others" (Cohen 2006:1), but to conclude thereby that economic globalisation is undermining the nation state is to approach the topic "[w]ith little sense of history" (Mann 1997:494); as Goldblatt et al. note, "[s]tate autonomy has always been limited and constrained by global forces and international actors" (1997:76). Not only has economic globalisation's influence on state power been overstated, its extent and uniformity have been misrepresented. Gilpin illustrates this with the examples of trade remaining "confined to a limited number of economic sectors" (2003:351) and lack of wage uniformity worldwide which "clearly suggests that the world is not as integrated as many proclaim" (2003:351). In general, he posits, the "impact of the global economy is highly uneven, and its impact varies from issue to issue; finance is much more globalized than are services and industrial production" (2003:349). One argument not yet considered is that economic globalization has provoked "an increasing demand for political co-operation across borders" (Sorensen 2006:194) and that the integration of states into various IGOs has diminished state sovereignty. Mann acknowledges the distant possibility of free trade being achieved "as the EU, NAFTA, the Asian and Pacific Conference countries and other trade groups merge under the loose umbrella of GATT" (1997:488). He notes Europe's "unique degree of continental economic integration" but is quick to point out that the EU's free market hardly represents economic globalisation generally, and that within it, "symbiosis between the national and the transnational remains" (1997:480). In any case, most economic IGOs demonstrate regionalism, not globalism.