ethnic-focused violence in the aftermath of a contested election, and with a major genocide feared, a diplomatic mission led by Kofi Annan under the auspices of the UN and African Union and explicitly invoking R2P successfully defused the situation -- demonstrating in the process that even in the most extreme cases, R2P was not just about military intervention. It was not until 2011 that the UN Security Council itself took coercive action explicitly invoking R2P. But when it did so, in the cases of Cote d'Ivoire and Libya, this was widely heralded -- including by me -- as the coming of age of the responsibility to protect.  Libya especially, at least in February and March last year, was a textbook example of how R2P is supposed to work in the face of a rapidly unfolding mass atrocity situation during which early-stage prevention measures no longer have any relevance. In February, Gaddafi's forces responded to the initial peaceful protests against the excesses of his regime, inspired by the Arab Spring revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt, by massacring at least several hundred of his own people. That led to the unanimous UN Security Council Resolution 1970, which specifically invoked 'the Libyan authorities' responsibility to protect its population", condemned its violence against civilians, demanded that this stop and sought to concentrate Gaddafi's mind by applying targeted sanctions, an arms embargo and the threat of ICC prosecution for crimes against humanity. Then, as it became apparent that Gaddafi was not only ignoring that resolution