AlimurRazi/FRUS-1971-bangladesh huggingface dataset:
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 146
146. Memorandum of Conversation
1
Washington
,
September 11, 1971, 9:30–10:10 a.m.
PARTICIPANTS
Ambassador
L.K. Jha
Henry A. Kissinger
The meeting was arranged at the request of Ambassador
Jha
.
Ambassador
Jha
began by saying he wanted to review the arrangements for the forthcoming visit of Prime Minister
Gandhi
(November 4–5, 1971).
2
Specifically, could the Prime Minister be picked up in New York by an airplane and brought to Andrews AFB on the morning of the arrival ceremony? Dr.
Kissinger
said that he thought this was possible and he would let the Ambassador know if there were any difficulty. The Ambassador then wanted to review the conduct of the meeting.
3
He agreed that it would be best if the Prime Minister and the President met alone with one adviser entering after the photographers had left through a side door.

Ambassador
Jha
then asked what interest the United States had in keeping East Bengal a part of Pakistan. Dr.
Kissinger
replied that the Ambassador misunderstood our policy. We had no interest in keeping East Bengal a part of Pakistan. We did have an interest in preventing the outbreak of a war and preventing that issue from turning into an international conflict. As for the rest, we would not take any active position one way or another. Ambassador
Jha
pointed out that the pressures on the Indian Government were very great. Dr.
Kissinger
replied that some of them were self-generated.
The Ambassador noted that
Haksar
was on his way out; maybe
Kaul
was also in difficulty, but it was not easy to tell who would replace him and whether the man who would replace him would be any better.
If we played our hand intelligently, the Ambassador continued, it would even turn out that India might now look for a compensating move
4
to take towards the United States. Dr.
Kissinger
responded that we would certainly be ready, but it was important for India not to be playing with the President. If it turned out that some of our reports were correct, that India was using the visit to the President to cover an imminent attack on Pakistan, our relations would not recover so soon.
Dr.
Kissinger
also said he could not understand the Indian press reports and official reports according to which he had told
Jha
that India would have no American support in the case of a Chinese attack. The Ambassador replied that what he had reported was the following: Dr.
Kissinger
had said that in the case of a Chinese attack that was unprovoked, the United Statesʼ interest in India would be very great; in the case of a Chinese attack produced by an Indian attack on Pakistan, it would be much harder for the United States to do something. Dr.
Kissinger
stated that this was essentially correct.
Dr.
Kissinger
and the Ambassador promised to stay in touch with each other in preparing the Prime Ministerʼs visit, and the meeting then ended.
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 149
149. Telegram From
the Department of State
to
the Consulate General in Calcutta
1
Washington
,
September 18, 1971, 1738Z
.
172246. Ref: Calcutta 2513, 2510.
2
1.
As Calcutta has noted,
Qaiyum
ʼs reluctance or inability produce Bangla Desh “Foreign Minister” Mushtaq Ahmed for meeting indicates considerable cooling
Mushtaq
ʼs initiative. While there may be many reasons for this development, point for us seems to be that we should not seek to lead unwilling
BD
reps into negotiation.
2.
At this time, we see little merit in
Qaiyum
ʼs alternative suggestion of meeting with “Prime Minister” Tajuddin Ahmed or with “Acting President”
Nazrul Islam
who were presumably not instigators of
Mushtaq
ʼs initiative. You should, therefore, avoid giving
Qaiyum
any encouragement that you wish to see these
BD
reps. If, however, he should on his own produce appointment with one or both, hold option open and report soonest so that Dept can consider what, if any, use might be made of such contacts.
3.
We do, however, see point in continuing to seek meeting with
Mushtaq
if for no other reason than to verify whether
Qaiyum
ʼs reporting of
Mushtaq
ʼs earlier and current positions has been accurate. Dept, therefore, suggests you continue discreetly seek contact with
Mushtaq
via any appropriate channel available to you (given
Qaiyum
ʼs increasingly emotional and seemingly erratic outbursts, it may be well

to avoid pursuing contact through him). You should, however, continue to be cautious in avoiding implication we have “important” message to pass
Mushtaq
lest latter seek hold out for higher level meeting there or elsewhere, e.g., as part of visit to,
UNGA
, New York. Should meeting with
Mushtaq
take place, believe you should pass on indication of President
Yahya
ʼs interest in negotiation, whether or not
Mushtaq
verifies past
BD
interest in negotiation.
Irwin
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 150
150. Telegram From
the Department of State
to
the Consulate General in Calcutta
1
Washington
,
September 21, 1971, 2347Z
.
173942. Subject: Contact with Bangla Desh Reps. Ref: Calcutta 2527,
2
State 172246.
3
1.
In view of fact no
USG
official has yet had contact with any member political leadership of
BD
,
PolOff
authorized meet with
BD
“Acting President”
Nazrul Islam
. We see meeting as means: (a) to establish whether any interest in
BD
“govt” in negotiated settlement at this stage; (b) to learn what are current negotiating demands of
BD
reps and (c) to inform
Nazrul Islam
, and through him
BD
cabinet, that we have already passed on to Pres.
Yahya
word of possible
BD
interest in negotiation and that latterʼs reaction was one of interest.
4
2.
We believe it is important at this stage that high level official in
BD
govt be at least aware there has been expression of interest in negotiated

settlement on part of
Yahya
govt. You should, of course, continue to take stance that we are neither proposing negotiations nor taking any part other than that of messenger. In this role, you may if occasion warrants offer to pass any
BD
message on negotiation or reaction to your information on
Yahya
ʼs position back to President
Yahya
.
3.
You should also use opportunity of meeting to urge
BD
“govt” and Mukti Bahini to respect
UN
relief operations in East Pakistan as per State 165031.
5
4.
Dept believes it would be useful, if opportunity arises in meeting with
Nazrul Islam
, determine if there is channel other than
Qaiyum
to
Nazrul
and
BD
cabinet.
6
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 152
152. Letter From Pakistani President
Yahya
to President
Nixon
1
Rawalpindi
,
September 26, 1971
.
Dear Mr. President,
In calling Major-General
N.A.M. Raza
, a veteran soldier as well as an experienced diplomat, back to duty from retirement, I have I think selected a most suitable envoy for Washington. His appointment further emphasises the paramount importance I attach to our relations with your great country. Apart from his distinguished services as our Ambassador in Tehran, Rome and Paris, he served twice as Ambassador in Peking.
2.
May I avail myself of this opportunity, Mr. President, to express my very sincere appreciation of the sympathetic understanding and assistance that I have been receiving from you and your Government in over-coming the immense difficulties placed in my path towards restoration of democracy, by the unfortunate crisis in East Pakistan.
3.
As you know I have been doing everything within my power to put the country back on the rails. However, India with her intransigence, her open hostility and her unabashed support and aid to the miscreants is making my task infinitely more difficult. I earnestly request you to do all you can to dissuade India from this militantly aggressive attitude of hers towards my country. She must be made to realise the serious threat that her present policy is posing towards the peace of this region.
4.
Since the announcement of my political programme of 28th June, I have taken various steps to hasten the moment for the redemption of my pledge to transfer power to a civilian Government. As you may have been informed, I have declared general amnesty in East Pakistan and have also appointed a civilian Governor there, who is being assisted by civilian ministers selected from various shades of political opinion. Dates for by-elections in East Pakistan have also been announced. All these steps have evoked a response from political circles and I am hopeful that by the end of the year the major problems would have been resolved. In this process of democratisation your continued personal interest and the support of the United States would be invaluable.
5.
With that in view, I would earnestly hope that Ambassador
Raza
, in whom I repose my fullest trust, would receive your kind cooperation and would have access to you so as to keep you posted on future developments in my country.
Please accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my highest consideration.
Yours sincerely,
Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 154
154. Editorial Note
President
Nixon
and
Henry Kissinger
met at the White House on September 30, 1971, with British Foreign Secretary
Sir Alec Douglas-Home
and Ambassador
Cromer
and reviewed a number of issues affecting relations between the United States and the United Kingdom. During the course of a discussion of the emerging crisis in South Asia,
Douglas-Home
pointed up the importance of making contact with the Bangladesh leaders in the interest of developing a basis for a political settlement.
Kissinger
responded: “We have been in touch with Bangladesh people in Calcutta. And we were trying to set up a meeting between the Bangladesh people and the West Pakistanis outside of India. And we had
Yahya
ʼs agreement to that. And the Indians have now totally thwarted it. They made it hard for these people to deal with us, theyʼre forcing them to check everything with them, they are padding demands which are totally incapable of fulfillment.”
Nixon
also felt that the Indians were preventing a settlement of the crisis: “theyʼre playing a game here that I think is wrong. I think theyʼre deliberately trying to make it insoluble.” Later in the conversation,
Kissinger
said: “The Bangladesh people are actually quite eager to talk.” “At first, they were willing to settle for autonomy, and as we all know autonomy would produce independence, there is no other way it can go. Now the Indians have escalated their demand into total independence immediately.” He said that
Yahya
never would agree to such a demand. “There has to be a face-saving formula and a transition period.”
Looking toward his upcoming conversation with Prime Minister
Gandhi
in November,
Nixon
suggested that the United States and the United Kingdom exchange information on their talks with her. It was important to do so, he said, so that “she doesnʼt come in here and, frankly, pull our legs.” (National Archives,
Nixon
Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation among President
Nixon
, British Foreign Secretary
Douglas-Home
, Ambassador
Cromer
, and National Security Assistant
Kissinger
, September 30, 1971, 4:10–5:31 p.m., Oval Office, Conversation No. 582–9) A transcript of this conversation is published in
Foreign Relations
, 1969–1976, volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972, Document 146
.
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 162
162. Memorandum of Conversation
1
Washington
,
October 8, 1971, 4:11–4:58 p.m.
PARTICIPANTS
Indian Ambassador
L.K. Jha
Dr.
Henry A. Kissinger
The meeting was held at the Ambassadorʼs request to discuss arrangements for Prime Minister
Gandhi
ʼs forthcoming visit.

The Ambassador began the conversation by discussing the visit. He said he noticed that there had been some coolness on the part of the Protocol people, and he wanted to make sure the Prime Minister would receive a cordial visit. Dr.
Kissinger
replied that he could assure him that there would be a cordial reception. He then telephoned Ambassador Mosbacher
2
in his presence to make sure that Ambassador
Jha
heard Dr.
Kissinger
give instructions about the need for Grade-A treatment.
Ambassador
Jha
then returned to the subject of a conversation he had had with Dr.
Kissinger
some weeks previously, when Dr.
Kissinger
had mentioned the need to have a yearʼs interval for a political settlement.
Jha
said that that year simply did not exist, and that India would be forced into some military action by the end of this year. The ten million refugees in Bengal would break the political cohesion of India; they were all Bengalis and did not leave Bengal, and in Bengal they would tip the balance of power totally in a Maoist direction. Finally, the financial cost would be more bankrupting than a war. Dr.
Kissinger
replied, “Have no misunderstanding: If you start a war we will cut off all economic aid and you must include that in your cost calculation.” Dr.
Kissinger
added that if the constant harrassment of the President in the Indian press and the constant playing with American political opponents did not cease, the Ambassador could not expect a very forthcoming attitude on our part.
3
The Ambassador as usual ascribed this to the machinations of the pro-Soviet group. He said he could tell Dr.
Kissinger
, however, that the pro-Soviet group was in some difficulty now, because apparently the Soviet Union had given the strongest warnings against unilateral Indian actions and seemed to be participating in delaying maneuvers.
Ambassador
Jha
then asked whether Dr.
Kissinger
was in a position to appeal to the Pakistanis for the release of
Mujib
and his reintroduction into Bengali political life. That they thought was necessary to keep moderate control over the Bangla Desh movement. Their experience with the Bangla Desh movement had been that the so-called foreign minister in Calcutta was already being attacked by Maoists, and part of their reluctance to let him engage in negotiations with
Yahya

was so that he wasnʼt discredited further, and leave the field open to the extremists.
Dr.
Kissinger
responded that it was important for us to come to some understanding of what was possible, and warned again against unilateral action.
The Ambassador and Dr.
Kissinger
agreed to meet again prior to Mrs.
Gandhi
ʼs visit.
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 172
172. Briefing Prepared for President
Nixon
1
Washington
,
October 27, 1971
.
PRESIDENTʼS THURSDAY BRIEF
For the President
Widespread Famine Averted for Now in East Pakistan:
Maury Williams
, after an on-the-spot review,
2
has concluded that the widespread famine—with associated deaths and an accelerated refugee flow to India— predicted by many last summer will not occur in East Pakistan this winter. The next critical period is March. He cites the following reasons:
—
U.S.
efforts in dramatizing the problem and in providing two-thirds of needed transport from ocean ports to river ports, plus continuing shipment of one million tons of grain, have been a major factor.
—Reduction of the East Pakistani population by the nine million (13%) more or less who have moved to India.
—The end of a black market flow of rice, normally one million tons annually, from East Pakistan into India as a result of border tension.
—The
UN
role in making food distribution neutral in the civil conflict.
—The prospect of the winter crop beginning in late November.

Williams
cautions, however, that the situation in East Pakistan is still grim and that continuing relief assistance will be needed. There is still the likelihood that increased guerrilla activity will make food distribution more difficult. Serious pockets of need will continue to exist. A buildup of stocks will have to continue against the next critical period in March, and a further strengthening of the
UN
field staff remains important.
Beyond the humanitarian aspect, this is also a major
U.S.
contribution to peace in South Asia since the avoidance of famine at this critical juncture will mean that many millions more Bengalis will not flee to India. This will be a point worth making to Mrs.
Gandhi
when she asks how our relationship with
Yahya
has contributed to peace. It is hard to prove, but the situation could have been a great deal worse by now.
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 174
174. Briefing Prepared for President
Nixon
1
Washington
,
October 29, 1971
.
PRESIDENTʼS SATURDAY BRIEFING
Indo-Soviet Relations:
From all indications, the Soviets appear to be keeping an unusually close watch on the situation in South Asia. At the end of last week, Deputy Foreign Minister
Firyubin
made a hurriedly arranged trip to New Delhi apparently to get a fresh reading on the situation. Then yesterday a military delegation, headed by the

commander of the Soviet air force and including representatives of the other services, arrived with little advance preparation.
2
If nothing else, this is a graphic demonstration of the consultation clause in the new “friendship” treaty. It also would seem to reflect Soviet concern that the Indo-Pak military confrontation could blow up into full scale fighting.
3
By visibly demonstrating their support for India, the Soviets may hope to deter the Paks from taking any rash actions.
Saunders Hoskinson
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 178
178. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (
Kissinger
) to President
Nixon
1
Washington
,
November 3, 1971
.
SUBJECT
President
Yahya
on Military Pullback

When I had my first talk Tuesday
2
with the new Pakistani Ambassador I asked him to provide you with the most forthcoming Pakistani position possible for your talk with Mrs.
Gandhi
. His reply this evening is as follows:
“As regards withdrawal of forces from the Indo-Pakistan border, the most appropriate and fair procedure would be for the armed forces of both the countries to withdraw simultaneously to mutually agreed safe distance. However, in the interest of peace and in order to provide an exit to Prime Minister
Indira Gandhi
,
President
Yahya Khan
would be willing to withdraw Pakistani forces first from the border to varying distances, depending upon the terrain of different sectors, provided the Indian Prime Minister, Mrs.
Indira Gandhi
, gives an undertaking to President
Nixon
that the Indian forces will then also withdraw shortly afterwards.
“As regards political plans, the National Assembly of Pakistan is to meet towards the end of December and other consequential steps are to follow. This is according to political plans already announced by the President of Pakistan. There is no other development.”
This provides nothing new on the political side. The significant point is that he is willing to pull some units back from the border on the basis of Mrs.
Gandhi
ʼs oral assurance to you that she will take a reciprocal step.
The Ambassador in delivering this message was instructed to emphasize the risk involved for President
Yahya
. He would be taking a concrete step on the basis of an oral statement which Mrs.
Gandhi
could later disavow, on a pretext such as saying that the situation had changed. If India attacked, he would be vulnerable to charges of jeopardizing Pakistanʼs security. Despite this risk, he has sent this reply because of his trust in you.
Mrs.
Gandhi
with Prime Minister
Heath
voiced reservations about the pullback idea. There would be an advantage in trying this out on her, although it may have to be followed up later at a lower level. State Department is not aware of this detailed message from
Yahya
.
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 180
180. Editorial Note
President
Nixon
and
Henry Kissinger
met in the Oval Office of the White House on the morning of November 5, 1971, to discuss
Nixon
ʼs conversation with Prime Minister
Gandhi
on the previous day.
Kissinger
ʼs overall assessment was that “the Indians are bastards anyway. They are starting a war there.… To them East Pakistan is no longer the issue. Now, I found it very interesting how she carried on to you yesterday about West Pakistan.” He felt, however, that
Nixon
had achieved his objective in the conversation: “While she was a bitch, we got what we wanted too&. She will not be able to go home and say that the United States didnʼt give her a warm reception and therefore in despair sheʼs got to go to war.”
Kissinger
judged that
Gandhi
had been thwarted in her objective: “She would rather have had you give her a cool reception so that she could say that she was really put upon.”
Nixon
agreed: “We really slobbered over the old witch.”
Kissinger
felt that on matters of substance, nothing of importance had

been conceded: “You slobbered over her in things that did not matter, but in things that did matter, you didnʼt give her an inch.”
Nixon
and
Kissinger
agreed that in the upcoming conversation with
Gandhi
the approach to take was to be “a shade cooler” and allow her to do more to carry the conversation than had been the case in the initial conversation. (National Archives,
Nixon
Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation between
Nixon
and
Kissinger
, November 5, 1971, 8:51–9:00 a.m., Oval Office, Conversation No. 615–4) A transcript of this conversation is published in
Foreign Relations
, 1969–1976, volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972, Document 150
.
President
Nixon
and Prime Minister
Gandhi
met in the Oval Office at 11:20 a.m. on November 5.
Kissinger
and
Haksar
were also present.
Nixon
opened the conversation by discussing the objectives of his planned trip to China. Thereafter the conversation, which lasted an hour, became a diplomatic tour dʼhorizon, touching on many of the trouble spots of the world, but with scant reference to South Asia.
Gandhi
did not respond to
Nixon
ʼs proposal of the previous day to consider a withdrawal of forces from the borders of India and Pakistan. (Ibid., Recording of conversation between President
Nixon
and Prime Minister
Gandhi
, November 5, 1971, 11:20 a.m.–12:20 p.m., Oval Office, Conversation No. 615–23)
Kissinger
prepared a memorandum of the conversation (ibid., White House Special Files, Presidentʼs Office Files, Box 2, Memoranda for the President, Beginning October 31, 1971) which is published in
Foreign Relations
, 1969–1976, volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972, Document 151
.
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 185
185. Memorandum From Rear Admiral
Robert Welander
to the Presidentʼs Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (
Haig
)
1
Washington
,
November 15, 1971
.
SUBJECT
Pakistan/India Contingency Planning
Prior to the 12 November
WSAG
meeting on the Pakistan–India Situation, HAK was advised that General Ryan,
2
the Acting Chairman, might bring up a
CINCPAC
proposal to ready a
WESTPAC
attack carrier task group for Indian Ocean operations to dissuade “third party” involvement.
The matter was not broached during the
WSAG
meeting. The
JCS
considered the matter Saturday
3
morning and have advised
CINCPAC
in the attached
4
that his concept is approved
for planning purposes only
and, should the situation deteriorate, that he may place a carrier task group on 48 hours readiness for such deployment.
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations