Aryan95614/aerograph-asrs huggingface dataset:
Aircraft: MEDIUM TRANSPORT; LOW WING; 2 TURBOJET ENG
Phase of flight: Final Approach
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was not actually working during the event. I am the Operation Supervisor of the employee who had the event. I worked the day shift on the day of and the employee worked the night shift. The following day I became aware of the event and conducted a performance discussion with him. The employee and I reviewed the event and discussed factors that contributed to [it] and mitigations for the future. The employee was very engaged and receptive. The employee's normal performance is excellent. After reviewing the event the controller did not violate any rules and never lost separation. Aircraft X was cleared for a visual approach following traffic and switched to the Tower. The aircraft was turning to final from the left base when he went through final and conflicted with an aircraft on a parallel runway. We discussed the dangers of using the same altitude on opposing bases but I felt that was not a contributing factor in this instance. The Controller also issued a 30 degree intercept in a timely manner. It was the pilot's error of going through final that caused the event. I honestly believe that the 7110.65; 7-4-4; is responsible for placing these two aircraft in an unsafe proximity. I have had to have way too many performance discussions with employees about this very same scenario of vectoring aircraft to parallel runways during visual approaches. The procedure does not prevent aircraft from being vectored to the same point on the finals at the same altitude as long as a Controller issues the visual approach to only one aircraft. It also only gives best practices and not direction on how to keep the planes separated. I see far too many close calls where planes don't collide from pure luck. The 7110.65; 7-4-4 needs to be changed to require aircraft to have standard separation until ESTABLISHED INBOUND on the final approach course. Until then we will continue to have these very unsafe events at airports around the NAS. ATC Supervisor reported a Controller complied with the rules and cleared an aircraft for a visual approach which subsequently conflicted with parallel runway traffic by flying through the final approach course.
Aircraft: PA28
Phase of flight: Landing
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway

While landing on Runway XX at approximately 70 KIAS and power pulled to idle; after touchdown; plane started to veer to the left. Plane ultimately veered off of runway onto grass; where it came to a near-complete stop. Power was added to keep the plane moving in order to avoid getting stuck in the grass. Tower asked if we were OKAY; which I responded in the affirmative.Tower instructed us to re-enter [Runway] XX; and taxi to the T-hangars (with runway crossing and holding instructions included). We inspected the airplane and there was no apparent damage to the plane; just grass stains on the wheel pants; which we cleaned up. The airport operations reported there was no damage to anything on the runway environment. And there were no injuries to me (PIC) or my safety pilot passenger.The airplane was inspected the following day and was found to be in good operating condition and has been successfully flown since; with no reported issues.I believe the cause was my feet inadvertently slipped up the pedals and activated the toe brakes after landing; with the left side braking more strongly. There were some tire marks on the runway that seem to support this; according to the ground ops personnel.I plan to go up with a CFII as soon as possible; paying special attention to my foot position on takeoffs and landings. I may also fly with the seat farther back to make it less likely that my toes will accidentally be on the brakes. PA-28 pilot reported a runway excursion on landing rollout.
Aircraft: B757
Phase of flight: Final Approach
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

While descending through 1200 feet on final to Runway 22L EWR we received a TCAS TA of traffic; I assumed it was a helicopter below. The Captain and jumpseater observed out of the left cockpit window to our East two drones. They estimated them at 1000 feet AGL. I never saw them and landed the plane without incident. We reported this to tower so they could advise traffic behind us. [Report narrative contained no additional information.] B757 flight crew experienced a TCAS TA at 1200 feet on final approach to Runway 22L at EWR and assumes it is from a helicopter below. The Captain and a jumpseater note two drones on the left side and 200 feet lower. No evasive action is required.
Aircraft: CARAVAN 208B
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Ground Incursion Taxiway; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

I was holding number four in sequence on Hotel Taxiway. When I applied power to continue taxiing; I lost braking action and the airplane began to turn to the right. I applied the brakes and they where NOT responding. The airplane was heading toward the grass area at CHARLIE. I called the Controller to ask to taxi to CHARLIE and somebody blocked my call. Since the airplane was still not responding and the frequency was congested I switched frequency (thinking I still had ground frequency on STBY) I called again (unfortunately I had Departure frequency 120.9) The Controller told me that I had the wrong frequency and when I switched back to Tower frequency 132.05. I was already at CHARLIE and called again and had no answer. A few seconds later the Controller (in a very angry tone) calls me to tell me that before I enter CHARLIE I needed permission. She did not give me the chance to tell her I had a situation in the airplane. She then asked me if I needed assistance and what where my intentions; to which I replied 'NO assistance needed (because by that time I had regain control of the airplane) and I needed to return to APRON 6. She switched me to Ground frequency. With extreme caution I taxied back to APRON 6 as Ground had cleared me. I never got to tell the Controller I had lost breaking action and that's why I entered CHARLIE without permission. A C-208B Captain reported a brake failure as she was attempting to hold short of a taxiway where prior entry permission was required as a result of frequency congestion could not communicate the aircraft's condition.
Aircraft: NO AIRCRAFT
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Captain requested a phone patch with Maintenance Control to report that First Officer had found a brake line disconnected. He requested Maintenance Control file a safety report. Maintenance Control disagreed with him because he thought 'I did nothing wrong'. The captain and I want this investigated as brake lines just do not routinely come off. Apparently the airplane had some brake work done in the past few days according to Maintenance Control. Both the captain and I came away with the impression that Maintenance Control just wanted to have a mechanic re-attach the brake line; and leave it at that. Shoddy maintenance or possibly even aircraft tampering are both serious situations which warrant the utmost concern from anyone that works at [this company]. In addition to the brake situation; unfortunately this is not the first time that a Maintenance controller falls short on professionalism. This needs to be addressed soon. A Dispatcher reported that a flight crew member wanted maintenance control to file a safety report after finding a brake line disconnected.
Aircraft: ANY UNKNOWN OR UNLISTED AIRCRAFT MANUFACTURER
Phase of flight: Final Approach
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

The RADAR feed in the Tower Cab froze and then some of the targets continued as discreet beacon codes no longer tagged. There were Mode C and VFR targets on the scope that also froze. During the RADAR 'outage' we had frozen verified Mode C targets that we were watching other targets fly through. As ATC we were knowingly running an operation merging IFR targets! We reset our RADAR feed by going to our backup and then returned to our primary. When the people in charge put us back on the primary RADAR; Tech Ops was never notified; and the ASR-9 was never taken out for maintenance or recertified. During the 'outage' no one deemed the Primary ASR-9 inoperative. In last 20 minutes; the same error had occurred for a second time! Denver Tower and the TRACON have the ability to run the RADAR feeds off of a couple of different locations. I do not understand why the people in charge never went to a back up RADAR feed. I also highly doubt that Tech Ops was notified; or the primary ASR9 recertified. My gut feeling is that for the last 20 hours everything happening in the Denver Class Bravo airspace is being done on an uncertified RADAR source. I might be wrong; and I hope that I am; but it is definitely worth looking into. Also I think the people in charge deserve a fair amount of scrutiny. Tower Controller described a primary RADAR unit failure and questioned the Class B operations that continued after the failure along with doubtful coordination with Maintenance.
Aircraft: CRJ900
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

AFT FA said she need[ed] to make an ice bag for a passenger. I ask[ed] her did the passenger injure herself on our equipment or was it a preexisting condition. She replied that the passenger hit her head on the overhead bin. The AFT FA gave the passenger the ice bag to the passenger. I explained to the AFT FA the she needs to get the details of what happened and the name of the passenger and complete a [report]. I personally did not see what happen[ed]; but the passenger sat with the ice bag to the right side of her head during the entire flight. The passenger asked for additional ice during flight. Passenger deplaned the AC without a complaint related to the injury; returned the bag of melted ice and said Thank You for the assistance. Passenger did not use caution while moving around the seating area. CRJ-900 Flight Attendant reported a passenger hit her head on the overhead bin during boarding. Ice was supplied and applied during the flight without further consequence.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Takeoff / Launch
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Jet Blast

Winds and weather had SFO operating with both arrivals and departures using Runway 28L/R. We were cleared into position Runway 28R after a B777 landed on the same runway. The B777 cleared the runway but held short of Runway 28L. We were then cleared for takeoff. The takeoff was normal and I was Flying Pilot. I happened to notice the B777 to the left between the parallels as I began a normal rotation. As we passed the B777 we experienced a hard jolt from the left. Thankfully it was a sudden but short jolt as it required some maneuvering to settle the flight path. I am not sure if the B777 had been cleared across but it felt like a significant jet blast we got from the heavy. No anomalies or limitations were exceeded. The flight continued normally. B737NG First Officer reported encountering jet blast on takeoff from a taxiing Widebody aircraft.
Aircraft: A310
Phase of flight: Landing
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Autopilot and autothrottles appeared to re-engage at touchdown after being disconnected (autopilot at 500 FT and autothrottles at 200 FT). At touchdown throttles came up and F/O had [to] physically retard them. At this point throttles would not go into reverse and aircraft looked like it was going to exit the right side of Runway 23. Capt stepped on the left rudder (acted as if autopilot was still engaged); [it] would not respond. Hit the disconnect switches (autopilot and autothrottles) again while engaging manual brakes pretty heavy. At this point the reversers came up; and a/c started to respond normally. Throttles were stiff; other than that I have no clue.Increase maintenance budget; better test equipment and more in depth training for maintenance folks with all the electronic systems on the aircraft.Prevention! Better than reaction. [Report narrative had no additional information] A310 flight crew reported that autopilot and autothrottles appeared to re-engage at touchdown after being disconnected; slowing selection of reverse thrust and affecting directional control.
Aircraft: A319
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

In cruise flight at FL370 I noticed in the First Officer's windshield what appeared to be St. Elmos fire. This was curious since we were in clear air. Further inspection revealed what appeared to be a crack quickly developing from the upper right corner down to the lower left corner. Inside the crack; what I thought was St. Elmos Fire; was the inner heating element arcing continuously as the crack quickly spread. The best way to describe this was watching a fuse burn across and within the windshield. We quickly went to the QRH for guidance and just as we opened it up the right windshield heat faulted shutting off power. The First officer and I tried to determine which pane it was and in more than one spot I felt what appeared to be a crack by sliding my finger nail back and forth across the area. We descended to FL230 and got the cabin PSI to less than 5; per the QRH; but the crack continued to spread across the glass. Further descent to 11;000 FT seemed to halt its spread but now I felt the safest course of action was to get the airplane on the ground. We contacted Dispatch through ACARS to inform them of our intentions to divert. We finished QRH procedures for windshield crack and arcing and landed uneventfully. No emergency was declared. ATC was very helpful expediting our arrival and the First Officer and our cabin crew did an outstanding job of working the problem and preparing the cabin as I flew the airplane. This allowed me to concentrate on the approach and airport facilities. Under the circumstances I felt this to be the safest course of actions for the given conditions. A319 Captain reports a cracked windshield on the First Officer's side at FL370. Descent is initiated to FL230 per QRH but the crack continues to grow and the Captain elects to divert to a suitable airport.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Got HAZMAT form and forgot to call Dispatch to do a pen and ink change to show HAZMAT onboard in remarks of Release. Air Carrier Captain reported he neglected to call Dispatch to do a pen & ink change to show Hazmat onboard on Flight Release.
Aircraft: A321
Phase of flight: Takeoff / Launch
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance

Apparently company message sent at XA:37; aircraft airborne XA:38. TOGA thrust set; First Officer flying; aircraft on takeoff roll - ECAM; EWD; scan I noticed company message. I'm not going to abort takeoff for a company message. Weight and Balance (W/B) 'do not takeoff' message after airborne. First W/B printer message at XA:31/after aircraft clean-up and climb received amended W/B printer message at XA:42/aircraft weighed approximately 2;000 LBS over; but more importantly; aircraft configuration required a flaps 2 and V-speed change. Aircraft weighed approximately 190;000 LBS and OAT was 28C. Contacted Dispatcher and he was made fully aware of the situation. If the company plans on last second/minute changes on W/B; an audible chime associated with the ACARS messages must be installed. Workload during taxi out; completing taxi check; below the line; mental preparation for takeoff roll and departure must not be interrupted with a situation such as this. Apparently there are not enough properly trained employees in Load Control and W/B to achieve these tasks in a timely manner. Time lapse of XA:31 until XA:42 does not appear to be normal for a W/B change. Company message on ECAM 'blends in' with all the other indicators making it difficult to notice. These situations have just started to appear in the past few months. I saved and printed ACARS messages if they are needed. Suggestion; install audible ACARS chime or a flashing company message que if this practice is to continue. Hire more W/B employees. Improve and update W/B procedures. A321 Captain reports receiving a company message during takeoff which is ignored until safely airborne. The message reads W/B do not takeoff. Takeoff weight had increased by 2;000 LBS with flap setting and V-speed changes.
Aircraft: CITATION V/ULTRA/ENCORE (C560)
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

About 10 minutes after reaching our cruise altitude of 40;000 feet; the door seal light illuminated. I prepared for an emergency descent and asked for a lower altitude. ATC approved it and a few seconds later a loud sound was heard from the door as the pressure started escaping. I started my emergency descent down to 10;000 feet and informed ATC of my intention to divert. Upon inspection by a mechanic; it was found that condensation had built up in the door seal after heavy rain two nights before. That condensation froze and caused the seal malfunction. The water was drained; and the trip continued uneventfully. Cessna Citation pilot reported the illumination of a cabin door seal warning light; followed by a loss of cabin pressure warning came on during cruise. A descent was executed; and a successful diversion a suitable airport was accomplished.
Aircraft: LARGE TRANSPORT; LOW WING; 2 TURBOJET ENG
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Assigned DRLLR 5 arrival into IAH. We were planning 26R RNAV Y. We were cleared to descend via the DRLLR 5. 6000 was set in altitude window and aircraft was in LNAV/VNAV. Runway was not assigned so approaching SKLER; Captain queried ATC. ATC advised ILS 26R. Crew discussed ensuring proceeding straight after SKLER. Captain as Pilot Monitoring began to change the approach in the FMC; in the process the aircraft leveled off at 7000; rather continuing the decent to 6000. We recognize this a couple miles from SKLER but before we were able to notify ATC that we might be high at SKLER; ATC assigned us a descent to 5000. We proceeded to descend to the new altitude and land uneventfully. First Officer reported leveling off high while they attempted to reprogram the FMC following a late runway assignment on the DRLLR FIVE STAR into IAH.
Aircraft: CRJ200
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

On Aircraft X to ZZZ at around XA:00 local time in our descent we received an EGPWS 'Terrain terrain; pull up pull up'. From 3;500 ft. on downwind CA (Captain) [Name] asked me to bug 2;500 ft. on the altitude knob. As we were descending I had mentioned to him that it looked like there may be rising terrain ahead of us. Continuing down to 2;500 ft. shortly after we were given the EGPWS audio to pull up. CA [Name] then clicked auto pilot off; added power and pitched up clearing any terrain that lie below us. The rest of the approach proceeded with no other complications. We had debriefed after engine shutdown at the gate. Looking forward I feel that my actions in this case would be to maybe be more assertive with my thoughts on the possible rising terrain in front of us and suggest to wait to descend until a base turn. First Officer reported a lack of assertiveness caused the flying pilot to descend in rising terrain; triggering EGPWS warnings and an autopilot disconnect to regain altitude.
Aircraft: GULFSTREAM V / G500 / G550
Phase of flight: Initial Climb
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Climbing out; shortly after flap retraction we received an amber CAS alert - UNCMDED STAB. Climb was continued to a safe altitude to allow checklist reference and procedure. At 7;800 feet there was a temporary CAS message of a PYLON HOT L message. At that point we declared an emergency and returned via radar vectors and landed without incident. During the final phase of our visual approach the CAS message cleared. The aircraft is currently being evaluated by Gulfstream technicians. No additional information was provided by the secondary narrative. A Gulfstream V flight crew returned to their departure airport following receipt of UNCOMED STAB and PYLON HOT L CAS warnings.
Aircraft: CESSNA CITATION SOVEREIGN (C680)
Phase of flight: Landing
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

While on a visual approach; we experienced a total loss of Hydraulic power. On the downwind leg the landing gear was lowered and immediately after all landing gear had normal down indications (three green lights) the amber HYDRAULIC VOLUME LOW CAS message appeared and the hydraulic fluid quantity indicated a low condition of only 90 cubic inches. The downwind leg was extended and the emergency checklist was accomplished. It was determined that a safe landing could be made and the landing was executed with no incident and emergency braking was applied to stop the aircraft. This was an unforeseen and unavoidable rare system failure. Our training proved effective and resulted in the safe completion of this event. Hydraulic Volume Low CAS message illuminated on a left downwind after gear was selected down. Positive ID of gear down was established with 3 illuminated green lights and throttle/flap position. Extended downwind leg to run appropriate checklist. Landed successful. CE680 flight crew experiences a hydraulic failure after the landing gear is extended during a visual approach. After landing emergency braking is used to stop the aircraft.
Aircraft: MEDIUM TRANSPORT; LOW WING; 2 TURBOJET ENG
Phase of flight: Final Approach
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

During North flow; I was working Arrivals. Aircraft X was on vectors for the ILS approach. After issuing Aircraft X his ILS approach clearance I scanned and noticed a VFR target climbing southbound. I issued traffic; but Aircraft X did not have the aircraft in sight. The target appeared to be continuing towards Aircraft X and started climbing; so I elected to cancel Aircraft X's approach clearance and issued a climb and turn to the East to avoid the traffic. I subsequently vectored Aircraft X back around and onto the approach.My previous reports involved the proximity of VFR targets to BFI arrivals when our airspace is in a South Flow. This report is a perfect example of the fact that this problem also exists when our airspace switches to a North Flow. The timing of this report is also a perfect example of how; even in a North Flow; this problem is continuous and always present.Something needs to change. The VFR aircraft are transiting a very narrow; busy corridor of airspace and are doing so without any communication with ATC. It is simply unsafe. The VFR aircraft in this area at the very least need to be in communication with ATC so that we can assign; as necessary; altitude restrictions ensuring the safety of all the aircraft involved. The solutions are not hard and while they are potentially more restrictive to VFR aircraft the bottom line is that what happens day in and day out in that airspace as it exists and operates now will eventually result in a very bad accident. S46 Controller reported vectoring an aircraft off of an ILS in order to avoid conflicting unidentified VFR traffic.