forms that the argument takes in modern psychology and cognitive science. I think Gerry Fodor and leading philosophers who are talking about cognition end up with a version of Berkeley's idealism when they try to explain how cognition could function when it has representations, as they now call them, instead of ideas as the empiricists call them, and the problem becomes all over again how to connect the representations with the world, or how to connect us with the world, because of the intermediaries that are our representations, or, in Berkeley's case, the ideas. And it's very interesting for me to see how contemporary, sophisticated, technical philosophy of cognitive science essentially rehearses the arguments of Berkeley and Malebranche and these others. Alan Saunders : James Franklin and Peter Slezak, thank you very much for joining us. The show was produced this week by Polly Rickard with technical production from Andrei Shabanov and Leila Schunnar.  I'm Alan Saunders.  I'll be back next week with another Philosopher's Zone . I. Giardina : 22 Apr 2012 7:53:43pm The argument that the Chinese room relies on a 'inner whole person' , whatever that could be, implies the essential feature of what this argument pertains towards. This has been dubbed in another discipline as primordialism which is the notion of some basic feature that accounts for subjectivity with historical content. Intentionality appears to have a historical component as heritage that strong AI theory cannot account for, unless there were a world of generations of AI,