on final to SEA Runway 16R in trail of a B737.
Aircraft: PIPER SINGLE UNDIFFERENTIATED OR OTHER MODEL
Phase of flight: Takeoff / Launch
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I had just taken off and landed in the traffic pattern with the intention of taking off again - touch and go - at ZZZ; and was keeping an eye out for the windsock which was still showing to be fully upright and indicating winds variable from slightly to the right of the airport runway's 240 degrees magnetic. I was aware of aircraft at ZZZ1 were departing east due to easterly winds and wanted to be attentive of any change in wind conditions and any resulting change in preferred traffic patterns initiated by others at ZZZ. I was also dividing my attention during the flight looking for other traffic outside; and any traffic displayed on my Garmin Pilot app made available through the Garmin GTX345 transponder that provides ADS-B in and out.After the first landing and during takeoff in my first touch and go for the day; I observed a jet on about a 2 mile final approaching ZZZ's Runway XX with landing lights on. I do not recall if the jet's landing gear was up or down; and hurried my climb to Vy and sidestepped to the right of the runway to clear the runway and allow for the jet to land at the airport's Runway XX. We were not in immediate danger of a collision; but we were too close for comfort passing by each other in opposing directions; around 500 ft. laterally and 0 ft. vertically of each other. I observed the jet continuing on past the airport and climbed straight out in an easterly direction. On crosswind to downwind leg; I took a screenshot of the ADS-B's traffic display for reference after my flight. All other traffic at ZZZ were still using Runway XY for the duration of my flight. After my flight; I came to notice that the aircraft that I came into a near miss with never showed up in my ADS-B display; nor did it show up in a flight tracking website; where all other traffic including my own was observed.I suspect this may have been an instrument approach check by a government aircraft for ZZZ's GPS Runway XX approach; but do not have a way of knowing or confirming. As a pilot with medical waivers and a limitation that does not allow me to fly where radio use is required; I'm unable to use the radio; so that option is not available to me. Seeing it was a clear day and the winds were strong enough to discourage the use of Runway XX; I had no reason to expect anyone to approach from the west. But the experience today has taught me to not only check the runway on landing for traffic; but for any aircraft approaching from the opposite direction. It would also be helpful if the jet in question also made itself known and visible on ADS-B. Piper pilot reported an NMAC event with an aircraft on final approach performing traffic pattern from the opposite direction.
Aircraft: MD-82
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

During descent on the arrival; autopilot disconnected; AC Crosstie Lockout; Left Generator OFF; and L AC Bus OFF illuminated. Due to high workload of EMG/Abnormal procedure and close proximity of the airport; an emergency was declared. Captain was flying the airplane and continued to fly the airplane; while First Officer accomplished as much of QRH procedure as possible before landing. On Base leg to runway; Captain instructed the First Officer to discontinue QRH and accomplish the normal procedure before landing checklist. We flew a visual approach; landed and taxied to gate. Left side electrical malfunctions; i.e. AC X tie lockout; left ac bus... Captain [PF] declared emergency to ATC. First Officer accomplished as much of QRH checklist as possible; changed focus to remaining descent and landing checklists. Landed aircraft. MD80 flight crew experienced an AC Crosstie Lockout; Left Generator OFF; and L AC Bus OFF indications during descent for landing. An emergency is declared and as much of the QRH procedure as possible for the failure is accomplished prior to landing.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Undershoot

Working ZZZ Center I believe; at FL380; was given instructions to cross ZZZZZ at FL290. Set 500 FPM descent in FMS; with intention of verifying and adjusting once stabilized in descent. Person A came from cabin and began conversation at cockpit; distracting me from my intended task; and I did not see that we were not going to make 29;000 at ZZZZZ until just before crossing; increased rate of descent in attempt to make [the] restriction. Estimate missing crossing by 500 feet or possibly more; as at approximately the same time; Center called and gave us descent to FL240; so we continued our descent. No mention was made by ATC of any conflict nor any questioning as to what our status for making the restriction was. This was our first trip in the aircraft in almost three months; due to COVID-19 pandemic issues; and also the first time we had worked as a crew in almost three months. Recent experience was certainly a factor; but not an excuse. I am extremely disappointed with myself for not staying better focused on my immediate task; and counseled the FO on duty to monitor when Pilot Not Flying.Suggest all crews redouble efforts and vigilance in these trying times as we are all working in unfamiliar situations now with the pressures put on us by the pandemic. Fortunately at this early stage of things moving back toward some semblance of normal; there was probably not a great possibility of a traffic conflict. That will change in the coming days; and even though we may not personally make any more mistakes as these; there will be other crews coming back to flying from furloughs; etc. that still need to get their game back. Looking out for ourselves and the other guys and gals even more than we did before will be the new normal for some time. Corporate Captain reported experiencing an undershoot of a crossing restriction and cited lack of recent flying experience due to the COVID-19 pandemic as a contributing factor.
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 140 ER/LR
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Ramp crew provided a [Load Report] which indicated 104lbs of freight. FO (First Officer) stated that while doing his preflight walk around he noticed that the cargo was human tissue. The [Load Report] did not indicate the cargo was anything more than freight. The [Load Report] also did not indicate that it was a UN3373. Captain went to baggage compartment and checked the packages for any labels. There were no UN3373 labels on the package or any other hazardous materials markings or labels seen; there was; however; a large bright label that stated 'TISSUE UNDER QUARANTINE: NOT YET DETERMINED SUITABLE FOR TRANSPORTATION IN ITS CURRENT FORM'. After not seeing an appropriate UN3373 label and seeing a label expressly stating that the package may not be safe for transportation; the Captain refused the package. The ground crew complied with the Captain's instructions and were very cooperative. The Captain contacted the Chief Pilot to discuss the issue with him. There were no further issues.The FO mentioned seeing the human tissue cargo to the captain. After noticing that biological material was not annotated on the [Load Report] the Captain checked the cargo himself to ensure compliance.Biological material was loaded on to the aircraft without being appropriately documented or vetted. While a NOTOC (Notice to Captain) is only required if biological material contains dry ice; that biological material must still be labeled properly and be indicated on the [Load Report] as UN3373. Without these labels there is no way to determine if the biological material is acceptable to carry. Neither an appropriate UN3373 label nor [Load Report] indication were used.The biological material was removed from the aircraft.Better training on appropriate Hazmat markings; labels; notification; and acceptance. EMB-145 First Officer reported Hazmat cargo labeled not suitable for air transport in cargo compartment. Package removed prior to departure.
Aircraft: A321
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

About 10+ mins after ascending I received a call from Flight Attendant 2 asking if I smelled anything out of the ordinary. I did. Initially; it was a very faint chemical-like smell. I got out of my Jump seat (3L) and walked a few rows towards the forward part of the cabin and the smell was about the same. I then called the Flight Attendant 1 to share my observations. Flight Attendant 1 was in communication with the flight deck. Afterwards; I went to the aft part of aircraft and the smell got stronger. Now; it was a chemical/car coolant leak smell. At one point; someone opened one of the lav doors in the aft; and the smell intensified. Some pax shared similar observations about the smell in the cabin. Shortly after; the captain came over the PA and informed pax that we were returning to ZZZ [departure airport] as a result of a cabin odor. While preparing for landing; I started feeling tingling in my legs. I returned to my jumpseat upon doing my compliance checks; and the tingling sensation increased. I also felt my thoughts get fogged. We landed; arrived at the gate; and deplaned. Emergency personnel and [Manager On Duty] were available to assist and guide us to get medical assistance. About 2 pax that felt ill received medical attention in the terminal. We requested to go to the hospital. [Manager On Duty] coordinated our transportation to the hospital; guided and assisted us to our transportation. Once at the ER; I got a headache; continued to feel tingling in my body; and my thoughts were fogged. My initial blood pressure reading was slightly elevated. My second reading was even higher. Please note that I don't have a history of high blood pressure. My carbon monoxide levels were measured and no CO poisoning was detected. I was released from the ER. (Before being released; my blood pressure reading was within normal range). It is currently [a few days after] and I have a headache; feel very tired; my arms and legs feel sore; and my thoughts are still fogged. I was the number 2 Flight Attendant sitting at the 4L 4R doors; direct view jump seat. We; the entire flight crew and all passengers onboard; experienced toxic fume odors and possible carbon monoxide poisoning throughout the cabin after takeoff climbing through 10;000 feet. Presented to hospital with symptoms of nausea [and] headache.Please for our health and safety of employees and passengers; please please ensure the Maintenance on these aircraft are in compliance. Our lives are on the line. We want to be able to come to work and not have to be subject to breathing toxics air to save money. Our lives and our passengers' lives are more important. Treat us the way you would treat your families. Please respect our lives. Two flight attendants reported cabin fumes led to a return to the departure airport and transport for medical evaluation.
Aircraft: A300
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Passing 18;000 on climbout noticed an unexplained decrease in right outer fuel quantity. Followed QRH procedures for fuel feed manual control and fuel leak. Did not confirm a fuel leak but right outer quantity continued to decrease. Right outer [fuel quantity] should not have burned down at all. After completing fuel feed manual control with center pumps off to ensure fuel was burning from inner tanks right outer continued to decrease. Entered fuel leak checklist and did not confirm a fuel leak because only indication was an imbalance but fuel total continued to burn down on pace with flight plan release. Consulted with [Maintenance] and Airbus tech pilot. Diverted to nearest airport. Aircraft landed exceeding outer wing tank limits; no problems noted. On the ground with engines shutdown and no fuel pumps on; right outer continued to decrease quantity over a one hour period. [Report narrative contained no additional information.] A300 flight crew reported an unexplained decrease in right outer fuel quantity and diverted.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Final Approach
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types

Approach cleared Air Carrier X to 9;000 FT. At seven mile ATC tells Air Carrier X report the visual approach. Air Carrier X contacted CTAF Unicom frequency. Transmitting our position from the field. Unicom replied with field conditions. Air Carrier X then switched back to Approach Control requesting lower. ATC then cleared Air Carrier X to 7;000 FT. At five miles we keyed up the lights. I requested lower; Approach Control said unable due to protected air space. What protected Airspace? I reported the field in sight expecting to hear cleared for the visual approach. Due to our close proximity and 7;000 FT altitude and mountains we continued to the field joining the glide path. I wanted to stay in my protected airspace as the Approach Control was busy with another aircraft. On our visual descent; and after calling the field; Approach Control asked our altitude. I replied we have the field descending on glide path. Approach Control replied 'maintain your altitude!' We leveled around 4;800 FT. He again said he couldn't clear us below 7;000 FT. Air Carrier X requested Approach to tell us when clear of said airspace. Approach replied one mile. So we're now 4;800 FT one mile from the end of the runway. Air Carrier X was in no position the do a stabilized approach so we executed a missed approach. Being so confused by Approach's inability to communicate he needed us to cancel our IFR clearance in order for us to descend; we canceled our IFR clearance and did a circle to land to Runway 30 at MHV. Air Carrier on a Visual Approach to MHV was restricted by ATC at an altitude that required a go around. The restriction to clear other unknown airspace.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: unknown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Ongoing issues with communications; while using IPICS; between the RTC and flight crews/Supertug. RTC performed a radio check with the flight crew after switching from the main to the standby radio on IPICS. The crew did not respond to the RTC communication on the first call; but responded on the second call stating that they had replied; but the RTC did not hear. 5th occurrence of the morning. The RTC switched to the telex system shortly after this incident. Dispatcher reported difficulty communicating with a flight crew during preflight.