Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 302
302. Telegram 7547 From the
Embassy in Pakistan
to the
Department of State
1
2
Islamabad
,
September 8, 1972, 1314Z
Subject:
Conversation With Pres
Bhutto
: Part I-The Subcontinent
1.
Summary:
Bhutto
expressed disappointment at his inability to proceed with recognition of
BD
in August as earlier planned, as result Mujib’s refusal to meet him and domestic political opposition. He reaffirmed intention to move toward
BD
recognition as soon as circumstances permit. Also reaffirmed intention to continue efforts toward rapprochment with India per Simla agreement. Although timetable has been set back somewhat. He is quite aware of relevance of
GOP
recognition of
BD
to continued progress with India. Bhutto indicated he had taken initiative on Chinese veto of
BD
application for admission to
UN
. He did not think position would be changed in time to permit admission by this year’s
UNGA
. End summary
2.
Pres
Bhutto
invited me for dinner Sept 7 at his Rawalpindi residence. During a three-hour period, with no others present, we touched on a variety of current issues spiced by
Bhutto
’s reminiscences from his years of involvement in
Pak
affairs at high level.
Bhutto
seemed

relaxed and reasonably well rested despite hectic pace which he has been maintaining. This message covers highlights of our conversation on relations with Bangladesh (
BD
) and India and the Chinese connection. Other principal subjects covered during the evening being reported septels.
3.
Bhutto
acknowledged there was setback to timetable he had envisaged in normalizing relations with Bangladesh and India. He had not found it possible to proceed as he had hoped to put
BD
recognition before National Assembly when it convened in mid August. As he had earlier told me, his domestic opponents had taken advantage of every opportunity to belabor him as getting ready to sell East Pakistan down the river. Meanwhile, he was vulnerable because Mujib had stubbornly continued to reject any meeting with
Bhutto
without prior formal recognition of
BD
by GOP. I said I thought
Bhutto
had decided before he went to Simla in late June, that he would move ahead on
BD
recognition in August even if he could not meet Mujib beforehand. Bhutto acknowledged that he had been thinking along those lines, although he had been given reason to believe (especially by Indonesians) that meeting with Mujib would be arranged for July. In absence such meeting and in light of political attacks on him especially in Punjab, Bhutto had decided to make tactical retreat.
4.
Bhutto
said he had perceived no change in Mujib’s position when he telephoned Mujib in London a couple of weeks ago. He had gotten impression that several other persons were present with Mujib at that time, and that Mujib was—at last in part—reiterating past positions for their benefit.
Bhutto
then recalled, once again, solemn promise which he said Mujib had made to him before being freed from detention here last January, that the two would meet again shortly to discuss common problems. But on this point, as on others, Mujib had shown that he was not much of a statesman.
Bhutto
remarked that all his other efforts to reach Mujib, including calls on him in London by Baluch leader Akbar Bugti, had drawn a blank.
5.
I asked whether the delay in his timetable implied any basic change in
Bhutto
’s strategy for recognizing
BD
, noting that this issue was apparently crucial to further progress in implementing Simla agreement with India.
Bhutto
said firmly that his basic strategy remained same. He was a realist and pragmatist, even if Mujib was not. He knew that
GOP
had, sooner or later, to recognize
BD
and that delay had its costs although he also could not afford to ignore domestic political considerations. In October he planned to go to the people and launch a campaign to get better understanding of the problem that would, in effect, prepare the way for recognition of
BD
. He could not, however, fix a date when he would see the time ripe to put matter to National Assembly for approval. Problem would be considerably simplified if Mujib could be persuaded to modify his stand on meeting
Bhutto
. Some friends (he mentioned French and Indonesians) had suggested possibility of arranging meeting at which
GOP
recognition of
BD
would be announced when the two principals came together.
Bhutto
said he was ready to offer Mujib the presidency of reunited Pakistan, if for nothing more than to show his own good faith (and also, it occurred to me to try to absolve himself of opposition charges that he had connived in breakup of Pakistan so that he could become President in the west.)
6.
I asked to what extent
Bhutto
was linking in his own mind the question of
BD
recognition with the release of POWs and the proposed war crimes trials.
Bhutto
said it would be disastrous to him if all the POWs were not released and if trials were begun in Dacca after recognition of
BD
. If trials were begun in the interim, it would be great setback to the prospects for recognition.
Bhutto
reiterated his own readiness to put on trial any
Pak
personnel charged with crimes in East Pakistan in 1971. He said he had no desire to protect rapists or others of that ilk.
7.
Noting it was most desirable to find some way to break the current impasse between Mujib and
Bhutto
,I asked
Bhutto
how his detention of the Bengalees in Pakistan figured in the picture.
Bhutto
interjected that he knew I had discussed this matter with some
Pak
officials including Air Marshal Chaudhry only last week (Islamabad A-140 September 1, 1972 notal). (This was the first I knew my informal conversations this subject, expressing doubts about the wisdom of not allowing the Bengalees to depart, had come to
Bhutto
’s attention.)
Bhutto
said he too was sympathetic to humanitarian problems being faced by Bengalees detained here. They had been caught up in a complex of troubles not to
Bhutto
’s liking (i.e., as innocent victims of the failure of India/
BD
to release the
Pak
POWs). He said he was looking at some possibilities for allowing some of the Bengalees to leave Pakistan. He agreed with my remark that whatever he could find it possible to do along that line should tend to counter the very unfavorable image which Pakistan had acquired in many countries during the events of 1971.
8.
I asked if
Bhutto
could tell me how the Chinese

veto of
BD
admission to the
UN
had come about, saying I surmised that Peking would not have applied its first veto unless it were in accord with Peking’s own assessment of principles and interests.
Bhutto
indicated that he had himself taken the initiative on this question. He had sent FonOff SecGen
Aziz Ahmed
to Peking in June (before Simla) to talk about contingencies and strategy. At that time, he was still planning on recognition of
BD
in August. But he had instructed Ahmed also to explore an alternative strategy in the event
Bhutto
felt unable to proceed with recognition. In that connection the possibility of a Chinese veto in UNSC had been discussed. Subsequently,
Amb
Shahi
had been called back for consultations and then returned to Peking for further discussions on the veto.
Bhutto
intimated that these efforts had been of importance and that the Chinese veto was a sign of Peking’s desire to help Pakistan at a very critical time. It was also taken in recognition of damage incurred by Pakistan as result of Soviet intrigues in 1971.
Bhutto
said he thought Peking wished to establish good relations with
BD
but it was willing to wait. In response to my query,
Bhutto
reaffirmed that the application of the veto was not inconsistent with his own continuing intention to pave the way for acceptance in Pakistan of the reality of
BD
. He thought, however, that
Pak
recognition of
BD
would probably not come in time for a reversal of the Chinese position and the acceptance of
BD
into the
UN
at this year’s session of UNGA.
9.
I asked about recent visit here by PRC Vice
FonMin
Chiao Kuan-Hua.
Bhutto
did not offer any details, commenting merely that Chiao had come for a review of issues at forthcoming
UNGA
. (
MFA
DirGen for
UN
affairs has given similar explanation for Chiao’s visit, which attracted much speculation here because it came at very short notice and in wake of Chinese veto of
BD
in
UNSC
.)
10.
Subject of Indo-
Pak
relations cropped up at various times during above discussion.
Bhutto
said he was determined to move ahead on efforts at rapprochement in wake of Simla accord. He recalled that
PriMin
Gandhi
had taken personal decision, in last moments

at Simla, to break deadlock on a few points and to sign the accord with
Bhutto
.
Bhutto
admitted that he had spoken to Mrs.
Gandhi
of his hopes and intentions on recognizing
BD
in August, and that she could well have been disappointed when
Bhutto
subsequently found himself unable to follow through. He had sent
Aziz Ahmed
back to Delhi last month to explain how events had obliged
Bhutto
to slow down on recognition. He then reiterated his dedication to moving from confrontation to a new relationship with India.
11.
Bhutto
said he was sorry that the deadline set at Simla for the completion of force withdrawals to either side of the Indo
Pak
border had not been met. He thought delineation of the Kashmir line of control, which the Indians considered as prerequisite to withdrawal to international border, would eventually be completed although the military negotiators on both sides had to be guided with a firm hand.
Bhutto
said he was not sure when the next meeting of Indo-
Pak
officials would take place pursuant to Simla accord, but it surely would not be before force withdrawals were completed. Planning for the next meeting with
PriMin
Gandhi would thus have to await further developments.
Bhutto
said he recognized the importance which
GOI
attaches, in this regard, to question of
Pak
recognition of BD.
Sober