Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 282
282. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (
Kissinger
) to
President Nixon
1
Washington
,
December 12, 1971
.
SUBJECT
Situation Report on South Asia
When Ambassador
Farland
asked for President
Yahya
ʼs views on a ceasefire at midnight (EST) last night,
Yahya
said that he was prepared to do “anything reasonable under the circumstances.”
2
In response to
Farland
ʼs question why Pakistanʼs first ceasefire proposal of Friday had been replaced later in the day by a less comprehensive one omitting political settlement,
Yahya
looked hard at Foreign Secretary
Sultan Khan
and said there had been a breakdown of communication and apparently some “general misunderstandings.” He added that the Foreign Secretary was rectifying the situation. According to a press report from Rawalpindi, a Pakistani government spokesman said that major diplomatic moves outside the
UN
and in keeping with the protection of Pakistanʼs interests are underway to end the conflict.
Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov flew into Delhi today at the head of a five-man delegation. Former Indian Ambassador to Moscow, D.P. Dhar, who negotiated the Indo-Soviet treaty, has flown to Moscow. Both moves are billed as made under the consultation provision of the treaty. [
2 lines of source text not declassified
]
From the United Nations, Ambassador
Bush
reports
3
that there are two main routes events there could take:
—One would be to do as
Bhutto
is presently inclined to do, i.e. return to the Security Council to seek a resolution identical to the one adopted in the General Assembly.
Bush
feels that some members of the eleven who voted with us in the Security Council previously, including China, would not have much enthusiasm for simply provoking another Soviet veto.
Bhutto
regards one advantage of this course as further discrediting the
USSR
in the eyes of the 104 nations who voted for

the Assembly resolution.
Bush
points out that the Paks could start down this track even if they are prepared (perhaps not overtly), to have a resolution amended to include the last paragraph of the Soviet resolution
4
providing for following through the results of the December 1970 election in East Pakistan.
—The alternative course would be to try through an intermediary to put together the essentials of a resolution which both parties would be able to live with prior to calling for a Security Council meeting.
Bush
reports
5
that
Bhutto
ʼs expressed dislike for Pakistanʼs first Friday proposal including political settlement suggests that
Bhutto
is more interested in mounting a public campaign against India and the Soviets.
Yahya
ʼs comments to
Farland
, however, suggest that
Bhutto
may receive instructions to accept a ceasefire resolution with at least implication of a negotiated withdrawal and political settlement to follow.
There is, of course, a third approach. This would be (1) to launch Security Council debate calling for endorsement of the General Assembly resolution, as described in the first approach above but (2) to be prepared by pre-arrangement with key parties to divert the debate part-way through to a compromise resolution.
Bush
also reports
6
Foreign Minister
Singh
ʼs view that the
UN
cannot take useful action at this time. If the
UN
does meet, he will insist that Bangla Desh representatives be present. He maintained that Indiaʼs recognition of Bangla Desh had two purposes: (1) to make clear that India had no territorial ambitions in East Pakistan and (2) to establish the moderate, elected democratic group in an effort to control the Mukti Bahini.
Singh
and [
said
] India has no territorial aims
in West Pakistan
but cautioned that this commitment is not open-ended if Pakistan continues the war and tries to make gains in the west to compensate for losses in the east. Under questioning,
Singh
would not make the same unequivocal commitment on Azad Kashmir. Foreign Secretary
Kaul
said, “we have no
major
ambitions.” Even in peacetime,
Kaul
said, India and Pakistan had talked about minor rectifications in the border. Both
Singh
and
Kaul
repeatedly said that they do not wish to prolong the war.
The evacuation of 300 foreign nationals from Dacca was completed this morning, including more than 100 Americans. Four British C–130ʼs with
UN
markings completed the job.

Yesterday there was a clandestine report from Islamabad
7
that
Yahya
had told his prime minister designate that the Chinese ambassador in Islamabad had assured him that within 72 hours the Chinese army would move toward the Northeast Frontier Agency border of India.
8
CIA
and
DIA
report this morning that no information has yet been received on unusual activity by Chinese forces in Tibet.
In East Pakistan, Pakistani forces continue to regroup for the defense of Dacca. In contrast to the 30,000 or more Pakistanis that could be mustered there, the Indians have roughly 60,000 men in three divisions moving toward the city with at least as many more in reserve near East Pakistanʼs borders. The guerrillas are also poised outside the city. In the west, fighting in the Kashmir and Punjab areas continues with little significant movement by either side. In the southern sector on the western front, the Indians claim now to be some 30 miles inside Pakistanʼs Sind Province. If the Indians press toward Hyderabad, Pakistan might have to divert forces from the north to prevent Karachi from being cut off from the rest of the country.
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations