AlimurRazi/FRUS-1971-bangladesh huggingface dataset:
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 211
211. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (
Kissinger
) to President
Nixon
1
Washington
,
December 1, 1971
.
SUBJECT
Your Message to Mrs.
Gandhi
2

Ambassador
Keating
called on Mrs.
Gandhi
this morning to deliver your message. She read the letter rapidly and said she would reply promptly although she indicated that she had already discussed some of the points with you.
3
In the ensuing discussion, Mrs.
Gandhi
made the following major points leaving the impression that she was weighing her remarks carefully and knew precisely what she wanted to say:
—India has great admiration for the
US
but every country must first look to its national interest. It was her duty to see what was in the interests of her country.
—Pakistan had been the first to move its troops to the border and no one had asked them to withdraw. It was only after India moved its troops to the border that proposals were made for withdrawals.
—
Yahya
ʼs problems had been self-created and “we are not in a position to make this easier for him.” That was one of the reasons why India could not withdraw its troops. India was being asked to allow the misdeeds of
Yahya
to stand and “we are not going to allow that.”
—No one in all of India was more opposed to war than she was. “I wouldnʼt like to take this country to war”, but, added, “this war and this situation are
4
not of our making.”
—Many countries said they were exerting pressure on
Yahya
but, she asked, “what has it yielded?” Nothing, she answered, “except that President
Yahya
has his back to the wall” and wants “to be bailed out.” Then she commented, “We have to take steps which will make us stronger to deal with this situation.”
—What
Yahya
had done to start a political process, especially the “farcical” elections, had moved the situation in the wrong direction. These so-called elections
5
are “not going to make any difference whatsoever.” (She enumerated [
enunciated
] each syllable of “what-so-ever.”)
—When
Keating
observed that her position was very firm, Mrs.
Gandhi
replied that it was “a little harder” than it had been and went on to say that her patience had worn thin. She did not know how she could tell India that it must continue to wait and added, “I canʼt hold it.”
—When
Keating
started to comment about the recent Indian military incursions, she cut him off by saying, “We canʼt afford to listen to advice which weakens us.”

Ambassador
Keating
comments that Mrs.
Gandhi
spoke with clarity and more grimness than he had ever seen her display. He concludes that, in the absence of some major development toward a meaningful political accommodation, India will assure that the efforts of the Mukti Bahini to liberate East Pakistan do not fail.
There seems to be no give in this position and probably little bluff. There is no evidence that she is wavering from pursuit of Indiaʼs interests as she sees them.
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 215
215. Editorial Note
In a speech to the nation on December 3, 1971, Prime Minister
Gandhi
charged that Pakistan had launched a full-scale attack against India earlier in the day, shortly after 5:30 p.m. She said that Pakistanʼs Air Force had struck at six Indian airfields in Kashmir and the Punjab and that Pakistani artillery was shelling Indian positions at several locations along the border between India and West Pakistan. India,
Gandhi
said, had no option but to adopt a war footing. (Situation Report #18 prepared by the Department of State India–Pakistan Working Group, December 3; National Archives,
Nixon
Presidential Materials,
NSC
Files, Box 571, Indo-Pak War, South Asia, 12/1/71–12/4/71)
Pakistan responded to the Indian charges in a note conveyed to the United States Embassy in Islamabad on December 3. Pakistan alleged that the Indian Air Force had been carrying out aggressive reconnaissance over the territory of West Pakistan for 3 or 4 days as a prelude to attacks launched by the Indian army between 3:30 and 4 p.m. on December 3 at several points on a front that stretched from Kashmir in the north to Rahim Yar Kham in the south. Pakistan represented the attacks on Indian airfields as necessary countermeasures. (Ibid.)
In Washington the question of responsibility for the initiation of warfare along the front between India and West Pakistan bore on policy

considerations. The Central Intelligence Agency weighed the evidence on December 4 and concluded that it was not possible to determine with certainty which side had initiated hostilities on December 3. (Memorandum from [
name not declassified
] to
Kissinger
, December 4; ibid., Box 642, Country Files, Middle East, India/Pakistan Situation)
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 216
216. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between President
Nixon
and His Assistant for National Security Affairs (
Kissinger
)
1
December 3, 1971, 10:45 a.m.
K
: Two matters I want to raise. It appears that West Pakistan has attacked because situation in East collapsing. State wants to use it as a pretext not to put out statement
2
at noon. I think itʼs more reason to cancel programs. State believes and I agree that we should take it to the Security Council once actions are confirmed. If a major war [develops] without going to the Security Council it would be a confession of poverty.
P: Who will object?
K
: India and the Soviet Union.
P: So we have to.
K
: Apparently no one else will. Even the liberal papers are supporting that.
P: I am for that. We have to cut off arms aid to India. We should have done it earlier. Allow India bias.
K
: Yes.
P:
Sisco
ʼs part? He isnʼt pro-Indian. Itʼs what they want below.
K
:
Sisco
has no convictions. Liberal, [omission in the source text], socialist syndrome. The Indians will just add—

P: I have decided it and there is no appeal.
K
: I also think—
P: I wrote it independently of anyone and I am surprised it hasnʼt been done.
K
: It wonʼt reach the
UN
tomorrow or late today. We shouldnʼt make a catastrophe of everything we have done and why Indian actions unjustified.
P: So West Pakistan giving trouble there.
K
: If they lose half of their country without fighting they will be destroyed. They may also be destroyed this way but they will go down fighting.
P: They will have enough for a few days. It puts the Soviets on the spot.
K
: I think I should give a brief note to the Russians so that they donʼt jump around about conversation yesterday and say we are going on your conversation with
Gromyko
.
3
A strong blast at their Vietnam friends and behavior on India. We are moving on our side but they are not doing enough on theirs.
P: On India certainly but on VN I wonder if it sounds hollow.
[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to South Asia.]
P: Pakistan thing makes your heart sick. For them to be done so by the Indians and after we have warned the bitch. Their [omission in the source text] and that but they have brought it on. We have to cut off arms. Why not? Because attacked by W. Pakistan. Tell them that when India talked about W. Pakistan attacking them itʼs like Russian claiming to be attacked by Finland.
K
: They will do it or we will do it from Key Biscayne. Itʼs a hell of a way but we can do it and I will get that message to the Soviets.
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 217
217. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State
Rogers
and the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (
Kissinger
)
1
Washington
,
December 3, 1971, 10:55 a.m.
R
: Hello.
K
: Hello, Bill. I just talked to the President. He is agreeable to the Security Council thing as soon as we get all the facts in. He is absolutely adamant about getting a statement
2
out at noon. He is raising cain again. I am getting the hell. He wants it to tilt towards Pakistan. He doesnʼt want it to be [omission in the source text] (Laughter). I agree with you, and I told the President that, that we should not go into the long history. We should save that for the
UN
, but I think we should put out the statement at noon.
R
: I am in favor of that. I just hesitate putting out a statement condemning India.
K
: No, no. I agree with you that we should not put out the long statement at noon, but I think we should put out some of these facts in the background pages.
R
: The facts we are speaking about are old hat as far as the news is concerned so a review statement to the press is like water off a duckʼs back.
K
: I told the President that the argument the people will give is itʼs like Finland attacking Russia; that they were provoked into it and didnʼt have any choice.
R
: The question is: Should we take a judicial role ourselves and decide who is guilty? I think it would be better placed in the Security Council.
K
: What I recommend, Bill, if you agree, is that the gist of what we had in that statement be used.
R
: I would say something like this: In view of the deteriorating situation in the area, we are cutting off all military shipments to India now. If this develops any interest on the part of the press then when
Bush
goes to the Security Council he can outline the steps about Pakistan.
K
: That is correct. We should do it on that basis. Another thing the President said is that we are considering cutting off economic aid.

R
: Well, we said we are considering other steps; that is just one of them.
K
: Well, I think it is beyond the point where we can mention that. Letʼs just put out the military statement.
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 219
219. Telegram From
the Department of State
to
the Embassy in Pakistan
1
Washington
,
December 3, 1971, 1513Z
.
218346. Subject: Letter from President
Yahya
.
Following is text of letter to President from President
Yahya
delivered to White House December 2:
2
“Dear Mr. President,
I write to thank you most sincerely for your letter of November 27
3
which was delivered to me by Ambassador
Farland
. I deeply appreciate the measures taken by you to counsel restraint and to promote a withdrawal of forces. I especially take note of your kind offer to consider suggestions from my government and to discuss with you measures that will help reduce the risk of further conflict in South Asia. It is in this spirit that I address these few lines to you now.
As you are aware, I have done my utmost to resolve the problem with India peacefully. I have gone more than half way. I have done my best to keep the clashes localised and confined to East Pakistan. Ambassador
Farland
and
Raza
are being kept informed of developments and the evolving military situation. Unfortunately India has chosen the path of war, aided and abetted by Soviet Union, in a bid to break up my country. Time is fast running out and the choice before me has, indeed, become very limited.
I have, therefore, been seriously considering to make an approach to you for a final attempt to avert the impending catastrophe. I do so now.
The advice given to the Indian Prime Minister and indications of the
U.S.
opposition to any rash actions by India have apparently proved futile. Gesture such as the stoppage of two million dollars worth of arms supplies to India or delay in the signing of
PL
–480 and development loans are unlikely to change the Indian attitude at this stage. Therefore, I request for urgent consideration, Mr. President, the following measures:
a)
issuance of a personal statement by you, condemning Indiaʼs aggression, aided and abetted by the Soviet Union, and calling for an

immediate end to hostilities and withdrawal of opposing forces to safe distance behind their respective borders;
b)
issuance of a statement by you strongly advising Soviet Union to desist from militarily supporting India in its aggression against Pakistan;
c)
your agreement to my invoking Article I of the Pakistan–United States Bilateral Agreement of Co-operation signed on 5th March 1959
4
and meeting my request for military assistance in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement.
5
Mr. President, Pakistan is determined to resist aggression launched by India which has enormous superiority of arms and equipment over us. The Russian involvement consisting of massive supplies of sophisticated arms to India has made our task much more difficult. Pakistan must, therefore, enlist powerful and tangible support of its friends in keeping with the solemn agreements signed with them, to meet this formidable challenge.
I shall be most anxiously awaiting your reply.
With warm personal regards,
Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan
.”
Rogers
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 220
220. Telegram From
the Embassy in Pakistan
to
the Department of State
1
Islamabad
,
December 3, 1971, 1500Z
.
12007. Subj: Indo-Pak Relations: Fighting in West. Ref: Islamabad 12001.
2

1.
In company with additional
FonSec
Alvie,
3
I arrived at President
Yahya
ʼs residence at about 2000 hours local time Dec. 3. Met with President
Yahya
10 minutes thereafter. In addition to President
Yahya
, there was in attendance Foreign Secretary
Sultan Khan
and Chief of Staff General
Abdul Hamid Khan
. President informed me that, beginning about 1500 hours local time Dec. 3, a series of Indian army incursions supported by air cover had occurred at a number of points as far north as Kashmir and as far south as Rahim Yar Kham. He said further that as a result of this activity, four Pak air force strikes had taken place upon airfields in the general area north and south of Lahore. He indicated that he was hopeful that Pak planes had returned safely but as yet he had not had a complete report from Air Marshal Rahim Khan. Furthermore, he asked me to convey to President
Nixon
his personal message to the effect that his restraint had been exercised to the utmost, and that the action which his government had taken today to interdict the military aggression of
GOI
was among the most difficult decisions that he had ever made.
2.
The President then began to spell out in precise detail the areas in which Indian incursions had transpired. I told him that I would appreciate it very much if the
FonSec
or the additional
FonSec
, who is taking extensive notes, could give me a copy setting forth these specific areas for the purpose of absolute clarity. This was immediately agreed to and the
FonSec
said that he would see that this information was delivered to the chancery shortly. I am awaiting this information at this time and will forward same upon receipt.
4
Farland
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 222
222. Backchannel Message From the Ambassador to Pakistan (
Farland
) to the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (
Kissinger
)
1
Islamabad
,
December 4, 1971, 0650Z
.
[
number not declassified
] In conversation with me at 2000 hrs. local December 3, (Islamabad 12007)
2
Yahya
said that, with India having precipitated an all-out war, his military forces were in desperate need of
U.S.
military supplies and earnestly sought my governmentʼs assistance in obtaining same.
3
He added that, assuming the
Nixon
administration found this to be an impossibility, “for Godʼs sake donʼt hinder or impede the delivery of equipment from friendly third countries.”
4
I told
Yahya
that I would pass the message to you. However, I admonished him that the requests carried with them difficulties of which he should be all too well aware given the history of
U.S.
military supplies to Pakistan.
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 233
233. Editorial Note
President
Nixon
and Secretary of State
Rogers
discussed the evolving crisis in South Asia in a telephone conversation on the morning of December 6, 1971.
Nixon
instructed
Rogers
to increase the publicity given to the amount of assistance being provided by the United States to the refugees in India. Then the conversation turned to an assessment of the conflict between India and Pakistan.
Rogers
described the situation in East Pakistan as “pretty bleak” for Pakistan.
Nixon
agreed but

added that Indian forces might face a difficult task if they tried to take West Pakistan.
Rogers
concurred and said: “I rather hope that the West Paks can do some good up in Kashmir, maybe they can make some offsetting gains up in there.” [
text not declassified
] (National Archives,
Nixon
Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation between President
Nixon
and Secretary of State
Rogers
, December 6, 1971, 9:19–9:24 a.m., White House Telephone, Conversation No. 16–14) A transcript of this conversation is published in
Foreign Relations
, 1969–1976, volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972, Document 161
.
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 236
236. Letter From President
Nixon
to Soviet General Secretary
Brezhnev
1
Washington
,
December 6, 1971
.
Dear Mr. Secretary:
I address this urgent message to you because of my profound concern about the deepening gravity of the situation in the Indian Subcontinent.
Whatever oneʼs view of the causes of the present conflict, the objective fact now is that Indian military forces are being used in an effort to impose political demands and to dismember the sovereign state of Pakistan. It is also a fact that your Government has aligned itself with this Indian policy.
You have publicly stated that because of your geographic proximity to the Subcontinent you consider your security interests involved in the present conflict. But other countries, near and far, cannot help but see their own interests involved as well. And this is bound to result in alignments by other states who had no wish to see the problems in the Subcontinent become international in character.
It had been my understanding, from my exchanges with you and my conversation with your Foreign Minister, that we were entering a new period in our relations which would be marked by mutual restraint and in which neither you nor we would act in crises to seek

unilateral advantages. I had understood your Foreign Minister to say that these principles would govern your policies, as they do ours, not only in such potentially dangerous areas as the Middle East but in international relations generally.
I regret to say that what is happening now in South Asia, where you are supporting the Indian Governmentʼs open use of force against the independence and integrity of Pakistan, merely serves to aggravate an already grave situation. Beyond that, however, this course of developments runs counter to the recent encouraging trend in international relations to which the mutual endeavors of our two governments have been making such a major contribution.
It is clear that the interests of all concerned states will be served if the territorial integrity of Pakistan were restored and military action were brought to an end. Urgent action is required and I believe that your great influence in New Delhi should serve these ends.
I must state frankly that it would be illusory to think that if India can somehow achieve its objectives by military action the issue will be closed. An “accomplished fact” brought about in this way would long complicate the international situation and undermine the confidence that we and you have worked so hard to establish. It could not help but have an adverse effect on a whole range of other issues.
I assure you, Mr. Secretary, that such a turn of events would be a painful disappointment at a time when we stand at the threshold of a new and more hopeful era in our relations. I am convinced that the spirit in which we agreed that the time had come for us to meet in Moscow next May requires from both of us the utmost restraint and the most urgent action to end the conflict and restore territorial integrity in the Subcontinent.
2
Sincerely,
Richard Nixon
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 238
238. Editorial Note
Department of State Spokesman Charles Bray made the following statement at a press briefing at 3 p.m. on December 6, 1971:
“General economic assistance in the pipeline for India has been suspended to the extent it is not firmly committed to suppliers and banks. General economic assistance, or non-project aid, is provided to support the general economy of an aid recipient and thus support a development effort. In the present circumstances in India this objective cannot be secured. Although the funds now frozen are included in formal agreements signed by India and the United States, we have both an obligation and a unilateral right to stop their use when the development purpose for which they were designed cannot be achieved. The amount affected by this temporary suspension is $87.6 million.” (Quoted in Situation Report #26 prepared by the Department of State India–Pakistan Working Group on December 6 at 3 p.m.; National Archives,
Nixon
Presidential Materials,
NSC
Files, Box 642, Country Files, Middle East, India/Pakistan Situation; quoted in part in
The New York Times
, December 7, 1971, page 1)
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 240
240. Memorandum From Secretary of State
Rogers
to President
Nixon
1
Washington
,
December 6, 1971
.
EVENING REPORT
1.
Briefing of Senate Leadership on India–Pakistan
—I met with the Senate leadership for almost an hour this afternoon to review the events leading up to the India-Pakistan war and to further explain
U.S.
efforts and policies.
2
I first outlined the general course of events and particularly stressed the repeated efforts that the Administration had made to dissuade the Indian Government from the use of military force in East Pakistan. I also noted the suggestions which we have made to President
Yahya
and his receptivity on a number of them.
I then explained the reasons for the action earlier today in suspending $87.6 million in general economic aid in the Indian pipeline. I stressed our policy of not becoming involved and noted the long history

of hatreds and problems in the area which were not of our doing. I reiterated the support we have had in the Security Council and noted our forthcoming efforts to take the issue to the General Assembly.
Senator Fulbright was the first to say that he thought we were doing exactly the right thing in not becoming involved and he said he had no criticism of
U.S.
policy. Senator Stennis said that he wanted to express very strong support for the Presidentʼs policies.
Also present and in accord were Senators Mansfield, Scott, Griffin, Smith, Cotton, Aiken and Allott.
[Omitted here is an analysis of issues unrelated to South Asia.]
Robert Miller
3
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations