Aryan95614/aerograph-asrs huggingface dataset:
Aircraft: CHALLENGER JET UNDIFFERENTIATED OR OTHER MODEL
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown

Due to a hurricane approaching; rides in the local area were bad. An earlier report of severe turbulence at FL320 was reported approximately 45 minutes prior to me assuming the sector; so I made sure I issued advisories to all aircraft. My workload increased due to more time spent on the frequency. I received a call from Sector 10 asking if I noticed the routing on a Challenger. Initially I didn't know who they were talking about. He explained the aircraft was direct a fix I've never heard of. I told him I had no idea what he was talking about. After reviewing the situation I realized that the Challenger had a bad routing that was not corrected by TMU. The aircraft made a right turn much earlier than anticipated and entered Sector 73's airspace without any coordination from me. I do not know if Sector 10 caught the bad routing prior to him entering Sector 73's airspace. For years we have been complaining that TMU does a less than satisfactory job of catching bad routes out of New York Center. A study was done and concluded there was a problem. The report was given to one of the STMC's in TMU. A study was done by TMU and they determined there was such a minuscule number of bad routes no action would be needed. ZNY Controller described an airspace incursion claiming that the TMU failed to correct a bad routing that led to the event.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

While parked at ORD the passengers were disembarking and I was seated in my seat when suddenly the control wheel violently slammed back into me and simultaneous the aircraft started to slide sideways. I immediately placed the electrical hydraulic systems on and within a second the control wheel moved forward; I was able to apply brake pressure to stop the sideways movement of the aircraft. I called ramp control and asked who was behind me. He stated it was a B777. I informed him what happened. I then got up after everything appeared to be stable and went to the main cabin door to make sure everybody was ok. To my surprise; the aircraft moved about 2 feet. There was a 2-foot gap between the jet bridge and the aircraft. We were lucky no passengers fell through as they were getting off. I then went downstairs to make sure there were no injuries on the ground. I talked to the lead ramp person and he said all okay; by then maintenance was there and inspected the aircraft. He stated all was fine. B737 Captain reported that while deplaning the aircraft at the gate; there was an abrupt aircraft movement. This movement was attributed to a heavy Boeing 777 taxiing behind his aircraft. No injuries were reported.
Aircraft: B757
Phase of flight: Final Approach
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC; Ground Event / Encounter Object; Inflight Event / Encounter Object

We were on the ILS 25L coming into LAX on an unusually clear day with excellent visibility and none of the usual LA haze. The Captain (CA) was pilot flying (PF) and I was pilot monitoring (PM). We had just passed HUNDA by approximately 1 to 1.5 miles and were about to descend through an altitude of approximately 3;000 feet. I was just about to contact tower after being handed off by approach when something caught my eye slightly ahead and to the right of the aircraft. At first I thought it was a large bird soaring towards us; but as it passed outside of the right forward First Officer's (FO) window; I very clearly saw a large square-shaped bright red drone with black accents and black propellers. I had it in sight for approximately 3 seconds as it approached and passed. It appeared to be heading opposite our direction and I would estimate it was only about 50 to 100 feet higher than us when we were passing abeam it and it was probably only between 100 and 200 feet right of us. It was definitely close enough for me to very clearly see it and recognize what it was; but not close enough that I feared it would strike our right wing; engine; or stabilizer. Immediately after we passed it; I checked in with tower and reported that we had just passed a drone inside of HUNDA. The tower controller asked if an estimate of about 3;200 feet altitude for the drone was accurate and I agreed. A few seconds later he asked approximately how far away from us I thought it had passed and what color it was; and I gave a conservative estimate of approximately 200 feet away from us and red with black for the color.I'm not sure there is anything we as pilots or the tower controller could have done to prevent this uncomfortably close encounter between a drone and a large passenger airplane unless these objects are made to be detectable on radar and/or TCAS and traceable to their extraordinarily irresponsible owners/operators. A B757 flight crew encountered a UAV on final approach to LAX as they descended through 3;000 feet MSL.
Aircraft: BARON 58/58TC
Phase of flight: Takeoff / Launch
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

I was cleared by Tower to depart Runway XX runway heading. As I rolled onto the runway I noticed an aircraft on final and I told Tower I would expedite. At this time they told me to hold short; I was already on the runway and rolling for departure and I relayed this to Tower. I heard them tell a regional jet to go-around and canceled landing clearance. I was already airborne; 75-100 feet on runway heading when they came back to me and told me to continue ground roll and exit the runway when able. I again relayed that I was already airborne and could not comply.I watched on G1000 ADS-B as the regional jet approached me from behind and left. I remained at a low altitude and watched them visually as it passed me high and to the left. Once it was well clear I continued my climb and was handed off to Departure. From there I was given on course and continued the short flight. I was the sole occupant of the aircraft. I use this airport frequently and have been instructed to depart with varied aircraft on final on many occasions. Baron single pilot reported a communication breakdown and ATC error that resulted in a NMAC.
Aircraft: LARGE TRANSPORT
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Denver Special! Denver attempted to hand two aircraft off on collision courses within 30 miles inside our airspace at the same altitude. When the sector 42 side called the Denver 8 sector to arrange some sort of separation the Denver 'controller' asked; 'What do you want us to do?' After some consideration the Denver 'controller' suggested taking Aircraft Y up to FL380 (wrong altitude for direction of flight). Even though 42 had opposite direction traffic we approved it for safety.Perhaps Denver center needs to be less complacent in their separation responsibilities. One facility handed two aircraft on converging courses at the same altitude off to another facility without initiating any action to ensure separation.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was working on my Aircraft X on [Date]; when I started my work the day was windy above 40 knots so my screen inspection was postponed. I was then helping my partner on the service check inspection assigned to him. Later on in the night around the wind slowed down. I had already picked up my job packings (seals) and a tire pressure gauge. When I started to set up to do my job card my partner went to stores to get me a torque wrench. I completed the TGB (Transfer Gear Box) inspection screens for both Engine 1 and Engine 2. Two coworkers [Name] and [Name1] preformed both 1 and 2 engine run. I preformed leak check inspections on both engines; I found no leaks. I heard that the aircraft I was working on had an oil leak. I don't know if the oil leak had anything to do with the work I preformed on the engines. I don't believe I properly documented the inspection for Engine 1 scavenge screen. This is my first time doing this job; I believe my work was preformed good; although my paper work was not documented properly; at the time it seamed that I needed to preform both engine inspections. Assigned chip detector card for #2 Engine. Later that night AMT (Aviation Maintenance Technician) came to me for leak check of both engines. I question as to why are we leak checking both engines when only #2 Engine was assigned. AMT inform me he also did the #1 Engine. He leaked check both engines and I informed him of documenting #1 Engine's work. Work card changed to work card and does not indicate on the card left or right engine; making it confusing for the AMT. I did not follow up with the AMT to verified #1 Engine's chip detector was done.On paperwork specifically state which engine requires the work to be accomplished. Technicians reported an oil leak after routine engine service and determined that both engines had work done when only one engine had documentation for the work.
Aircraft: LEARJET 35
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

First Officer flying. I was off frequency to get ATIS. While I was off; ATC gave us 'descend via the WLDER 8.' I came back on frequency. First Officer informed me of the clearance. He descended to cross SPKER intersection at FL230 and 280 knots. He made that restriction just fine. (Chart says to cross SPKER at FL230 or below and 280 KIAS.) However; the next restriction is at LTOWN intersection at 10;000 feet and 230 KIAS (we were landing south). The problem is that if you cross SPKER exactly at FL230 and 280 KIAS; it is physically impossible to make the LTOWN restriction. SPKER to LTOWN is only 19 nautical miles. I realize the SPKER restriction is FL230 or below; but this is misleading. In my mind; no STAR should be designed to be impossible to satisfy--making one restriction; impossible to make the next. The STAR should be changed. Delete the FL230 (keep the 280 KIAS) at SPKER. We design STAR's to not only satisfy ATC airspace requirements; but also to provide fuel-efficient; safe; and quiet descents. This philosophy was first initiated in the 'profile descents' at Denver in the late 70's and early 80's. A 'normal' profile to meet the LTOWN restriction would be to cross SPKER at about 15;000 feet (3:1 descent profile plus allowance to slow from 280 KIAS to 230 KIAS). This is quite a difference from the at-or-below FL230 published at SPKER. Even if Memphis is landing north; FL230 to 16;000 feet (SPKER/LTOWN) is 7;000 feet to lose. A 3:1 profile would require 21 nautical miles; with only 19 nautical miles between the two fixes. Again; I understand the restriction at SPKER is FL230 or below. But; again; the published altitude and speed restrictions should allow for a reasonable descent profile. The reporter states that his aircraft is not equipped with an FMC or autothrust and requires a great deal of planning to comply with OPD's with altitude windows that vary with the landing direction. The LR35 can descend very rapidly with full spoilers so the thinking was that if the SPKER restriction was made; the next one at LTOWN could be made. Not true even in the LR35. Suggest removing the altitude restriction at SPKER entirely or making it much lower. Captain of a non FMC LR35 reports missing the crossing restriction at LTOWN; while on the WLDER8 STAR; landing south with the First Officer flying; after making the restriction at SPKER; due to an excessive amount of altitude to lose by LTOWN.
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

The cause of this event was high pilot workload due to deferred on-board equipment and distraction. We had a deferred ACARS and FMS system. As a result; we were unable to use the normal RNAV procedures in the Houston area. Instead we were navigating point-to-point using VOR's. This caused some confusion for controllers and we dealt with multiple re-routes throughout the day. Communicating our situation to ATC; finding correct frequencies for new navaids; and determining appropriate radials was very distracting.Additionally; before; during and after the 10;000 foot flow we received multiple radio calls from Center. These included speed; heading; and altitude changes. As pilot monitoring; I was answering the radio during the 10;000 foot flow and missed the change from APU bleed to engine bleed air supply to the packs. I accept full responsibility for my part in this event. In the future I intend to always double check my flow patterns. As we were climbing through 16;500 feet to FL230 we received a 'CABIN' aural warning due to the cabin altitude increasing over 10;000 feet. We immediately deployed oxygen masks and informed ATC we had a pressurization issue and needed to descend to 10;000 feet. Upon reaching 10;000 we ran the QRH and discovered we had not changed from APU bleed to engine bleeds. We changed to the engine bleeds; determined that the pressurization system was fully functional; and continued to our destination after climbing to 320. [Report narrative contained no additional information]. When an EMB-145 was dispatched with both the FMS and ACARS inoperative the resulting increased workload contributed to their failure to switch pressurization from APU to engine bleeds. They received a cabin altitude warning climbing through about 16;000 and descended to 10;000 where they discovered their error. After reconfiguring the bleeds they continued to their destination.
Aircraft: PA28
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Departed to the northeast; after leaving the Class D Airspace I contacted the TRACON for VFR Flight Following. Once past Class B airspace I turned direct and leveled at 6;500 FT. Once at cruise the Gear Unsafe warning light turned on and remained on. I slowed the aircraft to gear extension speed and lowered the landing gear. No gear down indication followed. At this time I alerted the Approach Controller of my situation and declared an emergency. At that time I turned back toward my departure airport and offset to the east at 5;000 FT to troubleshoot and attempt an emergency gear extension. I asked the Controller for traffic advisories in the area. I then leveled at 5;000 FT and retrieved the Emergency Checklist for Emergency Gear Extension. I alerted the passenger of our intentions; gave him a briefing in the event that the nose gear collapses and how to evacuate the aircraft and had him unlatch one latch on the main cockpit door; and then started the checklist for emergency gear extension. Ran the checklist in full; checked the gear lights in another location to ensure the lights were not failed then slowed the aircraft to emergency gear extension speed and engaged the emergency gear handle. The two main gear fell free and with slight wing rocking I received two gear locked indicators on the main gear. I pushed the nose forward and back and received a nose gear down and locked light but that light continued to flicker on and off for the remainder of the flight. I contacted the Controller and asked to continue to my destination. Once on frequency with Tower I asked for emergency crews and for a low flyby near the Tower. I was cleared for the option on 27L and preformed a low flyby near the Tower. The Tower Controller then informed me that the gear appeared down. I then asked to land on Runway 17. I preformed a right hand 270 degree turn to set up for a final on Runway 17. I received my clearance to land on Runway 17 and touched down holding the nose gear off for as long as possible. All gear held in the down and locked position. I then taxied to our hangar without damage or injury. Upon preflight inspection there was no hydraulic fluid present on the fuselage or under the wing or on the gear. Upon post flight inspection there was an abundance of hydraulic fluid on the right side of the fuselage; in the right main gear well; on the right gear and fluid dripping from the seems where the wing meets the fuselage. The right main strut was angled slightly inboard but no other damaged was present on the aircraft. There were no injuries or fatalities. The aircraft flew the previous day with no issues or indications that there may be a problem with the gear. The controllers were very helpful and attentive once I declared the emergency. A PA32 hydraulic system failed in flight because of an apparent main landing gear malfunction so the pilot used the emergency checklist to extend the gear and land safely at his departure airport.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

ATC instructed us to accelerate to 280 kts as soon as possible on FIXIT departure off of 24L at LAX (straight west ground track). We are not sure whether or not we were outside the 12 NM national airspace buffer prior to accelerating above 250 kts. B737-800 First Officer reported SCT requested their flight accelerate to 280 kts as soon as possible after departing on the LAX FIXIT RNAV. The crew was uncertain if they were outside the 12 NM US airspace buffer and legal to exceed 250 kts below 10;000 FT.
Aircraft: CESSNA CITATION SOVEREIGN (C680)
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

[Enroute] we determined our primary airport was not a workable option due to low ceilings and a tail wind component. We talked with the [client] and also talked with dispatch and [selected an alternate]. We were assigned the arrival into [the alternate] at FL410. Leaving FL410 we descended into the clouds which had thunderstorms in the area. At approximately FL280 we got the left inboard wing anti-ice cold amber case message during our descent. Leveling at FL260 the case message then extinguished. Shortly after this we got the left engine control fault followed with a right engine control fault which caused a loss of the autopilot and yaw A+B. We were able to eventually reset the autopilot and the control faults reset. Several minutes later we again got the left and right engine control faults with a failure of the autopilot again. We also noted the L-engine carrot for the engine power turned to amber. The PIC noticed the airspeed indicator of the left side decreasing to 165KTS in the descent which didn't seem right; then we heard the overspeed clacker indicating an overspeed condition of the aircraft. We both then noted the overspeed condition on the right side along with the standby instruments. I then noted a slow decrease in airspeed on the left side all the way down to 30KTS. I transferred controls to the right seat pilot where the SIC stopped the rate of descent to level attitude. At this time we noted VFR conditions underneath us to the ground. We asked the controller if we had an airport underneath us and were told that [a suitable airport] was about 10 miles away with visual conditions. We decided to [request] priority handling to the airport. We then noted that the AHRS was totally inoperative with a red X on all the left instruments leaving me without any airspeed or any other reference data on the left side. The Controller then vectored us to a right downwind to the uncontrolled airport without any further incidence. This reminds me of the simulator training we had recently which simulated [another air carrier] incident which had wrong airspeed indications due to severe icing conditions. We were fortunate this didn't affect the right side or standby instruments and it was also fortunate we had VFR conditions underneath us as [our first alternate] was at minimums and 30 minutes away. I am very thankful for the sim training we had that covered icing/incorrect indications from Air Data Computer information. I quickly felt very confident of our assessment that the anti-ice/protection systems were unable to handle the conditions and [we took] corrective actions in response to the situation. CE-680 flight crew reported diverting to an alternate after noting system multiple anomalies associated with probable pitot/static icing.
Aircraft: SKYLANE 182/RG TURBO SKYLANE/RG
Phase of flight: Takeoff / Launch
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance

The rental company I operate under had asked myself and another flight instructor to return the crew car back to ZZZ and in the process of doing so; fly back the Cessna 182 that had stayed there over night. A few days ago; that C182 had a runway excursion under a renter and instructor that had resulted in the aircraft going off the end of the runway in to the dirt; stopping short of the fence at the end. This was due to a failure in the left brake. The mechanic in ZZZ had worked on the airplane over X days to inspect the condition and replace the left side brakes. Myself and another instructor were asked to fly the C182 back home to ZZZ1. Upon arriving to ZZZ; the mechanic had informed us that the C182 is good to go with no damage to the firewall and engine and had us do a static check on the ground before taxiing. This resulted in us using full brakes and full power to make sure the airplane wasn't going anywhere. After our preflight inspection and the 'OK' from the mechanic; we deemed it safe to fly back to ZZZ1. I had no issues upon landing and made the safe 20 minute maintenance flight home. Upon us returning the keys of the C182 to the office; we had asked for the airplane to be grounded regardless; for our own maintenance personnel to inspect the airplane. Our maintenance had let us know that the bottom of the fuselage appeared slightly bent and that the left brake that had been replaced still needed some work. Seeing as that we had flown an aircraft that had the potential to be unairworthy; I will be much more careful next time I take a maintenance flight and see if I can get a double check on aircraft that need to flown; with other mechanics. I do not do many maintenance flights for this reason and will be much more thorough about what airplanes I fly. Pilot conducting a ferry flight of a C182 that may have been in unairworthy condition.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

All flight attendants were in forward cabin with the Captain while he was providing us with his safety briefing. Gate agents sent passengers down 2 minutes early. Crew noticed passengers were boarding the aircraft at Door 2L with no FAs at the door. This is a violation of FAR 121.394 flight attendant requirements during passenger boarding. It states: 'the flight attendants must be evenly distributed throughout the airplane cabin; in the vicinity of the floor-level exits to provide the most effective assistance in the event of an emergency.' This seems to be happening quite frequently. Evidently customer service agents have been given a directive to 'board 2 minutes early' regardless if the flight attendants are ready or agree with it (which we do not). Passengers started boarding before the flight attendants were ready for them.