Aryan95614/aerograph-asrs huggingface dataset:
Aircraft: HAWKER HORIZON (RAYTHEON)
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Approach cleared us direct to VINGS; 2;000 MSL and 210 KIAS. Prior to VINGS; Approach changed the clearance to an assigned heading or 090; maintain 2;000 FT until established; cleared for the ILS 6 at TEB. Since we were on an assigned heading to intercept the localizer we accepted the ACT (activate) VECTORS - YES feature of the Honeywell FMS which 'cleans up' the navigation display; depicts the localizer course and TORBY (FAF) was the next fix displayed. We intercepted the localizer course; maintaining 2;000 and were preparing for glideslope intercept when NY Approach indicated we should be over DANDY at 1;500 and to descend to 1;500. DANDY was not available for reference nor displayed. We began an immediate descent to 1;500 intercepted the glide slope; completed the approach and landing uneventfully.To ensure recollection and compliance with mandatory altitude constraints this information should be included in the Notes and/or Plan View sections of the associated approach charts. Also; diligent crew awareness and coordination is required when the FMS; displays no longer depict the fix/altitude and DME (raw data) is the only available remaining reference for DANDY. When they were given vectors for the ILS Runway 6 at TEB the flight crew of a Hawker Horizon selected the 'Activate Vectors' mode of the Honeywell FMS; which removed the fix prior to the FAF; DANDY--which has a mandatory crossing at 1;500 MSL--from the display. They continued at their previously assigned 2;000 MSL; unaware of the need to cross the fix at the required altitude. ATC caught the impending error and advised the crew of the need to descend.
Aircraft: WIDEBODY; LOW WING; 2 TURBOJET ENG
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Plane loaded early. Received Dangerous Goods (DG) paperwork with accessible DG. Two full pallets; one of flammable liquid; one of oxidizer. These pallets were placed next to each other in 2L and 3L. As this was a Wide body cargo aircraft; no firefighting capability with pallets containing hazardous material.The Flight Operations Manual (FOM) has two statements concerning separation that apply. One; incompatible classes must be separated by 3 feet and the second is that for separation requirements; if the DG is contained in different ULD containers; that suffices for required separation. I was not comfortable with a full pallet of flammable liquid right next to a full pallet of incompatible oxidizer with nothing but less than 12 inches of space and a little Saran wrap between them. Consulted with the ramp agent and specialist and was informed they could move one Haz pallet to allow more room between them. I agreed and accepted responsibility for the resulting delay; the ramp personnel opted to bump the flammable liquid pallet; leaving only the oxidizer which did resolve our issue.A review of the separation requirements might be good; as I'm not sure this is the situation envisioned when the second statement was added. My concern in this DG situation was safety. I was willing to take all the DG material; just wanted a bit more space between the pallets. Please review the FOM separation requirements. Do not remove the crewmembers from the DG review procedures; as this may keep a DG incident from occurring. Widebody cargo aircraft Captain reported noticing during preflight incorrect loading of hazardous materials. Aircraft was reloaded properly.
Aircraft: PREMIER 1
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown

Aircraft X eastbound at FL390. Aircraft Y northbound direct to a fix at FL390; was going to pass approximately 5 miles behind Aircraft X plus or minus a mile or so. Therefore; lateral separation would at best be 'tight' and at worst would be a loss of separation. Conflict alert activated; and the Radar Controller suppressed Conflict Alert but took no control action whatsoever. The Radar Controller is a problematic employee who has been reported by multiple other controllers plus myself to multiple supervisors on multiple occasions. His control actions and demeanor are not only rude to other controllers and to pilots; they have become increasingly unsafe. With Conflict Alert continually activated but suppressed as shown by the Conflict Alert View on the ERAM display; the Radar Controller continued to take zero action while the airplanes were going to lose lateral separation. He then issued direct routing to Aircraft X; which is probably a 3-degree turn; which would do effectively nothing. I was conducting Radar Assist (D Side) OJT at the time at the sector; and with about 1 minute before lateral separation was going to be likely lost and still no action taken and with conflict alert still 'active' but suppressed; I asked the Radar Controller to turn Aircraft Y. He said it was not necessary.I lost it. I immediately told him; and I quote to the best of my ability here; 'The airplanes are running together. I'm part of the [expletive] sector team. Turn the [expletive] Aircraft Y.' This from a guy in the area who is known to NOT curse. He then casually turned Aircraft Y 20 degrees left. Shortly thereafter; we were able to go to one person at the sector; and I spoke to the Operations Manager at the Watch Desk about the incident; and shortly after that was able to speak to the Supervisor. I reported to both of them in polite but firm language that this employee is; in my opinion and apparently in the opinion of others; becoming a deliberately negligent Controller who is unwilling to take even basic steps to separate aircraft. If the FAA allows a Controller to deliberately suppress conflict alert and let two airplanes lose standard separation while taking essentially no action other than one 3-degree turn late in the process with light traffic and no meaningful complexity; with a Controller who is being reported to multiple management people by multiple Controllers for multiple incidents; then what will it take to have this Controller's behavior addressed? An accident? To be clear. This is an ongoing problem with a deliberately negligent Controller. This is an ongoing problem with a deliberately negligent Controller. It may take serious personnel actions to address this Controller's attitude problems. Suspension? Termination? A ZID Controller reported he observed another Controller deliberately allow two airplanes to approach with less than required separation even after the conflict was pointed out to them.
Aircraft: C172
Phase of flight: Takeoff / Launch
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

During the course of my Commercial FAA check ride while doing a normal takeoff the nose gear collapsed prior to rotation. I did the normal checklist prior to departure and both myself and the DPE were certain the gear handle was down. There were no warning lights; nor gear horn alarm. Maintenance is still evaluating the situation; but I suspect that the gear handle that pulls out and retracts to allow up and down movement of the handle was sticking; which allowed the handle to move during takeoff. C172RG pilot experiences a nose gear collapse during takeoff.
Aircraft: LIGHT SPORT AIRCRAFT
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Object; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway

Additional co-pilot brakes had been added to the aircraft by owner/pilot. Low speed taxi tests went well. Progressively higher taxi speeds were used to determine if co-pilot side brakes were operating correctly. During a higher speed taxi test on the main runway the aircraft began to veer to the left. Pilot was unable to maintain directional control of the airplane and struck one 't-post' (not connected to any fencing) on the side of the runway. The impact caused minor damage to the underside of the of the fuselage; a small puncture in the Dacron skin. The minor damage to the aircraft does not fit the definition of 'substantial damage' it was determined that no accident report was required at this time. After further inspection the co-pilot side left master cylinder was found to be 'sticking' when depressed and appears to have locked the left side brakes causing the loss of control. Without disassembling the master cylinder was unable to determine the cause of the master cylinder 'sticking'. Rans S6 Coyote Light Sport Aircraft pilot reported while completing a high-speed taxi to test out new brakes the aircraft veered left and struck a pole on the side of the runway.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Initial Climb
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

We were cleared the ILKUP Departure with the KOKRU Transition. During the preflight route/FMS review; we noted the departure note 1 mandates runway heading until 2;000 FT; but the FMC is programmed for an immediate turn back to MNS. Because of this discrepancy; I briefed and flew a departure in runway heading/heading select with a manual turn after 2;000 FT to comply with the restriction (we were eventually cleared a left turn direct ILKUP). Also; there are two ground tracks depicted; one which proceeds back to MNS and one which directs a ground track of 280 degrees to intercept the 330 degree radial to ILKUP. However; the narrative does not differentiate. The departure procedure needs to be clarified to specify which ground track to fly and the FMS needs to then be programmed accordingly. In the interim; a note to flight crews should be placed on the flight plan from SBEG clarifying the procedure to follow. The Reporter stated that he has not received clarification about the departure's track ambiguities. However; his other main concern was his aircraft's FMS directed an immediate left turn prior to the 2;000 FT constraint. He believes that immediate turn is a FMS programming error. Because the departure was manually flown he is uncertain what track the FMS would have directed the aircraft to follow had the automation remain engaged. A B737 departed on the SBEG ILKUP SID; KOKRU Transition; but the 2;000 FT turn constraint was not in the FMS departure programming and additionally chart ambiguity does not specify which departure track to follow after an eastbound takeoff.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Takeoff / Launch
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

At the gate prior to departure; my Captain and I thoroughly briefed the Departure. There was some discussion on headings to fly and I called and got verification from clearance delivery. The Captain and I again reviewed the departure procedure and discussed altitudes and air speeds to be flown. We ran our checklists and pushed and began our taxi. I switched to Tower frequency and we were cleared for takeoff. This was odd because we were still quite some distance from the end of the runway.We ran the Before Takeoff Checklist and took the runway for departure. At 400 FT; I hit Heading Select and began turning the Heading bug. We cleaned up on schedule and we both noticed we were not getting good heading commands. We kept the turn coming and it just didn't seem right. At that point I noticed we were accelerating rapidly. The Captain engaged Level Change to open the speed window at which time we lost our flight directors. It was then that I realized that we never turned them on. We had inadvertently entered TO/GA. We had flight directors for vertical but not lateral guidance. Upon selecting a vertical mode we exited TO/GA and I recycled the flight directors both on. We slowed down; leveled off and continued the flight without further incidence. B737-700 First Officer reported they lost their flight directors; then they realized that they never turned them on.
Aircraft: MD-82
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was assigned an A-Check; the interior [cabin] portion; I had signed my portion off. An FAA Inspector asked me to bring the A-Check paperwork with me. We stopped at the forward [entry] door and he asked if I inspected the forward entry door slide; as per the A-Check Card; [Item] 18 of 41; I said yes. He told me to show him; what I inspected: the [slide] pressure gauge flipped it over to the back-side; checked [slide] routing and expiration date.We proceeded to the aft service door. Again I showed him [slide] pressure gauge in green [band]; flipped [girt bar flap] over; checked expiration of slide routing; it all appeared normal. I stowed the girt bar back on the hook. That is when the [FAA] Inspector asked me to read verbatim; Paragraph 3a. At that point; he pointed out that I did not engage the girt bar and the Velcro on the right side [of the flap] were not properly fastened. I corrected my mistake and made a logbook entry; stating that the Velcro was not properly installed and made a balancing [corrective action] entry: Resecured flap Velcro tab properly; per Maintenance Manual (M/M) on aft galley service door slide. I apologized for my mistake in not attaching girt bar [in floor locks] arming it; and somehow missed not seeing that the Velcro was not attached properly. I need to pay attention more and ask questions if I do not understand [paperwork] and pay close attention to when revisions are added [to procedures]. There was a revision added on this section [of the A-Check Card]; I'm not sure when; but it was revised January 2012. A Line Mechanic reports an FAA Inspector pointed out maintenance step procedures that he had failed to accomplish during a Cabin Interior A-Check on an MD-82 aircraft.
Aircraft: PA-44 SEMINOLE/TURBO SEMINOLE
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Was practicing instrument approaches for a training flight. Upon starting the missed approach climbout there was a surge in the electricity shown through flickering lights; Low Bus annunciator indications; both alternators shown as inoperative; and a right ALT circuit breaker popped. We (my students and I) started turning off unnecessary equipment since we were running on our battery only; and on the way back toward the airport we started to smell something burning. The smell increased rapidly over the next 1-2 minutes and then the student observing in the back started to see smoke coming from the cockpit area. We immediately notified ATC at this point and told them we were going to land at the closest airport. A PA-44-180 electrical system surged during a practice instrument approach go around resulting the loss of both generators and smoke in the cockpit so the flight landed at the nearest airport.
Aircraft: CRJ200
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

ATIS reported to expect the visual to Runway 16. A visual approach was loaded and briefed including obstacle clearances and a pattern altitude of 3;700 FT 5-8 NM prior to SUG; ATC cleared us direct KEANS [direct] AVL. This would place us 5 NM from the runway with a 145 degree turn to final. We were cleared from 10;000 FT MSL to 6;000 FT MSL. Between 10-15 NM from the airport; ATC requested if we had the field in sight in which we acknowledged. We were cleared for a visual approach. We selected heading mode to give us a downwind; base and final. The downwind to base would take us in proximity to a 2;645 FT depicted tower. Other obstacles were considered outside our vertical and lateral paths. We were in terrain mode. We selected 3;700 FT and began a descent from 6;000 FT. Between 4;000 FT-4;300 FT we received a GPWS 'Terrain; Terrain; Pull-Up'. This was in day visual conditions with terrain and obstacle clearly in sight. We took positive corrective action until the GPWS warning/alert stopped and terrain clearance was assured. We advised ATC after we had landed. Although terrain clearance was visually assured; the mountainous terrain caused the GPWS to activate. The descent rate was less than 1;500 FPM trending to 1;000 FPM. The Captain stated that being that it was day visual conditions this would be acceptable; but in no way would we do a visual if it were night due to the terrain.Recommend vectors onto the LOC runway 16 or full procedure because a visual to 16 requires the mountain range to the east to be flown over at an altitude or rate that may cause a GPWS warning/alert. CRJ-200 flight crew reported receiving a GPWS 'Terrain' warning on visual approach to AVL Runway 16.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Aircraft

Operating ZZZ-ZZZ1 parked at Gate XX we had run the before start checklist all the way through and were ready to push. I verified the ground crew was ready for brake release; released the parking brake and asked the First Officer to call for push. The First Officer called Ramp requesting to push; Ramp cleared us to push giving way to the airplane parking at Gate XY. I relayed these instructions to the ground crew. We didn't move and then the ground crew told me to set the parking brake; which I did. I saw a group of rampers coming out of the terminal looking towards our left wing. I checked to see what they were looking at and then saw that the winglet of the plane parking at Gate XY had hit our aileron. I asked the First Officer to call Ops and get the jet ridge brought back to the plane while I called Dispatch and Maintenance. Once the cabin door was reopened and the gate agent was aware of what was going on; we deplaned the passengers.Wing walkers should look at wingtips to verify clearance. Verify there is enough space for our aircraft to park at [Gate] XY with a larger aircraft parked at [Gate] XX at ZZZ. On DATE approximately XA50 local; at Gate XX at ZZZ; while at the gate with the tug driver having control of the aircraft; another airline; attempted to enter their gate ended up running their right wing into our left wing. Our aircraft was not moving during the impact. We were at the gate with the jet bridge not connected. Ramp control had given our clearance to push back to spot after giving way to aircraft entering the gate at XY (gate to our left). We relayed this information to the tug driver and they acknowledged us. Then about ten seconds later the tug driver had asked the Captain to set the brake. We saw rampers running towards our aircraft and that is when the Captain had seen that the other aircraft had ran their right wing into the back of our left wing while entering their gate. After determining that there was no emergency that required emergency services; we had a jet bridge driver come back down so we could deplane the aircraft. We contacted Company and Maintenance came out to the aircraft. No passengers or crew members were injured. Our aircraft was stationary at the time and we were struck by another aircraft. In addition; the aircraft was under the control of contract rampers when the incident occurred. As a result; the incident was not the result of any action or inaction on the contractors part and any recommendations for preventing future incidents of this nature would involve third parties. Air carrier flight crew reported an aircraft parking at the adjacent gate made contact with their wingtip while sitting at the gate waiting for push back.
Aircraft: MEDIUM LARGE TRANSPORT; LOW WING; 2 TURBOJET ENG
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft X was westbound on the downwind assigned 5000 feet. Aircraft Y was released off of FFZ assigned 3000 feet and 180 heading. After I radar identified Aircraft Y there were numerous VFR aircraft in the vicinity appearing likely to converge with him. I climbed Aircraft Y to 4000 feet. There were still numerous aircraft in their vicinity. I turned Aircraft X to the north heading 350 and as soon as Aircraft X was abeam Aircraft Y I climbed Aircraft Y to 5000 feet to avoid the several VFR aircraft they were conflicting with. I felt this was the safe way even though there may not have been 3 miles lateral separation with Aircraft X.The only fix would be to lower the Class Bravo airspace. P50 TRACON Controller reported climbing an aircraft through the altitude of another aircraft with less than the required three lateral miles lateral separation to avoid numerous VFR aircraft.
Aircraft: SMALL AIRCRAFT
Phase of flight: Initial Climb
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

I was working LC [Local] combined with TCIC [Tower Controller in Charge]. Aircraft X called me with 'the ATIS' requesting to depart FPXX (float pond) opposite direction. I had opposite direction traffic arriving; but I advised him that if he would be ready in about three minutes (I had a gap) I could accommodate that since I had another aircraft waiting to go opposite direction off of Runway XY Right as well. He advised that he would be ready in three minutes and I instructed him to advise when ready for departure at FPXX. He called ready and I advised him to remain outside the channel; traffic was landing opposite direction. He replied 'Roger; Aircraft X.' We don't typically tell aircraft to 'hold short' of the float pond since there is no designated hold lines or markings; so instead it's common to use 'remain outside of the channel'. Aircraft Y was on short final for FPX; he advised that there was traffic departing opposite direction. I looked down the float pond to find Aircraft X airborne midfield off of FPXX just above the trees. I instructed him to 'turn left on course now.' I had intended to give him the wind and altimeter when clearing him for takeoff; but since I didn't get the chance; I never verified that he had the current ATIS. When I told him on frequency that he had been instructed to remain outside the channel; he was confused because I told him to be ready in three minutes and when he called ready he thought I had issued him a takeoff clearance. I did not notice his departure sooner because there is a known blind spot at the N end of the FP (the threshold for FPXX). I did not push for a read-back of my instruction for him to remain outside the channel either and no such read-back was obtained. The N end of the float pond is also known for intermittently poor radio coverage; so that may have been a factor in him hearing that he had been cleared for takeoff even though no transmissions that sounded like a landing/departure clearance were made during that time. The estimated lateral distance between Aircraft Y & Aircraft X when Aircraft X turned to avoid was approximately 3;000 feet; Aircraft Y was just coming up on Taxiway B; Aircraft X was just past mid-pond. Aircraft Y continued inbound for landing FP2; going around could have worsened the situation.You have my permission to share with concerned parties.The blind spot at FPXX should be addressed. I should have obtained a read-back for the pilot to remain outside the channel/hold short of FPXX (it would be helpful if there were markers for this). Tower Controller reported a NMAC between opposite direction traffic.