to recapitalise banks directly, and later over the seniority status of loans provided by the ESM. In seeking special conditions for its involvement, the formerly model pupil of Finland thrust itself into the European limelight as a troublemaker. This was fueled by strongly polarised opinion in the electorate. The traditional parties began to wonder whether the only way to fight the populists was to copy their Euroscepticism. ( see p.4 in this ECFR report ) Although this turn in Finnish European policy was widely noted in Brussels, and led to some speculation in the European media about the country's willingness to leave the euro, opinion polls in Finland have suggested that the concerns of the mainstream parties were largely overblown. Despite strong feelings over European issues, opinion polls in spring 2012 suggested that public opinion remained highly supportive on the core questions of both EU and euro membership (one poll suggested that the level of support for Finnish membership of the EU actually increased from 37 to 55 percent in the twelve months up to then). Both candidates that made it through to the second round of presidential elections in early 2012 were pro-European.  This suggests that the True Finns have been adept at mobilising latent dissatisfaction with specific elements of the response to the euro crisis, rather than in changing the broader level of support for the EU as a whole. The contours of the Finnish EU debate Since the economic and sovereign debt crisis hit Europe the Finnish