DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
UNITED STATES ARMY INTELLIGENCE & SECURITY COMMAND
FREEDOM OF INFORMATIONIPRIVACY OFFICE
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-5995
MAY 2 6 2OZ1
Freedom of Information/
Privacy Office

Mr. Steven Aftergood
Federation of American Scientists
1112 16th Street NW, Suite 400
Washington, DC 20036

Dear Mr. Aftergood:

This is in further response to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request of February 19,

2019, and supplements our response of November 20, 2019.

As noted in our letter, coordination has been completed with another government agency and

a field manual has been returned to this office for our review and direct response to you.

We have completed a review of the field manual in accordance with Executive Order (EO)

13526. As a result of this review, information has been sanitized from the public disclosure
provisions of the FOIA pursuant to Title U.S. Code 552 g (b)(3) which applies to information
exempt from disclosure by statute. The statute invoked under Title 5 U.S. Code 552 g (b)(3) is
50 U.S.C. S 3024(i), which allows for the protection of intelligence sources and methods. The
field manual is partially releasable and is enclosed for your perusal.

Since the release of the information deleted from the manual would result in an unwarranted

invasion of the privacy rights of the individual concerned, the information is exempt from the
public disclosure provisions of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) pursuant to Title 5 U.S.
Code 552 g (b)(6)

The withholding of the information described above is a partial denial of your request. This

denial is made on behalf of Major General Gary W. Johnston, Commanding, U.S. Army
Intelligence and Security Command, who is the Initial Denial Authority for Army intelligence
investigative and security records under the FOIA. You have the right to appeal this decision to
the Secretary of the Army. Your appeal must be postmarked no later than 90 calendar days
from the date of this letter. After the 90-day period, the case may be considered closed.
however, such closure does not preclude you from filing litigation in the courts. You should
state the basis of your disagreement with the response and provide justification for a
reconsideration of the denial. An appeal may not serve as a request for additional or new
information. An appeal may only address information denied in this response. Your appeal is to
be made to this office to the below listed address for forwarding, as appropriate, to the
Secretary of the Army, Office of the General Counsel.

Commander
U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command
Freedom of Information/Privacy Act Office
2600 Ernie Pyle Street, Room 3S02-B
Fort George G. Meade, Maryland 20755-5910

Additionally, we have been informed by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for

Intelligence & Security (USD(I&S), a component of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and
the Joint Staff (OSD/JS) that their information is exempt from public disclosure pursuant to 5
U.S. Code g 552 (b)(3), which pertains to information specifically exempted by a statute
establishing particular criteria for withholding, applying Section 50 u.s.c. g 403-1 (i)(1), which
protects intelligence sources and methods.

The withholding of the information by the USD(I&S), OSD/JS constitutes a partial denial of

your request and you have the right to appeal this decision.
                                                        If you decide to file an appeal, you

should write to the appellate authority, Ms. Joo Chung, Director of Oversight and compliance,
Office of the Secretary of Defense, by writing directly to the following address: 4800 Mark
Center Drive, ATTN: DPCLTD, FOIA Appeals, Mailbox# 24, Alexandria, VA 22350-1700. Your
appeal must be received within 90 days from the date of this letter. Please cite reference 20-
FC-0068 assigned to your request so that it may be easily identified.

If you have any questions regarding this action, feel free to contact this office at 1-866-548-

.mil/FAcTs/casestatus.as

5651 or email the INSCOM FOIA office at: usarmy.meade.902-mi-grp-mbx.inscom-foia-service-
center@mail.mil and refer to case #0069F-20. Please note that you now have the ability to
check the status of your request online via the U.S. Army Records Management and
Declassification Agency (RMDA) website:
                                     htt s://www.foia.arm

Please refer to FOIA Control Number: FP-20-003252. You may also contact the INSCOM FOIA
Public Liaison, Mrs. Joanne Benear, for any further assistance and to discuss any aspect of your
request at 301-677-7856. Additionally, you may contact the Office of Government Information
Services (OGIS) at the National Archives and Records Administration to inquire about the FOIA
mediation services they offer. The contact information for OGIS is as follows.. Office of
Government Information Services, National Archives and Records Administration, 8601 Adelphi
Road-OGIS, College Park, Maryland 20740-6001, email at o
                                                           nara. ov, telephone at 202-741-

5770. toll free at 1-877-684-6448. or facsimile at 202-741-5769.

Sincerely, H EATON.MICHA Digitally 51gned by HEATON.MICHAEL.TODD.I
EL.TODD.I 1609 160922075
-04.00.

22075
Michael T. Heaton
Director
Freedom of Information/Privacy Office

Investigative Records Repository

Enclosure

JULY 2018
requiresprote achuc8.1e.rnbx.doCtrine@rnall mil.

ferred lo ATtM:*AT
DESTRUCTI
Destroy by any method t nce with AR 380
tlication supersede FO,R OFFICIALIJSE,ONLY.

1775, Ins critiGal -
ontractots
85 jt con dated 1 0Vernber 1997
aragraph
'1181&herl was made on 14 Maroh 2
Amty Intelligence Center of Excellence,
'11 S,April

This publication is available at the Arniy Publishiiig Directc)rate site
(htt s://arm
ubs.arm
.mil), and the Central Army Registry site
(htt s://atiam.train,arm
.miVcatalo /dashboard).

## Intelligence (U) Contents (U)

Page
PREFACE (U) ........ .
vll
INTRODUCTION (U)....
FUNDAMENTALS (U).,..
Chapter 1
.1-10
1-10
.1-12
1-13
1-13
.1-16
1-16 1-16
.1.18
Section l - Intelllgence Overvlew (U)........ ..... .
Categories of Intelligence Products (U),........
Characteristics of Effective Intelligence (U).....
The Inlg11igence Warlighting Function (U).....,.
The Intelligence Process (U) .
National to Tactical Intelligence (Uj...
Sectlon 11- The Role of the Commander and Staff (U)..
The Commander (U)....... .
The Staff (U)....
Operational Art (U) .
Operational Framework (U).....
Section111- Antlcipated Operatlonal Environments and Threats (U).
The Operational Environment (U)
Multl-Domain Extended Battlefield and Operatlons (U)
Threats
IU)........
.1.19
Sectlon IV-
Intelligence and the Army's Strateglc Roles (U)..
INTELLIGENCE STAFF ACTIVITIES
(U)........
Chapter 2
.2-12
Sectlon l - General G-21S-2 Responslbllities (U).. .
Sectlon11-"Intelllgence Staff Support to the Commander (U).....
Intelligence Support to the Military Decision-making Process (U) ..
Intelligence and the Integrating Processes (U)
Information Collection (U)......

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Dlstrlbution authorlzed to U.S. Government agencles and thelr coniractors only as rt contains crilical information that requires protection in accordance with AR 25-55, dated 1 November 1997, paragraph 3-200, Exemption Number 3, subparagraph h. This determination was made on 14 March 2018. Other requests must be referred to ArrN: ATZS-DST-D, U.S, Army Intelllgence Center of Excellence, Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-7017, or via e-mail at rin DESTRUCTION NOTICE: Destroy by any method that will prevent disclosure ot contents or reconstruction of the document in accordance wiih AR 380-5.

This publication supersedes FM 2-0, dated 15 April 2014.

Contents (U)
.2-15
Types of Intelligence Products (U)..
INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS (U)....
Chapter 3
Mililary Intelligence Unit Operations (U)
.3-15
. 3-17
Information Collection and Intelligence Operations (U) .
Intelligence Operations and the Supported Unit Staff (U)
Intelligence Operations Guidelines (U) .
Applying the Operations Pracess in Intelligence Operations (Uj.
Task-Organizing (U)........
Technical Channels (U)
INTELLIGENCE STAFFS AND UNITS
(U)........
...
Chapter 4
National and Joint Intelligence Support (U) .
Theater Army (U) .
Corps (U)
Division (Uj..
4-10
.4-13
.4-17
Brigade Combat Team (Uj....
Battalion (U) .
Chapter 5
5-17
INTELLIGENCE AND THE ARMY'S STRATEGIC ROLES (U).. ,........ .
Overview (U) .....,....
Shape (U)........
Prevent (U).
Conduct Large-Scale Ground Combat (U) .
Consolidate Gains
(U).......
. 5-20
Win
(U)......
Chapter 6
FIGHTING FOR INTELLIGENCE DURING LARGE-SCALE COMBAT
OPERATIONS (U)...
Overview
(U) ........
The Challenge (U).
The Commander's Role and Slaff Integration (U) .
Intelligence Analysis (U)
Information Requirements (Uj..
The Intelligence Architecture and the Information Collection Plan (Uj.
Effective Inlormation Colleclion (U)
.6-16 .6-17
Developing the Situation and Continuous Information Collection (Uj...
Appendix A
INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION CAPABILITIES BY ECHELON
(U)..,........ .
Appendix B
ARMY TACTICAL TASKS FOR THE INTELLIGENCE WARFIGHTING FUNCTION
(u).
Appendlx C
JOINT TASK FORCE AND UNIFIED ACTION PARTNER CONSIDERATIONS (U)

Appendix D FORCE PROJECTION OPERATIONS CONSIDERATIONS (U)........
Appendix E GENERAL INTELLIGENCE PROVISIONS AND AUTHORITIES (U)..

Appendix F LANGUAGE SUPPORT CONSIDERATIONS (U).,.......
Glossary.1
GLOSSARY (U)........
REFERENCES (U)........ ...
. Index-1
INDEX (U)...
.
References.1

## Figures (U)

Introductory figure. (U) FM 2-0 logic chart
Figure 1-1.
(U) Intel igence
reach........,....
1-15
Figure 1-2. (U) Key aspects of the operational framework
1-18
Figure 1-3. (U) Windows of opportunity in a multi-domain extended battlefield
1-20
Figure 1-4. (U) Conflict continuum and the range of military operations...
1-21
.2.12
Figure
1-5. (U)
Intelligence and the Army's strategic roles.
Figure 2-1.
(U) G-21S-2 staff activity support to information collection
.2-16
Figure 2-2. (U) Intelligence product examples
.2-19
Figure 2-3. (U) Written intelligence summary example.....
. 2-21
Figure 2-4. (U) Intelligence running estimate example
Figure 3-1 .(U) Intelligence operations
supportto information
collection.
Figure 3-2. (U} Information collection overlay example........
Figure 3-3. (U) ISR collection in a joint environment...
Figure 3-4. (U) Intelligence support......
.3-10
Figure 3-5. (U} Troop leading procedures sequenced to the military decision-making process.. 3-12
Figure 3-6. (U> Technical channels .
.3-18
Figure 5-1.
(U) Notional large-scale combat joint phasing model.
Figure 5-2. (U) Enemy situation template example...
Figure 5-3. (U) Decision support template example........
5-11
Figure 5-4. (U) Information collection matrix example .
.5-12
Figure 5-5. (U) Enemy and friendly forces
.5-13
Figure 5-6. IU) Named area of interest overlay example.......
.5-14
Figure 5-7. (U) Example offensive action........
Figure 5-8. (U) Consolidation area during large-scale combat operations
.5-16
Figure 5-9 (U) Synchronizing information collection and operations in the consolidation area.. 5-17
Figure 6-1.
(U) Setting conditions lo develop a posilion of relative advantage.......

## (B) (3)

Figure B-3. (U) Support to situational understanding........
-B-13
Figure B-4. (U) Information collection...
.B-17

## Tables (U)

Table 1-1. (U) IPB and intelligence analysis support to operational framework considerations . 1-14
Table 2-1. (U) Intelligence support to the military decision-making process .
Table 2-2. (U) Staff input to IPB products...
2-11
Table 2-3. (U) Intelligence support to targeting
3-16
Table 3-1.
(U) Army command relationships.
3-17
Table 3-2, (U) Army support relationships.

Table 6-2. IU) Intelligence requirements associated with the offense..... Table A-1.

{U) National and joint intelligence collection capabilities

Table A-2. (U) Theater army intelligence collection capabilities.
Table A-3. (U) Corps intelligence collection capabilities........ Table A-4. (U) Division intelligence collection capabilities.
Table A-5. {U) Brigade combat team intelligence collection capabilities..
.A-11
Table A-6. (U) Legend for tables A-1 through
A-5........
Table C-1.
(U) Joint ISR and Army information collection responsibilities
Table C-2. (U) Fusion center participants.

## Preface (U)

(U)
FN12-n repre,%ent.4an iiiipoi.iant tLP loH'Jrd chanoin(Ythe ArmyL Iilture Jnd iinprnving Army I'Ladine.%.q h), ;Iddre%%i ni7 I IIL f.und amen t11 % aiid tiicl ic& a,qsnci ciled wil h i ntel lig7ciice duri n o Icir(ye_sca le cnmhal npei.al i(Ins.

Thi% publicaii()n dL%cribcs thc r()Ic ()t' thc L()niniandLr Jnd sldff in inicllicicncc. intclligiLncc sial:f ,IctivitiL%.

aiid Iii)w Iiiililarv iiilLIIiOLIILL (,Ml) uiiil.s LoiiduLt inlLI)igLllLL OPLI'aiii)n.s
<1.% pari i)f ii?Ini'riilli()Il Ll)IILLIii)J)
aci.oss tlic Arniy'% sirc1tc(Tic rolcs, FNq 2~0 cllso Loniains Ihc dc.%ci'iptions of thc Arniy iactlci1 tcl.sks includLd in thc inlcll iccncL wJrfiohiin(y t"uncLion, docLrinc 011 foroc projLction, and doctrinL ()n1inou4lbYc SllPPC)rl. Thi.s nianual i.s de.%igined In be u.sed wilh ADP.S/ADRP.% ?_(): -3_0. -3-07, -1-?8, .1_gn, and S-o, and wilh FMS .l_O,
( Ll ) The prinL"ipal iiudicnce f()r FM 2-0 is every .S()IdiLr aiid Dcp'irtineni ()f Ihe Ariny Ciiilicin whn pJriicip,1le iii or Nvith tlic intelligence wai"fiolilino functioii. Conimanders aiid .st<iff.s of Armv headquai"iei'.s serving cl.$
.j()itit liisk t"orLL i)r multinai ional hcadqiiartcr% 4hc)uld also retcr to cipplicablc .joint nr Irultinl1ional doctrinL
CLiiiceriiin(y j()inl inlellioence. FM 2-1) 1 l%0 .scrve% as a relerenee I'Dr per%onnel who <ire deiielnpinn docLrine,
',Idcr developinent. Inateri11 and t-Ol"LC siriicliii'e. and insiillltional qi nd Llllit (raining foi- inielli<7enLL'
()pcr<lti()n%.

( U) Coinmaiiders. .(itcift's, and sub()rd inate.8 en.%LifL Iheii. dec i.sioin4 and clLli(In.% Loiiipl), wilh ippliLaL)le Uiiiied
,Sicltc% ( U.S. ).. inicrn&ltional, and. in some Lil.se%. ho.sl-llc1tion lais ind re(iul<il i(Iii%. Comm<indci-.s ai all ILI'els LII%Lirc thcir SoldiLrs ()pcr'ite in aLcorJanLe with thL law of war,Ind thL rulLs of Lnii'igemcnt. (Scc F1 27-10.)
(Ll). F,Kl ?.O uses joint IL'rms whLre c1pplicablL. SeleL led joini and Army terni.% Jnd dLt-initiOn.R appLar in b(Iih the (yloss<ify dnd IliL text. For dcfinitions slinwn in Ihe texi. (lie tLrm i.s itdlicized. cind the nuinbei. of the pr()pnnent publicaii()n I"()11()WS Lhc dctinili()n. This publ iLaii()n is n()t Ihc prop()ncnt f()r Liny Arniy Icrm.%.

( LI ) FM ?_() ipplie.s toi tlie AL li lie Ai-111 J., tlic Ai-niy Naiioiii1 GLiai"d/AI-niy Nalioiial Gii<lrd of Ihe Uii lied Sialc8, dnd Ihc U,S. Arniy RcsLri'e unlLss ()tIILfv'i%C siatLd.

{ U) Tl)e pr()PollLnl ot" FM ?_n i.s Ihe U.S. Arniy Inicllj(yenLe CL'nier (iJ- E.xcellencc. The prL'parin a(yency i the Dii"ecioratc. ot Docirine ciiid Intel liaence SyKrenis Ti'1ining, U.S, Ilrnii, IntelliiJc,Iice C'enier ot. Excel lence..

SLnd Ii'riticn LoniniLni% cind rcL()mniendic lions 011 a DA Fnrni ?a?8 (Rccoinmcndcd ChaiigLs tci Public<iiiolls Sii"eei, e-lnail Fori I luachucc1, AZ
85613-7017;
by to Lind Blank FuJ"In%) lo CuniiniindLr, U.S. Army IntLIIiuiiLC CcniLr ul ExLellLnLe: ATTN.. ATZS-DST-D
(FM ?_O).

55()
Cibeque
.FILiachuLa.iLue.mbx.dnLlrine @m.2il.Iiiil; or subiiiil an clLLtrc)nic DA Forni ?{)18, Tliis page iiitentionally left blaiik.

## Introduction (U)

(U) Tlie Arini, Iiiusl reorient nn large-.&L'ile gyround Loinbai while .&imuli<lLie()u.sly conduciing ()thei' iy'pes i)f
(Iperalinn%
lr1dWIde tn prLI'ent pcer threat%
fi-nin gainin(7
L()n%idLraiioiis nLcLssarv i() aLliicvc Inilitarv SULCLSS in thL LurrLnt opcraiion<l1 en'IronMent reinain t-undanieni<llly uiILI)a1141L J, l)ul wlial Fia.s Ll)iiigLd 1,4 i17lPL')riaiii. AJ'iiiy f()I'LL,S LJJlIll)I f(')cu,% ,%olL ly 01) l<if(7L-.scalL gri.iu nd L()ITibai J prcpared for large-scale nround combat 17Lncr,2le4 crediblL'
opcrations at thc CXPLII.SL Df thL Othcr Inii.sion%. but thLy al%o Cinnot afford 10 bc unprcparcd for largc~SC<11c coiiib1L I
OPLration% in an incrcasiiigly un%Uible world. Bcin(y dL terreiiL e aiid contributes tc) WLirld wide st&ibil ily. ThL fulure require% the lethal theclter armics, cc)rps, di vision8, and brinadL'.s Iiecesi<iry tn Londucr (IPLratioiis with tliL riiyht mix (If torce.s neccssary to execuie taLtic<il tasks lo
'ILhiL VL ()PLratlOllS L2nd %tri11L>OjL CToal.s.

i U) fm ?_O providLS doctriiic tor Iiow Ariny forLL.S.
a.% a Pcirl Ot- cl .joint iecllll aiid iii Lon.junclioii witli uiiified
aL lion pai't nLr.s, dLI'clop intcl Ii&yLnLc to .supp(Irt i)pcrlti()n%. It dcsLri bc% Inlcll igcncc <2nd i ntcl l i gyc ncL opcrations
Usino Lurrent Ai"Inv cap<ibil itlLs aiid forniil1i1)ns in today's (IPLration'il environinLnt. Iniell igenLL 1% ci'ilical in a
coinplLx opei.ai ionL11 environiiient <igainsi a peer hrL <1t.
(U) IntelliL7cnLL drivLs opcraiions cind OPLration% LnablL intLlligencc. Coniniandcrs 41nd %taft4 nL'cd timely, acLurate.

relevanti ind prediciivL inielli genLe to understaiid Ihreai chc1flLierisllcs, g(ial% and objective,s, 11nd courses of action to SLICLL4i.sfully LXCL Iilc offensi ve and defensive lil.sk% in lai"(Te-.gcalL conibat operatioii.s. Pi-LCiSL in(elligence i% also critical to targLt thrL,'It iapabil itic.s al thc right tiinc 1nd place and IL) opcn wind()w,% of opporiunily aLro%s doiniin.%, p,IrtiLuI;Irly dLll-ing 1irge-%cale coinbat OPLf<ltions. Coniiii.1nderKi and &lat"fs must haiie detailed knowledge ot" threat .%lrcngths,
'ulnLrahi lities. ()r&iani/atinn.%. CqulPTiicfiL. capahilitie%, an(1 t2CtiC,R lil plan tor ai)d execute unified land nperalinns.

( U ) ThL i ntr()duL toi"y f I gurL ()n PcigL% Vl il 1.% Ihe fm 2-() II)IllL Lhart. Thc chiiri dcpiLt% FNI 3-0 d()clrinal c()nstruLt
011 Il)L lefi .%ide ai)J .bUPPOJ'I jiio jiiielliociiLL waJ"fig)hri jig fiii)L tioii doctriJ)a I coii.sli LlCt.s 011 IIIL I'j ohi .side of Ihe cli&1rt.

Thc li&iurL bL(Tin,%
by.showiiigIhL
Lfiiic11ily()f illlclligicnci in a Loiiiplcx (Ipcrcltional LnvirciniiiLnt, whiLh incliidc,s Lc)ns'idLrati()n% Lluriiio liirfYe.4cal comb1L I i)pcr'ilic)ns a (iai nst peer thrL'ils. I nlel li genLe iq nLtivorked. ,4ynLhroni2Ld, and collaboratl I'L t"roiii n'ilion<11 to I'IL IiL,'Il LcFieloiis. Intcl l illL llcL SLlPP()ris the Ariny opei"aiional concept of uni lied l'ind ()PLratlC)n% and thL L'onduLt ()f operation,s. IntclligLllLL %upporis Lolliin<lndcr.s and deciAi()n Inakcrs by leiici"Ic gying niiionLII-levL'I to l<lLtiL al-ILvel Ccipabi li tlLS 10 seize, ret'iiii, aiid L.Kploil thL i nitlcilll'e. I nlL IligenLe and the iiitellicrciice prepai"c1tioii of Ihe biiltlefield (IPB ) Pl-c)ce.s.s assist iii devel()pinbY ali in-depih uiiderslciiiding of rLlcN'int aspccl.% ot" Ihc OPLfltional Lnvironincnl aiid IhL Ihrcai. Ba%cd c)n IPB rLsuIIs. LnmiiianLlcrs Visuliliic Ihc de.sirLd Lnd slate and <1 broad coiiccpl ()f li(11 lo shape cui"I"eni coiidilionq i Illo Ih1L l Lnd .51lte.

i Ll ) Diiriiig7 Icirc7e_fcglL CLinibi?t opei <11ion.s, Arni), tni'ce.% will1i1ive to tighi tor inlelligence. I ntell igenct 1.% complex, c lid '1 PLcr thrL1t Laii counicr Army t"orccs intL IligLnLC Lt'f()rlS. T() aLhicvc siiuationcll undcrsiandi ng aoainst a thrLcl(. IriLiidl), forLL'% Illusl slri I'e tu idLiiiifs' ur o)peii winduw.s uf UPPLifLunit J, (IL ru%% d()miiin%. Sidrr i nteurdliun i diftiL uli bul LruLial; Ihe ,siat'f niu,%t work Ic)neilier to overcomc Lliallen(7e.4i clnd niiti(vate inform<l1inn Lolleciion Lcipabili Iy 11nd qysieiii l iiiiaiions by devL loping Lin i ntLJgTrrated inforniaiion col leciiori pl,In. A SULce.%%tul iiiforiiialion colleciioii effort is key to acliiei'ing .Ind Lxploilinil si;Ilt Clin Ihen An,IlyLe. intorm,?lioii collLcljL)n resu 11.% 41nil proiij(IL prodiiL l.s. IipdAtLS, ,'Ind prc(IiLtj VL ,I.%.sessinLnts that %iipport tcugeiin(T
decision niLikincy and the Lxecution of branLhL.s and/or .sequels. These complexilies place a %iikynifiLiini demand ()n inll liinLL pr(IfL.i.SIL)llcils l() elldblv nii%%i()n LL)lliiniind, fdLi lil<ilL iniliali lie, dnd %uppui"I
Lciniin<indcr.s and %t<lff.s in CXCLUtiiio l<iilorLd soluiinn.% for Lomplcx problcins.

i U) ThL filial and nin.%t crucial aspeLt of iiitclligence is the l.olc of the coniinandei-. The commk111dci- ow'n% the iiilcllibicnLL c ft()rt. To .%llLLL.ssfully di rcct the iniclli (ycncc cf fort. IhL Loinmindcr Ind .slaff Inu&t under%tLind niany a%peLt.% ol. IiitL Ill.

l7enLe, including the iiitelligyence coi'L Lompetenciei, the intLllig7ence proce.%%, <111d (he Arm).

intLlliocnLL Cap'ibililies. This I'equire% close inleracii(In bLtween Ihe conimander and Ihe G-?/S-2. The coniniandei"
d ii"eLts IIIL iIIILlligciiLL wai.figlitiiia tullc(ioii Ilii ougli Loiisiaiii eiigagLII)Lnl willi IIIL G-?/S-? aiid Ilie I'Ll4llion.sliip IIILY dLkcIop.

pn%itinns nf .%tralLgic 1idi'Jntage.

Mi1n)' ()t' (he
2 Posltions of relalive advantige. The intellinence

## Introduction (U) Introducllon (U)

defensive,
                stabduyorDSCAmkstome retain, and
                                                                      'wmm
                                                                                                      'm'm"'"fl'
exploit the initative 10 shape the
                                                environment,
                                                                     mmm\el'fowmmeNalnnsm
prevent conflict, consolidate gains, and win the Nation's
                                                                     synchronizes with unified acton partners
                                                                                                         mmmm
wars as part of a unified action.
                                                                     MWWWNQM

wars as part of a uThfied aiam.

Intellyenc 18 tritK*I in
' operdtryml wrKkM of .
opportunty acn)ss the dorTwns,
Windows of Opportunity
Intelligence is critical in udontiyng operational windows of
opportunity across the domains,
but sometimes t is necessary
1o take achon fo ensure successful intelligence collection.
lo take adrn to ensure Intellen
IMndow5 of Opportunlty
ut xTOrneS rt  n&7ssary

To Achieve and Exploil Positions of Refative Advaniage ro AGhEtrE arnl Extknil ol Relalwe Aifvanlaje

Secunty operations
                                                     To direct the intelligence effort, the commander and staff
                                                     must understand
                                                                          the fundamental Army intelligence

effort, tho Commander and $tafl To dkect the Into111
doctrinal constructs:
must understsnd t - fundamental Army Intelligence dootrlnal constructs:

## Introduction (U)

( U) FN4 2-() dLscribL4 thc tactlLS all echelon.4 usc to coiiduLI intelligence opcrations:
ChaptL'r I pi-esLiIL% IIIL fuiiddi1iLnl ol" AL flly iiilellj cyeiiLe di?Llriiial LciiisLruL Is. AddiLioii<illy, i I
dL.%CribCs thL rolL%I of thL coiiiinandLr and Slilf t. in intcll inLncC, Chapter 2 pr()vidcs tIIL G-?/S-? rc(ipon%ibililics IhLI1 qUPPL)ri Ihe c()nduci of opcration.% aLro.%s all eLhcloiis. li also dc.%LI-ibLS how thc iiitll i neiice .%llt'f %uppoi'ts the coniinander.

Chapter 3 addre%ses intell igenLe operationl wiih cin emphc1sis on the mis,sion conim1nd of Ml uni(.S.

IIiiLIIiiiLIILL UPLldli()11.% LL)IIJULied by MI uiiils lulluw IIIL Ariiiy'% fi"diiiew()I'k lur excrLi.SjIICY IIIjS%j()I)
climniand Ilic Iipcfiltions priiccs,%. TIIL npLration.% prncc(is dc%ci'ibLs Ihc aclil'itlcs PLrt'ornicd b), any niilit.Ii')' Iinil 10 &lccomplish a Ini%%ion. ThL %anie activitics describe what MI unit aLlions do to
 Lconipli%h Ihc tasks cis%igncd to thLni to Auppori Ihc coinniandLr. Additinnally, Lhaptcr 3 providcs iiitelljnence ()PLI'c1tioii,q guidL line% 1 nd a deilc iled discu.s(iion ot" ta.qk-orcflc nizing con.sidLfc1tions.

Chapter 4 diqcussL& intellibienLe %tiff% l< nd unit% frnm Ihe11er army toIhL battalion ILwel, as well theii. iIitLlligence col lection 'ind .11 l-%OLifLe intel lig7Lnce Cclpclbilities.

Chdpter 5 discusse% intel li (ycnce Iviihin Ilic Arni) s stralegic I'oles.

Cliapter 6 discuA%Ls fiolitiiig t'or iiitLI ligLIICL dui'iiig l ai"gic-%cale coiiibat opei'i tioiis. TIIL Lliapter Linpha.%lLS IhL i lliclli&7cllLe L hallcnge, intellicl]Le 4lnL11y(>lS support, diffcreni i nformiltion rc(iuiremenlN, hc)W to nvei"coine qoirc ot Ilie Lli,2llenftes ot. inforinatinn collection, and the continuous niture of iiit-ormLltion collectioii.

Appendix A discuq(iLs the employincnt of n,Itional-Ici'LI to batt.I1ion-level intclli(YLnLc collection Lapcibi lillC.%.

Appendix B lists thL Arniy laciiLal tLisks cl.SSOLialLd with thc intcllioLncc W6lrfighting tunction. Ta%k dcsLI"iPtions hLive been revisLd to incDrporatL doctrine on information collection (2nd oihei- chcinoes niide b), ADRP 1-01
Appendix C ciddrcssLs considcrcltionb thiiL G-?/S-?s musl addrcs,q when c)pLraLinft as P1rt of Ll joint lask force or IllLI,tlllcltinnal fni'Le.

Appendi% D dcNcribLS tnrcc projcLIic)n OPLfLltinn% and Ihc rLquifLd intcl lj (TcnLc .support l() uddrcs.

the .%PLcific nuaiiceA of Iiiobili2ation: deplovinLnt. eniployment, sustaining inlelligLncL cap,Ibiliti%.

'Iiid rcdcployiiicnt.

Appendix E di%cu%%e% intLlligcnL'L proN'i,qions and authorilics.

Appeiidix F dibc u.%ses tlie Loii%idLraliL)11.S t"()I" laiic?ucigc .supporl.

( U) Thi.% publiLati(111 U(iCS Ihe tLrin Ilii"e(Il, whiLh includc.q all cnemies and adN'Lr.%aric% thclt are a P<1rt ot" thc opcrational Lnvironnicnt.

( U ) FN4 2-() 11.KL'.S thL word Iliecifer to iiicl iL<ltc Ihpcilei. of'()i?eriifii)11.F.

I U) FM ?_O refeis io elLment% of in(elligenLe staff oI'oaiiization.s by the name used for them in table.s of i)I"giaiJi Ldliuii iiid Lquipii)L'iil. IVlieii Ld%k-cii'gidiiiLLd iii <1 L()ITlllldnd pi)si, Iliese ()I'cyaiiiLaiion.% l uifi I I tlic rolL uf"
laft- LIciMLni.s as dL%LribLd iii FM (I-().

I'U) Acrunyms ari introduced ai their tir.st U%e in the tront matter ot thi,% publicQtion (pretace L1nd inii.odiictioii ), lind a(Y<iin in the bocly ot the piibl ic<ltion (ch,Iptei"s ,Ind <1ppLndixe%).

and J-2) ,Icronyin% at Ihcir first use with()ui
(U) FM 2-0 inlroduLc.l> G-X. S-X. and J-X (%ULh a.% G-? S-?

LJelininL Lhm d%
IL IiindLfS re<id(Ibilii)'. DLfiniii()Ii% fuI" LhLNC iiLronyms Lcin be fuund in Ih ylub%dfy L)r Lhi publiciilion.

## Chapter 1 Fundamentals (U) Section I- Intelligence Overview (U) L- L. (U) Lommandersand Statt".S Require Accurate, LevInt, And Predi.Ctive Intelligence To Iinderstand Threai

characteristics, goals and objectives, and courses of action (COAS). Precise intelligence is also critical to target Ihreat capabilities at the right time and place a1 to open windows of opportunity acr05.8 domains, particularly during lar e-scale combat operations. Commanders and staffs rnust have detailed knowledge of threat strengths, vulnerabilities, organizations, equipment, capabilities. and iactics to plan for and exeute unified land operations.

1-2. (lj)
'I'he purpn,senf intel ligence i.$ to prnvide cnmmander,8 and ,staff,s with timely, accurate, relevant, predictive. and tailored inielligence about the enemy and other aspecLs of the operational environment.

IIitelligence supports the conduot-planning, preparing, executing, and assessing--of operations,
1-3.

(U) Intelligcnce drives thc conduct of operations and operations cnable intelligcnce, making intelligence and operations inseparable. Therefore, G-21S-2s ensure the intel ligence warfighting function operates effectivelv and efficiently. G-21S-2s are not simply managers; they are commanders, primary advisors on employing information collection a,ssets and driving infonnalion collection,
14. (U) Additiondlly, G-21S-2% suppurt Lummdnders with andlysi% dnd prL)duLtivn of timelv, klLLufiate, Iligence professionals relevant, and predictive intelligence tailored to commanders, specific needs. Int consistently Strive to provide intelligence that fc2cilitates the commander's situational understanding and supports operaiions.

1~5. (U) 'I"he integration and S]ChrOnization of the overall inteljigence effort are e8pecialJy challenging.

To be succ&ssful, G~21S-2s mu.st have a deep understanding of a number of intelligence doctrinal consirucLs:
Categories of intelligence products.

Characteristics of effective intelligence.

The intelligence K4'arfighiing function.

The intelligence process.

National to tactical intelligence.

## Categories Of Intelligence Products (U)

14. (U) Intelligence products are generally placed in one of eight production categories JP 2-0):
Warning intelligence. Warning intelligence are tho.se intelligence actiN'ities intended to deteci
and report tlme-sensit1'e intelligence informaiion on foreign developments that forewarn of
hostile actioiis or intention agaiiisi United States entities, partiiers, or interests (JP 2-0).
Current Intelllgence, This Inli1genCe pro%ides updaied support for ongoing operations. It
involvcs the integration of time-sensitive, all-sour intelligenLe and information into concise,
accurote, and objective reporting on thc arca of operations (AO) and current threat situation.
General militar) intelligence. General Iniliiairy iiitelligeiice is intel ligence concerning the
military capabilities of foreign countries or organizaiions, or topics affecting potenii&l United
States or rnuliinational tnilitar), operations (JP 2-0).
Torget Intelligenee. Targel inielligence ts inllIgenCe that portrays and locates the components
of a target or target complex and indicates its vulnerability and relative importance (JP 3-).
Scientific und technical intelligenL'e. S('ieiilific' ciiiil lec1711iL'al *iiilellige17c'e* is (hL product rcsuliing fr()In the i()Ilectioii. evalu6ltion, an<tls'si.s. 1nd intci-pretcill()n ()t fore ign scientific and lechnical inforin;Ifi(In Ihrll covLr%', cl. fL)I'eign (levelL)pniLnts in b<1SiC ,Ind ,1pplie(I resLclrch 11 nd in ,Ipplied engineerincy techniques: and b. sLieiitific aiid tLchniciil charac(eri.stic(i. cap.Ibilitie.s, and liiniiations ul. Lill I"()rL igiii nii lilify %y4ilL TII.%: WLiipi>ll.%, IVL'ilP()n ,iy%ILills. <irid IiiatLI'iLI: thL' fL%LcirLh and developniLni relaied tlierLto; and thc production Ineihods ciiiplovcd for Ihcir In<1nufi1cture
(JP 2-()1).

Counterintclli&yeiice. Cc)14iilvri171( l/IAJ(_'Iic'v 1.% inl"oriiiai ic)11 giiihcrcd cliid clL tiv itiL.% L()IiduLtLd lo identit"y, dLCLive, xplnil, di.qrupi:
L)r pri)tcci aft&iiiisI e%pinnacie; ()IhLr intLlligence acliN'ilie&, abolage, or a%.%,IS.sinalion% conducied tL)r or 011 belialf of forcign powers, organizations or pei.sons nr Ihcir,IgLnl%, ()r inicriiati()nal Icrriiri%l nrgiiini/.cltii)nA nr dLtiviiics I'.IP ?.()1.2).

Estimative intelligence. E.I'lii??cili I'i, i171L,l/i,iJeiii'' is intel ligenLe Ihal idL ntitie%. describes, ciiid t'orecasts adver%arv capcibilities lind Ihc iinplications f()r planning lind e.Keculi nft Inil liar), peratioJi.s ( JP ?_O).

Identity intL'lligenLe. Icleiilili, iiilelli,gi'n('(' 1.% IIIL intLlligycnLe rL%U Itino tri)ni the proLL%.4ing ()t identit J, aiiribuiLs L()IiccrninLi indiN'idu<l15, group%, nLtiv()rk.s. ()r p(IpulLiiion.s ()f i nlere.st (JP 2-n).

## Characteristics Of Effective Intelligence (U)

1-7. j LJ ) 'I'hL Ct-t-LCIi VLne.q nf inicl l incnce 1% IllLa%urcd 41gai n%l IhL' releiiani i nt-nrinali()n qucll ily critLfi c?.,
Accuracy. To the exiLlli p()ssible, intellib?eFice s hould accurately identit.y threat iiiienli()n.s.
Lap(Ibilities, l i niit1tions. <lnd dispnsition.s. li %hoLild bL dei.ived trc)m multiple soiirces &2nd
di,%ciplinc% l() Ini ni niic thc possibi lity of dcLcpiinn ()r nii(ii ntcrprLt<l1ion. Al iernati or
L()llii"adiLI()I'y lSSLS%IIILIIIS bhi)uld IIL pfL%LiIILd, wliLII IILLL%SilJ'y, tl) LIIKiUI"L balaiicL and unbiascd iniell igence.

Tiiiieliiiess. IIILLI ligiciiic, [)ruvidLd Cdrly, suppurls OPLI"aii(Iiis ai)L] prei'ciit,% Surprise fi'oiii Ilii'eiil actic)ns. It niusi flow continuouqlv to Ihc coniniandci. bcforc, during, and aficr an opcr,1lion.

Intcl li iienLc orcpaniati()ns, dltaba4se,%. aiid produLt,s niu.%t be airailable In develop estirnale,s, miike decisioii%. and plili OPLritions.

Usability. Intcll igicnLL Inusl be in IhL Lori"cLt diiia-fi Ic .spcc ific'ilinns for dal.Iba%in&Y and di.%pl,1)'.

Llsabilit! t"1ciliialc% fLirihL'r ,1n,Ily%i%. prodLIL'tion of inlL,IlibTLnLe, inlLTh(yrali(In ()f the prodLlCt ,IL"fns%
thu staff, and u.sL Iviihin ()perations.

ComplL'teness. InielligLIILe bi-ieting% aiid produci.s L'onvey 111 ot- Iftie nece%.%aryi coniponents (n bL
a% CL)mplLIL a,% pos.siblc, Precisioii. InielligienLe briL fing% cind pr()diici% providc. thc reqiiircd IL)iiel of det<li l Jnd coniplLKiIs'
Io cinswer the requirenienis.

Reliabilitv. Inielligence L v.Il Illc le.s cinil LILlvrtTli nes the exleni to which Ihc collccled int()I"mllion and Ihe int'orinaiion bL ing u%ed in inlLlliTeiice briefi n47S ciiid pi'oducts are Ii'ustworihv. uncLirrupied.

Lind unJi4it(.)riLd. Any LUIILLrn41 Ivlth thL fLliibilily ()r inLLlliyLnLL Inust bL %liilLd up fr()ni.U}
Inielli ociice niust al.so nieet three idditioncil cJ"iteric1."
Relevdnl. InielligienLe suppurLii Ihe Luinniander'%> I'LILiiremLnls.

Predictive. Inielligence inform() the cominandci" abLILlI wh<lt the thre1 l Lan do (Ihreai C<lpabililies.

eiiipliasiLillg Ilie IiiList dil[](YCI"OUi tlii'Lai COA) aiid is 111()sl likel), 10 di) (Ilie Iiic)%t likely Ihreai COA).

Thc iiitLlligencL Stat"f .should aiilicip<ltL Ihc conimandLr % intcl li nLIICL nced,s.

Tailo l'ed. I IilLII i gL JILL is ,sliai"Ld aiid d i%bciii i natLd 111 tlic foi'iiiLIt I"equcslLLI by tIIc LoiiiJiiaiidLI", siibordinc11c coinniandcrs. and 8taff.s. It should support and .8clti.sfy thc conirncindcr'.8 priorilics. ThL
intel lincnLc %taff prc4ents Llcar, LOllClSL intL I ligencc thilt IiieLI.s Ihc Lomiiiandcr. s prcfcrLnccs, faL il itates siiuaiionl1 under%iaiidi Iig. (ind is usable for decisioii Inciking oi" oiher aclions.

## Thf. Intfli.Igencf Warfighting Function (U)

1-8. (U) Inlelligence is ( l ) the product resulting frorn the collection, processing. integrdtion, evaluation, analysis, and intrpretation of available information concerning foreign nation,s, hostile or potentially hostile forces or element,$, or areas of actual or N)tential operntions; (2) the actiiiities that result in the producl; and
(3) the organizations engaged in such activities (JP 2-0). Intelligence Is both a function and u process that enables the Army to conduct operations.

1-9, (U) The inielligence warfighling fynclion i.s the related tasks and system8 that facilitate understanding the enemy, ierrain, weather, civil considerations. and other siunificani aspects of the operational cnvironment
(ADRP 3-0). Specifically, otjier sigIiifILll a.SPCLts of LI operational eiiTriroiiment iiiclude thre41ts, adversaries, the operational variable.8 (political, military, economic, social, infomation, infra.8tructure, physical environment, and time [PMESll-wr]), and other aspects depending on the nature of operations. (See ADRP 2-0 for more information on the intelligence warfighting function.)

Intelllgence warflghtlng functlon tasks (U)
(U) Provide Intelligence support to force generation.

l- l O. (U) The intelligence warfighting function is the Army's contribution to the intelligence effort.

It executes Ihe intelligence pr(Ke.ss by employing intelligencc capabilities. (See appendix A for morc on the einployment of intelligence capdbilities,)
The inielligence warfighiin8 funciion facilitstes support to Ihe cornrnander and staff thiough supporting tasks, which are intetTelaied, require the participation of the commander and staff, and arc often conducted simultaneously. (See appendix B for a detailed descripiion of the intelligence warfighting function tasks.)

## The Intelligence Process (U)

l - I l . (U) The design and StruLiure of Ihe intelligence process support LoJnmanders by providiiig intelligLnce nccdcd to cnhance thcir situational undcrstanding and Ikrcby thc cffcctivc Cxercisc of mission command.

The Army's intell igence process consists of four steps (plan and direci, collect and prc)ces3', produce. and di,fseminaie) and two continuing ativities (analyze and a,g,sess). (See ADRP 2-0 for a detailed discussion of the steps and continuing activities of the intelligence process.)
1-12. (U) The Arniy views rhe intelligence process as a model Ihat describes how the intelligence warfighting function develops iiitelligence tliat facilitaies siiuational understanding and supports dccision making. This process provides a common framework to guide Army professionals in their thoughts, discussions, plans.

and assessments pertaining to intelligence.

1-13. (U) Cnmmanders drive the intelligence prnce$8. "rhe intelligence prncess suppnrt,s all activitie.s nf the operations proce.s,s (plan, prepare, execute. and a,ssess) and i.s performed continuously to support each activity, Alihuugh Ihe iniellignLe pruLss includes unique (15t5 (d aLtIvlLies, il i& designcd SiTnil(Irly to thc operations process:
Tlie pldn dnd direL'I slep of *thv* intel ligenLe process clo.sely correspoiids with tlie pldn aciivity of thc opcrations proccss.

The c'ulleLf und pruc'eJJ, i)ruduL'f, aiid diJJeminule steps and the *anilyJ'iJ'* activity of the in*lligncc proccss togcthcr corrcspond to thc exeeule activity of the operations proccss.

Assess, which is continuous, is pali of the ovei.all as.sessinenl activity of Ihe operations pr()cess.

## National To Tactical Intelligence (U)

1-14. (U) The national to tactical intelligence effort Lonsisis of the sum total of all of the intelligence
%ipabiJiii& vf Ih enti UniieLI Stsiets (U.S.) intellienLe Lommunity <ind those of uther unified 4lLti()n partners. National to tactical intelligenLe assets include all U,S. intelligence professionals, sensor8, Systems, federated organizotions, information, ond processes supported by a network-enabled architecture, The most importani element is the people who make it work. (See appendix A for more on infrllisence capabilities.)
,Voie. (U) Iiilc Ili,gilllL'(' C'()111117iiiijll' IK all deparLmcnt.% or conccnicd willi intel l i (YL ncc Llctiiiity, ciihL r in 'in oiic r%iiyhi, miinagLfiLII, support, or partici patorv I'OIL (JP 2-n).

l- l S
(LJ) The vallie pi'ovided to the comniandei. is tlie ability to lever<ige
SpLcialized collectinn Lapabilitie.s.
Laroe voluiT)es of nonintelligence-l'clated inform,Ition.
Unique intelligence dalclba.seb.
SpLLiilid dlldly%i5 dnd iilldlyiiL pruduLI%,
l-l (). I'U) Collaboration
1.8 IhL ccnlral principlc of Lnnducting analv.sis acro.s.s inlclligicncc organiLation%.
,4rin! Iclctical unils provide accurate and detailed intLlligence about the threit% and relevant .i.4pecl.s ot- Ihe
operationlil environinLnt (especially tlio%e relaied 10 Ai"Iiiy aclii'itie.s), while other i nielli(yence organization.s pr()vidc Lxpcrtisc and clCCei% n()L rcadily dvJil&lblc to thc Ariiiy al thc tactical Icvcl, Additi()na[l, national-
ICVLI intLI li Lncc organiLati()ns pr()vidL o()vLrn(]nLC ()vcr cci'tain inicll IQL nLe mcthi)d.s cind ,ICti I'l lic,%.

Coopei'<ltioii cali beiiLf'it every Lcheloii. ( Sc appcnd ix C for joi lit ta.fik force [JTF] aiid uni fied 2Ltion partner Lnn.%iilLrL1tion%.)
1
17. (U)
Aiilly%t%
ILK'erL2gL all Llvai11ble iiitLllibicncL to crL.Iie a more comprLhensive ,Ind deiailed
,i.sies%mLnt ot tlirL'.ats ;Iiid relev<lnl I%PLCt.g ot" Ihe operation,Il cni'irLiiimeiil (siicli <1.8 terr<li n, we,Ither. ,Iiid ci I'll
,Ind c ultureil L olliidcraiions) to facili Ic1tc Ini.4si()n Li)miniind. An cxainplc ()r achicving grcaicr cfticicnc), betwLLn Ihe iniellioLnce Ivarfiohtino funL"lion and Ini.ssion commilnd is Ihe creaiion of fusion cenier&, Fusion LLllter.% ll'e ld h(!c Lells designed t() enablc tsiriyetino, faiiliiate LiirrLnt or fulurc ()pei'dlion,%, and inf()riii
(See L1ppendix C r(Ir Inore infL)riiialion on fu(>ioll Lenters, )
deLi.il)n miikinil

## Intelligence Arcfutecture (U)

l-l X. (U) Nation.Il 10 tactlcL21 inielligcncL l.s cnablcd by thc LL)niinuniccltionE neiwork. SpeLifiLall)', thc intel li CYL.nce archi ieLtLlI'e is bosed on communicai i(In% thal tr&ll)%init intellib?ence 11nd i nformltinn t() Ind froni
'ai"iOLlS collection Lleinentq. unit5. tind agenciL.s b), Ineans of ditferent teLhnologies and systeins. a.% Will as
[() Lind tr(Im iniclli ucncc analy%ts to u.%c i)rLYiiniL pr(IcL.%.ii ng. LxpI()i iaii()n, and dis sc mi Ilclt ion ( PE'D ) daia t-rom varioiiii collectioii platfnrni.% iiiid .soui"ce.%. W'ith Ilic coiili nued deve lopmenl Ot. .sensors, pi"cices.sor.s, 1 lid LoiiiinuniLcltion.% %y(itcni.s, il i.s inLfecl,iin715' iiiiporiai)I 10 undcryilcind thc rcquircinL ni.% Dt- e.4tabli.shi ng an cft"LcLivL L()Inmunicati()n.% arLliiieLture. AdLq Uate L ()Iiiiiunicalic)ns th&lt facililatc acLe%% to nlli()nal inlelligenLe organiz<ltions 1.% often the nio%t critiL al eniblei" for the intelligence wai"fightin(y flinction. The intclligence staff Inu%t identify the specific intelligenLe w'arfi(Ihtino funciion I"cquiremenls In the unit's L)vLrill LuniiiiuniLclti()ns arLhitL'LlurL. (SLL ADRP 2-0 ,Ind MI PubliLaliun ?_01.2 r()r ni()rL' intc)rindti()n on eslabli.%hino the intclli(yence arctiitecture. I
,Vole, ( U ) MI PLibl Ic&1tioii ?_Q l . 2. E.I'icil?li.s'liiii,4' Ilit IiilelliAieiic' A I'c:ITiieLiiire, 1.% an i nte I li (YLnce pri)P()ncni piiblicLltioii apprOed by Coniniclnding Gcncr'il, L.S, Arniy Intclligencc Cenicr of E,xcellenLe. The priniary audiLiice lor MI publications include.s MI officer.%. nonLomniis.sioned
()t'ficei-s, 'Ind stLifts froin theater .[77Y t() coinpaiiy levLls ( iniluding personnel SLrK'iiig in militarv i Iitclligciicc bi'l (YLidc.s-theatLr | Nq IB-TS I, cx pcdilionai-y-niil itcl1"y inlLlli ocnLc bri&iadL,s | E-M l Bs I, MI battcilions. and MI conipanic(i).

## Len'Eracinc. Intellic.Lnce (U)

1 19. (U) TIIL LI"(LLIiVLnLSS L)I' (IIL IiIILlligLIILL wJrf"j17
inicl IiiyLllLC Loinmunity ind unit-icd aLlii)n pai-lJ)ers, It Li1.%() prol idLli units Ihc ubil ity lo levyi'agc int"nrnialion and capi2bilities. Thi% inc ILides .Icce.%s to nationil capabililiei, laroer voluiiies of i nforinalioii Lind intclligence, and %PcLialiied analysis. Thc ability to Icvcragc all national to tactlLal intelligcncL ofv1niL,Ition.% <111oKvs
'IiyenciLS of
2 goi'erninLnt th'i( are Iiiiig fuiiLli()i)
hiiic7 L1 dirLLII)'
011
IlLLL,i.Ki tn IliL
aniilysis to collaborale lI1h othLr aii&ilv,%ts throughoLiI Ihc tIILcltcr and intellj(yenLc Lommunitv 41nd to fcderatL
analyijc sUPPQn w'hen nece%%ary. Sonie of the mo.%t i Inp()rlclllt aLtivitlLs Lliai fclc ili(<lte collaboi'aiioii i Iiclude Devel()pino iiiitial daia tiles.

Intclli (7LnLL rcach.

Gr<Jnli n LY <lL'Les.S.

Sharing.

Po,8tino Upd<l1ing Ihe inlelligenc.e poriion.s of (hL Lomiiion nper<ltional pictLire (COP).

Knowledgie n)cin,IgYement.

## Devel()Ping Initial Data Tr'Iles (U)

-?1). ( U) When geiierating iiitLlligLnce kniiivledge, unit intelligence perqonncl .should begin by determinin IhL int"ormati()n thcy nced i() Lollcct on IhL ()pcf*llional Lnvir()nment. A.s unlis be(yin 10 collcLt daiil 1)n thc operi1tioiial eiiviroi)11)eJii, tlie dLl11 .sliould be oroaJiiied ijito bL1.seliiie data tiles iJi accordaiice willi Ilie Lominandknr's nuidanLc. Thc%L filcs Inust bL L()nipaLiblL Ivith thL unil'.% Inis.sic)i) coinmand inforiiiiltion sy.stL ms. Generally: iaLiical echelc)ns Lreaie pi'iniai"y dlta t.iles baqed on IhL Ihi'eai, tLrriill <iiid weaiher, and civil consider1ction%. StrLiiegic and oper&1tioiial echelL)n.s create data filc%
ba%ed on IhL comrnander s opei-cltional requi reinenl8.

1-21 . ( Ll ) IntLIIiiLllLL' pr()fLsNi()ncil% L n.surL rLIL'Viint infui'nidll()n 1.% inL()rp()rdlLd ini() IhL L()Inrnun d<il(Ibil%L
and analoo dat<1 tiles a% threat capabilities niay liinit digital coniniunicaiions. Tliis information beconies Ihc ba.%i.% for providinir intelligLncc support tu niis(iion planningi and for dcveloping deployincnt readinc%s training on IhL operitional Lnvironinent. Tliif infornialic)n 18 u.%ed to DLVLlOp Soldier pi"edLploymeni Pl ckaL7es.

Assist in identifying the specific tvpes of Ihreais: threlt equipinent (including vehicles and weLlpony); thrcat lactiL,s, techniqucs. and proccdurcs (ThP): and cii'il Lon%ider,2tion% th<il Soldier.s can knxpect to cnLounicr when dcployLd.

miq.%ion rchL, possible.

Incorporate f iinul.1tion.4 ()r I"epliccl1ion% ot. Ihee t-aLior,% inl() predeployinent training cxerci.%es or
"Ifsiil exei-ciseito providLIhe most rc1& listic and relcvant Irciinin
1_2? (U) Nqiiny t"actc)r,% C<ln drivL thc rcquiremcnt t() updaic thc ba.sclinc knowlcdgc. Thc.SL t'aLtor(i can includc Lncliiy or (Idvcrs<1fN" Lurrcni opcr11ion.s, hiohcr LLhLlon ()pcrilti()11s, and iniLlligcncc analy%L.s or c1%SC.4snicnt.%.

Addiiional coii.sidei"ations include f<lclol"s such cl,S Lipdalcs blL sed on election% or key local leadei"sliip cliangcs iii the prc)jcc(cd AO, Lhangc.% to l()Lal infrcl.sifuL tui'e Ilnd eiients oulside Ihe unil'% projcLted AO that niay i mpLlct opcrations Ivithiii the projected AO, Atier Ihe data tile% are Lre'itLd, the d<lla. iiiforination, inielligence, produLt.;
Ind nic11eri21 nbill ine.d oi"giinized aiid refinecl to siipport pl<innin(y b<iscd on the commander'4 oil idance.

1-2.1, ( U ) The gener&ltc intclligcncc kn()wlLdgc ta.%k 1,11 al%0 the basis for dcvclopino il un ii. s iniliiil intLllige ncc dfLlii iLtLir, B J, pcrfui"niinu Illi.% Id%k, inlLI li LTLnLe sidl-fs LullLillu Iu LvlleLI. L<iieuoriLL', dnd iiniilyLe infoi"malion on relei'iinl a,speLt.% c)f Lhe prujecied AO, continually lddin(y new int"Drniation <ind LipdltingT and retinino Iheir undersL<lndino ol. the prL)jeLied AO.

-?4. IU) During ajid aftcr deploymenl, rhe genLrarL' inlelligLncc knowledgL lask 'il.s0 support%
t&lCIic11
()b'crivatLh. Whilc exLLutin(y opcraiii)ns, a unil's Infi)rmation databil.%c becniiics a %ourcc of inf()rniati()n t-ur IhL theaicr ariny to cnablc folloiv-()n force iluL2tionil1 understanding. (Sce appcndix D.)

## Intelllgence Reach (U)

(U) The actlvity by which Inielllgen organizations proactively and rapidly
1-25. (U) tntelligence reach allows commanders and staffs to acce(>s the resources of national, joint. foreign, and other mi litary nrgani7,atinns and units. Reque.stnrs can icquire information through the push and pull of infornjation.

databascs, hoinepages, Lollaborative tools, and bi'oadLa.st services. (Sec figure l. l.)

access Inlormation from, receive support
from, and conduct direct collaboratton and
information sharing wtth other units and
agencies, both within and outside the
area
     of
        operations,
                    unconstrained
                                  by

geographlc
             proxlmity,
                        echelon,
                                   or

command (ADRP 2-0).

## (B)(3)

1-28. (U) The intelligenc staff must detcrmine how best to support the unit's mission with intelligence reach capabilities. Detailed planning and training are critical to the success of intellig.yence reach operations, Intelligence reach SUPPOnS disiributed analysis and reach PED operations to answer Ihe commander's critical information requirements (CCIRS) and other requirements. Reach PED refers to PED capabilities at centralized locations wherc sensor data is disseminated for intelligence PED suppon.

1-29. (U) Intelligence reach allows intelligence analysts to retrieve existing information, intelligence products, and data that can support answering CCIRS and other requireinenLs from out.side the unit in a timely manner without waiting for an answer to a request for inforniation (RFI) or an inforniation collection task.

The int'()rmatinn, intellignce pr(xluct8, ()r data retrieved can then he evaluated tnr u%e in the unit's intelligence pn)ducts or analysis. Procedures 10 gain and maintain acce,ss and permissions are an important part of intelligcnLe reach. Three important aspect.s of intelligence reach are-
Searches cind quries.

Data mining.

Collaboration.

## (B)(3) Searches And Queries (U)

1-30. (U) *The* ability to search networks and query databases is an essents'al skill for intelligence prof$10naIs. The basic search techniques u.sed on the unclassifjed internet al.so apply to secret/collateral and top secret classified networks such as the SIPRNET and JWICS. To conduct a scarch or query, intelligence profcssionals must plan the search, conduct thc search. refin th search, and record the results.

Nole. (U) Anny intelligence professionals who research or collect open-source inforniation miisi pay careful atiention and comply with operations security requirements defined in AR 530-1 to prevent disclosure of critical and sensitive DOD information in any public domain.

1-.31. ju) Intclli&YcnLe prDtcssionals USC thcir undcrstanding of the quppnrtcd unil'q mission, s'pccifiL
intni'inalion requirenienis, ai)d avai11c ble .source.q ol: inforiniL ti()n .2nd inlelligencL to plan and execuie Iheir
.se<lrch. Becdqiise cl<1tisified intelli(Tence networks ;Iiicl systems are very compc1rtinenicl1ized, intelligence anals'sts should fii.st deiermine which neiworks or daiabase.s niosl likely haiie the required infc)rmation.

Cld%.%i IiLd nelw()rk% U%udlly h(IVL' spLL IIIL ilLLL%li fLquifL TllLnt%, dnd inlLIIi ULnLe pr()fLbsiunils niu%t Luc)rdindlL
for acce.s,s to cla8.%ified nctworks. (Foi" niore infoi-lnalion on open-source intelligenLe [OSINT] seLirch Iccliniquc%, scc .CTP ?_22.9 and U.S, Arniy DireciivL ?016-37.)

## Data Mining (Ll)

iilable.

1_3? i U > Data mi niiig is finding kLy pieces c)f informiiiion Ihai may be buried in Ihe Inass of daicl av Data niining USLS auiL)InatLd stati<>tlLc11 clnalysiq tcLliniquLli
10
,%earLh for spL'Lltic daia pariniclcrs thill i ntcllioence profcs.sionals predeterinine will answer tIIL li. infoi-mcltion requiremenl,s. Datil Inining can a55i5l in organiLing thL Ill&1.S.s of LQ)Ilcctcd daia.

## Collaboralioii (U)

-i.3. (U) Intel ligencc profesiinnals work iii ali ciivir()nmeni eiilianced b)1 collaboration. Collaboration filLilitaic% Pl< rallcl plannino cind cnhanLes (ill aspLLt,s ()f Ihc intLlliocnLe pr()ce,%.s by LnriLhing clnalysis, incnrpoi'atinu diffLrcnt p(iin(% of vicw, and broadLning %ilu1tional undcr,%ianding. Intclligcnce pr(Ifcs.%ional(>
dLvelop thc ability to work ett'eciil'ely with oihers on :1 coininon task. I'especl the conlribulions of oiherg, and contribuiL to coll%Ln%u.q w'hLn warranted.

## Granting Access (U)

1-34. (U) Properly Inanabiing lCLes% to dcltaba%es. inforinalion. or intellioeiice ensures per.qonnel. unils, or organizlltions thai need all or part of the inforni<11ion cali obiaiii Ilie inforination Ihey nccd. Inforniaiion rLside, in cla.%,%ifiLd and UllLlassit-icd dcilabasL%, PI-QLiranis, lict,()rk, 4iy.Stciii%, and othLI" web-basLd iollab()I"atlvL
cnvironniLnts niaintaincd by unificd llciion partnLI"s. Griillling accc.ss is govcrncd by Applicable national ageiicies.

Multiniltiun(Il, ,juini, and Arm), riiuliltiun.%, pulicie%, cind pi-ULedurL45.

Individual systein accrediiaiion.

.%peciali7.ed training for sy4tems nr dillahasL ugaLIe.

SpLCi'II sccurity proccdurLs and LnforLLIIIL)ni.

l-.l.S. (U) Thc iniclligLncc staff
MLisI idciiiify u.ser% Ivho will rLLiiiifL ICLC%% 10 pr()IcclL d Liiiil intcll igcncL WLbsilLli, Ivcb po.%li ngs, d&ilJ filL,%. and daiabcl%Ls.

Prncesse% reqLILSts trn ni inLI iVi11Llci1%. 1)rgtini Zillicins, Lll- <l(7Lncies oiit%iile the u nit ivho niii y fLqLiire acLe,s,s.

F'n.sures all acces%e% granlLd c()ntnrm tn tlie Jpprnpriaie l..,%. IJW: l)( )1) I'egulalinn.1s. cli1SSI tiLatii)n yuidclinc(i, and seLurity prot()col.s. (Scc .4R 380-?8.)

## Sharing (U)

1-3(). ( U) Sliariiio cillow.8 aiialysls, oilier intell i oence prot'cs%ion<ilsi Liiid other .subject niatier expcrts li) freel), cxchan<ic inforiii&ilion and inlLlligcncc. Ii
1.% mo%1 Lft"LLtiVLly aLcnniplished throug7h a wcb-bcised collciboralivL
Lnvirnnnient. such Js the use of Lloud tLchnology. Collaboration inLludL% the sharing ot" kiiowledge.

experli.se, and inforni<llion, and it ni<lv lake Inany forms, Coll<lbor<ltive tools include computer-bcised iool thai assi.%t individuals in w()rkin(y t()gLthcr Lind Sharing i nfiirniclli()n. They allow for I'irtuil onli ne InLcting.s cind dcilcl .%hari ng.

1__37. (U) Thc intcllibLllcc s(aff niu)t idLlltify Ihc fnost ct'fcctivc Inctliods of shiirilli7 intcllioencL with all I"e(iuired usei"%, l*oiiie u4ier% may require hardcopies ot" lie. or updated inlel ligenLe, .%(Iine may nLed to access IhL Iinit intclligeiicL web page, ,111d R()me ni,iy reqiiire Icce%% to specific Iinit cl<1ti1bases. ,Shilring clpplies to niultinaiional P<lnners who milv bL ullclble Ln accc%% U.S. inloi"m<llion systems or dal,1 filLS. InlelljoLnce pr()ti%si()nils mu4il iiLIiVLI v wurk wiih IhL lurLigTn di.NL l()%urL uffiLLf Iu L'nsurL IhL ,shcirin ()1" inlurniiliun, whiLh
1.4 enhanced by the proper use ot Lhe caveai 111)I rele(i.scil)le l() for(*lAI17 *17EIIj()17cII.I'* (al.80 Cillled NOFORN) 111d ils liiniied USLS auilioriLed within DOD. This niay requirc dci'LIopiTig .stKCiI1 intelligLncc archilcLturcs, s Jstcni.s, netivorks, or prc)cedure%i to t-acilitaiL .sharing.

## Posting (U)

1-.3%. IU ) Int"oi"Ination niay be posted to miliiai"y websites for Ihe widest po.ssible dis.seniinaiion. Thi.15 m<ikes IhL infurnic11i(In aiiailable iu pcrs(InnLI and unii,s who inicrc,sicdin Ihe inf()rm<1tionor iniellj(ycnccIhlc L arc nut pai'l of tlie Iioriiial dis%eniination group for cl Llllil Ol. oi"oanization. Wheii po.stiiig informL1tioii to the web oi. updalino inforniation on their web%ite, il 1% critical for units oi. oi'ganization.% to inform higher, SLiboi"dinaie, and 12tcral uni(% or cirganiLation(i that niay rcciuirc this informatic)n. A unit r'iI"Lly ha% Lnougyh pcr%onncl lo dLdic<ilL
,Snldier In coniinuniiNly &eirc.Ii wehsites tnr neiv oi. Iipd'iteLI Intni"niiili()n ()t PLi%siblL Iise tn (htlt unli. ThL inielligcnce siaft" Inu%[ regulcll.ly I"eN'iLW posied information to ensurL Il reinain.% valid, rclci<inl. and LurrLnt.

## Updating The Intelligence Portions Of The Common Operational Picture (U)

1-.3(). (U) Thc intclligcncc ,slat-t' input% IIL w or updcilLd intcllibiLIIcc c2iid iiiforiiiation into thc COP lo as%i,il thL coniniandLr and siaff i n ViualiLing thc operalinnal cnvironmeni. Thc c'ominc)17 ()l)E?I'ali01ial i)ic.'riii"e 1% a iiiglL diApl.iy i)f relLv<lllt inform<111()n witliiii 1 L:omriiandei s arcc1 of interi'..%t I,2ilored tn thL' Ll.ser'
reL]uifL ments <ind ba%Ld on comnion dat1 Ic nd inforination .%hared by more Ili<ln one comm<ind (ADRP 6.0).

Thi% di%plily
1% IhL re%uli uf repori, ilulI)mdtlL updcils. tiid L)k'Lrldy% Lumin()n Iu dll eLhLI()ns (ind ufien diojlally storcd in Ll L()mmnn dcilabl.%L.

1-4(). (U) The COP facilitates niission comin1&nd throu(Tli collaboiative interaLiion lind real-tinie %haring of.

inf()rinL1tion bciwccii coinniandLr.s and .%iafl-s, This L()nvcrTrcncc of intelli(YLncc and Ihe other Wirfightiiig tunctinn%
1.% critical tn operalic)11.s. 'I'he inlelliLTencc piirlinn% ()t' Ihe C-'C)P are th()se Iiie%ria(Ye.% clnd ni'erlavri relilling 10 Ihre<ll.s, iej'rain and weather, Ii lid ciiijl cDiisidei'aiion.s in the conimon daiabase. This intelli(yence aiid iiif()I'iiiaiii)11 i)rigi incilL fi'c)111 iiitLIIi ULIILL I)I'Tr(]II jLill ji)11.(i ill Vcl1-il)U.S LLlILIi)Il% ciiid fi"c)Ill Lilll)bai inlc)I'i))<llii)11.

The G-?IS-? eiisLir.s Lhe Loninion databa.sL fLflect% Ilie Ino%t current inl"oi"mciiion cind intellibience av<lilable in ordcr to In,iint.Trin Ihc intcyrit)i of thL iniclligLncc por(ion ot. the COP.

1-41. (U) The threat situation and civil considerLiliiins portions of the COP, while updc?ted cniilinuou%lv. are ciirrently liniited to displaying the IoLatioiis and disposition,s of threat forces <1t that point in tiine. The Ihreai SiILliiion poi-iinn of Ihc COP requirLS <lnalysi% to provide the rLquired leiiel ot" det<l11.

1-4?( U) With thc complc.xity ot" thL opcralional cnvironmcni, thL iniclljoLricc .st1ff niu.sl bL prcpJrcd to V(IliLJcile lind niili nt<llll LhL (Iirecil PL)rliun% uf Ilie COP iii il iimLI y cind I"IL xible ITlcinner.

Collciborlie with Ihe reli of Ihe .(iiaft- 10 ensiirL the appropri,Ite Iiii%siun Vlc riables (expre%sed as M ETT.TC [ Iiiis%lCIII. LIIL IIIY, Ln clill aiid wedihLI'. IrOL)PS <liid %uppc)I't 'l%'iiiliblL. IiiTie avJilabli. aiid L i I,'il ii)11.sidcrai i()n%J ) and ()PLfilional VcifiiiblLs ( PMESlI-Wr) irc displiL yLd.

EI"ILLIiVLly di%plav IIIL Iiiuliip)IL IYPLS and layi1% ol infoi'iiiatioIi IIIL Ll?IiiinaiidLf I'LqUIIL%.

Coordinaie wiih Ihc opcr1c li()ns %lc1ff tn LntiurL Ihe follow'in arc avciilclblL t'or usc w'ithin Ihc COP..

Intornialioii LolleL tcd 10 .supp()rt (hL coiiifn<indcr's dcci4iion poi nts.

Infornialion LoIIcLiic)n assLt% and .scnsnr av,11 labil il),.

Arrangeiiie nt and l()Lalioiis ol" I'i"iciidly t-oi'ces.

FiLlds of view/Loverl1 QL 1lrLa%.

## Knowledge Management (U)

143. (U) Knowledge m7nagcmen
IS the procss of enabling knowledge flow to enhance shared understanding, learning, and decision making (ADRP 6-0). The intrlli ence warfighting function uses the intelligence prf)ce,s.$ 28 the management tc>nl tr) ensure the right inf()rmatinn geLs tn the right u.sers at the right time in a useable formal without inundating users. Intelligence leaders must also ensure users do not rC]ve t1 sari)e infornialioii from tlie %aiiie origiiial source multiple times, CirLular reporting Lati rsuli in erroiieous anal)'sis by intelligence professionals or negatively impact commanders, decision making.

## Section11- The Role Of The Commander And Staff (U)

144. (lJ) C:ornmanders and stat.ts at all leiiels .%ynchroni7E inlelligence with the nther wartighting tunctinns
10 maxiinize their ability to Simultaneously visualize the operational environment and accompli,sh the rwuird IdLIiLdl tU&k* thruughuut the AO. The distributiun of spcLifiL intrlligenLe Gl2>5ets cnh<illLes the capability of the combined arms team to concentrate combai pow'er and minimize risk.

## The Commander (U)

145. (U) The comrnander, based on recommendations from the intelligence sthff, tailors intelligence capabilities and iiitelligence operations to .support tlie rnis.sion. The general force-tailoring and spexific tdsk organization establish ordcred command and support structurc with technical channels for intlligLnce operations. Commanders provide the staff and subordinate units guidance and continuous feedback Ihroughout operalions by Providing direction.

Providing their undersianding, %*isualizotion, and description of the problem.

Directintt through clearly stated CCIR8 and priorities.

Izdding ind m<iking disiuns.

Continuously assessing the operation through collaboration with the G-2/S-2 during the execution of operatioiis.

146. (U) Thc commandcr's involvcmcllt fd intcraction cnablL the otKrntion2> and intclli ence staffs to morc effectively asse.ss how well the intelligence produced is meeting Ihe commander, s requirenients. Commander involvement also assi.81S the staff in keeping the command's Infornknirion colleciion efforts, including intelligence operations, synchrDnized with the overall
0[ratiOn. The commandcr drives intelli8eoce, intelligence facilitaies operations, and operations are supporiive of intelligence; this relationship is continuous.

## Intelligence Considfk4Tions (U)

J 47. (U) Cuinlliandcis, considciaiions for the iiiielligenLe warfightiiig funLlion include
Reducing operational uncerthinty. Intel ligence does noi eliminate uncertai nty enLirel y, and to succeed, coininanders Iiiust take risks. Coi)Iiiiaiidcrs deterrnine tjie necessary risks iiiherent in any operation.

Detern]ining the appropriate balance between the time allotted for collection and operational necessity. It takes time to collect information und then dcvelop that information into dctailed and precise intelligence products. Information collection must be continuous and started as early in the operations process as feasible.

Prioritizing finite re80urces and capabilities. Focu8 collection on the key decisions the commander must makc.

Resourcing and prioritizing the intelligcnce Wdrfightin8 function appropriately to have enou network copabibty and access to meet commanders, needs.

Maximizin8 organic collelion and processin8 capabilitiLs while leveraging supporting colleclion a$8et,%, along with required expeditinnary-PF4.D
r&s()urca8
hy planning, cmrdinaiing, and requesting support from PED and analysis centers and national~level intelligence organizations,

## Intecration Of, Intellicencl In'Fo The Operation,S Proce,Ss (U)

js LssLntial a,% thL qt<iff .support.s unit
1-48. (U) ClIlSL inlLfclLtion bL(WLClI Ilic commLindLr and Ihc G-?/S-?

plaiinin(y and prLPLiration through Lhe i nte(yratiii processes .Ind continuino activitie.s. The G-/S~2 .%upports thc L 01))milndcr'.s abilily to undLrsl<lnd Ilie i)perilinnal Ln vir()nmcni (ind Visulc l ILL operation,s by Icic ding7 thc intLIIi Lience prepir;Ilinn nt. the h&liilet'ield ( I PB) pr(ILe,s% and pnrlraying the enemy thrnuohnul the military decision-makino procLss (MDMP), developini) the int'ormation collectinn plan (in Loordination with the G-.IIS-3). UPLldtili IhL i ntLlliiJLllLL runninu Lsliin&ilL, Lind dL VLI()ping intLIIi IYL nL'L pfL)duLt% (Ind rL'purts.

Comniandei".s direct Ihe intellivence warfightiiio fuiiclion through their relaiion.%liip with Ihe G-?/S-I
1-49. (Ll) Commandcrs usc thc ()peraiioii% pr()CL%S lo Lonlinuousl) dcsigin lind L()nduct ()pcralionf. IniegrLlting inielligeiice intn the operati()ng pr()ce%s prnvidL'% the intnrTllcl(ion and iii(e11 ioenLe needed i() LonduLc (plan, prepare, execute. and asses%) OPLralioii.%.

1~50, (U) Durin(7 planning, Ihe cnmmander-
Builds an LffcLtivc .stlc ff tcain Lind tostLrs a collabor,2tivc cnvironmLnt that encourag7e% Lritical IhinkingT. Landor. and LL)operation. all of whiLlI empower Lhe eniire siaff.

AccLPt.% necessary ri.sk.% 16 nd .%oinv operalional uncertainty. Intelli(yence Linnoi eliniinclle unLiloiinly.

Priorilizcs resource% cind capabilitie% t() suppol-i int'orinaiion collection. The commander Inu%t I'L,%oufLL IIIL iiIIL11 igLIIL L arLlii ILL'IUIL .%uI"fiLILiILIy i() pr()ViLIL adLL4 ualL nLlwi)I k L1Piibilily I Iiii.

LxamplL, b<indwidtli) and &icces.s. Netwoi'k acLess and effective uiiit coniJnuniccllion.4 are especially crillLal.

AII(ILc'llc,8 ldLqucllL ti niL t-()r iiiforniatioii LnllcLI i()n or dctcrniinc.% Ihc appropri(iIL balanLc hctwccn the iiine alloiied fni. colleLti(In (2nd i)peratinnal necesiits'.

li Ic1ke% tiine and Ic1LtiCLI1 patienLe lo collcct iiitorniation and then dcvelop effeciiiie iniellicye nce products.

Providc. iniliL21 guidcince, .2nd tl)cn inleiit and Ihe concept of the operation. to Ihe .%iaff. It i, iniportani for IhL G-?/S-2 to undcr%i,1nd Ihc Lomin,'Indcr s ouidiincc and to sharc boih thc samc perspeLlie of the operLllion and IhL operdlionLII eniiironmeni, Must own the priori(v in(elli(yence I'eciliire menc (PIR). The commander perAon&llly eng<lges in tlie development and Ipproval of PIRS that are clLar, answerable, focused on a singyle question. and nLLessary 10 driiiL an operationLI1 dccision.

En%ure% infnrniation collLcti()n and intclligTcllcL activi(ics intcor<ltcd fully into plans cind OPL ratioiis.

EIi%Lire.4i thL Staft" exploit,% inforiiiaiion and iiiielliTrenLe froni hinher eLhLlon.s, other unils. and uni fiLd clLiioll Pdl"tnr%. Inielli (ILnLe %hcifiiiy j.1 dll IiiipuI"l(Int flLLor thdl fclL ill lllLS L'UL)pLr(ILiun dnd ILCC%S t(I critlLal rLinforcing i nlL Ill nLllLC Lcipabilitic,s during OPLralions.

EnsurLS Lhc G-2/S-! leiids Ih r.%l uf the .%liilf (%vhu mu%l aLli vIy Lontribuie iu the pruLess) IlirL)ugh IPB. The commander must clsslst in sliapincy tlie fOLUS li nd scc)pe ot IPB to drive the resl of Ihe MDfvIP ct-fcctiiiclv. (SLC ATP 2-01.-I for doctrinL on IPB.)
En%urL% Ihc G-21S-? tOLU.iLS on mcinaginn dirLLtinn and coordinating Ihc inlclliftcncc eft-ort whilc the .Ml LL)Inmandei" f(ILU.se% 011 Lomiii.Indino tlie unit and cnnduLtino intelli(7encL operaiion%'.

Ensurcs thc G-.l/,S-I, in coordination wiih thL G-2/S-2, dcNclops thc intoi'mL1tion collLction plan,
,Iiich inclLidcs how (IrganiL Isscts will answcr Ihc PIR. ThL i nf()nnaiion collLLiion plan (ihould inLILidL contingLncy plans (ind IneeL tlic principlL& of CLicino rcdundancy, Iiid Inix. (Sce ATP 2-01.)
Ensui'L4 Ihe G-6/S-6 is inlew-al to pl&inniniy Idequate network &iccess during the operation LlS a ci"itical eiiabler to operation% aiid the intLlligence wai-t-ighting fuiiction. Therefore. tlic G-21S-? and CI-fi/S-6 Inusl L()ordinatc Lloscly throuiihoui 1111 planning7 IlctiviliLs.

En%ure.4 thL G-21S-?

in coordin,Ition Ivitli Ihe siaff, especialls, Ihe G-61S-6, develops cl thorough iniell jTrLnce ai'chiiecturL 11il< t de%Lribc.% how ecich in(elljnenLL di%cipline, complenieniary intelljoenLe Ci1pability. intelligencc PED Lclpcibility, and niuliin4ltional parLner providLs %upport In intelliLience nperaii()ns.

proccsscs, CL)nlinuing aLtivilics, and En%urcs thc G-?/,S-? LICIiVLlI' involvd wiih all intcoraiincj Ihe MDMP. For exaniple, the G-?/S-? mu.%[ lLtIVLly parlicipaie in IhL I,'Irnelino proce%8 Ivith IPB
producis, Lspe.cicill)I with e,vcnt templ,1tL cl11(11111ltriK, higyli_v,Iliie Ic1r(yet (HVT), ,1nd l<if17e.t ,qre.;i Lif interes1 (T Al ) reLoinmendcllioris. The G-21S-2 Ihoroughl), inienraiis bciiile damaTre assL.%,siiILni and lifgiLtin(I rLqU ifLlllLni% with thL ()IIILr rLquifLITILlli.% in IhL in furni(Iti()n Ll)IILLlI()n ploln.

-i
].
(U) Dui"ing prepdratiun. IhL cominandcr-
Eii%ure% Ilie G-2/S-? 1%> (2Lljiiely iiivvlvLd in dll l-elie.aI% <iiiJ p()rt1-1< ys a Si)phi%liLaid, LapablL,
and rLali.siic cnciny.
EIi%ui'LS IIIL G-3/S-3, iii co()I"dinatioii willi Ihc G-?/S-2, IIL2S iSSULd all iiifoi"i)iati()n colleciioii (Ii"dLI'S
in a limLly nianncr, trackcd thc prLPc11'dtion ofc 111 inforniaiion collcciion lSSCts, coordinaicd airspacc c1nd other kcy Lonlrol mcaqurLs, 'Ind resyiiLhronicd ongoingi Lollcclion and PED
rLqiiircnicnts as nccdcd.

EnsurLs the G-?/S-? and G-61S-6 cnnrdinatL to verit.y IhL network
1% opcr<ltiDnc11 and responsii'c.

En%urL% the G-?/S-? ha.s complLled inl-ormation .%liaring coordinatioIi with unit'ied Ic LIiL)n parliiei'4.

and ongoing processe8 al'e in place for SLib%cqiient pha%L% of Ihe opcr;)lioii.

-i2.
1 lj) l)LiringT executii)n and assL6isment, thL cninnic1ndci'
Ensure*> thL G-?/S-? and G-.3/S-3 Lan aqscss onooing opcraliong aainsl TPB
prodLlctg and information collection plan, As the Silultion diLialLs. Ihe G-?/S-2 aiid (i-_3/S-.3 fnodit"y tlie int'orinaiion collLLlion plan, proinpt Ihe Lominander'.s decisi()Iis. and recommend branches or SLqULI% <l% IILLL%bar)'.

En.%urcs Ihc G-?/S-? Loniinucilly Jssc%,SL.S thL cllLniy cind ()PLrational cnvir()nnicnt, (in%lerS PIR%,
,iiid updlte% tlie iuiiiig estiiiiatc.

En%Lires IhL United Slates Air Force (USAF) %tal-f weather ot"ticer (SWO) coniinuallv as%e%%LS
VLciilier Lffects on Ilie wdi-figilitin (y funition capc1bilitics in Ilie opLI"c1(i()Iial env ii'onnien c, aLiswer PIR%, and updaiLs thc wLaihcr portion ot. thL runnino c(ili1iiaiL.

EIisui'L% thc G I/S-? and t'il'L &UPPnl-t Loordiiiaii)r cifL Irackino b2iilL damagL (]S.%Lssmcnt Ind prok'iding operaiional contcxt based on IhL biiile daniaoe a%.ses.nient, Ensures the G-?/S-? aiid G-.31S-.3 allow adeciuate tiiiie lo plaii for Ihe next operation based (111 Lhe re%ulis ()f rhc current operalioii.

En8ure% tlic G.21S-? and G-()/S-6 c()ntinually a.4sCS.li ongoiiio ()pcralion% to modif)i intLlligeiicc arLhiieLlure requirenieni,% and ,%ysiem interoperkibility.

## The Staff (U)

] -S.I. (U) TIIL .4iat'f i.s 1 k-Ly conipL)Iieiil of IliL nii.%.%ion coiiiniand .sy.4lLllI. In additinii t() CXLculin(J Ilic mi.s.%ion Loininand st(If t- lllsk%, thL Staff. s priin<2r)I I'cspon%ibi l itic.s include Supportiiig the LoiiiiaiidLI".

Assi$lin subordinate corninandLrs, staff%, and units.

Int'()rining unil% and oi'gdllizc2ll()n,s out.side the headquarier.s.

## Supvnk'I 'I'Hk Comfviandek (U)

1-54. IU) Stat'fs %upp()ri the conimcindci.
To understand. N'isualize. lind desci'ibe thL ()pcI'.Ilional envii'onment; niake and articulatc decision%:
and dirLLt, ILad, and as%L.%% Ini liiary opcrati()ns.

Bv n)e1kingi rLcL)i)In)cnd41tinns and prLPciring plc1n.% cind ordcr.s t'or Ilic conirnandcr.

By pro(Iiici ng ti Incly cind rLIL'.v,Inl i ntoriii<1lion rfind ancily%is, <lllL1 vy ti%ing knnwlLd cyc 111(?llclgcmciii
10 exiract th11 inforination li.oin Ihe k'<lst aiiiounl of clvailiible informalion.

Ily haiile IraLking the on(Tning i)Iieriltinn tn en%Lire int"tirniatinn c()1 lecii()n ia%k"% <lre execut.ed nr adjustcd as Ilie siluation dictates.

'Ind by alLrling By sccing and undLrst&inding whLn window4 of opportunily will OPLII and close, Ind providinft reLomnieiidation.% to the c()mmander when decision criteria are mel.

By m()nitoring and pi'ovidints recoiiiniendation.s to adjust the plan or tasks hen Ihe silualion clianne.s and the aiiiicipated decisions arL no lonner relevant.

## Assis"R Subokdinate Comiiiander.S, Staf'B-S, And Uni'R.S (U)

1.55 (U) Effective stLTrt"fs estlbli%h clnd maintain <1 high degreL Ot CL)ordincltion and coopercltion with stcift"
of higher. lower. supportin(y supported, Ic nd adjacent uiiits. Staffs a.ssi5t subordinate he<1dqu<1riers in undcrsiandinq tlie laroLr Lontcxl c)t opLr<ltions.

## Inform Units.4Nd Orc,Anizatio.Ns Outside The Eieadquarters (U)

-.i(). (U) Staff% kLep Iijiyliei. aiid latei.al uiiils wiell iiifoi'nied. Tliey I'eceive iiifoi'iiiaiioii, dciei-liiiie its rclevancy, and disscininate that int-ormation to the upprDpriLltc hLadquarlers. Th.

kcy is relei'ancc lind timLline%s. nol volunie.

## Operational Art (U)

supported by thcir
1_57. (U)
Ariny comm1nder%and
.%tat"f.% employ operation1cl Lll"I to dLlcrniine Nvhat tactic% best clchieve a stratL)oiL pufpoL. Operalic?niil ai"t ifi thL Lugniijiic 11 pproach by L(Iminander% and %taft's skill, kiinwledge, Lxpcrience. creativity, aLid .judgment to develop .strltegie%, Lclmpaicn, 1 lid operations to oi'g,Inize lnd t.Inploy Inilil,11"S1 t"oi'Le% by inte(yrig1in(y e.Iids. Wl VS, ,Incl me,Ins (J P l-o). ThroLigli opei-1ltioncl1 ai"t, L (Iminandcrs and stiff% L()Inbine arl lind 4scicllcL l() dcvclop plan.s and ()rder%i Lhai dc.4Lribc how (wavs) thL
I"urL Lmpluy% i L% LJPdbilil je% (IllLdn%) Lu ctLliieve IhL' dLsirLd Lnd sldte (eiid.%) whilc Lun4iLleriniy ri,%k.

l-.iX. (U) In ipplying operaiional art. comnicliidcrs and thcir.%taffs u.sc a .sct of intcllcctual tools 10 a.s.sisi thcm in uiiderstandinb7 thLir oper,2tional enl'i roii ment, Ill%ul1izino their Operational appr()ich, and describincy the operation's eiid sl&iie. Collectively, thi% set of tools is known a% tlie Llenients ot- c)pei"ational art. These tool.%
a.st>is1 Loniinaiider.s 111 undLrstanding. iiisualizin<y and describin(y operalioiis and in formulatino their L()niniandcr'4 inLciii aiid planniiigy auidanLL. C()mmandcrs sclcciivclv use Ihcsc tool% in any operaii()n.

l-59. (U) SysteTnaLic thinking int"orins a situaLionLI1 template that puts a thrc<2t into perspective. Nol all elcnicnls of opcr&ltional art apply at all Icvcls of war. Thc appliculion of the clemcnts of opLr&1tional art is situ'ation- 'Ind echelon-dependeiit. (See FM 3-0 tor a detailed discu(ision ot. uperLltional art. )

## Operational Framework (U)

l~()O. (U) An cii?eraii()Iiul.frciiiieiF'c)rk' 1.8 a cognitlvL tool u.8cd tl) 1< S.Sl.St Lommandcr% and staff% in Llcarly
'isualIzin and discribiiio thL applicalic)n of coinbal pow'er in tiine, space, piirpose. and rc.%ource.s in the LOnLCPt of opcrations, (ADP I-() I ). TIIL opcration<il traniework considLrations (physic&21. tLmporal, virtual.

and cognitive) providL cominaiiders and %iat-fs Il Nvay 10 look Ilt niultiple domciin.s and Ihe inti)rmation Lnvii"oiiniLnt wiihin IhL coiiiexl of land operaiion%. Tlie G-?/S-2 as.sisis the cotnm1 Iider lnd Slc1ff in uiidLr%laiidiiii <iiid dLLoullliiio fi)I' IhL (IL Lon%idLI'lc lii-)IiA Ilirijuoli J IlUlTIL)Lr ()t" Pl'()LLSiLS aIid di ffLI'LlIt i)'pLs i)f iiitclli(yciicc produci%.

## Oplratlnnal Fk4Meivork Con,4Iiderations (U)

l-() l . (U ) Intell igTillLL i.s inhereiit in L211 .%taft' planniiigi aLtivilie%, Tlie IPB procL)%% proiiidei inforinaiioii t-or niL)%t nt" Ihe operationlil fi'ainework consideration,% to SLipport long-tcrm and short-terni OPLfiL tiollil planning.

l)urin(I IPFI. Ihc intcllioLnce %lLlt"t ILad.s Ihc rcst nt" thL %tat"f thrnugh the IPH prnLLS& In th)rnuohly idcniify sigyniticant a%pect% ot" Ihe operationLI1 Lnvir()nment. onalyzL how IhLse aqpectS ciflect operations, and identify Lllclny COA%. Tiible l- l un Piigie 1-14 li%ls tlie uperdli()nal fi'iimew()rk Lunsideriltiun.%. Je%LribeJ in F.M 3-0, and how IPB and (iubscqucnt iniclliocnLL an11y.%i.s suppoi't iach considcration.

1-62. (U) A thorough IPB and intelligcnce finalysi.s assist each echelon in fc)cu%ing opLrLI(iori.% on all
.significant asFcts of the ciperaiioiial environnient in time and space acro88 multiplL dojnains. This prcveiit%
each echelon from fociising7 only on the close fight and current OPt*fcllioiis. A broad focus across the operational frin'Ork considcraiions assists commandeI'%i and siaffs in better identifying frieTidly Ivindoivs of uptx)rtuniiy dllLI threui wind()ws uf vulnci'iibiliiie. within diid dLfu,%% iiLh (JL)mdin (Ind the infvriiidllc)ri environmcnt. This illustraies onc way that intclligence is Critical to operational pla.nning.

Operatlon81 framework
IPB and Inlelllgence an4lysl8 $UPPQrt
con8lderatlons' ,
Inle15igence support bggins well tslor8 the doployrnent of forces, thrwgh trie generate
intellioence knowledge inlelligence warfighting task, which addresses the yratsonal
variables (PMESII-PT), Irrfomiation gain8J duiing generate intelligencJ knowledge is
used by commanders and staffs to assist in Iraming the operational environment during
Physlcal conslderatlons inclu
the Army desi metrthology
geography, terrain, infrastructure,
- IPB pThides detailed analysis ol the mission vanables of enemy, teThain, wealher, and
Civil considerations to detemine their effects on operations.
IPB intelligence analysis assist in detemiirdng relevant aspects within an area of
populatsons, distance. weapons
ranges and effects. and known
enemy locations.
rations-such as civil considerations characteii5tics (ASCOPEh-Ihat are critirAI in
determining how friendly operabons may be impacled during the consolidation of gains.

- Intelligence anatysis is critical to the designabon of a deep area, the fire support
cojrdination line, and an e
ment area,
IPB Is a process that Is both geographlcally and temporally specific, Develwng threat coutses of action during IPB Is *tssed* M idenbfwng threal jeCtiVes, capabilities 2n be Us, IK)w long als, tlmelines, and end states.

IPB prDvides a temporal context usiro rates of nY)vement, time phase lines, phases of
0n8my fires, and other templates to capture 8namy tining,

Tempor81 conslderatlons are
related to tin*, including when
y lake lo generate and ernoY,
and how long they rrnjst be usod to
achieve desired effects,

- IPB acCots tor aspects associated wilh the center ol gravity and the enemy's morale
Cognltive considerations relate to pecple and how they behave. They Include Information rtaIning10
and willingness to continue operattons.

Intelllgertt support to contlnuous operatlonal ass8ssrnents conslders many relevant aspects of the operational environment, including sociocultural f&tors.

IPB also considers all Significnt aspects ol the cperational environment assttiated enemy decision making, enemy will, the Naticn's will, and the population's behavlor.

with the vari1$ civil consideratsons.

IPB arKJ intelligence analysis, in coordination with the cyberspace electrDmagnetic Vlrtual conslderallons Fertain lo activiknes and entities, both fnendly activities sects'on, provide intell0 on th8 threat's likefr/ actNlties within the and threat. reslding in cyberspace.

information environment, which includes cyberspace.

areas, Struclures, capabllrts, org8rizatiorLs, peo
, atKI ev9nts

ASCOPE
Ip8
xildligence prepatatrjn ol ts ballielield
PMESII.PT
y)lilical, rnilitary, ecffi(xnic, s(la1, informalion, inlraslructure, physical environrTenl, andli

## Unclassified Operational Framework Coni Iponf.Nt,S (U)

143. (U) The operdtiondl framework provides an organiziiig Lonstruci, visualizing and describing opcration.%
by eLheloii iii timc and space within Ih coniext of an AO, area of iiil]uenLe. ld area of intresi. It providLs a logical way LO deterniinc the r5ponsibilill pemissions, and restriction.g for subordin<lte cchclons, and by doing so it enable.s freedom of action and unity of effort. Figure 1-2 di,4iCUS(LS and illu.%ti"Iles several key aspects of the oper&2lional frclrnewcirk. When u,sed in coiijuni.tion with effLLtivc opersiiioll<il gr<ipliiL%. the npLraiinni11 framewnrk enahles cnmniander8 tn prnvide inient. dvelni) shared viAiJali7alinn, and ultiindtLI)'
create the shared under.sianding necessary for the exercise of infornied initiatie at every echelon. (See FM 3-0.) The opiraLioiial *fi'aiiJLwork* has four Lo)IiipuiiLnis:
Commanders are assigned an AO for the conduct of operations, from which, in turn, they assign AOS to subordinate uniL8 based on their visualization of the operation. L'nits should be as%igned AOS commen.surate with their ability to influence what happens within them.

Within their afisianed AO, Lomrnanders designate deep, close, support, and oL)nsolidation areas (as required) 10 describe the physical arnngemcnt ot torces in time, space, and pijrpose.

Cominanders establish decisive, .shaping, and flusiaining operi?tions to further articulate an nratIn in terms nf purtK)qe.

Cominanders identify Ihe main and SUPPOlling efforts to designate the shifting and prioiitizdlion of resource.s.

## (B)(3) Section111- Anticipated Operational Environments And Threats (U)

1-64. (U) Factors that affect operations extend far beyond the boundaries of a commander's asiiigned AO.

As SULh, cummdndrs, ?UPPK)nd by thcir stdff)i, seek tu develup and miiilliliin an understdnding of their operational environment and other factors, including but noi limited to adversary, enemy, friendly, and neutral actor8 that are relevant to a specific operation.

## The Operational Environment (U)

1-65. (U) An operaiic)nal envirunmetii i.s a composite of the condits'ons, circuinstaiices, aiid influences that affcct thc employment of capabilitics and bear on the decisions of thc commander (JP 3). (See appendix A
for more on the employment of intelligence capabilities.)
1-66. (U) An operati()nal environment encnmpa8ss the air, land, maritime, .qpace, and cyberqpacL' don)ain.8'
tlr inforniation environment; the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS); and other factors. Commanders and
5liiffs 41ndlyze dn operdtiunal envirunmeni using Ihe ei&yht Dperdtionul N'sariiibles (PMESII-PT). (Se FM 6-0
for more inforniation on the operational variables.)
1-67. (U) Within an operational environment, it is difficult to discern how the Inany entities will behave and interact '1th e<ich other, as well as the differing circumstances that will resuli from these actions. No two operational environments are the same. Additionally, an operational environment is not Static: it continually tTansfonns. Tkiis transformation results from opposing forces and aciors interacting and their abilities to learn aiid adapt. The coniplex and dynaniic nature of an operational environnient niakes determiiiing thc rclationship bctwccn causc and cffcct difficult and contn'buts to thc unccrtain naturc of nlllitary opcrations.

## Multi-Domain Ex'Fe4 Nded Battlefield And Operations (U)

1-68. (U) The interrelationship of the air, land, maritime, space. cyberspace, the information environment, and the E.MS requires c,$.$~doMaIn situal ional undersianding of the oprationdl environment. Commiqnder,8
and staffs must undersiand friendly and enemy capabilities wid vulnerabiliiies that reside in each domain.

From thi.q understanding, commanders can belter identify windows of opportunity during operations t()
cnnverge capahilities for the hest effects. .Since many capahilities are nnt nrganic to Army forces, commanders and staffs plan, coordinate for, and integrate joint and other unified action partner capabilities in d mulli-domdin apprOh L() uperdtion21. Intelligence pl<lys dn impurtunt role in situdtiundl undr>)nding across all domains.

1-69. (U) The Amly conducts operations across all domains and the InforntIOn environment. All Army operations are multi~domain operations and all battles are multi-domain battles. A multi-dornain approach to operation.s is neither new to the Army nor to national to tactical inielligence. Rapid and continued advance.s in technologies and the military application of new technologies to the space domain, the EMS, and the iiifoi"Iiiation environiiient (particularly cyberspace) require special coiisideraiions in i ntlli8ence, plaiin ing, and converging effects from across all domaii)s.

1.70. (U) Amiy operations and battles will InariablY involve challenges across multiple domains. Examples ot Army multi-domain o rations and activities include airborne and air assault 0[rationS. air and missile defense, fires, aviation, cyberspace electromag([C activities (CEMA). information o rations, space operiations, milit<Wy dLcpiiun, informatiun LolleLiivn. Kcy cunsiderdtivns for o rdling in multiplc domains include-
Mission Lommand.

Reconnai&qance in depth.

Information operatinn.s.

Mnbility.

Cross-domain fITes.

TemFX) and convergence of effecis.

ProieLliun.

Sustainment.

CEMA.

1-71. (U) Ariiiy f()rcc.s may bc rcquired to LonduLI opcration% acro.$8 multiplc domains 10 iiain frccdom of JLtion f()r Llther Iiiember,s ot- the joint forLe. This 1.4 %1 milar to other nieiiiber.li C)f the j()int force 0r(lI in n acr()ss multiple dLiin;iins lo Asi%i in providing groiind forLe% wiith a pasicion of I'cl'iti ve,1dvanr<1gc.. Ex,qmplesof these oper<1tions inLlude neutralizing eiieniy integr<ltcd air dLt"en.%LS, desiro)iin(T long-ranoe surface-10-.surface fires sj'sienis.

dLnyinii LnLlliy
(ILLL%S
Ic) dn AO, di%rupiin(T L'llLmy L()IMmdnd cind Lunirul, pri)ILLting triLndly nLtwork>, conducting taclical deception, or di.%ruptiiig an enemy s ability to conduct int'oi'mltion Wl rfare. All of these OPLfL)tions are cnablcd by prLLi(iC and dciailcd iniclligicncc on thrcat vu Incrabil itics,
1-7? (U) Ever) eLhelon 1% at"fcctLd by tlie niulti-d()Iiiain exiended battletield: each .%hnuld con%idLr time, ge()nr<lphy. decision niciking, the EMS. <ind the oilier Lloniiin.% diffei-entl),. Flowevei". noi every LLlielon
1% <ihlL
10 cft'ccljvL ly Lunduci ()peraiii)n.% acr().%,% muliiplc doniilin.s, Brigade combat tcaJii,% (BCT,s) and Ii)WLf CL'hel()n%
rc)Lu%d on finl)tingJ In Ilie clo(ie arc1 ocnerally laLk IhL IiiiiL aiid (Ibilil), to LflLvtivcly plaii diid einploy Inuliidi)niain capclbililic.s othcr than IhosL alrLcidy undcr thcir control. Thcsc echclons focus nn I"undamcntal operation471 a&peLts %uch as mobility, leihality, and protection. The diiyjsj{)n
1% the tirst echelon able to LffLciii'ely plan .1nd coordinate for the enipjoynienl ol" all mujii-domain capLibilitie.s acr05.S the operation11
frc1111Lwork. Thcatcr army c1nd Lorps cchelor]s'
hll'C a broadcr perspectivc. bc(tcr f()LU4i, and far Iiiorc Lapabilitic$ 10 ()rchcsirate and cnn%'erge niulti-dnm1in aLiiiijiies and opcraiions in timc and %paLe, Through tliese lC Ei vities 111d oper1tions. iiitLlligence is critical i n a%sisli lig friendly foi"ce% to Lffeclive ly ideiitit"y (ind cxploit window'% ot" opportunity LILross thc dorn<iins Ic) L'rc<11C <1nd cxploii rempor<1ry windowq nt" Supcriurit!.

1.7.1. (U) Althnugh rhere are m'iny polsible lechiiique.4 t'ol. L()nduLting QPLf1tions in and acro&% all ot" Ihe
(loinai n.q. ,7 niiilii-doni,iin oper14 IiLin Llgai n%t ;1 peLr thrcit reqiiire.% conliniioiis <illlc11iorial under%t,qnding 10 .%ee
()pp()rtuni Iics, %Cj L Ihe ini liaiive, and c Kploit cnciiiv vulncrabilitics or wi ndnw% of friendly %upcriority.

,Seci ng and under.(itandingi when and how IhL joini force Ivill isollie p011ioll%i of the opcrationiil environmeni in one or Inore dc)m<iins to allow <1 portion c)f the joint forLc to establish a decisive point for the cr()s%-doniain convergence nf cap<ibililiefi mu.(it be %upported by Colllinuous inielli(venLe opei"aliDn.s across Ihe domains.

Durin large-scale CDirJbaf OPLI"ation.s &l(yainst peer threai, ground-forcL coinmanders Iiiay be required to LondiiLI tIlLCiL(Il ilctii'itlc%. -%LJLh tls <1 dclibcrcltc 1( titick, lo shi( pc Ihc enwironmcnt to o,qi n <1 po.silion ot rcl&ili ve
(Idvaniagyc for 1LIiviiiLS. Such as j()iiit tirLS. Wlthin thc oihLr doniain45. OnLe that pn,%iiion i,s aLhieNcd.

operallc)Il% IvL)uld LclI]liiiuc lu iiicI'ea%e Ilie posilion ol- advillltLige in ui"dci' 10 LfL<iie a loiigier wiiidow or
,%upcri(Irity to facilit<2tL tolloM'_on rnis.sion.s and oper<llion.s aLro.s,s the doin<iin.s. Figure l-3 on Pc?(Ye 1-18
depicis a niulii-dcimain extended b&11tlcfiLld in whiLh t-riendl), ground forLe.% neutrc11ized enLiiiy intL>ctr&lled air det"cn%es, Ihus creating
,1 window ot" superiority t"oi" joint tires CLlpabilities across multiple dornaiiis. They aohiLved Ihi% thrnugh aggrc.s%ive inf()rmaii()n c(IllLct1nn and t"nLU.%e(l iniclligcnLc (analvsi%.

1.74. (U) During IPB. eaLh Slaff clement pr()vidc% Inpul, ensurino
<1 holi%lii view ot. tlie ()PLraiioncil ciivii-01111)Liii. SuLi%eqLILntly, tlie IPB et"fL)I"t aid.s iii ideniifyiiig doiiiaiii wi Iidows of opp()rtuiiii)' to exi)loil thi"L<11 vulncrabilitlLs. For c.xamplL, thc
11ir dLfcnsL iirtillLr)' ,%taff elcmcnt's input to IPB abc)ut Lncmy inte(Irated air defense .svslLni ( IADS) capabilitics and vulnerabilities miy presenl rhe fi'iendly conimandei.

wilh rccoinnicnded li niefrllllc.s Lind IoLaiion% 10 LondLlCI suppfL5ion ofr cncmy air defensc or dLCP Nirikc.

Additionally, the gaps identified durino mi,%%ion analysi% and IPB
will di'ive intormdtion colleciiun requiremeni%. ThL resuli.s ot" information LolleLtion ma5. cllso ideniify domain windoThis ot" oppoi"iunil.y. (SeL
ATP 2-() l .-I for Iiiore inforiiii1ioii c)n I PB.)

## (B) (3) Threats (U)

1-75. (U) A threaz is any combination of actors. entities, or forces that have Ihe capability and inteni to harm United States forccs, Uniied States national interest%, or Ihe homeland (ADRP 3-0). Threats may includc individuals, groups of individuals, paramilitary or rniliary forccs, nation-states, or national alliances. In general, a threat can be categorized as an enemy or an adversary:
An enemy is a party identified as hoslile against which the use of force is authorized (ADRP 3-0), An enem> is also called a Lc)mbatanl and is treated as such under the law of war.

An adversary is a porty acknowledged as FK)tentially hostile to a friendly partv and ugain$t whiLh the use of force may be enviqaged (JP 3-0).

nor
1-76, (U) Peer threats, as described in ADRP 3-0, are adversaries or enemies with equal or su capabilities and capacity to oppose U.S. forces acro.ss multiple domains worldwide or in a SFtific region where they enjoy a position of relative advanta&ye. Some examples include Ru.ssia, C.hina, Iran, and North Korea. A peer threat may also have a cultural affinity to specific region8, providing them relative advantages in tLrms uf time, %PdLe, dnd %dnLtuary.

1-77. (U) Somc thrcat capabilitics, particularly IADSS and long-rangc SurfaL'e-tSurfaCC fircs, sevcrely impde freedom of action in the air, maritime, and land domains. potentially hindering other Services from assisting in solving ground tactical problems. AnT]y cannon and rocket artillery are likely to be both outranged and significantl), oumumbered, which pre,sent a tactical problem even if friendly forces are not conte.sted in the air domain. The potential combination of relative disadvantage in the l&nd, maritime, and air domains will affLct how ATniy forces LoiiduLI opcrations. Friendly forces will fac neiny fornwtions designed around long-range fircs systcrns, which cmploy manuvcr arms to support fires. Thcrcforc. understandi.ng thc various methods (systems warfare, isolation, preclusAon, information warfare, and sanctuary) employed by the Nauon's adversaries and potential foes is critical to planning. (See ADRP 3-0 to understand the various threat.s across the range of mill1 operation8; .see FM 3-0 to understand peer threats in large-scale cornbat operations.)
1-78. IU) Peer threats generate tactical, operational, and strategic challenges thai are, in order of rnagnitu Inore ChlengIng militarily th those the Army has fuced since the end of the Cold War. Peer threat,s, enemies, and adver8aries employ strate les that capitalize on their capabilities to achieve their objectives.

When these objectives are at odds With the interests ot. the United Slates and Its allies. contlict becomes more likely. Peer threats prefer to achieve their goals without directly engaging U.S, forces in combat. They often emplov information warfare in cornbination with conventional and irregular military capabilities to achieve their goals. During a conflict, peer threats will try to weaken the resolve of the Unitel States and its partners to sustiiin conflict. The), will xploit friendly sensitivity to world opinion and attempt to exploit American domestic opinion and sensitivity to friendly casualties. Peer threats believe they have a comparative advantage becausc of their willingness to endure greater hardship, casu<21ties, and negat.ive public opinion.

## Section Iv- Intelligence And The Army's Strategic Roles (U),-

1-79. (U) The Arniy's primary rni,s.sion is to oroanize, train, and equip its forces to conduct prompi and sustoined land combat to defeat enemy ground forces and to 8eize, occupy, and defend land areas. The Army accomplishes its mission by supporting the joint force through the Arniy's four strate c roles:
Shape operntional environments.

Prevent confiict.

Prevail in large-scale grouIKI conibat.

Consolidate gains.

1-80. (U) The goal through all four rol8 IS to win. To win, intelligence operations mu.st provide threat warnings, identify threat capabilities, and describe how threat capabilities will be employed and how they will irnpact friendly operations. This intelligence support must occur across the conflict continuum and through the range of military operations. (See figure 1-4 on page 1-20.)

UNCLASSIFIED
Notional Operations Across the Conflict Continuum

1-81,
(U) Thc Army faces a numbcr of cliallcngcs in ordcr to .fjiuccc,ssfully conduct Idrgc-.salc combat oper<ltion%, Foremost among those cliallenge,% are peer threats, Ivho are highly l(laptive, technol()b.vically Idvanced, and operdte at a iempo and depth that greatly complicate.s Arniy forces, ability to regpond to Ihreat actions Iliroughoul the range of rnilitdf), OPLralions. Theref()re. conlpetition with peer threats begins well in advance of the conduct of Idrge~scale combat operation%. Throiighout the range of military OPLf<l1ions, intclligeiice is critical to i] ntdining a trained and ready Army and setting the conditions for succesliful largescale combat ()[l.tIons, should they be neLL4>sary.

1-82. (U) Friendly force,s are Jikely 10 start Idrge-scalL combat operatioiis from a po%ilion of relative disi2dvantage. However. trieri(Ily tor(%S Ci1n Nutj&clte these conditions as a part ot. the shape and prevent Strategic role.s. Inielligence. especially warning iiitLlligenLe and support to setting and supporting the theater, iti intekFril,I tu these effurts &15 the thedLer rnY Lumpeies with peer LhTe<lts beluw the level of arnlttd LonfliLt lu maints.iin an enduring iiiitiative. As fnendl), forces draw nearer 10 armed conflict, they must Ihoroughly plan to overcome the large-scale combat operations problein set. This opernti()nal problem .sei includes how t(F-
Fn,sure adequate joint intelligcncc, 8urvillancc, and reconnai8s<incL (ISR) and Army inform411ion collection to enable c)per&ilions.

Disrupt th Lnciny's capabi.lily to conduct conimand and control.

l)estroy critical coiiiponei)ts of the cneiny s antiacLess and ai.ea denial systeiTLs to enable friendly frccdorn of maneuvcr.

Defeat the ,I},$0r-tO-.ShootCr link betweeii th ei)Lniy s iiilLgralcd flres c()11)plcx and ISR as.sets.

Establish rcdundani friendly mission command neiworks.

Protect friendly forces from enemy inforimatioll W<wfarc. cyberspaLe opcration,8, and electronic warfare (EW).

Employ friendly CEMA capabilities.

F.nsure the mi ni muin level nt" Innhi lily neLe%.Sdr! to .support nperatinn*.

Apply trieiidly combat power in time, space, and purwse 10 achieve the desired effects on the enerny,
1-83. (U) During large-scale combal operauons, peer threats will mass effects across muluple domains at a speed Ihat will significantly impact on&yoing operations. Therefore, fiien ly forces mu,st also be prepared to operate quickjy across the physical domdin8 and the inforn]aiion environment. These multi-domain efforts entail joint synchronizauon. Service interde ndencies. and the cross-domain convergence of capabilities at d Lim (ind pldLe Iu Lredte upfdtiundl ddv<intdge.

1-84. (U) Thc likely first challcngc during largc-scal combat opratJoThs is dcfcating a nctwork of sophisticated antiacccss and area denial systems. Enmy forces will attempt to deny U.S. and multinational forces access to the AO by contesting U.S. and multinaiional forces in each of the domains and Ihe information environment. The joint force may even have to fight for i ntelli.gence to identify threat location8.

strengths, and vulnerabilities and then to gain an initial lodgmeni. Once Army force,s achieve initial acces8, those IOTCCS Inu5i k Ppad 10 inMnediaily conduLI taLiical operation5. A.$ a lodgineni is formed, th threai will cmploy a varicty of cffcctivc long-rangc firs and othr capabilities to dcny friendl), forcs frccdorn of maneuver-phy8ically and virtually. Peer threats are likely to use EW. offensive cyberspace operations and counter-space measures to deny and degrade U.S. forces maneuver. communications, intelligence collection.

and targeting capabilitie.s. Developing effective collection plans and l&skn"ng information collection tLsset.s (in depth and with redundancy)
1$ e,qscntial. This identifies window,% of opportunity to counter the threat's capabililies and to nable the J'oint forLe to maintain freedom of aciion and gain positions of rela(ive adv&ntagfr-physIcly, temporally, virtually, and cognitsvely. (See appcndix D for morc on intelligence support to force projection 0ratiOnS.)
1.85. (U) Each stratgic role presents a unique sel ot. intelligence rquireIenls, which are dioufi8ed in FM 3-0 and chapter 5 of this publicarion. Chapter 5 discusse,4 intelligence from Ihe theater army to the BCT
across shape, preveni, prevail in large-scale ground combai, and consolidate (Tains. Addiuonally, figure 1-5
lists ,8ome of the most important intelligence tasks for each strategic role.

## Unclassified

Cond1 exterksNe mi{
h IPB to
andi
otEratsons
evelop and re
rt intellwK

## . Develop And Ihen Inidl Roducts To Su

and irmtra
. Train Intelligen(% aTrJ rroneuver assets
on threat snatUres, threat TTP, aTrJ
iTrJudir9 Ihreat thw&taists<z, TTF),
enb
I threat COAS
velo
the intdligenc fTdlrt1U
tosu
oynI and Inthal
[OneS
. EffedNene&s of fnMIty oimtK)ns
- Pogrtive arKI rwitsve trends in 3
. Threat a(ai(ns to (x)unler fne
tMtEs
trfy likely k)c8tKxis of sLqy
ard spwal pu
to
aTrJo
- Idenlify Ihase su

stsbility actsvitie8
ucts thal
. Prow(* irrtell"
assist comnHnd in-
This page iiitentionally left blank.

## Chapter 2 Intelligence Staff Activities (U) Section I- General G-21S-2 Responsibilities (U) 2-1. (U) The Intelligence .Siat.T Ha8 Roles Ind Responsibilitie

that suppon the conduct of operations across all exhelons. The role of the G-21S-2 is multifaceted and involves rnany tasks and responsibilities that provide the best Possible intelligence to enable commanders 10 make timely and relevant decisions. This iq especially the case with intelligence support to large-scale combat operations against peer threats.

2-2.

(lJ) 'I'he CJ~21,(.2 c(K)rdinate,8 activities and %y.stern.8 that facil itate understanding the threat. terrain and weather, and other relevant a.spects of the operational eniiironment (such &s key Fx)pulations. groups, and organizatsoiis). The unit's G-21S-2 leads Lhe inLlligence ell, Th intllignce ccll rqusts, reLeivs, and analyzes information from multiple sources to produce and distribut intelligence products. The intelligence cell con,8isis of the majority of the intelli nc Staff and an attached USAF weather team,
2-3.

(U) The intelligence staff $iipports the commander in exerc'ising mi.s$ion command throughout the operations process. The intelligence staff uses knowled8e management and information management practices to provide commanders with the inforn]ation they need to establ ish and maintain their under,standing and to make cffective decisions.

2-4.
(U) Specific responsibilities of the G-21S-2 include but are not limited t
.~
Overseeing Ihc intlligcnce (xll, specifica]ly situation dvelopnKnL target development, ,supp)rt to
lethal and nonlethal Ngeting, .%upport to warning intelligence. support to a&8essment, and support lo prooction.

Providing the commander and siaff with assessments of kev groups and populations, including capabilities, inientions, and p)tential COAS.

Identifying gaps in intelligence and developing collection strategies.

Disscrninating intelligcnce products throughout thc unit (corps through battalion), as wclj as to higher and subordinate headquarters.

Rccciving, screening, and exploiting collected matcricl, and forwarding LO higher echelons those materiel requiring additional capabilities for further exploitation.

Answering RFIS from subordinate comrnonders, staffs, ld higher and adjocent units.

Coordinating units. intelligence requirements with supporting higher, lateral, and subordinate echelon.s.

Coordinating with the USAF SWO
Lo provide weather effects on the warfighting function capabilities to support the operations process, integrating processes, and continuing activities.

Overseeing the Intelligence cell. s contributions to collection rnanagemenL
Leadiiig the siaff ii? IPB aiid consoliLlating Jie stsff,s IPB produLts inio a cohereiji ajid holisiiL
IPB producl.

Monitoriiig intclligence opcrations.

Ensuring ongoing intelligence operations are collecting inforniation nded for anticipated decisions or other PIRS.

Ensuring informauon concerning the PIRS is processed and analyzed first.

(U) The primary role of the G-218-2
Is lo provide the commanderthe most complete and tlmely Intell1ger avallable. _
Rccoiiinicndiiig chLin(yc% In tliL in t"ormati(In collcction pl,1n bascd i)n chan()LS in Ihc situation and weatliei..

E.sl&ibli.shin(7 thL Illtellig7encL JrLhitLLture
111 cnll,Ibnrali()11 with IhL G-61S-(), Supporiing 4iLLurity progrlL ni%, 'hICh inclLidL
Supervising L()nimand ciiid pcr%(InnLI ScLurity pro(yfcini.s.

F.I'Jlu<lting phygical .ScLurily vulnerahiliticg l() %uppiirl siat"f %cLlions, Pglrliculcirly thc npcrati()n,s 4qnd .sigynaJ %lJt'f,ti.

PLrt'ormingY .slclt't' pl,? niii nbi Iin(J slipcrj gi ng IhLI KPL.L'.ic11 >cLurily (It'ticc.

(Ui The G-21S-2. to(yeiher with Ihe G-31S-3. 'i%sj.fil.8 Ihe Lommander in coordinatino ji)tegrlc ling. aiid
5upei"I:i%i n(1 Ihe L XLLulicin uf infui"m411juii LvIILLli()n pliin.% cinJ Lipcfdliun%. The G-?/S-?

LuniniandLI' in f()Lu%ing 1nd iiitcgraiing thLSC a.s,scts and rc.%()urLLS lo saiist-y Ihc c()rp% Ihrough baiiulion LIL>nce OPLfi tii?n% guidelines. G-I/S-2,s considLr the intLlligence requiremLnls. Stafl. leader% c()nqider intLIIi.

tollowi lig when plann ing, conti'olli nn and assLSSi Il(y iiilell i(yence opei"alions:
Commander's intent and gjuidaiice. Thc coniniandcr's intcnt and (yuidanLe InJy includL (ipecific rcquiremcnts for ()r constraints on intLIIi(TLncL opcfc1tions. Cnnvcrsely, thcy 111<151 allL)w' %ubordinatc coininanders 'ind SlLlffs lo niclke decision.8 mol-e fi'eely.

Nature ot. the mission dnd threat. Offensive, defensive, and siibilit), tasks difler in many W41>'S, anionii thcin: in f()rniaii()n rcquirci)Icnts, tl Lnefranics. lnd rules ()f en(TagYcnient. ThL intelligcnLe ot't"iccr idcniities b()th encmy and friendly strcnuh.s and weakncsii usino a Inulti-domaiii approach.

Thi.5 appro1ch il Pclth to victory.

Terrain, weaiher, and civil ci)nsideratlons. ThL G-?/S~2, G-31S-3, and engineer.s collaboraie to ensure thc tLrrain and environniental LharaLicfiLalioii (such &1%, urban, m()untain. junftle, nr de.scrt)
arL LollbidLred durin(7 the IPB procLss. and to iiitnrm Iiow, Ml colleciion c1S,setS ifL eniployed.

Cc)ndition% may denrade l>ens01" LapabilitlL.. (SLe FM I_ l? Ind ATP ?_Q l.-I for informition 011
,o%%'c,%sing kc,y ierr,iin in c5'bcr%pilCC.)
Troop.s and support available. The livailabilily of MI LoIIcLlion ai>sLls deieriiiine% Ihe possible inrel l igencL nperat inn%. ('ap,1hi lilie% fi'i)m hi&7her IieadqLl<lfierR nt'len ciuome nt oro,1nic <1sser Coininand aiid support relltionshipti may liniil how. supported unit eniploy the.se a%Neis.

'ime availahle. IVhcn pldnninu in(clligLnLL npcre1tinns,
%t<1t't',% cnnsidLr hi)Ih the time required In L()Ilcct iii t'orniation and Ihe ti Inc rcuircd t() pr()d ucc iniclliocncc frnm thcll int"nrni(Ilii)n. Ii IllLlkes
110 seii.%e Iu LOIILLI Iiiluriiialii)11 if Iliere is Iiul eiiuugyli liine 10 pruducL inlelligenLe fi'uni il.

Sial'f%
H-Iii)14r ib the speL21ic hi)Lir on D-day at which a Pily PirtiLuILif L1ttention ti) the linie 41vail<iblc beforc II-h()ur when Lonsidcring wheiher tu exeLute iniL11 i&)ence OPLralinn% to %upporl planiiinc, Pirlicul.Ir operation comniLnLe% (JP 5-0).

Complexitv of integrating and synchronizing intelligeiice operations. Inlclligcncc OPLfLlti()n.s are condLILtcd ovcr
<1 widc breadth and depth of IhL supporied coinmand'% AO.

SLICLL"SSfLII
intelligencL operaLion% require coordination aLfo%8 Inultiple echelons and fLEnction%. F()r exaniple, intellj(iencL operaiions require airspace, teri'ain, and %pace deconflictiaii and co()Tdinalion and adLCIUcltL PED Clc P1c bilitlL,% 10 Lll4iUI'L asiLls ai'L ablc to LnOPLI'atL Ltt"ILiLlltIy ,1nd effeciivLly. (SLL
Pcifcigrciph l_12 for morc inforniation on inicIIi(YLncL PED capabililics.)
Integratioii of signals intelligence (SIGINT), EW,, aiid cvbei"space operations (often retei"I'ed to as SIGINTIEW/Cyber). Enburing thc cftcLlivc intcbTfl1ion of SIGINT, EW, and cybcrsp<lLL
nperatii)ns' cap4lbililies is C)ne of Ihe niosl cDiiiplex aspects ot integraling and ,synchrnniziii(Y
inlellioencL' operations with other t-linctions. EffeLtive inte(Tralion extends well beyond .%iinple Loi)rdinaii()n. SIGINT. EW, and Lybcrspace i)pcrlLtii)ns ()Lcur cciinplctLly or paniall), within the saiiie porllolI Ot. tlie EMS cind shL1re Inany intLrrel<iied consideration.s. Effeciive iniegration nol niilv I"equircs deLoiifliLlion bul cilsu Ihe idciilit.icalji)n of windows of opporlunilies bLtween Ihese Ihrcc functions. TIILrct-orc, thc inlLJb7l"c1tinn of SIGINT, EW. and cybcrspacc OPLration.s rcquirLs Llose stat"f" LollabDraii()n, delailed prc)Ledural Lnnlrols, and the u.4e ot. leLhnic<l1 channels. Tlie Ispecls ot" tlicse three I IinLtions:
tol lowin<7 incl Iidc,s l*onie ot" Ihe inten'elcltc.d A Ilocation of asscts and bandwidth.

Planning, ta.$king, and Lf05s-cueing between functions.

Conduct of collection and reiiiiking assets.

Use of technical channels.

## Section11- Intelligence Staff Support To The Commander (U)

2&.

(U) Using infurnidiiun frum Lill intelli&yLnLL JisLiplines, Lumplenientiirv inielli&ivTIL LIIPiibiliLiL%, (Ind available sources, the iiiiclligcncc staff conducts all-,%ourLe <lnalysis and pi'oducc,% timely, accurate, relevcl11t, prLdiLllI'e, and thilored intelligLiice that satisfies the comniundcr's requircments, Tl)orough and di%cJpliiied all~sourc aiialysi% reducs the possibilily of error, bias, and Inisinformation throLigl) the con,sideration of mijltiplc 8nurce,s nf infnrmatinn and iiitLlligence. Analy4i.8 al,qn as.8iRtq in prnN'iding a fncu8ed view nf t.he opffl'ational environment and presents the commander with multiple optionq for employing multiple apaliili(jLs wid gfiiiing a tx)sil ioii of relative advdJltagL over the enemy.

Note. (U) Due to the nature and flilldity of large-alL combat oFrnti()n.s, cc)mmandei% will have lo have to rnake decisions with Im[rfeCt intelligenLe. Intelligence that is too late for commanderq to make timely decisions ullS in a loss ot.tk initiative and lost batt]es and eng2gerncnts.

2-7.

(U) The cornrnander depend.&i on a skilled intelligence staff to answer PIRS and other requirement.s thrnugh the 8ynchr()ni7.atinn nf the intelligenLe warfighting functinn with mi&sinn cnmmand. The intel ligeriLe staff does this by supporting the MDMP, providing IPB products. supporting the infornidtion colleLIioii effori, %UPTJofLing the thrgL(iiig effort, atid providiiig all-sourLY inlell igLnce aiialysis (IriLludtllg LOIiLIu,%i()TlS
and projections of future conditions or LvenLs).

## Intelligence Support To The Military Decision-Making Process (U)

2-8,
(U) The Inililory, decisioii-mukiiig process is an iterative planning metl)odology to undersiand Ihe situation and mission, develop a cour>e of action, and pr(KlucL an operali()n plan or order (ADP 5-0). The MDMP begins with the receipt of the mission and Lombine4 the conceptual and detaed compoi)enis of planning. Commanders use the MDMP to visualiLe the operati()naJ enN'ironment and the threat. build plans and orders foi" exteiided opei'allolls, and dLvelop oi'deis for f*hoit-ierin DratIO[l5 witliin the fi-aiiiework of a long-rdnge plan. (For morc inforniatii)n, scc FM 6-0.) tyuring thc MDMP, thc in(cllibicnL staff is rLsponsibl
for leading the IPB effort and for providing well-defined, ,specific all-sourLe intLlligLnce products and tools.

The stiff tailor8 the all-kourie product.% and tools 10 the cornmander's require,menis and the ope.ration.

Table 2-1 on page 24 outlines the intelligenLe support providLd to the .MDMP. The commander and ,staff require the following products throughout the pldnning process:
Line of comniunicatioiis overluy4J (including broadcast and communicationsl.

Hazards overlays (that accurately depict the affected areas).

Modified combined obstacle overlays (also called MCOOS) and terrain effects Iiutrics.

Weather effects matrice8 and other weather tactical decision aids.

Civil considerations oN'erlays (such as population, religion, network diagrams, and link (md node overlays).

Threat charactenstics.

Threat teniplates aiid Inodels.

Threai siwation ieinplatesi (threat COAS).

Eveni teniplat.es and matrices.

High-V1 lue target lists (HVTI.s), which facil it<lte or are used 10 devel(,)p high-p(lyotf target lists.

Nole. (U) Possible pr(x4iicts are limited only by the intclligence staffs initi'itive and creativity.

UNCLASSIFIED
ence support to step I
Step 14leceWt ofmlsshn
Intelll
Alert the stsff and other key
Begin parallel planning and collaborate wlth hlgher, lower, and adlaceni
intelligenee organizations to facilitate the IPB prooss.
participants.
Focus activities  the nission Wdri8bles.
Gather the tools.
Ident'ty gaps In IntellenCe holdings,
Update running estirnates.
Use intelligence reach to collect updated or additional enemy, terrain and wealh6r,
Conduct the initial assessment.
and CIMI c(nsi(Jerations data.
In coordination with the Air Force siaff weather officer, w)date the weather
Issue the commanderfs inilial
guidance.
estimate.
- Issue the initial waming order.
In coordination with the electronic Warfa offi(r aThY CEMA s@dion, update the
effects of the EMS and cyberspac8, includirKJ informath'(M from the cyber mission
INce suth as products that portrny the physical and logical layers.
Coordinate with the G-WSQ, G-61S-6, and the CEKW section to address the
inlomBtion environment and cyberspace.
Develop arKI submit initial requests for inlormalion based on intellig6nce gaps,
Continually uwjate target packats and the enemy siluation.
- Update the intelligence running estirnate,
UNCLASSIFIED
Step >-Ml38lon analy818
Ic*ntify gakE in the higher he(Idquartefs inlorrnatson collection plan and IPB.
Analyze the lier headquartefs, an
or order.
Lead the staff thrwgh the IPB process. Consolidate the staff:s IPB projucls into
a set ol cctsrent and holistic IPB prodts.
Perfwn initial IPB.
. Detemne s
'fi8d, iryliwj, and
Begin collection management by id9ntrfng specilied and Imled intelligence
tasks frorn the higher headquclrters order.
essential lasks.
Use rtInent intelligence from hoher 6thelons.
Review available assets and idenbfy
Assist in detemiining the area of operations and area of interest.
resource shryffalls.
D8vebp initial infonnabon requirements (with staff),
Detemine constraints.
In cwrdination with the G-SIS-3, recommend initid PIRS to the Cwimandef.
- Identrty critscal facts and develop
- Assist in developing irutial yrdtsons security vulnerdbilities and EEFIS.
assury)tions.
IlUde waather (which includes space) arKJ EMS effects on the enemls
Jin a risk assessment,
warlightiry furKtlon capabilities.
- Develop initial CCIRS and EEFIS.
Develop the inltial informatson
IlUde key considerations for threat cybeTrpace operations, including the
identification of key aspects of the cyber4)ace domain.
collectson plan.
MCOO and torraln (wlth englneer officer): Ek)es the overlay-
Identity restricted or severely restricted terrain?
Update plan for the use ot available
time.
Identity rrK)bility ttlmdors lair and ground)?
Develop initial themes and messages,
Identity infiltratlon larS and landing and pickup zones?
C*velop a proposed prd)lem
Identlfy key or deisfve terran?
staiement.
Define defensible terrain?
Develop a proposed mission
statement,
Identify terrain that supports survival and evasion ot pefs(nnd eXetsng their
isolated soldier guidance?
Present the mission anatysls briefing.
Identity capabilities within the informatson environment, such as lines of
C*v8lop issue initial
communlcations (telephcne, Intemet: c
ular). radlo stations, including range,
ccYnmand8rfs intent.
newspapers. cyber cales. threat and a(fversary narralives., threat arxj neutral actor
vulnerabilities10 informab(M opefations; and lriendly vulnerabilities lo threat
inlormiation operatio(E.
Develop and issue initial planrxng
guidance
Sftuatlon template8: Do the situation templates-
C*velop COA evaluation criter.
IlUde all commrtted and reinforcing forces as wdl as combat rnultpliers?
Issue a waming order.
Focus at least level8 down in detail (or as cormiand dctates), incI1ng all
threat warfighting furtiorLs?
Graphlcally portray threat characten'sh"c& weakness8s and peculiarities. acllvities,
aThd capabilities for eath COA?
Ev1 templates and matrlces (unrellned): Do Ihe enI tomplates idenbfy arrjfw
on NAIS, time
Step &40A development
Ensure IPB products are deliberately integrated into COA developrnent. Critical
Assess relative (xjmbat power.

- Generate q)tlons.

prod1$ indude tr)e MCOO, civil considerations products, threat otyectives, threat
mcxlels (includlng HVTS), situation tery)lates, and event templales.

- Array forces.

Develop a broad concept.
Integrate informabon and int Ilig6nc6 received trom the inits'al informati(
collection effort.
Assign headquarters,
Ersure w8ather and EMS eff8cts on t warfighb.ng function capabilities ar8
deliberately integrated into COA develokYrEnl.
Develop COA statements aThJ
sketches.
Refine arKI prioritize 31tuation ternplaies. event templates, and matnces.
Conduct COA briefing.
Updats Hvfs for tar
ting by lethal and nonlelhal method8.
Take an aclive part in anajyzing ccfflbat power by providing all available
infomats'on on current threat lorces arKJ the situabon.
Sel8ct or modity COAS lor (x>ntinued
analysis.
Provlde infomaUon on threat vulnerabllltles while analyzlng relative combat power.
Consmjer as many possible COAS as lime permits, starting wilh the most likely arKJ
includin
the worst case most dan

## Unclassified

Intelligence 8UPPQrt to 8tep 2
's, critcal adiorts, or that DPS?
hase lines time distan ana
Intelligenee support to *step* 3
Step +40A analys18 (war game)
As the enemy commander-
Gather the tools.
Use the ernY sitLAation ternate as a stsrtlng rxxnt and evenl temF4ate
'st all f rierKlly forces.
rnatr as guth lo develop critrAI efflY DPS x) rdation to fri&ulty COAS.
- Lisl assunplions.
Prqect enemy reactions to fridIY actions and pr(i8d enamy losses,
'st known Critscal events and DPS.
Sdect tlw WararnIng methcrfl.
Capture the results of each enemy action and counteraction as well as
corresponding hiendly and enemy strengths and vulnerats'lities
- Select a 16chnUe to record and
As the command's senlor Intelllgence officer
di$aY results.
Identfy new infoffnation requiremenls.
War-garne t opefalions and assess
Participate In largebng to sd&t high-payoff targets and FWTS Klentil1 during IPB.
t results.
Recommend PIRS thal correswnd to DPS and refine PIAS with t latest time
infonnatson is of value,
Conduct a war-game briefirvJ
(optional).
Redefine enemy COAS based on developed DPS and the situatson lemplate.
Develop critical enerny DPS in relation to lriendly COAS,
Fight as an uncooperative enerny lo develop DPS and prqect enery losses
Address all relevant enemy activities.
Assist in develoixng target se19ction Standa1$ arKI the attack guidarice matrix
from Waramed COAS.
Recommend changes to the inforrnation collection plan.
Based on the war game, refine the situation and event templat
corrgsponthng DPS, TAls, and Hvfs, indwjing NAIS.
Refine the event matrix with TAls arKI Hvfs.
Particifkqte in the targeting prOCS.
Link NAIS to TAIS.
l)isF4ay the scheme of Intormaiion collection chjring the war game.
Asssts the G-31S-3 in developing the dlsIOn support template.
Consider the ettts of enwny and triendly COAS on local powlats attitudes and
behaviors.
Step 540A comp8rlson 4 . .
CorKJuct analysls of advantages and
dsadvantages
Compare COAS.
Ensure iroation ol the *recommended* PIRS In the tasklng of subordinate units
and the rewests to higher and lateral echelons.
rdinate with supporting information collect'on organizations and G-21S-2s to
ensur8 th8 inlornation coll8ction FAan is understandable and ex8cutable. Wh8n
Conduct a COA decision briefing.
executed, the plan should enable a rapid and seamless transitson between current
and future operabons,
ML)lify the initi'al set of 1ntdligc8 requirements developed *during* missic
analysi810 reflect war.gamirg results.
IlUde weather arKI EMS eflacts on specific warfighting function capabilities,
analysis ol advantages and disadvantages for each COA.
Clearfy d91ineate inlelli9ence requirernnts.
Ensure the synchronization ol all available mllection assets.

## Unclassified

Intdllgence support to 8tep 4
Intelllgence *support* to step 5
UNCLASSIFIED
Step 640A approval
Recommend PIRS {including the latosl timo inbrmation is of value) and tho
Slpponing Informats cdlection plan.
- Im ment, refine, or rewoth the intelligen(x running estirTrate, Annex B
(Intellig rte), and the inlormation collection plan basod on he commandels
acceptsnce, modilication, or rejection of the staffs recommendatton.
Upon COA approval, the G-21S-2 and G.31S-3 coordinate wrth wr4Y)rting
infomwtion collKts'on resources to ensure the scherne of information coll
ti<
supports the arov COA.
Commander approves a COA.
Refine tIE weather ests'mate,
Collaborate with the G-WS-3 to ensure staff8 at all levels understand the followiry:
Scheme of inlomiation collection.
EEFIS.
C4)Ilection tasks.
Ar*lysis and production priorities.
Intelligence cThitrDI measures: target handover, reconnaissance handover, and
reporting ressibIlies.
PredureS lor taskin
Step 7-Qrder producllon,
dlssemlnatlon, and transiti'on
Intelllgence Support to step 7
The G.21S-2 *plans* cell, assisted by the Intelligen cell, develops AnrX B
(IntelligerrA) to the operation order and assists the G-WS.3 in prthgucing Annex L
(Information Collection).
The G-8S.2 plans ell assists other stafl m
rs in preparing the enemy or
infomiation collection aspects of their annexes. Paragraph 3 (Coord5nating
Ir6trucl'ons) ol Annex B (Intelligence) explains measures for hanfjling captured
rsonnel, documwts, arKY materiel.
Pr(xluce and disseminate orders.
Transition fr(xn annIrrfJ to q)erab'ons,
The G.21S.2 reviews tl* operabon order and Arnex B (htellig8nce) lor accuracy
and comF4eteness as well as compatitjlity With foreign dIsclopAj policy or
guideli$.
The G-21S-2 fofwards Arnex B (Intelligonce) to the G-31S-3 for incorporabon and
dissemination into Ihe orRrabon order.
The coll6ction manager, Suppted by the intelligence cell, develops requests lor
inlormation (intelligence production). with G-ZIS-2 approval, the manager fornards
tIEr
uests lo t ne hi
mand8r's crital inforlatIon rEx]uirement
CCIR
G.Y&3 divison or CoTpthttalion or brnJ8de operali(Ms slaff offi[
tx)urse ol action
G-e divig'on or c
k)n or bThJade signal slafl c4ficfjf
COA
DP
decisi( ponl
e&8ernial elemenl of fn'endy in10rat
eleclrrynagneti spectnhm
EEFI
EMS
CEMA
electrornagnetc adivities
ade intel
ell re
en staff offrer PIA
uirement
ttalion or bri
G.2iS.2 rfMS,on orcor

## Unclassified Intelligence And The Integrating Processes (U)

2-9.

(U) Corn.manders and staff.8 use the integrating processes IPB, targeting, and risk management to synchronize specific functions throughout the operations process. The intelligence staff supports the intgrating processes by proiiiding detailed and relevani all-source intelli ence on the Trarious aspects of the threai. terrain and weather, and civil con.8iderations. (See ADRP 5-0 for more on the integrating processe.g.)

## Perforni Intelligence Preparation Of The Barrlefield (U)

2-10. (U) The G-21S-2 leads the staff through the IPB process. The IPB pr(Kess consists of the following fuur sLep& define Ihe operaliunal environment. d&%Lrilx environmentdl effeLls un uperdiiulls, V<ilu41tr the threaL and determine threat COAS. (See paragraphs B-23 through B-27.) The IPB process considers all threat

Inidllgenee support
ortin
and re
her echelon and ad acent units.
high.value target
inlelligere pryrdti(m ot ts battlefield
Hvr
IPB
MCC()
Mr)difd corntyrd obstade ovpday
nanwd ar8a of interest
Inteifi

cupabilities within and across each domain within the unit's AO and area of interest and the relevant aspects of the information environment. IPB starts immcdiately upon receipt of the rni.sion, is refined Ihrough()ui pliinning. And Iipdated to support siibseqiJLnt operiqiional plaiin.ing. The other staff sections assist the intelligence staff in dL>veloping the TPB products reqiiired for pl{nning. Table 2-2 present.s each staff section's input tc) IPB produLt% (1suLh ds mL)difiLd L()InbinLd ubstaLle uvLrlilyl>, thrcat rn()dLl%, %itudtion teiJipl(IIL,S.

}1VT, high-payoff target lists, eveni templafrslniatrices). The SLqft" input is mi.ssion-deprideiit aIid not al linclusive. The following discussion provide.s aspecls of IPB that support mission analy$i.s, (For a detailed IPB discussion, .qee ATP 2-01.3.)

UNCLASSIFIED
Staff sectlon
All slaff sectlons: Provide their 3uI'ect matter experlise to
asgst in delemining tt not limited to thet
lowing.
G-21&2: Leads the IP8 efbrt aTrJ has stalf responsibility for
analyzing the mission vanables ol enemy, terrain and WBather,
and civil ccnsiderats'ons.

G-W&3: Provides subjeci matter eXpeSe on the art and science of militsry operalicns. Evaluates IPB products to ensure t1Y suN)ort friendly course of action development and analysis.

G41S4: Provid subject matter exporti68 on sustainment operatsons.

Provides subject mattel expertise on fnendly cixnrnunications systems and assists the G.2E.2 in idenbfw.

arKI evaluabng friendly c0rnmuntIOnS systems, vulnerabilities to cyberspace and eltrC1C attack.

G.91&9: Provides subject matter expertise on civil affairs operaknons.

Chiel of flres (dlvlsion and aboveyFlres support officer
(brlgade and below): Provides subject matter expertise on fires,

Englneer officer: Provides subject mattsr expertise on
mobilitylcourrtermc4jility arKI assists the G.WS-2 in developing
enemy obstacle plans for the enemy Situati( template.

## Unclassified

Intelllgence pparatIon of the battlefleld (IPB) Input
EmY objectives and delred end state.
NarTEd areas of Inlerest.
HIgValue tsrgels,
ints.
HigtFpayofl targets.
Decision
Thr8at doctrine, tacti1%, equipment, caEkgbilities,
vulnerab'lities, and intent.
. Threat systems.
IdentifaOn of areas of Interest and areas of influence.
Terrain analysis.
Determination of thr8at courses ol action.
operats(al experien(*.
AssiStse in detenninin
Target areas of interest.
Engagement are&s.
Time phase lin&s.
Flelatsve combat power matnces for fnendly and enemy
forces,
Threat logislJc3 (kntrine, tactics, equipment, capabilities,
vulnerabilities, and intent.
routesl
Ints,
/resu
Threat su
Threat employment of communlcations systems.
Threat communications networks and nodes.
Threat communications vulnerabilities.

- Line ol si
ht an81

Evaluation of civil considerations on ffm'litary operations.
ASCOPE (areas, stnJclures, capabilities. organizations,
people, aThJ avents) analysis.

. PMESlI.Fr (wlti(a, rri
ry, Kjial, infiyrThgtry),
iiilraslrtU, 8)viror#TwL ar(1

Civil considerations overla
Threat fires doctrine, tadicA, equipmenl, capabilibes,
vulnefab'lities, and intent.
Assistarce In selecting
Target areas of interest.
Decision points,
- Time
hase lines,
EltroniC attack.
Threat engineer doclme, tact, equipment, capabilrtles,
vulnerabt'lilies, and int nt.
Terrain analysis.
Mc4)ility ccyridors.
OAKCK (observation and fields ot fire, ayUeS of approach,
key tsThain. ct)stscles, and cover and corr2alment) lact(xs.
Obslacle locations.
UNCLASSIFIED
Stsff setlon
Chemlcal, blological, radlologkal, and nuclear (CBRN)
offlcer: ProvKles subjKt rnatter expertise on CBRN and
assists the G-21S-2 in determining the locations ot CBRN
assets potential areas of employment,
Alr d8f8n89 artlllery (ADA) offleer: Provides suty'ect matter
expertise on ADA and assists the G-WS.2 in detemining the
locations of ADA assets otential areas ol ernplo ment.
Cyberspace electromagnetlc aGtlvltles 8ectlon: Provides
subject fftter expertj'se on infom?ation pertsin1 to doctrine,
l&tics, aThJ aquipmenl ol enerny cYtspace and el8(xrortc
warfare (EW) fOrs, and access to yberspace and EW
abilities for inlormation colledion.
ca
EW off icfrr; Promdes subjed matter expertise on groundbased, alOrne, and functional EW ernrnt
considerations.
Information operations offker: Provides subject mattef
oxpertise on shaping operalional activities in and trirDugh the

inforrnatim environment.

Staff weathar offlcer: Provldes subject matter expertlse on weather effects on operations.

Space support tearn: Provides analysis of the space dornain
and Its capabillties and eflects wtthin the operab'onal
environment.
                                                                           erations.

## Unclassified Evaluate .Mllitary Aspec'Ts Of The Terrain (U)

2-11 . (U) The geospatial engineer team supports the Loininander and staff by LonduLtiiig a detailed analy.sis of the terrain within the area of interest. and the teani focuses on ideniifying naiural and maii-made features that may affeci operntion%. The geo,%patiaJ enginecr team, in conjui)ction with the intelligence .8taff, briefs the Cornmandcr and other staff on the effects the terrain may have on both friendly and threat forces, in tenns of the military ospects of terroin (exprLJs8cd as OAKOC [ob(erviition and fields of fire. ovenues of upprouch.

key terrain, ob.8tacles, and cover and conLealincnt]). Weather effects on terrain and operdtions are also briefed. (Se A TP 2-01.3 and ATP 3-14.80 for a det<2iled clisciission of terrain an<ilys1s and IPB producls. )

## F.Valuate Weather R.Ffects (U)

2-12. (U) The intelligence scaff, with suppon from Ihe USAF SWO, is rc5"Pollstble for profv'iding the cornlliander with a thorough under.stdndiiig of lelTcstrial and %olar weathcr effects on friLndly and threai
8yslem4i and operations, as wcll as on civil considLration.s, Thc intelligenLe staff providcs this information during the planning process and incorpora*s signifiLanl weather effects into all of the primliry inielli&Yerice produLYs. (See par<ogrciphs 242 through 2-53.) The intelligence siaff analyzes weather effects b&$ed on the military aspects of weather (visibility. wind. precipil*lltion, cloud cover, ceilings, thermal crossover.

temperdiure. hiimidity, and, as rLquircd. aLmospheric pressurc).

Intelllgence prnp8ratlon of the *battlefield* (IPB) Input
Threat CBRN dcKtrine, tactitx, equipm8nt, capabilitsos,
vulnerabilities, *and* intent.
Trfggers for using CBRN.
Terrain and weather considerations tor usin
CBRN.
- Threat ADA dctrine, tactics, equipment, capabilili8s,
vulnerabilitses, and intent.
Air avenues ol a
roach.
Throat cyborspace and EW doctrine, tartics, equipment,
capabilities, vul
rdbilities, and intent.
Threat use ol cyberspa(x and the electromawetic
spedrum.
Threat EW c*xtrine, tactics, equiwienl, capabilities,
vulnerabilities, an(1 intenl.
ht anal sis,
Line ol si
Threat inlomiation wartare dxtrine, tactics, equipment,
capabilities, vulrErabllrt]es, and intent.
Thr8at themes and messaging.
Information overta
Weather emecb on terrain.
Weather forecast charts,
Light and illuminab'on data tables.
Weather effecls on systerns and capabilities.
Tidal charts.
Threat space doctrine, lactics, 6Y4uipment, capabiliknes,
VlnerablI{tle$, and intent.
ace weathei effects on

1.1. I'U) The intelliftLllLL StLiff is rcbponsiblc f()r rLquc,sling 'eather cffcct,s on opcratiun.4 and oihcr rLlcvani environrnLntal infnrmcltion from the USAF SWO, who is tvpically a,%signed i() .supporl corpq, diii.%i()n.s, ai'iition brigadLs,
,111(l
%pecici1 nper41tions forc.e.s.

For
111 Lirher Linits, thL G-21S~?

is rL).Rponsible fnr coordinatiniy with (hL USAF SWO a8.sjpned to the next Iiigher headquarter.s or Ihc <ippropriaie local we1ther L>ffJLL. ThL G-?/S-2 ur G-31S-3 pri)vidL.4 tIIL USAF SWO WLiiihLf.(iLn.%itiviiy IhrL%h()Id% ()n Iriendly dnd IhrLdl tOl'CL5 Sv.%teins (ind capabililics. (Sec ATP 2-01 .-I for a detailcd explanltion of Ive<1iher <inaly.sis.)

## Evaluatc Civil Considerations (U)

14. 1 U) Cli il con.sidcr<ltions charaLtcri(ytiLs, c,xprcssLd as ASCOPE (1fLas: .litruLlures, Lapabililie.(i, i)foLilliLltions, pe()plL, eind events), <ire u.&ed to an1c1yze, and describe civil LnnsiderLltions (hat may ,Iffeci OPLration%. Included in civil coiisidei'ati()ns analysis are the effects urban centers Inay hal'e on friendly and thrcat f()rLCS aLliVitILS. Thcre is no siandard pr()duLt resuliing Iroin Ihis c1nalysis. The G-2/S-2 g)cncrallJ'
devclops products thclt fit the intoriiiatioii needed to de.scribe the situation and support the conimander'.s
.8iiuational under.standing. This is especially critical when friendly force.s are continuously con.solida(ing gain% during ,Irined Lonflict and whcn thc forcc tran(iition.s to priin<1rily conductino (itsibil ity tasks aftLr largc-
.%C<ile cnnib11 t nper,qlinns. (See ATP 2-(11.12nd ADRP _I-()7 tor di.%clls.sinn% on <in,Ilyzing civil con.%ider<ltion.q. )

## Identify Threat Capabilities (U)

l S I. U) In order 10 accurately predici thi"e<lt c1ciiviiies in lime and .space, the intelligence Slciff Inust fir.si uiidLI'staiid tlircat Lapabililies. AccuratLI)' dLPlctiiigi hnw a Ilircat comiiiaiidci" miglit Lmploy foi-cc.% rcquirLs thc intLlliocncc .slafl" to undcr(itLind how thc tlircclt
1%) Ol'gLillizLd and cquippcd, thc thrcat's capabilitiLs, and how, Ihc thrcai ha.% Lniploycd Lap'ibilitic.% in tlic pa%t. An undLI'slanding of thrcai charactcristics and dcl.iilcd
()rncllliLi< iioncll L hai't.% 1(iSi.St in Ihi% Jncily.si4. Thi % iiit"orniation cind iniell igence provide potentlcil thre411
ignature.A for collection by friendly inform,Ition collection units aiid .systems, Maintaining &1ccuf<iie threai LhdLLer1SL1Q,41 i % <il%u L%.sLniicil 111 LonduL'liniy liiryii ngi Lind LL)Inb<il (l%.%L4%inent. Thi% iLpplis t() rL&yul<ir and irrc(Tular Ihrccll%. (SLC ATP ?_O1.1.)

## Dl'Vli()P Thrlat [0Dlis (U)

l (). (U) When tea.(iible, the iniellincnce Suiff develops thi.eat Inodels for use during planning. Threat Inodel%
C'in dL:PlCt ciny niimbcr Lif rcLYLilar, irre(TLilc1r, or hybrid thre<ll activities ( for ex<iinple, ho, LhL' thrcat ma), exeLule offen4iivL. defensive, Lind unc()nventionL21 taLtic.%), Threclt models include Ll tLxt and graphic depiction
()f' the Ihrc<11'.s coiiiposiiion, disposiiion. objectives, 00<11s, iiinelines, and end ,siate. Thi-eat Inodels also explain Ihc capabilitlc%, .slrciigth,%, aiid vulncrabililic.s Iif" tlic thi"Lai. Tliey Clll focus 011 Ihc thrcat'.s intciit foi- fii-L.S, informaiion collLction. Inforination warfcifL, EW: and Ingi.%tics, Thrcat modcls c2rc prcscnicd during Ihc Inission anilysis bi'iefing. They should include
2 Systems ,Ipproach that depicts where friendly forces are Innst likcly or bcst pL)siiired ro disinteiirate thc thre.Il .& J'gteTM b J. .slrikin(Y 41 Ptlrticul,?r nnde. or capcibil ily. ThL
staft" u.ses 1 SyNtems cippfo1ch against %evei-1L I threat niethods, but the clpproach is rno.st releiaiil when as4ie,(i%in(y thi'elLI rrp, such as the IADS ()r thL' integrated fires complex .sy.stein of systein.s. (For more int()rmaii()n on threcll mDdcl,s and tcinplatcs, scc ATP 2-n1.3.)

## Dl'Velop High-Valul Target Lists (U)

17. (U) TlirLai situition templates and threat COA stlteinents ire accompanied by HVTLS that describe and prioritiie those assLls Ihic t thc thrcat requ irc% In aLhiLvc thrcat c)bjeLtives. A higli-lialiie iar,gei 1.% a laroci thc eneiny Lommander reqiiire.s for Ihe %ucces(iful conipletion of the mi%sion (Jp .3-60). The los.s of HVTS is expected
10
%eriou%ly degrade importani enemy funLiions. The intelli17ence siaff deielops HVTLS in LoL)I"dinatioii with the i-esl nf the .suiff. HVTL.S can iiiclude .speL itiL individual<) (oftcii referred to LlS IiiglivaluL individuals) Ilnd or(vanizati()ns. Hi(yh-p,iynft" t,Irgei% (HEfr.s) should idenlity key capabilitie.% or node.i within thc Ilireat'.s lai-gci" %y.(iteni of %yslems. tliat if IttaLkLd, Ilie fi"iendl v forLL can .Ichicve one of the four
(Icfc<lt IiieLh&1ni.Knis-dL.sirc)y, d i4iniLILyf,Ite, dislL)C;ItC. nl" i %Lilcl lL.

## Develop An Event Template And Nlalrix (U)

2-18. (U) The evenl ternplui ond matrix form the basis for planning LollLction slraiegies, 4iynLhroiiizing iiitelligericc Ivith fricndly operations, and prep&iring the inforniati()n collection plun. In some ingtzinces, the
.staff might disseminate the eent lempli?ie tn expedite intelligence and infnrrnatinn Li)Ilectinn planning at
.subordinate units. Devel()ped as the basis for the decision suppon ten)plaie and the collection overl<l)', Ihe event tniplatL aiid ntriX are Iiol briefcd duriJig Ini.ssion an&ly.sis, but the staff iiiu.$1 USL Ilielii during COA
dLvclopTYient. These products aid the coinmander's vi.(*ualizaiion and situational undLrstdnding. (For more on the event template and matrix, see ATP 2-01.3.)

## Pron'Ide Inteli.Icence Support To Targeting (U)

2-19. (U) The iritLlligence staff is eiisential to targeiing (both lethal and nonlethal dctii)ns). The largeting process uses Ihe decide., delecl, delIer, assess methodology. The intelligeiice stati. ensures the inli)matioii collection plan SUPPDrtS the finalized tcirgietiijg plan (target detectionj. Table 2-3 lists the most irnportrflnt subiLsk.*, pruduLLs, dnd Lvnsideriiiiull5 d.i4'VLliiLuJ with IiitelligciiLL suppurt iu tsrgLLiiig. (See ATP 3-) f()r more inforniation on the targeting process; see ADRP 1-03 and ATP 2-01.3 for more on intelligence support to targeting.)

UNCLASSIFIED
Commanderfs intent
Lead I'me belween decision points and target
areas of interest
R8celYe guldance
Hi.payOfl targets
Cunbat assessment rpquiremants
Attack criteria
Rules of en
6ment
High.value targets
Modified cornbined obstacle overtay
Develop-
Situation and event tem lates
Information collection
lan
Threat courses of action, as part ol war gaming, based on fro)dlY courses of action:
Expl81nuidarc8 matrix
the hi
off tar et list, tar et sdection standard matrix, and attack
Refine th8 event templats
AssBt in devel
Collection mana
emeni Icx)Is
Pmduce-
Inforrnation for tar et nominabon, vdidatiffl, and combat assessment
Collect-
Hi*>aYOff tae1-re18led inlomaknon and IntelligerKe to ts fires cell Of prOPriate lootion immediatdy
Dlssemlnate-
Pertin1 infomiab'on and battle damage a8sessffnt in accorda8 wilh standard operating
ocedures or other instructions
UNCLASSIFIED

## Pruvide Ii)Lelligenle Suppur( Lu Tarxel Develupmenl (U)

2_20. (U) Target dcNclopment involve,i the .systemltic analy,4>i,s of threat forces and opcratiorns 10 deterniine HVTS (people, organizations, or military units thc threai commander requires for successful coiiipletion of the mission). HFfs (people, organizai.ions, or Inil iiary units whose loss to the enemy contiibutes significantly In the .succe,8s nf the friendly C()A), and 8y.stems and systrrn cnmponcnt.8 for pniential engugemcnt thrnugh maneuver. rues, EW, or information operauons.

## Pruvide Iiitelligenle Suppurt Tu Targel Deteltiun (U)

2-21 . (U) The intelligence officer establishcs procedures for dis.seiiiinaliiig iar&yeting infornialion. The targeting team dei'elop& the sensor and attack guiduncc matrix to deterniine the sensors required lo detecl and locate targets.

The intelligence offjcer places these requilmentS
into the information colleciion synchrnnii.<1tinn tc)ol,s fnr later inc()rp()riltinn intn the intnrinatinn c()Ilectinn pliln.

## Provide Intelligence Support To Risk Managejqi4 Nt (U)

2-22. (U) Risk rnanagemeni is the Army's primary process for identifying hazards aiid COntlI1ng ri.sks during operation.8. Risk pnanasemenl IS the process to identify, assess. Id control risks and make decisions that balance risk cost with mission benefits (JP 34)). The chief of protection (or S-3 in units wiihoui a prntection cell), in cnnrdinatinn with the .sat'ety ntticer. integrate,$ risk management intn the Mt)MP. The intelligence .staff participats in the overall risk management proce.s.s and i.ntegrates risk management into LolleLtiun mdll<igement when reLommendingi l<l>ks fur infc)rn]<itsull LuIIL'Ltiun dsitsiet%.

2-23. (U) Commandcrs must focus and usc intclligcncc to explicitly undcrsiand Ihc lthality of largc~scale combat operaiions to preserve their combat power and tak,e the appropriate operational risk to achieve the end state. Using intelligence to see and understand within each domain can reduce ri.qk to the friendly force and enhance success in chaotic and high-tmpo opcrations. The distribution of .specific intelligence collection sysiems, personnel, and equipment enhances the capability of the combined arms team to concentrate coinbai power and reduce risk. Iiitelligciice pi"ovides the coininander the ability to dtect adversary capabi lities and activities, analyze enemy intentions, and track enemy capabilities across all domain8 to inform decisions and provide realistic assessments of operational and tactical risk. During situation develOpnnt, analysts determine the significance of collected infornmtion and its significance relative to predicted threat COAS
and. Through predictive analysis. Ihe staff templates threat activity or trends that present opportunities or risks to the friendly force. Thi,$ support a%.81,Sts the commander and staff in deciding when and where to concentrate sufficient combat power to defeat the threat iyhile mitigating risk.

## Information Collection (U)

2-24. (U) Information collection tasks provide commanders with detailed and timely intelligence, enabling thcm tL> gliin Siludtiondl understianding uf thc Lhredt (md rlev&int *515 of the uperdtion<il enviiunmLnt, Information colleted from multiple sources and analyzed Lrcomes intelligence thai providcs aniwers to CCIRS and oiher requirements. The intelligence Siaff supports information colleL'tt'on, as a continuing activity, by proi'iding all-source analysis of threats, trrain and wieather, and civil considerati.ons. (For more on the continuing activities, see ADRP 5-0.)
2-25. (U) At the thctical level, reconnaissance, surveillance, security operations, and intelligence operations are the primary means by which a coinmander conducts information collection 10 answer CCIRS and lo
,8UPPOrt operations. (See FM 3-55.) Information collection consi,sts of the lollowing ta.8ks'
Collection management.

Direci infornMtion colletion, Execute collection.

L'nnduct inteljigence-related missinn,8 and ()peratinns.

2-26, (U) In coordinaiion with the G-31S-3. the G-21S-2 contributes to information collection, as illustrated through three of Ili fou r inforoiaiioii collcLtioJi tasks highlighted in figty 2-1 . Chapter 3 of this publicaiion includcs a discussion of thc cxccutc collcction iask

## Collection Manacement (U)

ouidanLe,
?.?7. (U) Attci- rcccivino inpuis t.rom IhL coiniiiandcr aiid.%iaff thc commandLr'% intLnt, planning e)
IhL intelligeiicL 5111ff, in clL)se cooi'dination ivith the operations qtaff, perform.s and iiitelligence requireniLnl%
LullcLlion nianlc gcmcni la.%k%. Thc%ie ta.%k.% 41rc Ihc ba%ii fc)r crcaling 1n information c(Illeclion plic n that cnablL,s
('nl lecli(In managyeinenl (LIKkR are Ihe L(Immancler s ViSUil i7ati(In c1llLI silu'ilinndl under%t,111(ljiio Develop rLquirementA.

DcvLlop collectloll IT]L1naoenient toc)1,4.

A8sLS% LoIIcciion.

Update Lolleciioii 11)aiilgciiieiii iools.

## Develop Reqiiirements (U)

?_?8. IU ) Thc Lntirc unil %t'iff"devclops its inforincltion rcquirenients and dctcrniinL.s how bc.$1 to.%ati(yf)' Ihcni.

Thc siaff uscg rcconnaiisanLe, SLiriicill<lnce, aiid Ml collLction asscts l() col Icct inform<ltion. In Loordination with the USAF SWO, the %tiiff undersiands and nii[iaaies Ihe weather effccts on collection assels (plaiforni and seii.sor.s) 10 inform the selection or eniploynient of .specific &sseis. Eniploying redund<int colleciion a.sseL
iii dLPtI) pi'civide.s iJicrLlsLd probiibilily of collcL ti lig Ll'itILal iiit"oi'iiiatioii dui i no PLI'iods ot" il)LIc IllLlIt WLatlici".

Thc infoi-niation collcction plcin 1nii.sl balanLc rcdLindiincy agylinst aviilablc 1c.S.SLts and i ntell i(pcncc priorilicq,

## Develop Collection Manugement Tools (U)

?_?9. ( U ) ThL)re arL' at IL.14l thrcc L()IILLtion m41lldgciiicnt tool4: thc inforniation L()1 Icction niairi.x, inform<?tion c(II ILCI inn synchr()ni7.Lif inn mLilrix, Ind i nfnrinllinn cnl lectiiin nverlay. (.()I leclinn nia Iiaoe ment In()Is addre%
dll a,%sei% the operaiions otficcr C<ln task or request, as well Ic S the Loordinatinry Inechiinisnis needcd to eiisure
tdL(4U&ltL LUVLralL ()I' thc dfLcl ul" iniLfLS(. ThL UPL rdtiL)n% ()ffiLLf u.%L.4 thLSL' tL)ul.% Llu rin li the dirLLt i nl ()riniiiiun coIILclion t(i.%k tn dciLlop IhL infiirmation cc)IILction plin. (SLC ATP 2-01,)

## ,4Ssess Collecti()N (U)

-.l(). (U) Tlic coiiiniander and lit'iff Lolliinuously LKalLJaie and upd<lle (wlien neLessary) the inform'ltion L(Il ICLI i(In plan h&i%cd nii a%ie45i ng rcsults tr'i'i)m rccnn nai missinns. survLiI IdnLL task. %, sccurily operations. and inielligenLe operiltions. Asse%siii(T L()IILClion and Lipdclting Ihe information collection et-fori Ire part ILiilatly iinpvrl<int duringi exLLulii)n bcLilUSL siIuiJtiun% Lhiiny7e rdpidly. TL)iJeiher, LunimdiidL I'N and staffs dLtcrminc if rcquiremcnts havL bLLll li.stied or arL Still I'clcvani:
If rLquifLITILllls l)avL
L)LLII
.%<lti%l'iLd
01
llL
11() IoiiL)Lr ILILvaiit, IIILY arL LliiiinalLd fi'i')Iii Il)L
iiit-ormation collection pl<ln.

If reqLllI'eiiici)t& have 1101 beeii .%aii sfied bill are still i elevclllt, the iiitel ljoeiice staff cooi"dinatcs with Ihc opcraiions %toff dLiring thL opcfiltions and inLclligcncc working gyroup fc)r addilioniil asscl.s andlor recominends adjuqtnieni.K* ti) thL current COVLr;Ige,

## Update Collection Management Tools (L)

-1 l ([J ) When upd,qtin(y cnllcctinn niiin<loLinenl Innls. the intelligence staft"
ReceivL% inputs troni the Loniniandei. 6iiid other Ntaff sections,
Eli miiiate4 %1(i%fied I"Lquirenienls.
Dcvcl()P8 and add.% ncw rLqulI-cincnt.q, Traiisi ti011s 1() tlie Iiext opei.alioii.

## Direci, InforLation Collection (U)

-.3?

(U) Tlic opcralion,s ,%1lft int1-alL5 collcction a.SscI,s throuiyh a dLlibcratL and coordinatcd cffort aLfois all wart-ighiing t"unction&. Di rccting i n fnrniation LoIILLlinn i.ki Vital to control liini lcd collcction Lls.sets Duri no Ihe dii-eLI inlorinalion LolleL(ion task, %taft-% recommcnd cueing, redundancs., and mix as appropriate. Siat'ts acciiniplish tasking informcltion collcclinn bs, i%suiiig warninn i)rder8. fr',Ignientary nrders, 1nd nperaiion Ol-dcrs. They vcrify IhLIt inforniation collcction as%Lt% are operatin LlS dircLicd by coniinuously monitori ng IhL C)peraLion. SiJft"& Londuci reta%kingi to refine: updiie, or create neiv requireinent%. (See FM .3_55. I The direLI iiif()rniation LLIIILCliOn t,'i.%k iiicliides two subi<lsks:
Dei'elop the infoi-niation col lectic)n plaii, Execute, evalLiate. and update tlie in formation collectioii plLIII.

## Develop The Information Collection Plan (Ij)

l..I I i Ll ) Thc G-IIS-l (levcl(Ips thc int(Irinil1ion L'(IIILL lii)n plan b<lSL(l on thc cinalysis pcrlorniLd by IhL cnlirL
uiiii st,1ff. Tlirough 2( naly%is. the .staff delerTniiie.s the be.st Il1<ly 10 sali.sfy each requirement. The staff receives infoi'ni<11ion colleciion tasks and RFI.S froin .%ubordinaie ,2nd adj<lcent units <1nd higlier headquaner.q. The informcilion collcciion plan aligyns a%%ct% 10 colleciion tasks for <111 of Ihe <1$5et,% Ihat the G-31S-3 can la,%k or reque,st. Additionally, the plun pi"ovidL.% coordinatin(y in5truLli(Irisi 10 en,sure adequale coveraTre Ivithin the area of iniLfLst.

## Execute, Evaliiate, And Update The Infurmatiun Collection L)Lan (L )

.)4.

1 U) The Cvlluation ot. rLporting, producti()n, aiid dis.semin(Ition idcntific.s updJtc% t"(Ir Ihc inf()rmaiion LolleLtion plan. As tlie current tactical %ituclliLin changes. %142ff% ad j u.st tlie over<l11 i nforma(ion colleLtion pl.In
10 .%yiILlirniiiLe collLction t1L (iks. Tlii.s ()Pli nil LL s collectioii aiid explniiation C<ipabilitie.q. Tlie slaff coiisl<1ntl ), updaie,s requiremeiil.s to en%ure int'c)rinatic)11 Lollection ettorts synchronize wiih curreni operilion,s
&lnd
%uppoi1 fulure oper1 lioiis planiiing. Aoi coIILcled inforniatioii an.swer.s requirL'nients, the .staff updaie.s the intormcllion collection plan.

## Intelligence ,Staff Considerations To Achieve An Effective Inforniation Collection Plan (U)

-i5. (U) IVhcn ci)IiduL(in17 informalion LoIILLiion. thL iniLIIioLnLc siaff considLfs %i.X Lriicria to lichicvc an ett"ective and cfficint iiiformaiion Lolleciion plan:
Antlclpdte. The intLI ligLnLc stclff idenii tie% lic, or I'elinLS ex 1st ing reqiiirenieni.(i aiid prL.sents Ihein to coinmander4> for approval. Thej, rcL()g?niLe when aiid where
10 recc)minciid t()
IhL
oper1tion% slaft" a change in colleclioii, AniiLipaling and delelopino nLW requiremenis are based on solid situational under.standing, a Ilioi-ouoh review of IPB products &211d existi ng iniclligence,
,1nLI cln Iin11crsi,Ind ing nt. thc ci)nccpi ot. opcr,I1ions, inL Iii(liiig brclnLhc%, sc(ILJcIs, cind Ihc ncL d t()
tran%ition to follow-on operations.

Lnnrdinate. The i ntelligence sial:I' co()rdiiiates anLI collahnraies Iv iih all .%tatt' sectinns 'iii(J hi fiher Iie<ldquc1ricrs and subordinatL' and adjaLLnt uiiits in order to coniiiiuously syncliroiiiLe Ihe int'urmiili()n L()IILLti()n pldn wiih L)pcfiiliun.4i.

Prioritlze. The iniLlligicnLc ,qtaff prioritilLs LaLh validaicd intclligencc rcquiremcni bascd on its iiiipi)rlaiiLL 111 suppo1.ling IhL LuiniiiaiidLI' s iiiieiil Jiid deL i.%ioiis. Pi'ii)I"ili<]lioii, ba%cd ()n Ilie LnniniandLr'% guidince and Ihe Lurrent %iiuati()n, Ln%ures liiniied int'ormaliDn colleciion assels arc directed tow'irds the most crit ical requireinentq. Eft"eciive pri()rilizalion rLquires aq.sessinu Ihe operaiion c111d changing (iitu&ltion.8.

Balance. Balance
18 achieving maxiiiin cfficiLllLy using an appi'opi'iatc n)ix of informition L()Ilcctioii assLts to saii.%fy a% niilly L()mpcting intL'lligcncL requ irLiiients a% possiblL. Balancc involkes using <1 combination of cueino redundancy. and niix.

Reqch. Higher. Icltei'il, %ubordinatL', nr other or(y,IllizLltions m<ly re.liic bly Inswer the unil's requircnients. The iniell igence 4itat"f Laii use iiiicl ligencc re4ich (o aiiswer in itlcil infni'mation rLquircmciii.s '1[hOUl haiij Ilcf to U.%L orgiL nic and supporting int'orination c()Ilection aq%Lt%.

Control, Thc ()bjcct ot Lontrol is intluLllLlllQ .siiuation% aiid prov'idiii(T guidanLL and direction to
.synLhronizL Ihe forLe Ivhile clllowing .subordin11e iiiformatioii collLLtion unils and as%eLS freedom
()f aL tioii. Coiiiiaiidrs u%c Illissioii oi"dei-% 10 assi nn in fc)riiialion col lecliun Iiii S%iOllS c1nd issue guidaiice.

-.3(). (U) Thc intclligTencL .qiatf (in Lollaborcltion with Ihe Loniniander cind stat'n rcceivc.s 1nd I'alidalcs requircment%. pi'cpares the collection manageinenl tool8. reLommend.s information collection a,gset.s and CclP(Ibil iiie.s 10 the G-.31S-.I: <ind m<iint&li nq synclironiillt iLin cls OPLI'Li1ions progress.

## Conduct In'Fellic.Ence.Related Mi,S.Slons And Operations (U)

?.37. (U) ConduLting Iiormal. day-to-day intelligence tasks (t"or exc2mple, intellioenLe support to per.%onnel recovery) f<2ciliiaies Lhe conduct of recoiin<lisiance <2nd surveillance. These (asks <i1$0 include speci<11ized Ini,ssions (sucli as cxploitLltioii of a site) that providc iiilclli(yeiice and inforiiiation ouisidL thc traditioiial iiitormation collcction construct. Thc conduct intclliTrcnLL-rclaicd mission.s and OPLraiion.s tl.sk8 arL
Establish a nii ssion iiitellioeiiLe briLfi ng Lind debriefing proiyram.

Suppuri bitc Lxploiidlion.

Conduct explosive ordnance dispos11 suppnrt.

Prnvide inlellioence (iUPPOn tn perqnniiel recnvery.

## Establish A Mission Intelligence Briefing And Debriefing Program (U)

-.18. l U) C()Inniiinders .sldblish, iUPPL)rl, cind dlluLcile dppf()Pl"i(Iie I'e4OufLes fur a Ini%%ii)n brie finT dnd
pro(yrain. Thc intLII igencc (itat't" dcvLlop.q a mi%.si()n intLlli ftcnce briLfi n4Y
dLbricfinn plan and complcmcntlc ry debriefiiiLI plan 10 .suppori the coniinc1ndLr s procffilln.

## Siupport Site Exploitation (U)

?.39. (U) IntLI]jucncc oroaniL<ltions SLipport sitc explL)i11c tion to cnSurL infonnLltiOn, In,1tcriLI, and personnel are discovered ai the poinl of OLcLirrence or event, LiatherLd, and c1nalyzed. ChemiLal, biologici11, r2diolocTical, and nuclear (CBRfN ) quppori to the sile exploiLaiioii of weapons of nia.ss de.struciion .%ite.s provides technical function, Thi unli and its hi(ylicr int'()I'malioii of CBRN haz'ird.% that suppoi"t tliL IlltclligciicL wai'figlitino headciuarter.s CLln use IhL resulring facts, informi tion, or inielligence to iinswer information requirements, prolect the forcL, <iiid pi'oduce <ln adi,ant.ioe lo suppori siraiegic, operational, and tactical objeclives.

## Londuct Explosive Ordnance Disposal Support (Ll)

?_40. ( U) ALro,%s the ranoc ()f miliiary operati()n.s, thL cxp1o4iil'c ordnance di%p().sal (also L,Illcd EOD) unit processing. 1< nalyzing, ciiid exploiiing dc1ta and supports the intelligcnce Ivarfightino funclion by collectino iiifoi-111l tloll PLI"taiiii lig to toreigii ordiiaiiLe aiid iiiipi'oi'i.sed explosi ve deiiiLes 1'111so called IEDS). This task cnablLs thc synchroiiiLation ()f thL informiltinn collcction tasks LonduLted duriiig .sitc Lxploitation, thus dLveloping intellioence based on collected inform.Ition kind di.stributing intelligence to support iargetino and TTP
adjii%imcnis. This speciLilized technical inform<ltion, thoLigh noi processed IhroLIC7h traditi()nal iniLlligencc chiinncls. informs the developinLnl of iniclliocnLe pioducl%. and Ihc di.stributic)n of tLchnical data, information, and intelligenLe 10 suppori operations.

## Provide Intelli%Ence Support To Personnel Recover), (U)

?_41 , ( U) IntLII igcncc %uppOrt tc) PLrSOnnCl rLC()VLry COnSiSt.8 Of inrClljOCnLC lLtiVitlLS and LapabilitiC.S
locused on Lollectinft int"ormation to reLover and ieiniegr.Ite U,S. personnel wheiher Soldier, Department of the Ariny C2vilian. 8elected DOD conll"<lctor.

Lir oilier personnel as detei'mined by the Secretary of Dct'cn%c-wh() drc ili()laied in a .specit"iL AO. This support al.L) includc% dcvclopinn th()I'ough analysis, deiailed product.s, Ind LstimLiie% to %uppori inicorated .4rmy perbonnel recovei"y compojienis.

## Types Of Intelligence Products (U)

?.4? ( Ll ) The i ntell iuence st42t't' pi'odiices cind In41 Int;iin% 47 varieiy ot. proclllctq tailoreLI to itq consLimers. (,See t-iQLire ?.2 on Pd(ye 2-16.) Iniclligence and nperationL11 produLt.i are mutually supportiipe; together. they LiilidllLL IIIC LL)IIIITiaiidei- % ,%iiuation21 uiiJLI"sLaiidiiig. Tljese pi'oJuLLs 1( re develi)ped c111J Iiiairiliiiied 111
aLLQI'dancL Il'lth IhL cominatidci s guidi ncc.

243. (U) For all of these prc)ducts, the piimary focus of the ii)ielJigcnce staffs <inaly,sis i.$ pre%cnting predictivc intclligence to support operalion.s. Inielligence producis include but are not limited to ther-
Intelligence estlmate. The most detailed produLt devcloi)cd for capturing the analysis and conclusion.s about threats and other relevant a$ts of the opcrational environmcnt.

Intelllgence suminary (INI'SUM). The current assc,%.8inent of the threat .$ituiltion and civil considerations. The inforination and intelligence US to develop the IN'TSL'Nq are ultim&lteJy applid lo develop and Ulate th staff c.$tiniate.

Intelligence running estimute. The intelligience runniiig e%timate details the ability of the intclligence staff to support current and future operations.

## Intflliglnce Esti.Mate (U)

244. (U) An intelligence esiiinale is the apprai.%611, expres.sed in writing or ordlly, of avail<ible intelligence relating to a Specific situation or condiiioii with a view to deiemiining the COAS open to the threat and the order of probability of their adoptioii. The iniLlligence staff develop.s and mdiniain.8 the intelligyence e,8timate.

The pri Iiiary purpose of the iiitelligence esti niatc is tQ-
DrillIn Ihe full sei Of COAS open 10 (he thredl land Ihe prubiiblL order uf Ihcir udupiiun.

Disseminaie information and intelligence.

l)etcrmine reqUIreThnts c()nccrningT threat.s and other relevant a,qpect,g of the nperatinridl LnvironmLnt.

?_45. (U) ThL intLlligtrcnce LstiniatLJ
1% Ic log)ical and ordLrl)' cxuinination ()f intelligenLe factor% <iftLcling Ihe acLI)mpli.shment ()f a Inis%ion (Ihi'ec1ts, ieri'ain <lnd leather, and Liiiil con.%ideraiiL)n,%). It provide.K commander.%
with lin ;Illcl1)'.sis of I he ai'eil of inie.rest lnd thrL <11 .stl-Ln(yt h.% 11 11(1 c;IPc1bil il les Ih<lt Clin in fliJencL their mi.ssion, II i,s U.SLd a% a b<1.Si.s fnr planning aiid di.s,sen)inating intelljcyence.

?_4(). (U) Ali iiilLIIi&yLIILL LSIiTiiltL Iiiay bL Pl'Lpai'Ld Ji an J, ILiiel. Ii Iiiay bL foI'riiiil ()I' iiifuriiial ajid dLlailLd oi. sumJnarizcd. It i.s norinolly writtcn (lt divi.sion and highcr IL vcls li nd bi"icfLd dow'n to thc baitalion IL vcl.

An intLIIi(YLncc cstimate lnu.sl follow thc fivL-paraEraph forniat. (Sec FM 6-().) Thc folloivingT j.s not dn example of the tormal bul rather .1 %,Imple uf the b,Isic information 1nd inlelligencL' rh,11 L()uld be included within the intelligence estiinaie:
qi&sion.

Analysis of the AO. Thi.s aniilysi.% ()f the tcrrain is bascd on the follow'ing:
Mililary aspects of tei.rain (OAKOC).

Oiher 8ionificiint chiracieri81ics.

en.ain et"t-ecis nn t'riendly and threai (Iperaiinn.% an(1 Li vil Lnnii(lerc11innfi.

KVLathcr LffeLts' ()n fricndly and thrcat Iv<lrfighting function capabilitlL% in ()pcration.8 bascd Lin ciirrent ,qnd pre.dicti ve w'e,11her LonLdiliiin.i i n the nper,Ition411 envi ronmenl.

An analy%i.% ot" the CIN i I c()nsideratiuns clnd prc)jected et-feLt.s of civil Liin%ider&ltions on friendly cind tfrireal npei"lli()n.%. clnd vice ver.(i?.

Current threat situatiijn. This 18 ba.%Ld on Ihre.It characteri.%liL.% (%ee A TP
2-01.1) (ind iiicludes c%limilcs Ot- Ihe %lrength ot- threal force%, recent significant (IirLcil aLlivitlcs cind IrLnd, 'Ind thrL, pcculiarilie.s and vulncrabilitlL.s.

Threat capabilities. ThLJse Ll1'L Ihe br()<id COA% cind suppofiino L)per<ltions IhL11 Ihre<1t(i CL1n tak.e to aLhiL ve their (yoal.% <lnd objeciive.%, The intelligence stat"f con.siders each threat's ability to conduct LdLh ()pei-dtiun b<i%d un Ili Inissi()n Vdficibls QMETT_TC) reldlLd iu Ih Lurrni 51IU<ili()n.

Threat characteristlLs. The.%e pr()vide
,1 fran]c,{}rK fi)r thc con,%i.8ient cvaluatton ot any forcc.

ThL inlLI II LYL'llLL %(ifl" LL)n%idL'rs Lumpu%itiun%, disp()sil i()n,%, .%ifLngith%, vul nLriibiliiiL.%, Lunibdl effLclii'enc.ss: doctrinc <1nd tactics: conimand and SLipport relcltionships, elecironic iechnical dLIta, Lap'ibililiL% and li Iiiitations, currcnl opcrations, and historic1L J dat41 when an&llyLing IhrLat L har<lctcristics.

iummary of the most signifiLant puints. This include TIIL mn.s[ %1 cyni ficaiit tcri-aiji, WLc1thci", aiid L ivil c()11,sidLrations cffcct.s 011 OPLraiiuii.4.

Poieiiiial iinpacts nf L)pci'ati()n.% ()n tLrrain Lind civil con.sidcr.Iiions.

At Ll mininium, tlit, most likely <ind moqt d,2nger(Iiis thre<lt Q'OAS.

Thc rno%l sionificant threat strengths and vulnerabilities.

?.47. ( Ll ) The. inlL.Iligence esiini;Ite 1150 incliides 1.oiir 14ib8:
Tab A (Terrain). TLrrain 1% dcvelopLd pritnarily by thc cngincLr.staff officer.
Tab B (Iveaiher). 'Ll1[her
1.% dcvclopcd primarily by Ihe US/KF S10.
Tab C (Civil ConsidLratiuns). Cii'il con.(iidera(i()n.q pr(IduLt.S lire deiieloped primaril). by the
G-?/S-? in L()ordin4iliL)n with Ilie re%[ ()f tlie Sl<lff.

Tab D (IPB). IPB product.s ai"e dcke.loped priinarily by the G-?/S-2 in coordiliaiion iyith the rLst of the sliift.

## Intelligence Su[NRy (U)

?.4,%. ( U) Tlie INTSUM provides the contexl for thc Lommander's silu41tion411 understandinn. The INTSUM
rLIILCtS
IhL
CI-21,%-2
% interprc'.IcltlLin ,Ind conclusinn% rc(yarclEng thrcl1.s. terrHin And Wcciiher. ,Ind cikil con%ider.olions over a de%i(7llciied period of time. Thi.4 lime will V<iry ba%ed on Ihe commandei"'.% de%ire% c1nd tlie %ituaiic)11'.4 re(4Liireiiiil%. TIIL INTSUfvI pi'uvide(s a suiJiiiiai"y of IIIL Llii"1l .%ilucilion. tliieat Lapabi liliL%.

LhivaLieri%liLs Qt- tlie lerrai n cind WL1ther and civil Lon%idcrLltion%. and COA.%.

1.4L). i U) Thc INTSUM LlqSj.%t4i in cl.%.(iC,%.%i ngi thc currLnl silualion Lind in upd&lting oihLr intelligcncL rcport.%, It i,s di,45eniinated to higher, l()wer, and 11djaLLnl uiiit%. The INTSUM ha8 no prL.scribed t-c)riiiat; it can be prebenied iii wi'iiieii Ifigiire ?_.3), gi'<lphic. or or21 toi'mcll, 'l.% directed by the cnznm;Inder. The following
1.% cin exairiple of Ihe basic iiiformalion and intellig7ence Ih<lt %hould be included in an INTSUM:

l)ate.time. groiip (,21so ctillcd DTG) ot. Ihc INTSLIM ,In(I the pcrioi1 ot. liinc Ihc INT.%UM Lovcrs.
"eather effects on friL'ndly and thr&'il Iv,1rt"i&Thtino
functi()n capabijilics ba%cd on the Wcllthcr
Ihreshnl(J qen%itivities nt- thLse cap,Ihiliiie.s, a,s well L1.% the currenl,Iiid pi'ediclii:e weather cnndition,%
in the operaiional enviroiimeiit.

,Significant threut activitie.i oN'er the reporiiiig period and cl near-terni analvsis of Ihreal inteni and aLiiviIy.

SiLinificant impacts of civil consideration.s on ()pcraiions and vicc vers<l.

Subunit assessments of significant tlireat activities and civil c()nsideratii)n.s iii the AO over Ihe reportin(T
period 1nd a near-iemi 1naly.si,li of threai inienl and activit),.

N()tahle trends in threat actii'it.y over a de8ign<ltcd period of time (such ,2s the previoLl$ 14 d,iy%).

This niay bc prcsentcd a.% an all-.%()urce analy.%is produLt, or il may bc t-ocuscd on ,%pccific thrca(
activitlL.% ol" interc.$110 Ihc Loninicindcr-()r boih. Thi.% portion ()t' Ihc lNTSUfvI ,sh()uld hi(yhlipht ne/
or eirergino tlireais and tlie level of impclct thal each thrcal may pi"eseni to the unil's opLr,Ilion%.

C()mbat ddrnage assessrnent ri)11.up includes known or esiiina(cd Ihreat unil
%trengih.s, sjonificLini IhrcLIt .(*yslcms dcoradLd or dL.strnyLd, and all know'n caplurcd, woundcd, or killLd threat per,%onnel during the reporting period.

ritten threat situation or situdtion templ(Ite (a.% ot- a specific dlL te-tiine oroup).

Assessnients IllLlude Iiai-ILriii aiid Ii)n C7_IL'I'III ci%sessiiiil% ol" Ilireal aciivilie%. willi niuLh de(ai I
a% po.%%ible. ba.sed on clV'ail<ible inform<ltion and Lurrent iniclligLncc analy.si.s. INTSUN/l.% are iypiLallJ' pridiciii'e. 1hen specific iniellioeiiLe or infoi"maiion is nol &ivail.Ible, INTSUM% musi cc)Iitaiii Ilie G-21S-?'% be%t ci%%essnient of probabilitlLs of Ihreul Jctions based on experience and prnt"L.%.&i()nal Iiii l it&lry j udgmcni.

HVTLS (in coordinJti()n wiih the taroelingT officer) Illily includc high-viluL indi vidual.i, dcpcncling on the unit mi%.sion.

Current PIRS and prnjected PIRS bv pha%e.

Cnllection management ti)nls and products m<ly include inforiraii()n collection.

'i%%et dispo%ition. or 1S*ei alloctltion.

Special assessments IL rc devLlopcd for any unique circumstancL that rLquirc.s addilional analJ.%i%.

## Unclassified Classification

DATE.TIME GROUP:
INFORMATION: Latest b'me inlomiation is of value PERIOD COVERED:

1. HIGHUGHrS:
Alr: Highlights of the current air situation

b. Land: HighlilS ol the current ground situation, usually divided by area of operatior
d. Space: HigNights ol cuent space sltuation l. Informatlon Envlronment: Highlights ol ojrrent informatson environmenl situation g, Eleclromagnetk Spectrum: Highlights ol currenl eleclrornagneb'c spectrurn situation
. Mwltlme: Highlights d current maritime situation
. Cyberspace:
Highlights of ojrrent cybepace situation

2. SUMMARY OF ENEMY SITUATION: Each category should use the commanderfs related priority Intelligence requirements
and olher information r8quir8ments as the b8SlS tor the analysis and assessrnent
. Ground: Detailed analysis of the area of o
rab'ons by area or sector with comrnents on projected activity in the next 12
hours. How terrain affects a lutiOnal area's capabililies
b. Alr: Detailed analysis ol the air and air detense srtuabon with comments on projecied aclivity in the next 12 hours
c. Marltlme: Detailed analysis ol the maritirne and manbme delense (including waterways) with comments  projected acbvity
in next12 hours
c. Other: M8y be used lor detailed analysis ol pararnililary, insurgent, lerrorist, or other significanl enemy categories rK)t
discussed dsewhere
3. UMT ASSESSMEKr:
a. Most Llkety Course of Actlon:
b, Most Dangerous Course of Action:

c. Other:
4. ENEMY MOVEMENT DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD: Major enerny units (including at least two levels below that ol the
reporting command) and crdinateS of the new posltion
5. PRIORITY INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS: The commandees priority Intelligen r4uiroments and current satislaction
assessment for each priority inielligence requir8menl

## Classification Unclassified Intellic.Encf Rijnnjnc Ee*Tlmate (U)

2-50. (U) Effeciive plans and successful Lxecuiion hinge on accurate and curreni running estimciies. A
ruiiiing eslirriale is thc ontinuous &ssessnient of the curreni situation used to determine if the current operation is procccding according to the communder's intent and if the plannLd future opcralions arc
8upportable (ADP 5-0). Failure to maintain accurate ruTuiing L.stimales may lead to error.s or omi8sion8 thai result in flawed plans or bad decisions during execulion.

2-51 ,
(U)
Running e,%timate.8are princ ipal knoivledgy nianagement tools used by the commander and staff thruugliout Ihe uprdtiun% pruLss. In their runni.ng %u'tlldlS, Ihc LutnmindLr dnd C<iLh sldff scLtion coiiiinuou8ly consider th effeci of new inform<ltion and update the f()IIL>wing:

Facts/Assuinpiions.
Thredt ilcti vilj% dnLI Ldpdbi Iitic&.
Civil con4ideratic)n.i.

Lapons of ma.s.s dLsii'uLtion and CBRN
Rec()mniendalion8 and cnnclusinns.

Friend force status.

I. U) Each qtciff .section bu ilds and Inainlain.s 1.uii ni ni, e.si iniate.s. Thc runnin n e.%ti Inatc &lii%i.%tS thc ,%tot-t' in tracking and recoi'ding pertinent int()rrnaiion, WLII a.s prnvideq rec()mmendati()n% (e,specially tor aniicipaled decisions) 10 commilll(1ers. Riinning esli ni<ile.g represcnt Ihe lillcilssis iliid expert opin ion of. eilch Sl1ltr section by l-unLtional <lrea. Staft"s niaint<Trin rLinnini? estimates Ilirnughoui the operations process 10 agsisi in exercising mi s%i()n L()Inniiind. ThL bd.ilL UUtIiiiL fur thL runningy L.sliindlL illL ludL.%: %1 Iudti un dnd Lun,%idLrdliun%, niis,%iun, COA,%: anLIIy%is. ColllPLiri%on. and recoinniendcltion% aiid Lonclu,sion.s. (See FM 6-0.)
?.5.3. i U) Unlike most uihLr iniellj<yLnLc produci.s, Ihc iniellinenLe rijnning estimc1tc, striuwn in t'i&Turc ?_4, Loinbines bc)th an cinaly.si.% nf friendly lorce intelligencL activilie.% <ind Ilie ability to (*UPPOrt current and/nr tutui'e OPLraiion.g with intell igence anal s'sis of (Iircat.i, terrain and weathei". and civ il consideration%.

Coiiibininu Ihis cincll v.si.s I'acili tilte,% pr()jeciion.% rerTcvdinty Ihc foll(Iwing:
Effect.% nt" kcy Icrrain and 'eather on friendly and enemy ()peration.%.

ImpaLt c)t civil congideraliong ()n operations.

Impaci of t'riendlv oper<ilion% and threat acrivilies on cii'il cnn.ideraiions.

Signific&int Lulturcil factorf tn consider during planning.

Thrcai COA.s.

Thrdt inteni: Lhcif&lLierisliLS, Lind LlP<ibi litie%.

Exiliting or poieniial CBRN or toxic industrial mLlterial hclziird areas and required proteLtion.

SignifiLant LoiicIu,sion% drawn froin a Ihor()ugh and Lomplete anL11ysi%.

INTELLIGENCE RUNNING ESTIMATE NUMBER
DATE-TIME GROUP:
REFERENCES: Maps, chcrts, or Olhei documents
1. MISSION: The unit's mission deterrnined by the commander.

2. AREA OF OPERATIONS: Describe the existing situation in the area ol operations based ona. Terrain. How terrain affects a functional area's capabilities b. Civil Considerations. Description of areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events e. Weather, How weather aff ects friendly and adversary warfighting function capabilities
3. ENEMY SrrUATION: Summary of each threat characteristic that can influwce mission accomplishment a. Comp08ition.

b. Dispositlon. Geographic location ot threat elements and how they are deployed or employed c. Strength. Committed lorBes; reinforcements. air. chemical, biolcyJical, radiological, nudear, and h'gh-yield explosives weapons d. Tactlcs and Training. Strategy, methods of operations, and doctrine, tactics, and training e. Sustainment. Procurernent, maintenance, distribution, and replacement of all types of material f. Operational Effectlveness. Threat morale, weapons eflectiveness, equipment readiness, leadership, and personnel g. Intelligence. Eslimate of the enemy's intelligence collection capability h. Communlcations. Enemy's communications Modes i. Other.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES: (in convenlional operations)
St8te Enemy's C8P8blllties. What, where, *when,* and in what strength for eath capability b. State Enemy's LlmitatlDns. Cause and eff ecl for each limitation C. Analysis and Discussion. Effecl ol capabilities on terrain, civil considerations, weather
5. CONCLUSIONS: Conclusions based on information and analysis about the lotal effecls of the area of operations on threat operations ACKNOWLEDGE: [Designated Staff Officerfs Name and Designation]
OFFICIAL: [Authenticator's Name and Position]
This page iiiteiitioiially left bl ank.

## Chapter 3 Intelligence Operations (U) Military Intelligence Unit Operations (U)

3-1, (U) Inielligence operailons are the ta(ik.$ undertaken by tnilitary inolligence uniLs through the intelligence disciplines to obtain inforination
10 satisfy validated reqUiffrnlS (ADRP 2-0). MI unil collcction opcrations (intelligcncc opcratsons) follow thc Aimy's tramcwork for excrcisin8 mission command-the operation8 process. The major mis.sion command aciivities perforn]ed during operations are planning, preparing, executing, and continuously assessing thc operation. Inielligence commanders, supported by their staffs. u.se the operations process to dri ve Ihe conceptual and deiailed planning nces,sary lo direct, lead, and as%ess intelligence operations.

3-2. (U) Through intelli ence operaLions, MI collection

## Intelllgence Dlsclpllnes (U)

per,sonnel and systems collect i nformation about

capabilities,
                activities,
                             disposition,
                                             and
                                                    all
                                                          threat

(U) Counterintelligence (Cl).
(U) Geospatial Intelllgence (GEOINT).

ch{alengttcS
within the operational environment.

(U) Hurnan Intelligence (HUMI.

Intelligence pmfessionals ft)Iloiv the guidance outlined in

(U) Measurement and signaturo

dJsLiplines
<ind intelligen Lvmplementsry intclligence capabilities to ensure all tasks accomplished successfully and in accordan
with

Intelllgence (MASINT).
(U) OSINT.
(U) SIGINT.

intelligence regu lations and policics. (See ADRP 2-0 for a

(U) Technical intelligence (TECHINT).

de.8criPtion
               nt.
                     the
                                                            and

intelligence
               diqcipline.8

Complementary Inte115gence

cornplementary intelligence capabilities,)

apabllftle8 (U)

3-3.

(U) MI Lollection personnel are trallied atid certified.

(U) Blometrics-8nabled intelligence.
(U) Cyber-enabled intelligence.

MI 8cnsors, opcratd by MI pcrsonncl, can bc directcd to collect information. These Ml collection capabiIities are dislinci from other Army information collection
(U) Document and media exploitatlon,
(U) Forensic-enabled intelligence.

capabilities. ,such a.s reconnaissance or surveillance. The distinciion is required because Intelligence collection must comply with all applicable U.S. laws and policy.

Appendix E of tliis publication lists soine of the Iiiost iinportant laws, policy d(KiJmcnis, and other authoritative documentation. Additionally, certain intelligence di8cipline8 require specific tr4ining and
ertifJcaiions to conduct intelligence operntions.

## Information Collection And Intelligence Operations (U)

34,
(U) To understand intelligence operations, intelligence professionals must undersiand information collection and how intelligence operations nest withj'n it (under the execute collection task). Inforniaiion collecrion is an activiiy Ihat synchronizes and integrates the planning and employment of sensors and asset,8
a.$ well a,s the processing, exploitation. and dis,semination systems in dirext support of current and futurc operations (FM 3-55). Inforniation collcction is the Arn]y doctrinaj construct for synchronizAn and integrating the planning and employment of sensors and assets to collecl informaiion. Information collection also includes the G-21S-2 task of collection management (see paragraph 2-27).

I'U) Intcllibycncc operltions is c)nc of thc f'our priinar), kniCtICc11 ta8ks and Inissions Ihc Army conduLts as part of inf()rm41tic)n LoIILLti()n. The other Lhree are I'econnais.sancL, surveillance: and securitN' operc11ion,s:
Reconnois.sance produces int'orm'iiinn about Ilie AO.

Reconnai%sanLe identifies ierrain characteristics, enemy clnd triendly ob.sl.1cles to nioveinent, and the disposition of enemy force8
,gnLI Livili<ins Lnmineinclcrs Clc 11 Ill<inciivLr torcLs t'rLLly to Ol in ;Incl Inaintain IhL initilltlL.

SuccL%sful cind effective units combine three metliod.s 10 pert()rni reLonnaissance: di.srnountLd.

m()u nlcd, lind dLfidl. All unil4 (and PLr4()nnLI L()nduLI I"eLI)nnll,%siinLe. Uiii Is priiTl<ll ily IdskLd Ll)nducl reLonnll SSLinLL with tciilorcd and %pecil1ied capabiliiie.s I ncl udc. <iir cavalr>' and aiiack helicopter unil.s, gi'ound cavillry and
%COLlt unit%, cheinical reconnaissance elemenil, enoineer reconnais%ance unil4. Ind speci'il operatioiis forLes. (See FM 1-55.)
Surveillonce involves ob<*Lriiino <qn arecl to L"l)Ilecl informalion. In observing a givcn area, thc foLU.% and tLnipo of the LollcLtion effoi'l Lonics primirily froni thL cominandcr
.$ intcni and guidanLe. SurveillanLe involve.i obserNiiig thc threat and Ioccil populace In a named area of inieresl
(NAI) or TAI. Surveillance ni<ly be cl siand-alnne Ini.sion or P<1n of a reconnais.%ancL mi.8.sion
(Pirtic ull< rlv arel fcLoiiiiais.saiice). Sui"VLi Ilaiicc is tICl"Ld aiid laycrLd with tcclinic11 aq&Lts tliai collcct inforinaiion. It i.s P(lS.%iC and coniinuou.s. Survcillancc tasks can bL' pcrforinLd bv a variLt)'
of a.%scts (air, land, Inilri(ime, and sp(Icc), nicans (Soldicr cind systcnis .(iuLh 15 .Irtillcr)' and air
'Icciirate warning of enerny oper<11ions. to pi'oi'ide defense radcirs), and mediums (throuohoLlt the EfvIS). (SLL F.M I_55.)
Securit), operations are enabling operation,s that Lan occur during al l operation%. Cominanders Lindcrt.Ike these operations to provide eirly Ind the forcc being pri)Iccted with lime and Illiineuvcr .SP1ce to rLact to thc enemy. and to devclop the situ1tion so commander% can favorL1bly eniploy Ihe protected forLe. Commclnders mc1y conduci
.%ecurily oper<ltions to the ti-ont, flanks, and rear of their forces, whicli ni<ly be niovinft or stationary.

Thc uliiincltc goal is dLicrminino the cncniy's COA and a.ssi.slin(y thL main body in defeating enem), forceb. The security force will have a InixlurL of reconnaissance and surveillance asseil
10
accoinplish its mis.%icin. ISCC FM .7_5.S.)

IVole. *(U)* When nLcL.ssary, In(Incuvcr uniiN C()ndiJLt offcn%ivc t<q%ks i() collcLI informaiii)n.
.3_ti, i U ) IniclligTcncc c)peraiion.% ai"e drivcii b), thc ncLd 10 an4ivLr queslions crucial Ici Ihe conduci ()f Ihc overall operalion of the supporied f()rce. Units conductino inielligence operaiions follow the OPLrations proLLSS. C()IleL tioii aciivitie% acquii"e iiiforiiiaiioii and provide ilil1 inforinaiion 10 inielliiyLnce <1nalytical elcmLnl%. U&inn product.s dLClopcd for the Loininander and st1< ff, the G-31S-3 and G-?/S-2 devclop the iiifL)rm<ltion Lulleclion plaii based on the commander's intenl &iiid concept of nperiliong. The intorniation Lollection pl<ln Iniisl be synchronized with ClllTent cind turiire opei'iltions.

3_7. (U ) Aftcr thL SUPP()rtcd unil siat"f dLvilc)pq iiit"()rmation col IcLiion ta,sks and (1.s.signs cl LoIIcLti()n niis%iOn ILI (Ill MI uiiil. ciiid tlic LulleLlioii Iiianauei. develop% Ilie iiifuriiialioii collcctioi) pl<in. Ilie MI UlliL begiiis ryure .l- l.)
inielligyenLe operations to.siipport inforinaiion colleciion throu(yh IhL cxecuic colleLli()n ui.%k. (See fj.

Thi4 eft"()rt
1% complex, and there i,s .%ignific,Ini oi'erlap bLiween the supporled unil intelligence siatf and Ihe MI Linit. Tlierefore, the supported unit %t<1ff and the MI unit niust Lollaborate closely &1nd early-on durino planning7 1< nd Ihrnugh()ut t() the L()mplction ot opcrati()n%,
3-8.

(U) Executing collection focuses on requirements tied to the execution of tactical missions based on Ihe CCIRS, IntelJigyenL infurms Lommdnders and stiffs of *where* dnd when tu luok for-
The way: Reconnaissance, surveillance, security operatiofLs, and intelligence operations. (See figure 3-2.)
The means: Ranges from national and joini collection capabilities to individual Soldier ub%ervdtiuns <ind repurts..

The end: Intelligence Ihat suppons the commander's dexision making.

The result: The ,succes,sful execution and &sses.qmeni of operatioTL8 depend on the effeKtive synchronization and integration of the infnrmation collection effort.

## (B)(3) Intf,I.I,Igf.Ncf Opfrations And Thf.,Supportfd Untt Staff (L,)

3~9.

I'U) Thc supportcd coniinindcr and
.%cat'f plan cind a,ssc,s.s inform(Iiion Lollcction at cach cLhclon.

Typically, 'In MI unit sUPPI)rt(i Iheater cirmy, corp.s, divi.sion, and BCT echelons. In those case,s, the Ml unit works closely with the supported comm<1nder and statf to plan, prepare, exeLute, and assess inielliftenLe i)pcraii()ns. Additi()nally, thL MI unit usuallv serves a.% the nieans ()t- Ini.ssion coinniand for any aitached or
.(iupportino intelligencL Ccl1)ibilities at that echelon. Thi.s collaboration ensures eaLh eLhelon inteiirclte% and
.4iJiichroiiiLes iiitelli oence operltioii,s fi.oiii tlic theaier dO,n to the iactic11 levels. Foi- tliis reiison, both the supp()rtcd stat"f and MI unit staff Incinbcrs Inu,st thoroughly undcrstsind all clSPLLt,% ot. thc Eniclligcncc
,IfLhiteclure, includinft Collcction Cipabi lilics.

PED capabilities.

An(Il vliLil L<lP(Ibi lilies, Technicl1 Lhannels.

Prnccdures tnr intclligcnce and F.W' mainien,Ince L1nd nthei. .%uppni't.

l- l O. i U) Joint ISR c()Ilection as.sets are iinpi)rtlnt to Army taciical oper<ltions. In niany cases, joini ISR
LnllLLtioll l.S <lvailciblc Ic) taLtical uiiit.s, pi'ni'idiiig tIILy &lrc Iiot iii Iiic)veiiieiit Llnd havL CL)Iincctivity, LiiliLI'
throLI(Yh a broadLi%l di.$8cminalion sy.%tcm or within V1L rious intLlligcncc databa8cs. Although plLinning inf()rin,'Itinn LoIILLlion ,%tart.s with org<inic and .5upporting Arniy inforin,Ition collcction a.q,qets, in soine ca%e%, Armv unils niay reLeive Ll j()int ISR asset Ilirouiih joint app()rtionmeni and allc)ca(ion. The joint ISR proces.%
tyPiLally requires .%igniticant prioi" planning and appi"oi'cl1. Thi5 is unlikcly when thL joint force is trying to yain aLLL.%.S to lin AO or within a higyhly c()ntCSlLd opcrdtional Lnvironmeni. H()'Cver, in Lcrliin caiC% whcn ali Ariiiy uiiit i.s tlie Illllill effort Ol"
1.8 Pcll't of a decisiwe operatioii, joiiit appoi'tiollllLllt aiid illocaiioii ai"e po%.siblc.

l- I l. (U) In order In receive joint Iipporti()nmeni aiid 'illoc,Ition, the theaier ariny lind corp% intelliftence stat"f niii%t detcrinine wh<lt.joinl ,Issets Ire avii lable by condiiclinn collaboration cillLI coordin<ltion L41rls' in the joint pl<inning prDcess. The staff must also undei"st<ind the vai-iousjoin( ISR ,scheduling aiid collection TIILlnaoement IriLking niLLhaniiiills, ,SULh CIS IhL dll Ici%king ()rdL'r. Addill()nally, IhL' .%tciff mu,%t L%tdbli.sh dnd inLLgr<ilL firL
.suppoi"t coordinalion, air space coordinoc ting measures1 cliid othci. iinpoi-lanl conrdincltion means, (18 w'ell as pllin thc appropriatc rclationship 4lnd c()ntrol mean.% for IhL joint ISR a,%.sLlS. Figure 3-1 depicts thc t}'pical ISR cc)Ilection in a j()int Lnvironnicnt.

## (B)(3)

3.12. (U) Intelligence operations are cornplex. The staff must know and consider practical capabilities and limitstions of dll unit orgdlliL und (IIIoLdted dssets. Cdpubility Lonsiderdtio)ns inLlude the full()winw.

Range. Range deals with the collector's ability to provide target coverage. When considering an asset'.s range, Al is ijiiportant to con,sider Iiiission range (duration ajid dist) and the sensor range
(how closc the collwtion asset must be to the target to collect a ainst it). Additionally, intclligence staffs consider communications rquirernents from the asset to the command post, Thc staff determines the ability to maneuver, including transit and required collection time on specific NAts and TAIS.

Da) and night effectiven. Staffs consider factors such as available optlcs nd any effects of thermal crogsover.

Battery/Power source life. Staffs consider how long thc asset will be ablc to collect and how often the battery or power source will havc to be replenishcd to continue collection.

Expendabillty of asset. Staffs must consider if it is necessory to recover the collcctio.n &li,set or if it is expcndable. What is the risk &ssociated with emplacing and recoverAng the asset?

Technicul choractcristics. Each as.%Lt Inust L()Ii%idcr tinie facior.s (.tiuch as .%ct-UP cind tLc'ir-down time&) for ta.sk 'ILcomplif hment. Other techniL.I1 L haracterifiiicf inL'lude the follow'ing:
SpeLific eiiviroiiiieiital thi-e%li()Id seiisiliviIiLs foi. ec1ch collectioii assct tli<ll adversely iiffect or pi"ohibil Ihc Lffcctive u.sc of botli its plalt"oi"m and scnsor (includino fLlctors such cl.S tcrrain, Wcilthcr, and .soil Lcinipositioii).

Environn)ent<l1 effeLt% on the colleLlion a4i.set (inLluding factors .SULh cl.s urbcin or rural ierrain Ind s()il cc)mposilion).

WhLthci' IhL asset C111 coiilinuc 10 OpCfiltL dLspitL elLclI'onic Littack.

Reporting timeliness. Ecich asset is a.%sj(yned an earliest time and a
141lest lime inform,1tion reporting is of Vcllue accordincy to the infnrmaiinn LolleLtion plan aiid its fiupporting mairix. Other timclinc,is fciclors includc How Ihe a%set Iran%rNts dai<Cinformatinii in near real time, or how the as.set should be recovered to collect thL dit,?.

'I'he eqtahl Ished repnrl.i ng Lrileri1 fnr Llch c(Il lect.inn L1sset.

How Iono il lakcs to dis.scniinalc collLctcd inf()rinL1tion to each rcquc.stcr.

GevluLdliun ULLufiiL)'. ALLufilL J inipliL.% relidbiliiy (uid preLi%iun. The l,%,%el mu.sl be L(IP<al)le uf locaiing cl l&1r(yci accur<iiely cnnuoh to Lnciai gL It wilh pi-LcI.sion-ouidcd munition%.

Durablllty. Durabilily incliides factoi's such a5
Weatlier effecls c)n tlie eii)ployinenl of cnllectic)n asscts (pl,Itforni ,Iiid sens01' piyload).

EMS effecis on the cniploynicnl of cL)Ilcctic)n 1 5.SLts.

WhLihLr IhL priniL IllUVL'f Ldn Lr()s5 rL%lriLtud ILrrilin.

l)etecting threat activity.'I'he slat'f ciinsiilei"s whether thL cnl ILLI.inn Ll.sset can (leittct the expeLled threai activitv. and wheihcr the rhreai can deLcive Ihc L()IILciicin capabiliiy, Performaiice history. ExpLrienced stli f t. ofticers mult know which informaiion cnllection capcibi l ities are Iypic1115' rel iable to niLei the cuniniandei"'s infnrniaiion rLquirernenls. ReadinLss raic%. re%p()nsivcncsq. and Llccuracy, ovcr tinie. nicly raisL one LnllcL(or s rLliabiliiy lacior.

Intelligence PED capabilities. The .qtaff con.8ider.q whciher (he unit h<l.S the inielligenLe PFD
capiibilities. capaiily. and architeciui-e i-equired to .suppoi"t planned and prnjected intelligyence operations.

Inielligcncc PED capabiliiics are rcquired
10
pcrt-nrin rcsponsive intLlligcnLc opei'qtions to .%upport dyiiaiiijL Iiiaiieuver and fire suppoi"t Inissions. I IilL Ill oeiice PED capabil ilies cnhancc a unit's ability to Task. Intelligcncc PED capabilitics pr()vidc inpu( tl) Lhc (,oskingi nf MI Li)IIcLtion systelll.(i.

UndLf,%iaiidiiiu llLLL.%%cirv aiid availciblL' PED LapLlbilitlL.q i IiipfiivL% tIIL iiif()I IllLlli(111 Ilow and guidancc throu(yh tcchnical channels.

Collecl. To accomplish Ihe Inission, PED unil.5 and elements Iiiust haiie the capcibility to receive Lollection froni systenis Ihat are otherwise inaLLessible.

ProLess. PED sen.%or proccsqino and sen%or dilta fusion capibilities Iran%forni Ll lar(ier volume of data iiilo iiifoi"IlllliDIi 11Id cc)Iivei"t tliat iiiforniatioii iiito a useable foi"111it.

Exploil. Inielligence PED per.%nnnel quicklv analyze Ihe processLd inforniaiinn to add opci'aliL)111( l Lonlvxl li) Ilie i IiforiTialiL)11 1 lid iLleiiii fy %peLifiL I"elLvaiiLe lu (hL IiiisAioii.

DissL'minate. PED I'LporlS and product% provide cniiib<lt information and rellled intell igyeiice (o Loinniandcr% and 0[xrational LILniLntl*. This rcp()ning faLilitaics subsequcnl sincylL-.S(iufLL &1nd all-source intLlligenLe, ,1ncil)'si.%, t&1rgLli ng, cueing ot- otlier c()Ilectol'Aki lind decision
11lciki110

## Intf,I.T.Igf.Ncf. Opf.Rations Cuidf.I,Inf.S (U)

-3-13. (U) There are (7uidelines for conduciing ,SULL.%sful intellience operaiions. They noi a checkli%1;
rather. they describe wajs to effectively and efticieiiily Lmploy MI collection ClSSCIS (iiid to develop the
.situaticiii ba,scd
011
Lhc Lominander's guidaiicL.

Mii-rnring the fuiidamciit<115 of recoi)nai,ssancL, thesc
<yuidelines support efforts that resiilt in limely collection Eind reportin(y of the accurate, rele%'ant informcltion needed to produce intelliocnce, The supporied uiiit staff and Ml unit .sliff must deterinine which guidelincs lo emphil%ic bilsL(l on the .%ilu1c tion. Thc tollowing incliide thc intclljoencc OPLration.s giiidcline,%:
Mainiain readines.%.

En4iure c()nlinuous intelli(yenLe oper,Ition,%.

OriLni L)n rcciuirLment,s.

Proviije Iiiixed 11nLI I"LJuiidaiii LuverilllL.

Gain and mainiain sensor coniaLI.

Repon informcltioii rapidly and clCCLif2tel&, Retain freedom of nioicnient.

## .Maintain Re.,Kdiness (U)

-3-14. (U) Ml unit re<idines%
1.%
a Lontiiiiou% priority through predLplc)yinLnt. deployment, and p()fl dLployment. Reidine.%s is a kes1 element dui'ing p11< nning. The readines% of fvll unit per.%onnel 12nd equipment impacts hoiv MI capabiliiie% Lan bc Icvcri10cd to suppi)rt an operation during planning. MI unit rLadine.%,s 11.80
iiiipacts the colleLtioii of iiifoi"Iiiatioii I'equii"ed Ic) I'efiiie plaiis <111d issue oidLrs aiid foi. opei"atioiial execulioii.

3.15. (U) As P2rl of prepare, readiness focu%es on Training. MI coinniander% and leaders niLI.si estciblish a training plcin foLU.%ed on intelligence tasks
,1nd t"unction.s. Tliis ensures M I personnel 1ire prep&ired to conduct individui11 and collective task.

(o support the unil's mission <lnd Lire knowledgeable of equipment and other information collection as.sets and dc1tahase&. l)urin(y traini ng, rec()gni7i ng ()ppnrtunitie.s tn prepare tnr cnnventinnal fnrce
,1nd Ibpecial ()per<l1ions t"orLe (as well as joini <2nd intcragcncy) interdependence. inieroperability,
<iiid iniegraiioi) LLin pi-oduce Lyieal di videiid% dui.iiig opei-a(ioii.%. M I coiiiiaiidLI"s and Iciders Ilial
,seie opporlullitiLS to work with special operation% and other intelliiyence orgiinii.ation,s increasL
their under.%landiniy of LaLh oihei s capiibil iiies and facilitatc interdependence, interoperabi lily, and inte.all01] durincy operltions.

MaintenanL'e. This recurring event ensures intellioence assets are pi'OPLrl>' maintained and prLparLd to cnnduLt inforination coljcction. For exaniple, during planning. Nql leidcrs should Lon(iider Ihe aiiailability of equipinent maintainer% and facililies for l<lble of organiziltion and equipineni-b<lfsLd and commei-cicol-off-the-.shelf %v8ieniq thai niay require dedicated field .serN'ice rLpfL,5LlltiilivLs lo pr(IvidL I'Lpaii' aiiJ IiiaiiiiLnaiiLL.

Equipment status. The
.%iatus ot. collLcllc)n
2c5.scis Inusi bc nioniiorcd and rcportcd
10 the appi'opi'iatc stat"f" LILiiiciit*i.

Augnientation. Wlictlier in the resei-lrclill-ready .%1,1ge or preparingi for a specific nii.%.4ion, it is IieLessaJ'y for MI uiiitfi 10 idciiiit'y and J"epLlI-t aiiy additional personiicl oi" re.%OLlI"ces nece.s.sary to
,1cLoinpl ish Ihl IlliS$1()n. Thi% oficn i n K'oli'e.s addilional col ILL tion asseis or SPLcial iZLd pcrsonncl such Ll.$ lin(TLll%l% or teLhniknal L.xpei"ts.

,4>ustuinmLint. This iniiolves the identi fiLation of OLlt%ide i-e.soLirces. includin(y logistics, fuel, and proteLtion, neLLsNc1ry t'or nii.ssion sucLLsi.

## En,Sure Continu()Us In"Felligence Operation.S (U)

3_16. iu) Coiiimanders dii'Lct Ihc conduct of intorn11< lion collection .Iclivities before, during, and afier the LXCLLltion ot" 111 ()perclti()ns. C()Iiimander8 dcpend ()n intclligenLe to know whcrc, when. and how besi lo eniploy force.8 during all Iiii li iary operation(i. TypicL111y. collection aciivities be.in soon cifter recei pl of tlie mission and continue throughout preporation and execution of the overall operation. They do not cease after the operation concludes but continue as requirrd:
Before execution of the overall operation, intelligence operation,s focus on filling gaps in information about all relevant aSts of the operational environmeni.

During execution, intelligence operations focus on prov?ding commanders with updated information thai verifies the threat's composition, disposiiion, and inntion as the operation prngres.ses. This allnws cnmmander8 tn verify which C.C)A the threat 1$ actually adnpting and dctermine if the plan is still valid based on actuaj events in the AO. Commanders can then make decisions, as necded, illLluding adjustineni decisions (those that Inodify tlie order to respxynd to unanticipated opportunities or threats).

After execution, intelligence 0ratiOnS fOLUS on maintaining LonlaLI With threat forces to LollLt thc inforrnation neccssary for planning subscqucnt operations and protecting the fricn ly forLX. In stability tasks, intelligence operations often focus on relevant aspects of the AO and area of intercst and on the civd considerations dcsignaled by the commander.

## Orient On Requiremenis (U)

3-17. (lj) C'nmmanders prinrit17,e intelligence nperati()ns primarily hy providinLv their guidance and intent early in planning. G-21S-2s assist commanders in Identi.fying and updating their PIRS.

Ensuring PIRS are tied directly to the concept of operations and decision points, Focusing PIRS on their most critical needs (
cause of limited information collection assets).

Ensuring PIR,S include thc latest time information is of value or the event by which the information isr uired.

Approving requests for intelligence collection requirements beyond a unit's copobilities, Aggressively sceking the results of higher echelon intelligence opcration,s, as well as thc an,swers to information requirements across ull echelons through intelli ence reach.

3-18. (U) comnnderS
                         assign
                                 inforniation
                                              collection
                                                         tasks
                                                                based on
                                                                           a
                                                                             unit's
                                                                                     collection
                                                                                                capabilities.

Therefnre, cnmmanders en.sure the t&sks they asqign dn nnt exceed the cnllectinn and analytic(Il ahility nf
their unli, When not using organic asseis, commanders use previously established relationships to optimize
effective operatiuns a.s a conibined ariiLs teani, when possible.

## Provide Mixed And Redundlyt Coverage (U)

3-19. (U) Commanders inte .ate the capabilities of thcir assct.$ to provide mixed and redundant coverage of critical location.8 identified durin planning. The loyering of collection assets through cuein redundancy, and mixing assists in successfully answerin requirements. Maximum effiLiency in information collection is achieved when all MI collection as.se.ts (Ire caretiilly employed together. Thc appropriaie mix ot. collection assets assisis in satisfying as many different requirements as possible. It also reduces the likelihood the unit will f4ivur ur rely un one p(IniLular unit, disLipline. ur
&)ysrn. The inLllignLe lind 0rIl(lOn5 st2tffb col laborate to balance requirements, available capabilities, and areas 10 be covereAI. Commanders and staffs continuously assess results to deterniine any changes in critical locations requiring this level of coverage.

## Gain And Maintain Sensor Contact (U)

3-20. (U) Once a unit conducting intelligence operations gains sensor contact, it maintains that contact unless directed otherwise or the SurvIal of the unit is at risk. In intelligence operaiions: gaining and maintaining sensor contact occurs when the MI collection asset i,s capable of observing or recei ving a .signal or observable from a person or object. Sensor Contact is critical in signals intercepi and imiigery colleclion missions.

## Report Informa'Fion R.4Pidly And Acclirately (U)

.1-21. (Ll) MI collLction as,scL,s ciquifc clnd rcpori iimLlv and accui.atc information on all relcvant a%pLCI.s of the oper&i1ion&i1 environnient within tlie area ol. inlerest. The collection manager must esllblish a primiry, altLrnatc, Lontingency lind enicrgcncy cominuiiiL<21ions pl.on tor Lach col Icction as%ct> &ind ensurc it has bLcn le.%iecl infnrm&ltinn In<1y' quickly l()se its value. Ml Lnlleciinn a.s,sels repnrt exacily what they nhseri'c and, If <1ppropriatL. what thev do noi ob,serve. Seemingly uninipoilclnt information Inay be e,Kti"emely iinportant whLn Lc)nibinLd with uthLr inluriniltiun. NegTJtiVL rLpurts m(Iv bL
(1.% impori(Int cl% fLpurts ()f LhrL(Jt ilLtivity.

To ciisurc colleciion <l.ssets report information r<1pidlv, thc intelligence staff work.s wilh the si(ynal staff to ensurc cominuniLations plan.s inLorpora(e Ml collcction asset coininunicllions reciuircincnl.s, Indic&110rs and pecit.ic int'ormalion requirement.s should be wrilten .such that thLy CL2n be an.swered over the radio by a simple
.spot rep()rt in SALU"I'L (Size, aciivitv, location, unit, limL, and Lquipment) t"ormat t.rom the collection asset.

## ProLdl Eiirly Warning (U)

-3~??

(U) Commander( and 8iaff(i Position MI Lolleciioii asseis to provide early i'arning of threat action.

Comnilc ndei'.s u,se inielljnencL operation4 a.% pai"[ ol their int"orinaiion collection effori to ascenain Ihe threat COA and tiniing. ThLV then ()riLnt thLsL a.sset.s 1() obsLrvc thc%L location.% for indicaiors of Ihrc<l1 41Clion.s.

Tiiiiely and Climpleie reportiiio is essential to providing eLirly warning.

## Retain Freedo.Ni Of Moveliifni" (U)

.3_?3. (U) Ml collLclion as.%et,% require baiilet"iLld In(Ibililv to succes,%t-ullv acc()mpli%h their mi,Ksions. Thee aqsets do not en(Y<lg?e in clo.se coniblt in the cxeciilion of their colleciioii l1sks. The critlc,I1ity L)f MI Lollection as.sets makc% thcif %uri'iv,I1 thL Utniost CL)nsideration. It- thcse a.ssei,s arc deLisivLly cn(yaged, c(IllLction .filc)p.%
aiid PLrsonnel immediatcly exeLute necessars baiile drills. The N11 collection asset lecider's initiaiive and kiiL)wled(ye of the tcrr<1jll, weathci", and threat reduce tlic likelilioL)d of decisive en(Y<igeiiient and as.sisi in Inaintaining frcLdom ot" movLmcnt. Thc IPB prnLcss can identi t'y lnlicipatLd arcas of likcly cotitacl.

## Applying The Operations Process In Intii Lligince Operations (U)

-3-?4. (U) Thc operaiions process describes the sequence of activities perforrTied by any military unit to aLLoniplish cl Inission. (Sec ADRP 5-0.) MJ Linits condLlct the .SLlme seqiicncc of aciivitic(i (pl1n. preparc, cxeLUtC, <1nd <l%SC,qiy) to c2LLoillpli,sh thc ta.sks IS.Slg7ncd 10 thciii. MI unit(i follom, the operations process to LullLluL'I iniellii'LnLe oper(Itiun4 Ihc Ki(ImL w'cly miiieui'r uniL.% du lu LunduLI Iheir uperdliuns. Huwver, Lh
cunduct of inlelligyence operaiiL)n% requires colldlbor<ltioii and clo.se coordination with the supported unil intelli?ence siaff. (See fJgurL 3-4 on p.Igc .l- l Q.)
-3-25. (U) Inlellioence unit p11nning begin.s with the receipt of mi%sion, identif)'in(7 inforniation colleclion talks Ii'iihin Lin ordLr ()1" plan. 'I'hL unli then dclibcrately plclns, prcpclrcs, and exeLutcs the nii.s.sion in cl()se coordination wiih Ihe supporied uiiit Li)Ilection Inancig7er and oiher staff to .4ialisl5' specifiL requirement.s.

PED LILiiiLiiLs pruLCSS, Dui'iiigi thL xeLuLici[] c)[ inlLlligiLIILe OPLI"dtiuii%, M l LcilleLti()11 a.Ki.sel) (Iiid %uppcii"tiiic)
C.Kploit, 1 nd disscinindtc inlclliiycncc rcporl,%' and combat inforniation, Thc stcift" continually assLS.%Cq the etfeciivene%s of thu intormaiion Lollection pl&in to support Ihe operation.% process. Coinbat inforination ideniificd by the G-?/S-? is iinmLdiatcls' pa.sscd lo Ihc coininander,

## Pi.An (11)

3-26. (U) Planning is the art and science of understhnding a situation, envisioning a desired future, and la)'ing
()ut effective Wdy5 uf bringing Ih<il future dbuut (ADP 5-0). It rcbulis in d plin or urdcr tlidt Lummuniudte.%
the comrnander's intent, understanding, and N'isualization of tlic operation to subordinatcs, focusing on desired results.

## Mission Planning (U)

3-27. (U) Mi$sion planning begins when the MI unit receives or anticipates a new mission. This can come from an order issued by higher headquarters or derived from an ongoing otxration, The MI unil relies on
sldblished stdnd<wd uprdting proLedures (SOPS) to drtiLul(Ite individudl <ind Lullf%iii'e respc)n4ibiliLies during planning. The SOPS identify the participants, their responsibilities, and the tools or products required to produce intelligence.

3-28, (U) Upon mission receipc the supported unit's order and annexes must be examined to avoid mi.siin specified and implied tasks and conStrntS possibly contained in the order's annexes. The MI unit commander and leaders should vieW Annex B (Intelligence), Annex D (Fires), Annex F (Sustainment), Annx H (Protection), Aiinex L (Infonnaiion CollLtioi)), and Annex S (Special TLxliJiical Operaiions) 10 the basc opcration ordcr, wcll as all supporting appcndixcs and tabs,

## Militury Intelligence Unlt Commander (U)

3-29. (U) During planning, the MI unit commander uses specified and implied tasks, the supported unit's cominander's guidance and staff as,sessmenLs, and the infOrntiOn col lectinn plan. 'I"his al lows the M l unit cornmander to iailor planning considerations. which include but are not limited to-
Determining the amount and t)pe of equipment required and available for the mission.

Determining and rquestin8 the augrneni<ltion of pcrsonnel and equipment, including rquired PED support to exploit GEOINT, SIGINT, and MASINT collection.

Determining communications (network and voice) and connectivity architecture, requirements, and liiniiations to support the mission.

Coordinating with othcr units to support the MI unit's mission, including but not limitcd to-
Medical peOnnel to establish casualty evacuatton procedwes.

The fire support officer to coordinate f ire support.

The airspace coordinator if using airborne intelligence systems.

Supportd units to cnsurc tFic rcquird mission, conununications, logistics, and lifc support are aaIlable for the MI elementlpersonnel.

Maneuver units to coordinate terrain management where MI personnel arc expected to operate.

Adjacent Ml unit commanders to identify threat infonn<ltion and coordinate and deconflict operaLions.

Observing subordinat execution of troop Icading procedures by section, platoon, and company leaders.

Identifying language requirements and requesting augmentation as appropriate.

Ideiitifying iiiilligeiice contInge(Y funds requirenien(s. (See AR 381-141 [classified]).

Identifying intelligence and EW maintenance support and procedures before deployment, During deployment, this requires Lontinuous dssessnient, especially whell there al'e few or no org1
intclligcncc and EW tcchnicians and t'acilitics.

## Troop T2Ading Procedures (U)

3-30. (U) During planning, MI unit leaders below the MI battalion level conduct troop leading procedures tr) prepare fnr intel ligence nperatinns. The troop leading prnredure,f is a dynamic prnces,s used hy small-unit leaders to analyze a mission, develop a plan, and prepare for an operation (ADP 5-0). These procedures eriable leader5 to Inaxi IIiize available planning iiIJK while developing effective plans ld prepariiig Ihcir units for an 0ration. Troop leading procedures arc also supported by risk managemcnt. It is importani for MI
unit leaders to work with both their higher MI unit (when applicablc) and the supported uni throughout the entire troop leading procedures process.

3-31. (U) The troop Ieading procedures and MDMP and are similar but not identical. Commanders wii.h a coordinating staff use the MDMP; company-level and smaller units use the troop leading procedures (see figure 3-5 on page 3-J 2). (Sex paragraph 2-8 for more on the MDMP.)

## Unclassified Flgure 3-5. (U) Troop Leadlng Procedures Sequenced To The Mllllary Declslon-Maklng Process

3-32. (U) Troop ILaiJinb proLLdurLs Lonsis( of eiglit steps. The SLquLnLe of iJ)e troop Iuadiiig pi'oLLdus stcps is not rigid. Leadcrs modifv thc scqucncc to mcct thc mission, situaticin, and availablc time. Somc steps are Porfomied concurrently while others mav be pcrfornied continuousls throughoui the operation.

## Step L Receive The Mission (U)

3-33. (U) MI leaders analyze mission objectives and current cap<ibilities to accompl i.sh the l,$8j oned Inis%ion, a.s.ses% any possiblL issues (PLrsoniiel, equipiiieiil, or 11)aiiitn41llLL) Iliai could liiiit 11)i.s,sion suppoi"t, ai)d raise any issues that could hinder mission accomplishment to the MI commander and P>UPPOrted unit,

## Step 2 1,Fsue A Warning Order (U)

7-34. (U) MI leaders ot. elernents sui)poff ing a mission issue a warning order to PAfiicipilting elLmenls and per4ionnel as soon as po,ssiblL (USU<211y within an hour after receipt of the misiyion). This ensures subordinaii le&aders hdve key inf()rmdli()n needed iu nidximiLe prepardli()n tirne. The MI unit mdy h<ive tu issue mujtiple warning orders due to additional intormall()n or Lhangc,s to the supported uijil's wariiing order. The initial wIng order should include a task organization (provides the detailed task or anization for the mission:
formation, per.%onnel, and equipment) and timeline (provides a ,schedule of ajj preparatory t&sk.s from receipt of mission 10 the start of collection).

## SP 3 Make A Teniatlve Plon (U)

3.35. (U) MI leaders crcate a tcntatiye plan based on the supporled unit's warning order that atteinpts to meet mission requirements and remain wiihin the framework of the commander, s infrnt. MI leaders ensure-
MI personnel and elements have all available information to complete the mission.

Soldir&* preped lu exLcute dny l<ibks d5sii.gned tu Ihein land their seLLiun/elerneni.

All equipment and vehicles are prepared for the mis.8ion, inventoried, and operational.

## Step 4-In{TLe Movement (U)

3-36. (U) MI leaders may need to initiate movement while they are still planning or conducting reconnaissance. This slep can occur at any time during the troop leadin8 procedures process.

## .SEp 5 C(Jnduct Reconn47Is.Sance (U)

3~37, (U) Ml leaders, ai a minimum, conduct a map reconnaissance and coordinaie with the supported unli to tevicw product,s (such as ground rcconnai.s,$ancc. geospatial information or imagcry [including aeria]
photography], scout photographs, .8ketches) and to verify their terrain analysis, plan, and usability of routes.

This step could occur any time during the troop leading procedures.

## Stsp 6 Complete The Plon (U)

3-38. (U) MI leaders complete the plan based on reconnaissance and any changes in the situation, and confirm the Mission as received from the supportcd unit's warning order, This ensures the plan meeis mission requirements d remains within the framework of the commander's intent.

## Slep 7 Issue The Order (U)

3-39. (U) MI I,eaders give final direction to their Soldiers and other personnel regarding the mission.

subordina leaders should give a backbrief or confwmation brief to the responsible MI leader
<lt the conclusion of thc order to ensure specific thsks and purposGs are understood. Desigynated perso[e1 attend the mi.8sion brief, usually led by the maneuver element's mission leader.

## Step 8 Supervise And Refine (U)

340. (U) All MI personneUelements supporting the niission must attend all rehearsals. preeombat checks.

pr0mbat inspections, and criiical event,s conducied during planning. Ml leaders ensure all supporting personnel adhere to thc guidance, and ajl cquipmcni, personnel, and vehicles are preparcd for thc mission.

## Prepare (U)

341. (U) Preparation consists of thosc acti>iiics rfOrnId by units and Soldiers 10 improve their ability 10
execute an operation (ADP i-o), The prepare activity begins upon receipt of a plan or order, including a warning order. Intelligence operations begin once an order containing infomation collectson tasks is received. For MI collection assets conducting intelligence operations, preparation activities include but are not *limited* o-
Conducting the nexe8sary coordination, as the situation requires, incjuding logistics (by class of supply), maps, and medical evacuaiion procedLLres.

Verifying fire support, casualty evacuation. fratricide avoidance. airspace coordination. spectrum tnanagement. and other coordinats'on measures and procedu s.

Coordinliling Iviih thc USAF SWO IL) dLtLrniine weathcr Lffccls on cc)IILLti(In 2.ssel.8 (plaiform.

and %ensors) based on their lipLcific weiihei" thrL%h()Id sensitipitie.s and the current dnd prediLtive weather conditions in Ihe oper<lll(Illi21 envii'nnnient.

Retining plans, backbriefs, SOP I"Ll'iews. and rchcarsalsi &lnd coordiiiatiiig products with x'6 rious elLmenis ;InLI or(T,Iniz<i1ions.

-3-4?

(U) MI leader% should reconfirm <iiid verify exisiino intelligenLe discipline repori% for the largel and
51idl"e Ilieiii Ivitli Ihe suppoi.ied Lc)IlllJ)iinder. Mi I ILadLfs 4huuld al.iO review Nicllldl .survey.s, inLludiiicy tlie rcquirLd tcchnicc11 data and thc ;IpproprialL LnLryPtion, (Ind invcntory and Icst Ihc signal cquipnicnl,

## Perform Inspections (U)

-3.43. (U) After 1cquiring all required equipniLnt and Kupport ni<iieri'ilq, Nql leaders niust conduct in.%peciion tn ciisure unit persnnnel and sectinns are prepared to cniiduct Iheii" mi.ssion. ,%uhnrdinate leaders c()nduct prLL()nibat chcck% of thcir personnLI supporlina thc Inission. Partlclpclling MI clcnient Icaders Londuci pieLuiiibll i1ispeLliuiis L)efore tiii%%ioiI execulioii. Ii
1% LruLial foi. MI leadei'.% lo verify tliai TTP, pei".sniiiiel, equipnient, and 4ervice% are in place and ready tor niis%iun execu(i(In.

## Conduct Rehearsals (U)

3-44, (U) R hcarsils as%ist uiiils in preparing for opcration.s bv Cither verifyincf thal provi%ions and prnce(lures are in plL1ce and t"Iintinniiig, nr hs, ideniifving inadequacies that leidero and Ihe ,siaft- mu.%t remLdy They allow opei'atioii piriicip2L nt% to become familiar with and Irlc nslaie (he plan inio SPLCit"ic aciions Ih1< 1
()riLllI IhLm tu IhLif Lniiiri)nmL'llL dnd L)IhLI' uniis whLn LxLLulingy IhL Ini%.siun. RLhLafsdl% <ill()Kv IhL MI
eleniLni to inte(rraie with and becoine laniiliar to thL tiupported unit.

It als() ill()ws thc MI eleincnl
10
undcr%L.1nd its role and schLmc of nianLuvcr Kvithin thL Iger mission objectives,
.3.45,
( U) Ml le',Iders cc)nduLt intormation c(Illectinn rehearsals to en%ure the Lorrect inforniaiinn is colltcted, and Soldiers use Ihc right technique.s to .support Ihe mission. Iii a time-conslrained environrneni. the inf()rniation L()IILLiion rehLarsal Inay be cumbincd w'ith a c()Inbincd-arinA rehcirsal nr fire,s rehearsal.

## Execute (U)

3-46. i U ) Dui'i Iicy excuIiL)11, Nll leader.% eii.%ui'e tlieij. uiiil l.s properly s(agL'd willi Ihe %upp()rted uiiil and in thL ri(Thi order of Iiiovenieni.

MonitL)rs 1ssei localinn% cind %upp()rt% and cnsui'cs lorLe prntcclion ot- th()sc cleincnts.

IR on (hc right conin)uniLaiions nciwc)rk Lind c()nducis conimuniclli()ns chcLks.

Reports tcchnical, (hrelL and adniinistr,11ivL inforiiiaiion through the apprnpriatc coniinuniLalion.s netw()i"k (inlelligence and Iiper.I1ic)ns)
specifiedin I'ep(Irting crLiidel ineq e%labli.>hed in Annex B
I IiilLlliuence) and unil SOPS.

## A,S,Eie.Ss (U)

-347. (U) As.scssing7 cillows the Nql Lommander to deiermine the exisience and significance of variance% in Ilie opei"aiioii a,% eiivisioiied iii Ilie iiiitial plaii, Dui'iiig execulioii, assessiiig ali operalioii
1.%
<111 esseiitl<21 Lind Lontinuous ta.sk. li i.s a dclibcratL L(Impari,son nf prcN'iously tcmplatcd ouicomc.s lo clctual cvciils, u,sing thc coniniander's LlItLria for success to judge operational SUCLeSS at any point during the operation. ThL MI unil Loniin;IndLf <lises%cs probahle ouicoines of thc ()nooing opcr,I1ion i()
DLiern)ino whcthLr chl ngTL.% arc rcquired to accoinplish and Colliplctc the mission.

RLacl to thrL&lts.

Takc Lidvaiilclgi of oppoi"iunitlLs.

3-48. (U) A.s the (iituation changTcs, N11 IcLlder.s adju.st the inforniation collcction plan to keep informltion collection ia%k% ,%s'llLhronizLd with Ihe nvei'cill nperaii(In, c)ptiniize cnlleciion, and %uppori fut ure nper<ltional plcinniiig. MI leadLI'S assess intelligence oper,I1ic)n.s by Coll1bor'iiing wilh colleciion Inanagers 10
Identify if inforniation rcquircmLnt,% havc bLcll .slti,sticd.

EvaluatL tIIL ciuality ciiid (ILL uracy o( rLPiir(Ld infoi Illcili(Iii.

Adiu%t thc inf()rmalion Lollccii()n plan b<lsed on Ihc reni.iining int-orination oaps, Rcciuc.%tin(T tecclbi( Lk t'roin ieLliniccil 11 ijrhoritlcs l.SULh c1S the coiintcriniLlligencc 14 nd hiimiin intelligence .stciff element [G.1,X I) on Ihe efficiency ot. inforniation colleciion lcllvltie.s. and to identifv (hL riohi collLction aciii'iiy i() support Ihe Ini(sSiOn, Aiiending (ifter action review.s wilh tlie ,supponed commander aiid staff to asse.ss how well Ihe MI
LIL'rnLiII iniLg'fiilL'd willi (Ind .%upportLd LhL' unil durinyi thL trii%.%ii)n. ThL,iL lt"tLf <lL'llI)n rLkiLW, hould cover the following:
Iiiiegrl1ion of M l element inio tlic laroer mission plaii,
,ft"ccti vcnc.8q ()t' supp()rting thc Lniiini<indcr's infnrmatinn rcquireinenr(i.

IdL"ntit"ication ot cquipmcnt or personnLI dLficiencies.

Idcntification of Icsson% ILclrned cind cmcr(yinn TTP that could .qupport thL unit bcttcr in thc futurL.

## Task-Organizing (U)

3.49. (U) The ,it<iff carefully c()n.sidLr.% the appropriaie coinmand or .support relationship neLded for Lach siIuL1lion. The stat'f balancefi responsive .suppori tn Ihe auomented unit with flexibility to distribuie IhL lowdensit>'. high-dLmind MI collectloll 61sseis,
<18 necessary. across the vw.ious eLhelons. The Nll commandei.

nnrnially prnvides recnnimeiidatinns tn thc st1c ft- in matter.R nt" task-nrftani-/,ing MI cnllectinn <1s%ets and
()uilines thc cft'cct% of the L()niinand Llnd .%uppori relaiion.ship.s bcinu con,8idercd.

In co()rdinaiion wiih
,supporled uiiils, IFIL %tilrr detei'iiiinc% Lolliiii<iiid and suppi)I"I rLlcilionsliiF)%.

well 115
<idd ilioiial o)peraLi()llcl1
requireinents (SULh a%* langtruage .support Lon.%idLr<lticins l.%ee appendi,x Fl ), along wiih the Ini%%ion variable%
(NIETT-TC) when dcelOPIn0 plans Ilnd ()rders. The followincl discussion addre%.%e.% factor% to cc)n.ider for iiitelligence oper'ilioiis. (See ADRP .S-C) for doctrine on uisk-orgL1nizing.)

## Command Relationships (U)

3_.$1). ( Ll ) C'oninicinLI I'el,1tion.shi[)% ;Ire Iised whL'n Ihe mosr respnnsive employinent c)t' Iiiiginenli ng Ml lin irs i.s required. Ariiiy cnmniand rel<liionships arL either desi(ynaied as organic, assi (yned. att<iched: operational LL)llLr()l ( OPCON ), ()r laLIiL<LI Lontr()l (TACON). EdL'h rL'liltiun%hip hclS i nhLrL nl rL%p()n%ibilitlL% (IliSULldlLd wilh ii. (See iable l_l on Plge .l-l6,)
.411 relationships, othei" Lhan assi(7ned. teniporarily c1.S.%OCiclte Ihe auginLntiiig MI unit with the (YiinAnbi unit. Auginciiting units return lo Ihcir MI PlfLnt unit at the end ot tFIL
opet"Itinn. a.% specifiLd in (he pl11l or order dii'Lcting Ihe rel<ltion,ship, or when dirLcted bsi a fragmentarv order.

.1_.51 . ( I l ) ()P(-.( )N n()rmally prnvide.s t-ull 11utlinritv tn t1sk-nrg1c ni7.e Liugmenting cnmm<ind,s and forLe,s and to Liiipl()y thosL torLv.s thL gaininft conimander Lonsiders nccc,ssary. li docs not, in and of it.SLlf, includL
aiiihurilLILive dii'eLlioii toi. Io(yi(ilics or Illiillers of Iiiinislralioii. di(*Lipliiie. iiilrnal orbiLl11iLalioii, 01- unil trainin A SAcynifiLant Lon8iderillion iii the OPCON relciiionship i.s that su.stainineni and other administrative cc)ntrc)I reqpon.sibilitieis reiMlin wilh the parent N41 unil unless the plan or order directino Ihe relaiion%hip specifieii .niherwisL. Nnrmally. mLidificic tion% to (he inherent respoiigibiliiies ,Ire direcled in the Td.%"I".I" fc)
,fiibnrcliiicile Upiil. subparagraph ot paragraph .3 (Exec'uiin17) nf the nrder.

3-.52. (U) TACON limiis Ihc (7<lining c()minander's authorily l() the deiiiled dircciion and conrrc)l of nianeuverlmovenieni nece.ssc11y to icconipli.sh the niission.8 or 11isks as.signcd. TACON does Iiol providc auihorily tn LhlngL thL organiLat ional struci urc of thc au nnicntin(7 lsset or dirLct adniini%trat ivc or lobijqlic%
support.

Unless
Can irnF>)S8
m(xJffied
F*ve
May be
L>ynnkqffl
AtKQN
Are
Establish and
maintain
tiOn1P
resporoibilty
organlzgj
orAO
asygned
Ilai
)mMurHrAtbl
wlththrouglF-
All organi
forces
Anny HQ
Attached;
swcilied
organized
NIA
NIA
Offpnic HQ
Organ
Organ
Organic
HQ
or9111n9
dcum6nt
GainiThJ
uirgd
OPCON
ASCC of
As re(wid
Gaini
Gainr
AssJn&J
by OPCON
unit
HQ
Amiy HQ
chain of
command
Attthed
GainirKJ
by
Gaining
Unil to
Gaining unit
Gainiro
unlt
Gainirg
unlt
Arny HG
unlt
Parpnt untt
gaining
As
As rewirod by
galrlng unft and
Gaining
Parent unlt
Gaining
OPCON
unit may
gainirKJ
unlt
pass
OPC< to
bwer HQI
Galnkng
Gaining unlt
TACON
TACON, GS;
GSA, A; DS
Parent unit
Parent unlt
unit
gaining unit aThJ
Galnlng
unit

Nots.1 In NATO, IIK? gw'nry unit may not taskrganIZe a muftrKtl forGo. (See TAC(J4,)

ADCON
a(kn)inislrabv8 control
headwaners
are8 Ot (4)efations
not aAJlrAble
AO
NIA
NATO
Noth Atlanlic Tr
ASCC
Anry Ser4Ke o)mp)rent LY)mm&
DS
direct supp)rt
gw)eral suppon
GS
enerdl su
tacbcal control
TACON
GSR
orl-reinlorcin
UNCLASSIFIED

## Support Rclationsfiips (U)

3-53. (U) Coinmanders est<iblish support relation8hips (table 3-2) when subordination of one unli to another is inuppropriaie, such as when limited Ml collection Lap<l1)ilities must support multiple units. .SLlPPOrt relationship8 provide the greatest flexibility to di,sts"ibute MI colleLti()n &ssets across an AO. Supi)ort relationships are graduaied from an excliisive .supportLd and $u[)port,ing rclationship between two unit%-a,s in dll'eLI .(iuppoII
lo a broad level uf support KILnded to all UTljts under the Lontrol of die Iiigher hcadquartcr.*-a.s in gcncral support. Support rclationsliip8 do not n()rn]ully altcr administrativc control.

IntelligeiiLe operations noi'iTwlly use two support relationships:
Direcr *supporl* is a support relation.ship rcquiring a force to supp)rt another spccific forcc and authorizing it tD answer directly to the supportLd force's request for agsistance (FM 3-0).

Gcncral support is that support which is given to thc support.cd forcc as a wholc.

galned
Ha
unit furttsr
Provi
pri(xit
c)mma rKI or
estabushed
bysupwjrt
rdats'on&lip
of
OPC,
TACON, GS,
GSR. R, DS
ired by
OPCON
assigned
OPCC*4;
fequired
attsthd
TACON. GS;
GSR, R. DS
gainiro
unit
requir8d
by
Galnlng unll
TACON, GS;
GSR, R. DS
parent l11
unit
requir8d
s rowld by
parent unit
gakni
unit
HQ
ty organ9t10n
OPCON
opooh'onal control
rnIOrcIng
UNCLASSIFIED
The Inherent responslbllltles..
If the
May be
Recefve
Establitha
Have
Have
command
relatlonshlp
poslti(y or
suslanmt
ProvK
li&s(
cornmunkzOons
estsbllstsd
orpnlzed
relationthip
witl
Dir8d SuPrtI
suprtl
ParBnt unl
Parant unil
Parent
Sup
unit
Remforong
Reinfor1
Rein10ed
panI uni(
unit; then
Pa rent unit
unit
Parenl
unl
inlorced unil
Paffjrrt unrt
Parent unit
and &s reqlyred
Pafeni
unt
Gereftl
sup.
Part unl
rpinIo3
reinforcing
Gererdl support
Parent uiil
Parent
Parant u
Notg.i COmmarKJe ol units in direct supp)rt may lurther assKJn supp)rt relationships between their subordinate units and elgm8nts of tho
su
rted unit after o)ordinatson wlth Ihe su
rted cornmarer.

## Unclassified

3-54. (U) In all support relaiionships, the parent unit is rcsponsible for sustainrnLnt. CondJtion,s may exist in which sustainmeni by the parent unit is not po$siblL because of time, distance, or threats. In these cases, thc plan or order directing the support rLlcltion,sliip can direct the .supponed unit to providc 8ustainiment for the supporting unit, as described in paragyraph 3~51.

## "I'Echnical Channels (U)

3-55, (U) InforrndloII moves throughoui various eLhelo1 along specific ts'dnsniission paths or chunnLIs.

E,%iablishing command and support relationship4 directs the flow of reportcd inforinaiion during inillAbLnce nperaiinns. ('h<2nnel,s aq8lllt in streamlining inlnrm4ltinn di.%.%en)inatinn hy en,%uring the right inf()rmatii-In passes promptly to the right pcople. Commander.8 and staffs Iiormal ly cominunicate through Ihree channel$:
Lummdnd, st41ff, dnd tLhniL<il. (See ADRP 6-0 iind FM 6-02.71,)
3-56. (U) Through tcchniLdl Lhc1nncls, Lommai)dcr> and staffs cnsurc adhLrcncL to IipplicablL laws and policies, including but no limited to those li,sted in appendix E of this i)ublication. They also ensure the proper use of doct.riniil tecliniques and provide technid] support and guidallce. For iniell igence opLr<llion.$, technical channels are the transmission paths between intelligence units (inLluding sLctions) perforInii)g a technical function requirii)g sCIal extxrtise. Technical channels control the perforindiice of teclmical functions. They neither constitute nor bypass conimaiid authorities; rather, they serve as the mechanism for cnsuring the execution of clearly delinLatcd tcchnical tasks, functions, and C1pabilItIeS to mect the dynllmic requirLmenL.4 of unified land operations. (See figure 3-6 on page 3-18.)
3-57. (U) Eslablishing intelligence technical channels ensiires over,sight ot. and lL-JFierence to cxisting policic'.(i or reguldtion8 for informiiuon collcction tssks coniained within the infoi'niation collection plan. In specific L41E>es, reguldLury autliorily is gr<LntLIJ to ndtion<al and DOD intL:IlienLc agLnLies t'or .%'PeLifiL Inl[le1]Le discipl ine collection and is passed through technical ch4annels.

Aro
Can imp)
asslgn8d
mantsin
priorities
area ol
on galn8Y
untl furthgr
supp)rt
0rationS
r6lali(mgthlp
olby-
Parent uThl;
.giJpported unlt
unit
S6e noto I
Reik)rcLxI
Not
paranl urlt
Renk)rced
unil and
Parent unil,
Parent unit
Reiifor(xd unit
Nol
apptical4e
fequired
by parenl unit
by parent
As
As required by
Not
Parpnt unit
PanI unit
pareni unrt
ap
by pare

technical channels. Specifically, uses of technical channels include but are not limited to*

## Chapter 4 Intelligence Staffs And Units (U) National And Joint Intelligence Support (U)

4-1 .

(U) National iotelligence organizations employ speciajized resource8 and dedicated personnel to gain information about poicntsal adYersarAes, events, and other worldwide intelli ence requirtments. National intclligcne organizations routincly provide support to thc joint forcc comrnander while con(inuin8 to support national decision maker8. However, the focus of these national intelligence organizations is not eN'enly split among intelligence customers and varies according to the situation and competing requiremeiits. During large-scale combat operations against a peer tlweat, intense competition for in Iligence resources at every level requires efficient use and availability of Arniy information collection units and capabilities.

4-2.

(U) The Army, in response to validateAI requiremcnts, niay provid the theatcr and joint force with intelligence capabilities resident within INSCOM. INSCOM is a direcl reporting unit to tk Arniy Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence that conducts and synchroniz2s worldwide intelligence discipline and allsource intelligence o rations. INSC.OM also delivers linguist supFx)rt and intelli8ence-related advanced
,skills training, acquisirion support. logistics. communications. and other ,specialized capabil ities to support Army. joint, unifid <lLtiun Pdrtners, lind the U.S. in*lligence community. INSCOM'S funLtiuniil brigddeei and groups may provide general support, general support rinforcing, or direct support to theaters through intelligence reach, or they may be force-tailored for deployment to ,support the joint force. INSCOM'S
functional bri8ades and groups include-
An aerial intelligence brigade that provides aerial intelligence collection platforms, associated PED, and mission command ai forward locations.

ations, collection, A Cl group thal conducls the full range of Cl functions (operation$, investi analysis and prDduction. and technical services and .support ativitie8), An Army operations group that conducts global. full spectrum HUMINT operalions.

## Thfatfr Army (U)

4-4, IU) The Arm), Service componLni command (ASCC) of a conibatc1ni comniand is called a theater ariny. The ,4rmy contribute.4 oranizaiional eleinents and capabilitie.$ 10 joini foi.ce coinm<1nders 10 conduci unificd lC(ic)n lcross thc rcingc ot" mililar), opcratinii.s. Thcc1lcr arniy headquartcr,q, wilh thcir comni<lnd p().sls and their associated theqter-enablino coiiiiands lnd functional brigc1des, can control Ariny orjoin( forces for InallLr .scale contingency oper<ltions. (See ATP I_93.)
4.5. 1 U) 'I'he thei1tLf <1rmy Inaintains l< n arca ot rc,sp()nsibility-w'idc t"ocus, pr()N'iding %upp()rt to Ariny and joinl forLe.s acro.ss thL re(TiOlI, in accordiliice with thL geogrciphic comba&i111 c()nimand'% prioriiie% nf Support, DLpiiLlii]Ip 011 Ilie i-egiiun diid Ilic gTcugyJ'<ipIIiL Luiiibdlaiil ioiniJiaiid',s pi-iorili.%,Ilic rlaliv eiiipliasi.% tliai Ilic IhcatLf ciriny placL% on il,% ClPL fic tional aiid adiiiinislrati VL fL%ponsibilitlc.s L<in Vdry (Thrcatly. Thc thcatLr arni), t-oLu%es on adini nistrative duiies th,1t 4upport Ihose oper,I1ional requiremenis supporting the operation.s to prevent, large-scclle ground conibat, and the opcrations to consolidllc gains strltegic roles. This frcc.% the theater army to perform those t-unciion,8 thcll no other Army echeloii can perform during tho.se strateoic r()les:
Shaping the Ill'ea (If responsibility lo improve relcltive po.%itions of advantage enjoyed b! the Uiiited Stales and it.% allies.

Proiecti ncy ao<li nst threclt action% OLilside of the operalionL11 ,Irea.

Prcvcntiiin thc CxP4insion of conflict unintendLd b! friendly dLcision niakers .Ind
.senior coni nicl IidL.r.%.

Deiectinbi 2nd .%triking enemy Lap1 bilities that reside outsidL ()f a joinl oper,'Itioni area, IVole.

During I,Irge-SLale groLincl combat, theater Irniy conimL1ndei"s and stc1t-fs must noi overlook this inip()rtant ()PLraiional function.

4-6. (U ) TIIL IIILdlLr ariiiy LiiablLs tIIL LoITibataiil LoITiiiiaiidLr l() LITipI()y laiidp()wLI ciiiywkiLI'L in IIIL arLa ol.

responsibilitv acros.s thc rilllLie of militai'y oper<ltions. It coniinands Ll11 Arins, foi"ce% in the reoion uiitil the conibatLgnt LoinmandLf ilttaches .selcctcd Arniy t"orccs to J joint forces coniin1ndcr. Whcn thlt Iillppcn,s, thc theater ariny diiiides ils re%pon%ibility between tlic Army component in the joint oper4ltions area arid Arni).

torce,s operatinn in lither pans ot" the area ot- re.sponsibility. Each theater 1 rniy ,supports the Army'g %tr<lteaic rolcs sh<ipe. prcveni, conduLI lar(yc_.%cale orouiid Lonibat, and cons()lidaie gain.s and tc1cilitates IhL U.ie ot"
l<uidpow'ei' 111 Ihe .juiiil iask fui"Le lo wiii.

I'U) Thcalcr army intclljnLnLL opcraiions clfc Luntinu<illy Londucted lu providc inform<iiion and intel ligcnce used Io Slipport I,Ind force,s. Result. fruni these operations are ued IL) proi'ide 17uidance on plan%, policies, and sti"ate(iic ouid'ince. Foi. the Ariny'.s corpf. divisions. 1nd BCTS. the1ter kirmy intelligLnce
()PLrati()n% pr()vidc inforin&iiioll U%Ld in IPB. iar(rycting, silu1c lil)n divclopincni. Jnd pr()ILClion, a.s 'Ll[ <1$
pr()vidc .,Irni nu iiilLlli oencc.

4_8.

(U) Thc thcLiiei' lrniy hccidquciners ha% a G-2 who as,sist.s the coininandcr iii pi-ocessing, Qincilyzing, and di%scmiiiatinTr intorniation and intclligcncc providcd by %ubordin6ilc, highcr, and 1djaccni units, I'For morL

## Theater Army G-2 (U) Int"(Irmjiion On The The,Iier Arniy, See Atp 9.19.1 Iclaq,%It"Ied J,)

4.9. (Ll) ThL Ihe<11er ariny G-2 i.s (he c(Imm<1ndL"r' s principal L1%%1%tant who adviqes, pl<1ns, cind courdinates actioiis of the intelligence warti(yhting function. The thLater ai'my G-? is the-
Chiet. of the iiitelligence cell.

Theaier ariny's .senior intelligence officer.

Principal intelligence advisor to the thealei" Llrniy cominandei..

4~1 (). (U) Thc thLatLr ariny G-? is equipped with intclligcnce .sysieni.s and proLcssors Ihat connLct to all required network%. These %y%tein% are intei'operable willi the Army's mission Loiiiiand ,suite of ,systenis and are able 10 %hare d<ll<l wilh Army organizltions Ill
<111 echelon.s and organizatioiis within the inielligence iollllullity.

4_11 .

(U) Thc thcatcr ariny G-2 (Ind it.s .supporting &inLIIJsis Lind conirol clLnient (ACE) providc rcgionally t'QLUSLd intelligenLe 01 erwaich. RL)giionall! aligned. as.signed. and de.signaled forces mu,st Ilioi'ou&Thly CoLlI"dinaie wiih the SLippnriing IN,SCONI NqIB-T. (See par<igraphs 4-1 f throiioh 4-18.) This ,?Ilows reoion<i1
forces to access theaier intLlligLllcL, infra,siructure. and Iraining opportunitlL.s, l.s well a.s levei.age expertise rL'sidL'nl in thL IhLcltLr. Or.&TdlliLlti()ns L4ill cilsu intLfiiLI w iih INSCOM funLtiuniil LuInin(Ind4 t() t()L U% (Jr(T<illiL
intLllioence capabilities and enhiiiice .situational awai-enes.s and mi.s.sion readiness.

## Theater ArQy Intellicence Cell (U)

4-1?

(U) Thc thcaicr ai.niy intclligcncc ccll
1% rLsponsiblc for synchi"onizing and integratin(y Army intelligcncc oper&ltion.% throughour Ihe con)batant comniand's arca of. rLsponsibilily. Thc ccll'.s .Itat"f clcmcnt.s either embed or coordinilte with other Lornmciiid po.sl cell.s 10 f<icilit.gtL this synchronizalion. SpeLltic:;Illy, Ihe theater cirmy intelligence Lell pertorms the followino tclsks:
Plans, progrclms, budgets, manages, evcilLiaie%. oversees, cind integrates all Intelligence IL clivilie.s.

Provides functional oversight of assigned or 'ittached intelligeiice personnel and units.

M,Inaoes theaier army intelligence colleclion, production, dissemination, disclosure, and Cl requircmcnls.

Coordinates for national intelligence supporl and executes intelligence encyigement Ind Ihe4lter seLuritv cooper<ltion required.

4-1.1. iu) The intelligence CLII in the theater cirmy commcind pos1 provide8 regioni111y focused intellinence supp()rt to Ariiiy ind joini forces opcrclting in thc coiiibatint c()niinand'.s LlfLa ()f rcsponsibili tv. li i(i organiiLd l.$ il plaiiiig .8lKiff tliLl1 a.s,sist.s the Ilicatci. ariiiy coiiiiaiider iii developiiig tlie plai1% I"equired to siipport tlie conibai<2nl coiniiiilnd'.s opcration.s.

4-14. (U) Thc thLaler 'irmy inlelligence CLII depends on the MJB.T I'or intelli(rence collection, .4ingle-.%ource
'In,2lysis. lind i11-sOLifcL intelligLnce 10 meet Ilie the41tei' <lrmy'.s intelligence need.g. With ,iugymenlltion, the intclliocncL Lell Lan conduLI opcrAti()nal inicl lig7encc Lollcction cond coiialy.sis t() .support thcatLr ariny operation% or opcrate in direct support of a Lorps or other .%ubordinaie heldqucl1"iers.

## .Military Intellic,Ence Bricade.Theater (U)

4.15. (U) MIB-T.S aiL cissigiiLd to Lombaiaiit commcliid.s and niay be atlcichLd, OPCON. or TACO.N tn tlie thcaicr army by thc Lombataiit conimLlndcr, As thL Ihcalcr iirmy's pcrmancnily a.s.%jonLd ground iiiicIIicTcncc organi.Ition. the MIB-T can dLploy scalible and tailorablc iniellinencc cap'ibilitlL.% to nieet coiiibatant commaiid. ASCC, Lind JTF intellj(TenLe requiremenll. H(Iwever, it i.s likely that MIB-TS will be ()PCON ro the theatcr army: therefoi'e. thi.s publication discusses .MIB-TS a.s OPCON to the theatLr army.

4-16. (U) MIB~TS pruvidL fLgiull<LII y fL)L U%Ld LOI ILLliun cillLI cindl)i.lij.s l() %LlPPC)ri IhL(IIL'f drniy dtiily ()PLfdliun I'cquircmcni.% and ,spccific joint opci-ations in Ihc arLa of re.spon(iibililv. NIIB-TS provide the thcalLr army Ivith its tound&l1ional CLipabilities to set Ihe Iheater for the iiiielligence Wi1rt-j(yhting funclion. As such, MIB-TS serve as intcll iuencc iinchor poiiiis for deplo.In& forLeEi, A.% anLhor poinis, they provide intelligenLe s)Isfcin and intel li oeiice per%nnTiel supporl relaied tcl Lnmhiltani cnmmLind-.(*peci fic npercil ional envirnnmeni.(i. M l H-I.

also provide expertise on joint ISR and Arniy informcltion collection. intclli(yence resources. culturi1
kn()wlLdgL ol" LIIL IhLillLf, (Ind tliL thi'Lat, as WLII
d.% aLLL%%i 10 IIILatLr anLI Iiatioiial inielligenLL <lT'cliitLLturLs
(Ind daia thal .supporl iiitell i oence opercltions.

4_17, (U) Deploycd MIB-T torLes Icveragc .sccurc Lc)mAnunicltion.s netKvorks 10 1icce.ss nondLploycd MIB-T, higher echelon Army, joini: cind intelligence coinmunity capibilitses through intelligenLe reach. MIB-TS can proi'ide nr cnordinalL Ihe following .%upporl and Lntibling .sei'vices to ground fnrces deployino to, operating in, or othcrwi.sc (upporting7 thc thLatcr:
Intelligence:
Inlclligence 7$%rnLnl(*, COPs clnd intelliiyeiice gi'&lphic producis.

Pcr,si.%tcnt intclligcncc ovcrwatch (for cxamplc cultui'al, languagc, arca subjcct m1ttcr CXPLrts).

FederaiLd intellicyence pi'oduLtion and coordinaiion on behalf of Ihe ASCC G-2.

## Integration:

Infnrmatinn technology integration.

Data scrN'iLL.s (COP.% and inlLlligcncc piclurc%, theaiLr fuundation geo4patial data, dala sharing, acce.s.8 to the coinbaiant command's distributed integrated bickbone
[Jl.%L) called I)IH J: and kn4)wledge Inanagtrenient).

Data ingest services (data push and pull, data formatting: and Distributed Common Ground System-Army l DQ'.GS-AJ-to-niission coinmLlnd .system.% population), Architecturc man&igement seriiices
(.%ecret, sensitive compartniented information, and niultinational coiiimunication% nctwork%; reoionally aligned forccs DCGS-A conncLtivity;
theater geosp<1tial dat1< and services across all neiwork classification domains; and data rouling services provided or coordinaied by Ground Intelligence Suppoi't Acui'ity inforni1tion techiiology opei-ation.%).

Trainlng: Live environniLnt tr<iinino mobile training team.s, and .subject maitcr expcrti,se.

4-18. (U) The oroaiiiiaiic)n (lnd capacity of cach MIB-T diffcr in relc1tion to cndui-in(y theater requircinents and relitive prioritlz&ltion within the Defense Planning Guidance. Alihough tailored to the unique LifLuni.stancc<i of the theLltcr to whiLh it 18 assioncd, a MIB-T'S stindard baiielinc dc.4jon i.s IK multicompc)neni brig1dc headquarters tliat includes Regular Army and .ffjrmv Re%erN'e elemenis.

An OPLrations battalic)n tliat ,sLrvcs a.s thc thcaier army G-2's ACE. This battalion may also be iask-organized as
.1 theklter intellioence cenier. The batialion niay also send a task-oi'o.Inized intclligenLc %upport elcnient as p,Irt of a forward deploymcnt ot- a thLatLr army hL(Idqu&irtcrs cnmmand pn,qtlelemeni ancllor nther grnund iiitel ligencc Inrces.

A tDrwiird Lnllection bL1ltalion thLl1 niay possess Cl, HUMINT, ,Ind SIGIINT capabiliiies.

An Army Rcserve MI batt&i1ion-theaier support (knnwn as MIBN-TS) thal
1% <lSSi(7ned to Ihe Militiiry Intelligence Recidiiie%s Comniand but rE*(yion<illy aligned to the theiter, which c,2n niobilie to pr()I'ide surgc and an cxtcnsion of intcllioencc capilbility and Lap4lcily to thL MIB-T
10 suppori grounL1 force reqLiifLmLnl(i in theilter.

## Theater Army-Level Intellicence Collection Cap,Ibilitifs (U)

4-19.

(U)
TiblL 4-2 lists Iliid desLI'ibLS
tlie<l(Lr ai'iiiy-levLI iiitLIIi (YLIILL Ccipabili tIL%: WIIiLlI ai'L dividLd iiito oro(?nic and supporting collcction C<ipabilitics. Howcvcr. sincc cvci"y thcatLr and spccific opcration arc diffcreni, Ihe thcciicr ariii), G-? Ivill build an intclli&TcncL 'IrLliitecturc, rccLive 4lU (ymeniiltion llnd hi (Yhcr-levcl
8Lippnrl, <ind iask-()rgLinize organic intLIIiLyence unit.s b&scd on Ihe specific operation. The intelljoence ai'chiiecture will reflect h()w many MI Capdbilities are emplnyed fnrward a.s well as Lhe c;Ipabiliiie,s providcd Ihr()ugh rLachback.

JVole. ( U) Gcncrti11!, at cach ccliclon thcrL arc Inore I'Lquircincnt.s Ih<in intelligencc analytical and ollection capacity.

## (B) (3) Theater Army-Level All-Source Intelligencf Capabii.Ities (U)

4-20. (U) All-source intelligence support at the Iheater arniy level consists of robusl and sophisticated capabilities focused on analyzing a broad range of operational and missinn variables acros.s all domains. The analytical focu.s is at the Strategic and operational levels. This all-source support occuts acro,ss (ill Iheater army command posts and is a key componeni of the intelligence architecture. All-source intelligence support includcs the VarAOUS elements of the theater arrny intejligence cell, the MIB~T operations battal ion, and thc rcgionally aligncd Amjy Reservc theatcr support battalion.

4-21 . (U) The primary ajl-souffe analyticol element suptx)rti.ng the theater arniy is the A. Imost theater arniy ACES do not deploy forward. However, tailored ana]ytical elements deploy foNiard to SUPEK>rt the theater army command post strudure. Table 4-3 on patre 4-6 describes theater arnly-level all-source intelligence capabilities.

## (B) (3) Corps (U)

4-22. (U) The Lorps is a formiition th<lt employs orgdlliL dnd *'signed units for oper<itions. A Lorps headquarters is organized, trained, and equipped to control the operations of two to five divisions. The corps conducts large-scale combat operations as port of a joint campaign, employing divisions as its base. In addition to divisional units. the corps may command Bcfs and several types of multifunctional and functional brigade.s. The corps is the mosl versaiile cchelon above brigade. It is organiTKd, mannd. and equipped for Ige-Scale ground combat under two conditions. When serving under another echelon during multi-corps otxrations, the corps is ali interniediate tactical command. In rare cases when it is tlie only Army corps assigncd to a highcr echelon, it may scrvc as thc ARFOR. *ARFOR* is thc Army componcnt and scnior Arny headquarters of all Arniy forces assigned or attached to a combatant command, sulx)rdinate joint force ommand, joint functional command, or multinational comrnand (FM 3-94). When operating independently during large-scale ground combat, the corp,s may .serve as thc ARFOR or as the joint force land component commander (JFLCC) but it requires significant augmentation from joint and multinauonal forces  perform the this role successfully,
4-23, (U) During operations to shape and prevenL the corps is Capable of fulfilling the ARFOR role. It may also form the nucleu8 for a JTF or JFLCC to respond to situations exceeding a division's capability. This woiild requi joini torce augmentation to tiiltill either role successt'ully. During operations to consolidate gains. the corps rnay initiall), .8erN'e a8 an intemiediat tactical comrnand if a field arrny is present; or il ma), LunsiiLute the ARFOR, JFLC, ur d rfF, depending un operationdl rwuirements. These twu roleii wuuld alsu require joint force augmentation. Regardless of its role, the corps executes both operational and adminisrrative responsibilitie.s.

4_24. (U) A cnrps u.%ually reLcives rLinfc)rcin&i Lcipabilitics and unit% frc)Jn theatcr army, jnint, or multinalionlc I
echelon t() conduLt operaiion,%. ThLre
1.% no slcqndard contiguraiion f()r a L()rps, bui il generallj requires a mtineiiver enhilncenient brinacle. combcll 1lVi,I1inn b1"1(1de. (in expeditionary suslciinment cominand. cl field ai-iillery brigade. and an E-MIB io conduct large-scale conibat oper1& lions. Corp,s cornni<?nders rely on E-NIIB.%: rL'suurLLsi Ir()In highLr LLhL'I()n.4i:
Lind in s(ImL
L(I%L%, uriit,% fr()m liub()rdin<ltL
unit.% l() LunduLt intelligence operation%. ( Foi- detailed i Iiformation on corp.% intelligence acti vities and intelligLllLe operation.%, SLC ATP 2-19.3.)

## Corp,S G-2 (U)

4-2.5. (U) Thc intelligcncc warfighting function ,SLippof15 unified l<ind ()perclti(Ins bj ,2$5isting thL C()minander to undersLiiid how eneniy torces cind niher tlire<lts. terriiin, weatheri Kind civil con.sidLfcl1ions L.cin at'fect the Ini(itiion of Ihese cornmands. The corp.s G-2, %uppurted by the intelligenLe cell, <ldi'i.se.s Lhe cominander on how 10 lvera(ye Ihe inLelligence wart-ighting funciion to supp()ri operations.

4-2fi. ( U) Thc Ci)rps G-? advisc.% Ihc commiliidcr nn iniclli<yLnce, a.s.si,st,s thL commandLr in %ynLhr()nizino intellinence operition.s, and supeivises the intelligience cell, Coi"ps G-? key responsibilities include Actingy as principal intelligenLe advi%or t() thc corp(i coniniandcr.

Eii%uriiigi Ilie inicll igicnLe runiiiigi cslii Ileltc reiii<oillfi LUI"reiii.

En.suring inielligence produLls are published c1nd intelligence cell .suppoi-t is complLted iiccording to tlIL coiiiiaiiduf'.% ,slcilLd i LquifLlllcllts aiid thc coniiiiaiid's bati Ic I'liy(Iiin.

Pr()viding H'arning intLlligence.

Providing.situaiion dLN'elopmenl.

Providing Linique intel ligenL e %upport In oilier type.s ot. aciivitie,s.

Pi'oviding intellioencL support to tarbieting foi" lelhal and nonlLihal effeciq.

Priividing siat'f supervision nf Ihe intLII j nenLe Lraiiiin(y prooram.

Pr()viding.slal"f supcrvi.sii)n i)f a.s,signed Lommand .%LLurit)' proiyrams.

A%.%i.siirig Ilie Loiiiinaiidei" iii evalu<lliiib pliy%iLLI1 %eLurity vulnLI'abiliLie.%.

A.%%i%iing Ihe rest of Ihe %iaft- in dL velopino (l.%.sessineni criieria.

Idcniifving linTruist requirement%> pertaiiiin2 10 intelligence support. (See appendi.K F.)
Cc)ordin<2ting Cl activilie..s.

Coordiiiaiing with the USAF SWO to-
EIi,%ui'L thc wcathLr portion of IliL I'uiining cstimalc rcinain.i currLnt.

En,%ure w'eaiher producis are published ciccording (o (he Lomiiiandcr s siatcd requircmenis and the coniiiiand'8 b<]tile rhythni, ProvidL wcaiher.supporilo targLlingyl< nd oihcr iiciivilie,(i.

## Corp,S ITell[CeCe Cell (U)

4-?7. (U) ThL L()fp> inlLllj(yLnLL LLII faLilitiJtL% uiidLr%l<indingy ()f IhL L)P(*fcltiuniil cnvirunmLnt. ThL Lurp, iniclliocncL CCII
Disseininates intellicrence pi'oducts to suppon corp% operation.8 and the commander'.% situational RequLsLs, reLeive%, aiid aiiilyLLs iiilui"IiiJLiuii fi-orii l114iQ)ufLes.

uiidej'staiidi ng.

Mancige.s all requireinenis t-or iiifornicllion collection and MI collcction a,ssels undei. corps conlrol.

Interf<ice.s with the Inoi'ement and Inaneuver cell to integrate intelligence produci,s cind intelligence opLf<lti()ns LILtiVlliLS 11l1() curreni opcration4*, En%ure% we(Iiher producl.s clnd Neathtr effect(i int"orinaiion are integr<lied into current operations, Recommends t<isks 10 the corpq Qi-_I ti)r re4ource.s linder curp% cnnlrnl.

Receives. processes, analyzes, and disseminates all-source intelligence to support current and future operations.

Provides representatives to the current operations integration cell.

4-28. (U) Each corps intelligence cell provides policies and procedure.s for conducting intelligence operations to 8ubordinate echelon intelligence cells. "I'he.se policies and procedures djlow lower echelon inreljigence staffs the freedom to conduct intelligence staff aCtiltieS and inielligence operations more effiienlly, as routine tasks Lan be excutd withoui obiainiIi8 approval frolii higlier eLhelons,
4-29, (U) To support operations, the main command post intelligence cellration$.

Receives, processes, and anajyzes information from all Sources, and disseminates intelligence.

Provides relevant intelligence to support current and future o Participates in information collection planning.

Participates in the targeting process.

Pn)vides foundational geospatia] inforniation and service.s to ] headquarters mission command y.8iems t() 8uprK)rt vi.%uali7.ation thrnugh the genspatial engineer team resident in the CiF.C)l Nl. cell.

4-30. (U) The intelligence cell ai the corps level corLsists of the three principal sections: intelligence operations, G-2 ACE, and 0-2X.

## Intelligence Operations Section (U)

4-31 . (U) The intelligence operations section assists the G-2 in coordinating intelligence suptK)rt to the main command post, tactical command posi, mobile cornmand group, higher headquarters, and subordinate uniis.

It does thi,$ by managing input to the COP through the current operations inle ration cell. The intelligence operaiions seuon tracks the special security office (also called SSO). G-2 ACE, G~2X, and staff weather office pi"oduction and suppoit requii'enients.

## G-2 Analysis And Control 14 Lement (U)

4-32. (U) The G-2 A
is the G-2's principal organizalion for intelligence analysis, knowledge management, inforniation management, collection managemenL and intelligence production. It is an all~
source intelligence organizaiion with the organic inalysis. management, and information technology
apabiliiies needed 10 perform these tasks in operations. The G-2 ACE produces and disseminate8 intelligence and focuses collection rcsources 10 provide iiiforniaiioii thL comn)aiider need,s to make decisions.

## G-2X (U)

4-33, (U) The G-2X advises the comrnander and staff on employing CI and HUMINT colleciion a&sets. It interfaces with external organizations to synchronize and deconflict Cl and HUNqINT tasking and missions.

'rhe Ci-2X inLludes the fnl lowing;
CI coordinatlng authorlty. The CI coordinating authority (also called the CICA) provides technical control, nversighL and decnnflictinn for Cl as,%ets.

HUMINT operatlons cell. Thi8 cell provide.s priinary technical control and deconfliction for all HUMIKf a$8eis in the AO.

HUMINT analysis cell. This cell serves as the single-source analysis point for HUMIKr reporting and operational analysis. It answers RFIS related to HUMINT.

## Fxptr.I)Iti()Nary-Mii,Ii'Ary Tn'I'Tr:I,I.L(.'B.Nlp: Bri('Al)B. (U)

4-34. (U) The Arrny established Ihree brigade-level units in the Regular Army and another four in the Re.serve Coinponents (two each i n Llie Arniy Natioiial Guard and Army Reserve) to enharJLe tlie iiitelligenLe capabiliiy within cach of thc Army's thrcc corps. Thcsc E~MIB unit.8 arc dcsigncd to conduct intclligcnce iliLies:
operations to suppori decLsive action. An E~MIB provides the following capa

SIGtNT LolleLtiun.

CI LulleLtion dnd dctivities.

HUMINT collection.

PED.

CiEOIN"I' cnllection.

4-35. (U) An E-MIB is the primary information collection assei assi ed or artached to the corps. However.

in large-sCe combat operations, E-MIB assets are primarily task-organized down to the division level.

During stability tasks, E-MIB assets may support BCTS with additional intelli ence cap bilitis. E-MIBS are designed to perfonn in a varity of situations and be task-organized in multsple ways. An E-,V41B ompris One headquarters and headquarters comptmy.

Two MI banalions. Each consists of-
One headquarters and headquarters detachment.

One CI aDd HUMINT cornpany.

One collection and exploitation company.

## Corps-Level IntelligeCe Collection Capabilitils (U)

ize
4-36. (U) Table 44 lists corp8-level intelli ence collection capabilities, which are divided into organic and suppnrting cnllectinn capabiliti&s. Hnwever, since every cnrps and specific 0[ratInn are different, the cnrps G-2 will build an intelligence architecture, receive augmentation and hi her-level suppon. and task-or organic in*lli eiice uiiits based on Ihc sp]fiL operauon. The inlligence archileclure will reflect how Inany MI capabilities arc employed forward as well as thc capabilitics provided through rcachback.

## (B) (3) Corps-Level All-Source Intelligence Capabilities (U)

4-37. (U) All-source inieljigence support at the corps level consists of organic analytical capabilities focused on analyzing specific operational and mission I'ariables acros.s all domains wiih]n an assi ned theater, The analytical focus executes operational-level and tactical-level intelli ence analysis and pr(xluction of enerny ground forces, intent and capability to conduct future military operations wi thiii an operational environnient.

This all-sourcc support occuis at corps main and tactical forward command posts and is a critical part of thc intelligence architectuTe to higher, adjacent, and subordinate units.

4-38. (U) The primary all-source and]ytic element supportin8 the corps is the ACE. The ACE supports siiuation development. the thrcai characteristics database, and targeting atlYSIs, Generally, the corps ACE
analytical capability deploys to support the corps main and forward command posts. Table 4-5 on page 4-10
describes corps-levcl a11-,UrCe intlligence capabilities.

## (B) (3) Division (U)

4-39. (U) The division is a forniation that employs organic and assi ned units for operations. A division is thc tdLucdl unit uf execution for a Lorps. A division'ii Pri[nAY rule il* d,4> (I IdLticdl he<idquarter5 Lommdnding ility tasLs in an AO assigned brigade in decisive action. A division combines offensive, defensive, and sta by its higher headquarters, normally a corps. It task-or anizes ils subordinate forces to accomplish its mission. During lar8e-scale combat operations, a division operates not only as a headquarters but also as a centrali7.ed tactical force.

11-scale JTF or
440. (U) During operaLions to shape and prevent of limited scope and duration. the dAvision is capable of fulfilling the ARFOR role. Undcr such condiuons, it Inay also forni the nucleus for a si JFLCC, although it would requirc joint forcc augmcntation to fulfill ciihcr rolc succcssfully. During operations to consolidate gains. the division primarily serves as an intermediatc tactical command. When the situation is consolidated such that a field army or corps is no longer required to command and control operations, a division could assUTh the ARFOR or JFLCC role. Either role would al.so qUIre joint force augmentation.

anic, ussisned,
441. (U) Thc division primarily focuses on operational responsibilities. Unless the division is serving as the ARFOR, a higher echelon nor.mally retains administrative control for all but the division's or and atLqched units. However, when warranted, a higher echelon commander serving as the ARFOR ma>, designate a diiTision conimander as the deputy ARFOR with prescribed responsibilities.

442. (U) A division rnay receive reinforcing capabilities and units from a theater army. joinL or Inultinatioiwl echelon to onduct operations. In addition to Bcfs, a division rnay directly conLrDI several typcs of multifunctional and functional brigadcs. Thc standard organization for a division formation includcs:
a division artillery, a combat aviation brigdde, a susthinmeni brigade, a maneuver enhancement briwade, and three 10 five BCTS. The corps may also downward reinforce the division with an MI battalion from the E-MIB
&s well as other functional and multifunctional brigades and battslion,8. The divi,8ion may task-organi7, a.s necessary. for specific OEKTation.s. For example, during operations to .shape and prevent. the G-3 may direct sonic or all of Lhe Lollectioii and exploitaiion companies  suppori tlie division, s shapirig operations.

4_43. (U) Thc .%iiL. conipc)sition, and Lcipabilitic% of thc forLL'S ta%k-organiLed Iindcr
7 divisir)ri mly vary bLtween diviiiiolI.% invnlved in the KiamL' campJign, .Ind thLJ ni.iy change fr()ni nne operational phase lo nother, Operltion% diii.iiig 11irge-sctile conib<lt Dper,Ition% reqiiire a diflerent mi x (If forc.es and c.iipabililies froin tliose required for the cc)nduct of st<ibility ui%k%,
4-44. ( U) Divi.%ii)11 ariLI l)jcil)Ll'_ IL VLI iiilLI li nLIILL I)l)Lf(IIioii% Ll)I ILLI iiifi)riiicltic)n lo .%upi)ort cui'rLIIL iiiid futul'L
opcration.%, DLt<111Ld iniclligcncc ancllysis drivLi i Iiformation collcction foi. thc d ivi.%ion and it.s highLr hcadquartcr.%. To LollcLI thL inlormation ncLdLd for pl1nnin(F aiid dccision mciking, the division
,%l&lff integiraies all tools ai its di%posal into a SyllLhrnni zed and intLJ(yfclted eclielon i nfnrmiltion LolleLtion plan.

## Division G-2 (U)

4-45. ( Ll ) Tlie iniell ioencL Wlc rt'johiing t'iinLtion %ii [)pnrLS ij n itiecl I'inil nperation.s b J 'i%%i%ti ng the comni<l nder to Lindersiand Iiow enL'm> forLe.% and otlier Ihreclt.s, tei'rain. weather. and civil con4iidLraiion.% Cclll L2ffeL I the niis%iun ()l- Ihc%L Lumniinds, ThL divi %iuii G-2, suppurled by IhL illiclliiyenLe LCII, idvi%Lki Ilie L()ninidnder un Iiow tl) IcvcrclllL tIIL intclli oenLL W,1rfi htinL?

t"unctioti to support OPLrations.

4-46. (U) ThL diviiion G-? advj.%e,(* the cominlndLr on intelliocnce, Ihe commander in synLhronizine intclligLncL opcfiltinn.s, and .iupcrvi.%cs Ihc iiitLllj(renLc LCII. Divi,sion CJ-2 kcy rL%ponsibililics includc Actino as prinLipl1 inlLlligei)ce 1 dvisor Ic) dii'isir)11 Loinniander%.

En.%urino Ihe intcllj(yencL runiiino cstiiiiatL rLmJin% currenl.

Eii,%ui'iiig iniellj 17L ncc prc)duL IKI ai'L publ i,slicd and i IilLI ligciiLe ccll %>uppofi 1% coniplLtcd accordino to tlic conini<indci-' f> Statcd rcqui I'ciiicnts L1nd thc Loiiiiand'.5 b,Iltlc rhyih ni.

Prc)vidinbTr 'irnin(l intLlli oence.

Pi"ui'idingy %ilu&iliun dLiielupinLnl.

Providinn unique intelli(yenLe support tn other types of 1ctivities.

Pr()vid i iiitell i (yeiice suppDI'l t(} Uir(yeting tor lethcil an(1 lion IL)thal cffecls.

Providin(Y stiff %upervision of the iiitelligience tr:iinino proor,1m, Providing.st'iff supl rvision of a%igned coinniand SLciiriti' progr.Ims.

A%sisti n(1 Ihc comniaiidLI' i n ci'<iluJti n(y ph)'.%ical iwcurily vulncrcibi liiic%.

Askii sti lin Ilie rLSt of. Ilie stdff i n devel()piiig il.s.%es.slT)ciii crilLI"IJ.

IdLntifying lin(vuist requirLmeni% pLI"taining 10 inielliqencL .%uppnrt. (See apndiX F,)
Cnordinating Cl <lcti vilies, C".L)ordiiiiltin(y Ivitli the U.SAF .(iWQ) to En,siire the we<lthLr portion i)I" the I'unning esti nidtc rLiiiain.s CLirrent.

En.%Lirc M'eathei. producis 11re pub2ishLd according to tliL coiiim<lndei"
% Slltcd requireinents and IhL commLind's baiile rhythni.

Pi"ovide WLather ,%Lipport to tcll"(Yetine aiid oiher aLti vi IiL%.

## Division Intellicence Cell (U)

4-47. IU) TIIL Jivision intclli(TLnLc cell coordinates ailik'itic.s and sy.51Lm% tliat ils.4isl commanders to Linder.stand the enemy and othei. tlii'eat%, tLI"I"'iin aiid weathci-, and Livil con.sideration.%. Just like the corp.s intLlligcncc ccll. thc diwision inlclli(ycnLL Lell ha% thrLc piincip.il .(itlft" %LCtion%: thc iniclliiiencc operations section, the G-? ACB, dnd the G-?X. (See P<iracYi"aphi 4-3 I throuoli 4-.31.) EIlLh staff sectioii has Several Llements. The divi.sion iiiiellineiice cell prow"idLs ,In inielligence st,Ift" eleineni tn the curreiii operatioiis iiItLgl'atlDIl CLII. (Fc)I' 11)Ol'L 011 d ivi%ioii iiilLII ivLIicc clLti vitiL% aiid iiilL I l i aLllCC opcI'atloll.4, .SLL ATP ?.19.3. )

4_48.
( U) To ,SLlPPOI'I operc11ions, thL dii'isioii intclligLnLc cell
Reccives, proie_4se.s, and
inalyzc.% inforination fi.oiii all
.SOLlI'CC.%
10 produce and di%%eniinLile
intclli<
Prc)vidc% intelligenLe to SLippofi CulTeiit and fLlI ure OPLrat ic)n aciii'itie%.

DLVL l()p% iI)foi'iiiLIIi()11 LCJI ILLtiOll I'LLIU i fL ITIL III.S iiiid t>yllLhi'L)IiiLs illiLII igLIILL OPLI'atic)n.%.

rations (for example, firc ,support Participotes in the targeting process.

Through the G-3, supports, tasks, and directs intelligence o and survivability coordination).

Assesses information collextion, including intelligence operations, dnd resynchronizs the information collection plan throughout operations.

Plans, monitors, and analyzcs Cl and HUMINT aciivitscs.

Providcs, weathr inforjriatioii 10 supi)ori LUITeiJt and fuiwe operatioii activities, inf()rinaiioii collection management, thc targeting process, fire support. and medical evacuation.

Coordinatcs intelligence support with rnultifuncttonal biigade intelligeijce ,8ectioiis (aviatioii, intclligence, maneuvcr, fir&s, and division artillery).

Providcs foundational gcospatial information and services to all headquartcrs tnis%ion command systems to support visualizatAon.

## Division-Lev'El Intelligence Collectiop4 Capabilities (U)

4~49. (U) Table 4-6 lists division-level intelligLnce capabilities, which are divided into prganic and
.supporting collection capabilities. DivisiorLs have no organic intelli8ence collectioii capabilities, except limited information collects.on &sseL$ in the combat aviation brigade Gray Ea le company. The dil'ision G-2
will build an intelligence architecture, receil'e augmentation and higher-lei'el supporL dnd task-organize supporting intelligence units ba,sed on the s cific operatioii. The intelligence arcliitecture will reflect how many MI capabilities arc cmpjoycd forward as wcll as thc capabilitics providcd through reachback.

## (B) (3) Division-Level All-Source Intelligence Capabilities (U)

4-50. (U) All-source intelligence support at the division level consists of orgunic anulytical capabilities focused on analyzing taciical enerny ground forces. The analytical focus is on enemy ground forces, intent and capahility tr> cnnduct t-uture rnilitarv nperatinnq within a cnrp8 nr divi,%inn bnundary. All-snurce suppnrt occurs at the division main and tactical command posts and is a critical part of the intelligence architeciure tu suburdindtc Lumm(In(Js.

4-51. (U) Thc prirnary all-source analytical clcmcnt supporting thc division is thc ACE, Thc ACE supports situation dvelopmenL the threat characteristics database, and targeting analysis. Generally, the division analytical capability wjihin the ACE deploys to support the divi.sion main and forward cornmand posis.

Table 4-7 de.scribe8 divi,sion-level all-source intelligence capabilities.

## (B) (3) Brigade Combat Team (U)

4-$2. (U) A BCT
1.% Ilie Arniy',% priniciry c()nibined arms, Llo.se-coinbat force. BCf.s maneuver aoain.%t, close with Lind de%troy Ilie enLmy. BCTS seize and I'etain ke), terrain, e,Kerl consiani pressurL, and break the eiicmy'.% Ii'ill tn t'igiht. BCTS
11fc". IIIL Pl'iiicip,II ITrc)iJiid Jn<iiieiivcr Iinit.% Ot.

<7 divisi()n. All BC.T% include Ih(
tollow'in(y cap<ibi litieK:
iinLlJ ver.

Medic42l, Reconnai4i%ance.

SuslainincrAt.

Signal.

Eiiginccr.

4-53. (U) Thc organiiaiioiial flcxibility inlicrciii within thc BCT Lilloivs it fL) tunclion aLro,s,s the raiigyc of
<irm()red BCT.% have cniiibined 1L rms bclttali()ns <1nd int"iinlry and Str5'ker Brff Iicive Iiii l itL1ry IiperLIt i()Ii%
iiifaiiti"y bclttalinn&.

4-54. (U) Iiiiel libienie UPLfiiliiiis ifL (iufiTially weic.,
.IiiiJ Ic) %uppori Ihe Illdill el"furi. TlIL BCT iiilellig?eiiLe slruLIui-L ha.s IIIL flLxibi lity Iii tail()r it.5 Lapabilitie.s Ic) nicct tliL: rcquirL lliLnl.% ()f various iypc% of 0ratIon.
and adapi to L'hanging opei"alional needs durinn exccuiion, For ei1ch opei-alio)n, tlie conim.Inder and stiff crcatL
Lind rLfinc rcLiuircniciiis and dLvclop
'i sclicme ot. inf(Irniati()n collection that p(),%ilions MI and IlliineLiver LDI lect inn a.ssets where they Lcin he%1 %illi %t'y I Ii(i%e requireinL nt%. ( Fnr det<iilc(l i Iifnrimatiiin nn H("1"
ITiielligiLnLe activities clnd iiitLllioeiicc ()perclLion,s. .SLe ATP ?_19.4.)
4-_55.

(U) BCT iiitLIIiDLllCC ab.%LI.b fi'(1111 tlic Ml L(IInpaiiy ilJ"L eiiii)Iciycd 10 .4uppoit Illi.4.SIOII L()Iiiiiaiid by mecting thc BCT coininaiidcr'.% intorniation c()IlcLlioii ta.sk.s, Thc BCT staff dci'LIops &l sLlicinc ot intormalion Lollcctic)n that employs Inancuver Lll)d MI uiiit,s b<1.SLd 011 (hc BCT'% Ini%.%ion. PIR%, conLcPt of operation), and Lomiiiander'.s inlent. Thi% scheme integvr<ile.% intelli(ryence operations with the BCT'% nverall operation.

Thc MI c()Tiipany p()sltion.s Iklj col lection il.set.% to S<iiisfy spcci tIL int"orm21ion reL]LiifLillLnls.

Expo.se threat I'uliierabi lilies.

Moiiitor kLy l()catiL)n%.

DL IcLt tar(TCt(i, Collecl infi)rniati()n t'or a.s.%c%.%nieni ()f leih<il and n()n lethal e ffect.(>.

IdLf)li fy uppi)rluiiilies d.% Ilie), ai-iie.

## Brigade CoLbat Team S-2 (U)

4-5C). (U) The BCT S-? is tlie priiiLipal intelligenLe advi%()I" to the BCT cc)Iiiiiandei'. Addilionally, tlie BCT
S-2 .%upport% .SLLuritJ' pr(Igram.s and OliLfscL.s IhL BCT inlclligcncL CLII. SpLcit"ic rcspnns7bilitie.% of the BCT
S-? include but are not limitLd to Situation dcvelopmeiil, taroLI developmeiit. and .sLipport to lethal &1nd nonlethal largeting. Wcirning intLlligcncL, a,s.ie.ssiiicnt. and prntLction.

Prc)vidino thc Lnnini,IndLf LlllLI Slclt-f wilh a.SSL'.ssmcnts ol" cncin), L&1pabilitic%, intcnlions, and COAS
a.s tliey I'L Ic11L to the mis.sion.

Ideiitifyino intellioenLe gap.s 'ind deNeloping collection stratcgie.%.

Di,%%Lininatin(y intLIIioLllcL produc18 tlirouohout thc unit and to hifthLr and subordin<ltL hCi2dquartcrs, Aiismieriijbi RFI.% I I'uiii %ubordiiiaie LoiiiianLler%, Sliirrs, aiid Iiighei. and adjaLeni uiiils.

Cc)ordinaLi ng thL unit. s informatilin and intellioenLe requirenieni.s Ivith %upponino li igliLr, latLral, aiid .suboi'diiiaie eLlicloii(i.

Over%eLing BCT in(elligencL Lell contribuiion.s to L()Ileclion managcmenL.

LLading (he slaff in pcrforniin(y [PB.

Coordin<l(ino wiih the USAF SWO-
To include weather infoi'matioii gaps.

roi. w'eatlier infoi'inillion to support t<1r(ycting.

T() dis%cminaic wcathcr iiiformaiion and/or pr()duLt.4 Ihrouohou( Ihc unil, as w'ill Il,% l() hiohcr ai)d .%uboi-dinaie Iieadqucll-ILrs.

To 1115wer WL<iLhei" RFIS t-rom %ubordin'iiL coiniiiander%. siaffs, and hi(yher and adjaceiil Linii.s.

## Bric'Ade Conibat Team Intellic.E.Nce Cell (U)

4-57. (U) ThL BCT inlLIIi&yLllLL' LL'II is IhL intLlligrL'nLL ()fu&iniLdtic)n in IhL Lomiiicind pust thill (Ill%wL'r%
direLtly to thL BCT S-2. Higher he<1dquariei's Inay Lluginent this cell wilh clddilional cap61bilitie% Lo Incei miiisi()n re(iuircincnt%. Thc BCT intclligLncc ccll rciuc.st%, reccivcs, and anilyLes information froni all
%OUI-LL% 10 pi'oduce aiid di%tribute iiitLllibyence produLls. The inlelligence Lell's gccispatldl en(yineer tLam Illiina<7es Ihe toiiJid,Iiion,I1 neosp.Ilial intormalion ,Ind .SL Ivices t'or the BQT. SLippoMing tlie entire BC"T with analy'.%i.% pi-oducis, ,41ihounh IlierL afL intelligLnce siaff clenieni.s in oihei- comiiiand post cell.s. m05t of the irilLllibLnLL %ial"l- SLLllOlI fL%idLs in (Iiis LLII. (SLL F.M ()_() l i)I' d(ILlriiiL 011 Li-)Iiiinaiid po%l oi"gaiiiLilLion' SLC
ATP ?_19.4 for more inforniation on the BCT intellioence cell.)

## Iilii"Ary Intelligencf Cojqpany (U)

4-.58. (U ) Mo,st intelliftence personncl within Ihc BCT are assigned to the Ml company, The BCT coiiimilrider and .giat"fr" ta.%k-organic Ihc MI coiiip'iny basLd (In IhL mis.gion iariablLs (NqETT-TC). T() offsLt c'ipabilits, hortlalli, the BC'T intelljcreiice stal'f iniLJcyrcltL.% element% of Ihe MI L'()rnPc2n)i and receive8 augiineniaiion upport 1.roni the E-NqIB Ic) aLcoiiipli.sh thc mi%%ion.

4-59. (U) Tlie iiifcii"IlJcilioii LulleLlii)11 plilo()11, iiitell ICYL IILe ciiiJ EW %ystciii i Iiiegratiun pldluon. <iiid slafi"
wcaihLr offiLc .scctioii nf Ilic Ml CQlllP<onv arL OPCON to the BCT hcadquartci"% and IILadquariLr.s coinpany,
They ai'c further det<iiled 10 Ihe BCT S-? to 2uniiieni thc BCT intclliocnce .slaff ,%ection Ind f'icilitate the
e%labliiihiiicnt of Ihc BCT intLlligcnLe cell. Theiic clcnicnts (If thL Ml Lompanv provide thc BCT inielligienLc
LLII with autoiiiated intelligeiice VE'D, analysis. aiid di.s%emiii<lti()n capiibililiL.%, well a% accLs% t()
iiiielligence products of hiciher and loiver echLlon.s,
4-6(). ( U) Soldicrs frnin Ihc N41 Lc)nipanv ( niinu%) cxcculc HUMINT, SIGINTI lnd taLtiC411 unmanncd aircrLlft ystem (UAS) cnlleciion; docunient ,2nd Inedia exploil,1tion? lind in certain instances, bionieiric and forensic c(Illection. ThL MI Lonipany (Ininiis) coiisists ot- cl conipiin J he,Idqiiarlers, miiltifunctlLin platoon, cind IclcIici11
UAS plaioon.

Nole. *(U)* The MI coinp<lny (minus) represents the Soldiers reiiiainin<r afier Ihe inforiiiation LolleLticin plaioc)n, Ihe intelligence cind EW sysiem inte(yrii1ion plaioon, Lind the statf weather offiLe CLtion of thc MI conipany are OPCON t() thL BCT hcadquarlers and headciuarters company.

4_61. (Ll) Thcrc is thc pos.sibility of Cl, HUM INTI 2nd/or SIGINT augrticntatioii froni thc E-MIB in Jlll ny LircumstanLcg. TIIL highLr he:Idquarter% task-organizc> 4inv auomcnialion a.s part of thc MI c()Inpany (minus).

Aildilinnallv, the hi(Yher heLidquarter,% niay ta.%k-nrg&ini7e Ihe taciiLLI1 LJA.S pl<lt()nn under (")P(".()N tn the cninh1L I
aviation brigade b<1sed on UAS operaiional rLquifLments or fnr oiher rea.son,s. In soine inbiance.s. such
11S
I)PLf'atiuii% iii IhL Ll-)Il.q()IiLla(i()11 cifL<l, LoIILLIii)11 ILllll% oi, IiiuliifuiiL Lioii tLaiii.s fri)11) tlIL Iiiulii fui)cti()11 pl'itoi)i)
niLly opei.aie in cteiieral or direct .SLlPPOrt to a niaiieuvei. battalion. CLlvalry .SqU&ldrLin, one of the oiher bal&ilion%,
()r 10 sulx)rdinltc companiL% or troops.

## Bricadl Intelligence Support Elemen'I" (U)

4-()?

(U) A current technique usLd by BCT.%
1% thc e.stabli5hinent of ,7 bri(yade iniLlligLnce support eleniLnt
((116iO C?Ilc(l BISE) by ta.sk~()rgy,1niino pcrsonnel trL)m the BC.T intclli(rencc Lcll.1nd .Ml Loniplc ny. The brig.qde iiiiellioence (iUPPOrt elLment ib thL BCT S-2.4 niain aiialvtlccil oroinizaiion for all-.soui'Le analvsis cind PI"L)LILIL'lI()n. It I'L'LL'I I,'e% L()IlLILI eneiny iiif()riiidli()n, IriiLk% neniy niovLmeni, eneiny L()Inbcil Lflcclivciic%s, and crLaiLs inlclligcncL produLt,% dLrivcd t'rom anl< ly%i.s. Thc brigadc inielligLncL .suppuri elLincnt shares its inforniaiion IL nd conclu.%ion.s Ihrough LollaborLltion with the Bcf and its subordinilte clcnienl in(clligLnLc pcrsoniiL l and w'iih higher- .Ind laicriil-echL lon iniclli nLnLe orgyaniziiiions.

## Brigade Combat Teatsq-Level Intellicencf. Lollection Capabilitie.S (U)

4-63. (U) Tilble 4-8 on pa(Te 4-16 lists BCT-level intelli(yeiicL cap.1bilities. which <l1'e divided into highei" ,Ind
()rgTaniL clnd supporting collecti()n Lapabilitics. The ()r(YilliL intcl lioLncc collLLtion capability 18 the NII
companv. Ml company a.(iseis may provide downivard I"eint-orcenieni to manLLiver baitalion(i or mllneuver Loinpanies. SinLe cvery BCT and specific operation are different, the BCT S-2 will build ali iniellj(TeiiLe architccture, I'cccive auiTnientaiii)n and hi(yhLr-ILvcI suppi)rt, and task-organize org<lnic iniLlligcncc unit.

based on the specific operalion. The intelli(yencL' archilecture Ivill refleci how niany MI cap&ibilitie.% are cinploycd t.or1<1rd 1 s WCII 1$ IhL CaP1bililic.% providcd Ihi"oLigh rc.1chb'iLk.

## (B) (3) Bric.Ade Conibat Team~Level All-Source I.Ntelliclnce Capabilities (U)

4-64. (U) All-,source intell i(yence support at the BCT level i.() very basic and focuse,4 on oround oper1tiniis.

The other domains
&ll-L cnly. ,2ddres,sed basLd on how Ihe), iiffeLI BCT oper41tions. All-source .LlPPOrt is org7inizcd to In1 BCT I"eqLiircmLr,ts aLr()%s niain cind tactic'il forw'ird coinin,2nd po%lS. Tablc 4-9 de&cribL:s BCT-ILIILl all-source inielligeiice capabilitlLs,

## (B) (3) Battai.Ion (U)

4-65. (U) The role of a baitilion is lo clo.%e Ivith lind destroy eneiii), force% using tires, movemeni, clnd shock cft-eci, or to repLI IhL enemj
.s a..%auli by fire and countei'clt(ack. The baiialion coinbines Ihe eft'ons of it.8
conipaiiiLs to CXCLUte tilitical tiiission.s as part nt- Ihc BCT, or wliLn aucrmcnting aiioihcr BCT. Ania.s.sing Ihc conibL1t power of tliLse conipanie.s quickly, wliile integratin(Y clnd.synchronizing tlie supporting and .sustaining niultiplier.,
1% the key to victory, Combined arins b1ttalions are orgLinized to fighi clnd win, but they &1re Lcllliill)I CclP<lblc nl LXLciIIj110 %((Ibilily and (Ictensc .%iipp()rt (.)t' L ivil aiithorily tc1sKs 15 P1TI Ot. (i JTF.

4-66. ( U) The maniiing of (he iniellienLe siatt. Lind intelligenLe cell Lll Ihe bLltialion level within Ilie BCT
V(lJ"iL.% w'iih IliL tyPL of ball<iliuii, The ciiial vliLal dl)d pr(>JuLIiUII LapclLiIy <lL-r()ss Llic fi VL type.s of bill11()11
that arc organiL tn BCT.S varics ciccording to the .sizc of the intelligcncL .siaff and intclligLncc ccll, for operational consideratlolls.

SLich as weigliting the main effort, the BCT may task-orcyclnize intelligence support ICc2m8 froin the MI company, Cl team.s, HUMINT tcani8, SIGINT teaiiis, or niuliifunLtion ILcims to support a baiialion. Additionally, a battalion may use remote ,8ensor% tor defen.se nr int'ormc1tion colleciion purpo.ses. (For dLtailed information on bal(<qli()n iniellioence <iciiiie.s, see ATP 2-19.4.)

## Bat"Falion S-2 (U)

4-67. (U) Thv biilliiliun S-? pruvidLb iimely. clLLufiile iiitLIIiiTenLe cillil!%i% iind pruduLI.%
LU suppurl Ihc Lcininiinder. st&2ft', cind subordiniile uiiils. The bclttcilic)n S-2
ALIS a,% IhL prinLiPdl iniL I IiLllLL dLJvis1)r lu IhL b<llliil ion L()mindndLr.

In L()IijunLli()n wilh tlii S-3. %UPLrvisc,% and LO()rdiiiatcs CL)Ilcction. pi'oce%.si no pr()duciion, and dissciiiiriiiliuIi ol i IilLlligTellLe.

Plans <lnd Iiianagies inlorniation col Iccii()11 iask,s i n coordi naiion 11 Ih Ihe S-_I ;Ind fire% L-ell.

Ei'ciluate% the eneiny in terms of doLtriiie, threat chciracteristics.

HVTS, LLipabililies. and I'ulnerabilitie, In conjuiicli()n witli Ihe S-.3. cooi"diiiiltL.s IhL batial inn staff. s recoininend<ilions for .specitic PIRS
t() be dL,%j17naied
4?% CCIR8.

## Battali()N Intelligence Cell (U)

4-()8. { U) The battalioii iiitellibiLIILe Lell Loiiiaiiis Ilic b<lll<?IAOlI S-? (Ill assistaiii S-2: aiid oiie 01- i)iore cill-
.sourLL intL Ili(ycnLc cinalv.sl.s. Thc CLII mLikc.s an<ilytlLcil prLdictions on w'liLn and whcrL actions will ()ccur. It dlso proiiide.% an'ilysis on Ihe effLcls of relLI',Int a.specl.s of Ihe opei'alional environnieni on triendly and enemy COA,S Ind capabililic.%. Thc intclljoencL CLII integFf&1tcti (itiiff inpLIt lo IPB produc Is for slat"f plLinning. decision Illiiking. targeiing, and combat 42ssessment.

4-69. ( U) A b<iiialion inielli oence cell is iilso responsible f()r
17Llino IiieLtiiio.s.

Alteiiding all NqDMP and tai..

Prc)pusing new PIR& r(.) thL Loinni<indLr.

Providiiig thc stat'f wijih
7 dLtailcd prc)jLction of pos.siblc cncniy COA.S for thL next ?4 to 72 hour.s, h<15ed i)11 al l enemy, terriiin, cind WLaiher t ILt(Irs.

Crec1tiiig Lind Illiintaininn the intelligieiice running e.%iiinate, ,hICh provides the ci)mmiinder and staft- with currLnt assLs%meiits nt" IhL %ilu<ltinn iii thL A(): ha.qed nn eneiny l< Clivities <ind nther rLlcvant LIRPCLt,4 within Ihe AO.

I ntLsor'iting rLP()rting intc) intLI liocncL ccl I products.

LcvLraging Ihc brigade GEOINT LLII as Ippropri&lte.

C()ordinaiinrr wiih thL US.4F SWO a4*.s'iginLd Ici thL BCT 10 proiiide-
IVeaihcr effecl.s on fricndl), and LllLIiiJ Wirfi(Thting capabi litie.% (ind COA.1: bc1scd on currcni
,Ind prLdiLtivc KveathLr cc)nditinnii i n Ilie operc2tional cnvi roiinieiit, r()r inLegraLion int() the MDMP .Ind largetiiig proLess.

Thc 'L<lthLr Lslim&qtc, Vw'LLiihLr portion of thL riinnino Lstimatc, or updatcd wcathcr cstiniatc.

## Battalion-Level Intellicence Collectlon Capaisilities (U)

4-70. ( U) Tciblc 4-1 O list,s Iiianeuver battali()n-levcl intL IligLncL capabiliiic,s, OrgLiniL BCT MI coinpan), intelligeiice a.s,set.s ma), dow'n%,ard reinforce manLuver battalions or m6inLU%'er Loinpanies. Close coordiniiion aiid in adcqultc le1c d tinic arc requircd to en.sure Ihe effcctivc tlow of inforniation and intLlligeiiLe.

## (B) (3) Bati'Alion-Lfvel All-Solircf Intelligence Capabili"Fifs (U)

4.71 . i U) All-8oui'Lc iiitcll igciicc %upports tIIL C()nimaiider'% taciiLal rLquireiiients. Ivhich foLU$ 011 Lnei)i)'
laLliil1 f()rLLS opei'iltiiio wiihiii a sl)("Jrl IviiiJoiv i)I' illtillTI. TablL 4-1 I dL.%LI"ibLS I)Ilc IILUVLr batta lii)11-ILVL l allsource intclli(yence capabilities.

## (B) (3) Chapter 5 Intelligence And The Army's Strategic Roles (U) Overview (U)

-S_I.

IU) Thc Ariny
1,%
cl globally cngJgicd. rLgion1L11! rcsponsiN'L f()rcc Ihclt provide.% a full rangc of
-,IL)iibil itie% to coiiibat<lllt coiiiiaiiders. The Ai"niy pi ovidcs Ilie joijit foi"Le witli tlie Cipabili ty aiid Lapacity fnr Ihc applicaiion of l<indpowLr. Ariny iiiiclligLncc
1% ali iiihcrcnt part of any joint aiid Iiiultinational cniiibi i)ed Jrin,% ILiin. Tlie Army alKc) prok'ide% brc)ad iirr&ly of Intel ligence or(7ai)izaii()n% and C4ipabilities lo support LheatLf OPLI-ation.%. Coinbat1nt coninil< IidLrs dcvL lop (hLater C&iillplign plans thcll rely nii military L noa(ycmLnt. ()pLrc1tion%. pi)%tUl'L. tsccuri ty L()OPLrati()n. and ()Ilicr clclj Klitic% tli<lt scek to aLhicve U.S. niili()nal objectives &ind pi'event re%oi'iing to arined contlict 11,hilc .%etiing condiiions to tran.%ilion to dLtLr opercl1iL)ns WIILII fLCIUiI'Ld.

(U) When a.%iluati()n force% a bi"anLh to tIIL LcllllPoion pl,In, it mily eventuallv JeLid 10 laroe-.%ci11e combat OPLration.%. Lai"ge-.4cale cornb&lt operations
1fL inherently lethal aiid complex.

In these C.ISLS, the full LilP;Ibility ot" naiional lo 1,2ctlCcil inlL1liLncc %iippoi"ts the conibincirion ot. ot"tensive, deten5ive.. and slabilily tc1%ks 10 fiLie, rLlain. and cxpl()il Ihc initiativc and to consolidcllc gain% t() ullinic1icl rcturn to %hapino opei"IliL)n%. M()%( ()r thi% Lh<ipier di%Lu.s.%e% inlLlliLyenLe
4JLru%.% Ihe Arniy s(ratgyiL
r()le.%. Huwever.

%inLL
iiilcl ligieiicL is inliLrcntl)' j()int, il 1.% iinportant 10 cilso understand intell igence supp()ri Licross thL j()int pha.%i ng Inodel. (Sce I"jnure 5-1 un pa(Yc 5-1.) IntelliocnLe is requii'ed acro.s,% ,Ill domains and driiies joint operations aLI"O.%S the rcinoL ot- Irililai"y ()perations:
,4ihape (phase O). Joini, intergOVei"niiierili1. iJilLragenCy, Ind niUliin,ItiOn.21 OperaliOr)ti and I'c'iriou inlcrLlgLncy &lctivilic% arc pcrforinc'd lo di%suade c)r deicr advcrscirics and to as.sure or solidify relaiinn.%hip% with al IILS an(1 [iarlner,s.

Deter I phase l ). The joint force .%eLk% to deter unclesii'ablL advL'rsarv aLlion bsi denicJn.qtrJling il capilbilitlL% lind resnlvL. Thi% phase include activitie.s to pi-epifL forLLS and .set condiiion% for deplc)ymLlli Lind cmplovmcnt ()t" t'urLCs in thL Lvcnt dctcrrcniL
i% nni succc%st"ul.

,4>eize initiative (pl)dSe 2), Joint force COmiiiandCrS
,4eLk lo .SeiZe thL initiative throuiyh the appliLcllion ot" appropri<11L capabilillLb.

Domin<lte (phase 3). Joini force LomniandLrs focus on brecikiiig Ihe enerny's wjl} I"oi' orglni7.ed I-CSl%l(IncL. or iii nonconibai situation%, LL)Iiirnll inrv the opei"ltional env ii"onnicnl.

Stabi]izc (phase 4). Thc stibiliLc phil.%c i.s fLquifLd whLn thcrL 18 110 fully t"unctional, IL*clitiniatL
civil govLrniii authority pi'LSLnt. Tlie j(iini force mcly be required to PLrfc)rm limited Ioc<i1
CYovLrniiice uiilil IcgTjliiiiaie local enlitlLs arc funciic)IiiniTr The forLe Illly Iiave t() intLgi-ate Ilie Lt'fort% of othcr supporting ur contributino Iiiuliinltioni1. intLrgoi'ernnicntal, nongi)vcrnmcntal,
.1nd U.S. GovernmLnt dep<lrinieiit (ind aoency pariicipaiit.%.

EnablL' civil uuth()rit.I' (phusL' 5). Joint force Support to legitimlte civil governaiice in IhLater ch'iracLcriLcs Ihi% phasc. TIIL joint forLc I4'(Irks Io Lnablc Ihc viabi l ity ()f the ci vil 11uthority and it,s pr()vl.%inn i)f CSl*L'ntiaI
SLfviLC* tn Ihc1<irocst nunihLr (It" pc()plc in thc rcoj()n.

5_.3. ( U) Supporlin Ihe Ai'niy. (i conduci of unified llnd OpLrc1tiOnS lCrOSs tlie Lonflici Conlinuum reqUirL
t]IL ilItL"I lib)cllLL waJ"firTliti lig fui)ctio)11 to L)c ad<lPtal)IL aiid agile. Tlie Ai'iiiy s)'Iichi"oiiiLe.s ii(s illtell igLIILe efforts wiih uni fiLd ilLtinn partncr.% 10 (ichicC uni iy of Lfforl aiid to Incct thc LommcindLr's intcnt. IniclliTrcncc unily of ct-fort
1% LritlLal to accomplisli Ihc niission. ThLI"e Lll-c unique requireinents tor inlellinence dui-ing every OPcl'ltioii. Soinc inlclligyLllLL activiliL%
&lfL
%PCLit"iL' tn Lcrtain phl%CS. whilc othLrs .span niultiplc phasc.4.

Coinnianders IL nd leadcr.i addrLs% (he plinninL. LolleLiiori, 5lor<1gc, PED. clnd anilysi% of intelli(rence <ind associated coniexiual daia in cach phasc.

54.

(U) Anny intelligence units und capabilities usually have an important and consistent role in supporting
.8haping operations. Ideally, regionally a]igned forces build on and enhance exi8tJng threat daLq and a.%sociated information during Ihe shape phase. Within each theaier, Ihe developmeni and validation of databases gene,rally occur in a top-down manner, with signifjcant support from regionally aligned forces and special operations furLe%. Thi,4> dllL)W>* unit,% to mdint41in, pvpuldte, dnd cuntinuiUy upddte 1 thowugh dnd dLLufdte ddtdbd.%L during sub.sequent phases. Flowever, there may be instances when regionally aligned forces must develop and tx)pulate an authoritative daiabLse of threat signatures and associated coniextual information, in conjunction with joint forces and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), during the shape phase. This is particularly true when an drea quickly tran,sitinns frnrn the shape tn the deter ph&%e. As this transitinii (Curs, diffe.rent wrti()ns nf the area of responsibility range from relative ace to incrLasing iimount% of conflict to war. In all insiane,8. each eclielon below the11r Wtny mus pfpdr tu Csldblish Iwdlied intelligLnLL Lldtsb<lSeS during dny ph'd%L uf upfdtiL)n.

It is critical for command.s to update the intelligence databa$e continually wiih <lctual and potential threat information to maximiLe the value of inielligence product,s and reports.

5-5.

(U) Army forces ,4hape operational eni'ironmenl,s, prevent conflict, prevail in large~scale OUnd cornbat, and consolidate gains through aggressive execution of infonnation collection and inteljigence production. Operations to shape, prevent, conduct large-scale ground combat, and consolidate gains ummari7.e the Army's strategic mlGs as part nf a jnint force.

## Shape (U)

5-6,
(U) Operations to shape occur as shaping activities across the joint phasing model. (See figure 5-1 on page 5-2.) They focus on

Promoting and protecting U.S. national interests and influence.
Building partncr capacity and putnerships.
Recognizing and countering adN'ei"sary attempts to gain positions ol. rclative advantage.
SLtting LonditiL)ns (u w'in future LunfliLts.
5_7.

(U) Shapinby &lctiiiillc% (irc coiitinu()u% within an arLa nf rL.SpOnsibility. Arnij, fc)rces PLlrtiLipaie in and conduLt numer(iu.% ()IhLr alt1111e% IL) support Ihe conibatant conini.IndLr'q the1< ter campaion plan. These activitie& include developinft intelligence. Loiintering WLapon of mis desti-liction, provi(Iing siippon to humaniiarian eftoris, conducting inforinaiion opei"Itions. and organizinn Ic nd Pcll'iicipaiing i n combined tr<iinin iy cind LXL'fLjSL.%. ThL LL)Inbiil<inl Luiiim(IndLf USL4i thL%L <iLlivitlL% t() impr()%'L SLiurity w ithin Pdriner nation.s: enhance interncltional leoitimacy, gain multinationil cooper2 tion, cind influence adversarv decision Iniking. Thi< coopcr,Ilion inLludcs cxchan(7inn int"urniation and (ihlrinii iniclli(Icncc, obtaining occc%s for U.S. t"orLe.% in peacelime and Lriqiq, and niiti(yatino c()ndition.% that could lecld 10
<1 crisis.

i-x. { U ) Operatinni 10 sli,Ipe cnn.qi.%l Ot varinijs lonLI.Icrm niilitary enga(yeinLnt,s. .%ecurity L(Inperation. and dcicrrenic mis.%ii)ns, iasks, and 'ictions. TypiLcilly, IhesL ()PLI-Il1i()n% al.() i)Lcur lo suppnrt Ihe gc.ographiL
coiiibllanL IollllciiidLz' S tlieaier Laiiipdiilll plilll (11 Il)Lalei" SLL-ui"iLy coopef1c lioii plaii. Coiiibdllnl LuITiiiianderb ralL, Iliid L.XCLUlC j()int ()pLrai ions.

u.sc thL%e plLlll5 ils a to()1 In or(Ydn ILC, inlcii
5_(). (U) Intelligenle is integral in supporling opera(ions to shape. Durinn oper;Itl()11s to sh,'Ipe, Ihe iiitelligence staff niu%l establish a biseline inlelljiyenLe architeLliirL to meet cl bro,Id ringe of rL:quirenients.

IntcLligLncc pr()duLtS lS.$1,bt IhL c()mni&lndcr in c()uiiicrin(Y 4lction,s b J" advcrsarics tliaL chal Icnoc thc st1bility of a nL111()n or I'ccyion and arL Lc)nirary 10 Ll S. illlLfL%ts. Intcl li{iencc provides thc conimander (hc <lbililv 10
dctect adi'ersai"y WLirning.s. ani11yze eiiemj. intentionsi lind trlck eneiny capabililie, across L111 domains to i n foi"Iii dLL i.sions and rLalislic assL.s%lliLni% of OPLfcltiDnal and IclLlical risk.

5-1 (). (U) Support to continLeiicy plan dek'Llopment. whiLh is treaied a.% .1 br,Incli t() Ihe campaigin pl<in,
1% a liti11 L1Cli%'ily duriiig (Iperatinns In ,sliJpc. l)iffcreiil %itu,Ilinns witliin L2n cirea nt- reqpnnsihilily Ctlll Ccqu%e
<1
braiich t() thc canipaign plan t() incl udc rLginnc11 i nstcibil its.. ariiicd 1ogrL%Si()n. naturcll or ni2 n-lnadc di.sasicri.

ul. IIufiiaiiiLcl1'l<lll L I'i%e.s. IiitelliciLIiLe cis%i%L% iii ideiili fyiiigi Ilie%e poteiilial %ilLla(Ioiib <iiid p(Ii"IiL i Pcltes iii devL l()ping p11( n% 10 InitigcltL thL.%e sccnarios.

Noie. *(U)* National 10 taLLiL<'iI intclligcnLL orgianiatioll(i and units nius't develop and miiniain 'in
,Iiithoi-it,?tlvL d<1t'ib;i.(iL ol, tlire;It sinn4iiiifLs clllL1 'l%SOCl<1tLd cnnlexiiiil in tnrni,Itinn tL) .%iippnn 1111
pliinni niy

## 'I'Heatf.R Aillly (U)

I l . i U ) All intLllib7cllic L ftort% dLirin&Tr opcriltions 10 .4hclPt 1( rc 'iccniiipli.%hcd wiihi n ,7 I,IrgiLr niltionLII, .ioint.

1nd Loalition c()ntexl. Tlie focus of IhcatLr inielligcnLe eft-orls inLlude% IhL t"ol1()lInO, Condiict all-%oLirie intel]j(Tence aniilysis tD siipport Ilie .4SCC or combal,Int conim1nder ph<l.%e I
PIR.

.SLfvL. <1% thc thLcl(cr ,Irinv .4QE tor sinolc.qoiirLL IIIILII i<7encc. ,91 l-soijrcc inlclli QLllcc (I ncily.%is, <ind inielligTeiice collcction minaoement.

l.everage thL
I J..S. iiiielligence c()nimunity an(1 jninuallied iniclligLnce cnierpi'i4L, iiiiegr11ing I"e(Yionally aligiiLd forces and glob<il I'esponse t"nrce%.

(".Iinduct CQlllinu()Ll% infornicltion c()Ilectinn clclivltie(i and intelligence c1nalysis tn priivide eiirly (ind
.ILcuratL Ivarnin LY i ntcl lig7LnLL.

( U ) TIIL tIILLltci ariiiy G~? p11'ticipates iii opei'll liojial plcl111li11 o processes to ideiili t.y iiitelligeiicL .%uppoil rLqU ii'cmLIIIs 111 L)rdcr to support thcltLr plans Lind dLicrniinc gap% in i nf()rmatiun cin(I knowlLd(yc. Thi(> drivcs the deN'elopinenl ()t' IliL inforniati()n cullecli()n pl&in. The G-?* 111eilyzLS Ihe colleLled data and uses il Ic) rel'inc IPB product5. ,4ddition111y. the G-2 propose% PIRS for Loniniander 'ippi"oll2c l and identifies HVTS and HS
for G-3 appi'oi'al. Finally. thc theater arnij, G-2 conduct.s ISR synchronizcltion wilh Iialional, joinl. and L()ci1 il ion PLlrliiLrs t() Lnsurc adcquatc L()vcflc gc ot" ISR a%%L ts Ic) niLCI Ihe thc1c tcr. s, necd.s.

1.1.I U) The thLater arTlI)' G-2 build(1 relali()nship% %viih P<ll-tner nations Ilirouali e.Kerci.ses and exchanoe.s.

ExcrL i,%cs %lrengthLn rcl1ti()n%hip% with oini intLII i ycnLe c()niniunitv. includinzihc J-g and coinbal %u.J)Traiencic% (in p;Iriicular, (hc
(b) (3)
Iinil.s. Ind units 1PPOrtic)neLI <ig7ainst ,In oper<il ion pliln.

The Rcserve ConiponLnt: including Ihe .Miliiary IiiielligLnce ReadinL%% Command (al.%0 oallLd M IRC) 1n(1 the MIB_T'N Rescrve Q'ompc)nLnt rhLilter .siippL)rt b11t1< lion.

IN'SCOM, including rLinfnrLing sijpporl bLyond whal thc MIB-T
providL% (for cx.IiiiplL, illlelligTencL disLipline nr i111-&nurce %uppnrr frnin IN.%C'()M'.% t-unLtinnal hrigades, .sucII
Ll% the N,Iiicinal Ground Intclli2cnce Ccnter. Cl gr()up, and aei-icil inlelligence brig.Ide).

i_14, (U) MIB-TS coiiduLI MI Iiiissioii Loiiiiaiid, .%ii]olL-S()ufcL alid all .s(IUl'LL aiialy.%i.s, and iiilLlligLllLe collcction, &lnd coni'din.Iic for rcach PED a.s dii'cclcd by Ihc inforniation colJLction plan. Additionally. N1 IB-TS
rcach out to 4ind coordinatc with thL a%.sj(rncd Linit,q thcatLr-assigned, roiational, rc(yionally c11ioTned, and Lini Is (lpporiioncd <10iiinsi ()per'iiion pllns (cithcr tempor<lrily nr pcrmlTicntly) to Ihcir thccltcrs, Inis.ic)n and beoin the process of inie.(yratino fvll Soldiers and capabilitie.s inio theater operations bet-ore deplovnient. This i.s aLconipli.shed via <2 .standing meniorandurti ot- under%tandin(y rcitltionally L11 ionLd 10 tlic spccit'ic Iliccltcr.

l S
(U) The the'iter ai-my G-?

in cunjunction with Ilie Xi 41B-T, ful fi Ilb ,2n inip()r(&111t 1.ole in (heater throucTtI CI
and HUMINT otLraii()ns, Cl Lap'ibilitie.% iirc iiitcgr411 to forLL protcction opcraiions ()ut,sidc thL Lontincntal UnilLL-1 ,St41tes. Ai'iiiy torLes permiinentlj %1;Irioiied outsicll: Ihe cnnii neiitiil Unitecl StllL%, %iich Republic at- Korec1 aiid Eurc)pe. face a Iiigyh thi"ea( froni forLicyn intelligence encities: Ci fnrcL,q miii(7<ltL thi.% IhrLLIt,

## Echelons Corp,S And Beloii, (U)

l (). (U ) ThL primai"5' focus. of Il)e corps, divi%i()n, i1nd BCT iiitLlligience staffs during %%hLlpini operaiions is planninby, al()n :1th individual. L()Ilective, aiid unit ti"aiiiin17 aiid I"Ladiiies%. Echelcin,(i corp% aiid below uiiil PLlfiiLipate in Iheir 1%gigned Loinininds' tr,iiii no evLnl.%, illL ludino niissian rLhear.S<11 exerLi%e.s, Iiiis%ion rLadine,K% LXLfL ISLS, 'Iiid coinbLlI traiiii)gi ceniLr rotalions; they 'ilso pai-ticipate in 1nnu'.Il thelier evcnt.% wFien dirLL LLd. Addiii()11,'Il ly, M I S()IdiL r.% Iviihin LL ho lon.4 L'.orpi ,Ind bclciw Iinii.% ILer617e Projcci Foiindry ,18 KVCII
a(i niher training oppoi'luni lie% (for exaniple. lik:e envji'onniLnt trainingv ) 10 Iiiaini,2in PLri.shable teLliiiiLal skill.s
,?nd eiihance L1ciical Llnd iechiiical pi'oticienc),.

i-17. (U) OI)CL identifiLd as Pciri of thL rntaiinnal r()rLL, echLlon.s corps and bLI()w unil.% coordincltc 'Ith thc de.signalLd MIB-T lo begin tlieir integrL1tion into thcater inlelligencc opei"I1ions. Thi.s includes predeplo}Imeni le'ider, staff, and analvst coordinL2tion, as well
lie'itei'_.4pecific quilifiLation8 and CLrlitiLaiions. Soiiie or thL.sc qualifiLati()ns and LcrtifiLation% Lcin bc aLLonipli.shed through Poundry whilc other.% ma5, include live environniLni tr<iining opporiunilie.s. Finally. eLhelons corp% and bclow unil.s may e.siablish intelljiyence rL<lch L)peratio(1s Io ILdULL Iliei r torw11-d i)I' depluyLd SnlLlier pi'seiiLe alid Iiiaxi Iiiie IlL)Iideployed Ml Lap<1bililie
()r LXPLrli%L (for CxLiniplc, lingui.%i.%, fcdcralcd PED. and L()ntract nr Li'ilicln inal)i.(st%).

IR. (U) Bcf S-?s and MI coinpanies collabor'iie to tr.iin tlie intclli(ience team acro,%s IIIL BCT.

SpLLificiilly, thc BCT and MI Lompany IL'idership w'ork ()n dcvLlopino individu6ll SoldiL r skill%. crLW' drills.

baiile drill,s, and I'cfining tactlLil SOPS. Each %ei of iactjc<1l SOPS mii.st be tailored 10 addrL%s tlieater-%pecific TTP and In(egraie new oi. additional capabilitie% rLqulI'ed to opera(e iii the de%igna(ed joint operation.s area.

New oi" additional C<lPcibil itie.s C(111 includc 1ll<1tLfiLI (quick" rLaclioii capcibilitie.s, b)'stcm upiyrades) 1 lid PLI"snnnLI (Inilitai'y oi. LolI(racl lin(Yui<its. PED platoons. Cl tcams, iidditional HUMI,NT and SIGINT Ic<11ns).

## Pri4 Vent (U)

-5. l L). (U) Tlie iniLiil i)r uperiill()n.% lu prtrvnl i.%1 ILY dLIL'f <idver.%ilJ"}' aLlic)n% cind tu dL-5Ldl(Il. 1 ,%iIudliun, PrLVClIt Ictii'ilic.s cnable IhL .joini forcc Lo gain p()silion4 of rLIIIi vc LldvL1ntaiic bcfoi'c combat OPLrations.

Opcratii)Iis to prL)iicnt arc Lhdr'ictLricd bv actioii% to protLLt fricndly t-orcc% and indicatc IhL intcnl IL) CXCLUIC
%ub.sequent pli,2.se% ot. a planned operatinii. Fnr tliis rLa(i()n. il is Lrilic11 foi" Ihe theatLr army G-2, Ihe MIB-T, and othLI- I"egiDiially aligned torces to develop IntelligLnce daiabases dLiring %hape actii'itieq. The theaiei" ilrm),
1nd %ub()rdinaiL Ariny forLL% PLrf()rm thL r()Ilowing Inaj()r cicliviiic(i durino ()pcrLliions 10 prckcni:
ExeLute tle.xible deterrent optii)n% and t'lcxiblL I'c.%pon.%e optinn.%.

reginnalls, cilignLd between INSCOM and a.s%ignLd units
1% lhn.tie in Ihc Tliilor Arniv t"orces.

Pri)jLI Ilie fo)I"L C. I See dppeiidi,x D. )
?1). (U) OpLfLltions duri[)(7 thi.s phl< SL of c.SLall1 ting Lonflict placc incrc<l.inTr dimand.s on tliL intclligcncc warfi(Thtin(Y tLinctioii. The intelligenLL Staff increa.se,s its knowlediTre of the Ihi"e.It and the specific operational iiivironincnl, and it expands various intclligcnLL Lc2pabilitie.s .Is pai-l of the intclligLncc architccturc. With the hitt froni shiipino to deterrence. the theater Lirmv shit'ts tn refinin(J continoencs plan% lind preparing e.8timatL.

foi" increasing groui)d forceq IL nd capabilities,

## Thea"Rt4 R ArLy (U)

5.?1 . ( U) Tlic Iliealer inLclligienLL efroi't fOLUSL% Lin
MainLaining situaiionLI1 aw(Irenes.s across tlie tl)e<lier.
Prnvidin(y 8uppoi't tn warning inielligcncL.
Providin(y continual 8uppoJ't to tciroci developnieni.
iiiniiining the intclligence portion of Ilie COP,

PrDviding7 updatL.(> tn Ihc int'ormaiion cnllLctioii plan.
-j-??
(U) Additionally, thL Ihcater Lirniy G-?
Prepires t'or the2ter OPLninns, inLluding the recLPti(In, %taging, onward r)i()vement, ,Ind iniecyr&ltion
ot. Ml staffs and unit 011 the tinic-phased force ,Iiid deployment lisl (TPFDL) to the operation pl.In.
Maintains, upd,Iles. lind gliires all int"oi"mation: including the eneniy electronic threat characleristic,s
c)vcr11y Ivlth TPFDL unit.% to ensurc
7 L()ninion ind currenl undLrgianding of Ihc IhrLat.
S.! l. (U) The MIB-T Lontinues to coiidLlct MI mis%ion Lomniand, Sinule-%OurLL and all-%OUrCe lnaly.Si%, and iniLlljiience LoIILLiion. and 10 coordinaie foi" rLclch PED
direLted by the inforrncltion colleLtion p11( n.

Ho1Ve'Ll', tliri
1% Iiinre enipliasis on support tn t-01-Le pi"oieLliC)11, aiid on indic<ltions of how, tlic Iheacer is reaLlinn tLI U.S. .sh&lpingy Liperi11ions.

_?4. (U) The MIB~T role in I"eceiiiing TPFDL unils include% ensuring Ihose unils C1n operaie on Ihelter-
Li tic netwnrks, such ils Ihc (".niiihine(l F.nlcrprisc RLgion11 Intnrnialiiin F.xchanoc (al%n cal led (".F.NTR I X)
,System and
thL
B2ttletield
Inforniation Collecii()n
and
Exploitation Systein (also called
BICES).
Furiherinui-L, Ihe Army SIGINT dLlivitie.li, eiLhLr Iliruugrh MIB-T SIGINT elLiiienl% ui" by redLh frum the Army TcchniL<l1 Conirol and Analy%is Activity and Army Ci'yptolngic OfficL, can cls51.sl taciical SIGINT/EW
unils in LILces.sino thL&iier-specific dat&1b1ses and enteriiig tlicalLr-specific SIGJNT Iieiwork.s. Siinilarl),. Ihe Ihealer joini forLe Cl lind HUMINT sL<lft' clcnieni (al.so callcd J-?X) prO,]deS guidince on intc(yrating TPFDL
("1 <ind HIIMINT torcei*.

## Echelon.S Corps And Below (U)

5.2)
(U) Corp.s. divisiuns. and BCTS prLparL f()r nioiicinLnt iiil() IhCatLr and thL aLC()nipli.ShmCnt ()f rcLeption, staging, oniiiard nic)venient. and iniLoraiion. Corps and divisions inlL>orate their Arniv Re)erve and Ariny .Nalional Gud Illciin coniniand post OPLralional deiachinenls and fully inte(7ratc Iheir aclivilie.s into thL theater arniy G-2 and NIIB-T bilttlL I'hy'ihin to P&lrtiLip'iie in an,Ilys1.s and b41ttle update briefs. The main conin)and post opei'ation,Il dctachnienls e.slabli%h reaLh opLI'ations to IYl,1inlain conliiiuil! ,Ind prokide intcl ligcnce 11 p(I;Itcs while Ihe corp.%, (ljiii sion, (Incl BC.T hclLI(111;aricr.s iirc in Inovcment. Corp,s, divisions, ,Ind BCT.% .send ldvanced Piifiies forward. inLluding G-?/S-2 rLpre%entiltives.

?(). ( U ) Based L)11 Ihe liiiie LIviiil<ible, Linil.% Iiiay LL)nd UL t Lei iaiii Iliealei-.speLifiL iiilcll igciiLe readiii(i tr(iining bct'orL dcploynicni. Thill training is (7cncr2L Ily iaskcd through Army ForcLs Cominand ordcrs ba%cd on the'iier ouidanLL. .Ind il
1% ofien driven by material fieldiiio 10 support Ihe deployment but C1n include
.subjecis .such 'ifi thi'eat awarencs% and theitei" reporlin(7 procLdui"L.s. Once in theatL'r, unit5, linder thc direction
()f thL,Ilcr rcpre%entlc tivc,s. may LC)nduLt 'iddill()n'il iniclligenLc training as pari ot the rLCLPtion, siag?ing, onw'ird movenient, Lind intLJnl'atiun process.

.j-?7,
1 U) Bcfs fuJ"thLr tailor lactlL,I1 SOPS to) addrLs% theaiLr-specific TTP. Thc BCT inlelligcnLc leader.shAP
wDI'k.s cli)selv with INSCOM and thL Ilationil agLncie.%
tci tail()r CLlpabililie,s ti) the .fpecific oper<llinn471
Lnvii-onmLnt clncl 10 integr<lte new or i( d(litioncl1 ClP,Ibilities. Ne or <lddilionc21 c,Ip2bilities C&in incliide Illilteriel (foi" ex11nplL. quick reaction capabilities, liardl{lre or softw(u-e upgriide.s) and Eldditional pLI'%on nel l fiur LxiiiipIL, Iiii li t&iry i)r L ()nlrclL( li nyiui%ls, E-M I B-pr()v idLcI PED pl(It()()11.%, CI ILciin,%, iiddil i()niil HL Nq I NT
and S IGINT IL,Im.s i. BCT,S iil%io e%tciblish coniniLill iccl lions aiid liaisoii.s as nLce%(iary.

## Conduct Large~Scale Ground Combat (U)

5_?8. (U) ThL Ariny provide.%
IhL j()int force COininaiidLr
.%ignit-iCLint Llnd SU%t<1ined landpower and iiItLlligLIILC C<lpabilities. Liliili3o,ttl'
1.% *IIIL* abilily by tlircal, force, oi" occupation to paiii, .su.%taiii, aiid LxpI()it L()llirol OVLr ILind, rcsourLc%, and pc()plc (ADRP 3-1)), The Army.supporl.i Ihc joint I'orcc by providino LapLlbiliiy and capacilj for the applicaiion ot" landpowLr through Inaneuver. fire.s,
.%pecial operaliDn.s, intclligycnLL, cvbLfsplcL opcration.%, EW., .SPcice opcr'itions, sus1(iinnicnt, and arc<1 .%L'curitv.

5_?9. (U) Tlie joint forLe commander applies Armv LapLlbililieS to IieLltrL11iZe SOphiStlLLlied enemv t()rCeS aiid capabiliiies b), sv.8tem<11ic&illy destroying key nDdes 11nd capabilities e,ssenii;Il
10 the enemv's ability 10
Liin(inuL Ii<yhting. ThL jnini f()rcc rLquirc.s Army SPCCi<l1 opcrLltion.s forLC.% iiiid Lc)nvcn(ioniil Army units thai are pi"oficiLnl in combined ai'ins operation.% Lind cap6lble ot" employing CclP&ibilities cicross multiple doinains in coiiiplc1nLntY way%. By aggre%%ively engc1cying thc cnciny, Arinv t-orcL4 cnablL joint force frccdoni ot-
,ILtii)n. Ariii> iniLI lioLncc L1pahililic,s clrc an Intcg7ral Pcirl ()f I,%R acr()%% al l unificcl i?Cti()n parincrs. 1)urino Iciroe-.scale conibat, inielligence opei'aiions are Loniinually conducied to providc commanders and 8iaft"q Ihe dLILti IL'd kiii)wlLd<ye uf IhT&lt .%treii(yth.%, vulner<ibili LiL%. ()fiJ<illiilti()n%, quipmLIII. L<lP&Jbil iiie.4i, dnLI lilLIiL% I()
plin f()r and LXCCUtC unificd Icind opcrcl1ic)ns. Thi% intLlliDcnLc ,%UPP(Irts thc unit's bJttlL rhvthm, iuch
&l.S
Lommandcr Iipdate biiLt's iond I'arioLls siaff procLsses. The deniands of lar(ye.,scale combat operation.

Loiisuinc all stLl ft. CIL Iiicnt.%.

-.31). (U) Large-.%L IIL comb1t oper<1tioLis iiitroducL lei'Lls of complexity, leth1lity, and anibiftuity. aiid an QPLratin(T ienipo not coiiiinoii iii oilier operation,s, Wheii operaiiiig <lgainsi L1 peer Ihreai, comnicindLr.s
.1gi(IfciSi VLIY LiiiiduLt dLC IS IVL aLli(111 Io SLIZL, I"Ltaiii, aiid L,x ploit tlic iiiitiaii VL. Al'iiiy DPLraLioii% Iiiu.st.

oi'chc.%iratL niany siinuliinLous aclions in thL mo.(il dciiianding of OPL:rationcil cnviroiiiicnts. InlcllioLncL
suppi)rl% Ihc commandLr by vi.%ualiing Ihc IhiL,It Jnd dLIcLliniy Pcl(i%iblc IhrL,1t COAS, Ariny t()rcLs lnu.si intcg7fcltc <1nd synchroniLc thcsL ILtions lLro%s miiltiplc Llom1in% to LrcatL' oppcirtLinitlL.s to di%lDcalc, i%n11c te.

disintegr<ltc. and dLstroy enemy forces. Army forces .sirive 10 u%e intelligenLe, mobility, proieLlion, ciiid t"irepower 10 Strike Ilie eneniy unexpectcdly in IiiulLiplL doiiil ins and from niul iiple dii-ections, denying Ihe L IIC111y frccdom to IllllLUVLr by Lreaiing multi plc dilLiiinia.s tl)al tlic ciicm), Loinniaiider cannoi cft-Lctii'el)'
addrc.%s. IntLI ligencc supports thcsc opcrations by fclci lilclljiio sitiiational undcrstlndincy lind supporlin dcLiqion Inaking. IntllinLnLC a.s.sisi% coinnicindcr% in sccingy throug7h thc t"O(T and friLlion of IV<lr.

5_.1 l . (U) Beynn(I tc1cilitllin(y Ihe coniniinLler'.q %ilLI'llion(Il UnL1Lr.s1;4ndino (Ind deci %iOn niakin o pi'()vides wai"niiio iniclligence and .%uppoil.% i.he MDMP, t<irgetiiiiy and proieciion. Nlany dit"fereni inielli17ence pri)LIuLls prLdiLt dil'fLfLnt L'llLmy COA.% <ind suppi)rlinky dLtii)n.%, IVLII (IS V(lu. ri%ks <ind ()ppc)rtunitlLi. ThL,SL
prc)dLlcts ai"e inteoral to staff ancilysis ot- friendly plaiis (iiid orders. When possiblc, Ihe intelligence warfiohiing t'unLtion Icvcragic.s thc intclli(YLncc ;Irchitccturc Iu USL naiional 10 tLILIiLal intclligcnLL for Arniy opcrations.

HowciiLr, durin(T Apecific phases of largL-iLale comb'it operation.%, laLtic<il units niuilt dLpend on thLir own L()1 leclinn ,Ind analysis heLc2use ot the ()perati ng teiiip() L1nd requireiiienl t()r.signi tlcilnt Ini)veinenL and mliiieuver.

Unitq mu,%[ concentrate combai power ri1pidly troni disper.sed l(Kation% 10 cltl<lck critlci11 enenij, a.%seis cind LxplI)il ()ppurtuiiiliL.s; IhLlI, LhLy fllust di.SPLf.TrL 4UiLkl v Liioubil] l(J avoid bLLI)Iiiiiby l<irgLt%i IIILIII%LIVLS.

(U) Sincc sonic iniportant intclligcncc capiibililic.% al'c not organic to Ai"my forccs, commandcrs Lind statfs plan, Loordinatc t.or, and intcnratL .jL)int and othLr uiiifiLd action partncr intelliocnLc capabilitics to LlPPOI't 1 Inulti-domain approiich rc) i)periil ions. Soine ot" (hesc L<lPiibi lilies i nclude Iialional overhLad Lol ILctioii, theatei. lLI-I'il colleclion. cybei'sp,ILe nperations. and EW. Using i ntelligencL l() sce and understand viiliin LaLh doniain can rLducL risk 10 thL friLndly f()rcL ai)d ciihanLc qULLC.S.S in Lli,i()tic and high-ILmp()
OPLI alioiis. Wlieii OPL I'atiiig agaiiist ,1 peei tlirLal, rlie Loiiiiaiidei. Iiiu%t i-ely Iieavi Iy 011 illlLI l igeiice tc) ideiitif).

wind()ws ot. OPPL)rtunity. Thc undLfstandinb7 Ihal i.s giaincd t-roin Lir filLililatcd by intclli(7cnLc product.% all()ws iniclligence
.jnint forLc and Arniy Lnninicindcr.s ta Lnipl(iy thL right Lclpabilitlc% clt thL right iiinc and placc. TimLIy, acL ufcile, aiid pi"edicti ve i nlell igencL arid wLathcr efr'f'ectl 111nKv cninmLinders to L niplny Lnnrdinated i ndi rLcl firLS, (iir niissilL defen%L, joint fil-es. (lncl aitiick IllljclllL)11 ,It thL I'jolit plilLL c1nd time, piiltiiig the enenij, in
11
positioii ot" dis;Idi'aiiiage.

5_.31. ( U) G iVLlI IhL LlynaiiiiL aiiLI ILilicil IiaiiirL ()l- larg)L-.%LalL Loiiibal ()PLI'<ilii)11.4i, LUry)%, dii'isi()11, (lnd BCT
intclliociicL Soldicrs MLISI bc proficicni in a nuinbcr of circas to suppoi"t thL hicyh-tLmpo opcration.s rLqLJircd Ic) LfLaic and cxplait Ivindc)ws nf opportunity. Thc following arc t'isk"s and .%kills Ih<lt rcqiiirc Lontiniious.

I'epetitive triiii for prc)tjLienLy', Field crati.

Coinmand posl displaccmcnl.

Iiitelli oence and EW niaintenciiice aiid ,siisiai niiiciit.

Oper<lting in CBRN Lnvironment.%.

Continuous inforni<1tion collection frnni Ihe consolidiltion c1rea tn deep oper<ltions.

Intelligence siipport ILI lar(yeting, Aii'space control and reque,sting allocation of aeri111 collection assets.

## 'I'Heater Ar.Nqy (U)

5_.34. (Ll ) The Ihe'itLf 41rmy mcl), pfL)vi(le thL core nt',11<1nd component COmm41nd Or m1y hc1ve <1 qUbnrdin<lte field (lrniy. The MIB-T',s operation,s battilic)n foi.rns the the<2ler ACE. The joint force J-2 federate8 production rcquirciiieni,% with the theatcr ACE re,sp()n.siblc f()r Inainiainin(Y thc enemy oround COP, which i.s used in various foi"uni% to update Ihe joint force commander. In a combined eni:ironinent, the theaier ACI conduct.

IhL bulk of its opcraiions in LombinLd w'ork%paLLS &lnd on conibinLd networks while niaintaining snnie uniciuc U.S.-nnl! t-aLilitlLS Ol. Lap&ibilitie%.

-i-.3.S. (I l ) 'I'he thLater AC'F*. pl<lys an iinpnrlani rnle in clqsi%sing thL Lffectiveiie.s% nt" t'rieiidly nperatinns thrLiufth combai a%%c%.mLni.% thJt cnablc tIIL jojiil forLc Lominander'.% deci.si()n niakingi at key p()ints in Ihc upei-aLioii plcl11 (%LILlI as Ilie Iian%iliun to LILLi%ive ()PLI'iiliuiis). Additiuiial ly. Ilie tlicalei. ACE LonduLli ILirgct dcvclopinLnt for thL land componLnt to suppoi"t both joinl forcc coiiiniaiidLr and land cDmponcnl coniniandci"
targciing prioritlLs. ThL thecltcr batilcficld coordinaiion dctachincnt as%isl.(> Ihc G-.l and G-? in coordinlL tiiig input i nto I he.joi nl prioritized i ntegr,Ited t<irgL I li sl.

b(iard.s Ic nd planning cclls. Thc Inc),%t importani L)f Ihc%e f()r thc G-2 is thc joi nt ci)Ilection managLnient board,
5-.3(). ( U)
Asa coniponent ot" Ihe.joinl f()rLe. the Ihe<1ier Jrniy I"eprLsent.s %ubOrdinatc Arni), forces in joini whiLh enables the joint force cc)Iniiiandei' s dccision Iiiaki n(7 on the apportioiiiieiit c1nd allocation of ISR
I%.%Lt%. In turn, thc Ihcatcr arniy Inay c.slabli.sh a pi"occss lo furihcr allocaic ISR a.s.Cls to ciihcr a fiLld ariily or subordinate corps hel dquartLr% lo support dai ly c()nibat OPLration(i, The batilefield coordinatiiin dL tachmeni Illlltlins close coordiiicllion witli Ihe conibiiiLd Ic ir OPLI"1& (ions cenier ISR directorate duty officer and can <1SSlSI in decontliLtin(T ISR Lovcrage is.%ucs ocncr<1ied by mainiLnancc, Wc<lihcr, or changcs in priorily.

S_.17. (U) A kLy d%peLt uf iippuriiunmenl cind dlluLd(l()n ()I' ISR l>.%Lts
1% Ihe dllULdtiun uf Army intellienLe forLL% and Ariiiy %pecial operltion.s force.s wiihin the lime-phased fLirLe ind deployment di1lc (TpfDD). Thi iiicludL,q Rcscrvc Conipunent forLes %uch a% interro(yation battalion% thai support a joint intcrrogation and dLbriefing Lentei..

Furthermore, tlie theater armv, based on the the<lter lrniy G-?'.s recommendation, incnrpnrtilL% additlnllcll nnn,standard and quick rLactinn intel l ioence C<ipahi Iitie.g i ntn the Iheater 111-Iny ( 1-2, thL MIB-T. or other sub()rdinaie unils.

S_38. (U) Tlie Ilie<ilei' cl1"Iiiy G-? oi"gaiiizes Ihc Lffoi"I to CllsUI-e thci-e is Sufficieiit PED Of all a.SSjonCd Oi"
iillocaid ISR a%sClS thrnu(?h a Lombinalion of ()rganiL torLcs aiid rLdchbaLk Clpabilitics. Thc thcLltcr G-2 also uppnrts canip,iigin pJ<1niiin n to clddi'e%s ni.ijor cliaiioc.s to the siiuatioii. .such as the IrJnsitiDn t"rom11c r(Te-SLale conib,11 L)PLI'llion.s lo IhL' con4nlidalion ot Clclin%.

## Corps (U)

5-39. (U) The corps G-2 and intelligence staff have irnportant roles in the pLqnning and exexution of various operations and Arn]y decisive action tasks, such as forcible entry operations, corps and/or subordinate division attacks, joint suppression of enemy air defense, deep operations, and corps-level river Lrossin
540. (U) The corps staff, lcd by the corps intelligence cell. perfonns IPB to support all operational planning.

As a resuli of IPB, the siaff produces a range ot- intelligence products, including the enemy situaiion template and Ilie Lveiit teiiiplatL and its associatcd Ii]atrix. (Sec fig)ur 5-2.) Tliese produLls assi,st iii aicc)Iiipli$liing tasks, including but not limitcd to sharing information across the staff, driving ccrtain aspects of thc corps war game, and generating requirements to drive the informalion collection effort. The cOS collection manager uses IPB products to develop and then submit requiremenis to higher headquarters through joint sssiems, such as the Planning Tool for Resource, Integration, Synchronization, and Management (also called PRtSM), for validaLion ai the theater level. Additionally, the collection manager work,s in conjunction with Ihe G-3 to generate taskings for a&8i8ncd oj: attached informalioii collectiolI assets, Army ai'iation, and maneuver formations rcsponsible for reconnaissance and security missions.

541 . (U) The corps establishes procedures to suballocaie theater iiiforniation collcction capabilities down to the division level. Additionally, the corps task-organizes the E-MIB to support the corps and subordinate commanders. In some c&8es, the E-MIB receives an aeriaj ISR task force from the aerial inielligence brigade, generally struciuted around an aerial exploiiation battalion. The CO> also integrates nonsiandard or quick reaction capabilities into intelligence units or stsffs.

542. (U) The Lofps Llin LunduLI xpedIlioniY PED with frum the E~MIB lind Ih uperdiiull<il intelligcnce ground station within the corps G-2. In mo.st cases. the corps requires intelligence rcach support for PED, but the expeditionary capability ensures .some level of support when there is no neiwork connectivit), in either an austere or desradedldenied environment.

543. (U) The synchronization of the corps an,Ytical effort with inforniation collection und intelligence operations is critlcdl to providing the corps commander w'iih the timely and accurate inlelligence required to make decisions gardIng decisive operations. (See fjgure 5-3.) The sheer mK?gniiude of large-scale comb<Ql operations necessiiaies precise timing. Triggers to initiate deci,sive operatxons require precise and deLailed inielligenLe repurting dnd d,%%CS.4>mLnt.%.

## (B)(3)

i-44.

1 U) Corp.% .%h:Ipinb7 opcr'iti()n,4 set conditions f()r divisi()n OPLralii)ns. Shapin(Y OPLration% throug7h fireg i)r in f(Irmati(In nper,Ition4i requii'e cl th()rounh under%l<indi ngi of Ihreal .%y,%iems and criliL al vulnLf&ibi li ties. The coi-ps G~? ,Ind inic IligcnL:L $1,2t'f Lnsurc the i nforni(ItiL)n collLction e ffon GenLI"&lles targLtable data on kLy eneniy .systeni% to support %haping operalion,s, Supports coinb&1t assessinents tlilt pi"ovide thL coininandLr with the nLces.%aii' intelligLnce to deLidc il. conditions havL bccn niet to initicltc dccisivc opcrations.

a.g.SOLiaiLd PED) 10 detect cl movin(y eneiiiy foi"Lc (via SIGINT or <1 Inovin (y iaroet indicaior) and Support LhL
i_45
(U) An exainplL
ot'.(iyllLhronizcltionat Ihc Lorps level 1.8
Loordinlction for j()Int ISR capabiliiies (witli aiiLilytiL a8,%cs.SlllLllt Ili<il li.jo nL 1"% cl COIIIILliidLI"' s dLLi.8101l poiJiI. Iii tui"n. tliL dLClSi()n point is sj'nchi'oiiizcd c)
'ith opci"ation.s and firLs {for cxamplc. joint firL.S oj. Ariny aviaiioii) linkcd to
1 TAI.

i-46. i U) Thc corp.s intclligenLe siaf'f al.so .support4 Lorpg L&llTIP<1ign plcinning and futurc operati()n.s. Thc intclligci)Le S(at't' idcntiticq chcingL.s in thc .si(ucifion rh411 <1110, the Lomin;In(Icr to 111ke Iidi'intclgc ot. Ivindoiv%
of npportunity by makino adju.8tment8 10 the plan beyond Lurrent operations.

## Divi,(Iinn (U)

DcneralL (iroLiing dati1, <1nd us.SL.SS tlic ctfectlvLne8s c)t"
i-47. (U) ThL divisi()n G-2 and intelliL7cllLL Staff have iniportani roles in Ihc plLlnnino and exLLuiioii or dLLi,%iI'L lL tion. Tlie d iViiOlI eiiiploy.% 01-iyaiiic 'iJid suppoi-tiii(y i Iiforiiiatloll LolleL tioii assLt% to gcli11 and IiiaintLiin cncmy contact, dLvclop thL sitUclti()11, division ()pei'atioii.s.

i_4X. (Ll) The coips t,2sk-oroani/.e.s cl Pol-tion of. Ihe F_-MIB
10 Slipport dii:i.sion oper<ltion.s Lind Lnible
.%ub()rdinaiL Ll)Iniiiandcr%. Furthcr. the dii'i.%iDn iLlPP(ifl.% .%ubordinltc OPLf<ltion% by furihcr allocati ng i nf()rm<ili()n L()IleL Iiun L(IPibililie% i)r Ici%k-ur.gdniingT jiifo)rni(Iliun LuIILLliun Lap(Ibililie> in dirLt liUPP()rt uf <1
suburdinatL; inforiiiation Lolleciioii .supwrt i % n()t l iiiited 10 BCF.s. It 1% verv i niportaiit l() adequaiely re.sourcL
division anillery and cninb2t ak'iaiinn brigade (Iperai ion,%. Fui"ther, inforiiiati()n collection suppx)rl is required in consolidatinn caini 10 ideiitit'y eneiny ob%ervei-.%, bypis.%ed eneniy units, and unc()niicnLional force%.

(Fri)uiid .gtaiii)11 PED plaluoii. TIIL taLtiLal bir()uiid i_49. (U ) ThL di I'iSL()n iniellioenLc Staff must L()()rdinatL PED to .%upport IhL'.%C Ct"t-orts. Thc divisi()n ha% ()nL
iaLlical intellifFencL oround sialion at tlie dikision aiid BCT levels. Wh.n task-org'inized. the .supporting E-MIB pi'ui'ide.s PED LapabilitiL.%, (u iiiLludL 7 l(ILIiLLI1
stcilinn LnablLs scllfior d,Ita rcLLlPt and PED tnnl,s whLn net'Ork- connLctivity i.s liinitcd or nLgatcd.

i-f {). (U) The division collection manliger oi"LhLstrate% Ihe intorinaiioji collectioii effort. The collection niana(Te.I" (yenerate.s thL req Liireinent.s necess1ry to siipport di visioii opei"c1lion%. The diiiion Iises the .siine j()int systc nis thc c()rp.s to rcquLsI IhcaiLr (Ir naii()nal ISR suppori. Th()se rLque.stk> arc I,'al idated (if hi ohcr CLhelons. The collection Iiiaiiager, Ivorkn. ng in conjunLtion willi Ihe G-3, gyenerates ta.skjiicT.% for oroaniL and allocated inf()rniation collection .s)i%tem.s ind for Ihuse units assigned
<1 fcLoniiai,%sance or securily mission.

j-s l . (U) The divj,%j()n intelligence .st,Iff supporls t.Irgetin(7 ,Iiid Comb&2t asses.%nienl% Ic) ideniify ,1nd exploil eneilly I,ulnerabilitie%. This en,1bles cominander'8 deLisi()n niiking to support Iddition11 shaping OPLration%, iniliaiing dcLiSiVL Iipcfiltii)ns, nr khifting Ihc niciin ct"t()rt.

i-5? (U) The division G-? <1nd intelligTenLe stcift-.%ynclironize int-orniaiion operi1tions, inform1lion collection, aiid Loiiibil a>%essiiiLlIt% 111 Il fluid aiid L oiiiplex LIIViI"nllllLiII c IiaracteriLed by Iiiultii)le BCT <lllaL k.s,
.%upporiinn combai avialion briE2cdc opLralion.%, j()int firLS, opci'aiion,% iii thc c(In%olidatinn llrca. Thi synchroniL.Itioll LIIIOWs Ihe stlt't- to idLntify lIndOwS of Llpportunities. Synchronization acros(i the staff ties inforiii&llion collLction t() coiiiiandcr dLcision pc)ini% wilh Arniy 1vllc tion and j()int fires linkLd to the TAI.

j-f .3. (U) FILCtin(y windows of ()pp()rtuniiy ,IrL addrcsscd by current ()pcrclti()ns w'ithin divj,%j()n Loininand pu%ls. Iiilclli ITIIL'C (il 50 %LippurE.% fLilurL L)PLI'dliun% b), idL nlifyinii L h(IngL,% in Ihe siluili()Ii beyund IhL Lurreni
()perdtiun% tli<lt nece.%%itatL chiilliie% to IhL plan.

## Bricyade Combat Tea,11 (U)

5-$4. (Ll) ThL DCT S-? ,Ind iniLlligLllLL siaff suppoi"i BCT OPLraions from pl<lnning through exLLution, The BCT S-? conducts ba.sic IPB to support deLisive operations. Such as an attack to pcnetrate cln enciny defen.sii'e bclt, a rivLr criissiniy or .In eni'elopmcnt. Thc informcltinn collcction cft'ort ConfiJ'ni% Dr dcnies ILinplaied L)bslailc% and enLir)y ficyhiing POsition%. Lneiny rc%Lfwc4. and cncniy Itt,IL k" pa.%ilinn.

GLnerates taroet in(y dalil and liLipport.s targct delLLtion.

Supports both physical cind funclion<il daniagL as.sc%(>mcnt% whcn il
1.1 cl spccific PIR.

(U) Thc BCT S-? or dL.signatcd rcprLsLntaiivL, w'orking in Conjunction with the S-.3, gcncralc,4 t1%king%
r()r assigned, att<lched, and SLlPPI)rtiiio intellicyLnce
&isset4*.

Addition<illy, the S-2 develops NAI%
()r reqLiirenieni.% taked by Ihe S-I 10 units <l.%signed a reLonncii%sance, .%urveillanLe, or 8ecurits1 mi%,%ion.

.5-(). (U ) Th MI Lumpdny is iaskLd-()rqyiiniLed iu %UppLirl BCT Uper&ilii)n.s. Th MI Lompiilly mdy reLeiV
and intc(Irl1 Ic E-MIB assct.s ba,scd on IhL Sltuation. Thc MI company tactical (Iround %tation teani prnvides liinilLLI PED Lapibiliiy to support the BCT Shidow, UAS platooii or 10 I"eceive q& movino larcret indiLLltor froni thc Joint Survcillancc Targct AtLack Radir Sy.stcni (al%o callcd JSTARS) via thc comnion data link. The S-2
C()Ol'Ll1 nares Icldilinncil PF'I) requi reniLnls Ihrnu (7h IliL di vi %ii)n. In addi lii)n tii ()roiilliL assLt%, Ihe Fl("'I'
interTfciies supporting assets into the inforni<iiion col lectiDn plan.

s_f 7. (LI) TIIL BCT S-2 Liiid iiitcl ligLIICL siat"f ,svllLlirOiiizL iniLII ib)LllCL Wlth OPLI"aiiniis to CllSUl'L QVLI 11)cltCli in thc closc fi(yhi. (Scc figurc 5-4.) For cxainplc. SIGINT or EW, and Joint Survoillancc Targci Atiack Radcir S)'.stcm cOVLraL is synLhroniLcd with a t"riendly Lltt<1Lk to dLtcct Lncniy rcposilioning or encm). Lountcr,1ltack thriiuh eiiher IhL EMS or bs, a moving iar(YLI indicat()r. This AJnchrc)nizalion allow.s the c()mminder to visualizc window.s ot" Lipportunity lind lake idi'anli2oe OE. those window.% bet-oi"e they close.

## (B)(3) Dee,-Ensive And Offensive Tasks In Large-Scale CoLbat Operations (U)

5-58. (U) Corps and division commanders are directly concerned with those encm), forc,es and cap<ibilitic,s that can affect their current and future operations. Successful corps and division operations may depend on intelligence and successful joint interdiction operations, including those operations to isolate the battle or weaken Lhe enemy t'(yrce hetnre the hattle is tul ly jnined, (,fiee tigure .5-.5.)
5-59. (U) Corps and divisions execute decisive action tasks, of which offensive and defensive task,s comprise IT$t of the aL"tivities. CoiiimandeTs Inust focus aiid u,se intelligenLe ti) cxplicitly uiideisldnd tlie lediality of largc-scale combat opcrations to prcscrve thcir combat powcr and managc risk. Commandcrs also usc ground maneuver and other land-based capabilities to enable mdneuver in the other dom4iins,
5-60. (U) Bcfs and qubordinate echelons concentrate on performing offensive and defensive tasks aTrd necessary tactical enabling tasks. such as reconnaissance, securitv. or passage of lines. During large~scale cornbat operations. they only perfonn those minimal essential siability tasks necessary to coinply with the laws of land warfare. The.se rcquiremenLs cieate an even greater chiillenge for the intelligence warfighting function. They do Iiot conduct operationally significant consolidate gains activities unless assigned that mission in a consolidation area.

## Intelligence In The Defense (U)

5-61. (U) Before a battle, commanders at all echelons require intelligence and combat information, Specifically, they need to know The compo.8ition, 4uipment, intent; strengths, lulnerabilities, and scheme of maneuver of the attacLing enemy force.

The locaiion, direction, and speed of enemy reconnaissance elenients. The location and activiiies of enemy units and re.serves.

Enemy commwd and control &nd communicatsons facilities.

The location of enemy fire supy)rt (Ind air defns system.s with ass(Kiated comm<md and control network,s.

5-62. (U) The G-2 uses the prepare activity of Ihe operalions process to complete infonnauon collection integration and synchronization. Corps and divisions rely on joint dnd nan'onal sy.stems to detect and track targeis beyond Iheir limited organic capabilities. The corps headquarters employs available informaiion collection asseis 10 refine its knowledge of the leaIn, weather, aiid civil Collsideraiions within the arca of influence. Information collection assets identify frlendly I'ulnerabilities and key dcfcnsible terrain. The division headquarters conduct.s periodic information collpiion of any unassigned areas to prevent the enerny from exploiting those areas to achieve surprise.

5-63. (U) Cornrnanders continuousl)I refine the enemy portion of the COP thioughout Iheir areas of interest as parl of deep operations. They focus their information collection effons on key geographical areas and enemy capabilities of particular concern using NAIS. (See fjgure 5-6.)
5-64. (U) Suriieillance of the areas of interesi and effective reconnaissance are necessary to acquire targets and to verify and evaluate potential enemy COAS and capabilities. Inforrnation L'ollection effons focus on validating when, where, and with what strength the encmy will attack. This allows commandcrs to identify opportune times to conduct spoiling attacks and reposition forces.

## Intelligence In The Otlense (U)

5-65. (U) The inforrnation collection effort assi,SL8 cornmanders in deciding when and where to concentrate combai poiver. Information collection asseis answer the corps or division commander's PIRS and other informatioii requireinents, which flow froni IPB ld the war-gaining process. Infoi"InaLion required Inay include Enemy center,s of gravity or decisive points.

Location. orientaiion, and strength of enemy defenses. (See figure 5-7 on page 5-14,)
Locatioii of enemy reserves, fire supportg W)d other attack assets to support defensive positions.

Enemy air avenucs of approacli and likely cnemy engagement areas.

Kc)I terraili, aveiiues of approaLlI, aiid ol)sLaLILS.

5-66. (U) Thc G-2 idLntifiLs thrcat,s to corp,s and division support and cc)nsolicli2tion arcas, such as cncm).

special purpose forces, enemy bypi2ssed LolIN'ention<il forces, and irregulcor aLtiK'ities that may interfere with corps or division support acuvities.

5-67. (U) Thc G-2 integrnies and synchronizLs unified action partner capabilitie4) into the colleclioii effort.

The G-2 recommends speciliL reconnais(i&ince iasLs for corps- or di VifiiDn-coniri)I led rcc()nnaissancL forccs, rcaliziiig thc coiniiiander may la.sk these forces to conduct offen,siYe or other tactical enablin& task,s. A
focused approach to allocating collcction assets mtixirnizes the Capability of thc limited number of asset,s availablc to corps or divisions.

5-68, ( LJ)"fhe Ci-.1 synLlirnni7.cs infnrniaii()11 collectinn npcraiiiins with comhat ()pLrai,ions to ensure all corps and division ir)forinaiion collection providL% timely intorrnaiion to suppon c)perations. The G~3 tasks iriforiiia(i()n LolleLiion assets to support Ilie Ldfb7eliiib procss. Iii foriiiaiioii LollLLi()11 assets locate Largeis identificd in the attack &iuidance matrix and call for fire.s. The fires cell may engage targets to achieve leth and nonlethal effects.

5-69. (U) MI uniis and systerns conduct inieJljbTence opLrations to locate enemy unils and Sysleins. SICJINT
and EW systems usual.ly operate with the Lovering force and flank guard. The coiering force commander directs EW against enerny command and conirol and fire support networks. The c()niinander may use
lectroiiic deception to deceive tlie eneiny as to tlie location of the Inaiii body. Space-bused and cybcrspace systems and actii'itiLs also support thc security force in locating and dLtcrmining the presencL of enemy disruption forces, contact forces, and shielding forces.

## (B)(3) Co,Nsolidation Are.4 Durinc Larc:E-Scale Comba"R Operations (U)

-fj-7Q. (U) The L'f)11.%c)liduli(?11 di.ta *l.s* thc portion ()f thL C()mmandLr',s arca of opcratii)n.% that is dL%i(7natcd to facilitate the SLcurity and stabilily t'isks neLess&irv fnr the fi'eedoin of action in the closL are,1 aiid tn supporl thL Lontinuou% con%olidaiion of guins (ADRP .I_O). ThL Loll%olid<ltion are41
IA dL%ignLd to solve Ihe sccurity chL11lenge clssnciafed Iviih maintaiiiino ILrnP(I
ITI the clo.SL and deep areari. This Lhallenge i.q parricularly dit-ticult diiring oftensii'e iasks whLn the BCT rei1r bound<l1'ics .shift t'orwcql'd and increa%e Ihe sizL of Ihe divi%ion supp()rl ifLcl. Ci)minandLr4 Ldnnul illuw' IhL LnLin)' IitnL tu rL'L()n.%lllUtL unil.s iiid LclP<ibili(iLs cind lind() fi'ieiidlj. force.(i initial baltlefield (7lins,
5-71 . (Ll) Duringy larg7e-sLalc coinbat i)peraiii)n.%, tlic comin'indcr and IniJ,(>l plin for cind erTiploy nc)t Only
(IIL Iiece%%ar}' Loinb11 pl)ler bul alqi) bLvond whal
1.% required for Ihe close (ind deep are41.s lo con.%olidate Cl<1jllg. Corps 'ind divi.sion cominL1nderS Iiiay dL.%ignatL a COii,%OliddtiOn IfLd to a Subordinate LLhelOn
<18 an AO, Suboi"dinaiiii(y Ihis Inission and (1 separcltL AO tacili111es t'reLdom of aciion bv freein(y other unils su they Cclll t'OCU,S
i)11 IliL SUPPOrt. clo%c, aiid dLLP arcas. A divi.sioii LXLCUtllli? OPLI'ati01i8 tyPlc<illy I'Lquircs ali additioncll Bcf for thc division consolidation arca. ,4dditionally. a corps cxccutino opcrltions Incly rcquirc an additioncil division for thc corp8 consolidalion area, "fhc thc1tLf cirmj must acLounl for thc>e additional fnrces reciiiired to con%olidite g<lins when partio ipating in joint plLinning before thL: cnndiict nf opLrationA.

-7?

(U) Coiisolidation area.s ai"e dynaniiL, The unil,s il.ssigned lo these eaS initl<illy conduLt offensive, dcfen,sivL, and Ihc n)iiiinal Stability ia.sk.% nLLC.ssar)' tu defeai bypa.s%ed fnrce,%, Lontrol kc), Icrric in and ficilitie.s, and .%ecurL populacion centei"s. Over ti nie, as the siiuation m1< tures, the mi x ()t' ticlical task.s is likely tci bL LqULII P&ifi% %cLurily and %Uibility in cach consolidation irea. Howcvcr, sccurity~rclatcd tasks alw1 YS
Iiave fir%1 priority. Planniiig ind LKLCUtiOn to con%olidate gain.% must account t-or all potential nieans of enemy re,qi%ianLe and hL approaLhed as a Ii)I'ni nt" explnit2c tinn illL1 pur%uit in (Irder to create enduring nu(cnmes. li i Ll-itiC<11 Lo 1I'0id givi nn eiiemies thL iinie 10 rLorgaiiiL for <1n insuroency or soinL Dther kind of fi(yht.

S_7.1. (LT ) IiitLI ligiLIILL duriiio L()IisolidatL ilcl11l1> Pl'illl(wiIN' .Suppoi"l.s Inai Iitai Iiiiig tliL IIIOIIILnlUiii ot" ba(IlL
aci.oss IhL AO. Estcibli.shing SLLLirity aiid I liiiitcd aniouiit of .stiibility within thL con.solidation arL<l niay necL%.sil,ItL thc augmeni.Ilion of cxisting int'ormation Lollection Clc pabilitie.s as well as uniquc solutlons to an%iwer difticuli requirenienLs. (See figui"e .5-8 on page 5-16.) IntellioenLe .siaftfi in (he cons0lidali()11 ,1rea foLU.s on existing and I"uture t'Ol'Les, other threats. hazards. ind, ll times. key civil considei"<ltions in the Li)nsolidation (IfLL1. Thosc thrc'it% Inay I'<ingc fi'oni insur(reni group,% infiltratin(r rcar arca,s to hybrid or proxy foi'Leiy Witli tLcliiioloo ically <lL1vclllLcd .sysieiiis used Io CApIoii VLiliici"abilitis beh iiid close battle cirea%. MI
unit.s in thL con%c)lidaLion arccl conduLt (l IiiuliitLidc of Iclsk.q.

-74. (U) ThL fi!nchronizaiii)n of int-ormaiion LolleLtion and OPLraliOns iq Lritical in b71ining and maintciining conlacf Ivith enemy forcLs, well <1
Inaintaiiiingtlie tempoof opei"cltions 'icros% all echelon.s. (Se.e figiire 5-9
011 page 5-17.) Due to the IiiultitLide of talks OCCLII-I'In tliroughoLlt Ihe consolidation area. the entire staft- mu.si dLVLIUp (in inlc)rindliL)n LuIILLti()n pldn, FOL. LxcimplL, IhL G-41S-4 Lan pr()vidL int-orindliun un ri)ulL% th(Il niusl be secured cl(yainAI enem). stay-behind force%. ThL cheniical, biological, radiological, nuclecif cind hiohvicld cxplnsivc (also Cllllcd CBRNE) %taft' can pruvidc input on threat Lhcinical Lapabililie%, 2$ WCII a,% when and wherL the J, ni3y be eniployed to inipuct Lon&olid<ltion clrea operaiinnq. ,4ddition11 con%iderltioii% include bLlt ,Ire nol li niiled lo the tollowiiig:
Civilians, such as displaced pcrson.$
01- I"Lfu&iees, moiiing Ihrou17h Ilie consolidation area and i nf()rini1 lic)n thcy ma J. prnvi(Ic rc(7<l rdinii Lneiny acti vitie,q.

Infnrination collLction in support of log7isliL& operationq,.

RL-alloL,Ition ot infoi'mLllion collLLtion a.gsels.

IdLlliifiL<ltion of addilional l< rcas lo foLu,4 information collcclion.

EIiLllly usL of Li vilil11 ijifrastruLtul'L tlial Ill<ly iIIIPClCt fi"iciidl)l OPLralioiis.

High-v'ilue individuals or high-l'anking milil<1ry officers lttempiing to flee friendly furces.

HVTKI not de.stroyed, tlius reinaining <l.S thi'Lats.

Ab<in(loned ot. byp,Is%ed ITJLinitions, WL;Ipon.%. .1 nd indLl4*tri,11 cheinic;Ilr* th<lt m4ly en41ble continiie(I
insui"gLnt or proxs. leihal aLtii'itie.%.

5-75. (U) Some examples of inforniation collection in the consolidation area include
Reconnaissance and/or security operations along important lines of communications.
Combiiied ariiis baitdlioi) collelioii against bypassed, siay-behiiid, and/or Iiewly iiifiliraied eiiein), forccs.

Usin CI Iu <,55 possible Ihredl LulleLtion.

Using GEOINT. MASINT, and sIG1r 10 deiermine enem>, activities and po,ssible intentions.

HUMINf team.s debriefing displaced person.8 on location,s of enemy forces.

## (B)(3) (B)(3) Consolidate Gains (U)

5_7(). (U) C(Jiz,s(Ilid(Ilv ,11133' <l1'e aLliviliL,s 10 Iiiake eiidLJI inLI illly ILII)PUI cll'y Opei dliOlliil SULLSS aiid .%i Ili
LLindition% for cl Stablc cni'iron niLnt allowin(y for a triiii%iiion of Lcintrol 10 Icbyitimcltc authoritie4) (ADRP 3-0).

Coinmiinder.s Lonlinu1lls' (through all pha.ses of the operaiion) CL)nsider aclivities nece,s,sary to Lon%olidaLL> cyains and achieve tlie end qlate. Operations to consolidatL' gain% require ds'nii niic inielligyence effoit 10 Londucl
(7<lins (for example.

oft-en(iK'e and defLnsive ta.%k.s th(It do noi ci'e<lte seco11d5, inipacts to consolidating destr()iino kcy iiit-l"l( StruLturc) 'hIle <ils() suppiirlii]o IhL exccuiinn of area .%ecurit)l lind stabil ii), tt]%k%.

## Consolidatf, Gain,S Concurrfnt With Larc.E-Scale Coniiiat Opfrati()N,S (U)

Udins ti) m<ikL tLlllP()fdfy &Y<iills Lndurin.4,
-5-77. ( U) Ai"niy l()I"LLs Iiiu%l Lunt inuvusly L()ns1)lid(ItL
ConcurrLntly, iiitellioenLe requirnients often sijpport Ioclting bypclssed eneniy forces, bypas%ed or abandoncd niunition.s and WeL1polls, and %tay-behind SPLcial purpo.sc and proxy forLe.% rclocatinby di%placcd Livililns' rcL%tablishin(y law and c)rdcr: prDvidin(7 huii1anllxan 'Issi.%llncc; and rL%toringi kLy infrastruciurc.

Tlie%e aLtivitie% LLin oiily be lLcoinpli.shed If Ihe intel Iigence ert-ort IS CLirefull) nesied li(h operation.%.

5-7,%. (U) Army force(i musi dclibei'ltel)' plLl11 and prepare tor consolidciiing (yains 10 c,IPitalize on operational SULCC%S. Plaiiniii<y LonsidLI'alioii% includ traiisitioiiino opci-aii()ns, changL.% 10 task Lirganizatioii, Iiioditicatioii of IhL iniclligcncc architccturc. and nciv oi" additional asscts rcquircd to achicve thc dcsii.cd cnd statc. To Lon40lidltc gain.s, Ariny fL)fLCS t<lkc thL follow'iiig .spccific aLlions:
Con.s()lidation. FC)rLCS ()r(IciniLe 1( nd Streniythcn thcir nLwIy OcLupied positions, so Lonim&inders Lan use theni for %ubseciuent operatic)n4.

Arcd sccurit.Y. Foi"cL's Londuct.sccurity tasks to dcfLat cnciny rcinnqnts and protccl fricndly forccs, I'outes, crilic&il i nfrastructui"e, and PoPLilation.s, Is well as en&ible friendls, actioiis.

Stability thsks. Initially. fnrLL% CXCLUtC miniinuni-e%.sentlLI1 stibility tasks; Ihen, b), executin(7 the priiiiary siability ta%ks, thcy can starl to providc c4.qcntial govcrninental .KcrviLC%, cmcrocncy int'rastrucfurL rec()n%tl"uLtinn, an(1 human i tariiin rel ict-.

Influencc over local and rcgional audicnL'cs. CL)nimiindcrs coniinuniLatL crcdiblL n1rrcltii'cs t(I
specific audiLllLes tc) prevent interferenLe <ind tn ultimatLIy bieneraie support for operalions.

Securit), froni external threats. Commander% eiisure sufticienl conibai power i.s employed to pi"event physical di.sruption froiii thi-eLlls aLI"os,s the various domain,s
ind Ihe iiif()i-maiion cnvironmLnt.

-7L). (U) Durinii operations to consolidclte Cyclins, intelligenLe plays Iln iinporiani role in
11%.4LSsini7 the eiiKiiri)1111)Lrii((
DLtLct boih positive .Ind nc(JJliie Ircnds.

DetLriiiine the L I'feLtiveiie,ss ot. fi-tendl v operJ(i()n%.

ILlenti fy <lL tion4 that Loiild Ihi'e11en h,Ird w(!11 17,1in.%.

i-80. (U) E%sLntially. Ihil focu%c.s thc iiiiclligencc ct-f()rt on situatiori<il undL'ri<1ndingi, WcirninLY intclligiericc.

dnd suppul-l lu fc)rL pru(Lliun,
<15 well ds
<l%iisls in dirininiiig tcrniindliun Lriieiid ur wliLn li i uper(alionally acceptable to Iransition froni Ic1roe-scale c()Iiib<1l npercl1i()ns.

## Consolidate Gains Through Staiiiliti, Ta,Sks (U)

-%1.

(U) E,xtLnsii'c consolidLlte gaiiis effort.s bLgin at-ter a Cll'Lful transiiion froni large-.sLale combal OPLI"<ilioii.%. OpLrationy in Ihc consolid<ltion arc<lli arL cvcntual ly cxpandLd to inc lude extensiN'c .%iabil ily task%.

The Ii'ln.%ition trom l.<l1'ge.%cile comb<il c)pertitionq tn qriibililv miiit be condiicted while mciintlc i ning security (ind chclnoinn the nature of inlorination colleciion. Ba.sed on the commander's requirenients. units ma51 bc requircd t() niodifsl Iheir task organizati()n.(>: pri()ritlL%, and coinmc2nd relationship% ia meei additi()nal Isks <l,%ociated with siabilily tasks. It Iiiay be necLs%ary to augmeni Ihe .tiize: Lotnpo.sition. lind capabililies ut. Ihc fr'oi"cc% ta.sk-nrgiilliLLd undLr the corps (ind division with additional Lollcction cap4lcIIy cind Lcipabilil),
10 addi'c.s.% the Nix .%tiibilit)' task,4:
Egtablish civil security.

E%tabli.sh L ivil Lontrol.

Rcilloi'e essenlial .%i'i'iLs.

Suppoi"I 10 g)overnancc.

S'upport economic 'ind infr<2.struciure develL)pmenC.

Conduci .%ecurilw LI)OPLI'Lllion.

-1-8? i U ) IntelligencL operation.q suppoi'l 10 the .%ix ,sl<ibility iasik.% include% bui 1.% noi limiied to %uppori 10
L(Itiibiil ILrruri%ni,
'1s.%i%ldnLL Iviih <irin.s L()nlrul,
%uppc)rl Lu LL)untLrin%iurilLIILy.

.%UPP()rt l() LuLllItLrdruiT
operations, and suppDrl to forcion internLI1 defense. Iiitclligcnce .)UPPOI"t.% thcse opei-ation.% in LonjunLtion with providingi assistancc l() niaintain scLuritv, E.%SLnti&il tn inlLllioLncc opcratioiis during) IhL trLillsiiiun 10 Ihc enlible civil ,?uthority phase of operations delerininin(r hoKv intLII igence unil.q can support enabling the Iist44inclbilit)' ol" civil Aiithnrity. Intelligence st,'It't' cinLI Iinits Ii,Ivc ,1 dil'terent tOCLlS: orn&Trnize in
,1 dit"tereni
'Ind perl()riii uniquL t,i%ks:
mannLr.

Man), uniquc a4peLI.% (If Lhc ()PLfiL lii)nal Lnvirnnincni hLcniiie iiiipi)riant, .%ULh as snLioLultural t<1Ltor%, regional (lnd IoLil polillcs, c1nd finanL ILII iniel ligenLc.

S'peLl11 operiltionii t"orces_coiiientionci1 inlei7ration beconie8 critlCLI1.

Fu.sion centers Ind other unique L2nalyiical centers are foi'med.

Cenain aspects of operation.% beLoine more iinportcint, SULh as coiiniei'.improvised explosive dLViCCS, Ll)untcrEcrrori.sin: ind .scrcLning local hirLS.

## Theater Army (U)

-X3. ( lj ) 'I'he tlie<ilei" arni), adj usts tlie Iheater intel li (yciice archi tecture hased 051 the cha nging Situatinn.

ex&iniple, during thL Lon4()lidiltion ()f gains, addition<11 HUMINT torLes ni<ly bc rLquircd 10
cngT<1(YL the popul<ll ion iiid Io LOI)d ULI IiJi4uii <2L livilie.i willi h()s1-IlcilioIi fc)I'ccs. Addilioiial Cl foi"Le.% 11)ay be I'eqLiired lu identify enern), agenl.q ()r ssinipathizers. The theaiernii (yh reciuire additional acrial ISR
cls.%etsto l)eiter,quppnri
%tabilily I;Isk% suclI a% hvperspectral i niaoery.

-i-144. (U) TIIL con%olidation arca niay no( bc contiguous, and Arinv forccs will likcly COnSOlidalC gains in some AOS whilL .still conductin(y larL7e_sLcile combat operalions in others. The theatcr arni)I may reapportion or seciire Iddiiion<l1 ei1pibi litieK rcqiiested withiii the Joint oper,Itions <ire1 fo suppori Ihe transitioii to stcibility.

ThLn. (he G-? niubt carefully asses.s which iniel ligcnce assLts (ire required 10 .suppori each effon.

## Corps (U)

S.&)
(U) The corpii mu.st coniiniie conib<21 opei"ation% while siinultaneou.sly consolidating gains. A division as%ioncd Ilic nii.ssioii ot opcratiiio in tlie coii,%nlidation cll"La to .%uppnrt thc corps i,& l-Lquircd to conduct a multitude ot. OPLration.s to includc idLnlifving and dL(i(royin (T .stay-bLhi nd foi'ccs, idvlliifyinil cind ncutrcllizing CnLIIIy
$claI purpn%L forLL'S Llnd intelligcnLc pcr.%onnLI, clnd deterniining anv (rroups thal 1rc .%yinpaihctic to thc enLmy. Fi oure .5.8 on P<loe 5-16 depict% corp.% and divi.%ion Lons0lidllion LifLcl.% wiihin a geographi(: f"rcTrmew()rk of l1l1"oe-.%ccile coi)Ibat oper<ltions.

-fj_8(). ( U) Iniell igreiiLe 1% illLe(Ifdl Ll) Ihe.% ()per&lliL)n.%. Thui"uuirh JPB 15515ts in iden(ifJ i ngy likclj IoLdliun% c)r Lncmy %t1y-bchind and .SPLLial purposL forcc.%. Acldilionall),, IPB is critical in identifyino populaiinns thal nij(ylit be (or Ini oht become) %)'ii]pathetlL lo Ihe enLniy.

_87. (U) Infornialion collection rL mains i nipnrtLlnt diirino thc c"on%oliditiOn Of gains; hOv4'CVCr, the Ct'tort bLLC)IiIL.% Iiiore dLLLnlr&i1ized. Information cnllLction ilS%Lt.% will iypicall), bL pushed to the loive4l levL I whLre tIILy c,In be eft'ectively einployed to suppoi"t decei)Irc11i/.ed opei"aiions.

.5_8X, (u) ThL G-kn? cind tliL intLIIiTrLllLL (iiaff Illust Pc1y SPLLial aitciiiion t() IlllLlligcncc Support tll .%PLLializcd Iinit.% (fL)r LxaiiiplL, Army spccial opcration4
foi"CL.%. niiliiary policc, ciiginccrs, and U.S. GovcrnmLnt
4117LnLic.s) w'orking in closc LontaLI wilh IhL loLal PL)pulalion. Cc)nvLrsclJ, thc G-2 cind the inlclligcnce .st.Itf IisL: OSINT ilnd reports from thLse speciiilized Iinits %ince they ofien coniain inform<11ion thlt 2nAw'ers requirenienti and provides LOntLXI ciboul IhL operatlL)nc1l envii"onment. For example, OSINT units and Arniy
.4iPLLicil UPLfdlion% lorLes% ul-ien prL)vide i ilil inlui-lnaliun USLd lu deiei"miiie IoLiil %nlimciils, einei'&iingy is,%ue.

and trLnd.s, aiid ()thLr.8joniticant t"aLtors withiii thc opcrational environnicnt.

## Division (U)

5-89. (U) Althougli thc division is LonductinTr laroc-.%calc L()nibclt opcrations, an attachcd or organiL BCT
niay be la.%ked to consolidale (T<iins dui-ing continucd divifiion offensii'c or defeiisive ta%ks. Therefore, Ih.Il BCT KVIII rLquifL
'1 full coniplcincni of C<ipabilily L'nablcr4i, includin(y inlclligcnLe. Thi1 Inav nLce4%itatc L1
Lhan(ye i() thL E-MIB tclsk organizaiion. F()r Lx<iinplc. a BCT Lons()lidLilingT (rain% niay rcquirc additional HUMINT or CI &l.%set%. The BCT Illcl! also require long7 IoiiLr UAS coN'era(7L, SULh
<1.5 Gray EaglL UASS f'roiii divi.iion coiiibai avi<ltiun bi"ig7ade%, to Iiionitoi" likely Iiide Incation.s of SldJ'_beliind force.s or eiieiny uncc)n%'cniional tL)I'ces.

-9(). { U ) The divisioii information collecli()n Lffort niust b<ilance I"equirenients t()r long~raniye 5ensino 10
suppori shilpi no ln(l LILCiSiVe npcrili()ns, with thc re(111 ?rLincnl t'or PLrsi,stcnl %iirvci1141nLL I boih eicficil 1 nd oround c'lP<lbiliiiLS) in the LOnSOlidcltiOii ai'ea.

-91 . ( LI ) TIIL di vi%i()11 G-2 aiid the intLlligieiiLL ,%liifi' 11)Ll.4t pi-ovide iiiiell i IiLIILL .4iupporl 10 P.SyLliol()gyiL<21
opcrclti()ns uiiils. Ini litary int'orniation suppc)ri OPLfillions eft"ort%, and othcr fricndly I'()rcc% in L l().>C conlacl with the loc21 population 10 as.sc.%% Ihe effLctivene.%s of friendly Ines%aoe.% Lind to detect anv uninlended Lcill%cquLllLL.% ba.sed on t-riL'ndly aLllC)n%. Although 'ill inicll igence di.SL iplines nicly provldc .4upporl. OSINT
ill unique ly p()8iti()ned i() c()Iiiribute to thi.% eft-ort bs, LOI lecting t-roni publicly aviilable information.

## Bric.Ade Combat Teanq (U)

-S_L)?

(Lll TIIL BCT S-2 aiid iniclliocnLL
%tat-t" dcvLlop Ihe 8iluaiion fr()m Ihc boiiom-up durinfi thc Lun%c>lid&ilion ul" giiini. For exdniple, only the BCT L<in giaubre IoLiil 4enliniciil%. iiidiLdLiuns of cnemv allempi to %iibvLrl vulnerciblc groups, baiilc dama as.%L%.%nicnti Ilnd oiher IoLcl1 faLior%. ThereforL, Ihc BCT and II)WLf LLlielons bLcome Lhe mosl iinpc)rlanl portion of LhL intelligLnce arLhitec(ure. The BCT and lower ecliLlons Iise i ntLII igencL capcibilitics differeiiilj and strLiciure iiitelligencL units* in a diffei"Lnt manner., ConiplniL% Iiiay forni comp1ny intLlligL'Iicc .SLlPPC)rl team.%.

HUMINT and SIGINT teanis reLeivcd differenl eciuipinenl and are cmploj'ed at lower eLhclc)n.%.

B iuiiieiriL (Iiid fi)reii%iL ii11ui-ITiaiiuii dijd i Iilcll i ilL IILL bLI)Iiie Iijoi-c iiiipc)rl&llll.

Small unit intcr<iciion with thc Ii)c.I1 populcltion bcLomc.% nio)rc iiiip()riani.

HUMIN'I. and SIGIN'I. pcr.s()nncl may bc ta.%k-orbiLlnicd Ii)QLthcr
<15 a Inuliit-unLtion teain to support hioh-kli lue indiNidLial iargeiinct InielligenLe .support 10.sitc Lxploitation beLoms more importanl.

IntelligenL L aniilysls hit lie lL L I;%.% to more iiilLII i ftl'nce neiwork% clnd dat'ibcise%.

i-9.3. IU) IPB and intlligence anal)I,sis driiie the BCT int'()rinaiion collection plan. Fnr exlmple. HLNqINT
rcp()riiniy on a suspeLtcd sat.e h()u,%e, %pccial PLirpo.4c f()rLLS LULin(y UAS COVLra17L, Iocdl patri)1s 1() dcvLIop patterns of life, teinplates and hJper.specir<21 iinageryllight detection 10 idciiiify po.ssible Cc1che silcs in the iici n ily of 1 SU.%PCCtcd .84lte housL.

i-94. IU) IPB can idcntify enemy observer.% within the line of Sight lo friendly high-value assets. The S-2
ideni.i tie,s N A I s, Lind thL ,%-.3 iasks Incal .securits' Pltrnl,s, incl udi ng task-nrgani7.ed iiilel l iiyence Cilpahi lities, tn
,1s.sisI in idLntitying ciicniy pcrs()nncl and t() cxploil thoin upon tliLif L<lPturc. Additionally, the BCT S-?

LCI()I"di IiatLS iiifi)I"111<lti()11 coIILctii)n OvLfw<llcli wlii IL thL S-3 LIl%UL'L% Ariiiy aviatinn is available iii a I"Lcnniiais.banLL and attack. rolL,

## Win (U)

.i-9S. (U) Winning is the achiei'emeni of Ihe purpoqe of an operation and Ihe fuifillineni of lis Objectives, Thc intclligencc wartighiing funLiion i.s inte(yral 10 winning. The Ariny wins Ivhen II .SULLL%4fully PLrf()rnis its rolc% as Pc1fi ()f Ihe .joini forLe during operaii()ni>.

li Lft"ectivcly shapes an nperaiional cnvironrncnt f()r c()mbaiant commaiiders.

I t rciipnn(l.l rapi(I l y wi Ih Lnnugli cnnihal P()wcr l() prcvLnl W.1r Ihrnugh deierrencc during cri.si.s.

An enLniy is dcfcaiL'd to such an e.xicni th<lt it can no longycr rLil.%t cffcLtiiiely, and it Ligrccs to Le<ise hosiilitie.% on U.S. trni%.

i-9(). I'U) When rcquii-Ld to fiohc, thc Arinv's ability 10 prei'ail in gTround combat <1t Ic n}, scale beLoines <7
dLLj%iI'L I'clctoi- in brcaking IliL Clllly's will to L(Illtinuc tioliting. Iiiiclligeiicc is ali iiihcrcni aspLLI ()r all
.4rmv oper41tioiis aiid activitics, Army opcr1L tions lo dcfcat Lncinics during Illrgc-scali Lombat opcr1c tions is fundiimcnlal to winning ws. LargL-,SCilc conibat opcrltion% occur in the form of major opcrations and Lcillipc1igns ciimcd 'it detec1ling an enenij s clrmed forLes and mililary cap1bilities to support n<ltionl1
i)bjcctive.s.

## Chapter 6 Fighting For Intelligence During Large-Scale Combat Operations (U) Overview (U)

6-1 . (U) Operational success requires a successful intelligence effort. Fighting for intelligence encompasses the basics of establishing an effective inlelligence architecture, ,synchn)nizing the intclligence warfighting function, and planning and conducting information collection. The commander and staff need to understand the doctrinal fundamentals of fighting for intelligence and rnainiain proficiency in integrating the intelligence wartighting tunction into operations.

6~2.

(U) Conducting realistic training and building effective relationships are import4mt to operational success. Staff i ntegration, operational plannjng, aiid information collection plaiis are not foolproof and caji bccomc incffcctivc. Amiy forces cornpctc with an adaptivc cnemy; thcrcforc, perfcct planning and information collection seldom occurs. InklligenLe is not perfect, information colleclion is not easy, an(1 a single collection capability is not persisient and accurate enough to provide all of the answers. Conducting Information collection requires thorough and creats've planning, clggres,$ive execution, and adjustments biised on the situation.

## The Challenge (U)

6-.3.

(U) Prodijcing intelligence Ind executing intonnafion collection dit'ter signiticantly ba,sed on the Army str{Ite role. For example. intelligence operations conducted during shaping operations differ dra.stically from intelligence oper&itions conducted during large-scale cornbar 0ratiOnS.

64.

(U) Of Ihe four Arniy strategic roles (shape, prevent, conduci large-%caJe ground combaL and consolidaie gains), Ih intelligence warfjghting function is mo%t chdllenged to meet the vast niirnber of largescale combat operntion requirements. Lge-scale combat operations are inten.%e, lethal, and brutaJ--ireating condition.s, such a.8 complexity, chaos, feAr, violence, fatigue, and uncertajnty. Battlefields will include noncombatants crowded in and around dense urban area.s. To further complicat operations, enemies wdl employ conventional and unconventional tactics, teiTorism, criininal activities, and infoi"Ination warfarr.

Activities in thc information cnvironrncnt will often bc inscparablc frorn ground opcrations. Thc fluid and chaotic nature of large-scale combat operations will cause the greatest degree of fog, friction, and ,sl ress on the intelligence warfighiing function.

6-5. ([J) When fighting a peer threat during large-scale combai o rations. units must be prepared to fight for intelligence against enemy fomiations, a range of sophisticated threat capabiliues, and many unknown conditions within the opcrational environment. The challenges to information collection include IADSS.

long-range fires, counterreconnaissance, cyberspace and EW operations, and carnouflage, concealiT]ent, and deception,
6-6.

(U) Key aspects ot. tiglitin8 t'or intelligence to siiprA)rt oper<itions incliide the tollowing:
Commanders drive intelligence.

EffecLive staff integration is crucial.

Effcctivc intclligncc requires a comprchcnsive intclligcnce architccturc.

A thoroughly developed and flexible infnrniation collectioii plan is critical.

tx succcssful int"orni'ati(In LollcLlion plan bcgin% with idcntit.ying the riiylil rLquircincnl.% for reconnais.sance, . urk'eillaiiLL', ,4ecui'itv ()per'ii inn4, and intL11 igL nce opei'.'Itinn,%.

Togiether, commanders, (il,Ift"%, and %ubordinatL unil% slrive and constaiitly iidju.ql 10 develop 11nd
(71"essive intormalion collLction plan.

CXL'CU(e a layerLd and ag>

## The Commandfr's Role And Staff Integra'Fion (U)

-7, (U) Comm,2ndci'% and %tclt-f% nccd (iniLly, accLII",ItL. rilek'anl, and prLdictivc intclji cncc to undcr%tlnd threa( Lharaclcri%iics, gYo'il.% and objcclik"L%, and COA,4. PrLCiSC intcllioincc is criliL,I1 to iargLtin(J Ihreat Lap<ibiliiie% 111 tlie I"igh( ti me clnd plclcc to nPLn windoi.s of opportunity 1Lrn.Is d()niains. Comm<inderq L1nd slal'fs reCLIVL Lt-fectivL intelligence when they direLI and pai'iicipatL in intellioLnce warfightiIig functi()n aciiviiie). As dicussLd in chapier I, close interclction between Ihe conimaiidLr, G-?/S-? G-.31S-3, cirid the rc.sl cit thL siat't" 1% cssciitial 1.% IIIL cnlirL .siaff support.s uiiii pl aiiii iiig ciiid pi"LP&ifcl1 ion through Ihc inlLgrati no PI"OLC%SLS Ic nd continuing LICli & ilic.s.

6-8, IU) From thL per%pLciive ot- fighiing for intcllic7cnLc, thc tir.(il agpLct ot" .supporting opcration% is
11L VLlc)ping
(ynod intoi'm;IliLin ieqii ireme.Iil% 'inil desi(rn.11ing Pl R% 1.% 11 fLsiII i ot" I PB 11nd I he cnmplei ion ot the MDMP. CniiimandLI"% <1nd staft's Inu,st hiiJe det1< ilcd knowledge of Ilireat stren(yihs, vulnei'<1bilitie.s, c)ryTiiniLiil)()n%. L:quipniLlli, L(IPcibililiL%, <ind taLIiL % t(J pl dn f()r dnd LXL'L UIL. friLndl y UPLfdli()1is. Add ili()nal ly, tliere are niany uniquL iequirenientq thclt supporl SLisiainin(r operations and t'rieiidly aciiviLies witliin the
'"]()ll. consoliddtion arL,'IS.

## Intelligence Anali'sis Iu)

i U) TIILI"e
1% fai" Iiioi"e to iiiielligiLI)Le aii,oly%i% tliaii (iiiiplv IPB. IntelliiieiiLe aii(IIysi.(> IllU.%l .SUPI)ort Ilic Loiniiiaiidcr, s dLLi%ion%, %itulc tional undLr.siJnding. Army dL%ion InLLhc)dol()(yy, NIDMP, Icirgciincy <1nd t"orLC
pi'oILction con%ideratioiis anol continuou% oper,Itional assessiiients. In any oper&i1ion, both friendly aiid Lnemy t-orLLS Hiill eiideaiior to SLI conditions lo dLvelop cl PO%lti()n of re11L tive <idi',Int'iiie, Setting Ihe%e condiiions bcoin% w'ith g7LncralL illicll i(?LncL kni)wlcdgc, whiLh pr()vides rLILvant Kn(Iw'lLdoc about thL ()periiiional environnieni Ihat
1.% incorporJtLd into the Army desi(Tii meihodology clnd Ilien Li%ed later diii'ing other iiiiel ligieiiLe ancily.si,s ta.%k%. (See figui"L (i- l . )
6-10. (U) During tlie MDN1P, the iniellioence .stLiff leiqds IPB ,Iiid conduLl% conlinuou.q iniellioencL analy%1
10 LindLr.stand tlie opei"aiional envii"onmLnt and the c)Plions it prescnts lo friendly Ind Ihrec2l force%. For LX;IniplL', thrc<lt d,11,?b;Isc.s Ind sign<?tiire.% olcvLIopLII (luring genLfcllL intLlligcnce knowlc(l(Te i1SSiSt in asses%ing thrL<ll capabiliiies and vulnerLibilities diirino IPB. This inforination f<1ciliiaies decision niakin dLlI"illgt Ihe MDMP cind prui'ide% d Lonim()n und#i".sldnLlin&T ()n huw friendly forLe% Inily
&T(iin
1 pu%iliI)n ()I'

rclatlvL advaniagL
clcrc)s% niuliiplL doniains. This is CssLntial Ivhcn dvlLrminino how bcst tn InitigatL
suphistlc&1ted threat antiacce%.s and ai.ea denial %yslcllI.q, IADSS. and long-range fires capabilities? well as
acLounting for ciiiil Lon4idcrltions in IhL opcrationiil cnvirnnincnt.
6-11 . i Ll) Bascd on relcvaiit cl.PLLts i)f IhL ()pcf<lti()nal cnvir(Innienl (dcteriiii ned durin IPB ), the ci)niinandLr
and %tatf coniinLIoLisly as(ie%% iiitorni'ition. opercl1iolli, and LhcillLie% in the ope rltioiial enIrOnmenI. Warniiig
iiitelljb7L IILe, situation dLI'Llopiiieiit. <iiid iiiiel li <ieiicc suppoi't to tai'geting <l%.(iisI Lheiii iii f ui-thei" sliapiii(y tlie
i)pcJ'ational cnvironinLnt 10 t'icilit<2tL Ini.s.sion .SUCLL,S,4, ThL colliinuous a,s.4iLs.smcnl of collected inforinalion
Iso niiij(Tates i-isk 10 friendly t-orLe.% whi le idenlit'yiiio opportunities tc) levcrige friendly capabil ities to open
a wind(1, of opporlunily.

## Ififormation Requiriments (U)

6-12. (U) Cuniilludl (Issessmenis (Ind upd6ilL% iu IPB pr(xluLts, enable L()mmdndcrs dnd sldfl.% lu deelup d realistic and sufficiently flexible plan to account for encmy objectivcs. COAS, and capabililies. This ii1s0
assists commanders and staffs in identifying w'arning intelligence, which indicates changes in the likelihood of threat aclions against friendly forces or developments likely to cause harni to friendly forccs-whether in support of defen,sive or offensive ta.sks. Information requiremeT]t.s differ signi fjcanil y ba.sed on Ihe defensive or offensive task. the specific situation. and unique requirements for concurrent supporting operations such as missioiis iii the various Lonsolidation areas. During boih friendly defeiisive ]d uffcnsive Lasks. there are consolidation arca rcquircments to dctcct cncmy bypasscd or suq), behind forces, spcaal purposc forccs, Irregul forces, terrorists, and efforts 10 create an insurgeny or conduct information warfare.

## Defen,Sivf. Tasks (U)

6-13. (U) A def'iisii'e t(uk is a *task* conduciLd to dcfeat an encmy attack, gain time, econoNiize forLes, and develop condiiion.s favorablL for ()ffensive or sthbility tasks (ADRP 3-0). The three basic f:riLndly defen.sive iasks are area defLn.se, mobile defensL', and retrogyrade. During friendly defcii.sive Las'k,s, enemy forces cn)pl(iy precisi()n tires, other Inng-rdnge tires. and nnnletlial Cd[)4ihilitiei (8uch a% cyber and FW) tn attack t"rien(Ily mis.sion commai)d and key supporting and susiaining apabilitics. Friendly forces aim lo ppare dLfeiisive Pu%iiiiuns ind .set Lvndi(ic)n% while the vnLmy atLLrnpL%i to .%et the iitning uf, loLdLiun uf, Lundiiiun4 for bltile,
6-14. (U) Intclligcnce supports fi'iLndly force cfforts to protct the forc, disbursc and rcasscinblc the forcc as nccessiiry, and answer rcquiremLnls on when, whe, and in what %trcn&ith the enemy will attack. This intelligence supports decisions on setting the dcfense, emploving various capabili(iL.s, rei)08iliL)Iiing forces.

conducting counteratlacks. and when possible. tran,51tioning to offLiisive task8. Table 6-1 depicts inielligence requireinents gei)eralJy associaled with triendly defen.sive tasks.

## (B)(3) .4Rea Defense (U)

6-15. (U) The
(11-I'u tl('[('n.si'
1%
il defensive task th&lt concenlratLs on denyino eneniy forcLs &2ccess lo dc.liignatcd tLrrain for i (ipccific limc raihLr Ihan dLstroyingi IhL cncni! outrigyht (ADRP 3-9()). Arca dLfcn%c can tak.e place at the tactic'il iiiid nperLlli(Inc)I ILI'el< nt" war. 'I'he arecl dLtense f()Luqes nn retainino ierrain whcre Ihc bulk (It- l< det-endino forcc poqiiions itsLIt' in mutually suppc)rting, prepiired position.s. Units Inainlain tIILII' PO*yili()Iis aiid Ll)Iltri)I tliL tLI'raiii bLIWLLlI tIIL%L posilioi).%. TIIL dLCl4ilVL (JPLI'ali()11 fc)LUSL.% I ii'L(> Illlo engiigenient 1rea.8, po%sibly %upplenientcd by cl Lountercltiack. Comnianders Lan use their re.servc to reinforce fircs, add dLPth, block: or reAtc)re a Position b J, countLfLltLick' seizc thL initiJ(ivc; and dcsiroy encmv forces.

Uniiq <lt all echelon.s can LonduLt an are41 defense. (Sec Ffvl 3-90- I for the advlllt<lges and disadvaniage.% i)f uging a deten,qe i n depth and 1 f(Irw'ard det-enqL during thL Landuct nt- an ai'ea defense.)
6-16. (U) The iniLlliocncc siaft" Icad,% thL rc.si ()f thc .slat"f in idLntifying when, whcre, wilh Ivhat %trencyih, and Iiow tlie eiiciiiy will aLtack. Tliis allows tlie Colllliiidci' 10 ideiitify opportuiie ti Iiie.s to conduct spoiliiig attacks and rLPo%ltion forcL.fj. Thc cntirc slaff also identit-ics thrLLlts lo support and to consolidation <ifLas, such as cncniy .%pccial purpo%e forLes and irrcgular actiw"iliLs. Ivhich Inay intcrferL Wlth control of Ihe defcn,sL. In
'ILldition IC) the intelli(rence reqLiirement% ideniifiLd in lablL 6-1, condLlctino cln ,Irea defeii.gL', opercltions inLludLs c()nsideraiion ot the following iniellioence requirements:

## (B)(3) M(Ihile Def'En,Se (11)

6-17. (li ) Tlie 17i()l)ile cli [eii.Iv 1% a defensive Icl%k thai conceniraie4 on the deqtruLiion or dLfeat of the eneiny tlirnugh a decisiiie atL<lLk bv cl Strikiiig t'()i-cc (ADRP 3-90). Nl()bile dfen.sc
1% Iiiore nfcii a.s.s()cllted willi the operatic)nal Icvel ot. M'ar. The mobilc det'eiisL focuscs on defeatin4y or de.%tr()yino an enemy by allowino enemy lorceq to ,Idvance to a point where they are exposed to a decisive Lc)unLerallack b>, a .sti"iking force. The.s'ti'ikiJiA'
.l()I'Le Iq I dediLlc tL'd CoLinicr,Itllck t()rcc in cl Inobile defcnsL' Lon.ftitiited with Ihc bLI Ik of avail,1ble CL)mbit power
(ADRP 3-90). A fixincy forLe is a force de%ionated 10 suppleinent the %triking fc)rce by prei'eniing thc enemy from ni()ving fi'oin a specific <lre<l for a speci fic ti me. A fi.xiii(y t.orce supplenien(.s tliL %triki ngT forLe by holdi ng iltt2ck"ing encniy torce,f iii po.silii)11, tii Iiclp LliaiiiiL l L2ltIlLk'i ng Lneiny Ioi"cc.(i iiiln <?nibu.sh ai'ca,s, ciiid 10 l-Liaiii
(Ii"Las from wliicli 10 lauiich thL Stnkinoy force. A Inobile defeii>e I"equire.s an AO Ivith con.iidLrable depth.

Coinin,Inders shape their bi ttlLfield%. causing an eneiny force to 01:erex(end ils line% ofcommiinic&i1ion.q: cxpx)se its tliink&, ,Incl d i,%SlPilc i t% cc)mb,It p()wer, Co)In ni;1 nclcr(i IllOVC tricndl y torccii aroiincl And ELhind 41n cneiny torcc to cui off and dLsiroy theni. A division or hiiTher eLhelon norinally execiites a mobile defense. BCTS and nidneui'ci bcilt<iliun% PiirliLIP<ile in d Iiiubi le dclLn%L Pcirl uf cl fix ingy forLe ur d 4itrikinii f()rLC.

18. (U) In ciddition to thc iniclligLncc rcquircniLni.s idLlliifiLd in iablc 6-1, conducting (1 mobilc dcfcnsc OPLraiion8 includes con,sidei'alion of the follolving intelligence requireimenis:

## (B)(3) Retrograde (U)

6-19. (U) Tlie rL)II'()A)i-udLJ is a defcn%ive tLisk that iniiolves oi"ganized movement away from the enemy
(ADRP 3_90>. A rLtrogTf&idL can tike placc ai thc tacliL.Il or opcrational Icvcls of war. An cneiny may force the%L I)PLf(Itinn%. ()r a Ll)rnmiinder mav eiLciile Iliem vc)Iiintarily. 'I'he higher eLhel()n cnmmander nfr a fnrce executing a retrograde Iniist appi'ove the I'etrograde before its initiation. ,4 reii-ogi.ade i.s a transiiional C)PLrali()11, li is IlOL Ll")IIJuLled in is()latiuii. l[ 1% iilHiay% pai't of a l<l1'OL I, .%LIILIIIL of IiiaiiLu VLr JL,qjCIIILd Ill I"LJoaiii the iniliative and del-Lat the eneiny.

6-20. I'U) Thc Ihrcc form4 of the rclrogradL are-
Dela.v. A Ilela) ins *(?periiiin17* is an opcration in Iw'hilh cl forcc undcr prc.%.%urc tradc% %PclCL t-or liine bj slowinry doivn Ihe enemy'.s momentuni and inflicting maximum d'iinane on the enemy w'ithout, in principle, becomino deci.%ively en(y*ciged (JP 1_04). In delLIyq, Linilg yield ground 10 giin time whilc rctainino flexibility and trecdorn of action t() inflict thc niaximuim damc1gL on an cncmy.

ithdrdwal. A Ik'iilidi'awnl *(?perali()n* is cl planned relrL)griidc operation in which
<1 force in eonlcicl diseng<lgLs from an enemy force c111d move.s in a direction lway from Ihe enem), (JP 3_17).

Wiihdrawing units. lhL(her all or part of a coinmiited force. voluntarily disengage froni <1n enems,
10 Pl'L%crvc thc t-orcL or rclLa%c il foi- a nLKV niission.

RelirLll)Lnl. A I'eiii"eiiieJii is 1 Ii)rm i)I' rLtrc)ur(IdL in whiL h d fi)rLL UUI uf L()nldLt ni()VLS <lwcly fr()m Ihc cneiiij (ADRP .3-9n).

6-?1.

I'U) In eacli foi-m L)t" thc rL(rogrcidL, a fr"orLL thai is IiDt in contilLI wilh an Lnciny Inoi'cs to inoiliLr localioii, ncirinallv by a tactical road Inarch. In all rLlrograde operLilioiis, firm control of fi'iLndly m,Ineuver clemLni.% i.s a pi"erciiuisi te foi. SUCCLSS.

6-22. (U) Thc iniclljncncc qiat"f leadA Ihc rcsi of Ihc .st<1ff in ,IiialyLing IhL Icrrain, including oround and air
ai'LIIUL.% of appi'oaLlI, 10 dctei'iiiie tliL be.si i oute.% t'or boili Ilie fi ieiidly foi.ce retrograde and tlie likL ly eneiii J,
exploitation or pursuit opcration. In addition tn IhL intelligcncc rcquircmcnt% idcntificd in tablc 6-1 on pagc
6-4, conduLling a rctrograde opcration includcs LDll(>idcration of Ihc following intLlligcncc rcquircmenl,s:

## (B)(3) Offensive"Fasks (U)

6-23. (U) An nffeii.sii'e
111,A is a td%k cc)nducicd
10 dcfcat lind dc%tr()y cnLmy f()rcL% and seiLL terrain, resoui"ce.s. aiid populatioii centers (ADRP I-O), The foul- baiiic friendly offcnsive tasks are Inovement to contaLt 41ttack. exploilatiDn, and pursuit. Durinb fi-iendly offcn%iiic ta,%k%, enciny t-orccq attcinpt (o disrupi friendly <2CliI'itie.s by employing preci.sion fires. othLr long-range fires, and nonlethal cap<ibilities (like cjber an(1 F.W). Theret"nre. trien(dly tni"Le.q Atrive tn c(IndLlct the neLessai'y mni'emeni%: prepare IngistlLal .%uppnrt, and sei othei. condition.s while IhL cnem)1 liiempt.s to preiiLni fi"iendly forces froni eft-eciively .syiichronizing
<l(JL'q U<L(L LC)mb(Il P()wLr.

6-?4. IntclligcnLc dctcI'rnincs WhLII IL nd whLrc Ihc cncniy w'ill CollLLnti-alc combat powcr, find gap.s and

Nvakncs%eK in Lncni5' dct-Ln8c%. and prLdict how thc cnciny will conduct ani, Lc)untcratllLks. Thi.s intclli(IcncL
upports deLision.s on Lonductinu inform'ition LoIIcciio)n, e.xecuting Ic)n(Y-rangL firLq, peneiratin<7 enems,
securiiy arLas. OvLrcnminL7 ob%tacle*i, avoidi nci enemy .q(rengihs, defeaiin(v eiiciny COLllItLfl4 Iiacks. <ind when
PO(s%iblc. transitioni ngi tci Lxploitaii()n ()r pursLliI. Tablc fi-2 dcpiLl% i nicll ioe ncc rcquirc Incni.s (7Lncra Ilj
a%.SOL Idled Iviili Ilie fi"ieiidl) orrLll*ive lasks.

## (B)(3) ,Movement To Contact (U)

6_25. (U) Movemenl lo coniact IS 4qn offensive task designed to develop the situ&ilion and estcqblish or regain contact (ADRP 3-90). ConunandLrs conduct a movemeiit to contact when an enemy .%ituation is vague or not FY4LifiL Lnuugh tu LunduLt dn utldLk. The gL)al of d mi)vL'inLnl tu Lunl<lLI is tu m&ke initldl L()ntdLI w'ith d small element while rctainiiig enou&ih combat power to develop the situation and niitiglte the associated risk, A rnovennt to conlact employs purposeful and aggyrLs8ive reconnaissanLe and 8eLurity operations 10 guin contact with the enemv main body and develop the situation. The movement to contact force defeats enemy t'orces within its CilP<lbility and creates t'avori ble conclitioiis tor subs'eiiiienl tactical actions. It" the nioveinLnt ta contact force Inets a superior force that it 18 unable to defeat, the movement to contact force LonduLl% the SLLurily ur defen.iive tdsks neLe>isdry tu deNel()p thv situdtion luriher. A InvvLment tu LontdLI mdy result in (I
ieeling engagemeni. Once an cnemy force makes contact, the friendly coiriiiiander has five c)ptions: attaLk.

defend, bypass, delay. or withdraw, Subordinate forms of o move,ment to contact include search and attacL
and cordon and search operations.

6-26. I'U I A Ihor()ug7h IPB Lqnd war-g,11ning Lffort indic&1tc% orccls whcrc LoniaLt Nkiih thc enciny is likelv cls well a,%1 triendlv and enemy vulnei"1biliiies by pha4ie
()t- the i)perltion.

In additi()n to Ihe inlelligenLe reqiiirenient% identified in tc1ble 6-2 on Pil(yc 6-7, moveinent to c()nt41Lt incliides con.%idering the follo,ing inlLlligeiiLe reqLljI"einents,

## (B)(3) Attack (L)

6-27. (U) An *ull(i('L'* is an offensive tlqk that destroys or defLat8 eneniy t"orce. seizes and secLires terrain. or
botli (ADRP 3-9()). AttaLks incnrp()rdie co()rdinaled IllQvclllLnl supportcd by fire.%. Thcy Inay be Pcirl Ot-eiihLr
dLClSIN'e or sh,1ping operaiion.%. A coniniLinder niay degcribe an aitc2ck as hasLy or deliberate, depending on
tlic tiiiie avi1ilable for issei4illn the situatioii. plaiiiio Iiid pi-CP<21'iiig. A CollllLindei' Iiiay dccide to Loiiducl EW, oftcll8lvL cybLrspacc OPLfl1ion8, c1nd cithLr int"ormation-rclatcd cin attc1ck u.sinn ()Iily firL% (inLludiii(y capabilities), b.Iscd on .In an,Ily.sis ot" Ihe Inission variable.s (METh-TC). An .Ittack differ.s from 2 movemenr
10 L()ntict bLcaLise In an (Ittack. coininandLrs kn()w at Icl< %[ part of an Lneiny'.s di(iPo.sitions. This knowlcd(Ic Ln<lblL% comnianders to better synchronize and morL eflectively employ combat power. Subordin<lte forms ot. Ihe <lltack have special pui-poses. They include tlie tasks of ambush, counteraiiack, demonsir1c tion. feini.

raid. and sp()i liiig) <lttack". The Lonii)iaiidei' .5 inienE and Ihe Illis4iion vai iables deierinine whicli of tliesc forms c)f attLILk 10 Lmploy. C()mm1ndcr% LonduLt each ot IhL()L t"orm% ()f attack. e,xccpt for a raid, a.s eiihcr a ha,$1)'
oi. a dcliberate oper,I1ion.

on Pcigie 6-7, IttilLk inL'ILide.

6-?8.

i U) In iidllition l(I thc. intelligycnce rLquircmcnl% i(lenrit'iecl in IiblL 6-
Loiisiderino Ihe t.ol loivi ng i niell igenLL I'equirLnienLs:

## (B)(3) Exploitation (U)

6 ?9, (U ) An e.11)l(Jiicili()11 1.% (in ()rrL'Ii%ivL UPLI'dti()n th(It U.%Uiill v fulluws 1 %ULLL%s1-u l illldLk cind i.s dL,%jcynLd to dis01'ganize the enemy in depth (JP ?_Q 1.1 i. An exploilEl1ion .seLks to di.%iniegrc11c enemv forces, %0 the), havc no altrnati vc bul to surrender or retrcat. Expl()itation.4 t,Ike &idKiantagc of iactlccil opportunitie.%. Diw isiun
.Ind li jnlier hLadciuarters nc)rinally plan explnitatioii% .14 J brinch or SLquel.

h_3(). (lj) In 2 ddition 10 the intelligence requii'cTnent& idcntit-icd in tahle h-2 nn page (1-7, explnilalinn includes L(In.%iderinn thc t-ollow'ino intclligcnLe requirLincnts:

## (B)(3) Pursuit (U)

6~31 . I" U) A [Jiii'.s'iiii 1% all (il"fensi ve la.%k de%igiiied li) L&ilLh ()r LUI orr a Iiosiilc lorce illciiipliniy LO e%Lape, with thc Liim of dL.str()ying il ( ADRP 3-90). A pursuit n(IriiiL211y foll()w.s a SULCLssful Lxploitation. IIowLver, il.

eneiny I"esistince break.s dO,n and thc enemy benins fleeing the battlefield, any offensive lak can tran%ilion into a pursLllt. Pui-sLllts en11il rapid InovL ment 1 nd dccLntrki1 i7_ed control. Bold ac lion 'ind calL ulated initiati ve Irc rLquircd In the c()nducl ol- cl pur%uit.

6-3?

(Ll) An), rapid dLci.qion Inaking in supp()rt nf il pur.%uit U%L% IPB planninn (ind prodLlct% t"roiii the original
()ffcii.%ipe ta&k" and IhL appropi"l<Qte branch or .4LqULI planniiig. In additi()n LO the intelligencL requireiiient, L 011 Ptige 6-7. piirsLlIt i nc I Iide.% cnn%idLI'i ng the t.ol lowi ng i Iitelli ence reqiiirenientK'.

idLntified in table 6-?

## (B)(3) O'Rher Key'I'Asks For Shaping Largf-Scalf Combat Opfr,4Tions (U)

6-3_3. (Ll) TherL
(IrL Inciny impoi'tani lspect.s ot all ot'len.sjiie cind deten%ive ia.&ks, incliiding Ihe I,ICIicl1
eniiblin(7 tcosk%. Iii L()Inbilt, .SClLini7 the iniiiatlllL' involvL% C()nductinoy rec()nnaissanLc. maintiining (iecuriiy, pL'r1uriIn defcn%ive dnd urlensive li1sk.4
&ll Ilie edrliL4I P()iSible liine. forLinLi Ihe nLmJ iu Luliiiiniiie ot'fcnsivLly, and seiiing Ihe c()ndiiions for deci.sive operaiinn(i. Operalion,s in the deep area ink01e efforl.%
LO
pre'enl uncommilted or oul-ot-_Lontlct eneiny mineuver t'orces from bcing committed coherently or pi"eventing eneniy enabling c.Ipibilities, such a.5 tircs Ind air defense. froin ci'eating effecls in the close ,IfLa.

ThL' Pl5fposL C)t' opcrcltio)ns in the dccp clfc<l l.q to scr Lond iti()ns tor SllcLe.ss i n (hc clo,se ,1fccl Lir to sct LL)nclilion.q tor t'uture OPLraiioiis. Therefore. units niusi Lxecuie .successful reconnais(iance, security operation%. Llnd deep L)PLI"cltiun% bfurL ur il% Gl Pll"t uf dll uffcnsi I'e (Ind dcfLnsi ve Id%k%. SpLiI iLdlly, exeLuiiuns L)I" Ih(ie Ihree key tLosks arc Lritical t() thc %uccc,%,s of (ill offcnsivL and dcfen.sive tasks.

## Reconnaissance (U)

)-.14. (Ll) Typically, reconnais%aiiLe is conduLted til gain more inforination aboui a terrain fedture, geogriiphic arLcl. Lneiny torce, ()r oihLr operalion'il or mi.%.%ion V<lri;Ible Ih,It is iniport<inl tor a conim,Inder lo t()rniulate. Lont-irin, or niodify a COA. C()Ininandcr8 n()rinally a%.4jon reLI)nnai,4i%lL ncc objcclive,%, Ivhiih Lin bL intorinatioll ciboui a specil.ic oLographic IoLLllion. a specit'iL neiny aLtivity to be contirnied or denied, or
1 4PCCltic eneiny Linit to be l()caiLd ind tri< Lked, ThLrefore, every reconncll%%(Inoe 1% different (ind Ihere is no geiieral list nf i ntLlI"m<ltion requirLmenis,

## Securitv Operations (U)

Ci-.3S. ( Ll ) The ni,iin clifterence betweeii pertorniing seciirity Ici%k% <lnd recc)nn<llKslnce Ic1sks 1% Ihc1t 8eciirity ta.ks oi.ient on the force or facility being prntected. Ivhile rcconnai.gsance iusk.s are eneiny- and terrain-
()riciiiLd. ThL goil
()T %ccurily Icisk% is proiectingi a forcc froiii .%urpri,lic and rLducino thL unknown% in any sitLiation. Coniniaiider.s Inav perforni secui-ily task.s lo I h froiil. flanks, oi" real- i)f a friendl), fc)rce. Securi ty ia,sk% are shapingi OPLraiion,s.

A.5
1 .shaping OPLfcllion, CLon()my of forcL
1,% ofien a con.sideration whLn plaiiniiig. Secui"ilJ' operaiions encompa.ss five ta(ik%:
Screen. *S,'I'eeii* i.s a securily tclsk Ih,Il prim.inly pi'okide% eLirly H'ai-niiig to the proteLted force
(ADRP 3-90).

Guard. Giiard is a 5eLurity task 10 proicct the Inlill forLc by fighiing t() n&iin liinL Ivhile also obfcrving &ind rcporting information l< nd prcvcnting encmj. oround ob.serv,ition of and dirccl fire agiainst thL main hi)dy. lJnit8' cnnductini? 1 guard mi.q%i()n cannc)t C)pcr&lie independently heciL uqe thcs
1.cly upoii fires and funciionil Iiid muliitunctiL)n<11 support
<ls,seis of the main body
(ADRP 3-90).

Col'er. Coi'ei. i.s a .%ecurity ta%k t() proicct Ihc Iniiin body by t.1hling to gain iiinc while al%n ub%ei"villcT aiid I'epL>I"li[10 i Iiloi'iiiatlL)11 and pievenlin(T eiieiiis Lyrouiid observatioii o( aiid dii'eLI l-ire ancllllst Ihc niain body (ADRP .3-90). (Covcr, a.s <1 doctrincil tcrni, il.so has uihcr dct'i nilions.)
Area security, A reli .feL14rili' 1.% a seLuJ'it> iask Loiiducted to proteLI fi-ieiidl), foi"ie,s, iiistallc1lions routL%, and <lL(inn% wiihin a %pccit'ic ai'Lcl ( ADRP 3-90). ThL SLcurity forcL may be proteclino thc civilian popul.Ilion. civil in%litutions, and ciiiilian infi',IstruLtui"e w'ith 41 Llllit's AO.

L()Ciil securitv. Loc'al .fec'iii'ili'
is a
%CLuril)'
la%k Ihc1t includc% low-IcvLI sccurily activitic.s conduLied nLLir a unit to prLvLnt 4urprisL by thc LnLmy i ADRP .3_91)). Local gccurity is clo.sLIy
,2%soci'ited wiih Lini t foi"L e pi"ntection e t'fnrt.%.

## Deep Operations (U)

6-36. (U) DeLP operationq are combined arin.s operalion.s dii"ected ,Igainst uncominitted enemy torce% or Ccipabiliiic.% bcf()rc thcy Lan cngiagc fricndlv forLL'S in thL' Ll()%L' fight. DLep opLrcqtion.s also contributL' to etting tlie Liiiidilinns tn trinsitinii tn the nLXt phasL nf an (Ir)eratic)n (t()r exaniple, t.rnrn
,1 defengive to
,111
nft'eiisjiie task). Deep i)perLiiions (ll'e not si niply attacki nLY cin eiicinv f'orce in depth. Instead, Ihey lire the suiri
(-)r all clLlivitiLs Ih<l1 iiilluLnLL wIILn, wliLI'L, all(] iii wlil l Lunditii)n LnLllI)' fi)ILLS will bL LullllitILd. DLLP
opcrations ?( re norniall). planned and controlled 11 Iheiltei" cll"niJ, corps. and division levels, and iypicallN'
includL inforination Lc)IleLtion. tl rgLt acciuisilion, ground ind air maneuvLr, fire.%, CEMA, aiid inforinlti()n c)peraiion% either singly or in c'ombi1ii1ion. (See ATP 3-94.2 f()r ni()re on deep oper&1ti()ns.)
fi-.37. (U) Inlellioeiice support to deep npei'atinns is cln inherent p1 nf intellj(yence support lo iargeiin I ntLlligyLnLL rcquircincnt% l()( I ddrcs.s dccp opcratii)ns includc

## (B)(3) The Intelligence Architecture And The Information Collection Plan (U)

6-38. (u) At'ter compleiinu Ihe MDMP (to includc dLI'Lloping rLquirenienis), IhL c()nimandei- and Slilt-t.

dLVLI()P illl iiifi")riiiatil-)11 Ll)IILLtii)11 plan. DL VL l()ping tliL 111 l ()I'niatiun Li)IILLti()11 plcin ii]iiol I'L% c)vLI'layii)g IIIL
iiit"ormci1ion reqiiiren)ent,s on the current .siiuation, opcratlolliil pliill. ,1nd tlie existin(T inlel ligence architeLtLII'L, Othei- staff .Iclii'ilie.% that ,IffecL the developinLnt ol" thL iiiforinaLion col leciion plan incl ude ThL Liir tasking ordLr CYLIL.

The t(yellI)g pr()cc.s% aiid t<irgieti lig board.s aiid w(Ii"kgrnu ps.

Collection nianageinLnt boai-d,s/workgi"oups oi" operation.s and iiitelligcnce wnrking gi'oups. wliLII
fc)I'IllL
d.

6_.19. (U ) When the conimlinder and .stat"I" .$1irt plarining, niany aspects of lind IiTniLatioris 10 inform1tioii LL)Ilection havL alrL<ldv bcLn scl bagcd on IhL' .%PLCitIL% ()t' the intLlligyLncc <qrchilccturL and mis%iion comniaiid nelwc)rk. While unil& can Lh<lnge
1 te1 Lr)niponenl% i)t Ihc inlelligenLe architeLLure wiihin a %h()rt timet'l"LiniL.

nio%t Loniponcnts (ire alreadv
%ct or I"equire
1 fairly long lead liine 10 ch,Inge. Therefore. seltinn Ihc inLLIIiyL'llLL' iirLhi ILLiUfL 1% an iinp()riiinl d.%PL'LL i)f IhL' shilPL lind dLtLI' rulL%.

6-40. (U) Thc iniclli(YLIICC circhitLcturc
1.% dcvclopcd wcll bcforc dcploymcnt b1.scd on futurc plannin(7 cijid assuniptions on tlie einployment ot" intelligence capabililies. Periodically. units will revise the intellicyenlc IrchiieLtLifL' based on nLW pllinning faciors and 1SLimption%.

WCII qc S thc ilddition of ncw, c,Ipabililic4.

BLforc dLployrneni.

IiniL(* tiisk-or(Tlniie information collection Lapc1bilities based on the intelli(yencL
architLciure Lind other faciors such as Ihe coniinand posi siructure ilnd other key niission coinm<1nd nodL%.

F()Ilothijiio jiij lial dcplo)'Iiiciit. thL IlItLlligLIICL ai"cliilccturc wil l ali'cady bL largcly L%tablishcd aiid CaLII ui) li wil I dcvc lop an i nforinatlDn collcction pliin within tlic ccinic,xt of thL architcciurc.

## Establishinc. T14E In"Rf.Llic,FCe Architec'I'Ure (U)

6-41. IU) The inielljoenie architeclure be(yins wilh undLr.st1c ndin(y in(ellioLnce Lapabililie,s. Jntelligence CclP;Ibil ities broadl), fall inlo the cate(yoriL's of i ntell j iyeiice collcciion L apabilitlLS (by intLlligence discipline )
,Ind all-sourLc i ntc11 ig7cnLc LclP&ibililiL%. 14owciiLr. undcr%landin o capabil itics 1% Ini)rL eoniplcx than sinipl), kil0,In Ihc bi'oid caicooi"ies. Each inielligTLnLL LoIILcti()n Lapability comprige.specific colleLtL)rs/collecii()11
pliifoi"Iii% witli OllL or Iiiai"e spccifii LlpaL)il ities oi" <issoLiated .%LII%LlI'S. Foi. exaiiiplLI cl H UMINT collecii(111
teani is
1 HUMINT tLani thi1t LILn conduct inlcrr()iialion%, Inilitar), sourcc opcrations. and dcbriefing%.

(Appendix A
pi'L)vidL8 specitic int'nrni<ltinn an(1 pliiining Lonsideration%
t()r intelligcnce colleclion CilP,'Ibilities byiniL Iljiyeiice disciplinL.)
6-4? ( U) Many inielligence cap;Ibilities cifL de%igyned to be Linployed a.4 oi"glnic capabililics c1t a .speLific LLIIL Ii>ii. HowLVLf, .s()ITIL M I u()1 l% arL dL%i il IILd i() pl ('IvidL di)kviiwai"d rLiiif()rL iii(7 LJviibililiLs th<lt ai L til%k-
01'0<lnicd to cl lowcr cchclon. For cxamplc, an E-MIB dcploys HUMINT unil.% (o conduct intLI"rooations in varinus dctcntion faLilities .Ind depl()ys HU.MINT LoIIcLlion and Piophet tcains to .support thc divi.sion and/or
6-4.3. { U) The tables in chapier 4 pi'ovidL a genLral li.st of the ()r(yanic clnd %upportinn intelligence collection and all-,s()urcc iniclliocnLL capabilitlLs by LLhLI()n.

HowLVLf. Lach CLhcl()n rcccik'cs and dcpcnd%
()n iiitellioeiice ti.oin highcr and IOWLI" echelonb diid lateral units. They Ciin I"eceivL Ihi.s intelli(yence thi.ough
'aric)u.s Inccln% ()n cl nunibcr of dit-tcrLllt nLtwLirks. Thc me<ins includc t"Drnial nics%4igc traffic. dal<iba,ics, producl librclfiL%. Lhal rooms, iniell igencL difiqeiiiiatinn .syilL Iiis, and various nILe methods. Iiilel ligence personnel dis.seminate 1nd dLLCSS inforniation clnd inlelli(yenLe on I nuniber of networks: inclLidino the NIPRNET, SIPRNET, JWICS, c()l liiion nctw()rk.%. coiid iniLlligLllcL bri)idLi1sl %yslLms.

6-44. (U) TIILI'LI()IL.

IhL tablL.s iii LlidpILr 4 Jc) IioL pr()vidL
tI)L dLPLh aIid brLaJth i)f tliL intLlligLIICL'
wart-iohiine f-unction Ill each echelon. Fi(yure 6-1 ()n paoe 6-12 illu.%triles how leeraging ncltional to tactical
-LncL L.'IpabilitiL.s Lan support tactical OPLf&lti()ns down to the BCT Icvcl throu(7h ()rganiL and uppnrtiiig colleLti()n. le1 l di gseminalioLI Ihrougli intelli(yence broadLa%l dis.%eminat ion sy%tems and othei" iiitellinence system.s, quch cl.% l)("'(i%-A: down to the h<lttalion level.

6-45. (U) T() Lsiabli.sh (in LffLciive inielligenLe arLhiLLciurc, it
1.% iinporiant 10 undcrsiand somc kcy aspccts aiidli Iiiiiai ioi).) of Li11 i Iitelli Deiice ai'cliitectures:
All~source ancilysis is the Leniral poriion of the inielligeiiLe archiieLiure. Information collectioii i.

niecllli ngle.s% without iill-soui'Lc clllcilv.%i.s. All-%ource aiial I'sis dri v'es subsequLiil ii)foriiiali()n L()1 leLtian rcciuiremLnt%.

Tlic PED slruLlui"c is an iinpoi"laiit coini)oncni ot. Ilic intelligLncc ai'chitL'cturc. Pi'ocL(i%ing
1%
inhLreni '1[hill all intelligeiice collection.

Thei"e (li'e 11101-e Icquircniciiis f(Ir inicll igenLe LolleLtic)n tliaii Ilicre aj-e colleL tor_s.

E(ILh eLhel()n hd.s ulliquL Lhcillcnkci ba%ed un Ihe eiiemy cind the speLifiL uperilliun. Tlie LnLmy figh1.% 10 ci)unLLr (hL I'riLndly fnrcL S i nforination Li)IILction CilPcibilitic.s.

ThL L()IntTiandLf cind .slcLfl- Inusl (IJLqUiilL Iv rLSy()ufL'L' IhL inlLII i,4JLnLL cifLhilLL turL. AdL'qu(IIL
re.qoui-cing include.s sufficient nelwoi'k Lapabilily (for excimple. bandwidLh) and access. Neiwork aLCCti% Lind ct'fccljiic Ljnit Loniinuiiic4iiions arc C%PLLiall)' Lritical.

ThosL M I unit.s dcsigncd tu be doNvnward rcinforL ingT niay requirc equipnient or other .support Lo be effectii'e.

IniclligcnLL capabilitics and spccil"iL
collcct(Ir.s lacc thLir
01
i,SSUL8, SULh as c()niplLx coininunication chillenges, iechnical par.IineierF, ierrain effects. suri'ivability, UlllquL equipriient, and support 4ind intLllig7enLiI .1nd EW, IiiainienanLc. (See p,Iragraph 3-1 ? for Ll list L)t inlLlligcnLc Lapability Ll)Iisiderations, )
Other iinportaiit aspLLts ot. (he inielligence arcliileLILire incliide MI unit nii%%ion commLiiid It nd iechniL<11 channcls/inanagLinent.

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## Developinci The Inforniai'Ion Collection Plan (U)

1-46. (U) PIR.S and tlic mo.st import<int inlLlligLncc rcciuircmcnt.s and targc(ing rcquircmcnt.s form thL ba.lii.

of an inieor&lted inforniation collection pl,In. Ba.sed on the MDNIP, including a thorough war game, the Lominandcr and sU1tt' dcvclop a detailed and rcilistic inforniation collcction plan lo answer a4 niany requiremeiif,% as pnqsihle.

,%iatt" inte(yralion Lind .%ynL'hrnni/atinn ensure.$ Ihe enemy situalinn and the opercltional cnvii"onnient (not ju.si a predL'termined operational plan) drive the informcllion collection effort.

S()IiiLlimL'S. thi.s
1% rLIciTLd i()
<1% figihiingi thL LnLIIIy cind n()t .jU5t I"ightingy IhL p14Jn.

GLnLfiilly. ii)tL'lli&iL'nLL'
units and collectori are alloclted ba.sed on pi-iorilie% and Ihe unil's Illi< in eft-ort, Addiliorially, ij unil niay hc}ve ILI dcpcnd on thc highcr Lchclon to providL intclligcnce siipp(Irl durin(y a P&irtiLul.1r ()pcralional phasc becau.fic the unil is c()nNianily moving or lias il high operaliiig tLmpc) 'Ind cannot produce it.s uwn intelligence.

6~47. (U) Commander.s aiid staffs use the prinLiples ot- inforinc1lion Lollection. IPB and other key Slclt"r pi'oducts, and knnwledne of i nform<lLion cc)Ileciion capabi lities and limit<ltions to deiielop the inf()rnicltii)n LoIILLtioii plaii. OIiL L tt"eLti vc (ccliiiiquL 10 dL VLlcip ali iiilcgi aid inl(Ii'iiialinii cnllcctioii plaii i.s toi'iiiig ali opcralion.s and intclligcncc working group. A good Iccliiiiquc for ciiiph<1sizing Ihc inf()rinaiion c()Ilcc(ion Lffort is including thL Inost iniport'inl abpccts ()f this cffori in the concepl of opcr1tions. (SLL FM .I-S.S and ATP ?_O I t"()r Inore on developing an int"orni,Ilinn collectioii plLllI.)

## Infor,Ia Tion Collection Gap.S (U)

6.48. (U)
Ali C()Inmandcr%
cind Sl2ffs dcvelnp the inl"oriiiation collLction plan, thes, m<ly cncountLr iiiformation collection oap%. wliich often OCCLir due to Rulcs of engclgenient.

InsufficiLnt ne[lOrS, stenis. or pcr.soniiel/li n(yuists.

Lack ot technical capabilitie.s.

Inildequate colleclion range.

Movenient in prep(uatioii for operaiioii.(.

A higyh L)pgriltin&y iempo ciiid Lun.%t<illi ni<ineuvei'.

Uiifavorable terrain.

.surc.%.

UiiaLcLPt<ible ri.Kk t"ni' the employment ot %pecil"ic asgcts, Threii counierinL,
_49. (U) FiourL fr)-3 on paoL C)-14 illu.%tr<ltc8 (in ex1 Inple SCLlll ri() thal InLludcs p()Icntial opcrati()rial- ancl tactlLal-level informaiion collection gilP.s froin 7fj 10 _3()() kilonieters beyond IhL t"orwcird ed(YL ()t- the baiile
ll'La. Polcniial iiiforniatloll iollcction giap% cxI.%l bcLilu,se Ndii()nil ieLhnical Incans, whcn avai lible: t'c)LU.4? L)n national prii)ri'tlL,%. Evcn whcn al i Lined aoain.4t joini torcc conimand pric)rillcs. thcsc IllC<]n.i Inav not nicel iactical-IcvLI rLquiremL nts.

Mnsl of the other ServiLe ISR ,systenis do nnt IoLU.8 011 oround rLquiremeni.% unles.q IhLy are allc)Lated lo Ariiiy forces.

M()%l thedlr-IL IILI iniLII i (JenLe LuIILII()11 Ldpiibil iLiei Lind %en.surs <ire ernpluved to iJii%wcf Lhcdier intclligcncL rcquirciiicnl%.

C()I'p,s-ILvLI <liid bL low infi)riTiatlL)n Ll)IILLlii)11 unil.% iirid .systL lJl% Laniioi collLL( lt IIIL 75 li) .3()()-
kiloinLier rangc due to the liiniled rangc of oround collection sy.fiiem(i and the leihatity of enLmy IADS.% lo aLfi&il inlclli (ye nLe col leLtion. F3 (yurc 6-1 on pagc C)-14 illusiratc(> Ihc furihL%I informk11ion Lolleclion range and relative enipl()yment risk by echcl()n.

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Infom]ation originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

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Rcport ii)t'ormation rLipidly and accLiratel J.

Provide early warnin ReLaiii frL'Ld(IlTI of IiiuveiiiL111,
6-53. (U) Thc infoi'tnation LollcLtion plan mu.sl bc ,%iniplL cn()u(yh to CXLLUIL, .%hould avoid bcing prLdictablc
10 eneEny foi'Les. and should include adequate operations 8eLurity measures lo proiect friendly operatloTIs.

Eft"cctivc int'ormcltion collcLtion planning dependts 011 collaboration across the cchelons in order to vcrtlC4111y and horizontally layer the iiit'ormcltion collecti()n effoi't. A layered and Lontinuous inform<iiion collection ct'fori provides beitei. opportunitie,8 for deiecting encniy formi1tions: fire.s capabilitie.s, and critical ,specialized Cclpabilitics that po.sc thL) oi"e&ltc.st Ilii'cat to t'l"iLiidly foi"ce.s.

6-.54.

( U) Information collcclion at ccrtaiii dcpths oi" again.si ccrtain thrcat capabilitics nia)I not sccm possiblL.

HowewLr, coniniinders and Atat'fli can aiteinpt .%cvcral <ipproacliL,8, such as the following. 10 cnsLire or surge int'c)rm'itioii collLLtion diirino critiLcil h41%es ot. iin o er41tion:

## (B) (3) Developing The Situation And Continuous Inforniation Collection (U)

6-$5. 1 U ) The fighi for intelligence becomes more diffiLuIt lS unit.8 receive lono-ric nqe fires aiid In1( ke Loniact wilh eneiny t'orces. Int'L)rmiltion collection atid iniel ligence analy.si.s (ire inte(yr<il to devcloping the situation.

TIIL intclligience %taft' conduci.F .%ynLhrc)niLin(y 'ictivitic% 10 clg%l.st thc unit in dcvclopinn the situi1tion aiid adjuqtini7 int"orimatlLin colleclion. Thcre are nian5' requiremenlii for Ihe G-?/S-? ,Ind re%t nf tlie inlelligence stat"t tn participate in unit hattle rhythin clcllvlties tn sJinchrnni/.e intel ligence ,%uppnrt and the int"ormcill()n LC)I lecti()n effL)ri. The iiitelli(ycnLL Staft- providc4 up(laie.s ()n Ihe .%ituati()n and briLf.% chcingcs to the int"()rniation LulleLliun pliin duringT VdriOU.s Luinm(Indr updiilL%i, budrds, Lell metin(FS, dnd uihcr mLLling.%, Addiliunilly, the Lorp% and division intelligyenLe .$1lL t.fs may ilttend ()r Ivalch theciicr~level LoIILCtion m<lna<yeiiient board%, giving Ihein insi ohi inio natic)nal ,Ind joint priortiie.% and ci)%'erage. This in.sj nht, coordiniltion, and prep'iraticin ci'eate oppoi-tuiiitics foi" liclical units to leverLI(ye national and joint capabili Lies.

t>_56. (U) Thc thcatcr army, Lnrp,s, and divi.sion G-?$ Lonvene an operations and intelligence working group, or some torm of synchronizaiion rneeling, with key siaff and subordin1ie unils. These intelligence syiILlii"o Iii Latioii Iiiecii ng.s ( Lioi"Iiially Lond ULted via vidLo teleLonfci'eiic ing) ci.eate a coiiiioii understandi ng cil: thc cncmy. cnsurL inforinaiion collcclion plans iddrcss changic,s in Ihc,situation. &2nd coordinatL LoniinuoLI
infcirniaiion collection Jcross echelnng and unli,%.

6_.57. ILI) For example, the (i-? M1h[ cinlicipatL iin cnemy i)Iiit de%ignatcd (ls Ic n HFYf will cro.ss a key ph,Ise line iii thc Iiexl 24 to 48 Iiuur.s. The prLdictcd ni()veniLnl ()f thL HPT c()uld caLI,%e the corps G-3 and G-? to LUL)rdin(Ile Iviili thL' dik'i4iun G-I dnd G-? lu n%urL IhLre IS Luiiiinuuus IrdLkin uf IhL Hwf Iviili nu lu%5 of LOVLraiie. Duriiig the intelli<yciice 5ynchr(IniLatioii nieeling. thc Lofps G-2 cind division G-2 could coordinate or adjust Lin inlelli(yence hancl-over line tci ensUI'C continuou% coveraoe of Ihe HPT. Anoiher intorniation cc)IleLlic)n tLLhiiiquL 1.% In coordinaic for Loniplcnicntary/supportlllb LovcraTe. ForexaniplL. thc Ihc<lter arniy could conduLI
UAS Lulleciion fnr Ihe co.% Ivhile IhL HPT nioves int() a Lnrp% deep Lll(T<igLmeni arel. At the Bcf batialion levels. the.re is no rLqiiireinent for <in operaiic)ns clncl inielligence woi'king groiip hilt the operilti()ns cin(I
intel ligence siafl. mu.si .siill ,synchronize intell inence .sLJpport c111d the inforinaiinn colleL lion effort.

6-58. (U ) Iiiforiiiatloll Ll)IILLI li)11 IS Lollti nuous tliri)uc)l] IIIL LALLuLioii) i)f i)pcralioi)s ciiid Ir(In.%il ioii lo Lon%olidaic gains, Thc all-sourcc analytiLal ct"toi"l is kc! to intorniing thc coinmandcr cind .staff, who in iurn
8uppcirt Ihc conlinuLd fighl t.nr intclligLncL. ThLrct'orL, G-21S-?%, all-sourLe analy4ts, and collLclion In,Ina<yLrs mu.qt collaborale L l().%ely. Iiiielligence analyqi q <14Kj.%t% i n discniicrin(Y LOI IL C IiC)n gaps, genL rati ng more infnrmc1tion requirLmcnt%, and di"ii:ing
(111
npei"clli()Ii%. As with iniiial planiiing. intorniation inllc'ctic)n rLquircniLllis L&in bc Ic nNw'LfLd iminediaicly ()r dc%igna(cd a% PIR.% by thc cnninicindcr ()r validaicd (lq iiil c)riJidlioii rcquii'eiiicnls iii ui'dLI to drivL inforiiiilioii LollLclioii. Addilioiidl ly, ancily(ii.% (1.S.$1St.% iii dcicrniiniii iy Ihc LtfLCtiVCllL.S.S Ot" thL inforination Lol IcLlion ct'fnrl. Th<lt a.%.SL.s.smcnt Icad.$ 10 )djusimL nfs i n Ihe int'ormaiion e(IllLctinn plcin, niaking it more eft-iL lent and et-t"ective. Thorouoh plannin(i allow,s Lontinuou8
collection plannin(y Ihrough all phcl.scs, branchL s, and seqiieli of an operation.

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Infom]ation originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

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Infomlation pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

Infonnation originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

Infom]ation originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of the infom]ation under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

Other:
thcir iinpc1Lts; L ivil authori ty Lonsidcrcltic)n.s; znil itLiry orbTaniations, struciure, and equipnicnt; and aiii tudes towc1rd U.S., miiltinltional, or h()st-niltion t"nrLe.%. Studies Lan
'il.$0 include the view,s and altitudes (if niii Itini21ion,Il (iiid ho.st-n4ltion force% tow,vd.s the.se fiictors. Coinplete stiidies incliide two t41sks'.

Produce an area. I"egioiial, oi. country study of cl foi"ei(yn country.

Produce a .speci fied %tLidy,

## Tailor The Intelligence Force (2.1.5) (U)

B-? l. (U) The gLneraling force uses Ini%<sion an'ilysi.% IQ t"()cu% (he allocltinn of intelligence resourceq fnr use bj, <2 JTF or conib,11<qllt conini'indLr well i.s to supporl .%trateoic obje.ctive..s, tlie Ai-my'.s Inission. ,1nd
()pcration% clt each eLhcli)n. Ba%cd on 11.4 own n)1sSi()n Jnaly.si%. Ihe .staff a( each cchelon allocate,s intelligTence rc,sourLes ubtciillL'd Lliruugh IhL* ITLllLfciliTig furLe (ILLurdiii(y tu Ihe Lummdndr' s guiddllLL, illint, (Ind mis%iun objcLtives.

## Provide Support To Sii'Uational Understanding (2.2) (U)

B-22. (U ) Siliicili()Iial 1417der,slaizdiii,g ili thL product of applying analysis and judgjmcnt to rclcvant informllion lo dcteriiiinc the relationghip.s amoiig the opercltinnal and mi,s%ion Vlri'ible.%
IC) t'acilitaie decision makinn
(ADP S_o). Siippoi1 10 silualionlc l understinding is Ihe la%k of providing informiiion and inielligence to LoniniandLrs
%0) thc), can clLarly undcrstL1nd the torLC'S currcnt %tate wilh rel<2tion lo Ihe Ihrcat and otliLr aspeLl% of the AO. Ii SUPPOrt% tli commaiidci-'s lbility to make sound dLci%ions. (See figure B-.1 on Pcige B-8. ) Suppoi-t to .8ituatioll<i1 ui)dei'.

taiiding iiicliide% Ilie t"ollowiiig ,six ta.%ks:
Pertoi"ni IPB.

Pcrf()rni %it U<1lll)n dc 'cl
()pnicnt.

Jiilelli8e17ce .siippc)rl l(? 117iciiie 1171.S.si()17.r.

Providc taLtical intclligcnce (IWLrwalch.

C()nduLt PLiliLe illlelligencc opcraiion%.

Pi'ovidL intLlligeniL .SUPPOI'I 10 Ljl'il affairs (CA) opcration.s.

Note. *(U)* Headquartcrs, U.S. Ariny Mancuk'er Support Cenlcr of ExLellLnce will rcscind AR T 2.2.3 (pr(Ii'icle i171elli,qpeii('e .fiii)i?i)i-I If) i)r(Ilgc'll()n ) wilh the next piiblicllion ot, ADR P .I- 37.

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## Appendix C Joint Task Force And Unified Action Partner Considerations (U) Operating As A Joint Task Force Headquarters (U)

C- l. (U) When a diN'i.%ion or corp.s is de4i(ynated (o function as a JTF headquariei"s, it requires signitlLani augiiienlaiion 10 tulfill Ihe a,s.siocl<lted tasks, Ali Ariiiv unit designated as a JTF Iie<idqu<111rs tcill()ws joinl docLrine. (See JP 3-33.) The Arm) intelligence staft- assume,% the role of thL joint t.orce intellioence staft,
(Joint doctri ne calls thi8 8iaff tlie intelligence directorate.) (See JP ?_O I .)
(lj ) 'I'he primary t"ullLlinn nt IhL Arniy iiitclligence qiaff Ivhen cinployL(l as a .I'l'k iniclli(YLnLc siatf doe1 not chcinge.. howiLver, this ILinciiLin becomL% more Lomplex. The aniounl ()f ivailL1ble inform<ltion ofien LXLLLd% Ihc
iL&ifl-% abilily iu IlldnJgyL, l-ully under.ilcind, and leverciiie il. ThLrc is d hiirh dLmdnd lur inf()rniaiion froiii nclLional ILadci'ship, thL Incdicl, lind hiohLr hcadciuartcrs. This dcmand has the polcniial 10
ON'L'rwhelni tlie staff unles.s additionLI1 rLsourLe% ai"e allocLItLd. Thei"e Lll'e also complex Iiiuliinalioiial ,Iiid inicragTcnL y c()n.sidcraiic)n.s t'or thL' conduL'I ol. intcl li OinLL (IPLraiions, Ihi i ntell igTcnLL archilLLlurL, liaison.

ani1 intel l igienLL sh'irin(Y
C-.3.
(U) The priinary ta.sks of the j()ini iniclligcnLe stat"f" include
Fcicilitaiino an under.st,Indin(Y af thL (Ipei"ational eniironnienl and supports decision Inakin
Ti1iloring ,Ind distributiniT intelli (7eiiLe opcrai i()n%, i I. necess,Trry i InplLinenti ng a fedcrited siruciure
]L'r0,% mLJltiplL echLI()n%. Whcn appi'i)priatc, Ihc j()ini torcc intclligLllLc siaff: muqt al.%o placc
ancily%i% a.%sets in forw1 rd Ioccltions to betier .suppori lower echelon requireinents.
Ensurino availabilily of intelligence.
Prioritizin(T collecliciii in(I ;Illoc,Iling ,In<ilv.qii resoiirLes.
Integralinil threal a.s.%L.%sn)enLs developed b! the Loinbatant command intel li oence organillion to
provi(Ic thc JTF cc)Iiimc1nder, %tit't'. c()niponcnis, (Ind %ubor(lin(IIc Lini1% With I hc c()rTipILtC ,11 r, .(iPaCC.
grouiid. mL1rilinie. and Lyber%p'icL threat siiualion.
C-4. (U) Tlic joint force iiitellioeiice .staff Iiges the joiiit iiitelligeiiLe pi"Lparatioii of the oper1c tiollc11
cnvironiiicnt pr(ICLSS 10 analszc thc rclcvant aspects of Ihc Lnvironnicni. including thc physiL<11 domain,s, Ihc int"c)I"znalion environment. and PMESII-PT gy%teni and %ubsy%Lem.%. (See JP 2-01.3.) This analysis allows Ilie joinl siaff to dei'elop a COP 1nd Ilie jc)inl force intelligence staff 10 provide oiher intelligLnce support pr()duLt.%.

C.5. (U) Joint ISR and Arniy iiiforniation colleciioii both shal'e IIIL purpose of synchronizino and integrclting the pl<innin(7 <liid OPLratioii of sensor%. asset%. and PID f>vstems in direct .support of current and t-ulure nperLltinn%. I n botli JL)int and ArrnNi dc>clrine, thi.s acii vity is an inlL)oraled opercilions and in(ellioenLe tunction.

C.6.

(U) Ai"my int"ormilion collection docli.ine expandLd the joinl doctriii&l1 concept of ISR by betlei"
acL'nuniill 47 1{)I" thc rnlc ()f girc)und rLLnniiai%%anLc <ln(1 %urvci I I,Ince ()pcrat inns. (.%cL FM .3-5.5. ) I Iif()rnidtin n colleciinn activities Ire a synergTrj%lic M,hole.

'1[h enipha%i.s on sjiichronization Ind integration (If all coinpoiiLiII.% ciiid .syslciiis. CoiiiidL I'.% aiid st<ifl-% Iiave v itiil respoiisibi lilie.% iii iiiforinaii()n col lectlL)11
pl<inn ing, prcparation, LXLLulion, and cl%%C.%.51llLnt. C()nimandcrs' in volvciiicnt 1% particularl ), iiiiportani. Tlic
.%iicce%s of int-c)rmcl1iDn collecli()n is nieasured by il.q Lonlribuiions lo the commander's understanding,
'i%ualization. aiid deci.sion niaking. Table C- l 011 paoe C-? dLpict% the comparison of the joinl ISR ,Ind ArIiiy int(IrniJiion L()IILLtion.

I
UNCLASSIFIED
Jolnt ISR
rask
Responslblllty
J.2 (In *coordination* with
the J-3)
ISR concept of
operations
Collection management:
Collection
requirements
J-2 (in coordination with
the J-3)
manaqement
Collection operations
management
anizations
Execute collection
Units and o
Assessment and retasking
assistant chief of staff , intelligence
G-3
assistanl chief ot staff, operations
inlelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissare
ISR
oi nl Stafl
ence directorate of a
inlelli

## Unclassified

C-7. (lj) The I,SR cc>ncept nf ni)eral,inn.s r(Jughly cnrrespnnds tc) Annex l. { Infnrmatinn Cnllection) c)f an Army operation plan or order. The ISR concept of operauons doLurnents the syiJclironii,dtion, iiiiegraiion, aiid UPLI'ativn of ISR i-esouroes to support Luricnl aiKI future o[ILral.iotL$. li outlines tlie capabilily to task, collecc pro(xss, exploit, and disseminate limely and accurdte inforiiiation thai pr()vides the awareness necLs%iry to siiccessfully conduct operations. It 12ddresses how all avdilable ISR colleLtion assets and a,ssociated PED infrastructure, incliidiiig multinalional and coiiunercicil assets, will be used to satisfy the joint force'.s antiLipated colleLiion k.$.

C-8.

(U) To facilitate the opiimum use of all availablL ISR assets, the J-2. in coordination with the J-3,

raiions in c()nJunction with the Loniiiiaiid'.s plai)Iiiii&i effort, The ISR concci)t
devclop,s ali ISR coiicept of u
of opci'utions should be bascd on the collLiion siratcgy and ISR cxecuiioii plaiining, and it should be developcd jointly by the joint force intLlligenc and operation.s ,8taffs. Plansiing for the ISR concept of cJper41tions mu8t also ideniifs, and discus.% any ISR and PED asset gaps relative to the joinl force's validiiled PIRS. This dsses.snienl rnay be used to justsfy a commaii(ILr' s request for the allocation of additional ISR and PED resources. It should al,so require a periodic evaluation of the capabilillLs and contribuiions of all available ISR assets relltive to the joint force mission in order to maximize their Lfficient Ulililation and ensure the timely release of allocated ISR resources when no longer needed by the joini force.

C-9.
(U) In Ihe joint lexicon, ccillLclion management is a proces,s with Iwo subfunctionli
Collection requirements management-
Defines what intelligence systems mu,st collect.

Focuses on the reqUireientS of the customer.

Is 4211-source oriented and adNoclK ie,s tor what Intorination is necesscLry t'or colleclic)n.

Collection operati()ns managLAnient-
Spccifics how to satisfy the requircmcnt.

FuLus5 un Ihc &>lcLlivn vf speLifiL iiilclliyeiiLL disLiplincs Syilms within (I di.l>Lipliiie tu
collcct infomiation addrc.ssing Ihc CUst()ffr,S rcquircmcnt.
Is conducted by organizdiions to detLI'mine which assels can best saiisfy cu.8ioiirs, procluct

rLquest%.

Is informed by weather effects on collcciion &ssets based on current and prcdiciive weather
c)i)d ilion.s iii the 01)ei"diional cnvironiiieiiL
Army
Responslblllty
rask
G-2 and G-3
(S-2 and S~3)
Annex L (Inlormation
Collection) of the plan
or order
G-WS-2
Colleciion managoment
G-31S-3
Direct inlormation
collection
Execute collection
Unils and organizations
Assessmenl and retasking
J-3
operations directorate of a joint staff
S-2 battalion or brigade intelligence staff off icer
S-3
battalion or brigade operations staff officer

## Unified Action Intelligence Considerations (U)

C-10. (U) Every operatioii is differeiit. So
411"L Ihe Ivays in which intcllicTence opcraiions are conductcd with uiiificd aLlion Plrtners, e.specially multinJtionc11
forcL'S. Therc arc niany coinplcx considcr4ltion.s when the onduLtinrT inier<igency and niuliiniilional i Iitelli(yence i)perltlDn,s, to include intelligence shariniy iiitclligeiiLc architectLifL, Ind lii( isnn.

## .Multinational Opera'Fions (U)

C. I l . ( U) Mul liiiational oper'ition(i Lire Loniiiion, niakiniy muliination'il iiitelli gence opLraiions very iniportani. (SeL FM 3-16.) Naiional iniere%ts rLquire the Uniied SLate.s io act with other nations. In many ilucl1ioii.q, U.S. forcLs joiii Ivitli t'oreigiii forcc% to dcfLat Loiiiioii Ihica(s. Thc clclssifiLatj()Ll Ot- U.S, inicllicycncc will pi-L.SLnt a challcnoc in rclca.sjJio inforni1tioii, bul .sharing a.s much information and intelligcncc as pos.siblc iinprovc.4 intcropLrabilit)' and tru%t wiihin cl niuliinLltsonal forcc, Coiiiinanders and t'iffq Iieed i() Linder8iand their own and other nation.s, policies 011 intelligLnce sh,Trring. Eilrly .qhic ring (If infnrm(Ilioii dui'in(7 pl Ic nnin(y eiisures that Inulti n<ltion<l1 force,s operate effeciively.

## In'Flllic'Ence Opf"Ra"I'Ion4I Planniln'C, And C()()Rdina'I'I()N Ltrl Imul'Finai'I()Nal Operiltion.S (U)

C. i ? ( I l ) 'I'hc Iiiultinltinnal fi)ric intel ligcnLL Atal-t- plan% an(1 L()nr(li nL11c% i ntcl li (yencc npLralii)n.% l() fjiuppnrt tlie muliinaiion<i1 effort. The U.S. jnini forcL Sl<gff provides intelli oence and products to partners as authorized witliin tlie LuiifinLS of Llie Iiaiiui)al di.sLIL)%uI"e puliLv aiid direLliun of Lhc forcign disL lo.sure i)ffiLe (FDO).

## The Collection Coordination And Intelligence Requirements Management Process (U)

C-13. (U) ThL muliinLltional forLc intelligencL
sl&iff u.ses thc collection coordination and iniclliacnLe reciuirementq manLigement (CCIRM) proLC%.%, wliich de.%cribes Ihose actlNlties thal re,suli in Ihe effeclive (ind ctt'iLieni eniploynient ot. intelligence col lection c1nd PED 10 S<l1isty intelligience reqiiiremeni.s in support ot.

()pcr471i()ns. TIIL CCIRM process c()n%i8t4i Ot t,0 maj()r activities:

Intelligence requirement.s nianagLJment cquaie8 lo Lol Icciinn ni<111aoeincni in Army (Inctrine,
and to LolleLlic?n requirLiiient.% milnagemeni iii joinl doctrine.
Collection coordination equcllLs to dircci inforinciiion colleciion
in Army docirine lind to
cnllLction nperaiion.s niananemeni in joini docii"ine.

C_14. (U) A CCIRNI siaft- SLLtIOll LXCLUtLS IIIL CCIRNq procL.S.%. CCI Rbl %taff dutiL,s iiiclude

Conrdinaiing c()Inp()neni~Icvcl LolleLlion requircnicnt.s.
DevLloping ln elcLironic c()Ileciion exploitalion plan.
Valid<lli ng: priciriTizi ngy 4in(I di.%sLmincliing PIRS, specitic inlormiltiijn requi rement.s, iin(l RF15
received from suboi'din<iie elenienis (ind adjcicenl %iaffs respectively.
Mniiitnrino clnd en.quring cnllecli()11 requirement.s are idenlified
in mininiuni lime tn .qalist-y

requL4tcrs.
Nole. (U) P<iraoraph.s C- I l and C-14 implcmcnl niuliinltinncl1 doctrinc Loniaincd in AJP-2.

## Fusion Centers (U)

C-15. (U)
Fusioii CulltLI'S Illlc I'k a .8jiiiitiLaiit iiiiprovLlllcllt 10 dyiiaiiiic ()pci"alioiial suppoil by iiitL*oralino niission cominand w'ith focu.scd an411v.si% within a singlc ccntralizcd cntity. A fusinn ccntci" is an ad hoc Lollilbnrativc ct.fort bLtwcen 4cveral unit.s, orbTaniiation.%, or a(yencies thcll proiide re,sourLe,s, expertise, int"ormaiion, <lnd intelligence to <1 center with the goal of %iipporlin(y the r1 pid execLllic)n of operations.

C-16. (U) Fusion centers are primarily desigiiLd to focus collection and promote information sharing across multiple participants within a specific geographic area or mission type, Commanders at various echelon create fusion centers to-
Enhance the flow of information and intelligence.

Focus information collection to satisfy information requirements.

Collaboratc to cffectively incorporatc and Icvcrage PED and analysi.s rcsults (rcports/products).

C-17, (U) As an ad hoc effort, each fusion enter is designed in a different manner. Historically, fusion center h<ive relied heavily on intelligence, operation8. fires, and special operations personnel and systems.

Fusion centers &re most effective if they have participation from all of the key elements in the AO and representatives from all of the warfighting functions. When possible, fusion cenier,8 should include unified action partners. The ccnters require the ability to immediately levcrage information collection assets to suptx)rt current operations. Tible C-2 lists fusion ccntcr participants.

Nongov8frrEntal organizab'ons operating in the area of op8rabons.

For example, if a division creaies a fusion cell: the divisK)n will contribule intelligence prolessimals and may require brigade ence re resentatives.

intelli

## (B) (3) Unclassified

C.-18. (U) Fusion-center intlligence members tocus on developing requiTements tor inclusion in intorm<2tion col lection plans. and 10 proces,s, exploit, analyze, and disseminate the resulting collection. Repre8entatives d dndlysts m<illdgL, shcwe, lind fuse their *4igenLy-* or unit-speLifiL infoimdlii)n into the LulleLtive body uf information for refined intelligence analysis. Convcrsely, intelligence representati%'cs are the conduit balk to their parent agency to communicate, monitor, and process new fusion-center information requiremenis.

Intel ligence representatives ensure in*Uigence collection, reporting, analytjc product(i, and threat infnrmatinn are directed hack to their parLnt agency nr ()rgani7.atinn fnr prnper diq.seminatinn and feedhlck.

## Sharing And Iviute To Release (U)

C-19. (U) Because each multinational operation is unique. there are generally no fixed set of rules or policies for conducung in*lligence operations as pan of multinational operation.s. Commandets panicipating in a multinational operation develop the policy and procedures for Ihat particular opration. In most multinationa]
operations, commanders are required to share intelligence with foreign foeS and to coordinate receiving inielligence from those forces. A multilevel security syste,m that can easily facilitate sanAtization and dissemination ot. intormation to U.S. and multinational comm<2nders d(S not currently exist.

C-20. (U) One *chnique to facilitate collaboration and intelligeiice sharing is to establish an infomation exchange Lcll. Another teLhnique for sharing critlLal intelligLnce with Inuliiiiatioiial partners efficiently is having U.S. intelligence information writtcn for releasc at the loNN'cst possiblc classification levcl (with the least dissemination restrictions) within foreign disclosure guidelines. When inforn)ation relating to a particular source cannot shared, the intelligence derived from that source 8hould qtill be provided as lon as the infnnnatinn itself dne.s nnt pntents'ally cnmprnrni8e the .qnurce. 1.he lJ.S. Directnr nf Intel ligence must establish procedures for separating intelllgence from sources and rneth(xls. Analysts niust bance the aLLurac) Ind umouni nf inf"orini1tion writtLn for relca%c with thL SLLuritv ot" clilssltied Inatcrial. Thcn, thLy niusl properly vel th,It intelli (Yence (hrough Ihe t'i)rcibin disclo.%ure ot"t"iccr prior to d i%.scmi nati()n, IntLI ligence Pl"oiliiciion agencie.s often print highly classified repoi'ls in
11 forinilt th<11 separaies conip1rtmenled iiifornicilion froin Inielligence (Iiat can be widely disseniinated with what is ret'crred to as a tear line. The U.S.

ULnLL %tiil'l"s kLLP inf()rniati()n <ibuvL IhL tLdr linL f()r U.S. I"()rLLS whilL
.ji)i nl Lind Li)nipi)nLni inlLIIi.

di.%%cnii nclting Ihe intel l i(Fence below thc lear linc to multination1l forLe%. I lavino iiitelliuence production abiLllLics USL iei1r linL4i grcatly taLilitatcs intLllibicncc sh;Iring.

## Disclosure Policy And The Disclosure Of Classified Information (U)

C-? l. (U) Thc FDO ma). 1ppr()ve the disLlosure nt" classitied clnd controllcd unclc1.ssIt'ied Inilitsir)i informalion to l()reign repre.5enlat ives. Thi% 1% based on the poliLie.s, direcli IlL,5, and la ws Ihat cy()vern nati()ncl1 d isc IosLire policy aiid the rele&se of classified inforinaiion. The FDO provide,s thi% %ervice 10 Ihe coinmand aiid st(Iff and tn a.ssjonecl. attached, and suppi)rtinLY aoencies, allies, cind nihcr mulrinatinnal parlncr.%.

F<1ch natinn individually dcterniincs W7[ LollLcicd informcllioll Llln bc pa.%(icd, in what forniai, and how rhai information iJ passed. Tl)c U.S, fui.ce iiiielligenLe %Lalf eijfoi'ccs ijalional disLlosure policy diid disclo.%ure of Llassified inf(Irinltion to multinational iniclli(ycnLe p&InCr$ throu(yh the FDO. Thc FDO has st<lft" proponcncy t'or thi,s JCliDn.

C-?2. (U) Usino the discloslire polics,, Pcrtinent ILllVS. regiilations and dii'ectives, Ihe FDO cidjiidicc11e.

di.scl()surc rcquc%t% by usino dclcgatcd disLlu,%urv <luih(Iritic% and sani(iLcltion biuidelincs, Thc FDO Ic Iso advi.ses the comni<1nder and siat't- on polential problem% when existino di%clo.surc L1uthorities do not suppon cuJ"rent c)r fuiure reciuiJ"eJnents to discloise. Tlie FDO fclci li Iciles S>liari nn re lei ant and pei"tiiieiil i niel ligence cib()ut the situation aiid threai bLiween Ihe U,S. military and allic.% and ()thLr niultinati()n(Il parincr% Lon,%i.%tcnl with di.sclosure policy and U.S. joinl force guid,mce. The FDO pays speci'il attLnlion to intelli(Yence L l.l4>sitIclLion <ind Icvels of ,1CLLN(i of miilti na(ionc21 Pi rsonnel. HowcvLr, il avoids sh&1rino inforincllion ab()Lil inielligLllcL soufcL.s and mLih()d% Iviih allic,4 and ()thLr multinaiional p1rtncrs uniil appr()ved by the cippropriaiL naiionil-leN'el agLncy.

## (B

C_?3. (U) The U.S. joi nl forLe inlelli<yeiiLc ,staff nbtains the nece.%sary f()reign disLlosure auihoriLai ion t'or CLlteoory 8 (MI) int"ormation frcim the mLm3i%Llo.sure authDI'jty from tlie Lomb;It'iiil comimand FDO a.%
soon posiblc. U..S. inLelligTence pei"sonnel .shoLild be knowledgeable of the .SPLCit"ic forei(yii disclosLJre pnliLy, prnccdurcs, and rL)(yulaiinns t-nr thc QPLfcl11()n. li ill ttrILfLtnrc impLfcl1ivc Ihat the I l.,%. j()int f()rce iiitellioence
.%iaff con%iders clddino exirLI
FDO billeis to ttie joint m1nning documenl.

Personnel kiiuwled(ycable ()I' foi.ei ciii Llj.SLlosurc LnhclllLe IhL cl-fiLiciIL Iluiv ul. iiilclligLIILc.

C.94. (U) IntclligcnLL SUPPOrt tc) proicciioii nt. Ilic torcc
1% criticcll. Evcry cff()rt should bc madc lo ,sharL any iniellinencL thc1t could L1t'lect accomplishin(Y the Inultiniilional force n]ission or proiecling Ihe force. A key L()n%ider&ltion
1% thL apporlionmcnl ()f Ir1ined fr'orcign disclosurc pcrsc)nncl iviihin a Ihcaicr ot. operation% lo tacilitate Ihe Laplc bilityof .sh<2rin(y informllion and products wiihIhe multinational force. (See AR
380-10 t'or additioniil information on forei(yn disclo,sure.)
C-25. (U) The follnwing includes oilier iyener<il principle.s that a,ssist in guidino multinational intellioence opcriltion%-
M'dintain unity ol, efT'ort. Intelli(7encL officers ot. each natic)n Iieed to view the threat froni multinational as well as niltionLII per.specfives, A IhreL21 to one element of I niultin1& tionl& I force mu.sl bc Lonsidercd
<1 thrc,'It to all LILIIILnt%.

loke adjustments. There will be dit"ferences in intelli(yence dL)cirine and procedures Ininng multination'il partner.s, Major diffei"enLes mav include how intellioence is providcd In Ihe Lnifiiii<1ndei- or procedui'e.(i t"()r sh1ring information among intelligence a(yenLies.

Plan early and plan conL'urrenly. Thi% pcrmils solution% to <lny di t't'crcnce% 10 bc dcveloped and Iried bct.ore oper<ltion.s hegin. En.surc ther <1re suf"t'icient rc.sourcL.s f'or liai.son requirements to
.sLippori mu Itin.Itionci1 operl1ion%.

Perf()rm complLmentary nperdtii)ns. Partner intcllioence operations mu%1 be coinplenientary,
,Ind al l iniclli(?c ncL fL.%oufLCS riiu%l bL aN'ciilable lor appl icLltion lo I hc LnlirL iniLIIi OLnCL problcm.

Thc in(elligLncL .stc1ff must bc prLPclrcd lo navi(?atL diffcrent ippfov<il prnLL.s,sL. and political sensitivitie.8 Kvhen e.xecutin&i niuliincilional intelligence c)peraii()n(i.

-?(i. l Ll ) 'I'he t.nl l()wi na are c()n.%idercltinns fnr intel l igence netwc)rk.% <ind archi tectures H'hi le nperating wit h niultinationi21 force.)
Establish
(2 sharLd local are<1 network u.sing syslcins .%uch as the L()Iiibincd Enterprisc Rcgi()nal Inforin<liion Exchange Sy%tem or Ihe Battlefield Inform,1tion ColleLiion <2nd Ixploiiaiion System.

Eiiabli%h aiid ciifoi"Le d .iL<iiid&irdied pr()LL,Si fur Lh ifllLIIi.

iyenLe .sliari lig 'LhllcLlU1"L, ,%ULII ils USiI)
IhL cro.ss-doniai n cntcrpri,sc al l-,sourcc u.scr rcpo.sitory for cro.s.$4oinain opcration.s.

Maiiy Ilcilioii.% pi"nvidL tlicir owii Iialiciiial suilL of aiialyliLal tool%: d igilal niappiiig capiibililiL%, collciboration sot'tWcl1'C, und inlcrnal capibilitics. DCGS-A is thc pri mary iiitclligillcc cornponc.nt rcsidin(T Q)n thc U.S.-01)ly niission coinmand nLtwnrk.

Multinational iniclligcncc analysis oLcur.s on Lhc Inuliinational nLlwork of sharcd d<iiaba%c scri'crs, with its metad.Ila caialog and releasable databases. These tool,s acces% 11nd pull dL1ta from Ihe mLiliinil(ional force shared datab<lses ,Ind oiher nillionLilly owned %iorage f<lLililies.

St1ndardize coiiipiiible forniats in which inforniaiion is conk'erted oi" Slored so Ihat il is accessible
,1nd Ijscciblc by niultinltionfl1 Pirincr%. HnwL vcr. cn.siirc in fnrmiltion rh<lr d()cs not rc(Itiirc Lonvcrsioii is lefi i n illi oi.igi ncll formLiI to a facilitc11e fastei. tlow of inforrn<2t ion.

Llse tlie niiiltin<1tinniil intLlligenLe cenier i() cnLirdin(Ite Iniilrine1lion.I115R l< nd collection pl'in4 tor each nation.

l )esign<2ie a single nfl-icer as Ihe di reLtnr nt intcll igence t.nr Ihe Inultincltinna I fnrce.

Ensure eaLh nation h.Is a rcprc.%cntltive prL%Lnl <1t the multinational intclligcnce Len(cr.

C-27. 1 U) Thc et-fLctive u.se ()t intclli oencL liai.%i)n pLrs()nncl CL?n cstabli.sh .stron(y rclation,ship.%' Iviih muliinaiioncll pariner.s. Effeciive liaisons can bc in.%irumenic1l in resolving Ihe normcil problems that resuli froiii laiigua(ye bari-ici's aiid cultural and opei'ational diffcreiices during Inultinational iniell igence ()pcraiion.%.

## Appendix D Force Projection Operations Considerations (U) Intf.I.I.Igf.Ncf Support To Forcf Projfction (U)

D- l . ( U) Fc)r('e i)rojeLIi()11 is thc abiliiy to projcLt the Iiiilitary i nstrumcnl of national powcr fr()111 the United Slates c)I' aiiuilier tlieclier, iii ie%poiJ%e l() rLL4uiicineiili> fui. Iiiilit<iry opcrLilions (JP I-O). Il
1% Ihe niilil(U'y Lompnnent nt. po%ver projeLtii)n and a Lentril eleiiiLnl of the niltinncil military %trcltegy. Arniy ()rganizLltinns and inqtall,Iti()n5 linked with jnini forces and industry form a ,sirategiL pIL1It'orm lo nic2intain, project, and
.qustain Army force% wherciLI" thLy deploy, ForcL projeciion opei"alions are inherenilv joinl 'ind require si tucltinnal undcrsl<lndinrY and dctailcd planning cind %ynclir()nizati()n.

D-? (U) U ns11L blL L()ndiii()ns w()rldwidc oftcn prcL ludL (l %i(yni t"icanl pcri()d ()f tiinL t() producc i ntelligcnce to nieet contiiigcncy operation requireinent.s. "fhercfoi'e, N11
unils cind stlLffs prep<ire for polenlicll Lontingencics by buildinn thcir intclli<yence rcadiness. includin(y Ihcir skills und %y%teins Lxpcrti,qc, dully.

When
(2 unli receives a warning ordLr for deploynient or
1% a%%igTned a cnniinnenLv IMis%ion, il will beoin 10
yenerite intelJj(yence knowledge on the projectcd arel of interest.

D-.l. { U ) B uili i)n a f()undaii()n ()f intclligenLe reLqdinc%%, thc intel ligencc W&irfi(yhti ng t'unction providL% Ihc Lo)Iiinidnder witli Ihe inilli CTenLe Iiee(Jd to LonduL L fc)rLe prujeLiiun uperiliuns. SuLLessful intelliuenLe diiring fiirLe prnjcction operati()ni relies on Lonlinunus Lollection and intclligence pruduciian before and durinn the operation. Durin force projeLtion operltion.%, higher echLlons provide intelligence tn lower Lclielons until the e,Irly-cntr)I torcc secure4 tlie lodgnient .Irea, The .joi nt st&iff of tlie intellib7ence directorate he&7in% thc talk% t() %LI Ihc IhLatcr. Thi% jniiit 4lLlt't niu.%t excrci4L ju(Ignienl whcn prnvidi ng inl(Irindtii)n t
.qLibi)rdinate iniclligyenLc %iaffs to ai()id ovcrwhclming Ihcni.

D-4. ( U ) Key plaiiiino t"lCtOl"4i foi" iiitelli Dcllcv iii foi"CL pi"ojeLlion illLlude
,Siaying oui froni in intelli(yence plaiiniTicY:
BLJ(yin to genei',Ite inielligence knowledge soon al possible.

Develop a fiieads, Lft"ort.

PiioritlzL inielligcnce rLquiremcnt% t"C)r devLlopnicnl Ot IhL iniiial PIR.

Identit'y intellj <yence tr<li ni ng I"equircments (including. clu(Trrientees).

Uiidei"sl<indi nn Iiow 10 gct iniell igiciicc %uppc)rt:
Undersland thL combat:Int Loiiim,Iiid and deployed t-orce inielligLncL' arLhilecture, Identify as%e(. .sen%or, and intelli<7enLL PED reciuirement%.

Idcnlify pcr%oiincl clunniciiiatinn rLquircincnt%.

r)-S.

(U) Iniellioence le'ider.s L2nticipate, idcntify. considcr, and evaluate all IhrLilts 10 the unit thi'oughout t.orce projeLtion operations. This is critical during the deployment .Ind entrv operation% sianes of force pr()JCLti()n. l)uring thc.Kc stclges. Ihe unil is parfiLuliirly' k'ulnerahle tn (hrec1t <gctinn% hccausL ()t- ils liniiled conibiil powcr and knO,1edae of Ilie AO. ThLI'efoi'L, iiitelligcncc pi"ofession1ls cmphl%ize providing c()mbai irifni'iTllc tloll c1nd i Iiiel l igVLiILe pi'oduLl% Ilial iiidivilL LIILIIILie.S lu Ilie lhi.eal or relLvdiil iispeLls of Ilie uperaliuiial cnvironnienl. IniLlligLncc leadLrs.%hould ReviL w avai lable dallba%e% ciii Lined Loiiliiig)enLy areL15, beLIiii Lollaboi'alion aiid gLnerc2liiig intclligciicc knowlcdgc, c1nd dcvclop iniiial IPB product.s conLcrning Ihcsc c1fc&ls of inlcrcst.

ulalol-y g) uideli lies t'c)I" coiiductiiib? specific i Iitelli.

Coiiiply witli
(YL IILe opci"atioiis, C()oi"dinLltc for <lnd reheai.sc using tlie .S&2me Lofnn)uniccliiolli protocols that the joint torce, higher hLadquai-tcl S, Liiid subni'd iiiaLL 1 lid latLral uiiils will use wlicii dLpIoyud.

Plan, train, L2nd pr&lc(ice %uroin(7 intclligcncc an<il Vii% ()n likcly or developin47 contingenLies.

Prepare (ind pr&iclice Loordinaiion with other eleinen15 and or(Yiiniz<1tion.s (for ex<iinple, intelligenoe uniiKi and an,Ilvtical elements, the informL2tion ()periltion.5 Otficer, IhL USAF SWO, CA, militLiry information supporl opei"ations. the spice support element. and special operations forces Linits).

Include tlie follo,111g a.s 1 p,Irt of daily (sLlstain nicnt) operations:
A liiigLllst pl&lll wiih proficiency reqLiireinents.

Trilinin(y (individual and Lolleciive). inclliding auuinentees.

Appni nied 11n(I lr.ii Iic(I t()rcion d i%C losiirc pcr%onnel.

Establish formal or inforiiial inielligcnLL links, rclatinnships. and network% 10 lliLcI devclopinu Lontin(YLlliiL%.

Conduct ,Inal)%i% c)f Ihreais, ierrain and Iveather, <lnd civi I consideration% reciuirements or for'ard RF Is in 2ccnrd,2nce with unil ,()( )Ps.

Dcterinine Ihe need for addilioniil civil considerLltions and sociocultural research 1 nd analysi$ 10
gLncratc intcllioLnLc kn()wlLdgc.

Esl<ibli%li %tatement% of intelligence inlerLsts and devel()p production and warnin(F requirements.

FJ-().

(U) IntelliuenLe leaders support peacetime contingency planning Ivith intellienCe knowlLdge and IPB
products Lind datiibases i)n lik'el), contincyency are<ls. Inielljoence leadcr.s. w'ith the G-2/S-! Ind G-31S-3.

L.Stl( blish an inf()rmLltion Lollcclinn pl,In implcmcnlLd upnii alLrt n()lifioalion. fc)r a .smoi)th transiiion frnm predLployineiil
10 entrv, intellience leaders Inu.%t coordinalL
Lin intelligence architecture. To support int"()rmcltion c()IILCtion, thc intcll igcnce staff idcntifiL% fLqU ifLmLntti, including Col Iccli()n a.%(iets proiitdi ng support Ihrou(Thout the .IfLa L)f i ntcrc,sl.

IiitLI IiOLnLL PED capabililiLs rcciuirLd to .supp()rt i nformaiinii collcction a%4ielS, includi ng Ihc use ol- expcditionary or reach intelligenLL PED 10 be%l .qupport the requirementq of the operati()n, Coininand and support i-elaiionships.

Repoi"l <lnJ I'eL4uesl Pl'oLedui'es Iiol CQ)vercd 111 uIiit SOPS.

Depl())'Iment %equence of informaiion LollLLiion personnel and uIpment. Earl v deplo5'meni of key iiifoi-111<2tioll oI leLllolI pei'.soIiiiel aiid equi piiieiil is essciilial foi" foi'ce pi"otectioii and opcratinns, Thc c(Impositic)n ()f initlil and f(Illow-nn dcpl()5'ing assLl% 1% influLnccd by thc Ini,ssion V6iri.Ibles (METT-TC), av.iilabilily of coininunications, ,2iid a'aIlabl1ltY Of lift.

C()Ininuiiications circhitcclurc.% supporting both intLlligcncL .%lat"f$ lind col Icction assct%.

Fi'ieiidly I'uliiei-abi lities lo h()%lile iiiiell igence tlireats aiid plaiis foi- coiid ULliiig foi-ce pr(IteLtioii.

Thc staft. rnu,%t be(yin this planninby as CLirly a%
po.%',%iblc Ici cn%urc adequatc support t() t'()rcL
proieclion ()f dcploviii(y and initial-eiitry t-()ries.

TPFDD i-equireinents. Wlhcn neces.sary, the .staff %hoiild rLcommend Lhange.% tn priui.ily of moveinLnt. unil: or capibility to enable infornialion colletion, i U) IniLllioencc Icadcr% Lontinually In()nit()r 'ind u[)date appliL,Iblc plans and ()rdLrs IQ l-ctleLt the

lol vin(r %ituaiioii. especicillv durin(T L ri,%Ls, Naiional i nielligence aciii'iiies monitor reoional I1C(]Is
wi)rlcl wide c2iid Lclll <inswLr suiiie i IllLIIiiiLIILe rLLIUi I"Ll Illlt% .%uppoi"li1111 Ilie Jevelc)piiieiii of pl(1[l dnd (IrdLI %.

## Force Projection Processes (U)

F)-&.

(U) Force pi"c)jection encoinpas.%L% five pr()ce&*e% that OLcur iii a conliiiuous, L)verlippin<7 aiid repealing
8equenLe Ihrouohoui an operation. Tlie tive proce8seKi. as they pertL2in to intellioencL, include Mobilizcltion, Suitclining inielli&ience capllbi li tic.4.

Depluyment.

RcdvpluyinLnl.

Employmenl, D~9.

(U) Figure D- I depiLts the mobilikn'itson, deployiiient. and mploymcnt proces.$e$.

## Moiiilization (U)

D-10. (U) Mobilizatic)n i.8 the pr(Kess by which the Armed Forces of the United States or part of them are brought 10 a sthte of readiness for war or other natjonal emergency, which includes acLivating all or part of the Reserve Cornpoiieni as well as assciiibling aIid organizing pcr,$oniicl, supplies, and materiel (JP 4-n5).

This is also the point whcre thc intclligciicL staff bL'gins Lonductsng thc tasks rcquircd tc) sct thc thL"alcr. It asseinbles and organi/Ls resources to support national c.)bjeLlive(?. (See ADRP 4-0.>
D- I l . (U) The intelligence staff Lipd<lteK e.fstimaie4, dat.Iba%es, IPB products, and other i ntclligcnce prodiJLI
needed to support command decisions on force cornposiiion and dL:i)loynient pric)rJties and sLqueiicL. Units riisses5 their LulleLtiuii rLquirmLllli> i mrTILdiltLIy dfter iilert nutifiLauvn. The In.111ence staff begins verilving planning &s.sumption.s within the opcratii)n plan. The intelligence staff, w'ith CI per8onnLI ,suppoi't, provides force prolLction support and recommends l1]terrorIsM measures.

D-12. (U) During rnobilization. inlelligence lei2ders

Monitor intelligence reporting on threat activily, civil con.8ideralions, and warning data.
Managc information rcquircmcnl.8 and RFIS from thc umt and Subordinalc units to includc
updating information ollLciion planniiig.
EslAbliih habitual training relatioiiships with augmcntutson units and PLf50nncl as wcll as higher
echelon intclligLnce organi711tioiis ideniifjcd in the cxi,(>tiiig 0r11t10n plan.
,8upport augjncniation units and pcrsoniiel by preparing and conducting intelligenLe truiningy ond
threat update briefing.s and by di58eininal ing inlLlligyenLe.

Idcntify inforniation c()Ilection and iniclligicnLc PED t-orLc requircmenis for Ihc diffcrLnt types ()t operalion.s clnd continftenLy plan.%.

Ideiiijfy indii'idual mi litciry, civililln, and contractor auomentiltion requireinents.

t)- I l. IU) During mobilizalion: intelligence leadei-s, in conjunction with the rest of the staff, en%urc adequaie equippinu cind training of MI organic1tions and individual auunientccs that conduct iniclliaenLc nPLrations.

Prediciive iniellioence suppon.s the decisionq the comin&inder and siaft- make re(7<1rdino the size, Lomposilion, stl ULturL, &iiid Jepl()ylTieiiL .sequLnLe i)r Llie forLe.

t)_14, (U)
In a forcL pfojcciion operation, highcr cchclon% proi'ide intclligcncc for situation clnd lirgicl dLIILlopmenl 10 I0,Lr echLlons uniil the tactical nr()und torce coinpletL.% entry and %ecurLs the lodgmLnt area.

ThL higlicr he1dquanerq' intelli(Yence seciion Iniy be rt ILlctant 10 push everyihingi down tF0u0h t,Icticdl-IL vel intclligicnLc channcls due t() thc v()lumc of Ilic intclli(Tence intorm;Iiioll ,2vc1ilable. DCGS-A pr()vidcs Ihc BCT
S-2 aLLess 10 theaier and naiional daiabases with the Jbilily 10 collabor1te Ivith knowled17e cenier%. Intelligence rL<lJiiiL%S trainino a.s%i,s(s in eii.surillbi i ntellineiiL prot-essi()nalii and a.s.sets are ablL lo nieel the unli. s nceds durin(7
(Iperalioiis. The G-21S-! niust anticipalL: identifv, Lon%idLr, and evaliiaie al I polential threi1ts (O the eiitirc unit Ihi"oLigliout force pi"ojLLlioii operatioii%.

l)-1.S. [11)"I'hrnugh()ut IMiihili/.atinn. unil inlclli(rcncc aciivillL% prnvidc dcpl(iying t-nrLc.% Iviih IhL ni)st reLcni iniLllinence on Ilie coniingeiicj, ,Irea. The iniellioenLe .stat-f al,%o updaies dai<lba.se,s Jnd ,siiuaiion grlphiL.s.

IIiiLI li(yenLL leader Fully understand tlie uiiii. hiiTher headquariei's. and joini force inielligLncc organizaiion,%.

ReISe intclli(yence and intelligence-relaied communicatinns architecture,% <1nd integrate anj ne,
.systciiis' and sofiii'are ini() currcnt architcLturc%.

Support ?4_h()ur opcrati()ns and provide continuous iiiiclligcnce (to includc ILrrain and weather)
SLlPPOI't.

Plan all requirLd intelligence l'each pi"oLedures.

Deierinine Ir1nsporl,Ition avLiilabilily for deployment as well as dLiriiig deploymenl.

Deteriiii lie all %ustiiinabil ity requirement.s, Dcterrninc intellioence relea,se requirementb and restrictions and releasabilit>' to multinitiollc11 and ho.st-nation %ourLCS.

RcNicw qtatug-ot-forLcs igrcLmLnt%. rulcs of cngcl gycmLnt, intcrnational law, intLllj Dcncc sharing agreement%, and other acTreements, enipha%iiing IhL et-feLt Ilicv have c)n inielligence collection.

((.'nnrdinate with Ihe skift".iudne JdvnLatc nn IhL.%L i.s.sue.s.)
Ensurc dcploynicnl priorilic% t-or thL intornialion collection asscls Wlth rcqliircd intcl lib7cncc PED
Ccipabilitlcs clrL reflcctcd in thc TPFDD to supp()rt inforinL1tion c()Ilcctinn actsl, ilJe.&i.

En.l*ure intelligence link.q' providc the early-enlry cnnimandL r acLL.q.S to juint 41nd Ai"my all-.snurLe inielligence and information colleciion asseis. prnLLbsing sys(ems. aiid dai&lbases.

RCleW the qupporled unit conim,Inder's
.%PLcificd l<L%ks. iniplied taqks, task orgT"Inization, intclligcnLc ,scheine of %upport, and i()c)rdincltion rcquircinenis, Addrc%,s i%,sucs or %hortf<l11s and direci or coordinate chiillg7Ls.

EsiLlblis1i
<1Lces% to n11ional datc1bases and repositories tor each intelligence disLipline and coinplenien(ary in(e Iligence capil biliiy, well as link.% 10 Joini, Service, niul (i naiiona I, c1nd hoscnalioii d<ltabases (ind i-cpc),siiofiLs.

## Deployment (U)

D- l (). (U) Dcploymcnl i,s Ihc movcnicnt nf t"orcc,s and 111<ltcricl froni thcir point of orig7in 10 <1n opcraiional
.2rL'a. DurinT deplc)ynient, intelligLnce organizatinn% al Ilie homL ,qialion oi. deployed w2th the early-enlr), t.orce take advanl.2ge of thL comniiinic1lions architeciui"e and higlier and lower intelligence oraanization% to pr()vidc graphiL and LCXtUil1 intclligenLc updaie.s i() Ihc ti)fLLS cn r()ulC. En r()UlL updaics 1SSlSt in rcduL in(y informaiion gclPi and allow comIiiLinders 10 Jdju.sl plan% in responsL 10 Lh1n(yes in the siiuation bet'ol'c 1rriN'ing at the opci <?iioiial cirea. Iii IiialuI"e Ilieatei", iiiiel ligLiice11iiidoff is conduLled Lietweeii (lri'i viiii? units Liiid tlio.se previously dcploycd, ThL Ihrcc primiL ry arc<ls of intelligcncc 11<indoff arL opcration.4, targetin(y
- lind tLchniccil clilnnel reciuirement%.

1)_17. (I l) IntellioLnce unit% extend estahlished netwnrkq 10 coniiect intelligenLe giaftq and cnlleclinn cl%set.s ai various siage% of Ihe deployment tlow. WheAe neLes.S<1ry, units e.siabli.sh new communicaiions paihs to IIILLt Iniis%illll fLqUiILIIILnlS.

Il" dLpIuyLd, jL)iiii fi)rLL aiid ci)I'Ps ACES
pl<ly d criliLal rolL
III
ITiakiiio comniuniciLioIIs P<l(hs, nciwork%, Ilnd inicllioLncL dL1tabascs a.71]ab1L lo dLplo}'ing forccs.

r)-18, (U) Thc Army relie% on spacc_bascd L2< pabilities and sy%teins, suLh 2S olobal po%ilionin(y satcllites, coirniiiniccltionq .saiellites. we1tliLr sitelliies, 1nd i Iiielligence collection plitformq. These sys(eins L2re critical enablers for Arm! personnel to plan. cotnrnunicate. nc1vigate (ind maneuver. proN'ide mi.ssile warning, and pr()Icci and sustain Arniy force.s. Planning clnd c()orclination ot .sPiice .supporl wilh n31 iional, joini, ScrviLc, aiid thecqter i-LSOUI'ce.% occur Ihroub7h l iL11,%on witli s[)cice pi"ofe.fisionals. Space-Liiabled cap<Jbil ities arc key tLI
suppL)rting inlLlligcncc duringTr dcployniLnt and cniploymLni by Moiiitorinc7 lei-re%triiil areas of iiiiei'est to a%%i.%l iii rL vealing tlie Ihreat'% localioii and dispositioii, Pri)vidiniJ LuniniuniLiiiun% liiik% bclW'LClI Jepluyingy fL)fLe5 dnd Lhe Unilcd SiiltLli &in(J its ILrriiofiL'.S.

Periiiittinn MI collection a.SSCl4 to dcterminL
tIILir p()&ition accuraicly througih thc Gl()bal Positi()Iiiiig Sy%tLII) (iil(ii) LLIIILd GPS).

Providing nieieorolo(Yic<l1. oceinographic, and space environmental inforniciiion <lnd data Ih411 are proL%scd, &in(IlyLed? <tnd expluilcd lu prvduLe linicly ind <lLLuf<ile weliiher effeL Lb l)1) L)perdli()ns.

Providin(I warning,% ot" ballistic Ini%%ile launches.

1)-19. (Ll) Siiuatioii dcvLlopiiiLii( doiiiin1(Ls iiitLI IiOLllLL acti iii tILS dui'i ng Lai'ly-eiilry opcrali()1is. Thc intLlli ociicc staff c1ttcnipts to idcnti fy all IhrLclt.s to arrivinq forccs and a%sist.s thc cominandLI' in dlvcloping forcu protLLti01i nicasurcs. During cntry oper<l1ion%, LL'hclons lbovL Lorps orbTa niiations providc intcll igencc.

Thi.s Slipport inclLide.s provid ing acces.% to thc nl tinnal intelligLnce lind deploying rsC211iblL intclligencc Lleinent%. The entirc cft-or( focuses on providing tailored .fiupporl 10 deployinn and deployed eLhelons in rciponse to Iheii. PIRS and otlier requirements.

D.?O. (U) Collcction lind proLL8qing C<lpabilitlc.s 1rc cnhcinccd a8 assets rIVe and buildup in Ihc AO, with LmphL1.sis on the buildup of the deployed c,1pabilily requij.ed to conduci su.stained inforInation colleciion aLllvlties. Intelligence PED capabilitics arc cniploycd eiiher through Ihe deploynient of PED Lapabilities with the fc)rce (expeclilionL1ry PF'I)) nr Ihr(11}oh re.Ich PP'I) cnnducted in thealer, at sanctuary &ite%, nr t'rnni Ihe IocdLions within the United Stales.

r).? i . (U) WhLlI tIIL .ILiiior .41'iiiv IILcldci UcirtLI'.% ai"riVL4 111 tIIL OPLI"atiuncil ill'LLI: IhL jc)iiil f()rLL IIIILII igLIILL .%laff iicncc iiiiplciiicnts and. w'hLrc nLCL.S%lry. niodifics thc IhccltLr iniclligLnce circhilccturc. Dcploying intclli.

a%%cis Lstablisli liai50n wiih 4lat-fs and deployLd units. Liai%on pcrsonncl, bcl,sic coniirJLilliLaiions, and
<iri inlelljaenLe network should bL in place befnre Ihc schL"duled arrival of p'irent comm&1nd%. Iiit'ormation colleciion unils increase operiilion.s.

D.?? (U) In,stall<1tions in the Uniied StLlies and lis ten'iiories and oihei" ba.sc% outside Ihe operaiional are<l continuL 10 supporl dcployLd units. SysiLills Uiipdblc of rapid rccLiPI and proccs.sing of intLlliilLncc froni nalional systeins and hioh-caplclty, long-IILiuI coiThnunicalions systeiTls al'e critlLal to Ihe success of intclligcnce rcacli and
0,if.1ILh to a dcployed force. Thesc systeni% pr()vidc a contiiiuou8 flow of intLI li (yence In S<11 Iniiny ()perillii)n,I1 neLdi.

r)-? l ( U) DuJ-in(y eiitj-y Dpei"aiion,s the intelligence .siaff Moniior.% protectinn indici1tor.s.

A8sLlses the i nf()riiiali()n LOI lecti()11 effort.

Monilor.% intclligicnce rcporting L)n thrLat.s and civil Lonsidcration.s.

Pu.%h vei-%US pull rquiremenls L)I' inielligrenLe I"eaL'h Lind uverwdlLII.

The effeciivenes% of the inlelligence coinmuniLations arLhiieLture.

Reporting procedure% aiid timelinL%,

## E]Ployment (U)

D-?4. (U)
InlclligcncL
and iiit"orni<l(ion ct)Ilecticin support cipcrcltion,s by Incctino the comm(Indcr's requirLmenls. They focus primarily on SLlPPOI-ting the commander s giLuLltional under.standing. t4orgeling. Lind protcclion rcquircnicnts. Good planning and prcparatinn can cnsurc a sniooih trLin8ltinn from dcplovnient to enipl(iy menl and trnm Lrnplnyiiienl Ilir(iucyh 4iiqtLli nineiit In re(lepliiyment.

## Sli,S'Faining Intellic,Ence Capabili'Fie,S (U)

D-?5.

1 U) Su.titJining intellig)encc capabilitics ini'olves pr()vidino and maintaining Ihc approprialc numbcrs and skill level.s of inielligence profe.s%ionals lind maiLriel required for the dijration (If operations. Continuits, ni<ly be pi-oirided froiii Iociilions withiii and out.sidc the Uniied StalL(i and it% territories. For intLlligenLe, Lnntinuit J may be I"OLU.sed on force rotLilion. en,quring intelligence profe.s.sional.s nr unil.s enlLrino the AO
have curreni iniellinLnce diid a deiailed knowledge of onb7oing intelligence operations. This include%
ProK'iding dita-(ile updates.

Insuring
<1 coordinaied intell igenLe handi)t-f()f ongoinb7 iniclligTenLe opcraiion5, such miliiarN
.8ourcc OPLraiions.

Fn,surinn uiiil% havc the right iniell jcFLncc PED aiid othLr MI IlS%Lts. to includc pcr.sonnLI (includino linguisis), comniunication% sygtenis. inforination collection ,%ysienis, and appropriLlte niaintenance
%upporl.

## RedeployLlnt (U)

l )-l(). ILI ) Recl(plc.)1'117ei31 is tlie tr<instei' or roiioiion ()t" t'orces <ind milteriel to siipport Inolher jnint torce c()niinandLf'
()pcration<il requircinLnts,()r i()
return pers()nncl. cquipmcnl,and matcriclto thc home Ic ndlor dLmobilizaiion .siaii()n.% for reiniegration andlor ouiproce.8.sin(y ( JP 3-.3.fj). .4.$ Hiiih deploynient, there i.s a requircniLnl to LondLILt intelligence h<indoff froni thL redeployincy 10 thc deploying unil. A well-prepcired inielligenLe handot"f en.sure4 ,1 sinooth Lind %eamless transition between uniis.

D-?7. (U) Aq Lnmbc21 power and resc)urcei deLrease in Ihe nperaiiondl arLa, prc)teLlion and Ivarnino beconie tlie f()cu.s nf the Lonimander
.5 intelligence i-equiremciit.s. Tlii.s dni'e.s the ,seleciion nt" tho.se .i.%%el.S Ihai mu,st rcniciin dLpIoyLd until Ihc end ()t" thc ()pcriii()n Lind Iho%L Ihai niav Fcdepl()v c,'Irlicr. Thc G-21S-2
M()nitor.% Intelli L7ence rcp()rtincr on Ilireil 'lLliiiity cind warning d'ita.

CDnlinue% 10 conduct intelligence suppoi't to proiecti()11.

Reque.ql.f int'ormatRon collection .upport (c()mbatanl Li)(Iiiiiand cind n&irional
.sJ',stem.4) and intelliftence to siipporl redeploynienl.

D_?8. (U) After redeployincnl. MI pcr%onncl and unii.s rcc()vcr and rciurn lo prcdeplos'mcnt actil'itics.

Inl(IrniilLiL)n LUI ICL li()n Linils rc%umc LuniinciLllL)'_oriLnlcd PCdLLtimL illLcI ligcnLL uperiiiiull5. The inlLlli&rLnLe Prepaj es ifLI".aLlion I"Lpoi'l% ciiid IL%sOllS ILLlI'I)ed.

Monitors iiiielligence report in o on thrcat clctiKiity and civil con.siderations for contingencies.

Updatc% c)r Lonsolidaics databascs.

Maintains intelljoenLc rcadincs..

Prc)vidcs input into the forLc-dLiian upd&ltc procL%s to rcfinc InodifiLd lables of organilation and eL]uipmeni and 10 ei'c'ilii,ItL the neLd for individu(Il niobiliz'ition augmentee personnel.

Submils organiziltional needs requLsLq.

## Appendlx E General Intelligence Provisions And Authorities (U) United Statfs Codf Titi.Fs And Fxfcutivf Order 12333 (U)

E-I.

(U) G-21S-2s. intelligence planners, and MI unit commanders must comply with the intelligence provisions and authorities inLludd in the following titles of the Uniled States Code and with ExeLutive Order
12333 as amended:

Title 10, Armed Forces ofthe Uiiiled Staes. Key topic areas include
The authority of the Secretary of Defense over all DOD intelligence organizations and dLllvlties.

The sItIon of Under Secretary of Defense for Intelhgence.

The role of national intelligence Ihrough tactical intelligence and the integration of DOD ISR
capabilities.

Meeting the needs of combatant commanders through tactical corrllnanders.

Funds for foreign cryptolo ic support.

Appropridtiun?>, use, (ind iiuditing uf DOD intelligenLe fund%i.

Congre.88ional oversighi.

Title 32, National Guard. Key topic areas include
Posse Comitatus, Defense support of civil authorities.

Title 50, Wur and Nutiunal Defynse. Key IopiL C<11s, inLludL-
The Tole of the Secretary of Defense in conducting intelligence activities.

The purpose of all-source intelligence and the role of an iiitegratrd and synchronized DOD
intelligence c()Ilecnnn, analy.qi.q, and di%,4eminatinn as a part nf the larger inlelligence community.

The role of national intelligence through tacticaj intelligence. The needs of combotont commanders thIough tactical commanders.

Crc fu ctions of Cialized intelli Ib) (3
Cl activities.

Intelligence budget and oversighi, Executive nrder 12333, United ,State,s Intslligence Activities (as amended). Ke)1 areas include the following:
Principal legal authority for intelligence activitie.s (provides intelligence goals md direLtion%).

Defines *struclure* and Mission of the intelligence community.

Delineates jurisdictional boundarics among intelligence ag ncies and establishes dulles and re8wnsibiliiies for each department and agency within the intelligence community.

Declares rules to guide and limit the conduct of intelligence activities.

Defines agency responsibilities. including the DOD, s role. for national intelligence ef'forts.

Declares rules of conduct for intelligence activities involving U.S. persons.

Contains general provisions pertaining to oversight, implementation, and definil.ions.

E-2. (U) IntelligeiiLe activities authorized by ExeLutive Order 12333 as uriierided are further LxtendLLI to cornbatant commanderg through operalion order.s and plans, Additionally, certain iiiLelligenLe dLtivitie% may be directed by other legislative aiiihorily and are not exLliisivL to Title 10 or Tiije 50 statutes.

E-3. (U) Each organizatioii or unil must haiie a .SPLcifiL <2ssigncd mi.ssion 10 conduct a pai"iicull& r iype of iiIILlligL(Ice aLlivity, Tliese %peLifiL auihoriliLs arL ofien found in a wide range of doLuiiiLnt41, SULh as DOD
dirLtivcs, inlclligcncc-agcncy-spccific authoriiiL.s, Arrny rcgulations, opcration orders, and opcntion plans.

If the iiiielligcnce staff has any quesiion% on authorilics or fundingi sources, it should cc)ordinate closely with the unit staff judge advocdte because of the dynaJn,ic nature, complexity, and large volume of intel ligei)cc laws and policie,s.

E-4.

(U) The implicaLions of and con,8idLrntic)ns a,s.4ociaicd with these provision% and authoritief> include rhe oversight, management, and resourcing of intell igei)ce oper<lti()ns and the autliority for or prohibitions on certain 8peific intclli&yLncc avlivities.

E-5,
(U) Tiiles 10 and 50 are inextricably linked and mutually
.(FUPPM)rtAe statutory provisions for DOD
inicllignce acti viiies at eiiery level ot. 0ri?tiOnS (str<1 iegic. 0ri( tional. and taLiiLal) during pe,actinie or war,

## Intelligence Authority Sources (U)

E-6.

Table E- I Ii.SLS snrne of the most imp()rtant intclligence authority sources.

## Unclassified

Exeojtive Order12333, Unit9d States Intelligence Acfivitigs (as amended)
AR 381-10, U.S. Am?y Intelligence Acbviti8s AR 381-20, Amry Counterintelligence Program AR 381-26, Army Foreign Matariel Program AR 38147, Offensive Counterintelligence Operations _
AR 381 .100, Amiy Human Intelligence Cc41ecti Programs AR 381-102, Amy Gover Pmgram AR 381.141 , Intelligence Contingency Funds (classified)
DJD 5240.1-R, Procedures Govemlng the ActlvltRs of DOD Intelllgents Gomponents Thal Aftect Unlted States Persons Prcedures11 throu h13 remain tY3D Law of War Manual LK)DD 2310.01E, DOD Detainee Pro rarn tK)DD 3115,09, DOD Inielligence Interrogatsons, Detainee Debriefings, and facbcal auestioning CX)DD 5148.13, Intelligence Oversight (ReaGed Intdllgence Overslght Procedures 14 and 15 of DOD 5240.1-R)
C()DM 5240.01 , Procedures Goveming fv Conduct of DQD Intelligence Achvrties FM 2-22.3, Human Intelligence Collector Operations FM 27-10, The Law ofLand Warfare ICD104, Nalifflal Inlelligenc8 Program (NIP) Budget Fornulalion and Jush'fication, Execuliffl, and Performance Evaluation ICD113, FunctiLv7al Managers ence Plannin , Programming, BudgeQ'n , and Evalualion System ICD116, Intelli ICD 203, *Anal* ic Standards ICD 204, Naiilxal Inielllgence Prlorfttes Frainewo Tille10, USC, Arffpd Forces Titlo *32,* USC, Nabonal Guard

## Unclassified

UNCLASSIFIED
Tttle 50, USC, War and Nati'onaf Defense
Relevant DOD instructions
U,S, Army Directive 2016-37, U.S. Amiy Open-Source Inlelligence Activitt'es
Privacy Act d 1974 (seciijn 552a, fit18 5, USC [also called 5 USC { 552a])
Manual lor Courts-martial Urited States (2016 Edibon)
lrtemational troaties, such as the Hague Convention (1899 and1907), tho Geneva Convgntions (1949), and Protocol I to tha
Geneva Convenhons (1977)
AR
FM
ICD
Arrny regulatK)n
Departffent of Dglense
field ffBnual
nce cwnmunitydirgdi
t)OD
intellt
UnitExl Stalvs
DepartITn t of Delense direLxive
DODD
DOD
De artrront ol Defense manual
United Stales Code
UNCLASSIFIED

This page iiitentionally left blank.

## Appendix F Language Support Considerations (U) I,Anguagf Rf.Quirfmfnts (U)

F- l.

(U) Nqiliiarv OPLf<llion% higThly dcpcnd on IniliEary- and conlraLtor-providcd forei(rn lan(TUc10C supporl.

TIIL rLquii'ciiieiii Iu iUIIIILIIIiLale wilh iiiLI .sci"vc oi? niuliiiiaiioiial siaff.s, LolllluI)icaie Iviili IoLal p()pu laiion.s,
(Ind LolleLt inlormillion ncLe.s.silate% Ihe use of lin(?uist.s. Tlie growing focus on Inuliinational opcration,s inci"La.&LS the competition f()r liniiled linguiit re%oui'LL% thit 1lfL Vital for mi,%si()n SULLe%s.

## Lancua("E Slipport Categories (U)

F-2.
(U) LanguagL %upport reqLiifLincnt.% typicalls, fall into onc of six broad catcgTorie(>
CA opLration8.

Intcll igcnLc OPLration,(i.

Nqultincltii)nal l iai,sL)n.

Su,slc1ininLnt.

SpLL 1<11 i)PLrali()Ii%.

Iiifoi'in<ilioii.

Civil-niilitiry opcrLlli()ns (CMO).

## Intellil)Ence Operations (U)

F-l.

(U) Thi.s C&ltLgoi-i includLs linguist requirement.%i inhcrent in trciditional Cl, IIUMINT, lnd SIGINT
disciplincs, well J% loreign lanbiuagL support to protcLtion clnd e.Kploitation of open-sourLe inf(Irination.

## Multinational Liaison ( U)

F_4.

(IJ) This categnry incliidcii cnnr(lin<ltinii nt. Inilitary npcratinns an(1 liai%()n with multinaii()nal Piirtners, previoutily IinLiffilicllLd naiions. ho.st-nalion per%oiinel and ot-fices. and at times adVersY or forrner adN'ei'sary naLiun%. (Se FM 6-(). )

## .Special Operations (U)

F_5. (U) Opcrlc linns Londucted by (iPLLi<il opcrLltion% t()rcLS tyP?iLcilly rcquirc forcion IclngJu<igc LapdbililiL%.

Becaii.se of thc bi'nad ranne ot- langiianes. Ariny speciil opei-l tions torce.4 Inay not ha'e the required nunibLr ol personnel trained In cg pecit"ic langiiane or d i<ilcLI. In m,1ny La.%e4, Ariny %peci,q l operiiiions torLes re(] Iiire
8()phiilicatcd langTua(7c ski Ils requirin ,1 lluclllcLd lan(7uagic capcibil itv that can only Loinc froin ()r Vcllcd by a n(Il ive spedkei". Fur exdmple. p%yLho)lugiiLdl UPLratii)n> speL ialii>l% dLvelL)p pruduLI in liirieL liillgTuilcYe.

to obtciin a specifiL responsc <lnd %pecial t-orce,8 team Incnibers conves. the intent of the opcrc11ion to an indioenous forLL; CA personnel work in specialized ierins found in governnient, law, medical .siipport, 11lW
Lnfoi'cenieiit, infr.2strLILture pi'ojecig. public safet),. and population control. (See FN4 _1.05. )

## Civi1-Ill1Tary Uperations (U)

F-f), (U ) Ci'i/-Inililcii!' nperali(?n.s' arL aL (iK'illL.S ()t" a c()Inniandcr perf()rmed by dcsignatcd civil affdif,s Dr oihLr mili lary torces Ilidl esiLibli.%li, niaintain, infl uence. or exploil relc1tion.% belween niililary forLes, indigenous popu lation,%. and i nstitutl0115. by dii'ectly supporti lig7 the attainment of objectii'c% relati ng lo Ihe rL'L%thblishinLnt or Iiiaintenance ol" stability within a rLgion or host nalion (JP 3-.57). CMO may include mililary f()i-ces perforniing LILtiviiie% and funLtion% nornially PLrf"()rnied by IhL Ioc<l1, regional, or natinnal governmenl. Thc.se AL-tivilie.s n)<?s' nccur betore. diiring. or .subsequent l() other Inilitary ,2cric)ns. The.fe aLlivities arc funddnicntal t() cxcculing siability lasks conductcd during oft-cn%ii'c and dctcnsi ve Icl%k.s. CMO
1% an inherLni Luinmdnder's i-L>ponsibiliLy Lind Ariny IL)fLe% LL)nduLI CMO Iu Luurdin<ile Livil ind Inilildry
,ILtivitic.s, Iiiini Inizc Lii'il-mi litary friLtion IL nd thre<lt,% froin thc ci I'll Lc)mponcnt. niax inii/.e quppnrl for
(Iper.Ition.%1 <1nd meet the cnmmiinder, q le(ral obl igaiiniiq c1nd mor,11 reqpon.%ibi lities tii the Livilian population.s within the opercltion.ll ilrea.

F-7.

1 U ) CA personnel. otlier Ariny foi'ces. other noipernment acyencies, or a conibination of all Ihree perforni IhL.%L aLlivitiLs, aiid IIIL G-9 i.s tIIL IL<1d sl(]ff ul"fiLLI' foi. tl)LSL I1LIiviiiLS. Foi'Ligii lai)ouaLyL SUPP()rl
1% Ll'iliLal
10 CMO and mc1y includc lanL7Liaoc rcquircincnls in addition LO thosc naiivc in Ihc nation whLrc thc OPLratioii i oLcurrin(7 as (hcrc may bc othcr torcign gyovcrnnicnts and nongoiicrninLnlal aiyencics involvcd in %labilii)'
iask.%. (SLL F.M 1_57.)

## Civil Aft'Airs Operations (It)

F.8.

IU) CA opei"11tions enhcince the rel<iiioii%hip beiween civil 1uthoi'ilie.s and niilitc2ry t"orce,s. Thej involve iippI)ii n.il C,4 (unLlI()ndl SPL'Llciliy skil l% Iu dfLds n()rm(Il ly under IhL Livil gyui'crninLnt' ) rc%p()nsibility. The%L
operaiions involve establi.%hin(T mainiaining, intluencino or exploitino relLllions betweeii militarv t-orcLs and all levLl% ot. hosi-n1tion governmenl lgcnLies. CA personnel work with .speci.1li7.ed veriiacular in such 'ireas as governmcnl liaison, ILgal agJreeinent.s. mcdical support and ()pcration.s, lilw enforccrnLnl, infrLislruLiufL
projeci%, PLibliL .%at"eiv. ieLiirit J. and popul<ltiun Lonirot. (See FN4 3-5 7. )
projects. cngineerinn

## Sustainment (U)

i U) Thi.% Ldiegiui-51 Lull4iisl% ut" fui'LI(In l(Illgiuiigye suppur(
LU SUS1(iinmnL lunLiiuns. ThLS funLliun incl udc l()(Yi(itlL contrclcting; pc)rt, railhcad, clil"hLad, 01- ti"an.s.shipmeni (IpcrLilion%' and cOnOY OPLration.s. (SLC
ADP 4-0 and ADRP 4-0.)

## Information (U)

F.I(). (LJ) DOD m,Ikes e.er), e.ttnri In .iynchronize, ,I1ign, <ind coorclinaie coinmlinication activities to faLilii1l(c an undcrstanding ot" ho. IhL plannin<y and cxeLution ()f DOD straieiyics. plans, operatiun.%, Lind actlvllies will be reccived or understooL1 by key audiences. To suppon these eft"oris, commanders <lnd siat-t"s hoLild identif)r and understand key audience perceptions and possible reactions whcn p11c nninn and execuii[I
opei'aiinns. This undersl<1nding of key audience pci"Leptions Lind reaclions is a vital clemcnl Ot. every IheLlter Lampaign and coniin(iency plan, anLI it is e.5.seniial to the Ariny's abilitj lo achieve unily ot- effort thr()ugh Iini tie(l aLtion with IhL joi nl torcc, inicr;Igcncy p,Irtiicr%, cind thL. br()1(ler inicrnr&J<ini/.iilion<il comniiinily. Kc), audience beliLfs, PLfieptions. cind behavior are ifuciil 10 tlie SLILcess of clny stric tcoy, pl<1n, and opei'dlion.

F- I l . i U) U%iiigT aLLuralL l<lllg)ucigie, iii IhL ribhi IL)IlL diid willi Ilie ricylil Luriiialioii, 15 LruLial i() Ihcse et'furts
,Ind rcquirLs fnrcion lan(yuagc Support. Throuoh tlic c(Imniandcr',% communication .%ynchrnnizilion, public aff'iirs, infoi"mL1(ion uperaiions, &1nd defLnse support to public diploinacy are realized
41$ coinniunication%
.suppoi"ting cipabilities. The coinmander's coniniuiiication .gynchronizition a.sists leaders. planners, .Ind opcrators aL all IcvLI.s i n undcr%tandi ng Ihc dcsircd eft'ccts (ind aniiL iPLili ng pntcntial undeiiircd cft-ect,% ot" Ihe
,4rniv s
&lCIi01is Llnd Kvords, idenlit.ving kev audiencc.s. arid aLiively addressiiio Iheir perspeciives when appropi"iclte.

## Command Languace Program Fvianac,Er (U)

(U) Cominaiidcr.s tippoinl a unit Lomiiiand languaoe prooi.ani manager to ovcrse the unit's cc)mmand languagyc proiyram. Cuinniandcrs wilh 1 large nuinbcr of a.%signcd linul$IS (150 or niore) niusl Llppoini a f.ullliine conimilnd language program nianager wilh il specitlLd job desci"iption lo mani ge Ihe comm,1nd liingiuage prngram. Al I persnnnel pert()rnii ng cnininand language prngrani Inanlt ger dulle% (eiiher t-ul l-iiine nr as an
,Idditional duty) mu(it 1ltlLnd thL Defcnsc Lanou<ioe In.%ti(uic Forci(rn Langu1ge Ccntcr C()mniand LancyuaoL
Pr()LTI"<llTI Ma Iiagvei. CULifsL.

## Command Lanc,Uac.E Council (U)

r._I i. (U) A Lomincind 1inguilb7c Louncil
1.% rLquircd for a unit witli morc thali io IVUlgc-cOdcd posilions authorized on kli"m)' manning docunients. The purpo.se of the Lolllinand lanouai7e council i,s to promote lingiuistic eXLLIILnLC through the %harin(y ot. idea.s and inforine1tion .Ind to prioritic Ir1ining. Thc comniand ILinguigie c(iunLiI shiiuld inclucle the cnmmander. cnnim,In(l &eroL, rLN()ui"ce manaiyei-. Howei'er. the coinm,'InLler In,iy direct oiher st<1ff partlclP<1tion. For unit% with less than 5()
li nkiui %l.%, it 1% (It thL L ()InilldndLr'% disL rLliun Iu iiuih()riLL IhL Lst(IblishinLnl ()r d L(Jinnicirid liinLyucluL LC)ullLiI.

(See AR 11-6.)

## Language Support For Inti4 1.Ligence Operations (U)

F-14. (U) Thc ,8IGINT. HUMINT, and Cl disciplinc.s rcquii-c .spccific lanoLiagc skill.$ 10 accomplish thcir Lollcetion ts18k% .succe%sfully. SIGINT LoIIcLtor.4i ofiLn analyzL and report inf()rm<ltion obtained through intercept of foreicyn langu.10e cc)mmiinication%. CDiiimuniLalions intelliaence, together wilh intellioence research <ind 1lnals'.sis missions, dcmand.q highly skilled listeniiig and readino lanoua(ye capabilitie.s. HUfvIINT
L()IICL lion ()pcr1tinn% that rcquirc t"orcign lanquagiL Ci1pabiliticg includc the t"()11()wing:
Interrngdtion. Fc)rL)jon lanouag7c requirLincnt% for interrogation inc lude lisiening and spcdkino abilitiLs t'()r conductino (he intcrrooation i(%elf.

Debriefing. DebricfLr% requirL forLijon llnryuage reading. lisieniiig. and spelkin(tr capabilities 10
prepdl"e r()r (ind LdlTy uul dcbriLfiii(J% uf i()rei (yn >ubjeLt%.

Liai5()n. HUMINT collecLors rely heavily on langua(ye ability 10 conduct effeciii'e liai,son with hu,sl-niltiun inLI uihLr (Jf fil iali.

lilitarv source operations. All foreign 1<inguage capabilitie% arc required 10 LonduLt miliiarv OLifLL opLI'aiiL)l),* efreLtively.

F-l i. (U) Cl tcisks oftknn rcciuirL 112ll(ryUilbTC skill.s similar to tho,sc rcquircd fror HUkllNT t1< sks. Thc CI and HUMINT &pecialties boih identify language proficienc). wilh a skill qualification identifier. HoHiever, when
1llngLI.l(ye-qualified debriefers Ire noi &ivailable, inierpreiers m<l)' be USLd to ISSlSt the debriefers.

## Language Suppor'F Sources (U)

'. I h. ( I l ) ( .()miiiandcr% can use li1rinu% inurceA tc) ohiaiii the l inguists nLeded tn ,%uppnri npLfclti()11.s. li 1% Vllal to know thc advantagc. and di%idvantl OC% Ot L',ILh tyPL ()t- linoui%t and tn rnatch thL awailablc lingui.sls to Ihc V<iriuus reL4uirement% ()r Lhe uperiiliun L&ifLfullv.

## Arniy Lancu.4Cie Military Occupa'Fional Specialtifs (U)

r- i7. (U) ThL 11 nguage-dcpendcnt MI enlisted military occupational peci.11ty (MOS) is 35P with a skill qualit'ication identifier ofr L (ci"vptologic liri(7Ui,St). HUMINT collector speciLiltie.s (MOS .35M and warrant utficer MO,S
.3.5 IMI arc dc8ign1tcd cl.* lanouacvc- -dcpcndcnt, Lcdders should bc av4'L1rc of Ihe languagc prnticiency leK'LI i)t' Iheir cl&.%jc7ned HUMINT L(IlleLior.%, which ni<1y fcinge Irom almost no liingiiloe t() tiill natiiic proficicncy. Some Soldiers in the following enlisled and warrc1nt nfficcr MOSS <ire trclined in forei(In Idngiucl.gL,s: MOS%.35F Lind 350F (ill-%i)urLL in(LlligyLnLe Lill(Ilv%l), MOS%1 35L (and 351 L (Cl dgyLiII): ilTid fvlOS
.35N and 352N (SIGINT anillyst).

F-18. (Ll ) The lollowin(? non-ml Larccr nianagcinLiit ficlds: branLhe.%. and funLtion4112rcas include ILlngu,1CrL-
qualit.ied eiilisted MOSS and officer arei2% Llt. concentratinii: 18 (special force% lenlisted, warrant ot"ficers, and
()t"t"icei"s J), .37 (p.s)'chnln(YiCLI1 nperatiniis lenlisled and nt"ticersJ ), "IX (('A). functinnal arel 4% (fnreign 2rea i)fficLr), and ()9L (intLrprctcr-trl nslator).

## Con"Fract Lincui.S'Rs (U)

F-19. (U) U.S. civilians can bc coniracied ti) providL linnui.si .support. They haiiL an <ldvantagL C)vcr localnation611 hii"e.s becllu.se their loyalty to the Uniled St&ltes is niore readily evciluated and it is easier foi. them to be grantcd thc ncLe(iqary.sccurity Llearancc. Howei'er, there are usually %evere limitsllion.s nn Ihe dcplc)ynient aiid use nfr. LiviIiLln8. A carLtul asse%qment nt. their langua(Te ahility IN impnriJnl hecau%e thev may Li4e (Ildt'<i%liioiied tei'm.s oi. intLrject U.S. idioms. If the lingLllsts <lre receni iinniigrants. the use of the language in IhL ir Li)untry ()1" ()ri.in Luuld bL d<inuLruu.% tu IhL m. Sinii Idrly, IhLir Iuyiili), m(Iv fL.%idL wiih IhLif Ll)unlry L)I'
oi'join, religious group, tribill &2ffiliation. oi" other clo,se conneclions when the intere.st.s of Ihese groLlPs are at i)dds with U.S. iniLrLsts.

F-?O. (U) Lc)cal-IiatiDnLI1 hirc.q often provide the bulk" of lingui.%t support. They are usually les.% expensive to hirL thin U.S. civiliLin% are and know the Iocl1 dialeLt. idioin4, and culture. The experii%e of (he.%e liiigui,ql in Pcirticul<ir areas or subjict Ina(ter4 Lc1n be 1n a,%qet.

r-21.

(U) AII CCJmmind% mu.si coniply wilh thc Cl .scrcciiin(y policy for contract linouisi .support. Thi,s nia), be PLI-t"orined by tlie hiring agency within the joiiit opcralion.s arca or by. CI per.%onnel. Cl per,sonncl also scrcLn contract lingui.%t.s periodiLally Ihrouiihoui Iheir Linployincnt.

.22. 111) IVhen reqliestiiig LiviIiLin cnntrclct linguiqt,s, the c()nimanLler 2nd stJt'f musi iLdeiitit"y requirements by Lategorj;
Calegory I linftuists ai"e Iocilly hirLd pcrsoiinel wilh an understandin(T of the Enoli%h langu,Ige.

Thcy undLfLYQ a liinitLd %crcLningi, arL hircd in-thLaiLr. do noi p()S%CS% a scLurily clcarilllcL, (Ind &1rc Ii%eLI Ioj. UllLl<ls.%ificd wojk. Dui'iiiLI IllU%I i)pei"aLi(Jns, Laiegui'y I linguisl% IllUsL bc I'esLI'eeiid 011 a
.%chLdulcd ba.%i%. Caicoory I linUlSI Lannol bc u.SLd for intclligLllcL Dpcrations, Categoi"y Il lin oui.st% cU"c U.S. Lili/.eiis M,Iio Iiai'e Il<lllve Lolllliiid c)f (lie tat'giei laii(yua&ie aiid IlLarniilivc c()nimand of IhL Enolish linguclgL. Thcy undcroo a .scrcLning procc.ss thal includcs a n1tional afTency check. Upon tavoi'able tindinns, cateooi'yll linguisls ire grinied a %eLI'el coll,Iler&i1
LILaranLL.

Category Tll linguist(i Irc U.S. Lilizcns w'ho havc nativc cominand of the l1rgci langiuagL and nilive c()mmlL nd ot-Ihe Engliqh Icilloiicige. Tliey underooa screeniiig process th<lt inLliide.% <l.pecial backgi'ound inve.Kiti (7ation <ind <7 polygrciph. Upon t-avni'ible findi ngs, category Ill lingui%t% are griinied c1n intLrim or final i()p seLrci/%Ln,siiivc coinpcirinicniLd infi)rm1tii)n clLar<illLc by thc de4ii(yll<lled U.S. Goveriinieiit persoiinel security authorily.

## Non-Departiment Of Defen.Se Trained Army Lingui.St,S (U)

F-23. (U) Thc Army ha.% numcrou.% S()IdiLf(> Ot. all gyrLldL.% w'ho arL prDficicn( in a t'orcign ILlllc7u<igL but whc)sc primary duties do not require foreign1sill(Iu,Ige proficiency. They miy haN'e atleiided a civilian Lhool lo learn
,2 t"oreig71i languaoc, or they Inily hcive acciuircd proficienc). Ihrough Ihcir hcrii,Ige. TIILY haiic the adv&lnllgYe
()f beino trained Soldiers and are therefore readily dLployable throughout thL AO. Thev Iiiay qu,I1ify for a t"ore?gn lanauagc pi'oficiencv bonu% by passin(y the Detense Languane Prot)cienc)i Test. li is difficult for
11()[Iljiic?Ul.It to IIIL Uclpabi li tILS l)t- Soldici"A wlio111< VL Ilot takctl thL DL fLn%c L,Iiiguaoc Proficieiicy TLSI.

'ithout <1 IC.St ,scorc 011 rccord, it is l< Iso diffiLulI for thc ni<inpowcr Lind pcrsoiincl stciff to idLnlify thcm as

## Determining Language Support Requirements (U)

F-24.

1 U) DctLrniining linguisi rcquircmcni(i fc)r any opcration Lin bc difficuli bcL1use eJLh opLr1tion is Iinique. The Slilt'l. dLierniines lingiiisi rLqiiiremenl.sc I S P1( rl Ot, IPB (Iiiring mi.SilC)n c2llcilJ'sis. li .%ti1rts b), identifyin(y specificd or iinplied th.sks requiring foreiiyn language %uppoi'l. Oiher critical faciors arc Ihe
()rgyclllldt i()n ur LhLI(Jn uf L()IT]lliiind Lind IhL I()Liltion ()f LhL AO. ThL .sl(Jft- u%L.s IhL.SL LritLril ti) dLILrniinL
Ihc allocation of lingui%Ls, .such a.% one linguist ILaiM PLf LchLI()n i)t cnmmand, onL linguifit pcr PICCL
C)f eqiiipment. or one lingiiisi te1 ni per location whei'e the function i<) 10 be pei'forined. Thc slLiff Ihen determinL5
Ihc numbL'r of lingTUi.St. nccdLd for an opcralion ba4ed on IhL task.s to bc rformCd and thc alloLalion of linouist%.

Within this pr(Le%s the siat"t Lonsidcrq the dit'fcrcnt dialLLts within thL AO whcn dcterniinin&) Iclnouacye .suppofl rc(juirenienls. (For poliL>I Dn the Ai"Iiiy f()rei&)n11 llbiuage prL)grcini. see AR 11-6.)

F'_?.i. ([ l) 'I'he intellinence cell at caLh echelnn if re.qpnnfihle t-nr the fnllnwing:
Identifying calegory
11 and cate&Tory Ill linftuisl requirements nceded to %upport inlelligence funciions i n al I c()nti ngcnLy arca,%. Intclligcncc ,%taff rcquiremcnt.% for lin(7uiil %UPP()rl i ncludc but are not liiiied to evaluatineo 1nd/or using local map,s and ierrain products in operations and as.SL%%iElQ I ULdl opeii-%oui"Lc iii foriiiilii)Ii fui. inlellig[)LC val uc, Deieriniiiing liiiguisi requiremeni.s, bLlsed 011 Ihe mission and nii Ihe foreign langua(Tes <ind dialecis
8pokLii iii tlic AO.

Providing intelligcnLe traininn t'or Ml linEuisls empl()ycd in AOS.

Coordinatino for sccuriiy invLstigaiions, as nccLssar!, for local-hirL linguists.

Pi'ovidingi siipport tn CI screenino of contracted linguisl.% l& nd hired locaL-ncltiLinal141bor force, This page iiitentionally left blank.

## Glossary (U)

(U) The gIossary lists acronyms and terms with Army or joint definitions. Where Army and joint definition,8 differ, (Army) precedes Ihe definition. The proponent publication for other ierm,% is listed in pareniheses after the definition.

## Section I- Acronyms And Abbreviations (U)

ACE
analysis and control element
ADP
Amiy doctrine publication
ADRP
Arniy doctrine reference publication
AO
area of operations
AR
Army regulation
ART
Arrny tactical task
ASCC
Army Service coinponent command
ASCOPE
areas, structures, capabilities, oiganizations, people, and evenLs (civil
cnn.%ideraiinns)
ATP
Army techniqucs publication
BCT
CA
brigade combat team
civil affairs
chemicaj, biological, radiojogical, and nuclear
CBRN
CCIR
cornmander's critical information requirement
CCIRM
CEMA
collection coordination and intelligence r
cyberspace electromagnetic activities
countrrintelligence
ci
CMO
civjl-milit2ry operations
LOUISC of action
cominon 0ratIonal PlLture
COA
cop
DCGS-A
Distributed Cornmon Ground System-Army
Defense IntelligenLe Agency
DIA
DOD
Department of Defense
DUI)I)
l)epdrtment nt. l)efen%e directive
Department of Defen,8e manual
DODM
E-MIB
expeditionary-mil itary intelb.ge nce brigade
EMS
EW
electmmagnetic spectrum
electronic M'arfare
foreign disclosure ot.fice
FDO
FM
field manual
assistant chief of staff, intelligence
uirements managemeni

## Glossary (U)

G-2X
LounterintelligenLe dnd humiin intelligenLe .sldff elemeni
assi,stant chief of staff, operations
assitaiit cliief of sthff, logistics
assistant chief of staff, signal
assistant chief of staff, civil affairs operations
GEOINT
geospitial intelligence
high-payoff targci
FIVT
high-value larget
HVTL
high-value target lisi
HUMINT
hum<in intelligence
IADS
integrated air defense system
ICD
inllIgenCe community directive
IEWTFr
Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Tactical Proficiency Trainer
INSCOM
United Stats Arniy Inielligence and Securiiy Command
INTSUM
intelligence summar),
IPB
intelligei)Le preparatioii of Ihe baiilefield
ISR
intelligence. surveillance, and reconnaissance
JFLCC
Jp
intejligence dijectorate of <1 joint staff
joint force land component commander joint publication
J'I,
joint task fnrce
Joint Worldwidc IntclligLnce Coinmunication.8 Systcm
Jwcs
IDMP
military decision-making proce$8
MASINT
measurcmcnt and signature intelligence
.METT-TC
mission, enemy, terrain and weather. troops and support available. time
available, and civil consideraLions (mission variables)
MI
military inteIligence
MIB-T
ilitary inlelligenc brigade-theater
MOS
military occupational specialty
NAI
nanied area of interest
IPRNE'I.
Nnn-cla,s.qified Internct Pmtncnl Router Netwnrk
OAKOC
observation and fields of fire, a&enues of approach, key terrain, obstacles. and
cover and conceajment (mijitary aspects of teain)
OPCON
operational control
OSINT
open-sourceintelli
PED
prLK'es.sing. exploitation: and dissemination
P
priority intelligence requirement
PMESll.PT
political, tnilitary, econoinic, social, ilifornli0n, ii)frastruciure, physical
RFI
environment, and time (oprational variables)
request for information
battalion or brigade personnel staff officer
bdlt6ilivn ur brigdde in*llignLe sliff ufficer
battalion or brigade operaiions staff officer
battalion 01- brigade logistics Staff officer
b<lttalion or brigade signal staff officer
b<1ttalion or brigade ciN'il affairs operations
SIGINT
signals intelligence
SECRET Intcrnct Protocol Routcr Nctwork
SIPRNET
.8tandard operating procedure
staff weather offiLcr
swo
TACON
tactical Lontrol
TAI
target area of interest
TECHINT
technical intelligence
TPFDD
time-phased force and deplo}'ment data
TPFDL
time-phased force and deplo)'ment lisi
TTP
tactics, technique8, and procedure
UAS
uIiinai)ned aircraft system
United States
USACIDC
Uniied States Anny Criiiinal Investigation Coiniiiand
United States Air Force
USAF

## Section11- Terms (U) Adversary (U)

(U) A party acknoNN'ledged as potenually hostsle to a friendly party and against which the use of force may be envisag1. (JP 3-0)
area defense (U)
(U) A defensive task that conccntraies on denying enemy forces access to designated terrain for a specific time rather than destroying the enemy outnght. (ADRP 3-90)
area security (11)
(U) A security task conducted to protect friendly forces. installations routes. and actions within a
,8pecific Girea. (ADRP 3-90)

## Arfor (U)

(U) The Army component and .senior Army he<idquarteT8 of all Arniy forces as.si ned or atiached to a combatant command, sutyJrdinate joint force command, joint functional command, or mullinaiional command. (FM .3-94)

## Attsck (U)

(U) An offensive thsk that destroys or defeats enemy forces, Seizes and secures terrain, or both.

(ADRP 3-90)

## Civil.Military Operations (U)

(U) Activities of a commander perfom]ed by designated civil affairs or other miliiary force.s that establish, [rintaIn, influence, or exploit relations between MiliY forces, indigenous populations, and institutions, by directly supporting Ihe attainment of objectives relating to the reesiablishment or maintenance of stability within a region or host nation. (JP 3-57)

## Glossary (U)

common opcrational picturc (U)
( U) (Arniv) A sin&lL di.%plly l)r rLIL N'dlli infL)riniili()n Hiiihin il LuiiifiiiindLf'.s iifL'(I i)f iniL'rL'.s1 tiil(>rLd i()
Lhe Li%er',s requireinenis and based on Lonimon dat<1 and infoi'nicilion shared by more Lhaii one ci)nini&1nd. (ADRP 6-0)
consolidate gains (U)
( U) Acti vitie.s tLI illakc cnduri ng Ic ny tcinporary opcraii()n'il SUCLC4i.% lind sct the condition.% for Ll slciblc environnient illowino for a transjiion of conii'ol to ILgitim&lte auihoi'ities. ( ADRP I_O)
Lons()lid41ti()n ared (U)
(U) The portion ot" Ihe comniander'% area of operaiion% Ihll is de%ion<11ed 10 fc1ciliiate Ihe .secLifiLs' and taLiilily tasks IiLies,sary for the freedoiii of actioii in the clo.se ai"eL1 and to .support tlie conlinuou.s con.solidation nf uJin.%. (ADRP .I-())
counterilitelligence (U>
( U) Information gaihered and .2LlivitlLs conductcd 10 idenlif),, deLCiK'e, exploil, disrupi, or proteLI
a17ain,f l espinnane. nther intelligence activitie,f. ,faholage, nr a,s.fa.f.sin.2tion4 cnnducted Inr nr nn hehallof t'orcion pL)wer%, nroaniati()nq or per.%on.s or their agcnLs. or inicrnationc11 terroriit organiLaii()ns or
'ILtiviliL.%. ( JP !_OI ?)
coi'er (U)
(U) (Armv) A security ta,%k li) pr()tecl the In1in body by tiohiing? 10 gain tiine Ivhile alsn observing 41nd reporting infoi'm,Ition and prekenting enemy ground observltioii of and direci tirc against Ihe 111:iin body (ADRP _I-g0)
defen.sivL' task (U)
i U ) A Iciqk conduLtcd to dcfcat an cnciny aitaLk. g,iin tiinc. CLon()mizc forLLt?. dcvelop condiLion.s rdvui"Jble foi oJ"fes).%ive vr sl(Jbility iask.s. IADRP 3-0)
direct support (U)
(U) A suppoi't rclationship rcquirin(Y a t.orcc to .supporl anothcr SPCL ific forcL and aLiihorizing il to an.4w'cr dircLtly t() thL .4upp()rted forcc's rcquc.st for 41.ssislancL. (FM .I_OI
delaving operali()n (U)
(Ll ) (t)(_)D) An opcrxtion in which ,7 tnrcL' Iindcr pressiire rr1< (Ics sp,ILC tor timc by slnwin(y down thc Lneniy'.% momentum Ind inflictino nilximuiii daniaoe on the eneniy without, in principle, bLcoming decisively ennaned, (JP .3-04)
eneniy (U)
( U) A pariy identified as hostile against w,hich the use ot- f-nrce is authoriLed. (ADRP .3 0)
e.stimative intelligence (IJ)
IU) IntclligLnLc that idcntifjcs; dc.scribcs, and foreLa%ts adi'crsary L&2pabililic.s ,1nd Ihe implication.s for plannino and execLltiniT niilirary opercilions. (JP ?_O)
exploitation (U)
( U) (DOD) An oft"enivc operation that u.%uallv follows a succes.sful aitack and i.s de%igiid to di%()rLliiniLe th Liieniy in Ljcpih. (JP 2-01.3)
force projeclion (U)
(U) Thc abilily IL) prnjcLt thL Inilitiir)i instrumLnt of nalir)nal power fvoni thc Unitcd Statc% or ani)thcr thLater, in respc)1lsL to rLquiremenis foi" illilitary operl1ions. (J P l.O)
general Iniliiary intelligenLe (U)
l U) Iiitell igenLe ci)ncerning Ihe military cap.1bililie.s ()f fnreiiTn c()uniries i)r orcrani 2<l1iL)n.f, nr topic.s afteLling poientlcil Uniied St<iies or multinaiiunal military opercltion.s. (JP ?_O)
guard (U)
( U) A .%LLurit J lil.%k i() pr()ILLI thL Illdin l urLL by t-jiih linLY IL) bydin timL whilL' dl,%ii ()b.%L'rvinu Lind reporting inforincltion and preventing eneTny groLind ob.servation nf and direct fire again.si the fnL1in b()d5'. Unils cnnduLting il (yuard nii.l>sioll Lilnnnt operate indLpcnden(ly becausc Lhcy relj upon tircs ind t'unLtional and multit"uncti()nal supp()rt as%ei.s ()t" the Inain bod J. (ADRP 3 90)
H-huur (U)
(U) The SPLLific hour on D-day at KvhiLh a partiLular nperiiiioll Lommence.%. (JP.S-0)
hi&Jh-vdlue target
(U) A tirgei tliL eneiiiy commandLr requii'e% f()r the SUCCLs%lul completion ot the mi.s.sion. IJP 3-61))
identity intelligence (U)
(U) Thc intLllioencc re.sulii ng froin the proce.s.sin(T of iden(ily attributLs concerni lig i ncli vidudls, byroups, network.s, or populations of intercst. l JP ?_O)
information collection (U)
(U) An aLtivitv thlt synchronies elnd intcgr1tc(i thL pliniiing .1nd employnicnl of .scnsor% lnd a.%scts cl.$
vell as the proces.sino exploitation, and di%.semination ,sy.stein% in direci support of current and future operation.s. (FM .I..551
intelligience (U)
(U) (
l ) The producl resulting from Ihe LolleLtion, proces.%ing, iniegratinn, eii(Iluaiion, anal)'si.s. and inierprLlalion of avai lable iiiformatinn c()nLLrnino l(IreigYn niltioiis, hostile or potentially hoslile t"orLe%
or elemcnt.s. or are&* ()f actual or Polenlial operation&. (2) The LQLtivities that rL%uIt in the prnduct. (I I
'I'he ni-gcllli7L1tinng enn(Iged in such activitiL,s. (.1 P 1_())
intelligencc communit.y (U)
(U) All departiiients nr agLncie(i of cl (yovernmLn( that di.e concerned with iniell igence activity, either in an ClVLLSi o lit, IiiaiiagLI"Icl1, support, Ol. P<l1't icipal()r)I I"olL. (JP 2-0)
inti'lligence nperations (U)
(U) (rlrni),) Thc task% undertaken by mililclry inielli(yenLe units Ihroijoh the iniLlligence di%ciplines to obtaiii informaii()n to .satisfy Vilidated rLquii"eInLnls. (ADIIP 2-0)
intelligenLe preparation uf the bdttlefield (U)
(11) (Arm)')'I'he %y.sleniatic prncegs nl. an<11y7.in(7 the missinii v,Iriahles ()t- eneniy. (errain, WL,
'Ither, and Ll vi l L()n.sidcratinn,s in an arLa ()t' inicrcsi to dLtLrniine (heir L ftLLt ()n ()pcraii()ns. (A TP ?_01 .3)
intelligence reacli (U)
( U) TIIC lctiviiy by w'liicli intLlligcncc orgaiiizations proc1LIii'Lly and rapidly acccs.% iiifoi'iiiation from, rcccivc .SLlPPOI-t troni. and conduct dirccl collc1boraiion and informaiioii sh1c ring wilh othcr units <1nd
4iocllLlCS, both wi tlii11 'ind out.side thL Irca (If oper1L iiollii, unc()nstrainLd by nco(7raphiL prox i niily, eL helon, or Lollllm<iiid. (ADRP 2 0)
iiitelligeiice wai"fightllig fuiiction (U)
(U) The related Icisks 1nd system.% Ihcll facilitate underst,Inding the enemy. ierrain. weather. civil Lull l%iLlcr<ili()n%, and ()Iher 4Tni fiL&tnt <l%PCLl% ()[ Ihe oper(Ili ondl envirunineni. (,4DRP .3-0)
knowledge managenient (U)
Icarning, and dcLi.%ion
(U) Thc proccs.s ot Liiabling kiiowlcdgc tlow to cnhancc shared undcrst11 ndinn niakinil (ADRP C)-())
landpower (U)
lo gain, sustiiin, and e.xploit c()ntrol nVL'r llnd,
(U) The (ibility b! threiil. forLL', or occupation I'eNources. and people. (ADRP I-O)

## Glossary (U) Local .Sccuritv (U)

(Ll ) A SLL urily tii%k thill i nLludLS1()Iv-ILVL'I %LLUrily ilLIiVi IiL'K* LUndULILd nLif d Uni I t() prLVLlIt .%Urpri%L
b), the eneniy. IADRP .3-90)

## Milithry Decision-Makinl Proces.S (U)

(U) Ali iteralive planning niethodology to undei'st.Ind the situation and niission, develop a course of Ilction, ,Ind prodLILe an opcrL1tion plan or ordcr. (ADP 5_0)

## Iiiol)Ile Defen.Se (U)

( Ll) A dcfcn%i vc lilsk thai conccnlraicli on thc de.%lruction or dcfcat ()f Ihc cncm%' IFirniJoh a dcLi%ivc aiiick bv ,1 slrik.ino force. (ADRP 3-90)

## Mubilizatiun (U)

(U) The pi"oLc%.s by which the Armed Forces of the United Statc.s 01- part of them are broughi 10 a .st<ile c)f rcadine.%.s for w'ar ()r othLr natlolllL l enicrgcncy, which include%* aLtiiiating 4111 or part of. Ihc Rc%*crvc Coinponent a%* uiell a.(1 cissembling and orgLinizing personnel, .suppliei>, and Inatcriel. (JP 4-0.S)
muveniLlI( (u Lun(<lL( (U)
( U) (,4rinv) An offensive t,18k de%ig7ned to dcvelop the situll Lion and establish i)r regain contact.

(ADRP 3-90)

## Ffensii'E Task (L,)

l U ) A lask conducted to defeat and dc.slroy encniy t"orcc.s and sciLe terrain. resources) ciiid population centers. (ADRP 3-0)

## Operational Art (U)

(U) The ci)gnitive 1pproaLh by conimander% and %t,Ift's supported by their ,Iki11. kn()wledge, experience, crLativit Jli cliid judrynieni to delelop %iraie(yie%. campaion.%, and operations to oro1nize and eniploy militc11ry forces by inie(Yratin(y end.%, way(ii clnd Iiieans. (JP .3-0)
operational environment (U)
(U) A compo%ite ()t the condition.s. circuin%ianLcs, dnd influcnce.s that <lt"fect thc Linployment ot"
CcipabililiL% and bear on Ihe deLi,sions ot. Ihe comni&inder. (JP I-O)
operational frarnew'ork l LT)
(U) A cognitive lool used to <l.S.SlSt Loininiinders and It1ft"s in clearly visualizing ind describiniy Ihe applicatinn nt" cnnihat p()wer in ti Ine, space. purpnse: and reqnui'ce% in the cniicept r)f ()perc1tinn%,
(ADP I-QI)
plannin& (U)
(Ll) TIIC 41fi aiid ticiLncc of undc1.5tidlI]t7 a Situalion, eni/iSiOnino a dCSirCd fUtUrL, and l(IVi ng Out cft'cclivc wa).s ot" bringing that futurc about. (ADP 5-0)
preparation (U)
(U) Those activities pei'fornied by units and Soldiers to iiiiproi'e their IL bility to e,xecute an operation.

(Al)P .5-())
pursuit (U)
l U ) An ott-enb ivc t<1.sk dc%igincd t() Lciich or LUI off (I h()s1 i IL t"()rLL attempt ing 10 C%LapL, Ivith Ihc ai In ot.

dc%lros'illb) it. (ADRP 3-90)
redeployment (U)
(LI) (DOD)Thc transfer or rotation of forccs and matLricl to support Llnothcr joint t-()rLe coninic1ndcr .

upcrational requirements, or to rcturn personncl, equipnient, Ind Inaiericl to thc homL andlor demL)bi Iizcltion statii)ns for reintegrcltion andlor niiiprocessing. (J P 3_15)
retirement (U)
( U) A form of rLirograde in which a force out ot" contaci nioves <lW'ay trom thL' enemy. i ADRP .3-90)
rctr)gradc (U)
(U) (Arm),) A dLfLnsivL t<isk Ihdl inv()IvL'.% urgydniLd In(>kLlliLnt (IlaY fr()In thL LllLni). (ADRP 3-90)
risk management (U)
(U) Thc pr(ILLS.S t() idcntit'y, assL.ss, and contr(Il risks and nlk( dLCI.%inn.% thai balancc ri,sk co,%l with nii%.sion beiiefi t.%. (J P 3-0)
runninky estimate (U)
(U) The conl inLlolls asAessrnent of Ihe. clirre.ni sitlliltion u.sed In delermine if the L urrenl OPLralic)n i%
proLcedino accordino i() the LnniinJndLr s intent and if thL plannLd futurc opcr,Ition.$ 1( re .4upp()rtable.

(ADP 5 0)
scientific and teLhnical intelli&ienLL (U)
IU) The product resultin(y fi'oni the collection, evalucllion, analysis cind interpretiltion of foreign scicntific and ILchniciil int"orniaiion Ih.11 LOVLrS: ,2. foreign develnpment.s in ba.%ic and iipplicd re%Larch and in appliL'd engineering technique.%; .2nd b. scientific and Icchnical char<QL leri.%lic.s, CipabililiL,%, and li Iniiclti()n,s nt. 1111 fnrei nn Inilitairy sy.4tenis, weapnn%, weapnn ,systeins, and materiel: the rese,Irch and dcvLI()pmcnt rclatcd thcrcto; and the production niethnd% ciiipli)yed for thcir IManut"aLturc. IJP 2-01)
screen (U)
(U ) A SLLUI'ity task tlial pi.i111l rily pi'cividL% Liirly WLlI l)jii(! t(I tIIL Pl'()ILctLd l(IrcL. ( ADRP 7_9())
site exploitation (U)
(U ) ( DOD) A series ()t- aLI ii'ilie.% 10 rec(Igni 7.e, cnl leci, pr()Le.%%, preserke. and (inalyze inl-()rniation, pei"sLinnel, and/or materiel f()Lind duringi tIIL L()nduct nl" ciperations. (J P 3_31)
siludliunal undersldndinkj (L)
(U) The product of applving anal)Isi.s and Judgment tn rele&ani intorm.1tion to deterniinL the rel<l1ion%liips ainoiig the operationL11 and mis.sinn iiariable.s lo facili(aie dccision mak'ing. (ADP .5.0)
striking force (U)
(U) A dediLaled counter1ttack f()rce in
1 ni()bile defense Lonstituted with the bulk of c1vc?ilcible conibal pc)wer. (.4DRP 3_()())
target inlelligence (U)
( U ) I niL Ili4eiicL that porlrclys Lind IoLates thL coiiiponents nf L1 tiirgel ()r targiet cniiiple x aiid inil IL Liles 11%
'ulner<ihilily and rel<1tive IinpnrtL1nce. (.1 P .'4_6())
threat (U)
(U ) Any conibiniiion of aciors, eniiiies, or forcLs thai hale Ihe cap<ibiliiy and inteni 10 hariii United SILltcs I'oi"LLS, Uii iicd StatL s ll<1tionc11 iiitLrc.sts, c)r tIIL IiomLlaiid, (ADRP .3-0)
trnop leading procedures (U)
(U ) A d Jllllniic proce,%.q used by qinall-unit le,2dLfs Ic) aniilyze L1 niissi()n, dLvelnp a plan, ld prepare for an operatii)n. (ADP 5-0)
warnlnx IntelllgenL'L' (U)
(U) Those i Iitelli (yence actii illLs IlltendLd In deiLct aiid rLP()rt ti me.sensi(jiie i ntell i17e nce In t'oi"Inati()n on forLign dcvclopincnt.% that t()rcwarn ()f h()NtIlL aciion% or inicntion 1 gTrain%l United Staic% cniitic%.

partiiei"s, ui" iiitei"esls. { JP ?_O)
withdrgw'al OPLhfation IU)
(U) (DOD) A planncd rcti"ogi'adc opcr1 li()n iii which a foi.cc in contacl di.senuagc,s from an cncmv forLL
'Ind m()vcs in a dircLlic)n a1*7Y from Ihc cnemj.. { JP I_17)
This page iiitentionally left blank.

## References (U)

(U) AII URLS acces.sed 011 ?6 Apri12018.

## Required Publications (U)

(Ll) ThcsL d()cunicnt,s Inu%t bc availablL to iniLnded u.%ers of Ihis publicaiion.

( U ) DOD Di('ric)IiLiri' (jf Mi/iicii-I' (Iiicl A.I'J'i)('i(Iiecl Teri71.I'. Apri l 018.

( LI ) ADP ?.0. Iiifelligeii('*. I l AiigTii%l 201 ?

(U) ADP 3-0. 0i?criiiic)11.f. 6 OLiober 20 17.

(U ) ADRP I-()? Tei-177.F Iiiid Mililii'.y' S)'17ib()I,s'. 16 Nui'embLf &*
(LI) ADRP 2-(). Iiilelli,yeiice. 31 Augu.sl 20 I2.

(U) ADRP 3.0. ()[?erili(?11.s. C) OLlober ?017.

(U) FNI .I-O.

Oi)eraiic)11.5.6
Ocioliei
?017.

## Related Publications (U)

l Ll ) Thcsie dc)ci) nicnt.8 conlai n relev1( nt %iipplLlliLnt<l1 i ntnriii<l1ion.

## Joint Publications (U)

cs.liii l/oluLtI-inLI.

(U) Most.joint publication.s w"C clvL1ilc1blL on thc Joint EILclronic Librar),: www.

(U) mo.si DOD public(Iiion% arc avc1ilable on Ihe DOD Issuances WLb.silc:
wwiv,diic,Inil 1vh.dircc[1I,..

(U ) DOD LIiFt' ()[. Wcir Mciiiicil, 15 June ?{)1.S, AvailablL online;
1111 s://www.dLfLn.%L. uok/PL)rl<il,I I /D()LulliLnis1 ub%/L(IKV-()(-Wdr~ N4(InuJl-J LIIIL-?() l .fj. df.

( U) DOD _f 24U. I -R. Pri)('ecliii'e.s Gt? I'eriiinAi i/ie Acii iJiiie.s" c)J' DUD 117ielli,ge17(:c Ci)1111?fJii(Jiil.s' Thiif A]lei'l Uiiiiecl Siaie,s Pei-3()11.f. 7 DLcembei' 198?

(U) DODD ?310.O I E. DOD Deluiiic)e Pri.)8rciiii. 19 Augusl &()14.

I U ) DODD .1 11 .S.09. DOD Iiile/li.{peiic'(,. Iiilerrf.)A)(Jlji)Iis, DL>iciiiiee Debi"ie/i17,g.5', ciiid ILI('IIL'(II
Qiie.s'li()niii,q.

I l OclL)bcr ?() l ?

( U) DODD 5148.13. Iiilvlli,yiJii(:e Oi'vi".iii,Iif. ?G Api-j l ?()17.

( U ) DOD M 5240.0 l . PrcJc'ecliii"(J,s GcJi'ei'iiiiR Ilie C()Iicliici c)f DOD Iiilelli.gc)ncE' A ('li I'jlj(l.I',
8 Auou.(il 2016.

( l J) ,1P2-().

.Ic)iiir IiiiElli,geAiz('e. ??

()clnher
21)13.

( U ) J P 2-0 l . Jniiil 1117d hfali017al Iiifi,Iligei?L'c' Sui?p(?ri i(? Mililcii'i, Opt'i'aiinii,s. i J uly )017.

( U ) J p '?_O l ? C()Iiiilvi-Iiilelli,L'nc'v uiicl H11117un Iiiit,IIIAJeiiL'I' iii Jfjilll OiJgi'idli(Jii,s' (S ). () Api i l 1()16. This
.Inil/'dLi%/iiidcA.

indLx='?

publicilion is cla.8sificd. Accc.s.s inform<ilion 1% av,iilciblc onl i nL:
hit %'.//'dci%.

( U) Jp 2-U1 . 3. ./iJiril Iiifelli,4)VTI('v Pi"vi)ir(Ili()11 (?f Ilig Oi?vi Iili()Iiul Eli I'l i (Iriirieiii, 21 Mil)i ?014.

( U ) JP 2-03. Gei).Ipciiicil 11itelli,()eiiL'e iii J()iiil Oi?erali()n.s. 5 July 2017.

IU) Jp 3-0. Jnitil Opei"ario17.f. 17 J4inuarv 2017.

( U) Jp _1-04. J()iiii Sliipl?c)cird Ileli'i)i?iei" Iiiicl Tilii'c?l(Jr A ii'c'i'cifr *Opei"aii0115'.* 6 DeccnibL r
?() ]
2.

( u ) JP 3-17. ,4 ir hl()bilill' C)pgrciiic)11.5. 30 Sepieinber 2011

## References (U)

I U) JP 3-31. C(?niiiiand aiid Cniilr()I fc)I" Jf)iiil Laiiil Operciiii)t7.5,. ?4 Fubruary ?()14.

( U ) J P .l_1.3. ,11)iiii Ta.L" F()r('e Heci(l(Iiiii'lE'r,5". 31 Jcill Uclry ?018.

I l J ) .1 P ."4-."1.S. /Jppli) I'ip?gJJ/ diiil Rpi/p/)Ji))'InBJii l)nprulii)11.I'. I l) .Jti nu<iry 21) I X.

(U) JP 3-57. Cii'il-Mililiir' OpL'I"ali(?n,s. I I Scpienibcr ?01.3.

IU) JP .I_(IO. Jfjiiil 7ar,iJE'liri&,, 3 l Jaiiuai-y 201_3.

(U) JP 4-05. J()iiil M()bili.-dli017 Plciiii,1,. I l Febru<1ry 1014.

(U) JP 5-0. Jr?iiil Plaiini17,g, 16 Junc ?017.

## Arniy Publications (U)

(U) M()%t Ai"Iiiy dol Ii'i Iial publ iLatiQlls &we avai lable oli IIIL Ai'niy Publi%liiiig DirectoratL website;
Lib,s.c1rni htl s://<irin
.mil.

ju) ADP 1-01. D()L'lriiie Prijiiei., ? Sepiember ?014.

(U) ADP 3-07. Sicihilili. -31 ALlgYLl8t ?() I ?

( U ) ADP .I-?8. DE'fEn.se' Siippi)rl fjf Cii'il A Iiilic)rilit'.i.. ?6 J uly 012.

( U) ADP .3-9(), Olfeii.%e cind De[eii.sc,. .31 Augiu.sl 2012.

( I l ) A l)P 4-(). ,S'i.i.fl(J111117enl. .1 l .lu ly 2()12.

I'U) ADP .S-(l. TIIL, Opei-Iiii()11.s' Pri)L'L?.s,s, 17 M,iy 7012.

( U ) AD RP I -().3. Tlie A 1111 I, L/iii I'er,rul TLI.sl. Li.1. ! OLlol)ei" 2()1 .5.

( U) ADRP 3-07.

.sicihilill'.

31 ,4uou(it 2012.

I'U) ADRP I-?8. De[eJi.se SLippni'l (If Cii'il Aiiili01'ilie.s'. 14 June ?O 1.1.

(U) ADRP .1-37, Pi'fJlerii(?11. 11 Au(yiisl ?012.

I U) ADRP _3-90. 0ffe17.se ciiid DefL'Ii,5e. 31 Auou.st ?O l ?

I U) ADRP 4-0. Siislciinineiii, I l July 201 ?

(U) ADRP .S-O. The Opei'uiii)Iis Prf)Le.g.I'. 17 May 201 ?

I. U) ADRP 6-0. Mi.1'.s'ic)11 Ccjininciiid. 17 May 2n12.

I LI ) AR 11-6 A I'iii' FiJrei&?11 knin&iiiciA?e, PriiRI"Iiin. 18 FLbruiry ?()16.

I. U ) AR ? j_55. Tlic Dei)(Irlint'lll ()f Ilie A riii.), Fi-ec'd()111 (?( Iiifcii-Incili()17 11 L'l Pi"0,47riiip7. l Nove mber l ()C)7.

I U ) AR 350-.3 ? A I'1175' Fouiicli"I' Iiiiellixeiic'e Ti"cii11117x Pi"()8Jraiii. ? June ?()15.

I U ) AR .1 80- S. Dei)urtf17gl7t c?[ Ilie A r1711' IiiJ()1"117dli(?11 .Sc'L'iiri li, Pr(),{Iraiii. 29 September 2(K)O.

( U ) AR 3 80-1 O. F(?r('j 011 Di,I'('11?.s'111"c ciiid C()111(Ic'l.f kkiiili F()reisiii RLJJ?rc.scJnicilj l*(>.1'. 14 J uly ?015.

( U)AR 7 80-?8.

De/)6ii-IIiiviii c!I'Ilie A I"iiii: S'i)eL'ici/
Si L'Lii"ilI, S)'.s'lL'liI.16
Septeiiiber
1991
( U) AR 381.1 O. Ll ,S. A17711' 117lL'lli,getic'e Aciii'ilie.. -1 May 2007.

( U ) AR 3 8 I -20. A I"Iii' Cf)Iiiil(Jri1i1 Ili.ye111'e Pri)grciin. 25 Mav ?O l O.

(U) AR 381-26. A i-InJ' foi"eigii Maiei"iel Prc),gi'(4111 (L,). 8 Novcinber 2()17.

I, U ) AR 181-47. C)ffeii,Fii'e C()Illllei'iiiielli,qt'11L'e Opei'aii017.s. 29 Noi'Linbcr ?017,
{ U ) AR 3 8 I - 100. A riii I, Hiii?7(117 Iiilelligeiyc'i, C()Ilec'li()n Pi"c)sii'(Iiti.[. 2? February 2()16.

(U ) AR 381-10? Ariiii, C()I'ei" Prc)xi'aiii. ?9 Dcccinbcr 2()00.

( U ) AR 381-141, /nielli'Apeni'e Cn171iiigeiici' fiiii(I,r (C I,Is%ifiLd ). 16 January 20()4.

( U ) ATP ?.01 .3. 1171L,Ili,viiL'e Prei)cii'(Ili(Jii (If Ilie BLiiilefi L'l<l/B(Iiile.s1)(IL'e. l O Ni)VLiiibLI' 2014.

I U) AR S7O- l. Oi?eri11017.s Sec'iii-lli,. ?6 SLPten)ber 2014.

IU)
A TP?.Ol. Plciii RL'ciiiireiiii:171.
c117d
,I,I'.sL?,f. *Cnllcc'fic)17.* 19
ilugu.%l 2014.

IU ) ATP )_19.1 . { U) E('Iieli)11.s Al)(Ji'L C()rp.I' 117ielliAyeiiL'g nr,i)(Illj(Ilj()11,%' (S ). 17 Deceinbci- 20 15.

( U ) ATP ?_1 g.-I, Cc)ri?,f aizd Dii'i.vJi)i? Iiiielli,oL)Iice TeLl711iciiies. ?6 March ?015,
{ U)A TP
2-19.4. Brixci(IL Cc)Iiil)cii Teciiii IiilL,l/iReii('e TL'L'liii iqiie.s'.

l O FebruLiry ?O l .S.

( U ) ATP ?_?2.2-1 . Cniiiit'riiile'/li,g'llL'e Volu177e l.. Iii I'e.Ili,oalic)11.f, Aiicili's1.s (incl Pri)duc1i017, Liiid Tc('1711i('Lil SeripjL'e.F I117d S'iipi?c)rt Ac'ti i ilie.f ( U). I l DeLe m ber l ()15.

( U ) ATP ?_2?,2-2. f u) Cc.)Iiiili>i'iiilelliReiic'e 11()Iiiiie, 11.. O[)ei-cilic)11.s' aiicl C()l/ec'lic)Ji A ('li I'l lie.1 ( S ),
?? Deccmbcr 2016.

(U) ATP 2-2?.4. Tv('1711iL'(Il Iniglli,iJeiiL'e. 4 Ni)VLiiibLI' ?013.

(U) ATP 2-22.6, ( b,) ,S'i,)17cII.f Inlelli,4ien('e Tecliiiiqiie.f (TS). 17 DLcember ?n15.

IU) ATP ?_??.7. Gen.spaiial 117ie'lliReii('e. ?6 M<1rLh ?015.

(U) ATP ?_2?.8. (b,) Mea.s'iii"cYTlle'iif ciiicl Si%ri(Iliire Iiilc Ili,geiicL' (S//NF). 30 May ?() [4.

(U) ATP 2-2?.9. Open-S(Iiii"('e Iiiie/liA)eiiL'e (U). .30 June 2017.

( U ) A TP ?_2 ?..7 l . ( U) Hiii?zan Irifi,Ili,g eizcie) .Vi/itcii's' Sniirc e Oi)ercilic317.F Tec'hpiiqiie.f { S//N F-).

17 April 2()l.f.

(U) ATP ?_?2.33. (U) ?X Operali()11.S Cliid 3()14rc'(, V'alidali()rz TcclirpiqLie. (S/NFJ. 9 ,%cpiLiiibcr ?016.

( LI) ATP 3-21 .51 . Siil)iei'rLiiieLiii OiJei'ciii()11.5. 21 Fcbi Uai'y 2()18.

( U) A TP .1__14.81). CJec).I'iicilial Eii,qineei'iii,g. 22 FebrLiary ?()17.

(U) ATP .1_.19.?(). Po/icE, Inlelli,oeiice Opei'ali()11.s. 6 April 101.5.

(U ) ATP 3-()(). Tiii-geliiiA. 7 Mcly 2015.

(U) ATP .)-90.15. Silc Exi)Ic)11{Ilj()11. ?8 July ?015.

(U) ATP .1_9.1. Tlzecilei. Ari?11: Oi)eraiii)11.f. 26 Nc)vcinbcr ?014.

(U) ATP 3-94 ? DLC'P OI)L'r(Ili()IiJ'. I Septeniber
(U ) F1 ?.?? .3, Huiitriii Iiilelligeii('(' Ci)l/ec'lC)I' *O/?c)riilic)i7.1.* 6 SepiembLr ?006.

( U ) Ffvl 3-n5. Al'i?11 .gpec'iiil Oi)(Ji"{Ilj()17.1". 9 J,In Uify
( U) F1 3-12. Ci'bei".spci('e ciiicl EIL'cli'oiiiL' Wciifcire Oi?L'rtiiic?11,s'. I l April ?017.

( U) FM .3_16. Tlie A riiii, iii Miilii17CIII()17cII Opei'iili()11.f, 8 Aprjl 2014.

( l l ) .1-.19. Mililiii"I' P()Ii('c ()pei'iiii,i. ?fi Au(rusl ?(113.

( U) Ffvl 3-5(). Ariiii, Pei".5'c)Iincl Rc)L'()I'ei'),. ? Septeiiibei. ?()14.

( Ll) F] 3-55. Inf(?rJTI(Ili()11 Ci?IleL'ii(Jii. 3 fklay 201.3.

(LF) Ffvl 3-57. Ciiiil Affuirj. *Operiili()11.s.* 3 J OLtober 2n I
i.

(LT) Fkl 3-61. PiibliL' Ajfairs. Oi)ercilii)11,s. l April 2014,
( Ll ) rNI 3-9()- l . Offgii.I"e 1111(l Dc:'feii,I'e l/()Iiiiie l . ? 2 M circh ?013.

( Ll) F1 1-94. T17ealer Ai"Irii', C()i-p,S'. (Iiicl Dii'i.S'11)11 Oi?erCiiiiJ17.1'. 21 Apri l ?014.

(LI) FM 4-_3(). Orcliiance Opgrdfic)11.s. l April 2()14.

( Ll ) FNI C)-n. C()n7Jiicii7c/ei' ciiicl Srcifl Or,{J(1171.-Cllj()11 I117d Oi?eraliCJn,Y. 5 M ay ? 014.

(Ll ) Ffvl 6-01.71. Nclii'i.Jrk Oi)(;rcill()115. 14 July ?009,
(Ll) FM ?7-1 (). T17E' L(Iii' c)f Lipid Warfai'e. 18 JLily 1956
(Ll) U.S. Ariny DireLlii.'e 9016-37. U.S'. Arii71: Opcii-3c)urc'c /iilclliR'17(', Ac'lii'iliL'.5.. ?2 N()vember ?n16.

## Oteier Public.4Tion,S (U)

( U ) AJ P-2. A Iliecl J()l171 D()L'iriiie ](?r Iiiielli,gLyiic'e, C()Iiiiieri171elligeii( e aiid ,S'eciiriti'.

?? Febi'uaj-y 2016. Available 011 Ilic NATO ,Staiid<11'dizalioii OftlLe (N'SO) IVLb.sile:
hti './/n%o.nLilo. iiiUiis01.

(U ) ExLculive Ordcr 12313. Uiiiied.Siaie,f Iiiiellige32ce Ac"ljiiilie,F. 4 DccLnibcr J 981. AniLndcLI by ExeLutive Ordei- 13?84 (2()01) and 13470 (?008). Available online:
htt ;//www.archives. ()v/fLdcrcl1-rcoister/codification/exccuiivc-ordcr1l 2333.htnil.

(U) Geneva Convintions (1949). Available online:
SLd-?7-1
19.5. df.

hii
://www.l()L. iioi,/ri"/l rd/Mi l itai"
l.aw/ df/ASuL)

## References (U)

(U) Genevo Conventions. ProtoLol T (1977). Available online:
htl ,s://KvHiw.loc. ov/rr/lrd/Militar
Law/ df/A.Suh',SL:.d-?7- J 1975. df..

(U) ITague Convcntion (1899 and 1907). Available online;
hti s://www. loc <iov/rr/frd/Mili
LAW/ df/
,Sub'.%Ld-97-1 1975.. df..
(U) ICD 104. NuiicJn(Il Inielligenc'e Pi'ugr<Jm (NIP) Biiclsjel Furniulcilicjn und Ji4.s1ific.'uli(Jii, LieL'Lili(Jn,
and Perfoiwiance Fk'aluciiinn. 30 April 2013, Availablc onlinc;
ht1 s://wNw.dni. )ov/index.
h /what-we-dc)/ic-relclied- nicnus/ic-I'ellted-li nks/i Iiiel li
comniuni i -direL
(U) ICD I13, Fiinclic?nal Managei"s. 19 May 2009. Availablc onlinc:
hll %://www.dni.
h /whai-wc-di)/'
iov/iri
elatcd-meniislicel&1
d-linkdintclli
commLinit -direcli%'Ls.
(U) ICD 116. Inielligence Planiiiig, Programming, Biidgeiijig, and Evdluaii)1131;,I'reiii.
14 Scpiember 201 I. Avlilablc online: htt .s;//www.diii.
h /w'hai-w
ov/index.
o/ic-relaied~
menLis/ic-relclted-li nks/inte Ili ieiice-c()mniiinit -direCtiVe%,
(U) ICD 203. Anali'iic Staiidards. 2 Jinuary 2015. AvLiilable online:
h I,hat-Wehti s://www.diii, Tov/in
(i/IL-ri laied-1iieniislic-rLI ted-links/intelli
ene-
LomniLJnit -dir Ll.ives.
(U) ICD 204. National InlelligeiiL'e Pi'ioritlcs *FrameH'c)rk..* 2 January ?O 15. Ava.ilablc online:
h /what-we-cJn/ic-rLlate(l-IiienLI.g/ic-reliJlLd-l i nLsli Iitelli
enLehtt s:1/ww.dnI. ov/index.
L()mmunit -dirEctiN'es.
(U) Manual for Court,8-Martial United States (2016 Lditinn). Available on the Arrny Publi.%hing
Direcior<1te websile:
litt s://ar
,V df/wL
PL'B
27-
6 EDITI
FINAL. df.

(U) MI Publication 2-01.2. Esiablishing the Jnlelli8eiice Ar('hiec'ture. 4 February 2014. This MI
Doctrinc publication is availdblL on the InlLlligLnce Knowledge Network:
hti s://ikn.arm
(U) Privacy Act of 1974 (Setion 552a, Tit]e 5. United States Code). Available online:
ov/.

odL.hou.se.

"cod.hous.

(U) Title 10, United State8 Code. Armed Forces. AviiilJblc online: ht
(U) Tille 32, United Ststes Code. National Guard. Avciilable online: htt
//
(U) Title 50. United Slates Code. War and Naii()ricJl Defeii.ie. *Available* online:
IILI ://uSLudL,IIuu. ov/.

## Prescribed Forms (U)

(U) This section contains no entries.

## Referenced Forms (U)

(U) Unless otherwise indicated, DA forms are available on the Arniy Publisliiiig Directordte;
Iiu s://ann
(U) DA Forrn 2028. Rec'uminended Change,s 10 Piiblicciiii)ns and Blank Forms.

## Index (U)

(U) Enirie% are by page nuiiiber, ACE. *See* theater army, corps, battalion, 4-65, 4-66
and Cjivision.

all-source intelligence access

capabilities, 4-71

intelligence cell, 4-68, 4-69
establishing and maintaining, B-11
intelligence colleciion

capabilities, 4-70

collaboration, laciliiating, 1-20
S-2. 4-67
informationlintelligence, 1-35,
1-36
BCT, 4.524-55
all-source intelligence capabilities, 4-63
adversary, *See* threat, defined.

all-source analysis, 2-6
and defensive and offensive all-source intelligence tasks during large-scale combat operations, 5-60
and INSCOM, 4-2
products, 2-8
and large-scale ground all-source intelligence capabilities.

combat, 5-54-5-57
and multi-domain capabilities,
1-73
See theater army, corps, division, BCT, and battalion, brigade intelligence support analysis and Control element. See element, 4-62
ACE.

during the consolidation of antiaccess and area denial gains, 5-92-5-94
sysiem, 1-83, 1-85, 6.10
intelligence cell, 4-57
area defense intelligence collection and intelligence requirements, capabilities, 4-63
6-16
defined, 6-15
MI company, 4-584-61
S-2, 4-56
ARFOR
brigade combat team. *See* BCT.

corps, 4-22, 4-23
defined, 4-22
division, 4-40, 4-41
CCIR, 1-29, 1-30, 1-46, 2-24.
2-25, 3-8. 4-67, B-32, B-50
Army Universal Task List
intelligence warlightirg
CEMA, 6-39
function, 8-1
capabilities, 1-83
consideration for operating in
multiple domains, 1-71
Army, the, 5-1
Army's strategic roles, 1-79-1-85,
intelligence support to, B-58,
4-6, 5-5, 6-4
8-62, 8-65
assess, 3-47, 3-48
Cl, *5-24,* 5~75, 5-83, 5-89
operations process, 1-53
attack
and inielligence requirements,
activities, 4-26, 4-45, E-1
and force protection, D-11
as an intelligence discipline,
6-28
defined, 6-27
as INSCOM functional group,
4-2, 5-13

## Cl (Continueli

augmentation from E-MIB,
4-58
capabilities, 4-3, 4-18, 4-19,
4-344-36, 4-63, 5-15, A-3
defined, 1-6
G-2X, 4-33
linguisi requirement, F-3, F-14, F-15, F-17, F-21, F-25
operations, 5-15
requirements, 4-12
task-organized, 4-66, 5-92
civil aff airs operations intelligence support to, B-38
civil considerations effect on enemy forces, 8-25
evaluation of, 2-14
information and intelligence, B-19
intelliqence estimate tab, 2-47
collaboration. *See* intelligence reach.

collection assess, 2-30
collection coordination and intelligence requirements management process, C-13, C-14
collection management, 2-27-
2-31 , B-40-B-46, C-9

collection managgment tools,
2-27, 2-29, 2-31,
B-44
combat assessment
intelligence support to,
B.70-B-72
command relationship, 2-5, 2-47,
and ta5k-organizing MI

collection assets, 3-49-3-52
estat)lishing during inielligence

operations, 3-55

commander staff support of, 1-55
commander's critical information requirement. *See* GCIR.

## (U) Entrles Are By Paragraph Number Unless Indicated Otherwlse.

commander's role, 6-7, 6-8
cyberspace operations in intelligence, 1-46-1-53
and EW and SIGINT
integration, 2-5
common operational piclure. See cop.

complementary intelligence data mining. *See* intelligence capabilities, 2-6, 3-2, D-15
reach.

consolidate gains,1-81, 1-83, 5~5, deep operations for shaping large-scale combat operations, 6-36, 6-37

and the BCT, 5-92-5-94
and the corps, 5-85-5-88
and Ihe division. 5-89-5-91
and the theater army, 5-83,

5-84

defeat mechanisms, 2-17
delense, intelligence in, 5-61-5-64
defensive task

concurrent wilh large-scale

defined, 6-13
in large-scale combat

combat operations,
5-77-5-80

operations, 5-58-5-60

success of, 6-33

defined, 5-76
through stability tasks, 5-81

defensive task, friendly,6-13, 6-14

5-82

consolidation area

area delense, 6-15, 6-16
mobile defense, 6-17, 6-18
retrograde, 6-19-6-22

defined, 5-70
during large-scale combat

operations, 5-71-5~75

deployment, defined, D-16
direci support

COP, B.32, C-4

and intelligence operations,

3-53

division, 4.394-44

collaboration, facilitating, 1-20
defined, 1-40
updating, 1-40-1.43, 4-31,
ACE, 4-47, 4.51

5-21,
5-34, 5-63
all-source intelligence

corps, 4-22-4-24
capabilities, 4-50, 4-51

ACE, 4-304-32, 4-38
and defensive and offensive

all-source intelligence
capabilities, 4-37, 4-38
and defensive and offensive
tasks during large-scale combat operations, 5-58,
5-59, 5-62, 5-65
and large-scale ground combat, 5.47-5-53

tasks during large-scale
ground combai, 5-58, 5-59,
5-62, 5-65
and multi-domain capabilities,

and large-scale ground
1-73

combal, 5-39-5-46
and multi-domain capabilities,
consolidation area, 5-70
during the consolidation of

1-73
gains, 5-89-5-91

consolidation area, 5-70
during the consolidation of
gains, 5-85-5-88
G-2, 4.45, 4-46
intelligence cell, 4-47, 4-48
intelligence collection capabilities, 4-49
domains,
1-1,
1-67, 1-75, 1-77,
1-78, 4-21,
4-38, 4-51, 5-2, 5-9,

E-MIB, 4-34, 4-35
G-2, 4-25, 4-26
intelligence cell, 4-27-4-30
intelligence collection

capabilities, 4.36

C-4. See also multi-domain
extended battlefield.

counterintolligence. See Cl,
current intelligence, 1-6: B-59,

D-25

echelons corps and below

and operations to prevent,

analysis ot, 2-49, B-25
producing, 8-28

5-2S-5-27

cybersecurity and operations to shape,
5-16-5-18
intelligence support to, B-67
cyberspace electromagnetic electromagnetic spectrum. See activilies. *See* CEMA.

EMS.

electronic warfare. *See* EW.

E-MIB, 4-34, 4-35, 4-42

and larqe-scale ground
combat, 5-41, 5-48

augmentalion from, 4-58, 4-61
foi the conduct of large-scale
combat operations, 4-24
employment, D-24
EMS, 1-67, 1-70, 1-75, 2-5, 5-57, B-65
enemy. *See* threat, defined.

esiiniative intelligence, 1-6
event iemplate and matrix develop, 2-18
EW
and SIGINT and cyberspace operations integration, 2-5
execute MI leaders during execution,
3-46
operations process, 1-53

expeditionary-military intelligence
brigade. *See* E-MIB.

exploitation
and intelligence roquiremenis,

6-30
defined, 6-29
explosive orcjnance disposal, B-30
conduct, 2.38, 2-41 , B-51, B-56
fighting for int8lligence, 6-1-6-6
commander's role and stalf
integration, 6-7, 6-8
developing the inlormalion
collection plan, 6-38, 6-46,
6.47
doveloping the situation and
continuous information
collection, 6-55-6-58
effective *information* collection,
6-52-6-54
establishing an intelligence
architecture, 6-41-6-45

information collectioii gaps,
6-48-6-51
information requirements,
6-12-6-37
intelligence analysis, 6-9-6-11
iasks for shaping large-scale combat operations, 6-33
force generation, B-1, B-2
force projection, D-1
intelligence support to, D-1-D-7
processes, D-8-D-28

## (U) Entries Are By Paragraph Number Unless Indicated Otherwlse.

Foundry
HUMINT (continued)
leveraging, 5-16, 5-17
training, 8-3, B-6, B-7
operations, 4-2, 5-15
task-organized, 4-66, 5-91
freedom of action, 1-64, 1-72,
IADS, 1-78, 6-5, 6.10, 6-49
1-78, 1-86, 2-35, 5-29, 5-70,
5-71,
6-20
identity intelligence, 1-6
friendly forces
and large-scale combat
informalion collection
operations, 1-83
and joint ISR, C->C-8
challenges of large-scale
fusion center, C-15-C-18
during mobilization, D-1(PD-15
combat operations, 6-5
conducting Intelligence-related
missionsloperations,
G.2. See *also* theater army, corps,
2-37-2-44, B-51
and division.
and defensive and offensive
conducling, 6-1, 6-2, B-39
continuous, 6-55-6-58
defined, 3-4
directing, 2-32-2-36,
tasks during large-scale
ground combat, 5-62, 5-66,
5-67
8-47-8-49
G.2/S-2
during the consolidation of
considerations for intelligence
gains, 5-87, 5-90, 5-93
operations, 2.5
effective, 6-52-6-54
executing collection, 3-7, 3-8,

specific responsibilities, 2-4
support to the commander,
8-50
1-49, 2.1-2-5
G-2X, 4-31, 4-33, 4-47
gaps, 6-48-6-51
in the consolidation area, 5-74,
5-75
general mililary intelligence, 1-6
primary means of conducting, general support
2-25, 2-30, 3-5, 3-8, B-50
and intelligence operations, information collection plan, 2-5,
3-53
2-21,
2-34, B-49
generate intelligence knowledge, developing, 2-14, 2-3.3, 3-7,
1-21,
1-24, 1-25, B-14, B-15
5-74, 6-38, 6-46, 6-47, B-48
GEOINT
intelligence staff as an intelligence discipline, considerations, 2-35, 2-36
3-2, 5-74
MI leaders adjustment of, 3-48
information collection tasks, 2-25,
3-18, 3-48, B-39
capabilities, 4-3: 4-19, A-3
cell, 4-29, 4-69
collection, 3-29, 4-34
information environment, 1-62, geospatial intelligence. See GEOINT.

1-63, 1-67, 1~68, 1-70, 1-75,
6-4, B-11, B-62. B-69, C-4

information operations
intelligence support to,
high-valute target list
B-63-B-69
develop, 2-17
INSCOM
human intelligence. *See* HUMINT. HUMINT, 5-24, 5-75, 5-83
and BCT leadership, 5-27
and operations to shape, 5-13
functional brigades/groups, 4-2
activities, 4.48
as an intelligence discipline,
augmentalion from E-MIB,
inspections. 3-40. 3-43
iniegrated air defense sysiem.
4-61
See IADS.
capabilities, 4-3, 4-18, 4-19,
integrating processes, 2-9-2-23
4-36, 4-49, 4-63, 4-70, A-3
inlelligence
and disclosure to multinational
partners, C-24-C-27
collection, 4-34, 4-60
G-2X, 4-33
linguist requirement, F-3, F-14,
F-15, F-17
intelligence (continueo)
and operations to shape, 5-9,
5-10
as inherently joint, 5-2
categories of, 1-6
characteristics of, 1-7
defined, 1-9
devoloping networks, B-10
during deployment, D.16-D-23
during employment, D-24
during redeployment,
D-26-D-28
during the consolidation of
gains, 5.73, 5-79, 5-80, 5-86,
5.88, 5-92-5-94
in the defense, 5-61-5-64
in the ottense, 5-65-5-69
leveraging, 1-20-1-44
purpose of, 1-2-1-5
sharing and write to release,
C-19, C-20
support to deep operations,

6-37
support to security operations,
6-35
support to unique missions, B-30
sustaining capabilities, D-25
tailoring the intelligence force, B-21
intelligence analysis suppjrt to develop a position of relative advantage, 6-9-6-11
intelligence architecture,1-19, 5.31

6-38-6-40
and the BCT, 4-63, 5-92
and the commander, 1-51-1.53
and the corps, 4-36, 4-37, 5-83
and the division, 4-49, 4-50
and the theater army, 4-19,

4-20, 5-83
establishing 2-4, 5-5, 5-9, 6.1,
6-41-6-45, B-8-B-12
intelligence cell. *See* theater army,
corps, division, BCT, and
battalion.
intelligence collection capabilities,

6-41, 6-49, A-2, A-3. See also theater army: corps, division, BCT, and battalion.

intelligence community, 4-2, 4-9,
8-30, B-32, E-1

and operations to shape, 5-11,
5-13

capabilities, 4.16
defined, 1-15

## (U) Entries Are By Paragraph Number Unless Indlcated Otherwise.

intelligence database, 6-43
intelligence running estimate,
access, 5-92, B.12, B.15-B-17
developing and maintaining,

1-49, 2-43, 2-50-2-53, 4-26,
4-46, 4-69

5-4, 5-10, 5-19, B.12
intelligence staff

intelligence disciplines, 2-6, 3.2,
employed as a joint task force intelligence stalf, C~2-C-4

3-3, 5-90, A-2, B-32, C-9, D-15
and INSCOM, 4-2
intelligence summary (INTSUM),

intelligence estimate, 2-43-2-47
2-43, 2-48, 2-49

intelligence operations
intelligence: surveillance, and

and early warning of threat
reconnaissance. *Sog* ISR,

action, 3-22
intelligence warfighting function,

and sensor contact, 3-20
and support relationships, 3-53
asset capability considerations,
3-12

1-15, 1-44. 5-3, 5-20
and the corps, 4-25, 6-44
and the division, 4-45, 6-44
and the theater army, 4-9,

asset capat)ility integration,
4-16, 6-44

3-19
and winning, 5-95
challenges to meet large-scale

continuous, 3-16
defined, 3-1
during large-scale ground
combat operation requirements, 6-4

combat, 5-29-5-33
commander's considerations

freedom of maneuver/
for, 148, 6-8

movement, 3-23
defined, 1-10
leveraging the intelllgence reporting information, 3-21
support to Information architecture, 5-31
collection, 3-7
support to stability tasks, 5-82
synchronization of, 2-7, 6-1
tasks, 1-11, B-1
intelligence operations guidelines, IPB,1-49, 3-23
2-5, 3-13-3-23, 6-52
and the MDMP, 2-8
intelligence operations section, performing, 2-10-2-18: B-23
4-30, 4-30, 4-47
products, 4-21,
4-51,
4-64,
4-68, 5-12, 5-40, D-5, D-11
intelligence overwalch, B-13, 8.31
ISR asset, 5-12, C-8
Intelligen preparation of the apportioning, 3-10, battlefield. *See* IPB.

5-36-5-38
intelligence process, 1-12-1-14,
1-34, 1-44, B-30, B.32
intelligence products, 2-42-2-53, joint intelligence support, 4-2
5-4, 5-31
joint intelligence collection capabilities, 4-3
intelligence provisions and authorities, E.1-E-6
joint phasing model, 5-2-5-4
intelligence reach, 4-2, 4-16, 5-17, joint task force headquarters

operating as, G-1-C-9
5-42, B-9-8-12
collaboration, facilitating 1-20,
1-34, 1-37
data mining, 1-33, B-1>B-17,
knowledge management, 1-44, 2-2
B-19
collaboration, facilitating, 1-20
defined, 1-27-1.30
searchesiqueries, 1~31, 1-32,
8-12
landpower, 5-1
to answer requirements, 1-29,
1-30, 2-36, 3-17. D-23
defined, 5-28
employment of, 4-6, 4-21
intelligence readiness, B-3-B-7
language requirements, F-1-F-13
command language council,
intelligence requirement
F-13
command language program
delense, 6-14
otfense, 6-24
manager, F-12

language support
for intelligence operations,
F-14, F-15
sources, F-1 &-F-23
language support categories, F-2
civil allairs operations, F-8
civil mililary operations: F-6,
information, F-10, F-11
intelligence operations, F-3
multinational liaison, F.4
special operations, F-4
sustainment, F-9
large-scale combat OFerations, 5-2
against a peer threat, 1-75
and consolidating gains,
5.77-5-80
and consolidation areas,
5-70-5-74
and winning, 5-96
challenges to intelligence,
6-3-6-6
defensive and offensive tasks,
5-58-5-60
intelligence in the defense,
5-61-5-64
intelligence in the offense,
5-65-5-69
key tasks for shaping,
6.33-6-37

large-scale ground combat

against a peer threat, 1-74
and the BCT, 5-54-5-57
and Ihe corps, 5-39-5-46
and the division, 5-47-5-53
and the theater army,

5-34-5-38

conduct, 5.5, 5-28-5-33
prevail in, 1-81,
               1-83, 5-96

linguists
Army language military occupational specialties, F-17, F-18
contract linguists, F-19-F-22

determining requirements,
F-24, F-25
non-DOD trained Army
linguists, F.23
long-range fires, 1-72, 1-78, 6-5,
6-10. 6-13, 6-23, 6-24, 6-50,
6-51,
6-55
MDMP, 1-49
and the troop leading
procedures, 3-31
defined, 2.8
intelligence staff actions, 2-8

## (U) Entrles Are By Paragraph Number Unless Indicated Otherwlse.

measurement and signature
multi-domain extended
battlefield/battle,1.68-1-74
intelligence (MASINT), 5-75
as an intelligence discipline,
multinational operations, C-11
capabilities, 4-3: 4-19, 4-36,
national intelligence suppori, 4-1
collection, 3-29
national intelligence collection
MI collection asset, 2-28
capabilities, 4-3
national to tactical intelligence,
and preparation activities, 3-41
employing, 2-5, 3-13, 3-19,
3-58
1-15-1-18, 1-70
intelligence architecture, 1-19,
5.31
positioning, 4-55, D-18
providing early warnings, 3-22
reporting informalion, 3-21,
leveraging capabilities, 6-44
leveraging intelligence:
3-25, 3-58
1-20-1-44
retaining Ireedom of maneuver/
movement, 3-23
organizations, 1-20, 5-10
support to olfensive, defensive,
task-organizing, 3-49
and stability tasks, 5-2
MI company, 4-584-61
task-organizing, 4-68, 4-60
MI unit commander
offense, intelligence in, 5-65-5-69
offensive task
during planning, 3-29
MI unit staff
defined, 6-23
in large-scale combat
and intelligence operations,
operations, 5-58-5-60, 5-70
3-9-3-12
success of, 6-33

MIB-T, 4-144-19
offensive task, friendly, 6-21:
6-24

and large-scale ground
combai, 5-56
and operations lo prevent,
attack, 6-27, 6-28
exploitation: 6-29, 6-30
movement to contact, 6-25,

5-23, 5-24
6-26

and operations lo shape,
pursuit, 6-31,
6-32

5-13-5-15
open-source intelligence (OSINT)

military deception
intelligence support to, B-69
military decision-making process.
and the G-2, 5-88, 5-91
as an intelligence discipline, 3-2
capabilities, 4-3, 4-19, A-3
SeeMDMP.

operational art, 1-58-1-60

military information source
operational environment, 1-43,
1.49. 1-51,
1-53, 1.56, 1-59.

operations
intelligence supporl to, 8-65
military intelligence. *See* Ml,
military intelligence brigade-
1-67, 1-80, 2-49, 3-16, 4-37,
5-2, 5-5, 6-25, B-52
and information collection, 2-25,

Iheater. *S88* MIB-T.
6-46
and intelligence operations, mission intelligence briefing and
3-2, 3-21,
5-81
debriefing program, 2-37, 2-38, and intelligence readiness, B-52-B-54
B-3-B-5
mobile defense and intelligence requirements, and IPB, B-23, B-24
and national to tactical
6-18
intelligence, 1-17, 1-18
defined, 6-17
and the battalion intelligence mobilization, defined, D-10
cell, 4-68
and the corps intelligence cell, movement to contact
4-27
and inlelligence requirements, and the intelligence estimate,
6-26
2-43, 2-44, 2-46
defined, 6-25

operational environrnenl
(continue
and the intelligence warfighting
function, 1-10, 5-20
and winning, 5-95
defined, 1-66-1-68, B-24
G-2/S.2 responsibilily, 2-2
generate intelligence
knowledge, 1-21, 1-24, 1-25,
B-14
situational understanding of,
1-68, B-8, C-3, C-4
visualizing, 1-40, 1-45, 2-8
operational framework
components, 1-64
considerations, 1-62, 1-63
defined, 1-61
operational variables, 1-43, 1-67,
B-23, 8-24, 8-64
operations process, 3-1, 3-24
i n intelligence operations,
3-25-3-48
integration of intelligence,
1-49-1-53
operations security

intelligence support to, B-68

PED, 1-19
expeditionary PED, 5-42, D-20
intelligence PED, 1-30, 1-52,
3-12, 4-56, D-4, D-6, D-12, D-15, D-20, D-25
reach PED, 1-29, 5-14, 5-23, D-20
peer threat, 1-73, 1-76-1-78,
1-81-1-84, 2-1,
5-30. 5-32, 6-5, personnel recovery, B-30
intelligence support to, 2-37,
2-41, B-57
PIR, 1-51,
1-53, 2-4, 2-7, 2-49,
3-17, 4-67, 4-69, 5-11, 5-12,
5-54, 6-8, 6-46, D-4

## Plan

defined, 3-26
MI unit commander, 3-29
mission planning, 3-27, 3-28
operations process, 1-51
troop leading procedures,

3-30-3-40

police intelligence operations

conduct, B-32-B-37

position of relative advantage,

1-71, 1-84, 2-6, 6-9-6-11
and the peer threat, 1-76
and prevent activities, 5-19

## (U) Entrles Are By Paragraph Number Unless Indicated Otherwlse.

position ol relative advantage
(continueo)

during large-scale combat,

S~2, See BCT and battalion.

scientific and technical

1-73

intelligence, 1-6

shape, locus, 5-6
security operations
posting
lor shaping large-scale combat
collaboration, facililati ng, 1 ~20
operations, 6-33, 6-35
Information/intelligence, 1-39
prepare
a nd echelons corps and be(ow,

5-16-5-18

conduct rehearsals, 3-44, 3-45
during large-scale combat
operations, 5-61

and intelligence, 5-9, 5-10
and the 1heater army,
5-11-5-15

operations process, 1-52
performing inspections, 3-43
operations 10, 5-6-5.10
preparation aclivilies lor MI
collection assets, 3-41,
3-42
sharing
prevent, 1-81,
1-83, 5-5, 6-4
collaboration, facilitating, 1-20
intormationiintelligence, 1-37,
and echelons corps and below,
1-38, 1-52
5-25-5-27
and Ihe Iheater army,
SIGINT, 5-18, 5-75
5-21-5-24
and EW and cyberspace
operations to, 5-19, 5-20
operations integration, 2-5
priority intelligence requirement,
See PIR.
and EW systems, 5-69
Army SIGINT enterprise, 5-24
as an intelligence discipline,
processing, exploiiation, and
dissemination. *See* PED.
augmentation from E-MIB,

public affairs, intelligence support
4-61
to, B-64
capabilities, 4-3, 4-18, 4-19,
4-36, 4-63. 4-70, A-3
pursuit collection, 3-28, 4-34, 4-60
and intelligence requirements,
6-32
linguist requiremenl, F-3, F-14, F-17
defined, 6-31
task-organized, 4-66
signals intelligence. *See* SIGINT, readiness, 3-14. 3-15
site exploitation, 2-39, 5-92, B-56
reconnaissance support to, 2-38, 2-40, 8-51.

for shaping large.scale combat
8-55
operations, 6-33, 6-34
situation development redeployment, defined, D-26-D-28
perlorming, B-28
regionally aligned forces/units, situational understanding
4-11,
5-4, 5-11,
5-13, 5-14, 5-19
providing support to, 8-22
rehearsal, 1-22, 1-52, 3-40, 3-44, stability tasks
3-44, 5-16
and consolidating gains, 5-81,
5-82
requirement, 2-27, 2-33, 2-38, staff informing outside units/organizations, 1-57

B-43. See also CCIR, PIR, and
intelligence reach.
develop, 2-28
information requirements: 6-12

retrograde
integration, 6-7, 6-8
role in intelligence, 1-54
assisting subordinate roles,
and intelligence requirements,
1-56
6-22
supporting commanders, 1-55
defined, 6-19
forms of, 6-20, 6-21
stralegic roles. *See* Army's
sirategic roles.
risk management, 2-22, 2-23
studies, B-20
support relalionship, 2-5, 2-47,
and task-organizing MI
collection assets, 3-49, 3.53,
3-54
establishing during inielligence
operations, 3-55
largeting
intelligence support to, 2-19,
8.58-B.62
target detection, 2-21
target development, 2-20
target intelligence, 1-6
task-organizing MI collection
assets, 3-49
command relationships,
3-49-3-52
technical channels for intelligence
operations, 1-46, 2-5, 3-9,
3-55-3-58, 6-45, D-16
technical intelligence (TECHINT)
as an intelligence discipline,
capabilities, 4-3, 4-19, A-3

terrain effect on enemy forces, B-25
information and intelligence, B-17
intelligence estimate tab, 2-47
military aspects of, 2-11
theater army, 4-44-8
ACE, 4-11,
4-18, 4-21
all-source intelligence capabilities, 4-20, 4-21
and large-scale ground combat, 5-34-5-38
and rnulti-domain capabilities.

1-73
and operaiions to prevent,
5-21-5-24
and operations to shape,
5-11-5-15
during the consolidation of gains, 5-83, 5-84
G-2, 4-94-11
intelligence cell, 4-12-4-14
intell igence collection

capabilities, 4-19
MIB-T, 4-154-18
threat
efined, 1-76-1-79
capabilities, 2-15
characteristics, B-16
course of action, 1-8, 2-8, 2-46,
2-53, 3-21,
5-30, B-27, B-28

## Index (U) (U) Entries Are By Paragraph Number Unless Indicated Otherwise.

threat (coniinueo)
unified land operations, 1-1, 3-56
weather
evalualion, 2.8, 2.46, 2.53,
support to, 4-25, 4-45, 5-3,
coordinating with the Air Force
3-2, 4-38, 4-67, 5-22, 6-7,
5-29
B-26
staff weather officer, 2-4,
2-28, 4-46, 4-57, 4-69
model, 2-17
warning intelligence, 1-83, 5-31,
troop leading procedures, See
plan.
effect on enemy lorces, B-25
effects, 1-53, 2-12, 2-13, B-18
intelligence estimate tab, 2-48
win, 1-81, 5-95, 5-96
window of opportunity, 5-46, 5-53
U.S. Army Intelligence and
5-80, 6-12
defined, 1-6
provided by G-2, 4-45, 4-46
provided by S-2, 4-58
provided by theater army, 4-7,
Security Command, See
open, 1-1, 1-55, 6-7: 6-11, 6-54
identitying, 1-63, 1-68, 1-73,
5-21
INSCOM.
1-85, 2-5, 5-32, 5-33, 5-52
shaping the operational
unified action partners
visualizing, 5-57
environment, 6-11
intelligence considerations,
support to, 2-4
window ot superiority, 1-73, 1-74
C-10-C-27

This page iiitentionally left blank.

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:
MARK A. MILLEY
General, United States Army Chief of Staff Off icial:
b6
GERALD B. O'KEEFE
Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army
1817609

## Distribution:

Active Ar y, Army Ikatioiial thlard, and U.,S. Army Rcserve: To be distributed in aCcOanCe 11 ith the initial distribution niiinber (IDN) 111117, quireMents for FM 24),