Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 263
263. Memorandum of Conversation
1
Washington
,
December 10, 1971, 9:45–10:17 a.m.
PARTICIPANTS
Dr.
Henry A. Kissinger
, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
U. Alexis Johnson
, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
Admiral Thomas Moorer
, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Richard Helms
, Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Joseph J.
Sisco
, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Maurice Williams
, Agency for International Development
Warren Nutter
, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

Kissinger
: The President read in the news summary
2
that American planes were attacked by the Indians.
Johnson
: This was several days ago. Itʼs been protested.
Moorer
: Many are being killed in the West in ships.
Kissinger
: They are asking also for withdrawal of Indiaʼs troops.
3
Johnson
: Not as a condition.
Kissinger
: Where does this lead us?
Johnson
: I talked with George
Bush
. The
UN
has received it and has asked the Security Council to decide on it. Only the Chinese havenʼt been in on it.
4
Joe has the scenarios. We should send a flash message to
Farland
to confirm that this is
Yahya
ʼs view. We should bypass the Security Council. Itʼs quicker to do it by the Secretary General. We should get the
UN
Indian rep on the ground to talk with the Pak Generals. The Secretary General should tell his man.
Kissinger
: The President feels we are obliged to call for a ceasefire in the West. We should demand a ceasefire in the West. It must be clearly understood that our policy is to get a ceasefire in the West. Weʼll make a treaty if necessary.
Sisco
: Letʼs tell
Yahya
in a message that this is what we plan to do, and does he agree?
Kissinger
: If there is a ceasefire now, we donʼt have to worry about the territorial question in the West.
Johnson
: This goes right along with the
UNGA
resolution.
5
Sisco
: Add a sentence to the cable.
6
Tell
Yahya
he can assume if this is his proposal, he can assume it is based on a ceasefire in the West. We will go all out.

Kissinger
: I assume they did this in the East because they are finished.
Moorer
: With only 3–4 days left, there is time for the Indians to regroup.
Williams
: Theyʼll fight to the death. The Indians are close now.
[omission in the source text]: The situation is hopeless.
Kissinger
: We donʼt want to be the instrument pushing a Pakistani surrender, when the Chinese are on their side.
Bush
shouldnʼt do anything until we hear from
Yahya
.
Sisco
: We donʼt want it in the Security Council again. Weʼll negotiate down from the resolutions.
Kissinger
: Why not make Soviets put up?
Johnson
: Weʼre apt to get into a long debate and lose track of whatʼs happening on the ground.
Sisco
: The Paks have taken the initiative.
Kissinger
: The President doesnʼt want us to move in the
UN
to arrange a surrender. Take a tough line with the Indians. If the Paks want it, we will help.
Helms
: If we want West Pakistan tied in, we have to go to the Security Council. If there is an early agreement on what the Paks want in the East, we can move outside of the Security Council.
Kissinger
: We want to stop the attack in West Pakistan. There is no objection to this proposal but we must prevent an attack in the West. Get a flash to
Farland
to get
Yahya
ʼs views. Tell him it is our judgment we should use it as a basis for a ceasefire in the West.
Sisco
: Assume the Pakistani proposal is that
Yahya
wants a cease-fire in West. We will be helpful with the Indians to this end.
Kissinger
: We must prevent the destruction of the Pak Army in the West. We donʼt want our Ambassador to press
Yahya
to surrender.
Sisco
: There is no danger of that.
Farland
wouldnʼt do that.
Moorer
: We should give
Yahya
our judgment that his army can be destroyed in three weeks. He doesnʼt see that.
Sisco
: Let me make a language suggestion: We assume the Pakistani proposal was based on the assumption that Pakistan is ready for a ceasefire in the West as well. Please confirm, and indicate that we are prepared to weigh in heavily with the Indians and others to bring this about if this is
Yahya
ʼs desire.
Kissinger
: The Indians must know our priority area and the Russians must know we are serious.
Moorer
: How about the integrity of the border?
Sisco
: Some mutual withdrawals will be necessary in the West but it means the Indians canʼt take any Pakistani territory.

[omission in the source text]: Previous borders good.
Johnson
: The Indians want to straighten out the border. We should add the status quo ante to the telegram.
Kissinger
: We must be sure
Yahya
sees we are not turning on him.
Packard
: They donʼt know where they are up there.
Johnson
: He accepted the General Assembly resolution which calls for that.
Sisco
: It wonʼt remove any danger. Leave it fuzzy.
[omission in the source text]: Itʼs o.k. at this time.
Kissinger
: Couldnʼt we just say “Does this mean he is ready for a ceasefire in the West as well? If so, we are willing to make a major effort to bring this about to help preserve his territorial integrity and prevent the destruction of his army. Please respond FLASH.”
[All agree. Final text is attached at Tab A.]
7
Kissinger
: Back to the
UN
:
Bush
is to be clearly told that we should take no stance which suggests we are supporting the surrender of Pakistan. He should be one step back of what the Pakistanis say.
Sisco
:
Bhutto
asked to see the President. We got an interesting cable from the
DCM
.
8
Kissinger
: I saw it.
Bhutto
ʼs comments are interesting. The
DCM
ʼs comments suggested heʼs thinking of reconciliation with India. The President may be willing to see him—I donʼt know. It couldnʼt be sooner than Wednesday.
Sisco
: Should the Secretary and Henry see him sooner? The Secretary returns tonight.
Kissinger
: What is the Security Council problem?
Sisco
: The document
9
is circulated. I donʼt know whether the Secretary General has convened the Security Council. If we temporize—

have
Bush
say we havenʼt decided whether a Security Council meeting is indicated—while we are checking the authenticity of the request. If
Yahya
wants it and the Secretary General then goes to the Indians, saying they are ready to talk&.
Kissinger
: Suppose the President wants to go to the Security Council and insist we will cooperate only if there is a ceasefire in the West. This is like the Soviet resolution.
10
If the choice is between stop in the East but not in the West or an end of action in the West, there may be no need to pursue withdrawal anymore except as a negotiating ploy.
Williams
: An honorable withdrawal for Pak forces from the West [
East
] is a key point.
Helms
: Letʼs get out the message.
[The meeting ended.]
11
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations