Bush administration's theory -- and you can say, well, knocking out missile launchers and no-fly zones is much different than an invasion of a country. But the theory was that the existing Security Council resolutions gave that authority. It was not a broad, new authority of preemption. The debate right now amongst international lawyers is that preemption, if it's real anticipatory self-defense, that you are really anticipating an attack that is imminent, is okay, if that's -- under international law, if you define preemption in that way. But if you define preemption as what -- some people would say preventive, or what some people thought was in fact the Bush doctrine, that you could wait, look way, way, way, way, way out and prevent something that you thought was coming -- that's sort of more where the argument is, is that -- How far in advance do you have to anticipate -- and the requirement for an imminent threat and an imminent attack -- to anticipate how much is imminent when you're talking about nuclear weapons? TOOBIN: Matt? WAXMAN: Yeah. I would add to that I think there's actually a long history within the United States and the U.S. presidency of relying on preemptive self-defense. We very rarely use that publicly as our justification. John's right. Most people, I think, most informed observers believe that a preemption doctrine was the legal, the official legal position of the United States government for the Iraq War, and it wasn't. It was --