AlimurRazi/FRUS-1971-bangladesh huggingface dataset:
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 114
114. Telegram From
the Department of State
to
the Embassy in India
1
Washington
,
August 6, 1971, 1807Z
.
143415. Strictly Eyes Only for Ambassador
Keating
and Chargé
Sober
from the Secretary.
1.
I am increasingly concerned at public and intelligence indications that both Indian and Pakistani governments are beginning to feel war may be inevitable and are tending to act on that assumption. Pak and Indian air forces are on alert. Government of West Bengal has been informed that after August 15 it may not rely on presence of Indian army troops for internal security purposes. Bangla Desh guerrillas appear to hope to mount major offensive in September. Cross-border shelling by both Indians and Pakistanis has increased as has tempo of guerrilla activity which is shifting from sabotage to direct attacks on West Pakistani forces. In addition Indian rejection of
UN
presence on its side of border and efforts to exclude foreign relief workers from refugee areas suggest greater Indian sensitivity about activities in these areas.
2.
With these indications of rising danger in view you should seek early opportunity to meet with Foreign Minister or Foreign Secretary to express our continued concern at dangers of situation and our hope
GOI
will continue to act with utmost restraint. Specifically you should ask
GOI
to take no action which would exacerbate situation and to use its influence with Bengali guerrilla forces to prevent creation of situation in which guerrilla activities could lead to hostilities. We would hope
GOI
would refrain from public statements which would raise level of tension and would make no military deployment which might seem to be provocative.
3.
You may also tell Foreign Minister that we are making equally strong appeal in Islamabad and are well aware that restraint is not merely question for one side alone. We recognize that in cases of border incidents both sides must act with restraint and we are so informing
GOP
. You should stress in your presentation our view that war is in no oneʼs interests in area.
Rogers
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 118
118. Memorandum From Secretary of State
Rogers
to President
Nixon
1
Washington
,
August 10, 1971
.
SUBJECT
Discussion with
U Thant
on the
UN
Relief Effort in East Pakistan
In two meetings August 10 with the Secretary-General and members of his staff and of the specialized agencies involved, I stressed our desire to see the
UN
rise to the great humanitarian challenge posed by the risk of famine and disease among the victims of the strife in East Pakistan and assured him of our strong support for the
UN
effort.

U
Thant
seemed fully aware of the magnitude and urgency of the problem and was very cooperative. He expressed concern over the threats being made by the guerrilla leadership against the safety of
UN
personnel in the area and preoccupied by the need for a political accommodation with the Awami League in East Pakistan as the only real solution. He said he is prepared under Article 99 of the
UN
Charter
2
to bring the situation between India and Pakistan to the attention of the Security Council if he decides that it involves a serious threat to peace. He will announce this week, probably Wednesday,
3
that he has decided to station 38
UN
officials in the Dacca area by early September to coordinate and expedite the movement of relief supplies and to work out arrangements to assure that the supplies reach those in need. Once such arrangements are made he plans to send some 150 additional personnel to other parts of East Pakistan, including the reception centers established to handle returning refugees. Their staffing plan seems sensible.
He was grateful for our one million dollar contribution and the promise of additional financial aid for this effort, to which the
UK
is also contributing some $500,000. At the same time he displayed considerable concern lest the
US
appear to be dominating the
UN
effort, and particularly at any effort to politicize the
UN
relief effort.
The discussions with
U Thant
ʼs staff and representatives of the specialized agencies revealed substantial agreement with our assessment of the relief needs and what needs to be done to meet them. On the whole, I was favorably impressed by their competence and realistic attitude.
At
U Thant
ʼs request, Mr.
Sisco
and I gave him a brief and general appraisal of Mr.
Sisco
ʼs talks with Israeli officials, stressing that serious problems remain but that we are cautiously optimistic that an interim agreement is yet possible by the end of the year and that both sides continue to welcome our efforts to that end.
U Thant
said he would relay this information to Ambassador Jarring.
Incidentally, from the firmness with which
U Thant
spoke about his intention if necessary to raise the Indo-Pakistan matter in the Security Council and his stress on his good health, we came away with the impression that he is more than willing to remain as Secretary-General.
William P. Rogers
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 119
119. Letter From the Indian Ambassador (
Jha
) to President
Nixon
1
Washington
,
August 11, 1971
.
Excellency,
I am desired by my Prime Minister to convey to Your Excellency the following personal message from her:
“The Government and people of India as well as our Press and Parliament are greatly perturbed by the reported statement of President
Yahya Khan
that he is going to start a secret military trial of
Mujibur Rahman
without affording him any foreign legal assistance. We apprehend that this so-called trial will be used only as a publicity to execute
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman
. This will aggravate the situation in East Bengal and will create a serious situation in India because of the strong feelings of our people and all political parties. Hence our grave anxiety. We appeal to you to exercise your influence with President
Yahya Khan
to take a realistic view in the larger interest of the peace and stability of this region”. Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest esteem.
2
L.K. Jha
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 122
122. Memorandum From
Saunders Harold
of the National Security Council Staff to the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (
Kissinger
)
1
Washington
,
August 13, 1971
.
SUBJECT
Instruction on Contacts with Bangla Desh Representatives in India—Cable for Clearance
As you know, Bangla Desh representatives in India have recently sought out and made contact with middle ranking
U.S.
officials in New Delhi and Calcutta concerning a settlement with the West Pakistanis. It is not at all clear, however, what they are really fishing for. The approach in Calcutta,
2
allegedly reflecting the Bangla Desh “Foreign Ministerʼs” wishes, was along the lines of a settlement on the basis of something less than full independence, while the approach by the “Foreign Secretary” in New Delhi was based on the opposite outcome of total independence.
3
Another contact is scheduled for tomorrow in Calcutta.

In the attached cable
4
for your clearance State wishes to send the following instructions to New Delhi and Calcutta:
—No commitments, contingent or otherwise, should be made for future meetings with Bangla Desh representatives, unless or until these have first been checked with the Department.
—The already scheduled meeting tomorrow should be limited largely to another low-key listening exercise. A probe on the question of Awami League willingness to negotiate for less than independence is, however, authorized.
5
—We must not get into a position where our contact with Bangla Desh representatives will be misunderstood or misread by them or Islamabad.
6
This approach to the problem seems to make sense for today. There is some value in at least keeping our option open of informally talking with the Bangla Desh types, but we need control and we will need to square ourselves with
Yahya
before this goes further.
As the cable indicates, Stateʼs next move will be to consider informing
Yahya
of the contacts to date and passing along whatever seems worthwhile.
Recommendation:
That you approve the attached cable. Just to make sure there are no slipups, you may wish to tell
Sisco
orally that you expect to clear any outgoing cables on this subject.
7
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 124
124. Memorandum of Conversation
1
Washington
,
August 17, 1971
.
PARTICIPANTS
Anatoliy Dobrynin
, Soviet Ambassador
Henry A. Kissinger
, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to South Asia.]

Subcontinent
We then turned the conversation to India.
Dobrynin
said he wanted us to be sure to understand that the Soviets were doing their best to restrain India. They wanted peace in the subcontinent. It was an ironic development where they were lined up with what looked like we had always thought was the pillar of democracy while we were lined up with the Chinese. I said as far as the subcontinent were concerned, we were not lined up with anybody. We above all wanted to prevent the outbreak of a war, and we hoped that they did not inadvertently give the Indians enough backing so that they felt it was safe to engage in war.
Dobrynin
said that their interest was stability, and in fact they had invited the Pakistani Foreign Secretary to come to Moscow in order to show that they were pursuing a balanced policy. I said that they should not encourage Indian pressures for an immediate political solution since that would only make the problem impossible. I stated it would be best if we worked on the refugee and relief problems first and on political accommodation later.
Dobrynin
said that he was certain that the Soviet Union basically agreed.
Dobrynin
then asked me whether it was correct what the Indians had told them, namely that we would look at a Chinese attack on India as a matter of extreme gravity and might even give them some support. He said that the Indians had been puzzled by my comment but had then put it all together after my trip to Peking. I said that I never commented about meetings in other countries, but that we certainly were not aligned with any country against India.
Dobrynin
commented that he admired the general conduct of our foreign policy even when it was objectively directed against the Soviet Union, but he felt that our arms policy towards Pakistan escaped his understanding. We were paying a disproportionate amount for what we were shipping. I said that we never yielded to public pressure and that he knew very well that the arms we were shipping were minimal and inconsequential with respect to the strategic balance.
Dobrynin
volunteered that the Soviet treaty with India was not in response to recent events but had been in preparation for a year.
[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to South Asia.]
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 130
130. Telegram From
the Embassy in Pakistan
to
the Department of State
1
Islamabad
,
August 20, 1971, 1000Z
.
8501. Eyes Only for Secretary
Rogers
and Assistant Secretary
Sisco
. Subj: Trial of
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman
.
1.
Based on my assumption that Pres.
Yahya
would speak more freely to me alone, I introduced the delicate subject of
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman
ʼs future in a conversation with Pres.
Yahya
which ensued immediately after a meeting which concluded at noon Aug. 19, the participants of which were Pres.
Yahya
,
AID
Deputy Administrator
Maurice Williams
, presidential adviser
M.M. Ahmad
and myself.
2.
Broaching the matter, I indicated to
Yahya
that I realized that I was involving myself in a discussion which was completely an internal affair, but nonetheless I felt bold so to do inasmuch as the manner in which it was handled by his government would definitely and decisively affect virtually all assistance, humanitarian and economic, which my government could institute; and, further, it would have a bearing upon the refugee problem which had become international in character.
3.
I told
Yahya
that most, if not all, nations of the world were watching with intense interest and anxiety how the in-camera trial of
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman
was proceeding, and most, if not all, were seized with concern as to its outcome.
2
I concluded by stating that I, as a friend, felt strongly obligated to suggest (RFR [?] to admonish) that
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman
not be executed. Such an action, I said, would be in my belief contrary to the best interests of his government as well as to his own best personal interests.
4.
Pres.
Yahya
said that he wanted me to know (and for my government to know, but only on the highest levels) that my concern in this regard was unfounded. He said that he had gotten the most qualified Pakistani attorney, A.K. Brohi, to act as defense counsel, that the military tribunal had been advised that the trial must be conducted with the greatest care, without bias or prejudgment, and that the record

must be in full substantiation of whatever verdict was reached.
Yahya
further stated that because the charge carried the possibility of a death sentence, it was his plan that if such the verdict be, a request for mercy would be made in the
Sheikh
ʼs behalf, and he,
Yahya
, would accept the petition.
Yahya
observed that when this request for mercy, as aforesaid, reached him it was his intent to “sit on it for a few months” without making a decision until power was turned over to a civilian government.
5.
It was
Yahya
ʼs further observation that once the problem of
Mujibur
ʼs mercy petition became the problem of a civilian government, there was little or no possibility that
Mujibur
would be executed. I finished my comments with the remark that, “from what you have told me it is obvious that you have given considerable thought to a solution of this problem.”
Yahya
replied, “I have, and you can stop worrying because I am not going to execute the man even though he is a traitor.”
3
Farland
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 135
135. Memorandum From
Samuel Hoskinson of the National Security Council Staff
to the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (
Kissinger
)
1
Washington
,
August 26, 1971
.
SUBJECT
Rogers
–
Dobrynin
Talk on South Asia
2
You may have already seen the account of Secretary
Rogers
ʼ talk with
Dobrynin
on Wednesday. (attached)
3

In response to the Secretaryʼs probing concerning the Soviet position on South Asia,
Dobrynin
made the following major points:
—The
USSR
has no interest in conflict in the area and Soviet policy has been directed toward reducing the danger of conflict.
—Some recent developments make it appear to the public, perhaps erroneously, that the
US
favors Pakistan. After hearing the Secretaryʼs explanation of our arms policy toward Pakistan,
Dobrynin
implied he understood that in fact that issue was relatively insignificant but that press reports had inflamed tempers.
—The intent of the Indo-Soviet friendship treaty was to calm the Indians by assuring them that they had friends at a time when they suspected the Pakistanis of planning hostilities.
Dobrynin
added the treaty seemed in fact to have had the intended effect.
—The guerrilla action in East Pakistan is “practically over” and the real problem is coping with seven million refugees.
Dobrynin
further volunteered that the Soviets were giving no encouragement to the separatist movement in East Pakistan and said the Soviets had informed the Indians that they will not support demands for a separatist state.
—As for Soviet involvement with the Bengali guerrillas,
Dobrynin
stated, “we do not like to be involved in such things.”
Contrary to the
WSAG
discussions on August 17 and the subsequent memo
4
you sent to each of the members, State never cleared this approach to the Soviets with us. I have raised this matter with Acting Assistant Secretary
Atherton
(acting for
Sisco
) who said it was “out of his hands.” I also said that despite the
Rogers
–
Dobrynin
talk, we were still expecting to receive the broader scenario for a
US
approach to the Soviets “before” the outbreak of hostilities.
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 137
137. Telegram From
the Department of State
to
the Embassy in India
1
Washington
,
August 31, 1971, 1551Z
.
159706. Subj: Trial of
Mujibur Rahman
. Ref: State 149347.
2
Because of possibility that Indians might attempt to exploit any written reply to Mrs.
Gandhi
ʼs August 11 message
3
on trial of
Mujibur Rahman
, we have decided that it would be preferable for Ambassador to make oral response on behalf of President to Foreign Secretary
Kaul
. Ambassador should make following points: the President has received Mrs.
Gandhi
ʼs message and has considered it with care. There has been extensive interest in United States in trial of
Mujib
. Secretary
Rogers
has conveyed our concern about summary treatment of
Mujib
to
GOP
. We intend to continue to indicate our concern on appropriate future occasions, not only for humanitarian reasons, but also because we recognize importance which trial, and possible execution of
Mujib
, would have in broader context of search for peace and stability in South Asia.
Johnson
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 140
140. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (
Eliot
) to the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (
Kissinger
)
1
Washington
,
September 3, 1971
.
SUBJECT
Cut-Off of Aid to India
The Washington Special Action Group meeting on August 17, 1971 agreed on the need to prepare a study of a possible cut-off in economic assistance to India setting out the specific steps which might be taken

in gradually implementing a cut-off and evaluating the anticipated consequences.
The possible actions set forth in the attached paper
2
range from a total cut-off, which we would impose automatically if India clearly instigated hostilities, through a series of partial steps that might be used in an attempt to gain influence over Indian policy by using our aid program.
This analysis shows that a restrictive use of aid, in the short run at least, would provide us with some marginal influence but would be unlikely to affect significantly policies that India saw to be in its vital interest.
The paper does not consider alternative strategies. One such alternative might be based on supportive political and economic policies, paralleling those we are currently pursuing with respect to Pakistan.
We will be prepared to discuss these issues at the September 8 meeting of the
WSAG
.
Ted E.
3
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 143
143. Memorandum From
Harold Saunders
of the National Security Council Staff to the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (
Kissinger
)
1
Washington
,
September 7, 1971
.
SUBJECT
Guidance for
Keating
—
US
Policy Toward China and India
You will recall from our brief of August 31
2
that Foreign Minister
Singh
asked Ambassador
Keating
and Senator Percy for clarification

of the
US
position in the event of Sino-Indian hostilities. He recalled that:
—in July he and the Defense Minister had the impression from your talks in Delhi that India “could be reassured concerning continued
US
support against China;”
3
—after your return, in connection with a talk you had with Ambassador
Jha
, the
US
position “was conveyed that if China intervened as the result of an Indo-Pakistan confrontation, the
US
reaction could not be assured.”
Singh
said he was surprised at the apparent change and told
Keating
: “We would definitely like to know where it now stands” [Tab A, para. 6].
4
Keating
reports he is seeing
Singh
tomorrow, September 8, and asks for guidance [Tab B].
5
I assume that you were at least making a distinction between unprovoked and provoked Chinese attack and, perhaps more, attempting to unsettle any Indian planning for attacking Pakistan. I also assume that
Singh
ʼs question is a serious one since past Indian contingency plans have been based on the assumption of some sort of
US
help in the end.
It seems to me there are three generally possible ways to respond:
1.
Remain silent and leave the Indians uncertain.
2.
Instruct
Keating
to reply that there is no ground for confusion. The
US
has often expressed its interest in Indiaʼs independence and its consequent concern over an unprovoked Chinese attack (your first statement). But if India started a war, obviously the situation would be different.
3.
Add to the explanation in para. 2 above some comment that the Soviet-Indian treaty has injected further complications into our review of the situation.
Recommendation:
I am not in favor of a big exercise and a formal reply to
Singh
. My own suggestion would be to instruct
Keating
to use paragraph 2 above as his own explanation and pass
Singh
ʼs question off that way. Since this is a serious question, the Indians may continue to ask it until they

are satisfied that they understand our answer but this way we may be able to preserve some of our flexibility.
Approve
6
Letʼs remain silent
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations