AlimurRazi/FRUS-1971-bangladesh huggingface dataset:
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 328
328. Telegram 146191 From the
Department of State
to the
Embassy in Afghanistan
1
2
Washington
,
August 28, 1969, 2238Z
SUBJECT:
Conte Amendment
REFS:
(a) Kabul 4374; (b) NHK 3149; (c) NHK 3156
1.
Afghanistan’s recent acquisition SU-7 jet aircraft poses question whether
RGA
has entered into firm arrangements with
USSR
, post January 2, 1968, for additions to present inventory of weapons which, in context of Conte Amendment, are sophisticated. Consequently, we must determine whether Conte Amendment is applicable in this case.
2.
Agree (ref a) that there possible discrepancies between
Farhadi
’s account of SU-7 deal and information we have from other sources, and that you should seek high level
RGA
clarification and additional details.
3.
In course your discussions with
RGA
, you should state that since January 1968, when we first informed Afghans of the obligations imposed on
USG
by Conte and Symington Amendments, we have hoped to establish a frank dialogue which would serve our separate national interests and our mutual interest in continuing, unimpaired, U.S. economic assistance to Afghanistan. We have hoped that this dialogue, while recognizing that

Afghanistan as sovereign power has obvious right to determine its own security requirements, would nevertheless lead to Afghan policies and actions which would obviate any application of these U.S. legislative requirements. Unfortunately, appears Afghans have not responded as we had hoped.
4.
You should make clear that that the
RGA
’s recent acquisition of SU-7’s makes it imperative that we now examine this transaction specifically in light of Conte Amendment. We obviously can be more effective in determining what must be done if we have all the facts and can thus be sure of our ground. We therefore hope that the
RGA
will now consent to provide information to permit 16s to meet our mandatory legislative requirements.
5.
To determine applicability of Conte Amendment, we need to know:
A.
When firm arrangements for acquisition of SU-7’s were made, number of aircraft involved, and whether transaction on grant, loan or cash sale basis.
B.
If loan or cash sale, total amount of payment to be made and schedule therefor.
END
Rogers
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 331
331. Telegram 5090 From the
Embassy in Afghanistan
to the
Department of State
1
2
Kabul
,
October 6, 1969, 1150Z
Conte Amendment
Ref:
Kabul 4515
1.
At first opportunity since
Farhadi
’s return from Rabat conference, I called on him Oct. 5 and noted that month had elapsed since my previous approach concerning acquisition SU-7 aircraft (reftel).
2.
He said that following my earlier call he had discussed matter with King,
PriMin
and Min Def. Latter assured him that aircraft intended as replacement aircraft for planes which either have crashed or older aircraft to be removed from Afghan forces in view spiraling costs of maintenance. Min Def also said all negotiations for SU-7s had been concluded before Jan. 2, 1968 and he would provide
Farhadi
all pertinent details in near future.
3.
Farhadi
told me he believes King and others realize seriousness of Conte issue and fact that Embassy, as well as executive branch, had no option but to investigate thoroughly and enforce law if facts so indicate. He, therefore, expects full
RGA
cooperation although he has had some difficulties with Pri Min who has appeared very concerned over question

whether amendment constitutes “condition” or political “string” to
US
aid.
4.
I expect to see King within next two weeks (he will be in southern provinces until Oct 11) to follow up these preliminary steps at Fon Off level.
Neumann
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 332
332. Telegram 5218 From the
Embassy in Afghanistan
to the
Department of State
1
2
Kabul
,
October 14, 1969, 0815Z
Conte-Long Amendment
1.
During last week I had additional conversation (Kabul 5090) with
Farhadi
on SU-7 purchase. He passed some info which obtained from minister of defense, but we agreed it would be better get full story from king.
2.
At audience with King Oct. 12 (other subject septels) he reviewed
RGA
military acquisition policy. Said that in 1955 a very detailed 20 year agreement was worked out with Soviets which included overall Afghan force levels, organization, and arms aid. Since that time there have been some changes in force levels (downward) and several delays in implementation, some due to Soviets inability provide equipment at scheduled time and others due
RGA
inability take on additional debts. He said he regretted more than anyone expenditures on defense in view nation’s great development needs and he supported overall objective of Conte Amendment. However, afghanistan, as was true for other countries, needed small effective defense establishment.
3.
Turning to SU-7s, he said firm, written agreement for more sophisticated aircraft made in November 1964.

Planes are provided on thirty year loan including ten year grace period, with latter to start on receipt of aircraft. according 1955 twenty-year plan, MIG 17s were to constitute this particular tranche of aircraft. However, due to earlier Pakistani acquisition F–104s, situation reviewed in Nov. 1964 and Soviets agreed provide MIG 21s. At later date Soviets said SU-7s had advantages in that they could be used in ground support role which potentially very useful for internal security.
Neumann
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 336
336. Telegram 6242 From the
Embassy
in Afghanistan to the
Department of State
1
2
Kabul
,
October 8, 1970, 0810Z

Subject:
PL
–480 Wheat, Title I
Ref
State 142801
1.
Mohseni, Chief, Economic Section
RGA
,
MFA
, Oct. 6, asked
EmbOff
status Washington deliberations on Afghan request for 100,000 mt wheat under
PL
–480, Title I. Mohseni said that he had cable from Ambassador
Malikyar
reporting his call at Department and
MFA
wondering when we would begin negotiations.
Malikyar
reported
USG
could not rpt not supply full tonnage requested due budgetary restrictions but thought 60,000
mt
’s would be possisle. Report added
USG
willing consider remaining amount in next fiscal year.
2.
In the ensuing dicussion, it evolved that
MFA
had not rpt not given consideration to necessity for sufficient lead time to assure Kabul deliveries in March/April. As result this discussion, Embassy and
USAID
/A would appreciate guidance about date on which we could expect to receive negotiating instructions.
3.
EMB
/
AID
believe early conclusion
PL
–480 agreement would have salutary effect on wheat and flour prices which have risen precipitously over levels of year ago. Price increases in three grades of wheat as of Oct 1 compared with same date 1969

were 64 percent, 81 percent and 110 percent: those of wheat flour, 70 percent and 75 percent.
RGA
has successfully sought stem price rises by releasing wheat from food department’s stocks: however our best guesstimate available stocks not rpt not more than 100,000
mt
.
4.
EMB
/
AID
question efficacy of idea, which conveyed to us through official informal channels and which
RGA
now rpt now aware that
RGA
request be split 60,000
mt
FY
71 and 40,000
mt
FY
72, to meet budgetary limitations. We believe that need for full 100,000
mt
in
FY
1971 fully documented and supported by available data. If absolutely impossible to provide full amount do not rpt not judge it wise to tie shortfall to possible subsequent fiscal year requirements. If
RGA
requests
PL
–480 food grains for delivery in fiscal 1972, such request should be considered in terms of requirements and conditions obtaining at that time. It may very well be that shortfall from requested tonnage for fiscal 1971 delivery would be one of such conditions. But let’s not rpt not put ourselves in positions of committing something for next year on basis this year’s need.
Laingen
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 342
342. Information Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (
Van Hollen
) to Acting Secretary of State
Johnson
1
2
Washington
,
August 9, 1971

Drought in Afghanistan
For the second straight year, Afghanistan is faced with a drought which is expected to reduce the wheat crop by up to 25 percent and cause the death of up to 70 percent of the livestock (100 percent in some areas). Since wheat is the basic food in the near subsistence, predominantly agricultural economy of Afghanistan, and the pelts from the Karakul sheep, the largest hard currency earning export of Afghanistan, the drought is considered a major national disaster.
On August 7, Ambassador
Neumann
determined that a disaster of the magnitude to require outside assistance exists in Afghanistan. Under standing emergency authority, he is purchasing small amounts of animal feed and heavy lift pumps in Pakistan. If these can be used effectively in Afghanistan, the Ambassador expects to request additional funding for greater quantities.
On the basis of earlier information on the drought and a preliminary request from the Government of Afghanistan, we have approved the sale of 100,000 tons of wheat to Afghanistan under
PL
–480 Title I. Negotiations should begin this week, and be concluded promptly. Ambassador
Neumann
anticipates a future request for 100,000 tons of Wheat on a grant basis. Since such a request cannot be met under present
PL
–480 Title II ceilings, Congressional action might become necessary.
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 345
345. Telegram 5067 From the
Embassy
in Afghanistan to the
Department of State
1
2
Kabul
,
August 17, 1971, 0933Z

Subject:
Afghan Wheat Requirements
1.
On August 14 Ambassador
Neumann
accompanied by Harvey responded to request from
MinPlan
Sarabi for appointment.
Sarabi
explained that
RGA
estimate of wheat deficit this year based on country-wide survey conducted by
MinAg
and more recent information on current harvest indicated that gap in prospect exceeded 500,000 tons instead of 350,000 tons estimated earlier. He said also other potential suppliers, indicating Canada, Australia but not mentioning
USSR
, apparently were going to be disappointing in their responses to Afghan appeal for concessional wheat supplies. Accordingly
RGA
wished to increase its request to
USG
from 100,000 tons indicated earlier to 250,000 tons on a grant basis.
2.
Ambassador responded that
USG
had been somewhat slow in responding to initial
RGA
request but now emergency appeal of new government had brought quick and definitive response including authorization negotiating long-term credit for 100,000

tons. He urged fastest possible signature this Title I agreement both in order avoid delay in shipment because of probable October 1 strike, and as demonstration of real urgency of need which would be the best support for serious consideration of increased supply.
3.
Sarabi
indicated he understood this but
RGA
currently in extremely thin situation regarding foreign exchange with which finance ocean transport and inland transport. He urgently requested any possible U.S. help with these transport costs which total $4 million or more on 100,000 tons. We explained dim prospect for help on ocean transport but urged
RGA
approach Government of Pakistan as basis
Pak
rupee loan cover inland requirements analysis to justify further shipments and information on plans concerning work project and other direct distribution to poverty stricken population of drought areas as basis for Title II recommendation.
4.
Malikyar
visit reported State 148924 not repeat not reflection this additional request but simply result of his belief based on previous conversation that State/
AID
had not understood that original
RGA
100,000 ton request was for grant.
RGA
here did not share this confusion but instructed him that if he thought he could influence
USG
to provide this wheat as grant, he should try.
5.
In subsequent conversations with
MinPlan
staff and advisors we have emphasized need for above analysis as basis for mission recommendation. We expect these shortly. Stocks are low and need for additional supplies is widespread. Our current hunch is that if imports of at least 300,000 tons cannot be assured for
FY
72 further sharp price increases, commercial panic and widespread suffering in the late winter and spring will result. Requirement for further U.S. supply will depend in large part on availabilities from
USSR
on which any available information would be appreciated ASAP. Anticipate mission recommendation by September 10.
Neumann
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 346
346. Telegram 166666 From the
Department of State
to the
Embassy
in Afghanistan
1
2
Kabul
,
September 10, 1971, 2109Z

Ref:
Kabul’s 542117
Subject:
Debt Relief
In addition to guidance provided in State 153803, you should inform
RGA
as follows:
1.
We understand and sympathize with
RGA
debt problems. However, we support your advice to
RGA
that we cannot agree to any unilateral moratorium on debt obligations. Moratorium unacceptable for both statutory and policy reasons.
2.
USSR
accounts for almost three-quarters of Afghan’s foreign debt and over 50 percent of total debt servicing obligations in 1971 and 1972. Germany, whose debt smaller than ours, scheduled to receive about one-third more in debt service payments than us during these years. [
UK
and Japan are minor creditors]. These statistics indicate that afghan debt problem is multilateral and must be so approached.
Thus,
RGA
should first present its case for debt relief to
IBRD
, institution which primarily concerned with
LDC
debt problems. If convinced of need for debt relief,
IBRD
would then presumably approach creditors on multilateral basis. However, application, or even threat, of unilateral moratorium could adversely prejudice

consideration of Afghan request by
IBRD
and creditors.
Eschenberg of
IBRD
enroute to Kabul for consultations with
RGA
providing timely opportunity for
RGA
to broach debt problem which we understand not yet done.
3.
At same time,
RGA
may wish to discuss with
IMF
stabilization program and possible stand-by credits as is customary with
LDC
’s experiencing debt problems. Stabilization program under current circumstances might take into account domestic Afghan fiscal situation and measures to strengthen balance of payments including controls on exeternal debt.
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 347
347. Telegram 5641 From the
Embassy
in Afghanistan to the
Department of State
1
2
Kabul
,
September 13, 1971, 1305Z

Subject:
Further Drought Relief Wheat
Refs:
A. Kabul 4311
B. Kabul 5067
C. Kabul 5041
D. Kabul 5413
Background and summary: Earlier
RGA
request for 100,000 tons grant wheat based on June crop and requirements estimates showing deficit 390,000 tons and import-distribution program 350,000. Mission fully supported program of this magnitude as a starter, with distribution through government sales channels, indicated need probably understated but even so unlikely be fulfilled, recommended Title I program for the 100,000 tons in interest of speed and anticipated Title II sub-mission shortly (ref A). On basis revised crop estimates at harvest time
RGA
now projects deficit of 538,000 tons and has increased its request to U.S. by 150,000 tons on grant basis (ref B).
RGA
also making considerable effort mount food-for-work program which is expected to take 50,000–70,000 tons wheat, is arranging for quote advance unquote of wheat from normal stocks to start implementing program in five provinces in next few days. Meanwhile supply commitments other donors disappointing. From all appearances a serious gap of at least 150,000 tons remains if further sharp price increases and extensive village famine conditions are to be avoided this winter/spring.

Mission recommends Title II program including freight for 150,000 tons of which 50,000–70,000 tons anticipated requirement for directly administered rural distribution program for work and direct relief, remainder for government rationed, below market sale.
[Omitted here is the five page body of the telegram in which the Embassy supported the recommendation.]
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 351
351. Telegram 7282 From the
Embassy in Afghanistan
to the
Department of State
1
2
Kabul
,
December 4, 1971, 1230Z
Subject:
Conversation With His Majesty and Foreign Minister—Narcotics
Ref:
Kabul 7281
1.
Introduction and summary: I saw His Majesty King Zahir and Foreign Minister
Shafiq
on evening of December 2, separately and together. Both discussed with me Afghanistan’s concern with narcotics. Other subjects
septel
s.
2.
Shafiq
, in response to my observations about
USG
concern on narcotics, noted Secretary
Rogers
’ comments to him in New York and referred to
USIS
press release in Kabul highlighting President
Nixon
’s remarks on subject.
Shafiq
said
RGA
is taking subject very seriously and measures to review situation are under urgent study. He said Cabinet committee will definitely be established as result Cabinet decision at its last meeting. Only step remaining in this regard is selection of members. He stated committee would concentrate on two facets: first, economic and technical steps regarding substitute crops; and, second, improvement of enforcement. He expected foreign assistance would be needed for both.
MFA
will be “operational hub” for
RGA
, not because of its technical competence on subject

but because of urgency and need for coordination with other countries. He said
USG
advice this far greatly appreciated and would be needed in future.
3.
In conversation with His Majesty, I mentioned narcotics and HM noted he aware of
USG
concern and President’s personal interest, adding that he had immediately put
RGA
into action on this subject. He repeated steps taken as reported by
Shafiq
adding that
RGA
takes its responsibility on this subject very seriously and hoped that special Cabinet committee would begin talks on technical level with
USG
and international agencies soon. I reiterated
USG
grave concern about narcotics and deep inroads being made in
US
society. HM responded he understood but that it was not just
US
responsibility. He stated every country morally responsible;
RGA
cannot escape its part of global responsibility; and
RGA
will shoulder its share of burden.
4.
Comment: We have no illusions about
RGA
capability to fulfill any technical responsibilities; but we will take every possible step to ensure these expressions of support on part of highest levels of
RGA
are translated into operational positions by those Ministries and officials concerned.
Neumann
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 355
355. Telegram 884 From the
Embassy in Afghanistan
to the
Department of State
1
2
Kabul
,
February 12, 1972, 1114Z
Ref:
Embassy 772 and 695
1.
As indicated in post’s narcotics control action plan (Kabul A-130, December 13, 1971) page 9, mission decided in concert importance of taking action on narcotics problem in Afghanistan could be brought home to key
RGA
officials through the eyes of foreign press. All indications point to fact this mission campaign is constructive and producing results.
2.
Afghanies, unlike other people are unusually sensitive about what foreign press writes about their country.
3.
Influx of hippies and narcotic trafickers brought with it increased foreign press interest in newly evolving situation in Afghanistan created by both. Afghan hashish enjoys an especially high reputation among world travellers.
4.
Articles both in the
US
and
UK
with times such as quote Embassies kept busy rescuing the drug-frazzled freaks: hippies find Afghanistan a hellish drug heaven: hippies begging like dogs in Afghanistan; hippies sell bodies to Afghans for fix; Britain depicts Afghanistan as center of narcotics; Afghanistan

cracks down on drug users; hippies head for Kabul in all sorts of conveyances; a hippie burial; and Afghanistan: deadly economic opportunity unquote were reproduced in multiple copies by
USIS
and sent to the Prime Minister’s office, Deputy Foreign Minister,
MFA
’s Directors of Information and Economics, leading editor of independent and government newspapers and to President of Publications, MOIC. The Prime Ministers press advisor personally thanked PAO and request that
PM
’s office continue to receive all such articles.
5.
Certain articles were reprinted in independent newspapers; some have undoubted been cause of editorials on narcotics and hippies; and some have undoubtedly been food for thought to leading officials who are attempting to grapple with overall problems of narcotics and hippies.
6.
Afghanistan: Deadly economic opportunity written by Naomi Barry (International Herald Tribune) with cooperation of Embassy and
USIS
officers apparently hit home because it was result of a painful rebuttal from a high commerce ministry official, who is very well known by mission officers. Mrs. Barry ended her article by quoting a worried foreign diplomat quote the Afghans are sensitive people. When the government realizes the kind of reputation it is getting for itself abroad, it may become more severe at home unquote.
7.
The Ambassador also took occasion to emphasize above quote by showing his majesty one of articles when subject of narcotics was discussed.
8.
In addition,
USIS
has carried well over eighty percent of all articles that have been received by post through wireless file in United States bulletin which is distributed to approximately twelve hundred opinion leaders in Afghanistan, including all
RGA
officers concerned with narcotics. Copies of all wireless file stories on narcotics are sent immediately upon receipt to
MFA
Director concerned with subject.
Brescia