that because Japan was no longer able to exploit such national symbols effectively, there emerged a kind of identity or symbolic vacuum which was filled by Nihonjinron. The term Nihonjinron thus describes pre-war Discourses of identity shorn of their imperialistic and war-time symbolism. Mouer and Sugimoto (1986: 406) note that the Nihonjinron Discourse has two central tenets: Japanese society is 'uniquely' unique and group orientation is the dominant cultural pattern which shapes behaviour. A central premise of Nihonjinron is that the Japanese are a homogeneous people ( tan'itsu minzoku ) which constitute a racially unified nation ( tan'itsu minzoku kokka ). Compared with the period up until the end of the war, the role of the state in directly creating and propagating ideologies of identity is much less. There is no secret police, Imperial Rescript on Education, nor morality texts in schools. The level of state involvement and coercion is less overt and more subtle and indirect (Befu 2001: 140). But what Anderson (1983: 104) calls 'official nationalism' ? "a systematic, even Machiavellian, instilling of nationalist ideology through the mass media, the educational system, administrative regulations, and so forth" ? has not disappeared. Mouer and Sugimoto (1986: 170) note that Nihonjinron has become a major point of reference in justifying the conservative policies of the LDP. Occasionally, the government takes a direct role in deliberately introducing and officially sanctioning Nihonjinron as an ideology. For example, the Japanese government and affiliated organisations, such as the Japan Foundation, expend much energy in