Aryan95614/aerograph-asrs huggingface dataset:
Aircraft: SMALL TRANSPORT
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was operating as Pilot-in-Command of a privately-owned Part 91 flight from [the United States] to [an airport in] British Columbia to drop off my three passengers before ferrying the aircraft back to [a U.S. airport]. As per the international flight procedures; I had filed US CBP eAPIS manifests and ICAO flight plans for both the flight into Canada and the return flight back into the US. Additionally; I coordinated my arrival into Canada with Canadian Customs and landed [in British Columbia] with no issues. Upon my return flight to the US; I obtained my IFR clearance from Vancouver Center and was handed off to first Seattle Center during my US/Canada border crossing; and then later to Spokane Approach. After checking in with Spokane Approach; I was informed that; rather than continue to [the original destination] to clear Customs where I had intended; the US CBP was requesting that I instead clear Customs at Spokane International (GEG); with which I complied. Upon my shutdown in front of the US Customs office at GEG; I was very sternly informed that; in spite of my filing the appropriate eAPIS Arrival Manifest and ICAO Flight Plan; as well as obtaining my international IFR ATC Clearance; I hadn't received specific permission to enter US Airspace from the US CBP. I explained that it was my understanding that my eAPIS Arrival manifest and subsequent international IFR flight plan clearance had constituted permission and notification of my arrival into the US; which I was again told was incorrect. I spent upwards of 30 minutes then discussing with the Customs officer the preferred US CBP Arrival procedures; as well as the requirement for pilots to call and directly coordinate with the Customs office at the intended US Airport of Entry. After my extensive discussion with the officer; I now fully understand that the notification requirements of the individual Customs offices are independent of eAPIS filing notifications. However; in a fair amount of my after-the-fact reading and research; the absolute necessity of contacting the individual AOE Customs office isn't made particularly clear; nor is it clear that the eAPIS filing is not considered Customs notification. Usage of soft terminology wordings such as 'pilots SHOULD contact the CBP office' or 'CBP RECOMMENDS that flyers directly contact...'; as well as an unclear distinction between eAPIS filing and direct; over-the-phone Customs notification cloud the absolute requirement of directly contacting the CBP office independent of the eAPIS filing. Wording such as 'must' or 'required'; as well as standardized procedures between CBP offices; would've greatly diminished my incorrect understanding that eAPIS constituted the required Customs notification. A general aviation pilot reported that after filing all known paperwork to return to the United States from Canada; the United States Customs Border Patrol advised that proper permission had not been requested and granted to enter US airspace.
Aircraft: CARAVAN 208B
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

I was flying Aircraft X from ZZZ to ZZZ1 via direct on an IFR flight plan; level at 5;000 ft. It was a charter; empty out. One soul; 3.5 hours of fuel on board. A little over halfway to my destination; my fuel flow gauge began to rapidly fluctuate between 100-450 pph (pounds per hour). I turned my ignition and fuel boost on and checked both fuel tanks on; my fuel flow then began to fluctuate between 300-450 pph; no other indications; annunciations; or failures at this time. I simultaneously requested to return to the ZZZ airport and requested a higher altitude out of caution. I added power and initiated a climb to 8;000 ft. During my climb to 8;000 ft. my fuel flow began fluctuating again between 100-450 pph accompanied by an oil pressure fluctuation between 85 and 100 psi. Oil pressure unstable but maintaining within the green arc. There were no other failures or annunciations at this time. Given my inability to remedy the fluctuating gauges as well as the introduction of an oil pressure instability; I deemed it most appropriate to [request priority handling.] I landed safely at ZZZ airport approximately 45 minutes after my departure. Caravan Captain reported fuel flow and engine oil pressure anomalies and elected to return to departure airport.
Aircraft: M-20 SERIES UNDIFFERENTIATED OR OTHER MODEL
Phase of flight: Initial Climb
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

I was departing S50 (Auburn; WA) for IFR currency (practicing approaches in IMC). I filed a Round Robin IFR flight plan.Weather was MVFR at the airport at S50 due to Stratocumulus clouds; Vis > 6mi; Ceilings 1500-2000; tops reported at 3000-5000 ft. There is a valley; but terrain rises to the east.Once I was ready to depart (aircraft was in run-up) area; I was unable to get an IFR clearance on the ground using my VHF radio and had no cell phone present. (I had contacted SEA Departure on ground in the past.) I did reach SEA clearance delivery on the ground but they were too busy and provided me with alternate frequencies to SEA Departure; those did not work.I departed VFR; staying [in] the traffic pattern planning to contact Departure.Upon contact Departure was too busy with IFR traffic to give me my clearance; but said if I can maintain VFR heading south (getting to a different sector) I could contact them and get my clearance. Ceilings were level so I flew south at 1;100 ft MSL remaining east of the Class B Approach area for SEA. Once I was south enough I contacted Approach for my clearance; but they asked if I could provide my own separation up to 2;000 feet (sector MVA); which wasn't possible without breaking clearances.Ultimately; over Lake Tapps (VPLTP); I found an increase in ceiling (up to about 2;700-3;000 ft MSL) that allowed me to climb to MVA but; as I was climbing; I lost sight of my 'escape' route & airports and I realized that if conditions changed I might not be able to descend back down below the clouds safely. Reflecting; the decision to keep going (taking off into the pattern; traveling south; climbing into a 'hole') were all very risky. At the point that I was going to return to S50; I was considering declaring an emergency to get a clearance rather than trying to navigate back down below the clouds and to the airport.I should have dealt with the clearance on the ground not in the air. When talking to SEA Clearance; I should have been more direct to see if they could help get my clearance; and if not; then don't depart.Contributing factors:- Lack of planning for clearance (assuming VHF)- Forgetting Cell Phone- Mission mindset (departing expecting to get clearance)- Confusion with SEA Clearance (for connecting approach on ground vs. air) Mooney pilot reported becoming disoriented and entering IMC conditions while trying to get IFR clearance.
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 135 ER/LR
Phase of flight: approach
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

On approach into Chicago O'hare and cleared for the visual approach for Runway 28R we were given an intercept heading of 310 (approaching from the southeast) and cleared for the Visual Approach to Runway 28R. Once cleared for the approach I armed the approach mode on the glareshield; less than 2 seconds later the autopilot had captured a false localizer and began a left turn; I then disengaged the approach mode and selected heading mode to return to the proper intercept heading. I had held off on re-engaging the approach mode to ensure that it would not capture the false localizer again. I maintained a visual contact with the airport and landing runway. I also kept monitoring the PFD to see if the localizer would come 'alive'. There was no movement. I had taken a fast peek to ensure that we had set up and briefed the proper approach and we had. The localizer frequency of 111.1 for 28R was in the proper radio and the 28R approach was loaded in the FMS as a backup to our visual approach. I was rather shocked that the localizer wasn't moving just then I looked up and noticed we had closed in on the runway quicker than I had expected at which point I disengaged the autopilot and rolled into a 40 degree bank to avoid an overshoot. At which time the Approach Controller had transmitted that it appeared I overshot the localizer but there was no traffic on the parallel northern Runway; 27L; we were still outside WILLT Intersection. The localizer had captured prior to seeing an actual movement on the HSI until we were literally right on top of the course when it quickly moved to center. There was no TA or RA and the rest of the approach was uneventful. Hand flying with a greater frequency using pilotage and not relying on automation. Maintaining better situational awareness. Regional jet Captain reports being cleared for the visual approach to Runway 28R at ORD and intercepting a false localizer before returning to heading select; then overshooting the real localizer because the approach mode had not been rearmed.
Aircraft: IAI1124/1124A WESTWIND
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

We were on final [and] upon gear extension we received one unsafe light on the nose gear and illumination of the left/right hydraulic low pressure annunciators. We requested delay vectors to troubleshoot; and were granted a low pass for a Tower visual gear inspection. On short final; the gear light went green; all annunciators extinguished; and we advised Tower that we would like to return to land instead of delay vectors. We continued to land without incident and all hydraulic systems functioned normally and our information was taken down by airport operations regarding the irregularity. Upon post flight inspection; we discovered a low level of hydraulic fluid in the reservoir and evidence of a leak on from the left engine cowling. We advised our Company Maintenance team and requested maintenance to inspect and add fluid. After servicing; we cycled the engine to try to pinpoint the leak. We found it to be coming from a small plug in the pump housing. [Maintenance] procured a gasket for the plug; installed it; and we cycled the engine again. No leak. This process was on the heels of a week-long maintenance delay due to a fuel truck colliding with our aircraft en route to fuel us. There was severe weather in the vicinity as we repositioned empty; as well as schedule pressure for an early departure. In the course of events; I failed to actually write-up the squawk for maintenance to sign-off; and the work performed was not noted in the aircraft log. My error was not following procedures for performed maintenance. After a difficult week of coordinating our passengers' alternative transportation arrangements; overseeing our aircraft repairs; dealing with the poor weather and our mechanical irregularity; I only wanted the problem to go away so we could get home. I gave due attention to the corrective actions required; but failed to have them properly documented. A Westwind 24 Captain reported that he failed to properly document a hydraulic problem in the maintenance log; citing the pressure of a long assignment away from home as a factor.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

After leaving the gate and engine start our flight attendants called us and notified a passenger had left batteries in their gate check bag. The passenger had their carry on that wouldn't fit in an overhead so a gate agent checked the bag. In their bag they had two lithium ion batteries (two drill batteries) loose not inserted in a drill. We talked to dispatch and referenced FOM/Hazmat Manual and determined with [Operations] we needed to gate return to remove the bag from the cargo hold and either find room in the cabin for the bag or keep the batteries with the passenger. We Gate returned; retrieved the bag/batteries; and refueled. And all decided we could make room in the cabin for the bag. I spoke again with Dispatch and [Operations Manager] regarding the passenger and Carry-On being back in the cabin and all signs pointed to us following the rules on this situation. We left with an uneventful flight. After review it seems like conflicting information on if we broke a sterile TSA program rule or not. A recent chief pilot newsletter talks about a commuting pilot not able to retrieve a checked bag from the cargo hold. This bag had been screened by TSA and considered sterile. I regret not confirming that piece of information on if we should have removed the passenger; and the bag all together and have them re-screened. As frustrating as the timing was on the passenger realizing they had batteries in their bag; they did the right thing by bringing this to our attention. This was a first for me; if there's anything I overlooked or missed feedback is welcome.Knowing what I know now; I wished I would have been more familiar with this type of situation and if the bag could be returned to the cabin. In hindsight I would have removed the batteries and gave them to the passenger to keep on their person. Ultimately; leave the carry-on in the cargo hold. Air carrier Captain reported that a customer gate-checked a bag with lithium batteries; resulting in a return to the gate.
Aircraft: A320
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Another inoperative APU. I am up to eight now for this calendar year. Versus only three in eight years with [another company]. Why don't you understand how to maintain the Airbus properly?In this case the cabin temperature reached 86 degrees while we waited for a second air start cart after the first one did not work. This is not acceptable! Some passengers were sitting in this stifling heat for over thirty minutes; most notably the elderly passengers who pre-boarded. And they are the most susceptible to extreme temperatures. Being stuck in an aircraft cabin is not like being out in the desert where you get an occasional breeze; it's like being tossed into oven to cook!Additionally; the cross-bleed start checklist advises against single engine taxi operations if the APU generator is not available. Due to the confined gate/alley space this would have meant starting both engines at the gate and severely jeopardizing the safety of the ramp crew who would have had to work around the #2 engine while it was running at idle power. The most important breach of safety in this situation; today; is the go-minded attitude of the Company. There is no apparent regard for doing things right regardless of how long it takes to make the operation safe. Leaving on time regardless of the status of personnel and equipment; regardless of the risk to safety; regardless of the wellbeing of your passengers; is the only thing this company cares about.Stop making us fly around the county with broken APUs! This is not an acceptable way to treat people. This APU has been inoperative for four days! How can you possibly think that is acceptable behavior? Spend the money on maintenance before you kill someone! A320 Captain reported that inoperative APU that was being deferred over a period of 4 days caused elderly passengers to suffer in 86 degree heat for 30 minutes; causing them extreme discomfort.
Aircraft: B777
Phase of flight: Takeoff / Launch
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Upon arrival in ZZZZ I was notified that the inbound flight had an over temp in level cruise at altitude on the left engine. I called dispatch and they patched me through to [Maintenance and Mechanic at Engine desk]. [Maintenance] informed me that the engine only went up to 1032 degrees for less than 15 seconds so no action was required. [Maintenance] also notified me that the engine was old and had 34;300 hours on it and was scheduled for an engine wash. The inbound crew was also experiencing an over burn of fuel on the left engine approximately 1;000 lbs per hour more than the right engine. The engineers and engine group was not concerned as you are allowed to have up to 10 over temp situations of this type before action needs to be taken I was told. [Maintenance] also said twice that he was confident that we would have an over temp on takeoff but it should not go that high out of ZZZZ. I informed [Maintenance] and dispatch that I needed to discuss this issue with my flight crew and line maintenance before I would make the decision to depart. After reaching the cockpit I had a discussion with both the line maintenance mechanic and my 3 first officers. The line maintenance mechanic repeated what I was told by [Maintenance] and confirmed that it would be safe to depart. We decided to depart and had a normal start and taxi out. The left engine was running at idle approximately 100 degrees higher than the right engine; which I was told had only 5;600 hours on it. Upon taking the runway and applying power with the TOGA switch; we had a major spool time difference. The right engine came up to speed normally but the left engine did not. As a result; I believe of the twisting action we received a Takeoff Configuration Gear warning. Prior to advancing the power levers I made sure the main gear trucks were aligned so this warning was a non normal situation. I discontinued the takeoff after only achieving a speed of 30 to 40 knots. We cleared the runway and taxied to a safe and clear area. After clearing I conducted an experiment and brought the power lever on the right engine to approx. 50% range and it took 6 seconds to spool. When I did the same with the left engine it took 13 seconds to spool. I this time I decided to return to the gate. Upon arrival at the gate we shut down the engines and the mechanic came on the plane and showed us the picture that is attached for the left engine. This picture was taken shortly after shutdown. The mechanic believed that we had a fuel controller issue and that the engine was running too rich or that we had a hydro mechanical controller issue for the left engine. As a result the mechanic took the aircraft out of service and said it needed to be borro-scoped. The flight cancelled and my in-flight crew departed and then my flight crew and I moved the aircraft to a hardstand under tug control. The Captain of a Boeing 777 reported that the #1 engine had an over temp and would not come up to speed as quick as the #2 engine; resulting in a rejected takeoff.
Aircraft: WIDEBODY TRANSPORT
Phase of flight: Final Approach
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict; Inflight Event / Encounter Object

At 6;000 feet night VMC. About 10NM South of Morristown Airport. I noticed a possible drone about 500 to 750 feet above us moving in the opposite direction. It was very fast and I just noticed this off the corner of my left peripheral vision. There was no TCAS identification. We reported to NY Approach a possible drone sighting. Air Carrier Captain reported an airborne conflict with UAV during approach.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway

After landing in EWR we were given instructions from Ground to taxi RB to the gate and contact ramp. Upon getting towards the B intersection we contacted ramp and they said to enter on RA. We were confused about the direction of RA because of recent construction and the moving of the RA taxiway. I knew that there was construction and that there had been an email from the assistant Chief Pilot about a few months ago and I had not flown to EWR since; so I had my student ask the ramp for clarification and all we got was contact Ground again. This went back and forth and we turned the wrong direction on B taxiway towards the old location of RA. We had been monitoring ground on the other radio and he asked if ramp had sent us that way. Our response was one of confusion and we immediately stopped the aircraft. Ground allowed us to turn around and come back the proper direction where we finally got some guidance from the rather less than helpful Ramp Controller; after some cajoling. We did not enter any closed taxiway and we just turned around in the non-movement area; according to Ground; but it was concerning that I could not get good guidance from Ramp and in the heat of the moment I could not find the disseminated information required to taxi knowledgeably. We as a crew should have been more properly prepared for a new taxi situation; however prior to the flight I could not find the email where the information was printed. This may have something to do with trying to find email on my phone versus the company email tool. The ramp [our company uses] at the gates could be more helpful; rather than 'contact Ground' when asked for assistance. The disseminated information should be in the form of Jeppesen updates; not in an old; buried email. Ground seemed to see the light later on with other aircraft and asked if they were familiar. And the biggest problem of all is that there are no signs anywhere to show the location of the new RA. Also why would they not rename a completely new taxiway a new name? The new RA does not go in the proper order: RA; RB; RC as opposed to RB; RA; [and] then RC. All very confusing. Also finding the 'taxi out spots' which are only labeled in small print on the pavement; is also a problem for crews. Airline Check Pilot reported taxiing the wrong direction due to insufficient chart updates and taxiway surface markings.
Aircraft: MEDIUM LARGE TRANSPORT; LOW WING; 2 TURBOJET ENG
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was on CIC (Controller in Charge). Helicopters were in bound to the field from the northwest; expected to join a VFR arrival route. Weather wasn't good. Poor visibility and wind shear to the west. The trainee had given traffic on the inbound helicopters to Aircraft X about 10 miles out. The helicopters appeared to be south of course to avoid clouds and Aircraft X got a CA (Conflict Alert) about 5 miles from the runway. I asked the trainee if he had updated the traffic to get him to look; either out the window or at his screen at the traffic. The trainee said he already gave the traffic and it wasn't an issue. Aircraft X continued to have the CA all the way into the runway. We've had issues with helicopters; which are mostly seasonal; all summer long. The VFR arrival/departure is way too close to final for Runway 8. On weather days; they are very hard to see. These helicopter companies have been flying in flights with paying passengers all season as well. We have multiple aircraft inbound to Juneau from that area. This is not safe. The trainee should pay attention since this was very slow traffic and update traffic calls. Aircraft X had a CA with multiple helicopters inbound to the field. This 'I don't care enough to look attitude' is what's going to hurt someone someday. Helicopters with paying passengers should not be flying in flights. We need to update the helicopter arrivals/departures into Juneau Airport. JNU Tower Controller in Charge reported Local Control was not issuing sufficient traffic information about helicopters on a VFR route to an air carrier on final approach.