Aryan95614/aerograph-asrs huggingface dataset:
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Takeoff / Launch
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

Captain rejected the takeoff at approximately 135-140 KIAS due to a red engine overheat light on the number two engine. Aircraft was brought to a stop. The Captain notified the flight attendants and passengers to remain seated. Then the aircraft was taxied clear of the runway. Fire crew assistance was requested to inspect the tires and brakes for damage.While waiting for the fire crew inspection; a flight attendant notified the Captain that an elderly passenger requested to go to the hospital and was not doing well. Once the fire crew reported no problems with the brakes or tires; the Captain taxied the aircraft back to the gate and requested EMT and medical personnel meet the flight.Once at the gate; EMTs tended to and removed the passenger. Once that passenger was removed; all other passengers were deplaned and the aircraft was turned over to maintenance. On takeoff; right engine EGT climbed to 945; I called 'high EGT right engine' and pointed to the gauge. Captain immediately rejected the takeoff using standard procedure. Speed was approximately 138 knots; V1 was 145. Captain rejected takeoff outside high speed reject criteria. B737 flight crew experienced high EGT during takeoff and the Captain elected to reject the takeoff just prior to V1. A Flight Attendant notified the Captain that an elderly passenger had been adversely affected by the reject and EMT's should meet the aircraft at the gate.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

We departed ZZZ; Runway X; on the SID (Standard Instrument Departure). Unfortunately we did not catch that the SID Runway X is not authorized for use by Aircraft X Make/Model. There are several holes (traps) that we missed. We received an ATC (Air Traffic Control) uplink with the SID. In later crew discussion - we believe that this was based on our originally planned runway 1 departure.Our flight was originally flight planned for Runway Y; via the SID. With a late ZFW (Zero Fuel Weight) increase the working IRO (International Relief Officer) pointed out that we were no longer good to take off on Runway Y; that we needed Runway X. We asked ATC and were cleared out to Runway X.The takeoff and departure was normal and accomplished with SOP's; with no traffic or navigation conflicts. ATC never said anything about our departure. We didn't see any restrictions on the Jeppesen SID page. I forgot to re-check the 10-7 pages for departure notes after the runway change. None of us caught the note on the page that the SID is not authorized for Aircraft X Make/Model on Runway X.On the climb portion; after the turn to the northeasterly portion of the SID (at approximately 5;000 ft.) - the working IRO mentioned that we were not authorized to use the departure that we were already on. We had a quick look and since all elements of the flight appeared normal; we decided to discuss it later in the flight.We continued on and the flight was terminated in ZZZZ with no further issues or problems. ATC never queried us and I told the crew that I would be filing a report on our return.Also - I am a relatively new transfer to the ZZZ base; having been displaced recently. When I flew out of ZZZ we never used Runway Y. So I was probably predisposed to use Runway X; and my expectation bias likely had me trusting the ATC upload as valid and legal for the runway as well. Our flight plan showed Runway Y as our departure runway and the SID (Standard Instrument Departure). On taxi out we were assigned Runway X for departure and the SID. Bottom line none of us caught that Aircraft X Make/Model is not authorized to fly this SID. Air carrier flight crew reported inadvertently using an unauthorized departure route for their aircraft type.
Aircraft: WIDEBODY TRANSPORT
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

We were being vectored from the north for a visual approach to Runway 27 at MEM. During the descent from 4;000 FT to 3;000 FT the Controller told us we were re-entering Class B airspace and that we had been out of Class B airspace for about 1 mile. The threat was (and continues to be) the lack of a practical; real-time means for pilots to detect where they are in relation to the base of Class B airspace around an airport. It is totally impractical (too attention consuming during a critical phase of flight) to try to monitor on the EFB the aircraft's position relative to the varying radials; DMEs and altitudes. Suggestions from a piloting standpoint: 1) Slow to 200 KTS whenever approaching a Class B airspace. The downside of this approach is increased delays at airports; as Class B starts a considerable distance from airports. 2) Never descend before it is required to make altitude restrictions on the approach. The downside here is the increased potential for being high/fast if there is any misjudgment. From an automation standpoint; enhance automation; showing Class B airspace on the PFD or; perhaps better (to avoid excessive data on the PFD); showing aircraft location on a moving map on the Class B page of the EFB. From a regulatory standpoint: simplify the speed requirement; perhaps to be similar to that used by Canada (200 KTS if below 3;000 AGL within 10 miles of an airport). Wide Body Aircraft Captain is informed by ATC aircraft is reentering Class B after having been out of it. Reporter comments on the difficulty of monitoring Class B in the flight deck with current instruments.
Aircraft: A319
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Upon arriving to the aircraft an extreme strong odor was coming through the jetway from the aircraft cabin. During my preflight security check and preparing the galley for inflight service the C Flight Attendant came back and stated the odor in the cabin is toxic and we should not stay in the cabin; I agreed and we left to the jetway. The C Flight Attendant alerted the Captain of the toxic odor. The Captain called Maintenance and went through several procedures to clear the cabin of the toxins. Maintenance could not clear the cabin and could not assure that it would not reoccur. The next morning my throat was sore/scratchy and my eyes were irritated. A more routine Maintenance Program; clearing and cleaning hydraulic fuel leaks from cabin air sources. Certifying and documentation in the cabin log book when these checks and cleanings are done. It is important that all crew members should be in the loop with all aspects of cabin health and safety. An A319 Flight Attendant reported he and other crew members exited the aircraft because of a strong toxic odor which Maintenance was unable to clear. The flight was canceled and he had physical symptoms the following day.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance

We are currently in the process of returning X number of 737-MAX aircraft to service following the accomplishment of an EO. When auditing the paperwork on Aircraft Y; it was discovered that the tooling required to accomplish Step XX F.X; and F.Y was unavailable. This caused a retroactive audit of previously completed paperwork on Aircraft Z. It was determined that the tasks were stamped as accomplished in spite of the lack of available tooling. The aircraft was not in service at the time; however it was due to be released. The paperwork was pulled and the required tooling has been ordered to ensure correct accomplishment of these steps on both aircraft prior to aircraft release.The reference material uses generic three digit ATA codes (XX-XX-XX; XX-YY-XX) instead of complete ATA codes to identify applicable AMM references for a given task. Additionally; the maintenance tasks are all very similar when performed and easily confused. Furthermore the job card does not include the tooling in the bill of required materials; further obfuscating the tooling requirement. Finally; the tasks all have very similar nomenclature. You can be easily fooled into thinking you've accomplished more than one task when you have; in fact; only accomplished one; or part of another task. It is also worth noting that other similar task cards for this fleet type are significantly less vague. It appears that this card was created quickly with little mind paid to details. This is also the first time this job card has been accomplished at this station.Include the full ATA code for each task. Include the required tooling on the job card bill of materials. Add a note to Step XX F.X and F.X indicating that tooling is required to complete these steps. Technician reported ambiguity in AMM references for task cards resulted in not using the required tooling to return B737 MAX aircraft to service after storage.
Aircraft: A319
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

ATC had been vectoring our aircraft so as to fit other traffic in front of us. After we were clear for the visual approach; we were too high for safe approach in my judgment. The FO (First Officer) said; 'I am going to maneuver the aircraft' and began to S turn. I stated 'No we are not' and 'Go Around' A Soft Go Around was accomplished. The FO wanted to hack the approach by S turning from what would be a steep approach. The FO had been up for 21 hours at this point as he is a commuter who got up at 2am PDT the previous day I think the FO was tired and just wanted to put it on the ground. His subsequent landing was quite hard. I believe his judgment was affected by fatigue. Ultimately we did the right thing by going around. Unfortunately; I; as the Captain had to command it. A319 Captain reported having to command a go around to fatigued First Officer on an unstabilized approach.
Aircraft: A320
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Aircraft X; an A320 aircraft; arrived at gate with a log gripe concerning the Cabin Intercommunication DATA System (CIDS). The flight crew verbally informed us that they had a CIDS Director-1 and -2 ECAM fault and an Evacuate Warning that would not silence. Due to previous history of CIDS and Evacuate Warning problems; my Aircraft Electronics Technician (AET) coworker; Technician Y; and myself determined that we would replace CIDS Directors-1 and -2. The new CIDS Directors were ordered referencing Illustrated Parts Catalog (IPC) 23-73-34 for this aircraft effectivity. The last update of this document was May 2011. During the installation of the CIDS units; it was noted that the Company Part Numbers (CPN) of the old and new [CIDS Director] units were different. The IPC calls for CPN XXX729 for this aircraft effectivity; however; CPN XXX732 CIDS units were found installed. We contacted Maintenance Control for clarification and Maintenance Controller X agreed that this aircraft effectivity should have the CPN XXX729 CIDS units installed per IPC 23-73-34; Page-1f. Per IPC 23-73-34; Page-1; the CPN XXX731 unit is effective only for Aircraft Y; [a different A320 aircraft]. Installation and Test of both CIDS Directors was accomplished per Aircraft Maintenance Manuals (AMM) 23-73-34; with all tests passing and aircraft was then dispatched. A few minutes after the aircraft left ZZZ; my Supervisor; found an Airbus Maintenance Tip (MT) in the AMM. The Maintenance Tip was found to have a Part Number effectivity table that is in conflict with the current IPC. We immediately contacted Maintenance Control; this time speaking with Controller Y; and informed him of the conflicting part number information on these documents. Controller Y concluded that proper procedures were followed and that he would contact the Engineering Group to correct the documents in question. In addition I submitted a report to Engineering about the matter and hope to get a response soon. Aircraft X; an A320 aircraft; arrived with a logbook write-up of Cabin Intercommunication DATA System (CIDS). The crew reported verbally and the log was updated to (Evacuation Warning sounding and could not reset). The crew also reported and the post flight report showed the CIDS Directors-1 and -2 had failed. The fault could not be duplicated on the ground. It was determined that it would be best to replace both CIDS Directors reference Maintenance Manual (M/M) 23-73-34. The parts were ordered reference Illustrated Parts Catalog (IPC) 23-73-34 Page-1F; dated (May 2011). The parts arrived and [it] was found that the parts [previously] installed were different. A Line Technician; Avionics Technician; and a Maintenance Controller report about conflicting information between their Illustrated Parts Catalog (IPC) and the Airbus Maintenance Manual regarding the correct Cabin Intercommunication DATA System (CIDS) Directors they could use on an A320 aircraft with a CIDS Director ECAM fault and Evacuation Warning that would not silence.
Aircraft: SKYLANE 182/RG TURBO SKYLANE/RG
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

During the approach to HDC; New Orleans was vectoring me for the ILS to Runway 18. They gave me a heading to join the LOC and cleared me for the ILS to Runway 18. Moments later they ask if I was receiving the LOC; and advised me that a previous aircraft had let them know that they had not received it. I replied that I was not receiving the LOC; and they ask if I would like the RNAV to Runway 18. I replied yes; and they immediately cleared me for the RNAV to Runway 18. I had expected that ATC was going to vector me back around in a box pattern to set up for the RNAV to Runway 18; and when they simply cleared me for that approach; I started scrambling; since I was single pilot to reset the radios for the approach and join the inbound course. I was able to join the inbound course; a couple of miles outside the FAF; however upon being handed over to HDC Tower; Tower immediately advised me of a low altitude alert from New Orleans Approach. I had descended below the minimum altitude on the approach; prior to the FAF. I broke out of the clouds into VMC at approximately 1200 ft.; 600 ft. below the minimum altitude. I believe that the cause for this event is my failure to NOT accept the clearance for an approach that I was not completely set up and ready for. I should have asked for vectors in a box pattern to join the approach; and give myself time to fully brief the approach; have the radios set up; and be completely prepared prior to joining the final approach course. My hurried effort to set up the radios for the approach and join the course distracted me from flying the airplane and cause me to bust the altitude. Cessna 182 Pilot reported being alerted by Air Traffic Control that LOC Approach was not working and therefore being cleared for an RNAV approach completely unprepared which caused a descent below minimum altitude.
Aircraft: A300
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

[This was my] second consecutive AM 'out and back' assignment off reserve. The first was delayed approximately 1+15. This trip; my second; [was flown in an aircraft with] the autothrottles MEL'd inoperative. During descent and visual approach to Runway XXL we encountered continuous distractions on the radios due to MULTIPLE similar sounding call signs. One was the exact same digits as ours; two of which were just transposed; plus several others ending in the same number as ours.During the final approach segment of our visual to the runway I let my pilot not flying duties focus to too great an extent on the [pilot flying's] airspeed control which was complicated by the manual throttles and a wind shift. As a result I did not properly back him up and let us descend to the point we received a GPWS 'Too Low Flaps' warning; at which point I called for a go-around. We executed it in accordance with ATC instructions; then re-entered the pattern for a second visual approach to an uneventful landing.My fatigue level had ramped up quite quickly during our 'return' flight. I drank a cup of coffee; but it didn't help enough. I got target fixated on the airspeed and manual throttle control after being distracted by the continuous similar callsigns on frequency.[We need to make] a conscious attempt to change the way the company assigns call signs. A change that focuses on dissimilar phonetics rather ground personnel recognition convenience. Try to use the best aircraft available for these AM 'out and back' assignments. Even though we are returning in the day; which might seem easier; it most definitely isn't. The increased ATC traffic and increased work load associated with MEL's and focusing on so many similar sounding call signs; combined with the additional fatigue that hits once the sun comes up really got me to me today. When cleared onto final; we noticed winds of 330/50 at 3;000 FT MSL. The winds shifted significantly during the approach until they reached 250/14G20 on the ground. With the autothrottles inoperative; I was working hard to keep the airspeed in a safe regime while configuring the aircraft. Unfortunately; my focus on airspeed control combined with my fatigue lead me to not call for the final flap/slat setting of 30/40. Fatigue from an early morning out and back combined with coming off afternoon flying previously was more significant than I thought it would be. Fatigue; MEL'd autothrottles and communications problems due to similar call signs contributed to the failure of an A300-600 flight crew to select landing flaps prior to receipt of an EGPWS configuration warning. The flight crew initiated a go-around and flew a second approach uneventfully.
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

The rides had been bad and several aircraft had been asking for ride reports and I was spacing for the Class B airport. An E170 was eastbound at FL350 and requesting FL330 because of the bad rides. The E170 was in Sector X's airspace and I had just given Sector X the first of two northbound arrivals at FL340. In the next couple of minutes I was distracted by a situation in the southern part of my sector. When I scanned back to the north; the E170 had entered my airspace and the first arrival northbound was in Sector X. I gave the E170 a clearance for lower and Conflict Alert went of with an E145; the second arrival at FL340. I turned E170 20 degrees left to add more space between them. There was no loss of separation but it felt like a safety issue to me because they were closer than I usually let airplanes get and I had just been dealing with the other situation in the sector. I need to take a moment to refocus after some kind of distraction. When pilots are trying to get out of bad rides; it adds a sense of urgency to get them out of it as quickly as possible. If I would have taken just a moment to scan my entire sector again I would have made another evaluation at the traffic situation with the E145; and probably waited two minutes before descending E170. Distracted by attempts to resolve 'bad ride' reports; an Enroute Controller experienced a near separation loss.
Aircraft: LIGHT TRANSPORT; LOW WING; 2 TURBOJET ENG
Phase of flight: Initial Climb
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Bird / Animal

On DATE we were departing from ZZZ around XA:00 local time. We operate a type aircraft and was departing ZZZ to ZZZ1 to return to our home base with 4 passengers onboard. I was flying as PIC of the trip. Shortly after takeoff; we noticed a small flock of large black birds. We estimated the number to be around 5. During this critical phase of flight there was nearly no time to react. One bird struck the nose of our aircraft around 400 ft AGL. It created a loud thump noise throughout the cabin. The pilot monitoring and I accessed the situation and decided the plane was flying as it should; with no indication of engine damage or unusual flight characteristics. Due to the weather impact of ZZZ we decided to fly under 200 kts and head to a more serviceable airport. We diverted to ZZZ2 and checked in with ZZZ Approach to get a VFR clearance into the Bravo then land at ZZZ2. During cruise flight our passengers made us aware that there was blood on our left wing as well. We landed safely at ZZZ2 and parked at [the] FBO. We got out to check the damage and was surprised to see the nose cone damaged significantly. Part of the bird was inside the nose compartment as it made a hole and good size dent to the nose of the aircraft. There was blood as well on the left wing also around the right engine. After a closer look there does not seem to be any damage to the blades of the right engine. We talked to Company at ZZZ3 and to determine what the next steps are. We grounded the aircraft at ZZZ2 and will be in further discussions with maintenance to determine what the next steps will be to get our plane back home safely. Corporate aircraft Captain reported hitting a bird and then having to deviate.
Aircraft: HELICOPTER
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

I was completing the patient leg of the flight; delivering the patient to University Hospital under night vision goggles. I was following the GPS guidance information and didn't identify the hospital; subsequently flying past the hospital on the left side of the aircraft by one mile (airspeed approximately 90 KTS). I asked the med crew if they had the hospital in sight and the left side crew member said he had it behind the aircraft. I made a right hand turn to return to the hospital and in the process; I may have flown into the Class D airspace for ZZZ International Airport. I had the Tower frequency in the VHF radio but my pin selector switch was down inadvertently so I am not aware if ZZZ Tower tried to make contact. I placed my pin switch up at that moment; but didn't hear any traffic pertaining to my flight. I had the appropriate squawk code assigned to my aircraft in the transponder. I continued the flight to the University Hospital with the intent to contact ATC once on the ground; but was unable to find a good telephone number.In the future when flying night vision goggles over a highly lit up congested area; it may be easier to identify a hospital unaided. I have flown into this hospital using night vision goggles in the past; but in this circumstance; it was from a direction that I was not familiar with. Better crew coordination between the experienced medical crew and myself could have helped greatly. Medical crew thought I had the hospital in site and that I was making an orbit to align myself with prevailing winds; but did not state that we overflew the hospital until I asked if they had the hospital in site. Even though I had no intention of flying into Class D airspace; an advisory call to Tower while inbound would have made this situation nonexistent as they would have known of my intentions. Bell-407 pilot initially missed sighting the destination hospital while utilizing GPS and night vision goggles in a well-lit city environment. Pilot may have also inadvertantly infringed on nearby Class D airspace.