Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 109
109. Editorial Note
Ambassador
Farland
returned to Washington for consultations at the end of July. President
Nixon
and
Henry Kissinger
met with him at the White House on July 28, 1971. The discussion began with a brief summary of the initiative undertaken with the Peopleʼs Republic of China. Turning to developments on the subcontinent,
Farland
said: “There is another side to this picture, and I can say with complete candor that if we push
Yahya
to the point where he reacts, the reaction will be such that the entire subcontinent will be [unclear] I mean heʼll fight.” He anticipated that conflict between India and Pakistan would draw in China as well.
Nixon
asked: “What do you think our position should be?”
Farland
responded: “I think we are doing what we should.” He went on to paint a stark picture of prospects for the subcontinent. Hindus and Muslims had been at each otherʼs throats for centuries and in his view were likely to remain so.
Nixon
interjected: “Miserable damn place.”
Kissinger
said that his appreciation of Indiaʼs involvement in the crisis building in East Pakistan was that “if they can undermine East Pakistan then in West Pakistan so many forces would be, will unloosen, will be turned loose that the whole Pakistan issue will disappear.”
Nixon
turned to
Farland
and said: “You are convinced that
Yahya
will fight.”
Farland
responded: “Oh, he will.”
Nixon
said: “He will commit suicide.”
Kissinger
agreed that
Yahya
would fight: “Just as Lincoln would have fought.”
Farland
added: “The possibility of defeat is a minor consideration as opposed to their sense of national unity.”
Nixon
asked for
Farland
ʼs assessment of the “terrible stories” being circulated by the Indians about the horrors endured by the refugees at the hands of the Pakistani Army.
Farland
responded that the Indians were “past masters at propaganda.”
Nixon
and
Farland
turned to

the question of arms supply for Pakistan.
Farland
noted that “since March 25 we have sent over 2,200 rounds of 22 ammunition for survival rifles for down there, thatʼs all.” He went on to observe that “40–50 percent of what is in the pipeline is for spare parts for trucks and for communication equipment without which the starving refugees could not be fed.”
Nixon
encouraged
Farland
to “lay it right out” in discussing the issue and in talking about the situation in East Pakistan.
Nixon
felt that it was important to “try to help on the problem.” His concern was too that a “bloodbath” would develop in East Pakistan. “We warned the Indians very strongly,” he said, “that if they start anything—and believe me it would be a hell of a pleasure as far as I am concerned—if we just cut off every damn bit of aid we give them, at least whatever it is worth.”
Farland
said that
Yahya
had told him that his intelligence had pinpointed 29 refugee camps in India where guerrillas were being trained. “I hate to tell you this, Mr. President, but the guerrilla threat is growing by leaps and bounds. They are averaging 18 Pakistanis a day now, they are averaging two bridges a day, killing that many.” He added that the situation was exacerbated by the fact that refugees were prohibited from coming back to East Pakistan.
Nixon
said that his problems in dealing with the situation in East Pakistan were magnified by the Department of State bureaucracy. “We are having a hell of a time keeping the State Department bureaucracies hitched on this thing.” The Departmentʼs South Asia specialists were, in
Nixon
ʼs view, pro-Indian.
Farland
noted the political fallout that had resulted in the United States from the issue made about Pakistani brutality by the Consul General in Dacca, and by the head of
USIS
. Both officers had been transferred out of the area and
Farland
indicated that he was trying to prevent any further negative reporting on the situation in East Pakistan. (National Archives,
Nixon
Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation among
Nixon
,
Kissinger
, and
Farland
, July 28, 1971, 4:21–4:54 p.m., Oval Office, Conversation No. 549–25) The editors transcribed the portions of the conversation printed here specifically for this volume. A transcript of this conversation is published in
Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972, Document 141
.
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations