Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 112
112. Memorandum of Conversation
1
Washington
,
July 30, 1971, 6 p.m.
PARTICIPANTS
Joseph S. Farland
,
US
Ambassador to Pakistan
Henry A. Kissinger
, Assistant to the President
Harold H. Saunders
,
NSC
Staff

After the initial exchange of greetings, Dr.
Kissinger
asked the Ambassador whether he knew that Senator
Kennedy
had had the nerve to ask the Pakistanis to arrange a visa for a visit to China. He noted that Ambassador
Hilaly
had told him of this fact. There was an exchange on the fact that Senator
Kennedy
plans to visit the Indian refugee camps and that the Pakistanis had denied a visa to one of Senator
Kennedy
ʼs aides who has been particularly hostile to Pakistan.
Dr.
Kissinger
then asked the Ambassador what the reaction of the officers in his embassy had been after the announcement that Dr.
Kissinger
had gone to Peking from Islamabad.
Ambassador
Farland
said that he had never seen so many jaws drop. He said there was no suspicion of this in the embassy. Substantively, everyone felt that it was a significant accomplishment.
Mr.
Saunders
noted that there had been suspicion among embassy officers during Dr.
Kissinger
ʼs absence from Islamabad that something special was going on, but most of the officers had given up thinking much about it because they did not have any plausible idea of what might be happening. Ambassador
Farland
noted that he had been concerned about the
AP
stringer in Islamabad. Mr.
Saunders
noted that the few American reporters in Islamabad had pestered the embassy for a while on Saturday and then had taken off for various other places on Sunday morning, having decided that there apparently was to be no story in Islamabad.
Dr.
Kissinger
concluded this part of the conversation by describing the whole exercise as a “well done operation.” He said that he had fully expected something to leak after his return and he had been holding his breath until the Thursday
2
announcement.
Dr.
Kissinger
then turned to the situation in India and Pakistan. He said, “State is driving me to tears.” He said he was certain that the State Department wanted to link any movement on the refugee and relief fronts to a full political accommodation in East Pakistan.
He asked Ambassador
Farland
to check his judgment that (1) it is better to talk to
Yahya
“with love rather than with brutality” [Ambassador
Farland
said, “That is the only way.”]
3
and (2) that we could say anything to
Yahya
as long as we related it to a refugee settlement and did not describe it as related to “political accommodation.”
Dr.
Kissinger
said that, if one were to ask his estimate, there will some day be an independent Bangla Desh. However, the problem now is to defuse the refugee situation so that India cannot use it as a plausible

excuse for going to war. The political outcome in East Pakistan will run far behind the increase or decrease in tensions this fall resulting from the refugee problem. He concluded with a comment on Assistant Secretary
Sisco
ʼs characteristic of showing a lot of motion without much sense of strategy. He said he had “let
Sisco
get away with some things in the Middle East” but he is not going to let him do that in South Asia. “
Sisco
will produce two wars in his area, if we are not careful.”
Ambassador
Farland
agreed that the possibility of war is imminent.
Dr.
Kissinger
said he felt that we had to press the Indians harder. When he asked what Mr.
Saunders
thought, Mr.
Saunders
said that he felt that we had just about run out of steam with the Indians for a moment and had to press for some accomplishment on the Pakistani side before we could go back at the Indians. Dr.
Kissinger
shrugged.
Dr.
Kissinger
said that he thought the big mistake the Pakistanis were making was to dribble out all of the things they were doing on the refugee front. He felt that they should save them all up for several weeks and then announce a big program that could be pointed to as a significant effort to solve the refugee problem.
Dr.
Kissinger
asked whether Ambassador
Farland
thought he could sell this to President
Yahya
. Ambassador
Hilaly
did not understand it here. He thought that perhaps Foreign Secretary
Sultan Khan
had understood, but “he is such a hard-liner” that it seems unlikely that he would act on the suggestion. Dr.
Kissinger
does not feel that President
Yahya
had understood.
Ambassador
Farland
said that he thought that he could—or at least he would try—to sell this idea to President
Yahya
. Dr.
Kissinger
said, “Letʼs make a deal—that if you get some instructions from the State Department that you consider absolutely crazy, you will use the special communications channel with us.” Ambassador
Farland
agreed.
Ambassador
Farland
said that he had talked with Mr.
McNamara
at the World Bank and
McNamara
remained obstinately opposed to any resumption of economic assistance to Pakistan under present circumstances.
Dr.
Kissinger
said that it is absolutely essential that we get a comprehensive refugee program. If
Yahya
could propose a coherent program then we would have something to take to the Indians as a basis for squeezing them not to go to war. The Indians could then be asked to let the refugees go back or to keep quiet about them. In any case, if the Pakistanis had what looked like a plausible refugee program, then the Indians would have less of an excuse to go to war.
Dr.
Kissinger
said he would urge
Yahya
to be “sweeping on refugees.” He would urge him to allow the intrusion of
UN
officials into every village. Then, with international civil servants on the scene,

we could go to the Indians and refute any of the allegations they were making to keep the refugees from returning. The onus would be on them. It would be difficult to go to war on that issue.
Dr.
Kissinger
said that he despaired of the State Departmentʼs effort to link political accommodation with a refugee solution. [
Comment:
This had been discussed in the Senior Review Group earlier that afternoon.]
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Mr.
Saunders
said that he felt that the terms “political accommodation” and “civil administration” had been confused during the Senior Review Group meeting. Mr.
Saunders
felt that
Maury Williams
[Deputy Administrator,
AID
] had not been concerned about the political complexion of government in East Pakistan but had been saying that for the refugee relief and feeding programs to succeed, there would have to be some effective local administration. Food would not move if village functionaries could not commandeer trucks to go down to the docks and bring food back to the villages.
Williams
, Mr.
Saunders
felt, was talking about the need to restore the administrative machinery, whereas Stateʼs term “political accommodation,” while encompassing that thought, went beyond and had become shorthand for the ultimate constitutional and political arrangements in East Pakistan. Dr.
Kissinger
indicated that “
Maury Williams
is all right, but that idiot
Van Hollen
drives me crazy.”
Ambassador
Farland
said that he would sell President
Yahya
on the idea of a refugee-relief program.
Dr.
Kissinger
said he thought we were heading for war in South Asia. Whatʼs more, he said he felt that the Chinese Communists would come in.
Ambassador
Farland
said that the Russians had backed the Indians down the line. Dr.
Kissinger
noted that recent intelligence reports had indicated that the Soviets had offered to hold naval maneuvers with the Indians. He did not think the Indians would go that far. He said he thought that the Indians feel they can take all of Pakistan, or at least make West Pakistan so feeble that it would no longer be a threat to India.
[At this point Mr.
Saunders
left and Dr.
Kissinger
and Ambassador
Farland
concluded their meeting alone.]
H.S.
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations