the ethics of journalism, according to Belsey (1992: 77). He suggests that this is because society "values personal privacy" but also "thrives on publicity". In their book Media Ethics , Christians et al. (1991) give case examples and draw out three moral principles: the first "promotes decency and basic fairness as non-negotiable"; the second puts forward "redeeming social value" as the guiding principle for choosing what private information can be disclosed; and the third states that "the dignity of persons ought not be maligned in the name of press privilege" (Christians et al. 1991: 139 -- 140). Holsinger (1991) also states that "questions of privacy present more hard decisions than any others", and few topics are debated more heatedly. It is interesting to note that far more attention appears to have been paid to the privacy of children as perpetrators of crime than as victims. The recognition that young offenders need privacy appears to be universally recognised on the grounds that "publicity for juvenile offenders would stigmatise them and make it more difficult for them to go straight" (Holsinger 1991: 380). There are clearly accepted arguments that young people who commit crimes "should not be haunted for the rest of their lives by the mistakes of their youth" (Holsinger 1991: 237). This is why identification of the perpetrators in the Bulger case in the United Kingdom caused such intense debate (Franklin and Horwath 1996). In New Zealand, the Children, Young Persons and Their Families Act 1989 states, in line with