Aryan95614/aerograph-asrs huggingface dataset:
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Security

FO (First Officer) noticed [a suspicious] device hanging on spare bulbs panel before push as he was plugging in his personal headset. Contacted Operations and asked for jet bridge return with a GSC (Ground Security Coordinator). Looked up previous pilots and discovered they were at Gate XX. We reviewed QRH. Called Gate XX and confirmed device was previous FO's. Ownership was identified. Previous FO said device was battery pack for their personal headset. Device given back to previous FO by GSC. While getting ready to close up cabin door I turned around to plug in my headset and noticed a suspicious item hanging from the spare bulbs handle. I uncoupled it and inspected it; noticing an 8 cell battery pack similar to those used in remote control vehicles; attached by a zip tie and wired in to a black box that had a 2 position switch; led light and what appeared to be an antenna jack. I showed it to the Captain who quickly tried to get the Gate Agent as she had just closed the door. I called Operations requesting the jet bridge be returned and the Captain also asked for a GSC (Ground Security Coordinator) which I asked for through Operations.I looked up the inbound flight and the crew list assuming it was the previous First Officer's homemade charging device but also realized this could be an actual threat so we placed the item on the center pedestal and left it alone. The door was opened and the Captain asked our Gate Agent to contact the Gate Agent at Gate XX where the previous FO (First Officer) was.We reviewed the bomb on board QRH as well as threat level 3 in the FOM. The Captain then went into the jet bridge with the device and handed it over to the GSC. Shortly after; the previous FO came down our jet bridge and confirmed ownership of the suspected device and explained it was a battery pack for his headset.The GSC gave the device to FO who apologized for the confusion. The GSC confirmed the Captain and I felt the aircraft was secure and we were both ok to continue the flight and there was no need to deplane the aircraft. We both felt the aircraft was safe and the device's ownership was confirmed and no threat existed. We boarded the aircraft; ran the remaining checklists; and departed a little past departure time. We were able to make up most of the time and got the customers safely and comfortably to [the destination airport]. B737 NG flight crew reported a suspicious device hanging from the spare bulbs panel resulting in a flight delay.
Aircraft: CRJ200
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Speed All Types

On arrival...; ATC assigned 5;000 feet & and slow to 160 kts. Our next Clearence was to maintain 5;000 feet until [FIX] cleared ILS 36L. The First Officer was still a low time first officer and wanted to slow to landing configuration on schedule; so we did. After contacting tower; they asked our speed and we replied we were at our Vref. They said we were supposed to fly last assigned speed. So we sped up to 160 kts. However we were cleared for the approach and neither of us recalled a speed restriction nor did I recall reading back one to ATC. Tower turned us off the approach and we were vectored around to try it again. No further issues were encountered. Flight crew; initially cleared to 5;000 feet and 160 knots; slowed to Vref after being cleared for an ILS Approach. When switched to Tower frequency; Tower advised that the flight was supposed to maintain 160 knots. Aircraft was vectored around for another ILS Approach.
Aircraft: ROBINSON R44
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

During cruise portion of [flight]; the helicopter began to lose power. Manifold pressure climbed; RPMs climbed and oil temperature climbed into the red. I decided to divert to [a suitable alternate] to avoid a possible engine failure and possible emergency landing where a mechanic could diagnose the problem (still ongoing). Robinson R44 pilot reported he diverted to an alternate airport for a precautionary landing when he began to lose power.
Aircraft: MEDIUM TRANSPORT; LOW WING; 2 TURBOJET ENG
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Going in to Asheville airport (AVL) we were cleared for the visual approach runway 35 on a perpendicular course to the south at 8;000 feet. We had to rush down to make the speed and configuration changes needed to get on the approach. We were using the ILS frequency as backup. We were intercepting the localizer from the south and were slightly below glideslope at UMUXE when we got a ground proximity warning from the aircraft. I (being pilot flying) immediately stopped the descent and leveled off as we had visual references to the ground. The warning went away and we continued the approach without incident. A more thorough brief of the approach plate; even though it was only backup; could have prevented the GPWS. Also asking ATC for vectors to the final would have prevented the warning as well. The hill that set the warning off is small on the plate and easy to look over. Air carrier flight crew reported receiving a GPWS terrain warning on a visual approach at dusk to AVL airport.
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 135 ER/LR
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Nine hours into shift; volunteered to go on a 'road-trip' to another airport to remove and replace a faulty component. I hurried to grab my tools; references etc. I was given a part; and got on the road. Drove 3.5 hours; removed and replaced part; no fault messages. Aircraft is fixed and I completed a successful road trip. Or so I thought... What I did not realize is the part I was given was not 'effective' for the aircraft. I did not request the part myself; it was requested by our Maintenance Controller. This individual is not at fault however; because he requested the correct part. The Parts System we use to request parts recognized the part I was given as 'Interchangeable With' the correct part. Unfortunately it may be interchangeable; but it is not 'effective' for the aircraft I was working on. But once again the blame rests solely on me. Had I double checked the Illustrated Parts Catalog (IPC) to verify the difference between the two parts I would've been able to extinguish this whole situation. So as you can see; many factors came into effect: never dealing with these two different parts; I was given a part instead of requesting it myself; rushing out the door; long drive; and high hours on the job. But I consider none of these factors in any way as an excuse. I enjoy going on road trips; I have always considered them a great learning experience. And I don't consider this any differently. I have learned from the mistake I made and intend to be much more careful about part effectivity in the future. [Contributing factor was] not double checking/verifying the 'Effectivity' of the part given to me. [Recommend] not trusting the system we use to request parts. Aircraft overnighting at ZZZ1 gate. Complacency. A Line Mechanic reports replacing a faulty component on an EMB-135 aircraft with a part identified by their Parts Computer System as being 'Interchangeable with' the part he removed. The new part was interchangeable; but not 'Effective' for the aircraft. Mechanic noted the Illustrated Parts Catalog (IPC) had the correct information; but was not used to verify.
Aircraft: DHC8
Phase of flight: Takeoff / Launch
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Was a normal day; early van to to the airport; accepted plane; boarded; departed a few minutes early and proceeded to de-ice pad to have heavy coat of frost removed. Due to the cold I was in no particular hurry to get in the air; as I recall we were almost done with de-ice before the oil temps were within limits for flight. Just a note; I always like the plane to warm up adequate before flights on these cold mornings (-14c). Taxied out; de-ice equipment check; and took the runway and commenced a takeoff once clearance was received from tower. Somewhere around halfway through gear retraction the right engine began surging very radically; upon closer examination so was the prop. We as a crew determined the most likely cause was a beta lockout failure. We complied with the company memory procedures and when the condition levers were reduced below 1200 the surging ceased. The tower was notified of our intent to return and land; we entered the traffic pattern in a left downwind. The F/A was briefed; the passengers were briefed; ops were notified and we landed as I recall about 9 minutes after liftoff; taxi back to the gate was uneventful where deplaning proceeded without delay. There was a return to field but an emergency was not declared. A DHC-8 flight crew encountered a surging right engine shortly after landing gear retraction; reduced the RPM until the surging ceased per their Beta lockout procedure and returned to their departure airport.
Aircraft: BONANZA 35
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types

I was working DR1 and accepted a handoff from DR2 on a tag that read Aircraft X. The pilot asked for a Bravo clearance and climb which I issued. When I saw that the aircraft did not appear to be climbing; I began making inquiries. The altitude indicated 061 and an approximate 240 heading; not the climb to 085 on a 170 heading I'd issued. I attempted to turn further right to a 150 with no visible change. I asked for his altitude; thirty degree turns and finally to IDENT since I'd seen no change. In between some of this questioning; BJC called to say they tagged up a VFR as a Bravo violator 'BVIO' and wanted me to track him and have him call. When I asked Aircraft X to IDENT; I observed the BVIO IDENT. I asked for position and correlated it to that spot; 20 miles south of the AC DR2 identified as Aircraft X.After watching the replay we discovered that a code [XXYY] departed GXY. When DR2 got the call from Aircraft X and typed it in; the generated code was also [XXYY]. The system tagged the aircraft off GXY instead of the actual Aircraft X who departed BDU almost 35 miles apart. When DR2 called the position correctly; the pilot did not catch that it was incorrect. The real Aircraft X flew through BJC's airspace; through their traffic pattern; and I didn't make the connection until I saw the BVIO with an IDENT. I had to watch the replay to figure out how all of that happened.There were two aircraft squawking [XXYY] and the system didn't show any indication of it. I'd like to see that the system either not allow that to happen or at least have some sort of notification that it's happened. Denver TRACON Controller reported the ATC Computer allowed two aircraft to be tagged up on the same code; which led to confusion and airspace violations.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I returned to work after a 3 month absence. I am still qualified on the module. I was assigned as the trainer to Mechanic Y. I was training him on the stator case assembly. I demonstrated how to tighten each vane segment foot bolts. The procedure that I was taught; and which had been in use as long as I can remember; was to slide the case and vane assembly; so that approximately one third of it overhung the table surface. Then the bolts were tightened from below with a ratchet with a socket and long extension; repositioning the case and vane assembly as necessary until all bolts were tightened. At the time of the incident; I was not in the work area; having gone to the restroom.Support the case with a hoist and sling before tightening the bolts. This should be added to the job card. One week after return from 3 months off and being the first time working on this unit as a trainee.On Graveyard shift I was working on the module and order # XXXX. I was tightening the bolts of the vanes. The bolts are tighten from the bottom while the case sits on the table. To access the bolts part of the case is moved slightly beyond the edge of the table. I was sitting in a chair with rollers while I was tightening the bolts. The chair moved; the wrench and its extension did come off the bolt head causing the case to slide off the table and fall to the floor approximately 30 inches.There was no visible damage to the case because it fell directly on my arm and that cushioned the fall. Inspection will be called to inspect the unit.I would add to the job card to support the case with a hoist before tightening the bolts. Or developing a fixture that would allow to reach the bolts from the bottom without having to move part of the case off the edge of the table. Maintenance Instructor and Trainee reported a training mistake during a training session and both cited being off for an extended time contributed to the event.
Aircraft: A320
Phase of flight: taxi
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types

I was working Local 1 at JFK working ILS to Runway 31R and visuals to Runway 31L. An A320 was told to line up and wait on Runway 31L with a B767-200 on 5 mile final. The A320 was cleared for takeoff and notified of traffic on a 3 mile final. The A320 did not commence his takeoff roll. With the B767 on about 1.5 mile final I told the A320 he needed to go. The A320 slowly rolled down runway at less then taxi speed. I sensed he had a problem and told the A320 to exit the runway at Taxiway Y to allow the B767 to land. At this point the A320 advised he was rolling. The B767 was too close for this to work so I told the A320 to cancel takeoff and exit now at the next turn; which was Runway 4L. I tried to send the B767 around; but he had keyed the frequency asking about what he should do causing me not to be able to speak to the B767. Finally the B767 unkeyed and I sent him around as the A320 exited the runway. If an aircraft is cleared for takeoff but is not ready; they should notify ATC as soon as possible to prevent this type of situation. JFK Controller described a go-around event when traffic cleared for takeoff delayed longer than expected and separation collapsed; the reporter noted the departing aircraft should have informed ATC of any expected delays.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft X Battery was replaced due to the log book write up; low voltage; APU would not start with low battery voltage.Storage procedure required battery disconnect not to drain down. Believe this would have occurred sometime.These aircraft were parked due to unusual circumstances. Procedures were changing often. I hope a job card is developed to eliminate any future confusion. Technician reported an aircraft battery had to be replaced due to incorrect storage procedure.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

I instructed the handoff assist to amend the flight plan for Air Carrier X. Seeing ALURI as the next fix; and never hearing of that fix; I assumed that it was well in ZNY's airspace. Apparently ALERI is before LUCTI in ZMA's airspace; causing the flight plan to back track; resulting in an error within Oceanic Procedures (ATOPS). I should have gone to the end of the airway to tie in the route of flight at the correct fix instead of assuming or called ZMA to confirm. FDIO; ERAM; ERID; AND/OR ATOPS (FLIGH PLAN PROCESSING SOFTWARES) should provide notification alerting the controller that the route entered was in error is back tracking on itself. ZSU ARTCC Controller reported entering an improper routing in the ERAM for an aircraft.
Aircraft: GULFSTREAM G200 (IAI 1126 GALAXY)
Phase of flight: Initial Climb
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Departing TEB on the RUUDY departure; the Captain was the non flying pilot in the right seat and I was the SIC/flying pilot; but sitting in the left seat. The Captain deplaned the passengers; handled the luggage and paid the applicable fees then returned to the plane while I received the PDC and set up the FMS for departure. The RUUDY SID has a final altitude of 2;000 (or as assigned) with an intermediate stop at 1;500 until crossing WENTZ. The Captain set 2;000 in the altitude preselect which should have been 1;500. He then briefed the clearance. As the flying pilot I considered the noise abatement for the Teterboro area and intended to climb as expeditiously as possible to the initial altitude. We discussed 1;500 at WENTZ then the climb to 2;000 over TASCA however I didn't catch that the Captain had set 2;000 in the altitude preselect. The chain of events was: 1. the incorrect setting of the altitude preselect; 2. preoccupation with noise abatement; 3. I followed the flight director to the preselected altitude. I should have been able to break the error chain simply by noting the incorrect setting of the initial altitude rather than trusting what was set to be correct. A Gulfstream flight crew departing TEB on the RUUDY RNAV SID failed to cross WENTZ at 1;500 MSL as required. A contributing factor was setting the final SID altitude; 2;000 MSL; in the altitude alert window rather than the prior hard 1;500.
Aircraft: CESSNA AIRCRAFT UNDIFFERENTIATED OR OTHER MODEL
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

A Cessna was doing pattern work and Airport Maintenance was doing work throughout the airport. Ground Control coordinated that Airport Maintenance wanted to drive Runway 14L and hold short of Runway 18. I approved and changed my Cessna to Runway 14R and cleared him for the option. The Cessna asked if he could cross midfield I replied negative extend your base Runway 14R; cleared for the option. Relinquished Runway 14L to Ground Control. Then Ground stated that the Maintenance vehicle now wanted Runway 14R. I advised him we switched the Cessna to the right because of the request and to hold short of Runway 14R; Ground acknowledged. I believe Ground was contacted by two airport vehicles with requests at the same time and because the call signs are so similar; and on frequency sound similar; one took the others permission to proceed as requested. As the aircraft was flaring over the approach end of Runway 14R the CIC/Supervisor yelled out is he on the runway; vehicle on the runway. My Trainer and I were looking at the airplane and the vehicle was at the approach end of the runway but not on the runway. The confusion involved two similar sounding call signs for trucks both in the area and when ground replied. I would make sure that all vehicles that have access to the airport don't have similar sounding call signs. I also recommend better radios. Ground Control (GC) was having issues with two vehicles with similar sounding call signs. Ground instructed him to proceed as requested hold short of all runway's; but both vehicles started moving. Noticed the vehicle by the approach end of Runway 14R close but not on the runway and still moving. CIC noticed this first and drew it to the attention of me at Local Control. I told the Trainee I was training to send the Cessna around; the aircraft was less than a quarter mile final and approximately 100 FT AGL. He went around; continued to do pattern work while CIC and Ground worked with the vehicles to straighten the problem out. Rename one of the vehicles so the call signs aren't so similar. Tower Controller described a runway incursion event when several airport vehicles were requesting runway clearances all with similar call signs.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Dual pack fail at FL240. Returned to ZZZ. Landed overweight. Entered malfunction and overweight landing in maintenance log book.Aircraft was dispatched per the MEL with an inop right pack. B737 Captain reported a dual Pack failure in cruise and returned to the departure airport.
Aircraft: M-20 J (201) / ALLEGRO
Phase of flight: Landing
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical

On crosswind for Runway 9; I saw the other aircraft departing Runway 23. I had heard no radio traffic; so I called on CTAF to see if he had his radio on; no response. I then flew downwind; base and final but could not see the other aircraft; and there was no radio traffic on 122.8. Just as I was about to touch down; the other aircraft crossed the intersection of Runway's 5-23 and 9-27; about 1;000 FT in front of me as he landed on Runway 23. We were both landing simultaneously on different runways that intersected. After shutting down; I walked to the other pilot's hangar and asked him several questions: 'Do you have a radio in your plane?' 'Yes.' 'Do you keep it turned on?' 'No' 'Why not? We just about collided out there.' 'I can't hear it because of my hearing aid.' 'Why don't you get a headset?' 'I have one. It doesn't help.' 'Did you realize we were both landing and almost hit?' 'Oh; were you landing?' This pilot has had multiple near-misses at our field and multiple accidents. Upon discussing this issue with the airport manager immediately after; he informed me that [he] had a close call with another pilot in the past 2 weeks. This pilot apparently recently was flying without a medical; but I understand he has gotten it back. I do not understand how a pilot who is clearly dangerous; who has already exhibited unsafe actions and has had multiple incidents (including taxing in front of a King Air on short final about a year ago; which I previously reported) can be allowed to continue to fly; even under 'light sport'. Do we need to wait for someone to be killed by his actions before something is done? This is a serious matter of public safety. One issue is the pilot himself; and as I see it his inability to operate safely. The second is his use of equipment (or lack of use). At a minimum; he should be using the radio equipment in his aircraft so others can know his position and avoid him. As it is; if I know he is out flying; I do not pull my plane out. M20 pilot reports a conflict with an LSA pilot landing on an intersecting runway. The LSA pilot does not use his radio due to incompatibility with his hearing aids. Previous conflicts are alleged.
Aircraft: CRJ200
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

We were at cruise at FL260 when we heard a loud pop noise and the Captain's side front windshield outer panel shattered. We immediately checked to ensure pressure was stable (which it was); and decided to descend in case the other panes shattered as well. I (pilot flying) initiated a descent; the Captain (pilot monitoring) grabbed the QRH; and I advised ATC that our windshield shattered and we were in a descent to 10. The Controller cleared us down and asked if we wanted to declare an emergency; we didn't at that time but did a short time later with the same controller. A broken windshield; besides being startling with no obvious cause; creates at least two specific risks. One - of it worsening to the point that pressure is lost and/or breaks apart into the cockpit; and two - the visibility restrictions caused by a spider webbed window. We started descending prior to receiving clearance in order to minimize the first risk and notified the controller of our actions within a few hundred feet (at the first opportunity) to get an additional set of eyes to compensate for the second; and of course to keep the controller in the loop. CRJ-200 First Officer reports a shattered Captain's side front windshield at FL260 and starts descending. ATC is advised and an emergency is declared before diverting to a suitable airport.