## Civil Affairs Operations September 2006

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies and their contractors only to protect technical or operational information from automatic dissemination under the International Exchange Program or by other means. This determination was made on 20 December 2005. Other requests for this document must be referred to Commander, United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, ATTN: AOJK-DTD-CA, Fort Bragg, NC 28310-5000.

DESTRUCTION NOTICE: Destroy by any method that will prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the document. FOREIGN DISCLOSURE RESTRICTION (FD 6): This publication has been reviewed by the product developers in coordination with the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School foreign disclosure authority. This product is releasable to students from foreign countries on a case-by-case basis only.

## Headquarters, Department Of The Army Civil Affairs Operations Contents

Page

PREFACE ........v
INTRODUCTION TO CIVIL AFFAIRS........ 1-1
Chapter 1
Civil Affairs Forces Mission and Key Definitions........ 1-1 Civil Affairs Overview........ 1-2 Civil Affairs Functions and Capabilities ........ 1-6 Civil Affairs Soldiers........ 1-7 Civil Affairs Application of the Principles of War ........ 1-9 Civil Affairs Characteristics........ 1-11
CIVIL AFFAIRS ORGANIZATION........ 2-1
Chapter 2
Civil Affairs Organization, Functions, and Capabilities ........ 2-1 Civil Affairs Command (USAR) ........ 2-2 Civil Affairs Brigade (USAR)........ 2-14 Civil Affairs Brigade (Active Army) ........ 2-16 Civil Affairs Battalion (USAR) ........ 2-18 Civil Affairs Battalion (Active Army)........ 2-20 Civil Affairs Company, Civil Affairs Battalion (USAR and Active Army) ........ 2-22

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies and their contractors only to protect technical or operational information from automatic dissemination under the International Exchange Program or by other means. This determination was made on 20 December 2005. Other requests for this document must be referred to Commander, United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, ATTN: AOJK-DTD-CA, Fort Bragg, NC 28310-5000.

## Destruction Notice: Destroy By Any Method That Will Prevent Disclosure Of Contents Or Reconstruction Of The Document.

FOREIGN DISCLOSURE RESTRICTION (FD 6): This publication has been reviewed by the product developers in coordination with the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School foreign disclosure authority. This product is releasable to students from foreign countries on a case-by-case basis only. *This publication supersedes FM 41-10, 14 February 2000.

Civil Affairs Team, Civil Affairs Company, Civil Affairs Battalion (USAR and Active Army)........2-23 Command and Control........2-24
Unity of Effort ........2-25
Combatant Command Organization ........2-25 United States Special Operations Command ........2-26 United States Army Special Operations Command........2-26 United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command .....2-27 Theater Organization ........2-27 Theater Special Operations Command ........2-27 Theater Special Operations Command Civil-Military Operations Cell (J-9) .....2-29 Army Service Component Command Organization........2-29 Joint and Multinational Organization........2-30 Joint Task Forces........2-30 Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force ........2-30 Joint Special Operations Task Force........2-31 Civil-Military Operations (G-9/S-9) Staff Organization........2-33
CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS ........3-1
Chapter 3
Civil Affairs Core Tasks........3-1 Civil-Military Operations Support to Full Spectrum Operations ........3-18 Battlefield Organization........3-26 Civil-Military Operations and Information Operations........3-29 Civil Affairs Operations and Public Affairs ........3-31 Civil Affairs Operations Support to Army Special Operations Forces ........3-32 Force Protection During Civil Affairs Operations ........3-39
CIVIL AFFAIRS PLANNING ........4-1
Chapter 4
Civil Affairs Methodology ........4-1 Civil Considerations AnalysisASCOPE........4-3 Systems Analysis of the Operational Environment........4-5 ObjectivesEffectsTasks........4-6 Measures of Effectiveness and Measures of Performance........4-7 Evaluation Products ........4-8
Civil-Military Operations Working Group........4-11
Appendix A
TRANSITION CONSIDERATIONS ........ A-1
Appendix B
CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS ESTIMATE ........ B-1
Appendix C
CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS ANNEX........ C-1
Appendix D
CIVIL AFFAIRS AREA STUDY AND ASSESSMENT FORMAT ........ D-1

GLOSSARY........ Glossary-1

REFERENCES........ References-1

INDEX ........ Index-1

## Preface

Civil Affairs forces support missions in every theater, in peace and war, throughout full spectrum operations. They are a combat multiplier for every commander. The role of Civil Affairs forces in support of civil-military operations is clarified for the missions, employment, support requirements, capabilities, and limitations of these forces. Civil Affairs forces are only one of the many resources a commander has to help him with the myriad of tasks in this complex and ever-increasing mission. They are an essential element of civil-military operations by virtue of their area and linguistic orientation, cultural awareness, training in military-to-host nation (HN) advisory activities, and civilian professional skills that parallel common government functions. Although written primarily to assist Army Service Component Command (ASCC), modular Army corps, modular Army divisions, and brigade combat teams (BCTs) in conducting (planning, preparing for, executing, and assessing) Civil Affairs operations, this field manual (FM) has application in joint force operations as well. The commander must always consider the civil components within the area of operations (AO). This publication applies to the Active Army, Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, and United States Army Reserve unless otherwise stated. The proponent of this manual is the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS). Reviewers and users of this manual should submit comments and recommended changes on Department of the Army Form 2028 (*Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms*) to Commander, United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, ATTN: AOJK-DTD CA, Fort Bragg, NC 28310-5000. Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine nouns and pronouns do not refer exclusively to men.

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## Chapter 1 Introduction To Civil Affairs

Civil Affairs (CA) provides the military commander with expertise on the civil component of the operational environment. The commander uses CA's capabilities to analyze and influence the human terrain through specific processes and dedicated resources and personnel. As part of the commander's civil-military operations, CA conducts operations nested within the overall mission and intent. CA significantly helps ensure the legitimacy and credibility of the mission by advising on how to best meet the moral and legal obligations to the people affected by military operations. The key to understanding the role of CA is recognizing the importance of leveraging each relationship between the command and every individual, group, and organi zation in the operational environment to achieve a desired effect. The mission of CA forces is to engage and influence the civil populace by planning, executing, and transitioning Civil Affairs operations in Army, joint, interagency, and multinational operations to support commanders in engaging the civil component of their operational environment, in order to enhance civil-military operations or other stated U.S. objectives before, during, or after other military operations.

## Civil Affairs Forces Mission And Key Definitions

1-1. Civil-military operations involve the interaction of military forces with the civilian populace to facilitate military operations and consolidate operational objectives. A supportive civilian population can provide resources and information that facilitate friendly operations. It can also provide a positive climate for the military and diplomatic activity a nation pursues to achieve foreign policy objectives. A hostile civilian population threatens the immediate operations of deployed friendly forces and can often undermine public support at home for the policy objectives of the United States and its allies. When executed properly, civil-military operations can reduce friction between the civilian population and the military force. 1-2. FM 1-02, *Operational Terms and Graphics*, defines civil-military operations (CMO) as the activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations to consolidate and achieve U.S. objectives. CMO may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur before, during, or after other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. CMO may be performed by designated CA, by other military forces, or by a combination of CA and other forces. 1-3. CMO are conducted across full spectrum operations. When conducting CMO, commanders may employ a number of military capabilities and engage many different indigenous populations and institutions, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, HN organizations, and other governmental organizations. Among these capabilities are CA forces. CA forces can support the commander during CMO by conducting Civil Affairs operations.

1-4. Civil Affairs operations (CAO) are conducted by CA Soldiers and consist of the following core tasks:

z
Populace and resources control (PRC).
z
Foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA).
z
Civil information management (CIM).
z
Nation assistance (NA).
z
Support to civil administration (SCA).
1-5. Figure 1-1 depicts the interrelationship of CAO, CMO, and full spectrum operations. 1-6. CAO are those military operations planned, supported, executed, or transitioned by CA forces through, with, or by the indigenous populations and institutions (IPI), intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), or other governmental organizations (OGAs) to modify behaviors, to mitigate or defeat threats to civil society, and to assist in establishing the capacity for deterring or defeating future civil threats in support of CMO and other U.S. objectives.

## Civil Affairs Overview Civil-Military Operations

It is the responsibility of Combatant Commanders to plan and conduct CMO. CMO contribute to shaping the battlespace and supporting the geographic Combatant Commander's theater security cooperation plan.
JP 3-57, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations,
8 February 2001
1-7. The U.S. military can expect challenges from ever-increasing missions in a civil-military environment. As such, CA forces offer unique capabilities that not only enhance the military mission but also ultimately advance the U.S. interests. CA units are organized, equipped, and trained to accompany special operations forces (SOF), conventional forces, and interagency organizations. Helping a country in crisis requires skills that promote the U.S. military relationship with IPI, OGAs, IGOs, and NGOs. CA forces are skilled in conducting these tasks. They are CMO subject-matter experts (SMEs) and, if employed properly, can be a significant force multiplier. 1-8. CA forces are the designated Active Army and United State Army Reserve (USAR) forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct CAO and to support the commander in planning and conducting CMO. 1-9. CA forces support missions throughout full spectrum operations. Early determination of requirements, coupled with properly routed support requests, ensures timely access to CA forces. 1-10. CAO are conducted within the scope of five core tasks and may occur simultaneously or sequentially with combat operations depending on the operational environment. Although these tasks are the focus for all CA forces training, planning, and execution, they are not solely the responsibility of CA forces. As part of the larger category of CMO, these core tasks are nested within the maneuver commander's overall responsibility for planning and conducting CMO. CA forces focus on these core tasks, planning and executing them across full spectrum operations. As such, CA forces are the maneuver commander's primary asset to plan, coordinate, support, and execute CAO. 1-11. Using the base of Figure 1-2, the CMO staff, augmented by the Civil Affairs planning teams (CAPTs), develops plans that use U.S. military (including CA), coalition forces, and every available nonmilitary organization or resource to optimize CMO effects. Civil-military operation centers (CMOCs) and their civil liaison teams coordinate plans and operations with the civil component. Plans are developed by and implemented through the use of Civil Affairs teams (CATs) and CA functional specialists who conduct the key leader engagement, project management, and civil reconnaissance that feed into the supported commander's common operational picture.
1-12. During the planning process, CA Soldiers on the CMO staff provide the commander with analysis of the civil aspects that shape the environment at the tactical level using the evaluation tool known as ASCOPE (Figure 1-3). Whereas OAKOCC evaluates the physical terrain of the mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC), ASCOPE focuses on the civil considerations, evaluating the areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events of the civil terrain. CMO and CA planners further develop and implement their plans in conjunction with civilian officials from other United States Government (USG) agencies and other nonmilitary organizations, in order to synchronize U.S. and multinational efforts. 1-13. The five core tasks of CAO are interrelated with one another. Each of these core tasks may support the overall CMO goals and objectives as outlined in the civil-military strategy but rarely do they do so independently. Instead, the core tasks of CAO tie into and support one another across the full spectrum of military operations. 1-14. CA Soldiers help shape the environment for successful achievement of the desired end state of an operation and transition operations required for redeployment. (Appendix A discusses transition considerations.) According to FM 1, *The Army*, Army forces employ landpower throughout full spectrum operations. Effective employment of landpower requires securing and maintaining the initiative and combining types of operations. During joint campaigns overseas, Army forces execute a simultaneous and continuous combination of offensive, defensive, and stability operations as part of integrated joint, interagency, and multinational teams. Army forces within the United States and its territories combine offensive, defensive, and civil support operations to support homeland security concurrently with overseas campaigns. Strategically, the ability to conduct offensive, defensive, and stability operations in overseas campaigns while supporting homeland security domestically is central to full spectrum operations. Civil support operations provide Army capabilities to support homeland security directly. Overseas campaigns contribute to homeland security by taking the fight to the enemy. 1-15. *Offensive* operations carry the fight to the enemy by closing with and destroying enemy forces, seizing territory and vital resources, and imposing the commander's will on the enemy. Offensive operations focus on seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative. This active imposition of landpower makes the offense the decisive type of military operation, whether undertaken against irregular forces or the armed forces of a nation-state. In addition, the physical presence of land forces and their credible ability to conduct offensive operations enable the unimpeded conduct of stability operations. 1-16. *Defensive* operations counter enemy offensive operations. Defensive operations defeat attacks, destroying as many attackers as necessary. Defensive operations preserve control over land, protect key resources, and guard populations. Defensive operations also buy time and economize forces to allow the conduct of offensive operations elsewhere. Defensive operations not only defeat attacks but also create the conditions necessary to regain the initiative and go on the offensive or execute stability operations.

1-17. *Stability* operations sustain and exploit security and control over areas, populations, and resources.

Stability operations employ military capabilities to reconstruct or establish services and support civilian agencies. Stability operations involve both coercive and cooperative actions. Stability operations may occur before, during, and after offensive and defensive operations; however, they also occur separately, usually at the lower end of full spectrum operations. During stability operations, there is a high demand placed on CA capabilities. This can lead to an environment in which (in cooperation with a legitimate government) the other instruments of national power predominate. 1-18. Within the United States and its territories, Army forces support *homeland security* operations. Homeland security operations provide the nation strategic flexibility by protecting its citizens and infrastructure from conventional and unconventional threats. Homeland security has two components. The first component is homeland defense. If the United States comes under direct attack or is threatened by hostile armed forces, Army forces under joint command conduct offensive and defensive missions as part of homeland defense. The other component is civil support, which is the fourth type of Army operation. 1-19. *Civil Support Operations* address the consequences of man-made or natural accidents and incidents beyond the capabilities of civilian authorities. Army forces do not conduct stability operations within the United States and its territories; under U.S. law, the federal and state governments are responsible for those tasks. Instead, Army forces conduct civil support operations (CSO) when requested, providing Army expertise and capabilities to lead agency authorities.

Note. Chapter 3 provides a detailed discussion of CA support to full spectrum operations.

1-20. CAO typically support many elements of the geographic combatant commander's (GCC's) theater security cooperation plans (TSCPs). At the strategic and operational levels, especially during the implementation of the GCC TSCP, the timely application of CAO (for example, FHA and NA) can mitigate the need to apply other military operations in response to a crisis. When a crisis is unavoidable, groundwork laid by CAO can facilitate rapid, decisive operations. 1-21. Across full spectrum operations, CA and CMO planners contribute to the common operational picture by helping the supported commander and his staff visualize the entire situation. CA and CMO planners do this by analyzing the METT-TC, as described in FM 3-0, *Operations*. This analysis includes

z
Determining the need to establish one or more CMOCs and a CIM system and networks as early as possible to facilitate communication and coordination with the nonmilitary agencies operating in the AO.
z
Determining the need to employ a civil liaison team to facilitate communication and coordination with the nonmilitary agencies for operations at all echelons.
z
Developing an analysis using ASCOPE to determine what, when, where, and why civilians might be encountered in the AO, what activities those civilians are engaged in that might affect the military operation (and vice versa), and what the commander must do to support and/or interact with those civil actions, and conducting nonlethal targeting within the civilian component of the operational environment.
z
Developing the measures of effectiveness (MOEs) and measures of performance (MOPs) that generate the definition and conditions for CAO and CMO successful contribution to the supported unit's mission. Communicate and coordinate with OGAs in the development of MOEs and MOPs that support mutual goals and objectives toward the overall national strategy.
1-22. CA Soldiers advise the commander on the operational capabilities of CAPTs, CA functional specialty teams, CMOCs, civil liaison teams (CLTs), and CATs. CA Soldiers keep the commander informed of the specific actions taken by CATs and CAO/CMO that are enhancing the effectiveness of military operations. They also advise the commander on the risks associated with not engaging the civil component of the environment through CMO. CA Soldiers provide mission-essential information about the civil component of the operational environment that provides the commander with the situational awareness and situational understanding to achieve full spectrum dominance.

## Civil Affairs Functions And Capabilities

1-23. The primary function of all Army CA units is to support the warfighter by engaging the civil component of the battlefield. CA forces interface with IPI, IGOs, NGOs, other civilian and government organizations, and military forces to assist the supported commander to accomplish the mission. To meet this broad requirement, Army CA units are organized to support the Services, USG agencies, allied forces, agencies of other countries, and various IGOs, and their associated NGOs. Mission guidance and prioritiesincluding prioritized regional engagement activities and language requirementsfrom respective unified command combatant commanders provide regional focus. 1-24. CA capability requirements have shifted to meet the transforming needs of the Army. As shown in Figure 1-4, CA capabilities are aligned to support Army modularity, while maintaining SOF support, to execute CAO across the full spectrum of military operations. CA functions and capabilities are consolidated to support the BCT, the division, and the corps echelons with a CA planning capability, a CA/CMO coordinating capability, and a civil sector assessment and project management capability. 1-25. The functional capability requirement for CAO and CMO is spread across the tactical, operational, and strategic spectrums. As depicted in Table 1-1, page 1-7, these CA capabilities are designed to provide CAO/CMO planning and coordinating capabilities to supported commanders across this spectrum with functional CA specialty expertise that is scalable and modularly employable. The CA modular system is also compatible at all levels to fuse and manage civil information to provide commanders with increased situational awareness and understanding to achieve full spectrum dominance.

| Focus of Function    | Focus of     | Operational    |
|----------------------|--------------|----------------|
| Support              | Capabilities | Scope          |
| -                    |              |                |
| Develop and          |              |                |
| -                    |              |                |
|                      |              |                |
| Enable IPI and       |              |                |
| -                    |              |                |
|                      |              |                |
| U.S. Embassy         |              |                |
| OGAs                 |              |                |
| -                    |              |                |
| USAID OGAs           |              |                |
| Normal Scope:        |              |                |
| International to     |              |                |
| National             |              |                |
| -                    |              |                |
| Shape                |              |                |
| -                    |              |                |
| International        |              |                |
| Geographic           |              |                |
| Combatant            |              |                |
| Commander           |              |                |
| Strategic            |              |                |
| Operations           |              |                |
| Partners/Donors      |              |                |
| -                    |              |                |
| Development          |              |                |
| -                    |              |                |
| IGOs/NGOs            |              |                |
| Build Capacity       |              |                |
| of IPI to            |              |                |
| Provide Locally      |              |                |
| Sustainable          |              |                |
| Solutions            |              |                |
| -                    |              |                |
| Short-Term Civil     |              |                |
| -                    |              |                |
| U.S. Embassy         |              |                |
| -                    |              |                |
| Reconstruction       |              |                |
| Administration       |              |                |
| -                    |              |                |
| USAID                |              |                |
| Corps               |              |                |
| Operational to       |              |                |
| Strategic            |              |                |
| and                  |              |                |
| Development          |              |                |
| -                    |              |                |
| Stabilization,       |              |                |
| -                    |              |                |
| OGAs                 |              |                |
| Normal Scope:        |              |                |
| County/Large         |              |                |
| City to              |              |                |
| Subnational          |              |                |
| -                    |              |                |
| Enable Civil         |              |                |
| -                    |              |                |
| Example: CPA         |              |                |
| Administration       |              |                |
| IGOs/NGOs            |              |                |
| Reconstruction,      |              |                |
| and                  |              |                |
| Development          |              |                |
| -                    |              |                |
| Plan/Enable/         |              |                |
| Shape/Manage         |              |                |
| -                    |              |                |
| Planning,            |              |                |
| -                    |              |                |
| Regionally           |              |                |
| Aligned              |              |                |
| Assessment,          |              |                |
| and                  |              |                |
| Implementation       |              |                |
| -                    |              |                |
| Short-Term Civil     |              |                |
| -                    |              |                |
| Stabilization        |              |                |
| -                    |              |                |
| USAID                |              |                |
| Administration       |              |                |
| -                    |              |                |
| Reconstruction       |              |                |
| and                  |              |                |
| Reconstruction       |              |                |
| Division            |              |                |
| Tactical to          |              |                |
| Operational          |              |                |
| Teams                |              |                |
| -                    |              |                |
|                      |              |                |
| Enable HN and        |              |                |
| Normal Scope:        |              |                |
| County/Large         |              |                |
| City to              |              |                |
| Subnational          |              |                |
| OGAs                 |              |                |
| -                    |              |                |
| Enable Civil         |              |                |
| -                    |              |                |
| OGAs                 |              |                |
| Administration       |              |                |
| -                    |              |                |
| Stabilization        |              |                |
| -                    |              |                |
| IGOs/NGOs            |              |                |
| -                    |              |                |
| Plan/Enable/         |              |                |
| and                  |              |                |
| Reconstruction       |              |                |
| -                    |              |                |
| Planning and         |              |                |
| Shape/Manage         |              |                |
| (Execution           |              |                |
| Oriented)            |              |                |
| Assessment           |              |                |
| -                    |              |                |
| CIM                  |              |                |
| -                    |              |                |
| Plan, Assess,        |              |                |
| -                    |              |                |
| Immediate HA         |              |                |
| -                    |              |                |
| DART                 |              |                |
| -                    |              |                |
| OGA                  |              |                |
| to Prevent           |              |                |
| Crisis               |              |                |
| Normal Scope:        |              |                |
| Large City to        |              |                |
| Provincial           |              |                |
| -                    |              |                |
| IGOs/NGOs            |              |                |
| Brigade              |              |                |
| Combat               |              |                |
| Team                |              |                |
| Tactical             |              |                |
| and Enable           |              |                |
| Local                |              |                |
| Stabilization        |              |                |
| Activities           |              |                |

## Civil Affairs Soldiers

1-26. CA Soldiers, Active Army or USAR, enter the CA branch (38), functional area (38), or career field designation (38) with a variety of backgrounds, experience, and expertise. Most CA Soldiers are designated as 38s except for Judge Advocate officers (AOC 27A) and officers in the Army Medical Department (AMEDD) branches. Military operational and planning expertise, enhanced by CA training and coupled with the skills and capabilities obtained in the civil sector, make CA Soldiers unique in the Army. Individually and collectively, CA Soldiers apply their knowledge and talents in various ways to meet the needs of the supported commander.

## Civil Affairs Common Skill Sets

1-27. CA generalists and functional specialists are first and foremost, U.S. Army Soldiers capable of planning, coordinating, executing, and transitioning CAO and CMO at the joint, interagency, multinational, and coalition levels, while maintaining the responsiveness to meet the challenges and the adaptability to comfortably operate in ambiguous situations. To meet these challenges, CA Soldiers must be well-versed in the following CA common skill sets:

z
Warrior Skills. Able to perform as a member on a combat operation using individual and squad movement techniques (mounted and dismounted) and executing live-fire defensive protective
measures with common weapon systems. Skilled in basic combative techniques and force protection (FP) measures.
z
Communications. Able to perform routine short- and long-range (secured and unsecured)
communications, including message formatting, encryption, and decryption.
z
Civil Information Management. Able to perform using automation devices to conduct civil reconnaissance for the CIM process that can be partitioned from traditional military intelligence systems while maintaining the capability to geo-reference and interface pertinent civil and threat
data to assist in developing the civil inputs to the common operational picture (COP) of the operational area, and establishing and maintaining a situation map. Familiar with common Army, joint, interagency, and multinational operational terms, graphics and symbols, and determining civil, military, and environmental threat identification and classification.
z
Fieldcraft and Survival. Able to perform evading and surviving in all environmental conditions using fieldcraft techniques, and conventional and unconventional survival procedures.
z
Land Navigation. Able to navigate in all environments over short and long distances individually or in groups, mounted and dismounted using advanced positioning devices, orienteering techniques, map and compass, and terrain association to accurately arrive at a
destination.
z
Medical. Able to administer immediate combat medical life-saving treatment to a wounded or distressed individual in preparation for emergency evacuation.
z
Methods of Instruction. Able to deliver performance-oriented training to teach civil/military subjects.
z
Language. Select are able to communicate in the Soldier's assigned foreign language and may have limited ability to express themselves within the context of the customs, traditions, and mores of a specific culture or mix of cultures endemic to the area of responsibility (AOR).
z
Regional Focus and Cultural Awareness. Knowledgeable of regional geography, political, social, and economic systems. Familiar with IPI and their specific regional religious and ethnic
differences, and able to operate within the cultures indigenous to the AOR.
z
Negotiation and Mediation. Able to mediate, negotiate, and facilitate interaction across the civil-military spectrum.
z
CA Mission Planning. Able to plan for, execute, and continually assess CAO. Able to advise conventional and unconventional units in CMO. Able to conduct CA support mission planning. Able to prepare to transition CAO.
z
Information Operations. Able to synchronize CAO with information operations (IO) objectives. Able to support the IO plan and integrate indigenous information systems and institutions.
z
Project Management. Able to manage projects and programs associated with the delivery of effects, to include financial management.
z
International Civilian Response. Familiar with the international civilian organizations (United Nations [UN], International Committee of the Red Cross [ICRC], and so on) mandated with responding to the needs of civilian populations (for example, refugees, internally displaced persons [IDPs], other vulnerable persons, and so on).

## Civil Affairs Generalists

1-28. Most active-duty CMO staff personnel and CA personnel assigned to tactical units are CA generalists. When employed, CA generalists support the commander's immediate needs by planning and coordinating CAO that support the CMO goals and objectives as outlined in the supporting CMO strategy. The ability to negotiate with local civilians and a thorough knowledge of the military decision-making process (MDMP) are critical skills of the CA generalist. Many CA generalists have acquired basic skills found at a more developed level in the CA functional specialists. CA generalists all possess general administrative and management skills whereas functional specialists typically have technical skills. Effective CMO begin with the CA generalist's estimate of the situation and continues through course of action (COA) development and mission execution. Civil reconnaissance assists CMO planners and CA functional specialists in completing detailed planning for CMO to be conducted.

## Civil Affairs Functional Specialties

1-29. Civil Affairs commands (CACOMs) provide expertise in six functional specialty areas: rule of law, economic stability, governance, public health and welfare, infrastructure, and public education and information. USAR CA brigades and battalions have capabilities in four of the functional specialty areas: rule of law, governance, health and welfare, and infrastructure. Although the Active Army CA battalions have the capability to execute missions in some of these functional specialty areas, they are not organized to maintain the high-level skills required for specialized CAO. Within each functional specialty area, technically qualified and experienced individuals, known as CA functional specialists, advise and assist the commander and can assist or direct their civilian counterparts. These functional specialists, especially at the operational and strategic levels, may be employed in general support of interagency operations, in addition to direct support of military operations.

## Civil Affairs Application Of The Principles Of War

1-30. The principles of war are the basis of warfighting doctrine. Although war calls for the direct application of military force, CA commanders must consider all facets of the operational environment. They provide input to the supported unit operation plans (OPLANs), operation plans in concept format (CONPLANs), and functional plans (FUNCPLANs) focusing primarily on the impact of the civil component on military operations. The following paragraphs describe how these basic military principles relate to CAO.

## Objective

1-31. CA forces direct every operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable goal. A strategic military objective is subordinate to, and must fulfill, a political objective. Likewise, operational and tactical objectives must fulfill strategic military objectives and thus realize political objectives. Once strategic, operational, and tactical military objectives are specified, CA assets support commanders by

z
Planning, coordinating, and executing CAO in support of the commander's tactical and operational objectives to achieve his desired effects.
z
Planning, coordinating, and supporting CMO in support of the commander's tactical and operational objectives to achieve his desired effects.
z
Developing and monitoring MOEs to ensure objectives are being met within the civil component, including political, economic, and informational objectives.
z
Advising commanders on the political, cultural, and economic impacts of planned operations and their impact on overall objectives.
z
Increasing legitimacy of the HN government by executing operations and projects in consultation and coordination with civilian agencies and in accordance with local government priorities of work. At the project completion, the public affairs officer (PAO) publicizes in the local media in support of the IO plan and the CMO objectives.

## Offensive

1-32. CA forces seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. They support offensive operations by
z
Gaining, maintaining, influencing, and enhancing positive relationships with the IPI in promotion of U.S. objectives.
z
Proactively engaging key IGOs, NGOs, OGAs, civil leaders, and community members to set conditions for future success by synchronizing civilian support for and noninterference with military operations.
z
Consulting and coordinating with civilian agencies to quickly begin posthostility operations and projects to accelerate the return to normalcy. At the project completion, the PAO publicizes in
the local media in support of the IO plan and the CMO objectives.
z
Leveraging resources and encouraging friendly forces to minimize destruction of the civil
infrastructure.

## Maneuver

1-33. CA forces place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the flexible application of combat power. Related to mass, maneuver incorporates flexibility, mobility, and maneuverability. The local populace can either help or hinder maneuver operations. CA forces support maneuverability by

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Developing, coordinating, and executing plans to positively influence target populations to support the commanders' objectives, and to minimize the negative impact of military operations on civilian populations and interference by civilians during combat operations.
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Recommending routes that minimize the impact on civil population centers.
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Developing the restricted target list (RTL) (civilian supplement), including such items as cultural landmarks, humanitarian assets (for example, hospitals, schools, and IGO and NGO offices), critical infrastructure (for example, water supply systems), and museums.

## Mass

1-34. CA forces mass the effects of combat power in a decisive manner in time and space. The principle of mass requires the quick assembly of forces and resources at a particular place and time. CA units can recommend secure areas where population density, local support, logistical support, and transportation routes support the massing of friendly forces. CA units mass

z
Functional specialists to assist the supported commander to achieve desired effects.
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CA or CMO planners to support a commander's main effort element.
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CATs during combat, stability operations in time or space to shape the battlefield for follow-on
operations, determine the immediate needs of the populace, or shape the battlefield for transition.

## Economy Of Force

1-35. CA forces employ all combat power available in the most effective way possible, and allocate minimum-essential combat power to secondary efforts. CA units lessen the need to divert combat-ready troops from essential duties by planning for and employing local resources to maintain order and provide logistical support and services. In consultation and coordination with civilian agencies, CA forces deliver projects and programs that meet MOEs with the least expenditure of funds to achieve the greatest positive effects in the supported commander's AO.

## Surprise

1-36. CA forces achieve effects disproportionate to the effort by taking unexpected action. The element of surprise is difficult to achieve in highly populated areas. Concealing concentrations of forces from the local populace to maintain the element of surprise can be difficult. However, CA forces can enhance the effectiveness of surprise by coordinating necessary aspects of the plan with local authorities, and with internationally mandated IGOs that are chartered to provide care for affected civilian populations.

## Security

1-37. CA forces never allow the enemy to acquire an unexpected advantage. Security includes measures taken by a military unit, an activity, or an installation to protect itself against acts that may impair its effectiveness. CAO support security by

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Providing cultural awareness, advice, and assistance within the military to minimize cultural conflict between military forces and the civil population.
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Planning, managing, and providing oversight on projects according to existing principles and
standards and engaging civil leaders to get support for U.S. national objectives.
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Separating potential terrorists or enemy SOF from the support of the civilian populace by conducting projects that meet the supported commander's objectives, while putting an HN face
to them by engaging civil leaders.

## Unity Of Command

1-38. CA forces achieve common purpose and direction through unity of command, coordination, and cooperation. To achieve unity of effort, CA units must have a clear, concise chain of command that maxi mizes the effectiveness of their mission. During combined operations with indigenous military forces, CA Soldiers must stress the requirement for cooperation between indigenous military and civilian organizations.

## Simplicity

1-39. CA forces prepare uncomplicated concepts and plans and direct concise orders to ensure thorough understanding. CA relationships are simplified using a single staff focal point. The CMO staff officer can relieve the unit staff of many related functions. CA orders and CMO estimates (Appendix B) and annexes (Appendix C) must be simple and direct. They must also be supportable by the available resources. Early coordination and negotiations with civil authorities can ensure effective, successful operations.

## Civil Affairs Characteristics

1-40. All CA forces share a common set of characteristics articulated in the *Army Vision*. These char acteristics include: responsiveness, agility, versatility, lethality, survivability, sustainability, and trainability.
1-41. *Responsiveness*. To be truly responsive to the needs of the Army, CA forces must be deployable and capable of quickly and effectively engaging the civil component of the AOR. The primary means that the CA force uses to coordinate actions and engage the civil component are the CMOC, the CLTs, and the CATs. Additionally, some CA forces are capable of airborne or air assault insertion. CA units ensure a shared COP with key nonorganic resources to exploit mutual strengths and reduce and protect vulnerabilities. CA units are capable of independent operations for a minimum of 3 days regardless of the operational tempo (OPTEMPO). Because CA units must remain responsive to the needs of joint, coalition, OGAs, interagency, conventional forces, SOF, IGOs, and NGOs, they possess robust communications capability. CA units are outfitted with the latest military secure and nonsecure voice and digital communications equipment so that they have reachback capability regardless of assignment, to CA specialists, IGOs, NGOs, and OGAs throughout the AOR. 1-42. *Agility*. CA leaders are schooled in military art and science, doctrine, and regional and cultural awareness, and are adept at troop leading in dynamic and fluid operational environments. This agility allows the CA leader to leverage military and civil resources to achieve U.S. and coalition force objectives. The CA/CMO command and control (C2) systems are optimized for mission accomplishment and allow the civil elements of the COP to be updated continuously and shared across the force. Agility also allows the CA unit to share nontactical information with IPI, IGOs, NGOs, and OGAs outside the force, while facilitating rapid CMO decision making. 1-43. *Versatility*. CA units have the inherent capability to conduct decisive CAO in support of CMO in all conditions synchronized with Army and joint fires, reconnaissance, surveillance, and targeting acquisition (RSTA), and nonorganic assets. Although CA battalions are organized for maximum operability and effec tiveness, to include embedded CMOC and CLT organizations, they may be adapted to changes in mission. 1-44. *Lethality*. CA forces support lethality by providing commanders with civil information to increase their situational awareness and understanding to achieve full spectrum dominance. CA forces do this through civil reconnaissance (CR) and nonlethal targeting to shape the battlefield, inform the lethal targeting process, and mitigate civilian interference and collateral damage resulting from lethal targeting.

1-45. *Survivability*. CA commanders must attempt to accomplish a mission with minimal loss of personnel, equipment, and supplies by integrating FP considerations into all aspects of CAO. CA units must take advantage of all available technologies that provide maximum protection at the Soldier level. Further, CA Soldiers gain significant survivability advantages through the development of rapport with IPI, IGOs, NGOs, and OGAs who recognize that their success is tied to the ability of CA Soldiers to operate in the AO. Survivability is achieved through situational awareness, force design, and collective training.

1-46. *Sustainability*. CA units rely on technology to provide reachback (secure, nonsecure, voice, and digital), access to supplies, local nation supply procurement, and assistance of OGAs, IPI, IGOs, and NGOs for civil assistance support. CA forces support mission sustainability by planning and conducting CAO/CMO through, by, and with IPI, IGOs, NGOs, HN, and OGAs. This support involves providing assistance, coordination, and training to facilitate complete transition of CAO/CMO to IPI, IGOs, NGOs, HN, and OGA authorities. This type of CA support provides continuity and sustainability of CMO and ultimately the success of national objectives in a joint operations area (JOA)/AOR. 1-47. *Trainability*. CA forces must train to, and maintain the highest levels of readiness. CA leaders must be able to train their units without significant external support, be adaptive, and be able to learn and train during operations.

## Chapter 2 Civil Affairs Organization

On 17 August 1955, the CA Military Government Branch became the USAR Branch; on 2 October 1959, it became the CA Branch. The major organizational development of the branch traces back to the expansion of the War Department during World War II. At that time, the War and Navy Departments relied primarily upon volunteers from specific civilian careers for consolidation, occupation, and posthostility operations. In exchange for their services, the volunteers received commissions and appropriate military, area, and language training. The Army seeks to capitalize on the unique capabilities of today's citizen-Soldiers who offer high levels of civilian experience and military education appropriate to their grades. The experiences, coupled with military operational and planning expertise, result in Soldiers who can support contingencies across the full spectrum of military operations. CA personnel support commanders in a broad spectrum of missions, from liaison to the assumption of executive, legislative, and judicial processes in occupied areas or nations emerging from conflict.

## Civil Affairs Organization, Functions, And Capabilities

2-1. The primary function of all Army CA units is to provide the supported commander, from the GCC and below, the capability to engage the civil component of the operational environment. To accomplish this broad function, Army CA units are organized to support allied forces, the Services, USG agencies, agencies of other countries, and various IGOs. Mission guidance and priorities from GCCs provide regional focus. This focus includes prioritizing regional engagement activities and language requirements. 2-2. CA units support SOF and conventional forces at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. Most of the Army CA force is in the USAR. This force consists of four regionally aligned CACOMs that support one of four unified combatant commands (United States Pacific Command [USPACOM], United States European Command [USEUCOM], United States Central Command [USCENTCOM], and United States Southern Command [USSOUTHCOM]). The Active Army CA brigade has regionally focused battalions that provide CA support to the respective combatant commands anywhere in the world. This capability meets initial CA force requirements during contingency operations. Subsequent transition to USAR CA forces begins as soon as the forces can be mobilized and deployed to the AO. Because Active Army and USAR CA units are regionally focused and culturally aware, they have expertise in the cultural and political aspects of countries within a region. 2-3. To meet the increased need for a rapid deployment CA capability, the Army established an Active Army, airborne-qualified, CA brigade with a worldwide mission. Composed of four battalions with four line companies that are capable of performing Defense Planning Guidance (DPG)-directed missions, of executing comprehensive TSCPs, and of supporting GCCs during major combat operations (MCOs) and lesser contingency operations (LCOs). Figure 2-1, page 2-2, shows the previous breakdown of USAR CA forces, the USAR CA force structure that supports Army modularity, and the levels of command that are supported under the realigned force structure.

## Civil Affairs Command (Usar)

2-4. The Army force structure has four CACOMs, all in the USAR. Each CACOM functions as the CA
capability for one of four GCCsUSPACOM, USEUCOM, USCENTCOM, or USSOUTHCOM. The CACOM develops plans, policy, and programs through planning teams, fusion of information management, engagement, and analysis at the strategic and theater level. Its primary mission is to provide theater-level CA planning, coordination, policies, and programs in support of stabilization, reconstruction, and development efforts. The CACOM may deploy a theater-level CMOC to coordinate, analyze, and enable policies, programs, and CMO capabilities in support of the GCC and to develop and manage the strategic-level civil inputs to the COP for the GCC.

## Functions

2-5. The functions of the CACOM are to
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Serve as the GCC's senior CA advisor (CACOM commander).
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Serve as the theater-level focal point for civil-military coordination, collaboration, and consensus by providing subject-matter expertise to guide strategic-level military planners in melding their planning into a comprehensive civil-military campaign plan.
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Provide theater-level staff plugs to the GCC, subunified, and Service component commands.
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Formulate CA OPLANs to support the theater policy for PRC, FHA, CIM, NA, and SCA operations.
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Assist in establishing plans and policies for CMO support of all CONPLANs and OPLANs for the GCC and operational plans for the components.
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Program (assist) and manage theater-level spending implementation plans and policies to resource CMO projects by using various resources (Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Aid [OHDACA], commander's emergency response program [CERP], and commander's quick impact). (Having a dedicated contracting officer and financial management officer is key to this function.)
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Plan and help to set the conditions for the transition of stabilization, reconstruction, and development to civil authority.
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Conduct short-term support to civil administration and enable HN government functions. Routinely know and support IO core capabilities in indigenous government capacitybuilding
and delivery of government services.
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Provide theater-level analysis of specified civil information in coordination with the joint interagency coordination group (JIACG); develop strategic-level civil inputs to the supported commander's COP.
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Conduct C2 systems management of CAO and select theater-level CMO functions and capabilities (forces).
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Prepare to establish theater-level core of joint civil-military operations task force (JCMOTF) and/or combined joint civil-military operations task force (CJCMOTF).
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Liaise with supported military, OGAs, IGOs, NGOs, and IPI in-theater.
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Train, equip, mobilize, and deploy assigned or attached CA forces.
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Employ modular packages of technical expertise in the six CA functional areas to plan, coordinate, assess, or manage CAO based on mission requirements.
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Provide predeployment C2 of assigned and attached CA brigades, battalions, and companies.

## Capabilities

2-6. The CACOM has the following capabilities:
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Provide the CAPTs at the theater level with CA planning and regionally aligned plug-and-play capabilities that support the GCC, corps, and theater special operations command (TSOC).
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Provide the GCC/TSOC CMO cell with durational theater-level management of plans, policies,
and programs in support of the GCC civil-military objectives (TSCP, interagency) by
 Forming the core of the operational-level JCMOTF and being C2 system-capable.  Serving as a mechanism for theater-level civil-military coordination, collaboration, and
communication.
 Networking to theater CMOCs and CA elements via computer and communications
systems.
 Serving as the reachback capability for all CMOCs and CA elements within the theater of
operations.
 Conducting split operationsforward and rearin support of GCC HQ elements.
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Provide the CLTs with national-level to international-level interface/liaise capabilities between civil-military, HN, and humanitarian elements within and outside the theater of operations. Serve as the "storefronts" for the CACOM CMOC, where the military meet with the civil populace, the HN, and the humanitarian community.
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Provide the CIM cell-supported commander the capability to manage the flow of civil information, and develop the strategic-level civil components to the COP. Provide open access of data and analysis to other elements of the supported unit HQ and subordinate units. Provide releasable data and updates to IGOs, NGOs, and appropriate civilian entities.
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Provide the functional specialty cells with a modular package of functional experts that plan and enable HN government functions across the six functional areas:
 *Rule of law* pertains to the fair, competent, and efficient application and fair and effective
enforcement of the civil and criminal laws of a society through impartial legal institutions
and competent police and corrections systems. This functional area includes judge advocates trained in international and comparative law as well as CA specialists in related subjects.
 *Economic stability* pertains to the efficient management (for example, production,
distribution, trade, and consumption) of resources, goods, and services to ensure the viability of a society's economic system. This discipline includes CA specialists in economic development, civilian supply, and food and agriculture.
 *Infrastructure* pertains to designing, building, and maintaining the organizations, systems,
and architecture required to support transportation, water, communications, and power. This discipline includes CA specialists in public transportation, public works and utilities, and public communication.
 *Governance* pertains to creating, resourcing, managing, and sustaining the institutions and
processes through which a society is governed, is protected, and prospers. This discipline includes CA specialists in public administration, environmental management, and public safety areas.
 *Public health and welfare* pertains to the systems, institutions, programs, and practices that
promote the physical, mental, and social well-being of a society. This discipline includes CA specialists in public health and cultural relations.
 *Public education and information* pertains to designing, resourcing, and implementing
public education and public information programs and systems through media and formal education institutions. This discipline includes CA specialists in public education and civil information.

## Organization

2-7. A CACOM (Figure 2-2, page 2-5) consists of a headquarters and headquarters company (HHC), five CAPTs, and a CMOC capable of split operations (forward and rear) with three functional specialty cells, two CLTs, and a CIM cell.

## Civil Affairs Planning Teams, Cacom

2-8. The CACOM is assigned five CAPTs. The teams are designed to develop complete CA plans, policy, and programs that support the GCC's strategic CMO plans. The members of this team are wellskilled in Army planning (MDMP) and joint planning (Joint Operation Planning and Execution System [JOPES]). Team members have the required grade structure and training to provide support at the geographic combatant command, TSOC, joint force land component command, and the ASCC staff levels. As required, the CACOM CAPTs can provide SME support to the GCC's staff, the TSOC, or to a joint task force (JTF). The CAPTs assist CMO and other military planners with integrating the supported commander's military campaign plans into wider political-military, or comprehensive civilian-military strategic campaign plans.

## Civil-Military Operations Center

2-9. The CMOC is a standing capability formed by all CA units from the company level to the CACOM level. The CMOC serves as the primary coordination interface for the U.S. armed forces and IPI, humanitarian organizations, IGOs, NGOs, multinational military forces, and other civilian agencies of the USG. The CMOC facilitates continuous coordination among the key participants with regard to CMO and CAO from local levels to international levels within a given AO, and develops, manages, and analyzes the civil inputs to the COP. The CMOC is the operations and support element of the CA unit as well as a mechanism for the coordination of CMO.

## Civil Liaison Team, Cacom

2-10. CLTs are found at the CACOM, CA brigade, and CA battalion levels. The CLTs are organic components of the CMOCs they support. The CLT extends the outreach of its parent CMOC into multiple areas. It provides limited civil-military interface capability as a spoke for the exchange of information among IPI, IGOs, NGOs, and OGAs and has limited capability to link resources to prioritized requirements. The CLT is a stand-alone team for the CMOC that acts in the same role as a CAT does for a battalion. It provides the supported level CMOC with a storefront for CAO and CMO coordination capability without interfering with the regular staff functions.

## Civil Information Management Cell, Cmoc (Battalion To Cacom)

2-11. The CIM cell is located within the CMOC from the CA battalion to the CACOM levels. It collects civil information, enters it into a central database, and internally fuses civil information with the supported element, higher HQ, other USG/DOD agencies, and other agencies/organizations as appropriate. Coordination among other elements will ensure the timely availability of information for analysis and the widest possible dissemination of raw and analyzed civil information to all levels throughout the AO. The civil information grid (CIG) (Figure 2-3, page 2-6) shows how the CIM cell accomplishes distribution.

## Functions

2-12. The functions of the CIM cell are to
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Collect and consolidate civil information from CATs, CLTs, other military elements, USG and multinational agencies, IPI, IGOs, and NGOs and act as the primary interface between the
sensors and analysts.
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Collate information to create the civil input to the COP for the CMOC and supported unit.
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Fuse civil information with the supported element, higher HQ, other USG/DOD agencies and organizations as appropriate.

## Capabilities

2-13. Capabilities of the CIM cell are to
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Support the CJCMOTF by receiving, collating, transmitting, and integrating civil information to joint military, interagency customers, IGOs, and NGOs (CA brigade and CACOM).
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Serve as the CMOC's consolidation, synchronization, and communications center for developing and transmitting civil inputs to the COP.
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Manage the information flow among various CA elements.
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Facilitate rapid CMO decision-making.
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Filter information of intelligence value and redirect it into appropriate intelligence channels.
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Contribute to the supported commander's COP by providing actionable information that helps build capacity and isolates belligerents, obstructionists, and threats.
2-14. CA Soldiers must not appear to be active intelligence gatherers. They do, however, have unique information requirements (IRs)items of information on the enemy and his environment that may affect mission accomplishment. Before deploying into any AOwhether by friendly agreement, as part of a liberating force, or in an occupational roleCA units develop specific CA-unique IRs. The necessity to gather information on the target within a specific area and its people and on source material and agencies relevant to the operation is essential to mission preparation and execution. The CA functional specialists provide broad guidelines for CA IRs that must be satisfied before and during deployment. It is imperative that pertinent IRs are fed into the intelligence cycle as early as possible so unit intelligence personnel can either answer them based on existing databases or push them forward in the form of requests for information (RFIs). Such IRs might include, but are not limited to

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Typography, hydrography, climate, weather, and terrain, including landforms, drainage, vegetation, and soils.
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Census, location, ethnic composition, and health factors of the population.
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Attitude of the population, including ideological, religious, and cultural aspects.
z
Government structure, including forms, personalities, existing laws, and political heritage.
z
Educational standards and facilities and important cultural activities and repositories.
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Communications, transportation, utility, power, and natural resources.
z
Labor potential, including availability by type and skill, practices, and organizations.
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Economic development, including principal industries, scientific and technical capabilities, commercial processes, banking structure, monetary system, price and commodity controls, extent and nature of agricultural production, and accustomed population dietary habits.
z
Cores of resistance movements.
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Organization and operation of guerrilla forces in rear areas and the extent and degree of volition involved in local support.
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Hostile activities, including espionage, sabotage, and other factors of subversion and disaffection.

## Civil Affairs Functional Specialty Cell, Cacom

2-15. The CACOM provides three CA functional specialty cells that contain specialists in all six of the CA functional specialty areas (Figure 2-4). These cells are composed of Soldiers, both officer and enlisted, with technical expertise in the civilian sectors most likely to have an impact on CMO. Each CAO that a cell is called on to support may require a different emphasis on skills and team composition. A transition operation, in which the military force is redeploying home while the foreign nation (FN)/HN reestablishes civilian services, may place greater emphasis on infrastructure, economic stability, and public administration, whereas an FHA operation may demand public safety, rule of law, and public health and welfare. A wide variety of civilian skills may qualify for work in one of the six functional areas. The North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) codes can be used to determine applicable skills for inclusion into a functional skill area.

## Rule Of Law Section

2-16. The purpose of rule of law operations is to create security and stability for the civilian population by restoring and enhancing the effective and fair administration and enforcement of justice. Rule of law operations are of great importance in stability operations. Rule of law operations are particularly significant in the immediate aftermath of major ground combat operations, when it is imperative to restore order to the civilian population in the vacuum that almost inevitably results when the routine administration of the society is disrupted by combat. Close coordination between the Rule of Law Section and the Governance Section for synchronization and synergy between efforts to restore, reform, and assist the court and legal system and efforts to restore, reform and assist the public safety system is critical. A judicial system is powerless without an effective public safety system, whereas a public safety system is not legitimate without a fair and efficient judicial system. 2-17. Rule of law operations include measures to

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Provide for the restoration of order in the immediate aftermath of military operations.
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Provide for reestablishing routine police functions, such as controlling the population, crime prevention, investigating crimes, and arresting those who commit crimes.
z
Restore and enhance the operation of the court system, to include vetting and training judges, prosecutors, defense counsel, legal advisors and administrators, and restoring and equipping court and administrative facilities.
z
Restore and reform the HN civil and criminal legal system, to include reviewing and revising statutes, codes, decrees, and other laws to ensure compliance with international legal standards, as well as adopting transitional measures for the immediate administration of justice.
z
Provide for an effective corrections system that complies with international standards, to include selecting, vetting, and training corrections officials, and constructing or renovating appropriate facilities.
2-18. Rule of law operations will rarely, if ever, be exclusively a military or even a USG activity. Rule of law operations must be a collaborative effort involving

z
U.S. military assets, including military police (MP), engineers, combat forces, logistical elements, legal personnel, and CA personnel.
z
Other agencies of the federal government, to include Department of State (DOS), Department of Justice (DOJ), and United States Agency for International Development (USAID).
z
IGOs.
z
Coalition and other national elements, including military and civilian agencies.
z
NGOs engaged in judicial and legal reform.
z
HN legal professionals, including judges, prosecutors, defense counsel, legal advisors, legal administrators, and legal educators.
z
HN law enforcement personnel, including administrators, police, investigators, and trainers.
z
Other HN government officials.
2-19. In CA organizations and task-organized forces based on CA organizations, the rule of law operations are carried out by judge advocate personnel assigned or attached to the CA organization, by CA specialists in public safety with a background in law enforcement, and others with backgrounds in judicial administration, corrections, and other relevant areas. Rule of Law Section personnel may be detailed to work with an interagency, international, or other group carrying out rule of law operations. The judge advocates in the Rule of Law Section must have extensive training in international law, comparative law, and human rights law.

## Capabilities

2-20. Capabilities of the Rule of Law Section are to
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Determine the capabilities and effectiveness of the HN legal systems and the impact of those on CMO.
z
Evaluate the HN legal system, to include reviewing statutes, codes, decrees, regulations, procedures, and legal traditions for compliance with international standards, and advising and assisting the HN and other rule of law participants in the process of developing transitional codes and procedures and long-term legal reform.
z
Evaluate the personnel, judicial infrastructure, and equipment of the HN court system to determine requirements for training, repair and construction, and acquisition.
z
Provide support to transitional justice, to include acting as judges, magistrates, prosecutors, defense counsel, legal advisors, and court administrators when required.
z
Coordinate rule of law efforts involving U.S. and coalition military, other U.S. agencies, IGOs, NGOs, and HN authorities.
z
Assist the Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) in educating and training U.S. personnel in the indigenous legal system, obligations, and consequences.
z
Advise and assist the SJA in international and HN legal issues as required.
z
Assist the SJA with regard to status-of-forces agreement (SOFA) and status-of-mission agreement issues.
z
Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and assessing indigenous public safety systems, agencies, services, personnel, and resources.
z
Advise and assist in establishing the technical requirements for government public safety systems to support government administration (police and law enforcement administration and penal systems).

## Functions

2-21. By statute, the Judge Advocate General (JAG) is "the legal advisor of the Secretary of the Army and of all officers and agencies of the Department of the Army" (Section 3037, Title 10, United States Code [10 USC 3037]). The JAG carries out this statutory mission thorough the military attorneys of the JAG Corps and the civilian attorneys who work under the JAG's qualifying authority. These attorneys are responsible to the JAG under statute, Army regulations, and codes of professional conduct by which licensed attorneys are governed, and are the only persons authorized to practice law in the Army. 2-22. Many activities conducted in rule of law operations involve the practice of law, and therefore must be performed by JAG or other attorneys under the JAG's supervision. These activities include

z
Evaluating and assisting in developing transitional decrees, codes, ordinances and other measures intended to bring immediate order to areas in which the HN legal system is impaired or nonfunctioning.
z
Evaluating the reform of HN laws to ensure compliance with international legal standards and providing appropriate assistance to the drafting and review process when necessary.
z
Evaluating legal training given to HN judges, prosecutors, defense counsels, and legal advisors, and providing appropriate training when necessary.
z
Evaluating the legal training given police and corrections officials to ensure compliance with international human rights standards.
z
Serving as judges, magistrates, prosecutors, defense counsels and legal advisors for transitional courts.
z
Evaluating legal and administrative procedures to ensure compliance with international law, the law of the power administering the territory, and the law of the supported country.
z
Determining which HN offices and functions have the legal authority to evaluate, reform, and implement the law.
z
Advising U.S. military commanders and U.S., international, and HN authorities on the status of the HN legal system and its compliance with international standards, and providing recommended reforms.
z
Advising U.S. military commanders and others on the application of international law, U.S. domestic law, and HN law to the process of restoring and enhancing rule of law in the HN.
2-23. Normally, a senior judge advocate (lieutenant colonel [LTC] or colonel [COL]) will be assigned to be the SJA and the senior rule of law officer (SROLO) for the brigade, CACOM, JCMOTF, or other organizations conducting CMO. The SJA/SROLO will have two functions: as the SJA, he is the legal advisor to the commander and will be on the commander's personal staff. As the SROLO, he is the chief of the Rule of Law Section. The SJA/SROLO will provide staff supervision of rule of law operations and other legal activities of the judge advocates in the organization. The SJA/SROLO will be under the technical supervision of the SJA of the higher-level command or task force.

## Economic Stability Section

2-24. The Economic Stability Section consists of functional specialists in economic fields and business administration. It provides technical expertise, staff advice, and planning assistance to the supported command. The section conducts assessments of government, corporate, and private resources and systems. Using these assessments, based on their civilian skills, the team determines how to assist in the efficient management of resources, goods, and services to enhance the viability of the society's economic system.

The Economic Stability Section provides recommendations and, when appropriate, direction to maintain, sustain, and improve economic systems and services. Some skills found in this section include economists, bankers, supply technicians, business administrators, entrepreneurs, agriculturalists/farmers, food specialists and technicians, marketing and distribution specialists, and other officer and enlisted personnel whose civilian skills make them suitable for improving a nation's economic system. 2-25. Capabilities of the Economic Stability Section are to

z
Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and assessing food and agriculture systems, agencies, services, personnel, resources, and facilities.
z
Determine the capabilities and effectiveness of food and agricultural systems and the impact of those systems on CMO.
z
Develop plans, policies, and procedures and provide operational oversight and supervision in rehabilitating or establishing food and agricultural systems, and agencies for producing, processing, storing, transporting, distributing, and marketing.
z
Coordinate the use of indigenous government and commercial food and agricultural resources for military use, for CMO, and in support of government administration.
z
Advise and assist in establishing the technical requirements for food and agricultural resources (livestock, poultry, grain, vegetables, fruit, fish, fiber, and forestry) management to support government administration.
z
Advise and assist in rehabilitating, establishing, delivering, and maintaining food and agricultural systems and agencies.
z
Assist in coordinating IPI, IGO, NGO, and U.S. assistance and resources to support food and agricultural systems as part of CMO (crop and livestock improvement, agricultural training, and education).
z
Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in monitoring and assessing the indigenous economy, economic systems, commercial activities, agencies, services, personnel, and resources.
z
Determine the capabilities and effectiveness of economic systems and the impact of those systems on CMO.
z
Develop plans, policies, and procedures and provide operational oversight and supervision in rehabilitating or establishing economic and commercial systems, agencies, and resources.
z
Advise and assist with budgetary systems, monetary and fiscal policies, revenue-producing systems, and treasury operations.
z
Advise and assist in price control and rationing programs.
z
Develop and implement plans to prevent black-market activities.
z
Conduct liaison and coordinate with local government administration agencies and commercial enterprises in support of CMO.
z
Advise and assist in restoring, establishing, organizing, and operating economic and commerce systems, agencies, and organizations.
z
Advise and assist in the technical administrative requirements of employing economic controls (price controls, rationing programs, prevention of black-market activities, monetary and fiscal
policies, and labor).
z
Advise and assist in employing local commercial resources, including labor, to support government administration, CMO, and military use.
z
Assist in coordinating IPI, IGO, NGO, and U.S. assistance and resources to support local economic development as part of CMO.
z
Advise and assist the SJA and contracting officials in indigenous peoples' cultural intricacies.
z
Ensure compliance with international laws and conventions regarding use of labor and when acquiring and using local resources (supplies, equipment, and facilities).
z
Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and assessing public and commercial supply systems, agencies, services, personnel, resources, and facilities.
z
Determine the capabilities and effectiveness of civilian supply systems and the impact of those systems on CMO.
z
Determine the availability of local supplies.
z
Identify private and public property available for military use.
z
Develop plans and provide operational oversight and supervision in rehabilitating or establishing government and commercial supply systems and facilities.
z
Facilitate the coordination of government, commercial, and private property, facilities, supplies, equipment, and other resources for military use, for CMO, and in support of government administration.
z
Advise and assist in rehabilitating, establishing, and maintaining government and commercial supply systems and agencies.
z
Advise and assist in the technical administrative requirements for government and commercial supply resources to support government administration (transportation; storage; distribution, including rationing; and the use of captured and salvaged items).
z
Establish policies and procedures on custody and administration of public and private property.

## Infrastructure Section

2-26. The Infrastructure Section consists of functional specialists in public works, transportation, utilities, and communications. It provides technical expertise, staff advice, and planning assistance to the supported command. The section conducts assessments of the indigenous public infrastructure and systems. Using these assessments and their civilian skills, the team determines methods to design, build, and maintain the organizations, the architecture, and the systems required to support transportation, water, communications, and power. The Infrastructure Section provides recommendations and, when appropriate, direction to maintain, sustain, and improve the indigenous public systems and services, such as transportation, utilities, and postal systems. Some skills required in this section include engineers (civil, mechanical, electrical, and environmental); water and sewer specialists; electrical service specialists and administrators; road construction, telephone, radio, and television (TV) specialists; and other officers and enlisted personnel whose civilian skills make them suitable for improving a nation's basic infrastructure. 2-27. Capabilities of the Infrastructure Section are to

z
Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and assessing FN/HN public and commercial transportation systems, agencies, services, personnel, and resources.
z
Determine capabilities and effectiveness of transportation systems and the impact of those systems on CMO.
z
Develop plans and provide operational oversight and supervision in rehabilitating or establishing transportation equipment, facilities, and systems.
z
Facilitate the coordination of government and commercial transportation resources for military use, for CMO, and in support of government administration.
z
Advise and assist in establishing the technical requirements for government and commercial transportation resources to support government administration (motor vehicles and roads, trains
and railways, boats and waterways, aircraft and airports, and pipelines).
z
Advise and assist in rehabilitating, establishing, and maintaining government transportation systems and agencies.
z
Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and assessing FN/HN public and commercial works and utilities systems, agencies, services, and facilities.
z
Determine capabilities and effectiveness of public works and utilities systems and the impact of those systems on CMO.
z
Develop plans and provide operational oversight and supervision in rehabilitating or establishing public works and utilities equipment, facilities, and systems.
z
Advise and assist in establishing the technical requirements for government and commercial works and utilities resources to support government administration (electric power, natural gas, water production and distribution; sewage collection, treatment, and disposal; sanitation; and public facilities).
z
Advise and assist in rehabilitating, establishing, operating, and maintaining government works and utilities systems and agencies.
z
Assist in employing (coordinating) public works and utilities resources to support government administration and CMO.
z
Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and assessing government and commercial communication systems, agencies, services, personnel, resources, and facilities.
z
Determine the capabilities and effectiveness of communication systems and the impact of those systems on CMO.
z
Develop plans and provide operational oversight and supervision in rehabilitating or establishing communication equipment, facilities, and systems.
z
Advise and assist in establishing the technical requirements for government and commercial communications resources to support government administration (postal services, telephone, telegraph, radio, television, computer systems, and print media).
z
Advise and assist in rehabilitating, establishing, and maintaining government communications systems and agencies.

## Governance Section

2-28. The Governance Section consists of functional specialists in public administration and services, excluding public health and welfare, cultural relations, and education. It provides technical expertise, staff advice, and planning assistance to the supported command in creating, resourcing, managing, and sustaining the institutions and processes through which a society is governed, protected, and prospers. Some skills required in this section include public administrators, public safety administrators and managers, environmental administrators and managers, and other administrators whose civilian duties include upper level management of any public institutions at various levels (city/county/local/state/federal). 2-29. Capabilities of the Governance Section are to

z
Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and assessing FN/HN public administration systems, agencies, services, personnel, and resources.
z
Determine the capabilities and effectiveness of public administration systems and the impact of those systems on CMO.
z
Determine the capabilities and effectiveness of public safety systems and the impact of those systems on the GCC's or other supported commander's mission.
z
Develop plans and provide operational oversight and supervision in rehabilitating or establishing public safety systems, equipment, and facilities.
z
Advise and assist in establishing the technical requirements for government public safety systems to support government administration (police and law enforcement administration, fire protection, emergency rescue, and penal systems).
z
Advise and assist in rehabilitating, establishing, and maintaining government public safety
systems and agencies.
z
Assist in employing public safety resources to support government administration, CMO, and military use.
z
Develop plans and provide operational oversight and supervision in rehabilitating or establishing public administration systems, agencies, and resources.
z
Coordinate with FN/HN government administrators and agencies in support of CMO.
z
Advise and assist in restoring, establishing, organizing, and operating public government systems and agencies.
z
Advise and assist in developing technical administrative requirements, policies, and procedures for providing government services to the local population.
z
Assist in familiarizing, educating, and training U.S. personnel in the FN/HN social, cultural,
religious, ethnic characteristics, codes of behavior, and language.
z
Advise and assist in locating, identifying, preserving, and protecting significant cultural property.
z
Develop plans and provide operational oversight and supervision in protecting, preserving, and restoring significant cultural property and facilities (religious buildings, shrines and consecrated places, museums, monuments, art, archives, and libraries).
z
Advise and assist in establishing the technical requirements for government, community, and private systems and agencies to protect, preserve, and restore cultural property.
z
Advise and assist in rehabilitating, establishing, operating, and maintaining cultural property systems and agencies.
z
Assist in locating, identifying, and safeguarding cultural property and in determining ownership.

## Public Health And Welfare Section

2-30. The Public Health and Welfare Section consists of functional specialists in public health and medical services. It provides technical expertise, staff advice, and planning assistance to the supported command in creating, resourcing, managing, and sustaining the institutions and processes through which a society maintains the physical, mental and social health of its people. Some skills required in this section include doctors, dentists, hospital administrators, nurses, public health specialists, environmental scientists and specialists, museum curators, archivists, and others whose civilian duties include health and welfare management in addition to arts, monuments, and archives.

## 2-31. Capabilities Of The Public Health And Welfare Section Are To

z
Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and assessing IPI public and private health systems, sanitation systems, agencies, services, personnel, resources, and facilities.
z
Determine the capabilities and effectiveness of health and sanitation systems and the impact of
those systems on CMO.
z
Develop plans and provide operational oversight and supervision in rehabilitating or establishing public health systems, agencies, equipment, and facilities.
z
Coordinate the use of IPI government and private health resources for military use, for CMO, and in support of government administration.
z
Advise and assist in establishing the technical requirements for public health services and resources to support government administration (clinics, hospitals, pharmacies, food preparation and storage, ambulance transportation, skilled personnel, and education).
z
Advise and assist in rehabilitating, establishing, delivering, and maintaining government public health systems and agencies.
z
Assist in coordinating IPI, IGO, NGO, and U.S. assistance and resources to support local government public health systems as part of CMO.
z
Advise and assist IPI, IGO, NGO, and U.S. agencies in preventing, controlling, and treating diseases (education, immunization, and sanitation).
z
Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance on FN/HN social and cultural matters and determine the impact of those matters on social and mental well-being of the society and the
possible effects on CMO.
z
Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and assessing FN environmental and pollution control systems, agencies, services, personnel, resources, and facilities.
z
Determine the capabilities and effectiveness of environmental and pollution control systems and the impact of those systems on CMO.
z
Develop plans and provide operational oversight and supervision in rehabilitating or establishing environmental resource management systems, agencies, equipment, and facilities.
z
Coordinate FN/HN government and private environmental management resources for military
use, for CMO, and to support government administration to mitigate, prepare, respond to, and recover environmental activities.
z
Advise and assist in establishing the technical requirements for environmental management services and resources to support government administration (plans, policies, and procedures to protect natural resources and provide pollution control).
z
Advise and assist in rehabilitating, establishing, delivering, and maintaining government environmental management systems and agencies.
z
Advise, assist, and support the coordination of IPI, IGO, NGO, and U.S. assistance and resources to support local government environmental management as part of CMO.

## Public Education And Information Section

2-32. The Public Education and Information Section consists of functional specialists in education and information services. It provides technical expertise, staff advice, and planning assistance to the supported command in designing, resourcing, and implementing public education and information programs and systems through media and formal education institutions. Some skills required in this section include educators at all levels, education specialists, school administrators, public relations personnel, media specialists, and others whose civilian duties include education and information management. 2-33. Capabilities of the Public Education and Information Section are to

z
Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and assessing FN/HN public, parochial, and private education systems, agencies, services, personnel, and resources.
z
Determine the capabilities and effectiveness of education systems and the impact of those systems on CMO.
z
Develop plans and provide operational oversight and supervision in rehabilitating or establishing public education systems, agencies, facilities, and resources.
z
Advise and assist in establishing the technical requirements for the public education system to support government administration (primary, secondary, and postsecondary educational systems).
z
Advise and assist in rehabilitating, establishing, and maintaining public education systems and agencies.
z
Advise and assist FN/HN institutions in developing and coordinating public relations activities
to support government administration and the "single voice" message.
z
Recommend information control and civil censorship policies.

## Civil Affairs Brigade (Usar)

2-34. The CA brigade functions as the regionally focused, expeditionary, operational-level CA capability that supports the Army corps and the JTF HQ. The USAR CA brigade supports the corps and possesses a CA functional specialist cell not present within the Active Army CA brigade. The CA brigade focus is development, reconstruction, and stabilization. The CA brigade enables support to civil administration and is the operational C2 system structure to form a CJCMOTF. The brigade HQ provides command, control, and staff supervision of the operations of the CA brigade and assigned CA battalions or attached units. Its focus is on tactical and operational employment of CA forces and attached CMO forces. The CA brigade plans, enables, shapes, and manages CAO by, with, and through IPI, IGOs, NGOs, and OGAs through its CLT. The brigade has a functional specialty cell with limited capabilities in four of the six functional specialty areas (Figure 2-5).

## Functions

2-35. Functions of the CA brigade (USAR) are to
z
Provide the CA capability to support a corps/ASCC, or three-star JTF.
z
Serve as the corps/JTF commander's senior CA advisor (brigade commander).
z
Establish an operational-level CMOC that is C2 system capable to support joint, interagency, multinational, and coalition (JIMC) operations by various means.
z
Serve as a mechanism for civil-military coordination to produce focused civil inputs to the COP.
z
Plan, coordinate, and enable operational-level stability operations in coordination with HN, IGOs, NGOs, and OGAs focused on the regional to national levels of civil governments.
z
Provide C2 for CA battalions/companies and other CMO capabilities.
z
Provide cross-cultural communications and limited linguistic capability to the supported command, advising the commander on cultural influences in the AOR.
z
Provide the capability to establish core of JCMOTF.
z
Provide the ability to assess, develop, obtain resourcing for and manage operational-level humanitarian assistance (HA) and CMO spending implementation strategy. (Having a dedicated contracting officer and financial management officer are key to this function.)
z
Conduct C2 of select operational-level CMO functions and capabilities (forces).
z
Provide provincial-level to national-level CLT capability.
z
Train, equip, and deploy assigned or attached CA battalions and companies, and other CMO capabilities.
z
Provide unit-level administration for the brigade.
z
Provide limited sustainment capability for assigned vehicles/communications assets.

## Capabilities

2-36. The CA brigade (USAR) has the following capabilities:
z
Provide the CAPTs at the operational level with CA planning, regionally aligned, rapidly deployable, plug-and-play capabilities that support the JTF three-star HQ or corps.
z
Provide the CMOC with operational-level management, coordination, and synchronization capabilities of key CMO within the supported commander's AO. Operate (over-the-horizon [OTH]) away from the supported unit as required as a standing capability by

Forming the core of the JCMOTF and being C2 system-capable.

Serving as the focal point for civil-military coordination for its supported command.
z
Provide the CLTs with regional-level to national-level interface/liaise capabilities between civil-military, HN, and humanitarian elements within the JOA/AO. Serve as the storefront for the CA brigade CMOC where the military meets with the civil populace, the HN, and the humanitarian community.
z
Provide the CIM cell as the focal point for operational-level collation, fusion, and analysis of civil information; develop operational-level civil inputs to the COP in conjunction with the brigade CMOC while linking civil information to the appropriate military and civil systems via geospatially referenced data.
z
Provide the functional specialty cell (USAR only) with a modular package of functional specialty capability for intermediate level assessment of threats to a civil component of the environment at the subnational level; assess mission planning requirements; and develop, coordinate, and synchronize resources to meet the immediate need in four of the six functional areas: rule of law, governance, public health and welfare, and infrastructure.

## Organization

2-37. The CA brigade (USAR) (Figure 2-6) consists of an HHC, one CAPT, a CMOC with two CLTs and one functional specialty cell, and one or more CA battalions.

## Civil Affairs Brigade (Active Army)

2-38. The Active Army CA brigade's mission is to rapidly deploy regionally focused, initial entry, CAPTs, CMOCs, CA battalions, and CA companies to plan, enable, shape, and manage CAO in support of a GCC, TSOC, joint forces special operations component (JFSOC), corps, division, or BCT. CMO plans provide situational awareness and understanding of the civil component and improve the overall operations. The Active Army CA brigade can serve as the core of a JCMOTF. The brigade HQ provides command, control, and staff supervision of the operations of the CA brigade and assigned CA battalions or attached units. The Active Army CA brigade can support the GCC, the TSOC, the joint force land component commander, or the JFSOC. This HQ is rapidly deployable through various means of infiltration, to include static-line parachute, providing United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) with a responsive, flexible, and modular CA force package. While serving in an initial entry role during contingency operations, the brigade is able to transition with the follow-on USAR CA forces.

## Functions

2-39. Functions of the Active Army CA brigade are to
z
Rapidly deploy as an initial entry CA capability in support of the JFSOC, the corps/ASCC, the JTF, the GCC, or the TSOC.
z
Serve as the initial entry ground commander's senior CA advisor in contingency operations (brigade commander).
z
Provide initial entry operational-level CMOC with C2 system capability within immature operational environments in support of JIMC operations by various means. The CA brigade operates in remote environments and under austere conditions.
z
Serve as the core of an expeditionary JCMOTF.
z
Provide cross-cultural communications and limited linguistic capability to the supported command, advising the commander on cultural influences in the AOR.
z
Provide the ability to assess, develop, obtain resourcing for, and manage an operational-level CMO spending implementation strategy.
z
Conduct C2 system management of select operational-level CMO functions and capabilities (forces).
z
Provide provincial-level to national-level CLT capability.
z
Train, equip, and deploy assigned or attached CA battalions and companies.
z
Assess, plan, coordinate, and enable operational-level stability operations focused on regional to national civil institutions.
z
Provide C2 and information management for CA battalions/companies and other CMO capabilities.
z
Provide unit-level administration for the brigade.

## Capabilities

2-40. The capabilities of the Active Army CA brigade are to perform duties as the HQ responsible for the initial entry CA package for contingency operations. The brigade has the ability to deploy classified and unclassified communications links that provide communications capability with supported forces (SOF and conventional), IPI, IGOs, OGAs, and NGOs (local area network [LAN], wide area network [WAN], satellite communications [SATCOM], high frequency [HF], global commercial phones). In addition, the Active Army CA brigade has the following capabilities:

z
Provide the CAPT at the operational level with CA planning, regionally aligned, rapidly deployable, plug-and-play capabilities that support the TSOC, the joint special operations task force (JSOTF), or the three-star JTF HQ.
z
Provide the CMOC with operational-level management, coordination, and synchronization of key CMO within the supported commander's AO. Operate (OTH) away from the supported unit as required as a standing capability by

Forming the core of the theater-level JCMOTF and being C2 system-capable.

Serving
as
the
mechanism
for
civil-military
coordination,
collaboration,
and
communication.

Providing initial entry and rapid deployment.

Communicating and exchanging information with CMOCs and CA elements within
supported commander's JOA/AO, while leveraging reachback capability.
z
Provide the CLT with provincial-level to national-level interface/liaise capabilities between military, IPI, IGOs, OGAs, and NGOs within the JOA/AO. Serve as the "storefront" for the CA brigade CMOC where the military meet with the civil populace, the HN, and the humanitarian community.
z
Provide the CIM cell as the focal point for the operational-level collation and analysis of civil information; develop operational-level civil inputs to the COP in conjunction with the brigade CMOC while linking civil information to the appropriate military and civil (OGA, IGO, NGO, and IPI) systems via geospatially referenced data.

## Organization

2-41. The Active Army CA brigade (Figure 2-7) is composed of an HHC with robust Maintenance and Rigger Sections, a CAPT, and a CMOC with a CLT. The Active Army CA brigade does not have a functional specialty cell like the USAR CA brigade and, therefore, requires augmentation from the USAR CA brigade or CACOM when it requires these skill sets.

## Civil Affairs Battalion (Usar)

2-42. The CA battalion focus is on the division commander's ready-capability to plan, enable, shape, and manage stabilization and reconstruction and the enablement/reestablishment/support of civil administration at the provincial level. The primary mission is to be deployable worldwide. The USAR CA battalions possess limited, organic CA functional specialty supporta capability the Active Army CA battalions do not possess. The USAR CA battalion provides tactical CA support to the division command.

## Functions

2-43. Functions of USAR CA battalion are to
z
Plan, coordinate, and enable tactical-level stabilization and reconstruction focused on provincial-level and below civil institutions.
z
Provide CMOC with C2 system capability to division commander.
z
Provide CMOC, CAPT, CLT, functional specialty cells, and CATs for supported unit.
z
Plan, support, and coordinate FHA, PRC, SCA, and NA.
z
Synchronize CAO with CMO, IGOs, and Psychological Operations (PSYOP) plans. The CA battalion receives and collates civil information from CAT, CLT, and CA companies into tactical-level to operational-level civil components for the supported commander's COP using
classified and unclassified communications links.
z
Provide C2 of CA companies and other CMO capabilities.
z
Train, equip, and deploy assigned or attached CA companies.
z
Provide unit-level administration for the companies.

## Capabilities

2-44. The USAR CA battalion capabilities are to

z
Provide the CAPT at the tactical level with CA planning, regionally focused, rapidly deployable, plug-and-play capabilities that support the division HQ.
z
Provide the CMOC with tactical-level management, coordination, and synchronization of key CMO within the supported commander's AO. Operate (OTH) away from the supported unit as required as a standing capability by
 Supporting division HQ and being C2 system-capable.  Serving as the focal point for civil-military coordination, collaboration, and communication
for the supported unit HQ.
 Communicating and exchanging information with CMOCs and CA elements within the
supported commander's JOA/AO, while leveraging reachback capability.
z
Provide the CLT with local-level to provincial-level interface/liaise capabilities between civil-military, HN, and humanitarian elements within the AO. Serve as the storefronts for the CA battalion CMOC where the military meet with the civil populace, the HN, and the humanitarian community.
z
Provide the CIM cell with the tactical-level collation and analysis of civil information. Develop tactical-level civil inputs to the COP. Provide civil information input to the appropriate military
and civil systems via geo-spatially referenced data.
z
Provide the functional specialty cell with a modular package of functional experts that plan, coordinate, enable, and manage civil-military operations and projects, and shape the commander's civil environment. The CA battalion provides limited functional specialty capability for intermediate-level assessment of threats to civil components of the environment; assess mission planning requirements; and develop, coordinate, and synchronize the initial stability plan to meet immediate needs to mitigate threats to those areas of special concern to division maneuver commanders in the functional areas of rule of law, governance, public health and welfare, and infrastructure.

## Organization

2-45. The USAR CA battalion (Figure 2-8, page 2-20) has an HHC, a CAPT, a CMOC capable of providing one CLT, a functional specialty cell, and four CA companies, each with a CMOC and five CATs. Each CA line company can provide C2 to the assigned CATs and can provide planning, coordination, and assessment at the tactical level.

## Functional Specialty Cell, Civil Affairs Battalion (Usar)

2-46. The USAR CA battalion functional specialty cell (Figure 2-9) provides technical expertise and staff assistance in planning, coordinating, and executing CAO in support of CMO. Only four of the six functional specialty areas are represented in the CA battalion (USAR): rule of law, infrastructure, governance, and public health and welfare. Detailed descriptions of the various specialties can be found under the CACOM functional specialty cells. Because the USAR CA battalion's functional specialty cell is much smaller than the CACOM or brigade functional specialty cells, the USAR CA battalion functional specialty cell may require augmentation for some missions.

## Civil Affairs Battalion (Active Army)

2-47. The Active Army CA battalion functions as the tactical-level CA capability that supports the division, the BCT, the JSOTF, and the forward operational bases (FOBs). The Active Army CA battalions are regionally focused and support SOF while providing the rapid deployment "bridge" for division and BCTs until replaced by USAR CA battalions. The Active Army CA battalion rapidly deploys as the initial entry CA force with its CAPTs, CMOCs, CA companies, and CATs to plan, enable, shape, and conduct CAO to support the commander's situational understanding of the civil component and improve overall decision superiority.

## Functions

2-48. Functions of the Active Army CA battalion are to

z
Rapidly deploy by all means of infiltration, to include static-line parachute.
z
Plan, coordinate, and enable tactical-level stabilization and reconstruction focused on the supported commander's AO.
z
Provide a CMOC with C2 system capability to the JSOTF and the division commander.
z
Provide C2 system management of CA companies and other CMO capabilities.
z
Prepare to serve as the core of a civil-military task force.
z
Provide CMOCs, CLTs, CAPTs, and CATs for tactical support.
z
Plan, support, and coordinate FHA, PRC, SCA, and NA.
z
Synchronize CAO with CMO, IO, and PSYOP plans. Receive and collate civil information from CATs, CLTs, and CA companies into tactical-level to operational-level civil inputs to the supported commander's COP using classified and unclassified communications links.
z
Operate in remote and austere environments in support of SOF and conventional forces as required.
z
Provide cross-cultural communications and linguistic capabilities to the supported maneuver commander.
z
Train, equip, and deploy assigned or attached CA companies.
z
Provide unit-level administration for the companies.

## Capabilities

2-49. The Active Army CA battalion capabilities are to

z
Provide the CAPT at the tactical level and operational level with CA planning, regionally aligned, rapidly deployable, plug-and-play capabilities that support the JSOTF or the division HQ.
z
Provide the CMOC with tactical-level management, coordination, and synchronization of key CMO within the supported commander's AO. Operate (OTH) away from supported unit as required as a standing capability by providing
 Support to the JSOTF or the division HQ and being C2 system-capable.  A mechanism for civil-military coordination, collaboration, and communication.  An initial-entry/rapid-deployment capability.  Network capability to all CMOCs and CA elements within the supported commander's
environment via technical lines of communications while leveraging the reachback capability.
z
Provide the CLT with local-level to provincial-level interface/liaise capability between civil-military, HN, and humanitarian elements within the AO. Serve as the "storefront" for the Active Army CA battalion where the military meet with the civil populace, the HN, and the humanitarian community.
z
Provide the CIM cell with the tactical-level collation and analysis of civil information. The CA battalion develops tactical-level civil inputs to the COP. Provide civil information input to the appropriate military and civil systems via geospatially referenced data.
2-50. The Active Army CA battalion HQ possesses no functional specialty support, with the exception of limited public health and welfare and rule of law support, and requires augmentation from USAR CA forces.

## Organization

2-51. The Active Army CA battalion (Figure 2-10) has an HHC, a CAPT, a CMOC capable of providing a CLT, and four CA line companies, each with a CMOC. Each CA line company can provide C2 to the assigned CATs and can provide planning, coordination, and assessment at the tactical level.

## Civil Affairs Company, Civil Affairs Battalion (Usar And Active Army)

2-52. The CA battalion (USAR and Active Army) has four CA line companies, each with a C2 Section, Planning Section, a CMOC, and five CATs (Figure 2-11). The CMOC provides tactical CA support, to include assessment, planning, and coordination.

## Functions

2-53. The functions of the USAR and Active Army CA company are to
z
Rapidly deploy.
z
Conduct CR and plan, coordinate, and enable CAO and project management.
z
Provide C2 system management through the company CMOC to the CATs.
z
Provide a standing CMOC capability with generalist expertise in public health, public works, and public safety (USAR only).
z
Provide five CATs to support three maneuver battalions, a CMOC, and a BCT-directed operation.
z
Facilitate integration of civil input into the BCT's COP.

## Capabilities

2-54. Capabilities of the CA company of the CA battalion (USAR and Active Army) are to
z
Provide the CATs with tactical-level CR. Be able to plan, execute, and transition CAO in all environments. The CA company has communications capability that links directly into the supported unit's communications architecture.
z
Provide the CMOC with tactical-level planning, management, coordination, and synchronization
of key CMO within the supported commander's AO. The CA company operates (OTH) away from the supported unit as required as a standing capability by providing
 CMOC support to the BCT-level HQ.  A mechanism for civil-military coordination, collaboration, and communication.  An initial-entry/rapid-deployment capability (Active Army).  Limited functional specialty capability for initial assessment of the civil component of the
operational environment. The CA compnay assesses the mission planning requirements and develops and coordinates the resources to meet immediate requirements to mitigate civil threats to the supported commander's mission (only USAR has functional specialists organic in the CA company CMOC).

## Civil Affairs Team, Civil Affairs Company, Civil Affairs Battalion (Usar And Active Army)

2-55. The CAT (Figure 2-12) conducts CAO and provides CMO planning and assessment support to tactical maneuver commanders.

## Functions

2-56. The functions of the CAT are to
z
Conduct CR.
z
Conduct key leader engagement by constantly vetting contacts to eventually identify elites within the CAT's AOR.
z
Plan, coordinate, and enable CAO and project management.
z
Provide civil information to the supported unit and CMOC for inclusion of civil inputs to the supported commander's COP.

## Capabilities

2-57. Capabilities of the CAT are to

z
Rapidly deploy by all means of infiltration, to include static-line parachute (Active Army).
z
Provide CMO staff augmentation and CA planning and assessment support to tactical maneuver commanders.
z
Maintain direct data and voice communications with conventional forces, SOF, IPI, IGOs, NGOs, and interagency elements with classified and unclassified connectivity.
z
Provide cross-cultural communications and limited linguistic support to supported commanders.
z
Plan and support CMO conducted by military forces.
z
Conduct liaison with civilian authorities and key leader engagement.
z
Minimize interference between civil and military operations, and synchronize CMO to enhance mission effectiveness.
z
Conduct area studies and area assessments.
z
Assist the S-2/G-2 and other staff members with CMO preparation of the operational environment as required.
2-58. CA forces coordinate with military and civilian agencies. CA forces have extensive capabilities in all forms of communications; thus requiring very little, if any, augmentation from the supported command. By table of organization and equipment (TOE), CA units are authorized the latest in conventional and special operations (SO) communications equipment and computers to allow secured and unsecured Internet communication, OTH and satellite-capable radios and laptop computers with access to the Internet. Additionally, CA units must be equipped with the current and most common civilian communications equipment to allow them to interface with IGOs, NGOs, and IPI in the AOR. Specific requirements beyond these capabilities are determined during mission analysis and forwarded to the supported command as a statement of requirements (SORs).

## Command And Control The Art Of Command And The Science Of Control

...The most important role that commanders play in command and control (C2) is combining the art of command with the science of control. Commanders use the activities of visualizing the environment, describing their commander's visualization to subordinates, directing actions to achieve results, and leading the command to mission accomplishment as their decisionmaking methodology throughout the operations process. This methodology combines the art of command and the science of control.

FM 6-0, Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces
11 August 2003
2-59. CA mission capabilities support broad and specific U.S. foreign policy goals. Because the conduct of CAO and CMO entails joint and interagency coordination, commanders and senior staff must understand the U.S. organization for national security and the prevailing concepts of joint and multinational military operations. Therefore, CA forces require a centralized, responsive, and unambiguous C2 structure. Unnecessary layering of HQ decreases responsiveness and available mission planning time and creates an opportunity for a security compromise. 2-60. Normally, CA forces are attached to supported commanders with minimal layering of subordinate levels of command. This command organization may require an operational HQ (for example, CA brigade) to interact directly with joint forces. Frequent involvement in joint and interagency operations requires an understanding of the U.S. organization for national security and the nature of joint military operations. 2-61. On occasion, CA forces supporting two different commands may operate in the same AO (for example, a CAT supporting a maneuver commander is operating in the AO of a provisional reconstruction team [PRT]). During these situations, the CA/CMO effort must be coordinated to avoid redundancy and establish a unity of effort.

## Unity Of Effort

2-62. Unity of effort requires coordination among government departments and agencies within the executive branch, between the executive and legislative branches, among information organizations and NGOs, and among nations in any alliance or coalition. 2-63. The United States maintains diplomatic relations with more than 250 foreign countries through embassies, consulates, and other diplomatic missions. The U.S. Ambassador to a country is responsible to the President for directing, coordinating, and supervising official USG activities and personnel in that country. These personnel include all U.S. military personnel not assigned to the unified combatant commander or other designated U.S. military area commanders. FP and security of U.S. military personnel are a matter of significant interest. Often specific agreements between the U.S. Ambassador (also known as the chief of mission [COM]) and the GCC are required. CA forces, deployed to a particular country for various operational missions, remain under the combatant command (command authority) (COCOM) (assigned forces) or under operational control (OPCON) (attached forces) of the GCC exercised through a subordinate HQ (normally the TSOC). CA forces on exercises or support missions (versus operational deployments) remain under OPCON of their chain of command (Joint Publication [JP] 3-07.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense [FID]). Under no circumstances will CA forces operate in a GCC's AOR or in the ambassador's country of assignment without prior notification and approval. 2-64. Requests for CA forces may originate with the ambassador, defense attache, or security assistance organization chief, who passes the requests through the appropriate GCC to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). The CJCS ensures proper interagency coordination. If the forces are available intheater from theater-assigned forces and there are no restrictions on their employment, the GCC can approve and support the request. If insufficient CA forces are available in-theater, the GCC requests additional forces through the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM).

## Combatant Command Organization

2-65. Unified commands have assigned forces of two or more Services and broad, continuing missions. CA support is oriented toward the commanders of those geographic combatant commands with specified geographic responsibilities. The GCCs report through the CJCS to the President and/or the Secretary of Defense (SecDef). The mission requires the GCC to initiate, maintain, or improve peacetime relations between the nations in his AOR and the United States. The mission also requires the GCC to plan for and address conflicts that may threaten U.S. interests in the region. CA forces provide support across full spectrum operations and, therefore, are familiar with the GCC's concerns in war and in stability operations. The Army defines its specific actions in these areas of concern as offensive, defensive, and stability operations. Army commanders at all echelons combine offense, defense, stability, and support simultaneously or sequentially to accomplish assigned missions in war and stability operations. 2-66. The command authority vested in the GCCs by statutory law is known as the COCOM. Unless otherwise directed by the President and/or SecDef, the GCCs exercise command authority over all military assets placed under their OPCON. In the exercise of OPCON, the GCC can

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Determine CA force requirements and operational priorities.
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Prescribe the chain of command for CA forces operating within his AOR.
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Establish and maintain appropriate liaison with USG agencies and IPI.
2-67. CA personnel may perform liaison work with the USG and civilian agencies, such as the USAID and the DOJ, as well as IGOs and supporting NGOs, to provide advice and assistance in any or all of the six functional skill areas. Combatant commanders determine C2 requirements of CA personnel and forces supporting allied or multinational commanders within the policy constraints issued by the President and/or SecDef.

## United States Special Operations Command

2-68. USSOCOM is the unified command for SOF. Its commander assigns forces to conduct SO as required. All continental United States (CONUS)-based SOF are assigned to USSOCOM. USSOCOM has no geographic AOR. USSOCOM may act as a supporting command by providing mission-ready SOF to the geographic combatant commands or as the supported commander for the conduct of SO. CA units are under the COCOM of USSOCOM until a change of operational control (CHOP) occurs to one of the GCCs. USSOCOM coordinates with the GCCs to validate all requests for CA units and individuals during peace and war.

## United States Army Special Operations Command

2-69. USASOC (Figure 2-13) is the Army component of USSOCOM. Its mission is to command and support and to ensure combat readiness of assigned and attached Army Special Operations Forces
(ARSOF). As the Army's senior-level command of the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade (A), USASOC has the responsibility, in conjunction with USSOCOM, to recruit, organize, train, equip, mobilize, and sustain the Active Army's only CA brigade. As an ASCC, USASOC's primary missions are

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Policy development.
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Long-range planning.
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Programming and budgeting.
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Management and distribution of resources.
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Program performance review and evaluation.

## United States Army Civil Affairs And Psychological Operations Command

2-70. United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC) HQ is a table of distribution and allowance (TDA), nondeploying direct reporting unit (DRU) to the United States Army Reserve Command with the mission to organize, train, equip, monitor readiness of, validate, and prepare assigned Active Army and USAR forces for deployment. These forces conduct worldwide CAO in support of CMO; across full spectrum operations; and in support of the GCCs, U.S. Ambassadors, and other agencies as directed by USASOC.

## Theater Organization

2-71. When the President and/or SecDef authorize military operations, the GCC organizes his theater to orchestrate his joint operations with multinational and interagency activities. An integral part of this organization is the CMO staff element on the theater staff. 2-72. The CMO staff cell of the TSOC provides deliberate and contingency planning, maintenance of existing plans, assessments, and support to the GCCs TSCP. The CACOM supporting each GCC serves as the GCC's senior CA advisor (CACOM commander) and as the focal point for CMO coordination, collaboration, and consensus. The CACOM provides theater-level staff plugs to the GCC and to subordinate subunified and Service component commands. 2-73. According to FM 3-0, the operational framework for Army forces rests within the combatant commander's theater organization. Combatant commanders with geographic responsibilities conduct operations within an AOR (theater) assigned by the Unified Command Plan. When warranted, they designate theaters of war, theaters of operations, combat zones, and communications zones (COMMZs). Joint force commanders (JFCs) at all levels may establish subordinate operational areas (Figure 2-14, page 2-28). Joint doctrine discusses the assignment and responsibilities associated with theater operational areas. The JCS provides guidance and directives to the theater commander. All unified commands have CMO staffs to advise and assist the GCC in the execution of his CMO program. They also participate in deliberate and crisis-action planning and, when required, deploy as a member of the deployable joint task force augmentation cell (DJTFAC). CAPTs from respective theater-aligned CACOMs augment the GCC, ASCC commander, and joint force land component commander (JFLCC) staffs. CA contributions to the TSCP can include

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Liaison and Coordination. In coordination with the GCC staff and U.S. Embassy Country Team, CA personnel conduct liaison with multinational forces, indigenous security forces, U.S. forces, government agencies, IGOs, and NGOs.
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Education and Training. CA are uniquely qualified to train and prepare others for conducting TSCP activities due to their area and linguistic orientation, cross-cultural communications, and experiences in military to civil and HN advisory and assistance activities.
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Area Assessments. TSCP activities provide an ideal opportunity for CA to collect current open-source information obtained in the course of their normal duties to update assessments prior to a crisis in the GCC's AOR.

## Theater Special Operations Command

2-74. Normally, C2 of SOF should be executed within the SOF chain of command. The identification of a C2 organizational structure for SOF depends upon specific objectives, security requirements, and the operational environment. 2-75. The TSOC is the joint SO command through which the GCC normally exercises OPCON of SOF within the AOR. The exceptions are the USCENTCOM and USEUCOM AORs where the TSOC exercises OPCON of CA forces. The commander of the TSOC is also the permanent theater joint force special operations component commander (JFSOCC). He commands the TSOC and is the principal SO advisor to the GCC. The TSOC is a subordinate unified command of a unified command or a functional component command of another permanent joint command.
2-76. To provide the necessary unity of command, each GCC (except for United States Northern Command [USNORTHCOM]) has established a TSOC as a subunified command within the geographic combatant command. The TSOC is the primary theater SOF organization capable of performing broad continuous missions uniquely suited to SOF capabilities. The TSOC commander has three principal roles:

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Joint Force Commander. As the commander of a subunified command, the TSOC commander is a JFC. As such, he has the authority to plan and conduct joint operations as directed by the GCC. The JTF commander exercises OPCON of assigned commands and forces and normally over attached forces as well. The TSOC commander may establish a JTF that reports directly to him, such as a JSOTF, JCMOTF, or joint Psychological Operations task force (JPOTF), to plan and execute these missions.
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Theater SO Advisor. The TSOC commander advises the GCC and the other component commanders on the proper employment of SOF. The TSOC commander may develop specific recommendations for the assignment of SOF in-theater and opportunities for SOF to support the overall theater campaign plan. The role of theater SO advisor is best accomplished when the GCC establishes the TSOC commander as a special staff officer on the theater staff (in addition
to his duties as a commanderthat is, "dual-hatted"). In this case, the TSOC commander may appoint a deputy as his representative to the theater staff for routine day-to-day staff matters.
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Joint Force Special Operations Component Commander. When designated by the GCC, the TSOC commander will function as a JFSOCC. This will normally be the case when the GCC establishes functional component commanders for operations, absent the establishment of a JTF. The TSOC commander can also be designated as the JFSOCC within a JTF if the scope of the operations conducted by the JTF warrants it.

## Theater Special Operations Command Civil-Military Operations Cell (J-9)

2-77. Each regionally aligned TSOC has an assigned CMO staff cell (J-9). The J-9 cell provides deliberate and contingency planning, maintenance of existing plans, and assessments and support of the GCC and TSCP. The cell also provides liaison to the regionally aligned CACOM supporting the GCC and the GCC's J-3 (Figure 2-15).

## Army Service Component Command Organization

2-78. The ASCC HQ is a theater Army HQ that has three functional roles: Service component; Title 10 Service, administration, and support; and, when directed by the GCC, warfighting. 2-79. The ASCC commander exercises administrative control (ADCON) of all assigned and attached Army forces and OPCON of those Army forces not under the OPCON of another commander. He has Title 10 Service responsibilities for the administration and support of all Army forces assigned or attached to the GCC, including ARSOF (CA forces). These responsibilities include organization, control of resources and equipment, human resources support, logistics, individual and unit training, readiness, mobilization, demobilization, discipline, and other matters not included in the operational missions of the joint force. Thus, the ASCC commander must organize, train, equip, and maintain all Army forces in the theater, including ARSOF. 2-80. The ASCC commander, based on the factors of METT-TC, tailors his organization to provide or otherwise arrange for the required administration and support of deployed Army forces, including ARSOF. To ensure the unique capabilities and requirements of ARSOF are considered in ASCC planning and execution, there is an SO branch embedded in the G-3, Operations Division. In addition, USASOC assigns a special operations theater support element (SOTSE) to the ASCC to coordinate logistics support for deployed ARSOF. The SO branch coordinates closely with the SOF theater staff element, SOTSE, and the TSOC to identify ASCC requirements for SOF support and to ensure that SOF requirements for ASCC support are adequately addressed. When directed by the GCC, the ASCC also supports and sustains designated SOF of other U.S. Services and other multinational SOF. 2-81. The ASCC also has CMO staff elements embedded within the ASCC staff. If the GCC designates, the ASCC commander may act as the theater executive agent for CMO and support civil administration operations. The CACOM commander maintains oversight of all CA forces within the theater for the GCC and the ASCC commander. The CACOM commander is the primary CA advisor to the GCC, ASCC commander, and TSOC commander.

2-82. Army Service component CMO plans support the GCC's assigned political-military objectives, which are consistent with international laws, treaties and agreements, and President and/or SecDef guidance. CA forces assist the GCC in conducting strategic planning by linking his TSCP regional engagement activities with national strategic objectives. The plan contains general instructions for relations with national, local, and military authorities. When operations extend into territories of more than one nation, several national plans may exist. The CAPT augments the ASCC CMO staff from the theateraligned CACOM, CA brigade, or CA battalion. 2-83. CA planners assist the ASCC commander in supporting the GCC's TSCP, full spectrum operations, and the Army's mission-essential tasks. CA forces and CMO planners assist the ASCC commander in achieving his goal of complementing the unified action of other Service component commands and JFCs. The ASCC commander adapts and tailors his warfighting capabilities to complement and support civil authorities and agencies at home and abroad. CA forces and CMO planners provide the ASCC commander with support and expertise to reinforce or fill critical requirements beyond the immediate capabilities of civil authorities and agencies. CA forces and CMO planners often provide assistance to civil authorities and are often decisive elements in disaster relief and crisis resolution. CA forces and CMO planners under the ASCC commander can provide sustained support to civil authorities until they no longer require military assistance.

## Joint And Multinational Organization

2-84. During joint and multinational operations, CA forces serve as a bridge to the gap between the U.S. military, HN military, and civilian authorities supporting an operation. CAPTs from the CACOM or CA brigade provide CMO staff augmentation for joint or multinational HQ conducting CMO. U.S. military staff planning and coordination, as well as interagency activities, are the most likely mission-support activities CA units undertake in a joint or multinational environment. Participating nations normally develop directives covering a multinational command's political-military objectives. These include objectives and policies for the conduct of CMO. Therefore, senior level CA officers and NCOs are best suited to augment the CMO staffs of JFCs and multinational commanders as they develop applicable plans, policies, and programs. 2-85. CA forces assist the multinational force commander (MNFC) to achieve a greater degree of unity of effort, by informing him of the mandates, activities, and capabilities of IGOs and NGOs. CMO planners factor these into the commander's assessment of conditions and resources, and integrate them into the selected concept of operations (CONOPS). CMO planners on multinational force staffs also ensure the CMO annex to the OPLAN provides guidance to the MNFC regarding relationships with and support to NGOs and IGOs operating within the operational area. JP 3-16, Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations, provides additional guidance on CA support to joint operations.

## Joint Task Forces

2-86. The GCC may designate a corps and/or a division as a JTF. A JTF plans, conducts, and supports military operations on a mission or area basis. It accomplishes a specific mission or campaign of limited duration, but it can exist on a more permanent basis. During war or prolonged conflict, the JTF may control operations in a specific portion of the GCC's AOR. A JTF may be a new organization but it is often formed by augmenting an existing Service HQ with elements from other Services. CA units support JTFs by providing task-organized elements from a CA brigade to augment the JTF CMO staff. JP 3-57.1, Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs, provides further guidance on CA support to joint operations.

## Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force

2-87. Although not a CA organization, the JCMOTF will most likely have CA units at its core or as subordinate elements, and may be commanded by a CA commander. It is a special-purpose task force composed of units from two or more Services, flexible in size and composition, organized to conduct (planning, preparing for, executing, and continually assessing) CMO in a theater of operations or JOA. All CA brigades are task-organized to form the core of a JCMOTF. The expertise of CA personnel in dealing with government organizations, IGOs, NGOs, and IPI greatly enhances the opportunity for success. However, the JCMOTF may have conventional and SO forces assigned or attached to support the conduct of specific missions. (JP 3-57 provides additional information on joint CMO.) The JCMOTF, if properly chartered and established by the JFC, must meet the criteria as established in JP 5-00.2, Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures. 2-88. A JCMOTF may be established to

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Accomplish a specific contingency mission, such as FHA or SCA.
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Provide CMO support to U.S. or coalition military forces conducting military operations concurrent with or subsequent to geographic or general conflict.
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Perform other operations as directed by the commander, joint task force (CJTF).
2-89. A JCMOTF could

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Be organized as either a stand-alone JTF or as a subordinate unit in a JTF.
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Assist other JTF unit commanders, when the amount of CMO to be accomplished exceeds the ability of the commander's units to accomplish CMO in their AOR.
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Provideas part of a larger JTFthe CJTF, through a CMOC with linkage between the JTF and nonmilitary agencies operating in the JOA.
2-90. A JCMOTF should not

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Be the CMO staff augmentation for a JTF.
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Have, when subordinate to a JTF, the primary responsible force for accomplishing all CMO in the JOA.
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Eliminate the need for all units to train for CMO.
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Eliminate the need for all commanders in the JOA to plan and conduct CMO.
2-91. A JCMOTF should not be responsible for accomplishing all CMO tasks in the JOA. Service component and other task force commanders are responsible for accomplishing the CMO that they have the capability to accomplish within their AOR. When the need exceeds their capability, a JCMOTF can assist in meeting the shortfall.

## Joint Special Operations Task Force

2-92. CA forces are organized to support SOF across full spectrum operations and throughout MCOs, ongoing operations, and worldwide deterrence operations (Figure 2-16, page 2-32). The worldwide deterrence mission requires CA companies and their CATs to conduct shaping operations that promote regional stability by deterring aggression and cohesion. CA forces can be drawn upon to support ongoing operations and also act as the TSOC's CR elements throughout the AOR.

2-93. CA forces are organized to support SOF during ongoing operations with a battalion (minus) that is capable of conducting JSOTF (SF group)-directed operations or surging/flexing CA capabilities to reinforce the Special Forces operational bases (SFOBs). The CA company (minus) depicted under ongoing operations is in direct support to a JTF that is stood up to support joint conventional operations. The CA company serves as a bridging asset until CA brigade assets can be deployed. 2-94. The Active Army CA brigade, CAPT, and CMOC provide direct support to the TSOC and the TSOC forward, as required, to be employed to support SOF or as a bridging asset to conventional forces. The CA brigade CMOC is used to manage CMO for the TSOC. A CA battalion is apportioned to each JSOTF, and a CA company is apportioned to support Ranger regimental operations as well as other SOF operations. 2-95. Active Army CA forces are structured to support JSOTF operations at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels while maintaining regional focus. The concept of CA support to the JSOTF is that a CA battalion (minus) with two CA companies supports the JSOTF (Figure 2-17, page 2-33) and the CA battalion CAPT is collocated with the JSOTF HQ to assist in CMO planning within the joint special operations area (JSOA). A CA company HQ will be collocated with each SFOB and is capable of providing a CMOC, as directed, outside of each FOB. A CAT is designated to support each SF advanced operational base (AOB), as directed. The remaining CATs are designated as a surge capability for the SFOB commander.

## Civil-Military Operations (G-9/S-9) Staff Organization

2-96. The CMO staff officer/planner (G-9/S-9) is the principal staff officer for all CMO matters and conducts the initial assessment that determines CA force augmentation. The CAPTs augment supported G 9 staffs to assist in this process. The relationship between the G-9 primary staff officer to the supporting CA unit is the same relationship as the G-2 to the supporting military intelligence (MI) unit. 2-97. The G-9 and his staff ensure each COA effectively integrates civil considerations (the "C" of METT-TC). The G-9 and his staff consider not only tactical issues, but also logistics support issues. Care of dislocated civilians (DCs) is of particular concern (see page 3-4). The G-9's analysis considers the impact of operations on public order and safety, the potential for disaster relief requirements, noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs), SCA, and protection of culturally significant sites. If the unit does not have an assigned G-9, the commander may assign these responsibilities to another staff member. 2-98. The G-9 enhances the relationship between military forces and civilian authorities and personnel in the AO to ensure mission success. The G-9 has staff planning and oversight of

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Assigned and attached CA forces.
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All aspects of the relationship between the military force and the civil component in the environment of the supported commander.
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Advising the commander on the effect of military operations on the civilian populations.
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Minimizing civilian interference with operations. This includes DC operations, curfews, and movement restrictions, or deconflicting civilian and military activities with due regard for the safety and rights of refugees and IDPs.
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Advising the commander on legal and moral obligations incurred from the long- and short-term effects (economic, environmental, and health) of military operations on civilian populations.
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Coordinating, synchronizing, and integrating civil-military plans, programs, and policies with national and combatant command strategic objectives.
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Advising on the prioritizing and monitoring expenditures of allocated OHDACA, CERP, payroll, and other funds dedicated to CMO. The G-9 ensures subordinate units understand the movement, security, and control of funds. The G-9 coordinates with the funds controlling authority/financial manager to meet the commander's objectives.
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Coordinating and integrating deliberate planning for CMO-related products.
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Augmenting CMO staff.
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Coordinating and integrating area assessments and area studies in support of CMO.
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Supporting emergency defense and civic-action projects.
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Supporting protection of culturally significant sites.
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Supporting FHA and disaster relief.
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Supporting emergency food, shelter, clothing, and fuel for local civilians.
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Supporting public order and safety applicable to military operations.
2-99. The G-9 and his staff ensure the effective integration of the civil considerations mission analysis formula into the planning cycle. Like operations and intelligence officers, the G-9 and his staff focus on the operational area; but like personnel and logistics officers, they must also focus on logistics issues, particularly those regarding FHA and the care of DCs. 2-100. To plan and orchestrate unit operations, in peace or in war, the supported unit's operations officer must rely heavily upon items from the intelligence officer and the CMO officer (G-9/S-9), such as

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Civil inputs to the COP.
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Threat assessments that account for potential enemy actions and reactions to planned CMO.
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Analysis of civil information that identifies concerns of population groups within the projected JOA/AO and potential flash points that can result in civil strife and violence.
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Cultural awareness briefings.
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Situational and planning maps.
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Overlays (in this instance, overlays of DC movement routes; national, religious, and cultural monuments; hospitals; and power plants).
2-101. The supported unit's operations officer plans and integrates the overall operations effort. The unit G-9 plans, coordinates, and provides staff oversight of CMO and civilian component issues through direct coordination with the supported unit's operations officer. Throughout this process, the G-9 plans officer continuously ensures the fusion of the civil inputs received from subordinate CA elements, maneuver elements, OGAs, NGOs, IGOs, and HN sources to the unit commander's COP. 2-102. The G-9, like other primary staff officers, is authorized personnel on a modified table of organizations and equipment (MTOE). Planning teams from regionally focused Active Army and USAR CA units augment the G-9 staff. This augmentation gives the unit G-9 enough personnel to accomplish assigned tasks, including the requirement to establish and sustain a staff presence at the various boards, working groups, and unit command posts or operations centers depending on the supported unit's standing operating procedures (SOPs).

## Civil-Military Operations (S-9) Staff Organization For Brigade Combat Teams

2-103. The S-9 staff normally consists of a major (MAJ), CA officer, and a sergeant first class (SFC), CA NCO, for the maneuver BCT.

## Functions

2-104. The functions of the BCT S-9 are to
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Serve as staff proponent for the organization, use, and integration of attached CA forces.
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Develop plans, policies, and programs to further the relationship between the BCT and the civil component in the BCT's AO.
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Serve as the primary advisor to the BCT commander on the effect of civilian populations on BCT operations.
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Assist in the development of plans, policies, and programs to deconflict civilian activities with military operations within the BCT AOR. This includes DC operations, curfews, and
movement restrictions.
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Advise the BCT commander on legal and moral obligations incurred from the long- and short-term effects (economic, environmental, and health) of BCT operations on civilian populations.
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Coordinate, synchronize, and integrate civil-military plans, programs, and policies with operational objectives.
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Advise on prioritizing and monitoring expenditures of allocated OHDACA, CERP, payroll, and other funds dedicated to CMO. The BCT S-9 facilitates movement, security, and control of funds to subordinate units. The BCT S-9 coordinates with the funds controlling authority/financial manager to meet the commander's objectives.
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Conduct, coordinate, and integrate deliberate planning for CMO in support of BCT operations.
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Coordinate and integrate area assessments and area studies in support of CMO.
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Advise the BCT commander and staff on protection of culturally significant sites.
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Facilitate integration of civil inputs to the BCT's COP.
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Advise the BCT commander on using military units and assets that can perform CMO missions.

## Capabilites

2-105. Capabilities of the CMO staff cell of the BCT are to
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Provide tactical-level planning, management, coordination, and synchronization of key CMO within the BCT commander's AO.
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Provide a mechanism for civil-military coordination, collaboration, and communication within the BCT's AOR.
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Assist the S-4 with identifying and coordinating for facilities, supplies, and other material resources available from the local civil sector to support BCT operations.

## Civil-Military Operations Staff (G-9/J-9/Cj-9) Organization For Division And Corps

2-106. The G-9 staff for the division or corps (Figure 2-18) is tasked to provide the following functions in support of its division or corps.

## Functions

2-107. The functions of the G-9 (J-9/CJ-9) staff cell of the division or corps are to
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Serve as staff proponent for the organization, use, and integration of attached CA forces.
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Develop plans, policies, and programs to further the relationship between the division or corps and the civil component in the division or corps' AO or JOA.
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Serve as the primary advisor to the division or corps commander on the effect of civilian populations on division or corps operations.
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Assist in the development of plans, policies, procedures, and programs to deconflict civilian activities with military operations within the division or corps AOR or JOA. This includes DC operations, curfews, and movement restrictions.
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Advise the division or corps commander on legal and moral obligations incurred from the longand short-term effects (economic, environmental, and health) of division or corps operations on civilian populations.
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Coordinate, synchronize, and integrate civil-military plans, programs, and policies with strategic objectives and OGA efforts.
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Advise on prioritizing and monitoring expenditures of allocated OHDACA, CERP, payroll, and other funds dedicated to CMO. The G-9 facilitates movement, security, and control of funds to subordinate units. The G-9 coordinates with the funds controlling authority/financial manager to meet the commander's objectives.
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Conduct, coordinate, and integrate deliberate planning for CMO in support of division or corps operations.
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Coordinate and integrate area assessments and area studies in support of CMO.
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Advise the division or corps commander and staff on protection of culturally significant sites.
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Facilitate integration of civil inputs to the division or corps' COP.
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Advise the division or corps commander on using military units and assets that can perform CMO missions.

## Capabilities

2-108. Capabilities of the G-9 staff cell of the division or corps are to
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Provide tactical-level and operational-level planning, management, coordination, and synchronization of key CMO within the division or corps commander's AO.
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Provide a mechanism for civil-military coordination, collaboration, and communication within the modular Army division or modular Army corps AO.
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Assist the G-4 with identifying and coordinating for facilities, supplies, and other material resources available from the local civil sector to support modular Army division operations.

## Civil-Military Operations Staff Organization For Army Service Component Command (G-9) Or Geographic Combatant Commander

2-109. The G-9 staff cell for the ASCC (Figure 2-19, page 2-37) or CMO staff cell of the GCC is tasked with providing the following functions in support of its ASCC or GCC.

## Functions

2-110. The functions of the G-9 staff cell of the ASCC or CMO staff cell of the GCC are to
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Serve as staff proponent for the organization, use, and integration of attached CA slices.
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Develop plans, policies, and programs to further the relationship between the ASCC or GCC and the civil component in the ASCC or GCC's AO or JOA.
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Serve as the primary advisor to the ASCC commander on the effect of civilian populations on ASCC or GCC operations.
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Assist in the development of plans, policies, and programs to deconflict civilian activities with military operations within the ASCC or GCC AOR or JOA. This includes DC operations, curfews, and movement restrictions.
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Advise the ASCC or GCC on legal and moral obligations incurred from the long- and short-term effects (economic, environmental, and health) of ASCC or GCC operations on civilian populations.
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Coordinate, synchronize, and integrate civil-military plans, programs, and policies with strategic and national objectives.
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Advise the ASCC or GCC on prioritizing and monitoring expenditures of allocated OHDACA, CERP, payroll, and other funds dedicated to CMO. The CMO staff facilitates movement, security, and control of funds to subordinate units. The CMO staff coordinates with the funds controlling authority/financial manager to meet the commander's objectives.
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Conduct, coordinate, and integrate deliberate planning for CMO in support of ASCC operations.
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Coordinate and integrate area assessments and area studies in support of CMO.
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Advise the ASCC or GCC and staff on protection of culturally significant sites.
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Facilitate integration of civil inputs to the ASCC or GCC's COP.
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Advise the ASCC or GCC on using military units and assets that can perform CMO missions.

## Capabilties

2-111. Capabilities of the CMO staff cell of the ASCC or GCC are to
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Provide operational-level and strategic-level planning, management, coordination, and synchronization of key CMO within the ASCC or GCC's AO.
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Provide a mechanism for civil-military coordination, collaboration, and communication within the ASCC or GCC.
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Assist the G-4 with identifying and coordinating for facilities, supplies, and other material resources available from the local civil sector to support ASCC or GCC operations.
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## Chapter 3 Civil Affairs Operations Civil Affairs In Operation Enduring Freedom

With the collapse of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, the disruption of the Afghan economy and infrastructure required a concentrated Civil Affairs effort. At Bagram airport, Civil Affairs Team A32 (CAT-A32) established their operations in two abandoned hangars. From here the team made contact with the numerous nongovernmental agencies (NGOs) in the area and worked to coordinate CMO efforts with the flow of humanitarian aid in the region. Among the many tasks they accomplished was the evacuation of 40 injured children to Germany for hospital treatment. The team facilitated the arrival of the first relief aircraft into Bagram and the distribution of 945
bags of red wheat and 1,440 blankets to the local population. The rapid response of the humanitarian relief effort was instrumental in establishing the positive first impression of the local populace for the American military effort.

USASOC History Office
CA forces augment CMO staffs of GCCs, JTFs, theater Army components, maneuver commanders, and others as designated down to battalion level. They augment U.S. Embassies, OGAs, and multinational forces as well. CA forces may also form the nucleus of CMO-centric organizations, such as the PRTs, used in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. CA forces accomplish the mission by assisting in the conduct of CAO in support of CMO. The specific operations are mission-dependent and determined after applying the MDMP and the targeting process (discussed in detail in Chapter 4). CA commanders tailor their forces to meet mission requirements, ensuring the proper mix and timely employment of strategic-, operational-, and tactical-level forces as well as functional specialists. Key to this effort is the input of the GCC and TSOC CMO planners into the GCC contingency planning followed by early deployment of CAPTs and CA companies, which provide additional relevant CA input to OPLANs, FUNCPLANs, and CONPLANs.

## Civil Affairs Core Tasks

3-1. CA core tasks (Figure 3-1, page 3-2) are those primary tasks that CA forces are fully capable of planning, supporting, executing, or transitioning through, with, or by outside factors to mitigate or defeat civil threats. All CA core tasks support CMO. They embrace the relationship of military forces with the civil component, including IGOs, NGOs, and IPI in areas where military forces are present. CAO may also involve the application of CA expertise in areas normally the responsibility of the civilian government. CA forces offer an additive and unique capability for the supported commander to achieve his desired objectives.

3-2. CA core tasks supporting the GCC's missions include operations that
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Promote U.S. policy objectives before, during, and after combat operations by influencing the civil component of the operational area.
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Reduce demands on the Army supply system by facilitating the coordination of indigenous resources and supplies where appropriate.
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Fulfill responsibilities of the military under U.S. domestic and international laws relevant to civilian populations.
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Minimize civilian interference with military operations and the impact of military operations on the civilian populace.
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Coordinate military operations with civilian agencies of the USG, IPI, IGOs, and NGOs.
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Exercise civil administration in occupied or liberated areas until control can be returned to civilian or non-U.S. military authorities.
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Support civilian efforts to provide assistance to meet the life-sustaining needs of the civilian
population.
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Provide direct assistance according to internationally accepted standards and principles in areas where civilian operators are not present.
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Provide expertise in civil-sector functions normally the responsibility of civilian authorities, applied to implement U.S. policy to advise or assist in rehabilitating or restoring civil-sector functions.

## Populace And Resources Control

3-3. Military operations are not conducted in a vacuum that is free of civilian presence or influence. No matter the operational environment, military operations can be disrupted by

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Uncontrolled and uncoordinated movement of frightened civilians about the environment.
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Uncontrolled and uncoordinated movement of civilians conducting legitimate activities.
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Illegal or illegitimate activities such as insurgent operations or black-market activities.
3-4. The PRC operation consists of two distinct, yet linked, components: populace control and resources control. These controls are normally a responsibility of indigenous civil governments. They are defined and enforced during times of civil or military emergency. For practical and security reasons, military forces use PRC measures of some type and to varying degrees in military operations across the full spectrum of operations. PRC operations can be executed in conjunction with, and as an integral part of, all military operations.

## Populace Control

3-5. Populace control provides security for the populace, mobilize human resources, deny personnel to the enemy, and detect and reduce the effectiveness of enemy agents. Populace control measures include curfews, movement restrictions, travel permits, registration cards, and relocation of the population. DC operations and NEO are two special categories of populace control that require extensive planning and coordination among various military and nonmilitary organizations.

## Resources Control

3-6. Resources control regulates the movement or consumption of materiel resources, mobilize materiel resources, and deny materiel to the enemy. Resources control measures include licensing, regulations or guidelines, checkpoints (for example, roadblocks), ration controls, amnesty programs, and inspection of facilities.

## Civil Affairs Mission

3-7. The CA supporting tasks in PRC are in support of the commander's operations function. Generally, CA Soldier tasks include

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Identifying or evaluating existing HN PRC measures.
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Advising on PRC measures that would effectively support the commander's objectives.
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Recommending command guidance on how to implement PRC measures.
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Publicizing control measures among IPI.
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Identifying and assessing MOEs and MOPs.
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Participating in the execution of selected PRC operations, as needed or directed.
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Assisting in the arbitration of problems arising from implementation of PRC measures.

## Dislocated Civilian Operations

3-8. DC operations (also commonly referred to as resettlement operations) pertain to those actions required to move civilians out of harm's way or to safeguard them in the aftermath of a disaster. The disaster may be natural, as in a flood or an earthquake, or man-made, as in combat operations, social or political strife, or technological hazard emergency. 3-9. DC operations include the planning and management of DC routes, assembly areas, and camps in support of the HN and IGO efforts. They also include FHA support to the affected populace. The military police corps is a key component to the successful planning and execution of DC operations. Their involvement should be sought early in the planning process. 3-10. FM 3-05.401, *Civil Affairs Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*; FM 3-19.1, Military Police Operations; and FM 3-19.40, *Military Police Internment/Resettlement Operations,* provide additional information on DC operations. DC operations may occur in conjunction with the full spectrum of stability operations. 3-11. In DC operations, controlling agencies (for example, UN-mandatedUnited Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR], Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs [OCHA], ICRC, or HN) normally care for the basic needs of DCsfood, water, shelter, sanitation, and security. Controlling agencies must also be prepared to prevent or arrest the outbreak of disease among DCs. This last point is important for the health of the populace and military forces.

## Categories Of Civilians

3-12. During military operations, U.S. forces must consider two distinct categories of civiliansthose who remained in place and those who are dislocated. U.S. policy dictates what category people are placed in, and this may conflict with how IGOs, NGOs, and the HN refer to civilians. Therefore, CA Soldiers and CMO planners must be careful in how they describe categories of civilians. The first category includes civilians who are indigenous and other local populace, including civilians from other countries. Civilians within this category may or may not need help. If they can care for themselves, they should remain in place. 3-13. DCs are civilians who have left their homes. Their movement and presence can hinder military operations. They will likely require some degree of aid, such as medicine, food, shelter, clothing, and similar items. DCs may not be indigenous to the area or to the country in which they reside. DC is a generic term further subdivided into eight categories. These categories are defined by legal and political considerations as follows:

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Displaced Person: A civilian who is involuntarily outside the national boundaries of his or her country (JP 1-02, *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*).
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Refugee: A person outside of his or her country of nationality who is unable or unwilling to return because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion (1951 United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol).
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Evacuee: A civilian removed from his place of residence by military direction for reasons of
personal security or the requirements of the military situation (JP 1-02).
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Stateless Person: Civilian who has been denationalized or whose country of origin cannot be determined or who cannot establish a right to the nationality claimed (JP 1-02).
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War Victim: A classification created during the Vietnam era to describe civilians suffering injuries, loss of a family member, or damage to or destruction of their homes as a result of war. War victims may be eligible for a claim against the United States under the Foreign Claims Act.
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Internally Displaced Persons: Any persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized state border (UN definition contained in the Guiding Principles on Internal
Displacement).
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Returnee: Either a refugee or an IDP who has returned voluntarily to his or her former place of residence.
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Resettler: Subset of IDP or refugee - civilian wishing to return somewhere other than previously owned home or land within the country or area of original displacement.

## Civil Affairs Mission

3-14. The CA supporting tasks in DC operations are of support to the commander's operational function and to the administration of DC control measures. Generally, CA Soldier tasks include

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Identifying or evaluating existing HN and international community DC plans and operations.
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Advising on DC control measures that would effectively support the military operation.
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Advising on how to implement DC control measures.
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Publicizing control measures among IPI.
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Assessing MOEs.
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Participating in the execution of selected DC operations as needed or directed and in coordination with the internationally mandated organizations (for example, UNHCR, OCHA, ICRC) for their care.
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Assisting in arbitration of problems arising from implementation of DC control measures.

## Noncombatant Evacuation Operations

3-15. NEO refers to the authorized and orderly departure of noncombatants from a specific area by the DOS, DOD, or other appropriate authority. Although normally considered in connection with combat operations, evacuation may also be conducted in anticipation of, or in response to, any natural or manmade disaster in a foreign country, including civil unrest when evacuation to safe havens or to the United States is warranted. CA forces will normally assist the combatant commander or the ambassador in the planning and management of a NEO through their CAPTs; however, for CA forces to effectively support the GCC or Country Team, these planning teams need to play a role early in the planning process.
3-16. DOD defines two categories of noncombatant evacuees:

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U.S. citizens who may be ordered to evacuate by competent authority, including
 Civilian employees of all agencies of the USG and their dependents.  Military personnel of the U.S. Armed Forces specifically designated for evacuation as
noncombatants.
 Dependents of members of the U.S. Armed Forces.
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U.S. (and non-U.S.) citizens who may be authorized or assisted (but not necessarily ordered) by competent authority to evacuate, including
 Civilian employees of USG agencies and their dependents who are residents in the country
but are willing to be evacuated.
 Private U.S. citizens and their dependents.  Military personnel and their dependents, short of an ordered evacuation.  Designated aliens, including dependents of civilian employees of the USG and military
personnel of the U.S. Armed Forces, as prescribed by the DOS.
3-17. JP 3-07.5, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Noncombatant Evacuation Operations,* and FM 3-05.104, *Army Special Operations Forces Noncombatant Evacuation Operations*, provide additional information on NEOs. 3-18. NEOs remove threatened civilians from locations in an FN or an HN to safe areas or to the United States. Such operations are conducted under the direction of the DOS. The United States uses military assets in an evacuation only when civilian resources are inadequate. The DOS may request help in conducting evacuations to

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Protect U.S. citizens abroad.
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Minimize the number of U.S. citizens at risk.
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Minimize the number of U.S. citizens in combat areas to avoid impairing the combat
effectiveness of military forces.

## Types Of Environments

3-19. NEOs may be ordered in any of the following environments:

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Permissive. NEOs are conducted with the full help and cooperation of the affected nation. Evacuation of noncombatants is mutually beneficial to friends and allies. The political stability of nations granting authority to evacuate noncombatants is secure. An example of a permissive NEO is the evacuation of Subic Bay and Clark Air Base in the Philippines after eruption of the Mount Pinatubo Volcano in 1991.
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Uncertain. NEOs are conducted where overt or covert opposition to the evacuation exists. The opposition may come from the host government, opposition forces, outside forces, or from any combination of the three. Usually, a military show of force is sufficient to maintain control of the situation.
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Hostile. Operations to prevent or destroy the NEO are occurring or can be expected to occur. Forced entry by military forces into the AO and combat operations may be required to secure evacuees. A good example of a hostile evacuation is the U.S. Embassy in Saigon, Republic of Vietnam, in 1975.
3-20. The DOS is the lead agency for planning and conducting NEOs. The COM, normally the U.S. Ambassador or other principal DOS officer-in-charge, has primary responsibility for conducting evacuation operations. Every U.S. Embassy must maintain an emergency action plan (EAP), of which one section covers the U.S. military NEO plan. DOS in Washington, DC, maintains copies of these plans. The Washington Liaison Group coordinates evacuation planning among DOS, DOD, and other affected agencies for transportation options. Executive Order 12656 delegates responsibility for the protection and evacuation of U.S. citizens to the DOS and also directs the SecDef to advise and assist the Secretary of State in preparing and implementing plans. 3-21. NEOs are a political last step because they send a signal to the world that the United States has lost faith in the ability of the foreign government to protect U.S. personnel. The U.S. military plays only a supporting role in the implementation of a NEO. Military commanders have primary responsibility for military involvement in the operation. This involvement may include support during all phases of a NEO. Military planners must consider the terrain, weather, hydrography, designation and number of evacuees, and other factors of the area, including dissidents.

## Civil Affairs Mission

3-22. The CA supporting tasks in a NEO are of support to the commander's operational function and to the administration of certain aspects of the NEO. Generally, CA Soldier tasks include

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Advising the commander of the CA aspects and implications of current and proposed NEO plans, including assisting in writing the CMO annex in theater and respective subordinate plans.
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Supporting operation of evacuation sites, holding areas for non-U.S. nationals denied evacuation, and reception or processing stations.
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Assisting in the identification (ID) of U.S. citizens and others to be evacuated.
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Assisting in the screening and briefing of evacuees.
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Performing liaison with the Embassy, to include acting as a communications link with U.S. forces in the operational area.
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Recommending actions to the commander to minimize population interference with current and proposed military operations.
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Assisting in safe-haven activities as required.

## Foreign Humanitarian Assistance

3-23. FHA is defined as programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or man-made disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. FHA provided by U.S. forces is limited in scope and duration. The foreign assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the HN civil authorities and IGOs that may have the primary responsibility for providing FHA. FHA operations are those conducted outside the United States, its territories, and possessions (JP 1 02). Examples of disasters include hurricanes, earthquakes, floods, oil spills, famine, disease, civil conflicts, terrorist incidents, and incidents involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD) (Figure 3-2, page 3-7). JP 3-07.6, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance*, provides additional information on FHA. 3-24. FHA programs are normally the responsibility of the HN civil authorities. In addition to, or sometimes in lieu of, HN HA efforts, there will be a UN-led and coordinated assistance mission, within the framework of which literally hundreds of NGOs from around the world will be providing HA to all forms of disasters. 3-25. FHA operations refer to assistance provided by U.S. military forces. The actions taken in FHA are related to CSO in CONUS and U.S. territories and possessions. Defense support to civil authorities (DSCA) or CSO normally involves Army National Guard (ARNG) and Air National Guard (ANG) units operating in their state and territory role. CSO may also involve Active Army and USAR units, including ARNG and ANG units in a federal status when authorized and directed by the SecDef, and fall under the realm of stability operations. FM 3-0 and FM 3-07, *Stability Operations and Support Operation*s, provide additional information concerning stability operations and FHA. To differentiate FHA operations from domestic CSO, JP 3-57 and JP 3-07.6 refer to those operations conducted outside the United States, its territories, and possessions, as FHA.

3-26. The U.S. Agency for International Development/Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance/Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) provides foreign disaster assistance and coordinates the USG response to disasters abroad. U.S. military participation in FHA operations can range from providing security (allowing civilian agencies to operate safely and uninhibited), to conducting assessments, to providing specific military capabilities applied in direct disaster relief roles (providing food and medical care, constructing basic sanitation facilities, repairing public facilities, constructing shelters and temporary camps, and helicopter and fixed-wing transport for supplies, commodities, and passengers as demonstrated by the Indian Ocean Tsunami response in 20042005). 3-27. FHA operations are inherently complex operations that require a significant amount of interagency coordination. FHA is normally directed from the strategic level, coordinated and managed at the operational level, and conducted at a tactical level. FHA key tasks require centralized coordination and control. To help achieve FHA objectives, CMO planners must make sure the nominated programs have a benefit for a wide spectrum of the country in which the activity occurs, are self-sustaining or supportable by HN civilian or military forces, and are consistent with internationally accepted standards and principles.

FHA program development and implementation must be closely coordinated with the humanitarian community, which could include the UN, NGOs, and HN assistance agencies.

## Humanitarian And Civic Assistance

3-28. Humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA) and HA are categories of assistance that may be rendered by U.S. military personnel in FHA missions. Congress has authorized HCA and HA by statutory provisions and has appropriated funds for DOD to carry out these missions. A full discussion of these statutory

## Chapter 3

authorities and funding restraints is at paragraphs 3-50 through 3-71. Assistance provided under these provisions is limited to

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Medical, dental, and veterinary care provided in rural areas of a country.
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Construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems.
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Well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities.
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Rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities.
3-29. A special condition of HCA operations is that they must fulfill valid unit-training requirements. Although all HCA operations should strive to meet desired MOEs, benefit to the local populace is secondary to meeting the training requirements prescribed under law for any such operation. These operations are distinctly different from military civic action (MCA) projects, which are discussed later in this chapter.

## Disaster Relief

3-30. Disaster relief supporting tasks are conducted across the full spectrum of operations, from domestic natural disasters to the aftermath of foreign conflicts. FHA missions in the area of disaster relief include conducting technical assessments, transportation of goods and supplies, security for humanitarian infrastructure, and when deemed appropriate by civilian officials, direct efforts to mitigate the results of natural or man-made disasters. Examples of disasters include hurricanes, earthquakes, floods, oil spills, famine, and civil conflicts. Potential roles for U.S. forces include providing food and medical care, constructing basic sanitation facilities, repairing public facilities, constructing shelters, and responding quickly to relieve suffering, prevent loss of life, and protect property. 3-31. Normally, DOD is in a supporting role during disaster relief operations. As previously stated, USAID's OFDA provides foreign disaster assistance and coordinates the USG's response to disasters abroad. OFDA's mandate is to save lives, alleviate suffering, and reduce the economic impact of disasters. If a foreign disaster is large enough in scope for U.S. forces to be committed, it is likely that OFDA will also have a team or teams on the ground in the affected area. These are called disaster assistance response teams (DARTs). DARTs can vary in size and scope, but it is essential that U.S. forces operating in the same disaster area coordinate with these teams. OFDA has a military liaison unit, which can assign a liaison officer (LNO) to a military unit for the disaster relief operation; it is advisable for military commander's supporting disaster relief operations to assign LNOs to OFDA. In any case, if there are no LNOs available, it is critical that U.S. forces operating in a declared disaster area work closely with any OFDA DART on the ground.

## Disaster Relief Effort During The 2004-2005 Tsunami In The Indian Ocean Region

The Indian Ocean Tsunami disaster relief effort at the end of December 2004 is a good example of interagency cooperation, collaboration, and communication. As both DoD and OFDA rapidly responded to the effected disaster areas, both realized the need for close cooperation and coordination. OFDA dispatched LNOs at the tactical level to CMOCs operating in Sri Lanka, Indonesia, and Thailand, as well as at PACOM. The DoD, similarly embedded LNOs at OFDA's Response Management Team (RMT) in Washington, DC. This greatly simplified the request for assistance process from IOs and NGOs and increased the ability of both organizations to respond more effectively and quickly to those effected by the disaster.

Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance, USAID

## Dislocated Civilian Stability Operations

3-32. DCs stability operations are specific operations that assist refugees and IDPs. The UN definition of people in these two categories is important because of the rights and privileges afforded these groups by international legal instruments, including refugee convention, human rights law, and the guiding principles on IDPs. The UN is mandated with ensuring states and parties respect the terms of those instruments. The UN is responsible for coordinating and implementing programs in favor of the concerned populations as directed by its secretary general. FM 3-19.40 provides additional information. 3-33. Dislocated civilian stability operations include

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Care (food, supplies, medical care, and security).
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Placement (movement or relocation to other countries, camps, and locations). Normally, the U.S. military will not undertake this operation, except in extreme cases where lives are at stake. Such movements should always take place under the supervision of civilian authorities.
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Administration of camps, normally in support of internationally mandated IGOs (for example, UNHCR) or NGOs (for example, ICRC).

## Technical Assistance Operations

3-34. Technical assistance operations are generally short-term tasks such as communication restoration, relief supply management, and provision of emergency medical care, humanitarian demining, and highpriority relief supply delivery. Based upon Presidential and/or SecDef and the GCC's guidance, the FHA force commander should establish policy regarding technical advice and assistance to the affected country, UN, NGOs, and IGOs as soon as possible. Due to funding restrictions, the technical assistance operations are primarily conducted by Active Army forces.

3-35. Technical assistance and stability operations include
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Communication system restoration.
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Military relief supply management (to include high priority relief supply delivery). The U.S. military may also facilitate OGAs, IGOs, and NGOs with their relief supply efforts.
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Emergency medical care.
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Support of humanitarian mine action (HMA) (demining) operations by assisting in training the national mine action authority (NMAA) and conducting liaison activities with the HN infrastructure, the UN, and IGOs or NGOs.
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Assisting the NMAA to establish C2, and communicate effectively with subordinate organizations as well as HN government officials.
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Assistance in integrating the NMAA into the HN and international communities.

## Consequence Management

3-36. Consequence management (CM) operations mitigate the results of intentional or inadvertent release of WMD or chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives (CBRNE). These operations involve those essential services and activities required to manage and mitigate problems resulting from disasters and catastrophes. They involve measures to alleviate the damage, loss, hardship, or suffering caused by emergencies abroad. 3-37.  CM operations include

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Assisting with the restoration of essential HN government services.
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Assisting with the protection of HN public health and safety.
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Assisting with the provision of emergency relief to HN government, businesses, and individuals.
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Identifying and assessing the threat posed by hazardous materials.
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Providing consultation to HN decision makers.
3-38. FM 3-11.21, Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Aspects of Consequence Management, provides additional information concerning CM.

## Civil Affairs Mission

3-39. The CA supporting tasks in FHA are of support to the commander's operational function and to the administration of certain aspects of FHA. Generally, CA Soldier tasks include

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Participating in preparation and review of FUNCPLANs that address assisting USG agencies,
IGOs, HN agencies, and NGOs to support FHA and disaster relief operations.
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Monitoring all FHA operations for compliance with applicable laws, agreements, treaties, and contracts.
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Reviewing guidance from the GCC regarding FHA operations in TSCPs, FHA and disaster relief plans, and CM plans.
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Incorporating FHA assessment, FHA training, and HCA projects into TSCPs.
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Assessing the environment in which U.S. forces will conduct FHA operations, including the political situation, physical boundaries, potential threat to forces, global visibility, and media-interest climate for FHA operations.
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Confirming and validating the HN's ability to manage HA in the AO.
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Establishing a CMOC to coordinate and synchronize CAO and CMO efforts with interagency
and multinational HA efforts in the AO.
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Identifying shortfalls in HN HA plans and resources.
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Identifying HA resources, including various government agencies, military units, NGOs, and IPI in the theater of operations and establishing contact and working relationships as appropriate.
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Assessing, monitoring, and reporting the impact of the populace on FHA operations and FHA operations on the populace.
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Developing plans and strategies for long-range mitigation of political, economic, legal, social,
and military issues associated with FHA operations.
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Understanding that even in a permissive environment, nonthreatening means, such as demonstrations, may be used to impair credibility or reduce the effectiveness of U.S. military operations.

## Operational Environments Of Fha Operations

3-40. The U.S. force commander, in collaboration with other responding organizations, assesses the environment in which U.S. forces will conduct FHA operations. The operational environment includes the political situation, physical boundaries, potential threat to forces, global visibility, and media-interest climate for FHA operations (Figure 3-3).

3-41. Once the operational environment is confirmed, the U.S. force commander determines the types and numbers of forces required to meet the mission. The operational environment also determines the rules of engagement (ROE) to be used within the AO. For FHA, the more permissive the environment, the more predictable the outcome of the mission. Operational environments are categorized as permissive, uncertain, or hostile. The distinction between FHA conducted in a permissive environment versus a hostile environment must be clear. Failure to make this distinction results in inadequate planning and unrealistic expectations.

## Permissive Environment

3-42. A permissive environment is normally associated with pure relief operations following a natural disaster or economic collapse, with assistance provided at the request of the host government. A permissive environment is conducive to FHA operations. Little or no opposition or resistance to military forces is expected. Nonhostile, anti-U.S. interests may attempt to disrupt U.S. military operations. The physical security environment may be permissive; however, other nonthreatening means, such as demonstrations, may be used to impair credibility or to reduce the effectiveness of U.S. military operations. FHA operations in a permissive environment are characterized by

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Commonality of purpose for all parties.
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A quantifiable problemoften a single, natural disaster.
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Clear objectives and provision of support until normalcy returns.
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HN cooperation.

## Uncertain Environment

3-43. An uncertain environment is an operational environment in which the FN/HN does not have effective control of its territory and population.

## Hostile Environment

3-44. A hostile environment includes conditions, circumstances, and influences in the operational environment ranging from civil disorder or terrorist actions to full-scale combat. Forces conducting FHA must be prepared for a full-range of contingencies. Commanders can use their forces to safeguard the populace, defend the perimeter, provide escort convoys, screen the local populace, and assist in personnel recovery operations. FHA operations in a hostile environment are characterized by

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Multiple conflicting parties.
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Imminent danger to all parties.
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Relief as a weapon manipulated by combatants for political gain.
3-45. The more hostile the environment, the less predictable the outcome. Military forces conducting FHA operations must be prepared not only to counter actions by hostile forces attempting to disrupt the FHA mission but also to counter actions by a previously friendly populace. Commanders should not depend on their humanitarian mission to shield them from hostile acts. JFCs, in conjunction with higher authorities, must determine the appropriateness of the use of force. As the environment becomes progressively more hostile, the corresponding requirement for security increases, while the capability for humanitarian operations, such as food distribution and medical assistance, decreases. FM 3-0, FM 3-07, and JP 3-07.6 provide additional information. CJCSI 3214.01A, Military Support to Foreign Consequence Management Operations, has additional information and guidance on foreign CM.

## Rules Of Engagement During Fha Operations

3-46. The development of ROE for the forces participating in FHA operations is essential to the success of the mission. ROE for FHA operations are characterized by restraint. The levels of force, tactics, and weaponry must be evaluated and addressed. 3-47. The sensitive political and international nature of FHA operations means that the GCC must coordinate the details of FHA ROE with the JFC. The details may change as the operation evolves. Under normal circumstances, JCS peacetime ROE apply to all military operations. The GCC, in coordination with

## Chapter 3

the JFC, must request supplemental measures to deal with specifics of the mission. Actual ROE established for each FHA mission depend on the individual situation and operational environment. 3-48. For multinational operations, all participating military forces should establish common FHA ROE to provide consistency within the force. Individual nations using separate national ROE respond differently to the same situation. The following precepts are essential to the concept of ROE for U.S. military forces:

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The right of self-defense will never be prohibited.
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A unit commander will defend against a hostile act or hostile intent.
3-49. The two elements of self-defense are necessity and proportionality. In necessity, a hostile act must occur or a hostile intent must be apparent. In proportionalitythe use of forcemust be reasonable in intensity, duration, and magnitude to ensure the safety of forces.

## Sources Of Fha Funding

3-50. The Office of Humanitarian Assistance, under the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), executes a number of humanitarian and relief programs. Some forms of FHA may not extend to individuals or groups engaged in military or paramilitary operations. FHA is directed from the strategic level, coordinated and managed at the operational level, and conducted at a tactical level. The U.S. military and the CA community can play an important role toward enhancing U.S. national security while improving international relations through DOD programs, such as those described in the following paragraphs. 3-51. Sources of funding are always important in military operations, to include those conducted by CA units. The Congress appropriates funds for various purposes, to include military operations. Fiscal law requires that U.S. Government funds must be spent for the purpose the funds were appropriated, in no more than the amount appropriated, and within the time constraints imposed on the appropriation. Failure to comply with the restrictions of fiscal law can result in criminal sanctions. 3-52. Historically, DOD conducted limited HCA operations in FN without separate statutory authority. In 1984, the Comptroller General opined that DOD's extensive use of operation and maintenance (O&M) funds to provide HCA violated the purpose statute (Section 1301[a], Title 31, United States Code) and other well-established fiscal principles. The Comptroller General concluded that DOD had used its O&M accounts improperly to fund foreign aid and security assistance. Foreign aid and security assistance are the responsibility of the DOS, not DOD, and the funds used for such programs normally come from appropriations to the DOS, with their expenditure being authorized under Title 22 rather than Title 10. Activities, programs, and operations that are essentially foreign aid and should therefore be funded with DOS Title 22 money, may not be funded with DOD Title 10 money. 3-53. Congress, however, recognizing the need for the military to be able to conduct limited HCA projects and other FHA operations, passed legislation authorizing such actions and began appropriating funds for those purposes.

## Importance Of Understanding Funding From Operation Iraqi Freedom

Civil systems require money to operate. Obviously, money creates action in the civilian sector and the importance of this can be underlined by experience in Iraq with CERP
and other funding sources. The CA units should enhance the combatant commander's capability to mass money on high value targets, interdict local problems, and bolster the legitimacy of local leaders by executing projects aligned to Iraqi priorities of work. When the Division or BCT commander sees he will be receiving a CA unit he should immediately understand that he would be receiving the financial management capability to manage and execute projects and programs according to civilian standards. The capability to effectively contract, account for funds, and execute projects is according to civilian standards, not military standards, is essential. This is important to set the
conditions for the military to disengage and transition to civilian operations more quickly. CA units should come with the skills and information management equipment to facilitate better-managed effects with money.

AAR, 425th Civil Affairs Battalion with 1 AD
21 December 2004

## Humanitarian And Civic Assistance, Section 401, Title 10, United States Code

3-54. Section 401, Title 10, United States Code (10 USC 401) authorizes the military to conduct HCA activities. HCA activities are defined in the statute as the following:

z
Medical, dental, and veterinary care provided in rural or underserved areas of a country.
z
Construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems.
z
Well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities.
z
Rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities.
3-55. The typical sequence for the initiation and execution of HCA projects is as follows. The embassy, Country Teams, and the Service components of the GCCs' HCA provide lists of projects for their respective countries to the combatant commander having responsibility for that country. HCA funding comes directly from the Services to the combatant commanders. The money is Service O&M funds that are fenced off by the Services specifically for HCA. Each service is responsible for funding a particular combatant command (for example, Army: USSOUTHCOM and USEUCOM). 3-56. Congress imposed certain restrictions on the conduct of HCA. The DOS must approve all HCA projects. The security interests of the U.S. and the receiving nation must be promoted. The mission must serve the basic economic and social needs of the people involved. HCA must complement but not duplicate any other form of social or economic assistance. The aid may not be provided to any individual, group or organization engaged in military or paramilitary activity. HCA must be conducted in conjunction with an authorized military operation, which may be an exercise or a deployment for training (DFT). The HCA activity being conducted must promote specific operational-readiness skills of the individual Soldier.

3-57. HCA funds are used to pay for expenses incurred as a *direct result* of the HCA activity. These expenses include the following: consumable materials, equipment leasing, supplies, and necessary services. These expenses do not include costs associated with the military operations that likely would have been incurred whether or not the HCA was provided, such as transportation, military personnel, repair of USG equipment, and petroleum, oils and lubricants. HCA expenditures are reported each year to Congress by country, type, and amount. 3-58. Opportunities often arise during the course of an exercise or operation in a foreign country to perform minor HCA. For example, during the conduct of a combined exercise, a young boy near the exercise site may require minor medical attention to set a broken arm. 10 USC 401(c)(2) authorizes the military commander to permit the treatment of the child by the unit's assigned doctor or medic. The costs associated with this treatment would likely be minimal and would be paid from the unit's O&M funds. This kind of activity is referred to as de minimis HCA. Only HCA amounting to "minimal expenditures" may be provided. DOD Directive 2205.2, Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA) Provided in Conjunction with Military Operations, provides guidance in determining what "minimal" means. De minimis HCA activities must be one of the four activities statutorily allowed as an HCA activity. Additionally, all of the other restrictions for the conduct of HCA mentioned above apply to de minimis HCA.

## Humanitarian Assistance, Section 2561, Title 10, United States Code

3-59. Section 2561, Title 10, United States Code (10 USC 2561) authorizes use of funds for transportation of humanitarian relief and for other humanitarian purposes worldwide. "Other humanitarian purposes worldwide" is not defined in the statute. 3-60. 10 USC 2561 gives a much broader authority than 10 USC 401 and allows more flexibility in emergency situations to include natural or man-made disasters. On the other hand, HCA generally requires preplanned activities and must promote operational readiness skills of the U.S. participants. Generally, if the contemplated activity falls within the parameters of HCA under 10 USC 401, then the more specific HCA authority should be used.

3-61. 10 USC 2561 does not require the promotion of operational readiness skills of the U.S. military participants and allows contracting for goods and services if necessary for mission execution. Also, unlike HCA, which must be conducted in conjunction with an exercise or ongoing military operation, HA can be conducted as a stand-alone project. 3-62. This authority is often used to transport USG-donated goods to a country in need. (Section 402, Title 10, United States Code [10 USC 402] applies when relief supplies are supplied by NGOs.) 10 USC 2561 has been amended to allow the SecDef to use this authority to transport supplies intended for use to respond to, or mitigate the effects of, an event or condition that threatens serious harm to the environment (such as an oil spill) if other sources of transportation are not readily available. CA Soldiers and their servicing judge advocates must obtain and review current DOD guidance for HA activities.

## Excess And Nonlethal Supplies: Humanitarian Relief, Section 2557, Title 10, United States Code

3-63. Section 2557, Title 10, United States Code (10 USC 2557) allows DOD to provide excess and nonlethal supplies for humanitarian relief. Excess property may include any property except real property, weapons, ammunition, and any other equipment or material that is designed to inflict bodily harm or death. Excess property is that property which is in the Defense Reutilization and Marketing Office (DRMO) channels. If the required property is in the excess property inventory, it is transferred to USAID, as agent for DOS, for distribution to the target nation. Military personnel may distribute these supplies. This statute does not contain the authority to transport the items, but they may be transported under authority of 10 USC 2561.

## Transportation Of Privately-Owned Humanitarian Relief Supplies To Foreign Countries, Section 402, Title 10, United States Code

3-64. Section 402, Title 10, United States Code (10 USC 402) (commonly called the "Denton Amendment") authorizes the transportation of nongovernmental, privately-donated relief supplies. It is administered by DOS and DSCA. The relief supplies are transported on a space-available basis under certain conditions:

z
Supplies must be in useable condition.
z
Supplies must be suitable for humanitarian purposes.
z
Adequate arrangements must have been made for their distribution in-country. Once in-country,
the supplies may be distributed by any USG agency, foreign government agency, HN government agency, IGO, NGO, private voluntary organization (PVO), or other private nonprofit organization.
3-65. DOD may not use this authority to supply a military or paramilitary group. Since the supplies are transported on a space-available basis, no separate funding is necessary. However, reports must be submitted to Congress. 3-66. 10 USC 402 has been amended to allow the SecDef to use this authority to transport supplies intended for use to respond to, or mitigate the effects of, an event or condition that threatens serious harm to the environment if other sources of transportation are not readily available.

## Foreign Disaster Assistance, Section 404, Title 10, United States Code

3-67. Section 404, Title 10, United States Code (10 USC 404) in consultation with the Secretary of State, USAID is the lead agency for foreign disaster relief, with the primary source of funding being International Disaster Assistance Funds, Section 2292 through 2292k, Title 22, United States Code (22 USC 2292 through 2292k). DOD has limited authority to engage in disaster assistance. The President may direct DOD through the SecDef to respond to man-made or natural disasters. The President delegated disaster relief authority to the SecDef with concurrence of DOS (except in emergency situations). Executive Order
12966, 60 Federal Regulation 36949 (15 July 1995) provides additional information. DOD's participation must be necessary to "save lives." Assistance should take the form of support to the overall civilian effort and may include: transportation, supplies, services, and equipment.

3-68. 10 USC 404 is rarely used because there is no implementing guidance. As a result, DOD relies on the broad authority of 10 USC 2561 to conduct the foreign disaster assistance contemplated under 10 USC 404.

## Combatant Commander Initiative Funds, Section 166A, Title 10, United States Code

3-69. Section 166a, Title 10, United States Code (10 USC 166A) provides the combatant commanders with a great deal of legal flexibility to conduct humanitarian operations and activities. The statute specifically lists HCA as an authorized activity.

## Funding Sources For Military Humanitarian Operations

3-70. Fenced or budgeted O&M funds are used to pay for HCA, including de minimis HCA (for example, all activities other than demining). In an attempt to bring some order to the scattered authorities and funding sources for military humanitarian programs, Congress began appropriating funds into an account labeled OHDACA. OHDACA funds are generally used to pay for operations and activities that are authorized by 10 USC 2561, HA, and demining under 10 USC 401. Even though the law specifically lists HCA and disaster relief as appropriate uses for the fund, the actual practice is that OHDACA funds are used to pay for 10 USC 2561-authorized activities. 3-71. In some cases, Congress will authorize and appropriate funds for humanitarian relief and related activities in conjunction with a specific operation. An example is CERP. This program was developed by the coalition provisional authority in Iraq to enable commanders to respond to urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction requirements within their AOR. CERP was originally funded exclusively with seized assets. Congress subsequently appropriated funds to be expended under CERP, and the program was extended to Afghanistan. The rules governing the use of such funds will be based on any Congressional restrictions in the legislation, and will be tailored to the needs of the particular operation. 3-72. Further guidance is available from the servicing judge advocate and from the current year's Operational Law Handbook, published by the Center for Law and Military Operations (CLAMO) of the Judge Advocate General's Legal Center and School (JAGLCS).

## Nation Assistance

3-73. NA is civil or military assistance (other than FHA) rendered to a nation by U.S. forces within that nation's territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between the United States and that nation. NA operations support an HN by promoting sustainable development and growth of responsive institutions. The goal is to promote long-term regional stability. NA programs often include, but are not limited to, security assistance (SA), foreign internal defense (FID), 10 USC (DOD) programs, and activities performed on a reimbursable basis by federal agencies or IGOs. All NA operations are usually coordinated with the U.S. Ambassador through the Country Team.

## Security Assistance

3-74. SA is defined as those groups of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives.

## Foreign Internal Defense

3-75. FID is that participation by civilian or military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. Further detail concerning CA support to FID can be found later in this chapter under CAO support to SO.

## Military Civic Action

3-76. MCA involves operations intended to win support of the local population for the FN/HN and its military. MCA uses predominantly indigenous or paramilitary forces as labor and is planned as a series of short-term projects with the long-term goal of fostering national development. Properly planned, executed, and promulgated in close cooperation with local authorities, military, and community leaders, MCA projects can be useful in reaching desired objectives and goals. In MCA programs, U.S. personnel are limited to training and advising the HN military on planning and executing projects useful to the local population, such as building schools and clinics, digging wells, and developing roads. The intent of MCA is to enhance the image of the HN military and increase its acceptance and the supported government's acceptance with the local population. 3-77. MCA must comply with U.S. fiscal laws. Except for de minimis activities authorized under 10 USC 401, expenses for consumable materials, equipment leasing, supplies, and necessary services incurred as a direct result of MCA projects may not be paid out of USG funds unless authorized under a foreign aid or SA program for which funds are appropriated under 22 USC or which have other authority and funding as described in paragraphs 3-50 through 3-71. 3-78. MCA projects are divided into two general categories. These categories are explained below:

z
Mitigating MCA projects are immediate-response, short-term projects designed to provide
emergency assistance to a populace in the wake of a disaster and to reduce further damage or suffering, as in HA. The disaster could be from natural causessuch as earthquake, hurricane,
famine, or floodor from man-made causessuch as civil disturbance, accident, terrorism, or war. Some examples of mitigating MCA projects are

Operating an emergency medical clinic.

Distributing food.

Building temporary shelter and sanitation facilities.

Conducting damage clean-up operations, including decontamination of hazardous materials
(HAZMAT) spills or release of WMD.
z
Developmental MCA projects are long-term projects designed to enhance the infrastructure of a local area. They are often preventive in nature and include any activities that actually eliminate or reduce the probability of occurrence of a disaster. Developmental MCA projects require
interagency cooperation and continuous support from government sources to be effective. Some examples of developmental MCA projects are

Building or redesigning facilities to reflect better land-use management.

Building or reinforcing structures to withstand the destructive elements predominant to the
area.

Building or rehabilitating water sources and sanitation facilities to eliminate or prevent the
spread of disease.

Operating a long-term public health campaign to educate the populace on preventive health
measures (a medical readiness training exercise [MEDRETE]).

Conducting some humanitarian demining operations.

## Civil Affairs Mission

3-79. The CA supporting tasks in NA are of support to the commander's operational function. Generally, CA Soldier tasks include

z
Identifying, validating, or evaluating NA project nominations.
z
Synchronizing NA projects with other programs, military and civilian.
z
Participating in the execution of selected NA operations as needed or directed.
z
Tracking costs associated with execution of NA projects.
z
Performing quality-control assessments of NA operations and costs.
z
Assisting in the arbitration of problems arising from the execution of NA operations.

## Support To Civil Administration

3-80. SCA are military operations that help to stabilize or to continue the operations of the governing body or civil structure of a foreign country, whether by assisting an established government or by establishing military authority over an occupied population. 3-81. SCA occurs most often in stability operations. Some support to civil administration is manifested in the other CAO: PRC, FHA, and NA. The SCA operations consist of two distinct mission activities:

z
Civil administration in friendly territory. The GCC's support to governments of friendly territories during peacetime, disasters, or war. Examples of support include advising friendly
authorities and performing specific functions within limits of the authority and liability established by international treaties and agreements.
z
Civil administration in occupied territory. The establishment of a temporary government, as directed by the SecDef, to exercise executive, legislative, and judicial authority over the populace of a territory that U.S. forces have taken from an enemy by force of arms until an indigenous civil government can be established.

## Civil Administration Terms

3-82. During civil administration in occupied territory, the following terms apply:
z
Military governor. The military commander or other designated person who, in an occupied territory, exercises supreme authority over the civil population subject to the laws and usages of war and to any directive received from the commander's government or superior.
z
Military government ordinance. An enactment on the authority of a military governor promulgating laws or rules regulating the occupied territory under such control.

## Civil Affairs Mission

3-83. The CA supporting tasks in support to civil administration vary between assistance to civil administration in friendly territory, and civil administration in occupied territory. In either case, however, the CA mission is one of support to the commander's operational and support function with respect to the continuity of government in an FN/HN. Generally, CA Soldier tasks include

z
Identifying, validating, or evaluating FN/HN infrastructure.
z
Understanding the needs of the IPI in terms of the six functional areas.
z
Monitoring and anticipating future requirements of the IPI in terms of the six functional areas.
z
Performing liaison functions between military and civilian agencies.
z
Coordinating and synchronizing collaborative interagency or multinational support to civil
administration operations.
z
Participating in the execution of selected support to civil administration operations as needed or directed.
z
Performing quality-control assessments of support to civil administration operations and costs.
z
Assisting in the arbitration of problems arising from the execution of support to civil administration operations.
z
Coordinating and synchronizing transition of support to civil administration operations from military to indigenous government or international community control.
3-84. All six CA functional areas may participate in support to civil administration according to METT-TC.

## Civil Information Management

3-85. Civil information is information developed from data with relation to civil areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events, within the civil component of the commander's operational environment that can be fused or processed to increase DOD/Interagency/IGO/NGO/IPI situational awareness, situational understanding, or situational dominance. CIM is the process whereby, civil information is collected, entered into a central database, and internally fused with the supported element, higher HQ, other USG and DOD agencies, IGOs, and NGOs to ensure the timely availability of information for analysis and the widest possible dissemination of the raw and analyzed civil information to military and nonmilitary partners throughout the AO.

## Civil Reconnaissance

3-86. CR is a targeted, planned, and coordinated observation and evaluation of those specific civil aspects of the environment. CR focuses specifically on the civil component, the elements of which are best represented at the tactical level by the mnemonic ASCOPE. CR can be conducted by CA forces or by other forces as required. Examples of other specialties and assets that can conduct CR are engineers, medical, MP, and unmanned observation aircraft.

## Civil Information Grid

3-87. The CIG provides the capability to coordinate, collaborate, and communicate to develop the civil components of the COP. The CIG increases the situational understanding for the supported commander by vertically and horizontally integrating the technical lines of communication. This framework links every CA Soldier as a sensor and consumer to the CIM cell of the CMOC and the CMO cell. (Figure 2-3, page 2-6.)

## Civil Affairs Mission

3-88. The CA supporting tasks in CIM are of support to the commander's operational function. Generally, CA Soldier tasks include

z
Conducting CR to find, analyze, and report civil information.
z
Coordinating with non-CA assets to achieve a coherent reconnaissance and execution plan.
z
Synchronizing the collection and consolidation of civil information.
z
Developing the civil components of the COP.
z
Increasing the supported commander's environment awareness.
z
Assisting in the development of the supported commander's COP.
z
Conducting interagency, IGO, NGO, and IPI coordination.

## Ca Information Management Problems During Operation Iraqi Freedom

Civil information was a problem for the Commander's Common Operating Picture (COP), for project finance decision-makers, for government support work, and in intelligence. In Baghdad, CA units had inefficient tools and procedures in execution of government support and project management. A part of the problem is the inadequacy of software to facilitate common contact management and project management processes... This information problem extended way beyond Civil Affairs. There was [sic] no Common Operating Picture (COP) of civil information across Civil Affairs, CPA Ministries, US Army Corps of Engineers, USAID, and Coalition Allies... The lack of COP is also felt are higher levels of the organization tasked with analysis and management of large-scale plans and programs. Oversight and management is nearly impossible with visibility and feedback on projects, events and actions at the lowest level.

AAR, 425th Civil Affairs Battalion with 1 AD
21 December 2004

## Civil-Military Operations Support To Full Spectrum Operations

3-89. CAO and CMO occur throughout full spectrum operations (offensive, defensive, stability, and civil support operations [Figure 3-4, page 3-19]). CA forces and CMO planners support full spectrum operations at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Commanders at all levels will encounter civilians during most military operations and must plan CMO accordingly. Rear areas, for example, contain supplies, facilities, services, and labor resources U.S. commanders can use to support military operations. As was demonstrated in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, combat operations in or near these areas can be disrupted by

z
Uncontrolled and uncoordinated movement of civilians in the environment.
z
Hostile actions by the populace.
z
Failure to cooperate and coordinate with friendly forces.

## Offensive Operations

3-90. According to FM 1, offensive operations seek to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative to defeat the enemy decisively. Army forces attack simultaneously throughout the AO to throw enemies off balance, overwhelm their capabilities, disrupt their defenses, and ensure their defeat or destruction. Army forces conclude a phase of an offensive operations by consolidating gains, resuming the attack, or preparing for future operations. During offensive and defensive operations, the main effort is military-to-military contacts; however, the secondary effort is militaryto-civilian contacts. CMO/CAO support to offensive operations includes

z
Identifying of centers of gravity (COGs) within the operational AO.
z
Identifying of decisive points along lines of operation.
z
Denying the enemy resources.
z
Gaining civil information through CR and CIM to help develop the supported commander's
COP to help direct their attack.
z
Maneuvering CA forces and resources to advantageous positions before contact based on METT-TC.
z
Assisting in the planning of RTLs to minimize unnecessary damage to the civil infrastructure
and culturally sensitive sites.

## Defensive Operations

3-91. According to FM 3-0, defensive operations buy time, economize forces, and develop conditions favorable for resuming offensive operations. Therefore, major operations and campaigns combine defensive operations with offensive operations. Operational-level defensive operations normally include offensive and stability operations. CMO and CAO support to defensive operations include

z
Advising on the presence of culturally, economically, and politically significant assets and resources within the AO.
z
Identifying COG within the operational AO.
z
Identifying decisive points along lines of operation.
z
Denying the enemy resources.
z
Advising on countermobility operations directed at economically significant roads, railways, bridges, and so on.
z
Planning and executing PRC to evacuate endangered populations.
z
Assisting in the planning of RTLs to minimize unnecessary damage to the civil infrastructure and culturally sensitive sites.
z
Gaining civil information through CR and CIM to help develop the supported commander's COP to help direct the defense.
z
Advising the commander on the consideration of civilian movements during the planning for emplacement of minefields.
3-92. In the example depicted in Figure 3-5, page 3-21, deterrence has failed and the major effort shifts to military-to-military contacts. The division or corps deploys to defeat the enemy in support of the HN government. As the situation stabilizes in the north, the ASCC or GCC pushes down a CA brigade-level ASCC or GCC CMOC to the division or corps to manage key CMO functions and to set conditions for transition to stability operations. As the situation in the north improves, the ASCC or GCC-level CMOC is augmented by additional assets (engineers/military police/medical corps planners) in an economy-of-force effort by the division or corps commander and transitions to a JCMOTF. The additional two CA companies in the north are deployed from the Active Army CA brigade as a bridge. The division or corps moves the BCT south to assume tactical responsibility in a hostile sector, while the JCMOTF assumes CMO functional responsibility in the BCT's former AO. To the south, the division or corps establishes a CMOC to manage select CMO functions (PRC/FHA) if the civil situation deteriorates further. In this case, the ASCC or GCC CMOC (northern sector) reinforces the BCT commander's CMO effort as required. In conjunction with the CMO cell within the division or corps main, the CA battalion-level ASCC or GCC CMOC is establishing the framework for the division or corps CIG to provide a civil COP. All of this adds to the situational understanding of the division or corps and subordinate commanders as the engagement shifts from military-to-military to military-to-civilian.

## Stability Operations

3-93. CAO and CMO are conducted during offensive and defensive operations to set the conditions for stability operations. CMO is the major effort of support operations. CA support to stability operations depends on the condition of the affected IPI. The CMO staff continually monitors the condition of the HN throughout the operation, applies available resources to affect the civilian component, and recommends functional skills required to support this critical phase. CAO support conventional forces, SOF, USG agencies, and the HN civil administration in transitioning the power back to the local government. 3-94. Conflict termination marks the start of new challenges for CA forces and CMO planners. These challenges may include encounters with the local populace as it responds to a new or significantly changed government and to a new way of life. Problems may involve the unrealized hopes and aspirations of the local populace, as well as the desires of local leaders to be recognized as the legitimate power. The need to maintain and restore law and order, as well as basic life services (food, water, electricity) is critical early in stability operations. During stability operations, the main effort shifts from military-to-military to militaryto-civilian contacts. 3-95. Insurgency forces, if any, also present unique challenges for the commander. The complete demobilization of the insurgency force and the return of those forces to civilian pursuits should be the ultimate goal. Demobilization involves, among other things, the collection of weapons. The demobilization effort may be difficult unless the insurgency force receives assurances of transition assistance, jobs, and proper resettlement. A good example of how CA personnel participated in this effort occurred in Cambodia when CA personnel helped the government repatriate Khmer Rouge defectors. CA personnel coordinated with the HN, IGOs, and NGOs to locate jobs and to provide training. Posthostility operations can have a long-term impact on the civilian sector and U.S. national interests, and can be the most challenging and most significant part of military operations. 3-96. According to FM 1, time considerations normally are substantially different in stability operations. The goals of stability operations may not be achievable in the short term. Success often requires perseverancea long-term commitment to solving the real problem. The achievement of these goals may take years. Conversely, daily operations may require rapid responses to changing conditions based on unanticipated localized conflict among competing groups. Civil considerations are especially critical in stability operations. The civil population, HN government, NGOs, and IGOs can greatly affect achieving stability. 3-97. In the example depicted in Figure 3-6, the ASCC commander transitions to Phase IIIb/IV. During stability operations, the main effort shifts from military-to-military contacts to military-to-civilian contacts. With the reestablishment of the U.S. Embassy, the ASCC commander's supporting effort is support to civilian-to-civilian contacts. A tertiary effort continues to be military-to-military contacts, focused on training and transition of authority to HN security forces to establish security and rule of law across the AOR. Using reachback the CACOM (theater-level) CMOC pushes a reconstruction planning team to enable the U.S. Embassies civilian-to-civilian engagement. Additional functional specialists are pushed forward to the JCMOTF to assist in the ASCC commander's CMO priorities (for example, city planners, public works, and public health). 3-98. Army forces assist civil authorities, foreign or domestic, as they prepare for or respond to crises and relieve suffering. Army forces provide essential support, services, assets, or specialized resources to help civil authorities deal with situations beyond their capabilities. Army forces assistance should meet the immediate needs of designated groups for a limited time until civil authorities can do so without Army assistance. In extreme or exceptional cases, Army forces may provide relief or assistance directly to those in need. More commonly, Army forces help civil authorities, IGOs, and NGOs provide support. Army forces often conduct stability operations as stand-alone missions. However, most offensive and defensive operations require complementary stability operations before, during, and after execution. 3-99. Stability operations are usually nonlinear and noncontiguous. Leaders tailor the application of the operational framework, elements of operational design, and METT-TC to fit each situation. During stability operations identifying centers of gravity, decisive pointsand even the desired end statecan be more complex and unorthodox than in offensive and defensive operations. When visualizing a support operation, commanders must recognize that they may have to define the enemy differently. In stability operations, the adversary is often disease, hunger, or the consequences of disaster. CMO and CA planners are integral players in the successful execution of support operation missions. Support operations are normally conducted in a permissive environment.

## Civil Support Operations

But there is an overriding and urgent mission here in America today, and that's to protect our homeland. We have been called into action, and we've got to act.

President George W. Bush
10 July 2002
Everyone knows that the Pentagon is not in the business of providing an armed force for the United States, but when an event occurs, we get the phonecall and why do we get the phone call? Well, because the Department of Defense is considered the Department of Defense. They know that they've got troops. They've got people who respond. They're organized and they can be of assistance.

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld July 2002
3-100. Army forces conduct CSO within the United States and its territories. CSO is a supporting CA task due to the fact that DOD normally plays a supporting role under the National Response Plan (NRP) (signed December 2004). The NRP refers to DOD CSO as DSCA. 3-101. The DOD established USNORTHCOM in 2002 to consolidate, under a single unified command, existing missions that were previously executed by other military organizations. USNORTHCOM's mission is homeland defense and DSCA, to include

z
Conducting operations to deter, prevent, and defeat threats and aggression against the U.S. its territories, and its interests within the assigned AOR.
z
As directed by the President or SecDef, providing military assistance to civil authorities including crisis and CM (domestic incident management).

## Refugee Processing

The nature of stability operations often requires Army force commanders to report directly to a lead federal agency. In May 1980, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) established a Cuban refugee processing center at Fort Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania. An Army task force consisting of Active Army and Reserve Component (RC) forces supported the operation and reported to FEMA. In 1994, Logistics Task Force 64 supported DOS and Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) representatives in establishing refugee camps in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Army engineers, military police, medical personnel, logisticians, and legal representatives provided a variety of servicesincluding food, water, laundry, billeting, security, and maintenancefor 14,000 Haitian and 30,000 Cuban refugees. In August 1999, more than 550 Active Army and RC Soldiers formed Task Force Provide Refuge, an administrative and logistic organization to care for Kosovo refugees at Fort Dix, New Jersey. The task force commander responded to the INS while receiving, screening, and processing the refugees until they returned home or relocated within the United States.

3-102. Within the United States and its territories, Army forces support homeland security operations. Homeland security operations provide the nation strategic flexibility by protecting its citizens and infrastructure from conventional and unconventional threats. Homeland security has two components. The first component is homeland defense. If the United States comes under direct attack or is threatened by hostile armed forces, Army forces under joint command conduct offensive and defensive missions as part of homeland defense. The other component is civil support, which is the fourth type of Army operation. 3-103. CSO address the consequences of man-made or natural accidents and incidents beyond the capabilities of civilian authorities. Army forces do not conduct stability operations within the United States; under U.S. law, the federal and state governments are responsible for those tasks. Instead, Army forces conduct CSO when requested, providing Army expertise and capabilities to lead agency authorities. 3-104. CSO encompass the combined emergency management authorities, policies, procedures, and resources of local, state, and national-level governments to mitigate, prepare for, respond to, and recover from disasters of all kinds. Although DOD may support all phases of the emergency-management cycle (mitigation, preparation, response, and recovery), DOD usually only supports the response phase. DOD can deploy large organizations on short notice and employ them during the response phase of a disaster-response operation. In the aftermath of a disaster, this effort includes incorporating voluntary disaster relief organizations, the private sector, and international sources into the National Incident Management System (NIMS) (Figure 3-7). 3-105. DSCA support through CSO supplements the efforts and resources of state and local governments and organizations. A presidential declaration of a major disaster or emergency usually precedes CSO. CSO require extensive coordination and liaison among many organizationsinteragency, joint, Active Army, and USARas well as with state and local governments. The NRP provides national-level architecture to coordinate the actions of all supporting federal agencies through the NIMS. 3-106. The NRP applies to a major disaster or emergency as defined under the Stafford Act, which includes a natural catastrophe; fire, flood, or explosion regardless of cause; or any other occasion or instance for which the President deems Federal assistance is needed to supplement state and local efforts. The NRP and Federal assistance to emergency situations cover the full range of complex and constantly changing requirements following a disaster: saving lives, protecting property, and meeting basic human needs (response); restoring the disaster affected area (recovery); and reducing vulnerability to future disasters (mitigation). The NRP may also be implemented in response to the consequences of terrorism, IAW the Homeland Security Act of 2002. The Homeland Security Presidential Directive5 (HSPD5) establishes clear objectives for a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the U.S.; reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism, major disasters, and other emergencies; and minimize the damage and recover from attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies that occur.
3-107. Under the Stafford Act, and Executive Orders 12148 and 12656, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) primarily coordinates Federal emergency preparedness, planning, management, and disaster-assistance functions. DHS also establishes Federal disaster-assistance policy.
3-108. Under the Stafford Act, a Governor may request the President to declare a major disaster or an emergency if an event is beyond the combined response capabilities of the State and affected local governments. No direct Federal assistance is authorized before a Presidential declaration. However, DHS can use limited predeclaration authorities to move initial response resources (IRRs) (critical goods typically needed in the immediate aftermath of a disaster; for example, food, water, and emergency generators) and emergency teams closer to potentially affected areas. 3-109. DOD maintains significant resources (personnel, equipment, and supplies) that may be available to support the Federal response to a major disaster or emergency. DOD will normally provide support only when other resources are unavailable and only if such support does not interfere with its primary mission or ability to respond to operational contingencies. 3-110. In a major disaster or emergency as defined in the Stafford Act, the President may direct any federal agency, with or without reimbursement, to use its authorities and the resources granted to it under federal law (including personnel, equipment, supplies, facilities, and managerial, technical, and advisory services) in support of state and local assistance efforts. However, DOD components may also respond under independent funding authority or the commander's immediate response authority as defined in the DOD Directive 3025.1 M, *DOD Manual for Civil Emergencies*. National-level requests for military support are initially made through the Joint Director of Military Support (JDOMS), who represents the SecDef, as the DOD executive agent. The JDOMS then appoints a defense coordinating officer (DCO), as appropriate, for provision of DSCA. The DCO is under OPCON to the USNORTHCOM commander as the single point of contact (POC) in the field for coordinating and validating the use of DOD resources (except for those provided by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers supporting their public works and engineering function). 3-111. DOD may establish a JTF or response task force (RTF) to consolidate and manage supporting military operations. Both task forces are temporary, multi-service organizations created to provide a CM response to a major natural or man-made disaster or emergency, and fall under the C2 of USNORTHCOM in support of the DSCA in their AOR. The JTF responds to major disasters such as hurricanes or floods. The RTF responds to events involving the use of chemical, biological, and highly explosive agents and materials. A JTF or RTF commander exercises OPCON of all allocated DOD assets (except U.S. Army Corps of Engineers supporting their public works and engineering function); provides personnel, equipment, and supplies to the affected area; and provides disaster-response support based on mission assignments received through the DCO. In CSO, JTF or RTF commanders provide liaison elements, planning support, advisors, and technical experts to the lead agency. Through these contacts, commanders determine where their objectives and plans complement or conflict with those of other agencies. 3-112. The terms crisis management (CrM) and CM are used when CSO involve a terrorist event and the potential or actual employment of WMD. Crisis management and CM are defined as follows:

z
Crisis managementthose measures used to identify, acquire, and plan the use of resources needed to anticipate, prevent, and/or resolve a threat or an act of terrorism. It is predominantly a law enforcement response, normally executed under federal law (JP 3-26). These measures are used to resolve a hostile situation and investigate and prepare a criminal case for prosecution under federal law. CrM will include a response to an incident involving WMD, a special improvised explosive device, or a hostage crisis that is beyond the capability of the lead federal agency.
z
CMthose actions taken to maintain or restore essential services and manage and mitigate problems resulting from disasters and catastrophes, including natural, man-made, or terrorist incidents (JP 3-26). These actions include measures taken to protect public health and safety, and provide emergency relief to governments, businesses, and individuals affected by the consequences of a chemical, biological, nuclear, and/or high-yield explosive situation. For domestic CM, the primary authority rests with the states to respond and with the federal government to provide assistance as required.

## Civil Affairs Role

3-113. The CA supporting tasks in CSO are of support to the commander's operational function. Generally, CA Soldier tasks include

z
Assessing and assisting in the restoration of essential government services.
z
Assisting in the protection of public health and safety (within the limits of Federal law and USC).
z
Assisting in the provision of emergency relief to government, businesses, and individuals.
z
Identifying and assessing the threat posed by hazardous materials (civil considerations).
z
Providing consultation through the DCO to decision makers.
z
Participating in interagency assessment, planning, and synchronizing of domestic stability operations through JTF or RTF and DCO.
z
Participating in the execution of selected CSO operations, as needed or directed.
3-114. All six CA functional areas may participate in CSO according to METT-TC. DOD Directive 3025.15, *Military Assistance to Civil Authorities*, provides additional information on the role of U.S. forces in CSO. DOD Directive 5525.5, *DOD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials*, FM 3-05.401, FM 3-07, and CJCSI 3214.01A have additional information and guidance on foreign CM.

## Battlefield Organization

3-115. Battlefield organization is the allocation of forces in the AO by purpose. Commanders organize forces according to purposes by determining whether each unit's operation will be decisive, shaping, or sustaining. These decisions form the basis of the commander's CONOPS through the MDMP and METT-TC factors. Through MDMP and METT-TC considerations, the CMO planner recommends the allocation of CA forces in support of these operations to the supported commander.

## Jtf KatrinaCivil Support Operation Example

During the morning hours of 29 August 2005, Hurricane Katrina plowed through eastern Louisiana, Mississippi, and western Alabama with winds exceeding 145-miles per hour and a storm surge between 15 and 28 feet. The hurricane left many parts of these Gulf states devastated. It destroyed hundreds of thousands of homes, took thousands of lives, and left nonevacuees without food, water, electricity, and other services. The SecDef directed USNORTHCOM to support the DHS through FEMA disasterrelief efforts. Anticipating the devastating effects of Hurricane Katrina and the significant role DOD would have, USNORTHCOM established JTF Katrina, led by Lieutenant General Russel Honore. The XVIII Airborne Corps and III Corps were alerted, along with RC units from the National Guard and USAR. JTF Katrina grew to more than 24,000 active-duty Soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen and more than 50,000 Soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen from various RCs. JTF Katrina worked closely with federal, state, and local agencies and provided housing and meals to hundreds of thousands of people suffering from the devastating effects of Hurricane Katrina. The JTF established life-support centers that provided tents, medical care, potable water, showers, housing repair materials, and mosquito abatement missions; cleared debris; safely managed crowded airspace; and assisted in mortuary affairs. JTF Katrina forces significantly contributed to the unified actions between DOD and FEMA. These actions relieved human suffering and aided the victims of Hurricane Katrina.

## Decisive Operations

3-116. Decisive operations are those that directly accomplish the task assigned by the higher HQ. Decisive operations conclusively determine the outcome of major operations, battles, and engagements.

The decisive operation may include multiple actions conducted simultaneously throughout the AO. Normally, CAO and CMO support the offensive or defensive decisive operations by enabling maneuver, mainly through planning PRC and providing critical civil information to increase the commander's situational awareness and understanding. CAO and CMO support to decisive operations in stability operations do not always have immediate impacts. In CSO, decisive operations are supported by all CA core tasks and normally prevent or mitigate the effects of natural or man-made disasters. Normally, CAO and CMO support decisive operations in stability operations and CSO by planning and assisting in stabilizing and establishing order in the JOA or AO. CMO planners and CA forces support the warfighting commander's decisive operations by

z
Coordinating the use by military of local resources, facilities, and support, such as civilian labor, transportation, communications, maintenance or medical facilities, and miscellaneous services and supplies through, with, and by IPI.
z
Planning for possible population displacements and working with civilian organizations (IPI, UN, and so on) to minimize local populace interference with U.S. decisive operations.
z
Coordinating with civilian organizations to identify the local resources, facilities, and support
available for U.S. operations.
z
Providing liaison and coordinating CMO with local IPI, OGAs, IGOs, and NGOs as applicable.
z
Predicting movement of civilians and establishing procedures and processes to minimize their interference with decisive operations.
z
Estimating the availability of resources.
z
Preparing area studies of the assigned area as required to support the mission.
z
Providing civil information and CMO plans to U.S. and other agencies on the political, economic, social, and cultural characteristics of the local populace in support of U.S. and FN/HN goals.
z
Recommending theater policy for FHA, civil assistance, and civil administration operations.
z
Acting as the focal point for cultural considerations.
z
Providing technical expertise in all civil functions.
z
Providing timely civil information for the development of the supported commander's COP.

## Shaping Operations

3-117. Shaping operations at any echelon create and preserve conditions for the success of the decisive operation. In stability operations, shaping operations often convert temporary gains into long-term political success. Shaping operations can aim to keep newly gained stability from being undone. Shaping operations may focus on identifying and cooling potential flash points that can occur after initial stabilization efforts. The main effort during shaping operations is military-to-civilian contact. The secondary effort is civilianto-civilian contact by OGAs. CA forces conduct CAO, and CMO planners plan CMO to seek to deter a potential crisis, to reinforce or regain public support of HN government and U.S. forces, and to mitigate conditions that lead toward insurgent safe havens. CMO are shaping operations that gain favor with the IPI and influence positive attitudes and perceptions. CMO directly supports the commander's ability to conduct shaping operations in his JOA or AO by facilitating the transfer of responsibilities to IPI.

3-118. In the example depicted in Figure 3-8, page 3-28, the GCC dispatched a JTF, supported by a CA battalion-level CMOC and two CA companies to conduct CAO in the GCC area of interest. The CA battalion-level CMOC oversees select CMO within the JOA and works in conjunction with the Embassy to minimize conditions for the establishment of insurgent safe havens in the joint commander's area of interest. In this example, a JSOTF, supported by a CA battalion (minus) composed of two CA companies and a CA battalion-level CMOC, conducts CAO in the target area of the JOA. To deter crisis, the JSOTF conducts limited military-to-military contacts (HN) while the CA elements conduct military-to-civilian activities as a supporting effort to the JSOTF. CA forces focus on civil infrastructure assessments and improvements to prevent the spread of the insurgency and seek to achieve long-term solutions to facilitate follow-on operations.

## Sustaining Operations

3-119. Sustaining operations at any echelon can enable shaping and decisive operations by providing logistics support, rear area and base security, movement control, terrain management, and infrastructure development. CAO and CMO normally support sustaining operations through their planning abilities in movement control and infrastructure development. CAO and CMO support sustaining operations working with IPI and local authorities to protect local sources of essential supplies and services. CA forces support sustaining operations by

z
Providing liaison to local agencies and civilian authorities.
z
Identifying the local resources, facilities, and support available for U.S. operations.
z
Coordinating the use by military forces of local resources, facilities, and support, such as civilian labor, transportation, communications, medical facilities, and miscellaneous services and supplies.
z
Facilitating military efforts to develop and implement plans for using local resources, as well as supporting civil information programs and coordinating these efforts with those of IGOs, NGOs, and IPI.
z
Minimizing the impact of U.S. military operations on civilians through IO and by planning for
possible population displacements.
z
Managing civilian access to areas of ongoing operations using MPs and other designated units of the supported command.
z
Facilitating the passage of civilian humanitarian assistance and providers when possible.
z
Advising the command on cultural and moral considerations.

## Civil-Military Operations And Information Operations

3-120. CMO are related activities to IO. CMO and CAO compliment IO and facilitate mission accomplishment by enhancing the relationship between the civilian populace and the overall force. CA forces and CMO planners must maintain their credibility with the civilian populace and avoid the perception that their operations are directly related to IO activities. However, CMO and CAO can create conditions that contribute to information superiority. 3-121. Commanders and staffs at all levels encounter an expanding information domain termed the global information grid (GIG). The GIG contains information processes and systems that are beyond the direct influence of the military or the President and/or SecDef but, nevertheless, may directly impact the success or failure of military operations. The media, NGOs, IGOs, and selected individuals represent a partial list of GIG participants. 3-122. All military operations occur within the GIG, which is interactive and pervasive in its presence and influence. Current, emerging electronic technologies permit a global audience in near-real-time and without the benefit of filters to be knowledgeable of any aspect of a military operation. With easy access to the global or national information network, the suppression, control, or censorship of the spread of information may be neither feasible nor desirable. 3-123. Adversaries and other non-DOD organizationsincluding many participants, agencies, and influences outside the traditional view of military conflictintrude on the military information environment. Adversaries, perhaps supported by nonaligned nations, seek to gain an advantage in the GIG by using battlefield systems and organizations. In addition, the media, think tanks, academic institutions, IGOs, NGOs, and individuals with access to the information highway are all potentially significant participants in the GIG. These entities can affect the strategic and operational direction of military operations before they begin. Independent of military control, their impact is always situationdependent. Their activities may cause an unanticipated or unintentional effect on military operations. Such participants include

z
Government agencies, such as the DOS or the FEMA.
z
IGOs (UN, ICRC, World Health Organization [WHO], International Organization for Migration
[IOM], and so on) and NGOs.
z
International agencies that provide a commercial service, such as the European Space Agency.
z
Social and cultural elements, including religious movements and their leaders.
z
Intelligence and military communications systems of allies, adversaries, and other Services.
z
Individuals with the appropriate hardware and software to communicate with a worldwide audience.
3-124. Harnessing the potential of information to transform how the commander operates is critical to success in the future. Technology alone, however, cannot give commanders and staffs automatic environment visualization, flawless situational awareness, easily expanded vision, or highly effective information management. The products of a command's initiative to harness the potential of information can only support the application of a leader's judgment, wisdom, experience, and intuition to enhance his battle command. 3-125. Commanders currently synchronize CMO with IO and public affairs (PA) to gain and maintain information dominance, as well as effective C2. Successful operations require effective C2 to transform military capabilities into applied military power. 3-126. In many situations, GIG organizations are present in the AOR before conventional forces arrive. GIG organizations are often well entrenched, with an established logistical framework and long-standing coordination and liaison arrangements. The media, for example, may initially know the AOR better than the military. As the media cover the buildup, they gain a thorough understanding of the situation, particularly in stability operations, and form their own perspectives. The projection of forces into the situation is of national interest, with national and international media watching from the moment forces arrive. CA personnel need to deploy early to support the commander and the force in their interactions with these organizations. CA operations not only reduce the potential distractions to a commander but also educate these organizations and facilitate their efforts to provide accurate, balanced, credible, and timely information to local officials and agencies, as well as external audiences. Some unique considerations apply to force-projection operations and stability operations. Also, CA forces and CMO planners need to leverage the commander's plan with an IO effort to promote civilian legitimacy for IPI, not just to show what the United States is doing to help people. 3-127. Close integration of CMO with IO provides an integral role of interfacing with critical actors and influences in the GIG. Whether in stability operations or in war, conducting military operations, consolidating combat power, and seeking information dominance are improved when leveraging CA support. Although conditions differ across the spectrum of conflict, CA forces support CMO by establishing, maintaining, influencing, or exploiting relations among military forces, civil authorities, and the civilian populace in an AO to facilitate military operations. For example, during Operation RESTORE DEMOCRACY (September 1994 through March 1996), CA forces informed the local populace through the news media and public discussion on the reestablishment of the legitimate Haitian government. These measures created an information exchange that promoted understanding of confidence in, and positive perception of measures supporting military operations. 3-128. A CMOC can be established to interact with key participants and influences in the GIG, mainly through the CMOC CIM cell and the fusion it provides into the GIG, such as local authorities, IGOs, and NGOs. CATs support military operations by applying their skills and experience in public administration, economics, public facilities, linguistics, cultural affairs, and civil information and by providing information relevant to developing the commander's COP. 3-129. Commanders must include CMO in their planning guidance. CMO planners must consider all available support and information to ensure successful completion of the CMO mission. CA forces are well suited to plan, coordinate, support, and, if directed, supervise various operations to support U.S. objectives. 3-130. CMO, when interrelated with IO and PA, support the commander's objective of achieving information dominance in any operational environmentcombat or peacetime. CMO provide liaison and connectivity with essential participants and influences in the GIG and interact with specific elements of IO.
3-131. The nature of CA operational support to CMO and the need for CA personnel to develop and maintain a close relationship with the civilian populace put them in a favorable position to gather information. CA CIM activities encompass the complete spectrum of cultural, social, political, and economic issues within the present or potential AOs. In their daily operations, CA personnel work with people, equipment, and documents that are prime sources of information. Information gathered supports the COP and commander's critical information requirements (CCIR) and is often important to other agencies and to staff sections of other units. 3-132. CA units are included in the information collection plan of the supported unit. CA units report information that meets the criteria of the supported unit's collection plan. Prime sources of information available to CA units include but are not limited to

z
Civilians billeted with, catered to, or associated with enemy personnel.
z
DCs and other personnel participating in movement control, relief, or other assistance (normally referred to appropriate intelligence personnel).
z
Government documents, libraries, or archives.
z
Files of newspapers or periodicals.
z
Industrial and commercial records.
z
Technical equipment, blueprints, plans, or information of interest related to transportation, signal, engineer, and medical fields.
3-133. The information collected can supplement the intelligence effort. U.S. forces need timely, accurate information and intelligence to plan missions, to secure the element of surprise, to identify and develop targets, and to protect U.S. interests across the full spectrum of operations. CMO further provide timely information to the CCIR.

3-134. CA personnel are not, and must not have the appearance of being, intelligence agents. The mission of the unit drives the intelligence cycle. As operational planning begins, so does intelligence planning. Requirements for operational planning are normally for finished intelligence studies, estimates, or briefings. CMO planners prepare their estimates from basic intelligence documents not primarily written for CA use, such as an area study. (Appendix D provides a sample CA area study and assessment format.) Intelligence is the product resulting from the collection, evaluation, and processing of information. JP 3-13, Information Operations, and FM 3-13, Information Operations: Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, provide additional information on IO.

## Civil Affairs Operations And Public Affairs

3-135. As an official spokesperson, the PAO can make sure the command speaks with one voice and that operations security (OPSEC) is observed. CA, PSYOP, and PA elements use many of the same communications media with essentially the same messages but to different audiences. CA and PSYOP personnel address local populations and enemy forces, respectively. PA personnel address national and international news media and U.S. forces (Figure 3-9, page 3-32). 3-136. Popular U.S. public support contributes to the success of CMO. This support is gained by allowing the news media access to Soldiers and to unclassified information. PA personnel escort news media representatives whenever they are in the AO. Uncoordinated public support for CMO missions is usually inappropriate, expensive, logistically difficult, time-consuming, and often not useful in humanitarian relief operations. Financial contributions to favorite NGOs are much more desirable and helpful. 3-137. CA and PSYOP personnel provide news and information to the local populace on the effects of combat operations. PA personnel provide U.S. and international news media representatives' information on Army operations. PA products are a valuable source of news and information to Soldiers in the AO. The importance of coordinating CA efforts with PSYOP and PA activities cannot be overstressed. Information released through one of these channels is available to, and has an effect upon, all audiences. If information released to the HN populace by CA and PSYOP personnel conflicts with information released to U.S. Soldiers through PA channels, the result may be a loss of credibility for all involved and a negation of any positive accomplishments.

| Support                          |
|----------------------------------|
| -                                |
| Countering propaganda            |
| IGOs                             |
| -                                |
| Influencing/                     |
| informing.                       |
| and protecting from              |
| misinformation/rumor.            |
| -                                |
| Neutralizing                     |
| -                                |
|                                  |
| Developing EEFI to               |
| preclude inadvertent public      |
| disclosure.                      |
| misinformation and               |
| hostile propaganda               |
| directed against civil           |
| authorities.                     |
| -                                |
|                                  |
| Synchronizing PSYOP and          |
| OPSEC with PA strategy.          |
| -                                |
|                                  |
| Controlling EMS for              |
| legitimate purposes.             |
| -                                |
|                                  |
| Providing information on         |
| CMO                              |
| -                                |
|                                  |
| Providing information to         |
| CMOC activities to support       |
| PA strategy.                     |
| support friendly knowledge of    |
| information environment.         |
| -                                |
| Synchronizing information        |
| -                                |
| Synchronizing communications     |
| communications media             |
| and message.                     |
| media and message with           |
| PSYOP.                           |
| -                                |
| Identifying, coordinating,       |
| -                                |
|                                  |
| Coordinating C2 target sets      |
| with targeting cell.             |
| -                                |
|                                  |
| Establishing and maintaining     |
| and integrating media,           |
| public information, and          |
| host-nation support (HNS).       |
| liaison or dialogue with         |
| indigenous personnel and         |
| NGOs.                            |
| -                                |
|                                  |
| Supporting PSYOP with            |
| feedback on PSYOP themes.        |
| -                                |
|                                  |
| Providing news and               |
| information to the local people. |
| -                                |
| Producing accurate,              |
| PA                               |
| -                                |
| Developing information           |
| timely, and balanced             |
| information for the public.      |
| products to protect Soldiers     |
| against the effects of           |
| misinformation.                  |
| -                                |
|                                  |
| Coordinating with CA             |
| -                                |
|                                  |
| Coordinating with PSYOP and      |
| specialists to verify facts      |
| and validity of                  |
| information.                     |
| counterpropaganda planners to    |
| ensure a consistent message      |
| and to maintain OPSEC.           |
| -                                |
| Supporting counterpropaganda     |
| by countering misinformation.    |
| -                                |
|                                  |
| Providing assessment of          |
| effects of media coverage to     |
| OPSEC planners.                  |
| -                                |
|                                  |
| Providing assessment of          |
| essential non-U.S. media         |
| coverage of deception story.     |

## Civil Affairs Operations Support To Army Special Operations Forces

3-138. ARSOF perform various missions and core tasks (Figure 3-10, page 3-33). They are organized, trained, and equipped specifically to accomplish the core tasks: unconventional warfare (UW), FID, direct action (DA), special reconnaissance (SR), counterterrorism (CT), PSYOP, counterproliferation (CP) of WMD, CAO, and support to IO.

3-139. ARSOF core tasks fall into two categoriesdirect and indirect. Direct contact with the adversary applies military resources to accomplish a task without relying on indigenous or surrogate forces not under direct U.S. control. Indirect contact with the adversary applies military resources to train, advise, or assist interagency activities, nations important to U.S. interests, or indigenous or surrogate forces pursuing objectives that further U.S. interests. 3-140. Successful CAO depend on the support of the populace. No matter the state of the environment or the military operation, CAO are capable of supporting ARSOF to achieve the general U.S. goals in the AO (Figure 3-11, page 3-34). Most U.S. military operations occur in a low-threat environment with the objective of winning popular support. CA units must, therefore, help other SOF to mobilize this support, keeping in mind the impact of the operation on the civilian populace. CA forces, as part of SOF, must remain politically attuned, regionally oriented, and linguistically capable of supporting SO.

## Unconventional Warfare Unconventional Warfare Operation Enduring Freedom

In early November 2001, Army Special Forces teams (often reinforced with Air Force Special Tactics Team members) infiltrated Afghanistan via Special Operations Forces
(SOF) aircraft and linked up with anti-Taliban Afghan forces. Their unconventional warfare (UW) mission was to facilitate the overthrow of the Taliban regime. These SOF teams immediately gained the confidence of the Afghans, and between the intelligence they received from the Afghans and what they were able to determine themselves, the arrival of the SOF teams produced an immediate and exponential increase in the number of Taliban targets that could be identified to conventional strike aircraft. In addition to radically increasing the effectiveness of United States airpower, the UW teams also improved the effectiveness of the Afghan anti-Taliban forces they joined. Less than a month after the first UW team arrived in country, the fall of the Taliban had begun, and in weeks that followed, the last regions under Taliban control were liberated by anti- Taliban Afghan forces.

Source: United States Special Operations Command Public Affairs Office

| Condition/Environment    | Military Operations    |
|--------------------------|------------------------|
| War                      | Fight to Win           |
| -                        |                        |
|                          | PRC                    |
| (Hostile)                |                        |
| - DC                     |                        |
| - NEO                    |                        |
| - ID and Control         |                        |
| Critical Civil           |                        |
| Reserves                 |                        |
| - Populace               |                        |
| Control Measures         |                        |
| Conflict                 | Deter Aggression and   |
| -                        |                        |
|                          | PRC                    |
| (Uncertain)              | Resolve Conflict       |
| -                        |                        |
|                          | FHA                    |
| - Technical              |                        |
| Assistance               |                        |
| and SO                   |                        |
| - DC SO                  |                        |
| Peace                    | Promote Peace          |
| -                        |                        |
|                          | PRC                    |
| (Permissive)             |                        |
| -                        |                        |
|                          | FHA                    |
-
FHA
- HA - Disaster Relief - CM
-
CIM
- CR - CIG
-
CIM
- CR - CIG
-
NA
- FID - MCA - Security Assistance
-
CSO
- CM
-
CIM
-
NA
-
SCA
- Rule of Law - Pubic Health and Welfare - Infrastructure - Governance - Public Education and Information Sector
-
CSO

3-141. UW operations are defined as a broad spectrum of military and/or paramilitary operations and activities, normally of long duration, conducted through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces are organized, trained, equipped, supported and otherwise directed in varying degrees by an external source. UW operations can be conducted across the spectrum or conflict against regular and irregular forces, Statesponsored or not. 3-142. According to FM 3-05.201, *Special Forces Unconventional Warfare Operations*, CMO are inherent to UW. The UW environment contains military and civilian components that are scattered and intertwined within the JSOA. Although the Special Forces operational detachment (SFOD) generally focuses its efforts on the military aspect of an insurgency, it must also consider the nonmilitary aspects of the JSOA. Natural, routine, planned, or unpredictable indigenous activities may hinder or help the activities of the guerrilla force during all phases of a U.S.-sponsored insurgency. 3-143. CMO are the commander's activities that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military (including guerrilla or insurgent) forces, government, NGOs, and the IPI in the JSOA. CMO facilitate other military operations and consolidate and achieve U.S. objectives. In CMO, military forces may perform activities and functions that are normally the responsibility of local, regional, or national government. These activities will occur before, during, or after other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations in an UW environment. 3-144. The intent of U.S. military UW operations is to exploit a hostile power's political, military, economic, and psychological vulnerability by developing and sustaining resistance forces to accomplish U.S. strategic objectives. CMO planners and CA forces are well-equipped to assist SFODs in developing the internal and external factors that makeup the operational environment of UW operations and in achieving the support or neutrality of various segments of society within or influencing the JSOA.
3-145. Internal factors to which CA forces and CMO planners can contribute are as follows:

z
Strengths, weaknesses, vulnerabilities, functions, and COG within and influencing the JSOA.
z
Analysis of interrelationships the COGs and key members of the IPI within and influencing the JSOA, using the mnemonic ASCOPE.
z
Analysis of goals and motivating factors for key civil sector factors.
z
Relationships with USG, OGAs, IGOs, and NGOs within and influencing the JSOA.
3-146. External forces to which CA forces and CMO planners can contribute are as follows:

z
Scope and limitations of each agency's influence and programs.
z
Legal and political restrictions and considerations on SF activities.
z
Civil sources and assistance available to SF to further ensure mission accomplishment.
z
Intent and goals of NGOs and other key civilian IPI in the JSOA.
z
Status of relationships of IPI, international agencies, and NGOs with representatives of the USG.
z
Intent and goals of international agencies (for example, UN and NATO).
3-147. All CAO may support UW, although the most important role of CAO is facilitating the swift transition of power from the resistance forces to a legitimate government after the cessation of hostilities. CA forces may also assist SFODs in planning and executing UW operations by

z
Advising SFODs in cultural, political, and economic considerations within the JSOA.
z
Assessing impacts of proposed missions to the local populace.
z
Advising SFODs on development of resistance organizations and the expansion of the JSOA in gaining and maintaining popular support.
z
Assisting partisan forces to develop auxiliaries and to conduct PRC operations.
z
Assisting SFODs in integrating with OGAs (for example; DOS, USAID, and so on).
z
Advising and assisting SFODs in planning, coordination, and establishment of DC camps (key recruitment source).
z
Advising and planning measures to gain support of the UW force's civilian populace.
z
Planning mobilization of popular support to UW campaign.
z
Analyzing impacts of resistance on IPI and COGs through CA inputs to intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB).
z
Providing supported commander with critical elements of civil information to improve situational awareness and understanding within the battlefield.
z
Advising SFOD and partisan forces on development of civil administration within JSOA as a legitimate government begins to operate.
3-148. CA forces are capable of providing support to all seven phases of a UW campaign: preparation, initial contact, infiltration, organization, buildup, combat employment, and transition (Figure 3-12).

Additional information on CA support to these seven phases can be found in JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, and FM 3-05.201.

## Foreign Internal Defense

The war on terrorism will be fought with increased support for democracy programs, judicial reform, conflict resolution, poverty alleviation, economic reform, and health and education. All of these together deny the reason for terrorists to exist or to find safe haven within borders.

3-149. FID is defined as participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. 3-150. Like UW, FID is an umbrella concept that covers a broad range of activities. Its primary intent is always to help the legitimate host government address internal threats and their underlying causes. Commensurate with U.S. policy goals, the focus of all U.S. FID efforts is to support the HN program of internal defense and development (IDAD). FID is not restricted to times of conflict. It also can take place in the form of training exercises and other activities that show U.S. resolve to and for the region. 3-151. The proper use of CA assets in FID is essential during all phases of an insurgency to counter a resistance movement. When used to its full potential, CMO can be crucial in preventing the escalation of an insurgency to higher phases. A national development program can solidify the position of the HN government and improve conditions for the people. CAO vary with the capabilities of the host government and with the level of insurgent activity. The economic, social, and political situations also are major influences. 3-152. CA units conduct various CAO that support the internal development of an FN/HN. CA forces may support other military forces and nonmilitary agencies through direct or indirect support of FID, but they must coordinate with the HN and the TSOC (GCC). These operations focus on the indigenous infrastructures and population in the operational areas. 3-153. CA forces provide expertise in PRC, FHA, NA (MCA is a subtask of NA), SCA, and CIM. They also provide support in limited medical and engineer advisory capabilities. CA personnel supporting FID are normally assigned to the highest-level military elements supervising FID operations or to U.S. military advisory elements that train and aid FN/HN military units. CA elements supporting FID

z
Review U.S. SA program goals and HN IDAD goals and plan CMO to support the HN plan.
z
Plan CMO based on the three phases of insurgency described in FM 3-05.201.
z
Train HN military to plan, train for, and conduct NA, PRC, and other CAO appropriate to the IDAD of its country.
z
Train on tactics, techniques, and procedures required to protect the HN from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.
z
Train on developing indigenous individual, leader, and organizational skills to isolate insurgents
from the civil population, and protect the civil population.
z
Establish and maintain contact with nonmilitary agencies and local authorities.
z
Identify specific CMO missions the HN military can and should conduct.

## Sendero Luminoso Influence In Rural Peru

The government's failure to change conditions in the southern highlands made peasants question the relevance of the distant, culturally alien government which has little understanding of rural life. Sendero played on the frustration of the Andean peasants by proposing to entirely overthrow the "fascist" government in Lima. Not only did peasants have no viable alternative, but in fact, Sendero genuinely focused on their marginalized concerns.

Andrea Curtis
"Sendero Luminoso, A Study in Paradox"
Latitudes, Volume 1, 19911992
3-154. JP 3-07.1, JP 3-05, and FM 31-20-3, Foreign Internal Defense Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Special Forces (to be published as FM 3-05.202, Special Forces Foreign Internal Defense Operations) provide additional information on CA's role in FID.

## Direct Action

3-155. DA is defined as short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions conducted as a special operation in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments and which use specialized military capabilities to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover, or damage designated targets. DA differs from conventional offensive actions in the level of physical and political risk, operational techniques, and the degree of discriminate and precise use of force to achieve specific objectives. In the conduct of these operations, SOF may

z
Use raid, ambush, or direct assault tactics, including close quarters battle.
z
Emplace mines and other munitions.
z
Conduct standoff attacks by fire from air, ground, or maritime platforms.
z
Provide terminal guidance for precision-guided munitions.
z
Conduct independent sabotage.
z
Conduct antiship operations.
3-156. JP 3-05 provides additional information on DA. CA forces do not normally participate in DA missions; however, CA forces are capable of mitigating the effects of DA missions, depending on METT-TC.

## Special Reconnaissance

3-157. SR is defined as reconnaissance and surveillance actions conducted as a special operation in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to collect or verify information of strategic or operational significance, using military capabilities not normally found in conventional forces. These actions provide an additive capability for commanders and supplement other conventional reconnaissance and surveillance actions. SR operations are reconnaissance and surveillance actions conducted by SOF to confirm, refute, or obtain by visual observation or other collection methods information on the capabilities, intentions, and activities of an actual or potential enemy or to secure data on the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area. SR operations include target acquisition, area assessments, and poststrike reconnaissance. 3-158. FM 31-20-5*, Special Reconnaissance Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Special Forces* (to be published as FM 3-05.204, Special Forces Special Reconnaissance Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures) provides additional SR information. CA forces do not normally participate in SR missions.

## Counterterrorism

3-159. CT is defined as operations that include the offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, preempt, and respond to terrorism. ARSOF possess the capability to conduct these operations in an urban environment that may be denied to conventional forces because of political or threat conditions. 3-160. ARSOF activities within CT include, but are not limited to, intelligence operations, attacks against terrorist networks and infrastructures, hostage rescue, recovery of sensitive material from terrorist organizations, and nonlethal activities aimed at the ideologies or motivations that spawn terrorism. CA forces best support CT operations through these nonlethal activities. Depending on the METT-TC, all CA core tasks can support CT operations. Most CT activities are classified. Further discussion of CT is beyond the scope of this publication.

## Psychological Operations

3-161. PSYOP is defined as planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of PSYOP is to induce or reinforce attitudes and behaviors favorable to U.S. national goals in selected foreign target audiences. 3-162. FM 3-05.30, *Psychological Operations*; FM 3-05.301, Psychological Operations, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures; and JP 3-53, *Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations*, provide additional information on PSYOP. 3-163. CA forces integrate into the theater PSYOP plan by conducting public information activities and providing timely feedback on the effectiveness of the PSYOP plan. These activities are integrated into the battle plans, to include providing for accurate reporting of the operation and combating distorted or misrepresented information that may be disseminated by an adversary. CA planners can

z
Represent CA concerns in PSYOP activities.
z
Coordinate with the Psychological Operations task force (POTF) to ensure consistency of messages and OPSEC without compromising CA credibility.
z
Prepare CMO estimates, assessments, and the annex to the OPLAN or operations order (OPORD) to identify and integrate CA support.
z
Coordinate the use of local resources, facilities, and supportfor example, civilian labor, transportation, communications, maintenance, or medical facilities and miscellaneous services
and supplies.
z
Provide liaison to local agencies and civilian authorities.
z
Coordinate civic action projects in support of PSYOP plans.
z
Advise on cultural and moral considerations.
z
Through civil inputs to the IPB process, CA forces can provide SOF elements with nominations for targeted areas of interest and named areas of interest (NAIs) within the target area that will provide additional information for the commander to analyze for current and follow-on operations planning.

## Ca Cooperation With Psyop During Operation Uphold Democracy

During Operations UPHOLD DEMOCRACY and RESTORE DEMOCRACY in 1994, the joint Psychological Operations task force (JPOTF) nominated two HA missions to the JTF commander that, in its estimation, would produce positive results with the population of Haitirestore electricity to the island and remove the trash from the streets of the capital, Port-au-Prince. The collapse of the government had resulted in these services being discontinued, leaving the island in darkness and the streets filled with refuse. CA forces coordinated with Air Force Prime Power Teams and the 20th Engineer Brigade to execute these missions. In less than 30 days, power was restored and the major roads in the capital were free of trash. The success of these missions was highlighted in numerous broadcasts from major U.S. and international news organizations and showed the people of Haiti that the JTF was there to help them.

Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY AAR

## Counterproliferation Of Weapons Of Mass Destruction

3-164. CP is defined as actions taken to locate, seize, destroy, render safe, capture, or recover WMD. Major objectives of CP policy are to prevent the acquisition of WMD and delivery systems, roll back proliferation where it has occurred, deter the use of WMD and their delivery systems, and adapt U.S. military forces and planning to operate against the threats posed by WMD and their delivery systems. 3-165. CP is a special mission, not applicable to most CA forces. Nevertheless, CA forces are capable of responding to CM requirements involving WMD, under the umbrella of FHA. Additional information concerning CM can be found under FHA earlier in this chapter. CA forces are particularly well suited to address requirements that focus on regional, cultural, and linguistic capabilities.

## Force Protection During Civil Affairs Operations

3-166. FP is a paramount concern of all commanders. Every GCC and DRU has standing FP rules that must be fully understood and adhered to by all personnel. CA forces must incorporate these requirements in their planning to ensure compliance. 3-167. CA forces are most effective working in small units that interact with a wide variety of agencies, civilian and military. This interaction implies a degree of risk higher than the risks encountered by conventional forces. The risks can, however, be mitigated by a thorough analysis of the environment as it relates to mission requirements and by strict adherence to resultant force protection measures. The force protection requirements of the supported command may prove to be less than optimal for the CA team mission. It may, for example, be culturally inappropriate and counterproductive for CA personnel in full combat attire to conduct liaison with local officials. In such cases, the senior CA officer should coordinate with the supported commander to formulate plans that lead to mission success while allowing for cultural sensitivities.

3-168. CA forces, at a minimum, must abide by the guidelines for ROE and FP. JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations; JP 3-35, *Joint Deployment and Redeployment Operations*; JP 4-05, Joint Mobilization Planning; FM 100-17-3, *Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration* (to be published as FM 4-01.8, *Reception, Staging, and Onward Movement*); and Appendix G of USASOC Directive 525-13, Plans and OperationsForce Protection, provide additional information on ROE and FP. 3-169. FP is the military component of power protection. It is a central element of the national military strategy. Protection is the preservation of the fighting potential of a force so the commander can apply maximum force at the decisive time and place. Protection has four components: force protection, field discipline, safety, and fratricide avoidance. Protection bears significantly on every aspect of offensive and defensive operations, which also incorporate stability operations into their objectives. CA commanders must take great pains to protect their force from attack. Adversaries opposed to U.S. interests, or who seek to destabilize an area, will go to great lengths to expel U.S. forces. They will use terrorist tactics such as bombings, kidnappings, assassinations, ambushes, and raids. CA commanders must address FP during planning and revise their plan as necessary during execution. (FM 3-07.2 provides a process by which commanders can assess the threat to the force and act to defeat that threat.) 3-170. CA commanders must attempt to accomplish a mission with minimal loss of personnel, equipment, and supplies by integrating FP considerations into all aspects of the CAO process. FP encompasses a range of processes: mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment. These processes occur in a continuous, overlapping and repeating sequence throughout an operation. FP operations are inherently joint and require detailed planning and synchronization. FP includes specific subordinate AOR, and excludes others that are satisfied through other means. 3-171. CA Soldiers that occupy leadership positions should develop a FP plan that is flexible and situational. The plan should complement the theater FP policy without departing from the key areas of FP emphasis. It is important for leaders to constantly evaluate the proficiency of common Soldier skills that support tactical maneuverability and survivability. These skills are perishable and, therefore, require constant assessment and reinforcement. 3-172. FP policies and procedures are developed at all levels and must be doctrinally correct and specific to the CA mission and the supported commander's FP SOP. A master task list of FP skills and tasks are established by doctrine and adapted IAW mission focus. Once CA units are incorporated into the command that they will support, they will be further absorbed into the superior elements mission focus. Because CA
forces operate in small units and are not organized to provide their own FP beyond individual selfprotection skills and small arms, there will be many instances where CA will need FP support from the support command. CA leaders at all echelons need to coordinate with the staff of their supported commander to ensure all FP visions and intents are met.
3-173. FP is a compilation of basic Soldier skills, planning, SOPs, doctrine, and specific directives. The challenge to CA commanders and leaders alike is to seamlessly integrate these factors into the backbone of CAO to ensure mission accomplishment. The model depicted in Figure 3-13, page 3-41, identifies the major critical areas and the process to be addressed when planning, assessing, and identifying fluid, adaptable, and proven FP MOEs.

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## Chapter 4 Civil Affairs Planning

CA Soldiers, elements, and units, are assigned to, have a command relationship with, or provide support to Army, joint, or other Service HQ at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. As such, CA leaders must clearly understand both Army planning and orders production and joint operations planning (deliberate, crisis action, and campaign planning). They must understand the mechanics that underlie both Army and joint planning, and how CA integrates into the commander's intent, planning guidance and the unit's concept of operations. Although there are many similarities between Army and joint planning, joint operations planning is focused at the strategic-theater and operational levels within a GCC AOR or joint force commander's JOA. Army planning is focused at the tactical level within a commander's AO. This chapter provides doctrine for CA soldiers participating in both Army and joint planning. FM 5-0, *Army Planning and Orders Production*, provides detailed doctrine on Army planning. JP 5-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations, provides detailed doctrine on joint operations planning. Army corps HQ function at the operational or tactical level depending on the mission. When a corps performs its primary role as a contingency JTF or land component HQ, it functions at the operational level. In these roles, it directs either a campaign (as a JTF) or a major operation (as a land component). Army divisions, brigades, and smaller units normally function at the tactical level. However, divisions can serve as an operational-level HQ or as a JTF for small contingencies. In rare circumstances, a brigade may function at the operational level, serving as a small JTF or land component.

## Civil Affairs Methodology

4-1. The focus of all CAO/CMO is to enable commanders to engage the civil component of their operational environment. CAO/CMO is integrated into the conduct (plan, prepare, execute, and assess) of all operations and includes those activities that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace within an AOR, JOA, or AO. This effort focuses on assessing, monitoring, protecting, reinforcing, establishing, and transitioning political, economic, social, and cultural institutions. CA Soldiers assist commanders by conducting these operations and tasks both actively, through direct contact, and passively, through observation, research, and analysis. 4-2. The CA methodology describes how CA Soldiers, elements, and units approach all CAO and CMO. It consists of six steps:

z
Assess.
z
Decide.
z
Develop and detect.
z
Deliver.
z
Evaluate.
z
Transition.
The first five steps together are known as AD3E. 4-3. The CA methodology is applied equally by CA Soldiers at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. At each level, it supports the commander's ability to visualize, describe, direct, and lead operations in his exercise of battle command. 4-4. FM 3-05.401 provides a detailed discussion of the six steps of the CA methodology. A brief explanation of each step is discussed below:

z
Assess: Assess current conditions against a defined norm or established standards. This assessment begins at receipt of the mission and continues through the mission analysis process focusing on defining the civil components of the supported commander's AO. This step looks at the nonmilitary factors (ASCOPE) that shape the operational environment. It is conducted for each of the CA 14 functional specialties as well as the general aspects of the AO. The product of this step is an initial estimate and restated mission statement.
z
Decide: Decide who, what, when, where, why and how to focus CA assets and actions that support the commander's intent, planning guidance, and CONOPS. This step encompasses integrating CAO into unit COAs, and analyzing and providing recommendations to the commander for COA decision from a CA perspective. Upon the commander's COA decision, CA leaders refine a concept of CAO/CMO and the CAO/CMO plan. The plan directs taskorganized CA elements and non-CA forces to create or observe those conditions or events that would either mitigate or trigger a specific CAO/CMO response. It also addresses all CAO/CMO from initial response through transition to other authorities, whether they are military or civilian. The products of this step include the commander's concept for CMO, CA priorities, and the CMO annex. In addition MOPs and MOEs for the various related objectives and tasks are identified.
z
Develop and detect: Develop rapport and relationships with the nonmilitary participants of the operation (including the IPI) and detect those conditions or events that would call for a specific CAO/CMO response. CA accomplishes this step through numerous actions and operations, such as facilitating the interagency process in the CMOC, hosting meetings, participation in selected DC operations, conducting CR in support of CIM, and monitoring public information programs and CAO/CMO-related reports from the field. The products of this step include continuous assessments, revised or updated plans, formalized CMOC terms of reference, and fragmentary orders (FRAGOs).
z
Deliver: Engage the civil component with planned or on-call CAO (PRC, FHA, NA, SCA, and
CIM)/CMO as appropriate. This step is executed according to synchronized plans by CA Soldiers, non-CA Soldiers, IGOs, NGOs, and HN assets. The product of this step is an executed mission.
z
Evaluate: Evaluate the results of the executed mission. This step validates the CAO/CMO CONOPS and supports the management of MOPs and MOEs to assess task accomplishment and attainment of objectives. Evaluators analyze the effects of the operation (both desirable and undesirable) based on each of the 14 CA functional specialties, determine the sustainability of
any projects or programs initiated during the execution phase, and recommend follow-on actions.
z
Transition: Transition CAO or CMO to follow-on CA units, other military units, HN assets, UN organizations, IGOs, NGOs, and other civilian agencies as appropriate. This step is CA's direct contribution to a sustainable solution, and the commander's ability to secure the victory. This step is executed according to synchronized transition plans. The outcome of this step includes
successful transition of authority or relief-in-place, and programs that are durable and sustainable by the follow-on force or organization.
4-5. Elements of the common problem-solving and decision-making processes used at various levels of command are embedded within the steps of the CA methodology. Figure 4-1, page 4-3, demonstrates how the CA methodology and these processes are related.

## Civil Considerations AnalysisAscope

4-6. CAO/CMO planners apply the factors of METT-TC, concentrating on the civil considerations aspect of the AO during the conduct of MDMP. Civil considerations are analyzed using the mnemonic ASCOPE. The six characteristics are

z
Areas.
z
Structures.
z
Capabilities.
z
Organizations.
z
People.
z
Events.
4-7. *Areas* are key localities or aspects of the terrain within a commander's operational environment that are not normally thought of as militarily significant. Failure to consider key civil areas, however, can seriously affect the success of any military mission. 4-8. CAO planners analyze key civil areas from two perspectives: how do these areas affect the military mission and how do military operations impact on civilian activities in these areas? At times, the answers to these questions may dramatically influence major portions of the COAs being considered. 4-9. *Structures* are existing civil structures that take on many significant roles. Some, such as bridges, communications towers, power plants, and dams, are traditional HPTs. Others, such as churches, mosques, national libraries, and hospitals, are cultural sites that are generally protected by international law or other agreements. Still others are facilities with practical applications, such as jails, warehouses, schools, television stations, radio stations, and print plants, which may be useful for military purposes. 4-10. Structures analysis involves determining the location, functions, capabilities, and application in support of military operations. It also involves weighing the consequences of removing them from civilian use in terms of political, economic, religious, social, and informational implications; the reaction of the populace; and replacement costs. 4-11. Civil *capabilities* can be viewed from several perspectives. The term capabilities may refer to

z
Existing capabilities of the populace to sustain itself, such as through public administration, public safety, emergency services, and food and agriculture systems.
z
Capabilities with which the populace needs assistance, such as public works and utilities, public health, public transportation, economics, and commerce.
z
Resources and services that can be contracted to support the military mission, such as interpreters, laundry services, construction materials, and equipment. Local vendors, the HN, or other nations may provide these resources and services. In hostile territory, civil capabilities include resources that may be taken and used by military forces consistent with international law.
4-12. Analysis of the existing capabilities of the AO is normally conducted based on the 14 CA functional specialties. The analysis also identifies the capabilities of partner countries and organizations involved in the operation. In doing so, CAO/CMO planners consider how to address shortfalls, as well as how to capitalize on strengths in capabilities. 4-13. Civil *organizations* are organized groups that may or may not be affiliated with government agencies. They can be church groups, fraternal organizations, patriotic or service organizations, and community watch groups. They might be IGOs or the NGO community. 4-14. Organizations can assist the commander in keeping the populace informed of ongoing and future activities in an AO and influencing the actions of the populace. They can also form the nucleus of humanitarian assistance programs, interim-governing bodies, civil defense efforts, and other activities. 4-15. *People*, both individually and collectively, can have a positive, negative, or no impact on military operations. In the context of ASCOPE, the term *people* includes civilians or nonmilitary personnel encountered in an AO. The term may also extend to those outside the AO whose actions, opinions, or political influence can affect the military mission. In all military operations, U.S. forces must be prepared to encounter and work closely with civilians of all types. When analyzing people, CA Soldiers consider historical, cultural, ethnic, political, economic, and humanitarian factors. They also identify the key communicators and the formal and informal processes used to influence people. 4-16. Regardless of the nature of the operation, military forces will usually encounter various civilians living and operating in and around the supported unit's AO. To facilitate determining who they might be, it is useful to separate civilians into distinct categories. In foreign operations, these categories might include

z
Local nationals (town and city dwellers, farmers and other rural dwellers, and nomads).
z
Local civil authorities (elected and traditional leaders at all levels of government).
z
Expatriates.
z
Foreign employees of IGOs or NGOs.
z
USG and third-nation government agency representatives.
z
Contractors (U.S. citizens, local nationals, and third-nation citizens providing contract services).
z
DOD civilian employees.
z
The media (journalists from print, radio, and visual media).
4-17. Civilian activities are dictated primarily by the type of environment in which they occur. Each category of civilian should be considered separately, as their activities will impact differently, both positively and negatively, on the unit's mission. Military operations affect civilian activities in various ways. Commanders should consider the political, economic, psychological, environmental, and legal impact of operations on the categories of civilians identified in the AO. 4-18. As there are many different categories of civilians, there are many categories of civilian *events* that may affect the military mission. Some examples are planting and harvest seasons, elections, riots, and evacuations (both voluntary and involuntary). Likewise, there are military events that impact on the lives of civilians in an AO. Some examples are combat operations, including indirect fires, deployments and redeployments. CAO/CMO planners determine what events are occurring, and analyze the events for their political, economic, psychological, environmental, and legal implications.

## Systems Analysis Of The Operational Environment

4-19. System analysis is conducted at the theater strategic and JFC operational levels. System analysis defines how the physical and/or behavioral state of an adversary's political, military, economic, social, informational, infrastructure and other systems results from a military or nonmilitary action or set of actions. Analysis of the systems data gathered details the prevailing conditions within the AO. 4-20. The application of the elements of ASCOPE during system analysis identifies the key and decisive areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events of each subsystem. For example, ASCOPE would be applied to the entire concept of "economics." The staff would ask the questions: "Where are the key and decisive areas of economic activity? Where are the key and decisive structures (infrastructures) associated with economic activity? What are the key and decisive economic capabilities that must be engaged/restored (for example, banking)? What are the key and decisive economic organizations? What are the key and decisive economic people? Finally, what are the key and decisive economic events?" These questions would lead to an effective CONOPS, MOEs, and troops-to-task analysis. This approach to the analysis of the operational environment assists in COG analysis and operational design by identifying nodes, (a person, place, or physical thing) that is a fundamental component of a system, and links (the behavioral, physical, or functional relationship) between the nodes (Figure 4-2, page 4-6). The analysis includes an assessment of the systems' and nodes' important capabilities and vulnerabilities, which enables the subsequent identification of COGs and decisive points. 4-21. Both the system analysis and the IPB are complementary processes that produce the awareness and understandings required to plan and execute CAO/CMO. System analysis is a valuable complement to the IPB as it integrates an expansive spectrum of information. In reality, perfect knowledge and understanding of the adversary and environment are impossible to attain, but by applying a broader approach to understanding both, commanders are better able to move beyond situational awareness to a more comprehensive situational understanding.

4-22. A systems approach integrates people and processes, using multiple information sources and collaborative analysis to build a common, shared, holistic knowledge base of the operational environment. System analysis emphasizes a multidimensional approach toward situational understanding, distinguished by an analysis of the six interrelated characteristics of ASCOPE within each system. 4-23. A fully developed collaborative environment is an aggregation of individuals, organizations, systems, infrastructure, and processes to create and share the data, information, and knowledge needed to plan, execute, and assess operations. It enables commanders to make more informed decisions faster than the adversary. It offers commanders and staffs the capacity to facilitate the creation of a shared situational awareness so they can plan and operate with an enhanced unity of effort. 4-24. Included in the collaborative environment are the knowledge management techniques and procedures that govern collaboration within the HQ, the CMOC, and within the subordinate forces. These techniques and procedures encompass the processes and databases to integrate and synchronize the command and staff activity to generate supporting information and directives such as FRAGOs and operational reports. Collaboration through the CIM process, automation, and decision-support capabilities all enhance the efficiency of the battle staff rhythm and the commander's decision making. The collaborative environment seeks to provide the right information to the right people at the right time in an understandable and actionable format or display.

## ObjectivesEffectsTasks

4-25. Combatant commanders (CCDRs) develop theater campaign plans to accomplish multinational, national, and theater strategic objectives based on national strategic guidance received from the President and/or SecDef. Likewise, a subordinate JFC's planning supports the attainment of theater strategic objectives. At the operational level, the JFC develops operational-level objectives supported by measurable operational effects and assessment indicators. Joint operation planning uses measurable effects to relate higher-level objectives to component missions, tasks, and/or actions.

4-26. The mission analysis process begins when a priority (for example, a specific nation, region, contingency, or entity) is designated by the commander. During initial mission analysis, the commander and staff ensure they understand the operational end state and associated objectives, and design the tactical end states and supporting objectives. 4-27. The CA planners' civil considerations systems analysis identifies nodes and associated links for directed tasks to influence or change system behavior and capabilities to achieve desired objectives or effects. Understanding each system's ASCOPE characteristics and their interrelationships enables a holistic perspective of the operational environment. It also increases the understanding of how individual actions on one element of the system can affect other interrelated system components. 4-28. During the MDMP process, effects are planned and identified to achieve objectives. Planning is fundamentally about integrating all actions within the operational environment in time, space, and purpose to create the desired effects to achieve the commander's objectives. As a precursor to execution, planners seek to promote unity of effortto harmonize joint, combined, and interagency actions into an integrated, comprehensive plan to achieve desired effects. 4-29. Joint doctrine defines effect in two ways: 1) the physical or behavioral state of a system that results from an action, a set of actions, or another effect and 2) a result, outcome, or consequence of an action. The use of "effects" to describe the results of unit actions and weapons employment at the tactical level remains valid. However, the term "effect" has a broader meaning and generally focuses at the operational level. Effects **are not** descriptions of tasks to subordinate units. A specified effect describes desired or undesired conditions, generally described as behavior or capability within individual ASCOPE characteristics of the operational environment's systems that result from actions or a set of actions. An example of a desired effect is "general populace supports U.S./Coalition efforts." An effect is achievable, measurable, and can support more than one objective. Effects are used to bridge the gap between objectives and tasks. Planners identify tasks that, when executed against specified key nodes, should achieve the desired effects. 4-30. CAO planning is facilitated by habitual collaboration among SMEs from a wide variety of organizations, both military and OGA. Examining the operational environment across all ASCOPE characteristics may result in the identification of additional desired effects. 4-31. During initial mission analysis, the commander and staff ensure they understand the operational end state and associated objectives, and design the tactical end states and supporting objectives. They develop a set of desired effects that support the objectives. Equally important, they identify a set of associated undesired effects that could adversely influence the objective.

## Measures Of Effectiveness And Measures Of Performance

4-32. MOEs focus on effects attainment by demonstrating the impact that completed actions have had in attaining the desired adversary behaviors. MOP focus on task accomplishment. In other words, MOPs confirm or deny that we have "done things right." MOEs answers the question, "Are we doing the right thing , or are additional or alternate actions required?" 4-33. There are important differences between task accomplishment and effects attainment. MOEs measure changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment that are tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect, and whether they are conforming to the commander's intent. MOPs and MOEs are used collectively to provide an evaluation to identify trends that can affect future operations. CR, through the CIM process, assists the CAO/CMO planner to conduct evaluations that form the basis for a continuing review of the campaign plan, existing orders, and supporting activities to determine if operations should continue as planned or be adapted to achieve the commander's specified effects. Just as full integration of all actions is essential to building an effective plan, integration of these actions in the evaluations step is essential to evaluate how comprehensively effects are progressing toward objectives. 4-34. The primary purpose of evaluation is to identify progress toward the accomplishment of objectives at any point in time, which provides the basis for plan adjustment. Through the effective use of CR and CIM processes, combat assessments are developed by using two primary criteriaMOPs and MOEsto assess task accomplishment and effects attainment, respectively. Together, MOPs and MOEs support an overall assessment of objective accomplishment. 4-35. CAO/CMO planners identify MOEs for both desired and undesired effects. MOEs indicate how the ASCOPE characteristics of the operational environment's systems are behaving (for example, how the adversary is acting). Indicators for each MOE are developed and fed into intelligence collection planning as mission analysis and COA development continues. 4-36. Measuring effects improves planning and assessment by emphasizing the following:

z
The linking of operational objectives to tactical-level actions through a specified set of effects.
z
The systemic situational awareness and understanding of the adversary and operational environment enabled by a systemic analysis process.
z
The command and staff interaction across multiple echelons enabled by significant collaboration capabilities through CIM support to the collaborative environment.
z
The enhanced unity of effort between joint, multinational, and interagency organizations supported by the CIM process and fed through the CIG.
z
A more accurate, rigorous assessment of the attainment of objectives focused on system behavior rather than discrete task accomplishment.
4-37. With an understanding of desired and undesired effects, CAO/CMO planners connect nodes to specific effects. A node connected to an effect is a key node, and some of these may become high-value nodes if they contribute to more than one desired effect when acted on. CAO/CMO planners then consider specific actions that can be taken against these nodes. Success is measured by MOP.

4-38. MOP focus on task accomplishment by answering the following questions:
z
Was the task or action performed as the commander intended?
z
Regardless of effect, did the assigned force produce the fires, maneuver, or information required by the specified or implied tasks?
z
Have the expected results of the desired influence or the changes in system behavior after the assigned tasks been accomplished?
z
Are we doing things right?
4-39. The JFC's orders to subordinates will specify the tasks, purpose, and associated effects for action. At tactical levels, desired effects are reflected as part of the higher commander's intent statementthe concise expression of the purpose of the operation and the desired end statethat serves as incentive for the subordinate unit planning effort. 4-40. The final step is overall operational assessment, and through the CIM process, overlaying that information unto the supported commander's COP. Using assessments to determine the current and projected state of conditions, planners and commanders identify the difference, the "delta," between current and desired conditions as they relate to mission execution. CAO/CMO evaluations review what has happened and validate current and projected plans, and assist the commander and his staff to direct nearterm changes to impending operations and to refine future planning to ensure the command achieves its objectives.

## Evaluation Products

4-41. An MOE spreadsheet (Figure 4-3, page 4-9) provides criteria to measure an effect's success that directly supports the commander's objective. Usually identified in a quantifiable format, the collection of MOEs provides trends to determine positive progress toward a stated objective or desired effect. The MOEs spreadsheet allows the force to track, by AOR and key terrain, where indicators are occurring to show whether the unit is having success or failure with a particular effect.

4-42. The trend analysis spreadsheet (Figure 4-4, page 4-10) takes the historical information from the MOE spreadsheet and allows the commander and staff to visually see where positive and negative activities are occurring within the AOR. As shown in the following figure, the commander's objective and desired effects are clearly identified. MOE indicators are aligned for each effect. From this information and analysis of why a trend is up or down, the staff can identify trouble spots and plan operations to reverse the negative trend. 4-43. CAO and CMO planners can capitalize on the positive trends, determine what is causing the positive increase, and then apply successful techniques, tactics, and procedures (TTP) with higher HQ and subordinate task force commanders. The analysis from this product, TF commander's assessments, and intelligence summaries (INTSUMs) are used to develop the trend analysis slide. 4-44. The trend analysis chart (Figure 4-5, page 4-10) is a product that provides a visual tool for the assessment of the commander's objectives and effects. This product is derived from the trend analysis spreadsheet, commander's assessment, CMO assessments, and INTSUMs. It also shows in time how the commander evaluates each objective and desired effects.

4-45. The impact analysis chart (Figure 4-6, page 4-11) is part of the overall visual assessment for the commander. This product shows the impact of upward or downward trends. It does this by color-coding AORs with a RED, YELLOW, or GREEN status and the events or indicators that have occurred to make that assessment (printing limitations preclude Figure 4-6 from appearing in color). This chart allows commanders to quickly focus and graphically control forces.

## Civil-Military Operations Working Group

4-46. Commanders should establish a civil-military operations working group (CMOWG). The goal of the CMOWG is to bring all the players who have a part in CMO together to focus and synchronize their efforts in achieving the commander's CMO priorities. In addition to the CMOWG, CAO/CMO planners need to ensure that they are also actively involved in the information operations working group (IOWG), the intelligence fusion working group (IFWG), the joint effects-coordination board (JECB) and the targeting board at their respective levels. 4-47. The composition of the CMOWG will change based on level of command but should be chaired by the S/G/J-9 (lead CMO planner). Other members of the CMOWG may include the following:

z
Director of the CMOC.
z
Subordinate CA representative.
z
IO representative (S/G-7).
z
Medical representative.
z
Engineer representative.
z
Provost marshal representative.
z
SJA representative with expertise in CMO, preferably the unit's SROLO.
z
Political advisor (POLAD), if applicable.
z
PAO.
z
S/G/J-3 current operations representative.
z
S/G/J-2 targeting officer representative.
z
S/G/J-4 representative.
z
Resource management representative.
z
Subordinate LNO.

## Cmowgs In Operation Enduring Freedom

During Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (May 2004 through March 2006) the combined joint special operations task force-Afghanistan (CJSOTF-A) recognized the need to secure the Shur Ghar Pass in southern Afghanistan. Close collaboration between CA, coalition forces, IPI, NGOs, IGOs, USAID, DOS, USDA, the UN, and others produced an excellent example of a CMOWG. The Shur Ghar pass is located in central Zabul Province in southern Afghanistan. The pass sits in a mountain range that splits the province and is surrounded by mountains making approaches to it unobservable. Additionally, the rock-strewn sand road makes it an ideal location for improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and ambushes. Several coalition Soldiers lost their lives in the pass due to these threats. Through numerous CMOWGs at Kandahar Air Base and Zabul Province, CA
Soldiers from the 96th CA Battalion (A) and coalition forces prepared a concept to secure the Shur Ghar Pass. The concept included placing Afghan police in the pass, building a hardened police barracks compound, and instituting numerous police checkpoints. CERP funding was secured to build the police barracks and checkpoints in the pass. CA Soldiers supporting CJSOTF-A coordinated with Commander, Joint Task Force-76 to use CERP funding provided by the PRT in Qalat, the capital of Zabul Province. The plan was eventually transferred to Commander, Joint Task Force-76, specifically 3d BCT, 25th Infantry Division, and the Qalat PRT. DOS contractors from DynCorp ran a police training program in Zabul Province in conjunction with the 3d BCT, 25th Infantry Division, which produced trained police to man the pass. When the 3d BCT, 25th Infantry Division redeployed, the plan to secure the Shur Ghar Pass was transferred to the 173d (A) BCT. The 173d (A) BCT dedicated virtually all of its engineer assets to complete the initial road cut and base course. With approval from Commander, Joint Task Force-76, the Qalat PRT funded road construction equipment and a rock crusher and was able to provide training for Afghans to operate them. USAID agreed to fund an asphalt finish topcoat using a private contractor to pave the road. This collaborative effort took over a year from conception to completion. It involved CMOWGs at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels and was composed of elements from SOF and conventional forces, USAID, DOS, the Government of Afghanistan (GOA), and others to make it successful. The net result produced secure access to southern Afghanistan for coalition and Afghan security forces. It stimulated the economy in Zabul Province and southern Afghanistan, and legitimized the local governments, the provincial government, and the GOA.

## Appendix A Transition Considerations

Improving civil-military cooperation is another important aspect of transition support. By definition, transition support operations often involve the process of moving from a coalition military operation or UN peace support operation to an indigenous political authority. The military has a key role to play in creating a safe and secure environment in which humanitarian action, and near simultaneously, reconstruction, can take place. The military can increase the value of and resources allocated to humanitarian and reconstruction efforts. The military should, however, improve planning and communication with civilian agencies, including international organizations and nongovernmental organizations, in order to avoid confusion, manage expectations, and better utilize the comparative advantage that IOs and NGOs can bring to humanitarian relief and reconstruction. The designated civilian agencies perform these functions far better and at about one-tenth the cost of military implementation. While military personnel often like to deliver humanitarian relief and light infrastructure projects, the usually temporary nature of military deployments often creates unsustainable results and failed expectations on the part of needy beneficiaries.

Arthur E. Dewey Assistant Secretary for Population, Refugees and Migration, DOS
Remarks to the Conrad Hilton Humanitarian Prize New York City, New York
28 October 2004
CMO planners, usually CA trained personnel, play a major role in transition planning. Based on their expertise, they may be the best group to perform this function. For these planners to accomplish this task, a clearly identifiable end state and transition or termination criteria for the operation must be developed (JP 3-57.1). Termination or transition occurs when either the mission has been accomplished or when the President and/or SecDef direct. CMO planners play a major role in termination and transition. Criteria for termination or transition may be based on events, MOEs and success, availability of resources, or a specific date. A successful harvest and restoration of critical facilities in the crisis area are examples of events that might trigger termination of the mission. An acceptable drop in mortality rates, a certain percentage of DCs returned to their homes, or a given decrease in threat activity against the operation are examples of MOEs that may prompt the end of U.S. forces' involvement.

## Transition/Termination

A-1. The transition plan is vital if stability operations are to be a success. It prioritizes and plans for the successful handover of missions to a follow-on agency or force, being either military or civil in nature. Examples of these organizations are peacekeeping entities under a UN mandate, IGOs, NGOs, or IPI. CA forces and CMO planners are uniquely qualified to advise the commander on activities that reduce turmoil and stabilize the situation until international relief organizations or IPI assume control. A-2. Transition may occur between U.S. military forces, another military force (for example, multinational or forces from the affected country), regional organizations, the UN, or civilian organizations. A detailed plan addressing the various civil functions and to whom they will transition will

## Appendix A

greatly reduce the turmoil typically associated with transition. A comprehensive transition plan includes specific requirements for all elements involved in the transition, summarizes capabilities and assets, and assigns specific responsibilities.

A-3. An unclassified transition plan written in easily understood terms is particularly required when transitioning to nonmilitary organizations. Organizing the plan by specific functions (for example, provision of food, restoration of facilities, and health services) also enhances the transition.

A-4. The CMO staff should periodically review the transition plan with all participating organizations. This review will help ensure that planning assumptions are still valid and determine if changes in the situation require changes in the transition plan. A-5. CMO planners play a major role in transition planning and, based on their expertise, may be the best group to perform this function. In order for these planners to accomplish this task, a clearly identifiable end state and transition or termination criteria (Figure A-1) for the operation must be developed. Transition planning must start during the initial phases of operation planning to ensure adequate attention is placed in this critical areaplan for transition when planning for intervention.

-
Has the end state been achieved?
-
Can forces be safely withdrawn from the operational area?
-
Has consideration been given as to when USAR forces will be released?
-
Has coordination for redeployment of the force been conducted with appropriate commands, agencies,
and other organizations?
-
Has the commander identified postconflict requirements?
-
Has transition planning been accomplished in the event?
-
Has transition planning been accomplished in the event that operations are transitioning to another
military force, regional organization, UN, or civilian organization?
-
Have stated operational objectives been accomplished?
-
Have the underlying causes of the conflict been considered, and how do they influence termination
planning?
-
What additional support will be required for redeployment?
-
What are the FP requirements?
-
What arrangements have been made with other organizations to accomplish the postconflict activities?
For example, will there be humanitarian, governmental, and infrastructure assistance requirements?
-
What is the policy for evacuation of equipment used by the force?
-
What is the policy for redeployment?
-
How will postconflict requirements impact the timeline for redeployment of the force?
-
Will the force be expected to support these types of activities?

## Figure A-1. Sample Checklist For Termination Planning

A-6. Transition planning is an integral part of operation planning and mission analysis. Transferring control of an operation from U.S. military to a nonmilitary organization or to another military force requires detailed planning and execution. Mission analysis (analysis of mission statement), an identifiable end state, interagency plans (if developed), and national policy will all play an important role in the transition process. Transferring control of an operation is situationally dependent; each one will possess different characteristics and requirements. A-7. As the redeployment phase for U.S. forces approaches, it is important that FP remain the top priority. The redeployment phase of the operation can be the most hazardous in FP, because the tactical focus tends to shift toward redeployment and away from task FP. Areas that will impact significantly on the development of a transition plan are

z
Identification of issues.
z
Key events (past and present).
z
Work required to accomplish the transition.
z
A thorough knowledge of the organization or force taking over control of the operation.
A-8. Figure A-2 provides a list of issues that may have an effect on transition planning.

-
Who will determine when the transition begins or is complete?
-
Has the end state been accomplished?
-
Who will fund for the transition?
-
What is the new mission?
-
What U.S. forces, equipment, and/or supplies will remain behind?
-
What will be the command relationship for U.S. forces that remain behind?
-
What will be the communications requirements for U.S. forces that remain behind?
-
Who will support U.S. forces that remain behind?
-
Can intelligence be shared with the incoming force or organization?
-
Will new ROE be established?
-
Will ongoing operations (for example, engineer projects) be discontinued or interrupted?
-
Will the United States be expected to provide communications capability to the incoming force or
organization?
-
Will the incoming force or organization use the same headquarters facility as the departing force?
-
What is the policy for redeployment of the departing force?
-
Will sufficient security be available to provide force protection? Who provides it?
-
How will the turnover be accomplished?
-
Who will handle PA for the transition?
-
Have redeployment airlift and sealift arrangements been approved and passed to the United States Transportation Command?

## Figure A-2. Sample Checklist For Transition Planning

A-9. CA will play an integral role in both transition planning and the actual process. In any major operation, there will be significant interface with, and impact upon, the civilian populace and the local government. CA personnel must ensure that the gains made in this area are not lost in the transition process. CA planners must be involved in the supported commander's transition planning from the beginning. The CMOC prepares to hand over its role as a mechanism for collaboration, communication, and consensus between U.S. forces and IGOs, NGOs, other USG agencies, and local government agencies. CMOC personnel prepare a transition plan that includes all ongoing projects and coordination, points of contact for all agencies with which the CMOC has worked, possible resources, and any other information that may facilitate the transition process. A-10. All CMO assets involved in a mission must be prepared to assist in the planning and execution of transition operations. It is imperative that all teams and sections develop historical files to aid in the transition process. The transition process must be considered from the initial planning of the mission.

The military is skilled at campaign planning, but neither the military professionals, nor civilian professionals, is very good at comprehensive campaign planning. Each can do planning within their own narrow lane; but exceedingly few in either camp can work across the lanes to do comprehensive civil-military planning. Such planning means developing a common civil-military picture of:

1. The situation, both from the standpoint of a clear understanding of the threat, and familiarity with the total civilian and military assets needed to meet that threat;

## Appendix A

2. The overall civil-military mission; (developing the outlines of what is achievable is vital here. Top-level civilian and military planners need to get together early to work through what would be a realistic mission, and what it would cost.)
3. The concept of operations needed to reach the desired civil-military end-state; 4. What the military component could be expected to do support the main civilian effort in helping that effort achieve its political, humanitarian and reconstruction objectives. This needs to be spelled out in a range of specified and implied tasks that military forces might be called upon to provide; 5. Description of how cooperation and coordination will be accomplished.

Arthur E. Dewey Assistant Secretary for Population, Refugees and Migration, DOS
Presentation at the 15th International Challenges Seminar Beijing, China
4 November 2004

## Appendix B Civil-Military Operations Estimate

The CMO estimate is the CMO planner's (G/S-9's) evaluation of how CMO factors may influence the COA the commander is considering. This appendix discusses the CMO estimate. It addresses how the CMO planner develops and maintains it, and its relationship to the tasks of the MDMP. It shows which paragraphs of the estimate contribute to the CMO annex of operations plans and operations orders. It includes an annotated CMO estimate format.

## Estimate Development

B-1. The CMO estimate supports decision making throughout an operation. It is particularly helpful during the MDMP (Table B-1). The CMO estimate shows how CMO can best be integrated into the overall operation. An effective CMO planner begins to compile the CMO estimate immediately upon receipt of the higher command's warning order, or sooner if possible.

| MDMP Task                | Staff Estimate                                 |
|--------------------------|------------------------------------------------|
| Receipt of Mission       | Prepare and begin recording information.       |
| Mission Analysis         | Paragraph 1, Mission                           |
| -                        |                                                |
|                          |                                                |
| CMO concept of support   |                                                |
| -                        |                                                |
|                          | Enemy forces                                   |
| -                        |                                                |
|                          | Friendly forces                                |
| -                        |                                                |
|                          | Assumptions                                    |
| -                        |                                                |
|                          |                                                |
| ASCOPE                   |                                                |
| COA Development          | Paragraph 3, COA Development                   |
| COA Analysis (War Game)  | Paragraph 4, COA Analysis                      |
| -                        |                                                |
|                          |                                                |
| CMO in COA 1             |                                                |
|                         |                                                |
|                          |                                                |
| CMO concept of support   |                                                |
|                         |                                                |
|                          |                                                |
| CMO goals and objectives |                                                |
|                         |                                                |
|                          | Analysis                                       |
|                         |                                                |
|                          | Risk analysis                                  |
| -                        |                                                |
|                          |                                                |
| CMO in COA 2, and so on  |                                                |
| COA Comparison           | Paragraph 5, COA Comparison                    |
| COA Approval             | Paragraph 6, Recommendation and Conclusions    |
| Orders Production        | Update staff estimates to reflect approved COA |
| information.             |                                                |

B-2. The CMO estimate is a running estimate (FM 6-0, Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces). It is a living document that is continuously updated throughout the operations process. This staffing tool enables planners to make assessments during preparation and execution.

## Appendix B

B-3. Units below corps level rarely prepare written staff estimates. At those levels, a staff estimate usually consists of verbal summaries of available information backed up by overlays and charts. However, the staff estimate format is less an outline for a written product than it is a way to organize information. Maintaining a running CMO estimate means that the CMO planner maintains current information on all aspects of the situation and is prepared to make recommendations on decisions the commander must make. The CMO estimate format lists aspects of the situation in a logical sequence. The CMO planner may use it as a briefing aid to ensure that all aspects of the situation are addressed. B-4. Normally, the CMO estimate provides enough information to complete the first draft of the CMO annex and write the CMO paragraph for the base OPORD or OPLAN. The CMO estimate's depiction of the future also contributes to the commander's visualization. The estimate-derived initial CMO annex should be enough to begin an operation. The CMO estimate should be as comprehensive as possible within the time available. B-5. Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the CMO estimate are input to the mission analysis briefing. Paragraphs 3, 4, 5, and 6 are input to the COA decision briefing. B-6. During peacetime, units maintain staff estimates for potential contingencies. These form the basis for staff estimates related to a specific mission. During operations, they maintain running estimates. These estimates address decision points, branches, and sequels. If no CMO estimate exists, the CMO planner begins developing one upon mission receipt and refines it throughout the operation. Staff officers from CMO elements and attached CAPTs provide input to the CMO estimate. CMO input to the OPLAN/OPORD comes from the CMO estimate. B-7. The focus of estimate development is on situation assessment rather than COA development. The purpose is not to develop a perfect plan, but to assemble information underlying a CMO concept of support that can be modified to support the overall concept of operations. Estimate development never stops.

## Mission Analysis

B-8. During mission analysis, the CMO planner produces paragraphs 1 and 2 of the CMO estimate. These paragraphs guide all subsequent CMO planningboth for the current operation and for any branches and sequels. By the end of mission analysis, the CMO estimate includes the following information:

z
The restated CMO mission (paragraph 1, the CMO planner determines the initial CMO mission during the analysis of the higher HQ OPLAN/OPORD and the restated CMO mission during mission analysis. At the same time the commander approves the restated mission for the overall operation, he approves the restated CMO mission).
z
Characteristics of the AO and the civil-military environment that may influence friendly and adversary operations (paragraph 2a, determined during IPB).
z
Assets, resources, and associated capabilities that can be used in a CMO role (paragraphs 2c[2] and [3], determined during review of available assets).
z
Critical CMO facts and assumptions. (Facts are placed in the CMO-estimate subparagraph [usually 2a, 2b, or 2c] that concerns them. Assumptions are placed in subparagraph 2d.)
z
CMO criteria of success for analyzing and comparing COAs (paragraph 4[5]).
z
CMO-related HPT recommendations.
z
CMO IR.
B-9. At the end of mission analysis, paragraph 2 of the CMO estimate is well-formed. However, it is not complete. As part of a running estimate, it is updated as new information is received. Normally, paragraph
2 of the CMO estimate becomes the CMO input to the mission analysis briefing.

## Course Of Action Comparison

B-10. The CMO planner uses the information in the CMO estimate to refine CMO objectives and check the soundness of the CMO concept of support for each COA. The CMO planner assesses the CMO concept of support for each COA to ensure it can accomplish the CMO objectives with available resources. The CMO
planner also assesses the general strengths and vulnerabilities of the CMO concept of support for the COA. Special attention is paid to critical vulnerabilities that, if exploited by the adversary, could cause the CMO strategy, objectives, or goals to fail. The CMO planner records the information gathered during COA development for use during COA analysis. The information developed during COA comparison and analysis forms the basis for paragraph 3 of the CMO estimate. B-11. During COA analysis, the CMO planner confirms and refines the following CMO information:

z
Concept of support and CMO goals and objectives.
z
Strengths and vulnerabilities.
z
Resource requirements in terms of amount and effectiveness.
z
Effectiveness of risk control measures and resultant residual risk.
B-12. The assistant CMO planner assesses the CMO concept of support against the CMO MOEs and MOPs, as each COA is war-gamed. The results of this assessment are the basis for the COA comparison recorded in paragraph 5 of the estimate.

## Recommendations And Conclusions

B-13. The CMO staff planner analyzes the war gaming of the CMO concepts of support and compares the results for each COA with the others. The CMO concepts of support are rank-ordered according to how well they meet the evaluation criteria. Usually the comparison and ranking of the concepts of support are shown on a COA decision matrix. The matrix and a narrative explanation are recorded in paragraph 4 of the CMO estimate and briefed during the COA decision brief. B-14. After analyzing and comparing the CMO concepts of support, The CMO staff planner recommends the COA that the comparison shows CMO can best support. The recommendation and summarized conclusions become the final paragraph of the CMO estimate. B-15. Once the commander approves a COA, the CMO planner prepares the CMO annex. This is not a total reevaluation. Rather, the analysis done during COA comparison is explained based on the approved COA. B-16. The CMO planner prepares a CMO estimate in the format shown in Figure B-1, pages B-3 through B-5.

## Classification

REFERENCES: List maps, charts, CMO-related documents, and local command guidance.

1.  **MISSION.** Cite the restated CMO mission from mission analysis. 2.  SITUATION AND CONSIDERATIONS.
a.  Characteristics of the area of operations. (Key CMO factors derived from the intelligence
estimate and area studies/assessments). (1)
Weather. State how the military aspects of weather affect CMO.
(2)
Terrain. State how aspects of terrain affect CMO.

## Classification Classification

(3)
 Civil Considerations:
(a)  Attitudes of the population (cooperative or uncooperative).
(b)  Availability of the population (cooperative or uncooperative). (c)  Availability of local material and personnel to support military operations. (d)  Number of dislocated civilians in the area. (e)  Amount and type of war damage suffered by the economy (particularly in
transportation, public utilities, and communications).
(f)
Status and character of the civil government.
(g)  State of health of the civilian populace.
(h)  Ability of local police, judicial authorities, and correction officials to maintain
public order.
(i)
CMO environment. When working at the tactical level, describe the areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events.
b.  **Enemy Forces.** Include key CMO factors from the intelligence estimate and area
assessments. Address enemy capabilities by considering sabotage, espionage, subversion, terrorism, and movement of dislocated civilians, and their ability to influence or affect planned military operations and CMO.
c.  Friendly Forces.
(1)
Current status of CMO resources (OGA).
(2)
Comparison of CMO assets and resource requirements versus CMO capabilities
available and recommended solutions for discrepancies.
d.  **Assumptions.** CMO assumptions developed during mission analysis.

## 3.  Course Of Action.

a.  List the friendly COAs war-gamed. b.  List the evaluation criteria identified during COA analysis. All staff sections use the same
evaluation criteria.

## 4.  **Analysis Of Courses Of Action**. A.  Coa.

(1)
Analyze the CMO concept of support using the CMO analysis. All staff sections use
the same evaluation criteria.
(2)
Estimate the likelihood of accomplishing CMO objectives in the available time, given
friendly CMO capabilities and vulnerabilities, versus those likely threat COAs.
(3)
Determine the potential for unintended consequences of CMO tasks and the
possible impacts on both adversary and friendly COAs.
(4)
Identify critical subsystems within ASCOPE that should be evaluated within COA
analysis to assess CMO requirements.

## Classification Classification

(5)
Assess the effectiveness of CMO related capabilities in relation to each
other, and the most significant CMO-related vulnerabilities.
(6)
Evaluate the risk of failure to reach CMO goals or objectives in terms of
affects on the success of the COA.
(7)
Analyze the risk in executing CMO in the COA in terms of nonavailability of
assessments or resources.
(8)
List EEFI for this COA.
b.  **COA 2.** (Repeat the process outlined above for all COAs):
5.  **COA COMPARISON.** Compare the COAs in terms of the evaluation criteria. Rank-order COAs
for each criterion. Visually support the comparison with a decision matrix.
a.  Compare the costs of CMO in each COA based on the resources and time required
executing them in relation to the operational impact of their success (if a stated evaluation criteria).
b.  Compare the levels of risk to COA success and friendly assets should CMO fail (if a stated
evaluation criteria).
c.  Summarize the advantages and disadvantages for CMO in each COA to evaluate the
chance of success in each (as taken from the CMO analysis).

## 6.  Recommendation And Conclusions.

a.  Recommend a COA based on the comparison (most supportable from the CMO perspective).
b.  Present CMO issues, deficiencies, risks, and recommendations to reduce their impacts.
/signed/ (Designation of staff officer or originator) APPENDIXES: (As required)

## Classification

B-17. Upon completion of the CMO estimate, the CMO planner will have prepared the majority of input needed for the OPLAN/OPORD. The CMO planner can build most of the CMO annex through "cut and paste" from a well-prepared CMO estimate (Figure B-2, page B-6).

## Staff Estimate Briefing

B-18. The CMO estimate may be presented as a briefing to provide CMO information to the commander and staff. The briefing will normally elaborate on the key points derived from preparing the estimate, focusing principally on CMO capabilities and vulnerabilities, and support CMO can provide to the COAs. The briefing is part of either the mission analysis briefing (paragraphs 1 and 2) or part of the commander's decision briefing (paragraphs 3, 4, 5, and 6). The briefing itself consists of all of paragraph 1 and a summary of paragraphs 2 through 6 of the CMO estimate.

## Summary

B-19. The CMO estimate is both a process and a product. The process calls for a disciplined approach to collecting and processing information, and to recording the results. Automated tools such as databases and word processing programs give the CMO planner the flexibility and responsiveness needed to tailor the estimate to meet a variety of requirements. The CMO estimate is a living document that is continuously refined, as additional information becomes available. A current estimate allows the CMO planner to quickly provide accurate information to meet planning requirements as they change.

## Appendix C Civil-Military Operations Annex

The CMO annex serves three primary purposes:

-
The situation paragraph provides operational details on the situation from a CMO perspective.
-
The execution paragraph and matrix provide the direction needed to focus the effects of the CMO elements.
-
The assessment matrix displays the information needed to assess CMO tasks.
The CMO annex also addresses service support, command, and signal aspects of CMO that are not covered elsewhere in the OPLAN or OPORD. Much of the information in the CMO annex is derived from the CMO area study and CMO estimate. Major portions of the annex can be written directly from the CMO estimate. Much of the information required for the execution and assessment matrixes can be taken from CMO worksheets developed for COA approval. Normally, in Army operations, this annex is Annex Q (FM 5-0).

## Required Information

C-1. *Task Organization.* This section of the CMO annex states the CMO task organization for this mission. It identifies all the units that will accomplish the commander's CMO mission. These units could include both non-CA (for example, engineers, MP, and medical corps) and CA units. C-2. The task organization must clearly state the command relationship (assigned, OPCON, or tactical control [TACON]) of all the units that will be performing CMO. Include elements such as LNOs and the units or organizations they support in the Interagency Task Organization subparagraph. Include only those items not addressed in Annex A (Task Organization). C-3. *Situation.* The situation paragraph provides operational details on the situation from a CMO perspective. The situation paragraph of the CMO annex does not repeat the OPLAN or OPORD situation paragraph. It is tailored to aspects of the operational environment that affect CMO. The situation paragraph describes how the CMO environment may affect friendly, adversary, and other operations. It should discuss how CMO would influence friendly operations. C-4. *Civil.* This begins the situation paragraph with a description of the general civil situation. It lists the major strengths and vulnerabilities of civil components of the AO and how they relate to the overall mission. When developing this information, it is key to think in terms of nodal interaction that ultimately leads to an effects-based CMO strategy, with its inherent MOPs and MOEs. C-5. Subsequent subparagraphs under the civil subparagraph contain discussions, in terms of ASCOPE, as analyzed in the CMO estimate and area studies of the nodes and relationships essential for success of the commander's mission. C-6. *Areas*. This subparagraph lists the key civilian areas in the supported commander's operational environment. It approaches terrain analysis from a civilian perspective. Commanders analyze key civilian areas in terms of how they affect the mission as well as how military operations affect these areas. Examples of key civilian areas are areas defined by political boundaries (districts within a city, municipalities within a region; locations of government centers; social, political, religious, or criminal

## Appendix C

enclaves; agricultural and mining regions; trade routes; possible sites for the temporary settlement of dislocated civilians or other civil functions. C-7. *Structures.* This subparagraph lists the existing civil structures such as bridges, communications towers, power plants, and dams (traditional HPTs). Churches, mosques, national libraries, and hospitals are cultural sites that need to be listed and are generally protected by international law or other agreements. Still others are facilities with practical applications, such as jails, warehouses, schools, television stations, radio stations, and print plants, which may be useful for military purposes. C-8. *Capabilities.* This subparagraph lists civil capabilities by assessing if the populace is capable of sustaining itself through public administration, public safety, emergency services, and food and agriculture. It should also include whether the populace needs assistance with public works and utilities, public health, public transportation, economics, and commerce. C-9. *Organizations*. This subparagraph lists civil organizations that may or may not be affiliated with government agencies. They can be church groups, ethnic groups, fraternal organizations, patriotic or service organizations, IGOs or NGOs. C-10. *People*. This subparagraph lists civilian and nonmilitary personnel encountered in the supported commander's operational environment. The list may extend to those outside the operational environment whose actions, opinions and/or influence can affect the supported commander's operational environment. C-11. *Events*. This subparagraph lists the categories of civilian events that may affect military missions. These events include harvest seasons, elections, riots, and evacuations (both voluntary and involuntary). CAO/CMO planners determine what events are occurring, and analyze the events for their political, economic, psychological, environmental, and legal implications. C-12. *Threat.* This paragraph states the actual or potential nonmilitary threats to the force and to mission accomplishmentfor example, natural, man-made, and technological hazards; disease; DCs; criminals; and time. C-13. *Friendly Forces.* These paragraphs outline the CMO plans or the other unit's plans:

z
CMO plans of higher HQ.
z
CA plans of adjacent units.
z
Designated units in the AO that have civil-military capabilities (for example, engineers, MP, and medical corps) and are not organic to the unit for whom the annex is being written. As an example, if the 5067th Engineer Company (Bridge) is operating in the AO, it should be listed.
C-14. Attachments or Detachments. If not covered in task organization, all military and nonmilitary organizations participating in CMOC operations and CMO should be included; for example, in support of reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) plans; CA assets detached for liaison duties, and so on. C-15. *Assumptions.* This paragraph includes

z
Only part of an OPLAN, not OPORD.
z
Critical planning considerations and unknown conditions that must be confirmed by deliberate assessments.
z
Statement describing the operational risks associated with not engaging the civil component of the AO through CMO.
C-16. *Mission*. Provides a short, understandable, and descriptive statement of the CMO required to support the basic plan. The mission statement must state the who, what, when, *where*, and why. The following is offered as an example: 101st Airborne (Air Assault [AASLT]) Division conducts PRC operations commencing H-hour in AO Eagle to achieve freedom of movement for combat forces. C-17. *Execution and Matrix.* The execution paragraph provides the direction needed to synchronize the effects of CMO elements and related activities. It outlines the effects the commander wants CMO to achieve. It describes the activities of the force conducting CMO elements and related activities in enough detail to synchronize them by means of an execution matrix. The execution matrix is normally an appendix to the CMO annex.

C-18. It shows when each CMO task is to be executed. The execution matrix helps the CMO planner monitor and direct CMO during execution. It allows the CMO planner to monitor the coordination needed to execute CMO effectively without incurring unanticipated interference or CMO duplication of effort. The CMO planner places CMO tasks in the G-3/S-3 execution matrix. The CMO execution matrix is not a tasking document. The CMO planner places CMO tasks under tasks to subordinate units in the CMO OPLAN or OPORD annex or in the appropriate appendixes. C-19. *Concept of the Operation*. The concept of the operation is the second subparagraph in the execution section of the CMO annex. It provides a brief overview of the CMO, described in terms of lines of operations and by effects desired, by phase. This should include a discussion of civil-military objectives, civil decisive points, MOPs and MOEs and transition for each line of operation and a general timeline for the operation. Each line of operation should be discussed in greater detail in the appendixes where the key nodal relationship will be further defined. If there are to be no appendixes then the discussion here must be finitely detailed in this paragraph of the annex. C-20. *Tasks to Subordinate Units*. This is the third subparagraph that is a list of specific tasks to the elements listed in the task organization and attachments or detachments subparagraphs of the task organization. The MOPs for each task should be stated along with their MOEs. Ensure the following are completed:

z
Main supply route (MSR) blue is free of civilian traffic no later than (NLT) H+12.
z
DC camp orange is established NLT H+10.
z
On order establish civilian collection point X NLT notification + 2.5.
Example: 1st BCT conducts PRC operations, in sector, to prevent civilians from interfering with combat operation of 2d BCT.

C-21. *Coordinating Instructions*. This subparagraph provides instructions and details of coordination that apply to two or more subordinate units not covered by SOP. This includes civil CCIR, policy statements, special reporting procedures, FP guidance, effective time of attachments or detachments, references to annexes not mentioned elsewhere in the annex, coordinating authority, and so on. C-22. *Assessment Matrix.* The CMO planner incorporates the MOPs and MOEs for each CMO task into the assessment matrix. Normally, the matrix is an appendix to the annex. C-23. *Service Support.* This paragraph provides instructions and details concerning the service support relationship between the CMO elements and their supported units as well as any SO support elements in the AO. C-24. *Administrative*. This subparagraph can include

z
Location and contact information of the SJA.
z
Location and contact information of the contracting officer.
z
Location and contact information of the media information bureau.
z
Any other administrative matters that will affect the conduct of CMO.
C-25. *Medical*. This subparagraph should include at a minimum

z
Locations of medical facilities that will or can support CMO.
z
Locations of civilian medical facilities.
z
Include location of nonmilitary agencies in the AO that have medical facilities or capabilities. For each location only having capabilities (such as clinic only), specify the type of medical care provided at that facility.

## Appendix C

C-26. *Logistics*. This subparagraph should include at a minimum
z
Locations of logistical facilities that will or can support CMO.
z
Locations of civilian logistical facilities (for example, warehouses and port facilities).
z
Include location of nonmilitary agencies in the AO that have logistical facilities or are providing
logistical support.
For each location, list the class of supply at that location.

C-27. *Maintenance*. This subparagraph should include at a minimum
z
Locations of military maintenance facilities that will or can support CMO.
z
Locations of civil maintenance facilities capable or willing to support CMO.
z
Location of nonmilitary agencies in the AO that have maintenance facilities or are capable of providing maintenance to CMO assets.
For each location, list the level of maintenance provided at that location (operator, general, depot) as applicable.

C-28. *Command and Signal*. This subparagraph includes
z
A list of command relationships, the location of the CMO planners or CMOC(s), and alternate locations of the CMOC(s).
z
A list of all pertinent communication information, including primary and alternate means of communicating with military organizations, as well as with participating civilian organizations.
C-29. *Appendixes.* Appendixes include diagrams, synchronization matrixes, civil overlays, and others. The following are possible appendixes for the CMO annex:

z
Execution Matrix.
z
Assessment Matrix.
z
Cultural Briefing.
z
PRC Plan.

Dislocated Civilian Plan.

Noncombatant Evacuation Plan.
z
Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Plan.
z
Nation Assistance Plan.
z
Support to Civil Administration Plan.
z
Transfer of Authority Plan.
C-30. Annex Example. Figure C-1, pages C-5 through C-7, is an example of the CMO annex.

## Classification

ANNEX ____ (Civil-Military Operations) TO ____ (CORPS/DIVISION/BRIGADE) OPLAN # (OPORD #)____
References: (List those documents used to prepare this annex.)

1 - CMO annex of higher HQ. 2 - Relevant plans of participating civilian organizations. 3 - Relevant civilian agency operations guides and standards documents. 4 - Coordinated transition plans. 5 - International treaties and agreements. 6 - Operational CA database.
7 - Others (as applicable).
Task Organization. State the CMO task organization for this mission. Interagency Task Organization. Include elements such as liaison officers and the units or organizations they support.

1. Situation.
a. Civil.
(1) Areas. (2) Structures. (3) Capabilities. (4) Organizations. (5) People. (6) Events.
b. Threat. c. Friendly Forces.
(1) Higher HQ. (2) Adjacent units.
(3) Other forces.
d. Attachments/Detachments. e. Assumptions.
2. Mission. 3. Execution.
a. Commander's Intent.

## Classification Classification

b. Concept of the Operation.
(1) Phase I.
(a) Line of operation 1. (b) Line of operation 2.
(2) Phase II.
(a) Line of operation 1. (b) Line of operation 2.
(3) Phase III. (4) Phase IV. (5) Phase V.
c. Tasks to Subordinate Units.
(1) Unit 1. (2) Unit 2.
d. Coordinating Instructions.
4. Service Support.
a. Administrative. b. Medical. c. Logistics. d. Maintenance.
5. Command and Signal.
a. Command.
(1) Location of G-9/J-9/CMO planners/CAPTs. (2) Location of CMOC.
b. Signal.
(1) Reserved frequency for CMO, if any. (2) Special code words to indicate accomplishment of CMO tasks.

## Appendixes:

1. Execution Matrix. 2. Assessment Matrix. 3. Cultural Briefing.
4. PRC Plan (as required).
a. Dislocated Civilian Plan (as required). b. Noncombatant Evacuation Plan (as required).
5. Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Plan (as required). 6. Nation Assistance Plan (as required).

## Classification Classification

7. Support to Civil Administration Plan (as required). 8. Transfer of Authority Plan.
9. Any other (as required).

## Classification

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## Appendix D Civil Affairs Area Study And Assessment Format

The area study is a process common to all CA. Area study files contain information on a designated area. This information supports contingency and SO planning in areas assigned to U.S. forces. CA personnel obtain, analyze, and record information in advance of need. They update the study as required through an area assessment. An area study has no single format. The information acquired through the area study supports the area assessment. An area assessment begins with receipt of the mission. CA area assessments that support other forces should supplement, not repeat, information in the basic area study. To ensure coverage of all functional areas, reference should be made to the sample sequence of functions shown in Figure D-1, pages D-1 through D-23. When a CA area study is prepared separately, the "General"
section is used as a basic document.

## I. General.

A. Geography.
1. Location and size.
a. Location in relation to neighboring countries. b. Total land area (square miles or kilometers [size in relation to a U.S. state]).
2. Physical features.
a. Waterways and ports. b. Topography. c. Natural resources. d. Road and rail nets.
3. Climate.
a. Seasonal abnormalities, temperature, atmospheric pressure, humidity,
rainfall, and prevailing winds.
b. Characteristics and statistics.
4. Political geography.
a. Politically organized areas and regions. b. Effectiveness of administration of political areas in relation to geographic boundaries. c. Cities and towns. d. Boundaries e. Sources of raw material. f. Principles or traditions that command loyal support. g. State of industrial development.
B. History.
1. Brief history of
a. The development of the area.
b. Influence exerted by major powers in development. c. Divisions or partitions resulting from wars and treaties. d. Major geographic or political factors to the current status of the area. e. Present form of government and previous forms of government. f. Extent of political control over other areas. g. Degree of control over the population exercised by government. h. Susceptibility of existing government toward major powers. i. Political organization of the area.
2. Brief coverage of each
a. International treaty to which subject area or country is signatory. b. Status of forces agreement. c. Summary pronouncement of national policy pertinent to the subject area or country.
C. People.
1. Population.
a. Numbers. b. Distribution and density. c. Birth and death rates. d. Biographical sketches of prominent personalities.
(1) Name. (2) Address. (3) Business, profession, or occupation. (4) Political affiliation. (5) Education. (6) Religion.
2. Culture and social structure.
a. Culture.
(1) History, government, and geography as they affect the cultural makeup of the people.
(a) Events and facts considered most important. (b) Traditionally conducted activities, beliefs, or situations.
(2) Heroes and leaders of groups, with reasons for special esteem. (3) Ethnic groups (racial, tribal, or religious) and population distribution (rural or urban with ratios of age, sex, and imported or exported labor forces). (4) Majority or minority groups (unique challenges or conditions). (5) Moral codes. (6) Attitudes toward age, sex, race.
(7) Influences on personality development.

(8) Individuality. (9) Privacy.
(10) Nature of the people's perceptions.
(11) Clothing. (12) Fatalism or self-determination. (13) Values in economic philosophy (cooperation, competition, respect for personal and private property).

b. Social structure.

(1) Status of male and female, by age. (2) Humor, entertainment. (3) Community participation. (4) Exchange of gifts.
(5) Public displays of emotion. (6) Lines of authority. (7) Cooperation versus competition, including economics. (8) The family.
(a) Roles and status of family members. (b) Nuclear or extended. (c) Authority, obedience, place, and expectations of members. (d) Place in society. (e) Inheritance customs. (f) Entrance rites and rituals. (g) Markers of social change, adulthood, special activities.
(9) Dating and marriage.
(a) Age standards. (b) Influence of family and peers. (c) Common dating practices, courtship activities. (d) Chaperones, group dating. (e) Engagement customs.
(f) Divorce, separation, aloneness.
(g) Sexual mores.
(10) Greetings.
(a) Conversation and gestures on meeting. (b) Distinctive approaches for greetings. (c) Compliments given or received. (d) Space and time (standing, sitting, distance between people). (e) Farewell and leave-taking. (f) Use of first name versus titles. (g) Favorite, familiar, or pleasing phrases.
(11) Visiting practices.
(a) Conversations.
1 Topics.
2 Appropriate part of visit.
3 Attitude, rate, pitch, and tone.
(b) Gifts.
(c) Compliments on possessions, family, and children. (d) Parties and other social events. (e) Business discussions. (f) Mannerisms, gestures, posture, eye contact, and facial expressions.

(12) Eating practices.

(a) Table manners (before, during, and after the meal). (b) Average diet, meal size, and scheduling. (c) Specific foods reserved for special occasions or rituals.
(d) Forbidden foods. (e) Social and other occasions. (f) Unique problems and challenges.

(13) Work and recreation.

(a) Age, sex, status, and hierarchy. (b) Schedules. (c) Obligations, successes, or failures. (d) Business codes. (e) Bribes. (f) Family, cultural, and social recreation, vacation, and sports. (g) Individual recreation (age and sex exclusions and variations). (h) Distinctive arts and sciences. (i) Well-known artists, athletes, and others.
c. Dos and don'ts (Item or area that could embarrass or hurt the commander's mission if handled improperly. Include a quick reference for the commander and a starting point for briefing troops. This section may include items previously mentioned).

3. Languages.

a. Map showing distribution.
b. Minority groups. c. Standardization of languages.

4. Religion.

a. Religious sects (number, key leaders, and geographic locations). b. Funeral and burial practices. c. Religious problems. d. Eating and dietary habits. e. Sexual mores, including interrelations and intermarriages with alien personnel. f. Written and unwritten laws of conduct and human behavior.

D. U.S. Interests.
1. U.S. military units and teams in the area and their activities. 2. U.S. Government organizations in the area and their interests.
3. U.S. civilian organizations and interests in the area. 4. Legal agreements and treaties. 5. Trade and commercial interests.
E. FN Support.
1. C2.
a. Space and facilities at echelons above corps. b. C2 of other functional areas. c. Area security. d. Dislocated civilians.
e. Battlefield circulation control communications.
(1) Use of communications systems. (2) Repair of communications systems. (3) Cable construction and repair.
2. Combat service support.
a. Use of FN transportation and distribution systems, including highways, railways, waterways, ports (public and private). b. Use of FN buildings. c. Civilian services (laundry, bath, bakery, food, water). d. Depot operations and depot maintenance. e. Material-handling equipment. f. Labor.

(1) Skilled. (2) Manual. (3) Agricultural. (4) Male or female. (5) Draft exemption for U.S. employees.
(6) Third country (labor necessity, availability, and quantity).
(7) Screened by intelligence. (8) Linguists and interpreters. (9) Salary (standard wages). (10) Workday.

3. Mobility and Survivability.
a. Repair of railroads, highways, and pipelines. b. Obstacle construction. c. Contract guard services. d. Decontamination.
e. Port facilities and repair. f. Barrier and construction materials.
4. Medical.
a. Hospitals (facilities and beds). b. Medical evacuation. c. Medical supplies and equipment.
5. FN POC for U.S. forces and procedures. 6. Impact of U.S. presence on the FN economy.

## Ii. Public Administration.

A. General System of Public Administration.
1. Political traditions. 2. Political stability.
3. Standards and effectiveness. 4. Constitutional system. 5. Civil rights and practices. 6. Political factions, movements, and dynamics.
B. Structure of National Government.
1. Executive branch.
a. Organization. b. Powers. c. Policies. d. Administration.
2. Legislative branch.
a. Organization. b. Powers. c. Composition of membership. d. Pressure groups.
3. Judicial branch.
a. Organization.
b. Powers.
4. Methods of selection of key officials. 5. Biographical sketches of key officials.
a. Name. b. Address. c. Position in government. d. Political affiliation. e. Education. f. Religion. g. Former business, profession, or occupation. h. Attitude toward the United States.
6. Potential officials and biographical sketches.

C. Structure of Government at Other Levels.
1. Province or state.
2. District. 3. City. 4. Relations with national government. 5. Biographical sketches of key officials, potential officials, and other influential persons.
a. Name. b. Address. c. Position. d. Political affiliation.
e. Education. f. Religion. g. Former business, profession, or occupation. h. Attitude toward the United States.
D. Armed Forces.
1. Historical background. 2. Organization, size, and mission.
a. Defense establishment. b. Army. c. Navy. d. Air Force. e. Paramilitary forces. f. Political control and effectiveness.
3. General military policy. 4. International treaties. 5. Foreign influence. 6. Military establishment and the national economy.
a. Defense budget.
b. Percentage of total budget. c. Military pay.
7. Quality and source of manpower.
a. Key officers and qualifications. b. Recruitment. c. Conscription. d. Reserves. e. Training. f. Mobilization plans.
8. Logistics. 9. Weapons and equipment.
10. Ranks, uniforms, and insignia. 11. Loyalty and morale factors. 12. Military justice.
E. Political Parties.
1. Strength and capabilities. 2. Organization. 3. Policies and objectives. 4. Biographical sketches of leaders. 5. Training. 6. Role in international communist movement. 7. Relation to domestic government. 8. Internal party politics.
F. International Affairs.
1. Agencies. 2. Foreign relations. 3. Relations with intergovernmental organizations and nongovernmental organizations.

## Iii. Cultural Relations.

A. General conditions and problems. B. Cultural Affairs.
1. Religions in the area.
a. National. b. Organized. c. Unorganized (sects). d. Relations among religions and religious leaders, indigenous and missionary.
2. Clergy.
a. Number, location, and education of clergymen. b. Influence of religious leaders.
3. Religious beliefs.
a. Major tenets of each religion, including such concepts as
(1) Faith. (2) Impact of faith on life. (3) Concept of the hereafter. (4) Means of salvation. (5) Rites of cleaning and purification. (6) Impact of religions on value systems.
b. Degree of religious conviction in lives of indigenous populace.
4. Worship.
a. Forms and significance of worship of each religion. b. Places of worship. c. Frequency of worship.
5. Relationship between religion and motivation of indigenous people. 6. Relationship between religion and transcultural communication. 7. Socioeconomic influence of religion.

a. Influence of religions on society. b. Economic influence of religions.
(1) Religious ownership of property and other possessions. (2) Teachings of religions about private property.

8. Interrelation with government.
a. Relationship of religious leaders and government officials. b. Role of religions and religious leaders in armed forces. c. Political influence of religious leaders.
9. Religious schools.

a. Location, size, and attendance. b. Influence. c. Relationship to nonsecular schools.

C. Arts, Monuments, and Archives.
1. Description of conditions of the arts and monuments. 2. Advancements over the past 10 years. 3. Influence of outside countries. 4. Arts.

a. Location, type, use, and significance of the fine arts. b. Population attitude toward art treasures. c. Government policies and agencies dealing with the arts. d. Agencies through which arts are performed.
(1) Private. (2) Government.

5. Advancements in science. 6. Artists' organizations and government control. 7. Monuments.

a. Location of historic monuments and sites.
b. Present significance of historic monuments and sites.

8. Archives.

a. Location of archives. b. Varieties of archives.
(1) Public archives. (2) Semipublic archives. (3) Ecclesiastical archives.
(4) Private or family archives.
c. Contents or category of archives.
(1) Historical. (2) Current documents.

## Iv. Civilian Supply.

A. General Conditions and Problems (Peculiarities of climate and geography that might influence civilian supply). B. Storage, Refrigeration, and Processing Facilities.

1. Storage space, available and required.
a. Food. b. Other supplies.
2. Refrigeration, available and required.
a. Food.
b. Other supplies.

C. Distribution Channels.
1. Food. 2. Clothing. 3. Essential durables.
D. Dietary and Clothing Requirements and Customs.
1. Food.

a. Available. b. Required.

2. Clothing.

a. Available. b. Required.

3. Customs that might influence civilian supply.
E. Production Excesses and Shortages.

## V. Legal.

A. System of Laws.

1. Civil and criminal codes.
a. Origins.
b. Procedures. c. Penalties.
2. Political crimes.

B. Administration of Justice.
1. Historical development. 2. Agencies (national and local). 3. Courts and tribunals (types of jurisdiction [including administrative tribunals]). 4. Judicial procedures. 5. Personnel.

a. Judiciary.

b. Prosecutors. c. The Bar. d. Legal training.
e. Political controls.

## Vi. Public Safety.

A. General Conditions and Problems (primary consideration in this area is whether the existing institutions [police, fire, and penal] may be used to carry out the combat commander's primary mission and to provide the day-to-day control and bodily protection of the local population). B. Police System.

1. Organizations at all levels.
a. Types of police forces and criminal investigative agencies. b. Organization.
c. Areas of responsibility and jurisdiction. d. Chain of command. e. Names and biographical sketches of key personnel.
2. Equipment.
a. Arms and special equipment. b. Modern crime-fighting equipment. c. Traffic control equipment. d. Riot control equipment. e. Police communications. f. Transportation.
3. Personnel.
a. Strength. b. Method of selection.
(1) Political, racial, and religious requirements. (2) Reliability. (3) Morale and state of training.
c. Promotion basis.
4. Functions and authority.
a. Criminal action. b. Civil ordinances. c. Disorder and disaster control.
5. Police regulations that differ from U.S. concept of law and order.
a. General. b. Identification system. c. Restrictions on travel, gatherings, and curfews. d. Restrictions on ownership of firearms.
6. Miscellaneous.

a. Other methods of enforcing law and order, such as the influence of religious leaders, family ties, and role of the military.
b. Psychological effect on the local population.

C. Penal Institutions.
1. National and local.
a. Prisons and jails (number, location, and capacity). b. Concentration camps and labor camps (number, location, and capacity).
2. Organization. 3. Government agency exercising control. 4. Inmate breakdown.
a. Political (reliability and future use in the U.S. cause). b. Criminal. c. Juvenile. d. Sex.
5. Adequacy (sanitary and health conditions). 6. Treatment of prisoners. 7. Probation. 8. Parole.
D. Fire Protection.
1. Organization (in general, the same as for the police). 2. Equipment.
a. Type, location, and adequacy of existing equipment and facilities. b. Adaptability of local military firefighting equipment.
3. Personnel.
a. Strength and mode of selection. b. Training status and efficiency. c. Names and political reliability of key personnel.
4. Miscellaneous.
a. Particular problems in certain areas, such as overcrowded cities, narrow streets, and local water pressure. b. Possible use of equipment in controlling riots and other public disasters.

## Vii. Economic Development.

A. General Conditions and Problems. B. Public Finance.
1. Organization.
a. National level. b. Other levels. c. Biographical sketches of key personnel.
2. Policies.
a. Fiscal and economic policies. b. Special conditions and policies. c. Accounting systems used.
3. Monetary System.
a. Currency. b. Reserves or backing of currency.
c. Issuing authorities. d. Stability of currency. e. Controls. f. Exchange rates. g. Government authorities. h. Other legal instruments of exchange. i. Other means of exchange, such as the black market.
4. Budgetary system and current budget.
a. Current budget.
b. Budgetary analysis. c. Governing authorities and controls. d. Analysis of budgetary procedures. e. Patterns of expenditure and distribution.
5. Sources of government income.
a. Analysis of taxation (amount of taxes collected, method of collection, and type of taxes). b. Formulation of tax policies. c. Investments. d. Other sources of government income.
6. Financial Institutions.
a. Banking institutions (facilities, location, capital, and credit policies). b. Investment institutions.
(1) Stock institutions. (2) Controlling authorities and control exercised. (3) Miscellaneous investment companies.
c. Insurance companies (number, size, and location).
d. Specialized savings institutions.
7. Foreign exchange (balance of trade, controls, and restrictions). 8. Applicable laws and regulations.
C. Economics and Commerce.
1. Description of economic system.
a. Private enterprise. b. Public enterprise. c. Biographical sketches of key officials and business leaders.
2. National economic policy and controls.
3. Goals and programs.

a. Short-range. b. Intermediate-range.
c. Long-range.

4. Summary of important trade agreements and extent of participation in world trade. 5. Resources.
a. Natural. b. Developed. c. Human. d. Self-sufficiency, dependency, substitution.
6. Extent of development.
a. Capabilities of infrastructure.
b. Capabilities of industry and power. c. Capabilities of agriculture. d. Capabilities of service sector.
7. Statistics.
a. Per capita (income, savings, consumer spending). b. Aggregate (gross national product, national income). c. Ratios (unemployment, productivity, occupations). d. Validity of statistics (when compiled).
8. Internal movement of goods. 9. Exports and imports.
a. Type. b. Quantity. c. Market. d. Influence.
10. Commerce.
a. Domestic trade.
(1) Wholesale and retail distribution system.
(2) Markets and fairs.
(3) Weights and measures standards. (4) Cooperatives and public markets.
b. Foreign trade.
(1) Principal items of export and import. (2) Tariff system, customs, duties. (3) Trade agreements. (4) Balance of payments.
11. Industries.
a. Location of main industrial centers.
b. Names of important companies. c. Labor (skills and distribution). d. Power sources and capacities.
e. Manufacturing industries. f. Types (machinery, chemical, textile). g. Locations (province, city). h. Processing industries (types, locations, and capacities).
12. Agencies, institutions, and programs.
a. Government organization. b. Trade associations and chambers of commerce. c. Laws governing commerce and industry. d. Subsidies and monopolies.
13. Price control and rationing.
a Stabilization.
b. Variation of prices. c. Control measures and techniques. d. Commodities under price control. e. Distribution.
(1) Essential commodities. (2) Imports and exports. (3) Ration controls. (4) Production and distribution.
(5) Effect on demands.
(6) Types and status of markets.
f. Control systems.
(1) Price-control program. (2) Rationing program. (3) Raw materials. (4) Financial.
g. Legislation.
(1) Price-control legislation and items subject to price control. (2) Rationing legislation and items subject to rationing.
D. Labor.
1. Organization.
a. National level. b. Other levels. c. Key personnel with biographical sketches.
2. Labor force.
a. Employment data and trends.
b. Available manpower and labor supply by special classes. c. Ages and distribution. d. Unemployment.
e. Labor productivity.
3. Agencies, institutions, and programs.
a. Government labor policy.
(1) Labor laws and working conditions. (2) Role of government. (3) Government job placement controls. (4) Wages and other incentives.
b. Labor organizations.
(1) Organizations (type, size, location, leadership, and political influence).
(2) Membership. (3) Relations with foreign or international labor organizations. (4) Total potential labor force (type, distribution, mobility, and ages).
c. Social insurance. d. Labor disputes, including mechanisms for settling.
4. Wages and standards, including hours and working conditions.

## Viii. Food And Agriculture.

A. General Conditions and Problems.
1. Importance of agriculture in total economy. 2. Extent of agricultural productivity and self-sufficiency. 3. Principal problems. 4. Attitude of farm population.
B. Agricultural Geography.
1. Locations of principal farm areas. 2. Types of soil. 3. Influence of climate and topography. 4. Types of crops.
5. Farm to market road net.
C. Agricultural Products and Processing.
1. Livestock and dairy products (types, amounts, methods of processing, refrigeration, warehousing). 2. Crops (types, amounts, methods of processing, storage). 3. Poultry (types, amounts, methods of processing, storage, refrigeration).
D. Agricultural Practices.
1. Extent of mechanization. 2. Improvement programs. 3. Conservation programs. 4. Pest and disease control.
E. Land-Holding System and Reform Programs.
F. Fisheries.

1. Commercial (number, companies, location, type of fish, type of crafts, fishing areas, methods of processing, storage, annual production). 2. Private (policy, rules, regulations, type of fish, fishing areas).
3. Restocking program. 4. Problem areas.

G. Forestry.

1. Reforestation program. 2. Importance of forestry to the country. 3. Forestry services or administration. 4. Hunting (controls, laws, regulations, and types of game). 5. Products and their processing.

H. Agencies, Institutions and Programs.

1. Government. 2. Private.

I. Food Products.

1. Type. 2. Quantity. 3. Processing. 4. Location, size, ownership of warehouses. 5. Types and quantity of food supplies stored.

J. Applicable Laws and Regulations Governing Food and Agriculture.

## Ix. Environmental Management.

A. General Conditions and Problems. B. Pollution Control and Environmental Management Organizations. C. Laws and Regulations. D. Sources of Pollution.

1. Air. 2. Water.
3. Soil.

E. Health Hazard.

1. Immediate and present threats. 2. Near-term. 3. Mid-term. 4. Long term.

## X. Public Health.

A. Organization.
1. National level. 2. Other levels. 3. Biographical sketches of key personnel.

B. General Conditions and Problems. C. Agencies and Institutions.
1. Hospitals.

a. Number. b. Capacity (number of beds). c. Location and condition of facilities.

2. Other medical facilities.
a. Public. b. Private.
D. Medical Personnel.
1. Numbers (doctors and nurses). 2. Location.
E. Medical Equipment and Supplies.
1. Surgical and dental equipment. 2. Testing equipment. 3. Drugs.
a. Availability. b. Shortages.
4. Other supplies.
F. Diseases.
1. Predominant types. 2. Control programs.
G. Environmental Sanitation.
1. Regulations governing food and drugs. 2. Water control and supply. 3. Disposal of sewage and waste.
H. Public Welfare.
1. Organization.

a. National level.
b. Other levels.
c. Biographical sketches of key personnel.

2. Major social problems.
a. Juvenile delinquency. b. Alcohol and narcotics abuse. c. Unemployment. d. Poverty and dependency.
3. Public assistance.
a. Basis upon which granted. b. Types of relief and medical care provided.
4. Agencies, institutions, and programs.
a. Social insurance. b. Health insurance.
c. Accident insurance. d. Old age, disability, and survivors' pensions. e. Unemployment. f. Family assistance. g. Other.
5. Welfare services (government and private).
a. Child welfare (adoption, maternal). b. Emergency and war relief. c. Relief and public assistance.
(1) For mentally and physically handicapped. (2) For aged and indigent.
6. Institutions.
a. Orphanages (number, location, and capacity). b. Homes for the aged (number, locations, and capacity). c. Physical therapy (number and location).
7. Programs.
a. Recreational. b. Vocational. c. Health. d. Child care.
8. Welfare personnel.
a. Professional standards. b. Volunteer assistance. c. Number available by type of organization.
9. Financial and legal.
a. Financial plan (how funds are obtained).
b. Laws and regulations.
c. Organizational structure.
10. Regulations governing public welfare.

## Xi. Public Transportation.

A. General Conditions and Problems. B. Rail Transport.
1. Railroad by type, gauge, and miles or kilometers. 2. Type, number, and condition of rolling stock. 3. Location of switchyards. 4. Major rail terminals (number, size, location, and condition).
C. Vehicular Transportation.
1. Road (type, condition, and miles or kilometers). 2. Street systems and condition.
3. Vehicles and public conveyances by type, number, and ownership.
D. Water Transportation.
1. Size, location, type, use, and ownership of all floating vessels. 2. Location of all port facilities and services. 3. Identification of sea routes. 4. Location and use of inland waterways.
E. Air Transportation.
1. Location, size, and use of all airfields. 2. Number, size, use, and ownership of all aircraft.
F. Pipelines. G. Travel.
1. Status of tourist travel. 2. Restrictions. 3. Regulations. 4. Volume by geographic area of people leaving and entering. 5. Items of general importance common to all transportation systems.
a. Ownership. b. Regulatory agencies and licenses. c. Financial structure. d. Administration. e. Operation and revenues. f. Maintenance. g. Trade associations. h. Personnel and labor relations.
6. Elements relative to each specific transport system in detail.
a. Location and mileage.
b. Condition.
c. Effect of seasonal variation. d. Special traffic hazards and problems.

## Xii. Public Works And Utilities.

A. General Conditions and Problems. B. Public Works.
1. Public buildings, including hospitals (use, size, and location). 2. Roads and streets. 3. Bridges. 4. Port facilities (harbors). 5. Airports and railroad terminals.

6. Mass housing. 7. Dams (flood control).

C. Public Utilities.
1. Power system, including nuclear reactors and power-generating plants and distribution systems. 2. Water system, including source dams, degree of pollution, filter plants, and ownership. 3. Gas works (size, location, source, and ownership). 4. Sewage-collection systems and disposal plants. 5. Radioactive waste, garbage, and refuse disposal. 6. Storm drainage systems. 7. Items of general importance to all public works and utilities.
a. Ownership.
b. Regulating and licensing agencies. c. Financial structure. d. Administration. e. Operations and revenues. f. Maintenance. g. Trade associations. h. Personnel and labor relations.
8. Elements relative to each specific public works or utility in detail.
a. Locations of plants, line systems, nets, and connecting grids. b. Condition. c. New construction requirements. d. Available resources for construction. e. Priority of usage.

## Xiii. Public Communications.

A. General Conditions and Problems. B. Postal System.
1. Extent and frequency of service.
a. Metropolitan. b. Rural.
2. Censorship. 3. Private carriers. 4. Parcel post service. 5. Other functions.
a. Postal savings. b. Money order service. c. Issuance of licenses. d. Tax information service.
C. Telephone.

1. Exchanges and local service. 2. Long-line systems and connecting grids.
3. Priority usage. 4. Censorship. 5. Private systems. 6. International and intercontinental wire and submarine cables.

D. Telegraph.

1. Exchanges and local service. 2. Long-line systems and connecting grids. 3. Priority usage. 4. Censorship.
5. Private systems. 6. International and intercontinental wire and submarine cables.

E. Radio and Television.
1. Transmitting stations (number, type, and location). 2. Channels, frequencies, and trunk lines. 3. Hours of operation. 4. Censorship. 5. Propaganda usage. 6. Foreign influence. 7. Foreign broadcasts. 8. Programming.
F. Applicable Laws Governing Communications Systems.

## Xiv. Public Education.

A. Organization.

1. National level. 2. Other levels (province, state, district). 3. Biographical sketches of key personnel.
4. Philosophy guiding the educational systems.

B. General Conditions and Problems.
1. General development of the area's educational system. 2. Requirements placed upon individuals. 3. Significant achievements in recent years. 4. Educational level of population.
C. Agencies, Institutions, and Programs.

1. Government agencies and policies. 2. Educational systems and facilities.

a. Administration and controls.
b. Preschool, kindergarten, and primary schools. c. Secondary schools. d. Vocational and special schools.
e. Higher education. f. Teacher education. g. Private schools. h. Adult education.
3. Evaluation of educational system. 4. Private and public organizations.
a. Influence and pressure groups. b. Youth organizations. c. Religious groups.
D. Influence of Politics on Education.

## Xv. Civil Information.

A. General Conditions, Problems, and Stage of Development.
1. Effect of geographic, social, economic, and political factors. 2. Reading, listening, viewing habits. 3. Rural-urban differences. 4. Anticommunist appeal. 5. International outlook. 6. Techniques to measure impact.
B. Newspapers, Periodicals, and Publishing Firms.

1. Name. 2. Location. 3. Ownership. 4. Circulation. 5. Publication. 6. Language. 7. Editorial policies (political persuasion).
8. Procedures.
9. Employees. 10. Equipment. 11. Sources of supply. 12. Revenue.

C. Miscellaneous Means of Communications.

1. Private printing facilities. 2. Advertising agencies. 3. Others.

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## Glossary Section 1 - Acronyms And Abbreviations

A
airborne
AAR
after action review
AASLT
air assault
AD3E
assess, decide, develop and detect, deliver, and evaluate
ADCON
administrative control
AFSOF
Air Forces special operations forces
AMEDD
Army Medical Department
ANG
Air National Guard
AO
area of operations
AOB
advanced operational base
AOC
area of consideration
AOR
area of responsibility
AR
Army regulation
ARNG
Army National Guard
ARSOF
Army special operations forces
ASCC
Army Service Component Command
ASCOPE
areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events
BCT
brigade combat team
bde
brigade
bn
battalion
C2
command and control
CA
Civil Affairs
CACOM
Civil Affairs command
CAO
Civil Affairs operations
CAPT
Civil Affairs planning team
CAT
Civil Affairs team
CAT-A
Civil Affairs team alpha
CBRNE
chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives
CCDR
combatant commander
CCIR
commander's critical information requirements
cdr
commander
CERP
commander's emergency response program
CHOP
change of operational control
CIG
civil information grid
CIM
civil information management
CIMIC
civil-military cooperation

## Glossary

CIV
civilian
CJ-9
combined joint civil-military officer
CJCMOTF
combined joint civil-military operations task force
CJCS
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJCSI
Chairmand of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction
CJSOTF-A
combined joint special opertions task force-Afghanistan
CJTF
commander, joint task force
CLAMO
Center for Law and Military Operations
CLT
civil liaison team
CM
consequence management
CMD
command
CMO
civil-military operations
CMOC
civil-military operations center
CMOWG
civil-military operations working group
co
company
COA
course of action
COCOM
combatant command (command authority)
COG
center of gravity
COL
colonel
COM
chief of mission
COMM
communications
COMMZ
communications zone
CONOPS
concept of operations
CONPLAN
concept plan
CONUS
continental United States
COP
common operational picture
CP
counterproliferation
CPA
coalition provisional authority
CR
civil reconnaissance
CrM
crisis management
CSO
civil support operations
CT
counterterrorism
D3A
decide, detect, deliver, and assess
DA
Department of the Army, direct action
DART
disaster assistance response team
DC
dislocated civilian
DCO
defense coordinating officer
det
detachment
DFT
deployment for training
DHS
Department of Homeland Security
DIME
diplomatic, informational, military, and economic
div
division
DJTFAC
deployable joint task force augmentation cell
DOD
Department of Defense
DOJ
Department of Justice
DOS
Department of State
DPG
Defense Planning Guidance
DRMO
Defense Reutilization and Marketing Office
DRU
direct reporting unit
DSCA
defense support to civil authorities
EAP
emergency action plan
EEFI
essential elements of friendly information
EMS
emergency medical services
FEMA
Federal Emergency Management Agency
FF
foreign fighter
FHA
foreign humanitarian assistance
FID
foreign internal defense
FM
field manual
FN
foreign nation
FOB
forward operational base
FP
force protection
FRAGO
fragmentary order
FRL
former regime elites
FUNCPLAN
functional plan
G-2
Deputy/Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
G-3
Deptuy/Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans
G-4
Deputy/Assistant Chief of Staff for Logistics
G-9
Deputy/Assistant Chief of Staff for Civil-Military Operations
GCC
geographic combatant commander
GIG
global information grid
GOA
Government of Afghanistan
HA
humanitarian assistance
HAZMAT
hazardous materials
HCA
humanitarian and civic assistance
HF
high frequency
HHC
headquarters and headquarters company
HMA
humanitarian mine action
HN
host nation
HNS
host-nation support
HPT
high-payoff target

## Glossary

HQ
headquarters
HSPD
Homeland Security Presidential Directive
IAW
in accordance with
ICRC
International Committee of the Red Cross
ID
identification
IDAD
internal defense and development
IDP
internally displaced person
IED
improvised explosive device
IFWG
intelligence fusion working group
IGO
intergovernmental organization
INS
Immigration and Naturalization Service
intel
intelligence
INTSUM
intelligence summary
IO
information operations
IOM
International Organization for Migration
IOWG
information operations working group
IPB
intelligence preparation of the battlefield
IPI
indigenous populations and institutions
IR
information requirement
IRR
initial response resource
ISOCA
integrated special operations communication assemblage
J-2
intelligence directorate of a joint staff
J-3
operations directorate of a joint staff
J-4
logistics directorate of a joint staff
J-7
operational plans and joint force development directorate of a joint staff
J-9
civil-military operations director of joint staff section
JAG
Judge Advocate General
JAGLCS
Judge Advocate General's Legal Center and School
JCMOTF
joint civil-military operations task force
JCS
Joint Chiefs of Staff
JDOMS
Joint Director of Military Support
JECB
joint effects-coordination board
JFC
joint force commander
JFLCC
joint force land component commander
JFSOC
joint force special operations component
JFSOCC
joint force special operations component commander
JIACG
joint interagency coordination group
JIMC
joint, interagency, multinational, and coalition
JOA
joint operations area
JOPES
Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
JP
joint publication
JPOTF
joint Psychological Operations task force
JSOA
joint special operations area
JSOTF
joint special operations task force
JTF
joint task force
JWFC
Joint Warfighting Center
KM
knowledge management
LAN
local area network
LCO
lesser contingency operation
LNO
liaison officer
LTC
lieutenant colonel
MAJ
major
MCA
military civic action
MCO
major combat operation
MDMP
military decision-making process
MEDRETE
medical readiness training exercise
METL
mission-essential task list
METT-TC
mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations
MI
military intelligence
MIL
military
MNFC
multinational force commander
MOE
measure of effectiveness
MOP
measure of performance
MP
military police
MSR
main supply route
MTOE
modified table of organization and equipment
MTT
mobile training team
NA
nation assistance
NAI
named area of interest
NAICS
North American Industry Classification System
NATO
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCO
noncommissioned officer
NEO
noncombatant evacuation operation
NGO
nongovernmental organization
NIMS
National Incident Management System
NLT
no later than
NMAA
national mine action authority
NRP
National Response Plan
o/o
on order
O&M
operation and maintenance

## Glossary

OAKOCC
obstacles, avenues of approach, key terrain, observation, cover, concealment
OCHA
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OFDA
Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
OGA
other government agency
OHDACA
Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Aid
OPCON
operational control
OPLAN
operation plan
opn
operation
OPORD
operation order
OPSEC
operations security
OPTEMPO
operational tempo
OSD
Office of the Secretary of Defense
OTH
over-the-horizon
PA
public affairs
PACOM
Pacific command
PAO
public affairs officer
POC
point of contact
POL
political
POLAD
political advisor
POTF
Psychological Operations task force
PRC
populace and resources control
PRT
provisional reconstruction team
PSYOP
Psychological Operations
PVO
private voluntary organization
R&S
reconnaissance and surveillance
RC
Reserve Component
RFI
request for information
RGB
Ranger battalion
RGR
Ranger
ROE
rules of engagement
RPG
rocket-propelled grenade
RSOI
reception, staging, onward movement, and integration
RSTA
reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition
RTF
response task force
RTL
restricted target list
S-2
intelligence officer
S-3
operations and training officer
S-4
logistics officer
S-7
information operations officer
S-9
civil-military operations officer
SA
security assistance
SAFE
selected area for evasion
SATCOM
satellite communications
SCA
support to civil administration
SecDef
Secretary of Defense
SF
Special Forces
SFC
sergeant first class
SFG(A)
Special Forces group (airborne)
SFOB
Special Forces operational base
SFOD
Special Forces operational detachment
SJA
Staff Judge Advocate
SME
subject-matter expert
SO
special operations
SOF
special operations forces
SOFA
status-of-forces agreement
SOMPF
special operations mission planning folder
SOP
standing operating procedure
SOR
statement of requirement
SOTSE
special operations theater support element
SR
special reconnaissance
SROLO
senior rule of law officer
std
standard
sust
sustainment
synch
synchronization
TACLAN
tactical local area network
TACON
tactical control
TDA
table of distribution and allowances
TOE
table of organization and equipment
TSCP
theater security cooperation plan
TSOC
theater special operations command
TTP
tactics, techniques, and procedures
TV
television
UN
United Nations
UNHCR
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
U.S.
United States
USACAPOC
United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command
USAID
United States Agency for International Development
USAJFKSWCS
United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School
USAR
United States Army Reserve
USASOC
United States Army Special Operations Command

## Glossary

USC
United States Code
USCENTCOM
United States Central Command
USDA
United States Department of Agriculture
USEUCOM
United States European Command
USG
United States Government
USNORTHCOM
United States Northern Command
USPACOM
United States Pacific Command
USSOCOM
United States Special Operations Command
USSOUTHCOM
United States Southern Command
UW
unconventional warfare
VBIED
vehicle-borne improvised explosive device
WAN
wide area network
WHO
World Health Organization
WMD
weapons of mass destruction
WWW
world wide web

## Section Ii - Terms Antiterrorism

Defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, to include limited response and containment by local military forces. (JP 1-02)

## Area Assessment

The commander's prescribed collection of specific information that commences upon employment and is a continuous operation. It confirms, corrects, refutes, or adds to previous intelligence acquired from area studies and other sources prior to employment. (JP 1-02)

## Centers Of Gravity

Those characteristics, capabilities, or sources of power from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight. Also known as COG. (JP 3-0)

## Civil Administration

An administration established by a foreign government in (1) friendly territory, under an agreement with the government of the area concerned, to exercise certain authority normally the function of the local government; or (2) hostile territory, occupied by United States forces, where a foreign government exercises executive, legislative, and judicial authority until an indigenous civil government can be established. (JP 1-02)

## Civil Affairs

Designated Active and Reserve component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct Civil Affairs operations and to support civil-military operations. Also known as CA. (JP 3-57)

## Civil Affairs Operations

Those military operations planned, supported, executed, or transitioned by Civil Affairs forces through, with, or by the indigenous population and institutions, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, or other governmental agencies to modify behaviors, to mitigate or defeat threats to civil society, and to assist in establishing the capacity for deterring or defeating future civil threats in support of civil-military operations or other United Statess objectives. Also known as CAO.

## Civil Assistance

Assistance, based on a commander's decision, in which life-sustaining services are provided, order is maintained, and/or goods and services are distribtued within the commander's assigned area of operations.

## Civil Information

Information developed from data with relation to civil areas, structures, capabilities, organization, people, and events within the civil component of the commander's operational environment that can be fused or processed to increase Department of Defense/Interagency/intergovernmental organizations/nongovernmental organizations/indigenous populations and institutions situational awareness, situational understanding, or situational dominance.

## Civil Information Grid

Grid that provides the capability to coordinate, collaborate, and communicate to develop the civil components of the common operational picture. The civil information grid increases the situational understanding for the supported commander by vertically and horizontally integrating the technical lines of communication. This framework links every Civil Affairs Soldier as a sensor and consumer to the civil information management cell of the civil-military operations center and the civil-military operations cell. Also known as CIG.

## Civil Information Management

Process whereby civil information is collected, entered into a central database, and internally fused with the supported element, higher headquarters, other United States Government and Departement of Defense agencies, intergovernmental organizations, and nongovernmental organizations to ensure the timely availability of information for analysis and the widest possible dissemination of the raw and analyzed civil information to military and nonmilitary partners throughout the area of operations. Also known as CIM.

## Civil Liaison Team

Provides limited civil-military interface capability as a spoke for the exchange of information between indigenous populations and institutions, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and other governmental agencies, and has limited capability to link resources to prioritized requirements. The civil liaison team is a stand-alone team for the civil-military operations center. It provides the supported level civil-military operations center with a storefront for Civil Affairs operations and civil-military operations coordination capability without interfering with the regular staff functions. Also known as CLT.

## Civil-Military Operations

The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operation to consolidate and achieve operational United States objectives. Civil-military operations may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civilmilitary operations may be performed by designated Civil Affairs, by other military forces, or by a combination of Civil Affairs and other forces. Also known as CMO. (JP 3-57)

## Glossary Civil-Military Operations Center

A standing capability formed by all Civil Affairs units from the company level to the Civil Affairs command levels that serves as the primary coordination interface for the United States armed forces among indigenous populations and institutions, humanitarian organizations, intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, multinational military forces, and other civilian agencies of the United States Government. Also known as CMOC.

## Civil Reconnaissance

A targeted, planned, and coordinated observation and evaluation of those specific civil aspects of the environment. Civil reconnaissance focuses specifically on the civil component, the elements of which are best represented by the mnemonic ASCOPE: areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events. Civil reconnaissance can be conducted by Civil Affairs or by other forces, as required. Also known as CR.

## Civil Support Operations

Those activities and measures taken by the Department of Defense to foster mutual assistance and support between the Department of Defense and any United State civil government agency in planning or preparedness for, or in application of resources for response to, the consequences of civil emergencies or attacks, including national security emergencies. Also known as CSO.

## Combined Command

A unification of two or more forces or agencies of two or more allies. When all allies or services are not involved, the participating nations and services shall be identified; for example, combined navies.

## Consequence Management

Those measures taken to protect public health and safety, restore essential government services, and provide emergency relief to governments, businesses, and individuals affected by the consequences of a chemical, biological, nuclear, and/or high-yield explosive situation. For domestic consequence management, the primary authority rests with the States to respond and the Federal Government to provide assistance as required. Also known as CM. (JP 3-0)

## Counterterrorism

Those operations that include the offensive measures to prevent, deter, preempt, and respond to terrorism. Also known as CT.

## Decide, Detect, Deliver, And Assess

Civil-military operations targeting process methodology that provide a standard method for staff integration and ensures that the maximum effect of civil-military operations is realized.

## Defense Support To Civil Authorities

Department of Defense support, including federal military forces, Department of Defense civilians and Department of Defense contractor personnel, and Department of Defense agencies and components, for domestic emergencies and for designated law enforcement and other activities. Also known as DSCA. (National Response Plan, December 2004)

## Deployable Joint Task Force Augmentation Cell

A combatant commander's asset composed of personnel from the regional combatant commander's staff and component representatives. The members represent a multi-Service, multi-disciplined group of planners and operators who operationally report to the regional combatant commander's Operation Directorate until deployed to a joint task force. A cell can be tailored to meet the needs of a commander, joint task force, and deploy within 48 hours from notification. Members can also act as liaison officers between the regional combatant commander and the joint task force. Also known as DJTFAC.

## Developmental Assistance

Long-range programs to develop the infrastructure of a nation and aid in social and economic progress.

## Directed Policy Aims

President of the United States objectives that state a desired national end state relevant to the operation at hand. (JWFC Doctrine Pamphlet 7)

## Effect

The physical and/or behavioral state of civil areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events or a political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure system that results from a military or nonmilitary action or set of actions.

## Force Protection

Actions taken to prevent or mitigate hostile actions against Department of Defense personnel (to include family members), resources, facilities, and critical information. These actions conserve the force's fighting potential so it can be applied at the decisive time and place and incorparate the coordinated and synchronized offensive and defensive measures to enable the effective employment of the joint force while degrading opportunities for the enemy. Force protection does not include actions to defeat the enemy or protect against accidents, weather, or disease. (JP 1-02)

## Foreign Humanitarian Assistance

Programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. Foreign humanitarian assistance provided by United States forces is limited in scope and duration. The foreign assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing foreign humanitarian assistance. Foreign humanitarian assistance operations are those conducted outside the United States, its territories, and possessions. Also known as FHA. (JP 3-07.6)

## Foreign Internal Defense

Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. Also known as FID. (JP 1-02)

## Hostile Environment

Operational environment in which hostile forces have control as well as the intent and capability to effectively oppose or react to the operations a unit intends to conduct. See also operational environment. (JP 1-02).

## Host Nation

A nation that receives the forces and supplies of allied nations or North Atlantic Treaty Organization to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory. Also known as HN.

## Host-Nation Support

Civil and/or military assistance rendered by a nation to foreign forces within its territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. Also known as HNS. (JP 1-02)

## Humanitarian And Civic Assistance

Assistance to the local populace provided by predominantly United States forces in conjunction with military operations and exercises. This assistance is specifically authorized by 10 USC 401, and funded under separate authorities. Assistance provided under these provisions is limited to (1) medical, dental, and veterinary care provided in rural areas of a country; (2) construction of rudimentary surface

## Glossary

transportation systems; (3) well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities; and (4) rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities. Assistance must fulfill unit training requirements that incidentally create humanitarian benefit to the local populace. Also known as HCA. (JP 1-02)

## Information Superiority

The operational advantage derived from the ability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary's ability to do the same. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.) (JP 3-13)

## Instrument Of Power

All ways and meansdiplomatic, informational, military, economic, and othersavailable to the President to influence the operational environment. (JWFC Doctrine Pamphlet 7)

## Insurgency

An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict. (JP 1-02)

## Integrated Application

The harmonized operation that results from an adaptable effects-based planning, execution, and assessment process. (JWFC Doctrine Pamphlet 7).

## Internal Defense And Development

The full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. It focuses on building viable institutions (political, economic, social, and military) that respond to the needs of society. Also known as IDAD. (JP 1-02)

## Internally Displaced Person

Any person who has left their residence by reason of real or imagined danger but has not left the territory of their own country. (JP 1-02)

## Joint Task Force

A joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a subunified commander, or an existing joint task force commander. Also known as JTF. (JP 1-02)

## Knowledge Management

Techniques and procedures that encompass the processes and databases to integrate and synchronize the command and staff activity to generate supporting information and directives such as the effects tasking order, and operational reports. Also known as KM.

## Links

The behavioral, physical, or functional relationship between the nodes.

## Measure Of Effectiveness

Tool used to measure results achieved in the overall mission and execution of assigned tasks. Measures of effectiveness are a prerequisite to the performance of combat assessment. Also known as MOE. (JP 1-02)

## Measure Of Performance

Focus on task accomplishment by answering the question, was the task or action performed as the commander intended? Also known as MOP.

## Military Civic Action

The use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects useful to the local population at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and others contributing to economic and social development, which would also serve to improve the standing of the military forces with the population. (United States forces may at times advise or engage in military civic actions in overseas areas.) (JP 1-02)

## Military Information Environment

The environment contained within the global information environment, consisting of information systems and organizationsfriendly and adversary, military and nonmilitarythat support, enable, or significantly influence a specific military operation.

## Mobile Traning Team

A team consisting of one or more Unites States military or civilian personnel sent on temporary duty, often to a foreign nation, to give instruction. The mission of the team is to train indigenous personnel to operate, maintain, and employ weapons and support systems, or to develop a self-training capability in a particular skill. The Secretary of Defense may direct a team to train either military or civilian indigenous personnel, depending upon host-nation requests. (JP 1-02)

## Operational Environment

A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of military forces and bear on the decisions of the unit commander. (JP 1-02)

## Over-The-Horizon

Using atmospheric reflection and/or refraction phenomena to extend its range of detection beyond line-of-sight.

## Permissive Environment

Operational environment in which host country military and law enforcement agencies have control as well as the intent and capability to assist operations that a unit intends to conduct.

## Priority Intelligence Requirements

Those intelligence requirements for which a commander has an anticipated and stated priority in the task of planning and decision making.

## Psychological Operations

Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of Psychological Operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives. Also known as PSYOP. (JP 1-02)

## Reachback

The concept of connecting back to home station's infrastructure through communications systems.

## Rear Area

For any particular command, the area extending forward from its rear boundary to the rear of the area of responsibility of the next-lower level of command. This area is provided primarily for the performance of combat service support functions.

## Rear Battle

Those actions, including area damage control, taken by all units (combat, combat support, combat service support, and host nation) singly or in a combined effort, to secure the force, neutralize or defeat enemy operations in the rear area, and ensure freedom of action in the deep and close battles.

## Glossary Refugee

A person who, by reason of real or imagined danger, has left their home country or country of their nationality and is unwilling or unable to return.

## Response Management Team

United States Agency for International Development/ Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance's support cell in Washington, D.C., that manages response activities and coordinates interagency cooperation during foreign disasters when a disaster assistance response team is deployed to the field. Also known as RMT.

## Risk Management

The process of identifying, assessing, and controlling risks arising from operational factors and making decisions that balance risk cost with mission benefits. Also known as RM. (JP 1-02)

## Security Assistance

Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. Also known as SA. (JP 1-02)

## Security Assistance Organization

All Department of Defense elements located in a foreign country with assigned responsibilities for carrying out security assistance management functions. It includes military assistance advisory groups, military missions and groups, offices of defense and military cooperation, liaison groups, and defense attache personnel designated to perform security assistance functions. Also known as SAO. (JP 1-02)

## Selected Area For Evasion

A designated area in hostile territory that offers evaders or escapees a reasonable chance of avoiding capture and of surviving until they can be evacuated. Also called SAFE. (JP 1-02)

## Special Operations

Operations conducted by specially organized, trained, and equipped military and paramilitary forces to achieve military, political, economic, or informational objectives by unconventional military means in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas. These operations are conducted across full spectrum operations, independently or in coordination with operations of conventional, non-special operations forces. Politico-military considerations frequently shape special operations, requiring clandestine, covert, or low-visibility techniques and oversight at the national level. Special operations differ from conventional operations in degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets. Also known as SO. (JP 1-02)

## Specified Command

A command that has a broad, continuing mission, normally functional, and is established and so designated by the President through the Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It normally is composed of forces from a single Military Department. Also called specified combatant command. (JP 1-02)

## Support To Civil Administration

Assistance given by U.S. armed forces to friendly or neutral foreign civilian governments or government agencies. Also known as SCA.

## System

A functionally, physically, and/or behaviorally related group of elements that interact together as a whole. (JWFC Doctrine Pamphlet 7)

## Terrorism

The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological. (JP 1-02)

## Threat

The ability of an enemy or potential enemy to limit, neutralize, or destroy the effectiveness of a current or projected mission, organization, or item of equipment. (TRADOC Reg 381-1)

## Uncertain Environment

Operational environment in which host government forces, whether opposed to or receptive to operations that a unit intends to conduct, do not have totally effective control of the territory and population in the intended operational area.

## Unconventional Warfare

A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes, but is not limited to, guerrilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and unconventaionl assisted recovery. Also known as UW. (JP 1-02)

## Unified Command

A command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander and composed of significant assigned components of two or more Military Departments, that is established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Also called unified combatant command. (JP 1-02)

## U.S. Country Team

The senior in-country United States coordinating and supervising body, headed by the chief of the United States diplomatic mission, usually an ambassador, and composed of the senior member of each represented United States department or agency provided by United States forces.

This page intentionally left blank.

## References Sources Used These Are The Sources Quoted Or Paraphrased In This Publication.

CJCSI 3214.01A, *Military Support to Foreign Consequence Management Operations*, 1 April 2003 DOD Directive 2205.2, Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA) Provided in Conjunction with Military Operations, 6 October 1994
DOD Directive 3025.1-M, *DOD Manual for Civil Emergencies*, 2 June 1994 DOD Directive 5525.5, *DOD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials*, 15 January 1986, with change 1, 20 December 1989
Executive Order 12148, *Federal Emergency Management*, 20 July 1979 Executive Order 12656, *Assignment of Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities*, 18 November 1988 Executive Order 12966, *Foreign Disaster Assistance*, 14 July 1995
FM 1, *The Army*, 14 June 2005 FM 1-02, *Operational Terms and Graphics*, 21 September 2004 FM 3-0, *Operations*, 14 June 2001 FM 3-05.30, *Psychological Operations*, 15 April 2005 FM 3-05.104, *Army Special Operations Forces Noncombatant Evacuation Operations*,
2 February 2004
FM 3-05.201, *Special Forces Unconventional Warfare Operations*, 30 April 2003 FM 3-05.301, *Psychological Operations Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*, 31 December 2003 FM 3-05.401, *Civil Affairs Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*, 23 September 2003 FM 3-07, *Stability Operations and Support Operations*, 20 February 2003 FM 3-11.21, Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Aspects of Consequence Management, 12 December 2001
FM 3-13, *Information Operations: Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*, 28 November 2003 FM 3-19.1, *Military Police Operations*, 22 March 2001
FM 3-19.40, *Military Police Internment/Resettlement Operations (FM 19-40)*, 1 August 2001
FM 3-90, *Tactics*, 4 July 2001 FM 5-0, *Army Planning and Orders Production*, 20 January 2005
FM 100-17-3, *Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration*, 17 March 1999 FM 6-0, *Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces*, 11 August 2003 FM 31-20-3, *Foreign Internal Defense Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Special Forces*,
20 September 1994
FM 31-20-5, *Special Reconnaissance Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Special Forces*,
23 March 1993
Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5, *Management of Domestic Incidents*, 28 February 2003 JP 1-02, *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, 12 April 2001, as amended through
14 April 2006
JP 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, 10 September 2001 JP 3-05, *Doctrine for Joint Special Operations*, 17 December 2003
JP 3-07.1, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID)*,
30 April 2004

## References

JP 3-07.5, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Noncombatant Evacuation Operations*,
30 September 1997
JP 3-07.6, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance*,
15 August 2001
JP 3-13, *Information Operations*, 13 February 2006 JP 3-16, *Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations*, 5 April 2000 JP 3-26, *Homeland Security*, 2 August 2005 JP 3-35, *Joint Deployment and Redeployment Operations*, 7 September 1999 JP 3-53, *Joint Doctrine for Psychological Operations*, 5 September 2003 JP 3-57, *Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations*, 8 February 2001 JP 3-57.1, *Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs*, 14 April 2003
JP 4-05, *Joint Mobilization Planning*, 11 January 2006 JP 5-0, *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations*, 13 April 1995 JP 5-00.2, *Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures*, 13 January 1999 JWFC Doctrine Pamphlet 5, Operational Implications of the Collaborative Information Environment
(CIE), 1 June 2004
JWFC Doctrine Pamphlet 7, *Operational Implications of Effects-based Operations (EBO)*,
17 November 2004
USASOC Directive 525-13, *Force Protection (FOUO)*, 1 October 1997 10 USC 166A, Combatant Command Budgets 10 USC 401, Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Provided in Conjunction With Military Operations 10 USC 402, Transportation of Humanitarian Relief Supplies to Foreign Countries 10 USC 404, Foreign Disaster Assistance
10 USC 2557, Excess Nonlethal Supplies: Availability for Homeless Veteran Initiatives and
Humanitarian Relief
10 USC 2561, Humanitarian Assistance 10 USC 3037, Judge Advocate General, Assistant Judge Advocate General, and General Officers of
Judge Advocate General's Corps: Appointment; Duties
22 USC 2291-2292k, Foreign Assistance 31 USC 1301(a), Appropriation and Reappropriation of Federal Monies

## Readings Recommended These Sources Contain Relevant Supplemental Information.

AR 12-1, Security Assistance, International Logistics, Training, and Technical Assistance Support,
Policy and Responsibilities, 24 January 2000
AR 12-7, *Security Assistance Teams*, 15 June 1998 AR 12-15, *Joint Security Assistance Training (JSAT),* 5 June 2000 AR 25-52, *Authorized Abbreviations, Brevity Codes, and Acronyms*, 4 January 2005 AR 27-1, *Legal Services, Judge Advocate Legal Services*, 30 September 1996 AR 27-50, *Status of Forces Policies, Procedures, and Information*, 15 December 1989 AR 71-32, *Force Development and DocumentationConsolidated Policies*, 3 March 1997 AR 135-210, Order to Active Duty as Individuals for Other Than a Presidential Selected Reserve
Call-Up, Partial or Full Mobilization, 17 September 1999
AR 190-8, *Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees and Other Detainees*,
1 October 1997
AR 360-1, *The Army Public Affairs Program*, 15 September 2000
AR 500-5, *Army Mobilization*, 7 June 1996 AR 550-1, *Processing Requests for Political Asylum and Temporary Refuge*, 21 June 2004 AR 570-9, *Host Nation Support*, 29 March 2006
AR 600-8-1, *Army Casualty Program*, 7 April 2006
AR 600-20, *Army Command Policy*, 1 February 2006 CJCSI 3207.01A, *Military Support to Humanitarian Mine Action Operations*, 24 January 2005 DA Form 2028, Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms DA Pamphlet 25-30, *Consolidated Index of Army Publications and Blank Forms*, 1 April 2006
DA Pamphlet 27-1, *Treaties Governing Land Warfare*, 7 December 1956
DOD Directive 2000.13, *Civil Affairs*, 27 June 1994 DOD Directive 3025.1, *Military Support to Civil Authorities*, 15 January 1993
DOD Directive 3025.15, *Military Assistance to Civil Authorities*, 18 February 1997
DOD Directive 5100.46, *Foreign Disaster Relief*, 4 December 1975 DOD Directive 5500.7-R, *The Joint Ethics Regulation (JER)*, 30 August 1993, with changes 16,
23 March 2006
DOD Directive 5530.3, *International Agreements*, 11 June 1987, with change 1, 18 February 1991
Field Operations Guide (FOG) For Disaster Assessment and Response, Version 3.0; United States Agency for International Development/Bureau for Humanitarian Response/Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (USAID/OFDA), August 1998
FORSCOM Regulation 500-3-3, FORSCOM Mobilization and Deployment Planning System
(FORMDEPS), Volume III, Reserve Component Unit Commander's Handbook (RCUCH),
15 July 1999
FM 2-0, *Intelligence*, 17 May 2004 FM 3-05.20, *Special Forces Operations*, 26 June 2001 FM 3-05.70, *Survival*, 17 May 2002
FM 3-05.71, *(CFRD) Resistance and Escape (U) (FM 21-78)*, 7 September 2001
FM 3-07.31, Peace Operations, Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Conducting Peace Operations, 26 October 2003
FM 3-19.30, *Physical Security (FM 19-30)*, 8 January 2001
FM 4-0, *Combat Service Support*, 29 August 2003 FM 4-01.30, *Movement Control*, 1 September 2003 FM 8-42, *Combat Health Support in Stability Operations and Support Operations*, 27 October 1997
FM 8-55, *Planning for Health Service Support*, 9 September 1994
FM 27-1, *Legal Guide for Commanders*, 13 January 1992
FM 27-10, *The Law of Land Warfare*, 15 July 1976 FM 34-130, *Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield*, 8 July 1994 FM 63-1, *Support Battalions and Squadrons, Separate Brigades and Armored Calvary Regiment*,

30 September 1993, with change 1, 20 September 1994
FM 63-2, *Division Support Command, Armored, Infantry, and Mechanized Infantry Divisions*,
20 May 1991
FM 63-3, *Corps Support Command*, 30 September 1993
FM 71-100, *Division Operations,* 28 August 1996 FM 100-8, *The Army in Multinational Operations*, 24 November 1997 FM 100-25, *Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces*, 1 August 1999

## References

JP 2-03, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Geospatial Information and Services Support
to Joint Operations, 31 March 1999
JP 3-05.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Special Operations Task Force
Operations, 19 December 2001
JP 3-05.2, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Special Operations Targeting and Mission
Planning, 21 May 2003
JP 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*, 16 June 1995 JP 3-07.3, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations*, 12 February 1999 JP 3-07.4, *Joint Counterdrug Operations*, 17 February 1998 JP 3-08, Interagency Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization
Coordination During Joint Operations, *Volume I*, 17 March 2006
JP 3-08, Interagency Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization
Coordination During Joint Operations, *Volume II,* 17 March 2006
JP 3-60, *Joint Doctrine for Targeting*, 17 January 2002 JP 4-05.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Manpower Mobilization and Demobilization
Operations: Reserve Component (RC) Callup, 11 November 1998
MCWP 3-33.1, *Marine Air-Ground Task Force Civil-Military Operations*, 7 April 2003
Presidential Decision Directive39, *Counterterrorism Policy*, 21 June 1995
Presidential Decision Directive62, *Combating Terrorism*, 22 May 1998
Public Law 87-195, *Foreign Assistance Act of 1961*, Amended 7 May 2003
Public Law 99-433, *The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986*,
1 October 1986
Public Law 107-296, 116 Statute 2135, *Homeland Security Act of 2002*, 25 November 2002
Public Law 108-12, *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004*, 22 April 2003 Public Law 108-195, 117 Statute 2892, *Defense Production Act Reauthorization of 2003*,
19 December 2003
Public Law 288, 88 Statute 143 (1974) (codified at 42 U.S.C., Section 5121-5206), The Robert E.
Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act of 2002
STANAG 2067, *Control and Return of Stragglers*, 10 June 1987
STANAG 2101, *Establishing Liaison*, 15 May 2001 STANAG 2103, Reporting Nuclear Detonations, Biological and Chemical Attacks, and Predicting

and Warning of Associated Hazards and Hazard Areas, 31 August 2000
STANAG 2113, *Denial of a Unit's Military Equipment and Supplies to an Enemy*, 10 October 1995 STANAG 2149, *Intelligence Requests*, 22 March 1994 STANAG 6001, *Language Proficiency Levels*, 21 October 1976
STANAG 6002, *Principles and Procedures for the Conduct and Financing of Training Assistance*,
22 February 1989
10 USC, *Armed Forces*, 26 January 1998
10 USC 382, Emergency Situations Involving Chemical or Biological Weapons of Mass Destruction 18 USC 831, Emergencies Involving Nuclear Materials 18 USC 1385, Use of Army and Air Force as Posse Comitatus 31 USC 1535-1536, The Economy Act of 2002
50 USC 1601-1651, The National Emergencies Act of 2003 Army Campaign Plan, 12 April 2004 National Defense Plan, December 2004
National Military Strategy: A Strategy for Today; A Vision for Tomorrow, February 2004
Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations. *National Defense University*, April 2004
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Handbook for Emergencies, 6 May 2003
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status, January 1992
WORLD WIDE WEB
The following web sites provide information useful in CMO staff planning:
Adminet http://www.adminet.com/min/def African National Congress http://www.anc.org.za/ AirForceLink http://www.af.mil Air University http://www.au.af.mil/ Air and Space Power Journal http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apje.html American Universities http://www.clas.ufl.edu/au Associated Press (Trib.Com) http://www.trib.com/
Association of the United States Army http://www.ausa.org/ The Atlantic Monthly http://www2.theAtlantic.com/ Australian Defence Force Academy http://www.adfa.oz.au/ Bosnia Link http://www.dtic.mil/bosnia/ British American Security Information Council (BASIC) http://basicint.org/
Cable News Network http://www.cnn.com/ The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies http://www.ciss.ca/
Carter Center http://www.cartercenter.org/ CATO Institute http://www.cato.org/home.html Center for Army Lessons Learned http://call.army.mil/call.html Center for Defense Information http://www.cdi.org/ Center for International Security and Cooperation http://cisac.stanford.edu/
Center for Nonproliferation Studies http://cns.miis.edu/ Center for Security Studies http://www.fsk.ethz.ch/index_EN
Center for Strategic and International Studies http://www.csis.org/
Central Intelligence Agency http://www.odci.gov/ Country Studies http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/cshome.html Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency http://www.darpa.mil/
Defense Intelligence Agency http://www.dia.mil/
Europa http://www.europa.eu.int George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies http://www.marshallcenter.org Go http://infoseek.go.com/ GPO [Government Printing Office] Access http://www.gpoaccess.gov/
House Armed Services Committee http://www.house.gov./hasc Information Warfare and Information Security on the Web http://www.fas.org/irp/wwwinfo.html Institute for National Strategic Studies http://www.ndu.edu/inss/insshp.html Institute for the Advanced Study of Information Warfare http://www.psycom.net/iwar.1.html International Military Ethics Symposium http://www.usafa.af.mil/jscope/ Internet Resources Newsletter http://www.hw.ac.uk/libWWW/irn/irn.html

## References

Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies http://www.tau.ac.il/jcss/ Jane's IntelWeb http://intelweb.janes.com/ JCSLink http://www.jcs.mil
John F. Kennedy School of Government http://ksgwww.harvard.edu/
Joint Forces Staff College http://www.jfsc.ndu.edu Lycos http://www.lycos.com/ Military Spending Working Group http://www.fas.org/pub/gen/mswg National Defense University http://www.ndu.edu/
National Public Radio http://www.npr.org/
National Security Agency http://www.fas.org/irp/nsa/ National Technical Information Service http://www.ntis.gov North Atlantic Treaty Organization http://www.nato.int/ Naval Postgraduate School http://www.nps.navy.mil/ Naval War College http://www.nwc.navy.mil Netsurfer Digest http://www.netsurf.com/nsd/ New American Studies Web http://georgetown.edu/crossroads/asw Centre for Strategic Studies New Zealand http://www.vuw.ac.nz/css Organization of American States http://www.oas.org/ Parameters http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/ Project on Defense Alternatives http://www.comw.org/pda
RAND Corporation http://www.rand.org/
Starting Point http://www.stpt.com/ The Henry L. Stimson Center http://www.stimson.org The Internet Sleuth http://www.isleuth.com/
The Library of Congress http://www.loc.gov/
The National Endowment for Democracy http://www.ned.org/ The New York Times http://www.nytimes.com/ The White House http://www.whitehouse.gov/ The World Bank http://www.worldbank.org Thomas (The Library of Congress) http://thomas.loc.gov
Defense (UK Ministry of Defense) http://www.mod.uk Unified Command Plan (United States Department of Defense)
http://www.defenselink.mil/specials/unifiedcommand/
United Nations http://www.un.org United States Agency for International Development (includes OFDA);
http://www.usaid.gov/index.html United States Army http://www.army.mil/ United States Army War College at Carlisle Barracks http://carlisle-www.army.mil/ United States Code and Statutes (Find Law) http://www.findlaw.com/casecode/uscodes/ United States Department of Defense http://www.defenselink.mil United States Marine Corps http://www.usmc.mil/ United States Military Academy at West Point http://www.usma.edu/ USA Today http://www.usatoday.com/ U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command http://www-tradoc.army.mil/
U.S. Department of State http://www.state.gov U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services Committee http://armed-services.senate.gov UTA Department of Modern Languages http://langlab.uta.edu
Web Crawler http://webcrawler.com/ World News Connection http://wnc.fedworld.gov/ Yahoo http://www.yahoo.com This page intentionally left blank.

## Index A

2-7, 2-10, 2-18, 2-20, 2-27,
2-29 and 2-30, 3-22
Civil Affairs planning team
Active Army, 1-3, 1-7, 1-9, 2-1,
2-16 through 2-18, 2-20 through 2-24, 2-26 and 2-27, 2-32, 2-34, 3-6, 3-9, 3-20, 3-24
(CAPT), 1-3, 1-6, 2-3 and
2-4, 2-16 through 2-22, 2-27, 2-30, 2-32 and 2-33, 3-1, 3-5, B-2
Civil Affairs team (CAT), 2-5
area assessment, 2-24, 2-27,
2-34 through 2-37, B-4, D-1
2-23 and 2-24, 2-32
area study, 3-31, C-1, D-1
through D-23
areas, structures, capabilities,
organizations, people, events (ASCOPE), 1-4 and 1-5, 3-18, 3-35, 4-2 through 4-8, B-1, B-4, C-1
civil information grid (CIG), 2-5 and 2-6, 3-18, 3-20, 4-8
civil information management
(CIM), 1-2, 1-5, 1-8, 2-3 through 2-6, 2-16, 2-18 through 2-21, 3-18 through 3-20, 3-30, 3-37, 4-2, 4-6 through 4-8
civil liaison team (CLT), 1-6,
1-11, 2-4 through 2-6, 2-15 through 2-19, 2-21 and 2-22
Army Special Component
Command (ASCC), v, 2-4, 2-15, 2-17, 2-26 and 2-27, 2-29 and 2-30, 2-36 and 2-37, 3-20, 3-22
Army Special Operations
Forces (ARSOF), 2-26, 2-29,
3-32 and 3-33, 3-38

## C

civil administration
in friendly territory, 3-17 in occupied territory, 3-17
Civil Affairs
civil-military operations (CMO)
annex, 1-11, 2-30, 3-6, 4-2, B-1 through B-6, C-1, C-4 through C-7 estimate, 1-11, 3-38, B-1 through B-6, C-1, C-3 staff organization, 2-33 through 2-35 support to full spectrum, 1-4, 3-19 through 3-26
working group (CMOWG),
4-11
civil-military operations center
(CMOC), 1-3, 1-5, 1-6, 1-11, 2-2 through 2-6, 2-15 through 2-23, 2-31 and 2-32, 3-10, 3-18, 3-20 and 3-22, 3-27, 3-30, 4-2, 4-6, 4-11, A-3, C-2, C-4
civil reconnaissance (CR),
1-11, 2-22 and 2-23, 2-31, 3-18 through 3-20, 4-2, 4-7 and 4-8
civil support operations (CSO),
1-5, 3-6 and 3-7, 3-23 through 3-27

coalition forces, 1-3
combatant command
  (COCOM), 2-1, 2-4, 2-25
  and 2-26, 2-28, 2-33

battalion (Active Army), 2-20
through 2-23
battalion (USAR), 2-18
through 2-20, 2-22 and 2-23
brigade (Active Army), 2-17
through 2-18
brigade (USAR), 2-15
through 2-16
characteristics, 1-11
common skill sets, 1-7 and
1-8
company, 2-22 and 2-23,
2-32
generalists, 1-7 and 1-8
in joint operations, 1-12,
2-27 and 2-28, 2-30, 4-1
methodology, 4-1 through
4-3
operations, v, 3-29
Soldiers, 1-2 through 1-4,
1-6 through 1-8, 1-11 and
1-12, 2-7, 3-4, 3-14, 3-40,
4-1 and 4-2, 4-4

combatant commander, 1-5
  through 1-7, 2-25, 2-27,
  2-36, 3-5, 3-13, 3-15, 4-6

Civil Affairs Command
(CACOM), 1-9, 2-1 through

command and control (C2),
  1-11, 2-3, 2-15 through 2-19,
  2-21 through 2-25, 2-27, 3-9,
  3-25, 3-29, 3-32

consequence management
  (CM), 3-9 through 3-11,
  3-23, 3-25 and 3-26, 3-39

core tasks

ARSOF, 3-33
CA, 1-2 through 1-4, 3-1 and
3-2, 3-27 and 3-28

counterproliferation (CP), 3-32,
  3-39

counterterrorism (CT), 3-32,
  3-38

Country Team, 2-27, 3-5, 3-13,
3-15

## D

de minimis, 3-13, 3-15 and
3-16
Department of Defense (DOD),
2-5 and 2-6, 3-4 through 3-8, 3-12 through 3-15, 3-18, 3-23 through 3-26, 3-29, 4-5
Department of Justice (DOJ),
2-8, 2-25
Department of State (DOS),
2-8, 3-5 and 3-6, 3-12 through 3-15, 3-29, 3-35
direct action (DA), 3-32, 3-37
and 3-38
disaster assistance, 3-7 and
3-8, 3-14 and 3-15
disaster assistance response
team (DART), 1-7, 3-8
disaster relief, 2-30, 2-33 and
2-34, 3-7 and 3-8, 3-10, 3-14 and 3-15, 3-24
dislocated civilian (DC)
movement, 2-34 operations, 2-33, 2-35 through 2-37, 3-3 and 3-4, 4-2
E

effects,1-3, 1-8 through 1-10,
  2-14, 2-33, 2-35 through
  2-37, 3-4, 3-12 through 3-14,
  3-27, 3-31 and 3-32, 3-38,
  4-2, 4-6 through 4-9, 4-11,
  C-1 through C-3

embassy, 2-27, 3-5 and 3-6,
3-13, 3-22, 3-27
estimate, 1-9, 1-11, 4-2, B-1
through B-6, C-1, C-3
evaluation criteria, B-3 through
B-5

## F

Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA), 3-23, 3-29
force protection (FP), 1-8, 1-12,
2-25, 3-39 and 3-40, A-2 and A-3, C-3
foreign humanitairan

public administration, 2-4,
2-7, 2-12 and 2-13, 3-30,
4-4, C-2, D-6
public communication, 2-4,
D-21
public education, 2-4, 2-14,
D-22
public health, 2-4, 2-7, 2-12
and 2-14, 2-16, 2-19 through
2-21, 2-23, 3-9, 3-16, 3-22,
3-25, 4-4, C-2, D-17
public safety, 2-4, 2-7
through 2-9, 2-12 and 2-13,
2-23, 4-4, C-2, D-11
public transporation, 2-4,
4-4, C-2, D-19
public works and utilities,
2-4, 2-12, 4-4, C-2, D-20 and
D-21

funding sources, 3-12, 3-15

assistance (FHA), 1-2, 1-5,
2-3, 2-7, 2-19, 2-21, 2-31,
2-34, 3-3, 3-6 through 3-12,
3-15, 3-17, 3-20, 3-27, 3-37,
3-39, 4-2

## G

foreign internal defense (FID),
3-16, 3-32, 3-36 and 3-37
G-9 staff responsibilities, 2-33
through 2-37

foreign nation (FN), 2-7, 2-11
  through 2-14, 3-5, 3-11 and
  3-12, 3-16 and 3-17, 3-27,
  3-37, D-5 and D-6

functional area

geographical combatant
commanders (GCC), 1-5, 2-1 through 2-4, 2-12, 2-17, 2-25 through 2-30, 2-36 and 2-37, 3-1 and 3-2, 3-5, 3-9 and 3-10, 3-11, 3-13, 3-17, 3-20 3-27, 3-37, 3-39, 4-1

global information grid (GIG),
3-29 and 3-30
H
host nation (HN), v, 1-1, 1-7,

1-9, 1-11, 1-12, 2-3 and 2-4, 2-7 through 2-9, 2-11 through 2-16, 2-18, 2-19, 2-21, 2-27, 2-30, 2-34, 3-3 through 3-7, 3-9 through 3-11, 3-14 through 3-17, 3-20 through 3-22, 3-27, 3-31 and 3-22, 3-36 and 3-37, 4-2, 4-4
host-nation support (HNS),
3-32
economic stability, 1-9, 2-4,
2-7, 2-10 education and public information, 1-9, 2-4 food and argiculture, 2-4, 2-10, 4-4, C-2, D-16 and D-17 governance, 1-9, 2-4, 2-8, 2-12, 2-16, 2-19 and 2-20,
health and welfare, 1-9, 2-4,
2-7, 2-12 and 2-13, 2-16, 2-19 through 2-21 infrastructure, 1-5, 1-9 and 1-10, 2-4, 2-7, 2-9, 2-11, 2-16, 2-19 and 2-20, 3-8 and 3-9, 3-16 and 3-17, 3-20, 3-23, 3-27 and 3-28, 3-37 and 3-38, 4-5 and 4-6, A-2, D-14
rule of law, 1-9, 2-4, 2-7
through 2-10, 2-19, 2-21, 3-22
humanitarian and civic
assistance (HCA), 3-7 and 3 8, 3-10, 3-12 through 3-15
functional speciality
humanitarian assistance (HA),
1-7, 2-15, 3-6 and 3-7, 3-10,
3-14
I
indigenous populations and
institutions (IPI), 1-2 through 1-3, 1-6 through 1-8 and 1-9, 1-11 and 1-12, 2-3, 2-5 and 2-6, 2-10 and 2-11, 2-13
civilian supply, 2-4, 2-11,
D-10 cultural relations, 2-4, 2-12, D-8 economic development, 2-4, 2-7, 2-11, D-12 environmental management, 2-4, 2-14, D-17
international law, 2-8 and
2-9, 2-11, 2-30, 3-2, 4-4, C-2
through 2-15, 2-17 and 2-18, 2-24 and 2-25, 2-31, 3-1 through 3-4, 3-10, 3-17 and 3-18, 3-21, 3-27 through 3-30, 3-35, 4-2, A-1
information operations (IO), 1-8
and 1-10, 2-3, 2-21, 3-28 through 3-31, 4-11

intergovernmental
organizations (IGOs), 1-2 and 1-3, 1-6 and 1-7, 1-9 through 1-12, 2-1, 2-3 through 2-6, 2-8 and 2-9, 2-15, 2-17 through 2-19, 2-24 and 2-25, 2-27, 2-30 and 2-31, 2-34, 3-1 and 3-2, 3-6, 3-9, 3-15, 3-18, 3-21,
3-27, 3-28 and 3-29, 3-32,
4-2, 4-4 and 4-5, 4-12, A-1, A-3, C-2
internally displaced person
(IDP), 1-8, 2-33, 3-4, 3-8

## J

Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS),
2-25, 2-27, 3-11
Joint Civil-Military Operations

Task Force (JSOTF), 2-17,
2-20 and 2-21, 2-28, 2-32 and 2-33, 3-27
joint and multinational
organization, 2-30
Joint Operations and Planning
Execution System (JOPES),
2-4

L

law, 1-5, 2-4, 2-7 through 2-9,
2-11, 2-25, 2-30, 3-2, 3-8, 3 12, 3-15 through 3-17, 3-22, 3-24 through 3-25, 4-4, C-2
logistics, 2-29, 2-33 and 2-34,
3-28, C-4
measure of effectiveness
(MOE), 1-5, 1-9 and 1-10, 3-3 and 3-4, 3-8, 3-40, 4-2, 4-5, 4-7 through 4-9, A-1, B-3, C-1, C-3
measure of performance
(MOP), 1-5, 3-3, 4-2, 4-7 and 4-8, B-3, C-1, C-3
military civic action (MCA)
mitigating, 3-16 developmental, 3-16
military decision-making
process (MDMP), 1-8, 2-4, 3-1, 3-26, 4-3, 4-7, B-1

mission analysis (METT-TC),
1-4 and 1-5, 2-29, 2-33, 3-17, 3-20, 3-22, 3-26, 3-38, 4-3

defensive, 1-4 and 1-5, 3-19
through 3-21 and 3-22, 3-40
decisive, 1-5, 3-27, 3-28
offensive, 1-4 and 1-5, 1-9,
2-25, 3-19
sustaining, 3-28

mission planning, 1-8, 2-16,
2-19, 2-23 and 2-24
overlays, 2-34, B-2, C-4

mobilization, 2-29, 3-35, 3-40 multinational operations, 1-1, 2
30, 3-12

## N

populace and resources control
(PRC), 1-2, 2-3, 2-19, 2-21, 3-2 and 3-3, 3-17, 3-20, 3 27, 3-34 and 3-35, 3-37, 4-2, C-2 and C-3
nation assistance (NA), 1-2,
1-5, 2-3, 2-19, 2-21, 3-15 and 3-16, 3-33, 3-36, 4-2
principles of war, 1-9 through
1-11

noncombatant evacuation
operations (NEO), 2-33, 3-3
through 3-6, 3-33
Psychological Operations
(PSYOP), 2-19, 2-21, 3-31, 3-38 and 3-39
public affairs (PA), 3-29
through 3-31, A-3
refugee, 1-8, 2-33, 3-4, 3-8,
3-23
rules of engagement (ROE),
3-11 and 3-12, A-3

nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs), 1-1 through 1-3, 1-6 and 1-7, 1-9 through 1-12, 2 3, 2-6, 2-8 through 2-11, 2 14 and 2-15, 2-17 and 2-18, 2-24 and 2-25, 2-27, 2-30 and 2-31, 2-34, 3-1 through 3-2, 3-4, 3-6 through 3-10, 3 14, 3-18 3-21 and 3-22, 3-27 through 3-29, 3-35, 4-2, 4-4 and 4-5, A-1, A-3, C-2

## O

security assistance (SA), 3-15
and 3-16, 3-37
objectiveseffectstasks, 4-6
and 4-7
special reconnaissance (SR),
3-32, 3-38
Office of Foreign Disaster
Assistance (OFDA), 3-7 and
3-8
stability operations,1-4 and 1-5,
1-10, 2-8, 2-15, 2-17, 2-25, 3-3, 3-7 through 3-9, 3-17, 3 20 through 3-24, 3-27, 3-29 and 3-30, 3-40, A-1
operational control (OPCON),
2-25, 2-27 through 2-29, 3-25, C-1
support to civil administration
(SCA), 1-2, 2-3, 2-19, 2-21, 2-31, 2-33, 3-17, 3-37, 4-2
systems analysis, 4-5, 4-7
operational environment
permissive, 3-5, 3-10 and 3-11, 3-23 uncertain, 3-11 hostile, 3-5, 3-11

termination, 3-21, A-1 and A-2

operations
civil support, 1-4 and 1-5, 3-19, 3-23

Theater Special Operations
Command (TSOC), 2-3 and 2-4, 2-17, 2-25, 2-29, 2-31 and 2-32, 3-1, 3-37
Title 10, U.S. Code, 2-9, 2-29,
3-12 through 3-15

## P

Title 22, U.S. Code, 3-12, 3-14 transfer, 3-27, A-2 transition, 1-4, 1-8, 1-10, 1-12,
2-1, 2-3, 2-7, 2-17, 2-23, 3-17, 3-20 and 3-21, 3-35, 4-2, A-1 through A-3

## U

unconventional warfare (UW),
3-32, 3-33 through 3-35
Unified Command Plan, 2-27
United States Agency for
International Development (USAID), 2-8, 2-25, 3-8, 3-14, 3-35

## R

United States Army Civil Affairs
and Psychological
Operations Command (USACAPOC), 2-27

## S

United States Army Reserve
(USAR), 1-3, 1-7, 1-9, 2-1 and 2-2, 2-15 through 2-23, 2-27, 2-34, 3-6, 3-24
United States Army Special
Operations Command (USASOC), 2-17, 2-26 and 2-27, 2-29
United States Special
Operations Command (USSOCOM), 2-25 and 2-26
unity of effort,1-11, 2-25, 2-30,
4-6 through 4-8

## W

weapons of mass destruction
(WMD), 3-6, 3-9, 3-16, 3-25, 3-32, 3-39
T
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## Distribution:

Active Army, Army National Guard, and U. S. Army Reserve: To be distributed in accordance with initial distribution number 110347, requirements for FM 3-05.40.