AlimurRazi/FRUS-1971-bangladesh huggingface dataset:
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 356
356. Telegram 956 From the
Embassy in Iran
to the
Department of State
1
2
Tehran
,
February 16, 1972 0416Z
Subject:
Narcotics:
Nelson Gross
Visit to Afghanistan
1.
As Department aware I was not able to reach Kabul in view adverse weather and transportaion conditions. I remained in Jalalabad until advised by responsible Afghan officials that I could not reach Kabul Feb 13. I then returned by car to Peshawar with Kabul escort officer Helseth and thence via first available flight to Tehran for regional meeting.
2.
Also stranded in Jabalabad was
MFA
Chief of Protocol Sadullah Ghaussi. Realizing that I would not have opportunity for planned ministerial talks, I emphasized to Ghaussi deep interest and concern
USG
and President
Nixon
re increasing drug abuse problem. I asked Ghaussi pass to
RGA
thru
FonMin
Shafiq
following message from President
Nixon
and Secretary
Rogers
:
A)
USG
hopes
RGA
will be represented at Geneva Plenipotentiary Conference in March to amend single convention.
B)
USG
asked for
RGA
support of proposed amendments to single convention as stated in potential consensus which Embassy Kabul had already provided to
MFA
.
C)
USG
urges
RGA
join and participate in
CND
ad hoc committee on illicit traffic.
D)
AMB
Neumann
will soon be presenting to
RGA
plan for cooperative narcotics control which
USG
hopes
RGA
will receive and consider favorably, plan includes proposals aimed at (1) increasing Afghanis enforcement capabilities, (2) improving Afghan capability for intelligence data collection in regard to illicit traffic, and (3) some suggestions which eventually will involve plans for crop substitution for affected Afghan farmers if
RGA
agrees stop all narcotic production.
3.
Ghaussi took notes and said he would inform
FonMin
as soon as he could travel to Kabul. He said he could not, of course, respond to my message.
4.
Ghaussi then said he “had heard”
USG
offering Turkey 39 million dollars to stop opium production but that Turks holding out for 40 million dollars, believing it best. I told Ghaussi 35 million figure was firm and already agreed, but I explained that bulk that amount was to make up for Turk loss foreign exchange as result loss of legal export market. I hope this may forestall Afghan expectations of equivalent quid pro quo. Ghaussi did not respond.
MacArthur
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 360
360. Telegram 2042 From the
Embassy in Afghanistan
to the
Department of State
1
2
Kabul
,
April 13, 1972, 0945Z
Subj:
Afghanistan-Response to Prince Daud
REF:
(A) State 56321 (B) Kabul 1806
1.
Acting under my instructions, EmbOff gave Wahid Abdullah April 11 response indicated para 8, ref B, minus point three repeat three.
Wahid
took careful notes.
Wahid
immediately stated that there was no answer to question whether dialogue could continue.
Wahid
was pleased to learn that dialogue could continue through him and
EmbOff
.
2.
Again on my instructions,
EmbOff
then made point suggested para 3, ref A, concerning continuing
US
relations with Afghanistan over years as his “personal and informed opinion.”
3.
During conversation
EmbOff
asked how change in government might occur especially in view wahid’s earlier statement that Prince Daud could never take any action which would further divide Afghanistan.
Wahid
responded: (a) Daud still adheres to this principle; (b) some members royal family “would favor Daud’s return;” and (c) Marshal Shah Mali Khan and wife have for some time been actively working to effect reconciliation between His Majesty and Princes Daud and Naim.
4.
For first time in several years I recently saw Princes Daud and Naim at public affair (wedding receiption for Dr. Aziz Seraj’s daughter) and made point of speaking briefly to both.
Wahid
told
EmbOff
in response question, that Princes attended because groom was son of Daud’s former Minister of Interior

and is now protege of Daud.
5.
Rumors now cropping up in various Kabul circles about possibility that Daud may reenter political arena.
Neumann
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 361
361. Telegram 2055 From the
Embassy in Afghanistan
to the
Department of State
1
2
Kabul
,
April 15, 1972, 0340Z
Subject:
Narcotics-A Conversation With Afghan
FonMin
Ref:
Kabul 1705, Kabul 1404
1.
When I saw
FonMin
Shafiq
April 12 I again raised narcotics problem stressing need for stricter enforcement which would probably require new police, pharmaceutical and drug laws as well as need for Afghan active participation in
CND
ad hoc committee. While we agreed discuss subject at greater length on his return from
PRC
,
Shafiq
made following interesting observations: (a) he believed present two Cabinet committees too cumbersome and foreign governments need focal person to talk to; (b) he trying centralize problem by harmonizing action and speeding it up: (c) focal point should be in
MFA
.
2.
Shafiq
added he had proposed that Supreme Court take steps to see that uniform drug law is drafted. He said
MFA
now drafting note asking foreign help this regard. He

implied note would go to most Embassies Kabul but was not specific. He said he had also proposed (a) creation of special drug courts and (b) special drug training courses for
RGA
personnel involved in narcotics effort.
3.
Comment: I believe
MFA
focal point has definite advantages for us so long as procedure would not further delay initial work of Cabinet committees whose reports now due May. After above mentioned note arrives, I expect see respective chairmen in near future in effort obtain information on direction their work and possible tentative conclusions.
Neumann
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 366
366. Telegram 169365 From the
Department of State
to the
Embassy in Afghanistan
1
2
Kabul
,
September 15, 1972, 2237Z
.
Subj:
Famine in Western Mountains of Afghanistan
Ref:
Kabul 5348, 5349, 5350, 5354
1.
Department appreciates urgency with which action must be taken if relief is to reach affected areas in time to prevent same type of suffering that occurred last year. We await your further reporting on action
RGA
taking and especially look forward to report on your conversation with King.
2.
Preliminary review here indicates that airlift of wheat would be technically feasible to Chakcharan, Qali-Nau and bamiyan, particularly if air drop employed as on several past occasions in pakistan. this would reduce landings on undesirable fields to those required to recover drop gear. on contingency basis we have asked
DOD
to investigate availability of
USAF
C–130’s for month of October.
AID
investigating availability of commercial C–130’S.
3.
Strongly recommend urgent exploration of availability of Pakistani and Iranian trucks on contract basis, [ref Kabul 5348, para 7]. advise.
4.
If airlift should be decided necessary,
Shafiq
’s

determination to “ignore political problem” [Kabul 5354, para 13] can be drawn on to suggest to
RGA
that it also seek help from Iran and Pakistan where C–130 aircraft also available.
GOP
known to have ample experience moving bulk supplies into comparable locations—e.g., Gilgit and Skardu.
5.
For present you should avoid discussion any
USG
airlift possibility with
RGA
.
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 368
368. Telegram 5636 From the
Embassy in Afghanistan
to the
Department of State
1
2
Kabul
,
September 27, 1972, 0330Z
Subject:
Government-Afghan Styles or, Is Zahir Still PM?
1.
His Majesty evening Sept 25 rejected PM Zahirs resignation (ref A) and ordered PM continue in power (texts-by septel).
2.
We now have clearer picture of present siuation, although, timing of future moves siill unclear and possibly subject to further change. It is certain Zahir wants to resigns but timing his Sept 24 resignation still unclear although firm decision resign reached prior PM’s German trip. We also are certain King had firmly decided Sept 24 accept PM’s resignation and name
Shafiq
PM. Is also clear that
Shafiq
on morning Sept 25 moved in, took over decision making and convinced him that now was not propitious moment for change in govt. We assume his

arguments based upon anticipated absence both him and
Shafiq
beginning Sept 26 and continuing problem of legislative versus executive. We understand HM agreed with
Shafiq
that Zahir should remain in office until King returns. Then second look would be taken with particular emphasis on how Parliament (which reconvenes October 14) is behaving. We further understand that new govt with
Shafiq
as PM will be formed at that time but, in reality
Shafiq
has assumed complete charge as of now. Zahir will run govt in
Shafiq
’s absence but
Shafiq
will have final authorty when he returns even though Zahir will be PM in name until HM returns and carries out present intentions.
3.
Question most foreign observers and thinking Afghans are pondering is, why was it done this way and why was there this untypical admission of failure of PM’s resignation message? Why my first was that PM Zahir had chosed his words in order to force King accept his resignation. I now inclined conclude that wording was King’s was of shifting blame and that Zahir is to be made scapegoat for failure his govt and King work out effective modus operandi with Parliament, lack of which has stymied govt action in almost every field of endeavor. If Shafiq had not intervened as he did, HM would apparently have carried through his plan and named Shafiq PM Sept 25.
4.
Still undecided are return dates to Kabul of HM and
Shafiq
. It appears Shafiq will proceed from Turkey to NY for UNGA. We believe his stay in
US
will last only few days. On assumption Zahir and
Shafiq
keep domestic political situation under control it now appears HM will complete his vacation in europe before returning.
5.
While it does not seem possible that govt could discover new nadir of inactivity, I am forced to conclude that immediate period until Shafiq returns will undoubtedly see virtual cessation of all activity. Excluded from this appears to be Minister Seraj’s emergency relief program for central highlands which going forward full blast.
Neumann
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 371
371. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (
Sisco
) to Secretary of State
Rogers
1
2
Washington
,
December 12, 1972
New Government in Afghanistan
King Mohammad Zaher accepted the resignation of Prime Minister Zahir on December 5, and on December 7 asked Foreign Minister
Mohammad Moussa Shafiq
to form a new government.
Shafiq
appeared before the Parliament on December 11 with a partial list of his Cabinet members, and, according to the Afghan Embassy, received a vote of confidence today.
Shafiq
seems an outstanding choice for Prime Minister. You met him at the
UN
both this year and last, and I believe you will agree with Embassy Kabul that he is a bright, intelligent young man with a quick and agile mind that penetrates immediately to the core of issues before him. He has demonstrated a willingness to make decisions, which is unusual in Afghanistan. The new Prime Minister has an M.A. from Columbia, and speaks warmly of the special bond between Afghans and Americans which he feels is based on similar ideals and basic outlook. He has privately suggested closer cooperation between Afghanistan and the U.S. on international issues.
In his appearance before the Parliament December 11,
Shafiq
promised to continue Afghanistan’s nonaligned foreign policy, to suppress opium production, and to press economic and political reforms.
Shafiq
’s Cabinet is young, liberal and technically well qualified. Notable among the selections are Mohammad Khan Jalalar, age 37, one of the ablest economists in the

country, as Minister of Finance; Sahabuddin Kushkaki, 39 year old publisher of the only good independent newspaper in Afghanistan, as Minister of Information and Culture; and Dr. Abdul Wakil, the organizer and motivator of the outstanding drought relief activity with whom
USAID
and the Peace Corps have worked very closely during the past year, as Minister of Agriculture.
We expect the
Shafiq
Government to exercise stronger leadership on domestic issues and to pursue a more active and slightly more Western-oriented foreign policy.
Shafiq
’s major problem will be the extent to which the King will allow him to govern.
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 372
372. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (
Sisco
) to Secretary of State
Rogers
1
2
Washington
,
December 18, 1972
Afghanistan Narcotics Control
In presenting his program to the Parliament prior to receiving its vote of confidence, Prime Minister
Shafiq
promised “effective measures” to stop the narcotics traffic, and added that the Government of Afghanistan, with foreign assistance, will also develop a program to stop illicit opium cultivation. The next day he repeated his determination to launch a “crusade” against drugs in an interview with an
AP
correspondent.
Narcotics control thus became one of eleven planks in the platform of the government of the new Prime Minister, for the first time figuring as a priority item in the
RGA
agenda. This public recognition of the importance of the narcotics problem has undoubtedly resulted largely from the constant efforts of our Embassy in Kabul under the leadership of Ambassador
Robert G. Neumann
.
Recommendation:
That you approve the attached telegram to Ambassador
Neumann
commending him on a job well done.
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 1
1. Editorial Note
According to
Henry Kissinger
, “When the
Nixon
administration took office, our policy objective on the subcontinent was, quite simply, to avoid adding another complication to our agenda.” (
Kissinger
,
White House Years
, page 848) As events developed in South Asia, that proved to be an increasingly difficult objective to achieve. A political crisis developed in Pakistan out of Bengali demands for autonomy for East Pakistan, demands which were highlighted by the results of a general election in December 1970. The subsequent crisis, which roiled the subcontinent in conflict from March to December 1971, led to warfare between India and Pakistan, and eventuated in the transition of the east wing of Pakistan into the new nation of Bangladesh. The United States, which was using Pakistan at the time as a conduit in conducting secret negotiations with China, intervened in the crisis to try to prevent fighting between India and Pakistan. When fighting developed, the
Nixon
administration “tilted” toward Pakistan.
The background to the crisis in Pakistan, and the developing tensions between the United States and India are documented in a companion Internet publication,
Foreign Relations
, 1969–1976, volume E–7
, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972. This publication also documents such bilateral issues as economic and military assistance as well as the aftermath of the crisis. In 1972 the
Nixon
administration had to weigh the timing of recognition of the new government in Dacca, a decision that bore on relations with Pakistan, and reestablish a working relationship with India, as the dominant power on the subcontinent. Separate internet publications document relations with Afghanistan and with Bangladesh.
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 3
3. National Security Decision Memorandum 101
1
Washington
,
March 2, 1971
.
TO
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Agriculture
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Administrator, Agency for International Development
SUBJECT
FY
1971 Economic Assistance Program for India
The President has considered the recommendations for
FY
1971 economic assistance for India, contained in the memorandum of February 2, 1971, from the Secretary of State.
2
The President has approved

the approximately $150 million Title I
PL
480
3
program of concessional sales of surplus agricultural commodities and $10.8 million in technical assistance. The President also has approved a grant of $15–20 million for family planning subject to the review of progress under last yearʼs program as proposed by the Secretary of State.
With reference to the development loans, the President has authorized an initial loan of $170 million on the assumption that Indiaʼs needs will have a high priority claim on additional funds that might become available later this fiscal year. After reviewing competing requirements for such funds, the Secretary of State at that time should seek the Presidentʼs authorization before providing such additional funds.
Henry A. Kissinger
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 4
4. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (
Sisco
) and the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (
Green
) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (
Johnson
)
Washington
,
March 2, 1971
.
[Source: Department of State,
INR/IL
Historical Files, 40 Committee Files, 1971. Secret. 3 pages of source text not declassified.]
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 5
5. Memorandum From
Harold Saunders
and
Samuel Hoskinson
of the National Security Council Staff to the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (
Kissinger
)
1
Washington
,
March 4, 1971
.
SUBJECT
Situation in Pakistan
Overnight reports from Pakistan indicate that the situation in East Pakistan is deteriorating. The following are the new developments:
—
Mujibur Rahman
seems to have virtually slammed the door on the possibility of East-West accommodation by categorically rejecting President
Yahya
ʼs plan to hold a conference of the major political leaders on March 10.
—
Mujib
has admitted to several foreign correspondents “off the record” that he will announce the equivalent to independence for East Pakistan on Sunday.
2
He did, however, go on to say that the East and West wings should write their respective constitutions and thereafter discussions over the form of linkage could take place. [This leaves the door open to some sort of confederal relationship and is the reason we advocate—via your talking points
3
—not jumping too soon to recognition of East Pakistani independence.]
4
—At least one Pakistani air force C–130 has been seen flying into Dacca and there are recurrent reports of forces being flown into Dacca via the Pakistani commercial airline and of the movement of troops from the West via ship. These reports can not be confirmed but it is known that there is pressure from some elements in the military to make a quick repressive strike against the East Pakistani leaders in hopes of cowing them and the rest of the province. [The contingency

paper
5
says intervention is “very unlikely”. This seems less and less true.
CIA
working level judges that the East would respond with further violence rather than surrender.]
—The East Pakistanis in the embassy here have approached State concerning their relations with the Department following a “declaration of independence.” They expect to be expelled from the chancery and the current
DCM
, who is an East Pakistani, would then become the Chargé of a new embassy.
These developments just heighten my concern—which I know you fully share—of postponement of discussion of this issue. Regrettably, State just has not given this issue the attention it deserves. That is why we wrote the
NSSM
three weeks ago. Only because of our prodding is there a contingency paper today. As for the notion that this is not a policy issue, I can not believe that the repartition of South Asia after twenty-three years is not a policy issue of major proportions. State has not objected to dealing with this in the
NSC
framework so far.
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 7
7. Editorial Note
National elections were held in India March 1–10, 1971. Prime Minister
Indira Gandhi
ʼs Congress Party won 350 seats in the 521 seat Lok Sabha, the lower house of parliament. In an assessment of the election sent to Secretary
Rogers
on March 22, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Joseph Sisco
concluded that the election served
Gandhi
by “making both her partyʼs and her own position unassailable.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73,
POL
15–1 INDIA) On March 13 President
Nixon
sent a message to Prime Minister
Gandhi
congratulating her on her “landslide victory.” (Telegram 42498 to New Delhi; ibid.) In a telephone conversation with Secretary
Rogers
on March 17,
Henry Kissinger
said that he had discussed the election over lunch that day with Indian Ambassador
Jha
. According to
Jha
: “Now that she has won, she wants good relations with us.” (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division,
Kissinger
Papers, Box 367, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations