AlimurRazi/FRUS-1971-bangladesh huggingface dataset:
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 9
9. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (
Sisco
) to Secretary of State
Rogers
1
Washington
,
March 15, 1971
.
SUBJECT
Mujib
Takes Over East Pakistan;
Yahya
Flies to Dacca
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman
announced in Dacca early today, that his party, the Awami League, was taking over the administration of East Pakistan on the grounds that the party had a majority (288 of 300) in the Provincial Assembly.
Mujib
acted unilaterally and in defiance of President
Yahya Khan
ʼs Martial Law Administration which continues to be the Government of Pakistan. The fact that
Mujib
ʼs announcement contained 35 “directives” for assuming control of the administration indicates that it was a deliberate and carefully planned move.
In taking this step,
Mujib
has directly confronted the
Yahya
government but has carefully avoided an unqualified declaration of East

Pakistani independence and has based his action on the “democratic” voice of the people as expressed in the December election. The
Yahya
regime must react quickly to this critical move, and
Yahya
himself has flown to Dacca to talk with
Mujib
.
The options available to
Yahya
appear to be two, either of which would further endanger the already fragile unity of Pakistan. If
Yahya
acquiesces in the step, he has forfeited his martial law powers, at least in the East, and would be hard pressed to retain them in the West (see below regarding
Bhutto
ʼs speech on Sunday
2
). If
Yahya
, or others in the military, decide to resist
Mujib
ʼs action by force, East Pakistan will be engulfed in a struggle between the military and the Bengali nationalists, the outcome of which can only be eventual independence of Bengal and the breaking of all ties with West Pakistan—unless, as seems unlikely in the long run, the army can successfully contain a rebellion.
Mujib
ʼs statement called on Bengalis to resist “by all possible means” any force used against them.
In a speech in Karachi on Sunday, West Pakistan political leader
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto
demanded that power be turned over to majority parties in each wing,
Bhutto
ʼs in the West,
Mujib
ʼs in the East.
Bhutto
ʼs speech, in fact, may have triggered
Mujib
ʼs action. It may also indicate what has been suspected for some time, that
Bhutto
has decided that his chances of attaining power in the West are best achieved by a split—total or nearly so—in the country. However,
Bhutto
has less opportunity to act than
Mujib
because the army is strong in the West and could probably contain a rebellion.
The dayʼs events cast further doubt on continued unity in Pakistan.
Yahya
ʼs response will be the most important determining factor.
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 13
13. Memorandum From
Samuel Hoskinson
of the National Security Council Staff to the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (
Kissinger
)
1
Washington
,
March 28, 1971
.
SUBJECT
Situation in Pakistan
As you will have noted from the cables
2
and situation reports, the situation in East Pakistan appears to have taken another turn for the worse. Having beaten down the initial surge of resistance, the army now appears to have embarked on a reign of terror aimed at eliminating the core of future resistance. At least this seems to be the situation in Dacca. We have virtually no reliable information on the situation in the other major cities or what is going on in the countryside where most of the population resides.

These latest developments would seem to raise new policy issues for us. The most immediate questions which come to mind are:
—Is the present
U.S.
posture of simply ignoring the atrocities in East Pakistan still advisable or should we now be expressing our shock at least privately to the West Pakistanis? Our Consul General in Dacca thinks that the time has now come to approach the West Pakistanis. We do not yet, but should before long, have a recommendation from Ambassador
Farland
. [
Comment:
The Government has deported all foreign press correspondents but the story is still getting considerable play here. The full horror of what is going on will come to light sooner or later. After our major effort to provide natural disaster relief last fall, the Administration could be vulnerable to charges of a callous political calculation over a man-made disaster.]
3
—The Indians are clearly nervous about the situation. They do not seem disposed to intervene but there is considerable pressure on Mrs.
Gandhi
and we know that they are dusting off their own contingency plans. At a time when tensions are high in the subcontinent, there is always a chance that another irrational move could ignite a larger and even more serious conflict. Is now the time, as our contingency plans would seem to suggest, to begin closer consultations with New Delhi?
—There are a whole range of
AID
issues that will be coming up because of prior commitments and things already in the pipeline. Our actions on those could add up, in some peoplesʼ eyes, to approval or disapproval of the West Pakistani actions. At a minimum, they imply
U.S.
involvement given the situation in Pakistan.

Recommendation:
It is hard to predict what the next several days will bring, but, based on the current situation, you might wish to consider adding Pakistan to the agenda for Wednesday.
4
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 14
14. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between President
Nixon
and His Assistant for National Security Affairs (
Kissinger
)
1
San Clemente, California
,
March 29, 1971
.
P: Hello.
K
: Mr. President.
P: Hi
Henry
. You sleep well?
K
: Yes, very well. Itʼs really a very restful place out here.
P: Whatʼs new today. Got anything on the wires or anything of interest?
K
: Thereʼs nothing of any great consequence Mr. President. Apparently
Yahya
has got control of East Pakistan.
P: Good. Thereʼre sometimes the use of power is …
K
: The use of power against seeming odds pays off. Cause all the experts were saying that 30,000 people canʼt get control of 75 million. Well, this may still turn out to be true but as of this moment it seems to be quiet.
P: Well maybe things have changed. But hell, when you look over the history of nations 30,000 well-disciplined people can take 75 million any time. Look what the Spanish did when they came in and took the Incas and all the rest. Look what the British did when they took India.
K
: Thatʼs right.
P: To name just a few.

K
: Well in those cases the people were more or less neutral. In the Inca case they expected a god to come from the West …
P: That sort of … yeah, put them out.
K
: Which helped a bit.
P: Thatʼs right. But anyway I wish him well. I just … I mean itʼs better not to have it come apart than to have to come apart.
K
: Thatʼs right. The long-term impact of its coming about [
apart
] … people now say that the fellow
Mujib
in the East is really quite moderate and for a Bengali thatʼs right. But thatʼs an extremely unstable situation there and the radical groups are likely to gain increasing strength.
P: This will be only one blip in the battle and then it will go on and on and on and itʼs like everything in the period we live in isnʼt it since World War II.
K
: Thatʼs right, thatʼs right.
P: Where revolution in itself, independence is a virtue which of course it never was. That wasnʼt true at the time of the French revolution either and it isnʼt any more true today. The real question is whether anybody can run the god-damn place.
K
: Thatʼs right and of course the Bengalis have been extremely difficult to govern throughout their history.
P: The Indians canʼt govern them either.
K
: No, well actually the Indians who one normally would expect to favor a breakup of Pakistan arenʼt so eager for this one. Because theyʼre afraid that East Pakistan may in time, or East Bengal may in time have an attraction for West Bengal with Calcutta and also that the Chinese will gain a lot of influence there.
P: Interesting.
K
: And that, I think, is a good chance.
[Omitted here is discussion of issues unrelated to South Asia.]
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 15
15. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between
President Nixon
and His Assistant for National Security Affairs (
Kissinger
)
1
San Clemente, California
,
March 30, 1971, 9:35 a.m.
P: Whatʼs new today?
[Omitted here is discussion of issues unrelated to South Asia.]
K
: In Pakistan it continues, but there isnʼt a whole lot we can do about it.
P: No. Are we pressing?
K
: No, we may remove the American civilians.
P: Thatʼs okay.
K
: But even that we wonʼt do before Thursday.
2
P: But we should just stay out—like in Biafra, what the hell can we do?
K
: Good point.
P: I donʼt like it, but I didnʼt like shooting starving Biafrans either. What do they think we are going to do but help the Indians.
K
: They have been ambivalent about it anyway.
P: They are ambivalent about everything.
K
: That Consul in Dacca doesnʼt have the strongest nerves.
P: Neither does
Keating
. They are all in the middle of it; itʼs just like Biafra. The main thing to do is to keep cool and not do anything. Thereʼs nothing in it for us either way.
K
: It would infuriate the West Pakistanis; it wouldnʼt gain anything with the East Pakistanis, who wouldnʼt know about it anyway and the Indians are not noted for their gratitude.
[Omitted here is discussion of issues unrelated to South Asia.]
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 20
20. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State
Rogers
and the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (
Kissinger
)
1
Washington
,
April 6, 1971, 9:35 a.m.
R
: I wanted to talk about that goddam message from our people in Dacca.
2
Did you see it?
K
: No.
R
: Itʼs miserable. They bitched about our policy and have given it lots of distribution so it will probably leak. Itʼs inexcusable.
K
: And it will probably get to Ted
Kennedy
.

R
: I am sure it will.
K
: Somebody gives him cables. I have had him call me about them.
R
: Itʼs a terrible telegram. Couldnʼt be worse—says we failed to defend American lives and are morally bankrupt.
K
:
Blood
did that?
R
: Quite a few of them signed it. You know we are doing everything we can about it. Trying to get the telegrams back as many as we can. We are going to get a message back to them.
K
: I am going in these [next] two days to keep it from the President until he has given his speech.
3
R
: If you can keep it from him I will appreciate it. In the first place I think we have made a good choice.
K
: The Chinese havenʼt said anything.
R
: They talk about condemning atrocities. There are pictures of the East Pakistanis murdering people.
K
: Yes. There was one of an East Pakistani holding a head. Do you remember when they said there were 1000 bodies and they had the graves and then we couldnʼt find 20?
R
: To me it is outrageous they would send this.
K
: Unless it hits the wires I will hold it. I will not forward it.
R
: We should get our answers out at the same time the stories come out.
K
: I will not pass it on.
4
[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to South Asia.]
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 25
25. Editorial Note
President
Nixon
met in the Oval Office of the White House with
Henry Kissinger
and
H. R. Haldeman
on the morning of April 12, 1971, to discuss developments in Pakistan.
Kissinger
began by observing that “the Dacca consulate is in open rebellion.”
Nixon
and
Kissinger
expressed concern about the possibility of the United States becoming involved in the emerging civil war in Pakistan.
Kissinger
ʼs assessment was that if the United States were to support the insurgents in East Pakistan “we get West Pakistan turned against us, and … the Bengalis are going to go left anyway.”
Nixon
agreed: “If we get in the middle of that thing it would be a hell of a mistake.” He observed that: “The people who bitch about Vietnam bitch about it because we intervened in what they say is a civil war.” “Now some of those same bastards … want us to intervene here—both civil wars.”
Kissinger
said that the same people wanted the United States to cut off economic assistance to Pakistan. He judged that their argument was made for “pure doctrinaire reasons,” and in response to the loud

complaints coming from India about the situation in East Pakistan. “But India is screaming,”
Kissinger
added, “because they are scared to death of their own Bengalis. Deep down the Indians donʼt really want an independent East Pakistan because within ten years of that the West Bengalis are going to start bringing pressure on them for autonomy.” He concluded: “Itʼs a classic situation for us to stay out of.” He added: “For us to cut off aid would infuriate the West Pakistanis.” (National Archives,
Nixon
Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Conversation among
Nixon
,
Kissinger
, and
Haldeman
, April 12, 1971, 10:24–10:33 a.m., Oval Office, Conversation No. 477–1)
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 26
26. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (
Kissinger
) to
President Nixon
1
Washington
,
April 13, 1971
.
SUBJECT
Policy Review on Pakistan
Secretary
Rogers
has sent you the attached memo
2
saying that the time has come to “re-examine our basic stance toward Pakistan.” He cites the need to keep our options open in case East Pakistan becomes independent and to examine our relative priorities between India and Pakistan and the interplay of
U.S.
interests with those of Communist China and the Soviets in South Asia. To this end, the Secretary has ordered the Interdepartmental Group for the Near East and South Asia to conduct an “urgent review” of
U.S.
policy toward Pakistan and to make recommendations for consideration by the Senior Review Group and possibly by the
NSC
.
The situation in Pakistan is changing, and the Senior Review Group met Friday
3
morning to discuss our posture in light of these new developments. You will soon be called upon to make some decisions on our economic aid and military supply programs for Pakistan

on which it will be difficult, if not impossible, to find a neutral ground. Whatever we do or do not do has implications.
It is important that this exercise begin with a clear focus on our overall interests and objectives in South Asia and result in a policy framework that will provide a sound basis for these decisions. I shall report further as this review proceeds. The Senior Review Group is meeting again this week.
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 30
30. Telegram From
the Department of State
to
the Embassy in India
1
Washington
,
April 17, 1971, 0128Z
.
65665. Subj: East Pakistan Situation.
1.
NEA
Deputy Assistant Secretary
Van Hollen
in discussion with Indian Embassy
DCM
Rasgotra
April 16 expressed
USG
concern about any escalation recent incidents between India and Pakistan along East Pak frontier.
Van Hollen
noted that reported advance toward frontier check posts and border towns by Pakistan Army could be new factor which might heighten chance of clashes. He hoped India would continue to exercise restraint it had shown thus far.
Rasgotra
said he was sure it would but he noted that Pakistani firing across border did cause problems.
2.
In response to
Van Hollen
inquiry,
Rasgotra
said refugee flow from East Pakistan into India had definitely increased and India feared it might increase further.
2
He said India was not [
sic
] presently planning an approach to international organizations for assistance in dealing with situation and would be in touch with
USG
before doing so.
Van Hollen
noted when we last consulted on refugee problem (in Delhi)

it had not reached stage where international assistance required. He hoped
GOI
would keep in touch on this. If serious problem developed we would be prepared to consider what might be possible in terms of assistance on our part.
Johnson
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 31
31. Telegram From
the Department of State
to
the Embassy in Pakistan
1
Washington
,
April 17, 1971, 2102Z
.
65773. Subject: Provisional Government of Bangla Desh.
1.
Pakistan Ambassador
Hilaly
told
Van Hollen
on instructions April 16 that Government of Pakistan wished to bring to
USG
ʼs attention possible approach by representatives alleging to represent “Provisional Government of Bangla Desh.”
2.
Hilaly
said India had permitted establishment provisional government on its territory and was providing financial support. In
GOP
view, such provisional government exists only in
GOI
ʼs imagination, is designed to justify Indian intervention, and to aggravate already serious situation.
3.
Hilaly
said
GOP
understands that several representatives of so-called Provisional Government already have gone abroad to seek support. One such representative, Zakaria Choudhury, has already arrived in London. According Reuter news report London, April 15, he has held press conference and has been interviewed on
BBC
, claiming that Bengali separatists control three fourths of East Pakistan. Same news report states that
FCO
has refused receive Choudhury.
4.
Hilaly
concluded by saying that it was probable that another representative of Bangla Desh would come to Washington in effort see
USG
officials. In anticipation of this possibility, he had been asked formally to advise
USG
that
GOP
considered establishment of Provisional Government as essentially Indian-sponsored action. Representatives of

Bangla Desh, who have been charged with treason, have no right to speak regarding Pakistan.
2
5.
For London:
Would appreciate any information re activities Zakaria Choudhury, including any efforts he may have made to approach
FCO
.
6.
For Dacca:
Do you have any data on Choudhury?
Samuels
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 37
37. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between
President Nixon
and His Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (
Haig
)
1
Washington
,
April 29, 1971, ca. 9:30 a.m.
[Omitted here is discussion on Vietnam.]
P: And on the situation with regard to …I note one thing in here with regard to aid to India. Someone is saying we are contemplating sending aid to help the Pakistani refugees. I hope to hell weʼre not, but what about this?
H
: No, weʼve not been planning that. Thereʼs been some talk about our assistance to East Pakistan …
P: For the refugees?
H
: Yes.
P: But through East Pakistan?
H
: Yes.
P: What about the reaction from India? Have we had one?
H
: Not that Iʼm aware of.
P: But we can say our attitude toward the refugees is separate …
H
: Humanitarian.
P: One question, whether the
U.S.
is helping to end the fighting in Pakistan as the Russians are. What about that?
H
: The fighting is about over—there is considerable stability now …
P: But what have the Russians done?
H
: Nothing positive in substantive support. Thereʼs been a lot of propaganda noises, but then they back off.
[Omitted here is discussion on the Middle East and Southeast Asia.]
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 38
38. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (
Haig
) to
President Nixon
1
Washington
,
April 29, 1971
.
SUBJECT
Relief Assistance for East Pakistani Refugees in India
Pursuant to your question this morning about the Indian request for
U.S.
assistance in behalf of East Pakistani refugees who have moved into India,
2
you should be aware that we have received a request from Secretary
Rogers
recommending a modest program of relief assistance to be extended through international and
U.S.
voluntary agencies for East Pakistani refugees in India.
3
State has in mind an initial grant of some $1.4 million in food and another $1 million worth of other assistance if needs are established which other donors cannot meet.
OMB
has no budgetary problems with such a program.
The flow of refugees from East Pakistan into India has increased sharply in the last week. According to the Indians, there are now over 500,000 East Pakistani refugees and they expect their numbers could eventually total one to two million.
The magnitude of this problem—coming suddenly as it does—is beyond Indiaʼs limited resources. We have already told them that we would support Indian efforts to obtain assistance through international relief agencies. At the request of the West Bengal state government— the Indian state most heavily affected—
U.S.
voluntary agencies traditionally operating there are already involved in a very limited relief effort.
It is believed that the Pakistanis would take strong exception to relief efforts which were channeled through the Indian government. To minimize this criticism, we plan to channel our assistance through international agencies like the Red Cross and
U.S.
voluntary agencies. By utilizing international agencies we can insist on an objective assessment of the needs and a reasonable inspection of the use of relief supplies in the border areas and be sure the supplies are not used to support the insurgency in East Pakistan.

Attached at Tab A
4
is a question and answer which you might wish to draw upon tonight if the question arises.
Recommendation:
It is recommended that you approve this $2.5 million modest program of assistance to East Pakistani refugees to be administered through appropriate international and voluntary agencies.
5
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 40
40. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (
Kissinger
) to Acting Secretary of State
Irwin
1
Washington
,
May 7, 1971
.
SUBJECT
Letter to President
Yahya
In response to the suggestion in the Acting Secretary of Stateʼs memorandum of April 27 that the President review the substance of the paper prepared on Pakistan for the Senior Review Group,
2
the President has reviewed the options and approved the attached letter
3
to President
Yahya
.
As a result of this review, he has decided that our posture should be one of making a serious effort to help President
Yahya
bring an end to civil strife and achieve a peaceful settlement of the political problems which triggered it. While adjustments in some of our programs will be necessitated by the situation, these will be for development reasons only and not as a facade for application of political pressure. He recognizes that the only long-term prospect of restoring normal life in East Pakistan may be under conditions of greater East Pakistani autonomy, but he would prefer to see West Pakistanis reach that conclusion, if it is valid, for themselves. The
U.S.
position for now, therefore, will be to give President
Yahya
time to follow through his efforts to work out his own arrangements transitional to greater East Pakistani cooperation or autonomy.
The President also requested that the foregoing guidance be passed by the Department of State to Ambassador
Farland
in a restricted channel.
Haig
4
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations