AlimurRazi/FRUS-1971-bangladesh huggingface dataset:
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 37
37. Letter From Pakistani President
Yahya
to President
Nixon
1
2
Rawalpindi
,
October 1, 1969
Dear Mr. President,
I am writing you on a matter of great economic and political urgency to me, my government is getting extremely worried about the deteriorating food and price situation in the province of East Pakistan. The province is threatened with a major food deficit and rice, which is the staple diet of 70 million East Pakistanis, is selling at unprecedently high prices, almost 60 per cent higher than normal. This is causing wide-spread distress and misery. We are making all-out efforts to rush 1.7 million tons of foodgrains to East Pakistan to avoid a serious situation from arising there. On our own, we have already despatched a quarter million tons of wheat from West Pakistan and 350,000 tons of rice is also earmarked for despatch from the Western to Eastern wing. However, to meet the full gap, we need one million tons of wheat but we do not have the cash foreign exchange resources to purchase this quantity. We have, therefore, already made a formal request to your Government for import of one million tons of wheat under
US
Public Law 480. Mr.
M.M. Ahmed
, Deputy Chairman of our Planning Commission, will be discussing this request with your officials in Washington next week.
We require imports under
PL
480 on a priority basis. The timely introduction of
PL
480 wheat into East Pakistan (in the next 6 to 8 weeks) can help avoid large scale human misery and hardship and earn a tremendous amount of goodwill for the U.S.
I would request you, Mr. President, to give this matter your personal attention so that an act of high statesmanship can replace normal administrative procedures.
With best personal regards,
Yours Very Sincerely,
A.M. Yahya Khan
Contents
Press Release
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 39
39. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (
Kissinger
) to President
Nixon
1
2
Washington
,
October 16, 1969
FROM:
Henry A. Kissinger
SUBJECT:
Proposed
PL
480 Loan to Pakistan
AID
recommends (Tab A) that you approve a one million ton
PL
480 wheat agreement with Pakistan for
FY
1970. This is the first major commitment of funds to Pakistan in this fiscal year and the decision is politically significant, so the agencies decided to seek your approval.
The wheat is required to help Pakistan meet its minimum food needs and bring down prices, which are one of the main causes of political unrest in East Pakistan. President
Yahya Khan
has written you personally (Tab C), emphasizing the urgency of the need and stressing his desire for the proposed program.
State, Agriculture, Treasury, and Budget (Tab B) agree that one million tons of wheat be allocated for shipment to Pakistan, with 800,000 tons to be dispatched now and the last 200,000 tons, if conditions have not improved markedly, by February 1970. An announcement in the next few days would by itself have a helpful effect on prices, which have gone up sharply.
This proposal stands on its economic merits alone. On top of that, it can make an immediate and direct contribution to one of
Yahya
’s principal political problems—avoiding open unrest in East Pakistan which would complicate the already difficult job of working out a new constitutional agreement between East and West Pakistan.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you approve an
FY
1970
PL
480 wheat program of up to one million tons of wheat for Pakistan.
Contents
Press Release
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 44
44. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (
Kissinger
) to President
Nixon
1
2
Washington
,
November 29, 1969
SUBJECT:
Turkish Tank Sale to Pakistan

Since you have an ongoing interest in military shipments to Pakistan, I wanted to bring you up to date on a recent development.
The new government in Turkey has unexpectedly informed us that it is ready to complete the sale of 100 M–47 tanks to Pakistan if we can still replace those with M–48s through our military aid program. You may recall that this transaction has been hanging since late last year because of some technicalities in Turkish and
US
law governing the transfer of money and equipment provided under military assistance. This kind of third-country transaction is in line with our present military supply policy which you will be reviewing in the
NSC
on December 10.
The latest Turkish proposal meets our legal requirements and the tanks are available for shipment within 3–6 months, but the following problems remain to be resolved if we want the sale to go through:
1.
Funds would have, to be drawn from other military aid programs. The net cost to us would be about $3.7 million, up about a million dollars since this proposal was initiated about a year ago. We have told the Turks that this would not come out of their military aid ceiling.
2.
We have to find out whether the Pakistanis still want to go through with the sale. We have heard nothing from them on this in recent months and suspect that they may at this point prefer to hold off until after we finish our review of our South Asian arms policy.

There are two options:
1.
Wait until after the
NSC
discussion of South Asian arms supply policy on December 10. The argument for doing so is that this decision could then be placed in the context of whatever decisions you make at that meeting.
2.
Tell the bureaucracy to go ahead with this sale, since it can be done without further delay within present policy.
RECOMMENDATION:
Since you have already made yourself abundantly clear on this issue, I recommend that we move ahead now without further delays in an already drawn out exercise.
Approve
Go ahead now
Disapprove
Contents
Press Release
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 49
49. Telegram 29569 From the
Department of State
to the
Embassy in India
1
2
Washington
,
February 27, 1970, 2153Z

Please deliver following written message from Secretary to
FonMin
Dinesh Singh
:
Quote—Dear Mr. Foreign Minister: During the past year I believe we have developed a relationship which permits us to discuss issues between our governments with utmost candor. It is in this spirit that I raise a question which is giving me serious concern.
This relates to the decision of the Government of India without any prior consultation to request the closure of certain
US
cultural centers, a decision which I regret. I read today of statements by your government that this decision had been based upon an investigation of activities at the centers which was “not favorable”; and that certain centers had been engaged in “political and other undesirable activities”. I should much appreciate any clarification you can provide me regarding the meaning of these statements. Do they refer to
US
activities? To my knowledge the Government of India has never informed the

US
of any activities by
US
cultural centers which might be considered improper. These centers have functioned openly with the full knowledge and approval of the Government of India. As
Elliot Richardson
told your Charge today, at no time to our knowledge have
US
cultural centers in India been engaged in any improper activity. I am prepared to examine evidence, and its source, that your government may have to the contrary.
I know you will understand that matters such as this can have an effect upon the climate of the relations between our countries. It has already attracted public notice in this country. I raise these questions knowing that we both desire to avoid unnecessary frictions in our relationship. Sincerely yours,
William P. Rogers
—End quote.
Rogers
Contents
Press Release
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 53
53. Telegram 34382 From the
Department of State
to the
Embassy in India
1
2
Washington
,
March 9, 1970, 2152Z

Reference:
New Delhi 2505.
For Ambassador
Keating
from Secretary.
1. Please see Foreign Minister
Dinesh Singh
at earliest convenience and deliver following oral message from me:
(A)
I appreciate ForMin’s sending me the Government of India’s rationale for closing down cultural centers.
(B)
Unfortunately, I did not find his letter persuasive on the point which most concerned me, i.e. statements in Parliament alleging that cultural centers were engaging in “political and other undesirable activities”. Placing such allegations on the record at a time when the only cultural centers being closed (the Soviet center had been closed several months previously) were American centers was bound to lead to the inevitable concluson that our centers were the sole object of this most unfortunate reference. This conclusion, it should be noted, was reached by the press in both India and the United States and undoubtedly remains in the Indian public mind as well. Therefore,

I find it difficult to explain this occurrence as a “misunderstanding”. He would have been pleased to remove any basis for misunderstanding on his part regarding our cultural centers, but were precluded from doing so by lack of prior consultation before their closure was ordered.
(C)
As long as such allegations remain on record, I am concerned that doubts will remain in the Indian public mind—doubts which will cast suspicions on our other
USIS
operations in India and could cast a cloud in other areas as well.
(D)
Consequently, I would hope ForMin would be willing to issue public statement absolving us of “any political or other undesirable activiies” in
US
cultural centers. (
FYI
—If he demurs on this suggestion, as fallback position, you might suggest that our exchange of corespondence be made public. End
FYI
) Such public statement would help considerably to clear the record and remove the impression that the statements in the Indian Parliament were directed at
US
cultural centers.
Rogers
Contents
Press Release
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 56
56. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (
Kissinger
) to President
Nixon
1
2
Washington
,
undated

SUBJECT:
FY
1970 Aid Program for Pakistan
State (Tab A) requests your approval of a $102.5 million economic assistance program in Pakistan for
FY
1970. Added to the $90 million in
PL
480 assistance, which you approved in November, this would bring the total
FY
1970 U.S. assistance level to $192.5 million. The amount requested is within your budget and within the Foreign Assistance appropriation approved by Congress.
The proposed program of $102.5 million represents a drop in our level of non-
PL
480 assistance from $140 million in
FY
1969 and $158 million in
FY
1968. This low level is the result of budgetary constraints. It is quite possible, however, that an extra $20—$30 million will become available later in the year and the Pakistan program has a top priority claim on these funds. The $87 million loan component represents about 25 percent of the international consortium total of $370 million, a drop from former years when we supplied about 40 percent of the consortium’s total.
The major component in the proposed program is $83 million to permit Pakistan to increase its general imports, especially of fertilizer and industrial raw materials, to support growth in the agricultural and industrial sectors. It complements Pakistan’s own efforts to liberalize its exchange system, increase agricultural production, and build a buoyant private sector.
Our technical assistance program of $8 million, and most of our
PL
480 commodities and currency generated by them, assist President
Yahya
in raising agricultural productivity and the standard of living in depressed and politically troublesome East Pakistan.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you approve State’s proposed $102.5 million economic assistance program in Pakistan. Treasury, Agriculture, and Budget (Tab B) concur.
Contents
Press Release
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 58
58. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (
Eliot
) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (
Kissinger
)
1
2
Washington
,
May 15, 1970

Subject:
Closure of Five U.S. Cultural Centers in India
I reported in a May 6 memorandum to you that the Indians had taken several initiatives which might have permitted the five affected U.S. cultural centers to function in some alternate form but to continue their operations much as before.
Despite these signs, the Government of India has insisted upon conditions which we would not wish to meet. For example, we have been told that there could be no resident American Director of cultural centers, that foreign cultural centers might be subject in the future to the directives of an all-Indian board. These conditions would clearly be incompatible with the concept of an American cultural center.
We have instructed Ambassador
Keating
to inform Foreign Secretary
T.N. Kaul
that we are closing the five affected centers in accordance with the request of the Government of India. The closure will take place on Saturday, May 16, the end of the work week. This is two days prior to the Indian deadline of May 18. In order to keep the record straight, the Ambassador will leave with
Kaul
an aide memoire which demonstrates clearly that the Indians have been responsible for the closure of the centers and that we have been entirely reasonable in our response to their action.
We will report further on this matter next week after the centers have closed.
Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Contents
Press Release
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 59
59. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (
Kissinger
) to President
Nixon
1
2
Washington
,
undated

SUBJECT:
FY
1970 Assistance Program for India
Secretary
Rogers
(Tab A) requests your approval for a $193 million
AID
package for India, which would bring our total aid to India this year to $408 million. This is about the same as last year’s level and one-half of the level of 1968 and 1967. We should announce our pledge at the May 26 meeting of the aid-India consortium sponsored by the World Bank.
The World Bank has estimated that India will need about $1.2 billion of new aid to complement her $2 billion in export earnings this year. The aid is aimed at supporting India’s long-term economic development, by financing an increase in imports of industrial goods and fertilizer, and helping India meet her foreign debt service requirement. The U.S. share of development loan assistance to India represents about 29 percent of the consortium total, a drop from the 40 percent figure of past years due to increases in the aid of other consortium donors and decreases in our own contribution.
The new aid commitments proposed for India this year include:
$193 million new
AID
funds
$35 million
AID
loans approved earlier
$180 million
PL
480 sales agreement approved earlier
$408 million total U.S. aid
$350 million from other consortium countries
$300 million from
IDA
and World Bank
$1,058 million total world aid
The new $193 million would consist of:
—About $50–$90 million in loans for imports of fertilizer and other agricultural imports to support a vigorous government program to increase food grain production.
—About $70–$110 million in loans to provide raw materials and equipment for the private sector which accounts for close to 90 percent of Indian industrial production and is a vital element in its economic development, though it continues to be hampered by an extensive system of controls.
—$8 million in Technical Assistance grants, primarily for agriculture and family planning.
—$25 million in grants for population programs to supplement India’s own program, for which it has increased expenditures from $2 million in 1963/64 to a budgeted $56 million in 1969/70.
Although heavily dependent on foreign aid as a source of foreign exchange, India has taken steps to increase export earnings, re-schedule her large debt repayment load, and mobilize domestic resources to a greater extent. Progress has been good and, whereas foreign aid a few years ago financed 53 percent of India’s foreign exchange needs, it now finances only 40 percent.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you approve State’s request for a new $193 million economic assistance program for India. Budget (Tab B), Agriculture, and Treasury concur.
Contents
Press Release
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 61
61. Letter From the Country Director for India, Ceylon, Nepal, and the Maldives Islands (
Schneider
) to the Chargé d’ Affaires in India (
Stone
)
1
2
Washington
,
May 26, 1970

Dear
Galen
:
The military supply issue has become very active and some decision regarding sales to Pakistan is likely to be made fairly soon. Although hard to believe, the
CENTO
meeting in Washington was the cause of the renewed interest. Ambassador
Hilaly
, the Pakistani representative at the meeting, joined the
CENTO
Ministers at a meeting with the President. Apparently each Minister and finally
Hilaly
made a brief statement to the President.
Hilaly
made a pitch that Pakistan could not contribute to the stability of the area and pull its weight in
CENTO
unless Pakistan were strong militarily. Therefore, Pakistan needed military assistance from its allies.
The President passed
Joe Sisco
a note at the meeting saying that he thought the U.S. should provide some aid to Pakistan for the reasons cited by
Hilaly
.
As a result, a great new exercise is in midstream. A memorandum for the President indicating what we might sell to Pakistan and also indicating all of the pitfalls which we might encounter because of such sales is under preparation. This will be the first item of business we will take up with the Ambassador when he arrives here at about 11:30 tomorrow morning. Grant and I will lunch with him trying to fill in all of the background, and thereafter he has appointments with Chris, Joe, and Secretary
Laird
. It is unfortunate that we have to put this much burden on him at the outset, but the time pressures are mounting.

I will try to keep you informed on what goes on on this issue and others during the Ambassador’s visit. I have little else to convey now, but I wanted you to hear from me that the issue which has taken so much of our time for so long is again burning.
With best regards,
Sincerely yours,
David T. Schneider
Contents
Press Release
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 64
64. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (
Kissinger
) and the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (
Sisco
)
1
2
Washington
,
June 12, 1970, 11:30 a.m.

[Omitted here is conversation unrelated to South Asia.]
S: Now, Pakistan.
K: I wanted to discuss with you. He feels morally obligated to do something. We have seen your package. He would like to add seven B–57’s bombers to it and the tanks.
S: If you add those it changes the package to a defensive replacement package which is more offensive. Tanks have almost the imagery of the Phantom. It will increase your difficulty in selling it on the Hill and will have more effect in India. We feel we can get away with adding 6 B–57’s and justify it being old bombers and replacement. But the tanks if we cut it to 50 it has unfortunate psychological effect.
K: Our worry is that this package is so small they will consider it an insult.
S: If we are going to take the heat, why do it for so little?
K: Exactly.

S: Let me see if something can be added to the defensive package without adding offensively. I will call you back in a couple of hours.
Contents
Press Release
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 65
65. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (
Kissinger
) and the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (
Sisco
)
1
2
Washington
,
June 12, 1970, 4:40 p.m.

S: I have reviewed that Pakistan package and I have an idea but I will give it to you personally from me to you. You will get it tonight or tomorrow morning.
K: How can we order it?
S: You can send back a one page decision. I can get together with Hal Saunders and you can write me marching orders next week. We will talk on Monday.
K: What is it?
S: You leave the tanks out and add 57’s and instead of half a dozen you give them 12 interceptors which they have wanted and which are strictly defensive and more advanced level thing. It may be more attractive to the Pakistanis and more to the ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
K: Will the Secretary go through the roof?
S: I haven’t talked to him.
K: Where did we get the figure 12?
S: We worked it out here.
K: Can we say the President wanted to do more?
S: And after consultation we said this would be better. Do more and keep it within the confines—
K: The President wanted to do 100 (?).
S: You know about the Zeigler statement. We had them put out a denial. It could effect—
K: I don’t like the extremely strong denial. We should have said it wasn’t true. It came out ok.
[The conversation concludes with a reference by
Sisco
to personal plans.]
Contents
Press Release
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 70
70. Letter From President
Nixon
to the Ambassador to India (
Keating
)
1
2
Washington
,
July 17, 1970

Dear Ken,
I am sorry that I missed you while you were here. It would have been good to talk with you about the decision on military supply policy, and also to have chatted about the general situation.
In making the military supply decision, I thought long and hard about the arguments you have presented so moderately yet forcefully. This is why, in the end, I felt that I could not change our basic policy even though in terms of Pakistan’s needs there was a strong argument for supplying replacement items on a continuing basis. I just did not see, however, how I could avoid providing at least one package of equipment that President
Yahya
could point to as a sign of U.S. support at this critical stage in his political effort and as a means of avoiding some rather substantial expense that he would have had to incur in completely equipping units with new weapons.
As the first anniversary of my visit to New Delhi nears, I think again of that as one of the important milestones so far in this Administration.
All the best.
Sincerely,
Richard Nixon
Contents
Press Release
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations