Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 202
202. Telegram From
the Department of State
to
the Embassy in India
1
Washington
,
November 25, 1971, 0314Z
.
214138. Subj: South Asia Situation.
1.
Secretary called in Indian Chargé
Rasgotra
November 25 [24] to discuss South Asia situation.
Sisco
and Quainton present from
NEA
.
Rasgotra
accompanied by First Secretary Verma.
2.
Secretary began by stating that basic
US
position was to urge both sides to exercise maximum restraint. Nothing can come out of hostilities except greater tragedy for people in immediate vicinity and for millions of others. Secretary noted that he had just had long conversation with President
Nixon
and that President had expressed appreciation for his discussion with Prime Minister
Gandhi
and for assurance he had received that India would not initiate hostilities. Secretary noted that we had taken various positive steps. We have dried up military pipeline. We have continued to give maximum assistance for refugee relief. We have passed on President
Yahya
ʼs willingness to take first step in withdrawing troops if other side reciprocated. We very much hope that proposal could be reconsidered. We have also put forward ideas in order to get political negotiations started looking towards a political settlement. We agree a political settlement is essential. Secretary said he could not emphasize too much the attitude which the
US
Government and people would have to take if war breaks out. He stated it is very difficult to get at facts, since both sides engaged in combat. We would like impartial observers to find out what was happening. Secretary asked whether
Rasgotra
had any ideas how this might be done.
3.
Rasgotra
said he had no suggestions. He admitted Pakistanis saying one thing and
GOI
another. It was
GOI
duty keep
USG
informed of situation as it saw it.
Rasgotra
denied facts of Schanberg article in November 25
New York Times
reporting that Schanberg had seen Indian forces crossing borders. He acknowledged that skirmishes had taken place but insisted that India had no interest in precipitating a war.
4.
Secretary said he wished to stress Presidentʼs deep personal concern at recent turn of events. We have friendly relations with India and Pakistan. In this situation if forces could be withdrawn and separated a distance, so that neither side could take advantage of situation,

it would be a good thing.
Sisco
noted statement of Indian spokesman November 25 that troops have orders giving them right to cross borders in self defense. This was an added factor of concern and underscored need to disengage.
5.
Rasgotra
said he would pass on to New Delhi Presidentʼs concern. He thought spokesmanʼs announcement was nothing new and was consistent with earlier statement by Defense Minister that if India attacked it would reply. India had no intention of making major invasion.
6.
Secretary said he wished to close by saying we do not see any hope of cooling situation unless both sides show willingness to disengage and get political process started.
Sisco
said we would particularly appreciate getting
GOI
ʼs concrete reaction to our proposals on withdrawal,
Rasgotra
asked whether we had any indication of where and when Pakistan would withdraw.
Sisco
said no, but
GOP
was willing to take first step. India and Pakistan would have to work out details.
7.
Sisco
also noted that we had told Prime Minister of our ideas for political discussions between Bangla Desh representatives and
GOP
. Said we had looked at Prime Ministerʼs most recent letter
2
but had found no answer to our proposals but only reiteration of position that
Mujib
should be released.
Rasgotra
said that in order to react on second point,
GOI
would have to get
BD
reaction. There had been no reaction to date.
8.
Rasgotra
said he did not know whether
GOI
could accept withdrawal proposal. Secretary noted that it not a question of accepting anything, merely of discussing with
GOP
of whether it possible or not.
Sisco
added that we would hope
GOI
would be willing to discuss whatever is possible by way of withdrawal. We could facilitate means of discussion but we have no blueprint or detailed solution. Secretary said that it would be difficult for American public to understand how India could say it did not want hostilities and yet would not disengage because it did not know terms of disengagement.
Rasgotra
noted that if India withdrew it would leave basic situation in East Pakistan unchanged. He asked whether there had been any change in Pak attitude towards use of military in East Pakistan.
Sisco
said there had been no change, but
GOP
claimed that as long as Mukti Bahini supported by Indian troops was active in East Pakistan it would not be possible to reduce military actions.
Irwin
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations