enough political capital internationally to be able to say to the rest of the world, today we actually understand that your perspective is that we're not in compliance with international law. We may even agree with you on that point. But you know what we've done to get to this point. We had to do this, we think, to save the lives of 30,000 people at risk in northern Sri Lanka, or wherever it might be. And we'll accept the risk politically of how you view our action today. But we're not going to try to spend the next 10 years to change the rules of the game because of how we felt we needed to respond when the international legal system did not completely kick in to our benefit. And I take that, just for one second, into the domestic sphere with respect to detainee issues and the whole torture debate. A tremendous effort, from 2002 onwards, to try to reinterpret the law so as to state that what was being done was, in fact, justifiable and that t here was no legal liability for it. TOOBIN: Well, that's what the torture memo said. Right. Yes. SCHEFFER: Exactly. Exactly. That's their whole purpose, is to remove the liability from the effort -- -- as opposed to what we saw in 1999 out of the Israeli Supreme Court when they were posed with the whole issue of torture. They said, look, you can't just change all the rules. Torture is