Aryan95614/aerograph-asrs huggingface dataset:
Aircraft: CARAVAN UNDIFFERENTIATED
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

I remember being a little tired after a long week. We work long hours away from home and it can wear on a guy. I also remember being excited that it was almost the weekend. Everything was running on time that morning and the weather was decent with mild temps and about 1600 overcast. With plenty of time to do a preflight and obtain a clearance and after a small issue with a knot in a cargo strap; I taxied out and completed a run up and departed. [The aircraft] seemed to be a great airplane and I had flown it several times that week. I did notice what I considered a lower than average oil pressure and noted it on the trend the previous day 90-91 lbs in cruise; which is well within parameters for operations. The flight was a canned flight plan with an altitude of 7;000 feet MSL and I had leveled off. The autopilot was flying the plane and I had been handed off from tower to departure and then handed over to center. I had even called the company with my departure times. I remember anxiously waiting for some winds aloft information to pop up on the sometimes slow Garmin gmx200. I sometimes will request a higher altitude for a better ground speed.What happened next; caught me so off guard and startled me that I didn't do anything for a few seconds except retard the throttle. A loud explosion; equivalent to a shot gun blast and a winding down sound; kind of like a Jake brake on a big truck. Every emergency procedure I had ever trained for became all jumbled up in my head! With little or no NG% (Engine Gas Generator Speed) I didn't want to but I pulled the fuel condition lever over the gate to OFF. The controller wasted no time in giving me a quick vector to a nearby airport and I also managed to put it in the GPS. I had to get back on the gauges as my Caravan descended into the clouds for what must have been about a minute and a half. It was very dark below the cloud layer but I could see the surface. At one point I had picked out a gravel road but talked myself out of it thinking about telephone poles. I never did see that airport that was still 4 miles away I will say the radar altimeter was very useful by letting me know it was time to land [off airport]. A headwind helped with the 1800 lbs of cargo. This was not easy to write and I feel very lucky considering the variables and terrain. C208 pilot reported an engine failure at 7000 feet followed by an off airport landing.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

I took the pass down and was told there was 1 flight remaining and no issues. When I logged into my desk; I researched why [my] flight did not have out or off times in the system. Based on their scheduled departure time they should have already been airborne. I looked for the flight on my fusion screen and it was not visible. I called Operations to ask for verification and was given the out and off times for the mentioned flight. I then checked flightaware.com for the location of the flight and saw that it was crossing the Mexican border. I then proceeded to try to contact the flight via ACARS; but received the message 'ACARS free text could not be delivered at this time.' I then tried to establish communication with flight via ARINC phone patch. ARINC was also unsuccessful in contacting the crew. I tried ACARS several more times but got the same undeliverable message. I informed the Chief of Dispatch about the situation. I was unable to establish communications with the crew for the duration of the flight. I verified that the flight landed safely with Operations. Air carrier Dispatcher reported he was unable to establish contact with his flight.
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Phase of flight: Takeoff / Launch
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

I elected to perform a high speed aborted takeoff due to pop up severe weather conditions. Prior to departure; the weather was VFR and clear. Small thunderstorms were developing around the area north of the airport; but nothing was seen while taxiing to the runway. Both crew members engaged weather radar with an upward tilt; with nothing indicating the possibility of weather impacting departure. ATC issued a takeoff clearance for runway XX and advised us of a small cell of extreme precipitation north of the airport; and said it didn't appear to be a factor. We were lined up on Runway XX; facing south; and could not see any adverse weather around us. After initiating the takeoff roll; at around 100 knots; we encountered immediate extreme precipitation and wind forces. Visibility was reduced to 0 (I could not even see the nose of the aircraft). Simultaneously; ATC advised of 40-60 knot windshear over the runways and of a micro burst. Due to being unable to see out of the windshield and feeling the wind forces coupled with the windshear and micro burst warning; I elected to abort the takeoff. I estimate that the abort was initiated at 115 knots accounting for the reactionary delay of retarding the thrust levers. The flight attendant verified no one was injured. Aborted takeoff procedures were followed; and after a follow up with maintenance; dispatch; we were able to depart normally after the cell had passed.The conditions were not present at the time of takeoff; and no one (flight crew nor ATC) had a way to predict such a rapid; immediate change. We used wet takeoff numbers as a precaution since there were storms in the forecast while at the gate. I believe all parties involved functioned proficiently. We were clear to take off runway XX in ZZZ. Weather was clear; and winds calm. A little bit of rain on the East side of the airport while our takeoff roll at 90 knots; Captain (CA) and the First Officer (FO) lost sight of the runway due to extreme precipitation; and simultaneously the Tower Controller came on line and reported a Wind Shear alert on all runways; and a gain and loss of 25-30 knots. Winds went up to 50 knots. Captain decided to abort the takeoff. We initiated the abort at 117 knots. Our V speeds were as follows: V1: 129; Vr: 131; V2: 136. We stopped on the runway safely; made sure everyone in the back was all right; passengers and Flight Attendants. Tower asked us to exit the runway at the next available taxiway to our right; and stated that he did not have visual on us. We exited the runway on taxiway D; and did the after landing checklist. Tower then asked us to taxi to the run up pad of runway XX. Once at the pad; the CA contacted dispatch; talked to maintenance control and operations. We received our amendment; and we were cleared to takeoff again. The rest of the flight was uneventful. Flight crew reported a high speed Rejected Take Off after extreme precipitation and wind shear caused visibility to go to zero.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Arrival into JFK; weather CAVU. Captain was pilot flying; First Officer was pilot monitoring. Planned and briefed the visual 13L with the RNV RNP RWY 13L approach as backup. Approach cleared us direct to ASALT; cross ASALT 3;000; cleared approach. During the descent we received several calls for a VFR target at our 10-12 o'clock position. We never acquired the traffic visually; but had him on TCAS. Eventually Approach advised traffic no factor; contact Tower. On contact with Tower we were cleared to land. Approaching ASALT I noticed we were approximately 500 feet below the 3;000 foot crossing altitude. Somewhere during the descent while our attention was on the VFR traffic the plane dropped out of VNAV path and I didn't catch it. I disconnected the autopilot and returned to 3;000 feet. Once level I reengaged VNAV and completed the approach with no further problems. FMA mode changes are insidious. In clear weather; with your head out of the cockpit clearing for traffic in a high density environment; especially at your home field on a familiar approach; it is easy to miss a mode change. This is a good reminder to keep instruments in your cross check on those relatively few great weather days. B737-800 flight crew reported an altitude deviation on approach to JFK that resulted when they lost autoflight mode awareness.
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 135 ER/LR
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

When conducting an ice system test in flight the test performed normally until we turned the system off. When turning the system off we the flight crew noticed a 'boom' sound; however didn't receive any ICAS notification or any other signs of abnormalities. The Flight Attendant called us to ask if we hear the same thing but she also reported the sound of a 'grinding noise.' She stated a passenger also told her they heard something abnormal and asked the Flight Attendant what it was. After getting this information I decided it was best to return to the airport of departure. We told ATC we needed to return to the airport. We landed safely and upon further inspection MX did state to us there was a broken bleed line that was causing all the noise and the initial boom. On departure; the PIC and I initiated the ice detection test per the checklist and first flight of the day. We heard a boom noise as if somebody had dropped a case of water in the cabin. The flight attendant called us directly after and informed us of a loud grinding noise coming from underneath the floor of the aircraft. The PIC and I elected to return to [departure airport] where ample maintenance was present; and we were only on the departure. We returned safely with no further issues. EMB-135 flight crew reported returning to departure airport after experiencing an anomaly in the anti-ice system.
Aircraft: CESSNA 152
Phase of flight: Takeoff / Launch
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Object; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway

I landed on the Runway XXL to do touch and go. I was stabilized and on the centerline. After landing; I turned off the carburetor heat; put flaps up and full throttle in order to do touch and go. When I rotated at 50 knots; the airplane didn't lift off and I lost directional control. I couldn't maintain centerline so I pulled throttle out and pushed on the brakes. I ended up skidding to the left side of runway on the grass; hitting the runway lights. The runway was wet so I think I could have hydroplaned. I could have done more rudder control. I could have stopped and go. C152 student pilot reported a loss of control and runway excursion during landing on a wet runway.
Aircraft: PA-42 CHEYENNE IIA
Phase of flight: Landing
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

I filed an IFR flight plan in a Cheyenne III I have flown for a private company for many years. In the pattern; I lowered the landing gear handle; I felt the landing gear extend but did not get a green light for the left main and the 'gear not locked' light was illuminated. I abandoned the landing and gained altitude to orbit and run the checklist(s). Using the Emergency Gear Extension Checklist I tried using the hand pump and the blow down systems and could not get a safe indication. I assessed weather; fuel and daylight and decided to fly to another airport; 170 NM away because I felt I needed to burn down fuel to make the aircraft lighter and minimize the fire hazard. I checked NOTAMS and weather at another airport along the way. ATC suggested I fly by the Tower and have them visually inspect the landing gear. They advised me the landing gear appeared down but the inner gear doors were open. I advised them I wanted to go to another airport and land. I arrived in the pattern and a local pilot in a Cirrus offered to have a closer look at the gear and I accepted. He advised me the landing gear appeared extended with the inner doors open. I proceeded with a normal landing. About 500 FT after main wheel touchdown and decelerating through 90 KTS; the left main gear retracted and the left propeller; flap and aileron contacted the runway. When I filed my flight plan; I anticipated a flight student would come with me but they did not. My flight plan was filed showing 2 Souls On Board (SOB) and I did not change it to reflect 1. I should have changed the flight plan to reflect the correct number of SOB. PA42 pilot reports unsafe left main landing gear during approach and elects to divert to another airport. All attempts at obtaining a safe indication are futile and after a normal landing the left main gear collapses.
Aircraft: B757
Phase of flight: Takeoff / Launch
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Security; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

This is my first time working this aircraft; a B757-300. When giving the pilots a break I deployed the cart since there is no gate. When deploying the cart across the aisle I noticed that it does not rest against the wall as it does in all the other aircraft in the fleet. The B757-300 has a wider aisle where the galley meets the door cross-aisle. As such the cart is not 'stable' and I truly believe that it is a security threat. An assailant would easily be able to topple the cart as such. [Report narrative contained no additional information.] Flight Attendant reported the galley cart cannot be secured to block the flight deck for pilot breaks.
Aircraft: PA-46 MALIBU/MALIBU MIRAGE/MALIBU MATRIX
Phase of flight: Landing
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Pressurized brakes...It did it again. It was not even X years ago that I landed a Piper Malibu on a short runway only to notice upon touchdown that one complete side of the brake system was completely inoperative. Now; just last week; it happened again. Here's the story; and Piper needs to fix to the design problem...The Malibu has inverted master brake cylinders on the rudder pedals like many Pipers. Normally; the brakes work and there are no problems. Yet an insidious problem will develop. There are 3 O-rings on each master cylinder and these O-rings will leak. Yet; they will not leak brake fluid out of the system; they will and do let air into the system. The Malibu is pressurized; and when flown with a differential cabin pressure; the pressure is pushing air in to the brakes system thru the brake master cylinders. The cabin air which is under pressure is flowing to any opening in the cabin which to escape. When the O-rings in the brake system allows the cabin air to enter the braking system; the brakes stop working. If allowed to persist; the air in the system renders the brakes on the affected side or both sides ineffective...or even non-existent.Upside-down brake master cylinders...As you would expect; the air migrates upwards and enters the brake lines even so insidiously and it doesn`t take much air to make the brakes disabled. Here's the issue; Malibu brake failures are common on flights where the brakes worked perfectly on run-up and pre flight checks. The problem does not reveal itself until the brakes are used on landing.Although the checklist in the Malibu clearly states to check the brakes prior to takeoff. How do you check the brakes in flight prior to landing?If either side of the braking system is weak or non-existent; perform a go-around and consider your options. Pilot might want to fly to an airport with a longer runway if they have fuel. They may want to fly an approach a little slower and maybe plan to touch down as early as practicable on the runway. They might want to call for safety vehicles to be ready in case there is a landing over run issue and notify the FAA. In any case; you do not want to touch down on the runway and then realize you've got a brake problem. Many Piper pilots and passengers are in danger when this occurs. PA-46 Malibu pilot reported brake failure during landing rollout; citing a possible design flaw in the braking system.
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance

Climbing out; Autopilot/Flight Director would indicate an overspeed and the plane would pitch up violently. Disconnected Autopilot and reestablish. 5 minutes later same thing. Happened 50-60 times during flight. Aircraft would not capture NAV. Flight Level Change (FLCH) would not engage. Could only fly in Heading (HDG) mode and Flight Path Angle (FPA). FADEC never shifted from TO mode with the Automatic Takeoff Thrust Control System (ATTCS) armed. Checked Emergency Procedure Checklist (EPC) but could not find a checklist that would pertain to us. Decided to return to ZZZ. At decision time it indicated we would be 3000 lbs over landing weight so we initiated procedures to minimize overweight landing and returned to ZZZ. Landed approximately 750lbs over weight. Aircraft landed fine and there were no additional issues. Upon return I wrote the airplane up. Priority handling was not requested as the aircraft was still controllable with no Autopilot or Flight Director. EMB-175 Captain reported malfunctioning autoflight system which resulted in a return to departure airport.
Aircraft: A320
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

This incident started about 5-10 minutes after the last passenger deplaned. Doors 1L and 2L were both open; ostensibly for deplaning and boarding. There were many cleaners on aircraft from the front to the back. The situation was busy at best; frantic at worst. I was standing on the front air stairs when a Flight Attendant asked me if I could supervise her opening door 2R. The cleaners were beating on the door to have it opened so that the trash could be emptied. I agreed to supervise as no other crew members were available. I followed her to the back of the airplane where various ramp personnel were in aft galley conducting their work. She proceeded to arm the door as it had been disarmed from deplaning. It was at this point that I became confused. Before I could intervene; she pulled up on the handle; the door opened and the slide blew. She looked back at me in shock and said; 'Oh my god; I am so fired!' She was visibly shaken and in shock as was I.I should have done a better job confirming what was actually going on and trying to slow the process down. This included finding another flight attendant; pulling out manuals or rechecking door disarm indications in the cockpit. The overall issue for me was being distracted; rushed and uncertain of my supervision objective. I also believe she was trying to do the right thing; especially as a new employee. She was rushed and getting pressure from the cleaners. In retrospect; I think she was operating on muscle memory. Since she had already disarmed the door; the next event was to arm it. Additionally; she has a great attitude and was just trying to help others do their job. Procedurally; this might be avoided if aircraft crew deplanes immediately and gets out of the way of outstation cleaners. Or a procedure needs to be implemented as it relates to who is authorized to open and close doors during cleaning. A320 Captain reports being asked by a new Flight Attendant to monitor her actions while she disarms and opens an aft galley door. The door is already disarmed but is rearmed and opened before the reporter can react; blowing the slide.
Aircraft: PA-34-200 SENECA I
Phase of flight: Final Approach
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC

Seneca was on short final to runway 23 had to break out to avoid collision with glider on base or final to runway 19. Both aircraft took evasive action to avoid collision. Weather was clear with unlimited visibility; ASOS winds 280/08. Multiple glider tow traffic was departing north (runway 1) then using a right hand traffic pattern to land south (midfield runway 19). Additional traffic was parachute-jump Otters departing north (runway 1) and using a left hand traffic pattern to land south (midfield runway 19). Local traffic was using right hand traffic to runway 23 (the wind favored runway). I believe that simultaneous up-wind takeoffs; downwind landings; both right and left hand traffic patterns on runway 1/19 are a collision hazard when combined with heavy local and transient traffic. PA34 pilot reports a NMAC with a glider during approach to Runway 23 at ZPH; while the glider was apparently on approach to Runway 19. Runway 23 was the wind favored runway while Runway 19/1 was being used by jump aircraft and gliders and both left and right hand traffic patterns.
Aircraft: A321
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

We were conducting the RNAV 27 approach in Day VMC conditions to SAN with a Tailwind during most of the Arrival and initial Approach phase. The Captain was the Pilot Flying. When Cleared for the approach he followed the typical routine of arming Approach Mode which quickly captured lateral and vertical guidance and began descending on the glideslope. At the time we were at flaps one with about 10-15 kts buffer under the Flaps 1 redline of 235. Because of the tailwind and the somewhat steeper than normal approach angle; the aircraft started to accelerate after capturing the glideslope and quickly oversped the flaps by approximately 5-10 kts. The Captain began to intervene immediately with use of the speedbrakes but the acceleration trend carried us into the red line. After removing the aircraft from approach mode and taking us off the glideslope; the aircraft slowed below the red line and we continued configuring and landed normally. We wrote up the overspeed at the Gate in SAN.I believe that the core reason for this was a misunderstanding on the part of the PF (Pilot Flying) about what the aircraft would do once approach was armed. The PF said repeatedly that he thought the aircraft wouldn't overspeed with the automation set up with a selected speed and Approach Captured. Because of the tailwind and the aircraft's priority to follow the glideslope without regard to selected speed; an overspeed was possible. He may have been thinking of flight envelope protections in normal mode which would have protected an extreme overspeed but will allow the aircraft into the redline before they intervene.As the PM (Pilot Monitoring); I should have spoken up when approach mode was about to capture the glideslope to caution that an overspeed was possible. We had briefed during the approach briefing that a threat in SAN was the likelihood of being fast and high but I will add in the future that flap overspeeds; especially on the initial stage of the approach are possible. Additional emphasis in training about automation priorities where the aircraft will follow vertical guidance without regard to airspeeds may also be beneficial. A321 First Officer reported flap overspeed during a coupled approach with a tailwind.