Aryan95614/aerograph-asrs huggingface dataset:
Aircraft: LIGHT TRANSPORT; LOW WING; 2 TURBOPROP ENG
Phase of flight: Landing
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway

After the morning preflight task of checking weather; NOTAMs; and the aircraft; I departed for my morning flights. No applicable NOTAMs existed for the first two airports. While enroute to my second airport; Center gave me a NOTAM that Runway XX/XY was closed for the day. ZZZ asked me to report checking weather and asked for landing intentions. Upon listening to the AWOS; the winds were being reported between 13007 and 14007. I elected to do a straight in to Runway XZ/XA; accepting the light crosswind and tailwind; both of which I estimated at less than 5 kts.The runway length was 3002 feet and dry. I had previously landed on this runway with light crosswinds and no trouble. The approach end of XZ sits at a small bluff. The runway has a crown at the intersection of XX/XY and XZ/XA beyond which a downhill slope exists. I planned the approach to the numbers but at the last moment I experienced a slight updraft that caused me to touchdown long. The longer touchdown was created by a wind shift directly from behind and the subsequent updraft from the bluff.Immediately upon landing brakes and reverse thrust was applied. I crossed the intersection of the runways and was on the downhill slope. Once I realized I may not be able to stop; it was too late for a go-around. Continuing the stopping action was my safest action. The aircraft came to rest half of the end of the runway. I shut down the aircraft and completed a walk around when I observed a REIL lying on the ground and propeller damage.After the fact; there were two things that should have or could have been done. Refuse landing and go on to next destination. I should have made the landing into the predominant forecast of 17008 with the later TAF. Estimating winds from the south at 15-25 kts. Air taxi Captain reported landing long and experiencing a runway excursion.
Aircraft: CITATION V/ULTRA/ENCORE (C560)
Phase of flight: Final Approach
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

During RNAV XXL ZZZ we had a TCAS RA with an VFR Rotary traffic @ approximately 3 NM from touch down. ATC didn't provide separation between IFR and VFR traffic in control airspace. C560 Captain reported a TCAS RA with a helicopter while on approach. Captain further stated that ATC failed to provide traffic separation.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Departed SJC for ZZZ; encountered aircraft upset at FL 364 due to close proximity and below Boeing 777 at FL 370. No injuries or aircraft damage were apparent. Reporter stated he was surprised at the intensity of the wake turbulence. B737 Captain reported an upset climbing through FL364 after encountering wake turbulence from a B777 at FL370.
Aircraft: PC-12
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

[We were] issued a clearance to descend and maintain 13000 ft. We began descent with autopilot engaged and failed to set the appropriate altimeter setting. The autopilot captured normally; however our altimeter setting was set to 30.43; instead of the 29.98 for the destination airport. This put us vertically in conflict with another aircraft as we were now almost 500 ft lower than we would have been. After discussing the event with my First Officer I determined that we should have set the appropriate setting immediately; instead of waiting for the new automated weather to update. It was due to update any minute. We should have asked for the updated setting instead of waiting. PC-12 Captain reported an airborne conflict resulted from an altitude deviation related to improper altimeter setting.
Aircraft: MD-11
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

We were in level flight at 3;000 MSL when cleared for a visual approach to 17R. When the Captain selected approach/land mode the aircraft started an uncommanded high pitch/high power right turn. The Captain re-selected 3;000 FT; but we continued the high power/high pitch turn. The Captain disconnected the autopilot and started a descent with the autothrottles still commanding high power. The First Officer selected 2;800 FT in control panel multiple times but the autothrottles did not respond. The Captain then disconnected the autothrottles. Landing was uneventful; but the aircraft had climbed to nearly 4;000 FT before we regained control. An MD-11 flight crew was surprised when the aircraft entered a climbing right turn and the autothrottles advanced commensurately when the approach/land mode autoflight mode was selected. They disconnected the autopilot and autothrottles but gained nearly 1;000 FT before regaining flight path control.
Aircraft: B757
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

We got a Cabin Altitude EICAS warning message at FL400 and executed an emergency descent to 10;000 FT per QRH; declared emergency and diverted. Upon initial descent we turned off course 30 degrees and informed ATC of the deviation. Once settled and stable at 10;000 FT we completed appropriate checklists and completed the diversion with no further events. B757 First Officer experiences a Cabin Altitude EICAS warning message at FL400. An emergency is declared; descent initiated; and a diversion to a suitable airport is planned.
Aircraft: GULFSTREAM JET UNDIFFERENTIATED OR OTHER MODEL
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

While in oceanic cruise flight; we received instruction via CPDLC to contact Shannon Control at a specified time. VHF radio contact was made at the appropriate time and a normal 'radar identified' message was received with ensuing instructions to proceed after point DOGMA; direct to point NUMPO. After zooming in my map display; I discovered that we had a two mile right of track offset for SLOP and that we had not removed the offset prior to our Oceanic exit point. The track message clearly states that SLOP will be removed prior to the Oceanic exit point. No mention of our not being at the Oceanic exit point was made by the controller and the rest of the flight proceeded uneventfully. The primary cause of this incident was that only part of the crew was aware of the offset as it was made while the third pilot was off the flight deck in crew rest; and that pilot neither asked for or received a briefing as to the particulars of the current phase of flight. Better CRM would have prevented this situation; as well as the pilots on the flight deck maintaining a continuing awareness of the fact that a SLOP had been inserted into the flight plan and the need for its removal prior to Oceanic exit. More thorough inter crew; transfer of flying pilot briefs will be conducted; as well as a review of general basics of Oceanic flying procedures. Gulfstream Captain discovers after exiting oceanic airspace that the 2 NM SLOP has not been removed as directed by the track message.
Aircraft: SMALL TRANSPORT
Phase of flight: approach
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC

On left downwind for Runway 35L OKC at 3;000 feet; co-pilot reported seeing a quad-copter drone approximately 15 feet from the left wing tip. Reporter on a small transport aircraft stated they had a drone sighting during approach to OKC airport.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

During preflight on Flight XXXX I was notified by the flight attendants that I needed to talk to the maintenance guy on board about a problem with the overwing emergency exit row seats. The maintenance guy showed me that all of the emergency exit row seats tray tables folded down and blocked the exit rows on this [new] interior. This is in direct violation of FAA directives of nothing blocking the emergency exits. I entered it into the maintenance log and was assigned another aircraft after a long debate with the flight office.Outsourced Maintenance installed the wrong seats at the overwing emergency exit rows.Replace seats at emergency exit rows with proper seats on all [new] interiors. Until then aircraft should be removed from service. B737 Captain reported that incorrect seat type with fold down tray tables were installed at overwing exit row in violation of FAR.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Vehicle

During pushback from gate the tug operator stated that we had a problem. He then stated that we were loose. Suspecting that we might have a breakaway I asked him if we had a breakaway. He never responded with the term 'breakaway.' His communication was confusing and non-standard. I noticed that the tug was separating away from the aircraft and then the tug operator appeared to chase the aircraft in an attempt to catch up with it. As the aircraft came to a stop the tug continued to approach the aircraft until contact was made between the tug and the aircraft. Maintenance and operations were notified and a maintenance entry was made. [Report narrative contained no additional information.] B737 flight crew reported they were unsure if their aircraft broke away from the towbar because the tug driver was using nonstandard verbiage.
Aircraft: MD-83
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

My takeoff; reduced thrust power. This is our third flight of the day with this aircraft. After gear up and just prior to 1;000 feet; we get a fire warning on the left engine. The First Officer silences the bell and we note that the engine indications look normal. The First Officer declares an emergency and Tower asks us to switch to Departure Control; which we do. The First Officer then gets out the Engine Fire/Damage/Separation Checklist. After level off; the fire light went out as soon as the throttle was pulled to idle. There were no indications of severe engine damage/separation. In fact; the fire light never came back on and the left engine indications were normal throughout the flight. We make a climb to 3;000 feet and followed ATC headings for a return to land on XXR. On downwind; I gave control of the aircraft to my First Officer so I could brief my flight attendants and make a PA to the passengers. On crosswind with the gear down; I took back control of the aircraft. I kept the left engine running during the flight and flew a visual approach to XXR with an uneventful landing. Approach and landing were made with the left engine at idle. After landing; I stopped straight ahead on the runway and immediately made a PA telling the passengers to remain seated while the First Officer started radio contact with the Fire Chief. The Fire Chief made a complete circular inspection of our aircraft; including a thermal scan of the left engine. He stated that all looked normal and we requested taxi to our gate. We shut down the left engine during taxi to the gate. I would like to add that ATC was very helpful and seemed to anticipate what we wanted/needed. [This Report contains no additional information.] A MD-83 Left Engine Fire Warning alerted at 1;000 feet after takeoff but extinguished when thrust was reduced; so an emergency was declared and the flight returned to the departure airport with engine running where a thermal scan detected no abnormal heat.
Aircraft: C172
Phase of flight: Landing
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Event / Encounter Object; Ground Excursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

After landing; a wind gust picked up the right wing; the aircraft started to pivot on the left main and we went into the grass next to the taxiway. We struck a taxiway light before exiting the grass. The winds were 230/6 on ATIS during descent. A C172 instructor pilot reported striking a taxiway light after losing directional control following the landing.
Aircraft: EC130
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

The aircraft was shutdown in accordance with the shutdown procedures check list. After the engine was turned off and the main rotor RPM was at approximately 120; the flight medic opened the right side cabin door and stepped out of the aircraft. The winds at the airport were approximately 260 degrees at 15 knots. The aircraft was parked on a dolly that was oriented approximately 90 degrees to the wind - on a heading of approximately 170 degrees. The winds blew on the cabin door to the point that the air piston that holds the door at about 90 degrees in the normal open position broke loose from the aircraft mounting point and the door opened to a 180 degree position with the top of the door being above the cabin level in this position. During this event; the rotor blades were slowing down - thus drooping to a lower point in the rotation path. The rotors struck the top of the door breaking the door window and damaging the top edge of the door. All the rotor blades were damaged as well due to the door strike. [Suggestion: inspect] cabin door air piston for defects. EC130 pilot reported damage to the cabin door and rotor blades when the main cabin door was blown past the normal position; allowing the rotors to contact the top of the door.
Aircraft: A320
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Inbound flight logged 2 items- SYS 1 FAULT DISPLAYED ON UPPER ECAM-BRAKES and AUTOBRAKE FAULT DISPLAYED ON UPPER ECAM SCREEN-BRAKES. Maintenance deferred the first ECAM with MEL 32-42-03 BSCU 1 inoperative. That deferral makes a reference to the autobrake panel mode lights being inoperative and has a note FOR BSCU CHANNEL/SYSTEM 1 INOPERATIVE REFER TO MEL FOR AUTO/BRK PANEL MODE LIGHTS DEFERRAL. Maintenance took that reference and used it to defer the second ECAM listed above (MEL 32-42-04). In my review of the MEL; once on board; I did not question the linking of the second ECAM to the first ECAM MEL; guidance that was made by Maintenance. I ASSUMED that Maintenance had specific guidance that the second ECAM was a result of the loss of BSCU 1 and the autobrake panel lights; nothing more complex that had to be evaluated for compound failures. We complied with all MEL restrictions prior to departure to include verifying that the autobrakes were armed on the wheels SD page. Checking recall prior to departure only brought up the first ECAM. No autobrake ECAM or status messages were present. This furthered my belief that the maintenance issues had been addressed correctly. Taxi; takeoff and initial climb were normal. Nearing FL350 we received the same autobrake fault ECAM received by the first crew. We complied with the Irregular Procedure. We determined that we had lost normal brakes but did have antiskid. Further review of the Flight Manual to include the system resets section made it apparent to me that the autobrakes ECAM; while obviously related to the brake system fault ECAM; was not linked to it as a secondary failure due to the lights failure. We had two separate failures; as did the inbound flight that should have been treated as such. The maintenance dispatch was improper/illegal. Trust but VERIFY everything! Careful verification of maintenance actions could have prevented this. Illegal dispatch; the aircraft was dispatched with a BSCU channel 1 fault; along with the annunciator lights for the autobrakes inoperative. In fact the autobrakes and the BSCU 1 were written up on the inbound flight and Maintenance interpreted the autobrake fault as just an annunciator light issue. The plane should have been dispatched with an autobrake fault and BSCU channel 1 fault. Enroute we ran the autobrake fault ECAM; contacted Dispatch and Maintenance and continued to destination. A320 flight crew experiences an autobrake fault in cruise after the fault had been previously written up and diagnosed as an autobrake panel light fault and MELed as such. BSCU 1 was also MELed separately. Flight continues to destination.
Aircraft: CITATION II/SP (C551)
Phase of flight: Landing
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway

Just to raise awareness of a potential problem with anti-skid systems on Cessna aircraft. Normal approach and landing. Initial braking action good; anti-skid released; then reapplied brakes a couple of times; then released completely; cycled anti-skid switch with no effect; emergency brake had no effect either. Manufacturers emergency/abnormal checklist states'in the event of anti-skid failure; be prepared to use the emergency brake'. Citation pilot reported failure of the Anti-Skid Braking System on landing rollout.
Aircraft: SMALL AIRCRAFT
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

On go-around Aircraft X had a gradual loss of power which resulted in having to land in a nearby field. The airplane had been sitting (pickled) for three years a week before but had recently been flown from and to maintenance for the annual inspection (at ZZZ) and back to ZZZ1. The same day the off-field landing occurred; I had performed several landings and had no problems at all with the aircraft until this last takeoff/climbout.The RPM seemed to drop and the aircraft was not producing thrust. The engine has a massive carb heat system. Carb heat was used and possibly left on in the climbout however nobody thinks that carb heat would cause enough power loss to cause a catastrophic thrust - lift scenario in low density altitude flight conditions (sea level 65 degrees).Other issues might have been debris in the recently fueled tank; carburetor float issue and then possibly a prop governor issue. We could not reproduce the problem on the ground. So far; the issue is unknown as to the continual loss of power.In looking back at this event; I think that it would have been prudent to take a newly run aircraft that has been sitting for a while and just out of annual to a large airport where there is more room for errors. Only after several hours or days of 'testing' should you exercise an aircraft to other shorter riskier areas. You just never know what can go wrong. They say hindsight is 20/20 but I will need to take a better look at risk management when it comes to flying an aircraft that has an unfamiliar history or has just come out of hibernation and or annual inspection. GA pilot reported engine failure while climbing out from a go-around. Reporter successfully landed in a field near the airport.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was asked to inspect the right MLG (Main Landing Gear) assembly per job card XXX. On page 2 of the job card is a note that the 'Aircraft Must Be On Jacks'. The right MLG was supported by an axle jack and both wheel and brake assemblies were removed. I was to accomplish Step 3: DETAILED INSPECTION OF MLG; SLIDING TUBE; BRAKE ATTACHMENT FLANGE; UPPER AND LOWER TORQUE LINKS; UPPER AND LOWER TORQUE LINK PINS AND APEX PIN & NUT - EXTERNAL SURFACES; EXCEPT WHERE COVERED BY DRESSINGS AND BUSH FLANGES; and Step 4: DETAILED INSPECTION OF MLG; MAIN FITTING; FWD PINTLE PIN; FWD PINTLE PIN LOCK/ STUB BOLTS; REAR PINTLE PIN & NUT; RETRACTION ACTUATOR ATTACHMENT PINS & UPPER DIAPHRAGM CROSS PIN - EXTERNAL SURFACES; EXCEPT WHERE COVERED BY DRESSINGS & BUSH FLANGES.I read the note on page 2 of the job card; which stated the Aircraft Must Be On Jacks. I began inspecting the MLG but could not access all the points described because the axle jack interfered. I stated in a Work In Progress entry in [software] what items I inspected as well as a Work In Progress that the Aircraft needed to be jacked to complete the job card. The job card was completed without the aircraft being placed on jacks. Steps 5 & 6 of the job card are mechanic steps; however they require measurements to be taken with the weight off the gear. By using an axle jack to support the gear; inaccurate measurements may be obtained; and excessive wear fails to be identified. This job card is normally sequenced in the check to be accomplished after the aircraft is jacked; I noted that it is scheduled on day XX.I would suggest having this job card worked after the aircraft is jacked as the normal workflow shows. Maintenance Inspector reported an inability to complete a task card because of procedural issues concerning correct jacking of aircraft.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Uneventful preflight; checklists; pushback; taxi and takeoff on first leg of four total on the last day of a three-day trip until receiving an ACARS message from Dispatch at (time) that read 'your Ops agent from ZZZ just called to say they neglected to give you hazmat paperwork to sign. You have oxygen cylinders onboard. 5 pieces totaling 280 lb.' On arrival at the gate in ZZZ1; the faxed hazmat paperwork was signed by the Captain. Out time: XX18Z. Takeoff Time: XX24Z. Notification: XX36Z. The crew were completely unaware of the hazmat onboard until notified by Dispatch. Once the discrepancy was discovered the Ops Agent made a timely call to Dispatch who contacted the Chief Pilot on call and the [Company Communications System]. Attention to detail from the Ops Agent or the agents responsible for supplying the paperwork to the Ops Agent would have mitigated this discrepancy. B737-700 First Officer reported no pre-departure notification or documents of onboard hazmat shipment provided to the flight crew.