Aryan95614/aerograph-asrs huggingface dataset:
Aircraft: MEDIUM TRANSPORT; LOW WING; 2 TURBOJET ENG
Phase of flight: Final Approach
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

The flight to DCA was uneventful till about 5 miles on final. We had a constant tail wind on the approach around 30-40 kts. Approach was conducted on autopilot. We broke off around 1400-1800 ft. and continued in marginal VMC. After we passed 1000 ft. in stable conditions I noticed that aircraft slowly and then more aggressively starting to pitch down and vertical speed suddenly increasing from 800-900 ft/min to 1200-1800 ft/min. I was hoping that autopilot would correct this pitch down moment; but it didn't respond as I expected. I disconnected autopilot and stabilized path and speed before 500 ft. AGL. The rest of the of the approach and landing was uneventful. I would think that there was a combination of factors of the strong tailwind and some interference from the ground facilities. I am not sure if 5G interference played a role in this approach. I hope my case was a single event today; but if there were numerous aircraft affected on the approach this day; it should be investigated. Air carrier Captain reported autopilot issues on final approach at DCA; citing 5G interference as possibly contributing.
Aircraft: CRJ200
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

On climbout at approximately 1;000 feet AGL; we had a SMOKE TOILET Caution message with the smell of electrical fumes in the cabin and possible smoke. This was a ferry flight with no Flight Attendant; the cockpit door was open and the cabin lights were off; so it was difficult to confirm the smoke. I informed ATC we needed to return to the airport due to cabin smoke. We accomplished immediate action items for smoke and prepared for the return to the airport. ATC vectored us to a visual. Turning to final; I noticed the caution message was out and the fumes had dissipated. I was the Pilot Monitoring and the First Officer; who was the Pilot Flying; accomplished an uneventful landing. We told Tower the situation had cleared and that we could taxi back to the gate. We were given all clear from the fire department after an external inspection; and we taxied back to the gate. From there; we called Maintenance; and the Dispatcher.I am not aware of any undesired aircraft states occurring; but we had threats including numerous MELs (no Autopilot; and Antiskid channel one inop.); busy airport; and approaching 10 hours of duty. Another threat was that my O2 mask continued to fog up making it hard to see. Because I was unable to ascertain if there was actual smoke in the cabin due to the no lights in the cabin; on future ferry flights; I may turn on a few reading lights in the rear of the cabin. The fogging of the O2 mask was probably due to me not ensuring I had a good seal when I put the mask on. In the future; I'll be sure to have a good seal. CRJ-200 Captain reported returning to departure airport after receiving a SMOKE TOILET caution message and smelling electrical fumes.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Landing
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

I was flying an ILS (Instrument Landing System) approach to Runway XXR during VMC (Visual Meteorological Conditions) conditions. At 1;000 and 500 ft. AGL; the aircraft was stable and on glide slope with target landing speed. At approximately 400 ft. AGL I noticed a yaw to the left along with a master caution light. I corrected the yaw condition and asked the Captain to look at the caution. The aircraft remained stable and I landed without incident. Upon landing roll out the left engine was observed to be at 0 RPM.The Captain informed me that he was guarding the throttles and adjusted his position in his seat for better visual lookout. While adjusting his position his hand must have brushed against the left engine start lever and once out of the stop it fell approximately 1' and began to shut down the engine.Specifically provide guidance for hand placement for throttle guarding during an approach for the pilot monitoring. B737 First Officer reported that the Captain bumped an engine start lever during approach and caused the engine to shut down.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Takeoff / Launch
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

The First Officer briefed the ZZZZZ SID Runway XXL; which has the same initial altitude then a turn to ZZZZZ1; as is listed for Runway XY. As we performed the Before Push Checklist we became distracted during the runway response by the confirmation of receiving Report X. As we began the climb; we then noticed that the FMC was setup for XXL. As we passed 5;XXX feet; the FMC sequenced to turn direct ZZZZZ1; which was the same flight path for a Runway XY departure for the ZZZZZ SID; therefore no flight path deviation occurred. During loading of the FMC route the runway was initially loaded as XXL; after verifying with the Ramp that Runway XY was the intended departure runway for the ZZZZZ SID; I began to update the FMC. At that time the FA informed me of an issue that required the Ops Agent; therefore; distracting me from completing the runway change. When I returned; in my mind I had completed the runway change. I briefed the departure and we did not catch the error as the altitude of the turn coded in the FMC; and all the waypoints are identical for the two runways. As we performed the Before Push Checklist we were also distracted during the runway response by the confirmation of receiving Report X. We taxied out single engine and my focus was on starting the #2 engine. As we approached the end of Taxiway G we were cleared for takeoff. As we began the initial climb; I noticed that the FMC was setup for XXL. As we passed 5;XXX feet; the FMC sequenced to turn direct ZZZZZ1; which was actually the intended flight path for a Runway XY departure for the ZZZZZ SID; therefore no lateral fight path deviation occurred. Some additional external factors involved that led to additional distractions are the possibilities of furloughs related to COVID-19. Air Carrier flight crew reported loading the incorrect departure runway in the FMS but no track deviation occurred due to the flight path being the same. The First Officer reported distraction and COVID-19 job related concerns contributed to the event.
Aircraft: SMALL AIRCRAFT; HIGH WING; 1 ENG; FIXED GEAR
Phase of flight: Landing
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Stinson. Ground loop on runway; taxied to the end of the 31C. Stopped at the FBO and [had an] A&P look over the aircraft. No damaged to the airplane then left the same day. A Stinson V-77 pilot reported no injury or damage following a ground loop during landing. Maintenance examined the aircraft prior to departure the same day.
Aircraft: A321
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Shortly after arriving at the gate in our destination; the C Flight Attendant reported to me that she experienced symptoms and smelled an odor consistent with previous cabin odor reports turned in by other crew members. Her experience; as reported to me; occurred during takeoff and climb to approximately 10;000 FT. She stated that she smelled a dirty sock or musty odor and experience burning eyes at position 2R (A321) beginning at initial takeoff thrust application; with the smell and burning eye sensation gradually subsiding during the climb out; stating that she recalled not smelling the odor at about the time that I turned off the PED at 10;000 FT. Her only complaint beyond those was a sensation in the back of her throat throughout the remainder of the flight. None of the other flight attendants or the cockpit crew members experienced what the C Flight Attendant experienced. After receiving her report; I contacted Maintenance through Dispatch to report the odor occurrence. I advised the Flight Attendant to contact her Supervisor and get advice on whether she should seek medical care; and also advised the rest of the crew to do the same if they thought it was necessary. The aircraft was written up; an Aircraft Cabin Odor Report was filled out by me with the assistance of the effected Flight Attendant; and the logbook page and Odor Report were faxed to Maintenance. Our outbound flight was subsequently canceled; and at the time of this writing; the aircraft is awaiting Maintenance personal from a nearby maintenance station to trouble shoot the problem. An A321 Flight Attendant reported a dirty socks odor and experienced symptoms during takeoff and climb to 10;000 FT. The aircraft was removed from service at its destination.
Aircraft: A319
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Delayed reporting after Captain submitted [report]. Realized I should submit [a report] as well. Normal arrival into ZZZ. Snowstorm the previous night and into the morning. Ground taxi behind Aircraft Y with Captain riding the brakes. Taxiways with some snow and ice. Captain called for #2 engine shutdown. After arriving near the gate and lined up for a straight-in taxi; Captain set the parking brake; waiting for Ground crew to guide us in for the remaining 100 yards to the gate. Once directed by Ground crew; Captain released the parking brake and began to add power. No movement was noted and the Captain added more power; thinking that there was snow or ice preventing us from moving. I looked to checked that the parking brake was released and no message was displayed. I then looked at the pressure gauge and saw the needles pegged at 3000 psi; but was unable to recognize the discrepancy before the plane broke free with the asymmetric thrust and skidded in a 150-degree right hand turn. Once stopped; we confirmed that the needles were at 3000 psi with the brakes released. The Captain cycled the parking brake and the pressure returned to normal. With Ramp coordination; we continued our right-hand turn and returned to the gate normally. The brake issue was not reported via maintenance report since indications had return to normal. Follow-on flight crew was at the gate and we gave a verbal report of what happened with the brakes. We landed ZZZ XXR and taxied to the gate. We were waiting for the Ramp guys to marshal us in. We were pointed south with the right engine shut down; parking brake set. When they eventually showed up; I released the brake and added a bit of thrust to taxi in but the aircraft did not move. I assumed we had some ice and frozen clutter possibly stuck to the brake so I kept increasing thrust to get the aircraft to move. I am not sure how much thrust we had when the aircraft suddenly pivoted about 150 degrees to the right. I immediately retarded the throttle and selected full brakes. Ramp inquired why we made the turn. After we were cleared to continue the turn to taxi to the gate; we noticed that the park brake appeared to be stuck. Brakes released and indicated 3;000 psi. I cycled the brake a few times and when it showed normal indication; we continued in to the gate for an uneventful parking. I did not do a maintenance write-up as I believed this was the result of frozen clutter. I did inform the new Captain of what had happened. The pivot was sudden but it was not violent. We literally slid across an icy ramp. Very smooth. A319 flight crew reported a loss of aircraft control during taxi in to the gate due to the parking brake getting stuck and not releasing.
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

On final for the visual 34L into SEA we were following a [widebody] being vectored for the approach to 34C. Being 5 miles behind the heavy jet; we were cleared for the visual and I even prudently asked for the separation and their speed to better adjust things on our end to avoid wake turbulence. Around 5-10 miles from the runway at approximately 2500-3000 ft; we experienced a roll upset from wake turbulence from the [widebody]. It was aggressive; but controllable. If I had to guess; the aircraft was quickly rolled to about a 20 degree bank. The event only lasted a couple of seconds before we corrected the upset and were easily re-established. The Captain adjusted the glide path to sit even higher to the glide slope as to avoid the wake turbulence; but within the stable criteria. The rest of the approach and landing was uneventful and the landing and taxi to the gate routine. Upon reaching the gate and deplaning; one passenger stated 'thanks for not killing us' in a very rude disdainful tone. The second passenger asked if we dodged an airplane or birds. Neither were true. Due to the nature of the passenger concerns; I found it necessary to file an ASAP and crew report. After that the Flight Attendant-A informed us that the passenger didn't wear his seat belt even when instructed to. He was also the individual that stated his remarks to us. I also think that the [widebody] was high on his visual approach to 34C so it put the wake turbulence right at our altitude when we were flying a higher glide slope already; but it was dark and difficult to see the situation fully. I would suggest that the wake separation be increased for [widebodies]. Five miles was just barely adequate and any aircraft smaller might actually experience jet upset at a low altitude. EMB-175 reported encountering wake turbulence on approach to SEA in trail of a widebody transport. Reporter recommended increased separation from this type aircraft.
Aircraft: BRASILIA EMB-120 ALL SERIES
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance

Upon rotation received a 'peddle Steer Inop' glareshield message. We declared an emergency and returned to the departure airport for an uneventful landing.The root cause of this event is poor maintenance on the EMB-120 by this Airline. This aircraft has had this same issue multiple times. Either the Airline is not technically capable of maintaining these aircraft or they are not attempting to actually fix the issues at hand.I suggest this Airline Maintenance needs to be examined for systematical issues pertaining to troubleshooting and repeat write-ups. This is not a problem with a specific mechanic but comes from the top of our Company. An EMB-120 glare shield message 'PEDDLE Steer Inop' alerted at rotation on takeoff so an emergency was declared and the flight returned to the departure airport. Aircraft Maintenance is apparently lacking.
Aircraft: FALCON 7X
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

As this was my first trip to Southeast Asia using Controller Pilot Datalink Communications (CPDLC); I had studied the applicable procedures extensively; and was additionally confident in the experience of my copilot operating in this region. Crossing from the Manila Flight Information Region (FIR) into the Ho Chi Minh FIR over MIGUG and communicating over VHF; the controller asked us to report MESOX. We informed him that we were CPDLC; and he instructed us to use CPDLC. My colleague suggested that since we had ADS-C; we didn't need to send a position report. I accepted his recommendation; and shortly thereafter we were in radar contact. We proceeded to our destination without incident. In retrospect; I believe that we should have sent that position report; and will use this experience as a lesson for the future. Falcon 7X Captain reported he was unsure about reporting requirements in Southeast Asia using Controller Pilot Datalink Communications (CPDLC).
Aircraft: WIDEBODY; LOW WING; 3 TURBOJET ENG
Phase of flight: Takeoff / Launch
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Boston was departing on Runway 22R; winds were reported 260 at 13 kts with no gusts or windshear forecast. We planned a max power takeoff for departure on the HYLND4. At rotation; prior to establishing a positive rate of climb; the airspeed stagnated and the WAGS system sounded an aural Tailwind Shear alert and the flight director switched to wind shear guidance. Due to poor acceleration and climb performance; I advanced the throttles towards Firewall Power and we climbed out in takeoff configuration. The pilot monitoring notified Boston Tower of the windshear; and after windshear guidance was exited; Tower and departure provided vectors to HYLND; the final point of the SID. The power setting was reduced to max at about 1000 ft AGL and no exceedances were observed. With no evidence of damage or exceedances the flight was continued.Aircraft systems operated normally; windshear escape procedures were followed. Simulator training is very valuable in developing the reflexes for unexpected events such as low level wind shear. Air carrier Captain reported using firewall thrust to cope with an unexpected tailwind shear event during takeoff from BOS.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict

FLL feeder final was combined together. ROMEO was working Aircraft X inbound from the east for the 10L ILS final. Several controllers saw a 4;500 feet VFR [Aircraft Y] inbound from the north; descending southbound for the OPF/HWO area; and it was tagged as ''TFC'' acquiring the callsign via ADSB. Aircraft X was given an expeditious descent to get under the VFR as the Arrival Controller had numerous inbounds to both FLL parallel runways and it seemed this was the easiest way to de-conflict Aircraft X and Aircraft Y and go to immediately fix the other many aircraft who were also in conflict. Aircraft X was then also turned sharply in the descent in an attempt to join the final without crossing the projected path of the traffic; and miss a Caravan inbound for the airport too. Aircraft Y continued through the ILS approaches just west of PIONN; which has a crossing altitude of 025 and even turned back to the south and west to both miss the Bravo; but clearly also miss aircraft it saw out its window; creating even more problems for the ROMEO controller. The fact that this is allowed to happen and create unmitigated risk in the NAS is [absurd]. The traffic volume and complexity were already high; however had this event occurred during busier times of day; it would have been substantially more dangerous. FLL needs a bigger Class C airspace or a Class B! FLL airport is the 19th busiest airport in the USA; and one of the top 3 fastest growing; averaging 8% growth each of the last 5 years. FLL has a basic Class C airspace surrounding it that is beyond out of date and unable to aid in the safety of its aircraft on the finals. Planes inbound to each of their parallel runways are not offered any sort of protection until within 5 miles of the field; which allows several dozen VFRs each day to climb; descend; and transition across each final; without ATC advisories creating a very dangerous; unsafe; and hazardous situation in the skies above; not unlike San Diego in 1978. The FLL Class C is inadequate; and out of date; and needs a major airspace change around it; whether a bigger Charlie; or a full blown Class B before it's too late; just like [an accident in 1978] where people had to die before airspace changes happened. MIA TRACON Controller reported vectoring several aircraft conducting instrument approaches off course to avoid a VFR aircraft they were not in communication with.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

I was pilot flying during this event. I was resting my arm on the flap lever; inputting information into the FMS. I felt the flap handle move aft; the aircraft 'raised up a bit;' and the flap position indicator moved from the up position toward the 1 degree mark on the gauge. I immediately moved the handle down into the detent position. I pulled back on the handle to ensure that it was completely in the correct position. This confirmed to me that the flap handle had not been properly seated after takeoff cleanup. We were at FL390; 0.79 mach and 240 KTS. This whole event lasted less than 3 seconds.1 In cruise flight at FL390; we received clearance direct to a fix on the XXX Arrival. I was making an address to the passengers at that same time. The First Officer as pilot flying entered the new fix in the CDU and as he pulled his left hand back his wrist or hand brushed the Flap Control Lever and it momentarily dropped back the Flaps 1 position. The aircraft bumped momentarily before the First Officer could return the lever to the Flaps Zero position. There was no aural overspeed indication and the Leading Edge Device (Amber) in Transit Light did not ever illuminate. We notified Dispatch via free text message of the occurrence and asked for them to advise Maintenance. We entered the occurrence in the logbook and radioed Aircraft Maintenance of the event upon arrival at the gate. B737-800 First Officer inadvertently bumped the flap handle while entering data into the FMC during cruise; causing it to move out of the 'up' detent.
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Departed as normal; upon reaching approximately 400 feet received an EICAS message and warning for bleed 1 and 2 over pressure. Continued climb while cleaning up plane as normal. Leveled at 3;000 feet. I had the airplane and the radios; [Captain] began to run the QRH checklist. After completing the checklist the bleed 1 over pressure message went away but 2 did not. The captain decided to run the checklist once more with the same result. The checklist required us to land with one engine idle. At that time the captain decided to switch duties. I ran the single engine land checklist while he flew and had radios. After the checklist was completed we asked for vectors back to [departure airport] and proceeded to fly the visual. After landing we exited the runway. Everyone was fine and no other incidents occurred. Overall the [situation] was a success. We used CRM and the training we received. The only thing I would have changed was the decision to switch roles in between checklists. The captain had briefed that I would fly and he would run checklists as needed. The switch caused slight confusion on my end but we were able to handle the situation safely. An EMB-175 First Officer reported returning to the departure airport after receiving an EICAS message for dual bleed overpressure.