Aryan95614/aerograph-asrs huggingface dataset:
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Final Approach
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Cleared for visual approach to Runway XXL at ZZZ; we were turned towards the marker and were high and fast. We were able to get configured and slowed by 500 feet; but below 500 we received a GPWS Terrain Warning. This prompted us to execute a go-around. We entered right traffic and did a visual approach to Runway XXL with an uneventful landing. After shut down at the gate; we received an Advisory Crew Message Report below 500 of vertical speed max -1456; vertical speed average -513. This is no doubt what caused the warning. As my eyes were outside at the time of the occurrence; I was not aware of the excessive vertical speed. At 500 feet on final to Runway XXL; terrain warning went off. [We] went around and did another visual approach. After landing; [we] received a print out that we were 1400 FPM at 500 feet. We were slightly high and fast passing 1000 feet but was correcting. Neither one of us saw an excessive rate; but it was late; after being delayed. B737 flight crew reported an unstable approach accompanied by a GPWS Terrain Warning.
Aircraft: SMALL AIRCRAFT
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

VFR flight from ZZZ1 towards ZZZ2 and return with no specific route. Tablet GPS lost connection with autopilot and I lost situational awareness trying to get the GPS reconnected (using AVARE app). When I finally abandoned the effort and looked at the GPS I realized I was in ZZZ Class B airspace at approximately 3;200 MSL instead of below the 3;000 MSL floor as I usually am. Corrected altitude immediately and left the Class B; went home and landed.I should have had the GPS completely set up before departure and should also have stayed at my usual altitude of 2;500 MSL for local flights. I really don't have an excuse for losing situational awareness. Problem was exacerbated by opening a 2nd app (Naviator) at which point I didn't know which app might have been trying to control the autopilot. I will certainly not make that mistake again! Had not flown at all from 5 months so I am admittedly not as proficient as I would like to be. Will be correcting that situation shortly also! GA pilot reported losing GPS connection on tablet resulting in a Class B airspace incursion.
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Event / Encounter Vehicle

My crew and I reported for duty at XA:54L in ZZZ. Our aircraft; was coming in from ZZZZ and we met the crew at gate at approximately XB:00L. Upon deplaning; the Captain informed me that the parking brake was very difficult to set and that he had written it up. Maintenance showed up to the aircraft before my crew was allowed onto the plane; as it had to be searched first since it came from Canada. By the time we were allowed onto the plane; the maintenance crew was already working on it. I was able to get into the cockpit to begin my preflight preparations for our flight to ZZZ1. I noticed that the Maintenance workers were continuously pumping the parking/emergency brake up and down many times in an attempt to lubricate the lever. This apparently bled all of the pressure out of the parking brake accumulator; as evidenced by the illumination of the 'EMRG BRK LO PRES' caution light. I referred to the QRH regarding this caution light and it only said that the emergency/parking brake performance may be degraded and to use wheel chocks when parking the airplane. However; I knew to accumulator would recharge once the engines were started.Upon pushback from the gate; we were given the signal to start the engines. I instructed my First Officer to start the number 1 engine; which is standard operating procedure. Shortly after the engine started; and while the ground crew was still pushing us back; the 'EMRG BRK LO PRES' caution light extinguished; as I knew it would. Once the pushback was completed; I received the signal to set the parking brake; which I did (the parking brake light illuminated as well). However; once the ground crew disconnected the tug from the nose gear; the aircraft started slowing moving forward. I was unable to stop the aircraft in time before it made contact with the aircraft tug. Why the aircraft moved forward with the parking brake set is something I am unable to explain. My guess is that even though the caution light extinguished; there wasn't enough brake pressure in the accumulator to keep the aircraft from moving. There is also no indication in the cockpit regarding parking brake pressure.After contact with the tug occurred; maintenance was called to the aircraft and we were then towed back to the gate. Passengers were deplaned and the aircraft was shut down. A write-up was entered into the aircraft logbook and the crew was given another aircraft to continue the flight to ZZZ1. EMB-145 Captain reported after maintenance action; parking brake failed after gate pushback; resulted in collision with tug.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

The aircraft listed entered my airspace without coordination.I previously reported dozens of airspace violations directly to management. Management has recently changed its stance; and they now view a violation of my airspace as a performance issue on my part. It is their stance I am to watch all surrounding sectors and prevent other controllers from failing to do their job. I will now be reporting these airspace violations here instead to preserve my career.Also worth noting; the Controller that violated my airspace was working their first session after XX days off of COVID leave; and was working a higher volume of traffic than they could handle with the rust of being off so long. Controller did not have a D-side or any other support. The supervisor was apparently unaware of the traffic volume; and I walked over to ask him to monitor Controller.Bring back the safety and reporting culture. A controller should not have to choose between complying with a mandatory reporting requirement or losing their job; especially when it isn't that controller failed to comply with regulations. Center Controller reported multiple airspace violations resulting from hand-off issues with adjacent sector controllers.
Aircraft: SMALL AIRCRAFT
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Aircraft was below terrain and MSAW [Minimum Safe Altitude Warning] never went off. If it had; I probably would have caught it.A ticket has been submitted [to maintenance]. ZAB Controller reports of an aircraft that was below the terrain and the MSAW [Minimum Safe Altitude Warning] doesn't alarm.
Aircraft: C172
Phase of flight: Initial Climb
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC

Aircraft X released off LGB airport by Manhattan/Laker combined sector; training in progress. I was working the Controller in Charge position; when the trainer working position advised me of a possible situation in progress. I observed the trainee/trainer issuing a safety/traffic alert to the departing IFR aircraft and observed opposite direction traffic at co-altitude. Once the situation had been resolved I felt the situation appeared to be a near midair collision and was unaware of traffic being issued by the tower. I contacted LGB Tower to figure out if they had issued traffic and were doing anything to ensure separation. The LGB Controller didn't seem to be aware there was even a situation and didn't seem to care that we and pilots in control of both aircraft had to take evasive action; after further communication with the departing aircraft we determined no traffic was issued to the IFR aircraft prior to transfer of communication despite the unsafe situation. I have still not been made aware of any traffic issued to the other aircraft that LGB Tower was in communication with but it did appear that aircraft also took evasive action and turned hard south to avoid collision while our departing IFR aircraft turned north west.LGB Tower Control needs to maintain communication with both aircraft and issue and resolve any conflicts prior to transferring communications. I feel the Tower Controller needs immediate remedial training and be explained duty priority; then be able to demonstrate this ability before being returned to active duty. SCT TRACON Controller reported an unsafe situation with traffic off of LGB and traffic inbound to LGB.
Aircraft: MEDIUM TRANSPORT; LOW WING; 2 TURBOJET ENG
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

We were assigned a descent to 10;000 FT. The First Officer dialed 10;000 FT in the altitude selector; and I verified the altitude while is finger was on the knob. I then read back the clearance to 10;000 FT to ATC. While descending through approximately 13;000 FT; ATC asked us to verify we were cleared to 14;500 FT. I said we were assigned 10;000. He issued a low altitude alert and instructed an immediate climb to 14;500 FT. The First Officer disengaged the autopilot and climbed to 14;500. We then re-engaged the autopilot and continued the descent and approach without incident. The GPWS never detected anything; and neither of us saw any amber terrain on the map; so I don't believe we were close to impacting any terrain. I have no way of knowing why the incorrect altitude was assigned. We knew we were still over somewhat mountainous terrain; so we could have asked him to verify that was a safe altitude. An Air Carrier crew over mountainous terrain understood they were cleared to 10;000 FT; but while descending through 13;000 FT; ATC commanded a LOW ALTITUDE ALERT with an immediate climb to 14;500 FT. No EGPWS warning alerted.
Aircraft: JET/LONG RANGER/206
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC

While enroute to assigned base on a southwest heading; a crop duster popped up at my 12 o'clock. I was approximately 5 miles or so southwest of AWM. I don't know exactly the distance; but it was within 500 feet. At no time while enroute to base did myself or the nurse or paramedic see the crop-duster. Normally we will see them off to our left or right or in front of us. The way in which this one appear suddenly indicated to me that it must have come from behind our aircraft.When I saw the crop-duster; it was flying straight up in the air like they normally do after they have made a pass spraying chemicals. It appeared that it had come from either directly underneath us or perhaps to our left rear quarter area. Upon seeing the crop duster I turned to the south because the crop duster was drifting to the north. If the crop duster came from behind and/or underneath our aircraft; I don't know what I could have done to see him ahead of time. We always are on guard for crop dusters in our area because they frequent our flying areas. If this one was flying around during our pathway back to the base; we did not notice him like we normally notice the crop dusters. It is possible he could have taken off from behind us after we passed that area; or been behind some trees. We normally see the crop dusters well in advance. This is the first time in flying in crop dusting areas that this type incident has occurred. I think that even if I had been a few hundred feet higher we still would have encountered the crop duster as he was flying up; but I will make a point to fly even higher to lessen the chances of this occurring again. At the same time I think it is important for crop dusters to be more aware because if it had come from behind us he should have seen us; but at the same time I understand that they probably don't look up in the air as they are spraying. I believe that if I fly even higher and continue to be vigilant (as we always are to crop dusters in the area) I think this can reduce the chances of this occurring again. Helicopter pilot reported an NMAC with a crop duster in the vicinity of AWM airport.
Aircraft: WIDEBODY TRANSPORT
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Boston Tower (128.8) cleared us to cross Runway 22R at E; then call Ground on 121.9. Clearing the runway on the west side; we had to stop because we were unsure if a taxiing B757 was going to give way or not. The B757 flight was in the turn from K onto B northbound. The B757 aircraft showed no indication they would stop. Their taxi light remained on the entire event. My Captain held position on E and turned off our taxi light. The rear of our plane was still well over the hold short line on the active runway side. I contacted Ground on 121.9 as B757 crossed E directly in front of us; as my attention previously was on the B757 aircraft. The Ground Controller then told us to give way to the B757. Ground then cleared us left on B; right on K to the gate. This is the path B757 had just come. The was not enough room for our aircraft to clear the hold short line for 22R and remain clear of Taxiway B for the B757. Possible coordination issue between Tower Controller for 22R (128.8); Ground Controller; the B757 flight; and us. We had no advisory from Tower or Ground regarding the B757. As a result of the conflict with B757 we remained on an active runway until the B757 turned and passed quite quickly. When we crossed 22R we were cleared to taxi by Ground on 121.9 via B and K taxiways.The B757 was in a hurry. They later said on the radio that they were running out of duty day. I don't know what clearance the B757 was given but I felt that they should have give way to an aircraft exiting an active runway and taxiing straight ahead. An air carrier crew reported clearance to cross BOS Runway 22R but before clearing the Runway on Taxiway E stopped because a B757 turning from K onto B did not yield.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Landing
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

The LED landing lights chosen to replace older incandescent models are wholly unsuitable in intensity and field of illumination. It is extremely difficult to land at many Central American destinations which often have lighting and markings not up to domestic US standards. I note an uptick in maintenance originated write-ups of cracked podding; rotating shims; and other gripes on these aircraft. I'd suggest maintenance look for a correlation; these aircraft are difficult to land well at night. The miserable illumination provided by the chosen retrofit LED landing lights is a clear detriment to safety. B737NG Captain reported the new LED landing lights do not provide the level of illumination found in the older incandescent bulbs.
Aircraft: CRJ900
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

While enroute and climbing to FL330 the First Officer (pilot flying) reported a PIT flag on his Attitude indicator. Flight information was quickly cross checked with my side and with the standby instruments which indicated discrepancies on the First Officer's flight information. All of his information was unreliable including attitude; heading; and altitude. At that time I assumed control of the aircraft and became the flying pilot. ATC was informed of the loss of the First Officer's instruments and the autopilot. The problem was also complicated with incorrect flight director information on both sides of the aircraft. The flight director was cancelled and I flew the aircraft in raw data. We requested lower to vacate RSVM altitudes. Approximately 10 minutes into hand flying the aircraft we received an uncommanded rudder deflection full left; which then returned back to normal trim on its own. The autopilot was still off. At this time we declared an emergency as a precaution and asked for a lower altitude. At this time we had approximately 25 remaining to our destination. A second uncommanded rudder deflection occurred on descent 15 minutes after the initial one. It was less pronounced and was to the right. All checklist and company procedures were followed as outlined in the flight manual and the QRH. The company was notified via ACARS. The flight attendants were [briefed regarding the anomalies. The flight was completed without further incident. Maintenance and dispatch were contacted via telephone upon arrival at the gate. Two maintenance write-ups were completed at the gate. [I suspect they may need to] replace the IRS. Following the loss of the First Officer's flight instruments and the autoflight systems the flight crew of a CRJ-900 later experienced uncommanded full or near full rudder deflections to both the left and right. They descended and landed without further incident at their destination.
Aircraft: PC-12
Phase of flight: Landing
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft

At touchdown; aircraft started to pull right and right wing started to drop. I heard a noise and thought I had blown a tire. Next I flew back to centerline and in doing so I may have added slight power. I slapped the gear handle. I never heard a Gear Warning tone. When the Crew was asked; they said they didn't either.Settling down again; I kept the wings level and anticipated what I thought might be the inevitable right tendency.The aircraft however remained level; but I informed tower I had an issue and would roll out to the end. I appeared to have good control; and the noise was gone. I elected to taxi the short distance to the FBO with an escort of Airport Operations vehicles.By shutdown; all indications appeared to be normal again until post-flight inspection. At post-flight; damage was observed to the prop; the flap cowlings (subsequently the flap linkages); and rear avionics antennas.The approach to landing felt normal. I was sequenced between two aircraft and behind another Pilatus. Flaps were extended 7-8 miles from the airport and gear was extended on a final vector to the FAF approximately abeam the FAF. Landing checklist was completed via the IPAD; and a 'Last Finals' check was performed by myself at 500 foot call. (Last Finals: gear down-three green; flaps 15- final setting; lights on; landing clearance; go-around altitude set). Yaw Damper (YD) was disconnected at DH announcement.On GP for the ILS; Torque was normal at 6-7 inches with the AOA indicating middle or slightly lower. Idle power was set between 70-50 AGL. Initial touchdown was at TDZ or slightly beyond.ATC was typical for the airport and time of day.Maintenance and company management are investigating. And I have been reviewing my actions and performance in this event. Pilot reported that at touchdown the aircraft pulled to the right and the right wing started to drop; however; the wings remained level during rollout. At postflight; damage was found to parts of the aircraft.
Aircraft: MEDIUM TRANSPORT; LOW WING; 2 TURBOJET ENG
Phase of flight: Initial Climb
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Released Aircraft X off PSP RWY 13R. A few minutes later I released Aircraft Y off of UDD. Aircraft X departed and [needed to return to the airport] with PSP tower. The tower called and said Aircraft X was going to stay with them and go back to the airport and land. Aircraft X continued on the 100 degree heading and never climbed out of 2;000 or entered the traffic pattern. That heading kept Aircraft X aimed right at the UDD airport where the other aircraft was released for departure. I had to call the PSP tower and tell them to climb Aircraft X who was well below the MVA in the area. The two aircraft never had a loss of separation. The tower should have given me the aircraft if it was not going to stay in the tower pattern. I should have tried to reach out to Aircraft Y on the ground to attempt to cancel the release if it hadn't already switched to advisories for departure. Better communication between myself and the tower would have made the situation clearer and maybe easier to solve. SCT TRACON Controller reported an aircraft departed PSP and needed to return to the airport. They stayed on PSP Tower's frequency; but left the airport environment. This lead to a conflict with an aircraft departing UDD.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

FMS bridge visual [Runway] 28. Scattered low clouds. The pilot flying went below visual glide slope with four red showing on the PAPI. The pilot not flying mentioned we were low and the pilot flying slowed the rate of descent.We needed to pay closer attention to visual indications and should have refused a visual in marginal conditions. The crew was debriefed following the incident. A Check Airman reported the pilot flying had descended well below the visual glide slope on the Runway 28 charted Visual BRIJJ approach to SFO before being alerted by the pilot not flying. The descent was arrested and the landing completed.
Aircraft: LARGE TRANSPORT; LOW WING; 2 TURBOJET ENG
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC

Took a handoff on [Aircraft X] from S46. Traffic volume was steady but normal. In my scan I saw conflicting VFR traffic for [Aircraft X] at 11;500 feet (unverified). I expected S46 to stop [Aircraft X] under the VFR traffic and wait for them to pass before shipping them to me; they did not. [Aircraft X] checked on around 10;000 and my first transmission was to stop their climb immediately and I gave them traffic. I did not use proper phraseology in fear of time constraints. I gave [Aircraft X] traffic again and he reported them in sight. I cleared [Aircraft X] to climb at pilot discretion once I saw targets pass. In my career this is the closest I've seen two airplanes come nose to nose in an uncontrolled manner. The likelihood of collision in my opinion was severe.Raise the top of the bravo airspace to 150. There is no reason a VFR [aircraft] should fly uncontrolled through the top of highly congested airspace and not talk to a controller. ZSE ARTCC Controller reported Approach handed off an aircraft into a traffic conflict with a nonparticipant aircraft within Center's airspace.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

During climb out (low 20;000s) received call from cabin that the temperature in cabin was very hot and getting worse. Was not able to control heat from air-conditioning pack; returned to [departure airport]; landed overweight but uneventfully.Was told by mechanics there was an air cycle machine failure. [Report narrative contained no additional information.] B737-800 flight crew reported returning to the departure airport after they experienced an air cycle machine failure that resulted in high cabin temperatures.