# Chairman Of The Joint Chiefs Of Staff Instruction

## Defense Response To Chemical, Biological, Radiological, And Nuclear (Cbrn) Incidents In The Homeland

Reference{s):
See Enclosure E for References
1. Purpose. This instruction provides Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
(CJCS) policy guidance and operational instructions for Department of Defense (DoD) response to CBRN incidents in the homeland. For the purposes of this instruction, response refers to those actions necessary to save lives, protect property and the environment, and meet basic human needs after a CBRN
incident has occurred. (reference a)
2. Superseded/Cancellation. CJCSI 3125.01C, 4 June 2012, "Defense Response to Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear (CBRN) Incidents in the Homeland," is hereby superseded.

## 3. Applicability

a. This instruction is applicable to the Joint Staff (JS), the Services, Defense Agencies, Combatant Commands, and the National Guard Bureau
(NGB). It is provided for information and coordination to the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) and the appropriate U.S. Government (USG) departments and agencies.

b. Defense CBRN response operations in the homeland are those conducted within the United States, including the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, the Commonwealth of the Mariana Islands, federally recognized tribal areas, and any territory or possession of the United States or any political subdivision thereof.

c. This instruction does not apply to planning for or conduct of defense support for CBRN incidents on foreign territory that is addressed in reference b.

## 4. Facts And Assumptions A. Facts

(1) CBRN Response is a subset of CBRN Preparedness, which is a subset of domestic All-Hazards Preparedness. CBRN Response focuses on the specialized technical expertise, forces, and equipment needed to respond safely and effectively to the unique initial and residual hazards and effects of a CBRN
incident. Response to a high-yield explosive incident is not addressed in this instruction because a high-yield explosive incident does not generate similar initial or residual hazards and effects.

(2) Defense response to CBRN incidents in the homeland in support of other Federal departments or state, local, or tribal officials will normally be provided under the auspices of Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA)
(reference c). This type of support will normally be provided in accordance with (lAW) referenced for response under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act. Alternatively, support may be provided lAW the National Contingency Plan (NCP) (reference e) or other federal authority.

(3) Department of Defense (DoD) installation commanders will plan for response to and recovery from CBRN incidents on their installations. Planning should address protection of DoD personnel and assets from the effects of a CBRN incident. Installation commanders will maintain at least a basic level of CBRN emergency response capability and procedures to support civil authorities lAW references c, d, e, f, and g.

(4) The DoD has allotted forces, through assignment, allocation, and/or apportionment, primarily for the homeland CBRN response mission. These forces are collectively referred to as the CBRN Response Enterprise (CRE).

Under state control, these National Guard forces consist of Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Teams (WMD-CSTs), CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Packages (CERFPs), and Homeland Response Forces (HRFs). Under Federal control, these forces consist of the Defense CBRN Response Force
(DCRF) with Joint Task Force-Civil Support as its core, and two Command and Control CBRN Response Elements (C2CREs).

(5) U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), in coordination with the Joint Staff, U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), U.S. Transportation Command
(USTRANSCOM), the Services, and the NGB, will conduct comprehensive planning for all CBRN Response Enterprise forces in the USNORTHCOM area of responsibility (AOR) consistent with reference h.

(6) The Secretary of Homeland Security is responsible for coordinating and providing Federal assistance to state and local authorities in response to the consequences of natural or man-made disasters or emergencies, catastrophic events, and terrorist attacks. Normally, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), under the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS), is the primary agency being supported by the DoD during a presidential emergency or major disaster declaration.

(7) The DoD Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Global Campaign Plan will inform USNORTHCOM planning for CBRN response in the homeland, but will remain as separate plans. This planning should emphasize response to three nearly simultaneous, geographically dispersed, significant CBRN incidents, or one catastrophic CBRN incident, and focus on CBRN
response and not long-term recovery operations.

(8) The Chief, National Guard Bureau (CNGB) will coordinate and synchronize the notification and deployment of the non-federalized National Guard (NG) elements that support the CBRN Response Enterprise to mitigate effects of a regional or national CBRN incident.

(9) Any of the forces within the CBRN Response Enterprise may be tasked by the SecDef to support the USG response to CBRN incidents on foreign territory. Decisions regarding the deployment of CRE forces to respond to foreign CBRN incidents will be based on a domestic risk analysis; the considerations outlined in Enclosure D, paragraph 3; and criteria outlined in reference c.

(10) When requested, and approved by the appropriate authorities, DoD forces may provide support to civilian law enforcement missions (e.g., forensics, prevention, or law enforcement investigation activities) led by other Federal departments concurrently with response activities as a result of CBRN
incidents in the homeland lAW references i, j, and k.

(11) CBRN response as described in paragraph 1 is synonymous with CBRN consequence management (CBRN CM) in the foreign context.

## B. Assumptions

(1) Governors will employ CBRN response forces under their control prior to requesting Federal assistance. This includes requesting assistance from other states, normally via the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) process, for those CBRN response forces under state control with inherent regional or multi-state responsibilities.

(2) Additional DoD forces may be required to respond based on the scope and magnitude of the incident.

5. Policy. See Enclosure A.
6. Definitions. See Glossary.

## 7. Responsibilities. See Enclosure B. 8. Interagency Coordination

a. The National Security Council (NSC), supported by the National Security Council Staff, provides national-level policy and guidance on threats impacting the United States. Policy resulting from the NSC's efforts drives national-level planning efforts. The Domestic Resilience Group (DRG) is an interagency policy committee that convenes on a regular basis to develop and coordinate preparedness, response, and incident management policy. The DoD is represented at the DRG by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security (ASD(HD&GS)) and the JS. During an incident, the DRG may be convened by the NSC at DHS's request to evaluate relevant interagency policy issues regarding response, and develop recommendations as may be required. The National Operations Center (NOC) is the primary national hub for situational awareness and operations coordination across the Federal government for incident management. The NOC is a continuously operating multi-agency operations center. The National Response Coordination Center (NRCC) is the FEMA primary operations center, as well as the focal point for national resource coordination. Each of the ten FEMA regions can operate Regional Response Coordination Centers to coordinate regional response efforts and implement local Federal program support until a joint field office (JFO) is established and/ or other key DHS incident management officials can assume their NRF coordination responsibilities. The Incident Command System (ICS), a subset of the National Incident Management System (NIMS), is used at the tactical level.

b. The ASD (HD&GS), under the authority, direction, and control of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)), develops, coordinates, and oversees implementation of DoD policy for DSCA plans and activities. These activities include CERN response in the homeland, and providing recommendations, in coordination with (ICW) CJCS and Commander, USNORTHCOM (CDRUSNORTHCOM)/Commander, USPACOM
(CDRUSPACOM), as appropriate, to the SecDeffor approval.

c. Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the JS will conduct appropriate interagency staff coordination prior to the SecDef approval or authorization to employ DoD forces for CRBN response operations in the homeland.

d. Combatant Commands will include the JS during interagency coordination.

9. Summary of Changes. Administrative update included updates to acronyms, capability statements, and general grammar corrections.

10. Releasabilitv. UNRESTRICTED. This directive is approved for public release; distribution is unlimited on NIPRNET. DOD Components (to include the Combatant Commands), other Federal agencies, and the public, may obtain copies of this directive through the Internet from the CJCS Directives Electronic Library (http://www.dtic.mil/ cjcs_directivesf). JS activities may also obtain access via the SIPR Directives Electronic Library Websites.

## 11. Effective Date. This Instruction Is Effective Upon Receipt.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
JACQu9'fA!:wr, M.; G=, USAF
Vice D:!~~t, Joint Staff

Enclosures
A -Policy
B - DoD Roles and Responsibilities
C - Authorities and Federal Response Plans
D - Considerations
E - References
GL- Glossary
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## Distribution

Distribution A, B, C, plus the following:
Distribution A, B, C, plus the following:

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Department of Transportation ........ 2
Department of the Treasury ........ 2 Federal Bureau of Investigation ........ 2 Federal Emergency Management Agency ........ 2
National Security Council ........ 2
U.S. Coast Guard ........ 2

"OPR for the subject directive has chosen electronic distribution to the above organizations via E-mail. The Joint Staff Information Management Division has responsibility for publishing the subject directive to the SIPR and NIPR Joint Electronic Library Websites."
"OPR for the subject directive has chosen electronic distribution to the above organizations via E-mail. The Joint Staff Information Management Division has responsibility for publishing the subject directive to the SIPR and NIPR
Joint Electronic Library Websites."
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## Enclosure A Policy 1. General A. Federal Preparedness And Response

(1) Federal preparedness for and response to domestic CBRN incidents in support of state, local, tribal and territorial officials or in support of Federal departments and agencies is generally provided as stipulated in references a, d, and e.

(2) DHS is the lead agency (LA) for coordinating Federal incident preparedness and response activities within the United States, to include CBRN incidents, unless it occurs on a DoD installation.

## B. State And Local Preparedness And Response

(1) State and local officials are responsible for preparing for and coordinating the provision of assistance to their populace for domestic emergencies and disasters, including CBRN incidents in the homeland, as stipulated in reference d.

(2) Governors have the authority to deploy and employ NG forces under their control in response to domestic incidents. Following a major or catastrophic CBRN incident, the CNGB will facilitate and deconflict the alert and deployment of the NG elements of the CRE to ensure adequate and balanced NG CRE forces are available for supported govemors. CRE forces such as the WMD-CSTs, CERFPs, and HRFs are deployed and employed under state control unless ordered to federal title 10 active duty. Other NG assets, such as Division Headquarters, may also support a domestic CBRN response.

## 2. Dod Authority

a. References h, 1, and m provide national and DoD strategic guidance for DoD response to CBRN incidents in the homeland.

b. Reference n establishes Combatant Commander responsibilities for planning, supporting, and conducting CBRN Response operations.

c. Reference n provides authorities for CDRUSNORTHCOM and CDRUSPACOM, related to the preparedness, deployment, and employment of DoD CBRN response forces for response to domestic CBRN incidents.

d. Reference c establishes policy and assigns responsibilities for DSCA, including response to CERN incidents in the homeland, and authorizes immediate response authority for providing DSCA, when requested.

## 3. Mission Guidance For Dod Response To Domestic Cern Incidents

a. Incidents at Chemical Weapon Stockpile Sites. Response to incidents at U.S. Army chemical weapon stockpile/destruction sites will be conducted under the provisions of the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program and references d and e. Reference o provides further clarification of responsibilities shared between the U.S. Army and FEMA.

b. DSCA Request Evaluation. Each request for DSCA will be evaluated lAW the six criteria established in reference c.

c. Immediate Response Authority. Federal military commanders, heads of DoD Components, and/ or responsible DoD civilian officials (hereafter referred to collectively as -DoD officials) have Immediate Response Authority to temporarily employ resources under their control as described in reference c.

d. DoD Domestic CERN Response Mission Statement. DoD forces will prepare for and, when directed by the President of the United States or SecDef, conduct CERN response operations in support of civil authorities in the homeland to save lives, protect property and the environment, and meet basic human needs in order to reduce the effects of a CERN incident.

e. Response to Explosive Incidents. Response by DoD forces for high-yield, improvised, or other explosive device incidents that do not produce chemical, biological, or radiological hazards will be provided, as requested and approved, under the provisions and authority of references c and p.

## F. Dod Installation And Base Operations

(1) In the event a CERN incident occurs on or affects a domestic DoD
base or installation, the installation/base commander will immediately report the incident through military channels to inform the Chairman, who may recommend to the SecDef to request assistance from other Federal agencies. Unless directed otherwise by the SecDef or otherwise provided by law, responsibility for security and law and order on a DoD installation remains with the installation. The commander will request and coordinate support through higher HQ and the supported Combatant Commander as required.

Commanders will notify the closest Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) field office immediately to allow for the criminal investigation to commence as soon as possible. The commander has the authority and responsibility to notify state and local officials of the CERN incident when it poses a potential threat outside the installation and may make recommendations to state and local officials on actions that might be taken to protect the public.

(2) Consistent with paragraph 3c of this enclosure, commanders may engage in immediate response actions outside the installation. The President may unilaterally direct the DoD to assist state and local civilian authorities after a domestic CBRN incident, on or off a military installation. JAW reference f, mutual aid agreements between the installation commander and state and local officials outline reciprocal assistance under a prearranged plan. These agreements must be in writing and reviewed by legal counsel. For incidents resulting from a deliberate act, on or off military installations, Department of Justice (DOJ)/FBI is the lead Federal agency for the investigation; however, the commander maintains overall command over the installation.

(3) DoD installations may be required to serve in a base support installation (BSI) or other capacity to support the deployment and employment of DoD CBRN response forces. Additionally, DoD installations may be required to serve as a BSI in support of incoming FEMA or other Federal response assets. Installation forces and tenant commands will normally remain under their respective Service chains of command. Arriving DOD forces will normally be under the command of CDRUSNORTHCOM or CDRUSPACOM, as directed by SecDef and established in the appropriate CJCS deployment order(s). These GCCs may elect to exercise their command authority through designated component, subordinate, or dual status commanders.

(4) DoD installations may host CBRN Response forces or serve as a power projection platform from which forces deploy. These installations must prepare for and remain postured to support the rapid marshaling, staging, and movement of forces to no-notice CBRN incidents and exercises.

## 4. Command Of Dod Forces

a. Pre-Incident Operations. CDRUSNORTHCOM is the lead Combatant Commander to confirm the readiness of assigned, or to coordinate as required with the force providers to ensure the readiness of allocated, CRE forces.

CDRUSPACOM is responsible for confirming the readiness of assigned, or to coordinate as required with the force providers to ensure the readiness of allocated, CBRN forces. Reference n provides additional guidance on preincident command relationships.

b. Response Operations. Except for activities conducted under immediate response authority JAW reference c, USNORTHCOM or USPACOM will be the supported Combatant Command within their respective AOR JAW references m and n in response to a SecDef- approved request for DSCA requiring CBRN
response operations. The DoD will be in support of the NRF primary, cooperating, and coordinating agencies during domestic CBRN response operations, except when executing a CERN response on a Federal installation.

Federal title 10 forces will remain under the mission command of a designated Combatant Commander.

## C. Command Of National Guard Forces

(1) Army and Air National Guard forces, including WMD-CSTs, CERFPs, HRFs, Division HQ, and any NG units allocated to the DCRF or C2CREs, remain under the command of their respective governor unless ordered to federal title 10 active duty. A Dual-Status Commander may be appointed by Federal and State authorities to provide unity of effort for title 10
and Title 32 forces simultaneously employed in the United States in support of civil authorities.

(2) The Adjutant General (TAG) in each state may task-organize NG
units and exercise command and control (C2) over NG forces in state active duty status or serving under the provisions of Title 32, U.S.C.,.

## Enclosuree Dod Roles And Responsibilities

1. General The SecDef and the DepSecDef have the coordinating responsibility within the DoD to provide the overall policy and oversight for DSCA in the event of CERN incidents in the homeland. The CJCS, the Combatant Commanders, the Service Chiefs, the CNGE, and the Directors of the Defense Combat Support Agencies have key roles regarding defense support for CERN
response in the homeland.

## 2. Specific Responsibilities

a. Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) (USD(P)). The USD(P) facilitates the coordination of DoD policy goveming CERN response operations with Federal departments and agencies; state, local, tribal and territorial agencies; and the DoD components, as required.

b. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security (ASD(HD&GS)). The ASD(HD&GS), under USD(P), serves as USD(P)'s primary civilian advisor to the SecDef and USD(P) on CWMD, homeland defense activities, DSCA, and global security-related issues (references c and p).

c. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations /Low Intensity Conflict (ASD(SO/LIC)). The ASD(SO/LIC} supports planning by the ASD(HD&GS) for the contingent use of U.S. counterterrorism and Special Operations Forces in response to terrorist incidents in the homeland.

d. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (ASD(RA)). The ASD(RA}, under the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness
(USD(P&R)), assists the ASD(HD&GS) by providing recommendations, guidance, and support on the use of Reserve Components to perform CERN
response in the homeland.

e. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs (ASD(HA)). The ASD(HA}, under the USD(P&R), assists the ASD(HD&GS) by providing recommendations, guidance, and support for all domestic crisis situations or emergencies that may require health- or medical-related support for CERN
response missions, including situations involving coordination with the components of the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) within the DHS.

## F. Chairman Of The Joint Chiefs Of Staff

(1) Serves as the principal military adviser to the President and the SecDef regarding defense support for CBRN response in the homeland.

(2) Ensures planning is accomplished to provide CBRN response for CBRN incidents in the homeland.

(3) Assesses military installations to ensure that commanders are preparing for and are able to respond to CERN incidents in the homeland.

(4) Advises the SecDef and ASD(HD&GS) on the military readiness impact of requests for domestic CERN response forces.

(5) In coordination with the ASD(HD&GS), oversees the deployment and employment of DoD component resources, except National Guard forces under the control of the govemor, in response to CERN incidents in the homeland.

## G. Service Chiefs

( 1) In support of CERN response operations in the homeland, identify forces with CERN response-specific capabilities and prepare to provide support to the supported Combatant Commander.

(2) As directed, provide forces (to include federal Reserve Components)
capable of conducting CERN response operations in the homeland to the appropriate Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC) and/or Functional Combatant Commander (FCC). This requirement applies to force organization, training and exercise, equipping, and readiness standards established by the GCC.

(3) Exercise and confirm mission readiness of Active and Reserve Component forces assigned andjor allocated to the DCRF, and C2CRE-A and C2CRE-E for their title 10 joint mission annually for active forces allocated for one year, biennially for reserve forces allocated for two years.

(a) U.S. Army. When directed by SecDef, provide forces to the supported GCC (CDRUSNORTHCOM or CDRUSPACOM) for response to CBRN
incidents in the homeland. These forces may consist of, but are not limited to:
specialized units with CERN detection, identification, waming, reporting, protection, and decontamination capabilities; chemical detachments; explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) units; specialized medical units, force protection (FP)
elements; transportation units; logistics activities; *air* assets; mortuary affairs teams; and research capabilities.

(b) U.S. Navy. When directed by SecDef, the Navy will provide forces to the supported GCC for response to CBRN incidents in the homeland.

These forces may consist of, but are not limited to: EOD units, forward deployable medical units, Navy mobile construction units, transportation/maritime assets, logistics activities, air assets, nuclear power and radiological exposure tracking subject matter experts (SMEs), radiological monitoring and tracking equipment, and research capabilities.

(c) U.S. Air Force. When directed by SecDef, provide forces to the supported GCC for response to CBRN incidents in the homeland. These forces may consist of, but are not limited to: CBRN detection, identification, warning, reporting, protection, and decontamination capabilities; hazardous material first responders; EOD units; response-tailored specialty medical assets; FP elements; transportation units; logistics activities; air assets; and medical research capabilities.

(d) U.S. Marine Corps. When directed by SecDef, provide forces to the supported GCC for response to CBRN incidents in the homeland. These forces may consist of, but are not limited to: specialized CBRN teams/units, EOD units, specialized medical units, FP elements, transportation units, logistics activities, and air assets.

(4) When directed by the SecDef and ICW the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), provide CBRN response technical advice and assistance SMEs who possess knowledge of the physical properties, human and environmental effects, hazard control (mitigation and decontamination), and medical prophylaxis and treatments for chemical and biological warfare agents, highly toxic industrial materials, radiological materials, and effects of nuclear detonations. SMEs will be prepared to deploy to the supported GCC, DTRA
Operations Center, or other designated locations and will be made available to participate in DTRA CBRN Military Advisory Team (CMAT) related training, exercises and after action activities.

(5) Ensure installations that host CRE forces or serve as a power projection platform from which CRE forces deploy, are prepared for, and remain postured to, support the rapid marshaling, staging, and movement of CRE forces to no-notice CBRN incidents and exercises including after action activities.

h. Chief, National Guard Bureau
(1) Advise the SecDef through the Chairman regarding the employment of non-federalized NG capabilities.

(2) As the channel of communications with state NG forces, coordinate the notification and employment of non-federalized NG CBRN response capabilities on a regional or national basis, to include: Joint Task Force (State)
(JTF-State), WMD-CSTs, CERFP, HRFs, Division HQ, NG Response Forces, Joint Incident Site Communications Capability, and Expeditionary Medical Support.

(3) Facilitate and coordinate with other Federal agencies, the Services, Combatant Commands, and the states for any NG personnel and resources for contingency operations and DSCA, including National Special Security Events and Special Events (NSSEs/SEs).

(4) Provide support to supported Combatant Commands in exercising capabilities for DoD CBRN response in the homeland operations.

(5) When directed by SecDef, coordinate with individual states to provide National Guard forces to the supported GCC for response to CBRN
incidents in the homeland. These forces may consist of, but are not limited to, specialized chemical and biological units with CBRN detection, identification, warning, reporting, protection, and decontamination capabilities; chemical detachments; explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) units; specialized medical units; FP elements; transportation units; logistics activities; air assets; and research capabilities.

(6) When directed by the SecDef, support transition of state active duty or Title 32 National Guard forces to federalized title 10 status for DSCA in coordination with individual states, and the Army National Guard and Air National Guard.

(7) Coordinate with CDRUSNORTHCOM and CDRUSPACOM, through the respective services, to establish arrangements to sustain common training, equipment, exercise, and certification requirements for Active and Reserve Component CRE forces.

(8) Provide CDRUSNORTHCOM, and CDRUSPACOM, operational information gathered from governors, TAGs of states, the Commanding General of the DC National Guard, and other state civil authorities responsible for domestic preparedness and response to natural and man-made disasters.

(9) Provide regionally focused planning guidance to assist Homeland Response Force efforts to integrate NG CBRN response capabilities into NG, State, and FEMA Regional Response Plans.

## 1. The Joint Staff (1) Director For Intelligence (J-2)

(a) Serve as the Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) for Joint Staff
(JS) coordination with the interagency intelligence community in support of CBRN threat assessments and response operations in the homeland.

(b) Provide the Combatant Commands and JS with intelligence support to assist in planning, preparation, and execution of CBRN response operations in the homeland.

(c) Coordinate on the development of plans and policies relating to DoD intelligence support to CBRN response operations in the homeland.

## (2) Director For Operations (J -3)

(a) Serve as JS OPR for defense support to CBRN response operations in the homeland.

(b) Maintain a CJCS instruction for defense response to CBRN
incidents in the homeland.

(c) Coordinate on the development of plans and policies relating to DoD assets involved in CBRN response operations in the homeland, including recommending appropriate DoD augmentation of the Domestic Emergency Support Team.

(d) When directed by the SecDef, direct deployment of forces, capabilities, and specialized assets to augment the supported GCC to conduct CBRN response operations in the homeland. This requirement applies to operations, training events, and exercises.

(e) Collect observations from CBRN response operations, training, events, and exercises IAW references q and r.

(f) Develop execution orders and, ICW ASD(HD&GS), process requests for assistance for CBRN response operations in the homeland.

(g) Coordinate with the Services, Combatant Commanders, other joint force providers, joint force managers, and DoD agencies to identity and recommend conventional joint sourcing solutions.

(h) Serve as the JS doctrine sponsor for Joint Publication (JP) 3-27, Homeland Defense; JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities; reference bb;
and JP 3-42, Joint Explosive Ordnance Disposal.

## (3) Director For Logistics (J -4)

(a) Coordinate the development of plans and policies to sustain DoD
assets involved in CBRN response operations in the homeland, with a particular focus on specialized CBRN, medical, mortuary affairs, transportation, and engineer assets.

(b) Review the logistics plans and programs of the GCCs to determine logistic adequacy and feasibility for domestic CBRN response operations.

## (4) Director For Strategic Plans And Policy (J-5)

(a) Incorporate planning guidance for CBRN response operations in the Homeland into the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.

(b) Oversee development of joint policy, strategy and plans for CBRN response operations in the homeland, to include the use of DoD assets.

(c) Represent the JS and the Chairman in interagency working groups and other interagency forums concerning coordination and guidance for CBRN response operations in the homeland.

(d) Serve as the JS doctrine sponsor for references.

## (5) Director For Command. Control, Communications, And Computer/Cyber (J-6)

(a) Serve as JS OPR for joint communications systems interoperability guidance.

(b) Track deployment and readiness of CJCS-controlled communications systems assets.

## (6) Director For Joint Force Development (J-7)

(a) Coordinate with the Services, Combatant Commands, the JS, and Combat Support Agencies to develop joint doctrine for CBRN response in the homeland.

(b) Coordinate joint training and education requirements to prepare the Joint Force to conduct current and emerging joint CBRN response operations.

(c) Coordinate, in collaboration with Combatant Commands, Services, NGB, Combat Support Agencies, and the JS, the development of Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) tasks, conditions, and measures to reflect all aspects of CERN response operations.

(d) Provide support to Combatant Command Joint Exercise Program events, including coordination of joint force support and expertise regarding CERN response operations.

(e) Supports the CJCS IAW reference r; leads the Chairman' s Joint Lessons Learned Program (JLLP); and, through the phases of discovery, validation, resolution, evaluation, and dissemination, facilitates the institutionalization of lessons learned and best practices across the joint force.

(f) Conducts program management and executive sponsorship of the Joint Lessons Learned Information System {JLLIS), the DoD system of record for lessons learned. Through JLLIS, supports the J-3 and the joint force in observation collection from CERN response operations, training, events, and exercises.

(g) In coordination with the Services, Combatant Commands, Combat Support Agencies, and JS, incorporate CERN response operations into concept development efforts.

## (7) Director For Force Structure. Resources. And Assessment (J-8)

(a) Coordinate capability development requirements for CERN
response operations in the homeland, to include requirements validation, equipment acquisition and modernization, program objective memorandum build and budgetary reviews, and submitting resourcing requirements for Joint Capability Board/ Joint Requirements Oversight Committee recommendation.

(b) Assess exercise and operational feedback to identify future CERN response operation requirements and capabilities for the GCCs, Services, and Combat Support Agencies.

(c) Provide assistance, as requested, to develop or assess objectives for CERN response operations exercises, joint concept technology demonstrations, and experiments.

(d) In coordination with the Services and Combatant Commands, review and revise CERN response tasks, as appropriate, into the UJTL.

## J. Commander, U.S. Northern Command (Cdrusnorthcom)

(1) Plan and integrate the DoD' s response support to the NRF
Emergency Support Function (ESF) Coordinators and primary agencies for CERN incidents in the homeland within the USNORTHCOM AOR.

(2) Plan for CERN response operations in the homeland and support to civil authorities accounting for regional, state, and local-level activities.

Planning will incorporate active and reserve component forces as military responders that, to the extent applicable and practical, are familiar with state emergency plans, and state resources, capabilities, and emergency response activities. Reception, staging, onward movement, and integration and logistical implications for these forces must also be planned for.

(3) ICW JS, USPACOM, USTRANSCOM, Services, and NGB, establish and maintain common standards and tasks in order to support training, equipping, exercising, and certification requirements for Active and Reserve Component CRE forces.

(4) Coordinate and exercise internally and with USG departments and agencies IAW reference n. Execute after action reviews to capture lessons learned.

(5) Confirm the readiness of forces assigned or allocated to CDRUSNORTHCOM, for CERN response operations IAW reference n.

(6) Be prepared to respond to three nearly simultaneous, geographically dispersed, significant CERN incidents, or one catastrophic CERN incident within the Continental United States (CONUS), Puerto Rico, U.S. Virgin Islands, and Alaska.

(7) When directed by the SecDef, CDRUSNORTHCOM will execute CERN response operations in support of civil authorities IAW reference n to reduce the effects of deliberate and inadvertent CERN incidents within the Continental United States (CONUS), Puerto Rico, U.S. Virgin Islands, and Alaska.

(8) When directed by the SecDef to support other Combatant Commands' CERN response operations, CDRUSNORTHCOM will conduct risk analysis and provide recommendations to mitigate CERN response risks within the Continental United States (CONUS), Puerto Rico, U.S. Virgin Islands, and Alaska.

k. Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command
(CDRNORAD). Provide initial aerospace and maritime warning and assessment of attacks that could result in CERN incidents for the CONUS, Alaska, and Canada.

## 1. Commander, U.S. Pacific Command (Cdruspacoml

(1) Plan and integrate the DoD' s response support to the ESF
Coordinators and primary agencies for CERN incidents in the homeland within the USPACOM AOR.

(2) Conduct exercises lAW reference n to assess and develop capabilities for CERN response operations in the homeland within the USPACOM AOR. Execute after action reviews to capture lessons learned.

(3) When directed by the SecDef to support other Combatant Commands' CERN response operations, CDRUSPACOM will conduct risk analysis and provide recommendations to mitigate CERN response risks within the USPACOM AOR.

(4) IdentifY and coordinate resourcing of CERN response forces with force providers. Train and employ a C2 element capable of planning and integrating the DoD' s support to the coordinating agency for domestic CERN
response operations in Hawaii and the U.S. territories and possessions in the USPACOM AOR.

(5) Coordinate and exercise internally and with USG departments and agencies lAW reference n.

(6) When directed by the SecDef, CDRUSPACOM will execute CERN
response operations in support of civil authorities lAW reference n to reduce the effects of deliberate and inadvertent CERN incidents within Hawaii and the U.S. territories and possessions in the USPACOM AOR.

(7) Maintain C2 capabilities sufficient to C2 CERN response operations for a significant CERN incident within the USPACOM AOR.

(8) Plan on employing assigned forces for the initial response to CERN
incidents in the homeland within the USPACOM AOR.

(9) Confirm the readiness of forces assigned or allocated to CDRUSPACOM for CERN response operations lAW reference n.

(10) Plan and coordinate with CDRUSNORTHCOM and CNGE for requesting and employing CONUS-based CRE capabilities within the homeland portion of the USPACOM AOR.

(11) Plan and coordinate with CNGB for requesting and employing Hawaii and Guam NG CRE capabilities within the homeland portion of the USPACOM AOR.

m. Commanders of the other Geographic Commands. When directed by the SecDef, provide support to CDRUSNORTHCOM or CDRUSPACOM for CBRN
response in the homeland.

## N. Commander. U.S. Transportation Command (Cdrustranscom)

(1) When directed by the SecDef, provide deployment, employment, and redeployment common-user and commercial air, land, and sea transportation;
terminal management for DoD forces engaged in CBRN response operations;
and patient movement and aerial refueling in the homeland.

(2) When directed by the SecDef, provide the DoD global patient movement, ICW Combatant Commands, through the Defense Transportation System and IAW USTRANSCOM patient movement policy. Decontamination of patients must be performed prior to transport to prevent the potential spread of contamination. Consideration should be given to the specific characteristics and treatment requirements of a given infectious disease to assess whether movements with commercial or organic bio-isolation systems should be authorized.

(3) Be prepared to move selected forces and identified elements of other government agencies to support SecDef-directed CBRN response operations in the homeland.

(4) Provide liaison officers (LNOs) and other assistance to the supported Combatant Commanders and ESF Coordinators and primary agencies as determined by USTRANSCOM.

(5) Provide transportation and mobility forces to supported Combatant Commander as required for training, exercises, and operations.

(6) Facilitate inter-theater and assist with intra-theater movement planning for formerly contaminated and subsequently decontaminated personnel, equipment, and/or remains.

o. Commander. U.S. Special Operations Command (CDRUSSOCOM).

When directed by the SecDef, provide military resources and forces to a designated Combatant Command as required for training, exercises, and operations in support of civil authorities to reduce the effects of deliberate and inadvertent CBRN incidents within the homeland.

## P. Commander, U.S. Strategic Command (Cdrusstratcom)

(1) Synchronize planning for DoD CWMD efforts ICW other Combatant Commands, the Services, and, as directed, appropriate USG agencies. The phrase "synchronize planning'' pertains specifically to planning efforts only and by itself does not convey authority to execute operations or direct execution of operations.

(2) When directed by the SecDef, conduct space operations and space control support of CBRN response operations in the homeland for the supported Combatant Command.

## Q. Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (Dial

(1) Provide appropriate intelligence support to DoD leadership and the Combatant Commanders.

(2) Maintain liaison with non-DoD intelligence agencies.

r. Director, Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA). Be prepared to provide planning, engineering, acquiring, testing, fielding, and supporting global net-centric information and communications solutions as required.

DISA support functions fall within the following nine broad core areas:
communications, C2 capabilities, information assurance, computing services, interoperability, testing and standards, Global Information Grid enterprise services, engineering, and acquisition.

## S. Director. Defense Logistics Agency (Dla)

(1) Ensure the supported Combatant Command and supporting commands receive timely and effective logistics support in planning, exercising, and executing CBRN response operations in the homeland.

(2) Deploy DLA Initial Response Teams and other support elements as required.

(3) Report information on support, resources, and requests for assistance to CDRUSNORTHCOM and CDRUSPACOM for situational awareness.

(4) Direct Liaison Authorized (DIRLAUTH) with the military Services, Combatant Commands, other Defense Agencies, and JS to conduct planning, exercises, and execution of CBRN response missions.

## T. Director. Defense Threat Reduction Agency (Dtra)

(1) Serve as the primary DoD agency for providing CBRN technical advice and assistance support within the DoD, and ICW Joint Staff, to USG
departments and agencies in support of planning, training, exercises, and operations for CBRN response in the homeland.

(a) DIRLAUTH with the military Services, Combatant Commands, Defense Agencies, and JS to coordinate and integrate requested CBRN
response exercises and planning support.

(b) Provide modeling, predictions, assessments, publications, training, lessons learned, analysis, and other support, as requested. Serve as the designated technical operations center for the Interagency Modeling and Atmospheric Assessment Center lAW reference t.

(c) Provide a single point of contact, through the DTRA Operations Center, to a 24/7 WMD/CBRN technical reach-back and situational awareness facility for DTRA support.

(d) Provide LNOs and other assistance to supported Combatant Commands and other DoD components, as required.

(2) When approved by the SecDef, task organize and deploy DoD CBRN
technical advice and assistance forces as part of a CMAT to provide CBRN technical advice and assistance to the supported Combatant Commander, and other DoD components, in support of CBRN response operations in the homeland.

(3) ICW USSTRATCOM and the JS, sponsor, as appropriate, studies, joint concept technology demonstrations, and conferences to support development and acquisition of CBRN response doctrine, training, and equipment.

(4) Provide domestic CBRN response training to DoD components and, where required, coordinate with JS/J-7.

(5) Provide information on assigned capabilities, assets, and/or units capable of conducting CBRN response operations to the Defense Readiness Reporting System. Provide this information not later than 1 October annually.

Indicate whether capabilities are in deployable units or fixed facilities.

Information will include capability and capacity statements, Service branch, deployment configuration (personnel and equipment), deployment timing information, unit location, and support requirements. State capacity statements in measureable terms such as throughput (e.g., number of ambulatory personnel that can be decontaminated during a specific time period and the duration that the throughput can be sustained). Capability statements should include medical, engineer, and other support units that are specifically equipped to operate in a CBRN environment.

u. Director, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (DNGA). The DNGA
supports Incident Awareness and Assessment (IAA) by providing timely, relevant, and accurate geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) products, data, services, and support for CBRN response operations. GEOINT includes imagery, imagery intelligence, and geospatial information.

(1) Provide imagery collection support from national and commercial assets as appropriate.

(2) Provide GEOINT release and disclosure guidance and decisions to maximize support to domestic CBRN CM operations.

(3) Deploy GEOINT resources as requested.
(4) Provide GEOINT support in compliance with all regulatory guidance.
(5) Respond to authorized and approved requests for GEOINT from DoD
and non-DoD USG organizations.

(6) Direct Liaison Authorized (DIRLAUTH) with the military Services, Combatant Commands, other Defense Agencies, and JS to conduct planning, exercises, and execution of CBRN response missions.

(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

## Enclosure C Authorities And Federal Response Plans

1. Extemal Authorities and Plans. Several documents provide authority and guidance for DoD support of civil authorities. In addition to the National Response Framework (NRF), many Federal departments and agencies have statutorily derived response and contingency plans to coordinate activities and to execute successfully a cohesive, integrated response to CERN incidents in the homeland. A brief summary of these authorities and plans is provided.

a. National Response Framework. Referenced organizes the Federal govemment, in partnership with local, tribal, and state governments and the private sector, to complete both strategic and operational plans for the incident scenarios specified in the National Preparedness Guidelines. The NRF is comprised of the core document, the Emergency Support Function (ESF)
Annexes, Support Annexes, Incident Annexes, and Partner Guides.

(1) Core Document. The core document describes the framework that guides the national response, roles and responsibilities, response actions, response organizations, and planning requirements to achieve an effective national response to any incident that occurs, including CERN.

(2) Emergency Support Function (ESF) Annexes. Reference d groups Federal resources and capabilities into 15 functional areas that are most frequently needed in a national response. ESF 5 has been changed to Information and Planning. ESF 14 was replaced by the National Disaster Recovery Framework. The NRF states that the removal of contaminated debris will be a joint effort between ESF #3 and ESF #10.

(3) Support Annexes. The support annexes describe essential supporting aspects that are common to all incidents (e.g. financial management, volunteer and donations managements, etc.).

(4) Incident Annexes. The incident annexes address the unique aspects of how agencies respond to seven broad incident categories (biological, nuclear /radiological, etc.).

(5) Partner Guides. The partner guides provide ready references describing key roles and responsibilities for local, tribal, state, Federal, and private sector partners.

b. National Incident Management System (NIMS). On 28 February 2003, the President issued reference u, which directed the Secretary of Homeland Security to develop and administer NIMS. This system provides a consistent nationwide template to enable Federal, state, tribal, and local governments, the private sector, and nongovernmental organizations to work together to prepare for, prevent, respond to, and recover from the effects of incidents regardless of cause, size, location, or complexity. This consistency provides the foundation for utilization of NIMS for all incidents, ranging from daily occurrences to incidents requiring a coordinated Federal response.

c. National Contingency Plan (NCP). Reference e provides the organizational structure, procedures, and authority for the Federal government to respond to discharges of oil and releases of hazardous substances, pollutants, and contaminants, including radiological, chemical, and biological agents. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the United States Coast Guard have the responsibility for the NCP. The NCP may be activated in the initial stages of a CBRN incident, especially when the nature of the agent is unknown. Under the NCP, the DoD will be the on-scene coordinator for incidents involving DoD facilities and vessels and for removal response authority with respect to incidents involving DoD military weapons and munitions, or weapons and munitions under the jurisdiction, custody, or control of the DoD. ESF #10, -Oil and Hazardous Materials Response, places the response mechanisms of the NCP within the NRF coordination structure when both plans are implemented concurrently. The EPA publishes the NCP.

d. Presidential Policy Directive (PPD)-8. Reference a clarifies that the heads of all executive departments and agencies with roles in prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery are responsible for national preparedness efforts, including department-specific operational plans, as needed, consistent with their statutory roles and responsibilities. The PPD-8
definition of response is the underlying context for CBRN response operations in the homeland.

2. Internal Authorities and Plans. In addition to the external authority documents addressed in paragraph 1, the following summary addresses DoD-
specific authorities and plans.

a. Unified Command Plan (UCP) (reference m). Reference m is the document approved by the President that sets forth basic guidance to all unified Combatant Commanders. It establishes their missions, responsibilities, and force structure; delineates the general geographic AOR for GCCs; and specifies functional responsibilities for FCCs. The SecDef submits the UCP to the President every two years. This plan tasks CDRUSNORTHCOM
and CDRUSPACOM to provide support of civil authorities, to include DSCA, as directed, and redefines geographic AORs with all U.S. territories within these two geographic commands. CDRUSNORTHCOM is also responsible for providing CBRN-CM assistance and support to U.S. and Allied partner authorities within the USNORTHCOM AOR. In addition, this plan assigns CDRUSSTRATCOM responsibility for synchronizing planning for DoD CWMD
efforts ICW other Combatant Commands, the Services, and, as directed, appropriate USG agencies.

b. On 29 November 2005, the DepSecDefmandated (references) that the DoD adopt and implement policies and procedures consistent with the National Response Plan (NRP) (the predecessor to the NRF), NIMS, and Incident Command System (ICS). The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System and its successor, Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) system, provide existing planning processes for Joint Force Commander (JFC) plan development that are consistent with NIMS and the DHS integrated Planning System. Joint Doctrine provides the JFC with C2 organization and procedures that are compatible with NIMS and ICS. Preparedness for CERN response operations requires an understanding of the NRF, NIMS, and the ICS.

Response to CERN incidents will require the JFC to operate in compliance with the NRF and in coordination with local, state, tribal, and Federal response resources and capabilities.

c. On 21 June 2011, the SecDef approved reference n. This Execute Order
(EXORD) supports the execution of CERN response for CERN incidents in the homeland in support of civilian authorities.

d. On 7 June 2013, the SecDef approved reference o. This EXORD
supports the execution of Defense Support of Civil Authorities operations in response to disasters and emergencies in the homeland.

(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

## Enclosured Considerations

1. Intelligence. Reference 1 and DoD regulations limit DoD intelligence components to the collection of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence.

Use of Defense Intelligence Component assets in support of CBRN response operations must be specifically approved by the SecDef. The use of these intelligence assets for non-intelligence purposes is called Incident Awareness and Assessment (IAA) and is authorized for the following missions: situational awareness, damage assessment, evacuation monitoring, search and rescue, CBRN assessment, and hydrographic survey. When IAA collection occurs within the homeland, it should be done IAW references o and u.

2. Information. DHS has the overall responsibility for the collection, analysis, and dissemination of information on domestic operating environments. The NRF is applicable to all Federal departments and agencies that have primary jurisdiction for or participate in operations requiring a Federal response. The NRF establishes national-level coordination structure, processes, and protocols that are designated to implement the specific statutory authorities and responsibilities of various departments and agencies in particular contingency scenarios. The NRF establishes multi-agency coordinating structures at the national, regional, and field levels. At the national level, this process is coordinated by the NOC and its component element, the NRCC. At the regional level, information sharing occurs at the Regional Response Coordination Center. At the field level, a JFO acts as a temporary Federal facility. A defense coordinating officer (DCO) serves as the single DoD point of contact for information sharing at the JFO. Information relevant to CBRN response operations will be provided to the DoD through the DCO from the NRF primary and coordinating agencies. The on-scene military commander may request information as such to fulfill his or her specific requirements.

3. Availability and Timeliness of CBRN Response Capabilities. DoD units possess capabilities that can provide assistance during a CBRN incident in the homeland. However, response times and resources vary. In addition to the six request evaluation criteria listed in reference c, CBRN response planners should consider the type and severity of the incident to assess: 1) the specific capabilities requested, 2) the availability of DoD units with those capabilities,
3) the ability to deploy those units within the time span of the incident response that they will be needed, and 4) whether contracted support can fulfill mission requirements if DoD units are unavailable (reference v). Several DoD
units may be committed already to potential or current worldwide military operations or held in reserve for other purposes. Based on adjusted priorities, the President or SecDef could redirect these units to CBRN response operations in the homeland. The required time to disengage and redeploy the units and the impact on ongoing military operations are key planning considerations.

4. Media Impact. The media will play an important role in reporting and shaping public opinion conceming a CERN incident and DoD response operations. Any DoD response must take into account possible media repercussions. Public affairs guidance will generally be developed in coordination with the interagency core group (described in the NRF Public Affairs Support Annex) and the Incident Advisory Council and forwarded to the JFO Joint Information Center to manage information provided to the media.

OASD(PA) is the point of contact for all media inquiries conceming DSCA.

5. Medical. During a CERN incident, medical and public health needs will be significant factors. NDMS serves as the primary Federal level medical response element controlled by Health and Human Services. Other DoD medical capabilities extemal to NDMS could be requested to support ESF 8 additional requirements.

6. Domestic Transportation Assets. Transportation of DoD and other Federal personnel and assets to a CERN incident in the homeland will be critical to a successful response. DoD transportation assets are in high demand and require planning time. All transportation modes should be considered to support CERN response operations. A SecDef exception to policy will be required to transport non-DoD personnel on military aircraft. Unlike overseas deployments, ground transportation may be a viable option for CONUS
situations. Under NRF ESF # 1, Transportation, the Department of Transportation's (DOT's) Movement Coordination Center will coordinate deployment of Federal resources, including DoD resources, to support CERN
response operations in the homeland.

7. Reserve Component Forces. Reserve Component (RC) forces are capable of conducting and supporting a wide range of CERN response operations in the homeland. RC forces comprise a significant portion of the CERN response force packages designated in reference n and these forces will often be the first DoD forces operating as part of an integrated CERN response with local and state frrst responders. Additional RC forces that may be needed to respond to a CERN incident that are not part of the CRE are accessed following established GFM procedures.

8. Presidential Declaration. A major disaster declaration or an emergency declaration by the President JAW reference w authorizes Federal assistance to affected states through use of the Disaster Relief Fund. Once in effect, the DoD
may be reimbursed by FEMA for approved requests for assistance. Until a Presidential Declaration, the DoD may only provide assistance under immediate response authority, reciprocal support agreements, or other specific authorities.

9. Law Enforcement Activities. lAW title 18, USC, section 1385 (The Posse Comitatus Act), DoD title 10 personnel supporting CBRN response operations in the homeland will not directly or actively engage in civilian law enforcement activities unless otherwise directed by the SecDef and/ or the President, or as provided by exceptions authorized by various U.S. laws. Further guidance on Defense Cooperation with Civil Law Enforcement Officials is provided in reference i.

10. Fiscal Arrangements. Funding of DoD units participating in CBRN
response support to other government agencies will be lAW applicable law and within the established procedures in references c and w. If the President invokes reference x, FEMA issues mission assignments through coordination with the DCO at the JFO. Each DoD component is responsible for capturing and reporting incremental costs to Service or Defense agency comptrollers. All incremental DoD costs should be captured by providers of support for reimbursement by the supported agency. Standard interagency billing procedures should be followed. Only the SecDef has the authority to waive reimbursement.

11. Use of Force. Rules for the use of force (RUF) for U.S. forces will be in compliance with reference y. DoD forces will coordinate with on-scene primary agency and other security personnel to ensure common understanding of DoD
RUF. The Combatant Commander will notify the SecDef via the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of any use of force issues that cannot be resolved. The supported Combatant Commander may request additional mission-specific use afforce guidance as necessary. Combatant commanders can submit requests for additional supplemental RUF through the Chairman to the SecDef, as required. Units with assigned weapons may deploy with weapons stored; however, weapons will not be carried during CBRN response operations in the homeland unless authorized by the SecDef.

(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

## Enclosuree References

a. Presidential Policy Directive (PPD)-8, 30 March 2011, "National Preparedness"

b. CJCSI 3214.01 Series, "Defense Support for Chemical, Biological,
Radiological and Nuclear Incidents on Foreign Territory"
c. DoD Directive 3025.18,29 December 2010, wfCh #1 21 Sep 2012, "Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA)"

d. "National Response Framework" (NRF), May 2013
e. 40 CFR, Part 300, September 1994, "National Contingency Plan"
f. DoD Instruction 6055.17, 13 January 2009,w/Ch #1 19 Nov 2010, "DoD
Installation Emergency Management (IEM) Program"
g. DoD Instruction 3020.52, 18 May 2012, "Department of Defense Installation
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and High-Yield Explosive (CBRNE)
Preparedness Standards"
h. CJCSI 3110.01 Series, "Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) FY 2010"
i. DoD Instruction 3025.21, 27 February 2013, "Defense Support of Civilian
Law Enforcement Agencies"
j. Title 10 U.S.C., Chapter 18, "Military Support for Civilian Law Enforcement
Agencies"
k. USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3407-12, 29 March 2012, "Defense Support to
Prevent a CBRNE Attack in the Homeland"
1. "2015-2017 Guidance for Employment of the Force" (GEF), 3 February 2015
m. "Unified Command Plan," Change 1, 12 September 2011
n. CJCS CBRN Response EXORD, 21 June 2011
o. CJCS Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) Standing EXORD, 7 Jun
2013
p. DoD Directive 5111.13, 16 January 2009, "Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs (ASD(HD&ASA))"
q. CJCSM 3500.03 Series, "Joint Training System"
r. CJCSI 3150.25 Series, "Joint Lessons Learned Program"
s. DepSecDef memorandum, 29 November 2005, "Implementation of the National Response Plan and National Incident Management System"
t. Memorandum of Agreement between the Defense Threat Reduction Agency and the Office of Operations and Planning, Department of Homeland Security,
4 September, 2014, "Interagency Agreement For An Assisted Acquisition Between The Defense Threat Reduction AgencyfUSSTRATCOM Center For Combating WMD And The Department of Homeland Security Office Of Operations Coordination And Planning"
u. DoD Regulation 5240.1-R, 7 December 1982, "Procedures Governing the Activities of DoD Intelligence Components that Affect United States Persons"
v. JP 3-40,31 October 2014, "Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction"
w. DoD Regulation 7000.14-R, volume 11A, May 2001, "Reimbursable Operations, Policy and Procedures, and volume 12, January 2002, Special Accounts, Funds and Programs"
x. Title 42, United States Code, sections 5121 et seq., "The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act" as amended y. CJCSI 3121.01 Series, "Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force for US Forces"

## Supporting Documentation

Memorandum of Understanding between the Department of the Army and the Federal Emergency Management Agency, Department of Homeland Security, 23 March 2004, "Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program (CSEPP)"
CJCSI 5120.02 Series, "Joint Doctrine Development System"
HSPD-5, 28 February 2003, "Management of Domestic Incidents"
Title 10, U.S.C., Chapter 1209, section 12304
CJCS Memo (CJCS CM) CM-0028-14, 4 February 2014
JP 3-41, 21 June 2012, "Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Consequence Management"
DoD Instruction 3025.22, The Use of the National Guard for Defense Support of Civil Authorities"
JP 4-06, 12 October 2011, "Mortuary Affairs"
CSCSM 3130.03, 18 October 2012, "Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX)
Planning Formats and Guidance"
NSPD-17 /HSPD-4, September 2002, "National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction" HSPD-18, 31 January 2007, "Medical Countermeasures against Weapons of Mass Destruction"
HSPD-21, 18 October 2007, "Public Health and Medical Preparedness"
Executive Order 12333, 4 December 1981, "United States Intelligence Activities"
Executive Order 13527, 30 December 2009, "Establishing Federal Capability for the Timely Provision of Medical Countermeasures Following a Biological Attack"
"The Strategy for Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities,"
February 2013
"Department of Defense Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction," June 2014
USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3500-14, 30 September 2014, "Civil Support"
USPACOM CONPLAN 5002-13, December 2013, "Homeland Defense" USTRANSCOM memorandum, 14 March 2008, "Policy for Patient Movement of Contaminated, Contagious or Potentially Exposed Casualties"
"National Disaster Recovery Framework" (NDRF), September 2011
JP 1-02, "Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms"

## Glossary Part I-Abbreviations And Acronyms

Items marked with an *asterisk* (*) have definitions in PART II

AOR ASD(HD&GS)
Area of Responsibility
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense
and Global Security
C2
C2CRE
C4
CBRN
CDRUSNORTHCOM
CDRUSPACOM CDRUSTRANSCOM
CDRUSSOCOM
CDRUSSTRATCOM
CERFP CJCS CJCSI
CMAT CNGB CONPLAN
CONUS
CRE
CWMD
Command and Control
Command and Control CBRN Response Element
Command, Control, Communications, and Computers Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Commander, U.S. Northern Command Commander, U.S. Pacific Command Commander, U.S. Transportation Command
Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command
Commander, U.S. Strategic Command
CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Package
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction
CBRN Military Advisory Team Chief, National Guard Bureau
Concept Plan; operations plan in concept format
Continental United States
CBRN Response Enterprise
Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction
DCO
DCRF
DepSecDef DHS DIRLAUTH
DISA DLA DNGA
DoD
DOE DOJ DOT
DRG
DSCA
DTRA
Defense Coordinating Officer
Defense CBRN Response Force
Deputy Secretary of Defense Department of Homeland Security Direct Liaison Authorized
Defense Information Systems Agency Defense Logistics Agency
Director, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
Department of Defense Department of Energy Department of Justice
Department of Transportation Domestic Resilience Group Defense Support of Civil Authorities Defense Threat Reduction Agency
EOD EPA ESF EXORD
Explosive Ordnance Disposal
Environmental Protection Agency
Emergency Support Function
Execute Order
FBI
FEMA
FP
FSRT
Federal Bureau of Investigation Federal Emergency Management Agency
Force Protection
Fatality Search and Recovery Teams
Geographic Combatant Commander Geospatial Intelligence
Global Force Management
GCC
GEOINT
GFM
Homeland Defense
Department of Health and Human Services
Homeland Response Force Homeland Security Presidential Directive
Headquarters
HD
HHS HRF HSPD
HQ
In Accordance With
Incident Command System In Coordination With
lAW
res
ICW
Joint Field Office Joint Lessons Learned Information System
Joint Lessons Learned Program
Joint Staff Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
Joint Task Force
JFO
JLLIS
JLLP
JS JSCP
JTF
LA
LNO
Lead Agency Liaison Officer
Mission Assignment
MA
NCP
NCTC
NDMS NDRF NGB NIMS NJOIC NOC
NRCC
National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution
Contingency Plan
National Counterterrorism Center National Disaster Medical System
National Disaster Recovery Framework
National Guard Bureau
National Incident Management System
National Joint Operations and Intelligence Center
National Operations Center (DHS) National Response Coordination Center
NRF
NSC
NSCS NSPD
National Response Framework
National Security Council
National Security Council Staff National Security Presidential Directive
OASD(PA)
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public
Affairs)
OPR OSD
PA PPD
Office of Primary Responsibility
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Public Mfairs Presidential Policy Directive
RC RFA
RUF
Reserve Component(s)
Request For Assistance Rules for the Use of Force
SecDef
Secretary of Defense
TAG
The Adjutant General
UCP UJTL
u.s.c.
USD(P) USD(P&R)
Unified Command Plan Universal Joint Task List
United States Code
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness
USG USNORTHCOM USPACOM USSOCOM
USSTRATCOM
United States Govemment
U.S. Northern Command U.S. Pacific Command U.S. Special Operations Command
U.S. Strategic Command
VA
Veterans Administration
WMD WMD-CST
Weapons of Mass Destruction Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Team

## Part Ii-Definitions

Unless otherwise stated, the terms and definitions contained in this glossary are for the purposes of this instruction only.

Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear consequence management --
Actions taken to plan, prepare, respond to, and recover from chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear incidents. Also called CERN CM. (JP 1-02.

SOURCE: JP 3-41)
CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Package -- A National Guard task organized unit of 197 personnel capable of performing casualty search and extractions, emergency medical services, fatalities search and recovery, patient decontamination, and C2. Also called CERFP.

Civil authorities -- Those elected and appointed officers and employees who constitute the govemment of the United States, the governments of the 50
states, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, U.S.

possessions and territories, and political subdivisions thereof. (JP 1-02.

SOURCE: JP 3-28)
CBRN Military Advisorv Team -- A deployable element managed by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency to deliver technical and doctrinal expertise, consequence of execution assessments, and CBRN hazard prediction analysis capabilities to assist with crisis action planning for resolving CBRN situations.

Also called CMAT.

Complex catastrophe -- Any natural or man-made incident, including cyberspace attack, power grid failure, and terrorism, which results in cascading failures of multiple, interdependent, critical, life-sustaining infrastructure sectors and causes extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage, or disruption severely effecting the population, environment, economy, public health, national morale, response efforts, and/or govemment functions.

Coordinating agency -- An agency that supports the incident management mission by providing the leadership, staff, expertise, and authorities to implement critical and specific aspects of the response. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP
3-28)
Defense Coordinating Officer -- Department of Defense single point of contact for domestic emergencies who is assigned to a joint field office to process requirements for military support, forward mission assignments through proper channels to the appropriate military organizations, and assign military liaisons, as appropriate, to activated emergency support functions. Defense Coordinating Officers are assigned to USNORTHCOM and are stationed at each FEMA Region office on a full time basis. Also called DCO. (JP 1-02. SOURCE:
JP 3-28)
Defense support of civil authorities-- Support provided by U.S. Federal military forces, Department of Defense civilians, Department of Defense contract personnel, Department of Defense component assets, and National Guard forces (when the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the governors of the affected states, elects and requests to use those forces in Title 32, U.S.C., status) in response to requests for assistance from civil authorities for domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other domestic activities, or from qualifYing entities for special events. Also called DSCA. Also known as civil support. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: DODD 3025.18)
Domestic emergencies -- Civil defense emergencies, civil disturbances, major disasters, or natural disasters affecting the public welfare and occurring within the United States and its territories. See also natural disaster. (JP 1-02.

SOURCE: JP 3-27)
Domestic Emergency Support Team -- A specialized interagency team composed of subject-matter experts from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Homeland Security /Federal Emergency Management Agency, Department of Defense, Department of Energy, Department of Health and Human Services, and the Environmental Protection Agency. Also called DEST. Domestic Resilience Group -- A standing interagency committee that focuses on the development of national level preparedness, response, and incident management policy. Also called DRG.

Dual-Status Commander -- A dual-status commander is a commissioned officer serving on active duty and duty in, or with, the National Guard of a State that is appointed as the commander of Federal forces by Federal authorities and as commander of State National Guard forces by State authorities. This should be the usual and customary C2 arrangement when the Armed Forces and the National Guard are employed simultaneously in support of civil authorities in the United States. Also called DSC. (Source:
Public Law 112-81)
Emergency Management Assistance Compact -- Is a mutual aid agreement between states and territories of the United States. It enables states to share resources, including state's National Guard forces, to manage any emergency disaster duly declared by the Govemor including natural, man-made and other disasters, and enemy attack. Also called EMAC. (Source: Public Law 104-321)
Emergency support functions -- A grouping of govemment and certain privatesector capabilities into an organizational structure to provide the support, resources, program implementation, and services that are most likely to be needed to save lives, protect property and the environment, restore essential services and critical infrastructure, and help victims and communities retum to normal, when feasible, following domestic incidents.

Also called ESFs. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-28)
Homeland Response Force-- A National Guard task organized unit of 577
personnel capable of performing C2, security, casualty search and extraction, emergency medical services, and mass casualty decontamination. Also called HRF.

Incident management -- A national comprehensive approach to preventing, preparing for, responding to, and recovering from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3- 28)
Joint Field Office-- A temporary multiagency coordination center established at the incident site to provide a central location for coordination of Federal, state, local, tribal, nongovemmental, and private-sector organizations with primary responsibility for incident oversight, direction, or assistance to effectively coordinate protection, prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery actions. Also called JFO. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-28)
National Disaster Medical System-- A coordinated partnership between the Departments of Homeland Security, Health and Human Services, Defense, and Veterans Affairs established for the purpose of responding to the needs of victims of a public health emergency. Also called NDMS. (JP 1-02. SOURCE:
JP 3-41)
National Incident Management System -- A national crisis response system that provides a consistent, nationwide approach for Federal, state, local, and tribal govemments; the private sector; and nongovemmental organizations to work effectively and efficiently together to prepare for, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents, regardless of cause, size, or complexity. Also called NIMS. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-41)
National Operations Center-- The primary national hub for domestic incident management operational coordination and situational awareness. Also called NOC. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-28)
National Response Framework-- An interagency guide that establishes a comprehensive, national, all hazards approach to domestic incident response.

Also called NRF.

Presidential disaster declaration -- Unilaterally issued by the President, in accordance with the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, in response to a governor's request or if the emergency involves an area or facility for which the Federal govemment exercises exclusive or preeminent primary responsibility and authority.

U.S. Army Division Headquarters-- the Army Division Headquarters dent management mission by providing the uniquely capable of performing the Domestic All-Hazard Response mission and providing modular capability as an Army force or Joint Force Land Component Command headquarters for smaller scale contingencies.

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