## Security Cooperation U.S. Marine Corps

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

## Foreword

Marine Corps Tactical Publication 3-03D, *Security Cooperation,* is designed to assist Marines at every level in the execution of their duties to prioritize, plan, execute, and assess security cooperation engagements with partner nations in support of U.S. national security objectives. This publication underscores the importance of security cooperation as a way to help set the theater to enable leaders and commanders to expand the range of available operational options by enabling access and developing the capabilities and capacities of partners and allies globally. In addition, the publication emphasizes the unity of effort and action needed for success in security cooperation that require coordination across Marine Corps, joint, and interagency organizations that are not part of Marines' formal chain of command. The intent of the publication is to outline security cooperation guidance and lexicon, as well as Marine service component planning considerations, such as legal and political considerations, tools and resources, and the Marine Corps' security cooperation planning and execution process. While the techniques and procedures captured within this publication reflect current best practices, it is neither intended to be all-encompassing, nor prescriptive. To support campaign plan objectives; security cooperation activities can include and address a wide range of challenges across the range of military operations, from direct military confrontation, peace keeping operations, and building partner capacity and capability, to providing humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and stability operations. Security cooperation activities can set the conditions for success in contingencies and preparing for catastrophic events. Many generations of Marines have engaged with international partners, in peacetime and war, to build interoperability and to enhance the capacity and capabilities of our partners. The Marine Corps will continue to conduct security cooperation activities across the range of military operations with Marine air-ground task forces or other task-organized force packages enabled for security cooperation. Marine Corps security cooperation activities are planned, executed, and assessed at all levelsfrom the regional MARFOR and Service headquarters, to Marines taskorganized and equipped to conduct a mobile training team or advisor mission with a partner. As such, this publication applies to Marines and civilians across the total force. This publication cancels Marine Corps Interim Publication 3-03Di, *Security Cooperation*, dated
21 July 2015 and its associated change page and erratum.

Reviewed and approved this date.

Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group Publication Control Number: 147 000087 00 DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

## Chapter 1 Understanding Security Cooperation In A Strategic Context Security Cooperation As An Enabler To Strategy

The Marine Corps has an integral role in the naval campaign that will prove decisive in future conflict. However, no single Serviceor countryhas the capability or capacity to be everywhere at once. In a security environment of increasing technical complexity, faced with near-peer competitors and asymmetric warfare, it is increasingly important to operate seamlessly as part of the Joint Force and with our allies and partners in order to achieve success and leverage our collective strengths. The Marine Corps stands ready to "fight tonight," while shaping the security environment through SC activities that seek to improve the capabilities or capacities of foreign militaries and their security forces, thereby preventing situations from degrading or threatening regional, or our national, security. The Marine Corps trains with able and willing partners to increase interoperability and be better prepared to respond to crises. The Marine Corps deters conflict through a persistent naval presence, amplified through our coordination with allies and partners, while developing future partnerships that can influence a region. Security Cooperation activities help the Marine Corps shape future battlefields today through developing relationships that will provide maneuver space, shorten crisis response timelines, and provide positional advantage to Marine forces. These activities also contribute to shaping the information environment in which the Marine Corps operates by changing or maintaining the perceptions, attitudes, and behaviors of relevant actorsboth partners and adversaries. Finally, the Marine Corps responds to crises and contingencies, advising and operating alongside our coalition partners in support of mutual security challenges. Joint Publication (JP) 3-20 Security Cooperation defines Security Cooperation as:
"All Department of Defense interactions with foreign security establishments to build security relationships that promote specific United States security interests, develop allied and partner nation military and security capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to allied and partner nations" (JP 3-20).

Security Cooperation is founded on a tradition of cooperation between the United States and other partner nations (PNs) with similar security interests to meet common defense goals. Security Cooperation activities are an integral part of military operations that are planned, sourced, and executed through standard Service and Joint processes. Security Cooperation offers a way to achieve desired ends, rather than serve as an end unto itself, and can support achieving national defense and military objectives. United States foreign policy will continue to rely upon coalition or multilateral actions, requiring willing partners capable of fighting alongside of, or in lieu of, US forces. Additionally, transregional security challenges inherently require international cooperation that spans combatant commands (CCMDs). Security Cooperation allows the DOD to take proactive advantage of opportunities and not just react to threats. It strengthens the US network of allies and partners, which can improve the overall warfighting effectiveness of the Joint Force and enable more effective multinational operations. Security Cooperation activities enable more effective combined operations through coordinated planning, exercises, and operations with our partners. The Marine Corps is more effective when fighting alongside partners employing similar tactics, techniques, procedures, and equipment. Security Cooperation provides another tool for DOD decision makers and combatant commanders (CCDRs) to employ a multinational force, lessening the burden required in unilateral operations. Security Cooperation activities can help establish trust with our allies and partners, foster mutual understanding, prevent conflict, and deter adversaries and help partners build the capacity to defend themselves. Conducting SC activities helps set theater conditions that expand the range of operational options to commanders, such as enabling access and freedom of movement to directly support operational plans (OPLANs) and contingency plans.

## Security Cooperation And The Conflict Continuum

In today's operating environment, the Joint Force is always engaged on some level of the conflict continuum as outlined in Figure 1-1. The conflict continuum consists of three states of relations:


Cooperation. Mutually beneficial relationships between strategic actors with similar or
compatible interests. Although interests will rarely be in complete alignment, relations that are fundamentally cooperative are strategically important for the United States because they underpin international order, enhance collective security, help ensure access to global commons, enable burden-sharing, and deter conflict (Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning [JCIC]).

Competition below armed conflict. Exists when two or more actors in the international system have
incompatible interests but neither seeks to escalate to open conflict (JCIC).

Armed conflict, Exists when the use of violence is the primary means by which an actor seeks to
satisfy its interests. Armed conflict varies in intensity and ranges from limited warfare to major wars between state actors (JCIC).
Security Cooperation activities are conducted across the conflict continuum. They enable DOD to cooperate with allies and partners to prevent, deter, and de-escalate adversarial state and non-state actors during competition below the threshold of armed conflict and to limit the severity of combat. Security Cooperation is not bound by a war/not war paradigm or a transition phasing model, but rather, can support multiple objectives across the campaign at once. Security Cooperation strengthens our global network of allies and partnersthese relationships can shape the perceptions of both our partners and adversaries and counter false narratives. Security Cooperation also fosters a coalition that can respond more effectively to violence and provocation, when necessary.

## Security Cooperation Guided By National Strategy

National strategic direction and guidance drive SC. DOD strategic guidance documents highlight the importance of engaging with allies and partners to win decisively given the challenging and dynamic future operating environment and with decreasing defense budgets. Office of the Secretary of Defense and Joint Staff strategic planning guidance highlight that working with our allies and partners is key to setting the theater and direct that SC activities are to be used as tools to enable operations and execution of war plans. In this vein, transregional, multi-domain, and multi-functional threats require adaptive planning to integrate allies and partners as an element of national strategy. Presidential Policy Directive (PPD)-23, *Security Sector Assistance*, addresses DOD's whole-ofgovernment approach to the policies, programs, and activities the United States uses to engage with foreign partners and help shape their policies and actions in the security sector; help foreign partners build and sustain the capacity and effectiveness of legitimate institutions to provide security, safety, and justice for their people; and enable foreign partners to contribute to efforts that address common security challenges.

## Security Cooperation Relationships

Security Cooperation is the overarching term for DOD engagement with allies and PN security establishments in support of US national security objectives. Within the context of SC, there are many related Joint and interagency definitions and terminology.

USA, USAF)

Figure 1-2 outlines the relationship among various terms that are used to describe Marine Corps engagements with allies and partners. It also highlights that SC is a subset of security sector assistance. Within SC, the DOD engages with both PN defense (e.g., Ministries of Defense) and non-defense security sectors (e.g., Ministries of Interior, law enforcement). Within both the defense and non-defense security sectors, there are SC activities that are intended to build capability and capacity of our allies and partners. Security force assistance (SFA), defense institution building (DIB), and security assistance (SA) are all activities that are subsets of SC. These activities have specific goals, enable the Marine Corps to engage with different entities within PN governments, and are further defined and explained in Table A-2 outlines various activities and planning considerations unique to SC.

## Purposes Of Security Cooperation Engagement

Figure 1-3 depicts a pyramid of hierarchical purposes, in terms of Marine Corps investment of manpower and resources, for which the Marine Corps conducts SC. As the desired US end state increases in complexity, from relationship to capacity, so, too, does the required investment of the Marine Corps. More complex SC purposes, such as capability or capacity building, require longer-term and potentially more frequent engagements. Marine Corps SC planners base the types of SC activities that Marine forces should engage on the DOD's desired level of investment in alignment with defense objectives. Figure 1-3 illustrates a difference between developing a PN's capability and developing its capacity. In Marine Corps context, when assessing foreign security forces (FSF), "capability" is their ability to execute a specific mission set, whereas "capacity" is their ability to replicate and self-sustain that capability over time. For example, a Marine Corps mobile training team (MTT) may conduct a series of training activities with a partner to build or improve their naval infantry's expeditionary logistics capability. If the partner can replicate that capability over time, without external support, the partner has built an expeditionary logistics capacity. Capacity often involves sustained engagement in the governing, executive, generating, or operating functions of a PN at the ministerial or Service Headquarters level, due to the need to adequately and repeatedly organize, train, and equip forces to conduct a specific mission set. Security relationships with highly capable partners are intended to achieve a level of interoperability, capacity, and self-sustainment to enable the partners to export security aligned to US objectives (a desired result that meets the criteria of being specific, measurable, attainable, relevant, and time-bound. [DODI 5132.14]).

## Security Cooperation Requires Holistic Approach

Security Cooperation planning requires a holistic approach as its impacts are felt at the strategic level and it is typically executed over long periods of time in order to achieve a singular desired result. In accordance with PPD-23, SC planning is conducted through a deliberate and inclusive whole-of-government approach to ensure alignment of activities and resources common to both national security and foreign policy objectives. Where possible, US SC planning also considers activities of allied and PNs as well as international organizations. The application of SC resources and activities is determined by ongoing analyses of the security environment; PN political will, political stability, willingness and ability to protect sensitive information and technologies; absorptive capacity of our partners; PN respect for rule of law and human rights; and policy and legal constraints. Except in cases of overriding security considerations, efforts to build allied and PN defense and security capabilities are only to be pursued when the foreign country is able to, or is working toward being able to, absorb, sustain, and responsibly deploy such capabilities in support of US security objectives. Proposed materiel solutions must be integrated with nonmateriel solutions to maximize the allied or PN's ability and willingness to employ and sustain a capability (e.g., combined exercises, military education and training, institutional capacity building). Building PN capacity or a discrete capability is inherently a joint effort wherein the PN government is capable of executing oversight of its military forces. Capacity or capability development requires the basic force development functions required of any military organization (e.g., training and education, facilities, recruiting, doctrine). These include executive functions such as budgeting, acquisitions, and policy. These SC activities require advisors at multiple echelons and across many force development disciplines. One functional construct used to view levels of advisory effort is through the framework of governance, executive, generating and operational (G-EGO). All advisory efforts must achieve unity of effort and, through the DOD and DOS, perform unified actions. Marine Corps SC planners should evaluate existing SC activities with a given partner to ensure future efforts complement ongoing efforts. Figure 1-4 illustrates the G-EGO construct and the requirement for advisors across multiple echelons.

| Strategy        |
|-----------------|
| Force           |
| Management      |
| Human           |
| Resources       |
| Acquisition and |
| Logistics       |
| Inspector       |
| General (IG)    |
| Doctrine       |
|----------------|
| Leadership and |
| Education      |
| Facilities     |
Command and Control
Intelligence
Fires
Information
Logistics
Protection

Figure 1-5 outlines many of the considerations for Marine Corps SC planners when building partner capabilities based on multiple, mutually-enabling lines of effort. A PN capability is based not only on specific materiel or training solutions, but also on supporting elements that allow a partner to effectively integrate, sustain, and employ the desired effect. For example, the "doctrine, organization, training, materiel, logistics, personnel, facilities, and policy" (DOTMLPF-P) framework is a useful planning tool for holistic capability development that leads to capacity. Efforts should be complementary, synchronized, and reinforce partner absorptive capacity and ability to independently sustain and replicate the capability.

## Security Cooperation Continuous Assessment

As the Global integrator of SC, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) is responsible for addressing transregional threats and in conjunction with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) for Policy issues guidance to CCMDs. Many different organizations are involved, both DOD and interagency. Each agency with a role in achieving SC relationships, access, capability, or capacity, regardless of outcome, has a responsibility to feed the DOD Assess, Monitor, and Evaluate (AM&E) process in order to articulate return on investment of US resources. The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) 2017 requires the DOD to establish an AM&E program for SC activities. In compliance with NDAA 2017, the DOD has issued national guidance for AM&E. Additional AM&E guidance can be found in joint doctrine, DOD Instructions, policy memoranda, Office of the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) Planning Orders. Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation each serve a separate function at distinct points in planning and execution of SC activities, but, broadly speaking, AM&E is a DOD tool used to maintain accountability of resources expended on SC activities and activities. Assessment and Monitoring are the responsibility of the CCMD and Evaluation is the responsibility of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. All SC activities will have defined outcomes, which could include the following:


Build capability or capacity of key partners to support current operations.

Develop and exercise interoperability with key capable partners to support potential
contingency operations.

Build capability or capacity of key emerging partners to support potential specific
contingency operations.

Build capability or capacity of partners to conduct specific targeted missions.

Support access in support of US posture.

Mitigate risks assumed in US force structure for steady-state operations.

Provide DOD support to other foreign policy objectives.

## Marine Corps Approach To Security Cooperation

Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC) conducts and oversees SC activities as part of its Service Title 10 requirement to effectively organize, train, and equip forces to support SecDef, CJCS, and CCDR objectives. In this context, policy directs each Military Department to plan for and perform functions to fulfill the current and future operational requirements of the CCMDs, and specifically directs the Military Departments to provide forces to enhance military engagement, conduct SC, build the security capability and capacity of partners, and deter adversaries to prevent conflict (DODD 5100.01, *Functions of the DOD and its Major Components*).

Global demand for Marine forces and resources consistently exceeds the sustainable supply. These resource constraints necessitate a focused approach to Marine Corps SC. As a result, on behalf of the CMC, HQMC, the Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, and Operations (PP&O) issues prioritization guidance to focus Marine Corps SC activities and guide their planning, programming, budgeting, and execution. This guidance is applicable to the Marine Corps Total Force and addresses planners at all levels. Specifically, the prioritized guidance addresses event and activity design, partners with which the Marine Corps should engage, and what force requirements the Marine Corps should endorse. HQMC articulates this guidance using various mechanisms, typically classified, such as: Force Management Plan; Marine Corps SC Strategy; Service Campaign Support Plan; or as a standalone product. Service priorities aid the Marine Corps in focusing and determining areas such as, but not limited to


Which foreign partners, allies, or countries of interest can the Marine Corps best impact
through its language and regionally oriented training and education efforts?

Which potential Service military-to-military engagements, including exercises, should be
executed?

Which foreign students will likely attend Marine Corps schools?

With which countries will the Service likely engage in Marine Corps foreign personnel
exchange programs (PEPs)?

With which countries does the Service desire to establish foreign military sales (FMS) cases?
Additionally, these priorities inform the regional Marine forces in developing component supporting plans to CCDR campaign plans and SC activity/exercise design and execution.

Marine Forces plan, execute, and assess SC in accordance with geographic combatant commander (GCC) and CMC guidance. Per Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 7-10, Marine Corps Componency, planning for SC activity is among the component commander's responsibilities. This planning can include allocation, deployment, and employment of Marine forces to support the CCDR SC efforts. As directed, Marine Corps component commands (MCCCs) develop Campaign Support Plans that nest with CCMD plans and align with CMC priorities. These plans, to include SC plans, will incorporate guidance from the CCDR, Marine Corps component commander, and CMC. The Service supports the component command's execution of SC activities in support of SecDef, CJCS, and CCDR objectives based on available Service capabilities and resources, and institutional priorities. The Service establishes institutional guidance and objectives consistent with national strategic and theater objectives. HQMC guidance regarding SC does not supersede CCDR guidance. Service institutional objectives should align with national strategic guidance and provide a Service-specific focus allowing for a more efficient and effective allocation of resources in support of global SC priorities. Service guidance may prioritize specific institutional gaps, challenges, or equities, such as training, equipment, and interoperability issues which are unique to Marine Corps equities in a region or country. The Services and GCCs, via the Service component commands, work together to ensure Service institutional objectives and priorities are considered in the development of campaign plans (JP 3-20). Security Cooperation activities are complex in planning and execution and may involve many organizations both internal and external to the Marine Corps. SC activities are not discrete events conducted without a purpose. In accordance with the Marine Operating Concept, SC activities are conducted to promote regional stability, foster trust among partners, build FSF capability, and sometimes capacity. During execution, SC engagements are intended to shape environments. As strategic guidance changes, the Service may need to develop new relationships to meet evolving national security requirements while also maintaining enduring relationships with strategic partners. Many of the Marine Corps' enduring relationships were established through decades of shared battlespace, forged through coordinated planning and execution, and reinforced through lasting agreements for basing and access. These enduring relationships are typically with nearpeer partners that share similar values and capabilities. Due to the Marine Corps' proven legacy of working with international partners, FSFs, both large and small, view the Marine Corps as their partner of choice. Security Cooperation contributes to the operational capabilities of the Marine Corps Total Force by enhancing training and readiness; improving interoperability with other Services and agencies, allies, and partner FSFs; developing Marines enabled with Language, Regional Expertise, and Cultural (LREC) skills; and gaining access to leading foreign technologies. Our allies and partners can provide leading technologies, doctrine, tactics, and training opportunities in unique diverse environments and conditions. As such, SC provides opportunities for Marines to train in environments where the United States is likely to conduct future operations. The Marine Corps leverages forward-deployed, crisis response-capable forces, including the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) and special-purpose marine air-ground task force (SPMAGTFs)
assets, and smaller task-organized teams with varied skills to conduct SC. The Service trains Marines to plan long-term SC engagements utilizing the SC Planning and Execution Cycle (see Chapters 39), primarily with or through the component commands. This cycle draws from and continually improves the Marine Corps Planning Process (MCPP). Additionally, the Marine Corps develops Marines to perform advisory roles (e.g., advise, support, and liaison). Marines commonly refer to these roles in terms of train, advise, assist, and assess FSFs. As required, the Marine Corps deploys Marines to conduct advising, training, combined exercises, mobile training teams, key leader engagements, and other SC activities with PNs in support of broader national security interests. In this sense, the Marine Corps conducts SC activities to help achieve US objectives.

## Chapter 2 Security Cooperation, Organizations, Workforce Overview

Security Cooperation is complex and requires various members of the SC workforce and SC practitioners (Marine Corps) to operate using the principle of unified action in order to achieve the unity of effort required to accomplish national, theater, and Marine Corps objectives. This chapter describes some of the joint, interagency, and Marine Corps organizations and communities of personnel that contribute to planning, executing, and assessing Marine Corps SC activities that meet CCDR and CMC objectives.

## Joint, Maritime, And Interagency Organizations

As addressed in Chapter 1, the Marine Corps is only one piece of the larger SC puzzle. One must be aware of and understand non-Marine Corps SC organizations and personnel to coordinate, deconflict, and execute cooperative plans.

Country Team The country team is the senior United States government (USG) coordinating and supervising body in a foreign country. Headed by the chief of mission (COM), it includes the senior defense official (SDO)/defense attache (DATT), heads of all US embassy sections, and the senior members of the other represented USG departments or agencies, as desired by the COM. Depending on the size of a US embassy and the nature of US interests in a country, each country team may be configured differently. On initiating a cooperative plan with a specific PN, the country team draws on guidance from DOS and the COM, to develop an Integrated Country Strategy, which influences the CCDR's development of a country-specific security cooperation section plan (JP 3-20). The country team also issues directives to consulates, tasks action items for DOS offices and bureaus, and works to de-conflict/balance all agency programs and priorities within the context of the COM's integrated country strategy.

Security Cooperation Organization A security cooperation organization (SCO) includes all DOD elements located in a foreign country with assigned responsibilities for carrying out SA/cooperation management functions. Within the SCOs are military assistance advisory groups, military missions and groups, offices of defense and military cooperation, liaison groups, and SC professionals designated by SDO/DATT to perform SA/cooperation functions (DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, hereafter referred to as the DOD Dictionary). The SCOs fall under the authority of the SDO and chief of the US diplomatic mission in a foreign country. The SCOs are responsible for assessing whether a partner can build and sustain capabilities and capacity, and have the greatest visibility over the execution of SC activities in that PN. The SCO personnel are the foremost points of contact between the PN and the US Government regarding SC activities. The Marine Corps fills myriad global SCO billets. To the maximum extent possible, the Marine Corps aims to align these SCO billets with countries in which the Marine Corps has an enduring and ongoing relationship. The Marine Corps organizations most likely to be in direct contact with SCOs are the regional Marine Corps component command and Marine Corps Systems Command-International Programs (MCSC-IP).

Defense Attache Office The Defense Attache Office is an organizational element of the US diplomatic mission through which the Defense Attache System conducts its mission, and to which the SecDef may direct the attachment or assignment of other military detachments or elements. The office consists of personnel, materiel, activities, and facilities for which the SDO/DATT has operating responsibilities (MCO 3821. 2, *The Defense Attache System*). Within the Defense Attache Office, the SDO/DATT serves as the diplomatically accredited defense attache and chief of the SCO (if an SCO is present). The SDO/DATT, or a designated member of the SCO, is the point of contact for SC planning and developing the country plan with the CCMD planners. Subject to COM approval, the SDO/DATT is the lead integrator for SC activities with the PN (JP 3-20). The Marine Corps Director of Intelligence has the lead to select and sponsor Marine attaches serving in billets globally.

Defense Security Cooperation Agency The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) is a separate agency of the DOD under the direction, authority, and control of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, or USD(P). The DSCA directs, administers, and provides guidance to the DOD components for the execution of DOD SC activities for which DSCA has responsibility. This administration and direction includes delegating authority to implement SC programs, as appropriate, to the appropriate DOD component (e.g., Military Department, DOD agency, CCMD). For example, MCSC-IP, via Navy International Programs Office, may be directed to implement and execute an SC program for which DSCA has responsibility. DSCA primarily


represents the interests of the Secretary of Defense and USD(P) in SC matters;

supports the development of technology security and foreign disclosure and sales policies and
procedures for defense information, technology, and systems in coordination with USD(P) and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, as appropriate;

jointly establishes appropriate agreements and procedures with the Director, Defense
Intelligence Agency, and with the CCMDs for SDOs/DATTs;

approves, in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, SCO joint manpower
requirements, to include the establishment of new SCOs or changes in manpower authorizations or organizational structure;

with the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, approves changes to the grade or
Military Department affiliation of the SDO or DATT;

reports readiness of personnel (using the Defense Readiness Reporting System) for DOD SC
programs over which DSCA has responsibility to the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness;

acts as the Executive Agent for DOD Regional Centers for Security Studies; and

advises the Defense Technology Security Administration of proposed transfers of significant
new technologies or weapons systems and determinations of whether significant items or specific sales must be sold to PNs exclusively through FMS.
The DSCA leads DOD Institutional Capacity Building (ICB) efforts, which enhance the PN's capacity to exercise civilian control over its national security forces, contribute to collective security, absorb US provided assistance, and apply improved national security capabilities. DSCA also serves as the resource sponsor for SC authoritative databases, such as the Global Theater SC Management Information System (G-TSCMIS). HQMC and MCSC-IP work directly with DSCA regarding SC program planning, implementation, execution, and closure, SC policy and guidance, and SC workforce issues.

Defense Security Cooperation University This university, also known as DSCU, has the mission to educate the SC workforce and is aligned under DSCA. The DSCU offers a range of resident, mobile, and online courses and learning tools for personnel performing SC functions in the DOD, other US government agencies, the US defense industry, and for PNs who work with the DOD to procure US defense articles and services.

Defense Institute of International Legal Studies This institute, also known as DIILS is the lead US defense SC resource for professional legal education, training, and democratic rule of law for international military and civilians and is aligned to DSCA. The DIILS conducts mobile education and training, resident courses, and other engagement programs designed to foster the rule of law, improve accountable security and justice sectors, civilian control of the military, and democratic governance in PNs.

Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance This center, also known as JCISFA, is a CJCS-controlled activity that reports to the J7, Joint Force Development. JCISFA's mission is to support the integration of SFA capabilities into the current and future joint force in order to advance joint warfighting capability. They do so by


developing and integrating SFA capabilities into joint doctrine; supporting the design and
development of joint training and exercises;

supporting the development of professional military education (PME) curriculum;

capturing, analyzing, exchanging and archiving SFA lessons learned; and

supporting Joint Concepts with SFA subject matter expertise.
The JCISFA also advises and assists multinational organizations that are conducting SFA missions as part of a larger regional engagement strategy, provides analytical and technical support to assess US SFA capability and readiness gaps, and advises and assists interagency organizations SFA doctrine, best practices, and proven tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) to prepare for and conduct SFA missions. These resources are useful guides for Marines who conduct planning, advising, and training missions. The Marine Corps coordinates with JCISFA on SC planning, policy, and training. Marine Corps units and agencies rely on JCISFA for the latest lessons learned and TTPs on topics such as advising in combat environments, SC authorities, and on the impact of policies, procedures, and directives to the DOD. JCISFA also contributes information on SC activities to the Marine Corps Lessons Learned System (MCLLS).

The Navy International Programs Office This office, also known as Navy IPO, manages and implements international security assistance programs, cooperative development programs, and technology security policy. As a reporting unit to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition, the Navy IPO supports regional combatant commanders' and Navy leadership's efforts to build vigorous relationships with our maritime security partners around the world. The Navy IPO coordinates with the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard to formulate Department of the Navy security assistance policy, procedures, and priorities. The Navy IPO also teams with a wide network of US defense industry and security community product and service providers, program managers, policy makers, and technical and regulatory agencies to support the defense requirements of key partners and allies.

## Marine Corps Security Cooperation Organizations

This section highlights Marine Corps organizations that are vital to the Marine Corps during SC planning and execution. Multiple Marine Corps organizations plan, coordinate, execute, report, and assess SC activities in support of CCDR and service SC goals, objectives, and end states. For additional information on Marine Corps SC organizations, reference MCO 5710. 6, Security Cooperation.

HQMC, Deputy Commandant, Plans, Policies, and Operations HQMC conducts and oversees SC activities as part of its Service Title 10 requirement to effectively organize, train, and equip forces to support SecDef, CJCS, and CCDR objectives. The Deputy Commandant, Plans, Policies, and Operations (PP&O) is the advocate for SC and for the Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group. The International Affairs Branch, Strategy and Plans Division under DC PP&O, International Affairs Branch (PLU) develops and maintains policy and guidance to the Marine Corps to support the Service's SC activities in execution of the advocacy responsibilities. HQMC PP&O PLU represents the Service to the Joint Force to affect and shape SC doctrine, publications, and authorities reviews. This organization manages PN seats for quotaconstrained PME, acts as Service lead for SC authoritative database, and leads Marine Corps participation in Maritime SC coordination processes and policies, such as the Maritime SC Working Group and Maritime SC Policy.

Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group This organization, also known as MCSCG is a dedicated SC organization aligned under Fleet Marine Forces Atlantic (FMFLANT) Marine Corps Forces Command (MARFORCOM). MCSCG executes and enables SC programs, training and education, planning, and the execution of Marine Corps component command lines of operation in coordination with Fleet Marine Forces (FMF). MCSCG acts to ensure unity of effort in support of Marine Corps and regional component commander objectives, in support of Combatant Commander and USMC objectives.

Marine Corps Systems Command International Plans Also called MARCORSYSCOM-IP, this is a dedicated SC organization that serves as advisor to the commander of Marine Corps Systems Command on all Marine Corps international programs. The IP organization plans, coordinates, implements, and executes all Marine Corps-related SC acquisition and logistics matters, to include the sale of, lease and transfer of all Marine Corps defense articles (except for aviation and related articles), services and associated support to foreign partners. The MARCORSYSCOM-IP also manages and facilitates Marine Corps international agreements and cooperation and comparative testing programs. The organization is responsible to disclose reviews of requests for classified information, as well as technology transfer, procedures, instructions, and technical data packages to provide military assistance to friendly foreign governments. Organizationally, MARCORSYSCOM-IP has three divisions, each managed by assistant directors: FMS, Cooperative Engagement, and Financial Management.

## Marine Corps Security Cooperation Workforce

The 2017 NDAA required the DOD to establish a Security Cooperation Workforce Development Program. Consistent with the law, as well as further guidance from OSD and DSCA, the Marine Corps has defined the SC workforce as those Marine Corps civilians serving in permanent SC positions, as well as uniformed personnel temporarily assigned to permanent billets, who conduct SC as their primary function. These personnel comprise the SC workforce for the purposes of implementing the FY17 NDAA and the SC Workforce Development Program. The Marine Corps SC workforce includes permanent SC billets within the area of operations headquarters, the supporting establishment, operating forces, and externally assigned Marines in Joint SC billets. The Marine Corps SC workforce composition is based on DOD SC requirements and is articulated in policy through MCO 5710. 6_.

Security Cooperation Planner The SC planner analyzes CCMD, component, and Service priorities. This analysis is used to determine which FSF across the component's area of operations are most suited to conduct operations that support those security objectives. The SC planner must also understand the unique dynamics of the politics, history and culture of the region, the specific PN, and the key interagency stakeholders (COM, SCO, US Agency for International Development [USAID], Drug Enforcement Administration). This position may be called a regional planner, Marine forces desk officer, or carry another position title, depending on the command. The SC planners articulate and present the best use of Marine forces in-theater in support of SC requirements. Additionally, these Marines assist the CCDR in properly registering requirements in support of SC activities from the Service. The SC planners develop and monitor SC plans and activities required to achieve U.S. objectives. The SC planners are therefore also responsible for determining whether plan objectives are accomplished (self-evaluation) and, if tasked, reporting objective accomplishment to higher headquarters. The SC planners are well-read in national strategic, theater, and Service guidance for SC. They must understand all applicable authorities and programs under Title 10 and 22, and other SC activities including, mobile training teams, DOD training and education available to PNs, equipment, exercises, and key leader visits, etc., in order for DOD to achieve specific objectives. As part of this effort, SC planners also have assessment, monitoring and evaluation reporting responsibilities for all SC activities. Those responsibilities are delineated in CCMD guidance to subordinate component commands and may vary according to authority, desired outcome, or OSD policy requirements.

Engagement Planners Engagement planners are responsible for developing, executing, and assessing SC activities in support of elements or portions of a SC plan. As members of a MAGTF staff such as a MEF, engagement planners predominantly use the MCPP when planning the execution of activities that occur in support of SC plans developed by the , but also use or oversee the use of various other planning processes such as the Systems Approach to Training (SAT) process to develop PN training. Engagement planners should also monitor political/military exercises, wargames, and experimentation to ensure consistent objectives, activities, and messaging, and they leverage consecutive events to show progress over time in support of an identified strategic objective for that partner.

International Affairs Personnel International Affairs Personnel (IAP) includes a group of Marines who fill myriad billets across the total force. The DOD directs the Marine Corps to maintain a cadre of Marines who possess foreign LREC capabilities. The CMC established the IAP under PP&O to manage the accession, selection, development, and employment of this capability. The mission of the IAP is to develop and manage a cadre of Marines with necessary LREC capabilities to support service planning, policy development, and operational requirements (MCO 1520.11), International Affairs Program establishes and promulgates policy and procedures for programs managed collectively as the Marine Corps IAP and for selection, designation, and assignment of Marines to these programs. The IAP is an umbrella headquarters program that governs six programs to include:
Foreign and Regional Affairs Officers The foreign affairs officer (FAO) and regional affairs officer (RAO) are Marine officers with training or experience in international political-military affairs and advanced LREC to enhance planning, policy, and operations. This ability results from a regionally focused graduate-level education and regional knowledge through experience, travel, or immersion. The FAO skill set includes foreign language proficiency in one or more of the predominant languages used by the population in the region. The RAOs provide specialized regional expertise derived from graduatelevel education that is focused on international relations, political, cultural, sociological, economic and geographic factors associated with their region of study or have extensive in-country pol-mil experience in a designated region. The RAOs may or may not possess a language capability associated to their region of study. Both FAOs and RAOs serve across the full range of operations from higher headquarters and operational forces to joint, interagency, and coalition environments. Their billets are predominately located in Marine Corps command elements (e.g., HQMC, Marine Corps component commands and MEFs) rather than in joint, interagency, or coalition environments. The FAO/RAO designation is not a primary military occupational specialty (PMOS). Officers who carry this designation must remain proficient in their PMOS and serve in the operating forces at each rank. FAOs are expected to retain their LREC competencies between utilization tours and conduct language testing annually.

Foreign Area Staff Non-Commissioned Officers The foreign area staff non-commissioned officer(s) (FAS) are staff non-commissioned officers with LREC experience and capability who enhance planning, policy, and operations at all levels. This capability results from a combination of education, regional knowledge through training and experience, and foreign language proficiency in one or more predominant languages used in the region. The FASs serve within higher headquarters, operational and tactical forces, and their billets are predominately located in Marine Corps commands (e.g., MARFORs, MEFs, and MCSCG). The FAS designation is not a PMOS. Marines who carry this designation must remain proficient in their PMOS and serve in the operating forces at each rank. The FASs are also expected to retain their LREC skills between utilization tours and conduct language testing annually.

Afghanistan Pakistan Hands Program The Afghanistan Pakistan Hands (APH) Program is a cadre of military and civilian personnel who receive training in languages, regional expertise, culture, security force assistance, and advisory functions for deployment to key billets in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The APH personnel rotate in and out of theater to serve as advisors and mentors to local government and security force officials and they understand the issues and challenges associated with Afghanistan and Pakistan. They leverage this expertise to connect with the populations, governments, and security forces of Afghanistan and Pakistan in support of counterinsurgency efforts. The APH personnel engage directly with Afghan or Pakistani officials at the ministerial (strategic and operational) level. Upon completion of an in-theater deployment, APH personnel are assigned to key out-of-theater billets where their in-country experience is applied to Afghanistan or Pakistan regional issues. The Marine Corps provides the program with small cohorts of APH personnel, drawing from both the active and reserve components. For additional information on APH, reference CJCSI 1630. 01B, Afghanistan/Pakistan Hand Program.

Defense Personnel Exchange Program Authorized in Title 10, the DOD has entered into numerous agreements with allies and partners that allow for the exchange or assignment of foreign personnel in US defense establishments and for the corresponding exchange or assignment of US personnel in foreign defense establishments. Referred to as The Defense PEP, this program permits military or civilian participants to spend one or more years working in a PN's defense research and development organizations, joint program offices, or operational defense establishments, on projects directly related to their areas of expertise or military occupational specialty. The Defense PEP is an umbrella term that includes exchange programs, to include the Military PEP and Engineer and Scientist Exchange Program.

Military Personnel Exchange Program The Military Personnel Exchange Program is a CMC-directed, enduring, and reciprocal exchange of mission-specific subject matter expertise between the Marine Corps and PN services in order to meet Service and CCDR requirements. By performing formal duties under the direction of a Foreign Service unit supervisor, Military PEP personnel facilitate the exchange of knowledge and experience to both the parent and PN service in order to enhance interoperability and partner capability and capacity in the bilateral, multilateral, and coalition environments. Military PEP personnel do not possess the authority to act in a formal service liaison capacity or otherwise act as official representatives of their parent government, nor is the exchange to be used as a mechanism for unrestricted exchange of information between the Marine Corps and the PN. A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) and specific billet description between the Marine Corps and each PN service will define the concept and details of the agreed-upon positions. DC PP&O determines the reciprocity of the exchange based upon the PN's willingness and ability to provide personnel with qualifications, training, and skills that are equivalent of the personnel provided by the Marine Corps.

The Engineer and Scientist Exchange Program This program promotes international cooperation in military research, development, testing and evaluation, and acquisition through the exchange of practical experience of defense engineers and scientists. For the Marine Corps, Navy International Programs Office facilitates assignments under the program. This program places selected personnel into technical area assignments in alignment with their engineering or scientific backgrounds. A prerequisite for establishing the program is a formal international agreement via an MOU with each participant PN.

## Marine Corps Security Cooperation Practitioners

Security Cooperation practitioners are those within the operating forces who temporarily conduct SC yet are not considered members of the SC workforce as defined by OSD and DSCA. Security Cooperation practitioners may have training requirements associated with their temporary assignment, but these requirements are separate and distinct from SC Workforce Development Program requirements. Marine Corps SC practitioners may be SC advisors, trainers, planners, FAO/RAO, or other SMEs, or Marines conducting SC activities with SPMAGTFs, MEFs, or MEUs. Marines engage frequently with FSF throughout their careers as part of daily operations and duties during conflict, training, and while executing stabilization exercises. All Marines who engage with FSFs must understand how to conduct effective interactions and build rapport ("no better friend") skills as well as force protection and combat ("no worse enemy") skills. The goal is to keep Marines safe, yet enable Marines to be effective partners during interactions. Marines conducting SC must be able to apply interaction skills and cultural awareness to influence FSF and understand what SC is and how it contributes to achieving higher-level objectives. Training requirements for each SC practitioner are covered within the SC LREC training and readiness (T&R) manual.

Advisors Advisors have persistent, daily interactions with FSFs and are tasked to advise, liaise, and support an FSF organization. Advisors teach, coach, and mentor FSFs to develop their individual or unit security capabilities. As a liaison, the advisor assists the planning efforts of the FSF and helps the Marine Corps maintain a common operational picture of FSF activities. In the support role, the advisor will help the FSF acquire US assistance for capabilities it lacks such as, but not limited to: fires, intelligence, logistical support, medical, etc. Advisor teams are task-organized and enabled for the advisor mission in support of CCDR requirements. The Marine Corps provides advisors to the Joint Force at all levels (tactical, operational, and strategic). Marine Corps advisors influence the behaviors and attitudes of key FSF actors in attempt to change the climate in a way that stimulates the development of desired FSF capabilities. Advisors are proficient in their PMOS and must also serve as trainers of a specific FSF capability, as well as provide advice on how that capability should be employed. They are familiar with the LREC in the area of operations. Marine Corps advisors are trained in force protection, combat skills, and how to recognize and mitigate cultural stress. Through these skills, they build and maintain relationships and rapport with FSF counterparts to further mission objectives. Marine Corps advisors analyze and apply operational culture, and understand USG and Service objectives and plans for an assigned region or country. This training and experience makes Marine Corps advisors a valuable resource in the conduct of SC planning but their focus is execution of the already developed plan. Within the Marine Corps are both advisor billets and the cadre of Marines with the FSF Advisor additional MOS 0570/0571. The FSF Advisor additional MOS is awarded through advisor training or an experience track. This MOS meets the Marine Corps service requirement tasked through policy (e.g., CJCSI 3210.06A, *Irregular Warfare* and DODI 3000.11, Management of DOD IW and Security Force Assistance [*SFA] Capabilities*) to track the knowledge and skills gained in Iraq and Afghanistan and identify the inventory of personnel who may be able to support future CCDR advising requirements. For additional information on advisor billets and advising TTPs, see MCRP 3-03D, *Advising Foreign Security Forces*.

Trainers Marines often train FSF on a specific skill set to support pre-planned, short-duration SC activities. Marine trainers are sometimes part of a larger task-organized team on a MEU, SPMAGTF, or advisor team. Other times, these Marines may also be members of a tasked MTT, subject matter expert exchange (SMEE), or assigned to an SC team. Marines assigned to train FSF units should seek training on how to develop appropriate FSF training that links to SC plans and their desired outcomes.

Interactors All Marines interact with FSF or foreign populations while performing routine primary MOS duties, conducting operations, or participating in exercises as part of a larger force. These interactions are short-duration, but Marines who interact with FSFs or foreign populations must leverage basic engagement skills during interactions to "do no harm" and aid the unit's ability to achieve assigned operational objectives.

## Chapter 3 Marine Corps Security Cooperation Planning Overview

This chapter introduces the Marine Corps specific SC Planning and Execution Cycle and connections between this planning cycle and traditional planning processes. It also discusses the SC
Planning and Execution Cycle's applicability at varying levels of engagement and ends with a brief discussion of assessments and their importance throughout the cycle.

## Security Cooperation Planning At The Ccmd

Effective SC planning ensures activities are executed in accordance with strategic guidance. The CCMDs are responsible for conducting SC planning and issuing tasks to components or organic forces for execution. Planning at this level involves not only DOD personnel, but also the PN, interagency, and DOS. Security Cooperation planners at the CCMD level understand the USG's security strategy and the risks and benefits associated with PN relationships. Planners then determine how a relationship can be further developed and how it can support Commander's objectives. Each CCMD develops objectives with PNs based on the willingness and ability of the PN to cooperate with USG security strategy. Security Cooperation considerations are included in campaign and contingency plans through the Joint planning process. In some cases, the result of this strategic level planning is broad. An example of this could be broad statements about a PN in the combatant command campaign plan (CCP). In other cases, the USG may desire a PN to have the capacity to replicate, sustain, and employ a capability in support of specific coalition efforts. Guidance may be more specific, such as to develop the PN capabilities to deter an emerging or near-peer competitor, to support stabilization efforts in failing states, or provide logistics support or intelligence to mitigate risk to a contingency plan.

## Security Cooperation Planning At The Component Command

The component commanders typically plan and execute SC activities based upon CCMD-assigned tasks. However, there are cases where the component command may develop an SC plan and propose it to the CCMD for approval. An example may be a case where the Marine Corps desires to develop a relationship with a country to facilitate access to training areas in support of sustainment and readiness. In all cases, component command plans must be aligned with Service guidance and nested within CCMD plans. The intent of these Marine Corps-developed SC plans is to align a PN's status, posture, or behavior in accordance with US outcomes. These plans should drive exercise design, as well as intent, frequency, and duration of MTTs, and advise-and-assist missions and other activities. Nesting Service-level planning into joint plans helps ensure effective and efficient use of Marine resources, and provides the Marine Corps and the CCMD maximum return on investment. These plans must be instituted using all applicable higher level and interagency guidance, to include national (Presidential guidance), DOS, DOD (OSD and Joint Staff), CCMD, CMC, Services, and MARFORs. Like the SC planner at the CCMD, the MARFOR SC planner must understand the USG's or DOD's security strategy, the nature of relationships with PNs, and the desired endstate aligned to CCMD objectives. Security Cooperation planning should not be viewed as an isolated activity or process. Instead, SC considerations should be recognized as integral parts to any plan that similarly needs continuous assessment and refinement, but with a special focus on FSF assessment. Security Cooperation planning and execution is strategic in nature and spans multiple years. It is typically conducted at the MARFOR or higher. This does not mean that a MAGTF could not conduct the SC Planning and Execution Cycle, but it is more likely that the MAGTF would be intricately involved in the execution of the long-term plan to achieve the desired future state, versus planning the desired end-state of the FSF.

## Security Cooperation Planning And Execution Cycle

The SC Planning and Execution Cycle is intended to guide Marine Corps activities with a PN and incorporates the tenets of multiple planning processes. The SC Planning and Execution Cycle assists in defining the current PN state and helps design a method to achieve the desired end-state. The SC Planning and Execution Cycle creates a singular method to plan and execute SC activities and report return on investment. The cycle utilizes a lexicon, processes, and principles that are familiar to Marines. The SC Planning and Execution Cycle facilitates effective SC planning and enables the component command SC planner to:


Align with higher-level plans.

Translate strategic guidance into actionable steps.

Incorporate objectives and interests of multiple stakeholders, including the PN.

Successfully compete for and efficiently use constrained resources.

Demonstrate return on investment of committed resources.
Figure 3-1 depicts the six steps of the SC Planning and Execution Cycle. Each step is explained in detail in subsequent chapters of this publication as follows:

1. Theater Analysis (Chapter 4) 2. Security Role Analysis (Chapter 5) 3. FSF Assessment (Chapter 6) 4. Solutions Analysis (Chapter 7) 5. Resource Analysis (Chapter 8) 6. Execution (Chapter 9)
The steps of the SC Planning and Execution Cycle incorporate the best practices of multiple planning processes, or parts of processes, to include the following:


Joint SC management policy/programs/planning.

The Joint capabilities integration and development system (JCIDS).

The Marine Corps Expeditionary Force Development System.

Marine Corps instructional systems design process, SAT, and the MCPP.
The cycle applies the principles of these processes to the development of an SC purpose (relationship, access, capability, capacity). It helps determine what is required of a PN, how that is going to be achieved, and the resources necessary for execution. The SC Planning and Execution Cycle shapes and draws from the MCPP but is different from the MCPP in its design and application. Although the MCPP can span multiple planning levels (strategic, operational, tactical), and produce different levels of plans (strategic, campaign, tactical) it tends to focus on more distinct objectives (e.g., the enemy), more succinct timelines, and is destructive in design. The scope of SC planning is constructive in design while covering both a significantly broader set of objectives and, in many cases, an indefinite timeline consisting of discrete events. Successful SC planning is based on long-term, continuous planning and execution of SC activities with FSF to reach the desired future end-state. Table 3-1 identifies some contrasts between operations planning and SC planning.

Operations
Planning
SC Planning
Intended Effect
Operational
Strategic
Time Horizon
Short-to-Medium Range
3-5 years
Resources
Force Constrained
Authority/ Funding Constrained
Orientation
Reactive
Proactive
External
Coordination Focus
Higher, Adjacent, Supporting
Interagency, Partner Nation
Focus of Plan
Enemy
Partner

Once an SC plan is approved by the CCMD, the service component then resources the SC plan and requests forces to implement and execute the plan. In most cases, the Marine Corps will allocate forward deployed or rotational forces to execute SC events. A unit may be assigned to execute a SC plan in its entirety or only a portion thereof, depending on the depth of the SC plan, the operational environment, and resourcing. Advisor teams develop a deployment engagement plan to guide implementation of their assigned SC tasks. When interacting with the FSF directly, advisors and trainers develop their FSF-specific, standards-based training using the "analyze, design, develop, implement, and evaluate" (ADDIE) model in accordance with the SAT process. The ADDIE system is the developmental model for Marine Corps Instructional Systems Design (MCISD-SATE). Both systems are fully explained in the MCO 1553 series. All actions support the execution of the SC plan, which is directly linked to CCMD objectives. Table 3-2 depicts the relationship between planning processes and their corresponding echelons of command.

| Level                                 | Planning Process                | SC Personnel                      |
|---------------------------------------|---------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| CCMD                                  | SC Planning, JOPP               | G-2/3/5/7, SCO, SDO/DATT, Country |
| Tm                                    |                                 |                                   |
| MARFOR                                | SC Planning and Execution Cycle | MARFOR Planners                   |
| (G-3/G-5)                             |                                 |                                   |
| SC Engagement Planner (e.g., S-3)     |                                 |                                   |
| Marine Corps Planning Process         |                                 |                                   |
| (MCPP),                               |                                 |                                   |
| Advisors or Team Leaders              |                                 |                                   |
| Unit Assigned to Execute Security     |                                 |                                   |
| Cooperation Activities                |                                 |                                   |
| (e.g., SPMAGTF)                       |                                 |                                   |
| Systems Approach to Training Pro-     |                                 |                                   |
| cess                                  |                                 |                                   |
| Advisor                               |                                 |                                   |
| FSF Trainer                           |                                 |                                   |
| Security Cooperation                  |                                 |                                   |
| Event Execution                       |                                 |                                   |
| (e.g., MTT)                           |                                 |                                   |
| Other Tactical Planning Processes     |                                 |                                   |
| (i.e., Begin Planning, Arrange Recon- |                                 |                                   |
| naissance & Coordination, Make        |                                 |                                   |
| Reconnaissance, Complete Plan,        |                                 |                                   |
| Issue Order, Supervise [BAMCIS])      |                                 |                                   |

## Security Cooperation Level Of Engagement

The SC Planning and Execution Cycle is a best-practice process to follow in SC activity design, execution, and assessment over time. However, the full process cycle may not be required, applicable, or executable in all instances. Like any doctrinal planning process, it may be truncated based on constraints that create circumstances in the operational environment that warrant a modified version of the planning process. The degree to which the SC Planning and Execution Cycle is used will be determined by the level of engagement required by the Marine Corps to achieve its objectives and the degree to which the resources supporting those efforts are available. Not all PNs or FSFs require all phases of the SC Planning and Execution Cycle to achieve desired effects. For example, the Marine Corps may have a requirement for access or overflight for Marine forces in support of an ongoing operation in a given country. In this example, through training the FSF, the Marine Corps may gain and maintain operational access that provides the right of overflight, or sets the conditions to negotiate overflight. The Marine Corps commits only the necessary resources to achieve the desired overflight; in this example, FSF training is the tool enabling this access. As US objectives, strategy, and guidance shift, certain PNs may no longer be priorities, and longterm SC activities will be reevaluated. Security cooperation planners must judiciously commit Marine resources in the pursuit of achieving Marine Corps objectives, based on strategic guidance, perceived PN relationships, and available resources. There are many factors that determine the level of engagement for SC activities. Some factors include, but are not limited to the following:


The strategic importance of a partner to the DOD, whether directed or in support of operational
or contingency plans. This may include vulnerable partners in need of defensive capabilities to support US interests or capable allies able to share collective security requirements.

A partner's priority status. Some partners are of greater importance to the Marine Corps than to
another service or CCMD. In many cases, these are partners with, or requiring, an amphibious capability that can be leveraged in support of OPLANs or can facilitate an increase in Marine Corps readiness. Not all CCMD priorities are Marine Corps priorities.

The PN absorptive capacity relative to its culture, or socio-economic status of its force or
personnel (e.g., they have a low literacy rate or are a force in its nascent stages requiring more effort). The absorptive capacity of a foreign security force will impact the planning and execution of a SC plan in terms of time and resources required.

Partner nation objectives. The United States must have a common objective with a PN in order
for SC activities to achieve desired effects.

The Marine Corps resources available to work with a partner FSF. The operational environment
may preclude the Marine Corps from fully committing resources toward an SC plan.

## Assessments In The Security Cooperation Planning And Execution Cycle

Assessments have always been an integral part of Marine Corps SC, and best practices dictate that the Marine Corps complements and feeds DOD AM&E with its assessments (component-level, FSF Unit Level, SC/Advisor Team, Interim Progress Report, Closeout Report). The SC Planning and Execution Cycle relies upon assessments at multiple levels, and throughout the duration of the cycle to analyze, guide and adjust SC activity requirements. In SC, "assessment entails systematic analysis to provide an understanding of the context, conditions, partner capabilities, and requirements to inform SC planning and implementation" (JP 3-20). Assessments identify potential risks to SC activity success to help planners develop or adjust risk mitigation strategies (JP 3-20).

The assessment process must start with an understanding of the environments (institutional, environmental, organizational, and operational) and support strategy and plan development. Figure 3-2 provides an overview of assessments conducted throughout the SC Planning and Execution Cycle.

The assessment outcomes, regardless of type or level, are intrinsically linked and should be considered by the SC planner. Multiple assessments within a particular country should be deconflicted, coordinated, synchronized, and shared among stakeholders to reduce duplication of effort and contribute to a common understanding of FSF gaps and capabilities. Many FSFs are smaller than US or Marine Corps forces. All SC planners should endeavor to avoid overwhelming the partner nation with large and lengthy Marine Corps footprints and duplicative assessments. The following chapters discuss each type of assessment according to the step in which they occur within the SC Planning and Execution Cycle.

## Chapter 4 Security Cooperation Planning And Execution Cycle Step 1: Theater Analysis Overview

Although depicted as Step 1 of the SC Planning and Execution Cycle, theater analysis is a continuous analytical review of DoD, DOS, and other stakeholder guidance, available resources, and taskers with the intent to build an understanding of the operational environment as well as theater priorities, objectives, limitations, and risks.

Lead Theater analysis is inherently a CCMD function; however, the MARFOR SC planner should be adept at conducting this step to build understanding of the operational environment (OE), confirm CCMD findings, and to input Marine Corps equities into the planning process. MARFOR SC planners should be prepared to help develop and refine SC-related documents originating from the CCMD-level.

Focus Familiarize with Presidential policy and guidance, DOD, DOS, and Service-level priorities and how they apply to a relationship with a designated PN.

Timeline This step can take weeks or months, depending on the MARFOR SC planner's familiarity with the region, the level of detail of SC-related work conducted by the CCMD, availability of and ease of access to this information, time required to review and comprehend applicable documents, and other competing tasks.

## Inputs

An Understanding of Unified Action Security cooperation programs and activities are typically integrated and synchronized with the other instruments of national power, depending on how other interagency partners implement the national strategy to achieve strategic objectives. Accordingly, SC is an inherently joint mission and, therefore, requires coordination orat a minimumsituational awareness of subordinate, adjacent, and higher entities' (both internal and external to the DOD) SC-related activities.

Significant Security Cooperation Initiative A significant security cooperation initiative (SSCI) is a designator given by a geographic or functional CCMDs to SC activities, projects, and programs designed to achieve a single desired outcome or set of related outcomes. An SSCI is the fundamental unit of analysis for SC. They require a whole-of-government approach to SC, are broad in scope, and meet the following criteria:


Involve the application of multiple SC tools and programs;

Are overseen and managed by various DOD components and DOS;

Are multi-year efforts to realize a country or region-specific objective or functional objective
(e.g., maritime security or counterterrorism).
The SSCIs in a region are identified by geographic or functional CCMD for the purposes of assessment, monitoring, and independent evaluation in country-specific security cooperation sections of the CCP. They are operationalized using initiative design documents (IDDs) described in the next paragraph) which must include a program of AM&E. Geographic and functional CCMDs


Lead or support initial assessment efforts;

Facilitate participation of relevant SMEs and other appropriate participants assessing,
developing an IDD, and monitoring implementation;

Ensure IDDs are built for all designated SSCIs;

Monitor all SSCIs;

Submit to DSCA, all initial assessments (described in the next paragraph) and IDDs for all new
SC activities and should be prepared to retain materials after completion of the SC initiative for historical records.
Security Cooperation Guidance Relevant examples of documents reflecting SC guidance are depicted in Table 4-1. Key SC- specific documents are detailed below.

Examples of Relevant Security Cooperation Guidance
President
NSS, Presidential Policy Directive-23
Department of State
JRS, ICS, FBS
Department of Defense - OSD
NDS, DPG, CPG
Department of Defense - JS
JSCP, NMS, NMS Annexes, Global Campaign Plans
Department of Defense - CCMD
Theater strategy, CCP, CSCS, IA
Department of Defense - DON
N/A
Department of Defense - CMC
Force Management Plans, Security Cooperation Guidance, CMC Planning Guidance
Department of Defense - MARFOR
CSP
LEGEND
CCMD-Combatant Command
ICS-Integrated Country Strategy
CCP-Combatant Command Campaign Plan
JRS-Joint Regional Strategy
CMC-Commandant of the Marine Corps
JS-Joint Staff
CPG-Contingency Planning Guidance
JSCP-Joint Strategic Campaign Plan
CSCS-Country Specific SC Section
MARFOR-Marine Forces Component
CSP-Campaign Support Plan
MSCP-Marine Corps Security Cooperation Plan
DON-Department of the Navy
NDS-National Defense Strategy
DPG-Defense Planning Guidance
NMS-National Military Strategy
FBS-Functional Bureau Strategy
NSS-National Security Strategy
GCP-Global Campaign Plans
OSD-Office of Secretary of Defense
IA-Initial Assessment

Initial Assessment. Security cooperation planners lead initial assessments (IAs) to determine a PN's willingness and propensity to implement and sustain assistance, improve institutional capacity, and build capabilities in the context of country or other relevant objectives. They also identify requirements, gaps, and potential risks to an SC initiative. An IA should be conducted prior to the initiation of major SC activities with a given country. Initial assessments are conducted by the CCMD
or a Federally Funded Research and Development Center (FFRDC). These FFRDCs (e.g., Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA), Defense Governance Management Team (DGMT), RAND Corporation, Center for Naval Analysis) are unique, nonprofit entities sponsored and funded by the US government to conduct research. A CCMD may also assign an IA to a MARFOR. All DOD
activities designated SSCIs require an IA.

Initiative Design Document. An IDD is created at the CCMD level for activities designated as SSCIs.

An IDD is a comprehensive document that specifies the specific, measurable, attainable, relevant, and time-bound objectives, theory of change, and performance management plan for SSCI
activities. It is a plan to stimulate change in a PN. It measures the current state, envisions a desired future state, and represents a plan to achieve the future state. An IDD is the basis of all follow-on actions at the component (operational) and unit (tactical) level and their consequent analysis, planning, and actions. In the case of a new initiative, guidance for all SC initiatives would flow from the CCMD to the components via the IDD for follow-on security role analysis. The CCMD may also publish a list of country objectives and lines of operation. Service components then conduct security role analysis (Planning and Execution Cycle Step 2: Security Role Analysis) to validate the requirements for an SC initiative and provide recommendations to achieve the CCMD's country objectives. All MARFOR-level SC initiatives require approval from the CCMD.

## Process

Build Situational Awareness Gain access to, collect, and review relevant SC documents from the National, DOD, CCMD, Service, and component levels. If developed, OSD-level, country-specific SC guidance is also a useful tool to shape analysis and guide the MARFOR SC planner. At a minimum, the MARFOR SC
planner should answer the questions below. Questions like the following help determine Marine Corps equity in working with a specific FSF:


Why is Country X important to US national security?

What CCMD operational needs can be filled through a partnership with country X?

How are the PN operational needs relevant to the United States Marine Corps?

How does Marine Corps tactical activity in Country X serve component command needs?
Make a Level of Interoperability Recommendation If theater analysis yields a requirement for a PN to be interoperable with the Marine Corps, then the MARFOR SC planner will make an informed recommendation to the MARFOR Commander regarding the level of interoperability with a PN. Interoperability is not a broad, encompassing objective; therefore, it must be appropriately scoped based on specific, desired effects and PN capabilities. The Marine Corps compartmentalizes PN interoperability into three categories: integrated, compatible, and deconflicted. As defined by MCO 5710.6_, Marine Corps Security Cooperation, the following serves as a measure to assess the required effort and resources to achieve the required level of interoperability for all PN engagements:


Integrated Forces can merge seamlessly and are interchangeable. Other DOD Services will take
the lead for their respective warfighting domains to develop integrated interoperability with potential coalition forces.

Compatible Forces can interact with each other in the same geographical battlespace pursuing
common goals.

Deconflicted Multinational Forces can coexist but not interact operationally with each other.
For the purposes of this definition, "interact" implies a combat relationship between forces, not routine interaction required for coordination or deconfliction.
Make a Marine Corps-specific Applicability Recommendation The MARFOR SC planner should have a comprehensive understanding of the guidance and be able to provide an accurate representation of the Marine Corps-specific SC role in supporting this guidance. Not all higher-level guidance is applicable to Marine Corps SC objectives. The MARFOR SC planner will make a recommendation to the MARFOR Commander regarding whether the Marine Corps is the appropriate partner for a particular FSF (as opposed to the U.S. Army, U.S. Coast Guard, etc.) to achieve the desired capability or level of interoperability. This recommendation may include involvement by other entities, as appropriate.

Be Prepared to Provide Support to the CCMD
A MARFOR SC planner should be prepared to contribute to assessments and follow-on planning in support of the CCMD. The MARFOR SC planners may be tasked to support CCMD SSCIs by helping conduct IAs, or providing Marine Corps equities during the development of CCMD- led IDDs.


Thorough understanding of guiding documents, stakeholders, priorities, and current OE
conditions.

Authority to commit personnel and resources to follow-on SC assessments and analysis.

Service concurrence to commit personnel and resources to follow-on SC assessments and
analysis.

## Chapter 5 Security Cooperation Planning And Execution Cycle Step 2: Security Role Analysis Overview

During Planning and Execution Cycle Step 2: Security Role Analysis (Figure 5-1), the MARFOR SC planner analyzes the stakeholder objectives identified during theater analysis and determines a commonality of purpose that will help to define SC activities to be conducted. This commonality will be translated into a clearly-articulated desired security role. As a best practice, this step will include executing a component-level assessment.

Lead This step is most often led by MARFOR SC planners and involves collaboration with key stakeholders such as the DOD (e.g., CCMD), DOS (e.g., Country Team), and PN representatives.

Focus Identify a desired security role that can be supported by Marine forces for specific FSF from the designated PN.

Timeline Depending on the level of assessment already conducted, this step can take multiple weeks to complete.

Note: Note. The SC planner must understand Marine Corps unit training management (UTM) methodologies as they will be applied to the development of FSFs beginning in Planning and Execution Cycle Step 3 and for the duration of the cycle. The UTM process provides the standards that are linked to a capability to be assessed. Using Marine Corps UTM processes to govern the development of FSFs training objectives provides a concise methodology on which to build understandable, standards-based FSF capabilities. This allows standards to be evaluated, monitored, and reported accurately.

## Inputs

The primary input to security role analysis is the collective understanding attained during theater analysis.

## Process

Conduct Component-Level Assessment After the Marine Corps component command SC planner has conducted theater analysis, the planner should then determine the need for a component-level assessment. If an initial assessment was not completed in Planning and Execution Cycle Step 1: Theater Analysis, then conducting a component-level assessment is a critical part of the SC Planning and Execution Cycle. If an initial assessment was conducted, a component-level assessment may still be necessary to scope the component command's SC activities and validate the findings of the IA. Component-level assessments are conducted by the Marine Corps component command as required, but also may be executed by the Service Headquarters, CCMD, or other stakeholders. These assessments focus on the component level of the FSF, or on informing the component command's broader understanding of the work required in a given country to meet CCMD objectives. These assessments are compared to strategic analysis contained in initial assessments (e.g., CCMD responsibility) and unit-specific detail is provided during follow-on unit-level assessments. The component-level assessment validates: PN and FSF goals, PN willingness, absorptive capacity, operational culture, and any other current regional dynamics. The component-level assessment accomplishes this through four types of discrete analyses (institutional, environmental, organizational, and operational) which assist the Marine Corps component command SC planner in determining a desired end state. Each analysis is not a comprehensive assessment of each category. The information contained in the analyses are categories of information that are the minimum requirements determined by the component command SC planner that will, in turn, determine gaps in an FSF's capabilities. For additional planning considerations and procedures for conducting component-level assessments see Appendix C.

Conduct Stakeholder SC Common Objectives Analysis During Security Role Analysis, the SC planner must work with key stakeholders to identify and confirm objectives for the PN. Aligning these objectives will reveal common purpose, which should assist in reaching a commonly desired outcome. Figure 5-2 highlights some of the key guidance documents from which the SC planner derives various stakeholders' objectives and goals with a PN or FSF. The PN objectives may vary and the source documents or information will come from a range of sources (e.g., PN defense strategy/policies/campaign plan, international agreements, after action reports); however, the SC planner should collaborate with the US Embassy Team regarding the PN's desired objectives.

Draft Desired Security Role Using the common objectives analysis, the SC planner drafts a desired security role (DSR) statement for the FSF. This is the desired end state of a PN relationship. This analysis can be subjective in nature due to the available input to the process. This analysis should focus on determining which of the shared objectives is most suitable for the Marine Corps. There may be objectives common in scope and purpose for multiple stakeholders that are not appropriate as a Marine Corps-facilitated DSR. An example of this would be to develop FSF capabilty in a skillset the Marine Corps does not train to. The SC planner should seek commander's approval of the proposed DSR to ensure it meets the commander's intent. In some cases the DSR may be provided to the component command by the CCMD. A practical example of some of those similar and divergent key stakeholder objectives are included in Figure 5-3 below. Some countries may require multiple DSRs due to the complexities of requirements to meet objectives. DSRs come in many forms, depending on the future end state defined in terms of the SC purposes (relationship, access, capability, capacity). Table 5-1 provides some examples.

Access. A DSR for access defines requirements and specifically defines the type of access required, such as in support of an operational or contingency plan. In order to assure access, activities must be conducted to foster a PN relationship enough to facilitate an access agreement.

Capability/Capacity. Building PN capacity or a discrete capability that the CCMD desires the PN
to generate, replicate and sustain is inherently a joint effort. These efforts require the PN to perform the basic force development functions required of any military organization. Those include, but are not limited to: budgeting, acquisitions, policy, training and education, facilities, recruiting, doctrine, etc. This requires advisors at multiple echelons, across many force development disciplines. A DSR is directly linked to US guidance and the role we need the PN to fill. A DSR for a given FSF
should be shaped by the operational environment in which the PN is expected to operate. For example, if the PN is vulnerable to aggression and its defense is aligned to strategic guidance, any developed capability should be survivable and useful. Developing a DSR that does not align to strategic or US requirements is not a good use of US or PN resources. The DSR must support US objectives; however, PN buy-in to the DSR is critical for sustaining and developing capability or capacity. Developers must consider PN priorities, restrictions, absorptive capacity, and the likelihood a partner can sustain a capability once developed.

| Purpose                                                                    | DSR Statement                     |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| (not exhaustive)                                                           |                                   |
| Desired Outcome                                                            |                                   |
| (aligns with DoD)                                                          |                                   |
| Port visit, KLE, Staff Talks, exer-                                        |                                   |
| cises, training                                                            |                                   |
| Access required ISO O/CON Plan                                             |                                   |
| Access                                                                     |                                   |
| Country X provides overflight in sup-                                      |                                   |
| port of operational and/or contin-                                         |                                   |
| gency plans                                                                |                                   |
| Capability                                                                 |                                   |
| Advisor Teams, SMEEs, ICB, FMS                                             | Capability required in support of |
| plan, or regional stability. May be a                                      |                                   |
| capability GCC requires for limited                                        |                                   |
| time.                                                                      |                                   |
| Country X Naval Infantry Battalion                                         |                                   |
| conducts Visit, Board, Search, Sei-                                        |                                   |
| zure (VBSS) within sovereign                                               |                                   |
| waters to protect maritime fisheries                                       |                                   |
| zone.                                                                      |                                   |
| Advisor Teams, ICB, FMS, IMET,                                             |                                   |
| SMEEs, KLE, Staff Talks                                                    |                                   |
| GCC requires Country X ISO O/                                              |                                   |
| Con plan                                                                   |                                   |
| Capacity                                                                   |                                   |
| The Country X Naval Infantry con-                                          |                                   |
| ducts offensive and defensive oper-                                        |                                   |
| ations to defend against/deter                                             |                                   |
| Country Y aggression                                                       |                                   |
| Note:                                                                      |                                   |
| Capability/Capacity building requires ICB, MARFOR efforts must be          |                                   |
| linked to GCC ICB efforts (e.g. Initial Assessment, IDD, ICB advisors). SC |                                   |
| Engagement Plan nested with IDD.                                           |                                   |
| ISO - in support of                                                        |                                   |
| KLE - Key Leader Engagement                                                |                                   |
| O/Con plan - Operational or Contingency plan                               |                                   |
| LEGEND                                                                     |                                   |
| GCC - Geographic Combatant Command                                         |                                   |
| ICB - Institutional Capacity Building                                      |                                   |
| IDD - Initiative Design Document                                           |                                   |
| IMET - International Military Education and Trainig                        |                                   |

Develop Military/Security Tasks The SC planner should determine which military/security tasks (MSTs) the FSF must execute to achieve the DSR. These tasks are defined as follows:


Military task. Tasks for FSF military forces, such as Army, Marine, Naval, and Air forces.

Security task. Tasks for FSF policing agencies, such as border patrol or police agencies
performing internal security tasks.
The SC planner utilizes the Marine Corps Task List (MCTL) to find applicable Tasks that support the DSR. Task descriptions will be adjusted to fit the DSR, the PN and FSF absorptive capacity. For the Marine Corps, this begins with the Unified Joint Task List (UJTL) that identifies descriptive capability statements to the Joint Force. The MCTL nests with the UJTL by providing capability statements in each Marine Corps Task (MCT). A single MCT contains a capability statement and the measures by which readiness to perform that task are measured using percentages or other criteria (e.g., days, yes/no, etc.). Military/security tasks assigned to the FSF are similar to an MCTL description and is supported by Capability Sets. The MSTs chain directly to the DSR, while the subordinate Capability Sets chain directly to, and support, the MSTs. Variations in the number of DSRs required, and how they are linked to M/S Tasks, will vary based on the DSR, the size of the FSF force being developed, or even the capabilities required. Figure 5-4 shows how the chaining and linking of tasks begins to define a capability requirement. The SC planners must chain tasks required to fulfill the DSR. The Marine Corps chains tasks to guide the production of force generation and then links these tasks to required proficiencies. This takes place when a unit is assigned a group of MCTs, called a Mission-essential task list (METL). The accomplishment of a single MCT requires proficiency in both collective and individual tasks. Table 5-2 provides a brief example of Marine Corps chained and linked tasks required to accomplish a singular MCT (left). In developing MSTs for an FSF unit, Marines will use the same logical progression of task chaining and linking. Because the size of the FSF (e.g., component, regiment, battalion, company, platoon) differ based upon US objectives, the level of tasks, descriptions, and outputs may vary. Marines at all levels must consider the PN's capabilities, willingness, and absorptive capacity when creating an FSF MST list. Figure 5-5 provides a brief comparative example of an FSF MST list (right). The An SC planner uses these MSTs and continues chaining and linking to determine the Capability Requirements the FSF must be capable of executing to achieve the DSR. This continuation of chaining and linking of tasks down to the individual skills occurs in Planning and Execution Cycle Step 4: Solutions Analysis.

USMC
Task Level
Mission Essential Task List
example of chained events to an MCT
FSF
Task Level
DSR: Conduct of offensive
ops ISO a combined force
MCT/Met
MCT 1.6.1 Conduct Offensive Ops
Military/Security Task
MST 1 Conduct Offensive Ops
8000-6000
INF-MAN-8001 Conduct Offensive INF-C2-8004 Conduct Combat Operations Center (COC) Ops INF-C2-8005 Conduct Planning
7000-3000
INF-MAN-7001: Conduct a Ground attack INF-MAN-6001: Conduct a Ground attack INF-MAN-5001: Conduct a Ground attack INF-MAN-4001: Conduct a Ground Attack INF-MAN-3001: Conduct Fire and Movement
2000-1000
0300-ISUL-2501 Lead a squad 0300-OFF-1001 Perform Actions in a Hasty Firing Position 0300-PAT-1008 Perform Individual Actions in a Patrol 0300-M16-1005 Zero a Rifle Combat Optic (RCO) to a Service Rifle
This represents an METL required to conduct 1.6.1 Conduct Offensive Operations. Only one USMC task. (ref. MCO3500.XX series, depending on FSF capability).
LEGEND Bn: battalion Co: company INF: infantry Intel: intelligence ISUL: infantry small unit leader

##

Desired Security Role:
Deploy a regional-interoperable Naval Infantry Company capable of expeditionary/amphibious operations in support of a combined force Note:  Notional depiction of chaining and linking of

| Capability Set                                          | 1.1 Conduct Bn-level C2   |
|---------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------|
| 1.2 Establish fire support coord. center                |                           |
| 1.3 Plan and conduct intel ops                          |                           |
| Sub-capability set*                                     | 1.1.1 Operate a COC       |
| 1.2.1 Conduct fire support coord.                       |                           |
| 1.3.1 Establish a co.-level intel cell                  |                           |
| Individual skills*                                      | 1.1.1.1 Operate a radio   |
| 1.2.1.1 Occupy a mortar firing position                 |                           |
| 1.3.1.1 Conduct a tactical site exploita-               |                           |
| tion                                                    |                           |
| *Advisors, SC teams, SMEES, etc., utilize judgment to   |                           |
| develop a chained/linked FSF MSTL commensurate with FSF |                           |
| capability to be built (e.g., Bn., Co., Plt., etc.)     |                           |
| MAN: maneuver                                           |                           |
| OFF: offense                                            |                           |
| PAT: patrol                                             |                           |
| Plt: platoon                                            |                           |

Component-Level Assessment Findings Findings from the component-level assessments should demonstrate the goals and objectives that the relevant Marine Corps command seeks to solve through engagement with the PN (e.g., access, minimizing PN capability gaps). A component-level assessment's findings become the basis for the stakeholder analysis and DSR development.

## Approved Dsr The Approved Dsr Defines The Role The Pn Must Fill To Achieve Us Objectives.

Foreign Security Forces Military/Security Tasks and Capability Requirements The FSF capability requirements are derived from the MSTs it must achieve, improve, or sustain in order to effectively execute the DSR, or to improve their ability to perform an already established DSR. The FSF will not have organizations, structure, culture, mission, capabilities, or capacity identical to Marine Corps units. The SC planner must understand how to modify Marine Corps FSF standards commensurate with the FSF organization's culture, absorptive capacity, and available resources. The FSF capability requirements must be realistic, achievable, and sustainable.

# Chapter 6 Security Cooperation Planning And Execution Cycle Step 3: Foreign Security Forces Unit-Level Assessments

## Overview

During Step 3, FSF Unit-Level Assessment, the SC planner assesses the FSF's ability to perform the required capabilities to achieve the approved DSR.

Lead The SC planner is responsible for the FSF unit-level assessment, but will delegate the assessment to a team of SMEs. Depending on the scope of the FSF unit-level assessment, the assessment team may consist of numerous personnel who are SMEs covering various portions or the entire DOTMLPF-P construct. The SC planner will develop the scope of the FSF unit-level assessment in conjunction with the assessment team.

## Focus Evaluation Of The Designated Fsf. Timeline Approximately Six Months. Inputs

Approved Desired Security Role The approved DSR drives the mission objectives of the FSF unit-level assessment. It defines MSTs and the Capability Requirements against which the performance of the FSF is measured.

Military/Security Tasks and Capability Requirements The SC planner uses the MSTs and Capability requirements, derived from similar standards found in Marine Corps T&R manuals to formulate the standards against which the performance of the FSF's ability to achieve the DSR will be measured. At a minimum, FSF unit-level assessments are based on MSTs and Capability Requirements.

Marine Corps Training and Readiness Manual The MCO 3500 series, commonly called T&R Manuals, contain events that guide force generation, training and education. This system of progressive and ordered events minimizes duplications, ensures training effectiveness, standardizes capability development, and generates FSF
capabilities. All Marine Corps T&R events link back to the unit's METL and serve as the foundation for curriculum design and development throughout the ADDIE process.

## Process Assess Need For Unit-Level Assessment To Determine The Necessity For An Fsf Unit-Level Assessment, Consider The Following:


If the DSR for a country is only access, an FSF unit-level assessment is not necessary. Other
assessments should be conducted to confirm access requirements based on physical visits to identified locations. In cases such as this, the Marine Corps may or may not offer a capability. If the Marine Corps offers a capability, an FSF unit-level assessment is necessary. For Access DSRs, the SC planner will skip Planning and Execution Cycle Step 3 and jump to
Step 4. Many options may be available to achieve access. Not all options will require Marine Corps participation, or even require military input (e.g., direct commercial sales). Access requirements in support of operational and contingency plans, by definition, is a CCMD responsibility. However, the Marine Corps may identify requirements in support of Marine Corps objectives and make recommendations to the CCMD.

For capability DSRs, an FSF unit-level assessment is necessary. An FSF unit-level assessment
is conducted to measure the FSF's ability to execute those MSTs and Capability Requirements required to achieve the DSR, validate any assumptions made about the FSF during Planning and Execution Cycle Steps 1 and 2, identify capability gaps and validate the willingness of
the FSF to act in a capacity commensurate with the DSR. An FSF unit-level assessment considers all factors that influence an FSF organization and is designed to provide stakeholders as much information as possible to determine whether or not to move forward with an SC plan.

Establish FSF Unit-Level Assessment Criteria The SC planner utilizes the DSR and identified capability requirements to determine the scope (e.g., logistics vs. infantry skills, general vs. technical skills) and scale (e.g., platoon vs. battalion) of the FSF unit-level assessment. This helps determine the composition of the assessment team.

Source Assessment Team In some cases, the component command may source organic assets to conduct an FSF unit-level assessment. Most likely, the component command will request assistance from outside agencies such as MCSCG, FFRDCs, and defense contractors. The MCSCG is equipped to scope and lead assessments with its Assessments Cell.

Gather Input for an FSF Unit-Level Assessment The SC planner and the assessment team should review all pertinent documents, trip reports, after action reports, FSF briefs, etc. If possible, they should also conduct interviews of current advisors in-country or who have returned, research SC authoritative databases, or other pertinent systems of record. Finally, both the SC planner and the assessment team should inform or receive input from other agencies that conduct assessments such as: North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), FFRDCs, Center for Army Analysis, and any CCMD-level assessments.

Develop Unit-Level Assessment Performance Evaluation Checklists The SC planner establishes an operational planning team with those involved in the FSF unit-level assessment (i.e., SMEs, FFRDCs, etc. ) to shape the criteria to be assessed, the data collection plan (to include performance evaluation checklists), collection methodology, determination of SME
requirements, and the logistical requirements required to conduct the assessment. The SC planner develops a performance evaluation checklist (PECL) in order to measure FSF's current state and ability to perform the DSR. The PECL consists of collective standards required to conduct identified MSTs and is based on Marine Corps equivalent standards. The PECL will be used to evaluate the FSF's proficiency level during the FSF unit-level assessment. Much of the required information necessary to inform the scoping of the FSF unit-level assessment can be found in previously conducted assessments, to include the initial assessment and component-level assessment. See Appendix E for notional PECLs. If the FSF has their own T&R-like reference(s) the SC planner should develop PECLs according to the FSF's existing standards. Some PNs participate in international collective security agreements, such as the NATO. In these cases, the SC planner should use NATO training standards to develop PECLs. Regardless, the SC planner develops PECLs in conjunction with the stakeholders (e.g., SC teams, exercise forces, etc.), and should review these standards in comparison to the requirements of the MSTs and capability requirements developed to satisfy the DSR. This will ensure that the FSF trains to standards and tasks associated with the DSR. Most FSFs will not have established T&R reference(s), or doctrine similar to the Marine Corps. In these cases, the SC planner will need to use Marine Corps T&R standards to develop PECLs and negotiate with the stakeholders of the SC activity those events the FSF will be graded against.

The FSFs are not the Marine Corps and should not be expected to meet full Marine Corps T&R standards. As such, SC planners must adjust standards according to the DSR, FSF absorptive capacity, and available resources. SC planners should also take into account the PN's absorptive capacity when developing standards. The SC planners use a digital tool, or evaluation matrix, to record and analyze the quantitative evaluation data captured by PECLs in order to produce a training and readiness percentage for the training unit and its subordinate units.

Conduct FSF Unit-Level Assessment An FSF unit-level assessment has four subcomponents: the institutional analysis, environmental analysis, organizational analysis, and operational analysis. These analyses are described in detail in Appendix D. An FSF unit-level assessment consists of the following actions:


Measure FSF's ability to perform the DSR. In most cases the assessment team will travel to
the PN and evaluate the FSF in their own facilities and training locations. The FSF elements may be brought to other locations for this step.

Validate assumptions about FSF. The assessment team will confirm or deny assumptions made
during Planning and Execution Cycle Steps 1 and 2 with regard to the FSF's ability to perform the DSR. They should also determine the absorptive capacity of the FSF, to include the PN's ability to sustain and replicate the forces required to achieve the DSR.

Validate FSF willingness to execute DSR. During the assessment, through interaction with
the FSF and its leadership, the assessment team will clarify the FSF's willingness to perform the DSR.
Conduct Capabilities Gap Analysis The SC planner compares the results of the FSF unit-level assessment against the MSTs derived during Planning and Execution Cycle Step 2: Security Role Analysis. This comparison will provide a list of capability gaps needed to be addressed in order to achieve the DSR. In some situations, the SC planner will need to refine the MSTs based on assessment findings. The capabilities gap analysis will allow planners to make risk decisions in context of overall USG engagement in country and theater. The SC planner will also use this information for the continuation of chaining and linking of MSTs and capability requirements into sub-capabilities and individual skills requirements later in Planning and Execution Cycle Step 4: Solutions Analysis (Chapter 7).

Develop FSF Unit-Level Assessment Report The SC planner compiles and summarizes the research completed during pervious assessments (e.g., initial, component) In addition, the SC planner provides a recommendation with justification to proceed or not proceed with developing FSF along the identified capability gaps. Finally, the planner provides an estimate of the resources (forces and funding), and time required to achieve the DSR.

FSF Unit-Level Assessment Report The FSF unit-level assessment report will provide a list of gaps in the FSF's current capability to perform the DSR. This report is a compilation and summary of research completed during previous assessments and provides a recommendation for continuation of the SC plan. An example of an FSF unit-level assessment report is found in Appendix D.

# Chapter 7 Security Cooperation Planning And Execution Cycle Step 4: Solution Analysis

## Overview

During Step 4: Solutions Analysis (Figure 7-1), the SC planner determines solutions to the gaps in an FSF unit's ability to achieve a DSR through the development of resource-informed mitigations (i.e., SC activities). The end state of solutions analysis is to develop an SC engagement plan (SCEP).

Lead The SC planner is responsible for solutions analysis and will lead designated or remaining members of the assessment team to develop the SCEP.

Focus To attain coordination across the command's staff and the larger Marine Corps with support from SMEs in UTM, fiscal, legal, and force management.

Timeline The time required for this step will depend on the size of the initiative and its requirements. SC activities requiring congressional notification and approval may take more than twelve months to obtain approval and funding for program execution. Other activities may be allowed to proceed with CJCS or OSD approval. Exercise-related authorities should be identified at the earliest part of the Joint Exercise Life Cycle, particularly those who require GCC, Joint Staff, and OSD approval along with filling reporting requirements to Congress. These longer-timeline authorities are not intended for emergent requirements.

## Input

FSF Unit-Level Assessment Report The FSF unit-level assessment report compiled by the SC planner supplies a list of capability gaps in relation to the FSF's ability to achieve the DSR. This list of capability gaps is the starting point for conducting solutions analysis.

## Process

Identify Gaps in FSF Unit-Level Assessment Report The SC planner prioritizes the identified capability gaps in accordance with applicable guidance. It is important to note that not all gaps must be filled. The SC planner must prioritize gaps in such a manner that achieves the DSR, while maximizing required forces and funding without overcommitting Marine Corps resources.

Possible Solutions to Capability Gaps. Depending upon the absorptive capacity of the PN or the desired level of capability or interoperability, potential solutions (i.e., events) could come in many formsFMS, IMET, key leader engagements and senior leader engagements (KLEs/SLEs), SMEEs, exercises, etc. An SC plan could consist of as few or as many events as deemed appropriate by guidance and supported by available resources. Events that involve training should be organized in a logical order that progresses from basic to advanced or individual to collective skills. The list of possible events is limited only in the SC planner's ability to understand the authorities and resources available. Figure 7-2 shows examples of possible gap solutions for each tier of the SC pyramid that was introduced in Chapter 1.

Define Measures of Performance and Effectiveness A DSR defines the desired end-state of a specific PN security force. In order to measure progress towards this goal, the SC planner must define specific indicators. Measures of performance (MOPs)
and measures of effectiveness (MOEs) are quantitative and qualitative indicators that show the condition, state, or existence of something with the intent to ascertain information regarding progression towards, in this case, achievement of a DSR.

Measures of Performance. An MOP is defined as an indicator used to measure a friendly action that is tied to measuring task accomplishment. MOPs are commonly addressed in task execution matrices and confirm or deny proper task performance. MOPs help answer, "Are we doing things right?" or "Was the action taken?" or "Was the task completed to standard?"
Measures of Effectiveness. An MOE is defined as an indicator used to measure a current system state with change indicated by comparing multiple observations over time. MOEs help answer the question, "Are we doing the right things to create the effects of changes in the conditions of the OE
that we desire?" Data to support the MOP and MOE can be collected using a variety of methods (e.g., research, observation, conversation, etc.); it can be conducted in a formal or informal setting (e.g., during a large-scale exercise or in a phone conversation with a unit representative), as well as by various individuals or teams (an assessment team, an SC team, an advisor, a trainer, an interactor, etc.). Figure 7-3 contains MOP and MOE examples related to desired PN FSF capabilities.

Establish Milestones Milestones are scheduled events that indicate the completion of a major program task. They are observable and enable the measurement of the program's progress. When met, these specific FSF achievements result in proficient performance ratings that links to the FSF's ability to perform the related DSR. How these events are organized is determined by the SC planner and based on the resource picture and priority of that FSF's development in comparison to other commander's priorities. The MOPs and MOEs are used to determine whether an FSF unit has achieved a specified milestone. Assessing these achievements may require detailed planning efforts to build an assessment team and associated criteria.

Identify Decision Points Decision Points are defined as a point in space and time when the commander or staff anticipates making a key decision concerning a specific course of action (JP 5-0). Security cooperation planners need to identify known decision points, which allow commanders the opportunity to look for alternatives and minimize risk. For example, if the FSF fails to achieve a milestone, a decision must be made to adjust the plan or discontinue working with a given FSF. There will be other key decision points that are administrative in nature and are not considered milestones i.e., KLEs, DSCA proposals, funding decisions, resource decisions, etc. Security cooperation planners should be prepared for ad-hoc decision points that may occur, such as a change in a PN's will to support a DSR, shifts in USG or DOD priority, leadership changes, or a sudden change in available resources.

## Security Cooperation Concept Of Engagement

An SC Concept of Engagement is essentially a synchronized graphical representation used to organize and depict the initial conditions and an FSF unit's desired end state (i.e., DSR), chronologically-ordered SC events and milestones, sourcing considerations and solutions (to be discussed in Chapter 8) overlaid on a timeline. Figure 7-4 is a visual depiction of an example of an SC concept of engagement with an undetermined purpose developed to illustrate the complexity of SC planning. The example provides different types of activities over multiple years, using a SPMAGTF as the primary sourcing effort. The example is neither comprehensive nor representative of the full measure of efforts required to fulfill a DSR. However, it does provide an example of how SC planning must be comprehensive, strategic in nature, requires a multi-year effort, and contributes to and draws from DOS, DoD, and Marine Corps planning and resourcing processes.

Solutions Analysis/Chaining & Linking Tasks to DSR
Chaining and linking tasks from MST to individual skills guides the progression of the FSF toward DSR achievement in a defined and measurable manner. The SC Planning and Execution Cycle applies the Marine Corps T&R construct to the development of FSF standards, both collective and individual. In the absence of FSF T&R-like manuals, Marine Corps T&R manuals can be used as a guide, but should be adapted to fit the FSF. Figure 7-5 depicts the standards-based approach of chaining the DSR to Military/Security Tasks, based on capability gaps identified in the FSF Unit Level Assessment. Figure 7-5 demonstrates the further chaining of the individual skills required to perform the subordinate capabilities. Assigned units or teams can be given the responsibility to link the individual skills required of the FSF to accomplish a subordinate capability. In the example below, the assigned executing unit creates the associated training package to achieve a sub-capability using the Marine Corps SAT process:


Sub-capability 1.2.3 Land Navigation

Individual skill: read a map

Individual skill: utilize a compass

Individual skill: know pace count
Security Cooperation Event Performance Evaluation Check Lists As discussed in Chapter 6, a PECL is developed for each sub-capability of a capability set associated with each MST supporting a DSR. Event PECLs should be drawn from those developed for and followed during the FSF unit-level assessment; however, only a portion of those may be relevant to a single SC event. The group of PECLs provided to a unit executing an SC event should be scoped accordingly. It may be necessary to refine PECLs. In this case, SC planners should seek SME input. These PECLs become the standard for FSF evaluation used throughout the lifecycle of the SC plan (2-5 years) and ensure the FSF's performance will be appropriately measured against the same baseline. This provides the SC planner with the quantitative data to accurately assess, monitor, evaluate and report the progress of the FSF against established standards, which move toward DSR achievement. As a best practice, SC planners should use a digital tool, or evaluation matrix, to record and analyze the quantitative evaluation data captured by PECLs in order to produce an overall training and readiness percentage for the training unit and its subordinate units.

Event Cards Security cooperation planners use SC Event Cards to guide exercise design and sequencing to ensure activities are cumulative and progress the FSF over time. The SC event cards are specific to each event that will be reflected on an SCEP Tracker. An SCEP Tracker is further defined in paragraph j. The primary purpose of an SC event card is to scope an executing unit's mission (e.g., advise, train, assist, assess, etc.) for a singular event. Once an executing unit for a specific event is identified, the associated SC event card (or multiple cards, in the case of an SC Team departing on a 6-month deployment, for example) should be provided to them as a guide for follow-on detailed planning. Dependent upon the scope of the event, a single event may include all capabilities and sub-capabilities associated with an MST or it may be very narrowly-focused on a particularlytechnical sub-capability; each event card should reflect accordingly. Security cooperation planners also develop event cards for activities such as exercises, KLE/SLEs, SMEEs, etc. Additionally, SC event cards serve as a standardized method of reporting for record-keeping purposes. Security cooperation event card details should be entered into SC authoritative databases, as appropriate. Security cooperation event cards should be completed in accordance with SC authoritative databases guidelines and business rules. An example of an SC event card is shown in Figure 7-6.

LOO # 1: Maneuver
Milestone #1: Military/Security Task 1: Conduct amphibious assaults and raids
Capability set 1.2: Light infantry operations
Event
Number
Sub-capability
Recommended
Audience
Engagement
Category
Sub-activity
Organization
Planner
Location Base/
City/Country
Estimated Cost
Machine
gunnery
FSF HQ
Supply
TBD
TBD
TBD
TBD
Number
of
Personnel
Purpose: to train the FSF in basic machine gunnery (to include live-fire evaluation).
Number
of
Days
Travel:
1.1.2.1
Description: Advisor team develops training package to provide basic machine gunnery skills to

the FSF. Training should be standards based and train competency up to platoon level

and culminate with a live-fire evaluation that will use Marine Corps standard T&R


Security Cooperation Engagement Plan Tracker Creating an SC Engagement Plan Tracker is a best practice that can be used by SC planners to administratively organize events, track assessment data, and capture progress of an FSF organization over the span of multiple years. Using a series of spreadsheets, SC planners can track progress of the FSF from attaining a single sub-capability skill, to the entire capability set, to the associated MST, to all MSTs, thereby ultimately enabling the FSF to perform the DSR. Figure 7-7 provides an example of an SC engagement plan tracker and represents how the logical progression of linked capabilities development can be used to track FSF progression.

| Completed Events                      | Partially Complete Events   | Cancelled/Problem Events   |
|---------------------------------------|-----------------------------|----------------------------|
| Milestone 1                           |                             |                            |
| Military/Security Task 1:             |                             |                            |
| Conduct amphibious assaults and raids |                             |                            |
| Capability Set 1.1:                   |                             |                            |
| Ship to                               |                             |                            |
| shore movement                        |                             |                            |
| Capability Set 1.2:                   |                             |                            |
| Light infantry                        |                             |                            |
| operations                            |                             |                            |
| Capability Set:                       |                             |                            |
| Sub-capabilities                      | Sub-capabilities            | Sub-capabilities           |
| Completed Events                      | Partially Complete Events   | Cancelled/Problem Events   |
| Milestone 1                           | Milestone                   |                            |
| 1.1.1.1 1.1.1.2 1.1.1.3               | 1.1.2.1 1.1.2.2 1.1.2.3     | 1.1.1.4                    |
Military/Security Task:
Capability Set
Capability Set:
| Sub-capabilities   | Sub-capabilities   | Sub-capabilities   |
|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
Military/Security Task 2: Conduct maritime/riverine security operations
Military/Security Task:
Capability Set
Capability Set:
Capability Set 2.1
Capability Set 2.2
Capability Set 2.3
Sub-capabilities
| Sub-capabilities   | Sub-capabilities   | Sub-capabilities   |
|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
Milestone
Sub-capabilities
Sub-capabilities
Sub-capabilities
Military/Security Task:
Capability Set
| Capability Set          | Capability Set                          | Capability Set:   |
|-------------------------|-----------------------------------------|-------------------|
| 1.2.1.1 1.2.1.2 1.2.1.3 | 1.2.2.1 1.2.2.2 1.2.2.3 1.2.2.4 1.2.2.5 |                   |
| Sub-capabilities        | Sub-capabilities                        | Sub-capabilities  |
| Sub-capabilities        | Sub-capabilities                        | Sub-capabilities  |
| Sub-capabilities   | Sub-capabilities   | Sub-capabilities   |
|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
Sub-capabilities
Capability Set
| Sub-capabilities   | Sub-capabilities   | Sub-capabilities   |
|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| Capability Set   | Capability Set   | Capability Set   |
|------------------|------------------|------------------|
Capability Set
| Sub-capabilities   | Sub-capabilities   | Sub-capabilities   | Sub-capabilities   | Sub-capabilities   | Sub-capabilities   |
|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|

Security Cooperation Engagement Plan Package The components described above as well as those listed below comprise the Marine Corps' definition of an SC engagement plan package. An SCEP is a resource-derived, comprehensive plan that incorporates strategy, methodology, and timeline to conduct activities that close capability gaps and enable the FSF to fulfill a DSR. The SCEP is a "living" plan that must remain flexible based on priorities, resource availability, and changing conditions in the OE. At a minimum, an SCEP should include the following:
Background. A scene-setting document that provides context and relevance in order to build a commander's understanding.

## Executive Summary. A Succinct Summary Of The Key Points Of The Scep.

Security cooperation Concept of Engagement. A synchronized graphical representation used to organize and depict the initial conditions and an FSF unit's desired end state (i.e., DSR), chronologically-ordered SC events and milestones, sourcing considerations and solutions overlaid on a timeline.

Security Cooperation Event Cards. An SC event scoping and reporting tool; a summary of the training, logistics, and funding requirements associated with an SC event, provided to an executing unit to enable follow-on planning (Figure 7-6).

Evaluation Matrix. A digital tool, or evaluation matrix, used to record and analyze the quantitative evaluation data captured by PECLs. It produces an overall training and readiness percentage for the training unit and its subordinate units to assess FSF proficiency in subcapabilities of a capability set associated with MSTs supporting a DSR. An evaluation matrix can be used both in support of formal FSF unit-level assessments as well as in support of SC events (see chapters 6 and 7).

## Security Cooperation Engagement Plan Tracker. A Series Of Spreadsheets Used To Administratively Organize Events, Track Assessment Data, And Capture Fsf Progress Over The Span Of A Multi-Year Scep.

Enclosures. The CCMD-level initial assessment summary, component-level assessment report, FSF
Unit-Level assessment report, higher level supporting guidance, and any other document the staff deems necessary to reinforce the package.


A planned and approved, but not yet resourced, SCEP.

Authority to proceed with coordinating the commitment of personnel and resources in support
of SCEP execution.

Service concurrence to coordinate and commit personnel and resources in support of SCEP
execution.
# Chapter 8 Security Cooperation Planning And Execution Cycle Step 5: Resource Analysis

## Overview

Step 5, Resource Analysis (Figure 8-1), is focused on analyzing, coordinating, and formally requesting resources in support of an SCEP. Once the CCMD approves an SCEP and the Service concurs, the SC planner must identify resources required to effectively execute it. Resources include all required forces, funding, materiel, and training necessary across the lifecycle of an SCEP. Accordingly, resource analysis is a recurring step over the course of a SCEP lifecycle, due to evolving fiscal and manpower prioritization and conditions in the operational environment as well as in accordance with established processes.

Lead The SC planner leads resource analysis in collaboration with other staff members, internal and external, who are SMEs in other disciplines such as fiscal, force management, legal, and operations.

Focus Staff coordination across the command and the larger Marine Corps with respect to relevant process and cycle timelines (e.g., POM, GFM, etc.) and key events (e.g., Force Synch, etc.).

Timeline Sourcing and resourcing require broad consideration of Marine Corps institutional priorities and objectives approximately 18-24 months in advance, with an increased level of commitment as the execution of distinct events and activities nears.

## Inputs


A planned and approved, but not yet resourced, SCEP.

Sourcing and resourcing guiding documents and processes (GFM, POM, MCO 3120. 12 -
Marine Corps GFM and Force Synchronization, MCO 5710. 6 Marine Corps Security
Cooperation, and references provided in Table 8-1: Force Synchronization Systems & Tools.

## Process

Determine Applicable Authorities DOD requires an authority, appropriations, and associated resources (i.e., personnel) to conduct SC activities. A significant consideration for SC planning involves gaining the funding and authority to execute SC activities. Authorities to execute SC activities and the associated appropriations (i.e., funding), are not intrinsically linked. Both authorities and resources for SC vary considerably in scope. Figure 8-2 lists several programs under both Title 10 (DOD) and Title 22 (DOS), and shows how they overlap as DOS appropriations are implemented by DOD. Statutory authorities to conduct SC include multiple titles across US Code (primarily Title 10 and Title 22), as well as temporary authorities in public law. Policies (DODDs, DOD instructions, CJCS
instructions, NAV manuals, MCO, etc.) and execution authorities (Executive orders, Planning orders, etc.) will complement and further refine the processes, procedures, and guidelines for implementing SC authorities that govern the execution of SC activities. Funding sources for SC vary and may be funded through appropriations from Congress to DOD for specific programs, other USG agency appropriations, such as DOS appropriations, or Service operations and maintenance funding streams. Some SC programs, such as FMS and education and training, are paid for by PNs and can be dual-funded or completely US-funded. Security cooperation planners should understand and use the various authorities and associated resources available when planning and executing SC activities as part of an SC plan, to include Title 10 (DOD-focused) and Title 22 (DOS-focused).

Security Cooperation Proposals. Many SC-specific authorities require the development and submission of proposals. Some of these authorities include congressionally-appropriated funds whereas others authorize the expenditure of Service O&M funds. Most proposals must be routed through and approved by the GCC prior to submission to OSD or Joint Staff. Due to the long timelines associated with approval, advanced planning on the part of the SC planner is required to develop a proposal, submit it to the GCC, and receive approval by OSD, Joint Staff, DOS, or Congress. At a minimum, twelve months lead time is required for most SC trainand-equip authorities. Global Force Management. The GFM process enables SecDef to make proactive, risk-informed decisions in order to align forces against known CCDR requirements in advance of planning and deployment preparation timelines. The GFM has a large role in SC plan execution; it is, therefore, vital that the SC planner understand the DOD process to allocate forces to meet CCDR requirements. Most commands do not have forces assigned or require capabilities not resident within assigned forces to support CCDR engagement activities. As such, commands must request forces and resources to execute SC activities through their CCDR to the Joint Staff and the Service Headquarters. The Marine Corps role in GFM is governed by the Marine Corps Force Synchronization process and facilitates the Service's participation in GFM while concurrently enabling force generation and sustainment planning and execution. Under the authority of the Secretary of the Navy, the CMC supports GFM by nominating available Marine Corps units, personnel, equipment, and other resources for employment via respective CCDRs and also approves the allocation of Marine Corps forces in support of Title 10 and other institutional responsibilities (training, service exercises, and experimentation).

Force Synchronization Systems & Tools. In executing the afore mentioned responsibilities, the CMC
directs and employs the Marine Corps Force Synchronization Conferences and Force Management Summits to develop informed force allocation recommendations or decisions. The Force Synchronization process facilitates Service-wide coordination and alignment of force generation actions in support of Title 10 responsibilities, resulting in proper manning, training, and equipping of nominated forces/units for forward deployment and employment. The output from these forums is the release of the Marine Corps Bulletin (MCBUL) 3120. For further guidance, reference MCO 3120.12, Marine Corps GFM and Force Synchronization. Table 8-1 provides a list of additional Force Synchronization Systems and Tools.

System
SIPR/
NIPR
Principal Users
Purpose
JCRM/ LOGBOOK
SIPR
CCDRs, Joint Staff, PP&O, MARFORCOM
Used to register and track CCDR Operations (force) requirements
JOPES
SIPR
Joint Staff,PP&O, MC component commands, MEFs, SE
Used to plan, assign, and track lift requirements through planning, sourcing, and execution of force deployment & redeployment
JTIMS
SIPR
CCDRs, Joint Staff, MC component commands
Used to register CCDR & Joint Exercise requirements and associated sourcing solutions
SIPR
Joint Staff, J-7, Services, USSOCOM
Used to register and track Joint National Training Capability (JNTC) exercise force requests.
JNTC Agreements List
SIPR
CCDRs, MC component commands
Used to register & track SC events
G-TSCMIS, or its follow-on system
Used to register JMD/Joint Individual Augmentee (JIA) requirements
eJMAPS
SIPR
CCDRs, Joint Staff, M&RA, MC component commands
USMC Force Synch Playbook
SIPR
USMC-wide
Used to track all USMC requirements & associated sourcing solutions
JIA Playbook
SIPR
M&RA, MARFORCOM
Used to track USMC JMD/JIA requirements & associated sourcing solutions
Slider
SIPR
USMC-wide
Graphical presentation of employment decisions and effects
MCMPS MRTM
NIPR
M&RA, MARFORCOM
Tracks Marine Corps Individual Augment requirements and sourcing
MCTIMS
NIPR
USMC-wide
Used to develop the units' training plans, training schedules, and record training achievement
LEGEND eJMAPS - electronic Joint Manpower and Personnel System G-TSCMIS - Global-Theater Security Cooperation Management System JCRM - Joint Capabilities Resource Manager JOPES - Joint Operational Planning and Execution System MCMPS - Marine Corps Mobilization Processing System MCTIMS - Marine Corps Training Information Management System MRTM - Manpower Requirements Tracking Module NIPR - Non-secure Internet Protocol Router

SIPR - SECRET Internet Protocol Router. The Reserve Component (RC) fulfills operational and strategic roles for the Marine Corps. As part of the Marine Corps Total Force, the RC is assigned many of the Marine Corps SC requirements. The RC sources pre-planned, rotational, and emergent CCDR and Service requirements across a variety of operations. Statutory authority that directs how RC forces and individuals are to be activated, mobilized, resourced and utilized. If the RC is a force provider, Reservists are activated and mobilized. Generally, Reserve-sourced requirements should be identified approximately 12-months prior to activation date. Security cooperation planners should understand the timelines and requirements to activate RC forces.

Consider Timelines The SC planner must consider timelines to register requirements via appropriate venues or systems (e.g., POM, GFM, Joint Training Information Management Systems [JTIMS], Joint Capabilities Resource Manager [JCRM], etc.). Requested resources must be confirmed prior to the execution of any activity in support of a SCEP. As such, the SC planner should account for resources that can be acquired in the current and subsequent fiscal year, as well as those projections that will require POM and GFM submissions. For the SC planner, resourcing is driven by distinct battle rhythms for sourcing and resourcing, in addition to the execution of individual activities. Additionally, many requests for train-and-equip program resources and authorization to use an authority are on an annual battle rhythm, requiring the SC planner to work with the country team and CCMD to submit program proposals each year in preparation for subsequent fiscal years. Short-notice SC activities often generate emergent requirements that CCDRs cannot effectively staff and source via the GFM process. Under these circumstances, Marine Corps component commands should contact MARFORCOM and CMC PP&O for guidance. This does not alleviate Marine Corps component commands' responsibility for registering the requirements in JCRM. The SC planner must follow through to ensure all aspects of the event are properly tracked and completed.

Conduct Staff Coordination Once applicable authorities and available resources are known to the SC planner, the following staff actions are required in order to resource an SCEP. Some ongoing staff actions will continue from previous steps. Due to long lead times for certain tasks, some additional staff actions must be initiated by the SC planner prior to or immediately upon identification of a supporting unit/team; many of these actions will continue through Planning and Execution Cycle Step 6: Execution. The SC planner is likely not the SME on these matters, but must be proficient enough to coordinate and facilitate the completion of these tasks by appropriate personnel (other staff sections, unit/team assigned to execute an SC event, etc.). Security Cooperation planners shall coordinate SCEP execution preparations with other stakeholders (e.g., SCO, DAT, CCMD Staff, etc.) (Continued from Planning and Execution Cycle Step 4: Solutions Analysis). According to MCO 5710.6, when Marine Corps component commands use forces for SC events, the Marine Corps component commands shall relay this requirement through JCRM, electronic Joint Manpower and Personnel System, JTIMS, or the manpower requirements tracking module to MARFORCOM for registration in the Marine Corps Force Synchronization Playbook (Continues through Planning and Execution Cycle Step 6: Execution). The SC planner may be required to make entries in additional systems or send official correspondence to units/agencies including entry of specific events and activities into the JTIMS, submission of feasibility of support (FOS) or request for forces (RFF) correspondence for requested resources, etc. (Continues through Planning and Execution Cycle Step 6: Execution).

Feasibility of Support. An FOS query is a Joint or Marine Corps request to determine the availability, readiness, and commitment of specified forces or capabilities. The query is used throughout force synchronization and supports capability identification, force analysis, and sourcing solution development. The FOS query can be generated by any Marine Corps command, is typically transmitted via official message traffic, and serves as a means to gather information, but is not directive. Responses, agreements, or information exchanged during FOS staffing actions must be codified via formal submissions to the Joint Staff.

Request for Forces/Request for Capabilities. A request for forces/request for capabilities (RFF/RFC)
is originated by a CCDR or FP for units or capabilities to address requirements that cannot be sourced by the requesting headquarters. The request is generated because (either) the unit or capability is not resident in existing assigned or allocated forces or the unit or capability is not available due to current force commitments with other ongoing requirements in the CCDR's AOR. RFFs are not used to request forces for exercises or individual requirements. Further details regarding FOS queries and RFF/RFCs can be found in MCO 3120. 12 Marine Corps GFM and Force Synchronization. Security cooperation planners shall identify mitigation options and provide alternate recommendations (e.g., available resources from other DOD entities, the DOS, nongovernmental organizations [NGOs], etc.) in the event requested resources are denied or unavailable (continues through Planning and Execution Cycle Step 6: Execution). Security cooperation planners must be prepared to make initial event entries into SC authoritative databases, for all planned SC events involving Marine Corps personnel (continues through Planning and Execution Cycle Step 6: Execution). Security cooperation planners must be prepared to conduct detailed coordination with the country team (continues through Planning and Execution Cycle Step 6: Execution). Security cooperation planners must be prepared to facilitate the required training, equipping, and preparation of a unit/team assigned to execute an SC event (e.g., acquiring the necessary travel documentation such as visas and passports, immunizations, and proper travel authorities [verification of status protection, country/theater entry approval], etc.) (Continues through Planning and Execution Cycle Step 6: Execution). Security cooperation planners must be prepared to provide foreign disclosure guidance and facilitate requests between units/teams (once assigned) and foreign disclosure officers (FDOs) (continues through Planning and Execution Cycle Step 6: Execution). Security cooperation planners must be prepared to assist in the facilitation of the translation of training materials to be used by units/teams (once assigned) (continues through Planning and Execution Cycle Step 6: Execution).


Submitted POM or SC authority proposal in support of SC events from an approved SCEP.

Submitted GFM Playbook or Feasibility of Support message traffic in support of SC events
from an approved SCEP.

Generated RFF/RFC message traffic in support of SC events from an approved SCEP.

Identified resourcing gaps with recommended mitigations/alternate solutions.

Resourced (fully or partially) SCEP.

## Chapter 9 Security Cooperation Planning And Execution Cycle Step 6: Execution Overview

Step 6 of the SCPEC (Figure 9-1) is a feedback loop of execution and assessment concluding with closeout actions, as appropriate. The SC planner must effectively manage, coordinate, and synchronize SCEP activities with stakeholders and force providers. This will require the SC planner to maintain lines of communication with not only stakeholders and force providers, but also with assigned units/teams and FSF leadership, as appropriate.

Lead The SC planner is responsible for the overall execution of the SCEP, ensuring long-term support from stakeholders, conducting constant coordination across the command and higher headquarters staff(s), and ensuring the teams assigned to execute the events are adequately informed, resourced, conducting activities in the proper sequence, and providing meaningful feedback.

Focus On the progress of the SCEP (Marine Corps actions) as well as on the progression of the FSF (FSF fulfillment of the DSR).

Timeline An SCEPs is generally designed to span 2-5 years; the duration of the execution step should correspond accordingly, but is subject to political-military changes, funding availability, policy restrictions, etc.

## Inputs


Resourced (fully or partially) SCEP.

CCMD authority to execute in accordance with the approved SCEP.

Service concurrence to execute in accordance with the approved SCEP.

## Process

Continuous Stakeholder Coordination SCEP Execution requires continual monitoring of stakeholder objectives, as a change in stakeholder's position can have an effect on the SCEP. Coordination with other Marine Corps entities (such as supporting establishment or other Marine forces), maritime component staff, defense agencies, DOS, adjacent joint, interagency, allied and partner units that are engaging with the same FSF is critical to ensure all activities are aligned and synchronized in order to avoid duplication of effort with the same FSF. Duplication of effort could disproportionately burden the FSF, create information gaps or over-saturation, and waste resources. The SC planner must also recognize that the operational environment can rapidly change due to multiple factors, such as the political climate, US objectives, etc. Changes in the operational environment will also affect the SCEP, its execution, and possibly the desired capability and/or capacity of the FSF. As appropriate, the SC planner should incorporate activities conducted by other stakeholders into the SCEP to support MOP/MOE collection, provide additional indicators and milestones, and to achieve unity of effort. In some cases, given the level of engagement from other stakeholders, it may be necessary to adjust and refine the SCEP in both scale and scope. If additional FSF or PN activities are conducted by another Marine Corps entity, such as a KLE or exercise, the SC planner should participate in the planning for those events to ensure that actions taken align with the DSR. The SC planner can provide subject matter expertise on what types of activities support the DSR and will be supportable and sustainable for a given FSF.

Conduct Continuous Staff Coordination The SC planner owns the SCEP and is responsible for facilitating the development of FSF to meet a DSR in order to satisfy US and Service objectives. The SC planner should be aware of all SC activities conducted with the FSF to ensure appropriate deconfliction, coordination, and synchronization of efforts and outcomes. This is achieved through continuous staff coordination and actions that include, but are not limited to, the following:


Coordinate SCEP event execution preparations with other stakeholders (e.g., SCO, DAT,
CCMD Staff, etc.) (continued from Planning and Execution Cycle Steps 4 and 5).

According to MCO 5710. 6, when Marine Corps component commands employ forces for SC
events, the Marine Corps component commands shall relay this requirement through JCRM, electronic Joint Manpower and Personnel System, JTIMS, or the manpower requirements tracking module to MARFORCOM for registration in the Marine Corps Force Synchronization Playbook (continued from Planning and Execution Cycle Step 5: Resource Analysis).

Maintain electronic and administrative correspondence with all involved units and agencies,
adjusting and tracking throughout the lifecycle of the SC plan:

Record events, activities, progress, and feedback in the JTIMS and SC authoritative database

Track FOS and RFF resource requests (continued from Planning and Execution Cycle Step 5: Resource Analysis)

Record plan adjustments as support and SME requirements change (e.g., the FSF has progressed from needing training in rifle marksmanship to requiring capacity to develop a marksmanship schoolhouse).

Further details regarding FOS queries and RFF/RFCs can be found in the previous chapter as well as in MCO 3120.12 *Marine Corps GFM and Force Synchronization*.

Identify mitigation options and provide alternate recommendations (e.g., available resources
from other DOD entities, the DOS, NGOs, etc.) in the event requested resources are denied or unavailable (continued from Planning and Execution Cycle Step 5: Resource Analysis).

Conduct detailed coordination with the Country Team (continued from Planning and Execution
Cycle Step 5: Resource Analysis).

Monitor and report progress of the FSF's ability to achieve the DSR and be prepared to
recommend and seek approval from the commander for any significant changes to the SCEP based on analysis of FSF progress (analysis of assessments, monitoring and evaluations), changes in stakeholder objectives, or other operational environmental changes. Ensure these approved modifications are socialized among all stakeholders.
Conduct Continuous Unit/Team-Level Coordination The SC planner provides continuity as rotational units/teams execute one or more SC events on a given SCEP. However, because the SC planner will not necessarily be in-country during all SC events, awareness must be maintained via a robust relationship and a strong two-way feedback loop between the SC planner and the assigned units/teams. This is achieved through continuous staff coordination and supporting actions including, but not limited to, the following:


Inform assigned units/teams of all SCEP, theater, and FMF requirements well in advance of
programmed deployments to facilitate pre-deployment planning and training of assigned units (e.g., acquiring the necessary travel documentation such as visas and passports,
immunizations, and proper travel authorities [verification of status protection, country/theater
entry approval], etc.) (continued from Planning and Execution Cycle Step 5: Resource Analysis).

Ensure forces assigned to execute understand the current progress of the FSF and the desired
end-state of assigned SC events.

Utilize SC Event Cards to define mission requirements of the assigned SC event(s) and provide
them to units/teams to guide follow-on detailed planning. Only in this manner can the providing unit build a PTP that ensures the tasked unit is trained to accomplish the mission and is provided ample operational environment information to develop a plan to work with an FSF unit in concert with achieving their DSR.

Ensure units/teams assigned to execute are aware of existing MOPs and MOEs and are
provided pre- and post-event assessment criteria. For example, approved PECLs should be provided to units/teams in accordance with the focus of the assigned SC event. PECLs utilized during SC events should be drawn from the PECLs refined following the FSF Unit-Level Assessment; however, only a portion of that collection of PECLs may be relevant to a single SC event. The group of PECLs provided to a unit/team executing an SC event should be scoped accordingly.

Review and approve, as required, for FSF training packages developed by assigned units/teams
to ensure they are nested within the DSR, designed to achieve specific FSF standards, and have undergone foreign disclosure and technology transfer reviews. Assigned units/teams should utilize the ADDIE process during execution and should leverage NAVMC 1553.1 Marine
Corps Instructional Systems Design / Systems Approach to Training and Education Handbook to learn more about UTM. The MCISD/SATE process governs Marine Corps UTM and can be used to guide standards-based training and education to plan effective FSF engagements.

Security cooperation planners maintain awareness of FSF training packages and collect/review
completed PECLs, AARs, etc. developed by the assigned unit/team for consideration during follow-on planning, assessment, and execution. Ensure units/teams assigned to execute provide substantive feedback that facilitates the modification of existing or development of new followon SC events through adjustments to the SCEP. Figure 9-2 below describes what Marine advisors should expect from component command planners, and what Marine advisors should provide back.

| MARFOR to Advisors                        | Advisors to MARFOR                      |
|-------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------|
| Assignment of the right people to advise  |                                         |
| Conduct a Predeployment Training          |                                         |
| Program (PTP) for advisors, trainers, and |                                         |
|                                           | those who support/interact with Foreign |
|                                           | Security Force (FSF)                    |
| Proficiency in the System Approach to     |                                         |
|                                           | Training and Evaluation Process         |
| (SATE-P) and how to apply to FSF          |                                         |
| Desired Security Role (DSR)               |                                         |
| Event Card/s (Mission)                    |                                         |
| Access to all assessments                 |                                         |
| Access to previous evaluations            |                                         |
|                                           | and assessments                         |
| Resources                                 |                                         |
| Reach back support                        |                                         |
| Ability to talk to outgoing team          |                                         |
| Predeployment Site Survey (PDSS)          |                                         |

Assess Progress Based on the SC planner's recommendations, the commander provides guidance and direction as to when assessments of the FSF or SCEP will occur, who will conduct the assessments, and their scope. Assessing mission progress is a regular part of operations, but also should be scheduled as part of the battle rhythm of the executing unit. Assessments must not conflict with the operational culture of the FSF. For example, evaluating a predominately Muslim FSF during Ramadan would be inappropriate. If quality work goes into assessing, monitoring, and evaluating activities over the lifecycle of a SCEP, decision makers (e.g., component commanders, CCDRs, etc.) will be well-informed and able to make appropriate risk decisions regarding SC in support of a given PN. Therefore, the SC planner must consistently monitor SCEP activities, assess the effectiveness of SCEP execution, and evaluate and report progress of both the SCEP (administratively) and the FSF (operationally). Security cooperation planners are responsible for gathering meaningful quantitative and qualitative data from assigned unit/team after-action reports. Without this data, FSF progression cannot be measured effectively. Every time a unit/team works with FSF, the command should be assured the FSF is progressing towards achieving the DSR. Each rotation of Marine forces will provide evaluations of the FSF and a summary assessment. These summary assessments, or AARs, should be honest and candid in terms of the FSF's willingness to perform the DSR. Marine Corps SC AARs should move away from predominately discussing PTP requirements, living conditions, passports, etc., and more toward actions taken toward completing the mission of the unit/team.

Develop Interim Progress Reports.

Security cooperation planners develop interim progress reports (IPRs) to summarize and assess the progress of the SCEP and determine whether programmatic milestones for the FSF are achieved within anticipated timeframes and budgets. The IPRs are critical during execution to monitor FSF progress, inform stakeholders, and recommend potential course adjustments. They also ensure planned activities are synchronized and that the plan still supports accomplishing US or Service objectives. Considerations regarding IPRs include the following:


The IPR informs decision makers, particularly with regard to resource allocation or reallocation as required to adjust planned SC plan activities, and the composition and frequency of SC activities (e.g., employing quarterly MTTs instead of monthly SMEEs).

Security cooperation planners are responsible for scheduling IPRs throughout the lifecycle of a
SCEP. The IPRs are intended to inform commanders, the US Embassy Team, CCMD staff, HQMC, and other stakeholders.

The IPRs should occur yearly, or as required by the component or CCMD commander. In some
cases an IPR may be conducted to collect information to inform lawmakers of expenditures incurred against FSF progress. The IPRs are critical to the success of a SCEP and are incorporated into the plan during Planning and Execution Cycle: Steps 2-4.

Marine attaches can be a useful resource for current FSF capabilities. If permitted, SC planners
should interface regularly with available attaches for countries with SCEPs. However, there is no command relationship between attaches and SC planners. Attaches, in creating intelligence
reports, generate information that could inform the MARFOR SC planner. Additionally, an SC planner should inform the attache, if able, on ongoing SCEP status.


See Appendix D for further information on developing an IPR.

Develop Closeout Report A Closeout Report, developed by the SC planner, is a comprehensive report of all activities conducted in support of the SC plan, as well as all FSF assessments, monitoring, and evaluation. It should encapsulate every action and dollar spent to build FSF capability. The component command can use this report to keep the CCMD, DOD, and civilian government informed. Since the SC planner is not on the ground advising or training the FSF on a daily basis, accurate input from assigned units/teams executing SC events is critical. A Closeout Report is required once an FSF unit achieves the DSR or when the component command (or higher echelon of command) deems it necessary to curtail its engagements with the FSF in light of changes in the operational environment. At a minimum, a Closeout Report contains the following:


Executive Summary - A short, succinct summary (1-2 pages) of all actions executed.

Background - A detailed explanation of all actions taken during the execution of the SCEP.

Milestone Achievements - A listing and explanations of all designated milestones and what
was or was not accomplished and why.

Resource Management

How forces were utilized - A summary of the number of rotations, force type (MTT, SC Team, SPMAGTF, Army, Navy, etc.), force strength (numbers), and structure (ranks).

Equipment delivered - Foreign Military Sales (FMS), Direct Commercial Sales (DSC), Excess Defense Articles (EDA), etc.

Programs utilized - IMET, Foreign Exchange, or any other established programs.

Fiscal Accounting - A complete listing of the cost of all resources expended; estimated cost
versus actual cost must be represented.

Closeout Status - An explanation of the current status of the FSF and how the development and
employment of the capability transitioned from US to FSF. This section should include the capability developed, the degree to which it was developed, and the projected ability of the FSF to sustain the capability. Security cooperation planners should be prepared to make recommendations regarding follow-on SC activities or involvement with the PN.

Enclosures: The initial assessment summary (CCMD), the component-level assessment, the
unit-level FSF assessment, higher-level supporting guidance, all components of the SCEP, all FSF evaluations; IPRs; and rotational unit AARs.
A complete and approved closeout report.

## Planning And Execution Cycle Summary

During the final step of the SCPEC, the SC planner conducts final coordination and assessment to facilitate and measure progress through the execution phase of the SCEP. A Closeout Report is generated once the FSF achieve the DSR or when the component command (or higher echelon of command) deems it necessary to curtail its FSF engagements in light of changes in the operational environment. Figure 9-3 shows the entire SC Planning and Execution Cycle, as detailed in Chapters 4-9. This figure provides a comprehensive depiction of all the steps associated with planning, executing, and adjusting SC activities over time. Security cooperation planning and execution is a dynamic cycle; an SC plan must be continuously assessed and modified as conditions change. The SC Planning and Execution Cycle ensures the USMC can identify and articulate how Marine Corps SC activities are contributing to US objectives advancement by developing FSF capabilities to achieve a DSR.

## Appendix A Security Cooperation Activities And Enablers Overview

This section outlines a variety of SC activities (to include authorities, programs, funding streams, etc.) available to the DOD and Marine Corps to help achieve US objectives. The following sections do not include an exhaustive list of SC activities or SC planning considerations, but highlights those most commonly used by the Marine Corps.

## Security Cooperation Activities

Figure A-1 provides examples of the types of SC activities that can be conducted at each level in the pyramid to gain access and build relationships and FSF capability and capacity. Combined, the pyramids in Chapter 1 (Figure 1-3) and Figure A-1 below can inform SC planners about the types of SC activities at each level in the pyramid. As we build a partner's capability or capacity, the types of SC activities conducted become more complex, and they must be sustained and remain consistent over time to realize their full potential in fulfilling the requirements of a DSR. For additional information and an exhaustive list of SC activities, reference the Security Assistance Management Manual and the DISCS program handbook available online. Figure A-2 provides a snapshot of activities considered security cooperation. These activities are discussed in further detail in this section. The list in Figure A-2 is not exhaustive, but rather demonstrates the depth and breadth of the types of activities that fall under or relate to SC. The list of possible activities will be expounded upon throughout the chapter.

##  Security Cooperation Activities

- Multilateral exercises. - Combat advising (advise and assist teams). - Mobile training teams. - Information and intelligence sharing. - Foreign military sales. - International military students attending USMC
courses.
- Train and equip programs. - Personnel exchange programs personnel. - Key leader engagements. - International armaments cooperation.
The subsequent sections and tables describe and define SC activities commonly used by the Marine Corps and groups them into specific categories. These categories are the core types of SC activities outlined in Chapter 16, Title 10, US Code, and they provide an organizing construct to demonstrate different types of activities. This chapter contains the core DOD authorities for conducting SC, under the following categories: military-to-military contacts; personnel exchanges; combined exercises and training; train-and-equip/provision of defense articles; defense institution building; operational support; education and training; international armaments cooperation; and support to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

Military-to-Military Contacts Military-to-military (mil-to-mil) contacts are a group of authorities allowing the DOD to conduct SC activities. These authorities are primarily contained under Chapter 16, Title 10, US Code; Title 22, US Code (Security Assistance); and through annual authorization acts, such as the NDAA. By statute, some of these activities are required to be exercised in coordination with the Secretary of State. These programs vary greatly in terms of the agency or DOD activity responsible and the manner in which they are planned for and funded. Table A-1 outlines some key mil-to-mil activities conducted by the Marine Corps.

| Mil-to-Mil Activity                                                                                 | Definition                                                                                   |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Staff Talks                                                                                         | Serve as important venues to improve interoperability and operational effectiveness with key |
| allies and partners. Staff talks focus at the strategic and institutional levels and are the senior |                                                                                              |
| engagement forum for discussing the breadth of matters covered under Marine Corps Title             |                                                                                              |
| 10 responsibilities. Participants discuss shared interests in weapons systems, programs,            |                                                                                              |
| training, personnel, interoperability, information, strategy, and solutions to common interests.    |                                                                                              |
| The talks provide an opportunity to achieve a degree of intensity and depth that is not always      |                                                                                              |
| obtained in other fora, as well as focus on organize, train, and equip issues unique to the         |                                                                                              |
| institution. Bilateral talks are periodically conducted with the Australian Army, French Army,      |                                                                                              |
| Israel Defense Force, Japanese Self-Defense Force, and Republic of Korea Marine Corps.              |                                                                                              |
| Tri-lateral Staff Talks are conducted with the UK Royal Marines and the Netherlands Royal           |                                                                                              |
| Marines. The level of participation depends on the partner. Service-level staff talks are led by    |                                                                                              |
| HQMC PP&O PLU with participation from other HQ elements, supporting establishment, and              |                                                                                              |
| operating forces. MARFORs are able to conduct their own staff talks with partners; however,         |                                                                                              |
| they are not authorized to commit the resources of the Marine Corps, conclude international         |                                                                                              |
| agreements, or advocate on behalf of Service programs.                                              |                                                                                              |
| Senior Leader Visits                                                                                | Provide the Service's executive leadership (O7-level and higher), with the opportunity to    |
| engage with and impact the attitudes of key foreign military or security leaders. Conducting        |                                                                                              |
| senior leader visits is not about engaging key leaders when a crisis arises, but rather about       |                                                                                              |
| building relationships over time with enough strength and depth such that they can then sup-        |                                                                                              |
| port Marine Corps interests during crises. A deliberate approach to planning and assess-            |                                                                                              |
| ment is necessary to ensure that whenever the Service's executive leaders meet with foreign         |                                                                                              |
| counterparts, they are delivering an effective, consistent message that supports the organi-        |                                                                                              |
| zation's goals. Senior leader visits occur throughout the Service, to include HQMC, support-        |                                                                                              |
| ing establishment, and operating forces, and they can be requested by the partner or the            |                                                                                              |
| Marine Corps.                                                                                       |                                                                                              |
| Mil-to-Mil Activity                                                                              | Definition                                                                                  |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Other Staff Visits                                                                               | Afford supporting staff sections and organizations the opportunity to engage with foreign   |
| counterparts in order to build relationships that will advance Marine Corps interests. These     |                                                                                             |
| visits are often more narrow in scope and focused on specific institutional, operational, or     |                                                                                             |
| technical issues. More broadly, they can serve to strengthen the Marine Corps overall rela-      |                                                                                             |
| tionship with a given partner or provide a forum to collaborate on potential future mil-to-mil   |                                                                                             |
| engagements that are of value to the Service. Lastly, these visits can achieve strategic         |                                                                                             |
| effects by demonstrating the superiority of a professionally trained and led military force      |                                                                                             |
| thereby balancing against the influence of our adversaries. Staff visits can be requested by     |                                                                                             |
| the PN or the Marine Corps and occur throughout the Service, to include HQMC, supporting         |                                                                                             |
| establishment, and operating forces, and typically occur at the O6 level and below.              |                                                                                             |
| Official CMC                                                                                     |                                                                                             |
| Counterpart Visits                                                                               |                                                                                             |
| Specifically authorized in Title 10, US Code, to support "international relations" and "maintain |                                                                                             |
| the standing and prestige of the United States" Official counterpart visits establish or         |                                                                                             |
| enhance relationships between senior leaders in order to positively influence key foreign        |                                                                                             |
| counterparts in support of DOD and Marine Corps objectives.                                      |                                                                                             |
| -                                                                                                | These visits are initiated with a formal invitation from the CMC to a counterpart leader of |
| a PN service. The invitation is for the counterpart and may also include the counterpart's       |                                                                                             |
| spouse and up to two aides or staff members.                                                     |                                                                                             |
| -                                                                                                | Marine Corps pays all costs for the visit, except transportation to and from CONUS.         |
| -                                                                                                | The lead for these visits is the Commandant's Special Projects Directorate, with support    |
| from PP&O/PLU, CMC Protocol, Marine Barracks Washington, and Marine Corps                        |                                                                                             |
| organizations and installations visited.                                                         |                                                                                             |
| -                                                                                                | There is approximately one visit per quarter. The PNs are selected by CMC, based on         |
| current international engagement priorities and recommendations compiled by HQMC                 |                                                                                             |
| PP&O PLU.                                                                                        |                                                                                             |

Personnel Exchanges Personnel exchanges are authorized in Title 10 and include the numerous agreements with allies and partners that allow for the exchange or assignment of foreign personnel in US defense establishments and for the corresponding exchange or assignment of US personnel in foreign defense establishments. Reference Chapter 1 of this publication for additional information on exchange programs utilized by the Marine Corps.

Combined Exercises and Training Combined exercises and training include bilateral or multilateral exercises or training of US forces in tandem with PN forces (JP 3-20). Combined exercises and training should focus on enhancing or maintaining Marine Corps readiness against Marine Corps unit mission essential tasks, and is an opportunity to measure an FSF unit's current capabilities and progress toward a stated objective. The DOD has specific authorities to conduct combined exercises and training established in the NDAA.

Train-and-Equip/Provide Defense Articles, Training, and Services The DOD has many authorities and appropriations to deliver defense articles, services, and training to partners. This category also includes SA programs. Table A-2 describes many of these programs in detail.

| Train-and-Equip Activity                                                                          | Definition                                                                                     |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Pseudo Foreign Military                                                                           |                                                                                                |
| Sales                                                                                             |                                                                                                |
| Pseudo FMS is the process by which the USG provides and tracks defense articles and ser-          |                                                                                                |
| vices (to include training and design and construction services) that are funded with US gov-     |                                                                                                |
| ernment appropriations. These programs enable the DOD to train-and-equip partners for the         |                                                                                                |
| purpose of building the FSF's capabilities to conduct counterterrorism, counter drug,             |                                                                                                |
| counter-weapons of mass destruction, counter-transnational organized crime, maritime and          |                                                                                                |
| border security, and military intelligence operations, or to support operations that contribute   |                                                                                                |
| to an international coalition, among other capability areas. These activities utilize the author- |                                                                                                |
| ities provided to the DOD under Title 10, or via the annual National Defense Authorization        |                                                                                                |
| Act (e.g., Iraq Train-and-Equip Fund). The DOD leverages the FMS process, to include initi-       |                                                                                                |
| ating Letters of Office and Acceptance (LOAs), to procure the defense articles and services       |                                                                                                |
| to build the capabilities of partners under specific authorities. The pseudo-LOA itemizes the     |                                                                                                |
| defense articles and services included in the letter of request from the CCMD or security         |                                                                                                |
| cooperation organization (SCO). The pseudo-LOA is not signed by the PN, except for trans-         |                                                                                                |
| fers under the Foreign Assistance Act, Section 607. These pseudo-LOAs are commonly                |                                                                                                |
| referred to as "pseudo cases." Often, to refer to these pseudo-LOAs, the SC enterprise will       |                                                                                                |
| use the term "Building Partner Capacity (BPC)" to refer to the group of train-and-equip pro-      |                                                                                                |
| grams funded with US government appropriations that leverage the FMS process. However,            |                                                                                                |
| BPC is not necessarily a doctrinal term. The terms "BPC programs," "pseudo-FMS" and               |                                                                                                |
| "train-and-equip programs" are often used interchangeably across the DoD.                         | The Marine                                                                                     |
| Corps uses the terms "train-and-equip programs," or "pseudo-FMS programs."                        |                                                                                                |
| Security Force Assistance                                                                         | Security Force Assistance includes "the DOD activities that support the development of the     |
| capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions (JP 3-20)."  |                                                                                                |
| The DOD utilizes SFA activities to shape the OE or assist a PN in defending against internal/     |                                                                                                |
| transnational threats to security or stability. SFA also contributes to DOD's role in USG         |                                                                                                |
| efforts to support PN security sector reform, whether through routine SC activities or in sup-    |                                                                                                |
| port of a foreign internal defense (FID) operation. For additional information, reference         |                                                                                                |
| Appendix B of JP 3-20.                                                                            |                                                                                                |
| Defense Institution Building                                                                      | DIB is defined as SC activities conducted to establish or reform the capacity and capabilities |
| of a PN's defense institutions at the ministerial/department, military staff, and service head-   |                                                                                                |
| quarters levels (JP 3-20,                                                                         | Security Cooperation                                                                           |
| institutional and ministerial levels. Additionally, DIB activities are primarily conducted by DOD |                                                                                                |
| civilians and field-grade officers/senior enlisted uniformed members. In general, DIB activi-     |                                                                                                |
| ties should complement other strategic activities (e.g., Security Sector Reform) as well as       |                                                                                                |
| operational and tactical SC activities. Some authorities require complementary institutional      |                                                                                                |
| capacity-building programs to sustain other operational or tactical capabilities the US has       |                                                                                                |
| provided to a partner. Currently, OSD manages existing DIB programs that leverage civilian        |                                                                                                |
| and contracted expertise to engage with partners' defense and security institutions (e.g.,        |                                                                                                |
| Defense Government and Management Team, Ministry of Defense Advisor (MoDA) Pro-                   |                                                                                                |
| gram, Wales Initiative Fund, Defense Institution of International Legal Studies). For addi-       |                                                                                                |
| tional information on DIB, reference JP 3-20,                                                     | Security Cooperation                                                                           |
| Defense Institution Building.                                                                     |                                                                                                |

Operational Support Operational Support enables the DOD to assist allies and partners in the context of specifically designated operations. This support may include:


logistical support, supplies, and services;

equipment loans to enhance capabilities and interoperability;

specialized training; and

small-scale construction to enable countries to participate or continue participating in
designated operations.
Education Education opportunities enable partners to attend and participate in US Service academies, senior military colleges, special programs such as the Air Force's Aviation Leadership Program, and targeted education programs at public and private universities.

| Term                                                                                             | Definition                                                                             |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| IMET                                                                                             | See Table A-5.                                                                         |
| Regional Centers                                                                                 |                                                                                        |
| for Security Studies                                                                             |                                                                                        |
| Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) oversees five regional centers for security           |                                                                                        |
| studies that offer multilateral training, education, seminars, and networking discussions. Typ-  |                                                                                        |
| ically, the curriculum is focused at the executive level, on discussing security issues inherent |                                                                                        |
| to a particular region. The regional centers are authorized under Title 10, US Code.             |                                                                                        |
| The five regional centers are:                                                                   |                                                                                        |
| -                                                                                                | George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies; Garmisch, Germany, est.       |
| 1993                                                                                             |                                                                                        |
| -                                                                                                | Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies; Honolulu, Hawaii, est. 1995 |
| -                                                                                                | William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies; Washington, D.C., est. 1997   |
| -                                                                                                | Africa Center for Strategic Studies; Washington, D.C., est. 1999                       |
| -                                                                                                | Near East-South Asia Center for Strategic Studies; Washington, D.C., est. 2000         |

International Armaments Cooperation The International Armaments Cooperation (IAC) represents defense-related international research, development, production, and support SC activities involving cooperation between the US Government and the governments, industries, and academic institutions of allies and partners to directly support warfighting capability requirements for existing coalitions (e.g., NATO).

International Armaments Cooperation Activity
Definition
Foreign Comparative Testing
The foreign comparative testing (FCT) program is an acquisition program authorized by Congress in 1980 by Title 10, US Code, Section 2350a(g). Projects are nominated annually by the Secretary of Defense. The purpose of the FCT Program is to test and evaluate foreign non-developmental defense equipment to determine whether such equipment can satisfy the Services' requirements. The FCT funding is used for the testing and evaluation of foreign non-developmental items that have the potential to meet warfighter requirements. After successful comparative testing, the Service will typically procure that foreign materiel. MAR-
CORSYSCOM-IP manages the FCT program for the Marine Corps. The FCT program provides R&D funding to the Service; enables rapid fielding of emerging technologies; eliminates unnecessary duplication of RDT&E; reduces life cycle and procurement costs; enhances standardization and interoperability; promotes competition by qualifying alternative sources; and improves the US defense industrial base.
Acquisition and Cross- Servicing Agreements
Acquisition and cross-servicing agreements (ACSAs) enable the DOD to acquire logistics support, supplies, and services directly from a PN or international organization, or enable the US to provide that support to a PN or international organization. ACSAs can be used in support of operations, combined exercises, training, deployments, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations, certain peace operations under the UN Charter, etc. ACSAs are primarily exercised by the CCMDs or MARFORs and serve as an important tool to facilitate logistics support and services.


Usually, there must be a cross-servicing agreement and implementing arrangements,
negotiated in accordance with DOD Directive 2010.9, Acquisition and Cross-Servicing
Agreements.

ACSAs must primarily benefit the interest of DOD forward-deployed forces; they are not
a grant program. Acquisitions or transfers must be either in cash, replacement-in-kind, or exchange of supplies or services of equal value in support of the operational needs of US forces. ACSAs should not be used to increase inventories, nor can DOD use them when the desired materiel or service is reasonably available from US commercial sources. Most importantly, DOD acquisition personnel must ensure ACSAs are not used as a routine source of supply for a PN.

DOD Directive 2010.9, *Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements* and CJCSI
2120.01D, *Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements*, provide complete details on responsibilities and procedures for acquiring and transferring logistics support, supplies, and services under the authority of Sections 2341 and 2342 of Title 10, US Code.

ACSAs are executed by the authorized points of contacts contained in the individual
cross-servicing agreements with a partner. Personnel authorized to request services and execute ACSAs must be trained and authorized by letter.

International Armaments Cooperation Activity
Definition
Cooperative Research
Cooperative agreements facilitate cooperative research and development of technologies with allies and partners to support interoperability and leverage shared resources. DODD 5000.1, *The Defense Acquisition System* and DODI 5000.02, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System highlight that a cooperative development program with one or more PNs
is preferred over a new, unique Joint or agency development program. Navy International Programs Office (NIPO) is responsible for negotiating international agreements to facilitate cooperative RDT&E.
Information and Data Exchanges
The DOD Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) Information Exchange Program (IEP) is the primary, but not exclusive, means for DOD RDT&E information exchange taking place under bilateral and multilateral international agreements. This program is governed by DOD Instruction 2015 4, *Defense RDT&E IEP*. The United States and
its allied or PNs conduct RDT&E information exchange through IEP annexes to IEP agreements. RDT&E IEP primary goals include facilitating closer alliances, integrating US and PN technological capabilities, and improving interoperability and standardization across multinational forces. Navy International Programs Office (NIPO) is responsible for negotiating IEP annexes to facilitate the exchange of RDT&E information, including Classified Military Information (CMI), in a specific technology or scientific area with allied and friendly nations. In general, these annexes are valid for a period of five years and are renewable.

Security Cooperation Support To Humanitarian Assistance And Disaster Relief There are multiple programs and authorizations enabling the DOD to provide overseas humanitarian, disaster, and civic aid, primarily to provide for transportation, supplies, training, education, equipping, and limited construction to enable our partners to deliver humanitarian assistance and essential services to their civilian populations. In general, DSCA oversees and manages these funds and programs, funded through the Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid Appropriation (OHDACA).

Security Assistance This section outlines SA activities that SC planners and the Marine Corps can utilize and leverage to achieve DOD objectives. Table A-5 is not an exhaustive list of SA activities. As a subset of SC, SA includes the group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, and other related statutes by which the US Government provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, lease, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives; and those that are funded and authorized through the DOS to be administered by DoD/DSCA are considered part of SC (JP 3-20). These programs enable, enhance, and complement other SC activities, multinational interoperability, and support SFA, because these programs allow DOD to provide and sell FSFs training, defense articles, and defense services.

| Term                                                                                             | Definition                                                                         |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Foreign Military Sales                                                                           |                                                                                    |
| (FMS)                                                                                            |                                                                                    |
| Sales programs that require agreements/contracts between the US Government and an                |                                                                                    |
| authorized recipient government or international organization. The FMS program provides          |                                                                                    |
| the recipient current stocks or new procurements under DOD managed contracts, regardless         |                                                                                    |
| of the source of financing (JP 3-20). The program is non-appropriated, and is authorized by      |                                                                                    |
| the Arms Export Control Act, through which eligible foreign governments purchase defense         |                                                                                    |
| articles, services, education, and training from the US Government. The purchasing govern-       |                                                                                    |
| ment pays all costs associated with a sale. An FMS is conducted on the basis of a signed         |                                                                                    |
| government-to government agreement between the US and a foreign government, known as             |                                                                                    |
| a Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA). Each LOA is commonly referred to as a "case" and         |                                                                                    |
| is assigned a unique case identifier for accounting and reporting purposes. The FMS pro-         |                                                                                    |
| gram builds military-to-military relationships, promotes coalition building, enables interopera- |                                                                                    |
| bility, increases the number of systems and parts being produced to drive down DOD costs,        |                                                                                    |
| and benefits US industry.                                                                        |                                                                                    |
| -                                                                                                | Training provided under FMS can include education or training in US formal schools |
| (professional military education and technical skills training), contractor-provided             |                                                                                    |
| training, or deployed training assistance such as that provided by mobile training teams.        |                                                                                    |
| The Marine Corps lead for coordinating formal schoolhouse training and education for             |                                                                                    |
| international students under FMS is MCSCG.                                                       |                                                                                    |
| -                                                                                                | The Marine Corps Systems Command International Programs Office                     |
| (MARCORSYSCOM-IP) is the Marine Corps lead for the sale, lease, or transfer of                   |                                                                                    |
| ground defense articles, information technology systems and associated support.                  |                                                                                    |
| MARCORSYSCOM-IP develops FMS cases following the DOD policy for a "Total                         |                                                                                    |
| Package Approach" which includes all needed support items, training, technical                   |                                                                                    |
| assistance, initial support, ammunition, and any follow-on support from US government            |                                                                                    |
| or US government contractors required to introduce and operationally sustain major               |                                                                                    |
| items of equipment or systems.                                                                   |                                                                                    |
| Foreign Military Financing                                                                       |                                                                                    |
| (FMF)                                                                                            |                                                                                    |
| Through grants or loans, foreign military financing provides USG financing to friendly foreign   |                                                                                    |
| countries or international organizations for the purchase of defense articles, services, and     |                                                                                    |
| training either through FMS or direct commercial sales. The program is governed by the           |                                                                                    |
| Arms Export Control Act.                                                                         |                                                                                    |
| International Military                                                                           |                                                                                    |
| Education and Training                                                                           |                                                                                    |
| (IMET)                                                                                           |                                                                                    |
| Formal or informal instruction provided to foreign military students, units, and forces on a     |                                                                                    |
| non-reimbursable (grant) basis by offices or employees of the United States, contract techni-    |                                                                                    |
| cians, and contractors, instruction may include correspondence courses; technical, educa-        |                                                                                    |
| tional, or informational publications; and media of all kinds (JP 3-20). Funding for IMET is     |                                                                                    |
| congressionally appropriated, based on requested DOS allocations, by country. DSCA man-          |                                                                                    |
| ages and issues the IMET funds to the Military Departments, who disperse the funds to indi-      |                                                                                    |
| vidual countries or courses on behalf of the Services. The education and training is typically   |                                                                                    |
| provided in US military schools or aboard US installations, but may include deployed training    |                                                                                    |
| assistance such as that provided by mobile training teams or mobile education teams, sub-        |                                                                                    |
| ject to appropriate waiver approval. The Marine Corps lead for coordinating education and        |                                                                                    |
| training of internationals students under IMET is MCSCG.                                         |                                                                                    |
| Term                                                                                            | Definition                                                                                      |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Excess Defense Articles                                                                         | Defense articles no longer needed by DOD or United States Coast Guard are declared              |
| excess. This excess equipment may be offered at a reduced cost, or at no cost, to eligible      |                                                                                                 |
| foreign recipients on an "as is, where is" basis. Identified excess defense articles (EDA) can  |                                                                                                 |
| be sold under the normal FMS process and is authorized by the Arms Export Control Act,          |                                                                                                 |
| and under Section 516 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, which authorizes       |                                                                                                 |
| grant transfers of lethal and non-lethal EDA. Grant EDA transfers require Congressional         |                                                                                                 |
| approval. For EDA sales, prices range from 5 to 50 percent of original acquisition value,       |                                                                                                 |
| depending on the condition of the article. The foreign purchaser is financially responsible for |                                                                                                 |
| any repair and refurbishment costs, if necessary, and all costs associated with the transpor-   |                                                                                                 |
| tation of the EDA items. Under certain circumstances, transportation charges may be waived      |                                                                                                 |
| and the cost of transportation is absorbed by DOD appropriated funds. The EDA program           |                                                                                                 |
| provides a means by which the United States can transfer major weapons systems to PNs.          |                                                                                                 |
| Leases                                                                                          | Section 2796 of title 22, US code, authorizes the President to lease defense articles to eligi- |
| ble foreign countries or international organizations for a minimum of one month and up to       |                                                                                                 |
| five years. This non-appropriated program is administered by DSCA and uses the FMS pro-         |                                                                                                 |
| cess to develop lease agreements. The law allows the lease of defense articles only for com-    |                                                                                                 |
| pelling foreign policy or national security reasons, and stipulates that the cost of the lease, |                                                                                                 |
| with some exceptions, must be borne by the recipient. For the recipient country, leases may     |                                                                                                 |
| be less expensive than purchasing the article outright and leases provide a convenient vehi-    |                                                                                                 |
| cle for obtaining defense articles for temporary use. Leases are executed through a lease       |                                                                                                 |
| agreement, with an associated FMS case to cover repair, training, supply support or trans-      |                                                                                                 |
| portation, if required.                                                                         |                                                                                                 |
| Loans                                                                                           | Loans of defense materiel, supplies, or equipment, are authorized under the Arms Export         |
| Control Act, section 65 (22 US C. 2796d), in support of RDT&E programs and efforts. The         |                                                                                                 |
| intent of these loans is to strengthen the security of the US and its allies by promoting stan- |                                                                                                 |
| dardization, interchangeability, and interoperability of equipment.                             |                                                                                                 |

## Security Cooperation Enablers

This section outlines additional considerations integral to SC planning and execution. In addition to the specific SC activities that Marine Corps forces conduct, there are a number of enabling planning considerations, restraints, constraints, and underlying agreements that ensure the Marine Corps conducts SC activities legally, effectively, and efficiently with minimal risk to Marine Corps forces, mission, and institution. These considerations supplement and build upon the previous outline of SC activities, programs, tools, and resources. These considerations ensure the Marine Corps is compliant with laws and policies that govern US Government interaction with our allies and partners. These considerations are fundamental to and underpin all SC activities, regardless of type of activity. Marines at all levels should consult legal counsel and FDOs early and often in planning and executing SC. The enablers in this section directly affect what types of SC activities can be conducted with a PN. For example, conveying information or materiel, in any manner, to a PN government or international organization requires that information or materiel to be reviewed by an FDO. The following is not an exhaustive list of enablers, nor is every enabler required for every SC activity; rather, the following enablers are key SC planning and execution considerations:


Foreign disclosure and technology transfer.

International agreements, to include information sharing agreements.

Export control.

Human rights vetting.
Foreign Disclosure and Technology Transfer Foreign disclosure is conveying information, in any manner, to an authorized representative of a foreign government or international organization. Included materials that may be used as part of an SC event must be reviewed/approved by an FDO, also known as a designated disclosure authority. This policy is mandated by


Executive Order 13526, Classified National Security Information;

DODD 5230.11, Disclosure of Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments and
International Organizations;

Secretary of the Navy Instruction 5510.34, Disclosure of Classified Military Information and
Controlled Unclassified Information to Foreign Governments, International Organizations, and Foreign Representatives; and

MCO 5510.20, Disclosure of Military Information to Foreign Governments and Interests,
Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) and Classified Military Information (CMI).
Details concerning the foreign disclosure request process are provided in MCO 5510.20. Coordinate with the applicable, local FDO to submit requests as soon as a requirement is identified. Local policy may vary, but foreign disclosure requests generally should include the data points outlined in Figure A-3.

## Foreign Disclosure Request Contents

- Classification. Identify highest level of classification required to be disclosed. - Disclosure or release methods. Disclosure methods should be identified, whether oral, visual, documentary, or materiel. - NDP-1 categories, if known. Categories of information are specific categories of classified military information to be disclosed as outlined in MCO 5510.20_, Disclosure of Military Information to Foreign Governments and Interests, CUI, and CMI. - Product type. (e.g., briefing, manual, video) - Subject country. (i.e., the intended recipient) - Justification. (i.e., justify the disclosure or release) - Benefit to the United States. - Originator of the information/source document. - Limitations. (what is known that cannot be disclosed)
Part of National Disclosure Policy-1 (NDP-1) includes the "False Impressions Policy," which specifically states: "It is the policy of the United States to avoid creating false impressions of its readiness to make available classified military materiel, technology, or information. Therefore, initial planning with foreign governments and international organizations concerning programs which might involve the eventual disclosure of classified military information may be conducted only if it is explicitly understood and acknowledged that no US commitment to furnish such classified information or materiel is intended or implied until disclosure has been approved. Accordingly, proposals to foreign governments and international organizations which result from either US or combined initial planning, and which will lead to the eventual disclosure of classified military materiel, technology or information, including intelligence threat data or countermeasures information must be authorized in advance by designated disclosure officials in departments and agencies originating the information or by the National Disclosure Policy Committee, in compliance with procedures set forth in Section IV.2." (NDP-1). A false impression often results in negative consequences when expectations are not moderated. False impressions can be embarrassing for the United States, hinder interoperability, and have an adverse effect on SC efforts. Best practices to ensure compliance with the False Impression Policy and foreign disclosure policies include:


Involving an FDO in the planning process for all combined exercises and operations and
divulging all possible activities to preemptively determine what can legally be discussed with foreign government or international organization.

Never agreeing outright to any disclosure of CUI or CMI without the express approval of
an FDO.

Engaging FDOs early and often during all steps of engagements.
Additional information about Foreign Disclosure can be found in the Foreign Disclosure for Commanders course on MarineNet.

International Agreements International agreements, governed by DODD 5530.3, *International Agreements* and SECNAVINST 5710.25B, *International Agreements*, underpin many SC activities, to include personnel exchanges, mil-to-mil engagements, operational support, international armaments cooperation, exchange of supplies or goods, sale of defense articles, services, and training, and information and intelligence sharing, and they enable the DOD to leverage shared resources with our partners. International agreements can also include those established for the status of forces, access, basing, facilities, prepositioned equipment, international acquisition, communications, and health and medical agreements. All of these agreements facilitate more effective combined activities, from multinational combat operations to the exchange of personnel between the Marine Corps and a PN, by defining the scope and limitations associated with specific activities. Department of Defense personnel may only conclude those international agreements that are specifically authorized in DODD 5530.3 and SECNAVINST 5710.25B. Subject to clearance and approval by DOD, and as delegated, CMC is the Marine Corps approving authority for the establishment of an international agreement. Acquisition-related international agreements are the purview of OSD and, in some cases, Navy IPO. By policy, CCDRs are also authorized to negotiate and conclude international agreements in specific circumstances. In the absence of a binding international agreement between the DOD and an FSF organization, or the US Government and PN government, the SC planner should explore establishing non-binding Memoranda of Agreement/Memoranda of Understanding (MOA/MOU), to set forth concepts and terms under which planning and execution of SC activities will occur. Non-binding MOUs or MOAs are not international agreements. Information and Intelligence Sharing: There are specific international agreements between the US Government and PNs that facilitate and enable information and intelligence sharing. Information and intelligence sharing with partners can enhance PN intelligence capabilities and capacity, and improve two-way information sharing between the United States and allies and partners. An important component in planning is to consider and identify specific intelligence or information-sharing requirements and collaboration that benefit the United States and its partners, as appropriate, in support of SC or operational activities with partners. The following two types of information sharing agreements are key agreements that facilitate disclosure or release of certain US information and technology:


Overview Security of Military Information Agreement. This is a "legally binding international
agreement that establishes terms for the protection and handling of classified military information provided by either partner to the other" (Reference the Security Assistance
Management Manual). Any intelligence sharing agreements must align with the National Policy and Procedures for the Disclosure of Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations (short title: National Disclosure Policy [NDP]-1).
This policy provides specific disclosure criteria and limitations, definition of terms, release arrangements, and other guidance. Joint Force Commander, FDOs and CCMDs "require authority before they share classified military information or national intelligence with a foreign entity. Classified military information, as defined in National Security Decision Memorandum 119, Disclosure of Classified US Military Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations, is information under the control or jurisdiction of the DOD, its departments or agencies, or is of primary interest to them" (JP 2-0, *Joint Intelligence*).

Communications and Information Security Memorandum of Agreement. A formal document
that establishes terms for secure communications interoperability and security between the US Government (via the DSCA) and the PN. For additional information on information and intelligence sharing, reference the *Security Assistance Management Manual*.
Export Control Export control regulates the shipment or transfer, by whatever means, of controlled items, software, technology, or services out of the US Marine Corps Systems Command handles Export Control duties for Marine Corps ground equipment, while DC Aviation handles the same requirements for aviation equipment. These duties include serving as the Marine Corps focal point for export license requests, end-user certificates, and interfacing with government agencies, such as the DOS, the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls, and the Defense Technology Security Administration, to address and resolve import and export issues. Export control duties also includes the processing of International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) exemptions.

Additional Legal Considerations: Human Rights Vetting (Leahy Amendment)
The "Leahy Law" refers to a vetting process through which the US government validates that US assistance and DOD training programs are provided only to FSF units that have not committed gross human rights abuses. DOS, through the SCO, is responsible to conduct vetting in advance of training a PN. The DOS utilizes the "international vetting and security tracking" system to facilitate the vetting process. The statutory requirements for human rights vetting are contained both within Section 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and under a recurring provision in the DOD annual appropriations bill. If Marine units have reasonable information that would identify that an FSF organization had committed a gross human right abuse, it should be reported to the US Embassy/SCO.

## Appendix B Marine Corps Force Assistance Overview

Conducting Security Force Assistance at the tactical level is part of the Marine Corps Small Wars legacy of advising foreign forces. The Marine Corps conducts SFA activities as part of SC, utilizing task-organized forces and individual augments from both the active and reserve components. The Marine Corps is capable of planning and conducting SFA at all levels, from ministerial to tactical, with FSFs, including but not limited to military, paramilitary, police, and intelligence forces; border police, coast guard, and customs officials; and prison guards and correctional personnelthat provide security for a PN and its population or support a regional security organization's mission. JP-3-20 defines SFA as, "The Department of Defense activities that support development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions." During Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)/Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) and the ongoing Resolute Support Mission (RSM), the Marine Corps has provided individual advisors and advisor teams at all levels of the Afghan government. These advisors support the International Security Assistance Force mission to build the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Security Force assistance spans the conflict continuum with Marines primarily serving at the tactical level, training, assisting, equipping, and advising the ANSF during combat operations. Additionally, the Marine Corps advises, trains, equips, and assists FSFs around the globe in support of its efforts to increase its own readiness or to improve a PN capability. In Australia, the Marine Corps utilizes the Marine Forces Darwin (MRF-D) program to develop Marine Corps Amphibious readiness while simultaneously developing United States-Australia interoperability. In Jordan, SFA efforts are more focused on regional stability and the ability of the Jordanians to deter or defeat violent extremist organizations (VEO). The Jordanian Deployment Program (JODP) focuses on developing Jordan's capability to defend its sovereign borders from VEO aggression in support of regional stability. In the case of Jordan, the residual benefit of developing its capabilities provides the Marine Corps access and added security to the Port of Aqaba. The Marine Corps, in accordance with higher guidance, uses SFA activities to shape the OE or assist a PN in defending against internal and transnational threats to security or stability (i.e., supporting FID, CT, counterinsurgency, or other stability activities). Security Force Assistance activities may be used to assist a PN defend against external threats or help contribute to multinational operations; and help develop or reform another country's security forces or supporting institutions. They also contribute to DOD's role in USG efforts to support PN SSR, whether through routine SC activities or an FID operation. Security forces perform three generic functions: Executive, Generating, and Operating. The executive function includes strategic direction that provides oversight, policy, and resources for the FSF's generating and operating functions. The FSF generating function is the capacity and capabilities of the FSF to organize, train, equip, and build operating force units. FSF operating functions form operational capabilities through the use of concepts similar to the US joint functions to achieve FSF security objectives. Of note, specific generating and operating functions will likely have some overlap of requirements and responsibilities. In some FSF, a single organization may perform all three functions. The planners of SFA missions require knowledge of how their own organization distributes these functions, as well as how the FSF implements them in their system, in order to identify the SFA developmental tasks that will support the FSF's model rather than simply importing a US model to the FSF organization. Following the executive, generating, operating functions construct ensures SC planners consider the various functions the FSF must perform in order to sustain a force over time. This SC planner must consider all levels of the FSF when developing an SC plan to inform at what level the Marine Corps should engage with the FSF and the capability sets the FSF must perform to fulfill a DSR. During the SC Planning and Execution Cycle Step 1: Theater Analysis, the SC planner should determine the most effective level of engagement, and whether or not that level is the best use of Marine resources. For example, if an FSF DSR can only be achieved at the executive-level of the FSF, this may not be the most effective use of Marine Corps resources.

## Security Forces' Generic Functions

The Marine Corps typically works with Marine or Naval Infantry FSFs that are part of the PN Navy. This limits the role that the Marine Corps performs in advising at the executive and operational levels of an FSF unit. Although the Marine Corps has the capability to advise at these levels, due to its size and mission, it uses its forces to conduct SC and SFA activities at the operational level of the FSF. Examples of the Marine Corps capability to advise at the executive and operational levels are its participation in the Afghanistan-Pakistan Hands program, or the provision of individual augments (IAs) as ministerial and provincial level executive advisors during OIF and OEF.

Executive The executive function includes the national-level organizations or key individuals responsible for developing national FSF policy. This guidance consists of policies, procedures, and authorities needed to generate and employ the operating force. All security forces apply some level of executive function. The OSD, the Joint Staff, and the Service staffs perform this function for the United States.

Generating The generating function develops and sustains the capabilities of the operating forces. The generating force supports recruiting, organization, training, equipping, and building efforts for the FSF.

Operating The operating function employs military capabilities through application of the warfighting functions of maneuver, intelligence, fires, force protection, sustainment, and command and control during actual operations. Police forces employment (when authorized) may include training and actual operations with the integration of patrolling, forensics, apprehension, intelligence, investigations, incarceration, communications, and sustainment, or any other activities that support the PN's legitimate criminal justice or customs enforcement authorities.

## Foreign Security Forces Developmental Tasks

The Marine Corps applies the Organize Train, Equip, Rebuild/Build, and Advise (OTERA) developmental task framework to guide its SFA activities. These tasks can occur as stand-alone or in combination with one another. For example, during OEF, it was necessary to perform all OTERA tasks simultaneously, and across the security force functions (executive, generating, operating) in order to build the ANSF in accordance with International Security Assistance Force guidance. Put another way, the ANSF were nascent forces, and personnel had to be manned, trained, and equipped across all of the types of security forces such as the Afghan National Army, Afghan Border Police, Afghan Local Police, and Afghan Civil Operations Police. Each of these forces performed roles particular to their service. Marine advisors provided mentorship and advice on the executive, generating and operating functions at all levels of the ANSF for both combat and policing functions. This required recruiting, basic and advanced training, doctrinal writing, and specialty training such as instructor development, as well as many other tasks. As the FSF matured in its ability to man, train, equip itself to conduct operations, the Marine Corps had to adjust the quantity and type of advisors it provided. The transition from building FSF capabilities, to enabling the FSF to sustain and replicate capabilities (which the Marine Corps views as capacity) required a whole-of-government approach across the security sector to ensure similar actions be conducted at all levels of the government from local and provincial within the Marine AO, and simultaneously at the national level with Joint and coalition advisory efforts. Below is further explanation of the OTERA functions required to develop FSF, and the Marine Corps role in their execution:


Organize. All activities taken to create, improve, and integrate doctrinal principles,
organizational structures, capability constructs, and personnel management. This may include doctrine development, unit or organization design, command and staff processes, and recruiting and manning functions.

Train. All activities taken to create, improve, and integrate training, leader development, and
education at the individual, leader, collective, and staff levels. This may include doctrine development, unit or organization design, command and staff processes, and recruiting and manning functions.

Equip. All activities to design, improve, and integrate materiel and equipment, procurement,
fielding, accountability, and maintenance through life cycle management. This may also include fielding of new equipment, operational readiness process, repair, and recapitalization.

Rebuild or Build. All activities to create, improve, and integrate facilities. This may also
include physical infrastructures such as bases and stations, lines of communication, ranges and training complexes, and administrative structures.

Advise. All activities to provide subject matter expertise, guidance, advice, and counsel to FSF
while carrying out the missions assigned to the unit or organization. Advising may occur under combat or administrative conditions, at tactical through strategic levels, and in support of individuals or groups.
Other Required Tasks The OTERA construct does not fully capture all of the types of actions required to ensure FSF success in reaching a DSR, as discussed in Chapter 5. At times the Marine Corps may have to fill specific capability gaps until the FSF is capable of conducting a given activity or operation without direct US assistance or action. Additionally, the Marine Corps should be continuously assessing the capabilities of the FSF at all stages, steps, events or actions. Chapter 6 and Appendix D address FSF assessments.

Assist. The Marine Corps provides PN assistance to provide, coordinate, or facilitate FSF access to US or coalition support in capabilities such as intelligence, fires, logistics, command and control, and force protection. The focus of effort is assistance. Assistance efforts may be conducted in concert with related advising and training efforts to build FSF capacity.

Assess. The Marine Corps conducts assessments to measure the FSF unit's capabilities against the US desired capabilities and role for that FSF. Assessment provides initial and continuous feedback toward achieving FSF capabilities. Assessments guide the conduct of advising, training, or assistance activities. Assessments include training evaluations, the identification of FSF capability gaps, after-action reviews, readiness reviews, and other organizational assessments.

Foreign Internal Defense. The participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government, or other designated organization, to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to their security. Security cooperation activities can support FID activities, but not all FID activities are SC. For additional information regarding the relationship between SC and FID, reference JP 3-20 and JP 3-22 Foreign Internal Defense.

## Appendix C Component-Level Assessment Overview

This appendix highlights planning consideration and activities necessary for a Security cooperation planner and assessment team to conduct a component-level assessment. Assessments will vary in scope and size depending on the mission requirements. The below content serves and a starting point to guide the process. This appendix will discuss theater-level analysis inputs, the four analytical lenses that make up a component-level assessment, how the analysis links to security role analysis (Planning and Execution Cycle Step 2: Security Role Analysis), critical outputs, and the necessary content required for the assessment report. The purpose of a component-level assessment is to bolster security role analysis and, by extension, DSR development. It identifies current state FSF component-level capabilities to inform a SC planner, thereby helping determine a desired future state (e.g., DSR linked to IDD or country objective). Figure C-1 illustrates a component-level assessment's location in the SC Planning and Execution Cycle. Depending on the size of an FSF organization, the words, "service" and "component" may be interchangeable.

## Theater-Level Analysis Inputs

The primary input to an FSF component-level assessment is the theater analysis. The SC planner should also factor in the documents the CCMD used to craft the IDD. Some examples are


National Security Strategy. A document approved by the President of the United States for
developing, applying, and coordinating the instruments of national power to achieve objectives that contribute to national security.

National Military Strategy. A document approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
for distributing and applying military power to attain national security strategy and Defense strategic guidance objectives.

National Defense Strategy. Conducted in January every four years, and intermittently as
appropriate, by the Secretary of Defense and provided to the Military departments and all other DOD components and the congressional defense committees. In years the SecDef does not submit a defense strategy plan, an assessment of the current strategy must be submitted to Congress in February. Required content includes:

Priority mission of the DOD and assumed force planning scenarios and constructs.

Strategic environment, including critical and enduring threats imposed by state or non-state actors, and strategy to counter these threats.

Strategic framework that guides how DOD will prioritize threats and missions, and how DOD will allocate and mitigate risks and make resource investments.

Roles and missions of the armed forces to carry out missions, and role and capabilities of other US government agencies, allies, and international partners.

Force size and shape, force posture, defense capabilities, force readiness, infrastructure, organization, personnel, technological innovation, and other elements of the defense program to support the strategy.

Major investments DOD will make over the following 5-year period in accordance with the strategic framework.

Defense Planning Guidance. Product of the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution
processes. The guidance reflects the President's National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, and the Chairman's National Military Strategy. The planning guidance drives the POM and BES development.

Joint Strategic Campaign Plan (JSCP). A 5-year global strategic plan (reviewed every 2 years)
that operationalizes the National Military Strategy. It is the Chairman's primary document to guide and direct the preparation and integration of Joint Force campaign and contingency plans. The JSCP establishes a common set of processes, products, priorities, roles, and responsibilities to integrate the Joint Force's global operations, activities, and investments from day-to-day campaigning to contingencies. The JSCP directs four types of campaign plans: Global Campaign Plans (GCPs), Regional Campaign Plans (RCPs), Functional Campaign Plans (FCPs), and CCPs.

Global Campaign Plan. Created by the CCMD, articulates what the CCMD is trying to achieve,
how the CCMD is trying to achieve its objectives, what resources are required, why identified resources are critical, and potential risks if the activities necessary for successful execution of the campaign plan are not fully resourced.

Combatant Campaign Plan. The centerpiece of the CCMDs' planning construct, the CCP
operationalizes CCMD strategies over a two-to-five-year horizon by organizing and aligning available resources. The CCP focuses the command's day-to-day activities, which include ongoing operations, military engagement, security cooperation, deterrence, and other shaping or preventive activities. The CCMD campaign plan becomes the execution plan at the operational level by aggregating all assigned tasks from problem-focused plans (GCP, FCP, and RCP) to provide a campaign plan that fully integrates operations, activities and interests spanning the command's assigned responsibilities. The CCP's long-term and persistent and preventive activities are intended to identify and deter, counter, or otherwise mitigate an adversary's actions before they escalate to combat. Many of these activities are conducted with DOD in support of the diplomatic, economic, and informational efforts of USG partners and PNs.

Joint Regional Strategy: A three-year regional strategy developed jointly by the regional
bureaus of DOS and USAID, it identifies the priorities, goals, and areas of strategic focus within the region. Joint Regional Strategies provide a forward-looking and flexible framework within which bureaus and missions prioritize desired end states, supporting resources, and response to unanticipated events.

Integrated Country Strategy: A three-year strategy developed by a DOS country team for a
particular country, it articulates a common set of USG priorities and goals by setting the mission goals and objectives through a coordinated and collaborative planning effort. It provides the basis for the development of the annual mission resource requests. The COM leads the development process and has final approval authority.

CMC Security Cooperation Strategy: Service-level guidance provided to deputy commandants
and FMF commanders to shape international engagement planning and execution. It guides the Marine Corps total force in recommending the types of activities and recognizing opportunities that are best suited for Marine Corps engagement.

Contingency Plan: A branch of a campaign plan that comprises hypothetical situations for
designated threats, catastrophic events, and contingent missions outside of crisis conditions.

OPLAN: A complete and detailed plan containing a full description of the concept of
operations, all annexes applicable to the plan, and a time-phased force and deployment list.

A complete and detailed plan containing a full description of the concept of operations, all
annexes applicable to the plan, and a time-phased force and deployment list.
The FSF component-level assessment also takes inputs from the PN (e.g., strategies, policies, objectives). Additional sources for inputs to the component-level assessment can include contracted studies, open-source articles, historical SC information, etc.

## Component-Level Analytical Lenses

A component-level assessment uses four analytical lenses: institutional, environmental, organizational, and operational. Figure C-2 illustrates these lenses as four separate assessment types. It is a best practice if all four assessments are utilized in a singular framework. For the Marine Corps, all four assessments are executed as discrete analyses (four types) within the overarching component-level assessment. The four analytical lenses seek to answer the following questions:


Institutional analysis. Does the FSF/PN have the institutional systems and processes to
generate and replicate forces?

Environmental analysis. Is the PN's operational environment conducive to accomplishing a
desired US objective?

Organizational analysis. Is the FSF component properly organized to perform a desired US
objective?

Operational analysis. Does the FSF component have the skill set necessary to accomplish a
desired US objective?
The analytical lenses are functional areas through which an assessor views the PN/FSF component. Depending on the output of theater analysis, certain lenses may prove unnecessary to mission accomplishment. Consequently, an FSF component-level assessment may omit portions of a full component-level assessment if it does not factor into a stakeholder's decision making process. It is important that the outputs generated by the component-level assessment support the component command and by extension the CCMD, by providing accurate, specific, measurable, concise, timely, and relevant information to a decision maker. Some information may be difficult to measure. For example, how does one quantify willingness? Or access to a port or training area? How does one predict a social movement definitively? Ultimately the planner will need to make a well-informed prediction, which acknowledges risk (all categories of risk), for a decision maker and support it with data and analysis. Whatever outputs generated or decisions/assumptions the assessor has made must be fed back to the CCMD to ensure common understanding across all levels of command.

Component-Level Institutional Analysis Institutional analysis is typically conducted using the DOTMLPF-P construct. This analysis follows a systematic approach to analyze the FSF component's capability to fulfill their strategic mission. Although the FSF may have the capacity to conduct certain missions as defined by the PN, the institutional analysis should provide the narrative of institutional memory, or history, and thus provide context to the force's current capability/capacity. Institutional memory should be considered when comparing similarities between PN and US efforts prior to the application of SFA or other SC activities. The institutional analysis helps determine the effectiveness of an FSF institution's ability to perform common force development functions required to generate, sustain, and replicate forces. It analyzes how the FSF trains, organizes, and equips its forces by identifying the capabilities and capacities of the force structure and the component's supporting institutions. Analysis of an FSF unit's DOTMLPF-P structure will help stakeholders determine which future SC activities would meet strategic end-states established and disseminated by the CCMD. The analysis and report will be conducted and written using the DOTMLPF-P format:


Doctrine:

Does the FSF have its own doctrine?

Can they write and sustain doctrine?

Is there Marine Corps doctrine that can be used to assist the FSF component/service?

Organization:

What is the organizational structure?

Who are the key players in the institutional structure?

Are there friction points in the component or its supporting institutions/organizations?

Training:

What kind of training venues/ranges does the FSF have?

What does the FSF ELT pipeline look like?

Do they have PTP-like training?

Materiel:

Do they have materiel and equipment required to perform tasks in support of a DSR?

Do they have the ability to sustain materiel (maintenance, parts, etc.)?

Leadership:

Who are the key leaders?

How do soldiers/Marines progress in rank? Responsibility?

Do they utilize non-commissioned officers? How?

Personnel:

How do they recruit?

What is the basic education level of new recruits?

How do they retain personnel?

Facilities:

What is the functionality/status of their facilities (living, training, etc.)?

Policy:

Do they have institutional policies?

Who/what agency creates policy?
Institutional analysis is the primary method of analysis to determine gaps in force generation, sustainability, and replication. Here component level assessors and senior level advisors will identify primary gaps in capacity and capability to perform essential force development functions required of any military force. Therefore, it is the primary mechanism to inform the joint force of governance, executive, and generating advisor requirements.

Component-Level Environmental Analysis Planners must consider environmental influences when deciding whether to proceed with an SC initiative. The SC planner develops and employs an appropriate environmental framework that provides the information necessary to plan operations. The environmental conditions in a PN have a direct impact on an FSF unit's ability to fulfill a US objective. Similarly, they may also influence the SC planner's ability to determine gaps within the capacity and capability of the FSF, as well as its ability to grant access to land and air space or sustain a relationship with the United States. The environmental analysis provides context to the institutional and organizational analysis by addressing civil concerns within the PN. It describes how the environment developed into its current state and how it is projected to trend in the future. The assessor analyzes the current environmental conditions, keeping in mind that higher guidance is considered part of the environment, and should make assumptions about how the environment will trend based on historical data and current factors. Environmental analysis is the focal point for determining the depth and breadth of an SC initiative. This analysis produces a holistic view of the relevant adversarial, neutral, and friendly actors and aspects of the environment as a complex whole within the larger security environment. Operational culture is a key factor when analyzing the environment. A thorough environmental analysis may reveal requirements to develop additional capabilities or capacities in the FSF, or other PN agencies. Likewise, it may reveal additional requirements to gain access or build/sustain a relationship with the PN. Lastly, it may help develop recommendations to mitigate or address any environmental factors that hinder the FSF prior to initiating, continuing, or monitoring SC activities.

The environmental analysis at the component level answers the following questions:


What's occurring internally in the country where the FSF is located?

Politically

Militarily

Is there conflict occurring in the FSF's country?

Is the FSF actively involved in conflict in another region?

Economically

Socially

Physical environment (geography)

What's occurring externally (border countries) to the country where the FSF is located?

Politically

Socially (changing)

Economically

Militarily

Regional considerations (adjacent border crisis bleed over)

International sanctions/regulations/embargo

What has led to the requirement for Security cooperation activities?

What are the strengths and weaknesses of all relevant actors?

Is the situation (or the projected future situation) desirable or undesirable and why?

What conditions need to exist for success for the SFA or SC programs/activities/exercises?

What are indicators that identify the path to success?

What are indicators that define success of the SC activities?

Are there indicators that the FSF is heading in the wrong direction?

What capabilities and capacity does the FSF need to conducted the intended mission and be a
viable US partner?

Will the FSF maintain the required capacity to continue to be a viable US partner?

How proficient does the FSF need to be to accomplish the intended mission?

How does the environment affect reporting to institutional and organizational system?

Local populace attitudes towards the FSF and HN government

Local populace socio-cultural factors including prejudice and fears.

What capability gaps exist that can be traced to deficiencies in one or more of the development
constructs DOTMLPF-P as they relate to required or desired capabilities?

Doctrine

Organization

Training

Materiel

Leadership and Education

Personnel

Facilities

Policy
Component-Level Organizational Analysis Organizational Analysis follows a systems analysis approach to map and analyze the dynamics at work in FSF organizations and the organizational structures that comprise the FSF (including its institutions, agencies, etc.). The purpose of the analysis is to ensure that decision makers consider organizational influences when deciding a PN's willingness and propensity to implement and sustain assistance, increase capacity, and build capabilities to meet relevant objectives. It identifies gaps in current organizational structures that pose potential risk to a desired US outcome's achievability and mitigates them by identifying requirements to conduct successful SC activities. The analysis collects data and analyzes factors impacting the FSF's organizational performance based on its structure, personalities, and billet functions of those performing within the prescribed organizational structure. The organizational culture of a PN and FSF organization must be analyzed to identify areas of strength as well as gaps. Organizational culture is inherent to any military and is not necessarily compatible with the US military's own organizational culture. It is derived from a mix of societal, cultural, and political factors within the PN. An example would be a US recommendation to develop FSF noncommissioned officers. Although this may be a US desire, it may not be compatible within the organizational culture of the FSF (absorptive capacity). The Organizational Analysis at the component level answers the following questions:


What's occurring internally in the country?

The FSF stated unit mission?

FSF's equivalent mission essential tasks?

FSF's capability to execute them?

The organizational tables for authorized personnel and equipment (TO&E)

TO&E for personnel and equipment actually on-hand?

Any past or present foreign military presence or influence

In doctrine?

In training techniques, tactics, procedures?

During any combat or non-combat operations?

The unit's ability to retain and support acquired skills?

Training from past US, NATO, other ally, or near peer mobile training teams?

The existence of organizational memory (history) within the FSF?

The organization and leadership level that is responsible for training the individual security
force personnel?

Does the FSF have institutional training established, and is it effective?

Organizational deficiencies displayed during joint and multinational exercises and combat
operations?

Status of major end items and maintenance of training programs?

Locations of current and planned SC activities?

Religious, tribal or other affiliations impacting the organization?

Differences between FSF units, and differences between FSF and local populace?

Are there any minority groups within the FSF?

Who are key leaders within the organization and potential spoilers?

The presence, agendas, capabilities, influence, and attitudes of NGOs and International
Governmental Organizations as they impact the FSF's organizational structure?
Component-Level Operational Analysis Operational Analysis analyzes the strengths and gaps in the FSF's ability to perform its assigned missions, roles, and functions at the component level (e.g., the Colombian Marine Corps). The purpose of the analysis is to ensure that decision makers consider the operational capabilities of the FSF when deciding whether to proceed with an SC activity that moves the FSF from the current state to a desired future state. Operational analysis is conducted using the warfighting function framework (command and control, maneuver, fires, logistics, intelligence, force protection). Operational Analysis utilizes data from warfighting functions and analyzes it to create a baseline for FSF component capability/capacity. A proper operational analysis will tell an assessor whether the FSF component currently has the necessary warfighting skill sets to achieve a desired US outcome. Operational Analysis at the component level reports address the following:


The FSF's capability and capacity to conduct command and control and

Exercise command specifics and control specifics.

How the FSF:

Communicate & maintain information.

Assess the situation in their operational environment.

Prepare plans & orders.

Command subordinate forces.

Establish, organize & operate a headquarters.

Coordinate & control external support.

Conduct COMMSTRAT in the operational area.

The FSF stated unit mission

FSF's equivalent mission essential task list

FSF's capability to execute those tasks

The organizational tables for authorized personnel and equipment (TO&E).

TO&E for personnel and equipment on hand

Personnel/equipment that must be requested from higher

Does the unit/service have orders & standard operating procedures that govern the procedures
& processes for

Command & control

Maneuver

Fires/effects

Logistics

Information

Intelligence

Force protection

Identify gaps in the FSF by assessing the warfighting functions in relation to the FSF's mission
to:

Conduct command and control
 Exercising command specifics and control specifics  Commanding subordinate forces  Establish, organize & operate a headquarters  Coordinate & control the employment of external support

Communicate & maintain the status of information

Assess the situation in their operational environment

Prepare plans & orders

Conduct information operations in the operational area

How the FSF conducts:

offensive maneuver & movement

defensive maneuver & movement

exercise and manage the execution of information & civil-military operations

Conduct Fires/ Effects.

How the FSF conducts and executes combined arms
 organic coordination, and coordination with external agencies

Provide logistic support:

supply, maintenance, transportation, services, general engineering, and health services

Provide intelligence:

evaluate the intelligence organization

ability to process and disseminate intelligence

Provide force protection:

evaluate active defensive measures, active safety measures, and passive defensive measures

applied technology and procedures

field health and sanitation

## Connection To Security-Role Analysis

The analysis conducted in a component-level assessment informs the Security Role Analysis conducted by the SC planner. The SC planner weighs the objectives of the US (DOD and DOS), and the PN. Security Role Analysis finds the overlap in priorities of all three and generates a recommended DSR for CCMD approval. Figure C-3 illustrates this process for a capability DSR. For a DSR that requires building a capability, the SC planner employs security role analysis to create a military/security task list tailored to the designated FSF/PN. The military/security tasks that comprise this MSTL offer a standards-based approach to assessing the FSF that closely mirrors the Systems Approach to Training. The SAT is a systematic, problem-solving model used to produce an effective training program. This method creates a common perspective of the DSR across multiple iterations of SC planners, advisors, and assessors. This commonality provides SC activities and activities a foundation and direction forward despite personnel turnover in the Marine Corps and the FSF. While similar to mission-essential tasks and the METL found in Marine Corps T&R Manuals, the MST/MSTL differs from the MET/METL construct in that tasks are tailored to the FSF and evaluation-coded (e-coded) events are tailored to accomplishment of a specific DSR. Collective and individual training standards in support of MSTs are e-coded such that failure to perform the event to standard would result in failure to accomplish the MST and by extension the DSR. Thus, the MST/MSTL construct used by the Marine Corps SC planner nests within Marine Corps UTM because all MSTs are mission focused. "Units cannot achieve and sustain proficiency on every possible task. Therefore, [SC planners and advisors] must selectively identify tasks that are essential to accomplishing the [FSF's] mission." With time and resource constraints inherent to any SC activity, narrowing the focus from a relatively broad Marine Corps MET to MSTs tailored to an FSF organization allows the SC planner and advisor teams to maximize training and allows assessors to focus on crucial elements of DSR accomplishment, in this case, for a DSR capability. Another difference in the MST/MSTL and MET/METL constructs is the level at which events can be e-coded. In current Marine Corps T&R Manuals, events below the 7000 (Battalion) level are rarely e-coded. Most Marine Corps SC activities with FSFs occur at the 6000 (Company), 5000 (Platoon) and 4000 (Squad) level. Allowing the planner to e-code events independent of the MET/METL construct enables the SC planner to add an additional layer of guidance and granularity to an SC initiative or activity. This granularity allows advisors and assessors to effectively prioritize training events and standards to be assessed. For a DSR related to access or a relationship there may be no need for a capability-based MST or MSTL. The assessor would instead focus on the suitability of an airfield, or the compatibility of a port with US shipping. If there were an MST/MSTL construct associated with this access or relationship DSR, it would be tailored to that DSR (e.g., runway maintenance/suitability for US aircraft, flight line procedures, and runway security). In many cases, tactical activity is required to achieve the DSR (e.g., platoon exchange for access). In these cases, an MST/MSTL's focus would still be on DSR achievement, not the tactical proficiency of the FSF. Chaining and linking of collective and individual events needed to achieve an MSTL is conducted in Solution Analysis once gaps have been identified in the FSF Assessment (Unit Level).

## Component-Level Assessment Report

The assessment report is a formal document that contains all relevant information and analysis as it pertains to the SC activity assessed. This document is meant to be signed by SC workforce commander as validated inputs for follow on planning activities and program management. Component-level FSF assessment has four critical subcomponents: the Institutional Analysis, Environmental Analysis, Organizational Analysis, and Operational Analysis as previously depicted in Chapter 2, figure 3-4. An FSF assessment report should contain, at a minimum, the following information:


Cover Page

Executive Summary

One to two page summary that links the SC activity from the FSF component to US strategic objectives

Highlight of assessment conclusions and recommendations

Background

A brief summary of FSF and US relationship, previous activities, constraints and limitations, etc.)

Cover letter from the lead SC planner to the stakeholders

The analysis: (in the listed order)

Institutional Analysis

Environmental Analysis

Organizational Analysis

Operational Analysis

Conclusions

Recommendations

Appendices (Additional information)

A compilation and summary of research completed during previous assessments (i.e., Initial Assessment, IDD, etc.).

Summary of National Policy and Strategy, Department-level guidance (DoD/DOS) Regional and country-level guidance.

## Component Assessment Critical Outputs

The output of the component-level assessment is the findings that confirm the reasons a component command desires to work with an FSF organization or its subordinate units (e.g., for capability/capacity), or the MARFOR component's requirements of the PN (e.g., access). A component-level assessment's findings help complete the Security Role Analysis with facts gathered from documents, or by physically visiting a country to validate assumptions. A complete security role analysis includes the following elements:


The outcomes of a component-level assessment

Determination of Stakeholder Objectives

The Desired Security Role (DSR) The approved DSR defines MSTs and the Required
Capabilities the FSF must achieve, improve, or sustain.

If a capability is required;a determination of all military tasks, capability sets and subordinate
capabilities needed to achieve a security role will achieve the DSR should be chained and
linked to highlight the required force development resources and workforce that will be required.

If access is required; the level of access and required resources to obtain the defined access are
determined.

## Appendix D Foreign Security Forces Unit-Level Assessments Overview

This appendix highlights planning consideration and activities necessary for a Security cooperation planner and assessment team to conduct a unit-level assessment. Assessments will vary in scope and size depending on the mission requirements, the below content serves and a starting point to guide the unit-level assessment process. This appendix will discuss DSR inputs, the four analytical lenses that make up a unit-level assessment, links to security role analysis and the FSF assessment (Planning and Execution Cycle Steps 2 and 3), FSA baseline assessment, IPRs, SC/Advisor team assessments, and close-out reports. Unit-level assessments come in different forms and serve different purposes. This chapter highlights the types of unit-level assessments and the purposes for which they are conducted. Unit-level assessments occur in two phases of the SC planning and execution process. They occur first in Planning and Execution Cycle Step 3: Foreign Security Forces Unit-Level Assessment, where they guide solutions analysis and consequently SCEP development. They are also conducted in Planning and Execution Cycle Step 6: Execution, as a method of SCEP performance monitoring (IPR, Advisor Team Assessment) and as a way to validate accomplishment of a DSR at the conclusion of an SCEP (SCEP close-out). Figure D-1 illustrates the areas of unit-level assessments in the Marine Corps SC planning and execution process.

## Foreign Security Force Assessment (Unit-Level)

A unit-level FSF assessment is conducted to assess the FSF's ability to achieve the DSR developed in security role analysis, validate any assumptions made about the FSF during theater analysis and security role analysis, identify capability gaps in the FSF unit, and validate the willingness of the FSF unit to perform in a manner commensurate with the DSR. The unit-level assessment is a comparative analysis between the current state of the FSF and the desired future state (the DSR). It clearly articulate the FSF unit's/PN's ability to perform the DSR. The output of this assessment feeds Solutions Analysis, which is then applied toward developing an SCEP. The SCEP is designed to help an FSF organization progress from its current state to the desired future state; and monitors this progress through a series of indicators of MOP/MOE accomplishment or milestone achievement using the Marine Corps' SAT process for DSRs that require building a capability. The primary input to a unit-level assessment is the DSR generated by the Security Role Analysis. All SC Planning and Execution Cycle inputs used to generate the DSR should be available for analysis by the unit-level assessors. Information, analysis, and conclusions should support the MARFOR by identifying and validating DSR requirements. The assessment construct for a unit-level assessment is the same as the component level; consisting of institutional, environmental, organizational, and operational analysis. The unit-level lenses are scoped to focus on a specific FSF unit and the accomplishment of a specific DSR. The lenses of analysis are not mandatory, but are a best practice. Constraints/restraints may render some lenses impracticable to analyze. For example, if an FSF unit's DSR is linked to US access to an airfield by means of conducting small unit SC activities, the FSF's tactical competence has little relevance to DSR accomplishment, it is simply a means to an end. In this scenario an assessor would be interested in logistical concerns such as sustainment or a training area/range's safety and suitability for US personnel. Other warfighting functions, such as the FSF unit's ability to maneuver or command and control its forces is of little consequence to achieving the DSR. Each lens seeks to answer the following questions:


Institutional analysis. What institutions support the FSF unit/organization, and how?

Environmental analysis.  Is the FSF unit's operational environment conducive to
accomplishing a DSR?

Organizational analysis. Is the FSF unit properly organized to perform the DSR?

Operational analysis. Does the FSF unit have the skill set necessary to accomplish the DSR?
Unit-Level Institutional Analysis Institutional analysis is typically conducted using the DOTMLPF-P construct. This analysis follows a systematic approach to analyze the FSF unit's capability by analyzing the unit's supporting institutions. Examples of supporting institutions are those that train, equip, and supply a specific FSF unit. Practical examples that apply to the Marine Corps are Training and Education Command, MARCORSYSCOM, and Logistics Command. The unit-level institutional analysis helps the assessor determine the effectiveness of an FSF organization's supporting institutions, and, by extension, the organization's ability to accomplish a stated DSR. Analysis of an FSF unit's supporting institutions will help stakeholders determine whether future SC activities would promote FSF development and achieve the DSR disseminated by the MARFOR. The Institutional analysis at the FSF level addresses the following questions:


How much training do members of the FSF unit receive at recruit/entry level training?

Is the training effective?

Is the training retained?

Is the training compatible with Marine Corps TTPs?

How well is the FSF unit equipped?

Does the FSF unit have uniforms?

What is the condition of the FSF unit's weapons?

Is the FSF unit's gear serviceable?

How well is the FSF unit supplied?

Is the FSF unit capable of limited self-sustainment? If so, how long can the FSF unit sustain itself in the field?

Is the FSF unit tied to lines of communication/supply?
 What are those lines of communication?  What effect does that dependence on supply lines have on the FSF unit's operational
capability?

What does the FSF unit's maintenance cycle look like?

Does a process to repair/replace damaged/unserviceable gear exist?
 Is the process effective?  What does FSF unit's maintenance cycle timeline look like?

Who are the key actors/organizations in the FSF unit's supply process?

What is the FSF organization's relationship with higher headquarters?

How dependent is the FSF organization on their component for guidance/directives to
undertake operations?

In what time frame is that guidance received, understood, disseminated within the organization,
and executed?

What is the organization's relationship with its joint counterparts?

How easily can the organization procure:
 Air support?  Naval support?  Fire support?

Is interoperability a requirement, if so at what level (Integrated Force, Compatible Force, deconflicted Force)?

Can the FSF unit attach/detach forces with ease and as necessary in support of mission
objectives?
Unit-Level Environmental Analysis Environmental items analyzed at the component level are relevant at the unit level and should be incorporated into unit-level environmental analysis. However, unit-level environmental analysis narrows its focus to the OE that affects the FSF organization being assessed (i.e., drug trafficking affects the country, this cartel is active in the FSF unit's area of responsibility). The environmental conditions have a direct impact on their receptiveness to SC activities and their ability to accomplish a DSR. The environmental analysis provides context to the institutional and organizational analysis that is conducted by addressing the civil concerns within the FSF unit. It describes how the environment developed into its current state and how it is projected to trend in the future. The assessment team analyzes the unit's current environmental conditions, keeping in mind that FSF component/ institutional guidance is considered part of the environment, and should project how the environment will trend based on historical data and current factors.

This analysis produces a holistic view of the relevant adversarial, neutral, and friendly actors and aspects of the FSF unit's environment as a complex whole. Operational culture is a key factor when analyzing the environment. A thorough environmental analysis may reveal requirements to develop additional capabilities or capacities in the FSF unit, or its supporting institutions. It may also be utilized to develop recommendations to mitigate or address any environmental factors that may hinder the FSF unit prior to initiating, continuing, or monitoring SC activities. The environmental analysis at the FSF level addresses the following questions:


What's occurring internally in the PN?

Politically?

Militarily?

Economically?

Socially?

What is occurring internally in the FSF unit's area of responsibility?

What is the local populace's attitude towards the PN's governing body/the FSF/the FSF unit?

What are the broader regional considerations that would affect a partnership/ongoing security
cooperation engagement?

Is the PN actively involved in an internal or external conflict?

What are the FSF unit's goals?

Near-term?

Mid-term?

Long-term?

Is the PN/FSF unit subject to any international sanctions/embargoes?

How does the environment affect reporting to the institutional and organizational system?

What is the capacity of the FSF unit to sustain SC activities?

Are there any religious, tribal or other affiliations impacting the FSF unit?

Are there minority groups (ethnic, religious, social, economic) present with-in the FSF unit?

Is there a positive or negative impact toward its ability to accomplish a DSR?
Unit-Level Organizational Analysis An FSF unit-level organizational analysis provides the narrative of organizational memory, or history, and thus provides context to the force's current capability/capacity. For example, operated unit's experience operating extensively with small boats should be factored into an assessor's expectations of the organization. The FSF unit's memory should be considered when comparing similarities between FSF and US efforts prior to the application of Security Force Assistance or other SC activities. The unit-level organizational analysis informs the assessor of the FSF unit's organizational structure. It follows a systems analysis approach to map and analyze the dynamics at work within the FSF unit being assessed. The purpose of the analysis is to ensure that decision makers consider an FSF unit's organizational influences when trying to determine a PN's willingness and propensity to implement and sustain assistance, increase capacity, and build capabilities to meet relevant objectives. It identifies gaps in the current organizational structure that can be potential risks and helps identify requirements to conduct successful SC activities. Unit-level organizational analysis collects data and analyzes factors affecting the FSF unit's organizational performance based on its structure and the personalities of those performing within the prescribed organizational structure. The organizational culture of an FSF unit must be analyzed to identify areas of strength as well as gaps. Organizational analysis at the FSF level addresses the following questions:


What security role has the FSF unit been conducting recently?

For example, are they trained to conduct small boat operations? Or air assaults? Or are they trained and equipped to conduct mechanized operations? Depending on the unit's turnover in personnel, past security roles will have a half-life of memory within the organization, impacting its ability to conduct a DSR.

What is the composition of the FSF unit?

How long have key billet holders been in place?

How much longer will key billet holders be assigned with the FSF unit?

Who will the next billet holder be?

How receptive to SC activities and SFA are current and future billet holders and influencers within the FSF unit.

What is the FSF unit's ability to contribute to missions with shared objectives, based on the
analysis of FSF unit's capabilities?

What are potential risks, including assumptions and possible consequences of the SC activity?

What is the FSF unit's absorptive capacity, including the extent to which FSF units can support,
employ, and sustain assistance independently?

What is the FSF unit's stated mission?

What are the FSF unit's equivalent mission essential tasks (METs)?

What is the FSF unit's doctrinal task organization and table of equipment (TE)?

What is the FSF unit's current task organization and TE?

Are there are any past or current third party (US military, foreign military or otherwise)
influences on the FSF unit?

What are the FSF unit's training techniques, tactics, and procedures?

What is the effectiveness of current FSF unit-level training?

What leadership level is responsible for training the individual security force personnel?

What is the FSF unit's ability to retain acquired skills or sustain acquired equipment?

What are the locations of current and planned SC activities with the FSF unit?
Unit-Level Operational Analysis Unit-level operational analysis analyzes the strengths and gaps in the FSF unit's ability to perform its assigned mission, roles, and functions at the tactical level specifically as they pertain to the DSR regarding warfighting functions. The purpose of the analysis is to ensure that decision makers consider the tactical capabilities of the FSF when deciding whether to proceed with an SC activity.

Unit-level operational analysis is conducted using the warfighting function framework; command and control, maneuver, fires, logistics, intelligence, and force protection. Operational Analysis utilizes data from warfighting functions and analyzes it to create a baseline for the FSF organization's capability/capacity. Much of this data can be derived from current operations, exercises, and AARs. Where a question is relevant, but information is lacking to provide a complete picture, a tactical evaluation may be necessary. Of note, the tactical evaluation draws from the MSTL created in Security Role Analysis, if an MSTL does not exist the assessor will consult the Marine Corps MET/METL construct in making the tactical evaluation. Operational analysis at the FSF level addresses the following questions:


Command & Control.

How does the FSF component exercise command and control of its forces?
 Centralized/decentralized command structure?  What does the command structure look like?

How well does the FSF unit prepare and disseminate plans and orders?
 Are orders understood and acted on by subordinate elements within the unit?

How does the FSF unit coordinate and control the employment of external support?

Does the FSF unit maintain a common operational picture within its unit and with higher headquarters?

Maneuver.

How does the FSF unit conduct:
 Offensive Maneuver?  Defensive Maneuver?  Amphibious Maneuver?  Stability Operations?

How does the FSF unit conduct joint and combined operations?

Is the FSF unit capable of interoperability with the United States? If so, to what scale? And at what level?
 Integrated?  Compatible?  De-conflicted?

How does the FSF unit establish and conduct operations in a Combat Operations Center?

Fires.

Does the FSF unit execute combined arms?

How well does the component coordinate organic/inorganic assets and agencies?
 Close air support?  Indirect fire support agencies?  Naval gunfire?

How does the FSF unit conduct targeting?

Logistics.

What are the current logistical systems and processes, and do they operate efficiently?
 Supply?  Maintenance?  Transportation?  Services?  Overview engineering?  Health services?  Deployment Distribution?

Information.

Does the FSF unit conduct or contribute to operations in the information environment?
 What actions does it take to operate and defend networks, systems, and information in
order to enable C2 and the assured operation of critical systems?
 What actions does it take to characterize the physical, informational, and cognitive
dimensions of the IE in order to identify challenges, opportunities, and comparative advantages for the operational commander?
 What actions does it take to exploit or attack adversary networks, systems, signatures,
individuals, and information in order to create advantages for the operational commander?
 What actions does it take to inform domestic and international audiences in order to
build understanding and support for operational and institutional objectives?
 What actions does it take to influence select foreign audiences and affect their decision
making and behaviors in order to create conditions favorable to operational objectives?
 What actions does it take to induce ambiguity, misunderstanding, resource misallocation
and delayed actions in order to deliberately mislead adversary decision makers, cause them to reveal strengths, dispositions, and future intentions while protecting the operational unit's true capabilities, readiness, posture, and intent?
 What actions does it take to provide the commander with the ability to exercise C2 and
integrate resourced information assets and enhance the operational unit's ability to operate in the information environment?

What level of interoperability does the FSF share with US forces to conduct Operations in the Information Environment?

Intelligence.

Does the FSF unit conduct intelligence operations?

Does the FSF component organize its forces to disseminate intelligence in actionable time frames?

Force Protection.

Does the FSF component evaluate and institute
 Active defensive measures?  Active safety measures?  Passive defensive measures?

Are there field health and sanitation measures and standards?

## Baseline Foreign Security Forces Unit-Level Assessment

An FSF unit-level assessment often requires baseline assessment to determine where an SCEP should begin. The baseline assessment seeks to answer questions regarding an FSF capability and identifies areas in which SC activities should focus. A base line assessment generally draws from information and data that speaks to the FSF's ability to achieve the DSR, provides analysis that validates assumptions made about the FSF during theater analysis and security role analysis, and is critical to the identification of capability gaps in the FSF unit. As mentioned at the beginning to this appendix, baseline assessment uses the analytical structure similar to the component-level assessment; consisting of institutional analysis, environmental analysis, organizational analysis, and operational analysis. The difference is that the unit-level lenses focus on a specific FSF unit and the accomplishment of a specific DSR. Baseline assessment may involve information and data collected from training engagements, SC Advisor team assessments, and training evaluations.

## Interim Progress Report

An IPR is a type of unit-level assessment conducted in Planning and Execution Cycle Step 6. IPRs are conducted for one of two purposes:


To provide feedback on the effectiveness of the SCEP to SC planners at the MARFOR (or
MCSCG who may be assisting the MARFOR) or,

To inform SC planners of FSF progression towards achievement of a DSR.
Assessing viability of the SCEP and an FSF unit's progress toward a DSR are not necessarily mutually exclusive. The IPR addresses both concerns, thereby providing a valuable feedback mechanism to MARFOR SC planners that will allow timely bottom-up refinement to an SC initiative. Typically, IPRs are written into the SCEP and are conducted on an annual basis, or as required by the CCMD commander/MARFOR commander. The IPR should be focused specifically on the event that has led to the planned IPR (typically a milestone) and that event's impact on accomplishment of the PN's DSR. In other words, if a DSR's end-state is access to an area or the building of a relationship with a PN the IPR should be specifically focused on that milestone. At a minimum, an IPR should contain the following:


Executive Summary. A concise summary of what was assessed.

Significant milestone achievements.

Status of SCEP progression (both schedule and resources).

Factors contributing to on-track or accelerated SCEP progression.

Factors and challenges contributing to schedule delays or resource shortfalls.

Conclusions - Status of FSF/PN progression toward the DSR.

Recommendations for SCEP adjustments (if any).

IPR conclusions that could provide a decision point for a commander to proceed as planned or adjust course.
The MARFOR planner may request support from the SC workforce when conducting an IPR.

## Advisor Team Assessment

The Marine Corps SC Planning and Execution Cycle is designed to provide the ability to apply rotational forces to achieve objectives with PNs and their FSFs (access, capability, or capacity). This requires that every rotation of Marine Corps forces understand their roles and responsibilities to conduct assessments. In the case of a DSR that requires a capability/capacity build the Advisor Team Assessment/ Evaluation compares an FSF unit's current level of proficiency with the desired level of proficiency, linked to an event card. Advisors determine current training proficiency levels by reviewing all available training evaluations. Each evaluation applies only to a portion of an organization's total proficiency at a specific time. Therefore, advisors must use all available evaluation data to develop an assessment of the organization's overall capability to accomplish each task in the MSTL. In addition to past tactical evaluations, future events could influence the assessment. For example, the projected personnel turnover rate or the fielding of new equipment could significantly affect the Advisor's assessment of the proficiency status during the upcoming training period. Leaders update the assessment at the beginning of each rotation, after major training events (e.g., a milestone), and at the conclusion of their rotation. MARFORs must provide assessment guidance to rotational forces based on current status of the FSF in order to help them develop indicators to measure. Typically, this is accomplished through the mission event card of the SC team, advisor team, SMEE, or other activity. Roles and responsibilities differ at each level. The following construct adheres to the Marine Corps Force Generation process of Commander's Certification, and systems approach to training.

Officer-in-charge/staff non-commissioned officer-in-charge/team leader

Conducts an event that confirms previous rotations progress with the FSF.

Conducts the advising roles (advise, support, liaison, assist) required of the SCEP, for the
event(s) assigned.

Monitors and assesses advisor training with the FSF, for example, training products and class
delivery.

Oversees PECL development for training and exercises conducted with the FSF.

Compiles the quantitative and qualitative results generated by advisor PECLs.

Writes an AAR that captures overall assessment of the team's progress with the FSF.

Coordinates with MARFOR/PN FSF to develop additional tasks specific to the FSF mission
(e.g., T&R-like tasks).
Advisor/Trainer

Develops standards based training in accordance with the Marine Corps UTM process that
matches the chaining and linking of required FSF events (tasks) to accomplish the DSR (as assigned in event card).

Develops, executes, and compiles PECLs for every training event (task) that occurs.

## Security Cooperation Engagement Plan Close-Out

An SCEP close-out report is a comprehensive report of all activities conducted in support of the SCEP, as well as all assessments of the FSF. A close-out report is required once the FSF achieve the DSR or when the MARFOR deems it necessary to curtail its engagements with an FSF unit in light of changes in the operational environment. At a minimum, a close-out report contains the following:


Executive Summary. A short, succinct summary (1-2 pages) of all actions executed.

Background. A detailed explanation of all actions taken during execution of the SCEP.

Milestone Achievements. A listing and explanations of all designated milestones and what they
accomplished, or not accomplished (and why) from the SCEP tracker.

Resource Management.

Forces utilized. The number of rotations, force type (MTT, SC Tm, SPMAGTF, Army, Navy, etc.), force strength (numbers), and structure (ranks).

Equipment delivered. FMS, DCS, EDS, etc.

Programs employed. IMET, Foreign Exchange, or any other established programs.

Fiscal Accounting. A complete listing of all resources expended. Estimated cost versus actual
cost must be represented.

Closeout Status. An explanation of the current status of the FSF and how the development and
employment of the capability transitioned from the United States to FSF. This section should include the capability developed, the degree to which it was developed, and the projected ability of the FSF to sustain the capability.

Enclosures. The initial assessment summary (CCMD), the component-level FSF assessment,
the unit-level FSF assessment, higher level supporting guidance, all FSF evaluations, IPRs, and rotational unit assessments and AARs.
A close-out report may include a final assessment of a milestone event that is tactically evaluated as a final measure of DSR achievement. Outputs from the tactical evaluation inform the SCEP close-out report. If a tactical evaluation is not necessary (e.g., a capability was not built) a close-out report omits a tactical evaluation and would instead be a compilation of previously conducted activities.

## Appendix E Foreign Security Force Training Evaluation Overview

This appendix highlights planning consideration and activities necessary for an SC planner and assessment team to conduct an FSF training evaluation. Such an evaluation will vary in scope and size depending on the mission requirements. The following content serves and a starting point to guide the training evaluation process. This appendix will discuss DSR and SCEP inputs in the evaluation, Military Security Tacks, Performance Evaluation checklists, and how the training evaluation supports Planning and Execution Cycle Step 3: Foreign Security Forces Unit-Level Assessments, critical outputs and the necessary content required for the evaluation report. The FSF training evaluation is the process of determining whether the unit can accomplish the training objectives related to a specific training event by comparing actual performance to the standards listed for that task. The drills and training exercises for a squad or crew are aimed at accomplishing the collective task(s) practiced in that drill/exercise. A training evaluation is not an assessment, however, it is a crucial tool in informing an assessor (and by extension the SC planner) of FSF's operational capability to accomplish warfighting functions at the tactical level. The relationship can be best surmised, "Because of this evaluation, I assess that..." A training evaluation can be utilized for all unit-level assessments to provide quantitative and qualitative information regarding tactical proficiency, provide feedback for milestones reached via IPRs, or to validate accomplishment of a DSR as part of a SCEP close-out. A training evaluation is conducted by the MARFOR or the advisor team, potentially with MCSCG's assistance, and should be properly scoped by the SC planner prior to execution of the evaluation.

## Military/Security Task List Tracker

MCSCG has developed an evaluation matrix called the Military/Security Task List Tracker (MSTL Tracker). It is a digital tool that records and analyzes the quantitative evaluation data captured by the PECLs to produce overall training readiness grades for the training unit and its subordinate units. The MSTL tracker consists of four components, as illustrated in Figure E-1.

individual is wounded starting

Four Components:
- Performance Evaluation Checklist (PECL)

  - Based on event components specified in


T&R manuals.

  - Provide assessors with a structured


mechanism to evaluate, record notes, and


debrief training.

- PECL Summary

  - Records grading data from PECLs.

- Enables assessor to summarize unit


performance and view trends across units.

- Military/Security Task List by Function

- Consolidates all data by warfighting function.

- Mission/Security Task List (MSTL) Summary

- Consolidates grading data.

- Computes unit performance averages and


combat readiness percentages (CRPs).
Performance Evaluation Checklist There is a PECL for each event listed in the evaluation. The purpose of the PECL is twofold: first, it enables an evaluator to conduct a standardized evaluation of a training unit using Marine Corps training standards; second, it assists the evaluator with providing structured qualitative feedback to the training unit based on the specific steps the unit succeeded or failed to perform. The evaluation team leader is responsible for the compilation of PECLs and must use these PECLs as a basis for opinions and recommendations expressed in the unit-level assessment report. The PECL (Figure E-2) contains three elements:

at CCP, and advise company leadership on evacuation priorities and numbers. higher headquarters for

individual is wounded starting individual is wounded starting


Evaluation Information: This section contains space to annotate the unit being trained, the
name of the evaluator, and the date of the training evaluation.

Event Information: This section describes the event being trained, the conditions under which
the event must be conducted, and the trained standards to be met. This section also annotates whether the event is coded for formal evaluation (e-coded).

Evaluation Section: This section contains a table with three columns.

Performance Steps: Lists all the individual events or steps the training unit must conduct to complete the training event.

Notes: Provides a space for the evaluator to record notes on the training unit for each performance step.

Proficiency: Provides space for the assessor to assign the unit a grade for each performance step. Evaluators assign a quantitative score to event components on the PECL. Grades are assigned according to the following scale and can be color coded. Figure E-3 below provides an example of color-coding associated to scoring categories:
 **Untrained** (Grade=0) the training unit did not adequately perform the performance step.
If the evaluator observes that the training unit did not execute the performance step, a grade of (0) is assigned.
 **Partially Trained** (Grade=1) the training unit conducted the performance step with
difficulty.
 **Trained** (Grade=2) the training unit demonstrated mastery of the performance step.  **Not Observed** (N/O) the assessor did not observe performance of the event. Nonobserved performance steps are left blank and the evaluation matrix is coded in such a way that they do not affect the MSTL's cumulative average.
Performance Evaluation Checklist Summary Tab The PECL Summary (Figure E-4) tabulates scores for all performance steps of a task. It then averages the performance steps and provides a score. The table is coded to ignore non-observed task components. The scores for each performance step are drawn directly from the PECL onhand at the evaluation. The PECL Summary is divided by level (e.g., 9000, 8000, 7000, 6000 etc.) into distinct tabs. The PECL Summary is the building block for the following tabs.

INF-MAN-7006: Conduct a Helicopter/tilt-rotor assault
Battalion
1. Conduct integrated planning.
2.00
2. Conduct IPB.
1.00
3. Conduct fire support planing.
1.00
4. Conduct fire support coordination.
1.00
5. Task organize forces.
2.00
6. Conduct ISR.
2.00
7. Establish Go/No Criteria. 8. Designate TRAP force.
9. Conduct Command and Control.
2.00
10. Treat and process casualties.
1.00
11. Process detainees. 12. Conduct Combat Service Support. 13. Send and receive required reports.
1.00
14. Transition to follow on operations,
as required.
INF-MAN-7006
1.45 2.00 1.00

Military/Security Task List By Function Tab The "MSTL by Function" tab compiles scores from all tasks (by level and by unit [e.g., a company]) across an MSTL and displays them by warfighting function. This serves as a data visualization tool for the analysis of FSF performance trends. The information generated through this optic is used to produce the qualitative narrative of the assessment report, in addition to identifying trends by functional area. Figure E-5 illustrates a sample MSTL by Function tab.

Battalion MSTs
Function
Code
Task
E-Coded
Supporting
Events
Battalion
Assessment
INF-C2-7001
Employ a command and control (C2) system
INF-C2-6001
1.80
INF-C2-7003
Establish a command post (CP)
INF-C2-6002
Yes
1.70
INF-C2-7004
Conduct comabt operations center (COC) operations
INF-C2-6002
Yes
1.71
INF-C2-7005
Conduct planning
INF-C2-6003
Yes
1.64
INF-C2-7006
Conduct assessment
INF-C2-6004
Yes
0.75
INF-C2-7007
Conduct information management (IM)
INF-C2-6005
1.10
INF-C2-7009
Integrate enabler support
INF-C2-6006
1.50
INF-C2-7010
Execute a command and control (C2) process
INF-C2-6007
Commanding and Control
INF-C2-7011
Coordinate force deployment planning and execution (FDP&E)
INF-C2-7013
Integrate Marine Air Command and Control System support (MACCS)
INF-C2-6003
INF-C2-7014
Displace the command post (CP)
INF-C2-6002
INF-COND-7001
Conduct a forced march
Yes
Cond.
INF-CSS-7001
Conduct logistics planning
INF-CSS-6001
INF-CSS-7002
Conduct combat service support (CCS)
INF-CSS-6001
Yes
Logistics
INF-CSS-7003
Process casualties
INF-CSS-6002
1.60
INF-CSS-7004
Conduct detainee operations
INF-CSS-6003
1.50
INF-FP-7001
Conduct force protection
INF-FP-6001
INF-FP-7002
Employ Operational Security (OPSEC) measures
INF-FP-6002
Force
Protection
INF-FP-7004
Conduct chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear (CBRN) operations
INF-FP-6004
SQDR-OPS-7005
Establish base/airfield security operations
HQCO-ABGD-6001
Yes
2.00
INF-FSPT-7001
Conduct fire support planning
INF-FSPT-6001
Yes
1.20
INF-FSPT-7002
Conduct fire support coordination
INF-FSPT-6002
Fires
INF-FSPT-7003
Conduct decide, detect, deliver, assess (D3A) targeting
INF-FSPT-6003
INF-FSPT-7004
Conduct information operations
INF-FSPT-6004
INF-FSPT-7005
Integrate electronic warfare
INF-FSPT-6005
INF-INT-7001
Conduct intelligence operations
INF-INT-6001
Intelligence
INF-INT-7002
Direct reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) operations
INF-MAN-6217
INF-MAN-7001
Conduct a ground attack
INF-MAN-6001
INF-MAN-7002
Conduct a movement to contact
INF-MAN-6002
INF-MAN-7003
Conduct a pursuit
INF-MAN-6001
INF-MAN-7004
Conduct exploitation
INF-MAN-6001
INF-MAN-7005
Conduct an armored/infantry operation
INF-MAN-6005
INF-MAN-7006
Conduct a helicopter/tilt-rotor assault
INF-MAN-6003
Yes
1.45
INF-MAN-7007
Conduct a bypass operation
INF-MAN-6205
INF-MAN-7101
Conduct an area defense
INF-MAN-7102
Conduct a mobile defense
INF-MAN-6101
INF-MAN-6102
INF-MAN-7103
Conduct retrograde
INF-MAN-6103
INF-MAN-7104
Conduct security operations
INF-MAN-6212
Yes
INF-MAN-7202
Conduct mounted operations
INF-MAN-6212
INF-MAN-7203
Occupy an assembly area
INF-MAN-6203
INF-MAN-7204
Conduct a relief in place (RIP)
INF-MAN-6204
INF-MAN-7205
Conduct a gap crossing
INF-MAN-6205
INF-MAN-7206
Conduct passage of lines
INF-MAN-6206
INF-MAN-7207
Conduct a linkup
INF-MAN-6207
INF-MAN-7208
Conduct obstacle breaching
INF-MAN-6208
Maneuver
INF-MAN-7210
Conduct reserve operations
INF-MAN-6210
INF-MAN-7211
Conduct rear area operations
INF-C2-6007
INF-MAN-7212
Conduct route reconnaissance operations
INF-C2-6009
INF-MAN-7214
Employ scout snipers
INF-MAN-6217
INF-MAN-7215
Control an area
INF-MAN-6215
INF-MAN-7301
Conduct an amphibious assault
INF-MAN-6301
INF-MAN-7302
Develop a landing plan
INF-C2-6003
INF-MAN-7303
Conduct an amphibious withdrawal
INF-MAN-6103
INF-MAN-7304
Conduct an amphibious raid
INF-MAN-6004
INF-MAN-7305
Conduct noncombatant evacuation operations
INF-MAN-7306
Conduct an amphibious landing
INF-MAN-7401
Conduct civil military operations (CMO)
INF-MAN-7402
Restore civil security
INF-MAN-7403
Support the establishment of civil control
INF-MAN-7404
Support the restoration of essential services
INF-MAN-7405
Support local governance
INF-MAN-7406
Support economic development
INF-MAN-7408
Train and mentor foreign security forces
INF-TRNG-7001
Manage unit training and readiness
1.44
Yes
1.71
Yes
1.67
Yes
1.13
Yes
1.43
Yes
1.53
Yes
1.71
1.67
1.64

Military/Security Task List Summary Tab The Military/Security Task List Summary tab provides performance scores on designated e-coded events, overall performance of tasks, and a Combat Readiness Percentage (CRP) of e-coded events, if required. The information generated from the MSTL Tracker is used to produce the qualitative narrative of the assessment report. It also serves as a data visualization tool for the analysis of performance trends of the FSF. The MSTL Summary tab contains the MSTL Summary and the MST Summary. The MSTL Summary shows the FSF unit's overall performance and CRP at a glance. The MST summary displays all the events and their scores that generated an MST's score and CRP. The Combat Readiness Percentage (CRP) is calculated by adding the percentage of each completed and current (within sustainment interval) e-coded training event. The percentage for each MST is calculated the same way and all are added together and divided by the number of MSTs to determine unit CRP. For ease of calculation, we will say that each MST has four e-coded events, each contributing 25 percent toward the completion of the MST. If the unit has completed and is current on three of the four e-coded events for a given MST, then they have completed 75 percent of the MST. The CRP for each MST is added together and divided by the number of MSTs to get unit CRP; unit CRP is the average of MST CRP. Figure E-6, is an example of a Military/ Security Task List Summary. Figure E-7 is an MST Summary.

MSTL SUMMARY
Code
Task
Score
CRP
MST 1
Deploy forces/conduct maneuver
1.44
90%
MST 2
Conduct offensive operations
1.49
100%
MST 3
Conduct base defense
1.66
100%
MST 4
Conduct military operations in urbanized terrain (MOUT)
1.18
100%
MST 5
Conduct route clearance operations
1.64
100%
MST 6
Conduct stability operations
1.67
100%
MST 7
Integrate and operate with joint/combined forces
1.13
100%
MSTL CRP
1.46
100%
MST 2: Conduct Offensive Operations
Override
Code
Task
Score
Final Score
INF-MAN-7001
Conduct a ground attack
1.53
1.53
INF-MAN-7006
Conduct a helicopter/tilt rotor-borne assault
1.45
1.45
Average Performance
1.49
1.49
100%
CRP (% of E-coded events scored 1.00 or above)
100%

## Foreign Security Force Tactical Evaluation Report

A tactical evaluation report should be thoughtful, well-researched, well-organized, and should objectively evaluate FSF performance. The report should contain the following:


Executive Summary. A one-to-two page overview of the background, evaluation purpose,
objectives, assessment method, conclusions, and recommendations.

Operational Assessment of Military/Security Task List. Address all Training and Readiness
Standards assessed in the conduct of the exercise.

Methods:

Explain assessment methodology in detail.

Disclose assessment limitations, particularly those associated with the assessment methodology (e.g., SME shortfalls, exercise shortfalls, resource shortfalls).

Conclusion. Present findings as analyzed facts, evidence and data supported by strong
quantitative or qualitative evidence and not anecdotes, hearsay, or opinion.

Recommendations:

Support recommendations with specific findings.

Provide recommendations that are action oriented, practical, specific, and define who is responsible for action.

Annexes:

Evaluation matrix.

Full description of evaluation methodology.

A list of all references (e.g., T&R manuals).

## Training Evaluation Inputs Into The Security Cooperation Planning Process

The training evaluation is by design quantitative and qualitative in nature and therefore can be applied to each part of a unit-level FSF assessment (FSF base line assessment, an IPR, and SC/ Advisor team's assessments) by provide objecting data identifying capabilities and capability gaps. The training evaluation should at minimum provide an objective percentage or number value that highlights the performance of assigned tasks define in an engagement plan. It should be accompanied by a qualitative report that provides an objective explanation of the quantitative rating and recommendations for areas that FSF should sustain or improve to achieve their mission objectives and objective data to support the later solution analysis planning step.

## Section Ii. Terms And Definitions

advisorA security cooperation role with a goal to teach, coach, and influence foreign security force organizations in a way that cultivates their professional skills, behaviors, and attitudes in order to develop desired capabilities. (As contained in this glossary, this term and its definition are applicable to this publication only.) alliance The relationship that results from a formal agreement between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives that further the common interests of the members. (DOD Dictionary) assessment1. A continuous process that measures the overall effectiveness of employing joint force capabilities during military operations. 2. Determination of the progress toward accomplishing a task, creating a condition, or achieving an objective. 3. Analysis of the security, effectiveness, and potential of an existing or planned intelligence activity. 4. Judgment of the motives, qualifications, and characteristics of present or prospective employees or "agents." (DOD Dictionary) campaign planA joint operation plan for a series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic or operational objectives within a given time and space. (DOD Dictionary) capabilityThe ability to execute a specified course of action. (A capability may or may not be accompanied by an intention.) (MCRP 1-10.2) capacityThe ability of a foreign security forces organization or partner nation to replicate and self-sustain a given capability over time or to export a given capability in support of regional or global interests. (As contained in this glossary, this term and its definition are applicable to this publication only.)
chief of missionThe principal officer in charge of a diplomatic facility of the United States, including any individual temporarily assigned to be in charge of such a facility. Also called COM. (DOD Dictionary) closeout reportA final report that addresses all actions and activities executed in support of a security cooperation plan, which provides an accounting of all resources expended and analysis/ assessments of the effectiveness of the plan. (As contained in this glossary, this term and its definition are applicable to this publication only.) combinedA term identifying two or more forces or agencies of two or more allies operating together. (DOD Dictionary) componentOne of the subordinate organizations that constitute a joint force. (DOD
Dictionary, part one of a two-part definition) component-level assessmentIdentifies current state partner nation or foreign security forces component-level capabilities through four types of discrete analysis (institutional, environmental, organizational, and operational) to help determine a desired future state in security role analysis. (*As contained in this glossary, this term and its definition are applicable to this publication only.*) country team The senior, in-country, United States coordinating and supervising body, headed by the chief of the United States diplomatic mission, and composed of the senior member of each represented United States department or agency, as desired by the chief of the United States diplomatic mission. Also called CT. (DOD Dictionary)
defense institution buildingSecurity cooperation activities conducted to establish or reform the capacity and capabilities of a partner nation's defense institutions at the ministerial/ department, military staff, and Service Headquarters levels. Also called DIB. (DOD Dictionary).

desired security roleThe role assigned to a foreign security forces organization after analyzing the common objectives of all stakeholders and to meet security cooperation purposes (relationship, access, capability, capacity). Also called DSR. (As contained in this glossary, this term and its definition are applicable to this publication only.) foreign assistance Assistance to foreign nations ranging from the sale of military equipment and support for foreign internal defense to donations of food and medical supplies to aid survivors of natural and man-made disasters that may be provided through development assistance, humanitarian assistance, and security assistance. (DOD Dictionary) foreign internal defenseSee DOD Dictionary for core definition. Marine Corps amplification follows.) Participation by civilian, military, and law enforcement agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness,   insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security. Also called FID. (MCRP 1-10.2)
foreign military sales That portion of United States security assistance for sales programs that require agreements/contracts between the United States Government and an authorized recipient government or international organization for defense articles and services to be provided to the recipient for current stocks or new procurements under Department of Defense-managed contracts, regardless of the source of financing. Also called FMS. (DOD Dictionary)
foreign security forcesDefense and security establishments, or forces, of a foreign state, including: military, paramilitary, police, and constabulary forces, and the military and civilian agencies that primarily perform disaster or emergency response functions in a foreign state. Also called FSF. (As contained in this glossary, this term and its definition are applicable to this publication only.) foreign security force assessmentA tailored analysis of foreign security forces' based on mission and tasks conducted at various levels of command that validates capability standards, identifies gaps, determines operational risks associated with the gaps, and provides recommendations to address the gaps. (As contained in this glossary, this term and its definition are applicable to this publication only.)
humanitarian and civic assistanceAssistance to the local populace, specifically authorized by Title 10, United States Code, Section 401, and funded under separate authorities, provided by predominantly United States forces in conjunction with military operations. Also called HCA. (DOD Dictionary) initial assessmentInformation collected before or at the start of a significant security cooperation initiative, program, activity, etc. that provides a basis for planning, monitoring, or evaluating subsequent progress or impact. (DODI 5132.14) interagencyOf or pertaining to United States Government agencies and departments, including the Department of Defense. See also **interagency coordination**. (DOD Dictionary) interagency coordinationWithin the context of Department of Defense involvement, the coordination that occurs between elements of Department of Defense, and engaged US Government agencies for the purpose of achieving an objective. (DOD Dictionary) interim progress reportAssesses the progress of the security cooperation plan to determine whether programmatic milestones for the foreign security forces have been achieved within anticipated timeframes and budgets. Also called IPR. (As contained in this glossary, this term and its definition are applicable to this publication only.) international military education and trainingFormal or informal instruction provided to foreign military students, units, and forces on a non-reimbursable (grant) basis by offices or employees of the United States, contract technicians, and contractors. Instruction may include correspondence courses; technical, educational, or informational publications; and media of all kinds. Also called **IMET**. (DOD Dictionary) jointConnotes activities, operations, organizations, etc., in which elements of two or more Military Departments participate. (DOD Dictionary) materielAll items necessary to equip, operate, maintain, and support military activities without distinction as to its application for administrative or combat purposes. (DOD Dictionary) measure of effectiveness An indicator used to measure a current system state, with change indicated by comparing multiple observations over time. Also called MOE. (DOD Dictionary)
measure of performanceAn indicator used to measure a friendly action that is tied to measuring task accomplishment. Also called MOP. (DOD Dictionary)
military or security taskCollective foreign security forces unit-level responsibility that comprises capability sets and associated sub-capabilities. (As contained in this glossary, this term and its definition are applicable to this publication only.) mission essential task listThe list of a command's essential tasks with appropriate conditions and performance standards to assure successful mission accomplishment. Also called **METL**. (MCRP 1-10.2) multinationalBetween two or more forces or agencies of two or more nations or coalition partners. (DOD Dictionary) nongovernmental organizationA private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; or promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society. Also called NGO. (DOD Dictionary) objective1. The clearly defined, decisive, and attainable goal toward which every operation is directed. 2. The specific target of the action taken which is essential to the commander's plan. (DOD Dictionary) partner nation 1. A nation that the United States works with in a specific situation or operation. 2. In security cooperation, a nation with which the Department of Defense conducts security cooperation activities. Also called PN. (DOD Dictionary)
security assistanceGroup of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, lease, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives; and those that are funded and authorized through the Department of State to be administered by Department of Defense/Defense Security Cooperation Agency are considered part of security cooperation. Also called SA. See also security cooperation. (DOD Dictionary) security cooperationAll Department of Defense interactions with foreign security establishments to build security relationships that promote specific United States security interests, develop allied and partner nation military and security capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide United States forces with peacetime and contingency access to allied and partner nations. Also called SC. (DOD Dictionary) security cooperation engagement planA comprehensive but flexible plan that combines methodology, strategy, monitoring and assessments across a timeline to conduct security cooperation activities with a partner nation, helping them meet the requirements to fill a desired security role. Also called **SCEP**. (As contained in this glossary, this term and its definition are applicable to this publication only.) security cooperation organization A Department of Defense element that is part of the United States diplomatic mission located in a foreign country to carry out security assistance and cooperation management functions under the supervision and coordination authority of the senior defense official/defense attache (DOD Dictionary). Security Cooperation Planning and Execution CycleThe Marine Corps' six-step process to guide, plan, and monitor security cooperation activities and processes with foreign security forces to accomplish mutual objectives of the United States Government and partner nations. Also called **SCPEC**. (Upon promulgation of this publication, this term and definition are approved for use and will be included in the next edition of MCRP 1-10.2)
security force assistanceThe Department of Defense activities that support  the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions. Also called SFA. (DOD Dictionary)
security role analysisThe examination of the common security objectives among United States and partner nation stakeholders for the purpose of defining which security cooperation activities to conduct with a partner nation to attain a desired security role. (As contained in this glossary, this term and its definition are applicable to this publication only.) security sector reform A comprehensive set of programs and activities undertaken by a host nation to improve the way it provides safety, security, and justice. Also called SSR.

(DOD Dictionary) senior advisorsMarines tasked to organize, train, equip and mentor senior foreign security forces personnel while commanding and controlling the influence efforts of the Marine Corps team. (As contained in this glossary, this term and its definition are applicable to this publication only.)
solutions analysisThe data-based development of proposed security cooperation engagement plan activities designed to address gaps and risks in foreign security forces capabilities as identified during a foreign security forces assessment. (As contained in this glossary, this term and its definition are applicable to this publication only.) theater analysisA continuous analytical review of stakeholder guidance and available resources to build an understanding of theater priorities, objectives, constraints and restraints. (As contained in this glossary, this term and its definition are applicable to this publication only.)

## References And Related Publications Federal Issuances

United States Code
Title 10
Armed Forces
Title 22
Chapter 32, Foreign Relations and Intercourse
Title 22
Chapter 39, Arms Export Control
Title 50
War and National Defense

## National Security Publications Guidance For Employment Of The Force

The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) 2017 The National Defense Strategy of the United States The National Military Strategy of the United States Joint Strategic Campaign Plan DOD Guidance for Security Cooperation Theater and Functional Campaign Plans Country-Specific Security Cooperation Sections Executive Order
13526
Classified National Security Information

## Presidential Directive National Security Presidential Directive 22, Combating Trafficking In Persons

The National Security Strategy of the United States Presidential Policy Directive 23, Security Sector Assistance

## Miscellaneous United States Government Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plan For Support To Afghanistan Department Of State Quadrennial Diplomacy And Development Review

Joint Regional Strategy Integrated Country Strategy Strategy for Active Security Plan

## Department Of Defense

Department of Defense Directives (DODDs)
5100.01
Functions of the DOD and Its Major Components
5105.75
Department of Defense Operations at US Embassies - deleted
5132.03
DOD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation
5205.82
Defense Institution Building
5230.11
Disclosure of Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations
5230.20
Visits and Assignments of Foreign Nationals
5530.03
International Agreements deleted
Department of Defense Instructions (DODIs)
2200.01
Combating Trafficking in Persons (CTIP)
2205.02
Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA) Activities
3000.05
Stability Operations
3000.11
Management of DOD IW and Security Force Assistance (SFA) Capabilities
5132.13
Staffing of Security Cooperation Organizations (SCOs) and the Selection and Training of Security Cooperation Personnel
5132.14
Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation for the SC Enterprise
Defense Security Cooperation Agency Manual
5105.38-M
Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM)

## Chairman Of The Joint Chiefs Of Staff

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI)
1630. 01B
Afghanistan/Pakistan Hand Program
2120.01D
Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements
3210.06A
Irregular Warfare

## Joint Issuances

Joint Publications (JPs)
1
Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States
1-02
Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms
2-0
Joint Intelligence
3-0
Joint Operations
3-02
Amphibious Operations
3-02.1
Amphibious Embarkation and Debarkation
3_07
Stability
| 3-09   | Joint Fire Support        |
|--------|---------------------------|
| 3-20   | Security Cooperation      |
| 3-22   | Foreign Internal Defense  |
| 3-34   | Joint Engineer Operations |
| 4-0    | Joint Logistics           |

## Miscellaneous Joint Concept For Integrated Campaigning A Cooperative Strategy For 21St Century Seapower

Maritime Security Cooperation Policy: An Integrated USMC-USN-USCG Approach

## Secretary Of The Navy Instructions (Secnavinsts)

| 5510.34_                                                                     | Disclosure of Classified Military Information and Controlled Unclassified    |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Information to Foreign Governments, International Organizations, and Foreign |                                                                              |
| Representatives                                                              |                                                                              |
| 5710.25_                                                                     | International Agreements                                                     |

## Navy/Marine Corps Departmental Publications (Navmc)

| 1553.3_   | Systems Approach to Training User's Guide                       |
|-----------|-----------------------------------------------------------------|
| 3500.37_  | Train the Trainer Training and Readiness Manual (T3 T&R Manual) |
| 3500.59_  | Security Cooperation (SC) Training and Readiness (T&R) Manual   |
| 5710.6_   | Marine Corps Security Cooperation                               |

## United States Marine Corps

Marine Corps Doctrinal Publications (MCDPs)
1
Warfighting
1-0
Marine Corps Operations
1-1
Strategy
1-2
Campaigning
1-3
Tactics
2
Intelligence
3
Expeditionary Operations
4
Logistics
5
Planning
6
Command and Control
Marine Corps Warfighting Publications (MCWPs)
2-10A.3
Intelligence Operations
3-10
Ground Combat Operations
3-20
Aviation Operations
3-02
Insurgencies and Countering Insurgency
5-10
Marine Corps Planning Process
6-10
Leading Marines
7-10
Marine Corps Componency
Marine Corps Reference Publications (MCRPs)
1-10.2
Marine Corps Supplement to the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms
3-0A
Unit Training Management Guide
3-03D.1
MTTP Advising Foreign Security Forces
3-11.2A
Marine Troop Leader's Guide
5-12A
Operational Terms and Graphics
1-10.1
Organization of the United States Marine Corps
12-10A
Mountain Warfare Operations
12-10B.1
Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT)
Marine Corps Tactical Publications (MCTPs)
3-40B
Tactical-Level Logistics
8-10B
How to Conduct Training
12-10D
Desert Operations
Marine Corps Orders (MCOs)
P3500.72_
Marine Corps Ground Training and Readiness (T&R) Program
1520.11_
International Affairs Program (IAP)
1553.1_
The Marine Corps Training and Education System
1553.2_
Marine Corps Formal School Management Policy
1553.4_
Professional Military Education (PME)
3000.11_
Marine Corps Ground Equipment Condition and Supply Materiel Readiness Reporting (MRR)
3120.13_
Policy for Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU) and Marine Expeditionary Units (Special Operations Capable) MEU(SOC)
3120.12
Marine Corps GFM and Force Synchronization
3500.26_
Universal Naval Task List (UNTL)
3501.1_
Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluation System (MCCRES)
3502.6
Marine Corps Force Generation Process (FGP)
3504.1
Marine Corps Lessons Learned Program (MCLLP) and the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL)
3570.1_
Range Safety
3821.2_
The Defense Attache System
5311.1_
Total Force Structure Process (TFSP)
| 5320.12_   | Precedence Levels for Manning and Staffing                              |
|------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 5510.20_   | Disclosure of Military Information to Foreign Governments and Interests |
| 5530.14_   | Marine Corps Physical Security Program Manual                           |
| 5710.6_    | Marine Corps Security Cooperation                                       |
| 6100.13    | Marine Corps Physical Fitness and Combat Fitness Tests                  |

Marine Administrative Message (MARADMIN)
348/19
Implementation of the Regional, Culture, and Language Familiarization Program

## Concepts Marine Corps Operating Concepts: Assuring Littoral Access...Proven Crisis Response United States Navy

Naval Operations Concept 2010: Implementing the Maritime Strategy, 3rd edition

## Miscellaneous

Defense Security Cooperation Agency Handbook 7003 Military Articles & Services List (MASL) Force Synchronization Playbook Management of Security Cooperation (The Green Book)

## To Our Readers

Changes: Readers of this publication are encouraged to submit suggestions and changes to Doctrine Branch via e-mail: doctrine@usmc.mil. Suggestions and changes must include the following information:

-    Location of change
        Publication number and title Current page number Paragraph number (if applicable) Line number Figure or table number (if applicable) -    Nature of change
        Addition/deletion of text Proposed new text
Additional copies: If this publication is not an electronic only distribution, a printed copy may be obtained from Marine Corps Logistics Base, Albany, GA 31704-5001, by following the instructions in MCBul 5600, Marine Corps Doctrinal Publications Status. An electronic copy may be obtained from the United States Marine Corps Doctrine web page: https://homeport.usmc.mil/sites/mcdoctrine/SitePages/Home.aspx A non-cost copy of this document is available at:
https://www.marines.mil/News/Publications/MCPEL/

## Copyright Information

This document is a work of the United States Government and the text is in the public domain in the United States. Subject to the following stipulation, it may be distributed and copied:

-    Copyrights to graphics and rights to trademarks/Service marks included in this
document are reserved by original copyright or trademark/Service mark holders or their assignees, and are used here under a license to the Government and/or other permission.
-    The use or appearance of United States Marine Corps publications on a non-Federal
Government website does not imply or constitute Marine Corps endorsement of the distribution service.