AlimurRazi/FRUS-1971-bangladesh huggingface dataset:
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 276
276. Backchannel Message From the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (
Kissinger
) to the Ambassador to Pakistan (
Farland
)
1
Washington
,
December 11, 1971
.
After meeting this morning in New York with
Bhutto
,
2
Raza
and Shahi we have concluded that the proposal we have been considering (contained in my message of December 9
3
and paragraph 3 of your [
message number not declassified
])
4
has been overtaken by events and is too complicated to succeed here. Therefore, we have agreed to following scenario:
(1)
Government of Pakistan will obtain third-country support to introduce resolution in Security Council which will include provision for both ceasefire and withdrawal.
(2)
It is likely that such a resolution would be vetoed. We would then move to accept simple ceasefire without any linkage to the Soviet formulation which would seek political negotiation.
(3)
While remaining adamant in step (2) that ceasefire alone is essential first step, we would express willingness to include political negotiation following establishment of ceasefire.
Were we to follow any other course, it would look like complete collapse. Furthermore, should we start Security Council action with step (2) above, there is strong possibility that step (2), itself, might be vetoed if it were presented as initial position. Its chances of succeeding on second round are greatly enhanced by moving with step (1) first, recognizing that step (1) will probably not succeed.
Please meet with President
Yahya
urgently and explain foregoing and urge upon him essentiality of sticking with the procedure and of

avoiding initially any indication that proposals short of step (1) might be acceptable.
5
Pak delegation here is prepared to do same.
Warm regards.
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 279
279. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (
Kissinger
) and the Minister of the Soviet Embassy (
Vorontsov
)
1
Washington
,
December 11, 1971, 7:35 p.m.
HK: Yuly, I have just talked to the President and as you know, we are leaving for the Azores tomorrow at noon. He has asked me to tell you that if we donʼt hear from you by tomorrow morning that we will proceed unilaterally. We have now waited for 48 hours and in a matter that affects the peace of the world in these circumstances we will proceed unilaterally and if we do we will have to state our view about the involvement of other countries.

YV: I see, of course you know that Kusnetsov
2
is embarked on a mission to India now; and I have reasons to believe that thatʼs in direct connection to whatever we have discussed here.
HAK
: When did he leave?
YV: He left this morning Moscow time—I donʼt have any official word to you about that, but I know it is directly connected. So, of course, I will transmit the message to Moscow.
HAK
: I cannot stress to you sufficiently seriously how gravely we view the situation.
YV: Yes, I understand that, but I think that the mutual view of the situation now Kusnetsov trip to Delhi are underlying that. I think we might have something from Moscow tomorrow, but of course the results of his talks there is only to predict they are [omission in the source text] is going to be.
HAK
: Well, I understand it, you have to understand that we have not made a move for 72 hours in order to give us a chance of moving jointly. We cannot in all honor wait any longer.
YV: Why by unilateral holds [moves?] further on, do you want to reveal a little bit what that means.
HAK
: No, we will of course move unilaterally again in the
UN
, but we may also take certain other steps which were [while?] not irrevocable would be preferable if we did not have to take them.
YV: Okay, that is all I can tell you now, but I will transmit it.
HAK
: We again want to underline that this is not something that we prefer to do.
YV: I understand that, and in Moscow they understand that.
HAK
: Right, Okay.
3
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 284
284. Message From the
Soviet Leadership
to President
Nixon
1
Moscow
,
December 12, 1971
.
The first contacts with the Government of India and personally with Prime Minister I.
Gandhi
on the question which was raised by President
Nixon
in his letter
2
testify to the fact that the Government of India has no intention to take any military actions against West Pakistan.
The Soviet leaders believe that this makes the situation easier and hope that the Government of Pakistan will draw from this appropriate conclusions.
As far as other questions raised in the Presidentʼs letter are concerned the answers will be given in the shortest of time.
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 286
286. Message From
President Nixon
to Soviet General Secretary
Brezhnev
1
Washington
,
December 12, 1971, 11:30 a.m.
Mr. General Secretary:
I have just received your interim message
2
concerning the grave situation in the Indian Subcontinent.

However, after delaying for 72 hours in anticipation of your reply to my conversation with Minister Matskevich and Counsellor
Vorontsov
3
I had set in train certain moves in the United Nations Security Council at the time mentioned to Counsellor
Vorontsov
. These cannot now be reversed. I must also note that the Indian assurances still lack any concreteness.
I am still prepared to proceed along the lines set forth in my letter of December 10,
4
as well as in the conversations with your chargé dʼaffaires
Vorontsov
, and my talk with your Agriculture Minister.
In view of the urgency of the situation and the need for concerted action I propose that we continue closest consultations through established confidential channels. I cannot emphasize too strongly that time is of the essence to avoid consequences neither of us want.
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 285
285. Memorandum of Conversation
1
Washington
,
December 12, 1971, 11:15 a.m.
SOUTH ASIA
PARTICIPANTS
Dr.
Henry A. Kissinger
, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Richard Helms
, Director,
CIA
John N. Irwin II
, Under Secretary of State
U. Alexis Johnson
, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
Joseph J.
Sisco
, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs

Maurice Williams
,
AID
Admiral Moorer
, Chairman,
JCS
Warren Nutter
, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
Kissinger
: Let me give you the Presidentʼs decisions:
—
Bush
will go to the Security Council.
—
Ziegler
will put out the following statement. [He reads the White House statement.]
2
—We want on record the strongest possible statement calling for an immediate ceasefire and withdrawal.
—If this is vetoed, we must call this aggression.
—Instructions are to go to
Bush
; the timing is today.
—There will be no backgrounding. There must be a united government for the next 72 hours.
Irwin
:
Bush
is to introduce this resolution?
3
Kissinger
: Either we do it ourselves or we get some others to do it, for example, Somalia. The resolution should be based on the General Assembly Resolution.
Bush
should work with
Bhutto
to get the strategy clear. After this, if itʼs vetoed, we may be able to fall back if
Bhutto
wants it. We have no indication of this. In first round we must be very firm.

Sisco
: Tell him to put a resolution together and consult with
Bhutto
.
Kissinger
: The President wants all our officers to emphasize how important and serious this is, and edge toward calling it aggression.
The Fleet is to go.
Moorer
: The plan is to move through the Straits
4
and then into the Indian Ocean. In 45 hours they can move where we want them. Itʼs a carrier, 4 destroyers, an oiler and amphibious force (the Tripoli) with three destroyers—all set to go at daylight Monday, their time.
Kissinger
: Send it where there are Americans—say, Karachi. Defense can comment that theyʼre sent to help in a possible evacuation.
Irwin
: Will we announce it?
Kissinger
: Wait for a question. Are there any Americans in West or East Pakistan?
Irwin
: Yes, in both.
5
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 288
288. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (
Kissinger
) and the Minister of the Soviet Embassy (
Vorontsov
)
1
Washington
,
December 12, 1971, 12:30 p.m.
K
: Yuli, I just talked to the President again. I reported our conversation
2
to him and he asked me to tell you that we will work it out in a spirit so there are no winners or losers. And so we are not looking for any public humiliation of anybody. We also believe—and we will use our influence in the Security Council as it evolves to come up with a compromise as far as the
UN
is concerned in which everybody gives up a little. We are also prepared to proceed on our understandings on which you are working. We want to make sure that you approach us first so that for now on we will not take any additional steps beyond what we have told you.
V
: I recalled this to Moscow. First to you and the President and then …
K
: … and then work out the strategy and tactics and then work toward a solution as rapidly as possible. That is the spirit in which we will approach it as soon as we get confirmation from you.
V
: That is very important what they are doing in Delhi—a solution acceptable to you, to us, the Indians and to Pakistan.
K
: Thank you, Yuli. I am in immediate touch by phone on the plane, or they will flash a message to me.
V
: Or I should talk to Colonel
Kennedy
.
K
: This afternoon and after that talk to General
Haig
.
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 290
290. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between the Presidentʼs Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (
Haig
) and the Minister of the Soviet Embassy (
Vorontsov
)
1
Washington
,
December 12, 1971, 7:40 p.m.
V
: General, how are you. You are left alone. They arrived already?
2
H
: Yes. I just spoke to them. He
3
asked me to hold up our Seventh Fleet movements, and we are going to put that movement in orbit for 24 hours at a place so it wonʼt surface—the fact that they are moving.
V
: Still like the Vietnamese situation?
H
: They are considerably south of there. So it will be no public issue.
V
: For 24 hours. Very good. I think that is very necessary. During this 24 hours, we might have good results.
H
: Henry wanted you to have this.
V
: Thank you very much, General.
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 291
291. Message From the
Soviet Leadership
to President
Nixon
1
Moscow
,
December 13, 1971
.
We have attentively examined your message
2
over the direct communications link. In accordance with the confidential exchange of opinions existing between us, we are advising you that at the present time, we are conducting a clarification of all the circumstances in India.
We will inform you of the results of the clarification without delay.
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 292
292. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (
Kissinger
) to President
Nixon
1
Washington
,
December 13, 1971
.
SUBJECT
Destruction of
US
Aircraft in Pakistan
The following are the facts that you requested concerning the reported Indian attack on a
US
aircraft in Pakistan.
Ambassador
Farland
reported on December 5 that our Defense Representativesʼ plane and a
UN
aircraft were destroyed at the Islamabad international airport that morning during an Indian air attack. Both planes were clearly marked and parked at a separate area of the field away from any Pak military aircraft. Our Defense Representative was convinced that there was no case of misidentification and that both planes were deliberately attacked.

As soon as the facts were established, Secretary
Rogers
called in Ambassador
Jha
and protested this “indiscriminate strafing.”
2
There has been no formal Indian response.
Jha
agreed that it was unfortunate and said that although India did not want to damage the property of neutral countries, it was not possible to insure selectivity in strafing airports. The Secretary retorted that the military planes had been on one side of the field and non-military on the other.
While it is obvious that a more strenuous protest could have been undertaken at the time, events have now overtaken this issue and I recommend no further action.
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 293
293. Backchannel Message From the Presidentʼs Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (
Haig
) to the Ambassador to Pakistan (
Farland
)
1
Washington
,
December 13, 1971, 4:07 p.m.
We have just learned that
Bhutto
approached
Bush
in New York
2
with suggestion that following amendment to our SC resolution
3
be discussed with Soviets in effort to get compromise:
Calls upon the
GOP
to take effective action towards a political settlement in East Pakistan giving immediate recognition to the will of the East Pak population within the framework of one Pakistan.
This as you know marks departure from game plan
4
and we are concerned that introduction of this type of clause, particularly at this point, could lead to quick dissolution of our position. Soviets would veto on one-Pakistan grounds and then would be locked into a position on political issue. Debate on political question would inevitably

ensue and hope for quick ceasefire evaporate. For our part we want to stick with game plan.
Would appreciate knowing soonest whether
Bhutto
proposal represents instruction from Islamabad and if so what basis for proposal may be.
5
Warm regards.
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 294
294. Telegram From the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (
Kissinger
) to the Presidentʼs Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (
Haig
)
1
Lajes Air Field, Azores Islands
,
December 13, 1971, 1650Z
.
AWH 10038. My present view on India–Pakistan is as follows:
1.
We are positioned well but we must be as careful not to be maneuvered into the position of the last hold-out as we must be to avoid being the first to cave.
2.
I therefore suggest that if Security Council is still deadlocked tomorrow morning or the Soviets have vetoed we should consider backing a resolution for cease-fire and later withdrawal—even if Soviet answer is not yet received. Can we position
Bhutto
to get some of his friends to surface such a resolution? We should trigger stage 2 even if we have not heard from Soviets tomorrow. Can I see what such a resolution would look like. Let us discuss that.
3.
As for fleet, I am weighing advantage of moving it against risk of being called off prematurely by public pressure. Can we put it into Singapore for a day? In any event, fleet should go into Indian Ocean,

not Bay of Bengal. Let us discuss it. Let us discuss it on plane
2
before final go-ahead.
[Omitted here are instructions from
Kissinger
on Strategic Arms Limitation Talks.]
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 297
297. Telegram From the Presidentʼs Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (
Haig
) to the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (
Kissinger
) in the Azores
1
Washington
,
December 14, 1971, 0924Z
.
WH
11162. Deliver urgently as soon as addressee is awake on December 14, 1971.
By separate message
2
I have forwarded Soviet response. It is apparent we will have to take following steps:
(1)
Agree on suitable proposal and language for a negotiated settlement of conflict either in or outside of framework of
UN
. I am still awaiting reply from
UK
on language changes to their resolutions suggested last night.
(2)
Urgently notify
Farland
and Government of Pakistan, as well as
PRC
, of course of action to be pursued.
(3)
Bring State and bureaucracy on board with respect to whatever course of action is decided upon.
(4)
Consider issue of recalling fleet. (I would hold up pending acceptance by Soviets of final course of action decided upon.)
(5)
Regardless of channels used for completing negotiations, decide on strategy for concluding
UN
involvement in situation.
With respect to
PRC
I believe Soviet proposal is sufficiently disadvantageous to dictate that we allow Government of Pakistan to coordinate with
PRC
and leave primary initiative to them. I think Paks will buy this proposal at this time even though complete East Pakistani independence is likely outcome.
Please advise.
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 299
299. Backchannel Message From the Ambassador to Pakistan (
Farland
) to the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (
Kissinger
)
1
Islamabad
,
December 14, 1971, 1055Z
.
1092. When I returned home from seeing
Yahya
this noon, he telephoned to say that while his instructions to
Bhutto
remained valid, in the event India insisted on pursuing the war. “I will have to have twenty B–57s immediately.” I told him I would pass this message along, without assurances. Warm regards.
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 302
302. Telegram From the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (
Kissinger
) to the Presidentʼs Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (
Haig
)
1
Lajes, Azores
,
December 14, 1971
.
1.
Here are my present thoughts on India–Pakistan.
2.
We should move a ceasefire resolution soonest. It would be best if British resolution were introduced. But the Italian
2
would serve as a vehicle as well. The major objective should be to get a cease-fire resolution with vague political formula not mentioning Bangla Desh or East Pakistan. In this round we must make a record and get asked by Paks to do the political yielding. Make sure Paks keep Chinese informed and abroad. Put it hard to
Vorontsov
that vague formula is the bridge to our common objective on political side. It is imperative that they show good faith and stop stalling if they want serious dealing with White House.
3.
Spivack
is to stay away from Bangla Desh. See you soon.
4.
Re Delhi 19203,
3
Keating
is to give no such assurances. Many thanks.
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 304
304. Telegram From
the Department of State
to
the Embassy in India
1
Washington
,
December 14, 1971, 1848Z
.
224566. Subj: Carrier Deployment in Indian Ocean.
1.
Indian Ambassador
Jha
called at his request on Assistant Secretary
Sisco
to express
GOI
concern over reported
US
deployment of nuclear carrier in Indian Ocean for evacuation purposes. Ambassador accompanied by First Secretary Verma;
Van Hollen
,
Schneider
and Quainton present from
NEA
.
2.
Jha
said he wished to raise subject which has arisen out of his talks with Under Secretary
Irwin
. Under Secretary had, he said, informed him that helicopters had been pre-positioned in Thailand for evacuation purposes. Impression which he had received was that they were in Bangkok. However, subsequent reports indicate that helicopters were on nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, equipped with “all kinds of devices and gadgets.” In earlier conversations
Jha
said he had tried to make clear that
GOI
anxious to help in evacuation of foreign personnel and had made every facility available for that purpose.
GOI
is as anxious as before to insure safety of personnel in Dacca or their evacuation if necessary. In view of aircraft carrier report,
GOI
had instructed him to seek assurance from
USG
that there will be no evacuation operation without prior agreement with
GOI
or by force.
3.
Sisco
said he would report what
Jha
had said, but had nothing to add to December 13 statement by Secretary
Laird
re aircraft carrier.
2
He said he would be back in touch if he had anything to add.
4.
Jha
said he had also a report from New Delhi that
USG
had some plan or intention to establish a beachhead in some part of Bangla Desh for evacuation of
US
personnel or to facilitate transfer of Pakistani personnel to West Pakistan. Any such attempt would be a very serious matter and would endanger long-term Indo-
US
relations. It

might also have other implications and in any event would not have effect of bringing conflict to speedy end.
5.
Sisco
said he had seen report; while he was personally not aware of any such plan, he would take note of Ambassadorʼs remarks and if he had anything further would be back in touch.
Sisco
said he felt constrained to say, in view of
Jha
ʼs mention of possible impact on bilateral relations, that, although he did not wish to go into past history, we do see in
GOI
ʼs actions things which not only reflect present strains in our relations but also which obviously could have implications for our long-term relations, which both sides will be looking at in the future.
Irwin
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 306
306. Telegram From
the Department of State
to
the Embassy in Pakistan
1
Washington
,
December 14, 1971, 2136Z
.
224704. If and when Bangla Desh and or Indian forces occupy Dacca, you should not take any initiative to establish or encourage contact with them beyond that which may be required in emergency situations to protect American lives or to otherwise assure safety of your mission.
Rogers
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 307
307. Telegram From
the Consulate General in Dacca
to
the Department of State
1
Dacca
,
December 15, 1971, 0500Z
.
5643. 1. Assistant Secretary General
Paul
Marc
Henry
has asked that I arrange to have following message (not verbatim quote) passed from him to
SYG
.
Begin message:
I have been informed by Governor
Malik
and General Farman Ali that President
Yahya Khan
strongly desires to put a end to hostilities in
EP
. For this purpose he wishes to arrange with the Indian Govt an immediate cease-fire period of at least two hours in which discussions for this purpose can take place between the military commanders concerned. The President desires honorable conditions for Pakistani troops and protection of civilians. I pass this message to you for what it is worth, since I have no independent means of verification.
End of message
.
2
Spivack
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations