Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 320
320. Memorandum From
Douglas M. Cochran
of the Office of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh Affairs to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (
Sisco
)
1
2
Washington
,
December 8, 1972
Subject:
Pakistan: Growing Nervousness
It is certain that in the course of your forthcoming lunch with Pakistani Ambassador
Sultan Khan
you will be made well aware of growing
GOP
uncertainty regarding the state of its relations with the United States. Members of the Pakistan Embassy, including the Ambassador, have impressed upon officers of
NEA
/PAB their concern as to the extent and nature of our relationship. This week’s call on the Secretary by Minister Roy and the Ambassador reflected that concern as well.
There are three distinct areas in which the Pakistanis have been expecting more forthcoming positions on our part:
PL
–480 wheat,
POW
s and arms supply. Our less than maximum response to President
Bhutto
’s personal appeal for
PL
–480 wheat, our virtual silence on the
POW
issue, and our inaction since the election regarding arms supply all contribute to this atmosphere of worry. Anxiety on the latter issue clearly stimulated President
Bhutto
’s assertion to Lewis Simons of
The Washington Post
, reiterated to Consul Velletri in Peshawar, that Pakistan, while modest in its hopes for military supply from the United States, has yet to receive its “due”.
What is basically involved of course are Pakistan’s concerns about and attitudes toward India. And in that context one can understand, though not defend,
Bhutto
’s and
Sultan Khan
’s limited appreciation for the very large support we have provided on the economic side in the period since the war.

The more balanced tone of our recent exchanges with the Indians has simply added to Pakistani concern. In conversation with us on December 3, Ambassador
Khan
referred to the Secretary’s December 1 statement vis-à-vis India and pointedly asked “when are we going to get started?” Referring bluntly to arms, he noted that India can look to its “allies” for help but Pakistan, while it can obtain some assistance from China, seems unable to rely on the United States for even spares to keep its American-supplied tanks and aircraft in operation. We suspect that the Ambassador and Minister Roy went away from their meeting with the Secretary even more concerned that Pakistan was not getting its security concerns across to the
USG
.
Thus we can anticipate that, the probing by the Pakistanis regarding our intentions in regard to a lifting of the arms embargo will continue, culminating it seems to us in indications fairly soon that
Bhutto
will want to come here to talk about what he can expect from us in the security area.
FYI
: We expect to have available by next week a study by the intelligence community on the nature of Pakistan’s military procurement efforts since the war. We are requesting separately an assessment of the impact that our embargo on spares has had on Pakistan’s U.S. equipment inventory—the latter with reference to Ambassador
Khan
’s statement to the Secretary that this equipment is now largely immobile.
(NOTE: We suspect there is also, as far as Ambassador
Sultan Khan
is concerned, some sense of personal frustration in getting things accomplished. He has told both us and others—including Spencer Davis of the
AP
—that he feels he has failed in his mission here.)