Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 141
141. Paper Prepared by
Harold Saunders
and
Samuel Hoskinson
of the National Security Council Staff
1
Washington
,
September 3, 1971
.
NEW ISSUES
In addition to the issues arising from the continuing refinement of our contingency planning, there are several other issues that should be considered at this point. These arise either from actions we have already taken or may wish to take in the relatively near future.

Williams
ʼ Trip
. As you know,
Maury Williams
has returned from his trip to Pakistan. His written report
2
is attached to this memo, and he is prepared to report orally to the
WSAG
.
On the basis of his experiences,
Williams
has some specific recommendations for future action. He feels that refugees and relief in both India and Pakistan are integral parts of the same problem. On the relief side, the critical element for the success of our efforts is the acceptance, or tolerance, by all parties—Pakistan, Bengali insurgents and India—that food and humanitarian concern for the Bengalis is “above the battle.” On the refugee question,
Williams
sees the need for an equivalent “cease and stand fast” situation to break the vicious circle of the refugee influx leading to increased Indian support to the insurgents and the Pak army fighting back with policies encouraging more Hindu refugees to leave and never return. Specifically,
Williams
suggests that:
1.
We urge on
Yahya
a public declaration of protection for all minorities and that he back up the new Bengali Governor, Dr.
A.M. Malik
, in measures to reduce the emotions against the remaining Hindus.
2.
[We] parallel our approach to Pakistan on relief needs and administration with similar discussions in India at the appropriate level. Among other things, we would (a) encourage the Indians to help exempt the movement of relief supplies within East Pakistan from insurgent attack; (b) seek Indian recognition that intensification of the insurgency only produces more refugees; (c) seek help in obtaining a 60-day “dampening” of insurgent activity to permit a cooling of anti-Hindu passions in East Pakistan and improve the atmosphere for possible negotiations between Pakistani and “Bangla Desh” representatives; and (d) seek acceptance of
UN
observers statement [
stationed
] in East Pakistan having the freedom to cross into India on valid refugee business.
Comment
: The security of food distribution in East Pakistan is a crucial issue. Our next step should be to devise approaches to persuade the insurgents not to attack it.
Arms Supply to Pakistan
. This is an old issue returned with new problems because of
Joe Sisco
ʼs discussion with
Hilaly
.
3
The basic issue at this point is whether
Sisco
ʼs proposition to the Paks of trading our “cutoff”

of military supply for a resumption of economic assistance is tenable
. It could well turn out that
Sisco
has given an empty promise of economic aid in exchange for a cut-off of virtually nothing in the military supply pipeline. If this is true,
Yahya
ʼs willingness to give up quietly what little military supply remains for vital economic aid could quickly turn to pique if he comes to believe that in fact aid may not be forthcoming in the large and fairly immediate quantities
Sisco
seemed to indicate.
Bangla Desh-West Pakistani Talks
. If
Yahya
gives the signal to go ahead (Ambassador
Farland
will see him on Saturday)
4
and the “Bangla Desh” representatives agree, we may soon be on the sidelines of secret exploratory talks between them.
The main issue then for us will be at what moment, if ever, and how we should use our influence to help produce a settlement.
Sisco
ʼs inclination, as in the Middle East, will probably be to jump right into a mediatory role just as soon as there is any opportunity. However, to make our limited influence count most will require careful timing and employment of it with
Yahya
, if at all.
New Approach to India
. As you know, Under-Secretary
Irwin
would like to make a trip to India before too long to parallel
Williams
ʼ trip to Pakistan.
The main issue here is not so much the principle of a new high-level approach to India but its substance and who makes the pitch
.
Irwin
seems to have in mind using the same old refrain of restraint and mild threat, but, just as we were with Pakistan, we may well want to consider a new approach to India. There may be some new elements we can add.
Williams
, for example, seems to have some thoughts worthy of consideration. As for who does the job, State, especially after the
Williams
trip, will insist that they do it and
Irwin
would be much better than unleashing
Sisco
on the Indians.
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations