AlimurRazi/FRUS-1971-bangladesh huggingface dataset:
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 71
71. Backchannel Message From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (
Kissinger
) to the Ambassador to India (
Keating
)
1
2
Washington
,
July 19, 1970, 2:18 p.m.

Reference [
text not declassified
] the President is very grateful for your assessment contained in reference b and earlier messages.
Concerning Pakistan arms issue, as you know, the President has decided to make a one-time exception on this issue and we are now considering timing and modalities for proceeding. I understand your views have been sought by State 112500 of July 14.
The President has just dispatched letter to you outlining reasons for this action. Timing for Congressional consultations and notifications will depend upon number of factors. President has, however, asked me to bring to your attention that recognition of Hanoi by Indian Government will unquestionably result in Congressional furor here which could further conlplicate U.S. relations with India. The imminence of recognition will, of course, also be considered in assessing the timing on Pakistan arms package.
Again, thank you for your prompt and helpful responses. I too shall consider this channel closed barring no notable significant new developments.
Best regards.
Contents
Press Release
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 74
74. Telegram 1569 From the Consulate General in Dacca to the Department of State
1
2
Dacca
,
August 17, 1970, 0624Z

For Secretary and
Sisco
from Ambassador
1.
Severe floods are causing considerable damage and suffering in East Pakistan. Details have been given in our recent reporting. President
Yahya
has just concluded 12-day visit to East Pakistan during which he toured affected areas and inspected relief operations. On August 15 he announced decision to postpone until December 7 the national elections he had previously set for October 5, citing the flood effects which would make it infeasible to hold elections in October in east wing.
2.
GOP
has requested
US
and other foreign governments to provide relief assistance. I have already delivered check for rupees 100,000 (about dols 21,000) to President’s East Pakistan relief fund.
USG
has also agreed to permit Pakistan to begin purchases now of 300,000 tons of wheat against
PL
480 agreement still to be negotiated for current year. We are continuing to study relief needs and will recommend any other additional measures we believe called for. I am now in East Pakistan for first-hand look at situation.
3.
Realizing that following suggestion carries with it obligation for timely relief commitment, nevertheless, I believe a personal message from President
Nixon
to
Yahya
at this juncture would be timely and would be much appreciated.

Recommend Presidential message along following lines: “Ambassador
Farland
, after personal observation, has informed me of the serious flood situation in East Pakistan. I am grieved to learn of the damage which has caused grievous suffering to millions of your compatriots. The American people join with me in extending to them our compassionate and sympathetic understanding. We hope that the situation in the flood-stricken areas will soon improve and that Pakistan can again devote its full resources to the course of national progress which your government and people have charted.”
Blood
Contents
Press Release
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 76
76. Memorandum for the Record
1
2
Washington
,
September 24, 1970
SUBJECT:
Conversation with the President, September 24, 1970—MILITARY SUPPLY

I referred to my conversation with President
Yahya
on September 8 and gave the gist of my cable reporting on the military supply aspect. I conveyed to the President
Yahya
’s deep appreciation for the message I had delivered to him on June 20, which according to
Yahya
had strengthened his resolve to avoid asking the Soviets for any further arms. Further, I noted
Yahya
’s comment to me that he does not “cherish the communist embrace.”
I then explained to the President the reasons why the intended consultation with Congress has not yet been undertaken. The President thereupon asked Dr.
Kissinger
where the action stood and Dr.
Kissinger
said that it was still in the Department of State. The President then directed Dr.
Kissinger
to tell Mr.
Sisco
to move ahead on this at once, adding that he had made a decision, wanted it implemented promptly, and that politically this was the right time.
I then recalled that
Yahya
had told the President in Lahore last year of his problems in financing arms purchases, adding that
Yahya
had mentioned to me on September 8 that he greatly appreciated the package offer of which we had informed him tentatively in June, but that he might lack the money to follow through.
Yahya
had not specifically asked for credit as such but had expressed the hope that some arrangement could be worked out to help him purchase the arms we were prepared to sell. The President said he had made a decision and we should attempt to find a way to make it effective, otherwise the decision would have no meaning. The President asked Dr.
Kissinger
to look into this aspect and Dr.
Kissinger
said he would see what could be worked out.
Contents
Press Release
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 80
80. Telegram 7805 From the
Embassy in Pakistan
to the
Department of State
1
2
Rawalpindi
,
October 5, 1970, 1110Z
Subj:
Arms for Pakistan
Ref:
Rawalpindi 7789

1.
During my meeting with him October 5 on his plans to attend
UN
commemorative session (septel), President
Yahya Khan
said he had been briefed on my discussions on arms issue with
GOP
reps in last several days. He said particularly he had been given report by
FonSec
of my discussion with latter October 4 (reftel).
Yahya
said he was pleased that our military reps could now get down to specific discussions.
2.
He then immediately recalled concern he had expressed to Ambassador
Farland
last June and again in September over problem Pakistan faces in paying for any items it wishes purchase. He said again that
USG
knows better than he how difficult Pakistan’s financial situation is.
Yahya
said he hoped most sincerely that
USG
would find ways to make proposed sales feasible even within cash-payment framework. He agreed that financing problem would be largely affected by Pakistan’s choice of alternatives, e.g., for used as against new equipment. He remarked that
US
had large “surplus” stocks and that we should be able provide substantial concessions on prices therefor. He expressed hope that our negotiators will also be given authority to come up with concessions on timing of payments.
3.
Yahya
said he and his government would face very difficult situation if it turns out that Pakistan is unable to pay for
US
equipment which it requires and desires and which
USG
has offered

to sell. He affirmed
GOP
’s interest in maintaining secrecy on our sales offer, adding that it was particularly important at least until it was clear whether actual sales would be worked out.
4.
I assured
Yahya
that Ambassador had reported
Yahya
’s concern over financial problem, and that
USG
was indeed aware of this problem. I said I would again report
Yahya
’s concern. Discussion this subject concluded as we agreed our military reps should get on promptly with their discussions.
Sober
Contents
Press Release
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 82
82. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (
Kissinger
) to President
Nixon
1
2
Washington
,
undated

SUBJECT:
FY
1971
PL
480 Program for Pakistan
Acting Secretary
Johnson
(Tab A) requests your approval of a $72 million
PL
480 Program for Pakistan for
FY
1971. 800,000 tons of wheat and 100,000 tons of edible oil would be provided under the proposed agreement. As a result of budget limitations, the amount is less than the Pakistan request and less than the $87 million we provided last year. State, therefore, proposes to sign a smaller
PL
480 agreement ($15–20 million) in the latter part of
FY
71 to provide deliveries in the first quarter of
FY
1972, Pakistan’s most critical supply period. This would assure Pakistan of our continuing support.
Nearly all the commodities provided will go to East Pakistan which, although having made some progress in its agricultural sector in the previous year, has had poor results with miracle rice and continues to be an area of extreme poverty. A large portion of the receipts generated under the program will be utilized for rural development projects to support East Pakistan’s agriculture. Our
AID
mission has made a major effort to develop around this program a broad-based attack on some of East Pakistan’s fundamental economic and social problems ranging from family planning to community organization and education.
The proposed amount is within your
FY
71 budget.
OMB
(Tab B), Treasury and Agriculture concur in State’s request.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you approve the proposed $72 million
PL
480 program for Pakistan for
FY
1971.
Contents
Press Release
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 83
83. Letter From President
Nixon
to Pakistani President
Yahya
1
2
Washington
,
October 15, 1970

Dear Mr. President:
The patience you have shown in connection with the protracted review of our military supply policy has been very much appreciated. Our deliberations have taken even longer than anticipated and have involved a number of difficult considerations. One of the problems, as I have explained before, has been the current mood of our Congress toward military assistance and involvement abroad.
Despite these problems, I have tried to be as responsive as possible to Pakistan’s requests, in keeping with my assurance to you in Lahore that I would see what could be done to be helpful. I was pleased that Ambassador
Farland
was able to discuss these matters with you informally on June 20 and again last month before returning home on leave, and I had a good talk with him while he was here. Since then the necessary Congressional consultations have been completed and we are now able to move ahead.
In specific terms, I am pleased to confirm that we are prepared to sell Pakistan on this one occasion the following items which your military authorities have requested from us: six replacement fighter interceptor aircraft or, as an alternative, twelve interceptor aircraft of a different model if Pakistan transfers the remaining aircraft in the squadron concerned; seven replacement medium bomber aircraft; 300 armored personnel carriers; and four maritime patrol aircraft. Our diplomatic mission in Pakistan is prepared to discuss this offer in greater detail with you or your associates, and our respective military representatives can proceed with arrangements.
In addition to the aforementioned items, which are in the “lethal” category, I have asked our people to move as promptly and sympathetically as possible on pending requests by your military authorities to purchase various non-lethal items such as light aircraft, transport aircraft, jeeps and trucks. We are doing our best to be responsive on such items.

I recognize that the equipment to be provided does not cover some of your requests but I hope you will consider this offer as reflecting my sincere desire to be of assistance to Pakistan. As you know from our talk in Lahore, I have had a long personal association with your country and am anxious to ensure that our relations remain on a close and cordial basis.
In closing, let me express my admiration for the great skill you have shown in leading Pakistan through a difficult transition period. In your determination to see Pakistan safely and peacefully through this transition, you have demonstrated statesmanship, courage and sensitivity to the special conditions facing your country and the aspirations of your people. You have my warm good wishes in your great endeavor.
I am now looking forward with great pleasure to our meeting here in Washington and wish you a safe and comfortable journey.
Sincerely,
Richard Nixon
Contents
Press Release
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 95
95. Telegram 187199 From the
Department of State
to the
Embassy in Pakistan
1
2
Washington
,
November 15, 1970, 2208Z

SUBJECT:
Presidential Message on Cyclone Disaster in East Pakistan
REFERENCE:
187185
1. Please convey following message from President
Nixon
to President
Yahya Khan
:
QUOTE I have been deeply shocked and grieved to learn of the catastrophic cyclonic storm which has caused such grave loss of life and property in the coastal areas of East Pakistan. Please convey to your countrymen, and especially to those of the storm-affected area, the profound sympathy of the government and people of the United States for the tragic losses and human suffering wrought by this calamity. As in the past, the United States stands ready to render whatever assistance it can in helping to bring relief to the disaster area. UNQUOTE. We do not plan to release text to press but would have no objection if
GOP
desires to do so. However, please provide advance notice of public release.

2.
FYI
: The President desires to be as helpful as possible in providing relief assistance in this disaster and to make most generous combined offer of help justified by the circumstances, within limit our resources, rather than responding piecemeal. (This should not deter your making appropriate initial monetary grant of up to $25,000 under existing authority per reftel.)
Request Mission’s best assessment of consolidated needs from
USG
as soon as practicable, based on
GOP
information.
3. You should bear in mind that because of Southeast Asian requirements and unusually high incidence of disasters this fiscal year, contingency and supporting assistance funds are extremely scarce and will remain so unless replenished by supplemental appropriation which has not yet been presented to Congress.
PL
–480 resources, which are probably those most needed in this case, are also quite tight. Nevertheless, you should report requirements as you see them per para 2 above. End
FYI
.
Rogers
Contents
Press Release
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 96
96. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (
Kissinger
) to President
Nixon
1
2
Washington
,
undated

SUBJECT:
Groundwork for East Pakistan Relief
Ambassador
Farland
has delivered your message to
Yahya
, and a chartered plane with an initial shipment of 1,000 tents and 10,000 blankets is on its way to Dacca. Ambassador
Farland
has received normal authority to use $25,000 in
AID
contingency funds and $100,000 in
US
-owned Pakistani rupees for immediate needs.
An interagency task force is in operation under Deputy
AID
Administrator
Maurice Williams
, and it is coordinating resources of private agencies. As a former
AID
Mission Director in Pakistan, he is our top economic assistance expert on that area.
Ambassador
Farland
has asked the Pakistani Government for the earliest possible indication of what assistance is needed.
AID
today has inventoried the resources available to the U.S. Government as follows:
1.
Up to $4.7 million equivalent in Pakistani currency for non-food expenditures. [This would leave no other local currency resources available for other emergencies this fiscal year.]
2.
About $35 million in Pakistani currency for development works. This would be for basic reconstruction rather than for purely relief activities.
3.
Approximately $10 million remains formally uncommitted for non-food relief goods under the
AID
Contingency Fund. But this amount has been tentatively earmarked for short-run Cambodian needs. Up to $5 million could be made available, however.
4.
The
PL
480 budget ceiling would have to be raised to respond to Pakistan’s requests for food aid. This could be done on the basis of executive decision to meet Pakistan’s initial request for 50,000 tons of wheat. Since you have just approved a $72 million
PL
480 agreement, it should be possible to speed up shipments under that agreement and replace what is drawn for emergency shipments later.
Against the background of these availabilities,
AID
is thinking about an initial commitment of up to $10 million in dollars, food and local currency for immediate relief and for assistance in restoring lands to productive use. Until we have a Pakistani request, we do not know how this compares with their assessment of the needs. Also, it does not take account of private contributions (an effort will be made to bring the Center for Voluntary Action into their coordination).
There are two choices on the next move: One would be to ask President
Yahya
whether he would regard it as helpful for Maury Williams to go to Pakistan to assess possible U.S. contributions to relief and rehabilitation. The other would be to await the Pakistani Government’s assessment over the next few days.
Contents
Press Release
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 100
100. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (
Kissinger
) and the President’s Assistant (
Haldeman
)
1
2
Washington
,
November 20, 1970

K: I called for two reasons.
[Omitted here is conversation unrelated to South Asia.]
K: I have two problems about the Pakistanis. I called the Pakistan Ambassador. He is satisfied. I asked about sending a delegation. They are probably not eager to have a delegation.
H: We don’t care. Its to avoid the negative. We have to look humanitarian.
K: We can’t hurt relations with them. You can’t send a delegation into a country that doesn’t want it.
H: I just blasted people working on this because they only have a re-type of the Peru plan. Maybe we should drop food but we have to think of something.
K: Second, we will have the
WH
involved with a loser. Hundreds of thousands will starve there.
H: But we should do something.
K: We have a man who can step into the Zeigler briefing this afternoon.
H: I won’t do it because we have done nothing.
K: 10,000 blankets, ____ tents, ____ lbs. of wheat. Just waiting to know where to send it.
H: What about concentrated food stuffs.
K: I haven’t the detailed program.
H: What good can they do with wheat. We are treating it as a bureaucratic thing.

K: That’s not true. We have sent three cables a day.
H: Does any one in Iowa care about 3 cables a day to the Pakistanis? They watch thousands of people dying and we should be doing something.
K: And we are doing what can be done at this moment. If there’s a new idea of course we will implement it.
H: We need something that has dramatic fact.
[The conversation concluded with a discussion unrelated to South Asia.]
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 103
103. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (
Sisco
) to Acting Secretary of State
Irwin
1
2
Washington
,
December 3, 1970
SUBJECT:
India Keeps the Lid on the Arms Debate—INFORMATION MEMORANDUM
The Government of India has apparently decided to keep the lid on its criticism of our arms decision for Pakistan and to prevent it from escalating into a major crisis in our relations. Although Indian officials continue to be privately critical of our decision and skeptical about the rationale behind it, they have not attempted to stir up public controversy beyond that generated in the Parliamentary debate early in November.
We had expected that the Parliamentary session, which began on November 9, would generate a certain amount of hysterical criticism of the United States from all shades in the Indian political spectrum. In the event, although there were debates in both houses of Parliament, criticism was relatively muted, and considerable attention was also given to Soviet arms sales to Pakistan. The Embassy has reported that the arms issue is unlikely to surface in Parliament again unless there is a general foreign policy debate, which is not now expected. Discussion of the decision continues in the press but mainly in analytical pieces questioning our explanations of our decision. Journalists and officials alike remain skeptical that we can achieve our stated purposes through such a limited sale.

The Indians now seem disposed to accept the assurances which the Secretary gave to Mrs.
Gandhi
of our desire not to let this issue affect the basic nature of our relations. They remain skeptical, however, that we will in fact limit ourselves to a single sale.
Increasingly the Indians are looking towards the bilateral talks as a way of repairing the damage done to our relations in recent months. The attached telegram from New Delhi reports some of the recent signs of the Indian desire to put our relations back on the rails again.
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 105
105. National Security Study Memorandum 109
1
2
Washington
,
December 19, 1970
TO:
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Administrator, Agency for International Development
The Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT:
Policy Study on South Asia
The President has directed that a planning study be prepared analyzing major U.S. policy options toward South Asia.
The principal objective of the study will be to evaluate the status of our relations with India and Pakistan today and, more important, to recommend general policy lines which should be pursued in the 1970s. This study should reflect alternate views where they exist and be based on analyses in the following major areas:
—The United States’ interests and objectives in South Asia, particularly as they relate to broader U.S. interests in Asia, likely changes in U.S. interests arising from the evolution of the domestic political and economic situations in India and Pakistan and changes in the relationships between the U.S., the
USSR
and Communist China.
—The interests and objectives of the
USSR
and Communist China in South Asia and the interplay among these interests.
—The interests and objectives of India and Pakistan in their relations with the major world powers and with their Asian neighbors and the prospects for those relations.
—The most likely major political, economic, social and military trends in India and Pakistan.
—In the context of U.S. interests and objectives and those of the Soviet Union and Communist China, alternate U.S. policies toward South Asia including U.S. policies as to trade and investment, bilateral economic assistance, educational and cultural exchange, and military assistance.
The purpose of this analysis is to pose the fundamental policy choices in setting a U.S. posture toward this area in the 1970s. This study should recommend courses of action with particular regard to the role of India and Pakistan in Southeast Asia, the overall U.S. presence in South Asia, the United States’ economic, political, security and technological relations in the area, and the U.S. attitude towards the national unity of India and Pakistan and towards various forms of regional and subregional cooperation. It is recognized that the analysis and conclusions with respect to Pakistan will be tentative in view of Pakistan’s constitution-making process and may have to be revised in the light of later developments.
The study should be carried out under the direction of the Chairman,
NSC
IG/
NEA
and be forwarded to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs by March 15, 1971.
Henry A. Kissinger