Aryan95614/aerograph-asrs huggingface dataset:
Aircraft: CRJ900
Phase of flight: takeoff
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

With the arrival of the new 900s; fuel has been calculated wrong. When I thought numbers were off at first I was brushed aside and was told because the engines are more efficient the numbers would be different. Then another Dispatcher thought the numbers were way off; so he and I started discussing a different release; he involved the 900 Coordinator. Eventually the conclusion was that reserve was incorrect; as it was only calculating one engine versus two. I have dispatched a couple different flights with; at least incorrect reserve numbers and burn numbers for the last week. The 900 Coordinator concluded that it was 'fine' because there has been extra fuel and the engines performance is better than what is planned and the fuel is ok. I feel this was a safety issue as the required takeoff fuel has been wrong this whole time. Basically I thought I was planning for 45 minutes in reserve; but really was off. Due to another Dispatcher's persistence; the 900 Coordinator looked more closely at planning numbers. Calculation errors on IT and or management. Also; a way to manually check computer information is not available. Better training on the 900s might have helped this situation. CRJ-900 Dispatcher believes that he has been dispatching aircraft with inaccurate FAR fuel loads due to inaccurate burn numbers provided by the company.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Had an RA and turned and descended 400 ft. to avoided traffic. Controller sent us on a heading and altitude to fly close to a light twin. [We] banked hard to the left and lost 400 ft. B737 Captain reported a NMAC with a light twin during climb.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

I was dispatched to PVR with an inoperative APU. I was assured the PVR station would have electric and air available. Dispatch had ZZZ alternate and specifically states do NOT send aircraft to ZZZ without APU so I had amended release for ZZZ1 alternate. The ground power in PVR failed multiple times and ground air was marginally warm. The last time the electric failed was during the boarding process. The ground crew decided to get another power cart. This left us with a dark cabin and running on battery power for several minutes. Do we need to relearn our mistakes from the past? This aircraft NEVER should have been sent to a hot climate with an inoperative APU! I'm very disappointed in Flight Operations for allowing this to happen! DO NOT DISPATCH AIRCRAFT WITH INOPERATIVE APU to HOT AND HUMID climate service! 737 Captain reported aircraft with an inoperative APU was dispatched to a destination that was hot and humid and did not have auxiliary air or electric available.
Aircraft: LARGE TRANSPORT
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Both engines were removed and re-installed during this visit. L ENG had some extra work done on it after discovering leaking fuel pump. On test flight profile at FL300 we got ENG OVHT L EICAS and light. Also L STRUT OH DET 1 and 2 maintenance messages were active.Following [QRH] after EICAS remained active with thrust lever at idle; secured engine; declared emergency; and performed single engine approach and landing. Cleared runway and taxied unassisted back to the ramp. Post flight inspection did not show any signs of external damage. During test flight left engine EICAS indicated overheats. Engine secured and flight landed single engine.
Aircraft: A319
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Our aircraft was fueled prior to the aircraft being powered by Battery or GPU. After powering up the aircraft and when verifying the fuel load it was noted that all the outer tank fuel had transferred to the inner wing tanks and the wing tank transfer valves had closed properly. This is the incorrect sequence for fueling and due to all the fuel in the inner wing tank; Load Plan (LP) was notified. Load plan issued new CG setting based on the valves being open which we corrected to show valves closed but outer tanks empty and a second LP calculation was sent. The third LP calculation sent had an incorrect passenger count; so a 4th correction was sent and confirmed to be correct. We departed with a delay. We arrived at the jet in the morning to find no power on the aircraft but fueling had already taken place. All fuel was in the inner tanks (12000 lbs/side); no fuel in the outer tanks; the transfer valves were closed. The Flight Manual (FM) indicates that fueling on battery power only may result in fueling with transfer valves in the open position; however they close when normal power is established. At this point we were debating if we could depart with no fuel in the outer wing tanks. The FM only addresses an imbalance in the outer wing tanks not both empty. However; a section indicates if the fuel transfer valves are open then Load Planning needs to know. We determined that there were no restrictions advised dispatch and load planning. Load planning first sent weight for operating with transfer valves open; then resent weights with transfer valves closed. Each had a different CG. It seems to me that it is not the position of the valve but the quantity of fuel in the outer wing tank that should be the determining factor. Also; after engine start the outer wing tanks began filling and they were both full within approximately 1 hour after takeoff. A319 flight crew reported a fuel distribution irregularity due to improper fueling procedures. After determining that center of gravity limits were satisfied; the aircraft was dispatched.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

After a successful CAT III landing; we had crossed the two inboard runways and were taxiing north on taxiway towards gate. The FO; who was on the first trip back after one month off; did the after landing flow and confirmed our gate with operations. I thought we were cleared into the gate via spot; but this was not the case.As we were rounding the corner for spot and passing Aircraft Y that was on the line just south of spot; I confirmed with the FO that we were indeed cleared in as I had been distracted switching from low vis taxi diagrams to normal taxi diagrams as the vis was very good; shutting down the Number 2 engine; in addition to the fact that the FO was a soft spoken person. I only mention this as I wasn't surprised I hadn't heard them confirm our clearance to taxi into the gate as I was busy concentrating on the other threats just discussed.As rampers were visible from spot and were marshaling us into the gate; we pulled into the gate normally. Approximately 20 feet short of our final parking spot ground reminded us to contact ramp. We immediately contacted ramp; who was understandably very unhappy with us and we apologized for our error.Needless to say; I take complete responsibility for this incident and am embarrassed I allowed it to happen. I have learned a couple of things from this incident- first; that I need to be extra vigilant when some crew members don't have a lot of recent experience; secondly; when we had discussed that the ground ops were our biggest threat for this CAT III approach; I need to truly take it to heart and be extra cautious to help mitigate the threats present during this segment of our flight. Air carrier Captain reported being distracted and not contacting the ramp before taxiing to the gate.
Aircraft: MEDIUM LARGE TRANSPORT; LOW WING; 2 TURBOJET ENG
Phase of flight: Final Approach
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

We were set up for 8L; visual conditions. Just before turning base leg we were told to expect 8R. We set up the radios and FMS; ATC vectored us to about 2 miles outside MATON (FAF) we descended to 2;000 feet; which is the crossing altitude at MATON. We were cleared for the visual approach to 8R; it was in sight. Everything was normal; the approach mode was armed. Because we were intercepting both the LOC and GS at the same time very close to MATON; we didn't expect to see the GS signal immediately. At MATON the airplane pitched up rather dramatically to around 15 degrees and the autothrottles pushed up the power and pulled it back; it was very confused. I clicked off the autopilot immediately and pushed the nose over; and then remembered hearing ATC tell someone else much earlier; when we were still planning for 8L; that the GS was out of service on 8R. We recovered the situation but in the process gained almost 500 feet at MATON. Whether it was the right thing to do or not we recovered it and landed. We were certainly configured per the stabilized approach criteria; but our speed was a bit fast; maybe 15 kts fast most of the way down. The landing was in the touchdown zone. So we may not have met stabilized approach criteria; and we definitely gained close to 500 feet coming over the FAF. It is; of course; my job to know that the GS was Out of Service (OTS); but the runway change happened fast. Either way; I've never seen an autopilot behave that way to a lack of GS signal. I did not write it up as I really wasn't sure WHAT to write up; it was just responding to erroneous signals. I rather felt this was my fault as I never should have engaged the GS; but this is our standard procedure for any approach with an ILS; visual or not. It isn't necessarily the responsibility of ATC to remind every single pilot that the GS is OTS either. Air carrier Captain reported a late runway change resulted in an unstabilized approach to a landing.
Aircraft: CRJ900
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC

We were being vectored to a visual approach to 22L at EWR. We were just north of the SWEET intersection headed NE. ATC advised us of VFR traffic 500 above us headed SE. We had additional traffic 1000 below about 1 mile off our right side just ahead going NE also. We spotted the traffic and the TCAS showed them only 300 above us. We were given a frequency change. Before checking in with the new controller the TCAS issued an RA with a 'monitor vertical speed' command. The VSI directive was to maintain our VS or descend. The captain held level and we continued to monitor the traffic. I advised the new controller with the check in. The RA cleared and the captain reconnected the autopilot. The minimum distance between us and the traffic was 300 feet. We continued to a visual approach with no further issues. CRJ900 First Officer reported a TCAS event during vectors to EWR with VFR traffic 500 feet above. TCAS showed the altitude difference to be 300 feet and commanded; 'Monitor Vertical Speed' possibly due to IFR traffic 1000 feet below.
Aircraft: CRJ700
Phase of flight: unknown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL

Maintenance deferred the IDG [Integrated Drive Generator] on the aircraft. There was a previous MEL that stated operations could not be dependant on the APU. Looking over the MEL's at the time of deferral I discussed it with the PIC and we did not realize both MEL's would render the plane unairworthy. We amended the release with the IDG deferral and the flight departed. Maintenance did not call to advise us of the deferral of the IDG or discuss the issues having both MEL's on the aircraft at the same time. Looking over the previous MEL it was not clear to me that the APU could not be depended on for operations. The Captain also did not realize that plane should not depart with the deferrals.We need better communication between Maintenance and Dispatch regarding airworthiness. I need to understand clearly what the MEL's are indicating and the performance issues that will arise when more than one deferral is on the aircraft. The MEL should be clearer with possible notes indicating that the IDG's must be operative. When neither the Dispatcher nor the Captain noted the MELed IDG; combined with a previously noted APU MEL declaring it unable to provide electrical system redundancy; the flight was released with only a single source of electrical AC power.
Aircraft: BOEING COMPANY UNDIFFERENTIATED OR OTHER MODEL
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict

Aircraft X was on the RWY 10L ILS at 013 [heading]; and Aircraft Y was indicating 010 [heading] in the left downwind for RWY 08 at VUO which is underneath about a 3 mile final for RWY 10L. I called traffic to both pilots; but Aircraft X got a TCAS RA and started to climb. The pilot of Aircraft X advised that he was going around because he got an RA and was too close to Aircraft Y. On Aircraft X's 2nd approach to the airport; Aircraft Y was in a similar location as Aircraft X approached VUO airport; but was able to land. This all happened because of the close proximity of VUO airport to the final for RWY 10L at PDX. Our arrivals and traffic at VUO are at very similar altitudes in the vicinity of UAO.Three things I would recommend are to:A. Put a control tower at VUO airport.B. Restrict pattern work at VUO airport.C. Close VUO airport. Portland Tower Controller reported an unsafe situation related to an aircraft inbound to Portland and one inbound to Pearson Field that resulted in an RA and a go around.
Aircraft: A321
Phase of flight: Other Post flight unload
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

We were aircraft on ground in ZZZ for a slide. [Tracking system] spreadsheet this unit was not Hazmat. When told unit had Hazmat stickers on it. When off other units that was have waivers to be able ship. All the information I had to go off stated the unit was not Hazmat. Even the documentation for the unit didn't state it was Hazmat. Asked planning about their list of slides deemed non-Hazmat and they were unable to find. We do have several parts were the interchangeable part is not Hazmat. As the system told me that the slide was not Hazmat it was faster to send our unit then to get a unit from ZZZ1 by several hours. Cause: Due to incorrect info in system items was shipped on [passenger] flight when it should not have been.Suggestions: Always have copy of pick list from [software] with no Hazmat statement. Maintenance Technician reported Hazmat aircraft part was incorrectly shipped as Non-Hazmat.
Aircraft: LARGE TRANSPORT
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft X was southbound from CYLW to MMPR. The aircraft was level at FL370. As per the procedure entering Mazatlan (MMZT) Center; the flight plan was verified; radar services were terminated; and the aircraft was shipped to MMZT Center approximately 15 miles north of Mexican airspace. A couple minutes later I noticed the aircraft still in my airspace climbing without prior coordination. There were no other aircraft in the vicinity so separation was never lost. There has been an increasing problem of MMZT Center climbing or descending aircraft without coordination prior to entering their airspace.A better understanding of procedures and rules between the two nation's air traffic systems would be helpful. There is no way to prevent deviations with MMZT Center. We have tried supervisor to supervisor conversations and the occurrences keep happening more frequently. A formal way to discuss issues and consequences needs to be set up. ZAB Controller describes transferring communications of one aircraft to Mazatlan Center; and then sees the aircraft climb without coordination from MMZT ARTCC. No separation problems were noted. Controller states there is an increase of these problems with MMZT ARTCC.
Aircraft: CITATION LATITUDE (C680A)
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

I think Sector X was red - or close to it - during our noon push. I was also handling multiple deviations for weather. Our staffing is low; so we did not have a D side at the time to offer me and our supervisor was in recurrent training so we had a CIC on the desk; taking one more controller away from the floor. I felt busy - I descended Aircraft X from FL410 to FL390 to start stepping him down through all my traffic. I think I was busy enough that I don't remember the read back. I continued working on other things and saw conflict alert go off as the Aircraft X pilot asked me if he had traffic. I said yes - and told him I thought I had cleared him to FL390 - he said he answered with FL290. He was a few miles - maybe 3.5 miles lateral from Aircraft Y at FL380. I saw more traffic for him at FL360 so I reissued his clearance to descend to FL370. He repeated FL370.We need better staffing. We shouldn't be allowing controllers or supervisors to attend classes when we are 1 below the minimum safe number of controllers at the start of the shift. If I had a second pair of eyes or ears; maybe they would have caught it. I haven't listened to the FALCON; but I probably did miss his read back. I don't know. Just north of Moab; Denver Center cleared [our flight] to descend to FL290. We read back FL290. We descended from FL410 and approx. FL378; I noticed traffic on TCAS around FL370. I stopped descent and told ATC we have traffic on TCAS. [There was] no TA/RA. Controller replied 'say altitude'. I replied 'descending thru FL378 for FL290'. Controller replied 'I thought I gave you FL390'. I said 'no you gave us FL290'. Controller replied 'descend and maintain FL370'. I listened to our onboard playback of ATC transmissions and Controller clearly said descend and maintain FL290. When this event occurred; we were within 6 miles and 700 ft of traffic. No RA occurred. Additionally; I stopped the descent when I realized we were descending on the traffic's altitude. Denver Center Controller and corporate pilot reported a loss of separation due to communication error with pilot and ATC.
Aircraft: EMBRAER PHENOM 100
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Speed All Types

My captain and I were enroute on our IFR flight plan when we experienced a total hydraulic failure. It started when we began to lose pressure in the hydraulic system; and then ran the required QRH procedure. This fixed the problem for only a few moments before a 0 psi indication was observed. Our landing gear deployed because the hydraulic pressure could not keep it up in the gear wells. It was after this that we could not maintain our cruise speed; and our fuel required us to divert as well [as] look for the longest runway possible to stop the aircraft because of severely limited braking. Our expectation was to have only 6 brake applications from the emergency brake accumulator per the manufacturer and our training. We told Center that we needed to divert for both braking and fuel reasons; and they asked if we [would need assistance] because we might be shutting down the runway due to limited braking and might need to be towed off. We then [requested priority handling] and diverted to ZZZ and landed. Upon landing; we cleared the runway under our own power and the brakes had some pressure left. We stopped on the taxiway and were inspected and chocked by ZZZ operations.After no damage was observed to the aircraft and all individuals were deemed safe and not in need of medical attention; we were able to taxi under our own power. We then talked to our company operations and grounded the aircraft for maintenance. My captain and I debriefed the situation.Always be learning and applying the SOP's; and take your time. My Captain and I did all those things and conferred with one another on the best course of action; and determined because of limited fuel and range (even though we took off with well over the legal minimum); as a result of the gear deploying; we made the best and the SAFEST decision possible in the moment; and had the best outcome. Safety is ALWAYS the only priority.A good pilot is always learning! EMB-500 First Officer reported a total hydraulic failure.
Aircraft: A320
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Inbound aircraft to make up our flight had a companion dog that vomited and defecated multiple times. Stench quickly traveled throughout aircraft. Dog defecated in jetway as it was deplaning. Cleaners attempted to disinfect and cleanup the problem. When my crew boarded the aircraft; the fumes from the cleaning fluid were very intense. Flight Attendant thought she was getting a headache from the odors. My evaluation of the situation was that the fumes were way too strong to allow passenger operations. The cleaners had used a cleaning product called 'Aero Clean X-200.' The label on the bottle says in part; 'Vapors may cause central nervous system depression; headache; and dizziness...' I had to refuse the airplane for passenger operations. While all along the company kept lying to me saying there were no other aircraft available in a maintenance base and major hub; at night with multiple overnight airplanes. When I refused the airplane; amazingly there was another airplane available. Unnecessary 2 hour delay. A Companion Dog on an A320 became ill and loose boweled; requiring a potentially toxic cleaning agent to clean up. The crew refused aircraft for flight because of fumes.