Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 23
23. Telegram From Secretary of State
Rogers
to the
Department of State
1
2
Tehran
,
May 26, 1969, 0950Z
Subject:
Secretary’s Lahore Meeting With President
Yahya
1.
Summary: Tone of visit throughout was frank and cordial with President
Yahya
and Secretary Yusuf emphasizing theme quote we are glad you have come to see us as we are unquote. In ninety minute discussion May 24 with Secretary
Rogers
and party, President
Yahya
and colleagues discussed
Pak
internal situation forthrightly and at some length made pitch for continued economic aid and for direct military sales and sent friendly message to Afghan King. Secretary and party described U.S. efforts in Middle East and Southeast Asia and reviewed longer term relations with
USSR
. Secretary suggested U.S. would continue econ aid to Pakistan and was noncommittal on military sales. End summary.
2.
Pakistan internal situation. In lengthy discussion with frequent questions from Secretary,
Yahya
attributed administrative

collapse basically to (a) lack of sense of political participation by intellectuals, poorer classes and others, (b) imbalance between quote social sector unquote and development, i.e., inadequate improvement in current living standards, (c) neglect of East Pakistan, and (d) corruption and nepotism. Said martial law put out quote flame but not fire unquote. He moving as quickly as possible toward restoration normal democratic processes but timing depended on quote conditions and circumstances unquote.
Yahya
said parliamentary form of government and maximum regional autonomy were widespread demands: he would insure free elections but not impose specific constitutional forms.
Yahya
described present situation as not one of military repression forced on people but one which was welcomed by relieved populace as saving country from chaos. Stressed his own desire to go back to being a soldier
ASAP
.
3.
Economic assistance.
Yahya
, assisted by Deputy Chairman Planning Commission
M.M. Ahmad
, made effective presentation on econ development results.
Yahya
said
Pak
development success was as much vindication of U.S. philosophy of assistance as proof of Pakistan’s ability to help itself. Recent crisis, according Ahmad, showed growth alone not enough and must be blended with social justice. This requirement made
Pak
assistance needs more urgent than ever and pointed to (a) need for restoration of funds to earlier levels, (b) importance of early
IDA
contribution, (c)
Pak
need for
PL
–480 grain assistance to East Pakistan without quote normal restrictions unquote and (d) East
Pak
requirements for flood control and water development. Secretary said he understood
Pak
point of view but present situation (MLA) presented problems for some in U.S. He indicated we had asked Congress for $140 million commodity loan
FY
1970 and said he would look into latter two points.
4.
Military supply.
Yahya
made brief but emphatic reference along expected lines to need purchase U.S. arms to ensure Pakistan’s safety. Secretary questioned
Yahya
’s claim that Pakistan’s safety was threatened but assured
Yahya
matter was being carefully considered. In private conversation,
Yahya
re-emphasized seriousness of
Pak
arms supply situation and
Pak
request to U.S., saying
Pak
would have to have some source of supply.
5.
Southeast Asia. Secretary said U.S. had no desire impose any particular political system in South Vietnam: so long as outcome reflected will of people. U.S. objectives would be satisfied if
NVN
not prepared to negotiate seriously. U.S. would continue efforts to strengthen South Vietnam that it could assume larger share of responsibility. Secretary emphasized that simple U.S. pullout of Vietnam would be followed in short time by Chinese control of entire area and that this feared by countries of area. He indicated U.S. willing aid economically both North and South Vietnam following satisfactory settlement. He expressed uncertainty about Soviet assistance in arriving at settlement, but pointed to Soviets’ great concern now over china. Secretary said U.S. wants no land bases or other special privileges in Vietnam: we desire only that China not take over. He asked
Yahya
if Pakistan could be of assistance.
Yahya
described Pakistan’s objectives in area as similar and promised to be responsive to any specific request for help, mentioning particularly
Pak
dialogue with China.
6.
Middle East. Asst. Secty
Sisco
, without discussing specifics of possible settlement, told
Yahya
U.S. had been seeking define common ground with
USSR
in bilaterals, which could be passed to both sides through jarring. Similar dialogue underway in Four Power talks. Hardening of positions between parties on both sides plus deteriorating situation in area made this most difficult.
Yahya
made no substantive comment but seemed to applaud U.S. efforts.
7.
CENTO.
FonSec
Yusuf gave eloquent description of
Pak
position toward CENTO, asking how Pakistan could be active in military aspects of
CENTO
when
USSR
now a source of military supply. He pointed out, however, that
Pak
position on CENTO, with two Ambassadors and
MFA
Director at Tehran, was not as mere observer. Secretary said U.S. had sought better relations with
USSR
and with China but Czechoslovakia and
Brezhnev
Doctrine showed how little
USSR
had changed. Assured
Yahya
he understood his position and had no intent pressure him on CENTO. Separately Gen. Pirazada indicated Paks had no intention of leaving either
SEATO
or CENTO.
8.
Afghanistan.
Yahya
, in brief discussion of Pak-Afghan problems, said he wanted to improve relations and asked Secretary to convey this assurance to King. Secretary agreed to do so.
9.
Indo-
Pak
relations.
Yahya
did not devote large amount time to Indo-
Pak
troubles but took fairly hard line on Indian intransigence re Kashmir and Farraka. Said it was almost useless talk to people who would not admit problem existed. Indicated he was willing go on trying, however, and did not suggest
GOP
contemplated any new tactics in near future. Asked if Secretary would be willing help in dialogue with India. Secretary responded U.S. could not assume responsibility for solution to problem but if both sides wanted, we would be willing try be helpful in any way possible.
10.
ENDC. Yusuf expressed hope we would not agree to
Sov
proposal to accept Japanese-Mongolian candidacies for enlargement of ENDC, since this reduced Pakistan’s chances of membership. Pedersen later gave him U.S. statement accepting this formula pointing out specific U.S.-Sov agreement enlargement could not stop there.
Rogers