AlimurRazi/FRUS-1971-bangladesh huggingface dataset:
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 242
242. Backchannel Message From the Ambassador to Pakistan (
Farland
) to the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (
Kissinger
)
1
Islamabad
,
December 7, 1971, 1257Z
.
[
number not declassified
] At 1730 local 7 December Foreign Secretary handed me following text of message from President
Yahya Khan
for President
Nixon
and asked that I transmit it via the fastest possible means.
“The military situation in East Pakistan has deteriorated rapidly in the last 24 hours. Our forces there are without adequate artillery and air support. They are also cut off from being supplied and reinforced. They are resisting bravely but they are at a heavy disadvantage.
Yesterday India granted recognition to the so-called ‘Government of Bangla Desh.’ The Soviet Union has during the same period vetoed two resolutions in the Security Council, the Soviet Union are doing every thing by political and military means to enable India to obtain a military decision to annex East Pakistan.
If India should succeed in its objective, the loss of East Pakistan with a population of 70 million people dominated by Russia will also be a threat to the security of South Asia. It will bring under Soviet domination the region of Assam, Burma, Thailand and Malaysia.
The far-reaching consequences of such a development to the future of Asia need no comment.
In this critical hour for Pakistan I request Your Excellency to do whatever you can to relieve the pressure from our borders. There is need for urgent action to issue a stern warning to Russia and India to stop aggression against Pakistan. There is also urgent need for material assistance from the United States of America, directly or indirectly, as you may consider appropriate to meet the situation.”
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 244
244. Editorial Note
On December 7, 1971, Secretary of Commerce
Maurice Stans
reported to President
Nixon
at the White House on his 11-day trip to the Soviet Union. He was upbeat about the prospects for improved relations. Premier
Kosygin
had told him: “Mr. Secretary, we have high hopes for your mission.”
Stans
and his party had been feted in such a way as to reinforce that impression.
Stans
left after 20 minutes.
After
Stans
left the conversation turned to the situation on the subcontinent.
Nixon
and
Kissinger
began by discussing the backgrounder
Kissinger
intended to provide for the press on the crisis. Framed in general statements about United States concern for the success of Indiaʼs democracy and
Nixon
ʼs long-standing interest in the country,
Kissinger
said he could “make in a very low key way an enormously damning case against the Indians.” In sketching his indictment of India,
Kissinger
said: “I can show a real pattern of Indian deceit. For example on November 19 I saw the Indian Ambassador. On November 15 I saw the Pakistan Foreign Secretary. And I told him we needed a maximum program because it would be very difficult to prevent hostilities from breaking out. He said he would let me know after he came back on the 22nd. And on the 19th I told this to the Indian Ambassador. He said let me know as soon as you know when that will be. I said around the 28th. On the 22nd they attacked.”

Nixon
outlined the case he wanted to see made to the press: “The purpose is to show that weʼve done the best we can. And incidentally, I would also—I think you should also get across [that] we have no influence, we have no responsibility for either. Itʼs not our job. The Russians have an interest in India. The Chinese have a hell of an interest in Pakistan. We only have an interest in peace. Weʼre not anti-Indian, weʼre not anti-Pakistan. We are anti-aggression.” (National Archives,
Nixon
Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation among President
Nixon
, Secretary
Stans
,
Kissinger
,
Haig
, and
Ziegler
, December 7, 1971, 3:55–4:29 p.m., Oval Office, Conversation No. 631–4) The editors transcribed the portions of the tape recording printed here specifically for this volume. A transcript of this conversation is published in
Foreign Relations
, 1969–1976, volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972, Document 163
.
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 249
249. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between the Presidentʼs Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (
Haig
) and the Minister of the Soviet Embassy (
Vorontsov
)
1
Washington
,
December 8, 1971, 3:50 p.m.
V
: How are you, General?
H
: Fine, Mr. Minister. I am calling to convey a message. Dr.
Kissinger
is in a meeting right now, but he wanted you to have this message as soon as possible. It is to the effect that with respect to your note yesterday,
2
the President does not feel a response at this time is necessary until he receives a response to his written communication, and he wanted it understood that the “watershed” term
3
which he used was very, very pertinent, and he considers it a carefully thought-out and valid assessment on his part.
V
: Okay. I will have this in mind and transmit it to Moscow. Thank you, General.
H
: Good-bye, Mr. Minister.
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 250
250. Editorial Note
On instructions from Washington, a senior Embassy official met with the Shah in Tehran on December 8, 1971, to discuss the possibility of Iranian military support for Pakistan. The Shah stated that he had informed the Pakistani Ambassador in Tehran that, in light of the treaty of friendship signed by India and the Soviet Union, he could not send Iranian aircraft and pilots to Pakistan. He was not prepared to risk a confrontation with the Soviet Union.
The Shah proposed an alternative way to provide support to the hard-pressed Pakistani Air Force. He suggested that the United States urge King Hussein to send Jordanian F–104 fighters to Pakistan. The Shah in turn would send two squadrons of Iranian aircraft to Jordan

to defend Jordan while Jordanian planes and pilots were in Pakistan engaged in support of fellow Muslims.
The Embassy official indicated that, because of legal constraints regarding the use of military equipment provided by the United States, it would be difficult for officials in Washington to give permission for the transfer of the F–104s from Jordan to Pakistan, or to overlook their absence in Jordan. The Shah said that the United States could not hope to achieve the objective of bolstering Pakistan while maintaining that it was not involved in the effort. (National Archives,
Nixon
Presidential Materials,
NSC
Files, Box 643, Country Files, Middle East, India/Pakistan)
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 257
257. Memorandum of Conversation
1
Washington
,
December 9, 1971, 4–4:41 p.m.
Following an exchange of pleasantries in which Matskevich
2
emphasized Mr.
Brezhnev
ʼs warmly anticipated meeting with President
Nixon
, the President informed the Soviet representatives that he wished to discuss an urgent problem very frankly. The President continued,

“I want you to know how strongly I personally feel about this issue.” Great progress has been made in
US
/Soviet relations. No one two years ago would have thought this progress possible. It includes progress on
SALT
, the Berlin situation, and an agreement on the Spring Summit. Discussions have been held on the possibility of a European Security Conference, and the opportunity exists for a totally new relationship between the
U.S.
and the
USSR
.
“Now, quite frankly, a great cloud hangs over it—the problem of the Subcontinent.” Six-hundred million will win over 60,000,000 people. Pakistan will be cut in half. In the short-range, this may be a gain for the Soviet Union and a setback for China. It is certain to be a tragedy for Pakistan. What is far more significant if the situation continues is the fact that it will poison the whole new relationship between the
U.S.
and the
USSR
. The question is, ‘are short-term gains for India worth jeopardizing Soviet relations with the
U.S.
?’ This is not conveyed in a threatening way.
3
It would be difficult, however, for the
U.S.
to stand by if the Indians move forces into West Pakistan. The key to a settlement is in the hands of the Soviet Union. If the Soviets do not restrain the Indians, it will be difficult for the
U.S.
to deal with
Yahya
.
4
If the Indians continue military operations, we must inevitably look toward a confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States. The Soviet Union has a treaty with India, but the United States has obligations to Pakistan. The urgency of a ceasefire must be recognized.
5
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 262
262. Telegram From
the Department of State
to
the Embassy in India
1
Washington
,
December 10, 1971, 0113Z
.
222636. 1. Under Secretary accompanied by
Sisco
called in
Jha
, accompanied by Verma, First Secretary.
2. Irwin said the United States is deeply concerned over the current developments in South Asia and wishes to ask the Ambassador what Indian intentions are. The
US
cannot countenance an Indian policy resulting in Indiaʼs taking of any territory. That would have a most profound and long-lasting effect on
US
-Indian relations and require the
US
to consider the implications resulting from such an action. Irwin said he had been instructed to ask the Ambassador to obtain from his government the assurance that India has no intention of taking any territory, including any part of Azad Kashmir. He made clear that while not minimizing
US
concern over Indian policies and actions in East Pakistan he spoke with particular reference to West Pakistan.
3.
Jha
noted that India had recognized Bangla Desh, but there was no intention of annexation in the East or what he termed a protectorate relationship with Bangla Desh.
4.
Jha
continued that in the West there has never been any intention of territorial annexation. However, with respect to Azad Kashmir, he could not give any answer totally free of uncertainty. He said he would have to inquire of Delhi and he would be in touch with us as soon as possible. He noted that as in 1965 that Pak forces had moved into Kashmir. He said he thought one factor which would have to be weighed is how prolonged and how broadly [based] the fighting will be. Here we had the impression he was referring to the fighting in the

East, since he added that if Bangla Desh fighting could be sorted out quickly without new factors intervening, India would possibly go along with an early normalization of the situation. He said this was only personal speculation on his part since he would have to report to his government and get their views.
5.
Jha
then asked what are the Pak aims? Under Secretary pointed out that Pak aims were made very clear today in note to Secretary General accepting General Assembly resolution calling for ceasefire and withdrawal.
2
6. Meeting concluded with Irwin stressing we were approaching a most serious crisis in our relations and the Ambassador saying again he would be in touch with us soon as he heard from Delhi.
Irwin
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 264
264. Telegram From
the Department of State
to
the Embassy in Pakistan
1
Washington
,
December 10, 1971, 1539Z
.
222703. Islamabad for Ambassador.
You will have seen Dacca 5573.
2
Contact
Yahya
immediately. Confirm whether this is the bona fide Pak position. If so ask him whether he would like us to be helpful vis-à-vis the
UN
with communications and otherwise.
Does this mean that
Yahya
is ready for a cease-fire in the West? If he is, we want him to know that we are ready to make a major effort

to bring it about in order to preserve Pakistan territorial integrity and armed forces.
Please respond flash.
3
Irwin
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 265
265. Backchannel Message From the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (
Kissinger
) to the Ambassador to Pakistan (
Farland
)
1
Washington
,
December 10, 1971, 10:53 a.m.
You will be receiving flash instructions through regular channels concerning Pakistani proposal for immediate ceasefire.
2
The President has directed that future scenario be within the framework of the proposal which I provided to you within this channel.
3
Above all, no actions should be undertaken within regular channels that have not been previously cleared with President via this channel. There is to be no additional pressure on
Yahya
.
In everything we do with
Yahya
, we cannot have it said that we stabbed Pakistan in the back. This must be your guiding principle on each issue from this point on.
Warm regards.
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 268
268. Editorial Note
According to
Henry Kissinger
ʼs Daily Schedule, he was to meet with Soviet Chargé
Yuli Vorontsov
at 11:35 a.m. on December 10, 1971, and did so at 11:58. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division,
Kissinger
Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–1976, Record of Schedule) In his memoirs
Kissinger
writes that at this meeting he outlined a modified United States proposal for a settlement of the crisis. The proposal no longer called for a withdrawal of Indian forces. It stipulated a cease-fire and standstill agreement to be monitored by United Nations representatives in both wings of Pakistan. After the cease-fire took effect, there would be negotiations directed at troop withdrawals and the satisfaction of Bengali aspirations. (
White House Years
, page 905)
Kissinger
noted that he also conveyed to
Vorontsov
the text of the letter
Nixon
sent to
Brezhnev
on December 10 (
Document 269
). The only other record of this meeting that has been found is a tape recording of
Kissinger
ʼs report on the meeting to
Nixon
shortly thereafter.
Kissinger
told President
Nixon
that after their meeting,
Vorontsov
had needed no further proof of United States resolve. He said that “we got the message loud and clear from the President yesterday.”
Vorontsov
added: “I can tell you informally that if they are not

working through the night now in Moscow, they are not doing their duty.”
Kissinger
concluded: “Weʼre going to get it.” He said he had underlined the significance of the understanding President
Kennedy
had with President Ayub about coming to Pakistanʼs assistance. “I showed him the secret treaty. I said now I hope you understand the significance of this. It isnʼt just an obligation. It will completely defuse the Democrats because they are not going to attack their own President. So I said when the President yesterday spoke of an obligation he was speaking of a
Kennedy
obligation…. He said within an hour this will be on Mr.
Brezhnev
ʼs desk. And I told him weʼre moving some military forces, but it will not be visible until Sunday night…. In effect, it was giving him sort of veiled ultimatum.”
Nixon
said: “If
Brezhnev
does not have the good judgment not to push us to the wall on this miserable issue, … we just may as well forget the summit.”
Kissinger
ʼs judgment was that “by Sunday night or Monday” (December 12–13) there would be an acceptable cease-fire. He said: “I think that the Russians will agree with us to call for one.” The Chinese would accept such a proposal, he assured
Nixon
, “because weʼve got
Yahya
. What we are proposing to the Russians,
Yahya
gave us.” (National Archives,
Nixon
Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation between
Nixon
and
Kissinger
, December 10, 1971, 12:47 a.m.–1:01 p.m., Oval Office, Conversation No. 635–17) The editors transcribed the portions of the tape recording printed here specifically for this volume. A transcript of this conversation is published in
Foreign Relations
, 1969–1976, volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972, Document 173
.
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 269
269. Letter From
President Nixon
to Soviet General Secretary
Brezhnev
1
Washington
,
December 10, 1971
.
Dear Mr. Secretary:
I have carefully noted the contents of your letter of December 8, 1971.
2
My own views of the basic issues involved in the conflict on the

Indian Subcontinent were expressed in my previous letter
3
and in my conversation with your Minister of Agriculture.
4
The situation is constantly deteriorating and as it does the adverse implications grow for our relations and for progress toward a stable international peace.
The proposals, contained in your letter, concerning the political evolution of East Pakistan appear to be being met. Pakistanʼs actions today in this respect were largely due to our influence initiated immediately upon receipt of your letter.
This must now be followed by an immediate cease-fire in the West. If this does not take place, we would have to conclude that there is in progress an act of aggression directed at the whole of Pakistan, a friendly country toward which we have obligations.
I therefore propose an immediate joint appeal for a complete cease-fire.
Meanwhile, I urge you in the strongest terms to restrain India with which, by virtue of your treaty, you have great influence and for whose actions you must share responsibility.
Sincerely,
Richard Nixon
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 270
270. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (
Kissinger
) and the Minister of the Soviet Embassy (
Vorontsov
)
1
Washington
,
December 10, 1971, 1:27 p.m.
K
: I just spoke with the President before going off. I think this is basically clear but I wanted to be sure there was no ambiguity left. It seems to us that basically your proposal
2
is being accepted and therefore even harder to understand a delay in the joint action.

V
: I understand and I proceeded from that assumption.
K
: So some formulation should begin between East and West Pakistan. Itʼs not exact text but substance.
V
: When I was reading the paper,
3
in what form this joint action should be.
K
: [omission in the source text] Security Council?
V
: Thatʼs clear.
K
: Consider other proposals as well.
V
: I will make that clarification.
K
: The language you have is more precise than one I gave you.
V
: I understand.
K
: We will draft something in Security Council-type language and get it to you this afternoon.
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 271
271. Backchannel Message From the Ambassador to Pakistan (
Farland
) to the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (
Kissinger
)
1
Islamabad
,
December 10, 1971
.
1.
I met with
Yahya
in his residence at 1000 hrs. local Dec. 10 and conveyed to him the information contained in your message of Dec. 9.
2
Yahya
ʼs initial reaction was to indicate a lack of comprehension regarding exactly what was implied by the information conveyed. After I went over the entire subject again and reiterated salient points,
Yahya
still indicated strong objections because “Russia is giving India everything she wants.”
2.
I then undertook the hardest “sell job” of my life. After about 30 minutes I brought
Yahya
around to a point where he was making his own proposition. Except for the slightly different wording and the

fact it was his own proposal and not the Russian one,
Yahya
in fact “bought” the original proposal as delivered.
3.
Yahya
proposes that, subject to the provisos contained in paragraph 2 of your communication, (a) India and Pakistan should agree to an immediate ceasefire with the separate armed forces “standing fast”; and that the United Nations or other international organization provide observers to see that the ceasefire is effective; (b) that India and Pakistan “at any effective level” immediately open negotiations aimed at a settlement of the war and troop withdrawal; and coincident therewith simultaneously enter into negotiations looking towards the political satisfaction of Bengali aspirations, i.e., a political settlement.
4.
I read the operative paragraph above to
Yahya
and he reaffirmed his position. Warm regards.
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 272
272. Backchannel Message From the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (
Kissinger
) to the Ambassador to Pakistan (
Farland
)
1
Washington
,
December 10, 1971
.
Ref: [
message number not declassified
]
2
We are making strongest démarche to Soviets today which proposes that they join with us in supporting provisos contained in my message of December 9
3
and paragraph 3 of your [
message number not declassified
] which provides (a) India and Pakistan should agree to an immediate ceasefire with the separate armed forces “standing fast”; and that the United Nations or other international organization provide observers to see that the ceasefire is effective; (b) that India and Pakistan “at any effective level” immediately open negotiations aimed at a settlement of the war and troop withdrawal; and coincident therewith negotiations be started looking towards the political satisfaction of Bengali aspirations; i.e., a political settlement.

It is essential that Government of Pakistan refrain from making additional proposals until we have had opportunity to move within the above framework.
In discussing the foregoing procedure with
Yahya
, you should emphasize that the President has made the strongest démarche to the Soviets and included warning to them that we have obligations towards Pakistan which will not permit aggression against West Pakistan. President added that should Indian offensive be launched in the West, with Soviet acquiescence, a
US
/Soviet confrontation would ensue.
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 273
273. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (
Haig
) to the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (
Kissinger
)
1
Washington
,
December 10, 1971
.
Henry
:
[
name not declassified
] called and said that the Jordanians have replied as follows. They will send four aircraft with Jordanian pilots immediately to Pakistan. The Paks asked for 12, but he will hold to four initially to see how it goes. He is prepared to go as high as 22 ultimately.
Attached is a message from
Raza
2
referring to six F–5ʼs which the Turks have apparently agreed to provide if the
U.S.
agrees.
AH
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations