whereas the latter interprets the beyond of being ethically and theologically with an intervention of the Infinite, the Absolute, the former endeavours to show that the transcendental dimension beyond beings in their being is freedom, if not freedomsharing. The freedom of the other is the missing link that separates Heidegger's thinking from Lvinas' thinking. The issue is the following: if there lies beyond being the Idea of the Good, and this is translated as the Umwillen des Daseins, i.e. the for-the-sake-of Dasein's self, how is this for-the-sake-of-self to be reconciled with the freedom of the other, who likewise exists for the sake of self? This is a far more subtle and perplexing question for thinking than Lvinas' demand ? via the invocation and injunction of the Infinite that breaks with the (ontic-causal) Totality ? that moral-ethical responsibility be assumed for the other and that a certain conception of justice prevail, for it requires that the question of being itself be folded and unfolded richly enough for the other as other to appear ? albeit scarcely and non-substantially ? in the folds in adequate concepts that do not misrecognize it as a being in the third person, which has been its fate hitherto within the long tradition of the metaphysics of whatness. In E. Lvinas Spur des Anderen: Untersuchungen zur Phnomenologie und Sozialphilosophie Alber, Freiburg 1992, S.109/p.92. All pages references are to the German translations of Lvinas' works followed by the original French editions. The English renderings of the German translation