# Security And Mobility Support May 2020

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution unlimited. This publication supersedes ATP 3-39.30, dated 30 October 2014.

# Headquarters, Department Of The Army

This publication is available at the Army Publishing Directorate site
(https://armypubs.army.mil) and the Central Army Registry site
(https://atiam.train.army.mil/catalog/dashboard).

## Security And Mobility Support Contents

Page
PREFACE........ iv
INTRODUCTION ........ v
Chapter 1
SECURITY AND MOBILITY SUPPORT TO ARMY OPERATIONS ........ 1-1
The Security and Mobility Support Discipline ........ 1-1 Assured Mobilty Framework ........ 1-3 Operational Environment ........ 1-4 Support to Army Operations ........ 1-4 Support to Decisive Action ........ 1-6 Employment Considerations ........ 1-20 Intergrating Police Intelligence Operations ........ 1-23
Chapter 2
RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE ........ 2-1
Military Police Support to Information Collection ........ 2-1 Reconnaissance ........ 2-2 Surveillance ........ 2-7 Other Information Collection Methods Supporting Security and Mobility Support .... 2-9
Chapter 3
SUPPORT TO MOBILITY ........ 3-1
Movement and Maneuver ........ 3-1 Mobility ........ 3-1 Breaching........ 3-2 Clearing ........ 3-5 Gap Crossing ........ 3-7
Passage of Lines ........ 3-9 Main and Alternate Supply Route Regulation and Enforcement ........ 3-9
Chapter 4
SUPPORT TO SECURITY ........ 4-1
Security Operations ........ 4-1 Area Security ........ 4-1 Local Security ........ 4-21
Chapter 5
SUPPORT TO POPULACE AND RESOURCES CONTROL ........ 5-1
Section I - Populace Control ........ 5-1 Roles and Responsibilities for Populace Control ........ 5-1 Dislocated Civilian Operations........ 5-3 Military Police Support to Dislocated Civilian Operations ........ 5-4 Noncombatant Evacuation Operations ........ 5-7 Military Police Support to Noncombatant Evacuation Operations........ 5-8

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for pubic release; distribution unlimited.

## Preface

ATP 3-39.30 is aligned with the Military Police Corps Regiment's FM 3-39 and provides Army military police commanders, staffs, and Soldiers at all echelons a foundation for the conduct of security and mobility support in support of decisive action. To comprehend the doctrine contained in this manual, readers must first understand the nature of unified land operations as described in ADP 3-0. Readers of this manual must fully understand the Army profession and moral principles described in ADP 6-22, the fundamentals of the operations process found in ADP 5-0, the principles of command and control as described in ADP 6-0, the protection principles discussed in ADP 3-37, the conduct of Army operations outlined in FM 3-0, and military police operations addressed in FM 3-39.

The principal audience for ATP 3-39.30 is military police commanders and staff, but all members of the profession of arms may use this manual to facilitate an understanding of the capabilities tasks of military police. Commanders and staffs of a joint task force or multinational headquarters should also refer to applicable joint or multinational doctrine concerning the range of military operations and joint or multinational forces. Trainers and educators throughout the Army will also use this manual.

Commanders, staffs, and subordinates ensure that their decisions and actions comply with applicable United States, international, and in some cases host-nation laws and regulations. Commanders at all levels ensure that their Soldiers operate in accordance with the law of war and the rules of engagement. (See FM 6-27.)
ATP 3-39.30 uses joint terms where applicable. Selected joint and Army terms and definitions appear in both the glossary and the text. Terms for which ATP 3-39.30 is the proponent publication (the authority) are italicized in the text and are marked with an asterisk (*) in the glossary. Terms and definitions for which ATP 3-39.30 is the proponent publication are boldfaced in the text. For other definitions shown in the text, the term is italicized and the number of the proponent publication follows the definition.

ATP 3-39.30 applies to the Active Army, Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States and United States Army Reserve unless otherwise stated.

The proponent of ATP 3-39.30 is the United States Army Military Police School. The preparing agency is the Assistant Chief of Staff/Directorate of Training and Doctrine (DOTD), Maneuver Support Center of Excellence (MSCoE). Send comments and recommendations on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) to Commander, MSCoE, ATTN: ATZT-OPD-D, 14000 MSCoE Loop, Suite 270, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri
65473-8929;
by e-mail to usarmy.leonardwood.mscoe.mbx.mpdoc@mail.mil; or submit an electronic DA Form 2028.

## Introduction

ATP 3-39.30 examines the military police discipline of security and mobility support and how military police support Army, joint, and multinational forces by conducting the tactical tasks and activities associated with security and mobility support. ATP 3-39.30 provides military police commanders, staffs, and Soldiers a foundation for the conduct of security and mobility support across the range of military operations. The focus is primarily on those tactical tasks and activities (facilitated by military police technical capabilities) that enable the elements of combat power. It describes how military police are employed to protect the force and noncombatants and how they facilitate the preservation of the commander's freedom of action. The security and mobility support discipline enables and is enabled by the other military police disciplines of police operations and detention operations. Each discipline is seen through a policing or corrections lens and is driven by the integrating function of police intelligence. Police intelligence operations (PIO) support commanders at all levels through the integration of police intelligence activities within all military police operations. The disciplines are interdependent areas of expertise within the Military Police Corps Regiment.

The tasks in this discipline are focused on those military police tasks that are typically performed in a tactical environment, and while military police are the proponent for many of these tasks, some of these tasks may also be performed by other members of the combined arms team. Military police conducting tasks within the security and mobility support discipline are typically in a support role. These tasks are primarily focused on applying military police combat power in support of the movement and maneuver and protection warfighting functions; however, security and mobility tasks also support the conduct of populace and resources control
(PRC).
Military police perform many security and mobility support tasks and activities in the support area, making them a significant enabler to the sustainment warfighting function. Security and mobility support is enabled and facilitated by the technical tasks embodied in the military police disciplines of police operations and detention operations. These disciplines and the integrating function of PIO are described in-depth in other military police manuals and will be referred to when they are critical to discussions supporting the discipline of security and mobility support. ATP 3-39.30 includes significant changes. It


Increases the discussion of military police security and mobility support to Army operations.

Describes military police security and mobility support throughout the operational framework.

Describes how PIO is integrated throughout security and mobility support planning, preparation,
execution, and assessment.

Provides additional information on reconnaissance and surveillance.

Establishes an appendix on the route classification system and the types of route signing.

Adds an appendix on fundamental considerations, formats, and instructions for developing the security and mobility support (physical, security, antiterrorism, populace and resource control, and area security) appendixes to an operations order.
This ATP is divided into five chapters and four appendixes:


Chapter 1 describes the military police discipline of security and mobility support and how it is
affected by and affects the operational environment. While focused on the movement and
maneuver and protection warfighting functions, this discipline finds application among other
warfighting functions and provides support across the range of military operations.

Chapter 2 examines how military police conduct reconnaissance and surveillance to collect
information and monitor avenues of approach, potential landing zones, and drop zones.

Chapter 3 focuses on military police support to mobility operations as part of the movement and maneuver warfighting function.

## Introduction


Chapter 4 focuses on military police support to security operations as part of the protection warfighting function. Military police security and mobility tasks and activities associated with security operations are focused on area and local security and associated tasks and activities.

Chapter 5 describes how military police support to PRC can minimize civilian interference in military operations while also ensuring the security of dislocated civilians (DCs). The chapter
further describes how security and mobility facilitates resources control. Resources control
regulates the movement or consumption of material resources, mobilizes material resources, and denies materiel to the enemy. Resources controls target specific sectors of a nation's material wealth and economy, including natural resources, food and agriculture, immoveable property,
finances, and cultural and critical infrastructure. This includes the specifics associated with logistics security (LOGSEC) and associated crime prevention typically performed by criminal investigation division (CID) personnel.

Appendix A describes how assessment is an essential, continuous activity that occurs throughout
the operations process and how assessment assists commanders and staffs in comparing forecasted
outcomes to events to determine the effectiveness of security and mobility support tasks.

Appendix B discusses the options for DC camps and the role of military police in this portion of
PRC.

Appendix C describes the route classification system and the types of route signing.

Appendix D provides fundamental considerations, formats, and instructions for developing the security and mobility support (area security, physical, security, antiterrorism, and populace and resource control) appendixes.
Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine nouns and pronouns do not refer exclusively to men.

## Chapter 1 Security And Mobility Support To Army Operations

Military police support to Army operations is complex and requires an in-depth understanding of the operational environment, the commander's intent, the concept of operations, and the capabilities and limitations of military police in support of the operation. Military police provide support to each of the Army warfighting functions while performing their three disciplines (police operations, detention operations, and security and mobility support). Through these disciplines, military police units provide commanders an array of tailorable and focused capabilities across the range of military operations. The military police discipline of security and mobility support is focused on protecting the force and noncombatants and on preserving the commander's freedom of action. This chapter describes how the security and mobility support discipline enables mobility, security, and PRC for the joint force commander. All of the military police disciplines and their relationships and support to decisive action are detailed in FM 3-39.

## The Security And Mobility Support Discipline

1-1. The security and mobility support discipline is primarily comprised of the military police technical capabilities and tactical tasks that support mobility operations (with a focus on movement over maneuver), security (with a focus on area and local security that includes the significant tasks of antiterrorism [AT], physical security, and LOGSEC), and PRC (with a focus on the control and security of DC, noncombatant evacuation, resources, and infrastructure). Mobility operations are a part of the movement and maneuver warfighting function. Security tasks fall within the protection warfighting function or reinforce the protection warfighting function.

1-2. The security and mobility support discipline enables and is enabled by the other military police disciplines of police operations and detention operations. Each discipline is facilitated by the integrating function of PIO. PIO support commanders at all levels through the integration of police intelligence activities within all military police operations. See ATP 3-39.20 for more information on PIO.

1-3. During security and mobility support, military police units provide combat power to protect the command headquarters, equipment, and services that are essential for mission success, as prioritized by the joint force commander or geographic combatant commander (CCDR). Missions or tasks grouped under the security and mobility support discipline have applicability across the range of military operations in support of decisive action as described in FM 3-39. While many of these missions and subordinate tasks may also be performed by other members of the combined arms team, they are often best performed by military police. This is especially true in support areas and along ground lines of communication (LOC) throughout the area of operations (AO) or as operations transition from large-scale combat and return to competition or cooperation.

1-4. Military police possess technical skills and capabilities that are developed through training, education, and experiential learning gained through policing and corrections missions associated with the police operations and detention operations disciplines. See table 1-1, page 1-2, for major subtasks that are associated with security and mobility support.

Security and Mobility Support
Provide support to mobility.
Provide support to breaching. Provide support to clearing. Provide support to gap-crossing.
Develop a traffic control plan.
Conduct main/alternate supply route regulation and enforcement. Support passage of lines.
Conduct straggler movement control.
Conduct area security.
Conduct base/base camp defense. Conduct critical asset security.
Conduct protective services. Conduct response force operations.
Conduct lines of communication security.
Conduct checkpoints.
Support port area and pier security.
Conduct area damage control.
Conduct reconnaissance and surveillance.
Collect information. Conduct route reconnaissance. Conduct area reconnaissance. Conduct zone reconnaissance. Conduct civil reconnaissance.
Conduct patrols.
Apply antiterrorism measures.
Identify potential terrorist threats and other activities.
Reduce vulnerabilities to terrorist acts and attacks.
React to terrorist incidents.
Implement physical security procedures.
Establish checkpoints.
Control access to equipment, installations, materials, and documents.
Employ intrusion detection devices.
Provide military working dogs.
Detect explosives. Detect narcotics.
Conduct military working dog patrols.
Support populace and resources control.
Maintain curfews.
Restrict movement in specified areas. Require travel permits.
Resettle specific portions of a population. Require licenses. Implement and enforce regulations or guidelines.
Conduct checkpoints and inspection stations.
Implement amnesty programs.
Implement ration controls.
Conduct logistics security.
Conduct threat assessment. Develop criminal intelligence.
- Logistics security threat assessment.
- Criminal activity threat assessment. - Port vulnerability assessment. - Coordinate with other agencies.

## Assured Mobilty Framework

1-5. *Assured mobility* is a frameworkof processes, actions, and capabilitiesthat assures the ability of a force to deploy, move, and maneuver where and when desired, to achieve the commander's intent
(ATP 3-90.4). The assured mobility fundamentals (predict, detect, prevent, avoid, neutralize, and protect)
support the implementation of the assured mobility framework. This construct is one means of enabling a force to achieve the commander's intent. Assured mobility emphasizes proactive mobility and countermobility (and supporting protection) actions and integrates them in accomplishing this. Although primarily aligned with the movement and maneuver warfighting function, assured mobility has linkages to each of the warfighting functions through complementary and reinforcing capabilities. The fundamentals of assured mobility are described in ATP 3-90.4.

1-6. The assured mobility framework is applied at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war to facilitate freedom of action for the joint force and options for the joint force commander. While engineers are the principal staff integrator for assured mobility, other staff sections play critical roles in ensuring the effective application of mobility, countermobility, and associated protection tasks. Examples include the regulation of traffic in an AO or the handling of DCs to enable movement and maneuver. While primarily used to facilitate protection, a movement corridor (see ADP 3-37) is also a tool to facilitate movement and maneuver. The senior engineer staff officer's role within assured mobility is to integrate the warfighting functions within the framework of assured mobility. Military police commanders and provost marshals (PMs)
understand and use the framework to assist in the planning and execution of missions performed as part of support to security and mobility and security support.

1-7. The assured mobility framework follows a continuous cycle of planning, preparing, executing, and assessing decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations; it hinges on the application of six fundamentals that enable friendly forces to move and maneuver while denying the enemy the ability to do so. Commanders and staffs implement assured mobility by applying the six fundamentals across the planning and integrating processes. The military police focus within the fundamentals of assured mobility includes


Predict. This fundamental includes the integration of police intelligence during intelligence
preparation of the battlefield. Recognizing that combat (or natural/man-made disasters) may cause a populace to be an obstacle to movement, planners must estimate what assets (military police and other) will be needed to address DCs, stragglers, and other mobility- and security-related issues.

Detect. Military police have a unique role in the collection plan. Unlike many of the other
collection assets, military police see things through a policing perspective; therefore, they provide
valuable insights into the synchronization and integration of surveillance assets and reconnaissance missions. Given their police training and experience, military police may be able to inform commander's critical information requirements (CCIR) that other forces may neglect.

Prevent. This fundamental is focused toward countering an adversary's ability to affect the
movement and maneuver of friendly forces. While this is a broad requirement, mitigating the
effects of civilian interference on movement or maneuver, such as those caused by civilian
populations residing in or transiting the AO, is also included as part of prevention. Increased
awareness of the population's activities and movement patterns prevents the populace from
interfering with movement, thus affecting movement control priorities and traffic control plans.

Avoid. This fundamental is used if prevention fails; it includes the development of branches and
sequels to plans to avoid impediments to mobility (to include traffic congestion, crowds, and DCs). Adjusting movement and traffic control plans and rerouting traffic may be necessary to avoid, or at least mitigate, the effects of interference or obstacles.

Neutralize. Civilian interference (such as traffic congestion, crowds, and DCs) is mitigated by the
employment of military police, civil affairs (CA), and other assets and capabilities. This could
include providing support to civil administration and to public safety and transportation; managing
civil disturbances and crowds; establishing roadblocks, obstacles, and alternate routes; creating
bypasses (including the employment of tactical bridging) to enhance traffic flow, persuading the populace to avoid certain areas at certain times; and providing public information to facilitate a controlled response to a catastrophic event or to counter adversary efforts to manipulate the population.

Protect. Protection is a key component of assured mobility. Protection tasks in support of assured mobility include establishing movement corridors (see ADP 3-37) to facilitate trafficability and
movement through a given AO; protecting critical sites (such as bridges on main supply routes [MSRs]); and establishing convoy support centers, patrol bases, or other critical locations along
MSRs, routes, or road networks. Military police should also consider the applications of
countermobility and survivability as they apply to area and local security.

## Operational Environment

1-8. The *operational environment* is a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander (JP 3-0). An operational environment includes physical areas (air, land, maritime, and space) and the information environment
(cyberspace domain). The *information environment* is the aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information (JP 3-13). See ADP 3-0 for additional information on the operational environment.

1-9. Understanding the operational environment is essential to the successful execution of operations.

Commanders must thoroughly understand and appreciate the changing nature of an operational environment.

An operational environment involves not only the interaction of local variables, but also the interplay of global or regional influences (political, social [crime], economic) that impact conditions and operations.

1-10.  To gain this understanding, commanders normally consult with specialists in each area. Military police are one of the specialists available to add breadth and depth to the overall understanding of the operational environment. The nexus between criminal and irregular threats has grown closer and stronger. Criminal elements have been categorized as a subcategory of irregular threats. Their organizational structure, tactics, and activities are not exclusive to one type of irregular threat. Most crime occurs in populated urban areas where disorder and the fear of physical or fiscal harm affects civilian populations, marginalizes security forces, destabilizes governments, and delegitimizes military operations. The skills and technical abilities honed through the performance of policing and corrections missions give military police a unique perspective of the operational environment as seen through a policing and corrections lens.

1-11. Irregular and criminal threats continue to attack, manipulate, exploit, and intimidate vulnerable and frustrated populations to discredit governments, gain power and influence, drive disorder and instability, and generate illicit profits. Crime, disorder, and the fear of crime continue to be persistent, debilitating factors that contribute to instability across the operational environment, especially in densely populated urban areas and in weak, failing, and failed states. See FM 3-39 for additional information on criminal threats.

## Support To Army Operations

1-12. The Army conducts operations across multiple domains and the information environment. An operation is a sequence of tactical actions with a common purpose or unifying theme (JP 1). Unified land operations is the Army's contribution to unified action. *Unified land operations* is the simultaneous execution of offense, defense, stability, and defense support of civil authorities across multiple domains to shape operational environments, prevent conflict, prevail in large-scale ground combat, and consolidate gains as part of unified action (ADP 3-0). Unified land operations is executed through decisive action and guided by command and control.

1-13. In accomplishing its strategic role to prevent conflict, Army forces may conduct operations to deter adversary actions that are contrary to United States (U.S.) interests. Operations to prevent conflict may require the deployment or repositioning of credible forces in a theater to demonstrate the willingness to fight if deterrence fails (see FM 3-0). Operations to prevent are characterized by actions to protect friendly forces and indicate the intent to execute subsequent phases of a planned operation. Military police support operations to prevent by improving security within partner nations, enhancing international legitimacy, gaining multinational cooperation, and influencing adversary decision making.

1-14. All Army operations are multidomain, unfolding across not only land, maritime, air, space, and cyberspace domains but also the electromagnetic spectrum and the information environment. These operations include airborne and air assault operations, air and missile defense, fires, aviation, cyberspace electromagnetic activities, information operations, space operations, military deception, and information collection.

1-15. During large-scale combat operations, Army forces focus on the defeat and destruction of enemy ground forces as part of the joint team. Army forces close with and destroy enemy forces on any terrain, exploit success, and break their opponent's will to resist. Large-scale combat operations are extensive joint combat operations in terms of the scope and size of the forces committed and are conducted as a campaign aimed at achieving operational and strategic objectives. *Large-scale ground combat operations* are sustained combat operations involving multiple corps and divisions (ADP 3-0). Large-scale combat operations, including multiple domain aspects, incur significant operational risk, synchronization complications, capabilities convergence considerations, and high operational tempo. Army forces attack, defend, conduct stability tasks, and consolidate gains to attain national objectives.

1-16. During large-scale ground combat operations, commanders conduct decisive action to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. This involves the orchestration of many simultaneous unit actions in the most demanding of operational environments. The scale, scope, tempo, and lethality of large-scale ground combat exacerbates the dynamic and uncertain nature of war, delaying or making precise cause-and-effect determinations difficult. Military police enable Army forces to defeat enemy organizations, control terrain, protect populations, and preserve the joint force by conducting tasks from all three military police disciplines (police operations, detention operations, and security and mobility support). See FM 3-0 for additional information on multidomain extended field and large-scale combat operations.

1-17. During periods of armed conflict, military police continue to protect forces, populations, and critical infrastructure and assets. Military police employ manned/unmanned teams, to include military working dog
(MWD) teams, to conduct the reconnaissance and surveillance of bases, routes, facilities, and storage sites to detect, deter, defeat, or delay enemy forces, criminals, irregular threats, and bypassed conventional forces.

1-18. In addition, military police (in coordination with domestic and foreign law enforcement authorities, joint partners, and Army counterintelligence offices) expand their security and mobility support operations to protect power projection platforms to ensure that friendly forces are able to conduct movement and maneuver. Military police also conduct physical security inspections, crime prevention assessments, and vulnerability assessments to determine the effectiveness of security measures and to identify potential gaps in security posture. Along with the inspection and assessment results, military police provide unit commanders and facility managers police intelligence assessments (enabled by biometric and forensic data)
to strengthen crime prevention, physical security, and antiterrorism measures.

1-19. *Consolidate gains* are activities to make enduring any temporary operational success and to set the conditions for a sustainable security environment allowing for a transition of control to legitimate authorities
(ADP 3-0). Consolidation of gains activities occur in portions of an AO where large-scale ground combat operations are no longer occurring. The consolidation of gains is not separate or isolated from large-scale ground combat operations; consolidation of gains activities are a form of exploitation inherent to large-scale ground combat operations. Army forces conduct consolidation of gains throughout the range of military operations. Military police who support the consolidation of gains focus their priorities toward the performance of the six primary stability tasks as the security situation stabilizes. See FM 3-0 for additional information on the consolidation of gains.

1-20. Military police execute missions as part of an integrated combined arms effort through decisive action.

While some tasks are executed as part of a purely functional unit activity, all executed tasks and missions must be conducted within the intent and in support of the overall combined arms effort. The technical capabilities and tactical tasks associated with the security and mobility support discipline can be applied across the range of military operations. Major operations, crisis response, and contingency operations have the potential for close combat. These operations rely on the integration of military police and other enablers to ensure the movement and maneuver (mobility) of friendly forces while denying freedom of action to adversaries (countermobility).

1-21. The military police approach to the operational environment facilitates the synchronization of military police operations in support of combined arms through the framework of the warfighting functions. The focus of security and mobility support is on the movement and maneuver and protection warfighting functions, although it does have a role in the other warfighting functions as well. The fundamental relationships depicted in figure 1-1 provides a framework for understanding security and mobility support to decisive action.

## Support To Decisive Action

1-22. *Decisive action* is the continuous, simultaneous execution of offensive, defensive, and stability operations or defense support of civil authorities tasks (ADP 3-0). Similarly, military police support to decisive action requires the performance of all three military police disciplines when assisting the commander by providing a lethal, mobile, and flexible force that permits the commander to quickly concentrate efforts and resources to counter the enemy. Planning military police support to decisive action is complex and requires an in-depth understanding of the operational environment, the commander's intent, the concept of operations, and the capabilities and limitations of military police in support of the operation. While the tasks of decisive action are discussed separately in the following paragraphs, the tasks may be executed simultaneously. The relative weight of any one task in relation to the others is determined by the mission. Military police planners must continually assess and predict shifts in mission requirements and in the required military police capability as operations transition between phases or as conditions change within the operational environment. See appendix A for additional information of assessments.

1-23. Tasks associated with the security and mobility support discipline are the primary means through which military police support the movement and maneuver warfighting function. Typically, military police support movement that enables tactical maneuver. They conduct mobility support operations to conserve the maneuver force's combat power and ensure its efficient movement throughout the battlefield. Military police units enhance force momentum by controlling the movement of forces across the AO to make the most efficient use of the space and time necessary to generate mass and speed while denying enemy maneuver. By enhancing the ability to maneuver, military police units accelerate the concentration of combat power, increasing the velocity and tempo of the force necessary to exploit critical enemy vulnerabilities. Military police are trained, equipped, and organized to neutralize enemy harassing attacks in the consolidation and support areas, thereby negating the need to divert maneuver forces and preserving combat power for the decisive operation.

1-24. Several security and mobility support tasks are directly related to protection warfighting. The scheme of protection in an operational environment includes protecting personnel (U.S. forces, unified action partners, and noncombatants) and critical assets. In addition to safeguarding bases, base camps, and other critical fixed sites; securing routes; and protecting forces within sustainment areas, protection considerations are applied in support of battle positions, combat outposts, and critical host-nation (HN) infrastructure support. Current battlefields require that commanders know survivability tactics and techniques that provide this protection. See ADP 3-37 for additional information on protection.

1-25. Security and mobility support operations provide a distribution of military police forces throughout the AO, conducting aggressive patrolling and military police reconnaissance to protect units, critical facilities, and high-risk personnel (HRP) and to secure and control civilian populations. These patrols bring military police Soldiers into contact with a host of friendly units, civilians, and other governmental and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The information obtained from these contacts, whether passively or actively collected, contributes significantly to the information collection effort. In addition to information collection, security and mobility support operations often promote stability as PRC is conducive to a lawful and orderly environment. Police operations (see ATP 3-39.10) and associated skills and capabilities inherent in that function provide the fundamental base upon which military police functions are framed and conducted.

1-26. Planning is essential to the proper application of military police combat power. Understanding how the security and mobility support discipline and its tasks and capabilities typically align with the elements of decisive action assists planners in arraying military police forces to support mission accomplishment. The ability to rapidly transition between the elements of decisive action is essential. Military police planners provide planning considerations to the supported commander and staff at each echelon and advise on military police capabilities, methods of employment, and limitations. See FM 3-39 for more information on military police participation in the planning process.

## Security And Mobility Support To Offensive Tasks

1-27. Seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative to gain physical advantages and achieve definitive results is the essence of the offense. (For detailed information on offensive tasks and security operations, see FM 3-90-1.) The military police discipline of security and mobility support is primarily focused on those military police capabilities that enable movement and maneuver (mobility operations), provide protection (security operations), and support PRC.

1-28. The primary types of offensive operations are movement to contact, attack, exploitation, and pursuit.

The purposes of the offense are to


Secure decisive terrain.

Deprive the enemy of resources.

Gain information.

Deceive and divert an enemy force.

Fix an enemy force in position.

Disrupt an enemy force attack.

Set the conditions for successful future operations.
1-29. Military police units supporting the offense perform a wide range of tasks within the context of the security and mobility support discipline. (For information regarding the military police disciplines of police operations and detention operations, refer to ATP 3-39.10, FM 3-39, FM 3-63, and other supporting military police doctrine.) Military police leaders conducting security and mobility support tasks while supporting the offense must


Exercise disciplined initiative within the commander's intent.

Anticipate selective elements of the offensive force to pause, defend, resupply, or reconstitute while other forces attack.

Anticipate changes in the tempo of the operation and prepare the military police effort toward that
action.

Understand how operations affect security functions in a joint security area or along LOC and protect vital command and control and sustainment infrastructure or systems.

Consider the type and size of the AO, the LOC security requirements, the threat, and the plans for detainee operations (to include how DC may affect the movement of forces).

Understand the IPB process, the CCIR, and information requirements and then integrate police
intelligence activities in all military police operations to support those requirements.

Coordinate the care and security of DCs with the HN or multinational forces during PRC.

Assist the commander in speeding the shift of forces to support the main effort and enhance overall trafficability.

Anticipate transition to a pursuit or exploitation by positioning military police forces to support follow-on forces.

Support the movement of maneuver forces, enabling their ability to mass and maintain momentum. Military police protect command and command nodes such as the main command post and the tactical command post. The security and mobility support tasks assist in orchestrating the efforts
to mass, sustaining the offensive move. Military police quickly attack enemy reconnaissance forces throughout the AO. Likewise, military police maintain surveillance, provide early warning,
and attack the enemy with supporting and organic fires, ensuring the freedom of action of the force.

Know the location and composition of probable response forces or tactical combat forces (TCFs)
to coordinate and assist in securing the support areas and the joint security area.
1-30. Typical military police missions associated with security and mobility support conducted during the offense may include


Securing the movement of resources to ensure that commanders receive the forces, supplies, and equipment needed to support offensive operations.

Conducting area security to detect, deter, and defeat Level I and Level II threats and to delay Level
III threats operating within the AO by

Disrupting and countering threat intelligence agents and special forces, criminals, and
irregular threats reconnaissance and surveillance of friendly forces.

Denying threat special forces', criminals', and irregular threats' abilities to attack or conduct
other actions intended to harm friendly forces and or disrupt deployment and sustainment
operations.

Preventing the theft of military equipment and supplies by criminals or other threat actors.

Mitigating, solving, and preventing traffic congestion, traffic accidents, and other safetyrelated problems along MSRs and alternate supply routes (ASRs).

Targeting threat actors, groups, organizations, and networks to prevent their ability to cause harm to forces, populations, and critical infrastructure; drive disorder and instability; and impede freedom of action

Conducting security and mobility support tasks, such as support for gap crossings (including rivercrossings), passage-of-lines, breaching operations, secure convoys, and HRP security.

Providing main and ASR regulation and enforcement, enabling freedom of movement.

Supporting PRC to reduce the impact of DCs on maneuver forces.

Integrating police intelligence activities throughout military police operations to enhance
situational understanding and provide a holistic common operational picture.

Supporting forcible-entry operations (planning for detainee operations).

Supporting cordon-and-search tasks (outer cordon security and managing detainees).

Supporting movement corridor operations.

Integrating patrol and explosive detection dogs to clear routes and roadways of hazards.
1-31. The provost marshal or military police commander at the appropriate echelon integrates military police capabilities to support offensive tasks (see FM 3-39 for additional information on provost marshal responsibilities). Military police units prepare for offensive operations by conducting early linkups with the maneuver units they support. As military police units prepare for offensive tasks, they focus on inspections, combined arms rehearsals, support to the movement of the combined arms force into position for the attack, and the evacuation and control of captured and detained individuals. For detailed information on offensive tasks and security operations, see FM 3-90-1.

1-32. Military police units also join combined arms breaching and gap-crossing forces to conduct rehearsals for the breach, assault, and support forces. Preparation may include establishing protection measures and holding areas for tactical units moving across MSRs to assembly areas. If route clearance operations are anticipated, military police units join with engineer; chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN); explosive ordnance disposal (EOD); and other forces focused on route reconnaissance, inspections, clearance activities, and the establishment of movement corridors. Military police unit preparation activities are closely aligned and integrated with maneuver force preparations. Figure 1-2, page 1-10, provides an example of military police security and mobility support (gap crossing support, area security, MWD support, LOC
security, and PRC) to the offense.

BSA
brigade support area
CIV
civilian
EOD
explosive ordnance disposal
DC
dislocated civilian
km
kilometer
DET
detention
MP
military police
DSA
division support area
MSR
main supply route
TCP
traffic control post

## Security And Mobility Support To Defensive Tasks

1-33. A *defensive operation* is an operation to defeat an enemy attack, gain time, economize forces, and develop conditions favorable for offensive or stability operations (ADP 3-0). Defensive tasks counter enemy offensive tasks. They defeat attacks, destroying as much of the attacking enemy as possible. They also retain terrain, guard populations, and protect critical capabilities against enemy attacks. They can be used to gain time and economize forces so that offensive tasks can be executed elsewhere. The defense alone normally cannot achieve a decision. However, it can create conditions for a counteroffensive operation that lets Army forces regain the initiative. Defensive tasks can also establish a shield behind which stability tasks can progress. For an in-depth discussion of the defense, see FM 3-90-1. For a discussion of security operations, see FM 3-90-2.

1-34. The types of defensive operations include the mobile defense, area defense, and retrograde. The purpose of the defense is to create conditions for a counteroffensive that allows Army forces to regain the initiative. Other reasons for performing defensive tasks include


Retaining decisive terrain or denying a vital area to an enemy.

Attriting or fixing an enemy as a prelude to offensive tasks.

Countering enemy action.

Increasing an enemy's vulnerability by forcing an enemy commander to concentrate subordinate forces.
1-35. Military police units supporting the defense perform a wide range of tasks within the context of the security and mobility support discipline. Military police leaders conducting security and mobility support tasks supporting the defense must


Exercise disciplined initiative within the commander's intent.

Anticipate operational changes or transitions and prepare the military police effort toward that action.

Conduct security and mobility support to aid a force to maneuver and mass. Military police anticipate transitions from the defense to the offense and assist the movement of reserves or reaction forces.

Conduct security and mobility support to deny information to enemy reconnaissance elements
seeking the location of the defending force. Military police units are positioned where they can
control key terrain or improve the defensive capability of bases and base clusters.

Deny the ability of threat special forces, criminals, and irregular threats to attack or conduct other
actions intended to harm friendly forces or disrupt sustainment operations.

Prevent the theft of military equipment and supplies by criminals or other threat actors.

Mitigate, solve, and prevent traffic congestion, traffic accidents, and other safety-related problems
along MSRs and ASRs.

Target threat actors, groups, organizations, and networks to prevent their ability to cause harm to forces, populations, and critical infrastructure; drive disorder and instability; and impede freedom of action.

Understand how operations affect security functions in a support area or joint security area or along LOC and how they protect vital command and control and sustainment infrastructure or
systems.

Know the location and composition of probable response forces or TCFs to coordinate and assist
in securing the support area or joint security area.

Protect sustainment resources while supporting the lateral, forward, and rearward movement of
combat forces.

Coordinate the security and treatment of DCs with HN or multinational forces.

Understand the IPB process, the CCIR, and priority intelligence requirements to facilitate the integration of police intelligence activities to support those requirements.

Consider the type and size of the AO, the LOC security requirements, and the threat and plan for
detainee operations and DCs to determine how their presence may affect the movement of forces.
1-36. Successful military police operations in the defense depend on the leader's understanding of the commander's intent and the ability to properly employ military police capabilities and assets. In all three types of defensive operations, the focus for the military police force is to support the movement of repositioning or counterattacking forces and to support the evacuation of captured or detained individuals. Defensive missions demand focused effort to provide the freedom of movement for repositioning forces and the reserve when it is committed. These units are provided the priority of movement along MSRs. Additional activities in the defense include providing protection to sustainment activities (including critical headquarters, communications facilities, convoys, and supply sites). Examples of typical missions include


Securing the movement of resources to ensure that commanders receive the forces, supplies, and equipment needed to support defensive operations.

Conducting area security, including response force operations, to detect, deter, and defeat Level I
and Level II threats and delay Level III threats operating within the AO.

Supporting movement corridor operations.

Conducting convoy escorts.

Supporting PRC to reduce the impact of DCs on combat forces.

Integrating patrol and explosive detection dogs to clear routes and roadways of hazards.
1-37. Similar to offensive operations, military police units prepare for defensive operations by integrating and coordinating with their supported units. Military police units coordinate with AO and base camp commanders to establish proper command and support relationships. The establishment of a movement corridor may require intensive and broad coordination. The provost marshal or military police commander at the appropriate echelon coordinates military police capabilities to support defensive operations. Preparation may include establishing protection control measures. Military police unit preparation activities occur in close proximity and are closely aligned and integrated with maneuver force preparations. Figure 1-3 provides an example of military police security and mobility support (area security, MWD support, response force operations, LOC security, and PRC) to the defense.

brigade support area
| CIV      | civilian              |
|----------|-----------------------|
| EOD      | explosive ordnance    |
| disposal |                       |
| DC       | dislocated civilian   |
| DET      | detention             |
| DSA      | division support area |
| TCP      | traffic control post  |
|          |                       |

## Security And Mobility Support To Stability Tasks

1-38. Stability is an overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. (See ADP 3-07 and JP 3-0 for more information.) A
stability mechanism is the primary method through which friendly forces affect civilians in order to attain conditions that support establishing a lasting, stable peace (ADP 3-0). As with defeat mechanisms, combinations of stability mechanisms produce complementary and reinforcing effects that accomplish the mission more effectively and efficiently than single mechanisms do alone. For any organization assigned an AO, there will always be implied or even specified essential stability tasks to perform.

1-39. The four stability mechanisms are compel, control, influence, and support. Compel means to use, or to threaten to use, lethal force to establish control and dominance; effect behavioral change; or enforce compliance with mandates, agreements, or civil authority. Control involves imposing civil order. Influence means to alter the opinions, the attitudes, and ultimately the behavior of foreign friendly, neutral, adversary, and enemy populations through synchronizing information-related capabilities, presence, and conduct.

Support is to establish, reinforce, or set the conditions necessary for the instruments of national power to function effectively.

1-40. It is essential to maintain the initiative during stability activities by pursuing objectives that resolve the causes of instability. The combination of tasks conducted during stability activities depends on the situation. Stability consists of six primary tasksestablish civil security, establish civil control, restore essential services, provide support to governance, provide support to economic and infrastructure development, and conduct security cooperation. See FM 3-07 for details. The purposes of stability are to


Provide a secure environment.

Secure land areas.

Meet the critical needs of the populace.

Gain support for the HN government.

Shape the environment for interagency and HN success.
1-41. Planning and preparing for stability activities can be extremely difficult because of the technical nature of requirements and the broad range of potential military police missions associated with them. An early onthe-ground assessment can be critical to tailor the military police force with required specialties and military police resources. The results of this assessment are passed to planners to ensure that an adequate military police force arrives in the AO in a timely manner. This early, on-the-ground military police reconnaissance and associated assessment or survey identifies


Basic security requirements and establishes police intelligence within the AO.

The needs of the HN and necessary military police capabilities to address specific requirements.

Other special considerations that affect the military police force.
1-42. Military police capabilities may be applied to provide specific technical support integrated within the CA plan with a focus on PRC. (See ATP 3-57.60 for information on CA planning.) This may be especially true for security and mobility support. Integration occurs through the operations process and is facilitated by coordination between military police planners and CA staff at the Civil-Military Operations Center or some other location. (See ATP 3-57.70 for information on the Civil-Military Operations Center.) For additional information on CA operations and PRC, see ATP 3-57.10 and FM 3-57.

1-43. Military police tasks must be prioritized to achieve the greatest mission effect. The specific discipline performed at a given time is determined by the supported commander's needs and the availability of military police resources. The supported commander, taking into consideration the recommendations of the provost marshal (PM), sets the priorities for military police operations. The provost marshal often needs to prioritize tasks to optimize military police support.

1-44. Stability tasks tend to be of long duration compared to the other tasks of decisive action. As such, the military police level of effort is very high at the onset and decreases as the theater and HN capabilities mature.

Preparation activities include determining the level of the civil rule of law in the policing and corrections services and identifying significant infrastructure and base development construction projects for police stations, training centers, and corrections institutions. The highest priority projects may be executed using general engineering capabilities, while others may compete for contingency funding and execution through a contract capability. Military police forces may be engaged in counterinsurgency-type operations as the security structure of the HN evolves.

1-45. Military police are uniquely suited for stability operations. Their capabilities are often conducive to achieving desired stabilization end states and transition criteria. They possess robust capabilities to shoot, move, and communicate, but they are trained to exercise judgment and resolve issues using the lowest level of force possible according to the use-of-force continuum. Military police are trained to transition to deadly force only when all other options have been exhausted. Military police units must project a professional law enforcement and policing image. This presence is extremely important when tailoring a force that requires significant capabilities with a low political profile.

1-46. Military police can support stability tasks through all three disciplines. Conducting policing activities in support of civil security and civil control lines of effort is critical in establishing the rule of law. PIO are integrated and executed continuously throughout all military police operations; this includes potentially establishing, using, and transferring HN PIO. This typically includes a variety of support to establish or reestablish the rule of law and the breadth of activities necessary for handing over responsibilities to an HN
for performing those same activities. See ATP 3-39.10 and FM 3-39 for more information on police operations and support to stability.

1-47. Military police detention operations support to an HN during stability activities is critical. Detainees must be effectively managed and transferred to appropriately trained and disciplined HN police. Military police may support stability operations by working with the HN to establish or reestablish detention or corrections systems. See FM 3-39 and FM 3-63 for more information on detainee operations and support to stability.

1-48. Military police security and mobility support to stability is often linked to police operations and detention operations, but it also tends to be similar to the tasks performed in support of offense and defense. Security and mobility tasks support many of the police operations activities and potentially selected detention operations in their support of each of the stability primary tasks. However, the overall focus for security and mobility is typically on establishing civil control and restoring essential services. Figure 1-4 provides an example of security and mobility support (area security, MWD support, response force operations, LOC
security, and PRC) to stability. Police operation and detention operation support most likely to require activities and skills associated with security and mobility support includes the following:


Establishing, operating, and transferring police stations to trained and skilled HN police. This
contributes to and should be linked to other local and area security tasks discussed primarily in the
chapter 3 discussion of security operations.

Controlling the movement of DC and providing relief to human suffering. The discussion of DC operations is part of PRC and discussed primarily in the chapter 2 discussion of mobility operations and the chapter 5 discussion of DC operations.

Establishing and training regional and urban police patrol operations (traffic control management and emergency first responder operations). This is related primarily to mobility operations as discussed in chapter 2.

Establishing indigenous highway patrol capabilities. This is related primarily to mobility operations as discussed in chapter 2.

Conducting facility security and protection efforts. This contributes to and should be linked to
other local and area security tasks discussed primarily in the chapter 3 discussion of security operations.

Establishing and supporting DC camps in support of the commander's civil-military operations
(CMO) plan. This is included in the discussion of PRC operations in chapter 5 and highlighted in
the discussion of DC camps in appendix A.

Establishing a movement corridor. This is a combined arms task that requires a series of activities that support mobility operations (chapter 2) and security operations (chapter 3). It may also include activities that support PRC (chapter 5).

Denying threat criminals' and irregular threats' abilities to attack or conduct other actions intended
to harm friendly forces and or disrupt sustainment operations.

Preventing the theft of military equipment and supplies by criminals or other threat actors.

Mitigating, solving, and preventing traffic congestion, traffic accidents, and other safety related
problems along MSR and ASR.

Targeting threat actors, groups, organizations, and networks to prevent their ability to cause harm to forces, populations, and critical infrastructure; drive disorder and instability; and impede freedom of action.

BSA
brigade support area
CIV
civilian
DC
dislocated civilian
DET
detention
DSA
division support area
EOD
explosive ordnance disposal
MP
military police
MSR
main supply route
TCP
traffic control post

## Establish Civil Security

1-49. Establishing civil security involves providing for the safety of the HN and its population, including protection from internal and external threats; it is essential to providing a safe and secure environment. Civil security includes a diverse set of activities. These range from restoring order to conducting disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration. If a legitimate civil government cannot assume responsibility for the security sector, military forces perform the tasks associated with civil security. At the same time, they help develop HN security and police forces. Normally, the responsibility for establishing and maintaining civil security belongs to military forces from the onset of operations through transition, when HN security and police forces assume this role.

1-50. Operations to restore order are conducted to halt violence and to support, reinstate, or establish civil authorities. These operations provide security and stability after a conflict, while setting the conditions for transition to the rule of law. Providing effective security for the local population by reducing its exposure to the threat of violent conflict is critical to enabling a stable environment for continued stability tasks and reconstruction. Military police are uniquely suited to engage in operations to establish civil order. Military police Soldiers are trained and experienced in graduated-response techniques and the application of the minimal force necessary to control a situation. In operational environments that are between major conflict and instability, the ability to gain control of a potentially violent event, establish order, and disperse the population without resorting to a significant application of force can make a significant impact. Successful efforts to establish order with minimal violence ease the transition from instability toward stable peace and enable the establishment of effective governance under the rule of law.

## Establish Civil Control

1-51. Civil control centers on justice reform and the rule of law, supported by efforts to rebuild the HN
judiciary, police, and corrections systems. It encompasses the key institutions necessary for a functioning justice system, including police, investigative services, prosecutorial arm, and public defense. Civil control includes helping the state select an appropriate body of laws to enforce; usually this is the HNs most recent criminal code, purged of blatantly abusive statutes. These efforts are implemented by Army capabilities during stabilization in support of indigenous government following a U.S. military intervention.

1-52. Military police will be expected to conduct border control, boundary security, and establishing civil freedom of movement as subtasks establish civil security. Each will draw on activities and technical capabilities associated with security and mobility support. While portions of this are part of police operations, the tactical aspects of military police support are often addressed as support to mobility operations (chapter
2) and security operations (chapter 3). Activities supporting PRC are discussed in chapter 5.

1-53. One central component of civil security is the ability of the state to monitor and regulate its borders.

Generally, border and coast guard forces secure national boundaries while customs and immigration officials regulate the movement of people, animals, and goods across state borders at designated points of entry. These border controls are necessary to regulate immigration, control the movement of indigenous and foreign local populace, collect excise taxes or duties prevent importation or exportation of controlled materials, limit smuggling, and control the spread of disease vectors through quarantine. In cases where these capabilities have broken down or cease to exist, U.S. forces may be required to fill this capability gap to establish or maintain the security of the nation in question. Military police may play a significant role in this effort. The list of essential tasks may include an initial response and transformation, described as follows:


An initial response in which military forces

Establish border control and boundary security.

Establish and disseminate rules relevant to movement.

Dismantle roadblocks and establish checkpoints.

Promote and stability and civilian freedom of movement.

Ensure freedom of maneuver.

A transformation in which military forces train and equip border control and boundary security forces.

## Protect Key Personnel And Facilities

1-54. When required, military forces may extend protection and support to key civilian personnel to ensure their continued contribution to the overall operation. In the interest of transparency, military forces specifically request and carefully negotiate this protection. Similarly, the long-term success of any intervention often relies on the ability of external actors to protect and maintain critical infrastructure until the HN can resume that responsibility. Protection of key facilities may be either an immediate or long-term requirement. The list of essential tasks may include an initial response and transformation, described as follows:


An initial response in which military forces

Protect government-sponsored civilian reconstruction and stabilization personnel.

Protect contractor and civilian reconstruction and stabilization personnel and resources.

Provide emergency logistics support, as required.

Protect and secure places of religious worship and cultural sites.

Protect and secure critical infrastructure, natural resources, civil registries, and property
ownership documents.

Protect and secure strategically important institutions (such as government buildings; medical
treatment facilities and public health infrastructure; the central bank, national treasury, and
integral commercial banks; museums; and religious sites).

Protect and secure military depots, equipment, ammunition dumps, and means of communications.

Identify, secure, protect, and coordinate disposition for stockpiles of munitions and CBRN materiel and precursors, facilities, and adversaries with technical expertise.

A transformation in which military forces build HN capacity to protect

Civilian reconstruction and stabilization personnel.

Public infrastructure and institutions.

Military infrastructure.

## Restore Essential Services

1-55. The activities associated with this primary stability task extend beyond simply restoring local civil services and addressing the effects of humanitarian crises. While military forces generally center efforts on the initial response tasks for the immediate needs of the populace, other civilian agencies and organizations focus on broader humanitarian issues and social well-being. Transition tasks establish the foundation for long-term development, resolving the root causes of conflict that lead to events such as famine, DCs, and human trafficking. Fostering sustainability tasks ensures the permanence of those efforts by institutionalizing positive change in society.

1-56. Normally, military forces support HN and civilian relief agencies with these efforts. However, when the HN cannot perform its roles, military forces may execute these tasks directly or to support other civilian agencies and organizations. It is imperative that these activities are properly scaled to local capacity for sustainment. Proper scaling also creates the best opportunity for the local populace to create small-scale enterprises to provide as many of these essential services as possible through the private economy. Largescale projects that require complicated HN efforts to sustain should not be initiated until the necessary infrastructure is in place to support such effort.

1-57. Military police may support the restoration of essential services in a variety of fashions. Those that are supported by activities and capabilities associated with security and mobility support are focused on civilian dislocation, support to convoy and personnel security, and the necessary control associated with missions focused on famine prevention and emergency food relief programs, nonfood relief programs, and public health programs, to name a few. PRC is focused on support of DCs and provides specifics for planning and executing these sorts of missions. See chapter 5 and ATP 3-57.10 for more information. For information on those mobility activities associated with DC control, see chapter 2.

1-58. International organizations and NGOs, as well as other humanitarian actors, are best equipped and trained to manage the humanitarian crises associated with DCs. International organizations may include the United Nations and the International Organization for Migration. NGOs may include groups such as Cooperative Assistance for Relief Everywhere (known as CARE). Humanitarian actors may include the International Committee of the Red Cross, a well-known international organization.

1-59. The presence and uncontrolled flow of DCs can threaten the success of any operation. DCs are symptoms of broader issues such as conflict, insecurity, and disparities among the population. How displaced populations are treated can foster trust and confidencelaying the foundation for stabilization and reconstruction among a traumatized populationor create resentment and further chaos. Local and international aid organizations are most often best equipped to deal with the needs of the local populace but require a secure environment in which to operate. Through close cooperation, military forces can enable the success of these organizations by providing critical assistance to the populace.

1-60. DCs typically contain a high percentage of women or children. Many may suffer from some form of posttraumatic stress, and all require food, shelter, and medical care. Following a major disaster, humanitarian crisis, or conflict, providing adequate support to DCs often presents a challenge beyond the capability of available military forces. Therefore, military forces offer vital supportcoordinated with the efforts of other agencies and organizationsto provide humanitarian assistance to the general population. The list of essential tasks includes


Assisting DCs.

Supporting assistance to DCs.

Supporting security to DC camps.
1-61. Military police are essential to the performance of each of these essential tasks, at times leading the activities; but most commonly, they serve in support of other Army or joint forces and civilian organizations.

The dislocation of civilians may require significant effort and military police resources to bring control to DCs and to provide security for them from the point of discovery, to DC collection points and camps, and then ultimately to their subsequent resettlement or return to their homes.

## Assist Dislocated Civilians

1-62. When assisting DCs, military forces

Ensure that humanitarian aid organizations have access to populations in need.

Estimate food and other aid needs for affected populations.

Assess the adequacy of local physical transport, distribution, and storage.

## Support Assistance To Dislocated Civilians

1-63. When supporting efforts to assist DCs, the list of essential tasks may include an initial response and
transformation, described as follows:

An initial response in which military forces

Estimate food aid needs for DCs.

Assess the adequacy of local physical transport, distribution, and storage.

Establish camps for DCs.

Provide emergency food, water, shelter, sanitation, and medical care to DCs.

Transformation in which military forces

Ensure access to basic services, including education and health care.

Clear damaged and destroyed housing and assess damage.

## Support Security To Dislocated Civilian Camps

1-64. When supporting DC camp security, the list of essential tasks may include an initial response and transformation, described as follows:


An initial response in which military forces

Assess conditions of temporary shelters and camps for DCs.

Ensure adequate protection and monitoring of camps.

Ensure access of humanitarian aid organizations and security forces to camps.

Transformation in which military forces assist in establishing and maintaining order in camps.

## Security And Mobility Support To Defense Support Of Civil Authorities Tasks

1-65. Military police first responder capabilities are key aspects to the defense support of civil authorities
(DSCA) mission. DSCA is the support provided by U.S. federal military forces, Department of Defense
(DOD) Civilians, DOD contract personnel, DOD component assets, and National Guard forces (when the Secretary of Defense (SecDef), in coordination with the state governors, elects and requests to use those forces in Title 10, United States Code [10 USC] status) in response to requests for assistance from civil authorities for domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other domestic activities or from qualifying entities for special events. DSCA missions are also known as civil support missions (see DODD 3025.18). Military police support to domestic operations is constrained by various laws. (See ADP 3-28 for additional information on DSCA.) Most military police tasks performed in domestic support are common to overseas operations; however, military police conduct them under very different conditions. The following are the core tasks of DSCA:


Provide support for domestic disasters.

Provide support for domestic civilian law enforcement.

Provide support for domestic CBRN incidents.

Provide other designated domestic support.
1-66. The list of activities associated with security and mobility support is only slightly reduced from those performed in the other three elements of decisive action. Intensive support to mobility operations and potentially to security operations will likely be necessary to support civil authorities and will be only minimally affected by DSCA restrictions that may have a greater effect on the other military police disciplines.

1-67. Numerous features of DSCA are distinct from other decisive action tasks. DSCA tasks stress the employment of nondestructive means to save lives, alleviate suffering, and protect property. Typically, the Army National Guard is the first military force to respond to domestic emergencies. Federal military forces normally respond to support another federal agency, often after a Presidential declaration, to supplement the efforts and resources of state and local governments. Each state governor has the authority to call up his state National Guard forces (Army National Guard and Air National Guard) to respond to an incident, paid for by state funds and under the command and control of the governor. These forces are in State Active Duty status. State Active Duty forces conduct missions in accordance with the needs of the state and within the guidelines of state laws and statutes. Such a response is defined as National Guard Civil Support, not DSCA. Army National Guard (in 10 USC or 32 USC status), Army Reserve, and Active Duty Army forces perform DSCA.

1-68. Military police operations in DSCA may include the simultaneous application of all military police disciplines. Specialized military police capabilities also have the potential to be employed. Military police support may be required for Army forces providing movement and maneuver, command and control, protection, and sustainment to government agencies at all levels until they can function normally. In a martial law situation, extensive military police support may be required. Military police Soldiers have the essential training and technical capabilities needed for relief operations, focusing on restoring civil order (and including support to mobility operations and security operations). The restoration of civil order requires


Operational unity.

Effective coordination.

Public acceptance.

Threat awareness.

Minimal use of force.
1-69. There are few unique military police missions performed in DSCA that are not performed during other operations. The difference is the context in which they are performed. Section 1385, Title 18, United States Code (18 USC 1385) (The Posse Comitatus Act) carefully limits the actions that military forces, particularly Regular Army units (to include federalized National Guard units), can conduct within the United States and its territories. National Guard units, remaining under the control of their respective state governors, are not restricted in the manner that federal (active duty) forces are restricted. Army forces cooperate and synchronize their efforts closely with them. These agencies are trained, resourced, and equipped more extensively than similar agencies involved in stability activities overseas. Policies issued by the federal government govern the essential services that Army forces provide in response to a disaster. Within this context of support to federal agencies, the focus for military police during DSCA support operations is to support federal agencies restoring essential services. Essential services of concern for military police include


Rescues.

Food and water.

Emergency shelter.

Basic sanitation, including sewage and garbage disposal.

Minimum-essential access to affected areas.

## Employment Considerations

1-70. The size and composition of military police required to conduct security and mobility support tasks is based on the tactical situation (mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations [METT-TC]). Table 1-2 provides a baseline for military police leaders and staffs to use when planning for the conduct of security and mobility support tasks.

Note. The considerations presented in table 1-2 primarily describe potential employment of military police capabilities. These notional considerations do not relieve military police leaders and planners of the requirement to perform detailed mission analysis to support the identification and employment of specific capabilities required to accomplish missions.

| Task                    | Purpose    | Squad    |
|-------------------------|------------|----------|
| 1 TCP                   | 3 TCPs     | 9 TCPs   |
| Traffic Control         |            |          |
| Post                    |            |          |
| Preclude interruption   |            |          |
| of traffic along a      |            |          |
| designated route.       |            |          |
| Reconnaissance          |            |          |
| and Surveillance        |            |          |
| (Route, Area,           |            |          |
| Zone)                   |            |          |
| 225 sq km               |            |          |
| (rural)                 |            |          |
| 90 sq km                |            |          |
| (urban)                 |            |          |
| 45 km-                  |            |          |
| route/                  |            |          |
| pipeline                |            |          |
| Identifies terrain      |            |          |
| characteristics,        |            |          |
| enemy and friendly      |            |          |
| obstacles to            |            |          |
| movement, and           |            |          |
| enemy forces and        |            |          |
| civilian population     |            |          |
| dispositions in order   |            |          |
| to allow freedom of     |            |          |
| maneuver.               |            |          |
| Support to Gap          |            |          |
| Crossing                |            |          |
| To control traffic at   |            |          |
| gap crossing sites to   |            |          |
| ensure speed and        |            |          |
| efficiency of crossing. |            |          |
| NA                      |            |          |
| doctrinally             |            |          |
| a platoon               |            |          |
| operation               |            |          |
Speed and level of detail will modify the requirement and area the element can effectively recon.
675 sq km (rural) 275 sq km (urban) 135-km route/ pipeline
2,000 sq km (rural) 800 sq km (urban) 400-km route/ pipeline
1 brigade gap crossing operation
1 division gap crossing operation
| Task                    | Purpose    | Squad     |
|-------------------------|------------|-----------|
| 400-meter               |            |           |
| breach                  |            |           |
| Support to              |            |           |
| Breaching               |            |           |
| Operation               |            |           |
| To provide an           |            |           |
| efficient and orderly   |            |           |
| flow of the movement    |            |           |
| of forces into and      |            |           |
| through the breach      |            |           |
| area.                   |            |           |
| Support to              |            |           |
| Passage of              |            |           |
| Lines                   |            |           |
| To reduce confusion     |            |           |
| and congestion of       |            |           |
| units into and out of   |            |           |
| the passage area.       |            |           |
| NA                      |            |           |
| doctrinally             |            |           |
| a platoon               |            |           |
| operation               |            |           |
| Area Security           |            |           |
| To protect friendly     |            |           |
| forces, installations,  |            |           |
| routes, and actions     |            |           |
| within a specific area. |            |           |
| 166 sq km               |            |           |
| (rural)                 |            |           |
| 66 sq km                |            |           |
| (urban)                 |            |           |
| Straggler               |            |           |
| Control                 |            |           |
| Return stragglers to    |            |           |
| parent unit.            |            |           |
| METT-TC                 |            |           |
| Need                    |            |           |
| transportation          |            |           |
| support to return       |            |           |
| dismounted              |            |           |
| Soldiers to units.      |            |           |
| Dislocated              |            |           |
| Civilian                |            |           |
| Operations              |            |           |
| To ensure priority to   |            |           |
| military traffic by     |            |           |
| diverting dislocated    |            |           |
| civilians from MSRs     |            |           |
| and other areas to      |            |           |
| alternate               |            |           |
| routes/facilities.      |            |           |
| 12,500                  | 37,500     | 150,000   |
| Highly dependent        |            |           |
| upon the number         |            |           |
| of MSRs required        |            |           |
| to regulate and the     |            |           |
| proximity of            |            |           |
| supporting              |            |           |
| facilities.             |            |           |
| Noncombatant            |            |           |
| Evacuation              |            |           |
| Operations              |            |           |
| 1                       |            |           |
| extraction              |            |           |
| site                    |            |           |
| Security at departure   |            |           |
| locations and           |            |           |
| extraction sites for    |            |           |
| convoys carrying        |            |           |
| evacuees;               |            |           |
| interpersonal skills    |            |           |
| suited to handling      |            |           |
| evacuees.               |            |           |
| 1 defile                | 3 defiles  | 9 defiles |
| Operating a             |            |           |
| Defile                  |            |           |
| Preclude interruption   |            |           |
| of traffic through a    |            |           |
| narrow passageway.      |            |           |
| Route Security          |            |           |
| To prevent enemy        |            |           |
| ground forces from      |            |           |
| moving into direct fire |            |           |
| range of the            |            |           |
| protected route.        |            |           |
| 10 km                   | 25 km      | 80 km     |
| Route security          |            |           |
| consists of regular     |            |           |
| patrols. 5 km off of    |            |           |
| route in rural          |            |           |
| terrain, 1 km off of    |            |           |
| route in urban          |            |           |
| area.                   |            |           |
3,600 meter breach
1,200 meter breach
1 brigade passage of lines
1 division passage of lines
Executed through TCPs and route signing. Military police conduct straggler control to prevent enemy infiltration.
500 sq km (rural) 200 sq km (urban)
2,000 sq km (rural) 800 sq km (urban)
Higher density of friendly forces and limiting terrain reduces the unit's AO.
3 extraction sites
9 extraction
sites
| Task                                             | Purpose                                     |
|--------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------|
| METT-TC                                          |                                             |
| Typically no less than 1 military police         |                                             |
| squad (4 vehicles) per convoy, averaging         |                                             |
| 1 military police vehicle per 10 in convoy       |                                             |
| Convoy Security                                  |                                             |
| Anytime there is                                 |                                             |
| insufficient friendly                            |                                             |
| forces to                                        |                                             |
| continuously                                     |                                             |
| secure routes.                                   |                                             |
| 1 small                                          |                                             |
| site/asset                                       |                                             |
| 3 small                                          |                                             |
| sites/assets                                     |                                             |
| Critical                                         |                                             |
| Site/Asset                                       |                                             |
| Security                                         |                                             |
| To provide security                              |                                             |
| to a site or asset                               |                                             |
| that is deemed                                   |                                             |
| essential.                                       |                                             |
| 1 light-                                         |                                             |
| traffic                                          |                                             |
| checkpoint                                       |                                             |
| <12 hours                                        |                                             |
| Checkpoints                                      |                                             |
| For commanders to                                |                                             |
| control freedom of                               |                                             |
| movement in an                                   |                                             |
| AO.                                              |                                             |
| 3 light-/1                                       |                                             |
| heavy-                                           |                                             |
| traffic                                          |                                             |
| checkpoints                                      |                                             |
| <12 hours                                        |                                             |
| NA                                               |                                             |
| 1 combat                                         |                                             |
| outpost                                          |                                             |
| Combat Outpost                                   |                                             |
| Employing security                               |                                             |
| forces for                                       |                                             |
| sanctuary, support,                              |                                             |
| information                                      |                                             |
| collection, or area                              |                                             |
| denial.                                          |                                             |
| Response Force                                   |                                             |
| Operations                                       |                                             |
| 36 enemy                                         |                                             |
| personnel                                       |                                             |
| deliberate                                       |                                             |
| 123 enemy                                        |                                             |
| personnel                                       |                                             |
| deliberate                                       |                                             |
| To protect the force                             |                                             |
| and ensure                                       |                                             |
| freedom of                                       |                                             |
| movement for units                               |                                             |
| to conduct                                       |                                             |
| assigned missions.                               |                                             |
| 30 enemy                                         |                                             |
| personnel                                       |                                             |
| hasty                                            |                                             |
| 102 enemy                                        |                                             |
| personnel                                       |                                             |
| hasty                                            |                                             |
| (enemy                                           |                                             |
| personnel)                                       |                                             |
| 1 node                                           |                                             |
| 3 small                                          |                                             |
| nodes/1                                          |                                             |
| large node                                       |                                             |
| Node Protection                                  |                                             |
| To provide layered,                              |                                             |
| integrated, and                                  |                                             |
| redundant                                        |                                             |
| protection to a                                  |                                             |
| command node.                                    |                                             |
| Protective                                       |                                             |
| Services                                         |                                             |
| To protect high-risk                             |                                             |
| personnel.                                       |                                             |
| Generally 1 squad per high-risk                  |                                             |
| personnel.                                       |                                             |
| Dislocated                                       |                                             |
| Civilian                                         |                                             |
| Operations                                       |                                             |
| NA                                               |                                             |
| 1 per                                            |                                             |
| 1,666                                            |                                             |
| dislocated                                       |                                             |
| civilians                                        |                                             |
| Temporary                                        |                                             |
| resettlement of                                  |                                             |
| dislocated                                       |                                             |
| civiliansshelter,                               |                                             |
| sustain, guard,                                  |                                             |
| protect, and                                     |                                             |
| account for                                      |                                             |
| dislocated civilians.                            |                                             |
| Legend:                                          |                                             |
| AO                                               |                                             |
| area of operation                                |                                             |
| km                                               | kilometer                                   |
| MSR                                              | main supply route                           |
| METT-TC                                          | mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops |
| and support available, time available, and civil |                                             |
| considerations                                   |                                             |
Convoy composition, route, and threat level will determine protection requirement.
9 small sites/assets
Level of criticality and proximity of enemy will modify requirements.
Heavy traffic and constant operation will increase the number of military police squads required.
9 light-/ 3 heavytraffic checkpoints <12 hours
.
3 combat outposts 369 enemy
personnel deliberate
Ratio is 1:2.5 for hasty and 1:3 for deliberate against Level I/II. Can also delay Level III threats at a 1:6 ratio.
307 enemy
personnel hasty
9 small nodes/3 large nodes
Dependent upon size and level of protection required by node.
Detail modified by level of high-risk personnel and area of movement.
1 per 5,000
dislocated civilians
NA
not applicable
recon
reconnissance
sq
square
TCP
traffic control post

## Intergrating Police Intelligence Operations

1-71. PIO must be integrated throughout security and mobility support planning and execution. Collected police information results in police intelligence that informs members of the decision-making process by commanders, military police staffs, Soldiers, and leaders conducting security and mobility support missions. These products feed the intelligence process and enable commanders to make prudent decisions regarding the security of convoys transiting the areas and provide military police with the information necessary to mitigate the risk through the staff planning process. During large-scale ground combat operations, military police supporting maneuver forces rely heavily on traditional military intelligence processes to drive combat operations against enemy regular forces. However, military police conducting security and mobility support operations during large-scale ground combat operations also conduct tasks to defeat irregular threats across the operational environment that can threaten friendly operations or impede the freedom of movement. As military operations transition from large-scale ground combat to stability, PIO rises in importance to support situational understanding of criminal threats destabilizing society and police effectiveness, controlling crime to enable governance according to the rule of law.

1-72. The mobility and communication capabilities of military police units enable them to detect threat elements and rapidly report these contacts. Security and mobility support operations place military police Soldiers in the position to frequently observe and make contact with the local population, facilitating police engagements and information collection. PIO integrated throughout security and mobility support missions may result in collection opportunities that satisfy intelligence requirements and increase situational understanding.

1-73. The collection of police information and the development of police intelligence products allows military police conducting security and mobility support to plan and execute measures to reduce crimeconducive conditions and counter the effects of criminal activity on military operations. Figure 1-5, page 1-24, identifies the integration of security and mobility support task in the police intelligence framework. These countermeasures may include


Identifying high-threat areas, focuses for military police reconnaissance and surveillance, and
recommending bypass routes to movement control teams.

Conducting offensive operations to destroy criminals, criminal networks, and criminal organizations.

Hardening likely targets through the implementation of physical security and antiterrorism measures.

Developing procedures to prevent, detect, and respond to criminal and terrorist actions before they occur.

Implementing recommendations to reduce vulnerabilities to criminal and other irregular threats.

## Chapter 2 Reconnaissance And Surveillance

Reconnaissance and surveillance are part of information collection. Military police performing reconnaissance and surveillance do so with policing capabilities and the application of PIO (see ATP 3-39.20) that enables and enhances their ability to perform these activities. Reconnaissance is the active collection of information. Surveillance is a systematic collection of information. It should be continuous and involves active and passive activities. Both reconnaissance and surveillance produce raw data and information, some of which may be combat information that meets one or more of the CCIR or information requirements. This chapter discusses how military police conduct reconnaissance and surveillance to monitor likely high-speed avenues of approach and potential landing zones and drop zones.

## Military Police Support To Information Collection

2-1. *Information collection* is an activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and employment of sensors and assets as well as the processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations (FM 3-55). This activity implies a function, mission, or action and identifies the organization that performs it. Information collection activities are a synergistic whole with emphasis on synchronizing and integrating all components and systems. Information collection integrates the intelligence and operations staff functions focused on answering CCIR. See FM 3-55 for additional information on information collection.

2-2. Information collection is the acquisition of information and the provision of this information to processing elements. This includes the following:


Collection management.

Task and direct collection.

Execute collection.
2-3. Military police support information collection requirements during the conduct of military police operations that may contribute to CCIR; support intelligence-led, time-sensitive operations; or shape policing strategies necessary to forecast, anticipate, and preempt crime or disruptive activities to maintain order.

Military police also focus their efforts on the collection of police information. *Police information* is information collected during military police operations concerning crime, disorder, criminal activity, and criminal threats (FM 3-39). Police information includes, but is not limited to, a variety of data and information about crime, law enforcement, police institutions and their effectiveness, and other general information in the operational environment.

2-4. Collected police information, and subsequent analysis, enhance situational understanding, protection, civil control, and law enforcement. Prior to tasking military police to collect police information, commanders and staffs employ police intelligence analysts to perform activities that generate knowledge and information about the crime environment or to fulfill the information requirement without requiring the employment of collection assets. These activities include


Performing searches and queries of police or detention databases (such as the Army Law Enforcement Reporting System [ALERTS], Army Corrections Information System, or Detainee Reporting System).

Data mining police databases with analytical software to generate initial statistical or other data that directly answers information requirements without requiring further analysis.

Coordinating and liaison with other military units (U.S. and multinational), including CA, special
operations forces, and elements conducting reconnaissance and security operations.

Coordinate the employment of military intelligence personnel (when authorized) to leverage
organic Distributed Common Ground System (Army) capabilities for query of intelligence databases and integration of information from intelligence sources.

Sharing information and collaborating with unified action partners, such as local law enforcement
organizations, federal law enforcement agencies, and partner nation law enforcement personnel.
2-5. Generally, PIO drives military police operations focused directly on crime and criminal activity, such as law enforcement, corrections, and criminal investigations. PIO compliments, but does not replace, traditional military intelligence processes during the conduct of decisive action tasks. Military police employ reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities as the primary means to perform deliberate information collection. When performing reconnaissance in tactical environments, military police primarily focus on determining the presence of criminal, terrorist, enemy special operations teams, long-range reconnaissance units, mounted or dismounted combat reconnaissance teams, and partially attrited or reconstituted small combat units, or other irregular threats in an AO. See ATP 3-39.20 for additional information on PIO.

2-6. Military police also focus reconnaissance on understanding crime environments, police and detention capabilities, and destabilizing elements within society to support U.S. force stability operations and efforts to consolidate gains following large-scale ground combat. While surveillance is considered part of reconnaissance, a key difference between surveillance and reconnaissance missions is that surveillance is systematic, usually passive in collection of information, and may be continuous. Reconnaissance is typically more limited to the duration of an assigned mission, it is active in collection of information. Reconnaissance is a focused collection effort that employs many tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) throughout the course of the mission, one of which may include an extended period of surveillance.

2-7. Military police units conduct surveillance to gain information to help guard against unexpected threat attacks in an AO or to gain information critical to understanding, planning, and executing missions in support of decisive action. When surveillance is required in populated areas, military police patrols may be a more acceptable collection assets due to the perception of military police as a law enforcement organization rather than a purely combat element, and specialized training in the nonlethal use of force techniques and the graduated escalation of force.

2-8. Commanders and staffs must fully understand the capabilities and limitations of available military police assets. This prevents collection asset tasking that does not match capability at a particular echelon or organization. Some reconnaissance and surveillance requirements demand special equipment, training, or expertise to complete the mission successfully. This may require specific requests for technical capabilities not present in baseline military police organizations. Understanding the capabilities and limitations of various military police organizations is critical to planning and requesting the appropriate echelon and type of military police technical capability to meet mission requirements. (See FM 3-39 for the different military police organizations and their technical capabilities.)

## Reconnaissance

2-9. Reconnaissance identifies terrain characteristics, enemy and friendly obstacles to movement, and the disposition of enemy forces and civilian populations so the commander can maneuver his forces freely and rapidly. It is a focused collection effort performed before, during, and after operations to provide information used in the IPB process, as well as by the military police leader in order to formulate, confirm, or modify his course of action. *Reconnaissance* is a mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or adversary, or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic or geographic characteristics of a particular area (JP 2-0). See ADP 3-90, FM 3-98, and FM 3-90-2.

2-10. The responsibility for conducting reconnaissance does not reside solely with specifically organized units. Every unit has an implied mission to report information about the terrain, civilian activities, and friendly and enemy dispositions. This is regardless of its location and primary function. Troops in close combat and reconnaissance patrols of maneuver units at all echelons collect information on enemy units that they are in contact with. In echelon support areas, reserve maneuver forces, functional and multifunctional support and sustainment elements, other governmental agencies, and multinational forces observe and report civilian and enemy activity and significant changes in terrain trafficability. Although all units conduct reconnaissance, those specifically trained in reconnaissance tasks are aviation attack reconnaissance units, scouts, long-range reconnaissance units, and special forces. Some branches, such as the Corps of Engineers, CA, Military Police, and the Chemical Corps, have specific reconnaissance tasks to perform that complement the force's overall reconnaissance effort. However, brigade combat teams (BCTs), division, and corps commanders primarily use their organic or attached reconnaissance elementsground or airand intelligence elements to conduct reconnaissance.

2-11. Military police perform reconnaissance to help answer general and specific information requirements in support of the overall collection effort. Military police serve as the eyes and ears of the commander, especially in support areas and along ground LOC, by seeking out the enemy and reporting information obtained by reconnaissance patrols. Included in these areas are MSRs, bridges, tunnels, depots, terminals, sustainment bases, ammunition supply points, communications centers or nodes, critical routes, command posts, and areas near facilities designated as critical by the commander. Military police also become familiar with towns and other populated areas, ridgelines, woods, and critical terrain features from which the enemy can influence movements along road networks.

2-12. Military police play a major role in this effort by anticipating and providing route reconnaissance information for main and ASRs, airfields, seaports, and likely landing zones within the operational area.

Military police reconnaissance capabilities range from these tactical reconnaissance tasks, to highly technical assessments regarding investigative and forensic capabilities
2-13. During stability tasks, reconnaissance conducted by military police is normally conducted with a specialized, technical focus on policing and investigative aspects of the environment (see figure 2-1). As requirements for technical capabilities provided by military police increase (generally as stability tasks become dominant), the consolidation of military police assets and capabilities under the command of military police battalions and brigades within the division, corps, and theater echelon may be required to ensure the integration and synchronization of military police technical capabilities across the AO. See FM 3-39 for more information on military police reconnaissance, and see ATP 3-39.20 for information on police information operations.

2-14. There are seven fundamentals common to all successful reconnaissance operations. Leaders must ensure that planning, preparation, and execution of reconnaissance missions adhere to these principles which include


Ensuring continuous reconnaissance.

Not keeping reconnaissance assets in reserve.

Orienting on the reconnaissance objective.

Reporting all information rapidly and accurately.

Retaining freedom of maneuver.

Gaining and maintain threat contact.

Developing the situation rapidly.
2-15. Regardless of the type or form of reconnaissance (see ADP 3-90, ATP 3-34.81, FM 3-90-2, and TC 3-39.30 for specific reconnaissance information), the unit consists of the following three elements:
command element, reconnaissance element, and security element. Upon receipt of a reconnaissance mission, the mission leader develops an estimate of the situation and task-organizes the size of the reconnaissance force based on the mission variables. The mission leader develops the plan, based on the following considerations:


Obtaining accurate intelligence.

Conducting rehearsals.

Conducting inspections.

Using deception measures.

Using the smallest possible unit to accomplish the mission.

Minimizing audio and electronic communications.

Using surveillance, target acquisition, and night observation devices.

Remaining undetected.
2-16. This manual focuses on three of the forms of reconnaissanceroute, area, and zone. It also discusses the special focus of civil reconnaissance and some of the specifics associated with reconnaissance and presence patrols while conducting reconnaissance. Military police typically use two types of patrols when performing reconnaissancethe reconnaissance patrol and the presence patrol. When performed in a tactical environment, the guidelines for patrol operations in ATP 3-39.10 remain valid.

## Route Reconnaissance

2-17. *Route reconnaissance* is a type of reconnaissance operation to obtain detailed information of a specified route and all terrain from which the enemy could influence movement along that route (ADP 3-90).

That route may be a cross-country mobility corridor. Military police conduct route reconnaissance to provide new or updated information on route conditions, such as obstacles and bridge classifications, and enemy and civilian activity along the route. The commander normally assigns this mission when wanting to use a specific route for friendly movement.

2-18. The commander assigns a route reconnaissance as a separate mission or as a specified task for a unit conducting a zone or area reconnaissance. Typically a platoon-sized unit conducts a route reconnaissance over only one route at a time. For larger organizations, the number of platoons (or other designated reconnaissance assets) available directly influences the number of routes that can be covered at one time. Integrating ground, air, and technical assets assures a faster and more complete route reconnaissance. See ATP 3-34.81 and FM 3-90-1 for additional information concerning route reconnaissance.

2-19. Route reconnaissance tasks include the following:


Find, report, andbased on engagement criteriaclear within capabilities all enemy forces that can influence movement along the route.

Determine the trafficability of the route; can it support the friendly force?

Reconnoiter all terrain that the enemy can use to dominate movement along the route, such as choke points; ambush sites; and pickup zones, landing zones, and drop zones.

Reconnoiter all built-up areas, contaminated areas, and lateral routes along the route.

Evaluate and classify all bridges, defiles, overpasses, underpasses, and culverts along the route.

Locate any fords, crossing sites, or bypasses for existing and reinforcing obstacles (including builtup areas) along the route.

Locate all obstacles and create lanes as specified in execution orders (See appendix C on the
development of security and mobility support attachments that support the base operation order
[OPORD]).

Report the above route information to the headquarters initiating the route reconnaissance mission, to include providing a sketch map or a route overlay.

## Area Reconnaissance

2-20. *Area reconnaissance* is a type of reconnaissance operation that focuses on obtaining detailed information about the terrain or enemy activity within a prescribed area (ADP 3-90). Area reconnaissance is vital to maintaining area security and contributes to the commander's information collection plan.

2-21. Military police area reconnaissance is a composite of actions; it is initiated from observations and reports gathered over time by military police patrols and information gained through coordination with HN
police and other friendly forces. Military police area reconnaissance plans include areas near facilities that are designated as critical by the commander, such as


Named areas of interest.

Airbases.

Bases and base clusters.

Communications centers.

Logistic support clusters.

Key terminals, depots, and bridges.

Critical terrain features.

High-value assets.
2-22. When conducting an area reconnaissance mission, military police leaders follow these principles:

The unit moves to the appointed area in the shortest possible time. This typically involves traveling along existing roads by using the appropriate movement techniques. During this movement to an area, the unit reports and bypasses enemy opposition.

The unit halts and sets up an objective rally point when it reaches the designated area. Once the unit establishes the objective rally point, it reconnoiters the objective in one of the following ways:

When terrain permits, the security element moves to an overwatch position to observe the reconnaissance element. The mission leader may instruct small reconnaissance teams to move
to each surveillance or vantage point around the objective instead of having the entire
reconnaissance element move as a unit from point to point.

When the terrain does not allow the unit to secure the objective area, the unit leaves a security element at the objective rally point and uses reconnaissance and security teams to reconnoiter the objective. These teams move to different surveillance or vantage points from which they
reconnoiter the objective.

All elements return to the objective rally point after the unit reconnoiters the objective for the details that are outlined in the (See appendix C on the development of security and mobility
support attachments that support the base OPORD). Teams share information, consolidate it, and
report it; then they return to the patrol headquarters or continue to the next mission.

## Zone Reconnaissance

2-23. *Zone reconnaissance* is a type of reconnaissance operation that involves a directed effort to obtain detailed information on all routes, obstacles, terrain, and enemy forces within a zone defined by boundaries (ADP 3-90). The commander assigns a zone reconnaissance mission when he needs additional information on a zone before committing other forces in the zone. It is appropriate when the enemy situation is vague, existing knowledge of the terrain is limited, or combat operations have altered the terrain. Zone reconnaissance techniques include the use of moving elements, stationary teams, or a series of area reconnaissance actions. The three methods military police use to conduct a zone reconnaissance are fan, converging routes, and successive sector (see TC 3-39.30).

## Civil Reconnaissance

2-24. *Civil reconnaissance* is a targeted, planned, and coordinated observation and evaluation of specific civil aspects of the environment such as areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, or events
(JP 3-57). Civil reconnaissance focuses specifically on the civil component, the elements of which are best represented by the memory aid ASCOPEareas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events.

Civil reconnaissance can be conducted by CA or by other forces, as required. Like CBRN or engineer reconnaissance, it is not a form of reconnaissance, but has specific reconnaissance tasks that complement the force's overall reconnaissance efforts. See FM 3-57 for additional information on civil reconnaissance.

2-25. Military police may also be involved in civil reconnaissance, a focused type of reconnaissance that is performed leveraging the specifics of PIO (see ATP 3-39.20), police operations (see ATP 3-39.10), and other skills and capabilities typically associated with the policeman on the beat. Military police presence patrols are well suited for many civil reconnaissance missions.

## Reconnaissance Patrols

2-26. A reconnaissance patrol is most often performed when military police perform reconnaissance in a tactical role. A reconnaissance patrol collects information to confirm or disprove the accuracy of information previously gained. The intent for this type of patrol is to move stealthily, avoid enemy contact, and accomplish the tactical task without engaging in close combat. Reconnaissance patrols always try to accomplish their mission without being detected or observed. Because detection cannot always be avoided, a reconnaissance patrol carries the necessary arms and equipment to protect itself and break contact with the enemy.

2-27. A reconnaissance patrol normally travels light, with as few personnel, arms, ammunition, and equipment as possible. This increases stealth and cross-country mobility in close terrain. Regardless of how the patrol is armed and equipped, the leader always plans for the potential of direct-fire contact with a hostile force. Military police leaders must anticipate where they may possibly be observed and control the hazard by employing measures to lessen their level of risk (see ATP 5-19). If detected or if unanticipated opportunities arise, reconnaissance patrols must be able to rapidly transition to combat.

## Presence Patrols

2-28. A presence patrol is a form of reconnaissance typically used in stability or DSCA activities. Its primary goal is to gather information about the conditions in the unit's AO. To do this, the patrol gathers specific and general critical information (as determined by the commander). The patrol seeks out this information and then observes and reports. Its secondary role is to be seen as a tangible representation of the U.S. military force, projecting an image that furthers the accomplishment of the commander's intent. In addition to reconnaissance tasks, presence patrols demonstrate to the local populace the presence and intent of the U.S.

forces. Presence patrols are intended to clearly demonstrate the determination, competency, confidence, concern and, when appropriate, the overwhelming power of the force.

2-29. Military police Soldiers regularly observe and interact with the people and environments in which they operate. This regular contact and interaction with the population and environment make military police patrols effective in concurrent passive and active collection. Passive collection occurs every time military police Soldiers engage with the people or environment in which they operate. Through this passive collection, military police patrols may help satisfy general information and intelligence requirements applicable to the entire AO or military police patrols may discover information that was not requested but has recognized value. That information is provided to commanders and staffs, along with the contextual details and circumstances of the discovery.

2-30. Military police patrols use several patrol methods. These various patrol methods allow military police to adapt and employ the best method to effectively collect police information based on the circumstances. When operating in a densely populated area ( urban environment or special event), military police may opt for a foot or dismounted patrol to enable direct interaction, observation, and police engagement with populations who may report relevant information about crime or criminal threats. In situations with a rapidly developing situation where gaining information requires mobility (combat or active shooter situation), military police may opt for the greater mobility, communication, and protection offered by vehicle or mounted patrols. This versatility to adjust patrol methods rapidly to effectively meet information collection requirements makes military police ideal collection assets to employ in uncertain, dynamic, and rapidly evolving situations. (See ATP 3-39.10 for additional details on patrol methods.)
2-31. Military police patrols are often directed to conduct a deliberate collection mission to obtain specific information about an area or target. These requests are tied to a commander's priority intelligence requirements, provost marshal's intelligence requirements regarding the AO, or specific police investigations. Collection requirements are generally briefed to military police Soldiers as part of their patrol briefs before mission execution. Deliberate preparation specifically for the mission is required. Postmission debriefs are critical to ensure that information collected by military police patrols is received by the appropriate staff elements for timely analysis and dissemination.

2-32. Before sending out presence patrols, the commander should carefully consider what message he wants to convey and then clearly describe his intent to the patrol leader. A presence patrol takes deliberate steps to visibly reinforce the impression the commander wants to convey to the populace. Where the patrol goes, what it does there, how it handles its weapons, what equipment and vehicles it uses, and how it interacts with the populace are all part of that impression. When the presence patrol returns to the main body, the commander thoroughly debriefs it, not only for hard information but also for the patrol leader's impressions of the effects of the patrol on the populace. This allows the commander to determine whether to modify the actions of subsequent patrols. Considerations include


Planning for and rehearsing actions in and around large crowds of civilians or noncombatants. (See ATP 3-39.33 and TC 3-39.30 for additional information regarding civil disturbances.) Even though U.S. forces or the indigenous population may have a basic language capability, interpreters
are a critical asset for all but the most rudimentary interactions.

Briefing the element conducting the patrol on collection priorities.

Assigning responsibility to specific Soldiers for maintaining all-around and high-low security on
each floor and the roof of buildings.

Periodically occupying rooftops during the course of the patrol to increase observation and security.

Using urban city maps, as navigation by grid in an urban area can be difficult. Maps showing street names, neighborhoods, and so on are much more useful.

Knowing the numbers and locations of translators or interpreters in the patrol. Also know the ethnicity of the translators and how that might affect the population in the patrol area or route. (See TC 3-39.30 for additional guidance on translator employment considerations.)

Checking recent activity or trends in the local population or urban areas.
Note. During DSCA military police conduct presence patrols in support of local, state, or federal agencies. See ADP 3-28 for additional information on DSCA.

## Surveillance

2-33. Surveillance complements reconnaissance by cueing the commitment of reconnaissance assets against specific locations or specially targeted enemy units. Military police surveillance focuses on providing early warning of enemy reconnaissance elements rather than gaining and maintaining contact with the enemy's main body or destroying it. *Surveillance* is the systematic observation of aerospace, surface, or subsurface areas, places, persons, or things by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means (JP 3-0). See ATP 3-55.4, ATP 3-55.6, and FM 3-55 for more information. For the specialized, but related, aspects associated with law enforcement investigation, see ATP 3-39.12.

2-34. Military police maintain continuous surveillance of all the assigned named areas of interest or enemy reconnaissance avenues of approach in an assigned AO. Units accomplish this by establishing a series of listening posts (LPs) or observation posts (OPs). LPs or OPs may be either mounted or dismounted. Military police conduct active mounted patrols to extend their observation limits or to cover dead space and the area between LPs or OPs. When establishing LPs or OPs in urban areas, special considerations are involved. See TC 3-39.30 for more information on LPs and OPs.

2-35. A unit's ability to report is critical during surveillance. Effective early warning requires detailed planning for uninterrupted communications. The mission leader considers communication distances and significant terrain features to identify potential wireless communication problems. If problems exist, support is requested from the higher headquarters.

## Listening And Observation Posts

2-36. LPs/OPs are positions from which military police observe the enemy and direct and adjust indirect fires against him. They are the primary means of maintaining surveillance of an assigned avenue of approach or named area of interest. The LP/OP is generally used


On key terrain to observe a specific area.

As an early warning security measure in a defensive perimeter.

For the monitoring of likely enemy avenues of approach.

## Types Of Listening And Observation Posts

2-37. LPs/OPs may be mounted or dismounted:


Mounted LPs/OPs. Mounted LPs/OPs offer the advantages of vehicular optics, weapon systems, and the speed of displacement. However, an enemy can detect mounted LPs/OPs more readily than dismounted posts. The LP/OP remains mounted if rapid movement or displacement is
anticipated.

Dismounted LPs/OPs. Dismounted LPs/OPs provide maximum stealth and have the greatest likelihood of remaining undetected by the enemy, but they lack the agility of mounted LPs/OPs. The disadvantage of the dismounted LP/OP is the time it takes to remount and move if necessary.

## Selection Of A Listening Or Observation Post Site

2-38. Based on an analysis of METT-TC factors and guidance from the commander, the platoon leader determines the number of LPs/OPs to establish how to position them to allow long-range observation along the avenues of approach that are assigned by the commander to provide depth through the sector. Squad and team leaders select the exact positions for each LP/OP on the ground. LPs/OPs must have the following characteristics:


Covered and concealed routes to and from the LP/OP. Military police must be able to enter and leave the LP/OP without being seen by the enemy.

Unobstructed observation of the assigned area. Ideally, the fields of observation of adjacent LPs/OPs overlap to ensure full coverage.

Effective cover and concealment. Leaders should select positions with cover and concealment to reduce vulnerability on the battlefield. Military police may need to pass up a position with favorable observation capability, but with no cover and concealment, in favor of a position that affords better survivability.

A location that will not attract attention. LPs/OPs should not be in locations that attract
attention, such as water towers, isolated groves of trees, or lone buildings or trees. These positions
draw enemy attention and may be used as enemy artillery target reference points. LPs/OPs should
also be located away from natural lines of drift, along which a moving enemy force can be expected to travel. Such locations might include a route on the floor of a valley or a site near a
major highway.

A location that does not skyline observers. Avoid topographical crests, and position LPs/Ops
further down the slope of the hill or on the side, provided there are covered and concealed routes into and out of the position.

## Operation Of A Listening Or Observation Post

2-39. Ideally, a military police team should man an LP/OP to maintain team integrity. Duties on LPs/OPs are rotatedone team member observes, one team member records and reports observed information, and one team member rests or provides backup security. The team rotates duties every 20 to 30 minutes because the visual efficiency of an observer decreases rapidly after that length of time. The team leader sends enemy observations up the chain of command by using a size, activity, location, unit, time, and equipment report. When the LP/OP team is part of a defensive perimeter, it


Ensures that it has rearward cover.

Builds fighting positions for protection and concealment.

Uses trip flares, noisemaking devices, and night-vision devices to detect the enemy.

Emplaces M18A1 claymores and /or networked munitions for added protection.

Coordinates with the perimeter on reentry procedures to the perimeter from the withdrawal route.
2-40. The squad leader prepares a sector sketch that includes

A rough sketch of key and significant terrain, including named areas of interest and avenues of approach.

A north-pointing arrow.

The location of the LP/OP.

The location of the hide position.

Locations of vehicle fighting and observation positions.

Alternate positions (hide, fighting, observation).

Routes to and from the OP and fighting positions.

Sectors of observation.

Preplanned artillery targets.

Target reference points for direct fire.

Prepared spot reports.

## Other Information Collection Methods Supporting Security And Mobility Support

2-41. Military police obtain information from a myriad of sources during the execution of military police operations. The versatility of military police and their dispersion across the AO enables them to engage diverse populations to obtain the information needed to answer information and intelligence requirements related to crime, disorder, fear of crime, destabilizing factors, and police effectiveness in providing safe and secure environments. These sources of information are essential to developing a clear picture of the networks, trends, patterns, and associations that are critical to supporting mobility, security, PRC, and combating criminal and other irregular threats.

## Unmanned Aircraft Systems

2-42. Small unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) are designed for reconnaissance, surveillance, and remote monitoring and are capable of locating and recognizing enemy forces, moving vehicles, weapons systems, and other targets that contrast with their surroundings. Small UASs are also capable of locating and confirming the position of friendly forces and the presence of noncombatant civilians, monitoring detainee operations, supporting border operations, or searching for missing persons.

2-43. Military police commanders and their staffs may integrate small UASs to perform the reconnaissance and surveillance of specific locations and routes during military police tactical or law enforcement operations in support of posts, camps, and stations to help clarify and verify facts and assumptions in the operational environment. Military police can launch and recover a small UAS from unprepared terrain in minutes without special equipment. The system can be remotely controlled from the ground control unit or can fly completely autonomous missions using Global Positioning System waypoint navigation for launch and recovery. See ATP 3-04.1 for more information on UASs.

## Military Police Patrols

2-44. Typically, military police patrols are arrayed across the AO during the conduct of their assigned missions across the military police disciplines. The dispersion of military police patrols (single team, law enforcement unit, or squad- or platoon-size elements) makes them effective collection assets. Observation and evaluation skills are inherent in police training; this training further enhances the capabilities of military police patrols to contribute to the collection effort in support of PIO and other requirements.

2-45. Military police patrols use several patrol methods. These various patrol methods allow military police to adapt and employ the best method to effectively collect police information based on the circumstances.

When operating in a densely populated area ( urban environment or special event), military police may opt for a foot or dismounted patrol to enable direct interaction, observation, and police engagement with populations who may report relevant information about crime or criminal threats. In situations with a rapidly developing situation where gaining information requires mobility (combat or active shooter situation), military police may opt for the greater mobility, communication, and protection offered by vehicle or mounted patrols. This versatility to adjust patrol methods rapidly to effectively meet information collection requirements makes military police ideal collection assets to employ in uncertain, dynamic, and rapidly evolving situations. (See ATP 3-39.10 for additional details on patrol methods.)
2-46. Military police patrols are often directed to conduct a deliberate collection mission to obtain specific information about an area or target. These requests are tied to a commander's priority intelligence requirements, provost marshal's intelligence requirements regarding the AO, or specific police investigations. Intelligence requirements are generally briefed to military police Soldiers as part of their patrol briefs before mission execution. Deliberate preparation specifically for the mission is required. Post-mission debriefs are critical to ensure that information collected by military police patrols is received by the appropriate staff elements for timely analysis and dissemination.

## Cordon And Search And Law Enforcement Searches And Raids

2-47. *Cordon and search* is a technique of conducting a movement to contact that involves isolating a target area and searching suspected locations within that target area to capture or destroy possible enemy forces and contraband (FM 3-90-1). Cordon and search operations take place throughout the range of military operations. Commanders conducting a cordon and search organize their units into four elementscommand, security, search or assault, and support. The security element must be large enough to establish both an inner and an outer cordon around the target area of the search.

2-48. In operational areas, military police typically conduct cordon and search at the company level and below when performing area security tasks. Information, documents, media, other material or observations, and detainees obtained during cordon and search provide relevant police information for immediate (timesensitive) dissemination or for use during criminal and crime analysis to produce police intelligence. The police information obtained during cordon and search operations is critical to effectively disrupting criminal activity, furthering investigations, and providing evidence for use in prosecution under the rule of law.

2-49. Maneuver formations typically conduct cordon and search at the maneuver battalion level and below.

Military police attached or supporting maneuver commanders may provide critical assistance, typically by supporting the security or search element. Military police assets are especially valuable in providing support to the search element. Advanced technical capabilities that may be provided by military police to support combined arms cordon and search operations includeevidence response teams, MWDs, detention specialists, or forensic experts, as well as the general awareness and law enforcement training all military police Soldiers receive in protecting crime scenes, collecting forensic materials, and processing evidence according to stringent evidentiary standards.

2-50. Law enforcement searches and raids are conducted by trained law enforcement officers (military police Soldiers, Department of the Army civilian police, and United States Army Criminal Investigation Command [USACIDC] special agents). Law enforcement officers execute searches to secure evidence for judicial proceeding or to recover stolen property. They execute raids to apprehend offenders, obtain evidence of illegal activity, or confiscate illegal weapons and contraband. Due to the inherent danger of high-risk searches and raids, investigative units often request special reaction team support in the execution of such missions.

Special reaction teams are suited for high-risk law enforcement raids in high-threat environments. See ATP 3-39.11 for information on special reaction teams and law enforcement raids.

2-51. Law enforcement searches entail more than simply locating evidence or criminal subjects. They require procedures that preserve the legality of the search and present the best possible case to a prosecutor. To conduct a search, law enforcement may need a search authorization or warrant supported by a finding of probable cause that person, property, or evidence sought is located in the place or area to be searched. A
search authorization is express permission issued by a competent military authority, and a search warrant is issued by a competent civil authority, to search and/or seize property, evidence, or person. Failure to execute a search properly, or without authority, may result in the loss or inadmissibility of any evidence collected in a court-martial or in a federal judicial proceeding under the "exclusionary rule." Evidence derived from an exploitation of an illegal act may also be inadmissible under the "fruit of the poisoned tree" doctrine. Military police performing a law enforcement search must exert every effort to remain within the scope and limitations outlined in the search authorization or risk undermining the value of the police information or evidence obtained. (See ATP 3-39.10 for details on search and seizure during police operations.)
2-52. Law enforcement raids are used to execute searches or apprehensions when numerous subjects are involved or when there is a potential for a high degree of resistance. Requests for special reaction team support for raids usually occur in conjunction with ongoing law enforcement activities by USACIDC special agents who are skilled in conducting raids and apprehensions and are familiar with evidence collection and preservation. Law enforcement raids often result in an abundance of police information collected through active and passive methods resulting from actions and statements of an apprehended criminal subject, forensic evidence, media devices, photographic or audio recordings, and statements by witnesses or bystanders at the scene.

## Site Exploitation And Evidence Collection

2-53. *Site exploitation* is the synchronized and integrated application of scientific and technological capabilities and enablers to answer information requirements, facilitate subsequent operations, and support host-nation rule of law (ATP 3-90.15). A site is a location designated by a commander as potentially having materiel pertinent for collection and for the positive identification of persons. Site exploitation contributes to exploitation, which in the context of information collection consists of taking full advantage of any information that has come to hand for tactical, operational, or strategic purposes.

2-54. Site exploitation is guided by the information collection plan. The information collection plan enables the commander to focus assets on collecting information to answer specific information requirements. When the commander designates a site for exploitation, the staff establishes an objective and specific tactical tasks that support the information collection plan. The plan also ensures that the staff requests and integrates all necessary enablers before site exploitation. See ATP 3-90.15 for greater information on site exploitation.

2-55. Evidence collection entails collecting a wide array of physical objects, testimony, electronic data, and analyses; it is an essential task in successful military police operations. Evidence consists of objects, material, or data that can provide proof or a high probability of proof that an incident, association, or pattern will lead to a conclusion or judgment. The thoughts, intuition, and opinions of an analyst or investigator are not evidence; however, they can be critical in forming a conclusion or judgment. Effective evidence collection requires planning, preparation, execution, and training. In the case of a site suspected to be or have been a place of detention for captured or detained personnel, investigators and evidence collectors should be aware often detained personnel will leave "proof of life" at their place of detention. Evidence collection teams can be selected ahead of time to focus training and resources. Digital cameras, rubber gloves, paper bags, boxes, tape, and marking supplies are all tools required to collect evidence properly. Evidence collection should be performed as a deliberate and methodical process, unless the situation requires a hasty collection effort.

Evidence should be handled by as few personnel as possible to avoid contamination and the risk of breaking the legal chain of custody.

2-56. The most recognizable evidence consists of physical items that are related to crimes or incidents, including firearms, illegal drugs, and blood-spattered clothing. Although these items have obvious evidentiary value, their value is increased when placed in the hands of trained forensic analysts. For example, when properly handled and analyzed, weapons confiscated at the scene of an attack on U.S. forces may providethrough the discovery of fingerprints or deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) evidenceinformation on the individuals who last handled the firearms. The barrel and firing pin of a weapon may be an exact match to a weapon used in previous attacks against U.S. or multinational partners. The evaluation of drugs and associated materials may also provide fingerprints or DNA evidence; a chemical analysis may specify where the drug was grown or how it was processed.

2-57. The continuous growth in electronic devices (cellular telephones, digital cameras, laptop computers, global positioning systems) has expanded the types of evidence that can be collected. Photographs, video and audio recordings, recording equipment, computers, and portable data storage (diskettes, thumb drives, memory cards, media players) can provide a wealth of information about a criminal or terrorist organization. The information may include identities, training techniques, weapons capabilities, targets, and locations. Photographic evidence may come from U.S. or HN security forces, including manned or unmanned aircraft.

Note. Information extracted from electronic devices, photographs, video and audio recordings, and written or printed (hardcopy) documents related to law enforcement investigations can be exploited by trained digital forensic examiners assigned to USACIDC formations. If the information contained within these items does not have applicability to law enforcement investigations, the items should be forwarded to document and media exploitation teams if allowed by appropriate laws and policy to support intelligence analysis. (See ATP 2-91.8.)
2-58. Hardcopy documents are valuable sources of police information. Fingerprints and DNA can be lifted from sheets of paper or envelopes. The type of paper or print used may provide clues as to the system used or the age of the document. Word choices and spelling may provide clues as to a person's background and education. Handwriting analysis may give investigators another means of identifying a specific individual.

Lists kept near the computer may be valuable as they may contain passwords, Web site addresses, access codes, e-mail addresses, and aliases. This category of evidence also includes identity papers (passports, visas, licenses, property ownership, shipping documents). An analysis of written and printed documentation may identify locations that an individual has visited, suppliers used, funding sources, and associates. See ATP 3-39.12 for more information on evidence collection.

## Forensic Analysis And Biometric Identification Support

2-59. Forensic analysis and biometrics identification support through numerous modalities has significantly increased the ability of USACIDC investigators and police intelligence analysts to add clarity to understanding events and attribute individuals involved in those events. Biometrics identification tools and forensic capabilities can be significant assets to distinguish between friendly, neutral, and threat forces and to deny anonymity and impunity to criminals, terrorists, and other irregular threat actors. Forensic and biometric identification tools are also critical in criminal investigations to identify an individual, establish an individual's presence at a specific location in relation to time and space, establish a subject's physical contact with material related to an investigation, or identify an indicator of deception. Military police and USACIDC organizations extensively employ the use of biometrics and forensic capabilities while conducting law enforcement on bases and base camps, or in support of decisive action.

2-60. Biometrics collection capabilities require


Approved biometrics collection devices that are capable of collecting fingerprints, iris images, and facial photographs to DOD standards.

Personnel who are trained on how to operate biometrics collection devices.

Biometrics collection and storage capability and manipulation software for the comparison and analysis of biometrics samples.

Biometrics watch listing training to enable the local commander to build local watch lists.
2-61. Forensic capabilities require


Military police personnel, law enforcement investigators, or trained Soldiers who can recognize, preserve, and collect potential forensic evidence.

Forensic laboratory examiners who can extract usable information from collected materials.

## Biometrics

2-62. *Biometrics* is the process of recognizing an individual based on measurable anatomical, physiological, and behavioral characteristics (JP 2-0). Biometrics applications measure biological characteristics, which are stored in databases for future comparisons. In addition to the biological data stored in databases, biographic data and personal behavioral traits are also collected for future comparison.

2-63. These characteristics and traits can be useful for tracking individuals, making positive identifications, establishing security procedures, or detecting deception based on measurable biological responses to stimulus. Biometrics data can be used for protection and security efforts and as evidence in investigations and criminal prosecutions. Identification data is combined with claimed biographic data to match an individual to the DOD authoritative databases. During screening, military police compare the claimed identity of a subject with the database to verify the identity, discover the identity, or enroll as a new identity. This data includes biometrics data (fingerprints, voiceprints, facial photographs, iris images, DNA).

2-64. Military police and USACIDC personnel and investigators or police intelligence analysts can leverage biometrics data to develop trends, patterns, and associations between individuals. Biometrics data that results in identification, confirmation of an individual's presence at specific times and places, and determination of truthfulness or deception can be extremely useful in building singular associations to linking groups, cells, or organizations. Linking biometrics data with forensic analysis of evidence collected at the scene of a crime or attack can assist law enforcement personnel in criminal investigations or directly feed the targeting process for commanders conducting decisive action. Coordinating with the assistant chief of staff, intelligence
(G-2)/battalion or brigade intelligence staff officer (S-2) to nominate persons of interest to the biometrics watch lists enables law enforcement personnel to expose their persons of interest to global tracking and enables all biometrically equipped unified action partners to positively identify the persons of interest during battlefield encounters.

Note. Biometrics data that is collected during the course of military police operations can be extremely useful to military intelligence personnel in the development of biometrics-enabled intelligence. When not restricted by military police investigations or legal and policy restrictions, every effort should be made to forward this data to military intelligence. See ATP 2-22.85.

## Forensics

2-65. Forensics is the application of multidisciplinary scientific processes to establish facts. Collection of forensic material enables the methodical analysis of evidence to establish facts that can be used to identify connections between persons, objects, or data. It is most commonly associated with evidence collected at crime scenes or incident sites; but it also includes methodologies for the analysis of computers and networks, accounting, psychiatry, and other specialized fields. Forensics is typically employed to support legal proceedings that lead to criminal prosecution. Additionally, forensic analysis is used to answer CCIR, provide situational awareness, and support criminal and crime analysis and other mission requirements as part of decisive action.

2-66. USACIDC supports Army forensics requirements through the Defense Forensic Science Center. Its facility is stationary due to the nature of the equipment required and other operational requirements. The Defense Forensic Science Center deploys forensic exploitation teams with trained examiners to support operational commanders in the field. This expeditionary capability enables timely forensic analysis across a broad range of forensic capabilities, to include latent fingerprints, toolmarks, firearms, DNA, digital forensics analysis, and explosive and drug chemistry. USACIDC laboratory capabilities may be operated in conjunction with forensic laboratory capabilities resident in sister Services, capitalizing on complementary capabilities to support the operational commander.

2-67. Forensic analysis expands the ability of police intelligence analysts to establish trends, patterns, and associations by providing scientific facts of relationships between persons, objects, or data. Criminals, terrorists, or other threat actors tend to operate in predictable ways. The analyses and comparisons of fragments left at the scenes of improvised explosive device (IED) bombings or incident sites in an AO can identify similarities in materials used, the construct of the trigger device, and other variables. (For additional information on EOD, see FM 4-30.) This can lead to the development of patterns in which events can be associated with the same bomb maker. Information derived from the analyses of materials used, to include the identification of chemical characteristics, can enable police intelligence analysts to develop associations leading to specific suppliers of those materials. These efforts can lead investigators to the resolution of criminal investigations and assist operational commanders in developing targeting strategies.

2-68. The proper handling of material from crime scenes or incident sites is critical to the success of forensic examination by forensic scientists and technicians. Military police are trained to properly identify, preserve, and collect material, whether in the context of crime scene processing or when collecting material at an incident site. See ATP 3-39.12 for detailed information on evidence collection and preservation.

## Chapter 3 Support To Mobility

Military police support to the movement and maneuver warfighting function is primarily focused on support to mobility operations. As part of this focus, military police draw on technical capabilities and tasks used in the performance of PIO, traffic management and enforcement, restore and maintain order, support to civil security and civil control (support to border control, boundary security, and freedom of movement), detention operations, and the specialized application of maneuver support to include the establishment of a movement corridor. Military police units expedite the secure movement of theater resources to ensure that commanders receive the forces, supplies, and equipment needed to support the operational plan and changing tactical situations. Military police provide support to mobility operations as they conduct proactive measures to detect, deter, and defeat threat forces operating within the AO and ensure orderly and safe movement of U.S. forces and enable freedom of movement for the maneuver commander. The framework of assured mobility (see ATP 3-90.4) is helpful in understanding the role military police have in support of mobility operations.

## Movement And Maneuver

3-1. Military police must understand the framework in which support to mobility operations is conducted.

It is a combination of both movement and maneuver and, depending on how it's viewed, it may be focused on either movement or maneuver.

3-2. The movement and maneuver *warfighting function* is the related tasks and systems that move and employ forces to achieve a position of relative advantage over the enemy and other threats (ADP 3-0). Direct fire is inherent in maneuver, as is close combat. The function includes tasks associated with force projection related to gaining a positional advantage over an enemy.

3-3. *Maneuver* is the employment of forces in the operational area, through movement in combination with fires and information to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy (JP 3-0). Maneuver is the means by which commanders mass the effects of combat power to achieve surprise, shock, and momentum. Effective maneuver requires close coordination with fires. Movement is necessary to disperse and displace the force as a whole or in part when maneuvering.

3-4. Typically, military police are focused on supporting movement or enabling the maneuver at the tactical level. Although they may maneuver while doing so, their focus for the support they provide to mobility operations is on enhancing the movement of other forceswhether that is a convoy or a maneuver unitas it moves through routes as a part of a breaching or gap-crossing operation or some other mobility-related mission.

## Mobility

3-5. *Mobility* is a quality or capability of military forces which permits them to move from place to place while retaining the ability to fulfill their primary mission (JP 3-17). As described in ADP 3-90 and FM 3-90-1, mobility is essential to successful operations. Its major focus is to enable friendly forces to move and maneuver freely on the battlefield or a given AO. The commander wants the capability to move, exploit, and pursue the enemy across a wide front. When attacking, the commander wants to concentrate the effects of combat power at selected locations. This may require the unit to improve or construct combat trails through areas where routes do not exist. The surprise achieved by attacking through an area believed to be impassable may justify the effort expended in constructing these trails. The force bypasses existing obstacles identified before starting the offensive operation instead of breaching them when possible. However, this must be done with caution because it might play into the enemy's hand. Bypassed obstacles are reported to higher headquarters and are marked when the situation allows.

3-6. *Mobility tasks* are those combined arms activities that mitigate the effects of obstacles to enable freedom of movement and maneuver (ATP 3-90.4). They are conducted to enable friendly forces to move and maneuver freely on the battlefield. They are heavily dependent upon intelligence gained from surveillance and reconnaissance. Mobility operations include the following six primary tasks:


Conduct breaching.

Conduct clearing (areas and routes).

Conduct gap-crossing.

Construct and maintain combat roads and trails.

Construct and maintain forward airfields and landing zones.

Conduct traffic management and control.
3-7. Military police are mostly focused on support to the first three primary tasks and the last primary task of conduct traffic management and control. These four primary tasks provide a tactical focus for military police support to mobility operations.

## Breaching

3-8. A *breach* is a synchronized combined arms activity under the control of the maneuver commander conducted to allow maneuver through an obstacle (ATP 3-90.4). It's a synchronized combined arms mission under the control of the maneuver commander. Breaching begins when friendly forces detect an obstacle and begin to apply the breaching fundamentals. Breaching ends when battle handover occurs between follow-on forces and the unit conducting the breach. A breaching activity includes the reduction of minefields, other explosive hazards, and other obstacles.

3-9. Obstacle breaching is the employment of a combination of tactics and techniques to advance an attacking force to the farside of an obstacle that is covered by fire. Most combined arms breaching is conducted by a BCT or a battalion-size task force as a tactical mission, but higher echelons may also execute operational-level combined arms breaching tasks. Combined arms breaching operations are discussed in ATP 3-90.4.

3-10. The three types of breaching operations are the deliberate breach, the hasty breach, and the covert breach. Amphibious breaching is an adaption of the deliberate breach. An in-stride breach is a type of hasty breach. Basic information includes the following:


Deliberate breach. Deliberate breaching is the creation of a lane through a minefield or a clear route through a barrier or fortification, which is systematically planned and carried out. A deliberate breach is used against a strong defense or a complex obstacle system. It is similar to a deliberate attack, requiring detailed knowledge of both the defense and the obstacle systems. It is characterized by the most prior planning, preparation, and buildup of combat power on the nearside of obstacles. Subordinate units are task-organized to accomplish the breach. The breach
often requires securing the farside of the obstacle with an assault force before or during reduction.

Hasty breach. A *hasty breach* (land mine warfare) is the creation of lanes through enemy
minefields by expedient methods such as blasting with demolitions, pushing rollers or disabled vehicles through the minefields when the time factor does not permit detailed reconnaissance, deliberate breaching, or bypassing the obstacle (JP 3-15). A hasty breach is an adaptation to the
deliberate breach and is conducted when less time is available. It may be conducted during a
deliberate or hasty attack due to lack of clarity on enemy obstacles or changing enemy situations, to include the emplacement of scatterable mines.

Covert breach. Covert breaching is the creation of lanes through minefields or other obstacles
that is planned and intended to be executed without detection by an adversary. Its primary purpose
is to reduce obstacles in an undetected fashion to facilitate the passage of maneuver forces. A
covert breach is conducted when surprise is necessary or desirable and when limited visibility and terrain present the opportunity to reduce enemy obstacles without being seen. It uses elements of deliberate and hasty breaching as required.
3-11. Military police support to breaching operations provides an efficient and orderly flow of the movement of forces into and through the breach area. While breaching operations are typically focused on the support of maneuver, the military police role is typically focused on support of movement within maneuver. Military police support to breaching operations (deliberate, hasty, or covert) is based on an analysis of the mission variables. As a minimum, military police support typically include


Establishing traffic control posts (TCPs) along routes leading to or departing from the breach lanes
to expedite traffic flow.

Establishing holding areas.

Working with engineers to emplace temporary route signage.

Performing straggler-control activities.

Conducting area and local security to facilitate the passage of follow-on forces.

Broadening area and local security around the reduction area after the assault force has moved through.

Performing hand-off of security and movement control of routes and lanes to follow-on forces.
3-12. The commander of the force conducting the breaching operation organizes into three forces to conduct breachingsupport, breach, and assault forces. Military police are typically part of the breach force (part of the security element) or the support force in a breaching operation. Table 3-1 identifies breach responsibilities for each breach organization. As part of the breach force, they specifically focus on facilitating the passage of the assault force and follow-on forces. As in other operations, military police ensure that DCs do not degrade the breaching activities or movement throughout the breach area. As part of the support force, military police focus more on follow-on forces. In either case, their role is to facilitate movement to and ultimately out of the breach lanes. Military police involvement is directly proportional to the echelon conducting the breach and the number of lanes required to support the number of vehicles that will be passing through those lanes. Military police units conduct close coordination with the support, breach, and assault force commanders and the breaching force commander executing the breaching operation.

| Breach Organization                                                             | Responsibilities                |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| Support force                                                                   |                                 |
| - Suppress an enemy capable of placing direct fires on the reduction area to    |                                 |
| protect the breach force as it reduces the obstacle and the assault force as it |                                 |
| passes through the created lane.                                                |                                 |
| - Fix enemy forces to isolate the reduction area.                               |                                 |
| - Control obscuration.                                                          |                                 |
| Breach force                                                                    |                                 |
| - Reduce, proof, and mark the necessary number of lanes through the             |                                 |
| obstacle.                                                                       |                                 |
| - Report the status and location of created lanes.                              |                                 |
| - Provide local security on the near side and far side of the obstacle.         |                                 |
| - Provide additional suppression of enemy overwatching the obstacle.            |                                 |
| - Provide additional obscuration in the reduction area.                         |                                 |
| - Assist the passage of the assault force through created lanes.                |                                 |
| Assault force                                                                   | - Seize the far side objective. |
| - Reduce the enemy protective obstacles.                                        |                                 |
| - Provide clear routes from the reduction area to the battle handover line for  |                                 |
| follow-on forces.                                                               |                                 |
| - Prevent the enemy from placing direct fires on follow-on forces as they pass  |                                 |
| through the created lanes.                                                      |                                 |
| - Conduct battle handover with follow-on forces.                                |                                 |
| - Provide reinforcing fires for the support force.                              |                                 |
| - Destroy the enemy on the obstacle far side that is capable of placing direct  |                                 |
| fires on the reduction area.                                                    |                                 |

3-13. The most critical military police support is to provide traffic management for the breach area, where military police units provide the commander with a means to control traffic flow to appropriate cleared lanes.

When multiple lanes branch off from a single far-recognition marker, military police may provide a guide or establish a TCPs to direct the formation to the appropriate lanes. They also assist in modifying the traffic flow when lanes are closed for maintenance or improvement. Military police units enable the commander to make adjustments in traffic flow due to the tactical situation to include disabled vehicles or artillery fires.

3-14. Figure 3-1 provides an example of breaching operations. In this example, the first BCT conducts a breaching operation to seize OBJECTIVE DOG and pass the second BCT along ROUTES AUSTIN and DALLAS. The breach force (1-52 Combined Arms Battalion) creates breach lanes 2 and 3 to allow the assault force (1-50 Combined Arms Battalion) to seize OBJECTIVE DOG. After the farside objective is seized, the breach force creates an additional lane (Lane 1) to allow the second BCT to pass through the breach area along two passage routes to continue to the attack. Typically, as shown in this example, military police are assigned to the security element within the breach force to assist in providing local security for the reduction element and guiding the assault force to the far-recognition markers. They are poised to reroute traffic based on changes in the tactical situation. Military police efforts on the nearside of the breach area are focused on directing the second BCT and other follow-on forces toward the routes leading up to the reduction area and optimizing the flow of traffic up to and through the breach lanes to maintain momentum. Engineers in the breach force would create and mark the lanes through the obstacles to get the assault force through. While not necessarily being collocated with the breach force, military police would provide traffic control through the reduction area. The military police force may even remain under BCT control while doing this. Military police may be organized within the assault force as well, to be able to rapidly establish traffic control on the farside of the obstacle. This example depicts the establishment of two lanes by the breach forceenough to get the assault force of the first BCT through. Follow-on engineers would likely improve ROUTES AUSTIN
and DALLAS, and military police would potentially adjust the number of TCPs necessary to support this. Follow-on engineers may also open more lanes to facilitate the passage of follow-on forces with a corresponding requirement for military police support for movement control. The first BCT is responsible for route maintenance and traffic control throughout the breach area until they are handed off to follow-on forces.

## Clearing

3-15. *Clearing* is a mobility task that involves the total elimination or neutralization of an obstacle that is usually performed by follow-on engineers and is not done under fire (ATP 3-90.4). Commanders may order clearing tasks to facilitate mobility within an AO based on an analysis of the mission variables. They may also order a critical route or area clearance of mines, explosive hazards, or other obstacles. The operation could be conducted as a single mission to open or reopen a route or area, or it may be conducted on a recurring basis in support of efforts to defeat a sustained threat to a critical route. Clearing is often performed by a combined arms force built around an engineer-based force (to potentially include MWDs).

3-16. Clearing in the context of this description is not directly related to the tactical task of clear. Military police support to clearing operations is mostly focused on route clearance missions. Route clearance is the detection, investigation, marking and reporting, and neutralization of explosive hazards and other obstacles along a defined route to enable assured mobility for the maneuver commander. It is a combined arms operation that relies on a reconnaissance of the route to be cleared. Route clearance may be conducted to open a route for the necessary traffic or on a recurring basis to minimize the risk level along selected routes.

Route clearance teams are generally comprised of engineers, EOD personnel, a security element (infantry, military police, or an aviation unit), medical personnel, and a special operations team. MWDs may be a capability or tool used during the detection phase of the route clearance operation.

3-17. Military police support to route clearance is typically limited to providing reconnaissance information on routes in the AO and providing security for detection and clearing assets. Providing security may include observing oncoming traffic for threats, identifying hazards or obstacles in the route, containing suspect vehicles identified by other elements within the route-clearing team, and providing traffic control. The two methods of route clearance are contiguous and combat. Since each poses a degree of risk a thorough analysis of mission variables should be performed before selecting a clearance method (or combination) to use.


Contiguous. In contiguous clearance, the deliberate clearance begins at Checkpoint 1, and it is complete at Checkpoint 2. (See figure 3-2, page 3-6.) This method provides the best assurance of
route clearance. Although effective, it is not the most secure method in a high-threat environment.
Military police support to contiguous route clearance is limited to providing reconnaissance information on routes in the AO and security for detection and clearing assets. Commanders can also integrate patrol explosive-detection dogs or patrol explosive-detection dogs-enhanced MWD
teams to clear routes and roadways of hazards.

Combat. Whereas contiguous clearance focuses on a specific route, combat clearance focuses on specific points along a route (see figure 3-3, page 3-6). As mentioned previously, the IPB or
running estimates can identify locations where the enemy will be most likely to emplace obstacles
or establish ambush positions. These areas become named areas of interest or objectives for combat clearance missions. The combat clearance method divides a route into sections according to the number of suspected high-threat areas. Once the clearance team clears these sections, the route is considered clear. In this example, military police may be tasked as the security element. During the sweep, the security element would position itself where it can best overwatch the
detection, clearance, and improvement elements while they perform their assigned tasks. The
security element may be to the front, flank, or rear of the detection, clearance, and improvement
elements, depending on the situation. As part of a security force, military police would also be poised to respond to the presence of civilians to ensure that they do not interfere with the clearance mission. This might include diverting civilian traffic or establishing a hasty checkpoint or roadblock. The clearing element may include a specialized search dog or patrol explosive detection dog team.

## Gap Crossing

3-18. A gap is a ravine, mountain pass, river, or other terrain feature that presents an obstacle that may be bridged (ATP 3-90.4). Gaps will exist in the operational environment and present a significant challenge to movement and maneuver. A *gap crossing* is the projection of combat power across a linear obstacle (wet or dry gap) (ATP 3-90.4). (Gap-crossing operations in support of both maneuver and movement are discussed in detail in ATP 3-90.4.) Similar to breaching operations, the three types of gap crossings are deliberate, hasty, and covert.

3-19. Gap crossings force units to move in column formations along a few routes that come together at the crossing sites. Military police units play a vital role in helping the commander control traffic at gap-crossing sites and along routes leading into and out of the crossing area, to ensure that units cross the gap as quickly and efficiently as possible to maintain momentum. Controlling traffic is essential for ensuring that the crossing plan remains flexible to changes in the situation that may require adjustments to the routing and sequencing of crossing units. Effective traffic control also prevents congestion and the pooling of vehicles that offer lucrative targets for artillery and air strikes.

3-20. The crossing is usually planned and conducted by the headquarters directing the crossing. A division gap-crossing operation is conducted by a joint force commander or corps, depending on how the area of responsibility is structured. A BCT deliberate crossing is controlled by a division or corps, depending on how the area of responsibility is structured. When a BCT is crossing, the military police assets task-organized to the BCT may also cross to provide uninterrupted support to the BCT after being relieved by follow-on military police forces. In these instances, there is typically a reliance on an engineer headquarters in the area of responsibility to support the crossing. Commanders conducting a deliberate gap crossing typically organize their forces into assault, assured mobility, bridgehead, and breakout forces as follows:


Assault forces seize the farside objective to eliminate direct fire on the crossing sites.

Combat engineer companies, mobility augmentation companies, bridge companies, military police, and CBRN units provide crossing means, traffic control, and obscuration. These supporting units are task-organized to perform specific tasks and are controlled using specified procedures that are clear, simple, and rehearsed by all elements to ensure responsive support of the plan and unity of command and effort.

Bridgehead forces assault across a gap to secure the enemy side (the bridgehead) to allow the buildup and passage of a breakout force during gap crossing. The bridgehead is an area on the enemy side of the linear obstacle that is large enough to accommodate the majority of the crossing force, has adequate terrain to permit defense of the crossing sites, provides security of crossing
forces from enemy direct fire, and provides a base for continuing the attack. The bridgehead line
is the limit of the objective area in the development of the bridgehead.

Breakout forces attack to seize objectives beyond the bridgehead as a continuation of offensive operations.
3-21. The provost marshal section is responsible for developing the traffic control plan. The employment of military police for gap crossing is influenced by the mission variables. The number and placement of military police units supporting a gap-crossing operation vary with the size of the crossing force, the direction of the crossing (forward or retrograde), and the degree of enemy resistance expected and the number of DCs that may be encountered. Military police units are placed where they can best expedite and enforce movement tables along the routes leading into the crossing area.

3-22. The main effort of military police support to gap crossing is within the immediate gap-crossing site and routes leading to and from the site. Military police direct the crossing units to their proper locations using holding and staging areas, TCPs, and temporary signs (and subsequent signage [see GTA 19-08-002]) to ensure that units move through the area according to the crossing and traffic circulation plans. This is a highly critical aspect of gap- (and especially river-) crossing operations because the number of crossing sites are limited. Military police also provide mobile patrols along primary routes to control traffic, spot problems, guide and escort vehicles, and reroute traffic when necessary. In most gap-crossing operations, TCPs are located on both sides of the gap to improve communication and coordination between the units.

3-23. Military police unit support to gap-crossing reduces the crossing time and promotes the efficient movement of vehicles. It reduces congestion, speeds the crossing, and enables the crossing units to maintain momentum. Military police units may operate collection points or holding areas to temporarily secure DCs and detainees until they can be evacuated to the next higher echelon's holding area to ensure that they do not impede the gap-crossing. Additional military police augmentation may be needed from a higher military police headquarters, depending on the amount of traffic and numbers of detainees and DCs in the area. In restrictive terrain, military police platoons and squads may operate defiles which are special circulation control measures conducted to keep traffic moving smoothly through a narrow passageway (see FM 3-39).

Military police can also conduct area security to the rear and flanks of crossing forces to enhance security (see chapter 3 and TC 3-39.30).

3-24. Military police units operating inside the crossing areas are typically under the operational control of the crossing area commander for the duration of the operation. The military police unit operating outside of the crossing area is under the command of its appropriate echelon commander.

3-25. Figure 3-4 provides an example of military police support to a gap crossing to facilitate traffic control.

This would correspond to Phase I (Advance to the Gap) of a deliberate gap crossing. While military police may also be organized as part of the assault, bridgehead, or breakout forces, this example is focused on those military police organized as part of the assured mobility force. Those military police organic or taskorganized to the other forces will be performing missions or tasks for those units. See ATP 3-90.4 for specifics on the type of activities military police may perform at holding areas, staging areas, and TCPs and an example of a deliberate wet-gap crossing.

Legend: CFA
call forward area
EEP
engineer equipment park
ERP
engineer regulating point
Jan
January
MP
military police
PL
phase line
RL
release line
TCP
traffic control post

3-26. Retrograde gap crossings have the potential to be more difficult than forward crossings, especially when the force is under pressure by enemy forces. ATP 3-90.4 highlights special planning considerations and techniques to consider for situations involving significant number of DCs.

## Passage Of Lines

3-27. Although not one of the primary tasks of mobility operations, support to a passage of lines is frequently linked to military support to mobility operations. During a passage of lines, forces move forward or rearward through the combat positions of another force with the intention of moving into or out of contact with the enemy. A passage of lines is a high-risk military operation that requires close coordination between the passing unit, the stationary unit, and supporting forces. Passage of lines is one of the tactical enabling tasks and a tactical shaping task. See ADP 3-90 for more information.

3-28. Military police units support a passage of lines by reducing confusion and congestion of units into and out of the passage area. Military police units provide traffic management and enforcement in areas surrounding passage points and passage lanes to ensure that passing units have priority for using routes to and through the areas. The headquarters directing the operation sets the priority of route use.

3-29. Before the operation, military police units assigned to support the passage of lines conduct route reconnaissance and become familiar with the routes to, through, and beyond the area of passage. This enables military police units to extend the commander's command and control by providing directions at passage points and by guiding the units through the passage lanes. Traffic control measures may include TCPs, temporary route signs, checkpoints, roadblocks, defiles, and escort and guide vehicles. Military police must also be prepared to initiate vehicle holding areas at designated locations along movement routes. If the road network sustains damage, vehicles will be routed into a holding area until traffic can be restored or rerouted.

3-30. Maintaining unit integrity and reducing incidents of stragglers is vital to maintaining the passing unit's momentum in a forward passage of lines. Military police units perform aggressive straggler and DC control operations to return individuals to positive control and prevent enemy personnel mixed in with DCs from being able to infiltrate into the sustainment area. Military police support the passage of lines are required to conduct detailed coordination with passing and stationary units, to include


Communication requirements.

Recognition signals.

Route start points.

Times of passage.

Passing lanes.

Control measures, including TCPs, escort and guide vehicles, and temporary route signs. (Temporary route signs will decrease the number of TCPs needed; but if routes are not well defined or if they cross congested areas, expect to provide TCPs or escort vehicles.)

Detainee and DC evacuations.

## Main And Alternate Supply Route Regulation And Enforcement

3-31. Main and ASR regulation and enforcement (see ATP 3-90.4) is military police support to the mobility operations task of traffic management and control along with the logistics focused portion of movement control (see ATP 4-16) and is integrated with the military police focused activity of traffic management and enforcement (see ATP 3-39.10 and ATP 3-39.12). Traffic management and control is conducted to enable the unencumbered movement of personnel and resources along road networks in the most efficient manner possible. Although focused on supporting movement, traffic management can also be selectively applied to enable maneuver. Traffic management and control also contributes to the commander's protection efforts.

Reconnaissance is an essential component of effective traffic management and control. Traffic management holistically involves transportation, military police, engineer, and other technical capabilities. Four of the key activities supporting main and alternate route regulation and enforcement are route reconnaissance, traffic control plan development, DC control measures (see ATP 3-57.10), and straggler control. These activities typically overlap and are linked even as each activity accomplishes their own focused responsibilities.

3-32. Traffic management and enforcement and main and ASR regulation and enforcement collectively include all active and passive measures used to control traffic circulation, enforce traffic regulations, investigate traffic collisions, and enable safe movement of vehicular and pedestrian traffic. Traffic management and enforcement focuses on mitigating traffic disruptions created by threats, DCs, and congestion due to breakdowns, weather, and degradation of road surfaces. Military police conduct route regulation enforcement consistent with the traffic control plan.

3-33. Traffic management and enforcement activities are part of the police operations discipline and include the control of traffic circulation, enforcement of traffic regulations, and investigation of traffic incidents. These technical skills provide enablers for military police in the broader performance of their tactical mission during main and ASR regulation and enforcement.

3-34. Military police units provide main and alternate route regulation and enforcement to enhance movement and maneuver, keeping the routes within controlled spaces free for priority tactical and sustainment operations. Military police units support the command MSR regulation measures as stated in the traffic regulation plan. The traffic regulation plan contains specific measures to ensure the smooth and efficient use of the road network. It assigns military route numbers or names, the direction of travel, highway regulation points, and preplanned military police TCPs.

3-35. To expedite traffic on MSRs, military police units apply special circulation control measures, such as


Temporary route signing.

Static posts (TCPs, roadblocks, checkpoints, holding areas, or defiles at critical points).

Mobile patrolling between static posts.

Traffic and road conditions monitoring.
3-36. Military police units also gather military and police information on friendly and enemy activities and help stranded vehicles and crews. They place temporary route signs to warn of hazards or to guide drivers who are unfamiliar with the routes. Using these measures, military police units exercise jurisdiction over the road network in the AO and coordinate with the HN (when possible) to expedite movement on MSRs.

3-37. Military police units that are employed with engineer, logistics, EOD, aviation, and other forces may establish movement corridors to provide secure movement of military traffic through vulnerable areas. A movement corridor is a designated area established to protect and enable ground movement along a route
(ADP 3-37). Based on published movement tables, the combined movement corridor forces will open and maintain a safe passage route through uncontrolled terrain. The opening of the route requires a synchronized effort, with each branch providing unique movement and mobility skills to the route. The sequence may include route clearance and maintenance activities that are integrated with area security implementation along the corridor.

3-38. Engineer and military police forces conduct route reconnaissance missions to determine problems along the route. Sustainment forces may then establish temporary holding, maintenance, or rest areas along the corridor as the tactical situation dictates. With the establishment of military police TCPs and convoy escorts of critical commodities of supplies and with aviation convoy security in place, the convoys move along the protected route to their final destination. The movement corridor opens and closes for specified periods of time to meet movement table requirements.

## Marking Routes

3-39. Route signs support the traffic regulation plan by ensuring that specific routes are accurately identified.

Accurate and well-placed signs along the roadside help drivers arrive at their destinations. Military police patrols monitor signs on a routine basis, checking and creating specific signs before critical moves. When military police patrols discover that signs are damaged, destroyed, or moved due to weather, saboteurs, or battle activities, it is necessary to construct temporary signs to replace them see appendix C for additional information on route signs. This also applies when patrols encounter immediate and temporary MSR
obstructions, such as blown bridges or CBRN contamination. Military police Soldiers quickly construct and erect signs to


Identify routes.

Guide traffic around problem areas.

Provide directions, distances, and general information.

## Establishing And Operating A Traffic Control Post

3-40. Military police conduct security and mobility support to expedite military traffic flow by operating TCPs at critical locations. A *traffic control post* is a manned post that is used to preclude the interruption of traffic flow or movement along a designated route (FM 3-39). The location of each TCP is given in the traffic control plan.

3-41. Military police enforce the circulation control of traffic movement and MSR regulationsnot to apprehend violators. Tasks may include directing military personnel to their units or to a straggler collection point if the location of their unit is unknown; maintain surveillance of friendly movements and provide reports as required; manage DCs; watch for activity by insurgents, conventional enemy forces, and enemy aircraft; and screening suspicious people according to the standard operating procedures (SOPs), area rules of engagement (ROE), and the commander's guidance. Military police who operate a TCP also watch for and monitor local inhabitants. Military police ensure local civilian traffic or DCs do not delay military traffic. Civilian traffic and DCs should be rerouted or temporarily stopped until the MSR is opened will not delay military traffic. When establishing and operating a TCP, the military police


Establish overwatch for the TCP.

Sustain communications.

Select positions for squad members and the assigned crew-served weapons by

Position one team to direct the flow of traffic and control movement on the MSR.

Position another team to provide overwatch security for the military police who conduct movement control.

Rotate primary overwatch security duty between teams in the squad.

Rotate duties with the military police who conduct movement control on the MSR.

Direct and prepare concealed defensive positions (cover and concealment, good fields of fire communications) based on METT-TC. See FM 3-39 for military police perspectives of each
mission variable.

Maintain situational awareness.

Reconnoiter the surrounding area for enemy activity.

Record key information about incidents and subsequently notifies the chain of command according to the unit SOP.
3-42. Military police units ensure that classified routes are only used by authorized traffic within their timetable schedule. Military police TCPs prevent vehicles from traveling on roads that are too narrow for their passage or unable to support their weight to ensure that they do not obstruct the route. Many of these same skills are applicable to military police support to breaching, clearing, and gap-crossing movement
(TCPs, defiles, temporary route signing, and so forth). While focused on support to movement, these may also support maneuver.

## Establishing And Operating A Holding Area

3-43. Forces use holding areas during traffic interruptions or deployment from an aerial port or seaport of embarkation. Holding areas can be used as independent measures or with other measures (such as defiles or checkpoints) to support operations, such as gap crossings or the passage of lines. For example, a holding area may be established at each end of a defile to minimize congestion or it may be established with a roadblock or checkpoint for searching vehicles. Holding areas should offer concealment and a dispersion capability for the vehicles that are located within them.

3-44. METT-TC and the size of the holding area determine the number of military police teams that are required to operate it. Normally a military police squad operates a holding area, the squad leader designates one team to control the entrance to the holding area, one team to control the exit from the holding area, and one team to provide security. The fourth team provides additional overwatch, assists with traffic direction and parking, and executes the supplementary tasks that are assigned by the squad leader. The team leader also assigns each squad member a fighting position. When operating a large holding area, the military police leader may need additional personnel inside the area to direct traffic and parking and ensure that units comply with the flow plan.

## Establishing And Operating A Defile

3-45. Military police operate defiles when natural or man-made obstacles restrict traffic flow on an MSR. A
defile is a special movement circulation control measure that is conducted to keep traffic moving smoothly through a narrow passageway.

3-46. Defile operations prevent traffic jams by allowing traffic to move in only one direction at a time. When establishing or operating a defile, be vigilant to possible enemy attack due to the restrictive and vulnerable nature that a defile imposes. Tasks that are associated with establishing and operating a defile include


Preparing support by fire positions and, if needed, fighting positions.

Controlling the traffic that enters and leaves the defile at both ends.

Keeping security throughout the defile.

Notifying road users of traffic and tactical situations.
3-47. Before emplacing a defile, conduct a reconnaissance of the area and of the proposed location. Use the simplest method of control. Plan for two methods in case a backup is needed. Control measures can include the following:


Flag. The flag is given to the last driver, or it is attached to the last vehicle that enters the defile.
Another military police Soldier removes the flag when the vehicle reaches the end of the defile. This serves as a signal for traffic to start in the opposite direction.

Rider. The rider method is the same as the flag method except that the control person rides in the last vehicle in each group. This method is used to ensure that all vehicles have cleared the area.

Lead vehicle. The lead vehicle leads the convoy through the defile. This method is used when movement through the defile is long or confusing.

Trail vehicle. The trail vehicle method is the same as the flag and rider methods except that a trail vehicle is inserted behind the last vehicle that goes through the defile.

Visual. Control personnel are placed where they can readily see and signal each other at both ends of the defile. Agreed-upon, hand-and-arm signals or a signaling device (such as a flashlight) are
used to communicate. Signaling techniques are normally used in small defile operations. Holding
areas are not normally needed.

Communication. Radios are used as a last resort.
3-48. Additional tasks include

Establishing a temporary or static defense based on the amount of time that the defile will be used.

Using temporary signs to mark alternate or bypass routes. (These should be placed well in advance
to allow vehicles to avoid the defile where possible. Signs are used to reduce the need for
additional personnel.)

Controlling access to the defile to keep large numbers of vehicles and personnel from entering the defile at the same time.

Identifying up procedures for clearing the road if and when breakdowns occur. (Wrecker support may need to be coordinated. If it is unavailable, field methods should be used.)
3-49. Large defile operations must have a holding area at each end of the defile. Holding areas should offer cover and concealment for vehicles and troops and must be large enough to accommodate the number of vehicles that are expected or scheduled to use the route. Where a nuclear airburst is possible, holding areas should be 2 to 3 kilometers (1.24 to 1.86 miles) from the defile. See figure 3-5 for a depiction of a defile operation.

ALT
alternate
ASR
alternate supply route
Jan
January
MP
military police
MSR
main supply route
TCP
traffic control post

## Route Reconnaissance

3-50. Military police units conduct hasty and deliberate route reconnaissance to obtain information on a route and nearby terrain where the enemy can influence troop movement. Route reconnaissance focuses on continually monitoring the condition of main and ASRs and specified key terrain along routes, and reporting to the tactical commander. Military police patrols look for restricting terrain, effects of weather on the route, damage to the route, CBRN contamination, and enemy presence or absence.

3-51. When enemy activity is spotted, military police patrols report it, maintain surveillance, and develop the situation according to the commander's plan and intent. To gather information for proposed traffic plans, military police units look at the type and number of available routes, load classifications, route widths, obstructions, and restrictions. All of this information is critical to the commander's situational understanding and the development of the common operational picture. Route reconnaissance may be conducted as part of a multifunctional team with engineer, CBRN, and other specialties. See ATP 3-34.81 and chapter 1, FM 3-90-2, for more information on route, area, and zone reconnaissance.

## Traffic Control Plan Development

3-52. Movement control measures are supported with a traffic control plan that addresses military police support in controlling the use of main and ASRs (names, direction of travel, size, and weight restrictions), checkpoints, rest and refuel areas, TCPs, highway regulation points, and mobile patrols. The traffic control plan identifies major routes to bear most of the traffic load. It also reflects any route restrictions such as direction of travel, size and weight restrictions, and critical points.

3-53. A traffic control plan is developed by military police to complement the movement control and highway regulation plan and includes traffic enforcement measures that support movement control and highway traffic regulations, addresses speed control, establishes safety inspection checkpoints that assist in protecting the force, and ensures that only authorized traffic uses controlled routes. The traffic control plan contains specific measures to ensure the smooth and efficient use of the road network to include route designations, restrictions, priority of movement, direction of travel, highway regulation points, and preplanned military police TCPs. The traffic control plan supports the task of providing movement control. See ATP 4-16 for a discussion of this and other control measures. See GTA 90-01-005 for insights on TCP
operations.

3-54. Critical points may include facilities, terminals, ports, railheads, and cargo transfer points that, if congested, will limit the efficiency and effectiveness of the entire transportation network. The traffic control plan includes efforts to address high-volume traffic conditions and mitigate or prevent excessive traffic on highways, high volume primary routes, and urban streets including secondary routes and residential streets.

## Dislocated Civilian Control

3-55. DC operations are a special category of PRC (see chapter 5 and ATP 3-57.10). The goals of DC
operations are to minimize civilian interference with military operations and protect them from the effects of combat operations and natural or man-made disasters. Military police units providing traffic regulation and enforcement on routes may encounter DCs that could hinder military traffic flow. These units ensure priority to military traffic by diverting DCs from MSRs and other areas to refugee routes or DC camps. They deny the movement of civilians whose location, direction of movement, or actions may be a threat to themselves, tactical operations, or sustainment operations. If functioning, the HN government is responsible for identifying routes for the safe movement of DCs out of an AO. If needed, military police units assist the CA unit and HN assets in redirecting DCs to alternate routes. DC control may be focused on tactical routes (linked to the support of maneuver in mobility operations) and responding to immediate needs of tactical commanders, or in support of main and ASRs (linked to support of movement in mobility operations
typically focused on the support area).

3-56. Planning for DC control requires both bottom-up and top-down information to be included in the formulation of the plan to ensure its viability and effectiveness. Minimizing interference caused by DCs may include blocking, clearing, or collecting techniques (discussed in chapter 5).

3-57. Military police (and other U.S. forces) do not assume control of DCs unless they are requested to do so by the HN or are operating in an environment with a hostile or nonfunctioning government. When the joint force commander or geographic CCDR assumes responsibility, military police elements coordinate with CA elements to set up TCPs at critical points along the route to direct DCs to secondary roadways and areas not used by military forces. When directed, DCs may be housed within DC camps operated by U.S. forces and supported by military police. Ideally, HN authorities handle mass DC operations by implementing planned and rehearsed evacuation plans. When a military force assumes responsibility for planning DC
operations, DC planners should consider incorporating HN assets in the planning and implementation of DC plans. Figure 3-6 shows an example of an overlay for a DC collection plan in support of an offensive operation. Plans include collection points, selected DC routes (and perhaps time windows), assembly areas or holding areas, and projected location of DC camps. See appendix A for more information on DC camps and ATP 3-57.10 for more information on DC planning and techniques.

ASR
alternate supply route
Aug
August
CKP
check point
DC
dislocated civilian
DCAA
dislocated civilian assembly area
LD
line of departure
MP
military police
MSR
main supply route
obj
objective
PL
phase line

## Straggler Control

3-58. Straggler control refers to operations conducted to regulate friendly forces that have become separated from their commands by events in the AO. Straggler control is conducted by military police units using mobile patrols, TCPs, and checkpoint teams to return stragglers to their parent units. Most stragglers are simply Soldiers who become separated from their command as the result of a tactical operation. Forced marches and movements may result in disabled vehicles and stragglers. Military police units direct Soldiers to their parent unit or to a replacement unit according to command policies. They also provide basic first aid and initiate the medical evacuation of wounded stragglers.

3-59. Military police units can set up special posts and collection points for straggler control following CBRN attacks or major enemy actions that result in large numbers of lost, dazed, or confused military personnel. Mobile military police patrols operate between posts and direct or collect stragglers. Straggler collection points may be needed if many stragglers are present in the AO. If multinational forces are present in-theater, each nation establishes a collection point for its own personnel. Military police units must be aware of allied straggler collection locations and assist allied soldiers in returning to their respective commands.

Military police units use available theater transportation assets to transfer stragglers from TCPs and checkpoints to straggler collection points. At the collection points, they are screened and sorted for removal to a medical treatment facility, return to their units, or movement as directed by the controlling headquarters. The designation of a hasty collection point is highlighted in figure 3-7. This is one technique to support straggler control using a quadrant system to rapidly facilitate separation of the various activities that may all be performed at a collection point. By this method, each quadrant of a crossroads may be designated for a likely group or purpose. Each control point is located 55 to 110 yards (50 to 100 meters) from the roads to keep the groups sufficiently separated. Establishing the various collection points that are needed within the same vicinity consolidates common requirements for such things as food and water, medical treatment, and protection while maximizing the use of available resources.

3-60. Military police units report information about stragglers they come in contact with. This information is compiled by the military police unit headquarters and forwarded through appropriate channels to the higher command. Information obtained from stragglers that has immediate tactical value is reported immediately through command channels. Stragglers who are also identified as deserters are placed into detention channels.

## Chapter 4 Support To Security

Military police provide support to security operations primarily through tasks and activities aligned with area and local security, which are the last two tasks of the five subordinate tasks of security operations identified in ADP 3-90 and further explained in FM 3-90-2. Area and local security tasks are focused on protecting friendly forces, assets, and operations in an AO, typically in support areas. Within the context of area security, military police specifically support the area security efforts of the sustainment base and support units through the execution of a number of key tasks and activities.

They are also key participants in local area security efforts that include aspects of antiterrorism and physical security. See ADP 3-37 for an in-depth discussion of area and local security.

## Security Operations

4-1. *Security operations* are those operations performed by commanders to provide early and accurate warning of enemy operations, to provide the forces being protected with time and maneuver space within which to react to the enemy, and to develop the situation to allow commanders to effectively use their protected forces (ADP 3-90). Security operations encompass five primary tasksscreen, guard, cover, area security, and local security. While the first three tasks are linked to the movement and maneuver warfighting function, the last two are linked to the protection warfighting function. These last two security tasks are focused on providing protection, although they may also enhance the movement and maneuver of the force. The focus of military police performing security operations may be either on a force (convoy operations for example) or a facility (base camp, DC camp, detention site, or other example) for which they are providing security.

4-2. Military police may also conduct counterreconnaissance in the performance of area and local security as a supporting tactical mission task. *Counterreconnaissance* is a tactical mission task that encompasses all measures taken by a commander to counter enemy reconnaissance and surveillance efforts. Counterreconnaissance is not a distinct mission, but a component of all forms of security operations (FM 3-90-1).

4-3. Military police apply their technical capabilities and selected specialized activities in the performance of their role in supporting security operations. These include but are not limited to those associated with reconnaissance and surveillance, the use of UAS, and the employment of MWDs.

## Area Security

4-4. *Area security* is a type of security operation conducted to protect friendly forces, lines of communications, and activities within a specific area (ADP 3-90). It preserves the commander's freedom to move reserves, position fire support means, exercise command and control, and conduct sustaining operations.

4-5. Forces engaged in area security protect the force, installation, route, area, or asset and are integrated with other local security assets and efforts. Although vital to the success of military operations, area security is normally an economy-of-force mission, often designed to ensure the continued conduct of sustainment operations and to support decisive and shaping operations by generating and maintaining combat power.

4-6. Area security may be the predominant method of protecting support areas that are necessary to facilitate the positioning, employment, and protection of resources required to sustain, enable, and control forces. Area security is often an effective method of providing civil security and control during some stability activities. Forces engaged in area security can saturate an area or position on key terrain to provide protection through early warning, reconnaissance, or surveillance and to guard against unexpected enemy attack with an active response. This early warning, reconnaissance, or surveillance may come from ground- and spacebased sensors. Area security often focuses on named areas of interest in an effort to answer CCIR, confirm or deny threat intentions, and facilitate decision making. The maneuver enhancement brigade and some military police units are specifically equipped and trained to conduct area security and may constitute the only available force during some phases of an operation. However, area security takes advantage of the local security measures performed by all units, regardless of their location in the AO. Military police forces engage in area security missions in a manner emphasizing mobility, lethality, and communications capabilities.

4-7. During offense, defense, and stability activities, various military organizations may be involved in conducting area security in an economy-of-force role to counter enemy reconnaissance and surveillance efforts; create standoff distances from enemy direct- and indirect-fire systems; enhance movement and maneuver; and protect LOCs, convoys, various collection points, supply points, and other critical fixed sites without a significant diversion of combat power. Many of the same tasks may be performed in DSCA, but they are typically not in an economy-of-force role or with the same type of enemy. Bases and base camps employ local security measures (including EOD, assessments and recommendations, random antiterrorism measures, and increased force protection condition), but may be vulnerable to enemy or adversary remnant forces requiring a response that is beyond base camp capabilities. Area security supports offensive operations by providing a response capability to base clusters and sustainment areas and to designated geographical areas such as routes, bridge sites, or lodgments. In support areas, commanders conduct area damage control
(ADC) to prevent and respond to the negative effects of enemy or adversary action that can diminish combat power.

4-8. For a discussion of critical asset security and the methodology associated with vulnerability assessments of units, installations, facilities, and bases or base camps see ADP 3-37. This reference includes the staff planning associated with developing a critical asset list and subsequently identifying assets that will be applied to support the critical assets on the defended asset list. The general sequence of a vulnerability assessment is


Step 1. List assets and capabilities and the threats against them.

Step 2. Determine the common criteria for assessing vulnerabilities.

Step 3. Evaluate the vulnerability of assets and capabilities.
4-9. All commanders apportion combat power and dedicate assets to protection tasks and systems based on an analysis of the operational environment, the likelihood of threat action, and the relative value of friendly resources and populations. Based on their assessments, joint force commanders may designate the Army to provide a joint security coordinator to be responsible for designated joint security areas. Although all resources have value, an analysis of the mission variables may identify some resources, assets, or locations more significant to successful mission accomplishment from enemy or adversary and friendly perspectives. Commanders rely on risk management (threat, critical asset, and vulnerability assessments of units, installations, facilities, and bases or base camps) to facilitate decision making, issue guidance, and allocate resources. Criticality, vulnerability, and recoverability are some of the most significant considerations in determining protection priorities that become the subject of commander guidance and the focus of area security. Area security often focuses on the following activities:


Route and convoy security.

Checkpoints and combat outposts.

DC control.

ADC.

Base and base camp security and defense.

Node protection.

Protective services.

Air, sea, and rail ports and terminals security.

Response force operations.

## Route And Convoy Security

4-10. The protection of LOCs and friendly forces moving along them is critical to military operations. Plans to provide route security may include establishing a movement corridor for all or a portion of a route, designating units for convoy security, providing guidance for units to provide their own security during convoys, or establishing protection and security requirements for convoys carrying critical assets. While a separate focused task, convoy security is always linked to the security of routes or LOCs and depends upon the broader area security to support the specific local security activities associated with the security of the convoy. The security of LOCs and supply routes (rail, pipeline, highway, and waterway) presents one of the greatest security challenges in an AO. Route and convoy security operations are typically viewed as being defensive in nature and being terrain-oriented. See ADP 3-37 for additional information.

4-11. Movement control is a critical component to the control of LOCs, routes, and area security, but it is focused on control rather than security of the movement. *Movement control* is the planning, routing, scheduling, and control of personnel and cargo movements over lines of communications; includes maintaining in-transit visibility of forces and material through the deployment and/or redeployment process.

(JP 4-01.5). Security considerations should always be a part of movement control. Mobility considerations are also critical to providing security. See chapter 2 and ATP 3-90.4 for a discussion of the role of mobility operations in LOCs and route and convoy security.

4-12. Military police units are capable of providing security for LOCs and routes that are identified as critical to military operations. They also provide convoy security for high-priority designated units transporting joint force commander- or geographic CCDR-designated critical supplies to combat forces. Military police teams moving with, or imbedded within, a convoy are typically the least effective method for securing convoys. It is often most efficient to employ military police units on aggressive patrolling, route, area, and zone reconnaissance measures that would create a safe and secure environment for all types of unit movement. The security provided by military police relies on the convoy being trained and applying appropriate convoy self-protection techniques as highlighted in ATP 4-01.45.

## Route Security

4-13. Route security operations protect LOCs (including highway, pipeline, rail, and water) and friendly forces moving along them. Units conduct route security missions to prevent enemy ground forces from moving into direct fire range of the protected route. This also prevents or mitigates other threat efforts to interdicting traffic along the route. Route security operations are typically defensive in nature and terrainoriented.

4-14. Threat forces will attempt to sever supply routes and LOCs by various methods. Roads, waterways, and railways may be obstructed by mines, IED, or some other type of obstacle; ambush sites may be located adjacent to the route being secured; or bridges and tunnels may be destroyed by demolitions causing diversions, delays, or further actions against traffic using the route. Because of the nature of this mission, long routes may be extremely difficult to secure; however, measures can be enforced to reduce the effect of threat forces on the routes.

4-15. A route security force operates on and to the flanks of a designated route. Route security is often used in an economy-of-force role to secure critical MSRs or other routes. To accomplish the route security mission, the force performs the following functions:


Conduct continuous mounted and dismounted reconnaissance of the route and key locations along it to ensure that the route is trafficable.

Conduct route clearance at irregular intervals to prevent the emplacement of explosive hazards and other obstacles along the route.

Identify sections of the route to be searched and specific locations likely to support threat activities.

Establish roadblocks and checkpoints along the route and lateral routes to stop and search vehicles and persons on the route and entering the route.

Occupy key locations and terrain along or near the route. If possible, establish a screen that is oriented to prevent threat direct-fire weapons and observation from influencing the route.

Conduct ground and aerial patrols and surveillance aggressively to maintain route security.

Establish OP (covert, overt) or ambushes at critical points to watch for threat activity.
4-16. Security forces conduct route reconnaissance at irregular intervals to avoid developing a pattern that the threat may exploit. If adequate resources are available, reconnoiter the route, including conducting zone reconnaissance, to a designated distance to either flank. Supporting aviation or intelligence assets may reconnoiter in advance ground elements or assist in screening the flanks. In addition to reconnaissance, security elements may escort engineers conducting route clearance, improvement, or maintenance; clearing terrain at choke points or other potential ambush sites; or repairing damage caused by threat actions.

4-17. Military police may be called upon to support route reconnaissance, route clearance, and route maintenance in support of route security missions. Typically, military police would provide a portion of the force performing route security. See chapter 2 for a discussion of reconnaissance and mobility support activities related to route security.

4-18. Military police may also require engineer support to assist with the hasty construction of checkpoints and for possibly constructing barriers that route traffic to designated search areas (see ATP 3-37.34). The priority of military police is typically to security that enhances mobility along the route. Engineer geospatial support may assist in the planning, preparation, execution, and assessment of the mission (see ATP 3-34.80).

This includes supporting the analysis of potential ambush sites or locations where the enemy could affect friendly forces or local civilian traffic with obstacles or the emplacement of IED and other explosive hazards.

See ATP 3-90.4 and ATP 3-90.37 for more information.

## Convoy Security

4-19. A convoy security operation is a specialized kind of area security operation conducted to protect convoys. Units conduct convoy security operations anytime there are insufficient friendly forces to continuously secure routes and other LOCs in an AO, and there is a significant danger of enemy or adversary ground action directed against the convoy. Commanders should conduct convoy security in conjunction with route security and integration with other support area activities. Local or theater policy typically dictates when or which convoys receive special support for security and protection.

4-20. Planning includes designating units for convoy security; providing or confirming guidance on TTP for units to provide for their own security during convoys; or establishing protection and security requirements for convoys carrying critical assets. Convoy security operations are typically defensive in nature and orient on the protected force, but that does not eliminate the need for aggressive reconnaissance as part of the mission. See ATP 4-01.45 for more information on convoy security training requirements and TTP.

4-21. Convoy security missions generate unique requirements that the commander must consider when formulating a plan. The convoy security commander and his subordinates are briefed on the latest information regarding the threat situation and the area through which the convoy will pass. The commander formulates his plans and issues his orders, including commander's intent, assignment of troops as security force elements
(reconnaissance, screen, escort, and response), the movement formation, intervals between echelons and vehicles, the rate of travel, and detailed plans for actions on contact. (See appendix C on the development of security and mobility support attachments that support the base OPORD.) Immediate action drills (enemy ambush, obstacle, reaction to indirect fire) must be identified and rehearsed before movement and executed in case of contact.

4-22. A convoy security mission has certain critical tasks that guide planning and execution. To protect a convoy, the security force must accomplish the following:


Reconnoiter the convoy route.

Clear the route of obstacles or positions from which the threat could influence movement along the route.

Provide early warning and prevent the threat from impeding, harassing, containing, seizing, or destroying the convoy.
4-23. The convoy security force typically consists of the following four elements:


Reconnaissance. The reconnaissance element performs tasks associated with route reconnaissance forward of the convoy. It may also perform duties of the screen element.

Screen. The screen element provides early warning and security to the convoy flanks and rear. It
may also perform duties of the reconnaissance element.

Escort. The escort element provides local protection to the convoy. It may also provide a response
force to assist in repelling or destroying threat contact.

Response. The response force provides firepower and support to assist the other elements in
developing the situation or conducting a hasty attack. It may also perform duties of the escort
element.
4-24. Commanders plan and execute all troop and supply movement as tactical operations. Because of the inherent dangers of convoy operations, emphasis is on extensive security measures. These measures include


Secrecy when planning and disseminating orders, strict noise and light discipline during
movement, and varying routes and schedules.

Coordination with fire support or aerial support units to ensure that they understand how support is used to assist movement in enforcing preventive measures and in conducting close, continuous support of combat operations.

Maneuver for counterambush actions, including contingency plans for immediate actions against an ambush and the use of formations, which allow part of the column to be in position to maneuver against an ambush force.

Communications and coordination with supporting units and units along the route, adjacent HN
forces, and higher headquarters (airborne radio relay assets).

Coordination with the supported unit moving in the formation, including control measures, locations for leaders, communications, medical support, and weapon systems.

Gathering of information from local civilians along the movement route (possible enemy ambush sites).
4-25. Military police are often selected to conduct convoy security operations; these tend to be performed primarily in the support area and along LOC. They are typically best suited for the reconnaissance or escort element. Limited additional training may be required to fulfill any or all of the tasks associated with convoy security when properly equipped. Commanders may have geospatial support to help identify choke points, potential ambush locations, or potential road condition concerns during the IPB. Many of the tasks associated with route security may also be appropriate to or linked to the performance of this mission.

4-26. Military police units are capable of providing convoy security for high-priority designated units transporting joint force- or geographic CCDR-designated critical supplies to combat forces. Military police teams moving with a convoy are typically the least effective method for securing convoys. It is often effective to employ military police units on aggressive patrolling and route, area, and potentially zone reconnaissance missions that create a safe and secure environment for all types of unit movement. This may include performing as the forward security element discussed in ATP 4-01.45.

4-27. During execution of convoy security missions, military police implement the following four principles of mounted movement for tactical convoys:


360-degree security. Combine maximum all-around visibility for situational awareness with
interlocking sectors of fire and mutual support. Convoy personnel should also be aware of what is above and below their position. Situational awareness should focus on approaching vehicles, potential IEDs or other explosive hazards, suspicious wires and antennas, canalizing terrain, bridges, overpasses, and suspicious individuals or groups.

Deterrence. Present an aggressive and professional posture that demonstrates readiness and willingness to engage. An aggressive posture may deter the enemy from approaching or engaging
the convoy.

Agility. Adapt to conditions set by the environment or the enemy.

Unpredictability. Minimize the enemy's ability to predict time, route, composition, or purpose
of the convoy.
4-28. Military police leaders assigned a convoy security mission develop the security plan, provide guidance on TTP for units to provide for their own security during convoys, or establish protection and security requirements for convoys carrying critical assets. The mission leader plans for security of the convoy by developing a strategy that includes all required considerations for the specific mission including coordination with appropriate units for required support, obtaining necessary equipment and supplies, and preparing mission briefings for security personnel. Convoy security may also be performed as part of a movement corridor. When planning convoy security operations, the mission leader completes the following tasks:


Coordinate with HN security personnel (when necessary).

Consult with all sources (intelligence, engineers, highway traffic division, and other units) to obtain as much information as possible about current and past activity and other information affecting the convoy route (and alternate routes) and projected timeframes.

Apply mobility considerations (see ATP 3-90.4).

Reconnoiter the convoy route to

Identify likely trouble spots and ambush sites.

Determine possible locations for TCPs or checkpoints.

Identify route conditions.

Determine the location of friendly units in the area.

Coordinate with the convoy commander.

Determine actions to take if

Attacked by an IED or other explosive hazard.

Attacked by a sniper.

Ambushed with the road blocked.

Ambushed with the road not blocked.

Attacked from the air.

Attacked by indirect fires.

Encountering civilians on the route.
Note. The reaction to an enemy attack while providing convoy security varies based on the mission and/or the type of cargo. When carrying special weapons or ammunition, ensure that procedures are addressed in the special orders on exactly how to react to enemy contact.


Determine convoy organization, to include the location of critical cargo vehicles, command vehicles, armored vehicles, maintenance and recovery vehicles, and those with crew-served
weapons.

Determine the location where military police vehicles and Soldiers will be positioned within or in proximity to the convoy.

Determine primary and backup radio frequencies and emergency communications procedures.

Determine the timetable for movements.

Determine start points and release points.

Determine security measures to be used at halts and rest stops.

Determine the time and place that military police support begins and ends.

Determine road conditions.

Determine available support from indirect fires, mobility assets, aviation assets (to include UAS), HN police support, or any other friendly assets that may affect the convoy routes.

Identify primary and alternate routes.

Determine the method of escort for the convoy.

Brief the personnel on the mission, the enemy situation, and specific individual duties to be performed.

Coordinate with friendly units in the area where the convoy will pass, and identify the support the
friendly units can provide.

Coordinate with aviation assets, if available.

Ensure leaders conduct thorough precombat checks or precombat inspections and rehearsals. See TC 3-39.30 for a description and examples of precombat checks or precombat inspections.

## Checkpoints And Combat Outposts

4-29. It is often necessary to control the freedom of movement in an AO for a specific period of time or as a long-term operation. This may be accomplished by placing checkpoints and combat outposts along designated avenues and roadways or on key terrain identified through mission variables.

4-30. Checkpoints are used for controlling, regulating, and verifying movement; combat outposts are used for sanctuary, support, information collection, or area denial. Most checkpoints will never become a combat outpost, but a high density of other activities at a checkpoint (such as a series of collocated collection points, the requirement to maintain a checkpoint for an extended period of time, or significant enemy activity) may cause a checkpoint to grow into a combat outpost.

## Checkpoints

4-31. It is often necessary for commanders to control the freedom of movement in an AO. Military police accomplish this by placing short- or long-duration checkpoints along designated avenues and roadways or on key terrain identified through an analysis of the mission variables. Checkpoints monitor and control movement of personnel and vehicles, inspect cargo, enforce laws and regulations, and provide information. They may also be used simply to coordinate movement and surveillance activities.

4-32. Establishing checkpoints is a critical measure in a commander's overall protection efforts. A
commander designates checkpoints along a movement route to assist marching units in complying with the timetable. The movement overlay identifies critical points along the route where interference with movement might occur. The commander positions TCPs along the route to prevent congestion and confusion. They may be manned by military police or other unit personnel. These Soldiers report to the appropriate area movement control organization when each convoy, march column, and march serial arrives at and completes passage of their location. Checkpoints may also indicate critical terrain features and help to coordinate air-ground integration and enable effective civil control. See ATP 3-39.33 and TC 3-39.30 for information regarding civil disturbance.

4-33. Military police provide expertise to commanders on the construction and procedures involved in checkpoint operations. They also operate critical checkpoints to control traffic flow, enforce laws, and control movement at critical locations, such as border crossing sites or access to critical facilities. (See chapter 5 for more on border operations.) Military police establish and operate two types of checkpoints: deliberate and hasty.

## Deliberate Checkpoint

4-34. A deliberate checkpoint is a fixed position constructed and employed to protect an operating base camp, a well-established MSR, or a main road in a rural or built-up area. A deliberate checkpoint is typically a preplanned location linked to a larger tactical plan and intended for a longer period of time than a hasty checkpoint. A deliberate checkpoint may even require rehearsals to be conducted.

4-35. Survivability considerations may be significant in comparison to a hasty checkpoint. See ATP 3-37.34 for specifics on obstacle creation and use, to include a discussion of access or entry control points. See TC 3-39.30 for specifics associated with all access control points. Figure 4-1, page 4-8, illustrates an example of a deliberate checkpoint.

4-36. Deliberate checkpoints are typically used to

Control all vehicles and pedestrian traffic so crowds cannot assemble.

Identify and detain known offenders or suspected enemy or insurgent personnel.

Provide straggler control collection.

Enforce curfews.

Deter illegal movement.

Prevent the movement of supplies to the enemy.

Deny the enemy contact with or prevent insurgents from hiding within the local inhabitants.

Dominate the area around the checkpoint.

Collect information.
4-37. Checkpoints are generally categorized by how much traffic is expected to pass through them. A heavytraffic checkpoint normally requires a platoon to operate it. Although not optimal, a military police (or other type) squad can operate a light-traffic checkpoint for a short duration (12 hours or less). Checkpoints may also be classified by the number of other activities that are collocated or occurring in the same vicinity.

## Hasty Checkpoint

4-38. Units activate a hasty checkpoint as part of a larger tactical plan or in reaction to hostile activities (for example, bomb, mine incident, or sniper attack) and can close the checkpoint on the command of the controlling headquarters. A hasty checkpoint will always have a specific task and purpose. Hasty checkpoints may grow to be a deliberate checkpoint. Figure 4-2 illustrates an example of a hasty checkpoint.

4-39. Units set up hasty checkpoints to achieve surprise. Leaders avoid setting patterns by moving the checkpoint location and changing the method of operation at random. Units establish hasty checkpoints where they cannot be seen by approaching traffic until it is too late for approaching traffic to unobtrusively withdraw. Good locations to set up hasty checkpoints include bridges, defiles, highway intersections, the reverse slope of a hill, and just beyond a sharp curve. Characteristics of a hasty checkpoint include


Using vehicles, reinforced with concertina wire, as the obstacle. Soldiers may employ tire deflation devices or road spike strips. These devices are more effective than concertina wire and may be less intrusive in stability activities.

Positioning vehicles at each end of the checkpoint to partially block the route.

Conducting the search in the area between the vehicles.

Concealing a reaction force (at least one team) nearby to react in case the site is attacked.
4-40. The basic organization of a checkpoint includes a headquarters element, a security element, a search element, and an assault element. While checkpoint forces may vary in size, typical sizes are shown below. To operate a checkpoint, task-organize the unit as follows:


Headquarters element. This element is responsible for

Exercising command and control.

Maintaining a log of all activities.

Maintaining communication with its higher headquarters.

Coordinating local patrols.

Coordinating the role of civil authorities, as required.

Coordinating linkups, as required.

Coordinating relief in place, as required.

Integrating a reserve force or a quick response force (QRF).

Security element. This element consists of a military police squad responsible for

Monitoring traffic flow up to and through the checkpoint.

Watching for and reporting suspicious activity.

Providing early warning to the search and assault elements.

Preventing enemy ambush.

Search element. This element consists of a military police squad and is responsible for

Halting vehicles at the checkpoint.

Guiding vehicles to the designated search point.

Conducting personnel and vehicle searches.

Directing cleared vehicles to continue through the checkpoint.

Detaining personnel as directed.

Assault element. This element is responsible for

Preparing and occupying fortified fighting positions.

Eliminating any hostile element that forces its way past the search team, according to the
ROE.
Note. Checkpoints are part of a police action. As such, all Soldiers participating in the operation must clearly understand the ROE and the use of deadly force.

4-41. Checkpoint layout, construction, and operation are based on an analysis of the mission variables. The following procedures and considerations typically apply:


Position the checkpoint where traffic cannot turn back, get off the road, or bypass the checkpoint without being observed.

Position vehicles and crew-served weapons off the road but within sight of the checkpoint. This
helps deter resistance toward Soldiers operating the checkpoint. Place vehicles in a hull-down
position that allows for Soldiers to engage vehicles trying to break through or bypass the
checkpoint.

Place obstacles in the road to slow or canalize traffic into the search area. Traffic enters the checkpoint single file.

Place signs written in the HN language that explain the checkpoint and include instructions for passing through it.

Establish communications according to the unit SOP.

Designate the search area for vehicles and personnel. If possible, surround the search area with barriers that protect against such threats as a booby-trapped vehicle or suicide bomber. Women
are normally only checked with a metal detector or searched by female personnel. However, this
depends on the ROE and mission variables. TC 3-39.30 provides additional information regarding vehicle and personnel searches.

If applicable, checkpoint personnel should include linguists.

## Combat Outposts

4-42. A *combat outpost* is a reinforced observation post capable of conducting limited combat operations
(FM 3-90-2). Using combat outposts is a technique for employing security forces in restrictive terrain that precludes mounted security forces from covering the area. They are also used when smaller OPs (or potentially checkpoint and TCPs) are in danger of being overrun by enemy forces infiltrating into and through the security area. The commander uses a combat outpost to extend the depth of the security area, keep friendly forward OPs in place until they can observe the enemy's main body, or secure friendly forward OPs that will be encircled by enemy forces. Both mounted and dismounted forces can employ combat outposts. Combat outposts may also be used in conjunction with establishment of a movement corridor. See figure 4-3 for an example of combat outposts supporting a guard mission.

4-43. While an analysis of the mission variables determines the size, location, and number of combat outposts a unit establishes, a reinforced platoon typically occupies a combat outpost. A combat outpost must have sufficient resources to accomplish its designated missions, but not so much as to seriously deplete the strength of the main body. It is usually located far enough forward of the protected force to preclude enemy ground reconnaissance elements from observing the actions of the protected force.

4-44. The commander organizes a combat outpost to provide an all-around defense to withstand a superior enemy force. When the enemy has significant armored capability, the commander may give a combat outpost more than the standard allocation of antitank weapons. Forces manning combat outposts can conduct aggressive patrolling, engage and destroy enemy reconnaissance elements, and engage the enemy main body before their extraction. The commander plans to extract friendly forces from the outpost before the enemy overruns them.

4-45. Perhaps the most likely use of a combat outpost by military police would be in the conduct of a movement corridor. Another likely situation might be when multiple activities are collocated at a specific site and the likelihood of enemy activity against that site increases to where the security level of a combat outpost may be needed.

## Dislocated Civilian Control

4-46. Control of DCs has a security component to it, but in general, the primary focus has to do with enabling movement and maneuver for other forces. This is accomplished by minimizing civilian interference with military operations. Control of DCs is also conducted to protect civilians from the effects of combat operations and natural or man-made disasters. Chapter 2 is focused on control of DCs as a factor for enabling the movement and maneuver of friendly forces. Additional considerations, while in support of security operations, include a requirement to ensure that enemy forces and threats are not hidden within DC populations.

4-47. Chapter 5 discusses the relevance of DC control to PRC operations with additional information provided in appendix A on camps associated with DC operations. Military police support to populace control is largely focused on DC control.

## Area Damage Control

4-48. *Area damage control* is the measures taken before, during, and/or after a hostile action or natural or manmade disasters to reduce the probability of damage and minimize its effects (JP 3-10). Commanders conduct ADC when the damage and scope of the attack are limited and they can respond and recover with local assets and resources. In support areas, commanders conduct ADC to prevent and respond to the negative effects of enemy or adversary action that can diminish combat power. Although engineers may perform many of the activities associated with ADC, military police play a critical role as well. See ADP 3-37, FM 3-39, and FM 3-81 for more information on ADC.

4-49. Military police facilitate the reestablishment of order and control and minimize the effects from the often catastrophic effects of disasters. There are probably few if any new activities or capabilities required for military police to perform support to area damage, and many of them may not be specific to the security and mobility discipline.

4-50. When performed as part of DSCA, ADC is typically referred to as incident management. Some of these incidents may rise to the level of national significance and require additional resources for mitigation, recovery, and investigation. Incident management and ADC follow established battle drills and SOPs. These drills allow effective action against fear, panic, and confusion that follows an attack. They may perform these activities as part of a maneuver enhancement brigade. See ADP 3-28, ADP 3-37, FM 3-81, and JP 3-10 for more information on incident management.

## Base And Base Camp Security And Defense

4-51. *Base defense* is the local military measures, both normal and emergency, required to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of enemy attacks on, or sabotage of, a base to ensure the maximum capacity of its facilities is available to United States forces (JP 3-10). Although generally aligned under the protection warfighting function, base security and defense integrate tasks from both the protection and movement and maneuver warfighting functions as articulated in ADP 3-37 and ADP 3-90, respectively. ATP 3-37.2, FM 3-90-1, GTA 90-01-011, JP 3-07.2, and JP 3-10 are additional key references for base security and defense operations. A division or corps may be required to protect multiple bases or base camps. They may choose to establish one or more base cluster. In base defense operations, a *base cluster* is a collection of bases, geographically grouped for mutual protection and ease of command and control (JP 3-10). Base commanders are responsible for establishing base defense procedures for their AO. Units may be assigned base defense operations on a permanent or rotating basis, depending on the mission variables. See ATP 3-37.10 for a focused discussion of security and defense of bases and base camps.

4-52. The framework for base camp security and defense consists of three primary areas (see figure 4-4).

This structuring provides a means for organizing protection and defense information and requirements and focusing efforts. These three areas are


Outer security area. This is the area outside the perimeter that extends out to the limit of the base
camp commander's AO. Commanders establish an outer security area to provide early warning and reaction time, and deny enemy reconnaissance efforts and vantage points for conducting standoff attacks. The outer security area is typically patrolled by mobile security elements. Establishing check points or other LOC security measures are potential examples of limited operations beyond the base camp boundary and may even call for the establishment of a movement corridor in selected situations.

Perimeter zone. This zone includes the base camp perimeter and area immediately in front or behind it that is needed for OPs, fighting positions, and entry control points. Selected base camps may have designated inner and outer perimeters. Larger base camps will seldom employ this double layer of perimeters, and will rely more on a single perimeter supplemented with inner barriers and access control measures around critical facilities. Creation of a double perimeter is extremely resource intensive.

Inner security area. This is the area inside the base camp perimeter. Interior barrier plans can be used around individual unit locations and critical assets, and as traffic control measures to add depth to the base camp security plan and to halt or impede the progress of threat penetrations of
the perimeter zone.
4-53. Collectively, these three areas form the base camp AO. Commanders assigned an AO have inherent responsibilities that are described in FM 3-90-1. Not all commanders that may serve as base camp commanders will have the organic capabilities within their units to perform all of these responsibilities. In those situations, the higher commander must clearly articulate in the order which AO responsibilities will not be performed by the base camp commander (and who will perform them) or provide the necessary augmented capabilities to perform them. (See appendix C on the development of security and mobility support attachments that support the base OPORD.)
4-54. Base camp commanders and their staffs apply the framework for base security and defense to focus their planning activities and ensure that all critical elements of base security and defense are addressed. The framework is not intended as an all-inclusive solution to base security and defense, but is intended to provide a general template for planning.

4-55. Military police conduct area and base security operations to protect friendly forces, bases and base camps, and actions in the support area. As part of area security, military police units provide protection for bases and base camps (to include airbases) in the AO. In this role, military police units are capable of detecting, providing early warning of, and engaging enemy forces in the outer security area. Using military police skills, they may interface with the local population and apply police intelligence techniques to further facilitate the security of the base camp. Military police units provide in-depth security by operating outside the perimeter of the base camp beyond the range of threat weapons to the base camp as well as on the perimeter and internal to the base camp. This facilitates early detection and engagement of threat forces at a sufficient standoff distance to allow for their destruction or disruption before they can effectively engage the base camp. However, they may well perform roles within the perimeter zone and inner security zone, to include performing as the QRF, or in selected cases, as a TCF.

4-56. Airbase protection and defense are key components of military police area security. When the threat exceeds the airbase capabilities, the engaged commander requests military police assistance. Airbase defense requires special military police coordination with the United States Air Force security forces and other security forces responsible for base defense. Air Force security force units are responsible for internal airbase security and defense. Military police units are typically responsible for the airbase's external defense. Air Force and Army forces must coordinate their defensive efforts. This includes boundaries, fire control measures, and contact points. Combining the Air Force security forces with military police units provides an in-depth defense for weapon systems, aircraft, command centers, personnel, and other priority resources established by the airbase commander. See AFI 31-101 for more information on Air Force security operations.

4-57. In developing a base defense strategy, a simple, flexible defensive plan is essential. The plan should maximize the use of SOPs and battle drills at the user level. The base defense plan should also integrate the following fundamentals:


Understand the enemy. Defenders must be familiar with the capabilities and limitations of the enemy forces, weapons, equipment, and tactics.

Create situational awareness. Intelligence reporting is essential to provide an accurate picture of
the operational environment.

Use the defender's advantages. The defender's advantages may permit a numerically inferior
force to defeat a much larger one. These advantages include

The ability to fight from cover.

A more detailed knowledge of the local terrain and environment.

The ability to prepare positions, routes between them, obstacles, and fields of fire in advance.

The ability to plan communications, control measures, indirect fires, and logistics support for contingency operations.

The ability to deceive enemy forces about friendly defensive capabilities, dispositions, and execution of operations.

Concentrate at critical times and places. Defense of a base or base camp should be conducted
taking advantage of interior lines, permitting the timely and secure movement of forces to engage the most critical threats. The commander must mass combat power at points of decision by
economizing in some areas, retaining a reserve, and maneuvering to gain local superiority at critical points.

Conduct counterreconnaissance and counterattacks. Fixed bases usually have well-established
perimeters with limited depth. Counterreconnaissance and counterattack add depth to the battle outside the perimeter, allowing the base or base camp to continue its primary mission with minimal interference. (Counterreconnaissance patrols should be extended 2 to 3 miles [about 3 to 5 kilometers] beyond the perimeter, based on terrain, to reduce the risk of fratricide, especially at night.)

Coordinate critical defense assets. Synchronization of indirect fires, air defense resources, tactical aircraft, engineers, dismounted troops, armored vehicles, naval surface fire support, and helicopters can produce a combined-arms effect.

Balance base security with political and legal constraints. This fundamental is especially
critical in a low-intensity conflict environment.

Know the law of war **and ROE.** Base and base camp commanders and their subordinates must
comply with ROE. In joint-service (or multinational) operations, reconcile inconsistencies with
ROE.

Threat
Level
Definition or Description
Response
I
A *Level I threat* is a small enemy force that can be
defeated by maneuver units operating in the rear area or by the perimeter defenses (see JP 3-10). A Level I threat
for a typical base or base camp consists of a squad-size
unit or smaller group of enemy soldiers, agents, or terrorists. Typical objectives for a Level I threat include supplying themselves from friendly supply stocks; disrupting friendly command and control, logistics, and
facilities; and interdicting friendly LOCs. Countering Level I threats should be part of the day-to-day FP measures
implemented by all commanders.
Note. These include a potential for insider attacks by elements or individuals of HN partners and security forces, often characterized as green-on-blue.
II
A *Level II threat* is represented by enemy activities that
can be defeated by a base camp or base cluster augmented by a response force (see JP 3-10). Level II
threats consist of enemy special operations teams, longrange reconnaissance units, mounted or dismounted combat reconnaissance teams, and partially attrited small combat units. Typical objectives for a Level II threat include the disruption and destruction of friendly command and control, logistics, and commercial facilities,
and the interdiction of friendly LOCs.
III
A *Level III threat* is a threat beyond the defensive capability of both the base camp and base cluster and any local reserve or response force (see JP 3-10). Level III threats may be encountered when a threat force has the capability of projecting combat power by air, land,
sea, or anywhere into the operational area. Level III threats normally consist of a mobile enemy force. Possible objectives for a Level III threat include seizing key terrain, interfering with the movement and commitment of reserves and artillery, and destroying
friendly combat forces. Additional objectives could also include destroying friendly facilities, supply points, command post facilities, airfields, aviation assembly areas, arming and refueling points, and interdicting LOCs
and major supply routes.
FP
force protection
HN
host nation
JP
joint publication
LOC
lines of communication
A traditional response force for a Level I threat is a maneuver unit or perimeter defenses established by friendly base camps and base clusters. A typical response force for a Level II threat is a military police platoon; however, it can be a combat arms maneuver element. The response to a Level III threat is a tactical combat force.

4-59. The mission of the base security forces is to conduct reaction operations to deter, resist, or destroy an enemy Level I force (see table 4-1, page 4-15) attacking the base or base camp. The base defense force consists of combined security assets provided by units contained on the base camp. The base camp commander considers all available Army, joint, and multinational resources and forces in determining the exact organization of the base defense force. If the base camp comes under attack, the base camp commander responds within the capability of the base defense force.

4-60. A base defense force should have a significant amount of direct-fire lethality provided by a mixture of small arms, automatic weapons, and antitank systems. It should also have access to supporting indirect fires, a high degree of tactical mobility, and a reasonable span of control. It should be capable of


Conducting reconnaissance patrols for detecting and reporting the location, strength, and capabilities of enemy forces located near the base camp.

Developing positions within and outside the base camp from which enemy advances can be stopped or destroyed.

Using reserve elements to attack relatively small enemy units that threaten to penetrate the base
camp perimeter.

Providing internal security for critical capabilities located on the base camp.
4-61. To streamline command and control of the base defense force in the event of an attack, the base commander may designate a base defense force commander and establish a base defense operations center to ensure the integration of defense plans and maximum effectiveness of the total base defense effort. A base defense operations center is a command and control facility established by the base commander to serve as the focal point for base security and defense (JP 3-10). The nature of the base defense operations center depends on the combination of forces involved and may be joint, interagency, or multinational.

4-62. Military police leaders anticipate the integration of their capabilities into the base defense plan;
therefore, they know their roles, capabilities, and dependencies and have the ability to articulate the information to nonmilitary police leaders or battle staff. PIO can be used to provide essential early warnings of enemy activity allowing early prediction and potentially preventing a threat from affecting base operations. Additional base defense tasks may include patrols, access control, critical base facility security, LPs or OPs, and QRP or initial response force.

## Node Protection

4-63. Command posts and operations centers are often protected through area security techniques that involve the employment of protection and security assets in a layered, integrated, and redundant manner. This can often keep hostile threats at a distance by maximizing the standoff distance from explosive effects, while keeping the protected asset outside the range of enemy or adversary direct-fire weapons and observation.

4-64. Military police understand the elements of the movement order to include the possible activation of alternate command post nodes. Providing security for key nodes is potentially a very fluid requirement. Military police must be proactive in accomplishing this mission. This mission is often linked to the mission of HRP security. Nodes may be mobile rather than static sites, and part of the military police requirement is reconnaissance of new sites prior to that site being established as a node. In those cases military police may be part of the reconnaissance element or a quartering party to facilitate the movement and continuing security of the nodeand potentially the HRP associated with it.

## Protective Services

4-65. *High-risk personnel* are personnel who, by their grade, assignment, symbolic value, or relative isolation, are likely to be attractive or accessible terrorist targets (JP 3-07.2). Special precautions are taken to ensure the safety and security of these individuals and their family members from terrorist or criminal elements. When units identify a significant risk to selected personnel, the local commander normally organizes security details from organic resources. However, under certain circumstances, designated personnel may require protective service details by specially trained units. See ATP 3-39.35 for more information on the military police specific application of protective services. There are four levels of HRP as follows:


Level 1 and 2 HRP require significant protection, to include dedicated personal security details and other security measures as outlined in DODI O-2000.22.

Level 2.5 authorizes the designation of a CID personal security advisor who coordinates travel security for the assigned HRP and may be armed only if acting as part of a larger (temporary) protective detail.

Level 3 personnel are not authorized protective services; however, they should receive additional
antiterrorism and personal protective measure training.
4-66. The Deputy SecDef is the approval authority for all HRP levels. Approval authority for HRP level 2.5
for outside the continental United States travel is delegated to the Under SecDef for Policy by the Deputy SecDef.

4-67. Specially trained USACIDC special agents provide continuous executive-level protective service to designated Level 1 and 2 HRP. USACIDC personnel typically provide all close-in protection for Level 1 and
2 HRP but often require the augmentation of military police teams assigned or attached to USACIDC and trained in protective service tasks. Military police coordinate with USACIDC when augmenting personal security details. MWD teams may be employed to enhance military police and USACIDC detection and protection capabilities.

4-68. The goal of a protective services detail mission is to protect HRP from all hazards, whether caused by personal design, accident, or negligence. Although absolute protection is never possible, following certain well-established protective services detail basic principles will increase the probability of a successful mission. There are five essential fundamentals necessary to the success of protective services detail missions. They include


Planning and coordination. Planning is critical to a successful mission. Meticulously plan every element of protection; scrutinize every act or movement of the principal and the protective services detail to ensure maximum security. Mission leaders must thoroughly brief and rehearse emergency procedures to ensure that personnel instinctively react instantly and correctly.

Ensuring the availability of resources. There are many factors that determine the number of personnel assigned, as well as the equipment used, to a protection detail, with none being more important than the availability of resources. Pay special consideration to the principal's position,
the threat level at the location being visited, and the complexity of the mission. Consider all of these factors when requesting and making available resources for a mission.

Assigning responsibilities. Assigning individual responsibilities ensures successful completion
of all facets of the mission.

Controlling information. Closely control the release of personal information pertaining to the principal and other members of the party, details of the itinerary, and the security procedures to be employed. Make certain protective services detail personnel understand they are prohibited from discussing or releasing any of this information with anyone other than authorized personnel. Release of any information to other than authorized persons adversely affects the integrity of the
security mission.

Being flexible. Unexpected changes to the itinerary require that flexibility be the keynote factor in planning protective services detail missions. Prepare alternate and contingency plans to cover circumstances such as inclement weather, possible threats, or any other actions that may affect the
security of HRP. Good preventive measures and thorough backup plans are critical.

## Air, Sea, And Rail Ports And Terminals

4-69. Military police are often required to provide security support to ports and terminals (terminal operations). While there are similarities, each port or terminal environment is unique and requires specific knowledge of the nature of that port or terminal to properly apply security fundamentals and basic military police capabilities and skills. While the other military police disciplines potentially have linkages to ports and terminals, mobility and security support provide the focus for military police support.

4-70. Aerial ports and terminals often find military police supporting either Air Force or civilian organizations and focusing on the transition from air to land or land to air shipment and transport. Seaports and terminals typically require support of Navy and Marine Corps or civilian organizations with a focus on the transition from water to land or land to water. Railheads are potentially linked to aerial ports or seaports and terminals but are also unique in the potential requirement for military police to support security along the length of the railway as well as at fixed sites that are part of the rail system. LOGSEC provides a focused set of specialized capabilities that enable security for ports and terminals (see chapter 5).

4-71. Army expeditionary intermodal operations include all of the areas discussed below. The fundamentals of Army expeditionary intermodal operations and general terminal operation techniques tie together various transportation competencies to enhance deployment, redeployment, and distribution operations for the endto-end movement of personnel, equipment, or forces. For a better understanding of how military police may support intermodal operations, see ATP 4-13 or the specific manuals associated with the intermodal components and transportation competencies.

## Aerial Port And Terminal Security

4-72. Military police may be required to support the security of airfields or landing zones. When linked to a base, base camp, or base camp cluster, those requirements will be articulated by the respective commanders. When the base is primarily an air base, it is likely that the Air Force will be the commander of the base. In any case, the senior airfield authority will be an important player in this type of a mission.

4-73. Most base camps will likely need a minimum of a landing zone to facilitate resupply operations and casualty evacuation. When performed in relationship to a base camp with active airfields and landing zones, it is necessary to consider vulnerabilities to approaching and departing aircraft and implement the necessary protection measures to counter threats to include shoulder-launched and surface-to-air weapons and heavy machine guns. See JP 3-10 for more information.

4-74. Military police may have to integrate their security efforts with Air Force security forces when an airbase is linked with or included inside a base camp. The Air Force approach to security of an airbase is very similar to the doctrine for providing security to a base camp, but terminology and specifics do vary. See AFI 31-101 for more Air Force information on integrated defense operations.

4-75. Military police may be required to support the security of airports and airfields within the United States and its territories at the request of other federal agencies. When this occurs, it is part of DSCA tasks and ADP 3-28, JP 3-27, and JP 3-28 should be reviewed for more information. The only real change in performing in the domestic operational environment is the related legal restrictions that may apply.

## Seaport And Terminal Security

4-76. Military police typically provide area and local security for port and pier areas. The joint force commander and subordinate joint force commanders ensure that port security plans and responsibilities are clearly delineated and assigned. The Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command is charged by the United States Transportation Command as the single port manager for all ports. Area commanders (and subordinate military police) assigned a port area as part of their AO must develop and organize plans (in conjunction with the appropriate Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (brigade or battalion) to ensure that Soldiers are trained and equipped to protect or secure port areas and cargo as necessary. The patrol of harbors and anchorages is generally the mission of a dedicated port security unit and may include waterfront security operations. See JP 3-10 for more information on port security units and ATP 4-15 for information on Army water transportation operations.

4-77. In a wartime environment, military police and USACIDC will implement LOGSEC measures (see chapter 5) at the continental United States and outside the Continental United States terminals. Teams located at the ports of debarkation are cognizant of sensitive cargo shipments inbound to their location. This is a critical requirement to minimize or eliminate the risk of criminal activity directed against military equipment moving into the theater of operations. During redeployment the same procedures must be used to protect military equipment returning to its home station.

4-78. Base camps may be collocated with military ports and terminals. The CCDR or the joint force commander delineates responsibilities between the base camp commander, the military port commander, and the senior airfield authority (if one is included in the port area) to ensure unity of effort.

## Railway And Railhead Security

4-79. Military police and USACIDC agents support the security of railheads, terminals, and railways with LOGSEC, providing a special capability to facilitate this (see chapter 5). As with air and sea ports and terminals, railheads and terminals may be collocated with a base camp.

4-80. Military police support Army rail operations through local and area security and provide the specialized capability of LOGSEC to facilitate these operations as well. As with planning to support other intermodal operations, military police need to understand the basics of those operations. (See ATP 4-14 for more information on Army rail operations.) It is important to understand the critical assets associated with rail operations (tracks, locomotives and rolling stock, switching modes, tunnels and bridges, marshalling yards, and so forth) and the items (materiel and personnel) that are being transported. The basics associated with route security apply to the tracks, while those associated with local security will apply to the protection of sites and specific points within the rail system. Military police may also be involved in providing security as part of the security force on the rolling stock itself (to include armored trains and cars), and many of the basics associated with convoy security will apply.

## Response Force Operations

4-81. Response force operations include the planning for defeat of Levels I and II threats and the shaping of Level III threats until the designated TCF arrives for decisive operations. Response force operations use a mobile force with appropriate fire support to deal with Level II threats in the AO. Key to the performance of these activities is battle handover from a base camp or base cluster and their security forces to a TCF. A TCF is a rapidly deployable, air-ground mobile combat unit, with appropriate combat support and combat service support assets assigned to and capable of defeating Level III threats including combined arms (see JP 3-10).

4-82. Response force operations expediently reinforce unit organic protection capabilities or complement that protection with maneuver capabilities based on the threat. Response force operations include planning and training for the defeat of Level I and II threats and the shaping of Level III threats until a designated TCF
arrives for decisive operations. Response force operations use a QRF with appropriate fire support (usually designated by the area commander) to deal with Level II threats in the AO. See ATP 3-37.10, FM 3-39, and JP 3-10 for more information on response force operations.

4-83. A response force is a mobile force with appropriate fire support designated, usually by the area commander, to handle Level II threats in the operation area. Military police units may be designated as the base camp or critical facility commander's response force against Level I and Level II threat attacks. Military police units gather police information about the enemy while performing security and mobility support missions throughout the AO. This information updates the commander's common operational picture with enemy and criminal activity near base camps and throughout the AO. When needed, military police units provide wheeled armor response forces to respond to base camps and critical facilities under attack and to destroy the enemy. A base camp commander's defense plan is the cornerstone for protecting units and sustainment operations.

4-84. Military police may be identified as the QRF for a base camp or other location. Being designated as a QRF is similar to the creation of a reserve in that the QRF may only be used for the performance of activities associated with being the QRFit is a dedicated force. A QRF is a dedicated force on a base with adequate tactical mobility and fire support designated to defeat Level I and Level II threats and shape Level III threats until they can be defeated by a TCF or other available response forces (see ATP 3-37.10). The QRF provides the base camp or base cluster commander with a depth for security and defense. Once committed, the commander will be prepared to reconstitute a QRF. The base camp commander may assign the QRF a wide variety of tasks, both within the base camp security area and within the base camp perimeter, to


Reinforce a threatened area or respond to a penetration of the perimeter.

Establish contact with potential threats and engage those threats as required within the base camp security area, defeating Level II threats, and delaying Level III threats until they can be defeated by a TCF.

Reinforce engaged units outside the perimeter.

Conduct reconnaissance and surveillance activities.

Respond to threats on critical assets, infrastructure, or HRP.

Conduct security checks and random patrolling within the base camp perimeter.
4-85. The size and composition of the QRF is based on a threat assessment and the levels of uncertainty and risk, and is adjusted based on changes in the situation. The level of responsiveness (readiness condition) of the QRF is also a variable that is adjusted based on threat conditions. The QRF should be mounted to ensure adequate protection and tactical mobility.

4-86. When the threat exceeds a base camp or critical facility capabilities, the commander requests response force support. When military police are the designated response force, military police units that are near base camps, on patrol, or conducting area security will consolidate their forces, respond as quickly as possible, and conduct combat operations to destroy the enemy. When the threat exceeds military police capabilities, the military police response force may conduct a battle handover to a TCF. Military police forces performing or tasked as a response may conduct a


Movement to contact.

Hasty ambush.

Hasty attack.

Delay.

Call for fire (indirect fire or close air support).

Critical site defense.
4-87. If military police are the designated response force, they must

Review base defense plans.

Coordinate with the supported base commanders to synchronize response plans.

Exchange communications frequencies to ensure communications capability between security elements.

Identify military police contingency plans to counter likely enemy activities.

Integrate air defense artillery, engineer, CBRN, indirect-fire, and close air support into their plans
(if available).
4-88. Although the current intelligence and the base or critical facility commander's risk assessment and stated needs will be the driving factors, the military police commander should assist in determining the size and composition of the response force. The military police commander considers the following when developing his plan when designated as the QRF commander:


The current base defense plans and the commander's guidance.

The priority of ongoing operations.

The criticality of the base under attack.

The amount of time needed for given elements to consolidate.

The ability to communicate between security elements.

The identification of contingency plans to counter likely enemy activities.

The availability of additional forces to supplement the response force element, if required.

The integration of engineer, CBRN, fire support, and close air support.
4-89. Military police consolidate into squads or platoons to delay, defeat, or defend against Level I and Level II threats. Military police response forces also shape and delay Level III threats until a designated combined arms TCF arrives for decisive operations. Military police forces performing as a response force must be capable of conducting the following tasks:


Movement to contact.

Hasty ambush.

Hasty attack.

Delay.

Call for fire.

Defense of critical sites and assets.

Establishment of a fighting or survivability position (see ATP 3-37.34 and TC 3-39.30).

## Local Security

4-90. *Local security* is the low-level security activities conducted near a unit to prevent surprise by the enemy
(ADP 3-90). It provides immediate protection to the friendly force and is typically performed by a unit for itself, but may also be provided by another unit when the security requirement is greater than the unit or facility can provide for itself or may require specialized security capabilities that the unit or facility does not possess. Local security may include countermobility and survivability activities. All area security takes advantage of the local security measures performed by all units regardless of their location in the AO, and all local security should be linked to the broader area security activities.

4-91. Local security includes any local measure taken by units against enemy actions. It involves avoiding enemy detection or deceiving the enemy about friendly positions and intentions. It also includes finding any enemy forces in the immediate vicinity and knowing as much about their positions and intentions as possible.

Local security prevents a unit from being surprised, and it is an important part of maintaining the initiative. The requirement for maintaining local security is an inherent part of all operations. Units perform local security when conducting all operations, including tactical enabling operations. Military police training and capabilities make them a critical component of antiterrorism and physical security activities. LOGSEC is one specialized capability that military police provide to both of these tasks (see chapter 5).

4-92. Units use both active and passive measures to provide local security. Active measures include


OPs and patrols.

The establishment of specific levels of alert in the unit. The commander adjusts those levels based on the mission variables.

The establishment of stand-to times. A unit's SOPs detail its activities during the conduct of a
stand-to.

Using UAS.
4-93. Passive local security measures include

Camouflage and concealment.

Movement control.

Noise and light discipline.

Proper communications procedures.

The employment of available sensors, night-vision devices, and daylight sights to maintain
surveillance over the area immediately around the unit.

The incorporation of emission control to prevent the enemy from detecting, identifying, and locating friendly forces.
4-94. When military police provide protection around a critical site or asset, they typically conduct mobile security patrols, taking advantage of wheeled, armored vehicles with crew-served weapons and communications platforms manned by three military police Soldiers organic to the military police team and grouped in squad-, platoon-, or company-size elements. This standoff protection is capable of detecting and defeating Level I and Level II enemy threats as the enemy attempts to maneuver within direct-fire range of facilities or assets. Requirements may include establishing checkpoints and LPs or OPs. They may also include control of internal access points to facilities or sites and performing as an initial response force. Finally, military police may provide in-transit security protection as a critical asset moves between locations.

4-95. Military police may also be used to assist HN forces by establishing security measures or identifying gaps in existing security for critical facilities. Facilities having national, cultural, religious, or military significance may require dedicated security forces. Examples of HN critical assets include power generation, water treatment, hospitals, police stations, religious structures, and armories.

4-96. A military police unit executing security of a critical facility or site typically conducts the following tasks:


Receive and review the security mission directive and initiate troop leading procedures.

Gather information from previous reconnaissance reports, other units, or an element being relieved at a static post.

Ensure that all squad members know the following information before executing the mission:

The ROE, such as actions on contact.

The tactical situation and the security defense plan.

General orders.

Special orders detailing duties, responsibilities, and procedures.

Determine the security methodstatic posts or mobile patrolsand assign teams to specific
mission tasks. If specific orders are not provided, the squad leader determines the best method to use or uses a combination of both (See appendix C on the development of security and mobility support attachments that support the base OPORD).

Enforce situational awareness and ensure that certain squad members understand the procedures for reporting any unusual activity. Soldiers must be familiar with the surrounding areas and the local populace, both civilian and military.

Act as a response force by responding (as quickly as possible) to conduct combat operations to destroy the enemy.

## Antiterrorism

4-97. *Antiterrorism* consists of defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, to include rapid containment by local military and civilian forces (JP 3-07.2). It is an element of protection and part of the broader mission of combating terrorism. Antiterrorism is a consideration for all forces during all military operations. Military police are trained extensively in AT
measures and methods for assessing the threat, implementing preventive measures, and responding to terrorist incidents in a law enforcement capacity and in general terms. Military police can advise leaders and staffs from other units on antiterrorism requirements, measures, and response requirements. They should also be experts at applying many of the antiterrorism measures and activities. See ATP 3-37.2 for more information.

4-98. Military police identify potential terrorist threats and other threat activities to enhance the freedom of action by U.S. forces. The identification of threats is necessary to establish measures to protect from surprise, observation, detection, interference, espionage, terrorism, and sabotage. Identification of threats enables U.S. forces to take actions and implement procedures to reduce vulnerabilities to terrorist acts or attacks. These actions reduce personnel vulnerability to terrorism through education to enhance an understanding of the nature of terrorism, the maintenance of heightened situational understanding regarding current threats, and the mitigation of vulnerabilities to terrorist acts by implementing appropriate protective measures.

4-99. Military police are also trained and prepared to rapidly respond to terrorist attacks when prevention efforts fail. These emergency response actions incorporate measures to treat casualties, apprehend perpetrators, preserve evidence, minimize property damage, restore operations, and expedite the criminal investigation and collection of lessons learned from a terrorist incident. See AR 525-13 and ATP 3-37.2 for more information regarding AT.

4-100. *Counterterrorism* consists of activities and operations taken to neutralize terrorists and their organizations and networks in order to render them incapable of using violence to instill fear and coerce governments or societies to achieve their goals (JP 3-26). Counterterrorism actions include strikes and raids against terrorist organizations and facilities outside the United States and its territories. Although counterterrorism is a specified mission for selected special operations forces, conventional Army forces may also contribute. Commanders who employ conventional forces against terrorists are conducting offensive operations, not counterterrorism operations. While linked to AT, counterterrorism is not typically part of protection since it is focused on offensive measures.

## Physical Security

4-101. *Physical security* is that part of security concerned with physical measures designed to safeguard personnel; to prevent unauthorized access to equipment, installations, material, and documents; and to safeguard them against espionage, sabotage, damage, and theft (JP 3-0). The Army employs physical security measures in-depth to protect personnel, information, and critical resources in all locations and situations against various threats by developing and implementing effective security policies and procedures. This total system approach is based on the continuing analysis and employment of protective measures, to include physical barriers, clear zones, lighting, biometrics-capable access and key control, intrusion detection devices, defensive positions, and nonlethal capabilities. See AR 190-13 and ATP 3-39.32 for more information regarding physical security requirements and procedures. GTA 19-08-004 may be a useful reference for nonlethal munitions.

4-102. Physical security measures are applied in-depth as a critical aspect in applying security and antiterrorism measures on static locations. They are critical in preventing unauthorized access to restricted, controlled, or vulnerable areas. Physical security measures must be prioritized based on vulnerability and threat assessments to protect critical sites, personnel, and equipment. They should be used in conjunction with other security measures, such as mobile patrols, operations, and information security measures, as part of a holistic security program. Critical areas requiring extensive physical security measures may include


Bases or installations and base camps.

Troop housing areas (especially high-concentration areas).

Arms, ammunition, and explosives storage areas.

Key command posts.

Aerial ports of debarkation, aerial ports of embarkation, seaports of debarkations, and seaports of embarkation.

Critical sustainment hubs.

Access points and entry control points.
4-103. Physical security policies, programs, and goals are approved by the Provost Marshal General under the authority of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans. The United States Army Military Police School provides the Physical Security Course to train physical security inspectors and subject matter experts; the course provides military police Soldiers with an H3 (Physical Security) identifier. The course is a requirement for physical security inspectors on Army installations, posts, camps, and stations. Installation PMs are typically responsible for providing physical security expertise, to include periodic inspections to ensure compliance with physical security directives.

4-104. Military police are well versed in physical security applications and procedures and can provide commanders and staffs with subject matter expertise regarding the physical security of their personnel and assets. In an operational environment where strict adherence to physical security standards is not possible, military police personnel trained in physical security can assist commanders and staffs in developing measures to mitigate gaps in physical security requirements. While military police employ significant physical security measures in the course of military police operations, physical security measures are required by all Army units. Physical security measures employed to protect personnel and equipment may include


Establishing checkpoints. Checkpoints are established to monitor and control the movement of personnel and vehicles, inspect cargo, enforce laws and regulations, and provide information.
Establishing checkpoints can be a critical measure in a commander's overall protection efforts.
Checkpoints can also enable effective civil control operations. Military police can provide
expertise to commanders on the construction and procedures involved in checkpoint operations.
They may also be used to operate critical checkpoints, control traffic flow, enforce laws, and control movement at critical locations (such as border crossing sites), or control access to critical facilities. See ATP 3-39.32 and TC 19-210 for additional information on access control and
checkpoint operations.

Controlling access to equipment, installation, material, and documents. Access control
involves the establishment of a system of complementary, overlapping security measures to control access to critical resources and information. Measures may include physical barriers, clear zones, lighting, access and key control, the use of security badges, intrusion detection devices, defensive positions, and nonlethal capabilities. ATP 3-39.32 and TC 19-210 provide additional
information on access control and checkpoint operations; AR 190-11 covers physical security requirements, to include access control requirements for arms, ammunition, and explosives; and AR 190-13 covers physical security requirements, to include access control requirements for Army assets other than arms, ammunition, and explosives.

Employing intrusion detection devices. The employment of intrusion detection devices includes conducting site surveys and installing and operating intrusion detection systems to protect Army installations, personnel, operations, and critical resources in tactical and nontactical situations. See ATP 3-39.32 for more information on employment of intrusion detection devices.
4-105. Coordinating for the employment of countermobility and survivability measures. Countermobility
(see ATP 3-90.8) and survivability (see ATP 3-37.34) measures enhance the physical security of facilities and sites and are often related to specialized entry control measures and checkpoint operations. These include a variety of barrier types and measures. See ATP 3-37.34 for camouflage and concealment consideration that may apply to physical security.

## Chapter 5 Support To Populace And Resources Control

PRC is conducted in conjunction with and as an integral part of all military operations. PRC consists of two distinct, yet linked, components: populace control and resources control. Both components are normally the responsibility of indigenous civil governments. During times of civil or military emergency, proper authorities define, enact, and enforce PRC measures. For practical and security reasons, military forces employ PRC measures of some type and to varying degrees across the range of military operations. Military police support to PRC is typically first aimed at minimizing civilian interference with military operations, but the security of DCs is always an integral part of the military police mission as well. Many of the activities performed as part of support to mobility operations (chapter 2) and security operations (chapter 3) may also be performed as part of military police support to PRC. Whether facing the uncontrolled and uncoordinated movement of civilians within the operational environment or the illegal activities of sectors of the population (and its effect on resources control), military police must understand and consider PRC measures in the planning and execution of operations.

## Section I - Populace Control

5-1. Populace control provides security for the indigenous populace, mobilizes human resources, denies enemy access to the population, and detects and reduces the effectiveness of enemy agents. It involves establishing public order and safety, securing borders, protecting population centers and people, holding individuals accountable for criminal activities, controlling the activities of individuals or groups that pose a security risk, reestablishing essential civil services, and setting conditions in the operational area that support stability through unity of effort. Populace control may become necessary as a result of military operations or man-made or natural disasters.

5-2. International law requires the military force to focus on essential tasks that establish a safe, secure environment and address the immediate humanitarian needs of the local population. Populace control measures include curfews, movement restrictions, travel permits, registration cards, and civilian resettlements. Determining which populace control measures to employ requires a framework that applies across the range of military operations, from stable peace to general war. DC operations and noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO) are two special categories of populace control that require extensive planning and coordination among various military and nonmilitary organizations.

## Roles And Responsibilities For Populace Control

5-3. Populace control is normally a responsibility of HN civilian governments. U.S. forces may implement populace control when HN civilian authorities or agencies are unable or unwilling to control the civilian population. Populace control, as well as resources control, is escalated during civilian or military emergencies. In a permissive environment, U.S. forces implement populace control measures with the consent of the local government. In a hostile environment, those measures are applied according to international law and the law of war.

5-4. Populace control typically requires integrated and synchronized CMO as an inherent command responsibility. They encompass the activities that commanders take to establish and maintain relations with civil authorities, the general population, and other organizations. The assistant chief of staff, CA operations (G-9) or the battalion or brigade CA operations staff officer (S-9) is the primary staff integrator for CMO.

The G-9 or S-9 develops plans that use U.S. and multinational forces and all available NGOs or resources to optimize CMO. Due to the impact on the civilian population and the movement of HN assets and personnel, CA forces have the inherent responsibility to plan support for PRC.

5-5. The G-9 or S-9 enhances the relationship between military forces and civilian authorities and personnel in the AO to ensure mission success. Responsibilities and functions of the G-9 or S-9 differ depending on the operational echelon. Military police units may be deployed and employed in support of CMO anywhere in the world, and those supporting CMO must be briefed and understand the intent of these operations. The function of PIO (see ATP 3-39.20) is a significant enabler during CMO as is the proper treatment of all categories of detainees and DCs. Having a proper mindset and good situational awareness is critical. U.S. Armed Forces may be called upon to relieve human suffering (such as that encountered after a natural disaster), and appropriate discipline measures and controls are enacted to meet each situation.

## Supporting Organizations

5-6. PRC is conducted through coordination and synchronization of the activities of multiple civilian agencies and military organizations, to include extensive military police participation. Organizations supporting PRC include numerous participants (military and nonmilitary) with divergent missions. Agencies involved in PRC typically come from the joint community, interagency organizations, NGOs, international organizations, and HN or multinational organizations.

5-7. Because there are typically many different organizations involved, achieving a unified effort is critical to avoiding any duplication of effort. Achieving a unified effort requires close coordination, liaison, and common purpose for mission success. See ATP 3-57.20 for additional information on supporting organizations.

## General Planning Considerations

5-8. The specific planning focus of PRC may differ at each level of command and will vary depending upon the type and nature of the operation being performed and other relevant aspects of the operational environment. All commands and national and international agencies involved must have clearly defined responsibilities. When planning and executing PRC, consider the following actions:


Coordinate with the Department of State (DOS), the United Nations Office for the Coordination
of Humanitarian Affairs, and HN civil and military authorities to determine the appropriate levels
and types of aid required and available.

Minimize outside contributions (issue basic-needs items only) until DCs become self-sufficient,
and encourage DCs to become as independent as possible.

Review the effectiveness of humanitarian responses and adjust relief activities as necessary.

Coordinate with CA units to ensure the use of the United States, the HN, and international organizations such as the United Nations Children's Fund and the Cooperative for Assistance and
Relief Everywhere. Receiving assistance from these organizations not only capitalizes on their
experience but also reduces the requirements placed on United States Armed Forces.

Apply security restrictions as required for DCs. Under international laws, DCs have the right to
freedom of movement; however, in the event of a mass influx of DCs, security considerations may require restrictions.
5-9. The planning scope for PRC and the actual task implementation typically differ, depending on the command level, and will vary depending upon the type and nature of the operation being performed and other relevant aspects of the operational environment. Military police must have a basic understanding of the planning CA units conduct for PRC.

5-10. Based on national policy directives and other political efforts, the theater commander provides directives on the care, control, and disposition of DCs and offers general guidance on how to mitigate the DC
problem. Potential ways for mitigating the DC situation may include: the prevention of dislocations (for example, implementing a stay-put policy), DC avoidance, DC movement control, or any combination of those. The PRC operations plan


Includes migration and evacuation procedures.

Establishes minimum standards of care.

Defines the status and disposition of DCs.

Designates routes and movement control measures.

Identifies cultural and dietary considerations.

Includes information on DC plans, routes, and areas of concentration that all concerned staff elements need.

Provides measures to relieve suffering.

Establishes proper order and discipline measures within the facility for the security and safety of
DCs and Soldiers.

Provides an aggressive information program by using support agencies and DC leadership.
5-11. PRC measures may require large groups of civilians to be quartered temporarily (less than six months)
or semipermanently (more than six months). Military police may be tasked to set up, administer, and operate DC camps in close coordination with CA forces, HN or USG agencies, psychological operations units, NGOs, international humanitarian organizations, international organizations, and other interested organizations. A
military police unit commander may be designated as the DC camp commander. See appendix A for more information.

## Dislocated Civilian Operations

5-12. *Dislocated civilian*, or DC, is a broad term primarily used by the DOD that includes a displaced person, an evacuee, an internally displaced person, a migrant, a refugee, or a stateless person (JP 3-29). Legal and political considerations define these categories. DCs are removed from or leave their homes or places of habitual residence for reasons such as fear of persecution or to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights, natural or man-made disasters, or economic privation.

Categories of DCs include


Displaced person. *Displaced person* is a broad term used to refer to internally and externally
displaced persons collectively (JP 3-29).

Refugee. A refugee is a person who owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is
outside the country of his or her nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to
avail himself or herself of the protection of that country (see JP 3-29).

Evacuee. An *evacuee* is a civilian removed from a place of residence by military direction for
reasons of personal security or the requirements of the military situation (JP 3-57).

Stateless person. A *stateless person* is a person who is not considered as a national by any state
under the operation of its law (JP 3-29).

War victim. This is a classification created during the Vietnam era to describe civilians suffering
injuries, loss of a family member, or damage to or destruction of their homes because of war. War victims may be eligible for a claim against the United States under the Foreign Claims Act.

Migrants. A *migrant* is a person who belongs to a normally migratory culture who may cross
national boundaries, or has fled their native country for economic reasons rather than fear of political or ethnic persecution (JP 3-29).

Internally displaced persons. An *internally displaced person* is any person who has been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their home or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of
or to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters and who has not crossed an internationally recognized
state border (JP 3-29).

Returnee. A *returnee* is a displaced person who has returned voluntarily to his or her former place
of residence (JP 3-29).

Resettled person. A *resettled person* is a refugee or an internally displaced person wishing to
return somewhere other than his or her previous home or land within the country or area of original displacement (JP 3-29).
5-13. The goals of DC operations are to protect civilians from the effects of violence or disaster and to minimize civilian interference with military operations. DC activities typically include controlling the movement of civilians (see chapter 2). DC activities are performed throughout unified land operations, but most frequently in support of stability and DSCA. The authority to approve the conduct of such operations within U.S. territories lies with the SecDef and may require a special exception to the Posse Comitatus Act. The Posse Comitatus Act prohibits 10 USC (federal status) U.S. military from enforcing civilian laws within the United States or its territories without specific authorization.

5-14.  The U.S. Constitution and other federal, state, and local laws may directly, and perhaps significantly, affect operations in the United States and its territories if enforcement of civilian law is required. Using
10 USC U.S. military forces to conduct law enforcement functions in these cases requires an authorization by Congress (for example, the Insurrection Statutes, 10 USC 331-334) or a Constitutional authorization (for example, the President invoking his Executive Authority under Article 2 of the Constitution). National Guard Soldiers operating in a nonfederal status (32 USC or state active duty status) are not restricted by the Posse Comitatus Act (18 USC 1385). See ADP 3-28 and JP 3-28 for more information.

5-15. Planning and conducting DC activities are the most basic collective tasks performed by CA forces, and military police are a key component of those efforts. Typically, the United Nations or other international organizations and NGOs provide basic assistance and services to the affected population. However, when needed, the U.S. military may be requested to provide support, to include establishing and operating DC
camps, providing care (food, medical treatment, protection), and assisting with the movement or relocation of DCs. Because many of the talents needed for efficient and effective DC camps are linked to the disciplines of policing operations and detention operations (such as enforcing curfews, movement restrictions, and the use of travel permits and registration cards and establishing checkpoints, amnesty programs, and inspections), military police units are well suited for this mission. DC camps are discussed in appendix A.

## Military Police Support To Dislocated Civilian Operations

5-16. The first objective of military police support to DC operations is typically to control DC movement to ensure that DCs do not impede the movement and maneuver of military forces and to protect DCs from avoidable hazards. Controlling movement is especially critical when handling masses of DCs. Military police include the movement of DCs within the overall traffic control plan that is developed in close coordination with movement control, CA planners, and other members of the staff. Additional tasks that support DC
activities (conducted within the police operations discipline) include enforcing curfews, restricting movements, using travel permits and registration cards, establishing checkpoints, implementing amnesty programs, and conducting inspections. Military police may provide limited support to DCs during the first point of contact with them, but all efforts are made to expedite DC movement to established CA-controlled sites for them to receive support.

5-17. When performing DC activities, the level of control is typically drastically different from that of the majority of those interned during detainee operations. During detainee operations, the level of control and supervision is high, based on the significant and evident security risks. During DC activities, civilians are allowed freedom of movement as long as such movement does not impede operations. Security risks are always present, and efforts must be made to mitigate them to an acceptable level. Counterinsurgency operations may affect (or be affected by) DC activities, and ongoing insurgency operations may tend to blur the lines between DCs and detainee activities. See FM 3-63 for more information on detainee operations.

5-18. The mitigation of casualties among civilians is always a consideration, and military police may apply a variety of techniques in attempting to achieve this while performing activities in support of DC operations or NEOs. See ATP 3-57.10 for more information, to include specifics on nonlethal capabilities. A discussion on the rules of interaction, rules for the use of force (RUF), and the rule of law are included in the following discussion of NEOs.

## Dislocated Civilian Situation Template

5-19. Military police planners consider several variables when creating a situation template for DC
movements. DC movement factors include time and distance considerations (including the length of a DC
column), gaps between individual DCs and groups of DCs, traffic density (typically expressed in DCs per kilometer), and the rate of march. Once these variables are known, they can be depicted in a DC movement graph (a time-space diagram that visually depicts DC movements within an area). The DC situation template provides the basis for DC planning and a means for deconflicting route usage within the movement control plan for operational forces. See ATP 3-57.10 for more information.

## Route Planning

5-20. 0Military police and others involved in DC planning consider the following when developing movement routes for DCs:


Route selection. When selecting routes for civilian movement, military police consider the types of transportation that are common to the area. The provost marshal typically coordinates the
proposed traffic control plan with the movement control officer and the G-9 or S-9. All DC movements take place on designated civilian evacuation routes.

Route identification. After designating movement routes, plans are made to ensure that they are marked in languages and symbols that civilians and U.S. and multinational forces understand. Psychological operations units; military police units; and other joint, multinational, and HN military forces can help mark routes using agreed upon standards.

Control and assembly points. After selecting and marking movement routes, control and assembly points are established at selected key intersections. These points are coordinated between military police, CA, transportation, and logistics planners and captured in the traffic control plan.

Emergency rest areas. Emergency rest areas are established at congested points to provide
immediate needs (water, food, fuel, maintenance, and medical support) as necessary.

Local and national agencies. Using local and national agencies conserves military resources and
reduces the need for interpreters and translators. Civilian authorities normally have legal status and are best equipped to handle their own people.

Routing fundamentals. DC planners incorporate the following fundamentals when planning the routes for DCs:

Balance. The characteristics of the route must meet the needs of the supported traffic. Balance
also includes identifying requirements for route maintenance and improvement, and
implementation of protection measures.

Separation. Sufficient road space must be allocated to avoid conflicts and reduce the potential
for congestion.

Distribution. The number of routes allocated must be able to meet the demand to avoid congestion. Distributing traffic over more than one route also offers passive security.

Routing principles. DC planners consider the following principles when developing routes for DCs:

Assign highest-priority traffic to routes that provide the minimum time-distance.

Consider sustainability of the route network when assigning movements.

Separate motor movements from pedestrian movements.

Separate civilian traffic (vehicular or pedestrian) from military movements.

## Controlling Movement

5-21. Controlling movement is a typical military police mission. Military police may employ the techniques of blocking, clearing, and collecting to control DC movement. These techniques rely on detailed planning and assessment.

## Blocking

5-22. Roadblocks may be supported by checkpoints to prevent DCs from flowing onto roads or into areas essential for the conduct of military operations. Blocking involves preventing DCs from entering those areas and redirecting them to some other area, such as back to their homes or along a designated DC route.

5-23. Depending on the security situation and other factors, civilians and their means of transport may or may not be searched at the blocking position. The following questions must be considered when planning DC blocking operations:


What is the likely timing, direction, route, rate, and flow of DCs? (This is required to mass forces when and where they are most needed.)

Where is terrain that canalizes DCs?

Does the ability exist to reinforce a roadblock under pressure?

Does the flexibility exist to disengage on order?

## Clearing

5-24. Clearing directs DCs from main and ASRs, and other areas of military significance to keep them from interfering with operations. Clearing is conducted at the small-unit level by assigned Soldiers or by small, specialized teams whose sole purpose is to confront DCs, remove them from their current location, and orient them toward the location to which the commander wants them to go. In some cases, this may be the shoulder of the road.

5-25. Clearing is intended for fast-paced, unit-level operations. It is not an effective method for a large-scale DC mission. It must be deliberately planned and integrated with other control techniques. Clearing is merely intended to channel or direct DCs in specified directions away from military operations, installations, or encampments until assimilated by better-organized DC activities, such as collecting. Some of the challenges of clearing operations include the following:


The clearing technique is temporary in nature; units must continually sweep or direct new or returning DCs.

External support is often required to transmit the intended message in a way that the DCs understand.

DCs present a continuing security concern for friendly forces (for example, the potential for
terrorist acts such as car or suicide bombings).

A unit's resources can be quickly overwhelmed if the numbers of DCs are great or the DCs need
emergency assistance.

## Collecting

5-26. Collecting provides positive control of concentrations of DCs at various holding areas to prevent them from interfering with operations and to foster care and processing. The collection plan is resource intensive and must be coordinated and synchronized with operations, logistics, and security plans. Identifying DCs may not be necessary during collection; it depends on guidance from higher headquarters, CA units, the HN, and other agencies. The need to identify DCs varies from operation to operation. DC identification may be necessary for the following reasons:


To verify rosters against the actual population.

To provide timely reunification of family members.

To match DCs with their medical records in case of a medical emergency or evacuation.

To check the identities of DCs against the transfer roster.

To identify personnel being sought by HN, multinational, or U.S. forces.
5-27. When possible, existing HN facilities should be considered for use as collection points. Collecting must also be planned and executed in collaboration with HN authorities and nongovernmental and international governmental organization partners that specialize in public health, public safety, public communications, transportation, public works and utilities, and mass care and feeding. Its main features are


Collection points. These are temporary holding areas for gathering small numbers of DCs before
moving onward along DC routes to assembly areas or DC camps. Units establishing DC collection
points provide minimal emergency relief supplies that address only short-term (less than one day
to three or four days) immediate needs (for example, water and trauma first aid).

DC routes. These are routes that offer protection to DCs by moving them away from the main effort of military, logistics, or humanitarian assistance operations.

Assembly areas. These areas are larger and more elaborate than collection points. They provide DCs with emergency relief such as food, medical support, and temporary shelter. Designated personnel (military or civilians of the interagency, HN, and nongovernmental and international governmental partners) begin screening and registering DCs to identify family groups, determine points of origin and intended destinations, and other pertinent information. They also begin to
segregate enemy prisoners of war, hostile civilians, and deserters. Assembly areas are typically located in division security areas and may host DCs for a week or longer. Authorities may decide
to send DCs from assembly areas to camps to allow them to continue to their intended destination or to return home. Assembly areas may evolve into DC camps, if required.

DC camps. These are areas with temporary and semipermanent facilities that support the effective and efficient provision of shelter and aid to DCs over a longer period of time. DC camps are discussed in appendix A.

## Noncombatant Evacuation Operations

5-28. NEO refers to the authorized and orderly departure of noncombatants from a specific area by the DOS, the DOD, or other appropriate authority. Although the United States usually considers NEOs in connection with combat operations, it may also conduct a NEO in anticipation of or in response to any natural or manmade disaster in a foreign country. Civil unrest in a country may warrant evacuation to the United States or other safe haven.

Note. Pursuant to Executive Order 12656, the DOS is responsible for protecting and evacuating U.S. citizens and nationals abroad and for safeguarding their overseas property. The DOS is the lead agency for planning and conducting NEOs. Executive Order 12656 also directs the SecDef to advise and assist the Secretary of State in preparing and implementing these plans.

5-29. DOD defines the following two categories of noncombatant evacuees:


U.S. citizens that competent authority can order to evacuate. This includes

Civilian employees of all agencies of the United States Government (USG) and their dependents.

Military personnel of the United States Armed Forces specifically designated for evacuation
as noncombatants.

Dependents of members of the United States Armed Forces.

U.S. (and non-U.S.) citizens that competent authority may authorize or assist (but not necessarily
order) to evacuate. This includes

Civilian employees of USG agencies and their dependents who are residents in the country but are willing to evacuate.

Private U.S. citizens and their dependents.

Military personnel and their dependents, short of an ordered evacuation.

Designated aliens, including dependents of civilian employees of the USG and military.

Designated aliens, including dependents of civilian employees of the USG and military personnel of the United States Armed Forces, as prescribed by the DOS.
Note. JP 3-68 provides additional information on NEO.

## Military Police Support To Noncombatant Evacuation Operations

5-30. The primary support that military police units provide to NEOs centers on controlling the movement of evacuees, and providing security at departure locations and extraction sites and for convoys carrying evacuees. Military police are skilled in interpersonal communications and the graduated use of force from their law enforcement experiences. This skill set transfers well to working in direct contact with the evacuees and dealing with hostile incidents. Military police are a key member of marshalling teams that are responsible for locating evacuees and getting them to assembly areas and evacuation sites.

## Evacuation Planning

5-31. When the decision5-31 is made to evacuate a community, planners must make detailed plans to prevent uncontrolled groups from disrupting the movement of military units, supplies, and first responders. Mass evacuation planning includes the following:


Transportation. Planners should consider the maximum use of civilian transportation.

Movement control. Planners identify natural and man-made obstacles that will hamper movement along designated routes and mitigate their effects as necessary. Checkpoints and signage are used to direct the flow of traffic, and measures are in place to redirect traffic to alternate routes as required, based on changes in the situation. Collection points should be established for vehicles that breakdown.

Security. Military and HN security forces provide security for civilians after evacuation. These organizations also provide for the security of all civilian property left behind, including farm animals, pets, and other possessions.

Documentation. In some circumstances, evacuees may need identification documents to ensure
that personnel are properly manifested and to ensure orderly movement.

Briefing. Before movement, the movement control officer briefs evacuees. This can be
accomplished by using leaflets, loudspeakers, posters, or other available means. This briefing
explains the details of the move, restrictions on personal belongings, organization for movement, and schedules.

Rations. For a movement lasting no more than two days, planning should ensure that DCs are supplied with rations at the time of departure or at designated points en route.

Health care. The public health team makes maximum use of civilian medical personnel, equipment, and supplies to care for the health and physical well-being of the evacuees. Military
medical personnel, equipment, and supplies may be used to supplement HN and civilian organization assets, if necessary and authorized. Before movement, proper steps should be taken
by medical personnel to prevent the spread of infectious diseases.

Return. During planning, considerations should be taken to provide for the evacuees' eventual
return and criteria for determining the duration of their absence.

## Rules Of Interaction

5-32. Rules of interaction provide Soldiers with a guide for interacting with the civilian population. Rules of interaction include


Treating all DCs humanely and with respect.

Avoiding discussion of politics and policies with DCs.

Avoiding promises. If cornered, reply with, "I will see what I can do."

Refraining from making obscene gestures. DCs may understand the meaning.

Avoiding derogatory remarks. DCs may understand English, and the local linguists surely do.

Treating all DCs equally. DCs may become offended if they do not receive the same treatment or resources as other DCs.

Respecting religious articles and materials.

Treating medical problems seriously and maintaining a professional relationship.

Greeting DCs in their native language.

## Rules For The Use Of Force

5-33. RUF used in PRC vary from operation to operation. The CCDR establishes RUF, in conjunction with the staff judge advocate and upon joint staff approval, and approves special RUF developed for use in resettlement facilities. The RUF evolves to fit the changing environment, ensuring continued protection and safety for the DC population and U.S. military personnel. RUF should remain simple and understandable so that Soldiers are not confused and do not have to memorize extensive checklists. Standing RUF apply to 10 USC military police conducting operations in the United States and its territories, absent any explicit additional guidance from the SecDef. Commanders, after consultation with their servicing judge advocate, may also submit supplemental RUF requests for the SecDef's approval.

5-34. Nonlethal measures can and may be authorized by the RUF anytime during an operation to protect Soldiers and DCs from injury. Nonlethal weapons may include riot batons, pepper spray, stun guns, and shotguns loaded with nonlethal munitions. The successful accomplishment of any operation in which nonlethal weapons are employed requires extensive preparation, of which individual and unit training are vital. Training should be designed to give individuals an understanding of the entire subject area and enable them to function efficiently as members of a unit or independently. This training must be intensive and realistic. Training with nonlethal weapon capabilities is critical to ensure employment of these capabilities with confidence and proficiency. The RUF may include less than lethal force to protect mission-essential equipment from damage or destruction. Mission-essential equipment includes tactical and nontactical vehicles, communications equipment, weapons, computers, and office and personal equipment.

## Rule Of Law

5-35. Planning for follow-on to major combat operations should begin in the early planning stages for war.

Efforts to transition to the rule of law must start as soon as stability tasks begin, often simultaneously with major combat operations. First, security conditions must be established and political conditions initiated that support policing and judicial and corrections systems for fair and equitable treatment of citizens by the HN
government. This is often easier said than accomplished. Many nations simply do not have the underpinnings of the rule of law to understand and implement the system and will require coaching, mentoring, training, and support along a continuum toward peaceful existence. Additionally, if efforts in combat operations do not include shaping the area for stability, criminals, insurgents, and organized crime will control the population and the developing government, making the rule-of-law plan efforts exponentially more difficult.

Citizens must have the right to ownership, fair treatment by policing and judicial systems, and corrections systems that enforce compliance with the law in a manner that is equitable and uniformly fair to everyone. Military police forces are well-suited for providing HN assistance and training for principally two of the three legs of the rule of lawthe policing and corrections aspects.

5-36. Military police units must cultivate relationships with HN police and local officials in the operational area, if they exist, early in the operation to maximize efficiencies later during the transition period. This process will provide valuable police intelligence that will aid the unit in planning and recommending courses of action to assist in establishing the rule of law.

5-37. Whether in a transitional military authority role or supporting a legitimate HN government, military police support the PRC plan for mitigating the impact of criminal activity through resources control measures.

These actions may include


Securing stocks of critical commodities from theft or pillage.

Supporting border security and customs enforcement.

Identifying and mitigating black market activities dealing in critical commodities.

Securing stockpiles of natural resources.
5-38. Military police support to transition to the rule of law may include

Helping establish and train local police officers in basic to advanced law enforcement skills and operating police stations.

Assisting with developing requests for law enforcement equipment and sustainment items necessary for local law enforcement.

Providing joint patrolling.

Operating police stations.

Mentoring HN personnel until the HN is capable of independent operations.
5-39. Military police detention units can assist with establishing corrections operations in a reopened or temporary facility. They can also train the guard forces and prison operations staffs to properly operate a facility.

5-40. All of these activities build confidence in the local population that law-abiding citizens will be treated fairly and equitably and that laws will be applied equally and uniformly to every citizen. Citizens must know they will not be unlawfully detained or imprisoned. They must also be confident that the unlawful activity of others will be policed and punished.

5-41. Rule of law cannot expand or be sustained in crime-ridden environments where citizens fear for their safety due to criminal activity. Resources control measures specifically targeted to deter criminal activity contribute toward building the trust and confidence of the local populace while strengthening the legitimacy of the HN government or provisional authority.

## Section Ii - Resources Control

5-42. Resources control regulates the movement or consumption of material resources, mobilizes material resources, and denies materiel to the enemy. Resources controls target specific sectors of a nation's material wealth and economy, including natural resources, food and agriculture, immoveable property, finances, and cultural and critical infrastructure. (See ATP 3-57.20 for additional information.) Military police and CID
agents support to resources control may include


Securing existing harvest storage facilities to prevent spoilage and looting of harvested crops.

Implementing rationing and distribution programs for key commodities (such as food and fuel).

Establishing border security, including customs procedures, to prevent arms smuggling, human
trafficking, and other contraband such as drugs or currency.

Regulating and securing access to valuable natural resources.

Stopping illicit trade in natural resources and developing governance mechanisms and incentives to bring trade into the market.

Initiating processes for addressing and resolving resource ownership and access issues.

Locking international access of overseas financial accounts to prevent money laundering.

Protecting and securing strategically important institutions, such as government buildings and
archives, museums, religious sites, courthouses, and communications facilities.
5-43. Military police may also be tasked to secure critical convoys to ensure safe transit. Functions in support of resources control operations include the following activities:


Protecting against enemy activities within movement corridors and along MSRs.

Securing supply routes and critical convoys.

Conducting reconnaissance and surveillance.

Evaluating and recommending protective measures for high-risk facilities.

Employing protective measures for high-risk individuals.

Employing protective measures for designated supplies.

Conducting area and local security.

Conducting response force operations.

Applying antiterrorism measures.

Implementing physical security measures.

## Public And Private Property Control

5-44. Resources control, to include control of public and private movable and unmovable property, is most prevalent during the occupation of a foreign territory by U.S. forces. However, control measures may be implemented across the range of military operations based on specific authorities granted to a commander for a particular mission. Effective resources control requires the combined efforts of all instruments of national power. The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 and the 1949 Geneva Convention (IV) for the protection of civilians in time of war set forth rules relating to property in occupied territories. Territory is considered occupied when it is taken over by a sovereign power following a military intervention. In most cases, the period of occupation is temporary, pending the signing of a peace treaty or the formation of a new government. The occupation extends only to the territory where such authority has been established and can be exercised. (See ATP 3-57.20 for additional information.) International law recognizes the following five basic powers that a military commander of an occupation force possesses in relation to property in enemy territory:


Destruction.

Confiscation.

Seizure.

Requisition.

Control.
Note. The authority of an occupational force commander in the area of public and private property is situation-dependent. The treatment by the occupier of real and personal property is analyzed under a number of factors, including the nature of the property, the needs of the occupier, and whether it is owned by the state or privately. Legal review by the servicing staff judge advocate before the execution of any of the authorities granted to an occupational force is strongly recommended. For further information, see FM 6-27 and the Operational Law Handbook.

5-45. Resources control measures may be implemented in collaboration with a HN government during military engagement, limited intervention, peace operations, irregular warfare, and major operations.

Authority for the execution of such measures originates from a formal agreement negotiated by the DOS, such as a status-of-forces agreement, a mutual defense treaty, or a security cooperation treaty ratified by the United States and the HN government.

5-46. The long-term success of any intervention often relies on the ability of military forces to protect and maintain critical infrastructure until the HN can resume that responsibility. Critical infrastructure resources control measures directly support the primary stability taskestablish civil security. The initial response aim is to establish a safe and secure environment to enable the HN to sustain and further develop infrastructure capability.

5-47. Military police also implement countermeasures which may include implementing vulnerability and threat assessments, developing procedures to predict and prevent terrorist actions before they occur, hardening likely targets, and conducting offensive operations to destroy an enemy. Military police units actively use checkpoints and roadblocks to control the movement of vehicles, personnel, and materiel and to prevent illegal actions that may aid the enemy. These control measures serve as a deterrent to terrorist activities, saboteurs, and other threats.

## Civil Security Support

5-48. Key to the control of national resources is the primary stability taskestablish civil security. An essential task of establish civil security is border control and boundary security of the nation's borders and points of entry and embarkation. See FM 3-07 for additional information.

5-49. Border controls regulate immigration, control the movements of the local populace, collect excise taxes or duties, and limit smuggling. In controlling national resources, emphasis must be placed on the illegal exportation of assets by means of smuggling or through the corruption of border officials.

5-50. Planning of resources control measures must consider illegal activity and the impact of such activities on the management of resources within the operational environment. Black market activities, smuggling, theft, and corruption of HN officials are examples of criminal activities that may have a detrimental impact on the availability of critical resources. Criminals dealing in contraband items, such as arms and ammunition, pose a security threat to the population, the HN government, and the deployed military force.

5-51. An essential element in controlling criminal activity in the area of resources is border security and control. Border security activities include managing land border areas, airspace, coastal and territorial waters, and exclusive economic zones. The control of border areas and crossings deters smuggling, movement of irregular forces into HN territory, and uncontrolled flow of DCs. Border security forces monitor, detect, and prevent crime in border areas, including illegal entry and the illicit trafficking of goods, services, and human capital.

## Border Operations Support

5-52. Military police may be periodically tasked to support border operations along the U.S. borders in support of DSCA. The support provided may include technical equipment (such as thermal imagery, night vision, and infrared detection) and the operation of the equipment to help with the detection of personnel illegally entering into the United States. The Posse Comitatus Act may prohibit Regular Army or Army Reserve Soldiers from enforcing civil law; unless granted an exemption, they may only respond to defend themselves or law enforcement officials from imminent danger. Nonfederalized National Guard military police performing missions under the control of their respective state governors are not prohibited by the Posse Comitatus Act. Upon mobilization (federalization), National Guard Soldiers are restricted under the Posse Comitatus Act unless other valid legislation is invoked that would remove restrictions of the Posse Comitatus Act.

5-53. Borders other than United States borders may also require support from military police units. Military police may be required to operate control posts, conduct border patrols, and supervise crossing points at international borders. Many countries control the movement of military personnel and civilians at their borders. Border control is maintained for reasons of security; customs and tariff enforcement; protection of the civilian economy; and apprehension of criminals, absentees, and persons of intelligence interest. Control is maintained through the establishment of authorized road or rail crossing points, border patrols, control posts, and liaison with authorities of neighboring countries (if feasible). Prohibited or restricted zones are often used to help control circulation at the borders.

5-54. In conducting border control, military police normally coordinate with indigenous police, counterintelligence units, and CA units. They watch for individuals or items that may be involved in criminal and customs offenses. They also establish the identity and purpose of U.S. forces crossing borders and examine vehicles and travel documents. Support to border control may be paramount to prevent adversaries from moving weapons, supplies, and personnel across borders to attack or disrupt friendly forces.

5-55. Military police may also be tasked to enforce customs laws and regulations in support of local government or HN officials. The U.S. military enforcement of customs laws of countries in which U.S. forces are stationed is often part of agreements like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization status-of-forces agreement between the United States and the respective HN.

5-56. In controlling national resources, emphasis must be placed on the illegal exportation of assets by means of smuggling or through the corruption of border officials. Ineffective border control and management systems can frustrate efforts to detect and prevent organized criminal activity. This often results in increased trafficking of illegal arms, goods, and human capital and impacts the ability of the HN to generate revenue through duties and import and export fees. Conventional military forces may be able to provide immediate border security; however, unless they are acting as an occupying force, they are an inappropriate law enforcement force.

## Logistics Security Support

5-57. LOGSEC is concerned with the integrity of the logistics system through the prevention, identification, and investigation of criminal acts committed by terrorists, criminal elements, or insider threats ranging from the United States Army logistics provider to the military force on the ground. It includes any criminal or terrorist action intended to divert, steal, destroy, or substitute an inferior product or sabotage supplies delivered to or used by the U.S. military or to damage, destroy, or impede elements of the transportation infrastructure or conveyances within control of the United States Army. The LOGSEC mission is the responsibility of all CID field elements, and each echelon of CID should be involved, as required, to achieve a cohesive, effective support to the Army, when requested or required, that would enhance combat readiness, safety, and security or be a combat force multiplier.

5-58. LOGSEC encompasses security of the entire logistics system, from the acquisition of materials
(procurement fraud operations are under the investigative purview of the Major Procurement Fraud Unit, 701st Military Police Group [CID]); through all modes of the transportation network and storage sites; retrograde cargo through the transportation system; and reutilization, disposal, or demilitarization operations.

Supply diversion is normally encountered during in-transit movement of supplies or cargo and would fall to the investigative purview of the mainstream CID forces.

## Military Police Support To Logistics Security

5-59. Criminal investigators, as required and assigned, provide battlefield investigative support and criminal intelligence to each echelon of command from battalion through echelons above corps. USACIDC will assess the threat, capabilities, and intent of the criminal and terrorist threats. USACIDC will also assist the supported command in actions to eliminate threat activities or minimize their effects.

5-60. The USACIDC LOGSEC mission is a critical factor in the successful accomplishment of the Army's combat mission. LOGSEC sustains the integrity of the logistics pipeline from the manufacturer to the individual combat Soldier. It involves prevention, detection, and investigation of criminal and terrorist elements, HN or allied personnel, and even U.S. personnel. Operations in support of the USACIDC LOGSEC mission will prevent, detect, and investigate criminal intervention of the logistics pipeline that may adversely affect the Army's ability to maintain combat readiness or effectiveness by


Enhancing the readiness of the force.

Increasing the effectiveness of CID LOGSEC-related activities.

Creating an awareness of LOGSEC and the USACIDC role in the enhancement of the combat readiness of the Army.
5-61. Whatever the type of port, the principles for LOGSEC are constant, although the specifics change. A
successful port LOGSEC program is based on the following three-pronged approach to enhance the security of military property as it is moved from the port of embarkation to the port of debarkation, and onto its final destination:


Implementation of proactive crime prevention measures designed to eliminate crime-conducive
conditions within the staging areas of the port of embarkation and the port of debarkation.

Surveillance and visual inspection of the cargo and loading and unloading procedures.

LOGSEC awareness briefings for supercargo personnel accompanying cargo shipments.
5-62. Shipment of major end items (tanks, trucks, and weapons systems) presents a significant LOGSEC
challenge to USACIDC. Unlike containers, these items must be completely accessible to port personnel during the loading or discharge process.

5-63. Major end items are identified, accounted for, and processed by military terminals in the same manner as a container. This cargo is controlled by the logistics application of automated marking and reading symbols
(LOGMARS). With the LOGMARS label, the cargo is scanned into staging areas, scanned out, and then scanned for manifesting onto its designated vessel. During discharge, the process is reversed. Frequent problems exist in accountability due to inaccurate scanning or the loss or lack of LOGMARS labels. Major end items are frequently reported missing when not clearly shown on the final ship's manifest; however, in many cases it becomes frustrated cargo.

5-64. Secondary or "nested cargo" is not controlled by LOGMARS and is not accounted for on the ship manifest. In most instances, this cargo is readily accessible to criminal elements. Determining the exact circumstances surrounding the loss is virtually impossible. In their haste to move supplies and equipment, deploying units have historically ignored established security procedures. Only strong security measures and proactive threat assessments at the seaport of embarkation and the seaport of debarkation can prevent losses.

5-65. Formerly known as frustrated cargo, "astray cargo" can become a source of frustration. Unidentified cargo will ultimately end up in the astray cargo area. Frequently, reports of lost, missing, or stolen cargo can be resolved through a check with astray cargo. Careful examination should be made of the frustrated cargo procedures. Lack of security and inexperienced personnel will result in cargo being stolen, diverted, and reissued without accountability.

5-66. Immediately following the departure of a loaded vessel, a criminal information report will be prepared in message format and forwarded to the USACIDC activities responsible for the seaport of debarkation and the final destination of the cargo. A criminal information report should contain the following information:


Date of departure.

Cargo identification and inventory.

Intermediate stops.

Identity of supercargo personnel.

Identify of LOGSEC issues.

Estimated time of arrival at the seaport of debarkation.

## Phases Of Logistics Security Support

5-67. In the acquisition management phase, the investigative effort is directed at supporting user activities
(user or end item user) and the acquisition program manager. This investigative support radiates from concept development, concept exploration, research and development, engineering, manufacturing, and delivery and acceptance by the USG. This segment of LOGSEC is normally engaged by the major procurement fraud units.

5-68. The materiel distribution phase is the most fluid aspect of the logistics pipeline since it is typically the most vulnerable to criminal activity. This phase includes materiel movement via land, rail, air, and sea modes of transportation; and material storage and warehousing (depot activities). (See ATP 4-13 and ATP 4-14 for more information on intermodal and rail center operations.) Depots release materiel to supply activities or deploying units. Materiel vulnerabilities are most prevalent in locations where there are changes in the modes of transportation. These locations are commonly referred to as the nodes of transportation. In the distribution phase of LOGSEC operations, CID field elements aid in investigating supply diversion. Investigations are routinely performed by field CID elements as assets move through the logistics pipeline.

5-69. Proactive investigative efforts performed in the materiel distribution phase of LOGSEC include LOGSEC awareness briefings and threat assessment support to deploying or redeploying commanders and their unit movement control officers; criminal activity threat estimates and criminal activity threat assessments along the transportation routes; economic crime threat assessments at transportation facilities, storage locations, or military installations; LOGSEC threat assessments at major transportation nodes; and port vulnerability assessments at ports of debarkation and ports of embarkation.

5-70. The materiel management phase of LOGSEC should focus on the security of materiel after it is delivered from depots or ports to the intermediate supply activities, installations, or forward-deployed operating bases. At an installation, investigative support is provided to accountable officers at supply support activities. This investigative support must be provided to forward-deployed operating bases where materiel is warehoused before it is issued to the user.

5-71. LOGSEC performed during deployment operations is typically joint in nature as CCDRs face a variety of missions. A forward-deployed LOGSEC mission should begin by establishing effective liaison with all interested organizations. This allows for a more comprehensive mission analysis. This mission analysis should consider the investigative assets of the other military criminal investigative organizations and the responsibilities, requirements, and capabilities of each agency and each branch of service. Because of the areas of focus, some Services may have LOGSEC capabilities that are better applied to a specific mission than another Service.

## Threat Assessment Process

5-72. USACIDC and provost marshal staffs provide police information and intelligence analysis to commanders that identify indicators of potential crimes and criminal threats against Army property, facilities, or personnel. USACIDC elements collect, consolidate, analyze, and disseminate criminal intelligence and terrorist counteraction operations aimed at U.S. and allied interests and activities on the battlefield.

5-73. The USACIDC LOGSEC effort is directed toward the proactive prevention, detection, and investigation of criminal activity that results in the loss or malfunction of logistics or sustainment materiel. The threat assessment process consists of the following four specific steps:


Step 1. Identify the threat.

Step 2. Identify targets vulnerable to the threat.

Step 3. Prioritize identified targets.

Step 4. Develop proactive plans of action.
5-74. To implement an effective LOGSEC program, USACIDC field activities should be included on the distribution list of installation activities that receive reports regarding the supported commander's logistics posture. These reports may be internal or external to the installation and are prepared by one or more of the following agencies:


Army Audit Agency.

Defense Contract Audit Agency.

Office of Workers' Compensation Programs.

Defense Finance and Accounting Services.

Directorate of Contracting.

Government Accounting Office.

Internal Review and Compliance Office.

Directorate of Logistics.

Movement control team.

Theater Movement Control Agency.
5-75. The review and analysis of audit reports in addition to coordination with the preparing activity can provide a "snapshot" of a specific logistics activity on the installation. Reports prepared by other agencies can identify specific issues that may adversely impact on the Army's combat capabilities. These reports provide information on a wide range of subjects to include logistics systems and their use in support of combat operations. Other agencies preparing such reports may include the


Department of the Army Inspector General.

Department of the Defense Inspector General.

Installation inspector general.

Logistics Control Activity. Upon request, this activity can provide the ordering history of a
specific class of supply or item and the requiring activity through the Logistics Information File. The Logistics Information File is accessible by computer modem.

Defense Logistics Studies Information Exchange. This information is also accessible by computer modem.
5-76. Reports on logistics systems are initiated based on either a cyclic requirement or as needed. These reports can be obtained from either the Department of Logistics Assistant Chief of Staff for Logistics or accountable supply office and include the following:


Unit status reports. These reports provide the status of Soldiers and their materials by unit.

Material release denials.

Report of discrepancies.

Discrepancy in shipment reports.

Quality deficiency reports.

Inventory adjustment reports.

Reports of survey.

Sample data collection reports.
5-77. Other reports, such as AR 15-6 investigations and statement of charges reports, are generated by unit commanders. These reports are generally initiated when property is destroyed or lost, or accountability for an item has been lost, either at the installation, unit, or individual Soldier level.

5-78. Additional sources of information pertaining to the local criminal threat include the local police, HN
police, military intelligence, and counterintelligence. Sources and informants used in the conduct of CID drug suppression team operations may also be used to cultivate intelligence in economic crimes and LOGSEC arenas. Both drug users and dealers commonly trade or steal government property in order to support their activity.

## Development Of Criminal Intelligence

5-79. The development of criminal intelligence at the operational level in support of LOGSEC must be directed at assessing the criminal threat of the adversary, whether it is an enemy military unit, terrorist elements, the HN, allied personnel, or U.S. personnel. The focus on the development of operational-level intelligence is broad and includes the following factors:


Political.

Economic.

Sociological.

Technological.

Opportunity.
5-80. These factors may materially affect the nature of the threat at the operational level. This type of intelligence development requires access to information not normally developed or obtained by USACIDC. To assist in the development of operational-level intelligence, whether in a peacetime or combat environment, the military police and special agent should


Assess the situation and identify the threats.

Identify targets that may be vulnerable to the threat.

Analyze and transform information into usable criminal intelligence.

Target activities based on criminal intelligence.

Identify and investigate or deter and prevent criminal activities.

Identify conditions or procedures conducive to criminal activity.

Minimize or eliminate opportunities to commit a criminal offenses or engage in criminal activity.

Understand criminal environment.
5-81. Police engagement and the subsequent collection of information remains a primary focus for military police, and PIO are vital for proper situational understanding, given the linkage to criminal, terrorist, and insurgent threats. Some police intelligence may not be able to be shared with the intelligence community due to intelligence oversight regulations and procedures concerning intelligence personnel collecting on U.S. citizens, U.S. corporations, and non-U.S. citizen residents. See DODM 5240.01 and ATP 3-39.20 for more information.

5-82. Initial collected information may be an indicator of a problem such as product substitution, a supply diversion, or other criminal activity. Sources of information may be the result of a commander's situation or after action report that contains indicators of a problem, such as lack of fuel, spare parts, ammunition, or other critical items that delayed or prevented the completion of the mission. This information should be disseminated by the most expeditious means available to the widest audience possible to assist in further development of the information, even if it may still be fragmented, incomplete, or cryptic. Over-classification can limit the use of this information and should be avoided.

5-83. Agents assigned to support combat operations can only attempt to identify the conditions and indicators that may be indicative of criminal activity. Follow-up investigative activity on fragmentary information that involves work outside the area of combat operations will be conducted by USACIDC investigative assets in the continental United States or wherever the actual crime took place. Threat assessment instruments used within this arena include the following:


A LOGSEC **threat assessment**. This assessment

Is a crime prevention survey of a logistics activity.

Is performed in the same manner as a crime prevention survey.

Reports findings, and observations.

Provides recommendations.

Is initiated by CID or can be requested by commanders.

A criminal activity threat assessment. This assessment

Is performed separately from all other reports.

May be incorporated into a LOGSEC threat assessment or a port vulnerability assessment.

Reports on specific criminal threats to a specific installation or activity.

Identifies crime trends and threats.

Requires collection and correlation of information collected from federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies.

A port vulnerability assessment. This assessment

Is a crime prevention survey of a sea or aerial port of debarkation or port of embarkation.

Is performed the same as a LOGSEC threat assessment.

Is formatted as prescribed by headquarters.

Incorporates information from the criminal activity threat assessment into the body of the report.
5-84. These assessments assist in identifying areas of criminal vulnerability based on the logistical flow of supplies leaving the wholesale activity and going to the most forward-deployed units. All traveled routes and stops should be considered, while focusing on security and safety of the following:


Depots and supply nodes.

Airports, railheads and terminals, and seaports.

Air, land, and water transportation nodes.

## Coordination With Other Agencies

5-85. A multitude of other federal, state, and local government agencies and activities have primary jurisdiction over the ports, waterways, railroad infrastructure, highways, and other interstate and international transportation facilities used by the military. Additionally, several DOD and Army commands perform transportation infrastructure vulnerability and physical security assessments. These include port integrated vulnerability assessments done by the United States Navy and the Interagency Commission on Crime and Security to United States Seaports. Other transportation security segment assessments can be found with the Defense Threat Reduction Agency and their balanced survivability assessments and within the high-quality joint staff integrated vulnerability assessments conducted by DOD's Joint Staff (J-34/Combating Terrorism).

The United States Coast Guard has an Office of Investigations and Analysis that can be a highly valued resource when conducting LOGSEC assessments. The Area Maritime Security lead done by the United States Coast Guard captain of the port can be another good resource when conducting LOGSEC assessments. Additional resources when conducting LOGSEC would be open sources such as the American Association of Port Authorities, the National Waterways Conference, the American Waterways Operators, the Texas Transportation Institute's Center for Ports and Waterways, the International Maritime Organization, the U.S.

Department of Transportation, the United States Department of Commerce, the United States Department of the Interior, the Maritime Administration, the United States Army Corps of Engineers, the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, the United States Transportation Security Administration, and the United States Environmental Protection Agency.

5-86. Past assessments give direction on what kind of expertise is required in formulating a team of experts to conduct a LOGSEC assessment. Past assessment teams have included those experts with background in terrorist options, structural engineering, emergency operations, information operations, security operations, utility operations, communications, and mission operations. Past port vulnerability assessments have been done of the Port of Baltimore, Maryland; Apra Harbor, Guam; Port of Honolulu, Hawaii; Port of Charleston, South Carolina; and Port of Savannah, Georgia. Since the inception of the Global War on Terrorism, the Federal Bureau of Investigation-led joint terrorism task forces collect intelligence data on a wide-ranging scope of potential terrorist activity and targets. When CID receives a request for LOGSEC support from a senior Army commander, and when the scope of the mission is identified, CID field elements involved may find that the majority of the effort has already been done by one or more of the aforementioned agencies.

Therefore, coordination with other agencies involved in transportation security is imperative.

5-87. LOGSEC support to military commanders includes logistics-related crime prevention efforts, LOGSEC awareness briefings, criminal activity threat estimates, and criminal activity threat assessments. These operations are directed toward enhancing the Army's accountability, security, and visibility of materiel, personnel, and data in the logistics pipelinea term used to denote the continuum in which military assets are acquired, produced, transported, and maintained. This process includes acquisition management, materiel distribution, materiel management, and property disposal.

## Assessment

Assessment is an essential, continuous activity that occurs throughout the operations process. Assessment involves comparing forecasted outcomes with events to determine the effectiveness of security and mobility support tasks. Assessment helps the commander determine the progress toward attaining the desired end state, achieving objectives, and establishing the effectiveness of security and mobility support in support of larger Army and joint operations. While a failure in the execution of security and mobility support tasks is typically easy to detect, the successful application may be difficult to assess and quantify.

## Continuous Assessment

A-1. Assessment is a continuous process that precedes and concludes the operations process and is integral to modifying and adjusting the focus and direction of security and mobility support. *Assessment* is the determination of the progress toward accomplishing a task, creating a condition, or achieving an objective
(JP 3-0). Figure A-1 shows the activities of assessment, which include


Monitoring the current situation to collect relevant information.

Evaluating progress toward attaining end state conditions, achieving objectives, and performing tasks.

Recommending or directing action for improvement.
A-2. Commanders typically base assessments on their situational understanding, which is generally a composite of several informational sources and intuition. Assessments help commanders determine progress toward attaining the desired end state, achieving objectives, and performing tasks. It involves monitoring and evaluating the operational environment to determine what changes affect operations; however, operations may not proceed as visualized during planning.

## Monitoring

A-3. *Monitoring* is continuous observation of those conditions relevant to the current operation (ADP 5-0).

Monitoring allows military police commanders and staffs to collect information about the current situation
(threats [to include crime], freedom of movement, DCs, and security) to determine if current strategies and approaches are successfully achieving the commander's intent and concept of operations or if they require modification. Progress cannot be judgedand effective decisions cannot be madewithout an accurate understanding of the current situation.

A-4. During planning, commanders monitor the situation to develop facts and assumptions that underlie the plan. During preparation and execution, commanders and staffs monitor the situation to determine if the facts are still relevant, if their assumptions remain valid, and if new conditions emerged that affect the operation.

A-5. CCIR and decision points focus the staff's monitoring activities and prioritize the military police collection efforts. Information requirements concerning the enemy, terrain and weather, and civil considerations are identified and assigned priorities through reconnaissance and surveillance.

Reconnaissance and surveillance are part of information collection. Military police performing reconnaissance and surveillance do so with policing capabilities and the application of PIO (see ATP 3-39.20)
that enables and enhances their ability to perform these activities. Conducting PIO, including activities related to the collection, assessment, development, and dissemination of police intelligence products, is a primary responsibility for commanders and the provost marshal.

A-6. Staffs monitor and collect information from the common operational picture and friendly reports. This information includes operational and intelligence summaries from subordinate, higher, and adjacent headquarters and communications and reports from liaison teams. Staffs also identify information sources outside military channels (local law enforcement) and monitor their reports. These other channels might include products from civilian, HN, and other government agencies. Staffs apply information management and knowledge management to facilitate getting this information to the right people at the right time.

A-7. Staff sections record relevant information in running estimates. Each staff element starts to build their respective running estimates during mission analysis. The commander and each staff section must then continuously build and maintain these estimates throughout the entire operations process. Staff sections maintain a continuous assessment of current operations as a basis to determine if they are proceeding according to the commander's intent, mission, and concept of operations. In their running estimates, staff sections use this new information and these updated facts and assumptions as the basis for evaluation (see figure A-2).

ASR
alternate supply route
MP
military police
ASG
assigned
FRAGO
fragmentary order
BN
battalion
MSR
main supply route
CO
company
OBJ
objective
DC
dislocated civilians
PCT
percent
FA
field artillery
REQ
required
TCP
traffic control post
HHD
headquarters and headquarters detachment
US
United States
KIA
killed in action
WPNS
weapons

A-8. During planning, commanders monitor the situation to develop facts and assumptions that underlie the plan. During preparation and execution, commanders and staffs monitor the situation to determine if the facts are still relevant, if their assumptions remain valid, and if new conditions emerged that affect the operations.

## Evalute

A-9.  Staffs analyze relevant information collected through monitoring to evaluate the operation's progress.

Evaluating is using indicators to judge progress toward desired conditions and determining why the current degree of progress exists (ADP 5-0). Evaluation is at the center of the assessment process, where most of the analysis occurs. Evaluation helps commanders determine what is and what is not working, and it helps them gain insights into how to better accomplish the mission.

A-10. Criteria in the forms of measure of effectiveness (MOE) and measure of performance (MOP) help determine the progress toward attaining end state conditions, achieving objectives, and performing tasks. An MOE helps determine if a task is achieving its intended results, and an MOP helps determine if a task is completed properly. MOEs and MOPs are simply criteria; they do not represent the assessment itself. MOEs and MOPs require relevant information in the form of indicators for evaluation. They are developed during planning, refined during preparation, and monitored during execution.

A-11. The assessment plan is enabled by monitoring and evaluating MOE and MOP criteria derived from security and mobility support tasks. These measures are discrete, relevant, and responsive benchmarks that are useful in all operations. They may contain the CCIR and the essential elements of friendly information and may generate information requirements. MOEs and MOPs can be significant decision support tools and may drive transition periods, resource allocations, and other critical decisions (see table A-1, page A-4). See FM 6-0 for additional information on MOPs and MOEs.


MOE. A *measure of effectiveness* is an indicator used to measure a current system state, with
change indicated by comparing multiple observations over time (JP 5-0). An MOE helps measure changes in positive and negative conditions and is oriented to mission accomplishment, focuses on the results or consequences of an action, and is used to assess changes in the OE (for example, attacks on MSR TINA reduced by 33 percent of over the past 7 days). This is more often a subjective assessment because it tends to measure long-term results. MOEs are commonly found
and tracked in formal assessment plans. Examples of MOEs for the objective to provide a safe and
secure environment may include
 An increase in friendly forces freedom of movement and maneuver.  A decrease in base camp attacks.  A decline in threat efforts along routes.  An increase in information about the activities and resources of enemy or adversary activities.

MOP. A *measure of performance* is an indicator used measure friendly action that is tied to
measuring task accomplishment (JP 5-0). MOPs help answer questions such as, "Was the action
taken?" or "Were the tasks completed to standard?" or "Are we doing things right?" An MOP
confirms or denies that a task has been properly performed. MOPs are commonly found and
tracked at all levels in execution matrices. MOPs are also commonly used to evaluate training. Using an MOP to evaluate a task accomplishment using MOPs is relatively straightforward and often results in a yes or no answer. Example MOPs include

Route X cleared.


Generators delivered, are operational, and are secured at X, Y, Z.

$15,000 spent for schoolhouse completion.

Aerial dissemination of 60,000 leaflets over village D.

Indicator. In the context of assessment, an indicator is an item of information that provides insight into an MOE or MOP. Indicators result from reports from subordinates, surveys and polls, and
information requirements. Indicators help to answer the question, "What is the current status of this MOE or MOP?" A single indicator can influence multiple MOEs and MOPs. Examples of
indicators for an MOE are the decrease in threat activity by the

Number of attacks along MSR TINA each week.

Number of times that DCs restricted movement on MSRs each day.

Number of reports of criminal activity by the population per area each week.

Number of explosives found along routes each week.

Number of attacks on base camps each week.

| MOE                              | MOP                       |
|----------------------------------|---------------------------|
| Answers the question:            | Are we                    |
| doing the right things?          |                           |
| Answers the question:            |                           |
| Are we doing things              |                           |
| right?                           |                           |
| Answers the question:            |                           |
| What is the status of this       |                           |
| MOE or MOP?                      |                           |
| Measures the purpose             |                           |
| accomplishment.                  |                           |
| Measures the task                |                           |
| completion.                      |                           |
| Measures raw data inputs         |                           |
| to influence MOEs and            |                           |
| MOPs.                            |                           |
| Measures why in the mission      |                           |
| statement.                       |                           |
| Measures what's in the           |                           |
| mission statement.               |                           |
| The information used to          |                           |
| make measuring what or           |                           |
| why possible.                    |                           |
| Often formally tracked in formal |                           |
| assessment plans.                |                           |
| Often formally tracked           |                           |
| in execution matrixes.           |                           |
| Often formally tracked in        |                           |
| formal assessment plans.         |                           |
| Typically challenging to choose  |                           |
| the correct ones.                |                           |
| Typically simple to              |                           |
| choose the correct               |                           |
| ones.                            |                           |
| Typically as challenging to      |                           |
| select correctly as the          |                           |
| supported MOE or MOP.            |                           |
| Legend:                          |                           |
| MOE                              | measures of effectiveness |
| MOP                              | measures of performance   |

A-12. Significant changes in some conditions of the operational environment are subtle and only occur over a long period of time; however, many security and mobility support tasks are continuous (such as reconnaissance, surveillance, area security, physical security, antiterrorism, and support to populace and resource control). The enduring nature of these tasks can cause complacency or inattentiveness, requiring leaders to stay focused on determining, monitoring, and evaluating accurate indicators and warnings that maintain situational understanding and alert them to hazards and associated risks.

A-13. Commanders monitor MOEs and evaluate variances and change indicators for cause and effect to forecast failure or to identify a critical point of failure in an activity or operation. Based on this assessment, resources can be reassigned to mitigate the overall risk to the mission or to support or reinforce specific security efforts. The goal is to anticipate the need for action before failure occurs, rather than react to an unplanned loss. Thorough staff planning during the military decision-making process allows commanders to accelerate decision making by preplanning responses to anticipated events through the use of battle drills, branches, and sequels. War-gaming critical events also allows commanders to focus their critical information requirements and the supporting information collection efforts. Information developed during this process can be used to develop essential elements of friendly information and indicators or warnings that relate to the development of protection priorities.

A-14. If an action appears to be failing in its desired effect, the result may be attributed to

Personnel or equipment system failure.

Insufficient resource allocation at vulnerable points.

Variances in the anticipated threat-combat power ratio, resulting in an increased risk equation.

Ineffective supporting efforts, leading to a cumulative failure of more critical elements.
A-15. Assessment identifies the magnitude and significance of variances in performance or conditions from those that were expected through prior forecasting to determine if an adjustment decision is needed. Commanders monitor the ongoing operation to determine if it is progressing satisfactorily according to the current plan, including fragmentary orders that have modified it. The staff assesses the situation in relation to established protection criteria. This assessment ensures that facts and assumptions remain valid and also identifies new facts and assumptions. Assessment decreases reaction time by anticipating future requirements and linking them to current plans.

A-16. Based on the evaluation of progress and effectiveness, the staff brainstorms possible improvements to the plan and makes preliminary judgments about the relative merit of those changes. Staff members identify those changes possessing sufficient merit and provide them as recommendations to the commander or make adjustments within their delegated authority. Commanders integrate recommendations from the staff, subordinate commanders, and other mission partners with their personal assessments. Using those recommendations, they decide if and how the operation should be modified to better accomplish the mission.

A-17. During decisive action, recommendations to the commander range from continuing the operation as planned, executing a branch, or making unanticipated adjustments. Making adjustments includes assigning new tasks to subordinates, reprioritizing support, adjusting information collection assets, and significantly modifying the course of action. During security and mobility support, recommendations may suggest that additional TCP and checkpoints be required to restrict DCs on MSRs (output) that enable the freedom of movement (outcome); or that additional reconnaissance and surveillance efforts (output) be required to mitigate and defeat threats (outcome) before they have the opportunity to strike (attack) friendly forces or disrupt friendly operations in support areas.

## Assessment During Execution

A-18. *Execution* is the act of putting a plan into action by applying combat power to accomplish the mission and adjusting operations based on changes in the situation (ADP 5-0). In execution, commanders (supported by their staffs) focus their efforts on translating decisions into actions. Inherent in execution is deciding whether to execute planned actions, such as changing phases or executing a branch plan. Execution also includes adjusting the plan based on the changes in the situation and the running assessment of the progress of the current operation.

A-19. Assessment during execution is essential and involves a deliberate comparison of forecasted outcomes to actual events, using criteria to judge operational progress toward success. Throughout execution, commanders (supported by their staffs) assess (through monitoring and evaluation) the progress of the operation; make decisions; and direct the application of combat power to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. It is imperative that commanders and their staffs continually assess the probable outcome of the operation to determine whether changes are necessary, take advantage of an opportunity, and/or react to an unexpected threat to ensure that they accomplish their mission.

## Assessment Tools

A-20. Throughout the operations process, commanders integrate their assessments with those of the staff, subordinate commanders, and other unified action partners. The primary tools for assessing the progress of the operation include the OPORD, the common operational picture, personal observations, running estimates, and the assessment plan (see FM 6-0).

A-21. During planning, staffs can develop an assessment plan using the six steps listed in the bullets below.

The assessment plan ensures that the continuous assessment process of monitor, evaluate, and recommended or direct continuous assessment is applied throughout the preparation and execution of operations.


Step 1. Gather tools and assessment data.

Step 2. Understand current and desired conditions.

Step 3. Develop an assessment framework.

Step 4. Develop the collection plan.

Step 5. Assign responsibilities for conducting analysis and generating recommendations.

Step 6. Identify feedback mechanisms.
A-22. Staff members develop running estimates that illustrate the significant aspects of security and mobility support discipline over time. These estimates are used by commanders to maintain situational understanding and direct adjustments. Significant changes or variances among or within running estimates can signal a threat or an opportunity, alerting commanders to take action. The importance of running estimates increases as time decreases. Decision making in a time-constrained environment usually occurs after a unit has entered the AO and is conducting current operations. This means that the IPB, an updated common operating picture, and some portions of the running estimates should already exist.

A-23. Rehearsals are a commander's tool used to ensure that staffs and subordinates understand the commander's intent and the concept of the operations. Conducting a rehearsal allows commanders and staffs to identify shortcomings in the plan that were not previously recognized. Rehearsals also contribute to external and internal coordination, as the staff identifies additional coordinating requirements. Conducting a well planned and executed rehearsal enables leaders to incorporate lessons learned, during the assessment of the rehearsal, into existing plans and orders, or into subsequent rehearsals to better prepare for mission success (see FM 6-0 for additional information on rehearsals).

## Lessons Learned Integration

A-24. The manner in which organizations and Soldiers learn from mistakes is key to mission success.

Although the evaluation process occurs throughout the operations process, it also occurs as part of the after action review and assessment following the mission. Leaders at all levels ensure that Soldiers and equipment are combat-ready. Leaders demonstrate their responsibility to the sound stewardship practices and risk management principles required to ensure minimal loss of resources and military assets due to hostile, nonhostile, and environmental threats and hazards.

A-25. Key lessons learned are immediately applied and shared with other commands. Commanders develop systems to ensure the rapid dissemination of approved lessons learned and the tactics, techniques, and procedures proven to protect the force and achieve mission success. The staff at each command echelon evaluates the integration of lessons learned and constantly coordinates lessons with other staff elements within and between the levels of command. Postoperational evaluations typically


Identify threats that were not identified as part of the initial assessment or identify new threats that evolved during the operation or activity. For example, reevaluate when personnel, equipment, the environment, or the mission changes the initial assessments.

Assess the effectiveness of supporting operational goals and objectives. For example, determine if the controls positively or negatively impacted mission accomplishment and determine if they supported existing doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures.

Assess the implementation, execution, and communication of controls.

Assess the accuracy of residual risk and the effectiveness of controls in eliminating hazards and controlling risks.

Ensure coordination throughout the integration processes.

Was the process integrated throughout all phases of the operation?

Were risk controls effective?

Were risk decisions made at the appropriate level?

Was the process cyclic and continuous throughout the operation?
A-26. For units with a staff, assessments become more formal at each higher echelon. Assessment resources
(including staff officer expertise and time available) proportionally increase from battalion to brigade, division, corps, and theater army. For small units (those without a staff), assessment is mostly informal.

Small-unit leaders focus on assessing their unit's readiness (personnel, equipment, supplies, and morale) and their unit's ability to perform assigned tasks. As units assess and learn, small units change their TTPs based on their experiences; therefore, even the lowest echelons in the Army follow the assessment process.


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## Appendix B Dislocated Civilian Camps

The requirement to establish a DC camp may occur across the range of military operations. Although the United Nations or other international organizations and NGOs typically build and operate DC camps and provide basic assistance and services to the affected population, U.S. military forces may be tasked to perform this mission. Establishing DC camps requires a combined arms approach to harness the necessary expertise in a variety of fields such as logistics, engineering, protection, CA, environmental conditions, preventive medicine, and resource management. Military police are a key component to this effort because many of the tasks linked to the disciplines of policing operations and detention operations (such as curfew enforcement, movement restrictions, the use of travel permits and registration cards, checkpoint operations, amnesty programs, and inspections) are essential for efficient and effective DC camps. These skill sets make military police well-suited for supporting DC camps. Military police may also be tasked with taking the lead on planning and integrating DC camps within the supported maneuver commander's concept of operations and with operating them. A military police unit commander may be designated as a DC camp commander. Because DC camps are simply base camps with a unique purpose, the techniques and procedures for planning, establishing, and operating them are the same as those contained in ATP 3-37.10. The purpose of this appendix is to supplement the doctrine contained in that manual by focusing on the planning, design, and operational considerations that are specific to DC camps. Creating efficient and effective DC camps helps to conserve resources, limit liabilities, and reduce the overall logistic burden during extended operations.

## Planning Considerations

B-1. The CCDR determines what facilities are needed to satisfy operational requirements. Planning identifies when, where, and why a DC camp is needed. It identifies the purpose and functional requirements of the camp and its linkages and interdependencies with other camps, operational forces, and agencies. It also generates the information that is needed for executing all aspects of the camp's life cycle. The planning needed for DC camps occurs across all levels of war and command echelons. Planning activities cover a continuum that ranges from conceptual to fully detailed. Effective planning for DC camps relies on expertise in a variety of fields. Much of that expertise may only be available through reachback to higher headquarters and supporting organizations, such as the United States Army Corps of Engineers.

B-2. The planning and construction of DC camps will likely be performed under intense time constraints to meet very aggressive construction schedules. This is mostly due to the unpredictability of those situations where DCs are present. Preplanning is critical to avoiding a crisis; however, planners should expect very little preplanning time. DC operations are often long-term and require resourcing that is normally not immediately available through DOD sources.

B-3. Unlike base camps that are used solely for operational forces, many of the activities that occur within DC camps involve participation from U.S. and international government organizations and NGOs, such as the United States Agency for International Development, the United Nations, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the International Organization of Migration. International humanitarian organizations, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, carefully guard their neutrality and do not desire to be associated with or dependent upon the military for fear of losing their special status in the international community that allows them to fulfill their mission. It is important that camp planners understand the interests and requirements of these stakeholders early during planning and gain their trust and support from the beginning. See JP 3-08 for more information on interorganizational coordination. See JP 3-28 for situations where military police are responding to natural disasters within the United States and its territories as DSCA.

B-4. Effective DC camps begin with the accurate identification of requirements for each aspect of the camp's life cycle and the generation of supporting estimates and schedules for each phase of the operation.

Estimates include the resources (people with the necessary skills and units or organizations with the necessary capabilities, materials, and money) that are needed to fulfill identified requirements. Commanders and staffs use the planning process described in FM 6-0 to determine their requirements for DC camps and then integrate those plans within the concept of operations and the base camp development planning process. The planning process provides the framework for integrating the actions of the commander, staff, subordinate commanders, and others. A DC camp is simply a type of base camp developed to serve a special purpose. A
key ingredient for all DC camp planning and design activities is the incorporation of the base camp principles described in ATP 3-37.10.

B-5.  In rare instances, Army forces may be called upon to establish DC camps. In these cases, the force must take into account any legal considerations regarding the availability and ownership of land for camps;
logistic factors connected with shelter, food, sanitation, and medical care; security and crime prevention with the DC camp; and possible contracting requirements for construction. In planning DC operations, the primary factor is transition planning for the care and transfer of responsibility for the DC population to a controlling agency. Controlling agencies (such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the International Organization of Migration, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the International Committee of the Red Cross, or the HN) normally care for the basic needsfood, water, shelter, sanitation, and securityof DCs. Controlling agencies must also be prepared to prevent the outbreak of communicable disease among DCs. This last point is important for the health of the populace and for the supporting military forces.

## General Planning Considerations

B-6. The primary objective of DC operations is to protect civilians from the effects of violence or disaster and to minimize civilian interference with military operations. DC camps provide a means for consolidating DCs within a protected location from which aid can be effectively and efficiently rendered.

B-7. The specific planning focus of DC camps (to include duration and composition) may differ at each level of command and will vary depending on the characteristics and disposition of the DC population and other relevant aspects of the operational environment. Although military police are typically only in a supporting role to CA-led operations for DC camps and overall resettlement efforts, it is possible that in selected situations or for limited periods of time, military police organizations may be required to command and operate DC camps. All commands and national and international agencies involved must have clearly defined responsibilities. Planners consider the following when planning and projecting the establishment, operation, and management of DC camps:


Coordinate with CA units to ensure the use of the United States, the HN, and other international
organizations (such as the United Nations Children's Fund and the Cooperative for Assistance and
Relief Everywhere) to determine the appropriate levels and types of aid required and available.
Receiving assistance from these organizations not only capitalizes on their experience but also reduces the requirements placed on United States Armed Forces.

Minimize outside contributions (issue basic needs items only) until DCs become self-sufficient,
and encourage DCs to become as independent as possible.

Review the effectiveness of humanitarian responses, and adjust relief activities as necessary.

Apply the appropriate security restrictions for DCs that comply with U.S., international, and HN laws and regulations. Under international laws, DCs have the right to freedom of movement;
however, in the event of a mass influx of DCs, security considerations may require restrictions.

## Camp Standards

B-8. The CCDR specifies the facility allowances and the standards for construction, quality of life, design, environmental conditions, and protection for base camps in-theater. These standards are based on the characteristics of the region (such as resource availability, local climate, and local labor market) and the anticipated duration of a mission. For DC camps, there may also be applicable international humanitarian standards. See JP 3-34 for more information on basic guidelines for facility allowances and construction standards.

## Site Selection

B-9. Site selection balances mission, sustainment, protection, environmental, and engineering requirements.

The planning team determines possible locations for DC camps based on an analysis of operational and mission variables, with added emphasis on terrain, civil, and environmental considerations.

B-10. The location of a DC camp may range from a spontaneous settlement over a wide area, to an organized rural settlement, to a concentration in a very limited area. As part of an overall strategy for DC camps, planners must generally decide whether it is better to have a few larger camps or several smaller ones. Having several smaller camps requires an interconnected relationship between them to improve the use of limited resources. Generally, the smaller the camps the better from the standpoint of ease of control. Having a few larger camps reduces the aggregate number of dedicated personnel to command, operate, and manage the camps and allows resources and capabilities to be consolidated. Often, the only differences in the effort required for a small and a large base camp are the amount and type of resources expended and the degree of technical expertise and engineering required.

B-11. The security of camps should be a major consideration during the early stages of site selection. A
solution that maintains and fosters self-reliance among the dislocated population is always preferable. The CCDR must consider a plan for PRC operations and the construction of DC camps early in the operational plan. This provides the timely notification of engineers, the selection and development of facility sites, and the procurement of construction materials. Military police coordinate the location with engineers, sustainment units, higher headquarters, and the HN.

B-12. Existing structures, facilities, and infrastructure should be used when possible to reduce requirements for new construction, as long as they do not impose health or environmental hazards that cannot be mitigated. There are multiple options for the construction of facilities and infrastructurethese options include modifying preexisting structures; using preengineered metal or fabric buildings; using modular base camp kits; and constructing wood, steel, or concrete masonry unit framed and supported buildings.

B-13. If no immediate solutions arise to resolving the causes of dislocation, the planning for DC needs will require long-range planning. This includes planning for all seasons (winter and summer) and for rain and drought. Determining the weather extremes must be a primary design factor. Temporary arrangements can be very difficult and costly to change once established. Site selection, planning, and the types of shelter available all have a direct bearing on the level of assistance.

B-14. The command should analyze the wide array of logistics and operational requirements that are necessary to establish DC camps. The first requirement is to ensure that the correct number and type of personnel and construction materials are on the ground to establish and operate DC camps well in advance of the start of hostilities. The second requirement is to develop a long-term plan that will sustain the operations and maintenance of camps for their expected duration. Inaccurately assessing the logistics and operational requirements for each aspect of the DC camp life cycle early in the process will likely yield inefficiencies that waste valuable results and ultimately detract from the overall mission.

B-15. If a DC camp is improperly located, the entire DC population may require relocation when resources are depleted. Planners consider the following when selecting a site for a DC camp:


Operational and mission variables.

Accessibility and proximity to other organizations (military or civilian) that can provide additional sustainment and protection.

The ability for civilian relief organizations to be able to access and operate the site.

The viability of real estate acquisition.

The threat and boldness of adversaries in the area.

The attitude of the local population.

Accessibility and transportation to the site for support elements.

Proximity to potentially hazardous structures (such as dams and industrial chemical plants) if they are damaged or destroyed by a force of nature or an act of man.

Proximity to communications centers, large military fixed sites, ammunition storage areas, or other
potential military targets that should be avoided.

Accessibility and proximity to MSRs, transportation hubs, and distribution centers.

The availability of suitable existing facilities (to avoid unnecessary construction).

Susceptibility to natural disasters (flooding, earthquakes, fire).

The management and control of food and water resources or presence vermin, vectors, and other
factors (such as water drainage) that affect public health.

Access to an adequate source of potable water. (The supply should meet the demands for consumption, food sanitation, and personal hygiene.)

The availability of existing infrastructure (power, sewer, water, waste disposal).

The availability of construction resources (labor and material).

Soil drainage.

Other environmental considerations, as appropriate.

## Security

B-16. The security of U.S. forces, assets, and information is a high priority and no less important during DC
operations than during offensive or defensive operations. Even in a stable environment, banditry, vandalism, and various levels of violent activities from criminal or unruly crowds can occur. During a humanitarian mission, there should be a balance between the security posture and the camp population's right not to live in an armed camp. The appearance and use of stringent security tactics may be overwhelming and detrimental to the overall intent of the camp.

## Communications

B-17. Effective communications are vital to mission success. It is likely that interagency, international organizations, and NGOs will have their own communication networks. Planning must include procedures to provide for interoperable and compatible communications among all participants. The need for interoperability may necessitate using unclassified communications means, which can be extremely challenging for U.S. military forces.

## Design Considerations

B-18. Design is an extension of planning. During design, the construction means; construction standards;
quality-of-life standards; the level of camp capabilities; on-site conditions; and adaptable, scalable designs are matched against facility and infrastructure requirements. Planning and design are interdependent. Effective design hinges on the accuracy of information generated during planning, particularly information related to facility and infrastructure requirements, available resources, construction means, and site location.

## Construction Means

B-19. Construction may be performed by joint and multinational engineer units (troop construction), contractors, or a combination of both. See ATP 3-34.23 for more information on contract construction.

B-20. Sustainable DC camps leverage resources that are readily available through local means, established supply channels, and operational contract support. (See ATP 4-10 for more information on operational contact support.) The cost-effective use of materials and labor is achieved primarily through the use of local resources, including selected DCs as appropriate. Local resources are generally less expensive and help to avoid the challenges associated with international shipments; however, the quality of materials and services rendered must be considered in the overall cost-benefit analysis.

## Construction Methods

B-21. There are multiple options for the construction of facilities and infrastructurethese options include modifying preexisting structures; using pre-engineered metal or fabric buildings; using modular base camp kits (such as the Force Provider system); and constructing wood, steel, or concrete masonry unit framed and supported buildings. The type of construction depends on the climate, anticipated life of the facility, number of facilities to be established, and availability of construction resources (labor and materials).

## Preexisting Facilities And Infrastructure

B-22. Preexisting facilities and infrastructure should be used when possible to save time, conserve resources, and reduce the overall logistic footprint. Using preexisting structures assumes protection risks (in terms of survivability, safety, and force health protection) that must be mitigated through structural assessments and occupational and environmental health site assessments. Documenting the existing environmental conditions helps limit liabilities. In some cases, existing facilities with minor damage may be quickly repaired to make them immediately usable. For example, leaking roofs can be temporarily repaired with plastic sheeting.

B-23. Facilities are grouped into six broad categories that emphasize the use of existing assets over new construction. To the maximum extent possible, facility or real estate requirements should be met from these categories in the following order of priority:


U.S.-owned, -occupied, or -leased facilities (including captured facilities).

U.S.-owned facility substitutes, pre-positioned in-theater.

HN and multinational support where an agreement exists for the HN; multinational nations to
provide specific types and quantities of facilities at specified times in designated locations.

Facilities available from commercial sources.

U.S.-owned facility substitutes stored in the United States.

The construction of facilities that are considered a shortfall after an assessment of the availability of existing assets.
B-24. Public buildings and community facilities (schools, barracks, hotels, gymnasiums, warehouses) can be found in urban areas and offer an excellent temporary or transit accommodation. Using these existing facilities may offer the following advantages:


They are not continuously inhabited during normal use, and DCs can be accommodated
immediately without disrupting accommodation in the hosting area.

Services such as water and sanitation are immediately available, although these may be inadequate
if the numbers of DCs are large.

The need to construct additional structures specifically for DCs is avoided.
B-25. The disadvantages associated with using existing facilities might include the following:


The facilities can quickly become overcrowded.

Sanitation and other services can become overburdened.

Equipment and structures can be damaged.

Facilities are no longer available for their original purpose, thus disrupting public services to the hosting population.

There can be a lack of privacy and increased protection risks.
B-26. When possible, such accommodation in public buildings should be a temporary solution. The supporting infrastructure of the building (water, electricity, sanitation) deteriorates quickly from concentrated use, to the extent that living conditions can become dangerously unhealthy. The buildings decay rapidly, primarily because they are unsuited to such large numbers and lack the necessary infrastructure and utilities. In addition, the very low sense of responsibility by its inhabitants contributes to the deterioration.

Furthermore, since the normal use of the building has to be suspended with various social and economic consequences, both local and national governments are reluctant to transform public buildings into DC facilities. If such use is permitted, the need for quick evacuation of the building should be borne in mind as this may be requested by the government.

## Hurricane Katrina

When Hurricane Katrina struck, the Superdome presented what many perhaps assumed was a suitable existing facility; however, the expected population quickly grew and exceeded initial estimates. The Superdome was understaffed, undersupplied, and lacked accessibility due to high floodwaters, which made resupply, evacuations, and other operations difficult. The facility lost power, and the existing backup power provided only dim lighting. Conditions at the stadium worsened due to the increasing size of the population and a lack of air conditioning, running water, and proper waste management. Eventually, the Superdome became declared uninhabitable and was ordered to be evacuated as soon as possible; however, state and local officials lacked the necessary transportation assets to do so without additional support.

## Tentage

B-27. The primary advantage of using tents is that it provides a quick means for establishing a basic level of capabilities. However, the impacts of the long-term use of tents must be considered. The life span of an erected canvas tent depends on the manufacturing, the length of storage before deployment, the climate, and the care given by its occupants. When tents are used for long durations, provisions for repair materials should be considered. The longer that tentage is used and exposed to the elements, the less likely it is to be easily repacked, stored, and reused. Tentage used outside of the United States is typically not retrograded back to the United States unless it can meet the rigorous cleanliness requirements mandated by Executive Order 13122. Additionally, the cost of tentage, when combined with shipping costs into remote areas, may be more expensive than using local materials and labor to construct base camp facilities. Other disadvantages for tents are that they are susceptible to damage from high winds and are highly flammable unless made from fire-retardant material. Additionally, they may not provide the necessary protection from extreme weather conditions.

B-28. Figure B-1 is an example of a DC camp that used tents. Hundreds of tents stretched out on the plains near Fier, Albania, as the United States built a tent city called Camp Hope on May 23, 1999, as part of Operation Sustain Hope. Sustain Hope was the United States effort to bring in food, water, medicine, and relief supplies and to establish camps for the refugees who were fleeing from the Former Republic of Yugoslavia. This camp was planned to support up to 20,000 refugees.

## Prefabricated Or Manufactured Buildings

B-29. Prefabricated or manufactured buildings are structures that consist of several factory-built components that are assembled on-site to complete the unit. The primary advantage of prefabrication is that it saves time on the construction site; this may be a factor when construction time is limited based on tactical or weather conditions. Potential disadvantages to consider include requirements for the careful handling of prefabricated components (such as concrete panels) and the tendency for leaks where prefabricated components are joined.

## Traditional Construction

B-30. Traditional construction using wood, steel, or concrete masonry units offers flexibility in designs, including the incorporation of necessary protection measures and the ability to perfectly adapt to existing site conditions. Disadvantages include the time and effort needed for designing and constructing individual facilities, especially on a large scale. The environmental impacts (such as soil degradation) of procuring or using local construction material (such as the harvesting of timber) must also be considered.

## Basic Design

B-31. The overall physical layout of the camp should reflect a decentralized community-based approach, focusing on family, community, or other social groups. The camp should be subdivided into sections for ease of administration and the relief of camp tension. Each section can serve as an administrative subunit for transacting camp business. Major sections normally include a camp headquarters, a clinic, a dining facility, personal-hygiene facilities, sleeping areas, and animal compounds. Sleeping areas are further subdivided into separate areas for families, unaccompanied children, unattached females, and unattached males. Cultural and religious practices should also be considered, and efforts should be made to keep families together when possible.

B-32. Site planning should use a bottom-up approach by starting with the characteristics and needs of individual families and should reflect the wishes of the community as much as possible. Each community should be planned to include its own immediate services, such as latrines, showers, water points, waste collection, and laundry facilities. This promotes ownership, which leads to better care of facilities by communities.

B-33. The basic design for a DC camp centers on an administrative area and up to eight 1,000-person enclosures. The facility is designed to be expandable in capacity increments of 1,000. The initial facility is constructed with the administrative area and one 1,000-person enclosure and then expanded, as needed, by adding additional 1,000-person enclosures until the maximum 8,000 capacity is reached. The target upper number of civilians in a camp is approximately 8,000. This number helps enforce control measures and allows for the efficient administration of the camp and its population. Figure B-2, page B-8, depicts a DC facility with eight 1,000-person enclosures, each of which are divided into two 500-person compounds. The compounds are further divided into two 250-person subcompounds. Each 1,000-person enclosure must be self-contained with electric and water capabilities and must be able to be occupied immediately upon completion. Flexibility of this design facilitates various separations within the same larger camp (single men, single women, families, and other potential requirements for separation).

B-34. The Army Facilities Components System (AFCS) is the primary tool that planners use for both site design and facilities and infrastructure design. The AFCS designs aid in solving contingency construction that is constrained by resources and time. Facilities in the AFCS can be rapidly constructed with locally available materials. This allows for the use of preexisting supplies and indigenous craftsmen, both of which dramatically reduce costs and save time. The facilities and components in the AFCS satisfy many of the DC
camp construction requirements identified during planning. The AFCS can provide the specifications and material requirements for a variety of facilities when dimensions or population input is supplied. These plans are easily modified for temperate, frigid, tropic, and desert climates. The AFCS facilitates DC camp design within units at the lower tactical levels that typically lack necessary design skills and capabilities.

## Operations

B-35. The skills needed for operating a DC camp do not reside in any single branch or functional area. A
base operations center is used to group the necessary capabilities to produce synergic effects. The size, composition, and configuration of the base operations center needed for a DC camp may vary based on the population of the camp, the complexity of facility and infrastructure operations and maintenance requirements, and the characteristics of the DC population. For smaller DC camps with simpler and less extensive facilities and infrastructure, the base operations center may be subsumed within the owning unit command post, or it may be a stand-alone operations center. The organizational structure of base operations centers and the tasks they perform are detailed in ATP 3-37.10. Some of the key tasks or areas of emphasis that may be unique to operating DC camps include


Camp control.

Information dissemination.

Liaison.

Initial processing.

Mistreatment or abuse.

Basic conduct.

## Camp Control

B-36. Control of the camp population is key to successful camp operations. DC camp commanders must quickly and fairly establish and maintain discipline within the camp. They must publish and enforce rules of conduct for the camp, as necessary. Camp rules should be brief and kept to a minimum.

B-37. Because of the large number of DCs for whom control and care must be provided, the use of HN
civilians as cadre for the camp administration is preferred. DCs should become as involved in the administration of the camp as is viable.

## Information Dissemination

B-38. Dissemination of instructions and information to the camp population is vital. Communications may be in the form of notices on bulletin boards, posters, public address systems, loudspeakers, camp meetings and assemblies, or a camp radio station. CA public information teams and area military information support units may be able to assist.

## Liaison

B-39. Liaison involves coordination with all interested agencies. The USG and military authorities, allied liaison officers, and representatives of local governments and charitable organizations may help in relief and assistance operations.

## Initial Processing

B-40. The initial processing begins with the transport of civilians to the DC camp. The HN (in coordination with NGOs, international humanitarian organizations, and other international organizations) normally assists in arranging transportation for DCs, but military assets may be required to move DCs from the initial point of contact to established collection points and camps. Processing is done in a positive manner because these civilians may be fearful and in a state of shock. Civilians should understand why they are being processed and know what to expect at each station. This is accomplished by the facility commander ensuring that all DCs, HN representatives, or other officials receive an entrance briefing upon their arrival. The briefing is provided in the native language of the DCs. If there is more than one language represented, the briefing is provided in multiple languages to meet all language requirements. The facility commander may minimize difficulties through careful administration and by implementing the following measures:


Maintaining different national and cultural groups in separate facilities or sections of a facility.

Keeping families together while separating unaccompanied males, females, and children under the age of 18 (according to the laws of the HN as to when a child becomes an adult).

Furnishing necessary information regarding the status and future of DCs.

Making it possible for DCs to speak freely to camp officials.

Involving the DCs in camp administration, work, and recreation.
B-41. Military personnel provide training and support, while NGOs, international humanitarian organizations, international organizations, or other U.S. agencies typically conduct the processing of DCs at designated DC camps. In the absence of these organizations and agencies, military personnel may perform the functions found in table B-1, page B-10. The number and type of processing stations vary from operation to operation. Table B-1 also shows stations that are typically required during DC operations.

| Station                         | Purpose               |
|---------------------------------|-----------------------|
| 1                               |                       |
| Search and screen               |                       |
| Military police staff, MI       |                       |
| personnel, NGOs,                |                       |
| international humanitarian      |                       |
| organizations, and              |                       |
| international organizations     |                       |
| 2                               |                       |
| Accountability                  | Military police staff |
| Prepare forms and records to    |                       |
| maintain accountability of      |                       |
| DCs. Use forms and records      |                       |
| provided by the HN or CA        |                       |
| personnel or forms and          |                       |
| records used for detainee       |                       |
| operations that may apply to    |                       |
| DCs.                            |                       |
| 3                               |                       |
| Identification card or band     | Military police staff |
| Issue an identification card or |                       |
| band to each DC, if required,   |                       |
| to ease facility administration |                       |
| and control.                    |                       |
| 4                               |                       |
| Medical evaluation              | Medical personnel     |
| Evaluate DCs for signs of       |                       |
| illness or injury, and treat    |                       |
| them as necessary.              |                       |
| 5                               |                       |
| Assignment                      | Staff                 |
| Assign a sleeping area to       |                       |
| each DC.                        |                       |
| 6                               |                       |
| Personal items                  | Staff                 |
| Issue personal comfort items    |                       |
| and clothing if available.      |                       |

Note. *The number of people performing these tasks depends on the number of DCs and the time available. When
possible, allow HN authorities to conduct most of the processing.
Legend:
CA
                   civil affairs

| DC    | dislocated civilian          |
|-------|------------------------------|
| HN    | host nation                  |
| MI    | military intelligence        |
| NGO   | nongovernmental organization |

B-42. The DC camp commander determines the accountability procedures and requirements necessary for DC operations within the camp. Translators are present throughout processing. A senior member of the camp staff greets new arrivals and makes them feel welcome. DCs are briefed on facility policies and procedures and are screened to identify security and medical concerns. They are offered the use of personal-hygiene facilities. Family integrity is always maintained, if possible.

B-43. Searches of arriving DCs are conducted to take control of items that may cause harm to camp personnel and residents. Searchers confiscate and tag all confiscated items that noncombatants are not permitted to have according to U.S. or HN policy. Units have several disposition options for controlled property. Depending on the property category, units may retain control of it, return it to the persons from which it was taken, or hand it over to other agencies (such as local law enforcement). The owner should be given an official receipt (such as DA Form 3161, *Request for Issue or Turn-in*) and an explanation of the owner's rights and procedures for getting it returned. Camp commanders must ensure accountability of all confiscated property.

B-44. Same-gender searches are conducted when possible, and strip searches are never conducted without special authority and only in unique situations. Speed and security considerations may require mixed-gender searches. If so, perform them in a respectful manner, using all possible measures to prevent any action that could be interpreted as sexual molestation or assault. The on-site supervisor carefully controls Soldiers doing mixed-gender searches to prevent allegations of sexual misconduct. Using HN, NGO, or international humanitarian organization personnel to conduct searches may prevent negative situations from developing.

Conduct a pat-down search to ensure that weapons are not brought into the facility and that the facility is not infiltrated by insurgents.

B-45. Military police may be responsible for classifying DCs during processing. They coordinate with CA
personnel, NGOs, international humanitarian organizations, and international organizations to determine proper classifications. Military police personnel can expect a continuing need for the reclassification and reassignment of DCs. Statements made by DCs and the information on their identification papers determine their initial classifications. Agitators, enemy plants, and individuals who may be classified as DCs are identified by their activities. DCs may be reclassified according to their proper identity and/or ideology through a civilian internee review tribunal. DCs reclassified as detainees will be transferred to a theater internment facility or a strategic internment facility.

B-46. The National Detainee Reporting Center has the ability to assist commanders in establishing an automated detainee reporting system to process DCs. This portable detainee reporting system (jump kit) will assist in processing identification cards, internment serial numbers, and demographic information. An identification card is used to facilitate the identification of a DC. It contains the DC's name, photograph, and control number. The control number may be an internment serial number or a sequenced control number specific to the DC. Identification cards or bands permit identification by the DC categories. An identification band permits rapid, reliable identification of an individual and may be used in resettlement operations. While DCs cannot be prevented from removing or destroying identification bands, most will accept their use for identification purposes. When identification bands or cards deteriorate, replace them immediately.

## Addressing Mistreatment Or Abuse

B-47. All DOD personnel (military, civilian, and contractor) must correct, report, and document any incident or situation that might constitute the mistreatment or abuse of DCs. Acts and omissions that constitute inhumane treatment may be violations of U.S. laws, U.S. policy, and the law of war. These violations require immediate action to correct. Simply reporting violations is insufficient. If a violation is ongoing, Soldiers have an obligation to take action to stop the violation and report it to their chain of command.

B-48. All personnel who observe or have knowledge of possible abuse or mistreatment will immediately report the incident through their chain of command or supervision. Reports may also be submitted to the military police, a judge advocate, a chaplain, or an inspector general who will then forward the report through the recipient's chain of command or supervision. Reports made to other officials will be accepted and immediately forwarded through the recipient's chain of command or supervision, with an information copy forwarded to the appropriate CCDR.

B-49. Any commander or supervisor who obtains credible information about actual or possible abuse or mistreatment will immediately report the incident through command or supervisory channels to the responsible CCDR or to another appropriate authority (such as the USACIDC or the inspector general) for allegations involving personnel who are not assigned to a CCDR. In the latter instance, an information report is sent to the CCDR who has responsibility for the geographic area in which the alleged incident occurred.

## Basic Conduct Reminders

B-50. The following basic conduct reminders apply from initial contact with DCs, through in-processing, and throughout the duration of DC activities. All DC camp personnel will


Observe rigorous self-discipline.

Maintain a professional but impartial attitude.

Follow the guidelines established in the rules of interaction and the ROE.

Cope calmly with hostile or unruly behavior or incidents.

Take fair yet immediate, decisive action.
B-51. The DC camp commander takes positive action to establish those daily or periodic routines and responses that are conducive to good discipline and control. DC camp personnel


Enforce policies and procedures that provide control of camp residents.

Give reasonable, decisive orders to civilians in a language they understand.

Post (in an easily accessible area) camp rules, regulations, instructions, notices, orders, and
announcements that residents are expected to obey. This information is printed in a language understood by the DCs. Those individuals who do not have access to the posted copies will be
given a copy.

Ensure that the DCs obey orders, rules, and directives.

Report DCs who refuse or fail to obey an order or regulation.

Enforce nonfraternization with DCs.

Refuse to accept gifts from, or engage in any commercial activity with, DCs.

## Appendix C Route Classifications And Signing Systems

Military police use the military route classification system when performing the security and mobility support discipline. A route classification is a classification assigned to a route based on the factors of minimum width; worst route type; least bridge, raft, or culvert military load classification; and obstructions to traffic flow (see JP 3-34). This appendix discusses the route classification system and the types of route signing. (See ATP 3-34.81 for additional information about both subjects.)

## Route Classification

C-1. The route classification describes the traffic-bearing capabilities and conditions of a selected route and supports decisions on the improvements that are needed before a route can carry the proposed traffic. The way in which route reconnaissance is performed depends on the amount of detail required, the time available, the terrain problems that are encountered, and the tactical situation. A hasty route classification determines the immediate military trafficability of a specified route. It is limited to the critical terrain data that is necessary for route classification. The results are part of the mobility input to the common operational picture. Information concerning the route is updated with additional reports as required by the situation or the commander's guidance. A deliberate route classification (including road, bridge, tunnel, and other components) is conducted when sufficient time and qualified technical personnel are available. Deliberate route classification is usually conducted when operational requirements are anticipated to cause heavy, protracted use of the road and may follow the conduct of a hasty route reconnaissance.

C-2. Route classification results from collecting detailed technical information on the various components of a designated route, such as the road network, bridges along a selected route, and underpasses or overpasses. Route classification provides a graphical display of the load-carrying and rate-of-travel capacities of the selected route. In a route classification, the designated route components are reconnoitered and a classification formula is determined. The resulting formula and the graphical information from the classification components are displayed as a route classification overlay, which may be included directly on the common operational picture and is supplemented by the component reports that are generated to determine the classification.

C-3. In a general sense, route classification is based on the technical information that is collected on the various components of the selected route. In application, a route classification may include only the most critical details, such as if the route includes bridges with limited crossing capacity, underpasses with low overhead clearance, or critical sections of poorly maintained road. These components would be the determining components (and possible sole components) of a route classification. A route classification may also include alternate roads on which movement can be made and what type of vehicle and traffic load the alternate or bypass can handle. During combat operations, only the necessary and essential facts about a route are gathered as quickly and safely as possible from a route reconnaissance.

C-4. The route classification formula uses numbers, letters, and symbols to represent, in order, the


Route width (narrowest part along the route), in meters.

Route type, which is based on the ability to withstand weather and includes

Type Xall weather.

Type Ylimited all weather.

Type Zfair weather.

Lowest military load classification, which is found in the vehicle technical manual or on the vehicle data plate. A route military load classification is a class number that represents the safe load-carrying capacity and indicates the maximum vehicle class that can be accepted under normal conditions. Usually, the lowest bridge military load classification (regardless of the vehicle type
or traffic flow condition) determines the route military load classification. If there is no bridge on the route, the worst section of road will determine the overall route classification. The basis for a route military load classification are the effects of the vehicle characteristics (such as vehicle speed and tire width) and their loads on route trafficability. The broad categories are

Class 50average traffic route.

Class 80heavy traffic route.

Class 120very heavy traffic route.

Lowest overhead clearance, in meters, between the road surface and the overhead obstacle (power lines and overpasses). Use the infinity symbol () for unlimited clearance in the route classification formula.

Obstructions to traffic flow, if applicable, represented in the classification formula by the letters
OB. The exact nature of an obstruction is identified graphically in a route classification overlay.

Special conditions, such as snow blockage (T) or flooding (W).
C-5. The following are examples of route classification formulas:


6.1/Z/40/. This formula depicts a fair-weather route (Z) with a minimum traveled way of 6.1
meters (6.67 yards) and a military load classification of 40. Overhead clearance is unlimited (), and there are no obstructions to traffic flow. This route accommodates wheeled and tracked,
single-flow traffic without obstruction.

7/Y/50/4.6 (OB) (W). This formula depicts a limited, all-weather route (Y) with a minimum traveled way of 7 meters (7.66 yards), a military load classification of 50, an overhead clearance
of 4.6 meters (5.03 yards), and an obstruction. This route width is not suitable for double-flow
traffic (wheeled or tracked). This route is subject to regular, recurrent flooding.
C-6. The route classification formula and the graphical information from the classification components are displayed as a route classification overlay, which graphically depicts a route network of roads, bridge sites, and other components. As indicated in figure C-1, a route classification overlay provides specific details on the obstructions that slow down a convoy or maneuver force along a route. Figure C-2, page C-4, depicts the different route reconnaissance symbols that are used on these overlays.

## Temporary Route Signing

C-7. Posting signs at bridges and other constrictions or key locations along a route promotes efficient traffic control and limits the impact of hazardous areas along the route. Signs are used when it is necessary to identify the special controls that are placed on a route section or technical component; to warn vehicle operators of hazardous areas or conditions; and to identify holding areas, turnouts for parking and unloading vehicles, and checkpoints. The United States and allied nations use standardized procedures for posting military routes; however, this system may be integrated into other road sign systems according to military requirements.

C-8. A military route sign system, like the U.S. highway sign system, can enable road users to reach their destinations by following the route signs and road markings that are displayed along the roadside. Military police patrols monitor the signs on a routine basis, checking specific signs before critical moves. Engineers erect permanent signs, but these signs can be damaged, destroyed, or moved by weather, saboteurs, and battle.

C-9. When military police on patrol encounter immediate and temporary MSR obstructions, such as blown bridges or CBRN contamination, they construct and erect signs quickly to guide vehicles around the obstruction. Military police prepare and post temporary signs to


Identify routes.

Reroute traffic around problem areas.

Help convoys and units move quickly and easily to their destinations, even on unfamiliar routes.

Show drivers the locations of staging areas, tactical assembly areas, detours, key units, and facilities.

Give directions, distances, and general information.

Help lost military personnel find their way to the closest military police element.
C-10. Military police obtain signing materials (signs, paint, wire) through the Army supply system.

(Typically, military police platoons have route-signing kits that contain the necessary items to construct hasty signs.) In an emergency, use boards, shingles, or cardboard.

C-11. Conduct preplanned route signing for convoys and units that travel long stretches of MSRs, and link routes well in advance. It is a time-consuming, manpower- and material-intensive operation. Preplanned route signs are built by engineers or military police. If tasked to construct preplanned route signs, store the constructed and coded signs in a secure place to avoid the risk of being compromised.

Department of the Army
meter(s) North Atlantic Treaty Organization
railroad bridges
U.S.
United States

C-12. Military police squads use the route-signing kit to place signs along a route within the squad AO. One team posts the signs while another team provides overwatch security. The squad leader checks and confirms the sign placement by traveling the entire route. He develops an overlay with the location of each sign in his squad AO. Consolidate squad overlays to contribute to a platoon traffic control plan.

C-13. Place signs where they will support traffic control and traffic circulation plans. Reflect changes in sign locations on the traffic control plan overlay. Ensure that all route signs are large enough to be read easily in poor light. Size is not specified, but


Signs for international use cannot be less than 40 centimeters (15.75 inches) by 33 centimeters (12.99 inches).

Bridge classification signs must conform to Standardization Agreement 2010.
C-14. Use the following guidelines when placing signs:


Place hazard signs about 150 meters (164.04 yards) before the hazard.

Place regulatory signs (such as stop or yield signs) where a regulation takes effect.

Place signs on the side of the road that faces the traffic flow, about 1 meter (1.09 yards) off the traveled roadway. Conceal them from air view. If no cover is available, slant the sign stake forward.

Place signs 1 to 2 meters (1.09 to 2.19 yards) above the road level. Place the signs at the same
height, if possible. Sign height is governed by roadside foliage, by whether the route is in an urban
or rural area, and by day or night use. Do not use foliage to block signs. In urban areas, place signs
so that they are not hidden by vehicles or pedestrians and do not hinder pedestrians. Choose locations where street lighting and vehicle headlights increase sign visibility.

Use the least number of signs needed to be effective. Ensure that every sign is necessary and
specific.

Use more signs in urban areas than in rural areas.

Use more signs on night routes than on routes that are primarily used during the day.

Use signs to inform drivers to follow the common route when one road is used for two signed
routes. Use signs to inform drivers when such routes diverge.
C-15. Conceal signs so that they are visible only from the direction of travel. There is no exact rule that states the distance from which a sign should be visible. However, the distance should be no greater than security allows and no less than is reasonable for individuals who receive directions.

C-16. Carefully conceal illuminated signs. Ensure that the light source is just strong enough to light the sign but not strong enough to be seen from the air. This entails masking and covering the light sources. Consider placing chemical light sticks on top of the signs.

C-17. Place temporary route signs where they will provide warning and reaction time for drivers. Do not block existing civilian signs. Place warning signs at convenient distances from where a route regulation takes effect. This distance can be shown on the panel (for example, BLACKOUT 500 METERS). In areas where blackout drive is the rule and drivers are using night-vision equipment, employ infrared emitters on signs along routes to help guide units to their destinations. Just like any other light source, ensure that the infrared emitters are not visible from the air.

C-18. Figure C-3 depicts sample direction indicators that identify the route or name. Place such signs at intersections where roads merge and routes separate.

C-19. Figure C-4 depicts the guide and warning signs that are used together at important road junctions. They are rectangular, with the symbols in white on a black background. They include a directional arrow and the route number, name, and/or symbol. Place guide signs at road junctions to prevent confusion.

C-20. Figure C-5 depicts confidence and confirmation signs. Confidence signs reassure drivers that they are still on the correct route; use them where needed. Confirmation signs let drivers know that they are on the correct route after changing the direction of travel. These should be used after turns but should also be visible to drivers while they are making turns. Place confirmation signs 150 meters (164.04 yards) beyond critical road junctions to let drivers know that they are on the correct route.

C-21. Figure C-6 depicts countdown and regulatory signs. Countdown signs warn of anything that requires a major change to the movement. They are positioned in a series of three signs at 100-meter (109-yard)
intervals before designated locations, such as start points, relay points, MSR junctions, and blackout areas.

indicate traffic hazards, such as steep hills, crossroads, sharp curves, or flooded roads. Civilian signs usually suffice, but use military signs in combat zones. Military casualty evacuation route signs indicate the evacuation route for military casualties and are rectangular in shape with a white background, red directional arrow, cross, or crescent. Military casualty evacuation route signs include the word military, the unit or subunit designation, and other information, such as national markings. These signs are represented as directional disks, with four segments cut out to form a cross; or as a directional disk, with a crescent cut out.

C-23. Figure C-8 depicts civilian casualty evacuation route signs and a blackout warning sign. Civilian casualty evacuation route signs indicate the route that is established solely for civilian casualty evacuation.

They have a blue Geneva Convention information sign that portrays an ambulance in white with a red cross or crescent and the words Civilian Casualty Evacuation Route beneath the sign in the HN language. The placement of these signs is along the routes that are designated for civilian traffic as authorized by the HN. Blackout warning signs indicate the beginning of a blackout area. These are also based on the Geneva Convention hazard warning sign.

C-24. Figure C-9 depicts a blackout enforcement sign and a blackout relaxation sign. Blackout enforcement signs indicate that a blackout is in effect and are placed every 100 meters (109.36 yards) along the blackout route. Blackout relaxation signs indicate the end of the blackout area and are placed at the end of the blackout route.

## Main Supply Route Signs

C-25. MSR signs are identified by number, a pictorial symbol, or a name. Pictures and names

Are easier to identify and remember than numbers.

Prevent confusion with link route signs, which mark the routes of units that have three-figure
identification numbers. (A link route connects a unit or an activity to an MSR.)

Prevent the risk of compromising security by removing the chance use of an identification number that is already being used on a map overlay.
C-26. The two types of MSRs that are used in a theater of operations are axial and lateral. The following considerations are given for the theater of operation traffic circulation plan:


Axial. Axial MSRs run to and from the forward edge of the battle area and are identified by odd numbers. Axial MSRs are shown as solid lines on the traffic circulation plan overlay. Axial routes are represented by a pictorial symbol on the route sign and are marked on the overlay as pictorial (such as MSR CLUB). On axial MSRs, up is toward the forward edge of the battle area. It is shown
on overlays and signs as a plain arrow. Down is away from the forward edge of the battle area. It is shown as an arrow with a bar on the tail end.

Lateral. Lateral MSRs are identified by even numbers and are shown as broken lines on the traffic
circulation plan overlay. A named route sign represents lateral routes. The names are short, threeor four-letter words (such as fox, ant, or hen). Up and down arrows on lateral MSRs show only
general directions of travel. The general direction shown by up or down arrows varies with the
theater of operation. Up is usually to the north or east; down is usually to the south or west. A
plain arrow on an overlay or sign indicates up; a barred arrow shows down. To avoid confusion
on lateral MSRs, use the following letters on route signs to show the general direction of
movement:

Nnorth.

Ssouth.

Eeast.

Wwest.

NEnortheast.

NWnorthwest.

SEsoutheast.

SWsouthwest.

## Appendix D Security And Mobility Support Appendixes To The Protection Annex

Orders are formal methods that are used by leaders to communicate essential information. Orders define who, what, when, where, why, and how a unit will support a specific mission. This appendix provides fundamental considerations, formats, and instructions for developing the security and mobility support (area security, physical, security, antiterrorism, and populace and resource control) appendixes to the annex E, Protection, of the commander's base order or plan. Military police planners should also coordinate and address military police security and mobility support capabilities in the intelligence, operations, sustainment, CA, information collection, and HN support annexes of the base order or plan.

## Orders

D-1. Under command and control, commanders direct with mission orders. Mission orders emphasize to subordinates the results to be attained (not how they are to achieve them) and provide maximum freedom of action in determining how to best accomplish assigned missions. Effective mission orders communicate to subordinates the situation, the commander's mission and intent, and the important tasks of each unit. The commander's intent and concept of operations set guidelines that ensure unity of effort while allowing subordinate leaders to exercise initiative.

D-2. Orders are issued verbally and in writing with detailed graphic overlays. The standard five-paragraph format is associated with a written order. Orders are updated or changed as subordinate Soldiers and units provide timely reports about their experiences during the performance of their missions.

## Warning Orders

D-3. An Army warning order serves to alert or warn a unit or Soldier about an upcoming mission. It can be verbal or written and should be concise and as detailed as possible to maximize mission preparation time.

Figure D-1, page D-2, shows an annotated warning order format. The initial warning order includes the type of operation, general location, and initial timeline. The initial warning order and subsequent warning orders that provide additional details serve to notify or update subordinate leaders for the upcoming mission to ensure that Soldiers, vehicles, and equipment are ready after the OPORD is finalized by the staff and approved by the commander. See FM 6-0 for more information on warning orders.

## Operation Order

D-4. The OPORD is the formalized directive from the commander that defines the mission for the company, platoon, squad, or Soldier. It directs how the company, platoon, or squad will support the mission. Figure D-2, page D-3, provides an example of the OPORD format.

[CLASSIFICATION]
(Change from verbal orders, if any) (Optional)
WARNING ORDER [number]
References: Refer to higher headquarters OPORD, and identify map sheets for operation (optional). Time Zone Used Throughout the OPORD: (Optional).

Task Organization: (Optional). 1. Situation. The situation paragraph describes the conditions and circumstances of the operational environment that impact operations in the following subparagraphs:

a. Area of Interest. Describe significant changes to the area of interest. b. Area of Operations. Describe significant changes to the area of operations. c. Enemy Forces. Include significant changes to enemy composition, disposition, and courses of action.

Information not available may be included in subsequent WARNORDs.

d. Friendly Forces. Address only if essential to the WARNORD. e. Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Nongovernmental Organizations. Address only if essential to the

WARNO.

f. Civil Considerations. Address only if essential to the WARNORD. g. Attachments and Detachments. Provide initial task organization. h. Assumptions. List significant assumptions for order development.

2. Mission. State the issuing headquarters mission. 3. Execution.

a. Initial Commander's Intent. Provide brief commander's intent statement. b. Concept of Operations. This may be "to be determined" for an initial WARNORD. c. Tasks to Subordinate Units. Include known tasks at the time of issuance of the WARNORD. d. Coordinating Instructions. List only instructions and tasks applicable to two or more units not covered

in unit SOPs. 4. Sustainment. Include known logistics, personnel, or Army health system preparation tasks. 5. Command and Signal. Include changes to the existing order, or state "no change." ACKNOWLEDGE: Include instructions for the acknowledgement of the OPLAN or OPORD by addressees.

The word "acknowledge" may suffice. Refer to the message reference number if necessary.

Acknowledgement of a plan or order means that it has been received and understood.

Place the classification at the top and bottom of every page of the OPLAN or OPORD. Place the classification marking TS, S, or C in parentheses at the front of each paragraph and subparagraph. Refer to AR 380-5 for classification and release marking instructions.

The first line of the heading is the copy number that is assigned by the issuing headquarters. Maintain a log of specific copies issued to addressees. The second line is the official designation of the issuing headquarters (for example, 1st Infantry Division). The third line is the place of issue. It may be a code name, postal designation, or geographic location. The fourth line is the date or date-time group that the plan or order was signed or issued and becomes effective unless specified otherwise in the coordinating instructions. The fifth line is a headquarters internal control number assigned to all plans and orders according to unit SOPs.

OPERATION PLAN/ORDER [number] [(code name)] [(classification of title)] Number plans and orders consecutively by calendar year. Include code name, if any.

References: List documents that are essential to understanding the OPLAN or OPORD. List references concerning a specific function in the appropriate attachments.

(a) List maps and charts first. Map entries include the series number, country, sheet names or numbers, edition, and scale.

(b) List other references in subparagraphs labeled as shown.

## [Classification] Oplan/Opord [Number] [(Code Name)][Issuing Headquarters] [(Classification Of Title)]

Time Zone Used Throughout the OPLAN/OPORD: State the time zone used in the AO during execution.

When the OPLAN or OPORD applies to units in different time zones, use ZULU time. Task Organization: Describe the organization of forces available to the issuing headquarters and their command and support relationships. Refer to Annex A (Task Organization) if long or complicated.

1. Situation. The situation paragraph describes the conditions of the operational environment that impact operations in the following subparagraphs:
a. Area of Interest. Describe the area of interest. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) as required. b. Area of Operations. Describe the AO. Refer to the appropriate map by its subparagraph under references; for example, "Map, reference (b)." Refer to appendix 2 (Operation Overlay) to Annex C
(Operations) as required.

(1) Terrain. Describe the aspects of terrain that impact operations. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) as required.

(2) Weather. Describe the aspects of weather that impact operations. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence)
as required. (Place the classification and title of the OPLAN or OPORD and the issuing headquarters at the top of the second and any subsequent pages of the base plan or order.)
c. Enemy Forces. Identify enemy forces, and appraise their general capabilities. Describe the enemy's disposition, location, strength, and probable COA. Identify known or potential terrorist threats and adversaries within the AO. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) as required.

d. Friendly Forces. Briefly identify the missions of friendly forces and the objectives, goals, and missions of civilian organizations that impact the issuing headquarters in the following subparagraphs:
(1) Higher Headquarters Mission and Intent. Identify and state the mission and commander's intent for headquarters two levels up and one level up from the issuing headquarters.

(a) Higher Headquarters Two Levels Up. Identify the higher headquarters two levels up the paragraph heading (for example, Joint Task Force-18).

1. Mission.

2. Commander's intent.

(b) Higher Headquarters. Identify the higher headquarters one level up in the paragraph heading (for example, 1st U.S. Armored Division).

1. Mission.

2. Commander's intent.

(2) Missions of Adjacent Units. Identify and state the missions of adjacent units and other units whose actions have a significant impact on the issuing headquarters.

e. Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Nongovernmental Organizations. Identify and state the objective or goals and primary tasks of those non-DOD organizations that have a significant role within the AO. Refer to Annex V (Interagency Coordination) as required.

f. Civil Considerations. Describe the critical aspects of the civil situation that impact operations. Refer to appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate) to Annex B (Intelligence) as required.

g. Attachments and Detachments. List units attached to or detached from the issuing headquarters.

State when each attachment or detachment is effective (for example, on order, on commitment of the reserve)
if different from the effective time of the OPLAN or OPORD. Do not repeat information already listed in Annex A.


h. Assumptions. List assumptions used in the development of the OPLAN or OPORD.

2. Mission. State the unit missiona short description of who, what (task), when, where, and why (purpose) that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason for doing so.

[page number]
[CLASSIFICATION]

## [Classification] Oplan/Opord [Number] [(Code Name)][Issuing Headquarters] [(Classification Of Title)]

3. **Execution.** Describe how the commander intends to accomplish the mission in terms of the commander's intent, an overarching concept of operations, schemes of employment for each warfighting function, assessment, specified tasks to subordinate units, and key coordinating instructions in the subparagraphs below.

a. Commander's Intent. Commanders develop their intent statement personally. The commander's intent is a clear, concise statement of what the force must do and the conditions that the force must establish with respect to the enemy, terrain, and civil considerations which represent the desired end state. It succinctly describes what constitutes the success of an operation and provides the purpose and conditions that define the desired end state. The commander's intent must be easy to remember and clearly understood by two echelons.
b. Concept of Operations. The concept of operations is a statement that directs the manner in which subordinate units cooperate to accomplish the mission and establishes the sequence of actions that the force will use to achieve the end state. It is normally expressed in terms of decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations. It states the principal tasks required, the responsible subordinate units, and how the principal tasks complement each other. Normally, the concept of operations projects the status of the force at the end of the operation. If the mission dictates a significant change in tasks during operations, the commander may phase the operation. The concept of operations may be a single paragraph, divided into two or more subparagraphs, or, if unusually lengthy, it may be summarized here with details located in Annex C (Operations). If the concept of operations is phased, describe each phase in a subparagraph. Label these subparagraphs as "Phase" followed by the appropriate Roman numeral. For example, "Phase I." If the operation is phased, all paragraphs and subparagraphs of the base order and annexes must mirror the phasing established in the concept of operations. The operation overlay and graphic depictions of lines of effort help portray the concept of operations and are located in Annex C (Operations).

c. Scheme of Movement and Maneuver. Describe the employment of maneuver units according to the concept of operations. Provide the primary tasks of maneuver units that conduct the decisive operation and the purpose of each. Next, state the primary tasks of maneuver units that conduct shaping operations (including security operations) and the purpose of each. For offensive operations, identify the form of maneuver. For defensive operations, identify the type of defense. For stability operations, describe the role of maneuver units by primary stability tasks. If the operation is phased, identify the main effort by phase. Identify and include the priorities for the reserve. Refer to Annex C (Operations) as required.

(1) Scheme of Mobility/Countermobility. State the scheme of mobility/countermobility, including priorities by unit or area. Refer to Annex G (Engineer) as required.

(2) Scheme of Battlefield Obscuration. State the scheme of battlefield obscuration, including priorities by unit or area. Refer to appendix 9 (Battlefield Obscuration) to Annex C (Operations) as required.

(3) Scheme of Reconnaissance and Surveillance. Describe how the commander intends to use reconnaissance and surveillance to support the concept of operations. Include the primary reconnaissance objectives. Refer to Annex L (Reconnaissance and Surveillance) as required. (**Note:** Army forces do not conduct reconnaissance and surveillance within the United States and its territories. For domestic operations, this paragraph is titled "Information Awareness and Assessment", and the contents of this paragraph comply with Executive Order 12333.)
d. Scheme of Intelligence. Describe how the commander envisions intelligence that supports the concept of operations. Include the priority of effort to situation development, targeting, and assessment. State the priority of intelligence support to units and areas. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) as required.

e. Scheme of Fires. Describe how the commander intends to use fires to support the concept of operations, with an emphasis on the scheme of maneuver. State the fire support tasks and the purpose of each task. State the priorities for, allocation of, and restrictions on fires. Refer to Annex D (Fires) as required.

[page number]
[CLASSIFICATION]

## [Classification] Oplan/Opord [Number] [(Code Name)][Issuing Headquarters] [(Classification Of Title)]

f. Scheme of Protection. Describe how the commander envisions protection that supports the concept of operations. Include the priorities of protection by unit and area. Include survivability. Address the scheme of area security, including security for routes, bases, and critical infrastructure. Identify tactical combat and other reaction forces. Use subparagraphs for protection categories (for example, air and missile defense and explosive ordnance disposal) based on the situation. Refer to Annex E (Protection) as required.

g. Cyberspace Electromagnetic Activities. Describe how cyberspace electromagnetic activities (including spectrum management operations) support the concept of operations. Refer to appendix 12 (Cyberspace Electromagnetic Activities) to Annex C (Operations) as required. Refer to Annex H (Signal) for defensive cyberspace operations, Department of Defense information network operations, and spectrum management operations as required.

h. Stability Tasks. Describe how the commander envisions the conduct of stability tasks in coordination with other organizations through primary stability tasks. (See ADP 3-07 for additional information.) If other organizations or the HN are unable to provide for civil security, essential services restoration, and civil control, commanders with an assigned AO must do so with available resources, request additional resources, or request relief for these requirements from higher headquarters. Commanders assign specific responsibilities for stability tasks to subordinate units in paragraph 3j (Tasks to Subordinate Units) and paragraph 3k
(Coordinating Instructions). Refer to Annex C (Operations) and Annex K (Civil Affairs Operations) as required.

i. Assessment. Describe the priorities for assessment, and identify the measures of effectiveness used to assess end state conditions and objectives. Refer to Annex M (Assessment) as required.

j. Tasks to Subordinate Units. State the task assigned to each unit that reports directly to the headquarters who issues the order. Each task must include who (the subordinate unit assigned the task), what (the task itself), when, where, and why (purpose). Use a separate subparagraph for each unit. List units in task organization sequence. Place tasks that affect two or more units in paragraph 3k (Coordinating Instructions).

k. Coordinating Instructions. List only the instructions and tasks that are applicable to two or more units not covered in unit SOPs.

(1) Time or Condition When the OPORD Becomes Effective. List the time or condition when the OPORD
becomes effective.

(2) Commander's Critical Information Requirements. List the commander's critical information requirements.

(3) Essential Elements of Friendly Information. List EEFIs. (4) Fire Support Coordination Measures. List critical fire support coordination or control measures. (5) Airspace Coordinating Measures. List critical airspace coordinating or control measures. (6) Rules of Engagement. List the rules of engagement. Refer to appendix 11 (Rules of Engagement) to Annex C (Operations) as required. (*Note*. For operations within the United States and its territories, title this paragraph "Rules for the Use of Force.")
(7) Risk Reduction Control Measures. State the measures that are specific to this operation but are not included in unit SOPs. This may include mission-oriented protective posture, operational exposure guidance, troop-safety criteria, and fratricide avoidance measures. Refer to Annex E (Protection) as required.

(8) Personnel Recovery Coordination Measures. Refer to appendix 2 (Personnel Recovery) to Annex E
(Protection) as required.

(9) Environmental Considerations. Refer to appendix 5 (Environmental Considerations) to Annex G
(Engineer) as required.

(10) Themes and Messages. List information themes and messages.

## [Classification] Oplan/Opord [Number] [(Code Name)][Issuing Headquarters] [(Classification Of Title)]

(11) Other Coordinating Instructions. List in subparagraphs any additional coordinating instructions and tasks that apply to two or more units, such as the operational timeline and other critical timing or events. 4. Sustainment. Describe the concept of sustainment, including priorities of sustainment by unit or area. Include instructions for administrative movements, deployments, and transportation or references to applicable appendixes, if appropriate. Use the following subparagraphs to provide the broad concept of support for logistics, personnel, and Army health system support. Provide detailed instructions for each sustainment subfunction in the appendixes to Annex F (Sustainment) listed in Table E-2.

a. Logistics. Refer to Annex F (Sustainment) as required. b. Personnel. Refer to Annex F (Sustainment) as required. c. Army Health System Support. Refer to Annex F (Sustainment) as required.

## 5. Command And Signal.

a. Command. (1) Location of Commander and Key Leaders. State where the commander intends to be during the operation. State it by phase if the operation is phased.

(2) Succession of Command. State the succession of command if it is not covered in unit SOPs. (3) Liaison Requirements. State liaison requirements not covered in unit SOPs. b. Control. (1) Command Posts. Describe the employment of CPs, including the location of each CP and its time of opening and closing, as appropriate. State the primary controlling CP for specific tasks or phases of the operation (for example, "Division tactical command post will control the air assault").

(2) Reports. List reports not covered in SOPs. Refer to Annex R (Reports) as required. c. Signal. Describe the concept of signal support, including the location and movement of key signal nodes and critical electromagnetic spectrum considerations throughout the operation. Refer to Annex H (Signal) as required. ACKNOWLEDGE: Include instructions for the acknowledgement of the OPLAN or OPORD by addressees.

The word "acknowledge" may suffice. Refer to the message reference number if necessary. The acknowledgement of a plan or order means that it has been received and understood.

[Commander's last name]
[Commander's rank]
The commander or authorized representative signs the original copy. If the representative signs the original, add the phrase "For the Commander." The signed copy is the historical copy and remains in the headquarters files.

OFFICIAL:
[Authenticator's name]
[Authenticator's position]
Use only if the commander does not sign the original order. If the commander signs the original, no further authentication is required. If the commander does not sign, the signature of the preparing staff officer requires authentication and only the last name and rank of the commander appear in the signature block.

## [Classification] Oplan/Opord [Number] [(Code Name)][Issuing Headquarters] [(Classification Of Title)]

ANNEXES: List annexes by letter and title. Army and joint OPLANs or OPORDs do not use Annexes I and O
as attachments, so they label them as "Not Used." In Army orders. Annexes T, W, X, and Y are available for use in Army OPLANs or OPORDs and are labeled as "Spare." When an attachment required by doctrine or an SOP is unnecessary, label it "Omitted."

Annex ATask Organization
Annex BIntelligence
Annex COperations
Annex DFires
Annex EProtection
Annex FSustainment
Annex GEngineer
Annex HSignal
Annex INot Used
Annex JPublic Affairs
Annex KCivil Affairs Operations
Annex LReconnaissance and Surveillance
Annex MAssessment

Annex NSpace Operations
Annex ONot Used Annex PHN Support Annex QSpare Annex RReports Annex SSpecial Technical Operations
Annex TSpare Annex UInspector General Annex VInteragency Coordination Annex WSpare
Annex XSpare Annex YSpare
Annex ZDistribution

DISTRIBUTION: Furnish distribution copies for action or for information. List, in detail, those who are to receive the plan or order. Refer to Annex Z (Distribution) if lengthy.

[page number]
[CLASSIFICATION]
Legend: ADP AO AR C COA CP DOD
Army doctrine publication area of operations Army regulation confidential course of action command post Department of Defense
EEFI HN OPLAN OPORD S SOP TS ZULU
essential elements of friendly information
host nation operation plan operation order secret standard operating procedure top secret
time zone indicator for universal Time Source

## Operation Order Attachments

D-5. Attachments (annexes, appendixes, tabs, exhibits) help simplify orders by providing a structure for organizing information. Using attachments increases the base order clarity and usefulness by highlighting specific information, administrative support details, and instructions that expand on the base order.

## Attachments Of Special Interest To Military Police

D-6. Military police do not have standalone annexes. The provost marshal or military police planner prepares a portion of Annex C (Operations) and a portion of Annex E (Protection) to the OPORD or operation plan. Security and mobility support areas of interest for annexes and attachments


Conducting maneuver and mobility support operations, including route reconnaissance, surveillance, circulation control, DC and straggler control, and information dissemination.

Conducting area security operations, including activities associated with antiterrorism (security
measures or mitigation measures), zone and area reconnaissance, checkpoint access control, and
physical security of critical assets, nodes, ADC, and sensitive materials.

Providing physical security guidance for commanders.

Implementing antiterrorism measures.

## Physical Security Appendix To Protection

D-7. Physical security measures that support the base order are outlined in the physical security appendix to annex E. See figure D-3 for a sample format for this attachment.

Follow classification marking guidance as described in AR 380-5.

Include full heading if attachment is distributed separately from the base order or higher-level attachment.

APPENDIX __ (PHYSICAL SECURITY) TO ANNEX E (PROTECTION) TO OPORD [number] [(code name)][issuing headquarters] [(classification of title)]
References: List the documents that are essential to understanding the attachment.

a. List maps and charts first. Map entries include the series number, country, sheet name or number, edition, and scale.

b. List other references in subparagraphs labeled as shown.
Note. Doctrinal references for this attachment include ATP 3-39.10, ATP 3-39.11, ATP 3-39.20, ATP 3-39.30, ATP 3-39.32, ATP 3-39.34, ATP 3-39.35, and FM 3-39.

Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: Write the time zone established in the base order.

## 1. Situation.

a. Area of Interest. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) as required. b. Area of Operations. Refer to appendix 2 (Operation Overlay) to Annex C (Operations). (1) Terrain. Describe the five military aspects of terrain that impact operations. Refer to Annex B
(Intelligence) as required.
(2) Weather. Describe the five military aspects of weather that impact operations. Refer to Annex B
(Intelligence) as required.

[page number]
[CLASSIFICATION]

c. Enemy Forces. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence).
d. Friendly Forces. Refer to base order, Annex A (Task Organization), and Annex C (Operations). e. Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Nongovernmental Organizations. Identify and describe other
organizations in the AO that may impact physical security or the implementation of physical security procedures.

f. Civil Considerations. Describe the critical aspects of the civil situation that impact physical security.

Refer to Annex K (Civil Affairs Operations) as required. View civil considerations through a physical security perspective by using operation and mission variables.

g. Attachments and Detachments. If pertinent, list the units or assets that are attached to or are detached from the issuing headquarters. State when each attachment or detachment is effective (for example, on order or on commitment of the reserve) if different from the effective time of the base order. Do not repeat information that is already listed in Annex A (Task Organization).

h. Assumptions. List the assumptions that are specific to physical security which support the appendix development. 2. Mission. Describe how physical security supports the commander's intent and protection. Discuss the physical security measures that should be employed to safeguard personnel to prevent unauthorized access to arms, ammunition, explosives, equipment, installations, materials, and documents. Also discuss measures to safeguard against espionage, sabotage, damage, and theft.

3. Execution.

a. Scheme of Physical Security. The scheme of physical security is a statement of the overall physical security objective. Describe how physical security supports the commander's intent and the protection plan.

Direct the manner in which each element of the force will cooperate to accomplish the physical security requirements, and tie that to support of the operation with the task and purpose statement. The following subparagraphs are examples; omit what is unnecessary for brevity.

(1) Protective Barriers. Describe emplacement considerations of barriers and fencing (to form the perimeter of controlled areas) and vehicle barriers (to impede, channel, or stop vehicle traffic).

(2) Security Lighting. Describe the emplacement considerations of security lighting in support of physical security.

(3) Electronic Security Systems. Describe the emplacement considerations of interior and exterior electronic security systems.

(4) Access Control Points. Describe the procedures for controlling access to equipment, bases and base camps, materials, and documents in support of physical security.

(5) Security Forces. Identify the authority and jurisdiction of security forces and the type of security forces that are required.

(6) In-transit Forces. Describe the risk management for deploying forces and the security procedures for in-port cargo and rail cargo protection.

b. Tasks to Subordinate Units. List the physical security tasks that are assigned to specific subordinate units not contained in the base order.

c. Coordinating Instructions. List only the instructions that are applicable to two or more subordinate units not covered in the base order. Identify and highlight police operations-specific timings, information themes and messages, risk reduction control measures, and environmental considerations.

4. Sustainment. Identify priorities of sustainment for physical security key tasks, and specify additional instructions as required. Refer to Annex F (Sustainment) as required. 5. Command and Signal.

## A. Command. (1) Location Of The Commander. State The Locations Of The Provost Marshal And Military Police

commanders within the AO.

(2) Liaison Requirements. State the physical security liaison requirements that are not covered in SOPs.

## B. Control.

(1) Command Posts. Describe the employment of command posts within the AO, including the location of each command post and its time of opening and closing.

(2) Reports. List police operations-specific reports that are not covered in SOPs. Refer to Annex R
(Reports) as required.

c. Signal. Address police operations-specific communications requirements. Refer to Annex H (Signal)
as required. ACKNOWLEDGE: Include only if the attachment is distributed separately from the base order.

[Commander's last name]
[Commander's rank]
The commander or authorized representative signs the original copy of the attachment. If the representative signs the original, add the phrase "For the Commander." The signed copy is the historical copy and remains in the headquarter files.

DISTRIBUTION: Show only if distributed separately from the base order or higher-level attachments.

[page number]
[CLASSIFICATION]
Legend: AO AR ATP
area of operations Army regulation Army techniques publication
FM OPORD SOP
field manual operation order standard operating procedure

D-8. Antiterrorism measures that support the base order are outlined in the antiterrorism appendix to annex E. See figure D-4 for a sample format for this attachment.

Follow classification marking guidance as described AR 380-5. Include full heading if attachment is distributed separately from the base order or higher-level attachment.

APPENDIX 6 (ANTITERRORISM) TO ANNEX E (PROTECTION) TO OPORD [number] [(code name)]-
[issuing headquarters] [(classification of title)] References: List documents essential to understanding the attachment.

a. List maps and charts first. Map entries include series number, country, sheet name or number, edition, and scale.

     b. List other references in subparagraphs labeled as shown.
     c. The doctrinal reference for this attachment includes ADP 3-37, ATP 3-37.2, ATP 3-39.10, ATP
3-39.20, and ATP 3-39.30.
Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: Write the time zone established in the base order.
1. Situation.

a. Area of Interest. No change to Annex B (Intelligence) or appendix 1 (Design Concept) to Annex C

(Operations).

b. Area of Operations. No change to appendix 1 (Design Concept) to Annex C (Operations). (1) Terrain. Describe the five military aspects of terrain that impact operations. Refer to Annex B
(Intelligence) as required.

(2) Weather. Describe the five military aspects of weather that impact operations. Refer to Annex B
(Intelligence) as required.

[CLASSIFICATION]

c. Enemy Forces. If not indicated in the base order or Annex B (Intelligence) of the base order, describe specific details on the terrorist threat within the AO. Include the factors of identification, operational capability, intentions activity, composition, disposition, location, estimated strength, and known threat vulnerability.

Endure threat information includes potential terrorist capabilities and intentions for use of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons. Threat information should be divided, and each paragraph classification level should be labeled to ensure that as much of the information as possible remains unclassified.
d. Friendly Forces. If indicated in the base order or Annex A (Task Organization) Annex B (Intelligence)
of the base order, identify the forces available (military and civilian) to respond to terrorist threats or attacks.

Include the next higher headquarters and adjacent bases and units and organizations that are not under base command but may be required to respond to such an incident. These units and organizations may include HN, multiservice, and U.S. Army military police forces; fire and emergency services; medical, federal, state, and local agencies; special operations forces; engineers; detection (chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear) decontamination services; and explosive ordnance disposal services. Include a memorandum of agreement or understanding and other special arrangements that improve forces which are available to support the plan before, during, and after a terrorist attack.
e. Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Nongovernmental Organizations. Identify and describe other organizations in the AO that may impact the conduct of antiterrorism measures or the implementation of antiterrorism-specific equipment and tactics.

f. Civil Considerations. Describe the critical aspects of the civil situation that impact antiterrorism. Refer to appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate) to Annex B (Intelligence) as required.

g. Attachments and Detachments. If pertinent, list units or assets attached to, or detached from, the issuing headquarters. State when each attachment or detachment is effective (for example, on order or on commitment of the reserve) if different from the effective time of the base order. Do not repeat information already listed in Annex A (Task Organization).

h. Assumptions. List assumptions specific to antiterrorism that support appendix development.

Assumptions are those factors that are unlikely to change during the implementation of the antiterrorism appendix and that must be addressed to continue to plan. They can range from discussing base troop strength to addressing the local political and social environment.

2. Mission. State the antiterrorism mission in support of the current operation by providing a short description of who, what (task), when, where, and why (purpose) that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason for doing so.

3. Execution.

a. Scheme of Area Security. The scheme of antiterrorism is a statement of the overall antiterrorism objective. Describe how the commander envisions antiterrorism measures in support of the scheme of protection that supports the concept of operations in the base order. It should stress detection, deterrence, and mitigation of the terrorist threat in the environment (intransit, on base, during operations, in protection of the HN and local civilians.)
(1) Terrorist Threats and Other Threat Activities. Describe the unit process for developing its tailored threat assessment or local terrorist threat picture. The unit tailored threat assessment should be continuously evaluated, updated, and disseminated by implementing the antiterrorism principles as appropriate and as directed by the commander. Include the priority of effort to situation developments; force protection conditions;
and random antiterrorism measures, determinations, and assessments.

(2) Reduce Vulnerabilities to Terrorist Acts and Attacks. Describe the unit procedural process for reducing identified vulnerabilities to terrorist actions. This section should be tailored to support the environment that the appendix supports, such as troops and equipment during movement, airfield security, port security, embarkation/arrival areas, bases, and HN/local civilian terrorist mitigation measures. Discuss legal limitations or agency coordination procedures required to ensure that antiterrorism risks are mitigated.

[page number]
[CLASSIFICATION]

(3) Physical Security. This includes building and vehicle modification (sandbags, additional armor plating, blast film), barrier plans, specialized equipment employment, and entry control.

(a) Entry control point procedures.
(b) On-site security elements.
(c) Operations and information security.
(d) High-risk personnel procedures.

(4) Terrorist Incident Response Measures. Discuss the critical areas within the unit or base terrorist

threat or incident response plan that address the unit response reconstitution responsibilities upon
notification of an imminent terrorist threat or incident response and the procedures for obtaining technical
assistance and augmentation if the incident exceeds the unit or base organic capabilities. Include the

(a) Base Defense Operations Center. Discuss command relationships, staffing (partial/full), tenant unit

responsibilities, messages and message flow, and security and access procedures.

(b) Reporting Procedures. (Who/What/When/Where/How)
(c) Incident Response Management Procedures. (Who/What/When/Where/How)
(d) Critical Systems Continuity of Operations. Describe those systems that are essential to mission

execution and the critical infrastructure that supports essential operations of the base (utilities systems,
computer networks). This is of particular importance if vulnerability has identified one or more single points
of failure for capabilities to the operations of the base or unit primary mission. For bases and fixed-site
facilities, it is also important to note that critical infrastructure may be located off the base, with services
being supplied by local municipalities. This document outlines how the base or unit should continue to
operate if one or more critical systems are disrupted or fails and how the systems should be restored.

(5) Information Operations. State the overall concept for synchronizing antiterrorism with information

operations.

(a) Force Protection Condition. Describe the implementation of security measures across all force

protection condition levels. Each set of force protection condition measures is the minimum that must be
implemented when a particular baseline force protection condition level is designated. Although not
completely applicable in a combat zone, these measures can be used as a template in the development of
assessment, delay, denial, and notification. Force protection condition measures include provisions for
reinforcing physical security; increasing security personnel and inspections of vehicles, hand-carried items,
and packages; reinforcing random antiterrorism measures; and implementing other emergency measures.

(b) Random Antiterrorism Measures Procedures. Refer to the Random Antiterrorism Measure

attachment that outlines random antiterrorism measures implementation based on a weekly schedule in the
form of an execution matrix by date/time, unit, and necessary equipment.

(c) Rules of Engagement. See appendix 11 to Annex C as required.
(d) Critical Asset List. Identify assets that are of such extraordinary importance that their incapacitation

or destruction would have a very serious, debilitating effect on operations. The list will vary depending on the
mission variables and should represent those assets that are most attractive to terrorist action. Critical
assets can range from facilities (such as a Soldier's barracks on a forward operating base or base) to local
infrastructure (such as HN power plants and wells) to voting centers and HN government officials. Criticality
decision support tools (such as MSHARPP and CARVER) support critical asset list development.

(e) Defended Asset List. Identify assets from the critical asset list that are prioritized by the commander

to be defended with available resources. This allows the commander to apply finite protection capabilities to
the most vital assets. The defended asset list consists of assets that could directly impact mission failure or
strategic setbacks.

b. Tasks to Subordinate Units. List antiterrorism tasks assigned to specific subordinate units that are

not contained in the base order.

c. Coordinating Instructions. List only instructions applicable to two or more subordinate units that are

not covered in the base order. Identify and highlight antiterrorism-specific timings, information themes and
messages, risk reduction control measures, and environmental considerations.

[page number]

[CLASSIFICATION]

4. Sustainment. Identify the priorities of sustainment for area security operations key tasks, and specify additional instructions as required. Refer to Annex F (Sustainment) as required. 5. Command and Signal.

a. Command. (1) Location of Commander. State the locations of the provost marshal and military police commanders within the AO.

(2) Liaison Requirements. State the area security operations requirements not covered in unit SOPs. b. Control. (1) Command Posts. Describe the employment of command posts within the AO, including the location of each command post and its time of opening and closing.

(2) Reports. List area security operations-specific reports not covered in SOPs. Refer to Annex R
(Reports) as required.

c. Signal. Address area security operations-specific communications requirements. Refer to Annex H
(Signal) as required. ACKNOWLEDGE: Include only if attachment is distributed separately from the base order.

[Commander's last name]
[Commander's rank]
OFFICIAL: [Authenticator's name]
[Authenticator's position] Use only if the commander does not sign the original attachment. If the commander signs the original, no further authentication is required. If the commander does not sign, the signature of the preparing staff officer requires authentication and only the last name and rank of the commander appear in the signature block. ATTACHMENTS: List lower-level attachments (for example, exhibits).

DISTRIBUTION: Show only if distributed separately from the base order or higher-level attachments.

[page number]
[CLASSIFICATION]
Legend: ADP APO AR CARVER HN MSHARPP OPORD SOP U.S.
Army doctrine publication area of operations Army regulation criticality, accessibility, recoverability, vulnerability, effect, and recognizable host nation mission, symbolism, history, accessibility, recognizable, population, and proximity operation order standard operating procedure United States

D-9. PRC measures that support the base order are outlined in the PRC appendix to annex E. (See figure D-5 for a sample format for this attachment.)

Follow classification marking guidance as described AR 380-5. Include full heading if attachment is distributed separately from the base order or higher-level attachment. APPENDIX ___ (Populace and Resources Control) TO ANNEX E (PROTECTION) TO OPORD [number] [(code name)]-[issuing headquarters] [(classification of title)]
References: List documents essential to understanding the attachment.

a. List maps and charts first. Map entries include series number, country, sheet name or number, edition, and scale.

b. List other references in subparagraphs labeled as shown. c. The doctrinal reference for this attachment includes ADP 3-37, ATP 3-39.10, ATP 3-39.20, ATP
3-39.30, ATP 3-57.10, FM 3-39, and FM 3-57.

Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: Write the time zone established in the base order.

1. Situation. Include items of information affecting PRC support not included in paragraph 1of the OPORD or any information that needs expansion. The situation paragraph describes how the implementation of PRC
measures may affect friendly, adversary, and other operations. It should discuss how PRC would influence friendly operations. The situation paragraph describes the conditions and circumstances of the operational environment that impact PRC in the following subparagraphs:
a. Area of Interest. No change to Annex B (Intelligence) or appendix 1 (Design Concept) to Annex C
(Operations).

b. Area of Operations. No change to appendix 1 (Design Concept) to Annex C (Operations). (1) Terrain. Describe the five military aspects of terrain that impact operations. Refer to Annex B
(Intelligence) as required.

(2) Weather. Describe the five military aspects of weather that impact operations. Refer to Annex B
(Intelligence) as required.

c. Enemy Forces. If not indicated in the base order or Annex B (Intelligence) of the base order, describe specific details on the terrorist threat within the AO. Include the factors of identification, operational capability, intentions activity, composition, disposition, location, estimated strength, and known threat vulnerability. Endure threat information includes potential terrorist capabilities and intentions for use of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons. Threat information should be divided, and each paragraph classification level should be labeled to ensure that as much of the information as possible remains unclassified.
d. Friendly Forces. If indicated in the base order or Annex A (Task Organization) Annex B
(Intelligence) of the base order, identify the forces available (military and civilian) providing support to PRC tasks. Outline the higher headquarters plan as it pertains to PRC. List the designation, location, and outline the plans of higher, adjacent, and other PRC assets that support or impact the issuing HQ or require coordination and additional support. Include additional information on HN, interagency, intergovernmental organizations and nongovernmental organizations that may impact PRC measures.
e. Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Nongovernmental Organizations. Identify and describe other organizations in the AO that may support PRC measures. Outline the higher headquarters (HQ) plan as it pertains to PRC. List the designation, location, and outline the plans of higher, adjacent, and other PRC assets that support or impact the issuing HQ or require coordination and additional support. Include additional information on HN, interagency, International organizations, and nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) that may impact PRC measures.

(1) Interagency Organizations. Assess the ability of key interagency organizations operating in the AO to support the PRC mission. Include the agency's missions, capabilities, capacity, and coordination points of contact. Identify known requirements to support interagency operations.

(2) Intergovernmental Organizations. *Assess the ability of key* international organizations, especially United Nations agencies, operating in the AO to support the unit's PRC mission. Include the missions, capabilities, capacity, and coordination POCs of the agencies.
(3) Nongovernmental Organizations. Assess the key NGOs operating in the AO to support the unit's PRC mission. Include the missions, capabilities, capacity (such as the ability to support civil relief systems), and coordination POCs of the agencies. Identify known requirements to support NGOs.

f. Civil Considerations. Describe the critical aspects of the civil situation that impacts operations. Liaise with the intelligence staff section (G-2/S-2) and refer to Tab C (Civil Considerations) to Appendix 1
(Intelligence Estimate) to Annex B (Intelligence), as required. Address the general overview of civil considerations for the AO (described by mnemonic ASCOPEareas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events). Review the critical aspects of the civil situation by applying each of the operational variables (political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructurephysical environment, and time [PMESII-PT]) that could impact the civil considerations analysis.

(1) Areas. List the key civilian areas in the supported commander's operational environment. This paragraph approaches terrain analysis from a civilian perspective. Commanders analyze key civilian areas in terms of how they affect the mission as well as how military operations affect these areas. Examples of key civilian areas are areas defined by political boundaries, such as districts within a city or municipalities within a region; locations of government centers; social, political, religious, or criminal enclaves; agricultural and mining regions; trade routes; and possible sites for the temporary settlement of dislocated civilians (DCs) or other civil functions.

(2) Structures. List the locations of existing civil structures (critical infrastructure), such as ports, air terminals, transportation networks, bridges, communications towers, power plants, and dams, which are traditional high-payoff targets. List churches, mosques, national libraries, and hospitals as cultural sites, which are generally protected by international law or other agreements. List other infrastructures, including governance and public safety structures, such as national, regional, and urban government facilities; record archives; judiciary, police, fire, and emergency medical services; and economic and environmental structures (banking, stock and commodity exchanges, toxic industrial facilities, and pipelines). List other facilities with practical applications, such as jails/prisons, warehouses, schools, television stations, radio stations, and print plants, which may be require specific PRC protection measures.

(3) Capabilities. Describe civil capabilities for implementing PRC measures by assessing the populace capabilities of sustaining itself through public safety, emergency services, as well as food and agriculture sources. Include whether the populace needs assistance with public works and utilities, public health, public transportation, economics, and commerce. Examples: "Restoration of law enforcement is limited and will require support from United Nations or coalition forces; HN basic emergency and medical services are reportedly adequate to support the local populace. Criminal organizations provide population with critical economic need - schools, roads, economic infrastructure." (Refer to the preliminary area assessment developed during mission analysis.)
(4) Organizations. List civil organizations that may or may not be affiliated with government agencies, such as church groups, ethnic groups, multinational corporations, fraternal organizations, patriotic or service organizations, international organizations, and NGOs. Do not repeat those listed in Annex V or paragraph 1.e.

above (Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Nongovernmental Organizations). Example: "There are several charitable organizations in the AO. Religious groups provide minimal support but lack internal transportation. What infrastructure criminal organizations directly control or have influence over through intimidation or bribery? " Include HN organizations capable of forming the nucleus for PRC and humanitarian assistance programs, interim governing bodies, civil defense efforts, and other activities.

(5) People. List key personnel and linkage to the population, leaders, figureheads, clerics, police chiefs, and subject-matter experts, such as plant operators and public utility managers.

[page number]
[CLASSIFICATION]

Note: This list may extend to personnel outside of the operational environment whose actions, opinions, and influence can affect the supported commander's operational environment. Categorize groups of civilians, such as local nationals (town and city dwellers, farmers, other rural dwellers, and nomads), local civil authorities (elected and traditional leaders at all levels of government), expatriates, tribal or clan figureheads, religious leaders, third-nation government agency representatives, foreign employees of international organizations s or NGOs, contractors (United States [U.S.] citizens, local nationals, and third country nationals providing contract services), the media (journalists from print, radio, and visual media), and the DC population (refugees, displaced persons, internally displaced persons, evacuees, migrants, and stateless persons).

(6) Events. Determine what events, military and civilian, are occurring, and provide analysis of the events for their political, economic, psychological, environmental, moral, and legal implications. Categorize civilian events that may affect military missions. Civilian events may include harvest seasons, elections, riots, voluntary and involuntary evacuations, holidays, school year, and religious periods. Examples: "The school year has been suspended; the HN does not have the assets to enforce a curfew; this is not an electoral year."
g. Attachments and Detachments. List units attached to or detached from the issuing HQ. State when each attachment or detachment is effective (for example, on order or on commitment of the reserve) if different from the effective time of the OPLAN/OPORD. Do not repeat information already listed in Annex A (Task Organization). This paragraph includes all military and nonmilitary organizations participating in civil-military operations center (CMOC) operations and PRC. Identify other resources attached and detached, and include effective times of transfer, if appropriate.

h. Assumptions. Only list assumptions when preparing a protection annex to an OPLAN. (When preparing a PRC appendix to an OPORD, this step may be omitted.) Include unvalidated assumptions developed while preparing the PRC running estimate. List key assumptions used in the development of the OPLAN/OPORD if they pertain to the PRC mission.
(1) Identify critical planning considerations and unknown conditions that personnel must confirm during the initial assessment(s). Examples: "Restoration of law enforcement is limited and will require support from United Nations or coalition forces; military and interagency support will be available; personnel and facilities of relief and welfare organizations will continue to provide a basis for civilian relief programs; the civilian populace will continue to offer resistance to the opposing force."
(2) Provide a statement describing the operational risks of not engaging the civil component(s) of the AO.

2. Mission. State the PRC mission in support of the current operation by providing a short description of who, what (task), when, where, and why (purpose) that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason for doing so.

## 3. Execution.

a. Scheme of Support. The scheme of support is a statement of the overall PRC objective. Describe how the commander envisions PRC measures in support of the scheme of protection that supports the concept of operations in the base order. It should stress PRC objectives, civil decisive points, measures of performance, and measures of effectiveness, transitions for each phase of the operation, and a general timeline for the operation.

(1) Dislocated Civilian Operations. Describe methods for protecting civilians from the effects of violence or disaster and to minimize civilian interference with military operations. Tasks include establishing and operating dislocated civilian camps, providing care (food, medical treatment, protection), and assisting with the movement or relocation of dislocated civilians. Because many of the talents needed for efficient and effective dislocated civilian camps are linked to the disciplines of police operations and detention operations (such as enforcing curfews, movement restrictions, use of travel permits and registration cards, establishing checkpoints, amnesty programs, and inspections) military police must be involved planning and conducting dislocated civilian operations.

(2) Noncombatant Evacuation. Describe the process for the authorized and orderly departure of noncombatants from a specific area. Noncombatant evacuation is normally connected with combat operations, Noncombatant evacuation may also occur in anticipation of or in response to any natural or man-made disaster in a foreign country or civil unrest in a country may warrant evacuation to the United States or other safe haven.

Note. Pursuant to Executive Order 12656, the Department of State is responsible for protecting and evacuating U.S. citizens and nationals abroad and for safeguarding their overseas property. The Department of State is the lead agency for planning and conducting noncombatant evacuation. Executive Order 12656 also directs the Secretary of Defense to advise and assist the Secretary of State in preparing and implementing these plans.

(3) Resources Control. Describe how resources control provides security for the indigenous natural and man-made materiel resources of a nation-state, mobilizes economic resources, denies the enemy access to resources, and detects and reduces the effectiveness of enemy and criminal activity. Resources controls target specific sectors of a nation's material wealth and economy, including natural resources, food and agriculture, immoveable property, finances, and cultural and critical infrastructure. Resources control measures also include licensing, regulations or guidelines, checkpoints, and border security to include customs inspections, ration controls, amnesty programs, and inspection of facilities.

(4) Information Operations. State the overall concept for synchronizing PRC with information operations. b. Tasks to Subordinate Units. List PRC tasks assigned to specific subordinate units that are not contained in the base order.

c. Coordinating Instructions. List only instructions applicable to two or more subordinate units that are not covered in the base order. Identify and highlight PRC-specific timings, information themes and messages, risk reduction control measures, and environmental considerations.

4. Sustainment. Identify the priorities of sustainment for PRC key tasks, and specify additional instructions as required. Refer to Annex F (Sustainment) as required. 5. Command and Signal.

## A. Command. (1) Location Of Commander. State The Locations Of The Provost Marshal And Military Police Commanders

within the AO.

(2) Liaison Requirements. State the PRC operations requirements not covered in unit SOPs.
b. Control.
(1) Command Posts. Describe the employment of command posts within the AO, including the location of
each command post and its time of opening and closing.

(2) Reports. List PRC operations-specific reports not covered in SOPs. Refer to Annex R (Reports) as required.

c. Signal. Address PRC operations-specific communications requirements. Refer to Annex H (Signal) as required. ACKNOWLEDGE: Include only if attachment is distributed separately from the base order.

[Commander's last name]
[Commander's rank]
OFFICIAL: [Authenticator's name]
[Authenticator's position]
Use only if the commander does not sign the original attachment. If the commander signs the original, no further authentication is required. If the commander does not sign, the signature of the preparing staff officer requires authentication and only the last name and rank of the commander appear in the signature block
[page number]
[CLASSIFICATION]

ATTACHMENTS: List lower-level attachments (for example, exhibits).

DISTRIBUTION: Show only if distributed separately from the base order or higher-level attachments.

[page number]
[CLASSIFICATION]
Legend: ADP
Army doctrine publication
HN
host nation
AO
area of operations
HQ
headquarters
AR
Army regulation
NGO
nongovernmental organizations
ATP
Army techniques publication
OPLAN
operation plan
CMOC
civil-military operations center
OPORD
operation order
DC
dislocated civilian
PRC
populace and resources control
FM
field manual
SOP
standard operating procedure

D-10. Area security is no longer a primary protection task however, commanders and staffs must synchronize, integrate, and organize area security with the primary protection tasks to protect friendly forces, installations, LOC, and actions within specific areas. Below is an area security annex example to provide planners with an example of area security requirements. See figure D-6 for a sample format for this attachment.

Follow classification marking guidance as described in AR 380-5. Include full heading if attachment is distributed separately from the base order or higher-level attachment.

APPENDIX 1 (AREA SECURITY) TO ANNEX E (PROTECTION) TO OPORD [number] [(code name)]
[issuing headquarters] [(classification of title)] References: List documents essential to understanding the attachment.

a. List maps and charts first. Map entries include series number, country, sheet name or number, edition, and scale.

b. List other references in subparagraphs labeled as shown. c. Doctrinal references for this attachment include ADP 3-37, ADP 3-90, and FM 3-39.

Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: Write the time zone established in the base order.

1. Situation.

a. Area of Interest. No change to Annex B (Intelligence) or appendix 1 (Design Concept) to Annex C
(Operations).

b. Area of Operations. No change to appendix 1 (Design Concept) to Annex C (Operations). (1) Terrain. Describe the five military aspects of terrain that impact operations. Refer to Annex B
(Intelligence) as required.

(2) Weather. Describe the five military aspects of weather that impact operations. Refer to Annex B
(Intelligence) as required.

c. Enemy Forces. No change to Annex B (Intelligence). d. Friendly Forces. No change to the base order Annex A (Task Organization) and Annex B
(Intelligence) as required.

e. Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Nongovernmental Organizations. Identify and describe other organizations in the AO that may impact the conduct of area security.

f. Civil Considerations. Describe the critical aspects of the civil situation that impact area security operations. Refer to appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate) to Annex B (Intelligence) as required.

g. Attachments and Detachments. If pertinent, list units or assets attached to, or detached from, the issuing headquarters. State when each attachment or detachment is effective (for example, on order or on commitment of the reserve) if different from the effective time of the base order. Do not repeat information already listed in Annex A (Task Organization).

h. Assumptions. List assumptions specific to area security that support appendix development.

2. Mission. State the area security mission in support of the current operation by providing a short description of who, what (task), when, where, and why (purpose) that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason for doing so. 3. Execution.

a. Scheme of Area Security. The scheme of area security is a statement of the overall area security objective. Describe how area security supports the commander's intent, the maneuver plan, and protection priorities. Direct the manner in which each element of the force will cooperate to accomplish area security, and tie that to support of the operation with a task and purpose statement. Discuss how area security orients the force, installation, route, area, or assets to be protected and how area security is often an economy-offorce role assigned to many organizations and often designated to ensure the continued conduct of sustainment operations and to support decisive and shaping operations. Describe how forces engaged in area security saturate an area or position on key terrain to provide protection through early warning, reconnaissance, or surveillance and to guard against unexpected enemy attack with an active response. Discuss the role of response forces in the area security concept. The following subparagraphs are examples; omit what is unnecessary for brevity.

(1) Base and Base Cluster Defense. Describe how base and base cluster defense measures (normal and emergency) are required to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of enemy attacks on, or sabotage of, a base to ensure that the maximum capacity of its facilities are available to U.S. forces. A division or corps may be required to protect multiple forward-operating bases. Describe how bases leverage mutually supporting capabilities or joint assets for their collective defense. Units may be assigned base defensive operations on a permanent or rotating basis, depending on mission variables.
(2) Critical Asset Security. Describe how critical asset security supports the commander's intent and area security. Discuss the protection and security of personnel, physical assets, and information analyzed and deemed essential to the operation and success of the mission and the required resources for protection. This designation generally comes as a result of a deliberate assessment or as a directed mission. Refer to the commander's critical assets list and defended asset list as required.

(3) Command and Control Node Protection. Describe how command and control node protection supports the commander's intent and area security. Discuss how command posts and operations centers are protected through area security techniques that involve the employment of an array of protection and security assets in a layered, integrated, and redundant manner. Describe when, where, or under what conditions command posts will be massed or dispersed for survivability.

(4) High-risk Personnel Security. Describe how high-risk personnel security supports the commander's intent and area security. Identify high-risk personnel by grade, assignment, symbolic value, or relative isolation. High-risk personnel are likely to be attractive or accessible terrorist targets and could include HN dignitaries. Discuss what special precautions are taken to ensure the safety and security of these individuals. Identify the requirements for security details from internal resources. However, under certain circumstances, designated personnel may require protective services by specially trained units.
(5) Response Force. Describe how response force operations support the commander's protection priorities and area security. Direct minimum response force capabilities and procedures for increasing those capabilities. Discuss how response force operations expediently reinforce a unit's organic protection capabilities or complement that protection with maneuver capabilities based on the threat. Discussion should include the planning for defeat of Level I and Level II threats and the shaping of Level III threats until designated combined arms, tactical combat force arrives for decisive operations.

(6) Lines of Communication Security. Describe how lines-of-communication security support the commander's movement priorities and area security. Outline locations for concentrated protection along lines of communication and supply routes that are critical to military operations. Discuss focused protection for lines of communication and supply routes (rail, pipeline, highway, waterway) throughout the AO. Describe how route security operations are defensive in nature and how route security forces prevent an enemy force from impeding, harassing, or destroying traffic along a route or portions of a route. Direct movement corridor operations as necessary to facilitate movement in high-risk areas (the movement of a single element) as an enduring operation. Also discuss how units synchronize their efforts (reconnaissance, security, mobility, information engagement) within the movement corridor.
(7) Checkpoint and Combat Outposts. Describe how checkpoint and combat outposts support the commander's movement and protection priorities. Discuss how organizations control the freedom of movement in an AO for a specific period of time (curfews) or as an enduring operation (safety and antiterrorism). This can be accomplished by placing permanent or temporary checkpoints and combat outposts along designated avenues and roadways or on key terrain identified through mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, and time movement. Combat outposts are used for sanctuary, support, information, surveillance, and reconnaissance or area denial.

(8) Convoy Security. Describe how convoy security supports the commander's concept of support and area security. Discuss how convoy security is a specialized area security operation conducted to protect convoys and how units conduct convoy security operations anytime there are insufficient friendly forces to continuously secure routes in an area of operations and there is a significant danger of enemy ground action directed against the convoy. Also discuss how units conduct convoy security operations in conjunction with route security operations. Planning includes designating units for convoy security; providing guidance on tactics, techniques, and procedures for units to provide for their own security during convoys; or establishing protection and security requirements for convoys carrying critical assets. Local or theater policy typically dictates when or which convoys receive security and protection.

(9) Port Area and Pier Security. Describe how port area and pier security support the commander's intent and area security. Discuss how units who are assigned a port area as part of their AO must develop and organize plans to ensure that forces are trained, led, and equipped to concentrate the necessary combat power at the decisive time and place to protect or secure port areas and cargo, as necessary. The patrol of harbors and anchorages is generally the mission of a dedicated port security unit and may include waterfront security operations.

(10) Surveillance. Describe how surveillance supports the commander's intent and area security.

Discuss how the protection working group uses staff analysis and coordination with higher headquarters to determine which critical assets or locations are likely to be attractive targets and require surveillance. Direct the collection of information against specified intelligence requirements or at specified locations by units engaged in area security operations.

(11) Area Damage Control. Describe how area damage control supports the commander's intent and area security. Discuss how commanders conduct area damage control when the damage and scope of the attack is limited and they can respond and recover with local assets and resources. This recovery involves resuming operations, maintaining or restoring order, evacuating casualties, isolating danger or hazard areas, and mitigating personnel and material losses. Some attacks may rise to the level of incidents of national significance and require additional resources for mitigation, recovery, and investigation. In the latter case, commanders transition from area damage control to consequence management activities.

b. Tasks to Subordinate Units. List area security tasks assigned to specific subordinate units not contained in the base order.

c. Coordinating Instructions. List only instructions applicable to two or more subordinate units not covered in the base order. Identify and highlight area security-specific timings, information themes and messages, risk reduction control measures, and environmental considerations. 4. Sustainment. Identify priorities of sustainment for area security operations key tasks, and specify additional instructions as required. Refer to Annex F (Sustainment) as required.

## [Classification] 5. Command And Signal.

a. Command. (1) Location of Commander. State the locations of the provost marshal and military police commanders
within the AO.

(2) Liaison Requirements. State the area security operations requirements not covered in unit SOPs. b. Control. (1) Command Posts. Describe the employment of command posts within the AO, including the location
of each command post and its time of opening and closing.

(2) Reports. List area security operations-specific reports not covered in SOPs. Refer to Annex R
(Reports) as required.

c. Signal. Address area security operations-specific communications requirements. Refer to Annex H
(Signal) as required.

ACKNOWLEDGE: Include only if attachment is distributed separately from the base order.

[Commander's last name]
[Commander's rank]
OFFICIAL:
[Authenticator's name] [Authenticator's position]
Use only if the commander does not sign the original attachment. If the commander signs the original, no further authentication is required. If the commander does not sign, the signature of the preparing staff officer requires authentication and only the last name and rank of the commander appear in the signature block.

ATTACHMENTS: List lower-level attachments (for example, exhibits).

DISTRIBUTION: Show only if distributed separately from the base order or higher-level attachments.

[page number]
[CLASSIFICATION]
Legend: ADP
Army doctrine publication
AO
area of operations
AR
Army regulation
AS
area security
FM
field manual
HN
host nation
OPORD
operation order
SOP
standard operating procedure
U.S.
United States

## Fragmentary Order

D-11. The fragmentary order is used to update the OPORD with new information, tasks, or requirements.

Fragmentary orders are issued when changes occur. See figure D-7 for an illustration of the fragmentary order format.

(Change from verbal orders, if any) (Optional)
FRAGMENTARY ORDER [number] References: Refer to higher order being modified. Time Zone Used Throughout the OPORD: Write the time zone established in the base order.

1. Situation. Include changes to existing order, or state "No change." For example, "No change to OPORD 03-XX." 2. Mission. State "No change." 3. Execution. Include changes, or state "No change."
a. Commander's intent. Include changes, or state "No change."
b. Concept of operations. Include changes, or state "No change." c. Scheme of movement and maneuver. Include changes, or state "No change." d. Scheme of intelligence. Include changes, or state "No change." e. Scheme of fires. Include changes, or state "No change." f. Scheme of protection. Include changes, or state "No change."
g. Stability operations. Include changes, or state "No change." h. Assessment. Include changes, or state "No change." i. Tasks to subordinate units. Include changes, or state "No change." j. Coordinating instructions. Include changes, or state "No change."
4. Sustainment. Include changes, or state "No change." 5. Command and signal. Include changes, or state "No change."
[Commander's rank]

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## Glossary

The glossary lists acronyms and terms with Army or joint definitions. Where Army and joint definitions differ, (Army) precedes the definition. The Army proponent publication for other terms is listed in parentheses after the definition.

## Section I - Acronyms And Abbreviations

ADC
area damage control
ADP
Army doctrine publication
AFCS
Army Facilities Components System
AFMAN
Air Force manual
AFTTP
Air Force tactics, techniques, and procedures
ALERTS
Army Law Enforcement Reporting System
AO
area of operations
AR
Army regulation
ASCOPE
areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events
AT
antiterrorism
ATP
Army techniques publication
attn
attention
BCT
brigade combat team
CA
civil affairs
CARE
Cooperative Assistance for Relief Everywhere
CBRN
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
CCDR
combatant commander
CCIR
commander's critical information requirements
CID
criminal investigation division
CMO
civil-military operations
DA
Department of the Army
DC
dislocated civilian
DNA
deoxyribonucleic acid
DOD
Department of Defense
DODD
Department of Defense directive
DODI
Department of Defense instruction
DODM
Department of Defense manual
DOS
Department of State
DOTD
Directorate of Training and Doctrine
DSCA
defense support of civil authorities
EOD
explosive ordnance disposal
FM
field manual
G-2
assistant chief of staff, intelligence
G-9
assistant chief of staff, civil affairs operations
GTA
graphic training aid
HN
host nation
HRP
high-risk personnel
IED
improvised explosive device
JP
joint publication
LOC
lines of communication
LOGMARS
logistics application of automated marking and reading symbols
LOGSEC
logistics security
LP
listening post
MCRP
Marine Corps reference publication
MCTP
Marine Corps tactical publication
MCWP
Marine Corps warfighting publication
METT-TC
mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations
MSCoE
Maneuver Support Center of Excellence
MOE
measure of effectiveness
MOP
measure of performance
MSR
main supply route
MWD
military working dog
NEO
noncombatant evacuation operation
NGO
nongovernmental organization
NTTP
Navy tactics, techniques, and procedures
OP
observation post
OPORD
operation order
PIO
police intelligience operations
PM
provost marshal
PRC
populace and resources control
QRF
quick response force
ROE
rules of engagement
RUF
rules for the use of force
S-2
battalion or brigade intelligence staff officer
S-9
battalion or brigade civil affairs operations staff officer
SecDef
Secretary of Defense
SOP
standard operating procedure
TC
training circular
TCF
tactical combat force
TCP
traffic control post
TCO
tactical convoy operations
TTP
tactics, techniques, and procedures
UAS
unmanned aircraft system
U.S.
United States
USACIDC
United States Army Criminal Investigation Command
USC
United States Code
USG
United States Government

## Section Ii - Terms

None.


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## References

All URLs accessed on 10 December 2019.

## Required Publications These Documents Must Be Available To Intended Users Of This Publication.

DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. January 2020.

ADP 1-02. *Operational Terms and Military Symbols*. 14 August 2018. FM 1-02.1. *Operational Terms.* 21 November 2019.

## Related Publications These Publications Are Referenced In This Publication. Joint Publications Most Joint Publications Are Available Online: <Https://Www.Jcs.Mil/Doctrine/>.

JP 1. *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*. 25 March 2013.

JP 2-0. *Joint Intelligence.* 22 October 2013.

JP 3-0. *Joint Operations.* 17 January 2017.

JP 3-07.2. *Antiterrorism.* 14 March 2014.

JP 3-08. *Interorganizational Coordination.* 12 October 2016.

JP 3-10. *Joint Security Operations in Theater.* 25 July 2019.

JP 3-13. *Information Operations.* 27 November 2012. JP 3-15. *Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare for Joint Operations*. 6 September 2016.

JP 3-17. *Air Mobility Operations*. 5 February 2019.

JP 3-26. *Counterterrorism.* 24 October 2014.

JP 3-27. *Homeland Defense.* 10 April 2018.

JP 3-28. *Defense Support of Civil Authorities.* 29 October 2018.

JP 3-29. *Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.* 14 May 2019.

JP 3-34. *Joint Engineer Operations.* 6 January 2016.

JP 3-57. *Civil-Military Operations.* 9 July 2018. JP 3-68. *Noncombat Evacuation Operations.* 18 November 2015.

JP 4-01.5. *Joint Terminal Operations.* 2 November 2015.

JP 5-0. *Joint Planning*. 16 June 2017.

## Army Publications Most Army Doctrinal Publications Are Available Online At <Https://Armypubs.Army.Mil>

ADP 3-0. *Operations.* 31 July 2019.

ADP 3-07. *Stability.* 31 July 2019.

ADP 3-28. *Defense Support of Civil Authorities.* 31 July 2019.

ADP 3-37. *Protection.* 31 July 2019.

ADP 3-90. *Offense and Defense.* 31 July 2019.

ADP 5-0. *The Operations Process*. 31 July 2019.

## References

ADP 6-0. *Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces.* 31 July 2019. ADP 6-22. *Army Leadership and the Profession*. 31 July 2019.

AR 15-6. *Procedures for Administrative Investigations of Boards of Officers.* 1 April 2016.

AR 190-11. *Physical Security of Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives.* 17 January 2019. AR 190-13. *The Army Physical Security Program.* 27 June 2019.

AR 380-5. *Army Information Security Program*. 22 October 2019. AR 525-13. *Antiterrorism.* 3 December 2019.

ATP 2-91.8. *Techniques for Document and Media Exploitation.* 5 May 2015.

ATP 3-04.1. *Aviation Tactical Employment.* 13 April 2016. ATP 3-34.23. *Engineer OperationsEchelons Above Brigade Combat Team.* 10 June 2015.

ATP 3-34.80. *Geospatial Engineering*. 22 February 2017. ATP 3-37.2. *Antiterrorism*. 3 June 2014.

ATP 3-39.10. *Police Operations.* 26 January 2015.

ATP 3-39.11. *Military Police Special Reaction Teams.* 26 November 2013. ATP 3-39.12. *Law Enforcement Investigations.* 19 August 2013.

ATP 3-39.20. *Police Intelligence Operations.* 13 May 2019.

ATP 3-39.30. *Security and Mobility Support.* 30 October 2014.

ATP 3-39.32. *Physical Security*. 30 April 2014. ATP 3-39.33. *Civil Disturbances.* 21 April 2014.

ATP 3-39.34. *Military Working Dogs*. 30 January 2015.

ATP 3-39.35. *Protective Services.* 31 May 2013. ATP 3-55.4. *Techniques for Information Collection During Operations Among Populations.* 5 April
2016.

ATP 3-57.10. *Civil Affairs Support to Populace and Resources Control.* 6 August 2013.

ATP 3-57.60. *Civil Affairs Planning*. 27 April 2014.

ATP 3-57.70. *Civil-Military Operations Center*. 5 May 2014.

ATP 3-90.15. *Site Exploitation*. 28 July 2015.

ATP 3-90.37. *Countering Improvised Explosive Devices*. 29 July 2014.

ATP 4-13. *Army Expeditionary Intermodal Operations*. 16 April 2014.

ATP 4-14. *Expeditionary Railway Center Operations*. 29 May 2014.

ATP 4-15. *Army Watercraft Operations*. 3 April 2015.

ATP 4-16. *Movement Control.* 5 April 2013.

ATP 5-19. *Risk Management*. 14 April 2014.

FM 3-0. *Operations.* 6 October 2017.

FM 3-07. *Stability.* 2 June 2014.

FM 3-39. *Military Police Operations.* 9 April 2019. FM 3-55. *Information Collection.* 3 May 2013.

FM 3-57. *Civil Affairs Operations.* 17 April 2019.

FM 3-63. *Detainee Operations*. 2 January 2020.

FM 3-81. *Maneuver Enhancement Brigade.* 21 April 2014.

FM 3-90-1. *Offense and Defense, Volume 1.* 22 March 2013.

FM 3-90-2. *Reconnaissance, Security, and Tactical Enabling Tasks, Volume 2.* 22 March 2013.

FM 3-98. *Reconnaissance and Security Operations.* 1 July 2015.

FM 4-30. *Ordnance Operations.* 1 April 2014.

FM 6-0. *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations*. 5 May 2014.

GTA 19-08-002. *Portable Sign-Making Kit*. May 2001.

GTA 19-08-004. *Nonlethal Munitions*. October 2001.

GTA 90-01-005. *Checkpoint Operations Smartcard*. May 2016.

GTA 90-01-011. Deployed Forces *Protection Handbook (JFOB7).* 30 July 2019.

TC 3-39.30. *Military Police Leaders' Handbook.* 11 August 2015.

TC 19-210. *Access Control Handbook*. 4 October 2004.

## Air Force Publications Most Controlled Air Force Publications Are Available On The Cac-Enabled Web Site At <Https://Wmsweb.Afncr.Af.Mil/Wms/>.

AFI 31-101. *Integrated Defense.* 25 March 2020.

## Department Of Defense Publications Most Department Of Defense Publications Are Available Online: <Https://Www.Esd.Whs.Mil/Dd/>.

DODD 3025.18. *Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA).* 29 December 2010.

DODI O-2000.22. *Designation and Physical Protection of DoD High-Risk Personnel.* 19 June 2014.

DODM 5240.01. *Procedures Governing the Conduct of DoD Intelligence Activities*. 8 August 2016.

## Multi-Service Publications

ATP 2-22.85/MCRP 10-10F.1/NTTP 3-07.16/AFTTP 3-2.85. Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Tactical Employment of Biometrics in Support of Operations. 30 April 2020.

ATP 3-34.81/MCWP 3-17.4. *Engineer Reconnaissance.* 1 March 2016. ATP 3-37.10/MCRP 3-40D.13. *Base Camps.* 27 January 2017.

ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C. *Survivability Operations.* 16 April 2018.

ATP 3-55.6/MCRP 2-10A.4/NTTP 3-55.13/AFTTP 3-2.2. Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Air-To-Surface Radar System Employment. 23 October 2019.

ATP 3-57.20/MCRP 3-33.1C. Multi-Service Techniques for Civil Affairs Support to Foreign Humanitarian Assistance. 15 February 2013.

ATP 3-90.4/MCWP 3-17.8. *Combined Arms Mobility.* 8 March 2016.
ATP 3-90.8/MCWP 3-17.5. *Combined Arms Countermobility Operations.* 17 September 2014.
ATP 4-01.45/MCRP 3-40F.7 [MCRP 4-11.3H]/AFTTP 3-2.58. TCO Multi-Service Tactics,
Techniques, and Procedures for Tactical Convoy Operations. 22 February 2017.
ATP 4-10/MCRP 4-11H/NTTP 4-09.1/AFMAN 10-409-O. Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and
Procedures for Operational Contract Support. 18 February 2016.
FM 6-27/MCTP 11-10C. *The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Land Warfare.* 7 August 2019.

## Other Publications

Executive Order 12333. *United States Intelligence Activities*. 4 December 1981. Web site:
<https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/executive-order/12333.html>.
Executive Order 12656. *Assignment of Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities.* 18 November 1988.
Web site: <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=1567>.
Executive Order 13122. Interagency Task Force on the Economic Development of the Southwest
Border. 28 May 1999. Web site: <https://www.federalregister.gov/presidentialdocuments/executive-orders/william-j-clinton/1999>.
Geneva Conventions, Convention IV. *Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons,* Geneva. 12
August 1949. Web site: <https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/GC_1949-IV.pdf>.
Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907. Web site: <http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php>.
Operational Law Handbook. Web site: <http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/operational-lawhandbooks.html>.

Title 10, USC. *Armed Forces.* Edition 2010. Web site: <http://uscode.house.gov/>. Title 18, USC, Section 1385. *Use of Army and Air Force as Posse Comitatus*. Web site:
<http://uscode.house.gov/>.

Title 32 USC. *National Guard.* Edition 2010. Web site: <http://uscode.house.gov/>.

## Prescribed Forms This Section Contains No Entries.

REFERENCED FORMS
Unless otherwise indicated, DA forms are available on the Army Publishing Directorate Web site at
<https://armypubs.army.mil>.

DA Form 2028. *Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms*.

DA Form 3161. *Request for Issue or Turn-in.*

## Recommended Readings

ATP 2-01.3. *Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield*. 1 March 2019. ATP 3-07.6. *Protection of Civilians.* 29 October 2015.

ATP 3-34.20/MCRP 3-17.2D. *Countering Explosive Hazards.* 21 January 2016.

FM 2-0*. Intelligence*. 6 July 2018. Geneva Conventions, Convention I. For the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Geneva. 12 August 1949. Web site:
<https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/GC_1949-I.pdf>

Geneva Conventions, Convention II. For the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Geneva. 12 August 1949. Web site:
<https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/GC_1949-II.pdf>.
Geneva Conventions, Convention III. *Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.* 12 August 1949.
Web site: <https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/GC_1949-III.pdf>.
GTA 19-01-003. *Commander's Guide to Military Working Dogs*. 1 January 2009. Web site
<https://atiam.train.army.mil/catalog/dashboard>.

## Index

Entries are by paragraph number.

## A

aerial ports and terminals. 4-69

civil control. 2-3 civil security. 1-53, 4-6, 5-48
collection point. 3-23

security. 4-72
airbase. 2-21

dislocated civilians. 3-57
straggler control. 3-59

security. 4-56

collection point activities. 3-59,
4-35

combat outposts. 4-29, 4-42
combat power. 1-3, 1-12
combined arms. 1-12, 1-20
controlling movement. 5-17
convoy security. 4-9, 4-19,
  4-28

airbase defense. 4-56
analysis. 2-3
antiterrorism. 1-1, 4-97, D-8
area damage control. 4-7, 4-48
area of operations. C-12
area reconnaissance. 2-20
area security. 4-4, 4-6, 4-56, 4-86,
  4-90

assured mobility. 1-5, 3-25
astray cargo. 5-65

counterreconnaissance. 4-2
counterterrorism. 4-100
criminal activity threat
  assessment. 5-83

## B

criminal intelligence. 5-79

base camp. 4-8

security and defense. 4-9,
4-52, 4-57
threat levels. 4-58

base cluster. 4-51

deadly force. 1-45 defense support of civil authorities. 1-12, 1-65

threat levels. 4-58
base defense. 4-51
plan. 4-57

base defense operations center.

4-61

defensive tasks. 1-33
detention operations. 1-2, 1-29
dislocated civilian assistance.
  1-63

biometrics

dislocated civilian camps

definition. 2-62

biometrics data. 2-59, 2-62
border
operations. 5-52

design considerations. B-18
operations. B-35
planning. B-2
security. B-16
standards. B-8

border security. D-9 breaching operations
dislocated civilian control. 3-55,
4-46
dislocated civilian operations support. 5-16
displaced person. 5-12

combined arms. 1-32, 3-9 covert. 3-10
deliberate. 3-10
hasty. 3-10

## C

checkpoints. 4-30, C-7

evacuation planning, 5-9, 5-31
evacuee. 5-12

deliberate. 4-34, 4-36
hasty. 4-38, 4-39
organization. 4-40, 4-41

## F

forensic analysis. 2-67, 2-68 forensic evidence. 2-59, 2-65
full spectrum operations definition. 1-12

## G

gap-crossing operations support to. 3-25
graduated response. 1-50

## H

hasty breaching. 3-10 high-risk personnel. 4-65

## I

inner security area. 4-52 internally displaced person.

5-12

## L D

law enforcement. 2-3
law of war. 4-57
local security. 4-90
logistics pipeline. 5-68
logistics security. 5-57

threat assessment. 5-73,
  5-83

## M

main and alternate supply route regulation and enforcement.
3-31
main supply route signs. C-25
maneuver. 3-3 maneuver and mobility support

## E

main supply route. C-25
route classification. C-1
route reconnaissance. C-6
temporary route signing.
  C-7

migrant. 5-12
military police disciplines, 1-12,
  4-69, 5-15, D-9, D-17

populace control. 5-1
responsibilities. 5-3
port vulnerability assessment.

5-83
Posse Comitatus Act. 1-69,
5-13, 5-52

military police operations. 1-68
mobility. 3-5
mobility considerations. 4-11
mobility operations. 3-6
movement and maneuver.
  1-12, 3-2

protection warfighting function.
  1-12

movement and maneuver
  warfighting function. 3-2

protective services. 4-65, 4-68

movement control. 4-11, 5-21

## Q

quick response force. 4-84
clearing. 5-24
collecting. 5-26 roadblocks. 5-22

## R N

railheads and terminals. 4-69
security. 4-79
reconnaissance

nested cargo. 5-64
node protection. 4-63
noncombatant evacuation
  operations. 5-28

noncombatant evacuation
  operations support. 5-30

nonlethal. 1-12

area reconnaissance. 2-9
civil. 2-24
patrols. 2-26
presence patrols. 2-28
route reconnaissance. 2-9
zone. 2-23

## O

reconnaissance and surveillance.

A-5
offensive tasks. 1-38 operational environment definition. 1-8
orders. D-1
refugee. 5-12 resettled person. 5-12 resources control. 5-42
public and private property.

5-44
fragmentary order. D-11 operation order. D-4 warning order. D-3
response force. 4-83
outer security area. 4-52
operations. 4-81

## P

returnee. 5-12
route clearance. 3-16
route planning. 5-20
route reconnaissance. 2-17, 3-50,
  C-6

passage of lines. 3-27
patrol. C-8
perimeter zone. 4-52
physical security. 4-101
police intelligence. 2-3

route security. 4-13
route signing. C-7

rule of law. 1-50, 5-35 rules for the use of force. 5-33 rules of interaction. 5-32

## S

seaports and terminals. 4-69
security. 4-76
security. 1-3
security and mobility support.

1-25, 1-48
security and mobility support discipline. 1-1
security operations. 4-1
civil security. 4-1 route security. 4-1

stability. 1-12
stability mechanism. 1-38
stability tasks. 1-38
stateless person. 5-12
straggler. 3-58
straggler control. 3-58
surveillance. 2-33

## T

theater. 1-30, 1-36 threat assessment process.

5-72
threat levels base camps. 4-58
traffic control plan. 3-52 traffic regulation. 3-28 traffic regulation plan. 3-34

## U

unmanned aircraft system. 2-42

## W

war victims. 5-12
By Order of the Secretary of the Army:
Chief of Staff Official:
Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army
2013609

## Distribution: Distributed In Electronic Media Only (Emo).