Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 115
115. Telegram From
the Consulate General in Calcutta
to
the Department of State
1
Calcutta
,
August 07, 1971, 1220Z
.
2280. Subject: Meeting With
AL
Rep. Reference: Calcutta 2230.
2
Summary: In discussion with ConGen
PolOff
, Awami League
MNA
reiterated points made
reftel
and reaffirmed that (despite propaganda to the contrary)
AL
leaders are unanimous in desire for compromise settlement with
GOP
. He said, in approaching ConGen, he acting under specific instructions of Bangladesh Minister who hopes to convince
USG
to initiate negotiations with
GOP
which will lead to a meeting of interested parties and peaceful settlement of current impasse. He said Bangladesh military forces building to strength of two “conventional” divisions (plus guerrillas) when this level is reached they plan to seize and hold territory in East Bengal. End summary.
1.
On August 7
PolOff
met again with Awami League
MNA
from Comilla,
Qazi Zahirul Qaiyum
, who reaffirmed that he had contacted ConGen under specific instructions of Bangladesh Foreign Minister Khandakar Moshtaqyr Ahmed. In reiterating points made
reftel
,
Qaiyum
gave special emphasis to two of them:
US
is only country capable of successfully arranging settlement, and
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman
must be a party to such settlement. He said that if
Mujib
is tried and executed, prospects for a compromise “will be zero.” Other
AL
leaders including
BD
Cabinet members have “no authority, no control over the masses,” and thus they would be unable to negotiate compromise. On other hand, any compromise negotiated by
Mujib
would be accepted by the people, even including a return to the status quo ante. He said refugees would go home under any settlement approved by
Sheikh Mujib
.
Qaiyum
thought
USG
was following correct policy in allowing limited arms shipments to Pakistan, as this would make it easier for
USG
to approach
GOP
on question of political settlement.
2.
According
Qaiyum
,
AL
leaders think there is a good chance of war breaking out, perhaps in the next 15–20 days, which would be an enormous disaster for everyone on subcontinent.
Qaiyum
said there rumors that India may soon recognize the Bangladesh Government; he thought this would sharpen Indo-Pak confrontation, reduce prospects for political settlement and make war more likely. If war comes,
USSR
rather than USA is likely to take lead in negotiating peace settlement, and this will be to disadvantage of
AL
.
3.
Qaiyum
said there was little time left and urged
USG
to take action soonest. He thought
USG
best able judge exactly how to initiate negotiations, but recommended that first we convey to
GOP
the
AL
ʼs desire for compromise. He thought this might be done in Washington through Pak Ambassador and/or by
US
Embassy in Islamabad. He specifically authorized disclosure to
GOP
of any details of his conversation with us. He said he personally would be willing to go to West Pakistan for talks with the
GOP
, and Foreign Minister
Ahmed
also would undertake such a trip, provided the ground has been prepared and they had assurances of safe conduct.
Ahmed
also wants confer with
USG
officials, but does not know how best to arrange such talks.
4.
Qaiyum
said that Mukti Bahini
3
was becoming an increasingly powerful military force. He said they have developed two-prong strategy. They plan to build
MB
“conventional” force to two divisions. (They now have one division consisting of 10 battalions of 1200 men each.) When second division is trained and equipped, they will use their “conventional” forces to seize and hold portion of East Bengal. In meantime,
MB
guerrilla fighters will continue guerrilla warfare tactics throughout entire province.
Qaiyum
said
GOI
has 500 East Pakistanis [garble—in?] officer schools at Dehra Dun and in Rajasthan who will be assigned to “conventional” forces upon completion of their training.
GOI
is in process of providing “conventional” divisions with modern equipment including anti-aircraft guns. Guerrilla fighters are given shorter training at camps near border.
5.
In long run,
AL
is confident that it can achieve military victory. East Bengal, however, is being devastated (situation would be many times worse if there were an Indo-Pak war), which makes it increasingly important that all efforts be made to achieve political settlement. Under any circumstances an enormous reconstruction job will be required.

Qaiyum
thought that
US
was only country capable of providing necessary assistance.
6.
Comment
. We still have no reason to doubt
Qaiyum
ʼs bona fides.
4
To best
Qaiyum
ʼs knowledge, his is only such
AL
contact with
USG
. From military standpoint, he seemed more confident this week of eventual
MB
victory; but nevertheless he equally firmly convinced of necessity to strive for political settlement.
Gordon
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations