Aryan95614/aerograph-asrs huggingface dataset:
Aircraft: A319
Phase of flight: Takeoff / Launch
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

I was acting as PIC/Pilot Monitoring. At approximately 50 KTS; the ECAM annunciated '#1 Engine Compressor Vane.' I assumed control of the aircraft and rejected the takeoff without incident. After performing our prescribed duties per SOP; we returned to the gate. There appeared to be a history of related maintenance issues in the logbook. A319 Captain reports receiving an ECAM message 'ENG 1 Compressor Vane' at 50 knots and rejects the takeoff. Previous write ups for the same anomaly had been noted in the Logbook.
Aircraft: A321
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

On climbout of ZZZ; approximately 10;000 feet; had an ECAM message ENG1 COMPRESSOR VANE. After following ECAM procedures the only instruction is to avoid rapid thrust movements. We continued our Climb and our route to ZZZ1. In order to avoid rapid thrust movements; I descended using VS instead of open descent. At approximately 28;000 feet on the arrival the engine made it to idle and I heard an audible bang from the number one engine followed by the ECAM message ENG1 STALL. After accomplishing the first step of the procedure; THR LEVER1....Confirm....IDLE; The engine failed and we got the ECAM message; ENG1 FAIL. We followed the procedure and decided not to restart due to engine damage. We continued into ZZZ1 single ENG and had an uneventful landing. We stopped on the runway to allow inspection of the aircraft. We were given the all clear and taxied to the gate uneventfully. Mechanical anomaly caused by a failure of either the low compressor bleed valve or the variable stator vane. Climbing out of ZZZ we got an ECAM for engine 1 compressor vane which guided us to not make any rapid thrust changes. We continued on our way to ZZZ1. Beginning our descent on the arrival leaving FL330 around or below FL300 when power went idle we experienced an ENG1 compressor stall upon following that procedure which calls for thrust lever idle the number 1 engine failed. We continued our descent and approach into ZZZ1 landing. We stopped on the runway for the fire crew to inspect the aircraft after which we taxied to gate. A321 flight crew reported an ECAM engine problem which led to engine failure resulting in a single engine landing.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: unknown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

On Date Mechanic Name requested me to witness the removal and storage of the over wing slide bottle pins of the left and right wing slide bottles. The corrected action block of the non routine stated as such and that is what I witnessed and signed off as RII (Required Inspection Item).I saw nothing at the time directing the arming of the left and right over wing doors.I'm not sure why the disarming of the left and right over wing doors was written up on a non routine. There should be a Task Card for storing an aircraft and specific items called out to prepare the aircraft for storage; and to put the aircraft back into service. Technician reported confusion in signing off items when returning an aircraft to service after storage.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Arrived to the flight planning area and downloaded [flight plan]; for flight [to] SNA; for the second time; and noticed RLS #2 was because of an aircraft change. The TCAS was MEL'd on our new aircraft. I conferred with the First Officer (FO) and I decided that I would refuse [the aircraft]; as I feel that operating the flight with the TCAS inoperative was unsafe. The 10-7 for SNA also states; 'VFR traffic; Use caution for extensive general aviation traffic in the area'. I called and spoke to Dispatch and stated that I am refusing the aircraft. I expected to get some type of pushback or an excuse as why we need to take the aircraft to SNA; but to my pleasure he took my refusal well and I then gave him my number and asked to please call me when they had another aircraft. We were then notified that we had another aircraft change AGAIN (second time) and then it hit me. The reason WE had the original aircraft change in the first place; was that the crew before us also refused this aircraft; and they tried to assign this aircraft to us to take it. We were notified [of] our second new gate.[I then learned that] Dispatch switched the aircraft AGAIN (third time) so they tried to get a THIRD crew to take [the] aircraft with the TCAS on MEL! I met the Captain leaving the flight planning area; explained what happened and he also refused this aircraft! A B737 Captain reported that when he refused to fly an aircraft to SNA because of heavy light aircraft traffic and an inoperative TCAS his company 'shopped' the aircraft to other flight crews hoping someone would take it.
Aircraft: DC-10 UNDIFFERENTIATED OR OTHER MODEL
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

While descending through approximately 14;000 MSL; to ensure that the aircraft remained on the proper descent profile; the pilot flying extended the speedbrakes. Immediately after extending the speedbrakes; the aircraft went into an uncommanded right turn at approximately a 45 degree bank angle causing the aircraft to depart our cleared track by approximately one half mile. The Captain immediately disconnected the autopilot and had to apply full left aileron to maintain wings level. He then attempted to retract the speedbrake handle; but due to the friction on the handle; was unable to do so. He then directed me to retract the speedbrakes while he flew the aircraft. I was able to retract the speed brakes; and the pilot flying was immediately able to regain full control of the aircraft. Montreal Control noticed our heading deviate from course; and asked us to confirm that we were proceeding as previously cleared. I advised that the autopilot made an uncommanded input and that we were correcting back to course. After confirming that full aircraft control was maintained; we attempted to analyze the malfunction. We concluded that there was binding in the spoiler handle and that extension of the speedbrakes was the cause of the asymmetric flight control malfunction. After a full analysis of the malfunction; the landing runway; landing data; and possible solutions we decided to perform an ILS approach to Runway 24 using flaps 50; and no spoilers. After an uneventful landing; we taxied to parking; made the appropriate write-up in the logbook; and debriefed the aircraft mechanic as to the details of the malfunction. When a DC10 flight crew extended spoilers to assist compliance with their planned descent profile the aircraft abruptly banked 45 degrees and deviated from their cleared track. The pilot flying was unable to retract the spoilers while resisting the bank and directed the First Officer to do so. Normal flight was recovered and the landing was made without deploying spoilers as a precaution.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Initial Approach; Final Approach
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

For the ILS Runway 04R at ZZZ; performance numbers were run for a Flaps 30 landing with a good stopping margin at Autobrakes 3. ATIS winds were calling approximately 070/13 - no gusts. Upon switching to Tower at ZZZZZ on the localizer course and tracking the glideslope; Tower cleared us to land with winds now gusting to 20. As PF (Pilot Flying); I elected to add 4 knots to the Vtarget and as an added Safety measure at ZZZ; I selected Autobrakes MAX to compensate for a slightly increased approach speed. The PM (Pilot Monitoring) attempted to quickly re-run the performance data; but the gusts were not yet accounted for in the METAR. Rather than going heads down any longer inside 1;000 feet AGL; we agreed a 4-5 knot addition to VTarget and using Autobrakes MAX would be more than sufficient to account for the gust factor.At approximately 500 feet AGL; we received a GPWS Too Low Flaps Alert. The PM immediately called for the go-around and it was initiated. A quick scan of the flap handle and I realized that I had neglected to call for Flaps 30 from a Flaps 15 setting; and the Before Landing Checklist was not run. We were quickly vectored around for another uneventful ILS. The minor distraction of adding a gust factor and changing the Autobrakes setting sent me out of a normal approach configuration sequence and we ended up both missing the final flap setting and subsequent checklist.With the normal ZZZ procedure of not contacting (and often not switching to) Tower until reaching the fix at about a 5-mile final; it's possible for us to miss out on cues to changing weather on the ground. We were number 3 or 4 in a sequence of landings on 04R. Had we switched to Tower five or more miles sooner; we may have caught the gusting winds earlier and had more time to type in the adjusted winds and send away for the performance numbers prior to 1;000 feet AGL. This was another series of events combined with mild fatigue that led to poor task prioritization on our parts. The short version is that we got 'Too Low; Flaps' at 500 feet because we were at Flaps 15. We went around. Planned winds were 070/7. Tower winds were 070/12G20. I re-ran the performance landing numbers at 1;500 feet; but did not override the METAR and got back the numbers for 070/7. The PF (Pilot Flying) chose to add 5 knots to VTarget and we agreed to go from Medium to Max braking and continue.There is no guidance I am aware of as to when we would be required to re-run our landing numbers. I should not have tried to re-run the landing numbers at that point. That would have eliminated the distraction that led to not selecting our planned final flaps or running the Before Landing Checklist. B737-800 flight crew reported executing a go-around due to improper flap setting on short final.
Aircraft: MEDIUM LARGE TRANSPORT; LOW WING; 2 TURBOJET ENG
Phase of flight: Final Approach
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway

I was working LC1 which has arrivals to runway 13L and arrivals to runway 22L. Aircraft A landed runway 13L and attempted to turn off at taxiway ZA which was closed due to the snow that had fallen 7 days ago. Taxiway ZA turnoff was broadcasted as closed on the current ATIS. I told Aircraft A that that turnoff was closed and he had to go to the next one if able (taxiway E). Aircraft A did not move right away so I was forced to send the next arrival for runway 13L around; which was Aircraft X.I looked up at saw that Aircraft Z was airborne off runway 13R and was dipping his wings to turn left to a heading of 110. After seeing this I decided to turn the Aircraft X to a 090 heading and climb to 2000 feet so he wouldn't be a factor for the wake from Aircraft Z. At the time Aircraft Y was about 3 miles out for runway 22L at around 1000 feet. The 090 heading I thought would have the Aircraft X pass behind Aircraft Y but Aircraft Y was going 100 knots over the ground at the time so Aircraft X may have passed over head at 2000 feet. I pointed out Aircraft X to Aircraft Y and I believe Aircraft Y said he had him in sight. I did not have time to point out Aircraft Z or Aircraft Y to Aircraft X because of the other traffic I was working at the time. I also felt Aircraft X would be too busy in the cockpit to respond due to the recent go around instructions I issued. Aircraft A eventually cleared runway 13L and Aircraft Y landed runway 22L without any issues. The other Local controller turned Aircraft Z back to a 155 heading so Aircraft Z was not a factor for Aircraft X.The biggest problem that caused the whole event was Aircraft A trying to turnoff at a closed exit to their runway. Aircraft A had just rolled past the previous turnoff of DB; so I was about to give them instructions to exit at Taxiway E when I noticed them turning at ZA. If the pilot had listened to the ATIS they would have known not to turn off at taxiway ZA and Aircraft X would not have gone around. Also if the PONYNJ (Port Authority of NY and NJ) had plowed all the turnoffs to all of their runways at any point in the 7 days since it lasted snowed; this runway exit would of been open and therefore not an issue for Aircraft A to turnoff there. Also doing converging approaches without CRDA (Converging Runway Display Aid) is dangerous in the event of go arounds with departure headings that conflict with a straight out missed approach. JFK Local Controller reported an aircraft turned to exit the runway at a closed and blocked intersection. The next arrival had to be sent around. In the go around the aircraft now became a conflict for two other aircraft. Eventually the go around traffic comes back and lands. Controller reported that he thought the Port Authority should have done a better job clearing the intersections from snow.
Aircraft: CRJ900
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

On initial climb out from DCA Runway 1; First Officer made initial turn to follow the river. Engaged the autopilot to intercept the DOCTR2 RNAV course from the West. AP turned sharply to intercept and did not capture. Immediately disengaged AP and turned back towards the northwest. East bank of the river remained in view the whole time and we do not believe we crossed it. Winds at the time were approximately 330/11G19. FO hand flew plane until AP was transferred to CA side and recaptured course. FMS 2 was deferred; but 900 MEL does not preclude RNAV procedures as the 200 MEL does. CA was in white needles with FO in yellow (cross-side data) with MFD map data available and FMS 1 on the annunciator.Add an operational note to 900 MEL 34-61-1A that AP should only be coupled to non-deferred FMS side. Also; DCA DOCTR2 RNAV should be assigned cautiously with a strong west winds because of equipment limitations. [Report Narrative Contained No Additional Information]. CRJ-900 flight crew reported they deviated from their assigned RNAV departure when the aircraft failed to track the course.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

We were cleared the Visual Approach to Runway 36L following a heavy widebody aircraft; who was approximately 3 NM in front of us. I briefed the First Officer that I would ride the glideslope slightly high to avoid wake turbulence. Winds on final were a left quartering tailwind of about eight knots and shifting left quartering headwind around 500' AGL. At around 300' AGL; we encountered wake turbulence with a significant right roll to at least 35 degrees of bank. I countered with left aileron and elected to go around; asserting that the deviation had resulted in an unstable approach on short final. The go-around and subsequent landing to 36L were uneventful.With the shifting winds; at least five mile spacing behind the heavy widebody aircraft would have probably prevented the event. In fact; the subsequent approach was behind another heavy widebody aircraft and I assured 5 NM spacing resulting in a successful approach and landing with no wake turbulence. B737-800 Captain reported encountering wake turbulence on approach to MEM in trail of a heavy widebody aircraft.
Aircraft: WIDEBODY TRANSPORT
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter Object

During climbout from SBGR (Sao Paulo) on the CGO 1 (Congonhas One Departure) SCB transition; the Captain; First Officer; and Relief Pilot observed a large rectangular balloon; or kite approximately 100 feet in size directly in our flight path at exactly 10;000 feet. The object had a thick line or cable attached to it and descended downward from the object as far as the eye could see. The location of the object was directly in our path located over the Congonhas VOR on the departure. While executing the turn on the SID over CGO; all pilots saw the object and I proceeded to take evasive action to prevent hitting the object. The aircraft missed the object by approximately 200 feet. Captain reported the objects location and altitude to Departure Control. The SBGR ATIS did have warnings of possible balloon activity in the airport area. But; one never expects to see it at 10;000 feet with a large cable attached to it. Please notify the Brazilian Government on the seriousness of allowing this type of activity to continue. They make announcements on the ATIS; and know they are there; but seem to do little to correct this problem. [Narrative contained no additional information]. Air Carrier flight crew reports encountering a tethered balloon at 10;000 feet over CGO on the CGO 1 departure from SBGR. The SID crossing restriction at CGO is between FL100 and FL150.
Aircraft: MD-11
Phase of flight: Takeoff / Launch
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Flight was cleared for takeoff on Runway 08. As the throttles were raises to set takeoff power the crew received a level two alert 'ELEC Alerts'. After a brief moment on Runway 08 with ATC approval the crew decided to exit the runway to investigate the level two alert. Referring to the QRH the crew was instructed to contact aircraft Maintenance. After discussing the malfunction with aircraft Maintenance it was determined that we had a bad Electrical System Controller. Aircraft Maintenance instructed the crew to contact Maintenance Control to get a control number. After contacting Maintenance Control the crew received a control number for the inoperative Electrical System Controller. As the crew prepared to taxi for takeoff the level two alert 'ELEC Alerts' returned. After some troubling shooting with aircraft Maintenance it was determined that the number one IDG was bad. As directed by MEL 24-21-01 Integrated Drive Generators (IDG) inoperative; the number one IDG was disconnected. The MEL directed the crew to operative the electrical system in manual and the crew contacted Maintenance Control for control number. Flight departed with a deferred Electrical System Controller inoperative and the number one IDG deferred (disconnected) and arrived at our filed destination with no further incident or system malfunctions. An MD-11 developed two separate electrical system malfunctions while taxiing for takeoff. On the first takeoff attempt the Electrical System Controller failed; on the second attempt an IDG failed.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

When configuring for a visual approach at AVL we received a 'Flaps Fail' amber message when selecting flaps from 8 to 20. (IAS was approximately 180 KIAS). We asked Tower to give us holding instructions. We entered the holding pattern and ran the Flaps Fail QRH. We determined that 8;000 FT was plenty of runway for the conditions; so we elected to land at our destination and to not declare an emergency. This was a 'no-alternate' fuel plan and we felt that returning to our departure airport while the flaps were stuck at 17 would burn significantly more fuel.Once at the gate; Maintenance was able to talk us through resetting the flap indicator system IAW guidance found in the appropriate MEL Chapter. The outbound flight was slightly delayed; but able to its scheduled flights.Here are some thoughts as to my decision making. According to the most conservative numbers we could derive from the QRH; no more than 6;000 FT of runway would be required; we had 8;000 FT. Flap failures with plenty of runway available are routinely practiced in the simulator and under more demanding conditions. As a result we decided NOT to declare an emergency. We also decided not to have the passengers brace because we believed we had plenty of runway available. When I stopped the airplane on the runway; however; we were at the 2;000 FT marker. After landing; 3 out of 4 BTMS (Brake Temperature Monitoring System) indicators went white due to the maximum-effort braking on rollout. None of the indicators went red. My advice to other crews would be to take the flaps 45 landing distance in the AOM and double it. The 55% additive factor is wishful thinking; in my humble opinion. It is also good that when we practice this event in the simulator; we do it with no vertical guidance whatsoever. That way; when you do it backed up with a glide slope; it doesn't feel out of the ordinary at all. A commuter jet flight crew experienced the failure of the flaps to extend to a normal landing setting. They opted to land on their destination airport's 8;000 FT runway as their AOM indicated they would need only 6;000 FT of runway to come to a stop based on the setting at which the flaps had failed. After coming to a stop using maximum effort braking they had 2;000 FT of runway remaining.
Aircraft: ALBATROS (L39)
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was lead aircraft (L-39) with a wingman (BAE-AV-8) in a ferry flight to GYY. We were both flying experimental aircraft and are required to file VFR. The weather was VMC and because of the crowded Chicago airspace; we flew at 11;500 feet direct to GYY and asked for radar flight following to stay clear of controlled airspace. After climbing to cruising altitude; Milwaukee Departure told us that our radar service was terminated and frequency change approved. I went to Gary/Chicago Intl Tower and did a straight in to Runway 12. Ground Control told me to call Chicago TRACON. I was then informed that I had entered Class B airspace without permission. In retrospect; I should have continued to pursue radar flight following and assistance in an area with which I am not familiar. I am unsure as to how it was determined that I had violated airspace restrictions as both my wingman and I were monitoring our GPS and I showed descending beyond Chicago airspace. L39 pilot is informed after landing at GYY that he and his wingman may have violated the ORD Class B airspace during their arrival from the north.