are concerned with admissibility of evidence, which is not in issue here; and none, aside from those already mentioned, arose where in the face of clear and general language it was contended that Parliament must nevertheless have intended the words of the statute to have only a limited effect. It is true that the Act of 1987 goes further than any other drawn to our attention. In legislation concerned, for example, with Department of Trade inspections under the Companies Acts, the disclosure of incriminating evidence is a by-product of an investigation directed to other ends, whereas the whole purpose of this Act is to extract material which will lead to a conviction. It is also true that section 2(8) does not provide complete protection, since information obtained in answer to questions (such as, for example, the location of funds in a foreign bank account) can lead to the disclosure of damaging facts which once known can be proved by other means, even if the answers themselves cannot be put in evidence. This is not, however, a unique feature of this particular type of legislation. Moreover, even the Act of 1984 itself, which is the foundation of Code C, provides in section 76(4) that evidence discovered as the result of an inadmissible confession is not ipso facto rendered inadmissible. In my view these characteristics serve only to require the court to be more than ever cautious before concluding that Parliament really intended to exclude one of the immunities which I have