Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 79
79. Telegram 7754 From the
Embassy in Pakistan
to the
Department of State
1
2
Rawalpindi
,
October 1, 1970, 1005Z

Subj:
Military Supply-
GOP
Informed
Ref:
State 160440
1.
I called at 1000 hours local time October 1 on additional Foreign Secretary
M.A. Alvie
and Defense Secretary Ghias Uddin Ahmed to convey message reftel. I had decided seek meeting with
Alvie
(senior
MFA
officer present) upon learning that Foreign Secretary
Sultan Khan
would not be back in town for couple more days. In accordance my provisional understanding with
Sultan
before he left for Nepal: I had informed
Alvie
that matter to be discussed was also of interest to DefSec.
Alvie
thereupon asked me meet him at DefsSc’s office. Meeting was shifted to DefSec’s home as result closing
GOP
offices October 1 out of respect for Nasser.
2.
I apologized for asking for meeting when
GOP
offices closed down. Said I knew they had been waiting for word to proceed on our military supply decision. We had notified
GOI
last night (local time here) and wished to insure that first word reached
GOP
from us directly and officially.
3.
I said Executive Branch had informed Congress on Sept. 29 of President
Nixon
’s decision to offer sell certain items of military equipment on cash basis to Pakistan, as one-time exception to present policy. This was first practicable opportunity to inform Congress this subject in view of numerous difficult problems involving the Congress of which
GOP
was

aware. We had been deeply appreciative of importance
GOP
attached to getting on with implementation of President
Nixon
’s decision as conveyed by Ambassador
Farland
to President
Yahya
on June 20.
4.
Yesterday, I said, we had informed the
GOI
on President’s decision in general terms, as Ambassador
Farland
had told
Yahya
we would.
5.
On return from his present trip to Europe, I said President
Nixon
intends convey sales offer formally by letter to
Yahya
. Letter will be presented by Ambassador
Farland
on his return to Pakistan in latter part of October. Meanwhile, I said, in the interest of moving ahead expeditiously with planning, we were prepared to begin confidential discussion with appropriate persons in
GOP
. Discussion would concern details of sales offer such as type and quantities of materiel and alternatives available (e.g. type of fighter aircraft and maritime patrol sources of APCs), specifications, cost estimates and terms of sales.
US
Defense rep will have primary responsibility on
US
side under my guidance (and Ambassador’s guidance after his return) for working out procurement arrangements with
Pak
counterparts. I said we desired strongly to avoid publicity of any kind on this subject. We urged
GOP
to maintain confidence in interest of military security as well as for political reasons. I added that, if leaks should nevertheless occur, we would wish consult immediately with
GOP
regarding press handling.
6.
After quietly absorbing above and expressing immediate pleasure, Alvie and DefSec said they would not be surprised if the info were leaked by
GOI
, to be followed by strong Indian press reaction. Both agreed that
GOP
understood our interest in keeping matter secret and did not anticipate any serious problem with Pakistani press. If there should be Indian press leak,
GOP
would keep silent, neither confirm nor deny, and consult with us. I said we had also urged on
GOI
the need to withhold publicity and our desire to consult with it on handling if matter should become public knowledge.
7.
DefSec asked what we had told Indians about nature of

our decision. I said
GOI
had been told that equipment being offered to Pakistan consists of a few aircraft, largely replacements for previously supplied
US
aircraft and some armored transport vehicles. DefSec said he had no problem with that message to
GOI
.
8.
DefSec said
GOP
had financial problems and would need some accommodation regarding qte terms of sales unqte. He asked whether these sales would fall under limited credit facilities which Pakistan has enjoyed for certain types of (non-lethal) equipment. I replied that our present offer of sale, as Ambassador had told
Yahya
last June, was on cash basis. DefSec wondered whether terms would be similar to those now available for “cash” purchases of lethal spares. I replied that would have to be determined in course discussions between our military reps on details of sales offer.
9.
Defsec asked whether Conte-Long provisions would apply to current sales offer. I said it was my understanding that future of Conte-Long was uncertain. I understood provision had been eliminated from version of appropriations bill passed by one house but that action still required by second house. Said I could not predict what final action would be, but appreciated
Pak
concern and we would be consulting with them as situation clarified.
10.
In interest of rapid action DefSec said he would be talking in next couple days with Army Chief Hamid, Air
CINC
Rahim and Navy
CINC
Muzaffar Hasan about our offer. He will ask them to nominate representatives who, together with major general Inamul Haq (MinDef Director General of Defense Procurement), will form
Pak
team for discussion with
US
Def rep. He asked that latter call him early next week to arrange first meeting with
Pak
military reps.
11.
As meeting closed, both Alvie and DefSec reiteriated pleasure that we had now found it possible move forward on President’s decision conveyed to
GOP
last June. I said I shared their hope that we could make rapid progress in working out details. (In latter connection we would appreciate early receipt of separate messages concerning various items in package as referred to in para. 2D reftel).
Sober
Contents
Press Release
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations