AlimurRazi/FRUS-1971-bangladesh huggingface dataset:
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 2
2. Telegram 944 From the
Embassy in Pakistan
to the
Department of State
1
2
Rawalpindi
,
January 29, 1969, 0824Z
Subj
Local Political Situation
1.
Nebulous rumors are floating around that, partly because of pressure from his family,
Ayub
may be considering making effort at compromise with opposition whereby we would agree either not—rpt not—run again or resign shortly after re-election in return for assurances security persons and property self and family.
2.
Difficult to see what assurances could be considered reliable.
3.
As such rumors persist and as crescendo student and poltical unrest mounts, I am reminded of two incidents, both of which took place before troubles started, and which did not-rpt not—seem particularly significant at the time, as follows:
(A)
When Ayub took me to his orange groves, I believe on or about August 25, he remarked that he dreaded the prospects of another political campaign in which he would quote have to travel all over the country quote kissing babies’ asses unquote.
(B)
In a longhand letter to me dated October 3, 1968 in commenting on President Johnson’s decision not—rpt

not—to run for re-election. He wrote quote I came to know of the details some time ago. But even when the President met me on the airport at Karachi last November (sic) he spoke in similar strain. I then formed the imrression that unless he obtained massive open support from the people, he would not—rpt not—run. That is the way of a proud and sensitive man. Unquote.
4.
Looking back to that period of tranquility, it now rpt now seems evident that he had little stomach for a campaign and that he was sympathetic to President Johnson’s situation and problems.
5.
Most of us, and most third country people here, have felt that
Ayub
will weather the storm provided:
(A)
his health does not—rpt not—fail again;
(B)
he has the will to run; and
(C)
the military doesn’t—rpt not—decide to quote ask him out end quote.
6.
There, is still no—rpt no—evidence that 5 (C) above may take place.
7.
I have seen a good deal of
Ayub
lately at state dinners and on another private trip to his groves on January 12. He gives every evidence of having fully recovered from his illness.
8.
Re paragraph 5(B) above, the two incidents referred to in paragraph 3 above would indicate that even before the troubles he may have been contemplating retirement. The rumors referred to in paragraph 1 above, if of any validity, would indicate that the prospect is still very much on his mind.
9.
On the other hand, his character, at least prior to his illness, would suggest that we would react adversely to the prospect of withdrawing under fire even if he had been contemplating it previously.
10.
The next few days or weeks should indicate whether

or not—rpt not—he has the will and the means to carry on. If not—rpt not—after him may come the deluge.
Oehlert
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 7
7. Telegram 1439 From the
Embassy in Pakistan
to the
Department of State
1
2
Rawalpindi
,
February 11, 1969, 1058Z
Subj:
Military Supply Policy
REF:
A. STRJ5-UW 00808 (Notal)
B. STRJ7-RI 01178 ((95-))
C. Ankara 819 (Notal)
Please pass White House
1.
As is well known, this mission strongly recommends a liberalization of military supply policy for South Asia to permit case-by-case direct sale lethal end items as recommended reftel (A), and believes such revision
ASAP
is necessary for the protection of our vital interests in this area.
2.
After nearly two years of abortive efforts which have tried everyone’s souls we still have produced not repeat not one single tank or anything else. But we have succeeded in annoying

India repeatedly embarrassing Germany, Italy, Belgium and now repeat now Turkey: offending Iran: and estranging Pakistan.
3.
Reftel (B) once again points up bankruptcy of present third country sale policy.
4.
If, as stated reftel (B), it will in fact take quote approximately 15 months after
GOP
and
GOT
reach a firm agreement before the first M47’s arrive at a Pakistan port unquote then the mountain has labored to bring forth a mouse.
5.
Questions:
A.
How do we know that
GOP
and
GOT
will ever reach an agreement firm enough for us? Certainly the
GOT
shows marked signs of being reluctant about this.
B.
Why should it take 120 days to collect 60 tanks?
C.
Why should no repeat no shipment be made until 60 have been assembled?
D.
Why could not repeat not a token shipment be made as an evidence of good faith?
E.
Why must collection of M48’s await paper work on
MAP
order amendment? See reftel (C).
F.
How many more unforeseen slips between the cup and the lip may there be before any tanks arrive in Pakistan?
G.
Can
GOP
be reasonably expected to proceed if it knew of 15 months estimate for arrival first tanks?
H.
Why should we spend millions of dollars to get
GOP
100 old tanks when we have plenty we could sell and realize some dollars for ourselves?
6.
Longer range questions:
A.
If first 100 tanks do materialize where do next 100 come from?
B.
Where do the needed F–104S come from?
C.
Down the road, where do other needed items come from?
7.
If we are ever going to bite the bullet it seems clear it must be now repeat now.
8.
If paragraphs 5 and 6 of reftel (A) are correct, and we strongly maintain that they are, then we must take positive action and the hour is late indeed.
9.
If paragraphs 5 and 6 of reftel (A) are not repeat not correct, and I know of no repeat no responsible
USG
official who maintains that they are not repeat not, then why do we continue to invest, in this area, so much scarce economic aid sorely needed in other areas of admittedly vital importance?
10.
By every word at my command I urge a prompt liberalization of policy in the interests not repeat not of Pakistan or South Asia but rather in the interests of the United States of America.
Oehlert
Contents
Press Release
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 10
10. National Security Study Memorandum 26
1
2
Washington
,
February 21, 1969
TO:
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Administrator of
AID
The Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT:
Military Supply Policy in South Asia
The President has directed a thorough review of our military supply policy in South Asia.
He has directed the preparation of a study for
NSC
discussion of the full range of policy options with regard to military supply.
As a background for
NSC
consideration of these options, he has requested a paper discussing (1) the principal problems we face in developing a coherent policy in South Asia, (2) alternative views of U.S. interests in the subcontinent and (3) alternative strategies for pursuing those interests.
The President has directed that this study be prepared by the Interdepartmental Group for Near East and South Asia.
These papers should be forwarded to the
NSC
Review Group by March 24.
Henry A. Kissinger
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 12
12. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (
Kissinger
) to President
Nixon
1
2
Washington
,
March 20, 1969
SUBJECT:
Economic Policy Toward India
In line with our planned new procedure to give you a chance to review our economic aid policy in major aid-receiving countries once a year, we have set in motion papers on aid to India to come to you in April. This will be shortly after the
NSC
discussion of general aid policy.
However, a food aid program for India is in the works that should go ahead before that date. It involves sale of $30 million worth of rice and vegetable oil and $25 million worth of sorghum. The reasons for letting these move ahead at their normal pace are:
1.
The Department of Agriculture wants to move rice as quickly as possible. The
US
heavily overproduced last year to meet Vietnam requirements which did not turn out to be nearly so high as expected. Agriculture wants to avoid the cost of buying and storing the surplus.
2.
The Indians are anxious to get the sorghum. While the issue is not starvation this year, this low-price grain sold through their fair price shops helps keep urban food prices down.
Both these programs are follow-ons to an ongoing
FY
1969 food aid program ($170 million). The programs you will review next month will include a $150 million new wheat and cotton program, the entire development lending program for
FY
1970 and a few cleanup loans for
FY
1969.
I would be inclined to stand aside and let Agriculture and
AID
go ahead with these programs in their normal way. However, I do not want to tell them they are free to do so if you would prefer to review them in detail.
Recommendation
: That you approve the scenario outlined above-wallowing the on-going sales to proceed and planning an over-all review of the next year’s Indian aid program in April.
Approve
I’d like to see them
Other
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 13
13. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (
Kissinger
) to President
Nixon
1
2
Washington
,
March 25, 1969
SUBJECT:
Ayub Khan
Resignation
Ayub Khan
resigned today after proclaiming martial law and appointing General
Yahya Khan
—the Army commander—Martial Law Administrator.
Ayub
said, “I cannot preside over the destruction of my country.”
The principal question is whether or not this and the declaration of martial law which followed will be accepted by the mass of the people in East Pakistan.
If it is, law and order is likely to be restored rapidly. The new military regime would then presumably pick up the negotiations which
Ayub
has been carrying on with the opposition leaders to try to work out a new political structure for the country.
If East Pakistan reacts violently to what it may consider a virtual coup by the West Pakistani establishment which has long dominated the country, the situation in the East Wing would be very dangerous. Internal disturbances would probably be even greater than before and the opportunities for foreign meddling, especially by the Communist Chinese, would be increased.
It is impossible at this moment to tell which way things will go. However, there have been recent reports of military movements from West to East Pakistan and
Ayub
and the army probably feel that the military will be able to cope with the situation or they would not have undertaken their actions at this time.
The possibility that the army moved at its own initiative and forced Ayub’s resignation cannot be excluded but initially at least it appears more likely that the move was mutually agreed upon.

Ambassador
Oehlert
has standby authority to evacuate the 1100 Americans in East Pakistan and the 3,000 Americans in West Pakistan should this become necessary.
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 14
14. Letter From the Pakistani Ambassador (
Hilaly
) to Secretary of State
Rogers
1
2
Washington
,
March 27, 1969
Dear Mr. Secretary,
General
A.M. Yahya Khan
, Chief Martial Law Administrator of Pakistan, has asked me to convey the following personal message to President
Richard M. Nixon
:
BEGINS
“Excellency
On March 24th President
Mohammad Ayub Khan
addressed to me a letter, explaining that since the civil administration and constitutional authority in Pakistan had become ineffective, he had no option but to step aside and let the defence forces of Pakistan, as only remaining effective and legal instrument, to take over full control of the country’s affairs. On March 25th he announced his decision to relinquish office of the President of Pakistan and called upon me, as the Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army, to fulfill my constitutional responsibilities to defend the country not only against external aggression but also to save it from internal disorder and chaos.
2.
Consequently, I have placed the country under Martial Law and assumed all powers as the Chief Martial Law Administrator.
3.
It will be my earnest endeavour to restore as soon as possible normal conditions in the country as a preliminary to early restoration of democratic rule and a civilian Government elected on the basis of adult franchise.
4.
In this difficult hour Pakistan needs goodwill, understanding and support of all its friends. I am confident that existing friendly relations between Pakistan and your great country will not only be maintained but would continue to grow. On my part I can assure you that there will be no change in Pakistan’s policy which seeks friendship with all countries.
5.
I take this opportunity to extend to you my warmest regards and best wishes. Please accept Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration.
General
A.M. Yahya Khan
”
ENDS
May I request you to be kind enough to transmit the above to the President.
With my warm personal regards,
Yours sincerely,
A. Hilaly
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 19
19. Telegram 4275 From the
Embassy in Pakistan
to the
Department of State
1
2
Rawalpindi
,
April 29, 1969, 0832Z
Subject:
Peshawar
Ref:
A. Paragraph 17, Rawalpindi 5405 (31 May 1968)
B. Paragraphs 11 through 16, Rawalpindi 6039 (9 July 1968)
1.
At his request I called on the Defense Secretary at 0900 hours this morning.
2.
He reminded me that before I had left for consultation in Washington in June 1968 then President
Ayub
had given me a message for President Johnson to the effect that it might be possible to work out some continuation of the Peshawar operation if it could be done quote on a smaller and less visible basis, in a different location, under complete Pakistan control unquote. He also reminded me that upon my return from that consultation trip I had informed him that President Johnson had been interested in the suggestion and had requested me to explore that possibility fully. Comment: You will recall that when I conveyed President Johnson’s message to President
Ayub
the then new Foreign Minister, Arshad Hussain, remarked that while he had not repeat not been present at the prior meeting he had studied the record very carefully and that
Ayub
had not repeat not stated the matter as I had

suggested. You will recall further that Ayub promptly and vigorously contradicted the Minister saying that I had quoted him precisely but that in the intervening weeks there had been developments, namely that the Russians had stated that they would expect us to try this gambit and that they wanted the Pakistanis to know that if they undertook it, it would be detected, and therefore
Ayub
was no repeat no longer in a position to pursue that possibility.
3.
The Secretary then said that President
Yahya
would be writing to talk to me about the possibility of making some arrangement such as
Ayub
had previously suggested.
4.
Would appreciate instructions
ASAP
as to:
A.
What attitude I should take if Yahya does surface this possibility in the near future: and
B.
Should I raise the matter with him if he does not repeat not do so shortly?
Oehlert
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 21
21. Telegram 7466 From the
Mission to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
to the
Department of State
1
2
Paris
,
May 21, 1969, 1750Z
Subject:
Pakistan Consortium Meeting-Summary
1.
Annual consortium meeting Paris 19–20 generally went very well. Problem of declining net aid transfers fully explored in context need for increased resources for expansion social sector while maintaining growth. Pakistan impressed by members with necessity for better mobilization of domestic resources, particularly through progressive taxation. Donors showed understanding bank proposal for softer terms and larger portion of commodity aid. Growing debt servicing problem to be subject of further study and then separate meeting.
2.
Against $500 million request, members (except Belgium, France, Italy and
US
) indicated about $250 million would be forthcoming. Belgium, France and Italy will participate subject to governmental approvals and in case Italy and France movement of prior year funds.
US
delegate referred to request of 140 million to Congress. Germany and Netherlands disclosed softening of terms their aid. Germany to new
DAC
30 year level, Netherlands fully to old
DAC
with agreement in principle to move to new.
3.
Main speech by
US
delegate underscored challenge of tax problem, reduction in defense of expenditures to assist in investment, East Pakistan development, rural works program, family planning, “second generation” food grain problems. Presentation was warmly commended by Paks, who requested text for use their own struggles in bureaucracy. Transcript being hand carried to Rawalpindi and Washington.
4.
Full report of session follows in separate cables on a) opening statements, b) delegates response, c) debt servicing problem, d) aid contributions, e) closing remarks and f) press statement.
Trezise
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 22
22. Telegram 7699 From the Mission to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development to Secretary of State
Rogers
in New Delhi
1
2
Paris
,
May 23, 1969, 1922Z
Subject:
India Consortium: Summary
1.
Summary of consortium meeting for use as appropriate by Secretary. Detailed reports follow septels:
2.
Tone of meeting constructive with much laudatory comment on recent improvements in Indian economy and constructive exchange on need for improved Indian performance industrial efficiency, long-term export promotion, decision making re investments, and family planning. Agreement reached for meeting on this subject when
UN
study complete, purpose to coordinate consortium country efforts with Indian needs.
3.
AID
plans
IFY
1969–70: Most countries were not in a position to make firm commitments, but expressed intentions (subject in most cases including
US
to legislation) appeared to come fairly close to
IBRD
-recommended level of $1 billion including debt relief.
US
indicated budget request for India in
US
FY
1970
AID
bill was $385 million. Japanese and Italians remain reluctant to undertake commitments, latter expressing interest in whether Bank would agree that supplier credits are in some cases appropriate

substitute for aid. Germany expressly agreed to ease aid terms and Netherlands and Belgium noted possibility similar action.
4.
Debt relief: Agreement reached for
IFY
1969–70 debt rescheduling in some cases, including US, subject to reference to capitols, and for principle that similar relief should be given in 1970–71.
A.
Amount to comprise at least $300 million over course of three years meaning countries with shortfall in 1968–69 will attempt make full share. Japan to report its contribution in two months: other members indicated compliance.
B.
Some improvement in terms of rescheduling by Germany while France, Japan and Italy still unable to meet desired terms although latter two will come up to quantitative quota.
C.
Pressed on subject
Sov
bloc debt,
GOI
asserted that it now repeat now has trade deficit with “rupee area” and that it continues apply pressure on
USSR
for increased net flow resources in form larger non-project imports, with some success.
E.
India pressed hard by several delegations, including
US
, to limit use supplier credits.
5.
Indian del highly pleased with results consortium meeting and tell us they are so reporting to Delhi.
Brown
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 34
34. Telegram 140939 From the
Department of State
to the
White House
1
2
Washington
,
August 20, 1969, 2348Z
Subject:
Indian Presidential Election
White House please pass to San Francisco for Secretary
Rogers
and San Clemente for Dr.
Kissinger
1.
Prime Minister
Gandhi
has scored a spectacular victory with the election of her candidate, V.V. Giri, to the Presidency of India. Giri, whose candidacy had been rejected by the Congress Party leadership over Mrs.
Gandhi
’s objections, ran as an Independent and had the backing of the leftist parties, including the Communists. He won sufficient votes from the Prime Minister’s supporters in Congress Party ranks to defeat the official party designee, former Lower House Speaker Sanjiva Reddy, in the indirect election.
2.
Although the office of the President has in the past been a largely ceremonial one, it has important latent powers and the contest for it had developed into an unprecedented trial of strength between Mrs.
Gandhi
and her party rivals. The Prime Minister’s daring and successful gamble in defying the party organization to back the 75-year old former Vice President has put her in the most powerful position she has enjoyed since she took office in January 1966. Although she is likely to make conciliatory-gestures to her foes in an effort to paper over the bitter divisions

which had threatened to split the party in two, she is almost certain to interpret the Giri victory as an endorsement of the “progressive” cause she has championed since her dramatic nationalization of the major Indian banks a month ago.
3.
Ironically, Mrs.
Gandhi
’s unorthodox exercise in political brinksmanship should improve prospects for political stability in India. Giri’s defeat might well have led to an effort by her party opponents to unseat her on grounds of disloyalty and thus produced a split in party ranks. As it is, she seems likely to carry on as Prime Minister until the next election in 1972. Moreover, the progressive image which she seems determined to give to the party before then is likely to improve its prospects in that race, thus heading off the bogey of unstable coalition government which had seemed to loom for the post-1972 period. However, the policies she adopts in her efforts to project such an image may well include many which will not go down well with potential foreign investors.
END
Rogers
Contents
Press Release
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 35
35. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (
Sisco
) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (
Johnson
)
1
Washington
,
September 12, 1969
2 pages of source text not declassified.
Contents
Press Release
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 36
36. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (
Sisco
) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (
Johnson
)
1
Washington
,
September 15, 1969
2 pages of source text not declassified.
Contents
Press Release
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations