Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 289
289. Telegram From
the Mission to the United Nations
to
the Department of State
1
New York
,
December 12, 1971, 0536Z
.
4965. Subj: India/Pakistan:
Bush
mtg with Foreign Minister
Singh
.
1.
Following highlights of mtg between
Bush
and
Swaran Singh
uncleared.
2.
During two hour conversation between
Bush
and
Singh
, at latterʼs initiative,
Singh
and entourage (
Kaul
,
Jha
, and Sen) made following major points.
3.
UN
Action.
UN
cannot take useful action at this time. Further debate will only harden positions and create additional frictions.
UN
tied to precedent and formalistic rites and cannot deal with such complex issues. If
UN
has to meet in future, Bangla Desh reps must be present; it is a reality.
4.
Indian Aims in East. Indian aims are simple: Surrender of Pak forces with repatriation to follow; recognition of Bangla Desh.
US
should try understand complex reasons why India recognized Bangla Desh at this time. Recognition was public expression of self-negatism to show that India had no territorial ambitions. Also, situation in East Pakistan is very confused and volatile with many conflicting forces at play. India believed it was necessary recognize moderate, elected, democratic group so that there would be no power vacuum. Recognition of Bangla Desh is an effort control Mukti Bahini.
5.
GOI
very much aware need protect Biharis. Will establish safe areas under Indian control and assist in repatriation to West Pakistan if they desire.
6.
Aims in West. India has no territorial aims in West Pakistan. This commitment, however, is not open-ended if
GOP
continues war and tries make gains in West to make up for loss of East. Under our questioning, they would not make same unequivocal commitment re Azad Kashmir.
Kaul
said “We have no
major
ambitions”; even in peace time, he said, we talked with Paks about minor rectifications. Repeatedly,
Kaul
and
Singh
said they do not wish to prolong war.
2
7.
US
Influence With
Yahya
. Thrust of above was that
US
use leverage with
Yahya
, or whomever is in control (this point made on more than one occasion) to see realities in East and move to end war in West as well.
8.
US
/Indian Relations. Throughout conversation there was theme that we must try minimize impact on
US
-Indian relations, but they firmly held to position that they had taken only course open to India.
Singh
reviewed eight months history but said, let us put that aside, for it was vital we both understand events on Dec 6. India had not attacked on ground in West (“surely your intelligence knows this”) but, once
Yahya
said next day that state of war exists, India had chosen how it would react. Pak air attack was effort to “internationalize” conflict.
US
and India have many ideals in common; let these not be destroyed.
Kaul
very pointedly said that, if press reports were true that
US
would resume arms shipments to Pakistan, “this would be very serious”.
9.
Bush
made it very clear he could not make any commitment re not returning to
UN
.
US
was still attempting to see whether
UN
action “could be useful”. We were not, he said, engaged in exercise “to get someone” but were taking serious look at options. Also, emphasized that he did not wish them to underestimate potential impact of current situation on
US
-Indian relations. Movement of large armed forces over border had made impact here; American public also concerned over closeness of Indian ties with Soviets. Indians should also understand that large number of
UN
members also disturbed.
US
wanted better relations with India but they should clearly understand we have real problems now.
10.
Comment: Foregoing is summary. Discussion was cordial at all times.
Bush
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations