Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 96
96. Memorandum of Conversation
1
Rawalpindi
,
July 8, 1971
.
PARTICIPANTS
Sultan Khan
, Foreign Secretary
M.M. Ahmad
, Economic Advisor to President
Yahya
Agha Hilaly
, Ambassador of Pakistan to the
US
Henry A. Kissinger
, Assistant to the President
Harold H. Saunders
,
NSC
Staff
The conversation began with Dr.
Kissinger
pointing to some newspapers on the table in the reception room where the conversation took place and saying that it was a pleasure to see newspapers that were not reporting criticism of him. He said that the stories in the New Delhi newspapers about his talks came from Indian sources. He did not have a single word with the press in New Delhi. Each person he talked to must have given his own personal version of what
Kissinger
had said. There had been a “horrendous storm” in the press against the
US
while he was in New Delhi.
The Foreign Secretary replied that this put the Government of Pakistan in distinguished company. It too is receiving a bad press. Dr.
Kissinger
said that the Government of Pakistan had not handled its press relations as skillfully as it might have. Not many people around the world, for instance, know that the Government of Pakistan had invited the United Nations to come and work in the program for restoring the East Pakistani refugees to their homes.
The Foreign Secretary replied that this had been widely released by the
UN
organizations involved. Ambassador
Hilaly
said that, despite the release of news, the newspapers do not print the news. Mr.
Ahmad
said that Pakistan would have to buy space to see that the news

was appropriately reported. Ambassador
Hilaly
said that he had done that on one occasion in the
US
.
Shifting the subject, the Foreign Secretary asked, “How did they treat you generally?”
Dr.
Kissinger
replied that the Indians had treated him well except that everybody he had talked to had given his own version of what Dr.
Kissinger
had said to the press.
Dr.
Kissinger
said, “I do not consider it impossible that the Indians could take military action.”
Mr.
Ahmad
said that the refugee issue must be solved by cooperative action. Dr.
Kissinger
asked whether the Pakistanis had indicated that the refugees could get their property back. Mr.
Ahmad
said that this had been done. There must be normalcy in East Pakistan, to be sure, but the return of the refugees would also require Indian cooperation. India had encouraged the exodus of refugees by publicizing stories about conditions in East Pakistan.
Dr.
Kissinger
asked whether the Pakistanis had asked to talk with the refugees in the Indian camps. The Foreign Secretary said that India would not entertain such a proposal. If someone talks to the refugees, it will have to be someone from the
UN
.
The Foreign Secretary seconded Mr.
Ahmad
ʼs point that Indian cooperation would be required. When Indians talk about unilateral military action, this is a disincentive to the refugees to return. No refugee is going to get himself in the middle of a battle.
Mr.
Ahmad
said that President
Yahya
was thinking of putting his own man in East Pakistan—a senior civil servant to oversee all action connected with the return of the refugees.
The Foreign Secretary noted that Mr.
Kellogg
(Assistant to the
US
Secretary of State for Refugees) had by his observations confirmed the view that India is preventing the return of the refugees.
Mr.
Ahmad
repeated that there has to be some action on the part of India.
The Foreign Secretary went on to give another example of how the Pakistanis are trying to paint the right picture of what will greet the refugees if they return, while the Indians are trying to create an unfavorable picture. The Secretary said that, for instance, Pakistan calls the centers for the returning refugees “reception centers,” not “camps.” Foreign Minister
Singh
uses the words “camps,” connoting concentration camps. Now the Indians are spreading the word in the refugee centers in India that the property of the refugees had been taken away and re-distributed. President
Yahya
had wanted to make a strong statement against any unauthorized occupation of vacated properties. But his advisors had persuaded him not to because they feared India might seize on it.

Mr.
Ahmad
said that the problem needs to be defused quickly because it could pressure India into rash action.
Dr.
Kissinger
said it was not for him to advise. But he felt that if Pakistan could make a comprehensive proposal rather than to dribble out bits and pieces of its action and if Pakistan could internationalize its response to the refugee problem by getting international observers in, these actions would help. He felt it was important to defuse the refugee issue so that it could be separated from the issue of the political structure of East Pakistan. Linking the two will only prolong the current situation which could lead to war. War would be a catastrophe.
The Foreign Secretary asked what Dr.
Kissinger
felt would be the Indian rationale for war.
Dr.
Kissinger
replied that 7 million refugees are an intolerable burden. They overload an already overburdened Indian economy, particularly in eastern India. The Indians see enormous danger of communal riots. He said he had asked the Indians what India would accomplish by military action. He felt that the answer is that what would be achieved is not the point—the Indians just feel they may have to “do something.”
The Foreign Secretary checked his understanding that the Indians are not clear in their objective. Dr.
Kissinger
replied that the Indians feel they would win any military confrontation.
Mr.
Ahmad
said that if India insists that the refugees will only go back on certain political conditions, that will not contribute to the return of the refugees.
Dr.
Kissinger
repeated that he did not presume to advise the Pakistanis but urged them to think about separating the issues.
The Foreign Secretary said that India will not allow that. India is linking the two issues by saying that the refugees will only go back under certain conditions.
Dr.
Kissinger
asked what would be the best international organization to involve in this situation—the
UN
High Commissioner for Refugees or some other? He realized that alternatives included an international group of neutral countries as observers. Then he concluded that a war on the subcontinent would be unthinkable.
The Foreign Secretary agreed that war would be terrible. No one in Pakistan is thinking of going to war.
Dr.
Kissinger
acknowledged that Pakistan would still face pressure on the issue of a political settlement.
Mr.
Ahmad
pointed out that Pakistan was already taking steps to involve the
UN
in East Pakistan. He pointed out that the
UN
High Commissioner for Refugees would be sending a team.

Dr.
Kissinger
said that his point was that approval of such steps as that should not be dribbled out piecemeal. This does not help the Pakistani public relations position.
Mr.
Ahmad
said he felt that a comprehensive package could be put together. For instance, a new senior civilian is scheduled to be appointed in the next “two or three days” to oversee refugee affairs.
Dr.
Kissinger
asked whether the military governor would be put under the new civilian appointee. The Foreign Secretary said that he would be the “refugee czar”. He would not be placed over the military governor, but he would have control over everything in the refugee field. Mr.
Ahmad
added that the governors in all the provinces are military officers.
Dr.
Kissinger
said that the primary focus in the United States now is on the refugee problem.
Mr.
Ahmad
said that he felt that a comprehensive program on the refugee problem should be possible.
Ambassador
Hilaly
noted that the
Manchester Guardian
is urging the
UK
to take the refugee issue to the
UN
Security Council.
The Foreign Secretary said there is no evidence that India wants the refugee issue settled. For instance, in
ECOSOC
, India has been trying to get the issue inscribed on the agenda so that it could be debated there. Pakistan had opposed inscription but was quite willing to discuss the issue after the presentation of the report of the
UN
High Commissioner for Refugees.
Mr.
Ahmad
asked, “But what if India does not cooperate?” Dr.
Kissinger
replied, “At least there would be a Pakistani program.”
The Foreign Secretary said that what had been done so far had had to be piecemeal because of the way the decision-making process both in Pakistan and at the
UN
had evolved to date.
The conversation returned to the
UNHCR
. Ambassador
Hilaly
said that the Commissioner was beginning to talk about a political solution. This was playing into Indiaʼs hands. Prince
Sadruddin
(the
UNHCR
) had been attacked by the British press, particularly the
Guardian
.
Sadruddin
seems to be back-peddling in concern over these press attacks.
Ambassador
Hilaly
said that he is trying to be
U Thant
ʼs successor.
[At this point, the Foreign Secretary made a note on a paper he had in his pocket: “
ECOSOC
—announce package deal and invite India to cooperate.”]
2

Ambassador
Hilaly
said, referring to India, “You found them all hawks?”
Dr.
Kissinger
said that he was “really shocked by the hostility, bitterness and hawkishness of the Indians.” [
Sultan Khan
also made a note of that phrase. It was repeated two days later to Mr.
Saunders
in the Foreign Ministry, so the Foreign Secretary must have debriefed.] He said he felt that this issue needs to be defused in the next few months. He acknowledged that some of the Indian feeling may have been put on for his benefit.
The Foreign Secretary recalled that this was the sense of President
Yahya
ʼs last message
3
to President
Nixon
—that India was building a momentum toward attack which perhaps it could not stop. Mr.
Ahmad
referred to Neville Maxwellʼs book on the 1962 war
4
and commented how hysteria had developed and how each step produced a momentum for war.
The Foreign Secretary described efforts to hold a meeting between President
Yahya
and Mrs.
Gandhi
. The Shah had offered to provide neutral ground for an Indo-Pakistani meeting. Mrs.
Gandhi
had rejected it out of hand. The Shah was so angry that he has withdrawn the offer. Similarly, Podgorny and
Kosygin
had wanted to arrange a meeting in June of last year. It had been October before there was an Indian reply, and the reply was that a summit meeting was not appropriate at that time, that discussion should begin at the level of Secretary.
Ambassador
Hilaly
said, “The lady is unpredictable. She is maneuvering for a fight.”
Dr.
Kissinger
acknowledged that she may not be trying to settle the refugee question. However, time must be gained. The world must see that Pakistan is trying to settle the problem. The refugees today can be represented to the world by India as a cause of war. On the other hand, what kind of political arrangement Pakistan makes in East Pakistan cannot be presented as a justifiable cause of war.
The Foreign Secretary said that he did not feel that India would allow separation of these two issues.
Dr.
Kissinger
said he felt he was important to inject a civil presence into the refugee context.
Dr.
Kissinger
continued that he had talked to the
US
Mission in Islamabad.
5
They feel that if Pakistan can make some effort to restore

normal administration, it would be helpful. He said that the
AID
Mission felt that there were four elements that should be a part of a favorable economic development program to present to the consortium countries. When he asked Mr.
Saunders
what these points were, it was suggested that perhaps they could be taken up in detail with Mr.
Ahmad
at the specialized talk on economic affairs that was scheduled for the following day.
[These four points were: (1) the importance of a program for East Pakistan development with special emphasis in the strategy for labor intensive rural work; (2) a greater nation-wide effort at resource mobilization; (3) exchange reform; (4) restoration of emphasis on development in the Pakistani government budget rather than on military spending. These points were mentioned by Mr.
Saunders
to Mr.
Ahmad
in two conversations the next two days. Mr.
Saunders
hoped the Pakistani government could work with
AID
and achieve an understanding on a satisfactory development program.]
Dr.
Kissinger
continued that the
US
would do what it could to help if Pakistan could put forward a plausible development program. That would be helpful on the refugee front as well. One of the arguments the Indians are making is that a big food shortage can be expected in September which will drive a whole new batch of refugees into India.
At this point, the Foreign Secretary suggested that the conversation conclude so that Dr.
Kissinger
could go and talk with President
Yahya
.
6
Harold H. Saunders
7
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations