insights. So let me turn to the lessons we have learned. First lesson, simple and clear objectives matter. In the early days, we could not decide between guns and butter. Nuclear technology was given the task of delivering two national priorities -- energy for the masses, and plutonium for the military -- without proper economic or democratic scrutiny. The reactor used at Calder Hall was chosen firstly for plutonium production; electricity generation was a side effect. Born out of military requirements but serving civilian needs, the new industry was torn in two directions. Confused objectives led to confused design decisions -- and a high legacy cost. In the United States, by contrast, there was a competition for the most efficient and safe reactor design to produce electricity. A simple objective with a cost-effective result. The pressurised water reactor. The second lesson is avoid conflicts of interest. For the first two decades of nuclear energy, the UK Atomic Energy Authority was responsible for both promoting and researching nuclear energy. The Government's official adviser on nuclear policy was an organisation solely devoted to nuclear energy. Gardeners like gardening, researchers want more research, and the UKAEA wanted more nuclear energy using their own designs. That meant advice to Ministers was not always impartial. Designs were chosen and delivered without proper oversight. There was no sceptical, commercial eye for either operating or decommissioning costs. The third lesson is keep it simple. Such is the extraordinary inventiveness of the British scientific community -- to which