Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 316
316. Memorandum of Conversation
1
2
Washington
,
November 29, 1972, 11:45 a.m.–12:10 p.m.
PARTICIPANTS:
Sultan M. Khan
, Pakistani Ambassador to the United States
Dr.
Henry A. Kissinger
, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Peter W. Rodman,
NSC
Staff
The Ambassador: There are some things that have been coming up from time to time, accumulating, and I thought I would come and talk to you about them.
Dr.
Kissinger
: Certainly.
The Ambassador: In your absence, I received a message from Mr.
Kennedy
concerning our plan to recognize North Vietnam, North Korea and the Sihanouk Government. We have no intention to embarrass the U.S. Government. We had told you about this a long time ago and it was suggested to us that we should wait a bit, until after your election. We felt that we had indicated our desire and had waited for a better time and, therefore, we feel there has been no breach of faith. The recognition of the Sihanouk Government, however, has been delayed for the time being. If you have any preference about this let us know.
Dr.
Kissinger
: We would actually prefer that nothing happen until the agreement is reached.
The Ambassador: When would this be?

Dr.
Kissinger
: I am confident it will be done within a month.
The Ambassador: Oh, I see. That is not long. Would it cover the whole of Indochina?
Dr.
Kissinger
: In various ways.
The Ambassador: Then we can wait.
There is a series of things you have done and assurances you have given: there was the President’s February speech to the Congress and the visit of the Secretary General of our party and my various talks with you. We are very grateful for your many assurances that you are committed to the future security and well-being of Pakistan.
Dr.
Kissinger
: Absolutely. Let me talk to you about our military support Frankly, the easiest way for us to release your supplies is to do it in con-junction with releasing some blocked items for India too. This may include some radars, I understand.
The Ambassador: Yes, though I don’t know whether the radars would be on the Chinese border or facing Pakistan.
Dr.
Kissinger
: We know they are on the Chinese border. Now we are not hostile to China either, thanks to you.
As soon as we get our new people in place we will release this, certainly the equipment which you sent here for repairs.
The Ambassador: There are three types of items. One, the equipment that was literally lying on the docks when the embargo was imposed. Second, equipment sent here for repair and overhaul. And third, the one-time exception. We hope certainly that the material lying on the docks and sent here for repair can be released.
Dr.
Kissinger
: We will do it certainly. They really belong to you. I wild give you an answer within a week.
The Ambassador: The other thing is your promise of economic aid. I have found everyone’s attitude here cooperative and helpful, but the procedures being followed seem to be the normal procedures you would follow for any country.

We anticipated as early as March that there would be a short-fall in wheat. Everyone here spent months studying it. In August and September we reached an agreement for 600,000 tons. But then we were told that the supply had run out and that only 400, 000 tons were available. Only 250,000 tons were sent. Now it is acknowledged that our estimate of a short-fall was correct. We are now running short by 100,000 tons. I have talked with State and A.I.D. about this.
Dr.
Kissinger
: What do they tell you?
The Ambassador: They say that money is the main problem.
Dr.
Kissinger
: I will look into it. You know we will do what we can.
I am told that we have given you 50,000 tons more than was agreed. The argument our bureaucracy makes is that the 250,000 tons is 50,000 tons more than we had, and we had to take it away from somewhere else.
The Ambassador: Our information is that your stocks are not in short supply except in a technical sense. What goes into
PL
480 has to be declared surplus stocks, and since the Russian deal there has been little surplus.
Dr.
Kissinger
: I will have to check.
The Ambassador: We have a Civil Aviation delegation here for talks. What they want is this. When we lost the eastern wing, our airline had to spread out in other directions. We are now operating to Japan, to Canton and Shanghai. What we want to do is extend from Japan to Honolulu or even to San Francisco. We would hope for either an open route (with daily flights) or a restricted route, with three flights a week. Your Civil Aviation people replied that our airline is doing well in terms of dollar earnings, and, therefore, has no need for new routes. This is true for now, but like any other airline we have to look ahead. Certainly it is a lucrative market. Your people have no other objection except that they look at our dollar earnings.
We are prepared to give a designated U.S. airline, if necessary, a route to Islamabad, which you do not now have. And if China some day opens up to you you can use Islamabad as a stop on a route to China. Your

people see no need to give us something now for this and they fear we will ask for something else later when this prospect opens up. We are pre-pared to give assurances now that we will not ask for anything else later.
Dr.
Kissinger
: I will look into this.
The Ambassador: Our delegation is meeting today and tomorrow.
Dr.
Kissinger
: [To Mr. Rodman] Get this to Flanigan right away and ask him for some sympathetic consideration.
The Ambassador: Do you have anything on a new Ambassador to Pakistan?
Dr.
Kissinger
: We want someone we can trust. This is what is taking so long, but I can assure you we will do it within four weeks.
The Ambassador: I saw a press item here attributed to White House sources saying that the U.S. Government was making an invitation to President
Bhutto
to come to Washington.
Dr.
Kissinger
: That is nonsense. Everybody is a White House source these days. Would President
Bhutto
welcome an invitation?
The Ambassador: He might. He has visited Moscow and Peking this year.
Dr.
Kissinger
: I will look into it with the President. I will see.
The Ambassador: Is there anything in the way of special messages being exchanged now between the U.S. and India? There are stories about this. The press say that Billy Graham was carrying a special message from the President to Mrs.
Gandhi
.
Dr.
Kissinger
: That is nonsense.
The Ambassador: I want to leave with you a copy of President
Bhutto
’s message to President
Nixon
congratulating him on his reelection
[Tab A]. Note the warmth and friendship in it.
Dr.
Kissinger
: You know we appreciate this.
The Ambassador: Let me finish. Here is President
Nixon
’s reply. It probably came from the State Department [Tab B]. Compare it.

Dr.
Kissinger
: I will be honest with you because you are a friend. These things are done by our bureaucracy which happens to be pro-Indian.
President
Nixon
will write a letter to
Bhutto
within a week referring to this message. You should rest assured that we do not abandon our friends. I can tell you there is nothing going on with India. They are getting hungry so they need us. There is a slight difference in their tone, but nothing is going on. You have seen that the President stands by you.
The Ambassador: Here is a message I wanted to call to your attention about the Indian killings of Pakistani POWs [Tab C].
We have also heard from our people in Addis Ababa that Ethiopia was under pressure from you to extend recognition to Bangladesh.
Dr.
Kissinger
: God damn it. That is our bureaucracy. I will look into that immediately and find out what is going on.
[After closing pleasantries, the meeting ended.]