Aryan95614/aerograph-asrs huggingface dataset:
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

We had been cleared for the ILS 23 Approach. Just after crossing TRAVA intersection; we started our descent and got a GPWS aural warning; 'Caution Terrain.' We were indicating 4;000 ft. at 200 knots with flaps 8. We then got the aural warning 'Too Low; Terrain; Pull UP' at this point I performed the EGPWS escape maneuver by adding TOGA thrust and initiating a climb. The captain notified ATC of our GPWS warning and that we were initiating a climb. ATC responded with radar vectors back to shoot the ILS 23 approach again. I leveled off at 5;000 ft. after the warnings stopped. We completed the second approach without incident. Just prior to reaching TRAVA on ILS 23 going into BUF at 4000 feet and flaps 8; ATC told us to descend to 2300 feet. My First Officer (FO) as flying pilot started to descend and we got a GPWS 'caution terrain'. A few moments later 'too low terrain'. Being IMC; my FO executed the EGPWS escape maneuver. We informed ATC of our climb and came back around to do ILS 23 again. At the same point over the ground and same configuration; EGPWS did not go off this time. We landed in BUF without incident. Air carrier flight crew reported a terrain warning while on the ILS 23 approach to BUF.
Aircraft: SMALL AIRCRAFT; LOW WING; 1 ENG; FIXED GEAR
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC

Approx 5 to 10 miles west of ZZZ; I nearly had a mid-air with another aircraft while under ATC control. I was on an IFR flight plan but needed to return to ZZZ1 due to aircraft issue; and the controller cleared me to descend from 8000 feet to 5500 feet while asking me to turn Left; Heading 270. I continued to descend as the controller directed me next to turn Right; Heading 360. I did and was given a traffic point out to an aircraft flying slightly northwest; closing in on me. I acknowledged I saw the traffic on ADS-B. The controller asked if I could climb to 7;000 feet. After one attempt; I told him unable and watched as the other aircraft's ADS-B track closed in closely on me with the range in our altitudes decreasing. Finally when it appeared the tracks would soon be on top of each other; I turned to the right; then requested a turn to the right. The controller approved; then told the other aircraft to immediately turn left. Before pulling away; it appeared the other aircraft had 300 feet of vertical separation from me. During the position relief briefing Aircraft X reported aircraft issues and requested to return back to ZZZ. The relieved controller turned Aircraft X left heading 230 and descended them to 5;000 feet. The relieved controller finished the briefing and I took over the position. Aircraft Y was roughly 10 miles south-southwest of Aircraft X and direct ZZZ1 at 7;000 ft. I descended Aircraft Y to 5;000 feet and switched him to ZZZ. The 2 targets converged and came within less than 2 miles of each other around 7;000 ft. I missed the other controller assigning 5;000 to Aircraft Y. Maybe I should have waited to take the position until the relieved controller finished helping Aircraft X work through their aircraft equipment situation. TRACON Controller and a pilot reported a NMAC due to the Controller not being aware the Controller they had just relieved had descended another aircraft.
Aircraft: GULFSTREAM IV / G350 / G450
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict

Aircraft X was landing JAC from the east; and routed ZZZ...JAC. I had previously told the aircraft to depart ZZZ heading 255 vector for lower terrain. When he reached the appropriate MIA; I descended him to FL120. There was VFR traffic heading toward him northeast bound slowly climbing through about 112. I was very diligent about updating Aircraft X on the traffic. As they got closer; I told Aircraft X the traffic would come pretty close to him. I basically said that the traffic did not appear to be climbing fast enough to be a collision hazard; but just in case to turn 20 degrees right. After he started turning; the traffic was going to go behind him; but not by much. There was also a few hundred feet of separation. It was not a collision hazard; but close enough to get everyone's attention. Aircraft X then said he had the traffic in sight; but was still responding to an RA. Although the pilot didn't say; I was virtually certain the RA would have been a climb instruction; because a descent would have made no sense. I figured no problem. He sees the traffic; weather is beautiful; and he's about 16 miles from the airport. I asked him if he had the field in sight. To this he said no. When he didn't; I felt like I needed to take assertive action. If I turned him to the left; it would be toward the traffic; and even though he was likely past the traffic at this point; a climb would likely put him too high for final. I told him to make a right 360; and climb to 130. I had time to keep him in the 120 MIA; and it would climb him above the traffic on the next pass. The pilot acknowledged; and started climbing; but did not turn. I thought he was just turning slowly; and I was getting ready to tell him to expedite when he asked again if I wanted him to turn right. He hadn't started the turn yet. Due to the weather; and my knowledge of where the terrain actually was; I wasn't concerned about his safety. The wind was reported very light across the peaks; so I wasn't concerned about any significant turbulence either. In other words; I was concerned about clipping the MIA; but knew the pilot wasn't going to actually hit anything. I barely clipped the corner of the MIA; and missed it by a few hundred feet while the aircraft was climbing. Looking back; I feel like I took a legitimate course of action. I was using a routine vector; and was not expecting the RA. I recovered in what I believe was the safest manner practical. Just one of those things based on VFR traffic that is not in communication with the sector. ZLC Controller described a momentary MVA infraction when issuing turn instructions to avoid a developing conflict with VFR traffic.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Final Approach
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

We were cleared to 2000 ft. on the lateral path of Runway XX. I was at 210 kts. and in level change descending to 2000 ft. We called the runway and were cleared visual approach for Runway XX around ZZZZZ. I thought VNAV was engaged and asked for touch down elevation. I did not verify that VNAV was engaged. I asked for flaps 1 and flaps 5 to slow down. I was inadvertently in level change and the aircraft pitched nose down to maintain the 210 kts. I disconnected the autopilot and leveled the aircraft. During the repair; ATC called low altitude alert. We acknowledged that we were correcting and continued the landing normally. Aircraft automation was selected with LNAV and level change while descending to 2000 ft. Subsequently cleared visual approach and PF (Pilot Flying) started configuring to slow and asked to set touchdown elevation in the altitude window. PF and PM (Pilot Monitoring) didn't verify appropriate vertical mode for phase of flight and aircraft pitched for speed on pitch descent below glidepath. PF disconnected automation and corrected while PM communicated altitude correction to Tower. Air Carrier flight crew reported receiving ATC low altitude alert during visual approach. Excursion from altitude was due to flight crew failure to verify vertical VNAV mode selected.
Aircraft: MEDIUM TRANSPORT; LOW WING; 2 TURBOJET ENG
Phase of flight: Landing
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Landing Without Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Landing on CMH Runway 28L without landing clearance. On approach we were being vectored for the ILS 28L in VMC conditions. CMH Approach Control was issuing headings and various speed reductions before final approach fix. The last ATC communications to us were 'cleared for ILS 28L approach.' We flew the approach uneventfully and upon landing; and exiting the runway at A7 high speed; queried ATC if we should contact Ground Control. The Controller on frequency stated that we were transmitting on Approach frequency. This is when we realized that we did not/were never instructed to contact Tower Controller and we had just landed without landing clearance. We contacted Ground Controller and he gave us a vague clearance to taxi to the ramp. Due to multiple taxiway closures in the vicinity of our taxi route we confirmed our taxi clearance and proceeded to ramp uneventfully. Once on the ramp and parked we had a short conversation with Ground Controller about the incident and they did not seem too concerned about it. Some contributing factors that may have led to this event. We were on duty 6 hours prior to nighttime departure. As [a] crew we discussed after landing how distracting the [Runway] 28L new style bright LED runway and approach lights were. Also infrequent radio transmissions during final approach phase of flight created a sense of security; as a crew we should have been more vigilant and proactive in receiving landing clearance. ATC could be more proactive in assuring pilots contact appropriate controller/frequency. I told Ground that we were never handed off to the Tower from Approach and he responded with 'yes I know; we had you the whole time; its ok.' I readback our taxi clearance back and we proceeded to the ramp. The Controller seemed to be OK with it since it was VMC and [there was] no other traffic in the area or on the ground. A fatigued flight crew landed at CMH during late night operations without clearance. Fatigue and distractions including bright LED approach lights and a lull due to the lack of frequency activity.
Aircraft: B757
Phase of flight: Initial Climb
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

'Nose A/G DISAGREE' status message appeared after takeoff. Climbing out; we consulted the QRH. Concerned that this switch controls 'stall warning and portions of the caution and warning system'; we discussed our problem with this airport's Maintenance and Maintenance Control. They advised us to return to the departure airport and we concurred. Dispatch was notified of our return and an emergency was declared with ATC. We landed overweight; normal touchdown; long rollout; minimal braking with Airfield Rescue and Fire Fighters standing by to monitor brake temps (all OK). Arriving at gate; Maintenance advised us that the nose gear air/ground switch was broken and removed the aircraft from service. [Narrative #2 contained no additional information.] After takeoff a B757 EICAS alerted NOSE A/G DISAGREE so an emergency was declared and the flight returned to the departure airport.
Aircraft: DUCHESS 76
Phase of flight: Landing
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

We put gear handle down and at first did not get 3 green lights; only the 2 main wheels. Then we recycled gear and saw 3 green lights; although the nose wheel light was dimmer than other 2. We did a low approach and Tower confirmed twice that gear was down so we landed on the second pass. The nose gear collapsed on the landing roll. [Narative #2 had no additional information] A BE76 nose gear collapsed on landing after initially failing to indicate down but after cycling indicated safe and with Tower-observed report of the gear down.
Aircraft: LIGHT TRANSPORT; LOW WING; 2 TURBOJET ENG
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC

After completing our initial climb to 2;000 FT on the OAK6 departure from OAK we were cleared an unrestricted climb to 15;000 FT. We were in a 4;000 FPM climb and advised by NORCAL Departure to make a left turn to 180 degrees. During that climb; at 7;800 FT and climbing fast I was asked to level off at 8;000 FT which we were unable to do in a timely manner due to our climb rate. As I lowered the nose and reduced power and the climb; we encountered an RA. At the same time NORCAL advised us to make an immediate left turn to 140 degrees. My training kicked in and I followed the commands from the TCAS and flew the aircraft abruptly into the commanded guidance bars; disregarding the turn to 140 degrees. Just as I was pitching the nose abruptly over to comply with the RA; I saw a single engine aircraft in a very steep left turn at my altitude and within 500 FT of my aircraft. Once I had the traffic in sight; I eased off the TCAS RA commands and flew the aircraft away maintaining visual contact with the single engine plane. We advised NORCAL of the RA immediately and had no response. Nothing was said after the incident. The problem I have here is that NORCAL had both of us on radar and turned me (the jet aircraft) into the oncoming light aircraft. This seems to be an issue that is getting worse and needs to be addressed. A business jet departed OAK on the OAK 6 and during a high climb rate ascent was unable to level off after an amended climb clearance so the pilot took evasive to avoid the near miss traffic also under ATC control.
Aircraft: C210
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict

I departed in my Cessna 210; VFR for a return flight to my home base. I had asked Tower for radar services and Tower gave me a right turn out and then handed me over to Departure. Departure asked me what altitude I was climbing to and I told them 4;500 FT. I don't remember Departure's exact phraseology but they cleared me on course with a 'Climb and maintain 4;500'. I was never given any radar vectors or told a course to fly. My on course heading was just about straight west. Right after I checked in with Departure; I noticed an aircraft in the distance with a very; very bright recognition light on it. The aircraft was quite a ways above me and did not appear at that time to be moving across my windshield. I always pay special attention to any aircraft that does not appear to be moving in the windshield because I know that means that we are on a converging course. As I kept flying; the other aircraft appeared to be descending and I noticed that their recognition lights appeared to pulse alternately between two lights that I think were close together. Again; these lights were extremely bright and very attention grabbing but it also made it impossible for me to tell the size of the aircraft. I gradually turned a little bit to the southwest; I think probably around 30 degrees to the left of my original course. At this time; the other aircraft appeared to be slowly moving to the right across the copilot side windshield and I then knew that we were not on a converging course. I kept a close eye on the other aircraft. It would have been hard not to have because its recognition light was so bright. I was having a hard time judging distance but it appeared to be well clear of me. I had just leveled at 4;500 FT. I may have gone up an extra 50 FT; but I know I did not get to 4;600 FT. As the other aircraft was going behind me off my right side; I heard the pilot come on the radio and say something about his TCAS giving him a warning and he had to climb. I asked Departure what type of aircraft went behind me and he said it was a B737. I have very little knowledge about TCAS so I don't know what type of warning the other pilot got. I never thought that we were too close together. The only problems I see is that the bright recognition light made it hard for me to judge distance; but I still think that it was better for them to have such a bright light than to not have one. If Departure thought we were too close; he should have vectored one of us or given us a different altitude restriction. C210 pilot on a night VFR flight in contact with Departure Control; observed very bright lights of a converging aircraft and altered course. As the C210 pilot overshot his assigned altitude he heard the traffic; a B737; report responding to a TCAS alert to climb. Traffic passed clear behind the C210.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Takeoff / Launch
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

We initiated a maximum power takeoff due to deicing. With the combination of the cold weather and a light aircraft; the acceleration rate was noticeably greater than normal. Just as I completed setting the takeoff thrust; we both heard a click and immediately multiple Master Caution lights illuminated including 'Hyd' and 'Anti-ice' on my side. The Captain announced the abort and a very aggressive stop was initiated. We came to a stop on the runway and the Captain instructed me to tell the Tower. The aggressive stop was a result of the RTO activating. I did not make the 80 knot call out; but it was evident we exceeded that airspeed. I believe the acceleration rate; taking a moment longer to set max power; and the timing of the failure all contributed to me missing the call out. The Captain called for the RTO Checklist after coordinating with the Tower to have Fire and Rescue notified. I became frustrated with my inability to find it. I spent several minutes pouring over the QRH looking for it. I now know it is no longer in the QRH and am not sure how I was not aware of this. I feel I could have done a much better job assisting the Captain if I hadn't been so distracted trying to find the RTO Checklist. Aircraft lost Flight Director Command bars and had multiple warning indications during the takeoff roll. RTO was initiated by the Captain and aircraft returned to the gate. First Officer spent considerable time attempting to locate the QRH page referencing an RTO event; only to discover it had been eliminated from the QRH.
Aircraft: B757
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I'm only being made aware of the issue today. Two months ago; I had a flight between two west coast cities. Dispatch view prompted me to add a radio number due to a late inbound flight with the same flight number. Per policy I added radio number XXXT and made the change within Dispatch software and with ATC. Unknown to me the Dispatcher of the inbound XXX had made his flight XXXT as well. Dispatch software does not provide this information and we no longer have a function to tell which radio numbers have already been used or else I could have selected XXXA. Or in reality; had I known the inbound already had a radio number I could have left my leg alone completely. But as the system is set up now there was no prompt so we ended up with two XXXT's at the same airport at the same time. At the time of occurrence I was not aware of any of this. My crew did not report any problems to best of my recollection a month after the fact after having dispatched several hundred subsequent flights. A Dispatcher reported that after a dispatch software program change he and another Dispatcher were able to assign an outbound flight and a delayed inbound flight the same code while both aircraft were at the same airport.
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

While we were handling a radar failed indication; the FMS message 'COMPARE FUEL QUANTITY' appears on the FMS. The First Officer and I agreed that it was probably erroneous but it could be a fuel leak. We ran the QRH for fuel leak. The QRH says: (NOTE: An unexpected difference between the total fuel quantity indicated on EICAS and the total fuel quantity indicated on the FMS Fuel Management page may indicate a fuel leak condition.) We declared an emergency and Landed at the nearest suitable airport. After crash and rescue confirmed that we did not have a fuel leak; we taxied to the gate and wrote up the discrepancies. Since there were thunderstorms along our route of flight; the captain and I decided to advise ATC of the failure and asked if they could vector us around the thunderstorms since our radar display was not accurate. A few minutes later ATC gave us new routing to bring us around the back side of the weather. We were then told by ATC to expect holding as no aircraft were landing due to thunderstorms. After running the QRH procedure for the situation; we broke out of the clouds and were able to remain VMC and visually avoid the convective activity. We were told by ATC that planes were now landing and to disregard holding. The flight crew of an ERJ-170 responded appropriately to a 'Compare Fuel Quantity' ECAM message; declared an emergency and landed at the nearest suitable airport. A concurrent failed weather radar; and the presence of convective weather; turned out to be surmountable complicating factors.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Aircraft

Windy and snowy night at ZZZ. Boarded passengers and closed door. Got deiced and anti-iced at gate. Deicers couldn't deice our radome since the deicing truck couldn't get to the front of the aircraft. Deicer said they'd finish the deicing [and] spray the radome upon our push into the alley. We called for push. Ramp Tower cleared us to push. To the best of my knowledge; the Ramp Controller's exact words were; ''Cleared to push.'' The clearance was without qualification or further detail. Simply; 'Cleared to push.' I repeated same to our ground crew. We got pushed into the snowy alley. After resetting brakes; I asked ground crew to stay on interphone for a moment until I could re-establish radio contact with deicer (that is; so as to ask him if he needed engines off for the radome deicing). I believe the deicer's reply was that it didn't matter.I then cleared our ground crew to disconnect interphone; got pin and salute; etc. We started engines and deicer deiced our radome. Upon receipt of deicer's final report; and ground crew now gone; I was now able to toggle up Comm 2 audio (Ramp Tower). Our aircraft status was: stationary; parking brake parked; both engines running; and deicing and anti-icing fully completed. About the first thing I heard over Comm 2 was someone talking about having hit something.I initially thought it was a deicing truck (not ours; of course) somewhere out on the ramp that was discussing having hit something; but it turned out that there was now a [Company] 737 off our right wing - at our 3:30 position. He was telling us that as he had been taxiing forward (from a position behind us); the leading edge of his left wingtip (winglet) had contacted the aft edge of the winglet on our right wingtip.We remained parked - did not move - and called for [Company] Aircraft Maintenance to come out and inspect us. They came out and confirmed the aforementioned contact and confirmed some visible damage - but also said that our current state was safe: ''OK to get tugged back to the gate.'' We called for a tug and crew to tug us back to a gate. Due to the 28-knot winds gently buffeting our aircraft; we had not been aware of wingtip contact. There had been no jolt or bump perceptible to us (or; if there was a slight bump or jolt; it had been disguised by the wind.). Normal deplaning of passengers. Air carrier Captain reported their aircraft being struck by another aircraft while sitting still on the ramp.