Secretary could not therefore oppose it. These were the limits on procedural fairness that would arise if the order was made. Arguing against the making of such orders, the Secretary submitted that policy favoured the ability to pass on information to governments where threats to security would otherwise not be met. For example, the witness may be a terrorist planning an atrocity, and this may be evident from the nature of the evidence he gives in support of the risk of ill-treatment. Confidentiality might have severe diplomatic consequences if the government of a targeted country discovered that the Secretary had not passed on information that may have saved lives. So, which is to dominate? The interests of the litigant facing extradition and a risk of ill-treatment, or the interests of those vulnerable to terrorism? The Supreme Court was unanimous. Two judgments were delivered, each agreeing with the other. Lord Brown found an answer to the Secretary's potential diplomatic embarrassment in the defence of obedience to a court order [14]. It was necessary to maximise SIAC's chances of arriving at the correct decision [18]. However the power to make such confidentiality orders should be "most sparingly used" [19]. If necessary it should be open to the Secretary to try to persuade SIAC to seek a sufficient waiver of confidentiality to address national security concerns, and if that waiver was not forthcoming then SIAC could view the evidence with scepticism or exclude it [21]. And in any event, in deciding whether to