Aryan95614/aerograph-asrs huggingface dataset:
Aircraft: AIRBUS INDUSTRIE UNDIFFERENTIATED OR OTHER MODEL
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Aircraft X was issued 3;500 ft. by my Trainee and we heard a good read back of 3;500 ft. I observed the aircraft at 3;100 ft. and I issued a climb immediately as the aircraft was a few miles from a 3;500 ft. MVA. The aircraft continued to descend further before he was able to climb. To be honest I let the Trainee go too far in running his own sequence. Had I been working I would typically not have the aircraft that low and close to the airport if he wasn't number one for the runway. I think this may have contributed to the Pilot mistaking thinking he was cleared for the visual approach. TRACON Controller reported during that OJT an aircraft descended below its assigned altitude and flew below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude.
Aircraft: ECLIPSE 500
Phase of flight: Landing
Anomaly: Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

On visual approach to Runway XXR at ZZZ; LLWS led to loss of altitude on short final and stall warning horn. [I] was able to recover and execute a go-around. [The event] occurred within airport property but prior to the runway threshold. I would estimate that I recovered at approximately 50 ft. above the ground [and] 200 ft. prior to the runway threshold; which is way closer than I would want to be. As a lower-time pilot; I don't have high confidence in my measurement estimates.I don't believe the ATIS was reporting gusty winds; so I didn't add speed to Vref as I was trained to do in gusty conditions. I think my takeaway in the future is I will add speed to Vref in moderate turbulence conditions as well because of the potential for LLWS. When executing a visual approach to XXR at ZZZ; aircraft are typically asked to keep base turn within 2 miles of airport; which makes it hard to execute a stabilized approach to final; especially in moderate turbulence conditions. Single Pilot reported a stall warning and loss of altitude on short final due to a moderate turbulence event.
Aircraft: UAV - UNPILOTED AERIAL VEHICLE
Phase of flight: unknown
Anomaly: Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Arrived at the loss location and was in a hurry to get out of the extreme cold temperatures. Did not adequately check airspace at the location and flew without prior authorization. Airspace violation was discovered in my company's monthly flight reviews and has been discussed with me for corrective measures. Will file a flight plan next time I am in a LAANC ready airspace. DJI Phantom UAV operator reported inadvertently operating in PIT Class B airspace without clearance.
Aircraft: A319
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

During taxi into the gate at ZZZ while setting up for single engine taxi; I inadvertently selected the Number 1 ENG GEN switch off while intending to turn off the APU GEN switch to prevent a potential power cycle for a pending APU start. Because the Number 2 ENG GEN had already been turned off in preparation for single engine taxi (and awaiting the required 3 minutes for engine shutdown) switch misidentification resulted in a momentary loss of electrical power also effecting the nose wheel steering and brakes. The error was immediately noticed and power was reapplied retuning power; steering and braking immediately without incident. While taxiing in; I was slowing to make the turn to enter the ramp area to park. The Number two engine was set up for single engine taxi waiting on the time to shut it down. The first Officer was going to start the APU so he went to turn off the APU Gen but accidentally hit the no.1 Gen instead of the APU gen. and we lost all power brakes and steering momentarily. He immediately realized what he had done and selected the no.1 gen back online. The aircraft drifted left of centerline and I almost missed the taxiway I was slowing for due to no brakes. The brakes and steering came back as soon as the power was selected back on and I was able to stop for the turn and correct back towards the taxiway centerline. The First Officer was new and finishing consolidation and thought he had the correct switch; immediately recognized the mistake and corrected the issue. I was looking out the window towards the gate and did not see the switch he was pushing. A319 flight crew reported a momentary loss of electrical power during taxi when the operating generator disconnect switch was inadvertently activated.
Aircraft: AIRBUS 318/319/320/321 UNDIFFERENTIATED
Phase of flight: Final Approach
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Had to go around on a visual approach to RW 27R in KPHL due to the aircraft in front failing to clear as quickly as I had expected. We were cleared the visual approach after being told to proceed direct JALTO. Prior to that we were on vectors with an assigned airspeed of 180KTs (approximately 4 miles from JALTO on a right base). After being cleared the visual approach we seemed a bit tight on the proceeding aircraft so I slowed to 160 KTs 2 miles prior to JALTO and aimed about a mile outside the marker so as to make enough room. All seemed fine as we had 2.5 miles spacing on the TCAS as I slowed to approach. Normally 3 miles would be optimal on visual approaches but still it seemed we had enough. As we were descending through 1000 AFL tower asked the proceeding aircraft (company) to clear at K4 however we heard no response from them on the radio. Apparently they weren't able to make that exit as they continued down to T. Tower asked them to expedite down to T as we were on short final by then (approx. 700 AFL I'd guess) but again we heard no response from the preceding aircraft. At about 500 AFL tower directed us to go around which we did just as the aircraft was turning off at T.We had to go around for 2 reasons. First of all I didn't recognize the tight spacing quick enough to give myself 3 miles.... that extra .5 miles would have made the difference. However the secondary reason was that our company aircraft refused to respond to tower which raised doubt as to whether he/she would clear at T. I have witnessed many pilots (including myself) become annoyed when tower calls them on the radio during landing since obviously it is a busy time. That being said had they told tower that they would be off shortly then I'm certain we'd have been able to continue that approach to landing.... again we were not all that low at the time of the go around.... 500 AFL.At any rate it wasn't that much of a problem as we circled right back around and landed just a few minutes later.Personally I try to answer tower if possible when they call even during the landing. The best example is when you land RW 04 in KLGA and the tower immediately asks you if you can make P or G. Until you acknowledge with an answer they can't clear the aircraft on RW 13 for takeoff. We have to work as a team with tower during that landing/departing configuration and I think a bit of teamwork could have been used on RW 27R the other morning as well. An Airbus Captain executed a go-around on short final to PHL because the preceding aircraft was not clear of the runway; and failed to acknowledge ATC's request for an expedited runway exit.
Aircraft: CITATION EXCEL (C560XL)
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Inbound on the TELLR2 RNAV arrival into DEN level at FL190 were approaching the fix CRSTE and already established the arrival; we were cleared to descend via the TELLR2. We waited almost a full minute for the Top of Descent (TOD) to display and engaged VNAV/VALT. Approximately 2 minutes later over CREDE intersection; ATC changed our runway so the Pilot Not Flying (PNF) reloaded the FMS to 34L transition. When he executed the change; our TOD and all speed commands disappeared from the PFD. It took over 3 minutes for a TOD and VNAV to return; during this time I was very focused on manually making the altitude crossings while the PNF was desperately trying to determine why the FMS VNAV had failed. I was successful at making the altitude crossings manually; but due to task saturation caused by an inadequate and antiquated Honeywell FMS; I did not catch the speed restriction of 250 KTS at POWDR; about 3 miles past POWDR; Denver approach queried us about our current speed to which the PNF responded 'slowing for 250;' which was done immediately after the query. The rest of the arrival and landing was normal and there were no other excursions.The Excel crews are getting sick and tired of the shortcoming of the underpowered and antiquated FMS system. It amazes me that our safety department can't figure out why this fleet is having so many ALT/NAV deviations; but it is very clear in our minds that there is a direct correlation between this substandard and outdated FMS system and the deviations; it simply cannot meet the demands of the latest generation of RNAV procedures and is very unpredictable. The worst case scenario for this FMS is an arrival comprised of multiple in between altitudes; it does not have the computing power to make these calculations in a timely fashion.To mitigate this in the future; I recommend the safety department and the FAA do not authorize the XL fleet to perform these complex RNAV procedures. We should be using only NON-RNAV arrivals. I'm going to go out on a limb and assume the above recommendation will fall on deaf ears so I will also recommend that when between altitudes [that] are part of an RNAV arrival; the procedure is to replace every in between with a manual hard altitude that is in compliance with the published between range. For example; if the procedure specifies cross between FL190 and FL150; the crew would manually input FL170 as a hard altitude. CE-560XL Captain reported the Honeywell FMS installed in this type of aircraft is; in his opinion; incapable of complying with the complex demands of modern RNAV arrival procedures.
Aircraft: CRJ700
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Aircraft

CRJ-700 aircraft was pushed back from the gate. We performed engine start checks; then started engine. I; Mechanic X; called for taxi and we get clearance from Tower. Mechanic Y reports no brakes or steering. I try my brakes; no stop. I then armed thrust reverses and pull back on thrust reverser levers. I saw on the EICAS the thrust reverser did activate but not soon enough to stop us. After the incident I go to stop the engines and we go through shutdown procedures. Tower calls and ask if we need assistance or medical crew; and I tell them that we were okay. Then aircraft shutdown. I feel [that] an abnormal event and then the onset of panic caused the event along with the amount of time to fix said event. Aircraft damage. Struck against an aircraft. Surface dry. A Line Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) describes his efforts to stop their CRJ-700 aircraft during taxi out when he realized they did not have any brakes or nosewheel steering control prior to contacting another aircraft. The abnormal event and onset of panic contributed to the incident.
Aircraft: CESSNA 150
Phase of flight: Takeoff / Launch
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

While waiting for traffic to pass before takeoff from an untowered airport; I heard one aircraft report on final and another on downwind. I watched the one on downwind while the one on final landed and exited the runway. At that point; aircraft previously on downwind was turning base; and I looked and did not see anyone else on final; so I taxied onto the runway and took off.About the time I rotated; another pilot announced a go-around; and then overflew me slightly to the left. As it turned out; he was on final; but I did not see him. Good thing he did a go-around; as otherwise; he may not have been able to stop before colliding with me if he had landed.In retrospect; I suspect both pilots may have announced being on final on CTAF; but I was not aware of it being two separate aircraft. Being more cognizant of the different pilots making CTAF announcements and a better scan of the final approach path may have prevented this near collision. Despite CTAF transmissions and visual contact with other aircraft in the pattern; a C-150 pilot just airborne from a non-towered airport suffered an NMAC with another aircraft executing a go-around that had been on final to the same runway; but was unobserved by the reporter.
Aircraft: B777
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Lower level Flight Attendant crew rest area by Door 3R; inspection showed Halon light DISCH. Switch did not have guard or safety wire to prevent accidental discharge. Not sure if cleaners or stranger hit button. Maintenance consulted and dialog revealed a non-standard panel. The correct panel should have had a guard and procedure on label.I suggest installing a new panel or modify the existing panel to include a guard or safety wire system and recommend issuing a safety bulletin to alert crews. Without lower crew rest we lost 5 revenue seats to crew rest and left uncertainty as to what Maintenance Control thinks is installed on the aircraft. B777 Captain reported a non-standard fire protection panel installed in crew rest area; resulting in a delay and 5 seats to be reserved for crew rest.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Aircraft X was at 35;000 FT on the track out of ZZZZZ [Intersection]. As the aircraft was entering Center's airspace; the aircraft stated that due to aircraft maintenance it was turning around. I confirmed this with the aircraft via phone patch. I then treated the aircraft as an emergency. The aircraft was cleared to descend to 34;500 FT and was told upon reaching 34;500 FT; then cleared right turned direct ZZnZZw; further routing to follow. En route Controller provided emergency handling to an aircraft experiencing equipment difficulties.
Aircraft: ANY UNKNOWN OR UNLISTED AIRCRAFT MANUFACTURER
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Climbed out of S50 in Aircraft X; ATC requested we maintain visual obstacle clearance which we agreed; due to smoke visibility was low; passenger became nervous and turned the aircraft while we were being vectored; Requested ATC to vector us back to S50 for landing; ATC provided phone number to call TRACON after landing due to us turning while being vectored. Landed without incident; ATC marked matter as closed. Pilot reports deviation from Air Traffic Control vectors.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

After departing ZZZ Runway XX; Departure Control directed turn to 020 degrees; climb 10;000 MSL. Air Traffic Control then directed passing 11;000 MSL; cleared left turn direct ZZZ [VOR]; climb and maintain FL180. Air Traffic Control then amended clearance to 14;000 MSL. With aircraft in the turn; autopilot engaged; thrust in climb power and Open Climb mode; aircraft exceeded 14;000 MSL by 275 feet during automatic level with autopilot likely due to light weight. Air Traffic Control immediately gave us right turn 360 and firmly reminded us of our assigned altitude of 14;000 MSL; then called traffic at our 11 o'clock at 15;000 MSL. Autopilot was disconnected; we initiated immediate turn to 360; manually complete the level off at 14;000 MSL. There were no TA's or RA's during this event. Aircraft never exceeded 14;300 MSL during this event.Got altitude assignment while climbing at a high rate. Cause - Light weight aircraft as a result of very light passenger load.Suggestions - Awareness on aircraft operations with non-standard weight...much lighter than standard ops weights. Air carrier flight crew reported overshooting an assigned altitude during departure and cited the rate of climb due to the aircraft being light in weight as a contributing factor.
Aircraft: CESSNA 310/T310C
Phase of flight: Cruise; Landing
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

I was approximately 80 miles from destination airport level at 9;000 feet on an IFR flight plan. I was operating both engines on the auxiliary tanks and in preparation for descent and landing went to change the fuel selectors back to the main tanks. The right engine selector moved freely; however the left selector would not move. The left aux tank had two gallons remaining as indicated by instruments. The airport was reporting 600 scattered and if I recall correctly the ceiling was coming down and visibility was dropping due to snow.I could see alternate airport directly ahead and controllers informed me weather was 2;200 OVC. I requested a destination change and descent. I elected to make a power reduction on both engines but pulled to power to idle on the left engine in an attempt to conserve fuel. I broke out into visual conditions and noticed that Exhaust Gas Temperatures (EGTs) on the left engine had dropped indicating it had run out of fuel. I secured the left engine; increased power on the right engine to full. I located the alternate airport and selected a runway I was aligned with and it was also the longest available. ATC had reported that the braking action was reported as poor.I landed and applied brakes to stop when the plane began sliding on the ice. The brakes were locked when a dry patch of concrete was encountered. This caused the right side main tire to flat spot and wear to the point of failure. An attempt was made to taxi the plane but was found impossible with a single engine operating and with a flat tire. We were able to move the plane onto runway a cross runway. We notified airport management that we would require a tug and to NOTAM the occupied runway closed. Due to the ice conditions and facility staff availability the plane remained on the runway overnight and another attempt will be made today.Other than the flat tire; the plane does not appear to be damaged and an investigation into the fuel selector valve will be initiated. The fuel selector for left engine malfunctioned resulting in fuel starvation of the left engine. The pilot diverted to closest field available. Poor braking action resulted in a failed tire on landing rollout.
Aircraft: CESSNA 152
Phase of flight: Initial Climb
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

The preflight looked good [with the rental C152]; there were no noticeable leaks or discrepancies with the aircraft. The run up and magneto check was good. I got clearance to take off. The takeoff roll was normal. I rotated and climbed out at Vy. Everything was fine until I reached around 300 feet AGL; [at] that time I noticed I was no longer climbing and that the airspeed was dropping as well as the VSI. The stall warning horn began to sound and I started extending flaps to transition into slow flight to keep from stalling. The engine was still running smoothly; however the engine was not producing enough power to maintain altitude. At this time Tower asked me what was going on. I told them due to an unknown reason I was not able to maintain altitude and I was going to try to circle back and land. It did not look as though I would make it back to [the takeoff] runway and the Tower advised that I could land on [a different] runway instead. I was able to make it down and land and the partial power I still had was enough to taxi back to [FBO] where I notified them of the events and issue with their plane. C152 pilot reported engine was not producing normal power on takeoff and he was losing altitude; so he returned for an immediate landing.
Aircraft: B777
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance

While working an Engineering Repair Authorization EC/EA and AD 2012-11-09; Step 2-B1 appears to have the mechanic inspect the existing cable; install the mask and insert [Release] Cable pin into the striker pin of the cylinder if no damage was found. There was a misunderstanding by the [maintenance] crew of Step 2 of AD 2012-11-09; since the mechanic had to install a new cable; which is not addressed in AD 2012-11-09. As a result; the Cable assembly and oxygen masks were incorrectly installed on a B777-200 Aircraft during reactivation of the Oxygen System.Additional reference should include an Illustrated Parts Catalog (IPC) 35-21-01-40b (item C) for a better understanding of [Release] Cable routing. Also add a [maintenance] step to install any missing cable to [passenger O2] box; including hardware; into the Engineering Kit for AD 2012-11-09 and better training. An Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) recommends an additional reference be added to Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2012-11-09 to include Illustrated Parts Catalog (IPC) 35-21-01-40b; (item C). The IPC would provide a better understanding of the Passenger O2 mask box release cable routing. Misunderstanding of Step 2 of the AD resulted in an incorrect installation of the release cable and O2 masks on a B777-200 aircraft.
Aircraft: SMALL TRANSPORT
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL

I have been working in a dysfunctional flight department. I flew an aircraft without being sure that the MEL was done correctly. It originally became nonfunctional as I was flying with the Chief Pilot; and I asked him how we should write it up. He asked; officially or unofficially. I said officially; and thought the matter was going to be resolved before we flew it at altitude again. It was not and I flew with the O2 nonfunctional. There are a number of issues at this flight department; and I have reported it to the management; and the POI (Principle Operations Inspector). Flight Department Captain reported flying an aircraft with a non-functional O2 system and not knowing if the MEL for it had been followed correctly.