Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 168
168. Telegram From
the Department of State
to
the Embassy in India
1
Washington
,
October 15, 1971, 0222Z
.
189037. Subj: Risk of War in Indo-Pak Confrontation. Ref: (a) Karachi 2028, (b) New Delhi 15988, (c) Moscow 7529.
2
1.
In light Pakistani and Indian responses to our démarches regarding risks of war, we wish to emphasize and pursue further our proposal for mutual withdrawal of troops by both governments. For this purpose we wish to reinforce our approach for Soviet support with Indians and make further approach to
GOI
.
2.
For New Delhi:
Ambassador or Chargé should seek early appointment with
FonMin
and make following points:
A.
We were pleased to note
FonMin
ʼs categorical statement discrediting our report of large numbers of Mukti Bahini personnel prepared to invade East Pakistan and of concurrent Indian army diversion of defending Pak force. We also note
FonMin
ʼs statement that India would never attack Pak positions and would never commit any incursion against Pakistan territory.
B.
We wish to report that in response to our presentation to
GOP
, President
Yahya
assured us that Pakistan would not be first to initiate hostilities. In regard to our proposal for a pullback of military forces, President
Yahya
raised certain questions regarding how such pullback might apply to East Pakistan border but accepted proposal in principle subject to clarification on details such as with regard to East Pakistan. Specifically President
Yahya
suggested that mechanics of withdrawal might be worked out directly by India and Pakistan army chiefs of staff.
USG
has no particular desire to involve itself in regard such mechanics and suggests direct contact between military organizations at some level might be best way of carrying out withdrawal.
C.
We wish to re-state and emphasize suggestion which was put forward solely on our initiative that India and Pakistan carry out a mutual withdrawal of troops from their borders. We make this proposal in all seriousness and ask that India give it the most careful consideration. We believe India would agree that neither it nor Pakistan would find escalation or present tensions in its interest. Yet proximity of forces

along India–Pakistan borders present great danger of accidental war which each government has informed us it does not intend to initiate. We have made this proposal in hope that very substantial movement of men and matériel which has taken place on both sides of border might be reversed. We do not wish to involve ourselves in debate regarding details of which country has violated ground rules. Facts are that substantial movements have been made on both sides with resulting increase in dangers of escalation. Consequently we would appreciate Indiaʼs reaction to
Yahya
ʼs suggestion that the Chief of Staff on both sides might arrange the mechanics of the pullback. Alternately, we would be interested in any other Indian proposal for method by which pullback might be accomplished.
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3.
For Moscow:
Embassy Moscow authorized to brief
Gromyko
or other senior Soviet official on general outlines of our discussions with both
Yahya
and
Swaran Singh
. In particular Embassy should cover those portions of conversations regarding pullback proposal in detail and in such a way as to make apparent that
US
has obtained substantial agreement from
GOP
and that situation in regard to India is such that Sovietsʼ use of their influence might enhance prospects of Indian agreement to withdrawal which we are convinced is as much in Soviet interest as in ours.
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Rogers
Contents
Preface
Sources
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