Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 153
153. Memorandum for the Presidentʼs File
1
Washington
,
September 29, 1971, 3–4:40 p.m.
SUBJECT
President
Nixon
ʼs Meeting with
USSR
Foreign Minister
Gromyko
on September 29, 1971 from 3:00 p.m. to 4:40 p.m. in the Oval Office of the White House (List of participants is attached)
2
The President opened the conversation by noting that it had been one year since he had last met with the Foreign Minister. Since that time some progress had been achieved in a number of fields, notably in the Berlin problem and in some aspects of arms control. The President thought it would be very useful to get Mr.
Gromyko
ʼs evaluation of where we stood and what needed to be done now. He would also give the Minister his ideas in order to see how we could get things moving.
Foreign Minister
Gromyko
suggested that the discussion follow the lines of their talk last year, i.e., that one question after another be taken up with each side expressing their respective views and positions on that question before going on to the next. President
Nixon
agreed to this procedure.
Mr.
Gromyko
said that first of all he wanted to carry out the pleasant task of conveying to the President the personal regards of the Soviet leadership, Mr.
Brezhnev
, Mr.
Kosygin
and Mr. Podgorny.
[Omitted here is discussion of bilateral relations between the United States and the Soviet Union,
SALT
negotiations, the European Security Conference, and the Middle East.]
India–Pakistan
The President raised one other subject which was of serious concern to us now. He believed that Mrs.
Indira Gandhi
was presently visiting Moscow and she would be visiting here later. He wanted to

strongly emphasize his concern over the possibility that the situation involving East Pakistan, the refugees and Indians, could explode into a conflict. He believed it was in our mutual interest to discourage the Indian Government in every possible way from taking action that could explode into war in that area. Having said that, he would point out that he was aware of the fact that Pakistan was in no position to fight a successful war with India, because it was outnumbered. However, the situation in that area was so fraught with historical hatreds that if the Indians pushed too hard, the other nation might willingly commit suicide. He believed that the Soviet Union had played an important role in keeping the peace in that area in the past and hoped the Soviet Government would do all it could to prevent an outbreak of war in this crisis.
Mr.
Gromyko
said he had understood what the President had said in regard to American interests in the area and moreover he would say that he was gratified to learn the
U.S.
did not want to see a clash between India and Pakistan. He could assure the President that the Soviet Government also did not want the conflict to break out into war. Moreover, perhaps the President knew that the Soviet Union had taken steps in the present situation to rule out the possibility of a confrontation. Of course, Pakistan was by far the smaller country, but he would point out that to provoke a conflict one did not necessarily have to have superior size and strength. To do so it would be enough if there was a lack of restraint and insufficient understanding of oneʼs responsibilities. For these reasons, it was Soviet policy to do everything possible to prevent a confrontation and the Soviet Government had said so in its conversations with Mrs.
Gandhi
, the Indian Prime Minister. Mrs.
Gandhi
had assured the Soviet Government that India would do nothing to precipitate a clash with Pakistan. It was true the Pakistani leaders were conveying the same thoughts to the Soviet Government, but here the Soviets did not have as much confidence as in the case of the Indian leadership. Once again, he was gratified to know that the
U.S.
was interested in averting a war between those two countries and that it stood on the position of counseling both sides to exercise restraint. If this was so, this was one policy that our two countries had in common. On the whole, he would sum it, that the country that should be restrained first of all was Pakistan, at least this was the conclusion the Soviet Government had come to on the basis of what they had observed. The President said we would need to keep in close touch with each other on this situation.
[Omitted here is discussion of economic relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.]
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations