Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 353
353. Telegram 616 From the
Embassy in Afghanistan
to the
Department of State
1
2
Kabul
,
February 1, 1972
Subject:
New Year Assessment of Afghan Government Performance and Outlook for
US
Position in Afghanistan
I.
Summary: Performance of Afghan Government considerably improved overall under Prime Minister Zahir in response to challenge of severe drought and economic crisis, although improvement highly uneven and concentrated among a few Cabinet members. Rapid and flexible
US
assistance has greatly contributed to government effectiveness and strengthened
US
position in country under more dynamic leadership, Afghani foreign policy steered careful and successfully neutral course during Indo-
Pak
war, even showing some limited capacity to resist Soviet pressures.
RGA
now moving with some determination to establish better relations with both Iran and Pakistan and to strengthen countries. Similar attitudes toward outcome of Indo-
Pak
war now tending to reinforce parallelism of
US
and Afghan policy goals in region, further strengthening U.S position here. As a result, I believe
US
should be prepared provide some new assistance this fiscal year, without, however, further raising
US
profile in country.
II.
1971 produced some significant changes in
RGA
policies and performance.

A.
What has changed—internal.
1)
PM
Zahir’s personal relations with Parliament show great improvement over both Etemadi and Maiwandwal. It is possible (though not highly probable) that Zahir’s greater tactical skill and understanding of parliamentary imperatives can even be translated into a few concrete legislative achievements during longer March to August parliamentary session.
2)
Deputy
PM
named and Minister without Portfolio Wakili have proven uncommonly (for Afghanistan) energetic and courageous Ministers. For the first time in my memory there is an attempt at some overall direction of the economy (Hamed), and a very energetic leadership regarding wheat, especially food for work, and fertilizer distribution, however chaotic still. Minister of Interior Mansuri seemingly energetic and cooperative. Also Minister of Commerce Ghaussi knowledgable and workmanlike but not up to high standards set by Nur Ali. Minister of Health
Seraj
active and effective, especially in promoting health centers in outlying areas.
B.
What has not changed—internal.
1)
Rest of Cabinet not noticeably improved, nor are lower echelons. Minister of Finance clearly out of depth illustrating peter principle. Sarabi of Planning, always sad, getting sadder. Enayat-
Seraj
in Education has proved disappointing.
2)
Hamed
and Wakil, despite energy and good intentions, handicapped.
Hamed
long operating as a loner thus far has not staffed himself. Wakili, handicapped by operating as Minister without Portfolio without bureaucratic support from established ministry, less effective because of unclear lines of responsibility and certain amount of (hopefully diminishing) political naivete. Lower echelons still unable or unwilling exercise leadership and responsibility. Few people have been fired, and “business” as usual still pervades bureaucracy.
3)
While
PM
Zahir’s personal handling of Parliament superior, he has still not been able to move necessary but tough measures, especially those needed to increase revenues. I am unfortunately

not optimistic that this will change soon. I am convinced that
PM
fully understands significance of this but has come to conclusion move simply not possible politically. Regretfully I agree with his assessment. Parliament remains fragmented, undisciplined, and readily made hostage by demogagic members. Next session likely to produce very difficult challenges to government on foreign policy (Pushtunistan, Iran) on university crisis, and themes such as food distribution, corruption, and still sluggish economy.
C.
What has changed—external.
1)
Arrival of new, energetic, ambitious and extremely intelligent Foreign Minister
Shafiq
has galvanized (Afghan style) Foreign Ministry. More changes in personnel and organization are likely to occur. Moreover quick thinking and quick-acting
FonMin
is quite willing to intervene in other (economic) matters to get rapid results.
2)
Obviously with King’s approval, new
FonMin
seeks more active role for
RGA
in foreign affairs than over-cautious and negative Etemadi. This has been heightened by recent changes in subcontinent and shifts in power balance of area.
3)
For first time
RGA
was apparently willing resist
USSR
pressure to some extent and take separate, independent line re Indo-
Pak
crisis (Kabul 7621).
4)
Shafiq
now taking long-delayed initiatives to settle Helmand dispute with Iran and smooth relations more generally with
GOI
.
D.
What has not changed—external.

1.
Foreign Ministry, although clearly one of the best
RGA
Ministries, still slow and sluggish. Only
Shafiq
,
Farhadi
, Karzai, Mohseni, Ghaus hard-working and knowledgable. Rest remains as usual—which is not much. Chief of Protocol Saadallah Ghaussi highly knowledgeable and occasionally helpful outside area of protocol responsibilities.
2.
While stirrings of independence re
USSR
development, we should be under no illusion as to the degree of this independence, should Soviets decide to push really hard on any issue.
III.
US
program achievements: Complete list well known to Department. I want to point primarily to effective impact of
USG
forthcomingness on
PL
480 Title I and II wheat, and
US
role in stimulating new
RGA
fervor for fertilizer import and distribution. While both programs have their unorthodox and chaotic features, primary and in my view distinctive features are that (a) tens of thousands of hungry have been fed, (b) many new local construction projects undertaken in food-for-work program with result growing rural awareness self-help possibilities, (c) democratic and friendly government has been considerably strengthened. Highly effective, and flexible collaboration between Peace Corps and
USAID
greatly enhanced

impact of
US
policies, and exemplifies inter-agency cooperation at its best.
USG
has received much credit, and
US
position in Afghanistan considerably strengthened.
IV.
Afghanistan, the region and the
US
.
1.
RGA
is apprehensive over growing Indian power and possible further disintegration Pakistan. Despite considerable external and internal pressure
RGA
has exploited
Pak
difficulties to feather own nest.
RGA
wishes encourage moderate and realistic regime in Pakistan in order avoid encouragement for closer
Pak
alliance with
PRC
and consequent Sino-Soviet “cold war” intensifying at Afghan border, with strong possibilities increased and possibly irrisistable Soviet pressure on Afghanistan to confront Pakistan.
B.
Above consensus, plus desire for a more dynamic Afghan foreign policy, has moved
RGA
toward active pursuit closer cooperation with neighboring Muslim countries hoping thereby bring measure of support to
Bhutto
. This could also help in overcoming remaining problems with Iran, although powerful domestic (conservative) forces (aided by Matwandwal) and other government opposition constantly agitate against improvement relations with both Pakistani and Iran. King and
PM
therefore find it politically difficult move in both directions at once and had been giving Pakistan priority because of crisis. Recent dramatic visit to Tehran by
FonMin
Shafiq signals greater concentration on Iran relations to disarm parliamentary critics when parliament reconvenes in March.
C.
Whatever reaction to our policy re conflict may have been elsewhere, in Afghanistan it has served to strengthen
US
position because of parellel Afghan concerns re Russian influence, Indian intentions and
Pak
future. Because we were already doing well here as result prompt
USG
action in response drought emergency, I consider the present period high point in
USG
standing in Afghanistan.
D.
Because of the considerable common ground in
USG
and
RGA
policies I believe it is in
USG
interest to support present
RGA
, strengthening it where possible but without raising our

profile dramatically. Cornerstone program directions to reflect this policy should include:
1)
The food-for-work program;
2)
The accelerated fertilizer program, under private sector distribution;
3)
A continued
US
presence in Kabul University despite current crisis on campus (Kabul A-5);
4)
Strong continued Peace Corps presence at about current volunteer levels, which both very effective and well received;
5)
Support for
IBRD
role in providing future economic planning assistance and in addressing on multilateral basis long-term external debt burden—as moves in direction eventual IBRD-led “consultative group” of foreign donors;
6)
Continued pressure for increased
RGA
cooperation in effort combat narcotics traffic and production;
7)
Close, frequent consultations at highest levels
RGA
concerning
US
policies toward region;
8)
Earliest possible invitation to King for
US
visit to underscore
USG
support and confidence.
V.
In conclusion I assess past year as one in which Afghan political system remained completely intact despite serious challenges both internal and external. System showed some capacity adapt to challenge, though response clearly slow and inadequate many fronts. No real threats to regime or throne on horizon.
US
position here somewhat enhanced, and selective support for progressive elements in
RGA
program can help solidify our gains during 1972.
Neumann