the Gaza-Sinai border could invite Israeli action on Egyptian soil -- a scenario that neither the Brotherhood nor the Egyptian military is prepared to handle. Engaging Israel in war carries a number of risks for Hamas. Israel will continue to focus on eliminating the group's arsenal of long-range Fajr rockets and the group's senior commanders. A weakening of Hamas' leadership could create additional space for other groups to challenge its authority. Hamas could be attempting to use this escalation to drive toward a broader understanding with Israel, one that would compel Israel to accept the political authority of Hamas in Gaza and its Muslim Brotherhood affiliates in the region. If this is the case, Israel will target Hamas' long-range Fajr rockets anyway, so Hamas may as well deploy them to raise the political stakes on both sides for an eventual negotiation. However, this would assume that Hamas and its allies are prepared to deny Israel success in its military campaign. Unlike the 2006 confrontation between Israel and Hezbollah, in which Hamas opened up an additional front against Israel, Hezbollah is now greatly preoccupied with trying to defend its position in Lebanon with the Syrian regime in flux. The group's participation in a broader military campaign cannot be guaranteed. Instead, perhaps the most Hamas can realistically seek is to have an Israeli incursion in Gaza more seriously strain the Israeli-Egyptian relationship. Iran's intentions must also be examined. For Iran and the regime of Bashar al Assad in Syria, the Israeli military