uncertainties facing investors, for instance in electricity generation. I agree they face uncertainties, including those associated with the future international framework for climate change. Unfortunately, those uncertainties cannot be wished away. Rather, they are a fact of the current global situation. Imposing a scheme such as the one proposed, merely so as to reduce the cost of capital to electricity generators, only shifts the risk on to the community (who may not be the party best placed to bear it). This is using a sledgehammer to crack a nut. Is it the most cost effective way to reduce emissions? The fifth point is that we are in any event committed to reducing emissions by 5% and this scheme is the least costly way of doing so. Generally, it is my view that we should be willing to reconsider the 5% commitment if there is little sign of credible, comprehensive, global agreement. However, even if one takes that 5% commitment as given, it is hardly obvious that imposing such a unilateral tax, while throwing many billions of dollars at a range of rent-seeking projects, is an efficient way of meeting the goal. Rather, before leaping to that conclusion, one would want to see systematic modelling of alternatives. Insurance or anti-insurance? This brings me to the sixth and last argument, which is to say that Treasury's modelling shows the costs of such a scheme are low, so we should adopt it as a form of insurance. The notion that such a scheme