note, "markets constrain policymaking in developed countries" (2004:32), both in debt markets and exchange rate mechanisms, as well as other "financial flows - pension funds being a typical example -- [which] occur in an unpredictable way, disrupting the implementation of state policy" (Cohen 2006: 5). Thus, as Cohen relays, "[g]lobalisation is said to be the reign of multinationals, of deterritorialised and stateless business, and signals the inexorable decline of the state" (2006:4). Since "capitalism is now more or less global" (Mann 1997:478), it should come as no surprise that "global managers at corporate headquarters routinely mak[e] decisions which may affect the lives of thousands or even millions of people" (McCulloch 1978:343), yet it does not follow that this precipitates the nation-state's demise. The above factors hardly amount to what Cohen calls "a disintegration of the political sphere, giving way to 'governance' on a world scale" (2006:5). Perhaps, he observes, we should not expect them to: "[t]he 'transnational-declinist' theory is not an explanatory theory but rather a belief, a faith" (2006:9). Indeed, as Weiss notes, this school of thought has been largely put aside. "Today political analysts tend to talk less about the decline of the state [...] than of its transformation" (2005:529). For as Gilpin insists, whilst it is accurate "to say that economic globalization and transnational economic forces are eroding economic sovereignty in important ways [...] both the extent [...] and the consequences of economic globalization for the nation-state have been considerably exaggerated [...] this is still a state-dominated