Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 52
52. Memorandum of Conversation
1
Washington
,
May 21, 1971, 12:30–1:05 p.m.
PARTICIPANTS
Henry A. Kissinger
, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
L.K. Jha
, Ambassador of India
Samuel M. Hoskinson
,
NSC
Staff
After the initial exchange of pleasantries, Ambassador
Jha
began to explain the refugee situation in India.
Jha
explained that it was not simply a question of money and relief, although this was of course important. The big problem, he said, is that India cannot absorb this many people and they must find a way to get them back into East Pakistan.
Jha
explained that “tensions are high” both as far as the political situation in India was concerned and in terms of social problems. He went on to explain that a high percentage of the refugees are now Hindus and that there were communal conflicts between the refugees and the local population. He pointed out that this was a particularly serious problem in the Indian state of West Bengal. Ambassador
Jha
then summed up the situation by calling it “very explosive.” He pointed out that it was all in the letter
2
that the Prime Minister had sent to the President.
Dr.
Kissinger
asked what the choices were, and noted that “you canʼt go to war over refugees.” Ambassador
Jha
said that some will want to arm the refugees and send them back into East Pakistan. Others advocate bringing pressure on President
Yahya
. He then went on to explain that the prevailing high-level of tension could result in serious disruptions in already unstable West Bengal and to a serious problem in Indo-Pak relations. It could also result in a “backwash” effect on Indo-
U.S.
relations.
Jha
then went on to say that he hoped the President could reply to the Prime Ministerʼs letter in such a way as to convey support for India in international forums and informing her of what we were advising President
Yahya
.

Dr.
Kissinger
asked: “But what can we do? He (
Yahya
) claims he wants a political settlement.” Ambassador
Jha
said what India needs is a sense of movement in that direction; we need confirmation that he is moving toward a political settlement.
Dr.
Kissinger
said, “I understand.” “Frankly, I must tell you that I have not been able to study the Prime Ministerʼs letter. Letʼs not play games.” (At that point Dr.
Kissinger
searched for his copy of the letter and, when he found it, he quickly read it over.) Dr.
Kissinger
then said we will have to “study this carefully.” We can go into this further when you return. I can tell you now, however, that we would deplore this matter getting totally out of hand. We believe that the evolution in East Pakistan should be “gradual and most delicately handled.” Personally, I am not sure an “independent East Pakistan is in Indiaʼs interest.” Ambassador
Jha
indicated that he could understand this point of view. He said that India did not favor the break-up of Pakistan but the fact was that they did not see Pakistan surviving. This being the case, we fear guerrilla activity, he said. Also there is the question of Chinese involvement eventually in East Pakistan which is “ripe for this.”
Dr.
Kissinger
reiterated again that the situation must evolve and be handled with great delicacy. He said how things happen are almost as important as what happens. He then noted that the tendency here is “to do more than we say.” Dr.
Kissinger
advised the Ambassador to tell Prime Minister
Gandhi
that we are concerned and are doing here what we can with a low visibility. He said that he would like to continue this discussion with Ambassador
Jha
, perhaps over lunch, as soon as he returns. The reply to the Prime Ministerʼs letter, however, will have to be more formal than these informal exchanges between us. Dr.
Kissinger
then noted that the decision to supply 4 C–130 aircraft to India to assist in the refugee relief effort was being considered and we were “favorably inclined.”
Ambassador
Jha
said that Prime Minister
Gandhi
wants to keep the situation under control. But she needs a feeling of confidence from the Presidentʼs reply. Dr.
Kissinger
assured the Ambassador that the response will reflect that we are “trying to move in a constructive way.” Ambassador
Jha
asked that we point up the need to “share” what actions we are taking toward Pakistan. Dr.
Kissinger
responded by saying, “Letʼs start this process with lunch. You must understand we really canʼt go too far in a letter.” Ambassador
Jha
again stressed the need for some indication of support in international organizations.
Dr.
Kissinger
then explained to the Ambassador that the President has a degree of “personal influence” with the Pakistanis. This needs to be used privately and things that we say publicly, of course, have an effect on this influence. Dr.
Kissinger
then said that he thought the Indians have acted in a “restrained” manner through this whole affair.

Dr.
Kissinger
followed on by saying that he did not want to advise Ambassador
Jha
or the Indians, but he did want them to know that we will do whatever we can to “strengthen and share” with you. You can tell Prime Minister
Gandhi
“we value” our relationship with India. We do not, however, want the subcontinent to blow up, especially now.
Dr.
Kissinger
stressed that we believe India is “the stabilizing force in the subcontinent” from every point of view—political, military and economic. We all face delicate problems in the area, however, and we need to stay in close touch. Hopefully, we can act together in a constructive way. Dr.
Kissinger
then asked Ambassador
Jha
when it would be best for the President to respond to Mrs.
Gandhi
. He said he would be willing to discuss the letter informally with Ambassador
Jha
after he returned from India if this were preferable. Ambassador
Jha
said it would be better if the President would respond before he returned in two or three weeks.
Dr.
Kissinger
said that our reply will, of course, be “warm and positive” but that just because of the very nature of such correspondence it will need to be supplemented in an informal way. In this regard, the Ambassador could convey to Prime Minister
Gandhi
that we wanted to stay “in step with India. But, of course, this requires restraint on all sides.”
Dr.
Kissinger
informed Ambassador
Jha
that he may join the delegation to the inauguration of the President of Korea in early July and wondered if it would be feasible for him to spend a day or so in New Delhi perhaps around July 5 or 6 on his return trip. He would also, of course, have to spend a day in Pakistan. Dr.
Kissinger
stressed that he would want to talk with a few officials to get a feel for the situation, but to maintain a low profile. Ambassador
Jha
said he thought this would be “a good idea” and would be “useful.”
The conversation ended with Dr.
Kissinger
reiterating that the reply to Mrs.
Gandhi
could not get into too many “specifics” but perhaps it might be possible to indicate that there would be further contact with the Ambassador. Ambassador
Jha
commented that would be good and appropriate.
[While Dr.
Kissinger
had to step from the room to answer a call from the President, Ambassador
Jha
asked Mr.
Hoskinson
if he thought it would be possible for J.P. Narayan to see the President when he visited here in early June. The Ambassador explained that Narayan was a highly influential and articulate Indian elder statesman very much in the tradition of Mahatma
Gandhi
. Mr.
Hoskinson
opined that he “personally” thought that this might be rather difficult for the President to do since, as he understood it, Narayan would be on a private visit and he thought there would probably be considerable Pakistani

sensitivity concerning this visit. Mr.
Hoskinson
then reiterated the point that Dr.
Kissinger
had made concerning the measure of personal influence that the President had with the Pakistanis and the problem of doing things in public that might denegrate this important influence. Ambassador then asked about the possibility of Dr.
Kissinger
seeing Narayan. Mr.
Hoskinson
commented that this might be easier, but of course he could not speak for Dr.
Kissinger
on this subject. Ambassador
Jha
also informed Mr.
Hoskinson
that Mrs.
Gandhi
has probably had too much on her mind to make any final decision on her planned trip here in November. He opined that much, of course, would depend on the political situation in India and in Pakistan at that time. He might, however, be in a better position when he returned from India.]
3
SH
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations