Aryan95614/aerograph-asrs huggingface dataset:
Aircraft: MEDIUM TRANSPORT
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Departing ZZZ and assigned the ZZZZZX departure. The departure was thoroughly briefed before flight. All waypoints checked. We went as far as setting up the engine out procedure in the secondary flight plan. After takeoff the PF began the departure. The aircraft was cleaned up; accelerated; and hand-flown. A busy time immediately after departure. Within one minute after departure and after completing the after takeoff checklist I looked at my primary display and noticed our flight path was roughly one mile west and one mile south of the left-hand initial curve of the ZZZZZ Departure. It was visual conditions and I believe the PF got distracted by maintaining visual with the terrain outside during the initial steep climbout and not focusing closely enough on the departure course line. I did not catch the deviation initially with the workload and all happening within a couple minutes. There was never any issue with terrain or traffic. ATC stated after this initial departure climb that we were off our course; and I acknowledged this. Both myself the PNF; and the PF have flown very little in the last 3 months. I believe for the PF that this was his first leg in a few months. For myself; I've had 3 legs in the last 3.5 months. There is something to be said for a small lack of proficiency that this created; and not catching the error with a faster scan or recognition. Another factor was the PF wanting to get the feel of the plane again and to wanting to hand-fly a busy DP in mountainous terrain. Pilot reported a track heading deviation and cited lack of flying as a contributing factor.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

There were two issues with during the pushback. Upon requesting push clearance gate [ramp control] told us to push for spot X but disconnect abeam the gate. As we were pushing I noticed we were turning well wide of the spot X line and it appeared we were headed for the spot Y line. The Captain began communicating with the tug driver to inform him of his error. As the Captain began to communicate with the tug driver gate [ramp control] called me to tell me we were on the wrong line. I told them we were aware and trying to relay the message to the tug driver who didn't seem to understand what we were telling him. [Ramp control] told us it was okay and that we could disconnect where we were; which was now on the spot Y line. The Captain told the tug driver ramp wants us to disconnect here now. The next communication we received from the tug driver was to 'set brakes'. We noticed we were still rolling forward so the Captain said we can't because he is still towing us forward. The only reply was another 'set brakes'. We explained we still cannot set them he's towing us. Through several more exchanges we realized we're no longer connected to the tug. The Captain then applied the brakes causing an abrupt stop. During that time I was looking at the tug and it was moving backwards (away from aircraft) at the same speed we were rolling forward which visually appeared as if we were being towed. There was a complete lack of standard communication from the tug driver causing confusion. Once we had brakes set and were officially disconnected the flight attendants called to ask what happened and that they almost fell over during the briefing. B737NG First Officer reported several deviations from SOP during pushback that posed safety risks.
Aircraft: B767
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

It was after sunset when Aircraft X landed and was rolling out. My Ground Controller was busy with multiple tasks; including a clearance he was about to start reading. I gave the taxiway a quick scan and decided I was going to exit Aircraft X in front of his ramp and have him taxi into parking while monitoring ground (instead of stopping; calling and waiting). I loudly said to Ground Control 'Aircraft X to parking with me'. The ground controller working at the time is one of the best we have and I assumed he would say something if there was a problem. I told Aircraft X to 'turn right at [taxiway]; cross 31R and taxi to parking via A; monitor ground point niner on your way in'. Aircraft X crossed 31R partially then did not continue on to the A Taxiway. I heard Aircraft X say out of Ground Control's speaker 'hey; Ground; did you know about this Cessna?' I looked up to see a taxing Cessna pass in front of Aircraft X; left to right. My Ground Controller was obviously upset. Aircraft X taxied to parking without further incident.At [tower] we have a cultural practice of holding on to aircraft to parking; if it is close to the runway exit point. (taxiing aircraft to parking on tower frequency) It is generally accepted and most controllers here do it; under the premise that it provides better service. A few are against it and now I see why. It was dark when this occurred; which further increased the chances of the taxiing Cessna being missed with a quick scan of the taxiway.I have now joined the ranks of the few controllers who won't taxi them in on ground. I plan to bring this up at the next local safety council meeting and advise against the practice to my coworkers. Local Controller issued taxi instructions to an aircraft instead of switching the aircraft to Ground Control frequency to receive the taxi instructions. Reporter states this is a common practice at this facility in certain circumstances. Ground Control had traffic taxiing in confliction with the aircraft Local Control issued taxi instructions to. The pilot noticed the traffic and stopped on the taxiway and asked the Tower if they knew about the conflicting traffic.
Aircraft: B757
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Maintenance in ZZZZ found the Cannon plug broken on the First Officer's Stick Shaker. We applied MEL 27-32-02 which has you pull and collar the Circuit Breaker for the affected system isolating the Stick Shaker motor. The Cannon plug was secured and capped per the Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) Chapter-20; since it could not be re-connected to the broken receptacle on the motor. Initially; an Engineering Authorization was pursued until we realized that we could deactivate the system by pulling and collaring the Circuit Breaker per the MEL and that would isolate the broken connector. At that point; with Engineering Management's concurrence; we did not pursue an Engineering Authorization. The system was deactivated by pulling and collaring the Circuit Breaker for the Stick Shaker per the MEL. The Cannon plug on the motor was broken; it was not removed for isolation of the motor; and it could not be connected to the receptacle on the motor. I felt that the intent of the MEL was met and that we were not further isolating the system with the broken Cannon plug being disconnected as the maintenance alert states. [Recommend] clarifying the intent of maintenance alert XX-000. What is the exact communication from the FAA on this? When an item of equipment is inoperative (Stick Shaker motor Cannon plug Circuit Breaker) and maintenance is deferred under the guidance of the MEL (pull and collar Circuit Breaker); the airplane must be operated under all applicable conditions and limitations contained in the MEL: (pull and collar Circuit Breaker). Until further notice; if an additional isolation procedure is deemed to be necessary at any time during the deferral period of an MEL item; contact Maintenance Control and submit an Engineering Request. Engineering may issue an Engineering Authorization on a case by case basis to permit these procedures if appropriate. If Engineering does not issue an Engineering Authorization; or the conditions of the MEL cannot be met; the item must be repaired prior to further flight. Additional isolation needs to be defined. This was a broken Cannon plug on the Stick Shaker motor. Is this an additional isolation; or an inoperative system addressed by the MEL? Aircraft Maintenance Manager. An Aircraft Maintenance Manager reports about the need for clarification of a company Maintenance Alert that describes the importance of requesting an Engineering Authorization (E/A) when an additional isolation procedure is applied during a deferral process. Cannon plug for the first officer's Stick Shaker motor was broken and was capped-off; but was not part of the MEL procedure for deferral of the Stick Shaker System on a B757-200.
Aircraft: CRJ200
Phase of flight: Takeoff / Launch
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

At rotation; we encountered wake turbulence from the preceding MD-88. The aircraft rolled hard to the left and triggered a momentary stick-shaker. The First Officer lowered the pitch and countered the roll immediately. We encountered the wake turbulence again at 600 FT consisting of a hard roll again to the left. The First Officer countered the roll to maintain wings level. At 1;500 FT; we hit the wake turbulence again. I advised ATC and they gave us a heading of 070 to rejoin the departure. The remainder of the flight was uneventful. In the future; if ATC issues a takeoff clearance; so soon after the preceding aircraft takes off; I should be vigilant of possible wake turbulence. I should notify ATC sooner especially during RNAV departures. [Report narrative contained no additional information.] CRJ-200 flight crew reported wake turbulence encounter departing ATL in trail of an MD-88.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

I unknowingly rode in a van with; and flew with a Flight Attendant who had exhibited COVID symptoms the day prior to our flight. On [date 1]; the Flight Attendant reported from ZZZ that she had been vomiting and had a temperature above 100. She reportedly called in sick at that time; but still flew the next day with us ZZZ-ZZZ1. That day she also rode with us in the van; a 15 minute ride from the hotel. Only once airborne; from ZZZ-ZZZ1; was I made aware of the Flight Attendant's situation; and reported it immediately. I must not have all the information; because it appears that she called in sick on [date 1] with COVID symptoms; but was allowed to fly the [to] ZZZ1; then was on sick list again when she got to ZZZ1. Because I was in close proximity to the Flight Attendant with COVID symptoms for more than 15 minutes; I called in sick for the remainder of my trip. Air carrier Captain reported concerns with being in close contact with a Flight Attendant that had called in sick the day before for COVID-19 like symptoms.
Aircraft: SKYWAGON 185
Phase of flight: Landing
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Following a normal approach to landing at a back country airstrip; and during the rollout phase it appears as though the brakes were being applied by the right seat passenger. The wheel landing (which I have done literally 1;000's of times) seemed normal until the point at which the tail should have started to settle. The tail did not settle as expected and at this point the aircraft began a very gradual left turn and with the tail rising. The prop struck the ground. There were no injuries. The aircraft had only two front seat occupants; was full of fuel and any application of brakes at that time is not something that one should do. Having had lots of experience in this aircraft I am quite comfortable that A) Somebody had their feet on the brake(s) & B) I am relatively sure it was not me. C185 pilot reported a prop strike occurred on landing roll when the passenger presumably applied the brakes at an inopportune moment.
Aircraft: SR22
Phase of flight: Climb
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Climbing from 7;000 feet to 15;000 feet; noticed rising engine temperatures approaching 10;000 feet; initiated course reversal and descent. Tried to diagnose engine issue; but was unable to do so before completely losing power. SR22 pilot reported an engine failure was preceded by rising engine temperatures.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Landing
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

While landing; the ground spoilers deployed and then began to stow during the rollout. I wasn't exactly sure when it occurred during the landing. The Pilot Monitoring noticed it and returned the speedbrake handle to the deployed position. I thought it was something I had inadvertently done and didn't realize exactly how the sequence occurred. I figured since I didn't have a full picture on what just happened or why; we should fly the plane to the next destination; and if it happened again; we'd watch it more closely so we could describe it. We flew the plane to our next destination. In retrospect; that was a poor decision; and I believe I should have called a Maintenance Technician and given him all the information I could and have him take a look at it. [Report narrative contained no additional information] Flight crew experienced an apparent ground spoiler problem on landing roll out and decide to watch the spoilers closer on landing next leg.
Aircraft: SMALL AIRCRAFT; HIGH WING; 1 ENG; FIXED GEAR
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Ground Event / Encounter Object

I departed my home base late afternoon and flew to OXC; arriving at approximately about a half hour later. I was flying solo (the sole occupant of the plane). Upon arriving at OXC; I requested taxi to the east side of field as I was meeting somebody there. The tower gave me taxi instructions and I proceeded. As I went to make a 180 degree turn to park the plane into the tie down; I misjudged my clearance on the left hand side; causing the plastic wing tip to strike a chain-link fence at an angle of about 10 degrees. Immediately upon realizing what happened; I shut down the aircraft; and a line crew member in the area helped me push the plane off the fence and to a more suitable location. Inspection of the damage revealed broken strobe and nav lights; some paint damage; and a small dent on the front left corner of the plastic wing tip. I immediately called our Operations Officer and we decided to have the plane towed to the maintenance shop to get a disposition on the plane. When the plane was towed; the FBO staff were all in consensus that the damage was very minor and cosmetic; and that as long as we unscrewed the bracket for one of the lights and taped over the dangling wiring harness from the lights; the plane could be flown back. With help from the FBO; the bracket was unscrewed; the area taped over; and the aircraft was flown back to its home base without incident; arriving back still during daylight hours.It is noteworthy that multiple people noted to me that I was far from the first person to strike a fence in that area. I was shown other places where planes struck; and have been told that some planes have even practically taken the fence out. While I accept fault for misjudging my clearance on my left side; it appears as though this spot for some reason poses a problem for pilots. Perhaps further action should be taken in the future to make the parking in this area more pilot-friendly. A single engine pilot taxiing and turning to a tie down spot reported striking the wingtip on a chain link fence at OXC. The plastic wingtip; nav light; and strobe were damaged. Maintenance secured the damaged area which allowed the pilot to return to his home base.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Landing
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

This is a general report regarding some techniques I've seen from First Officers (mostly new hires). They are being taught that since we have higher target speeds it's ok to intentionally fly below the glideslope and inside of 200 ft it's ok to dive for the runway as 'we won't hit anything now'. This is leading to harder landings; either too slow or too fast target speeds and is normalizing deviance. Additionally going into LAX they are being taught to purposely land off centerline since it is a 'bumpy' runway. The training department should address these techniques. B737 Captain reported concern regarding some training techniques that are presented to the new hire pilots.
Aircraft: PA28
Phase of flight: Landing
Anomaly: Ground Excursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

I was practicing pattern work when I made my 3rd out of 3 approaches. The first approach was a touch n go; the second was a practice go around; and the 3rd was a normal approach. As I recall the wind was from 230 @ 10 knots. My set up for approach was good with no issues descending at approximately 300 feet per minute; then reducing down to 50 feet per minute; on final approach; with an approach speed of 80-85 mph indicated. I added my 3rd and final notch of flaps approximately 500 yds from the end of runway 26L; which I was cleared for the option for by ATC. Upon touchdown at around 65 mph; a strong wind gust from the left pushed my plane hard toward the right hand side of the runway. The plane also lifted back up a few feet as I was in the process of pulling my flaps back up. I attempted to steer back toward the left but the plane; by this time on the ground; continued to pull toward the right side. The plane then veered left at approximately a 60 degree angle; I did not attempt to correct the pull as I did not wish to tip the plane; and there was soft grass and short brush just off of runway 26L which appeared to be a safe location to come to a stop in. The plane rolled into the tall grass/brush. I completed a check list shut down of the engine; contacted the tower that I would need assistance pushing the plane off of the grass and back to the runway. I exited the plane and waited for airport personnel. The airport personnel assisted in turning my plane back toward runway 26L until my wheels were clear of the tall grass and brush. I started the engine back up; contacted the tower; then taxied back to my tie down spot. There was no damage to the aircraft noted. I learned from the this incident that I need to have improved command of my aircraft in terms of set up for a crosswind landing; to pull the flaps up to normal setting more quickly rather than leaving them in the full down position as I did in this case. I believe that this was the main reason for my failure to maintain control of my landing roll; or for why the aircraft ballooned once on the runway. My approach and landing speeds could have also been less; along with a more efficient crab angle into the cross wind that was occurring. I intend to seek out a CFI for further training with my aircraft; specifically for crosswind landings and procedures.I learned a great lesson from this incident; and will think of it often as I continue with my aviation pursuits. PA-28-180 pilot reported loss of control during landing in gusty wind conditions that resulted in excursion from the runway surface into grass and brush. No damage noted.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: unknown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I contacted Scheduling once I landed in ZZZZ. I wanted to return on the outbound flight that was completely empty. Scheduling informed me that I needed to [be] with crew and stay in ZZZZ. I expressed my concerns of staying with the crew. Then getting on 2 other aircraft and staying in 2 Hotels. Scheduling wanted to know the reason for my concern. I begin to explain that I received called before I left for my trip; that I have come in contact with a crew member that tested positive [for] COVID-19. Scheduling immediately turned me over to the Duty Manager on duty that evening back in ZZZ. I tried to explain the situation; and who was the person telling me the details of my interaction. And the scheduler that told me that I had to either do the trip or remove myself from the trip.I explained to Manager the person that called me to inform me of my contact with the crew member with COVID-19. And also explained what the Scheduler wanted me to do. Then I tried to explain the concern of the Captain of why I was on the trip in the first place. Manager explained he wanted me to continue on the trip. To stay at the hotel and continuing on with the crew on the rest of the trip. Manager informed me that someone from the COVID team would be calling me at the hotel within [X] hours. None of which ever happened.At this point of arriving in ZZZZ. The only thing I wanted to do is come home. I would like to know the reason why I could not do that. So would my crew and so would the flight deck. Please give me a reason why I had to stay in two hotels and try to self quarantine myself. After working the full flight from ZZZ1 to ZZZZ. Then staying at the hotel in ZZZZ. Then deadheading from ZZZZ to ZZZ2. Staying in a hotel in ZZZ2. And then continue on another flight from ZZZ2 to ZZZ1. No I'm not a doctor but listening to the experts; the scientist and the doctors. The best thing would have to turn me around and send me home. So please tell me why that was not done. And what was the purpose of keeping me there. Flight Attendant reported being asked to continue flying after being notified of being in contact with a crew member who had tested positive for COVID-19.
Aircraft: B767
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft X had a BTB for a Captain pitot static amber EICAS warning. We quickly determined it was a probe. We have an FAK with a R/H probe in inventory. We needed an LH probe. We were able to get one from company; we installed the probe; Ops checked probe; accomplished the paperwork. Had multiple conversations with Tech and [Maintenance Control]. Deferred the aerodynamic sealant with a 767 desk. No mention in B767 MM 34-11-01 OF RII . ETOPS was noted for ice/rain (mm 30-31). When I awoke this AM; I had a friend look up in GMM ATA 34 FOR RII and then notified [Maintenance Control] of a possible situation my next step was my report. There was 1 mechanic at ZZZ that was ETOPS qualified; me who accomplished task; [and] we had another who was RII but not ETOPS. Technician reported not having correct qualifications to perform and sign off the log book for a Captain's Pitot Probe replacement.
Aircraft: C172
Phase of flight: Initial Approach
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

I passed the final approach fix (FAF) well below specified minimum altitude while flying the OXR VOR 25 approach.I had not flown this approach for a long time; and chose to do so as part of maintaining general IFR proficiency. I failed to achieve a stabilized approach while on the approach segment leading to the CMA VOR; which is the FAF. At one point I realized I was higher than intended; and started a too aggressive correction toward 2;000 FT; which is the FAF crossing minimum. By the time I realized I had failed to halt my descent at 2;000; the VOR was in the zone when neither the TO nor the FROM flag was showing. Thus I thought I might already be passed the FAF. I was not sure I had passed the FAF. I was not sure I had passed the FAF below minimums until informed by ATC a few moments later. C172 pilot reported descending below the FAF crossing altitude during a practice VOR Runway 25 approach to OXR in day VMC. ATC detected the error.