doesn't have. James Franklin : Yes, but he knows that because he, Searle, is like you and me, a conscious being who understands. Peter Slezak : Exactly and what the hell's he doing in there? Yes he is, and that's the problem. James Franklin : It doesn't matter. No, I don't believe it matters whether he's in there or not. It's not essential that the person is in there... Peter Slezak : But if you're only on the outside, if there's nobody in there to tell this story, then from the outside on his own account you can't tell the difference. Alan Saunders : Why can't I simply say, 'Well look, I've got these meaningful messages in English, say, going in to the room, and meaningful answers coming out of the room and I think, hey, I'm told this is just a computer, but this is obviously a computer that is thinking, that is processing this information', you then open the door and lo and behold it's a zombie with no inner life at all. What's wrong with that? Peter Slezak : Well now, this is combining two related but different philosophical puzzles. The zombie question is strictly a question about consciousness, and that's I think a parallel argument. Searle strictly speaking is not talking about consciousness, actually. He's talking about what philosophers call intentionality, but it's the idea of meaningfulness. He's talking about the claim that symbols could be the substrate for meaning, and consciousness is really something slightly