Aryan95614/aerograph-asrs huggingface dataset:
Aircraft: C172
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Landing Without Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

Airport Ops called me on the land line and asked me if I had spoken to an Aircraft X. I did not recall speaking to an aircraft with that callsign; but I told him I'd check the tapes to verify. He informed me that he found the aircraft on the north ramp and believed that he had landed and taxied without any ATC authorization. According to airport ops there were 3 souls on the aircraft; 2 of which were deaf and mute and the third had no identification and he claimed that he was given ATC authorization to land.Upon further investigation we established that the aircraft entered the Class Delta airspace and landed without ever speaking to ATC. I did not see the aircraft since it was dark and he landed on the east runway which can be difficult to see aircraft during the day when you're looking for them.There's a lot you could do in this situation I think it was just a fluke occurrence. EUG Tower Controller reported that he was questioned by Airport Operations if he had spoken to a particular aircraft. The Controller did not recall talking to the aircraft. Aircraft was found to be at the north ramp. Pilot stated he had ATC clearance to land. It was found out later that the pilot never talked to ATC.
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

We were deviating north of weather on SKNRD 2 arrival. Originally given AEX transition then it changed to direct EGULZ which is on the SWB transition. We joined the arrival at EGULZ. Then we needed more deviations. We were given a series of southerly courses and step down altitudes from our cruise altitude which I think was in the mid-30s. We then were instructed to fly direct DOOBI and descend maintain 12;000 feet. A minute or two after we were instructed to descend via the arrival. Which we complied with. We slowed our descent rate to comply with the arrival and intercept the VPI. We then switched from Houston Center to Houston Approach. We checked in with 'Houston Approach passing FL250 descending via the SKNRD 2 Arrival' We crossed DOOBI between the published altitudes of FL190-220 at 280 knots. At that time Approach asked us why weren't we at 12;000 feet crossing DOOBI. We explained we were given descend via with no restrictions by the previous controller. He told us he would look into it with the previous controller. Soon after another crew; behind us; busted the altitude as well with the same incorrect instructions issued from the previous controller. The major threat was the possibility of a RA or near miss because of the lack of communication between the two controllers. As a group we need to do better at making sure we are all on the same page with these arrivals. Especially when there is a weather event affecting them. They can be confusing especially with this new phraseology. Primarily the two controllers (center and approach) absolutely need to be on the same page. Or at least catch us checking on with incorrect instructions. Air Carrier First Officer is informed by ATC that the assigned crossing restriction at DOOBI of 12;000 feet has been missed. The crew thought the clearance was to descend via the SKNRD 3 to maintain 12;000 feet and crossed DOOBI at the published altitude.
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

We received a Brake Control Fault message during climb out. The QRH stated the braking capability may be degraded. We contacted Dispatch via ACARS to notify them of our maintenance issue and to see if they wanted us to continue towards our destination which has very modest length runways. We attempted to get additional information from Flight Department/Maintenance regarding the fault and resulting landing performance but did not receive any input. We did receive a message from our Dispatcher that she was OK with us continuing to our short runway destination if we were. Ultimately; we made the decision to divert to another airport because of its longer runways and the fact we were unclear as to the possible degradation to landing/stopping performance.This aircraft had two previous write-ups that I saw in the logbook for the same Brake Control Fault issue; one the previous day. I think it would have been prudent to send this aircraft to somewhere other than our planned destination after the repair to the brake system the previous day. Finally; the volume of ACARS communications became impossible to keep up with while handling the emergency and flying the airplane. Input from the Flight Department would have been helpful after we requested it; essentially we were on our own. When faced with a Brake Control Fault message enroute to an airport with short runways the flight crew of an ERJ-170 elected to divert to an airport with superior facilities. The decision to divert was made in part due to their inability to communicate effectively with Dispatch and Maintenance to determine the extent of the failure's threat to stopping distance; a subject of great importance given the modest runways at their destination. In the reporter's words '...essentially; we were on [our] own.'
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance

Departed ZZZZ with BLEED 2 INOP (MEL); with both Packs operational. At FL240 we received a BLEED 1 FAIL caution message. I stopped the climb at 24;000 feet and informed Center; got approved to maintain FL240. First Officer was pilot flying. I ran the QRH and could NOT clear the message. I [advised] Center and initiated an emergency descent. Donned the crew masks; established communication and set XXXX on squawk. Informed the flight attendants via emergency button to prepare for emergency descent. Descended visually to 14;000 feet to avoid terrain. Called [Center] for MEA and was informed that it is 24;000 feet at my current position. Ran the QRH again with no success. QRH instructed us to use the APU BLEED and fly at maximum altitude of 15;000. I was unable due to terrain map maximum altitude of 16;000 feet in our current position. At that point decided to divert to ZZZZ1.Informed Company. Gave the [emergency information and instructions] to the flight attendants. 'Loss of pressurization; diverting to ZZZZ1. No BRACE; no EVACUATION required. We will be on the ground in 15 minutes.' I briefed the passengers over public address with the same message. Passing 10;000 feet we received a CREW OXY LO PRESS caution message. At this point I was forced to commit to an overweight landing with 76;400 pounds. I instructed the First Officer to aim to the threshold and come in flat so we can put the airplane smoothly on the ground. Great airmanship on the First Officer side allowed a perfect execution of this maneuver. We landed with 0-200 feet per minute descent rate. Taxied to a cleared area on the tarmac in ZZZZ1. Fire trucks were waiting for us on the scene. Called the passengers over the public address; 'Remain seated' three times. Got the 'Okay' signal from the Fire Rescue and Tower [that] there was no damage to the aircraft and that we are good to deplane. I then gave Ground Crew the okay to connect the air stairs. I called the Tower over the radio and degraded the [situation] back to normal. All souls plus 4 crew members deplaned the aircraft safely.After talking to Maintenance they mentioned that it was possible that both Packs were putting too much pressure on the BLEED 1 Valve. MEL 36-XX-XX-A and MEL 36-XX-XX-B DO NOT instruct us to use only one Pack. This is a serious problem in the Embraer 175 MEL instructions for a BLEED 1 (2) INOP. This emergency was a game changer for me with regard to dispatching an E-175 with one BLEED INOP. A change to the manual is required here to prevent this occurrence in the future. In my humble opinion; if one BLEED is INOP then the associated Pack should also be OFF manually by flight crew for as long as that BLEED is INOP; to prevent the operative BLEED source from failing. Embraer E175 Captain reported a dual bleed failure resulting in a diversion and an overweight landing.
Aircraft: ANY UNKNOWN OR UNLISTED AIRCRAFT MANUFACTURER
Phase of flight: Takeoff / Launch
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Vehicle; Ground Incursion Runway

I was departing RWY 31 out of ONL; I made at least two calls on CTAF before taking the runway stating my intentions. As I lined up on the runway; I noticed several vehicles working at the far end of the field on both sides of the runway but they were all well clear of the safety area. Shortly after I started my takeoff roll; I noticed a large pickup truck pulling a trailer approach the runway at the far end. As I had made radio calls and was currently moving at about 80 kts in the opposite direction; I thought he was going to hold short; let me pass and then take the runway. He did not hold short. He did not even pause before taking an active runway; and ended up nose to nose with a rotating [aircraft]. It was unseasonably cool due to the passage of a recent storm so I was able to climb very quickly above him. Still; I would estimate the distance between us to be about 200 feet when I crossed over.What caused this event was the truck driver's lack of knowledge and experience with airport operations. I never heard any calls from him when he took the runway so it is a fairly safe assumption that he did not have a radio and did not hear my calls. Also a quick visual check to make sure the runway was clear in both directions as is standard practice could have prevented this.[I responded to the incursion by climbing] at VX and [hoping] I clear him.Train people who intend to operate on an airfield proper see and avoid techniques and have them monitor CTAF. Pilot reported a runway incursion by a ground vehicle during takeoff roll.
Phase of flight: unknown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

I have been working at IAH for almost 15 years and the most dissatifaction I get is when so much time taken to close the ramp even if lightining strikes are so close and visible above our heads and within the airport area.This must be addressed on a war basis as human life have priority over operation and customer service; last night due to the major thunderstorm I heard several heated conversations over the radio that should not have taken place if timely decison was taken.I hear that there are lights installed to caution lightining strikes but to be honest a better commuication and alert methodology must be adopted.Given the tools and technology close to error free forecasting gives an idea as to where we are headed in terms of operation. A IAH Ramp Agent reported that his company is slow to clear ramp personnel to safety with lightning in the vicinity even when it is close; over head and within the airport area.
Aircraft: DA42 TWIN STAR
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

I was in cruise with my student and another instructor in the backseat as well. I noticed we were about 25-30 miles southwest of ZZZ airport and decided I had enough time to simulate an engine [failure]; feather it; and then do a restart. So; I simulated the engine failure by bringing the left throttle to idle; and my student went through all the checklists to identify and verify the engine and do a simulation of restarting the engine; and then deciding to actually feather the engine which is what I wanted him to do. After doing the items for feathering I noticed after about 5 seconds that the propeller was still moving freely and not feathering or shutting off completely. After noticing this; I still had my student keep the controls and go through the checklists for doing an actual restart; and as we were going through these checklist a 'L ALTN FAIL' and 'L OIL PRESS' enunciated on the PFD. Once seeing this; I also tried going through a re-feather checklist to see if I could get the engine to feather since it could help to fly the aircraft smoother. After that failed to work; I told my student I had controls and we gave each other positive control exchange; and asked him to find the alternator failure checklist. After telling me he could not find the checklist I noticed I was only 15 miles southwest at this point from ZZZ and so I asked the instructor in the back to call our head of safety manager to let him know what was happening and then I told my student what I was planning to do and to not touch the controls or rudder; and if I needed assistance I would ask for whatever I needed. I told Approach (we were on VFR flight following) that we were having left engine issues. The Controller asked me where I wanted to land. I told ATC at that time I was about 15 miles south of ZZZ and knowing we can keep straight and level flight that I wanted to continue to the airport. Continued to the airport and eventually asked ATC to switch frequencies to turn on the lights to see the airport/runway better. I eventually landed with no damage to the aircraft or injury to the two other passenger and taxied off of the runway and had to shutdown since it was impossible to taxi with just the right engine. We were off the runway completely when deciding to shut it down. We were towed back by our company that night. DA42 instructor pilot reported being unable to restore power to the left engine after a simulated engine failure in flight.
Aircraft: CRJ200
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

We were arriving into GSP from the northwest. Our weather radar was painting a few small but severe thunderstorms (steep color gradients) between our location and the west side of the approach to land north at GSP. The storms were moving north. One strong cell was immediately to the west of the final approach. The east side of the airport and approach appeared to be free of the small thunderstorms. I requested deviations to the east to clear the area of thunderstorms by passing north of the field by 20 miles or so. We were at 7000 ft at this time and experiencing moderate turbulence with +/- 10-15 kt airspeed changes. During the deviation to the east we received a couple of severe turbulence encounters. We were on the autopilot yet the aircraft rolled 30 degrees right and then 35-40 degrees left in 1-1.5 seconds. We extended our diversion further east; eventually being handed off to Charlotte (CLT) approach. During the diversion we were able to pick up the northern edge of the thunderstorms on the extreme right side of the weather radar. The colors displayed were levels 4 (red) and 5 (magenta). The advancing storms were too close to maneuver to get a better view of the area to the west and southwest towards GSP. CLT informed us that the weather was still approaching from the south and they were planning on closing the arrivals down after the last few airplanes landed. CLT approach had weather radar capability and they recommended we divert to ZZZ as it was in the clear still.ZZZ was closer than our filed alternate at this point. We coordinated with dispatch; our FA and the cabin our intent to divert to ZZZ. The FA informed us there were no injuries and everyone was ok in the cabin. We diverted to ZZZ for refueling and to let the weather pass the area. CRJ-200 Captain reported deviating to an alternate airport after encountering weather at GSP.
Aircraft: BONANZA 35
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

ATC issued vectors; fly-heading 320. I lost situational awareness when entering a cloud; momentarily lost directional control and inadvertently turned westbound. I was correcting as ATC queried my direction; headed back to 320 heading. ATC issued modification to clearance: vectors to an intersection; [then] direct. I lost situational awareness and proceeded direct to [the intersection] until ATC queried my direction. I then corrected and flew [assigned] vectors.Cause: When I entered the cloud; I failed to go to the artificial horizon immediately and quickly began unintended turn. I became alarmed and further distracted; so I missed the instruction to follow vectors to [the intersection] and proceeded direct instead. This was poor instrument technique on my part followed by failure to get my emotions under control quickly in order to continue navigating correctly. A Beach Bonanza pilot reported that he lost situational awareness when he entered a cloud.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

The flight had been level for some time at the published altitude 11000 FT. I reduced his speed to 220 KTS and issued crossing traffic climbing to 10000 FT. The flight crew acknowledged the traffic and began descending into him. I do not believe we ever had less than standard separation; but I would love to know why a pilot would ever descend into traffic he just acknowledged.This is one of a constant stream of pilots that fail to comply with the published crossing altitudes on the new OAPM [Optimization of Airspace and Procedures in the Metroplex] procedures. They [the procedures] need to be immediately terminated until the real source of the problem can be identified and corrected. This is a safety hazard. Following a B737NG flight crew's descent toward traffic climbing below them about which they had just advised; a D10 Approach Controller lamented the frequent failure of flight crews to comply with crossing restrictions as published in the new OAPM arrival.
Aircraft: CRJ200
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

During taxi out; we decided to turn on the Radar during our taxi out to make sure that it was operating correctly as we were going to be flying in an area were there was widespread heavy rain and embedded T-Storms. At this point in time we discovered that the Radar was only displaying STBY on the MFD and would not 'paint any weather or ground returns.' Since we were now aware that a piece of equipment on the aircraft wasn't working properly I followed the proper procedure and notified Dispatch that our Radar wasn't working and that we would need to return to the gate to call Maintenance via landline. The Dispatcher returned an ACARS message that there was nothing convective in the area and we should deal with it in the next station. This Dispatcher had no concern about what I considered a safe operation nor was he concerned with the legal standpoint of entering a maintenance discrepancy in the logbook and performing a proper MEL procedure. He wanted me to just go without a write-up. We returned to the gate to complete the maintenance logbook entry at which point in time Maintenance wanted to MEL it. The Maintenance Controller found it objectionable that I didn't feel it was safe to be flying the aircraft in the current weather conditions without an operable weather Radar; he went to switch me over to connect us with the Dispatcher for a conference call and did not realize that I was on the line while they discussed how I wouldn't fly the aircraft. The tone from the Maintenance Controller as well as the Dispatcher was not conducive to safety. It amounts to pilot pushing and creates a very unsafe work environment. They replaced the Radar control panel and the Radar worked perfectly all day after that. Dispatchers need to realize that when there is some sort of maintenance anomaly; that once it is known it needs to be addressed at that point in time by making the proper maintenance logbook entry and either applying an MEL or performing some sort of repair/reset function under the guidance of Maintenance Control. Also all parties need to realize that just because there is an MEL for a particular aircraft system such as the weather Radar; there are certain circumstances when that MEL provides no relief such as today. Some pilots; such as myself; require operating Radar when flying in conditions such as today with low ceilings; heavy rain; and embedded T-Storms. The Dispatcher's statement of 'it is just rain showers;' doesn't satisfy my safety requirements for avoiding convective activity without an operable Radar when I can't see and avoid the T-Storms due to solid IFR conditions. CRJ-200 Captain reports returning to the gate after discovering the Radar is inoperative with heavy weather in the forecast. This action is met with some resistance by Dispatch and Maintenance Control. The Radar Control Panel was replaced and the Radar worked perfectly after that.
Aircraft: PA28
Phase of flight: Final Approach
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Instrument Training; Non-precision approaches; LOC intro. Student pilot lost situational awareness when descending to MDA from step down fix on the ILS/LOC 10R FPR approach: Instead of leveling off at 380 ft he descended steeply to almost 150 ft needing the instructor pilot to take the controls and recover safe flight path in order to prevent an imminent crash on short final. There was an unexpected broken cloud layer at about 300 ft that permitted to spot the runway intermittently (at times in sight; no visual cues other times). The student did very well shooting a previous approach though having the same type of unexpected weather; the difference was that we stayed above the clouds at all times watching the layer from atop whereas in the LOC we were flying through the clouds and close to the ground. First encounter with IMC by student pilot.To encourage pilots to follow school rules on wx minima to conduct a flight and to have a contingency plan in case unforeseen wx becomes an issue. PA-28 instructor pilot reported his student descended steeply to 150 feet AGL during a practice non-precision instrument approach in IMC conditions.