with Searle, as a homunculus, going into a system which we know has intelligence, let's say a brain, and asking the same question in a brain, which everybody agrees is an intelligent system with meaning and intentionality, as they say. Clearly, if he did the same experiment in a brain, there's no level in a brain in which he would find anything more meaningful than the Chinese symbols. It would be equally unintelligible at any level that you choose to pick within a brain, and so in a system which everybody agrees is intentional, Searle's test also fails. James Franklin : I don't believe the homunculus being intelligent is an essential part of the argument, that it could be just a monkey or anything that will be able to follow the rules; in fact, a computer. What the argument is supposed to demonstrate, is that there must be something different in the case of thinking. Wouldn't his argument still be there if there's a zombie brain or indeed a computer in there following the Chinese rules? He would say from the outside, you can't see any of that, the room still appears to be intelligently answering in Chinese, but you know, because you've set up the experiment, that there is nothing in there thinking or understanding. Therefore thinking or understanding must be something essentially different. Peter Slezak : But you only know because of this thought experiment where you have a criterion, you have a test. I think Searle's experiment