Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 171
171. Memorandum From Secretary of State
Rogers
to President
Nixon
1
Washington
,
October 22, 1971
.
SUBJECT
Indo-Pakistan Situation
The potential for an outbreak of hostilities between India and Pakistan remains high; but we have no information that either side intends to take the initiative at this time. A possible indicator of the level of tensions will be whether Mrs.
Gandhi
begins her three-week international tour on October 24.
We have urged maximum restraint on both India and Pakistan. Specifically we have suggested to both that they pull their troops back from the border. President
Yahya
has reacted positively in private. The Indians have said they would consider withdrawals only if Pakistan withdrew first. They indicated that India would have to withdraw much farther than Pakistan. Both President
Yahya
and Mrs.
Gandhi
have publicly discussed the circumstances under which they might withdraw in contexts which are probably mutually unacceptable at this point. We are now planning, if Ambassador
Farland
concurs, to suggest that President
Yahya
consider a unilateral and limited withdrawal as a signal to the Indians of his desire to de-escalate and reduce tensions. We believe he might be willing to do this without jeopardizing

his military position, in order to put the onus on the Indians to take reciprocal action.
Recognizing that the lack of a viable political settlement in East Pakistan continues to fuel the tensions between India and Pakistan, we are also suggesting that Ambassador
Farland
, if he agrees, discuss ways in which
Yahya
might move more rapidly toward such a settlement. We are particularly focusing on ways in which
Yahya
might begin a dialogue with the previously elected representatives of East Pakistan. Because President
Yahya
has already indicated willingness to establish contact with Bangla Desh leaders, we are asking Ambassador
Farland
to suggest that they be included in any such dialogue. To date, however, the Bangla Desh representatives have refused, insisting that nothing can be negotiated except independence and only
Mujib
can speak for the Bangla Desh group. Given the apparent importance of the arrested Awami League President
Sheikh Mujib
to a negotiated settlement, we are asking Ambassador
Farland
to raise again with President
Yahya
whether he believes there are possibilities for
Mujib
to play a part in a settlement.
On October 19 Secretary General
U Thant
offered his good offices to President
Yahya
and Mrs.
Gandhi
.
2
We support this initiative. For the moment, however, we hope to keep the Indo-Pakistan dispute from surfacing in open debate in the Security Council. Between now and the time of Mrs.
Gandhi
ʼs visit on November 4 and 5, we prefer to work privately with both the Indians and the Pakistanis. During Mrs.
Gandhi
ʼs visit, we hope you will be able to dispel some of the suspicions which have entered our relationship with the Indians. At the same time, we will want again to urge maximum restraint on Mrs.
Gandhi
, get her to support direct negotiations between Bangla Desh leaders and President
Yahya
, and seek her cooperation in trying to stabilize the situation in East Pakistan. We believe that India must bear a share of the responsibility for bringing stability back to East Pakistan, in part by exercising greater control over India-based guerrilla activity.

Following Mrs.
Gandhi
ʼs visit, if it is necessary at that time, we may want to see the Indo-Pakistan situation aired in the Security Council and publicly in other ways in order to increase international pressure on both sides for restraint and de-escalation.
John N. Irwin
II
3
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations