Military Operations

# Command & Control Countermeasures (C2Cm)

                  Headquarters
                  Department of the Army
                  Washington, DC
                  31 July 1992
Unclassified

## Summary Of Change Ar 52520 Command & Control Countermeasures (C2Cm)

This revision--

o Establishes the basis for Army Command & Control Countermeasures Strategy
implementation.
o Specifies responsibilities for principle officials Headquarters, Department
of Army and major army commands.
o Changes Army C3CM policy to C2CM as found in Army doctrine FM 100-15.
o Prescribes planning guidance for implementation of the C2CM strategy. o Provides guidelines for security classification and downgrading for C2CM
planning.

## Military Operations Command & Control Countermeasures (C2Cm)

emphasis from joint C3CM policy while supporting its intent to achieve synergism from f i r e  s u p p o r t ,  e l e c t r o n i c  w a r f a r e ,  d e c e p t i o n and operations security.

Applicability. This regulation applies to the A c t i v e  A r m y ,  U .  S .  A r m y  R e s e r v e ,  a n d Army National Guard.

P r o p o n e n t  a n d  e x c e p t i o n  a u t h o r i t y .

The proponent of this regulation is the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans.

The DCSOPS has the authority to approve exceptions to this regulation which are consistent with controlling law and regulation. The DCSOPS may delegate this authority in writing to a division chief within the proponent agency who holds the rank of colonel or the civilian equivalent. The approval authority will coordinate all questions regarding the scope of authority to approve exceptions with HQDA, OTJAG, ATTN: DAJAAL, Washington, D.C. 203102200.

A r m y  m a n a g e m e n t  c o n t r o l  p r o c e s s .

This regulation is not subject to the internal control procedures and requirements of AR 112 Internal Control Systems.

Supplementation. Supplementation of this r e g u l a t i o n  a n d  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  c o m m a n d and local forms are prohibited without prior H i s t o r y .  T h i s  u p d a t e  p r i n t i n g  p u b l i s h e s  a r e v i s i o n  o f  t h i s  p u b l i c a t i o n .  B e c a u s e  t h e publication has been extensively revised, the changed portions have not been highlighted.

Summary. This regulation implements assigned service tasks from JCS Memorandum of Policy No. 30. It sets forth Army policy f o r  C o m m a n d ,  a n d  C o n t r o l ,  C o u n t e r m e a s - ures, establishes responsibility for C2CM, inc o r p o r a t e s  r e v i s e d  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  e l e c t r o n i c warfare, clarifies C2CM terminology, and updates references and definitions. This regulat i o n  r e p r e s e n t s  a  s i g n i f i c a n t  c h a n g e  i n Contents (Listed by paragraph and page number)

Chapter 1 Introduction, page 1
Purpose - 11, page 1
References - 12, page 1
Explanation of abbreviations and terms - 13, page 1
C2CM versus command, control, and communications
countermeasures (C3CM) - 14, page 1
General - 15, page 1
C2CM Strategy - 16, page 1
C2CM Program Objectives - 17, page 1
Army Goals for C2CM Strategy Implementation - 18, page 1

## Chapter 2 Responsibilities, Page 2

Section I Principal Officials of Headquarters, Department of Army, page 2
Assistant Secretary of the Army, (Research Development and Acquisition (ASA (RDA)) - 21, page 2
a p p r o v a l  f r o m  H Q D A  ( D A M O - F D I ) , WASH, DC 203100460.

Interim changes. Interim changes to this r e g u l a t i o n  a r e  n o t  o f f i c i a l  u n l e s s  a u t h e n t i - cated by the Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army. Users will destroy interim changes on their expiration dates if the changes are not superseded or rescinded earlier.

S u g g e s t e d  I m p r o v e m e n t s .  T h e  p r o p o -
nent agency of this regulation is the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans. Users are invited to send comments a n d  s u g g e s t i o n s  f o r  i m p r o v e m e n t  o n  D A Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) directly to HQDA (DAMOFDI), WASH, DC 203100460.

Distribution. Distribution of this publication is made in accordance with the requirements of DA Form 1209E, block number 3517 intended for command level C for Active Army, USAR, and ARNG, less MDW, COE, HSC, and CID.

The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DCSOPS)
- 22, page 2
The Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER) - 23, page 2
The Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (DCSLOG) - 24, page 2 The Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (DCSINT) - 25,
page 2
The Director of Information Systems for Command, Control,
Communications, and Computers (DISC4) - 26, page 2
The Commander, United States Army Operational Test and
Evaluation Command (OPTEC) - 27, page 3
Section II Commanders of Major Army Commands, page 3
The Commanding General, United States Army Training and
Doctrine Command (CG, TRADOC) - 28, page 3
The Commanding General, United States Army Materiel Command
(CG, AMC) - 29, page 3
The Commanding General, United States Army Intelligence and
Security Command (INSCOM) - 210, page 3
The Commanding General, United States Army Information
Systems Command (CG, USAISC) - 211, page 3
The Commanders, Army tactical and operational level commands
- 212, page 3
Chapter 3 Strategy Implementation, page 4
General - 31, page 4
Planning Guidelines - 32, page 4
Specific intentions of C2CM planning - 33, page 4 Planning Authorities - 34, page 5
Security Classification Guidance - 35, page 5
Appendix A.

References, page 6

## Figure List

Figure 31:, page 4

## Glossary Index

11. Purpose This regulation defines C2CM, describes its role in combat operat i o n s ,  i d e n t i f i e s  o b j e c t i v e s ,  p r e s c r i b e s  p o l i c y ,  a n d  a s s i g n s responsibilities.

## 12. References Required And Related Publications Are Listed In Appendix A.

13. Explanation of abbreviations and terms Abbreviations and terms used in this regulation are explained in the glossary.

14. C2CM versus command, control, and communications countermeasures (C3CM)
Modern military communications are important to the timely execution and coordination of battlefield operations. Communications are not the focus of the Army C2CM strategy whereas command and control targets are the focus using direct and indirect means to deny, disrupt, degrade, and destroy. Influencing the enemies command and control functions can delay or deny the proper concentration of c o m b a t  p o w e r .  C o m m a n d  a n d  c o n t r o l  f u n c t i o n s  a r e  p e r f o r m e d through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, facilities, and procedures employed by the commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces to accomplish the mission. Therefore, the C2CM strategy attacks and influences the C2 means to gather intelligence, assess options, formulate plans, and issue or execute orders. Communications are one means to maintain C2 of forces, weapons, and battlefield functions.

15. General a .  U S  A r m y  c o m m a n d e r s  w i l l  e m p l o y  a p p r o p r i a t e  a s s e t s  t o counter enemy C2 and to protect friendly C2 from similar enemy activities with direct and indirect measures. The means by which C2 and counter C2 measures are employed vary and encompass several battlefield operating systems (BOS) and functions.

b. Resources to support the C2CM concept are found throughout the force. These resources include, but are not limited to, destruction (Fire Support), electronic warfare (EW), military deception, intelligence, counterintelligence, operations security, special operations, and other military activities.

c. Knowledge of critical nodes (see glossary), as associated with high value target (HVT), and key connectivity links in the enemy and friendly C2 systems are essential to the planning and execution of US and allied C2CM. The Joint Command HVT list is a Joint Staff responsibility in coordination with component commands. Assistance in developing this list is available through the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Tailored Analytical Intelligence Support to Individual EW program and Command, Control, Communications and Countermeasures (C3CM) Projects (TASIP) program. Doctrinal combat/integrating developers at the Combined Arms Center (CAC) and service schools produce HVT lists during the system threat assessment process.

d. Intelligence and threat analysis support is required for optimum C2CM planning, system development, and operations. Operational commanders must weigh the advantages to be gained by countering enemy C2 nodes against the potential loss of intelligence from intercepted enemy emissionsparticularly those from higher command echelonsand the need to protect intelligence sources and methods.

16. C2CM Strategy C2CM is the integrated use of lethal and non-lethal means, OPSEC, and military deception against the enemy's command and control (C2) capabilities. Integration of C2CM denies effective execution of plans and orders by the enemy, impedes or denies accomplishment of military objectives, and conserves friendly combat resources. The resulting outcome is to cause the enemy commander to reassess combat plans and intentions.

a. A military force that builds a C2CM capability with proper training and resources will pose a very serious threat to an enemy commander's ability to execute successful combat operations. Degradation of electronic surveillance and target acquisition capabilities help prevent the effective deployment of combat forces and accurate employment of combat weapons. Disruption of C2 means will deny the ability to recover quickly from battle attacks or effective exploitation by maneuvering units. The presentation of false data to intelligence elements will cause confusion in the allocation of combat elements and prevent effective employment of these resources during critical combat engagements. Destruction of key facilities, command posts, and weapon control points will seriously influence the outcome of combat operations. In essence, C2CMs deny, degrade, disrupt, or destroy the complete use of key C2 capabilities.

( 1 )  D i r e c t  M e a s u r e s  ( s e e  t e r m s ,  g l o s s a r y )  c o u n t e r  t h e  e n e m y commander's means of controlling battlefield functions, using both lethal and non-lethal attack capabilities against troop control centers a n d  m e a n s ,  w e a p o n  s y s t e m s  c o n t r o l  c e n t e r s  a n d  f i r e  d i r e c t i o n means, reconnaissance systems, and force command planning centers, including commanders and their staffs. Direct measures deny effective use of the means for C2.

(2) Indirect Measures (see terms, glossary) protect friendly command and control from both friendly and adversary actions. These measures include OPSEC and military deception and are used to deny accurate and timely information about friendly forces or present false information about those forces. Electronic Protection Measures (EPM) and tactics will reduce or eliminate the effects of hostile attempts to degrade or disrupt friendly C3. Emission control (EM- CON) is critical to ECCM (EPMNATO) planning as a protective measure.

b. Electronic deception and the use of Wartime Reserves Modes
(WARM) can play an important role in the execution of direct and indirect C2 measures. By altering friendly stereotyped electromagnetic profiles and eliminating or disguising telltale control proced u r e s  o r  n e t w o r k  i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s ,  t h e  c a p a b i l i t y  o f  o p p o s i n g commanders to select the most rewarding C2 targets can be significantly reduced. By presenting notional targets to mislead, decoy, or disguise friendly capability or intentions, electronic deception can influence opposing commanders to making decisions which are advantageous to friendly forces. The use of WARM by attacking forces can significantly reduce electronic detection and enhance deception.

17. C2CM Program Objectives C2CM objectives are as follows:
a. Maximize U.S. capabilities to (1) Deny hostile military commanders the ability to command and control their forces effectively.

(2) Protect friendly C2 resources from enemy attempts to disrupt, degrade, detect, or destroy them.

b. Develop C2CM capabilities that are interoperable, compatible, and mutually supportive in joint and combined operations.

c. Integrate C2CM into military plans, operations, and exercises to maximize U.S. and allied military effectiveness.

d. Train or familiarize personnel at all levels with C2CM activities and objectives.

e. Evaluate the effects of C2CM on friendly and hostile C3.

18. Army Goals for C2CM Strategy Implementation
a. To maintain the proficiency of forces and develop capabilities
to employ C2CM across the operational continuum.
b. To employ C2CM at all times to maximize C2 effectiveness
and degrade the opposing force C2 effectiveness.
c. To coordinate C2CM programs, tactics, and concepts with
appropriate DOD agencies/departments and, when appropriate, with allied nations.
d. To have U.S. Army C2CM procedures and materiel programs
respond to operational missions and objectives of CINCs and Army MACOMs. This will be done to complement the effects of other weapon systems and effectively support the combat efforts of the United States and its allies.
e. Interoperability with USAF, USN and USMC C2 systems with a planned, step-by-step procedure. It will be aimed toward achieving a capability that satisfies joint and combined needs as well as individual US Army requirements.

f. To test all fielded systems that may be affected by hostile C2CM in C2CM environment that quantitatively and qualitatively represents the expected threat, described in the system STAR and reflected in the TTSP.

g. To develop smart munitions, deception devices, antiradiation weapons, targeting systems and other materiel having C2CM potential; and test these systems capabilities against representative or expected threat targets described in the STAR and reflected in the TTSP.

h. To engineer C2 countermeasures using US countermeasures equipment, materiel, and procedures. This includes built-in OPSEC measures to protect against foreign intelligence collection with additional counter intelligence/security, as required by DOD/Army security guidelines policy.

i. US Army Operational Requirement Documents (ORDs), Miss i o n  E q u i p m e n t  N e e d s  S t a t e m e n t s  ( M E N S ) ,  O p e r a t i o n a l  N e e d s Statements (ONS) and the subsequent development, design, and test of systems will consider and incorporate, where appropriate, capabilities to support the C2CM strategy implementation (lethal, nonl e t h a l ,  O P S E C ,  o r  d e c e p t i o n ) .  T h e s e  d o c u m e n t s  a n d  a c q u i s i t i o n activities will also evaluate the potential for unintentional interference with US and allied systems and take into account electromagnetic environmental effects (E3).

j. C2CM training will be a standing objective in all major Army exercises. During specified portions of the exercises, C2CM will be given priority over other exercise objectives.

k. To provide US Army intelligence element support to C2CM
planners and commanders at all echelons for planning and conducting C2CM. These elements will assist in preparing scenarios which represent anticipated threats and targets; they will also provide critical node analysis to aid in developing C2CM plans, tactics, and asset capabilities. Anticipated threats and targets are described in the STAR per AR 38111.

l. To eliminate or minimize vulnerability to friendly C2CM systems and equipment under development through shared responsibility involving the proponent, combat developer, materiel developer, and user.

## Chapter 2 Responsibilities Section I Principal Officials Of Headquarters, Department Of Army

21. Assistant Secretary of the Army, (Research Development and Acquisition (ASA (RDA))
ASA(RDA) will
a. Assume responsibility for the research, development, test, and evaluation (RDTE) required to support C2CM capabilities.

b. Be responsible for acquisition and life-cycle management of materiel in support of the C2CM strategy.

c. Plan and coordinate development or procurement of simulated hostile C2CM systems for testing and training.

d. Conduct research and acquire basic knowledge of the techn i q u e s  a n d  c i r c u i t r y  r e q u i r e d  t o  p r o v i d e  a n  e f f e c t i v e  d e f e n s i v e C2CM capability in appropriate types of Army equipment and ensure Program Executive Officers use this knowledge.

22. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DCSOPS)
The DCSOPS will
a. Serve as HQDA POC for C2CM and coordinate Army C2CM
functions.

b .  S u p e r v i s e  a n d  d e t e r m i n e  t h e  C 2 C M  f o r c e s  r e a d i n e s s  a n d C2CM operational capabilities of Army forces to accomplish assigned missions under real or assumed conditions.

c. Supervise the integration of C2CM into Army force strategies modernization, and unit training.

d. Provided for force integration of systems support of the C2CM
strategy.

e. Develop Army C2CM policy, programs, and validate force structure requirements for units of the Active Army, US Army Reserve, and Army National Guard.

f. Provide DA Staff supervision of the planning, execution, and evaluation of C2CM in the fielding training exercises.

g. Validate, coordinate, and approve materiel requirements documentation and establish priorities to support C2CM.

h. Provide DA Staff supervision of operational testing of equipment, systems, and organizations in support of the C2CM strategy.

i. Assess C2CM interoperability with the other Services and allies and make recommendations for improvements.

j. Coordinate C2CM matters with the other military services and allies, as appropriate.

k. Develop policies and programs for individual C2CM strategy training at Army, Joint, Combined, and National Defense University schools.

23. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER)
The DCSPER will
a. Ensure proper assignment and management of soldiers to key C2CM staff positions b. Ensure the inclusion of C2CM training courses in the Army Training Resources and Requirements System (ATRRS).

24. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (DCSLOG)
The DCSLOG will
a. Ensure logistical support for C2CM concept materiel within
DCSLOG assigned functions.
b. Ensure proper provisions for C2CM concept materiel under the
Integrated Logistic Support Program during the materiel acquisition process.
c. Provide continuous logistic support for fielded C2CM materiel
and test equipment.
d. Coordinate all requests for foreign materiel sales (FMS) involving C2CM equipment (EW, Fire Support, OPSEC, Deception) with ODCSOPS (DAMOFDI) and applicable Army agencies.
25. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (DCSINT)
The DCSINT will
a. Provide intelligence support to MACOM C2CM planning requests as stated under DIA request procedures for Tailored Analytic a l  I n t e l l i g e n c e  S u p p o r t  t o  I n d i v i d u a l  E W  a n d  C 3 C M  P r o j e c t s (TASIP).

b. Ensure C2CM threat information is produced to support materiel, training, doctrinal and operational needs of Army agencies and commands.

c. Monitor and coordinate the production aspects of threat C2CM
for transmittal to materiel/combat developers and MACOMs.

d. Serve as the proponent for Information System Security (ISS).

(AR 38019).

e. Ensure adequate availability of foreign equipment for test, exploitation and susceptibility study.

26. The Director of Information Systems for Command, Control, Communications, and Computers (DISC4)
The DISC4 will
a. Exercise responsibility for automated systems, electromagnetic spectrum management, and the automation/ communications management aspects of C2CM.

b. Ensure C2CM combined interoperability requirements are addressed and satisfied with mission area agreements of US and allied f o r c e s  s u c h  a s  N A T O  a n d  t h e  A m e r i c a n ,  B r i t i s h ,  C a n a d i a n , Australian (ABCA) Armies Standardization Program.

c. Ensure software compatibility with appropriate joint combined and allied forces.

d. Coordinate with ODCSINT concerning the management and implementation of an ISS program in support of C2CM policy.

27. The Commander, United States Army Operational Test and Evaluation Command (OPTEC)
The Commander, OPTEC will
a. Ensure objectives are incorporated into Test Design Plans to evaluate equipment performance in direct and indirect C2CM roles.

b. Ensure operational tests adequately stress equipment in a well simulated hostile threat C2 countermeasures environment.

(1) Exercise responsibility for the specific operational testing of C-E/and related systems, (includes RF/IR/EO defensive/offensive systems) in a C2CM threat environment.

(2) Conduct operational tests on assigned major and Category 1, non-major C-E/and related systems in an environment that represents the hostile C2CM threat.

(3) Provide policy guidance, review, and approve, as appropriate, plans and other documents relating to U.S. Army (including Joint programs) testing in a C2CM hostile threat environment conducted by other designated testers for Categories 2 through 4 non-major C- E/and related systems.

## Section Ii Commanders Of Major Army Commands

28. The Commanding General, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command (CG, TRADOC)
The CG, TRADOC will
a. Develop and test organizational and operational concepts and doctrine on the tactical and technical employment of C2CM to support Army operations in the field.

b. Recommend Science and Technology Objectives (STO) for C2CM to DA.

c. Prepare and provide recommendations on establishing, revising, or eliminating Required Operational Capability (ROC) documentation for C2CM operations by the Army.

d. Program for and conduct troop tests that may be required in coordination with OPTEC.

e. Direct and supervise the preparation of training literature and the training of personnel in the use, operation, and maintenance of C2CM strategy equipment to be used by Army units.

f .  I n t e g r a t e  C 2 C M  s t r a t e g y  t r a i n i n g  i n t o  T R A D O C  s c h o o l curricula.

g. Integrate requirements and procedures for countering hostile C2CM threat in combat developments and training activities.

h. Recommend establishment, revision, or elimination of Training Device Requirements (TDR) related to the C2CM strategy.

i. Develop doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP)
to support the C2CM strategy and program an objective implementation using a MACOM HVT lists as a baseline.

j. Review requirements for decision aids that automate the C2CM
strategy planning functions and initiate action under the Concept Based Requirements Systems (CBRS) to field their capability to tactical units.

k. Coordinate or provide U.S. representation to various allied or joint C2CM doctrinal and combat development fora.

29. The Commanding General, United States Army Materiel Command (CG, AMC)
The CG, AMC will
a. Perform materiel RDTE, procurement, storage, depot maintenance, and distribute materiel to the force as assigned by DA in support of the C2CM concept.

b. Ensure logistical support of all C2CM systems in the Integrated Logistic Support Program.

c. Prepare technical literature for the operation and maintenance of equipment in a C2CM environment in coordination with Program Executive Officer procurement programs.

d. Incorporate the most cost-effective anti-jamming circuitry and other C2 protection features into susceptible communications-elect r o n i c  e q u i p m e n t  a n d  r e c o m m e n d  t r a d e - o f f s  t o  t h e  c o m b a t developer.

e. Conduct C2CM vulnerability developmental tests and studies on equipment/systems and foreign C-E equipment.

f. Provide support and assistance, as required, to other army commands and Program Executive Officers in fulfilling their assigned C2CM vulnerability responsibilities.

g. Develop and procure simulated C2CM systems, as required, when requested.

210. The Commanding General, United States Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM)
The CG, INSCOM will
a. Support Army MACOM C2CM strategy activities in exercises, tests, and experiments to include assistance in assessing the effectiveness of applied C2CM.

b .  R e c o m m e n d  c h a n g e s  o r  a d d i t i o n s  t o  C G ,  T R A D O C ,  f o r C2CM concepts, doctrine, and related matters at the echelons above corps, joint, and combined levels.

c. As requested by CG, TRADOC, take part in combat development studies, experiments, and tests of organizational and operational concepts and doctrine.

d. Provide support and assistance to other Army commands in d e t e r m i n i n g  t h e i r  C 2 C M  v u l n e r a b i l i t i e s  a n d  a s s e s s i n g  t h r e a t susceptibilities.

e. Recommend Science and Technology Objectives (STO) for C2CM to HQDA.

f. Perform C2CM materiel acquisition functions assigned by DA
for EAC INSCOM forces.

g. Appoint a staff point of contact to assist operational planners with C2CM strategy implementation.

211. The Commanding General, United States Army Information Systems Command (CG, USAISC)
The CG, USAISC will
a. Develop, test, and recommend to CG, TRADOC, organizational and operational concepts and doctrine; these concepts and doctrine pertain to the employment of C2CM to support the operations of the Army portion of the Defense Communications System, Army air traffic control facilities, and USAISC-operated facilities in echelons above corps (EAC).

b. Integrate requirements and procedures for countering hostile C2CM threat in combat developments and training activities.

c. Prepare literature pertaining to operation of mission-peculiar equipment in a hostile C2CM threat environment.

d. Assist the CG, AMC, in determining the C2CM and antiradiation missile vulnerabilities of USAISC systems and, as appropriate, conduct C2CM susceptibility studies, vulnerability tests, and on mission-peculiar equipment/systems.

212. The Commanders, Army tactical and operational level commands These Commanders will
a. Exercise operational control over all C2CM strategy resources assigned.

b. Maintain C2CM readiness for Army forces assigned. c. Integrate C2CM training into unit training programs, maneuvers, and exercises, as appropriate.

d. Recommend to CG, TRADOC changes or additions to C2CM
concept, doctrine, tactics, or techniques that may result from the evaluation of training prescribed in (C) above.

e. Designate a single staff component (DCSOPS/G3) at headquarters staffs level to serve as a focal point for C2CM strategy implementation.

f .  I d e n t i f y  o p e r a t i o n a l  a n d  i n t e l l i g e n c e  r e q u i r e m e n t s ,  c o n d u c t evaluations, and request equipment needed to attain the required C2CM posture in consonance with other known requirements and priorities.

g. Identify personnel requirements and qualification for C2CM
activities; train and provide personnel to subordinate operational commands.

h. Ensure command and control capabilities are adequate to support planning and implementation of the C2CM strategy.

i. Maintain personnel security programs and provide guards and other defensive forces to protect against sabotage and attack of command and control facilities.

j. Develop and maintain a capability to perform military decept i o n .  T h i s  i n c l u d e s  B a t t l e f i e l d  D e c e p t i o n  s u p p o r t  t o  o p e r a t i o n a l plans (AR 52521).

k. Exercise commanders, staffs, and the intelligence system ability to support C2CM planning and implementation in order to gain experience in the detection of hostile countermeasure nodes.

l. Evaluate the capability of US Army combat forces to perform both offensively and defensively in an environment representative of hostile countermeasure nodes.

## Chapter 3 Strategy Implementation

31. General Modern military forces are highly dependent on C2 for effective application of combat power. The fundamental elements of C2 are personnel, facilities, sensors, processors, and decision making. Army doctrine frequently refers to these elements in a decide, detect, and deliver methodology for attacking enemy forces, facilities, and high value target systems that may interfere with successful mission accomplishment.

a. Targets. Targets are identified in terms of what, when, and where enemy capabilities pose the greatest potential to interfere with the success of friendly operations. Priority must first go to dealing with the most threatening enemy means within three basic target sets: (1) follow-on maneuver; (2) command, control, and communications (C3); and (3) high value targets.

b. Old method. Historically, the targeting methodology of detecting enemy targets; deciding whether, when, and how to attack them; and then delivering attacks against them is reactive and does little to wrest the initiative from the enemy or shape the future close fight. Such reactive procedures create high stress on the performance of sensors, processors, C2, decision makers, communications, and attack means because they force operations into a compressed time f r a m e .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  t h i s  t e c h n i q u e  i s  f r e q u e n t l y  n o t  r e s p o n s i v e enough in a highly mobile situation.

c. New method. The decide, detect, and deliver planning process is focused by combining it with forward thinking to provide the basic framework for battlefield planning in a Tactical Operations Center (TOC) or theater army operations center. This methodology is key to the effective use of fire, maneuver, and C2CM strategy implementation in military operations. Forward thinking protects friendly operations, orients the proactive planning process to identify relevant targets, and provides the method to determine target specifics, such as- times when the target is likely to be active, detected, and attacked with the required resources.

32. Planning Guidelines The planning process begins with the receipt of a mission (assigned from Echelons-Above-Corps (EAC) or delivered internally). The focus is on coordinating and synchronizing the activities of the functional planning cells to accomplish the planning mission within the commander's intent and guidance.

a. The Commander and staff have the responsibility to ensure all activities are synchronized in time and space. The G3 planning element is responsible for coordinating activities and must ensure that maneuver, aviation, and C2CM elements interact effectively and cooperate with elements at EAC. G3 planners deconflict fire support, deception, electronic warfare, and OPSEC plans to ensure economy of fires and to provide the commander with multiple options.

b. It is the responsibility of the G3 planning element to write the operations orders and coordinate with each functional planning cell regarding the specific tasks. Most importantly, the G3 planning element ensures that the operations plans are written based on the guidance and direction provided by the commander regarding use of countermeasures. Rules of Engagement (ROE) must be clearly understood as received from higher level commanders or clarified if not understood.

33. Specific intentions of C2CM planning Effective C2CM can deny the enemy commander the means required to concentrate the combat power of forces. Fires at depth against follow-on combat forces, command posts (CPs) and weapons control centers can significantly disrupt enemy tempo. Lethal and non-lethal attack can be used in conjunction with deception and OPSEC or in support of offensive deep maneuver or counterattacks. (See Figure 31)
a. Attack of enemy target acquisition, intelligence gathering, and C2 systems is conducted through a combination of lethal and nonlethal attacks and the use of indirect OPSEC and deception means. Normally, attacks using electromagnetic applications are conducted by radio frequency (RF), infrared (IR) or electro-optical (EO) means with results of damage, destruction, or disruption (non-lethal) to susceptible targets. The object of these actions may not be to completely destroy the enemy C2 system, but rather to create ambiguity, and to interrupt his ability to make timely, correct decisions, and transmit plans or orders.

b. An operational maneuver may be supported by fires of both surface-to-surface and air-to-surface systems, including both Air Force and Army aviation. On a time schedule dictated by that of the battle, identified targets that advantageously influence the friendly operation (HVT) are engaged with direct C2CM means (fires - EW). Attack systems are matched to the target set, and targets are engaged to delay, disrupt, damage or destroy them. Additionally, C2 facilities are attacked during the time when an enemy is attempting to react to friendly maneuver. Air Force EW and fire support should be coordinated through the battlefield coordination element/tactical air control center (BCE/TACC).

c. C2CM in low intensity conflict (LIC) uses the same decide, detect, and deliver planning methodology. C2CM has applicability in all four categories of LIC; Contingency operations, Combatting terrorism, Insurgency/counterinsurgency, and Peacekeeping operations. Targeting of national infrastructure and unconventional threat organizational structure with C2CM in consonance with the political, economic, and informational elements of national power is extremely important to US Army operations in LIC. These LIC targets are analogous to tactical HVT lists in conventional war involving armies with established doctrine and large force structures, but with the added dimension of being more amorphous in nature.

34. Planning Authorities C2CM planning will be conducted in accordance with the references at Appendix A (References), Section I (Related Publications).

35. Security Classification Guidance Information related to C2CM will be classified, downgraded, and declassified IAW AR 3805. The following guidelines will generally apply:
a. The following information is UNCLASSIFIED: (1) General C2CM policy, doctrine, strategies, tactics concepts, training programs, and new capabilities applicable to C2CM strategies being developed.

(2) Assignment of responsibilities for C2CM. (3) C2CM involving the coordination of individual techniques or disciplines such as EW; battlefield deception; intelligence support; OPSEC; the use of such lethal/nonlethal means as artillery, airdelivered weapons, missiles, and conventional or special operations forces.

(4) US Army intentions to employ specific methods, procedures, and capabilities to protect its C2 from foreign counter-C2.

(5) Revelation of general US policy concerning the planning and conduct of service, joint, and combined C2CM or C3CM.

b. The following is CLASSIFIED as indicated: ( 1 )  I n f o r m a t i o n  t h a t  r e v e a l s  t h e  e x t e n t  a n d  r e a d i n e s s  o f  t h e United States to conduct C2CM will be classified SECRET. This information may be classified TOP SECRET if it reveals serious deficiencies of long-lasting duration or deficiencies reflecting the capability of a strategic force to accomplish its mission. Downgrade: Originating Agency Determination Required (OADR)
(2) Concepts, equipment, or techniques applicable to C2CM that reveal details of intelligence support to specific missions will be classified according to intelligence information and should be sanitized in accordance with current regulations to:
(a) Permit its handling at no higher than the SECRET level with noncompartmented access.

(b) Make it releasable to allies. Downgrade: OADR (3) Information related to special techniques or equipment for C2CM will be classified on a case-by-case basis by the responsible agency or command, using guidelines in DOD directives 5200.1 and 5205.2 and supporting Army Regulations. Downgrade: OADR
(4) Joint C2CM guidance may be revealed to foreign nations authorized to have access to the level of classification and type of information involved when necessary for combined training, planning, or employment for C2CM. Downgrade as required by foreign disclosure policy or OADR.

## Appendix A References

MOP6
Joint Chief Of Staff Memorandum Of Policy - 6, Electronic Warfare Policy

## Section I Required Publications

MOP25
Wartime Reserve Modes Policy DOD 5200.1
DOD Information Security Program (paragraph 25b(3))
MOP30
Joint Chief of Staff Memorandum Of Policy - 30, Command, Control, and Communications Countermeasures Policy DOD 5205.2
DOD Operations Security Program (paragraph 25b(3))
MOP116
Military Deception

## Section Ii Related Publications

FM 620
Fire Support in Combined Arms Operations AR 112
Internal Management Control FM 1150
Combat Communications within the Division AR 251
The Army Information Resources Management Program FM 341
Division Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations AR 701
System Acquisition Policy and Procedures FM 902
Battlefield Deception AR 711
Army Combat Developments FM 1005
Operations AR 719
Materiel Objectives and Requirements FM 10015
Corps Operations (S)
AR 733
User Testing MJCS 15889
Procedures for Requesting Tailored Analytical Intelligence Support to Individual EW C2CM Projects (TASIP)
AR 1052
Electronic Counter-Countermeasures (ECCM) Electronic Warfare Susceptibility and Vulnerability

## Section Iii Referenced Forms This Section Contains No Entries.

AR 1053
Reporting Meaconing, Intrusion, Jamming and Interference of Electromagnetic Systems

## Section Iv Prescribed Forms This Section Contains No Entries.

AR 1055
Electromagnetic Cover and Deception (EC&D)
AR 38019
Information System Security AR 38111 (C)
Threat Support to US Army Force, Combat and Material Development AR 52521
Battlefield Deception Policy AR 52522
Electronic Warfare AR 5301
Operations Security AR 5302
Communication Security DDB2611189 (DIA)
Procedures for Requesting Tailored Analytic Intelligence Support to Individual EW and C3CM Projects (TASIP)
DDB17307291 (DIA)
Joint Procedures for Intelligence Support to Electronic Warfare Reprogramming

## Glossary Section I Abbreviations

DISC4
Director of Information Systems for Comm a n d ,  C o n t r o l  C o m m u n i c a t i o n s ,  a n d Computers ABCA
American, British, Canadian, Australian EAC
Echelons-Above-Corps AMC
US Army Materiel Command ECCM
Electronic Counter-Countermeasures EC&D
Electromagnetic Cover and Deception ASA(RDA)
Assistant Secretary of the Army (Research, Development and Acquisition)
EO
Electro-optic ARNG
Army National Guard EPM
Electronic Protective Measures BCE
Battlefield Coordination Element EW
Electronic Warfare BOS
Battlefield Operating Systems HQDA
Headquarters Department of the Army CAC
Combined Army Center HSC
Health Services Command CG
Commanding General HVT
High Value Target CID
Criminal Investigative Division COE
Chief of Engineers INSCOM
U S  A r m y  I n t e l l i g e n c e  a n d  S e c u r i t y Command CPs Command Posts

IR
Infrared
C2
Command and Control
MACOM(s)
Major Army Command

C2CM
Command, and Control Countermeasures

MED
Manipulative Electronic Deception
C3
Command, Control, and Communications
MND
Mission Needs Document
MOP
Memorandum of Policy

C3CM
C o m m a n d ,  C o n t r o l ,  a n d  C o m m u n i c a t i o n s Countermeasures

NATO
North Atlantic Treaty Organization

DA
Department of the Army

ONS
Operational Needs Statement

DCSINT
Deputy Chief of Staff Intelligence

OPSEC
Operational Security

## Dcslog Deputy Chief Of Staff For Logistics

OPTEC
US Army Operational Test and Evaluation Command

## Dcsops D E P U T Y  C H I E F  O F  S T A F F  F O R  O P E R A T I O N S  A N D Plans

ORD
Operational Requirements Document
DCSPER
Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel
QRC
Quick Reaction Capability
DIA
Defense Intelligence Agency

## Rdte Research, Development, Test, And Evaluation

RF
Radio Frequency ROC
Required Operational Capability ROE
Rules of Engagement STAR
System Threat Assessment Report STO
Science and Technology Objective TACC
Tactical Air Control Center TASIP
T a i l o r e d A n a l y t i c a l I n t e l l i g e n c e S u p p o r t t o Individual Projects TDR
Training Device Requirement TOC
Tactical Operations Center TRADOC
US Army Training and Doctrine Command TTP
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

US
United States
USAR
US Army Reserve
USACC
US Army Communications Command
USAISC
US Army Information Systems Command
WARM
Wartime Reserve Mode

## Section Ii Terms

Command and Control Countermeasures (C2CM)
The integrated use of lethal and nonlethal m e a n s ,  O P S E C ,  a n d  m i l i t a r y  d e c e p t i o n against the enemy's command and control capabilities to deny him the ability to effect i v e l y e x e c u t e p l a n s a n d o r d e r s . C 2 C M i s b o t h  d i r e c t  a n d  i n d i r e c t .  D i r e c t  m e a s u r e s counter the enemy commander's means of controlling battlefield functions, using both l e t h a l  a n d  n o n - l e t h a l  a t t a c k  c a p a b i l i t i e s a g a i n s t  t r o o p  c o n t r o l  c e n t e r s  a n d  m e a n s , weapons systems control centers and fire direction means, reconnaissance systems, and f o r c e  c o m m a n d  p l a n n i n g  m e a n s ,  i n c l u d i n g commanders and their staff. Direct measures deny the enemy commander the effective use procedures and technical features of equipment, which are meant to ensure friendly effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum. (MC 64/6) C2CM Major Components of his means of control. Indirect measures protect friendly command and control from both friendly and adversary actions. These measures include OPSEC and military deception and are used to deny the enemy comm a n d e r  a c c u r a t e  a n d  t i m e l y  i n f o r m a t i o n about friendly forces and to present the enemy false information about those forces.

Direct measures Those offensive measures taken to deny adversary decision makers the ability to effect i v e l y  c o m m a n d  a n d  c o n t r o l  t h e i r  f o r c e s .

(Generally applied with fire support and electronic warfare means)
Indirect measures Those defensive measures taken to maintain effective C2 capabilities of friendly forces f r o m  a c t u a l  o r  p o t e n t i a l  a d v e r s a r y  c o u n t e r C2. (Generally applied with operations secur i t y ,  a n d  b a t t l e f i e l d  d e c e p t i o n ,  o r  W A R M means)
Command and Control (C2)
The exercise of authority and direction by a p r o p e r l y  d e s i g n a t e d  c o m m a n d e r  o v e r  a s - signed or attached forces in the accomplishm e n t  o f  t h e  m i s s i o n .  C 2  f u n c t i o n s  a r e performed through an arrangement of personn e l ,  e q u i p m e n t ,  c o m m u n i c a t i o n s ,  f a c i l i t i e s , and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishm e n t  o f  t h e  m i s s i o n .  ( J C S  P u b  1 - 0 2 ) C o m m a n d ,  C o n t r o l ,  a n d  C o m m u n i c a t i o n Countermeasures (C3CM) The integrated use of operation security, military deception, jamming, and physical destruction, supported by i n t e l l i g e n c e , t o d e n y i n f o r m a t i o n t o , i n f l u - e n c e ,  d e g r a d e ,  o r  d e s t r o y  a d v e r s a r y  c o m - m a n d ,  c o n t r o l ,  a n d  c o m m u n i c a t i o n s  ( C 3 ) capabilities and to protect friendly C3 against such actions. (JCS Pub 102)
Operation Security (OPSEC)
A process of analyzing friendly actions in military operations and other activities to: (1) Identify those actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems. (2) Determine indicators hostile intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries. (3) Select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to a n  a c c e p t a b l e  l e v e l  t h e  v u l n e r a b i l i t i e s  o f friendly actions to adversary exploitation.

Critical Node Point in a C2 network whose disruption or destruction immediately degrades the ability of a force commander and staff to effectively command and control combat operations.

Military Deception Actions executed to mislead foreign decision makers, causing them to derive and accept desired appreciations of military capabilities, intentions, operations, or other activities that evoke foreign actions that contribute to the originator's objectives. (JCS Pub 102)
Battlefield Deception Those operations or measures conducted at echelon theater and below to purposely mislead enemy forces by distorting, concealing, or falsifying indicators of friendly intent. (AR 52521)
Strategy The art and science of developing and using political, economic, psychological, and military forces as necessary during peace and war, to afford the maximum support to policies, in order to increase the probabilities and f a v o r a b l e  c o n s e q u e n c e s  o f  v i c t o r y  a n d  t o lessen the chances of defeat. (JCS Pub 102)
Electronic Warfare (EW)
M i l i t a r y  a c t i o n  i n v o l v i n g  t h e  u s e  o f electromagnetic energy to determine, exploit, r e d u c e  o r  p r e v e n t  h o s t i l e  u s e  o f  t h e e l e c t r o m a g n e t i c  s p e c t r u m  t h r o u g h  d a m a g e , d e s t r u c t i o n , a n d d i s r u p t i o n , w h i l e r e t a i n i n g friendly use of the electromagnetic spectrum. (AR 52522) (JCS MOP6)
Electronic Protective Measures (EPM) (NATO)
That division of EW involving actions taken t o  e n s u r e  f r i e n d l y  e f f e c t i v e  u s e  o f  t h e e l e c t r o m a g n e t i c  s p e c t r u m  d e s p i t e  t h e  e n e - my's use of electronic energy. There are two subdivisions of EPM:
Wartime Reserve Mode WARM are characteristics and operating procedures of sensor, communications, navigation aids, threat recognition, weapons, and countermeasures systems that (a) will contribute to military effectiveness if unknown to or misunderstood by opposing commanders before they are used, but (b) could be exploited or neutralized if known in advance. WARM are deliberately held in reserve for w a r t i m e o r e m e r g e n c y u s e a n d s e l d o m , i f ever, applied or intercepted prior to such use. (JCS Pub 102)

## Section Iii Special Abbreviations And Terms This Section Contains No Entries.

Active EPM.

Detectable measure, such as altering transm i t t e r  p a r a m e t e r s  a s  n e c e s s a r y ,  t o  e n s u r e friendly effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum.

## Passive Epm. U N D E T E C T A B L E  M E A S U R E S ,  S U C H  A S  O P E R A T I N G Asarda, 21

C2CM
Objectives, 17 Goals, 18 Strategy Implementation, 18, 31 Planning Guidelines, 32, 33
Command, Control and Communications Countermeasures, 14, 15c, app a, 35a(5)
DCSOPS, 22 DISC4, 26 DCSINT, 25 DCSLOG, 24 DCSPER, 23 Decide, Detect, Deliver Methodology, 31c Direct Measures, 16a(1) Electronic Deception, 16b G3 Staff, 32a, 32b, 212e High value targets, 15c, 33b, 28i Indirect measures, 16a(2) Low Intensity Conflict, 33c Major Army Commands, 28 Operation Security, 15b, 18h, 33, app a Rules of Engagement, 32b Security Classification Guidance, 35 Smart Munitions, 18g

Tactics, Techniques and Procedures, 28i
Tailored Analytical Intelligence Support to
 Individual EW, C3CM Projects, 15c,
 app a, 25a

Wartime Reserve Modes, 16b

## Usapa

ELECTRONIC PUBLISHING SYSTEM TEXT FORMATTER ... Version 2.45

PIN:
                 049349000
DATE:
                 11-24-98
TIME:
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PAGES SET:
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DATA FILE:
              a17.fil
DOCUMENT:
              AR 52520
DOC STATUS:
              NEW PUBLICATION