AlimurRazi/FRUS-1971-bangladesh huggingface dataset:
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 264
264. Telegram 6684 From the
Embassy in India
to the
Department of State
1
2
New Delhi
,
May 31, 1972, 1430Z
Subject:
USAID
/India Technical Assistance Program
Ref:
New Delhi 6181
1.
Mission Director and Evans, Program Division Chief, have had separate meetings with Krishnaswami and
DEA
staff during past week.
2.
Evans was told that elimination of the U.S. technical assitance program had been discussed at “the highest levels”.
DEA
argued that U.S. aid, whether bilateral or through multilateral channels, was of great importance to India, so a compromise was reached whereby the
GOI
would continue to request technical assistance in a few selected areas where U.S. superiority was obvious.
3.
Krishnaswami said to Houston that the
GOI
did not like discussing “bits and pieces” of the aid program. They would prefer to talk about an aid program “in its totality”. Therefore, until such time as this might happen, the
GOI
will sign no new TA agreements, at least for
FY
72 and 73. He carefully pointed out that the
GOI
would sign proage necessary to continue on-going projects.
4.
DEA
proposes eliminating the agricultural production and agricultural inputs programs. They plan to take over directly costs involved in Iffco. Within a ceiling of about thirty technicians, they would like to continue agricultural universities development, rice research, soil & water, rural electric coops, science education, and nutritional foods development. Personnel levels in these projects are being negotiated.
5.
There was consierable discussion about U.S. and Indian support staff. Houston said the numbers would have to be reduced in line with the size of the program. He pointed out that Indian employees would most likely blame the
GOI
for what will be substantially number of separations. Krishnaswami seemed quite concerned about the situation.
6.
The subject of Nepalese participants in India was discussed. Krishnaswami told Houston that “in view of the present uncertainties the
GOI
would be unable to approve the program for the current year.” FYI: 164 requests for such training have been held by
DEA
for two months 271 Nepalese are in India now and we do not believe they will be affected. End FYI. We are advising USAID/Nepal.
7.
Trust fund replenishment is a recurrent theme in our discussions.
DEA
officials seem paralyzed at the thought of asking Parliament for an appropriation to cover locals costs of the U.S. aid program.
PL
480 (!) loan funds they consider to be almost as difficult. We intend to keep pressing
DEA
on this subject in view of the imminent depletion of these funds.
8.
Expect another meeting early next week.
Keating
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 271
271. Backchannel Message WH22059 From President
Nixon
to
John Connally
in New Zealand
1
2
Washington
,
June 24, 1972
I have read the message which General
Haig
sent to you at
Henry
’s request concerning the relationship between recent anti-U.S. statements by Prime Minister
Gandhi
and other Indian officials and the prospects for improving relations between our two Governments. This information was provided for background purposes. I would like to emphasize that it is essential that you take the strongest stand on this issue and would like to reemphasize the importance I attach to your maintaining the toughest and most aloof demeanor during your Indian leg in the face of these Indian attacks. The Indian press is suggesting that your visit to Delhi is associated with an effort by me to admit past mistakes in our policy towards India as part of an apologetic move to reestablish better relations. Thus, it is essential that you not contribute to this impression which can only invite further Indian insolence. It is also essential to our strategy vis-à-vis Hanoi and other countries that we in no way contribute to the impression that we are buttering up a state which has been in the forefront of vitriolic attack against my recent Vietnam decisions.
You should make it very clear from the outset that the U.S. cannot accept continuing anti-U.S. attacks whether they involve the conflict

in Southeast Asia or some other aspects of U.S. policy. I know I can count on you to ensure that this climate is clearly established during your stay in India.
I hope your stay in Australia permitted you and Nellie some rest from what can only be the most arduous journey. I look forward to seeing you in San Clemente upon your return.
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 275
275. National Security Study Memorandum 156
1
2
Washington
,
July 5, 1972
TO:
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
SUBJECT:
Indian Nuclear Developments
The President has directed an analysis of the implications for U.S. policy of an Indian nuclear test and an examination of possible positions the U.S. might adopt toward such a development.
As background, the study should consider:
—the likely impacts of a possible test on the policies and actions of—India’s neighbors in South Asia, of the
USSR
, of the
PRC
, and of other key states, both in regard to their political-military policies and in regard to their positions toward the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Test Ban Agreement;
—the likely political, military, and economic implications for India’s other policies and programs of a possible decision to develop nuclear weapons and delivery systems;
—an intelligence estimate of the likely time frame of these developments.
Based upon this analysis the study should examine the implications of an Indian nuclear test for U.S. interests and the policy options open to the United States in these circumstances with respect to India, India’s sub-continent neighbors, and other affected states.
The President has requested that this study be prepared on a need-to-know basis by an Ad Hoc Group comprising representatives of the addressees and the
NSC
Staff under the chairmanship of the Chairman of the
NSC
Interdepartmental Group for the Near East and South Asia. It should be submitted for consideration by the
NSC
Senior Review Group by August 18, 1972.
Henry A. Kissinger
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 277
277. Telegram 4075 From the
Embassy in Iran
to the
Department of State
1
2
Tehran
,
July 7, 1972, 2117Z
Subj:
Secretary
Connally
Travel: Memorandum of Private Conversation With Indian Prime Minister
Indira Gandhi
at Governor’s Residence, Simla on July 5, 1972: Part I of VII: Summit Consultations
1.
The meeting started promptly at 9:30 a.m. with no one present but the Prime Minister and myself. I started off by conveying President and Mrs.
Nixon
’s warm personal regards, having previously just presented the silver coin gift box to her. I told her how very much President and Mrs.
Nixon
had enjoyed her visit to the United States last year. She thanked me very much and asked me to convey her warmest regards to President and Mrs.
Nixon
. She recalled that Mrs.
Nixon
had given her a Boehm bird which she prized very highly and had it prominently displayed at her residence in New Delhi.
2.
I told her that the President wanted me to convey to her whatever information she wanted concerning his visits to Peking and Moscow. I very quickly and in a fairly summary fashion went over the same ground that I covered with other heads of government. I made the following major points:

A.
The President went to Peking and Moscow not for the purpose of entering into any trade arrangements or trying to create any commercial alliances. His purpose was to establish a dialogue with the hope that such communications would result in a lessening of tensions around the world and contribute to the solution of some of our problems and bring about an era of peace and tranquility.
B.
Although problems relating to third countries were discussed, there was no attempt in any way to negotiate with respect to third countries.
C.
The President made it clear to Premier Chou En Lai that we anticipated that we would be in Southeast Asia for some years to come.
D.
The President told the leaders in Moscow that our position in Vietnam was quite well known and quite firm and that we would not permit the North Vietnamese to accomplish a military victory over their neighbors to the south.
E.
I briefly outlined the fact that we had entered into a number of agreements with Moscow, all of which she was familiar with, so I did not elaborate on this subject.
F.
It was the President’s earnest hope that these two trips might be the beginning of a dialogue and communication that would end in the resolution of many of the difficult problems facing the world today.
Connally
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 280
280. Telegram 4078 From the
Embassy in Iran
to the
Department of State
1
2
Tehran
,
July 7, 1972, 2130Z
Subj:
Secretary
Connally
Travel: Memorandum of General Conversation With Indian Prime Minister
Indira Gandhi
at Governor’s Residence, Simla, on July 5, 1972: Part IV of VII: Foreign Investment
1.
At the end of one hour of private discussions, Ambassador
Keating
and Mr.
Samuel Hoskinson
of the
NSC
staff from our side, and Ambassador
Jha
and Mr.
Haksar
from the Indian side joined the discussions for another 40 minutes. This part of the meeting started with a discussion of India’s policies on foreign investments. I had previously told her I thought that much of our time in the next several years would be spent in trying to reshape the monetary fund and international agreements regarding trade. We had not, however, developed this at all in private meeting but had only alluded to complexity of problems. I had said President
Nixon
had spent a great deal of time on these matters in the last 18 months. I thought these economic and monetary problems would be of concern to world leaders more than before in coming months and years.
2.
Against this background, I questioned Mrs.
Gandhi
concerning foreign investments. I noted first that she was prepared to take over some insurance companies. “We have taken them,” she said. I said, yes. I understood

she had and was interested if this meant that India did not welcome foreign investments? Not at all, she said. When we need management or technology or products we cannot produce we will welcome foreign investments. Ambassador
Jha
added that when India nationalized its banks it did not nationalize foreign banks. Mrs.
Gandhi
added that she was criticized almost every week in Parliament because of that, too. Ambassador
Jha
then said that there were many things the Indians were capable of doing, both in terms of financial resources and management abilities and their technological progress, but also many things that they could not do and needed foreign assistance for. He said India would welcome that type of investment and noted that even India invested abroad in Australia, Nigeria, and Malaysia. How, he asked, could India therefore be against foreign investments? But, said
Jha
, we invest abroad not always under the conditions and in the companies in which we want to, but consistent with the regulations in the country in which we invest. That is what we will permit in India.
Connally
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 281
281. Telegram 4079 From the
Embassy in Iran
to the
Department of State
1
2
Tehran
,
July 7, 1972, 2130Z
Subj:
Secretary
Connally
Travel: Memorandum of General Conversation With Indian Prime Minister
Indira Gandhi
at Governor’s Residence, Simla on July 5, 1972: Part V of VII: Expertise in Bangladesh
I. The conversation then turned to Bangladesh again. The question was raised as to whether or not Bangladesh had expertise to provide the government with the necessary management skills in the cities and in the villages and necessary administrative and police protection, which would be essential. Mrs.
Gandhi
pointed out all her people told her that the officials of Bangladesh, with whom they had talked, had been of excellent ability, but frankly she did not know whether or not they had the numbers of people that were going to be needed. Mr.
Haksar
then elaborated on this to a considerable degree and said that when
Sheikh Mujib
returned to the country after the war there was absolute chaos. Then within roughly a six month period they had established order and that he thought they had done a “fairly good job.” In talking about availability of skilled people, the point was also made that one of the reasons for the great desire for return of Bengalis from West Pakistan was to have available the talents of the civil servants and the trained government officials.
Connally
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 282
282. Telegram 4080 From the
Embassy in Iran
to the
Department of State
1
2
Tehran
,
July 7, 1972, 2135Z
Subj:
Secretary
Connally
Travel: Memorandum of General Conversation With Indian Prime Minister
Indira Gandhi
at Governor’s Residence, Simla, on July 5, 1972: Part VI of VII:
US
Political Situation
1.
I then volunteered to discuss the American domestic political situation if Prime Minister was interested. She clearly was. I went through the rise and fall of many Democratic candidates in the last 18 months and finally came to the conclusion that it now appeared that McGovern would be nominated and that, if this was the case, it would be very decisive event within the Democratic Party. I pointed out that only recently the Credentials Sub-committee had refused to seat Mayor Daley and 55 delegates from Chicago. I thought this was grave and disturbing decision not only in Chicago and Illinois, but throughout the country. I briefly commented that I thought the traditional link with labor and the minorities and South, which put together the Democratic Party, was falling apart. The South had basically departed from its Democratic tradition and labor had become about as conservative politically and socially as any segment of American society. I anticipated President
Nixon
would get a high percentage, of the labor vote, notwithstanding the fact that a substantial number of labor leaders would be for the Democratic nominee. In conclusion, I thought the outcome

would clearly be the re-election of the President. This was why he was trying to do so many things in the diplomatic, economic and monetary fields—so that he might have some momentum in each of them to work with during his second term.
2.
I then complimented Mrs.
Gandhi
on her political success in India and she obviously was pleased. She then went on to say that, despite the success and parliamentary strength of the Congress Party, she still had domestic political problems. There was, for example, some opposition from even within the ranks of her own party and she had to contend with other parties. Political success, in short, carries its own problems.
3.
Finally as we walked out the Prime Minister asked me to convey her warmest regards to President
Nixon
and Mrs.
Nixon
and expressed her gratitude for the gift I had presented her.
Connally
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 283
283. Telegram 4081 From the
Embassy in Iran
to the
Department of State
1
2
Tehran
,
July 7, 1972, 2135Z
Subj:
Secretary Connally Travel: Memorandum of Conversation With Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi at Governor’s Residence, Simla, July 5, 1972: Part VII of VII: Personal Observations
1. My personal observation about the visit to Simla are as follows: First of all Mrs. Gandhi was very relaxed and looked well, although she said she was very tired, not having had even one day off the past year. During the course of our discussion, she was not sharp or acrimonious in any of her comments. While many of her comments were frank they were not of an offensive or belligerant nature. Nor was there any inflexion in her voice reflecting anger or resentment. On the contrary, her entire attitude was friendly and extremenly courteous even bordering on kindness. When the meetings broke up, the photographers approached her and asked us to take a stroll in the garden. Again she was quite relaxed and easy to talk to. When I asked her if she enjoyed being in Simla and what did she do here, she said she used to ride quite a bit but still walked when in Simla. She didnt like to walk on the plains where the weather “was hell.” I commented on a bed of lupin which looked like the blue bonnet—the Texas state flower. We strolled around the garden for 10 minutes or so in which she commented she loved flowers, but didn’t have a green thumb. She had once enjoyed garderning, but unfortunately she had married a man who

was much better at it than she was and he told her to stay out of the garden and arrange the flowers in the house. So her career as a gardener had been short-lived. All in all, it was an extremely amiable meeting in which she was very gracious.
Connally
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 284
284. Telegram 4085 From the
Embassy in Iran
to the
Department of State
1
2
Tehran
,
July 8, 1972, 0940Z
Subject:
Secretary
Connally
Travel: Memorandum of Conversation From Secretary
Connally
’s Meeting With President
Bhutto
at the Presidential Palace in Rawalpindi on July 6, 1972: Part I of VII: Preliminary Greetings.
1.
To begin with the atmosphere was exceedingly warm and cordial, which is apparently characteristic of personality of President
Bhutto
. He started off the conversation, in which we were along throughout, by expressing his great pleasure at my visit at this particular time to Pakistan.
2.
After preliminary greetings, in which I conveyed President
Nixon
’s fondest regards and respect and admiration for the political stability President
Bhutto
had brought to his country in a relatively short period of time in most adverse circumstances. I told him I was under instructions from the President to fully inform him on the President’s visit to Peking and Moscow; to discuss with him the domestic economic, and political situation in the U.S. and to the extent of his interest, to cover any problems in the international monetary and economic field. I told him I didn’t want to bore him with the monetary and economic matters since we had spent the two previous hours with his Planning and Economic and Finance Minister on these particular subjects. He said he had assumed nearly every portfolio except that of Finance Minister.
Connally
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 285
285. Telegram 4086 From the
Embassy in Iran
to the
Department of State
1
2
Tehran
,
July 8, 1972, 1000Z
Subject:
Secretary
Connally
Travel: Memorandum of Conversation From Secretary
Connally
’s Meeting With President
Bhutto
at the Presidential Palace in Rawalpindi on July 6, 1972: Part II of VII: U.S. Domestic Politicial Situation.
1.
He then immediately said the most important thing to us is your domestic political situation. Before I ask you your views, may I express to you my feelings and attitudes as we see things from here? President
Nixon
has done a truly magnificent job and has displayed a vast familiarity with world problems. His visit to Peking has been of incredible value and I would even say the same for his trip to Moscow. (This was obviously intended to put the visit to Moscow in secondary position.) He said: “What is happening in the U.S.? Surely McGovern does not stand a chance to be elected. If he were it would have disastrous consequences for the world. I am truly unable to understand men like Senator McGovern and Senator Church-who should be going to church.”
2.
After my evaluation of the domestic political situation, in which I outlined why I felt McGovern had come to achieve the degree of success he has and predicted that if he was indeed nominated that President
Nixon
would be reelected, President
Bhutto
said he could not believe that the American people would cast aside the magnificent contributions the

President has made for a man like McGovern. (He was effusive in his praise of the achievements of President
Nixon
and I am using substantially quotes of his.)
3.
After my evaluation of the domestic political situation he immediately related the importance of the elections this fall to the rest of the world. He said that nothing could have a more profound influence that the outcome of our election.
Connally
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 289
289. Telegram 4090 From the
Embassy in Iran
to the
Department of State
1
2
Tehran
,
July 8, 1972, 1250Z
Subject:
Secretary
Connally
Travel: Memorandum of Conversation From Secretary
Connally
’s Meeting With President
Bhutto
at the Presidential Palace in Rawalpindi on July 6, 1972: Part VI of VII: Foreign Investment
1.
At the end of the conversation, I expressed my appreciation for the opportunity to visit with
Bhutto
and talk with him. I said we had had an excellent meeting with his finance, monetary and production people and that I had raised the issue of investments and diversification within the country. We had made one suggestion to them that I wanted to repeat to him. We did not in any sense want to suggest what type of any economy or economic policy Pakistan should have, but if it wanted diversification and wanted foreign investment capital, I had told his ministers there were three essential ingredients: (1) political stability, (2) economic stability, and (3) a clear signal that Pakistan wanted foreign investments. I told him there was a shortage of capital in the world. Contrary to my avowed intentions not to give any suggestions or advice, but in his interest, I would say that both Singapore and Brazil add political and economic stability and an investment policy which taken together acted as incentives to attract capital. They had been tremendously successful. Whatever the rules following twelve years of military control in Pakistan, the

rules should be set forth explicitly so everyone could understand. I said that these rules being understood, I thought he could get help from other sources.
2.
Bhutto
replied he had tried to make it clear that he wanted investment. It would be safe. They had nationalized some domestic industries and businesses but had not tampered with any foreign investments except in the field of insurance, which frankly he did not class as foreign direct investment. It was a business that fed off domestic economy and was in a different category. He would try to make it even more clear in the future that they wanted all the foreign investments that they could get. This ended the conversation except for a reference to the dinner that evening in which he was going to provide some type of entertainment. He said: “If you don’t like it, stop it and we will go on to the next act.”
Connally
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 290
290. Telegram 4091 From the
Embassy in Iran
to the
Department of State
1
2
Tehran
,
July 8, 1972, 0645Z
Subject:
Secretary
Connally
Travel: Memorandum of Conversation From Secretary
Connally
’s Meeting With President
Bhutto
at the Presidential Palace in Rawalpindi on July 6, 1972: Part VII of VII: Summary Comment.
Comment: I thought the conversation was very frank, very warm and extremely cordial. My assessment is that
Bhutto
fully understands his diffiuclties. He is enormously upset about the Indians and their attitudes but is both intelligent and pragmatic enough to undertake the rebuilding of his own country without letting bitterness blind him as to what he has to do.
Connally