Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 42
42. Memorandum of Conversation
1
Palm Springs, California
,
May 7, 1971, 2:50–5:45 p.m.
PARTICIPANTS
Joseph S. Farland
,
U.S.
Ambassador to Pakistan
Henry A. Kissinger
, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
David R. Halperin (notetaker)
After an exchange of pleasantries, Ambassador
Farland
stated that the State Department had accepted his cover story without question.
2
Mr.
Kissinger
expressed appreciation for the cables sent by Ambassador
Farland
, and for his loyalty over the past weeks.
Mr.
Kissinger
then stated that
McNamara
3
was preparing to submit a devastating report concluding that it would take $250 million to give Pakistan breathing room; he then asked Ambassador
Farland
whether it is, in fact, possible to provide breathing room, and whether $250 million is a realistic estimate of the support required. Ambassador
Farland
replied that although he thought it would be possible, there are some real problems to contend with:
—Ambassador
Keating
seems to have gone berserk; he has violated security and appears determined to break Pakistan. For example, he recently called in a
New York Times
reporter and, although he did

not release the text, he did tell him the essence of
Blood
ʼs report.
4
Ambassador
Farland
is convinced that
Keating
is determined to make a political issue out of the Pakistani situation, and is attempting to discredit the Administration in the process.
—Another problem is the quality of political reporting in Dacca. The reporters there are missionaries without significant practical experience. They have never before seen war and are grossly exaggerating the amount of killing and bloodshed there.
Moving to the primary item of business, Mr.
Kissinger
explained to Ambassador
Farland
that for some time, we have been passing messages to the Chinese through the Pakistanis. Because of the communications problem, it had not been possible to inform Ambassador
Farland
of this previously, and messages have been conveyed directly to
Yahya
by the President, or through Ambassador
Hilaly
. Mr.
Kissinger
then outlined the exchange of messages that has occurred to date:
[Omitted here are
Kissinger
ʼs detailed briefing on the exchanges with the Chinese and discussion of communications and transportation arrangements relating to the contacts.]
Pakistanʼs Economic Situation
Mr.
Kissinger
stated that he would talk to
McNamara
on Monday, May 10, and tell him that
Yahya
must be kept afloat for six more months; one problem will be that
McNamara
is emotionally against
Yahya
—as is the entire liberal community. Ambassador
Farland
pointed out that matters wonʼt be helped by the fact that
Keating
is now on his way back to conduct a series of conferences, including some with his old Senate confreres. Mr.
Kissinger
stated that he would tell
McNamara
that this is the only channel we have, and he must give
Yahya
at least three months. Ambassador
Farland
stated that six months should be the goal.
Ambassador
Farland
stated that he had urged
Yahya
to tell his staff to make a new presentation to the consortium.
5
Ahmad
is coming to the United States next week, and Ambassador
Farland
has stressed this to him. The Ambassador stated that one inherent problem is that the lower echelon in the Pakistani bureaucracy feels they have a commitment from China to support operations in East Pakistan. Although Japan is negative in their position, Ambassador
Farland
felt that Germany will not let Pakistan go down the drain and the British

will probably help as well. Mr.
Kissinger
asked whether the $250 million will be applied entirely to debt re-scheduling—and whether
Yahya
could propose a plan applicable to West Pakistan. Ambassador
Farland
thought some of the $250 million would be a new loan, and that a consortium proposal would be geared to East Pakistan with the West receiving/administering the funds.
Mr.
Kissinger
next asked what he could do bureaucratically to help. Ambassador
Farland
said that the most important contribution would be to get
McNamara
to head up the consortium. Mr.
Kissinger
replied that he did not think
McNamara
would agree to this because it would antagonize his liberal friends. Ambassador
Farland
then pointed out that the
IMF
was another possibility that should not be overlooked. Assali had previously requested a standby loan from the
IMF
which was turned down; however, the loan request could be reactivated. Mr.
Kissinger
indicated that he would take this issue up with
Peterson
or
Shultz
, and that he would report on his meeting with
McNamara
through the Navy channel. [
2½ lines of source text not declassified
] Mr.
Kissinger
agreed that this was a good idea.
Political Situation
Mr.
Kissinger
asked how it was that the election results were so unexpected. Ambassador
Farland
said that everyone has missed in their predictions. In East Pakistan, Rahman had been able to capitalize on the cyclone. When the western nations began to pour in assistance, the Benghalis realized for the first time that they were part of the world. In the West, everyone had thought the landowners could continue to retain substantial support.
Ambassador
Farland
voiced some mild complaints about living in Pakistan and expressed the hope that if the China meeting came off successfully, a new post could be offered. Mr.
Kissinger
replied noncommittally that if this gets done, “we will owe you a great debt of gratitude.”
Mr.
Kissinger
asked if there is any way West Pakistan can hold on to East Pakistan. Ambassador
Farland
said no, not in the long run. Mr.
Kissinger
then said that all we need is six months. East Benghal is bound to become an economic disaster; Chinese influence will grow there, and it will not be possible to win any permanent friends there. Ambassador
Farland
agreed and pointed out the difficulty of making a financial commitment to the Benghalis.
Ambassador
Farland
asked if Mr.
Kissinger
could have
Hannah
pass the word down through regular channels that we are going to work things out and support the government. Mr.
Kissinger
said he would insure this gets done. Ambassador
Farland
then said that our interest in trying to save Pakistan be conveyed to the heads of government in Britain, Germany—and possibly also Japan. Mr.
Kissinger

replied that he might be going to Britain on other business and would speak to
Heath
about this. Ambassador
Farland
pointed out that at this point, the other members of the consortium do not know our position.
Summary
Mr.
Kissinger
indicated, by way of summary, that he would:
(1)
Have
Hannah
told that we want a positive attitude and six months time;
(2)
Talk to
McNamara
along the lines above;
(3)
Look into the
IMF
Loan;
(4)
Personally talk to
Heath
;
(5)
Have
Rush
6
talk to Brandt
7
in two weeks time—or, in any event, before the end of the month; and
(6)
Possibly get the State Department to get to Japan if there is a convenient way to do this.
Mr.
Kissinger
then asked Ambassador
Farland
to check back with him if at any point he received instructions from the Department which were intolerable.
[Omitted here is further discussion of contacts between the United States and China.]
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations