Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 147
147. Telegram From
the Department of State
to
the Embassy in India
1
Washington
,
September 15, 1971, 2005Z
.
169506. Subj: Refugee and East Pakistan Relief.
1.
Summary: Under Secretary
Irwin
called in Indian Ambassador
Jha
September 13 for general review of current relief situation in India and East Pakistan. Under Secretary stressed importance of India and
US
working together toward common goal of averting famine in East Pakistan. He expressed hope that
GOI
would publicly indicate its support for neutral
UN
relief effort and would use its influence with Bangla Desh leadership to persuade it to support
UN
relief on Bangla Desh Radio and to avoid guerrilla activities aimed at relief personnel. Under Secretary pointed to dangers of increased guerrilla activity, Indian support therefore and increase of tension flowing from precautionary actions taken by both India and Pakistan.
Jha
said ultimate solution of refugee problem rested on an East Bengali government which the refugees would trust. Under Secretary also raised with
Jha
desirability of some kind of verification system to determine number of refugees and their needs.
Jha
indicated
GOI
did not wish to see starvation in East Pakistan, and suggested that
USG
and other countries approach Bangla Desh representatives on subject of relief.
Jha
reacted negatively to verification proposal which appeared to impugn veracity of
GOI
. End summary.
2.
At Under Secretary
Irwin
ʼs request, Indian Ambassador
Jha
called September 13 to discuss famine situation in East Pakistan and relief needs.
Jha
accompanied by Minister
Rasgotra
and First Secretary Verma.
AID
Deputy Administrator
Williams
, Deputy Assistant Secretary
Van Hollen
and Quainton of
NEA/INC
also present.
3.
Under Secretary began by emphasizing common
USG
and
GOI
interest in working toward goal of averting famine in East Pakistan.
USG
, he said, recognized excellent job which India had done in organizing refugee relief. We also recognize political and economic pressures which refugees represent. As we see it, however, most immediate issue is famine which will come unless active measures taken to avert it. This will require energetic, extensive and effective
UN
effort. We hope this effort will be supported and accepted by
GOI
and Bangla

Desh (
BD
) leaders. If relief effort is disrupted, famine is likely and refugee flow will be increased. Greatest present danger is guerrilla attacks on relief assistance. Guerrillas have been most active all along East Pakistanʼs eastern border with India and have successfully disrupted rail line along eastern border. Only shipping remains and if that is attacked as well, it will destroy whatever relief effort we can make.
4.
Under Secretary noted that Foreign Secretary
Kaul
in discussion with Ambassador
Keating
and Professor Galbraith had recognized need for relief as long as it was not bound up with Pak military. We strongly agree that relief must be above the battle. We believe that Pak military can be kept away from relief effort. We hope very much
GOI
will be willing to back neutral relief effort. We would not expect it to back relief which was part of military operations. We would also hope
BD
leaders would support truly independent
UN
relief effort and would not continue to insist that
BD
reps be associated with relief effort. We recognize in asking
GOI
to use its influence with
BD
leaders that it may not have full control over guerrilla movement and that
BD
leaders may not fully control their own military. Nonetheless, if
BD
leaders would use
BD
radio to support
UN
relief effort this would be constructive.
5.
AID
Deputy Administrator
Williams
then reviewed achievements of his recent Pakistan trip, noting that the
UN
effort now accepted by
GOP
. It had also accepted
UN
ʼs need to monitor its relief and agreed that there would be no discrimination in allocation of relief to Hindus and Muslims.
Williams
noted that in response to
UNSYG
ʼs request, 17 coastal vessels of up to 800 tons and nine mini-bunkers, all with foreign crews, would be distributing relief. There would be no mixed cargoes, neither military nor industrial goods would be carried, and no jute would be brought back on return trips. Ships would operate under
UN
emblem.
6.
Jha
responded by stating that
GOI
anxious that there be no starvation deaths to add to others that have already taken place. He expressed appreciation for assessment of relief plans. He said question was how could
GOI
help, and wondered whether talking to Bangla Desh people would really help. He expressed view that relief operation needed to be projected in more positive way and thought that East Pakistani people with experience of slow cyclone relief effort had little confidence in
UN
. Recalling his earlier suggestion,
Jha
said that relief should begin in areas such as Barisal where logistics were not vital. In addition, he suggested that relief officials on both sides of border establish informal contact with
BD
representatives.
Jha
thought it would be preferable to convey our concerns directly to
BD
leaders rather than have them diluted through
GOI
.
Williams
noted that
UN
Mission in East Pakistan obviously could not deal with
BD
reps, but he thought
UNSYG
might be approaching them elsewhere. In any

event,
GOI
good offices with
BD
reps and clear public acceptance of
UN
relief effort would be helpful, although it would not substitute for direct
UN
contacts. He thought it would be particularly helpful if
BD
radio would state that battle was not against hungry people.
Van Hollen
added that it was important in terms of Indiaʼs public posture that it reaffirm publicly it wanted no one to starve and supported international relief effort. Since Indiaʼs influence with
BD
leaders is relatively the greatest, if
GOI
convinced that
UN
effort is neutral it could use its influence effectively with them.
7.
Jha
also expressed view that it would be helpful if other countries taking part in humanitarian relief effort contacted
BD
reps. He said that this would make it easier for
GOI
politically, since it would prefer to be joining international chorus rather than playing first fiddle. Under Secretary noted that some countries reluctant to take action which
GOI
opposes, particularly
USSR
. They will follow what
GOI
wants to do.
8.
Jha
said he was unaware to what extent
UN
had raised security issue with
GOI
in New York. Foreign Minister and Foreign Secretary will be in New York in next few weeks and will then have very direct discussions on this issue.
9.
Jha
asked
Williams
for his assessment of causes of current refugee flow.
Williams
said he was puzzled by number of refugees and differing
GOP
and
GOI
claims. Famine did not appear to be a major factor. First wave of refugees were political, second came because of communal fear and insecurity. There seemed to be direct corollation between insurgency and tensions which led to refugees. He said we were encouraged by Dr.
Malik
ʼs appointment since he had a reputation as a moderate on Hindu-Muslim matters.
10.
Under Secretary said that the Ambassadorʼs question to
Williams
led to another item he wished to discuss, namely Indiaʼs support to guerrillas. He commented that to degree that there is continuous fighting it seems communal problem is enhanced and the refugee flow increases. We recognize position
GOI
has taken with respect to support of
BD
movement, but fighting creates refugees. Further additional support to guerrillas or recognition of
BD
as independent government would increase refugee danger and danger of radicalization. Under Secretary noted that both India and Pakistan seemed to be taking precautionary action in case other side takes offensive action. Such actions can only increase tensions and lead to possibly more dangerous situation. We hope
GOI
will do all it can to avoid increasing tension.
11.
Jha
said that it was grave misreading of situation to think that guerrilla activity can be curbed or stopped by
GOI
in order to limit refugee influx. Large numbers of East Pakistani military personnel defected

in March and they will not give up or accept mere civilian administration in East Pakistan. Similarly, bulk of refugees will not go back if there is no fighting, but only if there is truly Bengali government.
Jha
noted that Hindu refugee flow threatened Indiaʼs entire secular policy. This was far more serious than question of whether fighting a bad thing. If that were to happen, it could be even more disastrous than conflict with Pakistan.
GOI
was committed, however, to avoid fighting and had tried to maintain degree of propriety in its relations with
GOP
.
Rasgotra
noted that cause of refugee exodus was systematic Pakistani campaign to evict Hindus. There was nothing
GOI
or guerrillas could do to stop this exodus.
12.
Conversation then turned to question of numbers of refugees. Under Secretary noted
GOP
claim of two million. All of our plans had been based on
GOI
figure of 8 million. It would be very helpful for us in dealing with Congress if we could have independent system or count by
UN
team. Such a count would probably come out with recognition of excellent job done by
GOI
.
Jha
replied that
GOI
had kept careful register of refugees and if anything figures were under-estimates. If purpose of verification was to carry weight with Congress, he thought Chairman of Refugee Subcommittee
2
who had recently visited India might be more helpful.
Jha
said
GOI
was not asking Congress for money and he concerned that
USG
felt Pak figures somehow more credible.
Williams
said what we had in mind was to have
UNHCR
representative review basis on which
GOI
counts refugees. This would be helpful in preparing estimates of how refugee burden affects development program. There is a feeling that
GOI
figures might perhaps be somewhat high and since we do not understand
GOI
procedures it would be useful if
UNHCR
could evaluate them.
13.
Williams
noted that in consortium operation World Bank had frequently carried out assessment of Indian economic performance and had sent teams to India.
Jha
said that consortium review had never been designed to question basis for
GOI
statistics. Getting satisfactory proof of numbers of refugees is irrelevant exercise if it is merely designed to keep foreign legislatures happy. There is no point at all in engaging in statistical exercise for this purpose. Until now level of aid from world as a whole only a fraction of what India has done. Principal constraint on contributions has not been lack of information about magnitude of problem but domestic preoccupations in donor countries. Unless
USG
proposal was part of new approach designed to mobilize massive international aid, there would be no point in counting exercise.
Williams
said we hoped larger international effort could be undertaken. Under

Secretary
Irwin
said he hoped
USG
proposal would be considered not as questioning of Indian estimates but in context of total development program which India faces.
Jha
reiterated that from his point of view verification of national data had never been international responsibility. Evaluation and appraisal, yes; but verification, no. This would be a wholly new chapter for
UN
.
14.
Rasgotra
noted that
UN
seemed to be mounting major programs in East Pakistan but had not done much in India.
Van Hollen
replied that this reflected different attitudes of
GOI
and
GOP
on this issue. He pointed out that since May,
GOP
had accepted substantial
UN
relief programs and personnel, whereas on Indian side there had been only a limited
UN
presence in New Delhi and apparent
GOI
disinterest in major
UN
activity in Eastern India.
Williams
noted that what we sought was common assessment in order to give us basis for providing resources. This was the way we had always operated in the past.
Jha
said if there were going to be a major international commitment to support of refugees on scale commensurate with problem, then clearly there would need to be discussion between administering agency and
GOI
on what was needed; but if it merely a matter of token contributions then dialogue on this subject would not be necessary. Under Secretary concluded by saying he had noted
Jha
ʼs strong reaction to proposal for
UN
counting. We had made proposal because we considered it as step which could be helpful in supporting Indiaʼs case in Congress.
Rogers
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations