Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 120
120. Minutes of Senior Review Group Meeting
1
Washington
,
August 11, 1971, 3:10–4:20 p.m.
SUBJECT
Pakistan
PARTICIPANTS
Chairman—
Henry A. Kissinger
State
John N. Irwin
Joseph Sisco
Christopher Van Hollen
Lindsay Grant
Defense
Armistead Selden
Brig. Gen. Devol Brett
JCS
Adm. Thomas H. Moorer
Col. James Connell
Lt. Col. Walter B. Ratliffe
CIA
Lt. Gen. Robt. E. Cushman
John Waller
[
name not declassified
]
AID
Maurice Williams
Herbert Rees
OMB
Kenneth Dam
NSC
Staff
Col.
Richard T. Kennedy
Samuel M. Hoskinson
Harold H. Saunders
Jeanne W. Davis
SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
It was agreed that
—The State/
AID
package of telegrams
2
would be reworked by State,
AID
and
Hal Saunders
, in the light of the Presidentʼs remarks, to separate some of the political issues from relief matters;
—Mr.
Williams
would leave for Pakistan next week to make the presentation to
Yahya
on relief matters and discuss with
M.M. Ahmad
the case to be made to the World Bank consortium in October.
Mr.
Kissinger
: The President would like to see the principals for a few minutes on Pakistan.
(The following adjourned to the Presidentʼs office and returned at 3:47:
Irwin
,
Sisco
,
Selden
,
Cushman
,
Moorer
,
Williams
,
Kissinger
,
Saunders
; see separate minutes.)
3
Mr.
Kissinger
: I think we covered the main points with the President on what is needed. We have the
AID
package on relief and refugees. I suggest we separate out some of the political issues from the relief matters.
Saunders
and
Van Hollen
can work together on this.
Mr.
Irwin
: I agree weʼve covered everything. We will take another look at the package in the light of the Presidentʼs remarks.
Mr.
Kissinger
: Is $100 million the right figure for refugee relief. Weʼre prepared to entertain a larger figure if that would be desirable.
Mr.
Sisco
: We should discuss the timing of this. Some people believe we can do too much too quickly with the Indians.
Mr.
Kissinger
: Iʼm talking about Pakistan. Weʼre not so eager to do things for India. We want to make a demonstrable case to prevent famine in East Pakistan.
Mr.
Irwin
: They donʼt need money as much as they do the means for distribution.
Mr.
Selden
: The real problem is distribution.
Mr.
Williams
: And administration.
Mr.
Kissinger
:
Hal Saunders
can get together with you on some changes in the State/
AID
message rather than redraft it here. Can we get the whole package out this week?
Mr.
Sisco
: I think so.
Mr.
Kissinger
: Then
Maury Williams
can go out there to make the presentation to
Yahya
. I think that is as much as can be done now.
Mr.
Irwin
: The quicker he can get there, the better.
Mr.
Williams
: We want to let the
UN
get out in front, though. Phase One should be an announcement by the
UN
that they are taking on the responsibility. My trip can then be made in support of the
UN
effort.
Mr.
Kissinger
: When will the
UN
announcement be made? Mr.
Sisco
: Itʼs supposed to be this week.

Mr.
Kissinger
: (to
Williams
) Then you could go out at least by the end of next week. I wouldnʼt want you to wait three weeks or so.
Mr.
Irwin
: He wouldnʼt wait beyond next week.
Mr.
Williams
: Just as long as the publicity is directed to the
UN
. Itʼs a psychological thing. I donʼt need to wait until they recruit the people to do the job.
Mr.
Kissinger
: Someone should talk fairly straight to the Indians, too, and tell them the party is over. We will do what we can to help on refugee relief, but if they are planning to use this to split up Pakistan, we wonʼt go along.
Mr.
Sisco
: The Secretary (
Rogers
) made this point clearly to
Jha
, but it will take constant reiteration. They will have less of an excuse now that their treaty with Moscow gives them some assurances.
Mr.
Irwin
: I have spoken twice to
Jha
and the Secretary saw him this morning.
Mr.
Kissinger
: The President has made it plain that there will be an absolute crisis in our relations if two divisions of Pakistan guerrillas cross the border.
Mr.
Sisco
: Iʼm convinced there will be no formal Indian attack, but they will probably continue to support the guerrillas in their border crossings. We should watch this very carefully in the light of the new treaty with Moscow.
(Messrs Williams,
Van Hollen
and
Rees
left the meeting.)
Mr.
Kissinger
: There was one other item I wished to take up. Should we not be doing something to prepare for October when the pressure to respond to Pakistanʼs financial assistance needs would become more acute? At present, there is little support in the World Bank consortium for additional assistance. Yet there might be something the
US
could be doing to help the Pakistanis present a better case to the consortium. I consider it intolerable that the World Bank should be setting political conditions for the resumption of assistance, but it would be difficult to argue that case if the Pakistanis made no case of their own on economic grounds. Could not
Maury Williams
, when he goes to Pakistan, also discuss with
M.M. Ahmad
the elements of a possible case to be presented to the consortium in October?
Messrs.
Irwin
and
Sisco
agreed heartily that this should be done.
(Mr.
Saunders
immediately after the meeting called Mr.
Williams
and informed him of the discussion. Mr.
Williams
said that he would be quite prepared to take up that subject and had been developing some ideas for an approach.)
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations