Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 309
309. Editorial Note
President
Nixon
met with
Henry Kissinger
in the Oval Office of the White House the morning of December 15, 1971, to discuss the latest developments in the crisis in South Asia.
Kissinger
reported that “the Russians came in yesterday giving us their own guarantee that there would be no attack on West Pakistan.” (See
Document 305
.)
Kissinger
continued: “Now itʼs done. Itʼs just a question of what legal way we choose.”
Nixon
said: “Well, what the
UN
does is really irrelevant.”
Kissinger
felt that a solution to the crisis might be formalized in an exchange of letters between
Nixon
and
Brezhnev
that would be made public.
Nixon
asked how the Chinese would react to a public accommodation between the United States and the Soviet Union.
Kissinger
responded: “Oh, the Chinese would be thrilled if West Pakistan were guaranteed.”
Kissinger
drew on his conversation with
Vorontsov
the previous evening to expand upon the Soviet guarantee: “He said well, I just had a cable to tell the President we give him, that this letter means that the Soviet Government gives him the guarantee that there will be no attack on West Pakistan, no annexation of West Pakistan.”
Nixon
asked: “
Vorontsov
talking now?”
Kissinger
replied: “Yeah. He said no annexation of West Pakistan territory as of now. Donʼt play any legalistic games with me. We consider the existing dividing line, and also that disputed territory cannot be taken. He said yes, thatʼs the guarantee. So now itʼs just a question of how to formalize it.”
Kissinger
considered the anticipated outcome to be “an absolute miracle.” He said: “I have this whole file of intelligence reports which makes it unmistakably clear that the Indian strategy was to knock over West Pakistan.”
Nixon
and
Kissinger
were concerned about efforts made by Ambassador
Jha
to influence public opinion in the United States during the crisis.
Kissinger
said: “After this is over we ought to do something about that goddamned Indian Ambassador here going on television every day and attacking American policy.
Nixon
asked: “Why havenʼt we done something already?”
Kissinger
responded: “Iʼd like to call State to call him in. He says he has unmistakable proof that we are planning a landing on the Bay of Bengal. Well thatʼs OK with me.”
Nixon
agreed: “Yeah, that scares them.”
Kissinger
added: “That carrier move is good.”
Nixon
said: “Why hell yes … the point about the carrier move, we just say … we got to be there for the purpose of their moving there. Look these people are savages.” He added: “I want a word—put a word in for
Scali
to use … that the United Nations cannot survive and we cannot have a stable world if we allow one member of the United Nations to cannibalize another. Cannibalize, thatʼs the word, I should have thought of it earlier. You see that really puts

it to the Indians. It has, the connotation is savages. To cannibalize, and thatʼs what the sons-of-bitches are up to.”
Kissinger
interjected: “One thing we have done, if I may say so, rather well. Weʼve put the Chinese into position where theyʼre more eager to yield than we are.” (National Archives,
Nixon
Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation between
Nixon
and
Kissinger
, December 15, 1971, 9:05–9:11 a.m., Oval Office, Conversation No. 638–4)
Kissinger
returned to the Oval Office later in the morning to ask for
Nixon
ʼs approval of the line he intended to take in a meeting he had scheduled within the hour with
Vorontsov
.
Kissinger
began: “And now Mr. President what I wanted to check with you just to make sure you approved. I am having
Vorontsov
in at 11:30. And I propose to tell him the following: Look, the Security Council thing can go on forever.”
Nixon
concurred: “Thatʼs right.”
Kissinger
continued: “What you and we have in mind, what you and we can do is—the President was very impressed by [unclear].”
Nixon
said: “By the letter of
Brezhnev
.”
Kissinger
went on: “Well, that I told him already we werenʼt impressed with Mr. President. I told him that was just words, what we need is something complete.”
Nixon
agreed: “Yeah, fine.”
Kissinger
said: “He was very impressed with these assurances. That we could make peace formal. That the President writes you a letter and you respond. Or that you write us a letter and we respond. It doesnʼt make much difference who takes the first step, in which youʼd say that you know that no military action [is] planned against West Pakistan.”
Nixon
instructed: “Just put it in the letter.”
Kissinger
said that the letters would then be published to “symbolize Soviet-American concern for peace.”
Nixon
said: “Good, good.” He added: “But tell him … it would only be beautiful if we do it fast.” One of two things were going to happen,
Kissinger
predicted: “Either they will both vote for the British resolution in the Security Council, in which case they will take credit for it, or they will not vote for the British resolution and exchange these letters.”
Nixon
felt that an exchange of letters would be good in any event and he instructed
Kissinger
to tell
Vorontsov
that. (Ibid., 11–11:03 a.m., Conversation No. 638–4) The editors transcribed the portions of the tape recording printed here specifically for this volume. A transcript of the conversation is published in
Foreign Relations
, 1969–1976, volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972, Document 189
.
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations