AlimurRazi/FRUS-1971-bangladesh huggingface dataset:
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 41
41. Letter From President
Nixon
to Pakistani President
Yahya
1
Washington
,
May 7, 1971
.
Dear Mr. President:
I have given most serious thought to your message
2
on the tragic situation which has developed in East Pakistan in the past few weeks. This situation has been of great concern to me.
Having labored so hard to carry out free national elections and to achieve an early and orderly transition, you must also be deeply disappointed not to have been able to transfer power to a civilian government according to the plan you had adopted and which you explained to me during your visit here last fall.
First, I should like to emphasize the sympathy which we in the United States feel for all the people of Pakistan who have been affected by these events and our concern over the loss of life and human suffering. I understand the anguish you must have felt in making the difficult decisions you have faced.
We also share your distress over the economic losses which have occurred and the serious resulting problems with which your Government has been faced. As you know, some of the Americans who were affected by the cessation of economic activity have had to leave East Pakistan because they were no longer able to perform their usual work. Because of the uncertainties, some of our programs are in abeyance.
We look forward to an early renewal of your national development effort and of normal economic activity throughout Pakistan. We especially hope for the restoration of internal communications in East Pakistan to forestall food shortages, and we are prepared to support international humanitarian relief there.
As you are probably aware, some opposition has been expressed among our public and in our Congress to continuing economic and military assistance to Pakistan under present circumstances. This was due largely to the circumstances of civil strife which will hopefully continue to subside. Further, it is to no oneʼs advantage to permit the situation in East Pakistan to lead to an internationalization of the situation. Foreign involvement could create new problems and compound the difficulty of securing an ultimate settlement. We have been in touch with the Government of India and have discussed the implications of the present situation. We have stressed the need for restraint.

Please let me know if there are any ways in which you believe that we can be helpful to the achievement of a satisfactory settlement. I would hope Ambassador
Farland
may have an early opportunity to discuss these matters with you and your colleagues.
With warm personal regards,
Sincerely,
Richard Nixon
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 45
45. Editorial Note
On May 13, 1971, the Indian Government requested that the United States make available four C–130 transport aircraft and the crews to fly them to help ferry refugees from East Pakistan from the over-burdened state of Tripura to Assam. (Telegram 7325 from New Delhi, May 13; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, REF
PAK
) The Department of State responded on the same day that the Indian request was receiving urgent consideration, and the Embassy was instructed to ask to what extent India was planning to use its own transport aircraft to participate in the airlift. (Telegram 83736 to New Delhi; ibid.)
On May 14 Assistant Secretary
Sisco
sent a memorandum to Under Secretary
Johnson
outlining the Indian request. He noted that the Department of Defense had reservations about providing the C–130s in that they were in short supply and needed in Southeast Asia.
Sisco
recommended a positive response to the request and attached a draft memorandum to the Secretary in which he argued that the request offered an opportunity to improve relations with India without necessitating a change in policy toward Pakistan. (Ibid.) The Embassy in Islamabad warned on May 14 that Pakistan would react unfavorably to a United States decision to participate in an airlift of East Pakistani refugees. (Telegram 4656 from Islamabad; ibid.) With that warning in mind, the Department explored whether the Indian request could be channeled through the
UN
High Commissioner for Refugees.

(Telegram 84775 to New Delhi, May 14; ibid.) After the
UN
High Commissioner had agreed to take responsibility for the airlift, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
Warren Nutter
recommended on May 18 that Defense approve a request for four C–130 transports for a period of up to 30 days. Secretary
Laird
approved the recommendation. (Washington National Records Center,
OSD
Files, FRC 330 76 0197, Box 65, India 1971)
The Department of State announced on June 12 that the United States would participate in the airlift. (Department of State
Bulletin
, June 28, 1971, page 823) The airlift exercise, which was code-named Bonny Jack, was terminated on July 14. (Telegram 127295 to New Delhi, July 14; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, REF
PAK
)
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 48
48. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (
Kissinger
) to President
Nixon
1
Washington
,
May 14, 1971
.
SUBJECT
Humanitarian Relief for Pakistan
The Pakistani relief problem is attracting increasing attention in the Congress and press and you will want to know how the problem is being handled.
There are two aspects to the human problem:
1.
There are now almost 2 million
refugees from East Pakistan in India,
and the figure could go substantially higher. You approved $2.5 million for
US
participation in an international effort, and this is operating through the
UN
High Commission for Refugees and private voluntary agencies. More food will be required, but basically this seems in hand for now, though there are the makings of a long-term problem.
2.
The larger problem lies
in East Pakistan
. Food stocks seem adequate in most areas for another two or three months, but the transportation and distribution systems are not functioning. We have privately offered Pakistan assistance through an international effort.
U Thant
has offered
UN
help and Secretary
Rogers
joined Foreign Secretary Home in encouraging
U Thant
to urge the Pakistanis to accept. As you know, President
Yahya
is adamant against inviting foreigners into East Pakistan.
In immediate terms there are two issues:
1.
Mounting Congressional criticism must be dealt with. This involves marshalling the facts on what we are doing in such a way as not to be offensive to President
Yahya
. This may be done by State Department statement.
2
2.
A compromise must be found to meet President
Yahya
ʼs sensitivity to foreign involvement as well as donorsʼ requirements for assurance that the food and equipment they give will be used for humane and not military purposes. This issue will become active only when food begins to move again.
I shall keep you informed of developments.
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 55
55. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between
President Nixon
and His Assistant for National Security Affairs (
Kissinger
)
1
May 23, 1971, 2:30 p.m.
[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to South Asia.]
K
: Yesterday, Mr. President, I didnʼt have a chance to talk to you about it, because we were both in transit. We have reports that the Indians are massing troops at the Pakistan border—
P: Which one, East or West?
K
: East. And I asked Alex [
Johnson
] let
Keating
tell the Indians that whatever the problem is and while we were keeping our hands off and while we were willing to help humanitarian efforts, we were strongly opposed to military action.
P: We certainly will; if they go in there with military action, by God we will cut off economic aid.
K
: And that is the last thing we can afford now to have the Pakistan government overthrown, given the other things we are doing.
P: And also they have got to know that if [
sic
] what is in jeopardy here is economic aid. That is what is in jeopardy.
K
: And there is absolutely no justification for it—they donʼt have a right to invade Pakistan no matter what Pakistan does in its territory. Besides the killing has stopped.
P: It has quieted down.
K
: Oh yes. It may not be a tenable situation in the long term, but again that is not for India to decide.
[Omitted here is the remainder of the discussion, which is unrelated to South Asia.]
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 59
59. Editorial Note
President
Nixon
and
Henry Kissinger
discussed developments in South Asia in the Oval Office of the White House the morning of May 26, 1971.
Kissinger
opened the conversation by referring to the letter that had recently been received from Prime Minister
Gandhi
(
Document 46
). Answering the letter,
Kissinger
said, would give the President the opportunity to “bring pressure on her not to take military action.” He added that he had talked to the Pakistani Ambassador who said that President
Yahya
would appreciate a letter from
Nixon
to give him an opportunity to respond with a litany of all the things he was doing to resolve the unrest in East Pakistan.
Kissinger
said that he and the Ambassador had it all worked out:
Nixon
would write that he hoped the refugees would soon be able to go back to East Pakistan and
Yahya
would respond that that was exactly what he wanted.
Nixon
could take credit for trying to pour calming oil on troubled waters. “You can tell the Indians to pipe down, and weʼll keep
Yahya
happy,”
Kissinger
said.
The conversation turned to what they saw as Indiaʼs role in fostering an insurgency in East Pakistan.
Nixon
said that “the goddamn Indians” were promoting another war.
Kissinger
agreed: “They are the most aggressive goddamn people around.” (National Archives,
Nixon
Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation between
Nixon
and
Kissinger
, May 26, 1971, 10:38–10:44 a.m., Oval Office, Conversation No. 505–4) A transcript of this conversation is published in
Foreign Relations
, 1969–1976, volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972, Document 135
.
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 65
65. Editorial Note
President
Nixon
and
Henry Kissinger
discussed Ambassador
Keating
and his approach to the crisis developing in South Asia in a conversation in the Oval Office of the White House on June 4, 1971.
Nixon
said that he had seen
Keating
at a social function the previous evening and agreed to meet with him later in the month. That opened a discussion of the extent to which
Nixon
and
Kissinger
felt that
Keating
had effectively become an advocate of the government to which he was accredited.
Nixon
said that he told
Keating
that the United States should not become involved in an internal conflict. He was skeptical about
Keating
holding to that line: “What the hell does he think we should do?”
Kissinger
responded: “He thinks we should cut off all military aid, all economic aid, and in effect help the Indians to push the Pakistanis out.”
Nixon
and
Kissinger
took exception to
Keating
ʼs outlook, with
Kissinger
observing that it was important to buoy up
Yahya
for at least another month while Pakistan served as the gateway to China.
Nixon
said: “Even apart from the Chinese thing, I wouldnʼt do that to help the Indians, the Indians are no goddamn good.” He noted that it seemed as though every
U.S.
Ambassador who went to India got “sucked in,”
Keating
included.
Kissinger
said that it made no sense to follow
Keating
ʼs advice and get involved in the conflict in East Pakistan. “If East Pakistan becomes independent, it is going to become a cesspool. It is going to be 100 million people, they have the lowest standard of living in Asia, no resources. Theyʼre going to become a ripe field for communist infiltration. And then theyʼre going to bring pressure on India because of West Bengal. So that the Indians in their usual idiotic way are playing for little stakes, unless they have in the back of

their minds that they could turn East Pakistan into a sort of protectorate that they could control from Calcutta.”
Nixon
concluded that all the Indians had in mind was to damage Pakistan. (National Archives,
Nixon
Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation between
Nixon
and
Kissinger
, June 4, 1971, 9:42–9:51 a.m., Oval Office, Conversation No. 512–4) A transcript of this conversation is published in
Foreign Relations
, 1969–1976, volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972, Document 136
.
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 69
69. Memorandum of Conversation
1
Washington
,
June 11, 1971, 1:03–1:56 p.m.
Lunch Conversation Between Indian Ambassador
Jha
and Mr.
Kissinger
The purpose of the conversation was to prepare for the meeting of Foreign Minister
Singh
and also to prevent Indian military action against Pakistan while the Chinese channel was being maintained.
I opened the conversation by telling
Jha
that we understood the suffering that was caused in India and the sense of concern that India

would naturally feel. I also told him that if India took unilateral military action, it would have to mean the end of any assistance on our part. It would turn the issue into an international problem involving China, the Soviet Union and other great powers, in which the Bengal problem would soon be submerged.
Jha
made a very eloquent defense then of the Indian position. He said six million refugees had already entered India. They were in the most heavily-populated states, in the states with the most heavy radical element. They could shift the voting balance in Bengal, for example, entirely in the direction of the Communists. It was a matter in India of its internal stability—there was nothing that the government wanted to do less than to go to war, but something had to be done.
I asked him for a solution. He replied that it wasnʼt enough to offer for the refugees to come back while new refugees were being created all the time. What was needed was a political conversation and a political solution, which he personally believed were unlikely except on the basis of independence for East Pakistan. He thought we could stop economic aid to Pakistan or suspend it as an interim measure.
I said that the President had a special relationship to Pakistan which enabled him to use his influence behind the scenes much more effectively. But I said that I remembered very well a conversation he had with me at Kay Grahamʼs
2
house in which he said that at some point India and the United States would have to see how to bell the cat. I was prepared to have personal contacts with him in a channel going from the President to the Prime Minister if they could give us four or five months to work on matters. Ambassador
Jha
said he thought that this was feasible. I told him that to show our goodwill we would immediately review the aid request to see whether we could substantially increase the refugee aid.
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 75
75. Telegram From
the Department of State
to
the Embassy in India
1
Washington
,
June 17, 1971, 2303Z
.
108624. Subject:
Swaran Singh
Visit; Additional
U.S.
Assistance.
1.
During meeting with
Swaran Singh
June 16, the President indicated that because of refugee burden
U.S.
would try to find additional $20 million in assistance this fiscal year and would find $50 million more soon after July 1.
2
We are working out details regarding composition this assistance and how much may be development lending. We are urgently preparing message providing details re assistance and guidance for discussions with Indian officials.
2.
This message intended to alert you to new
US
offer in event
Swaran Singh
reports it to
GOI
or Indian delegation at Paris Consortium or news leaks to press. You should not on your initiative discuss with Indian officials prior receiving further guidance.
Rogers
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 77
77. Telegram From
the Department of State
to
the Embassy in Pakistan
1
Washington
,
June 22, 1971, 0029Z
.
110978. Subject: Communication concerning recognition of Bangladesh.
1.
Department has received document
2
dated “Mujibnagar”, April 24, 1971, addressed to President. Document requests immediate
USG
recognition of “sovereign independent Peopleʼs Republic of Bangladesh” and establishment of diplomatic relations between
USG
and Bangladesh Government which it says “exercising full sovereignty and lawful authority within the territories known as East Pakistan prior to March 26, 1971.” Document signed by
Syed Nazrul Islam
, “Acting President,” and Khandakar Moshtaque Ahmed, “Foreign Minister.” Also attached are “Proclamation of Independence” dated April 10, 1971, proclamation by “Acting President”
Islam
continuing East Pakistan laws in force in “Bangladesh”, and purported cabinet of Bangladesh Government including “President”
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman
. Document mailed regular international air mail from West Berlin, postmarked May 26, 1971 with no return address.
2.
Method of transmittal naturally raises question, but if document genuine (and we have no reason to think it is not) it is first formal request from officials of Bangladesh movement for
USG
recognition and has sensitive political implications.
US
of course continues to consider East Pakistan part of State of Pakistan which we recognize, and to counsel
GOP
with whom we maintain diplomatic relations to develop political solution to present troubles. Document, however, makes it difficult for us to continue to take public line that we have never received any request for recognition of State of Bangladesh.
3.
Department is taking following actions: (a) no acknowledgement will be made of document; (b) document will be recorded by Records Services Division, OPR/RS, which routinely logs all communications received in Department; this step involves no determination of nature of communication by Department; (c)
NEA/PAF
will retain document routinely in office files; (d) we will continue to say “We consider the territory of East Pakistan to be part of the State of Pakistan”;

(e) if we are asked whether we have ever received a request to recognize Bangladesh, we would answer: “We have received through international air mail a letter mailed from Berlin without return address which purported to ask for recognition of the Peopleʼs Republic of Bangladeshʼ. It would be inappropriate for us to take any action with respect to it since we consider the territory of East Pakistan to be part of the State of Pakistan.”
Rogers
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 82
82. Letter From Pakistani President
Yahya
to President
Nixon
1
Islamabad
,
June 28, 1971
.
Dear Mr. President,
I was greatly encouraged by report given to me by Mr.
M.M. Ahmad
after his meeting with you in Washington last month. I deeply appreciate your continuing interest in our development and particularly your assurance that United States would not wish to do anything that would aggravate Pakistanʼs difficulties and United States would like World Bank and other members of Consortium to adopt a similar helpful posture.
2.
The proceedings of the informal meeting of the Consortium held at Paris on 21st June have however come to us as a disappointment. The official communiqué issued after the meeting is bare and negative. The same day British Broadcasting Corporation and
New York Times
carried stories that the Consortium had decided to withhold further aid to Pakistan until the Pakistan Government reveals what sort of political settlement it envisages for East Pakistan. The veracity of the newspaper reports has been enhanced by a statement of the British Foreign Secretary that “there can be no question of new British aid to Pakistan until we have firm evidence that real progress is being made towards a political settlement”.
3.
All these developments have led to a strong and widespread public reaction in Pakistan. It is most unfortunate that all this should have happened at this juncture. It can only make more difficult the task of a political settlement.
4.
In response to these developments I had no choice but to declare in unequivocal terms in my broadcast of today that external assistance with political strings will be unacceptable to Pakistan.
5.
It is important that the general impression about the present attitude of the Consortium countries to Pakistan is fully clarified. The adjournment of the Paris discussions without announcing a date to take up our requirements is being interpreted as a consequence of Indian pressure tactics.
6.
I hope Mr. President that in view of the friendly relations between our two countries and your personal interest in Pakistanʼs integrity and well-being, you will prevent the present ambiguity and misunderstanding from becoming a source of further strains in Pakistanʼs relations with the Western world. This is something which we should in our joint interest try to prevent.
7.
Your sympathetic approach to the problems that Pakistan is facing today and the understanding you have shown of our efforts to resolve the crisis in East Pakistan continue to be a source of strength to me. I hope Mr. President that your personal interest and support in this regard will be maintained.
With warm personal regards,
Yours sincerely,
A.M. Yahya Khan
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations