I pay fulsome tribute here -- that all eleven Magnox power stations were built to different specifications. Even their fuel elements were different sizes. From an energy policy point of view, we needed several good workaday Marks and Spencer suits. Instead, every reactor was bespoke from Savile Row. The second fleet of advanced gas-cooled reactors were built to a design that almost no-one else used. They did not deliver on budget or on time. The fourth lesson is that we forgot about our children. About their future. The regulatory systems were simply not geared toward long-term protection. In the early days, we didn't plan for decommissioning or managing radioactive waste. Short-term political or financial decisions were taken, with long-term consequences. In other countries, a levy on nuclear power went into special funds to deal with decommissioning. Both France and the United States handled the problems much better than us. In the UK, the money was more free-range than ring-fenced. It was tipped into new projects, in the belief that it would be clawed back from asset sales. Too often, we played double or nothing with public cash. Which brings me to the fifth issue: we took our eye off the money. The nuclear industry was like a expense account dinner: everybody ordering the most expensive items on the menu, because someone else was paying the bill. In the early days of nuclear power, cost-effectiveness was not an issue. Decommissioning estimates were often approximate and greatly understated. We bought in to