AlimurRazi/FRUS-1971-bangladesh huggingface dataset:
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 242
242. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State
Rogers
and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (
Kissinger
)
1
2
Washington
,
March 29, 1972, 11:30 a.m.
R: The Pakistan minister you are going to see later today?
K: I don’t know what about.
R: He is going to give you a hard sell on renewing supply of military equipment to Pakistan.
K: That’s not on.
R: He said they have to have arms to negotiate with India. He will give you the hard sell. I told him this was a Presidential decision and under the circumstances it was tough for us to consider such a program. I think encouragement would be harmful.
K: I won’t give him any. I have serious doubts that even the President, who is very pro-Pakistan is even thinking about it.
[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to South Asia.]
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 245
245. Telegram 2923 From the
Embassy in Pakistan
to the
Department of State
1
2
Islamabad
,
April 4, 1972, 0708Z
Subj:
Bhutto
’s Comments on Size of
Pak
Military and U.S. Military Supply
Ref:
Islamabad 2707 and 2879; State 56055
1.
During my meeting with Pres.
Bhutto
at his Karachi home on April 3, I referred to recent visit to Washington by MFA Sec Gen
Aziz Ahmed
. I noted that Ahmed had made rather hardline presentation on Soviet intentions in subcontinent and had expressed urgent need for substantial quantity of U.S. arms on soft terms. I said I had been struck by what seemed to me to be divergence between line taken by Ahmed and emphasis which
Bhutto
himself had been putting on primary need for breakthrough to peaceful and honorable settlement with India. Referring also to recent request by Amb.
Raza
for U.S. arms, I asked
Bhutto
if he could elucidate.
2.
Bhutto
said that his senior military leaders kept pressing to make good some obvious gaps in defense structure and for acquisition of some “sophisticated” weapons. He was not in position to ignore the military, as I knew, and he had thought it advisable to forward requests for defense equipment from U.S., which was held to be only logical source for some types of equipment. At same time,
Bhutto
said, he had told his military advisers that he did not think a positive response could be expected from
USG
until at least

after November elections. He did not intend to press us until after elections. On other hand, Bhutto went on, there was real problem in keeping operational the old equipment which Pakistan had received from U.S., and he hoped that we would be able to loosen up soon in supply of spare parts. (Comment: Latter position is identical with that taken with me by
GOP
FonSec
during our last meeting on April 1.)
3.
As for Aziz Ahmed, Bhutto said that he had counselled him not to point his finger and admonish people he would be talking to during his current travel abroad. But Ahmed is over 65 and doubtless finds it difficult to change his general approach and method of operations.
Bhutto
seemed to be implying that we should not take too seriously all of what Ahmed had said to us in Washington.
4.
Bhutto
reaffirmed his principal aim in relations with India is to achieve honorable political settlement that will open way to an era of peace. He acknowledged clear awareness that
GOP
cannot meet cumulative claims for maintenance of military budget at about recent levels and also pay for costly domestic reforms and development needs to which he is committed. He wanted to see a reduction in
Pak
military budget, but it would depend on India, he added, whether such a cut would be possible.
Sober
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 252
252. Telegram 67415 From the
Department of State
to the
Embassy in India
1
2
Washington
,
April 19, 1972, 1650Z

1.
We take serious exception to Foreign Minister’s April 17 statement in Parliament in regard to Vietnam. We consider this official
GOI
policy statement is most disturbing indication of Indian attitude regarding matter of great interest to USG.
2.
Therefore Ambassador should seek urgent appointment with Foreign Minister to discuss
GOI
statement. Ambassador should say we consider this particularly unbalanced comment on matter of very great interest to USG. We regard this statement as a further unfriendly act on part of GOI. FonMin’s statement is especially unfortunate in light of earlier
USG
demarche to Indian Ambassador in Washington.
3.
As further indication of seriousness with which
USG
views Indian Vietnam policy, for next two weeks Ambassador should hold to minimum his contacts with Indian officials and maintain formal stance during such contacts. For this period Ambassador should attend no social events hosted by
GOI
officials.
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 250
250. Memorandum From
Harold Saunders
of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (
Kissinger
)
1
2
Washington
,
April 18, 1972
SUBJECT:
Congressional Presentation on Indian Aid Program—Instructions to
Keating
You will recall that at the Monday
SRG
on South Asia it was mentioned that a telegram should be sent to New Delhi to put Ambassador
Keating
in a position to explain the presentation of the Indian aid program to the Congress.
As you know, that presentation will carry a “provisional” figure of $90 million for India for
FY
1973. This presentation will go to the Congress tomorrow (Wednesday) and we need to give Ambassador
Keating
an explanation of our procedure that is consistent with our interests.
A State Department telegram is in the process of clearance which, after simply quoting the language of the Congressional presentation, would have
Keating
tell the Minister of Finance that we have “agreed on this provisional allocation for the Indian program and on the unallocated reserve for development lending in Asia in order to keep our options open while our economic assistance relationship is under review.” If asked about the status of our aid program,
Keating
would be instructed to say that it remains unchanged.
The argument for having
Keating
make this kind of presentation is at least to get our reasoning to the Indian government directly so that it does not have to be filtered through the press. We cannot expect a reasonable reaction in any case and the present atmosphere resulting from their reaction over Vietnam will not make it any more so, but at least we will have put the truth on the record.
RECOMMENDATION: That you authorize us to clear this instruction to
Keating
tonight so as to give the embassy time to make a pre-emptive approach.
Approve
Other
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 253
253. Telegram 67420 From the
Department of State
to the
Embassy in India
1
2
Washington
,
April 19, 1972, 1650Z
Subject:
AID Presentation Paper for
FY
1973
1.
Unclassified
AID
presentation paper for
FY
1973 will be submitted to Congress April 20 and likely to receive press attention soon thereafter. This document will carry figure of dols. 75 million for Pakistan, provisional figure of dols. 90 million for India, and unallocated amount of dols. 110 million to support development programs in eligible Asian countries. Concerning India document will state quote in regard to India, U.S. economic assistance relatios [] relationships are under review. Indian leadership is placing increasing emphasis on self-reliance and seeks to reduce the country’s dependence upon economic aid from foreign nations. The dols. 90 million in development loans provisionally carried for India in the
FY
1973 program reflects all these current uncertainties. End quote. In regard to unallocated amount document will state quote the development loan request for
FY
1973 includes an unallocated amount of dols. 110 million to support development programs in eligible Asian countries identified here. The fluid situation in South Asia is a major factor in this treatment. The loan proposal for Pakistan could be a minimum considering the economic disruption caused by the war and the loss of East Pakistan. As noted above, U.S. economic assistance for India is under review. There are also claims for development loans by the South Asian neighbors of India and Pakistan,

as well as other Asian countries. End quote. Thereafter document lists following countries as possible additional recipients: Ceylon, Nepal, Afghanistan, Korea, Philippines, Indonesia.
2.
Because above text likely raise questions regarding U.S. intentions within GOI, Embassy should inform both Ministry External Affairs and Ministry of Finance at Joint Secretary level prior April 20 of planned submittal of
AID
document to Congress. Embassy should read above quoted sections of
AID
presentation paper to
GOI
officials. Embassy should also explain to officials that we have agreed upon this provisional repeat provisional allocation for India and unallocated amount for Asian countries in order to keep options open while economic assistance relationships with India continue under review. Decisions on allocation will depend on results of that review and on circumstances at the time, and you should make clear that no inference should be drawn one way or the other regarding what amounts, if any, might be made available. Should
GOI
officials inquire regarding present status U.S. aid for India [e.g., dols. 87 million suspension], Embassy should reply situation remains unchanged.
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 254
254. Telegram 4957 From the
Embassy in India
to the
Department of State
1
2
New Delhi
,
April 20, 1972, 1426Z
Subj:
Department’s Instructions Contained State 067415
1.
I have appointment with Foreign Minister
Swaran Singh
at 1100 hours local April 21 to carry out instructions contained subject telegram and in the absence of any further word from the Department will carry out those instructions to the letter.
2.
I feel I owe it to the Department, however, to call to your attention certain aspects which have probably been considered but may possibly have been overlooked. The points I wish to be sure the Department has considered are as follows:
A.
Implicit in instructions would appear to be assumption that Indian position on Viet-Nam is of considerable if not critical importance to USG. Making demarche as instructed as I see it will only contribute to Indian illussion that this is the case. In fact, I believe
GOI
position on Viet-Nam is irrelevant to the issue and relatively meaningless in the rest of Asia. I regret seeing it dignified.
B.
Effect of instructions on
GOI
in my judgement may again be to push Indians farther in Soviet direction. I question whether this is in our self-interest.
C.
Lest there be any illusion to the contrary, Department must be aware that given its present frame of mind
GOI
is not about to alter its position because we ask them to do so. If anything, in present climate they are excessively and proudly independent and wish to proclaim their independence to the world,
GOI
position will not be altered through my demarche.
D.
Department’s instructions obviously not conducive to development of a meaningful dialogue directed at improving our relations if that is in fact Department’s desire. There

may be reasons of which I am unaware why that is not rpt not desired at this time.
3.
If Department nevertheless wishes me to carry out instructions I suggest consideration be given to deleting language qte we regard this statement as a further unfriendly act on part of
GOI
unqte. Such language in context para 2A above strikes me as being somewhat overdrawn.
4.
I want to assure Department that I can fully appreciate irritation caused when a leading
GOI
official enunciates a policy which is so much at variance with ours on a matter of direct and critical importance to us. My only concern is that our reaction be consummate with our own long-term interest.
5.
Should Department wish to modify instructions in any way, I would appreciate their being slugged immediate for delivery at open of business April 21.
Keating
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 255
255. Telegram 69080 From the
Department of State
to the
Embassy in India
1
2
Washington
,
April 21, 1972, 0126Z
Ref:
New Delhi 4957
Subject:
Ambassador’s Talk With Foreign Minister on Vietnam
1.
We have reviewed our instructions in light of your comments
reftel
and believe some of your arguments are compelling. In particular we agree strong demarche to Indians might contribute to Indian illusion that their position on Vietnam is of great importance to USG. Further, for
USG
to react to additional unfavorable Indian statement only by terming it as further unfriendly act could be interpreted as sign of weakness on our part.
2.
Nevertheless, we do not believe we can permit
Swaran Singh
April 17 statement to pass without strong
US
objection. Accordingly, you should keep your appointment with Foreign Minister, inform him we consider his statement particularly unbalanced, and state
US
case firmly, drawing from Secretary’s testimony before Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
3.
You should also carry out instructions para 3, State 067415, in regard social and business contacts with Indian officials.
4.
We have just noted ticker report that Mrs.
Gandhi
also has made statement on Vietnam. If appropriate, you should refer to this statement in your meeting with Foreign Minister.
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 260
260. Telegram 5704 From the
Embassy in India
to the
Department of State
1
2
New Delhi
,
May 8, 1972, 1445Z
Subject:
Meeting With
DEA
re Economic Aid
1.
AID Director Houston was summoned to
DEA
May 8 for “urgent message”. Joint Secretary S. Krishnaswami advised that with I.G.W Patel in Montreal and M.G.
Kaul
in Santiago he had been instructed to deliver the following message which would also be given to State/AID by Ambassador
Jha
.
2.
Holding a typewritten paper but scarcely glancing at it, Krishnaswami said the
US
“economic aid” had been discussed extensively by his Ministry since the calls here and in Washington to advise the
GOI
of no development loans in
FY
72 and “provisional” development loans of dols 90 million for
FY
73 in the congressional presentation.
3.
Krishnaswami said the Ministry felt that the manner in which the
GOI
had been advised had been done to put special emphasis on the drastic cut in USAID. This, together with use of the word “provisional” led the Ministry to the conclusion that the “
USG
is no longer interested in the further economic development of india. Would
USAID
therefore remove all Americans working on economic aid at the earliest and hopefully within one month?” Houston commented that he did not believe
USG
disinterest was an accurate conclusion, but Krishnaswami repeated that he “was under instructions to give the message as stated”.
4.
Proceeding to details, Krishnaswami said in reply to Houston’s question that “technical assistance personnel were not involved at present. We will make a decision on technical assistance later”. Houston explained that there are almost no people working exclusively on “economic aid” but that we would make a serious attempt to comply with the
GOI
request.
5.
Krishnaswami was asked whether the
GOI
wished to have the executive and legislative branches of the
USG
advised widely of the
GOI
decision. He replied that no information would be released here, and he hoped not in Washington. Houston reminded him that Congress would be interested to know the situation as the
AID
bills are considered. Krishnaswami was then asked whether the
GOI
would accept dols 90 million if appropriated and offered. He answered he wanted it to be clear that the
GOI
was not rpt not rejecting today either dols 90 million or a possible resumption of the dols 87.6 million suspended loan. However, acceptance, if offered, would be considered when the
GOI
could see what “conditions” there might be. FYI: The
GOI
are still very sensitive about the unilateral suspension of what they consider to be a firm
USG
commitment. End FYI.
6.
Comment: Joint Secretary Krishnaswami was an Eisenhower Fellow in the U.S. in early 1971. We consider him to be very sympathetic to the U.S., and there can be no doubt he was acting under instructions. Mission proceeding to careful evaluation of personnel involved, and will advise soonest. Exempt from decontrol.
Keating
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 261
261. Telegram 83263 From the
Department of State
to the
Embassy in India
1
2
Washington
,
May 11, 1972, 2350Z
Subject:
AID Staff in India
Ref:
New Delhi 574
1.
We are considering the implications of Ministry of Finance request that
USAID
remove from India all Americans working on economic aid at early date. We do not wish in any way to suggest that we question this request or that we are reluctant to move in the direction suggested. We believe that the best tactics would be to indicate response for phased reduction of
AID
staff in India in line with mutually agreed priorities.
2.
We suggest
AID
Director return to Ministry of Finance and take following line:
A.
USG
considers Indian request a constructive proposal.
USG
does not wish maintain staff in any country which is not essential to program. We therefore propose USG-
GOI
consultations designed to produce mutually agreed reduction of
AID
staff taking into consideration Indian and
US
priorities for various programs.
B.
We suggest staff reductions not necessarily be limited to quote Americans working on economic aid unquote. As Mission Director told Krishnaswami, there are few if any
AID
personnel exclusively in that category. We propose that we indicate willingness for reduction of all

categories
AID
personnel not fully employed or not essential for mutually agreed program objectives.
C.
We suggest consultation with Ministry of Finance so that we may take carefully into account Indian and
US
priorities in regard to technical assistance and other
AID
activities.
D.
We are quite flexible in regard to the extent of personnel reductions and would welcome Ministry of Finance views on this subject.
E.
We note remarks by Krishnaswami regarding possible resumption of suspended or new aid. It should be made clear to
GOI
that favorable consideration for
AID
staff reductions carries with it no significance one way or the other in regard to resumption of aid. It is simply recognition of change in current status of ongoing program which we believe meets desires of both countries.
F.
We agree fully these discussions should be held very closely pending mutual agreement on
AID
staff reductions and plan limit information in Washington on strictly need-to-know basis.
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 262
262. Telegram 5892 From the
Embassy in India
to the
Department of State
1
2
New Delhi
,
May 12, 1972, 0835Z
Subj:
Second Meeting With
DEA
re American Personnel Working on Economic Aid—May 11, 1972
Ref:
New Delhi 5704
1.
AID Director Houston, accompanied by Deputy Director, called on
DEA
Joint Secretary S. Krishnaswami in follow-up of meeting reported reftel. Purpose of meeting was to advise
DEA
of American personnel directly involved in economic aid and who would be leaving India if
GOI
elected to proceed along lines of reftel. A list of all repeat all American personnel was left with Krishnaswami with indications of those who work primarily on the development of economic aid proposals including program loans and sector loans. Personnel list was also marked to indicate all other Americans scheduled to depart India between now and September without being replaced. (Total 59).
2.
Those indicated as working primarily on the development of economic aid were Clarence Gulick, David Mandel, and the potential replacement for Lester Hook’s position for handling operational aspects of non-project loans. It was explained that the remaining personnel in capital development and economic affairs were needed for other mission requirements such as monitoring existing loans and economic analysis and reporting. Other personnel, although contributing occasionally to economic aid portion of program, work primarily on technical assistance.
3.
Krishnaswami stated
DEA
wished to review the lists submitted and would advise us concerning their views sometime next week. No action was requested of us at this time.
4.
Director Houston commented that there also are Indian personnel associated with economic aid and agreed to provide a list of local-hire personnel comparable to list submitted of U.S. personnel.
Keating
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 263
263. Telegram 85263 From the
Department of State
to the
Embassy in India
1
2
Washington
,
May 16, 1972, 0035Z
Subject:
AID Staff in India
1.
We believe it is important that Ministry of Finance be aware that Indian request for reduction of
US
AID
staff has been carefully considered by Washington. Therefore
AID
Director should return promptly to
DEA
and convey instructions in State 9819, making clear our desire to consider jointly with Ministry of Finance minimum staffing needs in all categories of personnel, including technical assistance, to meet Indian and U.S. priorities for various programs.
2.
We note that mission has informed Ministry that fifty-nine Americans on
US
AID
staff will depart by next September without being replaced. Joint review with
GOI
should therefore focus on remaining staff. We wish to follow course of these discussions carefully. Embassy should therefore report fully discussions with
GOI
officials.