##

# Explosive Ordnance Disposal (Eod) Company, Platoon, And Team Operations

## February 2017 Distribution Restriction. Approved For Public Release; Distribution Is Unlimited. Headquarters Department Of The Army



This publication is available at the Army Publishing Directorate site (http://www.apd.army.mil), and the Central Army Registry site
(https://atiam.train.army.mil/catalog/dashboard)

## Explosive Ordnance Disposal (Eod) Company, Platoon, And Team Operations

1. This change updates EOD company mission command responsibilities based upon force structure changes.

The EOD platoon rules of allocation align to current brigade combat team force structure to ensure sufficient capacity for operation. The legend updates the table to accurately reflect modeling rules of allocation and support organizations.


2. A plus sign (+) marks new material.

3. ATP 4-32.3, February 2017, is changed as follows:


Remove Old Pages
Insert New Pages


| page i through iv    | page i through iv    |
|----------------------|----------------------|
| page 1-1 through 1-6 | page 1-1 through 1-6 |


4. File this transmittal sheet in front of the publication for reference purposes.

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.


By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

Chief of Staff

Official:


Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army
1711004

DISTRIBUTION:
Active Army, Army National Guard, and United States Army Reserve: Distributed in electronic media only (EMO).



## Preface

ATP 4-32.3, *Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Company, Platoon, and Team Operations,* provides doctrinal guidance for EOD operations through the company to the team level. This manual focuses on changes and additional capabilities added to the EOD companies through the force design update process.

The principal audience for ATP 4-32.3 is all members of the professions of arms. Commanders and staffs of Army headquarters serving as joint task force or multinational headquarters should also refer to applicable joint or multinational doctrine concerning the range of military operations and joint or multinational forces. Trainers and educators throughout the Army will also use this publication.

Commanders, staffs, and subordinates ensure that their decisions and actions comply with applicable U.S., international, and in some cases host-nation laws and regulations. Commanders at all levels ensure that their Soldiers operate in accordance with the law of war and the rules of engagement. (See FM 27-10).

ATP 4-32.3 uses joint terms where applicable. Selected joint and Army terms and definitions appear in both the glossary and the text. Terms for which ATP 4-32.3 is the proponent publication (the authority) are italicized in the text and are marked with an asterisk (*) in the glossary. Definitions for which ATP 4-32.3 is the proponent publication are boldfaced in the text. For other definitions shown in the text, the term is italicized and the number of the proponent publication follows the definition. ATP 4-32.3 applies to the Active Army, the Army National Guard /Army National Guard of the United Sates (ARNGUS), and the United States Army Reserve (USAR) unless otherwise stated.

The proponent of ATP 4-32.3 is the Unites States Army Ordnance School. The preparing agency is Training and Doctrine Command Capabilities Manager-EOD. Send comments and recommendations on a DA Form 2028 (*Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms*) to Commander, Unites States Army Combined Arms Support Command, ATTN: ATCL-TS (ATP 4-32.3), 2221 Adams Ave, Building 5020, Fort Lee, VA 23801-
1809; or submit an electronic DA Form 2028 by e-mail to:  usarmy.lee.tradoc.mbx.leee-cascomdoctrine@mail.mil. In addition to submission of DA Form 2028, provide same comments and recommendations in MilWiki for rapid dissemination to doctrine authors and for universal review at https://www.milsuite.mil/wiki/Portal:Army_Doctrine.

## Introduction

ATP 4-32.3 discusses and articulates the roles of the company, platoon, and team operations. ATP 4-32.3 addresses the adapted changes to the organizational structure from the approved EOD force design update. ATP 4-32.3 expands on company, platoon, and team operations not found in ATP 4-32, Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Operations.

ATP 4-32.3 discusses the best practices and techniques used by EOD organizations to provide support throughout unified land operations. It reflects the experiences and knowledge gained from recent deployed operations.

ATP 4-32.3 contains eight chapters and four appendices:
Chapter 1 describes the organizational structure of EOD companies and platoons. This chapter also provides an overview of company, platoon, and team level operations and how they support unified land operations.

Chapter 2 describes EOD operations in a non-permissive environment. It discusses mounted and dismounted operations, as well as support to special operations forces (SOF).

Chapter 3 describes EOD operations in a permissive environment. It discusses planning considerations required for conducting defense support to civil authorities (DSCA) missions.

Chapter 4 provides the principles of EOD team operations. It describes the management of an EOD incident from start to finish.

Chapter 5 outlines the incident management of unexploded ordnance (UXO) and recovered ordnance operations.

This chapter also provides planning considerations and implementation procedures for conducting multiple ordnance and range clearance operations.

Chapter 6 discusses improvised explosive device (IED) operations for EOD elements conducting operations in continental Unites States (CONUS) and outside the continental United States (OCONUS) environments.

Chapter 7 discusses chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) operations. This chapter provides instructions for the operations of the emergency personnel decontamination station and the emergency contamination control station.

Chapter 8 outlines the requirements for providing support to the United States Secret Service (USSS) while conducting very important person (VIP) support missions.

Appendix A provides the guidelines for EOD reporting.

Appendix B provides guidance for conducting range clearance operations.

Appendix C discusses the setup and operation of the emergency personnel decontamination station and the emergency contamination control station.

Appendix D lists supporting organizations which provide essential support to all EOD elements.


This page intentionally left blank.



## Chapter 1 Organizations

Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) companies are organized into four different company formations all having a different mission set. EOD elements can be deployed as companies, platoons or teams.

## Eod Companies

1-1. The mission for EOD companies is provide EOD support to unified land operations by detecting, identifying, conducting on-site evaluation, rendering safe, exploitation, and disposal or disposition of explosive ordnance, including weapons of mass destruction (WMD); and provide support to joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational operations, as required. This includes captured enemy ammunition, unexploded ordnance (UXO), improvised explosive device (IED), and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) munitions.

1-2. EOD companies provide the maneuver and other supported commanders with functional expertise and leadership concerning weapons technical exploitation capabilities that feed operations and intelligence fusion processes; explosive ordnance threat picture development; ammunition and explosive safety issues; and the effective employment of EOD forces.

1-3. EOD companies provide support to the United States Secret Service (USSS) and the Department of State (DOS) for the protection of the President of the United States (POTUS) and Vice-President of the United States (VPOTUS), as well as the Secretary of State and foreign dignitaries, as requested. 1-4.  EOD companies provide support to federal, state, and local law enforcement authorities, in the form of training, training support, render-safe and/or disposal of explosive ordnance which includes IEDs, military munitions, homemade explosives and precursors, and WMDs, when requested within the Department of Defense (DOD) and Army authorities.

1-5.   The companies are also organized to provide the following functions:


Exercise mission command of subordinate EOD forces.

Provide EOD support to Army special operations forces (SOF).

Provide support to countering weapons of mass destruction operations.

## Structure And Manning

1-6.  The EOD companies have been reorganized through a force design update which changes the structure of the companies but maintains the companies' operational capabilities.

1-7. The force design update reorganized the three-Soldier EOD team back to the previous two-Soldier team that are qualified and trained in accordance with AR 75-15, Policy for Explosive Ordnance Disposal. The two-man EOD team is low risk to the EOD team or the mission.

1-8. The approved EOD force design update increased the internal capability of EOD groups and battalions, while reducing the number of EOD battalions and companies. The reorganization better aligns EOD capabilities with changes to the Army brigade combat team (BCT) force structure. 1-9. The manning for EOD company formations were affected by the approved force design update. A more in-depth discussion of the company formations is explained throughout this chapter.

## +Eod Company

1-10. The EOD company (CO) provides mission command up to four organic EOD platoons, with a surge capability of two additional EOD platoons for a total of six platoons. The EOD company provides administrative company-level planning and support based on the level of employment, to include augmenting the BCT commander with a special staff element. The EOD company (figure 1-1) provides EOD service throughout the operational area and direct support (DS) or general support (GS) to a designated BCT/maneuver enhancement brigade or Special Forces group (airborne).

## Eod Company Airborne (Abn)

1-11. The EOD company (ABN) provides support to conventional forces and SOF to perform surgical strike operations in both permissive and non-permissive environments by means of ground assault, parachute insertion, fast-rope, and special patrol insertion/extraction in order to identify, render-safe, and exploit all explosive hazards to include CBRN. The EOD company (ABN) (figure 1-2) enables a direct action capability that is skilled in hostage rescue, kill/capture operations against designated targets, and other specialized tasks.

1-12.  The Soldiers of the EOD company (ABN) require the following additional skill sets:

A complete understanding of SOF tactics, techniques, and procedures.

Proficiency with SOF unique explosives.

Advanced counter-improvised explosive device (C-IED) skills.

Lightweight EOD tools.

Requisite mobility skills.

## Eod Company Continental United States (Conus) Support

1-13. The EOD company CONUS support provides assistance in the reduction and elimination of hazardous munitions and explosive device services to federal, state, and local agencies on an area basis. The EOD company CONUS support (figure 1-3) is allocated based on the concept of support requirements and dependent on the EOD battalion for administrative, religious, legal, personnel, field feeding, and supply services and support.

## Eod Company Weapons Of Mass Destruction (Wmd)

1-14. The EOD company (WMD) (figure 1-4) provides highly technical EOD operations and containment procedures for WMD in support of joint or interagency operations. It has the ability to respond anywhere in the world with two fully capable eight-person PLTs as part of the joint technical operations team. The unit has the capability to provide four WMD PLTs to support the Army or other United States (U.S.) Government department or agency in support of missions to defeat or mitigate WMD directed against the U.S. or its national interest. The nuclear support team provides internal training and operational management of the response PLTs.

## Eod Platoon

1-15. EOD PLTs are normally employed at the company level and provide leadership, supervision, and technical guidance for three to four EOD teams, typically consisting of two personnel. The EOD PLT provides the capability to eliminate and reduce explosive, CBRN hazards, including IEDs and conventional U.S. and foreign UXO. The EOD PLT (figure 1-5 on page 1-4) provides support to the USSS and the DOS
in protection of the President, Vice President, and other dignitaries as directed.

##

1-16. The manning structure for EOD PLTs was changed through the approved force design update. The response teams are reduced from 3 Soldiers per team to 2 Soldiers per team.

1-17. The size of companies remained the same for the EOD CO (ABN), the EOD CO (WMD) and the EOD
CO (CONUS Support).

## +Company And Platoon Level Operations

1-18. Company commanders, as well as their platoon leaders, must be masters of both the troop leading procedures process of unit level operations and the military decision making process of their supported brigade/battalion staffs. The rules of allocation for EOD forces is displayed in table 1-1.

1-19. The EOD company and platoon have an operational control (OPCON) or tactical control (TACON)
command relationship with their supported organizations.

1-20. The EOD teams have a DS relationship with the supported battalion and company. They are placed in a GS role while supporting base operations. For additional information on Army command and support relationships see FM 6-0, *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations*.

Supported Organization
Relationship
Modeling Rule of
Allocation
EOD
Organization
OPCON DS/GS

OPCON/TACON OPCON/TACON
DS/GS
EOD Battalion
BCT (as shown)
SFG(A) Ranger Regiment
MEB or land-owning
brigade headquarters
1 per BCT 1 per SFG(A) 1 per Land-owning Brigade HQ
1 per Ranger Regiment 8 per Homeland Defense 1 per 2-6 EOD
Platoons

##

Supported Organization
Relationship
Modeling Rule of
Allocation
EOD
Organization

3-4 Per committed
EOD Company
Assigned
BCT
Cavalry Squadron
DS/GS

Special Forces Battalion Ranger Battalion
Sustainment Brigade
DS/GS DS/GS
DS/GS
1 per Special Forces Battalion 1 per Ranger
Battalion
DS/GS
Brigade Engineer
Battalion (route clearance)
1 per Sustainment
Brigade
DS/GS
Maneuver Battalion (as shown) or land-owning
battalion headquarters

24-48 per Homeland Defense
1 per 3 EOD Teams
Legend:
BCT = brigade combat team
DS =  direct support
EOD = explosive ordnance disposal
GS = general support
MEB =  maneuver enhancement brigade
OPCON =  operational control
SFG = special forces group
TACON =  tactical control

1-21. Each Special Forces group has an Army EOD company that has a habitual direct support relationship with them and they are either collocated or located on a near CONUS installation to facilitate interdependence training on SOF tactics, techniques, and procedures. Each supported EOD company provides a platoon sized capability on prepare to deploy orders in support of enduring concept plan requirements. These platoons are available to rapidly respond and deploy in support of an emerging requirement with their aligned Special Forces group or other SOF force.

1-22. The integration of the company and platoon into the supported brigade and battalion organization staff should start at pre-deployment. Integrate early within the deployment cycle, possibly 6-12 months before the deployment. The supported unit may change during actual deployment but early integration is important to lay a positive ground work for whatever EOD element may actually provide the support. See JP 3-35, Deployment and Redeployment Operations for additional deployment information.

1-23. An administrative and logistic crosswalk should be conducted to determine what facets of support are accomplished by the parent EOD unit and what will  be expected to be provided by  the supported organizations.

1-24. The integration includes a thorough crosswalk with the supported units' staff sections. The organizations should discuss with the brigade personnel staff officer the following:


Establishment of administrative requirements not immediately available from the parent EOD
headquarters (HQ).

S-1 requirements to remain with parent EOD HQ (special pays).

Reporting and notification processes for causalities.

Handling of the unit's personal affairs worksheets packets.

Daily reports (personnel strengths), awards, and evaluations.
1-25. The leadership should ensure the EOD company's human resource specialists are intimately familiar with the supported unit's HR processes and procedures.

1-26. The integration with the brigade intelligence officer (S-2) and the S-2 staff section includes the following discussions:


Provide capabilities to support the S-2 staff, which includes the abilities to assist and develop
the ordnance order of battle (including IEDs), and the explosive threat picture.

Advise in the interrogation of enemy combatants involved in IED networks by providing specific
technical questions to gain more specific technical information.

Provide input to Paragraph 2 of orders/plans and Annex B concerning the explosive
ordnance/IED threat.

Provide Level 1 exploitation reports and capability to develop ordnance/IED focused
assessments.

Assist in developing other brigade/battalion-wide explosive threat/network related intelligence
summaries.

Direct channels of weapons technical information from subordinate teams that provide
immediate information to better develop the overall threat picture.

Distribution for periodic intelligence products from the S-2; courier cards, orders assistance,
security clearance updates, and access to special programs.

IED/ordnance threat specific products to the S-2 or assistance in developing these products.

Coordination of maps, intelligence products, and weather/light data for CBRN threats.

## Operations I**Ntegration**

1-27. The details of EOD operations should be fully integrated with the brigade staff operations officer. The operations officer is briefed on the following EOD capabilities:


Provide immediate and comprehensive recommendations of the array of EOD and other key
C-IED or counter explosive threat enablers.

Provide recommendations on prepositioning  of EOD assets to meet evolving  operational
priorities, weighting the main effort, or positioning capability to counter higher explosive threat areas.

Provide subject matter expertise in orders and plans development by writing the EOD/C-
IED/counter explosive threat subparagraph within the main order.

Must become an integral special staff asset during supported brigade/battalion staff military
decision making processes, including development of staff estimates and orders.

Maintain a physical presence in orders group meetings, battle update briefs, and other key staff
working groups; locating company/platoon HQs near supported unit HQs is desirable and effective in bolstering this crucial relationship.

Assist/coordinate engineer augmentation to include the use of explosive ordnance clearance
agents and route clearance capabilities.

Assist Fires cell in developing contingency plans for stuck rounds in artillery/mortar weapons,
missile system malfunctions, and enemy indirect fire attack crater analysis.

Assist Aviation cell in developing contingency plans for aircraft weapon system malfunctions
(hung fired weapons), and within recovery operation plans for downed aircraft to take care of possible armed systems or ordnance cargo.

Assist CBRN cell in planning and execution of operations involving captured or encountered
CBRN weapons or material.

Synchronize employment of any attached/supporting joint/international EOD assets including
those of the host nation, including both military and civil capabilities.

Primary subject matter expert in planning of very important person (VIP) protection support
operations.

Assists in developing employment schemes that support operational objectives.

Counter radio-controlled improvised explosive device electronic warfare (CREW) advisement
and coordinate with the electronic warfare officer the threat analysis for load sets, planning for employment of systems and other electronic warfare assets.

Recommend Fires actions for counter battery plans weigh against requirement for post
blast/exploitation of points of origins.

Recommend aviation-priority of air movement of EOD assets and exploitation material.

## Logistic I**Ntegration**

1-28.  Integration with the logistic section involves discussions on the following subjects:


Provides  subject  matter  expertise  regarding  brigade/battalion  ammunition  storage  safety,
disposition of captured/recovered enemy/foreign ordnance stores, or large cache recoveries.

Assists in developing disposition plans for retrograde of friendly force ammunition stores and
handling of battle damaged combat vehicles requiring ordnance download or have possible contamination by depleted uranium weapons.

Required assistance for all classes of supply.

Resupply planning to include push packages and emergency resupply.

Personnel  movement  throughout  the  area  of  operations  including  repositioning  elements,
replacements, and leaves.

## Communications I**Ntegration**

1-29. Communication section integration involves the following topics:


Communications support to include appropriate communications security fills.

Communications reporting systems.

Band width management issues with radio controlled equipment.

## Team Level Operations

1-30. The team is the key operational element for EOD forces as it is the echelon that actually performs the core actions of explosive ordnance disposal. The team leader and members inarguably have the most important tasks within the EOD field. Their mission success can have tactical, operational, or even strategic effect. 1-31. An Army EOD team is usually made up of only two to three Soldiers and is usually tasked to operate independently of its EOD chain of command. EOD Soldiers are required to be highly competent within their field and required to make critical decisions and actions in the absence of orders.

1-32. The team must use the same integration process used by the company and platoon to be fully integrated into their supported unit. The team leader must be actively involved in mission planning, especially when serving as a DS asset.

1-33. Team leaders must be familiar with the range of planning processes from troop leading procedures to support up to the company level and the military decision making process to support a battalion.

1-34. Along with providing input into the decision making processes, the team leader must have the ability to explain how the team can best be employed in a DS or GS role. The team leader must thoroughly understand the basics of common command and support relationships.

1-35. Team leaders have to know when and how to provide their subject matter expertise, as they may have to perform duties similar to the platoon leader or company commander. This would include participation and briefing at battle update briefs, and operations or planning meetings.


This page intentionally left blank.



## Chapter 2 Operations In A Non-Permissive Environment

Conducting operations in a non-permissive environment contributes to a lot of instability in the environment. The hazards facing the EOD teams are more abundant in this environment and they originate from a variety of threats.

## Non-Permissive Environment

2-1. Non-permissive environments are those found during deployments to contingency theaters of operation, such as a permissive environment which some level of lawlessness or heightened risk is assumed due to a breakdown in host country military and law enforcement capability. The use of energetic and/or explosive procedures are less constrained and are at times more focused on operational exigency.

2-2. Operations within this environment are in support of combat forces, usually maneuver units, and the operations usually happen during the varying phase of operations.

2-3. When operating in this environment, EOD forces must ensure operations are conducted within published rules of engagement and the rule of law.

2-4. The conducting of EOD procedures and processes must be flexible to meet the supported commander's mission goals and intent.

## Mounted Operations

2-5. Mounted operations are those in which the supported combat force is employing armor or mechanized forces in environments where the terrain and situation require or allow greater ground vehicle freedom of movement. Mounted operations allow EOD teams to operate using vehicles to enable the transportation of a complete complement of tools, equipment, and ammunition operational load. Operating out of its own vehicle provides the EOD team the greatest flexibility in determining an appropriate procedure. Below is a discussion of key elements when conducting mounted operations; other specific procedures are discussed in subsequent chapters.


Integration into supported unit movement plans, drills, and contingency plans.

Vehicle load planning.

Pre-combat checks and inspections.

Security plans, movement formations/vehicle spacing/sectors of observation and fire, action on
contact drills.

Specific duties of each vehicle position (or covered during team operations).

Route clearance patrol support requirements.

Importance of self-navigation, will consist of the use of digital navigation systems in addition to map recon.

Logistics/Sustainment requirements (fuel supply, vehicle maintenance and recovery plan).

Ammunition  requirements  (EOD  demolitions,  crew served  weapons,  individual  weapons, transportation of captured enemy ordnance/material/components).

CREW compatibility.

Movement techniques.

Risk assessment procedures.

## Dismounted Operations

2-6.  Dismounted operations are those in which the supported combat force employs dismounted troops such as light infantry or in environments where the terrain and situation restricts the use of ground vehicles. These environments include supporting forces inserted by air assault, airborne, or waterborne operations. Supporting special operations forces is discussed in the next section. Key elements of concern when conducting dismounted operations includes the following:


Integration into supported unit movement plans, drills, contingency plans and the position of
EOD personnel in movement formations.

Action on contract drills.

Maximizing EOD capabilities while determining dismounted equipment loadout.

## Load P**Lanning**

2-7. During load planning, EOD forces take into consideration the cross loading of critical team equipment and ammunition/explosives. Be prepared to cross load into supporting unit vehicles and the items carried should be tailored to the specific mission or the suspected threat and terrain. When cross loading equipment, the following key Soldier's load concerns should be addressed:


Accounting for life support items (food, water, and cold weather gear).

Minimum personal protection equipment (PPE) requirements (ballistic helmet; body armor w/
front, rear, side plates; eye protection; and ear protection).

Determining robotic, tools, and ammunition requirements.

Hand-held detectors and under armor trauma kits added to the loadout.

Individual Soldier's clothing may have to be modified or changed to support specific missions
or environments.

Emergency  resupply  includes  staged  or  mission  configured  loads;  examples:  bomb  suit,
additional tools/equipment, robot, batteries, demolition, food, and water.

## Physical F**Itness**

2-8. Health and fitness levels of every individual are important in any military operation, but dismounted operations requirements are higher. Individuals must be capable of carrying a very heavy load with only the items required for the mission. Critical areas of concerns are the following:


Soldiers' physical health requirements include the Soldier's profile status, dental status, and
medication requirements. All of these items will have an impact on the mission if not properly addressed.

Soldiers must be capable of carrying tools/equipment long distances, over a prolonged length of
time, and over rough terrain. Soldiers must be fully mission capable and have a clear head during physical stress.

## Fieldcraft And Soldier D**Iscipline**

2-9. Fieldcraft is the tactical skill to operate stealthily and the methods used to do so, which can differ during day and night operations and changes due to weather and terrain. A Soldier's fieldcraft is strengthened through the Soldier's discipline. Key elements which contribute to dismounted operations are the following:


Noise/light discipline.

Priorities of work.

Combat skills; actions at the halts, security, sector of fire, actions on contact, first aid and call
for fire.

Personal hygiene.

Nutrition and hydration.

## Support To Special Operations Forces

2-10. The support to special operations forces (SOF) requires EOD teams to be proficient at critical Soldier combat skills. While supporting SOF, it requires an even greater standard in Soldier combat skills, fieldcraft, weapon proficiency, physical fitness, and Soldier discipline.

2-11. The extra demands placed upon SOF support units dictate that only the most capable and competent Soldiers be assigned. To parallel SOF selection, a rigorous physical and mental assessment program should be implemented to evaluate EOD personnel prior to being assigned to an EOD unit supporting SOF.

## Competence Eod S**Kills**

2-12. The EOD team leader must display competence in EOD skills, since the majority of the time the EOD team leader will be out of reach of their parent unit for support and have to serve as the sole expert. The team leader must be able to determine the modification of common procedures when required for expediency.

## Physical F**Itness**

2-13. Soldiers must be capable of carrying tools/equipment for longer distances while conducting SOF missions, when compared to other dismounted conventional forces missions. The duration of SOF missions are longer and the terrain is rougher, as compared to other missions. 2-14. Intelligence received in support of SOF may provide more fidelity on specific explosive ordnance threats and the EOD team will be able to tailor their tools/equipment load prior to their mission.

## Weapons P**Roficiency**

2-15. The EOD team supporting SOF missions must possess advanced weapons skills, combat marksmanship skills, and the same mobility skills of the SOF organization the team is supporting.

## Combat S**Kills**

2-16. Prior to the mission, cross training must be conducted on the supported unit weapons and equipment (SOF specific weapons, communications sets, and vehicles).

2-17. The EOD team supporting SOF missions must match unit capabilities, with similar equipment and proficiency with weapons. The team must be proficient in small unit tactics and advanced medical skills.

## Summary

2-18. Operations in a non-permissive environment requires EOD teams to have a higher degree of preparedness, whether conducting mounted or dismounted operations. The team will integrate into the supported organization to receive mission sustaining support (ammunition, maintenance, food, and water).

2-19. When supporting SOF operations, the EOD teams must be proficient in the following: EOD skills, physical fitness, mobility skills, marksmanship, small unit tactics, and advanced medical training.


This page intentionally left blank.



## Chapter 3 Operations In A Permissive Environment

The operations in this environment include operations being conducted in both OCONUS and CONUS environments. The operations could consist of providing support to a host nation or to civilian law enforcement agencies. The environment is less threatening compared to a non-permissive environment, but the hazards remain for EOD organizations.

## Permissive Environment

3-1. A permissive environment is an operational environment in which host country military and law enforcement agencies have lost control as well as the intent and capability to assist operations that a unit intends to conduct. (JP 3-0) Included within this definition are Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) and Defense Support of Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies operations within the homeland.

3-2. Operations within this environment are in support of either military forces, during shaping or stability operations, or of domestic/civil public safety and law enforcement agencies overseas or within CONUS. Energetic or explosive procedures are more likely to be constrained by requirements to prevent collateral damage, disruption of civil activities, or sensitivities. Additional information can be acquired from JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities.

## Defense Support Of Civil Authorities (Dsca)

3-3. Army DSCA encompasses all support provided by all components of the Army to civil authorities within the United States and its possessions and territories. This includes support provided by the Regular Army and Army Reserve, and by the Army National Guard when in Title 10 or Title 32 status. Army forces conduct DSCA in response to requests from federal, state, territorial, local, and tribal authorities for domestic incidents, emergencies, disasters, designated law enforcement support, and other domestic activities, including EOD support. Support for domestic CBRN incidents and support for domestic civilian law enforcement agencies involve specific constructs, circumstances, and limitations. See ADRP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities, for more information pertaining to DSCA.

3-4. The EOD company possesses the same capabilities while supporting DSCA as when supporting offense, defense, and stability tasks. DSCA support to federal, state, tribal and territorial agencies includes the following:


Responding to eliminate hazard of military munitions and explosives.

Providing technical assistance to eliminate hazards of explosives.

Responding to accidents involving nonmilitary explosives and munitions that threaten life or property.

Responding to transportation accidents involving military munitions.

Assisting with munitions/war souvenir recovery operations.

Providing emergency support to formerly used defense sites (FUDS) for unknown military items, items containing possible chemical fillers or explosives, or munition threatening personnel safety.

Providing support and training to civil law enforcement agencies.

Supporting ordnance collection programs.

Educating civilian authorities about explosive hazards.

Displaying military ordnance and EOD capabilities for community safety and liaison events.
3-5. This includes providing support to the USSS and the DOS for the protection of the President, Vice President, and other designated VIPs.

3-6. EOD support to national special security events and counter drug operations are also conducted under DSCA support.

3-7. Support to domestic chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and high yield explosives (CBRNE)
operations includes the following:


Domestic preparedness.

Training with civil authorities.

Responding to CBRNE incidents.

## Eod Support To Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies

3-8. The request for EOD forces to provide immediate response in support of civil authorities must be processed in accordance with Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 3025.21, Defense Support of Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies. EOD forces may also provide disposition of military munitions in accordance with parts 260-270 of title 40, Code of Federal Regulations.

3-9. The EOD team providing support to law enforcement agencies cannot participate in the search or seizure of ordnance, as part of a civilian law enforcement investigation. The team can render-safe military munitions and take possession of military munitions for appropriate disposition, at the request of civilian law enforcement officials, when munitions have already been discovered and seized by civilian law enforcement personnel. 3-10. An immediate response can include the following actions:


Advice and assistance to civil authorities.

Mitigating, rendering safe, disposing or detecting the presence of:

UXO, damaged or deteriorated explosives or munitions, or an IED.

Other potentially explosive material or device.

Other potentially harmful chemical munitions or devices that create an actual or potential
threat.
3-11. Military munitions, discarded military munitions, and UXOs in an unauthorized location under the jurisdiction of public officials potentially present an imminent and substantial danger to public safety, and the environment, and may require an immediate EOD response. A request for an immediate response can be requested under the following conditions:


Items that were illegally removed from military installations.

Military munitions that land off range.

Munitions located on property formerly leased or owned by DOD (including manufacturing
areas, pads, pits, basins, ponds, streams, burial sites, and other locations incident to such operations).

Transportation accidents involving military munitions.

Unauthorized public possession of military munitions.
3-12. Rendering safe and disposing of IEDs and non-military commercial explosives reported or discovered outside of military installations are primarily the responsibility of civil authorities. However, due to the potential lethality and danger to public safety, EOD teams may provide assistance when requested by law enforcement agencies

## Electronic Counter-M**Easures** (Ecm)

3-13. EOD teams may employ ECM in the United States if approved by the Secretary of Defense and in accordance with the Department of Justice program for applying ECM in the United States in response to threats of radio-controlled improvised explosive devices.

3-14. All use of ECM while conducting EOD operations supporting civil authorities will be coordinated with and follow procedures established by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Strategic Information Operations Center and reported to the National Joint Operations and Intelligence Center.

3-15. Prior to ECM usage, the EOD on-scene commander will call the FBI Strategic Information Operations Center or the local FBI Special Agent Bomb Technician.

## Off-Post Response / Civil Public Safety Agency S**Upport**

3-16. Off-post EOD response does not violate Posse Comitatus because the units' actions are directly in support of and under the authority of the on-scene civil law enforcement official. Actions are limited to only those which prevent the loss of life, injury, or property damage in the interest of public safety. EOD units cannot conduct investigations of criminal activities (though personnel can assist in the collection of hazardous components to be immediately turned over to on-scene law enforcement) or take possession of any items or property (including stolen federal government property such as military ordnance) unless approved by the on-scene civil official. Authorities for off-post response usually fall into one of two processes:


Provide EOD support and capabilities to preplanned requests for assistance under Defense
Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA) IAW, Department of Defense Directive 3025.18, AR 75- 14 and AR 75-15.

Provide EOD support and capabilities under unplanned emergency response authority for
Defense Support to Civil Law Enforcement Authorities per DODI 3025.21, AR 75-14 and AR 75-15.
3-17. Just as with supported installation organizations, relationships must be established with supported civil public safety organizations as well. Engagements such as military ordnance recognition classes and interagency training opportunities enable successful integration with civil organizations.

3-18. The EOD team leader must be concerned with the following issues when conducting off-post responses:


Transportation of Class V; ground and air transportation requirements.

Sensitive item security (especially for overnight events).

Environmental permits for munitions' destruction (different standards/requirements for various
states).

Security and exclusion areas of both on-scene and at disposal areas.

Firefighting support, Emergency Medical Services, and Medical evacuation plans.

Collection of materials, ordnance, and IED components.

Accurate reporting in reports both for judicial and environmental purposes.

Data used in the EOD Information Management System which is commonly referred to as
EODIMS, and Bomb Data Center Reports.

Travel expense management, usage of government travel cards and travel orders if required for
the response.
3-19. Teams responding to off-station accidents or incidents will transport necessary explosive ingredients per requirements established by the senior mission commander per AR 190-11, Physical Security of Arms, Ammunition and Explosives.

3-20. During response missions, EOD organizations have been granted a waiver to AR 190-11 by the Office of the Provost Marshal General and are not required to carry weapons to safeguard Class 1 explosives.

## National Incident Management System **(Nims)**

3-21. The DOD has directed the Services to adopt and implement procedures consistent with the NIMS and the Incident Command System (ICS) at all domestic DOD installations. NIMS and the supporting ICS are the nation's primary venue for federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial governments to work effectively and efficiently together to prepare for, respond to, and recover from a domestic incident, regardless of cause, size or complexity.

3-22. The use of NIMS integrates existing best practices into a consistent, nationwide approach to domestic incident management that is applicable at all jurisdictional levels and across functional disciplines in an allhazards context while providing for interoperability and compatibility among federal, state, local, and tribal capabilities. Army installations will ensure compliance with this and supporting guidance with regard to training, standards, and procedural applications.

3-23. Every EOD Soldier must be certified as a first responder. This certification is provided by the Federal Emergency Management Agency under the Army emergency management program, NIMS, ICS, and rescue techniques for first responders.

3-24. Teams responding in support of the Department of Homeland Defense must integrate into the ICS. The team can integrate into the ICS by the following ways:


Identify which ICS objectives the EOD team can support.

Identify and coordinate communications between the EOD team and the ICS command post.

Identify the staging area and needed logistical resources.

Receive tasking from the ICS supervisor.

Conduct the team mission and safety brief.

Notify the ICS supervisor that the EOD team is ready to deploy as needed.

## Military Munition Rule

3-25. The Military Munition Rule was established by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to address six issues concerning military munitions, explosives, and hazardous waste. The EPA amended the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) implementing the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) in 40 CFR Parts 260-266, and Part 270. The following are the six specific issues taken from the CFR:


The conditions specifying when military munitions become subject to regulation as a solid waste
or hazardous waste under RCRA.

The application of RCRA hazardous waste standards to the use of munitions in weapons testing
and military training exercises.

The standards applicable to emergency responses to incidents involving munitions and other
explosives.

The  applicability  of  RCRA  requirements  to  unexploded  ordnance  and  environmental
contamination at closed or transferred military firing ranges.

The management standards necessary for the protection of human health and environmental
quality during the transportation and storage of waste military munitions.

The hazardous waste manifesting requirements during transportation on public or private rightof-ways on or along the borders of contiguous properties under the control of the same person.
3-26. The Military Munition Rule establishes the regulatory definition of solid waste as it applies to three specific categories of military munitions:


Unused munitions.

Munitions used for the intended purpose.

Used or fired munitions.
3-27. The Military Munition Rule identifies specific circumstances under which unused munitions are considered to be a solid waste for regulatory purposes:


The unused munitions are abandoned by being disposed of, burned, or incinerated, or treated
prior to disposal.

The unused munitions are removed from storage for disposal or treatment prior to disposal.

The unused munitions are deteriorated, leaking, or damaged to the point that it can no longer be
put back into serviceable condition and cannot be reasonably recycled or used for other purposes.

The unused munitions have been determined by an authorized military official to be solid waste.
3-28. The Military Munition Rule also sets standards for when military munitions are not solid waste.

Military munitions are not solid waste when the following conditions occur:


A munition is used for the training of military personnel.

A munition is being used for research, development, testing, and evaluation.

A munition is destroyed during range clearance operations at active and inactive ranges.

A munition that has not been used or discharged is repaired, reused, recycled, reclaimed,
disassembled, reconfigured or otherwise subjected to material recovery activities.
3-29. The Military Munition Rule also specifies that used or fired munitions are solid waste when they are removed from their landing spot and the following conditions exist:


Managed off-range (when transported off-range and stored, reclaimed, treated, or disposed of.

Disposed of by being buried on range.

Munitions that land off-range and are not promptly retrieved as statutory solid waste.

The rule postpones final action on the statutory status of used or fired munitions at closed or
transferred range.

## Formerly Used Defense Sites (Fuds)

3-30. The Department of Defense is responsible for environmental restoration of properties that were formerly owned by, leased to or otherwise possessed by the United States and under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Defense. These properties are known as FUDS. The Army is the lead agent for the program and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers executes the program on behalf of the Army and the Department of Defense. The scope and magnitude of the FUDS program are significant, with more than 10,000 properties identified for potential inclusion in the program. Environmental cleanup at FUDS properties is conducted in accordance with the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act. 3-31. Formerly used defense sites no longer under military control sometimes contain UXO or munitions fragments. Used or fired munitions removed from their landing spot and transported off-range would be subject to RCRA's regulation (except in emergency situations). Similarly, used or fired munitions resulting from research and training activities at locations other than ranges (laboratories) would be considered solid waste when removed from the site of use and transported for treatment or disposal. Additionally, the rule provides that munitions that land off-range that are not promptly rendered safe (if necessary) and/or retrieved, are statutory solid wastes under RCRA. This is based upon the EPA's view that a failure to render-safe and retrieve a munition that lands off-range would be evidence of intent to discard the munition, just as the failure to respond to a spill of a hazardous material could be evidence of intent to discard. If remedial action or render-safe procedures were not feasible, the operator of the range is required to maintain a record of the event including the type of munition that was fired off-range and its location (if known) for as long as a threat remains.

3-32. The EOD company may be called to respond to ordnance found at FUDS. Many of the FUDS may contain chemical ordnance or suspected chemical ordnance. The team responding must liaise with the local environmental office, the Army's Public Affairs Office, and local law enforcement. The team should keep all concerned personnel informed of the operation.

## Military Installation Support

3-33. Unit leadership from the company commander to the team leader must be fluent in DOD regulations, Department of Defense Directives, DODI, and Army Regulations (AR) along with the policies of their supported installations.

3-34. The unit has to support installation security, emergency management, Defense Critical Infrastructure , and Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources using the guidance from the following regulations:


Department of Defense Directive 3020.40, *Mission Assurance (MA)*

DODI 3025.21, *Defense Support of Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies*.

DODI 3020.45, *Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP) Management).*

DODI 6055.17, *DOD Installation Emergency Management (IEM) Program.*

AR 75-14, *Interservice Responsibilities for Explosive Ordnance Disposal*.

AR 75-15, *Policy for Explosive Ordnance Disposal.*

AR 525-27, *Army Emergency Management Program.*

DA Pamphlet 525-27, *Army Emergency Management Program.*
3-35. Units must establish and maintain close integration into installation operations and planning by providing subject matter expertise to the installation leadership and staff. The EOD unit must be able to address DSCA support concerns and delineate the unit's on- and off-post response area and responsibilities.

This integration includes participation in planning and operational exercises, establishing well defined operating procedures, and establishing close relationships with the following key installation activities:


Provost Marshall.

Directorate of Public Works.

Environmental Compliance, either on or off the installation.

Safety Office.

Logistics Readiness Center

Ammunition Management Office/Quality Assurance and Ammunition Surveillance - 24/7
storage and access to operational load ammunition.

Range Control.

Fire Department.

Emergency Medical Services.

Military Air Operations.

Directorate Plans, Training, Mobilization, Security - Notification of off-post response.

Public Affairs Office.

## Summary

3-36. Operating in permissive environments can be conducted while in a contingency environment or in a stateside environment providing DSCA support. The EOD team must be informed of key rules established by the Military Munition Rule, the EPA, and the Posse Comitatus Act while conducting off-installation support mission

## Chapter 4 Principles Of Eod Team Operations

The basic principles of EOD team operations remain the same regardless of the environment the team may encounter. Security and safety of the team is one of the top priorities of the team leader. Planning and preparing for the incident site before, during, and after the incident response is another priority.

## Tenets Of Eod Operations

4-1. To meet the criticality for immediate effectiveness, every EOD Soldier and leader must continue to strive to master all EOD skills. An EOD Soldier must be able to either physically perform them or to at least train, lead, and employ EOD capabilities.

4-2. While it's imperative that EOD Soldiers be capable of problem solving and adapting to changing conditions, there are several basic EOD operating tenets that must be mastered and employed to ensure mission success. These tenets are critical in conducting any EOD operation in any environment.

## S**Ecurity**

4-3. Security measures are those required to ensure the security of the EOD element, as well as the supported force and population. These measures should overlap and support the protection tenet. These measures include the following:


External security provided by the supported force, both enroute and at the scene of the EOD incident establishing an outer cordon, or civil law enforcement ensuring the scene is secure.

An outer cordon prevents access/entry and protects the populace. It could be supported by U.S. forces or host nation/allied nation forces. It also ensures the exclusion/safe area determined by the EOD team leader is established and maintained.

Internal security conducted by members of the EOD team, both enroute and on-scene for the inner cordon, is for the safety of the EOD team. An inner cordon is established for protecting of the EOD team and it can be secured by the supported security element.

Securing key components and materials which can be used for intelligence or forensic purposes;
securing of classified information.

## P**Rotection**

4-4.  Protection measures are those actions conducted to protect personnel from known or unknown dangers of explosive ordnance, before or after a render-safe procedure (RSP)/disposal can be accomplished, and overlap with those of the security tenet. These measures include:


Auxiliary support required such as on-scene medical providers and evacuation support, firefighting assets, combat engineers during all phases of the operation in both deployed/contingency operations or during CONUS/VIP support operations.

Determining required stand-off distances, establishing exclusion areas, and establishing a cleared safe area/ incident command post.

Remote employment of tools whenever possible.

Determining the appropriate PPE and utilizing it effectively.

Constructing and directing the construction of protective works when required for the protection of the team and property.

Decreasing the chances of having a misfire when conducting demolition operations, dual- initiate
all demolitions.

## R**Econnaissance**

4-5. This tenet includes actions prior to deployment, immediately following notification of a support request, and at the EOD incident scene. These measures include:


Study of the operational environment prior to deployment; including enemy ordnance order of
battle, current unit operational and intelligence reports in order for all members to become familiar with the current explosive ordnance threat.

Mission analysis of operations where EOD elements are either integrated/embedded into or may
be called to respond, either in support of friendly force contingency operations or in support of local civil public safety authorities from home station.

Question and answer communications with the supported unit or agency, prior to departure for
the incident site and once on-scene.

Initial and follow up research of the Automated Explosive Ordnance Disposal Publications
Systems (AEODPS) of reported threat to positively identify explosive threat (ordnance nomenclature, IED components, CBRN material).

Remote employment of EOD specific tools such as robotics, x-ray, or detectors.

Down-range actions to include hand drawings, notes, photographs, and measurements to
determine positive identification.

Conduct a proper risk assessment prior to the reconnaissance, using the risk management process
from ATP 5-19, *Risk Management*.

Review general EOD safety precautions.

## Render-Safe And D**Isposal**

4-6. This tenet is mainly governed by the procedures prescribed within AEODPS, but the ability to correctly interpret and apply these procedures to the specific situation at hand remains the inherent and profound responsibility of the certified EOD team leader.

4-7. Whether in a non-permissive or a permissive environment, the EOD team leader must be able to determine the best way to apply these procedures. Determining the "right" procedure must be a balance between what is the safest versus battlefield expediency, disruptions to civil activities, and intelligence or forensic requirements.

4-8.   The verification of all RSPs must be conducted by the certified EOD team leader.

## E**Xploitation**

4-9. Actions within this tenet support intelligence or forensic efforts to identify specific enemy/criminal individuals and networks; develop or improve counter measures to enemy weapons or devices; develop/improve vehicles, tools, protective equipment; processes/procedures for both the general force/public safety organizations, as well as EOD units. These actions are conducted after the successful execution of render-safe/disposal actions, an IED post blast investigation, recovery of an enemy cache, or in support of higher level exploitation laboratories and foreign weapons intelligence organizations. There are five levels of exploitation. 4-10. Level 1 exploitation begins at the incident site, with the EOD team performing a RSP or conducting a post-blast analysis. Once items are declared safe to travel, they are transported to the nearest processing facility for further analysis.

4-11. Level 2 exploitation is conducted at an in-country exploitation lab. Items collected are analyzed to identify the weapons and explosives threat, as well as their possible links to a network. The completed process could facilitate targeting enemy networks and provide intelligence to support host nation criminal judicial proceedings.

4-12. Level 3 exploitation takes place at facilities that can provide a strategic view of the explosive threat, based on information gained through a variety of resources. The team's collected information provides data which the Level 3 facilities can use to produce the following:


Intelligence information reports.

Intelligence bulletins.

Technical bulletins.

Intelligence assessments.

Forensic intelligence analysis reports.

Responses to requests for information.

Investigative leads.
4-13. Level 4 exploitation utilizes national facilities, in a CONUS environment, to support production for the theater objectives. The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency is tasked with establishing the standards, processes, and procedures required for the application of forensics to Weapons Technical Information collection, processing, analysis and exploitation processes. When these pertain to the exploitation of IEDs, further coordination with the Director, Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Agency is required.

4-14. Level 5 exploitation utilizes strategic oversight and special activities facilities, in a CONUS
environment, to support production for the theater objectives. Organizations within the DOD Science and Technology Intelligence Community process and exploit captured material in support of tactical and operational commanders and strategic level objectives.

## Incident Management Plan

4-15. The incident management plan is the process of how an EOD team manages an EOD incident, from start to finish.

## N**Otification**

4-16. The notification of an EOD incident or request for EOD support may come from local civil authority or from an installation via a nine-line EOD report. The notification allows the team to conduct a risk assessment prior to conducting the mission.

## Critical I**Nformation**

4-17. There are several elements of critical information that enable the team to be prepared prior to movement. These elements can enable an understanding of the urgency of the incident, and to develop an initial plan of action.

## Security Situation

4-18. The following questions should be asked to properly assess site security.


Is the site under enemy contact or observation?

Has the area been secured?

Is there a threat of direct/indirect fire?

How long has the area been secured?

What organization is securing the area?

Who is in charge of the scene?

Are there any post hostile activities in the area?

Is there any possible CBRN contamination, observable symptoms from personnel or other
physical signs?

## Description Of Item

4-19. The team attains information about the reported item by asking the following questions.


What are the initial measurements or size comparisons?

What is the number of items?

Are there any observable markings, colors, or features?

How did it get there?

How long has it been there?

Has the item been moved?

## Activities In The Area

4-20. The team asks the following questions to inquire about recent activities.

What friendly and enemy activities have occurred at the scene?

What individual or organization has possession of the item (home-station response)?
4-21. The above questions help to determine possible hazards present, such as booby-traps, CBRN, and their conditions.

## The Threat

4-22. The team asks the following questions to inquire about recent threats.

What is being threatened or what has been affected?

How many personnel are involved?

What type of facility/operation is threatened?

What are the reported damages and casualties?

## Scope Of The Threat

4-23. The team asks the following questions to inquire about the scope of the threat:

What is the effect of the threat?

How does this fit into the supported unit's mission/commander's intent/priorities?
4-24. Limited aspects of this information are obtained from the supported unit's EOD 9 line request, but other aspects such as the published commander's intent, priorities of support, or main/supporting efforts should also be taken into account.

## Determination Of H**Azards**

4-25. The initial determination of hazards can be used to determine an initial exclusion area/evacuation area. Need-to-know information includes what additional tools, equipment, PPE, or support that may be required by the team (especially important if the team is dismounted or inserted by air).

## Planning/Preparation/Rehearsals

4-26. Planning, preparation, and rehearsals are essential in conducting EOD missions. They contribute to a successful reconnaissance, RSP, and disposal of ordnance items.

## Determining Mission R**Equirements**

4-27. The team determines the required tools, equipment, explosives, and additional supplies necessary for the mission. This sequence is especially important if the team is supporting dismounted operations.

4-28. Prior to conducting dismounted operations, the team plans for emergency resupply and push packages, if there is a possibility the mission could exceed 72 hours.

4-29. The team determines requirements for additional support. Additional support could include the following:


Security personnel and equipment.

Earth moving equipment or additional transportation means.

Firefighting capabilities.

Medical support.

Combat engineer support.

Notification of applicable environmental authorities (home-station support).

Request for CONUS CREW activation (home-station support).

## R**Ehearsals**

4-30. Rehearsing for critical actions is dependent on the time available. Rehearsals may include a complete run-through of the selected tool/equipment employment and actions on the scene. Alternatively, the rehearsal may only allow for a quick back-brief from the team member to the team leader describing their actions while moving to the incident site.

## Movement To The Incident Site

4-31. Movement to the incident site may be as simple as walking or driving to the front of the supported unit's formation, during a DS embedded operation, or driving across several states for a home-station response.

4-32. In a contingency operation, the EOD team must be integrated into the formation, including their sectors of fire whether from a vehicle or dismounted. The team must know the battle drills/actions on contact, and contingency plans after an attack and rehearsed if possible.

4-33. In a home-station response, security is the safe and secure transport of sensitive items and explosives by a civil authority escort onto a private property. 4-34. Transportation can be provided by using the team's assigned military vehicle or unit response vehicle. The vehicle enables the team to usually carry most of its assigned equipment and required Class V.

## Establishing The Incident Site

4-35. The first step conducted by the team leader is to ensure that the EOD team and its dedicated security do not stop directly on top of the suspected item. The team should maintain the initial standoff distance determined prior to the movement to the incident site.

4-36. The next step determines the initial exclusion area and safe area for the incident command post. The area should be set at a distance of 381 meters/1250 feet for unknown items or use the best available distance based on the operational environment. 4-37. The following steps are required for fully establishing the incident site:


Ensure the site has not been used as a safe area in the past.

Employ available frontal and overhead protection.

Perform security sweeps of 0, 5, and 25 meters.

Identify the infrastructure and personnel within the initial exclusion area that may be affected by
a high order detonation.

Establish the outer cordon with supporting security.

Establish the inner cordon.

## Long Range R**Econ**

4-38. The team questions the on-scene personnel to confirm or add to the information received in the initial EOD 9 Line.

4-39. The team must ascertain the entire scene to include ingress/egress routes, possible locations for secondary devices or hazards, possible enemy observation points/trigger points, scope of damage/effect to area and then begin the sketch of scene.

4-40. The team must employ the use of long range optics or small unmanned aerial vehicles, if available, and employ robotics when possible and the operational environment allows.

## Down-Range R**Econ**

4-41. The team must exhaust all methods of remote reconnaissance within the constraints of terrain, conditions, or operational urgency.

4-42. Every effort must be made to gather all necessary/pertinent information to research and determine the positive identification of the item, without having to do additional approaches.

4-43. The manual approach of the team must be done only after all remote/robotic procedures have been utilized, yet were unable to provide enough information to provide a positive identification of the item or situation.

4-44. An action plan must be developed to include the priority of work and tasks to be accomplished while on-site, yet minimize exposure. This plan should also address contingencies for other team members and supporting security to include unexpected detonations, enemy direct/indirect fire, or injury/incapacitation of the team leader.

4-45. The team must use the level of PPE that provides the optimum amount of protection when conducting hands-on recon. The highest level of PPE must be utilized not just on the first approach but during all personnel exposures to the threat. The team is able to downgrade the level of PPE only after the threat has been reduced. 4-46. The team must ensure all initial safety precautions are implemented during all phases of the incident. Conduct searches for possible secondary IEDs, booby-traps, and additional hazards (enemy, physical, or CBRN).

4-47. The team can use a Soldier/civilian to guide them to the item location. The team leader must ensure the guide enters and exits on the same cleared path, and move to the first visual sighting of the item but no closer than 30 meters. The team leader can release the guide as soon as the item is identified and instruct the guide to return to the safe area on the same cleared path.

4-48. The team must adjust or expand the safe area if the items are larger or more numerous than initial reports. The area can also be adjusted if there are other hazards that immediately affect the situation. The team can perform immediate actions if necessary.

4-49. A recon of items must be conducted as quickly but as efficiently as possible. The team leader should conduct the following actions during the recon:


Make a hand drawn sketch, if at all possible, in addition to digital photographs.

Sketches should include measurements of the item (length, width, depth) to include separate
measurements of key components.

Sketches should also include any key features of the surrounding area (craters, damaged vehicles,
dead humans or animals, etc.).

Digital photographs should include a size scale comparison from differing directions/angles,
cardinal directions, and imagery of the entire scene.

Survey the incident site for  terrain features that  may aid or hinder  RSP  and/or disposal
operations.
4-50. While the team leader is conducting the recon, the team member should be conducting the following tasks:


Starting and maintaining the incident log.

Starting the tool-in/tool-out process, the team leader should have a tool when approaching an
item so there is never a wasted effort and minimize exposure to the item.

Monitoring communications.

Interacting with the security force.

Observing the team leader, monitoring the stay time on-site and in PPE.

Monitoring environmental conditions and the enemy situation.

Preparing tools and equipment at the direction of the team leader.

## Up-Range Research / Establishing Plan Of A**Ction**

4-51. The initial recon must be detailed enough to preclude any additional close approaches to the item.

4-52. The team can use the recon information to conduct research in identification guides, intelligence summaries, or AEODPS. The information can confirm the identification of UXOs, IEDs, or other explosive ordnance materials.

4-53. The team can utilize reach back capabilities to contact more senior EOD technicians at higher headquarters or other organizations, if communications and the operational situation allow.

4-54. The team leader should confer with the team member to assist in determining positive identification, and refining the plan of attack to render-safe/dispose of the threats.

4-55. Selection of the RSP and/or disposal procedure must be based on positive identification and the applicable TM 60 series publication taken from AEODPS. The preservation of material for use in forensic or intelligence exploitation is a key consideration, but should not override the safety of personnel to include the EOD team. 4-56. The team member must be preparing tools and demolition charges while continuing the tool-in/toolout concept.

## Conduct Rsp

4-57. The employment of tools and procedures are conducted during this phase. Procedures are selected from the guidance taken from AEODPS. Depending on the complexity of the ordnance, the procedure may need to be employed more than once, in order to achieve the desired effect.

4-58. The team leader performs and verifies the RSP during this phase. The team leader must determine if the RSP worked and verifies the success/accuracy of the attempted RSP. The team leader will also determine if the item is safe to proceed to disposal procedure.

## Post Rsp And Disposal A**Ctions**

4-59. Post blast actions are conducted after the successful RSP and/or disposal of the targeted items. The specific procedure can differ depending on the type of explosive ordnance and the operational environment in which the incident is being conducted. The overall actions performed during this phase are to ensure that the targeted items have been rendered safe or destroyed and the scene can either return to previous operations, secured, or marked for follow-on action.

4-60. Site exploitation concepts include actions to collect, record, and report all aspects of an incident scene.

This concept can include the collection and recovery of the following:


Munition or IED components.

Chemical warfare material samples.

Materials on the scene such as documents, electronic devices, computers.

Soil samples or pocket litter.

Any other objects that individuals may have touched.
4-61. An in-depth report includes detailed scene sketches, photographs, and detailed narratives. Such reports are crucial in developing information regarding origins of the threat actioned, determining specific criminal or enemy individuals or the networks that employed the item. The report can be used within the civil rule of law system for the targeting processes.

## Return M**Ovement**

4-62. The same aspects that were important during the movement to the incident scene are the same for returning back to the safe area. It may be as simple as returning to the original position within the dismounted/mounted movement formation or a significant drive back to the installation. The details of this phase must be planned out as well. When developing movement plans, the team must consider the carrying of additional explosive components and multiple methods of conveyance.

## Post Incident Requirements

4-63. An after action review (AAR) is one of the most important events that should take place after any type of military operation. It can be as formal as a written report with a presentation or as informal as a short but concise conversation with the team member. AARs can identify training shortcomings along with issues with equipment, maintenance, or published procedures. It is good practice to conclude all events by having one member of the team conduct an AAR.

4-64. The timely submission of comprehensive EOD reports should be one of the highest priorities of post incident actions. EOD team level reports can provide the most immediate and crucial information affecting future operations, from the tactical to the strategic levels.

4-65. For CONUS operations, EOD reports can be used as important documentation for state and federal environmental organizations or used within judicial processes for local, state, or federal law enforcement agencies. The importance of the accuracy, and completeness of an EOD report cannot be overstated. See appendix A for additional information on EOD reporting guidelines. 4-66. Reset and resupply includes those actions needed to ensure the team is prepared and ready to conduct future or follow-on operations. Equipment reset and resupply must take priority over rest and feeding, although those aspects are an important part of reset as well.

4-67. A resupply is not guaranteed and is dependent upon mission, enemy terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations.

## Summary

4-68. The principles of EOD team operations include applying the tenets of EOD operations, developing an incident management plan, reporting the incident, conducting AARs and reset and resupply activities at the conclusion of the operation.

## Chapter 5 Unexploded Explosive Ordnance (Uxo) And Recovered Ordnance

Conducting EOD operations against this type of threat includes procedures to handle U.S. or foreign manufactured explosive ordnance that can be either a UXO, items recovered from storage facilities, items captured in an enemy cache, or items received from local populace turn ins. The items can be encountered either singly or in large quantities.

## Incident Management

5-1.   The management of UXO incidents begins with incident planning and preparation. Factors concerning UXO or recovered military munitions should include those discussed in the subsequent paragraphs.

## Notification Of I**Ncident**

5-2.   After the team receives the notification for EOD support and starts the incident log, the team gathers the following critical information:


What is the security situation?

What is the description of item and the surrounding area?

What friendly and enemy activity occurred at the scene?

What is being threatened or has been affected?

What is the scope of the threat?
5-3.   Once the critical information is gathered, the initial determination of hazards is the next concern and consists of the following:


Electromagnetic hazards and precautions.

Magnetic, acoustic/seismic, infrared, and laser precautions.

Munition exposure to fire.

The occurrence of a wait time. If enough information is provided in the initial report, an extended
wait time may have to be observed, which could affect movement and security.
5-4.   The team enters the planning, preparation, and rehearsal phase once the critical information is gathered and initial hazards are determined. This phase consists of the following items:


Determine the required tools, equipment, Class V, and any additional supplies.

Determine the requirements for requesting additional support and notifications.

Plan  for  environmental  protection  permissions  (EOD  units  must  ensure  applicable  state environmental protection agencies are notified and permissions obtained).

Determine external support requirements. CONUS operations enable more support availability than contingency environments.

Determine possible disposal areas; CONUS operations rely on civil public safety officials for assistance in securing suitable areas.

Plot the initial exclusion area, 381 meters for unknown ordnance items.

Rehearse critical actions.

## Movement To Incident Site And Establishing Incident S**Cene**

5-5. The next phase consists of the moving the team and establishing the incident site. The two critical concerns of the movement are the availability of security and the means of transportation.

5-6.   During the establishment of the incident scene, the team uses the following guidelines:


Determine the initial exclusion area, safe area, and incident command post.

Determine if the site has been used as a safe area in the past.

Employ available frontal and overhead protection.

Perform 0's, 5's, and 25's.

Identify infrastructure and personnel within the initial exclusion area that may be affected by a
high order detonation.

Identify any additional hazards.

Establish inner and outer cordon with supporting security.

## Long Range R**Econ**

5-7.   During the long range recon, the team conducts the following actions:

Questioning of the on-scene personnel.

Ascertaining the entire scene.

Identifying any high risk munitions.

Employing the use of long range optics and robotics.
5-8. The team member must maintain an incident log to document all actions taken during the incident execution. The incident log can enable the team member or a replacement team to take over the incident in case of any disruptions.

## Down-Range R**Econ**

5-9. The down-range recon begins with the establishment of the action plan. The action plan includes a detailed contingency plan that addresses the following:


Premature detonations and the team member's actions.

Enemy contact and the team member's actions.

The penetration of the cordons and the security actions

Incapacitation of the team leader and possible actions.

Team member's actions as the safety observer.
5-10.  The recon continues with the team conducting the following actions:

Team leader dons PPE.

Team observes the EOD safety precautions.

Adjusts or expands the safe area, when required.

Performs immediate actions due to the identification of any high risk items.

Conducts sketches and takes photographs.
5-11. The team leader must conduct a proper approach, dependent upon the suspected ordnance. The first approach must be conducted by the team leader, subsequent approaches can be conducted by the team member. 5-12. The objective of the recon is to identify the ordnance and fuze by type, function, and condition. Detailed measurements must be made of the overall size. Specific measurements of differing components such as the main body, fuze, and fins will assist in the identification.

5-13. Appropriate tools must be carried on the recon to address any suspected immediate action items or high risk munitions.

5-14. Operating in non-permissive environments may require the use of hand held detectors to protect the team against an IED threat. The team must ensure sufficient security is available to protect it against direct fire.

## Up-Range R**Esearch**

5-15. The primary goal of this research is to obtain a positive identification of the ordnance and fuze. If practical, the team should utilize reachback capability to access the expertise of EOD leadership at platoon and company levels to assist in the identification, or request additional EOD teams if the incident becomes a multi-ordnance incident.

5-16. If the team encounters an insensitive high explosive munition or possible first-seen foreign ordnance, reachback assistance may be required. Reachback capability is one of many examples of the importance of an EOD mission command structure in theater or within immediate communication range.

5-17. If reachback support is unavailable or there are questions regarding positive identification between different but similar models of an item, always assume the worst case and most hazardous condition, then perform the corresponding procedures accordingly.

5-18. The team must ensure that the determined identification of the ordnance and fuze and the RSP/disposal procedures chosen are recorded in the incident log, prior to re-approaching the item and performing the procedures. 5-19. The team member is preparing applicable tools and charges for the team leader. The team can seek external support, if the requirement for protective works is too overwhelming for the team.

## Rsp And Disposal A**Ctions**

5-20. The team leader reminds the team member that the detailed contingency plan remains in place during the RSP and disposal phase. The team leader performs the following actions:


Employment of tools and procedures.

Verification of the RSP.

Post blast actions, if required.

Site exploitation, if required.
5-21. The followings actions are conducted by the team after the completion of the RSP and disposal.

The team leader will return to the safe area using the same route.

An AAR will be conducted, along with closing out the incident report.

The team member will reset the equipment and vehicle. A resupply of any expended supplies
and explosives is conducted.

## Multiple Ordnance Incident

5-22. Multiple UXO incidents can take from several days to weeks to complete, while threatening critical assets and restricting mobility of the commander's combat power. When conducting the incident in CONUS, external support must be requested if the workload exceeds the capabilities of the company. 5-23. Multiple UXO incidents can happen in many situations: range clearances, ammunition supply points, forward arming and refueling points, ammunition convoys, aircraft accidents, airfield recovery, and ordnance remaining after combined arms operations from both friendly and enemy units.

5-24. There are three recognized phases involved with conducting a multiple UXO incident. The phases include the initial planning phase, the hasty reconnaissance/immediate action phase and the RSP/disposal phase.

## Initial Planning P**Hase**

5-25. The initial planning phase consists of gathering critical information, identifying and coordinating necessary support, determining equipment and personnel requirements, receiving area priorities, establishing an assault command post (CP), and plotting the ordnance on a map.

5-26. Initial planning actions consist of the following:


Gather critical information concerning types, sizes, quantity, and markings of the ordnance.

Identify possible approaches to the ordnance.

Determine if protective works are currently employed.

Determine the proximity and priority of vital facilities.

Determine additional resources (EOD teams and equipment required).

Identify and coordinate external support:

Firefighting.

Medical.

Aviation (fly over the area and transportation).

Engineer support for protective works.

Off-site disposal and holding area.

Supplies (Classes I through X).
5-27. The assault CP is the center of information flow for the hasty reconnaissance/immediate action phase and RSP/disposal phases. It is also the coordination point for all EOD teams involved in the operation. It must be the focal point in the planning and implementation of the next two phases, and act as an intermediary between the teams. The assault CP will adjust plans and overlays, and pass on accurate information to both local and higher commands.

## Hasty Reconnaissance And Immediate Action P**Hase**

5-28. The primary purposes of the hasty reconnaissance/immediate action phase are:

To perform a quick visual reconnaissance.

Determine if any immediate actions are required, and execute the same.

Classify the ordnance and fusing by type, condition, and filler.
5-29. A detailed briefing is provided to the team, including the following topics:

Reported ordnance locations.

Types of ordnance expected to be encountered.

Safety precautions for the ordnance and any additional hazards in the area.

Grid operations boundaries.

Non-evacuated personnel remaining in the area.

The plan of attack.

Rally point location.

Marking system used for ordnance identification.

Ordnance that requires an immediate action.

Communication system used for grid operations.

Contingency plan addressing the following concerns:

Unknown UXO encountered.

Unexpected detonations.

Death and/or injury to personnel.

Communication failures.

Hostile action, direct fire, or indirect fire.
5-30. When the team has completed the hasty reconnaissance/immediate action phase, and returned to the rally point, the team consolidates all logs and sketches. From this information, the team leader will update the information by adding new ordnance and locations, ordnance classification, fuze and fuze condition, and munitions filler. Any new ordnance found must be photographed for the reconnaissance report to the assault CP. Before returning to the assault CP, the team leader must ensure that sketches of the assigned areas are as detailed as possible. The combined sketches are the key to planning the last phase of the operation.

5-31. The team leader briefs the assault CP on information obtained from the hasty reconnaissance/immediate action phase and identifies any additional support required.

## Rsp And Disposal P**Hase**

5-32. The RSP and disposal phase is broken into two sub-phases; planning and execution. Planning should include prioritization, resources needed, additional detailed reconnaissance needed, simultaneous operations projected, and external support requirements.

5-33. Planning must address all the hazards associated with the identified ordnance, the relation of the ordnance to critical facilities, and the commander's priorities.

5-34. The team executes the following actions:


Ensure all non-essential personnel are evacuated from the area.

Maintain communications with the CP.

Ensure all RSP and disposals are coordinated with the CP.

Verify all RSP and disposals.

Return to the CP and conduct an AAR.

## Other Multiple Ordnance Operations

5-35. Two other multiple ordnance operations includes large cache recovery and range clearance operations. Both operations require coordinated efforts between EOD and supporting elements.

## Large Cache R**Ecovery**

5-36. Large caches can be found in a variety of locations, such as schools, homes, religious centers, hospitals, sewage systems, or buried in a farmer's field. Large caches of captured enemy ammunition and explosive remnants of war can be found in ammunition supply points similar to U.S. Army ammunition supply points. Planning and execution factors for captured enemy ammunition are the same regardless of the quantity encountered.

5-37. The most dangerous hazard for recovery operations of large caches is the use of booby traps. The team must take booby trap precautions during operations. The team must ensure there is a positive identification of all items prior to any movements.

5-38. Commanders and leaders at all levels must involve EOD and trained ammunition handling specialists in the planning of captured enemy ammunition and explosive remnants of war operations.

## Range Clearance O**Perations**

5-39. Range clearance operations are conducted by EOD personnel, both at home-station and in deployed environments. Range clearance operations require long range planning due to their complexity. Each operation has specific requirements that vary for each range and installation. These operations are the responsibility of the installation. The installation is responsible for planning, funding, and providing the support personnel and resources necessary to conduct range clearance operations. See appendix B for additional information on range clearance procedures.

5-40. The teams conduct range clearance operations, while deployed, to clear ranges of all explosive ordnance in order to safely conduct unit training. These operations are conducted on ranges used by several nations with a wide variety of munitions.

## Summary

5-41. During UXO and recovered ordnance operations, the EOD team conducts similar operations and procedures whether supporting the installation or in a deployed environment. Multiple ordnance operations require detailed planning and coordination to ensure external support and essential mission requirements are met.

## Chapter 6 Improvised Explosive Device (Ied) Operations

This chapter provides an overview of IED operations in OCONUS and CONUS
environments. There are unique differences and policies required for the two mission sets. Several factors determine how the team establishes plans for defeating the IED.

## Outside The Continental United States (Oconus) Operations

6-1. OCONUS IED operations take place in both permissive and non-permissive environments. OCONUS operations take more critical analysis when compared to CONUS IED operations.

6-2. The incident management plan for OCONUS IED operations follows the same steps of a routine incident response. The plan begins with the notification for EOD support and concludes with the process of resetting and resupplying the team.

6-3. The team begins the process by receiving a request for EOD support. The team gathers the following critical information:


What is the current security situation?

Descriptions of the IED and surrounding area.

What friendly or enemy activity occurred at the scene?

What is being threatened or has been affected?

What is the scope of the threat?

If witnesses are available, request to have them separated (to avoid conflicting information).

Is the area suitable for collateral damage?

What is the recommendation for disposition?

What are current exploitation and intelligence requirements?
6-4. The team determines the initial hazards from the critical information gathered. The information is used for planning, preparation, and rehearsals. The team conducts the following actions prior to departure:


Study updated trends analysis and IED events in the area.

Recommend the size of the exclusion area from the size of the reported IED.

Determine required tools, equipment, ammunition, and supplies.

Determine requirements for additional support.

Rehearse any critical actions.
6-5. The team moves to the incident site, with their designated security, and establishes the incident scene.

The incident scene is established by the following actions:


Determine the initial exclusion area, safe area, and incident CP.

Adjust the exclusion area based on the size of the IED.

Ensure the site has not been used as a safe area in the past.

Employ available frontal and overhead protection.

Perform 0's, 5's, and 25's.

Identify infrastructure and personnel within the initial exclusion area that may be affected by a high order detonation.

Identify facilities and structures affected, to include those that are underground.

Identify additional hazards.

Establish inner/outer cordon, with supporting security.

## Ied Reconnaissance

6-6. The initial recon consists of questioning possible witnesses, checking the entire scene, and employing long range optics and robotics.

6-7.  The team leader must use remote means on the initial approach and whenever possible to keep safety as the top priority.

6-8.   The team member maintains an incident log for the duration of the IED recon.

6-9.   After the team leader develops the action plan, the plan is briefed covering the following actions:


Premature detonations and the team member's actions.

Enemy contact and the team member's actions.

The penetration of the cordons and security actions.

Incapacitation of the team leader and recovery actions.

Team member actions as the safety observer.

## Down-Range R**Econ**

6-10. During the down-range recon, the team leader conducts the following actions:


Dons the applicable PPE.

Observes applicable EOD safeties.

Adjusts or expands the safe area.

Performs immediate actions.

Make sketches and take photographs of the entire scene from all cardinal directions.

## Up-Range Recon R**Esearch**

6-11. Once the team returns up-range, the team leader updates and adjusts the team's plan of action. After the plan is updated, the team conducts the following actions:


Research to confirm identification.

Identify type by function.

Select the RSP and disposal procedures.

Discuss priorities of attack (power source, initiator, explosive, and switch).

Team member's actions:

Prepare tools for RSP.

Prepare demolition shots.

Prepare X-ray.

## Rsp And Disposal P**Hase**

6-12. The employment of tools and procedures are conducted during this phase. The procedures may be employed more than once in order to achieve the desired effect.

6-13. The team leader performs and verifies the RSP during this phase. The team leader must determine if the item is safe to move and/or proceed to the disposal procedure.

6-14. The team exploits the site for potential intelligence value by conducting the collection and recovery of munition or IED components. Other materials on the scene such as documents, electronic devices, computers or other objects can be gathered for intelligence purposes. 6-15. Post-blast activities are conducted after the successful RSP and disposal. The following critical actions are conducted during the post-blast phase:


Blast site estimation (will require more definitive/accurate information).

Measurement of the width and depth of the crater.

Determining the type of explosive material used.

Usage of handheld detectors in the blast holes.

Check for secondary devices (use same safety precautions as the first device).

Documented reporting activities should include:

Complete storyboards, level 1 reports.

Include pictures with size reference and cardinal directions.

Narrative description of what the effects of the blast were, before and after.

A detailed narrative with critical information.

Scene diagrams

Collection of critical information includes:

Maintaining the chain of custody (if used for rule of law operations).

Packaging of material collected (ensure it's free of contamination).

Handling (enforce use of gloves, don't touch or contaminate).

X-ray (ensure all components are free from explosive or completely rendered safe).
6-16. Once post-blast activities are completed, the team leader can return the incident scene to previous operations or mark for follow-on actions.

## Closing Out The I**Ncident**

6-17. The team cannot officially close out the incident until all reports are completed and forwarded to the higher headquarters. The reports must include detailed scene sketches, photographs, and detail narratives.

6-18. EOD reports and storyboards are the foundation for follow-on exploitation and intelligence efforts.

EOD team level reports have often provided the most immediate and crucial information affecting future operations.

6-19. The next step is conducting an AAR with the team. The AAR assists the team by determining what happened, identifying accomplishments and deficiencies, and determines improvements for future team operations.

6-20. The last step is resetting the team's equipment and resupplying any resources. The reset ensures the team is prepared and ready to conduct follow-on operations.

## Improvised Rocket Launchers

6-21. The improvised rocket launcher is a weapon constructed using military or homemade components, designed to propel an explosive charge to a target or at enemy forces. The launchers are constructed from metal or wood and launched by a washing machine timer and a 12 volt battery.

6-22. An individual rocket is fired from packing crates, wooden troughs, metal troughs, metal tubes, or holes dug in the ground. The rockets are wired to a timing device and fired at a certain time, giving the team ample time to escape before the enemy arrives on scene. The majority of the time, the rockets are fired manually. 6-23. A multiple rocket launcher can be hidden inside a box truck. The top and sides of the box truck can collapse or be taken down. A multiple rocket launcher can also be placed on the back of a pickup truck. Once the rockets are fired, the truck quickly moves on to another site to hide and avoid counter battery fire and reload.

6-24. Teams can encounter improvised rocket launchers from two locations; the point of origin and the point of impact. Both locations require different actions from the team.

6-25. At the point of origin, the teams conducts the following actions:


Conduct initial approaches, remotely if possible.

Immediately observe booby trap precautions and search for secondary devices.

Perform immediate action, if required.

Note the direction and angle that the rockets are aimed.

Immediately notify any affected units and facilities that maybe in the direction and range of the
rocket.

Knock rocket down remotely to prevent effective launch.

After render-safe of primary initiation system, X-ray all components.

Recover all associated components, taking special care to protect any forensic information that
may remain on items.

Include diagrams and/or photographs of the original site setup and any associated equipment
(launcher rails, jacks, and timers/clocks).

If the tactical situation doesn't permit the recovery of items, perform necessary actions to render
material unusable for future use; remove firing pins, crush tubes, and bend/destroy the rails.
6-26. At the point of impact, the team conducts the following actions:


Perform UXO procedures and crater analysis tasks.

Request fire direction radar data assistance to confirm the direction/distance of the attack.

Research known effective ranges of positively identified weapons when writing final report.

## Non-Permissive Environment Activities And Concerns

6-27. The team faces a heightened level of security when conducting IED operations in a non-permissive environment. 6-28. The team takes the following precautionary actions while operating in this environment.


Utilizes remote means (not just on first approach).

Usage of the bomb suit and other levels of PPE.

Actions required for mounted and dismounted operations.

Procedures based on the mission (mark and bypass, RSP, exploit, or blow in place).

Evaluating and reassessing, as different situations develop.

Capabilities of supporting forces.

Prioritization of incidents, when multiple incidents are received.

Multiple means of initiation for demolition and energetic tools.

## Conus Operations

6-29. CONUS IED operations require EOD teams to coordinate with civil law enforcement agencies and provide immediate EOD support to civilian authorities. Teams may also have to serve as technical advisors during IED operations.

6-30. Secretary of Defense and Director, FBI approval are required before EOD personnel can employ ECM
in CONUS.

6-31. The FBI serves as the primary federal agency for the domestic use of ECM. When the FBI requests EOD support, the use of ECM must be addressed. ECM usage is coordinated with the FBI's Strategic Information Operations Center and reported to the National Joint Operations and Intelligence Center. 6-32. CONUS IED operations use an incident management plan similar to that of OCONUS IED operations, with a few exceptions. The exceptions involve the notification process and the interaction with civil law enforcement agencies.

6-33. CONUS notifications and actions include the following:


Receiving an incident number from higher headquarters.

Coordinating with civil authorities.

Coordinating with local law enforcement.

Coordinating with firefighters and medical support.

Coordinating with the public affairs office for assistance with the press.

Contacting key installation points of contact.

Reporting installation's requirements.

Contacting key civil authorities' points of contact.

Receiving the FBI CREW authorization.

Using local procedures for material and evidence handling.
6-34. For CONUS operations, EOD reports are important documentation for advising state and federal environmental organizations and/or use within judicial processes for local, state, or federal law enforcement agencies. The importance of the accuracy and completeness of an EOD report cannot be overstated, it is one of the most important tasks that an EOD team can perform.


This page intentionally left blank.



## Chapter 7 Chemical, Biological, Radiological, And Nuclear (Cbrn) Operations

EOD forces are capable of responding to CBRN incidents, with the ability to identify chemical agents and biological agent precursors. The teams are able to collect samples for further analysis, perform leak seal and packaging of munitions, perform rendersafe procedures, and conduct emergency personnel decontamination station operations for EOD personnel.

## Incident Response

7-1.  The incident management plan follows similar rules as most conventional incidents, with the exception of establishing an emergency contamination control station or an emergency personnel decontamination station.

7-2. The operation begins with a request for EOD support. Upon receipt of the request, first actions include establishing the initial exclusion area of 381 meters and a downwind hazard area of 2000 meters.

7-3. The team establishes the incident scene by conducting on-site weather readings and determines the existence of an inversion.

7-4. The team leader ensures all personnel, including external support Soldiers (engineers, infantry, or chemical), have the same level of protection as the EOD element.

7-5. The team conducts thorough rehearsals with the supporting Soldiers to ensure everyone understands the assigned roles and instill confidence in all participants. 7-6.  A positive identification of CBRN material or the absence of such material is of the utmost importance to the operation.

7-7. A team must be thoroughly knowledgeable of any available support assets, such as decontamination units and chemical response units.

## Chemical And Biological Operations

7-8. After receiving notification for EOD support, the team leader notifies the EOD battalion and coordinates with the chemical accident or incident response and assistance officer.

7-9. The team leader is responsible for the safety of the team when entering the hazard area. Either the incident commander or the chemical accident or incident response and assistance officer is responsible for the management of the chemical incident operation.

7-10. The team leader makes a determination on whether the team is capable of handling the incident by asking the following critical questions:


How much contamination is present and how likely is gross contamination?

How many ordnance items are involved and what are their fuze conditions?

What procedures can be used on the ordnance?

Can the supporting unit help the team with additional personnel or equipment?

Disposition instructions on items encountered before transport?
7-11. The team leader requests additional support from the platoon, if incident conditions exceed the capabilities of the team.

7-12. The team dons the Joint Service Lightweight Integrated Suit Technology ensemble prior to departing the location and proceeds to establish the CP.



## E**Stablishing** The Cp

7-13. The team conducts surveys at least a mile from the proposed CP location. The team takes samples of suspect contamination during the approach to ensure the area upwind of the CP is contamination free. If contamination is encountered at the proposed CP, the team decontaminates and selects another location following the same selecting procedures.

7-14. The team establishes an exclusion area for conventional ordnance with the following guidelines:


When the team has not yet determined the explosive components, the maximum exclusion area
has a fragmentation radius of 381 meters, plus an emergency personnel decontamination station distance of 50 meters.

When there are no explosive components, reduce the exclusion area to a radius of 50 meters,
with the concurrence of the chemical accident or incident response and assistance officer or the on-scene commander. .
7-15. A downwind hazard area is established 2000 meters downwind from the accident site. All unprotected personnel are evacuated from the hazard area or required to wear chemical protective clothing. 7-16. The downwind hazard area is established by extending two radial lines at an angle of 20 degrees on each side of the primary wind direction (total angle of the downwind hazard area of 40 degrees). Two buffer zones, extending from the edge of the initial exclusion area, are then drawn to intersect the right and left radial lines. An exclusion area is shown in figure 7-1.

## Initial Entry Party R**Esponsibilities**

7-17. The task of the initial entry party is to determine the location, the number of munitions, and the condition of any munitions on-site. The initial entry party determines the type of chemical agent, the type of fuze, the fuze condition, the absence or presence of agent contamination, and the weather conditions at the site.

7-18. Prior to starting any chemical/biological operation, a hasty decontamination station is assembled at the hotline outside of the fragmentation/downwind safety area. The decontamination station contains decontamination product/chemical and rinse for personnel, as well as a first aid kit.

7-19. The team approaches the incident site by the most direct route, keeping upwind and avoiding heavy vegetation. The team looks for obvious signs of contamination, such as agent deposits (liquid or powder) in the area and people or animals showing symptoms of agent exposure.

7-20. When the team is close to the incident site, the team leader surveys it and decides the best place for the safety observer. The safety observer watches the team and operates the communication equipment.

7-21. The team carries detection equipment, first aid materials, communication equipment, EOD tools, and a limited amount of decontaminants (as a minimum). 7-22. If the agent is known, the initial entry party takes the proper decontaminant. The team takes hot soapy water for biological agents or bleach for chemicals.

7-23. If a chemical agent is suspected, a wet/dry shuffle pit is prepared upwind of the suspected contaminated item. To control the spread of contamination, all personnel at the incident site enter and exit through the shuffle pit.

7-24. A decontamination station is initially set up for hand washing, consisting of regular bleach. During chemical operations, hands are protected by chemical protective gloves and submerged in pure bleach during munition decontamination steps.

## Work Party R**Esponsibilities**

7-25. During most incidents, the duties of the work party are assumed by the initial entry party.

7-26. The duties of the work party consist of performing the RSP, controlling contamination, and decontaminating the item encountered
7-27. The work party completes the RSP for the explosive components before decontamination starts. In some cases, the fuze condition requires decontamination while preparing for the RSP.

7-28. The team separates non-leaking munitions from leaking munitions, then uprights leaking munitions, prior to starting the RSP.

7-29. After the fuze is rendered safe, leak sealing is performed to control the spread of contamination.

## Leak, Seal, And Packaging P**Rocedures**

7-30. The team conducts the following procedures:


Upright leaking munitions, dig sump around munition, or place in a bucket.

Perform gross decontamination of munition; no contact time following gross decontamination.

Rinse munition.

Leak-seal munition with appropriate materials.

Conduct munition decontamination again by the following procedures:

Decontaminate munition.

Scrub persistent agents with decontaminate to clean munition.

Wait required contact time, if persistent agent, keep the munition wet with decontaminant.

Rinse munition thoroughly.

Place munition in a plastic bag or suitable plastic material.

Keep the leak-seal top and center, tape the bag closed removing all air. Bend the bag top
portion over and create a stem.

Place in a second plastic bag and tape the second plastic bag per the instruction from above.

Proceed to final packaging.

## Final P**Ackaging**

7-31. If available, a chemical response team using specialized containers should conduct final packaging. The final packaging takes place at the hot line or at the contamination control line. If a chemical response team is not available, the EOD team uses the following procedures:


Support the munition in a container using some shock-absorbing material.

Position the munition so the leak-seal is upright.

Seal the container as tightly as possible to prevent vapor leakage.

Place the munition in a final container. The container must hold the entire munition and provide
a vapor-tight seal.

Mark the outside of the final container with the following:

Position of leak-seal.

Type of agent.

Type of munition.

Presence or absence of high explosives.

Type of decontaminant used.

Sealing procedure used.

Date/location/grid.

Unit's name and phone number.

## Disposal O**Perations**

7-32. Disposal operations are for emergency overseas operations only. Chemical and biological ordnance disposal operations are only conducted if the disposal operations do not increase the contamination in the area and allows operations to continue immediately.

7-33. When chemical or biological ordnance disposal operations threatens operations or critical assets, the rendering safe of the ordnance takes place first. The rendering safe of ordnance allows for asset recovery and mission continuation.

7-34. To effectively dispose of chemical agents, the team uses a minimum five pounds of explosives for every one pound of chemical agent.

7-35. The team leader considers the following before selecting the disposal site:


Direction of prevailing winds.

Elevation and openness of the terrain.

Distance  from any ammunition  storage  points,  inhabited  areas,  training  areas,  highways,
railroads, and airports.

Availability of an area of 60-meter radius cleared of combustibles.

Location of the medical aid station.

Location of the emergency personnel decontamination station.

Location of firefighting equipment.

Locations of bunkers for personnel protection from fragmentation.
7-36. In some remote locations, toxic chemical munitions are detonated where found, but the downwind hazard restrictions must be observed. The item must be completely covered with explosives for maximum affect. 7-37. The team leader should also consider neutralization for small quantities of chemical agents.

## Emergency Personnel Decontamination Station

7-38. The emergency personnel decontamination station (figure 7-2) is set up between the CP, the incident site, and outside the fragmentation range of the explosive ordnance. It must be set up in a contamination free area clear of brush, trees, and vegetation. It must be upwind of the incident and at least 50 meters downwind from the CP.

##


##

7-39. A critical feature of the emergency personnel decontamination station is the hot line. It is an imaginary line separating the contaminated area from the contamination reduction area. It is placed as close to the item as possible but outside the fragmentation radius. All personnel and equipment entering and leaving the incident area process through the hot line.

7-40. The contamination control line separates the contamination reduction area from the redress area.

Personnel do not cross into the redress area until they have been decontaminated. The contamination control line prevents personnel from entering the contamination reduction area without wearing proper protective clothing. The team decontaminates everything leaving the hot area and monitors for residue contamination prior to crossing the contamination control line. 7-41. The emergency personnel decontamination station is supervised and ran by a team leader with the assistance of two team members. The emergency personnel decontamination station team processes all personnel and equipment returning from the incident site through the emergency personnel decontamination station.

7-42. The emergency personnel decontamination station team makes sure all personnel processing through the emergency personnel decontamination station comply with the following actions:


Move into the wind as undressing progresses.

Decontaminate and remove the most heavily contaminated items of clothing first.

Remove all articles of clothing worn at the incident site.

Remove the mask and hood last before crossing into the redress area.
7-43. The EOD company decontaminates as much of the personnel protection items and mission-essential equipment as possible. When the operation is complete, the area is marked as a contaminated area and prepared for further decontaminating.

## Nuclear And Radiological Operations

7-44. EOD elements support the Geographic Combat Commander and Department of Energy (DOE) in responding to nuclear weapon accidents or incidents involving U.S. nuclear weapons in DOD or DOE
custody. Weapons in DOE custody are located in CONUS. EOD companies must review DODM 3150.08 Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Procedures (NARP), for guidance on nuclear operations.

7-45. The initial response force in CONUS and OCONUS comes from the nearest EOD unit, with followon support from a response task force coming from the Service that has custody of the weapon.

7-46. EOD personnel responding to an accident involving U.S. nuclear weapons or components in a foreign territory assists the host nation responders in saving lives and protecting property, and reestablishing U.S. custody of the weapon.

7-47. If the weapon is a threat system, Army EOD is responsible for preventing a nuclear detonation or a high-explosive detonation. The actions include conducting detection, identification, RSP, technical information gathering, and preparing complete weapons or components for shipment.

7-48. If the weapon is a U.S. system, the responsible service, either Navy or Air Force, are notified. The specific service is ultimately responsible for any recovery actions. Army EOD is responsible for preventing a detonation and the spreading of contamination. 7-49. If the weapon system is an allied system, Army EOD responsibilities are to prevent a detonation, prevent the spread of contamination and assist friendly forces as authorized.

## Incident R**Esponse**

7-50. When an EOD company responds to a nuclear incident, the company notifies the EOD battalion and coordinates with the nuclear accident and incident response and assistance officer and the FBI special agent bomb tech or WMD coordinator.

7-51. The EOD company commander is responsible for the safety of the EOD personnel entering the hazard area. Either the on-site commander or the nuclear accident and incident response and assistance officer is responsible for the management of the nuclear incident operation.

7-52. After the company receives the notification for EOD support, EOD personnel gather critical information and establish the CP after arriving at the incident location.

7-53. The EOD team establishes the CP by implementing the following guidelines:


The site is approachable from any direction if it is free of contamination.

Suspect areas are approached from upwind. If contamination is suspected, the area is checked
with an alpha survey meter and a low-range gamma survey meter.

The CP is be close to, but separate from support element operations.

If the item is unknown, an initial high explosive exclusion area with at least a 610 meters
fragmentation radius is established.

## Damage Weapon A**Ssessment**

7-54. The EOD team conducts weapon damage assessments, searches to reestablish accountability of the weapons and components, protects classified components from view, and stabilizes the site from nuclear and conventional explosive hazards.

7-55. The team response process is conducted in five phases. The five phases often overlap and consist of the following:


Notification and deployment.

Initial response.

Consolidation.

Weapon recovery operations.

Site remediation.
7-56. The EOD team conducts an initial reconnaissance of the area to locate the weapon and debris, and proceeds to weapon recovery operations.

7-57. The steps of the weapon recovery operations are the following:


Initial entry.

Locating the weapon and components.

Performing initial and continuation RSPs.

Development and approving the weapon recovery plans.

Interim packaging, local movement, temporary staging, and final packaging.

Preparing for the off-site shipment of the weapon and components.
7-58. The initial entry EOD work party consists of a nuclear weapon trained officer and another nuclear weapon trained Soldier assisted by two EOD personnel trained in nuclear weapons.

7-59. The team conducts an initial site stabilization by determining the weapon condition and, if required, conducts any immediate actions on weapon or components. The team locates all nuclear components during this phase. 7-60. When the weapon is stabilized, team priorities expand to the following.


Preventing nuclear detonation.

Preventing a high explosive detonation.

Detecting, identifying, containing, and reducing the hazards of explosives and radiation resulting
from the accident.

Protecting personnel against hazards.
7-61. The team could be tasked to perform a RSP on a damaged weapon in DOD or DOE custody, but are limited by the authorization of the response task force commander.

7-62. After the weapon is safe for local movement, it will be moved to a safe staging area. The team processes through the emergency contamination control station after completing the incident.

## Emergency Contamination Control Station

7-63. All personnel and equipment returning from a contaminated area proceeds through a contamination control station. The emergency contamination control station is shown in figure 7-3.

7-64. The emergency contamination control station is placed between the command post, the incident site, and outside the fragmentation range of the munition. It must be setup in an area free of contamination, upwind of the incident, and at least 50 meters downwind from the CP.

7-65. The hot line is placed as close to the item as possible but outside the fragmentation radius (610 meters for unknown nuclear weapons).

7-66. The contamination control line separates the contamination reduction area from the redress area.

Personnel cannot cross into the redress area until they are free of contamination or have an acceptable level of contamination.

7-67. The emergency contamination control station must be protected from the weather. It must be ran by at least one EOD Soldier dressed in the proper protective clothing from the time personnel depart for the incident until all personnel have processed out.

7-68. The team does not process through the emergency contamination control station if no contamination was encountered during the incident response.

## Chapter 8 Very Important Person (Vip) Support Operations

VIP support operations are conducted like any other EOD operation, using the team concept. A VIP team consists of a certified EOD team leader and a team member. The team provides support to United States Secret Service (USSS), and the Department of State (DOS) upon request.

## Mission Requirements

8-1. The mission requirements for supporting the USSS and the DOS are very similar in nature, but are based off the requirements for supporting the USSS.

8-2. The primary role of the EOD team is to detect hazards that may affect the principal during a visit, and advise the supporting agency so that the principal can be evacuated. The primary responsibility for handling a hazardous device lies with the law enforcement agency with jurisdiction in the area.

8-3. The Hazardous Device Countermeasures Manual sets the security clearance requirements for conducting the following missions.


POTUS support missions.

VPOTUS support missions.

Non-POTUS/VPOTUS support missions.
8-4.   Teams supporting POTUS/VPOTUS missions must have at least a current Secret clearance, based on a Single Scope Background Investigation.

8-5. Teams supporting non-POTUS/VPOTUS missions must have a minimum of a Secret/National Agency Check clearance, with a Single Scope Background Investigation initiated. An interim clearance is allowable for conducting the mission. 8-6. Additional information on the employment of DOD capabilities in support of the USSS can be obtained from reviewing DOD Directive 3025.13.

## Mission S**Tandards**

8-7. Commanders must carefully consider the Soldiers selected to support VIP missions. Soldiers who display a propensity for unnecessary risk-taking, or who routinely demonstrate poor judgment, are excluded from participating in VIP support missions.

8-8. VIP support missions require additional dress, appearance, and grooming standards. Teams selected for VIP missions must comply with the following:


No visible tattoos while wearing a standard business suit.

Not enrolled in the Army Body Composition Program.

No wearing of antiquated or faddish clothing.
8-9.   The teams are responsible for maintaining several USSS mission requirements.

Wear conservative business suits, unless other attire is specified.

Display EOD pins and credentials only for official purposes.

Avoid being in camera shots and television filming when working as much as possible.

Do not pose for photographs.

Do not carry and/or use personal cameras while on duty.

Do not talk to reporters or the general public about any activities concerning the principal.

Refrain from engaging in political conversations.

Do not patronize the bar in the same hotels where the principal, press, or staff is staying.

Do not discuss duties or the day's activities in public places.

Do not depend on USSS dashboard placards to avoid parking tickets.

## Prohibited T**Asks**

8-10. The teams are prohibited from performing the following specific tasks, while conducting USSS missions.


Performing security functions, such as standing post.

Conducting searches for any other civilian or government agency while assigned to the USSS.

Driving motorcade vehicles, operating the command post, or performing other police functions.

Being tasked to run errands not directly related to the mission.

Taking custody of gifts or packages after inspection.

Being positioned at magnetometer check points or other entrances at event sites.

Inspecting purses, or packages unless a Special Agent, USSS Uniformed Division Officer or
other lawful authority is present and requests such assistance.

Searching an area, unless it is secured prior to initiation of the search.

## Mission Notification

8-11. VIP missions generally have short notices, short durations, and require an emergency request for assistance.

8-12. The Joint EOD Very Important Person Protective Support Activity is the coordinating agent for the United States Northern Command, who provides DOD resources in support of the USSS.

8-13. The notification for support is requested for either CONUS or OCONUS USSS and/or DOS routine missions on a recurring basis for the protection of VIPs.

8-14. The USSS and DOS identify mission support requirements and submit the requirements directly to the Joint EOD Very Important Person Protective Support Activity. Based on the mission location and availability of teams in proximity to the mission location, the Joint EOD Very Important Person Protective Support Activity requests the teams from the 20th CBRNE Command, who then tasks the EOD groups.

8-15. The EOD groups task the EOD battalions for the supporting unit or units, as well as request the name and contact information for the senior team leaders.

8-16. The senior team leader is the only supporting team leader to contact the Joint EOD Very Important Person Protective Support Activity, USSS or DOS agents and relays mission information to the other supporting EOD teams from the same company. 8-17. The senior team leader telephonically reports team arrival/ready to support and mission completion/ team departure from the mission support site to the Joint EOD Very Important Person Protective Support Activity and the respective EOD group through the respective EOD battalion.

8-18. The senior team leader immediately reports any emergency situation that impact mission execution through the respective EOD battalion to the respective EOD group and the Joint EOD Very Important Person Protective Support Activity.

## Mission Execution

8-19. Upon arrival at the designated location, the senior EOD team leader reports to the USSS representative. The USSS representative provides the tentative mission schedules, the areas to be searched, and the routes and itineraries of the dignitary, including alternate routes. Information is provided on the location and room number of the security room, the package holding area, and the communications room. The EOD capabilities of the local authorities and the threat summary is provided during the brief.

8-20. Before and during the dignitary's visit, the senior EOD team leader surveys all of the areas on the itinerary and plans for the search. The senior EOD team leader recommends to the USSS agent any requirements needed to support the EOD teams.

8-21. Before the search, the senior EOD team leader meets with the USSS agent and local law enforcement officials. At the meeting, they determine the available disposal facilities and local bomb squad capabilities and responsibilities. They also determine the evacuation routes between the visit locations and the disposal facilities.

8-22. They select temporary sites and routes to the disposal sites that avoid crowds and main traffic areas.

They arrange for an escort vehicle in case it is necessary to move an explosive device. Explosives holding areas must as far away as practical from the areas the VIP is scheduled to visit.

8-23. The teams apply the search procedures for facilities and adjacent areas outlined in the HDCM. Security of the search and post search areas is the responsibility of the USSS. EOD teams are not used to secure areas. 8-24. The senior EOD team leader advises the USSS agent when the search is completed. The advance agent determines where EOD personnel are to wait. The senior EOD Soldier furnishes technical advice for identifying an explosive or incendiary device. The senior EOD Soldier notifies the agent of the findings.

8-25. When the principal arrives, EOD teams may, at the discretion of the responsible USSS agent, be assigned to an agent during the visit to provide immediate on-scene technical advice. If an explosive item is found, the EOD teams may be charged with helping the agent start evacuation procedures.

8-26. If a suspected item is found during a search, it must be reported immediately to the USSS. Even though speed is critical in reporting the situation, care and discretion must be used in reporting the incident. Under no circumstances should the situation be reported to anyone other than a representative of the USSS.

8-27. During the performance of the mission, every effort must be made to divert public attention from EOD
activities. EOD teams should immediately refer any inquiries about EOD support activities to the responsible USSS representative.

## Post Mission Requirements

8-28. When the mission is complete, the senior EOD Soldier has an exit briefing with the agent in charge. Prior to the EOD teams departing, the senior EOD Soldier contacts one of the following to determine if any missions are pending: the USSS coordinating center (when in operation), or the senior EOD Soldier's home unit. 8-29. Each senior team leader from the supporting companies are responsible for capturing the man-hours from the VIP mission and closeout the mission report in EOD Information Management System .


This page intentionally left blank.



## Appendix A Eod Reporting Guidelines

This appendix discusses the guidelines for reporting EOD incidents and the EOD
Information Management System used to capture data from EOD activities.

## Categories

A-1. EOD commanders categorize EOD incidents according to potential threats. Incident categories can be adjusted depending on the tactical situation, the target, updated intelligence, or field evaluation feedback from the EOD response team on-site A-2. Safety is the primary concern when planning EOD operations. Except when faced with a Category A
incident (described below), safety of the Soldier is paramount. In all incident categories, the first plan of action should be remote procedures. The four incident categories are described below.


Category A incidents prohibit unit maneuver and mission capabilities or threaten critical assets vital to the effort and are assigned priority over all other incidents. Category A is assigned to incidents that constitute a grave and immediate threat. Category A incidents are those that can cause mass destruction, widespread contamination, major reduction of combat personnel, or loss of critical facilities or infrastructures. EOD procedures are to be started immediately, regardless of risk to EOD personnel.

Category B incidents constitute an indirect threat that impairs unit maneuver and mission capabilities or threaten critical assets. Items of technical intelligence value are normally assigned to this category. Before EOD operations are started a safe waiting period may be observed to reduce the hazard to EOD personnel. This category correlates with the indirect priority of the incident report.

Category C incidents constitute a minor threat with the potential to reduce unit maneuver and mission capabilities or threaten noncritical assets. EOD personnel normally deal with category C incidents after category A and category B incidents. Strictly adhere to all wait times and safeties; EOD personnel should expose themselves to the minimum hazards to accomplish these missions.

Category D incidents constitute no threat and have little or no effect on unit capabilities or assets. Category D ordnance is still lethal and requires EOD response. Mark and leave category D
ordnance for EOD assessment.

## Explosive Ordnance Disposal 9 Line

A-3. The EOD 9 Line is the standardized method for Soldiers to report explosive hazards. The report provides a brief description, location, and a recommended priority. The report contains nine lines, and the reporting unit sends it by the fastest means available. An example of the report is shown in Table A-1, on page A-2.

A-4. The priorities provide the brigade commanders a tool to manage EOD assets in their area of operations based off the potential threat. The EOD company commander synchronizes EOD incident categories with EOD incident priorities for the brigade commander's staff, based off the brigade commander's priorities. The following four priorities are established for EOD support:


Immediate: This priority stops the unit's maneuver and mission capability. It threatens critical assets vital to the mission.

Indirect: This priority restricts the unit's maneuver and mission capability. It may also threaten critical assets important to the mission.

Minor: This priority reduces the unit's maneuver and mission capability. It may threaten
noncritical assets of value.

No Threat: This priority has little or no effect on the unit's capabilities or maneuverability. The
item is identified and reported for later action and force protection/public safety awareness.

Line 1
Date-time group
131200ZAUG14 1/7th Infantry, EH132221433
Line 2
Reporting unit / explosive
hazard location
Line 3
Contact Method
Sapper 6, Sergeant Rock
Line 4
Type of ordnance
82 millimeter mortar, 1 each
Line 5
CBRN contamination
Yes, Soldiers have blisters; M8 paper confirms
blister
Line 6
Resources threatened
Personnel, mine clearance equipment
Line 7
Impact on mission
Mine clearance operations stopped
Line 8
Protective measures
Personnel evacuated to 300 meters
Line 9
Recommended priority
Immediate

LEGEND
CBRN = chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear


Line 1. Date-time group. The date-time group when the explosive hazard was discovered.

Line 2. Reporting unit and explosive hazard location. The unit designation of the reporting unit
and the location of the explosive ordnance in an 8-digit grid coordinate.

Line 3. Contact method. Provide the radio frequency and the call sign, and/or the telephone
number and point of contact.

Line 4. Type of explosive ordnance. Note the size, quantity, type of ordnance (dropped,
projected, placed, possible IED, or thrown). Indicate the emplacement method and type of initiation device.

Line 5. CBRN contamination. If CBRN is present, be as specific as possible. (For example,
chemical agent monitor detected G agent at 3 bars; Soldiers are experiencing symptoms of nerve agent; excessive amount of dead wildlife.)

Line 6. Resources threatened. Report any equipment, facilities, or other assets that are threatened.

Line 7. Impact on mission. Provide a short description of the current tactical situation and how
the presence of the explosive ordnance affects current status (delayed, diverted, cancelled).

Line 8. Protective measures taken. Describe measures taken to protect personnel and equipment
(evacuated to 300M, item marked, sandbag barrier constructed).

Line 9. Recommended priority (immediate, indirect, minor, or no threat). Ensure that the priority
recommended corresponds with the tactical situation described on line 7 of the report (impact on mission). These priorities refer only to the explosive ordnance impact on the current mission. A priority of MINOR or NO THREAT does not mean that the explosive ordnance is not dangerous.

## Eod Information Management System

A-5. EOD Information Management System is a Nonsecure Internet Protocol Router (NIPRNET) and Secret Internet Protocol Router (SIPRNET) web application hosted at the Defense Information Systems Agency. EOD Information Management System provides a classified and unclassified information management tool for Joint Service Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) core processes; operations; resources; flight management; and incident reporting. EOD Information Management System also provides the capability for worldwide sharing of joint EOD operations; C-IED information; WMD information; and responses among the service branches; DOD; federal; state; and coalition partners.

A-6. EOD Information Management System enhances operational coordination among services, units, and personnel through the Very Important Person Protective Support Activity module which is used to identify available EOD teams and schedule missions for the protection of the POTUS, VPOUS, and other dignitaries.

A-7. EOD Information Management System historical data supports the identification of emerging tactics, techniques, and procedures requirements; equipment use; and deficiencies. Historical UXO response records support environmental and land remediation. EOD Information Management System supports mandatory environmental law reporting by capturing detailed data and maintaining archives for all explosives and munitions emergency responses per the following dictates: Resource Conservation Recovery Act, Military Munitions Rule (CFR 40); Presidential Directive 17, and DOD Manual 6055.09-M for recordkeeping of munitions responses and storage.

A-8. EOD Information Management System captures data from all joint service missions and responses, including but not limited to aircraft; IED; WMD; DSCA; range support; and Very Important Person Protective Support Activity module for the USSS and DOS.

A-9. EOD Information Management System data is shared with United States Department of Justice Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms; the Explosives Bomb Arson Tracking System; the Navy Joint Digital Information Gathering System Data Repository; the United States Army Corps of Engineers; environmental agencies; and the DOD.

## Eod Information Management System Procedures

A-10. The on-scene EOD team leader is responsible for writing the incident report within 24 hours of the incident completion.

A-11. Companies must not consider an incident as mission complete until the responding team leader has submitted the initial draft report into EOD Information Management System.

A-12. The incident report must focus on accuracy to be capable of providing a clear synopsis of events, to a noninvolved third-party.

A-13. The Military Munitions Rule establishes the minimal record-keeping requirement for all explosives or munitions emergency responses. The responding company must keep the incident reposts for at least three years.


This page intentionally left blank.



## Appendix B Range Clearance Checklist

This appendix provides guidance for conducting a range clearance and addresses the additional support, equipment, and procedures required for the event.

## Range Clearance Guidance

B-1.  Range  clearance  plans  are  verified  with  designated  points  of  contact  to  ensure  the  following information:


The ranges are included in a written authorization from the EOD battalion.

The installation is capable of providing the necessary support.
B-2.  The company operations section coordinates with the installation range control for the following critical information:


A list of ordnance items used on the range.

Procedures for obtaining air clearance.

Procedures to close the range due to unauthorized personnel.

A copy of the range control standing operation procedures.
B-3.  The key leaders make a reconnaissance of the range to determine the external support required and identify any additional hazards. The key leaders focus on the following requirements:


Establishing tentative priorities.

Establishing tentative plan and map clearance patterns.

Establishing tentative demonization and scrap collection areas.

Identifying the type of terrain.

Identifying the type and density of the vegetation.

Identifying the soil consistency.

Identifying the type and location of targets.

Identifying the amount and type of ordnance contamination:

Determining the ordnance size expected to be found.

Determining if cluster or dispensed munitions were used.

Determining the maximum and mean penetration depth.

Determining the types of ordnance used.

Determining the condition of dud ordnance.

Determining the hazards and the probability of detonation.

Determining the possible equipment damage due to high order explosions.

Estimating external support required based off the following considerations:

Records of past range clearances (in area/same site).

Size of area and distribution of ordnance.

Types of ordnance that could be encountered.

Terrain characteristics.

Climate/environmental conditions and considerations.

Anticipated length of operation (days/weeks).

Transportation distances for personnel and equipment.

Availability of resources.
B-4.  The team leader prepares the range clearance brief for all participants involved in the range clearance operation. The range clearance brief consists of the following:


Information on the ordnance, including safety hazards and possible conditions.

The correct staking method.

Designate teams and associated grids for the clearance.

Reporting and grid marking for ordnance found.

Safe areas for stakers to use during the disposal operations.

Safety briefing and associated hazards of the range.

Medical evacuation procedures.
B-5.  The range safety officer ensures that there are enough trained EOD Soldiers to supervise and work with the stakers.

B-6.  The range safety officer establishes the control point for the overall coordination of the clearing operations. B-7.  The range safety officer uses the following concept of operation:


The range is clear of all unauthorized personnel.

The search is thorough and complete.

All the items found are staked.

Air clearance is obtained, before any detonation.

EOD personnel follow the correct procedures for disposal.
B-8.  The range safety officer ensures the company, battalion, and installation are updated during clearance operations and at the completion of the range clearance.

## Appendix C Contamination And Decontamination Stations

This appendix addresses the setups for both the emergency personnel decontamination station and the emergency contamination control station. It lists the steps for guiding the EOD teams through the decontamination stations.

## Emergency Personnel Decontamination Station Setup

C-1. The emergency personnel decontamination station team consists of an EOD team leader and two team members following the suggested procedural steps for establishing, running, and managing the emergency personnel decontamination station.



## Step 1: E**Quipment Drop**


Equipment: Any material that prevents the contaminated equipment from contacting the ground, such as plastic bags, oilcloth, etc.

Action: Place all equipment used at the incident site on the protective material. If a shuffle pit is used, the team goes through the shuffle pit prior to crossing the hot line. The team removes the booties and places them in a container. The team steps across the hot line onto the grate covering the sump.


## Step 2: **Decontamination**


Equipment: Containers (with sprayers if possible) containing decontaminants; hot soapy water; rinse water; decontaminants in the sump; and first-aid for the agent(s) detected by IEP or Work Party.

Action: The team stands on the grate covering the sump, while the emergency personnel decontamination station team sprays, pours, or brushes each team member's impermeable protective clothing with decontaminant. The emergency personnel decontamination station team then sprays, pours, or brushes the protecting clothing with hot soapy water. The emergency personnel decontamination station team finally sprays, pours, or brushes the protective clothing with rinse water.


## Step 3: **Clothing Removal**


Equipment: Personnel Clothing, first-aid equipment and self-sealing bags.

Action: The team removes clothing, redresses, and receives first aid (if required).

## Emergency Contamination Control Station

C-2. The emergency contamination control station team uses the suggested steps for establishing, running, and managing the emergency contamination control station emergency contamination control station.

## Step 1: **Equipment Drop And Bootie Removal**


Equipment: Any material, such as plastic bags or oilcloth, which prevents the contaminated equipment from contacting the ground.

Action: The team places the equipment on material provided. The team removes film badges and dosimeters. The emergency contamination control station team reads the dosimeters. The team removes the booties, places the booties in a container, and steps over the hot line.

## Step 2: **Outer Clothing Removal And Monitoring**


Equipment: Containers used for booties and outer clothing. Radiacmeters used to read the
contamination encountered and a dosimeter register.

Action: The team removes the outer clothing and gloves, taking care not to touch the outer
clothing. The team steps forward while the emergency contamination control station team
monitors for contamination. If no contamination is detected or the contamination has been determined to be acceptable, the team removes the respirator, washes, and moves to the redress area. If any contamination is detected above the permissible levels, the team member goes immediately to step 3.

## Step 3: **Inner Clothing And Respirator Removal**


Equipment: Containers used for inner clothing and respirators.

Action: The team removes the inner clothing, including inner gloves and respirators, and places
in the container.

## Step 4: **Wash And Rinse Point**


Equipment: Containers used for hot soapy water and rinse water. Also required are towels,
radiacmeters, cornmeal, and powdered soap.

Action: The team washes the body with soapy water, paying particular attention to the
fingernails and hairy portions of the body. The team rinses the body with clean water, dries, and monitors the body for contamination. If contamination is detected above permissible levels, the team repeats the washing, rinsing, and drying process, then reassesses.

If the second washing does not bring contamination within permissible levels, the emergency
contamination control station team uses a mixture of 50 percent powdered soap and 50 percent cornmeal mixed with water to massage onto the contaminated area for five minutes. The mixture is rinsed from the body and the team member is reassessed.

If contamination is still detected, medical assistance is requested. If there is no contamination or
contamination is within acceptable limits, the team member crosses the contamination control line and redresses after washing face and hands.

## Step 5: **Redress Area**


Equipment: Personal clothing, first-aid equipment, and self-sealing bags.

Action: The team redresses and receives first-aid (if required).

## Appendix D Supporting Organizations

The complexity of current and emerging weapons systems require that EOD have comprehensive reach back capabilities to the DOD and national levels. Additionally, EOD teams must have reach across and feedback capabilities to provide and receive near real time, relevant reporting on weapon systems, explosive ordnance and trends in order to populate databases with the most current data. EOD organizations can receive feedback from Training and Doctrine Command Capability Manager -
Explosive Ordnance Disposal and Naval Explosives Ordnance Disposal Technology Division (NAVEODTECHDIV) for mission essential equipment and support item.

## Training And Doctrine Command Capability Manager - Explosive Ordnance Disposal

D-1. Training and Doctrine Command Capability Manger-EOD develops, integrates, and synchronizes Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education requirements for Army EOD throughout Training and Doctrine Command; coordinates Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational EOD requirements in coordination with the Sustainment Center of Excellence and assistance chief of staff, operations plans and information operations.

## G-38, Adaptive Counter-Improvised Explosive Device And Explosive Ordnance Disposal Solutions Division

D-2. The G-38 Division provides staff planning for assigned EOD strategic requirements in support of the geographic combatant commanders' operational plan. The G-38 Division accomplishes this planning by using the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System and coordinates the planning effort with the combatant commander's EOD staff officer.

D-3. G-38 manages the Army EOD Program in order to rapidly man, train, equip, and organize Army formations.

D-4. G-38 has the inherent ability to apply and defeat emergent asymmetric threats and adaptive networks including weapons of strategic of influence and asymmetric weapons, such as the IED, in support of unified land operations.

## Naval Explosives Ordnance Disposal Technology Division (Naveodtechdiv)

D-5. NAVEODTECHDIV exploits technology and intelligence to develop and deliver EOD information, tools, equipment, and life cycle support to meet the needs of joint service EOD operating forces and other specified customers. NAVEODTECHDIV manages the EOD database and provides a 24/7 reach back capability for UXO/IED/CBRN topics.

## Terrorist Explosive Device Analytical Center

D-6. The mission of the Terrorist Explosive Device Analytical Center is to prevent potential IED attacks by coordinating and managing the unified efforts of law enforcement, intelligence, and military assets to technically and forensically exploit all terrorist IEDs worldwide of interest to the U.S. government. The information and intelligence derived from the exploitation of terrorist IEDs is used to provide actionable intelligence to anti-terror missions and to help protect the U.S. military and multinational assets around the globe.

## Picatinny Arsenal

D-7. Picatinny Arsenal is the Joint Center of Excellence for Armaments and Munitions, providing products and services to all branches of the U.S. military. They specialize in the research, development, acquisition and lifecycle management of advanced conventional weapon systems and advanced ammunition. Picatinny's portfolio comprises nearly 90 percent of the Army's lethality and all conventional ammunition for joint warfighters.

## Sandia National Laboratories

D-8. Sandia National Laboratories is operated and managed by Sandia Corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary of Lockheed Martin Corporation. Sandia National Laboratories operates as a contractor for the U.S. Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration and supports numerous federal, state, and local government agencies, companies, and organizations.

## Defense Intelligence Agency

D-9. The Defense Intelligence Agency is first in all-source defense intelligence to prevent strategic surprise and deliver a decisive advantage to warfighters, defense planners, and policymakers. DIA deploys globally alongside warfighters and interagency partners to defend America's national security interests.

## Cbrne Analytical & Remediation Activity Mobile Expeditionary Laboratory

D-10. The CBRNE Mobile Expeditionary Laboratory deploys scientists to perform high-throughput chemical, explosives, and biological sample analysis to support Department of Defense combatant commanders, military installations, and support to U.S. civil authorities if requested. CBRNE Mobile Expeditionary Laboratory has three mobile lab packages: a light mobile expeditionary lab, a heavy mobile expeditionary lab, and a chemical air monitoring system, which deploy to support WMD elimination and remediation efforts in a forward deployed area.

## United States Army Intelligence And Security Command

D-11. The United States Army Intelligence and Security Command conducts a wide range of production activities, ranging from intelligence preparation of the battlefield to situation development, including signal intelligence analysis, imagery exploitation, and science and technology intelligence production.

## National Ground Intelligence Center (Ngic)

D-12. NGIC produces and disseminates all-source integrated intelligence on foreign ground forces, systems, and supporting combat technologies to ensure that U.S. Forces have a decisive edge on any battlefield. NGIC supports U.S. Army Forces during training, operational planning, deployment, and redeployment. NGIC maintains a counter IED targeting program portal on the Secret internet protocol router network web site that provides information concerning IED activities and incidents and NGIC IED assessments. In the IED fight, NGIC increases the capability of the multinational force to collect technical intelligence and provide dedicated intelligence fusion to support counter-insurgency operations.

## Center For Army Lessons Learned

D-13. The Center for Army Lessons Learned rapidly collects, analyzes, disseminates, and archives observations, insights, lessons learned, tactics, techniques, and procedures and operational records in order to facilitate rapid adaptation initiatives and conduct focused knowledge sharing and transfer that informs the Army and enables operationally based decision making, integration, and innovation throughout the Army and within the JIIM environment.

## Defense Threat Reduction Agency

D-14. The Defense Threat Reduction Agency is the U.S. Department of Defense's official Combat Support Agency for countering weapons of mass destruction. The Defense Threat Reduction Agency programs include basic science research and development, operational support to U.S. warfighters on the front line, and an in-house WMD think tank that aims to anticipate and mitigate future threats long before they have a chance to harm the U.S. and our allies.

## Asymmetric Warfare Group

D-15. The Asymmetric Warfare Group conducts operations in support of joint and Army Forces commanders to mitigate and defeat specified asymmetric threats. The Asymmetric Warfare Group assists in exploitation and analysis of asymmetric threats and provides advisory training for in-theater or pre-deployment forces.

## Technical Support Working Group

D-16. The Technical Support Working Group is the U.S. national forum that identifies, prioritizes, and coordinates interagency and international research and development requirements for combating terrorism. The Technical Support Working Group rapidly develops technologies and equipment to meet high priority needs of the combating terrorism community and addresses joint international operational requirements through cooperative research and development with major allies.


This page intentionally left blank.



## Glossary Acronyms And A **Bbreviations**

AAR
after action review
ABN
airborne
AEODPS
automated explosive ordnance disposal publication system
AR
Army Regulation
BCT
brigade combat team
CBRN
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
CBRNE
chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives
CFR
Code of Federal Regulations
CP
command post
C-IED
counter-improvised explosive device
CO
company
CONUS
continental United States
CREW
counter radio-controlled improvised explosive device electronic warfare
DOD
Department of Defense
DODI
Department of Defense Instruction
DOE
Department of Energy
DS
direct support
DSCA
defense support of civil authorities
ECM
electronic countermeasures
EOD
explosive ordnance disposal
EPA
Environmental Protection Agency
FBI
Federal Bureau of Investigation
FUDS
formerly used defense sites
G-38
Adaptive Counter-Improvised Explosive Device and Explosive Ordnance
Disposal Solutions Division
GS
general support
HQ
headquarters
ICS
Incident Command System
IED
improvised explosive device
NAVEODTECHDIV
Naval Explosives Ordnance Disposal Technology Division
NGIC
National Ground Intelligence Center
NIMS
National Incident Management System
OCONUS
outside the continental United States
OPCON
operational control
PLT
platoon
POTUS
President of the United States
PPE
personal protective equipment
RCRA
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
RSP
render-safe procedures
S-2
brigade intelligence staff officer
SOF
special operations forces
TACON
tactical control
USSS
United States Secret Service
UXO
unexploded explosive ordnance
VIP
very important person
VPOTUS
Vice President of the United States
WMD
weapons of mass destruction

## References

All URLs accessed on 5 December 2016.

## Required Publications

These documents must be available to intended users of this publication. ADRP 1-02, *Terms and Military Symbols*, 16 November 2016.

FM 6-0, *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations*, 5 May 2014.

Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 15 October 2016.

## Related Publications

These documents contain relevant supplemental information

## Joint P**Ublications**

Most joint publications are available on: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jointpub.htm JP 3-0, *Joint Operations,* 11 August 2011. JP 3-28, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities*, 31 July 2013.

JP 3-35, *Deployment and Redeployment Operations*, 31 January 2013.

## Army P**Ublications**

Most Army doctrinal publications are available online: https://armypubs.army.mil ADRP 3-28, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities*, 14 June 1013. AR 75-14, *Interservice Responsibilities for Explosive Ordnance Disposal*, 14 February 1992. AR 75-15, *Policy for Explosive Ordnance Disposal*, 17 December 2013.

AR 190-11, *Physical Security of Arms, Ammunition and Explosives*, 5 September 2013.

AR 525-27, *Army Emergency Management Program*, 13 March 2009.

ATP 4-32., *Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Operations*, 30 September 2013.

ATP 5-19, *Risk Management*, 14 April 2014.

DA PAM 525-27, *Army Emergency Management Program*, 20 September 2012.

FM 27-10, *The Law of Land Warfare*, 18 July 1956.

## Other P**Ublications**

Most DOD Directives and Instructions are available online:
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/dir.html DOD Directive 3020.40, *Mission Assurance (MA),* 29 November 2016.

DOD Directive 3025.13, Employment of DOD Capabilities in Support of the U.S. Secret Service
(USSS), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 8 October 2010.

DOD Directive 3025.18, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA)*, 29 December 2010.

DOD Instruction 3020.45, *Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP), Management,* 21 April
2008.

DOD Instruction 3025.21, *Defense Support of Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies*, 27 February 2013.

DOD Instruction 6055.17, *DOD Installation Emergency Management (IEM) Program,* 13 January
2009.

DOD Manual 3150.08, *Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Procedures (NARP),* 22 August 2013.

## References

DOD Manual 6055.09-M, DOD Ammunition and Explosives Safety Standards: General Explosives Safety Information, and Requirements, 29 February 2008.

Most United States Codes are available online: http://uscode.house.gov/browse/&editions=prelim.

Title 10, United States Code, *Armed Forces.*
Title 32, United States Code, *National Guard*.

Most Code of Federal Regulations are available online: http://www.ecfr.gov/cgi-
bin/ECFR?page=browse.

Title 40, Code of Federal Regulations, *Protection of the Environment,* Parts 260-265, 270. Most Presidential Directives are available online: https://www.whitehouse.gov. Presidential Directive 17, *Countering Improvised Explosive Devices,* 26 February 2013.

## Prescribed Forms

None.

## Referenced Forms

Unless otherwise indicated, DA forms are available on the Army Publishing Directorate (APD) web site: https://armypubs.army.mil.

DA Form 2028. *Recommended Changes to Publication and Blank Forms*.

## Index

Entries are listed by paragraph number unless indicated otherwise


## A

AAR, establishing the incident site, 4-634-65
activities in the area, critical information, 4-20


## C

EOD company (CONUS support),
1-13
EOD company WMD, 1-14
EOD platoon, 1-15
emergency personnel
decontamination station, 7-38
establishing the CP, chemical and
biological operations, 7-13
exploitation, tenet of EOD
operations, 4-9


final packaging, chemical and biological operations, 7-31
FUDS, 3-30



chemical and biological
operations, 7-87-12
closing out the incident, IED
reconnaissance, 6-176-20
communications, intergration, 1-
28
company level operations, 1-18
1-25
conduct RSP, establishing the
incident site, 4-57
CONUS IED operations, 6-296-
34
CREW, 3-133-15



## D

initial entry party responsibilities,
chemical and biological
operations, 7-177-24
improvished rocket launchers, 6-
216-26
incident mangagement plan, 4-15
incident response, nuclear
operations, 7-50
leak, seal and packaging
procedures, chemical and
biological operations, 7-30


logistics, integration, 1-27
long range recon, establishing the incident site, 4-38



## Military Munition Rule, 3-25

damage weapon assessment,
nuclear operations, 7-547-62
description of item, critical
information, 4-19
dismounted operations, non-
permissive environment, 2-6
disposal operations, chemical and
biological operations, 7-327-37
down-range recon, establishing
the incident site, 4-41
down-range recon, IED
reconnaissance, 6-10
DSCA, 3-33-12
emergency contamination control
station, 7-62

## E

EOD companies, mission of, 1-1
EOD company,  1-10
EOD company (ABN),  1-11

mission execution, VIP
operations, 8-19
mission notification, VIP
operations, 8-11
mission requirements, VIP
operations, 8-1
mission standards, VIP
operations, 8-78-9


mounted operations, nonpermissive environment, 2-5
multiple ordance incident, 5-22
5-24


## O

OCONUS IED operations, 6-1
operations, intergration, 1-26

P
F

## I

permissive environments, 3-1 platoon level operations , 1-18
1-25
post mission requirements, VIP
operations, 8-28 post RSP, establishing the
incident site, 4-59
prohibited tasks, VIP operations,
8-10
protection, tenet of EOD
operations, 4-4



## R

L

range clearnce operations, 5-39
5-40
reconnaissance, tenet of EOD
operations, 4-5
render safe and disposal, tenet of
EOD operations, 4-6
reset and resupply, establishing
the incident site, 4-66
return movement, establishing the
incident site, 4-62
RSP and disposal phase, IED
reconnaissance, 6-126-16

## M S

scope of the threat, critical
information, 4-23
security, tenet of EOD operations,
4-3
security situation, critical
information, 4-18

## Index

T
U
the threat, critical information, 4-
22
up-range recon, IED
reconnaissance, 6-11 up-range research, establishing
the incident site, 4-51

W
work party responsibilites,
chemical and biological
operations, 7-267-29

##

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

General, United States Army Chief of Staff

Official:


GERALD B. O'KEEFE
Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army
1702407

DISTRIBUTION:
Active Army, Army National Guard, and United States Army Reserve: Distributed in electronic media only (EMO).