DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
Headquarters United States Marine Corps Washington, DC 20380-0001

## Foreword I. Purpose

Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication (FMFRP) 12-25, The Guerrilla - And How To EigHim, is published to ensure the retention and dissemination of useful information which is not intended tobecoine doctrine or to be published in Fleet Marine Force manuals. FMFRPs in the 12 series are a special category:
reprints of historical works which are not available elsewhere.

## 2. Scope

This publication is a compilation of articles by a wide variety of authors about guerrilla warfare. It addresses historical guerrilla campaigns, strategies to be used against guerrillas, and other points of interest dealing with guerrilla warfare. These ideas on guerrilla warfare will give today's military professional an excellent basis for formulating an idea of the modern day threat.

## 3. Certification

Reviewed and approved this date.

## By Direction Of The Commandant Of The Marine Corps

                                          M. P. SULLIVAN
                                    Major General, U.S. Marine Corps
                                   Deputy Commander for Warfighting
                               Marine Corps Combat Development Command
                                          Quantico, Virginia
              "n/,',
DISTRIBUTION:
               IFs/

Printed with permission of the Marine Corps Association, publishers of the Marine Cores Gazette, Quantico, Virginia

## Introduction

lii 'Ci}ioiis rotlay tliiCItCti Iieetli,tit iii ((Ill 'oiId. ()tie-tlic lOOittegatoii hy(llOgCli l)flhl)FC(ltlitCS VSt rC5(JtlICCS of tech
iiolot', eliot, ItitI iii(,iie'. It is an tiltittt.itc Vca)oii (if civilii_etl anti SCiCtiti(i tttiii.

HIC othera hail atid
(if wood buried III a 11CC 1i dy._s (IC(ej)tively simple, the \'ca)()ti of a peasant.

In tare aoceInent, the two leaders of the ((lily countries able so far to llIaiieuvcr in space have (lirected the attention of their to1) advisers to that rice paddy. Other deterrents, say President Kcrittcdv, hc:VC the (.mItllluhIists rio strotigcr fount of war. I Jis
toty, says (liairuiaziKhrushchev, lutist t)ritig YaIS (If ''hii)CratiOll,''
a fortit (if \ arfare th;it the ''pcace_loviltg'' Soviets may Support without inconSistency -according to Conlmutinisr dogtmma.

A recmmiplasizcd nhissioli lotthe Amimericami fighting titan is
1)haih): Prepai to master the guerrilla. lo bear the guicrrill:m on his own ground, the 1mm-st essential is kiiowledgekiiowhedge about the enemy hiimiisclf, his mmmcthiods, streligt Its, v,cakmiesses, tactics, auth tcchinR1tmes. Mill-c than that, to beat the guerrilla miteans to tight riot in the sharp black mmmd 'hite of foritmal commibar, bitt iii
1
gray, fuzzy ilisctmrity where politics affect tactics and economics inilitictice strategy.

Fhie soldier must fuse wit hi m tie statesmitan, the tttrti ,ioliticiati.

'I'o win, the soldier lutist thiiil amid oiidcistaiid, mmmd his odds
'ill limiprove to the ext cut that lie has done his hiotimework before lie arrives on the battlefield. Traditionally, iiiilitary knowledge, an(l even foimuml doctrine, has been aired thirotmghi the open pages of the proIc'siouah mutihitam)'
jotmmmials: Arm)', Air loice, Naval l-iistiiute Pro-eedings, tlithtary Rcv,ew, Air Uiiiveisity Quarterly, Infantry, A-rmo-ramid time Marine Corps Gazette. Fortunately, in this critical "dccade of the guerrilla," an even wider audience is available through coittitiercially published books.

Such interest in iiiilitary problems is recent, as the history of the Marine Corps Association attests. It was s1)Urred into being on April 25,
1913, by a Marine with a vision: the late, great Corn
itiandant General John A. I cjeuiie. lie was only a colonel then, I nit lie saw clearly i great tiCC(l for bet tei military education, for professional thought, for fi tnt oat tonal policies and supporting iiiilitary doctrines. A prolessioital journal, lie believed, vasaiIrst step.

So the Gazette was founded andsomehowsupported by a minuscule Corps with 400 officers, few of t heiti more than high
school graduates. In its pages, General I ejeunc, aided by that rare visionary Lieutenant Colonel "Pete" Ellis, issued a message repeat
cdl)': War with Japan would come, amphibious var; Marines iiiust work nov to forge an amphibious weapon, the Fleet Marine I'orces. (Oddly enough, three decades of guerrilla war in Latin Attierica constituted the major obstacle to implementation of his weapon.) The anlphul)ious victories of World War II are now history, history written iii part by mmiiig Marines who fitted togetlieroftcii in the pages of the Gazeuethe tiny, essential pieces that completed the mosaic of amphibious capability. The road to Tokyo had been itiapped and charted in t lie 1920's and p:t'ed in the 1930's.

same pattern has been true in unconventional warfare.

Flic threat is clear in the 1960's, but strong warnings were issued a decade and two decades ago. Fortunately for the free world, the military journals contain in their files a rich lode of study, analysis, and commentary which today's students may quickly mine and refine.

'I'wo yeats ago, early in 1960, the Gazette Editorial Board began intensive work oii a special issue designed to dramatize the guerrilla threat o long obscured by nuclear clouds. This issue, which appeared in January,
196?, attracted not ICC
anti pl:mise far beyond our titodest hopes. For we well knew how much had been left out, excellent muateiial that begged for renewed attention. But a tiny journal with a circulation of 25,000 must watch its budget, count its pages like diamonds. That is why we are most grateful to Frederick A. Praeger for giving our authors thus chance to reach their deservedly widcr audienceand in a dinalde form.

J tist Who arc o hcsc author's? I .ct us discuss one. 'I'he first note of wa ruling about unconventional warfare was sounded in our p'g by Brigaolicr General Saininici B. Griffith II, US\IC (Ret.), in 1911. A ithooi1li lie was lien hUt a Captain, his cointrihiution was uuiassive---nlnc flrt trannslattuni (if tine writings of \Iaii 'l'scnnniig, stirIy tine keystone to all', sItRiv (if (lie gucrrilla.

lo that (Iistiungtmislned comnihnat veteran and thinker, arid to the other authors\'larincsitnct friends of the Marineswino in.iadc this work possible, these pages are gratefully dedicated.

1'. N. G.

## Contents Introduct'Ion V

I
TIlE 1'IIF()RY ANI) TilE ThREAT
3
MAO'S Pni
I KR ON Cu u:RKI ILA WAR ir(rns!rtL'd by Brigadier General Sgr,rn,el B. Griffith II
5
TIME,
SI'Acu,
ANt)
WILl.:
111K
POlITICOMIliTARY
ViEws or MAO TsI-1'uNG E. L. Kaizenbach, Jr.
II
INTERNAl. AfAR: Fiii IIr' Coz%I M UNIST lAcTIC
Roger JIilsmern
GUERRILLA \VARFARE AND U.S. MIlITARY Pou.ucv:
A
S'ruDY Peter t'aret and Jo/y,, IV. Shy
37
GUERRII.I.A WARFAIW IN UNDFRIWVFI.OPKI) A REAS
JV. H". Rostow
5-I
H
WINNING IN 1TIE MOUN]AINS-GRKKCE
63
1Il1
\VAR (:olonel I. C. illui'iay
65
III
\VINNIN(; IN i'I IF JUNGLF-i\II .A\'A
Iii
Vic-roity IN t'1AI.AYA
Lieutenant Colonel Rowland S. N. l laiis
115
l\'
LOSING IN 'II IL JUNGLEINI)( )CI IINA
145
INSIDE Till,: VIrTMINII General La Ntuyeii (iIil/;
1-17
Srui:i'r \'Vi,t tour Joy Bernard I?. Fall
I 7H
V
WAR, REVOLUTION, ANI) TERRORRUSSIA,
CUBA, ANI) CYPRUS
199
O,tflAiNG Sovii.r GuF;nIuI.LAs Ernst von I)ohnanyi
201
I low CAsI'Iio WON I)ickey CI.apeIIc
21
I I:HI(OR IN Cv I'IUIS L1L'uIL'mus! Colonel It. I .S. (ioisrlay
232
VI
SMALL UNITS \VIN SMALL WARS
249
MARINES, GUERRIllAS, ANt) Sri.i.i. \'VAIs
Major Michael Spark
25
COM ttr HELICOPTERS IN A i.;iiu
Major Ililaire ltetbouart
260
S,.IAII.UNII OI'I:lAnoNs 1ihTrine Corps schools
270
RICOMMENL)EI) RFAI)ING
30H

# Th1 Guerrilla An ) How To Fig Fit Him

## I

# The Thiory Ani) Tfl E Threat

1\IAO'S Pitt t14 I IR (IN ( u IR I I LA VAR
riauisLited lt>
(;ciiciil S. U. ( riIlith II, tJSI\l(
( Ict.

E'Irvii, SIACE, ANt> Vti.i.:
IliE PoIITIcol\ lii.ifRv \nII,:wS (ti i\ lAO
'isuiu I..

I
I(atzcuh.ich, Jr.

INIEItNAI. \\TAIt:
I iii: i'4iv (()rI I UNIST lActic Roger I lilsinan
(;ulltItII.I.A Sv/AItIAI(E ANU U.S. 1 Ii IITARY POlICY: A STUDY
I'ctct Paret and John \V. Shy
(LJEiuu lI.A
FARI I N (JNI)FRI)EvI.;I,OPI:I)
A flEAS
S.V 'SAJ. Rostow
'I liese autlu>rs need I it tIe iiitrodtictioii. Ceiicra I C riIflth yOU have just iiicr. \'/c present here a digest of his translation of t lao. I us complete translation, w'ith a cowprchcnsive new' I tittmliictioii, is available in l)OOI foriti: Mao Tsetung on Guerrilla IVar fare
(Ircderick A. Praegcr, 1961).

Dr. Katzenhach is I)cputy Assistant Secretary of I )cfensc for M aitpower and lAltIcation, a student of guerrilla war for imiitv years, 8(1(1 a Marine Reserve colonel.

Mr. I Iilsniaii is l)ircctor of Intelligence and Research for the l)cpartmiient of State. [Ic has been a guerrilla ltiiiiself, as lie states iii Iiis.irticle, originally a spccch (lelivere(l A ugust I, 1961, to the Institute of \'Vorld Affairs, iii San i)iego. lie has written the Foreword for an iIII1)oII;lot addition to giiciiill:iw;irfaie litcr;i
tu.rc: People's IVir, People's Army: The I',et Cong Insurrection l lailual for Underdeveloped Countries (I' rederick A. Praege r,
1962).

l)r. Parer and I )m. Shy are historians at Princeton University with a special interest in current dcfense problems. Their views unconventional war arc fully developed iii a i'ecent lH)Ok, Guerrillas in the 1960's (Frederick A. Praegcr, 1962).

I )r. Rostow's article WIS tailored front a widely acclaimed talk he gave when he was Special Assistant for National Security Affairs to the President of the United States. lie has since become Cltair,iian of the State 1 )epartnient Policy Planning Council.

# Mao's Primer On Guerri Ili \Va * 1Rans1Atcd By Brigadier (;1Nfiai. Samuel U. (N Ffttii It

Without a lx)llticaI goal, guerrilla warfare ittust fail, as it must ii its l)OlltiCal ()I)JCCIiVCS (10 nOt coiticiule with the aSpirations of the people and their sympathy, cooperation, and assist atice caturuot lie gaintil. The essence of guerrilla warfare is tiuts revohiitioiiary in character.

On tile other 11.111(1, Iii
.1 vat Of couiittciie'ohit iOl1l%' Ilattlic, ilucre is place for guerrilla hostilities. Ikcaosc guerrilla warfare hasically derives from the masses and is supported by them, it can neither exist nor flourish if it separates itschf from their sympathies and cooperation.

There are those who (1(1 flOt comprcliciid guerrilla action, amid who therefore (It) I)Ot titiderstand the (histiilgoishuillg
1umalitics of a people's guerrilla war, who say: '0n1y tegimlar t moops camu carry out guerrilla operations.'' 1 here are others who, hiccaumse they do not l)elieve in the ultimate success of guerrilla action, iitistahenly say: ''( ;iuetiilhi warfare is au insignificant :111(1 highly sj)cci:uhzc(l type of operation iii which there is no place mm the masses of the people.'' lhcrc are those who ridicule the masses amid umnulermmiimie resistance by wildly asserting that the people have no understand
log of t huc war of resistance.

The political goal mmist lie clearly amid precisely indicated to Ibis version was extracted by The New York li,,,cs,  19o1, trout the fulllengt Ii article pri uItc(l by the Gazette iii
194
I
a uid II)) sv u vail able iii tna k fomni.

inhabitants of guerrilla ZoneS, and their tlationilI
COflSCLOLISIICSS
ivikencd.

crc are some inilitarists who say: "\Ve are not interested in politics but 0111)' in the profession (if anus.'' It is vital that tilcsc Sill l1)iCl1 lill(fCd liii litarists I e uiiade ti I
rca lu_c the relatioislttp tctween politics and mi litany affairs. M ilitamy action is a method used to attain a political goal.

iii all arillies, obedience of the subordinates to their superiors must he exacted. Flils is true in the case of guerrilla discipline, bitt thC basis for gitermihla (ii5Ci1)IiIie must be tile iuldivi(luaI CUtl science. \Vitll guerrillas a (Iisci1)liIiC of cotiipulsioii is ineffective.

Ill lily Systelul where (Iisci1)iille is externally iiiiposed, tile rela
tionship that exists between officer and iuiail is characterized by indilfciencc of the oiie to the other. A SClfiIll1)OSe(I discipline is the prilliary characteristic (If a dctuiocratie SStClll iii tile artIIV.

lurtlier, iii such an alloy tile mode of living (if tile officers and tile soldiers 111(1st hOt (hillel too iiuuch.

Ibis is paiticularly true iii the case of guerrilla troops. Officers shu)uld live under tite same cotidit'ioiis as tlleil men, for that is tile only way in which t:ilcy C:ll1 gain fuouii their tuieii tile adtuiir:itiiiu atl(I coll(IdencC SO vital Ill war. it is incorrect to hold to a theory (If c9llaiity ill all tllillgS, l)tlt there 111(1St be C(plahity (If existence ill accepting tile hardships
111(1 dangers (If war.

lucre is also a unity (If s1)irit that should exist between troops and local itlhlahitatlts. (he l.ighthi l(o(itC Aiiui' 1Mlt iiIt(i practice a code khlowil as 'Ihiiee Rules ahl(l ligllt Remarks.''
Rules: All actions arc subject to cOillulland; (10 tInt steal fronl rile people; be neither selfish nor (uIlj(lSt.

Remarks: Replace tile door I used as a lied ill suiiiiuicr WllCtl
'umi lcacc the house; iou tip the hiedditig ill WllICh) you iiav slept;
I)C courteous; lie honest ill )'ollI
I I:It1S:lC(ioils; ret mini what you I)((lIo\''; icpl:lce vhiat 'oii hieak; (ho 1101 hi:itlic ill the 1)Icsellce of
\(OIlleIi; (10 (lot \iitllOtIt iiithonity sea ichi the 1iucketliooks of those oii arrest.

i\ l:Illy people I hulk it iuiipossilitc toi guerrillas to exist for long Ill tile elielily's rear. Such
1 belief rc'cats hack mif coiiipiehieuisioii ol hic relationship that should exist between the people and tile I loops. The former iiuay he likened to water and time latter to tile fish who inli,i hit it. Elu may it be said that these two cannot exist toget her? Ii is Only ttli(liSeiplined troops who iiiakc the people their cOClitics and who, hke the fish out of its native element, cannot live.

We fuit hii our ittission of destroying the cneiiiy by propa
gandiing lii troo1)S, lo,' treating his captured soldiers s'itli con
sideral ion, aiid by caring for those of his wounded who fall into our hands. II we fail iii these respects, we strengthen the solidarity of the eneni',.

the rinlaiy functions of guerrillas are tliiee: first, to conduct a war on exterior hues, that is, in the icat of the ciietlly; second, to establish bases; last, to extend the war areas. Thus guerrilla
)articipatioti itt the wat is not iiiciely a titatter of )Itrely local guerrilla tacticS but involves strategical cotisi&lcratioiis.

\'liat is hisie guerrilla strategy? Guerrilla sitatcgy tutist pri
itiarily be based on alertness, mobility, and attack. It lutist be adjusted to the eneuitv sit Ltatioul, the terrain, the existing lines of coiiittiltuiicatiiiti, the relative strengths, the weather, and the sit
hat Oil) of the people.

In guerrill;l warfare select the tactic of Seetilitig to Collie ftotii the east and itracking front die west; avoid t lie solid, attack the hollow; attack; withdraw; deliver a lightning blow, seek a light
nitig decisiot
. \Vhien guerrillas engage a stronger enemy, they withdraw when lie advances; harass him when he stoI)s; strike hitii
'heui lie is weary; i' him 'hien lie withdraws. lii guerrilla strategy the enetily's rear, flanks, and other vulnerable spots are his viral points, and here he must be harassed, attacked, dispersed, exhiatisted, and annihilated.

II we (atiltot Sutuottui(l whole artitics, we cati at least partially oksiio' ilium; if we ciiiiot kill the cnciiiy troops, we cati C;11)ltIiC
ilici,,.

Ilie otial elkct i iiiaiiy local successes will hc to change the ilarive st rengi his of the opposing forces.

Guerrillas an gain the initiative if tIny keep iii ituiiid the weak points of the ciieuiuy. Uccause of the enetily's iisulhcicnt titan
poeet, giterritlis cart
)perate over vast territories; because t lie ctienuy is a I
uciguier and a barbarian, guerrillas cati gain tile cunhidetice oh iiiihhioiis ui their cottfltryiiien ; because (if the st ti--
polity (if enemy coiritirairders, guerrillas can iriake lull usc of their own clcvcincss.

I he leader iritist be like the fisherman who, with his nets, is able 1)0th to CASt thetii and pull tliemir out in awareness of the kpthr of the water, tlrc strength of the currcirt, or the of
'liv obstructions that 111:1)' burl tlictii. As the Iisliciiiiaii controls his ncts, so the guerrilla leader lrolint:rilrs contact with arid control roer hmi Writs.

Vlietr the situation is st-ri(,us, the guerrillas lutist irrove with n lie fluidity of water and I lie casc of I lie blowing wind. Ability to fight a war without a rear area is a ltumrd:i,imcurtal clr:I r:rctcristic of guerrilla action, mit tins does not nic:in that guerrillas can exist urn ftp,,cti,n over- a long period of time without the development of base areas. Guerrilla bases iiray be classified according to their rc:i to itt as: first, irion Ii ta in bases; sec nit d, pl:1 ills I ases ; ann d last, river, lake, and bay bases.

1 lie advantages of bases in lllouhntaiinous areas arc evident.

A ftcr defeating tile cnemmiy iii any area, we moist I ;il(C u(lvalitilge nil tine period inc ren1utres (or rCorgalliY.atioln to press liomire OUi
:11 tacks. %Ve lutist riot attack an objective we are not certain' (11
winning. We lutist comnftmne our o1icratiotit to relatively Stimuli areas trod destroy the cireinry anti traitors iii those i"'- %'Vtic,r tIne inhabitants have becin inspired, new volunteers accepted, trained, cnuipped, and organized, our operations tiray be extended to iiiclti(le cities and lines of comlrnhmnicarum not strongly lucid. \'/c rntay at least hold these for tentporary (if riot PCrt)nunmciit) periods.

All these arc our duties ii, offeursive strategy. 1]icir object is to lciigdrcmi tIne period the eiietmny ninust rcmii:nimn on tire defensive.

I lien our. iuiilitany activities amid our org:rniz:it ion work anumomug ilne uiiasscs of the people triust be zealously cxp:nnokd; tintcl wit In t-ninn;mh 7.cal tIre strength of the encmiy at tacked timid ihiiiituishied.

I low arc guerrilla units brined? lii Ionic I
c:ise, tire guerrilla wiit is funned from the people.

1his is the fuuidaninentint type.

u11,0 tine arrival of tire enemy armury to oppress amid slaughter tire people, their lca(lcrs call upon therm to resist. ] hey assemble the inmost valorous eleiuneirts, ann them wit ii 01(1 rifles or bird guns, anti lius a guerrilla unit begins.

iii sonic places where the local government is riot determined or where its officers havc all fled, the kadcrs aitiong the iiiasscs call
111)011 the people to reSist and they tcspotid. Iii circilliistalwes of this Icind, the duties of leadership usually fall tipoti the slimil
(lets of young students, teachers, professors, 01 tier e(IilC:itOls, loCal soJliery, professional nICO, aitiSans, and those viiItotit a lixed pro fession, 'ho arc willing to cxert tlicinsclvcs to the l:ist dro1, of their l)lOod.

there are those vItii say ''I am a fnriiicr'' or "I un a stiitkni';
"I an discuss literatitte but not military ntis.'
this is uticorrect.

there 5 i) profuiin(l difference between the fanner and the soldier. You lilust lye courage. You suiiity leave your faitiis,uitl become soldiers. 'that you arc farmers is of no difference, and if you have education, that is SO imich the better. Vhicii von take your irlflS it) hand, you becoiiic soldiers; when 'on ate org:iiiizcd, you become tiiilirary tinks. Guerrilla hiostilut cs arc the (Iniversity of war.

I Still anotherl type (ii unit is that organized frotti troops that collie over from the cnelity. It is coutniitally possible (ii ldb0
(lis;ttlCCtI0ll in their tanks and we iiiust increase iitlt luohia!Z:ltuln efforts :iiid foment ni,ttinies attiotig such troops. htitittctliatcl' titer tiuttilly, they tni.ist be received into our ratihcsaiid organized. lii regard to this type of unit, it may be said I hat political work nittong them is (If the (ttttiost importance.

Guerrilla organizations I can also be] formed from hands of liatidits and brigands. \iany bandit groups pose as guerrillas and it is only necessary to correct their political beliefs to convert theni.

Iii spite if inescnpnlilc differences in the fitiitlatnctttal types ol guerrilla bands, it is possible to unite thetit to fortii a vast of gilerri Ihas.

All the people Of boll) sexes 11(1111 the ages ol sixtecit to forty -
live iliust be organized unto selldefense ittlitS, the basis of hiicli is vohiwtaty service. j\s'.i In-st step, they tiutsi procure anus, then
1)0th titilitary and political training titust he given theni.

Iheir respotisil)iluties arc:
local sentry duties, securing lttfottilat iou of the ctietiiy, arresting traitors, and j)revetiting (lie (hissctlluutatuout ((1
en eti y p r( pagan (hi.

When the cneniy launches a guerrillastupprussioti drive, I hew Ulilts, aimed with what weapons there ale, arc assigned to certain arcas to deceive, liindcr, and harass hiiii. 1 bus lic scIfdefense units assist thc cotnl,at:int guerrillas.

they have other functions. Ihcy furnish strctchcrbcarers to early the wuumnkd, carricis to take food to the tIi,01)S, amid cmii
Iiirt iiiissions to providc tlic triups with tea and puuiidgc. Each imiember of these groups must hnvc a weapoil, cccii ii t hc wcapn is only a hnifc, a pistol, a lance, or a spear.

In u'cgard to the problem of guerrilla c911i1)mIiciit, it lutist be iii de rsto< d that guc liii his are ugh i ly a rim icd at i ic k g n nips ti mat JCJiIi rc simple c(ltmiptlicnt.

( ;LIC,H1l8 IlaiRis that originate vitl the people are furnished nith revolvers, pistols. bird gnus, spears, big swords, ati<I land iiiitics and mliortimrs of local iiiatiimIacture.

Oilier elcimientary wc:ipoils arc :nktcd, 811(1 as imiany uewt:vpe ii tics as arc availaldc
:itc <list m,tnutcd. A Itcr a period of resistance, it is 1)ossiblc to increase the aimloitflt of e(Jnipnicnt by cajituriuig it front the cueiiiy.

Au artitory slunild he established in each guerrilla district for t lie mmianufactnrc and repair of ri lies and for the production of ca rtmidgcs, hand grenades, and bayonets. Guerrillas linist not
<lcpviid too iimuch on an armory. The cucimiy is the principal source of their supply. For <lest ruictiun of raitvay trackage, bridges, and si:itiotis in ciletilycomil rolled terribly, it is necessary to gather together deummohitiumi uiiarcrials.

lrops iumust lie trained in the
(uicaratuoi and use of dei,i<;htioi,s, :uunh dcimilii,oui mimmits mmmst be org:ini7cd in each regilimetit.

If: Western mimedicines arc not available, local uiiediciiies must be made to suffice.

Proj.gaiida umiaterials are very ilmiportant. Every large guerrilla flint should have a priliuitig press atid mimiuiieograpli stone. They tiiitSt :115(1 li:iVe paper oii which (ii 1)Iuiit )r0:1g1t1(li leaflets amid not ices;
lii addition, it is necessary to have (icki glasses, COI111I8SSCS,
811(1
iimihit:iiy limps. Au accommi1dislictl guerrilla unit wiii :IcluhIe these I hiltigs.

# Time, Space, And. Will: The Politico-Military Views Ol Mao Tse-Tung

li. L. KATZENBACJI, JR.

"Flic timiti foriti of struggle is war, the maui loriti of mirgilmi zation is the army,'' Mao Tsctuiig, the dict:itor of Red China, ittiec observed. Lie clabotatcd his dictutit his way: "... wit hour aittied struggle there will be no placc for tie 1iroletariat. there will be ito place for the people, tlicrc will hc ito (otliiiuhmiist I':mm't', and there vill be ito victory iii revolution.''
lhis philosophy, vhichi rchatcs war and ic'r,hitt ton so closel, is the Ci1(l product (if itmorc titan a
(1m1:imtcrccltnhmvs first hind cx1)CriCOCC with ittihitary tliattcrs. It is lint
:1 still) of intclhutim:il tinsel which Alno had picked up front the classics of (.i,liliimimnistli.

It represents his owit most intimate view ol and approach in tIi problem of revolution.

To be sure, his revolutionary fhrcbcars had a far greater ito crest iii military affairs, particularly nilitar' theory, ihtati have other revolutionaries it tither times. The articles that Karl AI:ti'x itid his friend and collaborator Friedrich Engcls Iote nit the Ciiiimcmmi
\Var for the 01(1 New York TriI,unc were at trihomi ed to ( cmmeral
\'Viiiflcld Scottthen, incidentally, ruttmiimit br the Ptesidcitc these United States. Nor is there any dnm,ht limit time hc' (1)10(111
llotaty' writing ott time t'raiicoPrussitti \Vit iii t H7(1 was (ho done by l'ltlgchs iii the Vail utah Gazette.

1 lie 1iciiclt Soci:ihist jc:mi I
auis wrote L'Ari,,ec Nouvelle, which still titlist lie rcga rdcd ms a classic tif military literature. The Russian I ,eitiim read and coimm nientcd on Clauscwitz, and Stalin has coiiiimmeiitcil oti I
cmiimn itid Clnusevitz. More recently, Khrushchev has lcvelcd criticism at

the military insights of Stalinhe said that Stalin did not even
know how to read a military map_and this would seem to indi-
cate that by his own lights Khrushchev considers himself a com-
petent military critic. In short, whereas the citizenry of the
Western world has had few students of military affairs among its
responsible political figures_Alexander Hamilton and "Teddy"
Roosevelt and Sir Winston Churchill arc perhaps the most promi-
nent of those exceptions that prove the rulethe intellectuals and
the politicians of the Communist world, translating their basic
concept of class war into meaningful action, have given what in
another society might he called prayerful consideration to the
study of military policy. Mao is the most distinguished of the
Communists who have given military theory their concentrated
and continuous attention.
  Mao's military thinking is not part of a Party line. To be sure,
he quotes from various Communist gospels, but he also quotes
from Chinese military classics, particularly the work of Sun Tzu,
with which he is thoroughly familiar. And from Clausewitz,
whotii he studied in Chinese translation as early
                                                        as 1928, he
borrows the usually quoted catch phrases. But, essentially, his
thconcs of war arc generalized from his own cxpcricnccs
                                                                as a
revolutionary. The daytoday crises foriiicd the foundation of a
doctrine that presently purports to be generally applicable and
absolutely timeless. Thus, his first important iiiilitary piece, The
Struggle in the Chingkang Mountains (1928), deals with specific
prohlciiis and hence is dated. On the J'rotracted I Var, which he
wrote a decade later, (leals with generalities, lays down a set of
''iiiinitahlc'' laws and thereby presumably seeks to take the ''if''
out of warfare, and to iiiake a science of an art.
   1 here arc fancier definitions, hut basically iiiilitary theory,
unlike Illost others, has to do with making the best use of the
available. In broad ternis, miiilitaiy doctrine would seem to have
sollie six colliponents, three of which arc tangible and three of
which are not.
  Of the tangiblcs, there is, first, the weapons systelli: the long
how, the Swiss pike, the Abomb, iteiis on the long list of the
instruments of war that have given a solc possessor a moment of

iiiilitary supremacy. Second, there is the sul)ply system, logistics
in the broadest sense. Perhaps this is the area in which U.S. mili-
tary genius
             has best expressed itself. Even such U.S. contributions
as amphibious techniques have contributed no more than, for
example, the fleet train, the Red Ball Express, the depot systciii
those techniques by which we helped fight and 'in a var on the
outside lines of communications. And, third, there is manpower.
  And then there arc three intangibles: spac, w'hich is defined
here as square mileage plus obstacles, niinus a workable com-
munications network; tinle; and will. It is to these three, space
and time and will, that the industrial Western world Itas given
least thought, and to which Mao has given most. The reason is
simple enough, for these three factors, plus Illalipower, added up
to the totality of his exploitable military potential. \iVeapons and
supplies were narrowly restricted. His was a military force born
in the most abject poverty. The problem toward which he
directed his attention, therefore, was this: I-low can a nation that
is not. industrialized defeat a nation that is? In stating his conclu-
sions, he said nothing which had not been stated in one way or
another before, but he (lid rerank military necessities. I-Ic and his
followers have achieved a degree of success, unfortunately, which
forces as relatively ill equipped as these had not achieved during
the whole of the nineteenth century, when \-Vestern trots carried
Western culture into the far corners of the world.
  Among the Comittunist Vietminh in Indochina, aittong the
Huks in the Philippines and the insurgents in Malaya, Mao's
writings were gospel. What Lenindid on the subject of imperial
isin and Marx on capitalism, Mao has done for antiindustrial
warfare. That is why an understanding of Mao's ittilitary philos
opIiy may be of rather more than casual interest.
  Although Mao never states it quite this way, the basic premise
of his theory is that political mobilization may l)c substituted for
industrial mobilization with a successful military outcome.
                                                                lli:it
is to say, his fundamental belief is that only those \Vh() will admit
defeat can be defeated. So if the totality of a population can be
made to resist surrender, this resistance can be turned into a war
of attrition which will eventually and inevitably be victorious.

Or, conversely, when the popu lace adiiiits delcat, the forces in the (ICkI ritiglit jus& as well surrender or withdraw.

Political iiiolnliiatioti,
1\hl() Wrote, ''iS the moSt ftitidamiicn,aI
cOlilitiOll 101 winning the war.'' lIe explained his thinking in the lurtim of a sililile: "Ilie people I may be likened to water and the I aritty
1(1 the tisii win) inhalut it.'' "With the common people of the hole country Ilmolmilizeci, we shall create it vast sea oi lnJlllanity aml drown the enemmty iii it
'' Mao holds that mnilitaiy salvation (lows fromit political conversion. Ikmt, note: Conversion takes ti tile.

So Mao's military prIlciim was how to organize space so that it could IIC iiia&k tO yield (line.

I (is political prolmlemii was how to org:mliizc time so that it could be made to yield wi/I, that quality which makes willingness It) sacrifice the omder of the day, and the ability to hear sulkring cheerfully the highest social virtue. So
\lao's real ,iijljtat-y j)rol)lemli was not that of getting the war over with, time question to which Western military thinkers have directed the greater p:lrt of their attention, but that (If keeping it going.

Prcsuimmabhy, it is axiouimatic that in war, as differentiated from Sport, one never lights on the enemy's terms. 'hue handicappers have imo place (III a planning staff, that is to say. \Vhat Mao evolved was a strategy which, as he saw it, Pt:mye(l to the cneiiiy veaIc
'hat itiatle the var which the Italians fought against the Almyssimnins in the muiid (930's so successful? \Vhy was it that the British were so marvelously successful at Omndurtiuan against the Sudanese? Most certainly, it w'as the plane, the 1)011th, artillery, and, above alt, time machine gun. But, by the Sante token, why was it that the French had such difficulties with the RifTs in the
1930's and were so frequently defeated in I ndocliina in the late I 940's and early (950's? SpecifIcally, with respect to the Abys
siiuian \Var, and by deduction with respect to the others, the answer Mao gives is that success or lack of it varies directly with the degree to which mIte native forces light with inferior veapuns against tlu)dernizcd forces on the latter's terluiS. By and large, it would seem true that what itiade the machinery of l'.11r01)Can tI'i' )S Si) sticcessftil Was tl):It native troops saw (it to
(lie, with glut y, 'itii honor, en masse, :111(1 iii \':inI.

So I lie tiist 1)IOI)IeIII tO which Mat) bent' his tijititl ':is how to avoid :t iiiihi;iiy decision. I his he knew lie had to do, :111(1 this, lie tl1(flIgllt, W:I
sotiietltiiig Ills CtlCIi), wliediei Nationalists, i Japanese, or '.1 hers, could tiever withstand.

''Ilie t'ell
:11 ICV.)ltlliotlary \V:lI \VC ii:ive fought'
111:1), lie suii
l)IiSiIl to tither CoilliII'ieS,'' l\'la() vrote in 1936, ''1)10
for uS It IS
otiiy like tile 1)i'cselilatIol), :lIIIj)IifiCatiol), :iiid 1)reliltlinary CXJ)OS1
tutu 1f the t I etue in au
.

essay with many exciting paragraphs yet to) follti.''
liiite :uuid again throughout his works on war lie returns to his saiiie tlteiiic:
''Our \'Var of Resistance catlilot he i1uiick ly woo and caii 01)1)'
liC :1 protracted war.'' Again, '':15
'a distant joutu'io y rests the strenpthi of a loose ito? a long t:tsk proves the chiaracuci of a iiian,'
so guerrilla warfare vthl dciuionstratc itS
power iii the CO(II'SC of a long and ruthless 'a A'lot'eover, one that u'hien Mao uses die Idol ''war'' he is not speak hg spC
iic:il!y of a wa i, but generally of the war. Just as the ;nil?etiniiii follows tile last Stage of revohutioii iii the \\'Otl(S
(11 Marx, so i Mao, the tuillenniuni of peace, W hen there will ''no longer he Ill wars,'' when there 'ilh be a ''new world of pernin
ncnt peace :11
1 peruiaitciit light,'' dawns oil thu IhIOII0\\ oh victor)'.

But the vicoiy of which lie is speaking lies ill I world uii:ide safe Ioi ( .OIIIITIINIII, ill II) age ill WhiCh itS ClitI1IiCS lie CI'IIShCd.

I he believes hiat mite silliiitucss to cotlproiltisc has a vhass basis, :1101
that therefore
:1 CoIhlJ)IollliSe peace will its 'dly 0I'igIhlS he
(100I11e(l to failure. Nor can there he any (1uustiur)S IS to his views
(ill lOCalls. iii Cliiiicse history, there ':is'.i iloldelll:II
who in couithy fahiiii tui'iied over the initiative to the euleulty. Of hiiii, Mao icuiiarks, ''Ve are not I)ukc Hsiang of Sung :111(1 have no USC for his si tipid scruples about benevolence, righitcousiicss, auiul inora lit)'
ill var.''
I l:I this tiwagilig I'evol(I(iohiary, who iiow directs the lives of hhiore ho than ails' other in thc whole world, changed his IthiIlih? I las SiI(C('SS .Iiiiied his view of a \l'oI'ld that is (:oiltuiiunist'
Coot 'oiled froiii pole to pole, of a war that uiinst oh necessity coit
tilitle ii,itil his solE ol world is a present reality?

\Var, gs'en S/)IICL', Irine, and the rcvohttionary will to exploit ihciii, has not ioiiy a clc;it' and Certaill outcoilic, hut cicarly (IC
unable stages as veli, in Alan's military thcoIoty. Protracted war, lie bites, i/lust (;iiirl this isa 1X1i11t lie ittakes rhignmtically) pass ihiiimghi ihi'ec sI:lgcs.

III the first, Mao is (HI what he calls the
"Si I';IiCgiC rickuisiec.' the second is a period ol sialciiiatc, a period iii lilCIEIIaliliul
(1)1 tIle third, in which a shut to the otfcnsivc iaLcs place. Ii IS tile lust i)CliO(I about winch I\hu) iS most coii
teiuictl.

\\i;ii is a iiiiliiai objective? A lull, au iiidiustiial center, a rail line, an air base?

( )f criursc thucy arc. But those U.S. observers wI
I hioiiglt I hat I lie Ii of sucli facilities spelled dcfcat were tong. ( )nl the desi itiction of the cneniy's force in being can lirilig an end U' ieSiSI:ttbce, Arid force iii 1eing iii a country such IS
( liiii;i, where tk1icuitleuicc on goods is iiiuiuiuuiuil, can survive itiidci iiiilieIic';ililc
(OlI(litiOflS. It
(1C1)Ct)(iS on what an aitny I lililisS I IlL SI iLesaic.

Alor&.,vei, the 0101(2 one side in any way can afford to stir
itruki, ilie itlOIc tue ((tiler intist defend. Mao was willing to give, in this 11151 stage ol war, a great deal indeed. lie makes almost a I ci isli of the dcsiuahiliiy of retreat. "Is it not sellcontradictory to light heroically lust and alEllitlOil territory afterwards?'' he asks ilittoticihly.

ihueui ihictoricahhy lie answers with yet another ucs
him:
''( )iie chiN first ann ilien relieves oneself; does nile cat iii
%;iIilr Bitt ill In nigh defeats lre1uently iiiake heroes, they do not coil nirage t lie spirit 1)1 resistance. Only victory, however small, can d this.

1 lie succcsshii stiithl actionthe raid, the aiiibusli, tl)e
:ississiiiatiouithijs is the uiiiterial frotii which iinhutant enthusiasm is woven. Rut coultiulturius victory at this level of uiuihitary activity us in it
1 iiiat ter of talluiuui ry and glory, but of caution and self.

restlalult. A tin tecogiuu/cS that during the strategic defensive, the VLl% p11cc tif survival is catitiouu.

Again and again lie inveigius against the dangers of desperado
iii, I lie 1ii,cess by which one gains glory by losing one's sh!rt.

\gaiil and again In insists on the necessity of local superiority;
I. cc nt ml e u'cr i cii :ug:II roil ni IC 15 Ii is mm ni ha. Comi mm ing dispersion it hi coticeiitrit inn of force, the secret of victory in detailthis is I lie concept iie is I ryihig to put at the forefront of the minds of th)SC whom he seeLs to tcach what he calls the "laws'' of wa F.

!1io wakes the point implicitly in his \vritings that although gmiertilla cperat inim are the cosittic trap of ttiihtaiy strategy, thu umick, the 1tmi(Lsalid in which i tCchiliiti(;llly Sii1)eiior iiiilitai V
itiachine hogs thiwit Ut timnecoustuiting futility, (hey cttimt in and of titeutiscives wimI vats. I .ike ittuti, the)' can stave oil defeat, litit, likc 11111(1, I hey cannot itiuig Victory.

Ilierefore, lie insists that during this first period of war, the period that eiicumiij)asscs tiic strategic defensive, thc atnmy lutist, as it must itt all stages of war, take an active political role. l'oi, according tO Alan, mIte army is not an imistnmmiicmit ul the state, hut the essence of it, its spirit, its life, anti its lio1)e:
Jj//y.fl 1/ic Ref Army /it,'hts, it fight..; not merely for the Le i'/
fig/thug, bitt to agitate the 'masses, In ortaiiIze them, and to he//u the/n csial'lish re'z_'oluiionary political pt'er;
u/uart jioii,
.cuc/'
oIjccIivcs, /igl.uti/ig loses its meal/lug 1i,,d the U1'1! Army the ret SOIl for its exL.;Iencc.

lheariny is then tO lout out the thissitleutts, to e9ui1) itself with imuimneographi utiacltines, and with
''chi;tlk camis and big brushes'' fiii'
cartoon warfare. The army is therefore to he of itsehl a single huge, coorthinateti J)t'o)agan(Ia niacluine, the torch of ievohiit iou.

The first stage of war slips Intu, the second luec:uuuse, is luimiischf reitt:urks, the Comitmmnunists have "ret reated iii spice hit advanced iii tuuue.'' Ike periol of staleuuuate begins.

\Vhuat, according to Mao's theory, has been luappenimig? iii tIit first place, the "iuuevitahuihiry''
u1 defeat has been wiped finuuu t lu umuituds of the defeatists by the very lact that the war has been connunteti. I )espair has given way to hope, the will to resist has I)ccui strengtlueuued, and the will to win is heginmuitug to ti;iwii Guerrilla tituits ale turmiing itit() mobile units stretigtliemied by thu capture of cttciuuy tutateriel, and the coordination between forces is being uuuome skillfully mutanaged. A series of hoc;uI actions, tiunugli each separate (1UC results in the retircuttetut of tile attack ing irregular forces, rait hue regarded as a strategic gain by thur irreguularsprovideti that they preserve their ;uluilil)' to take the field again. Iv regularly distuuubitug the peace, they are dcstroyiuug the local lcgitiuuiacv ni the established nutler. htuc'itahly, the dis tracted villagers will begin mtuakitug couitmilnmtiomus to the irregumhuu as ilistiralice for their (locks and luv'csts. ilie iii'egiiiais will (Itcut II.IVC l)cgtIui to collect taxes',tinl will have tal<eti the first steps toward hecoiniuig a respectat)Ie goverlunent. Auth the Collitilu lusts' eucuity has l)CCll given p:illSe to vouitier wlictiier or not his mt'n victory is certain, tkspite the niicndiuig capture of objective It Cl' 0l)jCCti'e.

Ittuidainctital to all else, 1kup says, is tlic belief that countries wit Ii legislative bodies silliply cannot tal<e :1 war of attrition, either litiaticiahly or, over the long 11th, psycluilugically. Indeed, the vC1.' tact of a iiiukiparty stnuetw'c iiiakcs the COlllIiiIttIleIlt to a lung war 51) politically suicidal as to he 41tuite iullpoSsit)ie. \Vlicn the IiIiCS of the Coiiiuiitiuiis(s' ChICIiIy ll'C tli'awti OUt like strings of chewing gunt, weak and sagging, when the Iuiiaiicial hurdeui increases from 11)011(11 to tiioiith, tue outcry against the war 'iIl of itself veakcii the aI)ihit%' (If tile tt'oops in tite field to fight. 'Flie vat' that \lao's theory contcuiiplatcs is the cheapest for hiiii auth I lie tin Ist espetisive for the enemy.

ia kc one exauiiple, and one chosen specifically to illustrate ltis hicury tititler the cirCunistances most favorable to it, the raid the
( otninnnist Victuui,nh made on the state of I OS in Indochina in I V 3.

Ii IC laid cm I .aC)s, like the war in I ndochitia itself, presented a lari'agc of paradoxes. it was'.i foot soltliei's' liitzki'ie,tig.iiuist ihlIlllC)l)iIi7.C(I, uiieciiatii'icd fOrCes.

ilulse Countries 'hiichi wei'c titlist lilluilediately threatened by itIhunuia and 'l'liailaiid, vliicli In oller I .l(I5 0,1 the w'est'vere less (iiSttIl'l)ed by it than those il,it'Ii ICIC far tiit:itit, i.e., Ii'anee, the United i(ingdotii, auth
1);lltiCtli:lFIy the United States. No 1iitclied battle was fought, little tilat dial datiiagc was clone, and little i)l()od was spilled. Vet the results of thisac tioll, whether the whole (if the iuttenclecl result as achieved or not, were as far_reaching as if a unalor victory l);t(l hetui u'nti. Scidoiii hi:is () IIIICII bCCU :ICCOI11J)hiSilCd with so little.

Pdillaps iii the cold light (if aftertlunighir, the uuiost Curious
151)CU( 1)1 (lie whole 1CtiOlI WlS that liuuui tile l)cg'iliulitlg it uii:itlt
1 iitut'Lcuy oh the old saying ''Nothing risked; ulothlitig gained.'
ever tluc gaiti, Ill) hthihitary ih)VCStIPICZ)t of sizable propor
ii(;Ii was liSl(e(l. Ihis was (1iiitc as sale ;i vciitiirc, Iii
1 \V4)id, as thu ( iiiiusc iiivasiull of lihet.

\i aftel a tlii&'eweeL ilivasinil, this is 'hat the (
iIIIItlIlllists litI(l IcC(iIIil)ljslIC($: (I) lucy 11,1(1 tliiowii terror tiw the lreiicli tiiilitaIy and civil atitliorit ics'alikc) in hiothi hidocliiiia ali(l titet to
l)(llit;iii li;iiice; (2) they had s1)rca(l Ireticli dcfcnding forces in lll(lOCliiIi;I (tCl tIlillilet thiaii previously; (3) they had poiditced iciicved d'iii tid fr a laiget iiicasnre of political :tiltoIii;Iity in
1)1)111
I .tO)5
;itn.l nilly (ittihoclia; (4) they had created a sit tia
tout in. lnchi Ii cncli s>eiihiiig iii the area was raised hy sonic
6() titillion; :titd
5) thicy lIa(l cost the tiiiitcth States sonic ittihlotn ust ii h oay ui foteigui aid. Ihis ' as, iii shioii, the Litid uth utiutti hiichi \lau
.1 selling haul advoc:iic&1 wit ii such iednn
uhitice in his writiugs_althn)iighi, to he suite, it was tiotihutless iliure successful tutu aitytliiitg lit had itnagiuted. It was one of those aids that 'un,ld tint Phase 2 of a plotiacteil wau him Phase
3.

Ilte third l)11.i5: ui i pint tacteul vat is tuut(histiuigulishic(l eXcept iii utute respect. Iii ill 1)1 his writings Mao uIeVCr loses sight of the fact that guerrilla action Ciuuliot Wilt WarS. this fact, lie ucahizes, titlist utcvci l)C futigotteit. ()itly hy couliI)iuliilg units into laitcr units, by cleating iii ougalil/atioul, by inctulcatitig (hiscih)hiiic, in a scuirtl, I)y tuiriliIl14 .roItps into aflhliCs, can the uiecessauy u'alautelie
(ii utuihittll\' 101CC he ltiuilt.

Rut what if thieve is Ito piogressioti? Sitp1usc SOuuiC(II1C lutluigles,
5t11)1015C llatre(l 0'CtCOuiue5 \i5(IOlti autti (leCisiouishIC bust, svhiat lien?

1 lie uuiiliuary philosophy of Mao t'se_ttnig is uiunuhu note I
it at bust scents to he.

I his is au euioiIuuuuIsl\
pciSiittsiC JiiCCc of propaganda, lot it all conies down to this pruuposiriu ui:
If I lie kadcrship is capable, a wau, as dilterentiated fuouti au action, (iii
11(11
ite lost.

A thought i\lao uuakes the ;iniiult that one lutist go iltuonghi mince iii a prolnungud war, inc points out that tlucne Is hot hICcCS
saiily constant and inevitable progress. Indeed, it is the theoiy ticit retnugressioul is possible, that a var nitty slip hauL .u stage, as well as that it will slip foiwaid, that gives the doctiiuie the shiumi
titer of iuuiallibi!ity winch is its greatest attraction. ( iven patience intl will, the tiuctritte of Mar) holds mit victory as inevitable.

1 herein lies its cutuiuig and its appeal.

lairil that the Coitmuinists have a iiiuiu)poly on patience is 'hat has titade Mao's the iniquitous Communist law' that it is. in
\ I laya, the Couiittitiiiistsargimcd that the "antiBritish national rcvoliui ionary war
( 'ritiitI I le protracted, uphill, and violent, arid that Alao Tsecung's "concepts ...

were illIj)eratives in the of the struggle."
To what extent is such a faith justified?

ilie answer is difficult.

Mao never really states how iltiportalit the lear base is to any t1ictatioIi.

It is the lewc of China at Indochina's door that has ceitaiIll\' cotiiitctt in good IiiC;isrIie for the success of Con,
imirluisi o1)e,atiuns tlierc as differentiated (mom the failures in rite l'liili1ipiuies and in Malaya. Amid the hills of western China spelled ii u hi in the di ffcreuicc between defeat and the silty ival of that si m mall spark from which victory has flamed Furtlierrimore, the ducmnc is applicable only to areas in which there is more than ample space. it would seem to me that, for
\ lao, Korea 'as the very worst spot in which to fight, and it w mid also seeiii to inc that he knew' it. Lie learned much about
1iusitiouial \Valfaic there, however, and, being a man who through
rit his works stresses time necessity of being cxtreimmdy flexible, lie doubtless imiade the 111(1st of the opportunity to learn a new iiIl)tlC (11 'iifitc.

imit on tIme other hand, his own wam iii China, ito ullanem hio'
one mimodifics the (act in tertlis of all Suits of forttiitotis events, diii follow his precepts, and lie did himself call the turn out all phases. Furthermore, the war the \'ietmninh fought in northern hmidi rclriua followed his teachings phase by phase despite the claims of \'ictiiiinh leaders that they improved on the doctrines.

Ii was a war of ideas iii a very real sense, and the fact that the iremichi leaders never scented to understand the nature of the war hey were fighting cut down enormously thiei r capacity to deal with it.

A rid, finally, there is rio gailmsaying that in a good part of South
c:msi Asia there is still space, and that lot many Mao mcniains the gmeat hero.

1 hat 1\Iao has taken so scornful a view of the power of weapons and paitieiilaily III
iii i)O\eI, that lie his j)l(iVCd hitiiself n willing III the p.1st to gi C ill) those targets \VlltCll lllu(ICIt1 technology is liest C(111)j)1)Cd ii destroy, and tli;it lie has l)1'(1 50 (kiting iii the cliallcii_-es, is a l)iell Uieii l'Ini, vliieli lie hi:is laid down, would sceiii to it I:'ate that lie is still an advciitiiici; a ('alitious man, hut au a(lvci.lut'er iievcttliclcss. And this, iii ttiin, would seem to indicate I lit the tJiiitcd States still needs those troops that will 1101(1 t he goni d on the gtouuid.

\Vcsterti sttatcp ' thought has considered the third stage of war, and tic third tage only. \Ve have fought wais ol iiil)aii nid itidiistr,al iiuterdn-ini, whole (liii own AsiatiC op1ioliclits 'uiuoi the
!\fricami ojpoiiellt.. of our allies have patiently l)1t a ptcess of rutal c,nsohid:ii ion which has, in effect, given thciii au iii
violahle sanctuary rum vliicli they can attack and withdraw at will. \-Vliai, thcieiurc, would seem to be nec(kd is a tiuilitary instrument ca1iah,l of invading and controlling this sanctuary, one that can Irtaintain both law and order in rural villages and itiarket aicus.

'l'lierefoue, we need not only troops which can strike oii the peti1)11e1ies of 1-lie I lee world, but also troops which call lie sent nor iuierel to (Igho butt also to maintain order. Ve iced not only useful ti nps hut sable I-loops- that is to say, troops which ale piulitically expendlile, tile kind of troops vhio ciii do the job as it is needed wit lit too great a political outcry iii a nation like null own luch s'
abhors war. Ilie kind of troops u iiiaii like President
( uiolidg: was willing to scud to tile
( ;ai-iluheuii, to Nicaragua and I haiti would scetti to lie the kind which would fulfIll this rc(1uireillcnt.

## Internal V/Ar: The New Communist Tactic Roger Hilsman

I lie Cold \Var wih Coiiiiunist Russia has becu with us for six
ccii yeats. And each 'eai, the Coiiinmnist tactics arc wore subtlc and Cotllpkx. In he 1940's, it was simple: the Soviet policy of
('spansioll tinl the A incrican policy of containment. The threat ol direct Cotinitiunist aggression remains, but new, more sophisti_
(aI ed tactics arc added every year.

In itiost Americans, the basic danger over the past decade has I iucii i lie threat of allout thermonuclear war. The i lircat remains.

Ii di es md should deniail our careful, constant attention.

Ncxt, there has been tile threat of "lititited war''ldfashioned,
14 mtslogging flglitiuig on the groundwith artillery, machine ins, and grenades. This is the dirty, bitter business of direct, crsunai killing, as we knew it in Korea.

I .imii ed wars and total war are closely ho kcd. A limited war tin be i lie escalator carrying the world right up to the mushrooni ml, ituils.

even as we hive jmiidered this conncctionand have tried
.144 j)IC1):lre for 1)0th eventualitiesthe Communists have found
' liii I hey rcga rd as i new chink in our armor. The new tactic
4 iiit ei'nal warusing uiiilitary force not across ii:itional bound
ries but inside t heiti. ihis newest concept is guerrilla waror,
1mm usc a itiore accurate terni, internal war.

It v:Is t his that President l(enncdy hid ill mind when he said:
'.'e face a chialleuige iii Berlin, but there is also a challenge in Smithicast Asia, where tile Iumrmlcrs are less guarded, the enemy Ii :i r he i'
('mi (I titi, a ii d tile di tige us of Coi ii uiiunisiii less apparent tO
(hoSe Will) have SI) liuk. \VC IICC a challenge iii (liii
(IWII lieiit
isphe re.

l'hris cven while rclteatiiig the Bcriiii crisis, Khitisiichev has stressed this third approach of iIILCUI1aI war again and again ii) re
ccitt speeches. I-ic sees the 1)ossil)ilities for internal wars in Asia, Africa, and Latin Aiiicriea as the I)cst way of rising force to expand the Coinniunist ciil1)1FC with tite least risk. lie argues that nuclear war is tIll) rlisasi toils CVCII for Leninisis. Apparently he has begun to liavc Itix ilonhus ll)orir CVe1) liii(i(Cd war OII the loi'caii illO(lCl.

\Vc cait take sonic credit for Khrushchev's cli:iitgc of heart.

Our strategic force ((1 (Icier iticIear war has paid its way. Our efforts to build ground forces, our alliances, and our sacrifices iii Koreathe fact h;it We stood and foiighirIcivc all paid oIl.

In retrospect, ve CiF( he 1)FoU(I of all titis, thlillighi Otil pride should not lead to overconfidence. Moreover, we ilitiSt beware of thinking that these di flerent tactics were separate or unrelated.

Evcii in the early stages of the Cold War, tile Soviets Inanipu
hatcd internal wars in Southeast Asia, Indonesia, rite Philippines, India, Guateitiala, and iii vulnerable states itt tile Middle last.

The Soviet leaders, bred is they were iii an atitiosphiere of tirl)an
based intrigue and revolutionary plotting, were pushed further iii their thinking by thte success of Mao Isctring's peasantbased Chinese Contitiunist revolution.

Lhe result is that internal warfare has recently gained a ite'
1)iOilliilCIlCC ut Soviet dogma. \'Vltat Khrushchev calls ''waus of hil)Cration'' or ''just tars'' ire 110W considered the 111(1st prohilising paths to further expansion. The theory enables Moscow and Peking to titaitipulate for their own purposes the pohitieth, ituiiic, and social revolutionary fervor rho is now sweepilig much of tile underdeveloped world. Since iitaity goveriiiicnts ire weak, siiicc SOfl)C ate coiiiipt, 510CC tIlde is iiiichi injustice iii the world, and since rite Communist conspirators are vehl traimle(l and supplied, it is usually lairhy easy to start or take lIlvahlilge of an internal war and to clairim that years of lthiroil nid (cr1111 are ill tile people's interest. h.ven when a governilielit tiles to nuder
take rcformii and keep thic peacc_ms in \'e,lczuie)m 0, Colombia
the Communists chant that the goverotitetit is "reprcssivc" and lC(lOUt)IC thcir efforts.

A second development is the (lexihilit and sophistication in tactics of guerrilla terror amid stihvci'sioti. 'I he Soviets continue to sponsor Comniiiuntst rebellions overtly vhercvcr pOssil)lC. ihey also do their best to infiltrate nationalist movements against colonialism. They try especially hard to capture the extreme nationalists like Luimnittiba. lhcy sponsor radical nationalism wherever they can find it, for the moore violence there is in a country, the greater the Communists' opportunity.

If a democratic nationalist government is in power, Commu
nists will advise that it separate itself from the West and permit the Coimimnunists to have "equal denmcratic rights''that is, positions of power in the government, freedom to propagandize, and the right to ocer regular forces or their own militia.

If a colonial or reactionary government is in power, the Corn
mnunists (lirect efforts along the entire spectrum of subversion.

They foster discontent in the cities, leading to demonstrations and strikes, perhaps to riots and mob action. Here their targets arc student groups, labor unions, and Leftwing intellectuals. In the countryside, they establish guerrilla forces in inaccessible regions, move to peasant areas, and, through a judicious mixture
on the Chinese Communist amid Castro Cuban patternsof social reform, admninistratioii, and slicer terror, establish a base of political rule. Whenever possible, in both ui'iami and rural sectors, they endeavor to create "people's ttiliti;is" as a device for om'gammi'/ing imiass Support to SiIl)I)leIIt(ItI thuir t ttlltiimmc commibatants.

l'hus they operate continuousls'
to ttrtd-trmtirmc an unfriendly government, and (Ii fTer in their liamid Ii iu
1 popular nationalist regimes only in the degree of their ctfnrt influence the govern
mnent directly and infiltrate its pow-cr ((lit ct-S.

Let me repeat that this new Soviet ciii1hasis on internal war does not mean that we can forger tfu'ttr the other, greater levels of war. Moscow's willingness iii use the Berlin issue indicates that their socalled "peaceful coexistence" does not rule out manufactured crises that run the rixl I ' inventional or even nuclear war. In fact, they could n it ret
1 xeav with internal war, except for the inhibitions imposed h- t liexi- iO hem two possibilities.

The great advantage of internal war is that it is less risky and less conspicuous than the more violent wars. It also involves techniques that the Communists feel they have mastered and we have not. We must also remember that Khrushchev is using his recently increased capacity to wage the more violent kinds of war to cxpand his freedom of maneuver in guerrilla war and to threaten escalation if we try to stop him.

In short, the so-called nuclear stalemate has not served to inhibit violence. If anything, it has enabled the Coniimmmiists to resort to a wider variety of force. Their new strength in nuclear weapons makes them all the more tempted to adventure with internal war.

How can we help stop the Communists froni destroying independent states from within? At President Kennedy's direction
as outlined in his second "State of the Union" messagesteps have been taken in several parts of the government to iricet this threat. The people in the Pentagon and we in the State l)epart_
nient have devoted special attention to it.

Let me take up the question of how we stop the Conimmiunists from destroying independent states from within under three headings: military security; modernization and rcforiii; and other political factors, especially those unique political factors undercutting a regime's stability.

Here we must be very hardheadedfor there are several alltoo-popular misconceptions.

In my judgment, it is nonsense to think that regular foiccs trained for conventional war can handle jungle guerrillas idequately. Yet in spite of sonic vely hard IessonsIUigsaysay in the l'hilippines, the British in Malaya, and the l'rciicli in Indochina and Algeriawe have been slow to learn.

Regular forces arc vital to resist external aggression. flirt we must not be deluded by the desire of local generals for "prestige hardware" or by the traditionalists' belief that welltrained regu-
Jars can do anything.

Regular forces are essential for regular military tasks. But guerrilla warfare is something special. Conventional forces with heavy equipment in field formation tend to cluster together, centralizing their pwer on terrain that allows rapid moveilient. They rely on tuails, cotisider stt(uig mintS ittil CitiCS ts vital targets to dCfCIi(l,
;iniI SO, when iPic' Ilit tlis,eisc, it is (1111%' tO get ticil (lOVIl itt static
)l)CI
(10115. Itt coitiltat, tigiti itihercitce t(t tile l)tilIcil)IC of cott
ceittlattoti l<ecps tOuts :lt tittwickly itattalititi or even regimental levels, usually s'itlt eiioflcotis StttSs (ill ltoi(litlg II!1(1 rather than ilestiiuviiig CnCIIIv ft )ICCS.

It is ilohlic that we Auticricaits have to leant titis titilitary lesson again in thc twetitiet it cctiturv. I Iavc we Iotgottcn that svc were the ones w'ho had to teach the lritishu regulaus "Indian lighting''
l,:iclc whett we VCtC still coi()tlics? I iavc we forgottctt that we t:iitglut the British tegularsattotlier hituil if lesson itt ''Indiatt fighting'' dtiriiig our Own rcvulut iou?

We Auiicric:utis have :liso forgotten that it :1s \vc vhio fought I)IIC iii the tilost sticcesslul cotutitcrgticrriila Catttf)aigtts itt history
iii the Pltihi1piuucs back at the tutu uf the cctttutry. \Vc learned sonic fuuiidauncntal uttihitary lessons then, itid it is dine we reinctit tiered titeiui.

A Itcr Aguina Ido's artuty was defeated and A guinalIt himself captured, sotute of the extrcutuists took to the Itil Is to become guerrillas. And thic' wcic not alone, lot three hitndt'cd years the Spatuish had been lighting a guettihla Wit ithi h);ltt(ls of religious fanatics itt the southern islands. And futt her south, itt Mittdatiao, the Aloros reuutaincd wtc(nt((iucre(I. All those ro:tuttcd the jungles and tuuoultutaittstai(hiulg, atnimsitiuug, kihlitig. itud pillaging.

I'hic univ tried to fight the gutcitilhas, lout with little success.

Ihe enettuy laded into the juthigic, atid the unwieldy regular units weic too burdened with cquipttieuut, too slow t io11ow. Regulars needed supply lines. ihey could not hive off the country or (10
vitInnit aulituiunitiott trains ut hospital coups.

hue regulars tended to establish a ftxed base frottu which they sahlicul (nut. 1 luuus the guerrillas always kttcw where they were and vhteut their guard was lax. 'ilte stage was set, for surprise attacks utuassacres.

lii fact, one of these utiassacres uas fatuous iii the old SUcotid only to (;usteu's I ast Stand. It iiccutrtcul at UaI:tttgiga out tile island of Sutuuar, and involved ( otttpativ C of the Ninth Infantry, (tile of the fittest regittueuuts itt the truly. At 6:40 AM., the titcn were lined tui before rIte cook shack, on the side of the
1);lIa(IC gr)ktli(l o1i1n)SitC \\'IICI(.' tIlCil tillis (i C iuled. SlidClIl\
the jungle cniiic ihivc as 45() guerrillas chiqud. Ihic ie1iiIais
(iiiipatiy f ;icvci hI a chance. lucy I iihii Imeliatolud. ( )io soldier killed SCVCraI iiieii
'ith a liascliall hat hieloic he \\aS (i\CI
whcltncd. 1'he cook accounted for several lii iic wit ii a
((IC ii cleaver. But Soon it ':is',iIl ()VCI'. lwciitfoiir III(Tt escaped. hue icst WCI'C killcd aTi(l tiiutihitcd.

I'itiaI1i, the t.Jnitctl States found the 5(1111 ion to t lie guci iihla
1)I()hICII1 in tl1c l1Ilili1)1)IIICS. \'c icciiiicd iiaiivc lihipiiios
iiuii wise to jungle ways, men \IuI knew tile i i:iiI iitil un. lilt ailis lilc their own bacic yincI. .Iliesc wClc divided ililo small groups d
10, IS, 20, or 50 luicit, aIRI over cacti glolip we pmut
1
A unericin ofl'iccra hoki and dctertititicd leader.

Iltis was the f:iumicd I'liilippitic Ccitistahiihii'.

I lIe Iiistovv then' fat)ulOuS CN)lOitS is well worth rca(liIE. It is IOl(l.-mi(l \('l\
chIin Vie EEuulcv's hook, Jung/c Patrol, 1nihhishcd ihoiit thiitv years ago.

liic trick was constant patrolling OVCF ccciv rail, md carcilul attention to intelligence work.

Ihic jungle, iithitui,uie,'.mimd siiu
prise attack arc the gucurilla's weapons.

1 lie solution is to adopt the same apons to light hiuti.

During World \Var II, our OSS guerrilla h,attaliuui u1icraicil hcliiuid the enemy 1iocs iii fill-ma. Nothui;ig ;ileascd mis inure iii those (lays than to have a regular Japauicsc 101cc take mit alice us.

Flicy operated iii large unwieldy units that cue easy to :uuiihiuslu.

Iheir uuiovCnients sciC simple to follow through the iiiomulmtaiuis and jungle. We felt that our ow'ii existence sas cll pusi itied when the Japanese had to take regular forces fiouiu hunt line Itgliting to chase a guerrilla unit. At (inc stage, fll (lilt fit-
ctiu
sistiulg of four Amcuicans and aI)ouit 200 fiiriiuc'e lo1a a 5hIOh('
Jiu1iaricsc reginucut of 3,00()
ruien ftiaiclIiI1r iiil ((UIiilcIiIeII(lu((f oveu. the niountanis far away from the front lilies. \Vliat we oiiltl have feared f:ii uiioue were snialicu groups 1tI
mi ic:ul i iv -especially ca lii 11)' 1ihtts O1 till' voiltl today, c()milli(IIII(IlilI.I o1nI:Iti,iI', e(uu(luuctcd by rcgtuhui troops rely ((ii the tactic ((I u(e(s un iuighi the countryside like those of the Japanese I'cgiluuIIIs that chased our guieruilla hattahioti in Huruiia. The swccps ire
1(1(1 5ICll 1h licized and too cunihcrsoinc to lIrilig results. This tactic Icads to antagonislil bctwccit the regular troops and thc population. Villagers fear reprisals and refuse thcir hel,,. Soldiers sense that they arc in guerrilla territory and act accordingly toward the l)el)lc.

Military inadcquacy leads to 1ailirc and so to dcIcat.

I fear that in the past our lllilitary_ai(l l1 gratiis for countries fighting against guerrillas havc oft en followed the mistaken as
suluption that all war is sitiii lar t I) the largescale tank and artillery engagements so familiar in Western Europe. Flic tactics of guerrilla warfare and the customs and culture of the eop1es, it seems to mc, should detcriiiin the proper weapons for cotunrerguerrilla forces. For instance, prior to World War II, the illountain tt'ihcs of Burma conducted tlmdr wars with long knivesa kind of sword called a "dah''and with oneshot, minizzleloading ilintlocks.

ilutitmia's Iliotlntainotus regions lie spitsely settleti and the scilmi
tutmuadic inhabitants constatitiv iliove froni One un(nhlltaill valley to another when the soil begins to wear out. Cotisc1ueitly, they see mm poimn iii lioldimig ground or in taking ground, and their whole history in war is one of higlltmliulg raids, sneak attacks, and iinlmshes.

1 hose of us in OSS who tried to make our guerrilla trops attack a defended position or stand by their own position reaped only disaster. Vc hid to adapt our we;ijmnsamitl our tactics tO
the icirain :i,id to the customiis of the people. I found tilut imiy tflH))S, :lccustoIllc(l II) fighting wit Ii knives, would wait until the etictiiy was within armim's teach before filing their gulls.

I
also
101111(1 they 5mw 110 poitlt iii sticking irotintl titer eNli;mustilig the first clip load of atutilullition. 1 lucy ucuc l,i'ive ill sneaking U}) Oil au euleully; they wcuc brave iii holding their tue in an ambush until Ill enetmiy u'as upon thucuti; hIlt their fuiitlauiicuutal miiaxiin was thi:tt the wise soldier lives to fight Inot Iucr d:ty. The Allicricauls who thought their puirposc was to stand ;ltld luoltI
101111(1 theumi
selves all alone in standing and hI dding.

Fhie lesson was olwiotis, it secttlc(l to inc.

I
c(pmi1)J)c(l iity imieui itli suluimicliite guutis of .41 caliber.

1 he turn wititetl tI) wait until the elicit,)' was cioe luclu tic opelillug fiie,
111(1 tile jungle itself rarely perummittc(l a shot ranging tunic (huiui a few yards.

I needed weapons wit hi a large 'oltimmie of firepower but neither range nor accuracy. I c(Jupped ow eight ltt:tti spiads vi ith seven stibtitachinc gnus an(l One light itiichioc gtili.

(hue S111il
60millimeter mortars to lay down an uuithrclla of lire to covel otit vvitlu(Irawal, Our tactics wcrc traditional fIll giierrill:is-\Ve aolloistuCd, WC hit, auud icC 1:11). hhuis p:irtictil:ui wit, ojwr:ut iuig hel,itl tluc cnctuuy line lot six uuuotutlis, killed over tOO
he cuteuiiv. hltw p many bridges and auluinunirlon an(l slilililV
diiiut1is, 111(1 \(l suffcrcd less than a dozen casualties.

lor cflcctivc coiuntcrguerrilla
1crat itS, WC need radical changes in organization, combat doctrine, and ei1iiipuiicilt
(ho key units might h (lccciltralizcd grmis of SO uncit, sell-ic and able to operate a(it000iluouslv, fatuticil tilt
1111(1 iii.

(1)11111 r'
side. The prenuiuuui is on leadership, for otili uuen of eoltt:iic :uil great skill can uiuakc this systcuui woi 1<; iitlt SIIII 111(11, 1)1115 (ICItItI
pay and training, a cotuuitergucitihla blue shollili iii t he thifhjuiuht to maintain.

l'Iic operational couucc})t is as follows: A gticrrill:uiuulcsuud j:urt of the country is tlt:uike(l off and dividcd iuilo sections. Iaclu 4cc tioii is patrolled hy one of these units, bitt all ire itt contact vi liii a central hcadqtta rtcus, which in turn liasar eserve force at its disposal. Upon contacting guerrillas, a
11:11 ml ;ulctls lic;iiht1uiaitets and adjacent patrols. As the latter converge, lic:i,h1,i:urueus ilipatches paratroops or helicopter trauis1ioris h)uhiui(l due etuellis, who is surrounded till destroyed. ( )nec lu
:uur.u is p:uificd, thur govCrniuuent consolidates its control and iii I(S ItS forces on to tIn next Section of land to he cleated.

lIuc 111:1111 ilu1'uelhicttts t hurt lie constant patrols, good Cotuuuutuuticatiouu facilities, t:i1iid uuiohihiiv, and capacity for rapid concelitratiouu.

One further point. 'Flue operations titlIst (arise ltlitiiututltli li:uitui to the people, lest they hecotute antagonistic to tile goicutittleulu the troops must he highly disciplined to res1ect civilian rights and property. Thc should offer help (uatigittg frotit field Ic),:tirs to actions like AI;ugsavsav's oiler (If legal sI'Iirs iii t lit'
Phuili1, pines). Cargo planes slunuld carry iii StIhillilUS. so tlt:tt lie h do lint have to live off thc conuutr'sidc.

1 In onus ho aluli(i\'ill:tlu luclt;uvjor should hc diverted s(lilarClv to tlit 1itcitill:ts tliUiIl41l\U..

They are the ones vvlto arc couuupelle(l 1(1 take to tc1rressiv'e tires, seizing rice or conscripting iuuen itt their dcspcrauioti i\s they hse popular Support, they will have nothing to fall back on when they stiffer inilkary dcfeats.

I hpe that this l:ist point indicatcs toy :1\V:IFCI1CSS of how itilpor
l:int it is to h,vc popular s(ul)port in cotidiictiiig an intcrnal war.

Many ohscrvers argue that stability and physical security arc basically political issues, depending on the Impula rity of govern tncnts. 10 this they' add that Cconoiliic (lC'el( )1)tttCilt is the key to
1(1p11lar support and the criterion by which rcgiuiics will be judged.

lii the long iiiti, popular sitpioit is cssetiii:il lot si:ilile govern
inents and a stable world. And there is no (luestioll that econoillic
(ICVCIOJ)lltCtlt, lllodcrtli7.:ition, and t'elortii :irc key factors in creating popular sup,ort and stable governalients. But in itty judg
inent, it would be niistakcn to think that guerrillas cannot thrive where governments arc popular 111(1 where iiiodcrnization, cco
notnic devclopiiiciit, and relormit ate going fotward. And the usual corollary to this tlmught_thic not ion that the existence of guerrillas is proof positive that the governi t tent is unpopular and lierelore not woith s(I)portitug.._is evcii Inure iiiisakcti. It is, iii fact, (Ideal ist. \Vc need ito nlciutizat 1(111, CCI 1111)1 itic dcvclopiticiit,
:10(1 rclottit to defeat guerrillas. Iluit oilier things ;llC also needed.

I .ct tllC (11:1w' (Iii uiiy pcrson:il experience once ionic. \Vlicti we blight iii lhuiuii:i, :ilouut ho pet cent ol I lie IWIPIC weic 1,i(,_t,,VCst,
:11101 her hU pci cent were procnctliv, and i lie rest were indifferent or turned inward toward their own fanii Iv and village. Yet our guerrilla group pcifoi'iiicd with great success. We recruited titeti not only froni t lie It) per cent who were pro_vVcst, but also front the 80 per cent who 'ere indifferent. We gave no (1narrer to the cttetiiy and his supporters, bitt we did everyt lung we could ti avoid eteat iuug hardship fo,' the lest, and to help tiuciti when we could. \'e wcuc careful tO itlIfl'C
:110011(1 their growing ciotis.

And 'ltctu we had to ask t heni for food, we paid o rairanged ati aiiduop (if (lotihile the atliotitit of rice we took. hklorc the war was over, it was the etieniy :i,ud his support ers iii the puppet govern_
ulietit who :ip)e:iIC(l ()l)})tCssiVC ti the Pt'Ihb0t we guerrillas.

hue idea that guerrillas thrive (ltul\' where the governtuicnt is utupipulal iiiay apply to the titiire developed )Euts (if the votld.

Bitt ill titany parts (if the world, states ate underdeveloped in the politicaladministrative scuse as velI as cci iiiuiiiically.

I I1C
1111111
her of people arc few who have the tin iiii ig
1(1
nih standard civilservice jobs that we tate for gr;iiit cd I :ickitig t stecl frame'' in which India tnlces such just 1inde, a guveiuiulichhl appears as a wca k and ulistant entity to tin 1st vii lagets, eccpt whieii it scrvcs as a burdensome tax collector. In host lands, it least li:iII
the people arc indifferent (1) thc guivciiitticilt. I,vcn I lie Ill cicinctits, rangcd fur or against tiic regittic, lie tint too sd iii I lieu
1)ohitical COflhtltittihctits.

In these circtiittstttlces, iit:lintainutit 11w h;ire tiuitItntitii of tioiial services is enough to deterttiine a tat ions fate for the siioi I
run. In the Congo, the collapse of twi) stlpioits_lhic ltiiiitarv Iorcc l'ul)hique md Belgian technical sctv icc-icvea led ho w f:t I
the state has to go before becoming au
:iiliiiistiative entity.

fly contrast, the Somali Republic, winch taittcd its iticiepeuid cncc at the same time, also faced a potent a lh' (hifllcult situtat ion keeping newly joined regions and piicrfil I Filial gioiips sati fied. As matteis developed, no pseudopo1iuil;ir ittatiifcstaiiuii oh discontent eliidl1('(l, tlciiilcs in part Ii)
1 sum11 hut ('fliciellt \Vcsi crittrained civil intl ii icc force.

As for iiioderiiuintioui, :ilthiuuuigli esSetil 1:11 lot thim'
luilig h:itih, ii

cannot help 11111(11
                  iii a coulitcrguerrill:l 1lloFahhl. Alodriiiij.:iu ion
inevitably UJ)iIoitS estalihishied siicial svstuhuls. 1mimlomec j)(,hil ((:11
111(1 economic dislocation and tension, 111(1 (nuhui)t deliver leiilN
quickly enough to relieve these shortre rio
                                          iressim
 However, there is tiloumiritig unrest iii rural aicas ill over
                                                           I hR
world. 'vVhat peasants increasingly Cln\C
                                          is
                                             Social
                                                   just (C
                                                           :uiid
reformnt
           a iutuiiuumiuum, the old way of life Slitli
                                                   Jim' (tIRlIi('
removed.
 This includes icformii of hnmi(ltdtiuhmc
                                      1FmailgcTmielitS; t(':il)Ii;il)le
iCtit, ('lC(lit, amimi iii:iikct facilities; and iiiijmle huhiRleili tnpk. lIii'

mtm;iy see ahien(l to the value (if utiliami cduiteuc
                                                            thi:ut hilly thiri; pii'
dutccitistead of uhlipuIrtitig
                                      fromii
                                               ulu:umh
                                                         ;iiid
                                                                loirilug
                                                                           I

raise crops for
                     x1imurt-aiid, in t urn, uuu:miiiil:ict inc liii
                                                                        lieu
plc needs. Finally. I iicv crave peace and pJm\iual sceulFul V
  Yet there is-i rowing link hctweetu uirh:iii
                                                              itid rtii:il umiirct.
As niodernization begins, the poorer fariiieis drift
                                                                    iii
                                                                        I lie
                                                                              iii V.
there to form the hard core of the unemi uplu ,cd shu iii ii wcl Ic rs v hi,

<,vct-tax thc nidiiiiciitaiy lllctro1n)litalI facilities.

ihcsc unfortu
natcs form the rccntits for tlic city titolis that Couiiinuiiists and
(kinagogucs have been turning mit iii the \ I iddlc last and I Satin A titemica for tile past Il ftccui yeats.

I lie pout ical link between the two hcetmics clear when we see how the vcry pool. are used as IccItlits for guerrilla lorces in the ittial aIcas
111(1 for "people's pi,iliti:i'' in thc tuitait regions. Comiiit,uitisis have long made usc of tile loimimer iii slIstaillilig a rchtchlioit; (_astto ;i,id (lic (tievara have liccottic adcjit at using 1)0(11 groups to siI)polt the preselit Cuban regime. n I 'atin America alone, Venezuela, Bolivia,
(;oloimmbia, and I'crii conic ittiinediatcly to tl)in(l as countries where
(lie comimh,ined l,rl)allrural prol)lctl) exists.

What is ret1u,re(l tip-st is a progtamlm of social reform. Very often time conservative clemnent in a commimtiunity will struggle irrationally against all rcfoiiii. As a conse(1ucnce, \'C Ii:i ye encountered in several parts of time world the auilazimig and s;uici(laI spCCtaClC of conservatives giving secret aid to the Coimittitunists in order to undermine timodest rcformiiist efforts.

Fqtmahiy itlmjiomtatlt is the miecd to indicate smite effort and progress on the long path to modernization. Smtiafl results, if they prove the intent of a regimlic, can imispiuc lait Ii that vill outlast the distress of earI' change. Iimiahlv, where these efforts arc comii
bitted ithi (lClli0Ctitic govcmtitliclit 111(1 ll1lS5 1)artV organization, tile govetmlmiicnt cati I)moa(lcml its base (if physical power.

It \'ene7ucia, (or example, the tilling party has IiCCn fostering refottit :uid change. It has also cmeamc(l
1
11:11 iomial oIgalli7atiOul, with inyai popin miiiitia elcittemits to support it. 'i'lioughi not professionals, muilitianien call lecp the peace in tile face of provocative demiiomistrations and can pcrloruim useful services ill slip
piemncmiting the work of regular lorces. A government that cannot get its itliage across to t lie peasant mv or tliolOhi7c 1)casallt support will find its functions ill both these ciidcavors tISU rped by tile
(om tlillllIlistS.

Ii, slmllllm:lm17.C tmm' Icelimig itti 1m1inlaiii', uclotiti, all(l immmlcriii
/.atioml: (I) tIle)' ate uuii1uimiatlt itlgrc(licllis hut tie not time deter
tmiitlatlts of events; (2) thelu mole P101st lie uiicasitieI untie ill tCIII1S
of tlteim contribution to physical security titan we generally iCll ize.

Let me refer briefly to several other val'i:It 101)5 iiii t lit I liciitt of internal securitythe political factors liit threaten the stability of new states. So far we have noted priltlarilv tlw liattire of i Tic Communist threat and the issues of good guvctiinlcnt atul cciinofluc developtiiciir. Unfortunately, (Ui t() uI
I hcsc tit)i'rls;il problems, most states have to grappic wit Ii specific dillictilt its I hat create further divisions, induce tensions. anti po pcI t'vcii the licst -
intentioned regillics to violence. Among t test tlithicttltics arc tlic f )l lowing:
I. Ai,taonisvis fleiween Underdevelolicul States.

1 lie I:t,iiiliai pattern of rivalry between neighbors, as old as history itself, exists with even greater intensity today bccaosc so iiiariy new 'states have suddenly sprung into being. Territorial clainis and other sources of friction arc still fresh, as iii the Pcrsia,i (;tihr nt I iiuhi:t's northern border legions. Such difficulties gclicratc I elisions, :111115
races, and nationalistic fervor, which Cmiiii itmist S try to cx 1)11 ut
2. Internal J)isagreev,ents.

I
aiii referring here to friction between regions of a state or between a legion and the cent rr.

the issues of regionalism in India, separatist ttiovcfncults in Iiiultu nesia, and tribalism in the fragmented (
uogo are cx:11 illiles of serious challenges to governmental authority and stabilit v.

3. SocialClass 4i,tagonism. It is chia 1:1(1 (lIst Ic iii cSI il ,Ii,lietl cc(111o1111c elites tli:it tlicy feel tliciiisclves I Iiic:itciicd frinti Iulo\
arid rcfusc to Co(InlCn:II1CC the very rcloisn t hat woiihul t:ist t he real thangers that they face. 11w great f;iiIlIl'cS of olul regililes ill Iraiice before I 7tW and Russia at the stan of tins edit ,t,s' art hot the outstanding itist:ilices of this historic jiiolitciii thi:it presents itself on almost every continent today.

4. intense i)isa,'rccmcnt over forc'icoi lolier.

I laqs ttliit'itii.t to the Baghdad Pact despite internal njiJ)',Sitiott :nid disapproval by all other Arab states is a case in point. Radicalnationalist African states accuse their neighbors of following a colonial, subservient line. lii trying to get theni oii
:1 (oliIl):llahulc uolll''t.

ra(iical slates cIiga1c iii claiidcstiiie ojiclatiouls t snhveii lu'ii'llluiir ing legitiles or support opposittoti factions \ hloS( itleologi itseili bles their own.

5. Traditional l'ulu,cal Rivalries I J1j/,/ a Soeia/ (lan. ( u iii tutu iiu olfets the leading example of two parties (hat, without basic sl)ci;ll 01 ideological differences, became emnl)roiled in a long civi
''ar, so bitter as to cause over 2 50,00() casualties. This war liter
ml ly s111)erimllpoSed itself (III il I the other pHIS of sccu my that ll(llll;llly confront a (levclo1)iug state. The army had to act to I hat situation froiii fraglilentilig tite country.

6. Lack of I'opiilar lk/icf in the State as a Sovereign Entity.

him large a reas of A Inca and the Au iddle East, normal loyalties follow either tribal and provincial lines or grand dreams of regional African or A rat) unity. ] lie state does attract sonic toy
aity because it is a going concern, one that can be used eisa lever of power at both these other levels,
\'Vithm this overlapping of h iyalties, it is only too easy for a government to meddle in the
,lFiirs of its neighbors and further weaken their internal cohesion
.aIways, of course, in the belief that its cause is just.

7. Ethnic or Racial Issues. Rebellious tribesmen are constant
(mauls Oil iiatioiiml nmulitary power in various states throughout Asia and A frica. The Coimmimmunists found iii Malaya's Chinese coIllIlliluit ready hands for their bloody insurrection, partly because ui interracial political rivalries. Indians in sonic t.,attn Ailmenic:mml countries are living at very low standards, arc begin
nilig to stir, and are potential l)ait for a Cotiminunist ethniceco
11101 mic appeal. CentralAfrican pagans have strained relations with Aloslelim Arab northerners ill a ciossroaul land that is beset by otmisithe pressures.

H. ilanditry. i'his is a cultural inheritance in many parts of the world. Bandits (or arimmed rural gangs) who flout the authorities Ilid cxph)it neighbors hive long existed ill many areastheir ac
I uvit ics colored perhaps with varying degrees of political or ideological overtones, hut essentially dedicated to violence. One
1111111(5
uml recent illustrations iii the Philippines, of traditional sporadic outbreaks in Java, of troul)les experienced by the new state (If Burma. These actions impoverish the peasant, IUIII the gi vemnmnelit's authority, paralyze public miiorale, and open the pith to similar Cointimunist tactics or to establishment of Comninu
lust lilt horny in that legion.

9. (.'oimitutional Crises. Unconstitutional extension of prcsi_
detitial power, So often exemplified in the history of Latin Amer
ica, is ttiie cxaiii1Ie Of a ColistIttit tonal crisis that titay lea(l to
1)11ti(iI ttiri)ioil hc,i such CNCC.ss(s arc traditionally resented 111(1
cotinteted by violence, the SC1ZLIIc of po/er by a nlilit;try julita is another.

there ate otliet obvious factors, such as the outburst of nation
alisin that may lolb)w JndepcittlJICC, j)roxitiiity It) Sitio Soviet territory, the existence and strentth of a uninunist Patty and its OIietltatiOtl towai(l MoSCOW ui Peking, anti, of course, revolts against colonial inle anti white illilloilty rule in certain areas.

the addition of ;ust a few of these special hazards to the l)asic
(hiffiC(iltics I
(lCSCiI1IC(I earlier jti;tccs a tremendous strain upon a guvcrllnient's ;tayin power. You can clearly sce why I am saying that: internal security is' problem in its own right and not simply :1 function of good govcrntllent or economic growth.

There arc iitauy things we can (to to help rcs1)oltsihle and friendly goveriititcnts at tack tIii pr(ih,fcttt all along the line.

I have already illustrated lio' the training of atImic(l forces caii be bettci' geared to the speeiftc war against guerrillas.

Iiojualiy imiI1)oitailt is tIle trainitig of polite .itid other forces to cope with the lesser manifestations of violence, not o'nly in detection and surveillance, bitt also in handlint.' a5tual outbursts. Vc may find ourselves encouraging reforiuer to organize mass parties, and in certain tense circtlltistaIIccs \ve may need to help create ciii
zeus' titilitia forces. Ve ate seriously intercsted in l)roadetling the will and capacity of friendly governments to angimietit social and political reforimi progratits as a basis for tiiodernri.ation.

We imiust also look for ways to case the access of beleaguered states tO ()mglsi(lc assistance. 'lime (on,mmttmnists usc rIte concept of state sovereignty as a device to seal oil a land front "imltelvclttioIl''
once the)' have itiade sufficient inroads. i'liey use international law, appeals to neutralist neighbors, the unpleasant reactions to what is called 'Vestcrn iiiiperiahisiii,'' and tue threat of force in this cifort. Vc timust fosict' Ilic growt Ii and use of international organizations as sources Of help help on all the problems I have mentioned, and help that can be ott tile scene and iii action before the crisis reaches its peak. In this way, we mitay ward off a show
down or at the very least have elements there w indicate outside
PP in being and on the way.

in any evens, the United States smut be prepared to become dnply involved. ihis effort miy he costly, hut careful and early usivolveinenr is far less expcsuive sir dangerous than a crash program. use Communists are already c.nnnmittcd everywhere, and imkss we approach she probleims hi a systematic way, with considerable thought, we will simply be paving the way for Mr.

Khrushchev in his new and potent tacticinternal war.

# Guerrilla \Varfare Ind U.S. Imiilitiry Policy: A Study Pjre1 Paret Ani) Joijn W. Sny

The I 9o0's, a Marine Corps officer icccntly said, may be "the decade of the gucrrilla." Events in Southeast Asia, in Africa, and in the ( .a ribl ean (It iI)dCCd SCCII I ((I bear OUt his prediction. No longer is the irregular warrior a iiiilitary orphan. '1'lic Ad,iiinis
tratioli has prt.9xiseil a I'a1)i(l cX1)ausiuii of ''tlncoiiveiit io,ial warfare ca1)aI)iIii iCS,''
a call to which Congressmen and journalists have respondid with enthitisiasiti. Even The New York 'i'imes has printeti a printer on the subject culled front Mao Tsetitng. *
Most of ti will agree that this swing in attitu(le is overdue.

hr too long, nuclear weapons have monopolized the nation's intehlect-nal iicrgics and material resources. Iven the groving interest iii the possii .ihity of limited war has largely acceptcd the traditional definition of ''war.'' Only now, when guerrillas in I'aos, Cuba, the Congo, and Algeria have -directly touched our national interest, (10 WC seem to he awakcning to the full range of iIillliary jiossilmihitics. Mome icflcction tnt earlier evenis iii
( ucccc, Palc',tine, Indochina, Indonesia, the Phiilippiiies, Malaya, Cy1)mtms, and even kaslunir amid Kenya might have shioureited this unloilunate t line lag in our thinking.

ltmr just ms nianv people have tended in the past to regard a certain wca1 tOn or doctrine, wliei her "massive retaliation'' or
"limititeil wat-,'' as the simitlc solution to our military problems, there is now a dai er that such tendencies will shift toward the guerrilla and subversion. 'I his kind of attitude, to which few of us arc imniminc, reflects a weakness for gadgets and fashions that Sc pp. s--in for this text.

has Pin Place Ifl (flit thinking on dclcnsc. i'hc eiitlnisiasts of gucr_
rilla varfare have tuade their case alter a long, dry SC8SOI1 Of ileglect.

1 hc t hue li:is coitic, however, t(
lialarice t he (JISCIISSU)fl.

\7c neefi to :)Il:IlV7C what wc have lc:iiiicd :iiunit gtlcrriil;% opcr:i
I iiiiS, 811(1 to clarify our I hiiiktng aiuit the relat ion of gucrrflla
:iifarc to Aiiiciic:iii foreign aIItI llltlitalV policy.

I he first (1nestion to :ik IS 8 S11111)IC otle (flit perhaps lot that reason is usually igoo)fc(l: \\'liat arc the functions (if guerrilla I listoiricallyboth before and after Spanish peasants fighting against Napulcon put "guerrilla'' into the dictionarythe irregn
hit li:is usually bccn defending his country against foreign 1f1V8
shin.

(lie twcnrictli century, however, has brought two other functions iiiore clearly into view: 1 lie giicriilla 111:1',' bc a wapoii of insiirlCctinIl, alillilig 8t the capture of political powt; anti he tti:lv be tlic illstrunidnt of foreign :iggIession. Today the second
:ic id bird ft mcti ii Is arc on r p rh iw rs' coi ice in, a It I o nigl guerrilla operations against conventional attack or in the aftermath of a nuclear strike remain conceivable.

(lie insurrectionary and aggressive functions of guerrilla \Vat
f:irc arc not new in thciiisclves. People discontented with thcir goovertismiefits atui agents of foreign powers have often hceii involved iii vioicnt uprisings that used unorthodox iiiilitary tactics.

\'hat- i.r comuparatively new is tile (ievch)pIIleult oil :1 body of the
ory that has systeinati7ed the tccluih1iic of using guerrilla warfare for he seizure of national or internal iomi:il power and has 1,laccd lie irregular lighter aiiiong the weapons systellls of modern war.

( ;il F. I .awrcnce, leader of lie ,\ r:ih guerrilla c:lllIpaigIl
:lgaiilst Turkish conltllullicatjons iii World War I, was the first of the nc' partisan "leadertheorists'' to have appeared in the ieiitictli century. l'hese tiicu, in their actions :15 well as in their ritings, have extended Clausewit7.' aii:ilysis (11 tile ariiied popu
l:icc as a tiiihita ry instrulilent, to include tile SC of irregulars for Puit teal ptiiposcs. While Mao isctiiiig is deservedly the best
((flown aitinig thciti, Mikliail I'rtmn7.e,
1 COfI
1 I(Jtsky, 80(1, tiiOSt recently, Chie Gties'ara, arc others of iiiiportance.

Viiat caii these titen teach us? they have described the comidi
ions under which guerrilla warfare can he initiated and sus
tamed. They have analyzed 1)0th the tcchtiopics :iiid the hci-t ive of guerrilla warlarc. Finally, perlpS 5)1 F)FiSiIitly, t hey have vealed the inherent Jiinitatioiis of this fin to of coiithat An Algerian rebel lcadcr recently explained t lie Ilecess:I I V
conditions for gttcriilla warfare in terms of drain.''
I Ic was using the vortl 1)0(11 in au utICOilveIltiolial :111(1 iii ItS CtIlveIit ioIlal, geographical, sense. Strategically, irregulars iced Co;lSiIctahlc SPCC in which to putsue hitandmu opcr:ilioIls stiC(csShIhl\.

Mao, for example, has doubted whether extensive guerrilla warfare could ever occur in a country as small as Uelgintii. lactically, irregulars require rough country, wit Ii lew l)CoI)IC and 1)00!

roads difficult of access to their opponents.

But the Algerian leader was also using "Ic rraio'' iii the ext ended sense of "political terrain.'' lntemnatioiiallv, )IiJ,lottiat IC S)tppOrl for the guerrillas can weaken their oppotidlit
, po vide
110 Ira I
itid material assiStance, and even furnish iiiihitai- s;tTictutarV that titav compensate for itiadcquatc space in the a rca if act "C o15eral iotts.

Internally, guerrillas must have the active stip})ott of some, and the acquiescence of iliost, of the civilian popnlat Internal poptila r support is the md ispcnsa I IIC
C( itiditii iii mi successful guerrilla action. This fact iiiaIex t lie relationship between the military and civilian realttis ttuorc ilitittiate thin iii any other type of warfare. Although this 1oit is often stated, its rationale is too little understood. Why itinsi tie guerrilla have a on psychological I iase among the l)eol)11?

First, thc irregular lighter is recruite(i by soitte ideological coinmitnicnthowcvcr crude it. might hie--;tiid toil 1)tiIIl:Ilily Iiy administrative unachiitiery. Only such cotiiiiuilttteiii cait 5051 liii t lie selfcontrol and unit discipline (leiilatl(le(l h i his itliuSt Joluishillig kind of combat. Agents, infiltrated fiotti ahitoail, niay phi ill important role, but perhaps the greatest advatita C of the gierrihla is that he is a native, fighting aiiiotig people tOll over giouttid he has known since hi rt It.

Second, civilian support helps to solve tile Ciii ical prohilcitis of logistics and intelligence. The local populace provides bull, shelter, medical care, and motley. Mote illuportailt, it furnishes the information the guerrilla iiiust have IT) onicr to eti;ov hut hi surprise when he attacks and security fromii at tack by his neiit. lveii when thc itiass of the people seem no miioFC thaii
.ipatlietic, afta'id, and unhappy at being caught iii the iiiidst of an iii(eimiah war, they are not truly neutral. If the gticrrihlas arc suc
ceeding, then the PC0Plt arc giving t hemii vital iiitelligcncc and tkiiyuig it to their oj)1)(nlciiIs. As Citevara has written: ''One of the milust illiportant characteristics of a guerrilla war is the notable
(hill(leI)Ce that exists bctwccn the iiifuriiiation the rebel forces possess and the inlorniation the cncinies posSess."
Popular stI,)1)ort indisj)cnsah)IC to (lie guerrilla hiecitise hc is uuilii:irily weak, a fact easily forgotten. After all, the guerrilla is lie does because he lacks the weapons, cu1tIi1HnCIIt, sup
plies, technical skills, and often iitiuiihcrs needed to (ighit iii any other way. Seldotut if ever has auuyomic deliberately chosen a tticrrilla strategy when other choices existed. If suflicietit luuilitary st rciugdu is avaihaiple, conventional oigaiir/.atioui an(l tactics pro
uhticc a decisioti more jnickly; if the goal is political, strcmugtli makes JaisSil)le ii coup d'etat inste:uul of a costly, protracted civil war.

lven the Aiuuericui revolutionaries, whose armuied populace gave tiucimu enortliotis gtmerrihla potciutial, IISC(l partisan warfarc oiuly as a last resort. 'l'Iiis traditioiuiil reluctance to employ guerrillas uitiless forced to do so is understandable. Guerrillas do great tlaiiu
lc to ilie 'ery society they are trying to defend or comitrol latauisc their weakness keeps thueiii fioiii prulecong peo1)le or l"l'V lhcir strength derives nut so mmmcli Sioi,i vca1,,is )flLI
urga?uii.;uitnu as fiostu chiatugcablc popular attitudes. Iii short, gucr
nIl:1 warfare as a tuuihitary iuieans to a political end is both costly intl risky. Civil War historians %'hio are fond of praising the p:iI'tiS:iiu exploits of \losby iii northern Virginia should retnciuilmcr i lie sctjuel:
Shicrici;iji devastated the Shenandoah
\iahley, and
\lohy, (k1)rived if his guerrilla base, umitittuarely failed.

I rime, guerrilla warfare has one uulajor advantage in this unclear age. It eiuiploycd aS an instruuuiemit of foreign aggression, it cunsti
I tiles an "aiiibiguotms threat'' I))' confusing the legal, political, and even ouilital)' bases for an effective iniciuiatiomual respouise. But:
lutist tul (lie native guicrrihlasauud their civilian supporters lutist have 1 stronger uliotive' for fighting than serving the convenience of a ii reign power. (hic intenia I conditions for irregular warfare must lw right hefuic the guerrilla Iiec, icsa'ailahle as a titeans of aggression.

Hie weakness of the guerrilla himself and his conse]iiciit need to gain and mll;iiittaimt strength ainomig the civili:iii population largely tlcteriiiie his te(lmiques amid Ol)jCCtIVCS. Unable to destroy his opponent lY)' by (hirect, military action, lie lights psy
eliologically by indirect, political iiieamis. Never attacking unless overwhcliiiingly superior, and never fighting long enough to he caught 11)1 t counterattack, the guerrilla leader uses cotitbat itself as a psychological weapon. With an unbroken string (if victories, however itisignilicauit itiaiiy of thieuii may be, lie creates comili
dence iii ultiiutatc success among his suppiJiters. Ar the sante titite, he fosters a glow imig despair aimiotig his opponents.

hit gitcirilla iomivcmts his reliance omi the civilian 1u)1nilanoii Intl )alia(lvammtagc. lkc:itmse lie camlilot hold ground om even do hi rgesea he d a iii age to ci met i iy f ) rces, his objective hec m ties c ni
trol of die popmilatioii. lie l)St1 this objective not only by pohiti(allv organi?iImg intl iiidoctrinarimig the peo})lC, hut also by educating his own mmmcii in tlmcir role of winning civilian support.

Ilie Ihiree l)iscipliimaty Rules'' and "lighmt Points of Attention,''
which Mao formiitmlatcd as early as 1928, make it plain to all irregular soldiers that they are expected to behave not as coil
(111015 or hamidits, lull as discipliuicd meplesentatives of a new social and ecommommiic om der.

Ibis new order, Mao also declares, is at the heart of the stmug_
gle. ''Vithiout a political goal,'' lie wiites, "guerrilla warfare miluist fail, as it umiust if its political olccti'es dl) nOt coiticitle with the asj)iua(uouls of the peple.'
I amid rcfommti, miatiomialistit, corruip
non, l)o'Cmty_thicse arc the issues exploited by iiiodcrti guerrillas to pcopk over. ()umcc it is orgatii?ed, and convinced 1)1 both the certainty and tIme justice of a giitrrilla victory, the civilian l)ol)tllatiomm replaces the traditional tools of war with i less tami
guile forum of strength.

'lIic ie1mmirctl imitegratiomi of mitilitat y and political act ion goes be'ouul foruinilatimig :1 lolnll;1m plogramut and then letting I lie patti
sans tlieiiuselvcs act as its salcsmiicmm.

lIven tIme siutallest tactical
(per:ir ion may have political imimphicatiomis. For exaimiple, aim attack on aim emicimmy strong point scemmis necessary, (nit iiiay alienate die Iocii itilialtitatits 01
)OSC tlieiii tO reprisals ;lg.Iillst which they callll( it tIC J)rOteCte(l.

I iic 1)OlitiCa I
COnSCt1IICIICCS iiia>i well (ilit
weigil the JH)NSil)IC iiiilitary gaul anti (IIC taiti IS tlt)t cairleit out.

I
ic A Iget tans have adO1)tCLl peritaps tlic 111(1St CXtfCIlie solution II) tiltS J)lOl)IeIli Of J)(JiitiCOltlilttarV C(H)rtIiflatiOfl by introducing
:1 pi ilitical officer, who illInseIf has had previous CXpCIiCOCC as a itithit try conllllandcr, at every ecliclim down to the section.

It is useful, with our new concern over guerrilla warfare, to imagine ourselves in the position of the guerrilla leader. \Ve then Sec I fiat he is (ace to face with Sonic serious oltllicultics and certain utilicicuit lillutatiouls. lii La (iucrra tic (iucvriilas, Chic Cticvara, like Mao, utlderStand.tt)ly stresses the J)ositsve side of itrcgular warfare. But a close reading of his hook tevealsa series of di ici iiii ias f , r the guerrilla katie r.

A I o v C alt, the gt iet.ii I Ia lea (let
1111 1st lIe Ct III titi tally active
harassing CflCfl1 COlilmtlniCatiOIlS, atiilntshiuiig isolated posts and det acliuiicnts, cleating by acts of violence a general climate of insecurity. I-his Illoveilicut thrives and grows on continual, small Successes. At the saiiic time, he must never risk a defeat. l)cfeat not only hurts his sitiahl, poorly c9nipped forces, bitt it also weakens partisan morale and civilian conhdence. the psychological (laiilagc Illay he greater than the tiiilitary. This \i'as I rue of tile July, 1961, Iiaule in South \'ietnaui, where tile S,Twt lost fewer than 200 of thieli- 5,00() iO,00() tigiiteis. Ike giler
iilIa leader. a,teiiqns to walk a title line between rashness :11n1
ilcuessa I','
I)0l(IUCS5.

Second, there is a &liieIlliiia posed by tCItaiIi Oil tile one hand, taIgets 1)11 the other.

Ilic tougher tile terrain, tile iliore secure is tue guerrilla force. Rut tile rougher tile terrain, tile uliore ditli
cult is ii (or guueruiii:is ii, 1111(1 local stijplies :iuid to hit tue uilost
111111u1taIlI lflhIuIaiy and p1a1 targets. ( uievara aduitits theut the
411 ks ;iuiil tile s(uI)(iIlbs ate tile seulsutivc areas that 111(1st be :ittacked a i id 111(14 ctrunated, mit that precisely tho iSe a rCas ale Illost danger
mis ior guerrilla operations. Eveui tile flatter, unite fertile, aud li&:ivily 1R)J)tilatCd fariiilatids Cotistittite "tiuifavorable tertaun."
iiictc is also tile uitattei of guerrilla discipline. Guevara notes that individual Conviction drives iiuost guerrillas to tight hut they lutist suin,iit to a discipline that is extretneiy severe by regular siitlit&ls. ( )nly tutkr such discipline can they IIICCt the eXt iaoi
tliuiai'' iysiiI
(nIl (.-lnotinIIai (leillands 1)I.(cctl upon thciii by irlegtllar 'aiIare (siiiilai dullalids nearly tiestioyed tue C0llIl)at effcctivencss of Allied long lange penetration groups in Burma in
19-14). Iii (Amba, (Inc iuiethod of solving this coiillict I)etWCcuI
individual ilsotivatuu1 and cticiiic regillielitation was to let unit COllllilittCCS, rallier than colllh)at coiiuiiandcrs, perform Ccrtaifl jtidii.ii ftlllCti(IIIS. Never thehess, even such SeIfilli!)OSC(l discipline Cannot afford any tiotilits aliotit the CauSe ()1 the leadership. lor this reason, gucriillas thiciuischvcs seem to lIe especially vulnerable to )SCl 11)11 Igica I itt ack.

Ihie guerlilia iea(lCr faces still another dilciiimua in dealing with the civilian popiliatioll. Although Iii:iny of the people may be dis
contciitcti, their discontent lutist he translated ilitI) willingness to CoIIiiiuit (II 5%11)1)Ult illegal, 'iolens acts. Generally they ire lirotighit tO tli, this by a colillilIlatiolt (if political persuasion anti iuiilitary success. But rarely if ever has a guerrilla iliovelluclit been able tO
avoid nimore coercive tcchnii1ues, including the USC of terror. ike citici;ih (1uestioli then i)ecolncs whether coercion, afl(i es1iccially terlOl, will alicii:itc people 111(11C tItan it iIirimlii(lates tiwiii.

Soiiie Amiiei-icait olhicials and journalists have recently :irgiied that terror alone, used by guernillas infiltrated into an aica, can Illaintain the popular liase needed for guerrilla warfare, lint Chic
(;R'iIi, iii his field titantial for I .atin Aiiierican revolutionaries, tines lint scent to agice. I IC tct(lII1S to the (1(IeStiOfl ol coelCioii repeatedly, never 9tlite clarifying tile answer; hut clearly reveal
iuig the coiiiplcxity of the 1tioi,heiii. "IFCaSOII,'' he a(liliits 00 the iciiid, lutist always be ''justly' 1)unislted,'' Guerrillas display
''absoitite i1111)lacaiulity'' toward ''ContClui1)tii)le perSoulS.''
Anti es1)cciahiy in ''unfavorable terrain ''---Cities or faiiiiaiidwiieie iS
lIlOSI
iIil1)ortant hitit iiitlitary operatiulis are iliost Iia'iartlotis, thit guerrillas ehiioiiiate ''recalcitrant cileliliCs ...w uk
out leniency here can he ito Clicililes ill d;lulgerouiS places.'
()ii the oilier hand, Gtievara rejects terrorisuil as a general policy I)cCaiusc it ''is i liegat i've vea1oii tit;t 1)1 Is in Ito way the desired effects, ihi:it capi 11(111 a people agaluista given recolu
tionary Iluoveilielit, and thir brings with it a loss of lives alitonig those taking part that is much greater than the return.''

## Lhe GuerrillaAnd How To Light Him

  There is some historical evidence supoIting
                                               his point. The
Greek Communists, although successful foi a time in using coer-
cive methods, eventually drove over a half-iiiillion of what should
have been their strongest supporters off the land and into the
cities. The Malayan Communists, once committed to a policy of
terror, found that it undermined their campaign of political
indoctrination and they abandoned it within a year. In southwest-
ern Korea, North Korean guerrillas successfully terrorized the
peasants until threats ceased to be certain of execution. Then
terror began to boomerang. Even the Algerians claim to have
given up the large-scale use of terror, as a means of keeping Mos-
lems in line, after finding its disadvantages too great.
  Terrorism, of course, can have other important uses besides
maintaining popular support. A government too weak to provide
a popular rallying point, a government without the administrative
machinery or military strength to perform its minimum func-
tions, may find that terrorism SO completely disrupts life that
peace on any terms seems preferable. Employed against a colonial
regime weakened by political difficulties at home and abroad,
terrorism alone may achieve the objective of the guerrillas. This
happened in Palestine and Cyprus. In Cyprus, EOKA never en-
gaged in large-scale irregular combat although its operations had
all the other characteristics of guerrilla 'arfirca popular cause,
civilian protection of the partisans, and goverumiental difficulties
in obtaining information and maintaining rdcr without further
alienating the population. In the end, the British decided that a
political settlement in Cyprus was prcfcrahlc to all-out war against
the insurgents.
  But the use of violence by the partisan against civilians re-
mainS an ambiguous, not an invincible, wc:1on for the guerrilla
leader. Indiscriminate or selective tcrroi. Rs extreme forms of
coercion, even sabotage if it disrupts civiliao life too greatly, may
have a backlash that repels rather th;iii
                                     II ii lets popular support.
At dines, however, guerrilla forces lIull resort to these tech-
niques, and the guerrilla leader must deal ' i Ii the difficult proh
lenis of just when and how to use thcll, and how to keep them
under control.
  Unfortunately, Guevara barely touches on tile last and greatest

## The Theory And The Threat

dilemma of the guerrilla leader (the rottenness of the Datisti regime largely solved it for the Cuban revolutionaries). As shall see, the big problem lies in the difficult choices involved in pushing the war to a victorious conclusion.

The belief that irregular operations must be regularized ii partisans are to win has become one of the dogmas of guerrilla theory. Before Mao, both experience aiid doctrine had primarily concerned the defensive function of guerrilla warfare, which takes for granted a friendly regular army that eventually invades the country and operates in conjunction with the partisans. Mao was the first to see clearly that such an army might be created from the guerrilla force itself. Having consolidated their position through irregular warfare by the early 1930's, the Chinese Coinmunists began to engage in more conventional operations. [hey reverted to a guerrilla strategy against the Japanese invasion iii
1937, but after 1945, drawing upon his pool of coml)at-trained manpower, Mao used primarily regular forces in expelling Chiang from the mainland.

When there is no chance of large-scale foreign intervention, and when the enemy is. politically and militarily strong, with both the will and the intelligence to use his strength, the dogma of regularization undoubtedly holds true. The psychological character of guerrilla warfare then becomes only the means of creating and consolidating the popular base, which in turn must.

eventually provide enough soldiers sufficiently well trained to defeat the enemy in open battle. But there are a nuimiber of pitfalls on the road to regular operationsregularization may he not just a dilemma, but a complex of dilemnias.

The first of these is proper timing of the transition. Premature regularization invites military disaster but overlong attachment to irregular operations may exhaust the population. i'he Chinese Communists worried most about the latter danger, the vice of
"guerrillaism"; the Algerian rebels had to resist the Oppi 5i1
temptation, of seeking the domestic and diplomatic prestige of conventional operations before being militarily ready'. One reason for the ultimate defeat of the Greek Coimimnunists appears to have been that before they could afford to (10 50 they were fighting as regular forces, with heavy weapons and territorial bases.

lerritorial bases are iiictitmncd by ( tieva raas being of great va Itic cvcn I)cforC any attcil1)t is made to regtlla Iii.C opCrati(nls.

- lilt')' iuakc it )OSsil)lC to have training anti rest arcas, supply
(l(iill)S, :lIld hospital facilit ics. Of COUESC, lic adds, tllcy must he
'scenic," mit how to inakc theni secure against lustclass rcgulars is not answered. Bases, it would seem, offer the sort of fixed target hat counterguerrilla forces always seek and rarely find.

in China and Indochina, guerrilla groups turned into regular iIiiiies capable of delcatnig large cncuiiy forces. In both cases, this was achieved with foreign assistance, and there is little evidence that victory can ever be gained w',thiout such help. l() l)e sure, guerrillas will supply tliciiisclves with :1iIiis and :iutitimnition by r:,i(is, and the civilian npulatioii viil provide other essentials.

Rut the Ft .N re9uired the sanctuary of Tuiiisi:iii territory and cvcii Castro iiecded outside support, including the crucial U.S.

ciiihargo against Batista iii 1958. Yet foreign aid can be a
'oedged sword for the guerrilla leader. The anus of the guerrilla movement and its foreign ally will never coincide exactly, and the differences may be important, especially if exploited by heir mutual enemy. This need to ac(lnire foreign aid makes lmssiile the third function of guerrilla warfareits use as an inst rumiient of aggression. But CVCII Co,iiiiutiists, wit ii their talent
1 r linking local grievances and flussiaii or Chinese loreugn policy ll
1 single ideological Ir:itiiework, do not always find it easy to duiiii,iatc a guerrilla uIn)t'eIllcmlt. At the satlic nine, the guerrilla leader tlln)r find it difficult to bargain for (nhIsi(lc help without tiiiderwining or conlprollnsiilg his own objectives.

in all of these diletiimnas, the guerrilla lender lutist display exccp_
I ional ;udgiiiciit. Cucirillas, unlike more convent u)Ilal forces, laclc tile strength to ntakc up for faulty decisions. Moreover, a shrewd opponent who understands the nature of irregular warfare can C( )tlsi(Icral)ly narrow the area in which sound decisions by the guerrilla leader are possible.

\Ve have outlined (lie nature of guerrilla warfareits setting, objectives. tcchnk1ucs, and litiiitatiotis. What do these factors nicati for the United States? We arc not iicrc urging specific solitiiiis to specific
1)1
eiIiS, hut our aiiaiysis iiiay oiler some gui(lClineS for thinking al)OtIt the gcncr;II I)IUl(lClII
((I
tl(C
((IC
tionship of guerrilla warfare (C) Aliteticati policy.

Guerrilla warfii'c concerns the United Stucs in t bce dilfcunt w'ayS:
1. In planning to employ guerrillas defensively, tlnis s rcngthening the ability of nonCommunist states 0) resist tcgua iattack.

2. In employing guerrillas as ofFensive Ue4poI)s.

3. n bolstering the defenses of a friendly nat ion lighting gnci_
rillas, or threatencd by them.

lo() often these areas are coiiluscd, ((F hiiipcd to{Ctb(CI (inCler the I)J11aSC ''uncoiivctitioiiil vaifarc ca1);(lnlit Cs.

Since ilC('%' tlt:il with di flcrcnt problems, they should L)C kC))t (list met l'hc first arca_plnnning to use guerrillas as a delc,isive vcapoii
needs little discussion. It appears ((Cost a1)1)lical,k to NAl ( ), as a means of making \'Vestcrn European I)Cl)lcs indigestible lot a conventionally armed invader or able to conduct the broken
back war that may follow' thermonuclear strikes. Any such plan must, however, Illect several important considerations. (Joe is the fact that guerrillas, because of their weakness, must rely' for
1)10
tcctuon on a nearly illlpenctral)le cnuntciin(clligcnce
\Vould not peacetnile reserve guci-rilla units ICc subject to infiliia-
(ion, or even to the capture of so illaily personnel iii the initial shock of invasion, that the entire Orgai(izat ion would be fat ally coiiiproinised? The resistance nioveriicnts of \Vorkl War Ii were recruited under wartiiiic conditions, certainly (Imsadvant ageous iii some ways, but perhaps essential if a guerrilla lot-cc is to survive.

If the problem (>1 security seems solvable, t lure is a gcg;aphical difficulty to consider. 'vVestern Europe is
:i fairly constricted area, with a high density l)eoPhe and coiintltinic:lliotis aml with few natural bastions. Most of it is very "unfa curable t crraiii.''
t Jn
doubtedly guerrilla warfare is possible in \Vcstcrti Eti rope for short tulle, especially if the Coiiimtinisr inva(lcis ate heavily engaged against \Vcstern regular forces. But it sucinsa NAR) strategy to rely on guerrillas as Ifl;)j(U tlcicii'ot i(
:15
:1
i1lc:ins of prob)ngc(l rcsistailce. tverytliing -ihI (l(l(C(l(l. (Cf (0111SF, on the willingness of the civilian l)nl)ttblt Intl ICC fight back.

lit short, it iiiay prove difficult if (lot iiiipossible to stockpile ellec
I tvcly (lie colilponelliS of guerrilla warfare.

lisiuig guerrillas as an offensive weapon, cuber to j)tIt pressure ni the (nnunuulists or to overthrow a govcrnhilclit obnoxnius to lie I. Itiitcd States, has recently received considerahic lttCuitiOfl. In case of Illajor war, it would clearly be a way to CX1)li lit discontent iii the Communist rearin II uligary, for examiiple. But its cmii
yum IC, it as a wea p1)11 in t he C ild \Va r, or as a ncw ii istnm Ii ient of A mm ic rican di ph m lacy, IS another mm ia t te r.

All wi mid agree that it is in the satellite area that the launching
1)1 guerrilla ilioVeilIClitS seemlis iiiost 1>ro(italile. Yet is it not pre
cis&lv this area where such ventures arc miiosr risky? Comiimnunist regimiles are past mmiasters (if this kind (if warfare and could be expected to fight back with ruthless efficiency rather than becoiiie less mmiihi,antly Comimiimuiiist. If a guerrilla immo'eImleiIt s/.wuld achieve success, despite or perhaps because of Comiiiiunist rcpres
sli ni, there would l)C real danger of escalation to a higher level iii 'iokncc. The United States, through some nimscalculatioii of this alimiost incalculable kind of warfare, might find itself with the ulilmappy choice of abandoning friends or raising the stakes. Sonic
;Ilial'sts of nuclear strategy have seen Westernbacked satellite ivult as the most likely occasion for a Russian surprise attack on the United States.

:\side 111)111 the direct danger u) ourselves, our potential allies ill I liese countries would undergo great and prolonged suffering.

It is doubt ful if they could ever win without A ummerican armed siuppi ut , and except in au allout war that would sccmii out the IItest ion. In other words, we would bc asking these people to Ict p;mvu1s iii our global strategy. Besides, if somiielinw it should iiee itself from Counniunist control, could a society terribly darn
:mgcd by internal var be stable vithiout resort to totalitarian tech
iii1ues? Is the United States interested in such an outcouiic, and is it willing to hear the responsibility for liberating people by liese imicans?

l'iuially, does the United States have the ca)aciry to conduct covert mmmilitary operations on an extensive scale? The Cuban venture was not a fair test because its concept largely rejected guerrillas in favor of a more conventional strategy. Nevertheless, there isa reason to siIs1ct that our ability to conceal Iroiii others and (U)!)) Oil!' own 1)0j)tiatiOIl \%'ll.lt \VC ire doing is lint very great.

It has i)cen argued tli:i the adiptiou of guerrilla stlI)versl()tl as Anierican policy woul lead to iiiidaiiicnral changes in both our internal structure and our international objectives.

In inaiiy Auncricatis, such cliatites are nitacceptalde in that they seem to crude the very I)aSis (II our national eXiStence.

Not only ullay ui)jc lions be raised on grotuiids of 1)rillciple, there at-c practical rcas us for heating with caution any proposed CIlIployllIelIt of gueiiclas U) uvcithrow govcnhuileuits. If such a break wit hi wlu:ut we ike U) thiiuuk of as traditional policy also ru1fl(l FL'S the general
\ ii iericau COOSCOSUS on natiu nl;i I
1)11 F1)( uSC, then we uiIay' ha ye we kcncd on iselvcs internally iliore thati any intCrflatiotiil gain l)1i'lt (IC \v(lItli. Although the Cold 7ar is ccrtainly hot: a o1)tlkllity COOl est, we may also iiuake it inure difficult for icltial and 1)OtCliti:ll allies to (OIICI(lde that it lies iii their interest to work with us.

lor CXaIilple, a govrnlucnt under guerrilla attack uiuiglit: hod it iinpossiiic to accc1
help Ii OIiI
au aggressive United States without discrediting i: self in tile eyes of its own piputlatioui as a tool of iuulperialislil. In such in eventuality, the Uuiirct,i States w(nuh(l have suffered, ult just a drop iii IieI)ulouS iultClThltiOIlil prestige, but a tangil)t unihitar' reverse. W. W. Rostow, Ill OflC
of the utiost cuiiipletc .ate,i,euits yet iiiade by the Aduuiiiisrratioui on guerrilla varfarc,0 las argued thus 1)oitit persuasively: ''I )espitc all rile Coiiuinunist talk of aiding tiiovetiicnts 4)1 natninal juule
pdndculce, they are driven iii the end, by the nature of their system, to violate the independence of nations. l)espite all the Couninuitist talk of Au uencaul ii uipcrialistiu, we are coiiiitted, by tile narurC of our sysu ni, to s(11)j)ort the cause (If iiat,ouiai iuide
1)eul&lehlce. Anti the fit iii will tout.''
Piuldic interest ill ti.. cuiiphuuiieuit of guerrillas by the United States has tended to diutte disciussioti of what is in fact: our bust pressing prolIleuui: huj. to fight against guerrillas. Such discussion as has occurred has g iierally taken the fonti of debate between the exponents i,f uiiihiu ;Iry aid and the cxponentS of ecouloillic aid See jp. 54-61 (or his text.

to undcrtlcvclopcd areas. It should be clear from the charactcr of guerrilla warfare, however, that neither iiiilitaiy incasures nor pofit icat liicasurcs by themselves 'ill solvc the 1)I()l)klil (If (ICfCI1SC
:og:limIst guerrillas.

Ic,r poirluoSeS of analysis, coointcigttcrrilla action may he scp
:lI'atc(l into three tasks, lout they arc sto inti,n;itcly related that SUCCCSS ill (Pile tasic ooltcmm (ICJ)CI1(IS oii progress iii the otloers. iic
:osks arc to defeat the guerrilla tiiihtarthy, to I)reak his cotlflcCtiofl
'it Ii the civilian loninmiatuPil, amid too rCC.stal)IisIl govcrnmcntai lilt lio,i-it' and social order.

l'uopfessuunal soldicrs arc faiiiili.or with the tactical problems of lighting irregulars but a few pommits can be profitably made here.

Succcssnil countcrgucrrilla 0p1,cratloils, as iii the Philippines, have alw:ovs cottihined a grid svstemol of territorial control with llud)ile st liking forces.

Ilic mobile striking forces cannot normally be iii:ioie omp of friendly civilians, organi7.ed and trained to fight as goicriillas. Instead, they ame comompooscd of the best regulars, able to vx1,ioit all the tcciomuologicah
:miid adinmnisiiaiave a(lv1fltages ol moiodc,n tioihitnry oorgairIatuon, and to CIlil)loV thcni in Uncoil
ccitt iomial fashion as 'cll. Since the territorial forces arc iiiainly
1uiliuc or homitedefense units, the role for Imicndly guerrillas in cumuli ciguerrilla action secmiis Very hiuiiitcd.

lhc lrcncim 1lttCll)1)ted to uSC such guerrillas in Indochina but ii lioiit munich success, iiiainly because t lies did lint have the P1nltar base from which to operate. Siuiiilarls'. tioc United States slio'ould not espcct to base its toiititaiy action against guerrillas oi local lmhouiar support, especially in tlc early stages of a conflict.

lictidi regular troops, oui the other hand, liever scent to have liccmi able to operate unconvcntionall'.

hlte lImit ISIt forces in
\ i:il:P)a. with a sutialler war on their hands, succeeded to :0 meuiiark
:il ole es t cut in imsuog i riegti Ia r tactics ng:mirost (
0111111 titlist gi tern I his.

Ii is iliil)Oit:lm%t for (lie IJtiitcd States too tititleistamid tins (liStitiC
tio,Il between guerrilla tactics available to both sides, and guerrilla ooig lii i/.:l 110)11, WI oicl is natUrally op1u osed to I I te go ve rio ii lent.

lii I inlocipina, tile heuch also failed to hmeak the line between the gitcriihias arni the civilian l)PtilatioiL
hhocir Iaiiure was clue lOot too a lack (if tuiidcist:iiidiitg l)tit to ii lack of limiui decisions Ciii commit eruiicasurcs.

Ironps iii tioc field, frustrated by tile sullen uncommunicativcncss of the population, vei'e al k )WC(l tO Ci till! I it occasional excesses and often to hc siIiiplv rough in I hcii' ii;iinlliitg of civilians. In the sauiic way, until it was su 01)1)C(l, })oliCC lirtitality in South Korea and thc Philippines act naii' helped t lie
(
nit
uliunist partisans.

It is not simply a question of l)cing kind to I lie nat is'es hut of kccpang some lcg:il framework intact.

(
oitii ergiterrihia fit i'ees rcpresent the govcrnmcnt to most of the pci pie catighit iii I lie iiiidst of a guerrilla war. If these forces act inure iri'es1oiisiitiv than the guerrillas tlueiitsclvcs, the govenhiiielit can luai'il hope to appeal to people as their protector and hcticfactor. Adiiiit tcdiy, the government will often have to cIilJ)loy sonic uiiutisuialiy luai'shi coercive measures iii breaking the guci'rillacivihiaii link, hot sm'h iiucasurcs must above all he legally foniitilat ed and applied. No government, unless it plans to rcsoi't to I i'uii\' totahitai'iati ICCiinitiues, can use terrorism or indiscriiiiuiatc hi'uttalitv igaiiusl its own people without uiideriiiiniiug its l)osil ott.

Ihough the conduct of troops iii I lie field can i'utiii any guycroitiental plan for severing the guei'rihla (ruin his popular base, there is much inure to accoiiiplishing this task ian having welll)eha'cd soldiers. ( )nc obvious re(1uireilieiut is PY1'' thogicai
warfare progralli. On the basis of past cx jicrieiicc, tins piogr:iiii tilust be highly sophisticated if it is to succeed. It (l()cs tint I eli lies, because the civilian target of the prograiui kiiosvs iiiore ihinit the guerrillas titan the govcrnhlicnt does, It does iioi people potentially syitipathctic to the g(tct'I'iIlas 'ii ii the thcmselves, because it seeks to break, to a reinforce, lie hiiilis between them. It will soinetitllcs spread infoi'iiiat ion that' would normally be classified, because iiIlnlc(liale iiid coiuviiiciiig i'eptirls
(if successful mihitai'y' operations arc the i)(t iiicaius of pci'sii:ohiiig that support of the guerri I l:ts is tin seise.

Another standard itietliod of denying the giie!i'iila his ponui;ir base is the resettleiiient of populations. Reei I lciiieiit hi;us liecti successful with the Chinese squatters in i\ ha lava. and part iahh' so with the Arabs iii Algeria. But whueii caiutiiat hg tile iiiihil;n advantages of resettlement and planning the details of thc prograin, full weight must he given to its jmiit icai, ccoitiiniic, antI
social effects, which are often extrcniehy liarinuu,?.

ihe ultimate technique in isolating guerrillas from the people is to 1)crstIadc thc people to dclcnd themselves. Milit iatype local defense units hclj, in the military dcfcat of time guerrillas. Grad
u:illy they may replace the territorial garrison forces and free regulars (or mobile operations. They protect their cohimmullItiCS, aimilnish raiders, and furnish intelligence and security to mobile foiccs in the vicinity. But at least as important is their political
(unction: Omice a substantial nuimiher of miiemnbcrs of a community commniut violence on behalf of the government, they have gone far i uwaid permanently breaking the tic bCtWCCti that conmmutltty
:mtmtl the guerrillas.

lIme third task in the conduct of counterguerrilla operations consists in assisting the threatened government to reestablish social order and its own authority. Although this task seenis wholly imonnulitary, it in fact attacks time underlying discontent li:it sustains violence. Neither economic aid from the United St :11 es nor domestic authoritarianism is an adequate answer to this l bletim. 'I lie government in question must admimiumister reform
(ikct ivcly and honestly hut without seeming to he simply re
s1nnidmng to the program of the guerrillas. Moreover, despite ceit:miil obvious shortrun disadvantages, the govcrhmnment will pn ili;ibly gaul in the long run if it permits more rathcr than less political activity_including criticism of the government. Such act i'ity gives discontented persons a choice other thaim supporting cit her the government or the guerrillas, and it keeps discontent above ground, where the government cami mimeasure amid alleviate it.

Perhaps such a reform program sounds immmpossihty idealistic, but its planks are based on the British accoimiplishmmietit in Malaya.

For those who still (loubt that basic reform and guerrilla warfare are connected, there is the example of the late flamntn Magsaysay, wium c,tuslmcd the t Ink rebellion as mmmcii wit Ii rcforiim as with weapons. The United States must of course decide whether it is rcad' to interfere in the political affairs and even in the adminis
I tat iou
(if weak afl(l often irrational friends, and help them
lotec them ii necessary_to carry (itit time needed program. At the saimic I imne, t lie lJtmitcd States itself must be clear nit hat kinds of mcfornm it will support, and what kinds arc too radical to be coin
1,atiblc Wit Ii its own objectives and political sit nation.

Therc is little hope that, in i)I:ice of reform, the United Status can simply persuade thc people of a guerrillainlested stntc to change their minds. lor years French artiiy oflicerS, who have bccoiiie the leading theorists of "revolutioiiirv \varfarc," 1)crsistcd in ignoring the simpic fact that most Algerian losicins 'erc not interested in becoming part of grcatcr French nato n. 11w idea that the minds of hut crate, economically I)ack vI(l pe plc aii be manipulated ovcr a wide range of desires is )O il)ai)lv wrong.

In any case, we do not have the time to try it. Inst cad, the United States must accept the fact that real grievances, prohicitig teal deimmands, provide lilost of the illpctus for gnu rn I Ia war, and imitist prepare to meet or at least undercut hI ISC dcii tajids.

It would be false to conclude this discusso iii of gncrrilla warfare on an optimistic note. Guerrillas present a diIflciilt and an expensive problem for American military poticy. Ihtt the first step in solving the problctii is to understand it. 11w sccotid step is to base action on that understanding, even when tin itt tcnt:1 ry 1i1.cs
sures argue otherwise. 'Fhic greatest danger in dealing with guerrillas is oversimplification; the second greatest is illipat Approaches to the problem that unduly stress either ttiihitar or noniimilitary action arc the worst kinds if o.ci'iittjiIificititi, though each tiiay scctii tellipting when OnC has lost patience wit Ii a imione complex approach. Only by eonstaitt iv recalling t lie ftindatiicntal structure of guerrilla iiI()VeIlIeiits,
111(1
((lilt iii
uously putting what may seem like fine theoretical distiintniiis itito practice, can the intricate but essential coor(hiliat loll of 1)ohiti
cal and military action be timaintained towa ni nIt iii late 5(ICCCSS.

## Guerrilla Warfare In Underdeveloped Areas W. W. Ros'Row

It does not rcqtli re titucli ulIlagitiatioli to understand why Prcsi
dent K ciincdy has taken the probleiti of guerrilla warfare scri
oitsly. When this A(lininiStration caine to responsibility, it faced four litajor crises: Cuba, the Congo, I aos, and Vietnam. Each represented a successful Communist l)reaclungovcr the previous
'tt years_of the Cold \Var truce lines which had emerged from World \\Tar II and its aftermath. In different ways, each had a riseum from the efforts of the international Communist movement exploit the inherent instal)iluties of the underdcvcloped areas of I I te u )nC( nu muii ist wo rId, and each I ia d a go er ri I lawarfare C( it ii P1 )IiCtI t.

( tmha, of course, differed ironi the other cases. The Cuban ic V( I liii ii )ll :lgai list llitisti WaS a litoad I)ascd national iiisii rrccrion.

Ihu ili:it i'evoltitiuii was tragically captured fromum within by the
.1 )iiiimuiuiSt apparatus, and now atiim A mnerica faces time (hanger of ( tiba's being used the base for training, supply, and direc
I ion of guerrilla warfare in the hcmiiispherc.

Mote than that, Mr. Khrushchev, iii his report to the Moscow
((IIiIClCIiCC ui Cimmutuuiiiist Pautics (published January 6,
1961), had cxpl:iiuicd at great length that the Cotmuiiunists fully support what lie called wars of national lit)cratioII and would tmmarch in t lie hunt iank with the peoples waging such struggles. The mill
I fly attn (If Air. Khrushchev's January, 1961, doctrine is, clearly, guerrilla warfare.

l'accd with these four crises, pressing in on the President from day to day, and faced with the candidly stated position of Mr.

Khrushchev, we I t;i ye, mi Iced, begun to take the pIOl)leIi i of guerrilla Wa rfarc st rioushy.

lo understand this prolilein, however, one mUSt begin with the great rcvohitioniry 1)roccs, that is going forward in the southern half of the world, br the gueiilltwarfare probletit in these regions is a product of that revolutionary process afld the Coin
inunist effort and intent ii, exploit it.

What is happening tlii i)ughour I Satin A inerica, Africa, the Middle Ilast, an(l Asia is I his: Old societies are changing their ways in order to create and maintain a national personality on the world scene antI to britig to their peoples the benets modern technology can oiler.

II uS process is truly rCVOititiOnaIT. It touches every aspect of t lo traditional lifeccononiic, social, anti political.

Ilte ulItr(flllictiofl of 1IU)(lcIfl technology brings al)out flOt itierely new itiet buds f production but a new style of family life, new links between tli& villages and the cities, the beginnings of ilatioulal politics, and a new relationship to the world outside.

Like all revolutions, the mevolution of itiodernization is disturbing. Individual umien are 0 ii between the ci unmitment to the old, faniiliar way of life and the attractions of a iiioderii Wd 'if life.

the power of old social groups_.notal)ly the landlord, who usna hly d ii iii mates t I me ti, d iti ona I s 'c iety is reduced.

P1 we r moves ti iward those who comminmand the tools tif modern technology, including inoderum weapons. Men and women iii time
'ilhages and the cides, feehug that the old ways iii life ale shi:mkcui and that new possiliiliiies ite to them, express (11(1
resent
ulieilts and new hopes.

i'lmis is the grand tren;i of revolutionary change, which the Coumunuimisis are exploiting with great energy. They believe that their tcchmnitjtics of
()rfl.tnizarion. based on small disciplined cadres of tolms1)iuatoms ii e ideally tmited to grasp itid to hold puver iii these ttmii,uilcnt settings. .1 hey believe that the weak trttisitii,ttml govctiimtieimts that one is likely to find
(limlilig tlii iiioderimii.atioim process dlt highly vtmlnermhle to stihvcsioim and to guerrilla warfare. Anti liatever (ommllmmtmnist doctrines of his
ri,riual inevitability may he, Coimmnitinists know that their tulle to seize power in the underdeveloped areas is limited. They know that, as iitottlentunm takes hold in an underdeveloped trca-a,ud tIle ItIIl(I:ltIlCtIt;ll
50(1:11 1irol,iciiis ilillCtitC(i Iiiii the tiditu,tial atC.' S(il%'c(I ihcii cli:iticcs II) SCIZC 10'Ci' declitic.

It is oil thc \C:lI(CSt liatiolis, lacing (lie,, iliost dilhctult trailsi
t;oii;il illoinClits, that thc Coiiiintinist S collcelltratc their attCtlti(fli.

1 lie)' arc the scavcngcls of thic inodcriiizatioii process. They believe tl)flt the tCClttiI(JIICS (if political centralization niidcr (lic
tatotial coiitrol:ittd the projected itilage of Sovict and Chincsc
( ;OitIIlltIIiISt CCOilOtllic progresswill persuade liesitatit iiicn, fnccd iiv great transitional ,)rol)lCIils, that the Couiitiniiiist model should lie fl(lopte(l for Iii0(IC1lit7itIOhi, CVC11
1t tile cost (if sttt'iciitieriiig hitiiiiaii liberty. they believe that I hey caui cx1)loit effectively tile tcseniiiieiits lutili up in many of these areas :lgaillst colonial nile
811(1
hat they cali associate thictitsclvcs effectively with the desire
(ii thc cmllcrging nations (or independence, (or status on tlic world scene, 811(1 for material progress.

i'liis is a formidable program, for the history of this century teaches us that Comimtininismii is not the long_run wave of the future toward which societies arc naturally drawn. But, on the contrary, it is one particular fom,,i of iiiodcrmi society to w'liicli a nation imiay fall prey during the transitional process. Coiiitiiu
nisni is best understood as a disease of the transition to mnodermiiza
tiohi.

\Vliat is our m-cpty to this historical concc1)tiohi amid strategy?

\'hat is the Ammicticati purpose and the Auimcricati strategy? We, too, recognize that a revolutionary process is under way. \Ne are dedicated to the proposition that this revolutionary FOCCSS of hhlo(iC111i7:itiOI% shall lie pcrniittcd to io forward in itidepeudence, with increasing degrees of huinaui freedom. %.Vc seek two results:
first, that truly iIl(lepcn(lcnt nations shall emerge on the world sCCIIt'; and, second, that each nation vi II he permitted to fashion, out of its own ctilturc and its owti aiimlntioiis, (lie kind of modern society it wants.

Ihe 58hllC
meligious
1t1(l
1)l1i10S01)hiicflI
beliefs winch decree that we respect the uhliuluciless of each individual iitakc it natural that we respect tile ill1ICt1C5S of each national society. Moicovet, WC Aimiciicaiis are confident that, if the jude
pcitdcnce of this process cami be ttiaiiitained over the coIning years atid decades, these societies will choose their own version of what we would recognize as a deitiocrat ic, open society.

These are our coiiiinitments of poiiv nol of f:lit h.

1 In United States has lii) interest in political s:iieIIilu. \Vlici'c we h: u military pacts, we have thciii because g vcl'illnenIs feel direct I
cndnngered by outside military action aiI we Ire prcpa red help protect their independence against such iiiIit;ll)' act ion. fliti to use Mao Tsetniig's famous we (In bit seek nat ioll'
which "lean to one side.'' \'Ve seek nations winch ill stand tip straight. And we do so for a reason: hcc:nise \VC :flC (ICCpIV
(idcnt that nations which stand tip stl:IiglIt ill JIlol cut I lIci F
independence an(l move in their own ways and in heir own iinc toward human freedomit and political dci in bciacv.

ThUs our central task in the underdeveloped (teas, is we see it, is to protect t lie independence of the lc\'( iltit iona iv pinccss now going forward. This is our mission,
(bid it is our tiltiiiiaie strength. For this is noran(l cannot bcthe imliSsiomi of Cotit
titunisiti. And in time, through the fog of pmn1)agalid;i md I lie hoimcst confusions (if omen caught up in time business of iim:iki ug new nations, this fundamimental difference ili l)ccolmmc iiicrcasiimglv clear in the southern half of the world.

I he A nlcric:mtl itmtercst will he served if our children live in an en vi r liii tient of St 101mg, assertive, independcnt nations, Capal)IC, hee:mnsc they arc st rommg, of assuming collective resphnsibility for the peace.

The (luffusion of pO\VCf is thc basis for frccd nit wit hum (01 r own Society, and we have no reason to fear it on t lie world scene. Ihit this outcome would he a defeat for Coon imlinistimnor for R 0551:1
as a national state, but for Coimmniunismn. I )cspitc all the Cominuti
nist tallc of aiding iimovei iicnts of national indepeimdencc, hey a ic driven in the end, by time nature of their system, to tiolaic rite independence of nations.

Despite all the.

( ;olitliitmimist talk
(if American inipctiahisiit. we are comlmmiiittc(l, h tIme nature of our Systcmli, to support the cause of iiatiinmal iinle1wndcttce. And the tiLithi will cut.

Flic victory we suck eihI see no tickcit:m1;c fnir:t(lcs doiti Biu:idw:iy, no clitti:mctic battles, no great \iiicrie:tti celelilatiolt'.

(if Victory. It isi ictory that will take ni:ntv eats
:mmtil lecatIu
(if hard work and dcdicationI)y mimammv peoplesto liritmg :ihont.

This will not be a victory of the United Stiles over I lie Soviet tltiion. It will not he a victory of capir:mhisnm over soci:mhistit.

It ihl he a victory of iiieii :10(1 nations that aim to stand ill) straight, OVCF
lie forces that wish to cultrap and to eNph)it tIicir rcvoliitiona ry aspirations of niodcrniz.ation. \VI:it this victory involves, in the cml, is tlic flsscrtion by nations of their right to iiidepcndcncc arid by tiicn and wonien (if their right to frccdoiii as they undcrstand it. A ml WC deeply believe this victory will coiiicon 1)0th sidcs
1)1 the lroui Curtain.

If A incricans (10 tint seek Victory in hc usual sense, what do we scek? %Vhat is the national interest of thc United States? Why do we Americans CX11CI1(I our treasure and assuiiic the risks of uiiodcrn war in this global struggle? lor Attiericans the reward of victory will be, simply, this: J t will permit American society to continue to devehp along tile old huiiiane lines which go back to our birth as a nation, and w'hiich reach deeper into history than tliat.back to tile Mediterranean roots of 'Vestern life. We arc struggling to maintain an envirolltilcnt 00 tile world scene that will 1icttnit our opcii society to survive and to flourish.

In ittal<e tins vision collIe title places a great i)(Ir(iCIi (ill tile United States at this phase oif lust on'.

1 lie preservation oil jude
WI I (ICI1 CC
hi:ts ii ia I1V
olti i let lSi( ills.

Fhie lituited St;ites Ii:is the pltuIi:Ilv PCslHHlSiiiihitV for deterring the Coiin,nuiuists front tisitg ultlClC:lt wc:lpoIlS ill the 1)ui5(Iit of their ahllI)itiOils. the United States li:is : ullajor responsibility for deterring the ki,d of overt aggression itli conventional forces that was launched iii JulIe, 1950, iii Korca.

The United States has the pliiiiarv tcs)oIlsii)ility for assisting the economies ,f those hard_pressed states on the periphery of tile Coiiinitunist bloc, uiidcr acute Iliilit:trV hr (1(lasi_tlIilitary pres
suit Iiicli they callulot be:ii
(rout Iwil owtl ICsOui.ces;
for cx:tiit1le, South Korea, \TietnaIlI, l:ti:ii, h'akist:iii, Irall. The United States has a special rcspoiisihuilttv of leaderShiij) iii bringing Plot tiicrehy its own resources but t lie resources of all the free world to hear in aiding the htig_rtiuu deveho )1)ullelIt (If those nations which are serious about inoderiiizing their ec000lily and their social life. And, as I'res,dent Keniiedv li:is uiiadc clear, he rcgards ill) program of his administration as mote iuilportault than his pro
grain for long_term ecouioumuic develo1)llient, dramatized, for cxaiiplc, by the Alliance for Progress, ill i.atin America. Lode
pciidcnce cannot be maintainccl by military iiicasurcs alone.

Modern societies must be built, and we arc prupa red to ilcil) iii,ild tliciii.

Finally, the United States has a role to play in learning to deter thc outbreak of guerrilla warfare, if possibk. anti It; deal wit Ii it, if necessary.

It is, of course, obvious that the priln:Irv ICSJ)(,iISiI)ilitV lot'
dealing with guerrilla warfare in tile undcrdevcloped :ircas not i;c American. 'I'hcsc are mnny ways in which we cats 11(11)
awl we are searching our mtnds and our iii):lgitialiOtlS. It) k:ii'ii better how to help; but a guerrilla war lutist I c lutiglit priilia I] lY
by those on the spot. rhis is So for a (1u1tc particular rcasoi!. A
guerrilla war is an intimate affair, fought not merely Ii wapoiis but fought in the winds of the mcii who live in i lic 'illagcs alitt in the hills, fought by the spirk and policy oI those who ititi the local government. An outsider cannot, by himself, win a gtmcm'rilla war. tic can hclp create conditions it) Which It can he wont ail(l he can (lircctly assist those prepared to light fm t heir itidcjwmiif cuice. We arc dcterinimicd to help destroy his tnt dliii bull dist'tsc, that is, guerrilla, war designed, initiated, stipplictl, and led Iromit outside an independent nation.

Although as
, leader of tile free world m lie (Jtiit cii States has sl)cc11l responsibilities which it accepts in this cuiittiioii VCiittII'C
of deterrence, it Is lluport'mt thit the whok mtitcm mntititiil unit niunity begin to accept its responsibility for dealing with this
11)1111 of aggressiolL it is important that the world I;ecomiic clear in mind, for examplc, that the;operation run iruiim I iatioi against Victnaiit is as certain a form of aggression a time Violation of tite
3Htli Parallel by the North Korean tirinics iii June, 1950.

In iiiy conversations with rcpresentiitivcs i1 fu,ieii govuril
lUCIUS, I am sometillics lectured that this or that gt,veltitimemim within the free world is not popular; they tell IUC that guerrilla warfare cannot be won unless the peoples are dissal istied.

'I hiese arc, at best, halftruths. The truth is that guerrilla varfa,'c, mounted from external baseswith rights of sanctuaryis
:1
terrible burden to carry for any govcrnmllcnt iii a society miialing its way toward modernization. For instance, it rc9ttircs sotitewlicuc between ten and twenty soldiers to control one guerrilla iii :iii organizcd operation. Moreover, the guerrilla force has this advantage: Its task is merely to destroy, while the government must build, ind protcct what it is building. A guerrilla war mounted Iioiii (nitside a transitional nation isac rude act of international v:i,I(lalisIIl. 'l'herc will be l) peace in the world if the international coiiuiiunity accepts the outcome of a guerrilla war, iiiountcd
(nun nitsidc a nation, as tantamount to a free election.

1 he sending of iiic, and anus across uuternatu)nal boundaries and the direction of guerrilla war fuom outside a sovereign nation is:lggrcssion; and this is a fact which the whole international colnnwnity must confront and whose consequent responsibilities it must accept. \Vit hout such international action those against w hunu aggression is mounted will be driven uucvital)ly to seek nut and engage the uiltiiiiatc son rcc of the aggression they con
In)! It.

In facing the problenu of guerrilla war, I have one observation to make as a historian. It is now fashionable to read the learned works of Mao 1'sctung and Che Guevara on guerrilla warfare.

1 his is, indeed, proper. One should read with care and without passu)n iIlt() the iuuinds of oiie's enemieS. hit it is historically inaccurate and psychologically dangerous to think that these men created the strategy and tactics of guerrilla war to which we are uuow rcs1)onding. Guerrilla warfare is not a form of military and psychological Iulagie cmeatcd by !lle Couunuuu,nisrs. 'Ilucre is no nile or parable in the Comuuiuiunist texts that was not known at an earlier time in history. i'he operation of Marion's men in relation iii the Battle of Cuwpcns in the A merican Revolution was, for ex:11111)lc, governed by rules that Mao merely echoes. Che Gucvara knows nothing of this business that T. E. Lawrence did not know or that was not practiced, for example, in the Peninsular cam
paigmu during the Napoleonic \Vars, a century earlier. The orches
nil ion of professional troops, militia, and guerrilla fighters is an
1)1(1 game, 'hosc rules can be stuudicd and learned.

My point is that we are up against a form of warfare that is powerful and effective only wheui we do not put our minds clearly to worlc on how to deal with it. I, for one, believe that with purposeful efforts most nations which might now be susceptible to guerrilla warfare could handle their border areas in ways vliich would niake i Item very unattractive to the iflitiJ(iofl (if this ugly game. \Ve m learn to prcvcnt the eiiicrgciice of the faitiotis sea in which \ lao Tscttittg taught his men to sviiii. Iltis re(1llires, of course, tint nicicly a l)10PCt military poigraiti of deterrence lint pnigraius (if village (leVCiOpIflent, coiiiitititiicitioltS, and indoctrination, the hcst way to fight a gitetrilla war is to prevent it front happening. A tid this can be done.

Siiiilai'ly, I ant cori1dcnt that we can deal with lic kind (if now (In(kr way iii \'icmalll. It is an extreitiely dangerous o1eration, and it could u'erwlieliti Vietnaiti if the \'ictllatllcse
aided by the free worlddo not deal with it. But it is au tuui
siihtle operation, by the book, based more on nuirdcr thaui out ltRal 01' J)SyCltoln ical appeal.

\Vlieit (;ouliuiillltists speak ol 'ai's of national lilicuat 1(111 :tit&l (if their support for
1)rogrcssivc foi'ct,''
I think of the systeIPt;uic program of assassination now going forward in which the pi'iii cipal 'ictii us are the I icaith, agriculture, and education officers ill
\'ictnauiiesc villages.

I'hc Viet Cong arc not trying to 1ierstuiidc the peasants of \.tietnaln that Counuitunisun is good; they arc trying to persuade thciti that their lives arc insecure unless they c(n)peu'ate Wit It then. With resolution and confidence (lit :tll sides, and with the assuuii1 1tion of international rcsponsiliility for rIte frontier problem, I I ,clicve we arc going to I ring this t hircat to
(lie independence ol \Tietnauii tuinler cont i'ol.

Aly view is, then, that tc 'onfroiir in guerrilla warfaic in the underdcvchped arca'asysteuiiatic atteulipt by the Coniutinutists to impose a serious (hiScase ott those societies artcniptiitg the transition to uiio&leruiizatiout. 'l'ltis attempt is.i present tlauiger iii South
cast Asia. It could 1tuickly become a major (langer in A frica and Latin Aitierica. It is our task to prevent that disease, if possil)le, and to eliminate it hcre it is itiiposed.

Every A merican l tould he aware of the nti lita ry :iutd the tivc dinteutsiouts of I he joti. '('hose vith vhtouii I have i lie privilege of working are (kdk'ated to that mission with every resource of utund and spirit at our coitiuuiand.

## Ii Winning In The Mountains- Greece

liii:. ANulBANIUF \'.it Colonel J. C. Murray, USMC
Victories have iiot come often for the free world as it stiiiiblcs along the tliiii and J)cFih)US track of the guerrilla. When, as iii Greece, such a victory is won, it is fortunate if there is a dis
tingtiishied military analyst omi the scene.

Colonel J.

. Murray is widely recognized as One of the Marine Corps' most incisive thinkers and writers, as well as a comiibat
tested troop commander. l'lw highly demanding jobs lie has been assigned testily to the esteem in which he is held.

We believe military profcssi inals will find his study particularly know lc(lgeal)le and penetrating. ihc conimneiltS of he (lazette editors in
1954, when this article first appeared (iii somewhat longer form), highlight its significance.

## The Anti-Ban Di.T War Colonel J. C. Murray

In the confusing welter of international problems engaging t/r attention of the American public following J Vorid I Var 11. it cancer of expansionist Soviet Connmtnisn, fastened its qif in man v areas without attracting particular attcnlion. It 'was not, until I/o malignancy reached out to take control of Greecethe biril-.

place of democracythat it was clearly isolated and labeled such. Ozce identified, it met determined resistance, the resuhtinv struggle focusing the attention of the free 'world first on local problemthen on the larger issue.

Forced into the field of active international assistance by tie financial inability of the British to render further assistance to the Greeks,-the U.S. decided to conic actively to the support of the

Greeks,- thus taking the lead in developing a policy of contain
ment. The influence of this policy has been world-wide, hut ii
has con'ie into open conflict 'u.'ith expansionist Conmninisin in
only three areasGreece, Korea, and Indochina.
  "The AntiBandit War" is the first comprehensive imaly.vis
                                                                 'I
the earliest of these three conflicts.
  Some of the conclusions are unexpected. The effects of (J..
assistance were perhaps mote far-reaching in the political, ceo
nomic, and psychological fields t/an in strictly military n,atter.
The military defeat of the Conn,,i,iii:us 'was hastenel by tv'
notable events. The first was Tito's split t'itF.J the (n,,info,vi,
which itself might not have been possible had hot /lmene:n
assistance in Greece assured a friendly flank instead of 'what iiiil't
have Otherwise been a segment of Cominforni encirclement. l I-
second was tl.'c appointment of Field
                                         !arslal l'apagos as (on,
mander in Chief of the Greek Gover,imeni forces.
  The itudy of this first contact het'ween expansionisi ,S(fl'ni
                               6

Cournurnisu, and the policy of containment is of iiiore than historical interest. It is of ,nnnednuc, current, and continuing interest. The problems arising from the connwn frontier with ex/;a1sionist Conn,,unism are not confined to Greece, where the
/1t5ent settlement may lie trgyi!s:tory. I/if.')' C'XiSF
the entire
20,000utile frontier of tl,e Soviet empire. At any point along this front, the pattern of Comnru,,i.ct aggressio in Greece iiiay appear or reappear in wl.'ole or in par!. "'l'he 4,,iillandit War" lays bare the anatomy of this pattern and discloses the ittagnitude of the effort required to defeat it in Greece.

I'J)IToflS
n Augosi,
949, n two swift hou's, thc Greek Govcrnmcnt forces, 265,000 strong, drove the sdfstykd '1 )elnocratic Army,"
csisting of less than 20,000 lighters, hnn thc soi' of Grcccc.

Scr1cially, this appeared to he no great feat of anos. Indeed, it seemed scarcely to merit a second thoght save for the curio is circmnstance that this c nparativcly small knee had withstood the gwernmenr forces for three years. That the Democratic A noy had hcen able to do this, and, in so doing, had prevented the establishment of condithms favorable 0) the rcco struction of Greece, warrants serious study in its propcr context. The prob
Icms arising from the common frmnier with Communism exist today in Iran, horma, and lindochina as well as in Korea, and the pattern of Cmmunist aggresskm in Greece, as distinct from that employed in f(orca, may appear elsewhere in whole or in part.

Vhat factors present when the govcrmumient achieved its easy victories in Vitsi and Grannnos in I 949 were not present whemi the guerrillas undertook operations in
946? What factors present
946 to 94 had altered by 949, and in what respect? Had changing circmnstanccs altered the significance of constant fac
tars in the situation? lln short, what 'erc the factors that led to the defeat of Cmmmmist aggression in Greece in August 1949?

For the nmst part, answers to these questions arc to be found in events in Greece during the years 194649. However, the

 events of that period have their roots in the GerinanRalian
 liulgarian occupation and in the hberni ion.
                                               hen too, happenit igs
in Yugoseva, Albania, and Bu'garia had repercussions in Greece.
 In addition, Grccee was near the vortex of the Cold \'Var pcilii us
of the great powers, and its affairs were iii flucnccd t hereby
                                                               o a
greater extent perhaps than those of any other nation,
                                                              Ibis
reference must be made to trends and cvcnts which lie ontsidu
the StriCt geogriiplucal and chronological linii S 01 he iiit ibandit
war. Moreover, although this study deals primarily
                                                         xvii h
                                                                lie
military aspects of the war against die guerrillas, political anti
economic onsidcradons inevitably intrude.
   With the signing of the Varkisa agreement, iii February, 194S,
defeat was acknowledged by ELAS, thc field force of thc Ciiii-
nwnistdoniinated National Liberation I root, which had gat hcicd
strength by monopolizing the cause of resistance to the occupa-
tion and husbanded it for the postwar struggle for control ol
Greece. But this did not sigoahi7.e the Coiiiiniiiist Parry's ah)ail(hiul-
went of the struggle for power. Although 40,00() weapons
surrendered under the agreement, they were largely unservice-
able. The better weapons were cached away for
                                                   lie next rioiinl.
Although most of the members of ELAS returned to their hoilies,
4,000 crossed the frontier to find sanctuary with
                                                      the satellite
neighbors. Others remained in the rnotinraiiis, potential nuclei for
future bands. These were hardcore Coiiiinunists or criiiinals vbo,
could not expect to benefit by the partial ailinesty features ui the
Varkisa pact.
  As the facade of the National Liberation l'ronr, behind vbnchi
the Greek Communist Parry had originally iiiarslnilcd its forces,
fell away, the Party leaders sought new catalysts. They found
diem in continued economic distress, in the inability of 1iohit nab
leaders to establish an effective government, and in cxl rciiics in
the treatment of the opposition by Rightist groups.
  Having previously failed to gain control of Greece by pout iual
nianeuverihg and outright
                              revolution,
                                          I lie
                                               Coniinnn 151 s nm
sought to achieve control as a eonsequcnce of
                                                 lie ilict 19)1 ral mu
of Greece or parts of it in a Communist federation of the lalh;ins.
Their purpose was to facilitate the luIi})OSi 11011 frouii wit hot it ol
what they had failed to achieve from within. 'll'hey had only to

create the vacuum inn) which cxternal forces, which stood waiting, could flow.

I bUS, when rite ltaiitls begaut to rcforuii following the first post
w;ti' electom, the Coittinunists sought to prostrate the economy md discredit the govcrumcut preparatory to their later, but tin
successitul, effort to CSt1l)li5h a SatCllitcICcl)gflize(l "Government i ml Free C recce,'' or to detach Greek Maccdonia, and even possibly Fpirus and 1 'brace, through atmcxatiout by Yugoslavia, A Ih:immia, and Ihulgaria, respectively.

ihe assumption of the initiative by the guerrillas tended to define the objectives of the government. These were: to establish and maintain conditions of econontic and political stability within
(;rcecc, to suppress the disruptive guerrilla forces, and to inter
(lict the aid to the guerrillas which began to (low across the north
crim borders.

( ttcrrilla warfare distinguishable front that of 194244 only by its greater ferocity began to burgeon here and there during the summer of 1946. Initially it was confined to areas near the northern border but Rightwing extremists retaliated in Icind in the south, giving the disorder a seemingly widespread character, which the Comiimnists, unaided, could not have accomplished.

'I bus attention 'as diverted from the trct in which internal dis
oder cnmld lmave been artriltuted to foreign intervention, and he Comimminunists won an early advantage in their ability to cantou
fl:mge the war as a domestic affairthe Greek people against the government in Athens.

Although the \'arkisa agreement did not so proimlise, it may have been understood that British troops were to be withdrawn uuomn C rcecc follo'ing the plebiscite on the return of the King, scheduled 1or August. 1mm view of this, the Coummuntmnists refrained front extending time scope of time disorder l)efore then. But when British troops remained beyond that date, Communist leaders were miumwilliimg to delay longer. Guerrilla activity, SCriotisly mc
suiimcd a fter the election in larclm, was unleashed on an increased scale in late September.

The situation developed along the lines of the following sche
mnatic and highly rationalized outline:
The campaign began with the murder of isolated officials
indiVi(lual gendarities or mayors of situili vilklges, and the beating anti threatening of Right_wing citizens of proltlilteltce. Al ti l(ICFS
werc COIltIiIittC(i "for giving iiiforiiiation.'' Pubhcity was given tIP 1)0th the event and its C:IIISC to
(iiscouragc ICCO)IISC of Cii iZeUS
to) their officials.

Ihese activities threw a heavy burden (JU the geitolaritiery, w'hich had to extend its patrolling and disperse its forces in an cifort to inaiittiin public morale in tile affected IFCaS.

At racks oil small patrols 111(1 postS of tile gciioitriiiciy forced titeiti to collSolidtrct() ducretse rite nuiitbcr of ariois it order to increase their strength.

Then caine raids on SI) all villages abandoned by tltc gen
(ialIltcry.

I heir purpose \ IS to obtain food and illiprove i)ln(iit security.

Next caine attacks on I;otger gendarmcry detacltiticnrstltose of rlii rty to forty men.

I his confined the genda rinery to the larger towits ill the affected areas. linail the anti)' was c:tllc(i lit.

Tite tactics used against the gciidarmery were now called into play against the army. Sin,o hi posts an(l patrols were attacked I))'
superior forces. ihis forcud the army to concentrate, I)OIt by this rime tile guerrillas were able to direct attacks against their frontier posts and against isolated arrisotts of company size.

A number of fairly wuhldeIincd bandit areas itow had been established in which army forces could not niove or operate cx
ill considerable strentrlt.

\Vithir. these areas, strong bamlds conducted systeiitatic raids on villages and tow'fls. They reiitoved food stocks :111(1 allinlals and drove inhabitants front their hoities, sometimes miturdening the residents of one village before warning the occupants of others to leave. Thus, the guerrillas etitbarrassed tile goverilillent by creating 0 refugee problemit imid aggltvatimig tue food shortage iii country already withtimi sight of starvation.

1'o further isolate thoc l)all(hit areas front go)vel'olIIieitt iii
iluence, the guerrillas Wi oared the attack and sabotage of con ntunications. Endeavoring to protect its own lutes of coltllltunica
0011 and answering the growing political (lemnand for protection of towns and public utilities further reduced the army's potential for offensive operations.

The goverlomncnt forces, by now engaged iii fullscale opera
tions against the hands, ichieve&l SOIIIC success, but the t)andits ivoided being brought to decisive action. The army frontier posts had beeui forced to concentrate, leaving large stretches of the liotitici uiiwitched. When guerrillas in the imith were hard pressed, thcy merely withdrew across the border, where pursuit
'asirrcstcd by satellite frontier guards.

I living tested the offciisive capal)ihitieS of die a rnIy, the bandits iii late 1947 l)egali to try to hold ground in certain areas to protect their supply routes. Moreover, the Coiiununists were ready to play their ti-u,n1> card, the establishment of the ''Provisional I )einoeratic Government.'' lu give substance to this fiction, they hid to be able to 511(1w that a rcasonal)ly large area 'as controlled by lie "Fice Govcrniiicnt.'' This government was proclaimed in t lie G ratinuos area on l)eccinber 24, 1947.

1 hc Ioregonig outline stresses the utihitary aspects (if the opera
I toils of the I )euiiocratic A rlny, but it (li)eS not conceal the salient characteristic of guerrilla strategy; that is, that it was economic, toititical, and terroristicand, only in the last instance, military.

Ihie gtieiiihla offensive was directed nor against the iriiicd forces, lou against utianneol civilians, the public services, lines of coin
lIltilliCitiOui, transportation, commerce, industry, and agriculture
---tile "aip and woof the cCon(nhiic, political, and social order.

Such operations as were conducted against the ariiiy were di rected to, attailillicilt of greater freedoiti of action as regards the ieal objectivedestruction of the economic, political, and social order. The guerrilla strategy was neither offensive nor defensive;
it was evasive. I ater it begin to develop a defensive character in certain areas along the northern frontier. hhscwhcre, evasion ietiiaiued the keym tc of iiii hiriry strategy. Meanwhile the real war, the war of destruction aii sabotage of the life ol the nation, Co tilt tinted unabated.

ilie al-thy's (list iiiajor campaign was initiated in Apiil, 1947.

ihie plan was to attack fist iii central Greece and thcn sweep uradtiallv northward to the border, destroying the guerrillas along i lie way. iliercafter the border would he scaled against reinfiltra
ii ui Tactically, areas containing guerrilla concentrations were to iie isolated and surrounded, whereupon the tra1)pc(l guerrillas WCIC tot be annihilated.

After sonic iiionths, it was recognized that this campaign was a failurc. During its course, the gucrrillas 'axed in strength and iii Iluence. A series of operations planned for the winter months was canceled. hillowing a reorgaiiit.ition, a new series of opera
tiolis was bcgun in April, 1948. A 1)relililiuiary phase to clean up sotitlicentral C Fcece appeared to () well, l)IIt tllC
timetable laggcd and the guerrillas consistcntly escaped the planned en
&iicletnciits. The caIIip:iigIi culminated in a baffle for the Grain
urnS t lountain area, which began on luiie 29. There, I 2,000
I 5,00() guerrillas defended thiciiisclvcs for two and a half iiionths against the attack of 50,000 government troops. i'Iie guerrillas eventually withdrew into .A Ihania, hut immediately reappeared in the Mount Vitsi a rca, to the northeast. Operations against this new position failed. Meantime, guerrilla activity increased else
hcre, partictilarly in the Pcloponncsus, where the guerrillas gained the initiative.

By Ilii(lwinter, the guerrillas had reestablished themselves in the
(raiiitiios area, l)ut the armiiy, ciiiployiiig 25,000 men, was wrest
ing the initiative Irouii
3,500 guerrillas in the Pelopotinesus.

f lc:inwhi he, the A rIimy was prepa ring the
1949 catuupaign. It o1)etic(l with another clearing operation in central C recce. As in
1948, this phase proceeded successfully. By the end of June, it was iii the impup stage and t lie concentration of troops for the
(;iutumiiiosVitsi phase \'as started. Following a diversion in the
( ;r area, an attack was launched in the Vitsi area on August hO. \Vithin three days, the position had been overrun.

)f a guerrilla garrison of 7,000, approximately 5,00() withdrew to Albania. lii the Cratiiinos operation launched on August 24, lie 200 s1uarc ituiles If the area were occupied iii five days, and
4,( )t)() go c tril las w itlid re w i tito Al ha iii a.

( uerrilla manpower ma) be measured in terms of three categories of personnelthose serving with the bands in Greece, self
dclciuse collaborators, and bandit reserves outside C meece. The first category indicates the itiiiuiediate coitibat strength of the I )ciuiocratic A rnuy. The number of collaborators gives a measure of the intelligence, security, and adiuuinistrati'e services available to the hands. The nuiuihcrs outside Greece included wounded highutets, recruits in training, and 1iersoiuiieh engaged in training or logistical activities. To these may be added a number of older men and women and abducted children of no cornl)at value. This figure provides an index to the flUnhl)Cr of rcplaceiiiciits and reserves availat)le to the bands. it is, therefore, a measure of their staying power.

Supplementing the three categories of personnel listed above were undetermined hundreds of \'ugoslavs, A lbaniaiis, and Biil gaiianS wilt) worked behind the borders of those colliltries to aid the guerrillas.

ilie rebels started operations in 1946 with a sricngth of 2,50(1
lighters. By the end of the year, it had reached 8,000. In April,
1947, t was 14,250, and in November, 18,000, where it began to level off. Froiii this time onward, the number of guerrilla llghters, in spite of a onetime pcil( of 26,000, was maintained so constantly between 20,00025,00() as to raise the conjecture that this may have l)ceIl the cstablisl ied l)ersonncl allowance mi the i)allds of C ;rcL. Whatever the reason, the number of fighters serving with the guerrillas rcl)Iaine(l in the vicinity of 20,000 25,000, except
(Itiring the initial build up and again just 1rior to the collapse.

At this latter time, the strength had fallen to less than I 8,000.

l'he numiierical stremoth of the ''selfdefense'' clement of the guerrilla uuwcmnent C;)) only be estimated. The value of the collaborator lay in the fact that he was not knownin day light, a peasant tilling his fields; at night, he might bear intelligence to a guerrilla liead1ua rters or place mines iii the highway. Son ne were discovered; others never will be.

[heir numiibcr was great. The miiagnitudc is indicated by the capture or surrender of 1,600 collaborators in eonncctio n with the military defeat of a force of
3,600 guerrillas in the Pelopunncsus in early 1949. I he ratio of c I laln ia to rs to gue rn las was even high icr on tI oe mm oa in I amid, p I-
ticularly near the norm bern frontiers, where the guerrillas cxci
ciscd doiiiination for hmng periods of timime and where the price of survival, ifl many ilIst;I1CCS, was collaboration .Aii ilHhiCat ion of the potential for colla lolrarion is available else' here. The three elections held since
1949 show that at least 200,000 mimales of voting age were favorably disposed toward, or stisceptilmle to, the influence of the Conimnunists. This does not mean, of course, that

 74
             7/'he GilerrilThAnd Iio'w to Fight Ilin,
    vee ctve
                            onists, hut t s
                                               futor to be kept ht
und oii sscssng the strength of the gcrDs.
         of those Ser'g n the
                                  ands when
                                                 rfarc was renewed
had enjoyed the
                     spkniky of the
                                         riern
                                                  cghbors pdor to
the ca to actkm. The tuber crossng nto the satdktes follow
hg the sgning of the \T
                             fldsa agreement was about 4,000, and
the
        crs of llts
                             arbooed n A bania, Yugoshtva, and
  igara
            ecafter dM not fai hdow thh. A rc
                                                     escntatve est
mate of the
                nber of Greek hcs
                                           the sateUhes dmlug the
war s: Mbanht4,500 cmthat eFcc vcs :md 6,500 mmcffcctves,
  chning oMer men ;md wmncn, wmmdcd ightcos, nod d dreo;
li2Ignra2,0002,50o c mbnt effectives and 2,500
                                                       ooeffccdves;
and Yugoshtvh4000 c mthat effccth'es and perhaps
                                                         0,000 non
e ffectv es.
   cw of these reservc.c were conunkted durog the inni batdcs,
and these from A hania and ua ra oniy. Tto's cksmg of the
( rcekYugoshiv hordcr o
                                    949, qua raothcd 4,000 conilmt
effcctkes n Yugniava and drove a wedge between the niao
strength of the gucrrUas M centrni Greece and 2,0002,500
gucrrUas n llugala and 2,500 n east Macedonia and Thracc.
The attcr, havktg been dcprkied of the protected eastwest route
north of the frontier, couM not move to the support of centraL
Grecce as govemuenr forces cm-ruUcd the regkm between sea
and frontier M centra Macedonia. 1 ims, the chsing of the border
rcsukcd n an outrght toss to the goerrmas of 4,000 ghtcrs and
isniated as many as 5,000 omre from the ha htoce of the guerrUk
forces. This was a persoune hs of 3035 per cent.
  0 nmnd forces enpMyed by the gnvcrmncnt in military or
 armilitarv functions during the a tibandit war inchtded the
Natkmal Army, the Natkmal Defense Corps, the gendarmery, and
armed civiLians. The strengths of nil components were increased
from thue to thue as the magnitude of the task of elbuinating the
guert-illas was more fully appreciated and as the means of main
taming larger forces became availaMe.
  When the govermocur returned to A hens in October, 944,
the only remnants of the prewar army were two units: the Third
rigade of 2,000 men and the ''Sacred Squadron" of 60800
officers. The United Kingdom undertook to equip and train a

              IVinning in the MOuntains-GreeCe
                                                              7
new army. The ol)jcctive was to make it an effcctive force of
100,000 by 1948. Ilowcver, by April, 1947, the need br ciitjiIo-
ing the army against the bandtts resulted in decisions to revise its
strength upward to 120,000 and to sliortcii the planned training
program.
  In early 1948, it was increased to 132,000. A tclllporary increase
of 15,000 was decided upon in April to pcriiiit the training of
replacements for casualties during the projected cailipaigil. 'Ihis
l)rought the atit horized strength of
                                      t lie aritty
                                                  to
                                                     137,000.
                                                              lii
November, this temporary strength was itia1e pernianeilt.
  As realization (if the inconclusive character of the l918 cain-
paign spread, both the Greek Government and the llritisli Mili-
tary Mission advocated further increases iii the strength pf the
army. In fact, it was one of the conditions put forward by Gen--
eral Papagos as a prerequisite to his acceptance of the position of
Commander in Chief that it be raised to 250,000. 'Fliis, however,
proved to be unnecessary.
  The probleitis experienced by the army in protecting t lie civil
community during the summer and fall f 1947 suggested
                                                             I lie
formation of an organization to provide a static defense (if towns
and villages. Immiiediately after the liberation, vlieii there had
been no instrumentality to take control of the territories pie
viously dominated by ELAS, a National Civil Guard had hceii
formed. It had combined certain of the no mimi bunci i ms of
                                                             i I
police and the anhly. It was hastily org:iiiized, poorly' coot tolled,
and given to excesses, and no one ws sorry wliemi t lie gcitdaitiierv
replaced it in November, 1945. l'his experience, however, pro-
vided a precedent that was drawn upon in iliectilig the new
problems.
  In October, 1947, it was decided to form a National l)cfetisc
Corps under army control. The initial authorization was for U)
battalions of 500 men eacha total of 20,000. Cadres for the
battalions were provided by the army, and the fillers were cx-
servicemen. Mcii from the same locality were placed iii
                                                         hic sine
battalion, After a short period of training, :1 hat tahi iii was I"
                                                              ud
to the region front which its members caine. Ilic thicoiy was
                                                             hat
they could live at home, functioning on a ''mliiiitmteilialt'
                                                        basis. lii
this way, it was hoped that the civil colt miltunity coil Id he plo

tected and the army freed to go after the guerrillas without greatly increasing the dislocation of the national life an(l econ
oiii)r. Further, it 'as expected that the poori organized civilian components could L)C dissolved and the gendarinery reduced to itS normal strength.

In January, 1948, the goal for the National I)efense Corps was changed to 100 battalions of 500 men eacha total of 50,000.

Eventually, 97 of these units were formed, but the "minuteman"
principle was gradually abandoned. More and itiore NDC battalions were "vitalized" and redesigned as light_infantry l)attalions.

As such, their status was tindistinguishable from other units of the army.

]iic gendarmery in Greece is an armed police force, w'hich, under the Ministry of Justice, maintains order except within the liiiits of towns having municipal police. Its normal strength is ahotit 20,000. The organization had fallen into disrepute through continuing to function under rite German occupation authorities, and although there was no evidence of extensive active collaboration, it was considered necessary to rebuild it from the ground up following the liberation. In this task, the government was aided by a British Police and Prisons Mission. Under its guidance, the gcitdarmery was reconstituted and in November, 1945, it resumed its (luties. O'ing to the growing threat to public order, its strength 'as increased to 32,000, hut even this was insufficient.

The disorder had grown beyond police proportions. Efforts to use the gndarmery in army_like operations were unsuccessful.

It 'as not equipped or trained to function in this iltauner. Moreover, while the gendarmery played soldier, its primary function suffered. A policeman's usefulness depends on his local kiowl
cdgca familiarity with people and places that enables him to detect the unusual. Police cannot be organized in large units and moved from place to place without sacrificing an important principle of police organization. Consequently, when the NDC was formed, the gendarinery was reduced in strength and confined to police work. Its strength thereafter was titaintained at about
25,000.

I ruin the first, the government was confronted by the ugly fact that its mission had two aspects. It must protect the civil power and population SO that the CCOflO could Continue Ii)
function, and it must destroy the bandit forces. But the bandit forces could be engaged and dcstroycd only by aggressive pursuit, and, in the absence of any instrumentality other than the gell
darincry for civil defense, the employment of the Illajor portion of the army in such operations would have left the civil Coin
Inunity without direct protection. After its first more or less fruitless series of offensive operations in 1947, the army suc
cumbed to political pressures to make static dispositions f troops for the protection of the civil community. This defensive iiiis, sion was a bottomless pit which long absorl)ed iiiuch of the army's capacity for liore productive undertakings.

Eventually, this highly unsatisfactory situation was alleviated by the formation of the NDC and by the arming of civilians.

Thus, by an increase in government forces of 50,00() for local defense p11r;es and by utilizing to some extent the capacity of coinhininities lo protect themselves, more po )fl table ciiiph yn ient of the army became pr:icticable.

The great disparity ii numerical strength between government forces and guerrilla fighters is shown in the following tabulation, which represents the approximate status as of the month of July,
1949:

Government Forces
Greek National A riily
150,000
National Defense Corps
50,000
Gcnda rmcr'
25,000
Civil police
7,500
Civilian coiiponents
232,500
!)e'mocratic Army
With l)ands in Greece
I 3,0U()
Guerrillas in satellites
10,000
Col Ia borators
Satellite personnel
2 8,00()

## Ii.

Irolli the start of the bandit war to its end, the t)cn'iocratic A rnly consisted almost exclusively of light infantry. The guer ii has had a "cavalry l)rigadc" and some antiaircraft and field ariilkiy. A ttillei'y, however, was of little value. Neither the guns
11(11 ally iiauitity of ainhllunit ion could be conccnt rated for Clfl
phyiiiciit. lxcept in the ( iaiiitius and \'iisi areas, where it was used but It in defense and in support of guerrilla attacks, artillery was Cm1)IoyCd only in delivering sporadic harassing fire on towns or villages. It contributed to the campaign of terrorism against the civil population, but its military significance was slight.

The services of the Democratic Army were, for the most part, established beyond the frouticr, vhcre they were protected from attack. lucy included training centers, tranSient Camps, hospitals, aml(l Iorwar(ling points for supplies. \Vithin Greece, except in the haseameas, services were provided by the lighters themselves or by collaborators.

Since they were lightly equipped and tmnimmpcdcd l)y scmvice elcimients or territorial responsibility, the guerrillas had good mIlollility in a tactical sense and a high degree of flexibility. Bands could be subdi 'idcd without appreciable 11)55 of coml)at efficiency.

Conversely, they could be increased to the limits of effective control. Every miiaii was a lighter. The bands had no soft rear.

litcy could face to the rear or to a flank with facility.

lvasion and temporary local concentration of superior forces
each an important page in the book of guerrilla tactical doc
triimcwcl-e aided by this flexibility. When threatened b en
ci rclcmmieuit, l)an(ls could split into sniall groups to lie up until the danger or slip through army lines to reassemble far fruuii time closing noose. Offensively, a temporary local concentration of superior forces could be built up in the rear of army lines or in the nudst of government_controlled territory by the inliltra
tinhi of such small groups.

Concealment, too, was aided by the factor of composition. Of nondescript appearance an(l without heavy equipment, the guerrillas could sometimes melt into the civil population. Their forma

                                               I 'iiining in the ilIountainsGrceee
                                                                                                                                                                                                 79
 flons were so inconspicuous by contrast with
                                                                                                                                                      the
                                                                                                                                                                    large, coin
 parativcly w'chlc(1UippCd columns of the army t hat the former
 invariably had the advantage of better coi ubat intelligence.
        The virtual absence of service troops, which gave the guerrillas
 Si) much tactical iiiobility aIl(I flCXiL)ility of eiiipluyiiicnt, \vasals()
 the source of tIcir greatest weakness. Bandit logistics, except in
 the border areas, could nut support sustained cuml)at operations
 at
          I fa I letI cii tire Iy tinder ti e den mn (is of a prof la ci cii ci gagei i ici if.
        l'iiially, as regards 11rC1)owcr, the guerrillas had
                                                                                                                                                                 high volitiiic
 at short ranges, hut little at; nicdiiii and none at lung ranges. I lie,
guerrillas were at their best in an aml)ush which they could break
 off, if need be, to disappear into rough terrain. 'they were cx
 cehlent in a raid on an undefended locality or a night raid against
 a defendcd locality, provided they had built
                                                                                                                                                 I
                                                                                                                                                           'iotts1y, as was
 their cu;toi1l,
                                                    local superiority of force. i'hey were at their
 orst in a tli, light attack against a fortiheil positu)n or in
effort to defet id by holding ground. 'l'hicv erc illcapal)lc ul
tinning nnIttai' decisioiis against orthodox fn,inations, but ilie
were well Rtted to con(hilct war against the civil populace.
      The l)cnuociaric Army was employed initially in accordaiicc
with its capabilities; that is, in anulnishing small forces,
                                                                                                                                                                               iii raids
against poorly defended localities, and in sabotage of pkll)liC
utilities. As rcards the ainly, the guerrillas practiced harassment
and evasion. In 1948, however, the l)emiiocrai Ic A ri ny began to
hold ground. 1 'he old tactics were npt givcn LII). I mideed, when
ariiiy
                    pressure 01) guerrilla positions had tim l)C eased, raids
                                                                                                                                                                                                iii
tthei' a reas became more frequent and more (letetlIuiI)e(I. It 'as
simply that a ne\v strategy was superimposed tipomi the old.
       Its decision to hold ground placed the I)cuuocratic A riuy at a
disadvantage and contributed to its defeat. Organizational changes
were iiiade to decrease the disadvantages of the new tactics, but
tIme guerrillas could nor alter materially the commupositioiiofforccs
factor. By tIn decision to hold ground, they opposed light iii
fantry in Iamg, relatively static concentrations to attack by bal-
anced forces. l'hus they exposed w'eakness to strength and their
initial success in thic Vitsi area was due only to the army's in
al)ility to exploit its own strength. Moreover, though the guer
i'illas turned the government's 1948 offensive into
                                                                                                                                                            a stalemate in

            TIc GuerrillaAnd 1 low 10 l'igbt liii,,
 rmr o Vftsi, they suffered severe casualtics in men and morale
 roon which tlicy never fully recovered.
   Gonci C. M. \'Vn,dluntse, W';lItiliiC cotiiii:ttitler ol thc AIIICd
Misshm o lie ( ;rcck guerrillas, in coiiitiicnt ilig on the contrast
h STUCQUC bctuccti ll AS (Cfunniuni.st(knnuliatctl partisans)
and DS (Rightist partisans), observed that whereas the latter
  cphycd Iorccs in small bands t'ouinmiaudcd by comiiparativcly
indcpendcn junior officers, thc "ammi:itcur strategists" of ILAS
dcvchpcd a large, centralized army of divisions and corps,
which the chain of coninmntl was alSo a military hierarchy. In
his view, this type of organization 'as excellent for imposing
miirary aw on the areas dotiiinatcd by H .AS, but poor for
gucoima pcrations.
   When gocrrilla operations were icsuiimcd in I 946, circumstances
      different. l'lic guerrillas were unable to assume rCSpHlSi_
hihty cur the governance of the civil population. A territorial
 rgoizarnm was created l)t,t it was separate from
                                                   the organiza_
rhm kr combat.
                 I he 7Otie of ol)ClatiOtiS \'as divided unto sectors.
"Sccror head1uartcrs'' exercised coordination wit hin their areas
hu did iu control operations. 1 heir tasks were the establislimiment
( cmmmmicatuolis, intelligence, logistics, amid the handling of
polk ical maucrs. \Vjt bin the sectors were tlic hill umiasses used by
 he c
       ithar units as operating bases. (he cotmih:it units were hands
o doffercnr si7.Cs w'Iiich moved about freel' within a sector or.
hcvcen sectors. Iti other words, this vas, by \Voodliouse's stand
a rds, a good organization br guerrilla 01)cratiouis.
           947, the h)osely organized bands of sixty to seventy
ncn grew into 1icouipanics and bat taboos as guerrilla strength
increased.
           ll'he guerrillas explained their failure to take the of
1cnsi'c during winter I 9474H on the grounds of organizational
wcakncsscs. hi preparation for the alloy's spring oilcnsive, the
guerillas dccide(l to consolidate i lie areas thicv held, and to effect
"inpb-ovemcos'' in their inilita my f)tganizalioti to permit war on
the plains. In short, they were departing (rout an organizational
stnicurc sOital)lC for their pu rposcs.
  Reasons contributing to this decision can only he surmuuiscd.
Il'crhaps there were militaristic tendencies auuiong the "amateur
.stratcgists" Perhaps guerrilla strength had grown to the point

that the leaders anticipated challenging the army in fullscale war
fare. Perhaps the difficulties expericnccd in
                                                  direct ilig
                                                             :iinl cu
ordinating nut tie rous independent
                                       ii n Is Were too
                                                         g rca t
                                                                  1
probably, however, the decision to leoiiga?iizc rcsuh ed priiiiarih
from the decision to defend an arca ali ing t lie fort licrii Iii irdci's.
The eniploynicut of the bands in a task of this nat nrc woii
                                                                     I
require more effective meatisof control.
  The decision to defend rep resented a tic1 ia little fn oiii
                                                            il ic lii
ciples of guerrilla warfare. lo
                                    attciipr to hold territory
                                                                   iii
definitely is to rely upon force of anus, alit1 the guerrilla 'ln
relics upon force of arms alone is (lonillicol to defeat.
  What induced the guerrilla leaders In iiiake this decision?
                                                                    It
may have been to give substance to t lie hut inn of tie' ( nvcniu
ment of Free Greece, or to acquire a territorial hase coil iia 'al k
to Yenan in China, or the ''People's Republic'' ill K irca ;
                                                                 1 or
                                                                    ii
may have reflected guefrilla recognition t liar they could tint coo;
tinue operations without supplies frotti across the liurtkr.
                                                                   I
secure their supply lines, they had to defend a hase area tlirnii Ii
which supplies could pass on the was' to I lie bi:uiids.
  In early 1948, the battalions of 1947 grew into lirigadec, an I
in May, a guerrilla division was forti ied. ly die cud of IV, i, tIlt
guerrillas had 8 divisions. These divisions colit rolled sonic
                                                                    .'

brigades, 42 battalions, 25 bi_cotuupato us, and I H iiude1wiuleiut coil panics.

The gathering of light infantry into; iiouiiitual "divisions'' (lItI ii; 'I
make them divisions in the sense (if a force of contInued art No supporting arms were added. 'Flie available forces were siiio1l gathered into larger fornuatioins. These were lint capahle of miwcl ing on equal terms the units of the a riny, which could timid, ti and fight theiui with greater success tliamu ii had the siuialler hia,itl.

The peculiar advantages of the guerrilla lu:id hecit sacrificed.

I lii.

departure front proper guerrilla organi/.atinuu amid tactics ;155i51
the army during its 1949 calipaign.

The combat anus of the ariuiy consisted of itilamitrv, irmillcr'.

armored reconnaissance, tanks, and conuhiat cmugilieers. ( )nigiiialh supporting anus were not organic to the ohivision. 'Ihey wcit under the control of various direcuirat es (of the general staff an I
units were attached to, or placed in support of, corps or division'
according to circuilistances. i'he division, then, consisted of little inouc than infantry, headquarters, and signal elements. Supporting anus, however, were established to provide certain attachments.

A iuiotintain division was normally reinforced by a cavalry squadron, a ituachinegun company, engineers, and a regiment of mountain artillery. Field divisions were similarly reinforced, except that armored cavalry and field artillery replaced cavalry and iwuu,nrain artillery.

] 'lie basic difference between field and IflountaiI divisions, the srreuigths of which were almut 10,500 and 8,500 respectively, lay iii the means provided for thci r transportation. The field division, of which there were three, was organized for war on the plains.

I 'hits, it was c(1uip1)ed with motor transport. The mountain division was provided animal transport. There were four such divisions. The relative availabilities of animal and motor resources and differing operational requirements resulted in many variations from these standards as the var wore out. Finally, by the spring of 1949, the thenexisting eight divisions were placed under the sante establishuuicut.

flic new division, the strength of which was t nit 9,300, included as organic eknients an engineer unit, a scout coni)any, and a battery of 75mm. l)aclcttowitzet's.

The standard division, a coniproanise between the specialized tiel(l antI lutountain divisions, could operate effectively over any terrain. 'I'hc new organization also recognized that the habitual widespread employment of army units made it necessary to in
chide as organic parts of the division a modicum of engineer and mit ii Ic my su pj)( t rt.

In all, six types of infantry were employed by the government.

Iii a(l(litiofl to the mujountain and field infantries referred to above, I here were coititmiamudo infantry, National l)cfense Corpssubse
ilimun ly light infantrygendarmuery, and artuied civilian coin
At the onset of guerrilla activity, the aniuy was not yet fully organized. It 'as deficient in training and, to some extent, in epuipIoCnt, antI the organization of its combat units, even those of time tulountain type, was not entirely suitable for conml)at against the couiuparatively small guerrilla hands of that period. There was, however, a psychological need for a measure of early success in arresting the depredations of thc guerrillas. In this situation, the British Military i\iissioii, its thinking conditioned 1hl1)5 by the experiences of the United Kingdom in the early clays of \'Vorld Var I I, sponsored the organization of coniniandus to speed training and to proVide sniall units specially trained to conibat go e rrill as.

hrty ColIlIIlflhld() coiiiianies were formed initially.

Subse
mtmently these were organized into) four groups oii five Collipamlies each. Hie strength of the group Wi5 ai)out 625. lii the sunimner of 1949, the bum CoIllIiian(io) groups 'emc liceil under tvo brigade itcadojimart ems, and a fifth group was organized.

As had happCned in the U.K. and in the U.S., lie best fighters were concentrated in the cnmiimnando units, tile)' received better pay, e(1uipl)lcnt, training, living comiditions,
:111(1 II1OFC 1iublicity.

i'verytiiing was done to set themmi up as a special category of pet
sontiel. This tile)' became, but the reason for it lay not in this favoritisiii. i'he meal sources oil their csprit de corps were their intense military activity and a successmo)n of mitihitary victories.

Oviiig toi tliei I' offeiisi'e Spirit and tile vidusprcid c,iifidciicc tile)' inspired, the commlmii:itl(ios began to gain a iiioniiii>iy of th right to light ti ic guerrillas. Other units, mecogmiii.imig their superiority, were content to let theni do so. Comiimmmandem's, appreCiat
imig their quality and the readiness with which tile)'
tmml(lertooi(
oi)ematiomls, began to use thcnm lit preference to iii icr troops iii operations of all kinds. It hecamiic lmccessi'y for thic (:omiimmiamikr ill Chief, who regarded these troops as a kind of strategic reserve, to state their proper role. Coiriniandos were to be used along rite following lines:
lii night rai(ls to open gaps iii defensive vomlos for later CXj)h)ititiOml iiy iitfintr>'.

2. hi deep raids into enemy_controlled territory.

. hi penetrations to attack the rear of encilly troops p11111cc1
down by tire, especially I iear the end of the light.

4. As strategic reserves to be transported to) the point of cmii
ploynient by rapid n teans such as aircra ft.

Except for an initial reluctance to accept the idea of special units, tile conimnando> Concept was not ojtmestioiiccl ill Greece.

They were regarded as lightly armed, highly mobile, and very effective.

A ctuaiiy the coniiiiandos were not hg iitly armed; they carried more firepower than a corresponding number of infantrymen froill a standard unit. Their mobility is c1uestionable since they had 110 means of transportation save walking. lXCC})t for arms, however, they were lightly e(1u11)pCd. Consc1tientiy, they could be moved readily ill transportation from external sources. lhey could operate effectively at night owing to their high state of training. They could gain surprise owing to their light C(]UIp
ment, their ability to nialce long marches, and thci r superior field
craft, and they could immake deep penetrations of the combat
patrol type owing to their ability to march and to operate for short periods with niiuimnuin e(uipinent. i'hcy were not suitable for sustained operations, and they were dependent to a far greater degree than standard units upon external administrative services.

Er is doubtful if tile functions assigned coIllIllaIldOS were of such a nature as to warrant the mnaiiltenancc of special unIts, with the concentration of effort and dislocation of Il montic that such a course of action entails. To a degree, the effectiveness of the colliunandos was achieved at the expense of tile standard infantry units. Vith proper training, tile latter could have performed tile missions assigned tile coilllnandos. They could, in addition, have held ground on the defensive or have taken their place in an attack against a fortified position. They could sustain themselves, moreover, without excessive reliance upon tile service and supply agencies of tile army.

A rinored cavairy and tanks did not play a sigilificant rote.

Unabie to penetrate tile niountain areas where most of the fight
ing took place, armor normally reinforced tile garrisons of towns.

It tended to raise tile morale of the soldiers and particularly the townspeople, who were impressed by such tangible evideiice of strength. Occasionally, armor 'as used to support a COUUtCI'
offeilsil'c to drive gilerri I las out of a captu red town. A rumor may have disturbed tile guerrillas. Their extensive ise of Al' (antitank) mimics, and their efforts to build up an antitank capability by tile ac(luisition of AT guns and l)y tile desigilation of infantry
''tank fighters," suggest as much. It is doubtful, however, if the largely )sycl1oIogical thlvailtagc that accrued to tiieariiiy by its posSesSion (If )riilOi trtified the effort that went into the illain
tenance of ti; isar in.

Owing to the COlIlpSitiOn 4)1 forces, ilic National Aiiiiy enjoyed two great advan: ages over the Democratic A rlny. First, it was capable (if tickling balanced forces of C) unbar a rins, whereas tile guerrillas were infantry only. Second, it \vasadc(1(lately sup
ported by supply and service elements.

1 his gave it strategic IIlol)iiity and tactical staying power. the guerrilla, 4)41 tiie (>dlCl hand, had few service tonnations outside rue base areas. Thus, lii units ill south and cent ral Greece had little Strategic illol)ility and liltIitC(l staying power.

At the outset of the war, the guerrillas eii;ployed their forces iii accordance vith their capabilities.

In
1948, however, they began to defend certain areas along the nortllerll border and to eIllploy larger foriitat.ions in south and central ( reece. In SO doing, they placed themselves at a disadvantage with respect to tile superior arms and logia ic capabilities of tile governiiienr forces.

lollowing the 1948 calllpaign, the to constitute aitillcrv and itli&; SuppOltitlg arills, iiit their choirs znet with little success. Ho-jr final illilitary defeat was due in pall to their effort to opposcabaianced force (If atiis with infantry alone. The guerrillas It no tone had the capal;ility
(>1 (lirCctly opposing tile army.

i iv they allowed thei i iseives to be l)llce(I
in tills poSitioii is difll(ilIt to understand.

'Flie table of ejuipmcnt for a guerrilla brigade, tI;e strength (If which was about I ,SOfl, provided the following arlI'llllent:

Pistols
55
Rifles
963
Sillall Illachine guns
393
l.igl it machine guiis
HI
flea y ill;Ichiile gulls
6
I igi it illortars
27
\ I cd;;nii tiioiti is
6

So far as is knowii, T;(I guerrilla brigade ever attained a strength of 1,500, and it is iiiiprobablc that any brigade 'a-as ever in the prcscribcd maimer. Guerrilla 111(1 link are not characteriZed by such precision. Ncvcrtliclcss, tin able is of value as an indication of guerrilla thinking w'ith respect to armament. Probably no more accurate estimate of the numbers and types of weapons in the hands of guerrillas could he wade than one arrived at by distributing arms to the total nuiither of guerrillas in accordance with the ratios established by this table. It would be necessary to add the limited number of heavier crew-served weapons not included in the brigade table of equipiiicnt. These included light field and mountain artillery, light antiaircraft and antitank guns, and a few heavy mortars. The total number of weapons would also include those stored locally and the resources of the goverutinents to the north. There is little evidence that the guerrillas ever experienced shortages in weapons, except in isolated instances where they were due to difficulties in distribution rather than to an overall shortage.

The guerrilla weakness in w'ciipons was the result not of short supply but of lack of standardization. There 'as infinite variety in their weapons. This diversity 'as the product of their manifold sources. it gave the guerrillas uIIany headaches and prevented them from getting maximum performance from their armament. Weapons training could not he standardized. Weapons maintenance was rendered difficult by a shortage of sparc pails and by the fact that parts were not interchangeable anumg the various iiakes. Perhaps worst of all ias the fact that auuiitinit i w supply was infinitely complicated. %Veapons were often out
1 :ictioii because ainrnuni
000 of the proper type \'as not a vai al I
it the right time and place, while local supp1ics of auiiiiuiiii' iii were sonictilncs par
tiallv useless. These prol)lelns were iii:i:iticd by the widespread deployment of guerrilla Emits and p''
'nhmltunicatums. A significant increase toward the end of t In u German weapons
rifles, in particulariiiav have been iii li':s to the exhaustion of Balkan stores than to an efrort on ii i. it of the guerrillas to standardize arms.

Apart fiotu their variety, guerrilla
'us were those used by infantry the world over. The con(IIi It': (if the war, however, brought the mine into great promiocin I he guerrilla, having no motor transport, could place antitanl in us it will, knowing that

            Winning in the MountainsGreece
                                                      87
they would not interfere with his own movements. The limited
road net and poor trafficability of the terrain off the roads
ensured a profitable return. Antitank and antipersonnel mines
were employed extensively, both offensively and defensively, and
for sabotage. Their weight was a disadvantage, but tens of thou-
sands were transported into Greece and the hundreds of legless
men one sees there today give convincing evidence of their effec-
tiveness. The mine was the most effective single weapon in the
guerrilla arsenal.
 In respect to armament, the objective of creating a modern
army in Greece had not been attained when operations against
the guerrillas began. Although there was a standard table of e(Juip-
ment, the weapons on hand varied from unit to unit according to
the availability of equipment.
 l'he principal infantry weapons were the .303 rifle, the Sten
gun, and the Bren gun. The last named was disrnbuted one per
squad or about 36 per battalion. The only crewserved WCa1)onS
in the battalion were mortars. A 2inch mortar was placed in each
rifle platoon. The only battalion weapon was the 3inch Ilmorrar.
In summary, the armament of the l)attalion included:

3-inch mortars
34
2inch mortars
12
Brcn guns
approx.
36
.303 rifles
approx. 600
Stcn guns
approx.
75

The brigade consisted of thrccbattalions. No supporting arms were introduced at this level. The division, in turn, consisted of three brigades. No supporting arms were organic with the divi
sion. However, a medium-machine-gun company of 16 \nickers was normally attached, and there were available for the support of each division about two batteries of artillery and a reconnaissance squadron.

The artillery was organized into eight regiments. The mountain regiment consisted of two batteries of 3.7 nu)untain howitzers.

Sometimes attached was a battery of 4.2 mortars. The icld regi
inent consisted of two batteries of 25_pounders. In addition, there two batteries of l1lC(litlfl artillery ConSiSting of four 5.5's each.

I he armored reconnaissance Squa(lrons, equipped with the U.S.

scout car and the Britishmade I lumber armored car, were organ
ized into reconnaissance regiments, of which there were three.

lo com1)lete the list of ariiiaincnt, it is only necessary to add hice small tank units, equipped with British Centaur tanks of limmiitcd serviceability, and later the U.S. Sherman.

A casmal inspection of this armament estal)lislImellt reveals that it is light, even lv l))o%IIlrain standards. Particularly striking are its deficiencies in iiiachine gulls and artillcry. But limited numbers md repowcr of the weapons were not the only shortcomings.

tluch of the equipment had been war surplus in the first place and ordnance maintenance was (lCIlCiCflt.

'I'he ltrst change in arniamnent was the substitution of the 60
tutu, for the 2inch mortam'. This was followed by the gradual substitution of the 81 mm. for the 3inch mortar. The absence of auflicient artillery suitable for mountain operations having been noted, the 75tutu, packhowitzer procured and (ICIiVCI'y was iumuk iii ilw spring of I 948. A liaucr' of four guns was provided each division, a development that went a long way toward increasing its selfsufliciency and its effectiveness in mountain warfare.

ils' lcbrmiamy, 1948, the contracting quantities of British weapons (lictatc(I their concentration in certain units. A decision vas reached to replace the .303's, the Bren guns, and the Vickers miiacline guns in three divisions and nine lightinfantry battalions with the
1903
rifle, the Browning automatic ri lie, and the
191 9A4 machine gun, respectively. The changeover 'as effect ed in two of the three divisions prior to the final battle.

the advent of the U.S. light iuiachine gun served to bring a In nit a re rga niza ti on of t I ie macI ii nc_gun establish i rue lit, not only in the three divisions to be U.Sequipped but the live British
equipped divisions as well. i'he division inachineguit company was replaced by a four_gun platoon in each infantry battalion.

i'his increased the machine guns in the division from an entirely inadeqmate 16 to 36, and placed them organically at the level of their norummal emplovnuent.

To meet the need for a directfire weapon suit able fur attacking covered eiu1ilacctiicnts, tWo neW WCapOItS Wete ilitri )(ItIccd in July, 1949the 2.36 rocket launcher and the 75-tutu. recoilless rifle. Rocketlauncher teams were organized on the basis of nine per (livision, and a tnulet rans1n)rtcd rccoillessriflc COtttl)atlY was formrucd. The latter was to be assigned to thc big best comuumuiatidcr itt the I)attlc area, who could reassign its elements in accor(lattec with the tactical plan amid t lie nat tire of the ciuct is'
ri i (icatiomus.

Ihic early collapse of the ucrrilIas did not 1)crtliit lull evahtiatuut'
of the usefulness of these weapons.

When the.decision was ieachcd to reequip three divisiumus with U.S. arms, it was also decided to reequip the comutuutandos. Prior to that (late, they had been equipped with the .303 rifle, a high ratio of Bren guns, and submachine guns, but no ztuaclminc guns.

In this case, the Ml rifle mathier than the Springfield replaced the
.303. Each group received 58 Browning autt)mulau ic n lies to replace i like numnl)er of Bren guns, and Bren guns on hand iii excess of this number 'ere retained. Five 2.36 rocket launchers were issued for a group muuacluiuiegun platoon. Hie couuvcrsuuu of the cotuinuando units was accuiuiplishie(l quickly, and all live groups were reequipped prior to the final campaign.

A comparison l)etweemi t lie total numbers pf guerrilla and guy ertumnemit weapons has Ito more signihcance th;uuu
1
CO)ttt1)atiSOIt between the total personnel strengths of the respective forces. In the early stages of the var, the guerrilla, mami for man, was as vellarmed as the soldier of the National A rmuuy. Au army unit had rio advantage in firepower over a guerrilla unit of equal size, except when the fornucr had the benefit of artillery and air support.

ihiat the guerrillas recognized their weakness visovis the artillery of the ;tmnuy is it tested by their effnmts, between their defeat iii the (ramuutumos iii 1948 and the final cauuup:tigiu, to build up an artillery attn in the base areas, particularly Vitsi, vhuiclu.

they occupied the longest. Artillery pieces of various types were obtained, hut the guerrillas were unable to constitute art effective am lhery arm. Their failure may be attributed to a lack of a rn lhery'
knowhow; to the action of the air force iii seek immg out and dcstroymg gun positi(mS; and to inability to ()l)tam equate supplieS of artillery ammunition.

## Ill.

I he term ''coit efficiency''
as tiscd hcrc ci iihraccs such factors as training, cotiunand and staff functioning, discipline, and morale.

Any judgnicot on the training of the I )cniocratic Army depends tiion the frame of reference. Dy orthodox standards, it was deticient in almost every rcspcct. Obviously, however, such standards are not appropriate. Guerrilla warfarc has bcci littic mt innalizcd by the ii runes of (ILll%' estfll)IishCd goVCIflhliCnts. For cxnmple, u,nil rccclItty thc U.S.

Army Field Service Regulations devoted only eight paragraphs to thc subject. I-historically, guCr
titla warfare has becn a practical art largely rebuilt front the ground up wherever the need for it arose. In recent years, it has been embraced by international Coniniunisin as a tactic of revolution, and the eniplnyinent of partisan warfare by the forces of international Cominuitisin svihl in tittic foster illoiC effective anti
guerrilla doctrine.

In Greece, the I)ciiiocratic Army did not have to start front the beginning in the developnicnt of its tactics. It was able to draw upon a vast reservoir of practical experience. Many of its leaders had served with Fl AS during the occupation, but a higher standard of partisan warfare had hcci developed under Tito in Yugoslavia. The new Yugoslav A rlny had many expert par
tiSan warriors. The guerrillas of Greece benefited from their experience.

EvIdence was presented to the United Nations Commission Concerning Frontier Incidents that men picked front the refugees who fled across the border following the abortive revolution in
(
were trained in guerrilla warfare in Yugoslavia ail(l Albania. In Yugoslavia, Slavicspeaking Greeks were attached directly to
1tc army for training. The Coinittissioui exaittined copies of military manuals in the Greek language used for theoretical and practical training ut guerrilla warfare in both Yugoslavia and Albania. Finally, it was reported that prior to the formation of

the Government of Free Greece, General Nadj, a Yugoslav expert
in guerrilla warfare, directed guerrilla ()pcratiOiiS front Skopije.
  Guerrilla leaders, then, were not without theoretical training
in guerrilla warfare, L)ut there were few
                                          licorists aimiiig therm.
They were practical soldiers selected for their ihility to get things
done. Failure was accepted as evidence of 111C01111)CtCI1CC
                                                        111(1 the
leader who failed as replaced. The tempt) of operat inns was
such that an rncornl1)etent leader was soon exposed.
  If the leaders were qualified by training and experience in gtncr_
rihla warfare, they were less SO for orthodox warfare. Time cvohnn-
tion towatd a strategy that depended upon time fornniat ion of larger
units and upon the adoption of COlm'Cnti( toil
                                                nitilit try
                                                         att i(s
tended to deprive the Denmcrntic A tiny of lcamlcish,1m
                                                       idct1nirt c
to its requirements.
  The training of tIme fighters varied widely. Sortie were is vcll
qualified as regards training as the leaders; that is, ex1)cricilcc iii
ELAS, training in tIme satellites, and experience in time field. Others
fell far short of this, particularly toward the end of time var.
Training in the satellites was continued for new recruits, mit tire
journey there was long and oftentimes inipract icaidc. Thus trninm
ing was given locally in loosely organized training centers, and
sonic recruits received their only trnini rig
                                           in
                                              t lie
                                                  liantis
                                                         t lmcnir
selves. This training was nimininnmal, ranging dr iwim ward lo urn two
months to almost not lung. Ior example, recruits taken
                                                   mt IKardinirci
were given only fifteen (lays' training prior o
                                              heir participation
in tinc attack on Karpension. Since nimuch mf tIre t mine was (lcvt)tC(l
to political indoctrination, military training could have inch n(lc(l
little more than the elements of fleldcraft arid basic wcaponm
instruction. Perhaps the best and most extensive training camine
froni association with veterans on tine job.
                                            line guerrilla wino
survived became battle-wise.
  If the impression has been created that time lrliCY aii(l Strategy
of the Communists was firm and steadfast at all tunes, it has been
unintentional. While a detailed analysis
                                        r f guerrilla icakrshni1,
and guerrilla morale is scarcely practicable,
                                             moe inmdicatim in
                                                             ml
the confusion that hcsct the guerrillas' efforts cant he given.
 The great mass of the guerrillas were carried along by the

leaders and by a deluge of pro1)aganda concealing adverse devel
oplilCotS or rationalizing them in the light of rhc Parry line.

Fhcre wcrc two orders of morale among the guerrillas. The first was the morale of the hardcore Communists. Initially, a high proportion of the guerrillas were of this cast, but with the increase of forced recruiting, a morale proiicimi arosc. The morale of he forced recruit, while not necessarily low, was of a different order. It depended upon the amount of his political mdoctrma
non. Vhcn possible, the new recruit was sent across the borders for indoctrination. When this coukl not be done, his indoctrina
i inn was carried out in Greece. This training being inconp1etc, continuous propaganda had to be carried on within the bands in order to keep up morale. More time was Spent in this type of activity than in military training. A good percentage of forced recruits rcsptmcled favorably to indoctrination, mit few became zealots.

Beginning early in 1949, the opportunities for the iiidoctrina
timt of recruits decreased sharply because of the increasing aggressiveness of, the army, w'hich kept guerrilla units on the imu;vc. 1 ime new, limited training was scarcely adequate to Convert a forced recruit into a hardened guerrilla who could endure the rigi us of guerrilla life without coiiipl:iiiir. As 1949 wore on, the knlcrs had nmore and more difficulty in maintaining immorale. By limly, probably the milajoriry of the I 8,50() guerrillas would have si,rm-ciidcrcd if given a chaimce; and by the rime of the Vitsi and
( r;mmmunos battles, guerrilla morale was at the lowest ebb since the start of the war.

I hose who are inclined to regard the Greek Army with intolcr
ance for its early showing in the antigucrrilla war would do well to turn back the pages to the year 1940. The results attained in six mmmonrhs of combat w'itl the Italian Army afford a strilcing manifestation of combat efficiency. Factors that w'ent into it were:
A 'elltraincd regular army as a nucleus for expansion.

I rained reserves.

0 nmperent conimnanders and staff officers.

II iglm national morale, universal and umistinring public support, mud outstanding combat esprit.

'These factors were dissipated in the period betw'ecii the Grcco
Ita hail war and the 'ar with the guerrillas.

Front April, 1941, to the stIllllucr of 1945, the ( reek A Filly (for all practical purposes) WitS nonexistent, and during this dine much of its knowflow' wis lost.

An army dissolved for 10(11 years is not rebuilt in a (lay, and efforts statied in IV 5 did nor progress rapi(lly. Training proceeded slowly, and the guerrilla activity' of the fall of 1946 found an a ritty tinprepa red for active operations.

lit April, 1947, the army started its first largescale offensive, and froiti that tune onward, its units were so engaged that training was thought to he impracticable. Moreover, on tIle part of officers who had long l)ecn deprived of conlilland responsil)ility or who had it thrust upon them w'ithout adequate preparation, there was a lack of appreciation of the importance (If training, particularly in tile units. 'l'ltere was a tendency to feel ti at training within a unit which had already seen acti 'e coi nl)at entailed a loss of face for the unit and its personnel.

It may be said, then, that the level training in the ant iy never exceeded indi'idual training;
111(1 that as the older reserves were replaced, the level of individual training was heconting less satisfactory.

In View of this, interest developed in the eviously neglected field of unit training.

this survey gives an indication of the state of training, which was rellecte(l in the arnly's colnl)at efficiency. It would he incorrect to leave the impression that the limited vcntu res iii unit and field training during the last year of the w'a r Iltade a significant contrilnition to victory. Infantry still perforitted less ellicieittly than could he desired at the attack in Vitsi in August, 1949. II ow
ever, the efforts were of value.

As rite ariy clliuyed a superiority of 10 to I
in itien and iiiatericl, its prolonged inability to elinlinate tltc guerrillas raises a question as to the quality of its direction. Was I lie ineffectiveness of the army tIle result of failure of coillillantlers to ciltl)loy cfleeti'chy the forces 1)('ed it their disposal? l)id the ahscnce of eliectivc leadership prolong lie 'ar? 'I'o sonic exteilt, I licse lInes
tioltS 111(1St he answered ill the afhrtnative. A lack uI competent and aggressive conlillanders plagued the army in 1947 and
194H.

A cotiiparatively h)w standard of professional training was not I lie only causeof coiinnand failures. Important too were a certain lack of discipline and the absence of a strong "will to fight."
In some countries, effective constitutional barriers have been established bctwceri military pwer and domestic politics. Others liavc been less successful in this respect. Greece has been among the lattcr.

Personal rclationships between individual military otliccrs and political leaders were not uncommon, and many miii
ta ry officers had channels by_passing the army conunand and the
\Var Ministry through which they could reach the government.

t lorcn'cr, the ariiiy comliHind, which owed its tenure to the government, could not disregard the wishes of the political figures who tiiade it up. Thus, the iiiilitary command's control over the ariiw tended to be circulllscril)ed by political considerations.

These nonmilitary influences affected army efficiency during the early stages of the antibandit war. Incompetent officers could not be discharged without governmental action, and this was difficult to ol)tain., Attempts to remove officers were projected into the realm of politics, where they were not susceptible of a sound solution. i'he inability of the army to remove incompetent and insubordinate officers tendc(l to destroy respect for authority. Subordinate comiiianders occasionally disregarded orders, confident that no great misfortune would accrue to them through their lailu ic o obey. 1 'o the habit of lialfuieasu res in t he execut loll of held orders, which prevailed in 1947 and 1948, may be attributed sonic of the army's lack of success.

Another factor that contributed to the ineffectiveness of the army, along with the state of its training and deficiencies in the professional qualifications of its officer corps, in the earlier effort, was the lack of a strong "will to fight." 'Fltis lack of offensive spirit, which was compounded of many eleiiicnts, fed Li0fl itself.

Prolonged lack of success developed a sense of frustration and ftitihity. The ai'lIly calime to believe that it was engaged in a Sisrplican task. The same operations were repeated again and
;IgaiIm, and there was no end in sight. \\'hat was the good of sac
mificing men and effort in a 1)01(1 attack to seize au objective, when it 'as certain that the mine objective would have to be taken again next month or next year? This feeling of hopelessness reached its nadir when thoughts of victory, engendered by the carly success of the 1948 canipaign, were dashed to the ground by the guerrilla defense of the Vitsi area. Another year of war had passed and the end was no nearer. ihe situation a1)pcared no better than at the start of the campaign.

ibis malignancy received nourishment fi'oin other sources.

Among them was the lack of discipline. 'Ilie lial)it of (piestiolling orders, which was i neittioned earlier, affected the ariliy's confidence in its coititnaud and leadership. A spirit of indecision was
fostered, which IliihitatC(I against decisive action. ho take decisive ac ti )n i v >1 yes the a ccepta nec of risks. A iii isca I Cu ha ti( ) n ii iay result in failure and censure. Since the bandits seldotit attacked a large military forn tation, a commander who temporized reduccd his chances of making au error. The inaction of a commander might have disastrous effects upon a campaign, hut if there were no errors of comnnussion on his part, it was difficult (0 proceed against hun. Consequently, the commanders soiiietiiiies showed a tendency to wait for the guerrillas to call the cues. Failure to take the initiative produced fear of the eneilly's capabilities and weakened confidence on the part of the army as to its own capa_
litlities. This lack f complete selfconfidence led the army to waver in its belief of ultimate victory.

'['his weakening of confidence in ultimate victory was not confined to the nat mow field of imiihitary i''raiiomis. It extended into the wider field where the objective the esiablislimmiemit of security and economimic wellbeing for the people of Greece. '['lie Comnnumnists had succeeded in creating a situation under w'hichi the government's effectiveness was hampered. If the government
'as incapable of consolidating such gains as the armlly might mimake, why go omi with it? Why mmiakc fruitless sacrifices? \Vlmy'
not "peace at any pi'ice'' now, instead of later?

The soldier wlit had less than confidence in the tmhtimiiatc (nit
conic had pcm'so grievances that reduced his offensive spirit.

'lime original call ips wcm'e m'esem'vists of the older classes who fought in the wa with Italy. As thici'c was for a bug little tin t'cplacciimeiit p"og no p'p' of i'chicfoiily a vista of a sucees;ion of miii litam'y operations until they sto1)pcd a bullet or stepped out a mine. Quite apart front the soldier's feeling hat lic 'as being called upon to risk life and linib while younger mcii vatched froni the side lines was his concern fur his family.

\ I aiiy of these older men were i iia rried and their pay 'as so low hat their families lived on the verge (if starvation.

l'iii;ihly, there were sonic activc Coniiiiunists in the army and a wi(lespIcad tolerance of varying degrees of Coiiitiiuiiist ideologies.

lcunoiiiic conditions in Greece 1)roduced many dissati.stied citi
lens. Comimmist teachings, once driven underground by Metaxas, gained considerable currency during the occupation and resist
nice. Many soldiers all(l even officers werc mildly tolerant of
( oiiimntmnist ideologies and possil)lv cvcn syiiipatlictic toward the guerrilla c:lilse. i'o evaluate this factor one must recall that the issue between Soviet expansionist Comimiunisimi and democracy had not beemi clearly defined. By gaining control of the resistance innvcilIcnt during World War II, the Communists had identified themselveswith the defense of Greece. hums they had giined as adherents many patriotic Greeks. It would take time for them to recognixe the changed situationthat the guerrillas no longer
(might for Greece and freedom, but for the Kremlin and slavery.

1 he wcal<cimcd olkiisivc spirit, product of these numy factors, In;mni fesred itself in coiiiiaiidcrs in a disinclination tO cOIli to teal grips with the enemily. In the soldier, it resulted in the degen
cratim m of the battle into a protracted longrange fire light from htichi the guerrilla was able to disengage at will.

1 here was no teal effort to close with him to secure his destruction. The net result was indecisive action.

lfforts miiade by time British and American missions prior to
1949 to persuade the government to give the army a lice rein in the conduct of operations, and to encourage the army to take more aggressive action, were not too productive. It was not until the dark weeks of the \'itSi stalemate of I 94H, when national mimorale dropped to an alltime low, that the government took a substantial step to improve the situation. In October, I'rime Miii
Lstcr Soplmoimlis wrote General Alexander Papagos proposing tIitt lie accept supremmie comimmuand of the Greek land forces.

General Papagos, alt bough holding an honorary appointment in the Cirt, was in military retirement at the time. Prior to World War II, he had beemi Chief of the Army General Staff.

Upon C rcecc's involvement in that war, lie bccai iic Con iiiiaiidci'
in Chief of the A riny. In this capacity, lie had (hirccted ilic ariiiy in the war against Italy. i'lic German OCCupation of ( FCCCC ami his iiiiprisonhiient in Germany deprived the Cciieial, tiinil a latci'
date, of a full iiicasurc of recognition for this service. Neverthie
less, his military reputation was established and lie was iiiivcrsahly respected as a patriot.

Genci'al Papagos did not: ii umediately accept the govern ii icn F's
1)roposal. lie i'Cj)liCd that lie COIll(l do so only if ccii :Iin conditions wei'c accepted I ))' the governiiicnt. '1 'hese provisiolis iticliRled, alliong other things, the cstabhishiiicnt of his jtiiistliciioii as (;Oiii iiiadcr in Chief with ()eI' to direct operations, to decide all iiiattCrs pertaining to military organization, and to 1)OSt and tratis
icr offl
'rs. He was to have the right to recall to active (hit)' aiiy rctir d1iccr, 'liei'eas no retired officers were to be rccallcd wit bout his a1)J)i'oval. 'Fhic government, after long dcb;itc, cepted these prOViSOS.

The instances where it is possible to put a iigcr on leadership and its value iii a crisis' are rarer than milital')' histories would have us believe, the role of the coilluIian(ler is often exaggerated.

(hit Papagos I ud qualifications that were iieeded at this dine.

I [a vilig refused to accept the post as Coiiimander in Chief until farreaching coinirntnicnts as to his authority had been made, he was in a [)ositic)ii to exert a 11 riii direction on the coinhlict of iiiihi
tary operations. Such direction was needed at this tiiiie to exploit fully the many favorable factors in the situation that had been created by U.S. assistance, the falling out of 'l'ito and the Coiiiin
form, and the increasing recognition of the true nature of the guerrilla var in Greece.

No developiiient could have been iiioi'c fortuitous than the appointment ol Papagos.

I lnprovelncnts in the cfl'ect i veness of t lie army were already under way and the beginnings of decisive action were noticeable. 1 however, it was Papagos who cousohi
datcd these gains and brought the army to the fruition of its J)oteIitiIlities.

I Ic restored discipline in the ariiiy by the nuthiless removal of unsuitable officers, lie stressed aggressive actioti and ordered the Ci'eek Armed Forces into a series of offensive o1)era
tions which deprived the guerrilla of the initiative and atfordcd hint I) tespite. I-Ic gavc the guerrillas no opportuiiitv to rccru icpl:tccmctits for their increasing battle casualtics, but harrien hciii until they were drivcn from Greece.

Llmkr Papagos, the army was galvanize(l into action. Its manpower was not increased, its training was not greatly improved, an(l there was no significant increase in its eupment. The aruuiy was stiuiply iIiI(IC
to
(to) what it was capable of doing, and no Oil iic hiatt this was titcn needed to gain the victory. Seven months alter tile a1)poiIitilleutt (if Papagos as Cottitnatider in Chief, the
\Ii was at an end.

Through the appointment of Papagos, the advisory functions
01 t tue U.S. and British Al ilitary A'I issntns CattiC into) their own as of increasing the efficiency of the army. The missions provided a mechanism by w'hicli faults in the army down to division level could be brought to the attention of the Corn
utiander in Chief, along with impartial advice and recotuinenda
II Ills for illlpuovclnents. The value of the ittissions depended not
(billY upon theit acceptance but upon the ability of the Coni
ttiiittki in Chief to implement their reconunendations. Papagos had, prior to his appointment, sought to restrict the influence iif the missions. However, following his appointment, he gave ct-cry in(hicaOon of appreciating the value of their services. More
o'ei, unlike his predecessors, he 'as capal)le of implementing their recommendations. I-us success was due in no small part to lie iui:uuiner in which he accepted the advice and rccotiiinendations
(It (lie U.S. and ihitisli ItIiSSft)ll5, and tutade full use of rhet,,.

## Iv.

1 limee geographical factors enter prominently into a consideration of the disposition of forces. These are the frontier, the minnmntains, and the sea. The influence of the sea and its impor
tauice ;is a tuteans of coluumunication arc discussed later. The frontier uttay be regarded as thc source of the var as well as the gicitest ally ( the l)cmmmocratic Arsiuy iii prolouigiiig it.

lime it,iiumntaiiis, too, were an asset of inestimable value to the guerrillas.

-Vith,outtlucmuu, the war in Greece could scarcely have beemi sustained.

irom the stait. 1)oiut of thc Creeks, defense of the frontier is a l-ferculean tasi
. From the Adriatic to the itirkisit border, the frontier Inca .UICS more than 700 miles. If Greece's eight wartime divisions were disposed along the border, the average divisional frontatc would he nearly 100 miles. But its length is only a part of tie proltlctit. The trace of the frontier, running from one end ti the other through a maze of mountains, has no defensive streng t. To the north lie other mountains, peru iittiitg defense nit SUCCc:,SIVC positions, Itut the coastal plain to the south affords no such possibilities. Thus, the historic routes between the Aegean and the central Ballcans, which cross the frontier in the valleys of the Stiimon antI the Axios and at the Monastir Cap,
1)rejudicc defense of the frontier from the sout It far more titan from the north. I A)fl and defensively weak, the border is also inaccessible. Except near I he routes just named, it is remote an(l communication with it is almost nonexistent. Orthodox military formations cannot operate there, and ntountaiil units can uitove and lie supplied only with difficulty.

An a(lditionaI disadvantage to the Greeks in defending the frontier is that the eastward projection has no depth. Fhe seacoast lies only a few u itiles froit the frontier, and in this region, lateral communications on land arc limited to one road and one railroad, 1)0th vulnerable to attack.

( rccce is cuitiposed of ituountains interspersed with sittall, inter
iuiontane valleys. The Pindus Mountains extend southeastward front the Albanian border 160 miles to the ( ; till of Corinth. A
sotitliward extension rises in the Peloponnesus. 'I he range varies in width from 40 to 60 uitiles. Its niaximnurn height is 7,500 feet, and it constitutes a nearly perfect barrier to eastwest comniu
nication between the Albanian border and the Gulf of Corinth.

Metsovan Pass, however, transits the barrier in northcentral Greece at an elevation of about 5,000 feet. Ground movement anywhere in the Pindus is limited by deep, narrow valleys having ICW hooch plains.

Another iliotlittaitu titass, Mounts VeniiioiiOlyimiptisOssa
Pelion, forms a semicircular arc along the western coast of the Aegean south of Salunika. It reaches inland at its southern extreni
ity to join with the Pindus range south of Thessaly Plain. A wide plateau loins this mass with the Pindns north ol the same plain.

Along the northern coast of thc Acgcan, the Rhodope Mountains ctcnd from flu Iga ru into castcrn Al :,cch,nia and Thracc.

A ltlumgh not as high as tlic Pindtis, this range, too, is stccp and rugged.

Because of these tll()UntfliflS aid others of lcsscr significance, movement in Greece is channehi7.cd along the few routes following the passes that connect the mterniontanc valleys. Elsewhere, particularly in the Pindus, great areas can be reached only on foot or by mule. Military formations cannot operate in these areas, and they have traditionally enjoyed considerable freedom from the police power of the various governments that have controlled the territory throughout its ccnmtphscatcd history. Many of these areas have been used for generations by bandits as operating bases and sanctuaries.

The first activity of the bands was confined to areas along the northern borders. I Jcre the bands enjoyed a tactical advantage such as s rarely given to any belligerent. They could not be decisively engaged. Whenever they 'cre ha id pressed, they simply withdrew across the border.

The Pindus range, between Metsovan and the Gulf of Corinth, and the range between Verniion and Pehion provided perhaps a dozen areas suitable for guerrilla operations. They were protected by their inaccessibility. lrotn tlmcni it was possible within a few hours to raid villages on the platims and harass the roads winding through the narrow valleys. Moveimiciit from one area to another was coimiparatively easy, particularly at night. These areas were organized as bases of operations, mit the bands were not committed to their defense. They followed guerrilla tactics here, moving from area to area to avoid being engaged.

ike establishment of collccultra(ions in south an(l central Greece involved an additional coimnnitincnt on the part of the guerrilla high coiiinmand. A line of coulitnuhiications by which supplies could be forwarded to these concentrations was essential.

As the government forces controlled time established routes, the Pimidus range was used for this purpose. An area of the northern Pindus had to be secured to 1)rotcct the point at which supplies could be moved from Albania or Yugoslavia into Greece for for

warding via thc Pindus route. To meet this repmimcmncmit. lit
guerrU.s comuniitted themselves to the defense of the base :mi'e;m
of Grammos an(l Vitsi. Although
                                Itemmiates to tIme Pimidmis o
                                                       lit'
were sometimes used, this decision t'cmmmainetl a keysmomic of t hei i
strategy until tlic end of the war.
  When the base areas were thrcatctied, time gmmcm'miIIms redotiblul
their harassing attacks elsewhere to divert g ivein mm mcnt
                                                    Ii tree
from that front. During the 1948 caimp:mign, time gI'ealcst effort
was made in the Peioponnesus, where thcre had ken little pre
vious activity. Because few government troops 'crc in that area,
the guerrillas were very successful. When the armimy delayed semI
ing reinforcements, several deputies froimi time Peloponrmcstms \'jI ii
drew from the government. The policy of nonrcimmIorccnmnt wa
followed, however, until the stalemate
                                    mm \'itsi hecammic wimmier
bound, when an overwhelming force 'as sent to
                                             I lie l'ctolmuim
nesus. The guerrillas had grow'n l)y
                                 I li;mt tutic to a strclmgt Ii
3,500, but their disposition was unfavor:il de. 'I lie ima 'a I lilt nil iii
the Gulf of Corinth prevented their escape to (lie mmmaimmlan(l,
                                                      miml
the guerrillas in the Peloponnesus were li(1uidated iii early 1919.
  The establishment of concentrations
                                     iii
                                        south
                                              and
                                                   cent a I
Greece and the base areas in the northern Pindus did not
                                                    mmmcmii
that the other areas along the northern frontier were inactivated.
On the contrary, perhaps six Immountain legions adjacent to Ytigo-
slavia and Bulgaria were used interimmittemitly as operating bases,
and approximately onefifth of the total guerrilla srrcmmgt ii
disposed there. A great advantage 'enjoyed by tIme gueri'iilas oper
miring in Macedonia and Thmracc was r hici r aI mility to mmmove lit ii ii
area to area under cover of the frontier. Yugosl:iv.t 0Cc111)ictl
                                                        1
central position in this covcrd'd route of commmmnhitmic:ml ions. 'I hi
TitoCominfortim rift, therefore, with t lie result ant closure of t hi'
border, was a serious blow as regards
                                     tIme
                                        (hisposit urn
                                                      I lie
guerrillas;
 In the 1948 canmpaign, the guerrillas vcm'c hue to oppose t itCi I
main strength to the army first in the ( ; riimmmm is, mmmd sklbsc1hIehit I'.
in the Vitsi regions. In 1949, through occupvimmg both areas slimmimi-
taneously, they allowed their forces to he split. 'Flue arimmy coo
ducted its concentration so that the guerrillas were mimmable to
determine where the main effort was to lie
                                        imade. Foib Whl1
                                                       :1

holding attack in C raitinios, the attack 'as dclivcred in Vitsi.

- I lie operation was coinplet ed SO quickly that no reinforcement was possible. Thc \'itsi force was so disorganize(l and demoral
iZed that it ws unable to reinforce the GrammOS position. The guerrillas had committed the fatal error of allowing their forces to be divided. They had perhaps anticipated that they WOUI(l be attic to shift Iorccs front one area to the other as they had in 1948.

liteir inability to do SO contributed to their defeat.

As of 1947, the ariiiy was organized into an army command and t'() corps. l'lie foriiicr was located at Volos; the latter at I arissa and Salonika, respectively. At this time, four divisions ittid two independent brigades assigned to one corps were disposed in I'liessaly, l1)irus, and central Macedonia. Three divisions and one independent brigade assigned to the other corps were located in eastern Macedonia and i'hrace, and four independent brigades were disposed in southern Greece and the Peloponnesus. Subse
ouently a third corps was activated. l'he assignment of corps areas and the disposition of troops varied thereafter in accordance with operational requirements.

( reece has three major lilies of land conmiunications.

One
1i lIds the Pindus range on the west to connect the Gulf of Corinth with the Albanian border. A second, passing between the Pindus and the Terniion_Pelion range, connects Attica with Sit iiika1 the lunasiir ( ap, and the single line of eastwest coin
Itiunicat bus. hoe third follows the north shore of the Aegean
1)aralleling the northern frontier. The majority of the towns are sit tuated (in or near these three routes. \Vith the guerrillas exercis
bug a precarious but tenacious control over the litountain areas ot t lie Pindus range, the \'eriioionPelion ralige, and along the Iii utloern borders of Macedonia and i'lorace, these routes and the to iWliS scattered along them were extremely vulnerable. Front operating bases in the mountains, the guerrillas could readily descend to harass them at any point. l'lie war, therefore, devel
(petl as a war without a hxed front.

Owing to the disposition_offorces factor, the guerrilla had tlw advantage of good terrain for evasion and for defense. The north
ciii frontier, heloimid which he was able to conduct all manner of military activity iii areas denied to the army, was a pmrticL1hir advantage.

1 his was canceled in part by Yugoslavia's support following the litOCoIIliItfOrII) split. Outside the northern base a reas, where the army controlled the routes of Communication and the guerrillas opera tcd from adjacent and intervening mountain areas, the war devckped as a war without a front. 1-Jere the army's control of contltlunications gave it strategic flexibIlity and tactical staying power. Whenever army forces ventured off the established routes, as they had to in order to engage the guerrilla, they found rite terrain the greatest obstacle. The guerrilla had superior observation, the ability to execute rapid tactical mov&
titents, and the ability to interpose terrain ol)st acles between himself and the governilteor forces.

The guerrilla's control of conununications outside the base areas was of a low order. 1 his influenced adversely his ability to concentrate forces and to supply them, particulat'ly during a protracted engageilient. This disadvantage was litinilnal so long as the I )enmcratic Army conducted guerrillatype operations using small bands. It grew in significance as the l)aI)ds foniicd into battalions, brigades, and divisions.

In each day of cotiihat, the U.S. soldier uses 37 })otlnds of supplies, inClU(iiItg: 6 po inds of rations, 6 pounds of c9uiptlIetIt, pounds of fuel and oil, and 20 pounds of allintunition. 1-lad the guerrillas used supplies on a conlparal)le basis, their 25,00()
would have iieeded I million pounds or 409 2toii I F(lCklflatis daily. Needless to say, they did not use supplies on this scale.

The average guerrilla was inured to hardship. II is needs wec fc'. lie was satisuied with a diet of bread, tiiilk, cheese, laiiib, and goat. Such items as salt, sugar, coffee, and tobacco were difficult to come by and w'ere sometimes missing. II is et1LliplIleflt conlprise(l boots, clothing, a blanket, a knife or ljaonet, and a firearm. Medical supplies, while negligible on a pro rata basis, did in the aggregate c nstitute a significant cjuautity. The anuilu
nition carried on the i idividual was 20-30 rounds, while 200300
w'ere carried for mach sine guns. Owing to this low initial allowance and the difficult)! of effecting resupply iii coiiihat, anitiluni
tioll was used sparingly. The titine, however, was used extensively.

In considering amiliunition requirelilents, a distinction Iliust he iiiatk hctw'cen troops operating within the defending base areas and those operating elsewhere. The number of artillery, antitank and antiaircraft guns and heavy mortars in the former areas inercased rc(1uireincnts there. Omitting this special case, the daily resupply for the average guerrilla did not exceed 5 pounds made III) :15 follows: rations, 3 pounds; equipment, I pound; and ammunition, I pounda total of 5 pounds.

i'hc requirement for transport probably varied between I and
2
)Inds per day for each guerrilla operating in south and central
( reece. i'his scenis insignificant, hut neither the supplies nor their quantity were insignificant. Without these supplies, which could not he ol)tained locally, the guerrillas could not function effectively. They werevital, therefore, to guerrilla operations.

Iivc thousand guerrillas iii south and central Greece would have used 50100 animal loads daily. laking 120 wiles as the average distance from the base areas to the users, the turnaround dine was in the neighborhood of two weeks. ilitis, 7001400
aiiiials would have been employed constantly in this traffic, even if no allowance is made for losses in transit. These w'erc actually
(itlite high. Mule trains were intercepted frequently by the air force or army units and damaged or (lestroyed.

The probleiils involved in organizing the routing and protection of the supply trains moving between the base areas and the l)afldS
in central and southern Greece were Imlany. They were greatest when the army was active. l)uring such times, the bandits were expending more supplies thami normally. They 'ere forced to abandon stores that could not be carried. They were unable to requisition supplies in areas through which they might be passing, as this took nine and provided information to the army. Sinii
larly, raids upon towns or army stores were impracticable.

linalIy, the mule trains from the north had greater difficulty in getting through, and not infrequently the bands were unable to keep their rendezvous with such trains. On top of this, greater ow Iii )crs of casualties required evacuation to the north. On many occasions, l)allds experienced local and tcIlip(}ra ry shortages of supply due to these factors. l)ii ring the 1949 canipaign, however, the operations of the army so reduced the effectiveness of the guerrilla supply system as to render it incapal)le of meeting the minimum needs of the hands in south and central Greece.

Yugoslavia occupied a key position in the provision of foreign aid to the Greek guerrillas. It had a pivotal posit urn geograplu
cally. Bulgaria was remote from the area of greatest guerrilla activity. Yugoslavia lay between Albania and Bulgaria. More than that, it complctcly surrounded Albania so that the latter, had no access to the U.S.S.R. or other satellites except via Yugoslav territory.

As the Grannnos area t'as adjacent to Albania, supplies moved to Greece through this area had to pass through Albania, but this (toes not wean they had their source there. On the contrary, the greater pt came front Yugoslavia. l'he Vitsi position could be reaclle(l from either Albania or Yugoslavia. Prior to January, I 949, the bulk of supplies entering Vitsi caine front Yugoslavia.

I )uring rIte iiioitth of Jantiary, Irnwcvcr, supplies front Yugoslavia declined to almost nothing, and virtually all supplies received after that date came front Albania. This, and the low levels iii certain classes of supplies found in the Vitsi and C ramiltos pOSi tig,ns after the collapse of the guerrilla defense, suggest that the
]'itoCominform rift su affected the supply situation of the l)einocratic Army that it was, by the spring of 1949, no longer capable of carrying on operations on the scale of 1947 and 1948.

Indeed, this may have been the proximate cause of the guerrilla collapse.

Supplies and equipment were provided the Nati mal Army ott the basis of authorized tables of equipment. 1 'hese tables provided few luxuries and were in some cases too spare. 'l'ltc British had been unable to meet all requirements, hut the most essential cOIIll)ar supplies and equipment had been provided. \Vithi U.S.

aid, the army 'as completely equipped by the middle of 1948.

Thereafter, procurement was designed to keep it so e(1llippe(l and supplied and to meet the requirements caused by increases in the forces oi' in their allowances. Supply shortages pi'oltlly never seriously affected the colnl)at efficiency of the a tiny. If so, it was ut any case fully equipped and supplied accor(liIIg to the accepted standards by the middle of 1948. Thereafter there were no sig
iiilicanc shortages.

## V.

Air 01)cIatiolls against the gucrrillas wcrc of two general types.

1 he Ii rst consisted of air operations aimed at "isolation of thc l):IttlCliCld." 1-lowever, all Greece was a hattlefiekl and the objec
iicc of such operations wa simply the tlcsttuction of guerrilla forces. Fhc second type of air action was direct support of ground

troops.
  Three tcchm(1ues w'ere employed in conducting the Iirst type
of o,)crations. First, there 'cre preplanncd strikes on targets
located in ad'ance by ground intelligence 01. by aerial photog_
raphy.
        Ihe second, armed reconnaissance, was normally con-
ducted only when information indicated the probability
                                                                    of
tiuiding a profitable target, as when a large enemy formation was
known to be on the march in a given locality. The third tech
niquc, and the one most commonly employed, was to locate
targets by the employment of reconnaissance aircraft. These
reitiiined on station until the arrival of strike aircraft to guide
thetim onto the target.
  A high percentage of the total air effort went into attacks of
this type. They were delivered against troops on the march, in
bivouac, or in concentrations for attack or defense. They were
delivered against bandit headquarters, l)anditheld towns, supply
installations, and defensive positions. They tended to restrict day-
light immovement of guerrillas. They harassed his concentrations
and punished his forces during withdrawal from action. The only
limiting factois to this independent air campaign were the avail-
ability of pilots, suitable aircraft, and the difliculty of target
ideuit ification. These operations
                                     wcie L)cing conducted over

( reecc, not hostile territory, and everything that moved could
not be attacked. Occasionally, too, army units and harmless
iiouicouiibatants were attacked, but the nuiiiber of legitimate tar
gets was great, and a nnich greater effort in the air to locate and
attack such targets would still have paid dividends.
    I )ircct support took many forms. It included comimiand liaison,
tactical reconnaissance, air observation, air spot for
                                                                                                       artillery,
aerial photography, aerial resupply, the dropping of propaganda

leaflets, and the attack of targets in Conjunction vith the ground forces. Tlic last naind was, of course, the Iliost II o1)ortant. The importance (If direct air sIt)port was cnhi;iiiccd by the hililiteti allocation (if artillery and mortars, by the nature of the terrain, which oftcn prevented the cinphynient of artillery, and by he fact that the bandits did not stand their ground, hut sought to withdraw from actioi by movement. The provision of iliouutain artillery improved fire support in mountain pcrat ions, mit there jersistecl in Greece a iced for "flying artillery" such as scldoiii has been experienced elsewhere. Given properly traine(l pilots, suitable aircraft, airground coordination, and communications, time opportunities for 1)rofirahhe employment of aircraft in direct support wotild have been myriad.

Flie record of Royal 1-Icllenic Air lorce operations during the war leads to the conclusion that the return from-n time air effort immitneasurably exceedeil the return from any comparable effort on the ground. Its manpower cost ranged froimi a IiliniIlltmn) of
5,000 to a maximum of 7,500, as compared to a imminimum of 120,
000 and a maximumim of 150,000 in regular ariimy units alone.

Moreover, casualties sustained in the air were infinitesimal as compared with those sustained on the ground.

The financial cost of air operations in Greece cannot be regarded as representative of the cost of such operations generally, since lowcost surplus aircraft and equipment were employed.

'Thereby, the cost of air operations was only a fraction of the cost of ground operations, probably less than 10 per cent.

The commando groups Imad been organized asantiguerrilla forces. They were employed, however, in actions that scarcely
,tistiied rime maintenance of special units. The British Military Mission advocated that they be reorganized as pursuit forces to range widely and rapidly through the nlommntaiiiolms country in pursuit of the elusive guerrilla. They were to be air supported, air supplied, and, insofar as practicable, airborne and air transported.

The union of the capabilities of tactical air with those of the raiding forces would have multiplied their effectiveness. Such a union might well have produced the most effective synthesis of fur conducting nearly all phases of the antigucrrilla war, the delibcratc attack of fortiticd areas.

lucre was a significant failure to visualize the 1)ossibihtscs that l:i' iii fuller exploitation of the grcatest weakness of thc gucrrilla
his lack of air capability and any positive means to combat it.

Faulty techniques were en(lured because of this failure as were also poor maintenance, the continued use of aircraft of limited suitability, and all the other factors that robbed Greece of a full return on its investment in the air. It was this failure, too, which prevented the allocation to the air of a greater portion of the total eflu it.

lucre was no war at sea during the guerrilla uprising. How
CVC1, 11) corrcspoitding nuiiiber of iiicn contributed more to the tilt illiate victory than those of the Royal Hellenic Navy. Its role was not a dramatic one. On an average of about four times a week, ships were called upon to deliver gunfire ashore to assist iii i lie defense of a l)eleaguered coastal village or to support an aruiiv unit operating iiear the coast. Ofttinies guerrillas would steal r Capt u ic a caique, and it would be necessary for the navy to in pursuit of it. Soiiictiiiics a naval landing patty would be put ashore to investigate reported guerrilla activitity. Frequently, aritty raiding parties were embarked and landed to make such searches or to iiiakc ancillary landings in conjunction with larger perations ashiorc. On one occasion, the navy was called upon to participate in a large_scale amphibious landing. The day_to_day
(liltics of the RUN were the patrolling of Greek waters and the
1iiovision of sea transport for the movement of troops and supplies. Thus the navy nlaintaine(l control of the seas surrounding
( rcecc, denying those waters to the guerrillas. By providing sea I iaiispoii, it assisted iii the full exploitation of the advantages that accrued I
the government through its continand of the sea.

It uttay be said that the factor of comniand of the sea has been assigned too much importance, since the guerrillas had no naval capability. True, but it was because that ca1)ability was denied lwuii by the navy. Save for the navy, the guerrillas could have gained and exercised a limited control of the sea lanes. That they could get possession of any of the hundreds of caIques which p1' the waters surrounding Greece was often (lemonstrated. Ilad they been able to Opei.rtc those vessels, the course of the war would have t)een very different. lnstanccs of attellrpts to usc vessels from Albania for supply purposes occurred in t lie Pelopon_
nesus in Scptenrber, 19-Ut. 1-lad there been no restraining inlltieiice in the form of a Greek Navy, it is even possible t hat rrjired vessels might have found their way into gucri-illa hands.

l.'atrolling wrs carried out to. enforce shipping and sailing regu
lations, and suspicious vessels were taken into custody for investigation.

Sonic of the specific objectives of patrolling directed against the guerrillas were: (1) preventing escape, (2) pI-cverrring rein
forceineirt, (3) preventing resupply, (4) preventing ieitl festation of rleaicd areas, (5) istlating guerrilla concentrations, (6) keeping tire Conrimiunist vii IrS from spreading to areas that had not been afFected previously, by preventing tire nroveilreirt of agents and organizers, and (7) guarding the islands around ( reece on w'hich prisoners of war were interned.

( )n tire political, psychological, and economic In >nts, lactors that coiltnl)uted to tire defeat of tire guerrillas were:
7'he !?'ritish and U.S. programs of aid to Greece. 1Irc presence of British troops in Greece at the onset of guerrilla operations exercised a restraining influence on the U.S.S.R. and tIre satellites,
1)reveirtiirg direct intervention in Greece aird (peii :rid to tIre guerrillas. U.S. participation strengthened tins restraining iirflu
etice. The British and American aid programs sustained tire got'
ernmneirt of C reecc and en:rl)?ed it to nrobilize, equip, :iird StIpl)ly large irrilitary forces, ilriIe at tire sanre time staving off tire collapse (if tire national econonly.

Airmem-icair interest, irmorcovcr, tended to till tire vacoimmrm when tire U.K. alone could no longer provide support oir tire req ui red scale. American assisturce 'as provided on suclr a scale as to improve the morale (if the Greek nation by giving it mope that pence might be restored and that a degree of econoiinic stal)ility urright once again be achieved.

The TitoCominform rift. Yugoslavia held a pivotal geograplni
cal position among the three satellite countries along Greece's nortirern frontier. Yugoslav Conrmunism quite naturally, tlrerc
lure, had takei the lead in the Coininformdircctcd aggression against Greece. The litoComiuforin rift brokc down the mecha
siisiii established to provide support to the guerrillas and resulted in a division within the Icaderslup of the guerrillas. Although this division was resolvcd in favor of the Conunforni, the rift tended to deprive the guerrilla nioveilient of the conviction of imme
diate pirposcfu1ness. Moreover, the cstnblishmcnt of a new mccli
:mistn for providing assistance to the guerrillas t'ns scarcely prncticallc, owing to the key geographical position of Yugoslavia.

1 he (till implications of the htoCumnin Ioriii rift were not felt uImuhIc(liatcly, but were experienced progressively from the fall of
1948 until July, 1949, at which time the GreekYugoslav border was closed by order of Tito.

Ihe TitoCominform rift was, to sonic extent, a product of lritish and American aid to Greece. Had Tito felt that the guer
uillas could win in Greece with attendant encirclement of Yugoslavia by Communist governments, it is doubtful that he would lI:lvc had the courage to stand his ground in the (lispute with the
( oinin(orm. Thus the i'itoConiin form rift which aided Greece in the antibandit war 'as itself, to a certain etciit, a byproduct of llritish and American aid, partictilarly the latter.

On the military front, factors contrilniting to the defeat of tlic guerrillas were:
The appoii,tn,ent of (it'neral I'apac'os as Commander ii, Chief of ihe got'eri?iif forces. The appointlllcnt of (c,icral l'apagos resulted in the fuller development of the combat ))otcntial of the
( ; reck A mined Forces. By the relief and dis,iiiss:il of unsuitable iandc rs a ml I v CI 111)1 iasiring c( ii it in m us, aggressive offensive
(,1)Cr:lti(,11S against the guerrillas, General Papagos tiscd the exist
ilig mimilitary forces inure effectively. There 'as no increase in lie numerical strength of the a ruied forces during his tenure. It was siuIIply that the forces, as they cisted, were used more effectively. Continuous pressure kept the guerrillas on the move, inflicted heavy casualties, and afforded them 110 OpportUnity to resupply or rcplacc casualties. Thus, their relative cotiibat power gradually declined during the sixmimontli period that preceded their final collapse.

The Papagos appointment brought thc planning and idvisot function of the U.S. and British Military Missions into their own as factors contributing to the victory.

The TitoConthiform rift. The TitoCoiiiinmnrii, rift icdiiccd the amount, of military aid available to the gtieri'illas. fly j anita iv,
1949, supplies furnished through Yugoslavia had fallcn off to a mere trickle. There arc. indications that smallarms and art ilkm ammunition may have gone into short supply 1rior to the final collapse of the guerrilla operations. The final blow to the gtmer_
rillas as a result of this rift was the closing of the Greck-Yugoslav frontier iq July, 1949. This deprived the guerrillas of the efFective use of approxiniatcly 30 per cent of their fighters and denied thciii the use of the regions north of the frontier as a protected timancu
vcr area. Supply shortages aid manpower losses resulting li-nm the Titoominforni rift may justify its identification is the proxi ate euse of the guerrilla collapse.

The partil abandonment of guerrilla tactics by the Democratic Army. The tendency of the Denmocratic A rmm,v during I 91R iid
1949 toward a military strategy that depended In,-
it's success upon the organization of larger formiiatinns anti the cmi iployimietit of orthodox military tactics implied a growing icliamice im,nmi military force alone. Under the existing conditions, aiiy such development plavc(l i,ito time hands of the gocr;imimcnt forces. The guerrillas were opposing weakness to strength. The decisive defeat of the guerrillas was made possible by their departure from proper guerrilla organization and tactics in their effort to defend the base areas along t lie northern frontier and the gal bering of their onetime siii;iIl hands into larger Iorimi:itinmis ranging iii size UI) to the division.

## Iii Winning In Tfie Jungle Malaya

Vic-roRy IN I\'IALAYA
Lieutenant Colonel Rowland S. N. Mans, MBF
"Never in the history of warfare have so few been chased so much by so many" might well sum up the completely successful British antilerrorist campaign in Malaya. But the jungle is the great equalizer, and aS usually happens, coiiibat caine down to niantoiiiat i in the infantry, in what at times was an almost uticroscopec war.

I Jcutcn:iit Colonel Mans fought that war agaii)st the terrorists, the Iccehie., and time jungle from 1953 to 1956. lIe was a rifle
culilpany oiniimantkr of the First Battalion of the Queen's Royal Regiment, for inure than a ycarj later, he served on the I lead
quarters Stall of the famed Seventeenth ( ; url ha I )i VS 'ii. Froit that experience, he presents here two pictures:
the highlevel overview of deploying units, and the smallunit view of imithivititial men at war. There arc lessons in each. It imist be understood hat these are I ieutenant Coli mel Mans's o'n opinions and in no way should be construed as representing his govci-nimlcimt's views.

## Victory In Malaya Lieutenant Colonel R0Wlani S. N. Mans

The emphasis being placed on guerrilla watfarc at the present
time by the armed forces of the United States h:is StiiIIulatC(l
considerable study of antiguerrilla campaigns fmiglfl Ill
                                                       ICCCI1t
timcs. Prominent among these is the war waged by the lliii isli
against the Communist terrorists in Malaya. It has beeii suggested
that the tactics employed in Malaya might he ccpially successful
in South Vietnam. Therefore, an examination of how and why
the Reds were defeated in Malaya may be of 'aIuc in p1''"g
similar operations in the future.
  The Communist I11c)vement began in Malaya as far hack as
1924, when agents of the Chinese Marxists arrived in the country
with the express intention of luring great numbers of Ovcrscas
Chinese into the Party. Some initial succcss was achieved with
two Chinese Eaces in particular, the Hnkkas auul the llailaimns; time
latter, although they had a monopoly of ccrt miii t jades iii Malaya,
such as running eating places and grocery stores, wcrc not umuch
esteemed by their fcllov.' Chinese. he 1-Jailaimiis, however, did
constitute the bulk of the domestic servants, especially in Euro-
pean households, and it is interesting that iiiany of those who,
prior to 1942, had served senior officials and merchants, later
became leaders of the terrorist movement.
  With the Malays, the communists had little success. This cour-
teous, easygoing people found nothing attractive in an ideology
that made hard work and sacrifice its basic precepts. The inabilIty
to win Malay support was to be a continual stumimhhimig block to
the Communists in the years ahead.
 In the late 1920's and the 1930's, the Commmmimiists in Mal:iya

and Singapore, with the help of their Soviet and Chinese masters, gradually consolidited their position. The familiar pattern of infiltration into trade unions, encouragement of labor disputes, aIl(I the distribution of seditious literature L)ecamc increasingly a1palent. In 1936, the Party promoted a series of strikes in Malaya. At Batti A rang, the country's only coal iiiine, 6,000
uCFS seized thc property, and it re1uired a sizable military peration to bring matters under control.

At the outbreak of World War II, the strength of the Malayan Coititliunist larty 'as 37,000, half of which was in Singapore.

At Ii rst, in common with their comrades in Britain and France, they did their best to disrupt the British war effort. It was not until Ccrnwny attacked Russia, in June, 1941, that they decided to cooperate with the government. However, even then, the policy was one of convenience only, and they stressed their deter
ii liflatl()n to expel the British from Malaya as Soon as practical)Ie.

Cooperation meant that selected Party members w'ere trained at No. 101 Special Training School in Singapore, w'hicli had been set up early in 1941 by the British A riny to give instruction to hot h soldiers and civilians in irregular warfare against the time when Japan iiiight enter the war. About 200 members of the A I ilayai Coin,iiunist Party (MCI') went through the school, and I cr wccn the fall of Si nga pore, in Fcbria iy, 1943, an(l May, 1943, licii the British regained contact wit Ii antiJapanese guerrillas in Ala laya, these trainees foriiied the hard core of the Malayan Peoples AntiJapanese Army (MPAJA), the military side of the AICP resistance moveiiient. Starring in l)eceniber, 1943, British assistance in the form of liaison teams, arms, food, and e]uipment was intensiticd, until by \'J I)ay, there were more than 4,000
active guerrillas under British command. At the same rime, how
ever, tInlcuu)wn to the British, there was another clandestine group of siiiilar strength whose mission was to form the hard core of nltigovcrnhllent guerrilla forces when a terrorist campaign 'as l;i no cl ed
\Vlicii the Al PAJA was disbanded in 1)cccunber, 1945, many of its nicuiibcrs responded to the call to hand in arms and aniiiiuni
tioli, hut large caches of these were hidden in the jungle for use later. I)uring 1946 and 1947, there was nmch internal dissension in the MCP. This centered around the controversial figure of
!Mi Tak, then the Secretary General. An Aniiaiiiite like Ho Chi Minh, with whom he met often in the 1930's, I .ni Talc had for some time been suspected of doublecrossing the Party. In Mardi,
1947, when he was due to he interrogated by the Central Coitimit
tee, he ainicipard events and decamped with all t hc funds, lie has never been seen :,incc.

The lacic of cohesion in MCP policy iii the years inimiicdiatcly following the war, coupled with the rciiia rkablc recovery of Malaya during his period, made it obvious to the M( 1 that it could achieve its aim of a People's Republic only by irined Coil
flict. The MCP was encouraged in these views at the Riissiuii
sponsored lileetitig of Asian and Australian Coiiiitinists held ii Calcutta in February, 1918. In March of that yeal, t lie decisinii to embark on a terror campaign was made, and by .1 titic, a usi in and murder were widcsprca(1. On June 18, the \l alayall ( ovcrn
miicnt proclaimed a state of emergency, and one of the first "hot"
wars of the Cold War had begun.

The MCP was well prepared for battle. It had 1)Ianiied its political and iiiilitary chain of coiiiinand sonic years before, iii the wailing days of the Japanese var. The jungle orgaili/.atioii nuilIl)cred about 10,000, although accurate figures were u111)ossihle to compile. The overwhelming majority were Chinese \vUll only a few Maliys ai d Indians, thus belying froni the si art the T\ICP's claim to be an ''allMalayan'' moveiiic,it. lii addition to i lie force in the jungle, a much greater number of synipat hizers reiiiaiiied in the towns and villages. Confident of a quick victory, the MCP
started its shooting war.

The terrorist organization had a considerable influence oh British dcployiiient during the callipaign. Overall policy was evolved and directed by a Central Coiiiiuittee of twelve iiieinbcrs headed by the new Secretary General, Chin Peiig. Spencer Chap
miian, the wartime guerrilla leader, in his honk The Jungle Is Neutral describesChin Peng as ''Britain's iiiost trusted guerrilla." He very soon hecaiiie Aialaya's iiiost wanted terrorist. l)ircctives froni the Ccntral Coiiiinittcc vcnt to the Noit Ii and Sotithi Ma
layan Bureaus, these in turn passed instructions to the State Committees, and it was at this level that tactical operations were planncd. The Statc organization was founded on the political ftaincwork of the ['ederation: nine states each with a ruling sultan and a statc government, and the two Britishadnunistered settlements of Malacca and Pcnang. J'hc chain of command from time State Coimuttirtecs went through J)istrict Committees to Branch Committees. l'hc I )istrict and Branch Committees had the task 1)1 kceptng in
(laytoday touch with the Mm Vuen, or
\I asses' ? lovcnicnt, as it is known in Communist China. 'Fhe M in
\'uemi was a vast network supplying the terrorists with food, C k)ti ii hg, and ml medical supplies, as well mv ulmg ti win with a fi istclass intelligence system. 1 'he exact nummiher of willing, and unwilling, members of this organization will never b known, in his hook Menace in Malaya, Ilarry Miller made a conservative cs immiate of 500,000.

I 'iaison between the terrorists in the ungte
:itmti lie l in Yticu was tmiaiiit aimmed by ''Masses' lxccuti yes,'' who t'arricd oil their everyday business iii towns and villages while mci imig as undercover men for the l)istrict Committees. in this way, propaganda could he fed into these communities while, at tIme sante time, tIme inure material means of existence could be simiuggled out.

Initially, the MCP tried to keep its political and military organi
zatioims sepamate. Political direction was to be passed clown the
('Utlililit tee chain antI iliilitary tasks carried out by the Malayan Races I iberatiun Arimmy (MRI A ). 11w MRI A began life with a grantliose battle order of regiments but these gradually dwindled to iimtlc1iendemii platoons. iii later (peratiomms, time M RI A was often assisted by Arimmed \'Voik Forces who were their link virh time A I in \'uen. As the British gained the initiative in the jungle war, the A I (1, like iimany siimmilar movements before and since, found it 111m1)ractical)lc to divorce the political from the military amid con
sc4)ucnm ly the two structures quickly intermingled. Quite often St ate Conmnmittee nmemmmbers were a Iso regimental coimmmanders.

I hits fusion became ii lute pronounced as the terrorists' strength WtS ietliicetl.

( )tm t lie go'cummmment side, the daytoday adimmmnistr;mtion it this till IC was based mm the state governimments, which were largely run by Malay officials with British advisers. ilme state sultans and their guverntmmetits bad a mitcasure of autonomimy, but in the final analysis, they verc responsible to the British High Coinitiissioncr in Kuala Lunipur.

Initially, the L)urdci of the emergency fell upon the shun Iders of (lie Federation Police, This 'as a mixed force of smite 10,000
men of all ranks_couprising Malays, Chinese, and a few Indians
under British officers. They were not organized fur a jungle war in terms of cithei personnel or equipment, l)ut they bore the brunt of the first shocks in an exemplary manner. It was a special squad of Chinese and Malay detectives that gave the Comiiiiunist terrorists (or CT's, as t!ey became universally known) their first setback. On J tily I o, 1)48, this squad, led by a British 1)ullce officer, Bill Stafford, killed I ,an Yew, the commander of rite M RLA.

Much of the credit It ir weathering the stonily days of 1948 and
1949 imist go to the Malayan police.

The army units in Malaya and Singapore were still iii rite i itrocs Of postwar Ieorgaitizttioit. lhte British Gurkita regiiticiits, vliicli wet-c destined to pla a decisive part iii the var, tad vitiy just been reformed after the division of the original Ciirkiia brigade between Britain and India when the latter country was granted its independence. l'urrherntore, although the army set nut to give the iiiaximuni aid to the Federation Government, it always had to keep an eye on the colony of Singapore, where MCP agents were active aitiong rite very large Chinese community.

lit the early days of the war, the CT's had considerable success.

They concentrated on rubber estates and tin litines with the obvious intention ol disrupting Malaya's two i)asic industries.

Their mitain targets were European planters-dud ii laltagers, together with Chinese and Indian overseers. The i\ liii Y ucit gave them uptotheminute in formation on the nlovemlients of their intended victims, and providing the itiurder 'as carried out expeditiously, there w'as little chance that the Security l'orccs would arrive in time. ("Security Forces" was the collective description of all armed aitriguerrilla agencies.)
1he terrorists' task was mitade much easier at this tulle by the presence of a 'em-y large ntiiiilter of Chinese ''squatters'' liviog near the jungle edge. These ''squatters'' were uNtidily the lalnir force for adjacent mines amid estates and therefore ripe ground for Mm Yuen activity. Whether or not the inhabitants wanted to assist them titade little diflercnce to the CT's; alter i few well
chosen murder victims had been dispatched, the rcst of the cotit
tiltitilty Was suflicictitly CoWed to agree to atiy (kilmild, especially IS
lie execution was normally by strangulation with a length of piano wire, for bullets were valuable to the Ci's and not to be vast ed on a few rccalcitrauits of their own racc.

Aunt hcr ,u)ticcal)lc feature of Cl tactics in thc early days of I lie cauiipatgn was a definite tendency to move about in large undies of up to IOU in strength. On the rare occasions when security forces contacted these large gangs, tiuinbcrs of CT's vetc killed. This g'rCgflrious attitude cotitraSte(l sharply with titet buds they adopted later. Many a "Toinniy" or "Johnny
( itrklm'' serving iii Malaya in the rtdddlc 1950's thought wistfully, ill ct minus of fruitless patrolling, of the days vlicui a contact tiie:iult a good scrap with a large gang, itisicad of a (1tuck shot .at sitile fleeing figure.

1 lit-cc major facts hccntiic iippalent at this time. Fiust, that this i is to lie a long and arduous caiipaigtt, tl:ir there was no easy o n I to success. Second, that it con 1(1 in t hc won unless a first
cJ:iss ititclligence urgatli7ation was built up. Third, and iliost ittt1uirtauit, that this was a war the military could not w'in on its ot1; the intricate weli of civil adniinistratioti, pohiec, arully, and civic leaders had to be w'oven into a cohesive whole, capable of Ittlirt inning as a varwinning titachinc.

1 ]iis concc1)t was cx
1tcssed in his usual sticcitiet way by Geticral Sit ( etakl i'ciiiplcr vIicti lie addressed a press conference iii I otnloti soon alter he
''as :ippointcd I ugh Coiiitiiissioticr for Mal:is'a: "I should like it to he clearly itiidcrstood that in Malay:i we tic conducting the c ;t in pa ign iga list Cown 1 no isti t in all fri n its. %Vc a ic fig Ii ti i ig i lot otilv nit the military front, but on the political, social, and ecu
liotttic fronts as 'ctl." It was Sir Gerald's predecessor, Sir E-Ienry iiitiey, tragically killed by a CT aiiilnisli iii ()ctohcr, 1951, who first spoke the words that bccanie the Slogan of the canpaigll in
\I;tl:tv;t: '' Ihis is a wal for the liciitts and titiunls ol the people.''
In I 951), I icuteltant General Sir I larold ltggs was appointed
1 )itcctor of Operations itt Alalaya, alt(l tlthiouglt htc held that tI)In)itlutient for on1y just over eighteen itiotitlis, the plan he conceived (luring that time laid the foundation for uiiial success.

## L'Hc Briggs Plan Had Three Main Aims:

  I. To bring the population, especially the isolated sections,
under effective administration and protection.
                                              I his iIiCltI(IC(l
                                                            I lie
rcscttlcincnt of "squatter" communities.

2. Concurrently to expand the police and localdefense forces.

   3.
         [o establish a unified civilian, police, and ittilit try systelll of
coiiiinand and control for all antiterrorist opel'atioiis.

 The resettlemcht plan involved the transfer of 11101C than hall
a million people, but its worth was underlined by the violent
reaction of the CT's; they used every means to dclay and hinder
its operation. That the Communists in Southeast Asia reali'.e tli
advcrsc effect that rcscttlemcnt can havc on
                                     t heir strategy
                                                 is
highlighted by their dctcriiuned efforts to jilt erlere
                                           wit Ii
                                                lie
Agrovillc scheme in South Vietnam. In August, 1961, the go'erti-
iiicnt (if South Vietnaiti, commenting on the (oIlIIntlnist phiti of
C:lIll)aigIi in their country, stated that front I 5H on subversive
and violent action was cinploycd with the aitit of (lisr(I)tiIig rural
deployment measures and creating Insecurity in the countryside.
 In Malaya, the resettlement of large nunihers of Chinese into
protected villages had a twofold effect. It made the CT's conic to
welldefined areas to collect food and supplies and tItus expose
tliciitsclves to Security Force ambushes; furthcri,iorc, it raised rite
iiioralc of the "new villagers'' by giving theuit better living
                                              coit
ditions. Showing theni the tangible cvidcncc of what deiiiocracy
had to offer was also instrumental In oiling the wheels of the
intelligence mchinc. Contentcd citizens arc
                                     ire hilicly to
operate with the forces of law and order than disc(,;ilentcd ones.
 It was obvious that if Communist attempts to break do'it i lie
rcsettlciiicnt plan werc to be defeated, the new villages iliost have
the titcans to resist attack until reinforcemeiitsarr ived. Ibis iticatit
t considerable expansion of the police force iii order to l)r(!vide
pclullancnt tcsident defense groups. GradualI',
                                     i hici r
                                             ccli
duties were taken over by I lowe Guard units Ioriitcd by the
villagers themselves. As the war against the terrorists piogiessed.
these 1-lowe Guards took a more and iiiorc prolililiellt part iii
offensive operations; there was a good (heal of intervillage rivalry

over the comparative efficiency of their rcspective units. Much of the credit for the performance of the I-Ionic Guards must go to the many army and police units who provided instructors for them.

General I3riggs appreciated that a policy of resettlement and protection of those resettled would not succeed unless the opera
i hmal machinery for prosecuting the war was properly gearcd to take full advantage of the dividends from such a policy. He concluded that war by conimimittee, although k is an anathema to imlost soldiers, was the only sure way of coordinating both planning and operations. He therefore created War Executive Corn
ii;iriccs at state and district levels. lo initiate policy, he set up a \'ar Council, consisting of himself and the separate heads of I lie civil :idmninist ration, police, arimmy, and air ((mmcc. Control at lie highest level was centralized further when General Sir Gerald
1 cmiplcr assumimed time ap1)ointnients of both Iugh Commissioner md I )ircctor of Operations, in February, 1952. tIc amalgamated time Federal Executive Council with the War Council, stating at the time: "There can he but one in.strunient of policy at Federa
ion national I level.''
Iarlv in the calmipaigum, it was decided to orgauii/.c the intelligence agencies around the police rather thami the army. This capitalized on the static nature of police dcploymcmmt, which en:ilmtcs time police to build mp the jut chligence picture in one area a long period. The agency responsible for collecting, collating, and (hisseumminating intelligence was the Special Branch of the Fcdcrntion Police. Special Branch ofliccrs were located at the lederal, state, and district levels. Liaison hmctwccn them and army units working in their areas was carried out imy Military Intelli
cmmcc Officers (MlO's). MlO's worked alongside Special Branch thiccrs in the same 0111cc amid in mmmnnv cases carried out each ii her's (hines in an cmmmcrgcncy. C madu:i liv, m his svstcnm provided in everincreasing flow of information for t lie Security Forces.

As t lie war rngrcsscl, military comnmimimmulers iii Malaya camiie to have mote and mtmore respect and adimmiramion for the work of the Special Branch. Sonic of the most devoted olljccms iii this service were the Chinese inspectors who functioned mostly at district level and thus ran a daily risk of death at the hands of their tcrrorist fellow countrymen.

The build-up of police and local-defense forces under the Briggs Plan enabled the Army to concentrate on offeiisivc tasks.

A sine qua non for the success of such operations x'as that cotilwanders at all levels as well as troops had to know iiltiiiiately the particular area in which they hunted. This was proved time and time again when otherwise efhcieirt units 'erc introduced to a strange sector where they were unfamiliar with the. terrain and the habits of the local CT's. From this fact developed the systelil known as framework deployment.

Framework deployment evolved around he infantry coilipany.

A battalion normally covered a district, wit Ii its coiIIl)antes occupying definite sectors in the district. Sowctiiiies it was siblc to keep one company as a reserve for ttiilorcsccn circtuinstances, but usually districts were so large that reserves could be kept only at higher levels of command. Anyway, the imimpor-.

tant thing was to have the troops on the ground, where they could take immediate advantage of Special Branch inforimiation.

Battalion and brigade commanders still retained sonic inherent flexibility by being able to denude one area of troops tcmimpouarily in order to support another where the Cl's were active.

I low
cvcr, these reinforcements were often a mixed blessing to lie company coniniandcr in situ; although they reuloceul I he intemisit y of patrolling for his own platoons, time Cl's, like rabbits, had a habit of going to ground when too many hunters were nearby.

I believe that higher commanders ijmust resist a tendency to swammip an area where guerrillas are beginping to move around boldly.

The accent should be on normal activity for as long as possilile to tempt them to overplay their hand. In the jungle, the slcdgchiamn_
muer has a habit of missing the nut.

I can best illustrate how framework operations were controlled by drawing upon my own experience asacomimpamuy coimimii:iiidcr in Malaya in 1954.

My company was deployed iii a district of North jolmore, mini in this case, as our battalion covered three dist rids, I rej)rcscmitc(l my commanding officer as the military mimemimlier of t lie local l)istrict War Executive Committee (E)7 EC) - Our commmmnittce was a typical one. The Chairman was the Malay District Officer.

Ihe members consisted of the British Adviser to the District Otflcci, the Senior Police Officer, the District Home Guard Officer, the l)isrrict Information Officer, three local civilians
(one L.ilfl)j)Cii), one Chinese, and one Malay), and myself. The lull coummittec minrimially met once wcekly but the Operations Suhcoumimnittce was often in daily session; i his consisted of the
1 )istt iet Offlccr, the Senior Police Officer, and myself, with others called in if necessary. I insist stress that whereas we planned as
1 C(HHh))itteC, the (laytO(lay conduct of operations was a joint iiiilitarypolice responsibility. We ran a joint operations room miianncd by a mixed team of soldiers and policemen. This was the nerve center of all our work and the control station for our radio conmiUnications to army and police patrols. A patrol requiring clearance to pursue Ci's outside its allotted boundaries would get this by a radio message to the joint operations room. In turn, any patrols operating in the vicinity would he quickly wa?ned of the new dcvchpmimcumt. This was vitally necessary if groups were not to clash with each other in the dense jungle, where one shot first and rj,,estinned a ftcrwarcl.

Most of our work was routine and mundane, to the extent that jungle patrolling can ever qualify for either of those descriptions.

We followed up Special Branch information and we played our own hunches. I'hcre were few spectacular successes, but we kept time terrorists on the move, constantly harrying them and doing all in O(J
poscr to starve them out of the jungle.

The immost successful operations in Malaya were those aimed at denying any (Olin of food supplies to the CT's. They were usually conceived at state level and planned in detail by the ilist net concerned. Such operations went on for a considerable titii, three to four months in many instances.

i'lme decision to strike at a certain area had to be taken in the gmeatcst secrecy for it entailed attacking not only the stomachs of the Cl's hut also those of their potential suppliers in the villages. Rationing was stringently enforced, even to the extent of insisting that all cans should be pierced by their purchasers before leaving a shop to prevent their being put into food dumps
1or terrorists. Iii a fooddenial operation, the innocent suffered with the guilty, but to make exceptions was an invitation t ()
failure.

As their food caches were reduced, the CT's grew nmorc amid more desperate. They took risks that exposed rhciii to Security'
Force retaliation. Information began to flow, and for the a rmuy, life I)CCflI1IC truly hectic. A niliuslics amid patrols werc the iiIcr of the day. 'Flic strain on junior coinmmianilcrs was considerable.

A spoiled anil)usll mimeant not only the Csca1)e of rerror,sts hut great loss of prcstigc in the district. I 'oyal citizens were pmeparcil to undergo ha rdsliip and mica r starvation if they saw the tangible signs of success, mit they were not So cager if time army and the police failed hen the opportunity arose.

I well reimicmber occasion when a careless movement by one tired man caused aim ambush to be sprung prematurely, after twenty_eight days of waiting for a Ci' courier to pass along a track. 'l'lic unforttmuai soldier was not allowed to forger his lapse easily.

Lack of food often forced a CE' to surrender. [Ic would slip away from a gang in which he had spent mmiamiy years and mmmak c his way to the road to give himself up to a assmng planter or the nearest police post. In his book Red Sbadow over Malaya, Brig;i dicr I- lcnnikcr recounts how one CT managed to appear just it the moment that VicePresident Nixon arrived at a village police post during his visit to Malaya in 1953, The VicePresident was assured that not even the British A riny would have tried
"arrange" a sideshow like that!

The mentality of a surrendered terrorist in Malaya was cutious.

Within minutes of giving himself up, he was quite prepared lead Security Fou'ce patrols to his recent hideout amid watch calm ni', while they attacked and killed his erstwhile commirades.

closci'
questione(l one on the subject and he said wit Ii brutal frankness that when one realizes that the Cause has failed, why waste tulle holding inquests? Espouse the winning side as quickly as possible without further recriullinatiomi or regret. This truly evidences in ability to a hamulH)o curtain down over the mind; btmt it also a trait of fatalisili that we should exploit to the mit no ist wi mcii ghting Oriental terrorists.

The full effects (if food denial and the consequent Cl' lnsse by death and surrender were constantly made known to hl(
reinaindcr by the long attn of psyclulogical warfarc. "Loud A hnith" aircraft fitted with powerful loudspeakers, leaflets, and riflhi() 11OatlCaStS were nil used to iiakc certain that those who had cscape(l so far were made fully cognizant of the perils to come and of the very simple altcrnativcsurrcui(ier. On one occasion, I
part in a novel type of (peratioli in which tIme CT's were assured by all available means that there would bc no shooting III a certain arcs for three days in order to allow them to sur
,c,ider without danger. There was munch wagging of heads by_
the pessimists, but we got three surrenders and these were directly responsible for time clinmiuiation of four more Cl's. The troops thought this a very good dividend for three days' rest.

In the latter stages of the campaign, bombing of terrorist camps achieved souume very conspicuous SUCCeSSeS, but it was in the realm
(ii air transport and air stmpp1y that the air force really umiade its uu:uune iii Alalaya.

lIme ability of Royal Air Force and Royal Australian Air Force pilots to drop supplies in the jungle with pinpoint accuracy meant t hat patrols could continue to operate as long as there were ter
morists to follow. Your logistic "tail'' was not a fixed base on the growid but an aircraft that could appear over you at any given time and drop the wherewithal to fight an(l live.

I recall being away
(mm base for about six weeks and receiving air supply
(1IoI)s every fourdays, as regularly as clockwork, with an OcCS
sional ma1, "fix" thrown in by a friendly pilot when was none too sure of our exact location.

'l'lme helicopter was another winning tool in Malaya. It enabled troops to be put down into clearings in the deej, jungle minutes after takeoff from the main base, thereby imnimiensely increasing tactical Ilcxibilky. FJOVCVCr, the C1"s soon grc%' svary of the wlnrlyliirds, 511(1 numerous stratagems had to he evolved in their use. (inc could mm longer try to descend lit emIly on top of a rammu1,, Ioi the CFs licamd the helicopters :i1pio:iching and very qmuickl' dispersed.

1 imercforc, we Jaiukd pal mols sinnuitancously in a widc ring around the suspected area, musing sonic of the patrols to provide "stops'' while a selected assault party mumovcd in. Many
'ariat ions of this drill had to he used if we were to gct the maxi
umiumim value fn)un these invaluable S55's and Whirlwinds. The first question our soldiers asked when briefed for dee1) jiliiglc operation was "\'Vill there be choppers?" The :ihtcriiativc w'as a wearying approach march, lasting probably days, with anything up to fty pounds of ammunition, food, and e(1lliplilcIit to carry.

Properly employed, the helicopter is a battle_winning weapon antiguerrilla warfare.

Success in Malaya did not come casily. It: had to be worked for. Hundreds of urnu hours of patrolling oft cii )ro(lucii1g lint Ii
ing but &ustrationor all might turn on a split_second encounter.

Ihousands of troops had to be indoctrinated in the art of fighting an elusive enemy and at the same time taught t hat living iii the jungle was no mystery of eating roots and driiikiiig out of ham
1)00 but rather the understanding of an unofficial but welltried principle of war.

i'actical drills and patrolling tcclmiqtes were built up gradually from the experiences of many units, especially fiomim those splendid Gurkha I
ttaliohs that spent more yeals in \lalaya thamu anyone else, and yet were still hunting Cl's in 1959 with the same zest as they showed at the beginning (if the emergency.

Their combat experiences, together with those of miiaiiy others, were tested at the Jungle Warfare Training Cctitcr.

Io try to summiiarizc all the ingredients of our SUCCeSS
ill Malaya is extremely difficult, for there were mm1:ITly. Sonic we discovered early; others took miiuch time amid effort to produce.

But I believe the following factors were vital:
1. The evolution of a coordinated intclligiice network.

the existence of an efficient police force was invaluable in this connection, and in countries where thelatter does hot cNist, building one up may have to be the first step in the carilpaign.

2. The heartsandminds campaign to will tile stIj)J)Olt of the people, carried out with enthusiasm by all ranks of the Security lorccs. Etcrc it should be remembered that success breeds success. A battalion that eliminated most of the C l's it iicoimmitcrcd had miiorc influence for good on the local npim hit ol than that had a series of failures.

3. A wellintegrated command system.

A
meal rc1tlircm,iclit under this heading is tact on the part of the iiiilitary comiuiiandcr workuig with the civil authorities. E-Iowcvcr, in the final event, he intist make it plain that he alone coiiunands and issues orders to Ins own soldiers.

4. The need to appreciate that this type of politicomilitary war is a slow business. It took eleven years before Malaya could be officially declared free from thc inenacc of Coiiiniunist terrorism, and even now a small group of hardcore fanatics still remains on the MalayanThai border.

I astlyan(l, in lily view, itiost important_success was due to a vchltriiiied Security lorcc team able to kill and harry their cncmy until he was exhausted. They fought their opponent in the jungle and out of it, and beat him.

## Ii.

With the possibility looming that United States forces may
1111(1 themselves faced with operations in Southeast Asia similar to those the British faced in Malayawith the aid of Curkhas, Ma lays, Fi j ia i is, and A Inca usit ii lay I )C
) I Va hi c t'
1)iSS Oil S( 111 ic of the fruits of our experience.

As a J)reninlile to any discussion of inuumr tactics against guerrillas, I iiiust c1111)hasize my belief that troops should never be introduced ''cold'' to such operations. A carefully coordinated training progialli, preferably carried out in a comparatively safe area within the country in which they are going to fight, enables them to learn their trade in time right locale and at the same time tiecomime thoroughly acclimatized.

lii Malaya, :ill iimcoiiming units were initiated into amitiguerrilla tactics at time l"ai l'ast 1 raining Cciitct iii Southern juhmorc. 'l'lic experience of immy own battalion was typical. Our unit advance party, consisting of all the riflecompany commanders and a selection of l)hatoomm commanders and noncommissioned officers, was put through a month's intensive course at the Center, cul
liminatiug in a strenuous threeday patrol. I 'he training area was usually free of Cl's, hut the few 'huo occasionally intrutled injected just enough spice into the proceedings to keep everyone on his toes. Our predecessors had iii fact killed a GT on their final training patrol, thus registering their first success in Malaya
'hi Ic the ma in body If the battalion was still (Ill I c I hg II seas!

i'hc cud of advanec_party training was tuned to coincide with tile arrival of the rest of the unit. The coiiipany coiiiinandcrs, with their trained assistant instructors) theti put their men through tile samc training program as they t11CIIISCIVCS had just completed.

i)uring tills time, our conlinanding officer, with his intelligence officer and other headquarters staff, made periodic VisitS (0 tue unit we were due to relieve. lhcrcfore, by tue time tue battalion moved upcountry to its operational aica, :111 ranks were accliiiiatized and had received an elementary but nevertheless essential introduction to antiguerrilla tactics. ihe polish to the rough article was ap1)hied later. At the same time, key personnel had had the Opporttinity to meet the civilian administratorsand police OfflCCrS with WhOITI they would soon be working; they were also ill a position to brief coiiipany and platooll COllilhl:hll(lerS oh such nlatters as tile terrain in the new area and the habits of local CT's.

lo many, this lengthy preparation may seem an overleisurely approach to war in this modern age. However, in tills kind of warfare, a unit's initial siiowing has a profohmild efFect, for good or bad, on the enemy's morale. liie better tile preparation, the more chance there is of getting tile team away to a flying start.

I'urthcrnmore, an early success can have a sharp effect on a wavering local population. !t may well coax iii forlhlatioll froiii a loyal but ilitllerto frightened civilian; and information is the life blood of the antiguerrilla system, for it leads to that most profitable form of operationthe ahllI)USil.

By far the most successful and, in terms of effort, the easiest way to ClilIlinatC CT's was with a wellplanned amhhi)husIl. For this reason, its planning ami(l execution deserve detailed study.

Ihe first essential ill tile planning of an ambush i'as ilIforhila
tion. This was usually supplied by the Special Brancll of the lederation Police, It might take the forum of a very carefully compiled dossier Oil I lie inoveiiients atld hal)its of certain local terrorists over a period of iimomitlis, indicating i rcmldez'ous for :1
food lift or a meeting at a specified date and mimiie. Alternatively, it could l)e information of doubtful reiiability brought in by an informer in need of cash. Whatever tile source, actu)n ilad to he taken and taken fast. In Malaya, many false trails w'erc followed and a large number of hours spent in great discomfort before one met 'ith success.

Once the information was received, the next and iiiost difficult tasic was the reconnaissance of the likely area. Overt inspection usually invited failure; die mere presence of an officer in uniform in rubber field or jicar the wire fence of a protected village was sufficient to warn all rubber tappers and other nearby workers that an ambush was in the offing. The word was cjuickly passed to the local Masses' Executive, and the proposed food lift or meeting with die terrorists was canceled. Various stratagems had to be adopted to defeat the curious in these circumstances. A
brother officer in my battalion, dressed in civilian clothes and carrying a theodolite, once posed as a surveyor of the Public Works I)epartmnent in order to reconnoiter a difficult ambush site. On another occasion,
1 had an awkward halfhour in the role of the representative of a company that sold a latex_growth stimulant. While a planter friend kept the Chinese overseer in conversation, I took a surreptitious look around, under the guise
(if carrying our a seemingly detailed inspection of the nearby rubber trees. Where even serious playactmg was too risky, we liati to rely on estate maps, aerial photographswhere the jungle canopy permitted theseand, in the final event, local knowledge.

We built up our records of local topography by insisting that every patrol commander write a brief report of his patrol in the Conpany Patrol Log upon his return and, where possible, include rough sketches of the terrain. In this way, we established a good picture of our operational area. When information was "hot"
and had to be acted upon immediately, our local knowledge was often the only guide to planning the ambush location.

After reconnaissance, the next step was to dcterniine which kind of ambush would ie most suitable. Generally this decision was influenced by three main factors: the type of target, the nature of the terrain, and the time of (lay, or night, when the trap was likely to be sprung.

The target could usually be classified in one of two broad categories: an individual or a small group of terrorists coming to a meeting, or, alternatively, a much larger body moving in from the jungle to take a food lift from a protected village. Whereas the siiahl group would probably be handled bcsr by a few picked iiiarks,iicu, a larger gang ncccsitated the deployment Of 1 iiiuch bigger force in what was known as an area aliil)ush. Because iuforiiiat-ion on the exact number of CT's likely to be involved
'as often very sketchy, the area iuimlnishc was the layout nominally eniployed.

The area ambush consisted of a number of stiiall groups of two or thrc men deployc(1 Sc) as to cover all possil)le avenues oi escape from the actual CT rendezvous. in thick j tingle, these escape routes were limited to paths or game trails, but iii a well
kept rubber estate, where the undergrowth was cut short between the lines of trees, considerable ingenuity was required in trying to predict which (hirection the fleeing Cl's would take when lire was opened.

When CT's were suspected of movemitent into cultivated areas bordering on the jungle, a modification of the area misetliod was posSible. This took the form of laying the ainLmsli from the jungle side, looking into the clearing (H plantation. HOweVer, this type of plan was suitable only for daylight operations.

Most food lifts took place at night, and the sitc was nearly always somewhere in the wire perimeter of a protected village.

lii these cases, the customary proccduic was for the ambush party to leave caiiip after the e'cnirigcurfew hour. The men would iiiovc straight into tlicir prearranged p ,situ)ns and remain there until the C1"s caine. if the mission was abortive, they returneti to camp before the curfe' was lifted, at dawn. In the latter event, care would be taken to obliterate signs of the occupation against the possil)ility of having to return to the same spot on several successive nights.

'Vhen the in formation indicated the possibility of a daylight
;iiiilnmsli near the jungle edge, the troops would move Out ostensibly in another (lurcction, as if proceeding on a routine patrol.

Once in the forcst, the force moved to an area between 500 and
1,000 yards froni the jungle edge and establishctl a tcnij)oriiry base. Froni here, the comimimiander made a careful and covert reconnaissance, taking care to avoid being seen by rubber tappers or cultivators. Once individual positions had been selected, the Ii 1st group for duty moved forva rd and occupied thcni as silently
:15 R)SSiI)lc.

III these circ%tmilst:liiccs, it was always :itlvisable to statinil iii the rear of mIme aiiibmuslm party a group whose task it was to look back into the jungle. Cl's had :111 (1(1(1 habit (if proachiiig froni unexpected directions.

1 lie strain of rclllaining constantly alert in the hot, htiiiid climiiate of the jungle is coiisitlerahmle, and this was often accent
tmatcd by the proximimity of local workers. If they suspected an
:11111 nushi, Coi liii Itmnist 5)' mu1iatimizers would suddcn ly I)CcomilC till
usually clumsy and drop their latex buckets with as much clangor as possible. This was a wellknown signal indicating that Security i'o,ccs were in the vicinity, to sustain splitsecond reactions by lie men, tile anihmsh party had to lie relieved fairly freuently;
jit immy conipany, we usually w'orked on the principle (if two hours
(in :iiitl four hours off. Reliefs would coiiie forward froni the jungle base camp, moving silently, having left all their heavy c1uiplllent behind. This kind of ambush could be iiiaintained for up to four
(tl five days, providing sufhciciit rations IRk! been brought in ti c first instance. The same net hod was used when it was uspcct ed that C' l's might return (1) one of didr camps subsequently discovered by us. Onc such antlitish wis iiiountcd by a I)latOOn of out' battalion for ten days. On the tenth day, C'i"s did in fact return to the Camp, and just 'when the platoon coiiiiander was waiting for thent to coitte within poitithilatik range, an ovcranxioiis SOl(iiCi' 01)CnCd file 1)tCttilttttcly
:111(1 the gang escaped. In the Rritisli A rlily, we have a saying that, cx
pressc(l in polite terms, states that there is an idiot iii cvei'y SeC
ruin. lii atitigtternhla operations, it iS itty CX1)CliC11CC that lie usually apicars when he is least wclcoiiic. VVe tiied to weed (Hit's mit iii training but the 0(1(1 one escaped the net in this case.

Any form of ambush, whether it was a special job for a small gl'ottp of picked iiiarksmen or an area a flair involving the 1)1St part of a company, merited very careful rehearsal, We would fii'st try to find a piece of ground neal' the Cilih) t liar reseitthiled
:is fai as possible the actual ambush site.

( ;t'0111)S WOtih(l I lieu h)C
1)osit ioncd to work out arcs of fire. If this 1)roce(Iu ic was not feasible, the jihan would he studied frotut a lmlt,li sand uilo(Iel quickly coitsi tucted in the camp area. When to open uire was always a ti'ich' l)toI)le1fl lot' iiibtisht comnmitatideus, and gitidatiec could be giv it on this during rehearsals by having other mciii
bets the c*tuuJ):tliy siuiutihate the u1i1iuoachi of a (1' g:ttug coining froiti a nttnul,ci' if (hiffei'elit dii'ectioiis, thus giving the titilnisht party an Pl .urtunity to gauge both distance and size of targets.

If timite perittitted, this drill wa also gone tlitouigli at night. Night illuiiiinating devices were also tested. llltotuglt()ut itty tulle iii Malaya, we weuc constantly experintel iii iig w itlu electrical h'
(lCt(IllItC&l flat-cs to give uts pueciotis light ti thiC Ittoliteilt the tilt
bush was sprung. Nowadays, portable initated devices would lie invaluable for this purpose. The Claymtiorcrype weapon would also appear to have a (lcfiriite place in 1)0th he night and day types of ambush.

lii out' reltcit'sals, we also paid \'ery cuteful at tent ion to tic drill for placing the mcii in ambush. It 'as our title thtut after the comuiman(Iet' gave a pream'i'angcd signal that all 1)ositiOtiS hitil beeti occupied, anyone moving in front of t hiese positions vouthd he shut. Similarly, the standdown procedure had to bc rchcarscd and all signals completely LIfl(lCrStOOd. We also pmcticed a drill for examining the sccnc of an atnl)ush 00CC It had lieeii sprung.

I his involved the commander's dctailing a group as,i search party.

On his order, they would come forward to chcck dead afl(l wounded C1"s. ihe rest of the ambush party votmld cover them in this task.

Lastly, and most important of all, weapons had to be thor
ouglily tested for accuracy. This was done on thc jungle range that a company either inherited or constructed. The jungle range was an improvised but very useful ancillary to every camp. it usually aE)out 2030 yards in length, w'ith a sandbagged l)utt.

i'argcts could be silhouettes representing CT's fixed in a stationary position or moving on an extciiiporized pulley system.

'ea1mns were tested here from positions identical with those norimially found in amnlnmshcs, i.e., around trees, over logs, and
1)ok ing through jungle undergrowth. This Was also the tiiiic to ensure that weaions were functioning correctly'.

A Iter the rehearsal, all that remained w'as the final check. This had to be mnctictilims. Any c9ui1mient that rattled liu,l to ie rc
mimoved or fixed with adhesive tape, hair cream was washed off as this could be smelled by the CT's, and black greasepaint was applied to all exposed parts of the body. Ollicers then inspected oimcc:igain for those simiall bitt telling details that so often IIieliit m lie ililferemice between success amid failure.

I)cscribing these amid
)t her preparations that his battalion miiade before au aiiiiusli, the late Richard
? hems, in his book Shoot to Kill, summarizes them as loliows:
''Overclaborate preparations for such a miserable emieuimy? Not oui your life. A fter living for so long like hunted
.iuiiuimals the terrorists had acquired an instinct for danger and a
51)Ccd of reaction to it which were little short of the uncanny.

:\ t t lie slightest hint of trouble tile).' were off_slipping and twist iumg through the undergrowth like some unearthly djinns.''
11115 p lepa red, the a miii ush pa try woo Id I nove out. The troops appreciated that t lie chances of success hung on a slender thread;
lic' knew that if they 'erc unsuccessful, inure information wu timId have to be sought, and even if they killed or captured C 1 's, a followup would prolmalmly result, in both cases, they would be face.! with the more formidable kind of antigucrrilla OpCri1tion_jUn Ic patrolling.

Whereas the ambush on information WaS a comparatively CtIS)'
method of cutt mating those CT's such as I)istrict and Hianch Committee m t nbems, who habitually worked near protected villages and est .ites, the hard core of the movement, such as the State Comumiti ces and Independent Platoons, seldom ventured OUt of their d ep jungle hideouts. It was therefore necessary to go in and find them, and this required a sound knowledge by all ranks of the am of jungle patrolling.

I think I cat L)est illustrate the various foimns of patrolling we adopted by dt scribing one operation in which I was involved that was long enough for us to try out immost of mu patrolling techniques.

In A pril, 19 4, I was ordered to take a reinforced coiitjtittiy of sonic four phum ons into the Tasek Hera area of Pahamig in central Malaya to seat :11 for and eliminate a wellknown C I leader who was believed have come up from Johorc. i'lie l'asek Hera is actually a set cs of lakes enclosed by vast tracts of swamiiiw l)cltml(ar jungle. Belukar was not a storyhook forest wit It towering trees under a I ugh canopy of vines and creepers, mit a contimimmotms vall of dense swampy undergrowth with cunningly concealed waitahit thorns that seemed fiendishly Itummian in their efforts to delay on I
Our ittain jungle base for this operation \t:ISI M:ila'amt police fort established a few months before as part of the plait to 'cait aborigine people of this region away front the terrorists.

lltcse socalled forts were really a collection of l)aiull)oo litmus stmrrotmitmleml by a I)arl)c(l wire fence, but they had the priceless asset of an airstl11) for hght aircraft. On this occasion, I ittade misc of tlti boon by feri ylmig in one platoon in Pionec aircraft, each of vluicIi carrie I four fully Cquippe(l soldiers, while I took the me--
mauling three platoons in by march route lasting two mlays.

We had little or ill) information except that our target was
"somitewlieic m the Tasek Hera area.'' This covered about Ho i1l)
s(1utires, each al)out 1,000 yards square. Therefore I had to divide up the area among my platoons and start a systematic search of each map square. I kept one platoon under lit)' hand at the fort uid dispatched the othcr three to look for the needle in rhc hay
stack.

1 lie first task of cach platoon was to IiiOVC out to its allotted area and cstal)lIsh a jungle base caiii1. This would be the nodal point froiii which patrols would search the adjacent area.

A base camp Was usually set up tw a platoon, although on occaSion, company bases would l)e formed for a Ia rgcscalc opcra_
tom. \'Vhatcvcr the size, the drill was the saute. l'lic platoon corn
iuaitder would select a likely area for his 11 ist base front the map before he SCt Out Oil his ritission. I he won N look for a spot that was easily identifiable on the niap so that his patrols would have a good flap fix for their starting point, and he would also prefer to be ncar a strcaiii for his water supply. "Basing tip," as we called it, was a jungle ritual that deserves description. Lirst, the proposed base area was searched by small pattols to nstirc that no CT's were in the vicinity. Then the mcii were dispersed in a rough circle facing outward with platoon headquarters in the center. Only then could everyone start to erect his improvised shelter. ] hcse were made froiti the ponchotype ground sheer, using available 'imies and branches as supports. Cutting was discouraged, for the sound (if a machete on wood carries a long way in jungle. The men usually paired off for this jot), and w'hile one was improving the "house," the other would start preparing iiieal. Ve always ate oii a shelter basis. Coucu rrcnr with these pIcpa rations, we took turns going to the water point to bathe, always under the eye (if a sentry. This was the time that I alw'ays felt particularly vulnerablc, dressed iii Mother Nature and jungle boots, and carrying a subutacltinc gun!

To guide those within as well as to thvait the intruder, a vine was stretched around the perimeter; front this, other guide vines were run to the area of platoon headquarters, where the night sentry was always located. IIc relied entirely on his cars to give warning (if suspicious movement in the vicinity of the base. Our invariable rule was no iiiovcnient for any reason outside the perimeter bctveeii dusk and dawn.

I having established base camp to his satisfaction, the platoon cootmitander sat in his shelter and planned his patiol program for the next (lay.

\Vc made use of tWO basic patrolling tcchnit1ucs in this opera
11011: the fail 1i:itiol atici the StECaill patrol. Roth these llIethlO(IS
were fOUtt(lC&l ott the Old maxim of "Flint, l'i x, :imnt A ttaclc''
Therefore, (lie priilmary function of these two types of patrol was
0) obtain inforniarion.

'I lie fan patrol was so called because the Separate patrols radi
ated out from the base like the ribs of a fan. A fait patrol rioriiially consisted of three or four men carrying only their weapons and animnunitiolt; they left all their heavy cjuipnlcmlt iii die base. Each patrol was directed ott a definite compassbearing front the base.

] lie interval between the ribs depended largely ott the standard of training.

I usually operated at tendegree spacings. lhc (his
lance out from base was governed by the nature of the jungle.

On the i'asck Beta operation, we could iiiaiiagc only atunit I
yards due to the thick belukar. In primary jungle, with little or nO undergrowth, this distance might be extended Ill) to 2,000
yards. 1 oweVcr, we seldom tried to lay ilowti
(lisl:mIm(cs hut worked on a time basis. From experience, we learned that a patrol COIl(l not be cxpCCtcd to maintain the rcqtiircd high standard of alcrtncss for more than about three hours. Therefore, Our patrolling was usually geared to this time limit. Patrol movement had to be slow, cach step made carefully, for a careless boot on a rottcn branch could mean giving the alaim to a nearby terrorist camp. Fyes and ears 'cre usually the best weapons, but a keen sense of smell was often instrumental in literally sniffing out CT's.

Their presence was frequently betrayed by the odor of Chinese cooking, or of curry on the rare occasions when Malay or Indian terrorists were in camp.

I laying reached its time or distance liiiit, the patrol might return in either of two ways. It could follow the hack hearing of the outward course, thus retracing the original line hack to base, or it could move a ptcdctcriiiined distance in paces to its tight or left and return on a back bearing of or minus live degrees of its outward COUrSe. For obvious reasons, the method to be used and the amount of right or left movement had to be laid down by the platoon conimnander before the patrols left the base.

One of my platoons in the Tasek Hera was located in an area heavily interlaced with jungle streams. In this case, the platoon ccmiinander uSed the stream method of patrolling. As in the fan
1)11 io!, grotips consisted of three to four men, but instead of following specilic hearings, they worked their way up and down time banks of streams and creeks. Like us, the CT's preferred to position their caiimps near running water and this method of searching was often successful in finding them.

I loweyer, in my opinion, there is one serious drawback to sticamn patrolling. Occasionally, there were consideral)le variations between the actual direction of streams and their alignment as shown on the map. This resulted in die very real danger of patrols clashing with each other. Therefore, if this method is to be used, the accuracy of the miiap should be carefully checked beforehand and only the nmininiumn number of patrols deployed in the area t )UC titHe.

\Vheii sending out his fami or streamim patrols to cover a thousand
'ard map square, the platoon coumitmiauider would always keep a reserve in base so that lie could quickly take advantage of any iiifoimation his patrols brought in. Fu rthcriinire, lie had to niain
tam good radio con inlunication with his coiiipa ny coiinrmndc r So that the latter Couki bring in extra troopS if the task 81)pearCtl beyond the capability of one platoon. ilic advent of the lieU
copter in Malaya greatly facilitated prompt cxl)lc)itation by a large force of aiiy information gained from reconnaissance trolling.

If a patrol detected or even suspected the presence of a Ci'
camp, the drill was fur one or two men to move back along the beaiing or stream to warn the base while the other two reinaineil to watch the area. J'hey would do their best to gain further information as to the extent of the layout, hut uppermost iii their minds was the fact that they must not prejudice the operation by premature movement at this stage.

When the platoon commander received warning of a suspected camp, he gathered up all available ii men in I aselea vi hg un1y a small rear party_amid moved out, guided by the men vlio had returned from the reconnaissance patrol. i'hcy advised him where to halt the main body so that its presence would not he discovered. i'lie platoon commander then moved forward and Contacted the rest of the patrol, getting uptodate information from them. He had now to carry out the most delicate part of the operation-his own reconnaissance, which might take hours if he was to get a good idea of the sftength of time Cr's and at time same time escape detection from their sentries. At the end of this reconnaissance, he had to make the decision as to whether he could manage the job alone or whether lie should radio time company comnimmarider and ask him to cuimie in and take over.

\'Vlmatever course he took, the platoon cuimimnander would he the key man in the action since lie had had t lie t)est look at the ground.

in the Tasek Bema, we had a chain of events simimilar to those I
have described, and the platoon commander decided that the camp was small enough to take on w'ithout extra support. [-Ic therefore carried out the next part of the drill, which \'as to surround time camp arLa.

When a small force, such as a platoon, was 5(1 rroimimdiimg a Cl'
camp, it could nor hope to form a continuous chain of i)ayuhlets around the site. In this case, an assault force of some six men led by the platoon conimandcr was detailed anti t lic rciiminder were
(liVi(led into "Stop'' groups of two to three incn cacli. it was the task of the platoon sergeant to put these into position. He (lid this by moving around the area of the canip on a series of right
angle bearings, dropping off "stops" on nil likely escape routes.

11th particular Cainj was near a small lake so the assault was to he made from the iahl(i side, with stops on either flank near the lake shore. Where there were no velldcflned getaway trails, the procedure was to place stops about 300400 yards out froiii the estimated perimeter of the camp.

The short jungle day seldom allowed the whole operation of fiuiditig a camp, carrying out the detailed reconnaissance, placing he stops, and finally attacking to be completed (luring the day
light hours_especially as an attack just before dusk precluded a followlip of escaping GT's in daylight. Therefore, it was usually necessary for the stops and assault group to remain in position tturotigliout the night. This placed a couisidcrai;lc strain on all concerned, l)ut thC troops always responded nobly as they real
ii.cd that this might 1e the climax to months of hard "jungle I unshing.''
As soomi as there was sufficient light, the platoon commander signaled time assault group to advance. Moving at time double, they charged directly into the camp, firing at all the visible enemy and at the jungle shelters constructed by the GT's. The terrorists invariably had a vellrehearsed escape plan, and those not hit by tIme initial bursts from the assault group would speedily fade into the siurroumiding jungle. It was the task of i lie stops to piclc them
1)11 as they escaped. As soon as all firing finishedand it seldom lasted fr more than a imiinutcthc platoon couimnmandcr organ
i7.cd a follow_up of any terrorists who were seen to have escaped he imet. Usually he had a tracker dog or an I ban to assist him in this task. Ibans were specially enlisted trackers from North lornco, skilled in following trails and distinguishing between liunmaim and animal signs.

If a companysized force was involved in time attack, the tactics were similar except that the cordon of stops was tighter, with inure mmmcii available for this task.

The camp we found in the Tasck Hera was, in fact, uiiocclI1)icd when the assault moved in; it was (liscovercil later that the iii habitants had lcft on a foodforaging CN pud it ion so oi aft ci the reconnaissance patrol heard their Inovcnicitts. ()tic rcturncd just as the platoon coinniander reached the cica ring in the cent ci the terrorist shelters. Each saw thc othct' siiiiltaneously antI the CT made off. He was chased and woniikd, and alt bough lie escaped on this occasion, his wound was stifliciciitly serious I
make him surrender a few days later. I luwever, this incident: va;
typical of the most common foriii of contact between Security Forces and Cl's in the Malayan jungle_i he chaticc encotlilt Cr.

No matter how carefully plans arc jiiadc, there will be occasions when patrols stuml)le on guerrillas by chance. \Nc found it necessary to have a sitiple drill for this occurrence, atitl it often worked well.

If a leading scout and a CT saw each other at the sante tulle and there was no possibility of gaining surprise, the scout: shouted
"Bandits!" and charged, followed by tile rest of the patrol. \'Vlictt there was a chance of bringing off au iii upr Ill lJ)ttl auiihuisli, the patrol would sup quickly iuito the jungle on cit her side of tie track and try to let the CT's get as close as possible. If nurs was only a small reconnaissance patrol, the patrol lea(ler Titiglit let large gang of CT's go by and and follow thcni to ascertain the whereabouts of their camp. I know of two occasions when this latter variatioi was carried out successfully by Gurldia troo1)s.

It does, however, demand a very high standard of jiinglccraft.

In these cases, quick reaction by the test of the patrol to t lie leading scout's w'arning was esseuitia I
itid this dc1 cuided on thorough knowledge of silent signals by everyone. Siletiuc golden in antiguerrilla operations; therefore, a cutli1)rehleulsivc list of silent hand signals was devised. Ilicsc ranged front " l'crrurists in front!'' (fist clenched, with thuhili) poititilig to the ground) to an iuiiprovised one in uiiy own conipaiiv that consisted of u'aisio!

the jungle hat accompanied by a low bow. In our language this meant "Request the company commander to couile to the fioiit of the column!'' After six mouths in the Alahavan jungle, ihh soldiers found it second nature to converse by hand signals.

The chance encounter that took place iii the lakeside cauiup was, in fact, our only contact with CT's during a sixweek stay in the Fascic Hera. It was discovered later that our iiiforiuation on the No.

I target had been premature; while we were searching for him, he was still in Johore. However, it had given us all an invaluable opportunity to polish the rough surface of our earlier training.

In addition to rhcsc l)asic tactics in fighting the CT's in Malaya, here were, of course, tnaity variitionssoiflC due to circuin
stances and terrain, others arising from the different fighting characteristics of the many nationalities involved. tior instance, the fleetfooted Fijians often preferred to chase their opponents rather than wait in ambush for them; this unorthodox but ex
trenicly effective technique made them some of the most feared terroristhunters in Malaya. \Vhatever the tactics used and the interpretation put oii them by different units, [ think I can safely say that adherence to the following iiiam principles was usually die foundation of successful operations against the CT's:
A spirit of initiative and aggression had to be instilled into everyone. At all times, junior leaders had to coniuiunicate to their men their determination to seek out ati(l destroy the enemy mm iiiattcr what the physical discomforts might be. This 'aS not always easy to do in a country containing sonic of the most diflIcult going imaginal)le. Most failures to climmunate C1"s in favorable conditions were attributable in sonic degree to a lack of "go'' oil time part of junior leaders.

2. A high standard of marksmanship at short ranges. The jungle contact, as we termed it, between friend and foe 'as fleeting in the extreme. By day, the enemy was usually iilovilmg quickly, and by night, lie 'as diflictilt to see. SUCCeSS, therefore, depended on being able to shoot fast and accurately. Constant practice is the only key to success here. Some purists say that every man must reach the same high standard of shooting. This is a very desirable
:miln but there is often insufficient time to achieve it. Therefore, I would counsel any unit that wants positive results in this kind of war to make certain that its best shots are up front!

3. Continual training in jungle navigation, using Compass and map. If fan and stream_type patrolling are to he used, then every wan tnust have an elementary knowledge of compass work.

Iii my experience, the iliost surprising people emerge IS skilled jungle navigators. One of lie best in by coiiipany was :1 young cockney soldier who had never bcn out of I MlidoIl he hite lu sailed for Malaya.

4. The ((evelo/mwnt of jwiglecraft. 'Ihis ahlcimibracimig terni probably defies detailed analysis hut rhtimik it is best syiiiboli'ied by Field \larshal \Vavcll's description of I lie ideal iIifaI1tI'yI1iin:
"1-fe must he a coni lonation of cat ho rglar, gumillian, amid poacher.''
Certainly the good jungle warriors in i\ Ia lay'a needed all these antisocial charactemist-ics and a surprisingly large number acqui red them.

Our ta'tics in i lalaya were by no beaus perfect. 'Flic gift of hindsight enables m oany of us to see where we went wrong and how we can improve in the future. But this 'as a new sort of war fought over sonic of the most formmiidal,le terrain in the world. Iii the beginning, we had to improvise amid ga iii cxpcricocc, and this took tulle. Ncvcrthcless, in the hoal event, we were able to (IC Vise methods that enabled all the varied forces involved to inflict a decisive defeat (mu militant Coimiiioiiismim. For this, niany can take uredit hut none more so than the imifamitrv pliate soldiers of many nationalities who sweated, foutlit, and won In the jungles of Malaya.

## Iv Losing In The Jungle Indochi N A

INSIDE THE VirrI4INII
General Vu Nguyen
(
STREET WrIIIOUT JoY
lCrIl1I(I B. Fill The fall of Dicn Bicn Phu marked the fall of an cinpire in Sutit h east Asiaand the demolition of iiiuch military dogma. I Icre notably hack w'ard Oriental country trim ii1ihed sillashlilig ly one of the lilost technically advanced \Vcstcrn countries, will supplied with airpower, tanks, artilicry, all(l graduates of thr Ecoic dc Gucrrc. The man who planned t hc Nort Ii V iCtlI;llilcr campaign was Gencral Vo Nguyen ( i:ip, now Minister of I )
fense. His commentary on this action has jtist ticcotiic a vai lalilu.

We think you will nd the sections we have extracted cxtrciiich thought_provoking. His complete book has now been pnhhislwt I
I'eople's War, l'eople's Army: The Vict ('o,, Insurrection ,1a,i nal for Underdeveloped Countries (Frederick A. Praegcr, 1962
Dr. Fail is also an authoritr on the I nducliiiici debacle, lie w' 'ii his doctorate as a result of his tcsearcli in the fleld with the Frciwli forces. Reprinted here is a chapter front his definitive loL.

Street Without Joy (The Stackpolc Coiiipaitv, 1961). I Ic is no"
at work Ofl a foi'thcoiiiing political lust ny, '1 'lie I"uo l'ie f/hr/n'
Frederick A. Pracger)
Front Phn riniciuiu, he w nt us i hat Vii Cong Regiment Ninety_flvc is hack at its old stalilpilig grnuiids the "Street""and nasty as ever."

## Inside The Vietminh General Vo Nguyen Giap

Vietnam is one of t lie oldest countries in Southeast Asia.

Stretching like an immense S along the edge of the Pacific, it includes Hac Ho, or North Vietnam, which, with the Red River Delta, is a region rich in agricultural and industrial possibilities;
Nani Ho, or South Vietnam, a vast alluvial plain furrowed by the arms of the Mekong nod especially favorable to agriculture; and Trung Ho, or Central \'ictnani, a long, narrow belt of land joining titciti. To describe i lie shape of their country, the Vietnamese like to recall an ililagc familiar to thenithar of a shoulder pole with a basket (,f paddy at each end.

\Tjetim extends over nearly 128,000 square titiles, on which lives a p)pulation of approximately
3() million. l)uriiig their iiiaiiy thioizs:i:ids of yca rs of history, the Victna,,iese people have always been able to titaintain a heroic tradition of struggle against foreign .iggrcssion. During the thirteenth century, in particular, they succeeded in thwarting nttcnl1)ts at invasion by rite Mongols, who had extended their doniinatioii over rite whole of fCiI(LII China.

lite L)'5 \'ar (if lil,eratioii \;i5
1 juSt
\V.Ii. Its aim \'as to will back die independence and unity of the count ry, to bring land to the j,casants, and to defend the achievements of the August Revoluti n. That is why it was, first and Iorcniost, a people's var. To educate, mobilize, organize, and anti the whole peo1)le in order that they might take part iii the resistance was the crucial task.

The enemy of the Vietnamese nation was aggressive iriipcrial
ism, which had to he overthrown. But, as the imperialists had long since joined w'irh the feudal landlords, the antilinpenalist stnig
glc definitely could not be separated from :iiitifcudal actioti. On ilic otlicr hand, in a lsickward COloithil coiiifliy such as OULS, whici'c the peasants make up the majority of the population, a people's war is essentially a peasants' w'ar under the leadership of the working class. A gciieral I)1oI)ilizatioI of the whole people is, ilicrefoi'e, neither more nor less than a iiiobilization of the rural tiiasscs. 'I'hc pi'otdcm (If land is of deCISIVe iiiIport:iulcC. The Vict
naiiicse war of lil,ciatioii was csscutially a national dciiiocratic i'cvolution carried Out under iiiilitary forni. It had
:1 twofold fundamental task: the overthrowing of inlpcria hisiii and the defeat of the feudal landlord class. The aiiti_iinpcrialist struggle was primary.

A backward colonial country w'hich had oiiiy j ust risen up to proclaim its independence and install people's powcr, Vietnam had only recently developed armed forces. They 'cre equipped with still mediocre arms and had no combat experience. The enemy, on the other hand, was an imperialist po\'c1 which had retained a fairly considerable economic an(l iiiilitary potential despite the recent German occupation. She had benefited, moreover, from the active support of the United States. l'he balance of forces decidedly showed up our w'eaknesses against the enemy's strength.

'I 'he \Tictnaullcse people's war, therefore, had to be hard and long lasting in order to succeed in creating conditions for victory.

Conceptions born of impatience and aimed at ot)taining speedy victory could only be gross errors. It was necessary to adopt a strategy of long_terni resistance in order to maintain and gradually augment our forces, white nibbling at and progressively destroying those of the enemy. It was necessary to acctiniulate thousands of small victories and to turn theiii into one great success, gradually altering the balance of forces, transforiiiing our weakness into power, and carrying off final victory.

At an early stage, our Party was able to discern the true characteristics (If the war. By proceeding from this analysis, throughout the duration of hostilities and under particularly difficult conditions, the Party solved all the problems of the resistance.

'l'his judicious leadership lcd us to victory.

Our strategy was, as we have strcssed, to wage a long-lasting Ii:ittle. A war of this type, generally spcalcnig, entails several phascs. In principle, stat'ting froni a stagc of contention, the war goes through a period of e1uilibriutn before arriving at a general counteroffensive. The way it is carried on can be subtle and corn
1)lCX, depending on the particular conditions obtaining on 1)0th sides du ring the course of operations. Only a longterm war ci iuld enable us to utili?.e to the inaxitiiuin our political trump cards, ti, overcome out niateriel handicap, and to transform our weakness into strength. To maintain and increase our forces was the principle to which we adhered. We contented ourselves with attacking when success was certain, refusing to give 1)attlc likely to incur losses to us, or to engage in hazardous actions. We had to build up our strength during the actual course of flgliting.

'I 'he form of lighting had to be coiiiplctely adapted to the situation. We had to raise our fighting spirit to the maxitmim and rely on the heroism of our troops to overcome the enemy's material superiority. In the main, especially at the outset, we had to resort to guerrilla fighting. In the Vietnamese theater of opera
ions, his iiiethod carried ofT great victories. It could be USed in the IliollIltains as 'ell as in the delta; it could he waged with good r Incdu)cre iiiate rid, even without arms, and was to enable us eventually to cptip ourselves at the cost of the endilly. Wherever lie l1editionary Corps W'CIit, thC entire population took 1)art in the fighting. Fvery coiiiuiiune had its fortified village. Every district had its regional troops fighting under command of local hianches of the Party, in liaison with the regular forces, in order to wear (h)wIi and annihilate the enemy.

Thci-eaftcr, with the development of our forces, guerrilla war changed ilIt() tiiobile warfarethough still strongly marked by guerrilla tacticswhich afterward became the basic loon of PctatiotiS on the main front, the northern front. In this process of development, our army constantly grew and passed from the stage of engagements involving a section or company, to fairly largescale caillpaigns l)riuging into action several divisions. Grad
ua lly, the a oily's equipment iiiiproved, mainly through seizure of anus from the French and American imperialists.

From a military point of view, the war proved that an made
(uatcly equipped aritly, fighting for a just cause, can, with appropriate strategy and tactics, conquer a modern army of aggressive impcria lisii Iii thc InalIageillelu of a 'a r economy in an agriculturally I ac kward C( w n try u i de rta kii ig a l( ng te ri ii resista I Ce, t ic r )l
lent of building l)ases in rear areas arises. The raising and defcitsc of production, iiid the dCVClO1)illCflt of agriculture, wcie proli
lenis of great importance for supplying the front as well as for progressive improvement of the people's living conditions. ] lic ii uitter of manufactu ring anus was not one which could be set aside.

lii the building of rural bases and the reinforcement of rear areas to give impetus to the resistance, time agrarian policy of the Party played a determ nining role. Therein lay the anti feudal task of the revolution. Iii a colony where the national (1ncstiolm is

esseiltiahl)' time 1)easalmt question, consolidation of the resistance
forces was possible only by solution of the agrarian probkiim.
   The August Revolution overthrew the feudal state. Reduction
of land rents and rates of interest, decreed by people's power,
bestowed on the peasants their first material advantages. I Sand
umIon(polized by the iiiipcrialists and traitors was confiscated and
shared out. Communal land and rice fields were more etpmitaltly
(listributed. lit 1953, deeming it necessary to promote the
plishitment of antifeudal
                                   tasks, the Party decided
                                                                         to
                                                                              achieve
agrarian reform even during the course -of the resistance var.
l)espite the errors that blemished accomplishment of the rcforiii,
it was a correct policy crowned with success. It resulted in real
imiatcrial advantages for the peasants and brought to the aritty and
the people a new breath of enthusiasm.
   ] imanks to this new agrarian policy, the life of the people, (lttr
nig time most difficult conditions of the var, generally i1111)rove(l,
not only in the vast free zones of the North, mit even itt
                                                                            he gtler
rilia bases in South V ictimaiti.
   rhe Vietnamese ar brought out the importance of btmi ldimmg
resistance bases in the countryside and enmplt:isited the close and
indissoluble relationship between the aittiiiimperiahist revolution
and the anti feudal revolution.
   From a political point of view, the question of unity uliong the

people and the mobilization of all their energies was of paranmunt importance. it vas the National United Front against the imperialists and their lackeys, the Vietiiatuesc traitors.

itt Vietnam, our Party carried off a great success in its policy of Front. As early as 'vVorld War II, the Party formed the League for the indcpcndcncc of V jetnam. flitting the early years of the war of resistance, we 1)ost1)onctl the application of agrarian rcvo
lutu)n, limiting on r program to the reduction of land rents and interestrates, w'hich enabled us to neutralize part of the landlord class and to rally around us the most patriotic of them.

Front the early days of the August Revolution, the policy of broad Front adopted by the Party neutralized the wavering dc
incnts among the landlord class and limited acts of sabotage by l)iirtisans of the Vietnam Quocl)anI)ang (Nationalist Party).

Thereafter, iii the course of the war, when agrarian reform had become an urgent necessity, our Party iiiadc a diulerentiatiou within the landlord class by providing different treatment for each type of landlord according to his political attitude toward lu1uidation of feudal appropriation of land.

Flie policy of unity among mi:uiioiualincsadpted by the Na
tiottal United Front also achieved great success, and the prograiui of unity with the vari(nIs religious circles attained good results.

The National United lront was to be a vast assembly of all the forces capable of being united, neutralizing all those which could be neutralized, dividing all those it was possible to divide.

hue object of this was to direct the spearhead at the chief enemy of the revolution, invading iiuuperialisuuu. The Front was to be an a lhiuuce between workers and peasants under the leadership of the working class, lit \1ietnalui, an alliance between workers and peasants was backed by a dazzling history and firm traditions.

I lie party of the work ilug class had been the only political party to light resolutely in all ci rcutiisrances for national independence.

it was the first to put forward the slogan "I 'and to the Tillers,"
and to struggle derertuuinedly for its realization. I lowever, in the cathy years of rIte resistance, underestimation of the iluupoltance of the peasant question hindered us (rout giving all the necessary attention to the workerpeasant alliance. This error Was 5L11)Se
qucntiy set right, especially from time moment elucn the Party decided, by means of accomplishing agrarian reform, to make the peasants the real masters of the countryside.

ihe war of liberation provcd that, iii the face of an enciiiy as powerful as he is cruel, Victory is possil)le only by uniting the whole people under a firm and wide national front based on the
\vOFl(Crpeasatlt alliance.

lo bring victory, it was not enough to have a correct strategic guiding principle. An appropriate guiding principlc of fighting was also necessary in order to early out the strategy. In general, ours was a guerrilla war moving gradually to regular or niohi Ic war combined with partial entrenched caiip warfare. Iasically, we had grasped that general. law; hence, we were succcssful.

Howcve r, we (11(1 not thoroughly grasp it frotti the hcgiiin ing, but only after it had been tested and tempered itt the practice of va r.

Iii the resistance war, guerrilla activity played an extrciiiely important role. Guerrilla war is the form of fighting by the masses of a weak md badly equipped country against an aggressive artimy with better e(lutplncnt and teclmnim1ues. ibis is the way of fighting a revolution. Guerrillas i-ely on heroic s1)int.

to iii
uimiph over modern weapons, avoiding the encitmy 'lieii he is [lie stronger and attacking hint 'hten lie is t lie wea ker. Nm iw scattering, i1O\' rcgl.ouplng, now Wearing out, low cxteriitiiiatiog time encnty, they are determined to fight everywhere, so that wherever the enemy goes lie is submerged in a sea of arm ited people who hit hack at him, thus undermining his spirit and exlmatistitig his forces.

In addition to scattering in order to wear omit: the emictimy, it is necessary to regroup big armed forces iii favorable situations to achieve supreitiacy in attack at a given point and titime to animi
Imilate the enemy. Successes iii many siii:mll fights added together giadiially veai out the enemity Itiatmpover, while little by little stretigthmtning our forces. The timaiti goal of time fighting mimust lie
(lcstructi( in of CtlCtil tilanpower. Our own itian1)ower sb mit Id mit be cx hamistcd front trying to keep or occupy lam I.

Guerrilla war was obviously in full keeping with tIme clmarae
teristics of our resistance war. In tIme early period, regular war was not possible. vVhcn the war started iii South Victnatti, our plan was to wage guerrilla warfare, and iii practice, guerrilla war took shn1ic. Bitt tvltcn the nfltiOliWidC WH bIOICC out, tIiC 1)OliCy of ntainly waging guerrilla warfare was not clearly set forth. At the bcginning of autuiiiitwintcr
1947, the I'arty Central Coin
unittec decreed the launching and extending of guerrilla activities ovcr all the occupicd areas. One part of our main force was divided into indC1)CldClt companies, operating scparately, which penetrated tleep into the enemy's rear area to carry out propaganda assigiluients among the people, to defend our bases, and to intensify guerrilla activity. The policy of using independent companies concurretitly with concentrated battalions was very successful. As guerrilla activities were intensified auth widely extended, many citetity rear areas 'cre turned into our front lines.

lo cope with our cxpan(hing guerrilla activities, great efforts were uitade by the enemy to launch repeated mopping_ui) operations with ever bigger forces. The aim of these operations was to annihilate our guerrilla units, destroy our political bases and crops, and plunder our property. The enemy hoped to crush our resistance forces and "pacify" his rear. That is why mopping_up operations and countermoppingup operations be
caine the chief form of guerrilla war in the enemy's rear.

lhrough the counter_mopping_up operations, ott r 1)CophC brought to the utmost their endurance of hardships and heroic fighting spirit, creating extremely rich forms of fighting. To maintain antI cxtcnd guerrilla activities in the enelily's rear, our Party cleverly combined he coordination of political and economic struggle with armed struggle. lime Party strove hard to avail itself of favorable opportunities to push the people into the armed struggle, develop our forces, annihilate and wear out the enemy forces, turn temporarily occupied zones into guerrilla zones or time latter into our bases. When limeeting a difficult situation, our Party cleverly switched the nioVcincnt in good dine to preserve our forces and safeguard our bases. Guerrilla activities in the enemy's rear were the highest expression of the iron will and courageous spirit of our peoplc, and at time same time were proof of the talented leadership of the l'arty.

lrouum the strategic point of view, guerrilla warfare causes many difficulties and losses to the enemy auth wears hint out. To annihilate enemy manpower and liberate land, guerrilla warfare has

 to change gradually to mobile warfare. l'liroiigh guerrilla ictiv
 ities, our troops were gradually foritied, fighting first with sinai'
units, then with bigger ones, moving froiii scattered lighting i'
more concentrated fighting. Guerrilki arInic gra(lually (ICVCI
oped to mobile warfarea form of lighting in
                                              which priu1ciplc
of regular warfare gradually appear but still bcar a guerrilla
character. Mobile warfare is fighting with concentrated troops
of the regular army. In this type of sar, rclativcly big forces arc
grouped and operated on a. relatively vast battleuield, attacking
the enemy where he is relatively exposed, advancing deeply, t lien
withdrawing swiftly. Such fighting is cliar:ictcrixcd by ext
dynamism, initiative, mobility, and rapidity of dccisuoii in face 'ii
new situations.
  As the resistance war went on, the strategic role of iinobilc
warfare became more important with every passing (lay'. Its task
was to annihilate a bigger and bigger ouiiibcr of the enemy iii
order to develop our own strength. The task of guerrilla w'ar-
fare waS to wear out and destroy thc enemy's rcscrvcs. l'hcrc-
fore, mobile war and guerrilla war went on side by side. Only by
annihilating the enemy's manpower could we sninashi
                                                      his
                                                          big
offensives, safeguard our bases and rear areas, and win the initia-
tive. By wiping out more and more of the enemy, by liberating
larger and larger localities one after the other, we could even-
tually destroy the whole enemy force and liberate our country.
  In 1947, with the plan of operating coilipailies separately and
massing battalions, we began to move to iiiore concentrated
fighting, then to mobile warfare. In 1948, we iiiade relatively
large ambush and surprise attacks with one or several battalions.
In 1949, we launched small eamaigns not only' in the North but
also on other battlefronts. From 1950 on, we began to launch
campaigns on an ever larger scale, enabling mobile warfare to
play the r1iain part on the northern battlefield, vhiilc eiitieiichieil
camp warfare was on the upgrade. This fact was clearly' iiianilcst
in the great Dien Bien Phu campaign.
  Once mobile warfare appears on the l)au lefronit of guerrilla
var, there must be close and correct coonliiiatioin I)CtWCCII I lI('
two. This is another general law in the conduct of var. ( )n
                                                          t lie
one hand, guerrilla warfare has to be extended to intake full usc

of the new favorable conditions brought about by mobile warfare. On the other hand, mobile warfarc has to be accelerated to annihilate large enemy forces and concurrently to create new favorable conditions for further extension of guerrilla war. In the course of the developmcnt of iiiol,ik warfare, t)ccause of the enemy's Situation an(l ours on the l)attlCIIClds, cntrcnchcd camp warfare gradually caine into being. It l)ccahllc part and parcel of iiioliilc warfare, continued to develop, and occupied a itiore and
,iiorc important position.

The conduct of the var had to maintain a correct ratio between the lighting forms. At the beginning, we had to stick to gucrrUla warfare and extend it. Passing to a new stage, as mobile warfare made its appearance, we had to hold firm the coordina
tion between the two forms, the chief one 1)eing guerrilla var
fare. Mobile warfare was of lesser iilportance but was on the upgrade. Then came a new and higher stage. Mohilc warfare wovcd to the tiiain position, at ii ist on only one battlefield, then on a widcning scope. l)uring this thne, guerrilla warfare was extended, but alter a while it fell hack to a lesser but still inipor
tant position.

On sonic battlefronts we met with difficulties because we were not determined to advance from guerrilla to mobile var. On others, rashness in speeding up mobile warfare had a bad influenceon guerrilla activity, and therefore mobile warfare also had trouble. In general, however, the correct ratio of emphasis was maintained. The IIoa Rink campaign was typical of coordination between guerrilla and mobile warf:itc units on the northern battlcfront. ilie I)ien llicn P1w caiilp:iigii and time winterspring
195 354 campaign w'crc also successful immodels of coordination.

Ilecause of the enemy's situation amid ours, there appeared a system of free zones interlaced with encimmycoiitrollcd areas, intersecting amid encircling each other. lii enciiiycontrolled areas, there were also guerrilla zones and guerrilla bases. These zones and bases expanded as the war progressed, while enemyoccupied areas narrowed.

The strategy of longterm war and the I)rtmicil)lc of expansion from guerrilla to regular war were succcssftul. Such were the basic strategy and tactics of the people's war in a sitiall and backward agricultural country under the leadership of our Party.

## Ii.

At the first shots of the iiiipcrialist invasion, ( ciierl I .eu?cic,
first commander of the French Expcdit ioiiary Corps,' (St iiitatcil
that the reoccupation of Vietnam won 1(1 I IC a iiiil i ta ry wa I ki iv er.
When encountering resistance in the Soot ii, t lie French getictak
considered it as Meak and temporary and stuck to their
                                                     (p1111011
that it would take ten weeks at the most to OCCupy and pacify the
whole of South Vietnam.
  Why did the French colonialists iiiakc such an csriliiat? 1k
cause they considered that to nicet their nggrcssion there intist
be an army. The \'ietnanicsc Army had inst hecit created. It
still numerically weak, badly organized. led
                                           iiv
                                               iIicxpericlice(l
officers and noncoimnissioned officers, 1,1(1 l)iOSi(le(l wit It old :iIil
insufficient equipilient. It had a lititited stock of ailiiiiunition and
no tanks, airplanes, or artillery. With such an ariiiy how could
serious resistance he undertaken and the attacks of a powerful
armored division repelled? All it could (1(1 was to USC U its stock
of munitions before laying down its anus. In fact, the Victnaiiiesc
Army was then weak in all respects and was destitute of every-
thing. The French colonialists were right iii this respect. But it
was not possible for them to understand a hiitdanicntal and deci-
sive fact the Vietnamese Army, tlumgh weak materially, was a
People's army. 1 lie war in Vietnaiji aS hut ilierely t lie
tion of two armies. In provoking hostilities, t lie cnhinialists had
alienated a wholc nation. And indccd, the whole \'ictnaiiicsc
nation, the entire Vietnamese people, rose against them. Unable to
grasp this profound truth, the French generals, lio believed iii
an easy victory, vcnt instead to certain defeat.
  Even to this day, bourgeois strategists have (hit ovcrconic their
surprise at the outcome of the war in Indocli itia. I low cotu Id t lie
Victnamcse nation have defeated an iiipcrialist power such
                                                          Is
France, which was backed by the U.S.?
 The Vietnamese People's A riuy s'as In uiii and grew up iii
                                                        t lic
flames of the va r of national liberation. Its eiiibryo was
                                                        I lie

selfdefense units crcatcd by the Nghe An Su'icts, which managed to hold power for a few months in the period of revolutionary upsurge iii the years 193031. ftc creatui of revolutionary armed forces, however, was positivcly considered only at the
()lltSCt of World \'Var II, 'hen preparation for an armed insurrection caine to the fore of our attention. Our military and para
military formations appeared at the Bite Son uprising and in the rcvolutumary bases in the Can Bang region. Following the sctting tip of the first platoon of National Salvation, on I )cccimmbcr 22,
1944, anothcr platoonsize unit was cieitted:
die Propaganda Unit of the Vietnaimi I .iberat ion Army. Our war bases were at the time limited to a few districts in tIle provinces of Cao Bang, Bac Can, and Lang Son in the jungle of the North. As for the revolutionary armed forces, they still consisted of people's self
defense units and a few groups and platoons completely free from
1)iodflctitnt work. Their umumitber increased quickly. There were already several thousand guerrillas at the beginning of 1945, when the Japanese fascists delivered the coup de grilce to the French coloniali.sts. At die time of the setting up of people's power in the rut-al regions of six provinces in Viet Bac, which were established as a free zone, the existing armed organizations uiiergcd to form the Vietnam Liberation Arimmy.

l)nm-ing die August,
1945, insurrection, side by side with the people and the selfdefense units, the I ibcratu)n Army took part in the conquest of power. By incorporating the paramilitary forces regrouped in the course of the glorious iays of August, the a u-iimy's strength increased rapidly. With heterogeneous materiel wrested from the Japanese and their Bao An troops (rifles alone consisted of sixteen different types, including old French models and even rifles of the Czarist forces taken by the Japanese), this young and poorly c(1ui1)pcd a rmny soon had to face the aggression of the French Expeditionary Corps which had modern arma
milents. Such antRjuated equipment requii-ed from the Vietnamese A rmny and people comitplete selfsacrifice and superluimnan heroism.

Should the enemy attack the regions where out troops were st;lti(Jned, the hitter would give battle. Should he (ct-ret about jut the large zones whet-c there were no regular formations, the people would stay his advance with rudimentary weapons: sticks, spears, scimitars, bows, flintlocks. From the first days, therc ap
peared three types of armed forces: paraiiiilitary organizations or guerrilla units, regional troops, and reg lar units. ]'Iicc foiiiia
tions were, in the field of organization, the expression of (he general mobilization of the people in arms. They coopcratcd closely with one another to annihilate the enemy.

Peasants, workers, and intellectuals crowded into the ranks of the arnicd forces of the rcvolution. Leading cadres of the Party'
:In(l the State :lpp:lratus became officers from the first iiioniciit.

The greatest difficulty was that of cquiplucitt.

1 hiroughiout Viet

naiti there was no factory manufacturing war inateiiel. For nearly a century, the possession and use of arms had been strictly for
bidden by the colonial administration. Importation was impossible, the neighboring countries being hostile. '1]e sole source of suppiy could only be the battlefronttake war materiel from the enemy and turn it against hiiii. While carrying on the aggression against Vietnam, the French Expeditionary Corps fulfilled anothcr task: It becaiiie, unwittingly, the supplier of the Vietnam People's Army with French, even U.S. arms. In spite of their enormous efforts, the arms factories set tip later on w'ith iiiakesliift means w'ere far from being able to meet all our needs. A great part of our military materiel came from war l)ooty.

As I have stressed, the People's Ariiiy could at first bring into combat only small units such as platoons or companies. 'Fhic regu_
lar forces were compelled to split up into companies operating separately to promote the extension of guerrilla activities, while mobile battalions were maintained for mijore ilmiportant actions.

Tempered in combat and stiniulated by victories, the guerrilla formations created conditions for the growth of the regional troops. And the latter, in turn, promoted development of the regular forces. lor nine successive years, by following this heroic path bristling with difficulties, our army grew up with a determination to win at all costs. It became an army of hundreds of thousands, successively amalgamating into regiments and divisions, and directtl toward progressive standardization in organization and equipillent. This force, ever more politically conscious and better trained militarily, succeeded in fighting and defeating tite 500,000 men of the Frcncli lx1)c(lit unarV Corps, equipped and Stll)l)ItCtl by the United States.

Political vork is the work of pi pagatida among and cduca
tu)tt of the iiiasscs. It is, Iurthcritture, thc rganizational work of thc Party in the army. We havc ahvnys given particular attention to strcngtltcning the Party in our military units. l'rom 35 to 40
per cent of the officers and enlisted men have joined it. Among the officers, the percentage even cxcccds 90 per cent.

lhc I'eopk's Army has always bCefl conccrncd v'itl Cstal)lish
ing an(l maintaining good relations with the people. l'ltis policy is based upon the identity of their aims. The people are to the army what water is to (isit, as the saying goes. And this saying has profound significance. Our army fought on the front; it has also worked to educate the people and has helped them to the best of its ability. The Vietnamese fighter has always taken care to observe Point 9 of his Oath of 1- loitor: "In contacts with the people, to follow these three recomineitdations: to respect the People; to help the people; to defend the people
.

.

. in order to win their confidence and affection and ;ichicvc a perfect understanding between the people and the army."
Our artity has always organized days of help for peasants in production work and in the struggle against flood and drought.

It has always observed a correct attitude itt its relations with the people. It has never (lone in)ury to their pr pettynot even a needle or a bit of thread. l)uring the resistance, especially in the enemy rear, the army hrnight everything into play to defend otdinary people's lives and property.

Iii time newly liberated legions, it strictly carried out the orders of the I'arty and govern
ment; which enabled it to win the unreserved support of the broadest masses, even in the minority regions and Catholic villages. Since the return of peace, thousands of officers and men have participated in agrarian reform for agricultural collectivization and socialist tratislornmntion of Ii:iitdicrafts, industry, and private trade. lime ariity has actively tahcit pt rt in the economic recovery and in socialist work days. It has participated in the building of hues of conununication; it has built its own barracks and cleared land to found State farms.

The Victnam People's A riny nlways strives to cst:ildtsli liii maintain good relitiotts
1ICtWCCIt oflicers
:111(1
ilicU
is well among the officers themselves. Origiiiit ing froi ii the work ii strata, officers and men also serve the people's interests :iti'l unstintingly devote theniselvcs to rite cause of the il:tt ion iii the working class. Of course, cvcry one of tliciii has part icitlir responsibilities. But relations of coliiradcshi1) bascd (II) jiolit nil equality and fraternity of classes have been established bet them. The officer likes his men. He must not onis' guide tlicii their work and studies, but must take an interest iii their desit---
and initiatives.

As for the soldier, he must respect his superiors :ti,id yori-crt I
fulfill all their orders. The officer of the People's A r,tiy tutist a good example front all points of view, lie hoist show hiiitn.-II
to be resolute and brave, ensure discipline and mt ernal k;i,i racy, and know how to achieve perfect unity attioiig his ittuti.

He must behave like a chief, a leader, vistvis the masses in lii unit. The basis of these relations between cnliste(l men aIi(l uIhcrr.

like those between officers or between solilicis, is soluiIarit iii combat and the mutual affection of brothers-inantis.

The army practices a strict discipline, allied to a wide iiitcrn:tl democracy. As required by Point 2 of his Oath of J bmor: "liii fighter must rigorously carry out the orders of his superiors throw huinsel I body and soul into the iii ittied iat e and strict Iil till mcnt of the tasks entrusted to hint.'' Can we say that gitcunilki warfare did tint rcquirc severe discipline? Of course not.

It i true that eontniandcrs and lcadcrs had a certain tint rgitl ol iitit it tive in order to undertake every posit he action they tiniughi opportune. But centralized ledcrship and unified cottiniatid it a given degree always proved to be necessary. I-Ic who speaks ol the army speaks of strict discipline.

Such discipline is not in contradiction to the internal dctiii r racy of our troops. In cells, in executive cotittitit tees of lie Part v at various levels, and in plenary meetings of light ilig units, tin principle of democratic ccntralisni is the rule. 'Fhie facts li:iv'
proved that the more democracy is respected within the units, t hr more unity will be strengthened, discipline raised, ailil i,nilri carried out.

## Toz The GuerrillaAnd How To Fight Him

The restoration of pence has created in Vietnam a new situa
tiorl. The North is entirely liberated, but the South is still under thc yoke of Amcrican imperialists and thcir lackeys. North Viet
iiii Ii:is entcrc(l a stagc of socialist rcvI)luhion whilc thc struggle i.S going on to frec the South frotit colonial and feudal fetters.

10 safeguard peace and socialist construction, to help in making lie North a strong rahiq)art for thc peaceful t-cunification of the ci nintry, the problem of forces of national defense should not he neglected. The People's Army must face the bellicose aims of American iiiipcrinlists and their lackeys and stc1) by step lccomc
:1 regular and modern army.

It is essential actively and firmly to continue thc progressive ransfoi,imtion of the People's Army into a regular and modern artmiv. i'himiks to developments (luring the last years of the resist
alice war, our arnly. which was mimadc up of infantrymen only, is now conposed of various branches. If improvement of equip
Itmelit 111(1 tcchniqucs is ilIlportatir, that of training cadres and soldiers capable of using thcnm is inure important. Our army has :ilw:ivs been concerned with the training of officers and warrant o(jjccrs of worker and peasant origin, or revolutionary intellec ti,:ils tested under (ire. It helps raise their cultural and technical keel to liecommic competent officers
:111(1 wirramit officers of a I cgmmlar and mimodern army.

lii raise the lighting power of the army, to bring al)OUt a sill mug ccmitralization of coummnmamid and close cooperation between

time different branches, it
                                        is necessary to enforce
                                                                              regulations
(it ted to a regular armimy. Nor that tmotiming li:ms been (lone in this
field (luring the years of the resistance ar: it is a matter of
peilecting existing regulations. l'he main thing is not to lose
sight of the principle that any new mcgtulatiutis lutist draw their
inspiration from the popular character of the army and the abso-
lute necessity of omaintaining rite leadership of tIme Patty. Along
wii Ii general regulations, officers' statutes have been promimulgated;
:1 correct s%'stenm of 'agcs has takcmi time 1ic of the former pro-
cedure of alli)wances in kind; the question mif rewards and dccora
tiolls his becti regularized. All these measures strengthened dis
ciplinc and solidarity within the army, and have instilled a greater

sense of responsibility among officers and warrant ofliccrs as
well as among sokhcrs.
  Military training and political education arc key tasks hi the
building of the ariiiy in peacetime. Coiiilait rcg(Ilat ions and tacti-
cal concepts and principles gain particular
                                              illiportanCe. i'hc
objective is to synthesize past experiences and to analy7.C our army
organization and cquipment in relation to our economic struc-
ture and the terrain of the country_a land of forests and jhiglcs,
of plains and fields. The problem is to assimilate vcll the iiiodcrn
military science of the armies of our brother countries. Unceas-
ing effort is indispensable in the training of troops and tile (level
opnlent of cadres.
  For many years, the Vietnam People's Aiiiiy was l)ascd on
voluntary service: All officers and soldiers voiuttaii ly eni istcd for
an indefinite period. Its ranks swelled with youth always ready
to answer the appeal of the Fatherland. Since the return of
it has become necessary to replace voluntary service l)y colilpili
sory military service. This substitution has met with
sponse from the population. A great nuinbcr of voiuntcers, ifter
demobilization, returned to fields and factories; others are work-
ing in units assigned to production worlc, thus making an active
contribution to the l)uilding of socialism. Conscription is enforced
on the basis of the strengthening and dcvclopiiicnt of the sell
defense organizations in the communes, factorics, and schools.
The members of these paramilitary organizations arc ready nut
only to rejoin the l)ernlatlent army, of w'hichi they constitute a
particularly important reserve, but also to ensure the securit' and
defense of their localities.
  The People's A riny was closely linked wi ii
                                            t I ie national lii )C ri
tion war, in the fire of which it was born and grew up. At present,
its development should be disassociated neither froni t lie building
of socialism in the North, nor from the people's struggle for a
reunified, independent, and democratic Victutaiti. Confident of the
people's affection and support, in these (lay's of 1)cicc as (lurilig
the svar, the army will achieve its taslcs to (Iclctid peace and the
Fad ic rla n d.
  Right at the founding of our army, the first aruiicd groups and
platoons had their Party groups and branches. ilie platoons had

their political commissars. As soon as they were forllled, the regillients had political Coinnnssars. rhe method of Party cni
uuittCe talcmg the lead and the conunander illottiiig tbc work also took shaj)e froui the very first days. Officers were provided with handl)ooks, The l'olitical Commissar's hook or Political Work in the Army.

A ftcr the August Revolution, the traditional iiiethod of Party leadership and political worlc WaS basically kept up. In the first years, however, there appeared a tendency not to take into due account the part played by political woric, and the political workers did not yet grasp that the main task was political educa
di iii and ideological leadership. Sometimes, the Party's 1)olitical agitation in the army was not closely coordinatcd with Party work. After the Second Party Congress, the Party's leadership strengthened in the ariiiy as in all other branches of activity.

Ideological remolding courses in the Party and the army brought alunit increased education in political and military policies.

In contrast with arillies of the exploiting Class, our army put iIit() practice a regime of internal democracy from its inception.

Internal relations between officers and irien as well as relations between the army and the people express coiiiplcte Unity of mind.

Recause of the demand of revolutionary work, there are in our army differences in ranks and offices, bitt these differences have hot 1n(l cannot influence time relations of political equality in the arimmy. lor this reason, internal demimocracy should ahI(l could be carried out in time aIiImy. lo practice democracy is also to apply the mass line of the Party in leading the army.

f)imring the resistance war, democracy was cxcrciscd in three W:i's and brought about good results:
I. l'oliiical democracy. At grassroot level, deimmocratic meetings and army congresses were held regularly So that imien as well oliiccrs had due opportunity to speak their views on fighting, work, stu(ly, and living questions. In our army, hot only have the officers the right to criticize the soldiers t)ut time latter also have time right to criticize the foriuier.

1lilitary democracy. Iii fighting as 'cll as in training, tlcm
ocratic meetings were called whenever circumstances permitted, to expound plans, proitiote initiative, and ovcrcniiie (Iiflicultics.

3. Economic democracy. In our army, oIflccrs and soldiers have the Fight to takc part in the inanagcnicnt and ii nproveinelit of material life. Finance is public. Thanks to the carrying out of democracy in an extcnsive way, we succeeded iii promoting the activity and creativeness of the masses of officers and men, and concentrai ilig their wisdom to solve the most difficult atii coiii
plicated problems; also thanks to it, internal unity was strengthened and the effectiveness of our army increased.

Under i he denmeratic regime, our army still has very strict, conscious discipline. Conscious discipline is built up oti the political consciousness of officers and men. The iiiost important iiietliod for maintaining discipline is education and pcrsLI:Isiorl, thus iiiak
ing the soldiers, of their own accord, respect and reimmind each other to ()l)serve discipline. When we speak of strict (lisci1)liJlc, we mean that everyone in the army, regardless of iank or office must observe discipline. No infringements are allowed.

Our army has always thought highly of discipline because it has been educated by the Party and knows that discipline is one of the I;ictors that improve combat effectiveness. ]]icrcfore, absolute obedience to orders and strict ohservaiice of discipline were writrcn down clearly in the ten pledges (If lioimr. Thanks to that, (lie tasks set by the Party were ftillillcd and all fighting orders were thormiglily carried out. in ext'iciiicl hard :ind ,rdtiotis circumstances. Now that our army is lou Iding itself into a regular and modern one, the demand for (lisci1)line, ccuitralii.iu
tion, and tunilication is all the greater.

Modernization of the army is virtually a echnical jevu ltut ion.

The more advanced our arms and technijuucs, the uuiore do we uieed men who are able to master theuui. Ut herwisc, ii todern tech
nical equipment cannot develop its effectiveness auu(l the army's efficiency will not be increased. This is a great responsibility in training.

Training of offiecus is central. The officers have been tested and tempered in actual lighting and have experience iii Inuibliuig the aruimy and leading time fighting. Ilowever, because they have grown up in the circumstances of guerrilla \'at, our officers arc wcalc in iiiodcrn tactics. Therefore, whik they have ceaselessly Ui raise their
(ilirical and ideological level, consolidate their class stand, and cultivate MarxistLeninist theory, they must, at the saiiic tiiiic, do thcir bcst to advaiicc their tcchnical military sci
cilce. lliis is of particular importance in the l)uulding of thc army at the present time.

Our Party ;idvocatcd that, to launch the people's var, it was iicccssary to have three kinds of armed forces. It attached great
11111u)rtancc to the building and dcvelopiiicnt Of selfdefense units and guerrilla units. Militia was set up everywhere. Thanks to the
(oundiiig of people's adnunisration everywhere in the countryside, and the existence of Party branches in every place, the militia spread far and wide and the people rose to fight. In the enemy's rear, guerrilla units, in coordination with the regular army, scattered and wore out the enemy, nailed them to their bases, so that our regular anny could launch mobile fighting to
:Innil)ilate theni. lucy turned the enemy rear into our front line and Inmilt guerrilla bases as starting points for our regular army's O(fe,siVC, right iii the heart of the enemy. They protected the people and their property, fought the enemy and kept up pro
(lliction, an(l frustrated the enemy's schemes to use war to feed and \'ictnamncsc to fight Vietnamese. In the free zones, guerrilla units effectively fought the enemy and kept watch on traitors; they were effective instruments for the local administra
io and local Party; at the same time, they were the shock force iii production, transport, and supply. Through combat and work, th guerrilla units became an inexhaustible and precious source of replcnislnmmcut fur the regular army, supplying it with men and officers who 'cre politically well educated and rich in fighting experience.

l'he situation has now changed and the revolution has shifted to a new stage. Our People's Army is becoming a regular and timodern army. If a new war breaks out, it will be a modern war.

Ihit on our side, war 'i{l always be a people's war. Consequently, instead of playing a Junior part, the militia will be more important. The militia will always be a strategic force, arid the guerrilla a strategic problem. In the future, as formerly, our armed forces 'ill include not only the regular army, but also the people's

armed and semiarnied forces which coordinate with the a iii
                                                            iii
military operations.
  At present, in peacetime, North Victnaiii is advancing to soiiii
ism. The struggle between two paths, socialism or capitalasit
                                                            is
being waged in town and countryside. \'Vc must consolidate
                                                            ni
intensify proletarian dictatorship; thus, the strengthening ol tic
selfdefense units in the countryside, cities, offices, and cotcip ikus
has all the more significance.
  Parallel with the building (if a perillaneilt army, a great ruscive
must be built,
               aimed at orgalwi.iug
                                    aitti educating the
                                                       lIi;lsscs
militarily. l'he base of the reserve is the selfdefense units. Their
tasks are: to replenish the permanent army; to maintain security
and protect production; to serve the front line and carry out
guerrilla activities in wartime.
  To consolidate and develop the selfdefense units, to multi
                                                             1
strong reserve, is a most important task, especially in peaccu hue,
when a substantial reduction has been utiade in the strengu Ii of
the permanent army in order to divert manpower to cconoiine
reconstruction. To perform this taslc satisfactorily, it is necessary
to grasp thoroughly the theory of people's war. We niust si icl
to the class line in organization and education, develop
                                                          I lie
militia's fine tradition and precious experience, and strengthen
the close relation between the permanent army, the militia, auiti
the reserve. At the same time, the leadership of Party commit Ices
in the local military organs, the miiilitia, and the FCSCIVC lutist
                                                           I
improved.

## Hi.

Dien Bien Phu was the greatest victory scored by the \'icI ni ii
People's army. It marked an important turn in the uuilitary and
political situation in Indochina. The solidarity of our a iuiiy amid
people in the struggle was the decisive factor in our success. A iii
this is the greatest lesson we have drawn front our expcmicincs.
Dien Bien Phit taught us that:
  A weak and small nation and a people's arIIty, once icud tct I
to stand up, to unite together, and to tight for independence intl
peace, will have the full power to defeat all aggressive fonts,

even t Itosc of au imperialist powcr such as i1111)crialist France aided l)' the Unitcd States.

At the start of the winter of 1953, the patriotic war of our plc cntered its eighth year.

Since the frontier caulipaign I the counteroffensive in the Vict
naiit( .hina In)rdCr region iii l9O I, our anii' had scored successive victories in many caultpaigns an(l kept the initiative on all i)att lefronts in North \1ietnhin. A ftcr the liberation of I-ba unit, the guerrilla bases in the Red River l)elta were extended, and vast areas in the northwest were won back one after the other.

1 ]te enemy found that to save the Situation they had to I)ring in rein lorceinents, reshuffle generals, and map out a new plait. At that dine, the war in Korea had just coutie to an end. It was in these cit cuitistances that I the lrautcoA,itcncaut iiiiperialists I
w ,ILe(l itiut the Nava rre Plait.

In
:u word, the Navaure Plait was a hugescale strategic plan aimed it wiping out the greater part of our main forces within eighteen itiontlis, and occupying our whole territory.

Ott the one hand, they decided to concentrate their forces in the Red River Delta in the autuiiin and winter of 1953 to mop up our guerrilla bases; on the other hand, they planned to launch attacks out our free rone in order to attract and exltausr our main forces. SinnultanCousI)', they intended to create new battalions of
1)ttJ)1)ct soldieis and regroup new units.

In accordance with this plan, in the first stage fairly strong uttuhik forces would he regrouped in the Red River i)clta to ittack and wear out our main forces, at the saute time occupying I )ieui lien Phuthius turning rite temporarily occupied area in the utorthiwest into a strong springboard.

Then, tiuring the rainy season, s'hen our main forces might he ex1)ected to he worn out, the enemy would rush forces to the Smith to occupy all our free zones and guerrilla bases iii the Fifth Lotte lone of the Zones into vIiicli Victuauit was divided dii ring i lie var and Nauti Ho.

1)tu ring the autninti and winter of 1955, a ftcr t lie "pacification''
of the South, very strong mobile forces won Id be regrouped out the l)attlefront of the Nort it to launch a big offensive against our rear. Starting simultaneously from the Delta and Dien Bien Phu, the powerful titolule mass of the French Army would annihilate our iiii forces, occupy our free zone, and bring the war to a smicccsslul end.

In the autumn of 1953, General Navarre launched this strategic plan. Vith tlc sh)gans "Always kecp the initiative," and "Always on the offensive," the I ugh Command of the Frcnch Expeditionary Corps concentrated in thc Red River I)clta fortyfour mobile l,attalions, launched fierce mopping_up operations in its rear,
:mtraclcctl Ninh Binh and Nito Quan, thrcatcncd Thanhhoa, para
cluited trnps on I 'ang Son, and threatened Phu Tho. At the tilime, they anned local bandits to sow confusion in the northwest. Then, on J;itmuary 20,
1954, Navarre dropped parachute trops to occupy l)icn Bien Phu. His plan was to reoccupy Na San, consolidate Lai Chau, and extend the occupied zone in the northwest.

About November, after wiping out a part of the enemy's forces on the Ninh Bjnh liattlefront, our anny opened the winterspring callipaign to smash the Navarre Plan of the American and French iiipe na lists.

In I)eceimihcr, 1953, our troops marched on the northwest,
;iiiihilatcd aim imn,,ortanl part of the enemy's manpower, liberated I ai Chan, and encircled I )icn Bicn P1w.

Also iii l)eccniher, the Pathet Lao forces and the Vietnam People's Volunteers launched an offensive in Middle Laos, wiped out important enemy lorces, liberated Thakhelc, and reached the Mckon'g River.

Jn.January, 1954, in the Fifth Zone, our troops launched an rcisivc o, the Western 1-lighlands, annihilated considerable enemimy Immnpower, liberated the town of Kontumn, and came into contact wt Ii time newly liberated I3oloven Highlands, in Lower I .aos.

Also in January of that year, the Pathet I ao forces and the Victimaii, People's Volunteers launched an offensive in Upper I aos, swept away important enemy forces, liberated the Namn
1 Iii basin, and threatened Luang Prabaug.

Ilmroughout this period, in the areas behind the enemy lines in North and Central Vietnam, as well as in the southernmost

 part of Trung 13o, and in Nam Ho, gucrrilla warfare was grcat Jy
 intensified.
   In the second wcck of March, tliinkiiig that our offensive was
 over, the enemy regrouped a part of their forces to resume the
 ''Atlanta" campaign in the south of l'rung Ho and to occupy
 Quy Nhon on March 12.
   On the next day, March 13, our troops launched the big offen-
 sive against the camp entrenched at E)icn lieu Phu.
   Our troops fought on the l)icn then Phu I)attleflel(1 fo flit)'
 five days and nights until the complete destruction of the cii
 trcnched camp was bnmght about on May 7, 1954.
   The winter_spring campaign of our army ciided with a historic
victory.
   The strategic direction of the Dien then Pliti cairipaign and
of the winter 1953spring 1954 campaign iii general was a typical
success of the rcvolutionary military line of MarxisniLcuinisiii
applied to the actual conditions of the I'evolutionary war in
Vietnam.
   Our strategy started froiti thorough analysis of the enemy's
contradictions. It aunied at concentrating our forces iii the enemy's
relatively exposed sectors, annihilating their ilianpower,. liberating
a part of the territory, and compelling them
                                             to scatter their forces,
thus creating favorable conditions for a decisive victory.
  For the French Expcditionar Corps, the war vaS a continuous
process of dispersal of forces. The enemy divisions were split
into regiments, then into battalions, companies, and platoons, to
be stationed at thousands of points and posts on the various l)attle
fronts of the Indochina theater of operations.
                                                 flie enemy found
himself face to face with a contradiction: Without scattering his
forces, it would be immipossiblc for him
                                           to occupy the invaded
territory; in scattering his forces, he put himitseif in (liflicmIltics.
The scatrcrc(l units would fall easy prey to our troops, their
mobile forces would be more and more reduced, and the short-
age of troops would he all the more acute. On the other hand,
if they concentrated their forces to move from the defensive
position and cope with us with more initiative, the occupation
forces would be weakened and it would be diflicult for them to

hold the invaded territory. Now, if the enemy gives up occupied tcrritory, the very aim of the war of rcconquest is defeated.

Our strategic line was to extend guerrilla w'arfarc everywhere.

,iid in each theater of operations, w'c cliosc the positions where tile CI1CI1I was relatively weak to concentrate our forces there and annihilate his manpower. As a result, tlic more we fought, the stronger we became; our forces grew with every passing day.

And parallel with the process of the enemy's dispersal of forces, our arincd forces unccasiuigly intensi IIc(l :10(1 eXteIldc(I guerrilla activities, while building up regular units. We vcnt gradually fioi,i ifldCpCU(lCnt companies operating separately to iiiobile bat
t:I lions, then froni battalions to regiments and divisions.

In 1953, when the Navarre Plan was being worked out, the liciicli inipertalists found thcinsclvcs faced w'ith a dilemma: lack of forces to win back the initiative, to attack and annihilate our iimam forces. They set to building UI) their fighting forces again at all costs, and, iii fact, they (liti concentrate big forces in the Red River l)elta. 'wVith these forces, they hoped to wear out our ti1:iiIi forces, and compel us to scatter our army between the I )elta and tile Ilmountainous regions, vitii a view to carrying out their plan gradually and preparing for a big (lecisi'e offensive.

\Vc were determined to break the Navarre Plan. But how to do it? Vaced with the new difficulties, it was necessary to analyze I lie Sit tiatioli to tletcriiiic a correct line of Ictioul which would ensure success.

ilie concrete problem was: l'he enemy was concentrating forces in the Red River I )elta, and launching attacks on our free zones. Now, should we concentrate our forces to face the enemy, or ii u il,ilize thcmil for attacks in other directions? 'l'hc 1)101)1cm was ditlicult. In concCnrrating our forces to tight the enemy in the I )clt:i, we could defend our free zone; but here the enemy was still strong and we could easily be decimated. On tile other hand, in It ticking in other directions with our 111am forces, we could exploit the vulnerable points of tile CflCi3i to annihilate tile 1)uIlc of their forces; bUt our free zone would thus be threatened.

A ftcr a careful study of the situation, the Party's Central Corn
limit tee issued the following slogan to break the Navarre Plan:
"I)ymunism, initiative, mo)biiity, and rapidity of decision in face of new situations.'' Keeping the initiative, w'e should concentrate our forces to attack strategic points which were relatively vu1
ncrablc. If we succeeded in keeping the
11111 1:1 t iVe, We Could achieve successes and coliupel the enemy to scat icr their forces, and finally, their phui i to threaten our free zone could itot he realized. On the other hand, if we were d ii vcn on tIle olefensi ye, not only could we not annihilate many enemy forces, hut iniu own force could easily stiffer losses, and it would tic difficult for us to Inca k the emieiiiy threat.

Always convinced that the essential thing was to destroy the encmiiy's IliallpowCr, t lie Central Committee worked out its plan of action by scientilic analysis:
to concentrate our ofFensive against flilportant strategic points w'here die ciicuiiy 'crc relatively weak iii order to wipe out a part (If thiei r itianpower, at the sailie time coiiipchliiig them to scatter their forces to cope with us at vital points which they had to defend at all costs.

This strategy proved correct. While the cneiiiy was trating big forces in the l)elta to threaten our frce tonic, instead of leaving our main forces in the Delta or scattering our forces in the free zone to defend it by a defensive action, we regrinipeol our forces and boldly attacked in the direction of the mu rt liwcst.

Indeed, our divisions marched on the northwest with an irre
sistifile immipeums, swept away thousands of local l)alldits at Son l.a and 'lhtian Cliau, and liberated I ai Chati, totting to pieces the greater part 0f the cm1ciny's column, which lied frommi I ai Cliau.

Siiiiultaneously, we encircled Dicn Bien Phu, thus comnpehliuig the enciiiy to carry' out iii haste a reinforceiiictit illovemilent to save it fronmi being wi1,cd out. In addition to the iled River l)elta, l)ien lieu Phim became a second point of concentration (if cnemiiy forces.

Concurrently with our OfFensive ii the northwest, the I autian
\riCtIi1flCSC joint forces launched a second offensive iii :111 iIii1)Ot
tant (hirection where t lie emielily was relatively exposed, t lie i\ lid
die Laos front.

Several cneiiiy miiohuhe units were annihilated nid the tuwli (if
'l'hakhek was liberated. Hie joint forces pushed on in the direction of Seno, an important enemy air base in Sa 'amimialchiet. The enemy had to rush forces in haste from the Red River I )elta and from all other L)attlCuiCldS to reinforce Seno, thus turning it into a third point of concentration of their forces.

In spite of defeats at various points, the enemy remained sub
eetivc in making estimates. Bccausc of the case with which they occupied l)icn lien Phti, the enemy thought we were incapable iii it tacking it. According to their thinking, the entrenched camp was too strong fur our trops. Moreover, they thought that the distance which separated it from our rear created insuperable
'Pl1v obstacles for us. They thought we had passed to the attack it other points because we (lid not know how to deal with Dien lien PIni; they thought that shortly we should be obliged to evacuate the northwest because of supply difficulties; then they would Iitid the iiicans to destroy a part of our main forces and would continue cccntion of their plan: the occupation of Tuan C iao and Son I a, and the return to Na San.

I
was this same suhjectivc estimation which wade them launch the A tiauit:i operation against the south of Pliti Yen in the Fifth Lone. This wellprepared attack was the first step in the occupa
tion of our whole free zone in the south of Central Vietnam, as foreseen by the Navarre Plan.

Iarly in 1954, while the enemy were feverishly making prepara
nuns for their offensive against our free territory in the Fifth our plan was to leave only a small part of our forces to protect our rear and to concentrate big forces to attack the West
crim I highlands, winch ere an important strategic position where the enemy were relatively exposed. Our advance to the Vestcrn I lighl:iiitls was accuIlm1)anied by resounding victories. Important eflCIliy 110115 were wiped out, and the town and whole province of Kuntuimi were liberated. Our troops made a raid on Pleiku, coiiipcllisig the enemy to dispatch more troops there in reinforce
illeilt, and turning PIci 1< u and various bases on the Western Highlands into a fourth point of concentration of French forces.

I )uring the mimic period, to create a diversion that would let nil I mops Step p re)1I1ti0ns at i)ien then P1w, the Laotian:.

\'ielnaiiicsc joint forces had launched an offensive in Upper Laos I room I )ien lemi Ilimi. Several enemy units were wiped out and the vast Nani I in basin was liberated. The enemy 'as compelled to

rush additional forccs to Luang Prabang, which bccaine the fifth
point of Concentration of French forces.
  In the first phase of the winterspring campaign, after three
months of activity by our army, the enemy had suffered great
losses on all battlefields. Many vast areas of strategic importance
had bCCO liberated, anti the Navarrc Plan of rcgroupnient of
forces was foiled. 'I 'he enemy, 'ho had made grcat efforts to
regroup fairly strong mobile forces on a single battlefieldthe
Red River Deltawere compelled to change their plan by coi'
centrating forces on a smaller scale at many different points. In
other words, the Navarrc Plan of active rcgroupmncnt of forces
had in fact been turned into a compulsory dispersal of these same
forces. The muchvaunted "Navarre mobile corps" in the Delta
had been icduced from fortyfour to twenty battalions, and a
great part of this force was no longer mol ii Ic. It had to be scat-
tered in order to protect the comnniunication lines. It vas the
beginning of the end of the Navarre Plan.
  For US, the Il rst phase of the wintcr-spmimIg camipaign was a
series of offensives launched simultaneously on various important
sectors where the enemy were relatively exposed, in which we
annihilated part of the enemy's forces and liberated occupied
areas, at the same time compelling 'the enemy to scatter their
forces in many directions. We continually kept the initiative in
the operations an(l drove die chcmy on the defensive. Also in
this periol, on the main bau lefront, we pinned down the enemy
at 1)icn Bicn Plui, thus crcating favorable conditions for our
troops on other battlefields. Iii the national theater of operations,
there was largesea Ic coordination between t he main battlefields
and the theaters of operation in the cncioiy's rear. In each theater,
there was also close coordination between the main battlefield
and the fronts in the enemy's rear. On the Indochinese battle
fi-ont, Dien Then Plum became the strongest base of regroupnient
of the enemy forces and therefore the mimost iiio1mrrant battlefield.
As Dien Bien Phu had been encircled for a long rimmic, there were
new favorable conditions for intensifying guerrilla activitics and
winning Iliajor successes in the Red River I )ch a, and in the s 'tot hI

em part of Tmiing Ilo, as well as in Naomi Ho. Fhie cneiiiy lacked the forces to launch moppingup operations on any considerable scale. i)uring this titHe, our free zones w'crc no longer threatened. Moreover, our coilipatriots in the free zones could go to w rk even in thc dayriiiie without licing molested by enemy tire ta I t.

W.IS also in the cotiisc of the first phase of the litter-Spring canipilign that we completed our 1)rcparations lou thc assault on
)kn lflcut Phit. i)uriiig this 1)cliO(l, I he d151)OSitiOulS of the fortified enrrcnchcd caitp had also undergone great changes. On the one hand, the enemy's forces had I teen increased and thei i defenses strengthened; on the other hand, after the successive liberation of
,ai Chati, Phong Saly, and the Nain Flu river valley, Dien Bien Phu was coiupletcly isolated, sonic hundreds of miles from its nearest supply E)ascs, Hanoi and the Plaine des Jarres.

rotn March 13, 1954, there began the second period of the vuttcr_-spring campaign. We launched the big offensive against I he fortified entrenched camp at I )icn lien l'hu.

his was 1 flew srcp itt the progress of the hostilities. Sticking firmly to our strategic principlesdyiiamiiisun, initiative, mobility, and rapidity of decision in the face of new situationsand having the conditions for victory well in hand, we directed our main attacic on the most powerful entrenched camp of the enemy. The task of our regular forces on the main battlefield was no longer to encircle and immobilize the enemy in their barracks, but to go over to the auack and to concentrate forces to annihilate l)ieui Rico Pint.

The task of the other battlefronts in the north, center, and south of Vietmani was to intensify activities continuously in coordination with l)ien lien Phu, in order to annihilate more enemy mitanpower, and scatter and pin down enemy forces, thus hampering the envmy in their efforts to reinforce 1)ien lien Phu.

the I )iemi lieu Putt battlefield, our coInt)ataults fought with rcmoa rkahie heroism and stubbornness. On all the coordinated battklromtts our troops did their utmost to overconie very great dithctmltics. They reorgaiiizcd their forces while fighting, and carried out the order of coordination with admirable detcniiina
ion and heroism.

Such was the essence of the strategic direction of the Dien lien Phim callipaign and of the winter__spring campaign as a whole. Its mliain object 'as the destruction of enemy manpower.

It took full advantage of the contradictions in which the enemy was involved and devclopc(l to the utmost the Spirit of activc Offensive of the revolutionary army. This correct, clearsighted, and 1)01(1 strategy cnal)led us to deprive the enemy of all J)OSSI
IHIity (If retrieving the initiative, and to create fiIvoraI)lC COfl(li
turns to light a dccisive battle on a battlefield chosen 1d 1cpiI
for by us. Fliis stratcgic dircurion cnsurcd the success of the whole winterspring campaign which was crowned by the great victory of l)ien lien Phu.

# Street 'Without Joy * Bernard B. Fall

lor years, comniumcations along the central Annam coast had bCen plagued by Coiiiinunist attacks against Road I, the main north-south artery along the coast. The principal source of rr(ml)tc was a string of heavily fortified villagcs along a line of sand dunes and salt marshes stretching from I-me to Quangtri.

l' 1953, the Fi-ench High Command had asseml)led sufficient i-escrves in time area to attempt to clear up the threat once and for all. In the meantime, losses had been heavy; one French COflVO
after another passing on the road had been either shelled or am hushed by the blackclad infantry of Vietminh Regiment NimIty live, a battlehardened, regular Communist unit infiltrated behind Fm-encI lines. This inspired the French soldiers, with that kind of hlack hummmor proper to all soldiers, to christen that stretch of Road I "Ia rUt' sans jole," in English, "Street Without Joy.''
Iii J nl', 1953, the French I I igh Commmim mand decided to clean up the Street Without Joy. Called "Operation Camargue," the action involved a imultaneous landing of troops along the sandy coast
(11 central A nnaun, coupled with two coordinated thrusts L)y amimmored units, with airborne forces remaining in reserve to seal
(iff attenpts at escape by time Commminist forces in the trap. With the elements of 10 infantry regiments, 2 airborne battalions, the hulk of 3 armored regiments, I squadron of armored launches IIi(I
I armored train, 4 artillery battalions, 34 transport aircraft, o reconnaissance aircraft, and 22 fighter_bombers, and about 12
navy ships, including 3 I ST'sthis force was not very inferior

in Size to some of those used in landing operations in 'vVorld War
II in the Pacific. (.ommuuist Regiment Nincty_livc and the few
guerrilla forces around it obviously had very little chance of
escaping the encirclement.
  ihe attack was to be carried Out by two amphibious forces,
three landborne grunplnents, and one airborne force, under the
overall command f General I ehlanc, with each of thc taslc
forces under command of a colonel.
  Groupwent A was to land on the coast on July 28, at dawn.
Grouprnent B was to advance overland in the north aI)out two
hours later and veer south behind the line of advance of Group
ment A. Groupn'ient C was to participate in the attack at about
the same time as Groupwent B at 0715, advance directly on the
Van Trinh Canal, and push all enemy elements west of the canal
against the canal ot across it. Groupincnr C %'as to pay particular
attention to the coordination of its movements with C roupment
D, which was to hind south of Groupmcnt A on the northern
peninsula of the lagoon.
  Croupment D, in turn, was to land as early as possible, at 0300
for its amphibious elements and at 0500 for its infantry, and push)
northward across the peninsula in order to form a comition front
with Groupment C as Soon as possible. The two airl)orne bat-
talions were held in reserve at the disposal of the I-ugh Coniinand
and were to be coniiiitted only upon its express permission. i'his
was to have serious consequences when rhcy were finally thrown
into the battle.
  At first view, thic forces assigned to this operation appeared
iillpressivc. Using a force of more than thirty battaliotis and two
artillery regiments, the operation against the Street Without Joy
was certainly one of the most formidable ever carried out in the
Indochinese theater of operations. Yet the enemy, on the other
side, amounted to a maximum of one weak infantry regiment.
What itiade the Operation so difficult for the French was, as usual
in Indochina, the terrain.
  From the coast, looking inland, the zone of operations divided
itself into seven disdnct natural strips of land. The first was the
coastline itself, fairly straight, covered with hard sand, and offer-
ing no diculties. I-lowever, a bare 110 yards beyond began the

dunes, varying in height front 15 to 60 feet, very hard to climb, and cuiding on the land side in veritable ditches or precipices. A
few fishing villages were precariously perched in the dune zone,
'litch in certain places had a depth of more than a mile. Then c:Iiute a 'i.one :iltotit 75 yards deep, euitircly covered with small pagodas, Or tOIltl)S aii(I tcmnples, which offered excellent protection to any defenders. This zone was followed by the Street
\',tliout Joy itself, Iringcd by :t rather ctirnnus system of inter
h cking sinai1 villages separated one fromim the other, often by less thait 200 to 300 yards. Facli village foruimed a veritable little labyrinth, which mucasi mcd barely more than 200 feet by 300 feet and was surrounded by bushes, hedges, or batuuhoo trees, and suuiall fences which made ground as well as aerial surveillance almost impossible. Regiment Ninetylive had spent more than two years fortifying the villages with an interlocking system of trenches and tunnels, underground anus depots, and rstaid stations, which no single l)rutnl thrust by large mutobile forces con 1(1 uncover or destroy. Close to 20 nuiles long and more thaut
30() yards wide, this zone of villages constituted the heart of the Comnniunist resistance zone a long the central A nnam coast.

Ott the land side, rite Street \Vit hour Joy was preceded by another, less welldefined line of villages, the center of which was Van Trinh. This was protected in turn by a vast zone of swamps, sand holes, and (1uicksand bogs, extending all the way to Road 1.

\'itlu an average width of about five muuiles, it constituted an almost imnpassal)le barrier to tanks and other motorized vehicles of the French Army, except on the few' roads crossing it, which were, of course, heavily iiuined and sabotaged. ibis, in short, was the fortress known as the Street Without Joy, which the French were now determined to crack in a comlil)ined air, sea, and land mssau It.

\'hu.ur further comumj)licate(l the situation for the French was that the villages had retained their civilian populatioiu of small farmers and fishermen. Since this population w'as, theoretically at least, to be considered ''frien(lly,'' the French I ugh Command distributed directives to all its units on the day before the opera
lion began that they had to show a "liumnauie attitude'' and treat civilians respectfully. Above all, they were not to bombard vil
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lages or set fire to them. It is certain that the limitations placed upon the employment of their weapons reduced the effectiveness of the French assault, particularly 'hen it caine into direct contact with major Vietininli resistance areas.

U hour was at dawn on July 28, 1953. l'hc lumbering LST's had left their assembly areas the evening before, and had steamed throughout the night toward their landing zone in the center of the coast facing the Street \Vnhout Joy. l)iseiiibarkment of the amphibious landing craft began at 0400 in a clanking of metal and a howling of engines, as the Crabs and Alligators of the Third Amphibious Group took to the water.

The Crabs and Alligators were French nicknames for two Americanbuilt amphibious vehicles. The Crab was an amphib
ions cargo carrier 29-C and the Alligator an LVT (landing vehicle, tracked) 4 or 4A. As their names indicated, the Crabs were never destined to bccoiiie a combat vehicle, but the French in Indochina soon found that the whole squadron of Crabs could render immense service as carriers of amphibious task forces o)crating in the roadless swamps and rice paddies of Vietnamese lowlands and coastal areas.

At first, these unarmored vehicles, lightly arnied with a few iiia
chine guns and mortars, became the victims of enemy bazookas.

This led to a change in tactics, and by 1953 the amphibious group and aiilpliil)ious subgroup had l)ecollie regular units of the French A rinored Forces in Indochina. They were regularly composed of s(1uadrons of thirty_three Crabs each, which were used as reconnaissance and pursuit elements; three squa(lrons of Alligators, which formed the breakthrough force, since they were both ariiicd and armored; and, finally, one platoon of six LVT's armed with howitzers providing the group with its own nmbile artillery.

On the negative side, both types of vehicle were considered fragile and required a great (Ical of maintenance, which was often hard to come by in the swamps of ludocluna. The Crabinitially built for carrying cargo in Alaskalacked floatability in water and towered too high on land, tlitis offering an easy target to eiiciiiy gunners, who soon found out that it was not armored.

On the other hand, it was small enough to be transported on an arIIly truck when not in use, or could be embarked in tight land

ing craft or barges. The Alligator, much heavier atid armored,
took vell to the Water but was too heavy on laud tor its fragile
tracks and relatively weak engine. Also, it could not travel great
distances on lat id but had to be transported on special tank car-
riers, since it was too big and too heavy to l)C transported on
trucks.
  Yet, it was an impressive sight as the 160 vehicles f the Third
Amphibious ( roup approached the A unain coast, each leaving
a wide wake in the leadencolored water, with the bright recog-
nition streamers of the various groups flapping in the morning
breeze on the lips of the radio aerials. At 0600 the first landing
wave of the aiiiphibious group hit the beaches, inuiicdiately fan-
ning our through the coastal villages and occupying the first hill-
crest line overlooking the coastal dunes. The French assault
against the Street Without Joy had begun.
  The regular infantry eleiiicnts of the Tonldiicse Mobile Group
had a tougher time of it. Of the three battalions, only onethe
Third Battalion of the Thirteenth Foreign Legion EIalfBrigadc_
had had any experience in seaborne operations; the other two
battalions, the First Mitong Mountaineers and the i'wciity_sixthi
Senegalese Rifle Battalion, had had no such experience. Unfaii,ihiar
with the landing ship's cargo nets and the rocking landing craft,
and plagued with seasickness, it took them close to four hours to
get ashore instead of the two hours assigned to that part of the
operation. In the meantime, the men of the Third Amphibious
Group were struggling with their vehicles atop the dune line.
Many of the heavily loaded Alligators had hogged down in the
sand as soon as they had left the coastal strip and had to be
unloaded on the spot. In many other cases, the lighter Crabs had
ptisticd on atop the dunes only to find theitisclves face to face
with a deep precipice. I lowever, they finally found a break be-
tween the fishing villages of Tan An and i\'ly I'huy, and soon
began ustiiiig inland on their own. Cotnnitiiiist resistance was
alitiost nonexistent. A few men were seen fleeing the first line (if
fishing villages near My Thuy, and farther to the north, two
enemy pIatoons.vere seen pulling out.
  In the meantime, Groupment B, under the command of Colonel
du Corail, had not remained inactive. By 0630, two battalioiis

of the Central Vietnamese Mobile Group reached and crossed the Van Trinh Canal, and by 0745, the lead elements of Groupnient saw the squattish shapes of the Third Amphibious Group's Crabs crawling over the hill line; the Street \'Vithout Joy was scaled off to the north.

lo the right of the Central Vietnamese Mobile Group, the Sixth T loroccan Spahis were not so lucky. lucy ran head oii iIlt()
the bottomless sw'aIiips nud sand holes east of Road I, where most of their vehicles, with the exccptiou of M24 light ranks, sooti hogged down. They succeeded in reaching the canalwhich was to be the line of departure for the floppingup operation on the land sideat about 0830. In their sector, also, there was no sign of enemy opposition. In fact, the whole countryside scenied abso
intel)T dead. No farmers were to be seen on the roads, and in the siiiall villages the population stayed iii thci r houses. lhroughout he whole desolate landscape, the Only moving objects were the French armored columns and truckborne infantry, as they staggered through sand dunes and morasses to the Van Triuli Canal.

Only at the extreme Light (lank of Grouptuent B was there any shooting. There, an Algerian rifle company ran into unex
1ected lire from 'hat appeared to be 110 inure than twenty or thirty Victmninh. Private Mohamniiied A bdelKader of Second Company fell forward as a burst of fire from a Browning Auto
iiwtic Rifle caught him directly in the chest. Varily, his (.'(UhiIa(lCS
Iauiiicd out ill shii'iiijsht formation and shot hack at tile illvisil)le enciiy hidden behind clumps of bushes and in sand holes. Abdel
Kader was tile' first French casualty in the assault.

1(1 the right of Croupuient B, Groupmcnt C, under I.ieutenant Colonel Cauthiier, had to execute tile most complicated maneuver I the operatiOn. '[lie bulk of its troops crossed Road I in the diu'cct iou of the canal to the north of My Chanh. A second coi
1111111 started along a path running parallel to Road 1, then veered si ia lpI' to tile right to reach tile canal between tile VIllage of \Tan I riuih 111(1 tile lagoon. Lastly, the Ninth Moroccan Tabor (Bat
t:Iiit)Il), cu,ihai'kcd oil landing craft, went ashore at LaiHa at tIn 10. .t't'uured i l)c:fl'l1i1&'aI, mild then sw'uhlg southeast along tile uuuI,ui,,l i'''.Ist of time l;it.uoui iii order to cuuumpktc tile sealingoff of lie Si icet \ 'ii limit Jo' on t lie land side. By 0830, it had reached

TayHoang and completed its part of the operation's first phase.
  Groupmnt D, under command of Lieutenant Colonel Le
Hagre, was to seal off the long peninsula reaching down along
the lagoon almost, to the city of Hue. Composed of eXperienced
troopS, it encotintercd little of the difficultics which had faced
Groupment A. The landing began at 0430, with the Scvcnth
Amphibious Group in the lead, followed in rapid SUCCeSSIOn by
Marine commandos and the Third Battalion of the Third Algerian
Rifle Regiment. The commandos and the amphibious group hit
the beach almost without stopping; the amphibious group imme-
diately headed north in the direction of the head of the lagoon,
while the commandos secured the little city of Time Clii Dcnmg
and, cutting straight aCross the peninsula, reached the north side
of the lagoon at 0530. For all practical purposes,. Viettuinh Regi-
ment Ninetyfive was trapped.
  Now began the hardest phase of the whole operationthe
mopping 'up. General I cblanc ordered the navy ships standing
offshore to move four immiles to the north of the villages of Ba
Lang and An- Fbi in order to seal off any attcmnpt of the rebels
to flee by sea. On the northern end of the Street Without Joy,
( roupment B began a methodical sweep of every village, a pains-
taking operation which had to be carried out w'ith the greatest
of care, regardless Qf results. .lach village, was first s(mrro(mlmdc(l
;miul scaled off by' troops. ilmcn, heavily itrmnored imif;iimt ry mmmove(l
in and searched the houses, while minedetector and bloodhound
teams probed in l)amnboo hushes and palm_tree stands for hidden
entrances to underground caches in the midst (If the sullen and
silent population. As a lilatter of routine, most of the young mmmcmi
froni the villages were arrested and detained pcmmtling a screening
by intelligence officers, hut even this had becommic a sort of EitC III
which everyone participated without any great Conviction.
  By 1100 in the morning C moupment B had worked its way
about four miles south through the lahy ririt Ii of tiny villages,
without having encountered any resistance, when it reached the
village of DougQue, located almimost iii the CuIIeI' of I In; t rC(:t
Without Jo', at the intersection of several patims leading across
the dunes toward the Van Trinh Canal. In the old tlays it had

contained a ctistouiis post whose brick structure was still standing, and this also gave it a certain importance.

l)ong_Que lay in the hot midday sun, snugly nestled in its swaying l)ainboo hedge, the very image of rural peacefulnessin the niunscion season, when there is little left for the farmer to do but ti) pray for rain and watch the rice grow from a tender green to a rich l)IOWniSlI )'CllO\V. But now, DongQue was the targct
1)1 the M24 light tanks of the Sixth Moroccan Spahis. In fact, the whole nortltcrn thrust seemed to be a Moroccan show, what with the Spahis being screened by the First Battalion, Moroccan Rifles, and the whole force being covered by the howitzers of Colonel I'irotli's Sixty_ninth African Artillery Regiment which, in normal runes, hauled front Icr, in northern Morocco. These were battle
hardened troops; they had fought Rommel in Tunisia, wa(lcd through the Rapido and clambered up the Petrella in Italy, knocked out the German Nineteenth A rniy in the Black Forest, and raced the Americans to Berchtesgaden. They were the elite of l'rancc's North A fuican troops, and more Moroccans had risen
(ci senior rankseveut to generalsin the French Army than any other nationality.

I Icre again, they were doing a workmanlike Jol) clearing their sectors.

Keeping their intervals carefully, the M24 tanks had worked their way toward I )ong_Que at a pace which permitted the infantry to keep with them. With the innate sixth sense which iie Moroccans seem to have for detecting uiiiics and booby traps, they had conic to within 1,500 yards of the village without losing a titan or a tank, mit that same sixth sense told them that something was wrong with l)ongQue. In silence, the infantrymen began to peel off the dike on either side of the tanics.

Atop the vehicles, the tanlc commanders had so far remained sitting on their open hatches, as much to see iiuore of the countryside around ilieni as to catch a breath of breeze. (At the First loreign Legion Ca;i iry, one crew, which must have contained an ex-Nazi electronics engineer, actually succeeded in mounting a regular airconditioner into an armored car. The story came to light when the vehicle got caught in an ambush and its crew went to tiniistutl lengths to defend it, and, when it was disabled, to retrieve it. The uiten were duly decorated for their bravery and then, in true foreign I cgun tradition, were sent to thc si i:iiii:
for "taking libcrrics with Governnicit property.'')
Major l)crrieu, commandcr of thc leading squadron, li I; cii straight ahead into the small town; the road appealeol clear any obstacics or the suspicious nunitids of hastily dug iiiinc ciii placements.Ncvcrthcless, thc tank churned to a halt io id
(li minedetector (ktait iiiakc one last sweep before ohhiiig for tin I.

Methodically, the talIlIC(I lI(Cfl with the Ionghiaiidlc&l fl)' ilig and the carpliones worked their way toward 1)i nigQi it, i II
quiescent under the tropical sun. I ater, it was iinpossihik decidc who had fired tirstthc Moroccan sergeant at the hit'." I
of the. dciiiiuing cktail who saw a rifle barrel flash in the ;iii, or a nervous Vict iiiinh who felt that the Moroccans were get lii too close for comfort. In any case, the 11 ic fight dcvehpcd w iihi incredible violcncc at very short range. it was only due w tin:
hairtrigger reactions of the Moroccans atop the road, ti'hin P1Y dropped to the ground and rolled off into the saving miii of the adjoining rice paddies, that nonc of theni was seriously woundcd.

i'hc tanks were equally lucky that time Viets hail jI1hmi liv tipped titci r hand ahead of tii uc, for time two I az mm mI;as ol i iii defenders opened firc only as time lead tmumksairemtly had Icli t hr dikes in a clatter of tracks and a howl of engines for the dilitiparativc safety of the dcpcrlying fields. Now "huttommcd mit,''
the turrets swung out in the direcromim of chic suspected Iamv('ms but still lu)iding their flrc. No point in wasting Imighpenctiam ''iii shells against thatch huts when time machine guns could do a much more effective job. The infantrymen, in turn, had spread in an arc around DougQue, but without immovimmg closcr. lkh imil one of the many grave mounds which always dot the Var Va:.i cmii countryside, time battalion commnaimder had squatted down omi I mis h;wnchcs ill rime mud, a map CmSC oil his knees and (lie coimlhmimmam ui carphoncnncro1)honc of his radio Set in hits hand. 'Ike set i:,cI(
t'as axcd to the back of a Vietnamese s'ho had also so tiam I cii down and who looked stolidly ahead tinder his battered hand- ii mu down Campaign hat at the heat haze shmimnnicriug over time rice fields;
The howitzers of time Sixty_ninth got time mange mf their i ;mrci wit ljii i few rounds,. and, iiiintites after the first radio call for support, l)ongQue began literally to disintegrate under the impact of their highangle fire. One by one the rice thatch of the roofs began to catch fire with a deep crackling sound that could occasionally be heard even above the din of the shells. Still, tu ibody ran; save for the agitation in the bamboo Inishes ound the village and the occasional flashes (ha idly visible at high noon)
of gunfire, the village might as well have been deserted. Then, all of a sudden, a tremendous explosion shook the village and a pillar of dense, black smoke rose in its center.

"The shells must've hit an underground depot," said Derrieu to his crew as he watched the shelling over the tank's scope.

"I Set's saddle up." With a howl, the idling tank engine shifted into high gear, and the lumbering vehicle, followed by the other tanks of the squadron, began to roll forward in the direction of the inferno that had bceii l)oiigQmie. ''lollow in line,'' said Der
iien over the intercom, and, no doubt as an afterthought due to his fanner ancestry, "and watch where you're going. No sense in ruining their whole rice crop.''
Now, siiiall black figures began to appear, seclilingly out of nowhere: from the windows of the houses, the roof frames, and
1u mm dugouts on the side of the road, a vcrital)lC flood of human beings, completely blocking the advance of the tanks as they rolled into time village. This was plmse two of the usual Victminh defense . pattern: Once the position has becoimic untenable or breached, uc the civilians as a shield for the withdrawal of the combatants. But this timmic, the ruse failed. 1 he tanks were not
:mkuic and the blackclad figures which now began to leave the village ran straight into the machinegun fire of the MoroCcanS.

By
1300, it was. all over for the Third Company, Battalion 3 0
of t lie Ninetyfl fth Independent Rcgiiimcumt, ''Vietnam People's
\ rnmy,'' but its sacrifice had bought exactly what the coiimamdcr had i,cededtwo hours of timmie to have the bulk of the unit withdraw toward the southern end of the pocket, where the Van Friiili Canal ended in a suit of niarshy, plantcovered delta which
11(1 one could effectively hope to seal oil.

On the French side, General Leblanc also realized that he eiiciimy, far (miii fighting to time death, was trying desperately to
(lily tilliC to last tintil the evening in order (1) Wit hdiiv into the nearby hills west of Road 1, and he ordered i he dropping iii of the first of the two paratroop battalions still held in rcscrvc. At
1045, the Second Battalion, First Colonial Parachute Regiment, having flown in all the way from Hanoi, dropped into it's assigned assembly area near the village of DaiLoc, at the border of the
(ltlnC otiC close to Croupiticot D, and immediately began its drive toward the mouth of the \'an Triuh Canal.

I lie rauc for the closing of the net around Regiment Ninety_five had l)cgun in earnest.

By midmorning of 1) day, there were still 'ide gaps to the south of the Van Trinh Canal iicar PliuA ii and I ,:mii Ia as the Ninth Tabor struggled through the sand pits and itiarshcs to reach its line of departure. Apparently, the Comiiiunists had correctly surmised that this was indeed the weakest point in the French pcriiimcter and had reacted accordingly. At 0H45, just as the Moroccans were about to enter PhuAn, heavy mmmaclmine_gun and smallarms fire began to smash into their ranks froiti the stir
rounding dikes. Silhouetted against the blue sky as they advanced over the dikes, and against the watery surface (if the rice paddies as they plodded through them toward PIntAn, they iffercd perfect targets and immediately sufFered heavy losses. Pinned down in the open, the Ninth now began to call for help. It is here that its subordination to the faraway C rotiplilemit C rather thaim to the nearby amphibious C roupnicuIt I) began to hack fi Fe; radio liaison to the Group's field command post at My Cltamih failed to function properly, and it ti'as not until 0910 that Colonel Cautlijer found out that things had gone sour on his extreme right wing.

But the Vietmitinhi was nor placing all its tacical eggs in a single basket. At t ZOO, sniahler
(mimics of tIme (ouhmuitiimist- 227th Battalion also attacked the assault guns of the l'irst Foreign I .cgion Cavalry with heavy mortar fire and followed up this attack with an equally heavy mortar shelling of the Second Battalion, Fourth Moroccau Infantry. By 0940, Gauthier had decided to comm i mit his last reserves, two companies fornied from trainees of a nearby Vietnamese NC() school and three Vietnamimesc infantry comimpanics hastily brought up from Llue. Finally, two additional infant iv

conipanics were ordered into the LuI Ia beachhead via LCM but
landed only at 1500. They then floundered iii the marshes for
almost three hours until they finally
                                        reached the Moroccans.
When they got their wind back, and had been beefed up by the
reinforcements, the Moroccans counterattacked vigorously and
finally occupied Phu-An at 1730.
  In view of the difficulties encountered by Groupmcnt C, Gen
eral I.eblanc requested the dropping of the Third Vietnamese
Piiratroop Battalion still held in reserve at Touranc. The order to
use this second paratroop battalion was given at 1145, to be car-
ried out at 1400. What then happened has remained somewhat
unclear, but according to the officers who participated in the
operation, two separate errors had been made: One was in trans
illiSSlOil of the order itsehi, which delayed takeoff time until about
1500; due second was in the weather forecast for the drop area.
l)uring the monsoon period, the winds which prevail on the
Annam coast reach gale force late in the afternoon. This is a fact
which is generally known ahmg the coastal area, but which may,
from I iine to time, escape the w'cather ol)servcrs placed several
hundred miles away from
                          A nuani in Saigon or I Ianoi. The result
was that when the C47's of Air Transport Group "Franche
Comte" appeared over the drop zone at J.angBao, the wind was
blowing gusts up to thirty miles an hourtwice the maximum
usually permissible in the case of airborne drops. The French
juiip masters were looking down at the drop zone, with the trails
of its siuioke pots lying almost flat on the ground, and shook their
hca(ls.
  "I lell. you can't have these guys lump into this mess!" said
one of them incredulously as he looked down. "They're going to
he l)lown all over the place, light as they are."
  In fact, their lightness has always heemi one of the problems and

j
      kcs aiiuong the Vietnamese paratroops. J nuluping with A ilierican
parachutes calculated to carry a 200pound iuuai with close to
85 to 100 pottiuds of e1uipnlcnt, the cinite has proved much too
vast for the small \Tictnalncse
                                                                                                    I 00pounders, who, even when
loaded down with all their para1)luernalia, still weighed only One
half of their American or Furopean counterparts. Thus, a Viet
namncsc airborne unit generally floated longer in the air (offering

a better target to ground fire), and also spread OVCr a far wider
area when landing. To load the \Tietnaiiicse down with more
equipment was no solution either, because once on the ground
they could not possibly carry it around. This lightness, couplcd
with the hitti wind speed, was to have disastrous consequences.
   By now, the insertion of an additional battalion had hecone
absohitely necessary on the peninsula, in order to ensur sealing
off the Victminh forces from the lagoon and the seashore. Thus,
an additional battalion had to be dropped regardless of the con-
sequences to the tiicn themselves. At 1650, the first "stick" oi
Vietnamese paratroopers left the lead aircraft, followed within
a few seconds by those of the other planes, and the hundreds of
parachutes began to float down in the deep l)hle sky like a vast
school of Portuguese menofwar. Everything seemed to have
gone all right. Only one parachute failed to open, and the men
of the ground party saw its human burden conic down, feet first,
held vertically by the drag of his unopened parachute, stirring
up a small cloud of sand, like an artillery shell, as he smashed into
the dune.
   'l'he strong wind caught the other paratroopers about ISO feet
a1ove the ground. It was as if an invisible fist kid been driven
through them; sonic of them left the vertical position an(l began
to fly off almost horizontally. Others, closer to the ground, were
slammed into it and dragged over the bushes, marshes, and dikes
at the speed of a racing horse. Two paratroopers were strangled
to death by the shroud lines o( their owii parachutes as they
desperately tried to liberate theniselves before being dragged
away. The equipittent parachuted with t lie battalion sit Irered an
even worse faste. Since most of the packages were soiiiewhat
lighter than the paratroopers, they floated even farther away,
sotite of them falling unto the sea and titany >f rbeiii drifting illtoi
Coitimunistheld territory. When the bit tili
                                                            fitially was as
seitibled at about 1730 (some of the men had been dragged iliore
than a mile before they had been able to liberate themselves froiti
their runaway parachutes), it was at best a weak rifle force. Close
to 10 per cent of the men had suffered j tiitii accidents, :111(1 a?i(,st
of the heavy equipment_mortars, machine guns, recoilhcss rifles,
and ammunitionhad been lost in the drop. But it wa in time

to take up its poSition in the southern tip of the pincer around Regiment Ninetyfive, between the Third Amphibious Group and the Second Paratroop Battalion, which had landed in the lilorning. By nightfall, with l'liuA n and Van Trilili occupied, the encniy had now been constricted into a pocket about nine miles long and tWo miles w'ide. 1() all appearanccs, Operation Caiiiarguc was a success.

iIo,wcvcr, this success was niore one of appearance than of reality. h) he sure, onehalf of the Street Without Joy already had fallen into French handshut without the expected bocty of enemy prisoners and equipment. This meant that the enemy forces and equipment were still in the pocket. The pocket, if the French were to succeed, had to become an airtight trap.

i'hc trap, however, had not become airtight. Along the southern sectul' of (Iroupuient C, the lastditch defense of PhuAn and the counterattacks of Battalion 227 had kept the French from reaching the natural boundary of the STan Trimih Canal. The result was that four French battalions had to guard a front more than seven miles long in order to prevent the escape of about
2,600 men, It was obvious that this pocket had several important gaps, particularly the whole network of tiny rivulets and canals cutting across the Van 'l'rinh Canal toward Road I.

1 o he sure, the amimpIlil)ious Crabs anti Alligators were sta
mined near, or even in, tmmany of the canals; and lniimdrcds of infantryimien spent an uncomfortable night standing in the knee
(Ice}) mmmd f the rice paddies, watching the black expanse ahead of them, where the slightest noise could he that of a frog jumping,
01' of a Coinnnmnist infiltrator stumbling over a branch. There is nothing tlmit sounds more like a patrol seeking its way forward in the mud than a stray buffalo plodding to its stable.

'File night of I) day plus one passed without niajor incident.

\\'Iiatever shooting occurred 'as at fleeting shadows. [-Ict'e and there, a French parachute flare lit tip the pocket area in its ghostly greenish light before it fizzed into the wet underbrush, the headlights of a French tatik or amphibious vehicle probed the night to search out the sources of suspect noises. But nothing noteworthy was detected.

When dawn broke, the men resumed thcir march forward, this tine on all fronts at once. The countryside appeared corn
pictely empty in the looming sun. The farmers again did not conic out of tlic villag.s to till thcir fields; tIre little \'ietnaiiiese boys who arc always riding the lumbering buffaloes mit to pasture were nowhere to c seen with their charges. Again, the only things that seemed to be moving in the countrysidewere the French tanks, the ampl ihious vehicles with their long aerials dipping in the breeze, airi long lines of grimy, weary, riiudcakcd infantrymen now pior ding through the fields in an aliiiost on;
broken line from hori,on to horizon.

By 1300, with the :.un beating unmercifully on steel helmets and berets or campai ri hats, Groupments A and D, along with parts of C rouprnent B reached the \Tan Trinli Canal throughout its whole length on the side opposite to Colonel Gauthiier's Group
tuent C. The trap had been sprung on the Street Without Joy.

The steel jaws of a modem armed force, supported by naval ships, amphibious tanks, and aircraft, had slammed shut on a force of hurriedly trined farmers lcd iy irien who, iii only a few cases, had receivd the training of corporals and sergeants.

A trap ten times the izc of the force to be tra})1)C(l had shut
and had caught nothim rg.

To be sure, "suspects" were found: that is, imicu of military age who could not prove hat they belonged to time village where Iiey vcrc arrested and who could, therefore, be assuiiicd to have been members of Communist fighting units. A few weapons were also found, and at the northern end of time pocket, where the \'ict
miminli had made its stand at DongQue, Some prisoners were takemm, anus in hand. But omi the whole, as of I) day 1)1115 thirtysix Imotims, Operation Camnarguc :ilready was a failurc. I-lowcver, it was not entirely over.

Some of the low Ilying Moranc observation planes had de
tected suspcct ilm()VCu nents in the direction of A mmI Irripo rof that some elemiients o Regiment Ninetylive had escaped trrvamrl the north. At 1300, tI icrefore, General Leblane ordered a i na tine commando unit and infantry from Groupmucnt A to early omit a seaborne raid on An1-Ioi. The raid was carried out swiftly ctumgI; the troops landed at 1500, InOppe(l up rapidly whatever S(IS})CCtS could be found, and returned to their ships by 1800, i hcir iiiission accomplished.

1 here rciiiaincd one more task to be acconphishcd in the now
occupied 'illagcs, the methodical housetohouse search for hid
kn entrances, caiiiouflagcd storage dumps, and the oneina
lunismtid chance of finding a really important Communist cadre, one of the unassuming l)laclcclad canho who, often barely twenty years old, really ran the war for the enemy. Hun
dreds of infantrymen swarmed out with mine detectors or, simply, long metal rods, thumping their rifle butts on the ground to (kt'cct suspici(nls hollow areas; others would strip and, holding Imamnls, form a chain and votikI slowly walk thmugh the mm ishies and ponds in the hope of finding weapons and equip
imment (lumped into the water at the last momenta sort of giant
size htmiiman rake slowly moving up and down the countryside.

I Icre and there, one of the members of the human rake would scream in pain, and his friends would pull him up from the water, his foot pierced by a rude hut effective caltrop_a small wooden plank studded with seveninchlong barbed steel arrowheads, which could pierce a foot even through the thick soles of a jungle lunit. What with the usual infection, the soldier would be disabled fur three iiionths or more. But the lmunmaii chains and the miilne dci ceo us and bloodhound teams kept on vit h their monotonous amid frustrating work, full of the knowledge of its futility.

Atop the sand dunes, the Crabs and Alligators of the Second
:imnl Third Amphibious Groups were still herding suspects toward the coastal village of l'rung-An for combing out by Vietnamese mud French intlligencc and security teams. These were the real victin)s of the war, the hapless civilians caught in the bow wave of a French armored group plowing under in ten minutes a rice CFO1 that had been the fruit of five months of backbreaking work;
or caught in the everpresent clutches of a Vietminh "tax cadre"
demanding his party's share of the crop's proceeds, after the farmer already had paid close to threefourths of his crop to the landlord, the tmsurcr, and the government tax collector. Foo bad
there will be no shirt for little [bang, who was to go to the village school this year and there will l)C fl() pork to sitppleiiient the diet of rice and (hR for the lunar Nev Year, the 'l'et.

By the en(l of 1) day plus two, all organized resistance lia(l ccascd, and on the (4 ilh)wing day began the withdrawal (If the flrstlnie unitsthe paratroopers, amphibious groups, and Marine commandos. Now caine the real job of permanently controlling the newly occupied area. Bridges that had l)eefl dynaniitcd over the past years had to be rebuilt; roads cut into ribbons by Vietmmli saboteurs had to be filled in; the whole artificial desert which the Communists had created around the Street Without Joy had to be eliminated. Vietnamese Government administrators iiiade their timid appearance in the face of a hostile or frightened population which, alter a week's fighting and years of life in a state (If siege, needed everything from rice to antillialaria tablets.

"Funny," said Major J)errieu of the Sixth Spaliis, watching some of the new administrators in the village of l)oiigQue, "they just never seem to succeed in striking the right note with the population. Either they come in and try to apologize for the mess we've just made with our planes and tanks; or they swagger and threaten the farmers as if they were enemy nationals, which
let's face itthey are in many cases."
''That may be So'' said young Lieutenant Dtijardin, standing on the shady side o his M24, "but I wouldn't care to lie in his shoes tonight, when w'e pull out. He's going to stay right here in the house which the Coininie commander still occupied yesterday, all by himself with th other four guys of his adiiiinistra
tive team, with the nearest post 300 yards away. I Tell, I'll bet he won't even sleep here but sleep in the post anyway."
"Lie probably will, and he'll inimediately lose face with the population and bec mc useless."
"And if he doesn't, he'll probably be (lead by toiiiorrow, and be just as useless. In any case, there goes the whole psychological efFect of the operation and we can start the whole thing all over again three months from nov. What a hopeless mess."
"\'Vell, if the Vietnamese can't lick that, we certainly can't.

After all, it's their country. Let's saddle up." With a shrug, both men walked back to their tanks, climbing into the turrets with the litheness of long practice.

Below them, on the tiny square of ruined DungQue, the young, earnest \'ietnailiesc a(liliinistrator, in his khaki shirt and slacks, was still talking to the villagcrs. They stood there itupas
sivcly, like SO nany woo(len statues.

On August 4, 1953, the El igh Command called ff Operation Cainargue. According to the newspapers, it had been a "total success, demonstrating once more the new aggressiveness and mol)ility" of the French and the value of great amounts of motor
i/ed ci1uipnient in swamp warfare. In their own reports, the French treated the operation with nuxed feelings.

To he sure, Regiment Ninety_five had, for the time being, disappeared as a constant menace along the central Atinain coast.

1 wo dozen villages or iiiore had been placed under at least partial influence of the national authorities. But this hI(l becii no opera
tu)li "on the cheap.'' Important numbers of troops and materiel had to be withdrawn froiii other vital sectors where they were sorely lacking, and where their absence began to create emergencies of their own.

And the results in actual loss of enemy combat potential had been frustrating. lur French losses of 17 dca(l and IOU wounded, the CflCIU had lost 182 dead and 387 prisoners, along with 51
rifles, H submachine guns,
2 mortars, an(l S BA R'sand how ii iaiiy of the dead and prisoners were regulars of tile Ninety_li Itim Regiiiient, and not iiieiely local Iariiieis ui iiiciiil>ers of the always expendable I )uiK icli
( Coniiiiuumist nillage no hitia ) , re
iiiaiiicd open' to question.

As regards swamp warfare tactics, Operation Caimiargue had once inure proved that it was impossible to seal off a pocket in an ailliglit f:islmkm as long as a battalion had to Iioltl iiioiC thmn 1,500
'aids of ground_and must of tile battalions along the southern think (if the pocket had held more than 3,000 yar(ls. Thus, the fact that the bulk of the Coimununist forces could slip through the "houc!age"the ring of French infantry and arnmrwas a fqre
gone conclusion as soon as the slow progress of the in fantry on the first day eliminated all hopes of constricting the pocket to mimaiiagcable size by nightfall.

For the progress of the infantry had been slow. In fact, it had been a crawl of about 1,500 yards an hour, on tlte avetage. But here again the tactical commander was caught in a dilc,ii,iia. i'ltc purpose of the peration was not the surfaec occuI):lt un of the villages hut thc hushingout of the enemy from his wellcauiou
flagcd hiding placeS and underground installations; hence any speed_up of the advance would be at the expitse of the tliuiotugli
ness of thc search for weapons, men, and secret ad,,,inisti'ative organizations. This dilemma was OflC that posCd itself rime and again iu the course of flop_up perations and was never satisfactorily resolved.

But, l)asically, th major defect of Operation CIlli:l rgtic 'as OI1C
which was shared by practically all si,iiilar. operations in the hI)dO
chinese war: No scalingoil of au c,teunv force could lw successful unless the proportion of attackers to defenders was 15 to I
or even 20 to I, for the enemy had in its favor an intittuate kutowl
edge of the terrain, the advantages of defensive orgaili/ation, In(l the syuiupathy of the population.

Another definite advantage of the enemy was its edge in corn
l)at intelligence. Very seldom did the French know exactly what they were looking for in the case of such a uuuopuip. ( )n the other hand, the very size and mechanization of the units employed against the Victmninli sooner or later gave away Irench intentions an(l even their order of battle; for the positioning f large units rcu1uired the prior arrival of reconnaissance tlci;iclu,uciuts
:10(1
liaison officers whose presence rarely remained undetected.

Fhitis, tactical surprise was, with the exception of airl)oluc raids, nonexistent, and the terrain itself precluded the usc of high speed as a compensating factor.

Vietmiiinh Regiment Niuuety(ive had lived to fight mimothicu day.

In the spring of 1954, it again began to infiltrate buck into us old hunting grounds, where it ambushed several convoys on Road I
and even attacked a Vietnamese battalion stationed near I 1u.

Communist forces had to evacuate the area in July, 1954, when the Geneva ceasefire split Vietnam in two at the I 7th Parallel, which runs a hire ten uuuiles to the north of Qttaiigtri. ( )uuce wore, the men of Regiment Ninetyfive emerged front their hideouts, picked up their weapons from the marshes and swammips, and iiiarchcd north in broad daylight along that Road I for which they had fought SO bitterly. Here and there along the road were stationed some of the tanks of the Sixth Spahis, guns elevated and tirrct hatches open.

Peace had come again to the Street Without Joy.

## V War, Revolution, And Terror Russia, Cuba, And Cyprus

COM BATING SovIEr GUI:10411.LAS
lrust von Dobnanyl HOW CASTRO WON
l)ickey Cliapelle IN CYI'Rus Lieutenant Colonel B. 1. S. Gourtay, OBE

A point to remember about unconventional warfare is that it does
not always follow the conventionally unconvcntioiial patterns 1)1
Greece, Malaya, and Indochina.
  Guerrilla war is the form of war that the w'cak must choose.
It dcvelops maximum I)wer when coupled with the support of
regular forces. Such a sruation occurred in Russia during World
War 11, and Ernst von l)ohnanyi was there. Born of German
emigre parents in Kiev, he was educated in Russia aiid Germany
and won the Iron Cross, both first and second class. This prophetic
article was written in 1955, three years after his release from an
eightyear term in a Russian prison camp.
  Mrs. Chapelle is a wideranging photograplicrc )trcSpoIldcllt
for Life, Reader's Digest, andwe arc proud to saythe Gazette.
Her heats have included Castro, the FLN in Algeria, and the
interior of a Hungarian prison cell. Meeting her iii
                                                     improbable
locales, many military iiicn have asked: "What's a 'womiril doing
here?" That is the title
                        f her recent hook (\Villiaiii Morrow and
Company, 1962). Ne hinic there is a lesson in her account oi
how Castro won, but there is an even more signifIcant one in why

Hatist:i lostcausc to ponder the relation of politics to military I H) W CI..

I .ieutcnant Colonel Gourlay, Royal Marines, descril)es still another patternthat of sheer terrorism in a tiny area. One of Uritain's most respected young professionals, he was picked to be the commander of the first Marines (41 Commando) aboard I I.M.S. lhiltvark.

## Combating Soviet Guerrillas Ernst Von Dohnany

Guerrilla w'arfare has become an essential part of nioderti strategy, a factor which shouldnot be overlooked by the military leaders.

1'his was sufficiently proved by the guerrilla and sistanee movements in almost every occupied lUr(pcaii country during World War 11, in Indonesia, Indochina, and Korea.

It secins, however, that the possibility of guerrilla warfare has hCen completely overlooked by the military planning stairs i the Western world. Consequently, the modern soldier is being trained to use every conceival)le weapon to defend hiiiisclf against the most terrible tools of destruction on land and in the air, but lie still remains unprepared to cope with the equally dangerous and exacting work of coiiiliating guerrillas. This negligence on the part of general staffs may prove to be as disastrous iii the future as it was for the German ariiied forces during \V rld \Va r II.

The dogmatic attitude of the German General Stall diiriiig the Soviet campaign was, undoubtedly, one of lie illairl icasojis for its failure, originally to prevent, and later, to s(i1)prcss I lie Soviet guerrilla movement which inflicted so many losses up1
the Gcriiian lighting forces. l)epcnding on the success of the blitz
kricg and the political weakness of the Couiuiininist Icgiille iii the Soviet Union, tlic Geruuians failetl to make 1)ie1,auui iuns Jui the severe Russian winter, and apparently completely excluded the idea of a possible guerrilla threat from their jiiinds. 'the arrogant and foolish policy of the German civil governi I ient in rega id to the Soviet people cannot be accepted as an excuse fi r the ilarru w
minded planning of the military authorities. J'IacIi('alIy the idcui
tical shortsighted attitude as that of the ( criiiaii
( eiic ra I Si all'
during World War II was displayed by the U.S. military corn
itiand during the Seiiiimle Indiai War in Florida tinder Jackson's md \'ati H(IrCiI'SiI(lIIIiIIiSttatiOflS. rtie government troops dis
1)atcIw(l tO pacify the Indians were certainly sufficiently trained
11,1 urtIunlox l)attle hut, not being fatitiliar with Indian ghting I lie woods, they paid a rcrrihle toll in blood fur their eventual

 SIIUCCSS.
    lii order to coittprclietnl the amazingly swift development of
 ,tmerrihIa hands, it is necessary to review the events of 1941. Seek
 imig to attain their tiRlin ol)jcctivcthe annihilation of major Soviet
 Ii uccsGcriiman spearheads rushed eastward, broke thriugh So-
 viet (lefenses, surroun(lcd entire armies, and spread confusion in
 i lie Sot'iet rear; but unfortunately, they paid little attention to dis
 1,erscd units and scattcrcd perSotli1el who remained in the oc
 ciipicd areas. Naturally, Soviet officerS and enlisted men who did
nut care to surrender disappeared into the countryside. Some
exchanged their uniforms for civilian clothing and sought refuge
iii villages; others hid iii swamps and forests; the wore active of
 hem organized guerrilla bands.
   The early winter, the unexpected setbaclc at Moscow, the
una(kquatc supply of winter clothing, and the breakdown of
supply
           lines
                  forced the German troops onto the defensive.
I )ccp snow and severe cold compelled the poorly clothed and
((lttippctl troops to stay in settlements, which in turn permitted
the still small guerrilla bands to remain undisturbed in the woods.
fly the spring of 1942, it was too latenumerous guerrilla groups
hid gained complete control over the territory not directly
ucciqncd by Gcriiiau forces. Innumerable assaults on communica
ii. n and supply lines (and even on small German garrisons)
hrccd the German units to concentrate solely on defending these
'it :il lit cries.
   1 he organization of Soviet guerrilla hands was comparatively
imiiple.
          lccrmmircd fimuim military personnel and fanatical Corn
miumnists, the hands esralihislied their headquarters and camps deep

mum inaccessible wootllantls and swamps. If no direct threat of a
;mm attack was expected, they billeted themselves in villages md somalI towns front which, in case of enlergency, they could fall back to their hiding places in the forests. The population, who vere given no protection by Gcriiian forces, willingly aCcepted and supported them. The bands varied in nuiiiber froiii approxunatcly fifteen to 200, kpcndiiig on the rcrrain, the availability of volunteers, and the attitude of t lic populace tiiwaid the German invadeis. Smaller hands were led by a (let achuiicni commander an&l a political colimuiiissar. Leaders of task gluu.ps ni sabotage squadsdispatched to intercept a German supply mmck, oi destroy a rail nm I I ,ri Ige, w to po ict mi-c finn I- were a nil lit cii from among the most efficient immemubers of t lie group.

Later, large guerrilla bands were stll)divjdcd into platoons and squads. Two or three hands were loosely organized into brigades.

III tifliC, COIII1IUIII1C:itmOliS were estal)hshed between bands anti brigades and thc Soviet Supreme Commimand across the front lines.

Procurement of arms and ammunition was easily accomplished from equipment thrown away by the soldiers of the routed Soviet armies. Food supply was available in villages and collective faruiis which, in most cases, had not l)cen dissolved by the Germuamis amid were frequently still nianagcd by rhc same Soviet functionaries
an error which proved to be of great assistance to the guerrillas.

On the other hand, the lack of clothing and medical supplies appeared to be a considerable handicap to the guerrilla bands.

Their operations were chiey limited to sabotage, cutting of German supply hues, mining of railroad tracks and roads, amid occasional assaults upon small German units. These missions were usually executed by small groups at night. lii comparatively few cases did the guerrillas attack larger Germuian units, and then only tinder the most advantageous circumstances. Thus, in the winter of 194142, a Germiian engineer battalion was annihilated, while embarked on a train moving west of Bryanslc. I hiving stopped the train by removing the rails in a cleared area, the guerrillas opened fire with four or live heavy miiachimmc gumis and succeeded in killing most of the Gcrmumns before they miianaged to evacuate the train and reach a snowcovered emmilninkmiient. I lowcvcr, it offered no better protection than had the train against i lie mmmi
derous fire. The above incident was an isolated case; genera II)'
the guerrillas disappeared into the woods as soon as the approach of a German unit was reported by their sentries.

Greatly alarmed by the new threat, the Cerimian coimimamid unit iat'e(l intensive study of appropriate ullctlu)ds of supprcssing the guerrilla activities.

1 (I accomplish this, each conmanding ollicer was ,tutltiuuizeil to do what lie deemed bcst. Certain of them tied to Inutit down the guerrilla l)ands by dispatching combat nuns intu the w 10(15. Ibis method proved to lie unsuccessful. If it Colt fronted by superior guerrilla forces, or decimated in a lap, the coilipamites or battalions returned after an abortive search with empty hands. l'he great advantage of guerrilla bands in viunllaitds lay it their mobility and their ability to disperse and disappear amitong the pipulation, their excellent communication with t lie local inlialutatits, amid in. the clumsiness of regular army units inex1)erienced iii backwoods fighting.

l:frimmts to eliminate the guerrilla movement through retaliatory ilicastires against the 1)opuhlnon were even more disastrous. The endangered population fled into the same inaccessible areas and joined the guerrillas. It was often like an endless chain. Small
( cititaui units or supply trains were attacked in a village and routed. ( crumman reinlorcctncnts iii riving later found no trace of giucurillas. 'Ihe pu1nilat ion was reluctant to give any infortitatiun megaudling die auackeis, as they kmicv that after the departure of lie ( ermumans, they would have to account for their "treason" to lie guerrillas who were the actual iminsters of the unprotected ia rnier. 1 heir reluctance to speak scemiied to the Germans to be mm maui fesra non ii loyalty to the band its. En raged by the sight of their dead coitirades, the Geinian soldiers frequently took revenge by sluoi ing sonic innocent peasants or by burning down a part, alt, of a village. ] licsc unjust acts merely iiicrcased the hatred if the nat ive for the ( ;a and either lcd Itiuui to join the gucr
tilLi bainls, (II uiu;mde him a willing spy for thtcuti.

I .argescalc o1)cratu()ns conducted by several regular divisions did little hauumm to the guerrilla movement.

l'htcse thoroughly
1ilautmted and expertly executed offensives miiiglit have guaranteed victory over a regular armumy unit operating in an orthodox man
met, but they were not effective against a foe who had no pernia
ncumt bases, who acted as an organized armed force one day, and became a group (if peaceful farmers the next. 1-having surrounded a large guerrillacontrolled area, the battalions 'would spread out in a line, create a tight circle around the objective, and advance slowly through the brush and swamp in a c(nnl)iiig o1)erat loll.

Whenever such a unit itict opposition, reserves, reinforced by tanks and artillery, would lie dispatclteil to break the op1msi jolt and to annihilate the hand. li spite of clever J)l:ulning, the ma ority of the gi te ri-ill a I ia I tls tmsui I I)' I na i lage(l to CSC:1 pe fri ii ii I I
endangcrcd area before the operation started, siiiply beCauSe hey had bCCn forcw'arned by the increase of tro(ps in the region, or by local informants.

In addition to the active measures described above, the Germitati command was forced to employ many divisions for the static defense of roads, railroads, and other means of cottiuttititicat ion.

These vital lines had been fortifiedthousands of miii kers, 111 Ii sades, and entrenched posts had been 1)uilt along the taiIioa(Is and roads; patrols walked from post to post in order to prevent sabotage on the tracks and to detect hidden mines. This task was performed chiefly by German guard regiments, I lungamian and Romanian units, and indigenous volunteer units. None of iliet were very reliable: the German units because of age and qualim y of personnel (either too 01(1 or physically disi1uahihcd for scmvicc in combat units), the allies because of their unwillingness to fight for the German cause, the indigenous volituicers because they had no real reason to light.

It was a dangerous situation for the Gerimians. All of i hew efforts had failed to eliminate hc danger of guerrilla raids which, in fact, were growing in frequency and ferocity.

Iii srite of this ap)arcntly hopeless situation, sonic Gerittait generals and commanders (lid find appropriate mneauis to miicct this threat. Their flexible plans enabled tlmeumi to adopt tutor! luodos tactics and, in doing so, finally to succeed in forcing the gmlcuuihli bands to withdraw or to reduce their activities.

The most outstanding example 'as comicci ved by the ci nit mnanding general of the German Second l'anzer A oily, General oberst (Colonel General) Schmidt. In early I )eceinber, 1941, this army had been stopped south of Moscow and had fallen back to the stabilized line ZhizdraOrclKursk. It was discovered that almost the entire i-ear, with the exception of larger towns like Bryansic, Bczhitsa, Karachcv, I)mitrovsk, E)mnicricv, and Scvsk,
'as under guerrilla control. The supply lines for the whole armiiy ctmsistcd of :i single railt'(JadOrelKaracheviiryanskUnetcha
)t-sk--,osk;ind the highway OrclBryimskRoslavlSmolenslc.

'I 'he a-cas south of Bryaiisk, including Lokot and Trubchevsk, and nmth of this city, including Dyat'kovo and Lyudinovo, were corn rolled by strong guerrilla bands which were a constant threat to these supply hues. In the spring of 1942, the towns of Dyat'
DWVO and I 4'IJ(tinOV() lla(l llccu cleared of guerrillas by German romps. II however, their garrisons were connected with one an
bet- 'by means of only one road and a branch railroad line which als sot oj cct ed to fret1 ucnt guerrilla attac ks.

fl'hc area soot It of llryansk was divided by the BryanskL'gov taiflonod ontoo a wioakd section west of the railroad and plains east of t, Iloc eastern SeCtiolt was soon brought under control by the Geriiinns. Garrisons 'cre stationed in Karachev, Brassovo, Navlya, and I okot. the district enclosed by these towns, with the esception of its northern part, offered no protection to guerrilla handsand ss'as quickly abandoned by them. On the other hand, the area between the railroad and the Desna River was covered wkh woods and swaiiips which formed perfect terrain for guer
rila hisflksg places and camps. An estimated 6,(iOO guerrillas and an equal rniinher of farmers and their families populated this area.

c as' a a 1)1 e ( en IIIIt rese EvesSo un te
1-1w igil rhin regiments
ordered to guard the llryanskL'gov railroad line. The corn
oooaonlhsg general ol the Second Panzer Army assigned only a smitH natonher of wher troops to check the guerrilla assaults.

The, tactics foriioul;otcd by Generaloberst Schmidt to suppress guerrilla operations south of Bryansk deserve a special study hkh, unfortunately, cannot be made at this time. However, a brief description of the events may suffice to demonstrate the in
of his Do f birch, 1942, a horsedrawn sled from Karachev arrived at Navlya and I
do it, loriliging a small group of Russian civilians.

he chief, aite k iitiinsk i, a slender, energetic, middleaged man, presented to the C ;ertii:iio garrison counnianders "towhomitmay
cinocet-n" orders signed by Gcncraloberst Sclmiidt, which re
quested German Units to render every possible assistance- to the bearer of the order. Furthermore, the order appointed Kaminski
;iS governor of the area inclu(ling the towns of Navlya, Lokot,
- a.rIlO,i,ll. I.sl, SpIn
 P.'II,aa
.ati icl. tkf O*'VUI(I,.,k IS.IHu. UIni
,,uI. .(uI 1t4)
I )iiiitiovsk, I )iiiit ricv, and Scvsk. lie was ant horized to act itidc
1)cn(klItly, to i11)j)f)iUt local olbcials, to organize the economy of t lie area, and, what is marc important, lie was responsible only to
( ;cneralol,erst Schmidt. No German officer in this area was to interfere with Kaininski's activities.

1iic new governor immediately ip intcd Biirgermeister
(i,rayrrrs), proci:iinicd the airolisli,,ie,it of the collectivefarm sys
tell), siipcrviserl tire distribution of the renlaillilig iiIlplCi)leflt% and SO c k a ii 1( mg Ia 1.11 te is, and sta ited the o rgai 1 izi t u ni of local iii iii tia for I lie piotcctir in ml this area against grierlilla raids. ihis i'COi'
gaiiizatioii changed the situation cot ireiy l'ruin then on, every cow, horse, pig, arid loaf of bread were the private property of the fanner I vanov or Pctrov. The population went to work with great eagerness. At last, it seemed, the Geitirans were acting as they had been expected to: At last they began to abolish the hated collective farms, to give the population selfgovernment, and to liiiir their own in (hicncc iiicrely to riiiirary needs. At the same tilDe, the newly created propeity owners turned their wrath against guerrillas ilio still visitctl their 'illagcsat night seeking food. Prior to Kaiiiislci's tiiiie, tile farmer had watched apatltcti_
cilly while the foraging l)ands confiscated collectivefarm stock;
however, now lie 'as directly affected, he 'as going to lose his own propertyhis cow, or pig. Many young men enlisted in the local militia and were treated by the poptmlation with the greatest respect. By tile summer of 1942, the marauding guerrilla bands 'erc imiet wit II fierce resistance. Every ste1) outside of the protecting woorl.s l)ecamile dangerous; for every bit of food seized in a village dim ring a night raid they had to l):iy with blood. Both pirties were at liommic iii tills territory; both fought for their liveli
i If d; in iti If) ugh it witi IOU t oie rcy. C ra dually, the all tag in ism n IletWeel) guerrillas and farmers began to overshadow tile events of the war, politics, and even their dislike of the Germans. The miiilitia, unassisted by tile Gerimlans, C(1Uipped itself with what could he found in tire voodslcft there by tile retreating Soviet A rimmy. I'.IT(,rts ('CrC ltliI(le to repair and employ tile abandoned Soviet heavy cpmipiiicnttinks, antitank grills, howitzers, mnor
tars, Imiachille grills, etc. Fiuially, Kalninski's force became a for
lmli(l;li)ie brigade, consisting of five or six battalions of 500 to 600
men each, a tanic unit with tcn to twelvc light tanks, anti au artillery battalion with some twenty gulls. 1 'his numbcr w'aS iu 0
only sufficient to stop the guerrilla raids on thc villages and towns of the area, but also to launch countcrraitis, and, with rite assist
auce of some German units, even a countcroffcnsive in the spring of 1943. E)uriug this offensive, Kaminski's itlilitia drovc the gulcr rillas from practically tiuc entire area between l)iiiiti'uvsk, l)niitriev, Scvsk, and I Micot, and 1)tlslied tlte borders of the "tih
cratcd area'' six to I1IUC miles northvest of I okot and about
1(111 I'
miles west of the BryanskI 'gov railroad line. Considering th'
fact that he received neither arms nor suIJ)ply froni the Ceriiiis, Kaininski's success exceeded all expectations. No doubt, had m 0
the German retreat interrupted this
(levch)plnenr, Kamninsk would have succeeded in his task of pacifying the entire area entrusted to him. Events, however, forced the indigenous unilil ia to join the Geruuian forces in their retreat west. A few w'ecks later, Kainiuski's iiiitia, having lost their prilliary reason for lighting.

deprived of titci r property, and knowing that there would be Iii pardon by Soviet authorities, became a ii uerc gang (If bandits whI I
plun(iered the population, indulged in drinking,
1tmarreled W itlt the Germans and aiiong rluciiisclvcs, refused to light, and at last were disbanded by the German cominauid.

Sound ideas wet-c souiictiiiics also born aiiioug ticlti pcrs1ii1tl of the German Army. Somie battalion, coulmpany, anti plato III
leaders formulated methods for effective sit mallsea Ic ailtigulerri la warfare. If properly developed, these ideas Ct)Iil(l serve as a for tile organization of special :intigiierilla uUits in the aituied forces of the Western world.

After the retreat front Moscow iii the winter (II
1941 42, a Ge rn ian CI iii nit in ica tk ns I a tta lion was
0 r he i-cd to occu u '
Bezhitsa. As has been mentioned, this surrounded town and its outskirts were repeatedly raided by guerrilla bands, which wet e hiding in the woodlands north and northwest of the town. hi order to keep these unpleasant neighbors away frouti Bczhiitsa, the battalion comuimnder established several outposts on I ittperiphery of the city. The lutIst advanced 1)ost was Stiut'I4)Iied in tile village of Chaikovichii, about two uiiiles north (If Bezluiisu.

Fortunately, the couiiinaiidcr (If this post was a Ceriuiaui who IiaI
spcnt many years in the Soviet Union and was familiar with Russian customs, the Russian mind, and the Russiati language.

I Iaviiig no dchiiitc orders, this officer was at liberty to wage war iii his own way. The post garrison consisted of fifteen German soldiers and about as niany native volunteers (sons of kulaks, persons persecuted by the Soviets for political or criminal rea
SUnS, and some adventurers). It required no special intelligence to discover that guerrilla scouts were watching this post from a very short distance, that some of the villagers were guerrilla Spies, and that every German move was inuimediately reported to the heatlquartcrs of the guerrilla band. With insulting impudence, the guerrillas constantly tinned (lie road from Bezhitsa to l)yat'lcovo
;ust outside of Chailw'ichi. Almost every day, trucks proceeding iii COUVO to l)yat'kovo were destroyed on this unpaved road. Flie commanding officer of the Chaikovichi post decided that some action must be taken. Having picked out a group of t'clvc reliable Germans and natives, he undertook to reconnoiter the snrroimn(ling area. l'or several days, this squad crisscrossed the ciittrc region, avoiding deliberately the woods and ravines until everyone became familiar with the terrain. Then, paying attention to utmost secrecy, the patrols were shifted to nighttime. At irregular times, without confiding his plans even to the German pcmsom)t)eh, the post comnlan(ler summoned his squad and left the village, using a covered onite iii order to :ivoid ()l)servatioii. llav
lug reached the extensive woods north or west of the village, the squad waited until dawn. This precaution was necessary in order to dcccivc the guerrilla sentries watching the Cerimian post from various points during the day, and perhaps from the village itself at miight. An encounter with guerrillas in the forest was not to be feared.

ihe squad was equipped with automatic weapons and hand grenades, and was thoroughly indoctrinated for such a fight.

If worst caine to worst, a retreat would present no difficulties:
hlie tree trunks offered sufficient protection against rifle fire; an envelopmcnt by the enemy would be extreimiehy difficult to per
forum; the 1ire1)oVcr (if automatic rifles and subiiiachiinc guns was sufficient to create a gap in a comparatively thin guerrilla line.

Moreover, it was unlikely that a guerrilla band would stand and light a (;crIilall unit whose strength was unklu)wn to them.

## 2 I Z The GuerrillaAnd How To Fight Him

Alter a pcriod of approximately four weeks, during which time scouting was carried on almost daily, the si1m,ad had sufficiently cx1)lurcd time area to determine the approximnatc location of the guerrilla calimp. SCOUtS discovered fresh paths and guerrilla nics
sages or warnings written on the bark of trees. Most of the paths led from the margin of the woods to a swampy district some two and a half miles inside the forest, The first ilmiportant work had becu accomplished. lime coiimnmaiidcr realized that his unit was too stimall for an attack on the hideout. Consequently, reinforcements were requested. The request was approved and the reinforcemnents promised for a date in .thc near future. Meanwhile, the reconnaissance squad in Chailcovichi shifted from scouting to aininish tactics. I .eaving the village with the same caution, time s(lmmcl inarchcd after sunset across thc country to places from which they could watch the Bezhitsat)yat'kovo road, which frc
quently 'as mined by guerrilla saboteurs. The patience of the squad was put to a considerable strain; having spent a night at one place, the ainlnisli party learned that mines had been laid at another site. I-lowevcr, one night, while lying in the grass on a flat knoll dominating the road, the scouts saw three or four figures moving on the road. At a signal from the leader, the squad opened lire. The surprised guerrillas ran into the dark without firing a single shot; mit lcft one of their party, a boy of aboutseventeen who had been killed by a burst of machinegun fire. This rather simi:ill victory would not be worth while mentioning, had it not catIs(l time discoutimumamice of mine_laying on this road. The guerrillas seemed to he greatly surprised and apparently frightened, since they did not know how many such ambushes were laid, Ironi whence the eneummy came, and how strong he was, Sonic (lays later, returning from a reconnaissance trip into the nods, the squad surprised a man lying under a tree about
110 yards in front of the woods. In a semicircle, concealed by the high grass, the scouts approached the man. Startled by a crack of a dry branch or some other sound, the stranger jumped to his leer, and seeing several Germans, took to flight. A few bursts brought him down.

A second man, unnoticed so far, jumped down from the tree vith raised hands. It appeared that this was i sentry post watchmimig the traffic on the road to Dyat'kovo. In addition, this post was to notify the guerrilla caiiip hack in the woods of approaching danger.

At last, thc pronosed rcinforccmcnrs arrived in Bczhitsa. It was important not to ar(nIse thc suspicions of ltc guerrillas in Cliaikovichi. Thcreforc, 1)0th the infantry couipaiiy an(l the rcconnaissancc squad were embarked in tarpaiihttcou'crcd t rocks in Bczhitsa and, togcrhcr with thc usual convoy, dcpartcd as if fur Dyat'kovo. The assault force dismounted from trucks dCC1) in the woods aboVe Chaikovichi and northeast of the suspected guerrilla camp. The captured guerrilla sentry was to he the guide.

With his hands tied, and led n a rope, the prisoner was ulla(le I
understand that disol)edicnce or treachery would mean certain death to him. After about a tvohour iitarch, the unit arrived without incident at the swan),). l)isclustmres by the g%IcrmiIl:I
indicated that thc Cflfli}) was pitched al)out 5 So yards fart her southwest on a hill in the middle of this area. The swaitip ippeared to be only waist deep. The company spread out and the soldiers advanced at intervals of five or six paces iii order not to lose sight of one another. In spite of this, the left wing of the company advanced too quickly, and three or four men popped up in the guerrilla camp long before the rest of the company had arrived. The surprise was complete. The band had just started their breakfast, which was served in primitive pots on rough
hewn tables. lerrified by the sudden a1)pearance of the Geritians, the guerrillas, amitoug whoiii there were several women, (lcd iii pamc in all directions, leaving everything behind. Those who ran toward the approaching German hinc were either killed or captured; others iiimagcd to escape into the protection of the brush and high grass. In all probability, the major part of the routed band found other guerrilla groups and continued their activities in another district. At any rate, the area betwCcn Bezhitsa and Dyat'kovo secnicd to be taboo for guerrillas from this time on.

Not a single assault, not a single mine, was reported or discovered until the retreat of the Ccriiian troops in A ugust, 1943.

Neither of the two cxamnphcsKaminski and the Chai koviclu squadwas a decisive victory over the guicrrilla movement.

and this cannot he sufficiently stressed, they dciiionstratcd one very essential thing, namely that guerrillas cannot survive in au where they are deprived of a food supply and freedom of inovcmenr. To achieve this O1)JCCtiVC, methods other than those prescribed for normal coIlll)at must be adopted.

## H.

ilic effectiveness of a regular ii,ilitary unit depends chiefly upon its combined firepower and coordinated action. If control is lost so that each small Unit imist operate without this overall coordination, it loses a great deal of its strength. Consequently, when a unit is forced to fight in a strange country over unfamiliar terrain, this unit vill prefer to fight in the open, where control is easier and firepover can be fully utilized.

On the other hand, the very nature of guerrilla hands accounts for their preference for close country and woodlands, areas where they can easily retreat and hide theiiisclves. Since there is no central authority such as the state to enforce discipline, it is almost impossible to forge a guerrilla band into a unit that would he the equal of a regular command and that could offer battle in the open.

But in their native lmm0110(ains, forests, or swammlps, guerrillas are far superior to regular forces, since they can attack their enemy whenever they hold the advantages of time and terrain and are assured of a safe retreat. From their hidden Camps, they can easily watch the enemy, maintain communications with their agents in occupied settlements, and between their own bands. It requires no special intelligence work for them to find out the location of enemy troops as well as their vulnerable supply and conimunica
tiomi lines. Knowing these things, a guerrilla can live and move about in his area without great danger. He can cven enter the villages and towns that are under the control of the invading forces.

Apart from the purely political and psychological means of preventing or suppressing a guerrilla mno'emcnt, it remains to be considered what can or cannot be done from a strictly military point of view. The answer does not seem to be very complicated:
(;ucrrillas must be fought w'ith guerrilla methods by specially trained units that can be trained and equipped without great cost and without detriment to the major force. However, it is necessary that serious consideration he given to this probkiii by the responsible Corn, nand.

As soon as an army pclctrates into foreign territory, it niust assign a certain number ol units to guard itS supply arid coin
Iliunication lines, as well is for garrison duty. llic cinployrticnt
(11 sonic of these units for active suppression of guerrilla hands would tcnti to decrease their number rather t hart rc u ire :iddi
tional personnel. But these antiguerrilla units must be previously organized and trained in irder to achieve success.

German experiences during World War It proved that:
Units assigned to guerrilla warfare must operate directly under a corps or army staff.

They must be completely mobile in summer and winter.

They must consist of appropriately equipped, independently o)craring COIltp:tnieS OI battalions.

The personnel must be carefully chosen aui(I
I hon nigh ly t rained for this special task.

A suggested organization for such an antigucrrilla battalion is as follows:
I. l'ersonnel. If possible, volunteers to be chosen frorir such professions as rangers, woodsmen, and professional and aniatenr hunters, as well as from the rural population of wooded and iiiountainous areas. People who are acquainted with the terrain and language of the presumed enemy country are to be preferred.

Volunteers from urban areas may also become protIcient. Age:
between eighteen arid forty. Special re(1uirenlents:
welldeveloped ability to find one's bearings, be a good iitarksrrmn with several weapons, maturity, and good physical condition.

2. Training. Basic riulitary training: have a t borough knowledge of and be expert in use of all organic weapons and, ii possible, those of the nemy. Operational training in woods, swamps, and mountains: operating alone (the fear of lighting when alone against guerrillas must be taken front rite tighter), or within a squad or in platoon formation; training in tIre systematic search of towns and villages; accurate snapshooting; the use of minedetectors; laying and removal of mines; skiing; conduct of operations in the winter; use of snow as. shelter, and woodsman
ship. In addition, lectures should be delivered regarding the way of life and the custoi,is of thc presumed eniny people; the l)est ways to trcat them in order to win their friendship and support;
rules of land warfare and how they are to be applied in case of guerrilla warfare (justly but severely), and economic COn(litiOflS
of the occupied country.

3. Organization and Equipment. The organization of a Marine Corps battalion with its squads subdivided into lire teams and its great firepower would roughly meet with the requirements of an antiguerrilia battalion. Its equipment may generally be the same.

I lowcvcr, keeping in mind the fact that companies, platoons, and even squads iiiay he forced to operate independently, some additional equipment must be supplied to these units. Squads dispatched into woods or mountains mmist be provided with means Of Uollmmflunication, that iS to siy light, poll-able radios with. sufficient range (at least three miles); platoons need more powerful sets in order to timaintain conmmunicatiorls with the company head

tl11;1l-C which may be located at a greater distance. Iliebattalion
lutist b equipped with a sufficient number of trucks to guarantee
time mobility of the tillit and ItS subdivisions. The availability of
one or two armored cars would greatly facilitate the mobility of
battalion and company comnnmnders, as veJl as being a valuable
asset whcrc greater lire support is needed. Since in some places
guerrillas use fortifications (dugouts and hunkers), the assign
liment of two or three mecoiliess guns, and perlma1)sa llaimietlirowcr
team, vould prevent unnecessary casualties. Mimic detectors should
be available to every platoon.
  4. Operations. The antiguerrilia battalion, being directly at-
tached to the army or corps headquarters, may be used for guard
duty, search of towns, etc., until tile receipt of information on
time presence of guerrilla bands iii a certain area. Then, depending
omi the supposed number of guerrillas, a platoon or company is
dispatched to the endangered sector. Company headquarters may
lie set up in the town w'liich is the nearest to the area of opera-
tions. A platoon of this company may be sent into a village in the
iimji,,ecl,atc neighborhood of the supposed guerrilla hiding place.
This conparatively small unit will not unduly alarm the guer

                 War, Revolution, and Terror
                                                         2 I 7
rillas and will leave them unprepared for a possible round-up.
Squads will reconnoilir the nearby woods and swamps, to inter
cc1)t guerrilla runncrs iiid sentries and lay aiiibushes for guerrilla
nhlning teamS, until
                     H)SitiVe
                            information on the locatton and
strength of the guerrihl.i band is obtained. Then the company, and
if necessary the battalon, may be called in and can be skillfully
directed to assault and to annihilate or, at least, disperse the band.
During these preparations, the members of aIhtiguerrilla
                                                        Units
must establish contact with the population and support their fight
by psychological treat tient of the natives. They ititist he always
ready to help the farti er, to protect hiiii, and, if possible, to win
hiiii as an associate aid cofighter. Members of these units must
always be on their guird against treachery. Patience and caution
are the first and most important rules for a successful operation
and for the presientiol of unnecessary casualties.

  if the hi1ilitary antigerrilla activities are assisted y a resource-
ful and flexible polkv, perhaps as displayed f)y ( ;eucrilol)erst
Schmidt during Won I War II in the llrya:skt .olwt area, the
task of suppressing a 1ucrrilla moveilient, or at least of reducing
it to insignificance, will be greatly facilitated.
  it iiiust be emphasiicd that in order to wage an effective anti
guerrilla callipaign, not only imist the responsible heathens he well
ac1u;iinted
             with
                    the
                         physical
                                    aspects
                                              of
                                                  the enemy
                                                                 force,
but also they must fully understand the psychology of the in
(hlgenlms pspuhation. ibis knowledge will enable theiii to estal
lish a policy that the population will recognize fl )t only for its
effectiveness but, what is inure important, for its liuinaiie and )ust
consideration of the welfare of the local inhabitants. Guerrillas
starve without the support of the people.

## How Castro Won Dickey Chapelle

J ust west (If Guantnanio City lies a licticl iii the Ccilnra Highway which is a textbook ambush Sitea horseshoe of asphak almost a mile from end to end, lined every yard on both skiles by Steef) ridges thick with jungle growth. One hot morning early in l)cccinber, 1958, the curve was ready for its fate. At each end, scvcra) 200_pound mines lay under the road surface, and near them a hidden rebelde rested with sweaty hands dose to the plunger. Seven light machine guns were emplaced in the greenery of the rocky slope, the nearest forty yards froii the road and the most distant almost on top of the ridge. More than 200 riflemen, itiany with automatic weapons, were dug in, two and three to a hole, along the risc.

But the bearded officer, Capitn Jose ValIc, who before the war had been a traffic clerk in an import (inn, was not satisfied.

I us pcople had been ilianning this ambush site now for thirteen days, and ih that rime they had eaten thirteen meals. So he did not think they were alert any more. As he walked his lines, he told them they could expect to be hit at any hour now by a column of Batista's troops many hundred strong. Other rebel forces were besieging one of the government's fortresses, that in he town of I a Maya ten miles farther west, and he predicted a relief ci iluiiitl would be dispatched to thcni front the army garrison at Cuantanamo City.

But the captain was increasingly aware that lie had given these saute troops this same word every other morning on the site, too.

So today he decided to change the disposition of his forces.

lie sent forty rillcuimcn and a light machine gun with its crew t%V() uttiles up the road. There was an antI)ush spot there too, a bush-covered slope lining the left of the road for a thousand

yards. 1-us orders to this advance guard lie rcpcatcd twice. They
were to hide in the jungle grass, fire on the relief column when
it was at the point nearest them, then leapfrog in thices and fours
back through the cane fields to the main ambush area, keeping the
convoy under fire only as long as they could do it witlu)ut expos-
ing themselves.
   "That will do no harm and make enough noise so CVCOflC
will be wide awdce before we're really hit," he finished.
   Just before noon, the enemy column did appear. There was a
lead ;cc1), an armored car, a tank, three buses heavily loaded with
troops, a rearguard jeepand one element the captain had not
thought aboutair cover. Two Cuban Air Force 8-26's were
flying wide figure eights along the road at an altitude of al)out
1,000 feet.
  The rebels of the advance guard, well concealed behind chunky
bushes and widc-bladed grass, opened fire. The machine gunner
accounted for the driver and the officer in the lead jeep and a
burst from a BAR killed three soldiers in the front scat of the
first bus. The convoy halted dead in the road. A handful of
soldiers in the crowded buses wrestled their weapons into firing
position but they could not see a target. Neither could the tank
crew, slowly traversing their 75 mm.
  Nor could the men in the 826's. But thcy lcne' the flue had
come from the green hillside, and they began to strafe it from end
to end. They so persistently stitched Wack and forth tlmt
                                                                t hue
rebels one by one looked quickly up, hesitated, and then fell back
behind their concealment. A halfdozen began to empty their
weapons at the planes. One B26 gunner opened uire with his 20
nun. He hit downslope from the rebels, and Iii(ust of them con
tiniued to empty clip after clip at the stalled convoy.
  i'he men in the driverless bus panicked and fled back through
the ditches to the cover (if nearby cane fields; a score dropped
their rifles as they ran, and three fell wounded or dying. The
drivers of the other two buses haciced theuti for perhaps fifty
yards, loaded the mcii who had been hit,
                                              t hen
                                                    (.1i u iuied and
jiukcd back. The tank and armoredcar (lrivels Ui uined where
they were to cover the l)uses. Then the whole column, leaving

only the two wrecked vehicles, was grinding our, faster and laster, II) the cast.

Ii was all over in a itial tcr of minutesall over, that is, but Ii i I lie verbal PY'01 eclilties of the rebel captain, whcn the lcadcr d his advance gna rd iep )rtcd. Ilic Captain pulkd hitti behind thc iksertcd lniilding of a cantina near the main ambush site.

'My orders were that you should lire and withdraw, fire and iithdraw!" he shouted ovcr and over at his redfaced junior.

"Ve would have, we would have, my Captain, but that we had p in cover from the 1126 and .

. ." the lieutenant began.

''Your excuse shames our dead!" the captain interrupted. "If i ni had linic what I told you to 1o, we would have captured I lie wlu de convoy,'' iie went on, rocking on his toes. "This way, hat do we have?

l'w wrecks and SOIIIC 1)100(1 0fl the Central Ii igliway ! And that is all there is to slmwfor i Itirtccn days of waiting!''
lie Opened his hiaiitls an(l put them over his bearded face. The lieutenant turnc(l and walked slowly out of the yard of the descried cantina.

Captain ValIc probably stated the net tactical gain to the rebel camiip:iigii correctly. lInt to an onlooker and possibly to the his
I orians, tile action was ilmore significant. It was almost a vignette I i lie ( uhami revolimi iou, an answer to the question: LIow (11(1
astro's rilleutien t iuiic and again turn back Batista's tanks and il:iiies?

My conclusion was that they earned all the real estate by tuinking vcry mistake in the bookbut one. They consistently delivered a high volume of lire. After they started shooting, they rarely let anything_the enemy's reaction or their own cornwander's ordersstop theuti from continuing to fire until there was nothing left to fire on.

They barely aimed and they did not conserve ammunition. But they unmistakably coinuiiunicated their will to tight to an enemy whose superior equipment was unmatched by the will to use it.

I Icie is' i rc1()rt from the Cuban lighting:
i'hc forces of Castro at the time I knew theni iiioved and fired Is an army, not a band or mob. Fidel estimated there were 7,300
in uniform (blue or green cotton drillfatigues) l)y the third week of December. Thcy 'erc dircctly supported by an ejual nisui ii of pcrsonnel uudcr niilitary orders, wluisc duties incitideti vuk in towns still policed by Batista, and who wore civilian clot liiii.

One in tcn of the fighters was a iioii-Ciibaui -I )uuiiiuiican, A l icahl, VCOCZIICIaIi, Nicaraguan, Argciititiiaii. About inic iii was a woman; except for OflC Sniper platoon, the voiiieii iii ilin form were noncombatants who (11(1
housekeeping and supl v assignments.

The basic unit of the rebel army was a forty_nan platoon coninianded by a secin(l lieutenant. The rebels insisted there were no differences in rate anumg the noiuiIhcer personnel; in practice,

 I noticed hliahly "natural NCO's'' wit Ii their own fOlIo\iuif
                                                                                                                                                iii
 from six to a dozcui men. The officer rauiks were (lie sau ne as
                                                                                                                                              J .S.
 ranks up to major, or connindante, still the highest miik iii
                                                                                                                                                lie
 Cuban military forces. (The single star on t lie Cuban Prime A liii
 ister's epaulets today signifies this rank,
                                                                                                    as it did duiiug
                                                                                                                                              i ic
 fighting.) In the field,
                                                       I worked with the coinmitand groups
 three majors l)eside the Castros. Each led about 5(U) itiemi
                                                                                                                                             antI
 twenty-odd officers.
      This simplified table of organization was reflected in the did -
 sion of responsibilities. \Vhat we consider SI
                                                                                                                  functions were
 almost entirely carried out by the senior officer or his to1) iiils
 personally. the S2 anti S4 svoilc
                                                                                    was done by iiieti
                                                                                                                                in
                                                                                                                                       iimmtl ii.
This left the iinifornmed forces the single primary concern
operations.
     'l'he staffs had no prohicuims of payurn pay, hence mm probictim
or of recruitment, since there were iiiorc s'oultlbe Fidelistis
than rifles with which to arm theuti. The sure method by which
a volunteer l)ccame a barbudo was to disarm one of Iat isi a's
soldiers (by force or purchase) and hike into a Castro couiiiiuaiid
POSt with his rifle, ammo, and canteen. One boy of fi ftecui hail
to be accepted when lie reported wit hi a BAR which lie insisted
he had gotten the hard way.
     More than half the rebelde fighters I knew had been field hands
in the cane fields or coffee plantations of Oricntc Province. Ibui
a high proportion of the others had city backgrounds and white
collar experience, so the overall literacy rare was very high for
Cuba. Probably the most capable battalion officer (mmw C3 oh

the Ctihan Rebel Arlity) was Comandante Antonio Lusson, whose family owned a large cane plantation near the Castro family's OWn fields.

Most of the enlisted men I knew had undergone a basic training stint of from two to four months in the most remote reaches of the Sierra Macstrc Mountains. They had learned scouting and patrolling thcrc (one had a copy of FM 2175 in his pack), but the pi-illiary purpose of the training obviously was to condition the men to cxtcnded periods of hunger and fatigue, to find out who would literally rat her light than eat. Not many had learned to use their weapons effectively, nor to maintain them in the field;
those who had became prized mcn.-But the barbudos almost without cxccption had developed a genuine esprit dc corps.

The wide dissinularity of military capability among them was prol);1I)ly less significant than the one common motivation. All (If Castro's lighting men were terror victims to the extent that they l)chieved they would he killed if they went back to their homes while Ratista remained in power. I knew dozens who showed me what they said were marks of torture on their bodies, or who told inc how they ha(l buried the bulletriddled bodies of their fathers, sans, or brothers.

"I always knew Latins could hate that much, but not that they could hate that long" is a comment I have heard about them.

One explanation is the conviction most of them expressed that they as individuals could not expect to live if they did not destroy the Ilatistianos who were then still policing their home conlnmnities.

The other side of the cointhe personal motivation of govern
iiien forcswas a particular target of psychological assault from the first.

Before I left the U.S., the Castro underground in New York briefed inc on the tactics this way: "We return prisoners without even intimidating the,ii. We (10 not exchange them, you understand; nor one of ours has ever been returned in the field. But we iust disarm our enemies when we capture them and send them back through the Cuban RC(l Cross."
I was cynical about this claim and once in Cuba I remarked to a rebel oflicer that I would be munch surprised to see unintimi
dated, uiiwottnded prisoucrs being reuiriicd, not exchangcc I, iii the middle of a shooting var. 'l'his rciiiark was a mistake.

That samc cvcning, I watched the surrender of htmnd teds ol liatistianos from a smalltown garrison. They wrc gat hem ccl within a hollow squa ieof rebel 1 oiiiInygunners and liaranc mccl by Rattl Castro:
"We hope that you will stay with us and fight against lie master who so illused you. If you decide to refuse this mvii itionand I am not going to repeat ityou will he delivered o the custody of the Cuban Red Cross toniorrow. Once you are under Ilatista's ordcrs again, we hope dt:it you will not ikc hf)
arms against us. But, if you do, renicimiber this:
"We took you this time. We can take you again. And when we do, we will not frightcn or torture or kill you, any timore I maim we are doing to you at this moment. If you arc captured a second time or even a third by us, we will again return you exacil as we are doing now."
This expression of Litter contempt for the lighting potent ial of the defeated had an almost physical impact on them. Sonic actually flinched as they listened.

The following day, I could not question that these men were returned unharmed. I counted 242 across a border check point marked by two burned-out car wrecks overlooking Santiago dc Cuba.

On the matter of casualty figures overall for the two yeats ccl active fighting, I came to accept Castro's estimate of 1,000 rebel dead because I was able to verify personally that the rebel dead announced for the actions I saw were correct. (But an even iticue important and still controversial casualty figure is thc rebel total loss from terrorism in the cities rather than military operations in the country. l'liis is believed to he more than 10,000 over a five-year period.)
The Fidelista combat intelligence was superb. The Bat ista commanders could not go to the head without a perspiring timncr arriving a few minutes later to tell Castro about it. tlost ul the informants were volunteersfarmers or villagers.

While the bulk of such reports was hardly marked by accuracy, Fidel himself placed the greatest reliance on theimi.

1 he iiight we met for the first time, hc and his command group were standing within 600 yar(ls of where a huge enemy patrol was searching for him. I assumed he was there to command an action to hit thiC patrol or cut it off.

'Oh, no," lic cplaiiied. "It's too big. They arc coming through the woods in a body, with men in pairs on cithcr side. When thc nearest pair is a few hundred yards away, peoplc will tell me and we will leave."
lncIny SCOUtS did in fact come in ten minutes after his depar
tiirc. In their asperity, they burned to the ground the farmer's house l)esidc which hc had becn.conferring. The farmer became a lighting Fidelista before the ashes of his house had cooled, bring
lug a Springfield rifle he had kept buried, apparently for just this eventuality.

One tradition of the Castro forces had a special usefulness to i heir intelligence_i he iiiatter of the beards. i'hc nucleus of the Castro forces grew them because there were no razors on Pico i'un1uino, where the)' hid. But in time, the l)eards served as an i(lentification device. \'Vhcn you saw a man with a sixmonth growth of hair and whiskers, you could be sure he had not been in contact with the Batista soldiery for a long time, since to them a l)eard was cause for summary arrest.

I )uiing the early iiiouithis of the lighting, the only military tactic usd1 by I lie rebels was to ainlnish small government patrols for their wcapoits. As the l)atrols grew larger, the rebelde under
giounl furnished ,iiiies, and the Fidelistas were able to turn back several punitive thrusts iiiade at them in the numntains by ringing their strongholds with the mines.

I heir expericncc in stopping movement along roads and trails led to the tactic by which they won much of Oriente Province.

Its general ob,ective was to isolate the government garrisons by halting all surface traffic. The rebels blew up the railroad bridges Ii rst, then iiiincd the side roads, and finally the iiiain artery across
( u,hia, i lie Central II igliway. They halted and burned every 4us, every car, and every truck. Noncoiiibatants were walked'at gun point l)ack to wherever they came froni-_-except for those abducted, including the U.S. servIcemen and technicians held for wcIIty_sevcn (lays in J lily of 1958.

By early I)ccembcr, the roads and most of the countryside had come under rebel control after dark; l)y daylight, nothing iiiu'ed but Batista's forces, in not less than company strength anti usual))'
with tanks and air cover.

But nmst town and village cuartcls were still fully gariisoittd, and the government controlled thc builtup areas.

Against them, Castro's forces uscd three kinds of offensive action: combat patrols, assault, and cud rclciticut. But mci Of these terms is oniy correct in the most limited sense.

The patrols were night marches, off the roads, of one or platoons with the objective of shaking UI) a garrison behind its concrete walls. Weapons included rifles, BAR's, lomiiiyguns, and one or two LMG's. On one patrol, the titcu brought an
81mm. mortar with five rounds for it. On another, they carried

a 20mm. cannon recovered front a wrecked Cuban Air luice
plane. For it they had only notoriously undependable Itoinet I i:i IC
ammo.
   The patrols crept close to the czar,tel walls (at Maffo, wit hut
forty yards) and opened fire. They sustained it no matter what
came hack at them until their amino ran low or, as happet ted
twice, the garrison set fire to their little fortress and ran the rebel
gamut in their trucks. At San Luis, the garrison resisted two sueli
raids vigorously and, the day after time sccoII(l, withdrew iii jeeps
and a truck iltt() the nearest larger cuartel. i'heir columnit tule lty
a rebel ambush, which happened to he facing the wrong way, itni
not a shot was fired.
   The tactic that the rebels called an assault was not an assault at
all as we use the word. It meant die rebel commnnanders woiihl
infiltrate their troops by (lark to positions as close to an objective
as possible without risking exposure. Fhey would then keep it
under uninterrupted smallarms lire twentyfour bouts a day.
But they would not advance nor would they use deuitolitiomis.
   In the fortress at La Maya, they thus trapped 525 people, 125
of them the wives and children of government soldiers, for seven--
teen days. Iii Mafro, there were 150 Ilatistiiuws vlto held (nit for
fourteen days and theti surrendered. 1hc artillery availal)ie oil
either side was negligible. The rebels used one 20tuttu. camtiit ni
with Comic effect because of poor luottietnade
                                                            aiuiuto, and the

garrison at Maff() - One night expended nine ii )rtar shells_pie
suinably all it hadagainst a rebel sound truck that had been haranguing the troops to surrender. On this occasion, the accuracy was outstanding; four rebels wcic killed and thirteen wounded.

hi spite of the fact that smallarms fire spattering concrete walls hardly sounds effective, these encirciements of the Batista cuartels wcrc tlic (lccisivc actions of the revolution. In the fight for Santa Clara, the final and largest action, it was a trainload of troops which the rebels encircled, not a fortress. And in this one case, those who could fire from buildings had better cover than the troops opposing theni.

However, in the fighting that I saw, the rebels only sought out concealment, and did almost without dugin or sandbagged positions. Often they exposed themselves deliberately for no logical military purpose. Once, when a whole platoon was dis
coiisolate because their rifle grenades were iiiisIiring, their battalion commander himself led a dozen men in a charge out of their concealment. An enemy blockhouse lay 150 yards away, and perhaps some of his men assumed that he planned to flank it.

But vithout grenades, demolitions, or mortar lire, he charged our fifty yards, then disposed his men behind the foot_high cover of the foundation of a wrecked building, and from there emptied several BAR magazines into the concrete blockhouse walls. He then ran his people back through a crescendo of incoming fire fwiii the blockhouse to their concealed positions. But for skinned knees and elbows, n casualties resulted. The effect on morale was cccllcnt. But the blockhouse was no less lethal than before.

Vhy were the government garrisons unable to break out of heir cuartels and l)locklu)uses?

Surely they could have broken the ring of besiegers. hit there would have been casualties, and the countryside 'as actively hostile.

Why were the cuariels not reinforced? Or better resupplied?

Until the last weeks of the fighting, the largcr were, in effect, reinforced by the fleeing garrisons front the smaller.

But as to why these in turn did not hold out, purely tactical answers are not enough. \'Vhen the 525 people from the La Maya

fortress surrentiered, they still had food, water, and amino. l'here
were scven wounded, two of them dying, in the group. Nine
peophc had hicen killed, and buried inside the walls (and seven
of the rebels had been killed, two from the air). Fhie Cuban Air
l'orce had not been successful in its resupply efforts. But it had
never tried drops directly within the cuarte! 'alls, presumably
because of the risk of hitting SOflIC of the people with falling
packages.
  Which raises what 'as to me a great mystery of the actions

 I observed: the astonishingly good performance of the B26'.
 True, they bombed and strafed the town of La Maya twice a
 (lay at least and the roads around it at all hours. But they did
 this so badly that
                                                      I WaS able to photograph them, sonictniics
 twice, after they had begun their runs, and then, tisuall' leisurely,
 to flloVC to shelter.
         Ihe Cuban Air lot cc 1126'sin pairs (lying in echelon
 usually committed in tl te adjoining county and then strafed froiii
 an altitude of 30() to 500 feet. They proved they knew how to do
 l)ettcr when they 'crc covering an unarmed l)C3 making a
 resupply drip, then they came in at right angles to each other
 antI went up the streets with wing tips at houserip level.
       I came to two conclusions about the cuinnis 1126 peiforuti
ances:
       First, the claims of the pilots at their subsequent trials that
they did everything short of incurring courttitartial to avoid
 killing noncombatants are entirely valid. (You reniciiiher, Fidel
set aside two trials acquitting ayers on this issue and ordered a
third, after which caine executions and prison sentences.)
      Second, the psychological impact of the ft-26 operations on
the people of rural Cuba vilI be a major barrier to friendly hiS.
Cuban relations for a generation to come. It
                                                                                                                           is ,io use to 1)0201
out that we sent Batista these planes for another purpose, and
stopped sending theni at all in March of I 95g. ihic planes, no
matter how poorly flown, utterly terrorized the province, and,
nu)ral judgments entirely aside, the fact is that we are heartily
hated because they caused such fear.
      Ar the time, incidentally, the rebels, without aircraft or ack

ack, (lid not ignore the planes but emptied rifles and BAR's up
at them no matter what the range. I never saw a hit scored but
the psychological effects were (Iramatic.
  Supply was a controlling factor in the entire Castro offensive.
  On the matter of food alime, the rebels' survival as a cohesive
fighting unit was frci.1ucntly in (lOtIl)t. Being 1)0th guest and
Woilian,
          I always had more to eat than anyone cisc, but at one
point
       I lived on raw sugar_cane for two days, and at another
time I ate only one meal a day for five days in a row. The char-
acteristic "hot chow" of the rebels in the field was a mush of
rice with pieces of freshkilled beef in it, served from a bucket
hung on a pole which was carried by two runners from one fox-
hole to another.
  l'ersonal c(1uipinent was severely limited. Cotton drill shirts and
pants were issued, but good footwear, canteens, and blankets were
not, and the relielde's arinl,ands, shoulder patches, and insignia of
rank were sewn and embroidered by his wife or one of the village
women.
  I-los;' Castro received his arms and ammunition was a subject of
acrimonious international debate for a long time.
  Before I went to Cuba, I was told that most weapons and ammo
were smuggled in by air from the U.S., Mexico, and Venezuela.
l)ictator Batista's Secretary of State once gave mc a personal
interview on a holiday to con)plain bitterly that A nicrican laxity
in arresting the smugglers was the reason the government could
not defeat the rebels.
  But there is little evidence for this thesis. Recently
                                                              I met
                                                                      a
Cuban flier who had flown arms from the U.S. to Cuba for
mimontlis during the revolution, lie said he had been told in Miami
that U.S. lawenforcement agencies were alerted in early 1958 to
look for a fleet of heavily loaded station wagons and several

l)C.3's.

"So what we did was to fly the stuff in a pair of Cessna 182's.

We got it out to landing strips near Key 'Vcst in an outboard tisling boat loaded on a trailer. Once I was driving the trailer and I had a flat. 'I 'lie police helped inc change tIme tire at the side of the highway w'ithout ever looking under time tar}) which coy
cred my boat. If they folded it back, they votiId have found twelve Tommyguns and the aiiiuo for thciii."
After I had been with the l"idelistas for a fcw weeks, I
no longer quest itined their onthespot insiStence t liar oiily' about 15
per cent of their weapons 'erc so "iiiiportcd.'' All tue i'esr, they said, were captured.

'1 lie weapnS that I saw were not new, and t lie great lllajority wcrc of the 'pe that we furnished to IlatistaSpi'ingIiclds, M l's, BAR's and 'lomiiiy_guns. And Colt .45 autoiliatics, iiiaiiy of the latter demonstrably captured weapons with butt plates still carrying, the insignia of the Cuban Army.

In the case of .30caliber alunlo, I saw it being ca1)turc(l during the battle of !.a Maya. The action around the tuvn involved more than 250 rebeldes, actually firing on the line day and night for tw'o and a half weeks. Yet when the battle was over, the rebel ainiiio inventory was fatter thait when ii began. Four times
(hiring the siege, a government L)C3 had made an air drop (im parachute; they just pushed the packages mit of the door) of aIll!11() for the fortress, aiirl four times the rehels had charged out under heavy fi ic and dragged the packages I ack behind their own lines. l"roni these bundles the rel)els also gained large quantities of medical supplies and some of the best cigarettes I ever smoked.

iwo weapons widely used by the rebels were manufactured right in Cuba itself by the underground.

One 'as the 200pound land mine, made at first froiii explosive salvaged out of unexploded aerial bombs that had been dropped by the Cuban Air Force. The mines usually were ermiplaced to he detonated electrically by a soldier on comimiand.

The other hoiiicniadc device wasat' ifle greimade 'htichi me
sciiililed no other grenade of which I've ever heard. It wasa firecracker shape about eight inches long w'it Ii a 'i inic;il cap on one end. It 'as detohated by a fuse of cotton siring. 'lu fire it, 'omi affixed it to the end of a rifle, lit the fuse, and pulled the trigger. In theory, the grenade exploded four seconds later.

I
watched more than a corc of these fIred. Each time soimict Imiug inhibited the clean getaway of ilic grenade fi'oiii tIme i'itleamul it dctoiiaieml within fifty yards of takeoff.

  A special logistic problem to the rebels was motor transport.
Their few dozen vehicles were jeeps, either captured from the
government or expropriated at gun point froni oil and mining
companies. (I remember there was a "duty ambulance" at the
battle of Jiguania sky_blue enameled panel truck marked EAT
STAR CANDIES.) Impulsive driving and no maintenance at all COfl
standy reduced the availability of vehicles. But the limited mileage
of roads and jeepable tracks in rural Cuba probably reduced the
itptance of motor transport to both sides in the fighting.
  At the climax of the revolution, the personnel in the field under
Fidel Castro's direct orders numbered about 15,000, half in uni
form, including a high proportion of men mentally and physically
superior. There was ultiiiiate motivation throughout, and disci
pline within small unitS was good. ihe titen were almost totally
lack mg in I))arksnIanshiJ) ability, conventional military knowhow,
and experience in fighting as a cohesive force of any size. Their
attitude toward their enemies was one of contempt leavened with
compassIon.
  Their combat intelligence was unexcclled in quantity and of
dependable accuracy. It was not organized on any military basis
but originated in the civilian population, which felt itself a direct
participant in every action, and generally welcomed the rebels as
liberators from terrorism.
  The Castro defensive operations depended largely on this intel-
ligence and on foot mobility; the rcbels simply did not remain
where they were sought.
  Their offensive operations rested on tactics involving the high-
est degree of surprise, the fewest men, the lowest risk, and the
greatest freedom to disengage. These included road ambushes,
raiding patrols, infiltration, and sustained siege by small-arms fire.
No dependence on artillery or motor transport was developed.
  Their logistics were primitive and in other than the nearideal
weather and terrain conditions of Cuba would have been disas-
trous. Their food supply was not adequate by any ordinary.
standard. Their primary source of arms and ammunition was the
enemy, although perhaps 15 per cent were smuggled into Cuba.
  Their conspicuous military virtue was their ability to maintain
a high voluimie of fire under conditions that would have discour

aged less motivated fighters. This virtue fully' exploited tlic iiiaor weakness of the vcll_equippcd government forces, which was a near_paralysis of the will to fire at all. If there is any military lesson from the Cuban revolution for all A IliCricallS, iii and out of uniform, I think this is it:
Machinery does not win wars. Men do.

## Terro.R In Cyprus Lieutenant Colonel B. I. S. Gourlay

l'bis article 'was 'writteIl in 1959, just before the struggle
(.'olo,,el (tl,cn itlajor) (bunny describes came to an end.

Pt asav civ o,dipiarv bicycle. I caning there against the curved
( irriigatcd iioui side of the cantcen hut, the metal fastener on its it1 saddkbag glinting in the burning Cyprus sun, it looked as
;iiu ,ucuit as a child aslecp, as iiiuch a natural part of the everyday sruiie as the trucks, jeeps, and staff cars that stood parked within tic barbedwire perimeter of the sprawling military camp.

Ii was lunchi iine. A carefree group of British soldiers, chatting intl laughing ammiong thcmmisel'cs, iiiovcd across the parade toward thu canteen in cheerful anticipation of the icecold beer which
;utcd theni at the bar within. As they approached the hut, they iii:tv perhaps have glanced at the bicycle, but only in the most iutrsorv wily; they hurried on and, joking still, passed through the uIcomning..(loors;Ind into imimiediate oblivion.

iou u thai precise iiuiutcimi rite flimsy hint was rent by a sudden c'p lisioi which shattered the sleepy midday stillness with a deaf
UI ii ig roar, and cast high up into the sky an ugly twisted assort
it t I tin ii )e i a ii d co rruga I cd iron, newly pain ted furniture, and ly cob ii'ed cu rtaiis.

i'iece by the debris came wheeling back to earth and tIed ;irnind the sony tangled skeleton of the hut. With it all taitie the ntissliapcn bits of what SO recently had been a very iii'ilinary bicycle. Of the saddlebag there was no trace.

Nor of the owner was there any sign. Could he have been one uI I lie many l)nildcrs' workmen in the camp? If so, he had, no ii tihit, long since passed unsuspected out of the exit gates under the eyes of the rcdcappcd military policc and even now, as the cehocs of his handiwork reached his waiting cars, sat celebrating in SOO1C distant bar, his mission vcll performed.

Incidents such as this have filled thc files of British security forces ever since April I, 1955, whcn EOK A (National Orgimiza
tion of Cypriot Combatants) launched its callipaigil of intiiiida
oon, sabotage, and mu nlcr with a series of islandwidc 1)0mb explosions. Surprising though it may scciii to those unaware of the background to the unrest, the chief sufferers have been the Cypriots themselves. They have been subjected to terrible outrages. The following few examples indicate the lengths to which the terrorists have been prepared to go: An abbot has been shot dead in his own monastery and a sick \volilan in her hospital bed;
a man has beCn illurdele(l in church, during a service, before the eyes of his own children; bombs have been rluown iI)discril'Ili
natcly into bars and cafes. Fhc tale of horror is long and of almost endless variety.

The purpose of this article is to outline the nature of the prob_
1cm that such terrorism presents to the security forces in general and the military ground forces in particular, and to describe sonic of the measures taken to solve it.

It will be immediately obvious that if time 1)roblCnh were a simple one, a solution would have been reached long before now.

In truth, it is far from simple. Terrorism the world over derives its impetus from j)c)litical, racial, or rcligiuus factors. In Cyprus, all three are present. We caimot, therefore, undertake an exaimmi
nation of the problem without taking these factors into account.

The iliost iiiipuitant tinC is probably that of politics. It does nut lie within the scope of this article,
01. the qualifications and provmee of the writer, to discuss the rights or wrongs of British political action in Cyprus, but it will be necessary to give a brief account of political events ut the island over the last hundred years in so far as they can help us to understand time background to unrest. This account, and indeed the whole article, makes only the most superficial reference to the point of view of the Turkish Cypriot, his reactions to terrorism, and his relations with the Greek Cypriots. Unless it is appreciated that this is done (lelibcr
arely in order to concentrate attention on terrorism itself, which is not of lurkish inspiration, an unbalanced impression will be formcd that the Cyprus problem concerns the Creek Cypriots in(I the British alone.

l'hc source of the unrest is the agitation for enosis, or union wit is Greece. It is no new idea. Indeed, at the very outset of the British occupation of Cyprus in 1878, when Turkey ceded the iShIti(l
151 ictisris for Ilpitishi protcction against Russia, the first II i&s ( oiissiiissiotier was welcomed on his arrival by a local Bishop wins is said to have expressed the hope that Great Britain would
'l1el1) Cyprus, as it did die lonian Islands, to be united with Mother Greece."
\ou will notice the significant fact that it was a local church
wls, expressed this political hope; significant because today it is still the churchman who seeks to assume political leadership in time struggle for minion with Greece. To the Western mind, the open association of time Church with a political party or creed is, Os say the least, unorthodox. But we have to remember that time lasrern churches have long been a nursery for those aspiring not only to ecclesiastical power but to positions of authority in oat i4,nai affairs, I en).

lii Ottoman I ilises, time Grcek Orthodox Church of Cyprus, lcd Imy its own A ichlushiop, was not permitted to play any part in politics, but it did enjoy a considerable say in the administration of time island. \'Vith time arrival of time British, it handed over its :idimiiiistiative powers. Anxious not to lose temporal influence, it dimcctcd its cti'itics snore and more into politics, and advocated iii its pulpits, sip amid down the island, the cause of enosis.

use first ismajor clash with British authority occurred in 1931, vlseim time Bishop of Kititsimi issued a seditious manifesto and led lie lesiglsatioum of all time Orthodox members of the Cyprus I egisiarivc Council. Riots ensued and Government House was Inirned down. As a result, a number of leading politicians, including the Bishop, were deported. Thereafter things quieted down.

The exiles 'crc eventually allowed to return. But agitation for union with Greece had not been completely stifled; it lay dor
ussaist and remained so for nearly two decades.

And then, in 1950, there came upon the scene a leader of the
(;ieeic community whose part in the struggle was soon to make his naiie world famous. That nmn was Makarios the Third, the prescnt Archbishop and selfstyled Ethnareh (National Lcadcr).

Youthful and intensely ambitious, a politician to his fingertips, he tOok up the leadership of the enosis nioveinent with a vigor anti aggressiveness not matched by his predecessors.

In 1951, he l)FOught Colonel Gcorgc C rivas, a former C reck Army officer and postwar guerrilla Icader, over from C rcecc Ii a visit, to advise hint on the fortitatioti of a otilitatit youth lilgilit ZatiOfl (PFX)N ). Front that moment on, it could only be a mat icr of time before the tkcision was taken to use 'iolcice in fort her ing the campaign for enosis. And in 1954 that decision was takuit.

Grivas returned to Cyprus to lead EOKA. lie inimediatcly set about building up a terrorist orgatuzatioli based On PEON, which by now was an underground movement. On April 1, 1955, as we have seen, with full approval of the Ethnarch and his ad'isoiv council, the battle opened with coor(linatcd 1)011mb explosions all over the island, the Cyprus Broadcasting Station being one of lie first government buildings to sit tFer.

.eaflcts streamed io ii FOKA's secret duplicators in everincreasing nitimihers. 'lrit It Soldiers,'' thc thundered, "choose: Peace or \Vuour friciil ships or our bullets!'' They were signed, ''IOKAl'he Chiil l)ighenis."
In those early days of tcrrorisimm, the real identity of he who styled himself I)igheiis was not positively known at to tog the Cypriot people as a whole, or indeed in British official ci ides.

The mystery surrounding the naimic iintloiihtedly added to ii glamour. It soon caine to exercise a powerful hold oti I lie iiiiai nation of the Greek cypriot coimimitnity. fly time tune it sets known to be he noni Ic guerre of Colonel C rivas, it COIiiili;liitic, I
not only foitititlable respect tlronglmotit Cyprus bitt also t he serious attention of politicians in London and An kara.

I )iglmcii is is one of the names of the hero of a Jlyzaimtiimc epic, "I )ighemmis i it Borderer." This hero was endowed w'ith supernatural po\vcrs.

Ii is possible that Gris'as chose this syimilmolic title to IeImiiu(l his followers of their Greek Byzantine heritage.

in A thetis, C ti VaS COU Id COfl (idCflt ly 1(1(1k for help, for here lie movement for cnosis had been strongly' supported by all polit icil parties for sonic time before the outl)reak of violence. The C icek Government under Field Marshal Papagos had formally raised the matter in 1954 in the United Nations. There were Greek nationals in the ranks of EOKA and Greek arms and explosives smuggled into the island. Last, hut I)y no means least, the statecontrolled Athens radio gave continuous backing to the movement y open incitement to violence. Dighenis clearly did not lack for support from C icece.

\Vhat maimer of imian is this l)ighcnis, this Grivas? Undoubtedly, his achievements to date mark him as an outstandingly able guerrilla leader. In his sixties, he is a strongly built man of me
ditmimi height, clark haired, swarthy, and mustached, with a strong and intense dark eyes. in character he is austere, selfdisciplined, determined, energetic, and ruthless to a degree; he did not shrink from ordering the placing of a time bomb in a transport aircraft which was scheduled to rake off with British service families on hoard. The bomb, in the event, exploded prcnaturely. tic is an excellent administrator. I-Ic is a master of disguise. Over and above all this, he is a fanatical champion of enosis and, in the words of the former Governor of Cyprus, Field Marshal Harding, "pathologically antiCommunist.''
Such is the mami. What of the island he operates in? When lie returned to Cyprus in 1954 with the task of organizing terrorism, he was returning to his homeland, for lie was born in a small town in the northeast corner of the island, lie therefore was well aware of the nature of time ground over which his gangs were to peratc, and must have found it much to his liking. Indeed, the island is in mmiany ways ideally suited to guerrilla activities. Its grcatcst length froni cast to west is 140 miles ali(l frommi north to south, sixty iiiiles. Its chief features arc two mountain ranges and a large plain which lies between them. TIme Kyrcnia Range in time north runs along the length of the coast, never mimore than a few immiles wide, its sharp ridges rising to a height of about 3,000
feet. lIme lroodos Mountains to the south of tIme central plain ale altogether more extensive, and at their highest rise to 6,000
icc
:
\Vit Ii their large forested areas (the Cyprus state forests cover 19 pcr cent of the whole island), theim' steep slopes, inipres
sivcly mugged terrain, and isolated villages, they provide wonder
mi territory for guerrillatype operations.

Ihe main towns lying in the central })lflin and alongthe coastal fringes arc iii their own way equally suited to terrorist operations.

Ilic visitor to Nicosia, tile iSland capita?, will notice how the houses crowd upon each other and how the narrow side streets nieandcr on and lose themselves in countless cross-connecting lanes. i'iicsc closely Inhiltup areas with tllcir Greelc and Turkish
(1tt, which all the iiiain towns share, provide the bomb tlirowcr and killer s'itli excellent cover for terrorist operations and equally excellent escape routes.

So utnich then for tile 5CCflC of Grivas' operations. No for his antis aul(l methods. As we have already seen, his ultimate desire is to sce Cyprus united with Greece. To help achieve this, it might be thought that he is bent on seizing control in the island.

i'his is not so: To be brief, it is impracticable for him to do so.

Rather, he aims to wake the British position untenable by working On public opinion inside and outside Cyprus. He intends w keep the struggle for enosis constantly before the world by violent action, and to build up a powerful body of opinion which will sympathize with EOKA in its struggle against an oppressive administration. As for the Greek Cypriots, they must help him. If they will not help actively, they must be terrified into silence.

If they work against him, they must be liquidated as traitors.

'Vhatcver ilnprcssion EOKA's activities may have had on outside opinion, there is nodoubting their effect on the 420,000
Greek Cypriots living in the island. Bombs are thrown; no one iicrs them. Murders are committed in the crowded daytime; no one sees them. The prevailing atmosphere is one of fear and SuspiCiOn.

Grivas has not found it difficult to bring his compatriots to this surly pass. Among all Greek Cypriots, there is a strong sense of being tied to Greece; they are Greek in their way of life and thinking, Greek in what they eat and drink, Greek in their re
iiguin. Even their schoolteachers are, in many cases, Greek nationals trained in Greece. Admittedly, a strong case can be arguc(l on political and racial grounds to show that the Greek Cypriot is mint a true Greek. But the fact remains that he feels passionately that lie is a Greek, and that is what matters. Certainly, it is enough to make him well disposed in principle toward the moVcment of ('iwsis, even though he may, for thc moSt pa ii abhor EOKA's brutal methods.

With the Turkish Cypriots things arc (liffercut. Outitunihered by four to one, thcy l)itterly oppose enosis, which to them spells doom. They claim partition but accept partnership w'ith the Hilt
ish. But if the British elect to leave Cyprus, they are prCpareil to go to extreme lengths to prevent the island, which Turkey iiilcd for hundreds of years and which is So close to the Turkish hoiiic
land, from falling into Greek hands. They are a proud and rcso
Itite people, more conscious today of their ties with Turkey han ever before. Their iimrtial qualities coniinand respect ann nig Greek Cypriots, and to some extent offset their numerical mienurity. They will never iiow to Grivas.

EOKA's active forces probably (10 not exceed a few hundred in numl)er. They are organized into districts. These in turn coinprise a number of mountain, village, and town groups or gangs.

The mountain gangs, each with an average strength of six men, comprise the hardcore terrorists. They live in the hilly regions where ideal training areas and hide-outs can be found. Charged with the moredifficult military operations such as raids on police stations and military outposts, ambushes, and missions of destruction, they rely on quick movement and on their hideouts to save them from the attention of the security forces.

The village gangs carryout tasks requiring less skill: supplying the iliountain groups with food, anus, and aiIlullUhiitiOfl, passing on inforiiuarion, simple sal)otage, and the like. They way lint remain foriuially constituted all the time, coming together iC
casionahly in varying strengths for specific tasks. They receive their instructions through the district leader, and, unlike their iuiore competent mountain partners 'hl() have precision wea1u nus, are usually issued shotguns.

The town groups have a multiplicity of tasks. It is they vluo distribute the wellknown leaflets wInch announce EOKA 's IC
actions to events of the day, record its threats, and prnclaiiii its truces. It is they who provoke the hysterics of (lelnonStial log schoc)lcIuildreiu, who give :isyluiii to iuiciiuhieis (If the orgaiui/a
turn, and who deal in assassination.

All these grouips--iuiotinr:iiiu, 'illagC, uii&I townCollie iiiitltr t hc strict control of Grivas hinisclf. tic conccrns huiiiself in thcir every activity and takes a personal interest in matters of the siia Ilest detail. \'ital 0) this control, which he CXCLCISC5 front i itiolule coiiniiainl post, is an efficient atid secure conununicatlons sysIclIi. ibis he IRIS Intilt up with a chain of reliable couriers, Itoth ii iaIc and fciiialc.

So 1,ii we have painted a picture of Cyprus which is l)ut half finished. It is, for the illost part, one of terrorism set against the background of a rugged island landscape. To give the picture balance, we now have to fill in thc foreground and depict the story of c000terrcrrorisnt.

## Il

Iii Cy' p rus, II ritai i ltea rs very special resp )nsibilities, not least of which is the maintenance of law and order. It is upon the security foices, so called, that this stern task lies.

'Flic term "security forces" does not mean the fighting services only, but rat her a partnership with the police and all the civil agencies whose task it is to keep the peace. If there is one great lesson that Britain has learned in dealing with security problems the world over, it is that they can oniy be solved when the civil, police, and iiiilitaiy authorities work together in unison. In efficient security' forces, there is no room for those who think that they can go it alone.

In the ensuing paragraphs we will chiefly be concerned with the military ground forces. Space does not allow us to do full justice to the pair other sections of the security forces are playing. A brief account, therefore, must suffice.

Security operations in Cyprus arc under the overall control of a iitilitary I)ircctur of Operations who is responsible to the Governor. lie works through a combined stall on which are repre
scntcd the three services, the police, and the civil administration.

This mixed staff is reflected in District Security committees dotted around the island and consisting of civil, military, and police representatives. They work in the closest accord and their decisions arc invariably jointly taken.

The main tasks of the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force may he said briefly 0) consist in coiniiiandwg the sea anti iii approaChCs to the island in order to pFCVCI1t smuggling.

l'lic ice force, SOnIC 2,000 strong, is coiliposeil of CrecI
ititi ILirkish Cypriots I)ackCd LII) by sonic 100 illspcctors and serailt'.

from the IJI)ite(l Kiiigiloiii police COl)St:ll)IllaI'iCS. ihe first oii tingent of the lattcr rcachcd Cyprus in 1956 at the instigation of Ficid Marshal I larding. i'hcir high standar(1 of integrit)' anti I Iicio calni performance of (hit)' in difficult times did much -to lot oot the shaken morale of the local force in the earl)' days of tciit or.-
ism, and ContinuC to do So today.

The civil adiiiinistration, it need hardly l)C said, providcs ill the essential experience in hical affairs without which the cilints of the security forces arc likely to he abortive or at best mis--
dircctcd. It is impossible to think of any type of operation which their views will not be sought, on matters ranging fiooiii thc protection of village water supplies to the problems of itiass fingerprinting.

We can now turn to the gi'oumid fotices. We have iIIc;ioI\'
gained a clear enough impression of tile terrain ill Cyprom guess at the restrictions and difficulties which it might ini1iitse on the operation of ground troops. But there are other ililpoil lilt restrictions to bear iii illind. These arc tile lCgal ones i1St, t hero.

is the basic principle of l'.ilgliSh law, which applies to all lint isil territories overseas, that when troops operate in support of I lie civil power, they iiittst not use ally wore force than is stint Iv necessary to achieve tile immediate awl.

Ibis is conlnlonly known as tile principle of minimum It ircc and is one which is impressed Up()11 tile
111111(1 of every si:i Ic British soldier. It carries special ililportance for the mliilitary I
cause thie' go al)onIt their duties :iiitied with let hal weapons.

Because mililitary commanders can he called to account if tile)' do not observe this principle, those in command of troops l;IciIlg serious disturbances may he caught in a dilemma. If they hcsit:lt C
too long in using their firepower, they run a risk of being oven
whelnied; if they shoot too early, they stand to he courtmartialcd for using excessive force. It is not only tile commander 'lio laces this dilemma. The individual soldier or Marine making an arrest, or surprising an intruder on military premises, to take two siiii1tlc examples, has also to keep the principle iii mind. But neither coin
inander nor individual soldier is likely to go far wrong if he acts with impartiality, with preventive and not punitive intent, and in good faith.

i'herc are occasions when troops will have no hesitation in opening fire; to take one obvious exaiiiple, when they themselves COIItC tinder fire. iheir actions in such cases are governed by the law or special emergency regulations issued from time to titHe by the Governor. liiicrgeuicy legislation covers such 1mints as powers of arrest, powers of search, power to remove obstructions on the roads (if made of stones, these can be used as missiles against the security forces), removal of national flags, banners, and slogans from btii Idings, interrogation of the public, action to be taken when civilian vehicles fail to stop, and a host of other matters.

lttough has been written to make it clear that the soldier has to know a great deal of the policeman's job in addition to his own.

lit his daily dealings with the public, he is more policcitian than soldier. I Ic has to be cooperative and friendly; yet he knows that it is the public 'ho shields the FOKA assassin, It is nor easy for Itimit to forget that many of his comrades have been killed on duty in the island. l'alcen all in all, his task is not straightforward.

It Cannot L)e learned in a (lay.

When all rite comilponcnts of the security forces arc worl(ing ogcther as a teatti at every level, and how niucli more easily this is said thami done, there will still be two reo1uiremiicmits vital to Success ill countetterrorist operations:
l'lie first is liNtclass coin
Ilnmnications, the second, information.

\'lieii violence broke out in A pii I, 1955, in Cyprus, neither existed. lor timany itionthis, while suitable equipment was being Itmought out front Umitain and installed, opCtatu)Ital mimessages had ioi he conveyed to all parts of tue island by dispatch rider or courier and via the few insecure post_office lines that existed. It was wellnigh iuiipossililc to organize rapid counteraction against the terrorists in such circumstances, let alone to achieve security.

Flue picture is now different. Firstclass cojuirnunications do exist.

1 he acquisition of informutation has not been such art easy mat
rem. No amount of propaganda or threats will drag determined terrorists front their lairs. They have to be sought out and de
stroycd. But to be successful in this, we must lia'.'c information;
yet without success we get no information. This is a vicious circle and one that had to be broken during the second half of 1955
while the build_up of troops and equipment was going on. It was riiarry months before useful information began to conic into the hands of the security forces. In the early spring of 1956, tIre pattern of EOKA's organization gradually began to take lrape, largely as a result of numerous small successes. \Veeks of patient patrolling, road checks, biushes with the town groups and niroun

tam
      gangs, and a lucky break from time to time, put the security
forces in a position to launch largescale offensive operations.
   By July of the same year, several of the inunnutain gangs had
been eliminated. Then the Suez crisis intervened and tire forma-
tions most concerned with operationS in the iliounitains, Fhc 'liii rd
Commando i3rigadc,
                                 Roytl Marines,
                                                          arid
                                                                  Pa racirute
                                                                                  Brigade,
were diverted to other tasks. Flrc story tlrerca ftcr is one of hills
and tiuces, mostly occurring after major EO1( A sethacks, and of
renewed offensives culminating in the security forces' successes
during the latter nriontl IS (if 1958.
   In Novemimlier of that year, Kyriakos Matsis, air animlnrslr expert
arid the most soughtafter EOKA leader after Grivas, was
                                                                                        stir
jirised in a village in the north of the island arid k i lied.
   The story of Iris discovery throws light on t tic piuhlciris at tend
lug searches of mountain villages. Such a story usually starts vitl1
tire receipt of infoinuiation as to the wincrcaln,riu.s r,I
                                                                               a g:iug 1)1
individual terrorist leader. More often than nor, this will lead to
the cordoning and searching of a house, a village, several villages,
or even a large tract of countryside. An operat iou
                                                                             of this sort
must achieve surprise to succeed. If the greatest care is not taken,
die birds will have flown by the time tire cordon is iii position.
As soon as troops leave their camps, their stucirgi Ii, cOuul1)ositi(,ur,
and direction of lmvcnuucurt will reach unfriendly cars. The ciii
ploynuent of helicopters can and does help to overconrre
                                                                                        t Iris
prol)lem, but for large operations great numbers of them
                                                                                         are
required. Even in administrative matters, it will he necessary to
resort to deception if operational intentions are not to be given
away. Fnrexainple, heavy demands oni base stores before pro-
tracted operations may result in a noticeable increase of adminis-

trative traffic. This, in turn, may reveal that soincthing big is afoot. Further, it iiiay lid1) EOKA to (leduec what units are involved.

Once the cordon is in position (troops in the order of hun
lreds may be needed for this task), it is for other ground forces to conduct the search. In default of pinpoint information, this process is likely to be a long one, Ineasurc(I in weeks or even months. The wanted men will clearly not be walking about openly in the hills and villages. They will L)e out of the way, in hideouts. rue location of these hideouts will lie determined by factors such as ease of concealment, accessibility, escape routes, aii(l so oil. A less obvious factor viIl be the need to be within reasonable distance of sources of food, water, and ammunition.

Most hideours are therefore found either in a village or a mile or two away from one. Marsis had elected to stay in the little village of Kato Dhiikoiiio when ncvs reached him of the big security drive in the Kyrenia Range. His discovery, SO typical of siiiilar successes in previous operations, Caine about to some extent by chance. The house in which lie lay hidden caine under search for arms.

l'he search seemed to be unsuccessful. As a soldier was having a last look around, lie used his bayonet to prod the tiled floor of the back parlor. In testing the cement between tw'o tiles, his bayonet went straight through and into what transpired to he the entrance to a ready_usc or eiiicrgcncy hideout.

Alatsis and two others were crouched below the floor in a hole six feet long, four feet wide, and two feet deep. 1-us companions chose to give rheiiiselves up. Matsis, resisting every persuasion to lollow suit, evenuia lly killed liitnscl I with an automatic weapon.

It iiiut not be thought, though, that all mountain operations take the forni of largescale sweeps and searches. The infiltration of small patrols, the posting of observers, aIilI)ush parties, and the Ii ke have achieved striking successes. The pirtictilir advantages of the small party arc that it can I)c introduced into an area surreptitunisly and that, oiice established, it does not excite the attention which the mass movement of troops inevitably does.

I hc apparent absence (if troops Iii an area will tend to lull the resident gangs, their supply parties and couriers into a false sense
(if security, and iliay induce carelessness on their part. It is under thcsc coiidituins that the security patrol iiiay StlI])riSC
a gang oii thc move, capture couriers with important doctiiiieuts, or stiiiible across the cigarette 1)acket which provftks vital evidence of a nearby hideout.

All hideouts are not so nrndest as the one in which Matsis met his death. His was cssentially of a type dcsigncd to provide temporary cover during Surprise search operations.

l'hc more elaborate hidet ut is built to house several mcii, ah)(l is stockcd with every reqilirenient for a long stay.

Before concluding these l)rief coniiiients on iiiount:iiil operations, mention i nust be made of informers. An integral part of any search is thc screening of every man and woman wit bin the cur
(ton. this process involves their passing before a (cain of police interrogators furnishcd with the details of wanted persons.

Fhie work of these interrogators can be greatly enhanced if they arc supportc&l by 'in exterrorist who, in order to save his neck, is prepared to puk out EOKA members. 'T'liis luau is conuilu()nly hidden behind ,u screen as the villagers file past and so retains his incognito. Wh1 de village gangs have been identified iii this way.

We have now learned something of uuuounluiui oJ)eratiouls. \.Vhuat goes on in the owns? i'iic chief problems here ire those of dealing vith the unnuan, dispersing unlawful assemuiblies, and suppressing riots.

Sonic indication of the advantages that gunimucuu enjoy iii the crowded narrow streets has already been given. An efFective counter to the ruthless killer is not easy to find. In fill the st rcets with armed soldiery is exorbitantly expensive in niami1iower and only iue lnaumit;uitue(l for short 1)criods. Suiap scauchucs of male passersby in the hope of catching the terrorist \il Ii a weapon oiu his person lilly have some deterrent effeci So ilso mmia'
the aruulilug of Bilt ishcivihi:umis, the use of decoys,
111(1 other uiucthiods of deception. l;iit it vihl only he a matter of tulle hefore a l)atielii killer will find a safe opportunity to shout. Special IOKA surveillance part's kcc1) a cheek on the iuuoveuienls of prospective victimuus, and when a daily or weekly pattern is csiahlished, choose the iuiost 1)rOpiti( itis iilouuiCiit for due (Iced.

The dispersal of unlawful assenitulies and the s(ul)l)ressi(uul (if riots present die security forces with thoroughly uiuipleasaiur and thankless tasks. A grCat many plwrograplis have appcarcd since
1955, and especially in the antiBritish press, of ugly riot scenes in Cyprus. It is well to remember that the quelling of disturbances is a difficult l)USInCSS; it requires from commanders nice judgment anti a sense of timing, and from everyone at every level, a cool head and self-restraint in the face of severe provocation and personal danger.

How does the commander of troops go about the problem of crmvd clearance? Standard British military doctrine lays down that it is the police who are rcsponsil)le, in the first place, for dealing with unruly crowds; that s'lien the police find the task too much for them they receive the aid of the military. In Cyprus it has been necessary to depart from this procedure, owing to the numerical inferiority of the police. As a result, troops are trained to use police methods in controlling crowds. They are no longer strangers to the baton and shield.

'Nhen a hostile crowd forms, then, it will probably first clash with the police or troops acting as policemen. It will also probably find across its path a thin concertinabarbedwire harrier or other hastily erected barrier, Its more enterprising elements will then try to find the flanks of the police, who, in turn, will use reserve forces to seal off the crowd's movements. The police will try every nonviolent means to disperse the crowd: loudspeaker announcements, written exhortations on large banners, the reading of a proclamation and warning to disperse, even the produc
turn of cameras to photograph ringleaders, and coloreddye sprayers to assist subsequent i(lentifications.

Assuming these measures fail, the throwing of bottles and stones by rowdies vill start about now. These will be aimed as much from the tops of nearby houses as from ground level. They will hurt. Even a siiiall bottle thrown from a height or hurled at short range can cause unpleasant damage to the unprotected face.

Alter the bottles and the stones may come the first "bomb,"
uss'-lly made from water pipe of about threeinch diameter filled CX1)IOSIVC, and scaled off at the ends. By the dine this hap
he stage is set for stern countermeasures.

e considering these measures, which culminate in the
of fire by the military, it would be well to mnemitiort that
all crowds do not nccessariiy reach a rcally violent state. Many disperse before thc bombthrowing stage is reached. Schoolclul
dren, for example, stage many demonstrations which for thc most part do not feature bombthrowing. But, noncthcless, they can be awkward to handle. Provoked by EOKA leaflets, they will stream from school, girls as well as bOyS. In aleallet addrcsscd to schoolchildren, Grivas once told them that the cause of enosis was
"more sacred than your teachers, your mother, or your father."
A likely occasion on which they will appeal is the funeral of an exterrorist. Turning up by the hundreds, chanting slogans, and I)ccoming more unruly as they go, they can often hC (l151)CrSC(l only by the use of tear gas and physical umamihandlimig. i'lic snatching of the leaders, often youths and girls in their teens (all of equal truculence), and locking them up out of harm's way for a few hours often has a salutary effect on these youthful gatherings.

But to return to the riotous crowd. The bomb has been thrown and we have on our hands a serious breach of the peace. The police, or troops acting as such, will now, if they have not already done so, embark on a series of baton charges. If the wind is right, they may employ tear gas delivered in hand-grenade form or shot from longer-range riot guns. If troops arc handy, the bayonet may have been resorted to, though this weapon has its disadvait
tagcs in that the user may l)CCOI1tC too closely ci iiliroilctl with time crowd. If all these measures fail, if.niorc boiiihs arc thrown or buildings are set on fire, and the crowd still will not disperse, the nmonient arrives to use the ultimate means of forcing the issue, the bullet. \'Ve have now, more than ever, to go carefully.

The first requirement before opening fire is for the military coiiminandcr on the spot to be quite satisfied hat rio ot her course is open to hint to achieve the immediate ai,ii of restoring Jaw and order. The next is to give the crowd a clear warning that they will be fired upon if they do not disperse. They ittust lie then given the opportunity to move off. If and when lire is eventually opened, it is carefully controlled: Two bullets lutist riot be used if one will suffice. Fire will be directed at those actually perpetrating the violence. Shots must not be placed over the heads of the crowd, as this serves only to panic the less hardy mneimIl)ers

and an ugly scramble to escape may lead to casualties from
trampling underfoot. Throughout, action must be aimed to pre-
vent further trouble and not to hand out wholesale punishment.
  When these stern and distasteful measures succeed, as succeed
they will, immediately steps are taken to succor the wounded on
1)0th sides. Arrested men w'ill be handed over to the police. The
scene will return to normal, though it iiiay he, as often happens
on these occasions, that a curfew is now imposed to prevent
further crowds from forming, and to allow tempers to cool.
  l'he important thing to remember in this type of operation, as
with all others in this troubled island, is that the armed forces act
in support of the civil power in order to restore law and order.
Military measures alone cannot solve the Cyprus problem. What
is required urgently is a political settlement, but this will not be
achieved so long, as the Cypriot fears to open his mouth to express
his true thoughts and aspirations.
  The primary objectives of the security forces are to uphold
the law, eliniinate the terrorists, and put an end to intimidation:
in sum, to create conditions for a political settlement.
 The task is hard, sometimes dangerous, often distasteful. But
it must not be thought that the British serviceman looks upon all
Greek Cypriots as his enemies and vice versa: Nitness the friend-
liness shown toward each other when an EOKA truce has seem-
ingly lrought operations to an CIRL I Ic looks forward, as all
fairmnindcd Britons and Cypriots must do, to the day when he
can resumc the old, long_established friendships.

## Vi Smali. Units Win Small Wars

MARINES, C (JERRILIAS, ANt) SMALL WARS
Major M icli:iel Spark, USMC
COMIJAT HELICOPTERS IN ALGERIA
Major Hilaire Bcthouatt, French A nuy SMALL-UNI, OPERATIONS
Marine Corps Schools

If you are looking for a pat, complete, final solution to thc guer-
rilla prol)lcm, yu will not find it here. What you will 1111(1 iS SOI1JIC
thoughtprovoking material.
  IdeaThe threat goes right to the root of IIIilitary organiza-
tion, training, equipment, and doctrine. Sec what Major Spark,
a career Marine, has to suggest.
  IdeaThe helicopter, properly used, could he decisive tacti
cally. Read how the French USCd their "choppers'' in Major
Bcthouart' piece. As this is written_nearly t\\'( ycars later
oniy in South Vietnam is more valid experience being gained
with the latest IllachinCS.
  IdeaSmallunit actionspatrols, ambushes, searches, road-
blocksare the key to tactical victory. Each of these depends
on specific, detailed knowhow.
  The "banana wars" of the 1920's and 1930's were guerrilla
wars. Marines came out Of the jungles after chasing Sandino,
Charlemagne Peralte, and other cacos, insurrectos, and generally
bad actors. Iron1 their reports, the Marine Corps developed the
noted Small Wars Alanual. Irom It, YOU could Icaill how to IIU)uIIt
a Phillips packsaddle; the differing psychology of horses, mules,
and burros; and to watch for male clothes in the wash while you
were flying over villages where only woiticn were to be seen.

A "nutsandbolts manual,'' the professionals calIe(l it, and the Marine Corps Educational Center, Marine Corps Schools, Quan
tico, Virginia, has now brought it up Lu date. The title of the new iiianuah is Fleet Marine Force i%Ianual2! (FMF4'l2 I)
Operations Against Guerrilla Forces. The first (Ira ft was printed early in 1962 for use at the schools. Refined by comment from the field, it \vilI eventually become doctrine.

The Gazette was struck by the wealth of specific detail con
taiIlc(l in the Appendixes. We have reprinted the first Appendix
"SmallUnit Operations"_which draws heavily on British doctrines used in Malaya. The entire manual is strongly recommended mot the Serious student.

## Marines, Guerrillas, And Small Wars Major Michael Spark

No force iii thc world today is better c1uippcd and ulgauii/.ctl
for couutergucrrilla operations than the U.S. Marine Corps. Sonic
foreign armies have fought guerrillas vcIl and hard in the past
few years. None of them can match the Marine Corps' potential,
once it is fully matured by a sound and intensive training program.
  Our special assets are numerous, deriving 1)0th from long_held
concepts and from recent refinements to nicer the deimmands of our
ampllil)iou.s miSsion.
  \Ve arc the only mobile ground force of conmbifle(l arms (in
chiding c iubat l)laflcS) in the world. 1 he Marine Corps has
everything a modern counterguerrilla force must have: colnl)at
troops, Support units, helicopters, and attack aircraft. In one
service we combine every \VCQI1 that call lie l)rouglit to bear
against guerrillas.
  The Corps has always held to the vital doctrine that all Marines
imiust be qualified as infantrymen. Therefore, in guerrilla sittia
tions, our combat service and support units would be inherentl'
capable of selfdefense. If necessary, they could also undertake
any antiguerrilla tasks that did not demand a high level of infaii
try unit training. This would give tremendous tactical flexibility
to the Marine coniinander. He could husband his infantry for t lie
offensive blows vhiclm alone can crush guerrillas.
  As a service, we are conditioned to austere logistics. Marines
get most (>1 their jobs done with less materiel t-haii other military
organizations find necessary. We do not cart around a large sup-
porting structure, so the target offered by our logistic base is

smaller. Because guerrillas often strike at supply lines, this would be ill to the good. \ lore of our overall strength could L)C devoted to ofrensive antigucirilla tasks instead of being used to protect a ci ittiplex network of installations.

Still, in any operation, troops must be moVed, fed, and rcaniniu
nitioncd.

Ovcrland rcsupply is always vulnerable to guerrilla attack. c;ticrrilhis cannot, however, effectively interdict air and sea routes of supply. l'lcre we would benelit from our mobile, seal)ase(l orientation. Because of our amphibious mission, we have long beeti accustomed to logistic support via ship and landing craft. With our utlo(krn amphibious doctrine, we have evolved effective ilietlu)ds of helicopter resupply. Trained to get by with very little, and able to move over the sea and through the air, we muld roh the guerrilla of the very targets he prefers most.

Recent pre1)ararunts fur general war also improve our readiness to deal with guerrillas. Much of the doctrine developed to meet the nowwaning threat of tactical atomics has almost equal appli
catn)n iii the smmpicssiou of guerrilla outbreaks. For years now, we have been )erfccting vertical envelopment, perimeter defense, coor(liImatu)n of physically separated units, and combat patrolling of unoccupied areas.

In facing guerrillas, these skills would serve us to good advantage.

Our cqtuipmneiit for guerrilla var is good and getting better.

I lelicopters are the preferred vehicle for rapid concentration ag;inst guerrillas. Time Marine Corps has been in the forefront of helicopter developittent and employment. The new Vertol II RBI will provide time Corps with a quantum increase in vertical lift ca1)aluiity. Its gas turbines xviiI free us from the bugaboo of lift IC(itIctiOli iii ltiglttcupcrarure areas.

New single-side-baud and radio-relay equipment provides effective tactical colilmnunications for antiguerrilla operations. In the Mechanical Mule, we have a good rough-country vehicle. Our iimmplmiimiints tractors are excellent for use in the swamps and deltas often favored by guerrillas.

Flie NATo series of small arms, the M79 grenade launcher, lighter packs, and dehydrated rations will improve the firepower anti reduce time l)urdcul of antiguerrilla teams. The GV1 Hercules 'iil greatly increase our air-transport and delivery cdpabil-.

ity In the A2F, wc are soon to get an attack aircraft with long endurance, able to carry a great vcight in bombs, an aIin,st i,kil antigucrrilla plaUc.

Because the guerrilla thrcat is growing, WC IlluSt StriVe (((III ill uously to improve our rcadincss to illcct it. i'hic circuitist iilccs under w'hich we may have to fight must be anticipated so training and (loctrinc will develop logically.

One thing is clear. We are not1 going to l)C gliculillas. Al iclt our organization and equipment would be wasted in such a rule.

More important, we are unfit for it. Guerrillas have m blend Wit Ii thc local population. They must speak, look, act, and titi ii l I l natives of the troubled area. Race, language, and lack of ml llt;II c knowledge of local terrain and customs all bar us from an cfh:ct guerrilla role as an organized force. Unless we plan to IiIit iii Utah, we should train to refine our capability as .i co(lIllcrgIIcI rilla force. This directly affects the path we should follow iii It iioiiig.

Significant. differences exist between the needs of gIlerliIl;ls ;ttnl antiguerill Ia troops. For example, guerrillas ii tust he pn IRicol II
the use of demolitions and captured weapons. Countcrgucrrihl have iiiore interest in airground cooperation, control of civ j Ii;us, and defense of fixed installations.

Our training must also icflect the tactical circultst:ccs III
which we may meet guerrillas. It is very possible we iiay aiti find them working with a major cneiiiy force, as tlicy Ii, I io Korea. l'hc Communists have a great deal (If experience i sd tactics. In this role, guerrillas caii seriously threaten a A true amphibious campaign.

Our offensive tactics stress deep, hehicoptcr_l)ornc let-I lullS.

We accept the possibility of initial, wide tillit sepal-at lot. F
ui bypassed areas, guerrillas can strike at our supporting ekoictis.

Their mission will be to dilute our attack. Each of our uiiits list be trained to repel these attacks while accoinplishiiig its prillipal task.

Because different inissu)ns must be dischiai.gcd by various laid ingforce elements, there will be variations in their aittigitcitilla problems. No unit's normal role can he forgotten wItcit pla I tiling antiguerrilla training. In general, fur training purposes, a division into three categories Can be itiade: in fantry and ui operating as or with infantry; combat service and support Units, and ;iviatum ground personnel; and aviatna) flight J)CESOI)flCl.

Each of these groups needs a different order of antiguerrilla training priorities. i'here will never be enough time to train in everything. The objective of every training plan must l)e to teach in SC9UCIICC the subjects that best prepare the particular unit for its probable rolc in guerrilla war.

Some antiguerrilbi subjects, of course, are needed by Marines in all units. These include: intelligence briefings and psychological indoctrination; civilian control measures, counterintelligence, and security; smallunit defensive tactics, especially of installations; l)iVOLIaCS an(1 I))()tor convoys; physical training; and escape and evasion.

In guerrilla war, the best tactics can be negated by failure to teach the troops the problems, hopes, and fears of the local population. Quoting Mao Tsetung, "The people are the sea in which iiicrrillas swim.'' A prime guerrilla obecrivc woiiltl be to turn all the people against the Marine force. Misunderstandings and ran
Join reprisals would excite the very situation the troops were sent t( suppress. In Russia, the Germans learned to their sorrow that bad treatment of civilians Il)uki1)hied guerrilla effectiveness.

Good indoctrination and strict discipline would greatly rc(luce mit problems with civilians. Ilowever, some guerrilla sympa
tliizers and provocat curs would always be i'hcy would try to create disturbances which all units must be trained to suppress. i'hic strictest security to prevent leakage of military infor
tuation must also l)e stresse(l, because guerrillas alitiost always have an excellent network of civilian informers.

Thorough grounding in defensive tactics is required iy all units lacing guerrillas. The Marine commander can select the troops for offensive tasks; the guerrilla strikes at targets of his own choosing. i lost often these targets will he reararea facilities, motor Convoys, and the like. Every unit must be taught to defend itself against sudden and violent attack.

In guerrilla war, physical training has increased importance.

Long distances often separate units. Motor movement is often difficult and dangerous. Combat security patrols arc arduous, long

marches COfl1IW)fl. All troops need the ability to carry combat
and survival loads over difficult terrain. 'l'hcy must learn to live
and work on reduced rations, under prui iitivc conditions, with
little sleep. Unit integrity is a must. In guerrilla war nobody can
be left behind.
   Escape and evasion training is essential to all types of units.
Iii future, Marines will he traveling itiore and more by heli-
copter. Occasionally, these aircraft may crash in
                                                         a
                                                            guerrilla
infested area. Bom Ii crew and passengers must have the knowhow
to make their way safely 'ack to friendly positions. Foraging, first
aid, dead reckoning, and map reading are basic skills in which all
Marines must become pr )flCicnt.
   In addition to
                   lie subjects already mentioned, sonic aspects of
counterguerrilla training' are of particular imimportance to infantry
troops. On theni the burden of hunting down the guerrilla will
fall, Much of die conventional training of infantry has. Imitiguer
rilla application. The problem is one of emphasis.
  Proficiency in deep patrolling, amiibuslies, and countcramlml)usllcs
must be stressed. Unfortunately, it is difficult to support properly
field exercises in these subjects. I)eep patrols re1uirc large, varied
training
          areas, often unavailable
                                      to infantry battalions. Both
patrol and ambush exercises require highly skilled aggressors for
imiaximum training benefit. In the past, aggressor tactics have often
tended to reflect zeal in the role at the
                                            CXI)CI1SC of realistic in-
St ruct ion.
  One solution to these problems would he time creation of divi-
sion patrol schools. If established, however, Such
                                                      schools should
not be permiuitted to destroy tactical integrity. Best results will he
obtained if infantry companies and platoons phase through timemmu
as units.
  Centralized schools or not, an obstacle to consistent pmti'ol md
ambush training is found in our somnetimuics vague doctrine md
lack of adequate references. Good Aruiiy Ranger manuals exist
but are hard to conic by. Uptodate Marine Corps doctrine is
lacking in sonic tactical areas. In 1940, for instance, the illarinc
Corps Small JVars Manual recommended an immediate assault by
ambushed units. Is this still our policy? If so, at what ranges?

For infantry units, survival training and lowlevel air-ground cooperation need more attention. The guerrilla's refuges are mountains, swamps, jungics, and deserts. In such areas, small units, often operating indepcndently, 'ould have to hunt him down.

Marine infantry must learn to fend for itself, survive, and fight in all types of adverse terrain. Concurrently, small twits must also itliprove their al)ility to work with supporting aircraft. To the platoon operating independently, a single helicopter load could mean survival, a single attack aircraft, victory. Simple signals and procedures must be worked out and practiced. Patrol leaders, including NCO's, must learn to benefit from air reconnaissance of their intended routes.

Other special training problems affect the infantry unit leader.

For him, antiguerrilla war would rc1uirc a iiicntal transition. Ius training has emphasized the rapid, violent, cohesive action re
(1(hulc(1 for the amphibious assault. Particularly when seelcing guerrilla contact, he must learmi to move deliberately, sometimes sacrificing speed for secrecy. On occasion, lie tmist accept loss of contact with his squads and fire teams. In the covert, dispersed forniations of the guerrilla hunt, officers cannot be everywhere, doing everything. From his personal experience, the writer can testily that these lessons need to and can be learned in field exercises.

Our service and support units have antiguerrilla requirements that often differ from those of the infantry. In some ways, theirs is the most difficult training task of all. They must prepare to discharge their normal functions while simmiltaneously fighting off guerrillas.

i'hey mntist worlc out detailed procedures for allocating men between work and security tasks. Flexible standard operating procedures, capable of adjusting to varying degrees of threat, mimust be set forth amid tested. Because training time for service units is always meager, their tactical training should stress their probable defensive role. Security patrolling, outposting, road
blocks, and convoy defense rather than long-range combat patrols should be emphasized.

Service/support units also need to give more attention to passive defense. Mines, wire, field fortications, and concealment can compensate for shortages of manpower. Service troops should be trained to fortify, mine, and wire in thcir installations quickly.

Done properly, these measures can present an effective Ol)StaCIC to surprise guerrilla attack.

The aiitiguerrilla skills rcquire(l of aviation lliglit personnel are again thiferent. Fortunately, most flight crews have been attending ex
2llent escape and evasion courses for years. For helicopter crews, however, such training iii the future should he held iii con;un:tion with ground units. In a crash, troop passcngrs and pilots might both survive. The commissioned pilot, because uif his rank, might becouuue the leader of an luuiprotoptu cotuiliat forma
non. His training should give him confidence in his ability to lead it to safety.

Otherwise, flightcrew training for antignerrilla tasks should compleuuient that of the infantry. Tecliniujuies involving single aircraft in support of platoon and S(luIa(l 1);ltr( uls uuiust he practiced. Experience must be gained in responding to the single communications snch small units can carry. A great (teal of work is necessary as well in the difficult problem of air detection of guerrillas.

For all units, the capstone of antiguerrilla training should be a major combined arms exercise, Ideally, it should feature civilian control problems and guerrillas in their most dangerous roleas auxiliaries to regular enemy forces. Such an exercise should last at least seven days. In some previous maneuvers, we have exhausted the troops in a brief period and ended the exercise as our realistic combat capability dropped toward zero. We could a heavy price for neglect of this sort if it becomes a habit.

Concurrent with intensilied training, we should review all other possil)le avenues foi'
iunprovetucutt of out auitiguicruiiia capuliihius'. One obviously essential step is to update utid leiSSuie tile Small II'ars Ma,n,,l. Asa parallel, we might ell iuicrease tie number of Marine officers sent as observeis to friendly ariuties engaged against guerrillas.

If we do not already have one, we also need a comuipletc catalogue of individual skills useful in combating guerrillas. It should

be prepared Oil
                a MarineCorpswide if not a national military
basis. Such an inventory should include interpreters, former area
residents, and men with special skills such as mountain clunbing,
desert survival, and animal packing. The personnel listed should
be readily available on request by a Marine commander commit-
ted to an antiguerrilia operation.
  Booklets containing language tips, basic area geography and
sociology, survival hints, and the like could vcll be prepared in
advance for potential trouble spots. On the squad level, they
would fill the vital orientation function now provided staffs by
formal area studies. Probably the total cost for coverage of all
likely "hot spots" would be less than that of a single tank.
  Another cheap but useful antiguerrilla tool would be gained
by reactivating our var-dog platoons. Dogs have always proved
their worth in security and tracking tasks. They are cheaper,
more versatile, and break down less often than some new radars
which are designed for similar purposes.
  More expensive but essential is a removable radio in the VHF
range for attack aircraft. In guerrilla war, the nunther of deep
patrols at any one time may far exceed the number of available
air-control parties. If air-ground communications are to be estab-
lished, attack aircraft need a radio that will net with infantry
PItC-lO radios. Such a radio would have a modest range and
would present a space problem
                              for the carrying airciaft. It would,
however, provide a vital link from plane to sinai1 patrol that is
now lacking.
  Also useful would be time mines that could be preset to deacti
'ate after a specified period. This would allow rear-area units to
mine themselves in without creating an urgent need for mine
clcaranc when the unit displaced.
  The items discussed by no illeans constitute an exhaustive list.
Only the imagination limits the number of new, desirable anti
guerrilla tools. New gear itself, however, is not our nrnst pressing
problem. What we must do is critically examine our structure and
policies in relation to the requirements of guerrilla war. Wherever
opporttmnity for improvement exists, we should grasp it.
  l'he Marine Corps has fought guerrillas in small wars during

most of its existence. Today, emphasis on offensive spirit, the individual fighting Marine, air_ground teamwork, and austcrc logistics make our Corps the nation's ideal coutitciguerrilla force.

Moderate refinements in training, tecllni(,ucs, and e(1uipnlent can make us even more effective in that jole. i'hesc adjustments can be made without detriment to other Marine Corps missions.

## Combat Flelicopters In Algeria Major Hilaire Bethouart

Ilic best way to explain French USC of helicopters in Algeria is
(u discuss soiiic typic:il examples- where hclicoptcrs were a deter
lilining factor in the issue of the I)attle. In such a war, the need fur last, accurate inlunilation is vital. When a few troops are scattcied in a very large country, it is necessary to know when and where to find thc enemy. Helicopters can be, and are, used in securing this information. In a zone where finding rebel troops is highly probable, small helicopterborne units often perform sallics to obtain or to confirm their location.

Ilaving first-class information, the company commander can set up a plan of battle in which helicopters, when available, will always play the main role because they can reach almost any point quicker than the rebels. Here are four typical kinds of liclkoptcr operations:

1. Enveloping an(l maneuvering by air.
2. A quick, unplanned change in the area of maneuver.
3. Speedy action when using helicopters.
4. Full niihoriic action in a desert area.
I. Lnvelopsn,g and iUanetivcring by Air. On January 3, 1958, the commanding officer of the Twenty_second Infantry Regi
mmient received inforinat ion that a companysize rcbel element was located in the Chatitguuuna Valley, living in caves. The CO decided to circle the suSpicious area the next morning and to search the
'allcy with all available means. The valley is about five miles long and two miles wide. ilie floor is at 4,000 feet. The top is 7,000
feet. The terrain is rocky and broken.

The comiiiandcr had eight companies calcfully coOl1) I ltc a The action started at 0800 with tlic landing of three cnnipaiii'
on the crest of the l)jchcl Farooun to liii ICk the eliclily's nurtlwrii escape route. At the same tithe, thrcc colilpallics staited to (2111111)
the right side of the vahlcy and one coiiipany began cliiiibiiig the left side. Anotlicr coiiipany was in reserve with the hehicopi crs, ready to join the battle when needed. At 1000, the elciiicnts the right side located and opened fire on the rebels.

The rebels fled down the valley to the west. Immediately, the CO sent his helicopter reserves to the heights west (If the valley.

The rebels, surrounded in a shrinking area, tried to fight their way out of the net. Unfortunately, this was in January. 'I bc day was short, and the coml)at could not be called oIl before night fall. The companies tried to maintain contact during the night by using aerial flares. This was not completely successful, however, and the remainder of the enemy unit vanished (luring the night.

The success of the operation, though not complete, was due omit)'
to the helicopters, which allowed the cOIiiIiiaIi(ler to quickly the road the enemy wanted to use.

2. Unplanned Change in the Area of Maneuver. Siniultamie ously, eighty miles east in an area near 1'ebessa, the CO of t lie sector reCCiVe(l word that a rebel unit coining from Itimiisia \';IS
resting for a while in the rough mountainous area called I Iamiiimiiai Guerra. He iiiicdiatcly decided to undertake an operation II
fl1O up this area. About nine companies, two armored s1uadro,is, and an H2 1 company were involved in the operation. The area is about six miles wide and ten miles long. After having circlcd the suspicious zone, using only land means, the I lainimuat Gimerra was completely combed without finding anything but small rebel elements flushed out five miles to the northwest by the iuicoiflhlig troops earlier in the morning.

At noon, after the search was over, the CO decided to uimale a company_size reconnaissance in the bills five mimiles snithw'est.

Around 1500, this unit met head on with an important rebel element. Immediately, the commander jumped into his hehicopi and flew tow'ard the light while he alerted helicopters amid mescret troops. At 1700, four companies were already transported by helicopter, circling the rebel position. The assault force was landed and the rebels destroyed before darlcncss.

What means, othcr than helicopters, could have pcrnuttcd the commander to catch up with an adversary vlm was not found iii the planned battle area?

3. Speedy Action When Using Helicopters. In a rcuiiote aici on the very rim of the Sahara Desert, the coinniandcr of the i\ iii Beida sector received accurate and timely information thai a transient rebel unit conung from Tunisia was due to ?cst in the Djcbel Tarf (luring the second week of January. i'hc iiforinat ion specified the exact valley where they were 5U1)poscd to stop.

i'arf Mountain, standing like a ilmshro()I1i in the desert, is 1st)
lated. It is ten miles frotit the nearest point where French cleiiieiiis are stationed, thirty miles from the first important French p05t.

It is, moreover, a beautiful observation post.

The CO (lecided to set up a fast, combined helicopter and motorized infantry operation which was scheduled to start at
1500 on January 10. The unusual schedule was intended to talic maximum advantage of the clement of surprise. At 1430, the ijisi echelon of a paratroop company \VflS picked up by helicopter at La Meskiana, thirty iiiilcs southeast of the 1'an, and landed
1500 on a prescribed spot.

At 1455, a two_company_size convoy left Canrobeit, ten ii tiles north, and rushed down toward its predesignated objective.

1 he first paratroop elements were engaged, iiiiediately after landiii1, in hard fighting against strong opposition. The second shuttle of helicopters could not land at the previous location, and directed toward dominating heights one mile northeast. 1 wit more companies were successfully landed iii this area, w'liilc the first elements held the rebels on their position.

At 1600, all elements, airborne and itiotorized, were on the l' it and started crushing enemy positions. Three assaults were dcliv -
ered during the next hour. At 1815, the light was over. 1 lie rebels all were killed or takcii prisoner. \Tanious aritiaments, incltidin1
thirteen machine guns, nineteen submachine guns, and a treuncti -
dous amount of supplies and equipnient were captured.

Speed was the keynote of this operation. Only three hours auth fifteen l1intires w'erc necessary to destroy a strong rchel niuli detected thirtyodd miles from the French 111am position. During the fight, air force and navy fighters gave the ground forces close afl(I strong support.

4. Full Air-borne Action in a Desert Area. Now let us go farther south to a desert arca where oil fields were found a few years ago.

One (lay during the winter of 1958, two tcaiiis of oil drillers and their light escort were slaughtered iii an area which was supposed to be inther quiet. A few (lays after this action was reported, further iiilormation indicated a rebel unit of about 200
titen was strolling :IlorIg a desert sand area about 200 rnilcs long and I So miles wide.

ihere was no possit)ility of ground reconnaissance in this area.

The mission was assigned to an aerial reconnaissance team. Mean
while, a task force made up of a paratroop battle group, a heli
copter company, various types of cargo planes, and a fighter squadron was set up and based on the main airfield of Timimoun.

The reconnaissance mission was rather difficult. To find several platoonsize tinits in an area covering 20,000 square miles was just :ilnnit like finding a needle in a haystack. Navigation was a too. Nothing is more like a sand dune than another sand dune.

19's t'erc organized in teams of two, coupled with an air force twin_engine reconnaissance plane. The L 19's acted as hunt
ilig dogs, flying at low altitudes around the sand hills, trying to find cities of enemy activities. The air force plane was the lug bother, doing all the navigating, and directing the L 19's as a luinter would direct his dogs. The aircraft acted as a radio relay, and was equipped w'ith iuiany rescue devices in case of emergency.

When (inc I..l9 (lid fluid a chic, l)ig brother called for the hell
ci ipters, which landed a twoplatoon ground reconnaissance Uflit a specified landing zone. At the same time, from the main base, air force cargo planes took off loaded with paratroopers, and were waiting oVCi' the area. If ground reconnaissance did find the enemy, tlicii the pauatroopcrs were to be dropped. As the battle developed, helicopters were used again to pick up ground forces and to land thcuii IIII places better located. This allowed the corn
u)iaui(ler to envelop the rebels tightly and to speed the fight.

(ouiiI,at of this kind is long and hard for hot Ii men and ma
-

tend. Nearly five weeks were necessary to search carefully the
20,000 square miles. Two major fights occurred. Several helicop-
terborne ground reconnaissances were conducted prior to cu:I
major fight. Two-thirds of the rebel force ws destroyed; the
remaining third vanished in the desert. Soldiers scattered individ-
ually, trying to join a rest camp in Moroccan territory at Figoig,
some 130 miles north.
  These few exaniples do not provitlc a c(uIIplctc picture of the
missions assigned to helicopter units in Algeria: They are, how-
ever, typical of routine operations carried on daily. They ill115
trate some of the lessons we learned from previous operations.
  Although any type of combat unit can be helicopter-lifted, t lie
best use of transport helicopters will be achieved if they are used
for the lift of specially trained and equipped troops. Very often,
soldiers landed by helicopter close to the rebels arc inimcdiat ely
involved in local, sometimes uncontrolled, flrc fights of the guer-
rilla-warfare type.
  In Algeria, transport helicopter units arc very often c(nI1ikil
with an infantry unit that is well trained and adapted to this kind
of fighting. These are usually airborne troops. Paratroopers
familiar with shock action, well equipped with light, 1'i'1ul
armament and all sorts of radio sets. Officers and NCO's arc
numerous and their basic tjaining is perfectly adapted to use
helicopters.
  When the same helicopter company works frequently 'ith i hr
same battle groups, new and invisible bonds arc cciiientcd mi the
benefit of alL Mutual understanding, and a coimnandcr cx iw ii

enced in employing helicopters, al-c of utiiiost l,cuicIIt when ii
liaulc reaches its climax. Achievement of the objective is f:n-ihi--
tated because the coinniander can give his orders in a few sinplc
words over the radio, w'ith assurance that he ssill be uikrstn ul.
  Helicopter units in the kind of war fought in Algeria must in it
be tied down by a prcplanncd schedule. Nor must they he IC-.
quired to ask higher command echelons for authority to take nil.
  The best team for Algeria is a battle group of paratroiijirt'
coupled with a helicopter company. I lelicopters give t lie I i:i tile
group CO essentially the mobility and Ilexihility he needs in

Cope with the varying situations he may have to face at any illOIflCflt.

It was generally found that helicopters, except for particular i'casms (such as l)locking action in a broken terrain), should not he used at. the beginning of an action when information about the enemy is still vague. Rather they should be kept in reserve for further decisive action. Before using his helicopters, the corn
iiiunder shoukl try, via ground forces and aerial observation, to verify and augment information. \'Vhen he knows the approxi
mate position and number of the enemy, and after having studied the terrain carefully, he can then cornmit his helicopters according to the same l)asic principles that an armored infantry battalion couunander would have used in 1944.

Using helicopters in a ground maneuver requires from the comimniander and his subordinates some indispensable qualities.

These are: speed of decision; keen understanding of the situa
lion; boldness; imagination.

Lack of one of these qualities will cause immediate disorder and loss of time, men, money, and efficiency.

In using helicopters in Algeria, many problems were encountered. The major ones were liaison and safety. In a relatively somali area, there were Ll9's carrying out observation missions or adjusting artillery tire: light helicopters for staff liaison or medic evacuations; 112 l's carrying troops; H19's carrying resupply;
'l'o's froum the air force for light close support; Corsairs from the navy, and air force jets for heavy close support; sometimes
11-26's for s'ery heavy close support; and last, the Broussard from the air force for leading fighter strikes.

'Though everybody is supposed to fly at a prescribed altitude, coordination is quite often difficult. The aircraft belong to three dilTcrcnt services and therefore are not fitted amid used the same wa.

'l'o solve the pruhlcimi, the Alouette was equipped for use as a IlviIIg CP by the counnandcr. This was successful to a degree.

I lie Alomictie is a iii lie tin) small to hold everything and every
Iunl needed. 'l'he it houctic Ill, however, should make a suitable Cl Pm iiii )1 mid helicopter.

lInt the true solution is to have all the aircraft involved in the ground fight belong to the same scrvicc, and therefore (ittcd tin:
same way and having the same channel of command. The French Aft Force, though, is very reluctant to give up aircraft. Ariiiy aviation was devchped only as a result of the wars in lndociiiia and Algeria.

Safety in using helicopters in the battle area is a great coilcern. When landing behind the cncniy litic, you never kuc whether or not your landing zone will bc clear of cneiy forcc.

Your observation air1)lalle may tell you that the area is clear wlccci ft is nor. Arabs are very good at canioiiflage. Wheti irrilieiy acid air force fighters are available, you iiiay re(1ucst sonic 1(111(1
1
eutralizatton fire prior to landing, l)Ut you do not -always have these means. Sometimes speed is of primary importance and yd oc do nor have enough time for such preparation. Even if you use alIl these means, a gap always rcziiaiiis between the end of neutralization fire and the first landing of the helicopters. i'his k enough to allow our adversaries to shoot down helicopters while they land, The first solution thought about 'as to arm the first helicopter that landed.

1-121's were fitted with four tiiaclune gurs acid thirtyeight 68mm. rockets. During tile final approach prior tic landing, this helicopter was supposed to sweep tile lalldillg zone with machinegull fire and ipckct blasts amid to unhia&l his troops
"in the Smoke of the explosions.'' 1 'his was reliable, but when scc equipped the
112 I could not carry anything but the pilots.

Therefore, we were missing our goal and wasting a cargo lieucopter. So we looked for something else.

The next solution was to arm tile Alouctte helicopter. it is a good, rugged, and powerful aircraft. It was arilmed with two containers, each one having eighteeii or thirtysix rockets of 37
mm., according to tile mission.

Ilie 37ciicii. isa llCv iciuid rockervery reliable.

Another pruhietim was safety for tile piatie itself and the crew.

%Ve tried to improve it. All tile 112 l's are tiow (itted with auto marie_scaling tanks. lhey are often clcccssat.y. We iidtcj,tcd a regulation making it mandatory to have two qualified pilots evuc I
in the small helicopters. In case one is kiflcd, tue other caci i)rici hack the aircraft. That has happened. Crews are requircd to wear flak suits and their seats arc flow armored. This particular feature saved many lives.

ill tltcsc SOlLItiOIS (to which were added a fcw regulations concerning rules of flight) proved very successful. Despite a steady increase in hours of flight, our losses decreased regularly during the past three years:
In 1957, 56,000 hours were flowi by helicopters in combat operations and 62 helicopters were hit. Nine crew members were killed and 4 wounded.

In 1958, 64,000 hours were flown by helicopters and 50 were hit, hut only 5 crew menmbcrs were killed.

In 1959, 66,000 hours were flown by helicopters, 35 were hit, o crew niembers were wounded, and none were killed.

It is interesting to compare losses that occurred during the time to the fixed_wing observation airplanes:
In 1957, roughly I 20,000 hours were flown by army fixedwing over the battlefields and 158 were hit. Of the crew members, 8
were Icilted and 11 were wounded.

Iii 1958, 145,000 hours were flown and 201 airplanes were hit.

ihere were 9 crew members killed and 17 w'ounded.

In 1959, I 50,00() hours were flown; 106 airplanes were hit, 7
crew tiiciiihc,s w'crc killed, and 9 voundcd.

A iiatysis of these data Slu)Ws that for the saimic nuimiher of hours
(if flight, two helicopters were hit as compared with three air
planes. The explanation is that helicopters in Algeria are highly vulnerable during the approach and landing. Compared to the length of (light, this is a very short period of time. The solution we worked out to improve security in this phase proved suc-

cess fu I.
   On the other hand, observation airplanes are often obliged to
fly over enemy troops to control their movemcnt and to give
the commander the latest information available. Many planes are
hit while marking targets with smoke devices. Therefore, it is
true to say that light airplanes are more vulnerable than heli-
copters in warfare of the type fought in Algeria.
  We have learned iiiany things in Algeria as far as army avia

tion is cooccrticd. Part of this expcricncc woukl nor pply in anothcr theaterof operation. Much of what we Icarncd, how'-
ever, wilt he valid in any Situation. Onc thing is ckar: I Iclicopters tISC(l by a I(Ctll coniiiian&lci' in an apprnpriuc SU hal ion ire a determining factor in the achievement of a iiiissioii.

## Small-Unit Operations Marine Corps Schools

I. GENERAL
a. Scope. Operations against guerrillas are characterized by aggressive smallunit actions. They are conducted by numerous squads, platoons, and CompanieS operating continually through
out the gucrri Ihi area.

ilus appendix contains the tactics and techniques employed by these units. All smallunit leaders and their men should thoroughly understand the contents of this appendix.

It includes estaL)hishing a patrol base,
)atrolhing, at tac Icing a gu Cr l I ha call a iii husi ICS, CULl n tc ii nish act iou, and search procedures.

b.

Example. lo show the importance of siiiallunir opera
turns, two examples arc given:
an operation conducted in August, 1954, in the Philippines and an operation in 195455
in Malaya.

(I)
Fhie Alert Platoon. Couiitergucrrihla operations 'ere conducted by the Philippine A riiiy during the period of
194660. Beginning in September, 1950, tlronigh personal leadership and increased intelligence efforts, concentrated offensives were launched. Once dispersed, the guerrillas were gradually hunted down by small units.

lypical of the siiiallunit response was the action of the alert platoon of the Seventeenth BCT (Battalion Combat
- IC:Iil%) in the vicinity of Manila, August 1617, 1954. About midnight, an intelligence agent reporte(l the presence of ten guerrillas bivouacked in a hut, preparing for ai attack. Im
uiiediatcly, the alert platoon was dispatched in a vehicle to a point about a mile short of the hut. With tV0 civilian guides, the platoon proceeded on foot to the objective. l'he terrain and a full moon favored their moveummemit. Trails to the hut were easily followed.

About
2 0 yards from the objective, the platoon leader divided his platoon into two groups and gave instructions.

At 0430, /\ ugust 17, the first group advanced toward the objective 'hilc members of the second group positioncd themselves ilong the guerrillas' avenue of withdrawal on the right flank of the objective. So that members of the assault group could deliver a large volume of fire, they' formed into skirmishers about sixty yards from the objective. The guerrilla sentry' opened fire, but was inunediatcly knocked down.

A fire fig1r with the guerrillas in the hut continued for aL)Out twenty minutes and then they broke contact, At'
tempting to withdraw, they were shot by nIcmnl)crs of the second group from their amiubushu positions.

(2)
''Operation Nassau." Do ring the period 19-I 8.60, the British cons meted ummny difficult operations in t\ 1 a laya. By
1951, the British forces established wchldcflncl ohujectives and then began their counterguerrihla opcran n.

Victory in this counterguerrilla operation is priuumarily attributed to good intelligence work, effccti \'C coiiiununiCa
tions, rapid deployiiuent of troops, aIm(l foodcontrol incas
ures. Rapid deployuuient was achieved by deploying small units in battalioncontrolled operations.

Operation Nassau, typical of the battalionsize operations iii Malaya, began in I )cceiiibcr, 1954, and ended in Septet it
her, 1955. The South Swamiup of Koala I .ailgut covers au area of over IOU square miles. It is a dense jungle with trees up to
150 feet tall where visibility is limited to about thirty yards.

A ftcr several assassinations, a British battalion was assigned to the area. h)od control was achieved tituouigli a system of rationing, convoys, gate checks, and searches. One couiupany began opeu-ations in the swamp about I )cccnihei
21,
1954.

On January 9,
1955, fullscale tactical operations began;
artillery, uuuortars, and aircraft began lourassitug fires in South Swamp. Originally, the plan 'as to bomb and shell the swamp day and night so that the terrorists would be driven out into ambushes; hut the terrorists were well prepared to stay indefinitely. Food parties caine out occasionally, hut the civil population was too afraid to report themim.

Plans werc niodified; harassing fires were reduced to nighttime only.

A uiilnishcs continued and patrolhng inside the swamp was iiiicpisifictl. Operations of ilius nature continued for tliiee mouths without results. Finally on March 21, an
:uiitnish party, after fortyfive hours of waiting, succeeded in killing two of cight termrists. The first two red pins, signifying kills, appeared on the operations map, and local iiioralc rose a little.

Another month passed before it was learned that terrorists were tiiaking a contact inside die swamp. One platoon estab
lislied an atiibusli; one terrorist appeared and was killed. May passed without a contact. In June, a chance meeting by a patrol accounted for one killed and one captured. A few days later, after four fruitless days of patrolling, one platoon en route to cami ;iccountcd for two more terrorists. The Number 3 terrorist in the area surrendered and reported that food control was so effective that one terrorist had been murdered Ill i 'l'' ()V 100(1.

On July 7, two additional companies 'ere assigned to the area; patrolling and harassing fires were intensified. Three terrorists surrendered and one of them led a platoon patrol to the terrorist leader's camp. The patrol attacked the camp, killing four, including the leader. Other patrols accounted for four nmrc; by the end of July, twenty_three terrorists rciiiaincd in the swamp with no 100(1 or communications with the outside world. Restrictions on the civil population Were lifted.

This was the nature of operations: 60,000 artillery shells,
30,000 ruunds'jf iiiortar ammunition, and 2,000 aircraft bombs for 35 terrorists killed or captured. Each one rcprc
Scnte(l 1,500 iiiaii_d:iys of patrolling or waiting in ambushes.

"Nassau" was considered a success, for the end of the emergency was one step nearer.

2.

ESTABLISHING A PATROL BASE
a. General. To cover the entire area of guerrilla operations, it is usually iicccssary to establish temporary patrol bases some tlista,ice (ruin the parent bases. lemporary patrol oases are established by coiii1any or smaller units and occupied for a few dayS 01' less.

b.

I )cccption. A patrol base is secretly occ(11)icd. Secrecy is maintained by practicing dcccption techniques that are carefully planned. l)cccprion plans should include the following considerations:
(I) If possibic, the iitarcI to the base is con(lucted at night.

(2) The route selected avoids centers of populatu)n.

(3) If necessary, local inhabitants met by the patrol ill remote areas arc detained.

(4)
Inhabitants of areas that cannot be avoided are (IC
ccived by the marching of troops in a direction that indicatcs the patrol is going to some other area.

(5) Scouts operate forward of tile main body of tile patrol.

(6) Bases arc located beyond areas that are patrolle(l daily.

(7) If fires arc necessary, smokeless fuel is burned.

(8) Normally, not more than one trail should lead 11Th)
the base and it should be camouagcd and guarded.

(9) The base is occupied as quickly and quietly as pussible. Security is established beyond sight and sound limits of the base.

(10) The route to the base is selected by usc of photos, maps, ground and aerial reconnaissance.

(II) If practical, the patrol leader mmiakcs an aerial flaissance.

(12) Terrain features that arc easily identified arc selected as check points and rest breaks.

(13) Daily aerial and ground reconnaissance is continued.

If necessary, other cover operations can be conducted.

Locating the Base.

( ! )
Its site must be chosen so that the patrol can carry out its assigned mission.

(2) ft must he secret and secure. A patrol operating froumu a base unknown to tile enemy increases the j)OSSil)iliIy >1
guerrilla contact. A secure base peruuuits the troops to rest.

     (3) The base must have facilities or terrain suited for the
  erection of adequate radio antennae.
     (4) If it is anticipated that an air drop or a helicopter
  resupply will be required, the base should have a convenient
  drop zone or landing point. These are generally better if
  located on high ground. For security reasons, the drop zone
  or landing point should not be located too close to the base.
     (5) The base iiiust allow men to 51CC1) in comfort. Wet
  areas and steep slopes are to he avoided. Flat and dry ground
  that drains quickly affords the best location.
     (6) It should he close to w'ater that can be used for
  drinking.
 d. Layout of the Base. All units should have an SOP for
quickly establishing a base. Once an SOP is clearly understood,
laying out a base l)econles simple routine. The patrol leader
indicates the center of the base and the base direction. The
members of the patrol then take up positions in their assigned
areas and are checked and corrected as necessary.
 e. Sequence of Establislunent. A suggested sequence for estab-
lisliing a base in jungle or heavy woods is as follows:
     (I) Leaving the Road or Trail. The jungle and heavy
  woods provide the best security from surprise and the best
  conditions for defense. Generally, the best method to use in
  leaving the trail or road is:
       (a) Select the poilir at which to leave the trail or road.
       (b) Maintain security while the column mOVeS off the
    trail.
       (c) 1-Live men at the end of the column camouflage the
    area where the exit was made from the trail.
       (d) Continue iiiuvcmiicnt until a suitable bivouac site is
    reached.
    (2) Occupation of the Bivouac Site.
       (a) This occupation
                               is based on a platoon of three
    squads, but the force way be larger or smaller. Using the
    clock method of designation, the patrol leader sends for
    his squad leaders and then selects the center of the base.
      (b) Upon arrival of the squad leaders, the patrol leader

stands in the ccnter of the base, indicates
12 o'clock, and then designates the area to be occupied by each sqtiad.

(c) Each squad moves into its assigned area under the control of its squad leader.

(d) Each squad establishes security posts to the front of its assigned position. The security is normally tinned by one fire team and the rcIII:Iining two prepare their positions for defense.

(3) Digging In. The extent of digging is dependent upon the length of time the position is to he occupied. Shelters arc not erected until adequate individual protection is assured.

The clearing of fields of fire will be accomplished concurrently. All field works are camouflaged as they are constructed.

(4) Sent ries. Upon completion of their defensive positions, each squad security patrol is replaced by at least ofle sentry, the exact number depending upon visibility and likelihood of contact. During darkness, the sentries are posted forward of the squad position hut closer to it thaii during daylight.

Squads may have to post additional sentries on the trail and on key terrain features.

5. Water. A reconnaissance is made for a suitable water point. A spot is selected for drinking and for bathing. Nor
nially, baths at the patrol base are not taken when the patrol is there for twenty_four hou?s or less. Individuals should fill canteens for other members of their squad. Security is provided.

(6) Garbage. Each squad will dig a garbage pit to reduce the fly and rat iiienace. It will be covered periodically.

(7) l'eriinciei Path and Marking iiails. Narrow p.iths arc cleared from platoon headquarters to the center of each squad position arid then around the inside of the perimeter to facilitate movement. A vine, rope, or wire may he strung waist high along each l)athl as a guide.

f. Base Alert. The critical periods for defending the base are
(lawn and dusk. During these periods, the entire patrol remains in an alert status. The base alert serves the following purposes:
(I) It enables each man to see the disposition of his neighbors and the naturc of the ground to his front and flanks.

(2) It allows the men to adjust their eyes to the changing light so they will acquire a mental picture of front and flanks.

(3) It provides a (lclinite cutoff period for the change of routine. Beginning with evening alert, all movement and noise cease and lights are extinguished. After the nmrning alert, the daily routine begins.

(4)
It enables the area squad leaders to check details while all men are positioned. This will include a check on maintenance of weapons, equipment, ammunition, etc.

g. Alarm. The patrol must have a suitable alarm signal for the approach of either friendly or enemy troops. This signal should not sound foreign to the jungle, but must lie detected only by patrol members.

h. Administration of the Base.

(I) Cooking Fires and Snmking. The smiiell of cooking and smoke caii carry more than 200 yards in the woods or jungle.

These fires are not allowed when the base position is close to the enemy, or when guerrilla patrols arc active. if cooking is permitted during daylight hours, smolceless fuel only is used.

(2) Location of Heads. Heads arc located in protected areas.

(3) l)isposal of Garbage. Garbage and trash iliust be disposed of as they occur. Before evacuating a base, the patrol leader ensures that all trash and 100(1 arc completely destroyed and camouflaged.

(4) Water Purification. The patrol leader must ensure that water is sterilized.

(5) Cooking. \'Vhemi each man carries his own rations, cooking will he done on an individual basis. If 5ini or 10
inI type rations are carried, other group cooking arrangements are made.

i. Leaving a Base. Before leaving the base, all signs of occupa
tion are removed. Any shelters are destroyed. The area is left to appear as though it has not been occupied.

3. PA1'ROLI iNC
a. General. Successful operations against gllcrrill:Is will often be the result of successful smallunit patrols. In make Contact with guerrillas is difficult, and infantry troops Will be ()cCtI1)ied pmy with patrol activity. Routine pat rolling seldom produces positive results. Because of time terrain, vcgct at ion, and enemy tactics, modifications of normal reel nmiqtics may be necessary. l'atrols need to be allpurpose_-._prcpared to light, aimibush, pursue, and reconnoiter. Sec FM 21 -75, Conibat Training of the Individual Soldier and Patrolling, for detailed irk
formation.

b. Patrol Authority. The authority to conduct patrols is tic
centralized as much as practicable. Although over-all patrolling policy, and certain special patrols, mimay be tlctcriiiimtcd by higher headquarters, the extensive patrol activity and rapid response usually make it desirable to assign patrol authority to lower echelons. Battalion, company, or platoon level immay be assignc(l Patrol authority. Flexibility is the prime consitkratnm. Specific authority will be determined by such things as terrain, guerrilla activity, coordination prol)lems, and troop availability. 1 'he actual control of patrols and the decentralization of authority arc improved by the assignment of operational areas of responsibility to a battalion, which, in turn, may subdivide its area into company areas. i'lmc assignment of operational areas will ret1miire C(msideI'allc coidi,t;ttion to aVO!(l pat I(Jl clashes, to permit the pursuit of guerrillas front one area to another, etc. Coordination may be achieved laterally between commands or by their pa rent coimmimmand (s) . Although patrol ant hority mmmay he decentralized, patrol activity will be reported to higher headquarters. 'I 'o prescribe and facilitate control and coordination, SOP's may be dcv isc(l.

Planning and Preparation by the Cot i mimiand. '1 'he echelon that has time authority for conducting p1tn)ls has rcspoiisibiities in connection with their plaminmimg and preparation. Depending on the echelon, it will he their responsibility to do all or most of the following:
(1) Notify. the patrol leader well before the tone of departure.

(2) Assign the patrol its mission in clear, concise terms.
(3) Provide the patrol leader with maps and photographs
for study, and furnish special pcrsonncl and equipment as
required.
(4) Carefully consider and select the best method of introducing the patrol into its operational area, to prevent loss
of security. Such measures as movement by night, USC of
helicopters, and use of civilian vehicles imist be considered.
(5) Issue a brief warning order to the patrol (see subparagraph e below).
(6) Make a reconnaissance, preferably aerial, in connection with a detailed map study.
(7) Iormulatc
a
(lctailc(l plan prescribing
the route,
security measures, inunediate action techniques, etc.
(8) Make final coordination
and aduiiinistrative arrangements.
(9) Issue patrol order (see subparagraph f below).
(10) Conduct a rehearsal to check control, security, actionS to l)C taken, etc.
(ii) Inspect mneiiilers of thc patrol for physical fitness,
equipment, uniforms, rations, water, etc.
(12) Brief the patrol leader, making available all possible
information which may affect his iiiissions. Previous patrol
leaders familiar with the area may participate in the briefing.
d. l'lanning and Preparation by the Patrol Leader. From the
time of receipt of the initial briefing until the departure of his
patrol, the patrol leader accoimiplishes the following:
(I) He makes certain that the ifliSSiOfl and all plans for
support, collmmuntcations, etc. arc understood.
(2) Following a map study, he formulates a tentative
patrol plan, ccinsidcring support,
100(1 and water
needs,
weapons and e(1u11)mnent to he carried, etc.
(3) He makes a
preliminary coordination concerning
friendly units, fire support, etc.
(4) He selects the troops for the patrol, being mindful
of physical condition, special skills needed, etc.
(5) He arranges for helicopter support of the patrol when
feasible and as required.

   (6)
        1-le determines the size and composition of the patrol.
   (7) He arranges for patrol rehearsal when practicable.
   (8) I-Ic provides reliable communications so guerrilla con-
 tact can be quickly reported and a rapid response can be
 made. Reliance cannot and should not be solely on electronic
 means.
   (9)
        In addition to communications,
                                              lie 1)rovidcs other
means and methods of control and coordination, such as use
 of check points and establishment of patrol
                                                      limits
                                                              and
 boundaries.
   (10) He prescribes rime of departure and approximate
 time of return. I ,atitudc must be given to the patrol leader
concerning his tiiiie of return.
e. Sample Patrol Warning Order.
   (I) Composition of the patrol.
   (2) Designation of the secondincommand.
   (3) Statement of patrol tiliSsion.
   (4) Time of patrol departure.
   (5) Uniform.
   (6) Normal and special equipment to he carried by in-
dividuals.
   (8) Camouflage measures to be taken.
   (9) Directions to specific individuals as to when and where
to draw amniunirion, water, rations, and special equipment.
   (10) Directions for the removal of personal letters, etc.
   (Ii) Directions for the cleaning of weapons.
   (12) Directions for ensuring that all equipment taken on
patrol is secured to prevent rattling.
   (13) Direct au individual to supervise prcparatiouis iii the
event you direct the secondinconiuiiaud
                                                 0)
                                                     :iccoinphisli
other (luties.
   (14) Set time and place for reassembly to receive your
patrol order.

f. Sample Patrol Order.
(I) Situation.
(a) Enemy Forces (size, activity, location, unit, terrain,
time, equipment).
(b) Friendly Forces (routes of friendly adjacent patrols,
fire support).
(2)
Mission (w'ho, what, when, where).
(3) Execution.
(a) Concept of Operations (set forth in broad terms the
manner in which you intend the patrol to be executed by
outlining the gcneral scheme of maneuver).
(b) Name of first tactical grouping or
idividual. (The
next lettered subparagraphs, beginning with this subparagraph, assign specitic tactical missions or tasks to each
tactical grouping or individual of the patrol, on the route
and at the objective.)
(c) Name of second tactical grouping or individual.
(d) Name of third tactical grouping or
cilividuaL
(e) Coordinating instructions.
(1) Time of departure.
(2) Time of return.
(3) Passage of friendly position (where and
how
accol)plishcd).
(4) Return to friendly position (where and how ac
coinplishcd).
(5) Initial formation.
(6) Route to be followed (describe in detail each kg
by distance, azimuth, terrain features, etc.)
(7) Alternate route of return (describe as
in
161
above).
(8) Check points (describe in detail).
(9) Fire support (concentration number or code, location).
(10) Description of objective (describe in detail relative to terrain, avenue oi approach, cover, conceahuent,
disposition of enemy and his automatic weapons).
(ii) Action at objective (describe planned action in
minute detail).
(12) Rally points (describe first rally point
if pre
designated; describe action you \vant taken at rally
points).
(/3) Actions at danger areas.
(14) Actions upon enemy contact.
(15) Actions in event of amlmsh.
(16) Thrust line.
(17) Anticipated light COn(lit buS IIfll II1000I1SC.
(18) Reporting results (when and to whom).
(19) Rehearsal (time and placc).
(l) Administration and Logistics.
a) Ordnance (by tactical grouping or individual)
(b)
A mununition (by weapon).
(c) Grenades and pyrotechnics (by tactical grouping
or individual).
(d) Uniform.
(e) Individual equipnient.
(f) Special equipment (by tactical grouping or
individual).
(g) Camouflage.
h) Rations.
(i) Casualty plan.
(j) Prisoner plan.
(5) Command and CommunicationsElectronics.
(a) Communications with Command Post.
(1) Type.
(2) When used. (3) Code words (code word and meaning).
(4) Call signs (comthand post, patrol).
(b) Conuuiunications with Supporting A
(c) lutrapatrol Co,nmunicatiouis.
(I) Visual.
(2) Audible.
(3) Pyrotechnic.
(4) Codes.
(d) Challenge and password.
(e) Chain of command.
f) I ocat ion of patrol leader.
(6) Are there any questions?
(7) Time check.
understood by all patrol members and cover the following items:
(I) Cleaning of weapons and equipmcnt.

(2) Turning in of special equipment (Irawn for the patrol.

(3) Pcrsonal vashing and hygiene, to include availability of small items of medical supplies.

(4) Food "Ifl(l rest.

(5) Use of exchange facilities, if available.

(6) Discussion of mistakes among members of the patrol, if not covered at the (lebriefing.

h. l)cbriefing.

( ) Return to Base. It is essential that there be an SOI
for rhc reception of patrols upon returning to base. This can have considcuable morale value in a campaign in which most patrols will be routine and contact the exception.

(2) l)cbrieling. The use of a debriefing form greatly sirnplilies the jol) of the patrol leader in making his report. As the patrols return from the operational area, they are im
iiiediatcly debriefed by a qualified debriefing officer. The entire patrol may he brought into the building or tent being used. A terrain model or large_scale map is used to trace the patrol route and to correlate various bits and pieces of in
Iniuiiat iou. A relaxed, calni, informal, unhurried atmosphere must 1)rc'ail.

1 he debriefing officer fills in the debriefing forimi, as the dchricting progresses.

(3) Sample Patrol Debriefing Report.

I )csignation of patrol
Date
MAI'S
(a) Size and composition of patrol.
(h) i'ask (ullission).
(c) i'iimic of departure.
((1) riuic ol return.
(e) Routes out and back (show sketch or annotated
overlay).
(f) Terrain (information on roads and trails approach

ing, traversing, and connecting suspected or known guerrilla areas. I 'ocation of fords; bridges, and ferries across water barriers. Location of all small settlcinents and farms in or near suspected guerrilla areas. lMCatiOfl and trace of streams that can provide a water supply. In the event t kit an outside agency is supplying the guerrillaslocation of areas suitable for drop or landing Zones; I)Oat or StIl)I11iIiUC

rendezvous; and roads and trails leading into enciny-hcld
or neutral countries supporting the guerrillas.
  (g) Enemy (size, activity, location, unit, time, equip-
nent).
  (Ii) Any itiap corrections.
   (I) Miscellaneous inforinarioii.
   (j) Resilts of encounters with the enemy (prisolicis
and disposition, identifications, enemy casualties, capturt'd
documents and equipment).
  (k) Condition of patrol
                            (include dis1)osit;oiI of
                                                    :ii1'
dead or wounded).
   (I) Conclusions and recoiiiiendarious (including
what extent the task was accolll})lished and recoiiuncntLi
tions as to patrol equipment and tactics).

Signature, grade/ran 1<, and organh/.atuHh/unit 1)1 patrol lcadc 1

(iii) Additional reniarks by interrogator.

Signature, grade/rank, and organization/unit/date of (lcbrachli1!

4. ATTACKING GUERRILLA IIOUSES ANI) CAMPS
a. Attacking Houses. It may bc ncccsary to scizc individuals or attack guerrillas known to he in certain houses. Iii plalimi it an attack, observe the following:
(I) Secrecy is essential. Relativcs, syiimpatliizcrs, or iiitiimii dated natives can warn the enemy of the patrol's appro:uIm.

(2) The location of the house and the nature of the tcri;miu surrounding it are determined l)y ground or aerial reconiiai*;
sance, sketch, photo, or guide.

## Z4 The (Iuer;'I!IaAnd How To Fight Him

(3) The patrol normally approaches and occupies its position during darkness.

(4)
rhc patrol is no larger than that required to carry out thc mission. A largc patrol is hard to control, difficult to conceal, an(l iiiay itiake too much noise.

(5) The approach is made quietly and cautiously. Barking tlogs anti other amiisnals often warn the inhabitants.

(6) All available cover is used.

(7) All avenues of escape arc covered, either physically or by fire.

(K) If the mission is to capture the occupants, and armed resistance is not expected, surround the house and approach it from all sides.

(9) If the nussuon is to attack the house, and armed resistance is expected, the patrol is located so that every side of the building is covered by fire.

b. Attacking Camps. Many of the instructions for attacking houses are applicable to attacking camps.

(1) A guide who knows the exact location of the camp is used.

(2) The guide makes a sketch of the camp and its approacles. This can be traced on the ground.

(3) The trail is left as soon as it is convenient, and the camp is approached from an unexpecte4 direction. When in the vicinity of the camp, approach slowly and cautiously.

(4) Normally, the patrol is split into two or more groups.

One group attacks the camp while others cover the main avenues of guerrilla withdrawal.

(5) After sighting the camp, the leader makes a careful reconnaissance.

(6) When the patrol is in position and prepared to open fire, the leader orders the enemy to surrender. In the event they refuse, the leader opens fire. All men direct their fire into the guerrilla camp.

f)cstroying Captured Bivouacs. The value of a camp as a knowii enemy site is considered before destroying it. Guerrillas occupy camp sites the)' have previously found satisfactory, particularly if slicltcrs have been constructed. The burning of shelters rarely scrvcs any useful purpose.

5. AMBUSHES
  a. General. An aniliush
                   is a surprise attack froiii
                                     a liuldtti
 position against a liu)ving coemy. It does not aitculipt to capi
 and hold ground permanently. There ale two types:
    (I) Immediate. An immediate ambush is one set with
   minimmim of planning. Little time is available for
   sance and occupation,
                  and the method
                              eiiiph)ycd
                                      depends
   entirely upon the commander.
    (2) Dclibcrate. A deliberate ambush is one planned
                                        and
   executed asa separate operation. Generally, tunic will allow
   planning, preparation, and rehearsal.
  b. Characteristics. l'o achieve success, the following spnii-
 taneous coordinated action is needed:
    (I) Good firing positions
                        (kneeling,
                               sitting, standing,
   lying, and firing from behind cover).
    (2) Training in ambush techniques.
    (3) Planning and briefing.
    (4) Security in all stages of the ambush.
    (5) Proper positioning of troops.
    (6) Concealment.
    (7) Battle discipline Throughout the operation.
    (8) A simple plan to begin firing.
  c. The Positioning for l)chibcratc Aimibushes.
    (I) Pruuiciplcs. There arc two fuuid;iumieuital principles hI
   posituo)nmg troops.
      (a) All possible approaches should be covered.
      (b) 'l'lie ambush must have depth.
    (2) Approaches. Information may frequently
                                     give
                                         m lie
  destination of the guerrillas but will rarely give the cxao:I
   route they will talce. No matter ho' good the in format ii
  guerrillas have a flair for arriving froimi an unexpected dircu
  turn. This factor causes a high failure rate in ambushes. Ii
                                          is
  essential that all possible approaches he covered.
    (3) E)epth. At the first burst of fire, guerrillas scalier
  rapidly, and the chances of getting a second burst frouim
                                        I lie

mine position are small. Therefore, withdrawal routes must be covered to provide an opportunity for snl)sequent fire at the fleeing guerrillas.

(4) The Ambush Group. An ambush is made up of a series of small elements of troops. The rifle squad facilitates the organization of the ambush group. One or two men are positioned where they can listen and observe, while the others rest in the ambush position. In positioning the men of the squad, the squad leader must:
(a) Consider concealment as his first priority. Movement in the area is kept to a minimum. Each man enters his position from the rear. The squad leader ensures that all traces of movement into the position are removed or concealed.

(b) Ensure that the man detailed to begin firing has a good view of the killing ground. He begins firing whcn the guerrillas are positioned so that a maximum number can be killed.

(c) Ensure that other members of the squad have good firing positions.

(d) Position his men for allround defense.

(e) Choose his own position for maximum control of his squad.

() Ambush Group Employment. Groups may be employed in two ways: the area ambush and the limited ambush.

(a) Area Ambush. All approaches are covered. They are covered in depth to catch scattering guerrillas. A series of groups, each with its own leader, is positioned as part of an over-all plan to encompass a particular guerrilla party that is expected.

(li) Limited Ambush. 'When there is only one likely approach, groups are positioned in depth with allround defense. This type of ambush is used when the area am
bush is impossible, or it may be used as one part of the area ambush.

(1. Planning the Deliberate Ambush.

(1) Intelligence. Information can be obtained from maps, recent patrol reports, police, special intelligence agents, photographs, and ground and aerial reconnaissances. Nuiner-

ous pieces of information, such as sightings of siw,kc, camps,
patrols, food plots, trails, and foot tracks, arc evaluated prior
to selecting the area for the ambush. The conunander ob-
tains all the information available on guerrilla tactics and thc
manner in which the guerrilla will rcact when a,Iil)ushcd.
Details of the enemy might include:
     (a) Time of movement, strength, organization of the
  guerrilla patrol, type of supplies carried.
     (b) Details of size, routes, habits as to tiiiie or locatIon,
  frequency, and arms.
     (c) Size of the guerrilla working parties, ration parties,
  and similar detachments.
     (d) The guerrillas' technique of patrolling.
     (e) Interval that the guerrilla patrol maintains between
  men.
  (2) (:learance. The time of departure, route used, loca-
tion of ambush, time of return, signs and countersigns, and
friendly patrols in the area are coordinated and cleared with
those forces that need to know.
  (3) Time Factor. The time for departure arid establishing
the ambush is based upon intelligence about the guerrilla
patrol to be ambushed, the necesity for being undetected,
and the route that the patrol will use.
  (4) Security. Planning should ensure that every aspect of
security is maintained throughout the planning and conduct
of the operation. It provides a secure place for briefings 811(1
conduct of rehearsals. Secrecy is maintained in the coordina-
tion of other operations that are to take place in the vicinity
of the ambush. Daylight aerial reconiiaissanccs to the front,
flanks, and over guerrilla trails are planned. thc password,
signs and countersigns, and codes for the operation are in-
cluded. A secure route over which the ambush party can
move to the ambush site is selected. i'lle plan will normally
provide for tile patrol to niove to the ambush site during
darkness. A cover plan is also considered.
  (5) Ground. Terrain that affords the ambush group cover,

concealment, and comman(l of the site is selected for the aml)ush. All possible approaches are considered.

e. Preparations for the Deliberate Ambush.

(I) The time available for preparation is often limited.

Certain items are kept in a state of constant readiness:
(a) %Veapons are zeroed and tested.

(li) Antitiunitioti, magazines, and chargers are kept clean, and the magazines are frequently emptied and refilled.

(2) Preparation on receipt of intelligence includes:
(a) 1 borough briefing.

(b) Rehearsal, witeit time allows.

(c) Final checking of weapons.

f. Briefing. All members of the atlIl)ush party are fully briefed.

Briefing is divided into two parts:
(I) Preliminary briefing at th base camp. This briefing may include a fiveparagraph order. The ambush commander briefs his command as thoroughly as possible to re (1(1cc the time spent on final orders, and as early as possible to allow niaxuiniumi tithe for preparation and rehearsal.

(2) Final briefing in the ;iinbush area by the ambush commander. This uttay be limited but must include:
(a) General area of each group, including direction of fire.

(b) Order to begin firing.

(c) Order on completion (if ambush.

(d) Variations (ruin the rehearsal iii regard to iitdivid
ual tasks.

g. Rehearsal. Rehearsals will increase chances for success.

Rehearsals are not carried (nit at the amnbusl site. All possible and likely guerrilla action is simulated, and the ambush groups practice under a variety of circumstances. Final rehearsals for night ambushes are conducted at night. When planned for, night illumination aids are employed.

h. Positioning the Deliberate Ambush.

(I) Area Ambushes.

(a) The aminish conimamider first chooses the killing ground and the general area and directions of fire for each group. He then designates the asSClfll)ly point fltl(l gives tht administrative plan.

(b) The ambush party fl1OVCS to a dispcrsal point froiii which groups can move by selected routes to their positiouS. The ambush commander may be able to position only one group in detail, leaving the rciiiainder to be positioned by group leaders.

(2) Limited Ambushes. On reaching the aiiibush area, the coiniiander will:
a) Make his reconnaissance to choose a killing grouliti anti consider the extent of his position, bcaiing hi jiiind that guerrillas usually move with large intervals betweeii on.: another. A killing ground of sixty_live to 110 yards is dt .irable. The ambush position should offer conccaliiicnt.

h) Ensure that the man designated to begin tiring has a god view of the killing ground.

i. Occupation of the Ambush Position. The occupation position of an ambush party is carefully conccalcd. (Such iiiinor items as smell of hair tonics and peculiar 100(1 odors may alert a guerrilla force.) Each individual should he able to see his sector o responsibility and be prepared to fire froiii any position once nring begins.

j. Lying in Ambush. Once a group is in position, there lutist be no sound (Jr movement. This is a test of training and battle discipline. Men arc trained to get into a coiiifortahle position and icumin still for long periods. I )iiiimg the wait, each maii has his weapon ready for immediate action.

k. Begin Firing. The firing begins when all possible guerrillas are in the killing ground. There must he mt premature action.

All men must clearly understand the orders and methods for opening tire.

(1) Fire can be opened providing the guerrillas are moving toward someone in a better position to kill. A himimitcd ambush can be commenced by the commander.

(2) Should any guerrilla spot the aimihush, begin timing.

(3) Once tiring begins, targets hecommic difficult to engage;
to cope with moving targets, men immay have to stand tip.

(4) A signal is arranged to stop firing, so immediate fol
low-up action and search can start as soon as the guerrillas disengage.

(5) Nhen the firing ceases, men previously detailed search the immediate area under cover of amL)ush weapons and by covering each other. These men will:
(a) Check guerrillas in the killing area.

(b) Search surrounding area for (lead and wounded.

(c) Collect arms, ammunition, and equipment.

I. Assembly Point. An easily found assembly point is selected at which troops collect at the end of an action. Assembly begins following execution of a prearranged signal.

in. Long-Term Ambushes. When authushes are set for periods of more than twelve hours, administrative arrangements for relief of groups for eating and sleeping are necessary. In long
term ambushes, an administrative area is set up. It should be located away from the ambush position. Trails may be cleared, and water should be available.

(1) Consideration is given to reliefs, particularly in the case of the area ambush. Normally, the relief will come from the administrative area along the communication lines. Although the whole party in the ambush is relieved, only one firing position is changed at a time. The reliefs take place when no guerrilla movcmcnt is expected.

(2) One method is to divide the amulnish group into thrcc parties, one in the aiiibush position, one in reserve, and one at rest. On rclicf, the party at rest takes over the ambush position; the men in the ambush position go to the reserve;
and the reserve goes to the rest area. If the party has fewer than eight men and the duration of the ambush is long, the whole party should be withdrawn to rest during set periods.

Such a party would be responsible for its own security while resting. When an ambush party is more than eight men but not large enough to carry out the threegroup method, sufficient men for allround observation carry out the ambush.

The others move away from the ambush position, post sentries, and rest. The party at rest does not smoke and cats precooked rations.

n. Night Ambushes.
   (1) General. The techniques applied in the day ambush
 also apply to the night ambush. In (larkness, concealment is
 easy, hut shooting is less accurate. It therefore becomes fllOfC
 important to have good positioning (If weapons so that killing
ground is covered by fire.
   (2) Factors. The following factors apply to night
 busheN:
     (a) The shotgun can be the primary weapon. (These
  will have to be requested early.)
      b) Ambush should contain a high proportion of auto-
   mat Ic weapons. The M 14 with selector is a good weapon
   for this purpose.
     (c) In darkness, all weapons, particularly machine guns
   firing down trails, may have their left and right limits of
   fire fixed to eliminate danger to the ambush party.
     (d) The ambush party never movcs about. Any move-
  ment is regarded as guerrilla movement.

        (
            ) Clear orders, explicit firecontrol instructions, and
    clear assembly points and signals are essential.
        (f) Men and groups are positioned closer together thaim
    in day. Control at night is allimportant.
        (g) It is difficult to take up an amulmushi position at night;
    where practical, the position is occupied (hiring lasi light.
    (3) Illumination. l'he sUccess of a night ambush may de-
pend on artificial illumination. Only in open country, with a
bright moon and no chance of clouds, is it possibly to rely
on
       an
              unillumirmated
                                        ambush.
                                                         Infrared
                                                                         dcviccs
                                                                                         (Sniper
Scopes) may be used to great advantage. As a general rule,
all night ambushes arc provided with artificial illunmination iii
some form. Any illumination at ground level is placed to
prcvcilr the ambush party from receiving glare. There arc a
variel
             of niglitillimnilnation aids available (hand illunmina

tiomi
         renades, trip flares, rifle grenades, handfired ihlumu
nant; parachute flares tired by imiortars, artillery amid naval
gunuil e, and parachutes dropped from aircraft). One pos
sible method of employing illumination
                                                             is to commence
firing without illumination. Illumination is then fired tichind

the guerrillas. The personnel who go forward to check guerrillas in the killing area and to collect arms and equipment should have illutiunation. This illumination is placed directly on the killing zone. Upon completion of the activities in the killing zone, there is normally no further requirement for illumination.

n. Obstacles. The objective of the ambush is to kill all of the guerrilla force. A useful anthush aid is an ambush obstacle. The ambush obstacle may Consist of a series of antipersonnel mines, Claymore weapons, sharpened stakes, deep (litches, barbed wire, or any device that will either delay or inflict casualties upon the guerrillas. Possible places for obstacles are:
(1) On likely guerrilla lines of retreat fron' an ambush.

(2) In dead spaces difficult to cover by the weapons of the ambush group.

(3) In the likely halting place of the main body of guerrillas.

p. Immediate Ambush. Little time is available for reconnaissance and occupation. and the techniques used depend on the patrol leader.

(I) The immediate ambush is employed when the point or scout sees or hears a guerrilla group approaching.

(a) The scout decides that an immediate ambush is possible and gives the signal.

(b) On seeing the signal, the leading clement immediately takes cover and remains still, even if it does not have a good firing position. The other men or units have time to choose good positions on the same side of the trail or road. The machine guns are carefully positioned.

(c) When the patrol leader estimates that the enemy is caught in the ambush, he OpenS fire himself. If the ambush is discovered before the patrol leader opens fire, fire will be opened by any member of the ambush party.

(2) There must be a prearranged signal to cease firing. An illumination rifle grenade or similar signal may be adequate.

. Required Signals for the l)cliberate Ambush. in rehearsing a deliberate ambush, the following signals are planned, rehearsed, and understood by all members of the ambush party:

(I) Enemy approaching.
(2) Commence firing.
(3) Cease fiiing.
(4) Check the killing zone.
(5) Withdraw front the killing
(6) Withdraw from the ambush position.
(7) Abandon the position.
Checklist. The following are items that may cause failures
in anibuhes against guerrillas:
(1) Disclosure by cocking weapons and moving sifctv
catches or change levers.
(2) l)isclosurc by footprints.
(3) Lack of fire control.
(4) Leaders badly positioned.
(5) Lack of allround security.
(6) Misfires and toppagcs through
failing to clean, inspect, and test weapons and magazines.
(7) Lack of a clearly defined procedure for opening fire.
(8) Firing prematurely.

6. COUNTERAM BUSH ACTION
  a. General.
    (I) Planning. In planning for defense against
                                    aitiloisli,
  initially consi(lcr the availal)lc forces. 'lhe siii:illunit leader
  responsible for moving a unit indcpclHlelu ly tlirmighi
  where ambush is likely, plans for the following:
     (a) The formation to be used.
     (b) March security.
     (c) Communication and control.
     (d) Special equipment.
     (e) Action if ambushed.
     (f). The reorganization.
    (2) Formation. A disnmunted unit citiploys a formation
  that provides for allround security while cii route. March
  interval is l)ased on the type of terrain, liitiits of visibility,
  size of the patrol, and to a certain extent on the titeans of
  control available. The interval between individuals and units
  at night is closer than the interval used during daylight. The

interval is also great enough to allow each succeeding ele-
ment to deploy when contact with the enemy is made. How-
ever, the distances are not so great as to prevent each element
from rapidly assisting the element in front of it. The patrol
leader is located well forward in the formation but not so
faras to restrict his moving throughout the formation as the
situation demands. Units are placed in the formation so they
iiiay distribute their firepower evenly throughout the forma-
tion. If troops are to be motorized, tactical unit integrity is
maintained.
   (3) March Security. Regardless of whether the unit is on
foot or motorized, security to the front, rear, and flanks is
necessary. A security element is placed well forward of the
main body with adequate radio or pyrotechnical comnmnica
tions. The security element is strong enough to sustain itself
until follow-up units can be deployed to assist in reducing
the ambush. However, if the enemy is not detected, it may
allow the security element to pass unmolested in order to
attack the main body. If this occurs, the security element
attacks the ambush position from the flanks or rear in con-
junction with the main action. Flank security elements are
placed out on terrain features adjacent to the route of march.
They move forward either by alternate or successive bounds,
if the terrain permits. This is often difficult because of rug-
gedness of the terrain and the lack of transportation or
communications. The next best thing is moving adjacent to
the column along routes paralleling the direction of march.
Rear security is handled similarly to frontal security, and
plans are for the rear guard to assist in. reducing the ambush,
either by envelopment or by furnishing supporting fire. Air-
craft above the column flying reconnaissance and surveil-
lance missions increase security. In an ambush, fighter and
attack aircraft can provide support. Communication between
these elements is a must.
  (4) Communication and Control. All available means of
communication consistent with security are used to assist in
maintaining control of the small unit. March objectives and
phase lines may he used to assist the conunander in control

ling hk unit. Communication with security clcments is man
datoi. Detailed prior planning and briefing, and rehearsals for all units, will assist in control. Alternate plans are iiiadc to prevent confusion and chaos. If the unit is ambushed, higher hcadqiiarters is notified as soon as possil)lc to alert other units in the vicinity.

(5) Special Equipment. It is often necessary to provide the unit with additional items of equipment and weapons, such as engineering tools, mine detectors, anti demolition equipment. Ample communication equipment is always nece5sary, including panel sets or smoke grenadcs for identifying the aminisli to aircraft.

(6) Action if Ambushed. If the unit is anthushed,.the most important counteraction is for all available personnel to return fire as rapidly as possible. Troops riding in trucks remain alert at all times and are trained to disembark inune
diately and to return fire. When trucks are required to halt, drivers halt their trucks on the road. They do not pull off onto the shoulders because they may be mined. Trucks used as lead vehicles are reinforced with sandbags to reduce the effect of mines.

(7) Method of Attack. If the strength of the unit is adequate, envelopment is usually the most desirable method of attack. A holding element and an attacking element are designated in all plans. Each element is briefed thoroughly its actions and alternate plans necessary to meet different situations. For example, a plan calling for the advance guard to be the holding force would not succeed if the enemy allowed this force to pass unmolested, If the strength of the ambushed unit prevents their attacking by envelopment, the plan should be to break out of the immediate area rapidly to minimize casualties. If a unit is surprised by the enemy, it tries to overcome him by returning all available fire immediately. This also allows the ambushed Unit to deploy and maneuver.

(8) Alert Force. An alert force, pIcparc(1 to move by foot or helicopter, is on constant alert for cmnployimicnt by higher headquarters in the event a patrol is ambushed, or for employmcnt for other purposes. The alert force studies the plans of all patrols. By studying the routes, check points, and dcsignatcd hclicopter landing sites, and through means of communications, it can rapidly reinforce an ambushed unit. If ambushcd, the patrol leader may request reinforcements. [Ic designates his position by reference to check points, designated helicopter landing sircs, terrain features, smolce panels, etc. If possible, he sends a guide to the place designated to guide the reinforcements into position. A sys
tern for rapiti cnployment of alert forces, ensuring defeat for the guerrilla ambushes, makes the ambush less likely to be eunploycd by the guerrilla.

(9) Reorganization. The reorganization after an ambush involves the use of assembly points and plans for security.

Care is taken to siminimize the possibility of the enemy's pressing time attack during this period. All personnel (including wounded), equipment, and supplies are assembled. If reor
ganization cannot be accomplished because of guerrilla action, it is accoimplishcd after reinforcements arrive.

h. l)isniounted Units.

(I) General. limuncdiatcaction (IA) drills are taught and thoroughly practiced. The underlying principles of each drill lutist be simplicity, aggressiveness, and spccd.

(2)
lmmncdiatcAcrion Drills. The IA drills to be practiced when a unit is caught in ambush are of two kinds:

     (a) Where only the foremost elements of a unit (pa-
  trol) arc caught in the ambush, an immediate encircling
  attack is carried out by the remainder of the unit (patrol).
     (b) Where the entire patrol
                                           is anthushed in open
  ground, an immediate assault is carried out by the sur-
  vivors.
  (3) Encircling Attack. The encircling attack is the cor-
rect reaction to a guerrilla aiiibush and is based on the normal
principles oi fire an(l maneuver taught in smallunit tactics.
     (a) Formimations arc designed so that only part of a
  patrol should be caught in the ambush. If these formations
  arc practiced and the distances correctly observed, the

whole patrol should not be pinned down by the opciiiig hurst of fire.

(h)
As the unit advances, the patrol lcadcr always has the terrain situation in mind. 1-Ic takes control of the bitt IC
by signaling or shouting "Envelop Right (or Left)." l'hk should be all that is necessary to initiate action. The truo1)s will have practiced the drill and will know their posit oilS
in the attack.

(c) The leading element lays down a base of flit to covci thc mancuvcring clement. If the leading dci ncilt has smoke grcnades, these arc used to screen the elciiaiits caught in thc killing zone.

(4) Immediate Assault. If the guerrilla ambush extends on a wide frontage and occupies a considerable portion along the trail or road, then a different tactic is called for. A stitill patrol, even with correct spacing, can be caught within the ambush. Sufficient room for maneuver is often limited, icquiring an immediate assault mounted directly at the guerrilla. It is seldom possible or desirable to try and take up firing positions and exchange fire with the guerrillas as long as the patrol (or unit)
is in the killing zone. i'lic pal moves as quickly as possiL)lC to a position outside the killing zone, and then assaults the guerrilla 1)osition.

c. Mounted Units.

(1) General. The guerrilla will spring his ainhusit ground that he has carefully chosen and organized, fiiii v.'hich he can kill by firing at point_hlanlc range. The piiii
ciple l)ehind the IA drill is that it is incorrect to stop vehicles in the area that the guerrilla has chosen as a killing zone--
unless forced to do so. The proper action is to drive on when fired upon, to stop only when past the ambush area or before running into it, and to counterattack immediately from flank and rear.

(2) IiiiictliatcAction lechnit1tic. Nhen vehicles arc Ii rcd Upon:
(a) l)rivcrs drive out of the danger zone.

(b) \Tehiclc sentries return fire immediately.

(c) When vehicles are clear of the danger zone, they stop to allow' unloading and offensive action.

(d) Subscquent vehicles approaching the danger zone will halt short of the area and their occupants will talce ollcnsive action.

(c) 'When vehicles are forced to halt in the danger zone, troops will quickly unload under the covering fire of the sentries, which should include smoke if possible, and will make for cover from which to join the attack against the guerrilla force.

(3) Counterattack.

(a) Guerrillas are always sensitive to threats to their rear or flanks. Offensive action to produce such threats can bc carried out only by those troops who are clear of the danger zone. If there are no such troops, then frontal attack under cover of smokeis made.

(h) In action when no troops have entered the danger zone, the convoy conunander will launch an immediate flanicing attack on the guerrilla position, using supporting fire from such weapons as machine guns and mortars.

(c) In action when some troops arc ahead of the danger ZOflC and others are halted short of it, confusion may arise as to which group should initiate the attack. The party which has not yet entered the ambush should make this attack.

(d) The best way in which an armored vehicle can assist in counrcrambush action is by moving to the danger zone to engage the guerrillas at very short range. In this way it can give good covering fire to our flanking attack, and aflord protection to any of our own troops who are caught in thc guerrilla killing ground.

(c) It is possible that the convoy commander may he killed or wounded by the guerrillas' initial burst of fire.

It is essential that vehicle commanders understand their rcsponsil)ilittcs for organizing a counterattack. This is ckarly stared in unit convoy orders and stressed at the l)rie(ing.

(f) The techniques outlined above arc practiced repeat
edly in varying situations until the natural reaction to
1
guerrilla ambush is the application of an IA drill.

(4) Vehicle Unloading Drill.

(a) General. In an ambush, the gucrrilla first tries lu stop one or more vehicles in his killing ground by the use of mines or obstacles and/or by firing at the tires iiul driver. He then tries to kill the troops in the vehicle load.

It is essential that the troops unload instantly w(len a veliicle is brought to a halt in a danger zone. This must he taught and practiced as a drill.

(b) Vehicle Loading. To ensure ease of unloading, all packs and cargo are piled in the center of the vehicle and/or excessive quantity of cargo is not loaded.

(c) Drill. When the vehicle is forced to stop:
(1) The vehicle commander shouts "Unload Riglil.

(or Left)" to indicate the direction in which troops will assemble.

(2) Vehicle sentries throw smoke grenades and o1wii fire immediately on the guerrilla positions.

(3) Troops unload over both sides and the rear of lic vehicle and run in the direction indicated.

(4) As soon as the' troops arc clcar of the vehicle, sentries follow and join in the attack.

(5) At this stng of the battle, the object is to collect the fit men for counteraction. \'Voundcd troops are cared for after counteraction has been taken.

(d) Training. This drill intist be practiced frequcurly by vehicle loads, e.g., infantry squads and platoons. vVheic miscellaneous vehicle loads arc iiiadc up before a iilovc ment, two or three practices are held before the convoy moves out.

7.

SEARCH PROCEDURES
a. General. Misuse of police or iiiilirary authority can uI
versely affect the ultimate outconic of operations against gllcr_
rillas. Seizure of contraband, evidence, intelligence material, supplies, or other material, during searches, must be plished lawfully and properly recorded to be of future legal value. Seizure of guerrilla supplies alone is not as damaging to a guerrilla niovcincnt as the apprehension of the suppliers and agents, along with the supplies or iiiaterial. l'ropcr use of police powers will gaul the respect and support of the people. Abusive, excessive, or inconsiderate police methods may temporarily suppress the guerrilla movement but at the same time may increase the civilian population's sympathy toward and/or sup
port of the guerrillas.

li. Authority. Authority for search operations must L)e carefully reviewed. Marines must be aware that they will perform searches and seizures in places and areas within military jurisdiction (or where otherwise lawful in the exercise of their police authority), for purposes of apprehending a suspect or securing evidence that tends to prove an offense has been committed. Usually there will be special laws regulating the search and seizure powers of the military forces. These laws must be given wide dissemination.

c. Searching a Suspect.

(I) General. The fact that anyone can be a guerrilla or a guerrilla sympathizer is stressed in all training. It 5 tiuring the initial handling of a person about to be searched that the greatest caution is required to prevent surprise and dangerous acts. During a search, one Marine must always cover the one making the search. I Iowcvcr, the searcher must be tactful to avoid making an enemy out of a suspect who may be anti
guerrilla.

(2) The Frisk Search. This iiethod is a quick search of an individual for dangerous weapons, evidence, or cofltral)afld.

It is preferably conducted in the prcscncc of an assistant and a witness. In conducting the frisk, the searcher has the suspect stand with his l)ack to him. The searcher's assistant takes a position from which he can cover the suspect with his weapon. The suspect is required to raise his arms. The searcher then slides his hands over the individual's entire body, crushing the clothing to locate any concealed objects.

(3) The Wall Search. Based on the principle of rendering the suspect harmless by placing him in a strained, awkward position, the wall search affords the searcher a degree of

safety. I is particularly useful when two Marines must search
several uspects. Any upright surface, such as a wall, vehicle,
or a tree, may be utilized. The wall search is conducted as
follows:
     (a) Position of Suspect. The suspect is required to face
  the
          all (or other object) and lean against it, supporting
  himself with his upraised hands placed far apart and
  fingers spread. His feet are placed well apart, turned out,
  and asparallel to and as far away from the wall s possil)le.
  His head is kept down.
     (b) Position of Searcher's Assistant. The searcher's as-
  sistant stands on the opposite side oif the suspect from the
  searcher, and to the rear. He covers the suspect with his
  weapon. When the searcher moves froiii his original posi
  don to the opposite side of the suspect, the assistant also
  chaiwcs position. The searcher walks around his assistant
  during this change to avoid coming between his assistant
  and the suspect.
     (c) Position of Searcher. The searcher ap1)roachlcs the
  suspect froiii the side. The searcher's weapon ilIlist not 1)C
  in such a position that the suspect can grab it. 1-Ic places
  his right foot in front of the suspect's right foot and makes
  and maintains ankletoankle contact. Froui this position,
  if the suspect offers resistance, the suspect's right foot can
  be pushed back from under him. When searching froi ii
  the left side of the suspect, the searcher places his left foot
  in front of the suspect's left foot and agaill Illaintailis ankle
  toankle contact.

   (d ) Searching Technique. In taking his initial position,
the searcher should be alert to prevent the suspect (miii
suddenly attempting to disarm or injure him. The searcher
first searches the suspect's headgear. The searcher then
checks the suspect's hands, arms, right side of the body, and
right leg, in sequence. He crushes the suspect's clothing
between his fingers; he (hoes not merely par it. lie pays
close attention to armpits, back, waist, legs, and tops of
boots or shoes. Any item found that is not considcre(l
                                                                               a
weapon or evidence is replaced in the suspect's pocket. If

    the suspect resists or attempts escape and has to be thrown
    prior to completing the search, the search is started over
    from the beginning.
    (4) Search of More Than One Suspect. When two or
 more suspects are to be searched, they must assume a position
 against the same vall but far enough apart so that they can-
 not reach one another. The searcher's assistant takes his posi-
 tion a few paces to the rear of the line with his weapon ready.
 The search is begun with the suspect on the right of the
 line. Search each suspect as described in subparagraph (3)
 above, On completion of the search of a suspect, he is moved
 to the left of the line and resumes the position against the
 wall. Thus, in approaching and searching the next suspect,
 the searcher is not between his assistant and a suspect.
    (5) Strip Search. A strip search may be conducted within
 any type of shelter. This type of search is usually considered
 necessary when the individual is suspected of being a guerrilla
 leader or important messenger. The search is preferably con-
 ducted in an enclosed space, such as a room or tent. Depend.
 ing on the nature of the suspect, the searching technique can
 be varied. One method is to use two unarmed searchers while
 a third Marine, who is armed, stands guard outside. The
 suspect's clothing,
                      including
                                  his
                                      shoes,
                                              is removed and
 searchcd carefully. A search is then made of his person,
 including his i,ir,uth, nose, ears, hair, armpits, crotch, and
 other areas of possible concealment.
   (6) Searching Women. Marines must be reminded that the
 resistance movement will make maximum use of women for
 all types of tasks where search may be a threat. Discretion
 should he used in searching women; women searchers are
 available. Women should not he detained in male confine-
 ment facilities.
d. Searching of Vehicles.
   (1) General. It will be necessary to maintain a continuous
 check on road movement to catch wanted persons and to
 prevent smuggling of contraband items. This requires the use
 of roadblocks. Since roadblocks cause considerable incon-
 venience and even fear, it is important that the civilian population understand that they are entirely a prcvcntive and not
a punitive measure.
    (a) Types. Broadly speaking, there are two types of
  roadblocks: deliberate and hasty.
       (1) Deliberate. This type of roadblock is positioned
    iii a town or in the open country, often on a main road.
    It will act as a useful deterrent to unlawful movement.
    This type of roadblock may not achieve, spectacular
    results.
      (2) Hasty. This type of roadblock is quickly posi-
    tioned in a town or in the open country, and the actual
    location is often related to some item of intelligence. The
    hasty roadblock initially may achieve a quick success,
    but it eventually becomes a deliberate roadblock.
    (b) Location. Concealment of a roadblock is desirable,
  but often impossible. The location should make it difficult
  for a person to turn back or reverse a vehicle without being
  noticed. Culverts, bridges, or deep cuts may be suital)k
  locations. Positions beyond sharp curves have the advan-
  tage that drivers do not see the roadblock in sufficient time
  to avoid inspection. Safety disadvantages may outweigh
  the advantages in such positions. A scarcity of good roads
  will increase the effect of a welt-placed roadblock.
    (c), Troop I)ispositions. A roadblock must have ade-
  quate troops to prevent anibush and surprise. An element
  of the roadblock should be positioned and concealed an
  appropriate distance (one hundred to several
                                                    hunti red
 yards) from the approach side of the roadblock to prevent.
  the escape of any vehicle or person attempting to turn
 around and flee upon sighting the block. An element should
 search the vehicle and its passengers and drivers. If the
 roadblock is manned for any length of rime, part of the
 troops are allowed to rest. The rest area is located near the
 search area so that the troops can be turned out quickly.
    (d) Special Equipment Required. For the roadhioclc to
 achieve maximum results, special equipment is required.
 Portable signs, in the native language and Fnglish, should
 be available. Signs denoting the vehicle search area, vehicle

parking arca, male and female search area, and dismount point speed movement. Adcquatc lighting is needed for the search area if the roadblock is to function efficiently at night. Coiiimunication equiplucot between the various troop unitS must be supplied. Barbed-wire obstacles across the road and around the search area should be providcd.

Iroops must have adequate firepower to withstand an attack or to repulse a vehicle attcinpting to flee or crash through the roadblock.

(2) Method. The roadblock is best established by placing two parallel lines of concertina bathed wire (each with a gap) across the road. The distance between these two parallel obstacles depends on the amount of traffic that will have to l)C held in the search area. The enclosure formed can then hc used :is the search area. If possible, there should be a place in the search area where large vehicles can be examined without delaying the (low of other traffic, which can be dealt with
(1uicl(ly. Accommodations are required for searching women suspects and holding persons for further interrogation. If possil,lc, the personnel manning a military roadblock should include a member of the civil police, an interpreter, and a trained w'oinan searcher. An officer or NCO must always l)e on duty (if close to the search area. When a vehicle is searched, all occupants are made to get out and stand clear of the 'ehicle. The owner or driver should be made to watch the search of his vehicle. The searcher is always covered by another Marine. While the search is being made, politeness and considcrauon are shown at all times. Depending on the type and cargo of vehicles, a careful search of likely hiding places may require a probe. The occupants of the vehicle can he searched simultaneously if sufficient searchers are available.

Searching a \'illage or Built-Up Area.

(I) General. The basic philosophy of a search of a village or built_up area is to conduct it with a measure of controlled inconvenience to the population. They should be inconvenienced to the mint where they will discourage guerrillas and their sympat hizcrs from remaining in their locale, but not to such an CXtCUt that they will be driven to collaborate wit Ii them as a' result of the search. The largc_scale search of a village or builtu1) area is normally a combined 1)olicc tiul military operation. It is preplaimed in detail and rehearsed.

Secrecy is maintained in order to achieve surprise. Physie;il reconnaissance of the area is avoidcd and the inforuimi II
needed about the ground obtained from aerial photographs.

Both vertical and oblique photos are studied carefully. In the ease of large cities, the local police may have a detailed nip showing rcltive size and location of buildings. For succcss, thC.scarch plan is simple and is executed swiftly. Methods titil techniques Can be varied.

(2) Organization of Troops. As villages and builtup vary, a force is taskorganized for each search. An organi'/a don consisting of troops, police, etc., is designed to accotti push the following:
(a) To surround the area to prevent escape.

(b) To establish roadblocks.

(c) To prevent an attack or interference by forces out side the area.

(d) To search houses and individuals as necessary and to
'identify a Suspect.

(e) To escort wanted persons to the place designated.

(3) Command and control. Normally, a search involving a battalion or more is l)est controlled by the military cmii mander with the police in support. lor a sitialler search, it is often best for the police to be in control with the military iii support. Regardless of the controlling agency, the actual search is best performed by native policc, witeut feasible.

(4) Method.

(a) Approach. An area is approached and surrouiidctl l)efore the inhabitants realize 'hat is happening. Soutir times it is best to drive into the area; nit other occasints it is best to disembark at a distance. The decision (lC[)CuldS
(ni the available approaches, exits, and the local situat'n ,ii.

(b) Surrounding the Area.

1)uriitg darkness, trol should approach by as many different routes an(l as silent Iv as possible. When close to their positions, they shoti Id dn,hlctiiiie. A ftcr (laylight, the area can be covered by a chain of ol,servation posts with gaps covered by patrols.

Normally, it is iuiipossible to surround an area completely for any length of time, due to the large number of troops re(1uire(l. If necessary, troops dig in, take advantage of natural cover, and use barbed wire to help maintain their line.

(c) Reserves. If there is a chance that hostile elements

10)111 the outside could interfere, reserves are employed to
prevent them from
                         joining the inhabitants of an area under
search. An air observer can assist by detecting and giving
early warning of any large-scale movement outside the
isolated area.
   (d) Search Parties. The officer in command of the oper-
ation makes known that the area is to be searched, a house
curfew is in force, and all inhal)itantS are to remain in
doors or gather at a central point for searching.
      (1) Each search party should consist of at least one
  native
             policeman,
                             protective
                                             escort,
                                                        and
                                                               a
                                                                   woman
  searcher.
      (2) When the search is in a building that has people
  in it, the first action required is to get everyone into one
  room. The police may give the necessary orders and do
  the actual searching. The object of this search is to
  screen for suspected persons.
     (3) Buildings are best searched from bottom to top.
  Mine detectors are used to search for arms and ammuni-
  tion. Every effort is made to avoid unnecessary damage.
     (4) After a house is searched, it is marked. Persons
  awaiting search are not allowed to move into a searched
  building.
     (5) In the case of a vacant house, or in cases of re-
  sistance,
               it iiiay be necessary to force entry. After
  searching a house containing property but whose occu-
  pants are away, the search party can nail it up and place
  a sentry outside to prevent looting. Before troops depart,
  arrangements are Illade in the community to protect
  empty houses until the occupants return.

6) When it is decided to search inhabitants in onc

  central area, the head of the house remains behind SO
  that he can be present when the house itself is searched.
  If this is nor done, the head of the house is in a pe ition
  to deny knowledge of anything incriminating that is
  found.
     (7) A problem in searching is the accusation of theft
  and looting that can be made against troops. In small
  searches, it may L)e possible to obtain a signed certi1cate
  from the bead of the household that nothing has been
  stolen, l)ut in a large search this iiay be impractical. In
  order to avoid accusations of theft, it may be necessary
  to search in the presence of witnesses.
  (e) tscorts. Wanted persons arc evacuated as soon as
possible. Troops normally undertake this task; therefore,
escort parties
                      transportation
                                       Joust be planned
                                                            in
advance.

## Recommended Reading I: Tile Theory And Tue Threat Books

( uj.ni:i, (roIwE SruAuer (cd). l'te Chinese Communists. IMndon:
Victor ( ;ollaiicz, 19.16.
Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla Warfare, Translated and with an Introduction by BRU;AmER GeNERAl. SAMUEl. B. Giuinrii, USMC (RET.).
New York: Frederick A. Pracgcr, 1961.
MIKSCIIE, F. 0. Secret Forces. London: Faber & Faber, 1950.
OSANKA, IRAN KU N M ARK (ed.). Modern Guerrilla War fare: Fighting
Communist Guerrilla Aloventents, 19411961. With an Introduction
by SAMUEL P. I-lUNTINToN. New York: The Free Press of Glencue,
1962.
PAKET, PF:reR,
and Siiv, JoHN W. Guerrillas in the 1960's. Rev. ed.
New Yoik: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962.
itosiow, V. %'V. l'I,e
Stages of Feonomic (iro'wth: A
NonCon:
munist Ma'nifesto. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1960.
ShANNON, LYLE W. (cd). Underdeveloped Areas: /1 Book of Readings and Research. New York: 1-larper & Brothers, 1957.
S,KAusz-I'Ju14:, R0BEKr, et a!. Protracted Conflict: The Communist
Threat in Terms of Strategy. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959.

## Additioiial Selections [Ruin The Marine Corps Gazette

ATKINSON, JAMES I). "American Military l'olicy and Coiiiinunist Unorthodox Warfare." Vol. 42, No. 1 (January, 1958), pp. 2025.
GRii,.ir,i, CoLoNel. SAMUEL B., II. "Guerrilla!" Vol. 34, No. 7 (July,
1950), pp. 4250; No. 8 (August, 1950), pp. 3645.
I IANRAIIAN, GENE Z. "Guerrilla \Varfare." Vol. 40, No. 3 (March,
1956), PP 3 136.
KIN-lNnt, LIeu-I-ENANr CoIoNI:I. \'VhIi.uAt1 it. "Para-Mihitary Warfare."
Vol. 35, No. 3 (March, 1951), pp. 4648.
Soiioii, MA,JOR A. H. " 'Nowhere Yet Everywhere.' " Vol. 42, No. 6
(June, 1958), pp. 3643.
II:
WINNING IN TI IF MOUNTAINSGREECE
Books
CoNmr, I). M. Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece 1)uring World
War ii. Washington, D.C.: Special Operations Research Office, The
American University, for the 1)epartincnt of the Army, 1961.
KENNEOY, ROBERT M. German Antiguerrilla Operations in the Balka'ns,
19411944. 1)eparnnent of the Ariiiy Pamphlet 20243. Washington,.
l).C.: I)cpartnient of the Army, 1954.
Moss, \V. STANLEY. ill Met by Moonlight, New York: The Macmillan
Company, l950.
MONIROSS, LYNN. "The Pohang Guerrilla 1-lunt: l6O() Square, Miles of
lroubJc." Vol. 36, No. I (Jandary, 1952), pp. 1827.

## Iii: V/Inning In Tile Jungi.E---Mai.Ay/\ Hooks

IIAKrI.E'I-r, VERNON. Reju'rt from Malaya. New York: (iiteiioii 11()OlCS,
1955.
CIwcKETI, MAJOIANuuIoNY. Green Beret, Red Star. London: lyrc
and SpottiswoOe, 195-I.
MIENs, RICHARD.'BOt to Kill. London: Faber & Faber, 1959.
Mu.,.ER, HARRY. the (.onnnunist Menace in Malaya. New York:
Frederick A. Praeger, 1954.

## Additional Selcctons From The Marine Corp.V Gazelle

11i.o,u, LmI:u'rENAN:I
Ct,M MANImELI l'iu:voi. "llmc ()ueeim's
'(
Vol. 38, No. 7 (July, i954), pp. 5256.
MEYERS, MAJOR BRUCE I'. "Malaya Jungle Patrols." Vol. 44, No. U)
(November, 1960), p. 2835.

## 1V Losing In Ti-Ie Jungle!Nl)Oci Iina Books

FALl., IJEKNAIw 1$. .itreet Without Joy: Indochina at JYar, 19-161954.
With an Introduction by MARSUALL ANDREWS, l-larrishorg, Pa.: Time
Stackpole Company, 1961.
GMP, Vo. NGUYEk People's War, People's Army: The Vit Cw,,c'
InsurrectiOn Mual for Underdeveloped Countries. Vith a Foreword byRokrflhl.slAN and a biography of Giap by IlINNARI)
11.
New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962.
TANIIAM, GEORGE (. Coniniunist Revolutionary lVarfarc: Tb Victminh in indochina. Frederick A. Praegcr, 1961.

## Additional Selections From The Marine Corps G(Izctlc

RIChARDS, MAJou Guy. "Jungle Patrolling.'' \ToI. 29, No.
I
(Jamuma my,
1945), pp.68?I; No. 2 (February, 1945), pp. 2124.
v,
WX, RlVOLUTION, AND TVRROR
tJSSIA, CUBA, ANt) CYPRUS
Books
AI.Asros, DoRos. Cyprus Guerrilla: Grivas, Makarios and the British.
London: Heinemann, 1960.
(:he Guevara on Guerrilla Warfare. With an Introduction by MAJ0I
I IARRIES-CLICIJY
Pu:1ERS0N, USMCR. New York: Frederick A.
Pracgcr, 1961.
l)lxoN, C. Auiiaia', and I-IEILBRUNN,
OTro. Communist Guerrilla
Warfare. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1955.
MANSFIEI.D, CAIrrAIN %VALTER R. "Marine with the Chetniks." Vol.
30, No.
I (January,
1946), pp. 39; No. 2 (February, 1946), pp.
1520.
VI: SMALL UNITS WIN SMALL WARS
hooks
CLARK, Micii*vi. K. Algeria in Turmoil: A History of the Rebellion.
New York: Frcdcrick A. Praeger, 1959.
I lIIIIWNN, O,'io.
Partisan
Warfare. New York:
Frederick A.
I'raegcr, 1962.
LINEIIAIU;EK, PAUL M. A. Psychological Warfare. 2d ed. New York:
l)tidll, Sloan & Pearce, 1960.
Additional Selections from the Marine Corps Gazette
CARI.SON., CAPTAIN EVANS F. "The Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua."
\'ol. 21, No. 3 (August, 1937), PP. 720.
EnsoN, CAPTAIN MERRIrr A. "The Coco Patrol." Vol. 20, No. 3 (August, 1936), pp. 1823, 3848; No. 4 (November, 1936), pp. 4041,
6072; Vol. 21, No. 1 (February, 1937), pp. 3543, 57-63.
Eii.is, MAJOR E. 11. "Bush Brigades." Vol. 6, No. 1 (March, 1921),
pp 115.
HANNEKEN, MAJOR HERMAN H. "A Discussion of the Voluntario
Troops in Nicaragua." Vol. 26, No. 4 (November, 1942), pp. 120,
24766.
I l.'iuur.,ro, MAJOR SAiauEL M. "The Strategy and Tactics of Small
Wais." Vol. 6, No. 4 (December, 1921), pp. 47491; Vol. 7, No. 1
(March, 1922), pp. 8392.
i'AvEY, Fiasr IJIWIENANT R. A. "The Arab Revolt." Vol. 40, No. 7
(July, 1956), PP 4852.
RILEY, MAJOR DAVID. "French Helicopter Operations in Algeria." Vol.
42, No. 2 (February, 1958), pp. 2126.
UTLEY, MAJOR HAROLD H. "An Introduction to the Tactics of Small
Wars." Vol. 16, No. I (May, 1931), pp. 5053; Vol. 18, No. 2 (August, 1933), pp. 44-48; No. 3 (November, 1933), pp. 4347.
All tile additional selections from the Marine Corps Gazette are available From: University Microfilms, 313 North First Street, Ann Arbor, Michigan.