Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 181
181. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India
1
Washington
,
November 8, 1971, 2045Z
.
203187. Subject: Secretaryʼs Meeting with Prime Minister
Gandhi
; East Pakistan Problem. Following is
Noforn
,
FYI
only, uncleared and subject to revision on review:
Summary: In response Secretaryʼs request,
PriMin
described manner in which East Pak situation was threat to Indian security and very

great domestic pressures on her to take firmer action. Secretary indicated steps
USG
had taken: dried up arms pipeline; secured
Yahya
ʼs agreement to unilateral withdrawal; and obtained
Yahya
ʼs agreement meet with Awami League representative and consider meeting with Awami Leaguer designated by
Mujib
. Said we hoped India would respond if there was unilateral withdrawal.
PriMin
described problems in way of withdrawal and raised questions regarding Bangla Desh/
Yahya
talks.
Sisco
responded if there was merit in ideas we have suggested, such questions can be worked out.
PriMin
questioned that
Yahya
genuinely sought political solution. Secretary and
Sisco
affirmed our evaluation that he did and Secretary pointed out
USG
has done its utmost to assist. End summary.
1.
Secretary met with
PriMin
Gandhi
at 10 AM November 5. Secretary accompanied by Ambassador
Keating
,
Sisco
and
Schneider
.
PriMin
accompanied by Ambassador
Jha
,
Haksar
and Sathe.
2.
Secretary opened conversation by expressing interest in Mrs.
Gandhi
ʼs views on East Pak problem.
PriMin
replied Indian security threatened by East Pak development. Threat caused not only by presence Pak armed forces on Indian borders but by massive refugee flow and
GOP
continuing actions in East Pak causing flow. This creates not just economic burden but also political and social problems which can affect Indian stability and integrity.
PriMin
pointed out crisis has created great pressures on her. Even within Cabinet there is feeling that by following “weak-kneed policy”
PriMin
is jeopardizing security of India.
PriMin
explained that she had had some experience with war, having been in London during worst period of World War II blitz. Said she understands larger ramifications of conflict, but India has been pushed step by step to confrontation. Most of her colleagues and leaders other parties had thought she should not make current trip. She concluded tensions would have become more severe if she had canceled. Therefore she concluded she had to go. She had told army even if there were casualties it should refrain from action, but this would be difficult to explain to Parliament. She was sending daily messages to Delhi. Even from here, she explained, she was trying to hold back pressures for more action. Said she had large majority in Parliament but on this issue it was not absolutely in her control.
3.
Secretary replied he agreed with
PriMin
ʼs judgment that tensions should be curbed. As President had told Mrs.
Gandhi
it would be world tragedy if there were India-Pakistan war. We understand Indiaʼs problem, which caused by others. We want to assist and have taken certain steps which we hope are in accord with Indian views. First, we have dried up arms pipeline to Pakistan. Some $160,000 worth of items remain on docks in New York. Arms matter is now behind us. We wish to brief Congressional leaders next week and thereafter make

information public. Second, we accept Indian position that we should not equate India with Pakistan and in fact we never have. Taking this into account, we have asked
Yahya
if he could unilaterally withdraw some of his military forces. He has said that he would. Third, we recognize this is not just military problem. It is political problem. We have had active discussions on political problem with
Yahya
and Awami Leaguers.
Yahya
has agreed to meet with a cleared Awami Leaguer, or meet with a Bangla Desh representative from India. Furthermore, he has agreed to consider meeting with Bangla Desh leader designated by
Mujib
. We think this is encouraging indication process can be started under which troops could be moved from border and political negotiations begun. We will continue to work to get this process started. This is all we can do. We cannot ask
Yahya
to release
Mujib
. This would not work. We would hope India could consider some response if
Yahya
makes unilateral withdrawal.
4.
PriMin
replied that
Yahya
would make withdrawal from western border, while major pressure on India is in east.
Haksar
explained that because of defections from East Pakistan Rifles,
GOP
had moved regular army forces to border and violated ground rules. These forces repeatedly shelling Indian territory.
Kaul
pointed out Pak bases were closer to borders and therefore they could more easily withdraw. Secretary and
Sisco
indicated we had not gone into details regarding withdrawal with
Yahya
. Questions Indians raised were understandable. Our hope was that Indians could get together with Paks and see if some equitable modality could be worked out.
5.
Following further discussion of negotiation proposal
Sisco
concluded that if Indians saw merit in ideas we had suggested there would remain a number of questions which could then be worked out.
6.
Returning to withdrawal question
Kaul
said withdrawal without political settlement would incorrectly suggest crisis coming under control. Secretary responded that political settlement would be difficult under threat of imminent war. If war started, there could not be political solution. Furthermore, without political solution, war likely to start.
7.
PriMin
and other members Indian delegation stated doubts that
Yahya
actually desires political solution. Secretary and
Sisco
indicated their belief that
Yahya
sincerely seeking such solution; that he in fact felt that he had to have one. Indians presented detailed recent history events in East Pakistan to demonstrate lack of sincerity on part
Yahya
. Asked what is evidence that
Yahya
in fact seeks political solution. Secretary replied he wanted make it clear that
US
had done all it could in this regard.
Haksar
intervened to say this was not matter in dispute between
US
and India. Indian questioning of
Yahya
ʼs motives was not criticism of
US
but was attempt seek understanding with
US
regarding

start [
state
] of play in East Pakistan.
Jha
pointed out he did not believe anyone had said
USG
should have done more.
8.
Secretary concluded conversation referring to success of Presidentʼs efforts restore peace to various parts of world. Said we fully understand problems brought to India by East Pak situation and Indian domestic political problems.
US
is doing best it can to help with these problems to avert danger of war.
9.
Following Secretaryʼs meeting with
PriMin
,
Kaul
told
Sisco
that if
GOI
could be assured that there had been contact with
Mujib
and that
Mujib
, free of coercion, had designated an individual to negotiate with
Yahya
, India could give this proposal its cautious support.
Rogers
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations