AlimurRazi/FRUS-1971-bangladesh huggingface dataset:
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 176
176. Telegram 12414 From the
Embassy in Pakistan
to the
Department of State
1
2
Islamabad
,
December 12, 1971, 0825Z

Subj:
Meeting With Pres.
Yahya
December 12
Ref:
State 2227031: State 223266
1.
I met with Pres.
Yahya Khan
in his residence at 10:30 hrs local December 12. The Foreign Secretary,
Sultan Khan
, was present during the entire meeting. The President appeared tired and somewhat strained, but exhibited more morale than I would have anticipated.
2.
The conversation began with a general discussion of the military situation in both East and West Pakistan. The President said that Pakistani troops had been forced back toward and into Dacca, where, unless a ceasefire was agreed upon, they would have to stage a last-ditch defense. In West Pakistan, he said, the general situation, was static. Although they had experienced several limited successes in Kashmir. He added that the air force continued to quote serve magnificently unquote.
3.
Moving to the subject of a ceasefire, I then referred to State
reftel
223266 (also reported Islamabad 12355), and asked
Yahya
if he could give me an explianation why General Faman Ali’s ceasefire offer had been replaced by less comprehensive offer from Governor Malik.

The President, after looking hard at the Foreign Secretary, said that there had been a breakdown of communications and apparently some qte general misunderstandings unqte. He added that the Foreign Secretary was rectifying this situation. (This matter had obviously flapped and further inquires seemed inappropriate.)
4.
Also on the matter of a ceasefire, I asked
Yahya
if he would care to give me his view thereon.
Yahya
said that he was prepared to do qte anything reasonable under the circumstances unqte. He went on to say that today’s Pakistan Times carried a Foreign Office spokesman’s statement qte that Pakistan had accepted the General Assembly resolution in its totality unqte. He added that, in view of the fact that 104 nations had supported the General Assembly resolution, presumably this position should be considered a reasonable one.
5.
Conversation concluded with my statements that we would like to be helpful vis-a-vis the
UN
with communications, and otherwise to do what we can to bring about an end to the conflict and to preserve Pakistan territorial integrity and armed forces in the west.
Farland
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 184
184. Telegram 5627 From the
Consulate General in Dacca
to the
Department of State
1
2
Dacca
,
December 14, 1971, 0408Z

Subject:
Possible Cease-fire in East
1.
This morning, at Governor Malik’s request, I met with him and Major General Rao Farman Ali, to discuss possibility of cease-fire in east and some form of arrangement with Indian Army and Mukti Bahini to avoid “bloodbath”.
2.
Farman Ali stated that
Pak
Army in east outnumbered and cut off, and while it might hold out for three or four days had no hope beyond that. He said that he saw no real possibility for help from any outside source and he had come to conclusion that most important thing in present circumstances was to avoid indiscriminate killing. He agreed with my suggestion that if such an attempt were to be made, it was better to make it before street-by-street fighting began in Dacca.
3.
Farman asked whether I was in a position to communicate speedily with Washington, Islamabad and Calcutta. I assured him I was. He and Governor thereupon said that they would present to me within next few hours specific proposals for cease-fire which they wished me to put forward through
USG
to Indians. I told them that I was available at any time.
4.
Comment: From nature of general conversation it

appears to me that they are leaning toward idea in first instance, of regrouping of all
Pak
forces at places in
EP
specified by Indians under agreement that those forces would engage in no military operations during discussion of more permanent cease fire arrangements. Farman Ali is still reluctant to face up to word “surender”, and he hopes that
Pak
forces will be able retain their arms, even though they may have to turn over all ammunition to Indians.
5.
I specified to the General and the Governor that any message they asked me to send must be authoritatively signed. They assured me there would be no question about that: message would bear their two signatures as well as that of General Niazi and would be approved by President
Yahya
before it reached me.
Spivack
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 185
185. Telegram 5628 From the
Consulate General in Dacca
to the
Department of State
1
2
Dacca
,
December 14, 1971, 0441Z

Subject:
Possible Cease-fire in East
Ref:
Dacca 5627
1.
Governor Malik has just telephoned to say that General Niazi has stated that negotiations are taking place in Islamabad between central government and Ambassador Farland and that there is no need for me to convey any proposals.
2.
Comment: From foregoing, there still appears to be strong difference of opinion betwee Niazi and Farman with Governor oscillating feebly between. Farman obviously desires to initiate some kind of action on basis his appreciation of what he considers desperate local situation. Niazi, whether on instructions from Islamabad or in line with his own romantic view of himself as dedicated soldier, is opposed. In effect, question boils down to whether
Pak
Army in east is to be sacrificed, together with uncounted thousands of civilians in East Pakistan in order to retain some bargaining position in west.
Spivack
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 187
187. Central Intelligence Agency Information Cable TDCS–315/07612–71
1
2
Washington
,
December 15, 1971
Subject:
High-level Indian Government Official’s Comments on the Visit to India of Vasily Kuznetsov, Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister
Country:
India, Pakistan,
USSR
, China
DOI:
15 December 1971
ACQ:
[
text not declassified
]
Source:
[
text not declassified
] His information is reliable and accurate. [
text not declassified
]
1.
On 15 December 1971 the high-level government official described above stated that Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister

Vasily Kuznetsov arrived in India on 12 December to discuss the political recognition of Bangladesh by the Soviet Union. The Indian Government official said that the Government of India had asked the Soviet Union to grant political recognition to Bangladesh and immediately thereafter to sign a defense treaty with the newly-installed government. Kuznetsov has told Indian officials that the Soviet Union is not prepared to recognize Bangladesh until Dacca falls and until the Indian Army successfully liberates Bangladesh from Pakistani forces. Kuznetsov added that, if the
USSR
is to retain whatever small influence it still has in Pakistan, it cannot recognize Bangladesh until these conditions are met.
2.
According to the Indian official, the Soviet Union is impatient with the Indian armed forces for their inability to liberate Bangladesh within the ten-day time frame mentioned before the outbreak of hostilities. Kuznetsov has told the Indians that the Soviet position in the Security Council of opposing a cease-fire become more untenable the longer the war goes on in the east. Which Kuznetsov said the Soviet Union will continue to use its veto to stall any efforts to bring about a cease-fire for the present,

he stressed the importance of quick and decisive Indian action in liberating Bangladesh in the shortest time possible.
3.
Kuznetsov delayed his scheduled return to Moscow because he is awaiting special instructions for
Leonid Brezhnev
, General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, regarding India’s request that the Soviet Union sign a defense agreement with the Bangladesh Government after Soviet recognition of Bangladesh. According to Kuznetsov,
Brezhnev
was not in Moscow when Kuznetsov sent him the request for guidance.
4.
Kuznetsov also discussed with Indian leaders the threat of Chinese intervention. The Indian Government official said both the Indian officials and Kuznetsov agreed it is possible that the Chinese may decide to launch an attack throgh Sikkim. They estimated that, after accomplishing the limited objective of overwhelming Indian defensive position in the Siliguri area, the Chinese would withdraw back across the border as they did in 1962 to the embarassment of the Indian Government.
5.
[
text not declassified
]
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 188
188. Telegram 19243 From the
Embassy in India
to the
Department of State
1
2
New Delhi
,
December 15, 1971, 0738Z
Subject:
Deployment Carrier Task Force in Indian Ocean
1.
Up until last few days I have felt able to defend U.S. policy on the basis of our over-riding concern to bring a halt to hostilities. I am now troubled by fact a number of my diplomatic colleagues view deployment of carrier task force as military escalation by U.S.
2.
This was forcefully brought to my attention by Canadian High Commissioner George who believes that our decision to deploy carrier task force at this time has served as encouragement to President
Yahya
to continue
Pak
military effort. In this regard George believes that
Yahya
’s disavowal of initial Farman Ali message and subsequent message from Governor Malik was directly related to word of carrier task force deployment.
3.
Furthermore, George views deployment as direct injection super power involvement which bound to increase nervousness of both Soviets and Chinese and likely prompt or serve as screen for their increased involvement.
4.
George has indicated that he is sending strong message along these lines to his Prime Minister, recommending that Trudeau in turn contact President.
5.
In order to place me in a position to defend this development

I would welcome fullest possible rationale to respond to foregoing arguments advanced by my colleagues here.
Keating
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 192
192. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between President
Nixon
and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (
Kissinger
)
1
2
Washington
,
December 16, 1971, 12:15 p.m.
P: I thought you should know. I called
Mitchell
on a couple of things. He was in a drug meeting with
Rogers
at the
WH
. I got Bill on the phone and told him that I x wanted
Sisco
and whoever at State to take a hardline on economic assistance thing. He said fine. I will do it myself. So he is on Salvo. Don’t do it publicly. That’s the line, don’t you agree?
K: Exactly.
P: On your background that’s the way I would play it. Don’t bust India publicly. It’s where we want to have effect.
K: She’s written a let to you asking where she went wrong. The policy is working.
P: You work with Sisco on conciliatory attitude. Vis a vis State. Let them be tough instead of us.
K: I agree.
P: No reason for you to talk with the Indian Ambassador.
K: No trouble with State now that it’s over. We are trying to get the British to ? ? ? ? ?. We have her text so it’s genuine offer. Trying to formalize it because she can renege at any time. Talked with
Bhutto
and having Raza in. He thinks and extremely grateful to President. He has Chinese aboard to.
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 194
194. Telegram 19600 From the
Embassy in India
to the
Department of State
1
2
New Delhi
,
December 23, 1971, 1035Z
Subj:
Prime Minister
Gandhi
on Indo-
US
Relations
We are advised on strictly confidential basis that Mrs.
Gandhi
told Newsman in exclusive interview Dec 22 that:
(A)
Indo-American relations can get back to normal today if
US
wants. Insofar as I’m concerned, they are perfectly normal. I have nothing against us. I’m deeply grateful to people of
US
. I can’t tell you how many hundreds and hundreds of letters I have received from eminent people in different fields of activity in
US
right down to school children in third, fourth, fifth and sixth grades. I’ve been very greatly touched by their sentiments.
(B)
As to misunderstanding by President
Nixon
of India’s case. It’s not just a question of India’s case insofar as Bangla Desh is concerned. It’s a question of recognizing what India is, what India stands for and what India wants to do. We have never accepted theory of balance of power, and we have no intention doing it now.
(C)
There is fantastic nonsense being talked about in
US
about our having received promises from the Soviet Union (i.e., concerning Soviet intervention against 7th Fleet and against China). I assure you that these matters were not talked over with Soviets and if after all this
US
refuses to recognize what sort of person I am and what sort of country India is, then, I’m afraid, I can’t say what will happen and what sort of relationship we will have. You must be able to judge a person and know what they’re like.
(D)
As to the economic consequences of war,

we’ll have some hardship but we are used to it and can bear it. We are also determined to cut down on all foreign aid, no matter what consequences will be. This regard, we want to be as self reliant as possible, from all sources, insofar as possible.
Keating
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 198
198. Editorial Note
Source: National Archives,
Nixon
Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation between
Nixon
and
Kissinger
, January 1, 1972, 11:00–11:19 a.m., White House Tapes, Conversation No. 17125.
President
Nixon
and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs
Henry Kissinger
discussed the aftermath of the crisis in South Asia in a telephone conversation on January 1, 1972. In the course of a general discussion of the impact of the crisis,
Kissinger
made the point that India needed to re establish better relations with the United States. He felt that the
Gandhi
Government would be concerned to offset the embrace of the Soviet Union and the concomitant growth of the Communist party and Communist influence in India. Discussion then turned to the question of the recognition of Bangladesh.
Nixon
said it was premature to consider such recognition.
Kissinger
pointed out that only India and Bhutan had recognized Bangladesh at that point.
Contents
Press Release
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 200
200. Telegram 26 From the
Consulate General in Karachi
to the
Department of State
1
2
Karachi
,
January 3, 1972, 1154Z
Subject:
January 3 Conversation With President
Bhutto
re His Letter to President
Ref:
State 233015
1.
I met with President
Bhutto
in his Karachi residence at 1100 hours local time. The conversation which ensued lasted for approximately 45 minutes. Among other matters discussed was the aforesaid subject.
Septel
s follow.
2.
With all the care befitting the matter, I enunciated the various subjects and points made in paras 2, 3 and 4 of reftel. President
Bhutto
expressed his full appreciation for the points made and indicated complete understanding. His one additional substantive comment outside the context of that to which we were speaking, was his expression of hope that the United States would use all of its influence in every possible area “to help get our men back from East Pakistan.” I told him I would advise my government not only of his request but of his great concern for the welfare of his countrymen.
3.
Pertaining to paragraph 5 of
reftel
, I told President
Bhutto
that the President had authorized negotiations to begin with the
GOP
for a new
PL
–480 Title I agreement, and spelled out that which was involved both in food and in value. I went on to state that this action was tangible evidence of
USG
’s awareness of the food requirements now of moment to West Pakistan, and also a concrete indication of
USG
’s desire to assist
GOP
on its road back to recovery from the tragic events recently transpired. President,
Bhutto
expressed his sincere and deep appreciation for this actions, indicating that it reflected precisely not only what I had said, but in addition indicated a major step toward the return to normalcy. She added that as he had heretofore informed me and as he had publicly announced, he was looking toward a “new era in
US
-
Pak
relationship.”
4.
Saying that the importance of my comments was such that the Foreign Office should be made aware thereof he asked that the
DCM
in Islamabad contact the Foreign Secretary
Sultan Khan
and convey the gist of this message to him also.
DCM
telephonically advised to do so.
Luppi
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 330
330. Letter From Pakistani President
Bhutto
to President
Nixon
1
Islamabad
,
undated
.
Excellency,
It is with a very heavy heart that I address this, my first message, to you for your assistance to alleviate human suffering. The news from Dacca is grim. Reports from independent sources, which must have reached you by now, speak of inhuman atrocities and mass murders of innocent people in a part of Pakistan which is now under Indiaʼs military occupation. To say that these killings and atrocities are being perpetrated by the so-called “Mukti Bahini” does not, and cannot, absolve India of its responsibility to ensure the safety of life and property of the people. The Commanding General of India has publicly stated that the “Mukti Bahini” and all other forces now in East Pakistan are under his effective command.
What is happening in Dacca is by no means an isolated affair. Reports of similar incidents are being received from other cities in East Pakistan also. News of this indiscriminate carnage has been received with the gravest concern in Pakistan, and cannot but be viewed with horror throughout the world.
I am, therefore, addressing this earnest appeal to you on behalf of the people of Pakistan and on my own behalf to use your influence with India most urgently to prevent further carnage. Otherwise that Province might soon be engulfed in a widespread blood-bath.
My Government has already approached the International Red Cross, who have sent some personnel and supplies to Dacca. The need of the hour, however, is for Red Cross presence in greater strength, for assistance by way of medicines and field hospitals in a more massive form. Apart from requesting the International Red Cross to do the needful, and in particular, to ensure compliance of the Geneva Convention, my Government has also enlisted the support of other friendly governments to lend their weight in moving the Red Cross and also to take action themselves through humanitarian organizations.
An urgent appeal to India by all permanent members of the Security Council and action by them individually in pursuance of these humanitarian objectives would go a long way in bringing peace to that strife torn land.

I would, in particular, impress on you immediately to approach the Government of India to take effective measures, with all the means at their command, to ensure that this carnage stops without loss of time.
I avail of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration.
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto
2
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 202
202. Telegram 364 From the
Embassy in Pakistan
to the
Department of State
1
2
Islamabad
,
January 12, 1972, 1130Z
Subject:
Meeting With President Bhutto Jan. 1972
Ref:
Islamabad 363
1.
During my meeting with President
Bhutto
at the President’s house at 2100 hours local Jan. 11, among other subjects discussed in reftel,
Bhutto
’s views concerning
Mujibur Rahman
’s statement upon the latter’s arrival in Dacca were solicited.
2.
Turning to
Mujibur Rahman
’s public declaration that there would be no ties with the West, I made inquiry concerning what steps
GOP
would now take.
Bhutto
answered inconclusively but did say that he was a pragmatist and that his course of action would be built on realities of the situation. He went on to add that, contrary to
Mujibur Rahman
’s public statement, he, the
Sheikh
, had made qte some promises unqte before his departure for London, promises made in an outburst of tears: qte he was almost hysterical unqte during which episode qte he not only embraced me but threw his head onto my lap and wept. Unqte Bhutto added that the coda in this affair had yet to be written, recalling that it was the Bengalis who had spearheaded the formation of Pakistan because of the repression of the Muslim by the Hindu. He concluded by saying qte when the people of East Pakistan are again controlled by India, the passage of time could bring about substantial changes in their thinking. unqte
Farland
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 208
208. Letter From the Pakistani Ambassador (
Raza
) to President
Nixon
1
2
Washington
,
January 18, 1972
My dear Mr. President,
I have the honour to convey to you the following message from President
Bhutto
:
BEGINS:
I am grateful for your message of congratulations on my assuming the office of President of Pakistan. On behalf of the people of Pakistan and myself, I reciprocate in full measure the warm sentiments you have expressed. At this first opportunity, let me convey our sincere appreciation to you and the American people for the support extended to us in our struggle to preserve our national independence and territorial integrity. The tragedy that has struck the people of Pakistan has few parallels in history. While the world watched, India set about to destroy with predatory cynicism the established frontiers of our homeland. India continues to occupy our territories in spite of the overwhelming verdict of the General Assembly and the demand of the Security Council for the withdrawal of all armed forces to their respective territories and to positions on the ceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmir. We seek a durable peace in the sub-continent,

a just and honourable peace, but there can be no peace unless the armed forces of India first vacate their occupation of our territories.
An uneasy truce prevails with our troops on the borders, and our people face the grim aftermath of war. The task ahead is indeed formidable, but we are determined to succeed. We are determined to rebuild on the debris of the past, a past not of our making. The problems of national reconstruction are massive. We must as early as possible bring a measure of hope and happiness to our people who have endured much suffering. We have no doubt that in all our efforts we will have your continued cooperation, understanding and friendship and that of your great people.
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto
ENDS.