Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 245
245. Telegram From
the Department of State
to
the Embassy in India
1
Washington
,
December 7, 1971, 0250Z
.
220243. Subj: Secretaryʼs Meeting With
Jha
. Following based on uncleared memcon:
1.
Indian Ambassador
Jha
called on Secretary December 6 to present copy of letter from Prime Minister
Gandhi
to President
2
(text being transmitted
septel
).
3
Jha
accompanied by
Rasgotra
and Verma.
Schneider
and Quainton also present from
NEA
.
2.
Jha
began by saying that
GOI
was “greatly shocked and surprised” at
USG
reaction in last few days.
Jha
added that he was personally shocked since from conversations which he and Minister
Rasgotra
have had with
USG
officials
GOI
had been given no reason to expect strong
US
reaction blaming India which he read about in Sundayʼs
4
paper. He said he would have expected to have been sent for before press talked to. His mind went back to conversation he had had

with Secretary before Mrs.
Gandhi
ʼs visit in which he had referred to earlier
Keating
and
Swaran Singh
conversation. In that conversation
Keating
had suggested if Pakistan had attacked India in the West India would be to blame.
Jha
said Secretary had said
USG
had not prejudged issue in that way.
3.
Jha
said that when
PM
was here and subsequently
USG
had indicated it attached importance to Indian withdrawal from western border.
GOI
had not been able to accept this. Pakistan had moved first and neither
UN
nor
US
had told it to move back. It had been Indiaʼs assessment of Pakistan strategy based on previous experience that Pakistan might use irregular troops to infiltrate into Kashmir and to follow this with attacks by regular forces. From
GOI
point of view presence of Indian troops on border was better safeguard of Indian position than withdrawal which would have exposed India to this risk.
Jha
said that one week ago just before he left New Delhi a high level decision was taken instructing Indian armed forces not to do anything on western border, not even to respond to minor acts of irritation. Although in substance
GOI
had not agreed with
US
withdrawal proposal, it was in general harmony with
US
thinking that it important western areas not be embroiled.
Jha
noted that
PM
ʼs letter described Pakistani attack on Indian airstrips. For
GOI
to be blamed for having precipitated conflict was very unfair.
4.
Secretary responded by saying that
USG
position was as set out by Ambassador
Bush
in speech to Security Council.
5
In backgrounders what press selects is not always balanced and India should accept that
US
position is as
Bush
has stated it. There would be no useful purpose in rehashing the past. However, he wished to say that when Mrs.
Gandhi
was here President had tried as much as he could to make clear that use of force in these circumstances was unacceptable and would lead to tragic results. While we sympathize with Indiaʼs position and understood its plight, war was least desirable of all possibilities. We had tried to find an alternative. Rightly or wrongly we felt that India desired an independent Bangla Desh and believed that only solution was dismemberment of Pakistan. We could not subscribe to that in terms of use of force. We think events have justified our assessment. It is now important that there be a ceasefire and withdrawal and that then we work out a political solution. We recognize a political solution is essential but India seems to be saying that only armed force can bring it about. We are very unhappy about this; President is personally unhappy. We feel very strongly about it. We had wanted to be good friends with both India and Pakistan and help create two strong and economically viable nations. We had succeeded to very great extent. However,

our economic assistance is wasted if war breaks out and everything is destroyed. Secretary noted that we had decided today to suspend economic assistance in pipeline of $87 million that was not firmly committed. There was now no Congressional support for any kind of economic assistance since Congressional leadership thinks everything is going down drain.
5.
Secretary asked whether there had been any change in
GOI
position with regard to
UN
resolution.
Jha
said there was not and now that
GOI
had recognized Bangla Desh government it should be made party to discussions. It is up to them whether they are willing for cease-fire. Secretary asked whether Indian troops would stay in Pakistan.
Jha
again replied in negative.
Rasgotra
noted that
UN
resolutions so far did not touch on basic issues at all. Secretary said we recognized there must be political solution.
GOI
position seems to be that there must first be a political solution and then a ceasefire. Our position is the reverse. First step is to stop fighting and then to have political solution.
Jha
noted that India had waited for 8 months but there had been no encouraging progress toward political settlement. India only wanted conditions in which refugees could return.
6.
Secretary noted that
Yahya
had political proposals which he thought would work. Perhaps they would not have worked, but they were not given a chance. Only acceptable position to India seemed to be independent Bangla Desh. India seemed to set a precondition of beginning dialogue with
Mujib
, whereas
Yahya
had indicated he would talk with designee. From
Yahya
ʼs point of view, however,
Mujib
not acceptable. Secretary said we have taken position that this was internal affair of Pakistan. We had tried to be helpful. He accepted several of our ideas such as mutual withdrawal and then unilateral withdrawal if India would respond. He indicated he would negotiate with Bangla Desh representatives from Calcutta or consider doing so through
Mujib
ʼs designated representative.
Jha
noted that Indiaʼs response had not been negative, but there were problems in finding out who was designee and what were his bona fides. Secretary asked hypothetically whether, if this problem could be overcome now, there could be a beginning to negotiations.
Schneider
noted that we had put forward range of possibilities with regard to negotiations. Some
Yahya
had said he would accept, others he would consider. The progressive increase in use of force had, however, preempted dialogue.
Rasgotra
asked that we keep in mind other side of case: that Pakistan military had been moving forward in East Pakistan and that there were threats and provocations.
7.
Secretary said
US
had had serious difficulty with idea that Pakistan is threatening India in east. We want to do everything we can to bring war to conclusion. We are greatly distressed at events. We have

legitimate interest in area where we have tried to be of assistance. The President is very disappointed since as a result of his conference with Mrs.
Gandhi
he thought that resort to force could be avoided. In our judgment even if India succeeded in getting what it wanted situation would be worse than before.
Rogers
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations