Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 24
24. Memorandum for the Record
1
Washington
,
April 9, 1971
.
SUBJECT
40 Committee Meeting—April 9
PARTICIPANTS
Henry A. Kissinger
, Assistant to the President
John Irwin
, Under Secretary of State
Thomas Moorer
, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Robert Cushman
, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Warren Nutter
, Assistant Secretary of Defense
Joseph Sisco
, Assistant Secretary of State
David Blee,
CIA
Harold H. Saunders
,
NSC
Staff
Following a Senior Review Group meeting on Ceylon and Pakistan,
2
the meeting moved into executive session at the request of the
CIA
member in order to consider an item appropriate to the 40 Committee.
General
Cushman
began by summarizing a request that had been received [
less than 1 line of source text not declassified
] which had been circulated in a short memo before the meeting (attached).
3
This was a request for
CIA
provision of unmarked small arms [
less than 1 line of source text not declassified
] to provide to the “freedom fighters” in East Pakistan. General
Cushman
remarked that the Agency had a secure channel through which it could deliver such weapons but that his personal opinion was that this operation would not remain secret much beyond that. He noted that Director
Helms
did not favor the project.
In response to Dr.
Kissinger
ʼs query, the following views were expressed:
—Mr.
Irwin
was “reluctant.”
—
Admiral Moorer
felt that it would be “very wrong” to be working on both sides of the East Pakistani issue at once.
—General
Cushman
felt that an affirmative response would prejudge the larger policy issue which the Senior Review Group had been discussing.
—Dr.
Kissinger
summarized by saying that he felt the President would never approve this project.

Mr.
Sisco
said that he felt the Indians were “testing us.” It is one thing, he noted, for the
U.S.
to close its eyes to reports of clandestine Indian support for the East Pakistani resistance movement but quite another thing for the
U.S.
to collude with the Indians in this supply.
Dr.
Kissinger
stated his assumption that the
U.S.
could not, in any case, deliver enough equipment to make a difference in the outcome in East Pakistan. He assumed, in any case, that the Indians would have sufficient stocks to supply any small arms that might be needed.
Mr. Blee said that the Indians do not have a large enough quantity of unmarked, unattributable weapons to supply what the East Pakistanis need in the quantities they need, so there would be a need if someone wanted this done. On the other hand, he did not see how Indian supply could make a difference in the outcome of the contest between the leftists and the moderates to gain control over the East Pakistani nationalist movement. He felt that it was a foregone conclusion that the leftists would win out.
Dr.
Kissinger
said that that is a very serious judgment which should be taken into account in our policy considerations. If we feel that, under present circumstances, the radicals are likely to take over, that could affect our judgment about the necessity of bringing the civil war to an end. He continued that, if the
U.S.
had been presented with a choice on March 25, it would certainly have urged President
Yahya
not to take a military course of action. But he recalled that everyone had been taken by surprise when the negotiations broke down and
Yahya
turned to military action.
Mr.
Sisco
noted that the
U.S.
and President
Yahya
both have a large stake in the preservation of moderate leadership in East Pakistan. He noted that he had said privately to Ambassador
Hilaly
that Pakistan has some interest in allowing those whom it had jailed to play a role in establishing a moderate leadership in East Pakistan. He noted that he had said privately to Ambassador
Hilaly
that Pakistan has some interest in allowing those whom it had jailed to play a role in establishing a moderate leadership in East Pakistan. In response to a question from Dr.
Kissinger
, Mr.
Sisco
felt that
CIA
much earlier than State had indicated the likelihood of President
Yahya
ʼs taking recourse to military action. State had been much more inclined to see a negotiated settlement and therefore had worried less about this issue before March 25.
Mr. Blee noted that the main opposition to
Mujibur Rahman
was leftist. The moderate leadership was now mostly in jail or dead. He concluded by noting that President
Yahya
is trying to crank up a “quizzling leadership,” and Mr.
Sisco
described Ambassador
Hilaly
ʼs present line about how
Yahya
is planning to concede the “six points” to East Pakistani leadership. Dr.
Kissinger
wondered why
Yahya
would have tried a military solution if he had expected to end up conceding

anyway. Mr. Blee surmised that the army had misjudged its ability to subdue East Pakistan quickly.
The discussion then turned to what the Indians want. Dr.
Kissinger
noted that in earlier sessions of the
SRG
it had been assumed that the Indians wanted a unified Pakistan. Mr. Blee replied that he felt what the Indians had really wanted was a very loose confederal relationship between East and West Pakistan.
Mr.
Irwin
noted that the Indians had proposed rescheduling the
US
-Indian bilateral talks—postponed from January because of the election—for May 24–25. He noted the problem of going to New Delhi without stopping in Islamabad. Mr.
Saunders
noted the difficulty of going to New Delhi if the East Pakistani insurgency were continuing and the West Pakistanis were holding India responsible for fueling it.
Dr.
Kissinger
showed great reservation, noted that the President had a special feeling about Pakistan and said he felt this problem would have to be checked with the President.
Comment:
The assumption underlying the discussion after Dr.
Kissinger
asked individualsʼ views on the Indian request was that there was no question of approving it.
H.S.
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations