AlimurRazi/FRUS-1971-bangladesh huggingface dataset:
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 186
186. Editorial Note
President
Nixon
met at the White House on the afternoon of November 15, 1971, with Pakistani Foreign Secretary
Sultan Khan
.
Nixon
briefed
Sultan Khan
on his conversations with Prime Minister
Gandhi
, assuring him that “we talked very directly” with her. With regard to United States policy in dealing with the developing crisis in South Asia,
Nixon
said: “What we are trying desperately to do is not to allow this terrible tragedy, the agony that youʼre going through, [to] be a pretext to start a war.” “The important thing,” he added, “is we know, I know, that this is one of those terrible problems that, frankly, must be solved

by political solution, it must not be solved by force. We simply want to play a role that will be helpful. We will try to restrain to the extent that we have any influence the Indians. We will do everything we can to try to help you in your cause.” (National Archives,
Nixon
Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation between President
Nixon
and Foreign Secretary
Sultan Mohammed Khan
, November 15, 1971, 4:31–4:39 p.m., Oval Office, Recording No. 617–17)
Sultan Khan
also met with Secretary of State
Rogers
on November 15. A summary of their conversation was transmitted to Islamabad on November 17 in telegram 208999. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73,
POL
7
PAK
)
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 187
187. Backchannel Message From the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (
Kissinger
) to the Ambassador to Pakistan (
Farland
)
1
Washington
,
November 15, 1971
.
To be delivered opening of business November 15, 1971.
1.
The President would appreciate it if you could give us in this channel your personal assessment of the situation in South Asia. We are receiving conflicting views as to the situation and how it is perceived by
Yahya Khan
. Some say he is desperate and cannot continue for long to control situation and therefore he would welcome our pressing him to a political solution. Others doubt this view.
2.
Would appreciate your assessment of how seriously
Yahya
views the three proposals which he discussed with you and how he sees their relative priority.
2
State, for example, thinks that the third proposal, i.e., agree to talk with anyone chosen by
Mujib
, is a

serious one which we can pursue. Is this assessment accurate in your judgment?
3.
The Presidentʼs views have not changed. He does not want our pressure to be added to that of India, but does wish to be helpful to
Yahya
. If you feel any instructions you receive go beyond our discussions in July, you should seek guidance directly in this channel before taking any action.
4.
We are counting on you in this delicate situation to keep us fully informed, to give us your candid assessments of developments and to keep the lid on impetuous moves.
Warm regards
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 191
191. Briefing Prepared for President
Nixon
1
Washington
,
November 19, 1971
.
PRESIDENTʼS SATURDAY BRIEFING
Situation in India:
Ambassador
Keating
reports that since Mrs.
Gandhi
has returned to New Delhi most observers feel that she is attempting to lower the political temperature there for the time being at least. She seems to be telling the Indian people and the world that, while she has no intention of reducing the pressure on Pakistan by withdrawing Indian troops from the frontiers or reducing support to the guerrillas, she is prepared to wait for some unspecified period to see whether the international communityʼs efforts to get
Yahya
into a dialogue with the Awami League are successful before initiating more decisive action. A frequent comment from Indian and foreign observers is that Mrs.
Gandhi
remains, as before her trip, less hawkish than the country as a whole and that she apparently continues to work to avoid a major war.
The above is the positive side of the picture. Our intelligence indicates that complementing this public posture is continuing planning for possible military intervention in East Pakistan and serious incidents, reflecting an aggressive Indian posture in support of the guerrillas, continue to flare up along the East Pakistan border. It is also worth noting that some official
U.S.
observers believe that the Indian and guerrilla pressures on the Pak forces could be gradually building up to a point at which the Paks could be goaded into counteractions which could precipitate a full-scale war.
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 192
192. Backchannel Message From the Ambassador to Pakistan (
Farland
) to the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (
Kissinger
)
1
Islamabad
,
November 19, 1971
.
Foll for Dr.
Henry Kissinger
from Ambassador
Farland
:
1.
Have reported results of my conversation Nov. 18 to State through Islamabad 11484.
2
It reflects that
Yahya
is determined to proceed on his own political plan of action for a ‘political solution’ between East and West Pakistan. He considers he has a viable plan of operation going for him. Will convene Assembly Dec. 27 and expects to turn power over to civilian government within about two weeks thereafter. He gave me the impression he was zealously anxious to extricate himself from a deteriorating situation by stepping down, thus accomplishing his prime objective, i.e., the transfer of power. From our conversation I seriously question if he will deviate from what he has as his blueprint.
2.
As reported
reftel
,
Yahya
is not interested in discussing political settlement with Mujibʼs designee, but continues to be interested in talks as reported paragraph 6 Islamabad 10927.
3
3.
I have definite impression that
Yahya
is beginning to feel cornered. For the first time he was somewhat testy during our conversation. He reaffirmed fact that he would not institute war with India, but we are dealing with a military man whose reactions have been preconditioned. Therefore I sincerely hope that Mrs.
Gandhi
be cautioned to the fullest by all interested governments, and that as a result of these admonishments she will prevent her generals from instituting any further incursions into Pak territory. Otherwise this thing could blow.
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 195
195. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (
Kissinger
) to President
Nixon
1
Washington
,
November 22, 1971
.
SUBJECT
Indo-Pak Fighting
2
The Pakistanis today claim in radio broadcasts that India “without a formal declaration of war, has launched an all-out offensive against East Pakistan.” They claim that the attack is concentrated in

the Jessore sector not too far from Calcutta and includes infantry, armor, and aircraft. The Paks also claim that fighting has flared up in several other locations along the East Pakistan border. The Indians claim that these reports are “absolutely false.” They do say, however, that several Pak planes have intruded into their airspace, that the Paks are trying to increase tension and create a “warlike situation” and that some Indian radio broadcasts say that a “concerted” guerrilla offensive is underway.
At this point, we have no independent evidence but it seems apparent that there has been a major incident. These are the possible explanations for todayʼs developments:
—The Indians may be supporting a major guerrilla offensive. If they are following the pattern of smaller past incidents, their forces would move the Pak forces back from a very narrow strip of border territory and then let the guerrillas hold it. Initial reports suggest that this is the least that has happened.
—The Indians may have begun a joint action that will continue with Indian regular forces seeking control of a major area rather than one of the smaller border areas that have been the object of actions over the past few weeks.
—The Pakistanis might have decided that war was inevitable and could have decided on the basis of this largest incident to date to charge the Indians now with having begun it in order to free them for whatever reaction they may feel necessary.
I held a special
WSAG
meeting this afternoon and will have another early Tuesday
3
morning to consider what we might do to help contain this situation if at all possible. Much will depend, of course, on what has actually happened and whether the action spreads.
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 197
197. Backchannel Message From the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (
Kissinger
) to the Ambassador to Pakistan (
Farland
)
1
Washington
,
November 24, 1971
.
Appreciate your personal assessments of the situation
2
and share your concern for its gravity. Because there may be some differences in approach within the bureaucracy, I wanted you to be aware of actions we have taken over the past twenty-four hours, and am providing information via this channel with the confidence that it will be kept exclusively to you although you may draw on it in discussions with
Yahya
. I also provided this information to Pakistani Ambassador
Raza
today on an exclusive basis. Details include:
1.
Meeting with the British Ambassador today during which I informed him that
U.S.
is prepared to support the
UN
Resolution along the lines contained in State 212583.
3
I emphasized, however, that we would leave up to the Government of Pakistan decision as to whether the issue should be referred to the Security Council. I asked him to request that his Government support Pakistan in
UN
and if this proved impossible for them, to at least refrain from supporting India.
2.
Decision to send stronger démarche to Prime Minister
Gandhi
on situation. Specific inquiries would be included concerning Indiaʼs failure to respond to our proposal already agreed to by
Yahya
calling for pullback of forces from border between West Pakistan and India.
3.
My discussion with Chancellor Brandt on November 23 during which I informed him of our position with respect to Security Council Resolution and suggested that we would welcome démarche from
FRG
to Indians registering
FRG
concern for the situation.
4.
Instruction to Ambassador
Beam
to register again our concerns to Moscow.
5.
Daily meetings of Washington Special Actions Group from which several additional actions are pending. These meetings have resulted in issuance of strictest Presidential instructions to tilt toward Pakistan in our public stance.
In addition to informing Ambassador
Raza
of the foregoing, I recommended that he check promptly with the
PRC
UN
delegation in New York to ascertain their views on the desirability of introducing the issue into the
UN
as well as their views on the draft resolution. I informed him that we believe
PRC
views should be considered by Pakistan as they decide whether or not to proceed in
UN
forum.
We will continue to follow the situation very closely and you can assure
Yahya
that President is personally involved in all aspects of the problem. Please keep me informed via this channel of any additional steps that you believe should be considered here.
Warm regards.
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 201
201. Telegram From
the Department of State
to
the Embassy in Pakistan
1
Washington
,
November 25, 1971, 0303Z
.
214136. Subject: Secretaryʼs Meeting with Ambassador
Raza
.
1.
Secretary
Rogers
called in Ambassador
Raza
of Pakistan November 24 to discuss current crisis and inform him of steps just taken with India. Minister Farooqi,
Sisco
,
Laingen
and Holmes also present.
2.
Secy
Rogers
said
USG
deeply concerned with recent developments in South Asia. Secretary said he had just finished talking with Indian Chargé
2
and had (a) urged maximum Indian restraint, (b) pointed out consequences of escalation which were “almost beyond comprehension,” (c) noted
Yahya
ʼs earlier offer of unilateral withdrawal from borders if followed by an appropriate Indian response, and (d) expressed our difficulty in understanding why India had not responded more favorably. Secretary said he had just returned from long meeting with Pres.
Nixon
and stated that President feels strongly on need for maximum restraint. Secretary said “You know and
Yahya
knows how strongly we feel about need to resolve this problem.” Told
Raza
we had also been in touch again with Soviets on need to achieve restraint. Secretary expressed hope all would act with restraint.
3.
Raza
mentioned alleged
U.S.
press statements quoting Dept as saying it has no evidence to substantiate Pakistani claims of Indian attack. Secretary replied that we have simply said “we have no independent information to confirm or deny” the Pakistani charges or the Indian denials. The
USG
does not want to be put in position of being asked to judge reports of a conflicting nature. Again referring to press report
Raza
said he had heard that
USG
had requested urgent meeting
UNSC
. Secy said this obviously erroneous report; said we understood
GOP
has recourse to
UN
under consideration and would be ready to discuss this with
GOP
whenever it wished do so.
Irwin
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 204
204. Backchannel Message From the Ambassador to Pakistan (
Farland
) to the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (
Kissinger
)
1
Islamabad
,
November 26, 1971, 0749Z
.
[
number not declassified
] 1. Met with
Yahya
0930 hours local this morning.
2
In conversation judiciously drew from info contained your wire of the 24th.
3
Specifically assured
Yahya
that President is personally involved in all aspects of the problem.
2.
Yahya
is continuing to exercise maximum restraint, but expressed regretfully that there was limit thereto in event India renews

attacks. Immediately bought my suggestion that he ask for
UN
observers on Pak side of border even though none stationed on Indian side.
3. If tilt towards Pakistan becomes evident, and as further proof of
GOI
ʼs military aggression becomes public, you might wish consider cut-off of military spare parts to India as evidence even-handed policy in subcontinent.
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 206
206. Telegram From
the Department of State
to
the Embassy in Pakistan
1
Washington
,
November 27, 1971, 0101Z
.
214925. For Ambassador
Farland
. Subj: Presidential Message to President
Yahya
. Ref: State 212620.
2
1.
This cable contains Presidential letter to
Yahya
for delivery soonest.
2.
As you will see from
septel
s
3
President has written to Mrs.
Gandhi
and
PM
Kosygin
to urge that India agree promptly to talks with Pakistan looking towards mutual withdrawal of forces. In presenting Presidentʼs letter to
Yahya
, you should stress that we have urged
GOI
to name a representative promptly who could talk to a representative named by
Yahya
on how to achieve mutual withdrawals. You should also tell
Yahya
that we have also indicated to
GOI
willingness of
Yahya
to take first step in this regard, provided there is assurance of an Indian response. You will also want to tell President
Yahya
that we are informing Mrs.
Gandhi
of willingness expressed to you by
Yahya
in your conversation November 26 (Islamabad 11710)
4
to consider
UN
observers on Pak side of East Pak borders.
3.
For your information we believe
GOI
and
GOP
high level military representatives are best way to proceed; we do not want to get into middle of trying to work out details of disengagement. This has to be done on ground by military reps of two governments.
4.
Text of letter to
Yahya
follows:
“Dear Mr. President:
Thank you for your letter of November 22 in which you describe the deepening conflict along your countryʼs eastern borders with India. I am grateful to you for the continued friendship and candor in our relationship which your letter represents. You know the importance I attach to this.

I am especially gratified to have reaffirmation of your strong desire to avoid what you so wisely say would be a senseless and destructive war with India. I have asked Ambassador
Farland
to convey to you directly what we have been trying to do recently, as friends of both Pakistan and India, to counsel restraint, to accomplish a withdrawal of forces, and to contribute to a lessening of tensions. I have made clear to the Government of India that the people and government of this country would not understand it if Indian actions led to broad scale hostilities. We are also continuing to make our views known on this to the Soviets, at the highest level.
Mr. President, my government intends to continue as a concerned friend of Pakistan to act in ways that hopefully might help prevent war between your country and India.
I have asked Ambassador
Farland
to keep in closest touch with you and your associates in the days ahead. We will welcome any suggestion your government may wish to discuss with us that will help reduce the risk of further conflict in South Asia.
With warm regards,
Richard M. Nixon
”
Irwin
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 207
207. Telegram From
the Department of State
to
the Embassy in the Soviet Union
1
Washington
,
November 27, 1971, 0103Z
.
214926. For Ambassador. Subject: South Asian Crisis.
1.
We are increasingly concerned at deteriorating military situation in South Asia and at prospect of full-scale hostilities between India and Pakistan in near future. You should seek earliest possible opportunity to present following letter from President to Chairman
Kosygin
.
2.
“Dear Mr. Chairman:
I have been following extremely closely developments on the South Asian sub-continent. The recent border incidents which have involved engagements between Indian and Pakistani aircraft, tanks, and artillery in the Jessore sector of East Pakistan have been of particular concern to me, as I am sure they have been to you. The situation has reached a point at which there appears to be an imminent danger of full-scale hostilities between India and Pakistan.
As Ambassador
Beam
has made clear to Foreign Minister
Gromyko
and Mr. Kuznetsov, the United States Government is doing all in its power to assist in deescalating the crisis. It is neither in the interests of the United States nor of the Soviet Union that there be war in South Asia. I welcome the assurances that your Government is using its influence to promote a peaceful resolution of this crisis.
In order to deescalate the crisis, we have proposed to the Governments of India and Pakistan that they withdraw their forces a limited distance from the frontiers. President
Yahya
has indicated his willingness to take the first step of withdrawal on the West Pakistan-Indian frontier if he could be assured that the Indians would reciprocate subsequently. On the frontier of East Pakistan he has agreed to permit the stationing of
UN
observers even if India does not reciprocate. I believe that these measures would directly contribute to a lowering of tension and would make possible the pursuit of the political settlement. I hope that your Government would give support to these ideas and, in connection with the pullback proposal, encourage India and Pakistan to designate promptly high level representatives who could work out the details.
Finally, I agree fully that our governments should continue to consult closely on this matter.
Sincerely yours,
Richard Nixon
”
Irwin
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 208
208. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (
Kissinger
) to President
Nixon
1
Washington
,
November 29, 1971
.
SUBJECT
Information Items
India-Pakistan
: Active fighting continues in the border areas of East Pakistan. Indian officials seem increasingly open about the fact that Indian troops have gone across the border, but they continue to maintain that the crossings are to quell Pakistani shelling or in some other act of self-defense. [
less than 1 line of source text not declassified
] the Pakistani army in East Pakistan expects to be able to defend the province for a month or more and to limit Indian penetrations to 10 or 15 miles if the Indians do not use air power.
Pakistani Foreign Secretary
Sultan Khan
Sunday
2
sent a message to
U Thant
through the Pakistani ambassador at the
UN
asking that
UN
observers be stationed on the East Pakistan borders as soon as possible. He said a public announcement would be made today.
During a two-hour talk with Ambassador
Farland
Saturday
3
evening, President
Yahya
said in response to an indication of interest from
Farland
that he would arrange a meeting for
Farland
tomorrow with A. K. Brohi, the distinguished Pakistani lawyer who has been defending
Mujibur Rahman
.
Yahya
said the prosecution in
Mujib
ʼs trial had completed its case and the trial had adjourned for a few days while Brohi prepares the defense.
Farland
says he had been aware from confidential sources that Brohi had been hopeful of contacting him. Several competent newsmen have reported being told that Brohi has been serving as a go-between in political negotiations between
Yahya
and
Mujib
.
Ambassador
Keating
ʼs report on his meeting with Mrs.
Gandhi
is just coming in and will be reported in a supplementary note.
4
[Omitted here are summary reports on foreign policy issues unrelated to South Asia.]
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 210
210. Backchannel Message From the Ambassador to Pakistan (
Farland
) to the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (
Kissinger
)
1
Islamabad
,
November 30, 1971, 1838Z
.
[
number not declassified
] We have no information here to suggest that a Pakistani attack on Kashmir is imminent or under active consideration,
2
although some contingency plan to that effect surely exists.
Yahya
continues to assure me that he does not wish war, nor does he intend to start it here. He has so far held sway over his hawks, although how much longer he can do so in the face of continued Indian incursions into East Pakistan is most uncertain. Pakistanis are in a state of readiness and if they do finally conclude they must fight in the West as well as in the East, Kashmir is an emotionally attractive target, although we have generally thought that they would go for the more easily penetrated areas further south. Will advise you immediately if anything changes this view. Best regards.
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations