Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 81
81. Telegram From
the Embassy in Pakistan
to
the Department of State
1
Islamabad
,
June 28, 1971, 1440Z
.
6487. Subj: East Pakistan Refugees:
Kellogg
Discussion with Pres.
Yahya
.
1.
Summary: In discussion with Special Assistant
Kellogg
2
June 28, Pres.
Yahya
voiced sharp concern over
GOI
general intentions and specifically whether it would allow refugees to return to East Pakistan. Expressed earnest desire that refugees return, offering full cooperation with
UN
.
Yahya
defensive about current situation in East Pakistan. He was skeptical about bona fides of streams of apparent refugees whom
Kellogg
had seen moving inland on Indian side of border.
Yahya
urged that
Kellogg
go to East Pakistan to see for himself, and
Kellogg
agreed to do so. End summary.
2.
Special Assistant
Kellogg
, accompanied by Ambassador and
DCM
, had 45-minute meeting with Pres.
Yahya
June 28 on refugee problem.
Kellogg
noted he had just visited several refugee camps and also had seen streams of refugees, who had apparently just come out of East Pakistan, on the Jessore–Calcutta road.
Yahya
expressed doubt, stating that some persons seem to move back and forth; visitors were given wrong information about actual closeness of border; and
Yahya
thought that large numbers of people could not now still be coming from Pakistan to India.
Kellogg
commented that he had spoken to

number of individual refugees, selected by him at random, albeit through interpreters. They were very largely unsophisticated agriculturist types and they could not merely have been repeating a story they had been told to relate. Moreover most stated they had been trekking up to 10 days.
3.
Yahya
launched into bitter attack on
PriMin
Gandhi
and her government. He referred to statements in which Mrs.
Gandhi
reported to have said that refugees canʼt go back. “Indian Government says they wonʼt let them go back.” Some of the few refugees who have trickled back, he said, show wounds and say they were beaten up on main roads in India leading back to Pakistan.
Kellogg
interjected that none of Indian officials with whom he had spoken had indicated anything other than that India wanted refugees to return to East Pakistan as soon as possible.
Kellogg
noted enormous economic, religious, political and social pressures on India resulting from refugee influx, and
GOI
estimated that $400 million would be required to care for refugees over six-month period.
Yahya
reverted to statements “she” had made. She does not want refugees to return to territory controlled by Pak Government. She wants political settlement of her choosing, and then she would turn refugees loose.
Kellogg
repeated that, from
FonSec
on down, none of Indian officials with whom he had spoken had said they wanted refugees to remain; nor had any referred to desire to see independent East Pakistan; “Bangla Desh” was never once mentioned to him. Meanwhile, if persons were continuing to leave East Pakistan and not returning in any appreciable numbers,
Kellogg
said, it would appear that they continued to be motivated by fear which caused them to flee in first place.
4.
Yahya
said he had been told by reliable Bengalis that the outflow had been halted.
Kellogg
should go and see for himself. There is no slaughter going on. Some armed opposition to the government was continuing, and it was meeting with armed response. How did those “thousands of arms” come into East Pakistan,
Yahya
asked. Pak forces had captured many weapons from Indian infiltrators. Some regular Indian army men (whom he acknowledged numbered only five) had been captured on Pak territory. Latter did not include large number of other infiltrators who came in to fight, blow up bridges, mine areas and then rush back to India when they see Pak military approaching. Shelling and firing continue from Indian side of border. Pak army has to fight back. When Awami Leaguers flew Bangla Desh flag over East Pakistan, it reflected direct collusion by
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman
with
GOI
. Now Indian support was taking different form,
Yahya
said. “You have seen the refugee camps; you didnʼt see their training camps” (i.e., for East Pak resistance).
Kellogg
acknowledged that he had seen countless persons in refugee camps under squalid conditions, but he had not seen any training camps in India.
5.
Kellogg
said he had sense of urgency. Indian
FonSec
had also used that term, adding that “If refugees canʼt move back, something must be done.” That set
Yahya
off on another outburst against Indians. Referring to the refugees, he said “I want them to come back.” He asked whether
GOI
would do anything to help, such as pulling its army back from borders. Urging
Kellogg
again to go see for himself,
Yahya
said that it would be credible if he personally saw “many thousands” streaming out from East Pak side. Noting that Bengalis may look alike,
Yahya
said it would be easy to be misled by persons claiming to be refugees but who might actually be destitutes who had previously been living in India. Mrs.
Gandhi
,
Yahya
said, had instigated the current problems through clandestine plotting with
Mujib
. Her people plotted against Pakistan. They had armed the opposition. They had imposed a ban on overflights. Now India might be hopeful of getting large amounts of additional foreign aid, on pretext of refugee need, to help it cope with own existing problems.
6.
Kellogg
, attempting to get discussion back to urgent need to deal with refugee situation, stated that American people were deeply concerned over the suffering and that we were anxious to do what we could to help.
Yahya
retorted that it would be most helpful if India would stop giving support to armed resistance and would help get refugees started back. He said that impression might have been gained from foreign press that East Pakistan was burning. That is not so; it is not an inferno. East Pakistan is now open territory,
Yahya
said. Vast majority of area is quiet, although border areas remain unstable.
Yahya
referred to presence and action of Indian border security force and Indian army in border regions. Main support to resistance thus far had come from BSF. But if Indian army moved against East Pakistan,
Yahya
said matter-of-factly, “of course, fighting canʼt be limited to East Pakistan.” He said Indians were maintaining 30–35 training camps and arming East Pak civilians in them. Responding to
Kellogg
ʼs comment that Indian
FonSec
had said it was not in Indiaʼs interest to have independent East Pakistan,
Yahya
said vehemently “
Kaul
is a damned liar. His actions donʼt tally with what he says.”
Yahya
added that it is important to see what is actually happening. Pakistanʼs borders are being kept boiling. He said
Kellogg
should go to the border areas and see which way the firing was coming from. Then he could ask
Kaul
how the thousands of captured arms came to East Pakistan.
7.
Yahya
said he would like to get
UN
in to help bring back refugees. Referring to rhubarb in India over
Sadruddin
ʼs statements there,
Yahya
said
UNHCR
had actually said that conditions are not normal but that they are returning to normal although it would take time.
Yahya
claimed that
Sadruddin
was criticized in India because he was Mussulman.
8.
Ambassador referred to suggestion he had made to
Yahya
on June 24 that President appoint full-time high-level refugee coordinator.
Yahya
referred to appointment of
H.R. Malik
3
who would be working with “
Kittani
ʼs
4
people.” He said another man would be working with
UNHCR
rep, but did not give any details and did not seem in mood to concentrate on that aspect.
9.
Referring to fighting in border areas,
Kellogg
asked whether some persons were fleeing into interior of East Pakistan.
Yahya
said some had, and referred vaguely to number of Beharis whom government was looking after.
10.
Ambassador used occasion to inform
Yahya
that
USG
had just authorized additional $1 million for coasters that could help meet urgent transport needs not only in cyclone areas but elsewhere in East Pakistan. Also informed
Yahya
of authorization for $4.7 million for variety of relief and reconstruction activities in cyclone area, to cover such needs as housing, shelters, and embankments. Ambassador pointed out that agreements would have to be concluded within two days, i.e. by end of fiscal year.
Yahya
expressed appreciation, although his mind was obviously focused primarily on problems with India which he recounted.
11.
Reverting for at least third time near end of conversation of value of
Kellogg
ʼs seeing situation for himself in East Pakistan,
Yahya
asked that we inform
FonSec
Sultan Khan
and have him arrange trip.
Kellogg
said he accepted
Yahya
ʼs suggestion, and Ambassador undertook inform
FonSec
soonest. (Ambassador did so in meeting
FonSec
about one hour later.
FonSec
assured that arrangements will be laid on.
Kellogg
and
DCM
are planning depart Islamabad June 29 and arrive Dacca morning June 30.)
12.
Comment
:
Yahya
was obviously in disturbed mood, and wished to focus only on urgency of what India rather than Pakistan must do to ease refugee problem. (In that regard he seemed reflect some of same concerns which Prince
Sadruddin
voiced in discussion with Secretary and
Sisco
June 24—ref State 115314.)
5
In brief tete-à-tete following
Yahya
ʼs discussion with
Kellogg
, Ambassador found
Yahya
disturbed over report from Ambassador
Hilaly
concerning former Consul General Bloodʼs testimony before
SFRC
last week.
Yahya
was also disturbed over

latest report of statement by
FonSec
Douglas-Home
on need for political settlement prior to aid. This is day on which
Yahya
ʼs most awaited speech is being made to nation on his plans for political accommodation and “transfer of power.” We found him a very harried man.
Farland
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations