Aryan95614/aerograph-asrs huggingface dataset:
Aircraft: A319
Phase of flight: Takeoff / Launch
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

The event was a low speed rejected takeoff. Around 80-90 kts we received a door forward cargo ECAM. As per my brief on rejected takeoff; I assumed aircraft control and rejected the takeoff. I believe the maximum speed attained was around 90 kts. The auto brakes engaged and pulled the aircraft to the right. I immediately disengaged the auto brakes and corrected back to runway center-line using both the rudder pedals and the tiller. I immediately released all brake applications because we were slowing down nicely and the next high speed taxiway was still down the runway a bit. I asked the FO (First Officer) to make a call to the Tower telling them we were aborting the takeoff and required no assistance. I applied brakes as we pulled off the runway on Taxiway XX and then on to Taxiway XY.I then looked at the brake temperatures which were around 400 and climbing slowly. I then made an announcement to the passengers explaining what had just happened and that there was nothing to worry about and that we would have to coordinate with Maintenance and allow the brakes to cool off. I then called [Maintenance Control] and explained the situation. We came to an agreement that it was best to go to a gate and get Maintenance [to] look at the door and get brake fans to cool the brakes. I then asked the FO to call Operations and coordinate for a gate; Maintenance; and arrange for brake fans. We proceeded to the gate; blocked in; and released the parking brake after we confirmed that all wheels were chalked. They took a little bit to get the fans in place. The temperatures reached around 675 on the left and around 770 on the right. Once the brake fans were in place; the temperatures came down quickly. Sometime during all of this when we were parked at the gate; the fuse plugs on the right side tires melted. After the brakes cooled off; we changed the 2 right side tires. We called Dispatch and coordinated for a new release and more gas. A319 Captain reported rejecting takeoff due to receiving a door forward cargo alert through ECAM.
Aircraft: CITATION EXCEL (C560XL)
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

While climbing through approximately FL190-FL200; the right engine fire light illuminated. I called for the INFLIGHT ENGINE FIRE QRC (Quick Reference Checklist) and my First Officer performed that while I took the radios. The light extinguished within three seconds of bringing the thrust lever to idle. We notified ATC; leveled off at FL220 then immediately started a descent and a diversion into ZZZ. I'm not sure if I missed him reading it or if he missed reading that line; but we did not catch that we should have then conducted the ENGINE INOP APPROACH and ENGINE INOP LANDING QRC's. Knowing that we still needed to run more checklists; but with several things running through my head at that point we forgot that we should have remained in the QRC; we conducted the ENGINE FIRE and the SINGLE-ENGINE Approach and Landing Abnormal/Emergency Cessna Checklists. After landing we stopped on the runway to allow the ARFF (Aircraft Rescue and Fire Fighting) trucks to evaluate. They said no fire; so we taxied to the FBO and shutdown normally. Maintenance was at the aircraft shortly thereafter and removed the engine cowling's for inspection. They had an opportunity to inspect the aircraft before we left the FBO property and they stated that there was evidence the light was probably the result of a bleed leak from a bad coupling. I reviewed the single engine procedures and the emergency checklists after securing the aircraft. I will continue to study these on a more frequent basis to ensure I am extremely familiar with the QRC. In addition; with any future emergencies; I will be sure to slow down my non-flying pilot if they are 'breezing' through the QRC and make them read it in a very slow and deliberate manner. I think I let the threat of fire (despite the light being extinguished) push me towards the approach and landing instead of ensuring we were precisely following correct procedures. I do understand that there is a balance between perceived urgency of the situation and being too 'wrapped up' in correct procedures. My last suggestion is to make a change to the QRC that would help to highlight or draw the eye to any lines that direct us to another QRC. Perhaps a larger font; different font; bold font or another color font. CE-560XLS flight crew encountered Engine Fire Warning in flight.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: No Specific Anomaly Occurred All Types

The overnight remote aircraft parking location for ABQ between Taxiway 'A' and the airport terminal gates presents a hazard to aircraft parking at gates [at the south side of the terminal]. To terminate an aircraft at gate [those gates] when aircraft are 'remoted'; taxiing aircraft do not have a lead-in line to follow as the extended safety zone for [these gates] to taxi way 'A' is partially blocked by the remoted aircraft. This requires aircraft to taxi between unlit aircraft with no taxi lines to follow to ensure aircraft clearance.At the western end of the remote parking spots there is a taxi line that goes around the remote parking spots and the terminal for the first two of the eight remote parking spots. This line provides taxi guidance between the first two remote parking spots and the gates but then goes into a terminal gate. Taxi lines should be painted that give aircraft a safe taxi route from taxiway Alpha to the terminal gates with aircraft parked at the remote parking spots to the south of the terminal. An air carrier Captain expressed concern that the remote parking area between the gates on the south side of the terminal and Taxiway A at ABQ is hazard for taxiing aircraft inbound to those gates. This is of particular concern because there is no taxi lead in line on the ramp to insure an aircraft is centered in the remaining gap. The Captain also notes that aircraft at both the terminal and the remote area are unlit; further compromising safe passage.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Just prior to Level off at FL 340 both blue engine fuel valve closed lights indication lights illuminated bright blue; ENGINE 1 & 2 High Pressure Shut Off Valve CB's popped. Engine all normal indication; used ARINC conferenced With Dispatch; Technical Support Maintenance Control; [and] Chief Pilot. Notified ATC [and] landed in ZZZ. B737 Captain reported multiple engine fuel and bleed air anomaly indications just prior to leveling off at cruise altitude.
Aircraft: MEDIUM TRANSPORT; HIGH WING; 2 TURBOPROP ENG
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Aircraft X on a vector for a RNAV 33 approach on the outside vector for the crosswind to downwind entered the obstruction ring for 2500 at 2000 ft. I was also dealing with a heavy aircraft and trying to fix the flight plan and steering clear of an active MOA while also vectoring additional aircraft for their approaches. I should have turned Aircraft X sooner and then commenced with dealing with other facilities on the landlines. TRACON Controller reported aircraft was vectored into a higher MVA.
Aircraft: SMALL AIRCRAFT; LOW WING; 1 ENG; FIXED GEAR
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

We requested the RNAV 26 approach. We were cleared direct HEDED; a waypoint with which we were not familiar. Flight conditions were a broken cloud deck at our altitude with moderate chop; good VFR conditions below. [The aircraft was] equipped with an Avidyne Entegra flight deck and two Garmin GTN 650 touch screen navigators. We displayed the RNAV 26 approach on the MFD and it did not display HEDED nor was HEDED on the paper en route charts. We manually entered HEDED as the active waypoint. The MFD showed that we had just passed HEDED and we requested further instructions. However; the Controller advised that we were still approximately 10 miles to the north of HEDED and we advised that the MFD was clearly showing that we had passed HEDED. We advised the Controller and circled around in a right turn to intercept HEDED and the Controller inquired as to our intentions. We explained the discrepancy between the Controller's report of our position and the MFD clear depiction of HEDED almost at our then present position. The huge discrepancy caused us to be confused and in order to avoid a possibly dangerous situation we cancelled the RNAV 26 approach and requested a visual approach to LNS which was completed without problems. Once safely on the ground; we realized that HEDED had been entered as a user waypoint at our present position at the time of entry and that when the MFD displayed the approach chart; it had started up in a zoom configuration so that HEDED was off screen and not visible. The only depiction we had regarding the location of HEDED showed HEDED 10 miles to the north northeast of its actual position. We're not sure how HEDED was entered as a user waypoint (perhaps; in the turbulence; and the difficulty in using a touch screen that we accidentally created a user waypoint). However; the displayed misinformation confused two experienced instrument pilots. We feel that the data entry error coupled with the MFD approach chart depiction starting in a zoomed view rather than a standard view (so that the correct information which would have been at the extreme edge of the display was never presented) created a dangerous situation. The GPS navigator should never have accepted a user waypoint with the same spelling as a published designated waypoint. There were no [traffic] conflicts involved. After discovering a large discrepancy between the GPS and the Controller's location of a fix; the pilots of an experimental aircraft cancelled the RNAV approach and flew a visual approach. Pilots later determined that they had accidentally entered the fix as a user waypoint at their current location.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Final Approach
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical

Runway 1R was closed because last week's storm knocked out all of the 80+ lights and signs associated with the Runway exits; which still has about [many] days to go for repairs. There is also a long term closure of Taxiway Zulu at Taxiway Charlie that creates a need for all inbound and outbound maintenance repositioning aircraft; as well as traffic to Runway 1L or 1R; to cross mid filed. So this was a night time; VMC; calm wind night coordination for crossing midfield between Local and Ground.The arrival was on about a five mile final when coordination took place to cross Runways 28L and 28R with this towing aircraft at Kilo. There was also a coordination to complete the crossing of Runway 28L at Delta with another aircraft under tow that was inconsequential to the event. The coordination was crossing on Grounds frequency after an aircraft landed Runway 28L. I told the arrival to turn left at Echo; traffic crossing downfield twice. They acknowledged and I advised Ground I had their acknowledgement and they issued the crossings. I believe they gave the Kilo crossing first; and then the Delta. In between; as soon as I had the exiting confirmed at Echo; I cleared an aircraft for takeoff Runway 1L; the arrival had just rolled through and was approaching Echo. This should have worked all day. As the aircraft under tow started moving at Kilo; they were looking good in my scan with their breakaway movement; then tragedy struck. I guess they were loaded with gas; because it did not work. Their extremely slow movement up to and over the hump (apex of the runway we normally see when an aircraft arrival has shut down one of their engines between the runways) and it takes just a little more for them to clear the middle high spot of the runway on crossing. It was decided at the beginning of the approach lights; it was not going to work.I sent the arrival aircraft around; with runway heading and three thousand; which they read back clearly and performed. I performed the coordination with NorCal Approach and then shipped them off to Departure. I would think that the tug driver would say out of caution that they were full of gas and heavier than usual before accepting the crossing; as this was very unusual for a regular crossing fleet with the Taxiway Zulu construction requiring midfield crossings. SFO Local Controller reported a situation where a towing air carrier aircraft did not tow fast enough across the runway causing an arrival aircraft to go around.
Aircraft: C172
Phase of flight: Takeoff / Launch
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

The [student pilot] was beginning a soft-field takeoff on runway 4 at SSI when she observed the Diamond Twin-star in the flare for landing runway 22 at the 1000 foot marker. I took the controls and was able to slow the airplane and exit the runway to avoid a collision. I followed the Twin-star to the ramp to talk with the pilot about what had just occurred. He was a [local pilot] and admitted he had been on the wrong CTAF frequency. C172 instructor pilot reported taking control on the takeoff roll and exiting the runway to avoid a collision with landing traffic coming from the opposite direction at the non-towered SSI airport.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Final Approach
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

During night VMC conditions; we were assigned to fly the VOR GPS B approach to 31L at PSP. This approach; we were told; was the only authorized approach into PSP due to a radar outage. We requested the RNAV Y (RNP) and were told 'unable' by ATC. This VOR approach that was flown had many threats embedded in it. This being the first time having flown this approach; I was unaware of its complexities. First; the approach makes you remain over 700 feet high on the 3 to 1 glide path at the final approach fix. We recognized this and configured early. The approach is also offset which places the aircraft in a trajectory toward rapidly rising terrain and a necessary descent rate of 1;900-1;500 FPM just to 'capture' the VASI. The outcome of the approach was successful without any GPWS alerts and we achieved stabilized approach criteria just in time to meet our 500 feet gate. It was a 'scramble' to achieve and certainly had many distractions such as trying to capture the glide path from above; rapid descent toward terrain and realigning with the runway. It seems to me that no CAT C or D aircraft should attempt this approach as you begin at the final approach fix way behind the stabilized approach criteria gate; I.E.; not in landing configuration and on glide path. Again; it leaves you 700 feet too high.On the ground; we queried ATC why we could not have flown either the RNAV visual or RNAV RNP and he stated it is the Local Control Tower policy to only allow VOR GPS B approaches to be flown during radar outages. There are no other restrictions on flying the RNAV's except 'local policy.'In the future; I would strongly urge [Company] to restrict our aircraft from flying the VOR GPS B as having seen it first hand; it is an approach with too many threats and a set up for failure (being forced to remain 700 feet high at final approach fix). I would not feel comfortable accepting this approach again. B737 First Officer reported the VOR OR GPS-B approach to PSP increases the flight crew's workload and has the potential of creating an unstable approach for this category aircraft.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I'm writing to address a concern that there is an issue with the B737 MAX. Since it has returned to service; after the global grounding; I have flown it at least 13 times. I previously addressed this concern with an aviation group; but my dialogue with them came to no resolution; and it appeared there wasn't much concern.The matter I want to clarify is performing the ILS test on the First Officer side. Outside of one time on Date 1; it has never functioned correctly (12 failures). It fails each time you perform the test. It functions properly on the Captain side; but not on the First Officer side. I inform the Captain of the failure and explain the Guidance Maintenance Control will probably take; which is to pull X circuit breaker; then run the test again. Many Captains are reluctant to make an entry into the Maintenance logbook. I attempt to explain that unless we write up the discrepancy; it will continue to be ignored. After nearly a year and no guidance from Flight Operations; I'm guessing it will continue to be ignored. I am not sure how to escalate the issue rather than filing a report and hoping the aviation group will explore the matter in greater detail. Please reach out to me if you have addition questions. B737 MAX pilot reported the ILS test on the First Officer side fails repeatedly. Reporter stated the problem exists and no one has been able to answer him as to why it fails.
Aircraft: CRJ900
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Departing ABE as per tower instructions and Company SOPs; a TCAS RA was triggered at approximately 800 ft. AGL during initial climb out. Flaps had not yet been retracted (20 degrees) and autopilot had not yet been selected on. The TCAS RA was followed; as well as a late vectoring from ABE Tower. The TCAS RA's required descent triggered a 'Don't Sink' aural from the aircraft GPWS.TCAS TA was triggered at approximately 500 ft. AGL as well as pilot monitoring identifying the aircraft in sight. Tower simultaneously vectored [us] to heading 280; and general aviation aircraft to turn away. TCAS RA was triggered during the turn and the TCAS RA was followed until the situation was resolved. ABE Control Tower cleared [us] for departure; runway heading; up to 3;000 ft. (I believe). At the same time; ABE Approach vectored a general aviation light aircraft directly into [our] initial climb out path. Tower and Approach failed to communicate to one another the instructions given and caused two aircraft to be vectored onto a collision course.An immediate turn to heading 280 was initiated; however; during the turn the TCAS RA was triggered indicating the need for a 3;000 ft./min descent. The resolution was resolved before a full 3;000 ft./min descent was achieved. A GPWS 'Don't Sink' aural was triggered during the TCAS RA's required action. This event occurred at 800 ft. AGL. No limitations were broken during the TCAS RA maneuver. The previously instructed heading; climb; and initial climb SOP procedures were followed after the resolution.Due to lack of internal ATC communication between approach and tower; [we were] accidentally cleared for departure into another aircraft. The TCAS RA which occurred during the initial climb-out at 800 ft. suggested that [we] descend at 3;000 ft./min. Luckily the RA was resolved before 3;000 ft./min was achieved; and autopilot had not yet been activated (increasing reaction time from pilot flying). The rate of descent the TCAS required triggered a 'Don't Sink' call from the GPWS; leading me to believe that the resolution of one situation could have caused the creation of another. CRJ-900 First Officer reported that a TCAS RA commanded a descent shortly after departure that caused a GPWS 'Don't sink' alert.
Aircraft: DA40 DIAMOND STAR
Phase of flight: Other VFR Traffic Pattern
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was working Local Control 2 which controls Runway XXL and Ground Control coordinated via the land line behind short final cross Runway XXL at intersection Delta and it was approved. I was watching Diamond Star on short final at the same time [another aircraft] crossed the hold bars Diamond Star advised that he was going around. The go around was conducted before the aircraft reached the landing threshold. I was working the Assistant Local Position monitoring LC1. Ground Control had coordinated a runway crossing at Taxiway Delta with Local 2 and Local 1. I had just received an IFR release from TRACON and was off monitor for a few seconds and then returned to listening to Local 1. Local 2 shouted out something about going around traffic was crossing. When I looked at the situation Diamond Star was starting a Climbing GO Around on Runway XXL and [another aircraft] was stopped about half way between the runway edge and the Hold Short lines. Recommendation; I do not believe we need to make any changes in procedure. The inexperienced Ground Controller should have said what he originally intended too. Tower Controller described a go around event when coordination between a Local Controller and Ground Controller was confused and Ground Controller cleared an aircraft to cross a runway with traffic on short final.
Aircraft: HELICOPTER
Phase of flight: Final Approach
Anomaly: Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Unauthorized Flight Operations (UAS)

While executing the ILS 04 into ESN on Date at approximately XA:30; our crew witnessed a small drone pass over the helicopter (50 ft. above helicopter). Our helicopter was within 2 miles from the field at approximately 450 ft. when the drone passed 50 ft. over the helicopter. The drone was approximately 2-3 ft. wide and white/silver. It appeared to have 2 rotors; but may been a fixed-wing type. The drone was reported to ESN tower who notified all aircraft on the ILS 04 and operating at the airfield. The drone was not seen again. Helicopter flight crew had a near miss with a UAS while on an ILS approach and notified ATC.
Aircraft: A321
Phase of flight: Final Approach
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

On a vector for approach to Runway 23; both Runway 23 and B757 traffic 3nm ahead in sight; CLT Approach Control cleared us for the Visual Approach Runway 23. Upon intercepting the final approach course; we encountered wake turbulence from the preceding B757; which contributed to us going through the final approach course. As we turned back to re-intercept the final approach course; re-encountered wake turbulence which then contributed to us going through the final approach course again. CLT Approach Control intervened and vectored us off the approach to re-enter to an uneventful approach and landing on Runway 23. I suspect the event occurred because we were within the range of the B757 wake. I suggest further separation from traffic ahead. [Report narrative contained no additional information.] A321 flight crew reported two track deviations from cleared course when wake turbulence from a preceding B757 was encountered during approach to CLT.