Aryan95614/aerograph-asrs huggingface dataset:
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Takeoff / Launch
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Basically there are no visible runway markings on this runway. I have never been here before and I will never go back again. At 500 feet you are looking at what looks like a road in the middle of nowhere and have to decide if you can land. We have airline service to this place so I assume it must be ok. Paint is so faded on runway that you can't make anything out. No numbers; edge marking; centerline marking; or anything else. No part 121 carrier should be flying to this place.No tower; no radar. Ceiling was much lower than we were told. Reported weather was 6500 SCT. Actually weather was 2000 BKN; good visibility. Multiple VFR aircraft flying around. Short; skinny runway; no runway numbers; no runway markings. If it doesn't look like a runway then don't land there. Air carrier Captain reported that in his opinion no air carrier should operate into MYEH because of substandard conditions.
Aircraft: LIGHT TRANSPORT; LOW WING; 2 TURBOPROP ENG
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

We recently had a change in airspace and procedures with C90 climbing departures northbound to 15;000 (it used to be 13;000). I had an overflight that was at 16;000; he asked to descend to 12;000 as soon as he was clear of C90 airspace. There was aircraft departing ORD that were also traffic for him. Once aircraft was clear of C90 and departing traffic; I descended him to 12;000 without thinking about the fact that I was over Milwaukee Approach airspace who owns up to 13;000. I was more concerned with missing the new C90 airspace. All the airspace below us was uniform when it was at 13;000. The change in procedures took my attention away from Milwaukee Approach airspace. Nothing happened from the incident other than I descended into somebody else's airspace with no appreq. I have worked this airspace very little since the change in airspace and procedures. ZAU Controller descended aircraft into Milwaukee airspace after the traffic cleared the lateral confines of C90 airspace. Reporter cited confusion following a recent airspace change.
Aircraft: BOMBARDIER/CANADAIR UNDIFFERENTIATED OR OTHER MODEL
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Vehicle

After landing on 35 at Philly and being cleared into the ramp from Spot 15 we were taxiing southbound. As I was preparing to make the turn in to the gate; I asked the First Officer (FO) to 'keep me honest' on the right side of the aircraft. He said it was clear; but a fuel truck was heading our way. I continued taxiing forward (still southbound) a little bit then started to angle the plane to the right towards the gate. The FO then stated that the fuel truck was still coming. I slowed down some more and asked him how far the truck was. Being that this was apparently his first trip off of IOE; I was trying to gauge his comfort level and what distance 'coming towards us' could be. As I came through about 30 degrees of turn the FO stated that the fuel truck wasn't stopping. At this point I applied the brakes and came to a complete stop. Within a second or two I had visual on the truck as he drove on by staring into what appeared to be a cell phone. At no point did he ever look our way; and the FO stated that he was shocked that the guy stayed at the same speed the entire time he was watching him. I immediately contacted the ramp and described the situation with them; and gave them the number of the fuel truck. There was still substantial room (150 plus feet) between the nose of the aircraft and the vehicle roadway at the time of the incident.Fuel truck driver not paying attention. The potential for an incident was increased ever so slightly by my choice to turn the plane in towards the ramp assuming the truck would see us and stop. Fortunately the FO was paying attention to where I couldn't see and kept us well out of danger. A CRJ Captain reports a fuel truck driver not yielding as they were turning into the ramp. The aircraft is stopped and as the truck passes by the driver appears to be fully engrossed in his cell phone.
Aircraft: LARGE TRANSPORT; LOW WING; 2 TURBOJET ENG
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

A new procedure has been placed at HCF that we need to call a supervisor to watch the R7 Controller start a track on an IAFDOF [Incorrect Altitude For Direction Of Flight] aircraft inbound. According to the CEDAR; we are required to call the supervisor on initial contact with the IAFDOF aircraft. I tried calling out to a supervisor upon initial contact of Aircraft X; who was coming inbound at AUNTI at an inappropriate altitude of FL390; but there was no supervisor at the desk. An OM [Operations Manager] was at the desk; but he ignored my attempts to contact him. I tried calling on the 'ZHN SUP' line; but the OM did not answer; and neither did the supervisor. I stated 'Article 65' on the line; because I was unable to perform a required task. I still kept attempting to find a supervisor. I even called sector R2/D2; and she said she saw a supervisor; behind the watch desk. I do not know why [the supervisor] did not respond to my verbal calls or my landline call; but I was unable to perform the IAFDOF procedure that we are required to do; in a timely manner. This new procedure is a distraction to the R7 and the D7 controllers because we need to locate a supervisor when supervisors are not always at the desk; or even on the floor. We put our traffic and the safety of the flying public at risk with this new procedure. Please; fix this.We need a coordinator at R7; especially if our management is putting additional unsafe procedures for us to do at a very busy sector. I am concerned there will be a catastrophic incident involving a mid-air; if we need to divert our attention from the radar; in order to locate a supervisor. Quite honestly; if this is how management is treating this new procedure; I will be unable to comply with it; especially if I am working the sector combined. I will not be able to sacrifice safety for a procedure that is totally unsafe and inappropriate.And staff the facility; in order to have a coordinator position. Not; a supervisor; but a controller; who understands the traffic. Most supervisors at the HCF are not even current on sector R7. HCF Controller reports of a new procedure that he needs to coordinate with a FLM. The controller cannot find a FLM and then States Article 65. The controller does not know why the FLMs are not being able to be found when this is part of the procedure.
Aircraft: SR20
Phase of flight: Landing
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

I was in flare for a landing for Runway 14. The nose of the plane dropped while I was in ground effect and uptown landing. The plane took off again. It bounced twice before coming to a full stop. Upon taxing to the parking at the FBO; I exited the plane and saw that I apparently had a prop strike; and the front gear had bend and push the oil drain in and began leaking oil from the plane. A SR-22 pilot reported the aircraft's nose dropped in the flair after which the aircraft lifted off and bounded twice. During the subsequent ramp inspection a bent propeller and oil leak were discovered.
Aircraft: BAE 125 SERIES 800
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

We were assigned and aircraft for an early morning departure. The plane had arrived a few hours prior. During preflight there was an overwhelmingly strong odor of fuel when I preflighted the right wheel well area. The entire bottom of the plane was wet with condensation. I ran my finger along the bottom skid and it became completely covered in jet fuel. I wrote the airplane up for a fuel leak. Later in the day I talked to the Mechanic who worked on it. He had cleaned the bottom of the airplane and he showed me a hole in the skid where the fuel was coming from. He told me the plan was to sign it off as an acceptable leak so that it could be moved somewhere were it could be fixed. The next morning I ran into the crew assigned to the aircraft. I discovered that they were not moving it to a place where it could be fixed; but were flying several revenue legs with the aircraft. I informed them of the prior day's history.Having another of several recent could not duplicate write ups this morning I also want to report something else that has been bothering me. In December I had a bad fuel leak from the refueling panel area. There is a report on file concerning the incident. I don't believe I was the first to have a leak in this area in this aircraft; and since December I have seen probably ten write ups on this aircraft for a fuel leak in the refueling/ventral tank area. How many fuel leaks in the same aircraft and the same area that obviously haven't been fixed are needed before this is considered a major safety problem?I would recommend reviewing the maintenance records from the last year for this aircraft in relation to this fuel leak. An HS-128-800 Captain reported a fuel leak in the refueling/ventral tank area which apparently had not been repaired since he recorded the leak in the maintenance log nearly nine months earlier.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance

FO's leg home; we observed and discussed the re-release on ground in ZZZZ; commented that it was unusual to see it coming from Continent X. Approaching ZZZZZ we never received the re-release and FO (flying) and Relief Pilot (monitoring) with CA on break failed to catch it. We didn't realize the mistake until CA asked me 'OBW [Oh By the Way] how'd that re-release go while I was asleep' while taxiing to gate at ZZZ! 1. FO's First flight in nearly 6 months.2. Unaccustomed to seeing re-release out of Continent X. 3. Crew failed to brief it when we swapped out for last break. 4. Dispatch failed to send it. 5. Should have put a reminder in computer; as a last ditch catch all; or a tried and true sticky note on dash.Avoid complacency; any number of reminders via sticky note; computer; following crew swap brief outline; timer; blaze yellow highlighter! First Officer reported not realizing that they did not receive a re-release.
Aircraft: DHC8
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Leaving ZZZ to ZZZ1. I forgot to turn the bleed switches on at acceleration height. Our takeoff required the bleeds to be off. We got a cabin press warning at cruise; to which we noticed the bleeds we're off and we turned them on. This cleared the cabin press warning and pressurization was normal; I went over the E&A checklist to confirm everything. We didn't execute an emergency descent as it wasn't required. Flight continued on with no incidents. Same as above.The early morning; plus the dark cockpit led to me noticing the bleed switch position. In the dark; the switches appear normal. A technique taught during sim is to touch the bleed switches during the acceleration height flow. I'll definitely be using that technique from here on out. Captain reported not turning engine bleed air switched to on after an engine bleed off takeoff; causing a loss of cabin pressure control.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Descent
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Had been cruising at FL370 and was issued a descent to FL290. While in descent at Mach .77 and around 31;000 feet; experienced significant wake turbulence roll (approximately 45 degrees AOB along with aircraft 'roll authority' warning) due to Boeing 767 aircraft 8-10 miles ahead of us. I contacted ATC and told them that we needed more separation and they allowed us to slow. When I had the chance; I made announcement to passengers explaining that it was unexpected and isolated wake turbulence that should not happen again. Later near 10;000 feet; I started to get into wake turbulence again; so I queried ATC as to was it same aircraft and stated we needed more separation. Boston Approach stated that they had just implemented new reduced separation criteria for B-767 aircraft which were now considered a lower category heavy aircraft (I believe 'Re-certified as Class C' was terminology used or something close to that). Not sure what the ATC separation standard was at altitude; but I am very thankful we were already descending or it likely would have been an emergency descent. Down low with approach control; the new 3.5 miles of separation minimum behind 'heavy; low and slow' B-767 (previously was 5 mile minimum per my query to Controller) was not sufficient. The FAA should further address safety issues associated with reduced wake turbulence separation. Been flying close to [XX] years and this was an eye opener at altitude. Air carrier Captain reported encountering wake turbulence descending into BOS in trail of a heavy B767; and expressed concern about an apparent recent change to ATC procedures allowing reduced separation to heavy B767 aircraft.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

We were on our sixth leg and were running approximately 30 minutes late due to a ground stop. Operations wanted us to push off the gate anyway because a Company aircraft was waiting for the gate. We pushed off under some time pressure (two-man wired push). We started one engine with the intention to taxi out and hold somewhere when we were informed that the hold was no longer in effect. So I directed the First Officer to start Number 1. I finally cleared the ground crew off. Just after completing the Before Taxi Checklist; Ground informed us that the inbound Company aircraft noticed something hanging from the nose gear. I suddenly realized that the ground crew had not held up the bypass pin and was certain the pin had not been removed. We called Company and asked them to get the push crew back out to remove the bypass pin. They came out and removed the pin. The rest of the flight was uneventful. We were tired and under some time pressure due to the lifting of the ground stop; which led to increased coordination to start the second engine. Couple this with being at the end of a long day; I didn't catch the pushback crew not having removed the bypass pin. This may have been a training issue (or a long day for them); but it was still incumbent on me to confirm the pin had been removed. Lesson learned and I will make sure I see the pin in hand before I clear the crew off. B737 Captain reports a rushed pushback and engine start where the ground crew departs without removing the nose wheel steering bypass pin. The flight waiting for the gate notes the flag attached to the pin and informs the reporter. The ground crew is recalled and the pin is removed before taxiing is attempted.
Aircraft: BE-KA
Phase of flight: Cruise
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

While climbing to altitude over jump zone; I observed a large cloud moving over the airport. The cloud was at approximately 6;000 feet; and estimated 1 mile by 1/2 mile in diameter. Approximately 500 to 700 feet in depth. As we approached our exit point for the skydivers; I noticed part of the cloud was still over the airport. I advised the jumpers in the aircraft that there was a cloud in the vicinity of the airport and to let me know which way to adjust my flight path in order to ensure cloud clearance. When I was on jump run and turned the exit light on; 5 experienced jumpers exited the aircraft. As the tandem instructors approached the door; they advised me to go around and offset jump run slightly to the west to avoid the cloud. The remaining jumpers exited the airplane.When I landed; I was advised by an Observer on the ground that the first 5 jumpers had penetrated the cloud. An announcement was made to the entire drop zone that disregard for cloud clearance requirements would not be tolerated and everyone was warned. A C90 skydiving jump pilot at 14;500 feet attempted to avoid dropping his jumpers on a cloud at about 6;000 feet but was told after landing the divers had penetrated the cloud.
Aircraft: COMMERCIAL FIXED WING
Phase of flight: Taxi
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types

We experienced a disruption in ATC service because the ZZZ Tower evacuated due to Coronavirus concerns. This is the second occurrence of ATC Controllers immediately abandoning their duty stations with airborne aircraft to avoid exposure risk. This protocol poses an unacceptable risk to Aircrew and Passengers; and should be re-evaluated based on the number of lives put at risk versus the number of Controllers avoiding virus exposure. If ATC Controllers won't stay at their duty station long enough to recover airborne aircraft in these scenarios; we should be dispatching every flight with a suitable alternate until the Corona Virus crisis is contained. Air carrier Captain reported a Control Tower that was ATC Zero; leading to a disruption in communications.
Aircraft: B737
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Approximately 12 minutes prior to push; the APU was started. After APU start; the blue 'APU Maintenance' light illuminated. Per CRM; I advocated to the Captain that; per the FM (Flight Manual); we could legally operate and write it up at our destination. The FM allows continued operation with this light on. The Captain; however; desired to have Maintenance address the problem. Maintenance was then called and the Mechanic arrived at the cockpit in a very timely manner and investigated via the FMC. The FMC Maintenance page read 'APU oil low.' The Captain and the Mechanic then agreed to close the main cabin door while the Mechanic added the oil; and then communicate through the cockpit window. While the Mechanic was adding oil to the APU; a ramp person yelled up to the captain through the cockpit window; 'It's going to be okay.' The Captain interpreted this to mean that it was now okay to start the APU. Unknown to me; the Captain then started the APU. After realizing the error; the Captain immediately shut down the APU. A few minutes later; the mechanic was finished servicing the APU and walked up the cockpit window. The Captain was highly apologetic to the mechanic. Fortunately; neither the mechanic nor anyone else was hurt. The flight then proceeded normally. This was a miscommunication problem. While it's true that the ramp agent was merely trying to be helpful; nonetheless; a communication error occurred somewhere between the Mechanic; the Ramp Agent; and the Captain. I believe the primary factors involved were expectation bias and time pressure. The Captain had an expectation bias and heard what he wanted to hear since we were at/near pushback time. Better monitor and cross check between us could have prevented this mishap. About 15 minutes prior to scheduled pushback; saw the APU required maintenance. Maintenance determined oil was needed. At push time; I asked mx on the radio if it was OK to close the door and start the APU without anyone coming back to the flight deck. They said it was OK to use the APU (I saw the oil had been serviced) and it did not require a new Maintenance Release; but I didn't ensure the aircraft was clear. I attempted to start the APU and then immediately shut it down when I realized I didn't know if there was still a technician outside the rear of the aircraft by the APU. B737 flight crew reported unconsciously starting the APU while the unit was still being serviced by a Mechanic.
Aircraft: HS 125 SERIES
Phase of flight: Parked
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Upon landing in ZZZ the yellow AUX HYD LO LEVEL light illuminated on the master warning and caution panel. The light remained on during the landing rollout and for most of the taxi to the FBO. After our passengers left the FBO; I contacted Maintenance Control. An appropriate M2B form was submitted and the aircraft went AOG. Another aircraft arrived in ZZZ and we went into a 6 hour [tentative] status at the FBO. Two mechanics arrived to repair Aircraft X. They walked over and wanted to discuss the write up. I was glad to talk to them. I communicated the symptoms previously described and commented that on my post flight a meniscus was clearly visible in the auxiliary hydraulic system sight tube. They also commented that the system was full. Nevertheless; both mechanics stated that [Headquarters] just wanted them to add a little fluid and sign it off. The next day we were assigned Aircraft X. The M2B form from the previous night was cleared in this manner. Subsequently; we departed ZZZ for ZZZ1. Upon landing; the yellow STALL IDENT light illuminated on the master warning and caution panel. It remained illuminated during the landing rollout and for part of the taxi to the blocks. Again; an M2B form was completed and the aircraft was AOG. A day or two later I observed that the aircraft was grounded for corrosion behind the master warning and caution panel.There are times that I find myself wondering if we are really trying to fix aircraft properly the first time an event happens. Over the past couple years I have reported the following events to the Chief Pilot: (1) Right engine oil cap found on preflight at maintenance facility. (2) At maintenance facility I was accepting an aircraft that was released to the line. The aircraft was in maintenance for repeated auto shutdowns of the APU. At power up; the APU auto shut down. (3) Aircraft in maintenance for a thrust reverser issue. After the aircraft was released from maintenance the issue persisted. Other repeat issues have included avionics write ups; fuel leaks and cabin electrical discrepancies. While it is probably more challenging than I could imagine; are we serious about properly effecting repairs? Captain reported his concern over observing chronically unresolved repeat maintenance issues.