certain instincts in animals; it is something less than intelligence. The latter is inspiration, intuition, emotion, susceptible of analysis into ideas which furnish intellectual notations of it and branch out into infinite detail; thus, like a unity which en- compasses and transcends a plurality incapable of ever equalling it, it contains any amount of intellectuality; it is more than intelligence. Between the two lies intelligence itself. It is at this point that the human soul would have settled down, had it sprung forward from the one without reaching the other. It would have dominated the morality of the closed soul; it would not have attained to, or rather it would not have created, that of the open soul. Its attitude, the result of getting up, would have lifted it to the plane of in- tellectuality. Compared with the position it had just left described negatively such a soul would be manifesting in- difference or insensibility, it would be in the "ataraxy" or the "apathy" of the Epicureans and the Stoics. Considered in what it positively is, if its detachment from the old sought to be an attachment to something new, its life would be con- templation; it would conform to the Platonic and the Aris- totelian ideal. From whatever angle we look at it, its attitude would be upright, noble, truly worthy of admiration and re- served for the chosen few. Philosophies which start from very different principles may find in it a common goal. The reason is that there