Translate the text from Welsh to English.



 
Heddiw traddododd y Goruchaf Lys ei ddyfarniad yn achos AXA General Insurance Limited and others (Appellants) v The Lord Advocate and others (Respondents) (Scotland) . 

 Mae’r achos hwn yn ymwneud â her gyfreithiol i un o Ddeddfau Senedd yr Alban, sef Deddf Amodau Iawndal (Yn Ymwneud ag Asbestos) (Yr Alban) 2009\. Mae’r Ddeddf honno yn darparu bod placiau plewrol asymptomatig, tewhau plewrol ac asbestosis i’w cyfrif yn niwed cyfreithadwy at ddibenion achos ar gyfer iawndal am niwed personol a bod yr effeithiau hynny i’w trin fel petaent wedi bod yn niwed cyfreithadwy erioed.  Effaith y Ddeddf, yn yr Alban, yw gwrthdroi dyfarniad Tŷ’r Arglwyddi (a hwythau’n eistedd fel barnwyr) yn achos Rothwell v Chemical \& Insulating Co Ltd .  Barn y Tŷ oedd nad oedd yr effeithiau hynny yn niwed cyfreithadwy ac felly na allent fod yn destun hawliad ar gyfer iawndal am niwed personol.

 Ystyriodd y Goruchaf Lys nifer o faterion, ond o diddordeb penodol o ran y setliad datganoli yng Nghymru oedd y ffaith i ddilysrwydd y Ddeddf Albanaidd gael ei herio ar sail yn y gyfraith gyffredin. Dadleuodd yr apelwyr (cwmnïau yswiriant) fod Deddfau Senedd yr Alban yn agored i adolygiad barnwrol ar sail eu bod yn ddefnydd  afresymol, afresymegol neu fympwyol o’r awdurdod deddfwriaethol a roddwyd i Senedd yr Alban gan Ddeddf yr Alban 1998\.  

 Pe bai’r haeriad hwnnw wedi cael ei ddal i fod yn gywir, byddai wedi dilyn bron yn anorfod y byddai Deddfau Cynulliad Cenedlaethol Cymru yn agored i adolygiad barnwrol ar y seiliau hyn yn yr un modd. Mae hyn yn allweddol i ansawdd y setliad datganoli.  Fel y dywed yr Arglwydd Hope (y Dirprwy Lywydd) :

 “…the question as to whether Acts of the Scottish Parliament and measures passed under devolved powers by the legislatures in Wales and Northern Ireland are amenable to judicial review, and if so on what grounds, is a matter of very great constitutional importance.”

   
Ymyrrodd y Prif Weinidog yn yr apêl yn y Goruchaf Lys. Gwnaeth hynny er mwyn cyflwyno sylwadau ar herio Deddfau’r Cynulliad ar seiliau yn y gyfraith gyffredin. Ymddangosais gerbron y Goruchaf Lys i gyflwyno sylwadau llafar ar ran Llywodraeth Cymru mewn gwrandawiad rhwng 13, 14 a 15 Mehefin 2011\. 

 Mae’r Arglwyddi Hope a Reed yn rhoi’r prif ddyfarniadau. Mae gweddill yr Arglwyddi (yr Arglwyddi Dyson, Brown, Mance, Kerr a Clarke) yn cytuno â’r Arglwyddi Hope a Reed ar fater yr her yn ôl y gyfraith gyffredin.

 Yn ei brif ddyfarniad ef,  mae’r Arglwydd Hope yn penderfynu fel a ganlyn: “Acts of the Scottish Parliament are not subject to judicial review at common law on the grounds of irrationality, unreasonableness or arbitrariness” .  Ond os yw deddfwrfa ddatganoledig yn mynd yn groes i reolaeth y gyfraith (e.e. diddymu adolygiad barnwrol neu leihau rôl y llysoedd wrth amddiffyn buddiannau unigolion) mae’r Arglwydd Hope o’r farn y byddai’n bosibl dal bod Deddf gan y ddeddfwrfa honno yn anghyfreithlon. Ein safiad erioed ar ran Cymru oedd cytuno os felly yr oedd hi, ni fyddai dim gwahaniaeth rhwng Deddfau’r Cynulliad a Deddfau Senedd y DU yn y cyswllt hwn.  Felly nid ar y pwynt hwn yr oeddem yn ceisio amddiffyn y setliad datganoli.

 Yn yr ail brif ddyfarniad, penderfyniad yr Arglwydd Reed yw :

 “…grounds of review developed in relation to administrative bodies which have been given limited powers for identifiable purposes, and which are designed to prevent such bodies from exceeding their powers or using them for an improper purpose or being influenced by irrelevant considerations, generally have no purchase in such circumstances, and cannot be applied.  As a general rule, and subject to the qualification which I shall mention shortly, \[the Scottish Parliament’s] decisions as to how to exercise its law\-making powers require no justification in law other than the will of the Parliament.  It is in principle accountable for the exercise of its powers, within the limits set by section 29(2\), to the electorate rather than the courts.”

 Fe ddywed ymhellach :

 “Law\-making by a democratically elected legislature is the paradigm of a political activity, and the reasonableness of the resultant decisions is inevitably a matter of political judgment.  In my opinion it would not be constitutionally appropriate for the courts to review such decisions on the ground of irrationality.  Such review would fail to recognise that courts and legislatures each have their own particular role to play in our constitution, and that each must be careful to respect the sphere of action of the other.”

 Yn ogystal â nadu her gyfreithiol i Ddeddfau Senedd yr Alban ar sail afresymoldeb, mae’r Arglwydd Reed hefyd yn nadu her ar sail diben amhriodol ac ystyriaeth o faterion amherthnasol.  Er hynny, fel yr Arglwydd Reed, mae’r Arglwydd Reed yntau yn gweld y byddai’n dal yn bosibl i herio Deddf yn gyfreithiol ar y sail ei bod yn mynd yn groes i hawliau sylfaenol neu reolaeth y gyfraith:

 “Parliament did not legislate in a vacuum: it legislated for a liberal democracy founded on particular constitutional principles and traditions. That being so, Parliament cannot be taken to have intended to establish a body which was free to abrogate fundamental rights or to violate the rule of law” .

 Mae’n amlwg bod croeso mawr i’r dyfarniad hwn.  Mae’n gosod cyfyngiadau sylweddol ar y seiliau y gallai’r llysoedd fod yn fodlon eu defnyddio i ystyried adolygu Deddfau Senedd yr Alban. Mae o arwyddocâd mawr i’r setliad datganoli yng Nghymru, achos fel y dywed yr Arglwydd Hope:

 “…while there are some differences of detail between the Scotland Act 1998 and the corresponding legislation for Wales and Northern Ireland, these differences do not matter for present purposes.  The essential nature of the legislatures that the legislation has created in each case is the same” . 

 Felly, mae’n debygol y bydd agwedd y Goruchaf Lys at ddeddfwriaeth yr Alban, fel y’i gwelwyd yng nghanlyniad yr achos hwn, yr un mor gymwys i’n Cynulliad ni.

 Bydd Llywodraeth Cymru yn parhau i ddadansoddi goblygiadau’r achos hwn.







Translation:


 
The Supreme Court has today handed down its judgment in the case of AXA General Insurance Limited and others (Appellants) v The Lord Advocate and others (Respondents) (Scotland) .


This case involves a legal challenge to the Damages (Asbestos\-related) Conditions (Scotland) Act 2009; an Act of the Scottish Parliament. That Act provides that asymptomatic pleural plaques, pleural thickening and asbestosis constitute, and are to be treated as always having constituted, actionable harm for the purposes of an action for damages for personal injury. The effect of the Act, in Scotland, is to reverse the judgment of the House of Lords (sitting judicially) in the case of Rothwell v Chemical \& Insulating Co Ltd  in which it held that such effects were not actionable harm and could not therefore be the subject of a claim for damages for personal injuries.


There were a number of issues considered by the Supreme Court but of particular interest for the Welsh devolution settlement was the fact that the validity of the Scottish Act was questioned on common law grounds: it was argued by the appellants (insurance companies) that Acts of the Scottish Parliament are open to judicial review as an unreasonable, irrational and or arbitrary exercise of the legislative authority conferred by the Scotland Act 1998 on the Scottish Parliament.


 If that contention was held to be right, it would almost inevitably follow that Acts of the National Assembly for Wales would similarly be open to judicial review on these grounds and this is fundamental to the quality of the devolution settlement. As Lord Hope (Deputy President) states :


“…the question as to whether Acts of the Scottish Parliament and measures passed under devolved powers by the legislatures in Wales and Northern Ireland are amenable to judicial review, and if so on what grounds, is a matter of very great constitutional importance.”


  

The First Minister intervened in the appeal in the Supreme Court in order to make representations on the scope of common law challenge so far as Acts of the Assembly were concerned. I appeared before the Supreme Court to make oral representations on behalf of the Welsh Government at the hearing which took place over 13th, 14th and 15th June 2011\.


Lords Hope and Reed give the leading judgments. The remainder of their Lordships (Lords Dyson, Brown, Mance, Kerr and Clarke agree with Lords Hope and Reed on the issue of common law challenge).


  

In his leading judgment, Lord Hope decides that “Acts of the Scottish Parliament are not subject to judicial review at common law on the grounds of irrationality, unreasonableness or arbitrariness” .  His Lordship leaves open the possibility that an Act of a devolved legislature that contravenes the rule of law (e.g. abolishing judicial review or diminishing the role of the courts in protecting the interests of individuals) might be held to be unlawful .  However, our position on behalf of Wales was always to agree that if this was the case, then the Acts of the Assembly would be in no different position in this respect than Acts of Parliament, so that this was not the issue upon which we sought to protect the devolution settlement.


In the second principal judgment Lord Reed decides  that:


“…grounds of review developed in relation to administrative bodies which have been given limited powers for identifiable purposes, and which are designed to prevent such bodies from exceeding their powers or using them for an improper purpose or being influenced by irrelevant considerations, generally have no purchase in such circumstances, and cannot be applied.  As a general rule, and subject to the qualification which I shall mention shortly, \[the Scottish Parliament’s] decisions as to how to exercise its law\-making powers require no justification in law other than the will of the Parliament.  It is in principle accountable for the exercise of its powers, within the limits set by section 29(2\), to the electorate rather than the courts.”


He goes on to say :


“Law\-making by a democratically elected legislature is the paradigm of a political activity, and the reasonableness of the resultant decisions is inevitably a matter of political judgment.  In my opinion it would not be constitutionally appropriate for the courts to review such decisions on the ground of irrationality.  Such review would fail to recognise that courts and legislatures each have their own particular role to play in our constitution, and that each must be careful to respect the sphere of action of the other.”


Lord Reed in addition to excluding legal challenge to Acts of the Scottish Parliament on grounds of irrationality also excludes challenges on grounds of improper purpose and the taking account of irrelevant considerations.  However, like Lord Hope, Lord Reed also reserves the possibility of legal challenge on the grounds of breach of fundamental rights or the rule of law:


“Parliament did not legislate in a vacuum: it legislated for a liberal democracy founded on particular constitutional principles and traditions. That being so, Parliament cannot be taken to have intended to establish a body which was free to abrogate fundamental rights or to violate the rule of law”.


In significantly limiting the grounds on which the courts might be willing to consider reviewing the Acts of the Scottish Parliament, the judgment is clearly welcome. It is of considerable significance for the Welsh devolution settlement, because, as Lord Hope said:


“…while there are some differences of detail between the Scotland Act 1998 and the corresponding legislation for Wales and Northern Ireland, these differences do not matter for present purposes. The essential nature of the legislatures that the legislation has created in each case is the same” .


So the Supreme Court’s approach to Scottish legislation, as illustrated by the outcome of  this case, will apply equally to Acts of our Assembly.


The Welsh Government will continue to analyse the implications of this case.