Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 272
272. Intelligence Note Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research
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Washington
,
July 3, 1972
INDIA-PAKISTAN: SUCCESSFUL SUMMIT
The last-minute settlement reached between Prime Minister
Gandhi
and President
Bhutto
, which contains significant points of agreement, attests to the desire of the two leaders for a basic reorientation of their countries’ relations. Each side obtained some of the concessions it wanted, and both have established a precedent and a mechanism for further agreements. The settlement is tentative, however, and will require good will on both sides to carry it out. Crucial to this process will be
Bhutto
’s ability to win acceptance of the agreement from the Pakistani people.
The Agreement
. India won three concessions: 1) a “no-war pact” intended to end Pakistan’s traditional policy of “confrontation”; 2) an agreement to resolve outstanding issues bilaterally, which will inhibit any Pakistani attempts to bring the U.N. or other powers into future arguments; and 3) Pakistani agreement to respect the present line of control in Kashmir as the effective ceasefire line.
In exchange, Pakistan won Indian withdrawal from as much as 6,000 square miles of Pakistani territory in the Punjab and Sind. Pakistan will also withdraw from about 100 square miles of Indian territory. These withdrawals along the international borders will take place within thirty days of ratification.

Both sides compromised on their basic approach.
Bhutto
modified his “step-by-step” demand by agreeing to an overall declaration of peaceful intentions before the
POW
issue is settled; India modified its demand for a “package” settlement by agreeing to withdraw troops from the international border before an agreement on Kashmir is reached.
Details of the resumption of normal communication, transportation, and trade links are to be worked out by “delegations from the two countries.”
Both sides have agreed to a second summit at an unspecified later date, prior to which representatives of the two countries are to “discuss the modalities” of
POW
repatriation, a final settlement on Kashmir, and resumption of diplomatic relations.
The agreement is subject to ratification. The Indians state that no further ratification action is required from their side.
Bhutto
has promised to refer the agreement to the National Assembly, and he has called a special early session on July 10 for this purpose.
Selling the Settlement
. In India, initial reaction to the agreement has been generally favorable, and no significant opposition is expected unless the debate in Pakistan raises questions about Pakistani intentions.
In Pakistan,
Bhutto
has a concrete Indian concession—the return of Pakistani territory—as evidence of Indian good intentions, and so should be successful in allaying popular fears. In his first speech on his return, he assured the crowd that he had compromised no principles, he

had not been blackmailed on the
POW
issue, he had made no concessions on Kashmir, and he had won back the territory. The fact that Indian withdrawal is conditional on ratification gives him an effective club to use on the National Assembly. If ratification is accomplished, withdrawal consummated, and the Kashmir ceasefire line maintained, there could be a momentum set up which would be helpful in reaching further agreements.
A major question mark in Pakistan will be the military. The renunciation of the threat or use of force, combined with the mutual withdrawal of troops from the border, will tend to deemphasize the Pakistan military and reduce its political influence.
Bhutto
will have to move very carefully to persuade the generals that the agreement is in their best interest. The continued presence of the opposing forces along the Kashmir ceasefire line gives the Pakistani military a potential opportunity to abort the agreement or obstruct an overall settlement by provoking a frontier incident.
Assessment
. There is no guarantee that this agreement will have any more lasting effect than the agreements ending the 1949 and 1965 Indo-Pakistan conflicts. Resolution of the
POW
issue will depend on Pakistani recognition of Bangladesh and some kind of agreement on war crimes trials. Resolution of the emotional Kashmir issue will involve painful concessions from both sides, and could cause both leaders serious domestic trouble. Nevertheless, the success of Prime Minister
Gandhi
and President
Bhutto
at Simla demonstrates a major effort on both sides to reach an accord.

Bhutto
made significant concessions of principle, committing himself to future negotiations to resolve these issues bilaterally, and in exchange accepted only a return to the prewar territorial positions along the international border. Mrs.
Gandhi
gave up actual control of territory in exchange for mere promises. Both sides appear to be determined to resolve the problems of their latest war, and to be looking toward a later, more conclusive negotiation. It was a statesmanlike action on each side, and provides hope that a lasting, comprehensive settlement on the subcontinent can be achieved.