criticism, aside from its underlying - and historically erroneous - premise that judicial institutions do not form an integral part of the democratic framework, is that it is, at its core, a complaint that the Charter has created too many rights for too many people. But since rights and participation define democracies, does the criticism not come down to the proposition that we have too much democracy and too many institutions available to enforce it? As England, Israel, and the European community also embrace a legislated commitment to an overriding Bill of Rights, it strikes me that Canada's decision to constitutionalize rights, placing them at the apex of the system, should be a source of great pride in our democratic compliance, not of cranky agitation. I would have thought that in a democracy, the majority would applaud no less enthusiastically the possibility that its rights would be vigorously protected by the judiciary, as that their opinions would be seriously taken into account by legislators. In fact, statistics repeatedly confirm that most Canadians, that majority whose interests are consistently invoked in arguments against judicial intervention, while expressing wariness or even outright disapproval over a particular result in a given case, do in fact remain committed to the Charter as a defining democratic instrument. What I would like to do, therefore, is try to show why and how democracy is enhanced, not cauterized, by a judiciary effectively fulfilling its Charter mandate, and how democratic values are strengthened not only by a strong