AlimurRazi/FRUS-1971-bangladesh huggingface dataset:
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 299
299. Memorandum of Conversation
1
2
Washington
,
August 30, 1972, 11:10–11:30 a.m.
SUBJECT:
Courtesy Call of Pakistani Ambassador Participants:
Participants:
Department of Defense
Secretary of Defense—
Melvin R. Laird
Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)—
G. Warren Nutter
Military Assistant to the Secretary—Col. Robert C. Taylor
Country Director for South Asia (ISA/MESA)—LTC Woolf P. Gross
Embassy of Pakistan
Ambassador—
Sultan Mohammad Khan
Military Attache—Col. Khan Ahmad Shamshad
1.
Nonsubstantive Issues
In response to a query by Mr.
Laird
concerning the recent Chinese veto of Bangladesh entry into the
UN
, the Ambassador outlined his country’s viewpoint on the matter and the effects of the veto on South Asian affairs. He indicated that Pakistan and initially, he believed, India preferred postponement of the Bangladesh entry issue rather than the confrontation that developed. It appeared that the matter emerged in the Security Council debate as another indication of the Sino-Soviet rivalry. The Ambassador volunteered that Pakistan remained committed in principle to recognition of Bangladesh as implied at the Simla Conference, but that
Sheikh Mujib
’s intransigence was impeding progress in that direction. He mentioned their concern over the plight of the 90,000
POW
’s still being held in India and opined that India continued to hold them in defiance of the Geneva Convention and world opinion as a pressure tactic.

2.
U.S. Military Supply Policy
Secretary
Laird
led into the subject of military supply with a question concerning Pakistan’s current defense posture. The Ambassador pointed out that Pakistan had lost a great deal of equipment along with the 3 1/2 divisions taken captive in East Pakistan. This had not been replaced. Its loss was compounded by Pakistan’s current inability to maintain its residual U.S.-source military inventory due to the embargo.
Ambassador
Sultan
briefly reviewed the programs stalled by the embargo making particular mention of the “one-time exception” sale offer of October 1970 covering four categories of lethal equipment. His reference to “B–52 bombers” as part of the package was quickly corrected to B–57’s by the U.S. participants. Mr.
Laird
took note of the difficulties for Pakistan portrayed by the Ambassador, but asked that Islamabad not press
US
for the time being. The Ambassador gave his assurance that Pakistan would not ask for renewed arms assistance now, adding that he hoped we could take another look at their requirements during the remaining months of this year. The Secretary indicated we were prepared to proceed on that basis.
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 308
308. Memorandum From the Country Director for India, Ceylon, and Nepal (
Schneider
) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (
Sisco
)
1
2
Washington
,
October 30, 1972
SUBJ:
Recent
GOI
Actions Affecting
US
Activities in India
You asked for a check-list of recent
GOI
actions curtailing American programs in India. Specific actions taken by the
GOI
since December 1971 follow:
—Drastically reduced
AID
personnel in India.
—Effectively ended use of trust fund rupees to support
AID
local administrative costs.
—Stopped making use of
US
AID
participant training programs in the US.
—Refused to approve an Exim loan to an Indian company.
—Stopped making use of
US
military training programs offered for Indian military personnel in
US
installations.
—Ended providing
US
-financed participant training in India for Nepalis.
—Outspokenly attacked the
US
for
CIA
interference in India.
—Approved no new
US
-owned rupee-funded joint
US
-Indian scientific research projects.
—Refused to approve rupee-funded international visitor program (IVP) invitations to Indians to visit the
US
.
—Issued no visas for individual scholars or professors to visit India under cultural exchange programs.
—Cancelled
MAC
agreement and refused to clear additional
MAC
cargo and passenger flights to India.
—Forced removal of defense attache and ODRI aircrafts.
—Refused to invite COMIDEASTFOR to pay farewell visit to India.
—Applied new rule requiring non-nuclear declaration prior to approval of ship visits; this makes
US
Naval visits to India impossible.
In addition, the
GOI
has pressed demands for payment of Indian income tax on behalf of American International School teachers, the
US
director of USEFI, and American director of Wheat Associates; thereby jeopardizing the future of these institutions in India.
There are indications that the
GOI
intends to curtail the Library of Congress book-purchasing program in India.
We have learned indirectly that the
GOI
is also restricting
US
voluntary agency rupee-financed programs in India.
No new Peace Corps groups have been approved since December 1971; the last volunteer would leave by December 1973. The
GOI
might place a limit (say 50 PCVs) on all national volunteer programs in India.
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 310
310. Telegram 201141 From the
Department of State
to the
Embassy in India
1
2
Washington
,
November 4, 1972, 0022Z
Subj:
Indian Debt Rescheduling
1.
USG
has decided to participate for one year rpt one year in World Bank proposal for debt relief for India with
US
share of $29.12 million.
2.
We have informed World Bank of this decision as part of our continuing technical discussions with bank. Bank is informing Indians and other AID-India Consortium members.
3.
Pending further guidance Embassy should avoid any interpretive comment regarding this decision in discussions with Indian officials. Embassy should not rpt not issue press statement and should restrict response to possible press queries to simple confirmation that decision made.
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 311
311. Memorandum From
Harold Saunders
and
John Holdridge
of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (
Kissinger
)
1
2
Washington
,
November 8, 1972
SUBJECT:
Pakistan’s Apparent Recognition of Hanoi
You should be aware of reports this morning that indicate that President
Bhutto
has approved the following steps:
—According to the Korean Consul in Islamabad, Pakistan intends to announce diplomatic recognition of North Korea on November 9 and at the same time intends to announce recognition of North Vietnam and of the Sihanouk government in Cambodia. Our Charge has been called in to see the acting Foreign Secretary today, despite the fact that today is a high Islamic religious holiday.
—Pakistani withdrawal from
SEATO
was announced this morning.
—We also have a report that the decision on
SEATO
was made at a cabinet meeting where President
Bhutto
was reportedly “extremely angry” at the
US
response to his
PL
–480 request. You will recall that he had asked for 400,000 tons of wheat over and above 600,000 tons for which agreements have already been signed. Following a careful review of our availabilities in the wake of the Soviet purchases, we promised 250,000 tons for the time being with another look at the situation in March.
As you recall, we have in past conversations with the Pakistanis urged them to hold off the recognition of Hanoi. In response to those approaches,
Bhutto
graciously said that he did not want to complicate the President’s life before his election and would “defer action” until after the election not

only on establishing diplomatic relations with North Vietnam but also on recognizing the Sihanouk government and North Korea. The Pakistani step does not take into account the delicate stage of the Vietnam negotiations. Also, the recognition of the Sihanouk government works at cross purposes with our support for the Lon Nol government.
The only operational question today is whether we should put on the record our disappointment that these steps have been taken at this delicate stage in Vietnam negotiations. We have made substantial efforts to help Bhutto as far as possible, and we might have expected him to take into account our timing problems. We can expect him in the near future to present a sizable shopping list for military equipment, but we cannot deal with that issue now. The only point that need be addressed now is whether or not we want him to understand that he has taken a step which is not consistent with
US
interests.
Recommendation: That you call Ambassador
Sultan Khan
and express your personal disappointment and have State put our Charge in Islamabad in a position to do the same.
Approve
Have State do it
Remain silent
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 314
314. Letter From Indian Prime Minister
Gandhi
to President
Nixon
1
2
New Delhi
,
November 28, 1972
Dear Mr. President,
I am touched by your message of November 19. I share your conviction that we now have the best opportunity of building a new structure of lasting peace. The vision itself is inspiring. Its translation into reality would indeed contribute a glorious chapter to the tortured history of mankind. Everywhere, people yearn to be released from the anxieties of poverty and war. If our actions are guided by this consciousness, we can bring peace within our reach. Friendship between our two countries, based on an understanding of each other’s experience and aspirations, will make a distinct contribution towards the larger vision of a generation of peace.
It is gracious of Mrs.
Nixon
and you to send me your greetings on my birthday. I deeply appreciate this friendly gesture.
With warm regards,
Yours sincerely,
(
Indira Gandhi
)
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 317
317. Telegram 217378 From the
Department of State
to the
Embassy in Pakistan
1
2
Washington
,
November 30, 1972, 2242Z
Subject:
Situation in South Asia
1.
During year that has followed Indo-
Pak
war and UNSC resolutions of December 1971,
USG
has scrupulously avoided involvement in political issues resulting from war, out of conviction that impetus for peaceful solution these issues must come from states in area directly concerned. For this reason we warmly welcomed Simla agreement, as well as Delhi discussions in August designed keep that process moving.
2.
This posture will continue to influence our policy in South Asia, as most recently demonstrated during
UNGA
focus on
BD
admission item. In conversations this subject with host government officials, action addressees should be especially guided by statement by Ambassador Phillips at conclusion
UNGA
debate [
USUN
5166], amplified along following lines:
A.
US
continues to regard bilateral approach embodied in Simla agreement and discussions that have taken place in that context as major contribution to peace.
B.
It remains our hope that the same constructive spirit of accommodation that resulted in the Simla agreement will extend to efforts by Pakistan and Bangladesh to find a basis for resolution of problems between them.
C.
We regret the current impasse affecting the

delineation/withdrawal process under Simla and the continued inability of Pakistan and Bangladesh to find the basis for talks.
D.
At the same time we are encouraged by continuing efforts resolve individual issues as part larger process of attaining peaceful settlement in South Asia. In this connection, we also encouraged by the decisions of the Governments of Pakistan, India and Bangladesh to release some of the Pakistani and Bengalee civilians detained since the war and to take the first, urgently-needed steps on POW repatriation. We believe these actions hold promise for improvement atmosphere and are conducive to ultimate solution of outstanding issues.
E.
Now that
UNGA
debate concluded, we hope as friend of all three states that there will be new and tangible steps that will demonstrate that all three governments mean what they say about wanting settlement in South Asia. As we see it, leadership in all three countries now have roughly equal opportunity to take and respond to initiatives that could bring real movement on variety of issues. We do not intend involve ourselves in any way in these efforts, nor do we propose pass judgment on positions of parties directly concerned. But as government that seeks closest possible relations with all states in the area, we see our own interests also served by redoubled efforts among all those involved.
3.
Above guidance intended for general use when subject of India-Pakistan-Bangladesh problem comes up in discussions with officials. We would not expect addressees would take initiative to present above points.
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 319
319. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (
Eliot
) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (
Kissinger
)
1
2
Washington
,
December 2, 1972
Subject:
Statement by Indian Foreign Minister
An analysis of Indian Foreign Minister
Swaran Singh
’s November 30 statement on Indo-U.S. relations is attached. This analysis was prepared by the Department’s Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs.
Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.

Attachment
Information Memorandum Prepared in the Bureau of Near East and South Asian Affairs
Washington
,
December 1, 1972
STATEMENT BY INDIAN FOREIGN MINISTER
Indian Foreign Minister Swaran Sigh’s November 30 statement is noteworthy as the most balanced and positive review of Indo-U.S. Relations by the
GOI
since the 1971 War. His remarks constitute a strong signal that India now desires better relations.
The Foreign Minister’s remarks were addressed to the United States, and, equally important, to Indian public opinion.
Swaran Singh
’s statement provides a well-reasoned basis for domestic acceptance of an effort to improve relations with the U.S.
In his remarks, he describes differences between the U.S. and India, which he characterizes as “temporary” in a calm and rational manner.
—On Vietnam, he sees the conflict on the way to a peaceful solution. Once peace is resolved, India will cooperate with the U.S. and others in the reconstruction effort.
—On Bangladesh, he welcomes our recognition and our participation in the reconstruction effort.
—On South Asia policy, he sees “every reason to believe” that the U.S. will “encourage and support” the spirit of the Simla Agreement.
While expressing interest in improved relations with the United States,
Swaran Singh
makes clear what India will seek from the U.S. in this relationship.

He underscores continuing Indian concern about possible U.S. military assistance to Pakistan; he urges the U.S. to accept the “realities of the new situation in the area” (i.e., a predominant Indian role); he seeks U.S. support of the policy of bilateralism in South Asia (i.e., India and Pakistan should work out their disputes by themselves).
Several factors have contributed to the evolution of the more forthcoming Indian attitude toward the U.S. articulated yesterday by
Swaran Singh
. Domestically, the euphoria of victory over Pakistan has worn off. India is facing major economic difficulties and a potential food shortage. The flow of U.S. resources, including food, into India looms more important than six months back.
Events influencing the timing of the Foreign Minister’s statement probably include our favorable action in participating in multilateral debt relief and the President’s friendly response to Mrs.
Gandhi
’s congratulatory message on his reelection. An additional element may be strains in Indo-Soviet relations, about which we have received intelligence reports. The Indians have reportedly resisted Soviet pressures to join COMECON, to undertake joint naval exercises and to provide more active support for the Asian security proposals.
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 321
321. Telegram 9952 From the
Embassy in Pakistan
to the
Department of State
1
2
Islamabad
,
December 12, 1972, 0600Z
Subj:
Indo/
Pak
Agreement on Kashmir Line: Withdrawal of Forces
Ref:
Islamabad 2237
1. I consider the December 11 agreement over the Kashmir line to have very important implications. Not only does it open the way for force withdrawals by both India and Pakistan to the international border, but it also makes it possible for both countries to pick up the thread of other positive steps anticipated in the Simla accord of last July. We are well aware, however, that many obstacles remain to the achievement of a qte durable peace in the subcontinent unqte as contemplated in the Simla accord.
2. I believe this is an appropriate time for us to show our pleasure over the Kashmir line delineation and the beginning of force withdrawals, and to underline our hopes that India and Pakistan will continue along the positive path drawn at Simla. This can be done by the Department’s spokesman, and perhaps will already have been done by the time this message reaches Washington. I believe that our pleasure and our hopes can most effectively be expressed to the Government of Pakistan (and presumably also to the Government of India) by a message from President
Nixon

to President
Bhutto
(and to Mrs.
Gandhi
). If some such message is not already in the drafting stage, I recommend that early attention be given to this suggestion.
Sober
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 324
324. Memorandum From the Political Counselor of the Embassy in Afghanistan (
Naas
) to the Ambassador to Afghanistan (
Neumann
)
1
2
Kabul
,
February 13, 1969
SUBJECT:
Conte-Long, Symington Amendments
You will recall that in your meeting with the King on December 30, you raised the question of Afghan military expenditures. The King assured you that he was strongly determined not to develop excessive armed forces or increase any segment of the military establishment beyond what had been planned many years ago. He said that, in his view, it would be madness to develop the military beyond basic requirements in view of Afghanistan’s economic needs. He noted that in fact the long term military plan which had been drafted during Prime Minister Daud’s time (a three phase plan) had been markedly reduced. He explained that, of course, attrited equipment would be replaced but emphasized again that there would be no step-up in total Afghan military strength.
To the best of our knowledge, admittedly scanty, the defense budget is in line with similar budgets for the last several years and that there is no significant increase. Attache sources indicate that in fact the Executive is trying to enforce more careful control by the military of their resources.
In the last year, again to the best of our knowledge, Afghanistan has received the following “sophisticated” equipment: (a) 10 MIG 21s,which were delivered in mid-1968, are more sophisticated than planes received before but were part of the agreed Air Force level under the 1965 Loan Agreement with the
USSR
. (b) There have been fragmentary reports of a newer, larger, perhaps surface-to-surface, missile having been introduced in Afghanistan in 1967 but we have not been able to confirm this. [
text not declassified
] doubt that such “new” missiles exist here but the possibility cannot be ruled out entirely.
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 327
327. Information Memorandum From the Acting Country Director for Pakistan and Afghanistan (
Spengler
) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (
Davies
)
1
2
Washington
,
August 27, 1969
SUBJECT:
Afghanistan’s Acquisition of SU-7 Jet Aircraft and the Conte and Symington Amendments
As you know, we recently were alerted to the possibility of a Conte Amendment problem with Afghanistan. Our Defense Attache at Kabul has now confirmed by visual observation (during the August 23
Jeshyn
fly-past) the presence in Afghanistan of three SU-7 fighter-bombers, a new item in the Afghan arms inventory and one which in terms of the Conte Amendment would quite clearly be “sophisticated”. The recent delivery of these SU-7’s confirms in part reports we received earlier that the
RGA
negotiated in December 1968 for the purchase of a total of eleven SU-7’s from the Soviets at a roughly estimated cost of $889,000 each. It also was reported that they were to be paid for out of a line of credit for military equipment previously granted to Afghanistan by the Soviets, quite possibly prior to 1968.
Since January 1968, we have discussed with a number of Afghan leaders including King Zaher our concern, in the context of both the Conte and Symington Amendments, over Afghan defense spending and the Afghans’ acquisition of sophisticated weaponry, which includes T–54 tanks, MIG–21’s and over 100 SA-2 missiles. Being aware of our concern, the
RGA
must have anticipated a negative U.S. reaction to the appearance of the SU-7’s. On August 20, a Foreign Ministry official told our Charge that the SU-7’s “constituted nothing new whatsoever in terms of Afghanistan’s overall military capability” and said that they were intended as replacements within overall squadron strength and structure according to an “agreement” (presumably with the Soviets) which long predated the Conte Amendment.
There are some possible discrepancies between the Foreign Ministry’s version of the SU-7 story and information we have from other sources. Moreover, even if the Afghans can make a persuasive case that the

newly-acquired SU-7’s are being financed from a line of credit predating the Conte Amendment, it is not clear whether this would make the Conte Amendment inapplicable. This constitutes a neat legal point which
AID
’s General Counsel has not yet faced in Conte Amendment cases.
We are preparing a joint State/
AID
message to our Embassy endorsing Ambassador
Neumann
’s proposal to seek clarification of the SU-7 transaction from top
RGA
officials and specifying the information we need from the
RGA
in order to help determine whether the Conte Amendment is applicable in this situation.