Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 74
74. Telegram From
the Department of State
to
the Embassy in India
1
Washington
,
June 17, 1971, 0029Z
.
107733. Subject: India–Pakistan; Indian Foreign Ministerʼs Meeting with Secretary. Following is
Noforn
,
FYI
only, uncleared and subject to revision on review.
Summary: During meeting between Indian Foreign Minister
Swaran Singh
and Secretary on June 16, there emerged substantial consensus on estimate of situation in East Pakistan and in regard to objectives which should be sought in order to resolve problem of East Pakistan refugees. There were some differences, however, in regard to specific actions which might be taken in pursuit of these objectives, particularly in regard use of economic assistance.
1.
Meeting between Secretary and
FonMin
Swaran Singh
was attended by Indian Ambassador
Jha
, Minister
Rasgotra
, and External Publicity Director, S.K. Singh, on Indian side; and Ambassador
Keating
, Assistant Secretary
Sisco
,
Van Hollen
and
Schneider
on
U.S.
side. Secretary led off substantive discussion, stating with emphasis how much
USG
appreciates and in fact congratulates
GOI
for manner in which it is currently dealing with an immensely difficult problem. Said India was doing well, was acting with restraint.
U.S.
will do whatever it can to cooperate with India. We were doing our best to keep India informed in complete confidence regarding everything we were doing because we wished to help India at a difficult time.
2.
Swaran Singh
replied that India wishes to cooperate with
U.S.
on exactly this basis of confidence. Said
U.S.
has as much information about situation in East Pakistan as
GOI
, therefore no need for lengthy presentation on his part. Secretary interrupted
Swaran Singh
saying, to the contrary, he would appreciate
FonMin
ʼs own account of situation.
3.
Thereafter
Swaran Singh
presented reasoned and restrained analysis of situation and presentation of
GOI
view. Started with description of
Yahya
ʼs deliberate decision to hold elections as part of process forming constitution.
Mujib
was elected within context of his six-point proposal for East Pakistan autonomy. Thus, Awami League activities were entirely within context of constitutional process started by
Yahya
himself.
Swaran Singh
observed many foreign governments

seemed to be bothered by “secessionist” aspect of East Pakistan situation. He observed that it was only after Pakistan military became engaged that new situation, outside of context legitimate constitution formation process, was created.
4.
Briefly and unemotionally
Swaran Singh
described “disaster” which had resulted from military action. Explained death totals were in six figures. Refugee flow was now touching six million. Said this easy to write on paper but must be seen to be believed.
5.
FonMin
stated Pak army had considered it could clean up situation in East Pakistan in 72 hours, but in fact East Pakistan has not yet returned to normal. Although
Yahya
made statement 22 May that refugees could come back, in three weeks since an additional two million have crossed into India.
GOI
therefore questions sincerity
Yahya
ʼs statement.
6.
Presenting Indian assessment of situation,
Swaran Singh
said it clear military action cannot resolve East Pakistan problem. It will simply harden attitudes. Therefore, first requirement is that military action come to end. Next requirement is that movement of refugees to India must stop. Even Pak military have capability of stopping flow. Next, all of refugees in India must return to Pakistan. If this is to take place, there must be restoration of peace and confidence in East Pakistan. India feels Pakistan military must be instructed it their responsibility to see that citizens do not leave East Pakistan. Thereafter more basic problem of restoration of peaceful conditions remains. Bland statement as refugees welcomed back is not enough. Something more must be done on the ground.
7.
Swaran Singh
explained that India believes a political approach to East Pakistan problem is required if confidence is to be restored. This approach should involve establishment of system which reflects will of people. Civilian regime which derived its authority from Pak military would not suffice, nor would one consisting of break-away elements of Awami League not representative of
Mujib
.
GOI
considered it important to influence
GOP
to see that it is in its own interest create such government which reflects aspirations of people.
GOI
believes there is some prospect that if
GOP
selects proper course, unity of Pakistan can be maintained.
2
Does not believe six points are inconsistent

with unity.
GOI
does not advocate any particular political solution which might be autonomy under 6 points, federation, confederation or independence. This up to Pakistan to decide upon, but India does wish to end conflict which both weakens Pakistan and causes refugee burden for India.
8.
Swaran Singh
described at some length Indian desire concentrate on social objectives following Mrs.
Gandhi
ʼs sweeping victory. Refugee influx was major setback and inflicted social and political strains in addition to economic drain.
FonMin
emphasized new, unsettled, unstable element in area which already beset with political problems. Indicated fear that instability in East Pakistan and Eastern India could contribute to general problems of Southeast Asia, possibly creating situation similar to Viet Nam. If international community does not join with India and heed warning now, trouble may be much greater in future.
9.
Concluding his presentation,
Swaran Singh
asked how long India could go on waiting helplessly while events in East Pakistan continued to unfold and refugees poured into India. Said he had heard from Indian Embassy that
U.S.
was already engaged in diplomatic efforts to help. He wondered how far
U.S.
had succeeded. Can India contribute its views regarding recent events? Does
U.S.
believe there is some hope for future?
U.S.
, because of world position, has special responsibility. In a sense Washington was only important visit on his tour.
3
Other stops had merely been on the way.
FonMin
had not come with any fixed ideas. Wanted
U.S.
advice on how to proceed.
10.
Responding to
Swaran Singh
ʼs presentation, Secretary said we view East Pakistan question in large measure as
Swaran Singh
had described. Problems such as this one, however, were frequently beyond any powerʼs ability to bring about solution at one point in time. We are prepared to play responsible helpful role but we have no simple, easy solution. Perhaps best course would be to discuss what we could do to improve situation as we have already been doing with India,
UN
,
UK
and
GOP
.
11.
Secretary said we had already had many discussions with Pakistan in regard to the need for political solution and we had become increasingly insistent. Like India, we have no formula to offer. We agree there should be less repression in East Pakistan and we will try to get
GOP
to create peaceful conditions in which refugees can return.
12.
Sisco
referred to efforts by
UNHCR
Sadruddin to make possible reversal of flow of refugees. Wondered what short-run measures such as those being examined by Sadruddin might be helpful to deal with refugee flow. Would it be possible to seal border?
Swaran Singh
replied
GOI
quite prepared cooperate with Pakistan on such measures but it doubted
GOP
genuinely interested in stopping flow. Described deliberate steps being taken by Pak army to expel Hindus.
13.
Saying
GOI
prepared cooperate with any effort designed to bring about return of refugees,
Swaran Singh
cited as one possibility
UN
administered refugee camps inside Pakistan.
Sisco
commented what little we know about Sadruddinʼs thinking is in this general direction, i.e.,
UN
presence in reception centers. This seems to us to be promising idea.
Swaran Singh
remarked that if such camps were in existence, at least refugees en route to India could be supported there. Secretary commented this was good suggestion. We prepared to do what we can to assist in this general area.
Jha
pointed out fear was only one factor deterring refugee return. It important they be able to get back their homes and property.
Sisco
said this was point we would make to Sadruddin and
GOP
at appropriate time.
14.
Sisco
noted Indian emphasis on political accommodation. Asked how “Bangla Desh” leadersʼ insistence upon independence as only solution relates to this.
Swaran Singh
replied
GOI
has carefully avoided committing itself to any particular solution. It has not recognized Bangla Desh nor decided that Bangla Desh must be separate entity, but one cannot expect East Bengalis to abandon idea of independence until they see real possibility of an acceptable alternative. Welcoming this view, Secretary stated we can urge
Yahya
to try to work out political solution but we cannot urge him to accept separatism. We can only advocate solution which has some prospect for success and point out to
Yahya
difficulties which he would face if he did not seek accommodation.
15.
Secretary raised subject of economic assistance and indicated our experience had shown us it could not and should not be used for political leverage.
Swaran Singh
argued that in case of Pakistan our giving aid constitutes interference in that it strengthens military regime. He urged
U.S.
to “postpone” aid until
GOP
takes corrective political action. Secretary replied
U.S.
could not withhold aid for political reasons.
U.S.
, however, will not give aid unless it actually reaches intended recipients. We will not permit it to be used by the military, nor do we intend to increase aid to Pakistan, but we do not accept view that if a country takes political actions with which we disagree, we should cut off our assistance. To do so would be inconsistent with traditional noninterference policy India has favored. Furthermore, our aid gives us influence and withdrawal of aid would deprive us of that influence.

Swaran Singh
replied that account should be taken of Pakistan economic plans and how current situation affects them, applying aid criteria. In regard humanitarian aid, India is not opposed, but would hope there could be assurance such aid would not strengthen military. The Secretary agreed with latter point. Secretary said we had made no military shipments and want keep this under careful review.
16.
Later, at working lunch,
Sisco
made clear
U.S.
has not rushed in with aid for Pakistan. It has been very careful. There has been substantial holding operation in regard aid and in other areas as well.
U.S.
is being very careful about aid and will continue to be infuture.
17.
Also, at lunch,
Swaran Singh
made only allusion to possible alternate course by
GOI
. Said India was pursuing international diplomatic route but he was fearful situation might be created in which
GOI
would have to use some means other than persuasion. He wanted
GOP
to be clearly aware of risks involved.
18.
Summing up situation
Swaran Singh
said time may be running out but
GOI
believes there is a chance for political accommodation within unified Pakistan. India has long wished to get away from atmosphere of confrontation with Pakistan. Although this effort has been set back, this is still Indian objective, and achievement does not depend upon emergence of independent East Pakistan.
19.
Also summing up during working lunch,
Sisco
remarked
USG
view very close to that of
GOI
as we have demonstrated by word and deed. We will do everything we can to help India deal with refugee burden. We recognize this assistance is only a palliative, an interim step. The answer is political accommodation. Neither
U.S.
nor India has a blueprint for solution. Whatever differences there may be in our analyses, we both agree Pakistanis must work out own settlement. Secretary remarked there no substantial difference of view between
U.S.
and India.
Rogers
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations