AlimurRazi/FRUS-1971-bangladesh huggingface dataset:
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 107
107. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (
Kissinger
) to President
Nixon
1
2
Washington
,
January 4, 1971
SUBJECT:
East Pakistan Disaster Relief
Attached at Tab A is a memo from
Maurice Williams
, the Chairman of the Inter-Departmental Working Group on East Pakistan Disaster Relief, on the status of U.S. assistance to the disaster area and needs which remain. Mr.
Williams
reports that:
—The United States has provided about $9 million in emergency relief assistance.
—U.S. military helicopters have air-lifted over 1 million pounds of supplies directly into the disaster area.
—Ambassador
Farland
and other Americans in the field have done a “magnificent job”.
—For all practical purposes, the short-term emergency relief requirements have now been met. The relief efforts may be entering a more difficult period since there is a danger that international interest and support will decline.
—The most critical need remaining is for’ food grain. At least 400,000 metric tons will probably be needed in the disaster area until another crop can be harvested a year from now.
Recommendations:
1.
In order to maintain the momentum of relief efforts, it is recommended that you approve a press release (Tab B) enumerating steps taken thus far and
—Announcing a grant contribution of 150,000 tons of food grain (valued at about $16 million)
—Expressing the hope that other countries, especially those in a position to provide rice, will join in the effort to feed the survivors
—Calling attention to the campaign of the Pakistan Relief Committee over the next few weeks to raise funds for use in Pakistan by U.S. voluntary agencies. (Mrs.
Nixon
is honorary chairman of this committee of prominent Americans and Mr. Finch’s office which is overseeing the operation strongly concurs in the statement.)
2.
Since the initial emergency relief effort has been completed and our aid will now be processed through normal channels, it is recommended that you sign the letter to Mr.
Williams
(Tab C) commending him and his committee for their effective handling of the disaster relief effort. Ray Price concurs.
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 108
108. Memorandum From Secretary of State
Rogers
to President
Nixon
1
2
Washington
,
January 14, 1971
Subject:
Military Sales Credit for Pakistan
We have looked into various ways to respond to the Pakistani request for credit to finance your recent arms offer, as requested in a January 5 memorandum from General
Haig
to Mr.
Eliot
.
The package you approved—which included interceptor and bomber aircraft, armored personnel carriers and maritime patrol aircraft—stipulated cash payment. It could cost Pakistan $40 million or more, depending on the models of equipment chosen. We have explained the decision to Congress and the Indians in terms of cash sales which rendered it less objectionable to them.
We believe it essential to hold the line on cash payment for these arms rather than allow credit financing. To do otherwise would undermine our credibility with the Indians and the Congress and our objective of continuing a restrictive military supply policy for South Asia.
Among the other alternatives we have examined are concessional prices, increased economic assistance and debt relief. We could not ask commercial manufacturers to offer concessional prices, and to sell defense materiel from inventories at less than its actual value would be prohibited by law. We advocate maintaining the highest level of economic assistance for Pakistan possible within available resources and justified by normal criteria. However, we would recommend against any additional economic aid or debt relief in order to enable Pakistan to purchase arms as this would contravene the essential purposes of such assistance.
The most practical alternative for partially easing the financial burden on Pakistan is to raise the level of its Foreign Military Sales (
FMS
) credit for purchases of non-lethal defense equipment. We propose

to increase that level from $5 million to $10 million for the current fiscal year. We are looking at the possibility of doing the same for 1972, but this will depend on other priorities which cannot be weighed effectively at present. (Pakistan purchases from us an average of $20 million in defense materiel annually.) We would also plan to encourage the Pakistanis to stretch out the procurement of arms to reduce the burden of their cash payments in any one year.
While this approach will only partially meet Pakistan’s need, by doubling our
FMS
credit for fiscal year 1971 we will be able to assure the Pakistanis that we have made a positive effort to be helpful. This reply has been, coordinated with the Department of Defense and the Agency for International Development.
William P. Rogers
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 111
111. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (
Kissinger
) to Secretary of State
Rogers
1
2
Washington
,
February 3, 1971
SUBJECT:
Military Sales Credit for Pakistan
In response to your memo of January 14, “Military Sales Credit for Pakistan,” the President has made the following decisions:
1.
The recommendation that the one-time-exception pack-age remain a cash sale is approved.
2.
The President would prefer that $13 million in credit be offered for
FY
1971.
3.
The President has instructed that Pakistan’s credit requirements be very sympathetically considered in consolidating the
FY
1972 program.
4.
In connection with the above, the following is approved as a position to take with the Government of Pakistan:
As President
Nixon
told President
Yahya
on October 25, the U.S. will continue to be as helpful as it can in assisting in meeting Pakistan’s financial needs. As President
Yahya
knows, U.S. assistance programs are limited in appropriations and subject to various restrictions. Indeed, when President
Yahya
last visited the U.S. the future of the entire military

credit program was still being vigorously contested in the Congress. President
Nixon
’s remarks at that time, there-fore, were a general statement of intention to be helpful and were not intended to address specific elements of the new arms package. Given the problems the U.S. must cope with, it is necessary to adhere to the original financial terms of the special offer that was made last June. However, in order to be as helpful as possible, the U.S. will increase the credit available for other Pakistani purchases in the U.S. to $13 million in U.S.
FY
1971. The U.S. will similarly be as sympathetic as possible to Pakistani financial needs in the next fiscal year.
Henry A. Kissinger
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 113
113. Letter From the Pakistani Ambassador (
Hilaly
) to Secretary of State
Rogers
1
2
Washington
,
February 8, 1971
Dear Mr. Secretary,
I have received the following message from my President for immediate communication to President
Nixon
:
MESSAGE BEGINS:
Your Excellency,
I must tell you of my serious concern over the turn of events which has resulted in a rapid escalation of tension in the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent. This has been brought about by what appears to
US
to be India’s deliberate over reaction to an incident for which Pakistan could not be held responsible.
Two young men from Indian occupied Kashmir hijacked an Indian plane flying from Srinagar to Jammu on 30th January and landed at Lahore. My Government took prompt steps to fulfil its obligations under international conventions and arranged repatriation of passengers and crew of the hijacked plane to India at the earliest opportunity. We also employed every means to have the plane released from the hijackers. Despite our sustained efforts, this object could not be achieved and the hijackers destroyed the plane on 2nd February.
Although the hijacking was the result of repressive measures adopted by the Government of India in occupied Kashmir, my Government deplored the action of the hijackers.
Instead of appreciating our helpful attitude, the Government of India for its own reasons used the incident to intensify tension between the two countries. Highly provocative statements have been made by responsible Indian leaders, including the Prime Minister, blaming Pakistan for the incident and threatening retaliatory action. The Indian authorities have also been allowing massive and violent demonstrations against the Pakistan High Commission in New Delhi which has resulted in damage to property and injuries to personnel of the High Commission.
On 4th February the Indian Government took the

extraordinary step of banning flights of all Pakistani aircraft over Indian territory. By taking this arbitrary measure of stopping direct flights between the two wings of Pakistan, India has committed a serious breach of its international and bilateral commitments which has resulted in heightening tensions. A situation has thus been created that could lead to developments which we in Pakistan very much wish to avoid.
Considering the degree of interest which your Government has taken in preservation of peace and tranquility in the sub-continent, I felt you would be interested in using your good offices with the Government of India for preventing a further deterioration of the situation and for bringing it back to normal. I and my Government would highly appreciate any effort that Your Excellency might make in this direction.
With kind regards.
Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan
. MESSAGE ENDS.
I will be grateful if you could kindly transmit it to its high destination.
With my best personal regards.
Yours sincerely,
A. Hilaly
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 115
115. National Security Study Memorandum 118
1
2
Washington
,
February 16, 1971
TO:
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence.
SUBJECT:
Contingency Study on Pakistan—Addendum to
NSSM
109
The President has directed that an immediate contingency study be made of the alternative U.S. postures toward a possible move in East Pakistan toward secession.
The emphasis in this study should be on contingency planning in preparation for possible decisions that might be necessary in the near future. Longer range U.S. policy toward Pakistan should continue to be considered within the framework of
NSSM
109 (Policy Study on South Asia). This contingency study should be fully compatible with the study being prepared in response to
NSSM
109 and should be designed to become an annex to it if it is not needed sooner.
The study should be done under the direction of the Chairman
NSC
IG/
NEA
and forwarded to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs by February 26, 1971.
Henry A. Kissinger
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 116
116. Letter From President
Nixon
to Pakistani President
Yahya
1
2
Washington
,
February 17, 1971
Dear Mr. President:
Thank you for your message informing me of the situation resulting from the hijacking of an Indian commercial aircraft to Pakistan on January 30. I have also carefully considered your suggestion that our government use its good offices with the Government of India for the purpose of preventing further deterioration of the situation and seeking to restore it to normalcy. These developments are of great concern to me, and I can assure you that I want very much to see this problem resolved and the resultant tension between Pakistan and India reduced.
First, I would emphasize our strong opposition to aircraft hijacking in any form and our desire to curb it through all practical means. I note with satisfaction that your government also deplores the action of the hijackers in this case.
With respect to the use of good offices, we have been discussing this case with the Government of India as we have with representatives of your government. We firmly believe that airline safety requires that all countries of the international community cooperate to strengthen international law and multilateral procedures for deterring aircraft hijacking, a problem which can be effectively dealt with only through a universal international approach. We have put this position to the Government of India, and have advised it as well as your government of the importance of acting in accordance with established international procedures regarding airline safety in seeking

solutions to various aspects of this problem. We feel that a multilateral approach offers the best means of moving toward such solutions.
Specifically, I would encourage your government to avail itself of the good offices procedures recently adopted by the International Civil Aviation Organization. We have already urged the Government of India to adopt this approach and we believe it would provide a practicable means of resolving these difficulties. Our government stands ready to cooperate in appropriate ways with the Government of Pakistan and the Government of India, and with other nations, in addressing this problem through such a multilateral procedure in the hope of overcoming this point of tension in the Subcontinent.
With warm personal regards,
Sincerely,
Richard Nixon
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 119
119. Telegram 1660 From the
Embassy in Pakistan
to the
Department of State
1
2
Islamabad
,
February 25, 1971, 1200Z
Subj:
My Feb. Session With
Yahya
, Internal Political Crisis
1.
Having arranged meeting with President
Yahya
on military supply matters (
septel
), I first presented him with President
Nixon
’s signed photograph which was much appreciated. Conversation subsequently turned to domestic political crisis.
2.
For first time in my experience with him,
Yahya
was clearly worried about next steps on difficult road towards representative government. He seemed disheartened by impasse between Mujib and
Bhutto
regarding constitution. He recalled all the various hard things he had done to bring political process along this far. His remarks indicated that while his regard for
Bhutto
was still low, he thought Bhutto did have a point in insisting on some give by Mujib re six points.
Yahya
said he had twice invited Mujib to confer with him here, and Mujib had twice declined. Now President was proceeding to Karachi this afternoon (Feb. 25) to have another talk with
Bhutto
. He confided that, in event
Bhutto
-Mujib impasse was not somehow resolved before March 3, he was considering deferral “for week or two” or later than that if need be of his own appearance at national assembly in Dacca (which
Yahya
implied would delay opening of Assembly).
Yahya
did not indicate what he thought might happen if impasse not broken fairly soon, but he spoke in a tone of despair of “blood and chaos” which might ensue.
3.
I re-affirmed our respect for all that
Yahya
had done thus far towards transferring power to represntatives of the people. I stressed that U.S. policy re integrity of Pakistan remained precisely as I had previously confirmed to him as well as to
Bhutto
. I said I had been considering going to Dacca very soon to see Mujib, whom I had not encountered during the last year, and making sure that he also comprehended our concern about Pakistan’s future. However, on balance I had decided that my seeing Mujib at this particularly sensitive juncture would likely be subject to considerable public misunderstanding.
Yahya
acknowledged that there was widespread suspicion that U.S. favored separation of East and West Pakistan. He said reports continued to reach him that
ConGen
and
USAID
officials in Dacca were giving Awami League contacts impression that
USG
favored separation, and latter were spreading the word. It had further been reported to
Yahya
that when I was last in Dacca on my return from U.S. (in January) I had seen Mujib. I assured him I had not.
Yahya
said that he himself was convinced that U.S. policy in support of unity of Pakistan remained as I had enunciated it to him previously. He would not rpt not misunderstand my seeing Mujib during next few days. On contrary, President urged me to go to dacca tomorrow, Feb. 26, and see Mujib as soon as possible.
4.
I am now scheduled depart Islamabad at noon Feb. 26 for Dacca and have requested our Consul General seek early meeting with Mujib.
Farland
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 122
122. Editorial Note
The political crisis in Pakistan, which escalated into civil war in East Pakistan in March 1971, ultimately led to armed conflict between India and Pakistan and convulsed the subcontinent of South Asia through the end of the year. Most of the important documents bearing on the United States response to that crisis are in
Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, South Asia Crisis, 1971.
The documents in this electronic publication for that period supplement, and should be read in conjunction with, the printed volume.
Contents
Press Release
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 124
124. Telegram 697 From the
Consulate General in Dacca
to the
Department of State
1
2
Dacca
,
March 10, 1971, 1205Z
Subject:
Pak
Political Crisis
Ref:
Islamabad 1975, 1976
1)
Alamgir Rahman (protect) came to see me this morning with what he said was message from Mujib. According Alamgir, Mujib had wanted
Yahya
to come to Dacca for talks and I was greatly relieved at news that
Yahya
was in fact coming. Mujib wanted very much to work out with
Yahya
some political settlement that would avoid bloodshed, satisfy Bengali aspirations, and preserve some vestige of link with Pakistan. Alamgir opined that it’s now too late to talk in terms of six-point constitution but perhaps some solution can be found along lines of confederation, with separate constitutions for East and West Pakistan, and one army and one Foreign Ministry.
2)
Mujib’s question, said Alamgir, was “does the United States want to see military confrontation with

the prospect of eventual communist domination of Bengal or would it prefer a political solution to the current crisis?” I told Alamgir that Mujib’s question, put that way, was easy to answer. We naturally hoped for a peaceful political solution in lieu of bloodshed: we were gratified to learn that Mujib is also thinking in these terms, and we interpret
Yahya
’s willingness to come to Dacca as evidence he too is desirous of achieving a peaceful solution. We hope both sides would approach talks in the spirit of compromise.
3)
Alamgir then said Mujib wanted to know if United States would be willing to indicate to
Yahya
our hopes for political solution to current crisis. I said I did not know if this thought had been conveyed to
Yahya
in Islamabad but I would undertake to suggest to Charge that, if appropriate occasion presented itself before
Yahya
’s departure he might note to
Yahya
our hopes for political solution to problems facing Pakistan.
4)
Comment: I recognize, of course, that expression of hope for “political solution” as distinct from “peaceful” solution carries implication that we would not be happy about military repression as
MLA
solution to crisis. Nonetheless, given urgency of situation I would hope we could be somewhat more positive in this regard.
5)
Our analysis of prospects for political compromise solution will follow by
septel
.
Blood
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 125
125. Telegram 959 From the
Consulate General in Dacca
to the
Department of State
1
2
Dacca
,
March 28, 1971, 0540Z
Subject:
Selective Genocide
1.
Here in Dacca we are mute and horrified witnesses to a reign of terror by the
Pak
military. Evidence continues to mount that the
MLA
authorities have a list of Awami League supporters whom they are systematically eliminating by seeking them out in their homes and shooting them down.
2.
Among those marked for extinction in addition to A.L. hierarchy, are student leaders and university faculty. In this second category we have reports that Fazlur Rahman, head of applied physics department, Professor Dev, head of philosophy department and a Hindu, M. Abedin, head of department of history, have been killed. Razzak of political science department is rumored dead. Also on list are bulk of
MNA
’s elect and number of
MPA
’s.
3.
Moreover, with support of
Pak
military, non-Bengali Muslims are systematically attacking poor people’s quarters and murdering Bengalis and Hindus. Streets

of Dacca are aflood with Hindus and others seeking to get out of Dacca. Many Bengalis have sought refuge in homes of Americans, most of whom are extending shelter.
4.
Tightning of curfew today (it is being reimposed at noon) seems designed to facilitate
Pak
military search and destroy operations. There is no rpt no resistance being offered in Dacca to military.
5.
Full horror of
Pak
military atrocities will come to light sooner or later. I, therefore, question continued advisability of present
USG
posture of pretending to believe
GOP
false assertions and denying, for understood reasons, that this office is communicating detailed account of events in East Pakistan. We should be expressing our shock, at least privately to
GOP
, at this wave of terror directed against their own countrymen by
Pak
military. I, of course, would have to be identified as source of information and presumably
GOP
would ask me to leave. I do not believe safety of American community would be threatened as a consequence, but our communication capability would be compromised.
Blood