Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971
Document 164
164. Telegram From
the Department of State
to
the Consulate General in Calcutta
1
Washington
,
October 9, 1971, 2149Z
.
186323. Subject: Bangla Desh Contacts. Ref: Calcutta 2575,
2
Islamabad 9960
3
and 10002.
4
1.
Commend Calcuttaʼs able and discreet handling of first contact with Bangla Desh “Foreign Minister” Mushtaq Ahmed. We also appreciate detailed report ConGen has provided of
Mushtaq
ʼs views. While much of substance of what
Mushtaq
had to say, particularly with reference to expectations of what
U.S.
could or should do in present crisis, was fatuous or naive, we nevertheless believe it worthwhile to give him response, with intent of developing some momentum in moving
BD
reps toward talks.
2.
You should, therefore, seek appointment with
Mushtaq
to report back views of
USG
. You should tell him that
USG
has no desire place itself between
GOP
and
BD
reps or to enter into merits of positions of either side.
USG
therefore has no substantive comment to make on points raised by
Mushtaq
. We would urge, rather, that the
BD
reps seek earliest opportunity to present views directly to
GOP
reps, in effort explore possibility of negotiated settlement. We would hope that

both sides could come to such meeting prepared to discuss whole range of issues that divide two sides, but without any preconditions. We have already discussed possibility of such meeting with President
Yahya
and he had indicated his interest.
USG
willing assist in passing messages back and forth that might lead to meeting, but we are not interested in playing transmission belt for “demands” or “positions” of one side or other.
3.
To
Mushtaq
ʼs probable reiteration of
BD
“desires,” you should suggest to him that
BD
reps present these directly to
GOP
in talks and not to us. Only by engaging in talks can two sides hope to find ways toward early end of violence, killings, and other hardships that now afflict people of East Pakistan. Alternative what we see is escalation violence, and possibly war, with further tragic consequences for entire Subcontinent. In our view, those who refuse to participate in unconditional talks may have to assume responsibility for continued loss of life and for loss of “opportunity” to achieve constructive outcome.
4.
We wish to keep our options open for contacts with other elements of
BD
leadership, although this will continue to be controlled from Washington. Hence while we assume that
Mushtaq
may remain principal channel for future communications, we do not wish to give him impression that he will necessarily be only channel. For example we obviously might be in touch with
BD
delegation in New York which presumably sent to this country for purpose of contacting foreign officials, including
U.S.
Therefore you may inform
Mushtaq
at your discretion that we intend to maintain some contact with other
BD
reps if occasion arises. We are confident this will not cause serious problems for
BD
, since we are not “negotiating” with any of reps and assume they will keep each other informed of contacts with
USG
reps.
5
5.
For
Islamabad
: Believe you need not go any further than you already have (Islamabad 9960) in informing
Yahya
of state of play on
BD
contacts. Your next step with
Yahya
, if you believe it might be productive, should be to suggest that
GOP
simultaneously look for ways establish its own direct contact with
BD
reps in N.Y., London or elsewhere.

Such contact could provide opportunity for
GOP
signal to
BD
type of settlement it may be willing to negotiate. Such signals at this stage could help pave way for substantive negotiations. You might also probe with
Yahya
whether Soviets have played any role to date in seeking to advance
GOP
–
BD
negotiations.
6
6.
Foregoing drafted prior receipt Calcutta 2605.
7
However, believe latest meeting with
Qaiyum
does not indicate alteration these instructions.
Rogers
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