Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 63
63. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (
Kissinger
) to President
Nixon
1
2
Washington
,
June 11, 1970

SUBJECT :
Arms Supply Policy for South Asia
When our Cambodian decision-making was at its height, you made a decision on the South Asian arms supply question but asked us to hold it. Then during your meeting with the
CENTO
foreign ministers you asked Assistant Secretary
Sisco
to take another look at what we might do for Pakistan. His memo is attached, and this will give you an opportunity for making a final decision. (Tab A)
To refresh your memory, the present policy bans the sale of lethal equipment but does allow sale of spare parts and non-lethal equipment as well as the sale of U.S.-made equipment now in the hands of third countries like Turkey. On this last point, you should be aware that one of the restrictions being proposed for inclusion in the Foreign Military Sales Act would prohibit third-country sales of this kind.
You will recall that the most realistic choice is between:
—relaxing the ban to permit sale of equipment to replace worn out equipment formerly provided by the U.S. and
—not changing policy, keeping it under review but making a one-time sale to provide Pakistan with some equipment it most urgently needs.
In your earlier consideration of this problem, you approved the second—the one-time exception—but asked that the decision be held.
The two sides of the case are well known to you:
1.
Ambassador
Farland
—like Ambassador
Hilaly
at your meeting with the
CENTO
ministers—argues strongly that Pakistan is at a political crossroads, that President
Yahya
needs support in his effort to keep Pakistan from going radical

and that re-opening of regular U.S. military supply can help him in his argument with his officers that Pakistan must keep its lines open to the U.S. He points out that
Yahya
is going on long-delayed trip to Moscow June 22 and that a U.S. answer before then is necessary so that
Yahya
will know what he can expect from the U.S. Farland concludes by describing the potential effects for U.S. interests if
Yahya
fails in his efforts to keep Pakistan out of radical hands—much greater Chinese influence in East Pakistan and even the commitment of Pakistani troops beside Arab forces against Israel.
2.
Ambassador
Keating
argues the desirability of not reinserting ourselves in the middle of the India-Pakistan rivalry by going back into the regular military aid business. He also argues that the sharp Indian reaction is not worth what must be the marginal U.S. influence on the Pakistani political scene.
Secretary
Rogers
concurs in your earlier judgment not to remove the arms embargo altogether. That leaves us, he feels, with only the choice of making a one-time exception to that embargo to permit one direct sale to Pakistan. While this has the obvious advantages of doing something for Pakistan, he points out that it will not meet Pakistan’s desire for a basic change in policy. He feels that even a one-time sale would create “major” problems with those in the Congress who feel that we should not after almost five years re-involve ourselves in a dispute where we do not have direct security interests.
If you wish to go ahead, the Secretary recommends a package consisting of:
—6 replacement F–104 fighter-interceptors or 12 F–5’s or F–104’s of a different model;
—300 armored personnel carriers;
—4 anti-submarine patrol aircraft.
Other possibilities for a package include:
—7 B–57 bombers
—100 M–48 tanks

The Secretary would exclude these because of adverse Congressional and Indian reaction. He feels that the controversy on the Hill over the Turkish tank deal alone could end the prospect of doing anything significant for Pakistan at this time. He rules out the B–57s because they are a more obviously offensive weapon.
If you decide to proceed with the arms offer to Pakistan as recommended by Secretary
Rogers
, he suggests the following scenario:
1.
Early consultations with Congress.
2.
A letter from you to President
Yahya
containing our arms offer.
3.
Informing the Indian Government simultaneously through our embassy in New Delhi.
4.
Asking both the Indians and the Pakistanis to treat our decision as confidential, but when leaks almost inevitably occur emphasize that the arms offer to Pakistan is a special exception.
Recommendation
: That you approve Secretary
Rogers
’ recommendation for carrying out your decision to make a one-time exception for Pakistan and that you approve transmittal of the decision to President
Yahya
before he goes to Moscow June 22.
Approve
Add tanks
Add B–57’s
Add tanks and B–57’s
Other
Contents
Press Release
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations