(provisionally) 'final station' in Sein und Zeit . Lvinas' ontic misunderstanding of the ontological structure of care serves him only as a polemical foil to bolster his opposed claim that the "subject" or "human being" is not fundamentally full of cares but fixated on its own egoistic enjoyment (cf. Totality and Infinity II A 2 "Living off... (Enjoyment)" and II A 3 "Enjoyment and Independence"). vi) Beyond being If there is one single, decisive point at which the issue between Heidegger and Lvinas becomes abundantly clear, it is the issue of e)pe/keina th=j ou)si/aj . This famous phrase from Plato's Politeia which announces the beyond of being as the i)de/a a)gaqou= , i.e. the Idea of the Good, is cited by both thinkers, but whereas Lvinas, to my knowledge, is content to quote the phrase and interpret it immediately as the intrusion of ethics into (the 'ontological totality' of) being without taking the effort to provide even the skerrick of an in-depth interpretation of the relevant passages in Plato, Heidegger is at some pains to provide an ontological interpretation of the i)de/a a)gaqou= , (8) which he interprets ? via a translation into Aristotelean ou(= e(/neka ? as the "Umwillen des Daseins" (e.g. GA26:237, cf. the entire section GA26:237-252 "Die Transzendenz des Daseins"). Even in Lvinas' last major work Autrement qu'tre ou au-del de l'essence , (9) whose title plays on the Platonic phrase, there is no serious attempt made to interpret in extenso the phrase e)pe/keina th=j ou)si/aj in