AlimurRazi/FRUS-1971-bangladesh huggingface dataset:
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 127
127. Telegram 986 From the
Consulate General in Dacca
to the
Department of State
1
2
Dacca
,
March 30, 1971, 0905Z
Subject:
Killings
References:
A. Dacca 9591
B. Islamabad 2792 (NOTAL)
C. Dacca 9641
D. Dacca 978
1.
American serving with FAO in East Pakistan visited
ConGen
March 30 to report on tour of Dacca University March 27. Was told weapons students had at Iqbal Hall served only to infuriate army. Students either shot down in rooms or mowed down when they came out of building in groups. Saw tightly packed pile of approximately twenty five corpses. Was told this was last batch of bodies remaining, others having been disposed of by army. While there, empty army truck arrived to remove bodies. Major atrocity recounted to him took place at Kokeya girls’ hall where building set

ablaze and girls machine-gunned as they fled building.
USIS
local who lives nearby confirms girls gunned down. Girls had no weapons. Forty killed. Attack aimed at eliminating female student leadership, since army apparently told girl student activists resided there. Estimated 1,000 persons, mostly students, but including faculty members resident in dorms, killed. He claimed university contacts who conducted him on tour had been noted for their reliability for information in past. Told all university files burned by army in what appeared be purposeful move.
2.
We have confirmed report one faculty member shot in own residence.
3.
Casualty total at university subject of considerable debate. On one hand fact school officially closed and many if not most students gone undoubtedly reduced casualties. On other hand, university halls had become Dacca base for student activity in Awami League “movement,” and thus not inconceivable young people might have flocked there at first indication of trouble night of March 25–26. At least two mass graves on campus, one near Iqbal Hall, other near Roeya Hall. Rain night March 29 exposed some bodies. Stench terrible.
4.
Reports vary re status of top student leaders. Some say army took no prisoners and killed all present in dorms. Hence if student leaders there, they too killed. Other university contacts say game plan if army moved in force was for top leaders to escape to countryside to organize resistance. Most apparently succeeded in getting out of Dacca environs. Army radio broadcast monitored here suggests some students escaped.
5.
Comment: Question of whether university professors subject of pre-planned purge still unanswered although actively being looked into. Academics met since military crackdown fearful for safety and in hiding. They believe they subject to elimination. Systematic destruction of academic records at university suggests campaign underway to erase all traces current “trouble

making” generation at Dacca University. Figure of thousand dead at university nonetheless strikes us as exaggerated, although nothing these days is inconceivable.
Blood
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 135
135. Conversation Between President
Nixon
and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (
Kissinger
)
1
2
Washington
,
May 26, 1971, 10:38–10:44 a.m.
Kissinger
:
Indira Gandhi
has written you a letter.
Nixon
: I know about—
Kissinger
: Well, no. We should answer it. Let me say one other thing.
Nixon
: [unclear]
Kissinger
: Well you can tell her—you can use it to bring pressure on her not to take military action. Also, I talked to the Pakistan Ambassador. He said that
Yahya
might appreciate a letter, which would give him an excuse to answer all the things by saying, listing all the things he’s doing because he can’t get any publicity here.
Nixon
: No.
Kissinger
: And conversely,
Indira Gandhi
, I checked with the Indian Ambassador, they’re getting so devious now—
Nixon
: She wants—
Kissinger
: She would like to be able to say that one result of her letter was—
Nixon
: Yeah.
Kissinger
:—that you’ve written to
Yahya
. So everybody’s happy. The Pakistanis—
Nixon
: But we don’t say anything against
Yahya
?
Kissinger
: No, no. You just say you hope the refugees will soon be able to go back to East Pakistan. He will then reply to you that’s exactly what he wants. I’ve got it all arranged with the—
Nixon
: Good. Go ahead.
Kissinger
:—Embassy. Then you can take credit. You can tell the Indians to pipe down—
Nixon
: Yeah.
Kissinger
: And we’ll keep
Yahya
happy.
Nixon
: The Indians need—what they need really is a—
Kissinger
: They’re such bastards.
Nixon
: A mass famine. But they aren’t going to get that. We’re going to feed them—a new kind of wheat. But if they’re not going to have a famine the last thing they need is another war. Let the goddamn Indians fight a war [unclear].
Kissinger
: They are the most aggressive goddamn people around there.
Nixon
: The Indians?
Kissinger
: Yeah.
Nixon
: Sure.
Contents
Press Release
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 136
136. Conversation Between President
Nixon
and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (
Kissinger
)
1
2
Washington
,
June 4, 1971, 9:42–9:51 a.m.
Nixon
: I told
Keating
that I would see him—he was there last night at this little party we had—and I told him I would see him when he came back, late and in the middle of June, just before the Foreign Minister came. And I think we’ll just have him for a half hour and then have him—
Kissinger
: I saw him leaving.
Nixon
: I also told him that, I said the problem here is that we just got to be sure we don’t get involved in an internal conflict, be pulled one way or another, so forth and so on.
Kissinger
: He’s almost fanatical on this issue.
Nixon
: Well what the hell does he think we should do about it?
Kissinger
: Oh he thinks—I tell you, he thinks we should cut off all military aid, all economic aid, and in effect help the Indians to push the Pakistanis out of—
Nixon
: Push—I don’t want him to come in with that kind of jackass thing with me.
Kissinger
: Mr. President, actually we’ve got to keep
Yahya
, we have to keep
Yahya
[unclear] public executions for the next month.
Nixon
: Look, even apart from the Chinese thing, I wouldn’t do that to help the Indians, the Indians are no goddamn good. Now
Keating
, like every Ambassador who goes over there, goes over there and gets sucked in. He now thinks the—
Kissinger
: Those sons-of-bitches, who never have lifted a finger for us, why should we get involved in the morass of East Pakistan? All the more so, I quite agree with the point, if East Pakistan becomes independent, it is going to become a cesspool. It’s going be 100 million people, they have the lowest standard of living in Asia—
Nixon
: Yeah.
Kissinger
: No resources. They’re going to become a ripe field for Communist infiltration. And then they’re going to bring pressure on India because of West Bengal. So that the Indians in their usual idiotic way are playing for little stakes, unless they have in the back of their minds that they could turn East Pakistan into a sort of protectorate that they could control from Calcutta. That they may have in the back of their mind.
Nixon
: Oh, what they had in the back of their mind was to destroy Pakistan.
Contents
Press Release
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 148
148. Telegram 186578 From the
Department of State
to the
Embassy in Pakistan
1
2
Washington
,
October 12, 1971, 1837Z
REF:
Islamabad 9833
Subject:
US
Leverage in Current Pakistan Crisis:
US
Policy
NOTE: Secretary signed following cable on September 29 before departing for New York. Regret delay in despatch.
1.
We much appreciate the evaluation you have given us in
reftel
of extent to which our strategy in Pakistan has produced results in specific actions by
GOP
to date directed at political settlement. No one can appreciate better than you and your colleagues on the spot in Pakistan the complexity of our current Pakistan relationship and the difficulty of moving
GOP
toward effective actions in the political domain. We concur in your view that the record to date suggests that our strategy has

moved situation a good way from the grim days in March, granted also that only a beginning has been made in the key task of getting
GOP
actions that will contribute to reducing violence and getting started on political settlement. In this connection we have noted with much interest that
Yahya
did not react adversely in your most recent conversation with him on Mujib to your references to potential that Mujib offers as “trump card” for political settlement. We have also noted recent
Pak
press speculation on possible leniency in Mujib case. As we see it, the way
Yahya
handles Mujib is clearly key both to current psychological atmosphere and to substantive progress toward political settlement and we hope you can continue find ways get this across.
2.
Your review of specific
USG
efforts and
GOP
actions particularly timely because of upcoming Congressional hearings in which we have important task of making sure record is fully clear and understood on these points.

This includes Kennedy Subcommittee sessions scheduled October 4.
3.
We would add two items to list you have compiled and that is your own imaginative and resourceful initiatives in number of areas, including handling of Mujib and treatment of Hindus and successful way in which you have preserved an atmosphere of personal confidence and frankness with President
Yahya
and his top associates. We appreciate how difficult this is in context of constant suggestions and advice we are directing at
GOP
in an area which they naturally regard as a matter of primarily internal
GOP
concern and we want you to know how much we appreciate this. You have earned the brief leave and medical checkup you are about to take. Enjoy your leave.
END
Rogers
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 149
149. Memorandum From
Harold Saunders
and
Samuel Hoskinson
of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (
Kissinger
)
1
2
Washington
,
November 4, 1971
SUBJECT:
Gandhi
Visit—Advisors’ Meeting in Cabinet Room
The Advisors’ Meeting in the Cabinet Room while you were with the President and Mrs.
Gandhi
covered the full range of issues concerning the current situation in South Asia.
Joe Sisco
did most of the talking on the
US
side and
T.N. Kaul
for the Indians. The general tone was friendly but firm on the issues.
Much of the time was spent by
Kaul
explaining at length the standard Indian positions. Beyond those, the major operational points to emerge were:
—
Sisco
described
Yahya
’s favorable response to the idea that he open a dialogue with certain Awami League or Bangla Desh representatives, perhaps speaking on behalf of Mujib, and urged India to react positively to such ideas for getting a political process started. He told
Kaul
it seems to us asking the impossible to insist that the process start with Mujib.
Kaul
’s “tentative” response was that under any conditions this probably would be a non-starter since the Bengalis are bent on independence and only Mujib would have a chance of settling for less, and even he might not now.
Kaul
did concede—in response to an idea presented by Ambassador
Keating
—that it might be “worth trying” to have someone talk to Mujib in jail if
Yahya
would go along with it. The general thrust of his response, however, was skeptical and negative. Mujib, he felt, had been out of touch and it might not be very meaningful to involve him unless he were out of jail and free to re-establish himself with his colleagues.
—
Sisco
also described
Yahya
’s acceptance of the idea of a unilateral Pakistani military withdrawal.
Kaul
’s response was tentative but negative, saying that India could not afford to take security risks until the political problem in East Pakistan was resolved. He added that India had no territorial designs and was not trying to dictate the terms of a settlement between East and West Pakistan but if attacked, India was determined that it would be a “decisive war with decisive results.”
—
Kaul
stressed that it was putting the “cart before the horse” to suggest Indo-
Pak
talks or the exercise of good offices between India and Pakistan. This was a problem between West and East Pakistan and could only be settled by them. Moreover, India has little influence.
—
Kaul
stressed that “all” the refugees, irrespective of their religion, “must” return.
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 157
157. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between President
Nixon
and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (
Kissinger
)
1
2
Washington
,
November 26, 1971, 10:42 a.m.

Mr.
Kissinger
/The President
K: Mr. President.
P:
Henry
anything going on today?
[Omitted here is conversation unrelated to South Asia.]
P: I noticed with interest the Pakistanis claim they are doing pretty well and I would like the Indians to be embarrassed.
K: The Indians have pulled off on this one but they are going to have to come back . . . Keating finally delivered the message and they are all over him. What we should do with the arms is wait until they make another military move.
P: Pakistan provocation . . . I saw that they admitted it they were in there...
K: Oh yes, they admitted it. The New York Times wrote a scorcher against India.
P: Did you talk to the Times and tell them that was the case?
K: Yes I talked to _______(?) I said if anyone is to blame for the war it is by following your advice. Cutting off aid to Pakistan. . .

P: Well and the thing is novel—it is the point I have been making and I hope you pushed it on Pakistan that we cut off their aid because of their internal conduct not for their external conduct. So we cut off aid and India busts into Pakistan and that is worse. Was it a strong editorial?
K: Oh yes, Mrs.
Gandhi
has betrayed her father.
P: Of course her father was just as bad as she is. What she said was so unconscionable and the Pakistanis were so prefabricated. Oh the Pakistan thing you feel no action on the arms thing should be taken.
K: I think as soon as military action starts again we should cut off aid.
P: I still want Connally, State and Hannah to say nothing is being moved into the economic aid pipeline into India. Are they riding herd on this? They will get the message.
K: Oh no question. We are just not saying anything. We are not signing the
PL
480 and we won’t say what the reason is for. The Chinese—I told them you can’t just say you are against the Indians and you better tell the Pakistanis what you are going to do. Do it independently and show them the resolution you are putting forth... We are going pretty far in condemning India. . . You talked with Heath.
[Omitted here is conversation unrelated to South Asia.]
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 158
158. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State
Rogers
and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (
Kissinger
)
1
2
Washington
,
December 3, 1971, 3:45 p.m.

R: On Pakistan Ambassador. Has no instructions but thought a good idea. Communications slow from here to his government so working out an arrangement for him to send through our channels. He feels sure they wil not oppose. They feel same thing in
UN
.
K: I think we should wait until we hear from them. We can wait until tomorrow morning.
R: There’s a lot of criticism on why we don’t do something. Ambassador had a press conference today and a lot of press critizing us for not taking action. Otherwise if we don’t do it someone else will.
K: As soon as we hear from the [?]. If we can get an answer tonight, sure.
R: Sooner we have the monkey off our back so the President can say he has acted.
K: The President does want to act. Wants to take a line to condemn the Indians.
R: It’s not a matter of condemning or blaming. It’s trying to stop it. If we blame India a general war will break out.
K: In the subcontinent.
R: We are short-sighted if we think our general approach is castigating India. It’s to bring a ceasefire.
K: And withdrawal.
R: If we say let’s condemn India, what does that do? We are trying to bring about ceasefire.
K: That’s what we want to do but in order to get that we have to make clear who started action.
R: That’s in the Security Council. If we don’t take lead for in the security council in for action then first we have lost the opportunity because someone else will and no advantage for railing against India now if we have Security Council—
K: I mean before the Security Council.
R: Right.
K: I think we should get the Security Council in a way that’s not offensive to Pakistan if it can be done. So what if the Belgians go to the Security Council?

R: The President said don’t let them blame me and people will. Church saying we are not doing a thing.
K: We should hit back.
R: How can we?
K: We have done a lot. Neglect India on refugee thing. He will hit at us no matter what we do.
R: If war breaks out and we do not move quickly to bring it to the Security Council in conjunction with others, the President will be blamed for inaction.
K: As soon as we know they don’t object.
R: This fellow doesn’t and getting in touch with ambassador in NY who has been in touch with his government. I don’t think we should wait until tomorrow.
K: Let’s talk again in a couple of hours.
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 160
160. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (
Kissinger
) and the Minister of the Soviet Embassy (
Vorontsov
)
1
2
Washington
,
December 5, 1971, 4:55 p.m.

V: Hello.
K: I am sorry to call you on a Sunday, but I was just talking to the President to report our conversation and I mentioned that at the end of our conversation you said that in a week or so it will be over and he said that he would like you to report to Moscow that in a week or so it may be ended but it won’t be over as far as we are concerned if it continues to take the present trend.
V: Yes.
H: He wants it to be clear that we are at a watershed in our relation-ship if it continues to go on this way.
V: I understand.
H: We cannot accept that any country would take unilateral actions like that.
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 164
164. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (
Kissinger
) and the Pakistani Ambassador (
Raza
)
1
2
Washington
,
December 8, 1971, 2:47 p.m.

R: I thought you were angry with me.
K: Due to the incompetence of my staff you were not notified. I was expecting you at 2:45.
R: No one told me.
K: It was because it was someone I wanted to see.
R: I am going to the State Dept. I rang Gen.
Haig
3 times.
K: They didn’t notify me.
R: The President has sent another message direct by
Farland
. About the whole situation. One or two suggestions—my trouble is that they keep saying see you.
K: Two things. One, tell your people to stop all cable traffic with respect to help on ammunition and so forth. We are doing what we can and we will send a coded message. It’s getting too dangerous for you to send it. I will keep you informed.
R: I am going to State now to keep the record straight.
K: Tell them you would like to invoke mutual security treaty. A formal request—
R: An aide memoire. Unsigned.
K: The secret clauses also?
R: “The bilateral U.S. /Pakistan agreement ? ? ? ? ? and independence of Pakistan ? ? ? ? ? ? ? gravest to Pakistan ? ? ? ? extend material help to us.”
K: Say they should use clarifications used in subsequent years.
R: Are you very busy today?
K: I will see you first thing tomorrow. We wax are here to support you.
R: You don’t have to say that. Things are getting late.
K: I can give you news that we are getting something out of the Shah for ammunition. You can send a cypher through me.
R: I have not sent a cable. Only through you. Are your cables different from the State Dept.?

K: Yes.
R: So you will give me a time tomorrow.
K: You can count on it.
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 167
167. Memorandum for the Record
1
2
Washington
,
December 9, 1971, 6:59 a.m.

Subject:
Alleged
US
Military Assistance to Pakistan
1.
The
US
Ambassador to India reports that on 8 December General Manokshaw, the Indian Chief of Staff, advised the
US
Defense Attache that a
US
Air Force C–141 aircraft had landed at Karachi, Pakistan at 290500Z November 1971 and had offloaded a number of crates onto Pakistani military vehicles. General Manokshaw commented that the cargo was “obviously a rush drop, bringing military equipment urgently required by Pakistani forces.” He went on to describe the source of his information as unimpeachable.
2.
The
US
Ambassador has requested a complete report on General Manokshaw’s allegation, and guidance on what information may be furnished him in reply.
3.
Preliminary information from the Military Airlift Command confirms that one
US
Air Force C–141 aircraft did arrive at Karachi on that date. The aircraft which was making the normal east-bound Embassy flight arrived in Karachi at 290930Z November and departed 291030Z November. The aircraft offloaded eight passengers and 539 pounds of cargo consisting of personal baggage and Embassy mail. No passengers or cargo were onloaded. The aircraft then proceeded to New Delhi, arriving at 291130Z and offloaded four passengers and 1,800 pounds of Embassy cargo. The C–141 departed New Delhi at 300415Z for Bangkok, Thailand. The above information has been provided to the Department of State.
Colin C. Hamilton
Brigadier General, USAF
Deputy Director for Operations (NMCC)