Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972
Document 190
190. Telegram 11410 From the
Embassy in the United Kingdom
to the
Department of State
1
2
London
,
December 15, 1971, 1656Z
Subject:
UK
Views on India/Pakistan
1)
Sir Stanley Tomlinson, Deputy Under Secretary, FCO, summoned us late December 14 to discuss
US
and
UK
policies on India-Pakistan. Making clear that he was expressing views of
UK
Govt, Tomlinson led off by observing that he had been privileged during his career to play an active part in US-
UK
relationship and it had been a rewarding and satisfying experience to him personally that the two govts had been able to act in concert and share a high degree of mutual confidence on major issues over a long period. It was a cause for disappointment and concern, therefore, to British Ministers and officials that in recent times there had been marked differences between
US
and
UK
policies on some important problems.
2)
Sir Stanley said the India-Pakistan situation had raised questions within the
UKG
as to whether the two governments were proceeding on the basis of different intelligence information and political assessments. Further, the
UK
felt that it really did not know the basis for
US
thinking and the objectives we were pursuing. He said he would like to indicate some specific aspects of
US
policy which were puzzling or disturbing to the
UK
.
3)
Suspension of economic aid to india. Tomlinson said the
UK
regretted that the
USG
had thought it necessary to take that step. He gathered that the rationale behind
US
action was that provision of economic aid which might be

used to sustain the war effort was contrary to principles of the aid program. While not wishing to argue the point, the
UK
had decided not to suspend its aid to India and had hoped that this aspect of the problem would not be carried further. The
UK
believed that aid policy should continue to be handled through the consortium, and
HMG
had not attempted to press its point of view on other consortium members. The
UK
was disappointed, therefore, to learn that the
US
had used its influence to persuade some other governments, specifically Japan and Germany, to adopt similar positions on aid to India.
4)
Bangla Desh attitudes. Tomlinson said he did not know the extent of
US
contacts or information vis-à-vis Bangla Desh representatives. Based on information available to them,
UK
officials were convinced that Bangladesh leaders would not settle for anything less than complete independence. Tomlinson observed that the
UKG
was not itself advocating Bangla Desh independence and that a confederal arrangement or any other solution which might be worked out between West and East Pakistan would be acceptable to the
UK
, but stark reality led the
UK
to conclude that independence was inevitable. If the
US
assessed the situation differently, the
UK
would like very much to know.
5)
US
views on the possibilities of earlier negotiations between Pakistan and Bangla Desh representatives. Tomlinson noted that
UK
officials had been puzzled by earlier statements by high
US
official to the effect that the
US
believed negotiations which the
US
had been trying to facilitate between Pakistan and Bangla Desh representatives could have led to positive political results. The
UK
wondered whether the
US
had information other than what had been available to the
UK
at that time, because the view of
UK
officials had been that even if such talks could have been arranged they held out little if any hope for progress.
6)
Withdrawal of Indian forces from East Pakistan. Tomlinson said the
UK
would be grateful to learn the background of
US
thinking on this proposal. In
UK
view,

main objective now is to prevent massacres of Pakistani forces and Biharis in east, and
UK
believes only organized force in east capable of preventing such horrors is Indian Army.
UK
has sought and received assurances from Indian Govt that Indian forces would conduct themselves in manner to minimize loss of life and ensure humane treatment. In circumstances,
UK
believes it would be serious mistake to insist that Indian forces withdraw immediately, even if that were realistic possibility.
7)
Indian intentions re territorial gain. Tomlinson reiterated what Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary said previously (London 11295), i.e.,
UK
assessment is that India does not have objective of territorial gains. He acknowledged that there had been some equivocation on Azad Kashmir but believed that statements by
PriMin
Gandhi
and
Swaran Singh
could be taken at face value.
UK
wondered whether
US
assessment differed.
8)
Security Council. Tomlinson went over same ground as Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary (London 11295) but noted that information just received indicated possibility that
US
may now be willing to accept language along lines proposed by
UK
for SC resolution.
9)
Comment: In view conversation with Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary December 12 and subsequent remarks to us by
FCO
Junior Minister Royle expressing concern about
US
-
UK
cooperation on India-Pakistan situation, we were not surprised that Tomlinson called us in for candid talk. There was no note of censure in what he said, but rather hope and desire that the
US
and
UK
Govts could find ways to share their thinking more fully and work in closer harmony.
Annenberg