Aryan95614/aerograph-asrs huggingface dataset:
Aircraft: SMALL AIRCRAFT; HIGH WING; 1 ENG; FIXED GEAR
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe

I had just finished my run-up at CEW (Bob Sikes Airport) and was holding short of Runway 35 for departure. Winds were reported out of the north at 5 kts. on the ASOS. Upon reaching the hold short; winds heavily favored Runway 35 (7-10 kts. on windsock out of the north). From my position; I had a clear view of both base and final for [Runway] 35; as well as the left downwind/base and final for [Runway] 17. I scanned the pattern and observed no traffic; I also had not heard any calls over the CTAF since engine start (roughly 6-7 minutes prior). I made my CTAF call announcing I would be taking Runway 35 for departure. Before I started moving; an FBO vehicle made a call announcing that there was an aircraft landing on Runway 17. Soon after; I had a visual on a [light aircraft] in his flare that was previously obscured from the glare of the sun. I never crossed the hold short line; and I thanked the vehicle over frequency; who stated that the traffic had not been making any radio calls. After the aircraft vacated the runway; I made an uneventful departure to the north. Although there was no immediate danger; it was a little too close for comfort. Personally; I have had no experience at an uncontrolled field with an aircraft not making any CTAF calls. I understand that it was within their right to do so; but I believe in this case it made an unsafe condition possible. The pilot must have not have picked up the ASOS; because he landed with a 7-10 kt. tailwind; I believe this added to the confusion. Luckily; the pilot didn't even use half of the 8;000 ft. runway; so if I had continued to line up on the runway; I would have easily been able to see him. To some degree; I fell victim to an expectancy bias. I will definitely take this as an important lesson moving forward. Light aircraft pilot reported he was about to take the runway at CEW; a non-towered airport; when a ground observer alerted him to traffic landing opposite direction who was not communicating on CTAF frequency.
Aircraft: ANY UNKNOWN OR UNLISTED AIRCRAFT MANUFACTURER
Phase of flight: Takeoff / Launch
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

On taxi-out to Runway 5 we made a radio call stating aircraft type and runway of intended departure. Upon reaching the hold short line we contacted Air Traffic Control for IFR clearance; and waited for release time for takeoff. Hold short line faces approach end of Runway 5; but does not allow pilot to view departure end of runway for on-coming traffic. After copying clearance we switched back to CTAF frequency and continued to monitor the frequency. Upon moving the aircraft we announced taking Runway 5 for takeoff and intended direction of departure. As we took the runway and started takeoff roll we encountered an aircraft on short final for Runway 23. This aircraft had not made any traffic calls and was difficult to see on the hazy background of the sky. Aircraft executed a missed approach and re-entered the pattern for Runway 5. I failed to make an abort decision at the appropriate time and continued with the takeoff and departure. Jeopardizing safety in the process.The cause was inadequate communication used by both aircraft; white aircraft on similar background and poor illumination of landing aircraft to be seen. Inadequate decision making by Captain of departing aircraft and failure to abort the departure. Ways to avoid this would be for all participating aircraft to be communicating effectively and for all aircraft to monitor the frequency and flow of traffic. Other avoidance measure would be to have an ATC facility present at the airport and better positioning of the hold short line for both sides of the runway to be seen. Pilot reported NMAC during takeoff from a nontowered airport.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude

While on approach to BUR; I was the Pilot Monitoring. We were issued a heading and a decent from 6;000 feet to 5;000 feet. ATC advised traffic at one o'clock and five miles. We advised traffic was not in sight due to being in and out of IMC. ATC issued another vector and advised traffic appeared to be descending and at one mile. As we broke out of the clouds; the traffic was in front of us (moving right to left) in a rapid descending left turn. Immediately the TCAS called Traffic and Descend. The Captain kicked off the autopilot and pitched down and turned hard right to avoid the traffic. We estimate that we came within 200 feet vertical and 500 feet horizontal from the other aircraft. We leveled off at 4;000 feet and 10-20 degrees from our assigned heading. I advised ATC that we maneuvered in response to an RA and remained at 4000 feet. We continued and landed in BUR with no further issues. Hard to say what could have prevented this incident. The other aircraft was not talking to ATC and made several rapid maneuvers; apparently to avoid clouds. The TCAS system worked. We responded in a timely manner to avoid a collision. Our aircraft was on a 170 degree heading at 5;000 feet MSL. We were IMC and on a vector off of the LYNXX 8 STAR into BUR. We had previously received a TCAS TA from traffic that had leveled off at 6;000 feet MSL. Our heading had placed us over terrain that peaked at 3;800 feet MSL (Oat Mountain); which was about 13 NM NW of BUR. Simultaneously; SoCal issued a Traffic Alert for that same traffic; we entered VMC conditions and spotted the traffic (appeared to be a Stearman); a TCAS RA 'Descend; Descend;' which was followed immediately by an 'Increase Descent.' I disengaged the autopilot and autothrust and began a descent; but immediately increased descent rate with the 'Increase Descent' call from the TCAS. The non-communicating traffic appeared to be 'scud running' by starting a sharp descending turn in front of us and heading southeast. I descended to 4;000 feet MSL with an avoidance turn to a heading of 190. In the commotion; my First Officer and I never heard the 'Clear of Conflict' call; but the display was clear. We advised SoCal of the deviation and our heading/altitude. The Controller cleared us to maintain 4;000 feet MSL with a vector to intercept the ILS to Runway 8. The Controller advised us that the traffic was inbound to VNY and was going to get a talking to by the Tower. We continued the approach and landing without further incident. B737 flight crew reports taking evasive action for a TCAS RA during descent into BUR. Clouds obscured visual contact with the other aircraft until the first TCAS resolution had been enunciated.
Aircraft: A321
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

My first time working on the Airbus 321 at [Company]. There are typically 3 flight attendants working the main cabin. We hit turbulence and had to immediately strap in and guess what? There are only 2 single jumpseats with seatbelts and harnesses in the rear of the aircraft. The 3rd flight attendant is out of luck. They can't get to 3L because we are trying not to kiss the ceiling. This situation MUST BE IMMMEDIATELY addressed. There needs to be double jumpseats with 4 seatbelts and harnesses available for working crew to keep them safe. All [Company] Airbus aircraft need to be retrofitted with these. Flight Attendant reported airline's A321s are inadequately configured with jumpseats; seatbelts; and shoulder harnesses to provide safety for three flight attendants working in the aft of the aircraft during turbulence.
Aircraft: MBB-BK 117 ALL SERIES
Phase of flight: unknown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance

During the track and balance of A/C S/N XXXX; there were issues getting the blades to fly together; blade swapping took place as well as blade replacements. I was doing the paperwork portion and trusted that the information given to me was correct. When I was told which S/N's were swapped and which were replaced. Logbook entries were made and signed off reflecting those actions. Fast forward a few weeks I was sent an RO (Repair Order) to get unserviceable blades sent out for repair. I printed out the RO's placed them in the blade boxes and got the blades sent out. Nowhere in this process did I physically check the S/N's of the blades. I trusted the mechanics to give me the correct information which was a huge mistake and I should have physically verified the P/N's and S/N's as outlined in our procedures. This is the end of my statement.Do not rely on others to verify P/N's S/N's. Physically Verify P/N's and S/N's. Double-check other mechanic work to ensure completeness and that what was said was done was actually done. Follow published guidance; policies; and procedures. Technician reported not verifying part numbers and serial numbers prior to shipping main rotor blades out for repair.
Aircraft: FALCON 900
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

The Jeppesen KRITR 1 RNAV SID at KCLT has a 'Speed Restriction' box. The speed restriction box states 'Upon reaching 10;000 feet accelerate to and MAINTAIN 280 KIAS; if unable advise ATC.' It then in the same box states next 'CHARLOTTE/DOUGLAS INTL only; Accelerate to 250 KIAS; if unable; advise ATC.' This is confusing. Prior to reaching 10;000 feet we asked Charlotte Departure what airspeed they were expecting us to maintain above 10;000 feet to clarify. The Air Traffic Controller stated '280 knots' we maintained the correct speed of 280 KIAS. Problem solved for us; but this ambiguous statement could cause someone else to make an error. Falcon 900 Captain reported some confusion of airspeed requirements on the KRITR1 RNAV SID and the statement 'Upon reaching 10;000 ft.' and 'Prior to reaching 10;000 ft.'
Aircraft: SMALL AIRCRAFT
Phase of flight: Final Approach
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC

Approaching Merrill Field from the northeast from the highway; we were instructed to enter the left downwind for Runway 7 and report Clark Middle School. Upon reporting we were at traffic pattern altitude of 900 FT. Tower instructed us to extend left downwind because of landing traffic at 1;800 FT. We had traffic in sight and turned left base over the downtown shoreline. We took a wide base turn because my student was flying. We were then set up for a long final approach. Landing traffic was clear the runway and we were cleared to land on Runway 7. Upon flying over the Sheraton Hotel (a notable landmark for its location to the traffic patterns of Merrill Field) we were approximately 500 FT MSL when my student called out traffic abeam to our right at our altitude. I saw the pilot of the other plane and it was close; maybe 200 FT by my perception. We immediately dove to the left. The [other aircraft] immediately banked away and to the right.Upon landing; I called the Merrill Field Tower to complain. They indicated that we were not at fault at all. The other aircraft did not listen to three instructions to follow behind us. Apparently the [other aircraft] claimed they were mistakenly following a military aircraft at Elmendorf AFB; which I think is a complete bunch of BS. I told the Tower Controller I wanted to pursue this with the FAA because I was not pleased at the other pilot's lack of situational awareness; attention on the radio; and overall flying abilities that I have never had anything like this happen before.The Tower Manager called me back; after having pulled the radar and radio tapes. He told me that the other aircraft did not listen to instruction; and that it was 1/20th of a mile (250 FT) from us on a T-Bone 90 degree intercept. I cannot believe how close this was. Assuming that plane was flying 70 KTS; we had 2 seconds before impact. I can't believe that pilot's poor attention to let something like this happen. Small aircraft instructor pilot reported an NMAC with another small aircraft in the pattern at MRI.
Aircraft: ANY UNKNOWN OR UNLISTED AIRCRAFT MANUFACTURER
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown

Once again the VRB RADAR was taken down for preventative maintenance in the middle of the day when it is needed most. We were very busy at sector three with numerous aircraft wanting to do practice instrument approaches. We had an aircraft that came from F11 wanting to do a practice approach at VRB and then return northward to SGJ. At some point we lost this aircraft on RADAR due to the RADAR outage. I was too busy to look closely; but it is quite possible that we had numerous non-RADAR deals with this aircraft as we had numerous aircraft on vectors at his altitude. There is no reason; other than the agency being to cheap; that this maintenance cannot be done on midnight shifts when there is no demand. Every time they take the RADAR during daylight hours it causes a severe degradation in safety and efficiency. That they continue to perform these operations during times of peak demand just shows that all the agencies talk of concern for safety is just that; talk. The VRB and MLB RADAR should never be taken offline for preventive maintenance during daylight hours. VRB RADAR was taken down for maintenance during a busy traffic period. A ZMA Controller suggests; as a safety issue; this type of elective maintenance should be completed during late night operations.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Parked; Taxi
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight departed the gate showing dangerous goods unsecured. The ramp lead tried to final multiple times without the required 15 bags and this is the alert that populated in my [Software] bar.[Error Message] The flight was already showing off the gate and had been off the gate for some time before the ramp attempted to final and they attempted to final the flight 4 times without the required bags. The lead realizing the issue then went into [Load Planning Software] and manually changed the bag count which of course allowed them to final the flight. Air Carrier Ramp personnel reported Hazmat Dangerous Goods transported without required Hazmat cargo configuration.
Aircraft: A330
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Strong burning dust odor/fumes upon climb out; near level off. Unknown passenger injury; most cabin crew had reaction to fumes. Coughing; bloody sinus discharge; headaches; dizzy; burning eyes. This event did not seem to affect me physically. A330 Flight Attendant reported most of the cabin crew and an unknown number of passengers experienced physical effects from fumes in the cabin during climb.
Aircraft: B787
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Upon receiving three B787 oxygen bottles. I; Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) in ZZZ inspected these bottles before putting them in service. This is normal practice in ZZZ. It was at this time I noticed one bottle was low; one was empty and the other was at 2000 psi (normal). My investigation revealed that all three bottles had damaged (bent) Gauges. ALL three is alarming to me. I have attached photos of all three bottles along with the Non-Rotable Parts tags. There needs to be an investigation to determine where the damage is occurring. And we need to check all B787s to determine if they are flying around with damaged bottles. Flight Deck Crew. Component. Reporter stated flight crews have two oxygen bottles located in the Main Equipment Center (MEC) under the cockpit floor. Bottles are made of composite materials with a valve head on the bottle that is different from earlier composite bottles. Mechanics must shut off both bottles when servicing either bottle to prevent loss of oxygen from bottle not being serviced. Bottles have to be removed for oxygen servicing; requiring a two-person effort. No scratches or dents are allowed on any bottle.Reporter stated his air carrier went to an all metal box for transporting their oxygen bottles because they are shipped pressurized on aircraft with 2;000 pounds of pressure. The containers are designed to handle heat and bottle pressures. They recently identified the cause of the damaged oxygen gauges on the bottles to be from the plastic shipping containers that had previously been used to ship oxygen bottles by ground; but are still used for storing them. The B787 composite bottles were not secured in the plastic containers and would slide around inside. Damage to the bottle valve head and gauge was more likely to occur when the plastic box was stood up on one end. His air carrier has already accomplished a Fleet Campaign and found one bottle installed with the bent pressure gauge. Almost all of the bent; damaged bottle gauges were found to be leaking oxygen. An Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) reports finding three Crew Oxygen bottles with damaged (bent) pressure gauges during a Receiving Inspection procedure prior to putting the bottles in service. Concerns also raised as to where the damage had been occurring and whether other aircraft may be flying around with damaged bottles.
Aircraft: STAGGER WING 17
Phase of flight: landing
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

I was flying about 700 feet AGL; when the engine sputtered and quit (I believe it was caused by carburetor icing.) I pushed the throttle ahead full; pulled carb heat and pumped the hand pump with no results so I ended up landed in the only safe place to land that would also cause the least damage to the aircraft. I landed gear up on the snow in a swamp instead of the woods. A Beechcraft Staggerwing pilot reported losing engine power around 700 feet and landing straight ahead with his gear up.
Aircraft: CARAVAN 208B
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

A Cessna Caravan; not in radar coverage; was [getting] handed off to me from a Center Sector 10 [at] 11;000 feet direct to the KSGU airport on a random route. I attempted to contact the Center sector about the aircraft as they were going through several areas of high terrain and many active military use airspaces. There wasn't an answer. Eventually they contacted me. I told them I could not take the aircraft because he was non-RADAR on a random direct route where no points on his path were displayable on my scope.The controller became agitated and asked me how he could fix it. I didn't have an answer; at that point; the rule had already been broken and I wasn't sure how he could fix it. He then got even angrier that he didn't know that he should have read the FAAH 7110.65 before he started controlling traffic; instead of asking me to explain it to him over a shout line while I was busy. I finally got the aircraft; not in radar contact; and I knew the transferring sector wasn't going to fix it; so the safest course of action was to give the aircraft to me. I made sure the aircraft was level above the highest terrain in the area and cleared him direct to a VOR within NAVAID use limitations. ZLC ARTCC Controller reported they were handed off an aircraft below their radar coverage on a random direct route instead of an approved non radar route.
Aircraft: AIRBUS 318/319/320/321 UNDIFFERENTIATED
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

In the descent to BZN; we were given direct KICDO (IAF on ILS 12) and a descent to 10;000 MSL. Approximately 9-10 miles east of KICDO; we received a GPWS 'TERRAIN; TERRAIN' while IMC. I; as pilot flying; performed the GPWS escape maneuver and climbed up to 11;000 while the captain notified ATC and we were given a stop climb at 11k. The controller said he doesn't usually have anyone have any GPWS hits in that sector but also mentioned the MSA had recently changed in the past few months. We continued to fly the ILS to a full stop without any more incidents. [Report narrative contained no additional information.] Airbus A320 series flight crew experienced a terrain warning descending to 10;000 feet approximately 9 NM east of KICDO during the ILS 12 at BZN. The aircraft was climbed to 11;000 feet and ATC confirmed that 10;000 feet was the correct altitude.
Aircraft: UAV: UNPILOTED AERIAL VEHICLE
Phase of flight: unknown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Unauthorized Flight Operations (UAS)

I am an ASEL and rotorcraft rated pilot and I teach Part 107 classes. I obtained my Remote Pilot certificate through the FAA Safety website and have had it for approximately X years. After two years; I renewed my certificate under the Part 61 Pilots Recurrent course. Since that renewal; my flight currency in manned aircraft has expired. I believe this means that I cannot use my 'Part 61 Pilot with Currency' certificate and have to take the Non-Part 61 recurrent course. I didn't realize this until I had been flying for approximately X months past my expiration of Part 61 currency. To aid in my Part 107 teaching; I decided to watch the 'Non-Part 61 Pilot Recurrent' training and saw that the intended audience included 'Part 61 Certificate Holders who do not have a current flight review'. I am now taking the appropriate course. UAS pilot reported not completing the correct recurrent Part 107 training at the time of their Part 61 currency expiration.