both economic globalisation's potency and the continuing importance of states. A global crisis triggered largely by a U.S. sub-prime crisis, it fits Mosely's point (2005:357-8) well: [T]he increasing openness of national economies has made the exercise of macroeconomic policy more complex and difficult. This does not mean that a national government can no longer guide the economy around the dangerous shoals of inflation and recession, but it does mean that the risk of shipwreck has grown. Response to the crisis was executed almost exclusively on a state and regional level, with central banks (particularly the U.S. F.R.B. and the E.C.B.) playing major roles and frequently bailing out the same MNCs whose supposed supremacy was discussed above. As Mosely summates, "domestic institutions play an important role in mediating pressures from the global economy, and these institutions often are resilient in the face of global economic pressures" (2005:355-6). Overall, while economic globalisation has produced unprecedented global interconnectedness, "[i]t is not at all clear that it is all over for nation states" (Goldblatt et al. 1997:61-2). "[T]he usual understanding of a dichotomy between the state and globalization is an illusion, as the processes of global restructuring are largely embedded within state institutions, politically contingent on state policies and actions, and primarily about the reorganisation of the state" (Amoore et al. 1997:186). Empirically, "the truth is much messier" (Cable 1995:38) than most theorists and writers insist. States now find themselves "deeply enmeshed in global networks of interaction" (Goldblatt et al. 1997:76), and the "state-centric