white-collar workers who supported the opposition, and began to restart production. In the end, 18,000 PDVSA employees -- half of the PDVSA workforce, but fully "90 percent of PDVSA's white-collar workforce" were dismissed (Collier 2006; Clough 2008). It is only after this massive social upheaval lasting almost two years that Chvez was able to assert the very basic right to increase royalties on oil production in the country. The point is, there is nothing automatic about being able to direct profits from the extractive industries towards national economic development, let alone social assistance for the poor. There were very serious class forces opposed to these steps being taken, and two years of intense class struggle before these very modest reforms could be implemented. Growth None of this history matters for commentators like Dyer. He berates Chvez for overseeing a rate of economic growth that has been slower than in Brazil or Colombia. Of course economic growth in Venezuela has been slower. First, Brazil is the biggest economy on the South American continent, with a domestic market many times the size of that in Venezuela. Second, Colombia's growth has been as a virtual client state of the US, and the price of its growth has been the displacement of millions from their land, and the death of thousands at the hands of right-wing death squads. Third, while Venezuela was able to assert control over oil by 2003, the oil industry in the country has never fully recovered from the loss of