Aryan95614/aerograph-asrs huggingface dataset:
Aircraft: J3 CUB
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

After becoming frustrated and impatient from an engine not starting for 30 minutes or so I accidentally left the throttle on full while hand-propping a J3-Cub while solo. The airplane was chocked; however; it jumped over the chocks upon starting up. I was able to make it to the cockpit to bring the throttle to idle and turn the switch off; however; the plane had moved approximately 50 feet from its original position by the time I had stopped it. There was no damage to the airplane; myself; or anybody on the ramp. J3 Cub pilot reported a loss of control while performing a hand prop start.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: No Specific Anomaly Occurred All Types

FLL's Taxiway T1 sign is missing along Taxiway Bravo eastbound approaching Taxiway T1 intersection. There has never been a sign along FLL's Taxiway Bravo eastbound approaching intersection T1. It would be helpful if FLL installed a T1 sign along Taxiway Bravo eastbound; which properly marks the T1 intersection. Air carrier Captain reported the T1 sign on FLL Taxiway B approaching Taxiway T1 east bound is missing.
Aircraft: A330
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Captain instructed crew to prepare cabin for a normal arrival; as we were about to experience a decompression. As oxygen masks were deployed; passengers were instructed to 'Don Oxygen Masks and Fasten Seat Belts.' I sat at my assigned 3L door; donned my oxygen mask; and assisted passengers sitting nearby. I instructed a woman to use an oxygen mask for her infant; and told children not to pull on the masks; etc. Once Captain advised us that it was safe to walk around; flight attendants walked through the cabin assisting passengers. A young woman was hyperventilating; other passengers were shaken; but overall there were no major incidents. The flight deck crew communicated very well with the crew and kept the passengers informed throughout. Passengers complimented the crew on their professionalism and calm as they deplaned. I did notice upon walking through the cabin that several passenger masks had not deployed. These passengers were not within view of the flight attendants; so they remained without oxygen. Also; we did not have a French translator on the flight; therefore communication with the French speaking passengers was compromised. A330 Flight Attendant describes a loss of cabin pressure during during descent. The cockpit crew was apparently aware that the masks were about to drop and informed the cabin.
Aircraft: PA28
Phase of flight: Landing
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Event / Encounter Object; Ground Excursion Runway

Ceiling was clear. Visibility was at least 10 miles. No precipitation. Upon landing I did not complete my flare and the main gear touched ground before I intended them to. I bounced and started porpoising. The plane went into the grass on the right side of the runway. When the plane stopped I taxied back onto the runway and [then] onto taxiway to clear the active. Tower asked if I needed assistance and I declined. I asked to taxi to the hangars; which they allowed. Upon inspecting the plane I saw a dent in the right flap. I figured the flap hit a raised runway light either during a bounce or more likely just by it hitting the underside of the flap when I rolled forward on the gear.I was able to get the phone number of the Tower from a local FBO. I called and spoke with the Controller with whom I was speaking during approach and landing. She confirmed that a runway light was hit but that it was somehow handled by maintenance. She reported no debris on the runway. I provided her with my name and phone number; so they could contact me further.Primary factor: Not responding correctly with control inputs to first bounce and onset of porpoising. I intend to spend time with a CFI to review this topic. Possible factor: Winds were reported by the Tower as coming from 220 at 10 knots gusting to 18 knots. I did include a gust factor in my landing airspeed. I did not perceive any gusting during final. Possible factor: The setting sun was low on the horizon. During final I adjusted the visor to just block the sun without blocking my view of the runway. It might have been the case that upon starting the flare; as the front of the plane angled up; the sun was no longer blocked by the visor. PA32 pilot reported some wing damage resulted when he lost directional control on landing roll and struck a landing light.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Proceeding visually east of Moose Center at JAC Rwy 19. Daylight visual conditions; received GPWS caution/warning from Blacktail Butte. Was starting turn to right at the time to intercept final. Alert went away once turn was commenced. I never felt uncomfortable with the terrain separation; and was surprised that it was triggered. Air carrier pilot reported receiving a short GPWS aural alert during the turn to final approach course to Runway 19 at Jackson Hole Airport.
Aircraft: MEDIUM LARGE TRANSPORT
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Aircraft X departed IFR to the northeast. The aircraft checked on turning to a 090 heading and climbing to 3000 feet. I instructed the aircraft to join V334 and climb to 5000 feet. A few minutes later I realized I had pointed the aircraft out to SJC who was holding departures instead of handing Aircraft X off to the adjacent sector. I initiated the hand off and called the sector. They had me descend Aircraft X to 4000 feet and turn left heading 330. As the controller was saying this I observed two B737's westbound descending out of 6000 feet. I instructed Aircraft X to descend to 4000 feet and turn left to 330. I also called traffic on the first B737 which the pilot reported in sight. I instructed Aircraft X to maintain visual separation. I then observed Aircraft X at 3700 feet at which time I reiterated 4000 feet which the pilot read back. It appeared to me Aircraft X was correcting and was not in any danger with the terrain. I called traffic on a VFR aircraft at 3500 feet and shipped the aircraft. It did not occur to me to issue a low altitude alert. A TRACON Controller reported they handed off an aircraft late and had to descend the traffic for converging traffic. The aircraft descended below the assigned altitude below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude into conflict with a target.
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Phase of flight: Initial Climb
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

We taxied out to the runway for takeoff and there were thunderstorms that had already moved through the area and another area was north of the airport. We taxied out to the runway and told the tower we were going to need time on the runway to look at the weather. When we lined up on the runway; the radar indicated a cell approximately 15 miles or so from the departure end. We told the tower we would need a right turn immediately after departure and they approved that. The First Officer was flying and I told him to be sure and follow the flight guidance after departure so that we would make the turn in time to avoid the weather. I also had the first officer select a non-flex takeoff due to the weather conditions that could occur just prior to entering the runway to look at the weather.The takeoff was normal and a turn was started at 400 feet when HDG was selected. As we were making the turn; the weather became moderately turbulent and we were turning inside the cell. At 1000 feet the first officer called for VNAV and I selected it. We continued to get bounced around and the aircraft was not accelerating. I stated several times to the first officer lower the nose to gain airspeed but he was somewhat hesitant to do it enough and deviate from the flight director. Also at the same time I checked to ensure the gear was up and it was. At some point following in the turbulence the stick shaker activated momentarily and I took control of the airplane and lowered the nose. At this point I continued to keep a level attitude and recover and accelerate the airplane and retract the flaps on proper airspeed. While doing this I noticed that the mode control panel had the speed control knob set to manual speeds and not FMS speeds. I commanded the switch to be set to FMS and then continued the climb up to our assigned attitude. At this point controls were transferred back to the First Officer and the flight continued. [Report narrative contained no additional information.] EMB-175 flight crew reported having trouble managing airspeed after takeoff in turbulent conditions.
Aircraft: CESSNA 180 SKYWAGON
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

During IFR flight I experienced a loss of power in my C-180. I declared an emergency was declared and landed safely at the airport. A C-180 pilot made a safe emergency landing at a nearby airport following an engine failure.
Aircraft: MD-82
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

On this flight; while level at FL270; we experienced a dual pack shutdown and as a result; declared an emergency in order to start a expedited descent to a lower altitude. At the time the packs shut down we had just finished deviating around rain showers; had just broken out into the clear and were in the process of securing the Anti-Ice System. Prior to the packs shutting down we had been in icing conditions with the complete Anti-Ice System turned on. The system had been turned on prior to entering the area of precipitation and had been on for at least 20-25 minutes by the time we exited icing conditions and this event occurred. We never had any indications of a problem with the system. After breaking out into the clear I ran the tail de-ice and at some point during the process I noticed the pressurization flow light had illuminated. Still with no indications of any issues with the Anti-Ice System I initially assumed the flow light had illuminated due to the system switching between the tail and wing; a temporary anomaly. It became obvious after a short period of time that the cabin was continuing to climb and both packs had inexplicably shut down. I immediately asked ATC for a descent and then decided to declare an emergency to make sure we got down before the cabin reached 10;000 feet. At approximately 16;000 feet I noticed the Left Pack had started working again and had the FO level the aircraft there. A short time later the Right Pack came back online. I told ATC that we were no longer an emergency aircraft and started a gradual climb back up to our cruising altitude of FL300. The cabin never climbed above approximately 7000-7500 feet. I called Dispatch on the phone to let them know of our situation and we agreed that since the Pressurization System had stabilized and we had enough fuel we would continue to ZZZ. We landed at ZZZ with just under 6000 pounds. The aircraft was taken out of service with the cause yet to be determined as I complete this report. A Captain reports about a dual Air Conditioning Pack shutdown in flight at FL270; resulting in an emergency descent. The MD-82 aircraft had just exited icing conditions with the complete Anti-Ice System turned on. At approximately 16;000 FT the Left and Right Packs came back online. Aircraft was removed from service after arrival.
Aircraft: LARGE TRANSPORT
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Just like my report from yesterday. Aircraft X assigned routing SFO.OFFSHORE7.SXC... After MCKEY the aircraft starts heading off course. At MQO; which is five miles east of the assigned route; my trainee cleared the aircraft direct DAISY. I asked the aircraft what they showed as their next point of navigation and the pilot exclaimed that they were direct DAISY. I did not argue with the pilot; but they had to make a good right turn to head to DAISY. They were five miles east of course and heading further east. Yesterday's aircraft was a different carrier and this one was Aircraft X; but they were both off of SFO. I would start by checking the DATA LINK clearances and make sure that the Flight Management System is receiving the OFFSHORE7 SXC transition clearance. Until someone is able to fix this we are just briefing each other to anticipate the deviation. ZLA enroute Controller reports problem that happened the day before happened this day that deals with incorrect routing being given to aircraft causing confusion and corrections having to be made by the Controller.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Enroute; sent several ACARS messages to Dispatch; [planned destination] weather bad; [planned] alternate also bad; ZZZ weather good. No response except; while descending on [our destinations] arrival; 'stick with [the planned alternate];' if you go into holding; try to get a hold of me. My response was 'no.' On downwind; thunderstorm on short final approach; with only ten minutes of hold fuel; diverted to ZZZ. I also had attempted several phone calls to Dispatch on internet cockpit phone; but it did not work. We asked ATC Center to call Dispatch; they took the phone number; but wasn't sure if they had time to call. After a few minutes; still no response from Dispatch; so [we] declared emergency; per company policy of ZZZ not being filed alternate [and] not approved by Dispatch. Landed ZZZ; got fuel; continued to [our original destination]. We need a better means to contact Dispatch. [We] sent numerous ACARS messages; no response until arrival at [our destination]. Internet phone is unreliable. Of the five or six times I have tried to use it; it has only worked once. Air carrier Captain reports inability to contact his Dispatcher directly to advise of a weather diversion to an airport other than the filed alternate.
Aircraft: CITATION V/ULTRA/ENCORE (C560)
Phase of flight: Final Approach
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict

HTO Tower is a temporary Tower that recently opened and since its rushed opening there has been a myriad of land line communication problems between the Tower and TRACON. We are currently communicating with the Tower via telephone line at the FLM desk to the single controller operated Tower. My loss of separation occurred when a UH60 was on the VOR A Approach to HTO and after being cleared for the approach and switched to the Tower he reversed his course and started heading outbound on the VOR. When I noticed the course reversal I turned a Citation V to a parallel course to avoid a loss of separation and advised the FLM to call HTO Tower and tell them to cancel the UH60's approach clearance and give him back to me. I then cleared the Citation V for the visual approach to Runway 28 and switched him to HTO Tower frequency. A few minutes later HTO Tower call the FLM and advised him they were on Runway 10 and he relayed that information to me; and at the same time I told the supervisor to tell the Tower to have the Citation V to go over the top of the airport and enter a left downwind to avoid the UH60 but the FLM advised that the Tower had hung up the phone. I then witnessed the Citation V enter a right downwind for Runway 10 and come in close proximity to the UH60. The HTO Tower should not be operational until they develop a suitable means of two way communication with the TRACON. When the communication system fails the airspace should be reverted back to Class G airspace as it is when the Tower is not open. A cell phone could be used in case of emergency however the controllers in the Tower were using as there main source of communication. An N90 Controller described a conflict involving traffic at HTO. The reporter claims that flawed land line communications equipment between the two facilities was the primary causal factor.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Final Approach
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

The First Officer was flying a visual approach to ZZZ Runway XXR with right traffic from ZZZZZ3 arrival. Radar vector to final; cleared to 3;000 feet from 4;000 feet and cleared the visual. First Officer was in vertical speed and I set 3;000 feet in the MCP window. He armed approach mode and captured the localizer. The aircraft leveled at 3;000 feet and did not capture the glide slope as we were too high. Gear was down; flaps 20 and speed was 163. First Officer disconnected the autopilot and dove down to capture the glide slope. I suggested speed brakes; which he used to get down. This rapid descent caused the Tower to issue an altitude warning. I then became very busy stowing speed brakes; landing flaps; checklists; and verifying stable approach parameters. We never did the 1;000 feet call for set M/A altitude and cleared to land check (which we were). The event; although satisfying the stable approach parameters; was highly irregular and borderline go-around scenario. The debrief included mostly what went wrong and why. We discussed and I noted the main errors. The First Officer said not flying for 7 months was the issue. Air carrier Captain reported an unstabilized approach. The First Officer's lack of recent flying was cited as a contributing factor.
Aircraft: A300
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

First Officer (FO) was pilot flying; Captain was pilot monitoring. During the FOs thru flight walk-around; he noticed a large access panel missing on the underside of the left wing; just inboard of the number one engine. The FO stated that he did not notice any panels missing in that area during the previous pre-flight just a few hours before. Suspect the panel departed the aircraft in flight somewhere between ZZZ and ZZZ1. There were no abnormal indications in the cockpit during the flight that would indicate at which point in the flight the panel departed the aircraft. Maintenance history indicated that maintenance had just completed work on a number 1 pneumatic sensor; and it appeared that the missing panel provided access to the pneumatic ducting in that area of the wing. [Report narrative contained no additional information.] The A300 crew noticed a missing panel during an intermediate walk-around.
Aircraft: A320
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

We pushed back and started engine 1 when we got an ECAM for ENG 2 REV MINOR FAULT. Called Maintenance and they had us start the number 2 engine and then bring back thrust levers into the reverse position momentarily to reset the fault. It worked and the message went away. We departed and were climbing on the SID (I think about 2;000 feet) when we then got an ECAM for ENG 1 REVERSER FAULT. There were no associated 'to-do's' on the ECAM which drove us to the QRH. The QRH starts with a bullet point 'If reverser position fault with reverser pressurized: LAND ASAP (AMBER).' It then directs us to bring the number 1 engine to idle. A big note here is that the ECAM did not have the AMBER LAND ASAP message whereas the QRH did. So we were receiving some conflicting information. All engine parameters and all system page parameters were indicating normal. We exercised the thrust lever into the idle position and back to climb and everything looked normal. So our big question was 'is the reverser pressurized?' and how to tell. We contacted Maintenance through Dispatch via ACARS. Maintenance eventually said they believed the reverser was not in threat of deployment. I asked if Dispatch if they wanted us to divert to ZZZ (along the route of flight) or ZZZ1 (home base for Maintenance) and they said to continue to LAX. The Pilot Monitoring and I believed it was not in threat of deployment as the ECAM did not have the associated AMBER LAND ASAP displayed. We did continue to LAX without incident and landed without using any reversers. Maintenance then MELed the reverser. I spoke with the Maintenance department when I landed in LAX and asked what it meant to have the reverser pressurized. And he told me that in the QRH that 'pressurized' meant 'deployed'. So the QRH was directing us to bring the thrust lever to IDLE and LAND ASAP only if the reverser were deployed. I'm not so sure I agree with that statement. From the time we first contacted Maintenance in the air via ACARS until we had a final direction from Maintenance that the reverser was most likely a fault and nothing physically wrong with it was about 40 minutes.I think the QRH needs to be reviewed and some better information put out there to the pilot group as to what is meant by a pressurized reverser. Also; we need to streamline the information process as 40 minutes is a long time to be flying around without good direction from maintenance as to what is meant by a pressurized reverser. A320 pilot reported ECAM for ENG 1 REVERSER FAULT inflight.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Taxiway is very rough especially when expediting across 17R. [There should be] a note on the taxi chart to proceed extra slow. This could create an issue when trying expedite for 17R traffic. Captain reported taxiway crossing MCO Runway 17R is very rough and should be noted in charting.
Aircraft: BE-KA
Phase of flight: Landing
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC

After entering the pattern at S50 there was a helicopter on downwind landing for Runway 34. I had the helicopter in sight and flew the pattern to it. As I turned final the helicopter seemed to be taking a lot of time and I couldn't tell if he was going to land on the runway or on the taxiway so I inquired if he was landing on the runway. He responded that he was going around. I continued with the approach. The aircraft I was flying has poor visibility forward during landing. In the round out I caught sight of the helicopter about 1/2 to 3/4 of the way down the runway between 50-100 feet AGL and apparently stationary. I executed a go-around; sidestepped to the left to avoid a potentially dangerous situation; and advised the helicopter to go right. After I landed I was met by an NTSB inspector [who had witnessed the event] who said that they had been having issues with helicopters and I should stop by the airport office and report this incident. I do believe FAR 91.126 instructs a helicopter to avoid the flow of fixed wing aircraft. A King Air pilot executed a go-around when the helicopter on approach ahead of him was hovering at low altitude over the runway as he was in the flare.