Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 244
244. Memorandum of Conversation
1
2
Washington
,
March 31, 1972
PARTICIPANTS:
Ambassador Jha
Henry A. Kissinger
I opened the luncheon conversation by telling
Jha
that we had had some disturbing reports. I showed him the newspaper clipping from
Newsweek
(attached) according to which the Indian Embassy was circulating copies of the Anderson papers. I told him that we would look at any intervention into our domestic politics with the gravest concern. I recalled to him Mrs.
Gandhi
’s violent reaction to what she took to be intervention by the U.S. Embassy in the Indian election.
Jha
said he doubted that it had happened in his Embassy but he would check and let me know. [A little later he called me and said none of their copies were out of the Embassy, which of course left open whether they had been xeroxed or had been sent out before then.]
We then turned to the more fundamental issues. I told Jha once again that we considered India a major country; that we recognized that a physical balance of power within the Subcontinent was not attainable, and it would not be sought by us. On the other hand, we were concerned with the balance of power in the world. India could in the long term profit from this concern, since it also protected it against hegemonial claims. At the same time, being a major power gave rise to the need for restraint. We had purposely not started arms shipments to Pakistan because we wanted to leave open the possibility of negotiation. If, however, India continued to insist on settling the issue entirely unilaterally, and if it used threats of military action, then of course our restraint would be more difficult to maintain.

Jha
asked what our real concerns were. I said, first, India’s relationship with the Soviet Union, which however might be less of a concern as our own relations with the Soviet Union improved; second, India’s use of its military strength on the Subcontinent; and thirdly, India’s general posture towards our foreign policy objectives.
Jha
said that he thought that it was time to start again a dialogue on economic aid, specifically, the $87 million on which an agreement had already been signed. I said that we first had to get to some fundamental political understanding.
Jha
asked how we might proceed in this direction. I said that we have now had three lunches and we have never had an offer of even a statement from India of its position.
Jha
said it was his impression that India wanted to pursue a policy of conciliation with Pakistan. However, the ceasefire line should be rectified in order to be strategically more useful. I asked whether that meant any major changes in territory. He said it might mean some change in essentially unpopulated territory, which might look larger on the map than it really was, in order to give India a strategically more defensible frontier. I said we did not want to get involved in the negotiations directly, but I reiterated that an Indian attempt to exploit its military position could not be looked at with indifference by the United States.
Jha
then said that with respect to the Soviet Union, India had no intention or desire to be a stooge and was willing and eager to maintain a dialogue with us. With respect to the general balance of power in Asia, it saw its interests very parallel to ours.
I told
Jha
that we would recognize Bangladesh on Tuesday, April 4 and that after that we thought that our interest lay in a stable progressive society in Bangladesh. He asked whether there mightn’t be some possibility of our starting some bilateral aid, since the
UN
operated very slowly. I said we would look into the matter most carefully.
Jha
said he would get me an authoritative statement from the Indian Government for our next meeting, which we tentatively set for April 20.