note, however, that the same could be said for black people or women, other groups deliberately excluded from constitutional citizenship by the framers US citizens are supposed to worship so avidly. Taking the more evolutive interpretive approach advocated by legal-liberals such as Ronald Dworkin, the court's reasoning in Tilikum appears glaringly question-begging: much of the textual evidence adduced to support the claim that the Bill of Rights serves humans alone, such as President Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation of 1863, refers not to humans but to persons . The reference of the term 'persons' being more a matter of morality than biology, the judge appears to have assumed the very thing he was purporting to prove. It may well be that you can't construct a political-moral theory of animal rights that plausibly fits with US constitutional law and practice as a whole -- what Dworkin would suggest we must do if we want to fight for constitutional animal rights -- but this wasn't even attempted. Whilst I intend to return to these constitutional issues at a later date, my intention is not to explore them here. Instead, I want to discuss Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka's book, published last year, Zoopolis: A Political Theory of Animal Rights . For it lays out a vision of our relationship to animals that may enable us to decide questions of this kind. I don't intend to lay out a case for animal rights, although where I stand on the issue is obvious, but rather present