AlimurRazi/FRUS-1971-bangladesh huggingface dataset:
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 86
86. Letter From
President Nixon
to Indian
Prime Minister Gandhi
1
Washington
,
July 1, 1971
.
Dear Madame Prime Minister:
Dr.
Kissinger
is visiting New Delhi to discuss United States relations with India and in particular to seek your views on the problem caused by the movement of millions of refugees from East Pakistan into India. As I told your Foreign Minister when I talked with him in the White House on June 16, we are concerned about this problem not only because of its humanitarian aspects, but more importantly because it is a major international issue with implications for all of us. It is because of these implications and our concern for the peace and well being of Asia that we must all devote so much attention to encouraging progress toward a solution.
I hope that the assistance which we have been able to provide in support of the refugees and which has been discussed with your Foreign Minister will help to meet your most pressing immediate needs.
With regard to the need for actions which will make possible a reversal of the refugee flow, we have continued to emphasize that a return to peace and security in East Pakistan and a viable political settlement are crucial to restoration of a more stable situation in South Asia. Dr.
Kissinger
will also be talking to President
Yahya
about this subject and will be delivering a personal message from me. I think there has been some forward movement in this regard over the past several weeks, but there is a need for more.
It is hoped that the recent difficulties over the delivery of arms ordered by Pakistan prior to March 25 will not prevent us from working together to achieve the objectives of peace and prosperity in South Asia, which are in the United Statesʼ interest as well as in Indiaʼs. I understand the nature of your Governmentʼs concern. You can appreciate the essentially restrictive nature of the interim actions we have taken since the civil strife began in East Pakistan. The United States must maintain a constructive relationship with Pakistan so that we may retain some influence in working with them toward important decisions to be made in that country, as we have in the past.

It was a great pleasure for me to have had the opportunity to discuss these issues with your Foreign Minister last month. I very much hope that we can continue to have frank exchanges of views on these matters and that you will be entirely candid with Dr.
Kissinger
in telling him how my government can be of assistance in resolving such complex and difficult problems.
Sincerely,
Richard Nixon
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 87
87. Evening Briefing Notes Prepared for the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (
Kissinger
)
1
Washington
,
July 2, 1971
.
Singh
Conversation with
Kosygin
: [
less than 1 line of source text not declassified
] discussions in early June between Indian Minister of External Affairs
Swaran Singh
and Chairman
Kosygin
resulted in a major political development for India. According to [
name not declassified
],
Kosygin
pledged support for the Indian guerrilla army operating in East Bengal, and, upon receipt of a formal request from India, the Soviets promised a guarantee of military protection to enable India to resist pressure from Communist China. Soviet policy makers, in [
name not declassified
] view, assume a divided Pakistan is no longer politically viable, and that an independent East Bengal is inevitable. [
name not declassified
] believes the Soviets are willing to concede West Pakistan to Chinese influence and to concentrate on backing India and the Bengali independence movement, probably with hopes of securing naval bases in East Bengal and great influence in the Indian Ocean area.
[Omitted here is an assessment of the report prepared by
Samuel Hoskinson
for
Harold Saunders
.
Hoskinson
found the report somewhat surprising but credible. As such, he concluded, it was disturbing: “The most disturbing aspect of the report is that, if
Kosygin
does come through on the guarantees against China, the Indians will feel much less inhibited about attacking East Pakistan.”]
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 88
88. National Security Study Memorandum 133
1
Washington
,
July 2, 1971
.
TO
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director, Central Intelligence
SUBJECT
Contingency Planning on South Asia
The President has directed that a contingency planning paper be prepared concerning the
U.S.
position in light of possible developments in South Asia.
—The paper should include a description of present
U.S.
strategy and steps taken to prevent the outbreak of hostilities. Additional steps in pursuing this strategy that could be considered in coming weeks to prevent or lessen the likelihood of the outbreak of hostilities should be discussed and their pros and cons assessed.
—The paper then should discuss the options open to the United States should hostilities occur.
The study should be prepared by an Ad Hoc Group comprising representatives of the addressees of this memorandum and the
NSC
Staff, chaired by the representative of the Secretary of State. This paper should be submitted by July 12, 1971, for consideration by the Senior Review Group.
Henry A. Kissinger
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 90
90. Memorandum for the Record
1
New Delhi
,
July 6, 1971
.
SUBJECT
Description of
Kissinger
–
Haksar
Talk
Dr.
Kissinger
met alone with Prime Minister
Gandhi
ʼs personal secretary,
P.N. Haksar
, at 6:00 p.m. July 6 in New Delhi. The following represents Dr.
Kissinger
ʼs brief description of the conversation after he returned to the Ashoka Hotel.
Dr.
Kissinger
said he had calmed
Haksar
down.
Haksar
had started critical comments of the
US
policy on arms assistance to Pakistan. Dr.
Kissinger
said he had told
Haksar
that if India were going into a paroxysm over this there was no way in which the
US
could respond. If the Indians could quiet down, the
US
would try to work quietly over the next few months to encourage a settlement of the refugee problem. Dr.
Kissinger
said that
Haksar
conceded that the
US
could not respond to a public furor.
Haksar
said that the government of India had a problem: It did not want to go to war but it did not know how not to go to war.
Later, Dr.
Kissinger
recalled that he had told
Haksar
that he thought the Indians were just making a lot of noise in order to set up

an invasion of East Pakistan. He said that he had suggested that he and
Haksar
talk about “ways not to have a war.”
After further conversation with
Haksar
and Foreign Secretary
Kaul
, at dinner, Dr.
Kissinger
said his assumption is that they are playing power politics with cold calculations. This is quite different from the embassyʼs assumption that this is a genuine Indian feeling against our arms aid to Pakistan. He said that he had told
Haksar
that “we are men of the world.”
Haksar
knows that aid does not make the difference. Even if the
US
shipped all $29 million worth of military equipment, it would not make any difference in the situation. So letʼs stop yelling about something that does not make a difference and talk might.
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 93
93. Editorial Note
Henry Kissinger
ʼs conversations in New Delhi on July 7, 1971, included a significant exchange with Defense Minister
Jagjivan Ram
. At
Kissinger
ʼs request, Ram assessed the Chinese military threat to India.
Kissinger
observed that China might intervene on behalf of Pakistan

if there was a war between India and Pakistan. He assured Ram that the United States would take a grave view of any Chinese move against India. (Memorandum of conversation; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73,
POL
INDIA–
US
) This memorandum is published in
Foreign Relations
, 1969–1976, volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972, Document 139
.
Kissinger
ʼs assurance to Defense Minister Ram contrasts with a warning he purportedly gave to Ambassador
L.K. Jha
on July 17. According to
Kissinger
ʼs appointment book, he met with
Jha
at the Western White House in San Clemente, California, on July 17. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division,
Kissinger
Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–1976, Record of Schedule) An account of this meeting prepared by
Jha
, cited by Seymour Hersh, indicates that
Jha
and
Kissinger
met alone.
Kissinger
apparently did not prepare a record of the meeting. According to
Jha
ʼs report of the meeting, as summarized by Hersh,
Kissinger
conveyed the warning that if war broke out between India and Pakistan and China became involved on Pakistanʼs side, “we would be unable to help you against China.” (Seymour Hersh,
The Price of Power
, New York: Summit Books, 1983, page 452) Intelligence information subsequently obtained from India supports
Jha
ʼs account.
Kissinger
, however, denied issuing such a warning when
Harold Saunders
raised the question on September 7.
Kissinger
and
Jha
ultimately reached agreement on the nature of the exchange in a conversation on September 11; see
Documents 110
,
143
, and
146
.
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 95
95. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (
Haig
) to President
Nixon
1
Washington
,
undated
.
SUBJECT
Dr.
Kissinger
ʼs Talks with Mrs.
Gandhi
and Foreign Minister
Singh
Some additional information concerning Dr.
Kissinger
ʼs meetings with Mrs.
Gandhi
and Foreign Minister
Singh
has been provided in Ambassador
Keating
ʼs reporting cables:
—In a brief initial private session Mrs.
Gandhi
explained her political problems, her desire to avoid the use of force and her concern about Chinese influence in East Pakistan.
—When asked how much time there was before the refugee problem would become unmanageable, Mrs.
Gandhi
said it already was “and we are holding it together by sheer will power.” She added that practically no one in the Indian Parliament approved of her policy.
—Mrs.
Gandhi
said that India was not wedded to any particular solution to the conflict between East and West Pakistan. In fact, she said, it is not an Indo-Pak problem and that India would not be involved except for the refugees.
—Mrs.
Gandhi
asserted that the pattern of the past
U.S.
-Pak relationship has led the Pakistanis to expect
U.S.
support no matter what actions it takes. This, she said, has encouraged a “policy of adventurism” and it is irritating to have the whole survival of the Pakistani state based on antagonism to India.
—Concerning her possible visit to the
U.S.
in November, Mrs.
Gandhi
said she would like to come but could not “breathe a word of it now” or she would be placed in a position where she would have to say “No.”
—In a relaxed, unemotional and cordial atmosphere, much of the same ground was covered with Foreign Minister
Singh
. He made an explicit effort to depersonalize the issue of our own shipments to Pakistan but did emphasize the blow to Indo-
U.S.
relations.
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 98
98. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (
Haig
) to
President Nixon
1
Washington
,
July 9, 1971
.
SUBJECT
Soviet Attitude on South Asia
Recent [
less than 1 line of source text not declassified
] reports
2
provide some insight into Soviet attitudes toward India and Pakistan.
As you know, Indian Foreign Minister
Swaran Singh
visited Moscow on this way to Washington. [1
line of source text not declassified
], his discussions there, especially with
Kosygin
, concerned Soviet assistance on the issue of East Pakistan. According to one report,
Kosygin
agreed immediately to provide small arms for the Indian-supported guerrillas operating in East Pakistan.
3
Singh
also asked for a guarantee of Soviet military protection if the Chinese made any threatening gestures to dissuade India from intervention in East Pakistan.
Kosygin
seemed favorably inclined, although he reportedly asked that Mrs.
Gandhi
make a formal written request.
These reports are a bit surprising since the Soviets have traditionally seen their interests in South Asia best served by stability, or at least they have not encouraged dramatic instabilities. They may well, however, have concluded that a divided Pakistan is no longer viable and that they may as well be on the side of “new realities.” Soviet policy in South Asia has always been to support India, and since 1965 to gain a foothold in Pakistan. They may calculate that this balance is no longer tenable, and that in a crisis Moscow would have to oppose Pakistan. Assurances on the Chinese threat could be viewed as mainly psychological, if the Soviets share our judgment that the Chinese probably would not go beyond threatening noises and border incidents in support of the West Pakistanis.
The most disturbing aspect of this report is that, if
Kosygin
does come through with some guarantee against China, the Indians will feel much less inhibited about military intervention in East Pakistan.
4

Despite all their brave talk about being able to defend against the Chinese and fighting on two other fronts against Pakistan, the Indians are still haunted by the 1962 humiliation. This could be why Foreign Minister
Singh
is reported to regard his Moscow visit as “a major political development” and Mrs.
Gandhi
is said to also be pleased.
We must bear in mind that these reports may be intended as psychological pressure to persuade us and Pakistan of Soviet support for New Delhi. It would be a major and radical break in Soviet policy to issue the Indians a blank check.
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 99
99. Editorial Note
The developing confrontation between India and Pakistan was one of the subjects discussed by Henry
Kissinger
and Chinese Premier Chou En-lai during
Kissinger
ʼs trip to Peking July 9–11, 1971. South Asia was discussed extensively on July 10, the second day of conversations between
Kissinger
and Chou. The United States and China shared a mutual concern about developments in East Pakistan, and
Kissinger
and Chou both saw Indiaʼs hand behind the Bengali resistance that threatened the control of
Yahya Khan
ʼs government over the eastern wing of the country. Chou implied that China would intervene if India acted to undermine Pakistanʼs control over East Pakistan: “In our opinion, if India continues on its present course in disregard of world opinion, it will continue to go on recklessly. We, however, support the stand of Pakistan. This is known to the world. If they (the Indians) are bent on provoking such a situation, then we cannot sit idly by.”
Kissinger
observed in response that, while the United States maintained what he referred to as “friendly relations” with India, the sympathies of the
Nixon
administration also lay with
Yahya Khan
ʼs government. He was more restrained in projecting a
U.S.
response to military action by India in East Pakistan: “You know from President
Yahya Khan
the strong friendship we feel for him and his country. We strongly oppose any military action to solve the problems of East Pakistan. And if India takes military action in East Pakistan, we would strongly and publicly disapprove of it.” (Memorandum of conversation, July 10; National Archives,
Nixon
Presidential Materials,
NSC
Files, Box 1032, Files for the President, China Materials, Polo I Record) The full text of the memorandum is scheduled for publication in
Foreign Relations
, 1969–1976, volume XVII, China, 1969–1972.
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 107
107. Telegram From
the Department of State
to
the Embassy in Pakistan
1
Washington
,
July 24, 1971, 1035Z
.
134643. 1. Following is uncleared memcon,
FYI
only,
Noforn
, subject to revision upon review.
2. During Ambassador
Hilaly
ʼs call on Secretary July 23 (
septel
),
2
Hilaly
raised two requests in economic field; i.e., request that
USG
expedite movement additional
PL
480 wheat and provide additional funds for leasing coastal vessels. He had told
NESA
Administrator
MacDonald
this morning of his impression that some
AID
people were “dragging their feet” on wheat shipments and issuance of
PA
ʼs and had made strong case for expeditious wheat movement.
GOP
was concerned about possible food shortage later in year and worried that possible
US
port strike in September would complicate movements if maximum

effort not made now to get additional wheat on its way.
Van Hollen
injected that we well aware of possible shortages. We would keep pipeline full and would look promptly at request for more coastal vessels. However,
US
seriously concerned about need speed distribution system East Pakistan.
Hilaly
said whatever the facts on congestion in Pak ports and transportation system, it would be better if wheat were tied up in Pak ports than in ports in
US
. It was unrealistic to expect that “every knot should be tied” before additional
PL
480 wheat “for which we have signed” is moved.
3. On coastal vessels
Hilaly
said
GOP
needed an additional one to two million dollars from
US
to hire up to half dozen coastal vessels of 3,000 ton capacity each. He had also raised this with
MacDonald
as important additional step that could be taken to avert difficulties later. Secretary assured
Hilaly
we would actively consider his requests, noting that if famine does in fact develop later in year and food is here and not in Pakistan, then we would also be subject heavy public criticism.
4. Ambassador made brief reference to articles todayʼs press quoting contents of Department cables on possible food shortages East Pakistan. Secretary assured
Hilaly
we equally concerned over unauthorized disclosure this cable traffic and had said so in statement to press. Ambassador said he had written Senator
Kennedy
strong letter of concern about news stories and particularly over language therein that some of Senatorʼs aides would shortly be visiting refugee camps India and “will try to enter East Pakistan” as well. He had reminded Senator that no one from his staff had applied for visas and that
GOP
could not be responsible for what might happen to such individuals should they attempt unauthorized entry across East Pakistan borders.
Comment:
We plan call in
Hilaly
next week to apprise him fully of steps being taken by
USG
and to urge upon him essential need for
GOP
to take urgent steps on its side to put
USG
resources effectively to use.
Rogers
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 108
108. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between President
Nixon
and His Assistant for National Security Affairs (
Kissinger
)
1
Washington
,
July 27, 1971, 7:20 p.m.
P: Working late?
K
: Yes, I am going over some papers.
P: Anything new?
K
: Nothing of any consequence.
P: A lot of stuff to catch up on I guess.
K
: Thereʼs a certain routine.
P: Terrific, I know.
K
: It keeps piling up. Thereʼs still a lot of congratulatory mail
2
coming in.
P: Good, good. You know the one thing we want to do is to be fair—we will probably be getting a question on the India/Pakistan thing. We really want to—we sure donʼt want to hurt our friends.
K
: No, we certainly donʼt. Being fed by the—.
P: I know, the Indians. Awful but they are getting some assistance from
Keating
, of course.
K
: A lot of assistance; he is practically their mouthpiece.
P: I talked to Bill [
Rogers
] in California while I was waiting for you. He is down on
Keating
; he is a total mouthpiece for the Indians.
K
: He has gone native. As I told you, I saw the Indians and listened to their complaints and
Keating
kept interrupting and saying but you forgot to mention this or that.
P: I think we ought to get moving on him; he is 71 years old.
K
: Yes, but he would do us a lot of damage now. We should wait until things quiet down.
P: Two or 3 months and then I think we ought to do it.
K
: I will make it clear with the Indians that there isnʼt going to be a war.
P: They had had this plan—covers planned [
sic
] long before this.

K
: They have certainly been more respectful since this trip. I have asked
Sisco
to prepare a scenario of how we could handle this situation. I will talk to
Farland
tomorrow; and within this next week we will have a proposal for you. The problem—no military aid to Pakistan, they are not even getting economic aid. If anything will tempt the Indians to attack, it will be the complete helplessness of Pakistan.
P: After all they have done, we just arenʼt going to let that happen.
K
: Right, right.
[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to South Asia.]
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 110
110. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence
Helms
to the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (
Kissinger
)
1
Washington
,
Jul 29, 1971
.
SUBJECT
Indian Reaction to Statement Attributed to You about
U.S.
Response in the Event of Indian Military Action in Bangla Desh
Following is an account [
2 lines of source text not declassified
] concerning a recent talk you had with Indian Ambassador
L.K. Jha
in Washington. This information will be given no further distribution unless you wish it.
1.
[
name not declassified
] said that in a recent conversation held in Washington, Dr.
Kissinger
had made clear to Ambassador
Jha
that the United States Government (
USG
) would consider any Chinese invasion of India in response to any Indian action in the Bangla Desh context as entirely different from the Chinese invasion in 1962, and that the
USG
would provide no support to India, either military or political, in that event.
2.
[
name not declassified
] remarked that while this was causing considerable concern at the highest levels of the Government of India (
GOI
), it was not being taken at those levels as a deliberate anti-Indian move on the part of the
USG
. According to [
name not declassified
], the leadership levels of the
GOI
believe that cautious steps toward normalization of
U.S.
-Chinese relations is to the net advantage of India and South Asia. [
name not declassified
] also remarked, however, that Dr.
Kissinger
ʼs statement would be taken as an intentional anti-India posture on the part of the
USG
by the lower levels of
MEA
and by the Indian public if and when they learned of it.
Dick
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations