## Civil Network Development And Engagement 6 February 2023

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. FOREIGN DISCLOSURE RESTRICTION (FD1): This learning product has been reviewed by the training developers in coordination with the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School foreign
disclosure officer. This learning product can be used to instruct international military students from all approved
countries without restrictions. This publication supersedes ATP 3-57.30, dated 1 May 2014.

## Headquarters, Department Of The Army


This publication is available
at the Army Publishing Directorate site
(https://armypubs.army.mil/)
and the Central Army Registry site
(https://atiam.train.army.mil/catalog/dashboard).

## Civil Network Development And Engagement Contents

Page

PREFACE........ v

INTRODUCTION ........ vii
Chapter 1
CIVIL NETWORK DEVELOPMENT AND ENGAGEMENT OVERVIEW ........ 1-1
Civil Networks ........ 1-1 Common Features of Civil Networks ........ 1-3 Composition of a Network ........ 1-4 Civil Network Development and Engagement Process ........ 1-5 Integration with Other Core Competencies ........ 1-8 Effects of Civil Networks ........ 1-11 Civil Affairs Staff Integration Requirements ........ 1-11
Chapter 2
CREATE AND EXECUTE A CIVIL NETWORK ENGAGEMENT PLAN ........ 2-1
Civil Network Engagement Plan ........ 2-1 Conduct Civil Network Engagement ........ 2-3
Chapter 3
ANALYSIS OF CIVIL NETWORKS ........ 3-1
Civil Network Analysis Overview ........ 3-1 Civil Network Analytical Methodologies ........ 3-9 Requirements for Civil Network Analysis ........ 3-25 Critical Thinking ........ 3-27 Civil Network Analysis and Civil Considerations ........ 3-29 Constraints ........ 3-37
Chapter 4
DEVELOPING AND EVALUATING CIVIL NETWORKS ........ 4-1
Development of Civil Networks........ 4-1 Evaluate Civil Networks ........ 4-7 Civil Network Development and Evaluation Outputs ........ 4-11
Chapter 5
INTEGRATION OF MOBILIZED CIVIL NETWORKS ........ 5-1
Develop Common Interest ........ 5-1
Civil Network Integration ........ 5-2

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. FOREIGN DISCLOSURE RESTRICTION (FD1): This learning product has been reviewed by the training developers in coordination with the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School foreign disclosure officer. This learning product can be used to instruct international military students from all approved countries without restrictions.

Figure 5-1. Civil network engagement and integration into staff operations ........ 5-10 Figure A-1. Civil reconnaissance tactical mission task and purposes ........A-1 Figure A-2. Civil engagement tactical mission task and purpose ........A-4
Figure A-3. Civil network development tactical mission task and purposes ........A-7 Figure B-1. Interrelationship of PMESII-PT and ASCOPE ........B-1

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## Preface

Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-57.30 provides techniques for Civil Affairs (CA) forces and Army commanders that develop and engage civil networks in order to promote mission command and achieve unified action. This manual discusses how CA forces identify existing or develop new civil networks to integrate information, capabilities, and resources that provide effects within military operations or to civilianled stabilization activities across the competition continuum. CA forces collect civil information, integrate civil knowledge into the Army operations process, and engage and develop civil networks to achieve operational effects that support military objectives. These doctrinal principles are intended to be used as a guide and are not to be considered prescriptive.
This manual describes the framework of civil network development and engagement (CNDE) as a methodology to systematically collect civil data and information through the development of civil networks that enable Civil Affairs operations (CAO). CNDE is foundational to the integration of CAO into the commander's vision and understanding of the civil component of the operational environment (OE). This integration includes mission command, protection, sustainment, and information collection. Moreover, CNDE informs staff planning at all echelons, reduces the need to transport goods or supplies that can be provided by host nation support, and reduces the burden on military units and resources in rear areas to organize civil security and other stability tasks for consolidation of gains and stabilization during crisis and combat. CNDE enables commanders to develop COAs that create measurable effects in the civil component that consolidate gains and create multiple dilemmas for an enemy force or adversary attempting to act and maneuver through that area. Civil networks can provide critical support to Army forces or interfere with the success of the mission. The civil-military operations/interagency cooperation directorate of a joint
staff (J-9); assistant chief of staff, Civil Affairs operations (G-9); battalion or brigade Civil Affairs operations staff officer (S-9); and CA staffs perform civil knowledge integration to plan and execute civil-military integration, which facilitates transitional governance. This support enhances the consolidation of gains and the development of stability-focused operations by echelon throughout the competition continuum and the range of military operations. The principal audience for ATP 3-57.30 is CA Soldiers and leaders that plan, develop, train, mobilize, leverage, interact with, are supported by, and integrate civil networks. This applies to the CA command and CA companies, battalions, brigades, and planning teams. This publication is also applicable to officers and senior noncommissioned officers who lead CA forces or who serve as the G-9 or S-9 on staffs. ATP 3-57.30
provides insight to doctrinally supported commands on how their attached and assigned CA forces enhance the commander's visualization of the OE, promote mission command and unified action, and enable the commander to achieve desired end states. This is achieved through the development of civil networks and the utilization of their resources, capabilities, and capacities.

This publication is also an applicable reference to the civilian leaders of the U.S. interagency. Commanders and staffs of Army headquarters serving as joint task force or multinational headquarters should use this manual to reference how the development and mobilization of civil networks can support operations at all echelons. Trainers and educators throughout the Army also use this manual. Commanders, staffs, and subordinates ensure their decisions and actions comply with applicable U.S., international and, in some cases, host nation laws and regulations. Commanders at all levels ensure their Soldiers operate in accordance with the law of war and the rules of engagement. (See FM 6-27.) ATP 3-57.30 uses joint terms where applicable. Selected joint and Army terms and definitions appear in both the glossary and the text. When such definitions are shown in the text, the term is italicized, and the number of the proponent publication follows the definition.

ATP 3-57.30 applies to the Active Army, the Army National Guard or Army National Guard of the United States, and the United States Army Reserve unless otherwise stated.

The proponent of ATP 3-57.30 is the U.S. Army Special Operations Center of Excellence, U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School. Send comments and recommendations on a DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) to Commander, U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, ATTN: AOJK-CAD, 3004 Ardennes Street, Stop A, Fort Bragg, NC
28310-9610; by email to cadoctrine@socom.mil; or by submitting an electronic DA Form 2028.



## Introduction

Military forces operate with many mission partners to achieve multi-domain operations in unified land operations. The integration of those partnersparticularly civilian groups or individuals that may or may not be organized into identifiable or coherent unit structureswith military operations is a significant challenge for commanders and staffs not used to working with civilian mission partners. CA forces mitigate that challenge by identifying, developing, and integrating civil networks into military plans and operations to achieve unity of effort. These networks extend a commander's operational reach; provide information, capabilities, resources, and capacities that fill identified military gaps; and enable a commander to focus limited military forces and resources against other military objectives within the OE. This is particularly critical during operations to consolidate gains and the execution of stability tasks in rear areas until transfer of those responsibilities to another authority. CA forces contribute to Army and joint operations and fulfil their requirement to achieve unified action by conducting CNDE. This publication illustrates techniques that Army CA forces utilize to establish contact with civil entities to develop civil networks. CA forces coordinate, collaborate, synchronize, and integrate with unified action partners and Army forces to meet the commander's information requirements, end states, and goals.

Chapter 1 provides an overview of CNDE and the impact that civil networks have on the OE and mission planning. It also provides an overview of the primary requirements for coordinating, collaborating, synchronizing, and integrating the resources, capabilities, and capacities of civil networks into Army operations and planning processes at all echelons. Chapter 2 explains how to create and execute a CNDE plan. It discusses the necessary inputs to establish a civil information collection plan. It further outlines the steps needed to execute CNDE and build civil networks. Lastly, it explains outputs necessary for the next step as covered in Chapter 3. Chapter 3 provides a detailed discussion of the analysis of civil networks. It addresses the steps necessary to assess and evaluate identified civil networks to determine their resources, capabilities, and capacities that are leveraged to enhance the commander's mission, consolidate gains, and support minimal-essential stability operations. Chapter 4 explains how to develop and evaluate select civil networks. It further explains how to determine loyalties, develop civil networks, confirm or deny gaps within civil networks, and ensure that their capabilities are executable once mobilized. Additionally, it provides insight into the evaluation of select civil networks based on strengths, vulnerabilities, capabilities, and motivations. Finally, it discusses how this process is responsible for the refinement of the civil information collection plan. Chapter 5 explains how CA forces integrate established and developed civil networks with operations. It discusses the methodology to leverage civil networks to accomplish military tasks for the commander, extend the commander's influence into the civil component, and assist in the achievement of the commander's end states and goals. It further describes the timing and phasing of this integration of mobilized civil networks to best support operations. Finally, it discusses the transfer, transition, or termination of the effects executed by mobilized civil networks based on the outcomes of the military operation. Appendix A provides an overview and discussion on the tactical mission tasks of CA forces. The appendix discusses in detail civil reconnaissance, civil engagement, and civil network development, and it outlines a methodology that explains the execution of each mission. The appendix provides a list of tasks and purposes for CA forces as they conduct missions to provide civil data and information on civil networks. Appendix B provides a listing of operational variables that CA forces will analyze using areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events during the conduct of civil considerations analysis.
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## Chapter 1 Civil Network Development And Engagement Overview

Civil network development and engagement (CNDE) is a foundational core competency for Civil Affairs (CA) forces and affects all other core competencies in the development of civil networks to achieve necessary effects for the commander. Civil networks are key to the commander reaching operational goals and end states. This chapter provides an overview of the primary requirements for coordinating, collaborating, synchronizing, and integrating the capabilities of civil networks into Army operations and planning processes at all echelons.

## Civil Networks

1-1. *Civil network development and engagement* is the activity by which the civil network capabilities and resources are engaged, evaluated, developed, and integrated into operations (FM 3-57). A *civil network* is a collection of formal and informal groups, associations, military engagements, and organizations within an operational environment that interact with each other with varying degrees of frequency, trust, and collaboration (FM 3-57). CA forces develop and engage civil networks to achieve situational understanding, integrate military and civilian capabilities in unified action, and leverage local resources to provide effects that support specific lines of effort (LOEs), end states, and goals of the commander.

1-2. Civil networks enable the commander to conserve combat power, impose multiple dilemmas on enemy forces and adversaries, extend the culmination point of operations, consolidate gains, conduct transitions, and extend influence into the civil component of the operational environment (OE). Ultimately, civil networks
leveraged by CA forcesenhance mission command, enable operations, and promote unified action. CNDE
is the methodology CA forces use to identifyand then leveragethe capabilities, resources, and capacities of civil networks and integrate them into military operations. A benefit of civil networks in the use of proxies to execute civil reconnaissance (CR), civil engagement (CE), and civil network development (CND).

## Types Of Civil Networks

1-3. CA forces engage with formal and informal civil networks in an OE. These civil networks possess within their formal and informal structure information, resources, and capabilities that can be leveraged and mobilized to provide effects that enhance the commander's mission. People associated with or part of these networks use various social media types and methods to communicate information within the network. This can be used to gain further informational understanding of the network and can be used to communicate and synchronize with a developed civil network. Over time, civil networks may or may not evolve from an informal to a formal civil network. They may become more interdependent with other civil networks as common interests or causes increase between different civil networks. Determining if a civil network is informal or formal is critical to understanding how it functions and where the authorities that run the civil network exist. Once CA forces understand which type of civil network they are dealing with, then they can properly categorize the civil network.

1-4. Formal civil networks are usually structured, hierarchical, interdependent, and legally registered or institutionalized, with clearly understood methods or rules with which to conduct business. Examples of formal networks include government agencies, corporate security structures, chambers of commerce, churches, international relief organizations, and student fraternities or sororities.

1-5. Informal civil networks often consist of diverse individuals and entities that share common goals and desires, but do not necessarily have formal or legal ties or dependencies upon the activities of other members of the network. Examples of informal networks within an OE include athletic or social club members, office contact rosters, university alumni groups, a restaurant's regular customers, a businessman's smartphone contact list, vendors at a farmer's market or bazaar, and neighborhood watch groups. CA forces conduct purpose-driven CR, CE, and CND to identify, engage and develop desired civil networks.

## Categories Of Civil Networks

1-6. Civil networks fall into four categories: friendly, neutral, threat, or unknown. Understanding the category into which civil networks fall determines the approach CA forces take to engage, integrate, or isolate certain civil networks with respect to military or civil-military operations (CMO). Figure 1-1 discusses the different categories of civil networks.



## Civil Network Reliability

1-7. CA forces must ensure the reliability of the civil networks that they are developing. The reliability of a network to provide information, capabilities, resources, and capacities is critical to mission success. CA forces rate each civil network on a scale that ranges from reliable to unreliable. In some cases, reliability will be difficult to measure. In these few cases, CA Soldiers deciding on the reliability of a civil network will have to make a judgement based on all the data and information that has been collected on the specific civil network. Much like in the military decision-making process (MDMP), assumptions are made until gaps in specific mission requirements are filled with actionable data.
1-8. Figure 1-2 provides a value-rating system and the criteria to judge each civil network according to the reliability that each civil network provides to the CA force.

## Common Features Of Civil Networks

1-9. There are many common features that make up a civil network. These features include a broad array of elements, foundational components, structures, and features that facilitate adaptability. Civil networks can find viability from various sources and situations that affect the group composing the civil network. When dealing with a civil network in the OE, it is important to realize that they may have some, all, or none of the features of a formal or informal network. CA forces should use caution in applying standard features to a spontaneously developed civil network. These spontaneous civil networks that are developed for a specified or unspecified purpose may not follow the normal motivations of a formal or informal civil network. In some cases, they will contain some of the aspects of formal and informal networks. Understanding the motivations of any civil network is important because these motivations vary greatly for different reasons. Motivations of a particular network help CA forces determine if a civil network should be developed. Motivations change within civil networks as the situations change within the area of operations (AO) and should be monitored at all times. Motivations for the existence of a civil network include


Ideology.

Religion.

Fear and intimidation.

Money.

Power.

Leaders (purpose, direction, motivation).

Members (socialization, identity, opportunity).

Popular support (acceptance, clout).

Operations.

Freedom of movement.

Structure or organization.

Disposition.

Infrastructure.

Logistics.

Communications.

Information and intelligence.

## Composition Of A Network

1-10. The diverse composition of civil networks makes them difficult to comprehend. It is important to understand this composition so that the proper relationship can be assigned to each part of the civil network.

The composition of each civil network falls into one of the following categories: node, critical node, link, or cell. Once the composition of the civil network is identified and categorized, CA forces can begin to understand the structure of the civil network. Figure 1-3 explains and shows the different compositions of a civil network.

## Civil Network Structures

1-11. There are three primary structures of civil networks: hierarchical, nonhierarchical, and blended.

Hierarchical civil networks are designed to have a tiered decision-making structure, a system or organization in which people or groups are ranked above one another according to status or authority. Nonhierarchical civil networks are designed with a decentralized decision-making structure. A blended civil network is a combination of the previous two network structures.
1-12. CA forces can determine the network density through analysis of the number of individual nodes connected in a network relative to the total number of nodes possible. This analysis is general in nature and does not indicate network effectiveness, but it does make networks more difficult to disrupt. Through the development of individual and group relationships within the civil networks with which CA forces interact, a bond of commonality and support for the strategic interests of the U.S. and the military mission may be cultivated.
1-13. Understanding the structure of the civil network enables CA forces to focus attention on the critical leaders, nodes, or capability that must be developed to provide desired effects. CA forces can then leverage these identified parts of the civil network through the development of personal relationships within the civil network. This bonding and building up of confidence in the CA force and civil networks working together makes it more difficult for a threat to disrupt or use the same civil network. This effectively denies critical capabilities, resources, and capacities to threat actors within the AO and disrupts the threat's operations.

## Characteristics Of Adaptive Civil Networks

1-14. All networks within an OE adapt as required to meet their objectiveswhether they are friendly, neutral, or threat. All civil networks possess characteristics that enable them to reach their established goals, end states, and objectives. Understanding these characteristics enables CA forces to leverage the capabilities, resources, or capacities of the civil network to enhance military operations. These characteristics are as follows:


Co-adaptive. The system must continually evolve to survive, and members must adapt to their
changing environment and the forces that counter it. Examples include military and government
entities.

Emergent. Emergence allows collections of individualspotentially unaware of their participation as a member of a networkto behave in unpredictable and intelligent ways as a
system. Examples include insurgencies and social network clubs.

Self-organizing. A system without a central authority or an external element imposing structure
upon it through planning is self-organizing. It is a "bottom-up" developed organization. Examples
include local civic groups, religious organizations, agricultural business organizations, and community networks.

Regenerative. Components are easily replaced within the system. Removal of a single node has minimal impact on the system as a whole. Examples include businesses, essential services,
governance, and manufacturing.

Decentralized (flat). Adaptive threat networks are generally not organized in a bureaucratic or
hierarchal way. In a decentralized system, the capabilities are distributed throughout the system or network. Long-term success against these networks focuses on changing the relationships and links in the networks and severing the links between networks and their smaller cells or nodes. Examples include insurgencies and unconventional and hybrid threats.
Note: ATP 5-0.6 provides additional information on the characteristics of networks.

## Civil Network Development And Engagement Process

1-15. CND is composed of the actions CA forces plan in order to develop, mobilize, and employ the effects of a potential civil network. Civil network engagement (CNE) is the actions taken by CA forces to conduct initial assessments of a civil network. CNE is like CEexcept a CNE can only be done as part of CND. It has a specific task and purpose of accomplishing actions with a civil network for the purpose of development. Figure 1-4, page 1-6, depicts the difference between CND and CNE.

1-16. CNDE is the activity by which the civil network capabilities and resources are engaged, evaluated, develop, and integrated into operations. CA forces conduct CNDE to


Provide commanders with options to detect, disrupt, and defeat threats in the civil component utilizing select civil networks.

Provide commanders with an accurate understanding and visualization of the civil component of the OE.

Enable commanders to extend operational reach into the civil component.

Enable freedom of movement and maneuver.

Manage limited resources.

Identify usable civilian resources.

Preserve combat power.

Assist commanders to shape the OE and produce effects in the civil component.
1-17. CA forces deliberately focus on the development of civil networks to extend the commander's operational reach, create multiple dilemmas for an adversary, support mission goals and end states, and manage finite resources within the AO to conserve military resources and facilitate consolidation of gains. The planning and execution of CNDE enables commanders to develop courses of action (COAs) that create effects in the civil component. Such effects consolidate gains and create multiple dilemmas for an enemy force attempting to act and maneuver through that area. Civil networks also enable commanders to assess the effects of information operations (IO) and other nonlethal actions in the OE. CNDE and its associated tasks are critical functions of Civil Affairs operations (CAO). Supported commanders utilize CA forces to extend command and control influence where it is not normally present or established in order to leverage the civil entities within the operational area and achieve desired end states. CA forces conduct CNDE to enable the operations of the commander.
1-18. When developing and engaging civil networks, CA forces use rigor and diligence to ensure that civil networks are not threatsand do not become threatsto the interests of the U.S. or the civil component.

Constant monitoring of these civil networks is critical to assess changes in motivation and loyalties. As CA forces identify civil networks within the AO, they categorize the civil networks and provide them to the appropriate staff entity. For example, an identified threat network goes to the battalion or brigade intelligence staff officer (S-2), an identified sustainment network goes to the battalion of brigade logistics staff officer
(S-4), and a network that requires targeting goes to the battalion or brigade operations staff officer (S-3) and fires. Figure 1-5 depicts the circular and continuous nature of the six-step CNDE process.

1-19. The common operational picture (COP) becomes clear as civil data is collected, analyzed, and developed into civil information that is focused on operational relevance. Once civil information has been identified, it is further evaluated and refined into civil knowledge. Civil knowledge is incorporated into all Army processes and informs the warfighting functions at all echelons. While there is a step-by-step process designed to engage, develop, and leverage the resulting civil networks, each step can inform and influence any of the other steps to refine and focus the development of civil networks. This civil knowledge then focuses the continuing efforts of CA forces and provides greater focus for the CNE plan.
1-20. The CNE plan and the civil information collection plan are mutually supportingbut are distinctly different in task, purpose, and end states by echelon. The CNE plan is designed to identify civil networks, develop them, and then leverage their capabilities, resources, and capacities in support of the commander's mission. The civil information collection plan is designed to focus the collection of civil information and data. *Information collection* is an activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and employment of sensors and assets as well as the processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations (FM 3-55). The collected civil data and information is analyzed and evaluated to produce civil knowledge.
1-21. Civil knowledge is integrated into the Army planning processes and informs the warfighting functions.

This process of collecting, analyzing, evaluating, and developing civil knowledge for integration is called civil knowledge integration (CKI). For the purposes of this manual, it is critical to understand that they are separate processes. However, they inform and influence each other in that they


Refine the focus of each process on the civil component through the civil information collection plan and the CNE plan.

Synchronize the civil information collection plan and the CNE plan.

Enhance the collaboration with the interagency, indigenous populations and institutions (IPI),
unified action partners, multinational forces, and the U.S. military.

Integrate military efforts with the civil component.

Coordinate the use of finite capabilities, resources, and capacities within the civil component to
support Army operations.
1-22. The CNDE process begins at the highest echelon of the CA force for planning and development. CA
companies and teams execute and collect essential data and information at the tactical level. This is not to say that higher echelons of the CA force structure do not execute higher-level and sensitive civil network requirements. Once the CND plan is finished, the mission requirements are assigned to the appropriate CA
force at all echelons to collect the necessary data and information. Although the CA company does not have the personnel to do detailed analysis and evaluation of collected civil network data and information, they are the primary collection capability of this critical information for commanders. CA companies can


Establish sensors within the civil component that provide early warning and threat actions for the commander.

Provide recommendations on which civil networks can be developed and mobilized.

Identify collected civil data and information and align that data with established LOE, mission
goals, and end states.

Identify possible threat networks.

Locate specific civil networks capabilities, resources, and capacities to establish desired effects.

Prioritize collected civil data and information in accordance with the commander's critical information requirements (CCIRs), priority intelligence requirements (PIRs), and other
information requirements.

Establish initial measures of effectiveness (MOEs) and measures of performance (MOPs) for the
development of a specific civil network.

## Integration With Other Core Competencies

1-23. CNDE is foundational to each of the other CA core competencies: CKI, transitional governance (TG), and civil-military integration (CMI). CA core competencies are mutually reinforcing, interdependent, and designed to address critical operational gaps with capabilities that are not organic to any other Army branch. At each echelon, the ranges of capability and capacity to execute the CA core competencies vary significantly. For example, a CA company or team has limited capability and capacity to augment its own requirements. On the other hand, a CA battalion has greater capability and capacity to augment a company's requirements. In addition, there are further, and more specific, capabilities that reside in the higher echelons of the CA force, such as the functional specialists that can be used to augment missions at lower echelons.

As a result, understanding the capabilities and limitations of CA organizations is helpful in employing CA forces efficiently and effectively. Ultimately, the goal of the execution of the core competencies is to coordinate, integrate, and synchronize the civil component with Army operations to achieve unified action.

Note: Force Management System Web (FMS-WEB) provides current capabilities of various CA elements at each echelon.

## Transitional Governance

1-24. TG is essential for maintaining stability in periods of competition, promoting resilience in periods of crisis, and assuring continuity of governance during armed conflict. *Transitional governance* is the actions taken to assure appropriate control and continuity of government functions throughout the range of military operations (FM 3-57). CNDE is critical to TG through the development of specific civil networks that have the ability to enhance, enable, synchronize, collaborate, and integrate governance capacity and capabilities. These civil networks can be identified, evaluated, developed, and maintained during large-scale combat operations and throughout the competition continuum at all levels of war. Once these networks are identified, vetted, and mobilized, they provide necessary effects that support the commander's goals and end states. This enables the commander to use military resources, capabilities, and capacities in other areas within the AO.

These can be used to achieve minimal stability tasks, government functions until proper civil authorities can resume control. Using the capabilities, resources, and capacities of the civil network extends the influence of the commander and preserves combat power for future operations.

## Civil Knowledge Integration

1-25. *Civil knowledge integration* is the actions taken to analyze, evaluate, and organize collected civil information for operational relevance and informing the warfighting functions (FM 3-57). The resulting civil knowledge is integrated with other knowledge about the OE to create shared understanding among commanders, unified action partners, international organizations, and civilian partners. Before, during, and after large-scale ground combat, CA forces neutralize or disrupt adversaries by leveraging civil networks, resources, capabilities, and relevant populations.
1-26. The civil data and information on civil networks derived from CNDE, and the civil knowledge derived by the CKI process, enable the situational understanding of the OE for the commander and staff. Civil knowledge enables the commander to visualize the battlefield, integrate planning, and increase the lethality of the unit through the targeting processes.

1-27. CKI and CNDE enhance, parallel, and complement each other. The CNDE-focused outcome is the development and mobilization of civil networks to support the commander's mission. CKI is the result of analyzed information being integrated within the civil component and military operations. These two processes are executed simultaneously and inform each other with pertinent civil information. They also help to refine and focus the civil information collection plan and the CND plan. The outcomes from both of these processes help CA forces to focus CR, CE, and CND more efficiently. This refinement also determines the best use of finite CA force structure to accomplish both internal mission requirements for CA forces by echelon and any mission requirements established in the operations order of the supported command.

1-28. CA forces use CKI primarily to inform, focus, and direct CAO and CMO at all echelons. Integrated civil knowledge enables the commander's understanding of the OE and informs the COP. This civil knowledge must be actionable, relevant, accurate, and reliable to enable the decision making of the commander. Figure 1-6. Page 1-10, shows the steps of the CKI process. The integration of civil knowledge is accomplished through Army integrating processes:


Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB).

Civil preparation of the battlefield (CPB).

Targeting.

Information collecting.

Knowledge management.

Risk management.
1-29. CA units also use this information as inputs to the CNDE process to refine information requirements and to shape branches, sequels, and other future missions. CNDE provides inputs into the CKI process that help to refine and focus the civil information collection plan. This helps to identify specific civil networks that can fill gaps or requirements identified during operational planning and the collection of civil information and data. These specific civil networks enable CAO to be conducted effectively and efficiently.
1-30. If no CAO staff are assigned to the supported unit, the commander of the CA element (as allocated by echelon) is required to fulfill the role of CAO staff officerwhile maintaining the command relationship with the CA unit. Each CA unit, at each echelon, is required to ensure the command receives CAO staff support. These commanders also ensure that the civil integration process is conducted, and civil knowledge is integrated into Army processes at every echelon.

## Civil-Military Integration

1-31. *Civil-military integration* is the actions taken to establish, maintain, influence, or leverage relations between military forces and indigenous populations and institutions to synchronize, coordinate, and enable interorganizational cooperation and to achieve unified action (FM 3-57). CMI is essential to effective integration of operations with subordinate commanders and unified action partners to achieve unity of effort. The establishment of a civil-military operations center (CMOC), or other mechanisms, enables civil information sharing and integration. CNDE is critical to CMI through the development of civil networks that can be leveraged to synchronize, coordinate, and enable interorganizational cooperation within an AO to achieve unity of effort. These civil networks are specifically identified and developed to coordinate, disseminate, and produce informational products that can synchronize efforts between civilian entities and military forces within a given geographical area. These efforts help inform the IPI, reduce risk to the populace and gain maneuverability, consolidate gains, preserve combat power, and enable mission command.

## Effects Of Civil Networks

1-32. The primary CA mission that is vital to all operations is the ability to develop and mobilize civil networks to provide required effects within the civil component based on the commander's stated mission and desired end states. These effects, by mobilized civil networks, are designed to provide multiple dilemmas for enemy forces and adversaries within an AO. Land operations disrupt routine life patterns of civilians who can dramatically impact military operations. It is critical for CA forces to be involved in the planning, development, and execution of appropriate civil controls. These civil controls protect civilians throughout military operations, reduce civilian casualties during consolidation of gains, and mitigate civilian interference in military operations during large-scale combat operations.
1-33. Civil networks that are properly identified, evaluated, and mobilized can provide desired and measurable effects within the civil component of the OE. Such effects support, enhance, and synchronize the COA chosen by the commander and developed by the staff. The outcomes are assessed and evaluated to determine if they are accomplishing the desired intent of the commander.
1-34. CA forces interact with the civil component of the OE. This increasingly places their interactions in dense urban environments, cyberspace, and the information environment. CA forces must understand the environments frequented by civilians and how to enable commanders to monitor and produce effects in those environments. Developed and mobilized civil networks within dense urban areas enable CA forces to conduct CAO and provide necessary effects that support the commander's LOEs. These LOEs can provide populace and resources control (PRC), infrastructure repairs, minimal stability tasks, and TG. These actions ultimately enable the commander to preserve combat power, manage limited resources, provide freedom of maneuver, and shape the OE to meet mission requirements.

## Civil Affairs Staff Integration Requirements

1-35. CA forces execute CNDE, CKI, TG, and CMI to enhance the understanding of the OE, visualization of the battlefield, and decision making of the commander and staff so that they may accomplish missions and achieve unified action. In the absence of an integrated CA staff, CA forces assigned by echelon are required to conduct the CAO planning and capabilities integration. The staff integrates this civil knowledge (using CKI)
into the Army planning processes, updates all staff estimates, and informs the warfighting functions. Civil networks can provide tremendous amounts of civil data and information that inform gaps in CPB, IPB, and other knowledge-integrating processes. Using the outputs of CNDE, the staff informs the commander, develops COAs, updates the COP, and develops branches and sequels to current or future operations.

1-36. The commander's intent links the mission, concept of operations (CONOPS), and tasks to subordinate units. CAO staff integrates the capabilities of supporting CA forces into the operations plan to support the intent of the commander. CAO staff also integrate civil knowledge gained through CNDE, CKI, and CMI into the operational planning cycle of the commander all the way through execution of CKI. Paragraph 3 (Execution) of Annex K (Civil Affairs Operations) (see FM 6-0) to the operation plan of the supported command addresses the CAO scheme of support and subordinate unit tasks. Paragraph 3 of Annex K also coordinates instructions that CA and other Army forces execute to accomplish the commander's intent. The execution paragraph outlines what the supported commander wants CAO to achieve in support of the mission.

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## Chapter 2 Create And Execute A Civil Network Engagement Plan

CA forces are CNE focused. CA forces engage populations, institutions, government apparatus, and unified action partners that reside or operate in and around an AO to establish and maintain relationships and communications channels in order to develop comprehensive situational understanding, integrate civil capabilities and information, and enable unity of effort in pursuit of stability. The CNE plan leads to civil networks that can be leveraged and mobilized toward that end. Their information, resources, capabilities, and capacities can then support civil and military LOEs, end states, and goals across the competition continuum. The execution of CNDE enables commanders to develop COAs that create effects in the civil component that consolidate gains and create multiple dilemmas for an enemy force attempting to act and maneuver through that area. Civil networks specifically developed to enable governance and government functions enhance the commander's ability to build stability within the AO. Civil networks also enable commanders to assess the effects of IO, battle damage assessments, and other nonlethal actions in the OE.

## Civil Network Engagement Plan

 The CNE plan organizes CA capabilities to address civil information requirements and civil resource requirements (including host nation [HN] or foreign nation support) through interaction and integration with civil networks for current or future operations in specific geographic areas. The development of a CNE plan initiates the CNDE process. This engagement plan is critical to the effectiveness of the CNDE processas well as the outputs that CA forces want to achieve that ultimately enable the commander, staff, and overarching mission requirements.
 The plan is developed at the highest level possible and then is refined and nested at echelon to the lowest levels of execution within the CA force structure. The goal is to create specific effects within the civil component of the OE. These effects are established and enabled by mobilized civil networks that have been developed and vetted through this process. Through the development and execution of the engagement plan, CA forces gain civil data and information that ultimately is transformed into civil knowledge that informs the MDMP. These outputs inform the commander and staff about the civil component, identify gaps in reporting requirements, and further refine the focus of the CNE plan.

## Creation Of A Civil Network Engagement Plan

 The CNE plan is created at the highest echelons of command. Once the strategic interests of the United States Government (USG) are established, codified, and then incorporated into each theater campaign plan, the CAO staff at that echelon begins to establish and refine the CNE plan. Ultimately, this plan is nested by echelon down to the lowest tactical element responsible for execution. There are requirements at each echelon for multiple actions concerning the civil networks that have to be identified, created, evaluated, leveraged, and mobilized based on mission requirements. The CNE plan must be nested with the theater campaign plan and the strategic interests of the USG.

 The elements or personnel that execute the plan at each echelon are determined based on the level of civil knowledge required by the mission of the higher command, the type of network being developed, or the sensitivity that is associated with a given civil network. A task and purpose are assigned to the CA force that executes the assigned CNE plan. In some cases, aspects of the CND are executed at a higher echelon because of rank, position, risk, resources, capabilities, or capacities that require greater experience, knowledge, skill, or position to develop, enhance, and leverage the specific civil network. For example, foreign national resources could be used to facilitate Army operations within a region and enhance the strategic interests of the USG. An agreement with a country or entity is normally worked out at the theater command level or higher. It requires a level of CA expertise, management, or knowledge that lower echelons of CA forces typically do not have available to them. Therefore, the development of a civil network to manage and assist the use of these resources happens at a higher echelon of the CA force.

## Inputs

 The inputs for the creation of the CNE plan vary greatly. As the plan is being executed, further refinement of the plan occurs as civil data and information are collected and transformed into civil knowledge. This civil knowledge confirms, denies, or clarifies known gaps in the CA running estimate, in the CCIR, or in other staff estimates that require additional information to be more accurate. At each echelon, as further civil knowledge is achieved, the plan is refined and developed to accurately assign responsibility, clarify requirements, provide feedback, and expand the understanding and visualization of the COP. This refinement helps to focus limited CA resources, capabilities, and force structure on the critical requirements within the civil component established by the commander. Some of the inputs to the creation of the CNE
plan include


Strategic interests of the USG as discussed through the whole-of-government approach.

Requirements established by the theater campaign plan.

CCIR, PIR, or other information-related requirements.

Area studies previously done regarding an AO.

Assessments, information, or surveys from other CA forces.

Operations orders, plans, and executive orders from higher commands.

Requests for information from the Department of State or other government agencies.

Civil data or information collected by CA forces within a specific AO.

Civil data given to CA forces from the IPI, unified action partners, or interagency personnel or entities.

Civil data collected from international organizations working within an AO.

Information requests from other staff entities by echelon that have gaps in critical information concerning the civil component of the OE.

Requirements from HN entities that request support through TG, stability, or other capacityrelated issues.
 Other inputs include


Mission analysis.

Gaps in predeployment assessments and information databases.

Commander's intent.

PIR of supported and CA unit commanders.

Planned branches and sequels to combat operations, including consolidation activities and
transition of governance activities to civil authorities.

After action reviews (AARs).
 Once all the civil inputs have been identified, the CAO staff at the highest echelons develops the CNE
plan. This process parallels the MDMP and begins the refinement of collected civil information. The CAO
staff analyzes and evaluates the civil information and transforms it into civil knowledge. By following the MDMP, they are then able to develop mission statements and requirements for CA forces at each echelon, adjacent CA components, and requests for information to the higher headquarters based on the mission analysis.

 Step one of the CNDE process closely corresponds with the Plan activity of the operations process.

Steps two through six correspond to the Execute activity of the operations process. Assessment is continuous throughout all steps and is part of the overall assessment activity of the operations process. Although
figure 1-5, page 1-7, portrays a cyclical CNDE process, all steps may be executed simultaneously.
 CA forces (including individuals and teams) identify individuals, organizations, and existing networks of people who are able to provide civil information, produce desired effects, or fulfill resource requirements in the OE. CA forces are trained and required to develop new (or engage existing) civil networks within the civil populations, government and nongovernment organizations (NGOs), the private sector, unified action partners, and others who reside or conduct business in and around the immediate AO.

## Outputs

 The outputs of this step include a developed CNE plan and a mission order or CONOPs that directs targeted CR, CE, and CND at all echelons. The outputs also answer all information resource requirements and civil network identifications in an area study. The final outputs from this step are initial assessments, deliberate assessments, and surveys conducted to identify civil networks and to confirm critical civil information concerning these civil networks. Other outputs include updates to the CA running estimate, additional mission tasks identified to be executed, purpose, objectives, effects, MOPs, and MOEs.

 The CNE plan focuses CA elements on the development of civil networks in their AO. The plan may request data on specific civil networks, the development of a certain civil network capability, or the identification of which civil networks are in the AO. The CNE plan is derived from the most current and accurate civil knowledge provide by the analysis of civil considerations, latest CA assessments, updated civil affairs area study, CA running estimate, and other staff inputs that have developed the current COP. The G-
9 is responsible for the development of the CNE plan and coordinates with the assistant chief of staff, operations (G-3) for tasking subordinate units within the command to execute the plan. The outputs of this step include the following:


A developed CNE plan.

A mission order or CONOPS that directs targeted CR, CE, and CND that answer all information
resource requirements, civil information gaps, CCIR, and targeting identification.

Confirmation of civil network identifications in an area study.

Updates to initial or deliberate assessments and surveys of identified civil networks to confirm current civil information.

Updates to the CA running estimate.

Identification of additional mission tasks to be executed.

Stated purpose and objectives for the CNE plan.

Identification of effects available within the AO.

Established MOPs regarding civil networks.

Established MOEs regarding civil networks.

AARs regarding the CNE plan.
 CA forces work with other information advantage capabilities to plan, prepare, execute, and assess the civil component of the OE to include communication activities. CNDE is one of the processes used by CA forces to understand and shape the information environment. This shaping is designed to create effects in the cognitive dimension that support decision dominance and freedom of action.

## Conduct Civil Network Engagement

 Once the CNE plan has been created, subordinate CA elements are assigned mission orders to execute required CR, CE, and CND to begin the identification and development of required civil networks. CA forces conduct CAO throughout the operational area to collect the necessary civil data and information to be compiled and sent back through the appropriate commands by echelon. This data is analyzed, evaluated, and processed into civil knowledge. It is critical for CA forces to task organize for each mission with necessary capabilities that have the relevant subject-matter expertise to locate, assess, develop, or engage identified resources, capabilities, or capacities. These capabilities are functional specialists, engineers, military police, medical, or other experts that are required to collect the appropriate civil data.

## Inputs To Civil Network Engagement

 The inputs to this step include constructing or updating the CNE plan based on the following:


Planned and targeted activities for engagements and information reporting requirements, such as

CCIR.

PIR.

Friendly force information requirements.

Named areas of interest.

Targeted areas of interest.

CONOPS for CR, CE, and CND.

An assessment crosswalk of

Task.

Purpose.

Objectives.

Effects.

MOPs.

MOEs.
 These inputs include civil network information and possible answers to information requirements in order to better understand and assess the OE, increase build partner capacity, enable unity of effort, enhance freedom of action, and disrupt threats. CA forces must integrate, collaborate, and synchronize with other information advantage capabilities, unified action partners, HN entities, and sensitive activities to achieve the commander's LOE and desired effects and to enable unified action. The tactical mission tasks of CR, CE, and CND enable CA forces to conduct required missions to attain the necessary civil data and information that begin the development and engagement of civil networks to support the mission goals of the commander.

## Civil Reconnaissance

 CA forces conduct CR across time and space in response to specific information requirements of the OE. This enhances the situational understanding and decision making of the supported commanders. CR is a targeted, planned, and coordinated observation and evaluation of specific civil factors in the OE. CR strives to consider the human, physical, and information dimensions of the OE. CR is conducted systematically over time to observe certain civil factors using


Routine engagement.

Patterned civil observance.

Active, passive, and virtual sensors.

Unmanned aircraft or vehicle.

Other means to support assessments, MOPs, and MOEs.

## Civil Engagement

 CA forces conduct deliberate or spontaneous CE with individuals or entities. CE is more effective when there is continuity between different CA elements and USG entities in the same AO. CE is critical to CNDE because the civil data and information collected during CE is analyzed, converted into civil knowledge, and integrated into the CNDE processes. CE is designed to


Establish or build relationships.

Understand, promote, or enhance capability.

Understand and create stability.

Gather, confirm, or deny information related to subversive efforts and threats within the civil
component.

Foster legitimacy or promote cooperation and unified action.
 *Civil engagement* is a targeted, planned, and coordinated meeting with known or potential contacts in a civil network that is designed to develop or maintain relationships and to share or collect information
(FM 3-57). There may be times when CEs are ad hoc or spontaneousas with chance meetings with new members of a potential or existing network. However, these meetings are also conducted according to a planned and rehearsed format designed to build relationships; enable partners and increase stability; collect, confirm, or deny information; foster legitimacy; and promote cooperation and unified action.
 CA forces may conduct CE in conjunction with maneuver unit patrols, hold unified action partner meetings with local leaders, or conduct IO unit polls and surveys in the virtual, physical, and cognitive dimensions. As an investment of resources, CE is critical to fully understanding the multiple players and changing conditions in an OE. It also preserves combat power by enabling military forces to tap into civilian resources that otherwise go unnoticed or underutilized. Through targeted engagement, those civil network resources are mobilized to action in support of U.S. military objectives.

## Civil Network Development

 CND requires detailed planning prior to the engagement of a civil network. It is critical for CA forces to systematically review their AO and begin to collect the civil data on all networks that might be available for the execution of certain effects. This planning flows directly into the CNE itself and helps provide a focus of the engagement when CA forces conduct the mission to assess the civil networks identified in the planning. CND is a tactical mission task and is explained in detail in Appendix A.

 CNDE fills a gap when networks required to meet mission requirements do not exist or are inadequate for the task and purpose. The most effective means of conducting CND is in person. Other means of conducting CND are acceptable depending on the authorities and the permissions granted. CA forces conduct CND to promote the relationship between military forces and the civil component and to develop partner civil networks. CND is primarily actioned under the core competency of CNDE, but it is also integral to TG and CMI. It enables CA forces to fulfill their role of engaging and leveraging the civil component of the OE while enhancing, enabling, or providing governance.

## Outputs From The Execution Of The Civil Network Engagement

 Once the required mission orders have been completed at each echelon, the civil data and information is reported to the CA force higher headquarters for compilation and forwarding to the originating headquarters. The CAO staff at each echelon collects necessary civil data and information from these reports to build the COP and inform other staff at their level. Using the CKI process, the CAO staff at each echelon determines the level of importance of the civil knowledge gained and then integrates that civil knowledge into the planning processes, staff updates, and critical information requirements of the commander.
 Critical outputs from the execution of the CNE plan


Update CKI.

Update civil data and information that feeds into the analysis of civil networks.

Update staff running estimates.

Inform Army planning processes (targeting, intelligence, supply), and warfighting functions.

Inform the COP and provide civil inputs to CPB.

Identify existing civil networks or determine if a new network must be developed.

Identify gaps in the civil component that help refine the civil information collection plan.

Confirm or deny the capability, resources, or capacities of existing civil networks.

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## Chapter 3 Analysis Of Civil Networks

CA forces analyze civil network informationwhich is gained through CR, CE, and CNDto have an improved understanding of the strengths, vulnerabilities, capabilities, and motivations of local civil networks. Through this analysis, commanders can better understand which civil networks in their AO are friendly, neutral, or hostile in nature. This detailed analysis and mapping of the civil networks allows commanders to decide which networks to engage with and which networks to develop. The analysis of civil network information also provides center of gravity (COG) analysis and enables more effective targeting. Ultimately, the results of this analysis determine which civil networks are identified to be developed and further analyzed for use in supporting the commander's LOE, mission end states, and goals.

## Civil Network Analysis Overview

3-1. CA forces must possess an understanding of relevant analysis methodologies related to civil networks to properly conduct the analysis, evaluation, and development of those networks. This results in the effective use of network-provided information, resources, capabilities, and capacities to support the commander's mission. CA forces leverage multiple types of information, reporting, analysis, and network-related products to bring clarity to the analysis of civil networks. This expertise by CA forces provides commanders with an understanding of complex networks that reside within the AO. Some sources of information that CA forces can use include


Open-source reporting.

Publicly available information.

Intelligence reporting.

USG databases.

Combat information.

Input from tactical unit leaders regarding their personal interactions with the populace during
day-to-day operations.

Partner military forces.

HN governmental organizations.
3-2. *Civil network analysis* is a process that identifies and analyzes the relative importance and influence of nodes within a civil network through network visualizations and qualitative and quantitative analytical methods (FM 3-57). This analysis is based upon six elements. These elements are exercised through the previously described network engagement activities. Although these functions are listed sequentially, these actions occur continuously and simultaneously:


Understand the mission.

Understand the OE.

Understand the networks.

Organize for network engagement.

Engage the networks.

Assess effects on networks.

## Understand The Mission

3-3. Understanding the mission and the commander's intent are key to setting parameters and focus for civil network analysis (CNA). CNA conducted by the CAO staff provides civil knowledge that enables and informs detailed network engagement planning to achieve tactical, operational, and strategic desired end states. In a complex OE, leaders at the lowest level understand the commander's intent for each echelon. It begins with the orders or initial guidance of the higher commander and is part of the MDMP.
3-4. Commanders and staff at all levels are required to support strategic level objectives through the effective and efficient use of diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments. In addition to understanding their mission, commanders and staff should understand the mission of other organizations in an OE and how those organizations relate to various elements. Not every group, organization, or network is bound by a common mission. Understanding the missions, purposes, causes, or binding relationships of the groups being analyzed facilitates understanding of how individuals, groups, and subgroupsas well as the infrastructures they rely uponare connected from a networked perspective. Figure 3-1 displays the mission analysis key inputs and outputs; figure 3-2 depicts an overview of the MDMP.

3-5. CNE activities vary in terms of the mix of offense, defense, and stability tasks. Stability tasks are tasks conducted as part of operations outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power. Their purpose is to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment and to provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. Stability operations tasks should occur frequently within the theater; commanders must integrate and synchronize stability activities within each major operation or campaign phase in order to conclude operations successfully.
ADP 3-07 provides additional information on stability operations.


3-6. Staffs support the commander in understanding, visualizing, and describing an OE, to include the characteristics related to network engagement in their planning. OE analysis also serves as the foundation for more detailed planning, including COA development and the production of plans and orders using the MDMP.

Figures 3-3 and 3-4 depict common Army processes used to understand the civil component of the OE.
3-7. For network engagement purposes, OE analysis defines and describes the networks within an OE and provides an understanding of the conditions that allowed the friendly, neutral, and threat networks to form. Understanding an OE through the lens of civil considerations influences the COA analysis and the execution of operations. Moreover, it helps commanders to understand the level of tolerance or support the population has for HN governance and insurgent, or threat network, activities.

3-8. As significant changes within an OE occur, staffs may choose to use Army design methodology to address these changes quickly. Army design methodology entails framing an OE, framing a problem, and developing an operational approach to solve the problem. Army design methodology results in an improved understanding of an OE, a problem statement, initial commander's intent, and an operational approach that serves as the link between conceptual and detailed planning. It serves as the foundation for more detailed planningincluding COA development and the production of plans and orders using the MDMP. FM 6-0
and ATP 5-0.1 provide more information on Army design methodology and MDMP.

## Understand The Civil Networks

3-9. Understanding the position of a civil network in regard to U.S. objectives allows it to be categorized as friendly, neutral, or threat, and to subsequently map the network picture. When the position of a group is unknown, it is placed in a fourth category: unknown civil networks. A comprehensive understanding of a civil network's relationships within the AO is gained through continuous analysis and the sharing of reports on the COP. Understanding the specific civil networks requires information and intelligence sharing across unified action partners and facilitates a whole of government approach.
3-10. To understand civil networks, commanders and staffs must determine whether the civil network is a deliberate structure or a network depiction of a portion of an OE. Formal civil networks require understanding of the basis for development and the conditions that allowed their formation. This is accomplished by understanding the


Catalyst. The condition or variable that brought individuals together to act.

Receptive audience. A group of individuals that feel they have more to gain by engaging in the
activities of the network than by not participating.

Accommodating environment. Conditions within an OE that facilitate the organization and
actions of a network.
3-11. Network depictions of groups require an understanding of the relationships between entities;
conditions that drive ideology, beliefs, and opinions; conditions that affect daily life; and the infrastructures that are depended upon. The CAO staff analyzes and evaluates geospatial conditions, political dynamics, social and local dynamics, and other civil considerations to better understand the civil networks in an OE. This is primarily done through an analysis of operational variables and civil considerations.

3-12. Operational variables describe the military aspects of an OE and the population's influence on it. Joint doctrine identifies the operational variables as political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure (PMESII). U.S. Army doctrine adds two variables to the joint variables, physical environment and time (PT), to make PMESII-PT. Civil considerations are analyzed and developed from civil knowledge with use of the framework of areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events (ASCOPE)
within the civil component of the commander's OE. Used together, a PMESII/ASCOPE crosswalk is used to collate civil data.

## Organize For Civil Network Engagement

3-13. A significant challenge related to CNE activities is developing situational understanding and unity of effort among a diverse range of organizations and actors found within an OE. Situational understanding and unity of effort facilitate the building of the friendly network. The G-3 or S-3 leads the process of collecting, consolidating, and correlating input from all the sections. The intelligence staff section and CA staff sections possess unique capabilities to analyze the civil component of the OE. The intelligence staff focuses on threats, and the CAO staff focuses on the civil considerations within the OE. Other staff entitiessuch as the IO section, military information support operations staff section, public affairs staff, CMO staff section, and the fire support sectionare primary contributors to the process.
3-14. CNE activities should include using the CMOC as a means of synchronization, coordination, and collaboration for the unified partners and civil entities that compose the joint task force and are represented or present within the AO. A CMOC is an organization normally composed of CA forces. Its purpose is to plan and facilitate coordination of military operations of the Armed Forces of the United States with IPI, the private sector, intergovernmental organizations, NGOs, multinational forces, and other governmental agencies in support of the joint force commander. The information gained through this coordination and collaboration assists the joint task force in understanding an OE and the networks in an OE. The CMOC is a standing capability formed by all CA unitsfrom the company to the CA commandwith capabilities that increase with each echelon.
3-15. Network engagement requires proper organizational structure and integration of all available organic or external assets when deploying into an AO. An *area of operations* is an operational area defined by the joint force commander for land and maritime forces that should be large enough to accomplish their missions and protect their forces (JP 3-0). Enablers available to the commander may be organic, deployed within theater, or available through reachback. Current and future operations require commanders to incorporate unique and specialized unified action partner capabilities into their staffsuch as law enforcement professionals, CA or other special operations forces, and other government agencies. Coordinated reachback support is available, along with HN coalition, national and international government agencies, and unified action partner capabilities.
3-16. At division and above, the commander employs working groups to plan, prepare, execute, and assess network engagement activities and to apply adjustments based on assessments. A *working group* is a grouping of predetermined staff representatives who meet to provide analysis, coordinate, and provide recommendations for a particular purpose or function (FM 6-0). CA forces should seek participation in IO
working groups. Based on the complementary nature of CNE and IO, commanders may leverage CA forces and staff with the already established IO working group to coordinate CNE activities. Commanders and staffs organize for CNE, in part, by establishing unity of effort among diverse members of the unified action partners as depicted in figure 3-5.

## Engage The Civil Networks

3-17. Commanders and staffs should plan to engage all networks within their AO. Engaging civil networks involves actions to support and influence friendly and neutral civil networks and their supporting systems. It also includes actions to influence, disrupt, defeat, and neutralize threat networks and their supporting systems.
3-18. Each civil network may require a unique engagement strategy. Depending on the phase of the operation, commanders and staffs select, prioritize, and match effective means of supporting and influencing friendly and neutral civil networks, as well as influencing and neutralizing threat networks. Commanders and staffs determine the desired effects on those networks; predict primary, secondary, and tertiary effects; and utilize lethal and nonlethal means to achieve the commander's desired end state. When engaging a civil network, commanders and staffs should be aware of how activity directed toward one network affects another network. Units gain situational understanding during CNE by integrating joint and combined capabilities with their actions. They do so while conducting information collection and performing essential stability tasks.
3-19. Commanders and staffs invest significant time and effort to determine indirect approaches to affect civil networks. They accomplish indirect neutralization of threat networks by directly supporting and influencing friendly and neutral networks. For example, in addition to directly neutralizing a threat network by conducting counter-threat finance operations, the staff can plan economic development programs to support and influence friendly and neutral networks. The resulting support and influence have the effect of strengthening the economy, which indirectly increases the degree to which the threat network is neutralized.

This particular approach to CNE is called integrated financial operations. Staffs have capabilities to apply similar CNE approaches combining complementary direct and indirect operations through missions such as stability activities and IO. Paragraph 3-5 discusses stability operations in further detail.

## Assess The Effects On Civil Networks

3-20. Assessment is a continuous process of monitoring and evaluating the situation within an OE and measuring the progress of an operation toward achieving the commander's objectives. Assessment applies to each activity related to network engagementmeasuring the extent to which it achieves desired effects.

Assessment also applies to the overall objectives for creating the desired end state. Assessing CNE activities may have immediate results but may have to be monitored for an extended period to determine if the outcome was successful. Commanders and staffs should integrate CNE considerations into all the tools that support assessment: the operation order, the COP, personal observations, running estimates, and the assessment plan.

3-21. CNE activities are conducted to support mission success, and they should be tracked to continually assess the degree to which they are supporting achievement of the commander's desired end state. The commander's desired end state should address or imply how civil networks should be changed between the current state of an OE and the desired end state. This guides the CAO staff in recommending the types of CNE activities that yield the desired effects. The CAO staff needs to understand how those effects change the behavior, structure, and activity of the civil networkfrom the onset of the activity through the desired end state so they can measure overall progress toward that end state with assessments.

3-22. District stability framework (DSF) was formerly known as the tactical conflict assessment planning framework. It was designed to help tactical commanders and their staffs identify the root causes of instability, develop activities to diminish or mitigate them, and evaluate the effectiveness of the activities in fostering stability at the tactical level (provincial or local). The DSF should be used to create local stabilization plans and provide data for the interagency conflict assessment framework, which has a strategic and operational level (country or regional) focus. See FM 3-07 for more information on DSF.

3-23. At division level and above, commanders and staffs may use the DSF, but they are sometimes best served by using the interagency conflict assessment framework. This framework was designed to guide the collection of information and enable unity of understanding among USG departments and agencies. This process helps all entities to understand and apply solutions to the dynamics and mitigating factors of violent conflict in a country.

3-24. CNE planning, DSF, and interagency conflict assessment framework are mutually reinforcing because they share many concepts, such as core grievances, societal patterns, motivations of key actors, and windows of vulnerability and opportunity.
3-25. The assessment process provides several tools and opportunities for theater and below units to track individual CNE activities, as well as overall progress toward the desired end state of CNE.

## Civil Network Analytical Methodologies

3-26. CNA is an analytical technique that identifies and analyzes the relative importance and influence of nodes within a civil network through network visualizations and qualitative and quantitative analytical methods. CA forces and staff conduct CNA by utilizing multiple methods of network analysis, which include


Organization mapping.

Nodal analysis.

Network function analysis.

Critical factors analysis (CFA).

Network template analysis.

Link analysis.

Social network analysis.
Note: When using civil network analytical methodologies, cultural aspects of gender should be factored into the analysis.

3-27. CNA breaks through social nuances and cultural barriers to enhance situational understanding and support the commander's visualization. When civil networks are analyzed, the civil information collected reveals factors in the civil component of the OE that provide commanders with a focal point for CAO. At tactical and operational levels, CNDE analysis supports the operations process by identifying critical civil networks, civil considerations, and centers of gravity during the MDMP (for example, mission analysis and COA development).

3-28. Throughout the operations process, commanders develop and improve their understanding of problems within an OE. To achieve understanding of relevant networks, the commander and staff leverage multiple types of information, reporting, analysis, and network-related products. The staff continually collects and analyzes information from a variety of sources. These include open-source and intelligence reports, civil information, combat information, and input from tactical unit leaders regarding their personal interactions with the populace during day-to-day operations. This granular level of information is necessary to understand the networks more completely within an OE. If analyzed thoroughly, it leads to a high-level of understanding of the interrelationships between friendly, threat, and neutral networks. Ultimately, the purpose of collection, interpretation, and analysis of information is to illuminate relationships within the networks being engaged.

Figure 3-6, page 3-10, provides an example overview of the CNA process.

3-29. As part of the integrated staff process, each staff element must focus on the relevant aspects of an OE
as they pertain to their warfighting function and mission variables. An integrated staff effort can effectively determine how the interactions of friendly forces, enemy forces, and indigenous populations affect each otheras well as their effect on friendly force operational outcomes. Integrated staff processessupported by broad network analysis products and collaborationare requirements for successfully engaging networks to shape an OE. These analytical techniques are nonsequential, and product development often occurs simultaneously, with outputs from one product incrementally impacting the development of adjacent products. Figure 3-7 depicts the analytic methods that support network engagement.
3-30. A staff conducting analysis for network engagement incorporates information from all staff sections.

This includes CPB products, IPB products, staff estimates, and integrating friendly and neutral network analysis to increase understanding of the network elements within an OE. The additional methods discussed below can be utilized by the staff to increase understanding of specific networks and to provide the commander with friendly, neutral, and threat critical vulnerabilities that can be engaged by the unit. Organizational mapping enables the unit to better understand itself: its strengths, weaknesses, capabilities, and gaps. Commanders can leverage organizational mapping to better understand the force and its connections and to facilitate mission command. This understanding guides the commander's decision making related to network engagement.
Note: ATP 2-33.4 provides additional information on analytical fundamentals.
3-31. CA forces collate, process, analyze, and disseminate this civil network information for integration into targeting and operations planning. Through CKI, the CAO staff integrates this information into the operations process to increase the commander's and staff's understanding of the OE and to further refine options for the commander to extend command influence or to produce desired effects in the civil component of the OE.

## Organization Mapping

3-32. Organizational mapping provides information to enable commanders to better organize their force, while mitigating risk, to engage networks more efficiently and effectivelyultimately enabling success. The unit must know not only the enemy, but also itself, in order to succeed. This applies to network engagement operations and specifically pertains to the fourth element of CNA: organize for network engagement. In order to organize for network engagement, the unit needs to knowat a minimumits strengths, weaknesses, gaps, and resources available. Put simply, organizational mapping is using network analysis methods to better understand one's own organization.
3-33. Organizational mapping can be applied in various ways. To mitigate risk, units identify


Key strengths, weaknesses, and gaps, including critical vulnerabilities.

Key personnel for disseminating information, as these often hold a network together.

Key personnel with specific knowledge, skills, abilities, or experiences.
3-34. Regardless of the specific application, the common theme of organizational mapping is that the unit can function more effectively when it understands itself. While the process should remain somewhat flexible, some basic steps that are often involved are


Define data requirements for mission analysis.

Collect, sort, and aggregate data considering relationships for future analysis.

Apply social network analysis (discussed late in this chapter).

Develop products, to include reports and visualizations.

Assess findings.

Provide impact of findings.

Implement and sustain the desired task organization to support mission requirements.

Monitor progress as part of the unit's assessment plan.
3-35. Achieving unified action is often challenging, in part, because diverse organizations have varying timelines, goals, authorities, and priorities. Organizational mapping can help mitigate these challenges. For example, organizational mapping enables the Army division serving as a joint task force during a deployment to form a well-functioning team by mapping organizations and their capabilities to mission requirements. This is a complex requirement because, even within the U.S. interagency, there are a broad array of agencies and capabilities associated with operations. Counter-threat finance, for example, would potentially require the involvement of the Department of Justice, Department of Treasury, Central Intelligence Agency, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and others. Commanders and staffs would need to understand the roles of these agencies to understand which agencies needed to be involved in counter-threat finance operations for a specific theater during a specific time period.
Note: This technique is used by CA forces during CAO to understand civil organizations that CA forces might work with to establish effects within the AO.

3-36.  Organizational mapping can also be understood in terms of personal or social interaction between members of the unit and interactions of unit members with those outside their unit. Templates, link diagrams, and social network analysis can all be applied to better understand our own organizations. For example, social network analysis gives leaders insight into who in the unit has strong social network measures, revealing informal leaders of the unit. Additionally, although it can be beneficial to analyze a network independently, it is often insightful to analyze these networks as a larger whole to better understand how they relate to one another. Understanding who in a unit has links to personnel within a HN government or security agency may indicate a member who can more easily adapt and succeed in a liaison officer role with that agency. If this disparate data is not collected and analyzed, these insights may not be realized.

3-37. When CA forces understand a civil network and its internal organization, they are better equipped to develop that civil network to execute desired effects. Organizational mapping enables more effective civil engagements and shaping operations. The basic steps involved in organizational mapping, as listed in paragraph 3-33, are only a guide. These steps can and should be modified and altered for each requirement.

Organizations that make the effort gain insights into their own strengths, weaknesses, gaps, and resources available. They also gain a deeper understanding of key personnel who function as reliable information conduits or who tie together various networks. CA forces identify key personnel or groups with important knowledge, skills, and abilities that can provide critical information concerning the civil network. This increased awareness and understanding enables the unit to plan and engage more effectively with friendly, neutral, and threat networks. Figure 3-8 describes the inputs and outputs of organizational mapping.

## Nodal Analysis

3-38. Nodal analysis is the study of the interrelationship of nodes. Nodal analysis reveals the interrelationship between people, organizations, entities, and locations. The individual nodes represent complex relationships between a person, place, or physical thing that are fundamental components of a system and link the behavioral, physical, or functional relationships between the nodes. Critical nodes are those identified as being essential and whose disruption or removal becomes a single trend analysis point failure. JP 5-0 contains additional information on this subject.

3-39. Trend analysis is a continuous analytical process that identifies patterns or societal behaviors in response to enemy and friendly operations over a period of time. Typically, trend analysis is the compilation of several system analytical products, reflecting changes in a temporal view and giving analysts a glimpse into the future.
3-40. Nodal analysis essentially brings systems analysis and link analysis together. Figure 3-9 shows the relationship between the two types of analysis.

## Association Matrix

3-41. During CAO, the association matrix is a good tool for mapping the relationships between key leaders, organizations, and events. This information assists in the planning and execution of CAO. A known association is determined by direct contact between individuals. Direct contact is determined by several factors, including face-to-face meetings of all members of a particular organizational cell. CA forces should remember that an association matrix, as the one depicted in figure 3-10, shows only the existence of these linkages and relationships, not the nature of the relationships.

3-42. Suspected associations are associations that are considered possible, or even probable, but cannot be confirmed using the above criteria. The rationale for depicting suspected associations is to get as close as possible to an objective analytic solution while not straying from known or confirmed facts. Another reason for depicting suspected associations is that it gives the CNDE analyst a focus for requests for information to confirm the suspected association. An association opportunity is an association that can be derived from this analysis and depicts possible associations that can be used to help develop civil networks for various reasons. These relationships can be leveraged to accomplish more comprehensive effects within the civil environment. These associations can be developed to assist the commander in achieving mission goals. The CNDE analyst continually works to corroborate information and confirm suspected associations. Examples of suspected associations include the following:


Groups identified through CND.

A key leader engagement in which one party can be identified but the other party can only be tentatively identified.

A new group of people identifying with different ethnicities.

A political party affiliation.

A family relation.
3-43. When corroborating suspected information, the CNDE analyst should remember that information sources are not limited to official sources. Local television, radio, newspapers, and online news sources are all excellent examples of the different kinds of information available. The association matrix is constructed in the form of an equilateral triangle, having the same number of rows and columns. Individuals listed within the association matrix must be listed in exactly the same order in relationship to both the rows and names listed along the diagonal side of the matrix. If the sequence is changed, then the proper associations are not established.

Note: In the event that a person of interest is (or becomes) deceased, a diamond is drawn next to the individual's name on the matrix. The purpose of the association matrix is to analyze the individuals within a network and their relationship to each other.

## Activities Matrix

3-44. The activities matrix determines connections between individuals, organizations, events, entities, addresses, activities, or anything other than another person. The activities matrix is a rectangular array of personalities compared against activities, locations, events, or other appropriate information. The kind and quantity of data that is available to the analyst determines the number of rows and columns and the content. The CNDE analyst may tailor the matrix to fit the needs of the problem at hand or may add to it as the problem expands in scope.

3-45. The activities matrix is constructed with personalities arranged vertically on the left. Events, activities, organizations, addresses, and capabilities are arranged along the bottom of the matrix. Figure 3-11 provides an example of an activities matrix. The activities matrix identifies internal and external activities, external ties, and links revealing motivational factors.

3-46. As in the association matrix, the activities matrix shows confirmed or strong associations between individuals and entities with a solid circle or dot, while suspected or weak associations are illustrated by an open circle. By using matrices, the analyst can pinpoint the optimal targets for further intelligence collection, identify key personalities within an organization, and considerably increase the understanding of an organization and its structure. Matrices can be used to present briefings and evidence or to store information in a concise and understandable manner within a database. Matrices do not replace standard reporting procedures or standard database files.

## Network Function Analysis

3-47. The network functions model provides a framework that depicts the various functions constituting the network: people, groups, events, command and control entities, elements, positions, and so on. Network function analysis is the examination of dynamic, multilink relationships characterized by varying degrees of complexity and uncertainty. Whereas hierarchical organizations have a formal leadership structure, day-to-day operations are typically accomplished by an informal network that leverages personal social ties.

Terrorist and other irregular threat organizations are often cellular and distributed, and they may or may not have ties to "official" organizational leadership. Part of the difficulty in countering these types of organizations understanding how they evolve, change, and adapt to military operations. It is critical for CA
forces to understand how they can be destabilized or supported to achieve specific objects or effects established by the commander. Network function analysis is informed by analysis of an OE and by input from all staff elements.
3-48. The improvised civil network functions model in figure 3-12, page 3-18, depicts civil network functions, activities, and specific critical capabilities that the network must perform to continue functioning effectively. Models of this type support functional analysis, which is based on the premise that certain functions must be performed by any network to bring about mission accomplishment. In this example of a civil network functions model, the parts cell must perform such functions as establishing a production site and enlisting a knowledgeable parts designer in order to successfully construct and employ a vehicle system that can support entities conducting stability functions. Network models portray the network's basic functions and capabilities and can be produced based on general or foundational information about an OE and the networks. This civil network functions model analysis is primarily focused on civil network functions (above the line) and its potential positive impact on governmental stability functions (below the line). Function model analysis can also be conducted on threat networks.

3-49. The staff develops the network functions model by identifying the structure and flow of major network functions (such as providing components, funds, and subject-matter expert support) that the network must be able to perform to remain effective. These essential network functions can be labeled critical capabilities and are an important consideration when conducting COG analysis or CFA.
3-50. Figure 3-13, page 3-19, depicts an example of a civil influence network.

## Critical Factors Analysis

3-51. CFA enables the staff to identify critical networks vulnerabilities based on analyzing the network's critical capabilities and critical requirements. CFA assists in identifying centers of gravity, critical capacity, critical requirements, and critical vulnerabilities. Definitions for these critical elements are as follows:


A *center of gravity* is the source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or the will to act (JP 5-0).

A *critical capability* is a means that is considered a crucial enabler for a center of gravity to
function as such and is essential to the accomplishment of the specified or assumed objective(s) (JP 5-0).

A *critical requirement* is an essential condition, resource, and means for a critical capability to be
fully operational (JP 5-0).

A *critical vulnerability* is an aspect of a critical requirement which is deficient or vulnerable to
direct or indirect attack that will create decisive or significant effects (JP 5-0).
3-52. As the staff develops in-depth understanding of network functions and critical capabilities, it applies that knowledge to conduct CFA. This method enables the staff to identify critical network vulnerabilities by analyzing the network's critical capabilities and critical requirements. A refined CFA provides the staff with detailed understanding of network critical functions and vulnerabilities. CFA assists the staff in providing the commander with when, where, why, and how those critical factors are vulnerable to network engagement activities. The steps of the CFA process are described as follows:


Step one of the network engagement CFA process, which is also part of the CPB process, is to develop initial understanding of an OE and to identify the objective of the network being analyzed.
Although many units apply this process solely to threat or adversary networks, significant value can be realized by using these analytical methods on friendly and neutral networks.

Step two identifies the network objective's critical capabilities through functional decomposition of the networks within a given OE. It considers friendly, neutral, and threat networks. This activity
is supported by network function analysis and the network functions model.

Step three identifies the network objective's critical requirements. These critical requirements act
as a list of more detailed factors needed to accomplish the critical capability.

Step four identifies the network-specific activities that are needed to accomplish those critical requirements. These specific activities can represent, with even more detail, what is needed to accomplish a critical requirement.

Step five involves analyzing specific activities to determine critical vulnerabilities within a given network function being considered. Critical vulnerabilities represent methods for exploiting or
removing specific activities so that a critical requirement cannot be accomplished.

Step six considers friendly element actions that can be recommended to the commander to either
mitigate friendly critical vulnerabilities or exploit threat critical vulnerabilities that are identified.
3-53. The CFA process outlined here aids the staff during the COA development and COA wargaming phases of the MDMP and may also inform higher level COG analysis. Because not all critical vulnerabilities represent the same level of vulnerability to the system, thorough planning and COA analysis must be used to determine the appropriate friendly element actions to take and what resources to apply to them. Identifying and recording critical capabilities, critical requirements, and critical vulnerabilities maps a series of points that a commander can engage to achieve operational goals.
3-54. Analysis of these network activities often provide insights that are beneficial to the intelligence and operations staff in the information collection management effort. Specifically, development of both observable and signature indicators of these activities often increases relevant and timely information collection, deepens network situational understanding, and brings clarity to defining and maintaining a coherent assessment plan. In general, the commander must possess sufficient operational reach and combat power, or other relevant capabilities, to take advantage of a network's critical vulnerabilities while protecting friendly critical capabilities. Figure 3-14 provides an example of a civil network using CFA. It provides the six steps of CFA and the outputs of this analysis to the staff integrating processes. JP 5-0 provides additional general information regarding CFA.

## Network Template Analysis

3-55. Network templates are derived from CFA and are useful products to support COA development and refinement. Network templates provide visualization of the sequence of events for the network critical requirements. The staff applies the sequence of events to the terrain as the locations of the events become known. In this way, developing and refining network templates provides understanding of what the network is doing, and in what order. It also supports an understanding of where the network is doing it.
3-56. A list of specific activities can be developed during CFA, and further refined concurrently with the development and refinement of the network templates. During the refinement of critical requirements, the analyst visualizes and carefully considers the specific activities required to complete the critical requirement.

As the network templates are refined to reflect network functions that occur in time and space, a network's critical vulnerabilities may be revealed for engagement.

3-57. In the context of network engagement, link diagrams visually depict who is doing what to whom (or for whom). The emphasis is on identifying individual members or cells of the network and their role or function within that network. Data, information, and intelligence to support link diagram development come from a variety of sources. For example, CA and other elements of a staff may find it useful to produce link diagrams for elements of the friendly and neutral networks. The staff can then incorporate these products into a comprehensive network diagram that supports a deeper understanding of the complexity within their OE.
3-58. Nodal relationships are key information from the link diagram that is used to enhance previous analyses; they often provide a starting point for future analysis. When building link diagrams, the analyst should attempt to depict a more robust and realistic representation of an OE by including a variety of node classes and types. Networks that use more than one node class (agents, locations, events, organizations, resources, and so on) are known as multimode networks. A group of networks is known as a meta-network. Building a link diagram using these rules supports multimode network construction. This directly supports step four, social network analysis, of meta-network analysis. It also supports a staff's requirement to organize data to support distributed operations. The inner workings of the network are better understood by analyzing both the critical capabilities in the network functions model and the node relationships in the link diagram.
3-59. In addition to providing an understanding of the dynamics behind the current OE conditions, the link diagram also provides insight as to how node relationships may be altered to achieve the conditions envisioned by the commander articulated in their desired end state. For example, studying the node relationships depicted in the link diagram provides some understanding of why and how nodes interact.
3-60. Understanding how the neutral, friendly, and threat networks are connected can be beneficial in identifying potentially corrupt officials or insider threats. It can also support assessment of how targeting affects those relationships and the network as a whole. These efforts are enhanced by building networks to a common standard across the staff and by incorporating these qualitative diagrams into a quantitative singlemode social network. Assessment of the impacts of targeting can then be measured and incorporated into a staff's assessment plan, thereby offering the commander additional information to support decision making.
3-61. When mission planning, time, and information permit, conducting network and link analysis at tactical, operational, and strategic levels enables staffs at all echelons to develop a COP of the networks within an OE. Figure 3-15 shows an example of a network template analysis. Figure 3-16, page 2-34, provides an example of link analysis.

## Social Network Analysis

3-62. Social network analysis quantitatively measures the importance and influence of nodes (people, organizations, events, and other like relationships) within a civil network. This analysis methodology looks at individual network-level measures and subnetwork measures that are interrelated. Individual network level measures include


Betweenness. This measures the extent to which a node is key to connecting otherwise
unconnected nodes (essential and/or vulnerable).

Closeness. This measures the average number of steps from one node to every other node in the
network (measured in degrees).

Degree. This measures the number of direct links a node has to other nodes in the network (popularity contest, social network friend count).

Eigenvector. This identifies high-degree nodes connected to other high-degree nodes (influencers
connected to influencers).
3-63. Subnetworks are groups within a broader network that are more connected to each other than to other parts of the network. Subgroups may represent functional parts of a network or network division. Figure 3-17, page 3-26, depicts social network analysis.

3-64. Analysis of networks assists in establishing civil security, establishing civil control, restoring essential services, and supporting governance and economic development. This analysis is nonsequential and often occurs simultaneously. It also provides the commander with friendly, neutral, and threat critical vulnerabilities that can be engaged by CA forces by echelon. These include


Information inputs, including publicly available information, CA information, USG databases,
and input from tactical leaders.

Inputs and outputs of the six CNA methodologies (organization mapping, network functions analysis, critical factors analysis, network template analysis, link analysis, and social network analysis).

Qualitative versus quantitative analysis.

Individual network-level measures (betweenness, closeness, degree, eigenvector).

## Requirements For Civil Network Analysis

3-65. CA forces conduct analysis of civil networks to enable operations and to achieve unified action throughout Army missions. As this analysis is being conducted at each echelon, certain requirements must be identified and incorporated into the MDMP as the development of civil networks continues. Primarily, CA staffs are looking at the existing and likely civil networks for capabilities, resources, and capacities that can enable the commander's mission. CNDE analysts must be critical thinkers and problem solvers who are familiar with different problem-solving methods to uncover the unknown unknowns. Examples of different analytical methods are as follows:


Critical thinking.

Logic.

Reasoning types.

Hypothesis formation.

Comparative analysis.

Scientific method.
3-66. Analysis of civil networks is performed to support the operations process. The operations process refers to the phases of planning, preparation, execution, and assessment of military operations. Planning cycles and the established battle rhythm dictate the type of CNA necessary to support operations. While analyzing civil networks, the CAO staff usually creates more questions than answers and generates several requests for information. CAO staff conducting analysis of civil networks should plan to respond to requests for information in a timely, accurate manner. These requests for information help to focus and direct the civil information collection plan and the CNE plan.

3-67. CNA combines the civil considerations of operational and mission variables provided by CA forces and the analysis of these variables by the assistant chief of staff, intelligence (G-2), or S-2. This combination provides a complete and detailed COP for the commander. The outcomes of CNA enable the commander in the development of COAs with desired effects that are measurable and facilitate military operations.

## Critical Thinking

3-68. Critical thinking is the foundation of analysis. Critical thinking is purposeful, reflective judgment focused on what to believe or what to do. Essential to problem solving, critical thinking involves forming a hypothesis by applying logic and reasoning to determine if adequate justification exists to support conclusions. Critical thinkers often reevaluate their work to ensure accuracy and relevancy.

3-69. CA forces may be inclined to develop conclusions based on personal experience. However, experience is subjective and may lead to flawed conclusions. Unbiased knowledge should be the basis for critical thinking. In addition, when it is combined with experience, unbiased knowledge greatly enhances CNDE analysis. Objectivity should drive critical thinking and be the cornerstone for CNDE analysis. ADP 5-0 and ADP 6-0 provide more information on critical thinking and planning.

3-70. A foundational requirement for critical thinking is the use of logic. Logic is the study of reason or rationalization of the causes of a situation. Logic involves both inductive and deductive reasoning. Logical reasoning is only as effective as the information under analysis. The use of logic during critical thinking provides a systematic process to analyze data and deduce what that data is providing to the user.

## Reasoning Types

3-71. Two types of reasoning are


Inductive reasoning. Inductive reasoning (factual assumptions) develops logical conclusions
based on similar criteria. Inductive reasoning is based on the concept that what is perceived to be true is true; however, the possibility exists that the findings may be false. For example, all reporting from CA forces on the island of Basilan, Philippines, indicates every village assessed is
Muslim. Therefore, inductive reasoning would dictate that all the villages on Basilan are Muslim when, in fact, they are not.

Deductive reasoning. Deductive reasoning is based on a series of facts that form a natural
conclusion. Deductive reasoning is not based on assumptions. For example, the provincial reconstruction team in Ghazni, Afghanistan, reports increased NGO activity across their AO. CA
teams operating in the same area report NGOs distributing humanitarian aid from United Nations
marked vehicles. Therefore, deductive reasoning dictates that the NGOs are working with the United Nations. The analysis of this civil information is deductive reasoning and forms the basis for trend analysis.

## Forming A Hypothesis

3-72. A hypothesis is an educated guess based on known facts and logical assumptions. While conducting CNA, CAO staff form hypotheses to provide explanations for problems that they intend to prove through further analysis. During CNA, developing a hypothesis involves understanding the problem and formulating solutions. Much like conducting an operational crosswalk, the hypothesis identifies the central issue (the problem) and an appropriate CAO response (the solution) to achieve the desired end state (commander's visualization) through an established LOE (the approach). When problem solving, it is a good practice for CA staffs conducting CNA to develop more than one hypothesis or to develop variations to the supporting arguments for comparative analysis. A sound hypothesis


Is clear and concise.

Reflects a position that the analyst is taking.

Is arguable and has an opposing argument.

Can be tested.

## Comparative Analysis

3-73. Comparison provides CA forces with the opportunity to find shortcomings in the supporting arguments. CAO staff conducting CNA often find that the best COA is not a single COAbut rather the combination of several different COAs. When conducting CNA, it is important for the CAO staff to define opposing arguments and maintain objectivity throughout the analytical process. One civil network may be able to meet the commander's requirements over another that is similar in design based on capabilities, resources, or capacities. Comparisons of these civil networks focus on


Test results.

Objectivity.

Simplicity.

## Scientific Method

3-74. The scientific method is a process that is used to acquire, confirm, or make changes to knowledge. It is a series of steps that identifies and solves problems. Although the scientific method follows a six-step process, new information or a change in thought may cause the CA staff conducting CNA to repeat steps as often as necessary.

## Step One: Define The Problem

3-75. The most difficult step in applying the scientific method to CNA is defining the problem. However, the nature of systems analysis is to precisely define the problem. The challenge is quite simple: we do not know what we do not know. Once the problem is defined, it must be stated in such a way that observation or experimentation can provide an answer without preconceptions or bias.

## Step Two: Gather Data

3-76. CA forces at all echelons must gather all available civil data and information relating to the problem and identify civil networks that may support the commander's requirements. For the CA staff conducting CNA, this generally includes reviewing historical databases or data files, as well as current reporting on the defined problem and existing civil networks.

## Step Three: Form A Hypothesis

3-77. Based on a review of gathered civil data and information, the CAO staff conducting CNA develops a hypothesis that provides a tentative explanation of the problem and makes an educated guess at how to solve the defined problem identified in step one. The hypothesis must be focused on providing a solution that is feasible. It must also be based on the commander's requirements, as well as the capabilities, resources, and capacities of identified civil networks. The hypothesis may present new problems, demanding additional research, collection requirements, and analysis.

## Step Four: Test The Hypothesis

3-78. The CAO staff tests the hypothesis by confirming or rejecting it through evaluation and investigation of identified civil networks and a review of their capabilities, resources, and capacities. The CAO staff conducting CNA uses various methods to investigate the identified hypothesis. These methods include


Pattern analysis, based on time and events.

Link analysis.

Research.

Trends.

## Step Five: Draw A Conclusion

3-79. When formulating a conclusion, the CAO staff must be unbiased. The CAO staff formulates conclusions by reviewing available facts, as well as considering relevant and reasonable assumptions, when analyzing a hypothesis. If the facts and assumptions do not support the hypothesis, a new hypothesis must be formed and investigated. This analysis is critical to align the proper civil network to the proper LOE established by the commander.

## Step Six: Communicate Results

3-80. Analytical results may be reported in several different ways. The most effective way is to answer information requirements through clear and concise statements in detailed assessments relating to the effects of each COA, and then conduct the supporting briefings. Each of these communication vehicles is centered on the analytical findings of the situation and is based on available data. Analytical results are not just a compilation of facts. They are a combination of facts and findings that either confirm or refute the hypothesis.

When presenting analytical results, CA Soldiers must explain what they know and why they know it, what they think and why they think it, as well as what they do not know and what they are doing about it. In doing so, they provide a clear, concise, and unbiased framework for the commander to conduct an independent analysis of the situation.
3-81. In addition to answering specific requests for information, CA forces and staff must anticipate the needs of the commander and staff. In addition to enabling the operations process, CA forces should continually look at all civil networks within the OE. Although CNA should be focused on specific mission sets, CA forces should also continually consider other civil networks that may not be pertinent to the current operational forces yet still possess the ability to impact CAO in the future. CA forces should analyze these civil networks as they plan for branches and sequels to the current operation. Civil networks that may not be leveraged now may be leveraged during other phases of the operation or as necessary based on changes in the civil component of the OE.

Note: The products that are produced will be tailored to the specific command by echelon.

## Civil Network Analysis And Civil Considerations

3-82. Different mission requirements at different echelons call for different types of analysis. For example, CNA conducted during the planning and execution of tactical operations is focused on civil considerations and how they apply to identified capabilities, resources, and capacities within existing civil networks. In contrast, CNA at operational and theater strategic levels focuses more on the systems approach. All CA forces and staff should be familiar with the different civil analytical models and their relationship to


Mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations, and informational considerations. (METT-TC [I]).

PMESII-PT.

ASCOPE.
3-83. Understanding METT-TC (I), PMESII-PT, and ASCOPE maximizes the accuracy and relevancy of CNA at each echelon. The following is a list of different types of analysis:


Civil considerations analysis. Civil considerations analysis is conducted in support of mission
analysis based on the mission variables outlined in the memory aid METT-TC (I).

Systems analysis. Systems analysis is conducted at operational levels and above to identify COGs
based in the operational variables outlined in the memory aid PMESII-PT.

Geospatial analysis. Geospatial analysis is the analyzing of imagery and geospatial information
to describe, assess, and visually depict physical features and geographically referenced activities that are of interest to the support commander.

Nodal analysis. Nodal analysis is the study of the interrelationship of nodes. This analysis
specifically looks at individual and group associations.

Trend analysis. Trend analysis identifies patterns and inclinations in data. This analysis focuses
on trends within a specific civil network or group.

Link analysis. Link analysis illustrates the interrelationship of people, events, and locations
through associations. This analysis focuses on these interrelationships to build effective civil networks.
3-84. Most CNA falls into either civil consideration analysis or systems analysis. Both processes exercise simple logic and employ inductive and deductive reasoning. Civil considerations analysis is performed to measure how civil considerations impact operations. Systems analysis is performed to define the physical or behavioral state of the operational variables within the environment. Figure 3-18 shows the relationship of operational variables and mission variables, specifically the impact of civil considerations on the operational variables. Figure 3-19 shows the relationship between METT-TC (I) and ASCOPE.

## Civil Network's Impact On Civil Consideration

3-85. During mission analysis, the commander and staff ensure that they understand the OE, which includes the analysis of threat and civil considerations within an OA. The combination of this analysis results in the development of a COP. Mission analysis focuses on the mission variables of METT-TC (I) that directly affect the mission. Civil considerations analysis is the "C" in METT-TC (I). *Civil considerations* are influence of manmade infrastructure, civilian institutions, and attitudes and activities of the civilian leaders, populations, and organizations within an area of operations on the conduct of military operations (ADP 6-0). This analysis is the process by which civil information is evaluated to determine the impact of the civil environment on operations, as well as the impact of operations on the civil component. CNA affects the analysis of the civil consideration by providing the data and information necessary to incorporate civil networks into the operations. The PMESII-PT/ASCOPE crosswalk is used to categorize civil networks against the types of information, capability, resources, or capacity they can provide to support mission requirements. Civil networks that can be binned in multiple categories may be considered more valuable for engagement as they represent the potential satisfaction of multiple mission requirements at any given time.

3-86. During mission analysis, identifying civil considerations as they apply to civil networks within the OE
is a fundamental requirement in all operations. However, identifying the secondary and tertiary effects from operations on these networks is just as important. CA forces and staff identify strengths, vulnerabilities, capabilities, and motivations of the civil networks within their AO. These civil networks should then be assessed on how to best leverage their information, capabilities, resources, and capacities to enable the commander's mission requirements and end states. CA forces are best suited to identify, assess, evaluate, and mobilize these civil networks to support Army operations, and to identify unforeseen consequences of military operations that can affect these civil networks. During CNA, CA forces provide critical guidance to the commander and staff that


Identifies pertinent civil networks that may support mission objectives.

Determines the need to develop a nonexisting civil network for a specific purpose.

Identifies gaps in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance planning.

Updates CCIRs and PIRs.

Refines and focuses the CPB, civil information collection plan, and CNE plan.

Identifies critical civil network information, resources, capabilities, and capacities.

Enables the mapping of the OE with regard to the civil component.

Informs the operations process.

Informs CA and other staff running estimates.

Informs the commander and staff enabling visualization of the battlefield.

Informs the COP.

Continuously refines the operational plan.

Develops branches and sequels to current and future operations.
3-87. Civil networks, viewed through PMESII-PT, are broken down into specific groupings of raw data.

When categorized by the mnemonic ASCOPE, the data is further divided and lends itself to detailed analysis of the identified civil network. The PMESII-PT/ASCOPE analytical paradigm provides CA Soldiers with a tool to identify specific factors and conditions that affect the OE. Appendix B details an example of civil analysis using the PMESII-PT/ASCOPE analytical paradigm.

## Systems Analysis Of Civil Networks

3-88. Systems analysis identifies the root cause of instability. The cause of instability may be war, insurgency, disasters, non-state actors, or any instability arising from conflict or changes in the status quo of the IPI. Systems analysis identifies the civil network's strengths, weaknesses, and vulnerabilities within the civil component by determining both the cause and the effect. Systems analysis defines the civil network's COG and enhances situational understanding concerning the civil networks within the AO. Systems analysis is conducted based on operational necessity, and the products reflect a single moment in time. These outputs reflect the capabilities, resources, and capacities of existing networks that may be leveraged to support operations.

3-89. Systems analysis closely follows the scientific method. It focuses on evaluating operational variables against civil considerations and is based on the PMESII-PT/ASCOPE analytical paradigm. It is important to remember that the purpose of all civil analysis is to facilitate operations. CAO focus on civil networks that possess critical capabilities, resources, and capacities that can support any established LOE. During largescale combat operations, systems analysis focuses more on the civil networks that help with limiting civil interference on operations. It guards against damage to the IPI, and it plans for transitional operations and consolidation of gains. During stability tasks, systems analysis focuses more on identifying civil networks that can be leveraged to increase stability and consolidate gains within the AO. Civil networks can provide additional strength to stability planning by identifying civil strengths, weaknesses, and vulnerabilities within the civil component, which enables the commander to focus finite resources effectively to promote stability. In both instances, the operational focus helps frame the problem and reveals which civil network may be best suited to resolve mission requirements with oversight from CA forces. Figure 3-18 depicts the operational variables and mission variables.

## Framing The Problem

3-90. Systems analysis begins with framing the problem. Framing the problem is an analytical process.

During this phase of CNA, it is necessary to identify the problem, facts, and assumptions about the civil network and determine if there is enough information available to conduct detailed CNA of the existing civil networks to support a solution to the requirements. Additionally, if there is not a civil network available to meet necessary requirements, CA forces and staff should determine if civil networks should be established. Framing the problem creates requests for information to source additional information that drives the civil information collection plan and the CND plan. These requests for information help to focus and refine collection efforts. Effective problem framing focuses on the


Visualization of the commander.

Enhancement of situational understanding.

Development of facts and assumptions.

## Filtering The Data

3-91. Once the mission requirements have been effectively framed, it is then necessary to gather all relevant civil information together and identify any information gaps concerning the civil networks. Information gaps are voids in understanding concerning civil networks that must be filled to conduct accurate analysis and subsequent evaluation. Once identified, these gaps become requests for information. Filtering the civil data and information is accomplished by addressing areas of influence to the commander in their order of significance. Filtering data focuses analytical efforts within a specific area and greatly reduces the analytical workload. Properly filtered civil data and information concerning specific civil networks ensure that specific capabilities, resources, and capacities can be properly aligned to support the commander's LOE and mission end states and goals.

3-92. In addition to meeting operational requirements, proper analysis of civil networks assists in the updating of the CAO running estimate and the writing of the CAO annex. CA forces must anticipate the needs of the commander and staff so that civil networks can be properly aligned to any critical need within the command at all echelons. Therefore, CA forces should continually look at all civil networks and aspects of the OE. CA forces should continually assess civil networks within the OE that possess the ability to impact CAO and provide capabilities, resources, and capacity to enable the commander's mission. This continual assessment by CA forces ensures loyalties have not changed, and that capabilities, resources, or capacities that can impact the civil network's ability to execute determined requirements have not been degraded.

## Evaluation Of Civil Networks

3-93. In the CNDE process, evaluation is taking analyzed information and determining the value, nature, character, or quality of civil networks. This evaluation of the civil networks aligns the civil network capabilities, resources, and capacities with the requirements of the commander. Evaluation of the analyzed civil networks results in forming conclusions from validated data that are the basis of understanding civil considerations. Such conclusions enable planning, execution, and assessment of operations. Evaluation provides situational awareness about operational conditions which decision makers synthesize with operational requirements, commander's guidance, and direction from higher to achieve situational understanding. Confirming civil considerations in relation to civil networks during evaluation is key to mission success.
3-94. Situational understanding, drawn from analyzed civil networks, provides the basis for timely and effective decision making. This evaluation enables the commander to visualize the OE, make effective decisions, develop proper COAs, and effectively use finite resources within the command. Evaluation of civil networks also enables the development of effective CMO plans. Chapter 4 discusses the evaluation of civil networks in detail. Regardless of the type of analysis used, the CA forces and staff must evaluate the products to validate the postanalytical information and form conclusions.

## Geospatial Evaluation And Civil Networks

3-95. Geospatial evaluation is conducted by mapping civil networks against the operational variables
(PMESII-PT), current conditions (situations), and mission requirements. When civil networks are broken down by operational variables, each variable can be used independently of the others to determine specific indicators of interests, functions, capabilities, and vulnerabilities. These variables can help identify civil network strengths, vulnerabilities, capabilities, and motivations that, in turn, help determine how these civil networks can be leveraged, protected, or neutralized within the AO. When stacked together, these individual variables, or layers, identify complex relationships and reveal how these networks interact with the OE. Geospatial analysis, therefore, improves understanding of the information, capabilities, resources, and capacities provided by civil networks. For example, if a road map was overlaid with one layer showing battledamaged areas; another layer showing a nearby network with access to road-building material, expertise, and equipment; and another layer showing a network with access to local manpower available for manual labor, a solution to repair a vital economic corridor is easily identified. Geospatial analysis


Significantly contributes to anticipating, estimating, and warning of possible future events.

Supports the MDMP.

Provides the foundation for developing shared situational awareness.

Produces geospatial information on geographic information system products.

Improves understanding of civil networks capabilities, resources, and capacities.

Describes the civil environment.

Facilitates staff analysis of the OE.

Supports situational understanding.

Enables well-informed decision making.
3-96. Although geospatial evaluation suggests the use of geographic information system, geospatial analysis can be performed with nothing more than a base map and layers of acetate. The concept of geospatial evaluation is essentially applying the fundamentals of nodal analysis to geographic information to reveal both the cause and effect of social instability and which civil networks might be best suited to prevent, reestablish, or affect these causes of social instability.

## Civil Considerations Overlay

3-97. After analysis and evaluation are complete, civil considerations overlays are used to graphically depict civil considerations in the OE and the civil networks that exist within the OE. The overlay should be clear and concise and capture the entire operational area. It can also depict the information as incorporated in the civil information collection plan and CND plan. In addition to identifying the ASCOPE variables, some other considerations may include


Governance. This overlay identifies facilities that impact the AO and the civil networks involved in stability operations, governance, or government operations.

Traffic flow. This overlay identifies main thoroughfares for vehicular, rail, and water traffic to
determine the impact on military operations and the civil networks that may control them.

Commodity flow. This overlay identifies the manner in which goods are brought to market and
the civil networks that affect that flow.

Essential services. This overlay identifies potential single points of failure in power facilities,
water sources, sewer, mass communication (broadcasting, publishing, and internet) sources, and
bridges. It also identifies other potential civil strengths, weaknesses, and vulnerabilities that, if damaged, may potentially create a humanitarian crisis. It includes the civil networks that effect these essential services.

Population density. This overlay identifies how many people per square mile are in the AO.

Ethnic overlays. This overlay identifies ethnic boundaries and cultural calendars. It also identifies
significant events that may take place during the operation that would necessitate different interpreters or further CNA.

Energy. This overly identifies the most important energy resources and raw materials within the
AO. In addition, it identifies strengths and vulnerabilities of these resources.

Civil supply. This overlay identifies supply chains, food, staples, and material shortages.
Note: ADP 3-07 provides additional information on civil supply.

3-98. CA Soldiers must be skilled users of digital mission command systems and be able to depict civil considerations for use in fully digitized command posts. In the event of failure or compromise of those systems, they should be prepared to conduct civil considerations analysis on a 1/50,000 scale map with clear acetate. Having an in-depth understanding of the OE, a rudimentary understanding of the civil networks includes local culture, capabilities, resources, and capacities that can affect military operations. CA forces and staff must maintain the ability to generate requests for information that are critical to the planning and execution of current or future operations. CA forces are well prepared to conduct this critical requirement and provide the necessary civil knowledge to enable the commander and staff to clearly visualize the OE and develop COAs that meet mission requirements. Figure 3-20 is an example of a civil considerations overlay.

## Social-Cultural Considerations

3-99. When local civil network support is necessary for successas is often the case in operations in the urban environmentthe population and the civil networks they comprise are central to accomplishing the mission. The COG of operations in urban environments is often the civil population or the effects that a civil network can bring to bear on an OE. To effectively develop and engage civil networks, it is important to develop a thorough understanding of the society and its culture, including the values, needs, history, religion, customs, social structure, and the civil networks that affect the urban area. It is imperative for Army forces to gain the civil population's support to advance stability and transition operations over to the appropriate civil authorities as the OE moves back to competition. In many cases, a civil COG is the approval of the civil population. CA forces should continuously assess and evaluate the sentiments of the population towards current operations within the OE.

3-100. Figure 3-21, page 3-36, depicts civil information collection plan information.

## Identifying Centers Of Gravity During Military Operations

3-101. CNDE analysis supports the operations process. Only through full collaboration with other staff can COG analysis be effective. The CNDE process provides critical civil knowledge and understanding of civil networks to other staff entities. This information is incorporated into COG analysis. Collaboration with the other staff members during COG analysis ensures unity of effort in the development of critical aspects of the plan that affect mission end states and goals. CA forces work closely with commanders and their staffs during COG analysis, focusing on


Identifying civil network information, capabilities, resources, and capacities.

Prioritizing the civil networks in support of CCIRs and PIRs.

Framing the problem.

Formulating the design through developed civil networks.

## Framing And Reframing

3-102. Framing (and reframing) the problem consists of marrying the commander's visualized end state with the COG. Framing requires a systemic approach to identifying and analyzing COGs, as well as the civil networks that can affect COGs. Like the initial COG analysis, it is a collaborative effort.

3-103. CNDE supports framing at all levels of operation through a process of systems approaches. Analysis and evaluation of the civil networks reveal appropriate operational COAs and effects that enable the commander to accomplish mission tasks and achieve identified end states.

## Formulating The Design

3-104. Formulating the design relies on framing the problem that exists within the domain of the supported commander. CNDE supports this by identifying civil networks and COGs that offer solutions to the problem by


Identifying civil network information, capabilities, resources, and capacities that can affect the
mission.

Recommending appropriate use of civil networks to accomplish desired effects within operational approaches.

Helping to identify civil network decisive points.

Developing civil networks that can operate and accomplish desired effects within established lines
of operations and effort.
3-105. Determining the operational approach includes identifying the developed civil network that can best accomplish or support the mission. Decisive points depicted by critical civil networks that offer the greatest leverage against COGs are then selected. CA staffs conducting CNA establish decisive points by establishing MOEs and MOPs. These MOEs and MOPs enable the commander and staff to determine if the assigned civil network is capable of achieving the desired effects and end states.

3-106. CNDE analysis graphically depicts civil network strengths, weaknesses, and vulnerabilities. This allows commanders to determine what operational or civil network capabilities within the AO can be employed or leveraged along LOE to achieve strategic level effects.

## Constraints

3-107. Effective CNDE analysis is subject to many pitfalls. The OE, technical issues, high operating tempo, and data integrity typically confound day-to-day CAO. Effective CNDE planning and execution can mitigate many of these issues. However, inaccuracy, relevancy, biases, assumptions, and omissions are harder to plan for and adversely affect CNA and evaluation. These issues are typical and, if left unchecked, challenge the timely and accurate analysis of civil networks. Moreover, they complicate the ability to leverage them to enable Army operations. It is incumbent upon leaders at all echelons to address these constraints in order to maximize the CA staff's ability to critically analyze and evaluate civil networks. Without this analysis, commanders lack critical developed civil networks that could enable the operations, extend the culmination point of the operation, conserve combat power, promote stability, and provide transitional support to governance.

## Workspace Considerations

3-108. CNDE analysis requires critical thinking. Leaders at every echelon should ensure CAO staff and supporting CA elements are provided an environment that is conducive to critical thinking. The CMOC can provide an environment for critical thinking, but every effort should be made to maintain a separate workspace that promotes critical thinking and lends itself to CNA. In circumstances where the CMOC and CAO staff conducting CNA are collocated, the CA commander should ensure that the CA staffwhen conducting analysisis focused exclusively on CNDE. OE considerations include the following:


Distractions.

CNDE battle rhythm.

Network connectivity.

Digital command and related systems.

## Technical Considerations

3-109. Effective CNDE analysis requires unhindered access to media sources and operational reporting from the command. CNDE analysis can be constrained by technical factors that include the following:


Limited bandwidth. Units reporting from austere environments may not be able to send detailed
information on pertinent civil networks in a timely matter. CA forces should make every effort to use brevity and codified terms to expedite the transfer of civil data and information related to the civil networks.

Automation systems. Because they are subject to negative environmental and manmade impacts
(extreme weather, power surges, accidental damage, viruses, hacking, and so on), computers are the weakest technical link in CNDE. CA forces should be afforded automation systems with high processing capabilities that are capable of handling large files and detailed graphics. Computers that are used to support CAO should be restricted exclusively to CAO and to CAO staff conducting
CNA. Automation and communications systems are vital to analysis of civil networks. They
facilitate real-time collaboration, detailed operational planning, and support of planning requirements.

Platform requirement. The platform should provide network-centric, enterprise intelligence,
weather, geospatial engineering, civil information, and space operations capabilities to maneuver, maneuver support, and sustainment organizations at all echelons from battalion to joint task force. It should also integrate tasking, collection, processing, and dissemination across the Army and
joint community. Finally, the platform should provide Army forces (through all phases of training
and deployment) with a fully compatible information collection ground processing system capable of supporting each computing environment.

Software considerations. Different versions of similar software may not be compatible.
Additionally, not all software can be installed on the different government networks. Local units should accept software installation vetted by other Department of Defense (DOD) networks.
Addressing technical considerations during CNDE greatly enhances the CA staff's ability to analyze civil networks and to provide critical civil data relating to the capabilities, resources, and capacities of civil networks with the command and staff.

## Accuracy

3-110. Accurately collected civil data about civil networks are the key to accurate CNDE analysis.

Decisions based on inaccurate information are made in error, causing a waste of time and resources and potentially undermining credibility. Every effort must be made to corroborate information and update existing data. Assessments, area studies, and country studies are all living documents and have limited shelf lives. Living documents are those documents that are continually edited and updated. It is important for CA
forces and staffs to remember that any analytical work based on dated information is dated as well.

## Bias

3-111. To be objective is to remain neutral or unbiased. CA Soldiers must understand bias to remain objective. Bias is a preconception that sways an individual's outlook or temperament. Developed throughout our lives, biases emanate from cultural beliefs and life experiences. Biases may become manifested personally or institutionally, either cognitively or subconsciously, and may imperceptibly manipulate perspectives and beliefs. For example, to state that, "Americans have a unique perspective of the world,"
demonstrates bias. However, to state that, "All people have a different perspective of the world,"
demonstrates objectivity.

3-112. During CNDE analysis, biases may emerge. Cultural, ethnic, gender, and political biases are among the most prevalent. For example, ethnocentrism is the belief that one's ethnic or cultural group is centrally important and defines what is right and wrong. CA forces encounter ethnocentrism at all levels and in every theater. CA forces must be able to recognize bias to mitigate its influence when analyzing civil networks. It is important to remember that biases are quick to develop and difficult to overcome. They lead to false assumptions concerning the analysis and evaluation of certain civil networks.

## Relevancy

3-113. CA forces are very low density and high demand. Therefore, every effort must be made to ensure CAO remains operationally relevant. Established civil networks can enable CAO using the civil network's capabilities, resources, and capacities that can be leveraged to enable military operations. Relevancy means relating to, or bearing upon, the matter at hand. Most importantly, the *so what* for CA forces is to remember that all civil information is relevant. However, not all civil information is operationally relevant. Operationally relevant civil networks develop to enable desired effects. Civil information associated with these networks provides information that specifically satisfies a CCIR and PIR. To ensure the relevancy of CAO and CMO, CNDE analysis should remain focused on


Continuously developing, engaging, and evaluating civil networks.

Developing new requests for information to refine the CNE plan and the civil information
collection plan.

Defining COGs.

Supporting MDMP.

Refining named areas of interest and target areas of interest.

Conducting trends analysis.

Refining CCIR.

## Assumptions

3-114. Assumptions are among the biggest challenges to effective CNDE analysis. This is because both inductive and deductive reasoning involve making an assumption. The problem is that assumptions are beliefs and, like all beliefs, assumptions may or may not be true.

3-115. The rationale that situational circumstances are the same in every AO is not accurate and usually stems from personal experiences. It is a good practice to treat every situation as unique and not automatically render a response based on previous CNA or personal experiences. This is not to imply that CAO staff conducting CNDE cannot make assumptions. Logical assumptions that are supported by facts are permissible. CA staffs conducting CNDE analysis should not hesitate to render such assumptions during the analytical process.

## Generalizations And Premature Conclusions

3-116. Generalizations and premature conclusions occur when the CNDE process is rushed, when there is not enough information to effectively analyze civil networks, or when (due to operating tempo) commanders and staff rush CNDE to provide quick results. The CAO staff conducting CNDE must ensure that the leaders and staff sections understand the need for realistic suspense time up front. Despite the desire for quick results, CNDE analysis of civil networks must be thorough, and the quality of CNDE analysis is commensurate with the amount of time involved. CNDE analysts must draw on training and experience to ensure quality products are developed in a timely manner. Improper analysis of critical civil networks can lead to catastrophic results that delay, hinder, or defeat the mission goals and end states of the commander.

## Omission

3-117. Omission is another critical limiting factor to CNDE analysis. To omit is to leave something out.

During MDMP, it could be potentially devastating to leave out one of the factors of METT-TC (I). Omitting a factor during CNDE analysis has the same potential to affect the accuracy and relevancy of the analytical product. This is the reason CNA is rarely done by itself.

3-118. CNA is conducted in conjunction with the CPB and CKI, and it is used to help inform other staff functions. However, during operations in which enemy forces provide a counter influence to developed civil networks and the execution of CAO, the effects of enemy operations must be factored into systems analysis.

## Oversimplification

3-119. The complex nature of CNDE begs for simplification, and the natural reaction is to oversimplify by not addressing all the factors present during CNA. Oversimplifying can occur because of the need for brevity or clarity or because of a general lack of understanding of this step of the CNDE process.

Note: CNDE is not synonymous with social network analysis, and the two must not be confused.

3-120. The real danger in oversimplification lies in the ability of the CAO staff conducting CNA to articulate the existing civil networks and their capabilities, resources, and capacities that can be leveraged to support Army operations. The basis for CNDE is to enhance the commander's visualization and to develop situational understanding. Oversimplification endangers both by usurping cognitive development and by merely sustaining situational awareness.

3-121. The analysis and evaluation of civil networks is necessary to identify subtle influences that detract from (or add to) the effects that enable stability within an AO and support U.S. foreign policy. Used correctly, CNDE analysis and evaluation provides the commander and staff with civil networks that possess specific information, capabilities, resources, and capacities. These can be leveraged to support current operations and to form a basis to measure trends that meet the commander's end state. CNDE analysis and evaluation provide the focal point for commanders to direct CAO and CMOthus ensuring that finite CA forces, in coordination and collaboration with existing civil networks, are used to their fullest potential.

## Outputs Of Civil Network Analysis

3-122. CNA outputs lead to the actual development and evaluation of identified civil networks. Once the CAO staff have conducted the analysis of civil networks, they possess a very clear estimate of the information, capabilities, resources, and capacities that can be leveraged from these identified civil networks. The staff also knows which civil networks require additional engagements to clarify required information.

At this point, the CA commanders at each echelon must identify the primary CNDE leader that continues to engage, develop, and evaluate each civil network. This individual takes the lead for the interface with the civil network to develop continuity, collaboration, and a close relationship with the civil network's leaders. This is invaluable when the civil network is mobilized to provide necessary effects determined by CA forces.

These engagement missions are assigned through the S-3 to the appropriate CA force at all echelons. In cases where a civil network is needed but does not exist, CA forces are identified and assigned the mission to begin developing the required civil network. These outputs also inform and focus the following CA requirements and Army processes:


CND plan.

Civil information collection plan.

CPB.

CKI.

CAO running estimate.

COA development.

Commander's visualization of the OE.

Other staff estimates.

## Civil Network Development Plan

3-123. The outputs from the analysis of civil networks inform and refine the CND plan. The CNDE process is depicted in figure 1-5 on page 1-7. Although it is a cyclical process, one step can inform another step or refine a step already conducted. In this manner, the analysis leads to the development and evaluation of selected civil networks. However, in cases where further information is required, the CND plan is updated, and appropriate CA forces are assigned the mission to collect the required information or data. Once this information or data has been collected, it is returned to the CAO staff at the appropriate echelon for analysis. It is important to not be dogmatic in the approach to developing civil networks. As critical information is collected or revealed through analysis, this civil knowledge must be incorporated into planning processes and acted upon according to mission requirements. Based upon the commander's mission, developed COAs, and established LOE, CA forces prioritize the identified civil networks to be developed first. CA forces determine the degree of urgency to engage and leverage certain civil networks based on CAO staff mission analysis during MDMP.

## Civil Information Collection Plan

3-124. CA forces and staff identify specific requirements for civil information based on the commander's need for a detailed knowledge of civil capabilities, strengths, vulnerabilities, organizations, and resources. A civil information collection plan is designed to identify specific CA elements to conduct CR, CE, and CND
to collect civil data and information that is used to develop civil knowledge. It is important to understand that other staff entities and units within the AO may have the civil information that is being requested or sought after, and that it may also be available through reachback, especially in the higher echelons of the CA force.

CAO staff at each echelon must collaborate with the appropriate staff to gain an understanding of the civil information being provided from multiple sources outside of the CA force structure.

3-125. CR, CE, and CND fill identified gaps or requirements in the civil information collection plan and may be conducted concurrently with other operations. The commander's intent, PIR, and the CCIR focus CAO and the civil information collection plan. In return, CA forces execute CKI to provide the operations process with a continual flow of essential and actionable civil knowledge during offensive, defensive, and stability operations. This civil knowledge enables CA forces to conduct CAO that effectively identify and assess civil strengths and vulnerabilities to provide commander-driven effects in the civil component, thereby enabling U.S. military forces to achieve decisive results.

3-126. The analysis of civil networks provides detailed civil knowledge that helps direct and focus further CR, CE, and CND missions to clarify required information requirements. This analysis informs the civil information collection plan at each echelon to ensure that further engagements and development of specified civil networks occurs in a timely and efficient manner with the appropriate CA force structure.

## Civil Preparation Of The Battlefield

3-127. *Civil preparation of the battlefield* is the systematic process of analyzing civil considerations in an area of interest to determine their effects on friendly, neutral, and enemy operations (FM 3-57). The civil collection plan is a product resulting from CPB that directs CA forces to conduct CR, CE, and CND to identify gaps in the CCIR, resources and capabilities within the civil component, and civil strengths and vulnerabilities. CKI enables the commander and staff to understand and visualize the OE more clearly and provides situational awareness for all elements in the OE. The integration of actionable civil knowledge provides the commander and subordinate unit commanders the ability to achieve decision superiority.

3-128. CPB is conducted by all CA forces at all echelons, is critical to informing the CNDE process, and provides direction for the engagement and development of specific civil networks. CPB analyzes and evaluates the political, economic, and social operational variables in an area of interest to determine opportunities and risks in an AO. The goal is to provide the commander with the capability to enhance, enable, or provide governance. The analysis and evaluation of civil information gained through CNDE, CKI, area studies, initial and deliberate assessments, and other CA processes is developed into civil knowledge. CA forces inject civil knowledge into all Army integrating processes.
3-129. CPB informs the CNDE process, but CNDE also informs CPB. CAO staff analyze information and data on civil networks that is collected during development of the CND plan. The output from this analysis helps clarify CPB and assists in aligning the developed civil network with the appropriate established LOE or COA. As this civil knowledge becomes clear, it assists the CAO staff at mapping the civil component of the OE and aligning the appropriate CA force structure or capability with the developed civil network.

## Civil Knowledge Integration

3-130. CKI provides the commanders, staff, and unified action partners with accurate and timely civil knowledge to update the COP, facilitate decision making, update Army processes, develop branches and sequels for current and future operations, and inform all warfighting functions. CKI is the process whereby civil information is collected, analyzed, and evaluated; processed into civil knowledge; and integrated into the planning processes of the supported element, higher headquarters, USG and DOD agencies, international organizations, and NGOs. The CA company is limited in its ability to conduct this process, but the CA
company commander may request additional support and capabilities from higher commands to support these requirements. At every echelon, the CAO staff supports the development of civil knowledge and its integration into the operations processes. This civil knowledge enables the mission planning requirements of the commander and staff to achieve situational understanding at each echelon.

3-131. CKI is one of the primary processes that guides CA forces at every echelon in the collection, processing, and maintaining of civil data and information collected from the civil component of the OE. This process informs all aspects of CAO and CMO, to include the CNDE process. The civil knowledge that is produced from the CKI process informs and focuses the CND plan. As the CNDE process goes forward, it too develops civil data and information that, in turn, further informs and focuses the civil information collection planthe first step in the CKI process. These two processes have two completely different outcomes, but they parallel each other and are symbiotic in the fact that both processes inform, direct, and focus the collection of civil data and information for CKI and the CND plan for CNDE.

## Civil Affairs Operations Running Estimate

3-132. CA forces prepare area studies, conduct assessments, and create and maintain running estimates to assist in the planning and updating of mission plans across the competition continuum. CA-produced area studies, assessments, and running estimates include geo-references. These geo-references allow for future geospatial application of these products into operations and mission planning sequences. These products develop and update an understanding of the civil component for the COP of the commander.

3-133. The CAO running estimate feeds directly into the MDMP, whether it is conducted unilaterally as part of CA-only operations, or it is integrated into the supported unit's planning process and development of the COP through CKI. To focus the estimate process, planners first develop a restated mission statement that delineates those CAO tasks necessary to successfully support the commander's mission. The mission statement is a short sentence or paragraph that describes the CAO essential task (or tasks) and purpose of the unit. It clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason for doing so. It contains the elements of who, what, when, where, and why, as well as the reason thereof, but seldom specifies how.

3-134. The analysis of civil networks results in refined data that ultimately help inform the CAO running estimate. CKI is the primary means, but the CNDE process also provides critical civil knowledge on the civil networks operating within the OE. The capabilities, resources, and capacities should be identified and incorporated as necessary into the CAO running estimate.

## Course Of Action Development

3-135. During COA development, CAO staff ensure each COA effectively integrates civil considerations.

They present a summary of their running estimate to describe how their findings affect, or are affected by, other staff functions. The CAO staff must be able to articulate how operations affect civilians and estimate the requirements for essential stability operations related to the mission. Ultimately, the CAO staff recommends the most effective way to integrate CA, HN, and interorganizational capabilities into combined arms operations to support multi-domain operations. The running estimate is the primary means that provides necessary civil knowledge to develop COAs that support the mission planning of the commander. The information and data collected on civil networks within the AO are incorporated and planned for when developing COAs. Once the analysis of civil networks is complete, the resulting civil knowledge can be incorporated into the CAO running estimate and then used to inform or identify the best COA that supports the mission end states and goals. Civil networks should be developed and mobilized according to the accepted COA. Branches and sequels to the current (or future) plan should include the description and capabilities, resources, and capacities of identified civil networks, as well as when they can be leveraged to best enable the commander's LOE, end states, and goals.

## Commander's Visualization Of The Operational Environment

3-136. CA forces collect civil data at all levels of operation through CND, CR, CE, data mining, and collaboration with IPI, interorganizational entities, NGOs, and other government agencies. The pertinent civil data ultimately becomes civil knowledge that is used to inform the COP, assist in the commander's visualization of the battlefield, update Army processes, and inform the warfighting functions.

3-137. The daily interaction between U.S. forces and the various civilians in the AO is the heart of collection. These collection efforts generally occur during actual missions assigned to a particular CA element. Collection can occur in a virtual environment as well when there are denied areas within an AO. CA forces must be able to execute collection of civil information in environments that do not permit a physical presence. The capture of these data points and the relevant contact information for each individual and entity are equally important. The collection of civil data ultimately provides the commander with knowledge of civil capabilities and resources that can be leveraged for military purposes. These leveraged capabilities and resources can help meet military objectives, build capacity under a transitional military authority, consolidate gains, and help establish civil control and civil security.

3-138. Through the execution of CNDE, CKI, TG, and CMI, CA forces provide critical civil knowledge toand expand options forthe supported commander. This increases situational understanding of the OE
and allows clarity for visualization of the battlefield and actionable civil knowledge for the decision-making process. During the fast pace of offensive operations, commanders may bypass large population centers. When passing by or through large population centers, civilians and military elements may come into conflict and slow the advance. CA forces develop networks and support governance in these population centers as a way to enable HN elements to maintain control.

3-139. The civil knowledge gained through the analysis of civil networks informs the COP and provides the commander with a clear visualization of the OE. Commanders leverage identified civil networks within the OEalong with their capabilities, resources, and capacitiesin support of their LOE, end states, goals, and mission requirements. Knowledge of the civil networks, combined with the civil knowledge developed from CKI, provides the commander and staff with the necessary civil knowledge to understand the civil component of the OE and ensure that the civil component is integrated into the mission planning and execution.

## Updating Other Staff Estimates

3-140. The results of the analysis of civil networks are ultimately used to update and inform the running estimates of other staffs as necessary. The civil networks that are identified, analyzed, and developed can be ultimately mobilized to support the staff and fill gaps in identified requirements. An example of this would be transportation requirements of the S-4. A civil network with the capability for hauling supplies could be leveraged and mobilized to assist in the movement of supplies for the military forces within an AO. Threat information that is gained while conducting CR, CE, and CND can be passed on to the S-2 and incorporated into the IPB process. The analysis of civil networks helps to identify the civil networks that might be targeted to accomplish specific requirements based on mission planning and analysis.

3-141. Once the primary staff entities update their estimates, the CA staffin collaboration with other staff entitiescan determine which, if any, civil networks could be mobilized to provide certain effects within the AO. These effects should be measurable through the development and execution of MOPs and MOEs. Once an assessment has been completed, the CAO staff can determine if a certain effect is being accomplished, if it should be changed, or if it should be cancelled. The commander is briefed on these assessments to determine if the desired effects are being accomplished.

3-142. The analysis of civil networks is a crucial step in the CNDE process. This analysis informs and updates numerous Army processes and helps to identify civil networks and their information, capabilities, resources, and capacities that can be leveraged to cause certain effects within the civil component that support the mission. Once this data on civil networks is compiled and analyzed, CA forces evaluate the strengths, vulnerabilities, capabilities, and motivations of the civil networks to assess how to best approach them and incorporate the information, capabilities, resources, and capacities they provide. CA forces also rank the capabilities, resources, and capacities of each civil network to determine if the network can carry out the effects or requirements placed on them if they are mobilized during operations. This prioritizes the civil networks by their capabilities and capacities to execute their objectives consistent with U.S. interests.



## Chapter 4 Developing And Evaluating Civil Networks

Civil networks are developed through programs, activities, and directed themes and messages that either support a friendly, neutral, or unknown network or disrupt a threat network. The ultimate goal of developing civil networks is to provide information, capability, resources, and capacity that preserve combat power, consolidate gains, conserve finite resources, provide freedom of maneuver to friendly forces, and/or deny the enemy freedom of maneuver and influence within the civilian population. CA
professionals who are tasked to develop civil networks must be cognizant of these requirements as they continue to develop, evaluate, and build relationships with these civil networks.

## Development Of Civil Networks

4-1. CA forces develop civil networks following a detailed analysis of the strengths, vulnerabilities, capabilities, and motivations of the civil entities that comprise a potential network. Development of these civil networks is coordinated with the supported command's targeting and mission planning sections. CA
forces select and develop civil networks to


Increase their capability and capacity for improved, shared understanding and assessment of
the OE.

Enable maneuverability of Army forces.

Export capacity building to other civil networks.

Increase freedom of action for maneuver and maneuver support forces.

Enable unified action.

Disrupt threats.
4-2. Civil networks are developed through programs, activities, and directed themes and messages that either support a friendly network, influence a neutral network, or disrupt a threat network. When civil networks are developed to provide a specific effect within the AO, CA forces must ensure that the civil network can be mobilized at the appropriate time during operations to execute the desired effects established by the commander.

4-3. Civil networks are developed through relationships based on personal initiative, personal contact, introduction by a trusted third party, participation in capacity-building efforts (such as training and advising), or through projects aimed at building legitimacy. Formal governmental networks are aided through support to civil administration activities and assistance as directed by the command. Building friendly networks facilitates freedom of maneuver for U.S. and partner forces. This enables initial contact with potential connecting nodes and streamlines transitioning networks between different CA elements. It is important that the incoming and outgoing CA elements update each other on situational understanding and transfer critical civil information and knowledge. This prevents duplicated efforts by different CA elements and the misuse of finite resources. This passing of contacts must also occur during the transition between competition to conflict and during the rapid movement of CA forces towards the advancing forward line of own troops (FLOT).

4-4. Inputs to this step include analysis of which civil networks are willing, committed to, and capable of achieving the commander's stated objectives and creating effects. This also includes a CND or assessment plan through which CA forces (in conjunction with unified action partners) assess the civil networks' capability, willingness, and commitment to achieve objectives and create effects.

## Improved Shared Understanding Of The Operational Environment

4-5. CA forces are tasked to conduct the development of selected civil networks within the AO. This is determined by the analysis of civil networks conducted by the CA staff. As CA forces develop specific civil networks based on their information, capabilities, resources, and capacities, the civil component of the OE
becomes clear. This allows the commander to visualize the OE from both the civil and threat perspective. Once the capabilities, resources, and capacities of the civil networks within the AO have been identified and verified by CA forces, they can be aligned with specific LOE, goals, or end states of the commander. The civil knowledge that flows from these established civil networks also informs the entire staffs' running estimates and updates the commander's CCIR, PIR, and other information-related requirements. All these aspects inform and update the shared understanding of the OE. This helps the staff to focus finite resources and capabilities to the most critical requirements, providing the commander with necessary effects within
the AO.

## Enabling Maneuverability Of Army Forces

4-6. By acting as sensors in the civil environment, friendly networks aid in providing early warning of threats and increasing shared understanding of the OE. When CA forces integrate civil networks with operations, this enables a commander's freedom of movement by


Facilitating joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration through civil administration.

Preserving combat power.

Consolidating gains through the actions of civil security and civil control.

Minimizing negative and maximizing positive civil influences.

## Export Capacity Building To Other Civil Networks

4-7. Capacity building develops the capability and capacity within friendly and neutral networks to counter malign actor influence and activities. Capacity building also negates malign actor influence by increasing HN government and military capacity to reduce the causes of instability. CA forces can assist these civil networks in the development of capabilities and capacities to achieve desired effects that counter malign actors. CA functional specialistswith expertise in governance, resources, or necessary civil functions
develop civil networks that can be enhanced, trained, and further developed to provide certain effects for the commander.

4-8. Security assistance programs are examples of capacity building that foster stability and security abroad by strengthening the military and law enforcement forces in our partner countries. They accomplish this capacity building through training and by helping partner countries purchase defense equipment and services produced in the United States.

## Increase Freedom Of Action For Military Units

4-9. *Unified action* is the synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort (JP 1, Volume 1). Each of the CA core competencies inherently supports these requirements by bringing military and civil network capabilities, resources, and capacities together in formal and informal ways to achieve common objectives.

Early integration of CA forces into plans, operations, and campaigns is critical to freedom of action. It reduces operational friction and enables unified action at the onset of military operations. When civil networks can be identified and developed early in the planning processes, the results, in general, are a more effective and efficient use of military resources. Also, early identification of specific CA forces to engage identified friendly or neutral civil networks enables necessary effects during early stages of operations.

4-10. Developed civil networks that result from CNDE provide increased freedom of action for the commander's forces through CA forces working with other information-related capabilities to plan, prepare, execute, and assess communication activities. CNDE is used to understand and shape the information environment through the development of civil networks to create effects in the cognitive dimension that support decision dominance and freedom of action. CA forces coordinate and synchronize objectives, effects, MOEs, and MOPs with the other information advantage capabilities to ensure that developed civil networks are able to maintain the desired effects required by the commander.

## Enable Unified Action

4-11. CA forces contribute to unified action through integration, coordination, and synchronization with interorganizational partners, joint forces, and interagency partners. By developing local civil networks, CA elements are able to increase the capabilities of local governance and add to the shared understanding of the OE that is essential to unified action. CA forces and staff integrate military and civilian organizations that influence operations or campaigns to seek and promote stability that achieves unified action. Developed civil networks can also provide early warning of threats to the civil component that can cause instability or disrupt the desire to achieve unified action.

4-12. The CA task force is one of the primary CA elements that can be deployed to enable unified action.

When augmented with other enablers (such as military police, engineers, medical, and other forces), the CA
task force can provide the commander with COAs that positively affect stabilization, governance, transition, and consolidation of gains within the AO. When supporting a division or corps executing rear area operations, a CA task force allows other military resources to be pushed forward to the FLOT and extend the commander's culmination point during large-scale combat operations. Civil networks can be developed, leveraged, and mobilized by CA forces to provide capabilities, resources, and capacities that can augment the CA task force's mission in the rear areas. The use of civil networks in the synchronization, coordination, and integration of the rear area under the overview of the CA task force enables unified action and provides the commander with effects that are designed to begin stabilization and transitional operations in an efficient manner as the FLOT is moved forward.

## Disrupt Threats

4-13. Working with developed civil networks during Army operations, CA forces can provide or enable stability and prevent future conflict by supporting Army forces through the integration of identified friendly civil networks into current or future operations. CA forcesthrough the building up friendly civil networks capabilities, resources, and capacitiesprovide the commander with early warning of threat activities, stronger responses by civil entities against threat actors, and the ability to secure critical civil resources and infrastructure from threat exploitation.

4-14. The proper use of civil networks enables the commander to focus military force structure in other critical areas within the OE and conserve combat power. During large-scale combat operations, these civil networks can enable the commander to maintain operational reach, extend command influences on the civil component, and conserve combat power. They also assist in consolidating gains during transition and provide critical resources and capabilities to achieve stability requirements as the region returns to a competition environment.

## Civil Network Development Activities

4-15. At this point in the CNDE process, the initial analysis of identified civil networks is complete. This analysis will continue throughout the time that the civil network is being used to ensure no changes have occurred that might hinder the civil network from executing desired effects. CA forces now begin to develop the specific civil networks based on their information, capabilities, resources, and capacities. This aligns the civil network with mission requirements for which it would be best suited. The commander is an integral part of this process because the commander determinesthrough MDMPthe effects, projects, engagements, or resources used that best meet the mission end states and goals. CA forces execute these missions within the civil component through the collaboration, synchronization, and integration with developed civil networks. Measures of assessment must be established at the beginning of operations to enable analysis of the effects being conducted. CA forces conduct these assessments to determine if the effects are being met, need to change, or should be cancelled. This information is briefed to the commander to make necessary decisions concerning the civil component of the OE.

## Mapping Civil Networks

4-16. Once CA forces and staff have identified and analyzed the civil networks within the AO, it is necessary to map out the various civil networks to visualize their location, avenues of approach, facilities, areas of influence, and any other pertinent data that would concern the civil networks. Each of the capabilities, resources, or capacities of the civil network should be listed and described. This helps in the development of the civil network and aligns it with the appropriate LOE, end state, or goal that it might support. This helps the commander and staff to visualize the civil component and apply civil knowledge products that have been produced to update and inform their staff running estimates and planning measures. Using the graphic control measures laid out in Appendix D of FM 3-57 ensures a standardized level of understanding and interpretation of this civil knowledge product.

## Activities Of Network Development

4-17. As they develop civil networks, CA forces determine three types of network development to be pursued for each civil network. This determination is done in conjunction with the mapping out of the civil networks that reside or influence the AO. The three network development activities can be applied concurrently, individually, or in various combinations across different groups and towards different supporting systems within a civil network. CNA provides commanders knowledge that allows them to apply these activities across the range of military operations.
4-18. No single activity can effectively develop efficiently functioning friendly networks without the support of the local population and the neutralization of threat networks. A singular focus on neutralizing threat networks ultimately fails because threat networks adapt, evolve, and continue to be tolerated or supported by the populaceor a subset of the populace. Both during and after development, CA forces use three categories to characterize the likely relationship between the civil network and the command:


Support.

Influence.

Neutralize.

## Support The Civil Network

4-19. CA forces recommend that the commander supports a specific civil network if it possesses information, capabilities, resources, or capacities that can support the commanders LOE, end states, or mission goals. This type of support


Is mainly conducted toward friendly or neutral civil networks.

Includes understanding how an OE affects the mission. Effects include conditions, vulnerabilities,
strengths, ideals, goals, issues, susceptibilities, influences, and so on.

Involves understanding that it does not matter if we think we are supporting them; what matters is
the supported network perceives that we are supporting them.

Includes CNA, which gives commanders the requisite knowledge to begin to understand how to
interact with key actors.

Includes the use of all available resources (in the AO and through reachback support) to facilitate
a whole-of-government approach to supporting friendly and neutral networks. Individual
communities, government agencies, businesses or religious organizations, and educational institutions have an impact on the population and can alter attitudes and perceptions.
4-20. Some critical examples of supporting a civil network are to


Conduct area security operations to provide freedom of maneuver and isolate threat networks from
their sources of strength.

Execute stability tasks that support positive outcomes for friendly and neutral networks.

Integrate the complementary effects of combined arms and joint or coalition capabilities.

Establish information and intelligence sharing protocols with the supported network.

Establish and maintain unity of effort with unified action partners.

Comprehensively engage and integrate the full range of actors as a basis for shared action and
reform. These include police forces, NGOs, international organizations, HN organizations and
institutions, academia, government officials, media, and businesses.

Negotiate and mediate on behalf of supported civil networks.

Gain visibility on the threat's campaign with friendly leadership and actively influence friendly
leadership to take ownership and invest in solving the problem that created the threat.

Successfully manage security transitions.

Mitigate civilian casualties.

## Influence The Civil Network

4-21. Figure 4-1 provides a graphic representation of this type of influence on a civil network. CA forces recommend that the commander influences a civil network if that network possesses some of the required information, capabilities, resources, or capacities that might support the commander's mission. The following are characteristics of influencing the civil network:


Influence can be applied to friendly, neutral, threat, and even unknown civil networks.

The purpose of influencing civil networks is to change or maintain the perceptions, attitudes, and behavior of select civil network elements so they act in a manner that supports audiences to support the achievement of U.S. objectives.

Influence involves legalities (permissions and authorities).

Lasting credibility is critical to positively influence civil networks. Unified action partners provide the leverage and support required to respond to a network's needs, gaps, and interests.

IO is an integrating staff function that focuses on adversaries and potential adversaries, and it is
the staff lead for influence activities directed toward threat civil networks. Military information support operations, CAO, public affairs, and CMO (and the staffs that integrate them) can provide
staff focus for influence activities directed toward neutral and friendly civil networks.

## Neutralize The Civil Network

4-22. Figure 4-2 depicts the neutralization of a threat network. CA forces recommend that the commander neutralize a civil network if that network is determined to be a hindrance or is expected to provide friction to the accomplishment of the commander's mission. The following are characteristics of neutralizing the civil network:


Neutralize is a tactical mission task that results in rendering enemy personnel or materiel incapable
of interfering with a particular operation (FM 3-90-1).

CNA provides the necessary network perspective of the relationships of threat elements to other
threat, neutral, friendly, and unknown elements in a single picture. This information is necessary in order to progress from a myopic threat perspective to one that recognizes that any single entity has an impact on others in an OE.

Neutralizing threat networks becomes essential when they cannot be influenced to change.
4-23. Neutralizing a threat civil network yields some positive effects that include


Facilitating freedom of maneuver for unified action partners to provide security to the population.

Freeing populations from the unwanted influence of the threat group and creating secure access to daily needs (commerce, electricity, travel, marketplaces).

Increasing HN capability and capacity.

Isolating the threat networks from the population.
4-24. The decision to neutralize a threat network should be the result of the targeting process and should be thoroughly staffed to ensure the commander concurs with the effect, as reestablishing a neutralized civil network may be more difficult than developing a new one in the event that its capability becomes required.

## Evaluate Civil Networks

4-25. Before, during, and after development, civil networks must be continuously evaluated for the capability and capacity to deliver the information, capabilities, resources, and effects that support U.S. objectives based on the strengths, vulnerabilities, capabilities, and motivations of the specific networks. Civil network capabilities are increased, strengths are enhanced, and weaknesses are mitigated through development.
4-26. Constant vetting is necessary for measuring and evaluating whether and how the direction and motivations of the developed civil network are in tandem with U.S. objectives. Civil networks that are developed to enable or provide governance must be continuously evaluated for appropriateness of action. Without assessing the progress of civil networks and their actions, it is impossible to ensure they are completing the objectives for which they were developed or engaged.

4-27. In the CNDE process, evaluation is taking analyzed information collected from civil networks and determining the capabilities, resources, capacities, value, nature, and character of identified civil networks.

This helps to justify a decision regarding the possible use of each civil network. Evaluation of civil networks results in forming conclusions from validated data that are the basis of understanding civil considerations. Evaluation enables planning, execution, and assessment of operations and identifies how the specific civil networks can support these operations. Evaluation of civil networks provides situational awareness about the civil network conditions. This affects the staff's ability to synthesize with operational requirements, commander's guidance, and direction from higher to achieve synchronized and integrated operations, a clear COP, and a better understanding of the civil component. Situational understanding provides the basis for timely and effective decision making. During evaluation, confirming civil considerations concerning identified civil networks is key to mission success.

## Evaluation Considerations

4-28. As CA forces evaluate the identified civil networks, there are many considerations that must be part of this evaluation. These considerations relate to the ways each civil network could facilitate or enable the commander to achieve unity of effort and meet these end states and goals. The network development life cycle can assist CA forces in understanding the evaluation process of each civil network that has been identified. It also enables the commander's planning, execution, and mission accomplishment. This cycle is as follows:


Designing the civil network.

Establishing the civil network (if necessary).

Assessing capabilities, resources, and capacities to meet desired requirements (gaps).

Vetting the civil network for loyalties, perceptions, expectations, relationships.

Protecting the civil network (compartmentalization).

Expanding the civil network (as necessary).

Culminating the civil network.


## Design Of The Civil Network

4-29. CA forces must understand the design of each network within their AO. All civil networks are not the same in terms of internal activities, relationships, information flow, and other systems that allow the civil network to function effectively and to achieve the goals of the leaders controlling the civil network. CA forces conduct CE with the pertinent leaders to begin understanding the design of the network and further refine the capabilities, resources, and capacities that the civil network can offer.

4-30. In some instances, only a portion of the civil network needs to be mobilized. It may be that just a specific node that possesses the capability, resource, or capacity that can support the commander's mission. This evaluation is critical because, as part of utilizing a civil network, CA forces must ensure that using that network does not hinder the civil network's ability to conduct its normal business and support the civil population requirements. An example of this is the use of fuel. If a local fuel source is required to enable operations, CA forces would determine whether using this fuel source would reduce the flow of fuel to the local or regional population. CA forces should ensure that there was enough capacity to maintain the flow of fuel to both the civilian areas and to Army operations.
4-31. Within the design, CA forces must look for and understand any internal shortfalls. The evaluation of these shortfalls enables a better understanding of what should be leveraged within the civil network. This evaluation is necessary to identify any augmentation the civil network might require to achieve critical effects desired by the commander.

4-32. CA forces should understand the leader perceptions, expectations, and thoughts on information flow, future operations, and current operations of the civil network they are leading. If the civil network is a group of people who are influencers with the IPI, then understanding the primary and secondary leadersas well as their intent and desires for their groupis necessary to incorporate their influences, as needed, into operations.

4-33. Understanding these internal functions of the civil network assists CA forces in the development of the critical relationship necessary for the building of trust, common interests, and mutual respect. When the civil network is mobilized, this built-up relationship is invaluable as CA forces collaborate with them to ensure effective support to Army operations.

## Establishment Of A Civil Network

4-34. In some situations, no civil networks exist that CA forces can leverage to provide necessary effects within the AO. If this occurs, CA forces must determine the effects needed and the best methodology to achieve those effects, and then they develop a civil network that can meet the mission requirements. CA forces can review which interagency, international organizations, or unified action partners are operating within the AO and determine if they have the capabilities, resources, or capacity to provide the necessary effects for the commander.

4-35. It is important to ensure that a civil network doesn't already exist that can provide the necessary effects.

Sometimes a civil network can be overlooked because of size, assumed capabilities, or some other reason that leads to a lack of true understanding of the nature of the existing civil networks. CA forces must verify this information before developing a completely new civil network within an AO.

4-36. Once MDMP is complete and the LOE, effects, and requirements within the AO have been established, CA forces determine if a new civil network is needed. Once a new civil network is determined to be needed, CA forces should start conducting CR and CE to determine where some expertise for the needed capability, resource, or capacity might be located. This may be a single node to start with, such as a heavy equipment operator, a prominent orator, or the owner of significant warehouse space. The requirements or effects desired determine where CA forces conduct missions to find and build these civil networks.

4-37. Once the initial person or contact has been made, that entity can also begin to help build the necessary network. This brings separate capabilities together for a common goal. This networking continues until the necessary entities are working together and developing a capability, resource, or capacity that can then be leveraged to assist, enable, and provide necessary effects within the AO. Caution should be made to ensure that the development of this new civil network doesn't negatively affect the IPI within the AO. The intent is not to make a civil network that detracts from the needs of the civilian populations.
4-38. If the decision is made to develop a new civil network, CA forces must ensure they are not enabling a civil network that will (later in the operations) become a hindrance, provide friction, or change loyalty to the goals and end states of the commander's mission. There is no specific way to determine these intangible facets of evaluating civil networks, but every effort should be made to ensure these civil networks maintain consistency in their support to military operations.

## Assessing Capabilities, Resources, And Capacities

4-39. CA forces conduct an initial assessment of capabilities, resources, and capacities during the conduct of CNE. This data is further analyzed, and determinations are made on which civil networks can support certain effects or LOE within the AO. During evaluation, this data is further refined to ensure CA forces understand the levels of capabilities, resources, and capacities that reside within each civil network. Determining whether identified civil networks can actually accomplish and sustain those effects for the appropriate length of time is critical to mission success. Figure 4-3 provides a method of rating the accuracy of data provided. There is also a description for each value.

4-40. CA forces determine methods to develop nodes and civil networks to best meet the desired effects of the commander or support critical LOE. CA forces continually analyze the civil networks to ensure the use of these networks is not going to remove critical capabilities, resources, or capacities from the civil component. Evaluation of a complete civil network or nodes within a civil network ensures a balance of power and parity between and within civil networks. If one entity is empowered more than necessary, the status quo of the civil component may be put at risk. It is always a constant that one civil network may rely onor is in competition withanother network. This power can be used to provide one civil network with a need and to provide the other civil network a method to facilitate the leader's desires and end states within the civil network. This power sharing helps to maintain a stable civil component. CA forces should not empower one civil network over another without clearly identifying the goals to be achieved by doing so.

## Vetting Civil Networks

4-41. Within each civil network, CA forces identify the level of commitment, loyalty, and willingness to work with military forces to accomplish identified end states and goals. There must be a continuous analysis of these factors to ensure that the leaders or individuals within the civil network have not changed their allegiances. When changes occur, a reassessment of leveraging the civil network becomes necessary. The results of this assessment and vetting determine whether Army forces continue to collaborate with the civil network (and at what level) or to cut ties with the network.
4-42. Another aspect of this vetting is to constantly ensure that the civil network can accomplish the desired effects of the commander. CA forces should assess the effectiveness of the organization and the ongoing programs and projects that the civil network is involved with. This vetting process should include MOEs and MOPs to ensure that the civil network is accomplishing established criteria in the manner that supports the LOE, end states, and goals of the mission. CA forces can also identify initial or additional training necessary for the civil network to be more effective in support of Army operations. This training could be with select network leaders or with the entire network as a whole. CA forces conducting the vetting process should ensure that the proper civil network has been identified to enable the correct LOE, end state, or goal of the commander. If there is a mismatch of capability with effects, then a change must be made so that finite capabilities, resources, and capacities are used in a more efficient manner.

## Protection Of Civil Networks

4-43. Once a civil network is mobilized or activated, CA forces must ensure that protection measure are in place for the civil network. The network may have its own resources to protect the network, but some civil networks may require augmentation. This protection could be as simple as providing threat information that might affect their operations. A civilian convoy of supplies may need convoy security with specific military forces or have the convoy incorporated into existing convoy operations.

4-44. To ensure continuity of protection for a civil network, CA forces that hand over an assigned area to another unit must provide this protection information. Protecting these developed civil networks ensures a more productive and effective outcome as they mobilize to conduct effects within the civil component of
the OE.

## Expansion Of Civil Networks

4-45. Civil networks are expanded once the MOEs and MOPs have been verified and the right effects are being realized within the OE. This expansion is limited to the actual capabilities, resources, and capacities of each specific civil network. The expansion of civil networks must be tied to the phasing of the operations so that, when the operations are ending, the civil network can then begin to reduce the effects it has been executing. In a situation where the civil network is continuing under the control of a civil entity, proper handover of the civil network must be planned to ensure a seamless flow of influence from the military to civil entities.

## Culmination Of Civil Networks

4-46. As Army operations move from large-scale combat operations to transitioning to consolidation of gainsand, ultimately, a return to competitionmobilized civil networks fall into three categories:
transitioned, transferred, or terminated. As the OE returns to competition, some of these mobilized civil networks may have overlap with the Department of State, another civil agency, an international organization, or a unified action partner. These areas of overlap must be addressed and deconflicted by the CAO staff at all echelons.
4-47. Through the collaboration of CA forces, civil networks transition from military influence back to the appropriate civil authorities and reintegrate into the civil component. Once the civil network is under civil control, it can begin to support civil LOE that the civil network would have originally supported. Transition to any number of proper civilian authorities may occur, such as the United Nations, Department of State, or HN. It is critical that these types of transfers are executed with the knowledge and understanding of the CA force structure (battalion or above) that is responsible for the civil component in which the civil network resides.

4-48. When a civil network is transferred to another entity (one military force to another military force), CA
forces must ensure that this transfer is not done in a vacuum. A proper hand over of these civil networks
which could include governance-type networks, security networks, or stability networksmust be integrated under the proper military control for seamless conduct of operations and further stabilization of the OE. It is important to have the CAO staff and leaders at each echelon involved and informed of the transfer of a civil network to another military authority. An example of this transfer is the relief in place or transfer of authority with one military unit replacing or relieving another military unit. When, in the return to competition, it is determined that a civil network retains value to the theater commander, it may be retained to support other requirements (for example, theater security cooperation). In the event the civil network is retained, considerations are similar to transferring a civil network, except in retention a U.S. Army or DOD entity remains associated with the civil network.
4-49. The final type of culmination of a civil network is termination of the network. There could be many reasons for the termination of a civil network. One reason may be that the civil network leaders or individuals may have changed loyalties, direction, or willingness to support U.S. initiatives. If this happens, then CA
forces must make recommendations to the commander to begin the process to ultimately terminate the relationship with the best possible outcomes for the Army mission. Another aspect of termination of a civil network might be the fact that the capability, resource, or capacity is no longer needed or is not a requirement for U.S. strategic goals. The civil network may be incorporated into another entityfor instance, a police force being incorporated into a new government's security plan and force structure. There may not be a need for ramped-up resource development or dispersion now that Army forces might be leaving the AO. In these cases of termination, all parties involved should ensure that the termination is conducted with the utmost respect and care due to possible political and civil ramifications of the termination.

4-50. All these culminating events for a civil network require detailed analysis and mission planning to ensure proper disposition of the civil networks. It is incumbent upon the CA force and staff to ensure proper recognition of these civil networks is identified and codified by the commanders at all echelons. Proper handover to civil authorities of these civil networks is critical to further enabling the new government, providing additional stability, and ensuring future access of U.S. forces within the HN.

## Civil Network Development And Evaluation Outputs

4-51. Once the identified civil networks have been developed and evaluated by CA forces, there should be a fairly accurate (although incomplete) understanding of the civil component of the OE and a more updated COP. The data and information collected by CA forces updates and informs the CAO running estimate, as well as all the other staff's running estimates. Civil knowledge gained on the civil network's information, capabilities, resources, and capacities provides the input into Army planning processes (targeting, IPB, CPB, and S-4 requirements) for the development of branches and sequels to current or future operations. The primary outputs from the development and evaluation steps of CNDE include


Confirming or denying gaps in the civil component.

Updating the COP with links and nodes and civil network relationships.

Linking neutral and unknown organizations for common purposes.

Refining the civil information collection plan.

Refining the CNE plan.

Categorizing civil networks based on value and effects they can provide.

Integrating MOPs and MOEs.

Defining capabilities, resources, and capacities that CA forces can leverage to enable the commander.

Validating the civil network's ability to provide the capability, resources, or capacities to the mission.

## Confirm Gaps In The Civil Component

4-52. CA forces and staff at each echelon must identify any gaps in CCIRs, PIRs, or other civil knowledge requirements for the command. Once these steps have been completed within the CNDE process, enough information should be available to identify critical gaps in information that may positively or negatively affect the mission. CA forces should have identified all of the strengths, weaknesses, and vulnerabilities to all of the civil networks up to this point within the OE. Once these gaps are identified, they help in the refinement of the CNE plan and the civil information collection plan. This, in turn, focuses finite CA
resources and capabilities to collect further data and information on any gaps that have been identified.

4-53. CA forces can also assist other staff entities in providing necessary information on any gaps in the primary staff's requirements. CA staffs are to inform the other staff's running estimates and planning processes to ensure the most updated information is available. The information, capabilities, resources, and capacities that civil networks possess can enable other staff member requirements to support the mission. This sharing of information is critical to the success of the operations and, ultimately, to the stabilization of the AO.

## Updating The Common Operational Picture

4-54. CA staffs take all the updated data and information on identified civil networks and update the COP
for the operation. This updated COP provides a clear picture of the civil networks within the AO, as well as their capabilities, resources, and capacities that can be leveraged by CA forces to enable the commander's plan. Knowledge of the civil networks within the AO also allows other staff entities to update their running estimates and plan accordingly. These civil networks are annotated with the LOE, end state, or goals to support and provide effects within the civil component.

4-55. The identified links and nodes within the civil network, as well as with other networks, are critical in understanding how the civil component is tied to the operational goals laid out in the mission planning. This updating of the COP also provides a way to depict neutral civil networks with possible threat networks and then link unknown organizations with neutral or supportive civil networks. The knowledge that is presented to the COP also identifies threat or hostile civil networks so the staff can determine the best means to deny, defeat, or neutralize those threat networks.

## Refinement Of The Civil Information Collection Plan

4-56. Once all this updated information and data from existing civil networks has been compiled and evaluated, the outflow returns to the civil information collection plan. This is the first step in the CKI process. CA forces refine and focusat each echelonthe knowledge received on civil networks during CR, CE, and CND. More information may be required on certain networks or more civil information may be required to fill a gap identified in the CNDE process. This cyclical process continues throughout the entire mission; it is also applicable to the development of branches and sequels to current or future operations. For example, if something happens in the OE, then what will CA forces do to counter or enhance that event?

## Refinement Of The Civil Network Engagement Plan

4-57. As discussed in the previous paragraph, the outputs to the development and evaluation of civil networks inform and refine the CNE plan. This is a continuous process that continues throughout the entire mission.

This knowledge guides the refinement and focus of CR, CE, and CND. CA forces then reengage identified gaps of information in civil networks by echelon. Consequently, they may reengage a civil network's leaders to clarify the capabilities, resources, and capacities of the network. CA forces also ask clarifying questions, such as, "What is the position of the leadership on U.S. policy and strategies in the AO?" Once this information is collected, it is returned to the CAO staff and incorporated into mission planning and running estimates. Figure 4-4 depicts the network engagement concept.

## Categorized Civil Networks

4-58. Once this information and data has been collected, CA forces categorize each of the civil networks within the AO. The civil networks are categorized by the capabilities, resources, and capacities that CA forces leverage to enable the mission of the commander. These abilities of the civil network must be measured by MOPs and MOEs so that CA forces can ensure that the civil network is able to provide the effects necessary once they are mobilized. It is important that CA forces understand the dynamics between these civil networks, especially if they have similar attributes and capabilities. CA forces must understand which civil networks are favorable supporters of the U.S. operations and which may cause friction during operations.

4-59. CA forces determine, by event or phase, when these civil networks are mobilized. They ask questions such as, "Will the civil networks be able to self-mobilize, or will there need to be an event to mobilize them?"
CA forces and staff determine the capabilities to be used to enable military operations and develop timelines to apply them. Categorizing also provides a list of which civil networks are more valuable to the operation andif a network is lost or degradedhow might it be replaced to gain the same effects. The end state of categorization is knowing all the aspects possible of the civil networks within the AO so that they can be leveraged appropriately.

## Validation Of The Civil Networks

4-60. At this point in the CNDE process, CA forces validate the identified civil networks for which they can actually provide the desired effects when called upon to do so. It is critical to know whether the civil networks, once mobilized, can provide the effects and sustain them as long as necessary. CA forces must ensure that the analysis of the civil network's capabilities, resources, and capacities is complete and provides the best information possible on the use of the civil network. Testing these capabilities is one of the best methods to ensure that the civil network can accomplish the desired effects when necessary.

4-61. The leaders and members of the network must be validated. Validation ensures the ability to carry out the necessary requirements to complete the civil network's mission once mobilized. Continuous vetting of network leaders and members is critical, as some may change their minds, change their loyalties, or be under duress. Such conditions cause friction within the operations. If CA forces find that a civil network cannot accomplish or sustain necessary effects, another civil network must be found to execute that effect. This validation assures CA forces they can rely on the effect being available at the time it is needed. It also provides the commander with the necessary capabilities to accomplish the assigned mission. Once the civil networks are validated, they are ready for mobilization when the desired effects are necessary.

## Chapter 5 Integration Of Mobilized Civil Networks

CA forces integrate established and developed civil networks with operations. CA
forces integrate these capabilities with Psychological Operations and Special Forces capabilities to further enhance situational understanding and information dominance within the operational area. These combined capabilities extend the commander's operational goals, end states, and campaign objectives. CA forces integrate mobilized friendly civil networks to


Bring collective action, social pressure, or political pressure around an area of common interest in support of the commander's objectives.

Meet or enable governance and government operations.

Preserve combat power.

Provide early warning of threats and increasing shared understanding of the OE.

Enable the commander to find, disrupt, and defeat threats in the civil component with minimal use
of combat power.

Enable the commander to cause multiple dilemmas for enemy or adversary elements through the execution of civil network effects.

## Develop Common Interest

5-1. CA forces enable mobilized civil networks to bring collective action, social pressure, or political pressure around an area of common interest in support of the commander's objectives. These civil networks can provide effects that influence the civil populace to support Army operations. They can provide information that protects the civil populace and prevents it from affecting the mission. Doing so provides freedom of movement for operational forces and extends the commander's influence into the civil component
(where that influence typically would not exist).

## Enable Governance And Government Operations

5-2. Mobilized civil networks related to governance and civil administration are necessary for the stabilization of an AO during and after large-scale combat operations. These civil networks can provide additional resources to stabilize the civil component and assist in the transfer of governance operations to the appropriate civil authorities. CA forces can provide collaboration with these types of civil networks through their training and expertise. Governance operations pertain to the administration of a civil government, whereas government operations pertain to the essential services required by the civil populace for day-to-day living. Civil networks that have capabilities, resources, or capacities to enable the return of essential services can be mobilized to ease the burden of these services being provided by military forces. CA functional specialists that have experience, knowledge, or understanding of these essential services can collaborate with these civil networks.

## Preserve Combat Power

5-3. Mobilized civil networks can enable CA forces to preserve combat power for the commander.

Mobilized civil networks provide effects that support the commander's LOE, end states, and goals. They deliver information, capabilities, resources, and capacities that reduce the need to employ Army resources and combat power against selected operational requirements. This enables the commander to use that combat power in other areas of the AO where it is more needed. These civil networks enable a more efficient and effective use of finite resources to meet mission goals and end states.

## Provide Early Warning

5-4. Friendly networks aid in providing early warning of threats and increasing shared understanding of the OE. This is done both actively and passively. Through training and coordination, civil networks can actively report on specific data points that link to direct threat activity or point to trends of increased instability in a particular community or subcommunity. For example, as local human sensors in the civil environment, network members may be the first to identify the arrival of threat actors or the results of threat destabilizing efforts in their neighborhoods, municipalities, or provinces. Likewise, civil networks can passively demonstrate indicators and warnings of increased threat influence throughout an AO or portions of an AO. For example, the uncharacteristic missing of deadlines or the sudden reluctance of network members to share information or resources may indicate changes in the environment caused by increased threat activity against the network or the formal or informal networks of those particular network members.

## Enabling The Commander

5-5. Developed by CA forces, mobilized civil networks enable the commander to find, disrupt, and defeat threats in the civil component. These threats can be to the IPI, the civil network, or military forces within the AO. Once a threat is identified by friendly civil networks, they can provide the information and details that enables the commander and planners to initiate an operation to remove the threat using minimal U.S.

resources. This allows the commander to focus these U.S. resources elsewhere within the AO. These civil networks can enable operational reach into the civil component to manage the threat. Without these civil networks to provide early warning, the commander may find out about the threat with insufficient time to engage before the threat begins to disrupt operations. CA forces are critical to the development of these civil networks that can help prevent damage to personnel, equipment, and infrastructure required for Army operations.

## Civil Network Integration

5-6. The integration of civil networks into CAO ultimately enables the commander to achieve operational end states. CA forces leverage these civil networks to meet the operational requirements placed upon the CA force through mission orders. CA forces collaborate with mobilized civil networks to utilize their information, capabilities, resources, and capacities and incorporate them into CAO.
5-7. Once integrated into operations, CA forces utilize these civil networks to engage the OE and the information environment to


Find, disrupt, and defeat threats in the civil component, both directly and indirectly.

Increase operational reach and reduce operational risk to the force.

Increase shared understanding of the civil component of the OE.

Achieve desired effects within the AO.

Provide access through CR and CE in denied areas.

Provide or enable governance functions in administration and assist in stability.

Provide or enable government functions through building capacity of essential services.

Increase freedom of action.

Establish continuous civil information flow (early warning, updates, feedback) to the commander and staff.

Enable unity of effort.

## Increase Operational Reach

5-8. When integrated with ongoing operations, these networks can extend the operational reach of the commander to access denied, politically sensitive, or normally inaccessible areas, thereby creating multiple dilemmas for an adversary force. The integration of these networks can increase the commander's ability to achieve desired objectives within the AO and reduce operational risk to the force.

5-9. Using civil networks that already exist within the OE and understand and know the pertinent actors provides a tremendous value to the commander. They can provide critical and timely information that is actionable and can be trusted because CA forces have already vetted their loyalties and willingness to support U.S. operations. This enables the commander's decision cycle to be more effective because decisions can be made quickly and with a high degree of confidence, bringing to bear the necessary effects within the AO to reinforce desired outcomes.

## Increased Shared Understanding Of The Operational Environment

5-10. Once civil networks are mobilized and integrated into current operations, they become increasingly important. They become information nodes and networks that provide timely civil information through the CA force structure to the command and staff. The information and data provided by the civil network is then analyzed and evaluated by CA forces and modified into civil knowledge through the CKI process. This integrated civil knowledge informs all of the warfighting functions, updates the CAO running estimates of the CA staff, as well as the rest of the staff, and updates and focuses the Army planning processes.
5-11. This timely civil knowledge that mobilized civil networks provides is timely, actionable, and critical to making proper decisions on the effects necessary to accomplish mission end states and goals. It provides feedback on how well certain effects are executed and about the outcomes of those effects. Ultimately, this increased shared understanding of the OE leads to unity of effort and unified action with all entities in the AO and builds a clear and understandable COP. Finally, these civil networks can provide early warning of threats to the OE so that the commander and staff can determine the most reasonable COA to counter
the threat.

## Achieving Desired Effects

5-12. Achieving desired effects is critical to the success of the commander's mission. Under the management of CA forces, mobilized civil networks enable these desired effects within the civil component of the OE.

Often, the command doesn't possess the best equipment, personnel, or capability to enact a certain effect that is needed within the civil component. Existing civil networks that are managed by CA forces at each echelon can be mobilized to provide that effect. This allows the commander to use military resources and capabilities in other critical areas of the battlefield. In large-scale combat operations environments, this is a critical resource that the commander can use to create stability in rear areas, while the military forces are focused on the actual battle at the FLOT.
5-13. Civil networks can provide governance or government capabilities to help the civilian population and help to keep them safe and away from combat operations. This provides freedom of maneuver for the commander and an efficient use of force structure that extends the commander's culmination point during operations. Ultimately, once there is movement back to competition, these types of civil networks are transferred over to the proper civilian authorities. Achieving desired effects established by the commander is critical to the consolidation of gains and transfer of control back to civilian authorities.

## Provide Access In Denied Areas

5-14. When feasible, these networks are developed and expanded during competition by CA forces. Under the control of a commander, the networks may be further utilized during large-scale combat operations to conduct CR and CE in their designated AO or within areas where the commander and assigned forces do not have physical access. Economic civil networks are an example of this access. They operate within the AO
and across areas (for example, areas beyond the FLOT) to provide services and resources they are designed to sell, trade, or provide. These same networks can be used to gain information on dispositions of IPI in these areas and can provide ideas on how to create effects in these areas to ensure support for future Army operations. CA forces provide the oversight of these civil networks to ensure they act, or will act, in a way that supports the operational requirements of the commander.
5-15.  Access to areas by any civil network beyond the FLOT can provide information on threats, population moves, or situations that may affect the military operations as they move forward. This type of information becomes invaluable to the decision-making processes of the commander and staff for future or current operations. This provides freedom of maneuver and prevents exposure of U.S. forces and equipment to unnecessary dangers.

## Enabling Governance And Government Functions

5-16. CA forces are required to conduct TG as necessary to enable Army operations and transition those operations through the stability framework to the proper civilian authorities. This is a critical aspect of consolidating gains and transitioning back to competition. TG is essential for maintaining stability in periods of competition, promoting resilience in periods of crisis and assuring continuity of governance during armed conflict. DODD 5100.01 directs the Army to establish a military government when occupying enemy territory, and DODD 2000.13 identifies CAO responsibilities within a military government. Governance and government activities are two primary areas that civil networks can leverage to provide capabilities, resources, and capacities in support of TG. CA forces are responsible to manage these civil networks and provide timely effects desired by the commander.

5-17. Military government specialists are a CA capability that provides government function expertise when the HN civil authorities are unable to execute these responsibilities. Officers and noncommissioned officers provide governance expertise throughout the AO and at every echelon until these requirements can be transferred to the appropriate and legitimate civil authorities.

## Governance Requirements

5-18. CA forces provide TG expertise to military commanders that enables interaction and influencing of civil populations and institutions. CA forces execute TG with an understanding of civil factors throughout the competition continuum. These governance requirements focus on administration activities within a country occupied by the U.S. military. CA forces can develop, mobilize, and manage civil networks possessing capabilities, resources, and capacities that support governance to produce desired effects within the AO. These civil factors include


Security.

Justice.

Reconciliation.

Humanitarian assistance.

Social well-being.

Governance and participation.

Economic stabilization.

Infrastructure.

Culture.
5-19. Utilizing civil networks, CA forces build capacity that supplements or replaces requirements with regard to civil security, cooperation, and services. This reduces the burden on U.S. forces to provide for the needs of the population. Without this capacity, a hostile civilian population (or subset of it) can threaten the operations of friendly forces and undermine mission legitimacy. A supportive civilian population and accompanying civil networks provide resources, freedom of maneuver, and information that facilitate friendly operations. The use of local civil networks for governance issues is more acceptable to the civil population and enables stability-focused missions being conducted by CA forces at all echelons.

## Government Functions

5-20. CA forces conduct TG to assure appropriate control and the continuation of government functions during times of destabilization. CA forces assure the effective transition of governance from civilian control to military control and then back to civilian control as smoothly and efficiently as possible. Mobilized local civil networks that possess knowledge about infrastructure and essential services provide or maintain services that are critical to the stabilization and restoration of government functions.
5-21. CA forces can leverage these types of civil networks to assist them in the execution of TG. All CA
missions are essential to proper execution of TG, but TG has two primary missions:


Provide transitional military authority.

Provide support to civil administration.
5-22. DODD 5100.01 mandates that the DOD maintains the capability to conduct military government operations. The DOD supports this mandate through TG. These missions give the Army the capability to better understand its military government role and to execute the legal responsibilities to the residents of liberated and occupied territories. These responsibilities are defined by international law in the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict and the 1899 Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes.
5-23. CA force structure contains civil sector expertise within focus areas that fall under the five government function specialty areas. CA military government specialists are technically qualified and experienced individuals who advise, enable, and assist commanders and their direct civilian counterparts with stabilizing and providing governance expertise for the OE until appropriate civilian control is possible. Within their area of specialization, they possess the critical skills necessary to establish, support, or reestablish capability and capacity, as well as to understand the regional and local impact of culture on that capability.

## Increase Freedom Of Action

5-24. Sustainment capabilities determine the depth and duration of Army operations. Successful sustainment enables freedom of action by increasing the number of options available to the commander. Sustainment is essential for retaining and exploiting the initiative. The sustainment warfighting function consists of
four elements:


Logistics.

Financial management.

Personnel services.

Health service support.
5-25. CA forces work with other information advantage capabilities to plan, prepare, execute, and assess communication activities. CNDE is used to understand and shape the information environment. It creates effects in the cognitive dimension that support decision dominance and freedom of action. CA forces coordinate and synchronize objectives, effects, MOEs, and MOPs with the other information advantage capabilities.
5-26. Civil networks are identified and selected to be influenced, enhanced, enabled, and integrated into operations to support the commander's mission and update the COP. They increase shared understanding of the OE, create freedom of action, and/or disrupt threats directly or indirectly. These civil networks can provide sustainment capabilities, resources, and capacities that reduce the requirements on military resources to conduct these operations. This enables the commander to use military resources to sustain more critical areas of the battlefield.

5-27. In consolidation and support areas, CA forces partner with local governments and organizations through CNDE and CMI to ensure that there is no disruption to logistics supply by adversaries in the civil component. Logistics convoysespecially those contracted locally during operational preparation of the environment and stability operationsare ripe for exploitation from criminal elements. CA forces, partnering with local civil networks and governments, help identify and disrupt criminal enterprises that may be associated with enemy elements. This action benefits the security of logistics supplies into the close area. Greater civil security in the rear area frees military resources that the commander can push to the FLOT. It also allows for more reliable logistics chains to support elements on the offensive.

## Continuous Civil Information Flow

5-28. CA forces collect, collate, process, analyze, and evaluate civil information in order to produce valuable and timely civil knowledge for integration and dissemination. CAO involve direct interaction with IPI and unified action partners for the collection, collation, and dissemination of civil information. They are a capability employed in the information environment to create and/or assess effects and shape operationally desirable conditions. Mobilized civil networks provide a continuous flow of civil information that CA forces analyze and evaluate at all echelons. They integrate it into all of the Army planning processes, update the COP, and inform the running estimates of the entire staff. This civil knowledge reduces planning cycles and decision-making requirements
5-29. At all echelons, CA forces identify, classify, and propose COAs to reduce vulnerabilities and leverage strengths within the civil component that could affect the overall mission completion. CA forces accomplish this through CR, CE, and CND. These mission tasks are focused by the civil information collection plan.
5-30. CA forces (including individuals and teams) identify individuals, organizations, and existing networks of people who are able to provide civil information, produce desired effects, or fulfill resource requirements in the OE. CA forces are trained and required to develop newor engage existingcivil networks within the civil populations, government organizations and NGOs, the private sector, unified action partners, and others who reside or conduct business in and around the immediate AO.

## Civil Preparation Of The Battlefield

5-31. CPB is conducted by all CA forces at all echelons. It is critical to informing the CNDE process and provides direction for the engagement and development of specific civil networks. CPB analyzes and evaluates the political, economic, and social operational variables in an area of interest to determine opportunities and risks in an AO. The goal is to provide the commander with the capability to enhance, enable, or provide governance. The analysis and evaluation of civil information gained through CNDE, area studies, initial and deliberate assessments, and other CA processes is developed into civil knowledge. CA forces integrate civil knowledge into CAO and all Army planning processes and use this civil knowledge to inform the warfighting functions. This civil knowledge


Provides commanders with a greater situational understanding of the OE.

Enables the commander's visualization of the battlefield.

Provides options that facilitate decision-making and enables information advantage.

Allows planners to develop effective plans and operations.
5-32. Information-sharing systems must use the lowest classification possible to ensure the widest distribution of information needed to coordinate with civilian agencies and organizations operating in the same operational area as military forces. During large-scale combat operations or in response to a disaster, the organic military information infrastructure enables CA forces to rapidly establish an information-sharing architecture to store, integrate, and disseminate critical civil information. This is accomplished by tying local civilian entities into the military system or by providing data connections to civilian systems. This exchange of information increases the amount of information collected and supports an improved situational understanding, increased trust with other entities within the AO, unity of effort, and a more detailed COP.

## Find, Disrupt, And Defeat Threats In The Civil Component

5-33. The role of CA is to engage and leverage the civil component of the OE while enhancing, enabling, or providing governance. CA forces accomplish this through the execution of the CA core competencies throughout the range of military operations and across the competition continuum. These CA missions are designed to provide and enable commanders with the capabilities to find, disrupt, and defeat threats within the civil component.
5-34. Threats in the civil component could be ineffective government, infrastructure degradation, criminal threats, asymmetric threats, and other factors that lead to unstable environments. Through CAO, CA forces enable mission command, increase situational understanding, preserve combat power, and consolidate gains.

These actions support the strategic objective of establishing a secure and stable OE that is consistent with U.S. interests. CA forces are specifically organized, trained, and resourced to address the civil environment and to integrate civil knowledge, resources, and considerations into decision making during activities that span the competition continuum.

5-35. When civil networks managed by CA forces at each echelon are mobilized and integrated with ongoing operations, they can extend the operational reach of the commander to access denied, politically sensitive, or normally inaccessible areas, thereby creating multiple dilemmas for an adversarial force. The integration of these networks can increase the commander's ability to reach desired objectives within the AO and reduce operational risk to the force. This critical knowledge provided by these civil networks reduces the planning time to place desired effects on specific targeted threats that have been identified by CA forces.

## Enable Unity Of Effort

5-36. *Unity of effort* is coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization that is the product of successful unified action
(JP-1). CA forces engage IPI and unified action partners to establish and maintain relationships, civil networks, and communication channels in order to enable unity of effort. Unified action requires the synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort. Each of the CA core competencies inherently supports these requirements by bringing military and civil capabilities together in formal and informal ways to achieve common objectives. Early integration of CA forces into plans, operations, and campaigns is critical to freedom of action, reduces operational friction, and enables unified action at the onset of military operations.

5-37. Commanders understand that they do not operate independently, but as part of a larger force united by a common operational purpose. They integrate, coordinate, and synchronize their actions with the rest of the force to achieve the overall objective of the operation. CA forces enable the commander to extend mission command influence beyond military forces and into the civil networks, organizations, and institutions over which the commander does not have command and control. These civil networks are built and integrated into operations through CNDE, and partnerships are managed through CMI. Integration, coordination, and synchronization between military forces and civilian elements is crucial to mission success and achieving unity of effort.

## Civil Affairs Focus During Mobilization Of Civil Networks

5-38. Civil networks are mobilized based upon the unit's mission requirements and the COA selected by the commander. The CAO staff at each echelon must determine when to mobilize designated civil networks. This is based upon the operational synchronization matrix that integrates all Army capabilities toward a given mission set. The mobilization is based on phases or a specific timing sequence that enables the mission. Decision points are determined by the staff and executed by the appropriate CA force by echelon. It is possible for the staff to correlate the populations to named areas of interest and individuals to target areas of interest. These mobilized civil networks are leverage until their capabilities, resources, or capacities are no longer required or until the effects they create have accomplished the assigned task and purpose.
5-39. Once civil networks have been mobilized, there are multiple requirements that CA forces and staffs at all echelons must execute for the proper synchronization, coordination, and integration of these civil networks into the operations. Constant evaluation of mobilized civil networks is overarching and critical to the CA
force overseeing the civil network. The following are critical considerations for CA forces to plan for during the time that civil networks are mobilized:


Logistics.

Communications.

Timing.

Liaison officers.

Monitoring of objectives and milestones.

Continuity of operations, including succession plan for key leaders and nodes.

Transfer of control.

## Influence In Partnering

5-40. Propaganda, deception, disinformation, misinformation, and the ability of individuals and groups to influence populations through technologies reflect the increasing speed of civil interaction. CA forces enable focused insights and understanding of the complex relationships and influences affecting civil societies, institutions, and populations within the AO. This enables commanders and their forces to have a clear understanding of the COP. CA forces provide unique capabilities to engage the civil component, thereby enabling consolidation activities that are fundamental to the stability of the affected population and civic institutions.
5-41. CA forces understand the sensitive political aspects of military operations. They establish relationships with formal and informal influencers and carefully manage those relationships to achieve positive outcomes during diplomatically sensitive interactions. CA forces must continue to partner during mobilization to build and foster the relationships that have been forged during the CNDE process. Supported commanders utilize CA forces to extend command and control influence where it is not normally present or established to leverage the civil entities within the operational area and achieve desired end states.

## Measuring Effects

5-42. CA forces and staff develop MOEs and MOPs prior to the mobilization of civil networks. These measures are then used to determine whether the desired effects are being achieved and, if not, why. This helps CA forces determine if the effects should stop, be altered, or continue as they are. CA forces track the effects and brief the commander, who then makes the decision. CA forces conduct CE and CR in the areas of execution to determine


Whether the tasks of the civil network were accomplished in accordance with the civil networks MOPs.

Whether the actions and effects conducted by the civil networks were effective.

What impact the actions had on the local populace and government systems.
5-43. Commanders must initiate transition planning prior to or during the initial phases of operation planning to ensure adequate attention is given to this critical area. Leaders may base the criteria for termination or transition on events, MOEs, availability of resources, or a specific date. Transitions may occur independently, sequentially, or simultaneously across the AO or within a theater. Ideally, U.S. forces execute each type of transition according to synchronized transition plans. Depending on the situation, CAO in transition operations may be


Terminated.

Transferred to follow-on forces.

Transitioned to other government agencies, IPI, or international organizations.

## Validate Resourcing Requirements

5-44. When civil networks are mobilized, CA forces at each echelon must ensure that resources that have been planned for actually still exist. Civil networks can change over time, and a constant review of capabilities, resources, and capacities is necessary to ensure that the civil network can execute the desired effects. To maximize desired effects, resources that are designed to enhance the capabilities of the civil networks must be available when the civil network is mobilized. At each echelon, CA staffs ensure that each civil network possesses the resources (or that necessary resources are available) to execute the desired effects when the civil network is mobilized. They achieve this by constantly reviewing civil knowledge provided by the force and by reviewing the CAO running estimate. CA forces also identify whether the resources of a mobilized civil network can sustain as required. If they cannot, CA forces may need to gain the resources that can augment the civil network to accomplish the mission.

## Facilitate Operations

5-45. It is critical that CA forces realize they are not in charge of these mobilized civil networks. The CA
force is responsible for synchronizing, coordinating, and integrating these civil networks into operations. By facilitating the integration of civil networks, CA forces are critical to the commander achieving required end states and goals. CA forces are the capability that commanders must use to affect the civil component and develop the relationships necessary with these civil networks to provide effects that support operations. The ability of CA forces to foster these relationships enables the commander to extend command influence into denied, hostile, or other areas not normally influenced by the commander.

## Synchronize, Coordinate, And Integrate

5-46. At the time of mobilization, these tasks are critical for CA forces and staffs at every echelon. CA forces conduct continuous CR, CE, and CND to ensure that the proper integration of civil network capabilities, resources, and capacities are fully engaged in the execution of desired effects. This process is continuous in order to provide up-to-date civil knowledge to the commander and staff so they may update estimates and ensure the mission is being conducted as planned. It is always critical to ensure that the civil component of the OE is updated and is reflected in the current COP.
5-47. Branches and sequels to current and future operations are derived from this process and drive the resourcing of critical and finite military resources within the AO. This process, when done in a proper and efficient manner by CA forces, extends the commander's culmination point and conserves the force for
future needs.

## Foster Unity Of Effort

5-48. CA forces engage IPI and unified action partners to establish and maintain relationships, civil networks, and communication channels in order to enable unity of effort. Unified action requires the synchronization, coordination, and integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort. Each of the CA core competencies inherently supports these requirements by bringing military and civil capabilities together, in formal and informal ways, to achieve common objectives. Early integration of CA forces into plans, operations, and campaigns is critical to freedom of action, reduces operational friction, and enables unified action at the onset of military operations.

5-49. During the MDMP, the G-9 or S-9 provides the commander with an analysis of the civil factors that shape the OE. As a part of mission analysis, the METT-TC (I) mission variables are evaluated for those aspects of the OE that directly or indirectly affect a mission. The CAO staff provides the commander with a detailed civil considerations analysis that focuses on how ASCOPE affects the civil component of the AO.

CAO planners further develop and implement their plans in conjunction with civilian officials from other USG departments and agencies, and participating nonmilitary organizations, in order to synchronize U.S. and multinational efforts. The CAO staff at every echelon provide this analysis ensuring civil knowledge, in conjunction with CKI and CMI, is integrated with unified action partners to achieve unity of effort.

## Mitigate Interference

5-50. During the commencement of offensive operations, CA units focus on establishing or reestablishing contact with civil authorities or civil networks. This enables situational understanding (which enhances the commander's decision making), targeting, execution of effects, and reduction of civil interference (which preserves combat power). CA units can also be allocated or task-organized to engage, assess, and evaluate the civil components of bypassed population centers to begin the stabilization processes.

5-51. CA forces must evaluate the capability and capacity of the HN to provide services. They must also determine the ability of other USG agencies, international agencies, NGOs, and contractors to provide support. CA forces, as required, lead and direct these identified capabilities and capacities until the proper civilian control is enacted. The goal is to address sources of conflict or friction, foster resilience of the HN, and create conditions that enable sustainable peace and security. CA forces conduct CAO in support of decisive action to reduce interference through CNDE, CMI, and PRC.
5-52. During offensive operations, civil networks that have been identified, developed, and integrated into operations by CA forces perform governance functions and PRC measures to ensure civilian interference with military movement is greatly reduced. Proper utilization of PRC in consolidation and support areas mitigates the need for commanders to dispatch troops to control these areas, thereby preserving combat power and effectively using finite resources. Effective use of PRC in consolidation areas increases the freedom of movement between consolidation areas and close areas. This allows commanders to


Maintain the initiative and extend their culmination point at the FLOT.

Enable joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration.

Allocate military resources when and where they are needed.

## Staff Integration

5-53. The commander's intent links the mission, CONOPS, and tasks to subordinate units. CAO staff integrate the capabilities of supporting CA forces into the operation plan in support of the commander's intent. CAO staff also integrate civil knowledge gained through CNDE, CKI, and CMI into the operational planning cycle of the commander all the way through execution of CKI. Paragraph 3 (Execution) of
Annex K (Civil Affairs Operations) to the operation plan of the supported command addresses the CAO scheme of support and subordinate unit tasks. Paragraph 3 of Annex K also coordinates instructions that CA and other Army forces execute to accomplish the commander's intent. The execution paragraph outlines what the supported commander wants CAO to achieve in support of the mission.
5-54. The CNDE process is an independent CA process that is integrated into the MDMP. The process is conducted at the same time as MDMP and informs the staff regarding the civil component of the operational area. Commanders lead the staff in understanding, visualizing, describing, directing, and assessing CAO based on integrated civil knowledge. The inputs from the CNDE process are continually integrated to inform the operations, intelligence, and targeting processes through CKI, which is the essential focal point that civil knowledge is integrated into these processes. Figure 5-1 depicts how the CNDE process is involved in the integration of civil networks into the Army's operational processes.

5-55. CA forces execute CNDE, CKI, TG, and CMI to enhance the understanding of the OE, visualization of the battlefield, and decision-making of the commander and staff so that they may accomplish missions and achieve unified action. In the absence of an integrated CA staff, CA forces assigned by echelon are required to conduct CAO planning requirements. The following CA elements provide direct input to or augment the planning process:


J-9/G-9/S-9.

Theater CA planning team.

CA planning team.

CAO working groups.

Security force assistance brigade CAO staff section.

CA company staff.

CMOC staff.

CA teams.

## Disseminate Civil Information

5-56. CA forces are specifically organized, trained, and resourced to address the civil environment and to integrate civil knowledge, resources, and considerations into decision making during activities that span the competition continuum. At each echelon, the CAO staff is responsible for integrating civil knowledge into the processes and warfighting functions of the supported Army commands. CAO staff integrate civil knowledge through the Army's knowledge-integrating processes and through integration with unified action partners.

5-57. CA forces at all echelons are focused on the collection of civil data and information by the civil collection plan. The civil collection plan is a product resulting from CPB that directs CA forces to conduct CR, CE, or CND to identify gaps in the CCIR, resources and capabilities within the civil component, and civil strengths and vulnerabilities. CKI enables the commander and staff to understand and visualize the OE more clearly and provides situational awareness for all elements in the OE. The integration of actionable civil knowledge provides the commander and subordinate unit commanders the ability to achieve decision superiority.

5-58. Providing this civil information to the command and to civil entities within the AO enables the commander to synchronize military operations with the civil populace and enables the civil populace to understand the parameters of ongoing operations. This helps keep the civilian population secure and prevents them from causing friction on the battlefield. Proper dissemination of information synchronizes the staff with timely data that can provide actionable information to develop branches and sequels, inform running estimates, and update the COP for the commander.

## Conduct After Action Reviews

5-59. CA forces must conduct post-execution AARs with each of the mobilized civil networks. Doing so enables the personnel and leaders of the civil network to evaluate how the mission unfolded once mobilized and to gauge whether the mission was effectively executed. They also provide information on how the civil population received or reacted to the effects provided during the operations. In conjunction with the AAR, CA forces should conduct CE and CR based on the information provided by the civil networks during the AAR process. This evaluated civil information can help determine if the comments from the AAR are consistent with the actual situation on the ground.

5-60. CA staffs collect, analyze, and evaluate all data from these processes to develop civil knowledge products. The commander and staff use these products to update the COP, determine branches and sequels to current and future operations, update staff running estimates, and provide feedback to the civil networks on future operations as necessary. CA staffs then compile civil knowledge from AARs to determine whether to refine civil network requirements, terminate them, or transition them to another appropriate authority. If possible, this transitional planning should be done prior to the end of operations to ensure these civil networks are adjudicated accordingly.

5-61. The development and mobilization of civil networks by CA forces is an essential element of CAO.

Integrating mobilized civil networks into operations provides access to local information, capabilities, resources, and capacities to accomplish mission goals and end states. These civil networks must be constantly evaluated to ensure that they are capable of providing the desired effect and to ensure that their loyalties have not changed toward the goals of the U.S. forces conducting operations. CA forces must use MOEs and MOPs to establish if the mobilized civil network is accomplishing the desired effects to meet the commander's intent. Finally, CA forces must ensure there is a transition plan for mobilized civil networks when they are no longer mobilized to support the mission. Proper use of civil networks enables CA forces to secure the victory in all OEs around the world.


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## Appendix A Civil Affairs Tactical Mission Tasks

The tactical mission tasks describe the results or effects the commander wants to achievethe *what* and *why* of a mission statement. The *what* is an effect that is normally measurable. The *why* provides the purpose of the mission. They provide mission task statements that align with current Army methodologies for issuing mission tasks to subordinate elements required to execute them. This provides commanders with an understanding of CA capabilities when developing COAs for different missions. The design of these mission tasks codifies CA doctrinal taxonomy with mission statements that assist in the standardization of language within the CA branch as a whole. They provide commanders with an understanding of CA capabilities when developing COAs for different missions. The CA tactical mission tasks of CR, CE, and CND are described below.

## Civil Reconnaissance

A-1. The tactical mission task of CR begins with the commander's guidance and is driven by the CCIR with collection being conducted at the tactical level. CR is a targeted, planned, and coordinated observation and evaluation of those specific civil aspects of the OE. CA forces use CR to gather information from the IPI to develop civil networks by focusing on the factors that define the civil component (ASCOPE). CR
concentrates on the civil information plan that synchronizes CA collection efforts with the CCIR and specific requests for information during the operations process.

A-2. The commander normally employs CR when the mission requires information regarding the civil component of the OE. All CR is focused by the civil information collection plan, which synchronizes CA collection efforts with the unit CCIR and any specific information requests. This task includes the identification, observation, confirmation, location, detection, and investigation of activities or individuals to answer civil information gaps. The commander may assign the force conducting CR-specific guidance based on the current COP. However, specific mission details should be left to the discretion of the CA team unit executing the CR as long as they are focused through the civil information collection plan and meet the commander's intent. Figure A-1 depicts how CA forces execute CR as a tactical mission task to achieve specific purposes.

| Tactical Mission Task    | Purposes            |
|--------------------------|---------------------|
| -                        |                     |
|                          | Identify            |
| -                        |                     |
|                          | Refute              |
| -                        |                     |
|                          | Monitor             |
| -                        |                     |
|                          | Observe             |
| -                        |                     |
|                          | Locate              |
| -                        |                     |
|                          | Detect              |
| Civil Reconnaissance     |                     |
| -                        |                     |
|                          | Assess (initial)    |
| -                        |                     |
|                          | Assess (deliberate) |
| -                        |                     |
|                          | Inspect             |
| -                        |                     |
|                          | Verify              |
| -                        |                     |
|                          | Survey              |
| -                        |                     |
|                          | Investigate         |

A-3. The steps of the CR tactical mission task include

Identification of the desired outcome or required information (purposes for the CR).

Identify.

Observe.

Assess (initial).

Verify.

Refute.

Locate.

Assess (deliberate).

Survey.

Monitor.

Detect.

Inspect.

Investigate.

Identification of targeted ASCOPE for the CR (to include any pre-existing information). Some
examples are

Areas.

Location.

Size.

Use.

Status.

Ownership.

History.

Structures.

Name.

Location.

Capacity.

Capabilities. (These requirements vary according to the capability type.)

Identification of organizations:

Name.

Location (base and sub-elements).

Size.

Function.

Status.

Leadership or management.

History.

Affiliations.

Identification of people (or person):

Name.

Location.

Description.

Title.

Social status.

Family structure.

Tribal, clan, or regional backgrounds and perspectives.

History.

Ethnicity or ethnicities.

Religion(s) or religious background(s).

Educational background(s).

Political affiliation(s).

Professional network.

Interests, agendas, or motivations.

Personal strengths.

Personal vulnerabilities.

Significance relative to the mission.

Potential for long-term influence.

Identification of events:

Location.

Size.

Sponsor.

Function.

Date.

Time.

History.

Conduct of mission planning:

Route planning.

Actions at the objective.

Communications.

Contingency plans.

Risk assessment.

Coordination with other elements.

Force protection, if required.

Interpreter support, if required.

Conduct of rehearsals:

Movement.

Objective.

Conduct of precombat inspections.

Conduct of the CR mission:

Locate, identify, and observe primary civil information required by the mission.

Constantly observe for secondary civil information throughout the mission.

Record all observations using digital or nondigital means.

Record notes about spontaneous engagements and conversations.

Consolidate and verify information among mission members for submission.

Close out of the mission:

Submit primary mission required civil information.

Catalog and submit any secondary civil information gathered:
o Create and archive trip reports.
o Identify critical information obtained. o Identify outstanding issues for follow-up meeting(s) or to generate any requests for
information.

Report any CCIR or PIR in support of mission requirements.

Assist in updating any CA products:
o Area study. o Staff running estimate. o Civil information collection plan.

## Civil Engagement

A-4. CE enhances the commander's understanding of the civil component and legitimizes the U.S. mission.

CE may be in person or by other means of communication. CE is designed to establish relationships with individuals or groups to develop civil networks that can support the commander's mission. CEs are the planned and targeted activities in which CA forces deliberately focus on the interaction with the IPI, unified action partners, and other civil entities. CE should be planned in accordance with information requirements, but it can also occur as a result of chance interactions within a dynamic OE. CA forces conduct CEs to promote the relationship between military forces and the civil networks. A commander normally employs this task to obtain or disseminate information, mitigate civilian-military interference, foster legitimacy, gain civil cooperation, build partner capacity, build civil networks, and obtain unified action. Figure A-2 depicts how CA forces execute CE as a tactical mission task to achieve specific purposes.

##

| Tactical Mission Task    | Purposes            |
|--------------------------|---------------------|
| -                        |                     |
|                          | Inform              |
| -                        |                     |
|                          | Influence           |
| -                        |                     |
|                          | Mediate             |
| -                        |                     |
|                          | Deliver             |
| -                        |                     |
|                          | Promote             |
| -                        |                     |
|                          | Stabilize           |
| -                        |                     |
|                          | Coordinate          |
| -                        |                     |
|                          | Resolve             |
| -                        |                     |
|                          | Verify              |
| -                        |                     |
|                          | Facilitate          |
| -                        |                     |
|                          | Develop             |
| -                        |                     |
|                          | Identify            |
| Civil Engagement         |                     |
| -                        |                     |
|                          | Distribute          |
| -                        |                     |
|                          | Supervise           |
| -                        |                     |
|                          | Refute              |
| -                        |                     |
|                          | Evaluate            |
| -                        |                     |
|                          | Conduct             |
| -                        |                     |
|                          | Assess (initial)    |
| -                        |                     |
|                          | Deconflict          |
| -                        |                     |
|                          | Investigate         |
| -                        |                     |
|                          | Assess (deliberate) |
| -                        |                     |
|                          | Mitigate            |
| -                        |                     |
|                          | Negotiate           |
| -                        |                     |
|                          | Survey              |

A-5. The steps of the CE tactical mission task include


Identify the desired outcome or required information (purposes of the CE):

Inform.

Deliver.

Coordinate.

Facilitate.

Distribute.

Evaluate.

Deconflict.

Mitigate.

Influence.

Promote.

Resolve.

Develop.

Supervise.

Conduct.

Investigate.

Negotiate.

Mediate.

Stabilize.

Verify.

Identify.

Refute.

Assess (initial).

Assess (deliberate).

Survey.

Identify the person(s) to be engaged (as applicable):

Name.

Location.

Description.

Title.

Social status.

Family structure.

Tribal, clan, or regional backgrounds and perspectives.

History.

Ethnicity or ethnicities.

Religion(s) or religious background(s).

Educational background(s).

Political affiliation(s).

Professional network.

Interests, agendas, or motivations.

Personal strengths.

Personal vulnerabilities.

Significance relative to the mission.

Potential for long-term influence.

Conduct mission planning:

Route planning:
o Time.
o Location.
o Primary and alternate route.

Actions at the objective:
o Identify second and third-order effects.
o Identify preliminary conditions required to achieve the desired effects.
o Develop the best alternative to a negotiated agreement.

Communications plan.

Identify required supplies and equipment.

Contingency plans.

Risk assessment.

Coordination with other elements:
o Force protection, if required.
o Interpreter support, if required.

Conduct rehearsals:

Movement:
o Engagement.
o Roles and responsibilities.
o Determine response to impasses.
o Understand talking points, key themes, and messages.
o Practice social nuances.
o Ensure an understanding of what must be achieved through the engagement.
o Anticipate possible topic changes.
o Anticipate any cultural expectations (gift exchanges, and so on).

Prepare the interpreter (if used):

Discuss common terms and desired effects to be achieved.

Discuss the nature of duties:
o Interpret.
o Direct translation.

Discuss expected standards of conduct.

Discuss interview technique(s) to be used.

Discuss the target audience.

Conduct precombat inspections.

Conduct the CE:

Locate and identify entity to be engaged.

Perform introduction.

Follow local etiquette.

Achieve desired goals and effects.

Restate agreements and discussion points.

Schedule follow-up if necessary.

Close out the mission:

Report and record outcome of engagement.

Report on primary mission objective.

Catalog and submit any secondary civil information gathered.

Create and archive trip reports:
o Identify critical information obtained.
o Identify outstanding issues for follow-up meeting(s) or to generate requests for
information.

Report any CCIR or PIR in support of mission requirements.

Coordinate with other staff sections.

Assist in updating any CA products:

Area study.

Staff running estimate.

Civil information collection plan.

## Civil Network Development

A-6. CND enhances the commander's understanding of the civil component and legitimizes the U.S.

mission. CND may be conducted in person or by other means of communication. CND is nested under the core competency of CNDE. CND is the planned and targeted action in which CA forces develop networks within the civil component of the OE to influence populations and manage local resources in order to extend the operational reach, consolidate gains, and achieve military objectives. CND should be planned and developed in accordance with the information collection plan, but this development can also occur as a result of chance interactions within a dynamic OE. CA conducts CND to promote the relationship between military forces and the civil component. A commander normally employs this task to obtain or disseminate information, mitigate civilian-military interference, foster legitimacy, gain civil cooperation, build partner capacity, and obtain unified action. Figure A-3 depicts how CA forces execute CND as a tactical mission task to achieve specific purposes.


Tactical Mission Task
Purposes
-
Inform
-
Influence
-
Mediate
-
Deliver
-
Promote
-
Stabilize
-
Coordinate
-
Resolve
-
Verify
-
Facilitate
-
Develop
-
Identify
Civil Network
Development
-
Distribute
-
Supervise
-
Refute
-
Evaluate
-
Conduct
-
Assess (initial)
-
Deconflict
-
Investigate
-
Assess (deliberate)
-
Mitigate
-
Negotiate
-
Survey

A-7. The steps of the CND tactical mission task include

Identify the desired outcome or required information (purposes of the CND):

Inform.

Deliver.

Coordinate.

Facilitate.

Distribute.


Evaluate.

Deconflict.

Mitigate.

Influence.

Promote.

Resolve.


Develop.


Supervise.

Conduct.


Investigate.

Negotiate.

Mediate.


Stabilize.


Verify.

Identify.

Refute.

Assess (initial).

Assess (deliberate).

Survey.

Identify the person(s) or network to be engaged (as applicable):

Name.

Location.

Description.

Title.

Social status.

Family structure.

Tribal, clan, or regional backgrounds and perspectives.

History.

Ethnicity or ethnicities.

Religion(s) or religious background(s).

Educational background(s).

Political affiliation(s).

Professional network.

Interests, agendas, or motivations.

Personal strengths.

Personal vulnerabilities.

Significance relative to the mission.

Potential for long-term influence.

Conduct mission planning:

Route planning:
o Time.
o Coordination with other elements.
o Location.
o Primary and alternate route.

Actions at the objective:
o Identify second and third-order effects.
o Identify preliminary conditions required to achieve the desired effects.
o Develop the best alternative to a negotiated agreement.
o Identify additional people or entities within the targeted network.

Communications plan.

Identify required supplies and equipment.

Contingency plans.

Risk assessment:
o Force protection, if required.
o Interpreter support, if required.

Conduct rehearsals:

Movement.

Network engagement.
o Roles and responsibilities.
o Determine response to impasses.
o Understand talking points, key themes, and messages.
o Practice social nuances.
o Ensure an understanding of what must be achieved through the network.
o Anticipate possible topic changes.
o Anticipate any cultural expectations (gift exchanges, and so on).
o Prepare the interpreter (if used):

Discuss common terms and desired effects to be achieved.

Discuss the nature of duties:
 Interpretation.
 Direct translation:
 Discuss expected standards of conduct.  Discuss interview technique(s) to be used.  Discuss the targeted civil network.

Conduct pre-combat inspections.

Conduct the CND:

Locate and identify the civil network to be engaged.

Perform introduction.

Follow local etiquette.

Achieve desired goals and effects.

Gather additional information on others (people) within the targeted network.

Restate agreements and discussion points.

Schedule follow-up if necessary.

Close out the mission:

Report and record outcome of the CND.

Report on primary mission objective.

Catalog and submit any secondary civil information or threat information gathered.

Create and archive trip reports:
o Identify critical information obtained.
o Identify outstanding issues for follow-up meeting(s) or to generate requests for
information.
o Develop node analysis graphics on the civil network as it is developed.

Report any CCIR or PIR in support of mission requirements.

Coordinate with other staff sections.

Assist in updating any CA products:
o Area study.
o Staff running estimate. o Civil information collection plan.

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## Appendix B Civil Analysis Example Of The Interrelationship Of Operational Variables And Civil Considerations

Appendix B serves as an example of civil analysis using PMESII-PT to break down specific groupings of civil information that have not been analyzed and then categorize that information using ASCOPE. This appendix provides a detailed analytical tool to process data into quantifiable information for evaluation. Such information helps assist the commander and staff in the development of appropriate COAs, branches or sequels to current operations, and inputs to future operations concerning the civil component of the OE. Figure B-1, pages B-1 through B-8, shows the interrelationship of
PMESII-PT and ASCOPE.

| PMESII-PT                        | ASCOPE                                               |
|----------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------|
| Political:                       | CAO analysis provides relevant political             |
| information that identifies the |                                                      |
| Areas:                           | Analysis of key political areas or terrain. Consider |
| the locations of the following:  |                                                      |
| -                                |                                                      |
|                                  | Overall strategic political situation in the AO.     |
| -                                |                                                      |
|                                  | Areas of influence.                                  |

-
Political leadership and type of government within the AO.
-
Physical boundaries (districts within a city or municipalities within a region).
-
Governance (areas where government services are available and areas without services).
-
Key aspects of the commander's OE, such as political boundaries and centers of the foreign nation government, including strengths, weaknesses, role in society, and so on.

Structures: Analysis of key political infrastructure. Consider the location and types of the following:

-
International organizations present in the AO.

-
Political, religious, or criminal facilities.

-
Civil society organizations.
-
Formal and informal leaders.
-
Government centers.


Capabilities: Analysis of the existing political capabilities
within the AO. Consider the following:
-
Influence on the existing population.

Consideration of the consequences of removing, limiting, or altering the political ASCOPE factors from the OE, as well as the impact these factors have on current operations.

-
Influence on the host nation.

-
Influence on the world stage.
-
Ability to meet the needs of the populace.
-
Ability to assist with needs, such as public works and utilities.

Organizations: Analysis of groups with or without affiliations to government agencies, such as

-
Political organizations.
-
Religious groups.
-
Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).

|                                                                 |                                                        | PMESII-PT    | ASCOPE                                               |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------|--------------|------------------------------------------------------|
| Political (continued)                                           |                                                        | People:      | Analysis of civilians or nonmilitary personnel in an |
| AO whose actions, opinions, or political influence can affect   |                                                        |              |                                                      |
| the population or mission, such as                             |                                                        |              |                                                      |
| -                                                               |                                                        |              |                                                      |
|                                                                 | Local civil authorities.                               |              |                                                      |
| -                                                               |                                                        |              |                                                      |
|                                                                 | Elected officials.                                     |              |                                                      |
| -                                                               |                                                        |              |                                                      |
|                                                                 | Traditional leaders.                                   |              |                                                      |
| -                                                               |                                                        |              |                                                      |
|                                                                 | Expatriates.                                           |              |                                                      |
| -                                                               |                                                        |              |                                                      |
|                                                                 | Tribal or clan figureheads.                            |              |                                                      |
| -                                                               |                                                        |              |                                                      |
|                                                                 | Religious leaders.                                     |              |                                                      |
| -                                                               |                                                        |              |                                                      |
|                                                                 | Third-nation government agency representatives.        |              |                                                      |
| -                                                               |                                                        |              |                                                      |
|                                                                 | Media representatives, including journalists from      |              |                                                      |
| print, radio, and visual media.                                 |                                                        |              |                                                      |
| -                                                               |                                                        |              |                                                      |
|                                                                 | Dislocated civilians (DCs), including refugees,        |              |                                                      |
| displaced persons, internally displaced persons,                |                                                        |              |                                                      |
| evacuees, migrants, and stateless persons.                      |                                                        |              |                                                      |
| Events:                                                         | Determination and analysis of political events that    |              |                                                      |
| have occurred (or will occur) in the AO for their political and |                                                        |              |                                                      |
| legal implications, such as                                    |                                                        |              |                                                      |
| -                                                               |                                                        |              |                                                      |
|                                                                 | Local or national elections.                           |              |                                                      |
| -                                                               |                                                        |              |                                                      |
|                                                                 | National holidays.                                     |              |                                                      |
| -                                                               |                                                        |              |                                                      |
|                                                                 | Religious periods (only for religious states).         |              |                                                      |
| -                                                               |                                                        |              |                                                      |
|                                                                 | Riots and demonstrations.                              |              |                                                      |
| -                                                               |                                                        |              |                                                      |
|                                                                 | Military operations.                                   |              |                                                      |
| Military:                                                       | CAO analysis provides relevant military information    |              |                                                      |
| that identifies the                                            |                                                        |              |                                                      |
| Areas:                                                          | Analysis of key military installations or facilities,  |              |                                                      |
| such as                                                        |                                                        |              |                                                      |
| -                                                               |                                                        |              |                                                      |
|                                                                 | Location of key installations.                         |              |                                                      |
| -                                                               |                                                        |              |                                                      |
|                                                                 | CAO capabilities of all U.S. and non-U.S. forces       |              |                                                      |
| available in the AO.                                            |                                                        |              |                                                      |
| -                                                               |                                                        |              |                                                      |
|                                                                 | Occupied areas.                                        |              |                                                      |
| -                                                               |                                                        |              |                                                      |
|                                                                 | Operational areas.                                     |              |                                                      |
| -                                                               |                                                        |              |                                                      |
|                                                                 | Potential influence of the military situation within   |              |                                                      |
| the AO and on the current mission requirements.                 |                                                        |              |                                                      |
| -                                                               |                                                        |              |                                                      |
|                                                                 | Roadblocks and checkpoints.                            |              |                                                      |
| -                                                               |                                                        |              |                                                      |
|                                                                 | Effect of the current military situation on stability, |              |                                                      |
| government security, and the populace.                          |                                                        |              |                                                      |
| -                                                               |                                                        |              |                                                      |
|                                                                 | Areas of influence.                                    |              |                                                      |
| -                                                               |                                                        |              |                                                      |
|                                                                 | Role of the military and, when applicable,             |              |                                                      |
| paramilitary security forces in the country.                    |                                                        |              |                                                      |
| -                                                               |                                                        |              |                                                      |
|                                                                 | Degree to which indigenous security forces are         |              |                                                      |
| resourced, accountable, and capable.                            |                                                        |              |                                                      |
| Structures:                                                     | Analysis of key military infrastructure, such as       |              |                                                      |
| installations, bases, airports, and naval facilities.           |                                                        |              |                                                      |
| Capabilities:                                                   | Analysis of military capabilities within the AO,       |              |                                                      |
| such as                                                        |                                                        |              |                                                      |
| -                                                               |                                                        |              |                                                      |
|                                                                 | Level of border security.                              |              |                                                      |
| -                                                               |                                                        |              |                                                      |
|                                                                 | Equipment.                                             |              |                                                      |
| -                                                               |                                                        |              |                                                      |
|                                                                 | Sustainment.                                           |              |                                                      |
| -                                                               |                                                        |              |                                                      |
|                                                                 | Degree of trust and cooperation between                |              |                                                      |
| elements of the indigenous security apparatus.                  |                                                        |              |                                                      |
|                                                                 |                                                        |              |                                                      |
| -                                                               |                                                        |              |                                                      |
|                                                                 | Operational status.                                    |              |                                                      |
| Organizations:                                                  | Analysis of military organizations within the          |              |                                                      |
| AO, such as                                                    |                                                        |              |                                                      |

Consideration of the consequences of removing, limiting, or altering the military ASCOPE factors from the OEas well as the impact these factors have on current operations.

-
Government forces.

-
Security forces.
-
Private militias.
-
Insurgent forces.

| People:                             |  Analysis of military personnel in an AO, such as    |
|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------|
| -                                   |                                                       |
|                                     | Key military leaders.                                 |
| -                                   |                                                       |
|                                     | Militia leaders.                                      |
| Events:                             | Analysis of military events that have occurred        |
| (or will occur) in the AO, such as |                                                       |
| -                                   |                                                       |
|                                     | Combat operations, including indirect fires, riots,   |
| and demonstrations.                 |                                                       |

-
Civilian evacuations (both voluntary and involuntary).
-
Terrorist incidents.

| PMESII-PT   |                                          |
|-------------|------------------------------------------|
| Areas:      | Analysis of key economic areas, such as |

Economic: CAO analysis provides relevant economic information that identifies the

-
Agricultural, industrial, and mining regions and trade routes.

-
Markets, both formal and informal.
-
Strengths and weaknesses of the economic systems along with the HN plans for economic
development.
-
Impoverished areas.
-
Areas with high unemployment.
-
Economic goals and objectives affecting the military mission.
-
Currency or currencies, if more than one is exchanged.
-
Taxes, tariffs, or other restrictions.
-
Shortages affecting the operation of the commander's ability to use foreign-nation supplies, including of the foreign nation to supply enough food to meet the need of the civil populace.

| Structures:   |  Analysis of key economic infrastructure,     |
|---------------|-----------------------------------------------|
| such as      |                                               |
| -             |                                               |
|               | Banking, stock, and commodity exchanges.      |

-
Agricultural calendar, including harvest, planting, and spraying seasons.
-
Industrial facilities and pipelines.
-
Economic fiscal calendar.
-
Mints and financial institutions.
-
Markets and bazaars.
Consideration of the consequences of removing, limiting,
or altering the economic ASCOPE factors from the OE, as well as the impact these factors have on current operations.

Capabilities: Analysis of economic capabilities within the
AO, such as

-
Gross national product.
-
Manufacturing and industry.
-
Population (available workforce).
-
NGO and international organization programs.
-
International trade agreements.
-
Changes to HN economic policy.

| Organizations:   |  Analysis of economic organizations within    |
|------------------|-----------------------------------------------|
| the AO, such as |                                               |
| -                |                                               |
|                  | Banking and financial institutions.           |
| -                |                                               |
|                  | NGO and international organization financial  |
| assistance.      |                                               |
| -                |                                               |
|                  | Government agencies.                          |

-
Chamber of Commerce.

| People:         |  Analysis of economic factors that affect people in    |
|-----------------|--------------------------------------------------------|
| an AO, such as |                                                        |
| -               |                                                        |
|                 | Business leaders.                                      |

-
Key leaders.
-
Poverty rate.

| Events:                                                |
|--------------------------------------------------------|
| will occur) in the AO, such as planting and harvesting |
| seasons.                                               |
| PMESII-PT   |                                        |
|-------------|----------------------------------------|
| Areas:      | Analysis of key social areas, such as |

Social: CAO analysis provides relevant social information that identifies the

-
Populated areas.

-
Current social climate in the AO.

-
Ethnic boundaries.

-
Key civilian communicators inside and outside the
AO and their link to the population. The most important identifications are of various faction
leaders in the population, including

Figureheads.

| Structures:                                           |  Analysis of key social infrastructure, such as    |
|-------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------|
| cultural and traditionally protected sites (churches, |                                                    |
| mosques, national libraries, shrines, and hospitals). |                                                    |
| Capabilities:                                         | Analysis of social capabilities within the AO,     |
| such as                                              |                                                    |


Religious leaders.
-
Religious outreach.
-
Social programs.
-
Orphanages.

Subject-matter experts associated with the
operation of critical civil infrastructure (water production and treatment, communications, electrical generation, transportation, health services, and so on).

| Organizations:   |  Analysis of economic organizations within    |
|------------------|-----------------------------------------------|
| the AO, such as |                                               |
|                  |                                               |
| -                |                                               |
|                  | Banking and financial institutions.           |
| -                |                                               |
|                  | NGO and international organization financial  |
| assistance.      |                                               |

Consideration of the consequences of removing, limiting, or altering the social ASCOPE factors from the OE, as well as the impact these factors have on current operations.

-
Government agencies.
-
Chamber of Commerce.

| People:                                |  Analysis of social people in an AO, such as    |
|----------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|
| -                                      |                                                  |
|                                        | Local nationals (town and city dwellers, farmers |
| and other rural dwellers, and nomads). |                                                  |
| -                                      |                                                  |
|                                        | Local civil authorities, including elected and   |
| government.                            |                                                  |

-
Expatriates.
-
Tribal or clan figureheads and religious leaders.
-
USG and third-nation government agency representatives.
-
Foreign employees of international organizations or NGOs.
-
Contractors, including U.S. citizens, local nationals, and third-nation citizens that provide contract services.
-
Media, including journalists from print, radio, and visual media.

-
DCs, including refugees, displaced persons, internally displaced persons, evacuees, migrants, and stateless persons.
Events: Analysis of social events that have occurred (or will occur) in the AO, such as

-
National holidays, school year, and religious
periods.
-
Civilian evacuations (both voluntary and involuntary).
-
Natural or man-made disasters.

| PMESII-PT   |                                             |
|-------------|---------------------------------------------|
| Areas:      | Analysis of key information areas, such as |

Information: CAO analysis provides relevant information that identifies the

-
Radio and television coverage areas.
-
Telephone and cell phone coverage areas.
-
Status and ability to transmit and receive information within the AO.
-
Areas with internet access.
-
Areas without access to information infrastructure.

-
Legitimate government's ability to inform its population.

| Structures:   |  Analysis of key information infrastructure, such    |
|---------------|------------------------------------------------------|
| as           |                                                      |
| -             |                                                      |
|               | Radio and television stations.                       |
| -             |                                                      |
|               | Print media and local media.                         |
| -             |                                                      |
|               | Communications towers.                               |
| Capabilities: | Analysis of information capabilities within the      |
| AO, such as  |                                                      |

-
Locations and meeting cycles of key nonmilitary agencies and programs in the AO (international organizations, NGOs, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, World Food Program, Office of the U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance [U.S. Agency for International
Development], governing bodies, health services, judicial and law enforcement, and community organizations).
-
Forms of media consumed by men and women.

-
Population within radio and television coverage areas.
-
Subscriber base.

-
Literacy rates of the population.

-
Government media restrictions.
Organizations: Analysis of information organizations within
the AO, such as

Consideration of the consequences of removing, limiting, or altering the information ASCOPE factors from the OE, as well as the impact these factors have on current operations.

-
News and media outlets.
-
Government-run media.
-
Telephone companies.
-
Broadcast companies.
-
Wireless service providers.
People: Analysis of information people in an AO, such as the media (including journalists from print, radio, and visual
media).
Events: Analysis of information events that have occurred (or will occur) in the AO, such as
-
Public announcements.
-
Current events.

## Pmesii-Pt Ascope

Areas: Analysis of key infrastructure areas, such as

Infrastructure: CAO analysis provides relevant infrastructure that identifies the

-
Electrical coverage areas.

-
Water coverage areas.
-
Sewer coverage areas.
-
Civil infrastructure in the AO. The analyst concentrates on how the state of the infrastructure
assists or hinders the commander's mission.
-
Road and rail networks.

Structures: Analysis of key structures, such as

-
Condition and location of key structures, including

Government facilities.
-
Power generation facilities.

Medical treatment facilities.
-
Water and sewer facilities.
-
Bridges and roads.

Cultural sites, such as monuments, religious shrines, libraries, museums, and so on.
-
Medical facilities.
-
Port and aerial facilities.

Facilities with practical applications, such as detention facilities and warehouses.

Power generation and transmission facilities.

Transportation grids and port, rail, and aerial facilities.
-
Facilities with practical military application (warehouses, schools, television and radio stations, and transmission towers, and print plants).

Water purification and sewage treatment
plants.

Capabilities: Analysis of infrastructure capabilities within
the AO, such as


Emergency management facilities, equipment, and response capabilities.
-
Public works and utilities (power plants, water, and sewer facilities).

Radio and television production and transmission facilities.
-
Public transportation (roads, bridges, and port and aerial facilities).
-
Public health facilities.
-
Agricultural and mining regions and other significant geographic and economic features.
-
Resources and services that the U.S. can contract
to support the military mission, such as interpreters, laundry services, construction materials, and equipment.
Consideration of the consequences of removing, limiting, or altering the infrastructure ASCOPE factors from the OE, as well as the impact these factors have on current operations.

Organizations: Analysis of infrastructure organizations within the AO, such as

-
Service providers and contractors.
-
Local civil authorities.

| People:                                                 |  Analysis of infrastructure people in an AO, such as    |
|---------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------|
| subject-matter experts associated with the operation of |                                                         |
| critical civil infrastructure (water production).       |                                                         |
| Events:                                                 | Analysis of infrastructure events that have occurred    |
| (or will occur) in the AO, such as                     |                                                         |
| -                                                       |                                                         |
|                                                         | Groundbreaking ceremonies.                              |
| -                                                       |                                                         |
|                                                         | School, government, or medical facilities.              |
PMESII-PT
ASCOPE
Areas: Analysis of the physical environment, such as
Physical Environment: CAO analysis provides relevant physical environment information that identifies
-
Weather constraints.

-
Man-made structures, particularly urban areas.

-
Areas prone to flooding, avalanche, or mudslides.
-
Areas affected by man-made or natural disasters.

-
Climate, weather, and significant reoccurring weather events (for example, floods).
-
Topography.

Structures: Analysis of structures within the physical environment, such as

-
Hydrology.

-
Populated urban areas.
-
Major thoroughfares.

-
Environmental conditions and hazards.


Consideration of the consequences of removing, limiting, or
altering the physical environment ASCOPE factors from the
OE, as well as the impact these factors have on current
operations.

| Capabilities:                                     |  Analysis of capabilities within the physical      |
|---------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------|
| environment, such as available natural resources. |                                                    |
| Organizations:                                    | Analysis of organizations within the physical      |
| environment, such as                             |                                                    |
| -                                                 |                                                    |
|                                                   | NGOs and international organizations.              |
| -                                                 |                                                    |
|                                                   | Environmental protection groups.                   |
| People:                                           | Analysis of the effect of the physical environment |
| on people within the AO, such as                 |                                                    |
| -                                                 |                                                    |
|                                                   | Lifestyle.                                         |
| -                                                 |                                                    |
|                                                   | Poverty rate.                                      |
| Events:                                           | Analysis of events and the physical environment,   |
| such as                                          |                                                    |
| -                                                 |                                                    |
|                                                   | Seasonal changes.                                  |
| -                                                 |                                                    |
|                                                   | Natural disasters.                                 |
| -                                                 |                                                    |
|                                                   | Climate change.                                    |
PMESII-PT
ASCOPE
Areas: Analytical considerations for time include
Time: CAO analysis provides relevant time information that identifies the implications of the operation's duration on

-
Friendly forces.
-
Adversary forces.

-
Short-term, high-impact mitigating CAO. Shortterm CAO provides immediate results; however, CAO is usually limited to low-cost projects and
have little impact on HN capability development.

-
Interagency timeline comparison.

-
Long-term development CAO. Long-term CAO is conducted in accordance with the HN development plan; however, long-term CAO has little immediate impact and often exceeds the CA forces operational dwell time.
Structures: Analytical considerations for time are in relation to other PMESII-PT factors. Structures are a factor during
mission planning. Capabilities: Analytical considerations for time include
-
Relationship to other PMESII-PT factors; measure
the impact of time on capabilities during mission planning. Capabilities that exist today may not tomorrow.
-
Impact of time on the populace's capability to sustain itself.
-
Timing and availability of resources and services that the U.S. can contract to support the military mission.
-
Dissident forces sustainment capabilities.
Organizations: Analytical considerations for time include
-
NGOs, international organizations, and other organizations capable of forming the nucleus for humanitarian assistance programs interim governing bodies, civil defense efforts, and other activities.
-
Counterinsurgency public affairs operations.
People: Analytical considerations for time include public support. Public support for military operations naturally diminishes with time. Events: Analytical considerations for time include
-
Current events.
-
National holidays, school year, and religious
periods.

## Glossary Section I - Acronyms And Abbreviations

| AAR     | after action review                                                            |
|---------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| ADP     | Army doctrine publication                                                      |
| AO      | area of operations                                                             |
| ASCOPE  | areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events             |
| ATP     | Army technical publication                                                     |
| CA      | Civil Affairs                                                                  |
| CAO     | Civil Affairs operations                                                       |
| CCIR    | commander's critical information requirement                                   |
| CE      | civil engagement                                                               |
| CFA     | critical factors analysis                                                      |
| CKI     | civil knowledge integration                                                    |
| CMI     | civil-military integration                                                     |
| CMO     | civil-military operations                                                      |
| CMOC    | civil-military operations center                                               |
| CNA     | civil network analysis                                                         |
| CND     | civil network development                                                      |
| CNDE    | civil network development and engagement                                       |
| CNE     | civil network engagement                                                       |
| COA     | course of action                                                               |
| COG     | center of gravity                                                              |
| CONOPS  | concept of operations                                                          |
| COP     | common operational picture                                                     |
| CPB     | civil preparation of the battlefield                                           |
| CR      | civil reconnaissance                                                           |
| DA      | Department of the Army                                                         |
| DOD     | Department of Defense                                                          |
| DODD    | Department of Defense directive                                                |
| DSF     | district stability framework                                                   |
| FLOT    | forward line of own troops                                                     |
| FM      | field manual                                                                   |
| FMS-WEB | Force Management System-Web                                                    |
| G-2     | assistant chief of staff, intelligence                                         |
| G-3     | assistant chief of staff, operations                                           |
| G-9     | assistant chief of staff, Civil Affairs operations (G-9), battalion or brigade |
| HN      | host nation                                                                    |
| IO                                            | information operations                                                         |
|-----------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| IPB                                           | intelligence preparation of the battlefield                                    |
| IPI                                           | indigenous populations and institutions                                        |
| J-9                                           | civil-military operations/interagency cooperation directorate of a joint staff |
| JP                                            | joint publication                                                              |
| LOE                                           | line of effort                                                                 |
| MDMP                                          | military decision-making process                                               |
| MOE                                           | measure of effectiveness                                                       |
| MOP                                           | measure of performance                                                         |
| NGO                                           | nongovernmental organization                                                   |
| OE                                            | operational environment                                                        |
| PIR                                           | priority intelligence requirement                                              |
| PMESII-PT                                     | political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical   |
| environment, and time [operational variables] |                                                                                |
| PRC                                           | populace and resources control                                                 |
| S-2                                           | battalion or brigade intelligence staff officer                                |
| S-3                                           | battalion or brigade operations staff officer                                  |
| S-4                                           | battalion or brigade logistics staff officer                                   |
| S-9                                           | battalion or brigade Civil Affairs operations staff officer                    |
| TG                                            | transitional governance                                                        |
| USG                                           | United States Government                                                       |

## Section Ii - Terms Civil Affairs Operations

Actions planned, coordinated, executed, and assessed to enhance awareness of, and manage the interaction with, the civil component of the operational environment; identify and mitigate underlying causes of instability within civil society; and/or involve the application of functional specialty skills normally the responsibility of civil government. (JP 3-57)

## Civil Engagement

A targeted, planned, and coordinated meeting with known or potential contacts in a civil network that is designed to develop or maintain relationships and to share or collect information. (FM 3-57)

## Civil Knowledge Integration

The actions taken to analyze, evaluate, and organize collected civil information for operational relevance and informing the warfighting function. (FM 3-57)

## Civil Military Integration

The actions taken to establish, maintain, influence, or leverage relations between military forces and indigenous populations and institutions to synchronize, coordinate, and enable interorganizational cooperation and to achieve unified action. (FM 3-57)

## Civil Network

A collection of formal and informal groups, associations, military engagements, and organizations within an operational environment that interact with each other with varying degrees of frequency, trust, and collaboration. (FM 3-57)

## Civil Network Analysis

A process that identifies and analyzes the relative importance and influence of nodes within a civil network through network visualizations and qualitative and quantitative analytical methods. (FM 3-57)

## Civil Network Development

The planned and targeted action in which Civil Affairs forces develop networks within the civil component of the operational environment to influence populations and manage local resources in order to extend the operational reach, consolidate gains, and achieve military objectives. (FM 3-57)

## Civil Network Development And Engagement

The activity by which the civil network capabilities and resources are engaged, evaluated, developed, and integrated into operations. (FM 3-57)

## Civil Preparation Of The Battlefield

The systematic process of analyzing civil considerations in an area of interest to determine their effects on friendly, neutral, and enemy operations. (FM 3-57)

## Measure Of Effectiveness

An indicator used to measure a current system state, with change indicated by comparing multiple observations over time. (JP 5-0)

## Measure Of Performance

An indicator used to measure a friendly action that is tied to measuring task accomplishment. (JP 5-0)

## Operational Environment

A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. (JP 3-0)

## Transitional Governance

The actions taken to assure appropriate control and continuity of government functions throughout the range of military operations. (FM 3-57)

## Unified Action

The synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort. (JP 1, Volume 1)

## Unity Of Effort

Coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization that is the product of successful unified action. (JP 1, Volume 2)

##

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## References

All websites accessed on 28 October 2022.

## Required Publications

These documents must be available to intended users of this publication. DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. November 2022.

FM 1-02.1. *Operational Terms.* 9 March 2021.

FM 1-02.2. *Military Symbols.* 18 May 2022.

## Related Publications

These documents contain relevant supplemental information.

## Joint And Department Of Defense Publications

Most joint publications are available online: https://www.jcs.mil/Doctrine. Most Department of Defense publications are available online: https://www.esd.whs.mil/DD/.
DODD 2000.13. *Civil Affairs.* 11 March 2014. DODD 5100.01. *Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components.*
21 December 2010.

JP 1, Volume 1. *Joint Warfighting.* 29 June 2020.

JP 1, Volume 2. *The Joint Force.* 19 June 2020.
JP 3-0. *Joint Campaigns and Operations.* 18 June 2022.

JP 3-57. *Civil-Military Operations.* 9 July 2018.

JP 5-0. *Joint Planning*. 1 December 2020.

## Army Publications

Most Army doctrinal publications are available online: https://armypubs.army.mil/.

ADP 3-07. *Stability.* 31 July 2019.

ADP 5-0. *The Operations Process.* 31 July 2019.

ADP 6-0. *Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces*. 31 July 2019.

ATP 2-33.4. *Intelligence Analysis.* 10 January 2020. ATP 5-0.1. *Army Design Methodology.* 1 July 2015. ATP 5-0.6. *Network Engagement.* 19 June 2017.

FM 3-07. *Stability.* 2 June 2014.

FM 3-55. *Information Collection.* 3 May 2013.

FM 3-57. *Civil Affairs Operations.* 28 July 2021.

FM 3-90-1. *Offense and Defense Volume 1.* 22 March 2013.

FM 6-0. *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations.* 16 May 2022.

FM 6-27, MCTP 11-10C. *The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Land Warfare*. 7 August 2019.

## Other Publications

1899 Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes. https://www.loc.gov.

## References

1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict.

www.unesco.org.

## Prescribed Forms

This section contains no entries.

## Referenced Forms

Unless otherwise indicated, DA forms are available online at: https://armypubs.army.mil. DA Form 2028. *Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms.*


## Index


Entries are by paragraph number.


## A N

critical thinking, 3-65, 3-68
through 3-81
nodal analysis, 3-26, 3-38 through
3-46, 3-83, 3-96
culmination of civil networks, 4-46
through 4-50
adaptive civil networks, 1-14
after action review, 2-6, 5-59
through 5-61

## O E

analytical methodologies. 3-26
through 3-31
organization mapping, 3-26, 3-32
through 3-37, 3-64
effects of civil networks, 1-32
through 1-34

## C S

engagement process, 1-15
through 1-22

## F

categories of civil networks, 1-6 civil network analysis overview,
3-1
staff integration,
1-36 and 1-36, 5-53 through 5-55

## T

foster unity of effort, 5-48 and
5-49
transitional governance, 1-24

## M V

civil network reliability, 1-7 and 1-8 common features, 1-9 composition, 1-10
core competencies, 1-23 through
1-31
validate resourcing requirements,
5-44
measuring effects, 5-42 and 5-43
mitigate interference, 5-50 through
5-52


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By Order of the Secretary of the Army:
Official:
MARK F. AVERILL
Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army
 2303001
DISTRIBUTION:
Active Army, Army National Guard, and United States Army Reserve.  Distributed in electronic media only (EMO).

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