AlimurRazi/FRUS-1971-bangladesh huggingface dataset:
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 308
308. Telegram From
the Embassy in India
to
the Department of State
1
New Delhi
,
December 15, 1971, 1050Z
.
Ref: State 225268.
2
1.
DCM
called on
Haksar
, Secretary to Prime Minister, at 1410
IST
, and handed him text of message from General Niazi as contained in Dacca 5637,
3
DATT
simultaneously passed copy to General
Manekshaw
, Chief of Army Staff.
2.
DCM
explained that
USG
could take no responsibility for content of message nor express views thereon, and was simply transmitting the message at request of Foreign Minister
Swaran Singh
.
3.
Haksar
was also informed that Foreign Minister attempting to telephone him urgently. He said he had had difficulty getting call through but had managed disjointed conversation with Foreign Secretary
Kaul
.
4.
Haksar
expressed appreciation, then asked where our overall relations had gone off the track. He recounted at some length the discussions with the National Security Adviser, Dr.
Kissinger
, and with Assistant Secretary
Sisco
, during Prime Ministerʼs visit in early November. He stressed that there could be no question of the integrity of Mrs.
Gandhi
ʼs remarks to the President. He said he had a copy of the record of their talk, and that he had agreed in advance to accept the
U.S.
record as the official record.
5.
Haksar
stated that all human affairs were transitory and he was not so much concerned about the present, as it would pass, as he was about the future. He expressed concern about the relations our children would have and what we owed to them.
Haksar
became quite emotional, his eyes watering, and asked what we could do.
DCM
suggested letter from Prime Minister to President might be in order.
Haksar
said he would draft such a letter that afternoon.
6.
U.K.
HICOMer Sir Terrence Garvey called
DCM
as above being drafted and recounted that Niazi text had been passed back and forth between our respective
UN
reps. He asked if message had been delivered locally.
DCM
confirmed that it had.
Keating
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 313
313. Backchannel Message From the Ambassador to Pakistan (
Farland
) to the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (
Kissinger
)
1
Islamabad
,
December 15, 1971, 1436Z
.
1096. Foreign Secretary called me to Foreign Office 1800 local 15 December. Said reports received from
Bhutto
indicate he highly pessimistic that any affirmative action will be forthcoming from Security Council. In addition,
GOP
intelligence indicates
GOI
upping offensive activity against West Pakistan and instigating subversive activity (presumably in Pushtun border areas) out of Afghanistan. He said that for West Pakistan to survive as nation it is necessary it be provided additional fighter aircraft. Present trickle MIG–19s and F–104s (he did not indicate origin) cannot stem the tide if India attacks—an attack which Pakistan now expects.
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 317
317. Memorandum for the Record
1
Washington
,
December 16, 1971
.
Shortly after 10:00 a.m. this morning General
Haig
called on the secure line to say the following:
The President wishes Mr.
Sisco
to call in Indian Ambassador
Jha
immediately.
Sisco
should make the following three points forcefully.
1.
With respect to Indiaʼs earlier refusal to give assurances that it had no territorial ambitions without similar assurances from Pakistan, we are now giving him Pak assurances of no territorial ambitions. We wish to know immediately that India has no territorial ambitions on its side.
2.
Now that East Pakistan has fallen, there can be no justification for continued fighting. If fighting continues, it will “have the most drastic consequences on
U.S.
-Indian relations.” (
Haig
commented that we should be no more specific than that.)
3.
We consider it intolerable for the Indian Ambassador to use our media as a platform to make attacks on the
U.S.
Government.
2
RHM
Deputy Executive Secretary
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 318
318. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (
Sisco
) to Secretary of State
Rogers
1
Washington
,
December 16, 1971
.
WSAG
MEETING THURSDAY, DECEMBER 16, 1971
The short
WSAG
meeting today discussed “Where do we go from here.”
Security Council:
At the outset of the meeting it was agreed that we would support the British-French draft resolution, which, in turn, had been endorsed by
Bhutto
. However, when it was learned during the meeting that the
UK
-French resolution had been dropped it was agreed that we would stay loose in New York and be prepared to support a simple ceasefire resolution, assuming it also had Pakistani support.
Reply to Mrs. Gandhi:
State was asked to prepare a reply to Mrs.
Gandhi
ʼs December 15 letter
2
to the President, setting forth our case strongly and explicitly.

Contingency Papers:
The following five papers
3
were requested for next Monday:
1.
U.S.
policy regarding humanitarian assistance for South Asia.
2.
U.S.
policy regarding economic assistance for South Asia. (In this connection,
Maury Williams
was asked on an urgent basis to do a paper on economic assistance for Pakistan.)
3.
U.S.
policy toward the Bangla Desh regime—assuming that we would not be prepared promptly to recognize Bangla Desh.
4.
Arrangements for restoring the territorial status quo in the West, including the Kashmir region, as of December 3.
5.
U.S.
military supply policy for South Asia.
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 320
320. Editorial Note
On December 16, 1971, at 2:30 p.m. local time in New Delhi, Prime Minister
Gandhi
announced to the Lok Sabha that the Pakistani forces commanded by General Niazi had surrendered unconditionally an hour earlier in Dacca. She hailed Dacca as “the free capital of a free country.” At the same time, the Indian Government announced a cease-fire on the front between India and West Pakistan to take effect the following day. In making the announcement a government spokesman stated that India had no territorial ambitions in the conflict. The announcement concluded that India expected there would be a “corresponding immediate response” from Pakistan. (Telegrams 19337 and 19340 from New Delhi, December 16; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73,
POL
27–14 INDIA–
PAK
)
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 321
321. Backchannel Message From the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (
Kissinger
) to the Ambassador to Pakistan (
Farland
)
1
Washington
,
December 16, 1971, 2244Z
.
WH
11189. I have just learned from British that Indians intend to keep their ceasefire offer open for only 24 hours. I have also learned that Soviets may move a formal resolution in the
UN
Security Council tonight which could be the source of extended controversy. For this reason I believe it is essential that
Yahya
move as quickly as possible to publicly accept Indian ceasefire proposal on a purely bilateral basis which would deprive Indians of any pretext for claiming Pakistani delays have justified continuation of fighting in the West. A unilateral announcement by Pakistan would then allow sufficient time to hammer out an acceptable
UN
resolution which would formalize the bilateral agreement between the two governments. In his unilateral acceptance
Yahya
could also recommend a formalization of the procedure within the
UN
forum.
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 322
322. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between President
Nixon
and His Assistant for National Security Affairs (
Kissinger
)
1
December 16, 1971, 5:15 p.m.
P: …
2
update on everything okay.
K
: Everything is now falling into place. The Soviets are tabling a resolution;
3
itʼs better than the old one but we still canʼt accept it. We

canʼt let it get settled on a Soviet resolution and secondly it is still very one-sided. Now the British are withdrawing theirs.
P: Are they going to support the Soviets?
K
: That is unthinkable to me; that they wouldnʼt do. We have a good resolution with the non-permanent members and I have given
Bush
urgent instructions to get it tabled and told
Vorontsov
we wouldnʼt accept theirs but hoped it was negotiable and he said it probably was. He said let the people in New York talk about it.
P: What about the exchange of letters?
K
: Thatʼs obviously off. Itʼs just as well as far as the Chinese are concerned. We cannot support a Soviet resolution.
P: There is a unilateral cease-fire [omission in the source text].
K
: Yes, but we have a problem getting
Yahya
to accept it. The Indians told the British our [their] offer is good for only 24 hours. She may figure
Yahya
canʼt move that fast. I have sent a cable
4
urging
Yahya
to accept it at least until the
UN
acts. This is all tactical maneuvering in the last 24 hours. It is aggravating for the people concerned, but nothing you need to follow step by step.
[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to South Asia.]
P: But you feel good about India–Pakistan?
K
: Barring total treachery …
P: On the part of the Indians.
K
: And the Russians. The real problem now is cosmetics.
[Omitted here is discussion largely related to dealing with the press.]
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 323
323. Telegram From
the Department of State
to
the Embassy in Pakistan
1
Washington
,
December 17, 1971, 0008Z
.
226610. 1. Indians have agreed to a ceasefire both in East and West. Its announcement
2
today included following phrase: “It is our earnest hope that there will be a corresponding immediate response from the
GOP
.”
2. This statement has been repeated in the Security Council by the Indian Foreign Minister. In New York, we are seeking to get a resolution adopted to which Government of Pakistan can respond affirmatively. This resolution has just been tabled by Ambassador
Bush
3
and it calls for a ceasefire on both fronts to remain in effect “until operations of disengagement take place, leading to prompt withdrawal of armed forces from all the occupied territories.” Paks want such resolution since apparently they find it less difficult to respond to such a
UN
resolution than to the statement in the Indian announcement today. This is consistent with
Yahya
ʼs speech today, in which he reiterated
GOP
ʼs willingness “honor any decision of the United Nations to bring about an honorable solution of the crisis, consistent with our national interests.”
3. However, kind of Security Council resolution we are trying to get adopted has run into continuing delay tactics from both the Indians and the Soviets. Danger is that longer
Yahya
delays responding directly to the Indian ceasefire announcement today, the greater the risk that this could be used by the Indians as a pretext to continue the war against
Yahya
in the West.
4.
Farland
should discuss the current situation immediately with
Yahya
with a view to bringing up the risks and hopefully getting him to take a decision on his own to respond affirmatively and on a bilateral basis to the Indian ceasefire announcement of today. If he needs
UN
fig leaf in his response, he can always justify it on ground he accepted the ceasefire contained in
GA
resolution adopted other day.
4
We

recognize that it would be preferable from his standpoint to be in a position to respond affirmatively to a Security Council resolution, but we believe that the likelihood of this kind of a resolution being adopted promptly is rapidly diminishing because of Soviet-Indian delay tactics.
5
Rogers
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 326
326. Letter From President
Nixon
to Indian Prime Minister
Gandhi
1
Washington
,
December 18, 1971
.
Dear Madame Prime Minister:
I have received your letter of December 15, 1971,
2
in which you seek to place the responsibility for the war in the subcontinent on others and in particular the United States. In the light of the many exchanges over the past year it cannot surprise you that I reject this view.
I will write you soon at greater length in confidential channels where this discussion belongs. But I cannot let your statement that “not

a single worthwhile step” was taken to bring about a political solution remain without response on the public record. It is a matter of judgment what is “worthwhile.” The
U.S.
made efforts extending for nine months to take steps to assist the refugees and to provide the worthwhile basis for political negotiation.
When we met in Washington you were assured of our intention to continue to carry the main financial burden for care of the refugees. You were informed of the Government of Pakistanʼs willingness to take the first step of military disengagement if it could be assured that India would reciprocate subsequently. You were also informed of various ways which could be used to get talks started between the Government of Pakistan and Bangla Desh representatives. We asked your Ambassador to work out with us a specific timetable for political evolution. You said that India wanted a peaceful solution. We accepted this statement at face value.
We never made any claims that our proposals met Indiaʼs position fully. They were proposals which would have started the process of negotiations. I had thought that this was one of those times when statesmanship could turn the course of history away from war.
If there is a strain in our relations, and there is, it is because your government spurned these proposals and without any warning whatever chose war instead. The subsequent disregard by your government of repeated calls of the United Nations for ceasefire and withdrawal— adopted by overwhelming majorities—confirms this judgment.
The stand taken by the United States in recent days has not been taken against India. It has been taken against the practice of turning to military action before all political resources are exhausted.
We recognize that India is a major Asian power and that we share the common values of genuinely democratic government. No act has been taken with a desire to damage the relationship between our two great countries. We would hope that the day may come when we can work together for the stability of Asia, and we deeply regret that the developments of the past few months in South Asia have thrust the day of stability farther into the future.
Sincerely,
Richard Nixon
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 332
332. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (
Kissinger
) to President
Nixon
1
Washington
,
December 22, 1971
.
SUBJECT
Information Items
[Omitted here are summary reports on foreign policy issues unrelated to South Asia.]
India-Pakistan Situation
: In West Pakistan,
Bhutto
is moving to consolidate his position. The list of generals “retired” along with
Yahya
includes virtually all of his close inner circle and the only top officers

remaining—Acting Commander of the Army Gul Hassan and Commander of the Air Force Rahim Khan—both had lines out to
Bhutto
before the war and have not been seriously tainted by the outcome.
Bhutto
, however, is keeping the Defense portfolio for himself.
Bhutto
is also retaining the External Affairs portfolio and has appointed a man he trusts over Foreign Secretary
Sultan Khan
.
On the political front,
Bhutto
has said that
Mujib
will be released from prison soon and put under some form of house arrest. This is, of course, only a gesture but it could be important for setting the tone for the dialogue that must soon ensue with the Indians and Bangla Desh leaders involving
Mujib
ʼs release and the fate of the
POW
s and other West Paks in Indian custody.
There is a great deal of speculation in New Delhi about the shape of the emerging India-Bangla Desh relationship. Our Embassy has been able to confirm that a treaty has been signed providing for economic assistance, especially aimed at helping the refugees return, and that planning is going forward in the trade field. There may also be provisions for security arrangements along the lines of the Indo-Soviet friendship treaty.
At the
UN
, the Security Council was finally able to agree on a resolution last night by a vote of thirteen to nothing with the Soviet Union and Poland abstaining.
2
The operative paragraph in effect formalizes the cease-fire and demands that it “remain in effect until withdrawals take place, as soon as practicable, of all armed forces to their respective territories and to the cease-fire line supervised by UNMOGIP.” This latter clause on the
UN
Military Observer Group for India and Pakistan is intended to imply full withdrawal in Kashmir and we have made it clear in our explanation of the vote that this is our understanding. This is not everything that we initially wanted, but it is the lowest common denominator that both the Indians and the Paks will agree on and as such the only alternative to a continuing Security Council deadlock. It provides a firm basis for strong multilateral démarches for full Indian withdrawal.
[Omitted here are summary reports on foreign policy issues unrelated to South Asia.]
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 334
334. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (
Kissinger
) to President
Nixon
1
Washington
,
December 27, 1971
.
SUBJECT
Information Items
[Omitted here are summary reports on foreign policy issues unrelated to South Asia.]
India-Pakistan Situation
: Ambassador
Farland
has sent in his assessment of the first few days of
Bhutto
ʼs regime. He concludes that
Bhutto
has moved with extraordinary speed to solidify his control of West Pakistan and to set the stage for launching his political and economic reform program. He has been aided in this effort by the widespread demoralization both within the military leadership and the populace as a whole, who seem prepared, at least for the moment, to give him a free hand. The early signs suggest that
Bhutto
ʼs domestic program will feature social reform and populist assaults on the establishment, while he builds a highly personal, somewhat authoritarian regime. On the international front,
Bhutto
has taken the first steps toward a new relationship with India with hints of some flexibility on the Bangla Desh issue and
Mujib
. On relations with the great powers, he seems to be keeping his options open. In sum,
Farland
says that
Bhutto
has taken over West Pakistan “lock, stock, and barrel,” probably saving it from internal collapse in the process. On the other hand, it is not clear whether
Bhutto
will be able to rise above his reputation for unscrupulousness, vanity, and intense personal ambition to become a real statesman.
From New Delhi, Ambassador
Keating
reports that Mrs.
Gandhi
ʼs domestic political stock has soared while the oppositionʼs has declined in the wake of Indiaʼs military victory. Personal adulation of Mrs.
Gandhi
has gone to the extremes with even the opposition leaders hailing her as Indiaʼs Joan of Arc and the incarnation of various Hindu deities. At the same time, Mrs.
Gandhi
appears to have retained her cool, calculating manner and is moving to capitalize on her popularity by scheduling new elections in several states.
In other developments over the weekend,
U Thant
has named Vittorio Winspeare-Guicciardi, Under Secretary General and head of the
UN
ʼs Geneva office, as his special representative in India and Pakistan

to go to the subcontinent to help deal with humanitarian problems as called for in the Security Council resolution.
2
Bhutto
is reported to have announced plans for a judicial inquiry into the causes for Pakistanʼs defeat. It is not to submit its findings for three months and may be
Bhutto
ʼs effort to satisfy public opinion with a minimum move.
3
[Omitted here are summary reports on foreign policy issues unrelated to South Asia.]
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations