Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 12
12. Telegram From
the Embassy in India
to
the Department of State
1
New Delhi
,
March 27, 1971, 1400Z
.
4416. Subj:
GOI
Reaction to East Pakistan Developments.
1.
At Foreign Secretary
Kaul
ʼs request, I called on him afternoon March 27.
DCM
and Joint Secretary
Ray
, Pakistan Division,
MEA
, also present.
2.
Foreign Secretary began by handing me copy of Foreign Ministerʼs statement made in Lok Sabha earlier in day. (Text and subsequent developments in Lok Sabha reported
septel
.)
2
Kaul
said Foreign Minister had been criticized by members of all parties on the basis his statement was too cold. Foreign Minister had had to intervene and state there was no doubt that the Government of Indiaʼs sympathy was with the people of East Pakistan who were being suppressed.
Kaul
said
GOI
was deeply concerned at developments. It now appeared that
Yahya
ʼs attempt at a settlement had been a facade in order to allow time for the transport of additional troops to East Pakistan.
3.
Kaul
said
GOI
information was that [garble] meeting that
Yahya
had had was with
Bhutto
who had objected to acceptance of
Mujib
ʼs six points.
3
Latest information, to which
Kaul
said he did not know whether to give credence or not, was that casualties ran into the tens of thousands.
4.
Kaul
said
GOI
was concerned about its own borders. There could be a threat to Indiaʼs security. It had to be expected that they

would have an unusually large influx of refugees.
GOI
, he said, were prepared to make their contribution toward the care and feeding of such refugees. However, they were deeply concerned that the magnitude of the problem would considerably exceed their ability to cope with it.
5.
Kaul
said he would be grateful if I could get in touch with my government and ask what its ideas were about coping with this problem.
4
Already some refugees had started coming into India. When he was asked where this had happened,
Kaul
said it was in the Tripura area.
6.
I told
Kaul
that I had understood that at least until recently the magnitude of the refugee influx had been trickling down. He confirmed this had been the case, but said that this time the problem would be of quite a different magnitude and he anticipated a need for medicines, blankets, food and shelter. He asked that we join with the
GOI
and other members of the international community in order to bring relief to the victims of the conflict.
7.
The Foreign Secretary then said he hoped there would not be outside intervention by any country. He added that perhaps even at this late hour it may still not be too late for
US
to express to the Pakistan Government our hope that a political solution can be reached.
Kaul
said he would be grateful if we could exchange any information we may get on the situation with the
GOI
.
8.
Kaul
then said that there had been rumours of possible Chinese intervention. He could appreciate that the Chinese would feel that it was in their interest to support West Pakistan. There was some evidence that China may have authorized Pak overflights by way of Kashmir, Tibet and Burma to East Pakistan.
DCM
said we understood that Indian radar had not picked up any evidence of such overflights.
Ray
replied that was correct, but that the
GOI
still did not rule out possibility that such overflights had in fact taken place.
9.
Foreign Secretary said that Chinese had at least, an understanding with the martial law administration. They did not like
Mujib
because he was considered to be pro-Western and pro-Indian. There were extremist elements in East Pakistan headed by
Bhashani
.
5
At the

moment,
Mujib
had the upper hand over him. The Chinese might try to fish in troubled waters. There was also a hard core of Naxalites in East Pakistan.
10.
Kaul
said they had just heard that Radio Pakistan had reported the arrest of Mujib. This had subsequently been denied by the Free Bengal Radio which had said
Mujib
was not in his house at the time of the reported Pak raid.
Kaul
said “our apprehension is that this will not simmer down.” He felt it was not wise for West Pakistan to be attempting to control the situation by force since this would only sow the seeds for future trouble. He then asked for my assessment.
11.
I said that I had thought that
Yahya
was sincerely attempting to carry out his original idea of a democratic government in all of Pakistan and that he was prepared to accept the six points and recognize greater autonomy in East Pakistan. Speaking personally, I told him that when I heard six shiploads of army personnel had arrived in East Pakistan I had doubts and wondered if talks were being dragged out waiting for the troops to arrive and then crack down. I told
Kaul
that based on our cables, it was my governmentʼs position that the present conflict was an internal matter that should be settled internally.
12.
Kaul
said
GOI
had recently heard that all units of the Pak army had been permitted to ask for fighter support from the Pak air force and that there had in fact been some air activity in Comilla. At this point,
Kaul
read me the text of what I took to be a reporting telegram from the Indian High Commission in Islamabad recording the events of the last few days. The essential point was that
Bhutto
had made it known that he believed that accession to the Awami League demands verged on a grant of sovereignty.
13.
Kaul
said that
GOI
information was that there had been four army brigades in East Pakistan. Since the crisis began, two brigades had been added one of which had been brought in by air and one by sea. Seven passenger ships loaded with troops (not six, he said) had arrived. This all amounted to more than two divisions of West Pakistani troops.
Kaul
said that since March there had been at least 13 C–130 flights and 30 flights of
PIA
Boeings transitting Ceylon. In reply to a question about tank strength,
Kaul
said that West Pakistan had one armoured regiment in East Pakistan, one squadron of which was employed in Dacca city.
14.
I asked
Kaul
if there had been any movement of Indian troops. He reminded me that they had militarily reinforced West Bengal prior to the elections and had said at the time that they would not remove such troops until they were certain that the situation had stabilized. So far, he said, we have not made any movements of troops in response to the developments in East Pakistan. However, “we may have to strengthen our borders”. When asked if this meant increasing the

border security forces, he replied that border security was already stretched to the limit.
15.
At this point, S.K. Singh,
MEA
spokesman, walked in carrying a ticker story.
Kaul
read this aloud. Story was based on a monitor report from Agatala of the Free Bengal Radio which claimed that martial law administrator Lt. General
Tikka Khan
had been killed by resistance forces which had stormed his premises.
16.
Comment:
I believe it will be useful for us to be reasonably full and frank in exchanging information on East Pakistan with the
GOI
. I hope Department can give me an indication of the extent to which we would be prepared to do in humanitarian relief effort on behalf of East Pakistan refugees soonest.
Keating
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations