requirements of the modern state than does the ambiguity of liberal religion." (p. 247)  Fundamentalist religion, in short, was better suited to the exclusive tendencies of the modern nation state, and the hierarchical patterns of social life which conservative political elites sought to promote. This last point, then, gets to my central concern with the review: its dichotomous approach to religion and politics.  Modern religious politics is not about tradition versus modernity, religion versus secularism or religious activists versus secular states.  On the contrary, these categories obscure more than they reveal.  Religious ideologies -- particularly their illiberal variant -- are thoroughly modern phenomenon.  Moreover, modern states are hardly secular, and the nationalist narratives from which they derive their legitimacy are infused with religious imagery and symbolism.  Moreover, as noted above, neither religion nor secularism is monolithic.  Secularism can be alternately interpreted as neutrality in matters of religion or as hostility towards religion (and this changes over time).  Similarly, religion is a multifaceted phenomenon that is interpreted -- and mobilized -- in different ways to achieve different ends. What I have sought to do in Religious Politics and Secular States is to captures this nuance, and provide a theoretical framework that accounts for the politicization of religion as well as its ambiguous nature.  I have also sought to ground this theory in three in depth case studies. Unfortunately, the review fails to reflect this nuance, and appears to reject the central argument of the book not because the empirical data is