Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 43
43. Memorandum of Conversation
1
Washington
,
May 10, 1971, 3:05–3:30 p.m.
PARTICIPANTS
M.M. Ahmad
, Economic Adviser to President
Yahya Khan
of Pakistan
Agha Hilaly
, Ambassador of Pakistan
Henry A. Kissinger
, Assistant to the President
Harold H. Saunders
,
NSC
Staff
Mr.
Ahmad
opened the conversation with a long explanation of the political developments over the last couple of years in Pakistan and

then turned, at Dr.
Kissinger
ʼs request, in the last few minutes to the prospects for the future.
Mr.
Ahmad
described President
Yahya
ʼs wish that he come to Washington and acquaint Dr.
Kissinger
and others with what has happened, why it happened, the present situation and the future program. President
Yahya
had been anxious that the army should hand over civil power as soon as possible and he had worked hard in that direction. He has been deeply disappointed at the way events have turned out. He believed that the solution to the situation in Pakistan was political—not military. Events prove this. A military solution could have been enforced easily back in 1969, and he did not choose to do so. He broke up the one unit in the West Wing, dividing authority in line with the several provinces. This tilted the balance in favor of East Pakistan. He held fair and free elections. Mr.
Ahmad
cited this background to show that President
Yahya
ʼs main desire had been to find a political solution.
Mr.
Ahmad
continued, saying that President
Yahya
had placed no limits on the making of a constitution except that it be in the framework of one single country. The President felt disappointment that
Mujibur Rahman
had begun shifting his ground after the election.
Mujib
was to have come to Islamabad for meetings early in the constitutional process, but
Yahya
went to Dacca. Arrangements were made for a second round of talks but
Mujib
found an excuse not to come. The President felt that there had to be some understanding among the politicians before the constituent assembly actually met.
The problem was that the main political parties were regional in character. When the President was unable to arrange a round of discussions, he found it necessary to postpone the constituent assembly. Postponement had provoked a sharp reaction in East Pakistan, even though the President announced a fresh date within six days.
President
Yahya
had gone to Dacca on April 15. The Awami League put forward its six demands
2
plus four more. The additional demands amounted to lifting martial law before the constituent assembly and transferring power to civil government beforehand. Then
Mujib
began shifting ground again. Some progress had been made in the talks, and President
Yahya
asked other political leaders to come over from West Pakistan.
Ahmad
joined them for talks on the economic side of the problem. There were some differences on this subject, but general agreement that the economic problems could be worked out.

President
Yahya
offered the possibility of a solution along any of the three following lines:
—There could be a proclamation embodying an interim constitution including most of the six points. President
Yahya
wanted the constituent assembly to meet first, letting them provide the authorization for the constitution. But the Awami League wanted martial law to be lifted first.
—If the constituent assembly could not meet first, there could be a proclamation putting forward the interim constitution but not lifting martial law, although that would be pushed into the background.
—A third possibility would have been to make an announcement that such an interim constitution would date from the date that the constituent assembly adopted it.
The West Pakistani leaders wanted the constituent assembly to meet and then break into two houses. The Awami League wanted the assembly to meet as two houses right from the start.
At this point Dr.
Kissinger
interjected that he would have to be leaving soon for a meeting with the President and the Secretary of State to hear the Secretaryʼs report on his trip to the Middle East. He said he wanted to hear whatever Mr.
Ahmad
had to say but simply wanted to point out that he would only have another ten minutes if Mr.
Ahmad
wanted to use the remaining time to look to the future.
Mr.
Ahmad
continued saying that President
Yahya
ʼs policy is still for the transfer of political power. He does not intend fresh elections. Apart from those people against whom there is some unfavorable evidence, those elected last December will still be able to form the nucleus of a government.
Dr.
Kissinger
asked whether this would include
Mujibur Rahman
. Mr.
Ahmad
replied that he ranked within the first eight or so of those political leaders against whom there is evidence of conspiring to secession. However, the rest of the Awami League can drop its title and form a government. They will be able to operate on the basis of an agreement as close to the six points as possible, meeting the legitimate needs of East Pakistan.
Dr.
Kissinger
asked when this might take place. Mr.
Ahmad
replied that this would be possible as soon as normal conditions are restored in East Pakistan—“shortly.” The law and order phase is, by and large, completed. Civil administration needs to be restored. Indian activity on the border will have to be ended, and Pakistan will appreciate whatever
US
assistance there can be on this score.
When Dr.
Kissinger
asked how this might be done, Mr.
Ahmad
simply said he hoped we would try. President
Yahya
said he hoped that it would be possible to produce a political package that would permit the Awami League to come forward. He continued saying that he

hoped that Pakistan could remain an element of stability in South Asia and he sought
US
help.
Dr.
Kissinger
said that the President has high regard for President
Yahya
and a feeling of personal affection for him. The last thing one does in a situation like this is to take advantage of a friend. The development of Pakistan remains in the
US
interest. Mr.
Ahmad
is familiar with the political pressures that operate in Washington. Anything the government of Pakistan can do to take account of our public opinion and help
US
with it would be most useful, although Dr.
Kissinger
said quickly that he had no prescriptions to offer. We would do our best to be helpful and not to compound the anguish “your country is already suffering.”
Mr.
Ahmad
concluded that President
Yahya
was very appreciative of the stand that the
US
had taken “in a hostile atmosphere.” The political initiatives now planned are intended to help improve this atmosphere.
H.S.
Contents
Preface
Sources
Abbreviations