Chapter VII of the UN Charter, to endorse any use of coercive military force, more formal and systematic attention needs to be paid by the Security Council to relevant prudential criteria or guidelines (including in particular 'last resort', 'proportionality' and 'balance of consequences') --   Third, after such action has been taken, there should be enhanced UN Security Council procedures to monitor and assess the manner in which such mandates are interpreted and implemented. Although the initial reaction by the P3 powers to the Brazilian RWP proposal when it was first articulated at last year's UN General Assembly  --   'these countries would want all those delaying and spoiling options, wouldn't they' -- this has begun to soften, as it must.  They have begun to realize, as they must, that if an un-vetoed majority vote is ever going to be secured again for tough action in a hard mass atrocity case, even action falling considerably short of military action, the issues at the heart of the backlash that has accompanied the implementation of the Libyan mandate, and the concerns of the BRICS states in particular -- voicing as they do the concerns of a much wider swathe of the developing world -- simply have to be taken seriously. *** All that said, renewed consensus on how to implement R2P in the hardest of cases in future is going to be hard to achieve, and will certainly take time to achieve: it is very difficult to believe that it could come in time