Aryan95614/aerograph-asrs huggingface dataset:
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

During pre-flight; engine number 1 fire handle light failed test. Maintenance placed B fire loop on placard. Takeoff from runway 8. During climb passing 14;000 ft engine overheat light illuminated with associated overheat/detec and master caution lights. Leveled off at FL180. [Advised ATC] and started return to [departure airport]. Completed QRH for engine overheat. Light extinguished when throttle closed. Planned flaps 15 landing. When thrust lever increased light did not illuminate. Coordinated with inflight crew for air return and made announcement to passengers. Accomplished visual approach. Taxied clear for fire inspection and shut down number 1 engine. Cleared to taxi; but could not due to brakes locked. Called for Maintenance and tug to move aircraft. Coordinated with ops for air stair and buses to move passengers to terminal. Total time in flight 21 minutes. Time from landing to passengers deplaned 1 hour. [Report narrative contained no additional information.] B737 flight crew reported returning to departure airport after receiving a Number 1 engine overheat warning during initial climb.
Aircraft: B767
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

While working the D-Side; a flight plan printed from Havana Center as Air Carrier X. The strip showed the type aircraft being a B737/Q. When the aircraft transitioned into Miami Approach's airspace; the Controller at Approach had noticed that the aircraft was in fact a B763/Q. On the active strip I had received from our automated data exchange with Havana had showed no remarks. Recommendation; the ADE process with Havana and ZMA still has a few 'bugs' that need to be fixed if this system is to remain full time. ZMA Controller described the flawed ADE process between ZMA and Havana that involved a wrong aircraft type identification of an inbound aircraft; initially identified as a B737; but later corrected to a B767.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation

Accepted [release]; two wheeled crates containing aircraft ejection seats. While conducting a physical search; we came across a full oxygen cylinder still attached to one of the seats and showing as pressurized. The item description [was] of Emergency O2 Cylinder. The item is about 15 inches by 2.5 inches. Nothing was declared on the documents that were submitted. Air Carrier Ground Personnel reported Cargo Department accepted a cargo shipment which contained a full oxygen cylinder.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Final Approach
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Aircraft X was IFR for Runway 26 at PHX. Aircraft Y was IFR for Runway 25L at PHX. Both aircraft were on 30 degree intercepts for their runways and cleared for the visual approach. Aircraft X went through final at almost the same altitude as Aircraft Y on the parallel runway. Separation was less than a mile and maybe 100 ft. Even though both aircraft were cleared for the visual approach and given 30 degree intercept headings they became dangerously close. The operation is completely acceptable in the 7110.65 but is very dangerous. This happens regularly with parallel runway operations at this facility.The 7110.65 needs to be changed to mandate standard separation until aircraft are established inbound on the final approach course. According to the 7110.65 paragraph 7-4-4; nobody is responsible for the IFR separation of 2 IFR aircraft. This operation is extremely unsafe and used at many busy airports with parallel runway operations. Many of the final approach courses are over highly populated cities. The risk of a catastrophic event is high. P50 TRACON reported a loss of separation between two aircraft on final.
Aircraft: B717 (FORMERLY MD-95)
Phase of flight: Takeoff / Launch
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I arrived at the aircraft and began the cockpit safety inspection and applied ground power after reviewing the aircraft logbook. I noticed one MEL that was for the Standby Avionics Cooling Fan INOP and circuit breaker collared. I proceeded outside and did a normal walk-around finding no defects. Boarding was normal and un-rushed. The Captain and I completed all the checklists; pushed back and taxied for departure after 2 successful engine starts. We lined up on the runway and I assumed the controls as pilot flying. We were cleared for takeoff and I applied takeoff power and executed a normal takeoff. Just after takeoff I noticed my ear pressure equalization was unusual and within a matter of minutes we got a CABIN RATE alert on the EAD. We both noticed that the cabin was climbing at roughly the same rate as the aircraft. The Captain said we may have a problem with pressurization and gave me the aircraft and radio control. The Captain attempted switching pressurization controllers to no effect and then tried manual pressurization and could not control the cabin altitude. He then stated we need to level off below 10;000 FT so we amended our clearance with ATC and informed them of pressurization problems. After the Captain tried trouble shooting the pressurization and not getting an adequate response from the system he decided to return to the departure airport. We got an amended clearance from ATC and returned to the departure airport for a visual approach. During the descent we remained in manual pressurization with the outflow valve full open and I executed a slow descent to ease pressure issues for the passengers. During the descent we received a CABIN INFLOW LO alert momentarily then quickly went out. We made a normal landing and returned to the gate. As the Captain conferred with Maintenance I went outside to inspect the outflow valve and noticed nothing unusual. I then went to the aft cargo door suspecting a door had not been closed even though we never had an indication of a door open. I noticed that the aft cargo door was latched but the door was slightly twisted in the frame allowing the forward part of the door to latch but the aft portion had a large gap. I believe this was our problem and upon testing the outflow valve and pressurizing the aircraft found that everything worked fine once the aft cargo door had been sealed properly. One of the ground crew observed the door ajar as I did and was the one who reseated the door properly. Training the ground crew to recognize a properly seated and locked cargo door would prevent future errors. A B717 Aft Cargo Door was partially closed ajar so that the Door Warning System indicated proper closure but after takeoff the aircraft would not pressurized. The crew returned to the departure airport where door was discovered.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

Went to plate the soup; upon twisting the thermos top it exploded like a huge volcano of hot soup in my face; eyes; hair; uniform; shoes; galley walls counters; doors; ceilings it was so powerful that it ricocheted to the wall across the galley and behind me. 4 ft. a complete mess. It ruined a couple settings as well. I was completely blinded and in shock for the first two minutes my eyes and my face were burning and I was shaking with fear; pain and shock. After I realized what happened I immediately called the crew and FD (Flight Deck) and grab some ice and towels. I went to the lavatory to assess my face hands and arms. I have burns and will continue to treat myself until I finish this trip. I was up until XA:00 am doing laundry of my uniform van was at XI:00 am. I noticed many red burn spots on my face; hands and arms. My eyes still sting and are red. I will seek medical treatment when I get home from this trip if symptoms worsen; I will get help right away.We need to be incredibly careful and vigilant about opening the thermos of soup. I believe this experience will and should warrant a service/safety bulletin immediately. Flight Attendant reported a soup canister exploded as it was being opened and resulted in burns.
Aircraft: A320
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

On an A320 aircraft; I installed a Data Loading Routing Box (DLRB) Reference AMM 31-38-34. It has been brought to my attention that the correct software was not installed when unit was installed. I don't remember reading that software was to be installed at that time. [Suggest] double check paperwork and check revision dates and check IPC to see if software is to be loaded in units. An Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) was informed correct software had not installed when he replaced a Data Loading Routing Unit (DLRB) on an A320 aircraft.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

The event occurred on Aircraft X from PHX to ELP. The weather was clear and daytime flying. As the flight entered the ELP airspace; ATC reported GPS jamming on the frequency. Runway 22 was closed; so the landing runway was 26L. The 2 approaches for this runway are RNAV(GPS) and the VOR RWY 26L. The aircraft was not certified for the RNP approach. We decided on the VOR due to the GPS jamming event. As we approached into ELP airspace we received an ECAM message: NAV FM/GPS POS disagree. Obviously due to the jamming event. The flight was in visual/daytime conditions; thus confirming position was quickly verified. During the VOR approach; First Officer was flying with autopilot on. Approximately 6-8 miles on final I noticed the flight track on Captain's ND (NAV Display) was starting to wander to the left. The First Officer's ND was showing normal indications; but wisely decided to turn off the autopilot and continue visually. At approximately 5 miles on final; we noticed the [VNAV] was commanding a much lower altitude than what was needed to remain on a normal 3 degree flight path to landing. The First Officer disregarded the false indications; and again preceded visually 3 to 1 with the VASI to and normal landing. Cause: GPS jamming probably from the Whites Sands missile range. Suggestions: I would highly recommend alerting crews in advance of these kind of events. This is in addition to ATIS and ATC reporting. I would highly recommend an alternate in the flight plan. If during night/IFR operations and Runway 22 closed; the only means to fly an approach would be raw data VOR. Air carrier non flying pilot reported GPS jamming while maneuvering for the arrival. Jamming was reported by ATC.
Aircraft: B777
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

North of ARVUM at FL360 in continuous moderate+ chop we requested FL340. Amazonica initially denied our request but subsequently cleared us to FL340. Upon reading back our clearance to FL340; Amazonica confirmed our clearance to FL340. Almost immediately Amazonica re-cleared us to FL360. Pop up traffic opposite direction appeared at the limits of TCAS 40nm; level at FL350. We were approaching 35;200 feet as we climbed back up to FL360 and assumed a right 1 mile offset. We were never closer than 30 miles to the opposite direction traffic before leveling at FL360. No TA or RA was received. While Amazonica has radar coverage throughout their airspace; their radios for the most part are atrocious. Constant vigilance is necessary and my alert copilot safely and smoothly maneuvered us to a safe altitude and course. Communication is extremely important in our profession and while read backs; and confirmation are necessary operational procedures; good radios are of paramount importance! A better means of communication must be found to mitigate communication errors; especially in remote and oceanic areas. A B777 aircraft received a clearance to descend to FL340; and almost immediately were re-cleared to FL360. They noted pop-up traffic on TCAS at FL350 at 40 miles away. The reporter notes the poor condition of Amazonica's radios.
Aircraft: CRJ200
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC

Climbing through about 8;000 ft. ATC advised us of VFR traffic at our 1 o'clock; around 3 miles away. It was maneuvering erratically. I immediately saw it. It was performing aerobatic maneuvers. It seemed to me to be rapidly coming towards us from our 1 to 2 o'clock position; so I told the FO (First Officer) to turn left away from it. It was getting very close doing erratic turns; dives and climbs. The FO didn't respond which lead me to believe he didn't see the traffic; so I took the controls and began a sharp climbing left turn. I thought we had cleared it when the FO said he saw it; it was coming back towards us again; at which point I then saw it going straight up; at our altitude; just in front of us. I immediately pulled the aircraft up into a much sharper climb; momentarily at about 30 degrees up. We flew past it within a few seconds. I returned the controls to the FO; took a deep breath; and advised ATC what took place. The aircraft was not in radio contact with ATC. Captain reported flight crew was forced to take repeated evasive action due to another aircraft maneuvering near them without ATC contact.
Aircraft: MD-11
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

During initial climb noted altitude miscompare ALT alert on Captains PFD instrument. At this time I cross checked my baro setting and altitude to the FO and seemed normal. Passing thru 3000 FT I noted the FO altitude miscompare also. I asked the FO to put autopilot on due to previous maintenance write up for CADC2 failure and suspected Airspeed Unreliable. We were now well above the overcast cloud layer in VMC. Ran Airspeed Unreliable checklist. Determined that CADC2 was bad and got numerous altitude and Airspeed edification checks from ATC. Stopped climb at FL330 and notified ATC that our altitude and Airspeed were Unreliable and inaccurate due to equipment malfunction. Got block altitude clearance of Fl320-FL340 and leveled off using vertical speed 0 at FL330 and [advised ATC] due to safety concerns and degraded capability. We also got wind shear det fail and IAS miscompare alerts. ATC confirmed our altitude as FL331 which agreed with the CA instruments. We noted/checked and verified our pitch and power settings for each phase and configuration of flight and all seemed ok after selecting CADC1 as good. We also got our altitude selector window back and PROF. After contacting [Operations Control] we determined that best option was to continue to destination as weather was VMC and we could descend VMC to landing per the checklist and they had parts. We received priority handling from ATC and did a long slow straight in ILS; Captain did approach and landing; to successful landing. FO did a great job with the checklists and backing up configuration speeds and verification checks with ATC.Event caused by bad CADC2. We ran the Airspeed Unreliable checklist and completed flight using good CADC1. MD11 Captain reported a Central Air Data Computer 2 (CADC2) failure on climbout that resulted in unreliable airspeed and altitude information.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

[Procedures Manual] XX.XX.X XX indicates cabin 'the security seals/stickers are installed by cabin appearance or authorized contractors. The exemption is the life vest compartment security seals that are installed by Aircraft Maintenance. All security fasteners are installed by Aircraft Maintenance. During pre-taxi walkaround; we frequently find improperly sealed and/or packed life vest on aircraft economy class seats. Cabin service gets notified by management to reseal the life vests. As per the [Procedures Manual] referenced above; 'all security fasteners are installed by aircraft maintenance.' Is it proper to have non licensed personnel to perform this type of work (1) on live airplane (2)undocumented? The aircraft mentioned in this report used as an example. Aircraft Maintenance Technician reports that company violates procedures regarding security seals and stickers.
Aircraft: MD-83
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL

With APU already running for entire flight segment per MEL 24-04A; on taxi in we shut down right engine. Thinking that Maintenance had properly placarded for the previous write-up; we were both surprised to see the right GEN AC BUS go dead along with the First Officer gauges and all other right AC powered items. My question is; would we have been single generator (Left AC; no Cross Tie) in flight IF we had lost right engine? I.e. Multiple emergency situations? Was placarding the AC Crosstie Inop the right solution to the previous write-ups about APU not picking up Right AC BUS on shut down? And has replacing the AC Crosstie Relay solving the problem now? If so; then perhaps jet should have never flown with crosstie relay on placard. To my mind; it really wasn't a crosstie issue since APU does not crosstie on the ground anyway. But APU was consistently failing to pick up Right AC BUS. I do not claim to be the systems expert; however it does concern me that perhaps if we had had the right engine fail; we could have also been single generator ops if the APU did not pick up the Right AC BUS. An MD-83 was dispatched under MEL 24-04A because of an AC CROSS TIE fault with the APU continuously operating but while taxiing in after landing when the right engine was shutdown the Right AC BUS lost power.
Aircraft: NO AIRCRAFT
Phase of flight: unknown
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

We have been having lighting issues over at the hangar spots with no lights. Company has put only 2 light towers out to provide limited lighting over some of these spots. Supervisors have been asking employees turn on light tower equipment who have not been trained on this piece of equipment. Supervisors who are not trainers have been going as far as to show employees how to turn on equipment when employees say they don't know how to use the equipment. Last week; a supervisor said on the radio that 'no one touch one of the light towers due to the fuel leaking'. Every employee who use equipment should be sign off on that equipment and know how to do a user check on that equipment. Not just shown how to turn equipment on. If someone went and electrocuted themselves by not knowing how to do a user check on the equipment or turn on the equipment with the fuel leaking and the light tower caught on fire or even themselves on fire from leaking fuel can end up in a bad result from injury to even death. Ground personnel reported lighting issues and training issues resulted in a safety hazard.
Aircraft: PIPER SINGLE UNDIFFERENTIATED OR OTHER MODEL
Phase of flight: Landing
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Event / Encounter Object

I conducted a visual pattern and approach to runway. I had planned one touch and go followed by a full stop landing. The one minute weather reported the surface winds at 220/6; yielding approximately a 5 knot crosswind component. I conducted a wheel landing and touched down on speed at 70 mph; on centerline; in the touchdown zone; and on the right/upwind wheel. After I lowered the left wheel; the aircraft immediately and uncontrollably veered sharply to the left. I applied full right rudder and immediately held the stick full right and aft to keep the aircraft from ground looping or cartwheeling. I was unable to control the aircraft and we departed the runway to the left and proceeded to impact two of the four PAPI lights. The prop hit a PAPI light causing the engine to quit. The aircraft continued and came to a stop approximately 50 to 100 ft off the runway. There were no injuries to myself (PIC) or passenger. I proceeded to secure the aircraft and survey the scene. I am extremely well trained in tailwheel operations and very familiar with this aircraft as it has been in my family for years. Nothing like this has ever happened. I was alert; well rested; and thoroughly enjoying the beautiful day. I immediately suspected that a brake had locked on the left wheel. This is supported by marks on the runway and grass as well as wear marks on the left wheel. I fully believe that my knowledge; experience; training; and safety minded professionalism prevented this from turning into a disaster. That being said; I urgently desire to know the root cause of the suspected brake/wheel malfunction to allow for future focused training and information sharing in the tailwheel community. Piper pilot reported a runway excursion following a crosswind landing.