Aryan95614/aerograph-asrs huggingface dataset:
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

At the gate in ZZZ; a Flight Attendant comes up and tells me about a passenger issue regarding a passenger who wasn't wearing a mask. Evidently this passenger had been flagged for noncompliance with the mask policy on a previous flight. The Supervisor came and told me that she had counseled the passenger and boarded her. I saw the passenger board without her mask and pointed it out to the Supervisor. The Supervisor turned and reminded the passenger again that her mask needs to be in place. The passenger complied. I asked the Supervisor what her gut level feeling was and she answered that she thought the passenger could be a problem. I asked why are we boarding her then? At that point; a Flight Attendant went back and had a discreet discussion with the passenger; advising her that we were ok with her flying; but only if she wore her mask. She complied and slept most of the way to ZZZ1. We did depart one minute late; and the delay message referenced our needing to deal with this passenger. Two other people were also non compliant. A couple boarded with masks pulled down and while carrying coffee cups. The man asserted that he knew airline policy and if he was drinking; he was exempt from mask usage. The Flight Attendant told him that it's only for active drinking; not just holding the cup. Initially; he was dismissive of her instructions; but eventually he and his companion did put their masks up. By the end of the flight; he and the Flight Attendant had a respectful discussion about the policy.The Supervisor knew the first passenger had caused trouble yet boarded her anyway. Certainly the agent saw the other couple board while not complying with the mask policy. I feel there still isn't enough specific guidance on mask usage.The airline needs to be very specific with passenger expectations regarding mask usage. It's a hot button issue and it creates division among the other (compliant) passengers which could lead to an inflight altercation and diversion. The mask policy is also creating a lot of chances for passengers' noncompliance with crew member instructions. People look for loopholes. The airline needs to be very blunt and specific; vs leaving it to the cabin crew to play the role of babysitter. It distracts from their primary safety role. Air carrier pilot reported being advised about a possible non-compliant passenger regarding mask wear.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Landing
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I am writing this report to request some communication and coordination between DEN ATC and JEPPS. The reason for this request is that routinely; DEN ATC does not use the Tower frequencies that are printed on the JEPPS Approach plates. For example; there is only one ATC Tower frequency printed on each one of the approach plates; however; DEN Tower does not always adhere to these frequencies. It is frustrating that DEN Tower does not use the frequencies printed on the JEPPS plates. I submitted a report on this same issue years ago; and I did get a response that DEN ATC was not aware of the Tower frequencies printed on the JEPPS plates. I was informed that most of the time; DEN ATC uses some type of reasoning for which frequencies they use for each runway; but that reasoning does not match up with the frequencies on the JEPPS plates. DEN is the only airport that always has this issue.Can someone from JEPPS get together with DEN ATC and communicate which are the correct frequencies for each runway. The frequencies that DEN Tower uses should match the same frequencies that are printed on the JEPPS Approach plates.This is all on top of the fact that it is extremely frustrating and adds to our high work load when DEN TRACON changes our STAR and/or arrival runway two or three times when we are close to the airport. This has to stop! Absolutely ridiculous that they make so many changes to arrivals and runways every single time we fly into DEN. I would rather fly an extra 3 minutes than have to change the arrival and runway in the FMC two or three times within close proximity the airport. Air carrier Captain reported ATC frequency does not match published frequencies on Jeppesen approach charts for DEN airport.
Aircraft: A300
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Departing with an inoperative fuel gauge; right inner (RI) on an A-300. MEL 24-42-01 (Inner Wing Tank Fuel Quantity Indication System RT Inner Inoperative) was read and complied with to include checking the logbook for entry verifying that the right inner was fueled to a known quantity. The left outer; left inner and right outer gauges were operating normally and were indicating 8.2; 13.0 and 8.3 respectively. The logbook entry and fuel service form verified the right inner quantity at 12.8. The Fuel Service Form (FSF) indicated the after fueling numbers cited above for a total of 42.3. In the remarks section of the FSF was a note that the right inner was fueled with 1;911 gallons which at a 6.7 density is 12;803 LBS. At this point we were satisfied that we had the required fuel on board because the operating fuel gauges plus the logbook verified fuel added up to our required fuel of 42.0. We called Maintenance with a question about the note in the MEL regarding the dash in the right inner quantity indicator. When he showed at the aircraft; he stated the right inner was verified to be fueled to a known quantity. We departed and I was the pilot not flying. Prior to top of descent; we noticed the right inner fuel valve had closed indicating the right inner was out of fuel. The right engine started to be fed from the right outer tank. The left inner still had about 5.0 remaining. To prevent a fuel imbalance we fed both engines from the left inner tank until it was empty. We calculated that we had enough fuel in the remaining tanks (left outer; left inner and right outer) to arrive at our destination with 10.5 versus 14.5 planned and proceeded to our destination and landed with approximately 10.4. Upon landing at our destination; Maintenance verified that the right inner tank was indeed empty. We concluded that we departed with less than 12.8 in the right inner tank. It appears that the fueler somehow allowed fuel to transfer out of the right inner tank after or while fueling it. The logbook and FSF both stated we had 12.8 in the right inner tank; but due to the fact we still had 5.0 in the lift inner tank when the right inner fuel valve closed en route; we concluded we did not have 12.8 in the right inner. More education and training for all parties involved; more discussion during training/IOE/hot topics about inoperative gauges and ways to catch mistakes. Have Maintenance verify by a means other than by the FSF after fueling is complete that the tank in question has the required fuel. Then have the crew verify by total gallons metered added to the before fueling numbers to verify TOTAL fuel on board; THEN verify the tank quantity in question by the logbook. A300 flight crew reports being dispatched with the right inner fuel gauge inoperative with the fueler verifying that 12.8 thousand pounds of fuel were loaded in the RI tank for a total fuel load of 42.3. Prior to top of descent; it is noticed the right inner fuel valve has closed indicating the RI was out of fuel.
Aircraft: A380
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was working the radar at Sector 17/18 combined; was talking to both airplanes. I issued the standard crossing clearance to a B757; 'cross 25 miles east of BOS at FL280'. There were a number of other things going on in the area; traffic wise; including a Global Hawk UAV that was holding in airspace on my sector's northern boundary. The supervisors; TMU and military coordinators had been trying to figure out for hours what we were going to do with the UAV because we do not normally work them and have no procedures in place for working them currently. I was distracted by that activity; as well as my regular traffic; including issuing reroutes to two other aircraft; and did not notice that an A380 was head-on with the B757. The two were approximately 1.5-2 minutes from losing separation; and I panicked and told the B757 to start down; no delay through FL340; then turned him 10 left. I realized I had meant to turn him right; so I turned the A380 10 left; also. I then noticed that was not going to be quite enough; so I turned them each another 10 left. I told the B757 to report leaving FL340; then a foreign aircraft asked a question; and I am not sure if I lost separation or not; it was very close. The hit prior to losing separation the B757 was at FL344. By the time the B757 was able to report; he said he was almost through FL330; and they were at 3 miles on my scope. Neither my D-side nor I caught it until it would have been too late; but the B757 had not started descending. Had I taken half a second longer to assess the situation; I would have just told the B757 to maintain FL360 until I saw him clear of the traffic. I then made the situation worse by turning him into the traffic instead of away from it; and had to take more action. Being less distracted by the unusual situation; and not having missed the oncoming traffic; I would have just waited to issue the descent clearance. ZBW Controller reports being distracted by a UAV holding in his airspace and not noting two aircraft that are head on; in a timely manner. Controller errors exacerbated the problem and separation may have been lost.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance

The aircraft arrived early with a flight director problem. Maintenance MELed the write-up. In the process they discovered the AFCS EXC AC circuit breaker popped and would not reset. This led to the addition of six more inter-related MELs that had to be addressed; to include collaring several circuit breakers. After verifying the appropriate application of each of the seven MELs; we pushed about an hour late. The plan was to have the repairs done in ZZZ after passing through ZZZ1. The flights from ZZZ to ZZZ1 and ZZZ2 were uneventful. In ZZZ1; Maintenance attempted to repair the aircraft; they were unable to repair it and returned it back to its originally MELed status. In the process they collared an additional circuit breaker that was not collared in the first instance. Additionally; one of the circuit breakers previously noted as collared does not actually exist (B AFCS sensor exc DC circuit breaker). The Captain had a lengthy discussion with Maintenance Control (including a picture of the actual write-up in Denver sent via cell phone). It was determined the 'D' in DC was actually an 'A'; making it AC. We continued on and terminated the aircraft. I believe this aircraft should have been pulled [out of service] and not allowed to leave in its condition. Additionally; I believe that my First Officer and I were set up to fail by having to apply seven MELs in a compound situation; not only from a safety aspect; but from a potential FAA action standpoint; in the event any portion of this complicated procedure was found to have not been executed properly after the fact. To my knowledge; I believe we acted appropriately and legally; but I should not be placed in a situation where I have to guess or wonder. I'm also embarrassed that the originating crew tomorrow will [receive] this aircraft in its current condition. A malfunctioning Flight Director; for which maintenance had no immediate resolution; ultimately resulted in multiple MEL deferrals that were intended to be resolved at a subsequent stop. After two uneventful legs maintenance was unable to resolve the problem at the planned repair station. Instead; they found another item they believed was required to be deferred. A subsequent in depth investigation; including emailed pictures of the original write-up; uncovered the source of the confusion; it was the incorrect interpretation of the letter 'A' instead of 'D'; thus changing 'AC' to 'DC'.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Captain was flying. We were just inside the WAHUU2 Arrival at FL380 when ATC issued a clearance to descend to FL340 and expect to descend via the WAHUU2. The Captain elected to start the descent by using Vertical Speed (VS) at 500 FPM then reinitialized the FMC to FL340 to place the FMC in a CRZ DESC mode; not VNAV PATH. She kept the descent going at 500 FPM.As we were approaching the new Top of Descent (TD) for FL340; we were at 35;500 feet MSL and I mentioned to the Captain we are going to be about 2;000 feet high above path unless we increase the rate of descent. The Captain elected to continue the slow descent as we passed the TD 1;500 feet above path and increasing while she stated not to worry. ATC then issued a clearance to descend via the WAHUU2. We were 2;500 feet above path. The Captain never engaged VNAV and elected to use VS to try and catch up to the path.As we were accelerating past 300 KIAS; I mentioned we are fast and need to maintain 280 KIAS per the note on the arrival. The Captain denied it at first; checked the chart looking for the note; found it; but continued to accelerate to catch the path in VS mode. I then requested ATC give us 'speed our discretion;' which they denied. We accelerated to 310 KIAS in VS. She never once engaged VNAV during the entire approach; putting my PM duties in the yellow to ensure we did not bust an altitude restriction. We finally got vectored off the WAHUU2 and landed uneventfully.The technique for Captains to use VS on published arrivals is still being practiced and places the PM in the yellow to crosscheck aircraft performance not to exceed published restrictions. There still remains a misunderstanding of how CRZ DESC works vs VNAV PATH; VNAV SPD; or VS. Please publish a training guide that is handed out or published on the Electronic Flight Bag (EFB) to clearly spell out the difference; with examples of each. There should be a comparison between CRZ DESC; VNAV PATH; VNAV SPD; and VS on the effects and impact to properly fly a published arrival with airspeed and altitude restrictions. B737-700 FO reported the Captain; as the pilot flying; chose to use CRZ DESC mode rather than VNAV; and was having difficulty complying with the RNAV STAR constraints.
Aircraft: SMALL AIRCRAFT; LOW WING; 1 ENG; FIXED GEAR
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Filed IFR to ZZZ; IMC most of the way. Given a vector direct to ZZZ; TRACON asked what approach I would like. I asked for and was given the GPS to Runway XX (more or less a straight in). Now I am in the clouds and trying to select that approach in the G430w/GMX200. No such approach in the database. I had just updated the data card a few days ago. In fact; there was no approach to ZZZ for any runway in the database that I could find. Now I am scrambling to figure out what I have done wrong and cannot find any approaches in the database for ZZZ. The only thing I had was a partial (Vectors only) approach VOR to Runway YY (nowhere near where I was or going to be). Found a hole; cancelled IFR and landed. I called the chart manufacturer this evening to ask if they had heard anybody complain that this database was faulty. After researching it; the tech found that Garmin had 'excluded' the GPS approach to Runway XX. So how is the pilot supposed to know that beforehand? I had printed out an approach plate for that approach and it is shown as a valid approach online. SoCal assigned the approach to me as it is a valid approach as far as they are concerned. The chart manufacturer says they send all approaches for each airport to Garmin. Then Garmin can delete as they wish; before the chart manufacturer releases the data for our download. Turns out we as pilots are also supposed to check on the Garmin website under 'excluded approaches' to see if any approaches at our destination are not in the database update just downloaded. The chart manufacturer sends out weekly notices to all subscribers about problems with their own data in their databases (corrections; additions; etc.); but the manufacturer does not maintain what changes Garmin makes. Imagine being IMC; being assigned an approach and then fumbling around with the [GPS] trying to enter a non existent approach. Not fun. Thought others should know of this possibility. [I] have not had this happen before today. So; as part of your preflight on the ground you might want to go to Garmin website and look to see if your destination airport has any Garmin deleted approaches. Pilot of a single engine; fixed gear aircraft in IMC requested and was cleared for a GPS approach to destination airport only to find that the GPS approach to that airport was not in his Garmin GPS. Pilot maneuvered to VMC and landed. Pilot later acertained that Garmin 'excludes' certain approaches from their database and pilots must therefore check a Garmin website for 'excluded approaches.'
Aircraft: CRJ200
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

While departing ZZZ with no long range navigation operational; the captain inadvertently switched the COM 1 frequency off of an active center frequency to one that was previously used. According to ZZZ Center; they were trying to call us numerous times on the frequency that was switched off; likely for less than a minute. They finally reached us on the previous frequency and we immediately switched to the correct frequency. The aircraft was being flown via VOR inputs as the primary navigation system; and the comm frequency was accidentally switched off as the captain switched VOR frequencies while attempting to acquire the next VOR station. Firstly; aircraft that are dispatched into the country's busiest airspace should have the navigation equipment operational that ATC expects and is used to using. Every time there is a non-RNAV aircraft; ATC still clears the crew to fly to GPS points or on RNAV arrivals or departure procedures; regardless of what is filed. Aircrew of course correct the controllers; but these non-RNAV aircraft generally result in confusion from one ATC controller to the next. Additionally; if an aircraft is to be dispatched using VORs as a primary means of navigation; all of the facilities on the route and the major ones near that route that help fix reporting points should be investigated by dispatch for closures or issues. We were repeatedly cleared to ZZZ VOR and it was; after we could not identify the fix; finally determined to be inoperative. We did not see this on the release. CRJ-200 flight crew reported a temporary loss of communication while attempting to tune the next VOR on non-RNAV required route.
Aircraft: SMALL AIRCRAFT; LOW WING; 2 ENG; RETRACTABLE GEAR
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I got this airplane in ZZZ. During the preflight all of the annunciator lights; including the three green gear lights worked. Once at cruise; I noticed a lot of post lights were out. As it was cloudy and getting darker; I started to change some of the post lights. I then pressed the press to test to make sure all of those lights were still working as they were on the ground. When I hit the press to test button; I noticed the right main landing gear green light was not illuminated. I thought to myself that this must be a bulb that burned out; and went into the QRH (Quick Reference Handbook) to find the 'bulb replacement' procedure. I followed the steps in QRH 5.6; and the bulb still did not come on. I consulted with a senior pilot on company frequency to get advice about if I should declare an emergency; because I knew I would need to blow the gear down. We agreed it was the smart and safe thing to do. I [notified ATC] with ZZZ Approach. I told them I needed a heading to let the passengers know what was going on. I let the passengers know what was happening; and also called SOC (System Operations Control). SOC asked if I could come to [base]; which I said I could. I told Approach that I would like to divert to [base] and [notify ATC]; and have emergency personnel standing by as a precaution. I then went to page 5.2 (as the QRH says to do) to go about blowing down the gear. While I was on base for XX in [base]; I went below 130 KTS and put the gear down. I did have 3 green lights; but continued to follow the procedure as outlined in QRH 5.2 to be safe and pre-cautionary. I then blew the gear down per QRH 5.2. I landed on XX in [base] without incident. Emergency personnel followed me off the runway and I stopped the aircraft. Airport Ops came and got my passengers off the aircraft. I then had MX (Maintenance) tow the aircraft as a precaution to the fleet and wrote up the aircraft. One passenger on the flight was a [other carrier] Captain and was pleased that I took pre-cautionary measures to ensure a safe and un-eventful landing. He told me through his years you always go by the book and complimented me on my professionalism and smooth landing. The passengers were brought to the gate and got on another aircraft with another pilot to head to ZZZ1. I explained the situation to the MX personnel; called the on-call duty manager and filled out necessary paperwork. Pilot flying light twin encountered gear indication light anomaly.
Aircraft: PREMIER 1
Phase of flight: Initial Climb
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC

Routine departure on Runway 24. Cleared to 2;000 feet. Tower gave heading to 200. On IFR flight plan; VFR conditions. Copilot called out glider. Observed white t-tail glider making a rapid left rolling maneuver and pull down; to escape my flight path. No communication from Tower or glider. No TCAS alert. Over in 5 seconds. Tower switched us to departure. Called airport manager to advise him of the event; and request condition of other aircraft. Passengers had full view of glider from rear of aircraft through cockpit window. Rest of flight uneventful. All my lights were on. Glider pilot made excellent combat style escape maneuver. Premier 1 Captain reported an NMAC with a glider departing FOK airport.
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Upon taxiing to [Runway] XXL; a loud banging and grinding sound with vibration and shimmy would happen intermittently on taxi with no real reason. Once crossed XXR we asked ATC if we could pull off and called Maintenance; they agreed best course of action was to gate return. Taxied back in slowly still hearing and feeling strange sounds and vibrations intermittently. Once parked a quick inspection by Maintenance revealed that while everything looked normal when still; once the aircraft was moved (they rocked it) the entire nose gear assembly wobbled and was loose. We were delayed swapped planes and continued [the] day as normal.The aircraft was received like this. It had already flown more than likely like this. There needs to be better discipline on reporting foreign sounds. Also; push crews sound like they are fighting a war when they hook up and disconnect. Maybe there is a correlation there. EMB-145 Captain reported noticing grinding sounds and vibrations during taxi-out resulting in a return to gate for an aircraft swap. Post maintenance inspection revealed the nose gear assembly was loose.