# Joint Civil Affairs Operations And Joint Civil-Military Operations Planning Guide

## September 2007

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.


HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY


INTRODUCTION ........ ii CIVIL AFFAIRS ORGANIZATIONS ........ 1
United States Army........ 1 United States Navy ........ 2
United States Marine Corps........ 2
United States Air Force........ 3 United States Coast Guard ........ 4
Joint Organizations ........ 4
Joint and Multinational Organizations ........ 9
CIVIL AFFAIRS METHODOLOGY........ 12
CIVIL CONSIDERATIONS ANALYSIS ........ 15 SYSTEMS ANALYSIS OF THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT ........ 20 OBJECTIVESEFFECTSTASKS........ 23
JOINT OPERATIONS PLANNING........ 25
The Joint Operation Planning Process........ 26
Contingency Planning ........ 61
Crisis Action Planning ........ 64 Integrating Civil Affairs Planning Into the Joint Operations Planning Process........ 69
Coordination With Other Government
Agencies ........ 100 Coordination With Intergovernmental Organizations........ 103 Coordination With Nongovernmental Organizations........ 105
Additional Recommendations in Working With Intergovernmental Organizations
and Nongovernmental Organizations........ 106

INTRODUCTION

Graphic Training Aid (GTA) 41-01-004 is intended to assist Civil Affairs (CA) Soldiers and civil-military operations (CMO) staffs working in a joint environment. It will assist the user in integrating CMO considerations into a joint staff planning product in full spectrum operations. CA forces provide the military commander with expertise on the civil component of the operational environment. The commander uses CA
capabilities to analyze and influence the indigenous populace and institutions (IPI) through specific processes and dedicated resources and personnel. As part of the commander's CMO, CA forces conduct operations nested within the overall mission and intent. CA
significantly helps ensure the legitimacy and credibility of the mission by advising on how to best meet the moral and legal obligations to the civil populace affected by military operations. The key to understanding the role of CA is recognizing the importance of leveraging each relationship between the supported command and every individual, group, and organization in the operational environment to achieve a desired effect. The mission of CA forces is to engage and influence the civil populace by planning, executing, and transitioning Civil Affairs operations (CAO) in Army, joint, interagency, and multinational operations to support commanders in engaging the civil component of their operational environment in order to enhance CMO or other stated United States (U.S.) objectives before, during, or after other military operations. This GTA should be used in conjunction with Joint Publication (JP) 3-33, *Joint Task Force Headquarters;* JP 3-57, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations; JP 3-57.1, Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs; JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*; Field Manual (FM)
3-05.40, *Civil Affairs Operations*; FM 3-05.401, Civil Affairs Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures; GTA 41-01-001, Civil Affairs Planning and Execution Guide; and applicable operation plans (OPLANs).

ii This publication applies to the Active Army, the Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, and the United States Army Reserve (USAR) unless otherwise stated. The proponent of this GTA is the United States Army John F.

Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS).

Submit comments and recommended changes to Commander, USAJFKSWCS, ATTN:
AOJK-DTD-CA, Fort Bragg, NC
28310-9610. Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine nouns and pronouns do not refer exclusively to men.



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CIVIL AFFAIRS ORGANIZATIONS

United States Army

Active Army. United States Special Operations Command
(USSOCOM) maintains one Active Army CA brigade consisting of four battalions and structured to deploy rapidly and provide initial CA support to military operations. It is immediately available for contingencies and is prepared for a variety of operational environments worldwide. The unit's primary mission is to provide rapid, short-duration CA support for contingency operations. It is not designed or resourced to provide the full range of CA functional specialty skills. Unit organization may be task-organized to support theater-specific mission requirements.


U.S. Army Reserve. United States Joint Forces Command
(USJFCOM) maintains more than 90 percent of its Army CA in the USAR. These continental United States (CONUS)-based units vary in size, organization, and capability, and consist of commands, brigades, and battalions. Units are headquarters (HQ) and HQ-size organizations, and are designed around professional specialties.

These units provide functional assistance, advisory, or coordinating skills at a level of expertise not structured in Army organic staffs and units. As with Active Army units, USAR units may be task-organized for specific requirements. Their functional skills and experience in advisory and assistance roles with host nation (HN) counterparts can be applied to augment the Active Army force, support conventional and special operations, and support or conduct civil administration missions. USAR CA units can be expected to arrive in theater 30 to
45 days after Presidential Reserve Call-up for contingencies or upon mobilization.

Outside Continental United States (OCONUS) Civil Affairs Units. United States Army Pacific Command (USPACOM)
maintains one CA brigade HQ without subordinate battalions. It is not part of USJFCOM. This USAR brigade reports directly to USPACOM.


United States Navy The U.S. Navy is currently in the process of developing a Maritime Civil Affairs Group (MCAG) with the mission to assess, plan, and execute CMO in the maritime environment using Navy Expeditionary Combat Command's organic, effects-based capabilities. Composed of two squadrons (West Coast and East Coast) with up to 18 Maritime Civil Affairs Teams (MCATs) each, they are multicomponent, comprised of both Active and Reserve Sailors. Each MCAT is composed of two officers and six enlisted personnel. MCATs will provide CA capacity in port, harbor, river, and delta cities and communities; in the coastal environment; and in island environments. The first MCATs are scheduled to be operational in June 2007. The MCAG is scheduled to be fully operational in August 2008.


United States Marine Corps

The United States Marine Corps (USMC) CA units consist of two Civil Affairs groups (CAGs) that augment the capability of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF). CAGs provide a unique capability to the MAGTF as selected Marine Corps reserve units. When activated, they are capable of self-administration, but require logistical support from the MAGTF command element. The 3d CAG is located at Camp Pendleton, California. The 4th CAG is located at Anacostia, Washington, DC. Within the Active force, the legal services support section within the force service support group can provide a limited, interim CA capability by supporting the MAGTF
commander's need to plan and coordinate CAO before the CAG is activated or in conjunction with advance CAG personnel. When activated, the CAG provides CA support to a Marine expeditionary force (MEF). The CAG is organized with a group HQ and a number of CA detachments. The group HQ is organized into a command section and staff sections, along with communications, motor transport, and public health sections. The group HQ provides the nucleus of CA staff support to the MEF command element, and command and control (C2) of subordinate CA elements. In garrison, the CAG HQ is responsible for training and equipping subordinate
2
elements, preparing them for deployment, and coordinating their support to the operating forces. It maintains communications with supported MEFs, advising the MEF commander and ensuring that plans, exercises, and operations appropriately consider CMO.


Civil Affairs Detachment. A CA detachment supports the Marine expeditionary brigade (MEB) or a major subordinate command of the MEF. CA detachments may be organized with a HQ, international law team, dislocated persons/refugees team, liaison team, and three general-purpose CA teams. Although all CA elements can assist the MAGTF in planning, coordinating, and executing CMO, the CA
detachment is the smallest element that can execute the morespecialized CAO without further augmentation.


Civil Affairs Team. A CA team supports the Marine expeditionary unit or major subordinate element of the MEB. A CA team helps the MAGTF plan, coordinate, and conduct CMO, but cannot support the full range of CMO functions.


United States Air Force

The USAF does not maintain CA units. However, a variety of functional organizations and capabilities within the Air Force Reserve Command and Air National Guard (ANG), as well as the Active force, can support or complement CAO. These capabilities include legal; air mobility; chaplain; supply; health services (to include dental care and preventive medicine services); security forces;
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance;
civil engineering; bioenvironmental; and meteorological specialists who can provide operations and staff support.

In supporting combatant commanders (CCDRs), the USAF, upon request, can provide specially qualified personnel for service in Army or joint CA units as specialists in matters of primary concern to the USAF. CA-specific functions are solely performed by the ANG judge advocates. When required, CA liaisons should be provided to the USAF HQ and each deployed aerospace expeditionary force.


United States Coast Guard

The United States Coast Guard (USCG) does not maintain CA units,
but can provide support to both domestic and overseas CMO across the range of military operations. Its national defense role is to provide
nonredundant, complementary resources that support the National
Military Strategy. USCG forces can provide capabilities over a range of naval warfare duties, including battle group operations; sealift escort; search and rescue; surveillance and interdiction; visit, board, search, and seizure; aids to navigation; peace operations support; and
force protection of military shipping at U.S. sea ports of embarkation and overseas ports of debarkation.

Joint Organizations

Theater Organization. When the President and/or Secretary of
Defense (SecDef) authorize military operations, the geographic combatant commander (GCC) organizes his theater to orchestrate his joint operations with multinational and interagency activities. An integral part of this organization is the CMO staff element on the theater staff. The CMO staff cell of the theater special operations command (TSOC) provides deliberate and contingency planning, maintenance of existing plans, assessments, and support to the GCC's theater
security cooperation plan (TSCP). The Civil Affairs command (CACOM) supporting each GCC serves as the GCC's senior CA advisor (CACOM commander) and as the focal point for CMO coordination, collaboration, and consensus. The CACOM provides theater-level staff plugs to the GCC and to subordinate subunified
and Service component commands. According to FM 3-0, *Operations*, the operational framework for Army forces rests within the GCC's theater organization. CCDRs with geographic responsibilities conduct operations within an area of responsibility (AOR) (theater) assigned by the Unified Command Plan. When warranted, they designate theaters of war, theaters of operations, combat zones, and communications zones. Joint force
commanders (JFCs) at all levels may establish subordinate areas of operations (AOs). Joint doctrine discusses the assignment and responsibilities associated with theater AOs. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) provide guidance and directives to the theater commander. All unified commands have CMO staffs to advise and assist the GCC in the execution of his CMO program. They also participate in contingency and crisis action planning and, when required, deploy as a member of the deployable joint task force augmentation cell. Civil Affairs planning teams (CAPTs) from respective theater-aligned CACOMs augment the GCC, Army Service component command (ASCC) commander, and joint force land component commander staffs. CA contributions to the TSCP can include


Liaison and coordination. In coordination with (ICW) the GCC staff and U.S. Embassy Country Team, CA personnel conduct liaison with multinational forces, indigenous security forces, U.S. forces, other government agencies (OGAs), intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).

Education and training. CA Soldiers are uniquely qualified to train and prepare others for conducting TSCP activities due to their area and linguistic orientation, cross-cultural communications, and experiences in military-to-civil and HN advisory and assistance activities.

Area assessments. TSCP activities provide an ideal opportunity for CA to collect current open-source information obtained in the course of their normal duties to update assessments prior to a crisis in the GCC's AOR.


Theater Special Operations Command. Normally, C2 of special operations forces (SOF) should be executed within the SOF chain of command. The identification of a C2 organizational structure for SOF depends upon specific objectives, security requirements, and the operational environment.


The TSOC is the joint special operations (SO) command through which the GCC normally exercises operational control (OPCON) of SOF within the AOR. The exceptions are the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) and United States European Command (USEUCOM) AORs, where the TSOC exercises OPCON of CA
forces. The commander of the TSOC is also the permanent theater joint force special operations component commander (JFSOCC). He commands the TSOC and is the principal SO advisor to the GCC.

The TSOC is a subordinate unified command of a unified command or a functional component command of another permanent joint command. To provide the necessary unity of command, each GCC (except for United States Northern Command
[USNORTHCOM])
has established a TSOC as a subunified command within the geographic combatant command. The TSOC is the primary theater SOF organization capable of performing broad continuous missions uniquely suited to SOF capabilities. The TSOC commander has three principal roles:


Joint force commander. As the commander of a subunified
command, the TSOC commander is a JFC. As such, he has the authority to plan and conduct joint operations as directed by the GCC. The joint task force (JTF) commander
exercises OPCON of assigned commands and forces and normally over attached forces as well. The TSOC commander may establish a JTF that reports directly to him, such as a joint special operations task force (JSOTF), joint civil-military operations task force (JCMOTF), or joint Psychological Operations task force (JPOTF), to plan and execute these missions.

Theater SO advisor. The TSOC commander advises the GCC and the other component commanders on the proper employment of SOF. The TSOC commander may develop specific recommendations for the assignment of SOF intheater and opportunities for SOF to support the overall theater campaign plan. The role of theater SO advisor is best accomplished when the GCC establishes the TSOC commander as a special staff officer on the theater staff (in
addition to his duties as a commanderthat is, "dualhatted"). In this case, the TSOC commander may appoint a deputy as his representative to the theater staff for routine day-to-day staff matters.


Joint force special operations component commander.
When designated by the GCC, the TSOC commander will
function as a JFSOCC. This will normally be the case when the GCC establishes functional component commanders for operations, absent the establishment of a JTF. The TSOC commander can also be designated as the JFSOCC within a JTF if the scope of the operations conducted by the JTF warrants it.

Theater
Special
Operations
Command
Civil-Military
Operations Cell (J-9). Each regionally aligned TSOC has an
assigned CMO staff cell (J-9). The J-9 cell provides contingency and crisis action planning, maintenance of existing plans, and assessments and support of the GCC and TSCP. The cell also provides liaison to the regionally aligned CACOM supporting the GCC and the GCC's J-3.
Army Service Component Command Organization. The
ASCC HQ is a theater Army HQ that has three functional roles: Service component; Title 10 Service, administration, and support; and, when directed by the GCC, warfighting. The ASCC commander exercises administrative control of all assigned and attached Army forces and OPCON of those Army forces not under the OPCON of another commander. He has Title 10
Service responsibilities for the administration and support of all Army forces assigned or attached to the GCC, including Army
special
operations
forces
(ARSOF)
(CA
forces).
These
responsibilities include organization, control of resources and equipment, human resources support, logistics, individual and unit training, readiness, mobilization, demobilization, discipline, and other matters not included in the operational missions of the joint force. Thus, the ASCC commander must organize, train, equip, and maintain all Army forces in the theater, including ARSOF.
The ASCC commander, based on the factors of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations (METT-TC), tailors his organization to provide or otherwise arrange for the required administration and support of deployed Army forces, including ARSOF. To ensure the unique capabilities and requirements of ARSOF are considered in ASCC
planning and execution, there is an SO branch embedded in the G-3, Operations Division. In addition, United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) assigns an Army special operations forces liaison element (ALE) to the ASCC to coordinate logistics support for deployed ARSOF. The SO branch coordinates closely with the SOF theater staff element, ALE, and the TSOC to identify ASCC requirements for SOF support and to ensure that SOF requirements for ASCC support are adequately addressed. When directed by the GCC, the ASCC also supports and sustains designated SOF of other U.S. Services and other multinational SOF. The ASCC also has CMO staff elements embedded within the ASCC staff. If the GCC designates, the ASCC commander may act as the theater executive agent for CMO and support civil administration operations. The CACOM commander maintains oversight of all CA
forces within the theater for the GCC and the ASCC commander. The CACOM commander is the primary CA advisor to the GCC, ASCC commander, and TSOC commander. Army Service component CMO plans support the GCC's assigned political-military objectives, which are consistent with international laws, treaties, and agreements, and President and/or SecDef guidance. CA forces assist the GCC in conducting strategic planning by linking his TSCP regional engagement activities with national strategic objectives. The plan contains general instructions for relations with national, local, and military authorities. When operations extend into territories of more than one nation, several national plans may exist. The CAPT augments the ASCC CMO staff from the theater-aligned CACOM, CA brigade, or CA battalion. CA planners assist the ASCC commander in supporting the GCC's TSCP, full spectrum operations, and the Army's mission-essential tasks. CA forces and CMO planners assist the ASCC commander in achieving his goal of complementing the unified action of other Service component commands and JFCs. The ASCC commander adapts and tailors his warfighting capabilities to complement and support civil authorities and agencies at home and abroad. CA forces and CMO planners provide the ASCC commander with support and expertise to reinforce or fill critical requirements beyond the immediate capabilities of civil authorities and agencies. CA forces and CMO planners often provide assistance to civil authorities and are often decisive elements in disaster relief and crisis resolution. CA forces and CMO planners under the ASCC commander can provide sustained support to civil authorities until they no longer require military assistance.


Joint and Multinational Organizations

During joint and multinational operations, CA forces serve as a bridge to the gap between the U.S. military, HN military, civilian authorities, and the private sector supporting an operation. CAPTs from the CACOM or CA brigade provide CMO staff augmentation for joint or multinational HQ conducting CMO. U.S. military staff planning and coordination, as well as interagency activities, are the most likely mission support activities CA units undertake in a joint or multinational environment. Participating nations normally develop directives covering a multinational command's political-military objectives. These include objectives and policies for the conduct of CMO. Therefore, senior-level CA officers and noncommissioned officers are best suited to augment the CMO staffs of JFCs and multinational commanders as they develop applicable plans, policies, and programs. CA forces assist the multinational force commander (MNFC) to achieve a greater degree of unity of effort by informing him of the mandates, activities, and capabilities of IGOs and NGOs. CMO
planners factor these into the commander's assessment of conditions and resources, and integrate them into the selected concept of operations (CONOPS). CMO planners on multinational force staffs also ensure the CMO annex to the OPLAN provides guidance to the MNFC regarding relationships with and support to NGOs and IGOs operating within the AO. JP 3-16, *Multinational Operations*, provides additional guidance on CA support to joint operations.


Joint Task Force. The GCC may designate a corps and/or a division as a JTF. A JTF plans, conducts, and supports military operations on a mission or area basis. It accomplishes a specific mission or campaign of limited duration, but it can exist on a more permanent basis. During war or prolonged conflict, the JTF may control operations in a specific portion of the GCC's AOR. A JTF may be a new organization but it is often formed by augmenting an existing Service HQ with elements from other Services. CA units support JTFs by providing task-organized elements from a CA brigade to augment the JTF CMO staff. JP 3-57.1 provides further guidance on CA support to joint operations.


Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force. Although not a CA
organization, the JCMOTF will most likely have CA units at its core or as subordinate elements, and may be commanded by a CA commander. It is a special-purpose task force composed of units from two or more Services, flexible in size and composition, organized to conduct (planning, preparing for, executing, and continually assessing) CMO in a theater of operations or joint operations area (JOA). The organizational structure of Army CA brigades is designed to form the core of a JCMOTF. The expertise of CA personnel in dealing with government organizations, IGOs, NGOs, and IPI greatly enhances the opportunity for success. However, the JCMOTF may have conventional and SO forces assigned or attached to support the conduct of specific missions. (JP 3-57 provides additional information on joint CMO.) The JCMOTF, if properly chartered and established by the JFC, must meet the criteria as established in JP 3-33. A JCMOTF may be established to


Accomplish a specific contingency mission, such as foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) or support to civil administration (SCA).

Provide CMO support to U.S. or coalition military forces conducting
military
operations
concurrent
with
or
subsequent to geographic or general conflict.

Perform other operations as directed by the commander, joint task force (CJTF). A JCMOTF could

Be organized as either a stand-alone JTF or as a
subordinate unit in a JTF.

Assist other JTF unit commanders, when the amount of CMO to be accomplished exceeds the ability of the commanders' units to accomplish CMO in their AOR.

Provideas part of a larger JTFthe CJTF, through a civil-military operations center (CMOC) with linkage between the JTF and nonmilitary agencies operating in the JOA. A JCMOTF should not

Be the CMO staff augmentation for a JTF.

Have, when subordinate to a JTF, the primary responsible force for accomplishing all CMO in the JOA.

Eliminate the need for all units to train for CMO.

Eliminate the need for all commanders in the JOA to plan and conduct CMO. A JCMOTF should not be responsible for accomplishing all CMO tasks in the JOA. Service component and other task force commanders are responsible for accomplishing the CMO that they have the capability to accomplish within their assigned AO. When the need exceeds their capability, a JCMOTF can assist in meeting the shortfall.


Joint Special Operations Task Force. CA forces are organized to support SOF across full spectrum operations and throughout major combat operations, ongoing operations, and worldwide deterrence operations. The worldwide deterrence mission requires CA companies and their Civil Affairs teams (CATs) to conduct shaping operations that promote regional stability by deterring aggression and cohesion. CA forces can be drawn upon to support ongoing

operations and also act as the TSOC's civil reconnaissance (CR)
elements throughout the AOR. CA forces are organized to support SOF during ongoing operations with a battalion (minus) that is capable of conducting JSOTF (Special
Forces [SF] group)-directed operations or surging/flexing CA
capabilities to reinforce the JSOTF. The CA company (minus) depicted under ongoing operations is in direct support to a JTF that is stood up to support joint conventional operations. The CA company serves as a bridging asset until CA brigade assets can be deployed. The Active Army CA brigade, CAPTs, and CMOC provide direct support to the TSOC and the TSOC forward, as required, to be
employed to support SOF or as a bridging asset to conventional forces. The CA brigade CMOC is used to manage CMO for the TSOC. A CA battalion is apportioned to each JSOTF, and a CA company is apportioned to support Ranger regimental operations as well as other SOF operations. Active Army CA forces are structured to support JSOTF operations at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels while maintaining regional focus. The concept of CA support to the JSOTF is that a CA battalion (minus) with two CA companies supports the JSOTF, and
the CA battalion CAPT is collocated with the JSOTF HQ to assist in
CMO planning within the joint special operations area (JSOA). A CA company HQ will be collocated with each JSOTF and is capable of providing a CMOC, as directed, outside of each special operations task force (SOTF). A CAT is designated to support each SF advanced operational base (AOB), as directed. The remaining CATs are designated as a surge capability for the JSOTF commander.

CIVIL AFFAIRS METHODOLOGY

The focus of all CAO/CMO is to enable commanders to engage the civil component of their operational environment. CAO/CMO are
integrated into the conduct (plan, prepare, execute, and assess) of all operations and include those activities that establish, maintain,
influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental
and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace within an AOR, JOA, or AO. This effort focuses on assessing, monitoring, protecting, reinforcing, establishing, and transitioning political, economic, social, and cultural institutions. CA Soldiers assist commanders by conducting these operations and tasks both actively, through direct contact, and passively, through observation, research, and analysis. The CA methodology describes how CA Soldiers, elements, and units approach all CAO and CMO. It consists of six steps:


Assess.

Decide.

Develop and detect.

Deliver.

Evaluate.

Transition. The first five steps together are known as AD3E. The CA methodology is applied equally by CA Soldiers at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. At each level, it supports the commander's ability to visualize, describe, direct, and lead operations in his exercise of battle command. FM 3-05.401
provides a detailed discussion of the six steps of the CA
methodology. A brief explanation of each step is discussed below:


Assess: Assess current conditions against a defined norm or
established standards. This assessment begins at receipt of
the mission and continues through the mission analysis process focusing on defining the civil components of the
supported commander's AO. This step looks at the civil considerations of METT-TC that shape the operational environment. It is conducted for each of the 14 CA functional specialties as well as the general aspects of the AO. The product of this step is an initial estimate and
restated mission statement.


Decide: Decide who, what, when, where, why, and how to
focus CA assets and actions that support the commander's
intent, planning guidance, and CONOPS. This step
encompasses integrating CAO into unit courses of action (COAs), and analyzing and providing recommendations to
the commander for a COA decision from a CA perspective.
Upon the commander's COA decision, CA leaders refine a concept of CAO/CMO and the CAO/CMO plan. The plan directs task-organized CA elements and non-CA forces to create or observe those conditions or events that would
either mitigate or trigger a specific CAO/CMO response. It also addresses all CAO/CMO from initial response through transition to other authorities, whether they are military or civilian. The products of this step include the commander's concept for CMO, CA priorities, and the CMO annex. In addition, measures of performance (MOPs) and measures of effectiveness (MOEs) for the various related objectives
and tasks are identified.

Develop and detect: Develop rapport and relationships
with the nonmilitary participants of the operation (including the IPI) and detect those conditions or events
that would call for a specific CAO/CMO response. CA
accomplishes this step through numerous actions and operations, such as facilitating the interagency process in
the CMOC, hosting meetings, participating in selected
dislocated civilian (DC) operations, conducting CR in support of civil information management (CIM), and monitoring public information programs and CAO/CMO- related reports from the field. The products of this step include continuous assessments, revised or updated plans, formalized CMOC terms of reference, and fragmentary orders (FRAGORDs).

Deliver: Engage the civil component with planned or oncall CAO (populace and resources control [PRC], FHA,
nation assistance, SCA, and CIM)/CMO as appropriate. This step is executed according to synchronized plans by CA Soldiers, non-CA Soldiers, IGOs, NGOs, IPI, and HN assets. The product of this step is an executed mission.

Evaluate: *Evaluate the results of the executed mission*. This
step validates the CAO/CMO CONOPS and supports the management of MOPs and MOEs to assess task accomplishment and attainment of objectives. Evaluators analyze the effects of the operation (both desirable and
undesirable) based on each of the 14 CA functional
specialties, determine the sustainability of any projects or programs initiated during the execution phase, and recommend follow-on actions.

Transition: Transition CAO or CMO to follow-on CA units,
other military units, HN and IPI assets, IGOs, NGOs,
OGAs, and other civilian agencies as appropriate. This step is CA's direct contribution to a sustainable solution, and the commander's ability to secure the victory. This step is executed according to synchronized transition plans. The outcome of this step includes successful transition of authority or relief-in-place, and programs that are durable and sustainable by the follow-on force or organization.
Elements of the common problem-solving and decision-making processes used at various levels of command are embedded within the steps of the CA methodology (Figure 1, pages 16 and 17).

CIVIL CONSIDERATIONS ANALYSIS

CAO/CMO planners apply the factors of METT-TC, concentrating on the civil considerations aspect of the AO during conduct of the military decision making process (MDMP). Civil considerations are analyzed using the mnemonic ASCOPE. The six characteristics are


Areas.

Structures.

Capabilities.

Organizations.

People.

Events.

Troop-
Leading
Issue a
Warning
Order
Make a
Tentative
Plan
Issue the
Complete
Order
Start
Necessary
Movement
Procedures
Conduct a
Preliminary
or Initial
Assessment
Planning
MDMP
Crisis Action
Joint
Process
COA
Analysis
Phase 4:
COA Selection
Analyze
COAs
COA
Approval
Approve
COA
Planning
Operations
SO Operational
Conduct Mission
Analysis
Conduct Briefback
Develop Plan
or Order
Produce
Orders
Attend Mission
Conference/Orders
Briefs and Conduct
Predeployment Site
Survey
Refine Concept Into
OPLAN, CONPLAN,
Supporting Plan or
OPORD
Planning Procedures
Make a
Decision
Identify the
Problem
Receive Mission
Initiation
Phase 1:
Situation Development
Receive
Mission
Receive
Mission
Generate
Alternatives
Send CONOPS to
Mission-Tasking HQ
COA
Development
Phase 3:
COA Development
Develop
COAs
Analyze the
Alternatives
Compare the
Alternatives
Receive CONOPS
Approval
COA
Comparison
Compare
COAs
Identify Facts
and
Assumptions
Initiate the SOMPF
Mission
Analysis
Phase 2:
Crisis Assessment
Analyze
Mission
Solving Steps
Basic Problem-
CA
Assess
Methodology

Areas are key localities or aspects of the terrain within a commander's operational environment that are not normally thought of as militarily significant. Failure to consider key civil areas, however, can seriously affect the success of any military mission. CAO planners analyze key civil areas from two perspectives: How do these areas affect the military mission and how do military operations impact on civilian activities in these areas? At times, the answers to these questions may dramatically influence major portions of the COAs being considered. Structures are existing civil structures that take on many significant roles. Somesuch as bridges, communications towers, power plants, and damsare traditional high-payoff targets. Otherssuch as churches, mosques, national libraries, and hospitalsare cultural sites that are generally protected by international law or other agreements. Still others are facilities with practical applications such as jails, warehouses, schools, television stations, radio stations, and print plantsthat may be useful for military purposes. Structures analysis involves determining the location, functions, capabilities, and application in support of military operations. It also involves weighing the consequences of removing them from civilian use in terms of political, economic, religious, social, and informational implications; the reaction of the populace; and replacement costs. Civil *capabilities* can be viewed from several perspectives. The term capabilities may refer to


Existing capabilities of the populace to sustain itself, such as through public administration, public safety, emergency services, and food and agriculture systems.

Capabilities with which the populace needs assistance, such as public works and utilities, public health, public transportation, economics, and commerce.

Resources and services that can be contracted to support
the military mission, such as interpreters, laundry services, construction materials, and equipment. Local vendors, the
HN, or other nations may provide these resources and services. In hostile territory, civil capabilities include
resources that may be taken and used by military forces consistent with international law. Analysis of the existing capabilities of the AO is normally conducted based on the 14 CA functional specialties. The analysis also identifies the capabilities of partner countries and organizations involved in the operation. In doing so, CAO/CMO planners consider how to address shortfalls, as well as how to capitalize on strengths in capabilities. Civil *organizations* are organized groups that may or may not be affiliated with government agencies. They can be church groups, fraternal organizations, patriotic or service organizations, or community watch groups. They might be IGOs or the NGO community. Organizations can assist the commander in keeping the populace informed of ongoing and future activities in an AO and influencing the actions of the populace. They can also form the nucleus of humanitarian assistance programs, interim-governing bodies, civil defense efforts, and other activities. People, both individually and collectively, can have a positive, a negative, or no impact on military operations. In the context of ASCOPE, the term "people" includes civilians or nonmilitary personnel encountered in an AO. The term may also extend to those outside the AO whose actions, opinions, or political influence can affect the military mission. In all military operations, U.S. forces must be prepared to encounter and work closely with civilians of all types. When analyzing people, CA Soldiers consider historical, cultural, ethnic, political, economic, and humanitarian factors. They also identify the key communicators and the formal and informal processes used to influence people. Regardless of the nature of the operation, military forces will usually encounter various civilians living and operating in and around the supported unit's AO. To facilitate determining who they might be, it is useful to separate civilians into distinct categories. In foreign operations, these categories might include


Local nationals (town and city dwellers, farmers and other
rural dwellers, and nomads).

Local civil authorities (elected and traditional leaders at all levels of government).

Expatriates.

Foreign employees of IGOs or NGOs.

United States Government (USG) and third-nation
government agency representatives.

Contractors (U.S. citizens, local nationals, and third-nation citizens providing contract services).

Department of Defense (DOD) civilian employees.

The media (journalists from print, radio, and visual media). Civilian activities are dictated primarily by the type of environment in which they occur. Each category of civilian should be considered
separately, as their activities will impact differently, both positively
and negatively, on the unit's mission. Military operations affect civilian activities in various ways. Commanders should consider the political, economic, psychological, environmental, and legal impact of operations on the categories of civilians identified in the AO. As there are many different categories of civilians, there are many categories of civilian *events* that may affect the military mission.
Some examples are planting and harvest seasons, elections, riots, and evacuations (both voluntary and involuntary). Likewise, there are military events that impact on the lives of civilians in an AO. Some examples
are
combat
operations,
including
indirect
fires,
deployments, and redeployments. CAO/CMO planners determine what events are occurring, and analyze the events for their political, economic, psychological, environmental, and legal implications.

SYSTEMS ANALYSIS OF THE OPERATIONAL
ENVIRONMENT

Systems analysis is conducted at the theater strategic and JFC operational levels. Systems analysis defines how the physical and/or
behavioral state of an adversary's political, military, economic, social, informational, infrastructure, and other systems results from a military or nonmilitary action or set of actions. Analysis of the
20
systems data gathered details the prevailing conditions within the AO. The application of the elements of ASCOPE during systems analysis identifies the key and decisive areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events of each subsystem. For example, ASCOPE would be applied to the entire concept of "economics." The staff would ask the questions, "Where are the key and decisive areas of economic activity? Where are the key and decisive structures
(infrastructures) associated with economic activity? What are the key and decisive economic capabilities that must be engaged/restored (for example, banking)? What are the key and decisive economic organizations? What are the key and decisive economic people?

Finally, what are the key and decisive economic events?" These questions would lead to effective CONOPS, MOEs, and troops-totask analysis. This approach to the analysis of the operational environment assists in center of gravity (COG) analysis and operational design by identifying nodes (a person, place, or physical thing) that are a fundamental component of a system, and links (the behavioral, physical, or functional relationship) between the nodes. The analysis includes an assessment of the systems' and nodes' important capabilities and vulnerabilities, which enables the subsequent identification of COGs and decisive points. Figure 2, page 22, identifies COGs. Both the systems analysis and the joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE) are complementary processes that produce the awareness and understanding required to plan and execute CAO/CMO. Systems analysis is a valuable complement to the JIPOE, as it integrates an expansive spectrum of information. In reality, perfect knowledge and understanding of the adversary and environment are impossible to attain, but by applying a broader approach to understanding both, commanders are better able to move beyond situational awareness to a more comprehensive situational understanding.


A systems approach integrates people and processes, using multiple information sources and collaborative analysis to build a common, shared, holistic knowledge base of the operational environment. Systems analysis emphasizes a multidimensional approach toward situational understanding, distinguished by an analysis of the six interrelated characteristics of ASCOPE within each system. A fully developed collaborative environment is an aggregation of individuals, organizations, systems, infrastructure, and processes to create and share the data, information, and knowledge needed to plan, execute, and assess operations. It enables commanders to make more informed decisions faster than the adversary. It offers commanders and staffs the capacity to facilitate the creation of a shared situational awareness so they can plan and operate with an enhanced unity of effort. Included in the collaborative environment are the knowledge management techniques and procedures that govern collaboration within the HQ, the CMOC, and the subordinate forces. These techniques and procedures encompass the processes and databases to integrate and synchronize the command and staff activity to generate supporting information and directives, such as FRAGORDs and operational reports. Collaboration through the CIM process, automation, and decision-support capabilities all enhance the efficiency of the battle staff rhythm and the commander's decision making. The collaborative environment seeks to provide the right information to the right people at the right time in an understandable and actionable format or display.


OBJECTIVESEFFECTSTASKS

CCDRs develop theater campaign plans to accomplish multinational, national, and theater strategic objectives based on national strategic guidance received from the President and/or SecDef. Likewise, a subordinate JFC's planning supports the attainment of theater strategic objectives. At the operational level, the JFC develops operational-level objectives supported by measurable operational effects and assessment indicators. Joint operation planning uses measurable effects to relate higher-level objectives to component missions, tasks, and/or actions. The mission analysis process begins when a priority (for example, a specific nation, region, contingency, or entity) is designated by the commander. During initial mission analysis, the commander and staff ensure they understand the operational end state and associated objectives, and design the tactical end states and supporting objectives. The CA planners' civil considerations systems analysis identifies nodes and associated links for directed tasks to influence or change

system behavior and capabilities to achieve desired objectives or effects. Understanding each system's ASCOPE characteristics and their interrelationships enables a holistic perspective of the operational environment. It also increases the understanding of how individual actions on one element of the system can affect other interrelated system components. During the MDMP process, effects are planned and identified to achieve objectives. Planning is fundamentally about integrating all actions within the operational environment in time, space, and purpose to create the desired effects to achieve the commander's objectives. As a precursor to execution, planners seek to promote unity of effortto harmonize joint, combined, and interagency actions into an integrated, comprehensive plan to achieve desired effects. Joint doctrine defines effect in two ways: 1) the physical or behavioral state of a system that results from an action, a set of actions, or another effect, and 2) a result, outcome, or consequence of an action. The use of effects to describe the results of unit actions and weapons employment at the tactical level remains valid. However, the term effect has a broader meaning and generally focuses at the operational level. Effects are not descriptions of tasks to subordinate units. A specified effect describes desired or undesired conditions, generally described as behavior or capability within individual ASCOPE characteristics of the operational environment's systems that result from actions or a set of actions. An example of a desired effect is "general populace supports U.S./coalition efforts." An effect is achievable, measurable, and can support more than one objective. Effects are used to bridge the gap between objectives and tasks. Planners identify tasks that, when executed against specified key nodes, should achieve the desired effects. CAO planning is facilitated by habitual collaboration among subjectmatter experts from a wide variety of organizations, both military and OGA. Examining the operational environment across all ASCOPE
characteristics may result in the identification of additional desired effects.

During initial mission analysis, the commander and staff ensure they understand the operational end state and associated objectives, and design the tactical end states and supporting objectives. They develop
a set of desired effects that support the objectives. Equally important,
they identify a set of associated undesired effects that could adversely
influence the objective.

JOINT OPERATIONS PLANNING

Joint doctrine incorporates a systems perspective approach in the analysis of an operational environment. Systems analysis defines how military and nonmilitary actions, or sets of actions, affect the physical and/or behavioral state of an adversary's political, military, economic, social, informational, infrastructure, and other systems.
Analysis of the gathered systems data details the prevailing conditions within the JOA. Analysis of the systems data in an operational environment assists in
COG analysis and operational design by identifying nodes (a person, place, or physical thing) that are a fundamental component of a system, and links (the behavioral, physical, or functional relationship)
between the nodes. The analysis includes an assessment of the important capabilities and vulnerabilities of the systems and nodes, which enables the subsequent identification of COGs and decisive points. A systems approach integrates people and processes. The systems
approach uses multiple information sources and collaborative analysis to build a common, shared, and holistic knowledge base of the operational environment. Systems analysis emphasizes a multidimensional
approach
toward
situational
understanding.
Situational understanding occurs through the analysis of the six interrelated characteristics of ASCOPE within each system. The six CA functional areas (rule of law, governance, infrastructure, economic stability, public education and information, and public health and welfare) coincide with the systems approach to operational environment awareness of the civil component. CA functional
specialists have successfully used systems analysis to develop CA area assessments and CA area studies. (FM 3-05.40, Appendix D, provides more information on assessments and studies.) The joint operation planning process (JOPP) is an orderly, analytical planning process, which consists of a set of logical steps to analyze a mission; develop, analyze, and compare alternative COAs; select the best COA; and produce a plan or order (Figure 3, page 27). Operational design is the use of various design elements in the conception and construction of the framework that underpins a joint OPLAN and its subsequent execution. The JFC and staff use operational design elements throughout the JOPP.


The Joint Operation Planning Process

The JOPP underpins planning at all levels and for missions across the range of military operations. It applies to both supported and supporting JFCs and to joint force component commands when the components participate in joint planning. This process is designed to facilitate interaction between the commander, staff, and subordinate HQ throughout planning. The JOPP helps commanders and their staffs organize their planning activities, share a common understanding of the mission and commander's intent, and develop effective plans and orders. This planning process applies to contingency planning and crisis action planning (CAP) within the context of the responsibilities specified by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3122 series, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES). The JOPP is also used by joint organizations that have no specific JOPES responsibilities. Furthermore, the JOPP supports planning throughout the course of an operation after the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), at the direction of the President or SecDef, issues the execute order. In common application, the JOPP proceeds according to planning milestones and other requirements established by commanders at various levels. However, the CJCSM 3122 series specifies joint planning and execution community
(JPEC)
milestones, deliverables, and interaction points for contingency and crisis action plans developed per the formal JOPES process.


Step 1: Planning Initiation. The JOPP begins when an appropriate authority recognizes a potential for military capability to be employed in response to a potential or actual crisis. At the strategic level, that authoritythe President, SecDef, or CJCS initiates planning by deciding to develop military options. The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG), and related strategic guidance statements (when applicable) serve as the primary guidance to begin contingency planning. However, CCDRs and other commanders may initiate planning on their own authority when they identify a planning requirement not directed by higher authority. The CJCS may also issue a warning order (WARNORD). Military options are normally developed in combination with other nonmilitary options so that the President can respond with all the appropriate instruments of national power. Below the strategic level, crises are reported to the National Military Command Center in an operational report. This report initiates analysis at the strategic level and may result in the President, SecDef, or CJCS initiating military planning. Whether or not planning begins as described here, the CCDR may act within approved rules of engagement (ROE) in an immediate crisis. Particularly in CAP, the JFC and staff will perform an assessment of the initiating directive to determine time available until mission execution, the current status of intelligence products and staff estimates, and other factors relevant to the specific planning situation.

The JFC will typically provide initial guidance (not to be confused with the JFC's planning guidance that is a product of mission analysis), which could specify time constraints, outline initial coordination requirements, authorize movement of key capabilities within the JFC's authority, and direct other actions as necessary. Planning is continuous once execution begins. However, planning initiation during execution is still relevant when there are significant changes to the current mission or planning assumptions or the commander receives a mission for follow-on operations. The plans directorate (J-5) of the JFC's staff typically focuses on planning sequels and potential future operations, whereas the operations directorate (J-3) focuses on branch planning and current operations.


Step 2: Mission Analysis. The joint force's mission is the task or set of tasks, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason for doing so. The primary purpose of mission analysis is to understand the problem and purpose of the operation and issue appropriate guidance to drive the rest of the planning process. The JFC and staff can accomplish mission analysis through a number of logical steps. Although some steps occur before others, mission analysis typically involves substantial parallel processing of information by the commander and staff, particularly in a CAP situation. Figure 4 outlines the key inputs and outputs during mission analysis. A primary consideration for a supported CCDR during mission analysis is the national strategic end statethe broadly expressed political, military, economic, social, informational, and other conditions that should exist after the conclusion of a campaign or operation. At some point, the CCDR must also consider multinational objectives associated with coalition or alliance operations:


The supported CCDR will typically specify a military end state. Although it will mirror many of the objectives of the national strategic end state, the theater strategic end state may contain other supporting objectives and conditions. This end state will normally represent a point in time and/or circumstance beyond which the President does not require the military instrument of national power as the primary means to achieve the remaining national strategic objectives.

JFCs include a discussion of the national strategic end state in their planning guidance. Doing so ensures that joint forces understand what the President wants the situation to
look like at the conclusion of U.S. involvement. The CCDR and subordinate JFCs typically include the military end
state in their commander's intent statement.

In response to the initiating planning directive, the commander and
staff analyze the assigned mission to accomplish the following:

Assess the scope of the assigned mission, end state, objectives, and other guidance from the next-higher commander. Determine whether the mission can be accomplished in a single operation, or will likely require a campaign due to its complexity and likely duration and intensity.

Determine military objectives and the specified, implied, and essential tasks. Develop a revised mission statement.

Determine initial desired and undesired effects and key assumptions.

Analyze the operational environment with respect to mission accomplishment. This analysis should result in understanding
operational
limitations
and
other
considerations that affect execution and that bear on operational and strategic decisions. A comprehensive
systems perspective considers the interaction between the individual elements of a system and across multiple systems
(political,
military,
economic,
social,
informational, infrastructure, and others). This systems perspective is an important consideration as the staff prepares its functional estimates, such as logistics, transportation and movement, and force protection.

In a crisis action situation, determine time available from mission receipt until probable receipt of a deployment or execute order. Planning at all levels is complex, so the JFC must allocate a sufficient part of available time for subordinate and supporting commands to conduct their planning, and ensure timely transmission of accurate
planning
information
and
instructions
to
those
organizations. Although some steps are necessarily sequential, the joint force HQ and components' planning
activities will be largely parallel, with subordinates involved in collaborative planning with their higher HQ.

The primary inputs to mission analysis are the higher HQ planning directive, other strategic guidance, the JIPOE, and initial staff
estimates. The primary products of mission analysis are a restated
mission statement, the JFC's initial intent statement, the JFC's planning guidance, and the initial commander's critical information requirements (CCIRs). Restated mission statement should be a short sentence or paragraph
that describes the organization's essential task (or tasks) and
purposea clear statement of the action to be taken and the reason for doing so. The mission statement contains the elements of who, what, when, where, and why, but seldom specifies how. It forms the basis for planning and is included in the planning guidance, the planning directive, staff estimates, the commander's estimate, the CONOPS, and the completed plan. The JFC's initial intent *statement* is a clear and concise expression of the purpose of the operation and the military end state. It provides focus to the staff and helps subordinate and supporting commanders
take actions to achieve the military end state without further orders, even when operations do not unfold as planned. It also includes where the commander will accept risk during the operation. The initial intent statement normally contains the purpose and military end state as the impetus for the planning process; it could be stated verbally when time is short. The commander refines the intent statement as planning progresses. The commander's approved intent
is written in paragraph 3, "Execution," as part of the operation plan or order. A well-devised intent statement enables subordinates to decide how
to act when facing unforeseen opportunities and threats, and in

situations where the CONOPS no longer applies. This statement deals primarily with the military conditions that lead to mission accomplishment, so the commander may highlight selected objectives and desired and undesired effects. The statement can also discuss other instruments of national power as they relate to the JFC's mission and the potential impact of military operations on these instruments. The commander's intent may include the commander's assessment of the adversary commander's intent and an assessment of where and how much risk is acceptable during the operation. The *JFC's planning guidance* is developed to ensure focused and effective planning. The commander and staff develop and communicate this planning guidance, which will accompany tentative COAs to subordinate and supporting commanders for their estimates of feasibility and supportability. As a minimum, the planning guidance should include the mission statement, assumptions, operational limitations, a discussion of the national strategic end state, termination criteria, military objectives, and the JFC's initial thoughts on desired and undesired effects. The planning guidance should also address the role of agencies and multinational partners in the pending operation and any related special considerations as required. The staff assembles both facts and assumptions to support the planning process and planning guidance:


A fact is a statement of information known to be true (such
as verified locations of friendly and adversary force dispositions),
whereas
an
assumption
provides
a
supposition about the current situation or future course of events, assumed to be true in the absence of facts. Assumptions are necessary to enable the commander to complete an estimate of the situation and select the COA. Assumptions that address gaps in knowledge are critical for the planning process to continue. For planning purposes, subordinate commanders treat assumptions made by higher
HQ as true in the absence of proof to the contrary. However, they should challenge those assumptions if they
appear unrealistic. Assumptions must be continually reviewed to ensure validity.


Commanders and their staff should anticipate changes to the plan that may become necessary should an assumption prove to be incorrect. Because of their influence on
planning, the fewest possible assumptions are included in a
plan. A valid assumption has three characteristics: it is logical, realistic, and essential for the planning to continue. Assumptions are made for both friendly and adversary situations. Commanders and staffs should never assume away adversary capabilities or assume that unrealistic friendly capabilities will be available.

OPLANs developed during contingency planning may contain assumptions that cannot be resolved until a potential crisis develops. In CAP, however, assumptions should be replaced with facts as soon as possible. The staff accomplishes this by identifying the information needed to convert assumptions to facts and submitting an information request to an appropriate agency as an information requirement. If the commander needs the information to make a key decision, the information requirement can be
designated a CCIR. Although there may be exceptions, the staff should strive to resolve all assumptions before issuing
the OPORD. Operational limitations are actions required or prohibited by higher authority and other restrictions that limit the commander's freedom of action, such as diplomatic agreements, political and economic conditions in affected countries, and HN issues. A constraint is a
requirement placed on the command by a higher command that
dictates an action, thus restricting freedom of action. For example, General Eisenhower was required to liberate Paris instead of
bypassing it during the 1944 campaign in France. A restraint is a requirement placed on the command by a higher command that
prohibits an action, thus restricting freedom of action. For example, General MacArthur was prohibited from striking Chinese targets north of the Yalu River during the Korean War. Many operational
limitations are commonly expressed as ROE. Operational limitations may restrict or bind COA selection or may even impede implementation of the chosen COA. Commanders must examine the operational limitations imposed on them, understand their impacts, and develop options that minimize these impacts in order to promote maximum freedom of action during execution. Mission success criteria describe the standards for determining mission accomplishment. The JFC includes these criteria in the planning guidance so that the joint force staff and components better understand what constitutes mission success. Termination criteria typically apply to the end of a joint operation and disengagement by joint forces, which often signal the end of the use of the military instrument of national power. Mission success criteria, on the other hand, can apply to any joint operation, subordinate phase, and joint force component operation. These criteria help the JFC determine if and when to move to the next major operation or phase. The initial set of these criteria determined during mission analysis becomes the basis for assessment. Assessment uses MOPs and MOEs to indicate progress toward achieving objectives. If the mission is unambiguous and limited in time and scope, mission success criteria could be readily identifiable and linked directly to the mission statement. For example, if the JFC's mission is to evacuate all U.S. personnel from the U.S. Embassy in Grayland, then mission analysis could identify two primary success criteria: (1) all U.S. personnel are evacuated, and (2) established ROE are not violated. However, more complex operations may require MOEs and MOPs for each task, effect, and phase of the operation. For example, if the JFC's specified tasks are to ensure friendly transit through the Straits of Gray, eject Redland forces from Grayland, and restore stability along the Grayland-Redland border, then mission analysis should indicate many potential success criteriameasured by MOEs and MOPsfor each desired effect and task. Measuring the status of tasks, effects, and objectives becomes the basis for reports to senior commanders and civilian leaders on the progress of the operation. The CCDR can then advise the President

and SecDef accordingly and adjust operations as required. Whether in a supported or supporting role, JFCs at all levels must develop their mission success criteria with a clear understanding of termination criteria established by the CJCS and SecDef. Commander's
critical
information
requirements
comprise
information requirements identified by the commander as being critical to timely information management and the decision-making process that affect successful mission accomplishment. CCIRs result from an analysis of information requirements in the context of the mission and the commander's intent. The two key subcomponents are
critical friendly force information and priority intelligence requirements. The information needed to verify or refute a planning assumption is an example of a CCIR. CCIRs are not static. Commanders refine and update them throughout an operation based on actionable information they need for decision making. They are
situation-dependent, focused on predictable events or activities, timesensitive, and always established by an order or plan.

Step 3: Course of Action Development. A COA consists of the
following information: what type of military action will occur, why the action is required (purpose), who will take the action, when the action will begin, where the action will occur, and how the action will occur (method of employment of forces). The staff converts the
approved COA into a CONOPS. COA determination consists of four primary activities: COA development, analysis and war gaming, comparison, and approval. Figure 5, page 36, outlines the key inputs and outputs during COA development. To develop COAs, the staff must focus on key information necessary
to make decisions, using the data from mission analysis. The staff develops COAs to provide options to the commander. All COAs
selected for analysis should be valid. A valid COA is one that is
adequate, feasible, acceptable, distinguishable, and complete. The
staff should reject potential COAs that do not meet all five criteria. A good COA accomplishes the mission within the commander's guidance, positions the joint force for future operations, and provides
flexibility to meet unforeseen events during execution. It also gives components the maximum latitude for initiative.

Key Inputs
Key Outputs

 Embedded within COA development is the application of operational art. Planners can develop different COAs for using joint force capabilities (operational fires and maneuver, deception, or joint force organization) by varying the combinations of the elements of operational design (such as phasing, line of operations, and so forth). During COA development, the commander and staff continue risk assessment, focusing on identifying and assessing hazards to mission accomplishment. The staff also continues to revise intelligence products. The adversary's most likely and most dangerous potential COAs are considered at this point and throughout COA development.


Generally, at the theater level, each COA will constitute a theater strategic or operational concept and should outline the following:


Major strategic and operational tasks to be accomplished in the order in which they are to be accomplished.

Capabilities required.

Task organization and related communications systems support concept.

Sustainment concept.

Deployment concept.

Estimate of time required to reach mission success criteria
or termination criteria.

Concept for maintaining a theater reserve.


Step 4: Course of Action Analysis and War Gaming. The commander and staff analyze each tentative COA separately according to the commander's guidance. COA analysis identifies advantages and disadvantages of each proposed friendly COA. Analysis of the proposed COAs should reveal a number of factors, including


Potential decision points.

Task organization adjustment.

Data for use in a synchronization matrix or other decisionmaking tool.

Identification of plan branches and sequels.

Identification of high-value targets.

A risk assessment.

COA advantages and disadvantages.

Recommended CCIRs. War gaming provides a means for the commander and participants to analyze a tentative COA, improve their understanding of the operational environment, and obtain insights that otherwise might not have occurred. An objective, comprehensive analysis of tentative COAs is difficult even without time constraints. Based upon time available, the commander should war-game each tentative COA against the most probable and the most dangerous adversary COAs (or most difficult objectives in noncombat operations) identified through the JIPOE process. Figure 6, page 38, outlines the key inputs and outputs during COA analysis and war gaming.

 War gaming is a conscious attempt to visualize the flow of the operation, given joint force strengths and dispositions, adversary capabilities and possible COAs, the objective area (OA), and other aspects of the operational environment. Each critical event within a proposed COA should be war-gamed based upon time available using
the action, reaction, and counteraction method of friendly and/or opposition force interaction. The basic war-gaming method (modified to fit the specific mission and environment) can apply to noncombat as well as combat operations.

War gaming stimulates thought about the operation so the staff will obtain ideas and insights that otherwise might not have occurred.
This process highlights tasks that appear to be particularly important
to the operation and provides a degree of familiarity with operationallevel possibilities that might otherwise be difficult to achieve. The war-gaming process can be as simple as a detailed narrative effort that describes the action, probable reaction, counteraction, assets, and time used. A more comprehensive version is the "sketchnote" technique, which adds operational sketches and notes to the narrative process in order to gain a clearer picture. The most

sophisticated form of war gaming is modern, computer-aided modeling and simulation. Figure 7 shows an example of war-gaming steps.



2. Conduct War Game and Assess Results:
1. Prepare for War Game:

- List and review friendly forces. - List and review enemy forces. - List known critical events.
- Purpose of war game (identify gaps,
visualization, and so on).
- Basic methodology (for example, action,
reaction, counteraction).
- Record results.
- Determine participants. - Determine enemy COAs to
oppose.

3. Output of War Gaming:

- Select war-gaming method:
 Manual.
- Results of the war game brief:
 Potential decision points.  Governing factors.  Potential branches and sequels.
- Revised staff estimates. - Refined COAs.
 Computer-assisted.
- Select a method to record and
display war-gaming results:
 Narrative.  Sketch and note.
- Feedback through the COA decision
brief.
 War game work sheets.  Synchronization matrix.


A set of governing factors is an important output from COA analysis and war gaming. Governing factors are those aspects of the situation
(or externally imposed factors) that the commander deems critical to mission accomplishment. Potential governing factors include elements of the commander's intent and planning guidance, wargaming results, selected principles of war, external constraints, or any criteria the commander desires. However, the most important element of war gaming is not the tool used, but the people who participate. Staff members who participate in war gaming should be the individuals who were deeply involved in the development of COAs. A robust cell that can aggressively pursue the adversary's point of view when considering adversary counteraction is essential. This "red cell" role-plays the adversary commander and staff. If formed, the cell would work for the joint force HQ J-2 and typically would reside in either the joint intelligence support element or the joint planning group. The red cell develops critical decision points relative to the friendly COAs, projects adversary reactions to friendly actions, and estimates adversary losses for each friendly COA. By trying to win the war game for the adversary, the red cell helps the staff fully address friendly responses for each adversary COA. If subordinate functional and Service components establish similar cells that mirror their adversary counterparts, this red cell network can collaborate to effectively war-game the adversary's full range of capabilities against the joint force. In addition to supporting the war-gaming effort during planning, the red cell can continue to view friendly joint operations from the adversary's perspective during execution. The red-cell process can be applied to noncombat operations to help determine unforeseen or most-likely obstacles, as well as the potential results of planned operations. A synchronization matrix is a decision-making tool and a method of recording the results of war gaming. Key results that should be recorded include decision points, potential governing factors, CCIRs, COA adjustments, branches, and sequels. Using a synchronization matrix helps the staff visually synchronize the COA across time and space in relation to the adversary's possible COAs. The war game and synchronization matrix efforts will be particularly useful in identifying cross-component support resource requirements.


Step 5: Course of Action Comparison. COA comparison is an objective process whereby COAs are considered independently of each other and evaluated/compared against a set of criteria that are established by the staff and commander. The goal is to identify the strengths and weaknesses of COAs so that a COA with the highest probability of success can be selected or developed. The commander and staff develop and evaluate a list of important criteria or governing factors, consider each COA's advantages and disadvantages, identify actions to overcome disadvantages, make final tests for feasibility and acceptability, and weigh the relative merits of each. Figure 8, page 41, outlines the key inputs and outputs during COA comparison. Using the governing factors, the staff then outlines each COA, highlighting advantages and disadvantages. Comparing the strengths and weaknesses of the COAs identifies their advantages and disadvantages relative to each other. The staff may use any technique that facilitates reaching consensus on the best recommendation so that the commander can make a decision in choosing the best COA. The staff evaluates COAs using governing factors to identify the one with the highest probability of success. The selected COA should also


Mitigate risk to the force and mission to an acceptable level.

Place the force in the best posture for future operations.

Provide maximum latitude for initiative by subordinates.

Provide the most flexibility to meet unexpected threats and opportunities. Actual comparison of COAs is critical. Any technique that helps the staff provide the best recommendation and enables the commander to
make the best decision is valid. A common, proven technique is the decision matrix, which uses governing factors to assess the effectiveness of each COA. However, a decision matrix alone cannot provide decision solutions. Its greatest value is in providing a method to compare COAs against criteria that, when met, produce success.


Step 6: Course of Action Approval. The staff determines the best COA to recommend to the commander. The staff briefs the commander on the COA comparison and the analysis and wargaming results, including a review of important supporting information. This briefing often takes the form of a commander's estimate. This information could include the intent of the next two higher commanders, the current status of the joint force, the current JIPOE, and assumptions used in COA development. The commander selects a COA or forms an alternate COA based upon the staff recommendations and the commander's personal estimate, experience, and judgment. Figure 9, page 43, outlines the key inputs and outputs during COA approval. The nature of a potential contingency could make it difficult to determine a specific end state until the crisis actually occurs. In these cases, the JFC may choose to present two or more valid COAs for approval by higher authority. A single COA can then be approved when the crisis occurs and specific circumstances become clear.


Contingency planning will result in plan development, whereas CAP
typically will lead directly to OPORD development. During plan or order development, the commander and staff, in collaboration with subordinate and supporting components and organizations, expand the approved COA into a detailed joint OPLAN or OPORD by first developing an executable CONOPSthe eventual centerpiece of the operation plan or order.



The CONOPS clearly and concisely expresses what the JFC intends to accomplish and how it will be done using available resources. It describes how the actions of the joint force components and supporting organizations will be integrated, synchronized, and phased to accomplish the mission, including potential branches and sequels. The CONOPS


States the commander's intent.

Describes the central approach the JFC intends to take to accomplish the mission.

Provides for the application, sequencing, synchronization, and integration of forces and capabilities in time, space, and purpose (including those of multinational and interagency organizations, as appropriate).

Describes when, where, and under what conditions the supported commander intends to give or refuse battle, if required.

Focuses on friendly and adversary COGs and their associated critical vulnerabilities.

Avoids discernible patterns and makes full use of ambiguity and deception.

Provides for controlling the tempo of the operation.

Visualizes the campaign in terms of the forces and functions involved.

Relates the joint force's objectives and desired effects to
those of the next-higher command and other organizations as necessary. This information enables assignment of tasks to subordinate and supporting commanders. The staff writes (or graphically portrays) the CONOPS in sufficient detail so that subordinate and supporting commanders understand their mission, tasks, and other requirements and can develop their
supporting plans accordingly. During CONOPS development, the
commander determines the best arrangement of simultaneous and sequential actions and activities to accomplish the assigned mission consistent with the approved COA. This arrangement of actions dictates the sequencing of forces into the OA, providing the link between the CONOPS and force planning. The link between the CONOPS and force planning is preserved and perpetuated through the time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) structure. The structure must ensure unit integrity, force mobility, and force visibility, as well as the ability to rapidly transition to branches or sequels as operational conditions dictate. Planners ensure that the
CONOPS, force plan, deployment plans, and supporting plans provide the flexibility to adapt to changing conditions and are consistent with the JFC's intent. If the scope, complexity, and duration of the military action contemplated to accomplish the assigned mission warrant a
campaign, then the staff outlines the series of military operations and associated objectives in a strategic concept. The staff develops the CONOPS for the preliminary part of the campaign in sufficient detail
to impart a clear understanding of the commander's concept of how the assigned mission will be accomplished. During CONOPS development, the JFC must assimilate many
variables under conditions of uncertainty to determine the essential
military conditions, sequence of actions, and application of capabilities and associated forces to create effects and achieve objectives. JFCs and their staffs must be continually aware of the higher-level objectives and associated desired and undesired effects that influence planning at every juncture. If operational objectives are not linked to strategic objectives, the inherent linkage or "nesting" is broken and, eventually, tactical considerations can begin to drive the overall strategy at cross-purposes. CJCSM 3122.01A, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), Volume I
(Planning Policies and Procedures), provides detailed guidance on CONOPS content and format.

Step 7: Plan or Order Development. For plans and orders developed per CJCSM 3122.01, the CJCS, ICW the supported and supporting commanders and other members of the JCS, monitors planning activities, resolves shortfalls when required, and reviews the supported commander's OPLAN
for adequacy, feasibility, acceptability, completeness, and compliance with joint doctrine. The supported commander will conduct in-progress reviews with the SecDef to confirm the plan's strategic guidance and receive approval of assumptions, the mission statement, the concept, the plan, and any further guidance required for plan refinement. If the President or SecDef decides to execute the plan, all three joint operation planning elementssituational awareness, planning, and executioncontinue in a complementary and iterative process. Figure 10 shows the plan development activities.



 Force Planning
 Feasibility Analysis
 Support Planning
 Refinement
 Nuclear Strike
 Documentation
 Deployment Planning
 Plan Review and Approval
 Shortfall Identification
 Supporting Plan Development

The JFC guides plan development by issuing a planning order (PLANORD) or similar planning directive to coordinate the activities of the commands and agencies involved. A number of activities are associated with plan development. These planning activities typically will be accomplished in a parallel, collaborative, and iterative fashion rather than sequentiallydepending largely on the planning time available. The same flexibility displayed in COA development is seen here again, as planners discover and eliminate shortfalls. The CJCSM 3122 series (JOPES) provides specific guidance on these activities for organizations required to prepare a plan per JOPES procedures. However, these are typical types of activities that other organizations also will accomplish as they plan for joint operations.

For example, a combatant command that is preparing a crisis-related OPORD at the President's direction will follow specific procedures and milestones in force planning, TPFDD development, and shortfall identification. If required, a JTF subordinate to the combatant command will support this effort even as the JTF commander and staff are planning for their specific mission and tasks. The entire JTF- specific process for joint planning fits within the overall planning process from the President and SecDef to the CJCS, the CCDR, and on down to the JTF. This process is especially close-knit between the CCDR and the JTF commander. Steps in the JTF planning process may be combined or eliminated based upon the CCDR's planning process and the time available. When planning the application of forces and capabilities, the JFC should not be completely constrained by the strategic plan's force apportionment if additional resources are justifiable and no other COA within the allocation reasonably exists. The additional capability requirements will be coordinated with the joint staff through the development process. Risk assessments will include results using both allocated capabilities and additional capabilities. Operation planning is inherently an iterative process with forces being requested and approved for certain early phases, while other forces may be needed or withdrawn for the later phases. This process is particularly complex when planning a campaign because of the potential magnitude of committed forces and length of the commitment. Finally, when making this determination, the JFC should also consider withholding some capability as an operational reserve. When developing an OPLAN, the supported JFC should designate the main effort and supporting efforts as soon as possible. This action is necessary for economy of effort and for allocating disparate forces, to include multinational forces. The main effort is based on the supported JFC's prioritized objectives. It identifies where the supported JFC will concentrate capabilities to achieve specific objectives. Designation of the main effort can be addressed in geographical
(area)
or functional terms.

Area tasks and responsibilities focus on a specific area to control or conduct operations. An example is the assignment of AOs for Army forces and Marine Corps forces operating in the same JOA. Functional tasks and responsibilities focus on the performance of continuing efforts that involve the forces of two or more Military Departments operating in the same domainair, land, sea, or spaceor where there is a need to accomplish a distinct aspect of the assigned mission. An example is the designation of the Navy component commander as the joint force air component commander when the Navy component commander has the preponderance of the air assets and the ability to effectively plan, task, and control joint air operations. In either case, designating the main effort will establish where or how a major portion of available friendly forces and assets are employed, often to attain the primary objective of a major operation or campaign. Designating a main effort facilitates the synchronized and integrated employment of the joint force while preserving the initiative of subordinate commanders. After the main effort is identified, joint force and component planners determine those tasks essential to accomplishing objectives. The supported JFC assigns these tasks to subordinate commanders along with the capabilities and support necessary to achieve them. As such, the CONOPS must clearly specify the nature of the main effort.

The main effort can change during the course of the operation based on numerous factors, including changes in the operational environment and how the adversary reacts to friendly operations.
When the main effort changes, support priorities must change to
ensure success. Both horizontal and vertical coordination within the
joint force and with multinational and interagency partners are
essential when shifting the main effort. Secondary efforts are important, but are ancillary to the main effort. They are normally designed to complement or enhance the success of the main effort
(for example, by diverting enemy resources). Only necessary
secondary effortswhose potential value offsets or exceeds the resources requiredshould be undertaken, because these efforts divert resources from the main effort. Secondary efforts normally lack the operational depth of the main effort and have fewer forces
and capabilities, smaller reserves, and more limited objectives. Force planning. The primary purposes of force planning are to influence COA development and selection based on force allocations, availability, and readiness; identify all forces needed to accomplish the supported component commanders' CONOPS with some rigor; and effectively phase the forces into the OA. Force planning consists of determining the force requirements by operation phase, mission,
mission priority, mission sequence, and operating area. It includes force allocation review, major force phasing, integration planning,
and force list structure development, followed by force list development. Force planning is the responsibility of the CCDR, supported by component commanders ICW global force management
(GFM) and USJFCOM force providers. Force planning begins early during CONOPS development and
focuses on applying the right force to the mission while ensuring force visibility, force mobility, and adaptability. The commander determines force requirements, develops a letter of instruction or time
phasing and force planning, and designs force modules to align and time-phase the forces in accordance with (IAW) the CONOPS. Major forces and elements are selected from those apportioned or allocated for planning and included in the supported commander's CONOPS by operation phase, mission, and mission priority. Service
components then collaboratively make tentative assessments of the specific sustainment capabilities required IAW the CONOPS. After the actual forces are identified (sourced), the CCDR refines the force plan to ensure it supports the CONOPS, provides force visibility, and enables flexibility. The commander identifies and resolves or reports shortfalls with a risk assessment. In CAP, force planning focuses on the actual units designated to participate in the planned operation and their readiness for deployment. The supported commander identifies force requirements as operational capabilities in the form of force packages to facilitate sourcing by the Services, USJFCOM, USSOCOM, and other force providers' supporting commands. A force package is a list (group of force capabilities) of the various forces (force requirements) that the supported commander requires to conduct the operation described in the CONOPS. The supported commander typically describes required force requirements in the form of broad capability descriptions or unit type codes, depending on the circumstances. The supported commander submits the required force packages through the joint staff to the force providers for sourcing. Force providers review the readiness and deployability posture of their available units before deciding which units to allocate to the supported commander's force requirements. Services and their component commands also determine mobilization requirements and plan for the provision of nonunit sustainment. The supported commander will review the sourcing recommendations through the GFM process to ensure compatibility with capability requirements and CONOPS. Support planning. The purpose of support planning is to determine the sequence of the personnel, logistic, and other support required to provide distribution, maintenance, civil engineering, medical support, and sustainment IAW the CONOPS. Support planning is conducted in parallel with other planning and encompasses such essential factors as


Executive agent identification.

Assignment of responsibility for base operating support.

Airfield operations.

Management of nonunit replacements.

Health service support.

Personnel management.

Financial management.

Handling of prisoners of war and detainees.

Theater civil engineering policy.

Logistic-related environmental considerations.

Support of noncombatant evacuation operations and other retrograde operations.

Nation assistance. Support planning is primarily the responsibility of the Service
component commanders and begins during CONOPS development. Service component commanders identify and update support requirements ICW the Services, the Defense Logistics Agency, and the United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM). They initiate the procurement of critical and low-density inventory items, determine host-nation support (HNS) availability, develop plans for
total asset visibility, and establish phased delivery plans for sustainment in line with the phases and priorities of the CONOPS. They also

Develop and train for battle damage repair.

Develop reparable retrograde plans.

Develop container management plans.

Develop force and line of communications protection plans.

Develop supporting phased transportation and support plans aligned to the CONOPS.

Report movement support requirements.

Service component commanders continue to refine their sustainment and transportation requirements as the force providers identify and source force requirements. During distribution planning, the supported CCDR and USTRANSCOM resolve gross distribution feasibility
questions
impacting
intertheater
and
intratheater
movement and sustainment delivery. USTRANSCOM and other transportation providers identify air, land, and sea transportation resources to support the approved CONOPS. These resources may include apportioned intertheater transportation, GCC-controlled theater transportation, and transportation organic to the subordinate commands. USTRANSCOM and other transportation providers develop transportation schedules for movement requirements identified by the supported commander. A transportation schedule does not necessarily mean that the supported commander's CONOPS
is transportation-feasible; rather, the schedules provide the most effective and realistic use of available transportation resources in relation to the phased CONOPS. Support refinement is conducted to confirm the sourcing of logistic requirements IAW strategic guidance and to assess the adequacy of resources provided through support planning. This refinement ensures support is phased IAW the CONOPS; refines support C2 planning; and integrates support plans across the supporting commands, Service components, and agencies. It ensures an effective, but minimum, logistics footprint for each phase of the CONOPS. Transportation refinement simulates the planned movement of resources that require lift support to ensure that the plan is transportation-feasible. The supported commander evaluates and adjusts the CONOPS to achieve end-to-end transportation feasibility, if possible, or requests additional resources if the level of risk is unacceptable. Transportation plans must be consistent and reconciled with plans and timelines required by providers of Service-unique combat and support aircraft to the supported CCDR. Planning must also consider requirements of international law, commonly understood customs and practices, and agreements or arrangements with foreign nations with which the United States requires permission for overflight, access, and diplomatic clearance. If significant changes are made to the CONOPS, it should be assessed for feasibility and refined to ensure it is acceptable.

Nuclear strike. Commanders must assess the military as well as political impact a nuclear strike would have on their operations. Nuclear planning guidance issued at the CCDR level is based on national-level political considerations and is influenced by the military mission. Although the U.S. Strategic Command conducts nuclear planning ICW the supported GCC and certain allied commanders, the supported commander does not effectively control the decision to use nuclear weapons. Deployment planning. Deployment planning is conducted on a continuous basis for all approved OPLANs and as required for specific crisis action plans. In all cases, mission requirements of a specific operation define the scope, duration, and scale of both deployment and redeployment operation planning. Unity of effort is paramount, since both deployment and redeployment operations involve numerous commands, agencies, and functional processes. Because the ability to adapt to unforeseen conditions is essential, supported CCDRs must ensure their deployment plans for each OPLAN or OPORD support global force visibility requirements. For a given plan, deployment planning decisions are based on the anticipated operational environment, which may be permissive, uncertain, or hostile. The anticipated operational environment dictates the type of entry operations, deployment concept, mobility options, predeployment training, and force integration requirements. Normally, supported CCDRs, their subordinate commanders, and their Service components are responsible for


Providing detailed situation information.

Mission statements by operation phase.

Theater support parameters.

Strategic and operational lift allocations by phase (for both force movements and sustainment).

HNS information and environmental standards.

Pre-positioned equipment planning guidance. Supported CCDRs must develop a deployment concept and identify specific predeployment standards necessary to meet mission
requirements. Supporting CCDRs provide trained and mission-ready forces to the supported combatant command deployment concept and predeployment standard. Services recruit, organize, train, and equip interoperable forces. The Services' predeployment planning and coordination with the supporting combatant command must ensure that predeployment standards specified by the supported CCDR are achieved, supporting personnel and forces arrive in the supported theater fully prepared to perform their mission, and deployment delays caused by duplication of predeployment efforts are eliminated. The Services and supporting CCDRs must ensure


Unit OPLANs are prepared.

Forces are tailored and echeloned.

Personnel and equipment movement plans are complete and accurate.

Command relationship and integration requirements are identified.

Mission-essential tasks are rehearsed.

Mission-specific training is conducted.

Force protection is planned and resourced.

Sustainment requirements are identified. Careful and detailed planning ensures that only required personnel,
equipment, and materiel deploy; unit training is exacting; missions
are fully understood; deployment changes are minimized during execution; and the flow of personnel, equipment, and movement of
materiel into theater aligns with the concept of operation. Movement planning integrates the activities and requirements of units
with partial or complete self-deployment capability, activities of units
that require lift support, and the transportation of sustainment and retrogrades. Movement planning is highly collaborative and is enhanced by coordinated use of simulation and analysis tools. The supported command is responsible for movement control,
including sequence of arrival, and exercises this authority through the
TPFDD and the JOPES validation process. The supported
commander will use the organic lift and nonorganic, common-user, strategic lift resources made available for planning by the CJCS.

Competing requirements for limited strategic lift resources, support facilities, and intratheater transportation assets will be assessed in terms of impact on mission accomplishment. If additional resources are required, the supported command will identify the requirements and provide rationale for those requirements. The supported commander's operational priorities and any movement constraints
(for example, assumptions concerning the potential use of weapons of mass destruction [WMD]) are used to prepare a movement plan. The plan will consider en route staging locations and the ability of these locations to support the scheduled activity. This information, together with an estimate of required site augmentation, will be communicated to appropriate supporting commanders. The global force manager and USTRANSCOM use the Joint Flow Analysis and Sustainment for Transportation model to assess transportation feasibility and develop recommendations on final portof-embarkation selections for those units without organic lift capability. Movement feasibility requires current analysis and assessment of movement C2 structures and systems, available organic strategic and theater lift assets, transportation infrastructure, and competing demands and restrictions. After coordinated review of the movement analysis by USTRANSCOM, the supported command, and the global force provider, the supported command may adjust the CONOPS to improve movement feasibility where operational requirements remain satisfied. Commander, USTRANSCOM, should adjust or reprioritize transportation assets to meet the supported commander's operational requirements. If doing so is not an option due to requirements from other commanders, then the supported commander adjusts TPFDD requirements or is provided additional strategic and theater lift capabilities using (but not limited to) Civil Reserve Air Fleet and/or Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement capabilities as necessary to achieve end-to-end transportation feasibility.

Operational requirements may cause the supported commander and/or subordinate commanders to alter their plans, potentially impacting the deployment priorities or TPFDD requirements.

Planners must understand and anticipate the impact of change. There is a high potential for a sequential pattern of disruption when changes are made to the TPFDD. A unit displaced by a change might not simply move on the next available lift, but may require reprogramming for movement at a later time. This change may not only disrupt the flow, but may also interrupt the operation. Time is also a factor in TPFDD changes. Airlift can respond to short-notice changes, but at a cost in efficiency. Sealift, on the other hand, requires longer lead times and cannot respond to change in a short period. These plan changes and the resulting modifications to the TPFDD must be handled during the planning cycles. Joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (JRSOI) planning is conducted to ensure an integrated joint force arrives and becomes operational in the AO as scheduled. Effective integration of the force into the joint operation is the primary objective of the deployment phase. The supported commander publishes supplemental instructions for time-phasing force deployment data development in the TPFDD
letter of instruction (LOI). The LOI provides operation-specific guidance for utilizing the JOPES processes and systems to provide force visibility and tracking, force mobility, and operational agility through the TPFDD and the validation process. It provides procedures for the deployment, redeployment, and rotations of the operation's forces. The LOI provides instructions on force planning sourcing, reporting, and validation. It defines planning and execution milestones and details movement control procedures and lift allocations to the commander's components, supporting commanders, and other members of the JPEC. A TPFDD must ensure force visibility, be tailored to the phases of the CONOPS, and be execution-feasible. Deployment and JRSOI refinement is conducted by the supported command ICW the joint staff, USJFCOM, USTRANSCOM, the


Services, and supporting commands. The purpose of the deployment and JRSOI refinement is to ensure the force deployment plan maintains force mobility throughout any movements, provides for force visibility and tracking at all times, provides for effective force
preparation, and fully integrates forces into a joint operation while
enabling unity of effort. This refinement conference examines
planned missions, the priority of the missions within the operation phases, and the forces assigned to those missions. By mission, the
refinement conference examines force capabilities, force size, support requirements, mission preparation, force positioning/basing, weapon systems, major equipment, force protection, and sustainment requirements. It should assess the feasibility of force closure by the commander's required delivery date and the feasibility of successful mission execution within the time frame established by the commander under the deployment concept. This refinement
conference should assess potential success of all force integration requirements. Transition criteria for all phases should be evaluated
for force redeployment or rotation requirements. For lower-priority plans that may be executed simultaneously with higher-priority plans or ongoing operations, combatant command and USTRANSCOM planners may develop several different deployment
scenarios to provide the CCDR a range of possible transportation
conditions under which the plan may have to be executed based on risk to this plan and the other ongoing operations. Doing so will help both the supported and supporting CCDRs identify risks associated with having to execute multiple operations in a transportationconstrained environment. Shortfall identification. Along with hazard and threat analysis, shortfall identification is performed throughout the plan development
process. The supported commander continuously identifies limiting factors and capabilities shortfalls and associated risks as plan development progresses. Where possible, the supported commander
resolves the shortfalls and required controls and countermeasures through planning adjustments and coordination with supporting and
subordinate commanders. If the shortfalls and necessary controls and
countermeasures cannot be reconciled, or the resources provided are
inadequate to perform the assigned task, the supported commander reports these limiting factors and assessment of the associated risk to the CJCS. The CJCS and the Service chiefs consider shortfalls and limiting factors reported by the supported commander and coordinate resolution. However, the completion of assigned plans is not delayed pending the resolution of shortfalls. If shortfalls cannot be resolved within the JSCP time frame, the completed plan will include a consolidated summary and impact assessment of unresolved shortfalls and associated risks. Feasibility analysis. This step in plan or order development is similar to determining the feasibility of a COA, except that it typically does not involve simulation-based war gaming. The focus in this step is on ensuring the assigned mission can be accomplished using available resources within the time contemplated by the plan. The results of force planning, support planning, deployment planning, and shortfall identification will affect OPLAN or OPORD feasibility. The primary factors considered are whether the apportioned or allocated resources can be deployed to the JOA when required, sustained throughout the operation, and employed effectively, or whether the scope of the plan exceeds the apportioned resources and supporting capabilities.

Measures to enhance feasibility include adjusting the CONOPS, ensuring sufficiency of resources and capabilities, and maintaining options and reserves. Refinement. During contingency planning, plan refinement typically is an orderly process that follows plan development and is associated with the plan assessment planning function. Refinement then continues on a regular basis as circumstances related to the potential contingency change. In CAP, refinement is almost continuous throughout OPLAN or OPORD development. Planners frequently adjust the plan or order based on results of force planning, support planning, deployment planning, shortfall identification, revised JIPOE, and changes to strategic guidance. Refinement continues even after execution begins, with changes typically transmitted in the form of FRAGORDs rather than revised copies of the plan or order.


Documentation. When the TPFDD is complete and end-to-end transportation feasibility has been achieved and is acceptable to the commander, the supported commander completes the documentation of the final transportation-feasible OPLAN or OPORD and coordinates distribution of the TPFDD within the JOPES network as appropriate. Plan review and approval. The plan review criteria are common to contingency planning and CAP. When the final OPLAN or OPORD is complete, the supported commander then submits it with the associated TPFDD file to the CJCS and SecDef for review, approval, or modification. The JPEC reviews the supported commander's OPLAN or OPORD and provides the results of the review to the CJCS. The CJCS reviews and recommends approval or disapproval of the OPLAN or OPORD to the SecDef. After the CJCS's review, the SecDef or President will review, approve, or modify the plan. The SecDef may delegate the approval of OPLANs to the CJCS. The President is the final approval authority for OPORDs. Figure 11, page 59, outlines the plan review criteria. Supporting plan development. Supporting commanders prepare plans that encompass their role in the joint operation. Employment planning is normally accomplished by the JFC (CCDR or subordinate JFC) who will direct the forces if the plan is executed. Detailed employment planning may be delayed when the political-military situation cannot be clearly forecast, or it may be excluded from supporting plans if employment is to be planned and executed within a multinational framework.


The supported commander normally reviews and approves supporting plans. However, the CJCS may be asked to resolve critical issues that arise during the review of supporting plans, and the joint staff may coordinate the review of any supporting plans should circumstances so warrant. Contingency planning does not conclude when the supported commander approves the supporting plans. Planning refinement and maintenance continues until the operation terminates or the planning requirement is cancelled or superseded.


Adequacy
The scope and concept of planned operations can accomplish the assigned
mission and comply with planning guidance provided. Are the assumptions valid and do they comply with strategic guidance? Planning assumptions must be reasonable and consistent with planning guidance.
Feasibility
The assigned mission can be accomplished using available resources within the
time contemplated by the plan. Can the apportioned or allocated resources be used effectively, or does the scope of the plan exceed available resources? Measures to enhance feasibility include crafting effective employment schemes, ensuring sufficiency of resources and capabilities, and maintaining options and reserves.
Acceptability
The plan is proportional and worth the expected costs. Used with the criterion of feasibility to ensure that the mission can be accomplished with available resources. Can the plan be accomplished without incurring excessive losses in personnel, equipment, materiel, time, or position? Risk management procedures can identify, assess, and control hazards and threats associated with possible accidental losses.
Completeness
The plan incorporates all tasks to be accomplished. It includes forces required, deployment concept, employment concept, sustainment concept, time estimates for achieving objectives, mission success criteria, and military end state.
Compliance With Joint Doctrine
The plan complies with joint doctrine to the maximum extent possible. Approved
joint doctrine provides a baseline that facilitates both planning and execution. The exception to this requirement is the development of multinational plans, which are the product of bilateral or multinational negotiations. These plans should adhere to applicable joint doctrine as closely as possible, but other nations and multinational organizations are not bound by U.S. joint doctrine.

 Transition is critical to the overall planning process. It is an orderly turnover of a plan or order as it is passed to those tasked with execution of the operation. It provides information, direction, and guidance relative to the plan or order that will help to facilitate situational awareness. Additionally, it provides an understanding of the rationale for key decisions necessary to ensure there is a coherent shift from planning to execution. These factors coupled together are intended to maintain the intent of the CONOPS, promote unity of effort, and generate tempo.

Successful transition ensures that those charged with executing an order have a full understanding of the plan. Regardless of the level of command, such a transition ensures that those who execute the order understand the commander's intent and CONOPS. Transition may be internal or external in the form of briefs or drills. Internally, transition occurs between future plans and future/current operations. Externally, transition occurs between the commander and subordinate commands. At higher levels of command, transition may include a formal transition brief to subordinate or adjacent commanders and to the staff supervising execution of the order. At lower levels, it might be less formal. The transition brief provides an overview of the mission, commander's intent, task organization, and enemy and friendly situation. It is given to ensure all actions necessary to implement the order are known and understood by those executing the order. The brief should include items from the order or plan, such as higher HQ
mission (tasks and intent), mission, commander's intent, CCIRs, task organization, situation (enemy and friendly), CONOPS, execution
(including branches and sequels), and planning support tools
(synchronization matrix, JIPOE products, and so on). A confirmation brief is given by a subordinate commander after receiving the order or plan. Subordinate commanders brief the higher commander on their understanding of commander's intent, their specific tasks and purpose, and the relationship between their unit's missions and the other units in the operation. The confirmation brief allows the higher commander to identify potential gaps in the plan, as well as discrepancies with subordinate plans. It also gives the commander insights into how subordinate commanders intend to accomplish their missions. Transition drills increase the situational awareness of subordinate commanders and the staff, and instill confidence and familiarity with the plan. Sand tables, map exercises, and rehearsals are examples of transition drills.


Contingency Planning

Contingency planning is planning that occurs in noncrisis situations.

A contingency is a situation that likely would involve military forces in response to natural and man-made disasters, terrorists, subversives, military operations by foreign powers, or other situations as directed by the President or SecDef. The JPEC uses contingency planning to develop plans for a broad range of contingencies based on tasks identified in the CPG, JSCP, or other planning directive. Contingency planning facilitates the transition to CAP. Plans are derived from the best available information, using forces and resources apportioned and allocated per GFM guidance.

Contingency planning encompasses the activities associated with the development of OPLANs for the deployment, employment, and sustainment of apportioned forces and resources in response to a hypothetical situation identified in joint strategic planning documents. This category of planning relies heavily on assumptions regarding the circumstances that will exist when a crisis arises. The transition from contingency planning to CAP and execution should be as seamless as possible. To ensure this, planners must develop fully documented concepts of operation that detail the assumptions, enemy forces, operation phases, prioritized missions, and force positioning. Detailed, war-gamed, refined, and fully documented contingency planning supports sound force acquisition and training in preparation for the most likely operational requirements. It also enables rapid comparison of the hypothetical conditions, operation phases, missions, and forces of the OPLAN to the actual requirements of CAP. Work performed during contingency planning allows the JPEC to develop the processes and procedures, as well as the analytical and planning expertise, that are critically needed during CAP. Contingency planning begins when a planning requirement is identified in the CPG, JSCP, or a PLANORD, and continues until the

requirement no longer exists. The JSCP links the JSPS to joint operation planning, identifies broad scenarios for plan development, specifies the type of joint OPLAN required, and provides additional planning guidance as necessary. A CCDR may also initiate contingency planning by preparing plans not specifically assigned but considered necessary to discharge command responsibilities. If a situation develops during a contingency planning cycle that warrants contingency planning but was not anticipated in the CPG/JSCP, the SecDef, through the CJCS, tasks the appropriate supported CCDR and applicable supporting CCDRs, Services, and logistics support agencies out-of-cycle to begin contingency planning in response to the new situation. The primary mechanism for tasking contingency planning outside of the CPG/JSCP cycle will be through strategic guidance statements from the SecDef and endorsed by message from the CJCS to the CCDRs. Plans are produced and adapted periodically to ensure relevancy. Contingency planning most often addresses military options requiring combat operations; however, plans must account for other types of joint operations across the range of military operations. For example, operations during Phase IV (Stabilize) of a campaign or operation and most stability operations are very complex and require extensive planning and coordination with non-DOD organizations, and with the military in support of other agencies. Contingency planning occurs in prescribed cycles IAW formally established procedures that complement and support other DOD planning cycles. ICW the JPEC, the joint staff develops and issues a planning schedule that coordinates plan development activities and establishes submission dates for joint OPLANs. The CJCS can also direct out-of-cycle contingency planning when circumstances warrant disruption of the normal planning cycle. Contingency planning encompasses four levels of planning detail, with an associated planning product for each level.


Level 1 Planning DetailCommander's Estimate. This level of planning involves the least amount of detail and focuses on producing a developed COA. The product for this level can be a COA briefing, command directive, commander's estimate, or a memorandum. The commander's estimate provides the SecDef with military COAs to meet a potential contingency. The estimate reflects the supported commander's analysis of the various COAs available to accomplish an assigned mission and contains a recommended COA.


Level 2 Planning DetailBase Plan. A base plan describes the CONOPS, major forces, concepts of support, and anticipated timelines for completing the mission. It normally does not include annexes or a TPFDD.

Level 3 Planning DetailCONPLAN. A CONPLAN is an OPLAN in an abbreviated format that may require considerable expansion or alteration to convert it into an OPLAN or OPORD. It includes a base plan with annexes required by the JFC and a supported commander's estimate of the plan's feasibility. It may also produce a TPFDD if applicable.


Level 4 Planning DetailOPLAN. An OPLAN is a complete and detailed joint plan containing a full description of the CONOPS, all annexes applicable to the plan, and a TPFDD. An OPLAN identifies the specific forces, functional support, and resources required to execute the plan and provide closure estimates for their flow into the theater. OPLANs can be quickly developed into an OPORD. An OPLAN is normally prepared when


The contingency is critical to national security and requires detailed prior planning.

The magnitude or timing of the contingency requires detailed planning.

Detailed planning is required to support multinational planning.

The feasibility of the plan's CONOPS cannot be
determined without detailed planning.

Detailed planning is necessary to determine force deployment, employment, and sustainment requirements; determine available resources to fill identified requirements; and validate shortfalls.
Contingency planning is a collaborative process that engages the SecDef, CJCS, JCS, CCDRs, and staffs of the entire JPEC in the development of relevant plans for all contingencies identified in the CPG, JSCP, and other planning directives. Contingency planning also includes JPEC concurrent, collaborative, and parallel joint planning activities. The JPEC reviews those plans tasked in the JSCP for SecDef approval. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD[P]) also reviews those plans for policy considerations in parallel with their approval by the CJCS. A CCDR can request a JPEC review for any tasked or untasked plans that pertain to the AOR. In addition, the CCDR can request a JPEC review during any planning function in the process, including plan assessment. CCDRs may direct the development of additional plans by their commands to accomplish assigned or implied missions. When directed by the President or SecDef through the CJCS, CCDRs may convert Level 1, 2, and 3 plans into Level 4 OPLANs or into fully developed OPORDs for execution. Combatant commands continue contingency planning even when engaged in actual contingency operations. Additionally, many contingency planning resources are often required for CAP, and some contingency planning may be interrupted or delayed until the contingency is stabilized or resolved. The JOPES Volume I provides details for COA development and selection as well as for plan review and approval during contingency planning. Details include process information for interaction between the supported commander, the SecDef, and the President, and formats for various planning products. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3141.01C, Responsibilities for the Management and Review of Operation Plans, governs the formal review and approval process for CONOPS and OPLANs.


Crisis Action Planning

A crisis is an incident or situation involving a threat to the United States, its territories, citizens, military forces, possessions, or vital interests. It typically develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, or military importance that the President or SecDef considers a commitment of U.S. military forces and resources to achieve national objectives. It may occur with little or no warning. It is fast-breaking and requires accelerated decision making. Sometimes a single crisis may spawn another crisis elsewhere. The JOPES provides additional CAP procedures for the time-sensitive development of OPORDs for the likely use of military forces in response to a crisis. CAP encompasses the activities associated with the time-sensitive development of OPORDs for the deployment, employment, and sustainment of assigned, attached, and allocated forces and resources in response to a situation that may result in actual military operations. Although contingency planning is normally conducted in anticipation of future events, CAP is based on circumstances that exist at the time planning occurs. There are always situations arising in the present that might require a U.S. military response. Such situations may approximate those previously planned for in contingency planning, though it is unlikely they would be identical, and sometimes they will be completely unanticipated. The time available to plan responses to such real-time events is short. In as little as a few days, commanders and staffs must develop and approve a feasible COA, publish the plan or order, prepare forces, ensure sufficient communications systems support, and arrange sustainment for the employment of U.S. military forces. In a crisis, situational awareness is continuously fed by the latest intelligence and operations reports. An adequate and feasible military response in a crisis demands flexible procedures that consider time available, rapid and effective communications, and relevant previous planning products whenever possible. In a crisis or time-sensitive situation, the CCDR uses CAP to adjust previously prepared OPLANs. The CCDR converts these plans to executable OPORDs or develops OPORDs from scratch when no useful OPLAN exists.

CAP activities are similar to contingency planning activities, but CAP is based on dynamic, real-world conditions vice static assumptions. CAP procedures provide for the rapid and effective exchange of information and analysis, the timely preparation of military COAs for consideration by the President or SecDef, and the prompt transmission of their decisions to the JPEC. CAP activities may be performed sequentially or in parallel, with supporting and subordinate plans or OPORDs being developed concurrently. The exact flow of the procedures is largely determined by the time available to complete the planning and by the significance of the crisis. Capabilities such as collaboration and decision-support tools will increase the ability of the planning process to adapt quickly to changing situations and improve the transition from contingency planning to CAP. The following paragraphs summarize the activities and interaction that occur during CAP. The JOPES Volume I includes detailed procedures. When the President, SecDef, or CJCS decides to develop military options, the CJCS issues a planning directive to the JPEC initiating the development of COAs and requesting that the supported commander submit a commander's estimate of the situation with a recommended COA to resolve the situation. Normally, the directive will be a WARNORD, but a PLANORD or alert order may be used if the nature and timing of the crisis warrant accelerated planning. In a quickly evolving crisis, the initial WARNORD
may be communicated vocally with a follow-on record copy to ensure that the JPEC is kept informed. If the directive contains force deployment preparation or deployment orders, SecDef approval is required. The WARNORD describes the situation, establishes command relationships, and identifies the mission and any planning constraints.

It may identify forces and strategic mobility resources, or it may request that the supported commander develop these factors. It may establish tentative dates and times to commence mobilization, deployment, or employment, or it may solicit the recommendations of the supported commander regarding these dates and times. If the President, SecDef, or CJCS directs development of a specific COA, the WARNORD will describe the COA and request the supported commander's assessment. A WARNORD sample is in the JOPES Volume I. In response to the WARNORD, the supported commander, in collaboration with subordinate and supporting commanders and the rest of the JPEC, reviews existing joint OPLANs for applicability and develops, analyzes, and compares COAs. Based on the supported commander's guidance, supporting commanders begin their planning activities. Although an existing plan almost never completely aligns with an emerging crisis, it can be used to facilitate rapid COA development. An existing OPLAN can be modified to fit the specific situation. An existing CONPLAN can be fully developed beyond the stage of an approved CONOPS. TPFDD related to specific OPLANs are stored in the JOPES database and available to the JPEC for review. The CJCS, in consultation with other members of the JCS and CCDRs, reviews and evaluates the supported commander's estimate and provides recommendations and advice to the President and SecDef for COA selection. The supported commander's COAs may be refined or revised, or new COAs may have to be developed to accommodate a changing situation. The President or SecDef selects a COA and directs that detailed planning be initiated. On receiving the decision of the President or SecDef, the CJCS issues an alert order to the JPEC to announce the decision. The SecDef approves the alert order. The order is a record communication that the President or SecDef has approved the detailed development of a military plan to help resolve the crisis. The contents of an alert order may vary, and sections may be deleted if the information has already been published, but it should always describe the selected COA in sufficient detail to allow the supported commander, in collaboration with other members of the JPEC, to conduct the detailed planning required to deploy, employ, and sustain forces. However, the alert order does not authorize execution of the approved COA.

The supported commander develops the OPORD and supporting TPFDD using an approved COA. Understandably, the speed of completion is greatly affected by the amount of prior planning and the planning time available. The supported commander and subordinate and supporting commanders identify actual forces, sustainment, and mobility resources and describe the CONOPS in OPORD format. They update and adjust planning accomplished during COA development for any new force and sustainment requirements, source forces, and lift resources. All members of the JPEC identify and resolve shortfalls and limitations. The supported CCDR submits the completed OPORD for approval to the SecDef or President via the CJCS. After an OPORD is approved, the President or SecDef may decide to begin deployment in anticipation of executing the operation or, as a show of resolve, execute the operation, place planning on hold, or cancel planning, pending resolution by some other means. Detailed planning may transition to execution as directed or become realigned with continuous situational awareness, which may prompt planning product adjustments and/or updates. In CAP, plan development continues after the President or SecDef decides to execute the OPORD or to return to the precrisis situation.

When the crisis does not lead to execution, the CJCS provides guidance regarding continued planning under either crisis action or contingency planning procedures. CAP provides the CJCS and CCDRs a process for getting vital decision-making information up the chain of command to the President and SecDef. CAP facilitates information sharing among the members of the JPEC and the integration of military advice from the CJCS in the analysis of military options. Additionally, CAP allows the President and SecDef to communicate their decisions rapidly and accurately through the CJCS to the CCDRs, subordinate and supporting commanders, the Services, and logistics support agencies to initiate detailed military planning, change deployment posture of the identified force, and execute military options. CAP also outlines the mechanisms for monitoring the execution of the operation.

The preceding discussion describes the activities sequentially. During a crisis, they may be conducted concurrently or even eliminated, depending on prevailing conditions. In some situations, no formal WARNORD is issued, and the first record communication that the JPEC receives is the PLANORD or alert order containing the COA to be used for plan development. It is also possible that the President or SecDef may decide to commit forces shortly after an event occurs, thereby significantly compressing planning activities. No specific length of time can be associated with any particular planning activity.

Severe time constraints may require crisis participants to pass information verbally, including the decision to commit forces.


Integrating Civil Affairs Planning Into the Joint Operations Planning Process

Planning Process Considerations. CA planning is based on national strategic objectives and a variety of legal obligations, such as the provisions of the U.S. Constitution, statutory law, judicial decisions, Presidential Directives, departmental regulations, and the rules and principles of international law, especially those incorporated in treaties and agreements applicable to areas where U.S. forces are employed. Therefore, the planning process should include consultations with appropriate legal staffs. Additional guidance to assist CCDRs in developing CA plans and annexes is contained in


The Civil Affairs Supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities
Plan,
JOPES,
and
applicable
Service
directives.

CA assessments and estimates that are prepared for CCDRs
and subordinate JFCs in their prescribed format. CA
estimates weigh relevant political, economic, sociological,
and military factors to form a basis of CA planning. JP 3-07.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for
Foreign Internal Defense (FID), Appendix E, provides
further details concerning CA estimates.
The JOPES integrates all elements of deliberate or crisis action CA planning. Inter-Service support, interagency coordination, and theater-unique procedures must be planned and coordinated in order to support CAO.

Theater Security Cooperation Plan and/or Peacetime Engagement. The TSCP is primarily a strategic planning document intended to link GCC-planned regional engagement activities with national strategic objectives. The TSCP is based on planning guidance provided in the JSCP, Enclosure E, Engagement Planning Guidance. Combatant command planned and supported operations and activities produce multiple benefits in readiness, modernization, and engagement. However, peacetime military engagement activities must be prioritized to ensure efforts are focused on those that are of greatest importance, without sacrificing warfighting capability. The TSCP identifies the synchronization of these activities on a regional basis and illustrates the efficiencies gained from GCC engagement activities that support national strategic objectives. GCCs and executive agents will develop TSCPs for their assigned theaters or designated countries inclusive of the execution year plus activities for the next two fiscal years. Since many of these activities involve the use of U.S. funds, care must be taken to ensure that all legal procedures and restrictions on their use are followed. The following categories of engagement activities are included in the TSCP:


Operational activities. These activities are conducted in conjunction with or part of ongoing operations that have significant engagement value and that support the CCDR's theater strategy. These activities include routine and continuing operations, not crisis response or episodic activities of an emergent operational nature. Examples include missions using forces present overseas, such as peace operations, FHA, sanctions enforcement, and
counterdrug operations.

Security assistance. This category of engagement activity impacts all levels of the USG as well as those planned by the CCDRs and executive agents ICW the senior military
representatives of the U.S. Embassy Country Teams or, where assigned, security assistance officers. Security assistance activities in the TSCP Activity Annexes include foreign military financing, foreign military sales, international military education and training, enhanced international military education and training, potential direct commercial sales, and the Excess Defense Articles program. Security assistance is a significant aspect of the CCDR's theater strategy. Compelling justification is required for programs that raise contentious security assistance issues. This justification must link the CCDR's TSCP strategy to prioritized regional objectives defined in the National Security Strategy.


Combined exercises. This category highlights the nature, scope, and frequency of peacetime exercises designed to support theater, regional, and country objectives. Combined exercises include those sponsored by both the CJCS and the CCDRs. Many of these exercises are CMO, to include road building, school construction, and medical, dental, and veterinary civic action projects.

Combined training. This category includes scheduled unit
and individual training activities with forces of other
nations. It does not include CJCS-sponsored and CCDR- sponsored exercises that are included in the combined exercises category. Joint combined exercise for training (JCET) is a special category of combined training that involves U.S. SOF training with the armed/security forces of a friendly foreign country. By law (Section 2011, Title 10, United States Code [10 USC 2011]), U.S. SOF participating in a JCET must be the primary beneficiary of training received during the JCET. JCET is designed to give SOF the opportunity to accomplish mission-essential task list training. An additional benefit of a JCET activity is improved interoperability with foreign forces participating in the exercise.

Combined education. This category includes activities
involving the education of foreign defense personnel by
U.S. institutions and programs, both in CONUS and OCONUS. In some cases, the supported CCDR or executive agent has direct control over the allocation of education quotas.


Military contacts. This category includes senior defense
official and senior officer visits, counterparts visits, ship
port
visits,
participation
in
defense
shows
and
demonstrations, bilateral and multilateral staff talks, defense cooperation working groups, military-technical working groups, regional conferences, State Partnerships for Peace, and personnel and unit exchange programs. Scheduling of these activities is addressed, as feasible, for the period covered by the TSCP.

Humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA). This category
includes those planned activities for which specifically
allocated HCA funds are requested and planned. These funds are primarily HCA-provided in conjunction with military operations and exercises, assistance in the form of transportation of humanitarian relief, and provision of excess nonlethal supplies for HCA purposes. Other forms of HCA, such as demining training, may also be applicable to this category.

Other engagements. This category consists of engagement
activities conducted by the CCDR or executive agent that do not properly belong in one of the previous categories. Examples
include
those
planned
as
part
of
the
implementation of the provisions of arms control treaties
and other related obligations.

Civil Affairs Support to the TSCP. CA functions are a key part
of all military operations, including peacetime engagement activities, and must be fully integrated into all plans. TSCP activities provide opportunities to establish and maintain military-to-civil relations in the region before a crisis. CA staff, and other military staff, should build relationships with contacts from OGAs, NGOs, IGOs, IPI, and the HN military before crises develop in the region.
CA contributions to the TSCP can include


Liaison and coordination. With the full approval of and ICW the GCC plans staff and appropriate U.S. Embassy Country Team, CA personnel conduct visits among multinational forces, indigenous security forces, U.S.
forces, government agencies, NGOs, and IGOs.

Education and training. JFCs and staffs can be trained by CA to assist them in obtaining the knowledge and techniques necessary to positively influence friends, allies, and HN counterparts and governments during TSCP
activities. CA forces are uniquely qualified to train and prepare others for conducting TSCP activities due to their
area and linguistic orientation, cultural awareness, and experiences
in
military-to-civil
and
military-to-HN
advisory and assistance activities.

Area assessments. TSCP activities provide an ideal opportunity for CA forces to collect current open-source information obtained in the course of their normal duties to update assessments prior to a crisis in a GCC's AOR. CJCSI 3113.01A, Responsibilities for the Coordination and Review of Security Cooperation Strategies, provides further guidance on TSCP.

Planning Considerations. TSOCs provide C2 of Army, Navy,
and Air Force SOF deployed in theater. They ensure that SOF capabilities are employed and SOF are synchronized with conventional military operations. TSOCs also ensure SOF personnel participate in theater mission planning and that theater component commanders are thoroughly familiar with SOF capabilities in
addition to operational and support requirements. Regardless of the
command relationship, TSOCs are the link between theater SOF and the GCC. CA selection. Selection of CA in support of a plan or order should be based on a clear concept of CA mission requirements. The JOPES integrates all elements of deliberate or crisis action CA planning, and identifies resources and phases requiring CA.
Effective CAO will assist JFCs in accomplishing regional objectives and assigned missions, regardless of the AO. JFCs must guard against
creating long-term civilian dependence on military resources by the local population, IPI, HN, NGOs, and IGOs.
Successful accomplishment of CA objectives in large part depends on
adequate plans and policy determinations, an adequate staff
capability, and availability of dedicated CA to assist the commander in carrying out responsibilities for CMO. It is important that CA be concentrated on those tasks that are most likely to lead to mission accomplishment. CA should be involved as early as possible in deliberate or crisis
action planning processes to accomplish required coordination efforts. CA should develop Annex G, "Civil-Military Operations," of
all plans and orders. Figure 12 outlines the CA general planning considerations.
 Administrative, logistic, and communications support
requirements of CA forces.
 The need for early employment of CA specialty
capabilities.
 The coordination between CA requirements and
campaign plans and strategies.
 The coordination of CA requirements with other
appropriate staff functions and non-DOD agencies.
 Peace operations. Plans for contingency operations may be joint, multinational, or single-Service. CMO annexes to such plans should, as a minimum, consider the items listed in Figure 13, page 75.

JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*, and JP 3-07.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations, provide further guidance on peace operations.

 Extent of U.S. military involvement and role of USG
agencies in CMO.
 Liaison requirements with other DOD elements; USG
agencies, including the Country Team; multinational forces; HN government officials; other foreign government officials; other civilian organizations; and international public and private groups.
 Additional lead time normally necessary for USAR CA
availability.
 Procedures for transition, continuation, or termination
of CA-relevant functions of other agencies, as directed or required.
 Identification of, and relations with, friendly and hostile
personalities and groups.
 Security and hostile force disarmament requirements
in uncertain environments.
 Organization and degree of effectiveness of the HN
government, the condition of the economy, the nature of cultural and social institutions, and the prevailing perceptions and attitudes of the population.

 War. The JFC's need to assume greater authority for CAO should be reflected in the planning assumptions because certain areas may be devastated and lack self-sufficiency in facilities, services, and manpower as a result of hostilities. U.S. and multinational forces may be required to provide emergency food, clothing, shelter, and medical

supplies to civilians. At the same time, identification of CA requirements derived from analysis of both current operational and
conflict termination missions may entail any combination of the planning considerations identified above for contingencies or crisisresponse operations. JP 3-0 provides further guidance on war.

During the initial phases of operations, CA forces play a major role in the handling of dislocated civilians (DCs) because of the rapid pace of operations, lack of indigenous resources, and limited access to the AO by NGOs and IGOs. The responsibility for movement and handling of DCs should primarily belong to NGOs and IGOs provided there is security for them to operate safely. CA may play a
major role when access to the AO places enormous burdens on the commander if the "right" forces, NGOs, and IGOs to handle the
situation have not been preplanned. The international community and
international humanitarian law may demand that the military perform many of the functions normally handled by other sources.

Analyzing the civil dimension. The challenge to CMO planners is to
successfully articulate their contribution to the JFC's mission. In the course of mission analysis, the COG concept is useful as an analytical tool while designing campaigns and operations to assist commanders and staffs in analyzing friendly and adversary sources of strength, as
well as weaknesses and vulnerabilities. Commanders and CMO
planners must look beyond the traditional military-to-military construct in considering the impact of the civil dimension on operations. Although the civil dimension applies to both adversary and friendly COGs, in some casessuch as peace operationsit can dominate the focus of analysis. Additionally, analysis of the civil dimension is a continuous process throughout an operation and looks at the following six interrelated factors:

Key civil geographic areas. Key civilian areas are localities or aspects of the terrain within a commander's operational environment that are not normally thought of as militarily significant. The commander must analyze key civilian areas in terms of how these areas affect the military's mission, as well as how military operations impact on these areas.
Examples of key civilian areas that a commander should analyze are


Areas defined by political boundaries (for example, districts within a city and municipalities within a region).

Locations of government centers.

Social, political, religious, or criminal enclaves.

Agricultural and mining regions.

Trade routes.

Possible sites for the temporary settlement of DCs or other civil functions.
NOTE: Failure to consider key civilian areas can seriously
affect the success of any military mission.

Infrastructures and buildings. Existing structures take on many significant roles. Bridges, communication facilities, power plants, and dams are often considered high-value targets. Others, such as churches, mosques, and national
libraries, are cultural sites that are generally protected by international law or other agreements. Hospitals are given special protection under international law. Other facilities
with practical applications, such as jails, warehouses,
schools, television and radio stations, and print plants, may be useful for military purposes. Analyzing structures involves determining the location, functions, capabilities, application, and consequences of supporting future military
operations. Using a structure for military purposes often competes with civilian requirements for the same structure and requires careful consideration. Additionally, if exigent military operations require decisions whether or not to destroy specific structures, consideration must balance the short- and long-term effects of such actions.

Institutional capabilities. Capabilities can be analyzed from different levels. The analyst views capabilities in priority from the perspective of those required to save, sustain, or enhance life. Capabilities can refer to the ability of local authoritiesbe they HNs, aggressor nations, or some other
bodiesto provide key functions or services to a populace (for example, public administration, public safety, emergency services, or food and agriculture). Capabilities include those areas with which the populace needs assistance in revitalizing after combat operations (for example, public works and utilities, public health, economics, and commerce). Capabilities also refer to resources and services that can be contracted to support the military mission (for example, interpreters, laundry services, and construction materials and equipment). The HN or other nations may provide these resources and services.


Influential
organizations.
These
organizations
are
nonmilitary groups or institutions that influence and interact within the AO. They generally have a hierarchical structure, defined goals, established operations, fixed facilities or meeting places, and a means of financial or logistic support. Some organizations may be indigenous to
the area, such as church groups, fraternal organizations, patriotic or service organizations, labor unions, criminal
organizations, and community watch groups. Other organizations, such as multinational corporations, United Nations agencies, OGAs, IGOs, and NGOs, may be introduced to the area from external sources. The commander

Must be familiar with the organizations operating within the AO. He must be knowledgeable about their activities, capabilities, and limitations.

Must understand how the operations of different organizations impact on his mission, how military operations impact on organizational activities, and how organizations and military forces can work together toward common goals, as necessary.
The commander uses the CMOC to keep advised of all
these issues.

Key communicators and populace. This general term is used to describe the nonmilitary personnel encountered by military forces during operations. The term includes all the civilians within an AO as well as those outside this area whose actions, opinions, or political influence can affect
the military mission. Individually or collectively, people
impact military operations in positive, negative, or neutral manners. In peace operations, U.S. forces must be prepared
to work closely with civilians of all types:

There may be many different groups of people living and working within a given AO. Like the discussion of organizations above, people may be indigenous to the area or introduced from external sources. An analysis of demographics should identify various capabilities, needs, and intentions of a specific population.

It is useful to separate people into distinct categories that consider historical, cultural, ethnic, political, economic, and humanitarian factors.
It
is
critical
to
identify
key
communicators, as well as the formal and informal communication processes used to influence a given population.

Events. Events include routine, cyclical, planned, or
spontaneous activities that significantly impact both
civilian lives and military operations. Some civil events that affect organizations, people, and military operations are
national
and
religious
holidays,
agricultural
crop/livestock
and
market
cycles,
elections,
civil
disturbances, and celebrations. Other events are disasters from natural, man-made, or technological sources that create civil hardship and require emergency response. Examples of events precipitated by military forces include combat operations, deployments, redeployments, and paydays. Once the analyst determines which events are occurring, it is important to template the events and to
analyze them for political, economic, psychological, environmental, and legal implications.

Predeployment Planning. From the joint operation perspective,
the Total Force Policy shifted a significant percentage of military
missions from the Active Army to the USAR. The Total Force Policy
increased reliance on USAR members, military retirees, DOD civilians, contractor personnel, and HNS. This policy also ensured
that mobilization actions would be considered early on in the planning process. The early deployment of CA in the AO can be a great force multiplier, setting the stage for the introduction of follow-on forces into an environment that has benefited from specialized interaction with the local population. The functional composition of CA varies with mission, availability, and qualifications of CA, plus the supported commander's preferences. Mobilization of USAR CA must be a consideration during predeployment planning:

USJFCOM maintains more than 90 percent of the Army's CA authorizations in USAR CA units.

USAR CA units can be expected to arrive in theater 30 to 45 days after Presidential Reserve Callup for contingencies or upon mobilization.

Postconflict Operations. Postconflict activities typically begin
with significant military involvement and then move increasingly toward civilian dominance as the threat wanes and civil infrastructures are reestablished. U.S. forces frequently will be in
transition from one mission to another. The transitions may include
moving from peacetime engagements to peace operations, transitioning from peace operations to war, and transitioning from peace operations to peacetime engagements. Transitions at the conclusion of any major military operation require significant preparation, planning, and negotiations between OGAs, NGOs, IGOs,
IPI, and the HN government. U.S. forces, at the conclusion of hostilities, will support long-term U.S. interests and strategic
objectives, including the establishment of security and stability in the region. Transition or termination occurs when either the mission has been accomplished, or the President and/or SecDef so directs. CMO
planners play a major role in transition and termination not only in
the planning process (by establishing a transition mechanism), but
also with assisting civilian organizations in clarifying their respective roles and responsibilities after U.S. military forces leave the area. Criteria for transition or termination may be based on events, measures of effectiveness and/or success, availability of resources, or a specific date. A successful harvest or restoration of critical facilities in the crisis area is an example of events that might trigger termination of the mission. An acceptable drop in mortality rates, a certain percentage of DCs returned to their homes, or a given decrease in threat activity is statistical criteria that may prompt the end of U.S. forces involvement. When other organizations (such as IPI, NGOs, HN, and IGOs) have
marshaled the necessary capabilities to assume the mission, U.S. forces may execute a transition plan. Transition may occur between the U.S. joint force, another military force (for example, United States, multinational, and affected country), regional organization,
the United Nations, or other civilian organizations. A detailed plan addressing the various functions and to whom they will transition will greatly reduce the turmoil typically associated with transition. A comprehensive transition plan includes specific requirements for all elements involved in the transition, summarizes capabilities and assets, and assigns specific responsibilities. A major aspect during transition is the movement of large numbers of military forces and civilians out of and/or within the AO. An unclassified transition plan written in easily understood terms particularly is required when transitioning to nonmilitary organizations. Organizing the plan by specific functions (such as provision of food, restoration of facilities, and medical care) also enhances the transition. The joint force staff should periodically review the
transition plan with all organizations that have a part in it. This
review will help ensure that planning assumptions are still valid and
determine if changes in the situation require changes in the transition plan.
Termination plans should cover transition to postdisaster or
emergency activities and conditions, as well as disposition of military forces. OPORDs and termination plans should be prepared simultaneously and in conjunction with the deployment plan, and with the termination plan serving as a supporting plan to the OPORD.
Figure 14, page 83, is a sample checklist for termination planning.

Transition Planning. CMO planners play a major role in transition
planning and, based on their expertise, may be the best group to perform this function. For these planners to accomplish this task, a
clearly identifiable end state and transition or termination criteria for the operation must be developed. Transition planning is an integral part of operation planning and mission analysis. Transferring control of an operation from U.S. military to a nonmilitary organization or another military force requires detailed planning and execution. Mission analysis (analysis
of mission statement), an identifiable end state, interagency politicalmilitary plan, and the national policy will all play an important role in the transition process. Transferring control of an operation is situation-dependent,
and
each
one
will
possess
different
characteristics and requirements. Transition planning must be initiated during the initial phases of operation planning to ensure adequate attention is placed in this critical areatransition planning must be done when planning for intervention.

As the redeployment phase for U.S. forces approaches, force protection must be emphasized. The redeployment phase can be the most hazardous because the tactical focus shifts toward redeployment and away from force protection. Areas that will impact significantly on the development of a transition plan are

Identification of issues.

Key events (past and present).

Work required to accomplish the transition.

A thorough knowledge of the organization or force taking over control of the operation.


 Has the end state been achieved?
 Have stated operational objectives been accomplished?  Have the underlying causes of the conflict been considered,
and how do they influence termination planning?
 Has the joint force commander identified postconflict
requirements?
 Can forces be safely withdrawn from the AO? What are the
force protection requirements?
 What additional support will be required for redeployment?  What is the policy for redeployment? What is the
relationship between postconflict requirements and the redeployment of the joint force?
 What is the policy for evacuation of equipment used by the
joint force?
 Has coordination for redeployment of the joint force been
conducted with appropriate commands, agencies, and other organizations?
 Has consideration been given as to when USAR forces will be
released?
 Has transition planning been accomplished in the event that
operations are transitioning to another military force, regional organization, the United Nations, or a civilian organization?
 What arrangements have been made with other organizations
to accomplish the postconflict activities? For example, will there be humanitarian, governmental, and infrastructure
assistance requirements?
 Will the joint force be expected to support these types of
activities?

The CMOC is heavily involved in the transition process. The CMOC prepares to hand over its role as the facilitator between U.S. forces and IPI, IGOs, NGOs, OGAs, and local government agencies. CMOC personnel prepare a transition plan that includes all ongoing projects and coordination, points of contact for all agencies with which the CMOC has worked, possible resources, and any other information that may facilitate the transition process. All CMO assets involved in a mission must be prepared to assist in the planning and execution of transition operations. The civil dimension may be the most complex portion of this process. It is imperative that all teams and sections develop historical files to aid in the transition process. This process must be considered from the initial planning of the mission. CA forces play a major role in this planning because of their expertise and ability to operate with a variety of organizations. Figure 15, page 85, is a sample checklist for transition planning. The JP 3-0 series of publications, JP 3-33, and FM 3-05.40, Appendix A, provide further information on transition and termination planning.


Force Protection. Force protection includes actions taken to prevent or mitigate hostile actions against DOD personnel (to include family members), resources, facilities, and critical information. These actions conserve the force's fighting potential so it can be applied at the decisive time and place, and incorporate the coordinated and synchronized offensive and defensive measures to enable the effective employment of the joint force while degrading opportunities for the adversary. Force protection does not include actions to defeat the adversary or protect against accidents, weather, or disease.

 Who will determine when the transition begins or is complete?  Have stated operational objectives been accomplished?  Who will fund this transition?  What is the new mission?  What U.S. forces, equipment, and/or supplies will remain behind?
 What will be the command relationship for U.S. forces that
remain behind?
 What will be the communications requirements for U.S. forces
that remain behind?
 Who will support U.S. forces that remain behind?
 Can intelligence be shared with the incoming force or
organization?
 Will new rules of engagement be established?  Will ongoing operations (for example, engineer projects) be
discontinued or interrupted?
 Will the United States be expected to provide communications
capability to the incoming force or organization?
 Will the incoming force or organization use the same HQ facility
as the joint force?
 What is the policy for redeployment of the joint force?  Will sufficient security be available to provide force protection?
Who provides it?
 How will the turnover be accomplished?  Who will handle public affairs for the transition?  Have redeployment airlift and sealift arrangements been
approved and passed to USTRANSCOM?

 Elements of force protection include but are not limited to the following:


Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN)
defense. U.S. forces use hazard avoidance, protection of
individuals and units, and decontamination to conduct sustained operations in CBRN and WMD environments. JP 3-11, Joint Doctrine for Operations in Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Environments, provides further guidance concerning CBRN.


Antiterrorism. Antiterrorism programs support force
protection by establishing measures that reduce the
vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts. These measures may include limited response and containment by local military forces. They also consist of
defensive measures to protect Soldiers, civilian employees, family members, facilities, information, and equipment. JP 3-07.2, *Antiterrorism*, provides further guidance on
antiterrorism.

Security. Security of forces and means enhances force protection
by
identifying
and
reducing
friendly
vulnerability to hostile acts, influence, or surprise. Security operations protect flanks and rear areas in the AO. Physical
security measures deter, detect, and defend critical installations, facilities, information, and systems against threats from intelligence assets, terrorists, criminals, and unconventional forces. Measures include fencing and perimeter stand-off space, lighting and sensors, vehicle barriers, blast protection, intrusion detection systems and
electronic surveillance, and access control devices and systems. Physical security measures, like any defense, should be overlapping and deployed in depth. JP 3-10, Joint Security Operations in Theater, provides further
guidance on physical security measures.

Operations security (OPSEC). Effective OPSEC measures
minimize the "signature" of joint force activities, avoid set patterns, and employ deception when patterns cannot be altered. OPSEC measures are an integral element of information
operations.
Although
strategic
OPSEC
measures are important, the most effective methods manifest themselves at the lowest level. Varying patrol routes, staffing guard posts and towers at irregular intervals, and conducting vehicle and personnel searches
and identification checks on a set but unpredictable pattern discourage terrorist activity. JP 3-13.3, Operations Security, provides further guidance on OPSEC.


Law enforcement. Law enforcement aids in force protection
through
the
prevention,
detection,
response,
and
investigation of crime. A cooperative police program
involving military and civilian and/or HN law enforcement agencies directly contributes to overall force protection.

Personal security. Personal security measures consist of common-sense rules of on- and off-duty conduct for every Soldier. They also include use of individual protective equipment, use of hardened vehicles and facilities, employment of dedicated guard forces, and use of duress alarms. Planning for Force Protection. JFCs and their subordinate commanders must address force protection during all phases of deliberate and crisis action planning. All aspects of force protection must be considered and threats minimized to ensure maximum operational success. JFCs and their subordinate commanders must implement force protection measures appropriate to all anticipated threats, to include terrorists. Supported and supporting commanders must ensure that deploying forces receive thorough briefings concerning the threat and personnel protection requirements prior to and upon arrival in the AO. In addition, JFCs and their subordinate commanders must evaluate the deployment of forces and each COA for the impact of terrorist organizations supporting the threat, and those not directly supporting the threat but seeking to take advantage of the situation. CA forces must address their particular force protection concerns with JFCs.

For example, it may be inappropriate and counterproductive for CA in full-combat attire to conduct liaison with local officials. Force protection concerns should be addressed early in the planning process. Additionally, CA must address with JFCs how the various elements of force protection (discussed above) impact on how they perform their mission. CA forces, because of their overall expertise and ability to work with the IPI, can provide JFCs insight into force protection concerns before they become major issues. JP 3-0 includes a more detailed discussion on force protection.


Joint Urban Operations. In any AO, most of the civil authority and the greater part of the population are likely to reside in one or more urban areas. Because of large populations and high population density in urban areas, any urban operation will require a significant CMO (CA) effort on the part of the joint force. CMO conducted as part of urban operations strive to achieve the same objectives as in other types of operations. These objectives include the following:


Enhance military effectiveness.

Support national objectives.

Reduce the negative impact of military operations or other destructive force on civilians.


CMO and Urban Operations. As with other activities, the complex, physical aspects of urban terrain can hamper CMO. The urban terrain can fragment and channel CMO efforts, particularly nation assistance. It can be difficult to find and reach all those in need of support. Constricted terrain makes it more difficult to control large numbers of people in PRC operations. Urban areas normally offer many buildings usable for shelter, medical care, and other forms of support, but the damage to those structures from military operations or natural or man-made disaster can make them unusable, thus adding to the control and support difficulties. Noncombatants are the primary focus of CMO, and urban areas may contain huge numbers of civilians. These numbers may range from the thousands to the millions. Depending on the circumstances, many will be displaced and in need of basic support. Services may be degraded or nonexistent. The requirement to control and support the noncombatant population can easily overwhelm local capabilities.

Effective urban CMO require knowledge of the ethnic, cultural, religious,
and
attitudinal
characteristics
of
the
populace.
Noncombatant populations in urban areas are rarely homogenous;
therefore, effective CMO will require the understanding of neighborhoods, tribal relations, religious relationships, and the basic
allegiances and daily life of the inhabitants. Urban infrastructure may be functioning with some degree of effectiveness, in which case CMO must work through and with local authorities and services. It may be necessary to repair physical infrastructure facilities and means, such as power plants or water
stations, as part of CMO. Existing service infrastructure may be totally lacking or overwhelmed by circumstances, requiring the joint force to provide not only basic subsistence and shelter, but the full
gamut of support personnelpolice, legal, administration, engineer, sanitation, medical, transportation, and other. The proximity of civilians to military targets increases the requirement to actively screen the joint integrated prioritized target list for indirect fires and minimize the impact of collateral damage. The proximity to civilians increases the risk that diseases and other public health hazards will pose health risks to military personnel.

CMO Considerations in Joint Urban Operations. Urban
operations will include CMO. Urban CMO can support overall operational objectives or be the main focus of operations, but are in
any case the responsibility of the CCDR to plan and conduct. Planning for CMO support of urban operations is generally the same
as for other CMO with special emphasis on the nature of the urban area. General planning considerations were addressed earlier in this GTA.
Additional planning considerations are the following:

CMO planners should carefully consider these aspects of the urban area: terrain, civilian populace, environment, and infrastructure.

Legal implications, communications, culture, education,
economic, religious, labor, health, and administrative infrastructure.

NGOs, IGOs, IPI, and interagency organizations. These
play a major part in all CMO but may be of more
importance in urban operations.

Synchronization. CMO must be synchronized both internally and
with other operations. The relation of CMO to the overall operation
can vary a great deal depending on the situation. Joint urban operations could require the full extent of CMO in one portion of an urban area while another is still being heavily contested. Most likely, regardless of the situation, civilians in the AO will have a great impact on operations. Planning must be synchronized to ensure CMO and other operations (for example, combat operations) support the
USG's overall objectives.

Support. CMO may require support in a number of key areas from
other forces (for example, health service support, engineer, and
military police). JP 3-57 includes further explanation of forces that support CMO.

Other Operational Considerations. The most important urban
operation consideration is that CMO will most likely occur simultaneously with, not subsequent to, other operationsincluding combat. The JFC must therefore identify sufficient forces and synchronize the planning and execution of these operations as well as the support required. The relation of CMO to other operations in joint urban operations will vary, but CMO will be a significant part of any operation. JP 3-06, *Doctrine for Joint Urban Operations*, provides further guidance on urban operations. Consequence Management (CM). JP 1-02 defines consequence
management as "actions taken to maintain or restore essential services and manage or mitigate problems resulting from disasters and catastrophes, including natural, man-made, or terrorist incidents." CM operations mitigate the results of intentional or inadvertent release of WMD or chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and
high-yield explosives (CBRNE). These operations involve those services and activities required to manage and mitigate problems resulting from disasters and catastrophes. They involve measures to
alleviate the damage, loss, hardship, or suffering caused by emergencies abroad.

Consequence Management Support to the United States, its Territories, and Possessions. This type of response occurs
under the primary jurisdiction of the affected state and local government. The Federal government provides assistance when
required. When situations are beyond the capability of the state, the
governor may request federal assistance from the President. The President may direct the Federal government to provide supplemental assistance to state and local governments to alleviate the suffering and damage resulting from disasters or emergencies. The agency with primary responsibility for coordination of federal assistance to state
and local governments is the Federal Emergency Management
Agency. CM involves measures to alleviate the damage, loss, hardship, or suffering caused by emergencies. It includes measures to
restore essential government services, protect public health and safety, and provide emergency relief to affected governments,
businesses, and individuals. The Commander, USNORTHCOM, acts as the supported CCDR for all CM operations conducted in the CONUS. The Commander,
USNORTHCOM, exercises OPCON of all DOD forces in such operations with the exception of JSOTFs and the U.S. Corps of Engineers supporting the lead Federal agency. USNORTHCOM and USPACOM are responsible for planning and executing military assistance to civil authorities for CM of incidents relating to CBRNE situations within the United States, its territories,
and possessions that fall within their respective AORs. Additionally, there are standing forces such as JTF-Civil Support and two Army Response Task Forces (East and West) that may be tasked
by
USNORTHCOM
to
respond
to
CM
situations. Other
organizations with specific missions to respond to CM situations
include the U.S. Marine Corps Chemical/Biological Incident Response Force, the U.S. Army's Chemical/Biological Rapid
Response Team, the U.S. Navy Response Task Force, and two U.S.
Air Force Response Task Forces (Air Combat Command and U.S. Air Forces Europe). The President can also federalize the National
Guard Civil Support Teams. The Commander, USNORTHCOM, acts as the supported CCDR for all CM operations conducted in Puerto Rico or the U.S. Virgin Islands. The Commander, USPACOM, acts as the supported CCDR for all CM operations conducted in Hawaii, Alaska, Guam, American
Samoa, or any of the other U.S. possessions in the Pacific AOR. JP 3-26, *Homeland Security*, provides further information on CM
support in the United States.

DOD Support to Foreign Consequence Management. DOD
support to foreign CM operations focuses on providing specialized assistance to the Department of State (DOS), the lead Federal agency, or in response to the use of CBRNE contaminants against an ally,
regional friend, or vital interest of the United States. Primary responsibility for managing and mitigating the effects of foreign WMD incidents resides with the HN government. The DOS
is designated as the lead Federal agency for foreign CM operations in
support of a foreign government. All DOD support will be coordinated through the responsible U.S. Embassy Chief of Mission
and Country Team. CJCSI 3214.01B, Military Support to Foreign
Consequence Management Operations, and JP 3-07.6, Joint Tactics,
Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance,
provide further information on foreign CM.

Civil Affairs Support to Consequence Management. CA will
coordinate with appropriate OGAs for support to CM operations. In
CM operations, CA forces may provide liaison to OGAs, conduct
assessments of the situation, or provide other expertise as required, to
include providing consultation to HN decision makers with the approved agency.

Mortuary Affairs. The death of civilians and noncombatants
presents a unique set of circumstances that requires specific political
and cultural sensitivities. Although not responsible for mortuary
affairs, CAwith their expertise in cultural awareness and contact with civil organizationsmay very well be the only answer. CA forces

Can act as intermediaries between the affected organization and the families to ensure the command honors cultural traditions and complies with HN government regulations.

Can assist local agencies interface with military assets providing support to remove the remains. This  support can include handling customs, location of storage facilities, burial sites, and transportation options.

Can advise the command on cultural traditions impacting the handling and removing of remains. JP 4-06, *Mortuary Affairs in Joint Operations*, provides further
guidance on mortuary affairs.

Humanitarian Demining Operations. The general role of CA in
these types of operations is to assist SOF and other forces in their efforts in supporting the USG and GCCs in achieving their objectives.

CA forces execute programs that build capabilities in management, administration, logistics, equipment maintenance, communications,
and data processing. CA forces are instrumental in the establishment
of the HN humanitarian demining office and the coordination of support with NGOs and IGOs. SF teams train HN cadre in techniques to locate, identify, and destroy land mines and unexploded ordnance.
PSYOP teams assist HN governments develop and implement mine awareness programs to train local populations to identify, avoid, and
report locations of land mines and unexploded ordnance until these
threats are removed.
CA forces train the HN demining HQ in management and C2 of its
subordinate elements. CA forces also provide liaison with the USG,
IPI, IGOs, and local organizations to coordinate support of the HN
demining infrastructure. CA forces possess the expertise to support other SOF, conventional forces, and civilian organizations in humanitarian demining operations. CA forces possess the unique skills that foster relationships with the civilian community, which allow them to be a logical choice as part of a team to assist foreign nations in demining
operations. CJCSI 3207.01A, Military Support to Humanitarian Mine Action
Operations, and JP 3-07 provide further guidance on military support to humanitarian demining operations.

Negotiation and Mediation. Although negotiation normally is not
a primary responsibility for CA, often it falls upon them. CA forces often find themselves in the role of a negotiator, mediator, or even arbitrator at some point during operations. Each role requires different attributes, but there are many common ones and the following focuses on those common attributes and techniques:

Negotiations do not exist in a vacuum. It is important to understand the broader issues of conflict and their changing nature.

In many operations, it is essential to maintain dialogue with all parties, groups, and organizations, including the government if one exists, but also the opposition or various factions or militias.

It is also important not to allow any one incident to destroy dialogue (even if force is applied)creating an atmosphere
of hostility will not lead to a resolution.
Negotiation is an exercise in persuasion. It is a way to advance the command's interests by jointly decided action. Cooperation of the other parties is a must; they must be considered partners in solving problems.

CA personnel must think carefully about the full range of the force's interests and prepare thoroughly for the full range of interests of the other parties. What are the underlying interests behind a particular position that a party has taken on a particular issue? People negotiate for different reasons, such as


Tasks (for example, the lease of a compound).

Relationships (for example, to get to know the other party and find out more information about who that person is).

Status (for example, legitimacy as a participant in the eyes of others). CA personnel must think carefully about alternatives in negotiating an agreement; how will they, as negotiators, be most persuasive in educating others to see a negotiated settlement as being in their best interest? CA personnel must be attuned to cultural differences. Actions can have different connotations. The use of language can be different "yes" may mean "no." How people reason and what constitutes facts and what principles apply are shaped by culture. Solutions are often best when they come from the factions themselves. Nonverbal behavior, such as the symbolic rituals or protocols of the arrangement for a meeting, is also important. It is particularly important to look at opportunities for small interim agreements that can be seen as trustbuilding steps that are necessary when it will take time to reach agreement on larger issues. Negotiations will be conducted at several levels: negotiations among OGAs and departments, between the multinational partners, between the joint force and IGOs, and between the joint force and local leaders. This complex web of negotiations requires the following to build consensus: tact, diplomacy, honesty, open-mindedness, patience, fairness, effective communications, cross-cultural sensitivity, and careful planning.

Procedures for Negotiation and Mediation. Successful negotiations by CA personnel should be based on the following steps:


Establish communications. The first step is to establish an
effective means of communicating with the political and/or faction leaders. CA personnel should not assume, without careful investigation, that certain leaders or elements are opposed to their efforts. CA personnel should insist on factfinding before forming any opinions.

Carefully develop a strategic plan and diagram the results
of the analysis. Useful questions to answer in this analysis are

What are the main issues?

Who are the relevant parties? First order? Second? Third?

What are these parties' publicly stated positions? Privately stated positions?

What are the underlying interests behind these positions?

What are the bottom-line needs of each party?

What are their concerns? Fears? To what degree does "historical baggage" affect them?

Negotiate the conduct of negotiations. This process must be
addressed in the initial planning sessions.

Set clear goals and objectives. Know what the joint force is trying to accomplish as well as the limits of its authority. Think carefully about how the joint force wants to approach the issues. Settle the easy issues first. Settle issue by issue in some order. Look to create linkages or to separate nonrelated issues. For example, security issues might be separated from logistic issues. Consider having
details worked out at later sessions with the right people. Understand these sessions will also be negotiations.

Work with the parties to identify common ground on which
to build meaningful dialogue. Expect to spend considerable time determining the exact problems. At this stage, be problem-oriented rather than solution-oriented. Also, note the following:

If a party perceives more benefits from an
alternative to negotiations than to any outcome negotiations could produce, do not expect that party to negotiate to achieve an agreement. CA personnel need to educate and persuade the party that negotiations will in fact produce the most benefits.

Focus on underlying interests. Differences in the relative value of interests, forecasts of future events, aversion to risk, and time preferences may offer opportunities to develop options for mutual gain.

Learn from the parties. Seek ways through partnering with them to find possible alternatives beyond their present thinking.

When necessary, assume the role of convener, facilitator, or mediator. Be patient. Composition of Negotiating Forum and Decision-Making
Mechanisms. In some cases, a committee or council can be formed
with appropriate representation from the various interested parties. It is critical to identify the right participants in advance. For example, will it include Chief of Mission and JFC-level, mid-level, or workinglevel personnel? In deciding what constitutes the appropriate construct for a meeting, CA personnel must consider the culture. For example, what role do women play in the society? How is status defined in the culture? Composition of the committee or council may also include legal
advisors, political representatives (DOS, IGOs, or others), military
representatives, and other civilian representatives from the joint
force, NGOs, or IGOs. Members should possess the status and ability to deal with the leadership representing all involved parties. For those members seen as part of the joint force, it is important that they understand the issues and speak with one voice. Doing so will
require a prior coordination within the joint force's delegation. They
must understand policy and direction from higher authority. Negotiations are time-consuming and can be frustrating. As the head
negotiators, CA personnel should be attentive to whether they have the people negotiating who can effectively recommend that their
superiors ratify an agreement reached. All the decision makers who will determine whether or not the agreement reached is implemented should be represented in the committee or council. A supportive climate needs to be developed for the decision makers to complete an agreement. In that vein, it is useful to talk to those who are not decision makers but from whom the decision makers will need support. In this way, they may assist CA personnel in helping their decision makers reach agreement. In zones of severe conflict and state collapse, it is frequently difficult
to determine the legitimate community leaders with whom any lasting agreement must be made. The JFC must ensure that all of his negotiators understand the scope and latitude of their authority. Their
requirement to obtain the JFC's prior approval will empower them in their role as negotiator and/or mediator.

Establishment of the Venue. What is the manner in which
meetings can be called? Can a neutral ground be found that is acceptable to all sides? Should U.S. representatives go to the factional leader's location, or will this improperly affect the negotiations? What about the details such as the seating arrangements
or specific settings traditionally used in the culture? Selection of a negotiating venue should also be based on security for all involved parties, accessibility, availability of communications
facilities, and comfort. CA personnel should ensure that appropriate
information arising from or relevant to the negotiations is shared with all parties. The timing of this sharing may vary depending on the circumstances. Sharing of information notwithstanding, all information generated from the negotiations may be held in confidence until officially released. That decision will depend on the nature of the talks. For example, if publicity may help create support and empower the negotiators to agree, release of information may be constructive.

Flexibility is needed here rather than a hard-and-fast rule.

Cultural Considerations. There are organizational cultures within the various agencies and departments of the USG that shape the context of negotiations. Equally important are national cultural differences. It is imperative that experienced interpreters be part of the negotiating team. What is critical is their understanding of the cultural context of terms used. The team needs more than literal translators. Negotiation is only one means of resolving conflict. It is worthwhile for CA personnel to consider indigenous conflict resolution techniques in selecting an approach. Adapting CA's techniques to indigenous ones (degradation of U.S. objectives is not acceptable)
may improve the prospects for a settlement. There are differences in styles of reasoning, manner in which an individual negotiates, who carries authority, and behavior in such dimensions as protocol and time. For example, in American culture it is accepted that one may offer concessions early in a negotiation to reach an agreement. That approach may not have the same connotation in other cultures. Moreover, the concept of compromise, which has a positive connotation for Americans, may have a negative one in other cultures. Where Americans tend to be direct problem solvers with a give-andtake approach, other cultures are indirect and most concerned with the long-term relationship, historical context, and principles. Issues of symbolism, status, and face may be important considerations. For example, answers may not be direct, and CA personnel will have to look for indirect formulations and nonverbal gestures to understand what the other party is telling them. In turn, this means CA personnel need to be careful with their wording and gestures so that unintended meanings are not sent. The other party may not say "no" directly to a proposal but that is what is meant. If an agreement cannot be reached, CA personnel should keep the dialogue going. At a minimum, they should seek agreement on when the parties will meet again, look for something to keep the momentum alive, go back to earlier discussions on common ground, and seek to keep trust alive in the process. Within their own team, CA personnel should consider selecting one person who understands conflict dynamics and cross-cultural issues to look at the process of the negotiations and advise CA. This individual can watch for body language and other indicators of how the process is working. In turn, he or she may be able to coach the JTF negotiators in more effective techniques.

Implementation. At the conclusion of negotiations, a report should be prepared to ensure all accomplishments, agreements, and disagreements are recorded for future use. CA personnel should consider giving one person the task of reporting and presenting to all participants what has taken place. Doing so can build trust in the process if it is viewed as an honest effort to understand each side's position.

Coordination With Other Government Agencies

In CMO, coordination with OGAs may be one of the top priorities.

By understanding the interagency process, JFCs will be better able to appreciate their role in it. An appreciation of the skills and resources of various OGAs and an understanding of how they interact with NGOs, IGOs, and regional organizations is critical to mission accomplishment. Civil-military relations can create economic, political, and social stability as they facilitate communications and encourage the development of the affected nation's materiel and human resources. JFCs use Annex V, "Interagency Coordination," of plans and orders to provide guidance for incorporating the interagency community into military operations.

The significance of the close coordination between CMO and interagency operations is that CA forces throughout history have displayed the ability to coordinate and work with a multitude of agencies and organizations. Much of the success of CA in dealing with these many varied agencies and organizations is based on their diverse backgrounds (for example, lawyers, engineers, agriculturalists, and city planners). For the purposes of this publication, the term "interagency operations" refers to coordination, liaison, and other actions and activities taken in the field to promote unity of effort and mission accomplishment. National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44, Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization, gives responsibility to the DOS to coordinate, lead, and strengthen USG efforts to prepare, plan for, and conduct reconstruction and stabilization missions, and to harmonize efforts with U.S. military plans and operations. DOD Directive 3000.05, Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations, outlines how DOD will fulfill its role as defined under NSPD 44. It notes that integrated civilian and military efforts are key to successful stability operations, and charges DOD to work closely with USG departments and agencies; foreign governments; global, regional, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental organizations; and the private sector. CCDRs are responsible for engaging relevant partners ICW USD(P)
and CJCS. The integration of political, economic, civil, and military objectives and the subsequent translation of these objectives into demonstrable action have always been essential to success at all levels of operations.

The new, rapidly changing global environment that is characterized by regional instability, the challenges of pluralistic governments, and unconventional threats will require even greater interagency cooperation with a fully functioning civil-military relationship. Military operations must be synchronized with those of other agencies of the USG, as well as with multinational forces, NGOs, IGOs, and regional organizations. These actions must be mutually supporting and respect the mandates of others. To successfully undertake interagency operations, the roles and relationships among various Federal agencies, combatant commands, state and local governments, the U.S. Embassy Country Team, and other engaged organizations must be clearly understood and effectively coordinated. Interagency coordination forges the vital link between the military and the economic, political and/or diplomatic, and informational entities of the USG as well as NGOs and IGOs. Successful interagency coordination and planning enables these agencies, departments, and organizations to mount a coherent, coordinated, and effective collective operationunity of effort must be achieved. CA
must have freedom of movement in the AO to facilitate access to the community, NGOs, IGOs, and others. The common thread throughout all major operations, whether in war or peace operations, is the broad range of agenciesmany with indispensable practical competencies and major legal responsibilitiesthat interact with the Armed Forces of the United States. The intrinsic nature of interagency coordination demands that planners consider all instruments of national power and recognize which agencies are best qualified to employ these instruments to achieve the objective. This consideration is especially necessary because the security challenges facing the United States today are growing in complexity, requiring the skills and resources of many organizations. Because the solution to a problem seldom, if ever, resides within the capability of just one agency, campaign plans, OPLANs, or OPORDs must be developed to leverage the core competencies of all available agencies, synchronizing their efforts with military capabilities toward a single objective. The President and/or SecDef employ the Armed Forces of the United States when they have deemed it necessary to use military means to promote national interests. The use of the military instrument of power as a component of the national security strategy takes the form of military objectives. These objectives need to be coordinated with associated diplomatic, economic, and informational objectives. The military instrument often plays a supporting role to other national agencies. Understanding how military coordination efforts interface with other organizations toward mission accomplishment is key to the success in joint operations and unified actions. Each organization brings its own unique capabilities and resources to the interagency table. The synergy developed by combining these capabilities and resources is the strength of this interagency process. In one coordinated forum, the process integrates many views, capabilities, and options.

Coordination With Intergovernmental Organizations Responding to humanitarian situations is a fundamental responsibility of the IGO system. This responsibility runs from the immediate response to the long-term amelioration of a crisis. This community will be represented by one or more of its agencies, such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) or the World Food Program. The body within this community charged with the coordination of the IGO's humanitarian activities is the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). It does not, however, have the authority to enforce coordination. It plays more of a facilitating and informational role. It also has responsibility for organizing the Consolidated Appeals Document, which presents to the donor community the best thinking of the IGO community on its needs in relation to a specific crisis or crisis area. The IGOs relate to

the OCHA in organizing joint assessments and reporting to the donor community. IGOs generally will have specific responsibility for certain specialties. For example, a major logistic role is played by the World
Food Program in the delivery of food and determination of an
appropriate nutrition standard. The UNHCR takes the lead in providing legal protection and material support to refugees or those in refugee-like situations. The role of the IGOs, along with that of the NGOs, is fundamental to the resolution or stabilizing of a humanitarian situation. They will be present, and it is essential that contact be made at the earliest opportunity. Taking individual action in reaction to an occurrence or perceived need without some form of consultation with the IGO community can easily backfire. Providing humanitarian daily rations as an immediate solution to a food crisis can be exactly the wrong thing to do. Although such relief efforts may provide a critical stopgap allowing
civilian agencies to overcome a temporary problem, these efforts may further distort the local market and cause its collapse. Typically, OCHA will set up a coordination center. The NGOs will be aware of its location and role as will the U.S. Embassy. The OCHA will also be in contact with government ministries (if the government is functioning), as the main responsibility eventually will
fall into the hands of the host country. Prior to arrival in country, it is advisable to contact the United Nations OCHA HQ in Geneva. This office will have the informational and communications links that will assist the military in reaching its end state. It should also be the focal point for advance planning and sharing of information on objectives.

Coordination With Nongovernmental Organizations

The NGO community is a multifaceted one. There are a number of larger NGOs with wide experience, both in operations and with finding ways to work together. There are also many smaller NGOs with a single programmatic focus. In many cases, they lack experience. They are all, however, highly motivated and often feel uncomfortable in dealing with a more structured community such as the military. When humanitarian organizations choose, they set up coordinating structures usually by sectors, such as health and food. One of the military's first tasks is to establish contact with these entities or any NGOs capable of providing assistance in contacting the larger community. A positive and open approach to this sort of outreach bears big dividends when the supported commander decides to stand up a CMOC. When possible and within force protection restraints, the military should coordinate with humanitarian organizations in the most open forum as possible "outside the wire." This type of cooperation will foster a better relationship between the military and humanitarian organizations. The military may expect that NGOs come with a variety of resources but will, very often, lack logistic capability, to include transportation. That requirement will be high on their list of expectations concerning what the military brings to the table. NGOs probably will have arrived in the AO before the military and often plan on staying for an extended period beyond the end of the present emergency. In some cases, they will have had a long history in the affected country working on development-oriented projects. NGOs often will have a very good sense of the place and situation. This knowledge and understanding should not, however, be equated with military intelligence. NGOs will share what they know of the environment and conditions in general, but they will hesitate or refuse to cooperate if there are any implications that this comes under the heading of "intelligence gathering."

Conversely, NGOs will expect that the military will function as a
partner in dealing with a difficult situation. For example, information on mine locations and areas of hostility should be shared. The daily security briefings in Utapao, Thailand, during Operation UNIFIED
ASSISTANCE conducted by the military became a rallying point for
the entire humanitarian community. NGOs see themselves as neutral. Their security often is dependent upon the host community sharing that perception. A responsible end
state will, in all likelihood, depend upon the manner in which the responsibilities of the military's presence are implemented in
cooperation with the humanitarian community at large.

Additional Recommendations in Working With Intergovernmental Organizations and Nongovernmental Organizations

Whenever possible, the military should encourage civilian humanitarian/disaster relief professionals and their organizations to mutually plan, conduct, participate in, or cooperate with CMO, FHA,
the private sector, and CAO. Sharing pertinent information, particularly that related to security, will enhance communication between the military and these humanitarian organizations. It should be recognized that, by and large, the humanitarian organizations will be in the AO long before the military arrives and will be there long after the military departs. The military can learn from these organizations and assist in their programstheir effectiveness is a key to the military end state. The hierarchical structures of the military and IGOs/NGOs are different and this is especially apparent in the area of decision making. The military values planning, preparation, and timely staffing to provide a foundation for its leadership to make decisions. Although IGO/NGO hierarchies involve countries and boards of directors, operational-level decision making is delegated to the field level where the decisions are also implemented. Field-level decisions are frequently made by consensus. Accordingly, the military should
maintain flexibility in its dealing with IGOs/NGOs and appreciate
that different structures and corporate cultures are at work. The military should understand and appreciate the specific mandates and operational requirements of IGOs (especially the International
Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement) and NGOs, and anticipate
their need for operational independence and autonomy. NGOs, IGOs, and other humanitarian players might possess
information that could be relevant to military CMO, but they may be unable to divulge that information to the military when doing so will jeopardize
their
organization's
charter
of
impartiality
and
independence. The appearance of partiality or no longer being
independent can adversely affect these organizations' ability to continue working in the AO. Coordination centers should be used to the greatest extent possible to
facilitate communications while building trust and respect for the mandates of all organizations working with the military. JP 3-08,
Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental
Organization Coordination During Joint Operations, and JP 3-57 provide further guidance on interagency coordination.
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