Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 138
138. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (
Haig
) to the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (
Kissinger
)
1
Washington
,
September 1, 1971
.
Attached is a memo from
Saunders
which deals with the subject the Secretary has been talking to you about personally and which confirms what
Sisco
indicated to me last week. You will note that
Yahya
is sending over a personal emissary
2
to discuss with
Sisco
the actual status of items remaining in the pipeline as a further refinement of the proposal.
As you know, Secretary
Rogers
has done this on his own despite contrary hints. Very few people in the Department are aware of the project according to
Eliot
. I told
Eliot
that this project could upset the President a great deal and that it would be well for us to take stock of the situation in the light of
Yahya
ʼs response and his obviously cooperative but apparently concerned attitude. I believe you will want to focus on this as soon as possible before it progresses any further.
3
The real problem is the large number of unfilled military requests which have been stonewalled by Defense.
Attachment
Washington
,
September 1, 1971
.
Memorandum From
Harold Saunders and Samuel Hoskinson
of the National Security Council Staff to the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (
Kissinger
)
4
SUBJECT
Sisco
–
Hilaly
–
Yahya
on the Military Aid Pipeline

Ambassador
Farland
has cabled to you
Yahya
ʼs reaction to a recent conversation between Assistant Secretary
Sisco
and Ambassador
Hilaly
in which
Sisco
indicated that the possibility of the stoppage of economic aid to Pakistan could be averted if the arms flow were shut off. We have no record of the
Sisco
–
Hilaly
talk—although the Paks have now provided us with the text of
Hilaly
ʼs report
5
—and were not previously informed about this approach.
Sisco
ʼs Proposition
According to
Hilaly
,
Sisco
called him in on August 23 and made the following major points:
—the question of arms shipments had become an important internal political issue in the
US
with the passage of the Gallagher amendment.
6
There was every likelihood that the Senate would pass a similar restriction which would also insist on the stoppage of economic aid until there is a satisfactory political settlement in East Pakistan.
—The possibility of such a stoppage of economic aid could be averted if the Administration agreed to cut off military supply to Pakistan. If the delivery of some of what little remained in the pipeline could be speeded up and the Paks agreed to sacrifice the remainder, the Administration could then placate the Senate by saying the pipeline had been closed and that “no Defense stores whatsoever would move to Pakistan in the future.”
—Pakistanʼs stake in the “immediate resumption” of economic aid from the consortium was much longer than its stake in the small amount of arms remaining in the pipeline.
—It was a mutual problem and both governments needed to help each other and devise a political strategy that could ensure the resumption and increase of economic aid.
Sisco
, “confidentially and unofficially” suggested that both governments sit together secretly as friends to look at what remained in the pipeline with a view to “announcing” its final close.
Yahya
ʼs Response
According to Foreign Secretary
Sultan Khan
,
Yahya
instructed
Hilaly
to inform
Sisco
7
that (1) the gesture of initiating prior unofficial

and confidential consultation on this matter of “vital importance” is appreciated; (2) he agreed that this was a mutual problem which required a common political strategy.
Yahya
then went on to ask that President
Nixon
be informed that:
—“We” would do well to consider the effect a public announcement of the kind suggested by
Sisco
would have on Pakistan internally and externally and on the image of
US
-Pak relations. Internally, it would be a “setback” to the “strengthened good feeling toward the
Nixon
Government” in Pakistan. Externally, other states might also cut off military supply and the impact would “merit very serious consideration.”
—Pakistanʼs difficulties with India would be “compounded.” It is for “serious consideration” whether it would not be in the
US
interests in South Asia to prevent development of a “precarious imbalance” between India and Pakistan.
—Then (almost as an afterthought in his instructions to
Hilaly
)
Yahya
added that the President be informed that he “in no way wishes to weaken the position of the
Nixon
Government. Therefore, should President
Nixon
feel that the proposed announcement would enable him to defeat the Democratic designs to make the existing position a political issue for the Presidential election, Pakistan will accept it despite the sacrifices it involves.” If this is the case, then
Yahya
would at least hope that the announcement would say “shipments of military stores to Pakistan have terminated, and their resumption will depend upon the improvement of the situation in East Pakistan,” and he would hope that under these circumstances “essential supplies” could later be “quietly resumed.”
—Finally,
Yahya
“notes with deep appreciation” the assurances that the cut off would help the Administration to (1) save economic aid for Pakistan (2) take a stronger line with Congress for resumption of economic aid to Pakistan and (3) to take the lead in the consortium for immediate resumption of international aid to Pakistan.
Comments
Unless you have talked to
Sisco
or Secretary
Rogers
had the permission of the President,
Sisco
has been free-wheeling again. We had no idea until this cable was received from Islamabad today (September 1) that he had made this approach on August 23.
That issue aside, however,
Yahya
ʼs response raises some important substantive questions.
1.
Yahya
realizes that there is very little (about $2.6 million) in the pipeline and that there is virtually no chance with Congressional pressure that more will be made available in the foreseeable future. This being the case he may well see this as a unique opportunity to trade

virtually nothing in military supply for vital
US
economic aid and leadership in the consortium.
2.
Resumption of economic aid to Pakistan and
US
pressure on the consortium governments to resume aid raises bureaucratic, Congressional and policy problems. As
Sisco
indicates, we might save the possibility of resuming aid by cutting off military supply but we will be right back in the soup again with Congress if we do this without first having some sort of national development plan such as the Congress expects. Taking the lead in the consortium raises the same problem and it is doubtful we could achieve much anyway in the consortium without such a plan. Finally,
AID
is no more aware of this approach than we.
Sisco
has promised much more than we may be able to deliver soon.
—A cut-off of military supply to Pakistan might gain us some points in India but we have already been so damaged there on this issue that a cut-off when the pipeline is almost dry will not recoup much. Moreover, there is some question whether we really want to send the Indians this kind of a signal now.
In short,
Sisco
is talking about a trade-off that might make sense when the Senate reconvenes. But he has raised it with the Paks without authority, without much sense of what it would take to resume aid and over-arousing Pak expectations about resumption.
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations