Are We Going to Get Serious About Aviation Security? TSA has spent over $40 billion, yet amateurs are still getting on planes with explosives Since its creation in 2004, the Transportation Security Administration has spent $40 billion on aviation security. Yet an amateur terrorist succeeded in getting on board Northwest flight 253 with a well-known type of explosive concealed on his person. Two egregious security failures allowed this to happen. First, despite an explicit warning from the terrorist's father, his name did not get added to either of the TSA's lists -- the 4,000-name no-fly list or the 14,000-name selectee list. Had he been on the latter list, he would have been subjected to secondary screening at Amsterdam Schiphol airport, where a routine swabbing of his hands and/or carry-ons would likely have revealed traces of the PETN explosive. But even if this trace-detection had not been carried out, the PETN which the terrorist concealed in his underwear would have been detected had he been required to pass through one of the 15 of millimeter-wave body-scanners now in use at Schiphol. But airport officials there maintain that they are not permitted to use these machines for U.S.-bound passengers (though TSA has disputed that). Both failures reflect the flawed philosophy that underlies U.S. aviation security policy. For the most part, it continues to be fixated on keeping bad things -- as opposed to bad people -- off of airplanes. It also implicitly assumes every passenger is equally likely to be a terrorist,