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## Civil Affairs Planning Contents

PREFACE INTRODUCTION Chapter 1 CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS AND CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS
Decisive Action Types and Levels of Civil Affairs Operations and Civil-Military Operations Planning Civil Affairs Methodology Civil Considerations Analysis Systems Perspective Analysis of the Operational Environment Measures of Effectiveness and Measures of Performance ObjectivesEffectsTasks
Chapter 2 TROOP LEADING PROCEDURES
Introduction
Problem Solving
Steps to Troop Leading Procedures
Chapter 3 THE MILITARY DECISIONMAKING PROCESS
Introduction Performing the Military Decisionmaking Process Summary Chapter 4 JOINT OPERATIONS PLANNING
The Systems Approach The Joint Operation Planning Process Chapter 5 TRANSITION PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
Introduction Termination Appendix A CIVIL AFFAIRS AREA STUDY Appendix B CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS ANNEX TO AN OPERATION ORDER Appendix C CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS RUNNING ESTIMATE FORMAT Appendix D PERSONNEL PROTECTION AND URBAN PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS GLOSSARY

## References Index Figures

Figure 1-1. Civil Affairs methodology Figure 1-2. Planning factorsassess Figure 1-3. Planning factorsdecide Figure 1-4. Planning factorsdevelop and detect Figure 1-5. Planning factorsdeliver Figure 1-6. Planning factorsevaluate Figure 1-7. Planning factorstransition Figure 1-8. Characteristics of centers of gravity Figure 1-9. Identifying centers of gravity Figure 1-10. Sample of a measure of effectiveness spreadsheet Figure 1-11. Sample of a trend analysis spreadsheet

Figure 1-12. Sample of a trend analysis chart Figure 1-13. Sample of an impact analysis chart Figure 1-14. Lines of effort Figure 1-15. Illustration of the memory aid SWEAT- MSO Figure 2-1. Parallel planning Figure 2-2. Seven-step problem-solving model Figure 2-3. Planning at the company level and below Figure 2-4. Eight-step sequence of troop leading procedures Figure 3-1. Receipt of mission Figure 3-2. Civil Affairs receipt of mission checklist Figure 3-3. Mission analysis Figure 3-4. Civil Affairs mission analysis checklist Figure 3-5. Course of action development Figure 3-6. Course of action development checklist Figure 3-7. Course of action analysis (war game) Figure 3-8. Civil Affairs course of action analysis and wargaming checklist Figure 3-9. Course of action comparison Figure 3-10. Civil Affairs course of action comparison checklist Figure 3-11. Course of action approval Figure 3-12. Orders production Figure 3-13. Civil Affairs operations running estimate and Civil Affairs operations annex relationship Figure 3-14. Synopsis of the military planning process Figure 4-1. Integrating the interagency community Figure 4-2. Information requirement categories Figure 4-3. Mission analysis Figure 4-4. United States Government agencies and capabilities Figure 4-5. Course of action development Figure 4-6. Course of action analysis and wargaming

Figure 4-7. Sample of wargaming steps Figure 4-8. Course of action comparison Figure 4-9. Course of action approval Figure 4-10. Products of joint operation planning Figure 4-11. Planning process with actions Figure 5-1. Civil-military operations center coordination chart Figure A-1. Civil Affairs area study Figure B-1. Civil Affairs operations annex to an operation order Figure C-1. Civil Affairs operations running estimate format

## Tables

Table 1-1. Comparison of Civil Affairs methodology and the various problem-solving and decisionmaking processes Table 1-2. Sample of an information analysis grid Table 1-3. Sample of a measures of performance worksheet Table 2-1. Comparison of the Civil Affairs methodology, troop leading procedures, military decisionmaking process, and joint operation planning process Table 3-1. Example of a decision matrix (advantages and disadvantages) Table 4-1. Sample matrix: civil considerations (ASCOPE) and operational variables (PMESII-PT) Table 5-1. Notional example of a transition matrix

## Distribution Restriction: Approved For Public Release; Distribution Is Unlimited.

FOREIGN DISCLOSURE RESTRICTION (FD 1): The material contained in this publication has been reviewed by the developers in coordination with the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School foreign disclosure authority. This product is releasable to students from all requesting foreign countries without restrictions.

## Preface

Civil Affairs (CA) forces support missions in every theater, in peace and war, throughout decisive actions. Army Techniques Publication
(ATP) 3-57.60, *Civil Affairs Planning*, enhances CA planning across the range of military operations. It is critical that CA elements at all echelons properly plan and execute Civil Affairs operations (CAO) to enhance the supported commander's successful mission accomplishment. From the basic principles of CAO planning through determination of measures of effectiveness (MOEs) and measures of performance (MOPs), this manual outlines and provides factors for successful CAO. ATP 3-57.60 provides United States (U.S.) Army doctrine for the CAO/civil-military operations (CMO) planning process as a whole and CA doctrine for CAO planning. Planning doctrine is aimed at achieving a unified plan of action in support of staff action planning procedures and the decisionmaking process (the joint operation planning process [JOPP] and military decisionmaking process [MDMP]) as they relate to CA-specific actions (civil considerations). This manual addresses CA methodology, troop leading procedures (TLP), MDMP, crisis action and deliberate planning, and transition planning considerations. The commander must always consider the civil component within the area of operations (AO). Commanders, staffs, and subordinates ensure their decisions and actions comply with applicable U.S., international, and, in some cases, host-nation (HN) laws and regulations. Commanders at all levels ensure their Soldiers operate in accordance with the law of war and the rules of engagement. (See Field Manual [FM] 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare.)
The commander is responsible for planning. It is the CAO planner's responsibility to apply the commander's vision as it relates to all the aspects of civil considerations. The principal audience for this ATP is the CAO planner. It is also applicable to the leadership of the Army, which includes officers and noncommissioned officers that command Army forces or serve on the staffs that support those commanding U.S. forces at all levels of war (strategic, operational, and tactical). In addition, ATP 3-57.60 gives credible information to the civilian leadership of the United States. This publication applies to the Active Army, Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, and United States Army Reserve unless otherwise stated. ATP 3-57.60 uses joint terms where applicable. Selected joint and Army terms and definitions appear in both the glossary and the text. For definitions shown in the text, the term is italicized and the number of the proponent publication follows the definition. This publication is not the proponent for any Army terms. The proponent of this manual is the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School. Reviewers and users of this manual should submit comments and recommended changes on Department of the Army Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) to Commander, United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, ATTN: AOJK- CDI-CAD, 3004 Ardennes Street, Stop A, Fort Bragg, NC 28310-9610; by E-mail to AOJK-DT-CA@soc.mil; or submit an electronic Department of the Army Form 2028. Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine nouns and pronouns do not refer exclusively to men.

## Introduction

ATP 3-57.60 expands the doctrinal discussion of the role of CA forces supporting Army and joint operational planning that resides in FM 3-57, *Civil Affairs Operations*. Publication of ATP 3-57.60
incorporates revisions to the Army's running estimate and operation plan (OPLAN) formats. Support of operational planning by CA forces occurs at all levels of warstrategic, operational, and tactical. Whether conducted by CA Soldiers assigned to the staffs of various mission command headquarters or by CA planning teams augmenting those organizations, planning for U.S. forces' interaction with the civil component of the operational environment (OE) is required across the range of military operations. Publication of ATP 3-57.60 replaces CA planning doctrine found in FM 3-05.401/Marine Corps Reference Publication 3-33.1A, Civil Affairs Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures.

ATP 3-57.60 consists of five chapters and four appendixes:
Chapter 1 provides techniques used by CA Soldiers used in conducting civil considerations analysis and analysis of the operational variables during planning. The discussion further provides techniques used in determining centers of gravity (COGs) as they relate to the civil component of the OE, MOEs, and MOPs.

Chapter 2 describes techniques used in the application of the CA
methodology in the execution of TLP and problem solving. Detailed planning considerations are provided for the analysis of civil considerations in the conduct of TLP.

Chapter 3 discusses the role of the CA planner in the execution of the MDMP. The chapter provides techniques used by CA planners during each of the seven steps of the MDMP.

Chapter 4 describes the role of CA planners in the execution of the JOPP. The chapter provides a discussion of the linkage required in the planning of CAO supporting the joint force commander's CMO intent and concept of operations (CONOPS). The discussion provides techniques used by CA planners during each step of the JOPP.

Chapter 5 provides techniques and planning considerations used by CA Soldiers in supporting the development of a transition plan. It describes the various types of transition and provides a listing of transition tasks that assist the CA planner to identify and prioritize those tasks required for transition.

Appendix A details the procedures and provides an example format for the completion of the CA area study.

Appendix B details the procedures and the format for the development of Annex K (Civil Affairs Operations) to an Army OPLAN or operation order (OPORD).

Appendix C details the procedures and the format for the development of the CAO running estimate.

Appendix D addresses planning considerations regarding personnel protection issues during all phases of deliberate and crisis action planning and general considerations used in conducting urban area operations. ATP 3-57.60 does not add or modify any terminology found in the Army lexicon and is not the source document for any term.

## Chapter 1 Civil Affairs Operations And Civil-Military Operations

Well-considered and -developed plans can lead to success. Planning a military operation is similar to planning other activities. However, plans for military operations are based on an imperfect understanding and uncertainty of how the commander expects the military situation to evolve. A well-developed plan does not guarantee successful implementation, which makes flexibility and adaptability essential to planning. In the military, decisive actions demand a flexible approach to planning that adapts methods to each situation. An effective planning process structures the thinking of commanders and staffs while supporting their insight, creativity, and initiative. Following this type of planning process, whether for offensive, defensive, stability, or defense support of civil authorities (DSCA), offers the best opportunity of mission success. Planning success leads to winning battles and engagements that are critical but rarely decisive. Army forces will continue to conduct operations in populations that range from small villages to modern metropolitan areas. These operational conditions are continuously evolving, from the beaches of Normandy to the provinces of Afghanistan. Warfare in modern society requires not only defeating the enemy but also simultaneously understanding and shaping civil conditions of both the government and the populace in concert with multinational forces, the interagency, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Proper CAO planning that addresses civil conditions can enhance the prospect of achieving the desired end statevictory!

## Decisive Action

1-1. Decisive action is the continuous, simultaneous combination of offensive, defensive, and stability or DSCA tasks. Offensive and defensive tasks are designed to defeat enemy forces. Stability tasks are designed to shape civil conditions and to secure lasting peace. DSCA dominates operations within the United States. DSCA is complemented by the execution of defensive and, rarely, offensive tasks.

## Offensive Tasks

1-2. Offensive tasks carry the fight to the enemy by closing with and destroying enemy forces, seizing territory and vital resources, and imposing the commander's will on the enemy. Offensive tasks focus on seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative. This active imposition of land power makes offensive tasks the decisive type of military operation, whether undertaken against irregular forces or the armed forces of a nation-state. In addition, the physical presence of land forces and their credible ability to conduct offensive tasks enable the unimpeded conduct of stability tasks.

DEFENSIVE TASKS
1-3. Defensive tasks counter enemy offensive operations. Defensive tasks are designed to defeat attacks, destroying as many attackers as necessary. Defensive tasks preserve control over land, protect key resources, and guard populations. In addition, defensive tasks buy time and economize forces, which allow the conduct of offensive tasks elsewhere. Defensive tasks not only defeat attacks but also create the conditions necessary to regain the initiative and transition to offensive tasks or execute stability tasks.

## Stability Tasks

1-4. Stability tasks sustain and exploit security and control over areas, populations, and resources. They employ military capabilities to reconstruct or establish services and to support civilian agencies and indigenous populations and institutions (IPI). Stability tasks involve both coercive and cooperative actions. These types of tasks are conducted continuously and simultaneously with offensive and defensive tasks during unified land operations. During stability tasks, there is a high level of demand for CA capabilities. This can lead to an environment in which (in cooperation with a legitimate government) the other instruments of national power predominate.

## Defense Support Of Civil Authorities

1-5. DSCA addresses the consequences of man-made or natural disasters and incidents beyond the capabilities of civilian authorities. U.S. Army forces do not conduct stability tasks within the United States and its territories; under U.S. law, the Federal Government and state governments are responsible for those tasks. Instead, Army forces conduct DSCA, when requested, providing their expertise and capabilities to lead agency authorities.

## Types And Levels Of Civil Affairs Operations And Civil-Military Operations Planning

1-6. A plan is a design for a future or anticipated operation. Plans come in many forms and vary in scope, complexity, and length of planning horizons. Strategic plans cover the overall conduct of a war. Operational or campaign plans cover a series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space. Tactical plans cover the employment of units in operations, including the ordered arrangement and maneuver of units in relation to each other and to the enemy. 1-7. Planning is the process by which the staff translates the commander's vision into a specific course of action (COA) for preparation and execution, focusing on the expected results. All echelons perform military planning across the range of military operations. Joint planning integrates military actions with those of the other instruments of national power and our multinational partners in time, space, and purpose to achieve the desired end state. Joint doctrine identifies two types of planning: deliberate planning and crisis action planning (CAP). Deliberate planning addresses an anticipated situation that is likely to involve military forces. Deliberate planning does not usually take place in a crisis situation. CAP typically develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, or military importance that the President or Secretary of Defense (SecDef) considers a commitment of U.S. military forces and resources to achieve national objectives. 1-8. Planning begins at the receipt of a mission or guidance, verbal or otherwise, from higher headquarters. Planning starts the operations process sequence. However, planning is a continuous process that must be treated as such throughout the entire operation. The result of the planning process is an OPLAN or OPORD that provides instructions, control measures, and time increments. The plan or order synchronizes all efforts in an action that meets the tactical, operational, and strategic objectives of the operation and leads to a predeveloped, desired end state. 1-9. The plan or order includes the commander's intent and provides a common understanding of necessary tasks, as well as when, where, and who will accomplish those tasks, without unduly restricting the initiative of subordinates. The final product provides decision points that anticipate options and provide the subordinate force with the flexibility to adapt to a variety of situations. 1-10. Commanders, leaders, and staffs use several approaches to planning. When in a joint arena, the approach includes JOPP. The U.S. Army described planning process is known as the MDMP; at lower echelons, it is known as TLP. Depending on the situation, commanders and staffs may opt to apply guidance from JOPP or MDMP, or they may conduct the process in an informal concept similar to TLP. The CA planner must be adept at tactical-, operational-, and strategic-level planning in support of Army, joint, unified, and multinational forces. FM 3-57 contains a complete comparison of the CA methodology and the various problem-solving and decisionmaking processes.

## Civil Affairs Methodology

1-11. The focus of all CAO/CMO is to enable commanders to engage the civil component of their OEs. CAO/CMO are integrated into the conduct (plan, prepare, execute, and assess) of all operations. They include those activities that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, IGOs, NGOs, HN organizations, other government agencies (OGAs), IPI, and the private sector within an area of responsibility (AOR), joint operational area, or AO. CAO/CMO efforts focus on assessing, monitoring, protecting, reinforcing, establishing, and transitioning political, economic, social, and cultural institutions. CA Soldiers assist commanders by conducting these operations and tasks both actively, through direct contact, and passively, through observation, research, and analysis. The CA methodology describes how CA Soldiers, units, and elements approach all CAO and CMO. Figure 1-1 details the six steps of the CA methodology. Table 1-1, pages 1-4 and 1-5, compares the CA methodology and the various problem-solving and decisionmaking processes. 1-12. The six steps of CA methodology are assess, decide, develop and detect, deliver, evaluate, and transition. CA Soldiers at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war apply the CA methodology equally. At each level, it supports the commander's ability to visualize, describe, direct, and lead operations in his exercise of applying the warfighting functions.

## Step 1Assess

1-13. In Step 1 (Figure 1-2), planners assesses current conditions against a defined norm or established standards. This assessment begins at mission receipt and continues through the missionanalysis process, which focuses on defining the civil components of the supported commander's AO. CAO/CMO planners take an initial look at the nonmilitary factors (civil considerations areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events [ASCOPE]) that shape the OE. 1-14. In Step 1, planners look at the civil considerations mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support availabletime available and civil considerations (METT-TC) that shape the OE. Step 1 is conducted for each of the CA
functional specialties, as well as the general aspects of the AO.

At the end of this step, CA Soldiers produce an initial estimate and a restated mission statement for CA or task-organized forces. They also determine what other groups (OGAs, IGOs, NGOs, or other military and HN civilian agencies) need to be involved in Step 2 (Decide) of the decisionmaking process. The product of Step 1 is an initial estimate and restated mission statement.

Note: Civil considerations are how the man-made infrastructure, the civilian institutions, and the attitudes and activities of the civilian leaders, populations, and organizations within an AO influence the conduct of military operations.

## Step 2Decide

1-15. In Step 2 (Figure 1-3), planners recommend who, what, when, where, why, and how to focus CA assets and actions in a manner that supports the commander's intent, planning guidance, and CONOPS. The commander considers their recommendations and makes the final decision. Step 2 encompasses

-  Integrating CAO into unit COAs. -  Analyzing and providing recommendations to the
commander for COA decisionmaking from a CA perspective.
1-16. The ultimate goal of planners during Step 2 is to synchronize all organizations (military and civilian) participating in the operation and to direct their focus toward attaining operational objectives. The achievement of appropriate operational objectives ultimately leads to the achievement of national strategic goals and theater-strategic objectives. Once the commander chooses a COA, CA leaders refine a concept of CAO/CMO and the CAO/CMO plan. The plan directs taskorganized CA elements and non-CA forces to create or observe those conditions or events that would either mitigate or trigger a specific CAO/CMO response. It also addresses all CAO/CMO from initial assessment through transition to other civilian or military authorities. The products of this step include the commander's concept for CMO, CA priorities, and the CMO annex. In addition, planners identify MOPs and MOEs for related objectives and tasks.

## Step 3Develop And Detect

1-17. In Step 3 (Figure 1-4, page 1-7), CAO/CMO personnel develop rapport and relationships with the nonmilitary participants of the operation (including the IPI) and detect conditions or events that call for a specific CAO/CMO response. CA accomplish this step through numerous actions and operations, such as facilitating the interagency process in the civil-military operations center (CMOC), hosting meetings, participating in select dislocated civilian (DC) operations, conducting civil reconnaissance (CR) in support of civil information management (CIM), and monitoring public information programs and CAO/CMO-related reports from the field. CAO and CMO develop the civilian component of the common operational picture and assist commanders in finalizing their situational understanding. (As the process develops, the commander's understanding of the situation will change from what it was during preliminary assessment and mission planning.) CAO/CMO detect (confirm or deny) the conditions, standards of care, and attitudes that either cancel or trigger planned and on-call CAO and CMO branches and sequels to the operation. The products of this step include continuous assessments, revised or updated plans, formalized CMOC terms of reference, and fragmentary orders (FRAGORDs).

## Step 4Deliver

1-18. In Step 4 (Figure 1-5, page 1-7), CAO/CMO personnel engage the civil component with planned or on-call CAO (populace and resources control [PRC], foreign humanitarian assistance [FHA], nation assistance [NA], support to civil administration [SCA], and CIM)/CMO, as appropriate. This step is executed according to synchronized plans by CA Soldiers, non- CA Soldiers, IGOs, NGOs, IPI, and HN assets. These actions may occur individually and selectively across the AO or simultaneously at various levels of operations and government. At the strategic and operational levels, application of some CAO can mitigate or facilitate the application of others; for example, engaging the civil sector with CAO during the execution of a combatant command theater campaign plan may reduce the need for crisis action operations. If a crisis action situation occurs before relationships and programs are in place, the theater campaign plan can facilitate certain operational aspects within the AO through illustrations, systems, facilities, programs, and knowledge. Information gathered during NA, developmental military civic action, or humanitarian and civic assistance projects conducted during peacetime can ward off potential crises caused by natural, man-made, or technological factors. In the event of a crisis, the same systems, facilities, programs, and sources of knowledge can be useful in conducting NA, PRC, FHA, and SCA. The product of this step is an executed mission.

## Step 5Evaluate

1-19. In Step 5 (Figure 1-6, page 1-8), personnel evaluate the results of the executed mission. Step 5 (Evaluate) is a vital part of the CA methodology. This step should not be confused with Step 1 (Assess) of the methodology. Step 5 actually begins in Step 3 (Develop and Detect) and continues through Step 4 (Deliver). During Step 5 (Evaluate), evaluators at the strategic and operational levels focus on the MOEs established for the operation during Step 2 (Decide). At the tactical level, the focus is on MOPs. Evaluations determine the sustainability of any projects or programs initiated during Step 4 (Deliver). Step 5 validates the CAO/CMO CONOPS and supports the management of MOPs and MOEs to assess accomplishment of tasks and attainment of objectives. Evaluators analyze the effects of the operation (both desirable and undesirable) based on the CA functional specialties. They also determine the sustainability of any projects or programs initiated during the execution phase and recommend follow-on actions.

1-20. Step 5 includes
-  CA and CMO briefings and reports. -  After action reviews. -  Additional project nominations. -  New mission requirements (for example, FRAGORDs). -  The finalized transition plan. -  The termination, transfer, or transition timelines that
meet the operational requirements of the supported commander.

## Step 6Transition

1-21. Step 6 (Figure 1-7) includes transition planning and execution, which are vital for successfully executing stability tasks. Planners prioritize tasks and plans for the successful handover of missions to a follow-on agency or force. Potential follow-on groups include peacekeeping entities under a United Nations (UN) mandate, IPI, IGOs, or NGOs. CAO and CMO planners are uniquely qualified to advise the commander on activities that reduce turmoil and stabilize situations until OGAs (Department of State [DOS], United States Agency for International Development [USAID], United States Department of Agriculture, Department of Justice, and so on), the international community, or the indigenous government and institutions assume control. CAO and CMO planners play a major role in transition planning. They may be the best group to plan for transition because of their expertise. For planners to accomplish transition planning, they must establish a clearly identifiable desired end state and determine transition or termination criteria for the operation. CAO and CMO planners begin transition planning during the initial phases of operation planning to ensure this critical area receives adequate attention. Transition of CAO or CMO falls into the following three categories:
-  Termination of an operation or task. -  Transfer of an operation or task to follow-on CA units, other military forces, or the international community.

-  Transition of an operation or task to OGAs, IGOs, or IPI.

## Civil Considerations Analysis

1-22. CAO/CMO planners apply the factors of METT-TC, concentrating on the civil considerations aspect of the AO during conduct of the MDMP. In the joint arena, the planning process is the JOPP, which produces a joint OPLAN or OPORD, just as MDMP helps in the development of plans and orders. Table 1-1, pages 1-4 and 1-5, provides a comparison of the MDMP and JOPP. 1-23. As discussed earlier, civil considerations are analyzed using the mnemonic ASCOPE. The six characteristics are discussed in the following paragraphs.

## Areas

1-24. Areas are key localities or aspects of the terrain within a commander's OE not normally thought of as militarily significant. However, failure to consider key civil areas can seriously affect the success of any military mission. CAO planners analyze key civil areas from the following two perspectives:
-  How do these areas affect the military mission? -  How do military operations affect civilian activities in these areas?

At times, the answers to these questions may dramatically influence major portions of the COAs under consideration.

## Structures

1-25. Structures can be existing or nonexisting (lack of) civil structures that take on many significant roles. Somesuch as bridges, communications towers, power plants, and damsare traditional high-payoff targets. Otherssuch as churches, mosques, national libraries, and hospitalsare cultural sites international law or other agreements generally protect. Other structures are facilities with practical applicationssuch as jails, warehouses, schools, television stations, radio stations, and print plantsthat may be useful for military purposes. Structures analysis involves determining the locations, functions, capabilities, and applications of structures in support of military operations. Structures analysis also involves weighing the consequences of removing the structures from civilian use in terms of
-  Political, economic, religious, social, and information implications.

-  Populace reaction. -  Replacement costs.

## Capabilities

1-26. Civil capabilities (shortfalls and strengths) can be viewed from several perspectives. The term civil capabilities may refer

to
-  Capabilities that exist and allow the populace to sustain
itself, such as
- Public administration. - Public safety. - Emergency services. - Food and agriculture systems.
-  Capabilities the populace needs assistance with, such as
- Public works and utilities. - Public health. - Public transportation. - Economics. - Commerce.
-  Resources and services that can be contracted to support
the military mission, such as
- Interpreters. - Laundry services. - Construction materials. - Equipment.
1-27. Local vendors, the HN, or other nations may provide these resources and services. In hostile territory, civil capabilities include resources that military forces may take and use consistent with international law. Analysis of the existing capabilities of the AO is normally conducted based on the CA functional specialties. The analysis also identifies the capabilities of partner countries and organizations involved in the operation, which allows CAO/CMO planners to consider how to address shortfalls and capitalize on strengths in capabilities.

## Organizations

1-28. Civil organizations are organized groups that may or may not be affiliated with government agencies. They can be church groups, fraternal organizations, patriotic or service organizations, or community watch groups. They may be IGOs, NGOs, or even violent extremist organizations that work contrary to the HN. Organizations can assist or deter the commander in keeping the populace informed of ongoing and future activities in an AO and influencing the actions of the populace. They can also form the nucleus of humanitarian assistance (HA) programs, interim governing bodies, civil defense efforts, and other activities.

## People

1-29. People, both individually and collectively, can have a positive, a negative, or a lack of impact on military operations. In the context of ASCOPE, the term "people" includes civilians or nonmilitary personnel encountered in an AO. The term may also extend to individuals outside the AO whose actions, opinions, or political influence can affect the military mission. In all military operations, U.S. forces must be prepared to encounter and work closely with civilians of all types. When analyzing people, CA Soldiers may consider historical, cultural, ethnic, political, economic, humanitarian, and other social factors. They also should identify the key communicators and their organizational ties or relationships that influence people in the AO. Regardless of the nature of the operation, military forces will usually encounter various civilians living and operating in and around the supported unit's AO. Separating civilians into distinct categories helps Soldiers identify locals. In foreign operations, these categories might include
-  Local nationals (town and city dwellers, farmers and other rural dwellers, and nomads).

-  Local civil authorities (elected and traditional leaders at all levels of government).

-  Expatriates. -  Foreign employees of IGOs or NGOs. -  United States Government (USG) and third-nation government agency representatives.

-  Contractors (U.S. citizens, local nationals, and thirdnation citizens providing contract services).

-  Department of Defense (DOD) civilian employees. -  The media (journalists from print, radio, and visual media).

1-30. Civilian activities are primarily dictated by the type of environment in which they occur. Each category of civilian should be considered separately because the activities of each will have both a positive and negative impact on the unit's mission. Military operations affect civilian activities in various ways. Commanders should consider the political, economic, psychological, environmental, and legal impact of operations on the categories of civilians identified in the AO.

## Events

1-31. Just as there are many different categories of civilians, there are many categories of civilian events that may affect the military mission. Some examples include
-  Planting and harvesting seasons. -  Elections. -  Riots. -  Religious activities and holidays. -  Evacuations (both voluntary and involuntary).
1-32. Likewise, there are military events that affect the lives of civilians in an AO. Some examples include
-  Combat operations, including indirect fires. -  Humanitarian assistance. -  Deployments and redeployments. -  Sustainment operations (unit training, live fire exercises,
convoy operations, and so forth).
1-33. CAO/CMO planners determine what events are occurring and analyze the events for their political, economic, psychological, environmental, and legal implications.

## Systems Perspective Analysis Of The Operational Environment

1-34. Systems analysis is conducted at the theater, strategic, and joint force commander (JFC) operational levels. Systems analysis defines how the physical and behavioral state of the political, military, economic, social, informational, infrastructure (PMESII), and other systems of an adversary (or a supporter) result from a military or nonmilitary action or set of actions. Analysis of the systems data gathered details the prevailing conditions within the AO. 1-35. The systems approach uses multiple information sources and collaborative analysis to build a common, shared, and holistic knowledge base of the OE. System analysis emphasizes a

multidimensional approach to situational understanding. The application of ASCOPE elements during systems analysis identifies the key and decisive areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events of each subsystem; for example, the staff would apply ASCOPE to the entire concept of economics. The planner asks
-  Where are the key and decisive areas of economic
activity?
-  Where are the key and decisive structures
(infrastructures) associated with economic activity?
-  What are the key and decisive economic capabilities that
must be engaged or restored (for example, banking)?
-  What are the key and decisive economic organizations? -  What are the key and decisive economic people? -  What are the key and decisive economic events?
These questions would lead to effective CONOPS, MOEs, and troops-to-task analysis. 1-36. This approach to the analysis of the OE assists in COG analysis and operational design by identifying nodes (a person, place, or physical thing) that are fundamental components of a system and links (the behavioral, physical, or functional relationship) between the nodes. The COG construct is a useful analytical tool that helps JFCs and staffs identify friendly and adversary strengths, weaknesses, and vulnerabilities. Planners must take this step seriously. A faulty conclusion resulting from a poor or hasty analysis can have serious consequences, such as the inability to achieve strategic and operational objectives at an acceptable cost. Friendly and enemy COGs can change over time because of actions taken by friendly forces and reactions by enemy forces. COGs are based on the end state, mission, objectives, and adversary strategy. Planners must continually analyze and refine COGs. Selection of COGs is not solely a static process by the J-2 during joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE). Systems analysis includes an assessment of important capabilities and vulnerabilities of the systems and nodes, which enables the subsequent identification of COGs and decisive points. Figure 1-8, page 1-12, shows a number of characteristics that can be associated with a COG. Figure 1-9, page 1-12, shows identifiers for COGs. 1-37. Systems analysis and JIPOE are complementary processes that produce the awareness and understandings required to plan and execute CAO/CMO. Systems analysis is a valuable complement to the JIPOE because it integrates an expansive spectrum of information. In reality, perfect knowledge and understanding of the adversary and environment are impossible to attain, but by applying a broader approach to understanding both, commanders are better able to move beyond situational awareness to a more comprehensive situational understanding. The six CA functional specialty areas (rule of law, governance, infrastructure, economic stability, public education and information, and public health and welfare) coincide with the systems approach to OE awareness of the civil component. CA functional specialists have successfully used systems analysis to develop CA area assessments and area studies and to contribute to the identification of COGs and decisive points.

Note: For U.S. Army commanders, the process is intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) instead of JIPOE.

1-38. Understanding the OE requires understanding civil considerations. CAO planners organize data collection according to civil considerations (ASCOPE). In analyzing the characteristics of the COG and applying ASCOPE, the CAO planner and staff must understand strengths and weaknesses of each civil consideration. Army forces use operational variables to understand and analyze the broad environment in which they are conducting operations. They use mission variables to focus analysis on specific elements of the environment that apply to their mission. Military planners describe the OE in terms of operational variables. Operational variables describe not only the military aspects of an OE but also the population's influence on it. Joint doctrine identifies the operational variables as PMESII. U.S. Army doctrine adds two variables to the joint variables. U.S. Army operational variables are political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time (PMESII-PT). Examples of CAO/CMO data collection that help identify the COG include, but are not limited to, the following:
-  Political data, which includes the
- Overall political situation in the AOR. - Political leadership and type of government.

- Key aspects of the AO, such as political boundaries, centers of the foreign nation, and government strengths, weaknesses, and its role in society.

- IGOs in the AO (UN, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, World Food Program, United Nations Children's Fund, and so on).

-  Military data, which includes the
- CMO capabilities of all U.S. and non-U.S. forces available in the AO.

- Manner in which the military situation within the AO influences the current mission requirements.

- Manner in which the current military situation is affecting stability, government security, and so on.

- Role of the military in the applicable country.

-  Economic data, which includes the
- Strengths and weaknesses of the economic system and the nation's plans to meet economic development goals and objectives that might affect mission accomplishment.

- Shortages in foreign nation supplies affecting the operation. The shortages include the nation's ability to meet the needs of the civil population (food, water, and so on).

- Agricultural calendar, including harvest and planting seasons.

- Economic fiscal calendar.

-  Social data, which includes the
- Current social climate in the AO. - Key personnel inside and outside the AO and their linkage to the populaces. Key figures include figureheads, clerics, and subject-matter experts (from health, electrical, transportation, and other services).

- Role of religion in society. - Events that can affect the commander's mission
weather events (floods), elections, school year, fiscal year, and holidays (religious periods and traditional vacations).

-  Information data, which includes the
- Status and ability to transmit and receive information in the AO.

- Locations and meeting cycles of key nonmilitary agencies in the AO (international groups, NGOs, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, World Food Program, Office of Foreign Disaster

Assistance, and so on).
-  Infrastructure data, which includes the
- Civil infrastructure in the AO. (The state of the
infrastructure assists or hinders the supported commander's mission.)
- Conditions and locations of key structures, such as
government facilities; medical treatment facilities; cultural sites; power generation and transmission facilities; transportation grids; port, rail, and aerial facilities; water purification and sewage treatment plants; and radio and television production and transmission facilities.
- Agricultural and mining regions and other significant
geographic and economic features.
-  Physical environment data, which includes
- Man-made structures, particularly in urban areas. - Climate and weather. - Topography. - Hydrology. - Natural resources. - Biological features and hazards. - Environmental conditions.
-  Time data, which is a significant consideration in military
operations. Analyzing it as an operational variable focuses on how an operation's duration might help or hinder each side. This has implications at every planning level. An enemy with limited military capability usually views protracted conflict as advantageous to them. They avoid battles and only engage when conditions are overwhelmingly in their favor. This is a strategy of exhaustion. Such a strategy dominated the American Revolution and remains effective today. The enemy concentrates on surviving and inflicting friendly and civilian casualties over time. Although the military balance may not change, this creates opportunities to affect the way domestic and international audiences view the conflict. Conversely, a hostile power may attempt to mass effects and achieve decisive results in a short period.
Note: The data sources CAO planners use for gathering information include U.S. and foreign government agencies; international, nongovernmental (Catholic Charities, Interaction, Doctors Without Borders, Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere, Save the Children, and so on), and private humanitarian/charitable organizations; and digital libraries. Access to classified military database networks and the World Wide Web greatly enhances the CAO planner's ability to obtain the critical information needed to conduct mission analysis.

assessing the ASCOPE factors by the operational variables of PMESII and other systems. 1-40. A systems approach integrates people and processes. It uses multiple information sources and collaborative analysis to build a common, shared, and holistic knowledge base of the OE. Systems analysis emphasizes a multidimensional approach to situational understanding distinguished by an analysis of the six interrelated characteristics of ASCOPE within each system. A fully developed collaborative environment is an aggregation of individuals, organizations, systems, infrastructures, and processes that creates and shares the data, information, and knowledge needed to plan, execute, and assess operations. It enables commanders to make informed decisions faster than the adversary. It offers commanders and staffs the ability to create a shared situational awareness, which allows them to plan and operate with an enhanced unity of effort. 1-41. The collaborative environment includes the knowledge management techniques and procedures that govern cooperation within the headquarters, CMOC, and subordinate forces. These techniques and procedures encompass the processes and databases to integrate and synchronize the command and staff activity to generate supporting information and directives, such as FRAGORDs and operational reports. Collaboration, through the CIM process, automation, and decision-support capabilities, enhances the efficiency of the staff and the commander's decisionmaking process. The collaborative environment seeks to provide the right information to the right people at the right time in an understandable and actionable format or display.

## Measures Of Effectiveness And Measures Of Performance

1-42. MOEs focus on effects attainment by demonstrating the impact that completed actions have had in attaining the desired behaviors, capabilities, environments, and so forth. MOEs determine whether current actions are effective or alternate actions are necessary. MOPs focus on task accomplishment. In other words, MOPs determine if past actions were effective and the degree to which they were accomplished. 1-43. There are important differences between task accomplishment and effects attainment. MOEs assess the attainment of desired effects via quantifiable indicators. Effects fill the gap between an objective (either strategic or operational) and tasks to subordinate units. CAO planners identify specific tasks that must be performed to obtain the desired effects. Achievement of desired effects leads to successful objectives and desired end states. CAO planners use MOPs and MOEs collectively to identify and evaluate trends that can affect future operations. 1-44. Too many MOEs and MOPs become unmanageable. At that point, the cost of collection efforts outweighs the value of assessment. Consequently, higher-echelon staffs ensure that their MOEs and MOPs do not overburden lower echelonsespecially at the battalion level and below. 1-45. CAO/CMO planners identify MOEs for desired and undesired effects. MOEs indicate how the ASCOPE characteristics of the systems in the OE are functioning (for example, how the adversary is reacting). Indicators for each MOE are developed and included in intelligence collection planning. 1-46. Measuring effects improves planning and assessment by emphasizing
-  The linkage of operational objectives to tactical-level actions through a specified set of effects.

-  A systemic situational awareness and understanding of
the adversary and OE through systems analysis.
-  The command and staff interaction across multiple
echelons. CIM support to the collaborative environment enables this significant capability.
-  The enhanced unity of effort between joint,
multinational, and interagency organizations, which the CIM process supports. The results of this effort are included in the civil information grid.
-  A more accurate, rigorous assessment of the attainment of
objectives that focuses on system behavior rather than individual task accomplishment.
1-47. CAO/CMO planners develop CMO MOEs to determine how well or how poorly an operation is proceeding in achieving CMO objectives according to the commander's mission statement and intent. CMO MOEs identify effective strategies and tactics. In addition, they signal when to shift resources, transition phases, and alter or terminate the mission. 1-48. With an understanding of desired and undesired effects, CAO/CMO planners connect nodes to specific effects. A node connected to an effect is called a key node. Key nodes may become high-value nodes if they contribute to more than one desired effect when acted upon. CAO/CMO planners consider specific actions that can be taken against these nodes. Success is measured by MOPs. 1-49. The JFC's orders to subordinates will specify the tasks, purpose, and associated effects for action. At tactical levels, desired effects are reflected in the higher commander's intent statement. This statement is a concise expression of the purpose and desired end state of an operation. It initiates the subordinate unit's planning effort.

## Evaluation Products

1-50. In addition to deciding what MOEs to evaluate, CAO/CMO planners develop plans to observe and validate each MOE. These plans determine
-  Who will observe the MOE? -  When the MOE will be observed?

-  How will the MOE be observed? -  Where the observations will be made? -  Who will approve and validate achievement of the MOE? -  What actions will be taken when the MOE is satisfactorily
achieved? By whom?

## Measuring Effects

1-51. Observation of MOEs can be assigned to individuals, CA teams, or elements such as the CMOC. Events or time may drive observation of MOEs. Some MOEs can be observed and measured immediately after an event. Other MOEs can only be observed after a cycle of time has passed (for example, the attitude of a local population toward the presence of coalition forces). 1-52. MOEs may be observed in a variety of ways. The deliberate assessment is the most effective method. Using a combination of surveys, interviews, and direct observation, the evaluator obtains detailed, current information at the source of the issue. Some MOEs may be observed in the course of routine civil-military or interagency operations. As CMO planners analyze reports from CA teams and various civilian agencies and record statistics, the CMOC provides input to the common operational picture. 1-53. An MOE spreadsheet (Figure 1-10) provides criteria to measure an effect's success that directly supports the commander's objective. Usually identified in a quantifiable format, the collection of MOE data provides trends to determine positive progress toward a stated objective or desired effect. The MOE spreadsheet allows the staff to track, by AO and key terrain, where indicators are occurring that shows whether the unit is having success or failure with a particular effect. 1-54. CAO/CMO planners use the historical information from the MOE spreadsheet to complete the trend analysis spreadsheet. The trend analysis spreadsheet allows the commander and staff to see where positive and negative activities are occurring within the AOR. As shown in Figure 1-11, page 1-18, the spreadsheet clearly identifies the commander's objective and desired effects. MOE indicators are aligned for each effect. From this information and analysis of the causes of trend shifts, the staff can identify trouble spots and plan operations to reverse negative and capitalize on positive trends. 1-55. CAO/CMO planners with higher headquarters and subordinate task force commanders apply those tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) identified. Trend analysis from this spreadsheet, assessments from the task force commanders, and intelligence summaries are used to develop the trend analysis slide. 1-56. The trend analysis chart (Figure 1-12, page 1-18) provides a visual tool for the assessment of a commander's objectives and effects. CAO and CMO planners complete the chart with data derived from the trend analysis spreadsheet, commander's assessment, CMO assessments, and intelligence summaries. The trend analysis chart provides the commander with a quick visual reference to evaluate how each effect is influencing the overall objective. 1-57. The impact analysis chart (Figure 1-13, page 1-19) is part of the overall visual assessment for the commander. This product shows the impact of upward or downward trends by color-coding the status of AORs and the events or indicators used to determine that status in red, yellow, and green (printing limitations preclude Figure 1-13, page 1-19, from appearing in color). This chart allows commanders to quickly focus and graphically control forces.

## Achieving Effects

1-58. Effects must be validated and approved before the final disposition of an event or program can be made. The approval authority must be identified during the decide phase. The approval authority may be a commander, ambassador, HN authorities, organized representatives of the international community, or some other entity.

1-59. Achievement of effects must be tied to a disposition action. This action may be the
-  Termination of an activity or task. -  Transfer of an activity or task to follow-on CA forces,
other military forces, or the international community.
-  Transition of an activity or task to the IPI.
1-60. As the evaluation phase progresses and satisfaction of MOEs indicates an operation is nearing completion, CAO/CMO planners finalize transition plans and begin executing termination or transition timelines. 1-61. Execution of an event or program may result in unexpected outcomes. As new problems arise, CAO/CMO planners must restart the CA methodology. They assess the new situation; decide what, if any, action to take; develop the new situation and detect conditions through deliberate assessments; deliver the appropriate CAO/CMO; and evaluate the effects using MOEs. When effects are satisfactorily achieved, CAO/CMO planners shift to the transition phase.

## Failure To Achieve Effects

1-62. If there is a failure to achieve effects, CAO/CMO planners must determine why. The evaluated effect of an event or program may be unsuccessful because levels were set too high, the wrong action was measured, or some other reason. CA Soldiers must be careful not to define success by what has been achieved.

1-63. At this point, CAO/CMO planners must decide what to do next. Some options include
-  Continuing the operation as it is currently planned and
reevaluating it at a future date.
-  Accepting the results and proceeding with the transition
of the operation as planned.
-  Redefining the mission, using the CA methodology, and
developing a new plan with new effects and MOEs.

## Measuring Performance

1-64. MOPs focus on task accomplishment by answering the following questions:

-  Was the task or action performed as the commander
intended?
-  Did the force produce the fires, maneuver, or information
required by the specified or implied tasks, regardless of effect?
-  Have the expected results of the desired influence or the
changes in system behavior after the assigned tasks been accomplished?
-  Are the forces doing things right?
1-65. Measuring performance is normally a quantitative analysis that determines whether the task or action was performed to a standard. The standard may be derived from a procedure (for example, a standard operating procedure [SOP]) or may be time-sensitive. Table 1-3 illustrates a technique for managing and measuring performance.

## ObjectivesEffectsTasks

1-66. Combatant commanders (CCDRs) develop theater campaign plans to accomplish multinational, national, and theater-strategic objectives based on national strategic guidance from the President or SecDef. Likewise, the planning of a subordinate JFC supports the attainment of theater-strategic objectives. At the operational level, the JFC develops objectives supported by measurable operational effects and assessment indicators. Joint operation planning uses measurable effects to relate higher-level objectives to component missions, tasks, and actions. 1-67. The mission analysis process begins when the commander designates a priority (for example, a specific nation, region, contingency, or entity). During initial mission analysis, the commander and staff ensure they understand the desired operational end state and its associated objectives, and they design the tactical end states and supporting objectives. 1-68. CA planners use civil considerations systems analysis to identify nodes and their associated links. This allows planners to direct tasks that influence or change system behavior and capabilities to achieve desired objectives or effects. Understanding each system's ASCOPE characteristics and their interrelationships enables a holistic perspective of the OE. It also increases the understanding of how individual actions in one element of the system can affect other interrelated system components. 1-69. During the MDMP process, effects are planned and identified to achieve objectives. Planning is fundamentally about integrating all actions within the OE in time, space, and purpose to create desired effects that achieve the commander's objectives. Before execution, planners seek to promote unity of effortto harmonize joint, combined, and interagency actions into an integrated, comprehensive plan to achieve desired effects.

1-70. Joint doctrine defines effects in the following two ways:
-  The physical or behavioral state of a system that results
from an action, a set of actions, or another effect.
-  A result, outcome, or consequence of an action.
1-71. The use of effects to describe the results of unit actions and weapons employment at the tactical level remains valid. However, the term "effect" has a broader meaning that generally focuses at the operational level. Effects are not descriptions of tasks to subordinate units. A specified effect describes desired or undesired conditions, commonly called behaviors or capabilities, within individual ASCOPE characteristics of the OE's systems that result from actions or a set of actions. An example of a desired effect is "general populace supports U.S. or coalition efforts." An effect is achievable and measurable. It can support more than one objective. Effects are used to bridge the gap between objectives and tasks. Planners identify tasks that, when executed against specified key nodes, should achieve the desired effects. 1-72. The USG uses varied concepts to applied planning. U.S. Army forces use doctrinal assessment tools to inform, aid planning, and shape execution. USG departments and agencies use similar tools, such as the interagency conflict assessment framework (ICAF) and district stability framework. The term "district stability framework" replaces what was known as tactical conflict assessment and planning framework. ICAF supports all government planning for stability activities. ICAF conflict diagnoses are fed into the situational analysis and policy formulation steps of the interagency. When a team uses the ICAF to support steady-state engagement or conflict prevention planning, it begins preplanning activities after it completes conflict diagnosis. The team uses its own or ICAF findings as a basis for making recommendations to planners on potential entry points for USG activities. USAID designed district stability framework as a tool to identify and address sources of instability in any unstable environment or in stability tasks. District stability framework is used to identify the causes of instability, develop actions to diminish or mitigate them, and evaluate the effectiveness of those actions. District stability framework is particularly useful at the tactical level (provincial or local). It can be used to develop plans and provide data in support of the ICAF. District stability framework is not necessarily appropriate for CMO in support of stability tasks because of its focus on identifying causes of instability. (FM 3-07, *Stability Operations*, contains more information on ICAF.) CAO/CMO planners vitally contribute to the examination and analysis of all known inputs to civil considerations in the OE. Therefore, CAO/CMO planners may fill a support role by providing information for both frameworks. They provide this information to promote a shared understanding.

1-73. During initial mission analysis, the commander and staff
-  Ensure that they understand the operational end state and
its associated objectives.
-  Design tactical end states and supporting objectives.
1-74. Commanders synchronize their activities along complementary lines of operations and lines of effort to achieve the desired end state. Lines of operations and lines of effort bridge the broad CONOPS. When writing their CONOPS, commanders consider synchronized concepts, the sequence of actions and phasing, decisive points and objectives, lines of operations, and lines of effort. Army Doctrine Publication (ADP)
3-0, *Unified Land Operations*, contains more information on lines of operations and lines of effort. Commanders develop a set of desired efforts that support the objectives. Equally important, the commander and staff identify a set of associated undesired efforts that could adversely influence achievement of the objective. Lines of effort lead to desired objectives that result in the desired operational end state. In essence, lines of effort often work best to link tasks with objectives (intermediate goals) and objectives with the conditions that define the end state. In operations involving civil factors, lines of effort may be the only way to link tasks, effects, conditions, and the desired end state. Lines of effort are often essential to help commanders at all levels visualize how military capabilities can support the other instruments of national power. They are a particularly valuable tool when used to achieve unity of effort, especially in operations involving IGOs, NGOs, HN organizations, OGAs, IPI, and the private sector. 1-75. At the corps and division level, commanders may consider linking primary stability tasks to the corresponding DOS postconflict stability sectors. These stability tasks link military actions with the broader interagency effort across the levels of war toward the operational end state. Figure 1-14, page 1-23, provides a visual for lines of effort. Tasks along the information line of effort typically produce effects across multiple lines of effort. Commanders develop and modify lines of effort to keep operations focused on achieving the end state. 1-76. As planning progresses through the step process (TLP, MDMP, or JOPP), commanders may modify lines of effort and add details during wargaming or as they become available through either the intelligence-collection process or an update of the running assessment. However, each operation differs, and commanders continue to develop and modify lines of effort to focus operations on achieving the desired end state as the situation matures. 1-77. At lower echelons of command, the primary stability tasks and corresponding stability sectors will usually be much broader than those of the higher echelons. Tactical lines of effort will usually address specific aspects of the AO, such as activities of HN security forces, local development projects, and restoration of essential services. For example, efforts to identify and restore essential services are often shaped using lines of effort based on sewage, water, electricity, academics, trash, medical, safety, and other considerations (SWEAT-MSO). Focus should be on the civil-military efforts in pursuit of related objectives. Figure 1-15, page 1-23, is an example of tactical level lines of effort based on the memory aid SWEAT-MSO. 1-78. Commanders exercise mission command by planning and then implementing that plan in the most effective way. Commanders are, therefore, most important participants in effective planning. Commanders use plans and orders to describe their vision and direct its execution. The CAO/CMO planner is responsible for
-  Applying the commander's vision as it relates to all the aspects of civil considerations.

-  Providing critical information to the decisionmaking process.

1-79. This framework leads to the development of an OPORD that offers the best opportunity for operational success. Planners may have to determine the lines of effort and objectives through unconventional thinking, but the end state determines operational success. From the squad level to the highest level of command, the measure of success is not only by defeating an enemy through military engagement but also by applying the other elements of national power (political, economic, and informational) to enhance regional stability. The synchronization and integration of all instruments of national power are necessary to ensure successful execution of an operation.

## Chapter 2 Troop Leading Procedures

Decisive actions demand a flexible approach to planning that adapts planning methods to individual situations. An effective planning process structures the thinking of commanders and staffs while supporting their insight, creativity, and initiative. The Army uses three different but related processes to guide planning activities. These processes are the
-  Army problem solving. -  MDMP. -  TLP.

Commanders in joint arenas use the JOPP. The JOPP is similar but not identical to the MDMP and TLP. The CAO planner must possess both Army and joint operation planning skills. Planners with this knowledge greatly enhance the application of TLP, which is only limited by a lack of experience and the policies and SOPs of the supported unit. For the CAO planner to apply TLP, MDMP, or JOPP, it is critical that he grasps CA doctrine, TTP, and force structure. In addition, customs, mores, and values of the target audience must be understood.

## Introduction

2-1. TLP are a dynamic process used to analyze a mission, develop a plan, and prepare for an operation. These procedures enable leaders to maximize available planning time and adequately prepare their units for operations. TLP consist of eight flexible steps. Some steps are accomplished independently. However, most steps are concurrent, and many steps continue throughout the process. 2-2. TLP extend the MDMP to the small-unit level, such as company, team, element, or detachment. The MDMP and TLP are similar but not identical. They are both linked by Army problem solving, which Army Doctrine Reference Publication
(ADRP) 5-0, *The Operations Process*, explains. Army commanders with coordinating staffs use the MDMP. Company and smallerunit commanders without formal staffs use TLP to plan and prepare for operations. Table 2-1 is a graphic comparison of the CA methodology, TLP, MDMP, and JOPP.

2-3. The similarities of the processes are obvious. The CA methodology is applied equally by CA Soldiers at all three levels of war. Each level of war is designed to support the commander's ability to visualize, describe, direct, and lead operations. However, at the tactical level, CA Soldiers, elements, and units approach CAO by applying TLP, which uses the first three steps of the CA methodology. The first three steps of the CA methodology are as follows:
-  **Assess.** Assess current conditions against a defined norm
or established standards. The product of this step is an initial estimate and restated mission statement.
-  **Decide.** Decide who, what, when, where, why, and how
to focus CA assets and actions that support the commander's intent, planning guidance, and CONOPS.
-  **Develop and Detect.** Develop rapport and relationships
with the nonmilitary participants of the operation (including the IPI) and detect those conditions or events that would call for a specific CAO/CMO response.
2-4. The type, amount, and timeliness of the information passed from higher to lower headquarters directly affects TLP of the lower unit leaders. Figure 2-1 illustrates the parallel sequences of the MDMP of a battalion and TLP of a company and its teams and elements. The solid arrows show when a higher headquarters planning event could start TLP of a subordinate unit. However, events do not always occur in the order shown. For example, TLP may start with receipt of a warning order (WARNORD) or it may not start until the higher headquarters completes the MDMP and issues an OPORD. FRAGORDs from higher headquarters may arrive at any time during TLP. Army leaders must remain flexible. Successful leaders adapt TLP to fit individual situations rather than attempting to alter the situation to fit a preconceived idea of how events should flow. 2-5. Army problem solving is a systematic way to arrive at the best solution to a problem. It applies at all echelons and includes the steps necessary to develop well-reasoned, supportable solutions. Problem solving incorporates risk management techniques appropriate to the situation. FM 5-19, Composite Risk Management, provides additional information on risk management techniques. Army leaders should remain as objective as possible when solving problems. The goal is to prepare a factually based, unbiased solution or recommendation for the decisionmaker. Figure 2-2 shows the seven-step problemsolving model. For CA, especially at the tactical level, the first step is critical. Although this seems simple, many people skip the first part of the problem-solving process. Before a leader can solve a problem, he has to identify the problem. 2-6. At the most basic level, a problem is simply the difference between what a person wants and what a person has. From a CAO/CMO perspective, solely evaluating this difference leads to the treatment of a symptom instead of the actual problem. For example, a civilian population needs enough food to eat, and a food shortage exists. The obvious problem is hunger. However, simply giving people food does not solve the problem. Unless the people are continually supplied with food, they will become hungry again. The difference is the population's lack of food, but the cause of the food shortage is the actual problem. The cause could be a water shortage, a lack of agricultural knowledge, or some other reason for the depletion of resources. Leaders must identify the problem and then ask why the situation exists. ADRP 5-0 contains additional information on problem solving.

## Steps To Troop Leading Procedures

2-7. Leaders of company and smaller units use TLP to develop plans and orders. Company-level and smaller units use TLP, which places planning responsibilities on the commander or small-unit leader. TLP are broken down into steps. The steps of TLP are not rigid or sequential. Leaders can adapt the steps to the mission, situation, and available time. Some TLP steps are performed concurrently while others continue through the entire operation. The type, amount, and timeliness of the information passed from higher to lower headquarters directly impacts the lower-unit leader's TLP. Normally, the first three steps of TLP receive the mission, issue a WARNORD, and make a tentative planoccur in order. However, the situation determines the sequence of subsequent steps. 2-8. TLP extend the MDMP to the small-unit level, providing a framework for small-unit leaders to plan and prepare for operations (Figure 2-3, page 2-4) and key planning tasks. In Figure 2-4, pages 2-4 through 2-7, the box on the left shows the steps of TLP. The box on the right depicts plan development tasks. Plan development occurs in Step 3 and completes in Step 6 of TLP. To meet the conditions of METT-TC, the sequence of steps in TLP is not rigid. Whether applying the steps in TLP or MDMP, it is imperative that leaders and Soldiers understand they are direct representatives of the United States through their actions or inactions. 2-9. Army leaders begin TLP when they receive the initial WARNORD or identify a new mission. As each subsequent order arrives, leaders modify their assessments, update tentative plans, and continually supervise and assess preparations. Parallel planning hinges on distributing information as it is received or developed. Army leaders cannot complete their plans until they receive their unit mission. The eight steps of TLP begin with receiving the mission (Figure 2-4, pages 2-4 through 2-7). 2-10. TLP are a dynamic process used to analyze a mission, develop a plan, and prepare for an operation. The sequence of the eight TLP steps is not rigid. Commanders modify the sequence to meet the mission, situation, and available time. Some TLP steps are performed concurrently while others continue through the entire operation. CA contributions toward mission accomplishment must be in clear and unambiguous terms. The tactical gain from CAO and the mission cost of skipped critical tasks must be obvious to the commander. The goal is to prepare a factually based, unbiased solution or recommendation for the decisionmaker. To accomplish the goal entails making informed decisions that balance risk and mission benefits. Risk management comes from the operational factors and decisionmaking process that provides leaders with a mechanism to indentify the risks associated with a COA during the planning process. Successful commanders adapt TLP to fit individual situations rather than attempting to alter the situation to fit a preconceived idea of how events should flow.

## Chapter 3 The Military Decisionmaking Process

Army forces conduct decisive and sustainable land operations through the simultaneous combination of offense, defense, and stability (or DSCA) appropriate to the mission and OE within their respective OEs. Military planners describe the OE in terms of operational variables. Operational variables are those broad aspects of the environment, both military and nonmilitary, that may differ from one operational area to another and affect campaigns and major operations. During the MDMP, CA Soldiers on the CAO staff provide the commander with an analysis of the civil components that may assist in shaping the OE and enhance the operational mission of the supported commander. The planning process is an art. When CAO planners apply MDMP in addressing the civil considerations of the commander's common operational picture, it can only enhance the prospects of achieving the supported commander's desired end state.

## Introduction

3-1. This chapter is designed to identify TTP level information on how CA planners execute and integrate into the MDMP when planning CAO. It is not merely a reiteration of the generic MDMP discussion found in ADRP 5-0. The CA planner must possess both U.S. Army and joint operation planning skills and an understanding of CA doctrine and of the customs, mores, and values of the civil component of the AO. In the planning process, knowing the enemy, whether it is a military foe or a natural or man-made disaster, is necessary. Staff planners must provide the supported commander with updated, factual information about the OE that includes nonlethal aspects of the AO. Therefore, it is imperative that CA integrate early in the planning stage of any military operation. Mission success is greatly enhanced when commanders integrate CA forces with both special operations and conventional forces early in the planning process. Benefits are amplified when CA forces use their knowledge of local customs and attitudes to prepare supported forces for the cultural context of their operations. The CA area study is a good baseline source of information of a designated AO. The focus is to provide the supported commander with the civil components of the areas of interest. The area study is not designed merely as a compilation of information, but rather to identify information gaps and to identify concerns that could influence the operation in a positive or negative manner. The impact of early CA involvement is even greater when forces apply civil considerations early on in the planning process. 3-2. The MDMP combines the conceptual and detailed aspects of the planning process. Commanders use it to build plans and orders for operations. The MDMP can be initiated based on a mission from higher headquarters or deduced by a commander or staff. The MDMP helps commanders understand situations, develop COAs, and decide on a COA to accomplish mission requirements. 3-3. Planning methodology includes identifying and understanding the problem and determining a desired outcome. The commander applies operational art (design, organization, and integration), an understanding of the situation, insight, abstract thought, and a conceptual understanding to take him through the process from intuition to a specific COA. From this understanding, commanders develop several options for achieving the desired outcome. This comparative analysis may result in a choice that modifies one of the options by incorporating features of others. The MDMP ends with the production of a fully synchronized plan or an order for execution. 3-4. The MDMP integrates activities of the commander, staff, subordinate commanders, and other military and civilian partners when developing an OPLAN or OPORD. Knowledge productssuch as results from an IPB and running estimates help inform staff about the OE. Commanders may direct some staff members to focus their mission analysis on certain areas. The CAO planners focus is on the civil considerations (ASCOPE) affecting the civil component of the AO.

Note: CAO planners in the operational level of war or in the joint environment most always use operational variables (PMESII-PT) to develop an understanding of the civil component of the OE. When appropriate, CAO planners may also analyze operational variables in conjunction with mission variables to further increase the depth of understanding.

3-5. CAO planners further develop conceptual ideas to complement outside agencies. They do this in conjunction with civilian officials from other USG agencies and other nonmilitary organizations to better synchronize the total Army efforts. Collaboration is the key to creating a common operational picture from which everyone has a shared understanding. It is critical that CAO planners during the MDMP process focus only on the civil component to ensure synchronization with the rest of the operational plan. Success for the CAO planner is the professional diligence that must be applied to be the master of the civil environment within the operational area. The CAO planner must relate the importance of understanding the OE in terms of the operational variables and the civil impact on those variables to the supported commander and staff.

## Performing The Military Decisionmaking Process

3-6. This section describes the methods and provides techniques for conducting each step of the MDMP specifically from the CAO planner's perspective. It describes the key inputs to each of the

seven steps. The seven steps are as follows:
-  Receipt of mission. -  Mission analysis. -  COA development. -  COA analysis (wargaming). -  COA comparison. -  COA approval. -  Orders production.

## Receipt Of Mission

3-7. Commanders initiate the MDMP upon receipt or in anticipation of a pending mission. The purpose of this step is to alert all participants of the pending planning requirements, determine the amount of time available for planning and preparation, and decide on a planning approach, including guidance on design and how to abbreviate the MDMP, if required. When a new mission is identified, individual commanders and staffs perform the actions and produce the outputs (Figure 3-1). 3-8. The CAO planner, as one of the commander's staff elements, is responsible to integrate CAO into the OPLAN or OPORD. It is imperative that the CAO planner take into account the considerations noted in Figure 3-2. These considerations aid the planner to balance the need for CAO detailed planning against the requirements for immediate action to meet the supported commander's desired effects and end states. 3-9. The last task in receipt of mission is to issue a WARNORD (or, when needed, subsequent WARNORDs) to subordinate and supporting units. The WARNORD is issued as early as possible to increase the time for COA development. The WARNORD should include, at a minimum, the type of operation (offensive, defensive, stability, or DSCA) or describe the situation and state the mission, objectives, and assumptions (if applicable); the general location of the operation; the initial timeline; and any movement or reconnaissance to initiate the mission. The WARNORD may set a tentative C-day (unnamed day on which a deployment operation begins)/L-hour (specific hour on C-day at which a deployment operation commences or is to commence) or ask for the commander's recommendations.

## Mission Analysis

3-10. To the CAO planner, the CA area study combined with the initial assessment forms the basis for initial analysis during the MDMP. The MDMP continues with an assessment of the situation or analyzes the mission. Commanders (supported by their staffs and informed by subordinate and adjacent commanders and by other partners) gather, analyze, and synthesize information to orient themselves on the current conditions of the OE. The CAO planner's focus is on the civil considerations of the OE. The commander and staff conduct mission analysis to better understand the situation and problem and identify what the command must accomplish, when and where it must be done, and most importantly whythe purpose of the operation. During mission analysis, the CAO planner must consider all five CA core tasks for two critical reasons. First is so the CAO planner stays CAO-focused; secondly, in most OEs, they will be interrelated with one another. The five CA core tasks are discussed below.

## Populace And Resources Control

3-11. **Populace Control.** Populace control provides for
-  Security of the populace. -  Mobilization of human resources. -  Denial of personnel availability to the enemy. -  Detection and reduction of effectiveness of enemy agents.
Examples of populace control measures include curfews, movement restrictions, travel permits, identification and registration cards, checkpoints and roadblocks, and voluntary resettlement.

3-12. **Resources Control.** Resources controls regulate the
-  Movement or consumption of materiel resources. -  Mobilization of materiel resources. -  Denial of materiel resources to the enemy.
Examples of resource control measures include licensing, regulations or guidelines, checkpoints and roadblocks, ration controls, amnesty programs, and facility inspections. 3-13. DC operations and noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs) are two special categories of PRC. CA Soldiers have supporting roles in these types of operations.

## Dislocated Civilian Operations

3-14. DC operations involve

-  Protecting civilians from the effects of violence or
disaster.
-  Minimizing civilian interference with military operations. -  Including the planning and management of DC routes,
collection points, assembly areas, and camps in support of the efforts of the HN, NGOs, and IGOs.

## Support To Noncombatant Evacuation Operations

3-15. **Populace Control.** Populace control measures for NEOs
are the same as for DC operations with the following exceptions:
-  The American embassy through the DOS leads these
operations.
-  The majority of personnel affected are noncombatant
evacuees (for example, U.S. citizens) conducting onward movement to a safe haven with support through to repatriation.
3-16. **Resources Control.** Resource control measures for NEOs are the same as for DC operations with the addition of the following factors:
-  Humans are resources (and populaces). -  Safety is a priority. -  Transportation is a focal point. -  All DOS requests will be supported.

## Foreign Humanitarian Assistance

3-17. FHA includes the following:
-  Disaster relief operations. -  Technical assistance operations. -  Consequence management (CM) operations.

## Civil Information Management

3-18. CIM includes the following:
-  CR. -  Civil information grid.

## Nation Assistance

3-19. NA includes the following:
-  Security assistance. -  Foreign internal defense. -  Title 10, United States Code (other than FHA).

## Support To Civil Administration

3-20. Support to SCA includes the following:
-  Civil administration in friendly territory. -  Civil administration of occupied territory.
Note: FM 3-57 contains additional information regarding the CA core tasks.

3-21. There are several key outputs expected when analyzing the mission (Figure 3-3). 3-22. The mission analysis process for the CAO planner focuses on defining the civil components of the supported commander's AO (for example, focus is on the nonmilitary factors of ASCOPE). The CA area study is a foundational part of the process. The area study is a detailed analysis of a specific country, an identifiable region within a country, or a region consisting of more than one country, including shared border areas (Appendix A contains a sample of a CA area study format). CA should assess each of the 14 functional specialties, as well as the general aspects of the AO. It is important for the CAO planner to focus only on the civil component during this process. The CAO planner needs to fully understand the supported unit's CONOPS when analyzing the mission from the CAO aspecta critical step in the planning process, since the focus for CA is on civil considerations of the OE. To a CAO planner, the mission statement will be the driving factor during mission analysis. For a CAO planner, mission analysis is key, as it feeds into the IPB by providing civil considerations data to the process. Sometimes civil considerations are not the commander's top priority. Depending on the type of operation expressed in the mission statement, the CAO planner will get an initial understanding of the level of CAO within a particular operation. 3-23. CAO planners must understand the problem. It is important that the tasks (specified, implied, and essential) and their purpose be thoroughly understood, be clearly stated, and encompass all requirements limitations (can do, must do, and constraints). CAO planners should understand the correlation between the supported commanders' CONOPS and the mission/ intent of the higher headquarters. The commander's visualization is the mental process of developing a situational understanding, determining a desired end state, and envisioning the broad sequence of events by which the force will achieve that end state. CA staff members must assist the commander in visualizing the civil components of the OE. CA staff members must also understand all requirements limitations of what they
-  Can do. -  Must do. -  Cannot do, such as
- **Constraints.** A constraint is a requirement placed on the command by a higher command that dictates an action, thus restricting freedom of action. For example, General Eisenhower was required to liberate Paris instead of bypassing it during the 1944 campaign in France.

- **Restraints.** Restraint, in the context of joint operation planning, is a requirement placed on the command by a higher command that prohibits an action, thus restricting freedom of action. For example, General MacArthur was prohibited from striking Chinese targets north of the Yalu River during the Korean War.

- **Operational Limitations.** Many operational limitations are commonly expressed as rules of engagement. Operational limitations may restrict or bind COA selection or may even impede implementation of the chosen COA. Commanders must examine the operational limitations imposed on them, understand their impacts, and develop options that minimize these impacts in order to promote maximum freedom of action during execution. Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, *Joint Operations Planning*, contains more information on constraints and operational limitations.

3-24. The supported commander will usually receive a mission tasking through a WARNORD or OPORD. Other types of orders include service support, movement, and FRAGORDs. A WARNORD should contain as much detail as possible. It informs subordinates of the unit mission and gives them the leader's timeline. Army leaders may also include any other instructions or information they think will help subordinates prepare for the new mission. This includes information on the enemy, the nature of the higher headquarters plan, and any specific instructions for preparing their units.

3-25. At a minimum, a WARNORD contains the following:
-  Approved unit mission statement. -  Commander's intent. -  Task organization changes. -  Attachments and detachments. -  Unit AO (sketch, overlay, or some other description). -  Commander's critical information requirements (CCIRs)
and essential elements of friendly information (EEFIs).
-  Risk guidance. -  Priorities by warfighting functions. -  Military deception guidance. -  Minimum essential stability tasks. -  Specific priorities.
3-26. An OPORD is a directive issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for effecting the coordinated execution of an operation. Traditionally called the five-paragraph field order, an OPORD contains, at a minimum, descriptions of the following:
-  Situation. -  Mission. -  Execution. -  Sustainment. -  Command and signal.

Note: OPORDs always specify an execution date and time.

3-27. When the commander receives a mission tasking, he begins his analysis with the following questions:
-  What tasks must the command do for the mission to be
accomplished?
-  What is the purpose of the mission? -  What limitations have been placed on the actions of the
command's forces?
-  What forces/assets are available to support the operation?
3-28. Once these questions are answered, the commander should understand the mission and should be prepared to give a CONOPS. The CAO planner, upon receipt of a WARNORD, FRAGORD, OPORD, and/or the supported commander's guidance, should immediately begin analyzing the mission and gathering information and data directed toward the civil components of the OE. Figure 3-4 provides the CAO planner with a list of considerations when analyzing the mission.

Note: The factor of "C" should address the civil dimensions as they apply to both the adversary (to include lethal and nonlethal and no-strike list targeting) and friendly COGs (ASCOPE).

3-29. CAO should be a totally integrated processunity of effort. CA mission analysis is situation-dependent and should promote a multidimensional approach to understanding the OE. The CAO planner should, from a CAO prospective, prioritize the effort necessary to maximize results within the constraints, limitations, and risks of the operation. These efforts are directed at the supported commander's desired end state.

## Course Of Action Development

3-30. The COA development step generates options for follow-on analysis and comparison that satisfy the commander's intent and planning guidance. During COA development, planners use the problem statement, mission statement, commander's intent, planning guidance, and the various knowledge products developed when analyzing the mission in an effort to develop COAs. Each prospective COA is examined for validity using the following screening criteria:
-  **Feasible.** The COA can accomplish the mission within the established time, space, and resource limitations.

-  **Acceptable.** The COA must balance cost and risk with the
advantage gained.
-  **Suitable.** The COA can accomplish the mission within the
commander's intent and planning guidance.
-  **Distinguishable.** Each COA must differ significantly from
the others (scheme or form of maneuver, lines of effort, phasing, day or night operations, use of forces in reserve, and task organization).
-  **Complete.** A COA must incorporate
- How the decisive operation leads to mission
accomplishment.
- How shaping operations create and preserve
conditions for success of the decisive operation or effort.
- How sustaining operations enable shaping and
decisive operations or efforts.
- How offensive, defensive, and stability tasks or DSCA
tasks are accounted for.
- What tasks are to be performed and what conditions
need to be achieved.
3-31. The staff also continues to revise and update products. During COA development, commanders and staffs perform the process actions and produce the outputs shown in Figure 3-5, page 3-9. 3-32. From a CAO planner's perspective, COA development is a unified staff action under the auspices of the operations section of the supported unit commander. Brainstorming is the preferred technique for generating options. It requires time, imagination, and creativity, but it usually produces the widest range of options. The staff (and members of organizations outside the headquarters) must be unbiased and open-minded when developing proposed options. In COA development, the CAO planner must remain engaged in the process even though it is mostly in a support role (mission dependent [offensive or defensive operations vice HA or DCs]). The CAO staff can provide the commander detailed analysis during the brainstorming process focused on the civil components of the AO. The product of the mnemonic ASCOPE may influence the COAs when applied. Examples of some of the key considerations

within ASCOPE are as follows:
-  **Areas.** Examples include
- Politically defined areas, such as districts within a
city or municipalities within a region.
- Government center locations. - Social, political, religious, or criminal enclaves. - Agricultural and mining regions. - Trade routes. - Sites with the potential for the temporary settlement
of DCs or other civil functions.
-  **Structures.** Examples include
- Bridges, communications towers, power plants, and
dams, which are traditionally high-payoff targets.
- Churches, mosques, national libraries, and hospitals,
which are cultural sites and generally protected by international law or other agreements.
- Facilities with practical applications (such as jails,
warehouses, schools, television stations, radio stations, and print plants) may be useful for military purposes.
-  **Capabilities.** Examples include
- Existing self-sustaining capabilities of the populace,
such as public administration, public safety, emergency services, and food and agriculture systems.
- Capabilities the populace needs assistance with, such
as public works and utilities, public health, public transportation, economics, and commerce.
- Resources and services that the force can contract to
support the mission, such as interpreters, laundry services, construction materials, and equipment. Local vendors, the HN, or other nations may provide these resources and services. In hostile territory, civil capabilities include resources that military forces can take and use in accordance with international law.
-  **Organizations.** Examples include
- Civil organizations, which are nonmilitary groups or
institutions in the AO. They influence and interact with the populace, force, and one another. They generally have a hierarchical structure, defined goals, established operations, fixed facilities or meeting places, and financial and logistical support.
- Indigenous and external organizations. Some
organizations may be indigenous to the area. Indigenous organization may include church groups, fraternal organizations, patriotic or service organizations, labor unions, criminal organizations, and community watch groups. External organizations usually come from outside the AO. External organizations may be multinational corporations, UN agencies, USG agencies, and NGOs, such as the International Red Cross.
Note: Organizations can help the commander inform the populace of ongoing and future activities in an AO and can influence the actions of the populace. They can also form the nucleus of HA programs, interim governing bodies, civil defense efforts, and other activities.

-  **People.** In the context of ASCOPE, the term "people"
includes civilians or nonmilitary personnel in an AO. The term may also extend to those outside the AO whose actions, opinions, or political influence can affect the military mission. In all military operations, U.S. forces must be prepared to encounter and work closely with civilians of all types. When CA Soldiers analyze people, they consider historical, cultural, ethnic, political, economic, and humanitarian factors. They also identify the key communicators and the formal and informal processes used to influence people. Examples include
- Local nationals, such as town and city dwellers,
farmers and other rural dwellers, and nomads.
- Local civil authorities, such as elected and traditional
leaders at all levels of government.
- Expatriates. - Foreign employees of IGOs or NGOs. - USG and third-nation government agency
representatives.
- Contractors, such as U.S. citizens, local nationals,
and third-nation citizens providing contract services.
- DOD civilian employees. - Members of the media, such as journalists from
print, radio, or visual media.
-  **Events.** Events are routine, cyclical, planned, or
spontaneous activities that significantly affect organizations, people, and military operations. Examples include
- National and religious holidays. - Agricultural crop, livestock, and market cycles. - Elections. - Civil disturbances. - Celebrations. - Natural, man-made, or technological disasters, such
as hurricanes, environmental damage, and war. Disasters create civil hardship and require emergency responses. They affect the attitudes and activities of governments and civilian populations.
- Events precipitated by military forces, including
combat operations, deployments, redeployments, and paydays.
Note: Once planners determine significant events, it is important for them to template the events and analyze them for their political, economic, psychological, environmental, and legal implications.

3-33. During COA development, the CA staff should consider the following (Figure 3-6, pages 3-10 and 3-11). The list is not prioritized nor is it all-inclusive.

Note: ASCOPE applies to the "C" factors of METT-TC, while normally at the joint level the OE is described in terms of the eight operational variables (PMESII-PT).

## Course Of Action Analysis (War Game)

3-34. COA analysis enables the commander and staff to identify problems, as well as the probable consequences, for each COA being considered. It helps to visualize the concept while conceptualizing and synchronizing a plan. COA analysis may require commanders and staffs to revisit parts of the COA as discrepancies arise (examples, changing assumptions to facts, modifying force structure, and updating intelligence). COA analysis not only ranks and appraises the quality for each COA from both a friendly and enemy point of view but also hopefully identifies potential execution problems, decisions, and contingencies. COA analysis influences how commanders and staffs understand the problem and may require the planning process to restart. 3-35. Wargaming is a disciplined, yet flexible, process. The simplest form of wargaming is the manual method, often utilizing a tabletop approach with blowups of matrices and templates. The most sophisticated form of wargaming is modern, computer-aided modeling and simulation. Regardless of the form used, each critical event within a proposed COA should be war gamed using the action, reaction, and counteraction methods of friendly and enemy forces interaction. This basic wargaming method (modified to fit the specific mission and environment) applies to offensive, defensive, stability, or DSCA operations. In essence, when conducting COA analysis, commanders and staffs receive input in the way of higher headquarters' orders, IPB products, running estimates, and so forth. Key input involves
-  Gathering tools (for example, easel, whiteboard, butcher paper, map boards, maps with overlays, and chalkboard).

-  Identifying the wargaming method and how to assess, display, and record the results.

-  Listing the following:
- Friendly forces. - Assumptions. - Critical events. - Decision points.

3-36. The key input involves a process of gathering tools, listing friendly forces, listing assumptions, listing known critical events and decision points, identifying a wargaming method, determining how to record or display the results, wargaming the operation while assessing the results, and if need be, conducting a war-game briefing. 3-37. During the war game, the staff takes each COA and begins to develop a detailed plan, determining the COA strengths or weaknesses. Wargaming tests and improves COAs. Figure 3-7 provides key outputs to the COA analysis of the war game.

3-38. Wargaming that leads to key output aids the staff in synchronizing the six warfighting functions for each COA. It also helps the commander and staff to
-  Determine how to maximize the effects of combat power
while protecting friendly forces and minimizing collateral damage.
-  Further develop a visualization of the operation and
anticipate operational events.
-  Determine conditions and resources required for success. -  Determine when and where to apply force capabilities. -  Focus IPB on enemy strengths and weaknesses, important
civil considerations, and the desired end state.
-  Identify coordination needed to produce synchronized
results.
-  Determine the most flexible COA. -  Determine branches and sequels to the COA. -  Determine possible second- and third-order effects from a
probable COA.
Note: The information the CAO planner develops during COA comparison and analysis forms the basis for paragraph 3 of the CAO running estimate. Appendix C provides a generic CAO running estimate format.

3-39. From a CAO perspective, the feasibility check should, at a minimum, analyze each COA to determine
-  Is the COA feasible? Does the supporting CA element
possess the required resources (for example, communications, transportation, and equipment)? Can the resources be made available in the time contemplated (for example, prepositioning materials and equipment and maximizing preexisting arrangements with HN or contractor support that capitalize on indigenous capabilities)? Is the plan adaptable to significant changes (logistics support changes, reprioritization of CAO tasks, or a drastic decrease in CA assets)? Feasibility is a quantitative measure that primarily involves time, space, and means. Is this mission operationally feasible?
-  Is the COA acceptable? Does the expected outcome justify
the risk? Even though the action will accomplish the mission and the unit either possesses or controls the required resources, is executing that COA worth the cost in terms of possible losses of personnel, time, materiel, and position? Planners base this analysis on intuition, experience, and a complete understanding of the situation. (FM 5-19 provides additional information on risk.)
-  Is the COA suitable? Will the COA actually accomplish
the mission when carried out successfully? Is it aimed at influencing the correct target audience or decisionmakers? Does it focus on the restated mission? Does it comply with the higher commander's intent? Does it follow the commander's guidance? Are the CAO and mission appropriate? Does the mission profile allow the application of CA force capabilities? Does the mission support the theater CMO campaign? Is the mission consistent with other ongoing CMO programs in theater? If not, is that acceptable to the commander?
-  Is the COA distinguishable? To present viable alternatives
for the commander's consideration, COAs must be
substantively different. Developing superficially different alternatives stifles creativity, wastes time, increases risk, reinforces undesirable certainty, and largely prevents effective staff analysis. It is better to develop one good COA and properly war game it than to develop three superficial COAs.

-  Is the COA complete? After reducing COAs to a manageable number, CAO planners perform a final check to confirm the COAs are technically correct. Does each retained COA adequately answer what, when, where, why, and how?

3-40. The CAO planner assesses the CAO concept of support against the CAO MOEs and MOPs as each COA is war gamed. The results of this assessment are the basis for the COA comparison that planners record in paragraph 5 of the CAO running estimate (Appendix C has a generic CAO running estimate format). The CA staff should consider the following (Figure 3-8, pages 3-13 and 3-14) when addressing COA analysis and wargaming. The list is not prioritized nor is it all-inclusive.

Note: The staff must compare COAs as to the subjective positive and negative while considering risk assessment and the probably of success.

3-41. The CAO planner (or G-9/S-9) ensures each COA effectively integrates civil considerations. The CAO officer considers not only tactical and operational issues, but also sustainment issues. This officer assesses how operations affect civilians and estimates the requirements for essential stability tasks commanders might have to undertake based on the ability of the unified action. Protection, care of DCs, and HN support are of particular concern when planning support for either a tactical or operational mission. The CAO officer provides feedback on how the culture in the AO affects each COA. If the unit lacks an assigned CAO officer, the commander assigns these responsibilities to another staff member. The CAO officer represents the other actors' points of view if these agencies are not able to participate in the war game for security or other reasons.

Note: Chapter 4 of this manual provides information on wargaming steps and general wargaming rules.

## Course Of Action Comparison

3-42. COA comparison is an objective process to evaluate COAs independently of each other and against set evaluation criteria approved by the commander and staff. After each COA is examined for its strengths and weaknesses, the one with the highest probability of success is developed into an OPLAN or OPORD. The commander and staff perform certain actions and processes that lead to the key outputs of evaluated COAs, usually with three recommended COAs (SOP-driven) and updated assumptions and running estimates.

Note: Refer to FM 3-57 for more information on the CAO running estimate.

3-43. The decision matrix is a highly structured and effective method used to compare COAs against criteria that, when met, suggest a great likelihood of producing success. Specific broad categories of COA characteristics are given a basic numerical value based on evaluation criteria. Weights are assigned based on subjective judgment regarding their relative importance to existing circumstances. Basic values are then multiplied by the weight to yield a given criterion's final score. The staff member then totals all scores to compare COAs. Although there are many ways of analyzing a COA during MDMP, most units develop a standard procedure. Staff officers may each use their own matrix to compare COAs with respect to their areas of expertise. Leaders compare COAs by weighing the advantages, disadvantages, strengths, and weaknesses of each, as noted during the war game. They decide which COA to execute, based on this comparison and on their professional judgment. 3-44. Table 3-1, page 3-15, is an example of a decision matrix focused on the civil considerations of the OE. In weighing the positive and negatives of the matrix (the staff assigns numerical value to the advantages and disadvantages of each COA in the priority of importance to mission success), the staff determines which COA can best be supported from a CAO perspective.

Note: Decision matrices can result in prioritized lists, presentations, charts, consolidated data, or a decision matrix table based on the mission requirements and the CA planning element. The decision matrix will be used to evaluate COAs and assess the factor's relative importance in the decisionmaking process. ASCOPE is the criteria to evaluate COAs analysis to assess requirements.

3-45. The staff compares (advantages and disadvantages) the COAs in terms of the evaluation criteria (supportable from a CAO perspective). The COAs are ranked or ordered for each criterion (from the best to least supportive from a CAO perspective). The staff will visually support the comparison with a decision matrix. The staff considers the costs (personnel, material, funds, and funding resources available) for each COA and the time required to execute the COA in relation to the operational impact of success (in terms of MOE). MOEs selected in the COA development phase may be used as criteria if their impact on the COAs is distinguishable. The staff prioritizes the criteria in order and assigns a weight to each criterion in order to reflect relative importance. The staff considers criteria and MOEs that
-  Measure success in relieving or reducing the results of natural or man-made disasters and other endemic conditions of human suffering.

-  Recognize the limited duration of U.S. military and

support requirements.
-  Assist in identifying shortfalls in U.S., HN, and
information operations HA plans and resources.
-  Recognize the interagency coordination requirements. -  Allow comparison of the efficient use of limited
resources.
-  Assess the impact on the populace. -  Assess the impact of implemented control procedures on
the long-range mitigation of political, economic, social, legal, and military issues affecting the operating environment.
Note: ATTP 5-0.1 provides additional information concerning and showing a numerical weighted sample decision matrix.

3-46. The staff compares the levels of risk (if a stated evaluation criteria). The staff summarizes the advantages and disadvantages of the COAs to evaluate the chance of success of each. It is not unusual for each staff member to present his findings for the others to consider in a brief to the supported commander (unit SOPs usually determine the order of presentation for supportability; for example, S-2, S-1, S-4, S-6, S-9, and S-3). Figure 3-9 illustrates the output of Step 5 (COA Comparison).

Note: The CAO planner analyzes the wargaming of the CA scheme of support and compares the results for each COA with the others. The CAO scheme of support is ranked or ordered according to how well the COA meets the evaluation criteria. Usually the comparison and ranking of the scheme of support are shown on a COA decision matrix. The matrix and a narrative explanation are recorded in paragraph 4 of the CAO running estimate and briefed during the COA decision brief (Appendix C provides a generic CAO running estimate format).

3-47. The COA comparison, the Army's MDMP, and the joint concept, when applied, are very similar in nature. The key outputs of the MDMP are predicated toward the ultimate goal of identifying the strengths and weaknesses of each COA so that the COA with the highest probability of success can be selected and further developed into an OPLAN or OPORD. 3-48. Figure 3-10, pages 3-16 and 3-17, lists considerations the CA staff should be prepared to address during COA comparison. 3-49. Commanders compare COAs by weighing the advantages, disadvantages, strengths, and weaknesses of each, as noted during the war game. They decide which COA to execute based on this comparison and on their professional judgment (usually through a decision brief).

Note: ATTP 5-0.1 contains more information on the decision brief.

## Course Of Action Approval

3-50. The three basic components of COA approval are: (1) the staff's recommendation of a COA (usually through a decision brief), (2) the commander's decision and possible approval of the recommend COA or a modification thereof, and (3) the commander's issuance of the final planning guidance (if necessary). 3-51. After the decision briefing, the commander can direct one of four outcomes: (1) select the COA to best accomplish the mission; (2) direct the development of a hybrid COA comprising the two or more presented; (3) direct the development of a COA not considered by the staff, with new guidance from the commander; and (4) reject all COAs and direct the staff to begin COA development again. 3-52. After selecting a COA, the commander issues the final planning guidance. The final planning guidance includes a refined commander's intent (if necessary) and new CCIRs to support execution. It also includes any additional guidance on priorities for the warfighting functions, orders preparation, rehearsal, and preparation. This guidance includes priorities for resources needed to preserve freedom of action and ensure continuous sustainment. Figure 3-11 illustrates the output of Step 6 (COA Approval).

## Orders Production

3-53. Based on the commander's decision and any additional final planning guidance, the staff will issue a WARNORD. The WARNORD confirms guidance issued in person or by video teleconferencing and expands on details not covered by the commander personally. The WARNORD issued after COA approval normally contains
-  The mission. -  The commander's intent. -  The updated CCIRs and EEFIs. -  The CONOPS. -  The AO. -  The principal tasks assigned to subordinate units. -  Any preparation and rehearsal instructions not included
in the SOPs.
-  A final timeline for the operation.
3-54. The staff prepares the OPLAN or OPORD by turning the selected COA into a clear, concise CONOPS with required supporting information. The COA statement becomes the CONOPS for the plan. The COA sketch becomes the basis for the operation overlay. OPLANs and OPORDs provide all the information subordinates need for execution of the mission. Mission orders avoid unnecessary constraints that inhibit subordinate initiative. The staff assists subordinate staffs with their planning and coordination. Figure 3-12 illustrates the key output of Step 7 (Orders Production) (for example, approved OPLANs or OPORDs).

3-55. The commander's approval of a COA initiates the production of the OPLAN and OPORD. The staff prepares the OPLAN or OPORD by turning the selected COA into a clear, concise CONOPS with the required supporting information. The CONOPS for the approved COA becomes the CONOPS for the OPLAN. There are three types of orders:
-  **OPORDs.** OPORDs are directive in nature, issued by a
commander to a subordinate commander for the purpose of execution of a planned operation. A commander issues an OPORD to direct the execution of long- or short-term operations within the framework of a long-range OPORD.
Note: The CAO annex addresses sustainment and mission command aspects of CAO that an OPORD (or OPLAN) does not cover elsewhere (example of a CAO annex to an OPORD [Appendix B]).

-  **WARNORDs.** WARNORDs help subordinate units and
staffs prepare for new missions by describing the situation, providing initial planning guidance, and directing preparation activities. WARNORDs increase subordinates' planning time, provide details of the impending operation, and list events that accompany preparation and execution.
-  **FRAGORDs.** FRAGORDs are abbreviated forms of an
OPORD issued, when needed, after an OPORD to change or modify the OPORD or to execute a branch or sequel to the OPORD. FRAGORDs include all five paragraph headings. FRAGORDs differ from OPORDs only in the degree of detail provided. FRAGORDs provide brief and specific instructions. They address only those parts of the original OPORD that have changed.
3-56. The COA sketch becomes the basis for the operation overlay. Orders and plans provide all information subordinates need for execution. The CMO staff produces the CAO annex (Annex K, ATTP 5-0.1) in support of the OPLAN/OPORD largely from the information contained in the CAO running estimate developed during the MDMP process. The CAO/CMO planner can build most of the CMO annex through cut and paste from a well-prepared CAO running estimate. Figure 3-13 reflects the relationship between the two products. CAO planners must maintain situational awareness after the publication of an OPLAN and OPORD. As new information becomes available, CAO planners update the CAO running estimate. A staff section first synchronizes critical data affecting the plan with the other staff sections and then disseminates the information, as appropriate.

3-57. The CAO annex serves the following three primary purposes:
-  The situation paragraph provides operational details on
the situation from a CMO perspective.
-  The execution paragraph and matrix provide the direction
needed to focus the effects of the CMO elements.
-  The assessment matrix displays the information needed to
assess CMO tasks.
3-58. The CAO annex also addresses service support, command, and signal aspects of CAO that are not covered elsewhere in the OPLAN or OPORD. Much of the information in the CAO annex is derived from the CA area study and CAO running estimate. Major portions of the annex can be written directly from the estimate. Much of the information required for the execution and assessment matrices can be taken from CA worksheets developed for COA approval. Normally, in Army operations, this annex is Annex K (Civil Affairs Operations). In the joint arena, it is Annex G (Civil-Military Operations). 3-59. Commanders review and approve orders before the staff reproduces and disseminates them unless they have delegated that authority. Traditionally, the chief of staff/executive officer or operations officer receives it. If time and conditions make it possible, the order is briefed to subordinate commanders face to face by the higher commander and staff. The CAO planner will be expected to brief his portion of the OPLAN or OPORD. Confirmation briefings can be done collaboratively, with several commanders at the same time, or with single commanders. They may be performed face to face or by video teleconferencing. It is critical that the CAO planner see all the way down to the end of each staff planners/agencies lane yet "keep in our lane," the civil considerations of planning process.

## Summary

3-60. One of the Army's problem-solving methods is the MDMP, with the other being TLP. The MDMP combines the conceptual and detailed aspects of planning. Input (be it from higher headquarters, the commander, estimates, reconnaissance, and so forth) leads into the MDMP, which through various steps/ processes leads to an output that eventually formulates a CONOPS developed into an OPLAN or OPORD. 3-61. Army problem solving through TLP and the MDMP is predicated on the levels of command (Figure 2-2, page 2-3). This planning via TLP and the MDMP are vastly similar in steps, but not identical. In some cases, the steps are concurrent with many steps continuous through the planning process. Both processes lead to orders, either issuances of or production of. Figure 3-14 provides a graphic synopsis of the Army's military planning process. 3-62. The MDMP is critical during all phases of planning. The CAO planner has a vital role in this process. Changes in the OE and effectively adapting to these situationswhether precipitated by the enemy, changes in friendly force status or new civil considerations (imperative to keep the CAO running estimate updated) operations never unfold exactly as planned. As the understanding of the situation changes, a commander's decisions made during execution are critical to an operation's success. When lacking time to perform the MDMP, commanders make an immediate adjustment decisionusing intuitive decisionmakingin the form of a focused COA. Wargaming, by the commander with the staff, may be similar to TLP in that it may be all verbal until an acceptable COA is determined and accepted by the commander. Noting that if time is available, commanders may direct the plans cell to develop a new COA using the MDMP. The time consideration makes the planning become operative. The key is the CAO planner needs to be able to act and react in real time as events occur, be they events that take place during long-term, short-term, or operational planning. It is critical that the CAO planner be constantly assessing possible second- and third-order effects during each mission. This will give the commander options (branches and sequels) as certain events unfold during a mission. The final result will be a commander able to meet the mission requirements and desired end state effectively and efficiently.

## Chapter 4 Joint Operations Planning

This chapter addresses joint operations planning, to include but not limited to the seven-step JOPP, specific responsibilities and tasks, mission success criteria, ASCOPE influences, and PMESII-PT in COA development and the decisionmaking processing. Joint doctrine incorporates a systems perspective approach in the analysis of an OE.

Systems analysis defines how military and nonmilitary actions or sets of actions affect the physical and behavioral state of an adversary's PMESII and other systems. Analysis of the gathered systems data details the prevailing conditions within the joint operational area.

## The Systems Approach

4-1. Analysis of the systems data in an OE assists in COG analysis and operational design by identifying
-  Nodespeople, places, or physical things that are
fundamental components of a system.
-  Linksbehavioral, physical, or functional relationships
between the nodes.
4-2. The systems data analysis includes an assessment of capabilities and vulnerabilities of the systems and nodes, which enables the subsequent identification of COGs and decisive points. 4-3. A systems approach integrates people and processes. The systems approach uses multiple information sources and collaborative analysis to build a common, shared, and holistic knowledge base of the OE. Systems analysis emphasizes a multidimensional approach toward situational understanding. Situational understanding occurs through the analysis of the six interrelated characteristics of ASCOPE and PMESII-PT within each system. The six CA specialty areas are
-  Rule of law. -  Governance. -  Infrastructure. -  Economic stability. -  Public education and information. -  Public health and welfare.

4-4. The specialty areas coincide with the systems approach to OE awareness of the civil component. CA functional specialists have successfully used systems analysis to develop CA area assessments and studies. CA commands provide expertise in all six functional specialty areas. U.S. Army Reserve CA brigades and battalions have capabilities in four of the functional specialty areas. Active U.S. Army CA battalions are capable of executing missions in some of these functional specialty areas. However, they are not organized to maintain the high-level skill required for specialized CAO. FM 3-57 contains more information on the functional specialist.

4-5. The JOPP is an orderly, analytical planning process that consists of a set of logical steps to
-  Analyze a mission. -  Develop, analyze, and compare alternative COAs. -  Select the best COA. -  Produce a plan or order.
4-6. The JOPP effectively translates operational art into science by adding knowledge, rigor, and analysis to the commander's design concept. Operational design is the use of various design elements in the conception and construction of the framework that underpins a joint OPLAN and its subsequent execution. The JFC and staff use operational design elements throughout the JOPP.

## The Joint Operation Planning Process

4-7. The JOPP underpins planning at all levels and for missions across the range of military operations. It applies to both supported and supporting JFCs and to joint force component commands participating in joint planning. This process facilitates interaction between the commander, staff, and subordinate headquarters throughout planning. The JOPP helps commanders and their staffs organize their planning activities, share a common understanding of the mission and commander's intent, and develop effective plans and orders. Figure 4-1 demonstrates the integration of the interagency community. 4-8. This planning process applies to deliberate planning and CAP within the context of the responsibilities specified by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Manual 3122 series, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES).

4-9. The CJCS is phasing out JOPES and replacing it with the Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) System. The APEX system will provide a single planning process that encompasses both deliberate and CAP through execution. Planners will document revised procedures to better link planning activities and products across the planning spectrum as part of the effort to transition from JOPES to APEX. APEX activities span many organizational levels but they focus on the interaction between the SecDef and CCDRs. This focus ultimately helps the President and SecDef decide when, where, and how to commit U.S. military capabilities in response to foreseen contingencies or unforeseen crises. APEX and JOPP share the same basic approach and problem-solving elements, such as mission analysis and COA development. Joint organizations without specific JOPES responsibilities also use the JOPP. Furthermore, the JOPP supports planning throughout the course of an operation after the CJCS, at the direction of the President or SecDef, issues the execute order. In most situations, the JOPP proceeds according to the planning milestones established by commanders at various echelons. The CJCS Manual 3122 series specifies joint planning and execution community milestones, deliverables, and interaction points for deliberate and crisis action plans that are developed following the formal JOPES process. The steps for JOPP include:
-  Step 1Initiation. -  Step 2Mission Analysis. -  Step 3COA Development. -  Step 4COA Analysis and War Game. -  Step 5COA Comparison. -  Step 6COA Approval. -  Step 7Develop Plan or Order.

## Step 1Initiation

4-10. To plan for the effective employment of forces, geographic combatant commanders/JFCs and their staffs must possess a thorough knowledge of national security policy and objectives, as well as national and theater military objectives. CA specialists can be employed to legitimize and facilitate U.S. military and national objectives. During precombat operations, CA teams and individuals assist the commander in
-  Completing an estimate of the situation. -  Preparing the CAO annex.

## -  Analyzing Various Coas From A Ca/Cmo Standpoint.

4-11. During operational deployment, CA personnel assess the civil component identify operational requirements to be performed as outlined in the functional specialty areas, and recommend methods to minimize civilian interference with military operations. CA can support postcombat operations by providing the commander with a means of reconstructing public administration organizations and facilities and conducting handover to civil and military agencies. 4-12. The CA planner must possess both U.S. Army and joint operation planning skills; a better-than-general working knowledge of CA doctrine, TTP, and force structure; and a thorough understanding of the customs, mores, and values of the civil sector of the AO. In the planning process, knowing the enemy, whether it is a military foe or a natural or man-made disaster, is necessary. Staff planners must provide the supported commander with updated, factual information about the OE that includes nonlethal aspects of the AO. Therefore, it is imperative to involve CA early in the planning stage of any military operation. Mission success is greatly enhanced when commanders integrate CA forces with both special operations and conventional forces early in the planning process. Benefits are amplified when CA forces use their knowledge of local customs and attitudes to prepare supported forces for the cultural context of their operations. The impact of early CA involvement is even greater when forces apply civil considerations aspects to the overall planning process. 4-13. The JOPP begins when an appropriate authority recognizes the potential for employment of a military capability in response to a potential or actual crisis. At the strategic level, that authoritythe President, SecDef, or CJCSinitiates planning by ordering the development of military options. The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, Contingency Planning Guidance, and related strategic guidance statements (when applicable) serve as the primary instruction to begin deliberate planning. However, CCDRs and other commanders may initiate planning on their own authority when they identify a planning requirement not directed by higher authority. The CJCS may also issue a WARNORD. Military options are normally developed in combination with other nonmilitary options so that the President can respond with all the appropriate instruments of national power. Below the strategic level, crises are reported to the National Military Command Center in an operational report. This report initiates analysis at the strategic level. It may result in the President, SecDef, or CJCS initiating a military plan. Regardless of the manner in which planning begins, the CCDR may act within approved rules of engagement in an immediate crisis. 4-14. Particularly in CAP, the JFC and his staff will perform an assessment of the initiating directive to determine the amount of time available until mission execution, the status of intelligence products and running estimates, and other factors specific to the planning situation. Typically, the JFC will provide initial guidance. This guidance could specify time constraints, outline initial coordination requirements, authorize movement of key capabilities within the JFC's authority, and direct other actions as necessary.

Note: The JFC's initial guidance should not be confused with his planning guidance, which is a product of mission analysis.

4-15. Planning is continuous once execution begins. However, planning initiation during execution is still relevant when there are significant changes to the current mission or planning assumptions or the commander receives a mission for follow-on operations. The J-5 of the JFC's staff typically focuses on planning sequels and potential future operations, whereas the J-3 focuses on branch planning and current operations.

## Step 2Mission Analysis

4-16. Mission analysis leads to the development of CMO COAs with a CMO component that supports the attainment of strategic national policy objectives and the CCDR's desired mission end state. The mission analysis process, whether formal or informal, is a critical step in identifying the operational tasks the supported unit needs, be it a company or a combatant command. Ultimately, the commander is responsible for analyzing and restating the mission so that subordinate commanders can begin their own planning efforts. The only difference between CA planning support and the overall planning process described in ADRP 5-0 is that CA planning support focuses on the civil component and directs the analysis process toward satisfying current civil problems. CA engage the civil component of the OE by assessing, monitoring, protecting, reinforcing, establishing, and transitioningboth actively and passivelypolitical, economic, and information (social and cultural) institutions and capabilities. The application of ASCOPE categories to the systems analysis refines the process and shapes the tactical environment. ASCOPE categories broaden the commander's perspective and assist him in shaping the environment at the tactical level. Above the tactical level, the planning process needs to become a little more analytically advanced in systems analysis for a better understanding of relationships, dependencies, strengths, and vulnerabilities facing the command. Viewing the OE at the joint or operational level, the analytical planning process used expands across six PMESII- PT boundaries. Both ASCOPE and PMESII-PT are best used in deliberate planning. However, depending upon the situation, planners can apply both processes to CAP. Both ASCOPE and PMESII-PT offer ideal starting points for organizing research to better identify information gaps early on in the analytical planning process. The emphasis of one system above the other is only relevant in how well the planner understands and interprets the supported commander's objectives. In many cases, the application of an ASCOPE/PMESII-PT matrix can assist in defining the OE. A mere list of civil considerations within each category does not qualify as an analysis of the OE. Shaping the environment requires identifying COGs and applying the best COAs to each COG. JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*, and FM 3-57
contain more information on this subject. 4-17. The outcome of the planning process produces operational products, MOEs, and MOPs. The goal of the planning process is the achievement of U.S. national goals and objectives at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war abroad and at home. In essence, the planning process identifies what CA tasks or policies need integration into the supported unit's operational concept. To properly plan, the CAO/CMO planner must express this information in a way that allows the supported commander and staff to understand the operational impact of CAO and to justify its legal, moral, or ethical impact. The mission planners who focus on the civil components should integrate planned or on-call CAO. Because civil components are diverse and, at times, misunderstood, it is essential that the mission analysis clearly identifies CAO/CMO priorities of effort and takes into consideration the supported unit's operational timeline and critical CA tasks.

Note: A CA critical task is one that, if not accomplished, may contribute to the failure of the supported unit's mission or the national strategic or military objectives.

4-18. CA Soldiers conduct CAO, which consist of the following core tasks:
-  PRC. -  FHA. -  CIM. -  NA. -  SCA.
4-19. CMO are defined in JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations, as the activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational U.S. objectives. Civil-military operations may include the performance by military forces of activities and functions that are normally the responsibility of local, regional, or national governments. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civil-military operations may be performed by designated CA, by other military forces, or by a combination of CA and other forces. When conducting CMO, commanders may employ a number of military capabilities (including CA forces) and engage many different elements, such as
-  IPI.

-  IGOs. -  NGOs. -  HN organizations. -  OGAs.
4-20. CA forces can support the commander during CMO by conducting CAO. Although conditions differ across the spectrum of conflict, CA forces support CMO by establishing, maintaining, influencing, or exploiting relations among military forces, civil authorities, and the civilian populace in an AO to facilitate military operations. Unity of effort is an integral part of CAO and CMO synchronization with whole-of-government efforts. It is essential that CAO planners and operations understand the importance of the different elements.

## Mission Analysis Overview

4-21. The primary inputs to mission analysis are the higher headquarters planning directive, other strategic guidance, the JIPOE, and initial estimates. The primary products of mission analysis are a restated mission statement, the JFC's initial intent statement; the JFC's planning guidance, and the initial CCIRs. CCIRs include priority intelligence requirements and friendly force information requirements. Not all proposed priority intelligence requirements and friendly force information requirements are selected as CCIRs. Those priority intelligence requirements not selected are downgraded to information requirements. Priority intelligence requirements focus on the adversary and the environment and drive intelligence collection and production requirements. Friendly force information requirements focus on the friendly force and supporting capabilities and drive reporting and requests for information (Figure 4-2, page 4-6). Although CCIRs generate priority intelligence requirements and friendly force information requirements for management, the staff focuses on answering the CCIRs to support the commander's MDMP. 4-22. The restated mission statement should be a short sentence or paragraph that describes the organization's essential task (or tasks) and purposea clear statement of the action to be taken and the reason for doing so. It forms the basis for planning and is included in the planning guidance, the planning directive, running estimates, the commander's visualization, the CONOPS, and the completed plan. 4-23. The JFC's initial intent statement is a clear and concise expression of the purpose of the operation and the military end state. It provides focus to the staff and helps subordinate and supporting commanders take actions to achieve the military end state without further orders, even when operations do not unfold as planned. It also includes where the commander will accept risk during the operation. 4-24. The initial intent statement normally contains the purpose and military end state as the impetus for the planning process; it could be stated verbally when time is short. The commander refines the intent statement as planning progresses. The commander's approved intent is written in paragraph 3, Execution, as part of the OPLAN or OPORD.

## 4-25. A Well-Devised Intent Statement Enables Subordinates To

decide how to act when facing unforeseen opportunities and threat, and in situations where the CONOPS no longer applies. This statement deals primarily with the military conditions that lead to mission accomplishment, so the commander may highlight selected objectives and desired and undesired effects. The statement can also discuss other instruments of national power as they relate to the JFC's mission and the potential impact of military operations on these instruments. The commander's intent may include the commander's assessment of the adversary commander's intent and an assessment of where and how much risk is acceptable during the operation. 4-26. The JFC's planning guidance is developed to ensure focused and effective planning. The commander and staff develop and communicate this planning guidance, which will accompany tentative COA to subordinate and supporting commanders for their estimates of feasibility and supportability. At a minimum, the planning guidance should include the mission statement, assumptions, operational limitations, and a discussion of the national strategic end state, termination criteria, military objectives, and the JFC's initial thoughts on desired and undesired effects. The planning guidance should also address the role of agencies and multinational partners in the pending operation and any related special considerations as required.

## Civil Affairs Mission Analysis Initiation

4-27. Prior to the mission analysis process, the CAO/CMO planner must do the following:
-  Find and understand the higher commander's mission,
intent, and CONOPS. The CAO/CMO planner should refer to applicable OPLANs/OPORDs and/or effect coordination with the unit operations officer (situationdependent).
-  Find and understand the supported commander's mission,
intent, and CONOPS. The CAO/CMO planner should refer to applicable OPLANs/OPORDs and/or effect coordination with the unit operations officer (situationdependent).
-  Find and understand the national and strategic objectives
and policies that relate to the mission. The CAO/CMO planner should refer to the higher headquarters S-9, G-9, J-9, theater-level ambassador (chief of mission), political advisor, or whoever is reliable and accessible, to include other staffers, to gain insight into the total operational concept.
-  Determine the supported commander's end state and
develop the CAO/CMO desired end state. If the bullets above have been ascertained, the CAO/CMO end state should support CA objectives through the identification of desirable and undesirable effects. The following are examples of CA indicators used to measure the effectiveness of CAO:
- Preventable disease rates. - Death rates among a distressed population. - Pregnancy and drug use rates. - Crime rates.
-  Update (continuously and concurrently) the CAO running
estimate, paying particular attention to paragraph 2.c.(2), which contains a comparison of CMO assets and resource requirements versus CMO capabilities available and recommended solutions for discrepancies. Recommend solutions (situation-dependent), when well founded, may assist the supported commander with identifying other choices in the MDMP. The key for the CAO/CMO planner is to ensure he is "staying in the CAO lane." It is important that the CAO/CMO planner understand that the supported unit's CONOPS, making the mission analysisfrom the CAO operational aspecta critical step in the planning process, is the focus on civil considerations. Figure 4-3 demonstrates mission analysis.

## Civil Affairs Operations- And Civil-Military Operations- Specific Mission Analysis Responsibilities

4-28. The S-9, G-9, or J-9 conducts mission analysis on all matters concerning CAO. The S-9, G-9, or J-9 analyzes and evaluates civil considerations (area, structure, capabilities, organizations, people, and events) for the supported commander. Specific responsibilities include, but are not limited to
-  Analyzing the effects of civilian populations on military
operations.
-  Analyzing the effects of military operations on the HN
and its populace.
-  Proposing DC movement, routes, and assembly areas. -  Assessing the HN ability to care for civilians. -  Assessing the HN resources to support military
operations.
-  Recommending additions to the no-fire list, including
cultural, religious, historical, and high-density civilian populace areas.

## Note: Joint Operations Are No-Strike Operations.

-  Identifying nongovernmental and other independent
organizations operating in the AO.
-  Identifying OGAs in the AO and their capabilities (Figure
4-4).
Note: This model is an excellent operational and strategic tool. It also can be very useful in tacticallevel planning if it is known that agencies are available. After identifying an agency, the capabilities that may be considered when effecting coordination and in the planning cycle are as noted.

## Mission Analysis Tasks

4-29. Mission analysis consists of a variety of tasks. These tasks are not necessarily sequential. They will usually result in a

formal staff briefing to the commander. Tasks include the following:
-  Analyze the higher headquarters order with the assistance
of the supported unit's total staff.
-  Review and analyze the materials that support the initial
IPB.
Note: Joint and functional component commanders use intelligence preparation of the OE instead of IPB.

JP 2-0, *Joint Intelligence*, contains more information on intelligence preparation of the OE.

-  Determine specified, implied, and essential tasks with the assistance of the supported unit's total staff.

-  Establish and validate planning factors as follows:
- Determine the source of the mission. - Identify the supporting and supported commanders. - State the higher commander's mission and intent. - Identify CAO specified, implied, and essential tasks not only from the CA annex but also from the entire OPORD. Failure to determine essential tasks will jeopardize mission accomplishment. Many CAO annexes contain specific tasks primarily based on doctrine instead of a thorough mission analysis and CAO running estimate. Appendix C contains a generic CAO running estimate format. Although orders do not specify implied tasks, they are necessary to accomplish specified CAO tasks. CAO/CMO planners must use professional judgment to determine if those tasks are relevant to the supported commander's operation and if they are essential CA tasks. CAO/ CMO planners must "stay in their lane," focusing on CA core tasks (PRC, FHA, NA, SCA, and CIM).

- Identify externally imposed limitations affecting the CA mission (constraints and risks). Constraints and risks include the following: command (mission tactics, control measures, logistics and equipment, rules of engagement, and other legal issues), environment (population, terrain and weather, and light data), and threat (strengths, weaknesses, and vulnerabilities).

- Identify available CA forces and assets and note any shortfalls.

- Establish CA planning facts and assumptions.

Develop assumptions to replace missing facts during planning. A CAO/CMO planner can incorporate assumptions from higher headquarters; however, he must focus on the assumptions necessary for CMO planning. Assumptions should address both friendly and enemy operations and use a worst-case scenario approach. Assumptions that address knowledge gaps are critical for the continuation of the planning process. For planning purposes, subordinate commanders treat assumptions made by higher headquarters as valid until proven otherwise. However, they should challenge those assumptions if they appear unrealistic. Assumptions must be continually reviewed to ensure validity. All assets should direct their efforts toward factually confirming CAO/CMO assumptions through the intelligence collection process, requests for information, essential elements of information, and so on.

- Analyze initial force structure requirements.

-  Conduct an initial risk assessment (identification and assessment of hazards). Determine where losses of CA personnel and equipment might occur in the operation. Establish and implement procedural controls to minimize losses. A CAO/CMO planner may also look at the risk to civilian populations; survival-related infrastructure; arts, monuments, and archives; and so on. Higher headquarters might state or imply acceptable risk in commander's intent, CONOPS, or additional guidance. In most cases, these risk assessments are directed toward the total force and not necessarily the civilian environment.

-  Determine essential element of information needs as follows:
- Critical information on the adversary and environment that the commander requires by a particular time. The commander relates this integrates this information to reach the most logical decision.

- Information the CAO/CMO planner needs either to

address an assumption or to assess a developing situation. This information is specific instead of general in nature.
-  Plan the use of time. (In a crisis action situation,
determine the time available from mission receipt to probable receipt of a deployment or execute order.)
-  Develop a proposed CA mission statement. It must be a
clear, concise statement of the essential (specified and implied) tasks to be accomplished by the command and the purpose of those tasks. The mission statement contains the elements of who, what, when, where, and why but seldom specifies how. The proposed CA mission statement forms the basis for planning. It is included in the planning guidance, planning directive, running estimates, commander's visualization, CONOPS, and completed order or plan. The mission statement asks
- Who will execute the operation (unit/organization)? - What is the unit's essential task (tactical mission
task)?
- When will the operation begin (by time or event)?
What is the duration of the operation?
- Where will the operation occur (AO, objective, grid
coordinates)?
- Why will the force conduct the operations (for what
purpose or reason)?
-  Conduct a mission analysis brief (situation-dependent).
Upon conclusion of the mission analysis and JIPOE, the staff will present a mission brief to the commander. The CAO/CMO planner will usually be required to present the CAO/CMO portion of the brief. The purpose of the brief is to provide the commander with the results of the mission analysis, to offer a forum for discussion of identified issues, and to present an opportunity for the commander to refine his guidance to the staff and to approve or disapprove the situational analysis of the staff. The mission brief will usually follow the unit's SOP (agenda, briefing order, and so on). The material presented to the commander should only address areas that the staff sections deem necessary.
-  Obtain approval of the mission statement. The CAO/CMO
planner determines the initial CMO mission during the analysis of the higher headquarters OPLAN/OPORD and the restated CMO mission during mission analysis. The commander approves the restated mission for the overall operation and the restated CMO mission at the same time).
-  Receive the commander's planning guidance. The
commander and staff develop and communicate the commander's planning guidance. This guidance will accompany tentative COAs to subordinate and supporting commanders for their feasibility and supportability estimates. Commanders must include CMO in this guidance. CAO/CMO planners must consider all available support/assistance and information to ensure successful completion of the CMO mission. CA forces are well suited to plan, coordinate, support, and, if directed, supervise various operations to support U.S. objectives.
-  Receive the commander's intent. The commander will
normally issue his initial intent with his planning guidance, as well as in the WARNORD. The commander's intent will focus on the upcoming action for subordinate units two levels down. The CAO/CMO planner should focus on CA core tasks as they relate to the overall mission and ensure they draw on any additional implied tasks and possible requests for information/essential elements of information.
-  Issue the commander's planning guidance (essence of the
commander's visualization). The commander approves or modifies the proposed mission and provides the staff, the subordinate commanders, and their staffs with initial planning guidance. The purpose is to focus staff efforts in a meaningful direction to develop COAs that reflect the commander's style and expectations. The guidance provided is situation-dependent (situation and time). The commander's guidance is essential for timely and effective COA development and analysis. The staff should receive the commander's guidance before preparing and conducting its running estimates. This is a critical time for the staff to update the CAO running estimate. The commander's guidance must focus on military tasks and associated objectives that support accomplishment of the assigned mission. There is no limit to the number of times the command can issue planning guidance.
-  Issue the WARNORD to subordinate commands. Once the
commander approves the mission (following the mission analysis briefing) and evaluates the factors affecting the mission, he will normally issue a WARNORD to the subordinate commander using the five-paragraph format (situation, mission, execution, sustainment, and command and signal). The WARNORD notifies the subordinate commander that a military action is forthcoming and once, a COA is selected, more information will follow. At a minimum, a WARNORD contains
- The approved mission statement. - The commander's intent. - Task organization changes. - Attachments and detachments. - The unit AO (sketch, overlay, or some other
description).
- CCIRs and EEFIs. - Risk guidance. - Priorities by warfighting functions. - Military deception guidance. - Essential stability tasks. - Specific priorities.
-  Review facts and assumptions. A fact is a statement of
information known to be true, such as verified locations of friendly and adversary forces. An assumption provides a hypothesis about the current situation or future course of events that is assumed true in the absence of facts. Assumptions are necessary to enable the commander to complete an estimate of the situation and select a COA. Assumptions must be continually reviewed for validity. Commanders and their staff should anticipate changes to the plan should an assumption prove to be incorrect. Because of the influence of assumptions on planning, commanders and staffs include the fewest possible assumptions in planning. A valid assumption is
- Logical. - Realistic.

## - Essential For Planning To Continue.

4-30. Commanders and staffs should never presuppose adversary capabilities or speculate that unrealistic friendly capabilities will be available in any situation. Although there may be exceptions, the staff should strive to resolve all assumptions before issuing the OPORD. 4-31. The CAO/CMO planner must completely understand the supported and higher commander's planned operation to determine how it ties into subsequent operations. This understanding allows the planner to capture the transition concept of CAO and the impact of today's actions on tomorrow's desired actions. It is essential that the CAO/CMO planner and staff absorb the information and use it to produce results that best support the operation. Planners determine the CAO/CMO priority of effort necessary to maximize results within the constraints, limitations, and risks of the operation and to achieve a CAO desired end state that meets the needs of the supported commander.

## Mission Success Criteria

4-32. Mission success criteria describe the standards that determine mission accomplishment. The JFC includes these criteria in the planning guidance so that the joint force staff and components understand what constitutes mission success. Termination criteria typically apply to the completion of a joint operation and the disengagement of joint forces, which often signals the end of the application of the military instrument of national power. Mission success criteria can apply to any joint operation, subordinate phase, or joint force component operation. Mission success criteria help the JFC determine if and when to move to the next major operation or phase. 4-33. Measuring the status of tasks, effects, and objectives provides the basis of operational progress reports to senior commanders and civilian leaders. With this information, the CCDR can advise the President and SecDef, who will adjust operations as required. Whether in a supported or supporting role, JFCs at all levels must develop their mission success criteria with a clear understanding of termination criteria

## Mission Analysis Summary

4-34. The process and products of CAO/CMO civil-component mission analysis help commanders and staffs develop and refine their situational understanding of the OE. A CAO/CMO systems approach integrates people and processes. The systems approach uses multiple information sources and collaborative analysis to build a common, shared, and holistic knowledge base of the OE. Systems analysis emphasizes a multidimensional approach to situational understanding. Analysis of the six interrelated ASCOPE elements within each system creates situational awareness. At the strategic theater and operational levels, CAO/ CMO planners organize data collection according to ASCOPE characteristics within each operational variable (PMESII-PT). If commanders and staffs thoroughly understand the operational and mission variables, they can develop effective COAs to
-  Accomplish the mission. -  Strive toward strategic national policy objectives. -  Achieve the CCDR's desired mission end state.

## Step 3Course Of Action Development

4-35. A COA is a sequence of activities or a possible plan to accomplish a mission. Step 3 (COA Development) generates options that satisfy the commander's intent and planning guidance for follow-on analysis, comparison, and approval. A good COA can defeat feasible enemy COAs while accounting for minimal essential stability tasks. For operations dominated by stability tasks, the COA must accomplish primary stability tasks. These tasks include maintaining the minimum security levels necessary for other tasks to take place. In an unconstrained environment, the planner's goal is to develop several possible COAs. Once the commander approves a COA, it becomes a CONOPS. During COA development, planners use the following:
-  Mission statement. -  Commander's intent. -  Commander's planning guidance. -  Knowledge products (planners create these products during mission analysis for COA development).

4-36. To develop COAs, the staff must focus on key decisionmaking information and use mission analysis data. The staff develops COAs to provide the commander with options. Figure 4-5 shows COA development. 4-37. Staffs must ensure they select valid COAs for analysis. A valid COA is one that is feasible, acceptable, suitable, distinguishable, and complete. The staff should reject potential COAs that do not meet all of the criteria.

4-38. A good COA
-  Positions the force for subsequent operations. -  Provides the force with the flexibility to meet unforeseen
events during execution.
-  Maximizes latitude for subordinates to show initiative.
4-39. During COA development, the commander and staff continue risk assessment. They focus on identifying and assessing hazards to mission accomplishment and incorporating into COAs controls that reduce these hazards. The staff also continues to revise intelligence products. At this point and throughout COA development, the staff considers the most likely and dangerous adversary COAs. 4-40. Embedded within COA development is the application of operational art. Planners can develop different COAs for using joint force capabilities (fires, movement and maneuver, deception, or joint force organization) by varying the combinations of operational design elements, such as phasing, line of operations, and so forth.

## Theater-Level Overview

4-41. At the theater level, each COA will generally constitute a theater, strategic, or operational concept and should outline the following:
-  Major strategic and operational tasks to be accomplished
and the order in which they are to be accomplished.
-  Major forces or capabilities requirements, to include joint,
interagency, and multinational.
-  Mission command concept. -  Sustainment concept. -  Deployment concept. -  Estimate of time requirements for mission success or
termination criteria.
-  Concept for maintaining a theater reserve. -  PMESII-PT influences.
4-42. There are some key areas within the mnemonic PMESII-PT that may influence COAs from a CAO/CMO perspective. Planners can draw information from the example summaries that follow the considerations. The examples are fictitious. The following list is not all-inclusive. Some points of concern fall into more than one consideration. Key areas are as follows:
-  **PMESII-PTPolitical Considerations.** Examples include
the
- Political environment's major strengths and
weaknesses.
- Social, political, religious, or criminal enclaves. - Characteristics of the political relationship with
Western civilization.
- Branches of the government (for example,
legislative, judicial, and executive) identification and definition.
- Electoral procedures and results. - Religion (Muslim, Christians, or other) and state
influences.
- Organizations that influence the political
environments (for example, NGOs, UN, and military).
- Population centers by size, accessibility,
sustainability, and essential functions.
- USG agreements, international treaties,
standardization agreements (North Atlantic Treaty Organization or standardization agreement), and treaties with HN.
- DOS position with an awareness of national policy
and strategy.
- American Embassy in the country (embassy workers
and staff [how many], NEO [how many], and composition [for example, private U.S. citizens, military personnel, dependents, designated aliens, and other government employees and their dependents]).
Fictitious Example Political President John Sylvester is the head of state. He came to power as the leader of the military government that was instituted after the death of the first elected president. After 5 years of military government rule, he was elected president through free elections. The country has moved toward instability for many reasons, but an outbreak of malaria has complicated the political situation. The government's ability to control its borders is questionable. UN forces, numbering no more than 4,000 troops, are limited to the country's three major cities, Toledo, Kaunda, and Prego. A majority of the population practices Islam. However, there is a small Christian contingent. The American embassy is at full strength. The U.S. ambassador is Joseph Black. Postponement of scheduled elections; imposition of martial law; deterioration of basic services; existence of armed conflict in the southern border regions; and a migration of the indigenous population, refugees, and displaced persons have negatively affected the ability of the government to respond to the humanitarian crisis within its borders. The administrative division of the government consists of 33 prefectures and 1 special zone, the capital of Toledo.

-  **PMESII-PTMilitary Considerations.** Examples include
the following:
- The largest adversary to the military (for example,
government, foreign country [negative or positive position or attitude toward the United States], and internal opposition).
- Chain of command and military structure (for
example, civilian leadership, conscript or volunteer force, and compensation compared to the civilian security force).
- Influences on the military structure (drugs, Western
civilization, religion, USG, and so on).
- Military-to-civilian relationships (controversial,
appropriate, intimidating, and so on).
- Corruption, such as involvement in black marketing
and the extent of involvement in such activities (for example, the entire military or factions of it).
- Military training. - Military preparation and ability to support domestic
emergencies (for example, floods, hurricanes, mudslides).
- Military support of any past peace operations. - Military involvement in maintaining civil order. - Morale. - Military history.
Fictitious Example Military The Armed Forces of this country are divided into four branchesArmy, Navy, Air Force, and gendarmeriewhose chiefs report to the CJCS. The 8,000-member Army is the largest of the four services. The Navy has about 900 members and operates several small patrol craft and barges. Air Force personnel total about 700. The equipment of the Air Force includes several Soviet-supplied fighter and transport planes. Several thousand gendarmes are responsible for internal security mostly in the larger cities. Most gendarmes are seemingly corrupt, participating in both black market and illegal drug activities. All military members are substantially underpaid in comparison to other countries in the AOR. The populace is extremely wary of the military because of its use of excessive violence against civilians in confrontational situations. The imposition of martial law by the government, as well as the practice by criminal elements of disguising members as official soldiers during the conduct of criminal activities, has eroded any trust between the population and security forces.

-  **PMESII-PTEconomic Considerations.** Examples
include the following:
- Economic basis, such as capitalism, socialism,
communism, or other (a description is necessary if the economy is not categorized).
- The underlying causes of social unrest in the civilian
populace (for example, issues involving human rights, monetary equity, judicial impropriety, and existence of lack of government assistance programs).
- Class divisions (for example, lower, middle, and
upper classes), as well as class resource control, such as sharing and hoarding by the wealthy.
- Labor pool, skilled or unskilled. - The accessibility of import and export capabilities
(for example, long hauls [overseas] and border crossings).
- Equity of medical services (for example, services
provided to all sects and classes).
- Foreign investor and international community
involvement in the overall economic system fostering future development.
- Education system and its relation to economic
opportunities (for example, viability and accessibility of the system to all sects and classes and at what levels).
- Corruption, such as involvement in the production,
sale, or transport of illicit drugs; participation in the black market; and manipulation of the banking system. State whether these activities are socially acceptable.
- The viability of the domestic market. - The accessibility of loans to the populace and
business owners.
- Identification of the organizations with stakes in
future development (for example, IGOs and NGOs).
- The top three positive and negative economic
indicators affecting overall economic stability from a governmental and populace perspective.
Fictitious Example Economic The country possesses major mineral, hydrological, and agricultural resources but remains an underdeveloped nation. Unskilled workers, government fiscal policy, rampant corruption, and inadequate infrastructure are adversely affecting economic growth. The mining sector accounts for over 70 percent of the country's exports. Dissatisfaction with economic conditions frequently prompts the populace to conduct nationwide strikes that require the government to declare martial law to restore order. Recently, the prices for necessities like food and fuel have risen beyond the reach of most of the population. There is a small middle class (mostly farmers) in outer regions that are far from the larger cities. Most crops are for local consumption or self-consumption. There is a movement underway for humanitarian organizations to increase their numbers in the country. Identified organizations are the Red Cross and Red Crescent. The composition of the gross domestic product by sectors includes agriculture, 26.8 percent; industry, 29.5 percent; and services,
35.9 percent.

-  **PMESII-PTSocial Considerations.** Examples include
the following:
- Social identity, which is best described through
nationality, tribe, or clan.
- The underlying causes of friction among civilian
sectors, such as social, economic, geographical, ethnic, religious, and political (government or lack of).
- The importance of tribal (or other factional) rules
when they conflict with the general law and order established by the government or other controlling power.
- The availability of water, food, and shelter. - The populace's perception of security from the social
and economic aspect.
- The status of law, order, and the protection of
personal property.
- The tolerance of government for religious freedom. - Corruption, such as involvement in the production,
sale, or transport of illicit drugs; participation in the black market; and manipulation of the banking system. Planners should note whether these activities are socially acceptable.
- Identification and location of DC camps and the
system that facilitates their existence.
- The presence of terrorist groups that affect the social
fabric of the population through fear or compassion toward the groups.
- Government travel restrictions on the local populace. - The overall positive and negative quality-of-life
factors.
Fictitious Example Social Outside the key cities of this country, the population gives credence to tribal rule, which plays a large role in general law and order. Government rule weighs heavily in the city but remains mostly anonymous in the rural regions. Although the government does not condone drug production or black market activity, a large number of officials take money from these operations. There are three DC camps (averaging 8,000 DCs per camp) located

on the outskirts of the cities of Toledo, Kaunda, and Prego. The government, with assistance from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, is administratively in control of the camps. There is a government-imposed curfew from 1200 to 0500 on the populace. However, there is no enforcement of
the curfew outside the city limits. Statistical information is as follows:
- Population: The population is 6.14 million, which includes refugees and foreign residents. - Refugee Population: The refugee population is 25,000. - Annual Growth Rate: The growth rate is 2.292 percent. - Ethnic Groups: The ethnic makeup of the country is 30 percent Serbian, 30 percent Mende, and 1 percent Krio. The rest of the population consists of 15 tribal groups and a small Lebanese community. - Religions: The major religion in the country is Islam. Seventy percent of the population practice Islam, 25 percent practice Christianity, and 5 percent practice animism. - Languages: The languages spoken in the country are Serbian, Urdu, Krio, English, and 15 other indigenous languages. - Literacy Rate: The literacy rate is 24 percent. - Life Expectancy: The life expectancy is 40.58 years. - Infant Mortality Rate: The infant mortality rate is 158.27 deaths per 1,000 live births. - Adult Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection Rates: The human immunodeficiency virus infection rate is 1.4 percent for those between the ages of 15 and 49. - Workforce: Agriculture accounts for 52.5 percent; industry, 30.6 percent; and services, 16.9 percent of the workforce.

## -  **Pmesii-PtInformation Considerations.** Examples Are

as follows:
- Areas of the information circuit that the government
controls and the general attitude of the civilian populace with the subsystem.
- The existence of government monitoring of
communications. If so, are the messages balanced.
- The primary mode of transmission by the
government of the local populace and its effectiveness.
- The government's censorship of any or all media
communications, and the extent.
- The locations of critical communication facilities
and, if possible, their power wattage.
- The Internet's availability and the percentage of the
local population with access to the Internet, as well as telephones, telegrams, radios, and so on.
- The resistance movement's access, if applicable, to
open communications.
- The location of government-controlled newspapers,
periodicals, and publishing firms and the editorial policies of each (political persuasion).
- Identification of private printing facilities,
advertising agencies, and other such facilities (if time permits).
- The general conditions, problems, and stages of
development that affect the geographical, social, economic, and political factors of society, including the reading, listening, and viewing habits of the populaces.
Fictitious Example Information The government's attempt to maintain an isolation policy is being challenged on a regular basis. Surrounding countries with uncontrolled borders have increased border crossings and information flow into what was a government-controlled bureaucracy. This development has led to discontent throughout the country. The local populace is beginning to learn about the freedoms they lack, and the government is realizing the discontent of

the people. Statistical data is as follows:
- Radio Broadcast Stations: There is one amplitude modulation station, two frequency modulation stations, and one shortwave station. - Television Broadcast Station: There are two television broadcast stations. - Internet Country Code: The internet country code is .sl with 3 Internet hosts and 5,000 users, which is an increase of 2,500 over the past year. - Print Media: The number of newspapers and periodicals in publication is unknown. The government controls all publications. The circulation of print publications is unknown. - Literacy Rate: The literacy rate is less than 40 percent of the total population. - Health: No known public awareness campaign to address the malaria outbreak is in place.
-  **PMESII-PTInfrastructure Considerations.** Examples
are as follows:
- The overall government infrastructure rating in
comparison with the AOR.
- The level of governmental infrastructure from a
national, regional, and local perspective through evaluation and analysis.
- The infrastructure's ability to support the movement
of goods and supplies (farm-to-market roads, factoryto-port access, and mine-to-refinery processing capability).
- The leading companies in infrastructure
development and country of origin for foreign companies.
- The overview of the condition of dams, toll roads,
ports, railroads, airports (especially runways), inland waterways, government factories, and so on.
- The status of civil telecommunications systems and
capabilities of the infrastructure to support information technology.
- The status of public works infrastructure, including
the capability of power, water, sewage, and refuse collection systems.
- The status of public health and facilities (provisions
of healthcare).
- Information dissemination at key gatherings sites
(for example, churches, mosques, and sporting events).
- The extent of the role unions play in the utilization
of infrastructure (truck drivers, factory workers, longshoremen, masons, and so on).
- The infrastructure's ability to continue maintaining
DC camps and the system facilitating the existence of the camps.
- The top three infrastructure systems that create or
exacerbate dissatisfaction among the populace.
Fictitious Example Infrastructure
In comparison to the rest of AOR, the country's infrastructure systems are lacking. There is an absence of skilled workers, and corruption (drug production, black market activities, and bribery) is prevalent at all levels, with the minor exception of the isolated rural areas. The government's focus is on city growth. It ignores the outskirts. The government petitioned the UN for both humanitarian and financial assistance. Statistical data is as follows:
- Transportation: There is one paved (2,438 meter) and one unpaved airfield, two heliports, one ocean port/terminal at Toledo (with a lattice boom crane [200-ton capacity/200 meters]), materials-handling equipment (forklifts), and over 2,500 kilometers of paved and over 10,400 kilometers of unpaved roads. Most major roadways remain in poor repair. There is no railway. - Power: The electrical capability is able to produce approximately 85 million kilowatts per hour. Electrical shortages are frequent and sustained. - Water and Sanitation: Government-supplied water distribution facilities are barely operable, and
sanitation systems are almost nonexistent. Incidents of contamination and inappropriate disposal of waste are frequent. - Telephones: There are over 14,000 main lines and over 276,000 mobile cellular lines in use. The general assessment is that the area has marginal telephone service. Domestic: A national microwave radio relay trunk system connects Toledo to Kaunda and Prego. Mobile cellular service is growing rapidly from a small base. The international country code is 232, and satellite earth station is 1 Intelsat (Atlantic Ocean).

-  PMESII-PTPhysical Characteristic Considerations.
Examples are as follows:
- The natural and man-made physical characteristics
of the AO.
- An analysis of what urban areas could contribute to
restrictive movement of the force (combat or humanitarian) and the civilian populace (for example, main supply route accessibility, DC control and movement, and NEOs).
- The affects of rural areas on force movement (for
example, unpaved roads, quagmires, marshes, and sand dunes), commodities (farm-to-market roads, factory-to-port accessibility, mine to refinery processing capability, and so on), accessibility and availability of foreign nation support.
- Time of year considerations in relationship to the
climate (for example, hot, cold, or arid) as they pertain to the care and welfare of the civil populaces (morale considerations).
- Hydrology of the AO in comparison with the time of
the year (for example, distribution of surface and underground water, evaporation process, and flow of the sea [tides]).
- Topography (geography) or environmental
conditions that add or deter to the operation (environmental health considerations that could affect military forces).
- The natural resources that could assist the force and
the populace (for example, raw materials, water, coal, and oil).
- The protection restraints within each physical
characteristic.
Fictitious Example Physical Characteristics The country is mountainous in the western region.

There is less of a geographical contour near the capital. Toledo is the only port city, but its shoreline is less than 5 miles long. The rest of the country is inland and is surrounded by three other national borders. The summers are moderate. The winters parallel those of Wisconsin (cold and windy). The only paved roads are between the three major cities. HN support is limited to the growing season and local crops (corn, soybeans, and wheat). Threats to the supported force include disaffected or DC populations outside the established camps (verbal and rioting), people wary and distrustful of the gendarmerie, and equipment thieves. A small, but intrusive, drug cartel exists in the western portion of the country.

-  **PMESII-PTTime Considerations.** Examples include the
following:
-  The effect of time on the civil environment and
CMO and the impact of military operations (consider both the friendly and enemy forces if the situation warrants).
-  The knowledge from legacy data, such as situation
reports, lessons learned, project tracking documentation of the area, after-action reports, and past mission objectives, which allow the force to measure certain factors of time; for example
-  Multiple situation reports from past rotations
identified the time of year that the Helmund

River increased in size, which denied access to vehicle patrols. The reports informed the force of limited access to opposite sides of the Helmund River during the spring and early summer. This allowed the force to
 Prepare for enemy tactics aimed at
taking advantage of this reduced capability.
 Plan and execute a bridge project that
allowed locals to bring goods to the market in a village on the opposite side of the river.
-  Lessons learned and submitted by a rotational
unit stated that residents were dissatisfied with the presence of the force within the city because their combat patrols disrupted traffic and pushed through crowded streets, which caused damage. This allowed the force to
 Identify alternate routes through the
city.
 Work with city infrastructure to
develop a memorandum of understanding and agreements of cooperation.
 Create and utilize existing
neighborhood and city officials to mitigate and manage accidents between military personnel and civilians.
-  Information from past force rotations
identified contractors that were war profiteers and dishonest. These contractors would wait until a new unit arrived and attempt to win projects funded by the forces. This information allowed the force to
 Develop and utilize a filing system
that transcended rotational units.
 Maintain a biometric database of
undesirable contractors.

## -  The Protection Restraints Within Each Characteristic

of time.

4-43. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, a matrix that organizes data by combining ASCOPE and PMESII-PT can assist in refining and analyzing civil considerations. Table 4-1, pages 4-20 and 4-21, provides an example of a matrix. The CIM cell within the CMOC is the best resource to organize data with civil considerations; however, the planner should ensure that specific information is confirmable or deniable by other resources within the supported command and through CR.

## Operational- And Tactical-Level Overview

4-44. Planning is the process commanders (and staff, if available) use to translate their vision into specific COAs for preparation and execution, focusing on the expected results. Planning involves the staff envisioning the commander's desired end state and describing effective methods to achieve it. In comparing the various problem-solving and decisionmaking practices, these planning processes are cognate through to the outcome of orders production. COA development in the JOPP and MDMP are similar. The JOPP and MDMP share the same basic approach and problem-solving elements, including, but not limited to, mission analysis and COA development.

Fictitious Example Time
Time consideration is critical in the planning process. When time consideration is effectively captured in planning, it can endure as a living document. Planners understand that any given amount of time available for CAO/CMO planning is insufficient. Planners must consider the following:
- Time of year (growing season, winter, arid, school, and so on). - Reverse planning (provide time for rehearsal, if possible). - All actions require a certain amount of time to execute. - A rapid tempo (rate of military action) limits the amount of information that can be collected and processed before a decision is required.
4-45. The steps of MDMP provide an orderly framework for planning in general. Tactical-level Army staffs exclusively use the MDMP steps. TLP extend the MDMP to the small-unit level. The MDMP and TLP are similar but not identical. TLP are

somewhat different because there is no COA development step within the process. TLP steps are forthright and are as follows:
-  Receive the mission. -  Issue a WARNORD. -  Make a tentative plan. -  Start necessary movement. -  Conduct a preliminary or initial assessment. -  Issue the complete order. -  Supervise.

## Summary Of The Course Of Action Development

4-46. JOPP and MDMP focus on the interaction between the commander and staff of an organization and the commander and staff of the next-higher and next-lower command. When following the steps of JOPP and MDMP and developing proposed COAs, it is imperative that the interfacing commands, outside agencies, and staff of the supported commander consider certain key inputs that increase the probability of success. Key inputs to consider include planning guidance, initial intent, running estimates, and intelligence data.

4-47. COA development planners align actions and resources in time and space and account for
-  Force requirements. -  Force availability. -  Task organization. -  Sustainment and deployment concepts. -  Risk. -  Functional elements of the plan, such as
- Personnel. - Intelligence. - Logistics. - Transportation and mobilization. - Engineering and protection. - HN support. - Health service support.

## Step 4Course Of Action Analysis And Wargaming

4-48. COA analysis and wargaming provide the commander and staff with methods to analyze tentative COAs, improve situational understanding, stimulate ideas, and obtain insights that might not occur otherwise. An objective, comprehensive analysis of tentative COAs is difficult, even without time constraints. The commander should war game each tentative COA against the most probable and dangerous adversary COAs or the most difficult stability or DSCA objectives and tasks based on the time available. COA analysis enables commanders and staffs to identify difficulties, coordination problems, and probable consequences of planned actions for each COA under consideration. COA analysis helps them to think through the tentative plan. COA analysis may require commanders and staffs to revisit parts of a COA as discrepancies arise. COA analysis not only appraises the quality of each COA but also uncovers potential execution problems, decisions, and contingencies. Analysis of the proposed COAs should reveal the following:
-  Potential decision points. -  Task organization adjustments. -  Data for a synchronization matrix or other decisionmaking tool.

-  Identity of plan branches and sequels. -  Identity of high-value targets. -  Risk assessments. -  COA advantages and disadvantages. -  Additional recommended CCIRs.

4-49. In addition, COA analysis provided commanders and staffs with a better understanding of the problem and sometimes requires the planning process to restart. From a CA perspective, the CAO/CMO planner analyzes each CAO for effective integration of civil considerations into the operation. The CAO/ CMO planner focuses on the operational areas, but like the S-1/ G-1 and S-4/G-4, they must also focus on support issues, particularly those regarding HN support and the care and welfare of the civilian population. When the planner analyzes each CAO, he must consider the impact of operations on public order and safety, potential for disaster relief requirements, NEOs, emergency services, and protection of culturally significant sites. Figure 4-6, page 4-23, shows key inputs and outputs of COA analysis and wargaming.

## Course Of Action Composition

4-50. A COA analysis consists of a feasibility check, wargaming, risk assessment, and comparison of war-game results. CAO/CMO
planners focus on the ability of available CA and other forces to accomplish the CMO tasks identified during mission analysis. 4-51. Wargaming COA is critical for the commander and staff to ensure complete integration and synchronization of all elements. Wargaming allows the commander and participants to
-  Analyze a tentative COA. -  Improve their understanding of the OE. -  Obtain insights that might not occur without wargaming.

4-52. Wargaming is a conscious attempt to visualize the flow of the operation, given joint force strengths and dispositions, adversary capabilities and possible COAs, the objective area, and other aspects of the OE. Each critical event within a proposed COA should be war gamed, considering the time available and using the action, reaction, and counteraction method of friendly and opposition force interaction. The basic wargaming method (modified to fit the specific mission and environment) applies to combat and noncombat operations, to include stability tasks, demining operations, and CAO/CMO. Prior to wargaming, CAO/ CMO planners should select criteria by which to evaluate the wargaming results of each COA. The wargaming process can be as simple as a detailed narrative effort that describes the action, probable reaction, counteraction, assets, and time used. The most sophisticated form of wargaming is modern, computeraided modeling and simulation.

## General Wargaming Rules

4-53. War gamers need to
-  Remain objective, not allowing personality or their
sensing of "what the commander wants" to influence them. They should avoid defending a COA just because they personally developed it.
-  Accurately record advantages and disadvantages of each
COA as they emerge.
-  Continually assess if the selected COA is one that is
adequate, feasible, acceptable, distinguishable, and complete. If a COA fails any of these tests, they reject it.
-  Avoid drawing premature conclusions and gathering facts
to support such conclusions.
-  Avoid comparing one COA with another during the war
game. This occurs during COA comparison.
-  Ensure each COA effectively integrates civil
considerations (the "C" of METT-TC). Civil considerations of the AO are analyzed using the mnemonic ASCOPE.
-  Consider not only tactical issues but also sustainment
issues. They must assesses the impact of operations on civilians and estimate the requirements for minimumessential stability tasks that command might have to undertake based on the ability of the unified action.
-  Consider HN support and the care of DCs. -  Consider the OE (for example, how operations affect
public order and safety, the potential for disaster relief requirements, NEOs, emergency services, and protection of culturally significant sites).
-  Provide feedback on how the culture in the AO affects
each COA.
-  Represent the point of view of the other actors (for
example, OGAs, NGOs, IGOs, and IPI) when these agencies are not able to participate in the war game for security or other reasons.
4-54. Risk management is inherent in military operations. It is the process of identifying, assessing, and controlling risks (probability and severity of loss linked to hazards) arising from operational factors and making decisions that balance risk cost with mission benefits. Risk management is a function of command and is based on the amount of risk a higher authority is willing to accept. Risk management assists commanders in conserving lives and resources and avoiding or mitigating unnecessary risk, making an informed decision to execute a mission, identifying feasible and effective control measures where specific standards do not exist, and providing reasonable alternatives for mission accomplishment. Risk assessment is the identification and assessment of hazards. Even though the safety officer's primary responsibility during mission analysis is conducting the risk assessment for the operation, CAO/CMO planners need to ensure that safety personnel also identify and assess the threat posed by hazardous materials (commercial enterprises), special traffic hazards and problems (urban areas/ main supply routes), and health hazards when considering civil considerations. Effective coordination with the safety office is imperative to produce a total risk assessment. 4-55. The staff must compare COAs as to the positive and negative aspects of each while considering risk assessment and the probability of success. The comparison is a subjective call without any one staff section having the upper hand on importance to mission accomplishment. Figure 4-7, pages 4-24 and 4-25, shows a sample of the wargaming steps.

## Summary Of Course Of Action Analysis And Wargaming

4-56. The most important element of COA analysis and wargaming is not the tool used, but the people who participate. Staff members who participate in wargaming should be the individuals who were deeply involved in the development of COAs. A robust cell that can aggressively pursue the adversary's point of view when considering adversary counteraction is essential. This cell role-plays the adversary commander and staff. If formed, the cell would work for the joint force headquarters J-2 and typically would reside in either the joint intelligence support element or the joint planning group. The cell develops critical decision points relative to the friendly COAs, projects adversary reactions to friendly actions, and estimates adversary losses for each friendly COA. By trying to win the war game for the adversary, the cell helps the staff fully address friendly responses for each adversary COA. If subordinate functional and Service components establish similar cells that mirror their adversary counterparts, this cell network can collaborate to effectively war game the adversary's full range of capabilities against the joint force. In addition to supporting the wargaming effort during planning, the cell can continue to view friendly joint operations from the adversary's perspective during execution. The cell process can be applied to noncombat operations to help determine unforeseen or most likely obstacles, as well as the potential results of planned operations. 4-57. A synchronization matrix is a decisionmaking tool and a method of recording wargaming results. Key results that should be recorded include decision points, potential governing factors, CCIRs, COA adjustments, branches, and sequels. Using a synchronization matrix helps the staff visually synchronize the COA across time and space in relation to the adversary's possible COAs. The war-game and synchronization matrix efforts will be particularly useful in identifying cross-component support resource requirements, all of which are critical for a means for the commander to better assess the OE and develop a CONOPS that will ultimately lead to mission success.

## Step 5Course Of Action Comparison

4-58. COA comparison is an objective process to evaluate COAs independently of each other and against set evaluation criteria approved by the commander and staff. The goal is to identify the strengths and weaknesses of COAs so that a COA with the highest probability of success can be selected and further developed in an OPLAN or OPORD. 4-59. Actual comparison of COAs is critical. Any technique that helps the staff provide the best recommendation and enables the commander to make the best decision is valid. Planners place COAs in rank order for each key consideration. A common, proven technique is the decision matrix, which uses governing factors to assess the effectiveness of each COA. A decision matrix can aid the comparison process if applied correctly. However, a decision matrix alone cannot provide decision solutions. Its greatest value is in providing a method to compare COAs against criteria that, when met, produced success. The commander and staff conduct the certain actions and processes that lead to the key outputs when conducting the COA comparison step of the MDMP. Figure 4-8, page 4-26, shows the key inputs and outputs of a COA comparison.

## Initiation Of Course Of Action Comparison

4-60. The COA comparison starts with all staff members analyzing and evaluating the advantages and disadvantages of each COA from their perspectives. Each staff member presents his findings for the others to consider (unit SOPs usually determine the order of presentation for supportability; for example, S-2, S-1, S-4, S-6, S-9, and S-3). Using the evaluation criteria developed before the war game, the staff outlines each COA, highlighting its advantages and disadvantages. Comparing the strengths and weaknesses of the COAs identifies their advantages and disadvantages with respect to one another. The staff may use any technique that facilitates reaching consensus on the best recommendation so that the commander can make a decision in choosing the best COA. The focus of the staff is to evaluate COAs using governing factors to identify the one with the highest probability of success. The selected COA should also
-  Mitigate risk to the force and mission to an acceptable level.

-  Place the force in the best posture for future operations. -  Provide maximum latitude for initiative by subordinates. -  Provide most flexibility to meet unexpected threats and opportunities.

4-61. When conducting COA comparisons using the decision matrix or any other process, consider the following criteria (not all-inclusive):
-  Identify strengths of each COA from a CAO/CMO
perspective by
- Determining the advantages with respects with each
COA.
- Determining the disadvantages with respects with
each COA.
-  Identify the weakness of each COA from a CAO/CMO
perspective by
- Determining the advantages with respects with each
COA.
- Determining the disadvantages with respects with
each COA.
-  Analyze the advantages and disadvantages of each COA
from their perspectives.
-  Evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of each COA
by
- Identifying CAO/CMO deficiencies, risks, and
recommendations that would reduce adverse impact.
- Determining the rank order for each COA criterion.
-  Compare feasibility of each COAs to identify the one with
the highest probability of success by
- Selecting a COA based on CAO/CMO supportability. - Comparing CAO/CMO selected COA with other staff
sections (informal).
4-62. The object when comparing COAs is to solidify the best COA from a CAO perspective without bias. MOEs selected in the COA development phase may be used as criteria if their impact on the COAs is distinguishable. Prioritize the criteria in order and assign a weight to each criterion in order to reflect relative importance. Consider criteria and MOEs that
-  Measure success in relieving or reducing the results of
natural or man-made disasters and/or other endemic conditions of human suffering.
-  Recognize the limited duration of U.S. military and
support requirements.
-  Assist in identifying shortfalls in U.S., HN, and
information operations HA plans and resources.
-  Recognize the interagency coordination requirements. -  Allow comparison of the efficient use of limited
resources.
-  Assess the impact on the populace. -  Assess the impact of implemented control procedures on
the long-range mitigation of political, economic, social, legal, and military issues affecting the operating environment.
4-63. The CAO/CMO planner must effectively integrate civil considerations into operations while considering aspects such as the following:
-  Effect of civilian populations on military operations. -  Effects of military operations on the HN and its populace. -  DC movement, routes, and assembly areas. -  HN ability to care for civilians. -  HN resources to support military operations. -  Determination of a no-strike list, including cultural,
religious, historical, and high-density civilian population areas.
-  Identification of nongovernmental and other independent
organizations operating in the AO.

## Summary Of Course Of Action Comparison

4-64. The staff compares feasible COAs to identify the one with the highest probability of success against the most-likely enemy COA, the most-dangerous enemy COA, the most-important stability task, or the most-damaging environmental impact. The COA comparison discovers the strengths and weaknesses of a COA. Governing factors may include the speed of deployment, risk, capability, flexibility, and logistics. Not all of these governing factors, however, are equal. The chief of staff or executive officer normally determines the weight of each criterion based on its relative importance and the commander's guidance. The commander may give guidance that results in weighting certain criteria. The staff member responsible for a functional area scores each COA using those criteria. Multiplying the score by the weight yields the criterion's value. The staff member then totals all values. However, care is used not to portray subjective conclusions as the results of quantifiable analysis. Comparing COAs by category is more accurate than comparing total scores. The value is providing a method to compare COAs against criteria that, when met, produce operational success. Staff officers use these analytical tools to prepare recommendations. Commanders provide the solution by applying their judgment to staff recommendations and making a decision. For example, is the COA under consideration more likely to achieve the essential tasks or does it support the achievement of all CMO objectives equally well?

## Step 6Course Of Action Approval

4-65. COA approval has three basic components. They are the
-  Staff's recommendation of a COA, usually through a
decision briefing.
-  Commander's decision and approval of a COA. -  Commander's issuance of the final planning guidance.
4-66. After the staff completes its analysis and comparison, it identifies its preferred COA for recommendation to the commander. If the staff cannot reach a decision, the chief of staff or executive officer decides which COA to recommend. If a significant disagreement still exists, then the staff informs the commander and, if necessary, they discuss the disagreement. The staff conducts a COA decision brief for the commander addressing the
-  COA comparison and analysis. -  COA advantages and disadvantages (including risk). -  Wargaming results, including the review and results of running estimates and other important supporting information.

4-67. The COA decision brief often takes the form of a commander's estimate. The decision brief could include information on the intent of the commanders the next two levels up, the current status of the force and its components, the current IPB (JIPOE), and the considerations for the potential COAs, including the
-  Assumptions used. -  Results of the running estimates. -  Summary of the war game for each COA, including critical events, COA modifications, and wargaming

results.
-  Advantages and disadvantages (including risk) of each
COA.
-  Recommended COA (if a significant disagreement exists,
the commander should be informed, and if necessary, the disagreement should be discussed).

## Civil Affairs Operations Thought Process

4-68. During the CAO approval process, the CA staff must ensure that the CAO running estimate is updated and accurate. Civil considerations can play a major role in the commander's decisionmaking process. The COA comparison and the analysis for CA focus needs to be on comparing costs in terms of time and CMO resources required, against the operational impact of success while considering the risk. The CA staff analyzes the risk in executing CMO in the COA in terms of nonavailability of assessments or resources. The impact of time and CMO resources required will guide the CAO/CMO planner to be able to summarize CMO advantages and disadvantages for each COA by
-  Identifying strengths of each COA from a CAO/CMO
perspective by
- Determining the advantages with respects to each
COA.
- Determining the disadvantages with respects to each
COA.
-  Identifying the weakness of each COA from a CAO/CMO
perspective by
- Determining the advantages with respects to each
COA.
- Determining the disadvantages with respects to each
COA.
-  Analyzing the advantages and disadvantages of each COA
from their perspectives.
-  Evaluating the advantages and disadvantages of each
COA by
- Identifying CAO/CMO deficiencies, risks, and
recommendations that would reduce adverse impact.
- Determining the rank order for each COA criterion.
-  Comparing feasibility of each COA to identify the one
with the highest probability of success by
- Selecting a COA based on the CAO/CMO
supportability.
- Comparing the CAO/CMO selected COA with other
staff sections (informal). The other staff sections include the
- G-2/S-2, G-3/S-3, G-4/S-4, G-5, G-6/S-6, and so
forth.
- IPI and NGOs (if applicable). - Interagency (DOS, USAID, and so on).
4-69. The COAs should be prioritized from the CAO/CMO perspective. The other planning staff elements should also prioritize when considering which COA can be best supported and
-  Pose the minimum risk to the force and mission
accomplishment.
-  Place the force in the best posture for future operations. -  Provide maximum latitude for initiative by subordinates. -  Provide the most flexibility to meet unexpected threats
and opportunities.
-  Provide the most secure and stable environment for
civilians in the AO.
-  Facilitate the best inform and influence activities themes
and messages.

## Commander's Decision

4-70. After the COA decision brief, the commander selects the COA to best accomplish the mission. The commander selects a COA or forms an alternate COA based upon the staff recommendations and the commander's personal estimate, experience, and judgment. The key outputs during COA approval are
-  The COA modification. -  The commander's selection of a COA. -  The commander's estimate (if required). -  The refined commander's intent.

4-71. If the commander rejects all COAs, the staff starts COA development again. If the commander modifies a proposed COA or gives the staff an entirely different one, the staff war games the new COAs and presents the results to the commander with a recommendation. There is no limitation on how many times the commander may issue planning guidance. However, the focus should remain upon the framework provided in the initial planning guidance unless there are significant changes in the mission, force projection, or military strategy. 4-72. The nature of a potential contingency could make it difficult to determine a specific end state until the crisis actually occurs. In these cases, the JFC may choose to present two or more valid COAs for approval by higher authority. A single COA can then be approved when the crisis occurs and specific circumstances become clear. 4-73. Deliberate planning will result in plan development, whereas CAP typically will lead directly to OPORD development. During plan or order development, the commander and staff, in collaboration with subordinate and supporting components and organizations, expand the approved COA into a detailed joint OPLAN or OPORD by first developing an executable CONOPSthe eventual centerpiece of the OPLAN or OPORD. Figure 4-9 shows COA approval. 4-74. The CONOPS clearly and concisely expresses what the JFC intends to accomplish and how it will be done using available resources. It describes how the actions of the joint force components and supporting organizations will be integrated, synchronized, and phased to accomplish the mission, including potential branches and sequels. The CONOPS

-  States the commander's intent. -  Describes the central approach the JFC intends to take to
accomplish the mission.
-  Provides for the application, sequencing, synchronization,
and integration of forces and capabilities in time, space, and purpose (including those of multinational and interagency organizations, as appropriate).
-  Describes when, where, and under what conditions the
supported commander intends to give or refuse battle, if required.
-  Focuses on friendly and adversary COGs and their
associated critical vulnerabilities.
-  Avoids discernible patterns and makes full use of
ambiguity and deception.
-  Provides for controlling the tempo of the operation. -  Visualizes the campaign in terms of the forces and
functions involved.
-  Relates the joint force's objectives and desired effects to
those of the next-higher command and other organizations, as necessary. This information enables assignment of tasks to subordinate and supporting commanders.
4-75. The staff writes (or graphically portrays) the CONOPS in sufficient detail so that subordinate and supporting commanders understand their mission, tasks, and other requirements and can develop their supporting plans accordingly. During CONOPS development, the commander determines the best arrangement of simultaneous and sequential actions and activities to accomplish the assigned mission consistent with the approved COA. This arrangement of actions dictates the sequencing of forces into the objective area, providing the link between the CONOPS and force planning. The link between the CONOPS and force planning is preserved and perpetuated through the timephased force and deployment data structure. The structure must ensure unit integrity, force mobility, and force visibility, as well as the ability to rapidly transition to branches or sequels as operational conditions dictate. Planners ensure that the CONOPS, force plans, deployment plans, and supporting plans provide the flexibility to adapt to changing conditions and are consistent with the JFC's intent. 4-76. If the scope, complexity, and duration of the military action contemplated to accomplish the assigned mission warrant a campaign, then the staff outlines the series of military operations and associated objectives in a strategic concept. The staff develops the CONOPS for the preliminary part of the campaign in sufficient detail to impart a clear understanding of the commander's concept of how the assigned mission will be accomplished. 4-77. During CONOPS development, the JFC must assimilate many variables under conditions of uncertainty to determine the essential military conditions, sequence of actions, and application of capabilities and associated forces to create effects and achieve objectives. JFCs and their staffs must be continually aware of the higher-level objectives and associated desired and undesired effects that influence planning at every juncture. If operational objectives are not linked to strategic objectives, the inherent linkage, or nesting, is broken and, eventually, tactical considerations can begin to drive the overall strategy at cross purposes. CJCS Manual 3122.02D, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), Volume III (Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data Development and Deployment Execution), provides detailed guidance on CONOPS content and format.

## Summary Of Course Of Action Approval

4-78. All information provided should be clear, accurate, and relevant to the fundamental purpose of the mission and CAO- specific. In comparing, consider all significant CAO implications and consequences from both friendly and advisories perspective. Conclusions should not go beyond what the data/information provided and should be consistent with reconciliation discrepancies in the data/information. Situation-dependent, the approval process itself may be oral or written, take hours to days to complete, and may require some critical fast-paced planning and thinking.

## Step 7Develop Plan Or Order

4-79. During plan or order development, the commander and staff, in collaboration with subordinate and supporting components and organizations, expand the approved COA into a detailed joint contingency plan or OPORD by first developing an executable CONOPSthe eventual centerpiece of the contingency plan or OPORD. 4-80. In the joint arena, operation planning encompasses the preparation of a number of planning- and execution-related products. Some are specific to JOPES. Other productssuch as OPLANs, OPORDs, and concept plansare also developed, and military organizations that have no specific JOPES planning requirements. Plans are conceived for different reasons depending on the mission requirements. At the joint level, campaign planning is the overarching umbrella for deliberate planning and CAP. These processes are intertwined, whereas campaign-planning principles contribute to both deliberate planning and CAP. Figure 4-10, page 4-31, shows the products of joint operation planning.

Note: CJCS Manual 3130.03, Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) Planning Formats and Guidance, provides the procedures and formats for all joint planning directives.

4-81. The planning process begins with initiate receipt of a WARNORD and continues through to the development of a plan or order. Figure 4-11, page 4-32, provides a visually summarization of this process. Appendix B shows the format for a CAO annex (with examples of CAO/CMO considerations) to an OPORD/OPLAN.

## Chapter 5 Transition Planning Considerations

Transition considerations are vital if stability tasks are to succeed. They prioritize tasks and plan for the successful handover of missions to a follow-on military, American Embassy/country team, civilian agency, or force. One of the first things planners must address and research during their initial review of transition is whether the higher authority developed an exit strategy. An exit strategy may address key points, such as "Does an exit strategy exist? Is it being updated, as necessary? Is it realistic? What transition actions need to occur? Has a lead entity been identified and, if so, what is the organization or staff element?" Outside of the DOD, examples of potential lead organizations are IGOs, NGOs, IPI, or peacekeeping entities under a UN mandate. U.S. military elements that can lead transition include a joint planning group, future operations cell, J-3, or J-5.

. . . Improving civil-military cooperation is another
important aspect of transition support. By definition,
transition support operations often involve the
process of moving from a coalition military
operation or UN peace support operation to an
indigenous political authority. The military has a
key role to play in creating a safe and secure
environment in which humanitarian action, and

near simultaneously, reconstruction, can take place.
The military can increase the value of and resources
allocated to humanitarian and reconstruction
efforts. The military should, however, improve
planning and communication with civilian agencies,
including international organizations and
nongovernmental organizations, in order to avoid
confusion, manage expectations, and better utilize
the comparative advantage that IGOs and NGOs
can bring to humanitarian relief and reconstruction.
The designated civilian agencies perform these
functions far better and at about one-tenth the cost
of military implementation. While military personnel
often like to deliver humanitarian relief and light
infrastructure projects, the usually temporary nature
of military deployments often creates unsustainable
results and failed expectations on the part of needy
beneficiaries . . .

                              Arthur E. Dewey
 Assistant Secretary for Population, Refugees and
                               Migration, DOS
Remarks to the Conrad Hilton Humanitarian Prize
                      New York City, New York
                              28 October 2004

## Introduction

5-1. CA forces are uniquely qualified to advise the commander on the civil component of the OE. It is critical that CA planners advise the commander on activities that reduce turmoil and stabilize operational situations, allowing operations to be transitioned over to the American Embassy/country team, HN, IPI, or international relief organizations. Leaders should identify the conditions for transition or termination of an operation at the beginning of the planning process. Clearly identifiable end states and goals must be established for transitional planning and execution to be successful. Planners usually identify transition or termination as the final phase of the campaign sequence; however, transition occurs throughout a campaign in the form of branches and sequels based upon MOEs and MOPs established as criteria for success at the beginning of the planning process. Transition planning is a continuous process based upon updated running estimates by the CA planner throughout the operation. Constant review of activities, projects, and organizations working within the operational area is critical to the transitional process to ensure all current operations are transferred in an orderly, sequential, and supportable fashion. 5-2. Transition planning should begin during the initial phases of operational planning to ensure adequate attention is placed on this critical task. The analysis of a mission statement, an identifiable end state, interagency plan, and the national policy all play an important role in the transition process. Transferring control of an operation is situation-dependent. Each transition will possess different political-military characteristics and requirements. The CAO/CMO planner must possess both Army and joint operation planning skills and a working knowledge of CA doctrine, TTP, and force structure. The CAO/CMO planner also must have a thorough understanding of the customs, mores, and values of the component of the OE. Examples of such appendixes include PRC, protection requirements, an assessment matrix, a humanitarian and civic assistance-nominated project list, and HN coordination activities.

5-3. General military assistance rendered to a civil authority or community is part of a wider diplomatic, humanitarian, and economic strategy to support a return or transition to peace and stability. Assistance with transition tasks is generally a postconflict activity; however, the chance of success is enhanced if reconstruction and peace efforts are conducted as a subsidiary activity throughout the duration of the operation. Military tasks in assisting transition cover a wide range of activities. Some of these activities can be grouped by function; for example
-  **Supervision.** Supervision may include supporting a
transition of authority to a local or national function of state, reforming local security forces, and relocating DCs.
-  **Administration.** This function includes liaison support
for establishing an interim government. This function also includes assisting with the supply of power, water, public transport, communications, and sanitation services (for example, those public services that form an essential part of the daily life of a community).
-  **Protection.** This function includes creating a secure
environment. The protection function may be extended, to include safeguarding individuals, communities, and installations.
-  **Response.** The ability of the military to respond to fresh
incidents is essential to retain control and keep the initiative. In some situations, responses may consist of techniques other than the use of force (for example, food distribution, well drilling, and so on).
-  **Collective Control.** This function includes
recommending to the commander or HN economic sanctions, curfews, and travel restriction.
-  **Coordination.** This function includes coordinating the
activities of a large number of agencies, other military units (liaison elements, CMOC), HN and IPI assets, IGOs, NGOs, OGAs, and other civilian agencies, as appropriate.
-  **Law and Order.** The military will contribute to the
overall aim of maintaining law and order. When supporting the electoral process, this responsibility rests with the police and civil authorities. If the situation degenerates, military enforcement may be necessary to restore the peace and to provide direct support to the police; this will tend to be a postconflict activity.
5-4. Transition should be executed according to plans synchronized with the supported unit. Depending on the situation, CAO and CMO in transition operations may be
-  Terminated. -  Transferred to follow-on forces. -  Transitioned to the IPI, OGA, or IGO.

5-5. Areas that will significantly affect the development of a transition plan include, but are not limited to, the identification of issues, key events, necessary tasks, and knowledge of the organization or force taking over control.

5-6. The following items assist the planner in prioritizing the many tasks involved in transition operations:
-  **Identification of Issues.** Examples include desired
- Political end state, for example, what are the desires
and concerns of the USG and the considerations of the
HN (democratic society, autocratic, government, egalitarian, and so on).

- Humanitarian end state; for example, eliminating pain and suffering, aiding the oppressed, or empathizing with the populace.

- Reconstruction objectives; for example infrastructure, government, education, or economic stability.

- Military end state (defeat the opposing force or secure the capital).

-  Identification of Key Events (Past and Present).

Examples include identifying the following criteria for the beginning of
- Transition operations. - Transfer-of-authority operations. - Termination operations, including the timeline.

Planners should keep in mind that in many cases, certain events may occur before prescribed conditions are or can be met; for example, the scheduled rotation of units versus an identified condition/objective has been obtained. The example may be applicable during humanitarian operations where meeting urgent needs has tangible indicators.

-  Identification of the Work Required to Accomplish the Transition. Examples include the following:
- Closing out all administrative actions. - Cleaning equipment and facilities. - Scheduling training and briefings for incoming personnel.

- Scheduling time for appreciation and closing ceremonies.

- Scheduling time for conducting and writing an after action review.

- Delivering the continuity books to incoming personnel.

- Planning for the briefing of incoming personnel on points of contact and other pertinent operational information.

- Conducting an inventory and transferring the property book, if appropriate.

- Paying all rents, fees, and contract amounts owed. - Reconciling operational funds. - Securing or destroying all classified material. - Initiating liaison with the succeeding organization, if
possible.
- Coordinating external transportation requirements.
-  Knowledge of the Organization or Force Taking Over
Control of the Operation. Examples include the
following:
- Identifying the mission of the organization assuming
responsibility for operations.
- Identifying the capabilities and limitations of the
succeeding organization.
- Determining the unit's density (personnel and
equipment).
- Verifying key essential personnel. - Determining the equipment to remain in place and
the procedures for transfer, if applicable.
- Determining the status of transportation support. - Validating operations security and document transfer
control procedures for classified material and equipment, if applicable.
5-7. There is no standard format for a transition plan. However, several significant areas must be addressed. The best way to cover all the areas is by using the five-paragraph OPORD format (situation, mission, execution, sustainment, and command and signal). This format may be lacking when synchronizing planning activities outside the military arena. When dealing with nonmilitary partners, a matrix (Table 5-1, page 5-4) may be the best way to plan, coordinate actions, and monitor the process. Regardless of format, it is important that the plan be unclassified. The transition plan must be written in easily understood terms (for example, limiting acronyms). Another format option is to organize the plan by specific functions, such as provision of food, restoration of facilities, and medical care. The plan should identify the organizations assuming the duties and responsibilities. It should identify the specific requirements thereof and establish an initial timeline for assumption of these actions or a combination of both or all. Coordination, with agreement from all players, throughout the planning process offers the best opportunity of success, just as with any plan.

Note: Although all facets of the transition planning process are important, it is critical that personnel protection is a priority in planning through implementation of the plan. Protection of the force is very easy to overlook, but doing so could lead to disaster.

5-8. A comprehensive transition plan, like all plans, needs to be reviewed periodically by the CA staff and all elements, to include the CMOC (Figure 5-1), involved in the transition. This helps to ensure that planning assumptions are still valid and determines if the situation requires changes/modifications as it pertains to the desired civil-military end state.

## Termination

5-9. The termination of an operation or task occurs for a variety of reasons. Some reasons are
-  The time specified for the task has elapsed. -  The milestones or overall objectives have been reached. -  The political or security situation has deteriorated below
an acceptable level.
-  A loss of support or funding by the project benefactor. -  A change of mission. -  The command directive.
5-10. When terminating an activity or task, whether completed as planned or not, CA Soldiers must execute certain closeout procedures. These include
-  Closing out all open administrative actions. -  Giving or returning equipment and facilities in good
condition to the appropriate authorities.
-  Conducting and writing an after action review.
5-11. Depending on METT-TC, the command climate, and other factors, CA Soldiers may consider conducting a termination ceremony. This action helps maintain good rapport with the IPI, as well as the international community, and facilitates future operations in the area. Chapter III of JP 3-57 and Appendix A of FM 3-57 address termination planning. 5-12. As the redeployment phase for U.S. forces approaches, protection (desired humanitarian end state) must be emphasized. The redeployment phase can be the most hazardous because the tactical focus shifts toward redeployment and away from protection.

5-13. The CMOC, if established, should be heavily involved in the transition process. The CMOC prepares to hand over its role as the facilitator between U.S. forces and IPI, IGOs, NGOs, OGAs, and local government agencies. CMOC personnel prepare a transition plan that includes all ongoing projects and coordination, points of contact for all agencies with which the CMOC has worked, possible resources, and any other information that may facilitate the transition process. The following is a list of items that a CMOC may include when preparing for transition:
-  Military forces (CA, special operations forces, engineers,
Army Medical Department, and so on).
-  IGOs (UN, United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees, World Food Programme, United Nations Children's Fund, and so on).
-  OGAs (DOS, USAID, United States Department of
Agriculture, Department of Justice, and so on).
-  Private sector (labor unions, financial institutions,
individual businesses, and so on).
-  International and regional organizations (Organization of
the Petroleum Exporting Countries, Gulf Cooperation Council, World Trade Organization, and so on).
-  NGOs (Catholic Charities, Interaction, Doctors Without
Borders, Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere, Save the Children, and so on).
5-14. All CMO assets involved in a mission must be prepared to assist in the planning, compiling of data and execution of transition operations. The civil dimension may be the most

complex portion of this process. It is imperative that all teams and sections develop historical files to aid in the transition process. Another reason for the establishment of a continuity book is to facilitate the continuity of operations during periods of potential disruption; for example, turnover of personnel (routine or emergency), expansion and contraction of the CMOC, and transition or termination of operations. Although there is no set format for a continuity book, there are some techniques that make the book useful in transition or termination. Techniques include the following:
-  Arrange book chronologically with daily, weekly, and
monthly calendars showing tasks.
-  Include details of who, what, where, why, when, and
how.
-  Include actions taken and points of contact for ongoing
projects.
-  Take photographs of projects, points of contact
(especially IGOs, IPI representatives, and so on), meeting facilities, and other items pertinent to conducting CMO, and include them where appropriate in the continuity book.
Note: Continuity book (extracts) can be used as an appropriate appendix.

5-15. The transition process must be considered from the initial planning of the mission. Transition planning must begin with the desired end state in mind and include close coordination with the DOS and the engagement of the indigenous government or regional actors early in postcrisis and postconflict planning. This creates an atmosphere of cooperation, collaboration, and enfranchisement for the recovering or reconstituting HN. All CAO/CMO assets involved in a mission must be prepared to assist in the planning and execution of transition operations. Transition operations need to be executed according to synchronized transition plans. It is imperative that all teams and sections maintain continuous two-way communications and develop historical files to aid in the transition process. Historical records are essential for future planning and will aid greatly in operations such as NA and humanitarian assistance. A comprehensive transition plan, like all plans, needs to be reviewed periodically by the CA staff and all elements involved in the transition. This helps to ensure that planning assumptions are still valid and determines if the situation requires changes/ modifications as it pertains to the desired civil-military end state. The outcome includes successful transition of authority or relief-in-place and programs that are durable and sustainable by the follow-on forces or organization and that support the HN and, if possible, meet the expectation of the indigenous population. To the nth degree, the mission has been accomplished and/or the President and/or SecDef so direct termination or transition.

5-16. The following are examples of events that might trigger the termination of the mission:
-  A successful harvest and restoration of critical facilities in
the crisis area.
-  An acceptable drop in mortality rates, a certain
percentage of DCs returned to their homes.
-  A given decrease in threat activity against the operation.
5-17. CA's direct contribution to a sustainable solution and the commander's ability to secure the victory is the ability to transition CAO/CMO to follow-on CA units, other military units, HN and IPI assets, IGOs, NGOs, OGAs, and other civilian agencies as appropriate. Transition operations need to be executed according to synchronized transition plans. The outcome includes successful transition of authority or relief-inplace and programs that are durable and sustainable by the follow-on force or organization and that support the HN and, if possible, meet the expectation of the indigenous population. To the nth degree, the mission has been accomplished and/or the President and/or SecDef so direct termination or transition.

5-18. The JP 3-0 series of publications, JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters, and FM 3-57, Appendix A, provide further information on transition and termination planning.

## Appendix A Civil Affairs Area Study

The area study is a pre-mission evaluation of a defined area that serves as the baseline research document for CA forces operating in that area. It is organized within the 6 CA functional specialty areas and provides information in each of the 14 functional specialties. The CA area study format, shown in Figure A-1, pages A-2 through A-20, is written to evaluate a country or region, but it can be easily tailored to support the study of a province, city, or village. In any case, CA personnel obtain, analyze, and record information in advance of need. They update the study as required through an area assessment. An area study has no single format. The information acquired through the area study supports the area assessment. An area assessment begins with receipt of the mission. CA area assessments that support other forces should supplement, not repeat, information in the basic area study. To ensure coverage of all CA functional specialty areas (governance, rule of law, economic stability, public health and welfare, infrastructure, and public education and information), reference should be made to the sample sequence of functions shown in Figure A-1, pages A-2 through A-20. When a CA area study is prepared separately, the General section is used as a basic document.

## Civil Affairs Area Study

A-1. The basic evaluation of an area of interest is the CA area study that establishes baseline information relating to the civil components of the area in question. CA area studies are normally prepared in support of a geographic combatant commander's, joint task force's, or theater Service component's contingency or theater campaign plan processes. The application of the CIM process will focus the area study to provide the supported commander with a detailed analysis of the civil component of the area of interest, not just a copulation of information. This analysis identifies the capabilities, strengths, weaknesses, and vulnerabilities of the IPI of the area in question. A-2. CA area studies address the operational variables (PMESII- PT) of a specific geographical area. Area studies may be prepared for a specific country, a region (for example, a shared border area between two or more countriesCosta Rica and Nicaragua) or an area within a country or region (for example, Gaza Strip or Horn of Africa). The preponderance of data gathered and analyzed in the preparation of an area study originates from open sources.

Note: The CA area study combined with the preliminary assessment is used as the basis for beginning mission analysis during MDMP.

## Appendix B Civil Affairs Operations Annex To An Operation Order

A military campaign plan translates U.S. national and strategic objectives into specific military objectives at the combatant command level. The campaign plan coordinates the activities of all the Services and the forces involved in the campaign. This plan directs the use of resources allocated to the command according to the strategic military objective and the phase of the campaign. The plans for the initial phase of operations may be quite detailed. Options should be formulated for success phases to deal with varied results from the initial phase of the campaign. Accordingly, the plan for success phases may be less detailed. CA planners begin the process of formulating a CAO supporting plan by analyzing the campaign plan to determine the specified, implied, and essential tasks. CA specified tasks are explicitly stated in the campaign plan; however, they may be quite general in nature. These tasks may need to orient subordinate units toward aspects of their respective AO and the level of the supported command, be it at the JFC, corps, or division level.

The CAO annex serves three primary purposes:
-  The situation paragraph provides operational
details on the situation from a CAO/CMO
perspective.
-  The execution paragraph and matrix provide
the direction needed to focus the effects of the CAO/CMO elements.
-  The assessment matrix displays the
information needed to assess CAO/CMO tasks.
The CAO annex also addresses sustainment and mission command aspects of CAO that are not covered elsewhere in the OPLAN or OPORD. Much of the information in the CAO annex is derived from CIM products incorporated into the CA area study or area assessment and the CAO running estimate. Major portions of the annex can be written directly from the CAO running estimate. Much of the information required for the execution and assessment matrices can be taken from the CAO decision matrix developed for COA approval. Normally, in Army operations, this annex is Annex K.

## Overview

B-1. The CAO annex succinctly describes the CAO that the task organization of the command executes in support of the command's stated mission and commander's intent. The annex organizes the information developed from the MDMP analysis of the civil component of the OE not addressed in the base order. The annex also provides information to facilitate coordination among organizations (higher, adjacent, and civil) outside of the command. B-2. The CAO annex, together with its associated appendixes and tabs, is an information management tool. It simplifies the base order by providing a structure for organizing information. Just as the annex expands the information contained in the base order, appendixes contain information necessary to expand annexes; tabs expand appendixes. For example, Appendix 4 to Annex K may detail CIM requirements; Tab A to Appendix 4 to Annex K would describe the CR plan; Tab B to Appendix 4 to Annex K would provide the CR report format. The G-9/S-9 staff is responsible for the preparation of the CAO annex and its attachments. B-3. Details of CAO support to the commander's intent and CONOPS not readily incorporated into the base order are contained in the CAO annex. The annex also describes the command's CAO linkage to the higher command's plan and its support of the overall joint force's CMO objectives.

## Annex Format

B-4. The CAO annex follows the five-paragraph format of the base orderSituation, Mission, Execution, Sustainment, and Command and Signal. Information developed during MDMP and recorded using the CAO running estimate is used to complete the majority of the annex. The following discussion provides doctrinal guidance for completing the CAO annex.

## Situation Paragraph Information

B-5. The situation paragraph provides operational details on the situation from a CAO perspective. The situation paragraph of the CAO annex does not repeat the OPLAN or OPORD situation paragraph. It is tailored to aspects of the OE that affect CAO. The situation paragraph describes how the CAO environment may affect friendly, adversary, and other operations. Discussion of the subparagraphs of the Situation paragraph follows.

## Area Of Interest

B-6. This subparagraph describes the CAO-specific components of the area of interest defined in Annex B (Intelligence) as required.

## Area Of Operations

B-7. This subparagraph refers to Appendix 1 (Operations Overlay) to Annex C (Operations).

## Terrain

B-8. This subparagraph lists all critical terrain aspects that impact CAO. Refer to Tab B (Terrain) to Appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate) to Annex B (Intelligence) as required.

## Weather

B-9. This subparagraph lists all critical weather aspects that impact CAO. Refer to Tab A (Weather) to Appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate) to Annex B (Intelligence) as required.

## Enemy Forces

B-10. This subparagraph lists known template locations and activities of enemy CAO units for one echelon up and two echelons down. It lists enemy maneuver and other capabilities that will impact CAO. It states expected enemy courses of action and employment of enemy CAO assets and refers to Annex B (Intelligence) as required.

## Friendly Forces

B-11. This subparagraph outlines the higher headquarters' plan as it pertains to CAO. It lists designation, location, and outline of plan of higher, adjacent, and other CAO assets that support or impact the issuing headquarters or require coordination and additional support. It includes additional information on interagency, IGOs, and NGOs that may impact CAO.

## Other

B-12. This subparagraph lists other elements in the AO that may impact the conduct of CAO operations or implementation of CAO-specific equipment and tactics. This section provides the analysis of the civil component of the AO developed during mission analysis. This subparagraph includes a description of the general civil situation. It lists the major strengths and vulnerabilities of civil components of the AO and how they relate to the overall mission. When developing this information, it is key to think in terms of nodal interaction that ultimately lead to supporting the overall joint force CMO strategy with its inherent MOPs and MOEs. This information is normally recorded in the Civil Considerations subparagraph of the Characteristics of the Area of Operations paragraph [2.b.(5)] of the CAO running estimate.

## Civil Considerations

B-13. This subparagraph uses ASCOPE; it identifies critical civil considerations that impact CAO. It refers to paragraph 1.f. of the base plan/order as required. Subsequent subparagraphs under the Civil Considerations subparagraph contain discussions, in terms of ASCOPE, as analyzed in the CAO running estimate and area assessments of the nodes and relationships essential for success of the commander's mission.

## Area

B-14. This subparagraph lists the key civilian areas in the supported commander's OE. It approaches terrain analysis from a civilian perspective. Commanders analyze key civilian areas in terms of how they affect the mission, as well as how military operations affect these areas. Examples of key civilian areas are areas defined by political boundaries (districts within a city, municipalities within a region; locations of government centers; social, political, religious, or criminal enclaves; agricultural and mining regions; trade routes; possible sites for the temporary settlement of DCs or other civil functions).

## Structures

B-15. This subparagraph lists the existing civil structures, such as bridges, communications towers, power plants, and dams (traditional high-payoff targets). Churches, mosques, national libraries, and hospitals are cultural sites that need to be listed and are generally protected by international law or other agreements. Still others are facilities with practical applications, such as jails, warehouses, schools, television stations, radio stations, and print plants, which may be useful for military purposes.

## Capabilities

B-16. This subparagraph lists civil capabilities by assessing if the populace is capable of sustaining itself through public administration, public safety, emergency services, and food and agriculture. It should also include whether the populace needs assistance with public works and utilities, public health, public transportation, economics, and commerce.

## Organizations

B-17. This subparagraph lists civil organizations that may or may not be affiliated with government agencies. They can be church groups, ethnic groups, fraternal organizations, patriotic or service organizations, IGOs, or NGOs.

## People

B-18. This subparagraph lists civilian and nonmilitary personnel encountered in the supported commander's OE. The list may extend to those outside the AO/area of interest whose actions, opinions, and/or influence can affect the supported commander's OE.

## Events

B-19. This subparagraph lists the categories of civilian events that may affect military missions. These events include harvest seasons, elections, riots, and evacuations (both voluntary and involuntary). Planners determine what events are occurring and analyze the events for their political, economic, psychological, environmental, and legal implications.

## Attachments Or Detachments

B-20. If not covered in the task organization, all military and nonmilitary organizations participating in CMOC operations and CAO should be included; for example, in support of reconnaissance and surveillance plans, CA assets detached for liaison duties, and so on.

## Assumptions

B-21. This paragraph includes
-  Part of an OPLAN not an OPORD. -  The critical planning considerations and the unknown
conditions that must be confirmed by deliberate assessments.
-  A statement describing the operational risks associated
with not engaging the civil component of the AO through

## Mission Paragraph Information

B-22. This paragraph cites the approved restated CAO mission resulting from mission analysisa short description of who (unit or organization), what (task), when (by time or event), where (AO, objective, and grid location), and why (purpose, mission objective, and end state). For example, the 101st Airborne (Air Assault) Division (who) plans, coordinates, and executes CAO (what) in support of Joint Task Force GOLD in AO EAGLE (where) to accomplish FID objectives (why) commencing upon receipt of this order (when) to support Country X in executing their internal defense and development program (why/end state).

## Execution Paragraph Information

B-23. The execution paragraph provides the direction needed to synchronize the effects of CAO and related CMO addressing the scheme of support, subordinate unit tasks, and any additional coordination instructions not addressed elsewhere. It outlines the effects the commander wants CAO to achieve. It describes the activities of the force executing CAO in enough detail to synchronize them by means of an execution matrix. The CAO execution matrix is normally an appendix to the annex. B-24. The matrix shows when each CAO task is to be executed. The execution matrix helps the G-9/S-9 representative in the current operations integration cell of the command monitor and direct CAO during execution. The execution matrix is a tool to execute CAO effectively without incurring unanticipated interference or duplication of effort. CAO tasks are incorporated and synchronized in the G-3/S-3 execution matrix contained within Annex C. The CAO execution matrix is not a tasking document. The CAO tasks are detailed under Tasks to Subordinate Units in paragraph 3.b. of the CAO annex or in the appropriate appendixes.

## Scheme Of Support

B-25. This paragraph describes how CAO support the commander's intent and the command's CONOPS. This discussion details the CAO CONOPS supporting the approved COA, which comes from paragraph 4, Analysis, of the CAO running estimate developed during MDMP. This discussion includes the principal tasks required, the responsible subordinate unit, and how the tasks complement one another. B-26. This paragraph should include a discussion of civilmilitary objectives, civil decisive points, MOPs and MOEs, transition for each phase of the operation, and a general timeline for the operation. Each phase of the operation should be discussed in greater detail in the appendixes where the key nodal relationship will be further defined. If there are no appendixes, the discussion here must be detailed in this paragraph of the annex.

## Tasks To Subordinate Units

B-27. This paragraph lists the specific tasks to the elements in the task organization and attachments or detachments subparagraphs of the task organization. The MOPs for each task should be stated along with their corresponding MOEs. MOPs and MOEs detailed in this paragraph come from paragraph 4, Analysis, of the CAO running estimate and referred from the assessment matrix appendix. Assessment of MOPs and MOEs is synchronized with the G-3/S-3's overall assessment plan contained at Annex M (Assessment).

## Coordinating Instructions

B-28. This subparagraph provides instructions and details of coordination that apply to two or more subordinate units not covered by the SOP. The instructions and details includes civil CCIR/EEFIs, policy statements, special reporting procedures, protection guidance, effective time of attachments or detachments, reference to annexes not mentioned elsewhere in the annex, coordinating authority, and so on. B-29. CAO support of the command's identified stability tasks are detailed in the coordinating instructions subparagraph. Units responsible for an AO must execute the below-listed tasks with available resources when no civilian agency or organization is capable. Stability tasks provide for minimum levels of security, food, water, shelter, and medical treatment to the civilian population and include
-  Civil security. -  Restoration of essential services. -  Civil control.

## Sustainment Paragraph Information

B-30. This paragraph provides instructions and details concerning the service support relationship between the CAO elements and their supported units. Identify priorities of sustainment for CAO key tasks and specify additional instructions as required for
-  **Logistics.** Refer to Annex D (Logistics) as required.

Provide the locations of

-  Logistics facilities that will or can support CAO. -  Civilian logistics facilities (for example, ice houses,
refrigerated storage facilities, warehouses, and port facilities).
-  Nonmilitary agencies in the AO that have logistics
facilities or can provide logistics support.
Note: For each location, list the class of supply at that location.

- Military maintenance facilities that will or can
support CAO.
- Civil maintenance facilities can or will to support
CAO.
- Nonmilitary agencies in the AO that have
maintenance facilities or are capable of providing maintenance to CAO assets.
Note: For each location, list the level of maintenance provided at that location (for example, operator, general, or deport), as applicable.

-  **Personnel.** Refer to Annex E (Personnel) as required.
Provide the following:
- Location and contact information of the staff judge
advocate.
- Location and contact information of the contracting
officer and contracting officer's representative.
- Location and contact information of the media
information bureau.
- Any other personnel matters that will affect the
conduct of CAO, such as human resources or chaplain support.
-  **Health Service Support.** Refer to Annex Q (Health
Service Support) as required. Provide the locations of
- Medical facilities that will or can support CAO. - Civilian medical facilities. - Nonmilitary agencies in the AO that have medical
facilities or capabilities.
Note: For each location, specify the type of medical care provided at that facility.

## Command And Signal Paragraph Information

B-31. This paragraph details specific CAO mission command instructions and information that is not covered in the base order. Specify additional instructions as required for
-  **Command.** Include the following:
- Location of key CAO leaders (G-9/S-9). - Location and alternate locations of the command's
CMOC.
- Location and alternate locations of higher, adjacent,
and subordinate CMOCs.
-  **Succession of Command.** State the CAO succession of
command if not covered in the unit's SOP.
-  **Liaisons Requirements.** Include the following:
- CAO liaison requirements to military organizations
and Services.
- CAO liaisons requirements to HN agencies. - CAO liaisons requirements to civilian organizations
(NGOs and IGOs).
-  **Communication and Information Networks.** Include
the following:
- CAO-specific communications requirements or
reports.
- Primary and alternate means of communicating with
participating civilian organizations.
- Instruction regarding maintenance and update of the
CIM database.

## Appendix Information

B-32. Appendixes include diagrams, synchronization matrices, civil overlays, and so forth. The following are possible appendixes for the CAO annex:
-  Execution Matrix. -  Assessment Matrix. -  Cultural Briefing. -  PRC Plan.
- DC Plan. - Noncombatant Evacuation Plan.
-  Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Plan. -  Nation Assistance Plan. -  CIM Plan. -  Support to Civil Administration Plan. -  Transition Plan.
B-33. Figure B-1, pages B-7 through B-14, is a sample CAO annex.

Note: Not every paragraph listed will be specifically addressed in the CAO Annex. They are included to ensure CA planners consider the context when developing the annex.

## Appendix C Civil Affairs Operations Running Estimate Format

The CAO running estimate is the CAO and CMO planner's (G-9/S-9's) evaluation of how CAO factors may influence the COA the supported commander is considering. The focus of estimate development is on situation assessment rather than COA development. Consequently, the CA
planners must make assumptions until the queries can be validated. The initial CAO running estimate is based on information obtained from the preliminary assessment driven by the CIM process. The CAO running estimate is both a process and a product. The process calls for a structured approach to gathering and processing information, through to recording the results. The product is the estimate itself. The CAO running estimate is a living document that is continuously refined as additional information becomes available. Estimate development never stops. This appendix provides the established format (Figure C-1, pages C-1 through C-3) for a generic CAO running estimate.

Note: FM 3-57 provides information on how the CAO
running estimate contributes to the MDMP.

## Appendix D Personnel Protection And Urban Planning Considerations

The protection warfighting function protects personnel, physical assets, and information. By protecting people, physical assets, and information, protection contributes to the fighting strength of the Army and enables commanders to use maximum combat power. The Army's charter is to protect national security interests by delivering decisive actions across the spectrum of conflict. Key to this is preserving and protecting the force for the commander to use at the decisive time and place.

## Personnel Protection Planning Considerations

D-1. Personnel protection is a paramount concern of all commanders. Every geographic combatant commander, U.S. Army command, U.S. Army Service component command, and direct reporting unit has standing personnel protection policies that require understanding and adherence by all personnel. CA units, teams, and elements need to plan and incorporate personnel protection measures to mitigate risk and protect the force. Personnel protection encompasses a range of processes mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment. These processes occur in a continuous, overlapping, and repeating sequence throughout an operation. Per the DOD-approved definition, protection does not include actions to defeat the enemy or protect against accidents, weather, or disease.

Force protection for U.S. forces will always be a significant issue in any military operation, and be an especially high priority in peace operations missions. In Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, U.S. force protection took on a higher degree of importance than we have seen in other military operations. In fact, force protection was a formal part of the OPLAN mission statement and permeated all aspects of mission execution. Furthermore, many participants [Bosnia-Herzegovina After Action Review, I Conference participants] agreed that U.S. force protection measures seemed to be politically motivated and clearly not based on a realistic threat assessment.

Bosnia-Herzegovina After Action Review I Conference D-2. As with all planning, consideration of personnel protection measures must be considered early in the planning process. Commanders must be sure to address protection issues during all phases of deliberate planning and CAP. All aspects of protection must be considered and threats minimized to ensure maximum operational success. Commanders must plan for and implement personnel protection measures appropriate to all anticipated threats, to include terrorists. D-3. Supported and supporting commanders must ensure that deploying forces receive thorough briefings concerning the threat and personnel protection requirements prior to and upon arrival in the operational area. In addition, commanders must evaluate the deployment of forces and each COA for the impact of terrorist organizations supporting the threat and those not directly supporting the threat but seeking to take advantage of the situation. D-4. CA forces should address their particular personnel protection concerns with the supported commander and or ambassador. When conducting operations in support of the American Embassy, the regional security officer is responsible to the chief of missions (ambassador) for security functions of all U.S. Embassies and Consulates in a given country or group of adjacent countries. The regional security officer should be coordinated with to ensure proper personnel protection measures are being used in the operational area. These types of concerns should be addressed early in the planning process. Additionally, CA Soldiers must address how the various elements of personnel protection influence how they perform their mission. The CA Soldier focuses on personnel protection at two distinct levels: (1) the individual or team level, and (2) the supported force level. These levels are discussed below:
-  At the individual or team level, CA Soldiers employ measures to counter threats to individual or team members from all sources while conducting CAO. Threats to CA Soldiers include enemy direct and indirect fires; chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives attack; ambush; improvised explosive devices; thugs, criminals, and enraged or disaffected civilians; and theft of equipment. CA Soldiers follow command guidance and unit protection SOPs.

-  At the supported-force level, conducting routine CAO can enhance protection of the supported force from threats from the civil component of the AO. Threats to the supported force include disaffected or DC populations, unfriendly political organizations, terrorist incidents, and theft of equipment.

D-5. CA Soldiers enhance protection measures in any operation by conducting normal CAO and CMO. CA Soldiers, because of their ability to work with the populace and their overall expertise, can provide added insight into personnel protection concerns of the supported commander before the concerns become major issues. This means CA Soldiers should (not allinclusive)
-  Circulate among the populace. -  Establish rapport with ordinary citizens, key leaders, representatives of international organizations, and NGOs.

-  Establish and maintain an accessible CMOC. -  Conduct continuous deliberate assessments. -  Conduct deliberate CR. -  Provide input to all-source analysis centers on conditions,
attitudes, and intentions of the populace.
D-6. It is difficult to prevent threat forces from attacking someone or something they want; however, there are ways that CA Soldiers can mitigate the effects and make themselves lessdesirable targets. CA Soldiers should not limit themselves to the following considerations when developing a sound protection plan. As with any planning sequence, CA Soldiers must consider the OE. Some common ways to increase personnel protection are as follows (not all-inclusive):
-  Maintaining a low profile. CA Soldiers should make every effort to
- Discourage very important person treatment.

Note: Personnel who have a driver or chauffeur are considered very important people.

- Limit the use of official staff cars, when feasible. If
staff cars are used, the vehicle should blend in as much as possible with the vehicles used by the local population.
- Avoid using official or diplomatic license plates. - Never permanently affix decals to vehicles. - Drive themselves (this allows the CA Soldier to
control the routes, speed of travel, and the pickup times).
- Minimize the number of bodyguards or escorts (this
allows the CA Soldier to better blend in with the local population).
- Downplay the importance of being interviewed or
photographed.
-  Controlling the environment. Whenever possible CA
Soldiers should consider
- Using on-base facilities. On-base facilities generally
offer better security and are probably better-equipped to deal with the OE (for example, hostile attacks).
- Using areas that employ some type of security
measure, such as guards, cameras, visitor sign-in rosters, and so on.

- Avoiding use of street-level rooms, if possible. - Being alert for anyone loitering or carrying objects that could conceal weapons.

- Being familiar with the uniforms of the local police, military, fire department, emergency services, and hotel security.

- Being familiar with the proper procedures for obtaining the services of the local police, military, fire department, emergency services, and hotel security.

-  Selecting a work/meeting place. CA Soldiers should take into consideration whether
- The area has reliable police, fire, and rescue services. - The area has a high crime rate or any late-night establishments.

- The area provides multiple routes to and from the work/meeting place or if the streets are narrow and one-way.

- The building selected has high walls and fences. The compound should have more than one gate to offer alternative ways in and out.

- The trees and shrubs serve as a screen to anyone trying to observe the grounds. Shrubbery within the perimeter and near the building should be trimmed or removed to prevent it from being used by intruders for concealment.

- Dogs are used to monitor the building and surrounding area, when possible.

- Security guards and night watchmen monitor the building and surrounding area.

- The doors and windows are strong. The CA Soldiers should change existing locks upon taking control of buildings. Whenever possible, doors and windows should have bars.

- Employees are hired from approved embassy lists.

- Participants of meetings are sitting in a direct line with the windows.

-  Selecting a meeting place outside of the workplace. CA
Soldiers should consider whether

- The meeting place has at least two exits. - A premeeting visit to the location was conducted. A
premeeting allows the CA Soldiers to become familiar with the layout of the building and its routes.
- The appointment was made in advance. - The interior of the meeting place is well lit.
D-7. For a list of force protection conditions and threat levels, refer to Army Regulation 525-13, *Antiterrorism*.

## Urban Planning Considerations

D-8. Increases in population and city expansions lead to a need for additional modifications of current combat operations to accommodate the changing OE for the U.S. military. The battlefields of the future will most likely be in urban areas. Military planners are well aware of the pitfalls of fighting in urban areas. D-9. Urban operations are conducted in an urban environment and include offensive, defensive, stability, or DSCA. The sole mission of the supported commander or one of several additional mission orders in a larger operation will more than likely be conducted in an urban environment. Regardless of the type of operations conducted or whether urban operations are the focus of the operation or only one component of a larger operation or campaign, the complex urban environment will significantly affect the overall conduct of the mission. Understanding the urban environment is essential early in the planning process. In the conduct of CAO/CMO in support of urban operational tasks, the commander's decisionmaking process can be greatly enhanced and is essential to the total planning process, reinforcing the need for CA forces to be considered early in the planning process. D-10. In any operational area, most of the civil authority and the greater part of the population are likely to reside in one or more urban areas. Because of the numbers and density of civilians, any urban operation will require a significant CAO/CMO effort on the part of the force. An example of the contribution of early CAO/CMO planning efforts:
-  The urban environment's people (their allegiance and support), infrastructure, capabilities, or other resources have or can be of significant operational or strategic value.

-  The urban area's geographical location can dominate a region or avenue of approach (main supply route and so on).

D-11. CAO/CMO conducted as part of urban operations strives to achieve the same objectives as in other types of operations. These objectives are to
-  Enhance military effectiveness. -  Support national objectives. -  Reduce the negative impact of military operations or
other destructive force on civilians.

## Civil-Military Operations And Urban Operations

D-12. As with other activities, the complex, physical aspects of urban terrain can hamper CMO. The urban terrain can fragment and channel CMO efforts, particularly HA. It will be difficult to find and reach all those in need of support. Constricted terrain makes it more difficult to control large numbers of people in PRC operations. Urban areas normally offer many buildings usable for shelter, medical care, and other forms of support but the damage to those structures from military operations or natural or man-made disaster can make them unusable, thus adding to the support difficulties. D-13. Noncombatants are the primary focus of CMO, and urban areas may contain huge numbers of civilians. These numbers may range from the thousands to the millions. Depending on the circumstances, many will be displaced and in need of basic support. Services may be degraded or nonexistent. The requirement to control and support the noncombatant population can easily overwhelm local capabilities. Effective urban CMO requires knowledge of the ethnic, cultural, religious, and attitudinal characteristics of the populace. Noncombatant populations in urban areas are rarely homogenous; therefore, effective CMO will require the understanding of neighborhoods, tribal relations, and the basic allegiances and daily life of the inhabitants. D-14. Urban infrastructure may be functioning with some degree of effectiveness, in which case CMO must work through and with local authorities and services. It may be necessary to repair physical infrastructure facilities and means, such as power plants or water stations, as part of CMO. Existing service infrastructure may be totally lacking or overwhelmed by circumstances, requiring the joint force to provide not only basic subsistence and shelter but also the full gamut of support personnelpolice, legal, administration, engineer, sanitation, medical, transportation, and others. D-15. The proximity of civilians to military targets increases the requirement to actively screen the joint integrated prioritized target list for indirect fires and minimize the impact of collateral damage. The proximity to civilians increases the risks that diseases and other public health hazards will pose health risks to military personnel.

## Civil-Military Operations Considerations In Joint Urban Operations

D-16. Urban operations include CMO. Urban CMO can support overall operational objectives or be the main focus of operations, but are in any case the responsibility of the CCDR to plan and conduct.

## Planning Considerations

D-17. Planning for CMO support of urban operations is generally the same as for other CMO with special emphasis on the nature of the urban area. General planning considerations were addressed earlier in this chapter. Additional planning considerations are as follows:
-  CMO planners should carefully consider these aspects of
the urban area: terrain, civilian populace, environment, and infrastructure.
-  Some other factors include legal implications,
communications, culture, education, economic, religious, labor, health, and administrative infrastructure.
-  NGOs, IGOs, and interagency organizations also play a
major part in all CMO but may be of more importance in urban operations.

## Synchronization

D-18. CMO must be synchronized both internally and with other operations. The relation of CMO to the overall operation can vary a great deal depending on the situation. Joint urban operations can require the full extent of CMO in one portion of an urban area while another is still being heavily contested. Most likely, regardless of the situation, civilians in the operational area will have a great impact on operations. Planning must be synchronized to ensure CMO and other operations (for example, combat operations) support the USG overall objectives.

## Support

D-19. Planning for CMO support to urban operations is the same as for other CMO with special emphasis on the nature of the urban area. CMO may require support in a number of key areas from other forces (for example, health service support, engineer, and military police). CA planners should carefully consider the aspects of the urban areaterrain, civilian populace, environment, and infrastructure.

## Other Operational Considerations

D-20. The most important urban operation consideration is that CMO will most likely occur simultaneously with, not subsequent to, other operationsincluding combat. The JFC must therefore identify sufficient forces and synchronize the planning and execution of these operations, as well as the support required. The relation of CMO to other operations in joint urban operations will vary, but CMO will be a significant part of any operation. For further guidance concerning urban operations, refer to JP 3-06, *Joint Urban Operations*, and FM 3-06, Urban Operations.

## Consequence Management

D-21. JP 1-02 defines *consequence management* as actions taken to maintain or restore essential services and manage and mitigate problems resulting from disasters and catastrophes, including natural, man-made, or terrorist incidents. CM operations mitigate the results of intentional or inadvertent release of weapons of mass destruction or chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives. These operations involve those services and activities required to manage and mitigate problems resulting from disasters and catastrophes. They involve measures to alleviate the damage, loss, hardship, or suffering caused by emergencies abroad.

## Consequence Management Support To The United States, Its Territories, And Possessions

D-22. This type of response occurs under the primary jurisdiction of the affected state and local government. The Federal government provides assistance when required. When situations are beyond the capability of the state, the governor may request federal assistance from the President. The President may direct the Federal government to provide supplemental assistance to state and local governments to alleviate the suffering and damage resulting from disasters or emergencies. The agency with primary responsibility for coordination of federal assistance to state and local governments is the Federal Emergency Management Agency. CM involves measures to alleviate the damage, loss, hardship, or suffering caused by emergencies. It includes measures to restore essential government services, protect public health and safety, and provide emergency relief to affected governments, businesses, and individuals. D-23. The Commander, United States Northern Command, acts as the supported CCDR for all CM operations conducted in the continental United States. The Commander, United States Northern Command, exercises operational control of all DOD forces in such operations with the exception of joint special operations task forces and the U.S. Corps of Engineers supporting the lead Federal agency. The United States Northern Command and United States Pacific Command are responsible for planning and executing military assistance to civil authorities for CM of incidents relating to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives situations within the United States, its territories, and possessions that fall within their respective AORs. Additionally, there are standing forces, such as joint task force-civil support and two U.S. Army response task forces (east and west) that may be tasked by the United States Northern Command to respond to CM situations. Other organizations with specific missions to respond to CM situations include the U.S. Marine Corps Chemical/Biological Incident Response Force, the U.S. Army's Chemical/Biological Rapid Response Team, the U.S. Navy's Response Task Force, and two U.S. Air Force Response Task Forces (Air Combat Command and U.S. Air Forces Europe). The President can also federalize the National Guard Civil Support Teams. The Commander, United States Northern Command, acts as the supported CCDR for all CM operations conducted in Puerto Rico or the U.S. Virgin Islands. The Commander, United States Pacific Command, acts as the supported CCDR for all CM operations conducted in Hawaii, Alaska, Guam, American Samoa, or any of the other U.S. possessions in the Pacific AOR. JP 3-27, *Homeland Defense*, provides further information on CM support in the United States.

Note: The role of the National Guard Civil Support team in homeland defense is to assess weapons of mass destruction attacks, advise civilian responders on appropriate actions through on-site testing and expert consultation, and facilitate the arrival of additional state and federal military forces.

## Department Of Defense Support To Foreign Consequence Management

D-24. DOD support to foreign CM operations focuses on providing specialized assistance to the DOS, the lead Federal agency, or in response to the use of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives contaminants against an ally, regional friend, or vital interest of the United States. Primary responsibility for managing and mitigating the effects of foreign weapons of mass destruction incidents resides with the HN government. The DOS is designated as the lead Federal agency for foreign CM operations in support of a foreign government. All DOD support will be coordinated through the responsible American embassy via the chief of mission and the country team. CJCS Instruction 3214.01D, Defense Support for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Incidents on Foreign Territory, and JP 3-29, *Foreign Humanitarian Assistance*, provide further information on foreign CM.

## Civil Affairs Support To Consequence Management

D-25. CA will coordinate with appropriate OGAs for support to CM operations. In CM operations, CA forces may provide liaison to OGAs, assess the situation, or provide other expertise as required, to include providing consultation to HN decisionmakers with the approval of the lead agency.

## Foreign Consequence Management Planning Considerations

D-26. Foreign consequence management plans should include support related to essential services and activities required to manage and mitigate problems resulting from disasters and catastrophes. Foreign consequence management operations are composed of five phases and are scoped by tasks to be accomplished. CA elements can contribute significantly in the planning of these phases. The five phases are:
-  Situation assessment and preparation. -  Deployment. -  Assistance to HN authorities. -  Transition to HN and other agencies. -  Redeployment.

For further guidance on CM phasing, refer to JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.

## Civil Affairs Can Support Consequence Management

D-27. The CA element needs to decide on who, what, where, when, why, and how to focus CA assets and actions to assist the supported commander's intent and planning guidance. Once the CA element has an understanding of the intent and has reviewed the specified tasks, implied tasks should be developed for CA (or non-CA) forces to support implementation of CM operations. The CA element should then identify a CONOPS that supports the commander's goals and objects while being sure to complement the lead agency's (usually DOS) program. The CA element

should
-  Think in terms of transition planning. -  Synchronize CONOPS with non-CA forces, HN, OGAs,
IGOs, IPI, and NGOs (as applicable).
-  Identify all key players and stakeholders in support of CM
operations.
-  Be sure to integrate CM across organizational sectors
supporting the commander's intent and the maneuver plan as applicable.
-  Consider and advise the supported commander/country
team of current or potential hazards regarding civilian populace and resource issues (positive and negative).
-  Project a time frame from the initial response phase
through transition to other authorities (begin planning for transition operations from a CAO aspect/stay in your lane).
-  Develop lead times and timelines as required to meet
commander's intent (reverse planning).
-  Continuously review CAO priorities and specified/
implied/essential tasks.
-  Identify funding and supplies from approved sources,
such as Commander's Emergency Relief Program or other funding sources dedicated for HA. Be sure to consider outside sources and funding (OGAs [USAID, Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, and so on], HN sources, IGOs, and NGOs).

## Summary

D-28. To summarize, CA elements will coordinate with appropriate agencies for support to foreign consequence management operations. In foreign consequence management operations, CA forces may liaise, conduct assessments, and/or provide other expertise as required, to include providing consultation to HN decisionmakers (all with the approval of the lead agency and the supported commanderif applicable). D-29. For further information regarding foreign consequence management, see JP 3-41, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management.

## Glossary

The Glossary lists acronyms and terms with Army, multi-Service, or joint definition, and other selected terms. Terms for which ATP 3-57.60 is the proponent manual (the authority) are marked with an asterisk (*). The proponent manual for other terms is listed in parentheses after the definition.

## Section I - Acronyms And Abbreviations

ADP
Army doctrine publication
ADRP
Army doctrine reference publication
AO
area of operations
AOR
area of responsibility
APEX
Adaptive Planning and Execution
ASCOPE
areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events
ATP
Army techniques publication
CA
Civil Affairs
CAO
Civil Affairs operations
CAP
crisis action planning
CCDR
combatant commander
CCIR
commander's critical information requirement
CIM
civil information management
CJCS
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CM
consequence management
CMO
civil-military operations
CMOC
civil-military operations center
COA
course of action
COG
center of gravity
CONOPS
concept of operations
CR
civil reconnaissance
DC
dislocated civilian
DOD
Department of Defense
DOS
Department of State
DSCA
defense support of civil authorities
EEFI
essential element of friendly information
FHA
foreign humanitarian assistance
FM
field manual
FRAGORD
fragmentary order
G-1
assistant chief of staff, personnel
G-2
assistant chief of staff, intelligence
G-3
assistant chief of staff, operations
G-4
assistant chief of staff, logistics
G-5
assistant chief of staff, plans
G-9
assistant chief of staff, civil-military operations
HA
humanitarian assistance
HN
host nation
ICAF
interagency conflict assessment framework
IGO
intergovernmental organization
IPB
intelligence preparation of the battlefield
IPI
indigenous populations and institutions
J-2
intelligence directorate of a joint staff
J-3
operations directorate of a joint staff
J-5
plans directorate of a joint staff
J-9
civil-military operations directorate of a joint staff
JFC
joint force commander
JIPOE
joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment
JOPES
Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
JOPP
joint operation planning process
JP
joint publication
MDMP
military decisionmaking process
METT-TC
mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support availabletime available and civil considerations
MOE
measure of effectiveness
MOP
measure of performance
NA
nation assistance
NEO
noncombatant evacuation operation
NGO
nongovernmental organization
OE
operational environment
OGA
other government agency
OPLAN
operation plan
OPORD
operation order
PMESII
political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure (Joint)
PMESII-PT
political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, time (Army)
PRC
populace and resources control
S-1
manpower and personnel staff officer
S-2
intelligence staff officer
S-3
operations staff officer
S-4
logistics staff officer
S-6
counterintelligence and human intelligence staff officer
S-9
Civil Affairs operations staff officer
SCA
support to civil administration
SecDef
Secretary of Defense
SOP
standard operating procedure
SWEAT-
MSO
sewage, water, electricity academics, trash, medical, safety, and other considerations
TLP
troop leading procedures
TTP
tactics, techniques, and procedures
UN
United Nations
U.S.
United States
USAID
Untied States Agency for International Development
USG
United States Government
WARNORD
warning order

## Section Ii - Terms

center of gravity The source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act. Also called COG.

(JP 3-0)
civil administration An administration established by a foreign government in (1) friendly territory, under an agreement with the government of the area concerned, to exercise certain authority normally the function of the local government; or (2) hostile territory, occupied by United States forces, where a foreign government exercises executive, legislative, and judicial authority until an indigenous civil government can be established. (JP 3-05)
Civil Affairs Designated Active and Reserve component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct Civil Affairs operations and to support civil-military operations. Also called CA. (JP 3-57)
Civil Affairs operations Actions planned, executed, and assesed by Civil Affairs forces that enhance awareness of and manage the interaction with the civil component of the operational environment; identify and mitigate underlying causes of instability within civil society; or involve the application of functional specialty skills normally the responsibility of civil government. Also called CAO. (JP 3-57)
civil information Information developed from data with relation to civil areas, structures, capabilities, organization, people, and events within the civil component of the commander's operational environment that can be fused or processed to increase Department of Defense/interagency/intergovernmental organizations/nongovernmental organizations/indigenous populations and institutions situational awareness, situational understanding, or situational dominance. (FM 3-57)
civil information management Process whereby civil information is collected, entered into a central database, and internally fused with the supported element, higher headquarters, other United States Government and Department of Defense agencies, intergovernmental organizations, and nongovernmental organizations to ensure the timely availability of information for analysis and the widest possible dissemination of the raw and analyzed civil information to military and nonmilitary partners throughout the area of operations. Also called CIM.

(FM 3-57)
civil-military operations Activities of a commander performed by designated Civil Affairs or other military forces that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, indigenous populations, and institutions, by directly supporting the attainment of objectives relating to the reestablishment or maintenance of stability within a region or host nation. Also known as CMO. (JP 3-57)
civil-military operations center An organization normally comprised of Civil Affairs, established to plan and facilitate coordination of activities of the Armed Forces of the United States with indigenous populations and institutions, the private sector, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, multinational forces, and other governmental agencies in support of the joint force commander. Also called **CMOC**. (JP 3-57)
civil reconnaissance A targeted, planned, and coordinated observation and evaluation of those specific civil aspects of the environment. Civil reconnaissance focuses specifically on the civil component, the elements of which are best represented by the mnemonic ASCOPE: areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events. Civil reconnaissance can be conducted by Civil Affairs or by other forces, as required.

Also called CR. (FM 3-57)
commander's intent A clear and concise expression of the purpose of the operation and the desired military end state that supports mission command, provides focus to the staff, and helps subordinate and supporting commanders act to achieve the commander's desired results without further orders, even when the operation does not unfold as planned. (JP 3-0)
commander's visualization The mental process of developing situational understanding, determining a desired end state, and envisioning an operational approach by which the force will achieve that end state. (ADP 5-0)
common operational picture
(Army) A single display of relevant information within a commander's area of interest tailored to the user's requirements and based on common data and information shared by more than one command. (ADRP 6-0)
dislocated civilian A broad term primarily used by the Department of Defense that includes a displaced person, an evacuee, an internally displaced person, a migrant, a refugee, or a stateless person.

Also called DC. (JP 3-29)
effect
1. The physical or behavioral state of a system that results from an action, a set of actions, or another effect. 2. The result, outcome, or consequence of an action. 3. A change to a condition, behavior, or degree of freedom. (JP 3-0)
essential element of friendly information
(Army) A critical aspect of a friendly operation that, if known by the enemy, would subsequently compromise, lead to failure, or limit success of the operation and therefore should be protected from enemy detection. Also called **EEFI**.

(ADRP 5-0)
essential element of information The most critical information requirements regarding the adversary and the environment needed by the commander by a particular time to relate with other available information and intelligence in order to assist in reaching a logical decision. (JP 2-0)
foreign humanitarian assistance Department of Defense activities, normally in support of the United States Agency for International Development or Department of State, conducted outside the United States, its territories, and possessions to relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation. Also called FHA. (JP
3-29)
host nation
(DOD) A nation which receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations and/or NATO organizations to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory. Also called HN. (JP 3-57)
indigenous populations and institutions The civilian construct of an area of operations, to include its population (legal citizens, legal and illegal immigrants, and all categories of dislocated civilians), governmental, tribal, commercial, and private organizations and entities. Also called IPI. (FM 3-57)
instruments of national power All of the means available to the government in its pursuit of national objectives. They are expressed as diplomatic, economic, informational, and military. (JP 1)
interagency United States Government agencies and departments, including the Department of Defense. See also interagency coordination. (JP 3-08)
interagency coordination Within the context of Department of Defense involvement, the coordination that occurs between elements of Department of Defense, and engaged U.S. Government agencies for the purpose of achieving an objective. (JP 3-0)
intergovernmental organization An organization created by a formal agreement between two or more governments on a global, regional, or functional basis to protect and promote national interests shared by member states. Also called IGO. (JP 3-08)
joint operation planning process An orderly, analytical process that consists of a logical set of steps to analyze a mission, select the best course of action, and produce a joint operation plan or order. Also called JOPP. (JP 5-0)
line of effort
(Army) A line that links multiple tasks using the logic of purpose rather than geographical reference to focus efforts toward establishing operational and strategic conditions. (ADRP 3-0)
line of operations
(Army) A line that defines the directional orientation of a force in time and space in relation to the enemy and links the force with its base of operations and objectives. (ADRP 3-0)
link
1. A behavioral, physical, or functional relationship between nodes. 2. In communications, a general term used to indicate the existence of communications facilities between two points. 3. A maritime route, other than a coastal or transit route, which links any two or more routes. (JP 3-0)
measure of effectiveness A criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect. Also called MOE. (JP 3-0)
measure of performance A criterion used to assess friendly actions that is tied to measuring task accomplishment. Also called MOP. (JP 3-0)
military decisionmaking process An iterative planning methodology to understand the situation and mission, develop a course of action, and produce an operation plan or order. (ADP 5-0)
mission command
(Army) The exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander's intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations (ADP 6-0)
mission statement
(DOD) A short sentence or paragraph that describes the organization's essential task(s), purpose, and action containing the elements of who, what, when, where, and why. (JP 5-0)
node
1. A location in a mobility system where a movement requirement is originated, processed for onward movement, or terminated. (JP 3-17) 2. In communications and computer systems, the physical location that provides terminating, switching, and gateway access services to support information exchange. (JP 6-0) 3. An element of a system that represents a person, place, or physical thing. (JP 3-0)
nongovernmental organization A private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society. Also called NGO.

(JP 3-08)
no-strike list A list of objects or entities characterized as protected from the effects of military operations under international law and/or rules of engagement. (JP 3-60)
operational environment A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. Also called OE. (JP 3-0)
operation order A directive issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the purpose of effecting the coordinated execution of an operation. Also called **OPORD.** (JP 5-0)
operation plan
1. Any plan for the conduct of military operations prepared in response to actual and potential contingencies. 2. A complete and detailed joint plan containing a full description of the concept of operations, all annexes applicable to the plan, and a time-phased force and deployment data. Also called **OPLAN.** (JP 5-0)
priority intelligence requirement
(DOD) An intelligence requirement, stated as a priority for intelligence support, that the commander and staff need to understand the adversary or other aspects of the operational environment. (JP 2-01)
reachback The process of obtaining products, services, and applications, or forces, or equipment, or material from organizations that are not forward deployed. (JP 3-30)
risk management The process of identifying, assessing, and controlling risks arising from operational factors and making decisions that balance risk cost with mission benefits. (JP 3-0)
standard operating procedure A set of instructions covering those features of operations which lend themselves to a definite or standardized procedure without loss of effectiveness. The procedure is applicable unless ordered otherwise. Also called SOP. (JP
3-31)
supporting plan An operation plan prepared by a supporting commander, a subordinate commander, or an agency to satisfy the requests or requirements of the supported commander's plan. (JP 5-0)
support to civil administration Assistance given by U.S. armed forces to stabilize or to continue the operations of the governing body or civil structure of a foreign country, whether by assisting an established government or by establishing military authority over an occupied population. Also called SCA. (FM 3-57)
theater The geographical area for which a commander of a geographic combatant command has been assigned responsibility. (JP 1)
threat Any combination of actors, entities, or forces that have the capability and intent to harm United States forces, United States national interests, or the homeland (ADRP 3-0)
troop leading procedure A dynamic process used by small-unit leaders to analyze a mission, develop a plan, and prepare for an operation. (ADP 5-0)
warning order
1. A preliminary notice of an order or action that is to follow. 2. A planning directive that initiates the development and evaluation of military courses of action by a supported commander and requests that the supported commander submit a commander's estimate. 3. A planning directive that describes the situation, allocates forces and resources, establishes command relationships, provides other initial planning guidance, and initiates subordinate unit mission planning. Also called **WARNORD**. (JP 5-0)

## References Required Publications

These documents must be available to intended users of this
publication.
ADRP 1-02, *Terms and Military Symbols*, 24 September 2013. JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and
Associated Terms, 8 November 2010.

## Related Publications

These documents contain relevant supplemental information.

## Army Publications

Most Army doctrinal publications are available online: <http://
www.apd.army.mil>.

ADP 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*, 10 October 2011. ADP 5-0, *The Operations Process*, 17 May 2012. ADP 6-0, *Mission Command*, 17 May 2012. ADRP 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*, 16 May 2012. ADRP 5-0, *The Operations Process*, 17 May 2012. ADRP 6-0, *Mission Command*, 17 May 2012. Army Regulation 525-13, *Antiterrorism*, 11 September 2008. ATTP 5-0.1, *Commander and Staff Officer Guide*, 14 September
2011.
FM 3-06, *Urban Operations*, 26 October 2006. FM 3-07, *Stability Operations*, 6 October 2008. FM 3-57, *Civil Affairs Operations*, 31 October 2011. FM 5-19, *Composite Risk Management*, 21 August 2006.
FM 27-10, *The Law of Land Warfare*, 18 July 1956. Graphic Training Aid 41-01-010, Civil Affairs Protection Considerations Guide, 1 August 2010.

## Joint Publications

Most joint publications are available online: <http://
www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jointpub.htm>.

CJCS Instruction 3214.01D, Defense Support for Chemical,
Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Incidents on Foreign
Territory, 31 December 2011.
CJCS Manual 3122.02D, Joint Operation Planning and Execution
System (JOPES) Volume III (Time-Phased Force and
Deployment Data Development and Deployment Execution),
1 April 2011, <https://ca.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/
cdata/limited/m312202.pdf>.
CJCS Manual 3130.03, Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX)
Planning Formats and Guidance, 18 October 2012,
<https://ca.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/cdata/limited/ m313003.pdf>.
JP 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, 25 March
2013.
JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and
Associated Terms, 8 November 2010.
JP 2-0, *Joint Intelligence*, 22 October 2013. JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military
Operations, 5 January 2012.
JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*, 11 August 2011. JP 3-05, *Special Operations*, 18 April 2011. JP 3-06, *Joint Urban Operations*, 20 November 2013. JP 3-08, *Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations*,
24 June 2011.
JP 3-17, *Air Mobility Operations*, 30 September 2013. JP 3-27, *Homeland Defense*, 29 July 2013. JP 3-29, *Foreign Humanitarian Assistance*, 3 January 2014. JP 3-30, *Command and Control for Joint Air Operations*, 12
January 2010.
JP 3-33, *Joint Task Force Headquarters*, 30 July 2012. JP 3-35, *Deployment and Redeployment Operations*, 31 January
2013.
JP 3-41, Chemical, Biological, Radiological,and Nuclear
Consequence Management, 21 June 2012.
JP 3-57, *Civil-Military Operations*, 11 September 2013. JP 3-60, *Joint Targeting*, 31 January 2013. JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*, 11 August 2011. JP 6-0, *Joint Communications Systems*, 10 June 2010.

## Other Publications

Foreign Assistance Act, 4 September 1961.

## Web Sites

The Web sites listed below provide useful information in CAO/CMO
planning and information collection.
Defense Technical Information Center: http://www.dtic.mil/
doctrine/index.html.
CJCS directives; handbooks, guides, and pamphlets;
instructions; manuals; and notices: http:// www.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/index.htm.

## Federal Agencies

United States Agency for International Development: http://
www.usaid.gov/.
Note: The site listed above is organized by region and special topics. It reports on U.S. foreign assistance projects throughout the world.

Bureau of Consular Affairs: http://travel.state.gov.
Note: The site listed above has information on international travel, country-specific information, travel alerts and travel warnings, passports (visas), laws and policies, and so on.

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention: http://
www.bt.cdc.gov/.

Note: The site above is intended to increase the nation's ability to prepare for and respond to public health emergencies.

Federal Aviation Administration: http://www.faa.gov/. Federal Bureau of Investigation: http://www.fbi.gov/. Federal Bureau of Prisons: http://www.bop.gov/. Federal Communications Commission: http://www.fcc.gov.

Note: The site above is charged with regulating interstate and international communications by radio, television, wire, satellite, and cable (jurisdiction covers the 50 states, the District of Columbia, and U.S. possessions).

Federal Emergency Management Agency http://
www.fema.gov/.

Homeland Security: http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/. International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) (U.S.

National Central Bureau): http://www.usdoj.gov/usncb.

Note: The site listed above is a component of the U.S. Department of Justice and serves as the United States' representative to INTERPOL, the International Criminal Police Organization.

Library of Congress: http://lcweb.loc.gov/rr/news/
extgovd.html.

Note: The site listed above is the source of government information on a broad scope. It provides access to U.S. Federal Government information, U.S. State Government information, U.S. politics, and international information.

Maritime Administration: http://www.marad.dot.gov.

Note: The Maritime Administration is the agency within the U.S. Department of Transportation dealing with waterborne transportation.

| National Homeland Security Knowledgebase:      | http://   |
|------------------------------------------------|-----------|
| www.nationalhomelandsecurityknowledgebase.com/ |           |
| resources.html                                 | .         |

National Nuclear Security Administration: http://
www.nnsa.doe.gov/.
National Security Agency/Central Security Service: http://
www.nsa.gov/.
Note: The National Security Agency/The Central Security Service core missions are to protect U.S. national security systems and to produce foreign signals intelligence information.

Occupational Safety and Health Administration: http://
www.osha.gov.

| Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration:    | http://                  |
|------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------|
| phmsa.dot.gov/hazmat                                       | .                        |
| U.S. Census Bureau:                                        | http://www.census.gov    |
| U.S. Department of Agriculture:                            | http://www.usda.gov/     |
| U.S. Department of Commerce:                               | http://www.commerce.gov/ |
| U.S. Department of Defense:                                | http://www.defense.gov/  |

Note: The site above provides information on DOD
activities, and by using the tabs, it provides access to major DOD publications, many on subjects of interest to students of U.S. foreign policy.

| U.S. Department of Energy:                    | http://www.energy.gov/   |
|-----------------------------------------------|--------------------------|
| U.S. Department of Health and Human Services: | http://                  |
| www.hhs.gov/                                  | .                        |

Note: The site above provides information on the principal agency for protecting the health of all Americans. It is comprised of the Office of the Secretary and 11 operating divisions and provides information on news, grants, regulations, and so on.

U.S. Department of Interior: http://www.doi.gov/. U.S. Department of Justice: http://www.usdoj.gov/. U.S. Department of State: http://www.state.gov/.

Note: The site listed above gives access to recent news, as well as country reports, and provides information on important international issues, such as terrorism, human rights, and religious freedom.

U.S. Department of Transportation: http://www.dot.gov/. U.S. Department of Treasury: http://www.treas.gov/. U.S. Diplomacy Center: http://diplomacy.state.gov.

Note: A State Department Web site for the U.S.

Diplomacy Center intended to . . . explain why diplomacy matters, and to inspire future leaders to become involved.

U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency: http://www.dea.gov. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency: http://www.epa.gov/. U.S. Food and Drug Administration: http://www.fda.gov/. U.S. General Services Administration: http://www.gsa.gov/. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission: http://www.sec.gov.

Note: The mission of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission is to protect investors; maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets; and facilitate capital formation.

## Department Of Defense

Air Force Office of Special Investigations: http://www.dtic.mil/
afosi/.

CJCS directives; handbooks, guides, and pamphlets;
instructions; manuals; and notices: http:// www.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/index.htm.
Note: This is an electronic link to CJCS publications, unclassified instructions, manuals, notices, guides, and other information on policy and procedures.

Defense Information Systems Agency: http://www.disa.mil/.
Note: The Defense Information Systems Agency is a Combat Support Agency that engineers and provides mission command capabilities and enterprise infrastructure to continuously operate and assure a global net-centric enterprise in direct support to joint warfighters, national-level leaders, and other mission and coalition partners.

Defense Security Service: http://www.dss.mil.
Note: The Defense Security Service secures the nation's technological base and oversees the protection of U.S. and foreign classified information in the hands of industry. It accomplishes this by clearing industrial facilities and personnel and associated information systems and collecting, analyzing, and providing threat information to industry and government partners.

Defense Technical Information Center: http://www.dtic.mil/. Defense Threat Reduction Agency: http://www.dtra.mil/. Military Sealift Command: http://www.msc.navy.mil/. Naval Criminal Investigative Service: http://
www.ncis.navy.mil/.

Office of Naval Intelligence: http://www.oni.navy.mil/. U.S. Air Force: http://www.af.mil/.

U.S. Central Command: http://www.centcom.mil/. U.S. Coast Guard: http://www.uscg.mil/. U.S. European Command: http://www.eucom.mil/. U.S. Marine Corps: http://www.usmc.mil/. U.S. Naval Security Group Command: http://www.fas.org/irp/
agency/navsecgru/index.html.
U.S. Navy: http://www.navy.mil/. U.S. Pacific Command: http://www.pacom.mil/. U.S. Special Operations Command: http://www.socom.mil/. U.S. Transportation Command: http://www.transcom.mil/.
Note: Tasked with the coordination of people and transportation assets to allow our country to project and sustain forces, whenever, wherever, and for as long as they are needed.

## United States Army

Office of Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence/G-2: http://
www.dami.army.pentagon.mil/.
Surface Deployment and Distribution
Command (2004): http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/
agency/army/mtmc.htm.
Note: On 1 January 2004, the Military Traffic Management Command changed its name to the Surface Deployment and Distribution Command. This Army major command and Army component command of the United States Transportation Command is responsible for the global, joint movement of combat units, sustainment cargo, service member household goods, and privately owned vehicles.

U.S. Army: http://www.army.mil/. U.S. Army Europe: http://www.hqusareur.army.mil/. U.S. Army Forces Command: http://www.forscom.army.mil/. U.S. Army Military Police School: http://www.wood.army.mil/
usamps/default.htm.
U.S. Army Pacific: http://www.usarpac.army.mil/. U.S. Army Signal Center of Excellence: http://
www.signal.army.mil/.
U.S. Army South: http://www.usarso.army.mil/. U.S. Army Special Operations Command: http://www.soc.mil/. U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command: http://
www.tradoc.army.mil.

## Other Agencies And Interests

Air University: http://www.au.af.mil/au/aul/bib97.htm.

Note: Anyone looking for bibliographies and databases concerned with national security (for example, various regions and countries and topics like terrorism, past wars, weapons and military doctrine, foreign and national security policy, government departments, and many others) will find many useful research tools on the site above.

Ask.com search engine: http://www.ask.com/?o=0&l=dir.

Note: The site above can provide answers to queries, as well as references.

Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere: http://
www.care.org.
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: http://
www.carnegieendowment.org/.
Note: The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace is a nonpartisan, private, nonprofit organization dedicated to advancing cooperation between nations and promoting active international engagement by the United States.

Center for International Policy http://www.ciponline.org/.

Note: This Web site provides access to reports that promote . . . a foreign policy based on cooperation, demilitarization, and respect for human rights.

Central Intelligence Agency: https://www.cia.gov/.
Note: This Web site above provides information on the agency, news reports about it, and featured stories often of a historical nature; it also provides a link to the World Fact Book.

Charity Navigator: www.charitynavigator.org.
Note: A guide to the financial reports of most U.S.-
based NGOs.

Economics resources: http://www.internationaleconomics.net/
economics.html.
Note: This Web site lists economics-related links that it claims represent some of the best sites with respect to international economics. Some of the links are to academic sites, but others are to economic think tanks and international institutions.

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations:
http://www.fao.org/.
Note: The Food and Agriculture Organization's mandate is to raise levels of nutrition, improve agricultural productivity, better the lives of rural populations, and contribute to the growth of the world economy.

Foreign Affairs: http://www.foreignaffairs.org/.
Note: The Council on Foreign Relations publishes foreign affairs, many of whose articles can be accessed online. The site also offers a daily guide to the Council's most influential analysis.

Global Security: http://www.globalsecurity.org/.
Note: This Web site seeks to bring readers the facts by means of hot topics, current news, videos, and important documents concerning the armed forces, intelligence, homeland security, and WMD. Its focus is innovative approaches to emerging security challenges.

Google: http://www.google.com/.

Note: The site listed above is a search engine (maps, news, video, images, and so on).

InterAction: www.interaction.org.
Note: The site listed above is for the U.S.-based international NGO consortium.

International Fund for Agricultural Development: http://
www.ifad.org.
Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies:
http://www.sais-jhu.edu/.
Note: A graduate school of international affairs, SAIS makes available on this site transcripts and audios of presentations made at the school.

National Review Online: http://www.nationalreview.com/.
Note: This Web site covers domestic politics; it contains many commentaries on U.S. foreign policy and the state of the world.

NGO Voice: www.ngovoice.org.

Note: The Web site for the European-based international NGO consortium.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization: http://www.nato.int/. Relief Web: www.reliefweb.int.

Note: A relief and development portal listing various NGO updates and resources The Economist: http://www.economist.com/.

Note: The Economist covers the world of politics, business, finance, technology, and the markets. Access to some sections of the site requires a subscription.

United Nations Action to Counter Terrorism: http://
www.un.org/terrorism/.
Note: This Web site provides UN actions to counter terrorismstrategic framework, UN news, human rights, Security Council, and so on.

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees: http://
www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home.
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs: www.unocha.org/.
Note: The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs mobilizes and coordinates humanitarian assistance delivered by international and national partners to populations and communities in need.

United States Code: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/uscode/.

Note: This Web site provides access to United States Code.

World Bank: http://worldbank.org/.

Note: The official Web site of the World Bank and its two subsidiaries, this Web site provides access to information about the bank and access to its studies and reports.

World Food Programme: www.wfp.org. World Health Organization: http://www.who.int/en/.

Note: This portion of the World Health Organization Web site provides access to news, reports, data, and treatment of acquired immunodeficiency syndrome/ human immunodeficiency virus.

World Public Opinion: http://worldpublicopinion.org/.
Note: This Web site provides a source of in-depth information and analysis on public opinion from around the world relating to international issues.

World Trade Organization: http://www.wto.org/.
Note: The site listed above provides information on the World Trade Organization and its activities, an online forum, and access to resources of use to researchers.

## Prescribed Forms

None.

REFERENCED FORMS
Department of the Army Forms are available on the Army Publishing Directorate Web site (www.apd.army.mil).

Department of the Army Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms).

## Index

A
Annex K, v, 3-20, B-1, B-2, B-8, B-10, B-12, B-14, B-15, B-17, B-19, B-20
area assessment, 1-12,
4-1, A-1, B-1, B-3, B-12, C-3
areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events (ASCOPE), 1-4, 1-9, 1-10, 1-11, 1-13, 1-15, 1-17, 1-22, 1-23, 2-6, 3-2, 3-6, 3-9 through 3-12, 3-15, 3-17, 4-1, 4-4, 4-13, 4-21 through 4-23, 4-26, B-3, B-10, B-15, C-1
C
center of gravity
(COG), v, 1-12, 1-13, 4-1, 4-4, 4-33
civil consideration, iii, iv, v, 1-4, 1-5, 1-9, 1-13, 1-22 through 1-24, 2-5, 3-1 through 3-4, 3-7, 3-9, 3-12, 3-14 through 3-16, 3-21, 4-3, 4-4, 4-8, 4-21, 4-25 through 4-27, 4-30, 4-31, B-3, B-10, C-3
concept plan, 1-5, 4-34 crisis action planning
(CAP), 1-2, 3-3, 4-2, 4-4, 4-32, 4-34, D-1
D
Department of Defense
(DOD), 1-11, 3-11, 5-1, B-10, D-1, D-6
Department of State
(DOS), 1-8, 1-24, 3-5, 4-15, 4-31, 5-1, 5-7, 5-8, D-6, D-7
dislocated civilian
(DC), 1-6, 1-16, 2-5, 3-4, 3-5, 3-10, 3-12, 3-15, 4-9, 4-17, 4-19, 4-20, 4-21, 4-23, 4-26, 4-30, 5-2, 5-8, B-3, B-8, B-10 through B-12, B-14, B-15, C-1 through C-3, D-2
E
economic, 1-2, 1-3, 1-9
through 1-15, 1-24, 3-11, 3-12, 3-17, 4-1, 4-4, 4-16 through 4-18, 4-22, 4-29, 5-2, 5-4, A-1, A-3, A-10, A-20, B-4, B-10, B-12, B-16, C-1 through C-3, D-5

## F Functional Specialty,

1-12, 4-1, 4-3, A-1
G
G-9, 3-15, 4-8, B-2, B-4, B-6, B-14, B-19, C-1
geographic combatant commander, 4-3, A-1, D-1
H
host nation (HN), 1-3,
1-5, 1-7, 1-10, 1-19, 1-24, 2-7, 3-3, 3-4, 3-11, 3-14, 3-17, 4-6, 4-9, 4-15, 4-29, 4-30, 5-1, 5-2, 5-4, 5-8, A-5, A-6, B-6, B-10, B-12, B-14, B-15, B-17, B-19, D-6, D-7
humanitarian and civic assistance, 1-7
humanitarian assistance (HA), 1-10, 3-10, 3-11, 3-17, 4-29, B-12, C-2, D-4, D-7
I
infrastructure, 1-5,
1-11 through 1-15, 2-6, 3-12, 4-1, 4-10, 4-17, 4-19, 4-21, 4-23, 5-1, 5-4, A-1, A-11, A-17, B-10, B-12, B-15, C-2, C-3, D-4, D-5
interagency, 1-1, 1-6,
1-17, 1-18, 1-23, 1-24, 3-3, 3-17, 4-2, 4-14, 4-29, 4-31, 4-33, 5-2, B-2, B-10, B-12, B-14, B-19, C-3, D-5
intergovernmental organization (IGO), 1-1, 1-3, 1-5, 1-7, 1-8, 1-10, 1-11, 1-13, 1-24, 3-4, 3-11, 3-18, 4-6, 4-16, 4-26, 5-1, 5-2, 5-7, 5-8, B-2, B-3, B-6, B-10, B-12, B-17, B-19, C-2, C-3, D-5, D-7
J
joint force commander
(JFC), 1-11, 1-12, 1-17, 1-22, 4-2, 4-3, 4-4, 4-6, 4-7, 4-12, 4-13, 4-32, 4-33, B-1, D-5
joint operation planning process (JOPP), iv, v, 1-3, 1-8, 1-9, 1-22, 1-24, 2-1, 4-1 through 4-3, 4-21, 4-22, 4-24
L
law, iv, 1-2, 1-9, 1-10,
1-12, 2-7, 3-3, 3-10, 3-11, 4-1, 4-15 through 4-17, 5-2, A-1, A-5, A-7 through A-13, A-16, A-19, B-3, B-12, C-2, C-3
logistics, 2-7, 3-14,
4-10, 4-12, 4-24, 4-30, A-7, B-5, B-17
M
measure of effectiveness (MOE), iv, v, 1-6 through 1-8, 1-12, 1-16 through 1-18, 1-20, 1-21, 3-14, 3-17, 4-5, 4-29, 5-2, B-3, B-5
measure of performance (MOP), iv, v, 1-6, 1-8, 1-16, 1-17, 1-21, 3-14, 4-5, 5-2, B-3, B-5, B-15
military decisionmaking process (MDMP), iv, v, 1-3, 1-9, 1-23, 1-24, 2-1, 2-2, 2-4, 3-1, 3-2, 3-4, 3-16, 3-18, 3-20, 3-21, 4-6, 4-8, 4-24, 4-28, A-1, B-1, B-2, B-5, B-14, C-4
mission planning, 1-4,
1-7, 2-5
N
nongovernmental organization (NGO), 1-1, 1-3, 1-5, 1-7, 1-8, 1-10, 1-11, 1-14, 1-24, 3-4, 3-11, 4-6, 4-15, 4-16, 4-26, 4-31, 5-1, 5-2, 5-7, 5-8, B-2, B-3, B-6, B-10, B-12, B-15, B-17, B-19, C-2, C-3, D-2, D-5, D-7
O
operation order
(OPORD), v, 1-2, 1-9, 1-24, 2-2, 2-5, 2-6, 2-8, 3-2 through 3-8, 3-15, 3-18 through 3-21, 4-7, 4-8, 4-10, 4-11, 4-12, 4-28, 4-32, 4-34, 5-4, B-1, B-2, B-4, B-8, B-10, B-12, B-14, B-15, B-17, B-19, B-20
operation plan
(OPLAN), v, 1-2, 1-9, 3-2, 3-8, 3-15, 3-18 through 3-21, 4-2, 4-7, 4-8, 4-11, 4-28, 4-32, 4-34, B-1, B-2, B-4, B-8, B-10, B-12, B-14, B-15, B-17, B-19, B-20, D-1
operational variables
(PMESII-PT), v, 1-13, 1-15, 2-5, 3-1 through 3-4, 3-12, 4-1, 4-4, 4-13 through 4-23, A-1, B-10
other government agency (OGA), 1-3, 1-5, 1-8, 1-24, 3-18, 4-6, 4-9, 4-26, 5-2, 5-7, 5-8, D-6, D-7
overlays, 2-7, 3-13, B-6
P
political, 1-3, 1-9
through 1-11, 1-13, 1-15, 1-16, 1-24, 2-6, 2-7, 3-10 through 3-12, 3-17, 4-4, 4-8, 4-14, 4-15, 4-17, 4-18, 4-22, 4-23, 4-29, 5-1, 5-2, 5-4, 5-7, A-2, A-3, A-6 through A-9, A-12, A-14, A-20, B-3, B-4, B-10 through B-12, C-1 through C-3, D-2
R
refugee, 4-15, 4-18, B-12, C-2
running estimate, ii, iii, v, 3-2 through 3-4, 3-13 through 3-15, 3-18, 3-20, 3-21, 4-4, 4-6, 4-8, 4-10, 4-11, 4-24, 4-30, 4-31, 5-2, B-1 through B-3, B-5, B-14, C-1, C-4
S
S-9, 2-5, 3-15, 3-17,
4-8, 4-29, B-2, B-4, B-6, B-14, B-19, C-1
social, 1-3, 1-9 through
1-11, 1-13 through 1-15, 2-6, 3-10, 3-17, 4-4, 4-15 through 4-18, 4-22, 4-23, 4-29, A-3, A-4, A-12, A-16, A-18, A-20, B-3, B-10, B-11, C-1
synchronization, 1-24,
2-8, 3-2, 4-6, 4-25 through 4-27, 4-33, B-6, D-5
T
termination, 1-8, 1-19,
1-20, 3-18, 4-7, 4-12 through 4-14, 5-1, 5-4, 5-7, 5-8
transfer, 1-8, 1-19, 5-4
through 5-6, A-18, B-13
transition, ii, iii, iv, v,
1-2, 1-3, 1-5, 1-6, 1-8, 1-9, 1-17, 1-19 through 1-21, 3-9, 3-15, 3-18, 4-2, 4-12, 4-33, 5-1 through 5-8, B-5, B-7, B-8, B-15, B-20, D-7
U
unified action, 3-15,
4-26
unity of effort, 1-15,
1-17, 1-23, 1-24, 3-9, 4-6
V
visualization, 3-7, 3-13,
4-6, 4-11
W
war gaming, iii, 1-4,
1-24, 3-2, 3-13 through 3-15, 3-18, 3-21, 4-25 through 4-27, 4-30
warning order
(WARNORD), 2-2, 2-4 through 2-6, 3-3, 3-7, 3-8, 3-19, 3-20, 4-3, 4-11, 4-12, 4-24, 4-34
By order of the Secretary of the Army:
General, United States Army Chief of Staff Official:
Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army
1408006
DISTRIBUTION:
Active Army, Army National Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve: Not to be distributed; electronic media only.