Aryan95614/aerograph-asrs huggingface dataset:
Aircraft: NO AIRCRAFT
Phase of flight: cruise
Anomaly: Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; No Specific Anomaly Occurred Unwanted Situation

I am concerned about having to wear a mask at cruise altitude while a Flight Attendant is on the Flight Deck. I feel we are putting Flight Attendant mask concerns over safety of flight concerns. If we experience a Rapid Decompression at FL 390; time of useful consciousness is measured in single digit seconds. A Rapid Decompression would be stressful; disconcerting and confusing. Now we would also have to waste a precious second or two to remove the cloth mask. If it is OK for the pilots to be mask-less in the cockpit when no Flight Attendant is present; why put the safety of the flight at risk solely for the comfort of flight attendants? Air Carrier Captain reported the requirement of wearing a face mask with a Flight Attendant on the Flight Deck is a safety concern; especially if there is an event such as a rapid decompression.
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Phase of flight: Final Approach
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

During a visual approach to Runway 28L in SFO; we received an RA. The airport was conducting simultaneous close parallel visual approaches to the 28s. We had the plane in sight on the parallel runway. They were slightly behind us and had been told to slow to follow us. The conflicting aircraft appeared to be established on the 28R LOC and was descending near the same rate and altitude as us. As we descended through about 1;100 FT; we received an RA to descend. We complied and ended up descending below 1;000 FT while below the glideslope. We saw the aircraft to our right and were clear of conflict and able to return to the glide slope by approximately 900 FT. We continued the approach and landed. An ERJ-170 pilot on a visual to SFO 28L reported taking TCAS RA evasive action from an aircraft on 28R which did not slow as directed by ATC.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

After the safety video was finished; #3 (me); #4; & #2 were walking through the cabin doing our safety compliance checks. The minute we all got in the aisle; we smelled a horrific dirty sock smell that reminded us of a dirty boy's locker room. Passengers were stopping us asking what that awful smell is. I #3 ran up front & called the cockpit. We eventually went back to the gate. Everyone deplaned including all 4 of us F/A's & the cockpit. Maintenance was waiting for us & they took the plane out of service. We 4 F/As went to the Emergency Room here in ZZZ to be tested & checked out for poisoning since it definitely was confirmed it was a FUME event! B737-800 Flight Attendants reported a ground gate return due to a fume event during taxi.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

After leaving Gate XX at ZZZ. We were being pushed to spot A. The Tug Driver stopped momentarily and we heard about a second of static on the radio. The Captain asked the Tug Driver if he said set brakes while simultaneously flashing the lights. At that point the tug and airplane began to move again. I heard a tow bar noise immediately followed by 'breakaway; breakaway'. The Captain and I instantly stepped on the brakes. The Captain then set the brakes and made sure everyone was ok. After coordinating with ramp crew; Maintenance; and Operations. We taxied back to the gate. While being towed to spot A off Gate XX we experienced an uncommanded aircraft movement. Tug Driver failed to say 'set brakes' before disconnecting tow bar and the jet moved forward striking the tow bar. The First Officer and I heard a scratchy sound over the intercom; I queried the Tug Driver over the intercom asking him 'Did you say set brakes?' since I felt the jet moving and sensed something wasn't right while seeing the tug moving backwards. I immediately stepped on the brakes; turned on the taxi light; felt a thump and heard the Tug Driver say 'breakaway; breakaway'. The Tug Driver and I re-established communication. Tug Driver had the Ramp Supervisor approach the jet and we exchanged information to ensure that everyone was ok. I requested that Maintenance inspect the nose gear per AFM 3.40.1 and broke the [Maintenance Release] via ACARS. The maintenance supervisor asked me to taxi the jet back to the gate for further inspection; I had the First Officer coordinate the taxi back to the gate. I informed the Flight Attendants and passengers of the tow bar incident and proceeded to Gate XX. Passengers were given the opportunity to deplane. The First Officer and I spoke with the Ramp Supervisor in the jet bridge and shared with him the chain of events. We went down to the ramp in order to inspect the nose gear and obtain information from the Maintenance Technicians. The Maintenance Supervisor briefed me on the need to replace the 'Tow Lug' since it had scratches. Visual inspection revealed no other damage. I contacted [Dispatch] and requested that the [Chief Pilot] join the phone conversation in order to inform him of the incident and request his advice. The Maintenance Technicians released the jet back into service and I continued the flight without further incident. Flight crew reported miscommunication with ground crew resulting in a tow breakaway.
Aircraft: CRJ900
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

I'm still perplexed as to why the fuel predictive modeler showed a rapid drop in available fuel once established in cruise and LRC power settings; followed by a rapid increase of over 1000 lbs on approach to landing. This should not have happened in the fuel predictive model. Running the fuel calculations manually we expected to have more; but we decided to error on the side of caution.Still being relatively new and never having had to divert before; and dealing with constant messages from dispatch; I was getting a little task saturated in my duties on this leg and this continued once we got on the ground with the termination of the flight and the disembarking of grumpy passengers. With the change of crew and termination of the flight we failed to contact maintenance regarding the fuel predictive modeler showing 1600 lbs and then rapidly increasing to 2600 lbs on approach.This happened on the last leg of our first day; of the four day trip. At the time of our departure we were +1000 lbs over our minimum fuel requirement for the flight. Operationally we were already several hours delayed and in an extended flight duty period. Due to weather and congestion; we were slowed approximately 250 miles out to 250 KIAS and then told to backtrack on a 180 degree reversal in lieu of holding. We queried ATC about our position and found that we were number 12 in line. At this point we checked our fuel and found that we were at our bugout fuel limit and had to proceed on to our field alternate. We headed towards our alternate and set LRC power. About 1/2 way to our alternate our fuel predictive modeler rapidly decreased to 1600 lbs of fuel estimated at arrival to our alternate. We could not account for the drop and decided to error on the side of caution and [advise ATC] to receive priority handling. We stayed high and executed an idle descent to a visual approach and landing. On the approach to landing; the fuel predictive modeler rapidly increased available fuel and after landing the totalizer showed 2600 lbs. At time of shutdown we had 2580 lbs remaining. After my walk around and the captain's announcement to the passengers; we should have contacted maintenance and followed on from there before we departed the aircraft. CRJ-900 First reported that while diverting to their alternate the fuel prediction at landing suddenly decreased by a thousand pounds possibly due to a totalizer anomaly. During approach the missing thousand pounds came back. The crew forgot to make a logbook entry concerning the fuel anomaly and departed to their original destination with no maintenance being performed.
Aircraft: B767
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types

The captain was flying the leg. We were a heavy Aircraft but within limits for takeoff. On climb out approximately 5000 ft through transition altitude on the departure both myself and the Captain reached down to set our altimeters. As this was happening I noticed that the Captain inadvertently continued a turn past the course line for the departure. As we were turning through the course I alerted him that he was doing so and called for a correction. He was still heads down setting the altimeter and started to further raise the nose up in the climbing turn. He started his correction back the other way but the nose was too high and the airspeed started to decay rapidly. I immediately noticed the yellow barber pole rising up to meet our speed bug (approx. 220-230) at an alarming rate. As the nose was still too high in a bank and the speed tape continued to decrease to the stick shaker; I alerted him then immediately took control of the Aircraft and performed a nose high turning unusual attitude recovery back to level and accelerating. Once the Aircraft was under control the Captain took control of the aircraft and continued to fly the departure. The timeline on these events written sounds like this event unfolded over a period of time but in reality it was literally seconds. Following a max gross weight takeoff; while turning right and climbing; with flaps up at clean maneuvering speed; as I turned right; the relief pilot stated 'transition altitude'; as a reminder for the PM and myself to set 29.92. We were in and out of clouds at the time and I was hand flying. I reached out to set 29.92 with the aircraft on speed and following the flight director. As I set the altimeters; I experienced vertigo; allowed the nose to get too high; and the stall feathers rapidly moved down to the nose attitude. The PM (Pilot Monitoring) was immediately aware; and pushed the stick forward; I said to him 'you have the controls'; and the aircraft was in a stable situation within seconds; though stick shaker was induced and it was necessary to rapidly lower the nose. I concentrated my attention on the attitude indicator; reset my internal gyros; and resumed aircraft control within ten to twenty seconds. The clean maneuvering speed was 254 and the aircraft probably decelerated to 235 momentarily. B767 flight crew reported a nose high attitude with stick shaker after the Captain experienced vertigo during the climb.
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was advised by the Flight Attendants just prior to push that the passenger prerecorded announcement system was playing. I called Maintenance who sent a local mechanic to check it out and who subsequently deferred the system. In the hustle and bustle of turning a long delayed jet; I neglected to coordinate with the dispatcher to amend the release for the new MEL item. Contributing to this was the fact we were already late and I was being rushed by operations and the agent. Additionally; and more importantly; was the fact that the company had us fly an extended day the day before with long airport sits. Over thirteen hours just from show to finish so in reality a fourteen hour plus day with respect to hotel door to door; which resulted in less than adequate sleep and no opportunity for me to get proper exercise which is every bit as important to me functioning at my highest levels as breathing.As long as the company continues to push us this hard; I for one will be occasionally filling out [reports] for missing small items because I'm not at my best. Additionally; the most mentally and physically dulling thing you can have me do is sit at airports. There is nothing relaxing or restful about these sits at all. And I absolutely see that dulling effect on everyone I fly with. EMB-170 Captain reported he forgot to request an amended flight release due to fatigue.
Aircraft: PA28
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC

I was flying VFR with one passenger from ZZZ to ZZZ1 for a touch and go and back to ZZZ. In order to avoid the Class B airspace; I planned to do the FLY VFR shoreline route below class B shelf at 2;000 ft. In my cross country flight; I always like to take flight following. I did the same this time starting from Approach followed by ZZZ3 Center. I entered the shoreline [route] after clearing the class D of ZZZ3. I informed the ZZZ3 Center that I will be staying at 2;000 ft. along the shoreline route. When crossing over the [landmark]; I was informed of traffic at my 2 o clock. I couldn't see the traffic so I reported by saying 'looking for traffic'. At the same time; I turned a little to the left knowing that the traffic is to my 2 o clock. After about 20 seconds I saw the traffic crossing to my right and felt like it was about 200 ft. in horizontal distance flying at the same altitude. I continued to my planned route to ZZZ2 ; performed the touch and go and returned back to ZZZ1 using the VFR shoreline route again at 2;000 ft. PA28 pilot reported a NMAC with crossing traffic.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

This aircraft has two exit placard on the ceiling; one at the window exit and one at row 18. Nowhere in the emergency PA do we notify passengers that they are on a plane with two ceiling exit placards. Nowhere in the Passenger Safety Information Card is this information notified to our passengers. In the emergency PA; we tell our passengers; 'Signs overhead and lights on the floor will lead you to the exit'; however; they do not on this plane. If smoke is in the cabin and our passengers follow the ceiling exit placard; they will not be aware that the one at row 18 does not lead to the over-wing exits. This misleading information has the potential to cause serious harm and or death. B737-700 Flight Attendant reported confusing location of the aircraft cabin emergency exit lights.
Aircraft: SMALL AIRCRAFT
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Aircraft X was cleared by Approach to ZZZ and placed on a heading of 180 climbing to 040. The aircraft checked on with me still climbing below the MIA (Minimum IFR Altitude) of 030 heading towards a 050 MIA within a minute and a half. The aircraft was also climbing at less than a 300 ft per minute climb rate. I initially went to turn him away from the MIA but he was still below the MIA of 030. The pilot read it back as a question so I responded negative; maintain current heading of 180. And he read that back correct. The pilot was having a hard time hearing me also when I asked to be out of 030ft in 1 minute or less. So I asked him if he had all surrounding terrain in sight and to maintain his own terrain and obstruction clearance then I also climbed him to 050ft. Pilots should advise if they're climb rate is going to be less than 300 ft per minute especially on an IFR clearance. Better coordination should have been done with myself and PDX approach. ZSE Controller reported an IFR departure at less than expected standard climb rate entering a higher MVA.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

During my pre-flight at the gate; I noticed that the cargo loading and ground crew was wearing 'Worldwide' safety vests instead of our Company. I observed no Company supervisors on the ramp. The ground crew was not ready for departure at departure time. They used non-standard phraseology during the pre-departure; push back; engine start and disconnect process. The ground crew opened the forward cargo door twice after the parking brake was released for push back without first notifying the Captain. The Captain flew to our destination and other than noting that the aircraft was nose heavy on takeoff; the flight was uneventful. After we parked at gate the Crew Chief entered the cockpit as the passengers were deplaning. He explained that the cargo had been incorrectly loaded and pointed to his 'Offload Report.' The report clearly showed that only ONE bag should have been placed in the forward cargo and the rest should have been in the aft cargo. The Crew Chief reported that the aft cargo was empty and ALL the bags were in the forward cargo. Obviously this is a very serious issue - one which could have caused aircraft controllability issues; or worse; a hull loss. The ground crew for our flight was one of the Company's recently outsourced crews. They used non-standard phraseology; indicating a lack of proper training. They were unable to prepare the aircraft for departure in a timely manner in spite of the fact that the cargo was relatively light; needing only one cargo bay. In my opinion; this lack of training; experience and supervision resulted in a very dangerous cargo loading error.Better training and supervision of new; improved outsourced contractors. Provide pilots with the same paperwork used to load the aircraft so we can double check with the load closeout/takeoff performance data and verify proper loading. This report adds no new information. A B737-800 crew reported that an outsourced ground crew loaded all freight forward when it should have been aft causing a nose heavy aircraft and also used non-standard phraseology during pushback.
Aircraft: A321
Phase of flight: Takeoff / Launch
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft TOW (Take-Off Weight) approximately 140K lbs; CG 17.7; T.O. trim setting 2.7NU. During takeoff roll; approximately ten knots prior to rotate speed; nose gear began lifting off of runway. Nose down force applied to side stick controller failed to control pitch. At five knots prior to rotate speed nose gear became fully airborne and the aircraft continued an uncommanded rotation until fully airborne. For several seconds the side stick controller was unable to overcome the continued increase in pitch. As the automated pitch trim system continued to trim; normal flight characteristics were restored after approximately 20-30 seconds. Aircraft accelerated near the flap speed limit until control of the aircraft was restored.Both dispatch and maintenance were fully debriefed about this incident. I am waiting for the results of their investigations. Improper aircraft loading and/or errors in the [performance calculations] are suspected.Feedback from dispatch and maintenance are required to determine the cause of the incident prior to making any recommendations. A321 Captain reported uncommanded rotation prior to V1 that could not be overcome by the side stick.
Aircraft: A300
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter FOD

At FL320 a loud bang was heard and felt. Right main gear door warning light and overspeed warning. No other indications. QRH was followed and complied with. Got new burn numbers from [Operations] and continued with only gear door warning. On touchdown we could feel the right main rumble. We rolled to the end and cleared [the runway]. Aircraft was towed to parking. We discovered a large hole in the wheel well door and a large hole in the outside tire on the right main gear. Cause: Fault in tire or we picked up something on takeoff roll. [Report narrative contained no additional information]. A300 flight crew reported a main gear tire exploded in cruise at FL320 causing damage to the wheel well door.
Aircraft: LARGE TRANSPORT; LOW WING; 2 TURBOJET ENG
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

ARTCC handed me two aircraft on collision courses at the same altitude! Aircraft X and Aircraft Y were going to lose separation within a few miles of crossing my boundary coming from Denver Center. I called the ARTCC 'controller' and told him to turn Aircraft X 30 degrees left to go behind Aircraft Y. He acknowledged that he would comply. He waited at least a couple minutes before he told the aircraft. The sooner he gave the clearance the better because there was a 100 knot tail wind on Aircraft X and he was going to pick up speed. I feel that the ARTCC 'controller' defiantly waited to turn Aircraft X because the aircraft took so long to start his turn; but this is only speculation.Retrain these people before a midair occurs! ZMP ARTCC reported ZDV ARTCC handed off two aircraft at the same altitude on converging courses without taking action to ensure separation.
Aircraft: CESSNA 180 SKYWAGON
Phase of flight: Takeoff / Launch
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown; Ground Incursion Runway

I finished pre-takeoff checklist and taxied towards end of runway [at an] uncontrolled airport with an active FSS. I was in radio communication with airport FSS. An aircraft reported turning base for a touch and go on the runway in use. I looked and saw the aircraft on base. It appeared as if I had lots of room so I reported my intention to expedite takeoff and clear the area prior to aircraft on base arriving. I rapidly took the runway at the end; which was in the displaced threshold area used for takeoff but not landing. I added the power and started the takeoff. About 1;000 FT down the runway; and just before lifting off; an aircraft reported 'Going Around.' As I lifted off a Cessna 150 passed overhead (with plenty of room to spare) on the missed approach. There had been another aircraft on approach in front of the one I saw on base. The Cessna 150 was evidently on final and by focusing on the aircraft on base I missed the one on final and cut him off by taking the runway. Cessna 150 continued climb out in front of me and I departed the pattern; (feeling like less than a pro) without further incident. Problem was haste and not adhering to procedures I teach my students at uncontrolled airports. I train students - prior to takeoff - announce; make a minimum 45 turn on the taxiway towards final to clear the area and preferably a 360 degree clearing turn on the taxiway to search the entire pattern prior to taking the runway; and announce again. If I would have practiced what I preach I most likely would have seen the other aircraft. C180 pilot reports not seeing an aircraft on final approach; believing his only traffic is an aircraft on base. The C150 on final approach goes around as the reporter is about to lift off.