rise of the Social Democrats in Saxony, which was of course itself a product of the same socio-economic developments. 12 Bismarck's Realpolitik , driven by pragmatism more than anything else, sought to resolve these social tensions of the industrialized society by granting workers rights and insurances, predicting State Socialism to be inevitable 13 and thus aiming at taking attention away from the newly emerging workers' movement. However, nothing could distract from the fact that the country was very much dominated by Prussia and had no outlets for the people's discontent with the country's many schisms and Bismarck recognized this: The lack of outlets for popular dissent and reform was especially damaging given the cleavages that continued to plague Germany after unification: Protestant North versus Catholic South, agriculture versus industry, Prussia versus the other states, Junkers versus middle-class liberals, industrialists versus the (increasingly Socialist) working class. Bismarck manipulated the parties and interests as he did foreign powers. But toward the end of his tenure, even he realized that German politics might someday reduce to a choice between surrender of privilege by the old elites or a coup d'tat against the liberal and Socialist groups he labelled Reichsfeinde (enemies of the Reich). 14 These splits within the country, some deeply seated, were only worsened by Bismarck's policy of Kulturkampf and the Socialist laws: The former, the 'fight' against political Catholicism (and its predominant form in Germany, the Zentrum party), to ensure the sphere of influence of protestant Prussia, once again divided Germany