of the Act, came to an end when they had secured sufficient evidence to justify a charge. The deputy judge's second reason, which reinforced this interpretation, was stated as follows, at p 1060: "I cannot believe that the legislature ever intended that the powers contained in paragraph 1, with the sanction of criminal penalties, should or could be invoked to obtain information or documents of a potentially incriminating nature from one who had already been cautioned and charged with offences under the Act . . . If this were to be so, it would make a mockery of the caution and the concept of the right to silence after a charge has been preferred." The position was however different as regards A and the company, for they had not been charged, and in the view of the deputy judge were in no better or worse position than any other potential witness from whom information and documents were sought for the purpose of securing compliance with or detecting evasion of the Act. Reliance was placed on Director of Public Prosecutions v Ellis [1973] 1 WLR 722, where it was held that the fact that two accused persons had been prosecuted to conviction did not mean that the purpose of Part I of the Act, namely securing compliance with and detecting evasion of the Act, were spent; and that accordingly it was still open to the authorities to employ their powers to obtain information relative to the same transaction from another person.