AlimurRazi/FRUS-1971-bangladesh huggingface dataset:
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 214
214. Letter From the Pakistani Ambassador (
Raza
) to Secretary of State
Rogers
1
2
Washington
,
January 24, 1972
I have been commanded by the President of Pakistan to convey the enclosed message to His Excellency the President of the United States of America. It is requested that this message be presented to His Excellency the President.

Enclosure
Message from Pakistani President Bhutto to President Nixon
undated
BEGINS:
Dear Mr. President,
For some years the rice shortage in East Pakistan has been met by exports from West Pakistan. This year’s rice crop totalling about 400,000 tons is similarly available for East Pakistan. Unfortunately, because of tragic political and economic situation, which I have inherited, it is beyond my country’s means to send this rice to East Pakistan in the normal manner. I, therefore, proposed to Ambassador
Farland
just before he proceeded to the United States that if your Government could assist by under-writing the export of this rice to East Pakistan, it would give me an opportunity, which would have very desirable political impact in East Pakistan and would be of great help to me in creating a climate of confidence there for pursuing the larger political objectives with
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman
. At some suitable time in future, I would acknowledge publicly this contribution of the United States in helping Pakistan and for contributing to the restoration of permanent peace in the subcontinent.

I appreciate, Mr. President, that there are demands in the Congress to sell
US
rice abroad and that the United States has not undertaken this kind of economic assistance until now. My reason for approaching you personally is that we are facing an extraordinary situation and if some way can be found to meet my request, it will have electrifying effect on public opinion in East Pakistan.
I earnestly hope that some procedural method can be found to meet this request.
With kind regards,
Yours sincerely,
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto
ENDS
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 218
218. Letter From the Pakistani Ambassador (
Raza
) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (
Sisco
)
1
2
Washington
,
January 28, 1972
Further to my letter no. SS/19/5/72, dated January 25, 1972, India continues to viola the ceasefire along the India West Pakistan-occupied Kashmir borders. In view of the grave situation which is developing from these serious violations, the Government of Pakistan feel that
UN
observers should be posted along the border areas. The
UN
Secretary-General has confirmed that he could strengthen
UN
observers on Kashmir ceasefire line but he could not repeat not extend their services to India-Pakistan border. For this purpose, a special group of observers similar to those posted on Kashmir ceasefire line needs to be established. This requires the authority of the Security Council through a formal resolution and not in the form of consensus of the members of the Council. The Government of Pakistan, therefore, decided to call a meeting of the Security Council as early as possible for the induction of observers on the borders of India and West Pakistan. The Government of Pakistan would be grateful if the
US
would kindly support Pakistan’s move for the Security Council meetinq and a for the Council initiatives to post
UN
observers on Indo-Pakistan border
.
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 221
221. Memorandum for the President’s File
1
2
Washington
,
February 3, 1972
SUBJECT:
Your Meeting with U.S. Ambassador to India, Kenneth
Keating
, on Thursday, February 3, 1972
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Ambassador
Keating
Dr.
Henry A. Kissinger
President
Nixon
: You have been through a tough time.
Ambassador
Keating
: I had a good talk with Dr.
Kissinger
about it. I am tough.
President
Nixon
: Neither country should be a country. They are too poor, too bloodthirsty.
Ambassador
Keating
: Yes, there should be a regional solution, like the
EEC
.
President
Nixon
: India shouldn’t waste its substance fighting Pakistan. China is their problem.
Ambassador
Keating
: I agree.
President
Nixon
: Let me give you my view. I’ll tell you what I’ll do. I am afraid they’ll leak it, so of course we can’t announce it. Let me tell you where we went wrong. I was too soft on Mrs.
Gandhi
. When she was here. I led her on. If we were going to restrain them at all we should have been tougher. I am not mad at Mrs.
Gandhi
. She has not had a better friend in this office than me. I have taken the line that India should have to compete with the
PRC
. I have always defended India.
Ambassador
Keating
: They could stop this press campaign against us, if it weren’t for their spokesman,
Kaul
, a slippery customer.

President
Nixon
: I want to confirm the backchannel arrangements we have. You communicate directly with me. India has a friend in the White House. They should know this. We are going to China for reasons of our own. We took action on India because our law requires it. In reality we are India’s best friend. Right,
Henry
?
Dr.
Kissinger
: That is true. But we must move at a measured pace.
Ambassador
Keating
: They are going to try to make a political issue out of it. State made me do it. I can’t deny my cables.
President
Nixon
: Put yourself in the position of India. She needs relations with the three great nations, if she wants a viable foreign policy. The United States is the only one that has no design on her.
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 222
222. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (
Nutter
) to Secretary of Defense
Laird
1
2
Washington
,
February 4, 1972
SUBJECT:
Strategic Weapons in Near East, South Asia Area
Several recent intelligence reports from sources in India and elsewhere indicate that the Indians may plan to explode a nuclear device in the near future. Whether the test is of a weapon or, as has been suggested, under the guise of “peaceful application,” it would set off a chain reaction that would be felt throughout West Asia.
India for some time has possessed the capability to produce nuclear weapons within a short period after any decision to move forward on a weapons program. Although we estimate the Indians would not be able to develop sophisticated delivery systems (missiles/high performance aircraft) for some 6–10 years, the military implication of such a program could not be missed by India’s neighbors. The Indian leadership doubtless recognizes that any test would tarnish the country’s image abroad, but it may believe that the advantages of “going nuclear” before the President’s trip to Peking and in conjunction with peace negotiations with Pakistan merit the risk.
Implications for the Near East and South Asia would be far reaching. Pakistan might opt to compete, with disastrous consequences for its already strained economy; more important, China might exploit the situation to secure a firm position on the subcontinent and to dabble in the Persian Gulf. The Shah of Iran already has indicated that an Indian decision to develop nuclear weapons would leave him no alternative but to follow suit despite his already massive military program. Such a move could cripple Iran’s economic development and further threaten the country’s internal stability. The reaction of Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and the Arab States of the Gulf is predictable. Finally, Israel could regard the Indian test a sufficient justification to surface its own nuclear program, adding a new dimension to the Arab-Israeli question, and opening new avenues for Soviet and Chinese penetration of the Arab world. The consequences of such a move for
US
interests—economic, military, and political—in the area and globally are incalculable.
I see little that we can do at this time to affect this situation. Nevertheless, we are continuing to study the problem and plan to forward to you, if and when India does go nuclear, various proposals for ways to minimize the impact of an Indian weapons program both on the states of the area and on
US
relations with those states.
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 223
223. Memorandum for the President’s File
1
2
Washington
,
February 8, 1972, 3:15–4:20 p.m.
SUBJECT:
President’s Meeting with
Robert McNamara
and
John Connally
on Tuesday, February 8, 1972 at 3:15 p.m. to 4:20 p.m.
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
John Connally
, Secretary of the Treasury
Robert McNamara
, President, World Bank
Dr.
Henry A. Kissinger
, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Mr.
McNamara
: The cartoons here are impressive.
The President: I have seen cartoon collections in various Presidential libraries. Cartoons were especially influential before TV.
Let me ask you, Bob, about your trip.
Mr.
McNamara
: The situation is bleak. Even Ceylon is highly unstable. 14,000 young people are in prison. [That would be like 235,000 in the U.S. equivalent.] Nepal is completely dependent on India; they currently need $8–10 million in economic aid. The mood in India is bellicose and self-righteous. In Pakistan,
Bhutto
is the only possible leader.
The President: What should we do?
Mr.
McNamara
: Restoring aid won’t reduce the stress, but we must have a serious dialogue with India.
The President: We are not offended by India. But Congress is. India hasn’t had a more consistent friend than I have been. In fact a large aid program to India is not necessary.

Mr.
McNamara
: I am having lunch with Jha. We must restore the $87 million aid commitment and work out the debt rescheduling. There will have to be a consortium meeting.
The President: Who should be our emissary? I am the best man to sell the Indian program. But let me ask you frankly: Is it worth normalizing our relations? Why should we give the $87 million? The $10 billion we gave them since their independence only gained us contempt and hatred.
Mr.
McNamara
: It would get us into a political dialogue now. It would make a difference.
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 225
225. Memorandum of Conversation
1
2
Washington
,
February 11, 1972, 1 p.m.
PARTICIPANTS:
Indian Ambassador
Jha
Dr.
Henry A. Kissinger
The lunch took place at my invitation and was designed to keep India quiet while we were in China, as well as to explore the possibilities of starting a serious dialogue.
I told
Jha
that the beginning of wisdom in our relations was to mute the debate, and also for him to stop playing to the American press with untruthful stories.
Jha
asked me what I meant. I said that I noted that he must have spoken to Tom Braden about the claim that if India and Pakistan got to war and China intervened we would not come to the defense of India. I said that
Jha
knew very well that this was not my view, and indeed I had stated the contrary.
Jha
said he was under the impression that I had said we would help India only if India were attacked. I said that
Jha
knew very well that I had said that there were three possibilities: First, if Pakistan attacked India, we would come to the assistance of India if China intervened. The second possibility was that China would invade India, in which case we would help India. The third possibility was Chinese intervention in an India-Pakistan war that India had started; in that case, we would not come to the assistance of India.
Jha
said there had been a genuine misunderstanding. I doubt it.
Secondly, I said, the Indian press should stop its attacks on our policy, and it could prove its good will by taking it easy on the President’s State of the World message.
Jha
said that he had already received my telephone suggestion to that effect and had taken energetic steps in that direction. I might have noticed that no Indian paper commented on the charge that India had planned to attack West Pakistan even though that was a very sore point in India.

I said the main problem now was to look to the future. The President was certainly prepared to establish a realistic relationship. In fact it might appear that recent events had been a blessing, because they enabled our countries to make a new start. India would take the United States less for granted; the United States could give up its sentimentalization of India.
Jha
said in principle he agreed and he was sure his Government would agree.
He then asked me how we would handle economic aid in this context. I said the economic aid question should come later in the dialogue; first we should define where we are going.
Jha
suggested that the best way for handling economic aid was to agree on a program for phasing it out; perhaps in that context it would be easier to start the aid program again. I told
Jha
that as our discussions developed I was certainly prepared to look into this.
I told
Jha
that the offer I had made last summer in India that
Haksar
come over periodically for a frank exchange of views was still open, and maybe this was a good time to give it effect.
Jha
said he would report to New Delhi and let me know as soon as I returned.
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 226
226. Telegram 1581 From the
Embassy in Pakistan
to the
Department of State
1
2
Islamabad
,
February 17, 1972, 1330Z
Subject
GOP
Soundings on
US
Bases, Defense Pact and Arms for Pakistan
FEBRUARY 17, 1972
FOR DEPUTY ASST. SECRETARY
VAN HOLLEN
/ NEA
SUBJECT
GOP
SOUNDINGS ON
US
BASES, DEFENSE PACT AND ARMS FOR PAKISTAN
1.
You will have noted increasing references by
GOP
reps to desire for closer military collaboration with
USG
. Early last Dec, Def Sec suggested
Pak
willingness to arrange facilities for
US
naval base (Islamabad 11961). Def Sec casually referred to that proposal again in later meeting with me in Dec. Proposal has resurfaced this week in conversation of
ISID
liaison officer with our Asst.
ArmAtt
(USDAO 171140Z Feb 72). Casual hints that
GOP
would like to have
US
military presence here have also been dropped by
Pak
officiers in various other conversations. Our firm policy and practice have been to listen politely on such occasions and to be entirely noncommittal.
2.
As you know,
Bhutto
has raised with me the matter of Pakistan’s future relationship with CENTO. (I responded that is a matter for
GOP
to decide.)
Bhutto
suggested to Cy Sulzberger on Feb 7 that he was interested in reviving and strengthening our existing defense agreement—presumably the bilateral of March 1959. This subject has not arisen in any of my talks with
Bhutto
, but line which Sulzberger reported is consistent with
Bhutto
’s desire for closer military relations with us.
3.
You have informed us of various approaches by Gen.
Raza
to ease up on existing arms embargo.
GOP
has refrained from pressing us officially here in arms supply in recent weeks. It is nevertheless matter

of live interest. As you know,
Bhutto
has expressed to at least two American reporters his hope that Pakistan may receive quantities of
US
arms. Talk along same line came up in my meeting last week with
Pak
Navy commander in Karachi. In peshawar Feb 15 I was told by senior
Pak
Air Force officers of their desire obtain a good strike aircraft from us. (When I said I thought they were getting supplies from China, they answered that the MIG–19 cannot do the job and that China does not have another suitable aircraft to offer.) As in case of bases, our firm policy is to be entirely noncommittal here on what decisions may be taken with regard to military supply.
4.
I know you have had these various questions under review and have doubtless been discussing them with
Amb
Farland
. We have steadfastly refrained from pressing for status reports on general review or on specific decisions. I thought however that it would be timely to present above summary to you. We are now in a somewhat euphoric stage in US-Pak relations, and I am sure that unwarranted expectations are being built up in some quarters here.
5.
We shall continue to listen noncommittally when these subjects come up here unless you have any better guidance for us.
6.
Assume you wish share this with Amb.
Farland
.
GP-2
Sober
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 230
230. Telegram 1834 From the
Embassy in Pakistan
to the
Department of State
1
2
Islamabad
,
February 25, 1972, 1117Z
Subj
Conversation With Pres
Bhutto
: Defense
Ref:
Islamabad 1823 and 1833
1.
Summary:
Bhutto
alluded to, his interest in seeing whether defense relationship between Pakistan and
US
can be strengthened. Replying noncommittally Charge took occasion to note very difficult policy decisions that
GOP
must face up to with regard to military budget and supply. End summary.
2.
During my dinner meeting with him Feb 24, Pres.
Bhutto
alluded to his interview by C.L. Sulzberger of NY Times on Feb 7. He said what had come out in print on question of defense relationship with
US
had been somewhat misleading. He had told Sulzberger that Pakistan already had defense agreement with
US
(reference was to bilateral of March 1959). That agreement had lain pretty much dormant for a number of years. Now he would be interested in seeing whether there was chance it might be brought back to life. He had added to Sulzberger that he recognized difficulties of reviving the defense agreement during presidential election year. Although Bhutto did not specifically refer to any
Pak
desire for arms from
US
, that was implicit in above remarks.
3.
I stated that as
Bhutto
probably knew, various aspects of our policy toward subcontinent were under review in Washington. Various decisions would stem from that review, and I was not in position to anticipate them. I did acknowledge probable validity of his remark concerning special difficulties of election year. I said I would, however, hazard prediction that principal emphasis in our overall policy toward subcontinent would remain on need for peace that would allow countries of the area to devote their fullest resources to programs of economic and social improvement which they wanted for their people. Specific decisions, I thought, would tend to revolve around that central point.
4.
I then remarked that it seemed to me that
GOP
had not yet come to grips with problem of its future military posture. There had been some talk that army would remain same size as prewar. That involved problem of conflicting needs from limited resources, of military budget and of economic programs to which
Bhutto
and his party were committed. There was also the serious problem of very scarce foreign reserves to be divided between military and nonmilitary needs. I said I knew that
GOP
, like other countries, would face difficult choices. The best decisions, I speculated, could be made in the framework of efforts to arrive at a durable peace in the subcontinent.
Bhutto
took all of this in without objection or comment.
Sober
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 231
231. Editorial Note
Source: Telegrams 2087, 3396, and 3530 from Islamabad, March 6, April 18, and April 21. Telegrams 2087 and 3530 are in the National Archives,
RG
59, Central Files 1970–73,
POL
23–9
PAK
. Telegram 3396 is ibid.,
POL
15–5
PAK
.
In a speech broadcast to the nation on March 6, 1972, President
Bhutto
announced that the National Assembly of Pakistan would be convened on April 14 to formulate plans for an interim Constitution. He also announced that martial law would be lifted on August 14. The National Assembly approved an interim Constitution on April 18 and
Bhutto
issued a proclamation suspending martial law on April 20.
Contents
Press Release
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 234
234. Memorandum From
Harold Saunders
and
Samuel Hoskinson
of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (
Kissinger
)
1
2
Washington
,
March 10, 1972
SUBJECT:
Aid to Pakistan
The following is intended to give you an idea of where we stand on the economic aid front for Pakistan and where we seem to be headed. The present game plan has two parts:
1.
The Pakistan Consortium meeting earlier this month revealed that wide support has now developed among the donor countries for substantial short term
debt relief
in support of an economic reform program. A proposal for $234 million in debt relief covering a portion of
Pak
payments due through the end of June 1973 was tabled and the formal responses of the donor governments are due March 20.
AID
favors this proposal since, among other things, it is tied to an equitable burden-sharing formula. Our share over the next fiscal year would be about $60 million.
2.
The debt rescheduling as now planned hinges on a substantial economic reform program by Bhutto. If agreement is reached by the end of the month on debt relief, the Paks would then—if Bhutto keeps his nerve—initiate a fiscal reform program, including a
substantial devaluation in early April
. The
IMF
is satisfied with the proposed Pakistani program and is prepared to support it with a sizable standby loan once the final decision on devaluation is made. It must be kept in mind that
Bhutto
is worried about the political repercussions of devaluation—rising prices—and it is not at all a foregone conclusion that he will go ahead as planned.

If the program goes ahead, the next step would be another Consortium meeting in late April—this time on new commodity assistance and perhaps to give some preliminary indication about what we are prepared to do in
FY
1973. They are thinking now about $75 million for Pakistan in
FY
1973 with a first tranche of $25 million in July.
If
Bhutto
does not go ahead with his reform, we will have a quite different situation with much less international support. We could provide some support, but there is no point in worrying about how much until the present effort falters.
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 239
239. Telegram 49598 From the
Department of State
to the
Embassy in Pakistan
1
2
Washington
,
March 23, 1972, 0219Z
SUBJECT:
Pak
Requests for Military Supply
REF:
State 229298, 230881, 021827
1.
In letter dated March 20 to
Sisco
, Ambassador
Raza
, on instructions, requested: (a) resumption of spares and end items already contracted for (including 300
APC
s), and (b) “agreement in principle for release of lethal sophisticated equipment such as artillery and anti-aircraft weapons, aircraft, ground-to-ground and ground-to-air missiles, missile-carrying boats, submarines, etc. at reduced price and on deferred payment.”
2.
Attachments to letter include: (a) new requests for end items including 100 M–47/48 tanks, 4 submarines, 12 B–57s, 25 F–5s, 1,000 M-601 trucks,some artillery and communications equipment; (b) list of “items already contracted but not yet delivered” which appears to be resume of previous requests reftels from old
FMS
cases, including 300
APC
s; and (c) list of

actual losses in December 71 war of U.S. origin equipment (includes 74 tanks, 25 F–86s, 4 B–57s and 3 F–104s. Letter and attachments pouched to Embassy.
3.
Itemized requests in attachments do not RPT not contain any missiles mentioned in covering letter from Ambassador. END
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 241
241. Telegram 3666 From the
Embassy in India
to the
Department of State
1
2
New Delhi
,
March 23, 1972, 1550Z
Subject:
GOP
Offer of Military Facilities in Pakistan
REF:
A) State 49598
B) Islamabad 2213
C) Islamabad 2247
1. Apparent
GOP
decision to seek replay history of substantial
US
military supply and collaboration against India strikes me as ominously irrational and, if pursued, certain to prejudice prospects for durable peace in South Asia.
2. I hope this Embassy will re consulted before any serious consideration is given to the proposals contained reftels.
Keating