Malaysian-sponsored initiative was effectively derailed in the mid 1990s by a combination of American opposition and a concomitant Japanese leadership failure. 90 For some observers, the re-emergence of China at the centre of East Asian affairs is something of a return to 'normal', and not something that American policymakers should necessarily become too exercised about. 91 Predictably, enough, however, it is something that many American observers are concerned about. 92 The fact that 'the United States' finds it so difficult to react to China's rise with any consistency tells us much about the constraints on and counterproductive nature of American leadership in the contemporary era. As Christensen points out, one of the paradoxical consequences of America's East Asia policy has been 'to improve [China's] relations with its neighbors diplomatically and economically at least in part as a hedge against US power and the fear of encirclement by a coalition led by the United States'. 93 Equally importantly, the dynamics embedded within the political economy of the US-China relationship mean that there are limits to what the US can now do: on the one hand, America is highly reliant on continuing inflows of capital, on the other, China's position in the international division of labour makes it a pivotal cog in global production (and consumption) processes, and one that many American business elites have a vested interest in preserving. 94 The Obama administration confronts a very different geopolitical and economic landscape in East Asia than did its predecessor. On the one