# German Tactical Doctrine

U.S. Marine Corps io 12UOO 00
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
Headquarters United States Marine Corps Washington, DC 20380-0001
13 April 1989
FOREWORD

## 1. Purpose

Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication (FMFRP) 12-11, German Tactical Doctrine, is published to ensure the retention and dissemination of useful information which is not intended to become doctrine or to be published in Fleet Marine Force manuals. FMFRPs in the 12 Series are a special category: reprints of historical works which are not available elsewhere.

## 2. Scope

This reference publication came about as the result of reports from American officers who attended the German General Staff School from
1935-1939. It describes the doctrinal similarities and differences which enabled the German Armies to achieve success in the early years of World War II, and gives the reader a view of German training and planning.

## 3. Certification

Reviewed and approved this date.

## By Direction Of The Commandant Of The Marine Corps

Major General, U.S. Marine Corps Deputy Commander for Warfighting Marine Corps Combat Development Command Quantico, Virginia DISTRIBUTION:

## German Tactical Doctrine

Prepared by Military Intelligence Service War Department December 20, 1942

## Foreword

litII)l'ItI(.1( 'I'I II ( ItEA'I', :LS the I'('StIIt of his CXI.)eriences iii tl)e Seven \'ars' Wat, IS CI'e(hitO(l with estal)IishitIg the lirsi (ene1Ll Stall in the history of military forces, This t.all Was cre:LLe( I
i I tam tt i 10 a( liii immisirative (10t41i Is, tints releasing tII()t'O liii i.e to the conuii.anders for t;actical Colt
Si(Iei'ailOiIS.

It was hut., hi()WOVO1', iiiit;iI 181(1 that F red
eii(k'M Sll(CeSSOI'S (StaI )l ISII(( I t school to trait i officers for
( enei'al Stall d tity.

Iee:uise siicceasliil 'nilitary results were achieved, France, Great lritain, the United States,
.htl )aJ 1, at 1(1 olliet' coutitnes based tI te formation of tI seir
( eiieral St.:i(is 111)011 tile itiocki Set by (ennany.

Regiiii ii ig with Sd iariih,orst, such (iisluIgwslie(I lea( hers and strategists as s'1oltk (the elder) and von Schmlielleti
'eie closely assodlate(l with the lIOVelOJ)meflt, of the wwral Stafi' School, which o)crated (,onl,muouSly from I I 0 tititil the outbreak of World War 1.

Subsequent to that war the Versiul los 'I'reaty forbade LI to comitintiamice of lime school, afl(I it was not until 1933 that the Kriegsakode
in/c, as the (lerinans call it, was officially reopened in the Rerun location that it was occupying at the outl)reak of
\\roi.I(1 War 11.

During the years from 1935 to 1939, the United States was :hJIowe(I to scud four in(hivi(llIal officers to take the course.

F rout their illuminating reports it is possible to learn the trend of German methods and teachings tip to I litler's attack on Poland.

Our ohsezvers unanimously agreed t.hi8t time ham bO(ly of (lOctrifle taught at the UI
Kriegsakademiethc body of doctrine that underlies the German waif are of todayis setforth in Truppenfuhrung, the German tactical bible so very similar iu matter and precept to our own FM 1005, Field Service Regulations, Operations.

rfho following partial rasuine of doctrine taught at the Kriegsakademic is actually a practical adaptation of relevant parts of Truppenfuhrung.

It will be noted that this resume (ignoring the factor of translation) is written ahuost exactly as a German would instruct Geriiuuis.

This faithfulness to the tone of the original lectures has beet made possible beca iso of Ii ic extre i tel y zu le( tate reports which were made by the U. S. officer-students.

'lii roughout, striking similarities will be observed between German tactical doctrine and that set down in pertinent manuals of the U. S. Army.

Ti. S. officers, however, should not be misled by the similarities to overlook the differences that also exist.

With regard to one of the basic similarities in doctrine, it has been pointed out by one of our Kriegsakademie graduates that "Owing to the phlegmatic nature of the German individual, initiative and aggressive action have to be forced on the lower leaders and staff, rank and file, whereas we 1)OSSCSS
these characteristics as a natural heritage."
The Military Intelligence Service tia.s pihlislicd the following Imilet.tu,s which describe various aspects of Ocrinan inilil ary nietliods: '"l'lie (,inia,, Armored Division," information Bulletin, No: 18, June 15, 1042; ''(erIIoul Methods f Warfare in the Lihyan Desert," Information Bulletin, No. 20, July 5, 1942, Tlie Ocriiiati Aritiored Army," Special Series, No. 4, Ot:I.ohu:r
17, 1942; "The Development of Oclinan Defensive 'l'aclics in Cyrenaica
19-Il," Special Seriea, No. 5, October 19, 1942; "Artillery iii tue 1 )esert,"
Special Series, No.

6, Nove,iml.cr
25,
1942.

Informimatiut, iiboiit
51)oeitiC
organizations and weapons may be found iii TM 30450, flawlbuok a,,
(Jer,,,an Military l"orces.

## Table Of Contents Sscion I. Post Of The Commander -

H. DUTIES OF THE STAFF
2
Ili. ESTIMATE OF THE TERRAtN
a
I. ltOAI)$ *NI I)IJTIS
3
2.
ltAII,IftIAl)N
-
4
3. i'KIIHA IN FOIl 'ION A'II'M;K..
4
1. 'I'I'ltItA IN yost 'i'iii 1)I.vNNHivN AC'VION_..
5
ii. (ien rut
... - ..

b. QIucsliw,8 'i'v He ('onsjk'rcd
5
11. 'I':.au,t IN you 'ri.s
I )i,* YINU ACTION
6
6. 'l'lILiLAIN lIIt TON flivuis*u;..
- ...
6
IV. CONCEALMENT
.,
..
7
7.
l'IIuYl'NC'rlON AOAINFI' 1.1 IIOUN I) RECONNAISMANI'N_
7
a. IImclile Obaervalivn..
7
I). Ojf naive con.cealniene
7
c. lhifruaive Concealment
8
(I. I"iile ilppeara:uea..
-  ..
..
8
8. l'lto'rMl'IoN ItIlA If4$'r As it JtECONNA 188* NC .. .. -
8
9.
(
NCEAI.MNN'r IN 1tis'i' Ait*s...
9
10.
OF TILO0V MOVNMENTS
9
IL.
I,O(UlflfJ (lfl(l Unloading
1)
I). load ftlovc,u,ents
.. ..
U
11. (o NAI.ftINNI' IN B*'ii'i.it_
.. .. -
1(1
V. COMBAT INTELLIGENCE
11
12. 'I'IIN I'IIEPAIIATION OF IN'VELI,IOENCu 1ton'is.. -
11
13. W HAT 'I'll ltNI'OIIT
12
II.
( I)NI'AC1' ANI) (uoItoINA'rIoN i3'l'VNNN I"ItINNII.Y
UNITS
12
15. 'I'IIANSMISSION or Onu;ns ANI) Ra:iowi's
12
16. I I)V A NUN M KNHAON (Ni'Euts..
13
17.
IN I'()IIMA'Il()N 'I',ittosju,i Ss'NcIA I. MNANN

14
I .
I LI 1(fl('IANi' I'IIINUII'I.N$ 1)1" t(EC()NNAISSANCE.. -
14
19. S'iitvs',o IU ItKUI)NN A ISSANCN_ -
.

15
90. TAC'I'IeAI, It Nu:ONNAINSANCE
15
21.
II NUONNAISSANCE BArl'AlJt)NS
10

## Vi Table Oi' Contents

Section
V. COMBAT INTELLIGENCEContinued.
IHgt'
22. Mu'IoIuzKD 1tICuN NA ISA NCN I3A'rIAI.IONH
16
23. flNCONNAI8SANC 13ArrAI.ION OP 'IIIN INPAN'II(Y
])IvlstoN
1$
24. BA!I-FLE 1tECONNAISSANCE
IS
VI. PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNICATION
20
25. OPERATION OF SIGNAL COMMIJNICAIION 'IIeOOI'M
..
20
26. ORDER OP TIlE
J)IvIsloN COMM(INICAIIIIN ur
PICER
21
27. CoIftIuNlcA'IloN IN TIlE 1)IrENni.. -. ...
..
22
28. VARIoUS MEANS OF COMMUNICATION
22
VII. ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION
26
29. (1 a i ap Na I'iti NW PIES.. - .. - ..
...
'26
30.
TIlE M INSION ..
...
28
:11. SEIZINO TIlE IN(IIA'IIvK

2$
VIII. THE DECISION
. - - -
- - -
..
-
21)
IX. FIELD ORDERS
30
32. (hNNHAb Rui.is.
30
33. WARNING ORI)EI18 (Vonnpwpoii.i)..
..
3$
:34. ('oi i'ip'r
()PEIIATIONS
OIIl)ER$
(( EMA MIII K
KIuI.E)
32
35. SNIAIIAlE Oicu,a (IINysI.IIEFEIlI.K)
33
36. SI'PiCIAL INSTRUCTIONS (IiEsoNaiolE ANoIIJINIIN-
lIEN)
- .. ..
38
X. MARCHES.
3.)
37. M ARChING IN 51 iii.,'ii'..i (oIIftuNs

31
:38.
MARCHING IN SINGLE COLt!ftIN....
35
39. l'ROTEC'IION AUA INST AIR AllACE $_

:35
lu.
N,o,ri' MARChES
37
4$. I)ty MARCIINH
--
3$
42.
ORUANIZA'vIoN YOU MARChING
- - -
31)
48.
(4,NNI,CiION ANI) COMMUNICATION..
...
41
44.
ItATES OF MAIOlI
. ..
--
41
IS. MARCH RESTS
-
42
III. MARCII Ohl'IPt)$lS. . .. ..
..
4:1

## I'Ngc Section Xi. Various Types Of Battle -

XII. THE ATTACK....
45
17.
I'o iui s o v ArrA c K
..
..
45
48. (oNsll
NATIONS IOfl AN ATTACK
46
19.
M ,:(,ulANns Ole' Ai'TA(,K
47
50. A'riei
U NIl A I'OMITION
.19
.111. A U'l'lt,I.KiLY JMI'I.OYMKNT
.
.
.
-
50
52.
I NiAN'UI(Y I'USITION (IF RKAU)INKMS (1iii,as'wiu.i,
53. IN FA t'ruv A TION
TI' TO fl K
Us, ASSA ii,;,,..
.
52
r.i. Awi'i ui.ity Si'i'oni' OF Ttll INFANTRY ADVANK..
53
55. I NrKltMll'l;Nl' 1tI)V.. N4'N OF TIIK B KsEnv.. -  - ..
..
53
56.
I.UKA Kill ltOl?(lll

- .. - .. .. -
54
i
Pcuelratjon of lh( hostile !'osition..
54
h. Time of Attark
..
..
- .. .. - ..
- ..
.
51
C.
JI'///,,/,oua/

.
.
SI
57. Aviu
ItKCOMM KNOKU
FOUL CERTAIN
Si'i':c,
u.
(AsIM
-- ...
-. - -.
.1.)
58. Miiria ENOAUEMEN'J'
56
a. 8eed and (Surprise
..
.
- ..
56
I. T4IIH (1?,)! S/?WC. -  .. - .. - -
..
57
f. Coordination.
57
ii. )IIrlboil.s
r1o. I'IltsI,lU
5$
XIII. THE DEFENSE
61
(iO.
1A VI)i(Al(l.l 'I'EIIIIAiN 11)11
(II
61. O-r,,pu (NsiuEuA'noNs
62
a. Defense or Ikinying Ic1iou?
62
h. l'repurulion of 1)efense urea
62
c.
Maneuvers.. -
62
(Ii.:rn.nL l'U(INCII'i.NS
l)l'INsI.. .
63
63. URUANIZA'vIlN 01. I)uiis. AU1u.As_..
63
a.
in Jkplh

..
. - ..
(13
b.
cYot'cr (171(1 Obstarles ..
64
lii -
ItI:SERV s, H Eli EU'S, A NI) ltEAit I'OSITJONS

..
(U
65. ACTUAL OJ'EJLATION o' 'riri J)1wENsE
65
a. Main Line of Resistance
.
65
b.
I1(1VUflCC Pmitwn.. ,. - .. ..
..
..
-
60
C.
Outpost I'osition
66

## Viii Table Of Contents

S.ctlon XIII. THE DEFENS-ConHnv.d.
Pio
08. Awnl.1.ERY IN 'tilPi DPiFNPiPi
67
a. conroi by Ari1tery C'ontmander.... - ..
(17
h. Tarlicp_ -- -.
-.
67
o.
Iiurruqe_ -
-
.. .. -
07
67. 1NYANIRY IN iiN DPVNN ..
68
68. II nwui,;P I'I'N KiIIA'flONN
..
68
09. TIIN CoI!NTnArrAcK .
OR
70. VIIIInnAwAt. TO A Il KARVAIIP POSIUION
- - -
60
XIV. THE DELAYING ACTION
- - -
70
XV. RETREAT-RETIREMENT
72
XVI. THE EMPLOYMENT OF FIELD ARTILLERY
73
71. ORaANIZATION.. -
-
73
72. Io(,ArION IN r,i krr CK
.. ..
75
73. 1,OVA'FION IN lUK I)K-;NRK
.... - - -.
- .
75
74. (t ,rKRA'IIUN WITH I ASTill.
...
75
APPENDIX. SAMPLE GERMAN ORDERS.
77
ILLUSTRATION
I"igsire I. ArIiIItry in
(Ilvusioll tIack
.... -
- - - -
74

## Sectkn I. Post Of The Commander

The personal influence of the commander upon his troops is of the greatest sigmIicLuice.

lie ILIUSI be lOCatC(l where iie CLLIL most efleetively lead.

On tiLe march he should be as far forward as security l)CrILILLS, and his location should be definitely known by the members of his stall so that all reports may rctch him 1)rO1fl)tly.

In the attack his conitnamid post shouki be located as far forward aS possible, yet l)rOLCCthd from hostile lire so as to ittsIue (uldistlIrbed operation; for tactiemLi reasons, the post is l)laCt(l near
(.1)0 I?UUJ) effort., facili tatiiig control at the mOSt. lln1)Ortant point of the battlefield.

The movement, of (lie (OIn1fluI(l J)08t is infILlelleed by the location of existing wire hues, and the divisional signal olkeer is kept constantly ii formed so that commumcatiom i requirements may be better anticipated.

lii a (lelaynig action, the commander remains in the forward position until he is convinced that his order for withdrawal is being successfully carried out;
then, with his artillery commander, he goes back to the IICW 1)OSitiOJI.

in very difficult or dangerous situations, ofteim present while withdrawals arc being executed, the c(nh)Imuumder will remain with his troops.

I9T73r
2 -.2

## Sectkn Ii. Duties Of The Staff

The commander should not be troubled with details.

To insure frictionless performances, there are definite assigmudnts to staff positions and duties.

Ea.(th staff maintains its prescribed strength.

The tactical staff remains with the command echelon, whereas the supply
811(1 adt,i.iistrution stall remains well LA) the rear, iii tue vicinity of the trains.

2

## Section Iii Estimate Of The Terrain

Proper utilization of modern iniplements of war (artil
levy, nirI)Ianes, gas, tanks, etc.) caii only be accoml)hshed through tll(ir (lf1lt a(bLl)tatiolp to tue tQITaIII.

The c1)tlillll.II(h1r liiiiscll (ll Ol)LLill 1)1113' a gelieuth )icL1lve 01
the i;ei'raiii ; lie hits, JI)weer, many supplet entary Inealis I)' %VI iicli
1ie Citli IPflrlI the Iii ic CO1i( IiI;ion if the area. in which his commtuid is e1n1)h)yed: for example, recoiuiais
sauce, air )Ilotographs, maps, sketches, LUId (uestl()nnlg of inhabitants, In judging t,crrain for specific purposes, you imist bear in mind the plan of the commander and the immediate taskto determine how that plan will be ipihlimeimeed (aided or hiijitlered) by the terrain.

## 1. Roads And Routes

tJse the best roads availal)Ie as routes for supply trains;
gain protection against air observation, but avoid defiles a.iiii iarrow ':tl leys.

l"or C( )i ii) )lLt trali is, rem neml er that.

cover from ground observation is also required.

How are time roads COlIStiUctC(l, and liow will bad weather influence them?

What are the bad or unpossil)le stretches, and what is the possibility of avoiding or repairing them?

'rhe form of the material, here and at many other points, is governed by the fact that It was presented as lectures at the Kriegsakademie.

What are the widths? 2 defiles and excavated passages?

t)ridges?

fords?' ferries?

steep grades? 6
2. RAILROADS
Differentiate between standard gage (1.435 meters, or
4 feet 8X inches) and narrow gage (1.20 meters, or 3 feet I l inches, to 0.6 meter, or 1 foot 1l inches).

Differentiate alSo between field line, cable line, electric, awl steam.

how many rails are there, and does room for a(huit,io.n exist alongside the rails?

After a small aummount of work on the bridges, tracks can usually be adapted use as marching routes for foot and mounted troops, as well as for motor vehicles.

## 3. Terrain For The Attack

(a) Where will the enemy resist the attack?

Where are his advance outposts, main position, switch positions?

(b) how has he disposed his forcesinfantry, artillery, reserve?

(c) Where is a position of readiness (Be,rei!-
slellung), and how can the terrain be best utilized for advance to it?

Is there conceahnent. from air observation?

Until what point wilt the attacking force be concealed from hostile ground observation?

(d) Where are covered approaches for iiifantiy toward the hostile position?

Are attack objectives so conspicuous and so located that coiicentrated artillery fire may be directed upon them?

For motor vehicles at least 2.5 meters, or 8 feet 44 inches, and for passing at. least 5 meters, or 16 feet 9 inches.

Construction material, capacity, destruction and repair possibilities.

Current speeds, beds, depths (for infantry tip to 1 meter, or 3 foot 3.4
incites, for machine guits and heavy infantry weapons up to 0.6 meter, or 1
foot 11.6 inches, and for armored cars up to 0.0 meter or 2 feet 11.4 inches).

Capacity and time required for crossing.

- Usually negotiable by motor vehicles if the ratio is not higher than I to 7.

Where are the best j)OSitiOflS for artillery and observation posts?

\Vliere is the terrain most favorable for tanks?

Where (1OCS the Leri'ttiii favor the CilCifly's couitterattack?

(e) And, lastly, what kind of attack 'is most favored by the terrain))cnetratioli, en vclol)tnent, or fron tat attack?

## 4. Terrain For The Defensive Action A. General

A
(lefensiVe l)OSiLiOi)
iS fre(IueIItly selected through examination of maps.

immediately thereafter, officers arc se it 01 terrain recom iaissai ice.

General Staff, artillery, and engineer officers reconnoiter for their restectivc purposes or weapons; later, a coordinated defense l)1a1) is built up from their information.

## 'B. Questions To Be Considered

Such questions as the following arise:
(a) What should be the locations of the inahi line of resistance, the flank support, the outpost line, and the advance positions?

(b) Where can artillery and heavy infantry weapons, as well as their required. observation posts, he located to bring time enemy under fire at long ranges?

(c) How can time enemy be subjected to frontal and flanking fire immediately in front of the main line of resistance, and where can a counterblow be effectively delivered?

(d) What obstacles must be constructed to canalize time attack of the enemy, including his tanks, and to cause him to advance where heavily concentrated fire Can be dehvere(l?

(e) Where will the reserves be ho
cated to obtain cover and also to facilitate counterattacks?

(J Should it be necessary to limit the enemy's peietra
tioii, and how can the defensive be established in a position to the rear?

## 5. Terrain For The Delaying Action

Where is an effective first line of defense?

Where are lines of defense to the rear?

Where is favorable ground for an outpost line?

Where are covered avenues of withdrawal?

Where is observation for supporting weal)-
ons?

Where are natural obstacles and terrain features vIucIt can he converted into effective obstacles?

Where is t(HTflJII which )crInits longrange observation and tiring?

## 6. Terrain For The Bivouac

Before the troops arrive, reconnoiter bivouac areas and routes leading thereto.

Avoid large assemblages of personnel.

'Liic smaller the groups, the easier to conceal in villages, woo(led areas, or other smtabl.o locations.

Maui
laiji the tactical integrity of units in bivouac.

if it is necessary to bivouac by day in open terrain, increase the
(listaitce and intervals to minimize the effect of hostile bombing.

I'or tactical purposes, bivouac requirements wclu( Ic: A (Le( i nate room; security and screening forces which ()C(tIl)Y coirunanding terrain and are sufliciently str(mg to I)erItut time and space for the main force to iiunieuver aeeou I ing to the situation; and routes connecting the various groups and leading to potential defensive area.s.

Bivouac requirements for troops demand dry ground and land
(preferably uncultivated) which is lightly wooded, protected against wind, and convenient to a supply of water, straw, and wood.

The proximity of villages is desirable.

## Sectkn Iv. Concealment

'Troops must use every opportunity and means to deny information to the enemy.

Otherwise the essential olemont in the attack, surprise, is lost.

Concealment is most effective when the enemy rcquircs a long tirn to discover that he has l)een deceived.

## 7. Protection Against Ground Reconnais- Sance

a. Hostile Observation Hostile observers and stalls can see great distances front high points (observation J)OSts) with field glasses fln,(l telescopes; therefore, (a) when troop moVements are
(O1itC1Iil Ia,ted , sti uly t,1 ie TI ut) c:trefilly to insure cover against j)ossll)ie hostile observ:rt,ion ; (b) conceal moVe
ments, posit ens, and installations i.y ti screen of security forces to the front an(l flanks.

6. Offensive Concealment Security iii all (liroctions ntnst be considered.

Concealment may 1)0 either offensive or defensive.

If offensive, cavalry and other highly mobile combat units arc launched against the hostile reconnaissance forces to drive them back.

This methlo(1 is effective, but occasionally hostile patrols are able to in 1jlt;rato or go :trOLWd the attacking force.

## C. Defensive Concealment

Defensive concealment is particularly effective when the terrain contributes natural ol)stacles such as a river, a chain of lakes, a swamp, or some similar area.

The stronger the natural obstacles, the weaker the force employed to protect the avenues of approach, and also the stronger the force that can be held as mobile reserve.

Reconnaissance units are sent far forward, operating energetically and according to opportunity against the hostile reconnaissance force.

## D. False Appearances

In situations where it is desired to deceive the enemy and impart the impression of great strength, circulate false rumors, execute false marches, and send troops against hostile reconnaissance forces with instructions to fire a great tleal of ammnunitioii ral)idly, to tie ill) the hostile communications net, to disturb radio transmission, and to organize deceptive transmission on radio or wire.

8. PROTECTION AGAINST AIR RECONNAISSANCE
Strong activity on the part of the hostile air force requires careful consideration for the conceahneiit of troops am 1(1
ii sl4Ll latioi is, particularly wi ie.i m aim tiaireraft means are lacking or very limite(.l.

rIli( fact that photographs reveal every detail must not be overlooked.

Artilicial means of concealuiemit, such as camouflage, smoke, or nets, are effective; but it is more important to survey carefully time surrounding area.

Avoid coi istruc tioi is and artificial works, sharp color contrasts, and lights.

Realize, on the other hand, that measures for concealment lIiiI(ler the troops, render mole difficult, freedom Of movement and distribution of orders, and through night marches and detours cause loss of time and decrease the capacity to fight.

## 9. Concealment In Rest Areas

Seiect rest areas iii wooded locations or IT) several villages.

Place horses, tanks, vehicles, etc., under trees or in stalls or courts, but avoid regular parking or parade
ground (listribution.

Regulate traffic in the area, keeping the main roads and intersections free.

10. CONCEALMENT OF TROOP MOVEMENTS
a. Loading and Unloading In rail 'novements it is practically impossible to conceal loading and unloading areas froliL hostile air rCCOJIHUIS sauce.

When 1)ossil)k, march the troops l)y night to a villag( near the loading station, permit them to rest, and then JUOVO theliL on HI smaller groups to the village where the loading station is located.

Load rapidly and vacate the vicinity promptly.

b. Road Movements In road movements, the concealment given by darkness is m st (fI(tCtiVO.

AVr1flIg( the let )mIrtur( of th)01)$ from bivouatc at. 1.1)0 I egii mmi U g of t tarki icss, whim arrival im m ti me fl(T ea before daybreak.

When marching by (lay, select routes leadnig through woods, villages, om other partially covereti LLVCUS.

rfI)c shadows of trees along the roads offer excellent mneans for concealing columns, md udh ig vehicles.

l3ridge construction cannot he eon
cealC(l, hut equijnnent CUll 1)0 so disposed prior to the
4ft77:r.

423
tictual construction that there is little or no tell-tale indication, of the preparations.

11. CONCEALMENT IN BATTLE
Carry out development and deployment, or either, under the concealment of darkness.

If the situation requires execution by daylight, seek covered areas.

Utilize camouflage to conceal the positions of guns, of headquarters, and of observation posts.

## Section V. Combat Intelligence

The coii UI LaIl(ler u inst coiitm (Lal l, (lay afl(l nigh t, con
(ILirt re()JIJiaJSSflMce W(l iitiliz intelligence means to seek information clarifying the enemy situation.

As sooii as l)ssil)1(, he will forward information and important reports to the next hiighir coiieriancler.

Once contact with the eiieiy iS gained, stepS shioulol be taken not to Jose contact.

In higher coiniiiands, and sometimes with the lower units, a special officer (intelligence officer) will be
(1014u1e(l to handle tii iJLtellig('nee matters.

Siteli an officer works in coor(hitlatiotl with all time conunan(lcrs of attach 10(1 intelligence units and i nfor'nation services, aiid keeps them constantly informed of the situation.

## 12. The Preparation Of Intelligence Reports

hoe1) in nihid time following mimics goverimitig the )reparL
tion of reports:
(a) Determine beforehand what reports must he sent in code and also what means of signal eoinmniwicttiOJiS are to be used.

(b) Differentiate be
between what one has personally seen and what another has remarked Or reported.

(c) Avoid euphemistic phrases and exaggerations.

(d) State strength, time, and place exactly.

(e) Include information on the condition of the terrain.

(f) Send in pertinent information yourself, never assuming that another unit has already sent it in.

(g) In very urgent cases, send a report not only to the next higher commander but also direct to the commander
uichief.

(Ii)
From time to time, sul)init a coinplete assembly of reports; frequently a sketch will suffice.

## 13. What To Report

En battle, utilize pauses to send in reports on enemy movements, your owim situation, the ainiuuiiitioii supply, the COIL(IIL1OII of the terrain, and your owim imupressiomis.

Make suggestions for time seizing of favorable oppor
tmiities.

Reports giving such information as exists just l)efore darkness sets iii are especially vahlal)Ic.

After a battle, report inimnediately what enemy Lrool)s oppose your force, what the enemy is doing, what the comhi Lion of your own troops is, where your troops are located, and what the status of the ammunition skml)j)Iy is.

## 14. Contact And Coordination Between Friendly Units

Liaison between neigh ibori ng uni ts, and between higl icr arid next lower units, is accomplished through a mutual exchange of reports and a prompt communication of friendly intentions.

Large units utilize liaisoi m officers for this purpose, each unit sending one of its officers to
(lie other and holding him respomlsil)le for the exehimuige of iiiformation.

Such officers keep their commanders informed of the situation with reference to the enemy, all
(ieVeloplfleflts of the situation, and the intentions of the other commander.

The duties of a liasion officer dcmnaiid tactical knowledge, intelligence, and tact.

## 15. Transmission Of Orders And Reports

Several communication means should always 1 e avail
able to a commander.

Where technical communication iiieans are uncertaill or Caluilot be Illallutalned, tliei'i coi irier service is established.

Very iinportan t orders or reports are generally sent L)y oflicer messengers in niotorcycles or ears.

[f delivery is uncertain, several means of transmission are used, as well as different routes, to insure the prompt arrival of the information at its des t;i ii a tu )II
I'ery cOiflhllafldeI is rCqLIire(l to know the routes of coiriniiniication and the messenger route.

All units assist iii the utui Iii telTu )1.e( I tratisi ii issioii of re )orLs at 1(1 1) uessagcs.

higher colIun:Ln(lers and eollnuIan(.lers of reeonnaissuice an(l security units are authorized to examine the messages
%VhIiChi t.hi&y COIItLCt CII roiit;c, noting ott the iiiessige (,hztt they have done so, tile hour, and the date.

## 16. Advance Message Centers

To expe(htc the receipt of information, advance message centers are established, particularly in ti te area or sector whei'e communications will be fl Un ICrOUS.

Such ii uessagc centers should be easily lOCatC(l, 1)rotected from hostile lire, and definitely connected with the rearward message center.

Under certain circumstances (for example, Ofl tile front of a cavalry corps), advance message centers and message asseitibly points iiiay be estal)lisiled at considerable distances from the main hleadq(larters, in order to
511111)1 ify and cxi ed ite the transmission of in fort nation between tile reconnaissance units and the main head
(lLILrt(1S.

## 17. Information Through Special Means

The air intelligence service observes hostile air activity and provides information relative to the air situation, and front this one can obtain a fairly accurate concetion of the enemy's intentions.

The signal comnumication intelligence service observes all hostile communications (radio, telephone, telegraph, etc.) through goniometric ifltCrCCl)t, listening posts, wire tapping, observers, .fl(l other means.

The routine interrogation of prisoners of war yields in iscellaneous information.

Captured doci
men t.s may include Or(lCrs, maps, messages, notehooks, news :q ,crs, I )1)otograplls, and films.

Scru tiny ol the Iu)Ntile j)reSs and pUbliCations is maintained.

## 18. Important Principles Of Reconnaissance

I )o not (lissipate reciinais.sance strength.

Superiority of i OCifil S is very ii) Ij)OIttUi t successful reconnaissance:
l)flt, MIuI)CrU)ril.y in mnoI)ility and clever employment ten(l to offset innucrical inferiority.

It will frequently be necessary to fight for information.

Advanced hostile security and reconnaissance forces must be penetrated or thrown hack ,to make contact possible with the hostile niain force.

hi this connection, it is often advisable to oCC(tl)Y
'I )(Wtmtflt p01mm ts (jmcldy with mnOtOrize( I forces.

When there is great inferiority to the eneirmy, fighting should be avoided, and an endeavor should he made to penetrate time enemy screen or go around it.

'lime commnitanoler who specifies what information is to I e ol )taine(I should coordinate all his StIl)o)Edinate recomi
intis.sai ice iieamis.

!flicidn t recommaissaimee is in tamed through employment of large numbers of recon
noitering units, bitt, l)y the careful direction and instruction of these units as to what the commander wishes to know.

J)eIiiiite in issions afl(i their relative urgency nmsf, be jndieated, and tim meanS of sending information to the rear, including
(lelinhlely regulated radio traffic, must 1)e insured.

19. STRATEGIC RECONNAISSANCE
Strategic, or oI)erati ire, reconnaissance endeavors to l)Uild Uj) a general J)ictlII'C of the overall sitIIati(m, thus
1u(ling the coInlnan(ler in chief in making the (iccisions which have iInI>0r141.nl inlliience oii tim cii,(jr cumpr.1qn.

Missions i)lLy iu)CItI( le ol)servation of hostile mobil iza
tions, assemblies, initial itutrch (I iree.tions, rn,ilroa(l move
inetits, l)O1t, inoveineti ts, supply echelons, construction of fort.ifieations, air :tclivi ties, locations, strengths, move
men (,s of unotA)rize(I and mechanized forces, and, par
tiemmlarly, oi mim [Ian ks.

Such in issions performed by ni r reck )lI I18.ISSflil cc lfl i t;s, lflOL()riZC(,I JCCOI1 naissa.n cc I )al
t,alions, and army cavalry units.

The three nimist supplement each other and be carefully coordinated to that end.

## 20. Tactical Reconnaissance

Tactical rCConna!sSance i.s concerned with the move
muents of the CflCifl in closer l)roximnity: his nioveinents, bivouac areas, organization, breadth an ci (lepti of clisposi
tion, supply service, construction of defensive works, air activity, amid location of LirfiCI(lS and antiaircraft.

Especially unportant is liniely reports of the ]ocatjon of lnolorizc(l or ii iri I;I.Ii ize(I f( )re(S.

For air rccoii imaissalire, lI)( rOitIIil:tfl(ler utilizes the air
l)laliC SqlltLdr()fl which is placed at his disposal for such purpose by the' air force.

For ground reconnaissance, be utilizes mdepcnden t motorized reconnaissance battalions, lll()tOriZCd VCCOHflIUSS:LflCC
battalions of the eav:Ll 1y, tuoun ted reconnaissance battalions of LI e CftVILI ry, and reconnaissance battalions of the infantry
(liViSiOflS.

## 21. Reconnaissance Battalions

.I)cfinitc sectors are generally assigned to reconnaissance l)attalions.

Within the corps, boundaries between divisions are (lcsignated, and on open flanks the houn(lary is designated between the flank reconnaissance area of the
(livision and that of the corps.

Reconnaissance units
:LVOi(l (iglititig unless it. is al)Sohutely re(lllire(I 1 )( the situation in the accoini 1 isi uncut of their missions.

If a reconnaissance Unit l)e giveti a security mission, the unit should be reinforced by others units: for example, by maci iine gull, light artillery, anti tank, and engineer troops.

If a reconnaissance battalion is directly in front of the division and in contact with tile enemy, it should he ordered either: (a) to 1HOVC off to a side afl(i continue reconnaissance in that area, or (b) to await relief from troops coining up front the rear, or (c) to fall back U1)OU
the troops in the rear.

In the absence of any orders, under the aforesaid circumstances the reconnaissance battalion should fall back upon tile troops in the rear.

On an open flank, reconnaissance battalions are echeloned forward.

## 22. Motorized Reconnaissance Battalions

The important advantage is speed.

Motorized recouiimaissauice l)attal Ions Cttfl i(COIi Ifl H ter by (lay :1.11(1 tiilLrchi on by night, and are restricted only by limitations of the IHOtOl' vehicles, terrain, wetttliei', routs, fuel supply, lUI(l signal COflllflUuiCtLtiOil.

They itittilitEtili eoiinectioii wit) i tHOUhit.C(1 recoflhiaIssaiuC ittiits l)y radio.

Advancing for-.

Wttl(L I 'j I)O H H Is II
i arer (1 te CI)CU iy, the shorter the
1)01111(15
they
1'Cll)lLIll as long as JR)Skible OH
roads.

lii hiosti Ic tern tory,
(Ii (leicut ioutes for the return are selected, and iflIpOrttLIIt points along the road, or p01'tILtlt
)ltL(eS, are secured.

J{est during the itight is Ol.)tailled by avoiding main i'oads and villages, aII(.I by hal tiiig tlIl(ler available cover iii isolated areas.

Contact with the eneiiiy, Jiow'cver, imist be niaiiitained.

Tue width of a sector should not be over 50 kilometers
(31 miles).

Tue depth is limited by fuel supply.

Motor VehIicl(s III
IIlO(lelII
I
tIIIiss:Ilt(e iiiils
1IILVC
IL imlnis of action of between 200 to 250 kiloiiiet,ers (.125 to .155
Illiles) 'it]ioiit repleiiisliiiieiit.

Scouting groups will generally be organized and dis
patched by the commander of a battalion.

Such groups include arnlore(1
scout cars, motorcycles, and radio eqUi)flIClit.

Along the more important roads and those leading to the (ICCIS1VC areas 01' 1)OiJItS, patrols should 1)e str()llger, hut too large a patrol increases the diiliculty of COItCeId tneiit from the enemy.

An noted car patrols within scouting groups will be given written orders per
tai.iiiig to route, (lestinatioll, and imiforniation desired;
they advance by bounds, wi (Ii distance and speed sometimes prescribed; generally, however, they precede the
(IiViSiO)I at; about 1. hour (approximately 40 kilometers, or
25 iiiiles).

Motorcycles are used to fill iii gaps and intervats, thereby thickening (lie reconnaissance itet.

The ic
tntiiider of the tnotonzed reconnaissance I)attalioir Serves as a reserve 101(1 US IL receiving am uI ILSSCI Ill )ly 1)01 ut for IO )OI'tS.

.11)77(I
I2----4

## 23. Reconnaissance Battalion Of The In- Fantry Division

'[lie recoimaissance battalion of the infantry division is employed as a unit, even if the division is advancing over a broad front in several columns.

The advance is made by bounds somewhat shorter than those of the motorized recoiinais&uice battalion.

Scout groups are sent out liiI(lcr the direction of the battalion commander.

The l)zLttalion can reconnoiter an area approximately 10 kilometers (6 miles) ii width, a.1i(l seldom is sent more than 30
or 40 kilometers (25 to 30 miles) forward.

The strength of the scout groups (sometimes up to that of a platoon vi0i light miiacliiiie guns) is, however, deteriniimeil by time situation and the mission.

Patrols sent out from the scout grottps remain oii the roads as long as possible,
:ulvanciimg by bounds from observation point to observa
tion point.

Becommaissance battal ioiis Of ill tenor diViSiOl IS
are usually withdrawn to the rear after time battle actually I megnis.

If, hmowevei, time
(Iivision IS
Ol)erlLtiuig over a broad front or in difficult terrain, the battalion may lie reimiforced, and utilized to fill in a gap or to seize aim unpor
(ant terrain feature.

Communications imist be carefully J)EO'i(lC(l.

Extra sigimal equipment and l)ersonlmel may he attached iii exceptjonal cases.

## 24. Battle Reconnaissance

'lime plIiJ)ose of battle reconnaissance is to reconnoiter
(lie enemy's front, flanks, amid rear to establish definitely the location of his flanks, artillery, heavy infantry weapons, and reserves.

Such reconnaissance locates our own front line and often provi(Ies closein security 1111(1
teiTttin rceonwussanee.8 eciirity is necessary at Itli tunes, l)ut reconnaissance imist not he neglected to accomplish security.

Rattle recomi IULISSaOCC is (tal )Iished usually at the openIng phases of the (ICVCIOI)ti ien t. or (lepPOyflien t.

'Ilie advance of the infantry in the attack reveals very
(1lIiCkly t.he location of hostile infantry and artillery; also, lire from our arti I lery i ipon liosli he infantry will generally result in the hostile artillery (lehi\'erimlg cotuiterfure and tb us revealing its location.

'11 tere are imotli air ni iti groim mit)
miteans flVlI.1 Itt) ile for J)crfoemning I)attle reconnaissance.

Soii ie of the sped 1w means of l)iLLLIe econnaiss:tnee are:
(a)
Iflf(tflt?7/ 7)(ttrot.s, sometimes rei,iforcecl with light machine guiis, heavy machue guns, light mortars, or antitank guns.

(b) Knyi
neer patrols, particularly valuable in approaching a forti
110(1 area, a defile, or a river.

(c) A rtillerj patrols, coti
isting usually of an officer H.fl(l a few imiounteti IT1CI)
assigned to reconnoiter routes of ap )roacli, O1)SefVatH Hi posts, flhl(l lire positions.

(il) Obscrt'atum battalion (arfil
ldVy), Skille(l Ill locat.iiig targets I)y 801111(1 amid flash, and in evaluating aerial photographs.
(c) Captive balloons, suppleinen tiiig the preceding means and permitting a general view over the hostile front.


Our observation posts and other friendly personnel, who are reconiioutering for our own artillery, heavy infantry weapon, mu( nntitak positions, can gain iiiticli lid pfiu I iii formation from u iii ts of i.lic recoil Iuiissnncc baLl al ion.

Sonic
(hues actually CCOIDJ)UI)Y the lat,talinn to get early information al>oiit the tOirtLiu,, potential targets, and gun positions.

II assists our own artillery iii firing on cOIIceaIe(I targets by l.raiisiuittiuig I her data.

By acci irate survey i ng pri nci ites, it. est aI ii islins Lhc loent.io ii net for the batteries.

The net is not, restricted to tho division sector, but.

,4ornct.iu)es extends 0 t.o 10 kilometers (as much as 6 miles).

## Section Vi. Principles Of Communi- Cation

The higher tinit is responsible for the cstablislnnent and maintenance of comnumication with the next lower unit.

%Tire connection with neighboring units is always established to the unit on the right.

This rule does not release the commanders of responsibility, however, to maintain contact with units to their left.

Of special importance is the connection between artillery and infantry.

If an artillery unit is attached to an in
lantry inut, tlicii the lnf(uttry is responsible f. the (OJI
nection; if the artillery is supporting an infantry unit, but not attached to it, then the artillery is responsible for the corn iection.

If, however, thic artillery, through some special circumstances, is unable to establish the coniicc-
1ioii, then the infantry must undertake the reSpOflSil)ility.

Connection with heavy infantry weapons is the responsibility of the infantry commander concerned.

25. OPERATION OF SIGNAL COMMUNICATION
TROOPS
The commander issues orders for th eniployinent of his communication units ordinarily after receiving the recoinmendations of the communication officer.

It is most essential that the commander punctually give the coininunication officer a complete picture of the situation, including the conirnander's intentions.

The comnmunication means of a cornluan(l post arc assembled in a message
20
center.

The proper functioning of coinmun ication is
:Iependent U0fl its useful employment on the part of the commander and upon the technical training of personnel.

## 26. Order Of The Division' Communication Officer

'Flie order of the division coimnunication officer should contain: (a) The enemy situation, our own troops, the plan of the commander; (b) the mission of the signal battalion; (c) specific orders for the signal coimnunication companies and supply train; (d) when applicable, instruc
tio us relative to secrecy, reJ)lace] ad t, uti I ization of coni
mercial nets, and system maintenance.

Iii II ie ad ':oice iarehi, the (Ii vision coiiutwiicaion l)attaLion builds and Thaintains au axis of signal corn
utuincation (wire lines) along the route upon winch the
(iLVisiOIL CO)Itinaflder and his headquarters are advaiHiflg.

In friendly territory, the existing comitiercial net is titil
ized to a niaximui it; ilL Cfldi ny territory, heavy field cal )le is generally installed overhead.

When contact with the enemy has been estal)hshcd by the division, wire corn
nuijiication must be nlluntaiflc(l at all COStS with the corps and inustalso be supploineutted by radio and other means.

Establishment of lateral connections within the division aJH I
1 ctweeit
(hivisioris is also very ilfll)Ortaflt in co
ordiutating the tactical effort.

Writ hiin the division, all command posts and observation posts should be connected according to their relative uhLl)OrtaflCe.

The division sigiual battalion will establish hues to the infantry regiurients, artillery commander, and the artillery units operating wider the artillery coin
as well as lateral connection to adjoining di
visions. When there is a deficiency of means, the ostablishment of the aforementioned artillery connection has priority.

The division signal officer will coordinate the establishment of the communication net and supervise its construction by his own signal troops and the communication troops of the various units. In a rapidly advancing attack, in pursuit, or in wtihdrawals or retreat, he will restrict the amount of installation.

27. COMMUNICATION IN THE DEFENSE
In the defense a very extensive communication net is established. Its construction is governed by the situation,
:111(1
by the time, inateiiel, inul j)ersonhle[ available.

Several means of communication bctwceii all important defensive installations are provided.

Wire cornmunication is carried by buried cables.

Special communication nets (such as infantry, artillery, antiaircraft) are establislied.

Alarms for gas and air attacks are installed.

Technical means to intercept hostile messages are intensified.

28. VARIOUS MEANS OF COMMUNICATION
When new troops are attached to a command, additional con nnunication requi1e nents are introduced; so reserve conununication personnel should always be held out.

The operation of communication troops must not be interfered with in any manner by other units.

The various means of conmiunication can be characterized as follows:
(a) Telephone.lnstallation of the telephone requires tiiite and materiel.

Wire lines are sensitive to such dis
turl)tuices as fire, wind, snow, frost, and storms.

'[lie enemy cait easily listen in on conversations, l)artidularly over singlewire connections; in the danger zone, therefore.

double lines and heavy insultded wires are used.

(b) Telegraph.The telegraph is snuple in operation and installation, and very often cannot be easily inter
ecptc(l.

Tue Morse code is utilized.

(c) A 'i(onwbile, mounted messenger, In C7/liSt, motorcyclist, runner.--in a war of movement, these nicans are often the most reliable.

They are used withon hesitancy when technical i (L1lM flI iiot available.

Sj )cet Is of trans IllSSiOfl vary.'0
(d) I?adio.When wire connections fail or are not ftinctioning st.e:ulily, ii e ra(l iO IS ifl(liSl en.sahle.

Electric
4oti I IS, slalic, oil icr rat I i( )
lr:Li 1511 iiSSi( HI
( ) I SIll LI lar WaVe lengths, n touiitaius, and oti icr interferences nUfli]iLiZe effective range of hearing, in practice, radio is valuable only if messages are short; traiisiuissioiis should therefore
1)0 iii telegram foitit, oinit;ting all unessential wor(ls.

(e) Bhinker.---This is an important signal means in battle wlieii wire hues are (k)StlOyC(l.

It cannot be used for great distances, and i greatly restricted by fog, mist, brigl it St 11)51)010, or j)1OX1I I iity of cnei i y observation.

Blinker liLessages ]lLIlst he very short, since 20 words req WEe al )OUt 10 I Li mites for ransniission.

U) Rockets, Very lights, jlarcs.-----These serve as signals whose meaning has l)eeJL prearranged and is thoroughly understood by the troops concerned.

Very l)1SO)S and l)Yroled nile equipment are cairietl I ial )itnally on light M esseliger on horse, 1 k I loitiet er (tlis iii lie) in 5 to 7 iii liii lis; nit toinobile or motorcycle, 3() to 40 kilotiteters (25 to :t i tithes) jier hoiiron good roads considerably faster; bicyclist, 15 to 20 kilometers (12 to 15 miles) per hour.

telephone carts and also in all combat trains.

Ability to see the.se signal lights is greatly influenced by the terrain.

Also, there is always the chuiice of confusion with enemy signal lights.

(g) Signal flags and panels.- -Prearranged signals with these means enable ground troops to send short messages, particularly in communicating with airphuies and balloons.

(h) Alarms.I-Iorns, sirens, bells, and go rigs are used f. gas or hostile airplane warning.

(i) Signal gun.Thi small mortar, which projects a message container, is useful in position warfare.

(j) Courier pigeons.-Althiough requiring at least 3
(lays to orient, courier pigeons are useful tIIl(ler heavy lire, for they are sensitive to gas, and terrain does not influence them.

They fly about
1 kilometer (5I8ths mile) in a minute.

They do not fly in darkness, rain, or storm, and with snow it is difficult for them to orient themselves.

(k) Message dogs. Expert and affectionate care by the men in charge of message dogs results in most satisfactory returns.

Such dogs can be used under heavy tire, and can remember and find locations on a battlefield in a radius of about 2 kilometers (13' miles).

r11y will efficiently follow an artificially made track (scent) up to
6 kilometers (about 4 miles).

(1) Listening-in apparatus.This apparatus is established to determine the location of hostile activity in planting mines, and to listen in on hostile communications.

(m) Airplanes.---An airplane may be used to connect a division headquarters with its foremost elements or neighbor units.

In such cases, no other reconnaissance mission should be given the plane.

It is iinportaitt to estal)liSil the location of the foremost line of infantry and of the hostile hue; the infantry troops on prearranged signal will ( his )htiy HLI ieis tO assist; LI I(
J )laI)e oui the i ILISSIOII.

Planes niay be uSe(1 for aitilleiy ,lire direction, and for ii nu I rtau III ig COl ill ectioi 1 1 )etween (Ii ViSiOn, CiLVtIry (Ii VISIO11, a11(l eOVl)S oi' army h1((k1lIULeI'S.

They are particularly a(lal)ted to CliStI'ih(It.uIIg quickly llUi)OItallt orders or
(id I 'eui ng I'C1)O1'LS to units a C( InSideral lie (listance away.

(n) Captive b(fiiOOflS.ILhIOOUS
o))SerVe artillery fire, give preamniged signals ijidictting the time of the thty, the signal to OI)Cfl ijie, etc.

Their dOIiIIIllIIuiCatiOll iuieails ii i(h1 i( he flags, i )allels, hi n i kei's, :u n I
Leli l )l I( )I s.

Weati ier
(OI1(Ii t,i011S, heavywooded Leriltin, ILII(l rilOUhIt:WIOUS COWL
try iPSLl'id( thI('iI
uisefuiliiess.

1UTi5

## Section Vii. Estimate Of The Situa- Tion

You must thoroughly work yourself into the stituatiori.

Place upon the situation map the location of your orni troops and put down the hiformnation that you have about the enemy.

This information is built up by reports from various sources, as suggested above under the heading "Combat Intelligence."
Tnforinatioii must be evaluated objectively; one must be extremely careful not to interpret what is received as one WoUld like it to be, or as one hoped it would be.

A large part of the iiiformation received in war is contradictory, a still greater part is false, and by far the greatest part is very uncertain.

29. GUIDING PRINCIPLES
Carefully read the orders received from the itext higher commander, and consider all ii mformnatio.n iecci ved.

In considering the situation, the following principles govern:
The first and most important principle is to utilize to the maximum the available means. Any moderation in this regard is a deterring factor in attaining the ultimate goal.

Second, concentrate as much of your force as possible where you plait or believe the principal blow (the main effort) will fall, and expose yourself disadvantageously at other points, in order to be more certain of success at the point of the main effort.

The success of the main effort more than compensates for any minor losses sustained.

Third, lose no time.

Unless special
26
1111 VIU I tages accrue by (lelay, it is very i in portant that you PXC1l te yolli' plans as (lUicidy as possible; through Sj)CC(iy action many measures of the enemy are nullified in their initial stages, Finally, you must weigh each situation mdependeiitly, restricthig yourself only to a consideration of the esset It.ials.

TI l( following (ltIeSt,iOflS may here occur:
lIiUSU)fl.

What 15 iiiy lllisSu)n?

Does it require de
cisive action or delaying action?

Must I light an iIl(iC
Pefl(lcI)t action Or will I be ill(hlIeIIeed by the movements or action of ot,lier troops?

'I'errai'u.

W1111 is the cOlI(l I lion of terrain hetweeii my troOh)S lU)(I the enciiiy?

\Vhichi routes Iea(l toward the
('I ieiiiy?

\V.l ie (lOPS
ii 10
leir;ti I I
)CFI Ill t.

)l
1
111c1 IPS
c(wc1cd ff0111 air OF 11111(1 ol)Scrvation for au attack on the enemy position?

When Ifl ILILSSLOI1 requires defense, where does the terrain offer favorable defensive positions?

What l)OSSibilitieS are therefore avaiIal)le for the ful
lihhtnent of 1113' tnissioii?

/ncini/
WI nIt, cati t;I ic eliot I1 ( In IA) 001 III t.er uiy iI;tns?

\\T1p1.( is the enemy now located?

Are there any bases mi' his streiigthi lLfl(l orgauiizatioui?

\Viiat can he do,
11111k lug C()l'i'eOt tactical
5111)1 )OSitiOiISP2
Are there n.uiv indications that the enemy has acted iiicorrectly?

Do I
know anything about the ability or personality of the coJIlUIan(ler or the con(hit.ion of his troops?

Ilow will the terrain influence the enemy's action?

How can I best fulfill iiiy misSion with tile most damage to the enemy?

II Always favor Ilie enemy in coiiipul ing I.he ItsIances possibly covered by I I K! (!I loll))' since his posi lion was In sf reported.

I? Al wnvs .isiiiie flint, lie will cnrry 0111, his plan rinet lisa, tvantageoiisly In you.

Own troops.Where are my own troops?

Which are immediately availal)le?

Which troops caii be later drawn in?

And when?

Are special transportation means such as a railroad or motor trucks at my disposal?

What can I expect from my troops considering their past perform
ance? how is the supply situation, especially with regard to aniniunitioti?

Is support from other organiza
t,ioiis possil 1e?

WI i icli of the present possible solutions will give the greatest success?

## 30. Changing The Mission

As a resitl t of all these COJlSidCflttiOiIS, IS the aCCoInJ)lish
iiieiit. of iiiy tIlISSiOJI HO loiiger l)05S11)1C?

(When, owing to lInaVoJ(IILI)le ci rctunsta.nces or unj )redictuble events, it is ilnln)Ssil)le to carry out a Ifll5SIOli, then and then only may I change my mission, and J must then assume full FCSI)OtISil)ility fr the change.

I must select a sul)stitute mission to assist effectively the general scheme of maneuver.

I irnist notify at once the next higher (,oInuIaIL(ler in case I decide that it is impossible to carry out my assigned nnsion.)
31. SEIZING THE INITIATIVE
In general, when confronted by a vague situation and difficult circumstances, as is often the case in warbe active.

Seize and maintain the initiative.

1)o not expect or await hints or suggestions from the enemy relative to your next move.

## Sectkn Viii. The Decision

The decision nuist indicate a clear objective to be attante(l Iy the eOOrdiIULte(.l 1L1l(l aggressive use of avail
ld)le means.

Time strong will of time iea(ter must dominate at all tiumes; often time stronger will einnpeis victory.

Never let, anxiety over l)CrSOlliLl security interfere o iiiflttejmec ill inmy inannei the real task, which is the amnmilmila
(doll of time emmemny.

Caltuly weigh time situat;ioii, thimmking
(1t11(k l\' I nit ovcrl(nJkumg JIOU wig CSSCII LuLl.

I IISUI'C
t.lnLt
:d I :issist;aim Is clearly u t IdersIahm( I your ilan.

Nervous
HCSS omi your l)alt is quickly reflected by subordinates.

Never 1101(1 a council of war.

(.oIni)lication and confusion are frequently ilmtrO(hICCd, and generally only an iticOllli)iCtC (LeciSiOll results.

One caim think through a situation imuicli better and reach a definite decision by i'sUICJ)CfldCflhifJ estiiriatung the SittiLt,IOlI.

Once a decision is juade, do not deviate, except for excellent reasons. in this connection, however, one cumi bring about disaster by obstinately clinging to the initial decision wimemi juStiIinJ)le grounds are presetit for a change.

The trtie art (11 lca(lersllii) IS tile abilit)' to recognize wheit a miew (lecisiomi is re(luired by the developments or cinuiges in time sut;uation.

rIJ)e commander should be resolute but il( it oh )Sti nate.

## Section Ix. Field Orders

Publishing orders is an art that can be learned only by continual pi'actice.

Prompt distribution of faultless orders furthers the confidence of the troops in the leader and often has decisive influence in achieving success in combat.

Conversely, power in the attack or strength to resist in the defense cati be greatly t'educed by faulty ot'dci'.

Commanders of divisions or larger units generally use written orders.

Simple imistructions :01(1 l)rief missions may be conununicated oi'ally or through time comnmnunicutions net, but the text should be simultaneously recorded.

Commanders of units smaller than a division generally use oi'al orders, but again, the text must be recorded in writing.

While higher commanders usually make reference to points or areas on maps, commanders of small units point ou1 or make such designations actually on the terrain.

Although oral discussions with' subordinates may contribute to clarity, the leader should not become de-
I)emm(lexIt upon such discussions.

Decisions and O1'(ICI'S
i'emain the direct responsibility of the leadem' himself.

## 32. General Rules

The following rules embrace accepted fundamentals tu1(L help to gain uniformity: (a) Do not issue orders mtiI
your plan of action is definitely established.

(b) I)istribute the order early enough o allow the lower echelons tune for further dissemination and full compliance.

30
(c) Create conditions that are conducive to clearness and conciseneSs, leaving )U)tllUlg to mutual agreements.

(d)
Place yourself nu tafly in the shoes of the subordinates receiving the order.

(e) State only what subordinates must know for the proper perfoimance of their tasks.

(f) Always state definitely whether the combat is to be LLti1Lek, delaying action, or defense, and whether the tn )() )S I I lUst ron ULi]L ''prepared for action'' r whether they
''niay rest.''
(g) Issue affirmative statements, avon I mg alt ii ogi 10(15 01' vague cx O'OSSIOIlS and statci iients of oxaggeratio I4
(h) Inoludo a 1 )Ficf colt wiendatioii of a unit for the execution of a (lifliCtIlt or unusual task, lartimilarly when troops are or(lere(l to withdraw, to tetire, or to hHlI'slIe tindei' CirelIlILStallCCS difficult for the tI'001)S to comprehend.

(i.) Use I)lescnbecl abbrcvia
lions.

(j) EIIL1)Ody 1)0I't1e1It iIIforJtLation for each sub
ject, unit, or weapon in a separate paragraph, underlining key words or phrases.

(k) Number all orders successively, also the paragrahs wrjtliiii the order.

33. WARNING ORDERS (VORBEFEHLE)
\arning or lot's, usually transnutte(E orally, by teic
1)110110, or I)y ra(hio, are issue(l to troops to give advance ill loi'i I flLtiOJi about the will of the CU) tO nander.

r1I te iii f( )tl t (atiol i contained therein is influenced by existing circm 'istaiLeestile time available, the situation with I'eSjKCt to tito oifleiuy 8)51 out' OWfl tJ'OOj)S, etc.but in general vil I niclude such i teins 8S the plan of tile coin
itL:L)I( let', arr:oigeiiieiuls for reco]1J1:usstLltce and security, to I (0 a) 1(1 I )lace of departures, iuiarchi destination, bivouacs, halts, ahI(l changes of direction.

Warning orders must
14 A 8LaLUllieIlt of eoiijettuic (if eXpeettLLiwI (IlilbI, lie tIeIiiil,Iy BtfltC(l as be followed as soon as Practicable by a complete order or
11.11 ifl(liVidLltl.l order.

## 34. Complete Operations Orders

(GESAMTBEFEHLE)
Compicte Ol)Ol'LtiOnS Ol(ICES 1)t0S011t a full survey of the situation with ECSpCCt to the enemy tU1(l OW r0O1)S, the plan of the coiiuiiander, the rote cucI unit will Iay, tunl l)ertinent inforiLation for the troops.

The usual arrange
llleHt follows:
Enerny.Pertinent i nfori I tation of the end i y, ii id ud
lug strength,
(IIS[)OSitioILS, dOfltlitiOfl, losses SflSthilIVll,
(Iefcats su licred, and the co ro i iander's expectation of what the enemy may do.

Own troops. A brief orientation involving the next higher units, neighboring units, and special SU))OFti1Ig units.

General plan.A clear and concise expression of the l)lall of the eolntnan(ler (not repetition of the plan of the iiext higl icr coInhItan(ier), to enSure that subordinates fully uulerstaitd his intentions.

Detailed pian.An announcement of the specific detui!s iclating to such matters as reconnaissance, IflSSiOI is, Sit! )Iy and evticwttioii, cotiutiunication, aiitl the coin
inand post.'5
I) As to reconnaissance, the detniled plan ,neuitioui the cuuciny iifiiruiial,iu,,u ihesi rc(I, the areas to 1)0 reconnoi t,retI
tm I by whom iiuiit whcuu, Ilie lime aim iIitei whero resiultiuig reports tre to lie sent, and the sequence of reco,mnziis
sin icos accori I jug to thici r ii rgculcy.

As to mzssions, wliiit caIi unit, with i iu Ii
ctut I ,iU.cli II IWI I_s or tIet.iich,i, leli IS liii i.sl. fiilli II is clearly HI,IIIOI I.

I ii reMI)evt Ii, sit pph end evai:uafjon, the iltili iii lu Iui,cli.,ii lug of agciicles iii rehit hni to the vuuiiInt eieuutcuits is specified.

As regards com,uunication, the axis of couti
mu,,,, teal ii ii, for (lie iii iii puil ,hishi ii ig the on hen is iuiil ic,iI.ed, ai ul s ,ecial i iisl rue
I it), IS, suicI as those i'' iii i lug to the use (if thuc rio 110 or cx isO uug couuuuierchil hots, are included.

As for the command peal, the location of the COiHhulail(Ier'8
headquarters and the time when it opens or closes, etc., are given.

## 35. Separate Orders (Einzelbefehle)

Separate orders (Einzeibcfehic) are issued when ciictiin
stances render it inipractical or unnecessary to issue a coml)letc operations order (Gesamiliefehi).

Such circumstances include situations wherein individual units must be given specific or special instructions, or where the tune availai)le (toes not pernut the issuance of a complete operations order.

The sel)arate order (Riuzelbefehi) con
taii is hie necessary infor, nation t insure coordination of effort, and later the J)tIbuiCUtI()tL of the eOJi1j)lCtC held ordet'
will include such iiiforinatiojt, l)ricfly stated, as was sent.

out previously in ii Ldivi(iIial orders.

36. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS
(BESONDERE ANORDNUNGEN)
Special iiisti'ictioiis SUp)lcfl1eJLt operations orders with information
)rmCi pah ly concern ii ig an Lmunitioll, con t
munication, e(ltii 1)1 nent, food supply, transportation, meit
ical LU id veteri itary service, cot istruction, and civil P
p%I I:Lti( )fl.

lii geiie&
SI)eCiLt I usirtictiomis are written and are issued direct to the units or agencies that they Concern.

## Section X. Marches

All arrangements pertaining to a iruu'ch Should be based upon the premise that the mass of the force must arrive at the new (lestmation with the minimum effort and the nzoxs.mnm secrecy.

\'heii contact with the enemy is hiiminent, the march formatin should favor easy ami rapid development for Colnl)at.

When ci n itact IS
1111
likely, the comfort of the conmuth(1' is the important consideration.

In view of modern LU I
(leVelOl)l non ts, nioveitients ii ndOI
cover of (larki mess will I e l;hie rule rather than the cxceptio] . rfl.( will 1)0 01 IC) UI Lstal ICOS
requiring day marches, however; or they may be safely undertaken when tile weather precludes hostile air activity.

## 37. Marching In Multiple Columns

The command should be itiarched UI liUIhlil)le coltiiniis, using all available routes, U iereI)y savn ig II me slreiigtli of the troops, affording better protection against air attacks, and maintaining tile eonlman(l in such formation as to facilitate development for combat.

'lhe f ,l lowil Ig CON
siderations, however, prevail: (o) Orgaiiiza.ti )iI ii de1 )tll permits freedom of maneuver.

(b) Echielomiwut of sonte columns on the open flank affor(ls i)rotcctiolt or facilitates later envelopment of the hostile flamik when II ie ci reiiy is fixed in the front.

(c) The strength of colwniis and the location of stronger columns vihI 1w (lctdnlulle(l by time whereabouts of the enemy amid by tile l;actical j)ian, us
34
influenced by the terrain.

(d) If the situation is initially too vague to determine such dispositions, then several weak columns should be marched into aggressive action against the enemy to clarify the ituation; the mass of the force may then follow in one or more columns.

(e)
The width of the advance should not be so broad as to preclude the building up of a main effort when contact with the enemy is na(1e.

(f) Zones of advance with boundaries shuld he indicated.

(g) And,listly, trans
inision of orders and reports must he carefully organize(l.

38. MARCHING IN SINGLE COLUMN
'ilie division SOIIU'tiIIIPS (U1fl()t aVOi(I inareliiuig iii a single column.

rpIe great disadvantage is the extraordinary length, which precludes assembling for a coozdinated effort in
1 (lay.

An advantage of the single column over multiple columns is greater security and flexibility for changing direction.

39. PROTECTION AGAINST AIR ATTACKS
The movements of large forces are protected by antiaircraft precautions, particularly at mi tial points, river crossings, and defiles.

Antiaircraft batteries advanci i g by })OIIfldS are set out in advance to front and flanks to p rovi Ic
)F( )tec tio at U ese cr1 Li cal poll ts.

TI c (( H I I
mander must insure that antiaircraft units have prioritY
on roads.

rfte danger from air attacks during daylight is greatly reduced by the fOllOWing ap)ro)riate IilethO(15
Increasing the depth of march columnsAt the coin-
Iflali(l I"iicjcrmarscIitwfe! (air defense depth), the troop units, I iorsedrawii dcii ien ts, and other 'eh ides doul Je the dista ces iiorniully inamtained on the IIIILIell.

Siiuiiil
tniieously it is indicated whether security forces, such as flank or advance guards, inaintaiii, increase, or (Icercase
(Listances.

Arrangenients are made for air defense depth, if eirciinisthnccs require such precaution, j.t the l)CglJH
of (,be march; or rest periods may be used (.0
ease or
(lecrease distances.

With short march columns, extensiomi or retraction are also accomplished during the nuireh.

increasing the breadth of march columns.A t, the corn
,natl(l
1"ieqermarschbrezte!

(air defense brea(lt.J i), time troops spread out, using both sides of a highway or eveim exj)andmg into the adjacent fields.

The formation invariably immiposes march difficulties upon the troops and is avoided whenever possil)le.

When troops are already ina.rchiiig in air defense depth, it is seldom necessary to require the addi tioiial precaution of inarclii mig in air defense breadth.

1)ividin..q a column.Very long columns marching along a single route are broken up into several short groups wi Iii I etween I - and 3kilometer 04 to 2mile) in terv;m,ls.

Disposing of (lie nw(onze.d units.The motorized L.umits of tile flhfa.1i try
(livisioJi, except time recOn.mlliiSslUlee l)attalioll or unit.s enil)loycd on security IflISSIOBS, are divided iitt groups and follow the various columns, advancing by bounds.

If the situatioli peruli ts, they are organized into a. fllOtOFiZC(l coluiimn and marched on a special road.

Motor vehicles are also marched in the intervals between the advance guard and time main body, anti between units of time rnam i)Ody.

Avertinq h.o.stie ptwies.Upon the approach of hostile Ia1 mes, :m.i r g ian Is rom
)tly son mid time warn i 1i, usi 1i pro
arram mge 1
sigi mals.

Marchum ig troops throw themselves down on, or off to the sides of, the road.

Motor vehicles li:tI I.,
:1.11(1 their drivers set. th(
I )t'tLl(t's .

Moitu ted tl'())j)S
rle:ti
('I I(' Ioa(l
:Ll1(l coil tiIltl(' tIi(' iiiurrl i
1LI1(1CI a'aiIal)l('
cover.

Antiaircraft WCl)OilS immediately lire U011 the hostile phuies, bitt riflemen do not fire unless a plane comes witliimi r:uige.

lreqmieimtlv the troops nrc I)If Ill I'C:L(IIIlCSS
to withstand a SII1IUILaIICOIIS fliF and gas n.tt8.Cl(.

At night, if flares are employed by the hostile fliers', foot soldiers throw tliemtiselves to the ground off the roadside.

Everyone cisc and au vehicles remain ab.soiuiely motionless while amitiancraft artillery 1novides defetise.

## 40. Night Marches

Although night marches initially tax the strength of troops, this disadvantage is nmininnzed after troops be
COItIC adjusted to resting in day bivouacs and eating regularly on a changed schedule.

Night marches have decide(I advantages: they deny altogether or restrict niaterially hostile ground and air reconnaiSsance, and by keeping the timciiiy igmmottnt, they c()iltril)Ute to SUrl)ltSe;
ii igi it unite1 ICS bi'iiig tEOOJ)S intO 1 )OSitiOIi for btLttlC
with few'er losses an(i conSc(fuen tly higher itiorale.

lit spite of the fact that maw highways are often iihtnii
nated wit] i flares by ,lostile aviators, it is' fre uently necessary to utilize highways for marches.

If Jnany alternative 1)afallel routes are avaihLl)lC, the principal high
iTays are avoided, or utilized by motor elements only.

Ihe hour of assembly at the beginning of time umiareli should COltIC aftei' dark in order to pi'ehtde observation b hush Ic planes.

Trooi )S are funned as for a i.lay tfltUCII
wi thou I. ext,ciision of d ist.auicc ir exj>ammsioii of vidtlm for air defense; but the security forces are drawn in sottiewhiat.

doser, and distances between units are slightly increased to itisiiie suflicient, muTer i'ooiuu.

J)oublc connecting files, sent by the principal unit to the subordinate unit., or from the rear unit to the forward unit, are liberally used to maintain contact.

The order of march is similar to time arrangement for a day march.

If time tactical situation permits, foot troops precede the mounted troops.

On good roads and by starlight or moonlight, time rate of march is practically the same as that of a day march.

On poor roads or in heavy darkness, the rate decreases to :3 kilometers (just under 2 miles) per hour and even less.

Bicycle troops and motorized units also mardi appreciably slower by night than by day.

it is advisable to arrange short, re.stsaboumt i() minutes in every hour; long rest periods tend to immake time troops sleepy.

The alert commander does not march his troops directly into bivouac if daylight is about to arrive.

He halts theni ill an available covered area and arranges to have them divided into small groups before the troops march on to bivouac or other destination.

## 41. Day Marches

When conf,1.ct. with the enemy is at. all possible, the counnander must march his command dthing the day with
"preparedness for combat" as the foremost consideration.

When contact with the enemy is not imminent, the commander can divide his command and march the various units on several routes.

When time is not pressing, time movement also can be carried out in small groups over long periods of time.

In any case, the first consideration in a day march is tactical; but time J)OSSf
l)Ihities of cover should not be overlooked.

Time stronger columns 5110111(1 be marched over the routes offering the inosi, coVer, while (lie weaker eaii l.)e Sen I over time more o)Cfl routes.

TI IC Lime of (lepartlile Oil a (lay match is inhluence(l by time Situation, the weather, time season, the length of (he iii (('mu ie( I itiardi , (lie condition of the tI'0o1)S, UI(1 oIl icr fac(,( us.

.11 is deSi rat)ie to ii iard i fiot IL LI1 Old bivouac area tIn(.lcr cover of darkness and reach a new
(InC l)y (layliglit.

## 42. Organization For Marching

In fantry I I tare] I es iii
(1)1 in i miis of Lii ice i ten :tt)rcast,, riLViLily iii:tmeiics in cOlutlIns of two abreast (exceptionally four), and 1II0IA)r vehicles travel in single columns.

In general Ilie rigli I side of tue fOa(l IS L1SC(i l)UL wlmeii organ
iztti,iotis are lIliXPd, the infantry should be l)C1uuitted to ina,rchi 011 the more conifortable side for walking.

Within time infantry division, the commander must organize his troops for the itiarchi so that lie can bring all of thieiii to bear against the enemy iii a concerted attack iti a single day.

in order to accoimimlis1m this, it may be necessary to march in two, three, or four columns, with each column jwoviditig its own security.

Examples are illustrated by time 1olI )wiilg (I iagraiiis:
43. CONNECTION AND COMMUNICATION
'l'lie commander of a larger unit is responsible for COil
nection with the iiext lower; the smaller units musi.

cooperate, however, when difficulties arise.

In terrain, or under circi onstances, where visibility is restricted, arrangeineiits for continuous connectioxi are intensified.

On a march in several coiuiinis, communication between the colujiuts is maintained through the most appropriate available ) ucaits."

## 44. Rates Of March

Si lice i (. i liii! It titiuit to )FOVI( Ic coiid itiojis wh ichi j )ClDU t, an even rate of march, the mixing of different sorts of troops should be avoided as i,imcli as possible.'7
On good roads and under favorable conditions the following average speeds can be accomplished:'8
Per hour I'OOtLfl)O)S

. Skin (3iin)
U'oot ttot.tps (small units)
-, ..

.
6 kin (3 mi)
Moutited Itoops (trot and wnlk) ..
7 km (4 mi)
Moumited ItoopS (trot)
10 kin (6 itii)
Bicyclists
.....
2 kin (75iiii)
Motorcyclists
-
40 km (25 titi)
I tuge olgiti ii zatiot is WiLii til I vciipoiis
(I)
I ucludimig mest, periods ...
4 kin (25 mi)
(2) Umulri sti('SS, vit1idtiV iS( I)eLiO(JL,
5 km (3 iiii)
Motorized units
.
30 kin (18 miii)
with, flu'
iqienly is iiiuiiiici,I.) blinker (trisiliIlLIy) , and sigii:tI flitg.s (seldom)
I? Pack aol iiials are otie ihist.urbiiig factor ii, inaintaiiuilig at, eve_, rate of
iiiareht.
lot Ii,iil I. ,,,s ;utitlvr ordinary coiidition the distance 1at4erih,cd aM ft
'In, ITet'' bel,weq'i, (i)tii patties, or similar no its, is 10 paces; for titoi ,tif.cd troops
tiiid (.niiiis
I
tIaces.
Such distances do tiof. appiy, of course, wheii air de
1i,ist tIe-pitt
ints bee-u
ordered.

Intense heat, poor roads, snow, ice, absence of bridges,
8.11(1 otlnr local cO1I(IItIOJIS greatly ijilltiejice the march rate and the travel distaiLce accomplished.

'l'lie rate foi foot troops on a cross-country or mountainous titarch decreases from tile normal hourly rate by as itweli as 2
or 3 kilometers..

WTJicn great distances must be covered rapidly, motor and rail trammsj)ortat.ion can be used to expedite marches;
for distances under 150 kilometers (93 miles) the use of IV LOtOF transportation is ECCOfflI Ii Cli (1C(1.

WI ien ci ret in i
stances require foot or mounted troops to make forced marches, every effort is made to assist the accomplislimitent.

Strict march discipline is preserved, and severe measures
(fl'C mctcd out ayalnst na1uucrers.

'l'hc nien are toli I why the particular march is being made, amid arrai igei i iem its are
11131k fur rests where rcfrcshnicnts such as hot coffee I)!

tea will be served.

Their packs arc carried, if possible, in trains.

## 45. March Rests

r1IC commander should indicate in the itiarehi order all the necessary information concerning the duration and other con(litJyns of the march. An officer, should he sent.

forward to reconnoiter suitable areas [or ists.

Arrange
meuts shouhl be made for a short halt, itot longem Luau
15 minutes, to begin after the troops have marched about.

2 kilometers (1% miles) so that equipment and ci timing may be comfortably readjusted on the men and aniumials.

The troops remain nea4r the road during such short periods, spreadmg out only a sufficient distance to secure COVf from hostile air observation. %Vhen a long march is made, halts are ordered about every 2 hours.

Rest periods are ittil ize I f r eating, drinking, Iced itig
ninials, and check
iI1. veitieles.

lhi(' sLo;)I)iIig
)Ia('('s 5110111(1 l)e 11C1E
and not too reSt;rictc(l.

In suiiinier a iest, should be PVC
ScI'iI)e(I (hiring the hottest tnne of the day.

During long rest )eIiols (lie (roo; )S :i.ie:iri:uigvd iii groups; and when hostile airplanes flI)I)1OI.eh, the air guards sound the warn
ilig aiii the t.I'OoI)S take cover, renlalfling itiotionfess.

## 46. March Outposts

'I1Iie security of a force ft a rest area is obtiuncd by careful I)rcl):LrathnI wit hut the area and by sending out security forces iitsti'tteted to conduct reconiiaissanccs, these
(fl,Utli)flS I )tJ))g cx (r(iSe(t
13)
OfllCY
to prevcnt the enemy fron o)I)t4uJwig ijifoijitathiji about the maui force, and iii OV( icr t(
)I( I ted U c it uti ii ft Irce Iioi It SI II] )tISC amul give it litite tO)
)Il iaic for CW11.l )at.

ACCO )r(iiiig to the degree of
(bimiger, if far fromit the enciriy, Silni )ler 1)rCdaUtioflS titay be taken.; l)u I since the effect of (listalice I ias 1 )CC1I greatly redure(E I)y iiiotoiizatioit amid alt ol)enLtiuJis, time following I)rinCiPles (if outposting should ap)ly:
(a) EJnpl.)y time mninnuwn itumber of troops consistent with the situatioii.

(b) Exploit the natural 1)rotectivc features of time terrain,.' particularly if the cucitmy is liable to CIII Iloy an i LOIc(l VOl 11d105 aI w:tys (,SttLhliSht rOa(l i)loGkS.

(c) By day, inaimit,aiit observeis II) poiitts of vantage for distaji t viewing of time sturow uhug terrain.

(d) I y night, nianitaimi listening jioiiits aim<1 1)atlOlS Oil 01' iiCtI tft 1)OsSibiC
avenues of approach.

(c) Provide protectioti for the flanks and rear.

(f) Establish air guards and a warning systdni.

## Section Xi. Various Types Of Battle

'Flie most important types of battle are the attack, the defense, an(l the witll(lrawal, or retreat.

A combination of these types occurs simultaneously or successively iii the course of every major campaign.

The commander and the General Staff Oflicer niust master the fundamental prmciples involved in t,hese VarIOUS f0FHLS of tactical tiianeuvcr.

Resolute application of these priflCiI.)leS mitay l)eI)etrate, at least will help to neutralize, the everpresent
"fog of war."

## Section Xii The Attack

TIi( aLl:uk iiiay be Iunol)c(I (a) froiii. one (IEFCCLIOII
against front, [lank, or rear; (b) from several direcLions simultaneously; (c) after penetration, into a new direction.

47. FORMS OF ATTACK
'Ihe frontal attock is LIie mosl; frequent form of attack, buL lrLccJuuuzcd and motorized weapons will decrease this frequency.

It requires superiority in strength and pro
dtices decisive results only when the hostile front is
,enetrated.

The envelopnuj (ltt(lck (envelopment) is the most dice
live fonn of inaieuver, and if aggressively employed deep in the hostile [lank or rear, it cait result in a most decisive victory, or (WCJI aJllliIlilat.lOn of the enemy.

An envelop
nent of both flanks presumes marked superiority in means.

Wide (m'eh)l)meJ1:Ls are more effective than closein.

A tiiong LI ic f:tc Lois 1,1 ial, con tril)uLe to successful envelo
mitents ai'e (lCceJ)tiOJi, concentration of Strcflgtll at the cr1 Lical 1)01)1 I, tVLi ml )le cccrVes, IflOl)il i Ly, and Si tfl)hCty of ULLL11OUVOI'.

As to 9urprzse, the enemy iiiust iiot be given the time necessary to take countermeasures.

As to mass, strength must be concentrated on the flank of the eflVClOi)flLeflt so that hostile extension of the line can be OVCITUfl OF 01 lOt flnvellt(xl, and hostile defei isive moves quickly and ellectively frustrated.

As to f;ing the enemy, the hostile forces in the front must, be contained sunultaneously with the erivelopmg attack r1he penetration is an attack where the maneuver is intended to split or separate the hostile line of resistance.

The following e,onsidcrntions contribute to success: selee
lion of a favorable point (a weak part of the enemy position, or favorable terrain); stu'prise (such as feints at oIlier J)OJtIt.S, or secrecy in concentration of strength); breadth of penetration (preferable a base as wide as the depth of the peiietration or wider) ;
(.lcpth in organization. (to exploit breaking through, and to check hostile cowi ter
attacks) ; rapid and full exploitation, of the breakthrough.

The limited objective attack is a form of maneuver intended to win unportant terrain features, to contain the enemy froritafly, or to stop the hostile advance.

Orgaiui
zatioii in depth is not required.

## 48. Considerations For An Attack

Some important general cooskicratiomis for tui attack are flue following: (a) Obtain unity of comnmnaiut and action;
avoid piecemeal attacks.

(b) Establish a main effort.

(c) Assign narrow zones of action.

(d) Reinforce fire by t( Idi tioiul artil ICJ3 and heavy mfan try WCL1 )OIIS.

(e)
Coordinate and intensify the lire ot all weapons. f)
Make timely cmnploynuent of tanks and reserves.

(g)
Exploit successes quickly and fully even though the location of tJ.ie main effort may properly have to be
' 'rh may be accomplished by point attack (which is both effective, aiid economical in troops) by frontal attack (which involves employment of considerable force and tl,crcbv reduces the troops available for the n,ai,, and by alLav.k w' il h liii, iPi% object i ye (nh ku re pu res a ,,u,,siiier tnre,
,utl rulr,isvs nuore (.uoq ftu, Ilue ,,,aj it ellort)
changed.2
(Ii) Recognize the crisis in a battle and react at j )fO )riat,ely.

13e
:ile,'t to every advantage, to each success no matter how s,mitII, to aimy niistakcs made i)y the eiicmyam:l
(X1)k)i t. I.II('M( to time ftdlest, degree.

If the attack appears
(iclilmitely SLOJ)l)e(l by StIffllg hostile reSiStanCe at a certain point, further success may be better accomplished by nijeetiuig fi'esli tl'OOi)S, 1) eo.iicenti'miting fires omi a different area, or by changing the disposition of troops.

49. MECHANICS OF ATTACK
rlle Vi(llIl of ti ZOnC of action is dependent upon terrain ttiid IfliSSlOll.

A
l)attfluiOJu of infantry with both flanks protected is assigned a zone of action 400 to J ,000 meters
(roughly 44() to 1, 100 yards) wide.

An infantry division ni a mneetiiig engagement, Where terrain is favorable for euumiuloylnejit of su))ortnug WeaponS, is assigned a zone of action 4,000 to 5,000 meters (4,400 to 5,500 yards) wide;
I ui I aim inf:u i try division having both flanks protected and t.n:i.khug time lii:m.i ii effort zig:unst a strong hostile position is assigned :u. zone of :uctioui of 3,00() meters (3,281 yards).

A
(.Iefiuli Ic oI)jecti VC 01' (hitoetiOul must be indicated for LI me aitmick.

Al Ii 1(11 mgI i zne of aetiomi are prescri I cd
, ti mey need not be coin pletely tilled with troops.

For divisions
:Ln( I I:Li'gel'
liii Is, Ii iCM(
Z( H IPS time selce ted ftoi ii LI me maj for the sumuahler units, they are determined by inspection of the terrain itself.

Time boundaries are extended dccl)
enough into hostile territory to preclude mixing of units fj the duration of the day's operation.

Strongpoints and
20 I'ur i'xninpir', iii i miiig an nI,sinc.le-ri ver or tnou ii l.n.in linJn(;he mail, i(i,i tIItLV 1H' %%'ii(iI((i (ilirilig Iht' piogi('SS oF Ilie Ol)PrILI.i0Il i,ccitu of a hreakI.iiioiigii iii an tipiex1ecI,ed difficult terrain iinist he lflChI(lC(l within t UI1Lt's Zone of
(t.iOI1 811(1 iiot locttted Oil itS bOUiRltLry line.

troqtiently only the designation of an objective is required in order to I I ULI Ii tU11 (Ii i'ecttoii and to
)reclude mixing of organ iztt
(ions.

1)o not include too much detail in the attack order and thus restrict inilitivC.

The ,inssioii mitut he clear- whot to do, l)Ut iWI /WW to (tO it.

'rue iiiiortant task of all weapons iS
to Cfl(Lbie the infantry to close wit/i the enemy and to drive deep into his pOStiOfl. i,l order to crush (iii resistance or to annihilate him.

'I hits cml caii be accoiflj)iishe(1 only if the hostile auitomnn.tic weapons and artillery are neutralized or destroyed. Coordination between infantry and artillery must at all times and in all situations be carefully arraiged.

When tanks and infantry are operating togethier, thI(W
both should be initially assigned the sante objective, namely, the hostile artillery.

rfaI)l(s can often attack front a dillet'cuit direction.

'the coordination of other weapons of the division attacking with tanks is based on the activities of the latter.

'lhie division commander is responsible for such coordination.

Artillery supports the tank 'ttack by firing 111)011 ant;itapk weapons, blinding hostile observation, and neutralizin villages and edges of woods.

Artillery tue must be carefully observed and controlled to l)rCCtUdC firing upon friendly tanks and advancing troops.

Engineer troops remove tank obstacles and assist tank units forward.

The air force provides con
miection between the fastmoving tank units, time (liViSiOn, and the artillery.

Commibat aviation may be employed to neutralize antitank weapons.

Antiaircraft troops protect tIme dcployinen t of troops,
)OSI Lioiis
(if L(i,(II hess, :trtillcry lfl)Si lions, and bathe iCcoullia.iss:l.ncc J laiies.

'l.'llC 111811! effort, niiist FCCeIVe the Inil k f :u i t,i:tii'craft, pio Lect,.ic,ii Gas illay be used against
:trtiIleiv 811(1 reserveS, LU(l ill cOnfleCtiol) 'tvit.li road blocks
(IF block:lAk's 011 8.11 open Ilaitic The comuninications net.

vill lie I)ased
111)011 the plan of maneuver; separate nets for artillery and infantry will be established, the artillery itel h:i.v I iig l )rR)ui I.'.

## 50. Attacking A Position

'J'hc plan of attack will be deierniiicd by the situation, the iiior:tlc of (lie euleiiiy, :tuid the extent of his defensive works.

A )J)roach to the hiostiIc position may be possible only under cover of darkness.

If the positioii caititot be turned or enVelol)ed, then a Penetration must be made Li irotiglt soi ie OiI t in the froi I.

TI e employment of UnLdC(llIal.e force and means leads to severe reverses.

Careful plaits for the attack hUSh include the necessary in font tation about U ic enemy and the terrain 21
'1'11o1oigll recointaissance ii.iust be conducted by the officers of all anuS, hut reconnaissance parties must be kept restricted Lii S17,C.

Air 1cc(nItIaiSSZLlICC is of l)arLicUlal' value.

01,
servatioti and listening posts iiiust be established. Limited
objective attacks, Strong combat patrols, and simnilar
1!tetlt(>dS 1i.!ay be necessary to gain the information de
SiIe(I.

'['he hlcatioul of the main efTort will be determined by friciullyitticu lions, the situation, the defensive strength of ULC hostile pOSI t,iot, the COV(We( I a )J r0:IMJICS, L11(i tile observation for supporting WCaJ)OI1S, particularly the artillery.

In selecting a place for a pciiet.ratioii 01' break
through, Consi(Ier thc following oin ts:
(a) Find out how the attack can be further developed after the initial breakthrough.

(b) Insure sufficient i'ooin for niaileuver.

(c) Avoid natural strongpoints or envelop them.

(d) Locate favorable terrain for the employment of tanks.

(e) Capture points or areas that will give good Ol)SCFVtLtiOfl (led) iiLt() hostile positions.

(f) l)esig
nate close or fardistant objectives according to the size of the attacking unit: if the final objective cannot be reached in one advance, designate intei'mucdiat,e objectives involving in some cases limitedobjective attacks.

## 51. Artillery Employment

Under the protection of advance infantry units, the artillery will 1)0 brought fOrW'flF(l.

Promni,t recommii:m,iss:uiee of ii U fvrrai ii mm ist I u c:Lrrfm ihly Ii I:L( h I y :LrtiJ leiy
)fhi(cr$
in sinai1 groups.

if ))Ossible, J)ositions for time batteiie.s should be SO placC(l that the artillery IVIISSIOII limay lie earned out without change of locations.

Ammuini,iitioii SlIl)PlY, oI)erVation, hostile 1)OSitiOH, ,t,(Hfl1LIlIIliCat,iOfl8,
:d frrilaI.('
; )()MI LI( Ins, am 1(1
rnimgt'
ii mmist
:mi I
I me rum msn kred, an(l any necessary l)rel)ILI'atiOlmS carried out LII :LtLVallcc.

The distribution of the artillery will be determined by its mission.

Units will usually be employed intact; it may, however, be necessary to detach batteries, jmarticu
larly the heavy artillery, in very narrow division sectors, for example, heavy liowi tzer batteries may be taken away from divisions to operate against distant targets tinder corps.

'I'l IP iiii ti:i.l iii issioi i of U ic artillery inay in(thide nfl','
or all of the following: firing UJ)Oli iiiiporlaiit, targets iii the I ):l.tllcIieId , (I rawing the fire of hostile artillery, engaging lit 001111 Ierhatter vrk against hostile artillery and anti
:u icraft I )atteIies as early as i
)SSil)IC, ai id Ii iii
)0Ii large hostile group inoveitients at maximum ranges and as promptly as l)osSible.

52. INFANTRY POSITION OF READINESS (BEREIT-
STELL UNG)
'!'lio following (()Il5!( fCt8tioItS for LII 10 In itiry ''f)OSi (iou Of readiness" iiiay 1)0 listed as follows:
(a) A void too ciose proximity to tim enemy position in cases where no cover is available to friendly troops.

(b) If the enemy has previously offered strong resistance in the ugh tiiig, if there is reason to avoid premature entrance iIIt() the efTeetive hostile (lefensive area, or if the enemy situation in the maui l)a(tle J)OSitiOIt IS not clariFied, have Ilie tion1,s jnr(i:thly (levvli)pe(l I)efore they are eoiiduicted Forward iii their resj)ectiVC ZOUCS of actioim.

(c) Avoid hostile aim' ttiil giotumul obstruction l)y prohibiting large asseinI)Iies iii iestiieted areas, by exploiting all ground folds nIi(l available eover, .mtd' by approaching immediately
)ri( r to fl me ttit
olF :i.s CIOS( If) (ItO I R)Sti IC
)051 (ion as coVet f)0JlmIits.

((/) Select (lie iiif:wtiy jUllij)ofl t)OSitiomI
as eloso as i)oSSihlC to the luostil )OSiL1O1i in order to permit
(he artillery to pus1i well forward and carry out its mission without changing location.22
(e) Establish local security W Iitti (,lti llftSLIII ttiI aV,tiIilI)l(, cover ilti itol i)eittlit. the close ajroaeli itt
(Iii, iii ftt I rv, the nrLi I ku) nit ist. be echielotied to (lie tear and prepared to RII m,mor ft' iii (got liv ad vance (lit the encniy position.

with infantry detachments.

(f) (lain sufficient depth by drawing out and retaining reserves to the rear.

(q) If the forces going into the 1)OsLtiOfl of readiness are scheduled
10 immake a (,IOSCIt) envelopment., insure that. the 1)OSi tion is a sufficient distance Off to the side to preclude the enveloping force advancing into and mixing with other friendly t)001)S on the flank, w'hcn the attack is launched.

## 53. Infantry Action Up To .The First Assault

rEI1C infantry action up to the first assault is carried out.

wm(Ier the support of artillery and heavy infantry wcai xnis.

Ii exceptionally strong artillery support is availal)Ie, the infnn try can more freely advance against the eflemn)'
1,osition ; if the artillery support is not strong, however, then the infantry must advance cautiously.

In the latter ease, nmving forward un(ler cover of darkness or of smoke, the itifati try l4ikeM IUIVIL11LL 1)1 (0V(i to ILVOI(I ltost;ile
(.)l )serVat.i( )tt it.t I of (lefi I tt( led I grom 111(1 to av )i(I lu )8t.i l( Ii ic.

'J'hie infantry attack begins with the a(lvtLnce of l;hie light wapons under cover of the tire of artillery and hidavy infantry weapons.

Part of lie latter should be pushed forward with the initial echelons to insure con
tinual close snpl)ort.

Riflemen work forward through the use of
1IIe and movement.

Local fire superiority must be exploited to the fullest degree to capture groun(l.

Those units or parts of units which cannot advance farther should dig in and hold tenaciously the ground already won.

When weak points in the hostile position arc found, they should he attacked aggressively and with SCI'VCS.

'flitis a 1)usli forward can be made.

Against consolidated and extensive defensive works on the other hand, the infantry may struggle for days, working slowly fvard.

rFI.c9iclies and terrain may be won, lost, and FCWOfl (luring the course of the action.

54. ARTILLERY SUPPORT OF THE INFANTRY AD-
VANCE
TIic effectiveness of coun terbattery in issions directed by ti me arti I levy commander (lepen (is upon observation and available amnuini tion.

Neut;rahzation was often ac
eOniplishe(l in World '\Tar I by a simultaneous concen
tratiomi of several batteries using gas shells.

Tnitially iiiaiy batteries may be concealed in a living position awaiting the. ojimorttinity to SlIJ)liSC the enemy,.

When new hostile batteries are discovered or additional eneniv forces 21 are h cat.ed , then eoiwen trated lire tiiay be delivered upon theni with these batteries.

This method is much more economnical in :uninunit.ion than continual lire of nil artillery against apparent; Itmit not (IelintI.ely
1(1011
Ii hot I targets.

A lie si tii:i,lioii ( IeV('h)I)S :i.iitl elaiihit's, artillei'y lire e:UI
be switched from the man ifeLIy less important targets to time more importantareas.

[lie n fami try will sometimes he (iflfl.VOid&)ly (lel:Lye(l in its advance by reason of changes in time immfantry.art,ilIery )h1Lti of COO1(hiflatiOIl.

There vill le situations in which many hostile l)atierics will not be IoeaLe.l until friendly infan try has plmsime(l forward and drawn fire.

55. INTERMITTENT ADVANCE OF THE RESERVES
At the disposal, of the commander, the reserves follow licyond iange of hostile lire.

W'lien time terrain permits,
' Arti llerv eiigagis the In Lst lie inf:tii try which is fight leg eu thc think or ii, uro t.

,f friend lv jut t.liei I'
3(1 V:LUC(' slioi 11(1
I )(' lflfl( IC I )j I )flfl I)( Is frOtH
C( iver
(.0 ()VCI.

56. BREAK-THROUGH
a. Penetration oF the Hostile Position rI1le tiiiing of the assault is (li't.en,Iitle(l either by ll)(
Forward echelons or by the commander himself.

No Ji31'(I
and fast rule can be apphe(l.

Should the foremost imi t recgiiize (lie oJ)portunity t.o I)''J' through, they niiist. take
11111
and
(1uick advantage, calling II)Oii S(I)p)urtiIIg weapons for intensified Inc to s(IJ)port their a.siiII..

\Vheii (he iii fan try is ol)serve(l 311 vaneung r:t)i(lIy on till'
lU)SLile I)oSt hon , this increased stq port nitty tim 1ev rerIatit C1rCIIH1SI4LIWeS occir
3tItOl)ItLf.iCtLIly.

5110111(1
(lie coin
inander order the assaultavoiding an elaborate pl:t.n lie titust. quickly concentrate his strength at the point of ienetration.

b. Time oF Attack I)aybrcak is often considered the tiiost favorable (inn'
to gain surprise for the attack.

\'V:.tr experience itidic:i.tes, however, LI)31. I l3y1 )r(':Ik IS II ie liii te of Ii igi )('S(.

:LIcrlness, and it is better to change continually the Iioiii of a(.tack.

The. tini of attack should usually .b postponed if t.li artillery has not completed all of it,s jrcparations.

An attack against a t)05it1011 must be supported by artillery which is fully prepared to carry out. its missions.

In order to penetrate a stubbornly defended main line of resistance, concentrations of fire by all weapons must be arranged.

c. Enemy Withdrawals If the enemy withdraws to rearward positions (a move generally accomplished at iuight), the following action sun; i1
I
I p t4LkeIi
(a)
1\4 LIfl t1Liii eIos eon tact, wiLl; the hostile ii;huitry.

(b) Proiiiptly reroiinoj (('F (lie new hostile J)0sf(,IoflS.

(() MOVe the artillery well forwar(I.

(d) Prepare for hostile co;n; teratt;acks.

(e) On the following day,
)UslI
ra.J )idly f rwar I wi 1,1 all force; cotni )el the enemy to st4wd :01(1 light, to Lake high I, or to stifTer destruction.

## 57. Action Recommended For Certain Special Cases

11 the ('IIPMIV h.is li:oI ioily
:i short tiiiip in which to I)1('l):Lre Jiis (ICICI1S1VC JIOSI t.iOfl , if the it)oi'tIe of tue enemy is shaken, ur if (lip
)oSsiI i1 it.

of sun wise is in t.rnd;ieed he ,rcparntnnis for n,t.t.:uk ing a position may he shortened to IiIiIit.P(l I)III1LI5SLIiCP, IllOte rajmitl (ICVCIO1HI1CUt itIi(I
J)r('J):LJ:tion I IV II P artillery, t1)( I ('IitJ )Ioyznent, (.)f tanks and siiioke SCJPPflS.

If the enemy resorts to delaying action. the response SI lOuI(l be to I weak LI Ill nigh I us Ii tie at one I
ill t and CxJ)loit the l)reak Wi (Ii strong force, and to press closely
111)011 the vilIi(lraVing hostile tI0OJ)S.

I the eneiuuy N Is I eI i iiul (lie cover of a. ver strong position, t,Iic directini; or location of the main etTort should he ChiBOged IthO\Vlc(lg4W)f 1,Iue terrain vill hieriiuit advance planning in this iiianeuvr.

More artillery, tanks, and engineer troops should be moved well forward, and minimum iequircineiit.s should be established in the communication system.

If the enemy succeeds in falling back UOfl an entirely new and very strong defensive position, a regrouping of the attacking forces and new plans may be required.

if l}i(' at,t.flCI( (()llti1itl(S
I Ill fit 0 igli l11.I I Wi ti fl)i if. i )ro(l i ing (lCCiSi'e resitil.,s, the legroli)ilig of t,Iie r()iIIlll:liI(l shoIIl(1 be cariied Oil )In(.Ier cover of darkfless.

rhlh( (lay's I)attIe exI)erience may iiitfica,te :1 JICW 1)0111 ( for the iiia in efl( iii., aIl(l the or(ler for attack sI U)i 11(1
I )P. issi tr I
ji ist.

:L5
early as pOSsil)hC.

B.(cOJlI)a.iS5L1We inu.st; he energetic and coiltunled, for the enemy viI1 also make changes in his tLiSJ)OSi tion (luring darkness.

Night attacks are useful in dcterin;nmg 1mOSUiC mt.eimtions and nioveiuieiit.s, iii seiziiig favorai)le J)OSit.ioIlS for the folkwing (lay's jump
ofT, uud in ol)tailuiug ()l)S('8.t.lOI)
I lar ssing fire '"V the artillery ami ftlJ' JUgilt.l)OJl)bJllg att,:tcks 8110111(1 be SCIl('(I
uiled.

Artillery support. may iiot he possible at. (lawn of l.Iie fnllovmg (lay, till I('SS the ('Ntr1. (1)CilIV 8)8i lions have I )(fl lO(I.t.C(l .

Oniv then cn.ii the artillery deliver iimi
ol ,servrd supj ,ort.i iig Ii res.

Si iuhiciemi t.

I igli I, for artillery ob.servat.ions siiould I)C LWait.ed Ill irefereiie to seiidiiig the infantry fOI'WUI'(l tlulsilJ,l)orf,ed.

Artillery on other Iron ts may he fired for deer1 t.i ye purposes during the illl.('I'V.l.l of %v:Lit.iiIg.

t'assiiig OVCF IA) t.hl(' (kielise Iunii time at.t.icL may I H'
lfl'tCSS1tl'' ))I'eill(l(' to hl0J(h1]1 CflJ)t.lIl'('d gi'ouiuiol, or may he
()fll('t'Vd l.), higher iitliority.

'I'I()L)5 Ill eit;lipr i.so' :u'e rcorgaui7ed, and unnecessary forces i tialiawn.

Artillery lEltist protect. the relief of friendly iifaiitry by heavy cOI)CCII t.flLtiO)1S ammo I COt 10 terl)at.tCl'y lire.

58. MEETING ENGAGEMENT
a. Speed and Surprise Eli a ineetmg ciign.genieimt., it is possible (t,lioiighi on
probable with modern farrenclinig recommaissamice :111(1
intelligence IlleaJis) that the first information of the presence of the enemy will be received through actual e )1I tact.

liii tial I
the situation is vague and the security of both forces uncertain.

A meeting engagement must iiot 1 e perilmi t,tC(l to (leVelOl) iii to a wild i'ush UpOn time hostile position; a CoordiJma,te(l plan must be carried out, caliuuly, but so accelerated as to carry out the following considerations: (a) Seize the initiative and fix the hostile force insofar as the situation permits.

(b) Expedite i)1eJ)aratiofls for the attack, quickly occupying ground favorable for observation, development, and advamice, and for Slll)j)Ortilmg weapons.

(r) I.iitensify reconnaissance, ground and air, to determine promptly the enemy's dispositions, strength, intentions, and weaknesses.

(d)
Surprise time enciuiy, J)rn1ci)ahly by iapidi ty of movement :Eml by screening your tr001)S and IIIOVCU)Cfl ts prior to entrance into l)aLtlc.

b. Time and Space The advance guard of iacim march column must provide time and space for developmrment by the main body.

An engct.ic
1( lv:tuice Ufl( icr cover of U me advance guard artillery often seizes important terrain features to the front and flanks, and fixes the hostile force.

By extending over a I )road front ts infantry and artillery, the advance guard can deceive the enemy relative to strength and movements.

c. Coordination In a meeting engagement in open terrain and when the enemy has excellent observation, it is necessary to develop and prepare for combat much earlier than otherWise.

TIme location of time main effort is promptly comnuuuimnieuttcd to time various columns, and they deploy in keeping with the general plan in order to insure coordination of effort.

The prompt employment of additional artillery support should be coordinated with the general scheme of maneuver.

d. Methods In attacking during a meeting engagement, alternative methods exist for utihzmg the main body: (a) prompt employment as the units of the march columns reach tl)e immediate combat area; (b) development, and occupation of a position of readiness from which the attack will be launched.

In the first case, the units will be issued individual orders as they arrive.24
All unit commanders nnmst insure coordination between their infantry and supporting weapons.

In the second case, the attack will be conducted similarly to an attack against an enemy in position.

It will not be advantageous to push through an attack immediately if the terrain is difficult or if the employment of the mass of the force on the same (lay is no longer possible.

The action of neighboring iimiits must also be taken into consideration.

59. PURSUIT
The abolute disregard of all factors xcept the annihilation of the hostile force will govern the conduct of the pursuit.

Time most imnI)ortant principles involved are to harass continually the hostile force in front amid on the flanks, and to block the avenues of retreat.

It is most important that time4 intention of the enemy to withdraw The situation may so develop that the immediate employment of umiIt.

n they arrive will not be necessary.

The remainder vill then be flrRt moved Into positions of readiness.

be promptly recognized.25
When such recognition be
conies definite, tue coinniander will inunediately elnJ)ioy all available force and spare no effort in order to annihilate
(lie eiieiiiy.

Pici I tt,i ue l)UtSI ut can result disastrously; oiL
the other hand, ii the withdrawing enemy is permitted time in which to break off combat, an opportunity for decisive victory may be lost; the commander must therefore carefully coi)si(.ler the situation RI1(l evaluate the information prior to committing his troops to the pursuit. Commanders of subordinate units in the forward echelon push energetically forward when the enemy gives way.

The presence of i uigl icr comnmnami ders in these forward units spurs the troops to greater effort.

Soni.e of the 11111 ortan 1. considerations for conducting successful pursuits are: (a) Employ air force units against large bodies of hostile retreating troops; use reconnaissance planes to deteritunc direction. of withdrawal and use
(living attacks with machine guns and boitibs upon tFOOj)M
aiil inatriel in marching columns, especially in defiles and against bridges.

(b) Employ artillery in harassing missions.

Let part of the long-range artillery pound vigorously on potential avenues of withdrawal, roads, etc., and keel) the bilk9f the artillery leap-froging rapidly, pressing clos Lehind the friendly infantry to rcndci support.

(c) Employ infantry in pushing rapidly forwtrd literally on the heels of (lie withdrawing enemy;
assign distant objectives in the direction of the withdrawal; have the heavy infantry weapons follow closely the forward echelon; and give the enemy no time to organ
' Clues may be (lerived from airplane rel)orts of rearward movements of Linins, supply, eclioloiis, and reserves; from reports from friendly troops; and from patroiliiig, particularly at iiiglit, and t,,isceliancous signal interceptiouR.

ize
:1. (lCI('I)S(.

((1)
I.'fl?7)i(fl/
(?U/1.??(('r.S'
to ICLit' roa(ls III
the rear of the pursuing forces, to remove obstacles, and to neutralize gassed areas.

\\TJ1ji the frontal attack is vigorously carried out, en vclol)ing forces of great mobility 26 will oi erate fron i flank and rear against the hostile retreating columns.

.l)cfilcs, bridges, and favorable observation (lee!) in rear of the enemy will be seized, and avenues of retreat cut off.

If the enemy succeeds in organizing a delaying J)OSition, a coordinated attack must be l)101111)tIY arranged and lnAtnChlCd.

Coiiiinaiiders niust insure a continual flow of supplies for the rapidly advancing units.

In pursuit, matters of
)ly and evacuation require particularly careful supervision.

Pursuing troops must maintain contact with the enemy,
:umoi intist report back fre ien t,Y to) heiukiiarters their own locations.

if time pursuit continues in to the nigh t.

iiii:ii try mini t,s p)ttsi) lorwarol :tluiig (lie rotc IS.

A rtiliery coiitiimues longrange hatassitig the, while individual hat.
teries follow time infantry iii close l)rOXiIIU(y for reildellug jnitmiediat,c SL1)J)Ort.27

  2 f 10 Ion zed oi fafl try, 1110011 te<l troops, Hiotori zbOI
                                                  1giI.rs, and ai iii t,ai ik
and ntpt.jnircrft, hulLs.
  " Artillery firing aL uiight hhpI(Ier slick condiLloips is, of course, inittu firing.

## Section Xiii. The Defense

'l'J1( 111115)111W I, considerations of defense are COflhI)inC(l in ut2lizatwn. of terrain and coordination of fire.

The natural defensive characteristics of the terrain should be unproved, and camouflage should he used freely.

A
fully coor(llnaf,e,d use of all available weapons must he arranged; strength should l)e conserved by keeping the lOSSeS ill 1)C1'SOflfl and materiel down to time very mini
inwn; and exact dispositions, strength, and intentions should be denied to the enemy as long as possible.

A.

weLlorganized defense capable of quickly and effectively reVerting to time attack, wi Lii cunning and (lCce)tiOfl eiislirouding the I1U)vClIIefltS and dispositions, wil.l offset.

hostile nunLelical superiority.

60. FAVORABLE TERRAIN FOR DEFENSE
't'lic l('fri i( kr I mas an ac I aim tage in that, he selects time terrain fir his battle.

.ULrcly viIl :iIl of the following terrain ieiuiicimien Is for defense exist in a single combat, area, htmL certaimi of them will he i)resen L, amid the cont
mnander may ilmiprovise the others: (a) good observation for artillery and other st1)J)orting weapons; (b) protection against hostile observation; (c) natural obstacles against tank attacks; (d) natural protection for flanks; (e) possibility for launching counterattacks.

## 61. Other Considerations A. Delense Or Delaying Action?

'l'lie JuiSSiOfl must. clearly ifldicate time form of (lefense cont.eln))lated: defense (Vertcidif/v.nq), meaning that. the n ,si t,ion viII be Jmel(l under all circumstances; or (Iclay ing action (JIinIaltcmidr Widcrsurnd).

Fire may be o1mcned ei LI icr at. maximum effective ranges, if time tuninmmn ition is aimiple, or at. closer r:ulgc.s, in order to effect surprise.

## B. Preparation Of Defense Area

WThen the.

hostile sit.uat.ion has not. been CLarlIiC(l
(especially if the. direction of t,lme enemy's attack is unknown), the mass of (;he defending force should be ref1uned in a position of readiness.

When informnatioii relative to hostile formmuttions, nI:Lin effort, strength, etc., becomes, available, then the troops may be moved into
(lefensive positions which have been previously recon
nuitereci and PrePared according to the time available and time situation.

Occasionally only a skeleton posItion will he OCCLtI)icd with artillery protected by small units of infantry, while the nmass is held lack centrally lOetLtCd so that it can quickly occupy positions upon time approach of the eneimy.

c. Maneuvers Advanced positions and outposts delay hini and give time for the occupation and preparation of favorable defense terrain.

Reserves are used for flank protection, for counterattacks, 'and for blocking penetrations.

Fire power must never be weakened by holding out unnecessarily large reserves.

If, after contact with the enemy, the situation requires defensive maneuver, the posit.ion is t1tuirkly organize(i L5 the Lr()Ol)S (iel)loy, anti if the ternun iS Il( ) I
:trticu htrly Iflv( )fll.l )Ie, Ii e t.ioops are tliawti 1 )tc1( to better defensive terrain.

62. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF DEFENSE
Sonic of the general principles of defense can be suni
inarizcd :ts follows: (a) Tue purpose of the defense is to iiuhhify the hostile attack.

(b) The pOSition selectedis held to the last; the commander may tinder certain cir
eunislances, however, restrict the time.

(c) The defensive I)OSitiOII selected must compel the enemy either to
:Ltt:Lrk, I'ehil)(1tIiSh lime advance, 01 attClflJ)t, (A) avoid coin
l)at,.28
(d)
I lostile eI1VelO)t1teIi1S
LLC COtlIilCrC(l by cx
leiiding or refusing time flank (or Ilanks), or by cehieloim
imient of reserves.

(c) If time enemy attempts to march around iii order to avoid time position entirely, then he should be attacked.

## 63. Organization Of Defense Areas A. Defense In Depth

'J'Jme mmcliii I cLltIP
)O)Sitit)li iS OrgafliZed ill (lejithl to acconijhsJm demise allaround Iircsan(I effectively limit hostile j)euietrati0nS.

LO(!.L"'Vitii(liavaIM
1)elore sul)erior hostile fire immay be authorized by time regimental Coin
Ii uLn(icr to ii is I )attal ion com mum manders, or, iii si mecitti cases, by time latter to their subordinates; local withdrawals niust not, however, permim it the loss of connection between tin its in time line or hostile penetration iii to t;hme niaimi battle zone.

En terrain not too umifavoral)le for time (lefeilse, uitits
2P Tiii iii Iii, irot,i1,lIslu.d if (lit, 1,osilioti etuiliol. lii til itt'lv iivoided or onveloped l,y (lie etienty.

OCCIi fronts double the width of those assigned for the attack.

rFIC5t islands of resistance are so organized as to Permit allaround defense, ithi wcapoiis SO SigILtcd as to coVel' 8,111 )OSSiI )IC aveii lies (if :L l )F( ):IcJ i tLt niaxi in Un i Imiges.

rIh1( defensive zone is orgaiuzed in (iepl;hl, Willi the iiiaiii line of resistance in front of the terrain that is favorable for observation posts for the artillery and heavy support
ing weapons.

Tue higher coiiiiandcr selects the geiiernl defensive line on the map and assigns sectors to units.

Subordinate commanders carefully reconnoiter the terrain and select the locations for their troops and various types of weapons.

b. Cover and Obstacles Cover for itiad iinegun en iplaceitten ts, obsei'vat,ion posts, and accon ipanyin g wca )ons is provided.

Obstacles are constructed to SUp)le1ILeIi t the natural
(lelelisiVe characteristics of the terrain.

Priorities of defensive works are governed by the rule that "elTectivciiess of lire takes 'priority over cover."
Tue nornial order of tasks is the following:29 (a) clearing fIelds of fire and establishing distances to increase the cfliciency of fire; (b) c:uiioullag
ing installations and erecting chniuny estabhishuiients;
(e) eoiistrtiting spun tei' cover for oliervatioii I)ost.s;
(il) cotistructing lILacJu1egun eiiiplacements; (e)
erect
i tig Inu') )( I wi i-c or oti icr ol )stael('s ; (f) exca'aI,i I ig di ig
outs, switch positions, or planned coiinnunication routes.

64. RESERVES, RELIEFS, AND REAR POSITIONS
Local reserves are used to fill in gaps in the line, to counterattack against a local penetration, and to relieve
" Several of I.l)es(, tasks, such as caim n t flagi ug, may be iii it leriak cii ci ,iiei r
rcut.Iy with other Lasks.

troops in the front line.

General reserves are used to I)roteol a Flank, to counterattack against, a serious pene
Iralion, to coun teratt,ack when the situation indicates a reltiin to offensive tactics, and to relieve organizations in (he line.

A. relief is only effected after a long period of defense, and tinder cover of darkness.

Infantry and artillery are never Velieve(l SlIilttl taneously. r1! relief order (lIrectS
when and where the relief is to report, the routes to be used by the relieving force and the troops relieved; and the Lime when the new comin:uiolcr is (Icinutely to assume resj)onsihulity for the sector.

Only necessary under exceJ)tional circumstances, rear JR)S1LR)flS must be located sufliciently back from the main line of resistance to require the enemy artillery to litove forwar(l.

A rear position will be ordered OcCUpied by the coimnander when the former position can be held only with unlustitiable losses and when consideration for adja
ccitt units does not forbid.

## 65. Actual Operation Of The Defense A. Main Line Of Resistance All Fires Along The Thitin Line Of Resistance And In The

I
11 )l iefensive zone are carefully coordi natc(l to insure that all areas, l):Lrti(tIlaily the potential avenues of aj
I )roacJ 1, arc covered by strong con CCII trations.

Artillery and infantry are coordinated to permit a rapid switch from one area to another; and fire plans are prepared to limit. penetrations and to block envelopments.

Defensive l)re1)tratio11s are secured from hostile observation by active reconnaissance and by a screening force,
1)0th of which operate under the same commander.

eiiei'oits use of ol)st;aries. nabir:tl 811(1 eol)St,rfleLe(l, is made.

'I'he advanced troops are under direct control oi the commander; after fighting in delaying action before superior enemy forces, they witluiraw t,o rearward posi
(.10115 aS prearranged by hini.

I,. Advance Position
'Flu' advance position, usually located within t,he sphere of (l;)eratLon of friendly longrange artillery in the main l)at.t,le position, is occupied to prevent the early seIzurC of iiiiportant. terrain features by the enemy.

Cantoufiage and (IlItlIlIly works ate Itse(I freely. The advance 3)OsitiOfl iticreases the effectiVellesS nnd the tune of eini,loyt,ieu t, of longrange artillery by j)rotecLwg a(lvatlcVd, artillery II )s('rvation n )sfs ; also, si tel i a js )SI ti( )fl (ICed VCS LI ie et ICI 113'
relative to the (liS1H)SitiOflS and organization for defense,
811(1 C8USCS iiit,i to deploy jreitiatnrcJy.

FriCil(lly tL'OO)8
i,iiist with(lraw ))elore the enemy can overrun the position.

in wi iluirawi ng, tren.rr:i.ngeol roil (es will in' indicated to insiire ilial the fire (If weai H )lIS loc:Lte I iii
$1 t(' fldX t
)( ISP (iou to the rear (outpost line of resistance) is not, ma.sked.

c. Outpost Position
'['lie 0U4)OSt position, h)Cflt,C(l within f11ie sphere of opet
atioii of tile light artillery batteries in Lie main position, is selected to provide Lime lot LrO()()S manning tile main defensi VC H)SLtiQl1 t 1 )FCI HtEC for aetti )I1, to Sill )1)lCI flCfl t oi.servation, anol to deceive tile attacker relative to dis
positions.

'l'roops from infantry units immediately to the tear generally occupy this line and are withdrasvn by signal according to prearranged 1)181) sO that fields l)Cfore tile mail) line of resistance are not obstructed.

Artillery delays tue hostile appt.oadl) by the use of haraSsing fires
(()tI .r()lle(l I
Va(li()
EOJ)Ort8
frotti iLdV(UiCC(l
()lJ5CI'va.tioII
posts.

To increase radnis of action, a few light batteries tiiay be advanced forward to locations between the out
)0St line afld the adValiCC position.

## 66. Artillery In The Defense

a. Control by Artillery Commander The cotiunander of the whole defensive force deter
ifllflCS the J)ropoi'twn of artillery to be held in direct sup
)( trt :Ifl(l ti te P1'ol)ortiOtl to be attached to inf:i,n try units.

Artilkry is kept. as far as l)OSSib1 tinder the control of the arti Ikry comttuun icr, who tIn(kr Lil cirettitistatices rct:uits control of the iiiass of the division artillery.

If the sit.ua
tioii l)eriilit.S Lfl(I there is an ample uwnunitioim supply, heavy lires may he (lelivercd at long ranges.

b. Tactics lii the initial stages of a (lefeumsuve action, artillery may soittetittirs he kei ,t, silcit I. Iii 1:i,ciit:ite tlerej tioii ; otlicuwise, it 'ull he etiiploycd to draw listile artillery lire, to deliver cotili (.cri)attery uir('s, or (o bring kwii harassing fires oii the approaching hiotile in fati try.

In the advanced stages of a defensive a ior,,.1t)i.jtilk of the artillery is used t.o
(hell vet' C(flICCI1traLion UI) hostile 1iOsitions of readijiess,
:uul i:rrticiilarhy oil hostile heavy mfantr,y weapons; the loll 11111111cr is USU( I to ( tel i ver coiun terbattery tire.

Aii I in the final stage vlieii the hostile force is on the j)Oillt of lat inch i tig its
:LSs:L( ii t.

(.1 te at Ii I lery delivers re iaratiotis and bai'i'ages U 1)011 tI I( tiosti he assault.

c. Barrage Should the eneitty uttake a s(iI'prise attack at night oi' iii a fog, a bai'i'age of all wcainiiis is delivered ittiwediately in iiit, of U e n iai ii ii no of resist:uice.

I )clin I Ic restrictions relative to coverage and duration of [ire arc issticd.' As a nile, heavy artillery does not participate.

67. INFANTRY IN THE DEFENSE
\\'itii J)LU't of their J)eaV3' WCat)OHS, the infantry opens lire upon the apj )roaching enemy at goo(l (histanre;
tf friendly artillery SuJ)l)Ort is weak, at itiaxittiut i nuige.s.

l'iring positions are located in advance of the maui hue of resistance or in the forward part of the defensive area. As Uic eiieiuiy draws cloSer, hO is engaged by the lire of all the defending heavy weapons, and finally by the lire of all
:LVaIIiLI lIe weapons.

The infaui try fills up gaps iii t,hue line, IcCiLI >Ltititi g any SCCLH)nS teifllflJI'al'i ly lost.

## 68. Hostile Penetrations

\\'hieie IIiLhI gr()iI)s ihie (Ii('Iuiy JULVC l)t'OkPIi 1,hirotiglt, I lit'
gI()ti)s Shi()Iil(l
1)0
(I('sl.royc(l iuIiInC(liatehy.

Ilox I:trrnges )Iaccd III
thOu re:ir 'ihl l)t'erhtI(1e their withi
liavttl.

When a successful l,ieaktJi rough of large pro
l)ortioIus has been accomplished by the euiciny, the coin
iuiLui(ICr of the defensive force will decide whether the position will be shifted or the lost grnd regained by counterattack.

Jf he decides to counterattack, thic fires of all weapons are carefully coordinated, a limited
)jcc
tive is assigned, and air and tank support is provided.

69. THE COUNTERATTACK
It is most important that the psychological moment be recognized lot' the cotIfl terbiow.

'['he couuiiiiander is ever
' Iii Uis coiiiicctio,i a Igii howitzer battery (105mm) can cover about 100
nJeii; f( )r md ieations.3'
The COnnLeraUaek plan rcseml)les a Ii, ii letiol )jeetiye attack iii which artillery sul)l)ort, Is)iiulaiies, tiid ()i)JCCtIVCS are Sj)Cci[iC(I.

Any Ob)JCCtiVC
sel(.'cted itiust. lie a (lecisive terrain feature.

70. WITHDRAWAL TO A REARWARD POSITION
Advance orcks ate issued to cliect a withdrawal, titris
('Itsuring C()Ot(IiI)tLLiOfl.

Cont.act.

with :.u1a.ccnt. units is UULJII Iaitu'd.

'l'hie l)U)'elItC1}t, to tue JC1 PS CITCCLC(I under C()V('l ol (ltt1kn('SS.3
Attivity 01) the original position will l)(' SiItWlfl.Le(l If) (leceiVe the efleiiiy.

Firing by part. of the Ill ItLil try and artillery will be Col) Litiucel from the forwatd
))0S1L10fl to give 1,1)0 0IWlfl the iinjression that it is still being strongly defetitled.

The hostile advance upon the timv (rctiewe) )0MI Lion will lie delaycol l)y the lire of
:utiI lery and I wavy weapons, su )l)Ienlcr) ted by incaiis of poison gas nn(1
oh ,st;aeles.

fl I I oliIe r1,iuIses, IIftv
In8(s, rtieiiiv errors, ii,nraln or th' 'in'tnv, ni
1IP Or riuti'Il
l.if)fI)iS.
I );y light. w 11.11(1 iL%SIiS o.ii. univ tile upt nul
ui,uuhu'i tiusel or Iug, 811i(irUhl
or uuILluuIni, s,i
over I, rrttiul or Vi'ty ret.iirled visil,iIil.v, vIieu, l,1u sititittlu,u,
(1(01111 tuly hid irni c's thai. Ii. will I ' cIaugeuuu is to wail. ut ii III dark ness.

## Section Xiv. The Delaying Action

l'lic l)tIr,)OS(' of tL (lcl:LyiIig
(tI0Ii IS If) ('.IT('.ct inaxitinun
(Ie.la.y to the enemy without committing the fiieiuilv force If) (IVciSIVC aclion It iS (I)1 )I0'e(l tO avoid 1)reaking In'
fore SIIJ)CIi0i hostile foFee ; IA) gauui t'iIIi( 01 to iuii )I)V(' (lie sit;IInt.u)n viLl, relerciuce to oJ)servation, cover, :111(1 field of lire; and to mimanenver the enemy into a position iii vhieIi lie uiiay be more effectively attacked.

If a transi
lion Irouui (lelense to delaying sLct,u)n is iiiiperative, the first position selected should he at least, 6 jiiilcs t,o tue rear.

A fully coordinated attack by the enemy can 1w theeked by causing hint to displace his art,illei'y and to reorganize generally before lie launches a new :ittack.

Tue characteristic organization for delaying action in
cii I(leS the lol tovmg consi(leI'ations:
(a) Siiecessi ye (It'
fensive lines are selected wi tJi Si ,liieien t. in frrvals to cai use fhiSI)hLcelfleflt of the enemy's artillery.

(b)
Posi tiotis S('ICCt('(l should J)CIIuuit distaiit oluscrvttt,ioui :Ln(l effective uI.se of lonr_range \'4C8l)OnS, an(l have cover iii the lear to facilitate withdrawal.

(c) Natural obsiclcs are fully cx
Ploited and supplemented by constructed obstacles and by the use of poison gas.

(d) The bulk of the artillery, along with the longrange artillery, is held under the artillery commander for long-range interdiction and counterbattery misions.

(e) Resistance in the forward position is continued until the next rearward position is occupied and fully prepared to carry on the defense.

(f) Units arc deployed over very broad fronts and
70
with ho olej )(;J1.

(j) SiiiaIt reserves are retained.

(Ii)
iteserves EC UtiliZC(l to
(O'1'1' the ViiI)(.Irawal l)ttrtIC(tltUl.y by dayiighit (according to the situation and terrain, they iiiay be located off to a (lank or on a commanding piece or terrain, which facilities tue protection (If l;Jic units withdrawing).

(i) \'VIien the situation permits, withdrawals arc always II}ade tinder COVCF of darkness; sometimes, even at the iisk (If being iitvolvcol in serious action requiring a
.strong (lelense, the sitiiatioii should be held iiiil;il
(larkuess.

## Section Xv. Retreat-Retirement

In n ietrcat,rctireiiiciil, coiit:tct
%viLh tue eiieiny is l)rokdn off for the purpose of seeking more favorable terrain or conditions for the resumption of uffcnsivc action.

A coinimnuider may be forced by time tL'CII(l ol circumstances to retire, or he niay, of Ins own free will,
('Icet to retire.

Only time greatest cinergeticy is cOflSi(lered to justify retreat.

Local reverses should not be taken seriotisly.

No seeondincommnatmd upon receipt of no
faVoral)le information is authorized to order a retreat.

If the sittntLion indicates time necessity, he iviust report to a higher conmniander and state I us intentions to retire
'iLlm time reasons therefor.

A retreat should be eflected under cover of darkness, Witi!

time greatest secrecy.

If troops are told the pur
pose to imiijnove their future chance of success their mimorale will not, be adversely affected.

Fresim t,fO()J)S if available should be given the mission of rear and flank guards to proLect the assembly and muovemnent, of the cointmi:tinl II
Lime eneimmy IS eiiipIo&iig immotorized or
1IICCJIZLImiZC(l troops, special provision vill have to be un:ule IA) protect IJm(' flanks with :LiItit:LOJ( weapoiis :uid l'OtL( I I )k)CkS.

## Sectkn Xvi. The Employment Of Field Artillery

Tile division artillery eointnaiider is a Sj)eCiaI advisor to the division commander on artillery employment,
1)l8CCnLCflt, and a)flmllflitiOfl he is also Conuluttider of tite artillery regiment, which iitcludes the medium howitzer battal
1)1, the SOlUidaIl( Ihash battalion, and such artillery as may be attached, lie orders artillery concentrations, counterbattery, and harrassiug lire in cooperation with the general scheme of maiteuver and in SUpI)OFt of tl.ie infantry.

Tile artillery battalioii is the fire unit.

r1lLe battalion count tander indicates definitely to his batteries such matters as the following: targets, aiming 1)0111th, amounts of amnnmnition to be fired, time for opening fire, location of l)0SitiOtlS, anunuttition supply, routes, types of fire, and kinds of amninujutjon.

Firing data are obtanlc(l for the battalion by Fm Igi I tg si tots, 11 Ut COt 11.1)1 itations, opera
tions of the obset'vatioit battalion (sowidandflash), and references furnished f 'friendly troops.

In very' wide sectoi's 01' when 0)e1tLLuIg iii terrain of restricted visibility, it IIUIy lM necessai'y 101' (eI't4LiJi l)fltteIi(S to obtain firing (ltthI illdiVidUally according to their tactical missions.

71. ORGANIZATION
l'art of the artillery, usually the light howitzers, has the Princil)al mission of providing direct support to the infantry.

The retitainder is employed in counterbattery, harassing fires and preparations, concentrations, and itiLer
(I icLions.

( lose (O1 iccLioii. Wi LI I LI I( St S 115 1ais Ihash tahioii IS 1IU.UJlttJ,i ilC(1.

1)i )OSitiOfl lUtist he kej)L hlexi I Ic to pent ut quick shifting of battery positions, OLiS5i(.)J1S, aII(l targets.

'I'ite ent)loynLeJIl. fit gel)er:L1 14 oIttiiiitoI
by these considerations: (a) itunber and knids of guns available; (b) COinbILt plans of the eoflUVLtl.It(l tL.S
H,
(c) terrain and we:Li;11('r; (il)
Ii st.iIe arLi I levy ; () ai i fit II LIII
Lion avai lahk

## 72. Location In The Attack

I
i gei lertLi , iii LI i('
:tI.t:i,e.k II ie arlil Inry is located ii IL
liLedilLIely iii rear of the infantry line, j ust beyoiid ratige of hostile smallarms fire.

Figure 1 shows a typical arr:riigeii ie:ffl, VIth Ii ie
)l )seFVtLI1OIL 1 )attalioJI. (soundai ni
llnsl i) operatti ig d ii'cctly under LIic artillery connuander.

II ree()JlnaisSaIlce and (OJIIbttt intelligence haVe given deliiiite
.II1IOF1IL:Lt.iOII
:LhotIt.

hostile (lisl)OSILIO1LM, t,luii a I)r('J)aflLLJO!I may be fired, continuing i() to 30 minutes,
:o 1(1 (leJ e11(li ug UOIL tl)C 8.)nlflUIiitlOfl available, the sur
j.niSe effect, and the itimt,ion.

in the case where lrac
t.ically
.iio jjifor'natioii On the eiieiny is available, the artillery J)JO1)t1'LtiO1I iS oiiiittcd; the infantry laLLnchcs the attack, drawnig lire from hostile heavy weapons and artillery, ipoii which, omice .locate(.l, the friendly artillery
(Li I II iereafter lire.

73. LOCATION IN THE DEFENSE
i\itillrry iii the deleiise is organized (lie sante %v:Ly as ii, It ie Itt.Uk .

hli( 011 ly (Ii (i(W(',iI N'
ilL
(.115,1(1St LU IlLS
15 Ii the direct sui port. wjxnts (hg1 it, I Lowitzers) arc .l(at;e(l slightly farther to the rear, and the general support guns
(ntedmin hiowitzei; u?e in a central location where they IIJL iflter(llCt. at long ranges to force an early deployment
(If iron.clung O1LOlI1 foiiiiat.ioii.s.

74. COOPERATION WITH INFANTRY
'l'iine and space itiust be carefully coordinated by both the imifaittry and the artillery, it is essential that the artillery observers be at all times alert, not only to locate targets and hostile forces but to follow closely the movemeats of frieiidly troops, particularly the infantry.

To facilitate ti is close contact, I I devoI yes upon tIie infantry to seize LU t( I 1101(1 terrain wi icli oilers excellent observatjon for the artillCry.

Coinntwiication is effectively ntain
t4.ti1tc(l.

Close contact l)etWeel). infantry and artillei'y ofhcers is absolutely essential.

'l'lie division conunander iinlica'Les, as )ro1npt.Iy as pussitic, the 1)11th of iiaiieuver to the artillery conu)un1(ler so as to ,ernut, the ki;Uer the IIi:Lxil)ltuIl fteedoiit iii pllUIIII3lg the role for Ille :Lr lilleiy.

En the advance the artiUery renders inunediate support IA) the iitfaiitry witeit C0J) tact. vit,li the elienty is gaiite(l.

r1h1iS S aCC0JtLJIiSI1C(l by the artillery observers, who aCcoIflI)aJty the foremost infantry eleinctits, or obSOIvV
front balloon oi auplaiie.

lii the attack the artillery iitust iietitralize the hostile rC5iSt4l.JlC( and opcii the way fop thl('
advance of the infantry.

Rapid reconnaissance and JEt))ti )t de )loylnen t for actiwi contribute to the success of this
)IIJSS1(ffl.

TI, is generally advaJIt4tgeOUs for the infantry to wait. for the support of the artillery.

It. is also nhiJ)orIAULt for the infantry to uiidersi;aud the hiiiita
lions and capabilities of the artillery.34
1i this e.oiiticcttwi : (1) the niiivibcr, caliber, atid effective range of bat
terk.s avadabtc; (2) the time mmeccssary for preparat.mon of fire; (3) the nount, and kind ot amnmtt,titioim available; (4) the type of targets a(lapt.e(I to artillery fire.

## Appendix. Sample German Orders

Examples of four dilierent German orders are given below in English translation.1
1'hougIi slightly awkward in. expression, the hte.ral rendering tends to give the reader t 1) L( )EO :teeii Iflth ((fl lCej )ii( )I I, I )Otll LM to
(OJ it.e.tit :I,( I LM to sl,rtitture.

'Ilic English text is, however, iiuich longer tli:tn the original (ei'nutii P1'1t1Y becinise several EJIglisil words are sometimes needed to carry the thought expressed ill a single Gernian word and partly because most of the (eI'n inn military abbreviations have been translated in full.

1. EXAMPLE A
WARNING ORDER (CORPS)
I ARMY Coin's GUT EIMARSETAUSEN
Ol'1RArJoNs SlcT1oN No.
12.4., 1915 2
VARNING Oiwnn I.. Our rear guards withdrew before Weak enemy attacks.

A long hostile column was observed niarching east on the roao I: BUILENWi NNENBERGFU itS-
T.EN]3ERG (head of COltUilfl here by J 700).

2. I Army Corps continues to retireon CASSELon 13.4., marching to position behind the FULDA RIVER, where it will establish a defensive positIon.

3. rfl( 2d and 3(1 1I.nf Divs will march upon CASSEI1
at 0400, with the heads of their main bodies crossing the line: VOLKMARSENWOLI' HAGENIPPINGHAtJ-
SEN and the nortlieriutiost column of the 2d ml. Div.

over ElIltINGEN - OI3ERELSUNGEN
DUItN-
l3Elt( .

The rear guards evacuate their present positions at
03(W) and withdraw to the line: VOLKMARSEN-WOLF-
HAGENNAIJM )IRG. This line will he held at. leasl until 13.4, I4($).

4. The 1st hif Div withdraws upon i:IANN MUN-
DEN.

It will cover the wing and flaiik of the I Corps Bowidary l)etweCii 1st and 2(1 Divs: BILLENGSFIAU
SEN
RiIODEN
BREUNA
E.IIRSTEN -
S1'EEI.E -.

WEJ)EMUNJ)IN (all to IsI. Div).

5. Corps Commander goes at. 0300 to 1)URNBERG, in the course ol the In.orniiig to ESCEIERODA.

Reports to DURNBEIUJ alter 0500.

Sent by Offirer x in pIL.s.seJiger (iAE.

I
(eneral
2. EXAMPLE B
COMPLETE COMBAT ORDER (CORPS)
Iii ARMY Coin's Coin's II EA Dqu AItTEItS
GENERAL STAFF SECTION
FRIEDRECIIRODA
Operations No. 3
21.4., 190()
Coups QRVER FOn 'rue Ar1'ACK ON 24.4
1. In the /wstile positions along the Corps front there have been fl() essential chatiges noted and enemy will continue to defend his position.

Improvement of fleidworks continues.

Aerial photographs of the front taken on the Iiiorliing 20.4. will be (IiStril)iite(I to(lay Lu all units dowii hi iIIclLl(k' IMLI,hLliOIiS.

Iii the sector (lit VAIt(J ULA
A1.'I'GU1tNA along the UMSTIWTT RiVER, work on a rearward defensive position has been noted.

2. 'I'Iie I Armj Corp.s attacks at X hour oii 24.4. iii its jireseii I; coitibat. zone and destroys the hostile force south of the lJl\'ISTitU'i"L'
Strong forces will follow tue Corps in the 2d line available to exploit a breakthrough.

ii it(I.c/; ()ij((,iiV( of (lie (J017).S Ofl 24.4:
I [igli grotni I liorti icast. and north of ASCII ABAWI E
GLEBEN STEIN B
north edge (lit IIA1tT1l.

3. Reconnaissance.

a. Reconnaissance Echelon (1-1) 3
(Air) reconnoiter the Corps Coritbat Zone to include the tJMSTEtt'TT RI V J.R during 22.4 and 23.4.

Observe I )artic(Il:Lrly br l ,eci:Ll I I()St.i IC arr:LngeJi ICII ts of disposi
lions.

()ii 23.4 csj )ecially reconnoiter hi locale hostile reserves, lank batTlerS, tank delense weapons, and tank units.

Front daylweak 24.4 on are attached to:
7th I)ivisioii
.1 Airplane
8th l)ivision
3 Airplanes I'Ianes available and prepared to fly inissioiis beginning
24.4.,
0430, from u.jii,hing field FRIEDRJCIIROJ)A.

I )rop am I
,ickii1i field maintained until 24.4., 0430, as follows:
by 7 t)iv at. ALS B
by 8 I)iv southwest IIAIN 13
b. Battle reconnaissance by the divisions:
through con Liii ual surveillauce of the battlelield day and night, froiti 22.4 until 24.4, establish the location of changes involving hostile observatioii posts, au titank defense,
'iLit, artillery positions, road bIocks and barriers, reserves.

For reasons of clecei,tioii tue activity of patrols will not 1)0 increased.

4. Orjanizution and Combat Zones for the A Wick:
Right: 9th 1)iv Middle: 71,Ii Div Attached:
Corps Arty Btry 39
liv Arty Btry 35 (only until 24.4, X+2
hours)
Left: 8th Div A ttached:
'ft Brig 12
Army Arty lteg(. 101
Smoke Bn 102
Bou,i.duric.

l)etween 9th and 7th 1)ivs: east edge ROCII
ii El Mwest edge ASU EIAItAeast edge EC I(ARTS lEJ.3EN east e(l ge I Li I ' 13 EN-
275.

between 7th and 8th i)ivs: east edge BBU
LIE! M -wet edge (JRLJM J3ACII (STEIN 13
to 7th i)iv)___wrest edge UFHOVENwest edge 'L'IIAMSJ3RUCK.

between 8th Div and I Army Corps: east edge C ROSSEN 13 EHRI N GEN-vt slope 367
west part of C It.

1IAR'111 I
- -west edge ALTERSTEI)T-cast edge (JROSSEN (JOT-
TERN
5. Conduct of Atack.--a. General.

Alter :u artillery l)Ieparation of 45 minutes, which will cover the approach of the infantry to the line: NESSE
B! EI3ER, the infantry along the entire Corps front will
:Litack, crossing over the NESSEBIEBER line at X
hour.

Siitult;aiieotisIy in the 8th 1)iv combat zone the landing waves of the rfallk Brigade will cross the same I inc.

As 1sf A (lurk (fljeetivr, the Corps and the iieigliboriiig divisions of the I and 11. Corps, will win the line: 334
j torti icast, 1r m MOLSCI1LEBEN )ESCI1EN BERGEN
292
(JIoltIl from HAUSEN)309 (northeast from WIS]'J IA EJSEN) north edge of WANGENIJEIM--- -
278 (west from WANGENHEIM)LOH BTUNGE-
I )A ER II l' I (..l ITS-i FHC.I.l Bedge of wood northwest (I ROSSENBEI I RING ENWA RTEN B.

The Tank Brigade will drive its attack through to include the hostile artillery positions iii the area: TUN
C l'1)A ItEl Cl lEN BACH OSTE1U3EIIItUNGEN-
LOll B.

CoiltinuatioJi of the attack after reaching 1st Oh 1ecti VO (lilly U )0ll O1'(ICr of the Coij )S.

1). (]007dinu.t ion of Time.

X 45 iit,iil X 40 minutes: Surprise lire by all artillery i() (liSillil) hostile comnunneations, reserves, and head
(Plarters.

Infantry and Brigade begin to move iii to attack l)ositioi 15.

40 until X 20 ni.yutes: Counterbattery fire by all ai'tillery.

X2() until X hour: Artillery lire upon hostile forward defeiisi ye
)OSi ti aiS.

Smoking of BSTELLEN.3
Tile
3d Div will smoke particularly the forest edge north of U ROSSBE1IR1NGEN.

X hour I I)f:Ll1 try atni liii l;iaI waves of Tank Brigade cross the line:
NESSE
UI EJ3EIt 13.

Transfer of artillery lire to the
' OI,ervs.ioii l)OtR.

hostile artillery positions rearward corresponding to the advance of the infantry attack.

Sinniltaneously a box barrage around the point of l)e1eLrat1on fired by the artillery of the I and II Corps.

Early advance of positions of the mass of the light.

artillery to Hill 309 (9th i)iv)-278 (7th 1.)iv) IX)!! ll
'l'IiUNOE1)AE.RLOitC1i 13(8th l)iv) will he :trr:wgrl and carried out.

The Tank Brigade will, after reaching the 1st Objective and capturing the hostile artillery south of OR IIARTJ I.

assemble in the area BRU H El M-FR!EI1RICl I WE lt'11 It awaiting further orders of the Corps Coiiiinander.

6. The Corps Artillery beginning with the aitilkwy l)reparatioll will niain Lain Fire, by the 150nun artillery, upon the road: 0 RAFENTON NA! AN 0 ESAI1ZA
(tItOSSENGOTTERN.

7. Corps Antiaircraft A nil/cry Part f Army A it A r/
I?egt 104 and Army Pursuit Squadron: 1noI.ect. the ,relar:I.
(ion for the. :Ltt4Lek
defend the ;,sseiiil ,Iy areas fn)I,I hiostik air observation and air attack.

Siccial I
1' eI,iu,i of (lie tank assembly onlered in I :LragraphI Jib will he pr.ivi led.

8. Corps Reserves.

29th Inf Corps AT Bn Corps Engr Bn The 29th In! will reconnoiter for covered a roadies to and possible assembly areas in the area: FROTTS'['E I )'l'.

9
Divisions will utilize to the fullest extent. (()V(W
and camouflage in preparation for time attack.

Divisions will, submit their attack and fire plans to
(.hme Corps Commander not later than 23.4, 1200.

X hour will be announced at 23.4, 2300.

10. TIic Corps Command Post will remain at FRIED
RI (ill B.( H )A tin lii 24.4
(.X ----30 when it will be estab
liShC(l at HAIN B).

I)istrihul;ion B
General of Infantry
3. EXAMPLE C
SEPARATE ORDER (ARMY)
Aiiv ( ()MMANDIR
ARMY iiQ
( ENERAL STAFF' SECrI0N I
ALTENBURG, 1.12., 1500
N1UM HIHt
't'o lti's .1 NI 1tI,U'I' 19
I. Res ml ltegt II) (with .1st Bit Ites Arty Rcgt 7, 1st
(Jo ites Engr l3ii
7 atI,aeJied) is attached to the X Army Corps (.1 t(( at WITTCHENJ)ORF).

It is expected that Ites ml Itegt
19 will be eiiijiloyed on the west hank of the X Army Corps in the vicinity of SCI:ILEIrI1Z.

2. lteiiild Ites luf Itegt 19 will be transported in trucks
('l'ik Uii II) via S( 1 KOblN
IsISIN J,3J!itGHERMS
I )Oltl' lo AUMA.

March to begin lroiir 1IAUMBUItU
li( )l later lhaui 2. 12., 0000.

The ( oiiwiander of the Truck Battalion 11 will report at 163() in NAUMBUiOto the Commander of the Ites lnf ltegt 19.

The loading of troops into trucks in the bivouac area is not poSSil)le before 2200.

Alter the troops are unloaded in the new area, the Trk I3it Ii will tiiarcli immediately to ZETZ.

3. TIme Comimniander of Ites inf Itegt 19 will report at time COURT
I l.OIJSE in AUMA at 1.12., 0200, where he will receive further orders through time Commander of the X
Corps.

(by Radio)
For the Commander-in-Chief

## 4. Example D Special Instructions (Division Adminis- Trative Order)

1 si' I.)lvJsIoN
DiVISION (.miwA.rsD I'OS'I'
GENERAL STAFF SECTION
F11J.EJ)ENSTA'I' 8. 10., 1931)
lB

S1'ECIAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR Sui'i'iy
(to 1)ivision Oider N wnb'r
'iieral Stall Section Ia,
8.10., 1D30)
1. A rnrnuni(ion.Tlie supply of ammunition for the reat guards will be provided from the balances now in hands of troops and from the additional ainowt.s to be delivered not later than 2200 to each regiiiient a. follows:
75,000 rifle cartridges
1,000 hand grenades
130 flares
60 signal ugh it cartridges
680 light infantry mortar shells
330 37-mm shells rI1J, supply of ammunition for the.artiIkry will be handled by the existing supply ilIsLalIatJ(,ns.

Sii
)ly of aiiiitiiij
tioti for the J)ivision Iteconii:ussance Battalioii will be handled by 1st Infantry Reginiemit.

As reserve for the reai guards, ammunition will be left back in the presenb aniniumtion distributing point wider guard, as follows:
100,000 arnior-piercmg cartridges
200 light infantry mortar shells
30() 37nun shells
600 105mni light howitzer shells
(OIII1flU( icr ol (lie rear guard is responsible mi' the er (Ils(.ril ni th m of (,l i is reserve annit un ition l'Iac('
:1.11(1 (jIlI(' for ISSLIC of fl.ITIHU1OI t,oii to the troops

II tarci t ing to (lie rear vtIJ 1)0 indicated later.
2. /?i/.iinis.
Rations and reduced iron rations for tue
gII:L1(ls will he left l)cl)Illd under guar(1 fl.S follow's:
,r rear gutards
ii east see toy: .1 N G JRSLF]3EN
C11URCIT
l'or
iiuuiiuig tear guai'ds: (lit SS1tE'ITBA(l I
(.1i UB(J:1.
These rat;ioiis will he coIlccte(l ).y the rc:i.rgiiard trooos
on 0. 1.0., 0400.
Rations for rem:iniiig troops for 9.10. will be delivered
IA) the bivouacs ol March Groups A, B, and (2, by meaiis
of supply colititin
(animaldrawn) before 9.10., 0600.
'1'] iese su )ply columns will then remain with the march
groi 11)S.

3. 1l!edieui e.rvice (l'ilen).

( llveting 1oin I (severeIy 'ounded) at Fit IEI)EN
SEA I )T.

(oIIecting point (lightly wounded) at, GA.MSTAI)T.

These collecting stations Will be closed at 21.00.

The Mcd Co and Mit And) Vial (less Section remaining with icar guard) will march to GRAFEN1tOJ)A via KLEIM
itETT13ACiIBITTSTADT-G RAWI NKEL.

Collecting point for wounded will be established in GOSSEL to open not later than 9.10., 0700.

The F Ilosp will remain in ARNSTADT until 9.10.,
0400, and will thei be marched to SUHL. Wounded will be transported from ARNSTADT up o including
9.10., 0400, in hospital trains.

To take care of unforeseen losses
(nLat&ici)
and wounded within the rear guards, onehalf pEat of the Mcd Co and 5 Mtr Ambs will remain in FLU E1)ENSTA 1 )'I'
available to the Comdr of the rear guard.

4. Medical Service (Animals).

Collecting point at ERMSTEJYI' will remain opcii until 2100.

Collecting point will be opened at GOSSEJ not later than 9.10, 0700.

Animal park and hospital will be marched at. 2100 to the vicinity of GEHLBERG.

5. Motor Sup plies (Gas ---Oil Grease Repairs).

Filling station for passenger cars and trucks 1CHUL1)
opet until 2200 at present location, tlieti UU)VC to GRAFENRODA immediately.

Motor Repair Company will march at.

23(H)
to flORN BURG (south of GRAVEN lU) I )A).

6. Saivaqe.Salvage materials not yet. (Ieliverc(l IA) IIu'
).resent division salvage collecting point, will he carJic(I
back by troops as far as is practicable.

'I'Jie inohili.ty of trains nd transport with troops wiltnot be sacrificed for this purpose.

7. Trains.

Combat trains march at 2000 on OBER.SHOF.

Supply trains (Mtz) march at 2000 on ELGERS-
BURG.

Supply trains (animal): see paragraph 2.

Distribution:
- ..

Same as Division Order No. -
Signed.

U. S. SOVISSNUS? p5157155 OVPICI IllS