Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 177
177. Telegram From
the Embassy in Pakistan
to
the Department of State
1
Islamabad
,
November 2, 1971, 0810Z
.
10905. Subj: Indo-Pak Confrontation—Military Pullback. Ref: State 198660.
2
1.
Summary:
Yahya
agreed to unilaterally withdrawing military units as first step in defusing explosive situation in subcontinent. End summary.
2.
I met with President
Yahya Khan
at the Presidentʼs house in Rawalpindi at 0900 hours Tuesday, November 2. During the hour and twenty-minute conversation which ensued, among other matters which were topics for comment and which will be reported by
septel
s,
3
the question of a unilateral military pullback was discussed at length.
3.
Emphasizing at the outset that I was speaking as a concerned friend with a desire to be helpful and stressing the concern of the
USG
regarding the imminent possibility of a war on the subcontinent, I referred to Mrs.
Indira Gandhi
ʼs November 4–5 visit to Washington for the purpose of discussions with President
Nixon
. I also made note of the fact that the Tuesday morning
Pak Times
carried an article datelined London, November 1, which reported “that the Indian Prime Minister said today that her government would never agree to a unilateral withdrawal of Indian troops from the borders of East Pakistan.” I then went on to recall our conversation of October 28 during which he (President
Yahya
) had asked me for any specific suggestions which we might have for the purpose of defusing the explosive situation existing in the subcontinent (Islamabad 10802).
4
4.
Responding to that request, a major suggestion of immediate moment, I said, was one which any leader of a nation under threat of attack would find hard to accept—doubly so when the leader of the nation had devoted his life to military pursuits—was to adopt an action diametrically opposite to that which Mrs.
Gandhi
had negated, i.e., agree to the concept of unilateral withdrawal.
5.
Yahya
didnʼt hesitate at all, saying spontaneously: “Of course I will. Now this doesnʼt mean that I would pull the troops back into the barracks but I will gladly promise to make the first move back from a forward military position.”
6.
I told
Yahya
that I personally considered this a most salutary development and I knew that my government also would so consider it. I added that I would convey this information to
USG
soonest so that Mrs.
Gandhi
might be apprised of his posture on this matter during her Washington conversations.
7.
Yahya
concluded this portion of our conversation by saying “What I want your government to know, is that in order to bring normalcy back to the subcontinent, I will do anything within my power short of simply turning Pakistan over to India.”
8.
FYI
: Contrary to the suggestion contained in the
reftel
I felt it inappropriate to go into proposals relating to specific military units, or examples thereof, the pullback of which would be feasible and could be signaled by local commanders to their opposite numbers. As delicate as this particular conversation was, I believed it necessary to establish a commitment rather than become involved in specifics.
Farland
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations