Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 106
106. Telegram From
the Department of State
to
the Embassy in India
1
Washington
,
July 24, 1971, 1438Z
.
134596. Subj: Meeting Between Secretary and Indian Ambassador regarding China
1.
Summary: At Secretaryʼs invitation Indian Ambassador
Jha
visited Department July 22 for discussion recent
US
moves regarding China. Secretary explained purpose of Dr.
Kissinger
ʼs visit to Peking was to arrange Presidential visit.
US
overall purpose was to establish communications with Peoples Republic of China and normalize relations. While there had been presentations of established positions on issues by both sides during
Kissinger
visit, there had been no decisions or understandings. We intended seek improvement of relations but not at expense of other nations. Amb
Jha
indicated
GOI
welcomed new
US
effort improve relations with
PRC
but concerned how relationship might affect interests of other countries and how it might relate to troubled Sino-India relationship and Chinese support of Pakistan. End summary.
2.
Secretary opened meeting, also attended by
Sisco
,
Rasgotra, Verma
and
Schneider
, saying he had intended to see
Jha
sooner but Amb had been out of town. He had just come from appointment with President who conveyed his best regards to Amb
Jha
and asked that they be conveyed to
PM
Gandhi
. Secretary explained that Dr.
Kissinger
had telephoned
Jha
prior to Presidentʼs announcement of
Kissinger

visit and planned Presidential trip to Peking.
2
Dr.
Kissinger
had been in India immediately prior to his trip to China and he wanted to make clear that he had intended no misrepresentation when he did not inform
GOI
of planned visit. No other government had been consulted in advance since we believed without secrecy there would have been too many obstacles in way of successful mission. Secretary said he appreciated Indiaʼs understanding of Presidentʼs announcement.
3.
Secretary explained purpose of
Kissinger
visit was to arrange Presidential visit. It seemed important to us that President meet
PRC
leaders as best means of normalizing relations, which was our purpose. We use this general term because we do not now know how normalization will develop.
US
Administration does not consider it wise continue without communications with country of 750 million people. This does not mean our policy will change. It may mean improvement in relations with
PRC
but this will not be made at expense of other nations. We have had close communications with Soviets for a long time but these have not been conducted at expense of our friends. No time has yet been fixed for Presidential visit. May 1 was mentioned as deadline because we did not wish visit to become involved in
US
Presidential campaign.
4.
Referring to
Kissinger
/Chou-En-lai conversations Secretary explained half of time was taken for translation. Much of discussion related to working out communiqué. Balance consisted of restatement of policies, publicly stated before, of both governments. There were no agreements, explicit or implicit, and no understandings other than to have summit meeting. Both sides thought there would be something to be gained by that meeting. That gain will depend upon events. There was certainly nothing in conversations—and Secretary emphasized he had seen everything regarding talks which President had seen—which was detrimental to India in any sense of the word.
5.
Amb
Jha
said
GOI
understood why it was not taken into confidence regarding
Kissinger
trip.
GOI
had noted that
Kissinger
when in New Delhi had discussed China in more detail than expected in view of refugee problem. In light of later revelations India read this as a prior assurance. Indian Foreign Ministerʼs first response was to welcome
US
move. Later he made certain observations that external powers should not seek decide future of other countries.
US
move was important in relationship to state of Sino-India relations and active Chinese support to Pakistan. Therefore there was undercurrent of anxiety in India. There was feeling that this plus Pak role in arranging meeting will make it more difficult for
USG
to play constructive part in seeking solution to

refugee problem and promoting political accommodation in East Pakistan. India is concerned that all these developments may weaken kind of support it is seeking. Result could be additional obstacle in way of warm relations between India and
US
.
6.
Secretary replied
US
does not intend that this happen. Explained any time we improve relations with one country there are inevitable suspicions that this being done at expense of others. This not so in this case. Secretary has long believed there need for communications with
PRC
. This should ease tensions and promote world peace. There is no collusion or invidious purpose behind
US
moves.
US
actions will demonstrate this is so.
7.
Jha
inquired whether there were any discussions in Peking about India. Secretary answered that he has avoided answering specific questions such as this and he would in this case except to say that there was no discussion of India in any substantial way. Most discussion related to matters of direct
US
-China interest. India not high on list of such matters.
8.
Secretary explained that if better relations established between
US
and
PRC
this should reduce world tensions and, he would think, would be helpful to India as it would in regard Japan and Indo-China. We do not know and are trying to avoid speculation regarding prospects as that would make it appear we had reached agreements. Result, however, could be beneficial to Asia generally. During current era when nuclear power is so destructive it just possible we could have long period of peace. This is what we hope for. Furthermore, we are doing everything we can to show Soviet Union that this
US
move not directed against them.
9.
Jha
explained India has also said it desires normalization with China. It continues support Chinese entry in
UN
. Agreed if
US
move reduces tensions India would be most happy.
10.
Secretary then inquired about latest report on flow of refugees from Pakistan into India.
Jha
replied there had been some reduction down to 40–50,000 per day. This was nonetheless high and no reverse trend in sight. Refugees not likely return while influx continuing as each newcomer brings warnings about return.
Jha
said that new reason for migration had been added to Pak actions against political leaders and Hindus. Now food and economic difficulties becoming operative factor while other factors continued. Predicted another 2 million refugees may enter India when monsoon ends and travel easier.
11.
Secretary inquired about
UN
activities.
Sisco
replied these in planning phase.
SYG
had developed more precise proposal regarding
UN
presence to facilitate refugee return. There no disposition now to have Security Council meet. Clear conditions must be created in East Pakistan under which flow will stop and refugees can return. There

must be stability, absence of fear, adequate food. For latter purpose much must be done to improve transport to avoid famine. Both India and
US
wish to see steps toward political accommodation.
US
will do everything it can to influence these conditions in East Pakistan in the context of restraint and moderation on part of both India and Pakistan. This is
US
policy.
Jha
and
Rasgotra
pointed out East Pakistan problem was not instance of India–Pakistan dispute. It is problem between West and East Pakistan which has effect on India. India therefore takes exception to consideration of problem as another manifestation of India-Pakistan differences.
Sisco
said that, as he had said before, East Pakistan problem was not anything created by either
US
or India.
12.
In conclusion Secretary asked that his best regards be conveyed to
FonMin
Swaran Singh
whose visit we much enjoyed.
Jha
indicated
FonMin
hoped Secretary could visit India again. Secretary was noncommittal. Said he hoped
Jha
would keep in close touch with him and
Sisco
during current difficult period.
Rogers
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations