Aryan95614/aerograph-asrs huggingface dataset:
Aircraft: M-20 SERIES UNDIFFERENTIATED OR OTHER MODEL
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC

I was 10 miles north of ZZZ and flying heading 220 at 1;500 ft. MSL and 105 knots in a Mooney inbound for a VFR traffic pattern entry on a right downwind to Runway XX. Three airplanes had just landed and I was maneuvering for the 45 degree entry to Runway XX. I heard the Cessna announce it was 4 miles ahead and also maneuvering for the same entry to Runway XX. The sun was setting to the west which made it difficult to spot aircraft to the southwest and west of my flight path. I announced on CTAF that I was 10 miles north and maneuvering for the 45 degree entry right downwind Runway XX. At 5 miles northwest of ZZZ; I announced that I was 5 miles northwest maneuvering for the 45 degree entry; right downwind; for Runway XX.At that point; I heard the Cessna was on the 45 entry to right downwind Runway XX. I turned to a heading of 180 at 1;300 ft. MSL; 113 knots; and remained 5 miles west of ZZZ; while visually scanning ahead; left and right; for the Cessna. It was very difficult to see southwest and west due to the sun setting. At 5 miles west of ZZZ; I announced Mooney is 5 miles west of ZZZ maneuvering for the 45 entry; right downwind; Runway XX".Within a minute; I spotted the Cessna approximately 100 ft. below and 400 ft. to the right. The CFI onboard called on the radio; and said "did you see us?" I responded; "Yes I just did. Would you like to go ahead of me or do you want me to proceed on the 45 entry?" He responded that they would continue the entry and go ahead of me. I continued to fly a heading of 180 and then executed a turn to the west followed by a 360 degree turn to the east to enter the pattern after the Cessna. I landed and did not see the Cessna on the ramp.Afterwards; I called the CFI in the Cessna; whom I've known for years. I listened to his remarks and explained that I had no intention of overtaking him in The Cessna. This is not something I would ever attempt nor have I ever done in 18 years of flying. He mentioned they had requested my position in the air (around 5 miles out) and I said that I never heard that request nor that they were in the Cessna. I was only monitoring CTAF and visually scanning for traffic. I heard they were already on the 45 degree entry to Runway XX. I believe that 1 or 2 of their position reports or requests for my position were not transmitted or heard because we may have both pressed the mic button at the same time to give or request position reports. One of the Cessna's communications may have been incomplete which could explain why I heard that the Cessna was on the 45 degree entry to Runway XX; as I was 5 miles west northwest of ZZZ." A single pilot reported a Near Mid-Air Collision (NMAC) with another aircraft entering the landing pattern. Sun position reportedly inhibited early visual contact.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Clearing Runway 22 after landing; I thought the Controller stated; 'Exit the runway at Hotel. Remain this frequency and taxi to the gate.' I thought; 'Cool;' and changed pages on the EFB IPad to the airport page to reconfirm the location of our gate. Next thing I know the Controller says; 'Company Flight Number; STOP!' I hit the brakes and saw that another aircraft was lifting off on Runway 26. The Controller intervention had prevented what would have been a runway incursion. I looked at the First Officer and asked; 'I thought he said taxi to the gate?' The First Officer replied; 'No; he said to hold short of the approach end of 8.' The Tower Controller then cleared us to the gate.Beyond the obvious failure to communicate intentions and verify; the lack of signage and standard hold short runway markings at that end of the airport has always been a problem. After exiting Runway 22 on Taxiway H in ELP; a B737-500 Captain believed he had been cleared 'to the gate.' Instead; as they approached the lengthy overrun of Runway 8/26; Ground Control alerted they had been cleared to '...hold short of [the approach end] of runway eight.
Aircraft: PC-12
Phase of flight: Landing
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway

Landed at the airport on Runway XX. Winds were reported 090/18 KTS. I judged the crosswind to be in aircraft limits with 30 degrees of flaps. The left main tire blew out upon landing and the aircraft departed the runway to the left. It is my impression that no excessive side loads were imposed on the landing gear. The blow out appeared to happen immediately after touchdown.I will be more cautious landing with any crosswind in the Pilatus. While landing in a crosswind the downwind tire of a PC-12 failed and the aircraft exited the runway to the left.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: landing
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I have the following questions about the Landing Attitude Modifier:1. How will the Flight Crew know if this system has failed? Will the Spoiler light illuminate?2. What action is necessary by the Flight Crew if this system fails? I understand this system gives additional nose wheel clearance during landing.3. In light of the poor design of the new MCAS system can we be sure a single component failure or poor software design in the LAM system will not cause an erroneous spoiler deployment; or deployment of the spoilers on a single wing? I believe it would be prudent to review the design and implementation of this system. B737-800 MAX Captain reported questions about the Landing Attitude Modifier.
Aircraft: CESSNA CITATION SOVEREIGN (C680)
Phase of flight: Takeoff / Launch
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

After takeoff; and having raised gear and flaps around 600 FT AGL I started to add some primary stab trim to release pressure on yoke when we received 2 - amber CASS messages 1) primary stab trim fail; and 2) Autopilot stab trim INOP. Also we received 1 blue CASS message - autopilot fail A\B. I then pushed the red autopilot/trim disconnect button and informed my First Officer I would some help on the yoke due to no stab trim available. As we were trying to level off; Tower asked us to switch to Center. At that time I tried to use the secondary trim and saw no movement on trim indicator nor heard any 'clacking'. The first officer then tried to relieve pressure on the yoke with secondary trim to no avail. While maintain runway heading and leveling off at 2;000 as was our initial assignment; the First Officer declared an emergency with Tower and they said to contact Center as they could not help! Upon contacting Center [the First Officer] informed them we were an emergency aircraft with 2 crew on board and we would need to maintain present heading and possibly altitude to run some checklists. Center asked us to climb to 3;000 FT and fly northerly heading; so that we would be clear of antennas in the area. While doing the new clearance I reduced power and kept airspeed around 200-220 KTS which helped keep pressure on yoke to a minimum.We then ran the amber primary stab trim fail checklist. After completing that; we trouble shot some more to try and get secondary trim to work. We pushed the red autopilot trim disc button and tried reengaging primary stab; which would not work and then switching to secondary to see if that helped...it didn't!!! We then tried clearing CASS messages by pushing red autopilot trim disc. button and instead of using primary trim again we went to directly to secondary trim and this helped. We then advised ATC of our intention to diverting to a nearby airport with very long runways. We then worked through the remainder of the checklist for landing. This checklist informed us of the limit of landing flaps 15 and increased v -speeds and runway usage. While I was flying the plane and helping with radios; the First Officer set up the approach and coordinated with ATC to have emergency vehicles standing by. When abeam the airport I asked for flaps 7 to see how much secondary trim would be needed and we coordinated with ATC on how long a final we would need for our approach. We [flew and uneventful approach; landed and] informed Tower that we would no longer need emergency vehicles and we would be taxiing to parking. After shutting down engines; I retried the primary stab trim and it worked as if nothing happened. A CE-680 flight crew declared an emergency and diverted to a nearby airport when primary and secondary stabilizer trim systems failed prior to flap retraction.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Takeoff / Launch
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Taking off of Runway 35 at MHT; at approximately 110 KIAS (V1 was 134); the Takeoff Configuration Warning horn sound began. My abort briefing has always included the statement that the only things that meet our abort criteria above 80 knots will have some kind audible warning or indication; with the exception being; aircraft unsafe or unable to fly. With this in mind; and hearing an audible warning; I instinctively began to retard the thrust levers to abort the takeoff; and looked at the flap indicator; which correctly read flaps 1. I immediately decided that I did not want to perform a high speed abort for a Takeoff Warning horn. I immediately increased the thrust levers back to the Max Thrust N1 bugs; and completed the takeoff uneventfully. The Takeoff Warning horn only sounded for two; or maybe three beeps; and then stopped. I had only slightly retarded the thrust levers when I decided not to abort (I estimate approximately 10% N1). I know; from years of human factors education; that indecision can often be your own worst enemy; however; I did not have any concerns about the airworthiness of the aircraft; and felt that the decision to continue; even though the takeoff performance data was now invalid; was of considerably less risk than a high speed abort for an erroneous takeoff configuration Warning horn. All checklists were properly completed; to the best of my knowledge. We were not rushed. The warning horn did not sound during the thrust lever check.I messaged Maintenance through ACARS to meet us at [destination]; however; nobody showed up. Enroute I had confirmed in the FOM that an 'Info Only' entry in the logbook was the correct course of action with no Maintenance notification required. Upon arrival at the gate; I completed the 'Info Only' entry in the logbook; and briefed the next Flight Crew about the incident. [Report narrative contained no additional information.] B737 flight crew reported they elected to continue the takeoff after receiving a momentary takeoff warning horn at approximately 110 kts.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Visual landing into ROA with airport in sight; the Captain was in a left base for Runway 24 and while approaching the course between PROSE and HIBAN above 3700 ft. with a shallow descent of about 600 ft. per minute; we were approaching the mountain range under visual conditions and the terrain caused an RA to go off. The RA lasted about 5 seconds and we did not overreact because we could visually see that we were clear of the mountain or any terrain. Terrain page was up on FO (Flight Officer) side as well. Air carrier First Officer reported that while on a visual approach to ROA over mountains; they received a terrain RA while visually being clear of terrain.
Aircraft: PA28
Phase of flight: Landing
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

I meet two students for lessons. I briefed both students per the lesson plan and since I had not flown with either student I asked them if they had landed an aircraft by themselves and had they been demonstrated a forward slip to land by their regular instructor. Both students replied in the affirmative and demonstrated sufficient knowledge of the procedures and V speed during the pre-mission brief. Preflight run up and taxi were all within standards; however I noticed that the student pilot taxied well left of center line; he corrected after prompting.On the takeoff we performed a short field takeoff [and] the student lacked right rudder inpu. The student corrected when prompted; [but] this tendency continued for the duration of the flight. We stayed in the pattern and made left traffic. The first approach performed was a normal landing the student turned early to final and was well left of course; we performed a go-around. Second approach performed was a short field landing at the 1;000 feet mark; student preformed the landing within standards with minimum instructor input until the threshold touching down just past his intended landing point. Third approach was a forward slip to land. Student preformed the downwind and base leg to standards; but turned early to final and was well left of center line. I aborted the approach and we performed a go around. The fourth and fifth approaches were normal and short; both within lessons standards.Sixth approach was forward slip to land; downwind was within 100 feet of TPA; abeam touchdown 1;000 feet mark point student reduced power to 1;600 RPM and extended Flaps 10 and descended to 1;900 MSL (700 AGL). Student maintained altitude from base to final; aircraft was aligned with the center line on final however student began the forward slip early. Airspeed was 70 KIAS in the decent; I instructed the student to an increase engine power from idle by 300 RPM to make the 1;000 foot markers. Upon the threshold passing under the engine cowl the student abruptly reduced power to idle and began pitch for a nose up attitude without removing the forward slip. I promptly took control of the aircraft and pitched nose down while applying right rudder to remove the slip. The aircraft landed hard with the stall horn going off I heard a loud 'thunk' and immediately suspect a tail strike. I requested a taxi back to the apron where we parked and inspected the tail and saw visible damage. We secured the aircraft and returned to the [ramp]. A PA-28 instructor reported his student's control and landing difficulties ended with a high flare and an early power reduction. Subsequently; the aircraft landed hard which resulted in a tail strike.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

During cruise flight at FL350; FLT CTRL SYS B became inoperative. We completed QRH procedures which directed us to place the FLT CTRL B switch to RUD STBY. This also created additional failures in Diff Feel and Yaw Damper Fail. We also noticed that 'A' system hydraulic fluid appeared to be decreasing. Since we were not yet halfway and about to go on a portion of our trip completely over water for approximately 500 miles; we elected to turn around to divert back to ZZZ. We considered diverting 300 miles to ZZZ1 and looked at other potential diversion points on the return to ZZZ. We were going to be approximately 2;000 pounds overweight; so we [requested priority handling] in accordance with the FOM and company policy. During the approach the flight controls were sluggish. The approach and landing were completed per the 737 QRH Overweight Landing Checklist; and an overweight landing entry made in addition to the SYS B Failure in the a/c logbook.Suggestions - I think the 737 QRH needs to be reviewed for additional steps on this item. Very brief. Doesn't mention that follow on failures will occur including loss of Yaw Damper and Feel Diff. Additionally there is no information in QRH Overweight Landing Checklist that indicates[requesting priority handling] is required per company policy. B737-800 Captain reported a flight control system malfunction and hydraulics system quantity decreasing made flight control sluggish during cruise. The crew decided to return to the departure airport.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC

A drone/object passed overhead our position as we descended on the glidepath for [Runway] 20R. I saw the object for only a few seconds. We reported it to Tower. It was about 100 feet above us as we descended through 2;500 feet on final approach to [Runway] 20R. B737-700 First Officer reported a NMAC with a UAV while on approach.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

The adjacent Center was handing us two aircraft off on collision courses at the same altitude. We called the sector that was responsible for the two aircraft and in communication to advise them we weren't going to accept the aircraft on collision courses. The adjacent Center 'Controller' said; 'Roger.' Then he called back and told us 'he didn't know what to do about it.' We had to issue control instructions to him because he didn't know what to do! We told him to turn Aircraft X 20 right. Without this turn Aircraft X and Aircraft Y would have collided 15 miles inside our airspace. I'm not sure what to say. We brought to the attention two aircraft that were going to crash in less than three minutes and the Controller didn't know how to separate them! The Supervisor was on scene and watched everything transpire. ZMP Center Controller reported the adjacent Center handed two aircraft off to them on conflicting courses at the same altitude.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

I am filing this report to point out an extremely challenging arrival and approach. Initially cleared for PURRL RNAV STAR to DEN; we set up for Runway 35R since they didn't give us a runway and we had used 35R on an earlier trip. We briefed the arrival and approach to 35R and then had following changes:1) Slow to 250 from published 280.2) Given Runway 35L (changed box and briefed).3) Given ZPLYN1 Arrival and 35L (changed box and briefed).4) Told to accelerate to 280.5) Switched controllers and told to hold 210.Several of these changes required total [reprogramming of our route on the FMS]. Still a ways out the RVR dropped to 1;400 for blowing fog. The minimums for our CAT I aircraft (no HUD) were RVR 1;800. However; we had had 35R in sight for 40 miles so we asked for a visual to 35R with the field in sight. Approach Control said he couldn't do it because the field was IFR; but he gave us a heading and cleared us for the ILS 35R. (We were way out as all this was happening.) He said RVR for 35R was 2500/6000/6000. Tower then recleared us to land 35R. We flew the ILS 35R as previously briefed to an uneventful visual landing. As we cleared the runway; Tower told the guy behind us RVR has dropped to 1;400 approach end. He said he needed 1;800 and Tower said to wait as it just came up to 1;800 and then quickly to 6;000. My concern is whether we had the reported visibility required for the ILS even though we were visual the whole way. My First Officer said Tower told us RVR was 2500/6000/6000. He did not file a report because he is sure of this and is positive we stayed within the rules.I don't like the new RNAV arrivals that are very complex. It takes a long time to load and check them. The many restrictions--accompanied by numerous airspeed; arrival and runway changes--make them extremely challenging. We commented that they should attach a company safety form to the flight plan. Tower and Approach Control guys were very helpful. Great coordination between ATC and the flight crew of a B737-700 salvaged an uneventful landing at DEN during rapidly changing airport weather due to blowing fog. Programming changes to complex RNAV STARs was cited as a contributing factor to the flight crew's workload.
Aircraft: PA28
Phase of flight: Landing
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway

Came in to land on Runway XX. Upon landing student applied heavy left brakes. I applied right rudder to counteract. I applied the handbrake and there was no pressure. I had to use the handbrake because the Cherokee doesn't have brakes on copilot side.Ended up off the runway and in the grass. Taxied off the grass back to parking. Instructor reported that student pilot used heavy braking action on landing; causing the aircraft to exit the runway.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

It was day three of six for me and day three with very good FO (First Officer). Well rested; great rapport and above average Crew coordination. Knew we had a MAX. It was my leg; normal Ops Brief; plus I briefed our concerns with the MAX issues; bulletin; MCAS; stab trim cutout response etc. I mentioned I would engage autopilot sooner than usual (I generally hand fly to at least above 10;000 ft.) to remove the possible MCAS threat. Weather was about 1000 OVC drizzle; temperature dropping and an occasional snow flake. I double checked with an additional personal walkaround just prior to push; a few drops of water on the aircraft but clean aircraft; no deice required. Strong crosswind and I asked Tug Driver to push a little more tail east so as not to have slow/hung start gusts 30+. Wind and mechanical turbulence was noted. Careful engine warm times; normal flaps 5 takeoff in strong (appeared almost direct) crosswind. Departure was normal. Takeoff and climb in light to moderate turbulence. After flaps 1 to 'up' and above clean 'MASI up speed' with LNAV engaged I looked at and engaged A Autopilot. As I was returning to my PFD (Primary Flight Display) PM (Pilot Monitoring) called 'DESCENDING' followed by almost an immediate: 'DONT SINK DONT SINK!' I immediately disconnected AP (Autopilot) (it WAS engaged as we got full horn etc.) and resumed climb. Now; I would generally assume it was my automation error; i.e.; aircraft was trying to acquire a miss-commanded speed/no autothrottles; crossing restriction etc.; but frankly neither of us could find an inappropriate setup error (not to say there wasn't one). With the concerns with the MAX 8 nose down stuff; we both thought it appropriate to bring it to your attention. We discussed issue at length over the course of the return to ZZZ. Best guess from me is airspeed fluctuation due to mechanical shear/frontal passage that overwhelmed automation temporarily or something incorrectly setup in MCP (Mode Control Panel). PM's callout on 'descending' was particularly quick and welcome as I was just coming back to my display after looking away. System and procedures coupled with CRM (Resource Management) trapped and mitigated issue. B737MAX Captain reported an autopilot anomaly in which led to an undesired brief nose down situation.