Aryan95614/aerograph-asrs huggingface dataset:
Aircraft: CRJ900
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

ATC cleared us to descend to 3;000 ft and slow to 180 knots and fly heading 360. We reported the preceding Airbus in sight. ATC gave us heading 300 follow the Airbus for the visual approach to 27L. Right after establishing the 300 heading; we encountered heavy wake turbulence. The autopilot disconnected as the aircraft rolled through 50-60 degrees and the 'Bank Angle' aural sounded. I used full aileron control input to stop the roll and established a heading of about 315 degrees. In an effort to increase spacing from the Airbus and side step the wake; I maintained that heading. To increase the stall margin I called for flaps 30 and continuous ignition to be added. The First Officer complied and notified ATC we encountered wake turbulence. The speed slowed below 180 prior to DEPOT and was at about 160 1.5 - 2 miles prior to DEPOT. Wake turbulence nibbled at the aircraft several times after the first encounter and we were very focused on controlling the aircraft and taking action to mitigate further loss of control. Another Controller then chastised us for slowing early and [then] he demanded compliance in the future. Because we were focused on controlling the aircraft; we did not adequately articulate the need for us to deviate from the ATC instructions. The controller was not able to interpret our notification of encountering wake turbulence as our having a difficulty controlling the aircraft. Speak up quickly and precisely when an undesired state is encountered and to notify ATC that the flight is unable to continue on the clearance. An error of mine (pilot monitoring) to not speak up to ATC and ask for a slower speed because of too close separation with the aircraft ahead that caused the dangerous wake turbulence encounter. CRJ900 flight crew reported encountering significant wake turbulence in trail of an A320 on approach to ATL.
Aircraft: A300
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown; Ground Excursion Taxiway; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Weather was bad (snow and very low visibility). Taxied Air Carrier X via Delta and Delta Two and cross Runway 23L. I forgot that Delta Two was closed because it wasn't plowed. Air Carrier X slid off the taxiway into the grass at Delta two. He didn't know if he was past the hold short lines; so we closed the runway. Had to get a tow to get him off the grass. I just forgot that Delta two was closed. It's a common taxiway that we use during the Air Carrier outbound push and I reverted to old habits. Tower Controller described a taxiway excursion when an air carrier was cleared via a closed taxiway during snow and very low visibility conditions.
Aircraft: C210
Phase of flight: Landing
Anomaly: Ground Excursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

We left mid afternoon in a C-210 and wanted to get a few hours in before nightfall. The weather was VMC the entire trip although we did deviate to avoid some weather. After a 30 minute deviation I decided to turn around and land before we went into some marginal VFR weather. The nearest VMC airport was 10 miles south of us and was reporting winds slightly favoring Runway 36. I entered a left downwind for Runway 36 and saw that the wind sock indicated a gusting wind from the east. I crabbed the plane for a crosswind landing. We landed on the upwind side of runway for a crosswind landing. After landing I got hit by a large gust of wind from the east which pushed the airplane to the west side of runway. Although I increased right rudder and right aileron the left main wheel went off the runway into the mud. After that happened the airplane was non responsive I could not get it back onto the runway. I pulled the yoke all the way to my chest to keep pressure off the nose wheel and we were almost at a complete stop when the nose wheel hit a rut and we [nosed] over on the back side of plane. Most of the damage was done to the plane while trying to pull the airplane out of the mud. The prop did strike the dirt at idle speed. Other than that there was not a whole lot of damage. After diverting from his VFR trip due to weather enroute; the pilot of a C210 lost control on landing in gusty crosswinds; exited the runway and got mired in mud causing the aircraft to nose over onto its back.
Aircraft: A321
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

After level-off Captain did all-call and ask if we smelled any odd odors; especially around row 19 and wing area. All flight attendants did cabin check and reported no odor. Captain said there was a dirty sock smell in cockpit and to continue monitoring cabin for odors. On a further check; flight attendant in the mid cabin noticed the odor for a split second. Flight Attendant 3 said she smelled it briefly and had a metallic taste. Reported both to Captain; he advised there were fume event write-ups in log book. Notified deadheading crew members. After landing; I had the dirty sock smell at my forward jumpseat. Breathed it in making arrival announcement; the back of my throat [felt] raw with an acid taste. Eyes burned voice went in and out and was coughing. Notified Captain after passengers deplaned; and he said it had come back on landing in cockpit also. The Captain phoned the aft galley after level off to check around row 19 for a dirty sock smell. We did smell it faintly. I did not smell it when at my jumpseat. We continued to monitor but did not smell any more the rest of the flight. The Captain said they had the dirty sock smell in the cockpit! #3 had a metal taste and headache. #1 had throat congestion and smelled the fume on landing! We were unable to check on the Captain and First Officer after landing because the mechanics came on board. A321 flight attendants reported dirty socks odor in flight. Flight attendants reported experiencing health issues.
Aircraft: CRJ200
Phase of flight: Climb; Takeoff / Launch
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

During the takeoff roll; we received a caution message and the 'STAB TRIM' caution message. As we were above 80 KTS; and the above did not involve engine fire/failure; loss of directional control; or the aircraft's inability to fly; we continued the takeoff. The initial climb out proceeded normally; with the aircraft handling satisfactorily. I attempted to reset the stab trim with the switches; but to no avail. The First Officer (F/O) and I both tried our trip disconnect switches and made sure that the trim switches themselves were centered; still the stab trim would not engage. After running the QRH; the stab trim would still not engage. I called Maintenance (MTX) over the radio and advised them of the situation and was hoping they had some trick up their sleeves to make the trim engage...still to no avail. I then [advised] Center and requested a return to the departure airport. I called the Flight Attendant and advised her of the situation and gave her the TEST items. I also spoke to the passengers and advised them of what was wrong and of our intention to return. We completed the 'prior to landing' part of the QRH and executed a flap 20 landing on rwy 18C. After we taxied in; we off loaded the passengers and I spoke to Maintenance Control and to the Dispatch Supervisor; giving them the information they needed about our flight. We then swapped into another aircraft and continued on to our destination.In speaking to MTX on the telephone after we landed; they seemed to think; based on the diagnostic codes in the computer; that there was a short in the Stab Trim panel on the center console. In speaking to the mechanics who came out to repair the aircraft; they thought this was possible as dirt/debris/water/etc. from shoes drips onto and into the center console when people get in and out of the seats on the flight deck. A CRJ-200 EICAS alerted STAB TRIM during takeoff but the crew continued. In flight; the Stabilizer Trim was found failed and would not reset so the flight returned to the departure airport for maintenance.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: unknown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

The callsign conflict was missed -- in my opinion -- as the result of two circumstances. First; I am still working on developing a workflow. Although I do have significant Dispatch experience; my coming up to speed in systems familiarization still has me with a handicap in reviewing potential conflict. Second; the workload for company employees as the result of significant cancellations; schedule adjustments; and non-scheduled flying as the direct result of the COVID-19 circumstances is requiring increased schedule activity. The resulting delays; reposition flights; extreme biohazard precautions within the offices and other company property...are all responsible for degrading the inherent stability otherwise found in well-established systems and in the best practice of dispatching. Communication -- while still required -- must be remote and minimized.Corrective action: It is my opinion the only course of action which would have prevented this occurrence is tighter communication. I do believe that if the ATC coordinators; Dispatch coordinators; and dispatchers were free to openly and routinely communicate as enjoyed in the past (absent COVID-19); and the situation were moot; we likely would not have had a callsign conflict. When balanced against the risk of closer socialization and systems still in place with ATC as risk mitigation; I do not believe that corrective action is warranted at this time and the systems in place today consistent with best practices and in the good interest of public health; worked as best as they could have.We were dispatching Flight ABC and received an ACARS from that aircraft notifying us that ATC had given them a new callsign -- Aircraft X 'ABCE' -- as the result of a callsign conflict. An identically numbered flight; ABC; no additional E; which was being operated by different Dispatcher was late inbound due to equipment delays. The callsign conflict was not apparent to us -- the dispatchers for this flight; nor was it recognized by the second flight's Dispatcher; ATC coordinators; or Dispatch coordinators. We acknowledged the new callsign; continued the flight as planned. Dispatcher reported a similar callsign issue and cancellations attributed in part to COVID-19 pandemic related work environment.
Aircraft: B757
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

We were on a visual approach to Runway 27 and while slowing from 210 to 190; we selected flaps to one and then flaps to 5. We noticed the zipper was not lowering and then noticed the flaps were indicating up. We had no EICAS warning. We accelerated back to 210; and tried to cycle the flaps. Again; flaps did not indicate any movement and no ICAS warnings. Fuel was at about 7;400 LBS. We asked for radar vectors to the north to troubleshoot and set up for possible approach to [the longest runway]. At this time I noticed we had a status message SLAT/FLAP ELEC. Again; with no EICAS message; I opted to set up for an all flaps up landing. We ran the landing with all flaps up checklist in the QRH. Flew an uneventful flaps up monitored approach to landing without requiring further assistance. When clear of the runway; we checked the brake cooling chart in the QRH before taxiing back to park. [We] landed at 167 KTS at about 163;000 LBS with auto brakes 4. B757-200 Captain reports failure of the flaps to move to the selected position during approach with no EICAS warnings; but with a status message indicating Slat/Flap Elec. A zero flap landing ensues at a landing weight of 163;000 LBS.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown

At XB:15 message arrived from flight stating the following:Over ABERI… Switched satellite coms from satcom to satlink and want to check if we can still data communicate with you via iridium's satlink system. Please respond. XA:25.At XB:16 a response was sent to the crew. At XB:36 the crew sent the following message:So that took 1 hour… Thank you for the reply. Estimate ZZZZ at XH:00When timeline for when messages were received by dispatch; the crew responded that the message was sent from the plane at XA:25. Message follows:Correct. We sent the message at XA:25. A Dispatcher reported a flight crew checked their communications to Dispatch via the Iridium SATLINK system while on a polar route over ABERI intersection. The crew's message took 50 minutes to arrive at Dispatch whereupon the Dispatcher immediately issued a reply to the aircraft. Twenty minutes after the Dispatcher sent the reply; the crew sent back confirmation that they had received the Dispatch reply.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

The flight was originally scheduled to arrive to ORD on the WATSN 2 RNAV arrival. The descent; expected approach to Rwy 27R and taxi plan were thoroughly briefed prior to Top of Descent. Shortly after the DAIFE intersection on the arrival; we were told to expect to hold due to runway changes in progress at O'Hare. We were initially given a 360 degree right hand turn just prior to the WATSN intersection; and after completing the turn were told to expect the ESSPO 1 RNAV Arrival to Rwy 28C. The ATC controller gave us clearance direct ESSPO. As we were less than 30 miles from the intersection; FMC changes were made in a rapid fashion. Shortly after making the changes and attempting to brief as much as possible prior to descent; the ATC controller cleared the flight 'via the ESSPO 1 RNAV arrival'. The crew misinterpreted the clearance as 'descend via the ESSPO 1 RNAV arrival;' and the pilot flying consulted with the Monitoring Pilot to confirm the descent to cross ESSPO at 12;000 FT. The error by the crew was that the 12;000 FT altitude was only an 'expect' clearance and ATC had not cleared the flight to that altitude. The crew initiated a shallow descent to 12;000 FT and almost immediately noticed converging traffic from the west. The pilot flying pointed out the traffic to the monitoring pilot as a potential threat. The crew picked up the traffic visually as well and attempted to query ATC about it; but was unable to due to radio congestion. Shortly thereafter; ATC instructed the flight to level off at 16;000 ft. The crew received a momentary TCAS RA during level off at 16;000 ft; and remained approximately 1000 ft. altitude above the converging traffic. The remainder of the arrival and landing was uneventful. [Report narrative contained no additional information]. B737 flight crew reported an excursion from their cleared altitude when they misinterpreted a clearance to 'proceed via' the arrival as a clearance to 'descend via' the arrival.
Aircraft: A321
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

At top of descent; we noted engine vibrations followed by ENG1 Comp Vane and then ENG Fail ECAMs. Accomplished ECAM actions; notified ATC; conducted appropriate QRH follow ups; briefed the flight attendants and Dispatch; and notified the passengers via PA. Landed at SFO with one engine inoperative. An A321 flight crew shut down the left engine due to vibration and an ENG1 Comp Vane ECAM warning.
Aircraft: MEDIUM LARGE TRANSPORT
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

I was working Ground Control. The runway configuration at LGA was the localizer approach landing Runway 31; departing Runway 4. Traffic departing for BOS required coordination with N90 TMU for approval due to a large mile in trail restriction. Aircraft X called requesting taxi instructions for departure. I advised the pilot that his flight would be delayed and a release time was coordinated. After the pilot acknowledged the information; I taxied him onto Taxiway 'A'; 'G' and instructed him to hold short of Runway 4 at Taxiway 'G.' while Aircraft X was holding short of Runway 4 at 'G'; I checked the brite to see where the next arrival was on the final and then scanned out the window to see if Local had any departures in position or on takeoff roll.The closest arrival on the radar screen was on a 4 mile final and there were no aircraft established on takeoff roll or holding in position on Runway 4. I coordinated with the Local Controller to cross Runway 4 at Taxiway 'G'. The Local Controller verbally approved my request to cross Runway 4 at Taxiway 'G.' I instructed Aircraft X to cross Runway 4 at Taxiway 'G' then turn right onto Taxiway 'BB' and hold short of Taxiway 'E.' the pilot read back the taxi instructions and proceeded to cross Runway 4 as instructed. While watching Aircraft X cross the runway I heard the Local Controller issue taxi into position and hold (TIPH) instructions to a departure and then advise the pilot to be ready to 'go right out.' I saw Aircraft Y in position on Runway 4 and a regional jet taxiing into position and hold for Runway 4. I immediately told the Local Controller that I still had a runway crossing in progress at Taxiway 'G.' as soon as I observed Aircraft X complete the runway crossing; I coordinated with the Local Controller that I was 'clear of Runway 4.'I recommend the use of 'memory joggers' for the Local Controller. For example:1. Folding the strip of the aircraft holding in position in the up position.2. The Ground Controller physically placing their hand on the departure bay; in the way of the Local Controller; to prevent reading and/or movement of the strips lined up for departure.3. A 'runway crossing' strip placed in the departure bay until a crossing is complete. Ground asked for and received a crossing from Local on the departure runway. Ground crossed Aircraft X. Before the crossing was complete Local cleared Aircraft Y for departure. I was trying to work out the location in the line-up for our BOS departure that had an Apreq time and did not notice the error until Ground Control brought it to my attention. At this point it seemed that Aircraft Y had just begun their departure roll and Aircraft X was clearing the runway. Although the Cab Coordinator has many responsibilities I must prioritize better and be more vigilant in my duties. LGA controllers describe a runway incursion due to the Local Controller forgetting that he/she had approved a runway crossing downfield.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Cabin altitude about 10;500 ft. Warning horn and light. Donned oxygen masks and gained communication. Initiated emergency descent and [advised ATC]. Cleared to 10;000 ft. Accomplished Cabin Altitude Warning Checklist. Informed Flight Attendants and Passengers. Accomplished Emergency Descent Checklist. Contacted Dispatch and Duty Control for diversion and overweight landing. Debriefed First Officer and Flight Attendants after normal landing. B737 Captain reported that the cabin altitude exceeded 10;000 feet while in climb at 25;000 feet; so he initiated an immediate descent and diverted to a nearby airport.
Aircraft: B767
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Object

After arriving in ZZZ and dealing with some taxiing issues; we eventually stopped the aircraft on a taxiway. We were marshaled to a stop in front of a tow tug by a ground crew. I stopped the aircraft and set the parking brake. While sitting there; I made several attempts to contact the tow crew while they were hooking up to the aircraft. Nobody ever got on the headset or tried to give me hand signals to coordinate the tow. After a couple minutes I saw the Marshaller walking away from us. At the same time we felt the aircraft start lurching as the tug started trying to tow us. The driver made 3-4 attempts to start the tow. I tried again to contact them on the interphone while waving the Marshaller back to the plane. Using hand signals; I was finally able to determine they were ready for brake release. I released the parking brake and the tow started. After being towed straight ahead for 15-20 seconds we heard a loud banging noise and the aircraft lurched. I stopped the aircraft and set the parking brake. No one ever made any attempt to communicate with us. After a couple minutes we saw the ground crew walking away from the aircraft. Over the next 20 minutes; I called call Ground control; maintenance; and the chief pilot. I had the FO call out the window to get anyone on the interphone to tell us what was happening. Eventually maintenance arrived and connected the interphone and told me that the tow crew did not connect the steering bypass pin and that after the tow bar broke free from the nose gear; the aircraft rolled over the tow bar. That is the point where I stopped and the nose gear was on top of the tow bar. B767 Captain reported the towbar broke free and the nose gear rolled over the towbar. The ground crew did not connect the steering bypass pin.
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

I was pilot flying. We were being vectored for an extended final approach. During one of the turns; I noticed that the engine 1 oil temperature was boxed red and was indicating around 130 degrees. I pointed it out to the Captain. The Captain ran the QRH for Engine High Oil Temperature. The first two items in the QRH say to reduce thrust on the affected engine; and to maintain the temp within limits. Thrust was initially pulled back some; but not to idle; and the temp continued to climb. Thrust was then pulled all the way to idle. The temp continued to climb. The QRH then goes on to say that if the limits cannot be maintained; a precautionary engine shutdown should be performed. With the oil temp continuing to climb with idle thrust; we agreed to shut down the engine. I saw the oil temp reach 144 degrees around the time the engine was shut down. The Captain performed the engine failure/precautionary engine shutdown procedure and the one engine inoperative approach and landing procedure. When the approach controller switched us over to tower; the Captain then [advised ATC]. We landed and cleared the runway; where emergency equipment was waiting for us. We then taxied to the gate and notified maintenance.A threat was having to perform multiple QRH procedures in a high workload environment; but due to the vectors and long final; there was adequate time to accomplish the necessary procedures. Another threat was having to perform a single engine landing since it is not something that occurs often. [Report narrative contained no additional information.] EMB-145 flight crew reported an inflight shutdown of the left engine when the engine oil overheated during the approach.