Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 292
292. Memorandum for the President’s File by the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (
Kissinger
)
1
2
San Clemente, California
,
July 14, 1972, 9 a.m.
SUBJECT:
Meeting with
John B. Connally
PARTICIPANTS:
The President Secretary
Connally
Henry A. Kissinger
The President
welcomed Secretary
Connally
warmly and congratulated him on the success of his round-the-world trip. [Secretary
Connally
’s trip, from June 6 to July 11, took him to six Latin American countries, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, Malaysia, South Vietnam, Cambodia, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, and Iran.] The President told Secretary
Connally
, “You did a great job,” and asked for a summary of the trip’s highlights.
[Omitted here is
Connally
’s report on the stops he made in Latin America and Southeast Asia.]

Turning to South Asia, Secretary
Connally
thought that Bangladesh “must be the worst place in the world.” But it needed our support and could be a bridge to India.
The President
observed that the Japanese also could and must do more in the area of economic assistance.
Secretary
Connally
went on to describe Mujib as articulate, smart, a consummate actor and demagogue. There was a question whether Bangladesh could exist. It needed the skilled Bengalis from West Pakistan; otherwise it had no civil servants. But the U.S. can’t undertake a continuing level of support.
In India, the Secretary had had very frank talks. Mrs.
Gandhi
assured him that India had no special animus against the U.S. and that much of what India was saying was only repeating what India had always said.
Pakistan’s President
Bhutto
had changed his views on the U.S. He was very grateful for everything the U.S. had done for Pakistan. Secretary
Connally
found the quality of Pakistani leadership very high. Our problem was one of public relations.
Bhutto
denied Pakistani mistreatment of Bengalis. War crimes trials,
Bhutto
had said, would force Pakistan into war. Pakistan would not sit still at the mercy of the Indians.
Bhutto
was a smart politician and a smart leader.
Afghanistan the Secretary had found a pitiful country. It had no leadership. As a country it was incapable of acting. The Secretary remarked that

Afghanistan had lost a lot of planes just trying to fly them on maneuvers during the India-Pakistan war. Ambassador
Neumann
was an impressive fellow; he deserved a better post.
[Omitted here is
Connally
’s report on his stop in Iran and a discussion of oil policy.]
Secretary
Connally
summed up several strong feelings he had as a result of his trip. For one thing, we were permitting too many countries to malign us, India particularly. He cited the Indian attacks on us on Vietnam. We had to stop this criticism of the U.S. Secondly, it was the Secretary’s impression that most of these countries had more competence than they had ever possessed in the past. Third, it was his conviction that the next battleground in world affairs would be economics. We had to use our economic strength as a weapon. For example, we had to stop the Philippines’ bitching or we would lose our bases. We should threaten removing the bases and abolishing the sugar quota and the Laurel-Langley tariff.
The Secretary had observed in the course of summing up that we had dropped in popularity in India. As for Latin America, watch Echeverria, he said.

We can’t be all things to all people, Secretary
Connally
said. We had to be selective as to the friends we sought. We couldn’t do everything for everybody. The Latin Americans wanted a U.S. Latin American policy. We have one, but they didn’t know what it means. In South Asia and East Asia, Iran, Pakistan, Indonesia, and Malaysia were the key countries. As a general principle we had to articulate a firm U.S. point of view. We had to have a clear view of our interest and pursue it vigorously instead of letting others take the initiative all the time. We had to develop a capacity for this type of activity.
The President
expressed his appreciation for this report and advice. The trouble was that all our ambassadors were worried about was how they were getting along with their hosts. The State guys had the right manners but they minced around and had no clear concept of defending the natural interest. The President also commented that it was a grievous mistake not to sell F–4’s to the Latin American countries that sought them.
The meeting ended and Secretary
Connally
then went outside to speak with the press.