Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 301
301. Telegram From
the Embassy in Pakistan
to
the Department of State
1
Islamabad
,
December 14, 1971, 1321Z
.
12537. Subject: Discussion with Pres.
Yahya
re Ceasefire—Dec. 14. Ref: Dacca 5627; Dacca 5628;
2
Islamabad 12507;
3
and Islamabad 12538.
4
1.
Summary: President
Yahya
acknowledges that military situation in East Pakistan has hopelessly deteriorated. He provided me with

Governor
Malik
ʼs Dec. 13 report of chaotic conditions. Because military situation now irretrievable and for over-riding humanitarian reasons,
Yahya
is giving
Bhutto
widest possible latitude at
UN
to effect ceasefire and troop withdrawal. End summary.
2.
At my request, I met with President
Yahya
in his residence at 1130 hours local, Dec. 14. The conversation ensued for an hour and 45 minutes.
FonSec
Sultan Khan
was present during most of the meeting.
3.
I informed President
Yahya
that a flash wire
5
from my Consul General in Dacca, Herbert A. Spivack, reported that he had this morning received a phone call from Governor Abdul Motaleb Malik saying that he and Maj. Gen. Rao Farman Ali were prepared to submit to him (Spivak) certain proposals for a ceasefire, saying that a ceasefire was absolutely necessary inasmuch as the situation had become hopelessly worsened.
Malik
had assured the Consul General that the proposals would carry their signatures and would have the approval of President
Yahya
. I went on to say that shortly thereafter I had received another flash message
6
from Consul General
Spivack
indicating that these proposals, according to Governor
Malik
, would not be forthcoming inasmuch as “General Niazi had stated that negotiations are taking place in Islamabad between the central government and Ambassador
Farland
, and that there was no need for me (
Malik
) to convey any proposals.”
4.
I then asked
Yahya
if the
GOP
had had further thoughts over and beyond our last conversation of Dec. 12 (Islamabad 12415)
7
during which he had informed me that, on the matter of ceasefire, he was prepared to do “anything reasonable under the circumstances”; and raised the question of whether or not
GOP
was now prepared to go beyond the
UNGA
resolution.
5.
Yahya
said that the situation in East Pakistan had continued to deteriorate, and this deterioration was taking place at a much [more] rapid rate than anticipated. Consequently, for humane reasons, it was necessary to minimize the bloodshed which was occurring, and that he wanted me to know that the bloodshed being inflicted both by the military and civilian populations was reaching “holocaust” proportions.
6.
In our previous conversations,
Yahya
noted, the subject of cease-fire had been discussed only in general terms and without reference to

specifics; however, current conditions now require
USG
be informed of specific determinations of
GOP
. Consequently,
Yahya
said that, when he received my call, he was in the process of instituting a request for me to come to see him this morning.
7.
Also, he advised me that he had attempted to call Governor
Malik
this morning but the communication system was largely inoperative and no satisfactory conversation was concluded. He added that his call to
Malik
was predicated upon a communication from the Governor which he had received yesterday and which now prompted his (
Yahya
ʼs) current evaluation and thinking. He read and then, at my request, gave me a copy of Governor
Malik
ʼs report, asking that I send it to the Department. It is being dispatched separately by
reftel
Islamabad 12538.
8.
Because of his now firm decision that the military situation in East Pakistan was chaotic and irretrievable and that, for over-riding humanitarian considerations, he had decided to give Vice Prime Minister-designate and Foreign Minister-designate
Zulfikar A. Bhutto
the widest possible latitude in his approach to the United Nations to effect a ceasefire and troop withdrawal.
Yahya
went on to say that the Foreign Office had prepared and processed a communication to him spelling out his commission in detail.
Yahya
added that
Bhutto
would get in touch with Ambassador
Bush
at the
USUN
and would convey to him the substance of the reported message. At this juncture I asked
Yahya
if he would care to elaborate at this time upon
Bhutto
ʼs commission.
Yahya
replied that the communication to
Bhutto
was couched in Foreign Office jargon but what it said in brief was “do the best you can under the circumstances.”
9.
Yahya
concluded the conversation by telling me that he would advise Governor
Malik
of our meeting and of his decision to give
Bhutto
widest discretion. Also, he said he would be sending military instructions to General Niazi to continue moderate defensive activities during present diplomatic maneuvering, but with every effort being made to reduce loss of life.
Farland
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations