Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 133
133. Telegram From
the Embassy in Pakistan
to
the Department of State
1
Islamabad
,
August 24, 1971, 1255Z
.
8631. For Asst. Secretary
Sisco
. Subj: Contacts With Bangla Desh Reps—Pres.
Yahya
ʼs Reaction. Ref: State 154078.
2
1.
Summary. Pres.
Yahya
indicated his approval quiet
USG
contacts with individuals formerly associated with Awami League and indicated appreciation for receipt present and future info obtained through said contacts. Looked with favor upon an unpublicized meeting between
GOP
and Bangla Desh group for purpose seeking political rapprochement. Embassy disinclined to issue visa to “Foreign Minister.” End summary.
2.
Immediately following Aug. 24 call by Ambassador David Popper
3
and me upon Pres.
Yahya
to discuss narcotic drug problems and purposes of Popperʼs mission as related thereto, I requested a private conversation with
Yahya
in order to discuss matters suggested
reftel
.
3.
In accordance
reftel
I stated that the
U.S.
Consulate General in Calcutta had been picking up “signals” from various Bangla Desh sympathizers, particularly Khan Abdul Qaiyum Khan,
4
a former attorney in Comilla. These signals seemed to indicate that a substantial number of
MPA
ʼs and
MNA
ʼs presently in Calcutta and elsewhere were seriously amenable to the acceptance of an agreement which would maintain the integrity and unity of Pakistan, within the general concept of the so-called “six points,” if such an agreement could be somehow

reached between
Mujibur
and
Yahya
, given the circumstances of
Mujibur
ʼs ongoing trial. I told
Yahya
that in making mention of this I wanted him fully to understand that
USG
had taken no initiative whatsoever in gathering this information nor was the
USG
seeking to play a mediatory role between the
GOP
and the outlawed Awami League. Conversely, I stated that
USG
had consistently maintained a diplomatic stance of non-involvement and had in no way sought out or solicited contacts with “Bangla Desh Govt” reps. However, I noted
Yahya
ʼs many conversations with me during which he emphasized his hope for a return to normalcy and his additional hope that with such a climate he could turn power back to the people. Since
USG
was now privy to this information, I thought that in the interests of the much sought for peace I should bring it to his attention.
4.
Yahya
ʼs reaction was favorable and positive. He said that he was most happy that I had provided him with this type of intelligence and he felt that the
U.S.
had been correct in its political and diplomatic posture, adding that he hoped our officials “with their customary care and exercise of discretion” would maintain appropriate contacts.
Yahya
noted that his overriding desire was to bring harmony back into the body politic of Pakistan with such adjustments therein as would be for the greatest possible good of both wings. That included, he said, widespread economic and political adjustments in the east wing which he stood prepared to make. He opined, however, that he could not understand why those
MPA
ʼs and
MNA
ʼs who had been fully cleared did not come forward and take over the organization of a
GOEP
so that he could transfer power soonest.
5.
Following the general discussion on the aforesaid aspect, I asked
Yahya
if he saw any major obstacle to a select group of
GOP
members, unpublicized and on neutral ground in a foreign country, meeting with a few of the key people for whom
Qaiyum
indicated he spoke. I said the purpose of such a hypothetical meeting could be to ascertain jointly whether or not there existed areas in which political rapprochement could be effected. This would serve its own purpose, and in addition the related matters of refugees, food distribution and rehabilitation could get under way meaningfully and with full purpose.
Yahya
replied he would favor such a development wholeheartedly, asking that in case such a contingency developed, I keep closely in touch with him on this matter generally.
6.
It would seem that several forces are at play in this present situation. (A) At least some of the Bangla Deshers are realizing that their independence would be sorely limited by the interests of India; as such independence may be an illusion. And (B)
Yahya
may be coming to the conclusion that his appetite wasnʼt commensurate with the bite he took. In any event the foregoing represents a glimmer of light amidst the

encircling gloom, and a hoped for vindication of
U.S.
policy vis-à-vis Pakistan.
7.
Re paragraph 4 of
reftel
,
5
it is the Embassyʼs strongly held belief that we should avoid problems involved in issuing visa to Bangla Desh “Foreign Minister.” To do so would almost inevitably raise concerns here about our good faith in not encouraging separatist movement. These concerns would be enhanced by inevitable
U.S.
and world press/television coverage which “Foreign Minister” visit would receive in
U.S.
rather than have Bangla Desh “
FonMin
” in
U.S.
, Embassy believes it highly preferable that he take his story to interested
GOP
representatives in London, where reportedly he will soon be going. He would be less visible in London than in New York or Washington, and it should be easier there to make covert contacts with
GOP
representatives.
Farland
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations