need not be refuted to make the point that psychophysical reduction cannot be accommodated by the subjective-to-objective model from other cases. 10 The problem is not just that when I look at the Mona Lisa , my visual experience has a certain quality, no trace of which is to be found by someone looking into my brain. For even if he did observe there a tiny image of the Mona Lisa , he would have no reason to identify it with the experience. 11 The relation would therefore not be a contingent one, like that of a cause and its distinct effect. It would be necessarily true that a physical state felt a certain way. Saul Kripke in Semantics of Natural Language , (ed. Davidson and Harman) argues that causal behaviorist and related analyses of the mental fail because they construe, e.g., 'pain' as a merely contingent name of pains. The subjective character of an experience ('its immediate phenomenolocal quality' Kripke calls it (p. 340)) is the essential property left out by such analyses, and the one in virtue of which it is, necessarily , the experience it is. My view is closely related to his. Like Kripke, I find the hypothesis that a certain brain state should necessarily have a certain subjective character incomprehensible without further explanation. No such explanation emerges from theories which view the mind-brain relation as contingent, but perhaps there are other alternatives, not yet discovered. A theory that explained how the mind-brain relation was necessary