are real people too and we are supposed to see them too as parts of works. All I do is things we are supposed to do when aesthetically appreciating works of art; I attentively watch the 'installation' from all angles, interpret it, have it absorb me; I build experiential dimensions in my imagination, find the aesthetic qualities of the 'installation', make connections with relevant other circumstances. And I am actively engaged: spiritually-by introducing all sorts of relevant associations-and physically-by walking around the wreckage, gazing through the shattered windows, reading the texts in the newspaper, concentrating on all the details whichever of my senses deliver to me: on the sounds, the smells, the images, temperatures, etc. Only one thing I fail to do: I do not act in accordance to the moral depths of my thoughts and feelings. For clearly, if one is aware of another person's pain and struggle, one should try to free him from his awkward position, to stop his bleeding, provide first aid, or, at the least, call an ambulance. One might want to argue that the failure in my treatment of the victim was more complicated psychologically and involved a reduction of the man's personhood. Yet I merely treated the person as a persona and reduced, quite properly I think, his personhood to his role in the whole of the 'installation'. [16] With works of art, it is the norm to refrain from moral actions in this sense, and this, I suppose, is what it means