Aryan95614/aerograph-asrs huggingface dataset:
Aircraft: LARGE TRANSPORT; LOW WING; 2 TURBOJET ENG
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

We showed up to an aircraft going into MDW; with a current and forecast wet runway (BR); with 20.4 thousand pounds of tanker fuel already loaded on the aircraft. The METAR and TAF were calling for mist until 1.5 hours after scheduled land time. The FOM says we can't tanker with forecast runway conditions less than good. Wet-good is less than good. Therefore I considered this illegal. The Dispatcher put me on hold for six minutes to call the MDW Tower. He announced that the Tower was calling a dry runway at that moment and I was 'legal'. I called the Chief Pilot on Call and discussed the situation. Before we took off; our landing data showed a stopping margin of 140 feet and our actual stopping margin with MAX braking was only 40 feet! Although it was 'legal'; it was pushing the boundaries of being 'SAFE'. I was told that a total mishap would cost the company 2.5 billion dollars; yet Dispatch has no trouble pushing Aircrew right up to the edge of performance limits to save a few dollars. This dumps all the responsibility on the Captains; and the Dispatcher is bullet proof: 'legal'. We attend required training that emphasizes risk management and mitigation; yet our Dispatcher has no trouble pushing us right up to the safety LIMITS and exposing us to unnecessary risks. I'm writing this report because I think Dispatch was illegal to tanker fuel with the current and forecast weather reports indicating a wet runway. They increased our operational risk and pushed me into the corner as to whether I was going to even take the aircraft. I spent a lot of time on the phone with two calls to Dispatch and one to the Chief Pilot on Call; and we pushed late because of it. Moreover; it was on our minds while operating the flight; a very unnecessary distraction.Common sense would have gone a long way here. It is one thing to sit behind a desk and think of the world with a black and white perspective; legal versus illegal. It is another thing to actually have to fly the aircraft full of people counting on you to keep it out of the dirt. If the FOM says not to tanker fuel; we shouldn't do it. It is a safety issue. If the runway forecast is dry; the Dispatchers should back off the performance limit a bit and give the Pilots additional breathing room because flying is fluid in nature. The assumption that all conditional will be perfect is naïve. An air carrier Captain questioned tankering fuel into MDW and landing on a wet runway with very little stopping margin.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Descending into ROA on an extended left downwind for Runway 24 in VMC; level at 5;200 feet; we received a GPWS [Ground Proximity Warning System] warning 'Terrain; pull up.' Captain disengaged the autopilot increased power and began to climb. First Officer notified ATC of warning and altitude deviation; ATC acknowledged and told us 5;200 feet was minimum vectoring altitude for the area. Returned to assigned altitude and continued on visual approach to [Runway] 24 with no further incident. Air carrier First Officer reported receiving a GPWS while descending into ROA airport; ATC advised the altitude they were at was at the Minimum Vectoring Altitude.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Shortly after commencing the initial descend from 40;000 on the ISVA3E for SKBO and no weather indicated on the radar; we hit turbulence causing the airplane to rapidly climb and then descend. I observed from the FC seat +/- 800 feet and +/- 10 knots of airspeed. The autopilot was engaged with LNAV/VNAV and VNAV PATH indicated on the FMA. The seatbelt sign was on. After the unexpected turbulence was over; the Captain asked me to call the Flight Attendants. #1 FA stated that it appeared two FAs were injured and that he would call back with the final assessment. A few minutes later #1 FA called back and stated two FAs and a passenger were indeed injured and required medical attention. I briefed the Captain and he directed me to have medics meet us at the gate. Upon arriving at gate; the medics boarded the airplane and only took the FAs to the local hospital.Cause - This was unexpected turbulence. Perhaps now in the summer months with convective weather in the area of SKBO; I will suggest to the Captain ask the FAs to remain seated from descend to landing.Night flying into SKBO could hide weather disturbances not shown in the radar; perhaps have the FAs finish service early and sit from descend to landing. Air carrier First Officer reported experiencing unexpected turbulence at FL400 during initial descent to SKBO airport.
Aircraft: B757
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

At about 50 minutes into flight just north of ZZZ1 at FL350 we experienced a loss of our Left Fuel quantity gauge; and fuel totalizer. After conferring with QRH; Dispatch; and [Technical Support Maintenance Control]; it was determined that there was no inflight reset; and we did not feel comfortable continuing an Atlantic crossing without knowing the fuel quantity. We [Requested Priority Handling]; notified crew; and diverted to ZZZ where we made a safe overweight landing. B757 First Officer reported the failure of the fuel quantity indicator; the return to departure airport and overweight landing.
Aircraft: SMALL TRANSPORT; LOW WING; 2 TURBOJET ENG
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I am reporting this event after it was brought to my attention by the controller working the sector. I reviewed and derived details of the event from the FALCON replay. XA:11Z: ZDV apreqs Aircraft X direct to APA as 'Critical' which would have the aircraft track over SOLAR on the D01/ZDV boundary. No altitude was specified. The DR4 controller accepts the apreq. This aircraft should have originally be assigned the ZOMBZ3 arrival. XA:21Z: DR4 conducts a position relief briefing without mentioning that an aircraft had been approved direct APA.XA:30Z: ZDV Sector 41 initiates a hand off of Aircraft X roughly 10 miles south of SOLAR descending out of FL240 to 17;000. ZDV41 calls DR4 and states that they weren't sure what was coordinated as the coordination was roughly 30 minutes prior; they also request control on Aircraft Y. Aircraft Y had been a departure from APA pointed out from SR4 to DR4 to climb to FL200 for the ALS transition; which routes over SOLAR southbound. This aircraft was in direct conflict with Aircraft X as Aircraft X was assigned 17;000 from ZDV without coordination. DR4 stops Aircraft X at FL210 as soon as the pilot checked in. No LoSS occurred.DR has to then vector and descend Aircraft X through several DEN departures well east of APA and sequence Aircraft X behind slower turboprop traffic because that was the only place to effectively fit them into the flow of APA traffic. Had Aircraft X been routed via the ZOMBZ3 arrival; they would have been de-conflicted with Aircraft Y and all of the DEN traffic. Aircraft X would have likely been cleared direct to APA within D01 airspace and expedited to the airfield because there was less traffic west of APA. We are having a significant issue between ZDV and D01 regarding priority handling of MEDEVAC aircraft. Situations like this highlight exactly the reasons we have tried to explain to ZDV that simply direct destination is NOT advantageous to all aircraft. In fact; it often times delays MEDEVAC aircraft even more and is clearly unsafe. We have discussed this issue with NATCA and Management at ZDV several times now; however they refuse to comply with the LOA because their interpretation of priority handling is not consistent with reality of the NAS in general; and expeditious terminal operations. D01 TRACON Controller reported issues with a MEDEVAC aircraft not being able to get an expedited routing and becoming a conflict with another aircraft.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Conflict NMAC

We departed on the RNAV Departure. The Captain was flying. I was Pilot Monitoring. Shortly after takeoff; while in a turn on the assigned lateral profile; Tower asked if we had helicopter traffic in sight at approximately our 2 o'clock position. I responded that we had the green helicopter in sight. The helicopter was slightly higher than our altitude. Shortly thereafter we received an Amber TCAS TA alert followed immediately thereafter by a Red TCAS RA alert instructing us to continue our climb rate. The helicopter had made a left turn directly toward us. We responded according to the RA guidance to climb even though the helicopter was slightly higher than us. Additionally we added a turn to increase visual separation with the helicopter traffic as we climbed above them and they passed below us.Because I don't know what clearance the helicopter traffic had; I don't know what could have been done to prevent this incident. It does strike me as odd that the helicopter was flying so close to the charted SID lateral profile that low to the ground and that close to the departure runway. B747-800 First Officer reported TCAS warnings during climb.
Aircraft: B717 (FORMERLY MD-95)
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Several Non-Routines I wrote up were signed-off by the Inspection Manager as 'visually re-inspected.' then he decided that the discrepant component was OK. The components were pulley and Slat Track bearings on a B717 aircraft. The Boeing Standard Overhaul Practices Manual (SOPM) has procedures to determine the wear of bearings. The procedures require bearing removal to verify the condition of the bearings. The pulley bearings had fretting residue from the deterioration of the needle bearings. The Slat track bearings had plating worn down to the base metal causing rust. Engineering provided a Repair document which contradicted the written criteria in the Boeing SOPM. In the past the bearings were replaced because of the SOPM criteria. Lack of time is no excuse to overlook safety. Recently a jammed slat caused the aircraft to roll during take-off. The mentioned worn components would cause the same situation when they fail. Our Air Carrier has not had cable pulley failures because we have been replacing the pulleys when they show signs of bearing wear. [Found] during audit of the Check Non-Routines. This type of maintenance is being used in a desperate attempt to make an unrealistic C-Check Estimated Time of Release (ETR.) This type of maintenance will cause future delays when the aircraft leaves the Check. [Recommend that] Inspection Manager realizes his lack of B717 experience along with his lack of B717 knowledge and follows Boeing procedures. Stop blindly signing-off. Maintenance Inspector. Hangar. C-Check. Reporter stated their Inspection Manager was also the Chief Inspector for their Air Carrier and did not have any experience on the B717 aircraft. The Manager had been 'Overriding' numerous Inspector write-ups by using the same information in the Boeing Standard Overhaul Practices Manual (SOPM) that the Inspector had referenced in his write-up indicating excessive wear. The Manager would than state on the Inspector's write-ups; that the pulley and Slat Track bearings were serviceable. He believes the Inspection Manager's comments on the write-ups could be considered fraudulent sign-offs. Reporter stated the Inspection Manager had been fired; no reason was given. Their Fleet Engineering however; continues to try and deviate from the Boeing SOPM and allow the excessive wear on the pulley and Slat Track bearings in order to reduce the maintenance time of the aircraft. Engineering still has not shown any information that Boeing has approved changes to the bearing wear criteria. An Aircraft Maintenance Inspector reports their Inspection Manager; who is also their Chief Inspector; had been overriding non-routine write-ups made by inspectors during C-Checks for excessive wear on B717 aircraft pulley and slat track bearings; and then signing them off as serviceable bearings.
Aircraft: HELICOPTER
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance

During a tour in ZZZ; at straight and level flight on my way to the landing zone; the helicopter seemed to be operating with reduced power when at max continuous power (MCP). Please keep in mind that during my preflight inspection of the helicopter in the morning; before conducting tours; I noticed no visible abnormalities. There was no low rotor RPM condition and no visible change in RPM throughout the tour. I noticed that with 2 passenger flights; earlier in the day; I was able to maintain MCP and 100 KIAS. Then; at the time of the occurrence; I noticed that with relatively the same weight in another 2 passenger flight that I was only able to maintain MCP and fly at 80 KIAS without decreasing in altitude. Given the 20 knot loss; I felt I should shut down prior to taking any more flights and just give the engine a once-over. Upon my inspection; I noticed oil spray over the engine on the helicopter's right side and some on the firewall. As a pilot; I felt at that point I needed to call our maintenance guy to give me his opinion on the situation. Our maintenance guy is also the Chief Pilot and Primary Manager of the company. He instructed me not to sell or take up any other flights with passengers. He then proceeded to tell me to fly the helicopter to ZZZ for him to come inspect it and make necessary repairs. Given the amount of oil I started with during pre-flight and the amount of oil in the engine after 2 hours of run time (the difference was 1.5 quarts burned; 8 quarts in the morning and 6.5 in the engine at the time of shutdown and pilot inspection) I felt I was within limits to fly the helicopter not even 5 minutes from the landing zone to Company at ZZZ. There was no oil light illumination in flight during that time or any time during tours. Both the oil temperature and oil pressure gauges were in the green. There has been a cracked cylinder on this helicopter before which resulted in reduced power as well. Given that; in my experience as a pilot; I believed this to be another cracked cylinder or maybe even a bad valve. I felt that my flight back to the airport was within limits. I topped off the oil; performed a power check and a magneto check prior to takeoff from the landing zone. I made my call to Tower; lifted off from the landing zone; flew my .03 flight over to Company; shutdown; and left back to ZZZ1 for Maintenance to handle it. This is the facts from my perspective; from what I was experiencing; to what I was told from Maintenance/Management; and how it was handled. Pilot reported after discovering a serious engine oil leak; he was directed to fly to another airport so it could be fixed; instead of getting a ferry permit.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Takeoff / Launch
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

After LAX Ground Control granted us pushback clearance from Gate; they advised us to plan for Runway 25R. Having already planned and briefed for Runway 24L; the FO (First Officer) requested 24L; but LAX Ground Control denied the request. After the Before Taxi Checklist and prior to taxi; the FO and I reprogrammed the FMC; briefed the Runway 25R particulars and completed the Departure Plan Checklist. Upon requesting Taxi Clearance; LAX Ground Control advised us to plan for Runway 24L. Again; the FO and I reprogrammed the FMC and re-briefed the Runway 24L particulars and re-ran the Departure Plan Checklist.When we requested taxi again; LAX Ground Control gave us 'Taxi to 24L via Delta 8; Echo. Prior to turning right onto Taxiway Echo; Tower cleared us for takeoff. We completed our Takeoff Flows and I called for the Before Takeoff Checklist. During the taxi; I will note it was very dark and there were no center line taxiway lights. The only lights illuminated were the Runway 24L threshold approach lights and the runway center line lights. During the takeoff roll; the FO realized we were departing from intersection Victor (the point of approach threshold lighting) and not the full length from Echo 6.The FO stated the discrepancy; but by the time I recognized the discrepancy; we were rapidly approaching 80 knots. Given the runway length from intersection Victor was greater than 10;500' and our takeoff weight was exceptionally low due to a light fuel load and [comparatively few] Passengers; I elected to continue the takeoff. [Report narrative contained no additional information.] B737 pilots reported taking off from the incorrect ATC assigned clearance position.
Aircraft: C172
Phase of flight: Landing
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was entering the pattern at ZZZ to land flying a C172. I crossed the runway at 1000ft MSL to enter the right downwind for runway XX which uses right traffic. As I crossed over the runway there was Aircraft Y; a DA20; executing a low pass over the runway. I started my turn into the downwind and he started his turn to crosswind and then to downwind. I looked back and he was closer to me then I was comfortable with so I speed up a little bit. Then when I turned final I received a traffic alert saying he was at my six less than one mile. I asked my passenger to watch him and she told me he looked like he was 200 feet from us and looked like he was about to pull up alongside us. I chose to go around rather than risk him landing on top of us. I also chose to execute the go-around because he never acknowledged my position in the pattern during his radio calls he acknowledged the two aircraft in front of me. C172 pilot reported a NMAC on final at a non-towered airport; resulting in a go around.
Aircraft: A320
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

This is not really a safety event but an ongoing problem with facilities east and south of ZMP. I could file one of these every week or two and will start filing them all. Aircraft X had a flight plan in the system that departed JFK enroute to ZZZ. It was on a very circuitous route most likely due to weather. The aircraft flight plan departed JFK and progressed through ZDC; ZJX; ZTL; ZME; and ZKC prior to entering ZMP airspace. The aircraft showed up overdue in our EDST and we started to look for it. ZKC Controller had no knowledge of the flight. I called Aircraft X's Company Dispatch and they said the flight had been canceled. My issue is how does an aircraft flight plan go through 5 Centers and numerous sectors and have every controller along the way either delete or ignore an overdue aircraft?Training on recognizing an overdue aircraft in the EDST and following up to find the aircraft. Reporter stated he has filed three reports of this nature within the last two weeks of this report. In discussion with other people; one person thought this might be an ERAM problem. This reporter is not sure if it is controllers in the system who are not doing what they are required to do by tracking down the aircraft and then removing the flight plan; or is this being done but then the problem still passes on to various ATC Centers. ZMP Controller complains about a flight that isn't airborne and has been canceled; progresses electronically from departure airport through 5 other centers before reaching his center.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Many separate problems with the Flight Plan. First it arrived 23 minutes late. I call the Dispatcher and noticed RLSE 02 and he said 'ZFW went down and redispatch plan wouldn't take in the computer; so I guess your still on 5%.' I was confused and asked him to send it to me; then once I saw it maybe I could figure out what he was talking about and that was another 6 minutes then the printer failed. Once airborne we lost data link around 80N and I attempted probably 15 times over the next 90 minute to contact any LDOC [Long Distance Operational Control] or Commercial Radio facility printed on the Arctic/Polar chart but never a response. I did send a full position report with FUEL and asked GANDER on HF to send to the company at NEUTR but after that lost them; but got Magadan OK at NALIM but no data link comm until just short of KUBON. We did comply with the 90 minute reporting on the 5% OPS SPEC B343 but can't prove it and Dispatch claims they never received the NEUTR report from Gander. The Dispatcher said he was filing a report and told of us of all the shortcomings in the computer system and I concur that we should no longer dispatch above 80N on the 5% because it's very difficult to comply since LDOC is about 50/50 over many years of trying. Air Carrier Captain laments his company's computer flight plan and the poor communication capability above 80N.
Aircraft: EUROCOPTER AS 350/355/EC130 - ASTAR/TWINSTAR/ECUREUIL
Phase of flight: Landing
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Object

Landed at the receiving hospital following a scene flight. On walkaround inspection found that the helipad perimeter chain was broken. Ambulance personnel that witnessed the landing stated that the chain had been broken by the helicopter on landing. Upon inspection of the helicopter; found that both of the tail rotor strike indicators had been bent flat and that both of the abrasion strips had impact damage. The lower vertical fin had paint matching the perimeter chain. I had no indications from the cockpit that I had contacted anything on landing. Need to position aircraft forward of the helipad 'H' to ensure adequate tail rotor clearance. Helicopter pilot discovers during post flight and is informed by observers; that the tail rotor had contacted the perimeter chain during landing severing the chain.