Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 117
117. Memorandum of Conversation
1
Washington
,
August 9, 1971, 1:15–2:30 p.m.
PARTICIPANTS
Ambassador
Lakshmi Kant Jha
of India
Mr.
Henry A. Kissinger
The lunch took place at the Ambassadorʼs request. Mr.
Kissinger
opened the conversation by saying that the Ambassador had picked a rather difficult occasion—the signing of the Soviet

Indian friendship treaty [treaty text at Tab A].
2
In itself, the treaty was a matter of secondary concern to us, though it was hard to reconcile with the non-alignment policy of India. What did concern us, however, was the possibility that India might draw the conclusion from it of an unlimited freedom of action vis-à-vis Pakistan. Mr.
Kissinger
said he could not be more categorical in pointing out that a war between India and Pakistan would set back Indian-American relations for half a decade. No matter what the Ambassador was told around town, Mr.
Kissinger
wanted him to understand that an attack on East Pakistan would involve the high probability of a cut-off of aid. Also, if India wound up as a result of this treaty as a diplomatic appendage to the Soviet Union, there would be a much lessened interest in India. As he had pointed out to all the people he spoke with in India, the American interest was a strong, self-reliant independent India.
The Ambassador said that, of course, India was not going to be anybodyʼs diplomatic satellite. Mr.
Kissinger
called his attention to Article 9 of the treaty
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which, if read literally, meant that India would have to support the Soviet Union diplomatically in a new crisis over Berlin. The Ambassador said that, obviously, this was not the intention of the treaty. India was looking for a counter-weight to Pakistanʼs repeated claims to the effect that in a new war China would be on its side. Mr.
Kissinger
said that anything that exacerbated conditions in the subcontinent was against our policy. He hoped the Ambassador understood that we were deadly serious about it.
Mr.
Kissinger
also said that it seemed a pity for the United States and India, which have no conflicting interests, to quarrel over a problem whose solution was preordained by history. The Ambassador asked Mr.
Kissinger
what he meant. Mr.
Kissinger
said that it seemed to him that over a historical period, East Bengal would be gaining autonomy even without Indian intervention. We, in turn, had no interest in the subcontinent except to see a strong and developing India and an independent Pakistan. Indeed, there was a difference in our approach to India and in our approach to Pakistan. India was a potential world power; Pakistan would always be a regional power. For all these reasons, the problem would sort itself out if we separated the issue of relief from that of refugees and the issue of refugees from that of political

accommodation. The Ambassador said that he had no difficulty separating relief from refugees, but he saw no way of separating refugees from political accommodation.
The Ambassador then handed Mr.
Kissinger
a letter by Prime Minister
Gandhi
to the President. The letter [Tab B]
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was couched in very conciliatory terms. He said it would provide an excellent opportunity for the President to state his basic policy towards India and to start a useful dialogue. He also told Mr.
Kissinger
that Prime Minister
Gandhi
had accepted the invitation to come to Washington and, indeed, on the dates we had proposed. This would give us an opportunity to ease some of the tensions.
Mr.
Kissinger
told the Ambassador that we welcomed Prime Minister
Gandhi
but that it was essential that the India/Pakistan problem not be solved by war. We would be generous in refugee relief, but India should not believe that it could use this crisis to overthrow the settlement of 1946.
The meeting ended with an exchange of pleasantries.
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations