being to build maximum possible institutional credibility for the rebels,  and a believable political transition plan from them, with this then putting new pressure on Russia to persuade the Syrian leadership to accept a settlement process.  This is a very slender reed, but it may be the only one we have. The worst possible outcome would be for Syria, through frustration and familiarity, to over time slide out of public consciousness into the realm of forgotten conflicts and forgotten atrocity crimes. It is absolutely crucial that those of us committed to R2P, the norm we have worked so hard to create over the last ten years, do everything we can to keep global attention focused on what is happening within the country and not becoming desensitized or immune to new shocks -- maintaining our passion and maintaining our shame at our inability to stop this carnage, and not resting until we have done so. *** The completely effective implementation of R2P is going to be work in progress for some time yet. There are bound to be acute frustrations and disappointments and occasions for despair along the way, but that should not for a moment lead us to conclude that the whole enterprise has been misconceived. Despite what has gone wrong over the last year, I think the basic consensus on the Security Council of February-March 2011 can be re-established, with Brazil's RWP proposal, further refined and developed, playing a critical role as a circuit-breaker. I say this because I