Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 367
367. Telegram 5368 From the
Embassy in Afghanistan
to the
Department of State
1
2
Kabul
,
September 16, 1972
Subj:
Food Crisis: Conversation With His Majesty
Ref:
(A) Kabul 5348
(B) Kabul 5349 (NOTAL)
(C) Kabul 5350 (NOTAL)
(D) Kabul 5354
1.
Summary: His Majesty outlined to me September 14
RGA
plans meet impending food crisis along lines previously enunicated by acting
PriMin
Shafiq
. In response King’s reference to airlift, I made appropriate caveats. His Majesty stated additional value of food crisis operation would be experience gained which would assist
RGA
in tackling other problems. While operation leader not yet selected, program reveals considerable attention to problem with impressive arrangements which now have royal imprimatur. Action requested: none. End summary.
2.
I saw His Majesty King Zahir evening September 14 primarily to discuss impending food crisis and
RGA
action in

face thereof (other subjects septel). HM chose receive me alone.
3.
My presentation on food crisis was essentially same that I had given acting
PriMin
Shafiq
and Sardar Abdul Wali previously. Considering
Shafiq
’s recommendation concerning presentation, I balanced exposition of problem with possible solutions. Concluding, I said government appeared be doing very well in its initial planning to meet crisis.
4.
King expressed his appreciation my approach to him as well as to
Shafiq
and Abdul Wali. This was first comprehensive analysis they had concerning critical food situation. this is now clear and reality of situation known.
5.
King said government undertaking following activities: (a) Organization being set up under one person who will have absolute control over operation. This person will have complete power and total authority. (b) Under him will be regional agents throughout affected area, again with complete authority for all aspects operation without reference to Kabul. Authority granted regional agents supersedes that all local authorities including governor. (c) Inspection team based in Kabul will visit each area every two weeks. This team will have full authority to take necessary on-spot actions to correct any deficiences noted. (d) Larger body including non-government members in Kabul will oversee entire operation and will have juridical authority to indict. (e) Afghan Army will have principal executive role and will receive full cooperation of Afghan Air Force.
6.
King mentioned possibility foreign airlift. I responded we willing to consider but that I could not commit USG. I emphasized need for ongoing program before this decision could be made. I also noted, even if airlift utilized, need for considerable local transportation move wheat from regional distribution centers to local consumer. I said airlift is very technical operation which requires suitable ground personnel and cooperation in airlift operation even between countries having similar equipment can be difficult. I would welcome Soviet cooperation in providing assistance to
RGA
this endeavor but noted it was clearly Afghan responsibility work out program for foreign assistance. I said food crisis had come up in Soviet Ambassador’s farewell call on me and that he had

indicated their interest in type Afghan organization set up to meet this impending crisis. I concluded it was Afghan responsibility explore question of political risks and consequences involved in seeking foreign assistance (Note: During Soviet Ambassador Kiktev’s farewell call September 13, he indicated knowledge general situation and doubts that
RGA
could really mount effective organization. He mentioned Soviet sugar sat by river three weeks waiting for Afghan trucks. I believe Afghans will have problem convincing Soviets.)
7.
HM then said that, regardless outcome of this operation, there was some value in it because quote we will have learned something unquote. Continuing, he said this is not just operation against food and transport shortages. It is operation against whole Afghan structure. When current problem is resolved, quote we must reconsider entire administration unquote. I responded this was very important and significant observations and I agreed with his reference to need reappraise entire Afghan structure and thereby entire nation. (Comment: I was agreeably surprised by this comment since it indicates HM and
RGA
aware real value this indication of ability organize and direct large-scale program is that it can be applied in other fields and situations. This realization could lead to greater and more useful activity in future on part government.)
8.
HM said he would tell us beginning next week (Saturday September 16) who key personnel in this operation are. He added that he wants closest cooperation possible with foreign friends, who should be brought in on everything.
9.
I expressed my admiration for what had been accomplished in last few days. I said I was especially impressed by
Shafiq
—his perception and understanding of problem and actions he had initiated. I said this illustrated effectiveness of unified control since there is no division possible between economic and political subjects. Program countering food crisis, I concluded, had shown correctness this principle.
10.
Comment: King’s outline of
RGA
plans revealed effective collaboration at highest levels. There no doubt but that Shafiq quote sold unquote his proposals to HM. While I am confident that RGA will seek implement its plan of operations. I again

emphasized need for strong, dominant personality to head up operation. Indeed, without this, whole operation could fail. Neither Shafiq nor King gave any indication whom they have in mind.
Neumann