Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 145
145. Telegram 9833 From the
Embassy in Pakistan
to the
Department of State
1
2
Islamabad
,
September 28, 1971, 1039Z
Subj:
U.S. Leverage in Current East Pakistan Crisis U.S. Policy Ref Islamabad 9113
1.
For some time I have been concerned, as I know you are, about the problem of explaining
USG
policy toward Pakistan. It is a real problem which Dave Abshire and I talked over at some length during his visit here earlier this month. This cable is, to a marked extent, an outgrowth of that conversation.
2.
The central element of our strategy in Pakistan, as noted in
reftel
, has been the maintenance of sufficient leverage with the
GOP
to encourage actions on its part designed to lessen the danger of an Indo-
Pak
war, hasten the return of displaced persons and enhance prospects for the restoration of normality and stability in East Pakistan. These have been the major purposes of the generally sympathetic, non-reprehending attitude we have maintained toward Pakistan. This we have expressed in such ways as refusing to join in the worldwide chorus of public

condemnation of
GOP
actions in East
Pak
, citing economic rather than political factors when suspending new development aid commitments, and tempering our cut-off of military sales by permitting already-licensed shipments to go forward.
3.
In judging how successful this strategy has been, the yard stick is not the application of leverage as such but rather the effectiveness in using it to bring about desired changes in
GOP
policy and practices. Measured by this standard, I believe
US
strategy has been reasonably successful. As more so than generally realized within the
USG
, and most certainly immeasurably more than understood by the press. We have used our position to urge a number of specific suggestions on the
GOP
and the
GOP
has adopted a surprisingly large proportion of them. We are under no illusion that their adoption has brought the East
Pak
crisis to the verge of solution: there is no question that the situation there remains tense and perilous for all concerned and the coda thereon is yet to be written. The weight of evidence suggests, however, that measures taken at our prodding have had a beneficial effect on developments and have forestalled what otherwise would have been an even more grim situation. In short, a convincing case can be made that our strategy has “worked” in that we have probably accomplished as much as any outside entity could reasonably expect to achieve in this complex, altogether tragic situation once the
GOP
committed itself to the course of military action begun on March 25–26.
4.
The problem in presenting this case lies in the fact that an essential aspect of
US
strategy is its confidential nature. Our advice has been acceptable to
GOP
leaders largely because it has been given in a manner designed not to humilitate them, i.e., informally in private meetings with President
Yahya
and his top advisers. (For example I have met with
Yahya
for private substantive conversations 11 times in the past four months.) The need to preserve this confidence makes the defense of our strategy before congressional and other critics an especially difficult question, for which there is probably no fully satisfactory answer.
5.
It occurs to me, however, that it might be helpful to you and to those others charged with explaining our Pakistan policy if you and they had for background use a brief compilation of

specific examples of how leverage has been used to help defuse or ameliorate the crisis. Some examples are mentioned in the text of reftel. The following list is intended as a supplement to
reftel
. It is by no means a comprehensive list of our activities in this regard, since we have been working with (and on) the
GOP
at multiple levels, but it does provide eleven specific examples of the applications of our leverage to bring about desired results:
(1)
Civilian governor for East
Pak
: I first suggested the need for return to civilian rule in East
Pak
during my May 22 meeting with
Yahya
. In a later meeting on July 15 I broadened this suggestion into a specific proposal that he consider naming a Bengali civilian as governor of
EP
, and noted Dr.
A.M. Malik
as a likely candidate. When I called on him with Maury Williams on Aug 19,
Yahya
told me he had decided to follow our advice and appoint Dr. Malik as East
Pak
governor. The appointment was announced Sept. 1.
(2)
Transfer
Tikka Khan
. From East
Pak
: In conjunction with my suggestion to appoint an
EP
civilian governor, on several occasions I conveyed the thought that it would be advisable to transfer General
Tikka Khan
(who had become a symbol of army repression) out of East Pakistan. When
Yahya
acted on the Malik appointment, he announced simultaneously
Tikka Khan
’s transfer to West
Pak
. This was done over the objection of army field commanders and, according to
Yahya
, was predicated on my demarche.
(3)
Appeal for return of refugees: At our May 22 meeting I first raised with
Yahya
our concern over the continuing refugee flow into India, suggesting he issue a public statement assuring the refugees that the
GOP
would welecome their return home.
Yahya
agreed to consider the suggestion and as a result, he issued a public statement on May 24 inviting the refugees to return home without fear.
(4)
Assurances for Hindu refugees: At our June 5 meeting, I conveyed to
Yahya
USG
satisfaction over his May 24 statement on refugees but suggested he issue a further statement specifically assuring Hindu refugees that their return would be welcome.
Yahya
agreed to do so and included such an assurance in his June 28 nationwide radio broadcast.
(5)
Treatment of Hindus in East
Pak
: Starting with our May 22 meeting I have regularly raised with
Yahya
the question of repressive army treatment of the Hindu populace in East
Pak
. He has been especially sensitive to criticism in this field and has reacted rather briskly on occasion, but has several times agreed to do what he could to insure equitable treatment. While the actual situation on the ground in east remains far from satisfactory

in this regard and reports of incidents continue to be received, we have information to confirm that troops in
EP
have been given a series of increasingly firm orders instructing them to refrain from repressive and discriminatory acts.
(6)
General amnesty: In the course of my talks with
Yahya
on the question of refugees, on several occassions I broached the subject of a general amnesty to help create conditions conducive to their return.
Yahya
expressed interest in this topic. On Sept 5 he ordered a general amnesty covering all persons in east
Pak
not already charged with specific criminal acts.
(7)
GOP
acceptance
UNHCR
presence in East
Pak
: At the time of our May 22 meeting, I stressed the importance of involving the
UN
in a humanitarian relief effort and urged
Yahya
to submit a formal request to the
UN
for assistance in coordinating the aid effort through the UNHCR.
Yahya
replied that a written request to the
UN
was being issued that same day.
(8)
GOP
acceptance
UN
-staffed field relief operations in EP: During various meetings with
GOP
leaders in June and July, other EmbOffs and I pressed strongly for an adequate
UN
field staff in East
Pak
to assist the relief effort. The initial
GOP
reaction was decidedly hesitant, but
Yahya
“bought” the idea and, in so doing, overrode his advisers. At my most recent meeting with
Yahya
on Sept 21, he once again offered full cooperation in
UN
staffing.
(9)
Improvements in
GOP
administration of relief effort: One major subject in my talks with
Yahya
since June has been the inadequate performance of the
Pak
civil administration in carryng out and coordinating the East
Pak
relief effort. I have urged specific measures to improve
GOP
and
GOEP
performance and other
EmbOff
s have done the same at other levels. A number of them have been adopted. As examples in our June meeting I expressed concern over poor coordination in food relief and suggested the need for a “food czar” to act as coordinator.
Yahya
responded several days later by appointing an over-all “food czar”. At a later meeting in August,
AID
Deputy Administrator Williams and I cited the need for a single
GOP
officer to coordinate transport and other aspects of the relief effort. On

the spot
Yahya
agreed to give the East
Pak
Chief Secretary this assignment.
(10)
Better utilization of, and foreign crews for, coasters: A key problem in mounting the East
Pak
relief effort has been the need for small coastal vessels to move food up country from deepwater ports. As early as our June 5 meeting I prodded
Yahya
on the
GOP
failure to mobilize coasters already on hand for food transport, gaining his agreement to do so, the major effort on coasters came later, however, when we succeeded in persuading
Yahya
to accept foreign crews on coasters supplied by foreign countries in order reassure donors against their misuse.
(11)
Trial and sentencing of Mujib: This issue offers an example of both use and limitations of our leverage, and the final story has not yet been written. I have raised the question of Mujib with
Yahya
at almost every meeting since May, and it is also one of the few issues in which we have also exerted public presure on the
GOP
. The results have been as much as could have been hoped for realistically. Mujib has been brought to trial on charges that could lead to the death penalty. On the other hand the trial is not being conducted in a summary manner: Mujib has been allowed an outstanding defense lawyer: and we have received personal assurances that he will not be executed.
6. In conclusion, in any attempt to evaluate our current strategy towards the
GOP
with particular reference to its application in East Pakistan,
U Thant
’s precept voiced on September 20 should not be overlooked. Said
U Thant
: “In tragic circumstances such as these, it is all too easy to make moral judgements. It is far more difficult to face up to the political and human fralities of the situation and to help the people find a way out of their difficulties. It is the latter course which in my view, the United Nations must follow.”
Farland