Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 212
212. Telegram 11838 From the
Department of State
to the
Embassy in India
1
2
Washington
,
January 21, 1972, 1406Z
SUBJECT:
Indo-American Relations
REF:
(a) New Delhi 642
(b) New Delhi 774
1.
At his request, India Ambassador
Jha
accompanied by Minister
Rasgotra
and First Secretary Verma called on Under Secretary
Irwin
January 20.
Quainton
,
NEA
/INC, also present. Although
Jha
clearly wished to explore
US
views Under Secretary contented himself primarily with listening and asking a few questions.
Jha
began by noting recent
Keating
/
Kaul
meeting (ref A) and discussion of need to mend bilateral relations and get back on

more even keel.
Jha
said he personally strongly believed in need to do this. Problem was how
US
planned to respond. Perhaps it was premature to expect response. It was important to take cognizance in both countries of fact that there is large public opinion.

Indian public opinion very hurt and Utter about recent events and it would therefore be more difficult for
GOI
to take any initiatives than in this country. Basic fact is that India and
US
cannot remain aloof and indifferent. It is only a question of time before this is recognized.
Jha
asked whether it was better to bide our time or do something to hasten long term process.
2.
Under Secretary replied that we have been carefully looking at what has happened and at present events.
Amb
Keating
would be here next week, and we would be reviewing with him variety of aspects of our relations. We were interested in
Keating
/
Kaul
conversation. We will be looking at these questions over next period, and he hoped that out of that would come a time when, depending on attitudes of each government, we would be able to take new look at each other and develop a new relationship. Unfortunately in past, although India recognized
US
helpful economically, we seem never to have been politically attuned. We have certainly felt that India

has never responded in a politically helpful way to our positions and problems throughout the world. Recent unequal recognition of Hanoi, when India was chairman of
ICC
, seemed to be continuation of past attitudes and practice. We recognize that India is and has been a power and that it is a great democracy. In time we hope for and look to develop our relations on a new basis.
3.
Jha
commented that while he recognized that Under Secretary was only citing Hanoi as example, he felt
USG
did not appreciate that
GOI
had never consciously taken any decision meaning it to be anti-American.
GOI
took decision in principle to recognize Hanoi some time back, but deferred out of deference to
US
sensitivities. Decision did not mean any departure from objectivity in dealing with problems of Indo-China. Recognition was only of North Vietnam and not of any
DRV
claim to take South by force.
4.
Jha
added that in context of misunderstandings he wished to touch on question of development of
US
relations with China.
USG
had felt that India was against it, and took it for granted that India would oppose. India does not oppose. Thus where
USG
could have taken Indian support for granted, it assumed opposition. Equally, where, as in case of Hanoi, there was no intention to be hostile,
US
took Indian actions to be hostile.
USG
misjudged not only Indian support but also its hostility.
Jha
asked where fault in communication had been. Speaking personally he thought a lot of trouble and misunderstanding came from reliance of some in
US
on “custodians of intelligence” and gossip they picked up. He said he believed great deal can be achieved by being frank and by believing each other. Under Secretary agreed these were necessary ingredients for any two countries to develop good relations. If
USG
sees no prospect of improving relations at this time Jha said it should say so, so that we are at least

working with certain degree of mutual understanding and trust.
5.
Jha
then discussed at length current situation in subcontinent and problem of establishing internal balance and viability. While he had never been admirer Of President
Bhutto
, he thought Bhutto had recently displayed great deal of realism and critical sense in what he has done and said.
Bhutto
had told someone in whom
Jha
said he had trust that he recognized that if Pakistan continued to have running battle with India and kept arming with view to going to war, power of army would have to be maintained and there would never be return to democracy. He had therefore concluded Pakistan must come to terms with India. If true, this could lead to good relations not only between India and Pakistan, but also between Pakistan and Bangladesh.
6.
Jha
said India wanted Pakistan to prosper just as it wanted Bangladesh to have economic viability which could make difference between an extreme leftist government and dedication to democracy. Nepal, which in no sense takes policy decisions to please India, and which has very good relations with China, Pakistan and
US
, has seen wisdom of recognizing
BD
, and of strengthening and supporting process now going on in
BD
.
7.
Under Secretary asked
Jha
for his assessment of
BD
’s chances for stability and economic development and about Indian plans for keeping troops in
BD
for purposes of stability.
Jha
responded that Indian troops would be out in a few weeks as soon as apparatus for maintenance of law and order built up. India had declined to take responsiblities for linguistic minorities, because it felt it important for new government to accept responsibility. India was determined and anxious to pull out at earliest possible opportunity. Under Secretary

noted Mujib’s call for turning in of arms.
Jha
acknowledged that success uncertain, but fact Mujib had called or it would deny guerrillas who failed to comply with much of their local base and support.
8.
Rasgotra
then commented on economic complimentarity of East and West Bengal. Before partition East Bengal was granary of West Bengal and much of India, and there was also a natural flow of economic activity. Rasgotra said that, in his view,
BD
would not be “international basket case” although it would need inputs from and cooperation with India.
Jha
added that after partition complimentary elements had been suppressed and denied, and such development, as took place, particularly in establishment of jute mills, was competitive with India. However, in future there would be more trade.
BD
would export fish, poultry and fresh vegetables to India and import cheap coal, steel and textiles. However, India could not afford customs union with
BD

in view of competitive jute situation. He hoped both sides would have sense to avoid trade war over jute. In addition rice production would go up rapidly in
BD
and there would be great opportunities for cooperative water management. There would also be considerable transit trade from Assam to Calcutta from which
BD
would derive revenue.
9.
Jha
commented that there would also be strong desire in
BD
to retain separateness and identity. Only Naxalites would want to carve out unified Communist Bengal. Under Secretary said he assumed it was important to India to have stable country on its eastern front, but wondered what would be demands on India to maintain that stability.
Jha
replied that stability for all India’s neighbors of utmost importance. However, India’s concern with their stability did not give it duty or right to meddle in what goes on in those countries. India cannot subjugate or dominate their political processes.
10.
Rasgotra
said he had nagging worry about West Pakistan stability. In
BD
he thought there was good chance of responsible system of government, which would give it stability. However, unless role of army in Pakistan not greatly reduced in West Pakistan, problems would remain.
Jha
added that
BD
is homogeneous unit with strong sense of having fought for its freedom. West Pakistan, on other hand, like India consists of diverse groups. Even India had felt disruptive tendencies, but it had handled them politically. In Pakistan this political handling had been lacking and instead there had been reliance on military authority. Rasgotra asked whether we had any estimate of how long Bhutto would rely on martial law. Under Secretary said he could not predict.
END
Rogers