Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 19
19. Telegram From
the Consulate General in Dacca
to
the Department of State
1
Dacca
,
April 6, 1971, 0730Z
.
1138. Subj: Dissent From
U.S.
Policy Toward East Pakistan.
1.
Aware of the task force proposals on “openness” in the Foreign Service, and with the conviction that
U.S.
policy related to recent developments in East Pakistan serves neither our moral interests broadly defined nor our national interests narrowly defined, numerous officers of AmConGen Dacca,
USAID
Dacca and
USIS
Dacca consider it their duty to register strong dissent with fundamental aspects of this policy. Our government has failed to denounce the suppression of democracy. Our government has failed to denounce atrocities. Our government has failed to take forceful measures to protect its citizens while at the same time bending over backwards to placate the West Pak dominated government and to lessen likely and deservedly negative international public relations impact against them. Our government has evidenced what many will consider moral bankruptcy, ironically at a time when the
USSR
sent President
Yahya
a message
2
defending democracy, condemning arrest of leader of democratically elected majority party (incidentally pro-West) and calling for end to repressive measures and bloodshed. In our most recent policy paper for Pakistan,
3
our interests in Pakistan were defined as primarily humanitarian, rather than strategic. But we have chosen not to intervene, even morally, on the grounds that the Awami conflict, in which unfortunately the overworked term genocide is applicable, is purely internal matter of a sovereign state. Private Americans have expressed disgust. We, as professional public servants express our dissent with current policy and fervently hope that our true and lasting interests here can be defined and our policies

redirected in order to salvage our nationʼs position as a moral leader of the free world.
2.
Our specific areas of dissent, as well as our policy proposals, will follow by
septel
.
4
3.
Signed:
Brian Bell
Robert L. Bourquein
W. Scott Butcher
Eric Griffel
Zachary M. Hahn
Jake Harshbarger
Robert A. Jackson
Lawrence Koegel
Joseph A. Malpeli
Willard D. McCleary
Desaix Myers
John L. Nesvig
William Grant Parr
Robert Carce
Richard L. Simpson
Robert C. Simpson
Richard E. Suttor
Wayne A. Swedengurg
Richard L. Wilson
Shannon W. Wilson
5
4.
I support the right of the above named officers to voice their dissent. Because they attach urgency to their expression of dissent and because we are without any means of communication other than telegraphic, I authorize the use of a telegram for this purpose.
5.
I believe the views of these officers, who are among the finest
U.S.
officials in East Pakistan, are echoed by the vast majority of the American community, both official and unofficial.
6
I also subscribe to

these views but I do not think it appropriate for me to sign their statement as long as I am principal officer at this post.
6.
My support of their stand takes on another dimension. As I hope to develop in further reporting, I believe the most likely eventual outcome of the struggle underway in East Pakistan is a Bengali victory and the consequent establishment of an independent Bangladesh. At the moment we possess the good will of the Awami League. We would be foolish to forfeit this asset by pursuing a rigid policy of one-sided support to the likely loser.
7
Blood
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations